THE ATTITUDE OF THE FRENCH REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT
TOWARD GERMAN UNIFICATION IN 1848

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By
ROBERT J. HAHN, B. A., A. M.
The Ohio State University
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Approved by:

Adviser
Department of History
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INTRODUCTION

The problem of German unification is not a remote matter of purely academic interest in our own day. It constitutes one of the key diplomatic questions of current European politics, as it has for much the greater part of modern history. But the problem of Germany's unity as it presents itself today is not identical to that which existed from the later Middle Ages to the era of Bismarck. Important elements of similarity are to be found, but the differences are equally great, perhaps greater.

In the past, two factors were principally responsible for German disunity. One was the particularist tradition, amalgam of several components—local differences of confession, culture, and language resulting from long historical development in relative isolation, together with local dynastic loyalties and the egoistic policies of the princes, zealous to guard their prerogatives. The second factor, of only slightly less importance than the particularist tradition, was the deliberate policy of Germany's neighbors, especially France, of encouraging local differences within Germany as a means of thwarting centralization. Today, after seventy-five years as a united nation, the centrifugal tendencies of the particularist tradition in Germany are virtually dead, superseded by a strongly
established tradition of national unity which few Germans would publicly disavow. The Prussian state, once a leading focus of particularism, has even ceased to exist. Only the active intervention of foreign powers maintains Germany in its present sundered state, and since it is no longer feasible to exploit particularist traditions to attain this end, it is achieved by the undisguised presence of superior force.

With France, however, in the days of her European pre-eminence, it was otherwise. Seldom resorting to such direct methods, she contrived to mitigate the blunt reality of superior force with an adroit combination of bribery, cunning, and tactful diplomacy; but she made little effort to conceal her purpose. The preservation of German disunity remained, in fact, an acknowledged and cardinal principle of French diplomacy at least from the reign of Francis I through the Bourgeois Monarchy of Louis Philippe.

Until the fall of Louis Philippe, the task of French diplomacy in encouraging German disunity was made relatively simple by the abundance of centrifugal forces in Germany and by the lack of a powerful, concerted drive toward unity among the Germans themselves. From the time of the wars of liberation against Napoleonic domination, a lively sentiment in favor of unification did, indeed, manifest itself within the Confederation. So long as the German princes sat securely on their thrones, however, little headway could be
made against their particularist tendencies by the proponents of a united fatherland.

In 1848 this hoary state of affairs was abruptly transformed by the outbreak of revolutions across Europe. In Germany the revolution, or rather revolutions, bore two essential traits—national and liberal—traits which seemed to their advocates inextricably intertwined. The national and liberal elements in the German revolution aspired to establish the unity of the German peoples, which they believed feasible only under the guarantees afforded by the traditional liberal institutions of free speech, free press, constitutional government, trial by jury, etc. As the revolutionary movement gained momentum, its liberal and unifying program appeared to enjoy the enthusiastic support of the overwhelming majority of the German people.

Thus, French diplomacy was confronted by a somewhat different problem than had hitherto been the case. Whereas German unity, stoutly opposed by the princes, had long been the goal of the Hapsburgs, and more recently the fond dream of a few isolated patriots, disgruntled at the humiliation of what they considered their fatherland, it seemed in 1848 to represent the determined wish of the mass of the nation. Moreover, the princes, thoroughly intimidated in the first months of revolution, at least, hardly ventured to express opposition. On the contrary, many declared themselves resigned to centralization.
Yet a further complication was involved, for the French diplomacy of 1848 marked a sharp departure, or at least it pretended to, from the traditional diplomacy of France. It rested upon new conceptions and cherished new goals. Again and again French republican spokesmen in 1848 assured the world that French diplomacy had renounced all egoistical dreams of aggrandizement, again and again they proclaimed their sympathy for the aspirations of the peoples of Europe struggling to found their national existence.

German historians, however, generally refuse to be impressed by the numerous contemporary French declarations of selfless moral idealism as the sole criterion of the diplomacy of the infant Second Republic. With but few exceptions they insist that French policy in 1848 was relentlessly and persistently hostile to the German unification movement.

Heinrich von Sybel regarded it as inevitable that the appearance of a strong, united Germany should awaken the jealousy of all the great powers of Europe, including republican France.¹

Friedrich Ley, who of all the Germans who have turned their attention to the problem, has made the most systematic study of it, is reasonably well-informed even though he does not draw at all upon French diplomatic sources. His work is

marred, however, by nationalist bias and he fails to perceive the complexity of the French reaction to German events. An underlying pre-conception that the Republican government of 1848 was compelled by the force of tradition to oppose German unity is readily evident in the irritated tone of Ley's arguments, leaving the impression that he began with a thesis and ransacked libraries and archives to prove it. According to him, the Republic of 1848, no less than previous French governments was unwilling to countenance a development which would have ended French influence in Germany and precluded the possibility of a further eastward territorial expansion of France. Minimising ideological factors as a force capable of altering a long established diplomatic policy, Ley concludes that the same spirit which moved France to war against Germany in 1870 and which prompted her to intrigues against German unity after World War I was equally operative in 1848.2

Erich Marcks, with more learning and greater circumspection, generally confirms the opinions of Ley. For him, the "legend" of French good-will toward German national aspirations in 1848 is completely without foundation, not only for the days of the Paulskirche's greatest prestige, but from the outset of the movement. No possibility ever

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existed during the revolutionary year of a cooperative action, such as envisioned by the Prussian Foreign Minister von Arnim, between France and Germany. It did not exist because, if we are to believe Marcks, French foreign policy in 1848 was conducted "according to the laws of French raison d'état," the French bourgeoisie, "obeying all the history of its people and of its state" opposed the German bourgeoisie of the Paulskirche.3

Eberhard Meier, for whom the "true longing of the Forty-Eighters" was realized in the Nazi regime, concurs with Marcks in maintaining that Germany's unity could have been achieved in 1848 only in overcoming the combined opposition of the European Powers.4

S. A. Kaehler is in full accord with the opinions already cited, stating them with perhaps even greater assurance. Any sympathy which the French liberals might have entertained for the efforts of their ideological confreres in Germany was outweighed, he asserts, by their reluctance to accept a strong and united neighbor where they had so long enjoyed the advantages of having a weak one. Thus revolutionary and republican France pursued a foreign policy identical to that which the republic of 1793 had inherited


from the Bourbon monarchy. Kaehler finds the attitude of Lamartine and Cavaignac all the more reprehensible in that they supported Italy's uprising against the Hapsburgs, invoking in favor of the Italian movement the same principle of nationality which they stubbornly refused to allow the Germans in the case of Schleswig.\(^5\)

Less moralizing than Kaehler, Kurt von Raumer is equally confident in attributing to the regimes of Lamartine and Cavaignac an unmitigated hostility to the German unification project, implying that war itself would not have seemed to the French leaders too high a price to pay for frustrating the centralizing tendencies of the Paulskirche, had these seemed near fruition. He regards it as an indisputable fact that France, "yielding to the momentum of her history, was compelled always to attempt to obstruct German unification" and that if Germany persisted toward the goal of unification, she had no choice but to resort to war.\(^6\)

The views of Wilhelm Mommsen hardly vary from Raumer's though Mommsen advances them somewhat less dogmatically. He too is thoroughly persuaded that considerations of ideological sympathy could not have overcome the repugnance of

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the leaders of the Second Republic to the prospect of seeing a united Germany appear on their borders, nor does he feel that Erich Marcks has gone too far in maintaining that a successful unification of Germany in the revolutionary year would have provoked foreign (French included) intervention. 7

Perhaps one further example may be permitted before the limits of patience are exceeded. Anticipating all the judgments thus far reviewed, with the exception of Sybel’s, Hermann Oncken in 1922 expressed in the broadest general terms their essential idea. Without specific reference to the situation in 1848, he declared:

> It is a fateful error to believe that an alteration in the [political] form of a state must also occasion a new orientation of [its] foreign policy. On the contrary, the innate tendencies of the Power—and the historic will to conquest of the French is one of the most striking examples of the constancy of such basic forces—in whatever political forms it may invest itself, will break through, merely adopting a terminology suitable to the needs of the time. 8

The German historians whose views have just been examined cite numerous incidents in support of their contention that the Second Republic was unreservedly antipathetic


to the unification of Germany in 1848. But it is hardly unjust to say that their position can be largely reduced to two arguments. One, that the momentum of the centuries-old French tradition of hostility to German unity was inevitably too powerful to be resisted by the statesmen of the Second Republic. Two, that German unification was incontestably deleterious to French interests and must therefore necessarily have been resisted by French leaders, whatever their party or ideological affiliation.

Both these lines of argument, it is clear, are a priori rather than empirically based. As such they are not necessarily invalid, but they can hardly compel unhesitating assent so long as they remain unsubstantiated by a more searching investigation. It must be admitted as possible, although certainly not probable, that new conceptions could come to the fore with sufficient impact to displace a time-honored tradition of French diplomacy, and that conceivably French statesmen could have regarded the emergence of a united Germany as not necessarily inimical to the welfare of their country as they understood it.

In fact, this seemingly unlikely possibility became reality, at least momentarily, if the French republicans were sincere in heralding a new historical epoch in which selfish dynastic ambitions and narrowly conceived national interests shielded by the abominated treaties of 1815 were to be superseded as the guiding principles of European
politics by a system recognizing the fraternity of the peoples and their right freely to pursue their development as its basis.

Whether, as the German historians have generally held, the weight of a diplomatic tradition sanctioned by time and some of the most illustrious names of France inevitably prevailed over the new ideals enunciated by the Second Republic, can only be answered, in the final analysis, by an appeal to the pertinent documents. Before proceeding to an examination of the events of 1848, however, it will be useful, as a means of affording perspective, to make a brief survey of French policy toward German unification down to the outbreak of the revolutions of 1848.
CHAPTER I

FRENCH POLICY AND GERMAN DISUNITY PRIOR TO 1848

The French monarchy of the old regime pursued with considerable success, and over a long period of years, a policy of opposition to the unification of Germany or, perhaps better stated, of lending support and encouragement to centrifugal forces already present there in abundance. This policy attained its mature, classic formulation in the period immediately following the Peace of Westphalia, which culminated a long historical evolution.

As early as the thirteenth century an awareness had developed among Frenchmen who occupied themselves with questions of state, of the benefits accruing to their country from the prevailing disorder in Germany. The institution of an elective Emperor, an inherent source of weakness for the Empire, contrasted strikingly with the firmly established hereditary principle governing royal succession in France, where the monarchical authority was not frittered away in frantic bargaining for the throne. While it is improbable, or at least doubtful, that in this epoch the kings of France pursued any systematically planned course of action to maintain German disunity,¹ such a policy was being urged. One

of its earliest proponents was a legist of the late thirteenth century, Pierre Dubois who, though his writings exercised little immediate influence, can thus be regarded as the herald of a program which, in subsequent centuries, was to constitute the fundamental principle of French policy in Germany.²

But, even had the French monarchy been so disposed, the desperate, exhausting Hundred Years War precluded, for a century and a half, the development of a systematic program for maintaining and capitalizing upon the weakness and division of Germany. When France had finally recovered from the debilitating effects of her long struggle with England, she was confronted by a changed situation on her eastern frontier. The marriage of Mary of Burgundy with Maximilian of Hapsburg contributed to a revival of the fortunes of the Imperial house in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Even more significant from the French standpoint was the transfer in the year 1516 of the Spanish crown to the Hapsburg family. The resulting encirclement of France by the Hapsburg power constituted at least until the reign of Louis XIV the chief preoccupation of French diplomacy. One convenient device for combatting the overwhelming might of the Hapsburgs was the encouragement of the forces of

disunity and division present within Germany. The outbreak of religious strife in the Empire during the reign of Charles V afforded the French crown a further lever in addition to those previously available for prying the princes away from the Emperor.

During the course of the long and bitter struggle between Charles V and Francis I, the French monarchy developed a fairly effective system of cultivating the seeds of division within the Empire. The King of France, having assumed the role of defender of "Germanic liberties"—that is, the freedom of the princes from imperial authority—intervened frequently in German affairs, ever alert to protest the slightest infringement by the Emperor of the "constitution" of the Empire, a constitution the chief function of which was to confirm the existing anarchy. From this anarchy, which she assiduously cultivated and upheld, France derived two chief advantages. She was free of the danger that the combined force of the Empire which, if effectively marshalled would have been formidable, would ever be directed against her. Furthermore, the permanent German paralysis made it possible for France to play a larger and freer role in Europe and, from time to time, to detach segments of German territory.

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To be sure, its very nature imposed a certain degree of restraint on French exploitation of this advantageous situation. The German princes accepted the collaboration of the King of France primarily as a means of assuring their independence. If, therefore, a threat of French rule loomed up, or if French inroads into German territory became too brutal, its princes, breaking with their too exigent protector, turned to the Hapsburgs for assistance, as in the days of Louis XIV's ruthless aggressions. Likewise, when Hapsburg power declined, the princes, no longer feeling themselves immediately menaced from that quarter, were less disposed to solicit the friendship or aid of France.

The internal chaos into which France was plunged in the second half of the sixteenth century temporarily rendered her incapable of pursuing a consistent and systematic policy in Germany. During the reign of Henry IV as under Henry II the practice of cultivating the friendship of the German princes and encouraging their resistance to the Emperor was renewed, but it was not until Cardinal Richelieu and the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 that the French system of upholding German disunity found its most effective and classic expression. To a considerable degree, at least, the long-standing French dream of smashing the remnants of Hapsburg

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power in the Empire was realized. The specter that had
haunted Richelieu, a combined Hapsburg attack from north,
and south was now dispelled, at least for a time, for
though Spain persisted in the struggle until the Peace of
the Pyrenees in 1659, her forces, unaided by those of the
Austrian Hapsburgs, no longer constituted a serious peril
for France.5 As applied to the Empire, the Treaty of West­
phalia provided four principal sets of terms: territorial
and political particularisation, election of the Emperor,
supremacy of the Diet, and the guarantee by the victors to
maintain the system unaltered—which, in effect, meant the
partial paralysis of the Empire. Certainly, much of this
was not new. Since the days of Frederick II of Hohenstauffen
the Emperors, except for fleeting periods, had exercised di­
minishing authority, the less so since the Reformation had
deprived them of their principal remaining source of strength
by eliminating the religious character of their office.
National disunity and independence of the princes had long
prevailed. The novel and significant element introduced by
the Treaty of Westphalia was its formal confirmation of the
existing state of anarchy within the Empire, together with the

5 The Treaty of Westphalia obliged the Emperor to re­
frain from aiding present or future enemies of the French
king. Thus, France had succeeded, if only temporarily, in
dissociating the Austro-Spanish bloc, so much feared by her.
It should be noted that Richelieu had led France into
war for the purpose of breaking the Hapsburg encirclement
of France, and not in the hope of territorial aggrandizement.
cf. Wilhelm Mommsen, Richelieu, Elsass und Lothringen (Berlin,
1922), p. 82.
right granted to France and to her Swedish ally actively to intervene in Germany for the perpetuation of conditions so favorable to their interest. Until the end of the Old Regime in 1789 the maintenance of conditions recognized by the Treaty of Westphalia constituted the basis of French policy in the Empire. By invoking the Treaty, any German prince who found himself in dispute with the Emperor could summon the aid of the French king who, as "Garantor of Germanic Liberties" availed himself willingly of this legal right to intervene in the affairs of the Empire. With the formal recognition of the sovereignty of the princes, the Landeshoheit, the treaty was in effect more a constitution than a diplomatic instrument, changing neither the composition nor the procedure of the Diet, but investing it with a new significance by which it more nearly approximated an assembly of the representatives of sovereign states than the deliberative body of the Empire. France expected, by manipulating members of the Diet, playing upon religious animosities and the disruptive force of princely egoism and cupidity, to encounter little difficulty in maintaining a dominant position in Germany.

7 Bertrand Auerbach, La France et le Saint Empire Romain Germanique (Paris, 1912), p. XXXVIII.

6 France acquired the right to intervene in German affairs only as a guarantor of the Treaty. Sweden enjoyed, in addition, the right of participating in the affairs of the Empire as Reichstand, in consequence of her possessions in north Germany. Cf. Pierre Rain, La diplomatie française d'Henri IV à Vergennes (Paris, 1945), pp. 51-52.
ness in thwarting unfavorable developments in the Diet, France maintained at Ratisbon a special diplomatic emissary who was ever ready to take appropriate action at the first token of restiveness.  

The Empire was divested of all real substance, its functions restricted to maintenance of the peace and the dispensation of justice among the princes; not even these limited tasks were accomplished with complete success. Having become essentially an "image resting upon an idea," the Empire was destined to slumber on for a century and a half, but was never capable of posing a serious political threat to France, or of acting in vital unison against her, even in reaction to repeated aggression. From the Rhine to the Vistula, from the Alps to the Baltic, Germany lay prostrate, divided into numerous independent sovereignties, seemingly beyond restoration. Though by no means originally responsible for German disunity, France had contributed to its development and she long worked diligently to preserve it.

The efforts of French diplomacy to maintain the disunity of the Empire were somewhat complicated in the later

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8 Cf. Ibid., passim for examples of intervention by French emissaries.


10 Note should be taken of the fact, however, that while the Empire had become insignificant as a power factor in Europe, the Emperor, now deriving his strength very largely from his extensive dynastic lands, continued to play a major role in international affairs.
seventeenth century by the depredations and brutality of Louis XIV, whose cynicism allowed him even to put forth a claim to the imperial throne as his rightful patrimony.11 So widespread was the resentment stirred in Germany by the Sun King's ruthless acts of spoliation, such as the seizure in 1681 of Strassburg, to which even the electoral princes could not remain indifferent, and which virtually ended all chance of his obtaining the imperial throne,12 that a revival of the moribund sense of German patriotism seemed possible. Even the large sums of money distributed by Louis XIV's agents13 could not entirely overcome hostility toward France, so that when the War of the League of Augsburg broke out, for the first time in many years no German prince was to be found on the side of the enemy.14 After the negotiation of 1698, even Prussian statesmen never again seriously considered the idea of soliciting French protection of Germanic liberties.15 The term Erbfeind, long used to

designate the Turks, began in the age of Louis XIV to be applied by the Germans to the French as well,\textsuperscript{16} saddling the latter with an onus which permanently handicapped their policy in Germany. "The seed of Franco-German enmity had sprung up,"\textsuperscript{17} though it was still far from having attained the intensity which it was later to possess.

While France continued to adhere inflexibly to the purpose of maintaining German disunity, she was obliged to adapt her policy in the eighteenth century to the remarkable rise in the power and importance of Prussia, which came to be, through two great wars, virtually a co-equal of Austria in the Empire. France had made a special effort to acquire the good-will and co-operation of Prussia; in proportion as the might of the Hohenzollern kingdom increased, its role as a factor of French policy in the Empire grew larger, while simultaneously the significance of the Diet and the small states in French calculations declined. The greater importance of Prussia in French plans for containing Austria was foreshadowed in a \textit{mémoire} of 1714,\textsuperscript{18} but did not reach full maturity until the War of the Austrian Succession.


\textsuperscript{18} Cf. \textit{Recueil des Instructions données aux ambassadeurs et aux ministres de la France} (Paris, 1884-1898) XVI (Frusse), pp. 293-315.
The death of the Emperor Charles VI in 1740 stirred a flurry of excitement at the French court, provoking a resurgence of the anti-Austrian tradition. Many courtiers and army officers, seeing an opportunity to resume the War of the Spanish Succession under more favorable conditions, urged the octogenarian prime minister Cardinal Fleury to prompt action. Instead, Fleury solicited the opinions of French diplomats conversant with German affairs. A penetrating memorandum was submitted to him by Chavigny, whose acquaintance with the politics of the Empire derived from a long contact with the Diet. Chavigny, discountenancing war, favored the acceptance of Francis of Lorraine, Maria Theresa's husband, as Emperor, in accordance with the terms of the Pragmatic Sanction, to which France had given its assent. The French monarchy could derive considerable strength from a reputation for fidelity, and the disesteem in which the Grand Duke of Lorraine was held in Germany would contribute to a diminution of the power of the House of Hapsburg. Further to restrict Hapsburg influence in the Empire, Chavigny proposed that a constitutional reform be introduced which would subordinate the remnants of the imperial executive authority to the Diet. His attitude was seconded by Blondel, a French agent just recalled from Mannheim. The

French envoy extraordinary in Berlin, after Frederick II's departure for Silesia, suggested that France might offer to aid Maria Theresa in return for Luxemburg and portions of Flanders but, as an alternative, he put forward the proposal that France might join the attack upon the House of Hapsburg.  

Cardinal Fleury, who had long worked indirectly for the weakening of the Hapsburgs under the guise of friendly relations, was inclined to favor Chavigny's program. He sought in vain, however, to withstand the wave of bellicose enthusiasm which now arose among the nobles and generals at the Court of Versailles; so favorable an occasion for depriving the Hapsburgs of their imperial dignity, they thought, could not be allowed to pass unexploited. France had in 1739, before the outbreak of war, approached Frederick William I with a view to closer cooperation against Austria. In early 1741 Belle Isle was dispatched to Berlin to prepare the way for the elevation to the imperial throne of the Elector of Bavaria. Bavaria was not sufficiently wealthy or populous to confer upon the office any

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20 Fritz Wagner, Kaiser Karl VII und die grossen Maechte 1740-1745 (Stuttgart, 1938), pp. 81-84.
21 Recueil des Instructions, XVI (Prusse), pp. 360-361.
22 Ibid., XVI (Prusse), pp. 368-378.
real authority, hence would of necessity be amenable to French direction. In addition, it was assumed that a contemplated redistribution of Hapsburg territories would so entangle the German states in a web of mutual suspicion and mistrust as to obviate the likelihood of any of their number elevating itself to the pre-eminence in the past enjoyed by Austria and becoming "as dangerous for France or as inimical to its repose"\textsuperscript{23} as Austria had been. To carry out her program France, in cynical disregard of her solemn acceptance of the Pragmatic Sanction, joined in the attack upon Maria Theresa and offered nothing more in justification than "political subtleties."\textsuperscript{24}

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To maintain German disunity, the essence of French policy had for two centuries been eminently simple: oppose the princes to the Emperor, the only force capable of imposing a single will on the entire Empire. In the War of the Austrian Succession, however, as the culmination of a long evolution, Prussia had emerged as a power capable of challenging Austrian hegemony. Henceforth the Empire had two masters, the Emperor and the King of Prussia. The French

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., I (Autriche), pp. 382-385.

\textsuperscript{24} M. de Flassan, Histoire générale de la diplomatie française (2nd. ed.; 7 vols., Paris, 1811), V, 128.
government, taking cognizance of the new importance of Prussia, found comfort in the prospect of permanent hostility between the two chief powers in the Empire; the question of Silesia was seen as a source of enduring discord between Prussia and Austria, a discord that would redound to the advantage of France. Nothing was more natural than that the Court of Versailles should henceforth base its traditional German policy on this fundamental rivalry between Prussia and Austria. By adroitly balancing between the two rival German Powers, throwing its weight now into the one side of the scales, now into the other, France could retain the final decision in her own hands. Indeed, this continued to be French practice down to the end of the old regime. The subsequent French alliance with Austria merely obscured, but did not alter this situation.

On the eve of the Revolution, the French government was still doggedly combatting the faintest signs of unifying tendencies in Germany.\textsuperscript{25} With the fateful French triumph in the Thirty Years War a system was perfected, the essence and purpose of which remained inflexible, though the methods of its application evolved in the process of its continuing adaptation to the changing historical context in both France and Germany. What had begun as an essentially defensive policy, designed to secure France against the overwhelming

\textsuperscript{25} For this period, cf. Paul Oursel, \textit{La diplomatie de la France sous Louis XVI} (Paris, 1921).
might of the House of Hapsburg in its Austrian and Spanish branches, became in the post-Westphalian era a system of offense the calculated purpose of which was to perpetuate the anarchy and impotence into which the Empire had fallen. Although in the eighteenth century French tactics were adapted to the emergence of Prussia to a level of approximate equality with Austria, few French statesmen, until the nineteenth century, saw in Prussia a serious candidate for accomplishing the unification of Germany. Their reasons for not fearing the Hohenzollern monarchy in this respect were numerous. Long historical tradition had inextricably associated Hapsburg Austria with the idea of German unity, both in Germany and in France, making it difficult for French officials to conceive of the impulse toward hegemony and unity in the Empire as emanating from any other source. No Hohenzollern, not even Frederick the Great, ever aroused a serious suspicion of aspiring to the imperial dignity or of aiming at the conquest of Germany. Furthermore, despite Frederick's spectacular victories, Prussian strength was never estimated in France as being genuinely equivalent to that of Austria. It was held to be in large part "factitious" and ephemeral, dependent upon the unique genius of Frederick and destined to suffer a decline after his death.26

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On the whole, the German policy of the French monarchy in the old regime must be adjudged a great success. In 1789, although there existed in the Empire substantially more national and unitary sentiment than in the years following the Peace of Westphalia, there appeared no imminent or even remote likelihood of that bewildering mage of sovereignties being forged into a united nation, responsive to a single will.\textsuperscript{27} Admittedly, the disorganized state of the Empire was not entirely or even primarily due to French intervention; but that this was a significant factor cannot be denied. Left wholly to their own devices, the princes might have succumbed slowly and piecemeal to the Emperor, or might have rallied against him under one of their number, forming a union exclusive of Hapsburg territories. At any rate, so long as the French king stood by as protector of the "Germanic liberties," the princes were not compelled to embrace either of these disagreeable alternatives. And so long as the Empire remained disunited, France would continue to enjoy the pre-eminent position in Europe which was still hers in 1789.

