THE UNITED STATES AND THE CONGO QUESTION, 1884-1914

DISSERTATION
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Sybil E. Crowe, in a distinguished monograph, *The West Berlin African Conference 1884–1885*, critically berated the part played by the United States in that memorable international gathering. This British author stated:

The part played by her at the conference is of some interest but of no practical importance. It is indeed possible to compare it with that taken by her at Paris in 1918. Secure, then as later, on the other side of the Atlantic, with little or no direct interest in the issues at stake, she could afford, then as later, to be magnificently Utopian in her ideals, but when it came to giving any material pledge of them she at once drew back. Thus her representative at Berlin in 1884 and 1885 is to be found constantly advocating the widest possible application of every possible liberal principle, from free trade and free navigation on the Congo and the Niger, and the abolition of the internal slave trade and the liquor traffic, down to the international relation of colonial occupations in Africa; yet she was the only one who had refused to give a pledge on entering the conference that she would ratify its decision, and in fact she never did ratify them.1

The Crowe analysis appeared to this observer as the action of a man with a telescope, who, due to the impact of a growing second world holocaust, looked through the wrong end. National policy inherently made the role of this country and its relations to other Powers of greater importance than the then available records revealed to this earlier writer. Moreover, trade with its various ramifications, in that imperialistic era, was of direct importance to all Powers. In addition, distance or the expanse of the Atlantic was, then as later, no guarantee of security.

Action motivating each Power should have been of keen importance to their various representatives, to their contemporaries, and to

prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to have American warships make frequent visits by Africa, Asia, and South America because "the national flag must be carried to such coasts before the merchant flag can be safely or profitably exhibited."\textsuperscript{10} Feeling that our foreign commerce had been neglected by private individuals, he urged governmental support, stating that "the fostering, the developing, and directing of commerce by government should be laid down as a necessity of the first importance."\textsuperscript{11}

In the decades between 1870 and 1890, owing to industrial expansion our manufacturers began to accumulate surpluses and became interested in developing foreign markets. Our surplus was basically due to an increase in the cotton industry whose production by 1880 equalled that of all Europe and England. Facilitating this tremendous increase were improvements in the various means of communication and transportation. These factors in turn tended to accelerate our demand for sub-tropical and tropical products. In addition, Big Business had the surplus capital for further exploitation.\textsuperscript{12}

Within the thirty year period from 1870 to 1900, our foreign trade doubled and, simultaneously, the proportion of manufactured goods among exports increased from fifteen to almost thirty-two percent. This also meant that we were competing with other nations in the markets of the world. More important for this investigation,


"entertaining, the exchanging of presents, and the negotiating of treaties or agreements."^2

Prior to the American Revolution, Yankee merchantmen cruised on the west coast of Africa to collect slaves. Despite the fact that Congress in 1808 forbade the trade, they continued to traffic long after the establishment of national independence. After 1819, the Executive, through a Congressional Act, was empowered to prohibit this traffic by use of our national vessels.^3 Significantly, naval officer L. H. Stockton, by cooperating with Dr. Eli Ayres and Bushrod Washington, was partially responsible for laying the foundation for the State of Liberia. As a result of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of August 9, 1842, our Navy, along with Britain's, had the responsibility of maintaining Atlantic squadrons to suppress the slave trade. Thus, indirectly, the Navy was allied with abolitionist and emancipationist groups which sought the return of the slave of his native land.^[4]

Another early indication of American interest in Africa was the T. J. Bowen Report on the Exploration of the River Niger in Africa which was submitted by Senator E. B. Washburne in connection with Senate Bill 607 in 1857. He held that the bill would promote and interest American traders in the rapidly-developing commerce of the African Continent. At the same time, with only slight additional outlay, it would suppress more effectively the remaining slave trade upon the West African coast. Specifically, the Bill

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^3Ibid., p. 355.

^4Ibid., pp. 355-359.
sought: (1) an increase of efficiency of the African Squadron; (2) admission of all African products to American ports free of duty; and (3) the establishment of a steamship line direct to the African coast, including the equatorial section. 5

Two years later, the threads of our interest in Africa were found in the initial instructions given to the Commander of our squadron on the coast of Africa. He was directed to protest the "rights and interests of our countrymen and our commerce in that quarter." An accompanying instruction ordered "the suppression of the slave trade by American citizens under the flag of the United States." Hence, commercial interest was sine qua non even prior to the Civil War. 6 Construction of a new Navy to meet new needs as a rising Power began in 1883 with the authorization of three steel cruisers and a dispatch boat. Thirty additional vessels, including the second class battleships, Maine and Texas, were authorized in the next six years. 7

It has been maintained at home and abroad that we, as a nation, had no interest in expansion prior to 1898. From the evidence of this research, it would appear that the intensity of vocal expression on trade expansion varied in the periods before and after 1898. There were reasons, however, for the failure of the United States to expand its trade in Africa prior to 1898. Our pause at the "water's edge" was not for lack of exponents of Manifest Destiny,


7 George T. Gore, A Navy Second to None (New York City: Harcourt Brace, 1940), Chaps. III-VI.
but rather, because key responsible statesmen were not ready to go far afield. Even southward expansion was curtailed by antislavery forces. Since the country was saddled with debt following the Civil War, expansion in the Caribbean, along with the possession of Alaska was regarded as extravagant. Consideration for extension was swept aside whenever the Caribbean was hit by hurricane, earthquake and tidal wave. It was further observed that domestic expansion and growth were given priority.

One European student who took a comparative view of Africa's role in shaping the foreign policy of the then Great Powers, and the United States, concluded that we were entirely devoid of any interest in that continent. He felt that the apparent great indifference of the American people to Africa was due to our slight interest in foreign affairs as a whole. This lack of concern in international affairs was mirrored by the American press. His conclusions, however, did not prove that Americans were not interested in economic gains from Africa.

A renewal of interest in Africa attended the philosophy of trade extension developed by William Evarts, Secretary of State. As a friend of the great merchants and shippers, he was disturbed by the general depression and panic of 1873, and was convinced that flowing trade was the panacea for peace in his time. Evarts used the full powers of his department to push foreign trade. He

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prevailed upon the Secretary of the Navy to have American warships make frequent visits by Africa, Asia, and South America because "the national flag must be carried to such coasts before the merchant flag can be safely or profitably exhibited." Feeling that our foreign commerce had gone neglected by private individuals, he urged governmental support, stating that "the fostering, the developing, and directing of commerce by government should be laid down as a necessity of the first importance." 

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it meant that Big Business could argue that possession of colonies would help absorb the surplus. Moreover, it was in this era that European Powers were then engaged in the imperialistic race for colonial possessions, especially in Africa.\footnote{Pratt, op. cit., p. 27.}

It was not strange that imperialism beckoned to the United States. When Thomas F. Bayard assumed office as Secretary of State in March of 1885, the noted American historian, John Fiske, finally placed before the reading public his \textit{Manifest Destiny}. Fiske held that Anglo-Saxon civilization would dominate the world.\footnote{Charles Callan Tansill, \textit{The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard} \textit{(New York City: Fordham University Press}, 1940), pp. 22, 8. \textit{Pratt, op. cit.}, p. 23.} Writing in \textit{Harpers New Monthly}, he stated that it would spread from:

\begin{quote}
... the rising to the setting sun, will not fail to keep that sovereignty of the sea and that commercial supremacy which it began to acquire when England first stretched its arm across the Atlantic to the shores of Virginia and Massachusetts.\footnote{John Fiske, "Manifest Destiny", \textit{Harpers New Monthly}, May-March LXX (1885), pp. 578-590. \textit{Cf. Tansill, op. cit.}, p. 23.}
\end{quote}

Public opinion in this country, as in other Western areas, was greatly influenced by the British naturalist, Charles Darwin. His evolutionary philosophy was popularly set forth in \textit{The Origin of the Species} (1859) and \textit{The Descent of Man} (1861). Although his hypothesis was confined to higher forms of life in the biological world, expansionists were quick to apply the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" to the sociological and political world. Our own interpreters were not the least reticent in adopting the principle which was soon accepted as an iron-clad law of nature.
Hence, unscrupulous international competition was justified in the name of "progress" or civilization.¹⁶

Even the wearers of the "robe and frock" gave heed to the clarion call of imperialism. By combining Darwinistic concepts with those of Divine Will, they preached and wrote favorably in support of the imperialistic doctrine. For example, the well-known divine, Reverend Josiah Strong, General Secretary of the Evangelical Alliance of the United States, held that the Anglo-Saxon was divinely commissioned to be... his brother's keeper.

... This race of unequaled energy with... the might of wealth behind... the largest liberty, the purest Christianity, the highest civilization,... will spread itself over the earth. If I read not amiss this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out to the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt the result of this competition of races will be the "survival of the fittest?"¹⁷

The devotee tried to justify his action morally on the ground that large sections of the world were in the hands of less skillful or non-technical people who were guilty of under-development of their natural resources. Since the world had become more populated, the natural wealth of these far distant regions must be utilized to meet the growing demands of mankind. Especially should this principle of utility prevail since the less-developed areas were being exposed to the light of progress and civilization.¹⁸ Whether the inhabitants of such areas themselves wished such exposure or not was lightly brushed aside as a matter unworthy of receiving consideration.

¹⁶Pratt, op. cit., p. 22.
Another significant advocate of imperialism was Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan of the United States Navy. Rubbing shoulders with important figures of his time, he often had the opportunity to present in key quarters his thesis on the cultivation of sea power. This held that no nation could ever hope to maintain a position of first rate importance in the world without a large Navy. Sea power according to Mahan rested upon a combination of overseas commerce, its merchant marine, its Navy, its naval bases, its coaling stations at key points and its overseas colonies. Without these, no country could hope to rate as an imperial power nor could it ever assume the moral obligation set forth in the famous Kipling son, "The White Man's Burden."

Imperialistic sentiments in this country in the period under survey did not go unchallenged. Senator Thomas F. Bayard, a Little American and a Congressional opponent of the American expansionist policy, was the first to use the term "imperialism" in the Senate. He held that its adoption

...would embark the Government of the United States upon the vast and trackless sea of imperialism (and would) change it into an imperial Government of outlying and distant dependencies with a foreign population strangers to us in race, in blood, in customs, political, social, moral, and religious. Unfortunately, neither he nor his kind had the foresight to point out the consequences certain to arise when Great Powers sought to impose their own particular ways of life upon peoples enjoying other civilizations.

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20 Ibid., p. 10.

The continental desire to avoid entanglements which might prove costly has been alleged as a dominant feature of the old European colonial policy. Later the imperialistic concept prevailed where colonies and enterprises were thought to be able to pay their way. Before the start of the present century the major interest of the United States was concerned with the investment feature of new colonial enterprise. With the impact of industrialization, new wants developed and with surplus wealth we felt the urge of deliberate exploitation of natural resources previously neglected. By advocating the doctrine of free trade in specified neutral areas, opportunitistic investors in the United States expected to hold their own in new areas. This was the period in which prevailed a unique confidence in the maintenance of contracts and obligations whether made by individuals or governments.\(^1\)

In the technical sense, we were thus attracted to Africa,\(^2\) especially the Congo.

The interest of the writer in the Congo Question came while working at Ohio State University under Professor Lowell J. Ragatz. Impressed by the lack of thorough research on the subject, the researcher was encouraged by Professor Ragatz to make a detailed scholarly investigation. Largely as a result of his steady encouragement and able criticism along with that of Professor E. H. Roseboom and Professor Foster Rhea Dulles, the student has been able to pursue the study to a successful close. He also owes a special debt of gratitude to Central State College for scholastic leave of absence

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and Ohio State University for scholarship grants. To these, he expresses his most sincere gratitude.

The list of institutions and individuals to whom he is indebted for assistance is unusually long. Nevertheless, he is obliged to acknowledge gratefully the friendly and professional assistance given by members of the following libraries; the National Archives, the Library of Congress, the Library of Ohio State University, the Library of the Department of State, the Library of Howard University, the Iowa State Museum Library, and the Library of Central State College. He likewise is indebted to Bethmann Archive of New York City, the Ohio State Museum, the Belgian Embassy, and the American Antiquarium Society of Worcester, Massachusetts.

Various other persons aided the writer. Those whose names are cited here contributed valuable suggestions and special encouragement: librarians, J. W. Gatliff, W. Petty and R. Erlandson; archivist Julia B. Carroll; artist J. P. Hubbard; Sammeye Walker, Lillian Foster and J. T. Henry gave their services on the manuscript. The J. H. Franklins, R. W. Logan and R. S. Dozer facilitated quick access to special materials. Marcella Sampson, the typist was cooperative and extremely patient. The writer absolves them of responsibility of possible error.

Special thanks are accorded his wife and family whose assistance, companionship, patience and encouragement were important mainsprings to the success of this work.
Readers of the American and British press became very much interested in Africa between 1870 and 1880, due mainly to the reportorial work of Henry Morton Stanley attending his explorative missions to the so-called Dark Continent. As a special correspondent for the New York Herald, owned by James Gordon Bennett, Stanley was given, in 1869, the mission "to go and find Livingstone", from whom no word had been received in two years. Mr. Bennett, who was aware that a well-reported search would be a circulation booster contracted, in Paris through his son, for the organization of the expedition in January 1871. The journey began March 10, 1871, and Livingstone was found November 10, 1871 at Ujiji, Congo. A year later, after stopping briefly in his native England, Stanley returned to the United States and was given honors.

The editors of an encyclopedia, and also contemporaries of Stanley, were of the opinion that he had not made any positive contributions to the field of geography. They contended that he was not qualified and was without training or culture. It was felt, however, that he had rendered an indirect aid to science and that he should be commended for carrying out orders of Bennett.  

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1Hoskins, op. cit., 33. Much of Africa was known. At least twelve explorations by hardy men occurred between 1769 and 1869. Among them were James Bruce on the Blue Nile from 1769-73; Bonaparte in Egypt, 1798; Mungo Park on the Niger in 1795; Ritchie and Lyon in Tripoli, 1818; Alexander Laing in Timbuktu in 1825; Booth and Chaillu in Northwest Africa, 1851-1868; Burton and Speke at Lake Tanganyika; Baker and Nyanza in the Nile and Sudan 1864 and Livingstone in 1869-1866.

A second journey by Stanley in 1874, under sponsorship of the New York Herald and the London Daily Telegraph, was of far greater consequence than the first. He collected tales and wrote stories to fulfill his contract with the press. Erroneously he told many that he had discovered the correct source of the Congo. However, it was only true that the river was not the lower part of the Nile. Commercially, he discovered a system of water-ways entering the heart of Africa which could serve as avenues of trade. The Congo was navigable for almost ten thousand miles. Politically, the experience led to the founding of the Congo and to the partition of unappropriated sections of Africa. Indirectly, but significantly, it finally led to a serious official interest and concern on the part of this government.

Incidentally, the real name and true citizenship of Stanley were frequently circumscribed by doubt. Such was true even in our Department of State in 1887 despite the fact that he served in both the Confederate and Union forces during the Civil War. Mr. Alvey A. Adee, a policy maker in the Department, in the spring of 1887, sought Stanley's true identification from a Dr. Dwight, Chief of Bureau of Rolls and Library. Mr. Adee alleged that, previous to this time, when they had met in Spain, the journalist-explorer had identified himself as "Ennery Mortlake Stanley." Mr. Dwight replied with the version of the Lippincott Biographical Dictionary.


4Taken from an undated signed note attached to Tree's original No. 235 from Belgium of April 19, 1887 at the National Archives.
The question of Stanley's actual name and citizenship status was handled exceptionally well by his most recent English biographer. He was born on January 26, 1841, at Tremerchion near Derby, Wales, and was christened John Rowlands. He took the name of Henry Morton Stanley from an employer in New Orleans about 1859. This employer had adopted him after loving him as a son. His citizenship was brought out in the open in a contest between Harpers, the American published and Habbard, the English publisher for his first book. Legally, he did not become an American citizen until May 15, 1885, although he considered himself as one prior to this date. Probably at the insistence of his English wife, whom he married after his famous African travels, Stanley in 1892, applied for British citizenship "and on May 31st was granted the certificate of readmission."

It was even before Stanley began his second trip to Africa that Leopold II, towering king of the Belgians, gave contemplation to colonization and exploration projects in the Far East, the Philippines and Formosa. He considered East Africa, but due to the exploit of Stanley, turned his royal attention from other areas to the Atlantic shore. Influenced by Banning, a political writer who had written an article in Echo du Parliament, and Lambermont an adviser, the King's eyes were drawn to the Congo.

In September of 1876, Leopold II convened a geographical conference at Brussels. It was the Assembly's desire "to open to civilization the only part of our globe where it has not yet penetrated",

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5 Hird, op. cit., p. 26 passim.
6 Ibid., p. 203.
7 Ibid., p. 295.
an obvious reference to equatorial Africa. Belgian writers have designated this first meeting as the International Conference of Geography. In its deliberations it recommended the establishment of stations, a permanent central organization, branch units in other countries, and the convocation of a Commission or Congress which met at Brussels in June of 1877. With the exception of Great Britain, delegates from Continental Europe and the United States were in attendance. This particular meeting was the real core and origin of the International African Association.

An executive committee was formed which represented the English-speaking, Germanic and Latin races. Ex-ministers to Belgium, Henry Shelton Sanford of Florida represented the United States. Leopold II assumed the presidency for a period of a year. In actual fact, he never released the office until annexation of the Congo by Belgium. Branches of the organization were established in Europe and the United States for the purpose of collecting of funds "to aid, abet, and establish hospitable and scientific stations in Africa." A blue flag with a golden star in the center was the Association's emblem.