\textsuperscript{27} "Guarantee of European equilibrium, the impotence of the German nation seemed to a generation nourished on cosmopolitanism a benefit, and not a scandal," Jacques Droz, \textit{L'Allemagne et la Révolution française} (Paris, 1949), p. 8.
The Germany policy of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic governments was in some respects a continuation of the monarchical tradition, in others a departure from it. The ultimate, though inadvertent result of the impact of the Revolution upon Germany was territorial consolidation, and this alone for the first time rendered national unification a practicable possibility.

Questions of foreign policy came to be, during the Revolution, far more a matter of public interest than ever before. The day was irretrievably past when French foreign policy could be formulated and executed by the king and a handful of assistants, with no interest or criticism from public opinion. Under Louis XIV the great mass of the French population learned nothing of foreign affairs except when the demands of war imposed disagreeable hardships or when reports of glorious triumphs were announced from the pulpit.\footnote{28 C. G. Picavet, \textit{La diplomatie française au temps de Louis XIV} (Paris, 1930), pp. 311-312.}

Already in 1756 public indifferences had abruptly given way to clamorous censure of royal conduct of foreign policy, at least on the part of the \textit{philosophes} and their followers, to whom the alliance with Austria seemed a retrograde measure,\footnote{29 René Pinon, \textit{Histoire diplomatique, 1515-1928} (Paris, n.d.), p. 358.} contrary to French national interest. Critics
denounced the rupture with "enlightened" and liberal Prussia, the recent new ally of France, and the disastrous issue of the Seven Years War appeared to confirm their judgment. Popular sentiment, led by the philosophes, continued hostile to Austria and favorable to Prussia down to the outbreak of the Revolution, when it found expression through the revolutionary leaders who were imbued with the views of the philosophes. From the outbreak of the Revolution until the eve of the Battle of Jena, cooperation with Prussia remained an abiding goal of French leaders.

The governments of Louis XV and Louis XVI, far from being as abjectly devoted to the Austrian alliance as the philosophes often implied, had never ceased to regard Prussia as an invaluable counterweight to Austria's ambitions in Germany. Even before the Revolution, Count Mirabeau had contended that the continuance of a vigorous and independent Prussia was a French necessity. This view persisted in the partiality displayed by the revolutionaries for Prussia. With them, however, the Prussian alliance had the further advantage of conforming to their ideological bias in favor of the more liberal Prussia and against reactionary Austria.

At no time did the successive revolutionary governments or Napoleon lose sight of the enormous benefit accruing to France from German disunity. The invasion of France in 1792 by German forces demonstrated what a formidable
neighbor an effectively united Germany might be. It also revealed the feebleness of this same Germany in its disunited state. The predilection of the revolutionaries for Prussia fitted neatly into their program for maintaining German disunity, for they conceived the problem essentially as one of preventing Austria from extending her authority over the independent princes and Prussia seemed to them, as it had to the monarchy, a precious ally in the effort.

Numerous attempts were made to secure Prussia as an ally against Great Britain and Russia as well as against Austria, attempts which were thwarted by French territorial ambitions. Prussia was as reluctant to surrender her territories on the left bank of the Rhine as she was to appear in German opinion as an accomplice of the French in the spoliation of German territories. The dynamic of French territorial expansion at the expense of the Empire was of course not a novel product of the Revolution. Extensive areas of Germany had fallen to Henry II, to Louis XIV and to Louis XV, but France had made these acquisitions, not in the execution of a preconceived plan, but largely as a result of hazard. France had merely capitalized on favorable circumstances of the moment. During the early years of the Revolution, however, a dramatic and fateful evolution had taken place. The doctrine of the natural frontiers of France, which had heretofore been sporadically advanced by various publicists, had never, it seems, decisively
influenced or guided French policy under the monarchy.\textsuperscript{30} In late 1792, however, the idea spread like a contagion amidst the excitement of military victories.\textsuperscript{31} Embraced by many of the revolutionary leaders, it was soon launched publicly by Danton as the official policy of the French Republic, and so firmly did the two conceptions of republic and Rhine frontier become welded together that for many years the one implied the other in republican thought.\textsuperscript{32} Insistence on the Rhine frontier proved of tragic significance, forcing a prolongation of the war until the French had either triumphed over Great Britain and all of Europe, or until they had themselves succumbed. Great Britain would not stand aside while the French occupied Belgium, nor could the French feel secure in their possession of the German left bank of the Rhine until they had extended their control to the right bank, and the attempt to assure their eastern frontier dragged them ever farther eastward to eventual disaster.

French diplomatic tactics fluctuated according to the contingencies of military events and the possibilities of

\begin{footnotes}
\item[31] \textit{Ibid.}, p. 330.
\item[32] A. Sorel, \textit{L'Europe et la Révolution française} (8 vols.; Paris, 1887-1904), I, 248. By the time of the Peace of Basel in 1795, the doctrine of the "natural frontiers" had been incorporated into the constitution and the "natural frontiers" had become the "constitutional frontiers."}
\end{footnotes}
the moment. Numerous combinations were attempted by the various revolutionary governments to obtain the acquiescence of the German princes to French annexation of the left bank. No clear-cut doctrine seems to have governed rigidly the degree or nature of the concessions they were willing to make in order to gain that acquiescence, but the chief concern was to prevent a substantial increase in Austrian power.\textsuperscript{33} Some even questioned the value of the left bank to France if it was counter-balanced by substantial gains for Austria, and some, including Bonaparte, expressed reluctance to contribute to large-scale Prussian expansion.\textsuperscript{34} In general, their attitude toward Prussia was far friendlier than that of Bonaparte in 1797 in the Peace of Campo Formio. The Directory was prepared in early 1796, for example, to help Prussia obtain territories and even the imperial crown in return for Prussian assent to the French annexation of the left bank of the Rhine.\textsuperscript{35} And later, Napoleon himself made numerous efforts to win the cooperation of Prussia through large territorial concessions.\textsuperscript{36}

It is not possible, in the rapid succession of events during the revolutionary and Napoleonic periods to disengage


\textsuperscript{34} E. Bourgeois, \textit{Manuel historique de politique étrangère} (4 vols.; Paris, 1913-1926), II, 156.

\textsuperscript{35} R. Guyot, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 131.

\textsuperscript{36} Cf. G. Sorel, \textit{op. cit.}, VI, 328.
as distinct a French policy toward German unity as had been conducted by the monarchy. The opportunities of the moment sometimes tended to predominate over theoretical considerations. Realities tended to be obscured by the new principles which the revolutionaries proclaimed, but most of these principles were quickly reduced to mere propagandistic devices for justifying the selfish ends of French aggrandizement and later the personal aggrandizement of Napoleon. The program of the liberation of the nationalities, for example, later to constitute a key element in the foreign policy of the Second Republic, soon became, under the First Republic, confounded with conquest of the governments and exploitation of the peoples of Europe. Similarly, the policy of the "constitutional frontiers" was reduced, under the Directory, to a mere sham.

Sorel and Pinon contend that French foreign policy during the Revolution was essentially a continuation of the traditional policy of the monarchy, even though its lines were rendered indistinct by frequent changes and its edges were blurred by the smoke screen of propaganda which surrounded events. This view requires revision in certain respects, but insofar as the attitude toward German uni-

37 Sorel, op. cit., I, 541-542.
38 Pinon, op. cit., 357-358.
39 This is especially true in the matter of "natural frontiers," which was an innovation.
In some respects, Napoleon's imperial settlement at its apogee represented a culmination of the German policy of the Ancien Régime. The Confederation of the Rhône was an improved version of Mazarin's League of the Rhône. Napoleon's client princes, who owed everything to him, were of necessity more firmly attached to him than they had been to any Bourbon monarch, their very existence depending on his continued good-will. The influence of Prussia and Austria had not only been eliminated from the rest of Germany, the two monarchies had themselves been crushed militarily and reduced to humiliating impotence.

But the completeness of the French triumph was a major factor in its undoing. The Germany of 1789 was more aware of national feeling than had been the Germany of Louis XIV's day; the Revolution itself had greatly stimulated patriotic sentiment, extolling as it did the doctrine of national sovereignty. And the weight of the Napoleonic heel, resting far more heavily upon Germany than that of any previous French conqueror, elicited a reaction which was in its turn far more violent than had theretofore occurred. A powerful wave of national and unitary feeling swept
across Germany in the wars of liberation, and Prussia seemed to be in the spearhead of the movement, the focal point toward which German eyes turned for inspiration and leadership in the struggle for freedom. Prussia was also in the forefront in vigorously pressing for the reduction of French territory and power, with the result that at the Congress of Vienna and for sometime thereafter, French efforts in Germany were directed in large part toward the curtailment of Prussian influence. Even the orders with which Louis XVIII dispatched Talleyrand to the Congress of Vienna stressed the urgency of arresting the menacing expansion of Prussia.\textsuperscript{40}

The old policy of supporting the smaller and medium states of Germany was revived, in the hope that internal dissensions could again be utilized to thwart unification.\textsuperscript{41} Conditions no longer permitted the French to maneuver as freely and as openly as they had formerly done, but their hopes of evoking a sympathetic echo among the secondary states of Germany were not disappointed. Bavaria, Wuerttemberg, and other states hostile to Prussian influence would receive French military aid against the Hohenzollern monarch, declared Louis XVIII in October, 1814, if they decided to resist his ambitions.\textsuperscript{42}

\textsuperscript{40} R. Rahn, \textit{Talleyrand} (Tuebingen, 1949), pp. 214-216.

\textsuperscript{41} E. Bourgeois, \textit{op. cit.}, II, 555-556.

\textsuperscript{42} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 562.
French attention in Germany did not long continue to be fixed primarily on the Prussian danger. As the initial flush of her wartime exertion died away, Prussia gradually sank into a less prominent position, making it evident that not Frederick William III, but Metternich was the most powerful man in Germany. The mounting influence of the Austrian chancellor was reflected in the apprehensive reports of Louis XVIII's envoys in the smaller German states who foresaw that he was going "to form of all Germany a homogeneous unit" under his personal direction. Abandoning his program of rapprochement with Austria, Talleyrand's successors in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs preferred to cultivate friendly relations with Prussia, an evolution no doubt inspired, in part at least, by the hope of encouraging resistance to the Austrian effort to dominate Germany.

One of the principal aspirations of the Restoration monarchy was the recovery of the left bank of the Rhine. The opposition had found the question of the Rhine frontier, a legacy of the Republic, a very effective rallying point for its attacks upon the regime, and by 1822 a number of adherents of the government were proposing that it make the Rhine frontier policy its own as a means of depriving its

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critics of one of their most powerful weapons. 45

Of course, confronted by an alert and watchful Europe, France could not hope to acquire the Rhine territory unaided. Nor could she expect the sympathy of Great Britain for such a project, for that Power was almost as reluctant to see the French installed at Cologne as at Antwerp. A collaboration with Russia seemed natural. At the moment the Tsar, engaged in the formulation of plans for the final dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, sought to enlist the aid of France by promising colonies in Anatolia. Seeing in the Tsar's desire for French support an opportunity not to be neglected, certain governmental advisors counseled rejecting the offer of territories in Asia Minor, and as a countermeasure, suggesting Belgium and the Rhineland as the price of cooperation. 46 This proposed Franco-Russian collaboration seemed all the more logical because of the fact that England and Austria, the two Powers most active in withholding from France the Rhine frontier were also chiefly responsible for Russia's difficulty in obtaining Constantinople. 47

Although not realized, the idea of the Russian alliance as a means of securing the Rhine frontier continued to haunt Restoration statements. In 1829, in the wake of wide-

45 Zeller, La France et l'Allemagne, pp. 177-178.
46 S. Charléty (Lavisse, ed.) Histoire de France contemporaine (Paris, 1921), V, 185.
47 G. Grosjean, La Restauration et l'Allemagne, pp. 52-53.
spread disappointment in France at the insignificant results of French participation in the war against the Sultan, Chateaubriand renewed the proposals that France enter into an arrangement with the Tsar whereby she would receive the "line of the Rhine, from Strassburg to Cologne." But the climax of these phantasies was attained in the grandiose scheme of Prince Polignac which received the approval of his sovereign in September of 1829. According to the terms of this plan, which was too unrealistic to have any serious possibilities of success, the entire map of Europe would virtually have been redrawn. The Turks were to have been expelled from the Balkan peninsula, Russia receiving Moldavia and Walachia, with Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina and Turkish Dalmatia falling to Austria. All the rest of the peninsula was to constitute a new state over which the king of the Netherlands would rule. The Netherlands, on the other hand were to disappear completely, the northern part going to Prussia, the Belgian areas going to France. Prussia, renouncing all her territories on the left bank of the Rhine, was to receive Saxony as well as the northern Netherlands, and France was to get Luxemburg along with Belgium. Bavaria was to receive enough territory to join its two disconnected portions, and the King of Saxony, losing his ancestral domains to Prussia was to be accorded the Rhine territories.

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48 S. Charlété, op. cit., IV, 359.
surrendered by Prussia.\textsuperscript{49} Thus, even though France would not gain immediate possession of the German Rhineland by this fantastically elaborate plan, she could expect to exercise a firm tutelage over the miserable former Saxon monarch. The aim of Chateaubriand's proposal was to be achieved by enlarging it sufficiently to gratify the appetites of the other major continental Powers.

As already noted, the Restoration ministers who succeeded Talleyrand were generally well disposed toward Prussia, as was Charlé X himself. In the later 1820's, as the attraction of its customs-union moved across south Germany, it became increasingly evident that Prussia was emerging from its temporary inaction. This Prussian initiative to create a German Customs-Union produced a situation to which neither France nor Austria could be indifferent. Rumigny, French envoy in Munich, urged his nation's support for a middle German customs union, seeing in it the most advantageous means of arresting the rapid extension of Prussian influence in this area. Such a union, obliged to rely on French support, would afford France an excellent vehicle for restoring its position in Germany.\textsuperscript{50} Rumigny's concern at


first elicited an echo in Paris. Count Reinhard, envoy to the Diet, was instructed to avail himself of all possible means to support the new union in the belief that it would keep Hohenzollern influence out of southwestern Germany. The inconveniences which such an economic consolidation seemed to entail for French trade were serious enough, but Paris also feared that Prussian military occupation of southwestern Germany would not be long in following Prussian economic penetration.

But the French will to resist gradually subsided to the point where they seemed almost resigned to the establishment of Prussian commercial and even political hegemony in Germany. Nothing of any real consequence was undertaken to obstruct it. Rumigny was counseled to remain calm, on the ground that the Prussian-Bavarian agreement was a mere project, of doubtful success and of remote execution. He persisted nevertheless in soliciting instructions and was left without response or enjoined to refrain from interfering:

We shall for the moment neither take part in the Prussian plan, nor make an effort to raise up obstacles against it. All that the king recommends to you is that you continue attentively to observe its progress.

A few days before, Count de Rayneval, temporarily directing

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53 May 7, 1829; quoted in Grosjean, *La Restauration et l'Allemagne*, pp. 105-106.
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, had composed a dispatch of similar tenor for the French minister in Berlin.

The relations which Prussia seeks to establish with the states of southern Germany attract the most serious attention of all the Powers. Attempts have been made to inspire us with uneasiness in the matter, but we feel no concern. We shall see Prussia strengthen her ties with the other members of the Germanic body without the least fear or jealousy.54

A degree of consolation was clearly taken by the French government from the belief that Berlin's initiative was directed primarily against Austria, which would be isolated and discomfited as a result of its success.55 But the feeble efforts deployed in Paris to arrest the extension of Prussian influence sprang no doubt from a feeling of the inevitability of change in Germany which was crystallizing in France, a feeling expressed by Rumigny when he wrote in January, 1830, "We must not lose sight of the fact that she [Germany] is about to transform herself. She intends to effect a change. It would be impossible to stop her." Rumigny did not attempt to conceal a certain distress which he felt in view of the future prospects in Germany, but he deemed it advisable that France should "follow the irresistible bent of affairs," since clinging to the old system might eventually result in her becoming snarled in grave complications.56

54 April 24, 1829, quoted in Grosjean, La Restauration et l'Allemagne, p. 116.
55 Ibid., p. 115.
56 Ibid., p. 198.
There seems to have prevailed among the ministers of the Restoration a feeling that German unification would not necessarily prove disastrous to French interests if France received as compensation the left bank of the Rhine. In the light of the belief which had gained acceptance among some of them at least, that German unification was an eventual probability, they may well have considered it the wisest course to accept the inevitable, while at the same time exacting as high a price as possible for their consent and a measure of protection against its consequences. The dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, which seemed to be imminent, appeared to Polignac to offer a golden opportunity, which might not recur, to obtain the Rhine boundary. If Prussian hegemony in Germany was the price that had to be paid for this extension of the French frontier, it perhaps appeared worth it to Polignac. Later, under other circumstances, it was feared Prussia might extend her sway over Germany without France being able to secure any compensating accretion of strength.

It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the French republicans too, would have accepted, with modifications, the view that France could afford to permit German unification, provided that she received the left bank of the Rhine. The Napoleonic legend, acquiring great vitality dur-

57 Ibid., p. 204.
ing the 1820's, profoundly influenced republican thought on foreign policy, and Napoleon, in the Memorial of St. Helena had acknowledged the right of Germans, as well as of other nationalities to unite. That the republicans were strenuous advocates of the Rhine frontier and the "war against the kings," is abundantly clear. Foreign affairs were accorded an exaggerated importance during these years in their program, as they thought to enlist the support of the masses by exalting patriotic sentiments, even to the neglect of social problems. Their attacks on the Bourbon regime stressed its association with Waterloo and with the foreign conqueror. At workers' meetings in the late 1820's republican orators regularly concluded by excoriating the treaties of 1815 and demanding the Rhine boundary. The revolution of 1830 which ended the Bourbon reign was as much an expression of patriotic transport as it was a protest against Charles X's breach of the constitution and its triumph was interpreted as a revenge for Waterloo. It released an upsurge of sympathy for the peoples groaning under the domination of the Holy Alliance and engendered a resurgence of

60 G. Weill, Histoire du parti républicain en France de 1814 à 1870 (Paris, 1900), p. 27 (footnote)
national pride, of the desire for glory and for conquests. A war for the emancipation of the peoples was widely called for; the spirit of the Girondins lived again, reinforced by the newer idea of the historical mission of the nations. "The sight of the tri-colored flag, that is what aroused the people," said Cavaignac, "and it would certainly be easier to push Paris toward the Rhine then toward St. Cloud."61

By 1830, then, there appeared to be little real determination in France to maintain Germany in a divided condition. The Restoration monarchy, faced in its last years with a dynamic extension of Prussian economic influence across Germany, at first took only feeble and ineffective counter-measures to thwart the success of the movement which appeared to be a harbinger of political integration. Subsequently, the government of Charles X dropped even these half-hearted measures and gave indication of being prepared to acquiesce in Prussian domination beyond the Rhine if it obtained Belgium and the Rhineland (through the device of conferring it upon the Saxon monarch). While the republicans do not seem to have formulated an attitude toward the problem of German unification, it may be inferred from their espousal of the cause of nationalities and national sovereignty, that they could not logically have been opposed to it.

61 S. Charléty, op. cit., V, 8.
Since the diplomatic revolution of 1756, when French public opinion first seriously interested itself in the conduct of foreign affairs, its influence had become steadily more important. Bursting forth in the blaze of enthusiasm of the great Revolution, popular interest in foreign affairs was temporarily suppressed, but not extinguished, with the Bourbon Restoration. Underneath the surface calm of the Restoration smoldered a hot resentment, not so much because of conditions within France, because "the people were never happier than from 1815 to 1829, but because it [the government] had been imposed by would-be conquerors, by foreign power and by traitors at home."62

The revolution of 1830, being inspired in large measure by considerations of foreign affairs, marked a new high in the importance of popular opinion on the subject. Much of popular opinion in 1830 and during the early years of the July monarchy was feverishly bellicose. Intoxicated by memories of revolutionary and Napoleonic glories, the program of French liberals and republicans was a curious compound of sympathy for oppressed peoples and the most blatant national egoism, a program which contrasted sharply with that of Louis Philippe, who was as little inclined to

62 Weill, Parti républicain, p. 27 (footnote).
an adventurous policy abroad as he was at home.

Never during his reign was the government of Louis Philippe confronted with an immediate threat of German unification, but on three separate occasions the problem made itself felt. In the early 1830's the extension of the Prussian customs union, which had given some concern to the government of Charles X, was a source of disquiet for the July monarchy. The French Foreign Minister, Broglie, proposed in late 1833 an alliance with England, one purpose of which was to resist the extension of the Prussian customs system in Germany as well as to encourage the smaller princes against the encroachments of the Diet. Even before Broglie became Foreign Minister, Louis Philippe's diplomats had been pursuing in Germany the traditional French policy of intervention on behalf of the small princes. The government's opinion was no doubt reflected as well in the assertion by the Journal des Débats of September 9, 1833, that no changes in the states bordering France would be tolerated without French participation.


64 K. Hillebrand, Geschichte Frankreichs von der Thronbesteigung Louis Philipp's (2 vols.; Gotha, 1877), I, 542-544. The French king, in answer to German objections to French intervention, habitually pretended to have no knowledge of such conduct on the part of his diplomats.

65 Thureau-Dangin, loc. cit., p. 738.
After the unsettled conditions which marked the international scene for the first few years following the July revolution had become stabilized, the Austrian government evinced a certain interest in drawing closer to France. The incipient rapprochement was abruptly halted however, by the crisis which rocked Europe in 1840. Though its origin was entirely extraneous to German affairs, it was the only occasion on which the relations of Louis Philippe's government with the courts of Vienna and Berlin assumed a harsh tone.

The French were startled by the vehemence and extent of the reaction which their menaces and war preparations elicited in Germany. Patriotic sentiment, slumbering in that land since being overtaken by disillusionment in the years following the victory over Napoleon, suddenly blazed forth anew, full of hostility for France, the hereditary enemy. Vainly did French diplomacy resort to the traditional and proven tactic of drawing the small German states into the French orbit. Demonstrating that a quite different spirit obtained from that of the days of Richelieu, Mazarin, and Louis XIV, the lesser German governments maintained complete solidarity with Berlin and Vienna. They followed

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67 Ibid., p. 63.
the example of Berlin even to interdicting the exportation of horses to France, a measure which the enraged Paris press had futilely attempted to forestall by loudly proclaiming in advance that it would be regarded as a declaration of war.\textsuperscript{69} Thiers, miscalculating the temper of Prussia, vainly resorted to a time-honored French tactic in attempting to detach her from Austria, with the intention of concentrating his assault upon the Hapsburg possessions in Italy.\textsuperscript{70}

The violent flare-up of German temper in 1840 undoubtedly made a lasting impression on some Frenchmen. Edgar Quinet seized the occasion to renew his warnings, begun in the early 1830's of the potential menace to France which a powerful and united Germany would pose. Publishing a fiery pamphlet in which he urged the destruction of the treaties of 1815 which had so long shamed France, he proposed that the French frontier be advanced to the Rhine, naively persuaded that Germany would readily acquiesce in the transfer of the left bank of that river to France.\textsuperscript{71}

Though the crisis of 1840 did not result in war, it had once again made abundantly evident to France the inconvenience of having a united and hostile Germany on her border.

\textsuperscript{69} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 313.
\textsuperscript{70} \textit{Ibid.}, p. 310.
\textsuperscript{71} Cf. for all of Quinet's essays on the menace of the new Germany, P. Gautier, \textit{Un Prophète: Edgar Quinet} (Paris, 1917).
In early 1842, Thiers, still smarting from the fiasco of 1840, declared that he was not prepared to abandon the idea of a Rhine frontier, the only means of guaranteeing French security.

The third and last occasion on which the government of Louis Philippe experienced keen apprehension in regard to German developments resulted from the liberalization program introduced by Frederick William IV of Prussia in 1847. Guizot took alarm at once; on the 25th of February, 1847, before the United Diet summoned by the Prussian monarch had begun its labors, he addressed an agitated note to his ambassador in Vienna. Denying that he had any objection to the adoption by Prussia of a constitutional regime, he professed to see a serious danger in the indirect results such a transformation would have on the position of Prussia in Germany. "We are struck," he continued,

by the great advantage that an ambitious Prussia could henceforth derive, in Germany, from the two ideas which she clearly tends to adopt, German unity and the liberal spirit. She could, with the aid of these two levers, gradually undermine the secondary German states, draw them into her orbit, so as profoundly to alter the present Germany, and, in consequence, the European order. Now the independence, the peaceful and vigorous existence of the secondary German states is of enormous importance to us, and we cannot perceive the possibility of their being compromised or even weakened, to the profit of a single power, without taking serious note of

72 Haller, op. cit., p. 138.
of this possibility and shaping our policy accordingly.73

Following this clear statement of his position, Guizot instructed the ambassador to determine the position of Metternich in the matter. Not content with making overtures to Metternich, the French minister admonished the secondary German states to be on their guard, at the same time assuring them of a discreet but firm support against any attempt to absorb them.74 A few months later, the Journal des Débats, a government organ, replying to German protests against its anti-unification position, reasserted the French interest in the continued independent existence of the secondary German states.75

Not all of France, however, shared the grave concern with which the government regarded the Prussian developments. While Guizot was drawing Metternich's attention to its disturbing implications, Thiers saluted Frederick William's action, seeing in it a new conquest of the French spirit across the Rhine.76 The occasional comments which the press of the left made on the German situation were expressions of indignation at the government which, instead of extending a

73 Thureau - Dangin, Histoire, VII, 167-168.
74 Ibid., p. 170.
75 Ibid., pp. 170-171.
76 Bourgeois, op. cit., III, 270.
helping hand to Prussia to facilitate its liberal transfor-
mation, was effecting a rapprochement with reactionary
Austria,\textsuperscript{77} a criticism reminiscent of the attacks of the
philosophes against the alliance with Austria in 1756, con-
cluded in somewhat similar circumstances. The liberals and
republicans who welcomed Frederick William's reforms saw
the matter primarily in ideological terms rather than in
terms of power politics, an attitude increasingly character-
istic of republican thinking on foreign affairs since the
early 1840's.

It has been seen that under the Restoration and in
the early years of the July Monarchy, the republican party
urged a nationalistic and warlike program, a program based
on emotional identification with the glorious memories of
the Revolution rather than on rational considerations.
Their cardinal aim was the destruction of the iniquitous
settlement of 1815, a sweeping away of the apparatus of re-
action which had been brutally imposed on France and on
Europe by triumphant monarchy. Not France alone was to
benefit from the coming liberation, but all Europe. Tyrants
were to be overthrown, to be replaced by liberal republican
regimes which would guarantee liberty, equality, and frater-
nity, as proclaimed by the Revolution. Nations as well as
individuals were to be accorded their independence and right

\textsuperscript{77} Thureau - Dangin, \textit{Histoire}, VII, 171.
of self determination; this too had been part of the revolutionary doctrine, although it had necessarily been obscured by the exigencies of the war which the kings of Europe, implacable foes of the rights of men and of nations, had forced on revolutionary France.

Even Napoleon, whose active career gave little evidence of compassion for the rights and dignity of nations, had, in his Memorial of St. Helena, declared it to have been his purpose to bring about the unity of the various national groups of Europe. "I should have liked," he asserted, "to make of each one of these peoples [Spanish, Italians, and Germans] a single, corporate nation. . . . Germany has the right to unite itself in a single body just as Ireland has the right to separate itself from England."78

The republicans envisioned a conquest of Europe by French ideas, a conquest to be secured by a holy collaboration between the French nation in arms and the oppressed peoples of Europe who would rise up to help achieve the liberation of the continent. The republicans felt that as compensation for her service in the cause of the peoples France would be entirely justified in claiming the Rhine frontier, and in their naïveté they were convinced that the Germans would freely approve such an acquisition by the country which was

78 Weill, L'idée de nationalité, pp. 46-47.
the source of their happiness. 79

Their exaggerated conception of the devotion of other peoples to French ideas led many French liberals and republicans to see in the ferment stirring in Europe in the 1830's and 1840's the result of their influence, 80 and when they visualized the renovated Europe which was to proceed from the dissemination of French ideas they imagined that French influence would remain in the ascendant. As will be seen, this attitude carried over into the early months of the revolution of 1848, and it was only slowly and painfully modified as events, particularly the course of developments in Germany, revealed its lack of solid foundation.

Thus, on the eve of the February revolution, though the government of Louis Philippe, showing more concern than had Charles X and his ministers, was actively attempting to rally resistance to the extension of Prussian influence over Germany, the republicans were prepared by their general outlook to consider sympathetically the prospect of a united

79 These views were generally held among the French republicans. Quinet was their most eloquent, but by no means, their sole proponent. Raspail, who in the early 1830's published a republican journal, the Réformateur, was the first of the French republicans to condemn the spirit of conquest and the doctrine of natural frontiers. His pacifism for some time made little headway among his fellow republicans.

80 Bourgeois, op. cit., III, 271.
Germany. Indeed, the National, their leading journal had already indicated its desire to see German unification effected under the auspices of democracy.\textsuperscript{81}

\textsuperscript{81} Weill, \textit{Parti républicain}, p. 198.
CHAPTER II

FORMULATION OF THE FRENCH ATTITUDE
DURING LAMARTINE’S MINISTRY

Revolution, long feared by the partisans of order, long and impatiently awaited by the exponents of change, exploded at last across Europe in the early months of 1848, coming as a surprise at this particular moment to all parties in spite of the chronic anticipation of such an event for it seemed no more imminent at the beginning of 1848 than it had for some time. The continent had become a powderkeg due to the damming up of unappeased social, economic and national grievances, with subterranean rumblings of discontent erupting in violent upheavals in Switzerland and Italy, not to mention Bavaria, before the February revolution shook Paris. But it was the fall of the Bourgeois Monarchy and the seizure of power in the French capital by a band of republicans which precipitated the convulsions which toppled cabinets and ministers across Europe like tenpins and shook thrones to their foundations. For a few months in the spring and early summer the peoples and princes of much of Europe lived in a delirium of uncertainty and confusion, deploring or rejoicing in the events, according as they seemed to affect their fears and hopes. The
dizzy swirl of confusion disorganizing Europe rendered for some time impossible an accurate appraisal of the mould into which the flux of old institutions was likely to be recast. Almost any result seemed possible and almost every solution had its adherents. In such circumstances the fearful and the pessimistic tended to foresee catastrophe and the imperiling of all they valued, but to the young, the strong, the visionary apostles of a better world, the collapse of the established order represented an opportunity and a challenge, the chance long dreamed of to reforge society in conformity with their cherished conceptions. Such was the spirit pervading the Provisional Government which installed itself, amidst a host of jubilant supporters, at the Hotel de Ville in Paris on February 24, 1848.

The Provisional Government was in fact, though not officially, headed by the distinguished poet Alphonse de Lamartine who had only a few hours earlier, in the turbulent chamber of the Palais Bourbon, decided to throw his support behind a republic rather than an Orleanist regency. In addition to heading the government, Lamartine assumed direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, so that for a time the fate of France, both at home and abroad, seemed to rest in his hands, a curious destiny for a poet. He was not, however altogether unprepared for the task so abruptly thrust upon him by events. A long career of public service as a member of the diplomatic corps during the Restoration, later
as one of the leading members of the opposition in the legislature in the last years of the July Monarchy had afforded him a considerable experience of affairs, an experience which was supplemented by the study and writing of history.

The hectic succession of events of the first few days of the Provisional Government allowed Lamartine little time to deliberate on the foreign relations of the new republic. Without his virile eloquence and happy faculty for finding the right tone and the mot juste with which to cajole and manipulate the excited mob milling incessantly about the Hotel de Ville and swarming even through its corridors and chambers, the revolutionary passions unleashed in the overthrow of Louis Philippe might not have been contained within the bounds of moderation where they in fact remained. His moderating influence was great, perhaps decisive, in both internal and external affairs. A sincere, if neophyte republican, but hostile to socialism, Lamartine in his brilliant and courageous speech of February 25 succeeded, in the face of an aroused mob, in obtaining the rejection of the red banner as the flag of the Second Republic and throughout the rule of the Provisional Government he continued to resist serious social revolution. Similarly, in foreign affairs, Lamartine's influence served to check the more radical tendencies of the revolution from finding expression in a flamboyant and aggressive foreign policy; invoking a course of
peace and reconciliation, he sought at once to reassure foreign governments that a republic did not inevitably mean war, while at the same time he endeavored to curb republican ardor for a crusade against the tyrants of Europe.

It was not until six days after seizing power that Lamartine found time to enter Guizot's old office at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and set to work in earnest on external affairs.¹ In the meantime the most pressing problem confronting him was to dispel the alarm that gripped the cabinets of Europe at the news of the creation of a republic in France, which event, he feared, would provoke a renewal of the coalition against his fatherland. He therefore addressed, on February 27, a letter to the ambassadors of the foreign powers, assuring them of the republican government's urgent desire to preserve liberty, peace, and good relations with all nations similarly disposed.²

Lamartine was not mistaken in anticipating a sharp reaction, especially in the courts of the Holy Alliance, at the tidings of republican rule in Paris. Inevitably memories of the long and costly struggle against the first Republic and its successors were revived as apprehension mounted that a guerre de propagande might imminently be launched.

¹ A. de Lamartine, Histoire de la Révolution de 1848 (Brussels and Leipzig, 1849), II, 8.
² A. de Lamartine, Trois Mois au Pouvoir (Brussels, 1848), pp. 63-64.
In Germany, where the impressions of the war fever rampant in France in 1830 and in 1840 were still unforgotten, the danger of a French attack was felt to be particularly acute. Had not the deposed Louis Philippe been bitterly assailed throughout most of his reign for his pacifism by the very party which had just seized power in France, the party which had repeatedly denounced the settlement of 1815, and which had in 1830 and again in 1840 clamored for conquest of the Rhineland and a guerre aux rois? Was it not known to all that Lamartine himself had participated in these attacks?

Responding to the threat, a meeting of the crown council in Berlin of February 28 resolved to invite Austrian cooperation in preparing common defensive measures against a possible French attack as well as against seditious manifestations in Germany. The following day the Diet at Frankfurt, at the instigation of its presiding officer, the Prussian Count Doenhoff, resolved to form a committee to study "the threatening situation arising from the events in Paris." Fully aware that the very existence of Austria was threatened and that the Hapsburg empire alone was virtually helpless before the storm, Metternich frantically appealed to Prussia, Russia, and even England for cooperation.

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3 F. Rachfal, Deutschland, Koenig Friedrich Wilhelm und die Maerzrevolution (Halle a. S., 1901), pp. 63-64.
against the revolution.\textsuperscript{5} Disclaiming any thought of intervention in the internal affairs of France, he hoped nevertheless effectively to isolate her and to bring about a united military action in the event of French aggression in any quarter.\textsuperscript{6} The arch-defender of autocracy, Tsar Nicholas, on learning of the overthrow of the Orleans dynasty, reacted with characteristic impulsive violence, expressing the hope that war would ensue, preferably from a French attack on Germany which would rally its people to patriotic resistance. Should peace prevail for any length of time, he feared, the revolutionary contagion could only with difficulty be prevented from making great inroads in that potentially explosive land.\textsuperscript{7} On the 4th of March he addressed to Fredrick William IV an urgent recommendation to assemble the military forces of Germany for an immediate campaign against the French. Within three months, promised Nicholas, he would be standing behind the Prussian king with 350,000 men, ready to hurl them against the French at the first summons.\textsuperscript{8}

Lamartine was equally persuaded of the imperative

\textsuperscript{5} H. von Srbik, Metternich, der Staatsmann und der Mensch (2 vols.; Munich, 1925), II, 248-257.

\textsuperscript{6} cf. Metternich M\textsc{\char12}m\textsc{i}o\textsc{\char12}res (8 vols.; Paris, 1880-1884), VII, 593-599 (Letters to Canitz and Lebzeltern).

\textsuperscript{7} E. Bapst, Origines de la guerre de Crime\textsc{\char13}e; la France et la Russie de 1848 \& 1854 (Paris, 1912), p. 3.

necessity of dampening the war ardor at home which, in his estimation, was seething among the republican and worker forces. Yet, while seeking to check the aggressive spirit of the radicals, he had to avoid squarely affronting them. Thus, the desire to achieve several imperfectly reconcilable objectives—reassurance to the Powers of his government's peaceful intentions, cajolery and flattery of the radical republicans while simultaneously frustrating their dreams of a guerre de propagande—was reflected in the self-contradictions of Lamartine's Manifesto to Europe which was issued on March 5. In tone the Manifesto fluctuated sharply: now boldly, almost haughtily arrogant, now ardently proclaiming pacific ideals and intentions. To conciliate the Powers, the bellicose tradition of 1792 was expressly and unequivocally renounced; to mollify the republicans of France the hated and much decried treaties of 1815 were declared to have no further validity in theory, but this repudiation was at once rendered practically meaningless by the assurance that they would be recognized in fact. A cordial, but relatively innocuous declaration of sympathy was extended to the oppressed or threatened nationalities, only two of whom—Switzerland and Italy—were mentioned, thus entailing an implied warning to Austria. Of Poland, for whom the French republicans traditionally entertained the warmest...

sympathies, no notice was taken. England alone among the Great Powers was singled out for specific mention, Lamartine asserting that the fall of the Orleans dynasty in France had removed all ground for hostility between the two Powers.¹⁰

That Lamartine reposed an immense confidence in the efficacy of his pacific declarations to Europe is evident from a jubilant letter of March 5, the date of the issuance of the Manifesto. Perceiving the intervention of God, he asserted "our foreign affairs were not more assured after Austerlitz. We shall have a French system in place of isolation."¹¹ In fact, the pacific avowals which the poet proffered to Europe were welcomed in most quarters with a sense of relief not entirely devoid of misgiving. From Munich Bourgoing reported a favorable reception by the Bavarian ministers of the principles enunciated in the Manifesto. "Bavaria," he continued, in terms well calculated to please Lamartine, "is attached and devoted to the pacific and humanitarian views ... so ably developed in the first diplomatic document which has just inaugurated our new


republican era." His dispatch of two days later, however, was somewhat more cautious. After lengthier deliberation, the Bavarian ministers had noted objectionable passages and implications in the Manifesto; even so, they continued favorably disposed, though not concealing their disquietude as to the reaction which might be evoked at the Courts of Berlin and Vienna by some of the more spirited passages, particularly those pronouncing the condemnation of the treaties of 1815.

Berlin, too, was on the way to being persuaded of Lamartine's determination to maintain the peace, but its approval of the Manifesto was qualified by the apprehensions inspired by two references it contained. "How," asked Baron Canitz, "can we treat with you upon the basis of treaties which you declare invalid? Which are the oppressed nationalities you wish to see reconstituted?" England's peaceful intentions toward the new republic had been indicated as early as the 28th of February when Lord John Russel declared to the House of Commons that Her Majesty's government would not intervene in any way in the internal affairs of

12 Archives des Affaires Étrangères, Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 8, 1848. Henceforth the Archives des Affaires Étrangères will be designated by the abbreviation, A.A.E.

13 A.A.E., Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 10, 1848.

the French nation. Palmerston, whose malevolence toward
Guizot and Louis Philippe was well known, did not deny en-
joying a twinge of satisfaction in their misfortune and
though at first feeling little sympathy for the provisional
government, he was anxious to avoid war. Recognizing
that in spite of its partial disavowal of the treaties of
1815, Lamartine's Manifesto to Europe conveyed essentially
a message of peace, the foreign minister picturesquely
declared:

If you were to put the whole of it into a
crucible and to evaporate the gaseous parts and
scum off the dross you would find the regulus to
be peace and good fellowship with other govern-
ments.

Lamartine, then, was not altogether unjustified in his
exultant appraisal of the French diplomatic situation as of
March 5th, proper allowance being made for his habitual
optimism. England was pacifically inclined, two members of
the Holy Alliance were resolving not to go beyond the as-
sumption of a defensive posture, and Russia, deprived of
the cooperation of the two major German courts, was ren-
dered incapable of meddling in French affairs. In thus
winning for the Second French Republic the necessary time

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15 P. de la Gorce, Histoire de la seconde république

16 H. C. F. Bell, Lord Palmerston (2 vols. London,
New York, 1936), I, 425.

17 Ibid., p. 425.
in which to consolidate itself, the poet-statesman had achieved his primary and most essential objective. Had he acceded to the pressure for war, as Tsar Nicholas had frankly hoped and as an important element among the victorious republicans, some of them members of the Provisional Government, vociferously urged, the Coalition would doubtless have reformed itself against France, with defeat at the hands of the allies a likelihood, and destruction of the Republic a certainty. Nor was it mere calculation and the prospect of disastrous defeat which prompted Lamartine to pursue a policy of peace. Though he occasionally gave utterance to somewhat bellicose sentiments, it is impossible to feel that his pacifism was not sincere and profound. He praised the July Monarchy for its devotion to peace and he never succumbed, as did so many of the literary figures of his time, to the cult of Napoleonic glory.

18 Views differ somewhat as to the extent and intensity of war fever in Paris after the Revolution of February, but Lamartine, in his writings on the period of the Provisional Government, tends to create the impression that had not his firm hand grasped the helm and restrained the impetuous spirits, war very probably would have been launched by the newly created republic.

19 It is sometimes implied by German historians that it was only military weakness which prevented the Second Republic from launching war in the spring of 1848. This is not true, although the low state of military preparedness of the French forces was certainly an additional factor imposing restraint on the republican government.

early 1840 Thiers, courting public favor, proposed the return of the emperor's ashes to France, Lamartine expressed grave doubts as to the wisdom of the plan, fearing the possible consequences of cultivating the memory of a man who embodied the spirit of war and force. He declared:

I do not believe it is prudent thus continually to deify war, to excite the already too impetuous seething of French blood which they would have us believe is impatient to be shed after twenty-five years of peace, as if peace, which constitutes the happiness and glory of the world, could be a shame to nations.21

Hardly a year after warning against the menace of corrupting France with the worship of Napoleon, Lamartine again courageously celebrated the virtues of peace, this time in face of the virulent war fever, stemming from the crisis of 1840, and which had not yet entirely subsided in France, by publishing his poem, the "Marseillaise de la Paix" in which the hope is fervently expressed that the waters of the Rhine be never again discolored by blood shed in a war between German and Frenchman.22 It seems indisputable that Lamartine, inclined to peace by temperament and by rational conviction, inaugurated his foreign policy with a plea for peace, not merely out of considerations of expediency, but also in the sincere belief that peace is preferable to war.

But Lamartine's program was by no means exhausted with


22 Ibid., II, 94.
the preservation of peace, important and desirable as was that objective. Something of a dreamer, long aspiring to a career of statesmanship wherein his political achievements would equal in splendor his literary triumphs, he found himself at last in a position to realize his cherished visions of establishing a reign of justice and freedom at home, of peace and harmony among the nationalities in international affairs. Having successfully resisted the forces seeking to push France into war in the early days of the Provisional Government, he encountered thereafter no serious opposition in shaping foreign policy according to his will and "did not enter the council of ministers except to report new triumphs for the republic."23 Wishing to avoid too great a disruption and disorganization of the conduct of diplomacy, the new minister permitted to remain at their posts the incumbent personnel of the central administration for foreign affairs, but drew into his own hands "all the spirit, all the secret and all the direction" of foreign policy.24 From their diplomatic posts in foreign lands, however, Lamartine recalled, within a few weeks of the February revolution, all the ambassadors and almost all the plenipotentiaries, replacing them with secret or

23 Lamartine, Mémoires Politiques, III, 243.
confidential agents with republican sympathies or at least without attachments to the fallen dynasty.\(^{25}\)

In Lamartine's view, the situation confronting him offered a splendid opportunity to restore France to the position of pre-eminence in Europe which had been lost through the defeat of Napoleon and which the mistaken policies of the Restoration and the July Monarchy had failed to recover. To achieve this end he imagined an alliance system, the nucleus of which would be constituted by France, England, and Prussia, with the rest of Germany (exclusive of Austria), Switzerland, Belgium, Italy, and Spain eventually adhering.\(^{26}\) In this scheme, Austria was visualized as the principal antagonist of France with Switzerland and Italy being the probable foci of contention.\(^{27}\) Serious overtures to the British would be delayed until the propitious moment, Lamartine judging it sufficient for the interim to assure benevolent disposition on the part of the London government for, he believed, France could not be gravely imperiled militarily if England remained friendly.\(^{28}\) It was at Berlin that Lamartine hoped to make the first step toward founding his

\(^{25}\) Ibid., p. 22.

\(^{26}\) Circourt, *Souvenirs*, I, 78-79.

\(^{27}\) *Mémoires Politiques*, III, p. 150; pp. 154-155.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., pp. 147-148.
alliance system;29 after Prussia, most of Germany could be expected to enter the French camp, thereby creating a firm barrier against Russia.30 Only decrepit and reactionary Austria, isolated from the rest of Germany, would be left to confront France, a prospect which Lamartine contemplated with equanimity.

Toward the other Great Power of the continent, Tsarist Russia, Lamartine's policy was tentative and uncertain. As the foreign minister of a republic newly born of revolution, he could not gracefully make open advances in the direction of Europe's most formidable tyranny, nor could he reasonably anticipate that such advances would receive anything but a frigid reception from St. Petersburg. He was not, like the more frenzied republicans, aflame with hatred and zeal for the destruction of the system of Tsarist autocracy; so far from it in fact, that he was able to write some years later:

Alliance with Russia is the cry of nature, the revelation of geographies, the war alliance of the future eventualities of two great races; it is the equilibrium of peace of two great weights at the extremities of the continent, containing the center and relegating England to a satellite position on the ocean and in Asia.31

Only the question of Poland, Lamartine believed, stood between France and Russia, but as a prompt introduction of

29 Ibid., p. 157.
30 Ibid., p. 160.
31 Ibid., p. 15.
reform in the Tsar's Polish territories seemed hardly likely, he adopted a reserved attitude in the matter. With "time and reflexion" a solution might be forthcoming.\textsuperscript{32}

The problem of the oppressed nationalities proved one of the most thorny with which Lamartine had to grapple. Here too he adopted a moderate position, seeking to propitiate the governments of the great powers, all of whom were immediately concerned, while at the same time avoiding either a head-on collision with the republicans at home who clamored for liberation of the oppressed nationalities or a blunt rejection of the entreaties for assistance which were pouring in upon the Provisional Government from Poles, Italians, Irish, etc. A strong tradition of sympathy existed among French republicans for the subjugated peoples of Europe, especially for the Poles, whose cause inspired, or at least afforded a pretext for, the great demonstration of the Parisian masses against the Constituent Assembly on May 15.

While sharing the general sympathy for the aspirations of the oppressed peoples, Lamartine fully understood that to extend them direct military aid, or even the promise of such aid, was tantamount to a declaration of war against all the Great Powers of Europe, hence irreconcilable with his determination to maintain the peace. He limited himself, \textsuperscript{32} Ibid., pp. 156-157. Lamartine made a few overtures toward Russia in the spring of 1848 which led to no immediate results. This subject will be referred to again in chapter V.
therefore, to vague general assurances of sympathy and benevolence toward the peoples struggling for their national independence, scrupulously declining to commit France to any definite engagements on their behalf. He did however, especially in the case of Poland, seek through diplomatic action to persuade the powers to grant a measure of independence to their minorities. It was in Italy that Lamartine was most disposed to intervene directly, with military forces if need be, to aid a subjugated people to throw off its chains. Italy, by its geographical proximity, was more readily accessible to French arms than any of the other oppressed nations, and coming to its aid seemed to Lamartine as likely to involve France in war with no power except Austria. Furthermore, it is certain that Lamartine envisioned territorial acquisitions in the Piedmont region as compensation for French participation in the Italian struggle for independence.  

Evidence of Lamartine's hopes for territorial aggrandizement appears in his Mémoires, III, 249 and Correspondance, IV, 281.
As Lamartine had anticipated, the republic was not many days old at Paris before there began that series of eruptions with which Europe was soon convulsed. The resulting paralysis at Vienna, Berlin, and most of the other German capitals signified the elimination of what threat had remained of an attack by the powers of the coalition against the newly established French republic. To some of Lamartine's colleagues, such as Ledru-Rollin, Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government, the confusion and demoralization of the central European governments seemed to offer an irresistible opportunity to spread revolutionary doctrines by all available means, but Lamartine held fast in the midst of the storm to his originally charted course of loyalty toward the established governments. We have already seen that Lamartine was no doctrinaire of the extreme republican type, conceiving of foreign policy exclusively as an instrumentality for the dissemination of French ideas and principles in Europe. His grasp of the European situation may have been in some respects defective, but in part, at least his conceptions reflected established French tradition. His most radical innovation was the advocacy of peace, not merely from timorous caution, as he charged the July Monarchy with doing, but as a calculated instrument of policy, primarily to avert a coalition against France, but also, apparently to attach the European peoples to the Republic. Rejecting as repugnant to the basic principles of
the February revolution all thought of a military conquest of Europe, Lamartine seems nevertheless to have caressed the vision of establishing a moral hegemony on the continent by an explosion of French ideas which, in conquering men's hearts would rivet their allegiance to Paris in a "solidarity of peace with France."34 After the flood tide of the revolutions of 1848 had subsided, he claimed never to have imagined or even desired that republican institutions should gain sway in Europe in one great burst of revolutionary activity.35 This is probably true, but in the first months of the movement, when revolution appeared to be sweeping everything before it, he was intoxicated by its seemingly irresistible progress, attributing its widespread success to the influence of the French example and his own sagacity in maintaining peace. Nevertheless, his original instructions to the emissaries of the Republic at the various European courts, formally enjoining them to abstain from fomenting insurrection, or from "mixing in any republican plot," remained unaltered, as did his opposition to committing the Republic to the support of causes which circumstances might later compel it to renounce.36 Desiring and confidently

34 cf. Ibid, pp. 24-25; p. 244; p. 250. Lamartine implies, but does not clearly avow such hopes. His policy of loyalty toward established governments constrained him to oppose any overt propagandistic activities.