It was interesting to observe that, in the United States, in May 1877, enthusiasm was so strong that the American Committee


called a meeting in New York and established a branch organ of the International African Association. Mr. John H. B. Latrobe of the American Colonization Society was elected president and Sanford was designated as a delegate to the June meeting in Brussels. This American citizen was in turn elected a member of the executive committee and the role which he assumed in this African enterprise dates from this year. Sanford's only biographer, now living in Derby, Connecticut, and one of three men who has had access to his now unavailable papers states that:

In 1887, (sic), he went as a delegate from the American Geographical Society to the International African Association Congress convoked by Leopold II at the Royal Palace in Brussels.

The version of the African scholar, Raymond Leslie Buell, on the meeting of the Conference of Geographers designated Stanley as one of the catalytic forces involved, with the missionaries Livingstone of England and Schweinfurth of Germany as the other forces. He also called attention to the statement of Strauch, another adviser to the King made in the June meeting of 1877 that the Association's "enterprise is not directed to the creation of a Belgian Colony but to the establishment of a powerful Negro State". It was probably

10Reeves, op. cit., p. 17.
12Leo T. Molley, Henry Shelton Sanford 1823-1891. A Biography (Derby, Connecticut: The Bacon Printing Company, 1952), p. 26. The year 1887 should be considered as a typographical error. It was not in agreement with the minutes of that meeting in 1877.
felt that this view would make a good psychological and practical appeal to the United States which had recently concluded the Civil War and which had supported the establishment of Liberia as a place for discontented Negroes, all of whom many whites would have approved of emigration.

The minutes of this long-named organization — International Association for the Exploration and Civilization of Central Africa — revealed that even though "Mr. M. Sanfor" (sic) was in attendance at the first meeting, there was no person present representing our country in official capacity. As a delegate at the second meeting, Sanford was made a member of the executive committee. The minutes also noted the prominent personnel in attendance at an open meeting of the branch in New York, among whom were Professor Joseph Henry of Washington, Professor A. Guyot of Princeton College and Mr. M. Schiefflin of New York, the vice president of the branch. Judge Charles P. Daly was the original president of the branch while John H. Latrobe, Jr. became president at a later date. On June 15, 1877, the treasurer's report showed a membership of 250, subscriptions of 287,000 francs, and actual surplus capital of 39,000 francs. ¹¹

The meeting of the Association had adjourned only a few months before its president, King Leopold II, was galvanized into action by the journalistic despatch of Stanley sent on October 9, 1877 to the London Daily Telegraph. Significantly the last two lines read:

I inform you that the work of the Anglo-American Expedition which you commissioned me to perform, has been performed to the very letter. We have discovered the great highway of commerce to broad Africa is the Congo.15

On instruction from Leopold II, Sanford, along with Baron Greindl, a nobleman and an employee of the King as honorary members of the Royal Geographical Society, met Stanley in Marseilles in the railroad station in January of 1878. In the race to make inducements to Stanley, they beat Italy to him. The King's agents richly wined and dined him and talked with him about Leopold's African enterprise. Not to overlook a point, Sanford also wrote to James G. Bennett that Leopold desired Stanley's services. The ex-minister then announced to the explorer that his discoveries had brought about the birth of a great project and that it would realize success if his talents were engaged.16

From a long line of Yankee ancestors, Henry Shelton Sanford, was born in Woodbury, Connecticut, June 15, 1823. After graduation from Washington College (now Trinity College) in Hartford, Connecticut, he entered the University of Heidelberg, won honors and graduated in 1849, cum laude with the degree of Doctor of Laws. As an international lawyer, he was an unusually good linguist. As a member of the diplomatic corps, he served from 1819 to 1870 as


Secretary of the American Legation, Chargé d'Affairs in Brussels and Minister to Belgium. Papers in the Department of State archives reveal that he was wealthy in his own right from sugar investment in the West Indies and was closely associated with the New York Merchants Association, the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad Company, the New York Stock Exchange, the National Bank of Commerce and the Panama Railway. Politically, he had powerful contacts with S. J. Tilden and Martin Van Buren and a thirty year acquaintanceship with Thurlow Weed. Although he was highly regarded as a linguist and exceptional business man of wealth, he had enemies who criticized him as a crooked Weed appointment.

Belgian writers described Sanford as one who, if he liked a person, gave him his complete loyalty. A more recent writer who had access to Sanford's papers felt that he was a man of large fortune who enjoyed sumptuously entertaining. He was regarded as a man of the world who had a wide acquaintance among prominent public men in both the Old World and the New and a rather proficient linguist who was always interested in business matters. He accepted it as a compliment to be looked upon as a man of mystery.

Perhaps Leopold II sensed devotion and loyalty in Sanford. According to some, he allegedly used him as an example to Stanley,

17. Molley, op. cit., pp. 10 et seq. See Dept. of State, Appointment Papers, Applications and Letters of Recommendation Tray 16h (1853-1861); 1861-1864; Tray 190 (1877-1885,MSS) (Washington, D. C., National Archives).


19. Frank Maloy Anderson, The Mystery of a Public Man; A Historical Detective Story (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota, 1948), p. 87; and Thomson, op. cit., p. 87. The author had access to Sanford's Papers which definitely proved that the ex-minister was a skillful and efficient manipulator behind the scenes.
the Anglo-American, that a man of his origin should not hesitate to enter into employment of a foreign ruler. The explorer's refusal of Belgium's first offer in unsuccessful anticipation of an invitation to serve Great Britain did not deter the persistent King one whit. Stanley, while in Paris, received an invitation from the King in August, 1878, and another in November of the same year. The latter resulted in a meeting at Brussels of Stanley and Leopold II, and in the organization of Comité d'Études du Haut Congo, a Belgian subsidiary of the International African Association.

A review of all available sources reveals that Stanley was employed by Leopold II for a period of five years, extending from January 8, 1879 to June of 1884. As a key agent for the Comité and its successor, he laid the basis for the wily King's domain. He then withdrew and thereafter was never again employed in the Congo work, although his further assistance was frequently sought. Incidentally, he exacted no small sum for his services. It has been estimated that he averaged at least $10,000 annually for negotiating 450 treaties at the nominal expense of cloth, whiskey, beads and copper wire. In return Belgium got almost one million square miles of empire, an area more than eighty times its own size and equaling the territory of the United States east of the Mississippi.

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20 Middleton, op. cit., p. 32. The original observation was from Ludwig Bauer's Leopold the Unloved.

21 Ibid. Also Daye, op. cit., p. 165.


23 Middleton, op. cit., p. 35.
Stanley's discovery of the secret to the Congo for commercialization, undoubtedly made him more attractive to Leopold II, who rather rapidly became an imperialist in disguise. The journalist-explorer observed that ships were held up by rapids less than one hundred miles from the mouth of the Congo, but that navigation could be resumed about two hundred and fifty miles further upstream. He was the first to visualize the possible construction of a railroad to bridge this handicap, and which would tap the great resources of the country. By it, trade could be more readily transported to the Atlantic Coast, eliminating the longer, costlier trip to the east coast. This was no wild dream for a geographical expedition soon verified the fact that the Congo River, along with its tributaries had almost uninterrupted navigation for 10,000 miles.

Why were the Big Powers not immediately attracted to Stanley's philosophy of exploitation? He first offered the Congo Basin to Great Britain regardless of the fact that he had carried the flag of the United States. Logical explanations prevailed for the refusal of Great Britain. British imperialism was not as active then as earlier and again later. The British had lost several expeditions in this region prior to the Stanley episode, and colonial indifference

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25Gardiner G. Hubbard "Africa, Its Past and Future", *The National Geographic Magazine*, Vol. II, No. 2, p. 100. On page 190, the contributor implied that Stanley was wrong on his claim of identifying the ARUNINI as the source of the Congo. He held that the Free State Expedition of 1887 found the little "Kibali", rising in the Sudan and also known as the "Welle" and "Dorce" as the proper source.

26The New York Sun, February 7, 1890, p. 6. The United States flag, unofficially taken was carried to impress the natives and it was the only emblem that could not arouse suspicions among whites that possibly the expedition had political ends in view.
with regard to this section of Africa had developed over several
decades. In addition, the British were involved in the deposition
of Ismail Pasha of Egypt and security of her own forty percent of
the Suez, and at the same time, were eyeing the Sudan.

In the meantime, Great Britain's missionaries who were frequently
traders, anticipating greater profits with the Leopold organization,
argued against British entrance. Moreover, Bismarck the "honest
broker", who had not yet submitted to pressure for colonies, was
criticized for hesitation and negligence in developing a German
colonial empire. France, the embittered loser in a recent war with
Germany, was now preoccupied with an internal crisis involving
anticlericalism.27

No explanation was found expressed by Stanley for his failure
to approach the United States even though he then regarded himself
as an American citizen, and the Livingstone mission was sponsored
by a leading news organ. Possibly, Stanley thought that the distance
was too great for American exploitation, a concept which would also
reveal his ignorance of the American consuls' pleas for greater action
on American-African trade. On the contrary, he could hardly have
been unaware of the American foreign policy based on the Monroe
Doctrine which would have deterred him from making an approach.
Moreover, the country was in the throes of national domestic rebuilding
and expansion.

Upon the hiring of Stanley in 1878, Leopold immediately formed
the subsidiary unit previously mentioned. He was far-sighted enough

An explanation for the British is excellent. Stolberg-Wernigerode,
op. cit., p. 199. Harry R. Ruding "Belgian Africa", Current History,
to establish it under the guise of humanity and unselfishness, while limiting the unit to special activity which laid the basis of his commercial program. This committee of the Upper Congo was still under the flag of the International African Association. 28

This subsidiary was secretly dissolved on November 17, 1879 in a monetary manipulation of alleged bankruptcy which accrued to Leopold's advantage and left him as the sole director of Stanley's activities. The records revealed that the Dutch branch of the Association was the financial loser and meantime, the Comité d'Etude du Haut du Congo became known as "The International Association of the Congo", frequently abbreviated A.I.C. Leopold was the driving dynamo of it. 29 Stanley, unaware of the change, had agreed to work for the Comité, later described with gusto its purposes in his publication on the founding of the Free State. Between 1879 and 1894, Stanley established with the natives through 300 odd treaty agreements twenty-two stations along the Congo and gained accessions of land unknown to the A.I.C. One writer has designated the Comité as merely the "front" which hid the Kings gnawing greed for territory. 30

For a time thereafter, the question of the legality of the A.I.C. and the validity of its contractual agreements were much discussed in Europe. In reality, due to the maneuvering of Leopold

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the A.I.C. was of illegal origin. That fact alone should have made null and void its contracts but the King was one who could keep a secret. Since a favorable view was given it by the Senate, Jessie Siddell Reeves observed that individuals and private associations could not acquire territory with a public title except by virtue of a mandate, a delegation or at least ratification by existing powers, seemed to have concluded with hesitation that we should have recognized the A.I.C. on the theory of de facto government.\textsuperscript{31} Meanwhile, France and Portugal, protesting in no uncertain terms that a private association could not conclude contracts in public or international law, gave Leopold II a bad case of jitters. Their unequivocal stand led the King to seek recognition of the A.I.C. by a large Power.\textsuperscript{32}

Validity and legality were based upon a unique political relationship. Having previously objected to the idea of a powerful Negro State, on the grounds that the several groups of natives in the area would seek jealously to guard their independence, Stanley, after much persuasion at length accepted the idea of a "Republican confederation of free Negroes". Drawing up a special constitution by which the native chiefs transferred their military authority to Leopold while retaining their independence, Stanley made treaties with the tribes which were recognized by the Association as "Free States".\textsuperscript{33} The cliché, in connection with Leopold's original Association, a legal body, was quite effective in America, despite the

\textsuperscript{31}Reeves, op. cit., p. 22. Senate Report No. 393 (1884), pp. 30-37 ff.


\textsuperscript{33}Snow, op. cit., pp. 35-137 ff. Stanley still thought he was employed by the International African Association.
fact that some serious consideration was given to the problem by the State Department. The press revealing an earlier official tone of American thought, and also aware that the A.I.C., with Leopold II, acting as a private individual had found commercial establishments, occupied territory, and gained cessions of sovereignty commented belatedly, although pertinently:

When this came to the attention of the United States, the Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, expressed the American attitude toward it by saying that "the representatives of the world's commerce could admit the existence of no asserted title (of any foreign country, at least) to territory which should be made offensive to the general and peaceful pursuits of that commerce without the closest scrutiny and investigation as to its fundamental merits."3

The Tribune also inferred that, during the Evart's regime this scrutiny and investigation were not needed. Moreover, the aims of the Association were apparently philanthropic with no intent of political control. Neutrality of the valley was its objective.

It can also be said without contradiction that Belgium, whose neutrality was guaranteed by the major European Powers, was in the unique position of international trusteeship to further its project in Africa on a basis of 'neutrality'35 with commerce opened to all. The American project of 1840, a similar scheme, was called the Buxton plan. The Belgian plan allegedly proposed to open Africa to science, Christianity, commerce and to civilization and to abolish the slave trade. This Belgian plan postdated the unsuccessful American project of an African colony and also that of the International Red Cross. It was significant, however, that intimate


35 New York Times, June 14, 1900, p. 33. The deception which Leopold had in mind in those years was appropriate to the later Chinese comment "Even here...the word neutrality was only good to deceive the people".
friendly personnel of the former and the latter who planned both were learned men. They were executive members of the Comité, and were also cognizant of the American attitude on the fundamental Free State concept." 36

The plan to obtain political recognition for the International Association of the Congo among the family of nations was born in Brussels. The leaders who initiated the great design were Colonel Strauch, president of the Comité d'Études and later rewarded as head of the Congo cabinet, ex-minister Henry Sanford who had been Leopold's special delegate to await Stanley's return from Africa in 1878; and the King himself. The principle aim of their project, now quite old but then rather new, was to play upon the vanity of the United States. 37

The official encyclopedia of the Congo described the matter in this manner:

Quite naturally, he will think of the United States and with reason: there the public was particularly sensitive to humanitarian ideas; the Negro Republic of Liberia was founded by an American society. Stanley, himself, had become an American citizen. General Henry S. Sanford was unanimously selected to take charge of negotiations. He returned to America on November 27, 1883 armed with a personal letter from the King to President Arthur and a well-filled briefcase. 38

Sanford, who was well aware of the importance of the sanctity of contracts in the English-speaking world and of its use in relation to less civilized people in treaty form, applied expertly

the contract principle to the Congo project. Moreover, he stopped on the continent and in England to avail himself of additional legal advice on historical precedents regarding customs and practices in the acquisition of sovereignty and recognition.

Supporting this fact was the long treaties found in our official report. With the philanthropic and humanitarian aspects of the Association's alleged program already well accepted, Sanford as its chosen representative, stated the real intent and purposes of his organization. No duties were to be levied on goods entering its territories or brought by the route around the cataracts. This was done to encourage commercial penetration in Equatorial Africa. Foreigners were given the right to purchase, sell, lease and build on the sole condition of obedience to the law. Favoritism would not be granted to any nation and all were acting to combat the slave trade.

It was quite obvious that Sanford, as one who could work behind the scenes, had sufficient ability to influence President Arthur, who was considered by some as a weak president. His message, in almost mirror-like manner, reflected the sentiment and speech from contact

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42 Middleton, op. cit., p. 32. The title was obtained when the Minnesota militia granted it to him on receipt of a gift of field pieces. Reference is made to General, an unearned title.
with our ex-minister. For example, there were such terms as "nuclei of states established"; "offers freedom to commerce"; "prohibits the slave trade"; "it does not aim at political control". Significantly, besides indicating the Sanford influence, the presidential message of December 4, 1883, also revealed the effect of Leopold II's letter to the President. It served later as an important basis for the Morgan resolution and it portended strained relations with Portugal in connection with failure of the proposed Anglo-Portuguese Treaty.

Sanford's influence was no less important on Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama who, as a member of that august body, served a period of twenty-eight years on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and was its chairman during the second Cleveland administration. A senatorial colleague's sketch of Morgan gave some clarification of how the favorable existence of a Sanford-Morgan relationship was possible. According to Cullom, Morgan was unusual in that he had a store of information on every subject but lacked sound judgment and was undependable in tough situations. Although honest and sincere of purpose, he seldom saw both sides of a question and seldom, if ever, changed a decision. He was quite a likeable person if one was in accord with him.


\[4^5\] Shelby M. Cullom, Fifty Years of Public Service; Personal Recollections of Shelby M. Cullom (Chicago: A. C. McClurg, 1911), p. 348. Not one word was written by him on the Congo Question.
With Morgan, Sanford resorted to flattery, philanthropy and our national desire for increased trade. On the first point, he spoke subtlety and gloriously of the birth and growth of the United States and made allusions to the possible development of Free States in the Congo.\textsuperscript{46} Too, aware of Senator Morgan's feeling on the Negro problem, he referred to the project as an asylum for freedmen. To dispel the Senator's suspicions, he wrote in a letter to Morgan:

\begin{quote}
The only practical difficulty in his wonderful progress by Leopold in the Congo proves to be an unrecognized flag, which is liable to be misunderstood or abused, and the people under it subjected to impediments in the philanthropic work on the part of those engaged in the slave trade or for other selfish ends.\textsuperscript{47}
\end{quote}

Moreover, completely unaware of Leopold's dissolution of the Comité, Sanford also presented the high humanitarian ideals of the I.A.A.

On the matter of trade, he had only to refer to the illegal commerce of the Portuguese slave trade and the petitions of the New York Chamber of Commerce, on which more will follow below.\textsuperscript{48} The resolution of Senator Morgan submitted to Congress spoke plainest of all. It held that:

\begin{quote}
Prompt action is recommended to the President towards securing unrestricted freedom of access and traffic to our citizens in their legitimate enterprises in the Congo Basin from its mouth to its sources.\textsuperscript{49}
\end{quote}

The two clauses of the resolution left no doubt in one's mind that we desired the exercise of all of the freedoms which we espoused in this area.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{46}Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 155.

\textsuperscript{47}Middleton, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{48}Thomson, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 73-74, and 154.


\textsuperscript{50}Ibid.
The keen shrewd planning of an astute monarch, his psycho-legalistic adviser, and a valuable but practical-minded wealthy ex-minister from America bore fruition in the declaration between the United States and the International Association of the Congo. Among the internationally-minded, recognition was a much discussed question. The best American authority on the establishment of the Congo State held that the publicists were in general agreement on the right of this private association to found new states. In that sense, the United States at least had the press in its favor.

Thomson stated that Senator Morgan actually believed that the "Free States" already existed, hence his recognition was based upon that of de jure government. Recognition by the Senate was based on the application of its analogy of the American Colonization Society and Liberia. It would also seem plausible that a quid pro quo was lurking in the minds of the senators.

The stated reasons found in the Senate Report for recognition of the flag of the Association, which the lawmakers regarded as synonymous to and the agent of the Free States were, summarily, as follows: (1) The native people had "instinctively" regarded it as their first banner which had promised them good will and security. (2) The Association intended to introduce civilization in the Congo area and give them peace and prosperity. (3) The Association represented security of persons and property to those who visited the Congo. (4) Since the nations recognized the flag of the Confederate States, it would be difficult to state why the flag of the Association

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51 See Appendix A for the entire declaration of exchange.
52 Thomson, op. cit., pp. 156-158.
should not be recognized.53

Our lawmakers whose main interest was trade extension introduced their actions with veiled moralism. (1) It was a duty to the Negro population of the United States to attempt to secure for it the right freely to return to Africa with all the privileges of trade concessions and colonial reestablishment. (2) Recognition would counteract Portugal which still perpetrated the slave trade under guise of emigration to other countries. (3) The importance of the Congo as an avenue of commerce and civilization to 50,000,000 could not be underestimated. (4) The merchants of Europe and America insisted upon an equal right to free trade in the Congo Valley for the blessings of Africa and the commercial (sic) world.54

In officially extending his support for recognition of the International African Association, Frederick Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under Arthur, acknowledging that he was partially influenced by the various resolutions of state chambers of commerce, took the following position: (1) that a philanthropic association had a right to found a state as much as had the Puritans and groups of adventurers; (2) that he was concerned with the interests of our citizens seeking trade in "that vast and fertile region as an outlet for overproduction of our manufacturers; and (3) that he sought a practical means of eliminating the roots of the slave trade.55

Occasionally, distant events which seem inconsequential at the time have provoked deliberative bodies to speedy action giving

53 Senate Report No. 393 (1884), pp. 3-4 ff.
54 Ibid., p. 7.
55 Ibid., p. 10.
clearer insight into their veiled desires. This occurred in the case of recognition. Approval and accord to this new flag had been fully discussed and recommended in a resolution to the Senate on March 26, 1884. There was delay of about a month before Sanford and Frelinghuysen affixed signatures and seals. Quite unexpectedly, the news that France was preparing to claim a part of the Congo Basin was published in the morning newspapers on April 22, 1884. "Recognition of the United States occurred that afternoon." We desired surety and recognition of the principle of freedom of trade. Our friend France was expected to follow in this.

There was a definite interlocking of personnel of the American Colonization Society and the American branch of the International African Association which favored approval of recognition for the latter by the former. The Honorable John H. B. Latrobe, a member of the American Colonization Society for thirty-one years and president in the eighties, was also a branch president of the I.A.A. in 1884. In addition to his Belgian connections, Sanford was an executive of the A.C.S. In the light of the program and personnel of the A.C.S., it was inconceivable that anything less than sympathy was accorded any such African organization.

Supporting this above thesis, the Society's correspondence indicates that it kept an alert eye for political connections in furthering its own African schemes or those in which it was interested. For example, a proposed call upon Secretary Blaine was abandoned

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56 Ibid., p. 52. See Senate Resolution No. 48 of the same session and also Senate Resolution No. 58.
57 Snow, op. cit., p. 139.
when it appeared certain that he was to retire from the Cabinet. In the letter William Coppinger, Secretary of the A.C.S. also stated that; "Ex-Senator Frelinghuysen is generally looked upon as a friend of ours. The President rates as a first-class New York society man and politician". Moreover, about a year later, Coppinger urgently sought from C.W., an unknown printer, 1000 pamphlet copies of "The Race for Africa", which indicated his awareness of the impact of imperialism.

The above comments make it clearer why Leopold II was able to create the concept of analogy between the American Colonization Society and the International Association of the Congo. No one at that time, with the possible exception of Frelinghuysen, appeared to note the differences in the disposal of organized Free States. The American group conferred complete independence upon the Free State of Liberia before it was recognized by the Powers. Thus complete autonomy followed a patron-ward relationship. On the other hand, the Free States of the Congo vanished as if by black magic. Naturally, Leopold resorted to disguise and cloaked his machinations in humanitarian philanthropy. Lately, the Society still adhering to its original purpose has been berated for its alleged humanitarianism. Founded in 1817, it seemed to have been organized solely for the sending to Africa of free Negroes, who were thought to be very dangerous and "likely to breed uprisings among the black slaves".

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61 Thomson, op. cit., p. 158.

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An examination of post-mortem views of recognition by contemporaries bring to light a variety of views. Belgian writers held that Leopold appealed to the American sense of justice and philanthropy which earlier had led them to found Liberia and which subsequently caused them to engage in a glorious struggle for the abolition of slavery, for Negro citizenship.\(^6^3\)

Present day Belgian writers have observed that the word "State" in reference to either association was never written in the declaration of exchange. They hold that the agreement actually increased confusion existing within the minds of the American negotiators on the three organizations. They hastened to add that a similar confusion existed in Belgium over the International African Association, le Comité and the International Association of the Congo due to the "same administration, personnel and flag".\(^6^4\)

A minority expression within the House of Representatives felt that our recognition was adroitly used by England to prejudice the unratified Anglo-Portuguese Treaty which would have eliminated entirely Belgian action in the Congo.\(^6^5\) Strangely, the English anti-treaty group were the trade people almost all followers of John Bright and members of the Baptist Missionary group who hoped to profit more greatly under Leopold than under England. On the other hand, English imperialists, supporters of the treaty, held that American recognition looked like "a piece of very sharp practice - an act of immorality, in fact - novel in international relations and

\(^6^3\)Wauters, loco. cit., p. 236.


hardly contemplated by International Law". 66

The views of four twentieth century scholars reflecting the matter merit attention from students of modern imperialism. A German, Stolberg-Wernigerode, believed that recognition resulted solely because Americans were inclined to accept "the high-sounding phrases of the Belgian King at their face value" and that our own interests would be taken care of best under the I.A.C. 67 It is not clear whether "interests" referred to the abortive domestic movement of Negro emigration, designated by Logan as the "nadir of Negro life", 68 and/or whether Stolberg-Wernigerode carefully considered our national aspirations in the full play of international activity. It was strongly held that we rigidly adhered to the international legalistic principle of recognition by requiring the Association to make a declaration of international trusteeship. 69 Snow, an expert on international law maintained further that in this way we avoided entanglement with the European Powers. We were a member of the compact with a guarantee from the Association.

This observer concluded that the specialist, Snow, who wrote a treatise on legal relations to the native for the full benefit of our government, was aware of the actions of the Secretary of State

66 Thomson, op. cit., p. 158. Cf. The Times (London), May 4, 1881. Also see Hird, op. cit., p. 195. The English did not participate in the original meetings called by Leopold whereupon Sanford replaced Barr the British delegate on the Comité. Edward D. Morel, King Leopold's Rule in Africa (London: William Heineman, 1904), p. 10. The English in the 1900's supported Morel in the crusades against Congo atrocities and also when he described recognition as "grizzly satire".

67 Stolberg-Wernigerode, op. cit., p. 205.


69 See Appendix A.
who was really of an imperialistic mind. He preferred, however, to indict the official by an absence of comment. The theory that "the real impulsion for recognition appears to have come" (1) from American humanitarianism; and (2) mercantile circles were promised free trade was readily accepted as a partial analysis. To be exact, only a very small minority was seriously concerned about "a refuge for Negro peoples free from" European domination. In reality, it was more or less a shield for the mercantile group. In addition the theory fails to consider factors stated in the views previously mentioned. The effect of propaganda, a view presented by Hird, who wove into vision clearly all the other factors, was found as the most acceptable theory. It could have been designated as the Sanford propaganda, and it certainly complemented and dove-tailed with the Tisdel version.

Additional research has made possible newer documentation in support and clarification of Thomson's conclusion. It has also given greater support to the idea of mercantile interest by calling attention to consular influence and likewise serves to pinpoint more exactly the activities of key governmental figures. The conclusion of Thomson that the origin of the Congo Free State was based upon international jealousy failed strongly to point out that our entrance made it possible for us to profit from this condition.

70 Snow, op. cit., p. 138.
71 Marvel, op. cit., p. 27, for.
72 Hird, op. cit., p. 195.
73 See Chapter III.
74 Thomson, op. cit., p. 313.
In giving life to the Congo Free State by recognition, we also blocked possible monopoly by Portugal or England, or a joint one by both, and provided a better chance for freedom of commerce on the Congo. In support of this thesis and conjecturing on the future line of foreign governmental action, the *New York Tribune*, about a year prior to official recognition declared:

If the choice lies between France and Portugal, England will naturally side with the Power which will not permit the horrors of slave traffic. The French Government, therefore, can safely proclaim its sovereignty over the Congo region, inasmuch as the consent of England is secured in advance. This it will probably do. Whether M. de Brazza will endeavor to open his road and contest the ground openly with his rival in the interior is a matter of conjecture.75

About two weeks prior to our recognition, *The Commercial and Financial Chronicle* indicated clearly that we were considerably concerned about the Congo. Protesting against the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, it castigated possible imposition of the Portuguese "Mozambique Tariff", the Portuguese claims and the absurd action of British recognition of Portugal's claim on the Congo. On the other hand missionary progress was envisioned and encouragement was given our imperialistic urge. Significantly, in closing, it advised that:

The whole affair must be reopened. It is a case for international arrangement... It concerns all the trading countries, ourselves included and we cannot afford to be indifferent in the circumstances... Those African lands should be for the benefit, not of one nation, but of all. The conduct of Great Britain is the less justifiable that

75 *The New York Tribune*, April 19, 1883. On March 26, 1884 the same paper reechoed President Arthur's words of United States cooperation with commercial Powers to settle the Congo Question.
the Government of that country has repeatedly and decidedly protested against the claims of Portugal in the premises.76

Stanley was probably unaware that he was assuming a prophetic role when he penned this significant remark in his diary at the start of his trip in 1879.

I shall be closely watched by all the traders on the Congo on behalf of their respective nationalities and their Governments will be well informed of all that is done here.77

In that same year, Naval Lieutenant F. J. Drake, with a discerning eye wrote to interested parties of the economic possibilities in the Congo region. He calculated that a Dutch trading company engaged in exporting ivory, palm oil, palm nuts, ground nuts, rubber, sesame, green copal and orcin grossed almost five million dollars in 1879. To the Mayor of Brooklyn, he wrote:

No money is used in this trade, nor is there any money in circulation. The business is conducted entirely on the barter system.

The percentage on money invested seldom falls short of 300, and frequently runs as high as 400 percent. The most is made on liquor, and the demand for that article increases from year to year. The bad quality supplied is plainly telling on the Negro race, but business cannot be successfully transacted on this coast of Africa without this necessary article.78

In the early spring of 1881, the New York Tribune bemoaned the fact that we were playing a small role in the world's carrying trade.

76 The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, Vol. XXXVIII, April 5, 1884, p. 403 in "The Congo Question". Introduction has reference to Judge Daly's observations, individual previously referred to - member of Am. Col. Society. Note that Portugal who was against our action of recognition gave answer in The Times (London), May 5, 1884. She reminded us of our high tariff and of our long having been her best customer in the slave trade.

77 Hird, op. cit., p. 194.

78 Senate Report No. 393, p. 15. Letter of Lt. (Navy) F. J. Drake to Hon. Seth Low, Mayor of Brooklyn. It was attached as an exhibit in seeking recognition of the flag of the International African Association.
It noted that London papers described the United States "as watching the venture with chagrin and jealousy". In attempting to awaken the American public and drive home a telling point, the editorial ended strongly with the comment that:

"We are becoming the great food centre for all the world. Yet there is no reason why we should not also carry our food to market, and not leave England to boast that she is "the owner of 49 percent of the whole merchantile marine of the globe", while we own merely 16 percent. It is salutary work to drag our failures to the light, though not as agreeable or easy as to join in the incessant crowing over success."

On October 1, 1882 Secretary Frelinghuysen in submitting his observations on our share of the total African trade for the years of 1880 and 1881 gave the following statistics: Total Imports into Africa $193,517,000; Exports from Africa $179,614,000; total $373,131,000. U. S. (1880) Imports into Africa $6,012,000; U. S. exports from Africa $4,023,000; total $10,064,000. U. S. (1881) imports into Africa $4,561,924; U. S. exports from Africa $3,803,092; total $8,384,933.

The Secretary recognized the various American restraints of isolation, the Monroe Doctrine and domestic expansion, to the founding of imperial colonies. Yet he longed for the opportunities of trade offered us from colonies founded by others. Thus the Secretary urged the United States to greater expenditure of effort in that direction.

"There is no reason why we should not obtain a share thereof, as no political restraints are put upon it; and as far as the establishment of trade with those parts of Africa not colonized by Europeans is concerned, the opportunities of the United States are as good as those of other countries.

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80 U. S. 49th Cong. 3rd sess. Ex. Doc. 98, p. 43. Also called Commercial Relations (1880-1881).
The fact that the American flag carries with it in Africa no reminiscence of conquest or war is recognized by the rude tribes as well as by the more civilized people, and favorably affects the commercial relations of the United States with them.°

An incessant call for the increase of American trade was made in the cry of our consuls located at various points on the huge perimeter of the African coast. With an accelerated volume and emphasis, they repeatedly encouraged our merchants and government to give greater attention to this phase of international trade. From Sierra Leone in 1881, Judson Lewis wrote that we still continued to furnish flour, bread, lumber, slate and tobacco, but we had not made any advancement in the cotton goods trade. "We were not accustomed to put up piece goods according to the customs of the country". After presenting a long list of the needs of the colonists, James W. Siler, wrote from Capetown in October of 1883 that the United States enjoyed a part of this trade, and with direct monthly steam communication might within a very brief period of time take the lead. From Tamatave, Mr. R. M. Whitney, vice consul noted that only five of our vessels visited the place in 1882 and 1883. In that same period our imports fell from $306,783.60 to $299,754.44 and our exports from $310,179.78 to $165,694.15. On the east coast of Africa and in the Indian Ocean, Consul Thomas L. Prentice, reporting from Mauritius in 1883 observed that our trade

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81 Ibid., p. 99.
83 Ibid., p. 119.
was no further advanced than it was in 1879. In further explanation he stated:

By the term "trade with Mauritius", I mean direct trade. Doubtless, a large number of United States articles find their way through British markets. Hence our merchants ought to encourage direct shipments because we could undersell a foreign shipper who earns a commission, especially where double freight and landing charges are charged.85

The consul sadly viewed the fact that our trade with Egypt had dropped considerably. In 1885 only two American ships of 1820 tonnage had put in at Egyptian ports, whereas, in the period 1870-1884 eighteen of our ships with a tonnage of 20,092,912 had docked.86

The trade with Sierra Leone likewise fell off but not to the same degree as that experienced by Egypt. Lewis noted that African commerce was still transacted by three houses: Yates and Porterfield of America; Randall and Fisher of England; and the Senegal Company of France. However the outlook for this area, which was more or less typical of the West African coast, was extremely bright.

There is no special way that I can see of opening up trade to any considerable extent, except in the direction of the interior.... Where we now reach a hundred people and get a pound of produce and furnish twelve yards of cotton, there are a thousand people standing ready to take cotton in proportion and give us produce in payment.87

In 1887, the same official was perturbed at the stagnant figure which we maintained and was probably more disgusted because goods were adulterated. Nevertheless, he was by no means reticent in suggesting decent changes.88

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85 Ibid., pp. 124-125.
86 Ibid., p. 75.
87 Ibid., p. 94.
Even our consul at Morocco was alert to the action needed to pull us from the doldrums of the sixteen percent carrying trade. In the years 1884, 1885 and 1886, he consistently suggested direct communication between our country and important stopovers in Africa. If this were done our products could then be introduced on a large scale:


to say nothing of the advantage of opening a direct trade with a country which is a stepping stone to many points of Central Africa. 89

From the same post on January 6, 1887, his cry was not only a petition but a warning.

There is no doubt that the European Powers are now competing in a race for the predominance in commercial influence, and while watching closely the progress made in that direction, I must solicit the cooperation of our Government and countrymen to avoid our being lost in the field. 90

President Arthur, in his letter of July 22, 1884 to King Leopold II, besides revealing his understanding that the Free States were in the process of being established, and that the Association was not called a State, indicated the impact of the cries of the consulate. It was his expectation that these Free States would:

pledge themselves never to grant to the citizens of one nation any advantages without immediately extending the same to the citizens of all other countries... and to grant absolute liberty of commerce to all nations. 91

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89 Ibid., Part II, pp. 1545; 1557.
90 Ibid., p. 1558. Note. Our agent at St. Paul de Loanda observed that our missionaries located in places suitable for farming and livestock. He felt that they "would make good at both farming... and missionary endeavors". Ibid., pp. 1576-7.
91 Dept. of State Credences MSS, September 1, 1881 - November 18, 1890, Vol. VI, pp. 262-263. President Arthur to Leopold II, July 22, 1884. It was in reply to Leopold II's letter of thanks for recognition, written May 15, 1884. Note. Harry R. Rudin, loco. cit., p. 15. He indicated that the President was a pushover in this matter. Without much apparent difficulty the President was persuaded to bring the issue of recognizing Leopold's state before Congress."
Belmont who was in Congress at that time, contended that the President acted in harmony with the traditional United States' policy which sought the best gains of our commercial interests while, at the same time avoiding entanglement with foreign nations.\textsuperscript{92} Frelinghuysen in a letter to Morgan felt that:

The passage in the President's message indicates his desire that the United States should not lose its share of trade and commercial influence in this interesting and rich valley.\textsuperscript{93}

Even earlier, Frelinghuysen himself was more greatly concerned about the prospects of trade than any other factor. In another letter to Morgan, he wrote:

It is proposed by the Association to admit American goods free of all duties, to permit Americans, whether traders or missionaries to hold property and exercise any legitimate pursuit to... be accorded to any other people and to abolish the slave trade in all the regions acquired by the Association.\textsuperscript{94}

Surely this attitude on the part of Frelinghuysen, who was well acquainted with the merchants of the eastern seaboard, was not predominately due to the impact of the Sanford propaganda.