35 Ibid., p. 244.

36 Lamartine, Mémoires Politiques, III, 244.
expecting the dissemination of liberal French principles and institutions across Europe, Lamartine opposed, as has been indicated, any intervention in foreign lands or any participation in the subversion of foreign governments by citizens of the Second Republic. His determined reserve was motivated by two considerations, one a matter of principle, the other of practical import. Since he had, upon assuming control of the Foreign Ministry, in his Manifesto of March 7, assured the governments of Europe of his intention to maintain peace and respect their integrity, his sense of honor would not permit him to acquiesce in any act of "disloyalty" toward them. Secondly, he continued to fear that even in their distress the governments of central Europe, in the face of undisguised French intervention might yet find it possible to rally their peoples behind them and, reforming their alliance, march against the Republic. Like Bismarck, Lamartine was haunted by a "nightmare of coalitions."

When, a few days after taking office, Lamartine began to execute his diplomatic strategy, the effort to achieve the unification of Germany under the auspices of the Frankfort Parliament was not yet foreseen. Since Prussia, traditionally regarded in France as advanced and enlightened (the more so since Frederick William IV's recent reform efforts) was also the most powerful state in Germany outside Austria, between whom and the Republic there could be no
confidence, it was natural that Lamartine should have sought to win Germany through Berlin. He envisioned apparently, a Germany subject at least to the moral tutelage of Prussia and bound in fraternal alliance with the French Republic, whose authority and influence would thereby be enormously augmented.37

As reports of the progress of the German revolution streamed into Paris, its double aspect steadily became clearer. It was not confined, as was the February revolution in France, to a movement toward more broadly liberal institutions; it contained a second element of equal if not greater importance, the drive for unification, not merely the loose affiliation of the lesser German states with Prussia, but a definitely centralized and unified state.

The German struggle for unification rapidly became and remained throughout the year 1848 an important concern for French policy, but not to the degree one might imagine. On the international horizon, the events in Italy, where sputtered a war in which France might momentarily become involved, attracted more general interest than did the developments in Germany. But even the unfolding drama in Italy was for the most part overshadowed by the vertiginous succession of problems and crises which kept Paris seething ominously in the spring months, reaching a climax in the

bloody paroxysm of the "June days" and terminating only in
the election of a president in the final days of the year.

Nevertheless, in spite of the numerous distractions,
the French government and even French public opinion ob-
served with more than casual interest the evolution of the
German efforts to forge a unified nation from a congeries
of nearly forty political entities of various sizes and
conditions. The prospect that the Germanic Confederation,
heir to, and hardly less powerless and supine than the old,
Holy Roman Empire might be transformed into a vigorous and
efficient modern state confronted the Second Republic with
a dilemma. Inevitably such a transformation would entail a
shift in the power relationships of Europe, closing irrevo-
cably the long period of French predominance on the conti-
nent. Should the Republic, in fidelity to its proclaimed
devotion to the rights of nationalities, renounce consid-
erations of power politics as outmoded in the new era her-
alded by the February revolution, or should it adhere
steadfastly to the classic French policy of supporting dis-
unity across the Rhine? The Foreign Minister of the Second
Republic hovered uncertainly between the two alternatives
for some time before reaching a decision.

In the hectic confusion and pressure of his approxi-
mately two-and-one-half months as Foreign Minister,
Lamartine did not have the time necessary carefully to
examine the course of German developments, to reflect at
length on their meaning for France, or to formulate a really systematic attitude and policy toward them. Pre-occupied with matters of more immediately pressing concern, he apparently did not read all the dispatches sent to him by his agents in Germany, but relied on his secretary for their content.

Even had he studied them all carefully, he could not easily upon that basis have gained a clear perception of whither Germany was headed, so various and conflicting were the reports, some of his informants revising their appraisals from day to day in an effort to keep them abreast of the latest developments of a swiftly changing scene. French envoys were unanimous only in warning that Germany would hotly resent any sort of interference from outside her borders, and would oppose a united resistance to a French invasion. Most of them were convinced that liberal ideas and institutions were winning a permanent foothold in Germany, thus confirming Lamartine's sanguine expectations as to the irresistible impact of French ideas launched by the revolution, but they doubted the likelihood of a republic issuing from the maelstrom. They did not all express an opinion on the desirability of German unification, but the general paralysis gripping the princely governments, their impotence to resist the demands of the revolution during the spring months, seemed to persuade most of the French observers that some tightening of the bonds of German unity
was inevitable. Several freely disclosed to the Foreign Minister their distress at this prospect. From Munich, on March 20, Bourgoing, a diplomat of the July Monarchy who was soon to be recalled by Lamartine expressed the hope that Bavaria, old friend and ally of France, would not become subordinate to either Prussia or Austria.38 A few days later the French minister at Stuttgart, Fontenoy, with an air of melancholy recognized the apparent inevitability of a new order in Germany, one which would have sorely vexed Richelieu, Louis XIV, and probably Napoleon. Fontenoy, apparently a veteran diplomat of the old school, acknowledged the necessity of bringing his thinking into line with the doctrine of nationalities held by the Second Republic, but confessed to accepting the idea of a united Germany only with reluctance.39

Tallenay, reporting on March 20 from Hamburg in a mood of excitement generated by news of the revolt at Berlin, triumphantly asserted, "all of Germany is today regenerated, royalty no longer exists and from this moment, far from encountering enemies across the Rhine, the French Republic will find nothing but sympathy."40 Abruptly sobered by

38 A.A.E., Bourgoing to Lamartine, Munich, March 20, 1848.
39 A.A.E., Fontenoy to Lamartine, Stuttgart, March 26, 1848.
40 A.A.E., Tallenay to Lamartine, Hamburg, March 20, 1848.
subsequent information from Berlin that Frederick William had not only retained his throne, but was proposing himself as leader of the German unification movement, Tallenay's next dispatch was as somber as that of the 20th had been ebullient. Warning against the dangers of Prussian ambition, which aimed at subjecting all Germany to its control, he urged that France maintain a vigilant scrutiny over Prussia's bold enterprise.\textsuperscript{41} Surveying the situation in Germany some six weeks later, he drew comfort from the obstacles emerging to prevent its unification; the position of France, he concluded, was rendered stronger and more secure by Germany's difficulties.\textsuperscript{42}

Having returned to Strasbourg after his reconnaissance mission in Germany, the special agent Klein reported in a tone of disillusionment in early May that German unity might be achieved under a constitutional monarchy, but no immediate hope existed of its being established in republican form. In these circumstances "it is natural," he thought, "to hope that the great difficulties in the creation of German unity will give rise to discords which will enable French policy to recapture some of the ground it has lost." However, he repeated the warning so often and urgently

\textsuperscript{41} A.A.E., Tallenay to Lamartine, Hamburg, March 21, 1848.

\textsuperscript{42} A.A.E., Tallenay to Lamartine, London, May 9, 1848. (Tallenay had in the meantime been transferred to London.)
expressed by nearly every French observer across the Rhine against any meddling in German affairs for the time being, as this could only provoke an unfavorable reaction. The wisest course, he believed, was to await more favorable circumstances, certain to occur eventually, which "we can exploit to the profit of democracy."  

In Frankfurt, Billing, a diplomat of the July Monarchy, observed with apprehension in early March the increasing momentum of the drive toward German unity. Of the two alternatives then being widely considered in Germany—a union under Prussian domination as proposed by Gagern, or a tightening of the bonds of the Confederation as proposed by Bassermann—the first seemed to him the more objectionable, because of the formidable military character such an arrangement would impress upon Germany. By giving Germany cause for alarm, he cautioned, France would do herself the disservice of helping to promote the Prussian candidacy. The following day Billing expanded his observations on the immense military potential over which a highly centralized Germany would dispose, adding that "what is important for French policy is that Germany remain a federative power and does not constitute a national unity."  

43 A.A.E., Klein to Lamartine, Strasbourg, May 10, 1848.  

44 A.A.E., Billing to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 6, 1848.
existence of its constitutional monarchies seemed in his view to afford an important obstacle to this undesirable unity.  

Salignac-Fenelon, who in mid-March was appointed to succeed Billing, reported on the developments in the unification movement without extensive comment. His dispatches did, however, take note of certain characteristics of the German national spirit which were beginning to manifest themselves and which would be important factors in shaping the French attitude toward the effort to achieve German unity. On March 26 he described the grandiose dreams of expansion which were being enunciated by certain members of the Diet: the seizure or liberation of such remote regions as Courland, Livonia, and Finland. A week later he signaled the mention of Alsace and Lorraine in the Diet, a matter certain to evoke concern at Paris. The resolution of the Diet to intervene in Schleswig-Holstein was reproved, and the infraction entailed in the Diet's action of a treaty to which France was a signatory was cited in a dispatch of

45 A.A.E., Billing to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 7, 1848.

46 A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 26, 1848.

47 A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 31, 1848.
Salignac-Fenelon's in early April.\textsuperscript{48} Not long afterward, in the sharp displeasure with which he greeted the rumor of an impending mediatisation of the lesser princes to the benefit of "some large power," he revealed his unwillingness to see one strong power replace the agglomeration of states constituting the Germanic Confederation.\textsuperscript{49}

Salignac-Fenelon was replaced at the end of April by a stormy and volatile figure named Savoye, a German republican refugee who had passed a number of years in Paris as a lycée instructor. Savoye at once proceeded to bombard Paris with communications to the effect that the princes, aristocracy, and bourgeoisie of Germany were hostile to France, but that the people were sympathetic.\textsuperscript{50} An outlook quite different from that of the tradition-minded career diplomats soon becomes discernible in his correspondence a propos of German unity.

Insisting on the common interests of France and Germany and on the desirability of their moving ever closer together, Savoye hinted even at suborning the German press to enlist it in the cause of promoting better relations.\textsuperscript{51} The princes and their cabinets, he assured Paris, were the

\textsuperscript{48} A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 9, 1848.

\textsuperscript{49} A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 21, 1848.

\textsuperscript{50} A.A.E., Frankfurt; his first dispatch was written on April 30, 1848.

\textsuperscript{51} A.A.E., Savoye to Lamartine, Frankfurt, May 3, 1848.
principal obstacle to close Franco-German amity; they did not hesitate even to consider waging war against France as a means of crushing the spirit of revolution which menaced their prerogatives. While inciting the German national spirit against France, the princes were also, according to Savoye, assiduously stimulating the spirit of localism to opposition against the centralizing tendencies of Frankfurt.\(^2\) Savoye came close in this way to equating enmity to France with enmity to German unity.

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During the year 1848 the major Parisian newspapers, though carrying frequent reports of the ferment stirring in Germany, made relatively few appraisals of the tendency toward unification, a seeming indifference surprising only if one forgets the more immediate preoccupations besetting them. In spite of their numerous distractions, however, most of them followed events across the Rhine with more than casual interest.

Almost universally the grande presse of Paris shared Lamartine's delight in the rapid extension of liberal ideas and institutions across Germany in the spring of 1848. Although their reaction to German unification was somewhat

\(^{52}\) A.A.E., Savoye to Lamartine, Frankfurt, May 3, 1848.
more complex, the tenor of comment running from tepid acceptance of a seemingly irresistible phenomenon to enthusiastic endorsement thereof, none of the prominent papers directly challenged or reproved the principle of unity. As the scope and implications of German national aspirations became clearer, however, articles occasionally appeared sharply critical of certain aspects of the movement, especially its relations with neighboring nationalities. A brief survey of the press will illustrate these points.

On March 14, the Moniteur, closely associated with the government, and reflecting its views, after happily recounting the swift spread of revolutionary reform in Germany, observed with satisfaction that German national sentiment had been abruptly transformed. Instead of being an expression of hostility toward other nations, it was now intent upon the liberal reorganization of Germany which, no longer inclined in its new form under a parliamentary government toward alliances with the reactionary courts, would become a friend of France. A week later, after describing the further progress of freedom and pro-French sympathies across the Rhine, the Moniteur proclaimed that "the French Republic sees with satisfaction and just pride the confidence which its principles have inspired among German democrats; she will answer worthily, she salutes joyously the dawn of

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53 Moniteur, March 14, 1848.
In early April the Moniteur, recording additional liberal gains in Germany, emphasized the increasingly benevolent attitude of its peoples toward France since the fear of an impending French attack had been dispelled by the wise policies of the Provisional Government. Brimming with optimism, the Moniteur believed the Germans, won over to the idea of a free Italy, to be energetically hailing the reports from Milan of resistance to the Austrians. Furthermore, every German was persuaded that a resurrection of Poland was immediately imperative. "The most popular idea in Germany at the present moment," it declared, "is a war between Russia and the Poles aided by the Germans. It is indubitable that the thought of this regeneration [of Poland] establishes between the French Republic and Germany new ties of good understanding and solidarity."  

During the same period, the Siècle, too, was praising the unanimous German determination, "which echoes from the Danube to the Rhine to the Baltic," to restore an independent Poland, which restoration was seen as linked indissolubly with the question of the unity and liberty of Germany. Only a month later, its tone much changed, the same

54 Ibid., March 21, 1848.
55 Ibid., April 7, 1848.
56 Siècle, March 29, 1848.
paper expressed profound regret at the unexpected turn of events in the Polish question. Frederick William IV, instead of acting with decision [i.e., aiding the Poles against the Russians] had allowed matters to drift to disaster.

The Siècle thought to perceive the machinations of Russian diplomacy at the origin of the sudden recrudescence of anti-Polish sentiment in Germany and concluded by deploiring that Germany should "turn its back on the interests of liberty and civilization to satisfy a falsely conceived personal interest." 57

The Journal des Débats, on the 23rd of March, declared itself well pleased with the liberal reforms instituted in Germany, but took no note whatever of the unification plans. 58 A week later an article in the same publication observed that the principal current interest of the Germans was in founding their national unity which the Journal, without indicating any other judgment, recognized as a virtually inevitable historical evolution. 59 After several subsequent articles in the same vein, plus references to German desires for an alliance with France, the Journal, toward the middle of April, unequivocally revealed its

57 Ibid., April 28, 1848.
58 Journal des Débats, March 23, 1848.
59 Ibid., March 30, 1848.
position vis-à-vis German unity. Asserting that Germany's disunity has been a misfortune for its peoples, it blamed Russia as principally responsible among those foreign nations which in the past thirty years had sought to introduce new causes for division. "Now she has lost the game, or at least we have the right to hope and to believe it," concluded the article, "because the national parliament is definitely convoked to Frankfurt, and in the near future." 60  

Again in mid-May the Journal des Débats expressed the view that Germany unity was fairly certain of realization. It then cited and proceeded to deny the charges which had been raised in the German press to the effect that France trembled with fear at the prospect of German unity. "That is a great error," it declared emphatically. "Everything that separates France from Russia is welcome to French policy; everything which unites and consolidates Germany, become liberal, consolidates France as well." 61  

Until May 7 the Constitutionel remained silent on German unification. When at last it examined the question, it cited the difficulties and obstacles in the way of unification, but otherwise gave no clue to its attitude. 62  

The National, organ of the moderate republicans, and

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60 Ibid., April 11, 1848.
61 Ibid., May 15, 1848.
62 Constitutionel, May 7, 1848.
on whose staff Bastide had long been a prominent figure, promptly welcomed the spread of revolution in Germany, believing it to herald the establishment of democracy on the French model across the Rhine. On March 10, after noting the absence of hostility toward France such as had existed in 1792, it offered the assurance that Germany would not regret its trust, for the Republic harbored no intention of seeking territorial aggrandizement or molesting its neighbors. "We have reconquered our liberty, we will respect the liberty of others." An article of the same tenor followed three days later, expressing the conviction that the people of Germany were now too mature to follow their princes into a war against France. Shortly thereafter the National, glowing with excitement at the prospect of a Franco-German alliance against the retrograde enterprises of the Tsar, called for "war against Russia if she should undertake anything against the liberty of the peoples. That is what France wants, that is what, henceforth, Germany wants with her." Fired by its vision of Franco-German cooperation against Russia, the National went on to express delight with the developing German unity, believing that "to draw tighter the bonds of their common fatherland is for the Germans to go forward to democracy, as the one depends on the other."

63 National, March 10, 1848.
64 Ibid., March 13, 1848.
The article ended with the prediction that a free Germany would help to reconstitute a free Poland. By the beginning of April, the National's joy was already somewhat dimmed by what seemed to it a sinister turn of events in Germany: the revolutionary torrent was failing to sweep away the princes and two of these odious creatures, the king of Prussia and the Austrian Emperor were even recovering sufficiently from their initial confusion to claim a role in the constitution of German unity. Testily the paper demanded to know when these princes had become the upholders of "the great principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity, the necessary basis of any political unity." The princes can never create the true unity of liberty, it asserted, but only the false unity of oppression. "Only democracy is qualified to accomplish this great work, because it alone has written on its ensign this device: fraternal solidarity. . ." A few days later the National betrayed its mounting irritation at the course of affairs across the Rhine by sharply rebuking the outcry raised there because of the deployment in eastern France of workers purposing an invasion of Germany. The next issue, however, carried an article renouncing the old French policy of maintaining

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65 Ibid., March 15, 1848.
66 Ibid., April 1, 1848.
67 Ibid., April 3, 1848.
small, weak neighbors. "The new policy is that she [France] have about her large and powerful nationalities; this policy is now applicable in Italy." This was followed by a declaration in favor of Italian independence and unity.\textsuperscript{68}

As the improbability of a republican Germany became increasingly apparent, Italy tended to replace that country in the affections of the National; on May 8 it declared that except for Italy, France would be alone in Europe, and more seriously endangered by the monarchical reactions in Prussia and Austria.\textsuperscript{69}

The Réforme, which reflected the views of Ledru-Rollin's socialist-minded wing of the republican party, was even more zealous than the National in its desire to see Germany a republic, but during the spring months it commented only fleetingly on German unity, apparently accepting it as the natural and inevitable concomitant of republicanism. It confidently predicted on March 17 that the peoples of "generous and too docile Germany," at last shaking off their lethargy, would soon follow the example of France and drive out their princes.\textsuperscript{70}

During the following weeks appeared several articles attacking the princes and their pretensions to govern a united Germany. On April

\textsuperscript{68} Ibìd., April 4, 1848.

\textsuperscript{69} Ibìd., May 8, 1848.

\textsuperscript{70} Réforme, March 17, 1848.
11 the Reforme exposed the plans it thought to discern among the German princes, prodded by the Tsar, to rally their subjects to a war against France. The one hope of confounding their nefarious designs, according to the Reforme, lay with the German people themselves, France's "sole ally in Germany."\(^71\) As the weeks passed, the Reforme could not escape the realization that indigenous republican forces alone were not sufficiently strong to win control of Germany. Loath to suffer the collapse of its fondly cherished dream, it urged, in late April, active French intervention to aid the German republicans to seize power. Republican Germany would then, the Reforme maintained, wage a war against Russia for the liberation of Poland, and France would aid in the struggle, even to the extent of procuring Courland for the Germans as compensation for the loss of Posen.\(^72\) Some two weeks later, vexed by Lamartine's failure to assist the republican movement in Germany, the Reforme obliquely charged him with betraying his revolutionary mission and it deplored the consequences already manifest in that nation: "the peoples of Germany are about to fall again under the weight of an old imperial crown which despotism, by means of a bastard constitution, would raise up from the dust of the Napoleonic battlefields." To the Reforme, the triumph

\(^{71}\) Ibid., April 11, 1848.

\(^{72}\) Ibid., May 9, 1848.
of "despotism" across the Rhine constituted a threat for France as well as a tragedy for Germany. France would soon find itself confronted by a feudal empire which "disposing of the combined forces of thirty-eight dynasties, all sworn enemies of our young republic. . . [will join] whoever should like to attack us from across the Nieman, the Danube, or the channel." Obviously, the prospect of a united German Empire rising from the ashes of the old Confederation was extremely distasteful to the Reform. But it was a monarchy, not unity in Germany, which offended it. A republican Germany, continued the article, "would serve us as a rampart against probable invasion from the north" and, by acting vigorously, exploiting the discontent arising in Germany against the current trends, France might yet make it possible for her neighbor on the east to "constitute its unity otherwise than under feudalism."73

What then, can be said of the French attitude toward German unification during the period of the Provisional Government which extended from February 24 to early May? It has been seen that among the French diplomatic representatives who were in Germany at the time of the February revolution, the transformation of the loosely joined Confederation with its thirty-eight virtually independent components into a centralized and unified state was not generally

73 Ibid., May 9, 1848.
regarded with favor. The old French diplomatic tradition of maintaining a splintered Germany was too deeply imbedded in their outlook to be lightly cast aside in deference to the republican doctrine of the rights of nationalities. To be sure, they were resigned to some modification in the structure of Germany, as this seemed in the spring of 1848 practically unavoidable. A few of them expressed the hope that the changes would be kept to a minimum, but not even the most conservative advocated French intervention to restore the old order of things. A considerably different attitude, however, was revealed by some of the men Lamartine named to replace the veteran diplomats who had held their posts under the Monarchy of July. Circourt, for example, did not seem troubled at the possible extension of Prussian influence over Germany, and Savoye, most especially, seemed not only ready but eager to accept whatever plans the German republicans entertained, including unification of their land. Nevertheless, the bulk of the diplomatic correspondence addressed to Lamartine took a rather dim view of German unity.

French public opinion, on the other hand, as reflected in the leading journals of Paris, proved much less loyal to the venerable tradition of keeping weak neighbors on the French borders and, consequently, more receptive to the new terms of reference which the republicans applied to Europe. Infected by the doctrines of the brotherhood of peoples and
the rights of nationalities, the directors of the press no longer made their evaluations of French foreign relations in the light of the axiomatic balance of power. Those editors among them who did not rejoice at the prospect of a united Germany were evidently prepared to accept it as a phenomenon conveying no special peril for France, and the only calls for intervention were those made by radical republicans who wanted to aid their counterparts across the Rhine achieve the unification of Germany under republican rather than monarchical auspices.

If French diplomacy was somewhat apprehensive, and popular opinion generally favorable toward German unity, what was the attitude of the Provisional Government itself? For practical purposes, this is largely to inquire after the opinion of one man, the dictator of foreign policy under the Provisional Government, Alphonse de Lamartine. Admittedly Lamartine encountered some dissent within the government from his conceptions of a proper republican foreign policy, notably from the Ledru-Rollin faction, which advocated a more aggressive support of revolution outside France. But, except for harassing tactics, such as lending surreptitious encouragement to the foreign workers in France planning invasion of their homeland, Ledru-Rollin could not deflect the policy of Lamartine, who retained a firm control of the Foreign Ministry.
Lamartine had served the restored Bourbon monarchy for some years in diplomatic posts in Italy; he must have, during this time, absorbed some of the French tradition of maintaining weak and divided neighbors, but whatever residue of this doctrine he may have retained does not seem to have influenced his views on Germany in 1848. Proving far more congenial to his poetic nature than did sober calculations of the balance of power, the humanitarian doctrines of brotherhood and peace among nations the more easily gained empire over him because of his belief that a new era in human history had dawned when he had decided for a republic rather than a regency in the midst of a tumultuous scene at the Palais Bourbon. His pronouncements in the spring of 1848 make abundantly clear Lamartine's conviction that the humanitarian and fraternal principles inspiring the rejuvenated social and political order of Europe rendered obsolete the hallowed diplomatic maxims of a past dominated by force, not justice.

Tending to see German unification as an aspect of the general reform movement sweeping Europe, Lamartine apparently gave the matter relatively little serious reflection. Other, more immediately pressing concerns virtually monopolized his attention, allowing him time for only the most cursory study of German developments. In not one of his frequent dispatches to his envoys in Germany did he go substantially beyond a general restatement of his public declarations.
of a desire for peace, understanding, and close friendship with that nation, nor was the question of German unity raised. The principal concern displayed in his correspondence was to allay the misgivings of the German governments as to possible invasion from France, misgivings which were kindled anew by the menacing deployment of the swarms of workers of German and other nationalities who had marched out from Paris with the intention of launching an invasion for the conquest and republicanisation of Germany. Important in Lamartine's view as was the mission of Circourt to Berlin, he found time to write him only one letter, in addition to the original instruction, during the entire period of Circourt's official assignment at the Prussian capital, in spite of the latter's repeated pleas for further instructions. It appears, even, that Lamartine did not read all the dispatches addressed to him by his envoys in Germany, but depended on his secretary for their contents, as he depended on him to compose some of his communications to the envoys.

Of Lamartine's infrequent directives to the French envoys, it may be said that in general they tend to confirm the sincerity of his public pronouncements in regard to Germany. His instructions to Lefebvre, who was appointed

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74 *Circourt Souvenirs*, I, LXVIII.
plenipotentiary at Karlsruhe, stressed the influence which French ideas had gained in Germany during the weeks following the February revolution. Expressing the conviction that Germany would be well disposed toward the Republic so long as the Republic did not threaten her tranquility, he added the assurance that France would not disturb the peace if she were not herself molested. Lefebvre was instructed carefully to observe everything of importance that transpired in Baden and the surrounding states, but no mention was made of German unity. A few days later in a dispatch to Berlin he said much the same thing, urging Circourt to emphasize to the Prussian government the pacific nature of French intentions. Toward the end of March, a dispatch from Salignac-Fenelon, at Frankfurt, exposed the view that except for a lingering fear of France, Germany would perhaps adopt a republican form. To this Lamartine replied by observing that Germany had hardly attained the degree of political maturity indispensable for republican institutions, but that it would be a grave error to allow suspicion of French intentions to stand in the way of her moving in that direction. 