Quite interestingly, it was observed that Congress was rather consistent on the "trade line". The very first step following recognition was followed by an act calling for the appointment of an agent to the Congo Basin. It was maintained that these actions were carried but because Congress and the President sought a guarantee for participation in free trade and intercourse for citizens of the

\textsuperscript{92}Belmont, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 317.


United States. This, then, was the result of concomitant factors, among which an outstanding one, previously overlooked, was the great urge for international trade.

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Ibid., pp. 4-5.
CHAPTER II
THE PRE-CONFERENCE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

The receipt of varied information from our diplomatic Representatives abroad has often made it possible and more easy for those in the Department of State to successfully implement our foreign policy. The bent which we took in 1881 and 1885 toward the Congo, at a time when Europe was engaged in an imperialistic race, was considerably influenced by the official correspondence then received. The significance of those exchanges was indicated by the fact that, frequently, despatches were deleted or were not printed at all in Foreign Relations of the United States.\footnote{The (np.) found placed in references indicate that the item referred to was not printed.} This was especially true of messages on the Congo Question prior to the West Berlin African Conference of 1884 and 1885.

The Secretary of State received a clear and concise statement in regard to the Congo from each of the European countries. Every newspaper in the United States with but few exceptions opposed the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Public opinion in Europe was against it, whereas in France the treaty was ignored. In Germany and Holland it was felt it would be foolish for the Netherlands to adhere to it. Ratification probably meant war, and a member of the House of the Dutch Estates General sought an expression on the matter from his Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Willebois. Commercially-minded, the Minister felt that, under the treaty, the area would be transformed from a freeport region into a custom house and that this
would eliminate his country's preponderance of trade. In the face of international rivalry, his most significant remark was in calling attention to the absence of a Power in the unoccupied part of the coast situated at the mouths and delta of the Congo. The area was most certainly a good spot for a naval base or coaling station, and he wisely commented ("to govern is to foresee").

Undoubtedly, within this comment was the first germ of a later movement on the part of the United States Government to locate a factory, naval base or coaling station in this region. Obviously, the inaccessibility or loss of the Frelinghuysen Papers, the selectivity and destruction of the Alvey A. Adee collection and the status of our own Navy in May of 1884, were a few factors which still make it debatable whether such a germ was sterile, weak or dormant at that particular time.

Less than three weeks later, Secretary Frelinghuysen was informed that France which had secured exclusive favorable terms from the Association had recognized it. The Dutch, however, who had much at stake, regarded all such recognition and especially the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty with an "observing expectancy".

Significant correspondence from France on the Congo Question came at a much earlier date than with the Netherlands. Minister Levi P. Morton notified the department in December of 1882 that Stanley, the explorer, was protesting vigorously against the Congo-French Treaty made by his rival de Brazzo with the African King, Makoko.

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3 Ibid., Dayton to Secretary, May 23, 1884. (np).
The French Parliament, judging from the action of Senate members, was in complete accord with checkmating Stanley and excelling others in the penetration of regions recently opened to the world. ¹

If our press reflected the Department of State's view then we looked upon the de Brazza-Stanley affair as one of "perils in the Congo". Critical of the French, the editor erroneously held that de Brazza had not beaten Stanley to the native king. Additional criticisms were leveled against the French, who supplied de Brazza with a small body of troops, indicating that they were determined to establish a protectorate over that region. ⁵

The territory was not under Portuguese jurisdiction according to the report sent by our Minister in Portugal concerning this same incident; yet, the inhabitants considered themselves subjects of Portugal. The French resorted to camouflage of their war vessels to take Loango and Ponta Negra, and were assisted by two Portuguese commercial houses, an act which invoked the sympathy of the Negroes who could not be bought off with costly presents. Minister Francis, whose description of the affair was taken from Commercio do Porto of Oporto, was in accord with the writer on abandonment of two propositions for settlement of the Congo Question and acceptance of the third. The first, an attempt to maintain an independent region without any European control, would have invited anarchy and the elimination of whites or the foreign element from the area. The second, which was absolute and exclusive domination, would eliminate


liberty of commerce but would nourish "protestation", "opposition", war and devastation as an evil and for both white and black. The third method sought "support and loyal acceptance by Europe of Portuguese domination over the Congo". This was based on an historical background but, as we are aware, it was later to be rejected for that control and domination by the European neutral power - Belgium. In reply to the minister, Secretary Frelinghuysen indicated that this report was read with much interest and attentive consideration.

Henry Vignaud, our Chargé d'Affairs in the French capital, was our "seeing eye" prior to the Conference in Berlin. His despatches indicated that France, which had other colonial irons in the fire in China, was reluctant to antagonize the United States, a possible arbiter or mediator in the Oriental Theater. The next message on the Congo and West Africa, as seen by the United States' agent from the French capital, was a four point summary of French-Congo relationships, as revealed by the French Yellow Book covering the period from October 16, 1882 to October 2, 1884. The first point, dealing with France and the I.A.A., laid bare agreements between the two in which France was given a preferential right of acquisition in the event of alienation of the I.A.A.'s territory. The second point publicized the instructions given to de Brazza.

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6Foreign Relations (1883), pp. 739-741, No. 60. Francis to Frelinghuysen, May 15, 1883.

7Portugal Instructions. (186901892). (MSS) Vo. V, p. 307. Hereafter designated Port. Inst., Vol. V. Frelinghuysen thought Portugal was too closely connected to England, whereas Belgium would give a greater guarantee to "commercial liberty", a principle we fought for in the Conference.

French Congo. He was to make a peaceful intervention (as if there was ever such a thing) and resort to arms only if necessary. The third point was a description of French-Portuguese contest over the territory of the left bank of the Congo from its mouth to its source. Of greater significance, was its opposition to the unratified Anglo-Portuguese Treaty which the French politician held contrary to the principles of free navigation and commerce. This controversy was (of course, no longer of concern) in view of Portugal's renunciation and abandonment of the treaty.\(^9\)

The final point which was his observation of the background work leading to the Conference, indicated that J. A. Kasson, our representative to the Congo Conference 1884-85, who had analyzed correctly the import of the invitation for the United States, was in good standing with Germany. Moreover, under conditions imposed by Leopold, Germany stood ready to gain the preferential rights from France which was heir apparent to the Association. In addition, in view of the total French picture and its relation to the United States, Bismarck and Kasson would exploit the situation to its fullest.\(^10\) The Department of State issued the following despatch of approval.

"Your analysis of the questions treated in this correspondence has been read with interest".\(^11\)

In London, information was circulated that most likely Stanley, with additional military aid, would not only secure a better route

\(^9\)Ibid., No. 645. Vignaud to Secretary Frelinghuysen, Oct. 16, 1884 (np).

\(^10\)Ibid.

and establish a greater number of commercial stations, but that he
would also more likely defeat de Brazza and forestall French
advances.\textsuperscript{12} Within four months, on June 29, 1883 an American sloop
of war, \textit{The Quinnebuck}, steamed into the port of Loanda where
Commander Nicoll Ludlow, the commanding officer, announced his
intentions of visiting various west coast points recently occupied
by the French. Ludlow, soon after, took the liberty of informing
the English of France's intentions to claim the coast as far as 50
12' south latitude.\textsuperscript{13} It is very possible that Dayton's letter of
May 23, 1883 occasioned this cruise of the \textit{Quinnebuck}. It was also
possible that, as probable arbiter and mediator, we were trying to
stretch our luck by working all three nations. If one were to
accept editorial opinion as a weathervane, we were really Bismarck-
ian and consistent in supporting England on the principle of freedom
of trade for, we were also critical of her failure to support the
I.A.A. on the same tack in the Congo area.\textsuperscript{14} When Secretary of State
Frelinghuysen, received from London on March 22, 1884, copies of
the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty involving the Congo, plus the assurance
that it would receive rough treatment and not be ratified, the Sec­
retary possibly had visions of the American State taking the lead
with Belgium in that vast rich region of the Congo.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Accounts and Papers (1884). Vol. LVI, No. 31. Cohen to
Granville. March 13, 1883. Received April 21, 1884.
\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., No. 38. Cohen to Granville. July 6, 1883.
\textsuperscript{14}New York Tribune, March 26, 1884. This expression came about
two weeks prior to recognition. We were still anti-Portuguese.
\textsuperscript{15}Diplomatic Correspondence, Gr. Britain; James R. Lowell (1884)
Vol. CXLIX, No. 732. Lowell to Secretary, March 5, 1884. Ibid.,
No. 764. (both np).
It is quite probable that, by September of 1884, an understanding existed between the United States and Great Britain relative to affairs in the Congo. The Anglo-Portuguese Treaty had been revoked and the way was paved to put a possible squeeze on Portugal. Moreover, Tisdel, United States' special agent to the Congo, found it necessary to make stops in England and a return trip from the continent back to England while enroute to his African destination. Official English sources have found it apropos to record instructions from the Department of State specifically designed for Tisdel. Incidentally, this was the last bit of pre-conference correspondence on the Congo Question involving London and Washington.  

In extending our commerce in the valley of the Congo, the heart of his instructions read:

> Your inquiries cover a broad field, and your reports must be full upon three principle divisions, viz., the political, the geographical, and the commercial situations.  

The second situation was designated because the geographical area of the Congo was not well-known in relation to trade. The latter was specified to assume practical information necessary to the success of the trader and merchant, whereas, the former has an immediate and vital effect on trade.

Mr. Nicholas Fish, a member of that famous Fish Clan of New York who was always interested in banking and finance, was our Minister Resident in Belgium from 1882 to 1886. He cleared protocol

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16 *State Papers* (1885), pp. 282-283, No. 224; Frelinghuysen to Tisdel.

17 Ibid.

at Brussels in a most cordial and friendly manner, dining with royalty at the Summer Palace in Laerken and making lengthy press lines in both private and official journals. Simultaneously, other columns appeared supporting the United States' control of the Panama Canal. Apparently, the Fish family flushed with such a lush reception, was unaware at first that this action was a possible phase of easing the plans of Leopold II.  

Following recognition by the United States and in the spring of 1884, the problems of the I.A.C. became very urgent. A suitable form of government was needed; a revenue system was required; and the establishment of an adequate police was needed. Fish wrote that recruits for the constabulary force would probably be gained from the British Gold Coast. He also called attention to the Spanish hostility against our recognition, and the Belgian semi-official press view to delay ratification of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty.

The reception did not blind Mr. Fish to any adverse attitudes on the part of the Belgian public or government. Alert to the pulse of important Belgian forces in reaction to the United States, he forwarded to Washington an article on the "Great Nervousness of Commercial and Financial Disorders in the United States". It recommended abstention from commercial relations with the United States and the establishment of a quarantine to cure the United States of its malady. It was highly significant, in view of the fact that the Journal de Bruxelles in which the article was published was the


property and political organ of Mr. Malow, an aspirant for the position of Premier. The article portrayed the start of an inevitable struggle for commercial supremacy between the Old World and the New World, if such a struggle had not already begun.

It was predicted that the struggle would last for generations. It was likely to cause much greater and more numerous disasters in Europe than even those attributed by the author of the article to the nervous energy of the American people in matters of trade and commerce. If any European country was to escape with less, it could be considered fortunate. Our malady was designated as a form of politico-economical pathology which was based on the concept of American prosperity being rooted in the evils of Speculation. Its solution was to boycott us until we came to our economic senses for we could not get along without the world.\textsuperscript{21}

Four months intervened before Mr. Fish sent another message regarding the Congo to Washington. On October 16, 1884, he sent clippings from \textit{Le Noire}, which sharply attacked the Association, and particularly Stanley for treating Portugal and France as unimportant factors in the Congo. Fish himself seriously doubted our policy of recognition. He held that it was "questionable" since the Association was "abnormal", "irregular" and contrary to public law. Fish also informed our Government that the Belgium radical press objected to the official relationship of the King to the Association on very strong constitutional grounds. As to the proposed Congo Conference, Fish clearly indicated that its delay was due to the prolonged

\textsuperscript{21}Ibid., Vol. XXI, No. 214. Fish to Frelinghuysen, June 11, 1884. (np). One may speculate as to whether or not, this was the reverse side of Leopold's plan, whereby he would rid himself of another rival. Observations from a recent interview reveal that this fear still exists in Belgium.
attention of the British to affairs in Egypt. This was quite contrary to Crowe (see author's Appendix XII, p. 220, 2nd. paragraph) who placed the blame on the United States.^{22}

Within this same pouch were clippings from the *Times* (London) which gave the English view for the call of the Conference. Of greater importance was Fish’s conclusion that the Niger should not be a part of the deliberations for it had long been an English possession. Of still greater significance was the tone of reference to the naval power of Britain. By implication, one observed that he felt we had not the Navy to compete with our Old Motherhood in the African scramble. He felt strongly that we should push only for freedom of trade and a neutrality of commerce.^{23} Coming from a New Yorker of moneyed interests, it was worthy of due consideration.

John M. Francis, former owner of the *Troy Daily Time* in the state of New York, named by President Garfield as minister to Belgium, but whose appointment was consummated by President Arthur, subsequently became our Minister in Portugal. Since Portugal had claims to the Congo prior to the Stanley expeditions and Leopold plan, preconference correspondence from Lisbon was extremely important. We were informed by Francis that the Portuguese Parliament engaged in long procrastinations on the proposed Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Many members of the body felt that should failure result with Great Britain, Portugal should turn to France. Francis felt that this

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22Ibid., No. 275. Fish to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 16, 1884, (np). Britain sought to straighten out Egyptian financial dilemma but was delayed by rationalist insurrections led by the Mahdi.

23Ibid., Fish also sent Kasson twenty-three sources in preparation for the Conference. Publications were later forwarded to the Department of State, whose present officials think that they were destroyed by fire. No. 284. Fish to Secretary, Oct. 31, 1884, (np).
latter action would make it possible for the interested Powers to ally and obtain stipulations favorable to each in this African territory. 24

We were later informed that the situation became more strained for Portugal when French officers overran Portuguese African Territory claimed by Portugal and made treaties with the natives who practically surrendered territory and sovereignty. Incidentally, it was charged that the French were abetted by Jesuit Missionaries. Additional irritation developed when the International Law Institute, which was in favor of neutrality of the Congo, voted to meet in Munich and to bring its findings to the attention of the Powers. In refutation to the above, as well as of charges of slavery against Portugal, was enclosed an excellent article by the Portuguese London Times correspondent 25 who castigated the French and was dubious of the International Law Institutes' position.

The remainder of the correspondence from Lisbon which fell within this period was, for the purposes of treatment, classified into three general categories. The first, described the efforts of Portugal to hold to its Congo claims; the second, described maneuvers to win the support of Powers for the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty; the last caused Portuguese reactions from pressure which the United States placed upon her.

With official approval further to substantiate its claims, an expedition on the San Thome went north of latitude 5° 12' to the river Luiza Loango as its extreme boundary. Within this area, the

24Foreign Relations (1883), p. 743, No. 70. Francis to Frelinghuysen, June 22, 1883.

Portuguese made contractual stipulations with the African natives which presaged important articles found in the act of the Congo Conference to be held one year later. With some surprise, one read clauses of "freedom of trade for all people"; "admission of missionaries of all creeds"; and "suppression of trade in slaves", although Bocage, Portuguese Minister of Foreign Affairs, considered it impossible to suppress slavery. The question, however, which went provocingly unanswered, was whether that information was ever relayed to Kasson and others. Meanwhile, Portugal asserted that she would never abandon her rights by submitting to international control of the area.  

The treatment of the Congo Question and the proposed treaty, forwarded to the Department in a summary report by Francis of the King's December address to the Cortes, was conspicuous by its omission. As a program of great national interest a year ago, it now indicated the exhaustion of efforts in unsuccessful ratification of the treaty and, likewise, a possible technique on the part of the King of Portugal still to keep the Powers guessing. Later, following a postponed session, a similar action of "omission" was taken in a meeting of the Cortes, though delegates were sent to the Berlin West African Conference. Meanwhile, efforts to establish a Portuguese

\[26\] Ibid. No. 94. Francis to Sec. Frelinghuysen, Nov. 23, 1883, (np). In his No. 95 which followed five days later, Francis verified the above in an authentic but unofficial report. It differed only in respect of designating the French Catholic missionaries as political bagmen, the objections to Stanley for use of monopoly and force, and the observation of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce's letter of protest for Portugal's failure to keep the status quo. This was extremely significant to the Secretary.

\[27\] Ibid., No. 107. Francis to Frelinghuysen, Jan. 5, 1884, (np).
Trading Company on the Congo met with failure. This, likewise, was read with interest. 28

It appears that Portugal resorted to a subtle but timely move to win the support of this country for the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Its letter was sent through the Department to Mr. Chandler, Secretary of the Navy. With precedent in its favor, Portugal listed nine reasons why it felt vessels of the United States should stop at Lisbon rather than at some other port such as Gibraltar. Among the reasons were large safe harbor space, cheaper coal, fresher provisions, friendly seaport and court, the availability of machine shops, foundries and dockyards, freedom of the facilities and beneficial climate. If this were not a move to win favor, certainly it was possible to bring avoidance or easement of any pressure. 29

Seemingly, the diplomatic maneuvering was quickened. Just three days after, Francis received a message from the President by letter directing adherence to our policy. During the Yuletide season, information was forwarded that an American national, Mr. Edward McMurdo along with Mr. George Sedgwick, other United States citizens, and foreign capitalists, had been granted a railway concession to be developed in Portuguese possessions. Originating before 1873, this project of construction was now expected to take place in Mozambique.


29 Diplomatic Corr., Portugal, Vol. XXXI, No. 6. Francis to Frelinghuysen, Nov. 3, 1882 (np). A written notation on the document read, "Ade sent (it) to NAVY, Nov. 20. It has already been noted that the USS Quinnebesc sailed into Lisbon the next March. See No. 39, Francis to Sec., March 10, 1883."
or Portuguese East Africa.  

In the light of past Anglo-Portuguese relations of extreme differences and diplomatic conflicts, this Portuguese concession was possibly effective in the recall of a British Minister and the fall of the Tontes Ministry. This development which was deleted from the printed version of Foreign Relations (see above), was doubly significant in the light of our ministers conduct in Portugal, not to mention the impact of the Presidents' recent message. The imperialistic urge, not only for the Congo but for Africa as a whole, was by no means dormant, judging from the closing words of Francis' observation:

There is reason for congratulations that by means of the road to be constructed over Portuguese territory to the Transvaal that great region will be thrown open to the civilizing influences of commerce, as it is also a source of satisfaction that the promised amelioration of Central Africa will be due largely to the courage and enterprise of citizens of the United States.  

From Lisbon, Francis sent to the Secretary of State six enclosures with his long despatch describing the public outburst and heated demonstrations of the Portuguese people in reaction to the speech of April 3, 1883, of Mr. Jacob Bright of England who opposed the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty on the Congo. An attaché in London, Major L. de Quillian, Secretary of the Portuguese Legation, imprudently sent an article to an English paper denouncing Bright for use of "unfounded accusation and wanton insult" to the Portuguese Government and

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The Department was told that rejuvenated Portuguese departments, Stanley's explorations, French rivalry, British non-recognition of Portuguese claims and Granville's willingness to negotiate had accelerated possible Anglo-Portuguese negotiations.
people. Like the pot-kettle fable, he also stated that the M.P. was lacking in "all the principles of courtesy". Yet he was hopeful that the Bright offensive discourse would not prevent an equitable and stable Anglo-Portuguese agreement.  

Regardless of student threats and adoration for Quillinan, Francis thought that the latter would be recalled. Hot-headed public reaction, preceded by a discourteous official indiscretion probably meant a strain and stress on Portuguese diplomatic maneuvers. It was likewise indicative of a possible attitude that could be manifested toward us.

The communications sent by Francis in the two despatches of March and April of 1884 revealed that Britain kept the United States unusually well informed on its relations with Portugal. So impressive was this action that it was highly exaggerated in regard to Anglo-U.S. understanding. From the first despatch, we felt that Britain had the better end of the deal, whereas Portugal, which could not do better, would still have a partnership of an old friend. The second despatch revealed the Cortes' desires of new additions to the proposed treaty. Here specific duties were to be abolished. A ten percent ad valorem, with certain exceptions, was substituted for a uniform tariff.  

Portugal, which in her expectations of approval of the treaty and her claims by the leading nations, was in for a shock in the light of our reply to the Minister's communication. Frelinghuysen mailed copies of the Senate Ex. Doc. No. 393 of March 26, 1884 of

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33 Ibid., No. 121. Francis to Frelinghuysen, March 12, 1884. No. 125. Francis to Frelinghuysen, April 1, 1884 (np).
the 48th Congress, 1st session, and the Declaration of April 22, 1884, which recognized the Association. The first enclosure indicated a flat refusal to recognize the Portuguese claims on five or more points and the second left no doubt where we stood.  

With every European country finding fault with the proposed treaty, notwithstanding the efforts of the Chamber of Deputy of the Cortes to have it meet universal acceptance, Portugal, having hopefully taken the United States for granted discovered too late that its tank of troubles was overflowing. A protest in very strong legal arguments was made to Francis who replied that the action of the United States meant what it said and that "circumstances alter cases".  

Frelinghuysen on May 27, 1884, gave the Minister assistance of the character of Shylock exacting his due.

The views of this Government are fully set out in the Senate Executive Document No. 393 of this Session and in the... Declaration of April 22 (1884), which took the rather unusual course of an initiative in the Senate which body advised the action taken in advance of any movement on the part of the Executives.

This Government does not aspire to any exclusive privileges in the valley of the Congo but seeks without tax or toll to have its share of the commerce of that vast region first explored by an American citizen.

The above economic view did not in anywise coincide with the Belmont explanation of the United States attitude and action against

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the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty and claims of Portugal to the Congo.  
The antislavery thesis was not mentioned by Secretary Frelinghuysen and it could be considered only as a secondary argument. The economic pull exceeded that of human pathos.

The United States Consul L. du Verge, of French extraction, born in Mauritius, naturalized and a resident of Maryland, informed Francis that he had ample evidence of the Portuguese slave business. After traveling over much of the western section of the Congo, he wrote:

I have new proof which will be exhibited to the United States Government on my return home where I am going by leave of absence granted me from the Department and dated August 27, 1883. My health is so poor, that I hardly know if I'll ever reach the States but hope that God will grant it.  

Unfortunately, there was no evidence to indicate whether the consul's statement indicated fortunate circumstances or regard for faithful performance. It was known from financial records that he at least started for home. However, about a week later, the Portuguese Government reported rumors alleging that the United States was cooperating with Stanley in his aggressive war against the natives friendly to Portugal and in an area under Portuguese sovereignty and possession. It was also rumored that the consul had been wounded while aiding Stanley. This disagreeable incident, although uninvestigated by any authorities, was accepted as the truth by the protesting 

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37 Belmont, op. cit., 318. The Senator held that these questions (slavery) in no way required the participation of the United States. Our country apparently was cooperating with England. Nevertheless the Senate had elements of the antislavery view which made possible the effectiveness of the Leopold cliche, a fact which Middleton admittedly did not document.

Portuguese Government which declared that it later might be a subject for serious representations at Washington.39

As a result of the last two despatches describing the above, Frelinghuysen on December 14, 1883, made the significant reply by direct reference to President Arthur's message to Congress (see Appendix A). He emphasized it by instructing Francis (who readily assented) to use as his guide the specific designation of the paragraph on the Congo Valley, and in sending four copies of the address to him.40 It could hardly be interpreted other than that we strongly supported the Association and were in cooperation with Belgium and any other Power who sympathized with her program. To the United States, the Dark Continent must be lighted by the commercial torch on a basis of the open door policy. That was our primary interest. The injection of the slavery issue and other moral ideals was only secondary. Nevertheless, the brows of the rigid adherents of the foreign policy traditions of the Fathers, without a thought to the intangible forces affecting all nations undoubtedly darkened with some dismay.

As might be expected, the release of President Arthur's message occasioned a flood of public indignation in Portugal. The United States was criticized for a lack of caliber of the Presidency as compared to that of the Jefferson Administration and other eras. The Portuguese predicted that this was the decline of democracy since the ear of the President was under the influence of "bad mouthpieces "

39Diplomatic Corr. Port., Vol. XXXI., No. 95 (Confidential), Francis to Frelinghuysen, Nov. 23, 1883 (np).
who attempted to flatter their "countrymen of color" due to their fathers or forefathers' origin in the Congo Valley. In due fairness, let it be said that the Portuguese did not spare the lash of criticism from those adherents of the Monroe Doctrine who failed to use both logic and justice on the Congo, whereas, they wanted it applied to the Panama Question and Mississippi Valley.\(^1\)

It was incontestably assumed that part of the presidential message was a direct fling at Portugal, resulting from the activities of Stanley, an American citizen (really an immigrant alien) who was their "great adversary in the Congo". Thus, Stanley, too, was a natural object of their criticism. They observed that Stanley, now an employee of Leopold II, had recently offered the Congo to England. Moreover, on May 11, 1878, he had written a letter to the Geographical Society of Lisbon sustaining the efficacious discharge of their duties in their efforts to suppress the slave trade. Now, in his recent letter published in London, his second opinion was of a contrary nature. Hence in some manner, the Portuguese felt that Stanley had the ear of our President.\(^2\)

Prone to react like most humans, the Portuguese attempted to strike back. Although The Geographical Society of Lisbon did not deal with the question of political rights in the Congo territory, it issued a very strong refutation of the charge that Portugal was encouraging the slave trade in its African possessions. This publication, designed for distribution to all Powers, served to answer


\(^2\)Ibid.
the grave charge of assumption that Portugal should not in the interests of civilization be permitted to exercise exclusive sovereignty as demanded over the important regions of Central Africa contiguous to the Congo. Simultaneously, the Portuguese Government charged that American missionaries, for over a year, had caused incessant trouble with the natives and Portuguese citizens who were posted in colonial territories. The Sicilian Bark affair shortly after was an answer to the presidential message and the "squeeze" on Portugal. According to a letter of the owner, Mr. George Ropes of Boston, dated January 11, 1883, a fine of £2000 was imposed upon him on the transfer of his cotton goods seized at Mozambique, as the result of a mere informality or irregularity, carried out on the command of a Portuguese official.

Pressure upon Portugal and the expressions of rebutting resentment from various Portuguese organs continued. For example, the New York Chamber of Commerce in January of 1884 sent a resolution to President Arthur requesting him to confer with the I.A.A. to get "free commerce on the Congo River" which was then monopolized by the Portuguese. This action provoked a stinging criticism and a provocative analysis on that Yankee action in the Correspondenza de Portugal, accepted organ of the Portuguese Government. It rejected the monopoly idea by presenting the fact that, of all nations trading along the Congo on common ground, her sovereignty was denied by all despite the issuance of a public document supporting the right of

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[^1]: Ibid., No. 108. Francis to Frelinghuysen, Jan. 7, 1884 (np).
liberty to trade to all nations. Obviously a dold (undeclared) war was being waged against her by interested parties.

The New York Chamber of Commerce was further accused of seeking an understanding with the I.A.A. which had a monopoly of commerce from treaties made with chiefs of the Upper Congo. In a parting shot, it held that; "adoption of the resolution [came] through the views of some of its members who were influenced by some occult object". 15

There was a good basis for the Portuguese charge. Sanford who came to this country in November of 1883, was still here, and was closely associated with Judge Daly and other important men in New York. Moreover, he did not leave until the Declaration had been signed. It should not be forgotten that beside spending time with Frelinghuysen whose acquaintance among commercial leaders was broad, Sanford, whose wealth and prestige were known, would have also taken the liberty to profit from such contacts. The above facts, not previously noted by any writer, must either be considered as a new contribution or accepted as an assumption.

Interesting to find, almost to the degree of amazement, was the letter of Senor Leilas a wealthy Portuguese nobleman which was forwarded by Francis. It sought to persuade the United States to establish a consulate at Little Fish Bay (Mossamedas), located in latitude 15° 13' and longitude 12° 2' east of meridian Greenwich. Posted erroneously on the wrong ship, Francis received this letter on March 1, 1884, one year following the date on which it was written. It significantly attempted to point out a port and colony on the West

Coast of Africa which afforded an opportunity for the extension of our commerce. Along with it was sent a map.\textsuperscript{16} To this first reaction of pressure from within Portugal, Frelinghuysen replied on April 5, 1884, that "however desirable the suggested action, the existing appropriations were insufficient to warrant" the attempt.\textsuperscript{17} This observation made in reference to the suggestion of Joas F. D. Leilas, is indicative that some Portuguese "Yankeephile" desires of imperial extension by the United States most certainly antedated the flagship idea of Leopold II.

The first general election held in Portugal in the summer of 1884 created new and profound pressure. The background of the situation came with the results under the new electoral law which provided for limited minority representation. This made possible the election of all Deputies who were opposed to the Government. Violence was experienced at some places in Portugal. At Funchal, Maderia, in opposition to unfair methods adopted by the Government to stifle popular will, violent resistance resulted. A large portion of the multitude set up a cry in favor of annexation by the United States and displayed "The Stars and Stripes" as indicative of an uprising to that purpose. Several lives were lost and an un-numbered list of persons were injured before order was restored upon action following the arrival of a troop-filled Portuguese man-o-war. The affair was quite serious.\textsuperscript{18} The question lingered in mind as to whether the incident was spontaneous or whether we were operating with

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid., No. 120. Francis to Frelinghuysen, March 11, 1884 (np).
\textsuperscript{17}Port. Instruc. No. 60. Frelinghuysen to Francis (np).
\textsuperscript{18}Diplomatic Corr. Port., Vol. XXXII, No. 120. Francis to Frelinghuysen, July 8, 1884 (np).
"Snake Funds" which made it impossible for the United States to accept the Leilas offer that was underwritten by wealthy Portuguese individuals. Long research has yet to reveal a complete satisfactory answer.

Belmont declared that Portugal, disconcerted by domestic procrastination and disbalance, overwhelmed by the Powers dislike of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, suggested that other countries be invited to appoint delegates to serve on an International Commission to adjudicate differences. He further alleged that Britain welcomed the suggestion and sounded Germany, which later made contact with France. To him this was the germ of the Berlin West African Conference of 1884-1885.49

Honorable John Adam Kasson, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleinpotentiary to Germany from 1881-1885, was the central figure in the pre-conference communications between Washington and Berlin. Still it may be debatable whether or not he held any less position in playing his patriotic role as we first broke tradition by participating via Africa in European affairs. A Representative from Iowa, but born in Charlotte, Vermont, January 11, 1822, he received his education and college training in his native state but went westward. He practiced law in St. Louis until 1857 then moved to Des Moines, Iowa which thereafter became his legal residence.

Personnel files in the National Archives reveal that Kasson, former owner of the Des Moines Register, held almost continuously from 1861 to 1898 various important posts in public service. For

49Belmont, op. cit., p. 319. This difference of emphasis placed on the origin of the Conference, as a comment from Portugal, appeared to have a better basis of argument than that constructed by Crowe (op. cit., p. 37).
example, he was a First Assistant Postmaster General, a delegate to the First International Postal Conference, Minister to Austria, Commissioner on the Samoan Conference and later on the Joint High Commission to settle U.S.-Anglo differences in respecting the Dominion of Canada, 1898.50

The skillful manner in which American personnel handled diplomatic matters involving the United States and Germany aided in establishing rapport in which Kasson, with his suave, and almost impersonal manner, could function. Mr. Henry Sidney Everett, our Charge d'Affairs, gave assistance by his expert attention to the accreditation ofLt. Commander Chadwick, Navy Attaché, our official observer of the autumn maneuvers. His attendance gave increased prestige to us, a growing nation.51 On October 4, the Secretary was informed of the protest note sent to Count Hatzfeldt. This involved an attempt in June by the German war vessel Leipzig to search again an American barque, the P. J. Carlton at Singapore. Previously, the boat had been searched in legal fashion by the Port Marine inspector and a German officer and no deserters were found.52

Three days later, the play of power politics began in high gear as Kasson wrote of the despatch of four German war vessels to the West African Coast, a movement that gave serious notice to the

50Department of State, Letters of Recommendations and Appointments, Kasson File, Drawer 166. Correspondence indicated that he was supported strongly by all outstanding Republicans and was extremely discreet in his dealings with vested interests.

51Diplomatic Corr, Germany, Vol. XXXV. Everett to Secretary of State, August 25, 1884, No. 15. Kasson to Frelinghuysen on the problem of status of Chinese merchant ships sold to American citizens, September 17, 1884 (np).

52Ibid., No. 19. Kasson to Secretary Frelinghuysen, September 21, 1884. Rec., October 11, 1884, (np).
British Government. Rather quickly, he had been informed of Belgian concurrence in the policy of the United States on the Congo Question. Meanwhile, however, he had listened to a Belgian request for the American interpretation of the German policy. It was an odd fact that the Belgian King had made a similar request of him and also sought our influence favorably to impress the German Government in its behalf. It was also strange that Kasson did not inform our Government of this request until October 10.

Adept in both French and German and a serious reader of governmental organs, Kasson was fully conversant with views on the Conference and the suggested agenda scheduled for November. On the basis of previous discussion with the Belgian King (designated for deletion by the Department), Kasson gave credence to the report of the proposed Conference. He was fully aware that such a meeting might deter strife and warlike collisions, in the remarkable struggle which was then in progress between the commercial powers for special advantages in the African trade.

It seemed reasonable to assume that Kasson and our Government was aware of this keen imperialistic rivalry, even prior to his sailing for Europe. Judging from the various letters in his personal file, his affiliations and recommendations, his appointment was at least indicative of the mounting situation. At the same time, one observed that Leopold II was playing a most careful but winning game in the field of commercial rivalry.

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53 Ibid., No. 20. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Sept. 27, 1884 (np).
54 Ibid., No. 33. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 10, 1884 (np). Press Clippings were forwarded to the Department, which it later lost.
From communications exchanged between October 13th and 27th of 1884, our Department was aware that an invitation would be extended to us because Liberia with its old American-colonial-socialist connection was considered as being under our protection. Since the I.A.A. was not recognized by the European Powers at that time, it would be excluded, however, its delegate was to be heard. It was quite evident then that, not only would we have to argue convincingly for our commercial and humane principles, but that we would have the further responsibility of gaining friends for the Leopold creation. The program featured: (1) freedom of commerce and freedom for all flags on the Congo; (2) freedom of commerce and free navigation for all flags on the Niger; and (3) a definition of the right of seizure of such territories as had not been subjected to the flag of any civilized state.

The core of the exchange of cablegrams and despatches between Kasson and the Acting Secretary of State involved the issue whether the Conference could "comport" with our policy of non-intervention. Kasson replied that our traditional policy did not conflict with the invitation - meaning the items scheduled for discussion. Moreover, the statement that "last winter you approved first proposition" was prima facie evidence that the two, and possibly others, previously had given consideration to that matter in the problem of trade expansion. The second principle limited action to two African rivers, whereas, the third (really the white man's burden), while restrictive and conservative of native rights, left each Government
the right to adopt or reject the Conference conclusion. Reflectively, this was as good a way as any to say that the United States could not lose by either decision.