76 A.A.E., Lamartine to Lefebvre (Baden), March 13, 1848.

77 Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 154-155.

78 A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, March 26, 1848.
reservations whatever toward Germany," he reiterated, echoing his solemn public assurances. He further affirmed that France respected all governments and all nationalities and no more intended to meddle in the internal affairs of other peoples than she was disposed to permit them to meddle in hers. A few days later, in order to dispel the alarm aroused in Germany by the threatened invasion from France by German and Polish workers, Lamartine repeated his assurances to Salignac-Fenelon that France had no desire to launch an invasion of Germany, emphasizing that his public declarations of pacific intentions were not mere rhetoric, but lay at the base of French policy.

In early May, instructing the newly appointed chargé d'affaires at Hamburg, Lamartine directed him to gather information on "the new and grave" situation in Germany, but he seemed equally concerned to garner data on Russian activities and intentions. No reference was made to German unity, but Lamartine ended by calling attention to the war which had broken out between Denmark and the Germanic Confederation.

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79 A.A.E., Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon (Frankfurt), March 31, 1848.
80 A.A.E., Lamartine to Salignac-Fenelon (Frankfurt), April 4, 1848.
81 A.A.E., Lamartine to Dessessarts (Hamburg), May 3, 1848.
The Schleswig-Holstein crisis, which extended throughout the year 1848 was to prove of major significance not only in determining the fate of the German unification attempt, but also in shaping the French attitude toward that attempt. Only the day before writing the instruction for the chargé at Hamburg, Lamartine had exposed his views on the Schleswig-Holstein situation in a dispatch to the French minister in Copenhagen. Although his remarks did not depart from a discreet reserve, it is evident that Lamartine's sympathies lay with Denmark rather than with the Confederation, whose beligerency he reproved, albeit cautiously. However, since Denmark had not yet seen fit to include France in her appeal for support addressed to Britain and Russia, nothing remained to the Republic but to offer its sincere wishes that the dispute be settled speedily and on the best terms possible for Denmark, old friend and ally of France.\textsuperscript{82} Mild as was this implied rebuke of the policy of Frankfurt apropos of the Schleswig-Holstein question, it is significant. It is one of the few direct evidences of any misgivings on Lamartine's part at developments in Germany and, moreover, it is an early statement of an attitude which grew steadily more pronounced in the Foreign Ministry of the Republic as the Schleswig-Holstein affair unfolded. Nevertheless, its importance should not

\textsuperscript{82} A.A.E., Lamartine to Dotezac (Copenhagen), May 2, 1848.
be exaggerated, as other data indicate that Lamartine still saw little to fear in the growing spirit of German nationalism.

In all his public references to Germany in the spring of 1848 Lamartine expressed deep satisfaction with the course of events in that land. While these pronouncements were undoubtedly made with one eye on their propaganda value, still, in so far as they can be controlled by his private diplomatic correspondence they appear to have honestly mirrored his attitudes and views.

In addition to his Manifesto to the European nations which he proposed to his colleagues on March 4, Lamartine made a number of public pronouncements on the foreign policy of the Provisional Government. Some were more or less extemporaneous harangues addressed to the various foreign deputations who came to pay him their compliments or present him their petitions; others were considered statements delivered to the Constituent Assembly. Although he never discussed German affairs in detail, nor systematically exposed his views on German unity in these declarations, they consistently and with unmistakable sincerity reflected satisfaction with developments across the Rhine.

Replying on March 19 to a Polish deputation which sought more active French assistance for the liberation of

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83 It was not issued until March 7.
their homeland, Lamartine, after urging patience, rejected all suggestion of violence against Germany. It would be an act of insanity and treason to liberty to interfere in the German nations at the moment when they were working to "modify themselves their internal system of confederation to create the unity and right of peoples. . ." And why should France interfere. Did not each courier bring additional reports from Germany of peoples adopting "our principles and fortifying our cause precisely because we have declared that this principle is the respect of the desires, of the forms of government, of the territories of all the peoples."

He went on to rejoice at the immense success which his foreign policy had enjoyed, citing the many examples in Germany and elsewhere of devotion to French ideas.84

Toward the end of March Lamartine replied in similar terms to a delegation of the National Italian Association, asserting that neither fear, nor complaisance, nor sentiment of preference would ever persuade the Republic to abandon its principle of respect for the independence of nations in the choice of their internal regime.85

That no significant change occurred in Lamartine's evaluation of events in Germany to the end of his occupancy of the Foreign Ministry is attested by his two addresses to

84 Lamartine, Trois Mois au Pouvoir, pp. 119-121.
85 Ibid., p. 132.
the Constituent Assembly of May 8 and May 23, which reveal better than anything else his reaction to German developments. The content, spirit, and tone of these speeches leave no doubt that he was still convinced that a new era of harmony, brotherhood, and good will in Europe had been inaugurated by the February revolution. Obviously delighted and naively flattered by the wave of revolution which had swept over Germany in the wake of the February events at Paris, and which he attributed to the irresistible attraction of the French example plus his own prudent conduct of French policy, he presented in his report of May 8 to the recently gathered Constituent Assembly a veritable catalogue of the triumphant march of democracy in Germany. In Prussia, an enlightened and well-meaning king "hastens to concede everything to the people." Even before the Prussian constituent assembly had met the Polish regions of Prussia demanded recognition of their separate identity. The King consented, and thereupon began a preliminary sketch of a Polish nationality "which may be enlarged and solidified by further developments in another direction." In Württemberg censorship was abolished, liberty of the press and a popular militia were established. In Baden, because of its proximity highly susceptible to French influence, similar gains were made and, moreover, the Duke promised "to cooperate in the establishment of a united German Parliament, that congress of German democracy from which will issue the
new order." In Bavaria, the new King united his cause with that of the people. The former sovereign of Hesse-Darmstadt was succeeded by a more liberal ruler and "everything is granted." The Elector of Hesse-Cassel, notorious for his opposition to democratic principles was forced to concede all, including admission of the "principle of a German Parliament." Insurrection constrained the Duke of Nassau to suppression of tithes, to permission of the political and military organization of his people, and to acceptance of the German Parliament. Leipzig had revolted, obtaining from the King of Saxony, already a constitutional monarch, "accession to the principle of a German Parliament." The same day the Prince of Oldenburg was forced to make liberal reforms. A few days later the people of Mecklenburg named a preliminary assembly to elect delegates to the German Parliament. Hamburg introduced democratic reforms in its already republican constitution. Bremen does likewise and "accedes to the German Parliament." Luebeck, after considerable violence, "conquers the same principle." Beyond doubt he was convinced that "everywhere, since the proclamation of the Republic, under various forms appropriate to the genius of the peoples, independence, liberty, and democracy are being organized on the French model."87

86 Ibid., pp. 177-179. Italics mine.

87 Ibid., p. 180. Lamartine here used the expression "French model" rather loosely. He knew that the French system was not being exactly duplicated in other lands, but
Lamartine's repeated mention of the Frankfurt Parliament in the context of liberal or democratic concessions extorted from retrograde princes leaves no doubt that he regarded the projected establishment of a stronger central authority in Germany as a desirable evolution. The Parliament, closely associated, even equated in his mind with the advancement of democracy in Germany was interpreted by him as consecrating the rupture with the old autocratic order. "All these decompositions," he proclaimed on May 8, "all these elements of federal unity are epitomised in the German Parliament at Frankfurt."88

Lamartine's belief that the new democratic Germany would inevitably desire close and friendly relations with France remained as strong as ever. He maintained that "Germany constitutes her natural alliance with us in constituting her independent parliament at Frankfurt. It is the future coalition of the peoples, closely dependent upon France, rather than aligned against her as was the case under the regime of the courts,"89 His belief in the he did believe that France was the source of much of the inspiration for the changes taking place in Europe.

88 Lamartine, Trois Mois au Pouvoir, p. 179.

89 Ibid., p. 183. It is not easy to say precisely what Lamartine had in mind in the expression "closely dependent upon France." Probably he was not completely clear himself. But he evidently had in mind the moral and intellectual tutelage which he expected Paris, as the source and principal center of the new ideas sweeping Europe, to exercise over the peoples newly won to those doctrines.
natural alliance of the democratic peoples of Europe with France was of fundamental importance in determining Lamartine's reaction to German unification. With their common principles binding together the peoples of Europe, the old strategic concepts stemming from the era of dynastic rivalries became largely irrelevant, so that the interests of France no longer required weak neighbors along her frontiers.

Her frontiers! I make use of a term that has lost a part of its meaning. Under the republic it is the democratic and fraternal principle which becomes the true frontier of France. It is not her territory which expands, it is her influence, it is her sphere of magnetic attraction on the continent, it is the disinterested intellectual tutelage which she exercises over the peoples, it is in sum the French system substituted in three days and in three months in place of the Holy Alliance.90

Is it surprising then that Lamartine, turning his back on centuries of French diplomatic tradition, should enthusiastically welcome the movement toward German unity? Intoxicated by his vision of a reconciliation of the peoples under the inspiration and guidance of France, he viewed the matter in an altogether different perspective than had Richelieu or Louis XIV.

The nature of Lamartine's conception of a unified Germany is not clear, nor was it clear, apparently, in his

90 Ibid., p. 181.
own mind. In the turbulent spring months of 1848 it was not possible to formulate any precise notion of what might eventually issue from the welter of contending purposes and interests obtaining in Germany. Certainly the dispatches from French envoys provided no firm basis for drawing conclusions as to the future structure of that land, for they revised their prognoses from day to day and were often contradictory. In fact, Lamartine's estimates of German developments were grounded less upon factual reports than upon his hopes and desires, which seem generally to have suggested a federal state, "diverse but unified."91 That considerable vagueness marked his manner of envisioning the new Germany, however, is revealed even in the speech of May 8.

In summary, then, it may be stated definitely that, on the whole, the French attitude toward German unity was undeniably favorable. The only discordant note came from some of the members of the diplomatic corps who were too deeply imbued with the tradition of maintaining a divided Germany to be able to renounce it in favor of the doctrine of nationalities. Representative opinions of some of these men have already been cited, but perhaps the most vigorous defense of the traditional French policy of maintaining a divided Germany was made by the irascible old Duke of Broglie who had served for some time as foreign minister in the

91 Lamartine, Trois Mois au Pouvoir, p. 179. (Statement made in his speech of May 8.)
earlier period of Louis Philippe's reign. In an article which did not appear until August of 1848, but which no doubt reflected a constant and unswerving opinion, Broglie severely castigated the republican policy of permitting, contrary to historic French practice, the creation of formidably powerful states on their borders. Scorning as naively absurd the faith that universal democracy would usher in the age of universal peace, he warned that French interests would be fatally compromised if the republican government stood idly by while Italy and Germany, rising above their former impotence, became strong and united nations. But the Duke of Broglie, reflecting the spirit of a previous era, was far removed from the seats of power in 1848 and could exercise no influence in altering the policies of a government which he deplored. Moreover, among the diplomats on active duty in early 1848, most of those inclined to adhere unswervingly to the old tradition were replaced by men more favorably disposed to the projected changes in the German constitution.

The general French acceptance, nay, endorsement of German unity may seem at first glance surprising. Centuries of history had afforded repeated illustrations of the advantages procured to France by the weakness and division of

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92 Albert de Broglie, "De la politique étrangère de la France depuis la Révolution de Février," Revue des deux Mondes (August, 1848), XXXIII, 293-313.
Germany. The eastward extension of France's borders had been greatly facilitated, if not made possible, by the lack of a strong and respected central authority in the old German Empire. French power and influence on the continent in the 17th and 18th centuries could have been nowhere nearly so great had a vigorous and united empire, dominating central Europe, opposed its will and ambition to those of France. French colonial enterprise could hardly have ventured so bold a challenge to the other maritime powers of Europe had not the monarchy always been able to count upon having at least some allies among the German princes to help secure her rear while her energies were being absorbed in struggles for distant possessions. Had the German states presented a unanimous and determined front in the decade of the 1790's, the French Revolution might have been contained or crushed before its expansionist spirit could gain momentum. That these considerations were still influential in the councils of the July Monarchy to the very end is evident from Guizot's alarm in 1847 at the possible extension of Prussian influence over Germany, to forestall which he entered into consultations with Metternich.

Nevertheless, the attitude of the Provisional Government in 1848 did not represent as abrupt a departure from previous policy and thinking as might seem to be indicated. Already discernible in the Restoration years was a tendency to consider alternatives to the policy of maintaining a
divided Germany in face of the growing opinion that eventual German unity was an inevitable historical evolution. Prince Polignac's solution was to procure to France extensive territorial compensation as a means of safeguarding an incontestable French preponderance. This also was a remedy, in part inspired by Napoleonic doctrines, proposed insistently by the republicans until the early 1840's. Lamartine saw the situation in a rather different light. He had virtually abandoned, or at least tended to relegate to subordinate importance, the territorial aggrandizement of France for to him the geographical extension and military might of the Republic were of less significance than the admiration and devotion which it commanded among the peoples of Europe. And the irresistible march of revolution across the continent in the spring of 1848 filled him with the conviction that the supreme moment had arrived when France, with Alphonse de Lamartine as the chief architect of her glory, could attain an unprecedented triumph by inspiring the creation of free democratic nations where, in his view, the fetid breath of tyranny had so long stifled the development and progress of mankind. With the free peoples of Europe bound to France in democratic fraternity, it was no longer necessary for her statesmen to scheme in terms of power politics, and she could, without compunction, accept the unification of Germany since, in the new context, this implied no menace to French security. Now that sordid dynas-
tic quarrels, ambitions, and jealousies were no longer capable of mischievously poisoning their relations, Germans and Frenchmen, in recognition of their common interests and the interests of humanity, would live together in a glorious and abiding harmony and brotherhood. ⁹³

Even had the Provisional Government disapproved the unification of Germany, it may be doubted whether its policy would have differed sharply from that pursued by Lamartine. Any intervention, or mere hint of intervention in Germany to disrupt the movement toward unification could have had no other result than to accelerate the process by directing it against France, a fact which Lamartine well understood. Furthermore, what means were available to the Provisional Government to thwart German unity if it had so desired to do? Its own military forces were in a state of unpreparedness, barely sufficing to maintain order at home. Some manner of cooperation with the German princes or with the Tsar might have been attempted, but neither of these alternatives were conceivable in the circumstances. It seems then, that had the Provisional Government desired the failure of the unification attempt, its conduct would not

⁹³ Lamartine writes of his position in late April: "His popularity was without limits in Paris, in France, in Germany, in Italy, in America. For Germany, his name meant peace; for France, it was a guarantee against terror; for Italy it meant hope; for America, it meant the republic. He had in truth at that moment the sovereignty of the European conscience." Mémoires Politiques III, 307.
have varied significantly from what it in fact was. The chief obstacle to German unity was the various German state governments themselves, and perhaps the best means for allowing this opposition to become effective was to maintain an aloof attitude, thereby giving the princes an opportunity to recover from their initial paralysis so that their egoism might once again preside over the destinies of Germany. However, this is merely gratuitous speculation. There is no evidence that Lamartine was thinking in these terms; there is, on the contrary, an abundance of evidence that he was sincere in his endorsements of German unity. It was in the nature of this "incorrigible visionary... whose persistent optimism resulted in the gradual dilapidation of his private fortune and the eclipse of his political influence"\(^4\) to become passionately enamoured of an idealistic conception of a new and better world to the exclusion of all other considerations. He wanted to believe, and therefore did believe that a new era was born in 1848, in which republican virtues would triumph over all vice and the rights of the peoples would at last be realized. Not the least of these rights was that of the Germans to establish their national unity.

\(^{94}\) R. Whitehouse, *op. cit.*, I, viii.
CHAPTER III

MID-MAY TO JULY: PERIOD OF GROWING FRENCH DISILLUSIONMENT WITH GERMAN DEVELOPMENTS

Lamartine's replacement as head of the Foreign Ministry by Jules Bastide marked the end of the first phase of the evolution of the French attitude toward the German unification movement of 1848. Imagining that Bastide would continue the policies established by him, Lamartine expected to retain his influence over the conduct of foreign affairs even after surrendering the office.¹ In this respect Lamartine's hopes were not entirely realized, for Bastide's policies diverged from those which he had projected, especially in Italian affairs.² A subtle difference between Lamartine's and Bastide's attitude toward German unity became apparent soon after Bastide assumed control of the foreign ministry, a difference provoked in part by the evolution of affairs in Germany, in part due to a difference in the two men themselves. Although as sincere a republican as Lamartine, and a republican of far longer standing, Bastide was less emotionally impulsive, less a Gefuehls-politiker than his extravagantly emotional predecessor.

¹ Circourt, Souvenirs, II, 145-146.
² Lamartine, Mémoires politiques, III, 245.
Unlike Lamartine, Bastide was wholly inexperienced in diplomatic affairs prior to the February revolution; but he showed considerable aptitude for the work, although the republican informality of his manners disturbed the partisans of strict decorum. Fond of placing his feet upon the table, with a cigar in his mouth, he carried his departure from diplomatic custom to the point of receiving the envoys of foreign powers in his shirt sleeves. He had been named on February 27 under secretary of State by Lamartine, who later wrote of him:

Bastide was a man of calm and resolution, his name had been popularised by a long republican opposition on the National. He had a reputation for probity; he deserved it. The people knew Bastide; Lamartine did not know him before the twenty-fourth of February; during the initial tumults of the first night, and the assaults of the second day, he had been struck by his attitude of common sense, by his imperturbability. He had thought that this man would be a precious auxiliary. Furthermore, he had reckoned that the name of Bastide, long associated with republicanism, would, by its celebrity, cover the name of Lamartine whose republicanism had been purely philosophic until that time and would therefore be suspected by the multitude. Under the eyes of Bastide, no treason to the republic

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3 A.J.P. Taylor is rather critical of Bastide's capacities, attributing to him numerous tactical errors in the conduct of French diplomacy, especially in regard to Italian affairs. However, it is difficult to deny that for a neophyte he displayed considerable balance and common sense. cf. Taylor's *The Italian Problem in European Diplomacy 1848-49* (Manchester, 1934).


was to be feared. The foreign minister could moderate the revolution in its relations with Europe, prevent war, save the blood of France and of humanity without being accused of abandoning the revolution.\textsuperscript{6}

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Lamartine's well-founded boast that in the early period of the Provisional Government he exercised exclusive control in the formation of French foreign policy has already been noted. Bastide might have made a somewhat similar claim, for if he did have recourse to the counsel of experienced statesmen, he stubbornly excluded the Constituent Assembly from any significant participation in the shaping of foreign policy, a surprising procedure on the part of a minister so sincerely devoted to republican principles, and one that did not fail to elicit bitter protests.\textsuperscript{7} Even the committee for foreign affairs was denied access to any knowledge of the plans and attitudes inspiring the policies of the Foreign Ministry, with the result that its discussions, which in any case never dealt systematically with the question of German unification, remained futile and sterile. On several occasions, in answer to strictures passed upon his secretive methods Bastide, emphasizing the

\textsuperscript{6} Lamartine, \textit{Histoire de la Revolution de 1848}, II, 9.

\textsuperscript{7} Certain members of the Constituent Assembly who were especially concerned with foreign affairs attempted several times to force Bastide to divulge his intentions in regard to the foreign relations of France, but without success. Cf. the \textit{Moniteur} for August 1 and November 8, 1848.
uncertain and delicate nature of the diplomatic situation, insisted upon the undesirable consequences which a public airing of the government's policy could have for current projects and negotiations. Mockery of fate, a government which proceeded from revolution, which had subsequently legitimized itself by an appeal to the sovereign electorate, and which tirelessly reiterated its faith in the wisdom of the people, deemed it expedient to envelop its diplomacy in as thick and impenetrable shroud of secrecy as had the late and much maligned cabinet of Guizot. But if Bastide's unwillingness to expose his purposes and actions to the glaring light of publicity appeared incongruous with the basic principles of a republic founded upon the general will, it is evident that a different course would have hopelessly complicated an already difficult task. Only by devising and carrying out his policies in an atmosphere secure from the intrusions of inflamed popular passions could he hope to achieve a reconciliation of various conflicting claims—the demands of the ardent republicans that aid be extended to their confrères across the border, the national interests of France, the clamors of the struggling nationalities throughout Europe, and the constant admonitions of the established governments, whose existence seemed threatened by the efforts of those nationalities.

Lamartine's public statements had already encumbered the diplomacy of the Second Republic with several embaras-
sing legacies. For Bastide to reveal his true attitude toward Germany which, as the summer progressed, diverged increasingly from the public professions of the Second Republic, would have been especially awkward, as it would not only have evoked bitter attacks from the French left, but would probably have furthered the realization of tendencies in Germany which he disliked. Furthermore, as he was always somewhat tentative in his policy toward Germany, preferring that the situation clarify itself before France became irrevocably committed to any definite position, non-disclosure of his attitude permitted a greater flexibility and maneuverability, advantages which no statesman freely relinquishes.

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In addition to his long association with the republican journal, the National, Bastide had, in May, 1847, in collaboration with P.J.B. Buchez, founded a monthly, the Revue Nationale, the purpose of which, as explained in the first issue, was to reconcile the French Revolution with Catholicism, while accenting the importance of the French "nationality." "In all things... the supreme rule that we shall follow will be the interest of the French nationality. ... [and] we will oppose with all our force..."

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8 It later became a weekly.

9 May, 1847.
everything that is harmful to it."\textsuperscript{10}

It will be recalled that the \textit{National} at first warmly endorsed democratic reform and unification in Germany,\textsuperscript{11} but became greatly disturbed at the excesses of the German national spirit, as well as by the pretentions of the princes to lead the way to unity. The \textit{Revue Nationale} displayed the same abandoned enthusiasm for German democratic unification in the early months of the revolution. On March 9 it judged a republican Germany to be yet some distance in the future. Austria and Prussia were profoundly hostile to the Republic; Prussia was massing troops in a threatening manner, and wanted nothing more than to crush the revolution at its fountainhead. Nevertheless, the Republic was not gravely threatened, the \textit{Revue} assured its readers, for the masses of central Germany, having already secured their liberty in a few glorious weeks, would not stand idly by and permit the Prussian and Austrian tyrants to attack the cradle of that liberty with impunity. France was enjoined to enter into a "fraternal union with the peoples of Germany because, from now on, the German peoples amount to something and its voice counts in Europe."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10} \textit{Revue Nationale}, May, 1847, p. 3.
\textsuperscript{11} The \textit{National} had taken a stand in favor of German unification under democratic auspices even under the July Monarchy. cf. G. Weill, \textit{Parti républicain}, p. 198.
\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Revue Nationale}, March 9, 1848, p. 315.
The swift course of events firing the imagination of its editors, the Revue Nationale soon became a staunch advocate of close European unity. Present events, it maintained, would usher in a new public law which will finally establish the relations of peoples upon the bases of union and fraternity; the old monarchical law has disappeared, with its hideous cortege of blood and hate; in its place it is up to us to install Christian law which, while respecting national individualities, should link them in one fold and perhaps fuse them later into a common unity. The moment has come to attempt the great work of European federation.

A month ago a similar proposal would have seemed the fancy of a dreamer, but in presence of the miracles we have witnessed, are there still skeptics blind enough not to see that this great work can be an accomplished fact at least for the continent, before the 19th century completes it's course?13

The same issue contained another article which, after expressing satisfaction with events in Germany, asserted confidently, "If we have war now it will not be with Austria or Prussia. There remains Russia, our great enemy in the East; there remains the English aristocracy."14 A week later the Revue Nationale, again citing Russia and the English aristocracy as the only two remaining counter-revolutionary forces in Europe, hailed developments in Germany, which "is transforming itself into a vast federation; it is the German

13 Ibid., March 23, 1848, p. 333.
14 Ibid., pp. 334-335.
empire resuscitated to the profit of the peoples and of liberty." 15

In early April the matter of German unity was squarely considered. After a brief summary of the movement, the dazzling conclusion was offered that "these efforts are glorious for France; they are a striking testimony of our ascendancy. Just as our revolutions attract all the peoples, all the peoples seem to want, after our example, to gravitate around a single political center. . . ." From here, however, a certain note of reserve is discernible in the tenor of the article: Germany did not have the long tradition of unity generic to France, nor had she any city comparable to Paris as a natural focal point of political centralization. This lack of a traditional center, thought the Revue, might contribute to a renewal of a system on the order of the old circles. Inevitably, though, upon the ruins of the monarchies, "we shall see raised up a vast republican federation, or perhaps a true centralization made in the image of ours." 16 Thus, after briefly faltering, the Revue Nationale resolved its doubts and unflinchingly accepted the prospect of a united Germany. The following issue, without making a specific reference to unification extolled the glorious role to be played by the impending Frankfurt Parliament which "seems called, in effect, to execute one of the

15 Ibid., March 30, 1848, p. 347.
16 Ibid., April 6, 1848, pp. 362-364.
most splendid missions which it has ever been given to a reunion of men to exercise, that of carrying out for a great people an entire political transformation." Whether this transformation could be effected however, without first repulsing the reactionary intervention of Russia in a great military struggle seemed dubious to the Revue.\textsuperscript{17}

But the days of the \textit{Revue Nationale} were numbered, it fell silent in the summer of 1848 after having carried on a brief though vigorous campaign in behalf of its principles. Some time before expiring it emitted an appraisal of the policies of the Committee of Fifty which held the rudder of the newly launched German ship of state during the interval extending from the dissolution of the \textit{Vorparlament} to the opening of the National Assembly on May 18. This appraisal was marked by more than a touch of irony and disillusionment. The celerity with which the Fifty had associated German interests with the Austrian struggle against Italian national aspirations, the failure of the Fifty to support the cause of Polish independence with sufficient determination, plus the fact that a soberer analysis of the composition and tendencies of the Frankfurt group revealed that republicanism was not in the ascendancy in that body caused the \textit{Revue Nationale} to regard the whole matter with much diminished enthusiasm.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.}, April 13, 1848, p. 388.

\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Ibid.}, May 4, 1848, pp. 425-426.
The disappearance of the Revue Nationale not long after Bastide's assumption of control of the Foreign Ministry might not have been merely coincidental. If Bastide had continued, during the rule of the Provisional Government, to take an active part in editing his review, the additional burden and responsibilities imposed on him as Foreign Minister would probably have forced him to abandon his journalistic activities. But whether or not Bastide had continued to exert an important influence over the policies of the Revue Nationale after the February revolution, and this seems quite possible, it may be safely assumed that its expressed reactions to events in Germany did not vary significantly from those of its co-founder, so unexpectedly and precipitately catapulted into high office by the events of February. This assumption derives further confirmation from the fact that Bastide's earliest recorded pronouncements on German affairs, written shortly after his appointment as Lamartine's successor, reflects precisely the same attitude of chagrin and disillusionment betrayed by the Revue Nationale in its final days. Not yet arraigning the principle of German unification per se, he revealed as early as May 19 a keen irritation with the excesses of the "exaggerated spirit of nationality and unity which reign in Germany, driving Frankfurt to usurpations against neighboring states."19

19 A.A.E., Bastide to Tallenay (London) May 19, 1848.
In order to understand Bastide's sense of disillusionment with the trend of German developments, the course of their unfolding in the shaken Confederation must be briefly traced. The ultimate results of Germany's reorganization were altogether uncertain in May of 1848, as they remained to some extent throughout the year. Nevertheless, a few salient tendencies were becoming increasingly manifest, tendencies which no responsible French statesman could regard with complete unconcern.

Though the emergence of the various nationalities into a state of independence and self rule had seemed to the French republicans in early 1848 a desirable goal consistent with the cherished principles extolled by them for many years, unexpected and extremely thorny complications in the form of national minorities were thrusting up formidable obstacles to the realization of such a program. Many German patriots were displaying painfully little sympathy with the national aspirations of neighboring peoples wherever those aspirations clashed with German interests. Unfortunately, the hopelessly confused interpenetration of nationalities in the northern and eastern border areas made such clashes inevitable.

In the spring months of 1848 the Polish regions of Prussia presented the most bafflingly complex as well as one of the most momentous problems in the realm of external affairs to the excited architects of the new Germany. The
dispute with Denmark over Schleswig-Holstein was of importance second only to the Polish question, but was relatively clear cut, notwithstanding Palmerston's witticism about there being only three men who had ever fully understood the problem involved. Although it was a matter of far less pressing concern than either Schleswig or Poland, the challenge to German influence south of the Alps occasioned by the Italian uprising also aroused intense interest at Frankfurt, attention of a sort very disturbing to the French government. The Italian problem, and Frankfurt's attitude toward it, eventually assumed an immense importance in determining the attitude of the Second Republic toward the German unification movement.

The fate of Poland, one of the most sensitive issues confronting Europe in the spring months of 1848, excited lively interest in both Germany and France. It constituted one of the principal bases upon which French opinion toward Germany was formed. Sentiment in France, traditionally partial to Poland, was overwhelmingly in favor of a free Polish nation, although few responsible officials were prepared to invoke war to bring it about. Even so, the possibility of war against Russia, without whose defeat a genuine re-establishment of Poland was out of the question, was at least considered by Lamartine. In such a war, French

20 In early April Lamartine rather reluctantly agreed to take up arms at the side of Prussia should that state suffer a Russian attack because of its efforts to resurrect a free Polish nation. cf. Circourt, Souvenirs I, 329-330.
forces, had they participated, would have functioned as allies of German forces.

In the early weeks of revolutionary fervor, before the incompatibility of German and Polish national aims had become clearly evident, an anti-Russian crusade on behalf of Poland was widely agitated and extolled throughout Germany. The population of Berlin accorded to Mieroslawski and his fellow Poles a jubilant salute after releasing them from prison on the 20th of March. Even von Arnim, the newly appointed Prussian Minister of Foreign Affairs was favorably disposed to the idea of a restoration of Poland, seeing in it a means by which his sovereign's prestige, woefully tarnished by the humiliating debacle of March 18, could be restored. If Frederick William were to place himself at the head of the movement of sympathy for the Polish cause then sweeping Germany, his popularity, Arnim believed, would be at once restored, and the position of Prussia in Germany immeasurably strengthened. Any serious undertaking on behalf of the Poles would involve collaboration with the French Republic. In late March, therefore, von Arnim indicated to Circourt a willingness to grant the right of transit to volunteers proceeding from France or elsewhere to western Poland. "The struggle for the principle of the reconstruction of independent nationalities," added the Prussian

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21 Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 175-176. The Poles had been held in prison for their part in the uprising of 1846.
foreign minister, was a struggle for "a just principle, . . . for our present principle." 22

Almost unanimously the extreme Left in Germany demanded the restitution of a free, democratic Poland and expressed a willingness to protect the Poles with the entire strength of the German nation, 23 seeming to welcome the advent of war with Russian, wherein, aided by their French confreres, they would execute the glorious task of overthrowing the citadel of barbarism and tyranny. 24 The anti-Russian frenzy sweeping Germany in the spring of 1848 was not an altogether new phenomenon, as hostility toward Russia had been an integral component of liberal opinion there since 1830. 25 Nor was the advocacy of war against Russia confined to the fringe of radical republicanism. Even men of moderate views such as Gervinus were urging the restoration of Poland through military action against Russia. 26

Perhaps the climax of the Polenschwaermerei was reached when the Vorparlament almost unanimously approved the republican Struve's proposal that it declare it to be

22 Ibid., p. 307.

23 Meier, Die Aussenpolitischen Ideen der Achtundvierziger, p. 2.

24 Sybel, Die Begrundung des deutschen Reiches, I,151.

25 Meier, op. cit., p. 20.

26 Ibid., p. 23. It should be noted, however, that in calling for war, Gervinus was prompted by calculations of German interest rather than by love of Poland.
the "sacred duty of the German people to restore Poland"
and to rectify the crying injustice of Poland's partition.27 Yet it soon became apparent that the prospects for selfless
German cooperation in the restoration of Poland were not as
bright as the overwhelming expression of sentiment in the
Vorparlament seemed to indicate. Whereas the Left had en-
dorsed Struve's proposal because of ideological considera-
tions and because of the conviction that justice and decency
demanded that the crimes committed against Poland be expung-
ed, the Right had accorded its approval primarily for tacti-
cal reasons. Like Gervinus the Vorparlament Right urged the
extension of aid to the Poles as a means of advancing
German national interests, with the further advantage that
it provided a useful outlet for dangerous revolutionary
pressures.28

From mid-April onward German sympathy for Poland,
which had been from the outset in part merely opportunistic
or tactical, steadily declined. Many Germans at first fav-
orably disposed toward Polish aspirations were moved to
sharp hostility as relations between the Poles and Germans
in the mixed Polish-German areas of Posen deteriorated into
violence and disorder. Few German patriots could ignore the
bitter protests of their fellow nationals in the border
provinces against any arrangement which might place them

27 V. Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution
28 Meier, op. cit., p. 37.
under Polish sovereignty. Frederick William IV and his ministers, feeling a certain sympathy for the Poles, had, at the beginning of April, sent the capable General von Willisen to Posen. Willisen had long been friendly toward Polish national aspirations, but even his ability and good will proved insufficient to solve what was, in the excitement of the hour, an essentially insoluble problem. In Berlin pro-Polish sentiment declined noticeably, and toward the end of April the Prussian government fundamentally revised its plans for Polish reorganization. In early May, Prussia dealt prospects for a substantial restoration of Poland a crippling blow by incorporating a large part of the province of Posen, including the city of Posen, into the German Confederation.

The mounting ascendancy of nationalistic considerations over sympathy for Poland as a determinant of German policy was revealed also in the attitude of the Committee of Fifty which had been designated by the Vorparlament to exercise a surveillance of German affairs until the gathering of the National Assembly. In the confusion and brief duration of the Vorparlament the wide difference in foreign policy views between Left and Right had not become conspicuously evident and some of the resolutions hastily enacted in

29 Valentin, op. cit., I, 541.
30 Ibid., p. 524.
this sphere, such as the condemnation of the partition of Poland, helped to create the impression of a substantial unanonymity of attitude.31 During the more extended deliberations of the Committee of Fifty, the extensive concessions in favor of Poland, which the Left continued to push, were at first regarded with coolness, and finally opposed by the Right, whose adherents succeeded in obtaining a relegation to the forthcoming National Assembly of decisions affecting a restoration of Poland.32

In the discussion of Polish affairs toward the end of April the Prussian influence made itself increasingly felt in the ranks of the Fifty, so that the nationalist majority was quite willing to deem as valid the Prussian arguments in justification of the annexation to the Confederation of the mixed German-Polish areas of Posen.33 Writing from Berlin on May 1, Circourt declared the prospects of the restoration of a free Poland under German auspices, apparently so bright only a few weeks previously, to be completely shattered. Instead of denouncing crimes committed against the Polish nation, the Germans were now characterizing its members as "incorrigible and barbarous hordes" who must be dealt a final lesson. If France persisted in the "grand enterprise" of

31 Meier, op. cit., pp. 18-19.
32 Ibid., p. 57.
33 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
restoring Poland, she must accomplish it alone. "And to do it without Germany," Circourt warned his government, "is to do it against Germany.\(^3^4\)

Meanwhile, an evolution hardly more reassuring from the French standpoint had been taking place in German-Danish relations. In late March Germans in the disputed duchy of Schleswig had raised the standard of revolt against Danish rule, determined to prevent the severance of their long-standing tie with Holstein. The occupation of Schleswig by victorious Danish troops provoked an outcry in Germany which resulted on April 12 in a call from the Diet to Frederick William IV to protect the rights of Schleswig and in the issuance of a call by the Committee of Fifty for a volunteer corps to aid the duchies. The following day Hanoverian troops entered the duchies; before the new Germany had fairly begun its re-organization, its partisans had engaged it in a war on the strength of its most vaunted principle—nationality. Moreover, the advance of Prussian troops into Jutland early in May evoked the concerted applause of democrats, liberals, and conservatives.\(^3^5\) From Frankfurt Salignac-Fenelon, writing to Lamartine condemned German aggression against Denmark and pointed out that England, Russia, and France were all concerned in the matter because of


the treaty of 1720 by which those three Powers confirmed the attribution of the duchy of Schleswig to the king of Den­mark. Later, this treaty was to provide a justification for the French government joining with England and Russia in making representations on behalf of Denmark against German pretentions. However, as French attachments to Denmark were not nearly so strong as those to Poland, the Provisional Government remained largely passive in the early stages of the affair of the duchies, the more disposed thereto as the Danes at first showed little inclination to solicit French intervention in their defense. It was Palmerston who took the lead in defending Danish interests, Lamartine contenting himself with an expression of sympathy to Count Moltke, the Danish ambassador at Paris, for his country's cause.  

As interest in Poland subsided, German reaction toward events in Italy became one of the major concerns of the French government. The Prussian government had exhibited an acute interest in the Italian situation from the beginning of the disorders south of the Alps. For some time it had shared the sympathy prevailing in north Germany for the Italian cause. At the same time, however, the Prussian government urged Circourt to make it clear to his government that any

36 A.A.E., Salignac-Fenelon to Lamartine, Frankfurt, April 9, 1848.

37 A.A.E., Bastide to Tallenay (London), May 19, 1848.
violation of German territory by the Italians and their auxiliaries would oblige members of the Confederation to extend military assistance to Austria.38 From early May the French agent in Berlin was almost as much occupied with the question of Italy as with that of Poland. The territories attributed by the treaties of 1815 to the Confederation had been encroached upon by Italian forces, making an intervention by German forces in the fighting a distinct possibility. In that case French intervention on behalf of Italy would be a likely consequence. The Committee of Fifty, asserting its own authority in increasing measure, imperiously summoned the Diet to recover German territory in the Tyrol and in Istria thus creating a situation the gravity of which Circourt did not fail to point out to his government in a dispatch of May 2.39 A few days later he renewed his warning that any attempt to aid the Italians against Austria would involve the Republic in a war with all of Germany,40 a judgment which seemed confirmed by an identical warning from Lefebvre, in Baden.41 Thus even more than in the case of Poland, in Italy the French republicans' desire to aid an oppressed nationality to gain its independence was squarely blocked by the intransigence of German nationalism.

38 Circourt, Sourvenirs, II, pp. 32-33.
39 Ibid., p. 141.
40 Ibid., p. 164.
41 A.A.E., Lefebvre to Lamartine, Baden, May 5, 1848.
Moreover, evidence was mounting that the new Germany was unlikely to be either democratic or republican. Having found themselves in a feeble minority in the Vorparlament, some of the more zealous republicans had sought the realization of their program in an absurdly futile uprising in southwestern Germany. Unable to enlist the aid of either the French Republic or of a significantly large sector of the Baden population, the desperate bands of Hecker and Struve were dispersed with relative ease by government troops. The principal result of the Baden upheaval proved to be the gulf which it created between the Democratic and the liberal monarchist elements of Germany. These liberals, terrified by what they interpreted as the emergence of the "red specter," now rallied to the banners of their princes. Taking cognizance of this development, Lefebvre, who only a few weeks before had announced the approaching collapse of the princes and the imminent establishment of a united and democratic Germany, warned in early May that the princes "are today what they have been for sixty years, the inveterate enemies of our principles" and now, their position strengthened by the revulsion of the noble and bourgeois classes away from democracy, they were prone to contemplate war with France as a means of distracting the attention of

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\[42\] A.A.E., Lefebvre to Lamartine, Karlsruhe, April 10, 1848.
their subjects from social and political grievances. The cause of Poland and the prospects for a German republic were destroyed for a lifetime, as Lefebvre saw it, in the double reaction occurring in Germany, "reaction against France and reaction against the Poles."\textsuperscript{43} From Frankfurt the newly arrived French envoy, Savoye reported a lively feeling of mistrust toward France among the Committee of Fifty,\textsuperscript{44} while a few days later a special French agent, summarizing the conclusions of his reconnaissance mission in Germany, corroborated the opinion of Lefebvre that no present prospect existed for the creation of a German republic. Deploiring the Germans' enthusiasm for the Austrian efforts in Italy and their indifference toward the cause of Poland, Klein commented in disillusionment that the spirit of German nationalism "marches constantly ahead of the spirit of democracy...Thus things seen from close-up often lose the prestige that distance confers." In view of this situation, Klein deemed it "natural to hope that great difficulties in the creation of German unity will introduce discords which will enable French influence to recapture a part of the terrain which it has lost." However, like virtually all French observers in Germany, he emphasized the advisability of avoiding any af-

\textsuperscript{43} A.A.E., Lefebvre to Lamartine, Karlsruhe, May 5, 1848.

\textsuperscript{44} A.A.E., Lefebvre to Lamartine, Karlsruhe, May 3, 1848.
front to German sensibilities by direct French interference, for such conduct could only have the result of accelerating the German unification movement. Rather than bungle matters through premature action, France should bide its time, he cautioned, and await a more favorable juncture for reasserting its interests. The policy of watchful reserve, here advocated by Klein roughly foreshadowed the course which Bastide was to adopt after his disillusionment with German developments had advanced as far as Klein's disenchantment.

Viewed against the background of events in Germany, Bastide's loss of enthusiasm for the unification of that land is entirely comprehensible. After several weeks of overwhelming confusion, during which time many French republicans, quite probably Bastide among them, prematurely hailed the fulfillment of their cherished hopes for a re-birth of Europe, had come a series of dream-shattering developments in Germany, of which only the most obstinate visionaries could fail to see the significance. Bastide was not in this category. Sincere republican and idealist though he was, a fund of common sense re-enforced no doubt by the sobering effects of his responsibilities enabled him to view events realistically, and a realistic appraisal of the trend of events in Germany could not fail to disclose that some of the fondest hopes of the French republicans,

\[45\] A.A.E., Klein to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Strasbourg, May 10, 1848.
momentarily raised up, had already, by early May, miscarried.

Prospects for a liberated Poland were nearly shattered, prospects for a republican Germany seemed almost irretrievably dashed and, to crown it all, the new Germany, not yet fully drawn up on its feet, was reeling about in an alarmingly aggressive fashion, assaulting Denmark, babbling wildly of Livonia, Courland, Limburg, yes, even Alsace, and pointedly warning the French against extending military aid to the Italians, who like the Germans themselves were seeking to achieve national unity and independence. With so many of his most cherished interests, not alone as a Frenchman, but also as a republican, thus placed in jeopardy by the antics of the squawking, *enfant terrible* of German nationalism Bastide instinctively recoiled before the image of the mature neighbor which so unpromising a youthful behavior conjured up. In such circumstances he inevitably conceived in a fresh light and with new understanding, the traditional policy of the French Monarchy of maintaining German disunity.

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Even with his misgivings alerted, it cannot be said that Bastide, when he became Foreign Minister had yet become irrevocably hostile to German unity. Increasingly more inclined in that direction, as the weeks passed, by the continuing revelation of the temper underlying German developments, Bastide nevertheless did not entirely despair for some weeks of the possibility of finding in Germany a partner with whom
much might yet be achieved.

Accounts of events beyond the Rhine were still sufficiently varied as to permit some continued uncertainty as to their eventual result. Reports of the growing strength of republican and democratic sentiment reached Bastide with sufficient frequency in late May and early June to keep alive a ray of hope that the new authority in the process of gestation at Frankfurt might soon come under the sway of such influences. Meneval wrote from Dresden in early May that the republicans desired especially German unity.\textsuperscript{46} A week later, still doubting whether their influence would be sufficiently great to dominate the forthcoming national assembly, Meneval felt that republican elements were destined to exercise a wholesome influence on its deliberations.\textsuperscript{47}

From Hamburg, Dessessarts, who favored a close union between the French and German peoples, wrote of the warm welcome accorded him shortly after his arrival in Hamburg by a workman's society which wished to express "in the name of all Germany" the sympathies of democratic Germany for the French Republic.\textsuperscript{48} Tydings of a similar vein were conveyed by the reports of Rothan, stationed at Cassel. On June 11 he declared radical ideas to be gaining ground rapidly. Irre-

\textsuperscript{46} A.A.E., Meneval to Lamartine, Dresden, May 5, 1848.

\textsuperscript{47} A.A.E., Meneval to Lamartine, Dresden, May 12, 1848.

\textsuperscript{48} A.A.E., Dessessarts to Bastide, Hamburg, May 30, 1848.
sistibly, emboldened by the inertia of the governments, the democrats were obtaining an increasingly formidable position. It could be said, he felt, that the republican party had sunk its roots deep into the soil of Germany, so extensively indeed, that the traditional love of the Germans for their princes, of which Heine spoke, had almost entirely disappeared.\textsuperscript{49} Elaborating the same theme a week later, Rothan saw democratic ideas everywhere gaining adherents, with the movement in favor of a republic developing with a "remarkable intensity."\textsuperscript{50}

But most impressive of all were the reports emanating from the two most critical French diplomatic posts in Germany, Frankfurt and Berlin, which were both, it is worthy of note, occupied by zealous republicans wholeheartedly dedicated to the ideal of a close union between the French and German peoples. M. Savoye had been sent to Frankfurt by Lamartine in late April. The appointment of a fiery republican like Savoye, who in the turbulent spring months of 1849 was openly to enter the ranks of German radicals in revolt against their governments,\textsuperscript{51} was in itself something of an index of the French government's attitude toward Germany.

\textsuperscript{49} A.A.E., Rothan to Bastide, Cassel, June 11, 1848.
\textsuperscript{50} A.A.E., Rothan to Bastide, Cassel, June 11, 1848.
\textsuperscript{51} A.A.E., Bassano to de Lhuys, Baden, May 16, 1849.
Savoye was a German political refugee who had for years been an instructor in the Lycée Descartes and who had at the same time established himself in French republican circles. He returned to Germany as the French agent at Frankfurt with a few simple, burning convictions: the German princes were a crafty, scheming lot, inveterately hostile to France and to the spread of French ideas in Germany; the German people on the other hand were trustworthy and devoted to French ideas. The struggle in which the two forces were locked could and must have only one issue—the triumph of the friends and partisans of French ideas. Even as, with the passing of time, things did not go as he had anticipated, Savoye clung tenaciously to his original conceptions, wrestling bravely with the increasingly difficult task of forcing the facts of the German situation into his pre-conceived framework.

Feeling an exalted sense of responsibility before the great task assigned to him, he solemnly dedicated all his energies toward effecting a rapprochement between the French and German peoples in the interests of the liberty, peace, and happiness of the two peoples.²

Constantly scenting nefarious princely intrigues to implant hatred of France in the minds of the people, he saw the devotion of the German masses to French ideas as the most effective defense of the Second Republic. In his dis-

² *A.A.E.,* Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, May 23, 1848.
patch of May 7 he summarized the policy of the German governments, and of the two chief states, Prussia and Austria especially, as follows: excite and exploit among the German people a suspicion of the alleged designs of France; vis à vis the National Assembly stimulate the sentiment of loyalty to the provincial governments so as gradually to provoke resistance to the efforts of that body to attain its principal object, the constitution of Germany unity. Unfortunately, thought Savoye, the maneuvers to disorient the program of unification were enjoying no little success.53

So disturbed was Savoye at the extent of reactionary intrigues afoot in Germany that he pled for "extraordinary resources" to enhance the effectiveness of his countermeasures, urging the utmost dispatch upon Bastide, as in a few days the "most sacred interests" were to be contested for. He felt confident that with resolute energy, all could be saved, for an ever growing number of Germans wanted only to be reassured as to the intentions of the Second Republic to embrace it with a "fraternal cordiality."54 An event a few days later occasioned further distress for Savoye. The newly assembled Frankfurt Parliament chose as its president Henrich von Gagern, who was undesirable from the French minister's point of view, because of his known monarchist

53 A.A.E., Savoye to Lamartine, Frankfurt, May 7, 1848.
54 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, May 15, 1848.
sympathies, and as being a "minister in active service of a reigning prince." But doggedly refusing to despair in the face of this further set-back to his dreams, Savoye found consolation in the hope that sooner or later democratic elements might gain control of the assembly.55

A week later Savoye renewed his denunciations of the efforts of the princely governments to stem the democratic tide rising in Germany. But this time his vituperation reflected an air of triumph, for the princes had just been dealt a mighty blow by the Parliament which had declared itself solely possessed of the right to frame a constitution for Germany, subordinating the powers of the various state assemblies to the National Assembly at Frankfurt. This vote, which appeared to constitute an important step toward German unity was received in Savoye's words, "by us French who sincerely love Germany, and want to extend her a fraternal hand...with a profound emotion as a reassuring guarantee of the future destinies of German liberty."56 He rejoiced as the Parliament prepared to establish a central government for Germany, noting that it was simultaneously to consider the conclusion of an offensive and defensive alliance with France.57

55 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, May 19, 1848.
56 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, May 28, 1848.
57 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, May 31, 1848.
Like many of the more radical French democrats, Savoye believed that a united, democratic Germany would prove a necessary and invaluable ally against England and Russia, strongholds of aristocracy and autocracy, respectively. So highly did he esteem this potential alliance, all the more to be cherished as the Frankfurt Parliament seemed disposed to push "by the most energetic means" the creation of a navy, that he urged Bastide to refrain from irritating the extremely delicate national sensibilities of the Germans in the Schleswig-Holstein question. He even suggested that the French newspapers, which did not conceal their sympathy for Denmark, should observe a similar reserve. Warning that Russia might well be the chief beneficiary of the Schleswig-Holstein affair, he suggested that Sweden and Denmark, as soon as they realized the price that Russia would exact for her services, would probably turn to France and Germany for protection.58

The possibility of an alliance between Russia and Prussia for crushing the Parliament of Frankfurt also troubled Savoye. France too, he feared, was endangered by Prussian hostility, for was not the Prussian government preparing to strengthen the fortresses of Coblenz and Cologne "at the very moment when the German people, . . .when the democratic elements in the Parliament all are applauding the fraternal

58 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 11, 1848.
principles which guide the republican government in France."
If these fears proved well founded, thought Savoye, only
France could preserve freedom in Germany against the over­
whelming weight of Prusso-Russian reaction.