The lengthy explanatory despatch of Kasson, sent by way of England, of his interview and analysis of the Congo Question, left the constantly recurring thought that a verbal understanding must have existed between the United States and England. Our position at the time and past and subsequent action on the part of both countries indicated a fait accompli. This unprinted document gave further evidence that the Congo Question had been thoroughly discussed by Frelinghuysen and Kasson prior to the latter's departure for Berlin and seemingly we had awaited this chance since the last winter. It indicated that Kasson approved of the Secretary seeking the President's support on recognition of the Association. Moreover, it revealed that Acting Secretary Davis was the first of the Department heads to recommend participation in the Conference. Again, in contrast to the Crowe theory of the Conference's origin, Kasson was very dubious as to its German inception, notwithstanding the policy of Germany dropping the hint and letting France take the lead. His expression, "supposed to be inspired at the Foreign Office", was also evidence by the fact that German intelligence was unaware of Portuguese approaches to the French to convene the Powers even prior to the obvious fate of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty. Parenthetically, one concluded that

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55 Ibid., No. 34. Kasson to Secretary, October 13, 1884 (np). Cablegrams, October 14, 1884. Germany Instruc., cipher telegram. Frelinghuysen to Kasson, October 17, 1884. "My views coincide with yours... accepting invitation on... three points mentioned... reserving right to decline to accept conclusions". Note. The concept of bipartisan foreign policy was weak and a national campaign was underway. Hence a reserve clause was almost mandatory.
Angra Pequena was not the factor of origin of the Conference but one supplemental to it.\(^{56}\)

Kasson explicitly stated that he approved of participation with the reservation clause, and regarded the coming event as analogous to previous postal and meridian conferences in which we had participated and played an important part. He further justified participation on the bases that we were a "commercial power (and) equally interested with the others"; that the purpose of the Conference "appears commendable... both to native rights and to neutral interests"; the last two words synonymous with the United States; and that it was the "wisest means" to prevent a selfish arrangement (European monopoly), and to avoid international war.\(^{57}\)

The extremely heavy weight of responsibility imposed upon Kasson was seen in the Instructions of the Department of State on the Congo Question. The very first line, "much must be left to your discretion", was in some respect an acknowledgment that, in this affair we were mainly without a policy. Even though there naturally appeared seemingly complete and full advantages in an isolationist and traditional policy, Kasson was now in a difficult position. He was, without doubt, circumscribed on the one hand by negative mandates of Herculean proportions, which incidentally mankind has often attempted to circumvent. He was commanded "not to intervene in the affairs of foreign nations... nor to decide territorial questions between them". Moreover, he was not to help the

\(^{56}\)Ibid., No. 40 (via England), Kasson to Frelinghuysen, October 15, 1884 (np). There was no conversation of time when despatches were sent via England.

\(^{57}\)Ibid.
Conference gain "greater power of intervention or control" than that assumed by the individual nation.

The United States had a reputation of idealistic diplomacy and within this Mosaic pattern, our Minister, Kasson, was given the positive mandates of: strict adherence to the Invitation's three points for discussion; support almost to the hilt of "our policy of unrestricted freedom of trade in that vast and productive region"; and to ascertain whether the Conference could give shape and scope to the project of creating a great state in the heart of Western Africa since a national state of the Congo had not been fully effected or in existence.

Given to one who, as if he had the faith of a Joseph in Egypt, the final instructions read:

With these brief instructions, the matter is left to your judgment and discretion in the confidence that you will take care that no action of yours may seem to pledge the United States to any course or conclusion contrary to its well-known policy, and that the fullest liberty of action upon the conclusions of the conference will be reserved to this Government.58

Never was a man, in the midst of the shrewdest, keenest, and most conniving diplomats of Europe placed in a more precarious position.

Since this was the first occasion of the United States assuming an active role in deliberations with European Powers on the partition of Africa, it is a revealing experience to attempt an analysis of the reasoning of its Minister, Mr. Kasson. Final conclusions led one to believe that Kasson, as a participant in this affair, was a

necro-isolationist. He expressed adherence to traditional isolationism when it was advantageous, at which time his internationalism was more retractile and dormant. On this occasion he exercised his mission of world diplomacy tempered by concepts of non-intervention. He was not to be classed as a Luciferian opportunist because he was not without definite idealistic and moral tendencies.

Participation based upon his legalistic reasoning imposed a diplomatic distinction between a "Conference" and a "Congress"; namely, the results of the former were never binding on the Government's representative until formally accepted by the State. The reasons which he gave European nations for participation were:
(1) to avoid renewal of former struggles for trade monopoly; (2) to prevent war from the future commercial rivalry on the West African Coast; (3) to prevent a single power or combination of powers from control of routes to the heart of the continent; (4) to open the area to American enterprise on the freest possible equal terms; (5) to eliminate every needless burden on our commerce and intercourse with the Congo country.

Not with the idea of escaping responsibility or distributing his own duties, but with the purpose of obtaining the maximum success at the Conference, Kasson sought additional personnel. He requested the use of Henry Sanford and supported the idea in the following words:

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59Diplomatic Corr. Germany, Vol. XXXVI, No. 42. Kasson to Frelinghuysen. Telegram, Oct. 18, 1884 (np). Lines of deletion show that our personnel desired to omit information on the views held about the Invitation and the instructions to have Tisdel proceed to his post forthwith following interview with Kasson. Later this was rescinded.

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HON. HENRY SHELTON SANFORD, L. L. D.
After careful reflection upon the probable phase of discussion, and the central position in them of the "African International Association" in antagonism with Portugal and France, I believe it would be beyond doubt useful to have the assistance of Mr. Sanford who had successfully presented to you the claims of that Association to recognition. 50

The above reason indicated that Kasson was certainly aware of Sanford's efforts in Washington. Moreover, since a briefing on the international situation, which is required of every appointee, had been made in advance, one could also contend that the request as made was nothing more than an act in the scheme of things. For example, his second reason was carefully noted in stating that he had need:

...of an associate who can devote his time to those outside preliminary conversations which often shape the action of the Conference in advance, and early information of which would be important in forming my own judgment upon questions of detail. And I beg therefore to thank you for your reply to my suggestion. 61

Similarly, the Minister sought the services of Stanley as an expert on Congo geography. The Department granted both requests with the approval of compensation to Sanford but none to Stanley, 62 who as an employee of the I.A.A., was limited or restrained by Kasson, our chief representative at the Conference, as suggested by the latter, Sanford was placed under restraint by the Department.

The action of the United States and our Minister provoked a few challenging queries which are yet to be satisfactorily answered.

61 Ibid.
62 Ibid. Also No. 46, Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 20, 1884 (np). No. 64, Kasson to Frelinghuysen showed Stanley in England at the time of Sanford's visit. Sanford thought Stanley was persona non grata in Germany because the latter did not accept a present deal with the Germans. The former sought our aid, which was not needed in Stanley's favor, to attend the Conference.
There was no enclosure of a copy of the Kasson letter to Sanford, our Associate Delegate to the Conference. Why? Why again was it necessary that the Minister's communications (cable) on requesting additional personnel be sent "via England" where, at that time, Sanford was visiting? Was it necessary that the Secretary take a week to reply to the cable on this affair? The despatch and its directive was handled by Mr. Alvey A. Adee, considered by many as the observer for Presidents and the Gibralter for the Department. 63 The only feasible conclusion is that the entire Department was attempting to exploit this additional personnel for the expansion and extension of American commerce.

It might be apropos to note here that evidently the legal-minded, reserved and discreet Mr. Kasson sensed that Clio would some day put to test the conduct of the United States and her representatives involved in the Congo Question. In every piece of important correspondence, he repeated the instructions and comments of his superiors as well as those of his own. It appeared that he did not intend to be found lacking in any respect. In this connection, the charge of his fellow Iowan, Charles Rollins Keyes, that he was a victim of Bismarckian flood light, was not valid, for Kasson was adamantly opposed to any indication that Stanley's position would be subordinate to the will or whim of the Chancellor. 64

To get as complete a picture of the Conference as possible, the Department instructed our special agent, Tisdel to take a delay enroute but to stop at the Conference. Baron Alvensleben, the

63Ibid. Received Nov. 10, 1884; acknowledged November 14, 1884; and the comment, "Handled by Mr. A. Adee".

64Ibid., No. 61. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, November 9, 1884.
The German Minister to the United States felt that Tisdel, who was outside of the categories of "expert", "associate", and representative, should not attend. The Department thought otherwise and instructed Kasson "to secure for Mr. Tisdel all proper facilities for attendance". Kasson later reported that Tisdel gave him much valuable information and further indicated that the two cooperated in a splendid fashion. On the contrary, there was not found among the papers of Kasson any references of a similar high regard for his helper, Mr. Sanford.

By November of 1884, action along the Congo and the west coast of Africa was bristling with an unaccustomed display of military might. Almost daily, notices were sent out by the European Governments of their occupation and possession of unoccupied shores, islands or sections of the interior. Italy, Spain and even Turkey dispatched vessels and raised the question of their claim to representation in the Conference by reasons of their African interests.

Informed that an American war vessel had been ordered to the Congo, in view of the European action, Kasson advised Washington that expediency would speedily require one or more additional "naval vessels to linger, while making soundings, and surveys in the Lower Congo". Moreover, he added:

I venture the further opinion, that an authority should go with them (or with our diplomatic agent) if a healthy point, well situated for a commercial resort, can be found in the Lower Congo, not already lawfully appropriated by another, to obtain from the natives the exclusive use of a

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65 Germany, Instruc. (1880-1887), No. 43. Sec. To Kasson, Oct. 31, 1884 and again on Nov. 6, 1884.

limited district for a depot and factorial establishment for the use and benefit of American citizens, and of our Government.67

Besides presenting the effective description of the African scramble which preceded the Conference, this correspondence clearly shows that we were more concerned about the establishment of a commercial position prior to the Conference than during its sessions or after. Trade could follow the flag. To Kasson, this was the beginning of a rat race via power politics. Since we were in it, on the basis of prior discovery, we preferred to gain first a Navy nook and dollar depot. Too, possession as nine points of the law, could be more easily validated with the cooperation of the Navy Department.

This significant but implicit piece of correspondence elicits and merits several compelling observations. It definitely stamps Kasson as an imperialist, a benevolent one if you like, but an imperialist. That went likewise for the company which he kept. It was possible that Kasson's idea of the use of the Navy was borrowed from Tisdel, who in turn had it urged upon him by the scheming Leopold II. Kasson, however, who felt himself fast becoming an ace diplomat, did suggest a press release on this action before the Conference commenced.68 There was no indication that Frelinghuysen, who by now, had been several times bombarded with this idea of using the Navy, informed Kasson of the full instructions given the commanders who sailed to the West African Coast.

67Ibid., No. 60. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Nov. 3, 1884. Rec. Nov. 17, 1884 (np). A marginal notation indicated that the Department sent the original or a copy to the Navy. Recently no record of it was found.

68Ibid.
It appeared that the internationalists with imperialistic aspirations who were in the political saddle gave little if any attention to the continuance of this foreign policy in the face of a political defeat. No evidence has yet come to light, in support of this naval action and African interests on the part of both national parties that our policy of national interests would continue within the framework of the commercial rivalry of the Powers.
CHAPTER III
THE TISDEL TEMPORARY MISSION

Willard P. Tisdel, who played an important role in the relations between the United States and the early Congo of the middle eighties, was an Ohioan from the Lake Region. At eighteen, he enrolled at Cleveland, Ohio, as a private in Company D, Seventh Regiment of the Ohio Infantry. The Company Book described him as five feet, nine inches, with a light complexion, grey eyes, and brown hair. Born near Lake County, Ohio, his occupation was that of a clerk when he enlisted. Evidently he was sworn in at Painesville, Ohio, on April 22, by John N. Dyer. Serving for a period of three years, he rose from the ranks of corporal to various grades of sergeant. At one time, he was used as a commissioner recruiting sergeant serving in Painesville and Columbus, Ohio. On a number of occasions he was "demoted". Possibly because of "time due", he was last paid on November, 1863, and mustered out as a private on April 24, 1864. Like many others, as a result of the Civil War record, he was addressed as "Colonel".¹

At some period in his later life, Tisdel the clerk, made himself very familiar with foreign languages. This feat made it possible for him to sell his services not only to his Government but to important people who had investments abroad. A letter written by J. B. Houston, vice-president of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company, informs us that Tisdel had been affiliated with the firm since 1874 and for a period of "seventeen years". During the early nineties he served as the Company's special agent to all the Central American

¹United States Army Civil War Records, (Washington; the National Archives).

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Republics, Mexico, and Brazil and, with the support of Senator Calvin S. Brice of Ohio was endorsed as Minister to Ecuador.\(^2\)

On August 19, 1884, during the recess of Congress, Tisdel was appointed to "be Agent to States of Congo Association ... until the end of the next session of Senate". Confirmation of the appointment was completed on December 8, 1884.\(^3\) The appropriations bill approved on July 7, 1884 provided him with a salary of $5000 and a maximum expense account of $10,000. This latter sum was to be used in the introduction and extension of our trade in the Congo. On September 8, 1884, he was instructed to proceed as quickly as possible to his new field of duty.\(^4\)

The Executive Department, as well as Congress, was quite aware that the Congo Association was not ready to receive a diplomatic representative. They felt, however, that a trustworthy informant fully authorized as an "agent to the States or Congo Association" would make possible the introduction and extension of our trade in the Congo valley. Thus, Tisdel was instructed to confine his inquiries to three principal divisions — the geographical, commercial and political fields of investigation.\(^5\)

On the first division, he was instructed to direct his attention "more particularly to that class of geographical information necessary and interesting to those engaged in commerce, rather than to


\(^3\)Department of State, Commissions Permanent and Temporary Miscellaneous No. 3, Jan. 16, 1871 - March 13, 1885, pp. 560 and 578.


\(^5\)Ibid., pp. 282-283.
more scientific and technical matters. Tisdel readily understood that every aspect of the transportation system of the Congo was desirable information.

In connection with the commercial condition of the country, the topography, the soil, the climate, education, organization of society, morals, statistics of population, finance, extent and location of stations, settlements available to oceanic or inland transportation, the production, consumption and trade of the country, as well as the prices of labor and living, the money in use, and the methods of barter or sale, are legitimate subjects of inquiry and investigation.⁶

Although the United States was uncommitted on the conflicting claims in the Congo Basin, Tisdel was instructed to report upon them, and to give special attention to any commercial or political agreements existing between the native tribes, the European Powers and the Association. He was to concern himself with the legal code and the protection of individual rights. Since the enlightened methods of political government nourished commerce, his attention was directed to the systems of executive and judicial administration, customs and dues, fees and taxes and to other matters affecting trade. It was made very clear to Tisdel that the following instruction took priority over the others:

The effort should be made to find out without delay what articles the inhabitants of the Congo Valley are in need of, or what American manufacturers or products would there find a market, and thus, in the language of the act, introduce and extend the commerce of the United States in the Congo Valley. Both the people and the Government of the United States will be much satisfied with the early extension and increase of our commerce there than by any other result of your mission.⁷

The first deleted section of the instructions to Tisdel (omitted from Foreign Relations, 1885, page 283), recognized the irritation

⁶Ibid., p. 283.
⁷Ibid., p. 284. Since the report was to be transmitted to Congress, this was a very important order to obey.
between Portugal and the Association. The section, moreover, included the neutral position of Secretary Frelinghuysen which Tisdel was to assume while reviewing the situation in Congo. Tisdel also was to refrain from any expression of opinion to either party until ordered otherwise by the Secretary.  

The second deletion which was originally the last paragraph imposed special care on strictly political information "which should be regarded as Confidential". It had to be in "separate despatches and distinctly marked 'confidential'".

By the first week, in October of 1881, Tisdel left Belgium to visit in London. On or about October 9, 1881, Mr. Fish, Minister to Belgium, interceded for an interview with King Leopold II. They were received at eleven A.M., and the King spoke freely with them about the Congo. According to Fish, he was very appreciative of the United States act of recognition. It had been previously agreed that Tisdel was to report the details of his observations. Fish, however, was impressively struck by Leopold's emphatic denunciation of the desire attributed to the I.A.A. to make a pecuniary profit out of the undertaking. Leopold gave positive and reiterated assurances that the great object was to establish free trade not only on the Congo, but along both banks of the river whether by water, portage, wagon road or railroad. It seemed to Fish that Leopold protested too much for a King.

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9 Ibid., p. 375.

Galvanized by "greater stimulant than that of royal reiterated assurances", Fish was struck with Leopold's desire that Tisdal salute the flag of the Association. When this hour-long interview ended, the King thanked Fish for bringing Tisdal, and renewed his suggestion on the salute scheme. Fish promised his full support and gave it by urging the despatch of a war vessel even if the Kearsage was unavailable. The Minister likewise observed that Strauch, Secretary-General of the Association gave courteous, useful and polite attention to Tisdal.11

Within that same communication, Fish gave to the Department Tisdels' analysis of the proposed Conference. To Tisdal, the failure of Portugal to bring Germany and other European Powers to acquiescence on the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty, made the Conference necessary. Moreover, since a considerable number of Portuguese Marine forces were on the Congo, it would benefit his mission to have him conveyed in a ship of war. Faced with these circumstances, he approved of the proposed ceremony of the twenty-one gun salute of recognition to the flag. To him, such action would give decided weight to the United States' voice at the proposed meeting. In addition, this action would give increased weight to the deliberations even if the United States did not participate.12 Yet, apparently, Tisdal ignored the fact that special agents seldom, if ever, were conveyed to their posts by naval might. Such action would place them immediately and completely in a political role.