Prussia was Savoye's <b>bete noire</b>, to which he attrib­
uted responsibility for nearly all which befell in Germany
of a nature displeasing to him. For nearly three months
after his arrival in Germany he managed to persuade himself
that his hopes could eventually be realized in the Parlia­
ment of Frankfurt. In August, as will be seen, he gradually,
painfully surrendered this illusion, but he never lost his
faith that the German "people" were thoroughly devoted to
France, and he was fond of citing examples of their loyal­
ty.59 As his confidence in the Parliament declined, he
tended to place ever more stress on the friendliness of the
"people."

Throughout the month of June his faith in the German
National Assembly did not seriously falter. On the 22nd of
that month he expressed belief that his unceasing exertions
to procure from that body a declaration in favor of a fra­
ternal alliance with France, "a very desirable goal in the

59 On June 12, for example, he reported a mass meeting
which had been held the previous day not far from Frankfurt
where a resolution was made denouncing as equally treason­
able any cooperation with Russia or any war or hostile act
against France. Two days later he described a widespread
political agitation in the Frankfurt region, an agitation of
a nature very friendly to France and assuming a steadily more
republican character. A.A.E., Savoye to Arago, Frankfurt,
June 12 and June 14, 1848.
interests of the two countries," were about to achieve fruition.  

Soon thereafter he described his profound emotion on hearing the extremely warm acclaim, a standing ovation, received in the Parliament by the proposal of one of the members to reply to the fraternal greeting extended by the French National Assembly on May 23.  

Equally a sincere democrat as Savoye, equally zealous in seeking a rapprochement between the French and German peoples was Emanuel Arago, named by Bastide to succeed Circourt at Berlin. Arago, son of the illustrious scientist Francois Arago, had personally taken part in the revolution of February 24, and had been sent to Lyons by the Provisional Government as its delegate in the southwestern departments, where he vigorously demonstrated his attachment to republican ideals.  

Carrying his republican sentiments even into the composition of his dispatches, he dispensed with the standard forms and usages. Instead of the usual address, "Mr. Minister," he used "Citizen Minister," and in place of the customary, elaborate complimentary close, he terminated invariably with "Salute and fraternity." He, of course, did not have Savoye's previous experience with German political life, but his appraisals of the situation in the Confederation

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60 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 22, 1848.  
61 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 24, 1848.  
62 Circourt, Souvenirs, I, 92-93.
tended to be quite similar to those of Savoye, and he under­
went the same agonizing experience of attempting to force
the facts to fit his ardent belief in a close cooperation
between the French and German nations to further liberal
ideals.

On his way to Berlin, Arago stopped over for a short
time in Frankfurt, whence he sent his first dispatch. No
doubt influenced by Savoye, whose efforts on behalf of a
Franco-German entente he praised, he expressed optimism
about the possibility of finding a solution for French for­
eign problems. "The unfortunate misunderstandings which
have alienated Germany from us are disappearing today. . .
and great numbers of the most eminent men of this country
comprehend the necessity of a perfect entente between
France and Germany." Although doubting that a republic was
forthcoming in the near future, he regarded with benevol­
ence the measures taken by the Frankfurt Parliament to sub­
ordinate to its authority the governments of the various
German States. 63

The restoration of Poland was Arago's principal aim
at Berlin. 64 Like other intensely republican partisans of
the Provisional Government, he considered doing something
for unhappy Poland to be a duty incumbent upon republican

64 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, May 31, 1848.
France and he confidently anticipated sympathetic cooperation from the Frankfurt Parliament and from all liberal Germans. Blaming Circourt's treachery for the failure of the Prussian government to realize how much importance France attached to the restoration of Poland, he exerted himself unstintingly to wring from the Prussian foreign minister von Arnim a promise to execute Frederick William IV's commitment of March 24 on behalf of a free and independent Polish nation. But he soon (but only for a short time) despaired of persuading the Prussian government to restore Poland, especially since Arnim, who had conceived the program of cooperation with France for that purpose, was resigning.

Since succor for the Poles was not to be found in the government of Berlin, it must be found elsewhere. Arago did

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65 Circourt had executed his mission in a spirit quite contrary to the intentions of the Provisional Government. An aristocratic conservative, and a good friend of Lamartine's the learned and widely traveled Circourt had no sympathy for the revolution of February and, as became evident, little but contempt for the Poles. Because of his many important connections in Prussia - he was, for example, well acquainted with Frederick William IV - he was sent to Berlin in early March as an assurance of the Republic's peaceful intentions.

His assignment was to work for a close understanding with Prussia and for the restoration of Poland, a task which he soon concluded to be comprised of two mutually incompatible goals. Circourt's conduct at Berlin was sharply castigated by republican critics and resulted in his estrangement from Lamartine. It is possible that, had Circourt's attitude been different the Franco-Prussian cooperation in favor of a Polish restoration envisioned by von Arnim might have been more fruitful.

66 Later in the summer, as the Prussian assembly came more and more under democratic influence, and showed itself well disposed toward Polish aspirations, Arago's hopes of obtaining cooperation in Berlin again soared; cf. below.
not hesitate; the "resurrection of a truly free, truly independent Poland was intimately bound up with German unity, with democratic unity." Only democracy, he thought, was capable of bringing unity to Germany. Fortunately, the movement toward a democratic centralization was making daily progress for, though the present authorities would make many promises to gain time, nothing of importance could result from dealing with them. Posing the question whether France should now simply assume the role of passive spectator of the grave events transpiring before her, or whether she should make every possible effort to direct them toward desirable results, he of course recommended the latter alternative for "justice and humanity do not permit us to rest."

With the aid in Germany of the "party of the future which understands that the resurrection of Poland is absolutely necessary to the future security of Germany and which seems destined soon to become master of the situation," the task, so Arago had persuaded himself, would not be too difficult.67

The chief obstacle, he believed, was Russia, whose emperor showed himself unalterably opposed to any change in Poland's status, and who had, if rumors reaching Arago were correct, recently declared that the establishment of a free Poland in the Posen district would be considered a casus belli. Being also bitterly opposed to developments in

67 A.A.E., Arago to Basstide, Berlin, June 17, 1848.
Germany, the Russians, predicted Arago, would seize the first occasion that presented itself to intervene there militarily to restore the old order. A period of caution, he advised, was therefore prescribed for France during which she supported Poland while carefully avoiding affronts to German sensibilities. Then Germany,

Whose thinking is rapidly moving toward us, will throw herself completely into the arms of France when Russia attacks her, United then with Germany for the triumph of the great principle which will regenerate Europe, we shall re-establish Poland with the applause and assistance of the entire German Confederation. I know not a single German patriot who, German unity secured, does not feel the absolute necessity of a free and independent Poland.

Like Savoye, Arago was doubtlessly disappointed by the election of the Archduke John as Vicar of the Empire, but he contrived with his usual ingenuity to place upon the matter a construction favorable to his desires. He argued that since the Archduke must necessarily depend upon the Parliament of Frankfurt for his support, and draw his ministers from the majority elements of that body, his election did not really have an anti-democratic significance because the majority of the Parliament was "leaning visibly toward democratic ideas." Still pursuing the goal of a close Franco-German alliance, "the results of which must be so great when

\[68\] Arago had in mind the principle of free nationalities organized on a democratic basis.

\[69\] A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 20, 1848.
the two principles which divide Europe—absolutism and democracy—meet face to face, between East and West, between France and Russia," he urged that France establish as quickly as possible intimate relations with the Archduke's government.

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It is evident then, from the foregoing summary, that the tendency of much of the diplomatic correspondence reaching Bastide to the end of June was far from negative in its attitude toward German developments. From many points came reports of increasing democratic strength and pro-French sympathies, together with predictions of continuing advances in the same direction. From the two most significant posts came veritable torrents of emotionally charged expostulations in behalf of a fraternal union of the German and French peoples, exemplified by the almost pathetic plea of Arago for assurance from Bastide that, in spite of the terrible "June Days" uprising in Paris, no departure was contemplated from the policy of fraternal alliance between France and Germany.

But of course, this is not the complete picture. Many of the dispatches from Germany did not render so favorable an account of developments, but rather tended to augment the impression of disillusionment which Bastide and

70 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, July 1, 1848.
71 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 28, 1848.
many other French republicans felt by mid-May. Even those two stalwart champions of German unity as the basis of a close Franco-German alliance, Savoye and Arago, were hard pressed to conceal from themselves, or from Bastide, some of the less palatable truths about the German movement, and Savoye, somewhat sooner than Arago, displayed occasional symptoms of faltering in his faith. In June 20, though still devoted to the goal of Franco-German understanding, he condemned the war-madness which had misled the Germans into military action against Denmark and then into sending General von Pfuel to Posen. Nevertheless, while declaring the necessity of insisting upon justice for the Poles, he attempted to dissuade Bastide from opposing German designs in Schleswig-Holstein. Such opposition would be dangerous, he thought, for the Schleswig-Holstein question was "absolutely national" and it would be impossible to persuade any German that when "all the nationalities are reconstituting themselves, the Frankfurt Assembly should abandon the Germans of Schleswig-Holstein. . . ."72

The choice of a prince as head of the German Central Government, which Savoye grudgingly acknowledged to be likely a week before the election of Archduke John, was of

72 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, June 28, 1848. This was the nearest any of the French agents came to supporting the German position in the dispute over Schleswig. The French were almost unanimously in regarding Germany as the aggressor.
course, a serious disappointment to him, as was the failure of the Frankfurt Parliament to push vigorously toward an alliance with France. 73 In July 1, the committee for international questions of the German National Assembly, minimizing the danger of an attack from Russia, recommended to that body that no action be taken toward entering into a formal alliance with France prior to the installation of the central executive authority. 74 Savoye saw this as a maneuver to evade the issue of an alliance and, as will be seen, the reluctance of Frankfurt to welcome a close relationship with Paris was disappointing to Bastide as well.

More disturbing to the French Foreign Minister, however, was the accumulating evidence of the aggressive spirit associated with the centralizing tendency in Germany. Fontenay, at Stuttgart, expressed apprehension for the future

73 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 2, 1848. Bastide had hoped that Frankfurt would respond heartily to the alliance offer which was extended by the French National Constituent Assembly on May 24. Because of the unprecedented manner in which this alliance proposal was tendered by the French government, however, many members of the Frankfurt Parliament, especially the conservatives who were suspicious of the Republic and who did not wish to enter into an alliance with it, pretended not to take the French proposal seriously. cf. E. Meier, op. cit., p. 90 and p. 94. The French proposal consisted simply of an order of the day adopted by the French assembly on May 24, recommending to the Executive Commission that it continue the policy established by the Provisional Government of friendship and fraternal pact with Germany. cf. below in this chapter for further detail.

74 Cf. Stenographischer Bericht der deutschen constituienden Nationalversammlung ed. Franz Wigard, Frankfurt am Main, 1848, I, 655.
of Germany's neighbors should the opinions presiding at Frankfurth excite the "German dream" beyond reasonable limits. Meneval, who had earlier tended to take a not unfavorable view of the German movement, noting its growing republican character, was disconcerted by the "singular spectacle of popular assemblies applauding acts which they would have been taxed to reprove sufficiently had they not been committed in the interest of German nationalism." It was the haste of the German liberals and even "the most democratic clubs" to approve the suppression of the Prague uprising by Prince Windischgraetz and the extreme hostility manifested toward the Poles which evoked Meneval's reproach. But what he saw seemed to him a repetition of the upsurge of anti-French sentiment in 1840. "Today it is the turn of the Poles, the Italians, and the Danes," he warned. "Tomorrow it will be ours, should the slightest dispute arise between us and the Germans." 

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Possible German intervention in Italy on the side of Austria was a factor with which, more and more, the French had to reckon. Contemplating this disagreeable complication,

75 A.A.E., Fontenoy to Bastide, Stuttgart, May 23, 1848.
76 A.A.E., Meneval to Lamartine, Dresden, May 5 and May 12, 1848.
77 A.A.E., Meneval to Bastide, Dresden, June 27, 1848.
"however strange it may be," the French minister in Vienna wrote:

German patriotism has recently assumed such proportions, and pushed back so far the frontiers of the German nation, that the pretention to include Trieste in it appears to many people a quite natural thing which they loudly proclaim.78

A few days later, reporting that Vienna, usually so sensitive in such matters, did not seem troubled by German intervention in the Trieste question, De Lacour repeated his denunciations of the aggressive tendencies of the German patriots, who advanced their claims with such a "convinced air as to their legitimacy."79 On June 29, he wrote that the "ultra-Germans of Vienna "even entertained hopes of reconquering Lombardy and other areas recently lost in Italy through the aid of the German Confederation and some talked already of the offer of 25,000 Bavarian troops for such an enterprise. Similar rumors of impending German intervention in Italy were sent from Turin by Reiset, who judged that if such reports were well founded, a general conflagration would result.80

By July, the possibility that a general war might grow out of the Schleswig-Holstein or the Italian situations

78 A.A.E., DeLacour to Bastide, Vienna, June 20,1848.
79 A.A.E., DeLacour to Bastide, Vienna, June 25,1848.
80 A.A.E., DeLacour to Bastide, Vienna, June 28,1848.
troubled Bastide constantly. If it broke out in either area, it seemed quite likely that France and Germany would be ranged on opposite sides of the quarrel. In the early weeks of Bastide's occupancy of the Foreign Ministry, the situation had seemed to present itself in a far different light, for then, though the aggressive élan of the German movement had already disturbed him, he could still believe that these were perhaps but the temporary excesses and aberrations likely to accompany any great upheaval. He could then still believe that France and Germany were natural allies.

On May 23 he enjoined Savoye to persist in his efforts to convince the Germans that France desired close and amicable relations. The same day he declared his belief that the democratic monarchies recently created in Germany were destined to serve as stepping stones to pure republicanism. Two weeks later he urged Savoye to cultivate as widely as possible good relations, especially with the members of the Frankfurt Parliament, for it was among these men that he must gain adherence to

the principle of a close alliance between France and Germany. It is by the realization and sincerity of this fraternal alliance that results fecund for liberty and civilisation and true international law will

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81 A.A.E., Bastide to Savoye (Frankfurt), May 23, 1848.

82 A.A.E., Bastide to Thiard (Bern), May 23, 1848.
triumph. It will be through this union that the great iniquity of Poland's partition will be overcome. France, through the organ of its National Assembly, has proclaimed simultaneously the necessity of this fraternal pact with Germany and the reconstitution of the Polish nation. Is it not natural and desirable that the voice of Germany answer the voice of France with a similar manifestation? We would certainly experience a lively satisfaction from such an event.

This is a significant document both in form and content. Its somewhat exalted tone indicates that as late as June 8, Bastide was still subject to the transports of that republican idealism which continued to hold its more doctrinaire adherents, such as Savoye and Arago, in its thrall for yet some time. The alliance proposal indicates that he still accepted the widespread republican belief in the natural similarity of interests between a democratic Germany and a republican France. One of these common interests, the one most immediately to be realized, was the restoration of a free Poland which could serve as an additional bulwark for a democratic Europe against the looming menace of Russia. One of the most cherished dreams of the French republicans, the restoration of Poland, could be achieved only through the close cooperation of Germany, and it was to gain this, as has been seen, that Arago was deploying all his resources at Berlin.

Thus, a month after assuming direction of the Foreign

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83 In its resolution of May 24, 1848.
84 A.A.E., Bastide to Savoye (Frankfurt), June 8, 1848.
Ministry, Bastide still entertained the hope that common interests drawing France and the new Germany together would prove stronger than the reckless claims put forth by German nationalism, which tended to drive a wedge between the two nations. But he did not minimize the danger of these claims, In the very letter in which he declared the desirability of a Franco-German alliance, he vigorously condemned German aggression in Schleswig, frankly declaring the sympathy of the French government to be with Denmark. Only grave internal difficulties, he continued, had prevented France from taking from the beginning an attitude in conformity with the guarantee made to Denmark in the treaty of 1720. Turning then to the crux of the matter, he concluded:

The sentiment which leads Germany to the constitution of her...national unity is doubtless quite legitimate, but it is a tendency which should not be pushed to the point of usurpation. All the lands where there is a German race do not belong for that reason alone to Germany. 85

Shortly thereafter, while condemning measures recently taken at Berlin as a new partition of Poland, Bastide again registered his concern at the force of German expansionism. "We cannot remain indifferent," he wrote, "to these tendencies of Germany which, under the pretext of constituting German unity aim at nothing less than the absorption into the...Confederation of all the territories containing a

85 A.A.E., Bastide to Savoye (Frankfurt), June 8, 1848.
population of German origin."86 Using much the same language
in a dispatch to Arago treating the recent developments in
Poland, he branded as unacceptable the principle that a few
fragments of a nationality scattered among a large national-
ity composing the population of a country justified the dis-
memberment of that country or the overthrowing of its bor-
ders. "The government of the Republic considers it both a
right and a duty to protest loudly against an action so
evidently contrary to the stipulations of treaties as to the
rights of the Polish nation," he concluded.87

Bastide's growing irritation with German conduct, his
increasing realization of the dissimilarity of Frankfurt's
aims from those of Paris, and of the German conception of
nationality from that of the French were all evidenced in a
dispatch of mid-June which summarized clearly his attitude
at that time. To remind the strongly Germanophile Savoye
that Germany must be seen in the larger European perspective,
he wrote:

Without doubt it is to our interest to
cultivate and to conciliate Germany and we
are entirely disposed to do so, understand-
ing as we do the value of her friendship and
her alliance. But we cannot carry our sympa-
thies and our concessions to the point of
closing our eyes in the face of manifest acts
of usurpation and. . .the digressions of this

86 A.A.E., Bastide to Tallenay (London), June 12, 1848.

87 A.A.E., Bastide to Arago (Berlin), early June, 1848 (exact date not affixed).
spirit of German nationality which drives Germany to invade territories which have never been hers. Nor can we disregard our sympathies for other peoples, nor remain indifferent to the violation of rights which France has guaranteed or to a new dismemberment of Poland. We have nothing, I repeat, but affectionate and fraternal feelings for Germany. We desire sincerely to see the closest union established between her and France. But France cannot think solely of Germany, [her] policy must not become exclusively German, the more so as at this moment Germany seems to us to be surrendering to impulses dangerous to herself. Thus, in the Schleswig affair, her action against Denmark places her perhaps, and without the least necessity, within an inch of war with Russia at a time when more than ever she requires the preservation of peace to accomplish her work of reorganization.

As to the Grand Duchy of Posen, if, as we want to believe, Germany sincerely wishes, as we do, the re-establishment of Poland, it is, one must admit, rather singular to begin by incorporating into the German Confederation at least half of a province which has always been Polish in the pretension that a portion of the population is of German origin and speaks German. We believe, we who have proclaimed a respect for nationalities and for the territorial boundaries of 1815, that this annexation to Germany of what is falsely called the German part of the Grand Duchy cannot be effected without committing a new violation of the Polish nationality.88

Sarcasm was beginning to replace idealism in Bastide's references to the Germans, although he had not, even yet, entirely abandoned hope that an understanding with them was possible. At the end of the month he addressed to Arago a communication which, while briefly reiterating the desirability of cultivating the friendship of Germany, was in

88 A.A.E., Bastide to Savoye (Frankfurt), June 16, 1848.
large part given over to cataloguing and reproving the faults of her behavior, in terms more biting than ever.

In this question of Schleswig as in that of the Grand Duchy of Posen, we cannot see, on the part of Prussia and of Germany, anything but a violation of the principle of equity and of international law, an abuse of force, a manifest violation of the dogma of respect for nationalities and moreover, a misunderstanding of the true interests of the German Confederation.89

For some weeks after firing this blast of criticism at German conduct, Bastide maintained an unwonted silence in regard to developments in the Confederation. The explanation for this silence cannot be certainly determined. It was probably due in part, at least, to the fact that he had to defend himself against the attacks of dissatisfied elements who were seeking his dismissal from office.90 But it seems not unreasonable also to presume that it marked a period of reappraisal of the whole German movement. While attempting to revise his conceptions to bring them more into accord with the realities of the European panorama, apparently he preferred to issue no further policy directives until a new program had been formulated.

The days of late June and early July witnessed several events which must have constituted for Bastide a culmina-

89 A.A.E., Bastide to Arago (Berlin), June 28, 1848.

tion of the steady process of disillusionment in regard to Germany which had been under way in expanding measure since spring. The near conjunction of the election of Archduke John as Vicar of the Empire on June 29 and the disinclination clearly revealed on July 3 by the Frankfurt Parliament to enter into an alliance with France, dealt a double blow to the already shaken visions of the French republicans.

The choice of a prince as head of the provisional central authority of Germany had been foreseen for some time and came as a surprise only to the most blindly obstinate of the French republicans. But the election of an Austrian prince, occurring as it did at a time when reports were becoming more frequent of the likelihood of a German intervention in Italy in favor of Austria, seemed to enhance the prospects of such a disagreeable eventuality. The distress occasioned in the French Foreign Ministry by this further linking of German and Austrian interests was compounded by the fact that Italy was coming to seem as the only potential theater in which the diplomacy of the Second Republic could win a striking victory. The inability to secure German cooperation had brought the project for Poland's restoration to complete frustration. And now, with the election of Archduke John, German nationalism apparently was on the way to placing itself at the disposal of the Hapsburgs, traditional enemies of French republicanism (as well as French expansionism), and notorious opponents of the principle of
nationalities proclaimed by the Second Republic. It was the Hapsburgs who oppressed the peoples of Italy, for whom the French republicans professed a special sympathy and it was the Hapsburg government which Lamartine had menaced, when he declared in his Manifesto of March 7:

If the hour of the reconstruction of several oppressed nationalities of Europe, or elsewhere, seems to us to have sounded in the decrees of Providence, . . . if the states of Italy were invaded; if limits or obstacles were placed in the way of their internal transformations; if their right to form alliances among themselves to consolidate an Italian fatherland were contested, the French republic would feel justified in taking up arms to protect these legitimate movements of growth and of popular patriotism.91

The question of Italy became more and more, as the summer progressed, the principal pre-occupation, the focal point of Bastide's diplomacy. Lamartine had publicly committed the Republic to the defense of Italian freedom.92 It was therefore a question of honor; France could not stand idly by while Italy was crushed and her struggle for liberty nullified. With Austria enfeebled and apparently in the process of disintegration, the commitment which France had assumed in Italy did not seem an especially onerous one, so long, that is, as the tottering Hapsburg empire stood alone.

91 Lamartine, Mémoires Politiques, III, 38.

92 Lamartine later charged that Bastide had betrayed Italian liberty by not taking a positive stand in 1848, a charge which Bastide denied and attempted to disprove in his book, La République française et l'Italie en 1848 (Brussels, 1858), pp. 5-6.
south of the Alps. The intrusion of Germany, however, exulting in the new-found sense of power of her swelling patriotism, would transform the situation radically. This was an eventuality which, in spite of certain ominous portents, the French republicans could hardly have conceived in the first flush of the revolutionary triumphs of 1848, but by late June it was a nightmare with which Bastide had constantly to reckon. In the later summer he indited numerous bitter comments on the paradox presented by German exponents of nationalism heatedly denying to the Italians the same rights they so fiercely claimed for themselves. So deeply did the election of the Austrian Archduke as Vicar of the Empire vex him that ten years later he denounced it as equivalent to

an eventual declaration of war against France; it showed that Germany, or at least the dominant parties in Germany were far from having broken with the past; that they were less distrustful of their princes than of revolutionary France and that if we appeared in Italy before their misgivings were allayed we would encounter a coalition not only of monarchs, but of peoples.93

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Of similar importance in destroying Bastide's remaining glimmer of hope in the possibility of a fruitful Franco-German cooperation was the disinterest evinced by the Frankfurt Parliament in effecting an alliance with France. On

93 J. Bastide, op. cit., p. 33.
June 24, it is true, the Parliament had responded to an emotional summons from one of its members to reply to the French assembly's offer of a fraternal pact, by a unanimous standing acclamation. But this was a rather empty gesture so long as it resulted in no concrete measures.

The declaration of the French Constituent Assembly in favor of a fraternal pact with Germany had been largely motivated, it will be recalled, by the desire to accomplish something for Poland. In the great debate on foreign policy held in the Constituent Assembly on May 23, Italy and Poland were the main subjects of discussion. At that moment Italy's freedom seemed reasonably assured, but the outlook for a liberated Poland had become gloomy. It was clear to all that only with German assistance could the long suffering "eastern bulwark of civilization" be restored. The orators were agreed that some overture should be made to Frankfurt, where, it was believed, both humane sentiment and a realization of Germany's true interests would elicit a readiness to collaborate with France in so noble a project. One speaker attributed the sudden growth in Germany of antipathy toward the Poles to the machinations of Russian agents who had deliberately incited the Poles to excesses in order to discredit plans for a free Poland. Lamartine professed to find the cause for diminished German friendliness toward republican France and her projects, in the workers' invasions of southwestern Germany which had been launched largely
from French territory. If Germany were reassured of the peacefulness of French intentions, he felt, she would be more cooperative. An approach to Germany would be fruitful, declared Sarrans, because "Germany, which should be united to us by very tight bonds...which shares almost entirely our thoughts on liberty, our philosophical ideas and our social interests...will hearken to our voice."  