The remainder of this correspondence contains two comments of interest to us. Fish sent to the Assistant Secretary of State,

11Ibid.
12Ibid.
John Davis, in Paris, a duplicate of his despatch. He indicated that Tisdel was to meet Davis later in Paris. Nothing was found in the Archives on this duplicate or on any meeting between Davis and Tisdel. The second comment was the observation on the conduct of the British Customs. In answer to a protest, the Custom officials informed Fish that they would not inspect diplomatic pouches to the United States sent by way of London when carried by Agents or American citizens duly designated to carry the same.13

On October 31, 1884, four days after receipt of this despatch, the Department was informed that, upon the introduction of Tisdel by Mr. Davis, our embassy at Paris found pleasure in giving him its assistance. They observed that Tisdel was physically fit, "full of his subject and hopeful of making his mission a success." He was looked upon as a typical representative of American energy, spirit of enterprise and enlightened common sense. Of a greater interest and challenge than the agent's fitness was the presence of Assistant Secretary of State John Davis.14

It would be extreme to assume that the Assistant Secretary journeyed to Europe only to make an introduction of a recently appointed agent to our Embassy in Paris. Although every general source failed to indicate the Assistant's presence and assignment, they also failed to note, in any manner, his presence in Europe during the fall season of 1884.15 Quite likely he was again on a

13Ibid.
special mission for the President. He was more familiar with the Anglo-Portuguese differences in Africa than any other living American. He had served as arbitrator for them in the previous decade. In addition, it would facilitate the work of the Department to have him on a secret mission guiding the collection of specific information, or imperialistic issues. The use of the plural pronoun, nominative case, underscored by the investigation, was perhaps one of the leading points supporting the assumption.  

In a sympathetic press other possibilities such as the Bartholdi Statue for the harbor of New York and pork incidents involving quarantine were available for camouflage. Too, as Tisdel later pointed out, Davis and Kasson gave him final instructions prior to his departure for the Congo. Gibraltar had been a base of call and the State Department had been recently requested to use its influence to change the location. Francis in Portugal and Davis in Paris were the only Americans in Europe with knowledge of this fact. The assumption became one of fact, upon spotting the use of Lisbon and Madeira as points of naval departure in the Tisdel cable.

Having been actively engaged at Brussels informing myself about Congo and will be ready to leave first departure unless you think it advisable that I should await the results of Berlin Conference, which convenes November fifth and which I deem is very important as beyond doubt. The future organization of the Congo depends on its action. The result of this Conference will simplify the political side of my mission. King of Belgium very grateful for recognition by United States, it being the only Power having yet named delegate to the Association. King of Belgium expresses earnest wish that American delegate should go to Congo on warship. If any ship is to be

16Diplomatic Corr. France (1884) (MSS) Vol. XCX. No. 650 Vignaud to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 21, 1884 (np). "Tisdel must leave tomorrow if not authorized to remain. We both agree that his presence here one month more, until the Berlin Conference meets, would be more useful than to proceed now to Africa".

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ordered to West Coast would it not be advisable that I
be conveyed by it from either Lisbon or Madeira. I
await reply at Paris legation.

The cable clearly indicated that Tisdel did not make a direct
request for use of naval vessels for himself. Nevertheless, he ex­
posed himself to possible reprimand from the Secretary on the
charge of exceeding the political limits of his position. The cable
was also another factor in the pretext to resort to armed might
for possible national gain. It already has been indicated that
Tisdel had "special means of information", yet he was ready for im­
mediate departure if instructed.18

The partial preliminary report of Tisdel's investigations in
Europe was strictly a patriotic performance, technically outside
the line of duty. Granted a delay enroute, he deviated to satisfy
his suspicions of the political status and exact condition of the
allegedly "Free States of the Congo Association". Supposedly to
arrange for financial credit and letters of introduction, he collected
commercial and much political information from the Dutch African
Company at Rotterdam. At the invitation of Sanford, then he went
to Gingelon, Belgium where he availed himself "largely of information"
placed at his disposal in both words and "documents". He left there
to see H. M. Stanley in England. Their conversations included both
commercial and political problems. He noticed that Stanley always
created a "favorable impression" toward the Association in his many
speeches. Upon his return to the Continent, he was taken in hand
by Nicholas Fish. Tisdel carefully noted that the public was aroused
by French claims to African territory and the menacing attitude of
the Portuguese toward the Association. In a later report, he gave

17 Ibid., No. 643. Vignaud to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 15, 1884.
Rec., Oct. 31, 1884. Sent by Charge d'Affairs Vignaud.
18 Ibid., No. 650. Vignaud to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 24, 1884.
Rec., Nov. 8, 1884 (np).
longer comments on the reactions of the public in England and Belgium.

The most striking feature of this report was the acceptance of the suggestion of the use of United States naval vessels by both Leopold and Tisdel as a fait accompli. Made on October 10, 1884, Tisdel's telegraphic request was enroute, but was actually fulfilled on October 15, 1884. The record shows that Secretary Frelinghuysen did not make a request to the Navy until November 22, 1884. Tisdel's preliminary report was dated October 29, 1884. This point of departure by use of the Navy may be looked upon, in part, as a confident, masterful and diplomatic play.\(^1^9\)

From Brussels, Tisdel went to Berlin and met the Iron Chancellor prior to the start of the Conference. As a patient listener to Bismarck's solution, he looked upon it to complicate the Congo question. Summarily, the Chancellor felt the Powers should follow the example set by the United States and recognize the new State, indicate its form of government and constitution, and dictate its manner of administration. The Conference should also consider frontier demarcations and the problem of exemption of excise taxes.\(^2^0\)

Tisdel, who felt obligated to Senator John T. Morgan for the assignment, had a greater political faith in the Senator than in Secretary Frelinghuysen. Unknown to the latter, he submitted two reports to the Senator in letter form on November 23 and 25, 1884, from London. In the first letter, using the reports, addresses and conversations of Stanley and his associates as sources, he

\(^1^9\)Department of State, Special Agents, Willard P. Tisdel. (MSS) Vol. XXXII, No. 1. Tisdel to Frelinghuysen, Oct. 29, 1884. pp. ff. (pp). Hereafter referred to as Special Agents, Vol. XXXII. From the Dutch interview Tisdel felt that items from all sections of the U.S.A. could be bartered if we captured the trade.

\(^2^0\)Ibid.
wrote in a hopeful but cautious vein. The territory of the Congo appeared to be one of the most fertile in the world, with inexhaustible resources and "with recognition... by the Powers, it would seem that the inducements... will attract multitudes." 21

In spite of European hopes that the Congo area would surpass the Amazon Valley, Tisdel reserved his opinion for a later day. He felt that the labor problem was a serious one and that long years would intervene before the native could be relied upon. 22 After presenting a historical resume of the origin of the I.A.A., the functions of its branch forms and the activity of the Belgians in the Comité, he returned again to matters of trade. Referring to Senate Report No. 393, he reminded Senator Morgan that the Dutch African Trading Company had done a gross business of over $6,000.00 in 1879. The Belgians who were just getting started and employing 150 Americans and Europeans were making $700,000 a year. He concluded the matter on this hopeful note.

I can see no reason why the people of the United States should not come in for a large share of the valuable trade which must soon be developed in this region. 23

The second letter which Morgan received was one of ironic but controlled disappointment. Tisdel requested that its contents would be kept from the Department. After listing the facts which led to his detention in Europe, he presented his most unfortunate discovery.

22Ibid., p. 22; Tisdel to Morgan - London, Nov. 23, 1884.
23Ibid.
When I reached Brussels, I found that (no) such country was known, and that I had been accredited to a country which did (not) in reality exist. Nor does it yet exist.24

The italics of Tisdel's letter were indicative that he inadvertently omitted the negative term from the main phrase. Disgusted at his discovery, apparently, he was too disappointed to make mention of the request of the United States naval forces. On going to Berlin, he conferred with Kasson and urged him to extend every effort for recognition of the "Free States" by the Powers, "on the same basis laid down by the U.S." Otherwise, he felt that this country would be "placed in a most humiliating position".25

Undaunted, appreciative of past favors, Tisdel expressed the following sentiments to Morgan, owner of a plantation near Faunsdale, Alabama:

I thank you for your kindness and I ask your support in the Senate that we may now make a record for our country, and that you may realize your hopes and expectations in the matter of American Negro Colonists and which I must heartedly endorse.

By December of 1884, the United States Navy had become a full-fledged participant in the effort to extend American trade to the Congo. William E. Chandler, Secretary of the Navy, cooperated with Frelinghuysen, who suggested that a United States naval vessel be sent to the mouth of the Congo. Frelinghuysen was informed that:27

The Admiral commanding the European Station has been instructed by letter, to direct the commanding officer of

25Ibid.
26Ibid., Vol. III. Charlie Rusbe to Morgan; Dec. 30, 1886.
27Ibid., Vol. I. Tisdel to Morgan; November 25, 1884.
the USS Kersage to proceed at once to the Congo River, and to remain there until the Admiral himself can reach there in his flagship in February next.  

On December 5, 1884, Chandler forwarded a copy of naval instructions which had been sent to Rear Admiral Earl English, who was commanding the United States Naval Force on the European Station. The orders directed English to send the Kearsage, and to present himself in the flagship, Lancaster, at the mouth of the Congo.

Sent for the information of the Department of State, they were to be mailed to Mr. Tisdel, if the Secretary deemed it advisable.

Four days later, Secretary Frelinghuysen forwarded by way of London a copy of the Navy Department's instructions to Tisdel.

On the next day he sent to Tisdel a copy of a letter stating that the Admiral had been instructed to proceed at once with the orders and plans.

The underlying motive of our personnel which supported the use of naval vessels in the Congo affair was undeniably imperialistic. It is an irrefutable fact that Tisdel, Kasson, Frelinghuysen and Chandler desired the use of those vessels mainly for the extension of American trade in the Congo Valley. Conceivably, a variation of

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28 Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters, December Part I (1884) (Washington, D.C.: National Archives); hereafter designated as Miscellaneous Letters, Dec. Part I; William E. Chandler to Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, December 4, 1884. See also Miscellaneous Register to the State Department, No. 5, July 1, 1884 - June 30, 1885, p. 383.

29 Miscellaneous Letters Part I (1884), Chandler to Frelinghuysen, December 5, 1884. See Appendix B for complete "Instructions to C. O. English."

30 Department of State, Special Missions, Vol. III, No. 3. Frelinghuysen to Tisdel, Dec. 9, 1884, p. 387; No. 5; Frelinghuysen to Tisdel, Dec. 10, 1884, p. 388. Hereafter designated as Special Missions.
THE HON. FREDERICK T. FRELINGHUYSEN. SECRETARY OF STATE.
personal minor motives existed among this group. To Tisdel, the Navy, as a means of transportation to his post and aid thereafter, would greatly facilitate his assignment. As for prestige, seldom if ever, were even top diplomats conveyed to their posts by vessels of war. For Kasson, greater respect would be accorded him in the capital of Germany. With a coaling station on the West Coast of Africa, he felt we could better keep a eye on growing Maritime European Powers and possibly serve as a stabilizing and deterrent factor to war.

Apparently not too interested in a naval station on the African coast, Chandler accepted it as an opportunity to gain much-needed hydrographic information for future use. He could observe clearly and keenly the play of power politics by maritime Powers in an imperialistic race. From the instructions on "a prolonged stay in the interior", he was evidently aware of the favorable reception of the United States flag by the inland natives.\textsuperscript{31}

With Frelinghuysen, the use of the Navy in satisfying minor motives was a perilous affair. Ostensibly, it served to put a check on the Congo encroachers, Portugal and France. Simultaneously, Frelinghuysen served notice that we were seriously interested in African trade, hence also world commerce. Underneath it all, he saw the United States, a growing sea Power, as the balance wheel of Europe. The naval ceremonial suggestion of Leopold for recognition was only an opportunity for which he had been waiting.

The preliminary report of Tisdel to the Department was written in two sections. That report dated November 23, 1884, and printed\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{31}Miscellaneous Letters Part I (1884) Dec. 5, 1885. Instructions to Commanding Officer Earl English. See Appendix B for complete instructions.
for the public was, generally speaking, a commercial account on the Congo from investigations made in Europe. In larger political phase, a confidential matter of his preliminary statement, which was written two days later, was omitted from Foreign Relations. It contained the subtle, veiled undertones of a startled and partially frustrated hireling who was shocked at the role taken by his employer. With practically the same language which he had used in a letter to Morgan, to Frelinghuysen the Agent complained:

Upon my arrival in Brussels, I found very much to my surprise, that the "Free States of Congo", did not exist, notwithstanding the Declaration now in Washington (signed) by Col. Sanford, and I was forced to believe that the action of the United States Government had been a little premature.

He reported that our recognition was a "most agreeable" surprise to European nations who manipulated it as a leverage to launch the "Free States" into the political world. As if to remind or chasten the Secretary of the calculated risk taken at the Berlin West African Conference, he added:

But had Germany declined this recognition, I can imagine that the United States would have been placed in a very humiliating position. Now everything is favorable to the "Free States", and the founders have to thank the United States.

To disrobe the Secretary of due credit, Tisdel held that the manner in which Kasson handled the Congo affair "elevated him to the first word as a Diplomat" and on that fact America took the

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32 Foreign Relations (1885) pp. 285-293. Tisdel to Frelinghuysen, November 23, 1884. Rec., December 9, 1884. The deletions were all political comments. See Special Agents, Vol. XXXIII.


34 Ibid.
lead. Finally, he was also unable to refrain from adding the thought that his delay enroute, too, was a significant factor in our initial success.  

Frelinghuysen was by no means disconcerted at this piece of correspondence. His full reply, available only in *Special Missions*, was representative of the sharp, analytical, long-range and patient planner. He approved the deletion of the phrase which referred to the date of this particular communication. He informed Tisdel that the Department, in its designation, had no intention to accredit him to the Government of the State of the Congo Association. It knew that, as a political unity those States did not exist. To curb the vanity of Tisdel, who was journeying by way of a naval vessel, the Secretary reminded him that his mission was commercial and that his "designation was geographical rather than political". In view of the November election, it appeared that the Secretary checked his files. Forthwith, he sent Tisdel a commission and a tender of oath. They certainly would have tended to forestall any reoccurrence of excess political action on the part of the Agent. It was softened by the remark that his valuable report on the Congo was sent to Congress.

Writing aboard ship while enroute to the Congo, Tisdel described his plan of operations in the discharge of his mission.

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35 Ibid.
36 *Foreign Relations (1885)*, p. 293, No. 6. Frelinghuysen to Tisdel, Dec. 12, 1884. Also see *Special Missions*, Vol. III, p. 389, No. 6; Frelinghuysen to Tisdel.
37 *Foreign Relations (1885)*, p. 293.
From Vivi, he would go into the interior as far as the Equator and return. He planned to study well the Congo Basin and proceed south to Loanda. From this point, he would travel in a coasting steamer to Dakar. He would then be able to report on the trade and the future prospects of commerce along the coast. If dependent upon a trade caravan, it would probably take seventy-five days to tour the Congo Valley. He expected to cut his time to sixty days by use of an escort of ten to twenty men. Having made contact with the Kearsage, he planned to meet a ship detail from it at Stanley Pool.\textsuperscript{39}

The extent to which Tisdel deviated from his original plans was seen in the voluminous report of April 22, 1885 sent from Lisbon, Portugal, and the June report written in Washington and printed in Foreign Relations. The other reports extending from May 4, 1884 to August 25, 1885, were posted in Europe. The first one, limited to the Lower Congo and the coast, was for the benefit of the interested American merchant. Americans were advised to invest only if they were supplied with large capital. Only then could they compete with the well-established houses from Rotterdam, Liverpool, Hamburg and Paris. Even so, it would be of no avail unless they owned or had reasonable access to two-way transportation facilities.\textsuperscript{40}

Americans were told that the most valuable native products were rubber, palm kernels, palm oil, gum copal, ground nuts and wax. Rubber and palm trees were abundant in the Lowlands. Supply was


\textsuperscript{40}Foreign Relations (1885), p. 294. Linguists and knowledge of trading habits were \textit{a priori}. 
able to meet the ever-increasing demands if the native could be induced to work. Although they were glad to get cloth and gin, they did not like the white man and preferred that whites would keep outside of their domain. On the contrary, an industrious black man with a knowledge of the Fiote language could "travel anywhere in the country unmolested".\textsuperscript{11}

Tisdel was dubious of competing with the extremely cheap cotton goods from England. However, he was well satisfied that American common cutlery, lumber, ready-made wooden houses, medicines, beads and Yankee notions could be delivered at a lower price rather than "being invoiced from Europe". The American problem was to reach these traders and, apparently, it revolved around the expansion of merchant shipping facilities. Since business was done on a barter and trade system, profits were large.\textsuperscript{12} As for the best place for American goods, he recommended the areas of Benguela, St. Paul de Loando, and Mossamedes, which were South of the Congo River. The large population would gladly trade if contact could be established.\textsuperscript{13}

The remainder of the West Coast was monopolized by various European nations. The English dominated trade in the Niger, Dahomey, Gold Coast, and Ashanti. He found the Germans in the Cameroons, the French along the Senegal area and all three in the Guinea area. Optimistically, he still maintained that profitable trade was available if cargo steamers with some passenger accomodations would be established between the United States and the Western shores of Africa.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., p. 295.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., p. 297.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., p. 298.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., pp. 294-300.
The second phase of Tisdel's report, with the erroneous indication of having been written in Washington, was undoubtedly sent from Berlin. There, he had been confined since May 1, 1885 with the Congo fever. This was the most pessimistic communication on the possibilities of commercial activities in the Congo that the Department ever received. When it is compared with that from Lieutenant Taunt who covered the same area, one concludes that Tisdel did not write the report on the spot, that he was misinformed, and that he wrote it while ill. He gave neither good, kind nor promising phrases to either man, land or beast. 45

Since the new administration was adamantly opposed to the Congo venture, it was possible that the last report was part of a likely plan to bring about a gradual change of foreign policy on the Congo Question. Tisdel later revealed that he was propositioned by Sanford to falsify the reports in a manner most favorable to the schemes of Sanford and Stanley. It was also suggested to him to submit the briefs to the ex-Minister's review before mailing them to the Department. 46

The "Report of Lieutenant Taunt of a Journey on the River Congo" was one which indicated that the officer would have made a success in most any line of endeavor. Objectively, it was a job well done and it cost less than the expense of the assignment given to Agent Tisdel. The report covered a six-months span and was executed under orders of Rear-Admiral Earl English, USN. 47 With due consideration

46 Infra. Chap. VIII. See also Tisdel to Bayard. Appendix C.
47 United States 49th Cong. 2nd sess. (1887), Senate Ex. Doc. No. 77. Hereafter designated as Senate Ex. Doc. No. 77.
to the limitations of time and geographical factors, he accomplished a thorough job, and was duly commended by the service.\textsuperscript{48}

He reported on the progress of the Independent State of the Congo, its system of government, agents, stations, food, troops, labor, transportation problems and railway schemes, the character of the country and the native population. In contradiction to the Tisdel report, he made this observation:

I met with sickness and death, as reported by Mr. Tisdel but certainly no misery or want, unless it was the want of proper medical attention, there being but two doctors on the river, which number is, I think, utterly inadequate for the proper care of the sick.... Life was of the primitive kind... but... far less serious than I expected to find in a country where white men had never set foot seven years ago.\textsuperscript{49}

From close examination, he believed that the reported wealth of the Upper Congo Valley had not been exaggerated. It contained untapped natural resources in great abundance. He was dubious of its developments unless the barren unhealthy region could be bridged by steam to reduce the journey. To him, colonization was dependent upon the success of the proposed railway. Even then few citizens, except representatives of American trading firms, would leave America to settle and colonize the Congo, unless they were interested in missionary work.\textsuperscript{50}

Momentarily, he held a dim view on prospects for successful American exploitation. What could be done by one with capital and push when the railroad was completed as another question. European


\textsuperscript{49} Senate Ex. Doc. No. 77, p. 400.