Agreed in principle on an appeal to Germany, the Constituent Assembly referred to the foreign affairs committee the question as to how the matter should be handled. In the committee discussion Bastide, as had Lamartine in the assembly, opposed an address to the Frankfurt Parliament. It is possible that already Bastide's later policy of withholding recognition from the government of Archduke John, in order not to enhance its prospects of success, was foreshadowed in his reluctance to make a direct approach to the Parliament. But it seems more likely that, as he and Lamartine contended, the lack of a regular means for delivering the address, and the numerous possible embarrassing complications of its delivery were the real reasons for his attitude.

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94 Moniteur, May 24, 1848 reports the entire debate.

95 Archives Nationales (Assemblée Constituante: Procès-Verbaux du Comité des Affaires Étrangères); session of May 24. The session of May 24 was the only one of the committee's sessions in which Germany was the central subject of discussion.
The committee decided, as Bastide urged, in favor of a simple declaration by the Constituent Assembly. On May 24 the assembly adopted unanimously the declaration that

the national assembly invites the executive commission to continue to take as its guide the unanimous wishes of the assembly summarized in these words: Fraternal pact with Germany; reconstruction of a free and independent Poland; liberation of Italy.96

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The somewhat indecisive, but in effect, negative response on July 3 by the Frankfurt Parliament to the suggestion of a fraternal pact virtually administered the coup de grâce to the first two of the expressed wishes of the French Constituent Assembly. The choice of a Hapsburg prince as Vicar of the Empire seemed to endanger the third.

One further factor must be mentioned as having probably influenced the change which occurred at this time in the French attitude toward Germany. The crushing defeat of the republican extremists in the "June Days" uprising, by removing pressure on the French government to do something for Poland, made the German alliance less necessary to it. Furthermore, by discrediting radical and innovating ideas, and restoring the prestige of older and more conventional views, the "June Days" no doubt indirectly contributed to the reversion to the traditional attitude toward German unity. But the influence of the "June Days" in this respect

96 Moniteur, May 25, 1848.
can only be inferred, it cannot be accurately assessed, as it left no significant traces in the diplomatic correspondence of the period. The only reference to a possible reaction of the "June Days" on France's German policy appeared in Arago's appeal to Bastide in late June to reassure him that, in spite of the upheaval in Paris, nothing would be altered in the policy of friendship toward Germany.98 This, of course, indicates that Arago saw a possibility that out of the violence of the "June Days" might emerge a new German policy, less friendly than the one first set forth by the Republic. It may safely be presumed that Arago's apprehensions were not without basis and that since to some extent French policy toward the question of German unity was a function of the relations between the government of the Republic and the republican masses of Paris, a change in those relations would tend to produce a change in that policy. But, compared to the other factors cited above, the effect, of the "June Days" was of secondary importance.

In these circumstances, how could Bastide long have escaped the conviction that a united Germany was a prospect little to be desired from the French standpoint? Still in the initial phases of her development, she seemed to confront France at every turn, and her interests, rather than coinciding with those of France, as had been confidently predicted by the ardent republicans, regularly clashed with

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97 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, June 28, 1848.
them. Inevitably the frustrations of the new situation evoked comparisons in the minds of Bastide and his colleagues with the former state of affairs, wherein Germany was composed of many independent states, often amenable to French purposes, or at least incapable of regularly thwarting them. Fraternal union of independent nationalities was a sound and excellent principle, but its attempted application had led to unforeseen complications. Differing somewhat from the French conception, the German idea of nationality, taking community of race and language as its basis, had resulted in an attack upon Denmark, the annexation of Posen, and numerous extravagant claims threatening Russia in her Baltic provinces, Holland in Limburg, Italy in Trieste, and France herself in Alsace and Lorraine. No Frenchmen, republican or not, who faced the situation squarely, could fail to be disturbed by these omens of trouble.
CHAPTER IV

JULY THROUGH MID-AUGUST; MOUNTING IRRITATION WITH FRANKFURT

Nothing occurred in Germany through the middle of August of a nature substantially to alter the French government's attitude, as it had developed by early July, to the question of German unification. The accumulating evidence of the real character of German national aims, the continuing irritations resulting from its aggressive tactics, only served to confirm the judgments already formulated, rendering steadily greater the barrier of grievances which had thrust itself up and alienated Bastide and his colleagues from the German revolution.

The same source of friction which had arisen in the preceding months—German conduct in regard to the Polish, Schleswig, and Italian situations, primarily—continued in effect during this period. By mid-August their cumulative impact had effected so fundamental a re-orientation of Bastide's attitude toward German unity that he was prepared to undertake a program to help frustrate its realization.

Circumstances of the German evolution facilitated this decision. Even Savoye and Arago had, before the end of August, become hostile to the Frankfurt Parliament, though not to the principle of German unification per se. But Arago by
that time hoped to see it realized under the aegis of a liberal Prussia, and Savoye dreamed of somehow effecting it through a collaboration between the French Republic and German democrats.

In early July sympathy of the French government for Germany was by no means entirely dead. Occasional reports continued to reach Bastide from his agents in that land telling of friendly demonstrations and expressions of affection for France. Evoux believed even, that everywhere the Germans were becoming more profoundly and more sincerely attached to France.  

Another informant offered the assurance that republicanism, benevolently disposed toward France, was likely to gain eventual control if France was very careful to avoid exciting apprehension among the Germans.  

Savoye and Arago especially continued to find hope in the friendly disposition of the German people. Their princes, and even their National Assembly might be hostile to France, conceded Savoye, who had begun to castigate the Frankfurt Parliament as made up largely of "functionaries, servants, and partisans of the old monarchical system, who fear and hate France." But the sympathies of the people, he insisted, were solidly with France. Seeing in it the only

1 A.A.E., Evoux to Bastide, Hamburg, July 7, 1848.

2 A.A.E., Kraetzler - Rasspaerts to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Strasbourg, July 12, 1848 (Mémoires et Documents, t. 163).

3 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 15, 1848.
hope for realizing his dream of restoring the Polish nation to an independent status, Arago clung with tenacity to the conception of a Germany, except for its reactionary aristocracy, solidly pro-French in feeling. But, however, much the German people might be favorably inclined toward France, the conduct of policy seemed hardly to reflect it, and it was this fact, rather than evidence of friendliness among large segments of the German population, which appeared of greatest significance to Bastide.

Some of the favorite projects of French republicans were encountering opposition from Frankfurt. In part due to the attitude of Frankfurt, the Second Republic had been obliged almost to abandon hope of achieving anything of consequence for Poland, although for the sake of appearance, and no doubt to satisfy the republican conscience, gestures continued to be made at Frankfurt.

Toward the end of July, one final occasion arose which appeared to offer hope, however slight, of securing from the Germans some measure of aid for the Poles when the question of Posen, and its relation to the German Confederation was considered by the Frankfurt Parliament. For some time before the subject was formally treated by that body, Savoye deployed all his energy and resources to obtain a decision favorable to a restoration of an independent Polish territory.

\[4\] A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 15, July 20, August 1, August 4, etc.
Arago, who had been heartened by recent measures of the Prussian assembly looking toward a re-examination of the decisions already taken regarding Posen, anxiously awaited the outcome of the impending debate, and expressed the hope that Savoye's efforts at Frankfurt would prove as fruitful as his own had been in bringing about the change of attitude at Berlin. If Frankfurt proved to be less sympathetic to Poland than was Berlin, he would then be placed in a strange position! Persuaded that German unity, that centralization of German power is henceforth certain, that it is indispensable to the steady progress of Democracy, that it will assure, in the future, by the very triumph of Democracy, the resurrection of Poland. I should see myself forced momentarily to support the goodwill of Prussia against the malevolence of Germany. I hope, however, that it will not be so.

But it did prove to be so and, however reluctantly, Arago was to find himself forced more and more to support the "goodwill of Prussia" against the "malevolence of Germany."

The democratic minority at Frankfurt shared the French viewpoint on Poland, as it did in the question of nationalities generally. Ruge expressed the German democratic views in a stirring speech, pleading for a cooperative action on the part of England, France, and Germany to place Europe upon the foundation of a new international law cognizant of the rights of free nations. But the interruptions of the

5 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 15, 1848.
hostile majority of his auditors made it difficult for Ruge to make himself heard at times, and Heinrich von Gagern, president of the assembly, branded as a "half-treason to the nation" his fervidly uttered wish to see Radetzky driven from Italy. The reception accorded Ruge's address clearly foreshadowed the outcome of the vote, which was unfavorable to Polish hopes, incorporating certain Posen districts into the German Empire.

Savoye, his patience exhausted by this most recent of a long series of disappointments, was moved to an outburst of denunciation against the

spirit of madness which seems to seize the Parliament everytime a question of conquest arises and that the possibility emerges of rounding out their borders or of acquiring new territory under the pretext of protecting the German nationality. It was the case with Schleswig-Holstein and with Limburg; it was the same today with the part of Posen in question and it will probably be the same with the Italian Tyrol when its turn comes.

How could the average French republican fail to lose all sympathy for the German movement, when such disgust was felt by Savoye, who had originally embraced it with so much ardor, who was "attached to Germany by youthful memories" and who would have been "Happy to render [to her] a striking and pious hommage," could not do so

in this affair where all the noble, grand, and elevated feeling seems to me to have abandoned

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6 Stenographischer Bericht der deutschen Nationalversammlung, II, 1184-1185.
her representatives. I say it with a deep conviction: loyalty, frankness and generosity, true fraternity, have been uniquely on the side of France, and have characterized all her actions. If, as a result of the extreme irritation which today's vote cannot fail to arouse in Germany, among the Poles, and doubtless in France, unhappy complications should follow, the republican government, strong in its manifest honesty will be able to say 'we have acted loyally, our consciences are clear, let happen what may.'

Bastide, too, protested against the annexation of a large part of Posen voted at Frankfurt, but without much real conviction, in view of the almost certain futility of such efforts. Moreover, he advised Arago that, while not deserting the principle of Polish independence, it would be unwise to push too vigorously French efforts in that direction at a time when other questions, "relatively more important in the...general situation in Europe" had to be confronted.

Unwilling to abandon Poland to her fate, Arago reacted sharply to Bastide's suggestion, telling his chief that he was not sufficiently informed as to German affairs. Public opinion, "the opinion of men wise and well informed," insisted Arago, no longer was in accord with the ideologues of Frankfurt, no more than it was in accord with the "accomplices of the old Prussian party, the party of absolute monarchy"

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7 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, July 27, 1848.
8 A.A.E., Bastide to Arago (Berlin), August 1, 1848.
which systematically rejected any form of German unity.\textsuperscript{9}

Arago, who had been much heartened by the growing democratic influence manifest in the deliberations of the Prussian assembly,\textsuperscript{10} doubtless gained his impressions of opinion prevalent among "wise and well informed" Germans largely through his democratic associations in Berlin.

The curious turns of Arago's thought, as he sought to accommodate his hopes for Poland with his conviction that German unity would provide the basis for realizing the Second Republic's program of liberated nationalities are not easy to follow. For some time he saw in the Frankfurt Parliament an instrument for aiding in the salvation of oppressed nationalities. Was it not reasonable to assume, so it seemed to the ardently republican Arago, that a revolutionary assembly bent upon forging a united and independent homeland for Germans would cordially assist other peoples engaged in the same heroic task? Like Savoye, who had been filled with similar pre-conceptions, Arago was gradually forced by events to relinquish his faith in the Frankfurt Parliament, but he stoutly refused to admit that German unity in itself was undesirable. No, he preferred to believe that not the principle, but its representatives were at fault. The National Assembly, misapprehending its mission, had been led astray by the enticing allurements of false ambitions. But underr-

\textsuperscript{9} A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 4, 1848.

\textsuperscript{10} E. Brandenburg, \textit{Die Reichsgruendung}, I, 241.
neath the Assembly stood the German people, free from the egoistical mania which had corrupted Frankfurt and diverted it from its true function. It was to the untainted people, then, that France must appeal, he argued.

He had, it is true, as early as July 15 referred to the possibility of supporting the "goodwill of Prussia" against the "malevolence of Germany," but he qualified this idea a few days later. Again considering what France should do if the impending vote at Frankfurt, as seemed likely, proved unfavorable to Poland, he wrote that it was only to the Prussian proposal, not to Prussia itself, that France must address herself.

We shall seek to find how it will be possible, without endangering the principle of German unity, inseparable henceforth from the Democratic principle and eventually favorable to the Polish cause how it will be possible to invoke and sustain the decision of Berlin against the decision of Frankfurt.11

The vote of July 27, by which the Frankfurt Parliament pronounced for the annexation of part of Posen to the Reich was the act which finally alienated Arago, as well as Savoye, from that body. But both remained loyal to the principle of German unity, both turned from the Parliament to the people in their search for German democracy. Savoye had no alternative; as a former German political exile, detesting the princes and their governments, he could not, under any circumstances, think of collaborating with them.

11 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 20, 1848.
With Arago, it was somewhat different. Cooperation with a German prince, at least temporarily, in pursuit of an immediately desirable end, was acceptable. He favored the "decision of Berlin," calling for a re-examination of the Posen question, over the "decision of Frankfurt," which annexed parts of Posen to Germany, and he believed that the larger part of public opinion in Germany shared his attitude. But how could the "decision of Berlin" be made to prevail? Arago might rhetorically appeal to the "better informed parliament of the future against the group then assembled at Frankfurt," but that led to no practical results. Circumstances steadily pushed him toward cooperation with the Prussian government which in the Polish, Danish, and Italian questions he found to be more reasonable and tractable than was Frankfurt. He hoped that

the ministry and the assembly of Prussia will continue the commission of inquiry [for the situation in Posen]. . . . that we shall succeed thereby, in spite of the systematic Germanisers in re-organizing Poland. And, if we obtain this happy result, as I firmly expect, the protest of the French government will have received in Prussia a complete satisfaction.  

Arago even began to show signs of regret that Prussia was not heading the movement toward German unity, rather than

12 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 1, 1848.
13 A.A.E., private letter, Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848.
14 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, July 31, 1848, italics are Arago's.
Frankfurt. The Prussian ministry, he declared, was using all its influence to restrain the Vicar of the Empire from following the dangerous course prescribed by the extreme nationalist sentiment predominant at Frankfurt. The Prussian government, in his opinion saw clearly the dangers of the "ultra teutonism" which sought to extend its domination over foreign peoples. He firmly hoped to see it persist in a policy toward Poland "more humane, more...in conformity with the rights of nations" than that of Frankfurt and he had heard a rumor, which he believed founded, that Berlin had requested Archduke John to attempt to end the war in Italy.

In a private letter to Bastide, Arago summarized his views on the matter of Frankfurt and Berlin.

My sympathies, those of France, are obviously, in principle, for Frankfurt, for German unity; but it must be recognized that from the point of view of external relations, Berlin conducts itself better than Frankfurt.

... We must not hesitate. . .if not to support Prussia against Frankfurt (God forbid that I should ever give you such advise) at least, to maintain Prussia in her good ways. Arago was still clinging to the conception of German unity effected under the auspices of the central government of Frankfurt; but his insistence had become a sort of ritual litany of an outmoded faith whose hollowness he could only with increasing difficulty conceal from himself. It was not

15 A.A.E., Arago to Bastide, Berlin, August 2, 1848.
to be long before he transferred his allegiance altogether from Frankfurt to Berlin.

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In July and August the situation in Italy was really a source of much graver concern for the French government than was the Polish question which, having become mired in a dismal futility, no longer presented either significant possibilities or grave dangers. Matters in Italy, on the other hand, were moving toward a crisis which threatened to involve all of Europe, especially after the smashing Austrian victory at Custozza on July 25. The government of the Republic, morally committed to aiding Italy if called upon to do so, anxiously followed the advance of Radetzky’s forces.

Dazzled by their initial successes over the Austrians, and desiring that the honor of freeing Italy should be theirs alone, that Italian liberals had, in the early phases of the struggle, rejected French military assistance as unnecessary. King Charles Albert of Piedmont-Sardinia, the somewhat reluctant leader of the Italian national uprising against Austrian domination had shunned it for fear that it would result in the spread of republican ideas in his realm. But, their former buoyant confidence shattered by the overwhelming defeat suffered at Custozza, many Italian leaders promptly turned to France with clamorous appeals for aid.

Bastide, hoping if at all possible to avoid French
military intervention, which almost certainly would have touched off a disastrous general war, moved uneasily in the face of the urgent entreaties from beyond the Alps. To bring about a negotiated settlement which granted important concessions to the Italian war aims seemed the most desirable solution. Believing that chances of obtaining a truce would be much improved if England joined France in proposing it, Bastide energetically sought to enlist Palmerston's support. It was finally accorded, though because the British minister could not entirely overcome his suspicions of French intentions in Italy, not without a degree of reserve. The negotiations which the two powers undertook to persuade Austria to accept the mediation proposal dragged along for months, and as they several times threatened to break down, French military involvement seemed near on more than one occasion in the late summer and fall. But Bastide intended to invoke war only as a last resort, for he knew that, in view of the probable alignment of forces, it was likely to end in defeat for France. A steady flow of dispatches continued to indicate that Germany, her pro-Austrian tendencies undiminished, would be found at the side of the Hapsburg empire from the outbreak of war.

As has been seen, German patriots had, to the astonishment of French republicans, very early pronounced in favor

16 The subject of the Anglo-French mediation will be dealt with at greater length in the next chapter.
of the Austrian cause in Italy. As time passed, their conviction grew that Radetzky's objectives were German objectives. Lefebvre described the widespread jubilation inspired among Germans of rank and position by the old field-marshall's sweeping victories. Swelling with pride, they spoke of Charles Albert as if he were already a declared enemy of Germany, of the Austrians as if they were compatriots, and of the mediation proposed by France and England as an infringement of the right and dignity of the German nation. Closely associated with this strong hostility toward Italy, and with the spirit of nationalism and unity, was a resurgence of vindictiveness toward France which for some time had become steadily more evident.17

From Italy Reiset reported widespread covert activities on the part of the Germans to aid Austria and to undermine the Italian ability to resist.18 Denouncing the support extended by the Frankfurt Parliament to the Austrians, he marveled, as did Bastide, at the paradox of the Germans who, after having proclaimed the principle of nationalities, were seeking to incorporate Italian territory into their empire.19

Savoye, too, noted the discrepancy between German declarations in favor of the liberty of nationalities and

17 A.A.E., Lefebvre to Bastide, Baden, August 15, 1848.
18 A.A.E., Reiset to Bastide, Turin, July 18, 1848.
19 A.A.E., Reiset to Bastide, Turin, July 22, 1848.
the attitude displayed by the Frankfurt Parliament toward
the Italian struggle for independence. Characteristically,
he attributed the hostile German reaction largely to the
machinations of the princes, who hoped to foment and utilize
an exaggerated sense of nationalism to implement their cam­
paign against democratic ideas, and who would not hesitate
to launch war against France to achieve their purpose. Un­
fortunately, too many Germans, it seemed to Savoye, readily
duped by such tactics, were daily becoming more fascinated
by expressions of grandeur, of power, and of national glory.
Had democracy been victorious, he was certain, peace and
concord would have prevailed, but democracy was far from
gaining control in Germany. Instead, the old monarchial
system was making a powerful resurgence.20

From Dresden came additional warnings that Germany
took a serious interest in the Italian situation. The Saxon
minister von Pfordten frankly stated his conviction that
French intervention in Italy would inevitably bring German
forces to the side of Austria.21

In the face of so much evidence, Bastide could not
fail to be convinced: French participation in the Austro­
Italian conflict, even for the purpose of preventing a com­

20 A.A.E., Savoye to Bastide, Frankfurt, August 12, 1848.

21 A.A.E., Reinhard to Bastide, Dresden, August 17, and August 20, 1848.
plete re-subjugation of Italy, would inevitably mean war with the Germany of Frankfurt as well as with Austria. In spite of this grim prospect, however, Bastide was persuaded that the Republic could not permit a complete Austrian triumph. French troops would come to the aid of the Italians, he warned Vienna, if Austrian forces advanced into the Legations.22

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The Schleswig-Holstein dispute also presented the constant danger, in July and August, of spilling over and embroiling Europe in a general war. Here France was not as immediately involved as in Italy, but as the summer progressed she took an increasingly active interest in the efforts to conclude an armistice. Unable to see any justification for the attempt to incorporate Schleswig into the German nation, Bastide was quick to accept Palmerston's invitation to support a proposal to divide Schleswig into a German and a Danish section.23 He also welcomed the news of the armistice arranged at Malmoe in early July as eliminating a potential source of disagreeable complications in Europe. His only regret was that either of the two final settlements to be considered--division of Schleswig on a

22 A.A.E., Bastide to DeLacour (Vienna), August 24, 1848.

23 A.A.E., Bastide to Dotezac (Copenhagen), early July, 1848 (exact date not given).
national basis, or quasi-independence for Schleswig— exacted a sacrifice from Denmark.\textsuperscript{24} As the establishment of a quasi-independent Schleswig seemed to entail the less injurious consequences for Denmark, he indicated his preference for that alternative.\textsuperscript{25}

But new and unforeseen difficulties arose which seemed to jeopardize the possibility of finding any peaceful solution. General Wrangel, who had originally been placed in command of the forces operating against Denmark by Frederick William IV, created a sensation by refusing to recognize the truce negotiated in the name of that monarch. Maintaining that his obedience was now owed in the first instance to the central authority in Frankfurt, he refused to withdraw his forces to the prescribed positions until receiving orders so to do from that source. At the same time he demanded a revision of the military stipulations of the agreement, whereupon the Imperial Vicar directed Prussia to resume negotiations on the basis of Wrangel's proposals. As Denmark, however, refused to consider any departure from the original agreement, the negotiations seemed threatened with collapse.\textsuperscript{26}

Thus peace, which had momentarily seemed restored in Denmark, was again jeopardized by the ambitions of Frankfurt.

\textsuperscript{24} The implications of Bastide's pro-Danish attitude will be considered in the next chapter.

\textsuperscript{25} A.A.E., Bastide to Dotezec (Copenhagen), July 12, 1848.

\textsuperscript{26} E. Brandenburg, \textit{op. cit.}, I, 225-226.
It was the action of Berlin which eventually forced the Frankfurt Parliament to accept the Malmoe armistice. Confronted by heavy pressure from both St. Petersburg and London, the Prussian government was unwilling to risk the unpredictable consequences of the resumption of the war against Denmark. It therefore accepted, in late August, the armistice of Malmoe, incorporating the conditions previously rejected by the central government.

Here was yet another instance of the inconveniences of Germany unity; and as had recently become clearly evident in the Polish and Italian questions, Prussia was showing an inclination to pursue a line of action at variance with, and independent of, the policy of Frankfurt in the Schleswig-Holstein dispute.

Moreover, in all three areas of strife, where Frankfurt's aims clashed head-on with those of the Second Republic, Prussia seemed to embrace a more sane, moderate, and reasonable policy than did Frankfurt. Arago had found that Berlin exercised a restraining influence on the impulsive elements at Frankfurt who sought to confound German interests with those of Austria in Italy. He had discovered that French republican aspirations for Poland had a better chance of being realized through the Prussian government than through the German National Assembly. The evolution of the Schleswig-Holstein truce negotiations only seemed to confirm the conclusions arising from experience in Poland and Italy,
namely, that Prussia was a far more comfortable and desirable neighbor than would be a Germany united under the spirit currently prevailing at Frankfurt.

Such was the conclusion of Bastide, such even was the reluctant conclusion of Arago. But the preference for Berlin over Frankfurt did not remain confined to the mere theoretical sphere. It was to become, before the end of August, the basis of French policy toward the question of German unity.

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From the beginning of the German revolution in the spring of 1848, it had been evident that many formidable obstacles must be surmounted before the unity of the nation was achieved. The dispatches of the French diplomatic representatives in Germany had not infrequently alluded to these difficulties; as the summer progressed, they cited them more regularly and with greater insistence. It was generally acknowledged by the agents of the Second Republic that eventually German unification or consolidation in one form or another was inevitable. The tendency toward unity had been slowly gaining momentum for many years, since the high point of disintegration of the immediate post-Westphalian period, and the revolutionary movement of 1848 seemed to carry the evolution a long step forward.

Nevertheless, by mid-summer Fontenay had concluded that a majority of Germans opposed a complete abolition of
the old particularist organization of their land. Sometime in the future a completely unified German empire must emerge, he conceded, while expressing the hope and confidence that such an event was still remote.²⁷

The King of Hanover, one of the most reactionary princes in Germany, took the lead in refusing to recognize the extensive powers claimed by the Frankfurt Parliament, especially the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the individual states of the Confederation. Ernest August, in taking his bold stand, was surreptitiously encouraged from Berlin.²⁸ Every government in Germany, without exception, according to Meneval, would have spoken exactly as that of Hanover, had they not lacked the courage. So he had been told by the foreign minister of Saxony, in which kingdom many were despairing of achieving unity.

Meneval, who had previously rejoiced over the decline of Prussian and Austrian influence in Germany, believed Ernest August's declaration to be merely a symptom of the obstacles and rivalries which would for a long time to come oppose the establishment of a thorough-going unity in Germany. The situation encouraged him to hope that the secondary states of

²⁷ A.A.E., Fontenay to Bastide, Stuttgart, July 22, 1848. In a marginal comment Bastide expressed agreement with Fontenay's wish that German unification was reserved to a distant future.

²⁸ V. Valentin, Geschichte der deutschen Revolution, 1848-1849, II, 105.