\textsuperscript{50} Ibid.
firms trading on the West Coast of Africa were wealthy and long established. If American houses located there, they would face competition and could expect no immediate returns. At the same time, he was aware that there existed a demand for American cotton goods, canned goods and lumber. The latter seemed insatiable.

Ignoring the political and imperialistic implications on the establishing of a coaling station, Taunt took strictly a thrifty view.

It has been suggested that the United States Government establish a coaling station at the mouth of the Congo. This is not at all necessary for the Dutch African Trading Company always keep a large stock of coal on hand which it can supply our vessels for much less money than it would cost our Government to lay it down there.51

Much was revealed on the matter of slavery from the parsimonious and pertinent comments given to it. Conducted by the Arab, the slave traffic existed without concealment. In cunning artlessness, the Congo State attempted to curb the traffic by periodic purchases from the "Traffickers". With but few exceptions, the unfortunate ones were women who rejoiced to gain relief from their captors.52

With reservation, Taunt substantiated Tisdal's report in his concluding comments.

I agree perfectly with what I understand to be Mr. Tisdal's report on the valley of the Lower Congo. That from Boma to the sea the country is fertile, but between Boma and Stanley Pool it is a mountainous, bleak, unhealthy region, relieved now and then by a few fertile spots. This section, however, is but the gateway to the real valley of the Congo higher up, which region Mr. Tisdal did not visit.53

51 Ibid., p. 41. Cf. Foreign Relations (1885), p. 315. Tisdal held that eligible land was unavailable and for sale only at an exorbitant fee.
52 Senate Executive Document, No. 77, p. 41.
53 Ibid., p. 39.
The remainder of the correspondence of Tisdel was highlighted by several unusual incidents. During his stop-over in Europe, he took the opportunity to collect and compile all the printed information relative to the Berlin Conference and Congo Questions. These were gathered from the various European newspapers and constituted two volumes of "Scrapbook" material which were sent to the Department. "Along with it was a large map of Central Africa showing the boundary demarcation of the so-called Congo Free State."

The second event was the "Stanhope Affair" which created a great state of excitement within the ranks of the Congo Association. A report cabled from London and published in the New York Herald on July 22, 1885, criticized the management of Congo affairs as being very poor and inefficient. Perturbed, Colonel Strauch, the President, had Tisdel check to see if the story came from Washington, D.C. The event was significant on several accounts. Tisdel admitted to Bayard that the article was mainly true. He recognized the writer as English ex-Army officer, Captain Stanhope, a former employee of the Association. Tisdel had befriended Stanhope when he was "surrounded by 400 or 500 savages" who were about to make an attack upon him. Tisdel, held that the natives fled because they thought his detail was the advance guard of a large Army. In a political sense, the Congo was extremely sensitive to reaction from Washington. Moreover, the New York release produced additional comment in Europe. From the aggressiveness of additional statements,

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54 Special Agents, XXXII; Tisdel to Sec. Bayard, July 1, 1885. Upon inquiry, the "Scrapbook" of two volumes was not found in the National Archives. No one has seen them or knows where they are.
it was evident that either Stanley or Sanford or both took exception to the contents of Tisdel's official reports. He promised the Secretary articles pro and con on the Association in the Congo.\textsuperscript{55} He still wanted to engage in the political affairs rather than commercial ones.

The novel feature of the correspondence sent to the Secretary in the latter part of August was a revelation of our advanced knowledge of German war moves for purposes of imperialistic gains. Through the "tipsy tongue" of important General Staff members in Berlin, Tisdel was made aware of German intent on the eastern coast of Africa as early as the previous December. He presented this information to Secretary Bayard who was in Europe on July 3, 1885. At that time he looked upon it as being basically a colonizing scheme.

The correspondence indicated that, prior to his departure from Berlin in 1884, he gave this information to Kasson. Here it must be interjected that the German treaties were made with local native chiefs who were vassals of the Sultan of Zanzibar. Aware of the intent of Germany, an antagonist of England, Kasson fought to observe the legal recognition of the Sultan.\textsuperscript{56} On this score the Iowan's actions were a warning to Britain which was not on the alert. Herein, the English critic slightly erred in thinking that

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid. Confidential, Tisdel to Bayard; August 10, 1885. Rec. Aug. 21, 1885. Note. Article V in contract, with the Association prevented one from talking or writing on the Congo. See Foreign Relations (1885), p. 312.

\textsuperscript{56} Special Agent, XXXII, Tisdel to Bayard; August 25, 1885 Rec. Sept. 11, 1885.
Kasson was only a rumor monger,\textsuperscript{57} who incidentally was quite unable to awaken John Bull for his own welfare on the floor of the Congo Conference. The European press took another view, one expressed with strong indignation. It was angrily maintained that a secret treaty existed between Britain and Germany whereby the former would be made secure for the annexation of a portion of Zanzibar territory.\textsuperscript{58}

Tisdel tendered his resignation to Secretary Bayard and expressed thanks and appreciation for the confidence shown in him and the courtesies extended. Two days later, on November 11, 1885 in harmony with its marginal notation, it was accepted by the Secretary who wrote to him as follows:

In accepting your resignation, I have had great pleasure in expressing to you the entire approval and appreciation by the Department of the whole course of your proceedings in the execution of its instructions as shown in your full and intelligent reports which have conveyed to the Department much needed information.\textsuperscript{59}

Bayard, who was in complete sympathy with Tisdel's views on the United States - Congo trade, also wrote Senator Morgan six months later that Tisdel "had been diligent and zealous" under his predecessor.\textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{57}Crowe, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 97.

\textsuperscript{58}Special Agent, XXXIII, Tisdel to Bayard; August 25, 1885. Rec. Sept. 11, 1885.

\textsuperscript{59}Ibid., Tisdel to Bayard, November 8, 1885. Notation - Accepted with thanks for the valuable service rendered the country p/JOP. Bayard to Tisdel, Nov. 11, 1885.

\textsuperscript{60}Morgan Papers, II, 388. Bayard to Morgan, May 29, 1886.
CHAPTER IV
PARTICIPATION - A BREAK WITH TRADITION

Keenly alert and astute office holders, politicians, policy makers, and publicists, who were interested in our foreign affairs found themselves confronted by an impending break with tradition in the late spring of 1884. Among the various distant lands with which we were concerned was the reputedly rich and populous valley of the Congo. In December of 1883, the President held that our relations with it thereafter would be such that the country could not be indifferent. In fact, he felt it would be advisable to cooperate with other commercial powers to help safeguard the rights of trade "from the interference or political control from any one nation".\(^1\)

Those who were well informed were quite aware that our consular agents who were located on the periphery of the Dark Continent had consistently sought an increase of American trade with Africa. On April 22, 1884, when recognition was accorded the International African Association, some of our citizens thought in terms of expansion of American trade. Others pondered the question of whether or not we were disobeying the admonitions of the Founding Fathers by meddling in European affairs. This milieu provided a part of the backdrop for the political parties in the election of 1884.

The Republicans then in power, were keenly interested in both foreign and domestic trade. Their platform makers felt that the regulation of commerce with foreign nations was one of the most

\(^1\)See Annual Message of the President, Appendix D.
important prerogatives of the General Government. The Republican Party platform stated that it:

...favors a policy which shall keep us from entangling alliances with foreign nations, and which shall give the right to expect that foreign nations shall refrain from meddling in American affairs - the policy which shall seek peace and can trade with all Powers, but especially with those of the Western Hemisphere.2

The professional platform makers of the Democratic Party were led by Manton Marble, who felt that he had "just the panacea for the present conditions". The Democrats, who met a month after the Republicans, dubbed the latter's platform as Mr. "Blaine's policy". Because of interest in the Congo, to the Democrats, the Republican foreign policy plank was comparable to the British policy of colonialism. Some felt that "Blaine's policy" was a British policy of knuckling to England. Thus, the Democratic Party promised to regain commerce that America had left to British bottoms. It pledged to search out markets for American products. Apparently expressing veiled dissatisfaction on the recent recognition of the Association in the Congo, the Democratic Party also promised to adopt a well-defined executed foreign policy.3

In due justice to his country and party, President Arthur felt that it was imperative to refer again to the Congo matter in his fourth Annual Message to Congress. Absence of comment might have left the loser of the last election, the Republican Party, in an embarrassing position. Thus he spoke:

Pursuant to the advice of the Senate at the last session, I recognized the flag of the International Association of the Congo as that of a friendly Government, avoiding

2The New York Tribune, June 6, 1884, p. 5.
3The Chicago Tribune, July 10, 1884, p. 2.
in so doing any prejudgment of conflicting territorial claims in that region. Subsequently, in execution of the expressed wish of Congress, I appointed a commercial agent for the Congo Basin. The importance of the rich prospective trade of the Congo Valley has led to the general conviction that it should be opened to all nations upon equal terms. At an international conference for the consideration of this subject called by the Emperor of Germany, now in session in Berlin, delegates are in attendance on behalf of the United States. Of the results of this conference you will be duly advised.\footnote{James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the President, (New York City: Bureau of National Literature, 1897), IX, 1823. See also Foreign Relations (1884), p. IV.}

Obviously, this was the customary way of attempting to disclose a clean record upon relinquishing power. He wanted it known that, regardless of conflicting European claims, that he had avoided entanglements. Meanwhile, he had sought to carry out the mandate of both parties which wanted extension of our trade. Hence, because they had requested it, he had appointed an agent to the Congo and had seen that we had representation in the Congo Conference. Moreover, appropriate information from this conference would be given to them.\footnote{Diplomatic Corr. Belgium (1884-1885), XXII, No. 293. Fish to Frelinghuysen, Jan. 2, 1885. Rec. Jan. 31, 1885.}

By October the fifteenth, one month before the start of the Conference, it was well-known that the United States had been accorded an invitation to participate in its deliberations. For the most part, reaction was calm and non-committal at this break with tradition. However, the leading financial trade journal, \emph{Commercial and Financial Chronicle} without being antagonistic, took a very pessimistic view. From the proposed agenda, which was released before the meeting, the editor felt that a settlement of conflicting
territorial claims should have been made first. Then one should have followed a consideration of trading privileges. One would next need a visible body of authority, and that authority "to be one and undivided". The natural and easy way out would be the recognition of the Association. However, progress and a solution were limited by Britain which desired an exclusion of the discussion of all proprietary rights. This press found it difficult to realize good from this endeavor.

In view of the fruitlessness of the late Conference on Egypt, another abortive assembly of diplomatic magnates would be very disappointing and would discourage future similar attempts.6

A cursory view of European writers revealed no lack of reluctance and reticence of expression on their part toward our participation on the Congo Question. Robert Goffin, a contemporary authority on the Congo, stated:

The Powers of Europe were interested in Africa. It remained only in effect to open up with their colonial activity; America replied that for herself... she would adhere to the Monroe Doctrine.7

Perhaps the author was too kind to add that our adherence was limited strictly to land-grabbing. Regardless of the unrecognized anomaly, we were to take a seat for trade. Another writer, rather than take a strong negative stand on our participation, recommended what later proved to be a profitable admonition for some European countries. He suggested that it would be better for Europeans to colonize Africa than for their surplus populations to go to America and more quickly realize the necessity of new markets. As colonists, their surplus

7Encyclopédia du Congo, I, p. 9.

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population would depend upon the mother country. As a result, Europeans would pioneer in new fields for manufacturing and commerce. 8

Due credit must go to the leading British authority, Crowe, who failed to see the impact of traditional foreign policy on our participation in the Conference, and the continuity of the impact which did not end on February 26, 1885. That writer was quite aware of the ambiguity of our position in the Conference with the use of Stanley and Sanford, who were also prominent personages in the Association of the Congo. Neither was she blind nor dumb to the fact that we sought the maximum protection for international trade, the diplomatic substitute for one's own commerce. Nor was she unaware that we wanted others to assume rigid obligations for the security of this trade. 9

Slightly related to the theory of security was the observations of another European student León Lotar the Belgian who viewed our action as that of a pacifist. To him, we considered the existence of this new State as a guarantee against the dangers of international violence. He felt that we would and did participate mainly to keep the peace by way of the Congo in Africa, in a manner similar to European regard to neutral Belgium. 10

With the opening of the Berlin West African Conference on November 15, 1884, the anomalous position of our representatives

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8Hubbard, loco. cit., p. 105.
9Crowe, op. cit., pp. 97-98.
10León Lotar, The Participation of Belgians in the Colonial Work of Leopold II, Institut Royal Colonial Belge (1940), II, 593 passim. See also Sessional Papers (1884-1885), LV, 23.
was more highly accentuated. It was a disturbing thought in the mind of Frelinghuysen, our Secretary of State. It should have been observed by Europeans from the assignments we gave to our minor representation. Aware that much deliberation had been given also to the problem of whether or not it was advisable for us to participate in the Conference, Frelinghuysen was still worried because of conflicting claims of jurisdiction. In a cable message, he warned Kasson that this ticklish matter might easily come to the floor for discussion.

Frelinghuysen was a man who experienced poor health, but seldom showed poor judgment. However, on this occasion he gingerly placed his fears between two admonitions. Af first he advised Kasson that it was not our policy to intervene in the affairs of foreign nations to decide territorial questions between them. Next, he instructed him to take care that "no act of yours may seem to pledge the United States to any course or conclusion contrary to its well-known policy". He explained to Kasson that we desired the fullest liberty of action upon the conclusions of the Conference. This was the diplomatic way of saying that this Government still desired the isolationists' principles of foreign policy while participating in an international or European affair. Moreover, in part, it provided the basis for our later action that was regarded by some as having no effect on the Conference whatsoever. Nevertheless, of equal or greater importance were the words, "no act of yours may seem to pledge". They covered a multitude of possibilities and became extremely susceptible to the internationalist's

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leanings when tied to the instructions "much must be left to your discretion". We were fully aware of the pregnant problems facing the Conference. As adherents of the Monroe Doctrine, but not with little minds, we took the lead, an unexpected an irregular course.

The abnormality of our position continued with Kasson's choice of Stanley and Sanford. This was clearly deduced by Crowe who did not have access to our documentary proofs. On the contrary she made no treatment of Tisdel, notwithstanding consideration given in the files of the British Government. Ironically, the situation became more complex as the King of Belgium placed Stanley, the impetuous journalist under control of Sanford. Meanwhile, Kasson, as has been previously noted, successfully requested that Departmental restraint be placed upon Sanford. Unfortunately, even our discretionary use of Sanford insured greater success to Leopold II who hoodwinked Bismarck, the French Foreign Minister and our own Secretary of State through use of the fear technique.

The willing cooperation of the Navy Department has unmistakable proof of the degree to which we broke with tradition in 1884 and 1885. Without doubt, Kasson was happy and greatly encouraged to learn that our Navy was acting in concert and complete harmony with

\[\text{12 Supra. Chap. II.}\]

\[\text{13 Crowe, op. cit., p. 97.}\]

\[\text{14 Thomson, op. cit., p. 223. Cf. Middleton, op. cit., p. 89.}^{\text{\textsuperscript{14}}}\text{ Stanley was in a highly anomalous position".}\]

State Department plans. He felt that his arguments would now carry with stronger force and respect on the Conference floor. Meanwhile the Navy, in the execution of its assignment, displayed on the surface as keen an interest in the Congo Question as any European counterpart.

In preparation for this display, Rear-Admiral Earl English took on 216 tons of coal at Lisbon...

...on account of the uncertainty of obtaining coal at the Congo, and in the hope that it may be the means of securing a coaling station in that locality for the future use of our Government. I shall make an effort on my arrival at the Congo to have a desirable site near the mouth of the river reserved or ceded for that purpose....

With a miser's budget and sharp-eyed bureaucrats scrutinizing expenditures, English planned to spend as little as possible. In fact it would seem that he had the idea of resorting to "palaver and barter". His assistant, Commander William Bridgman, found the most desirable sites occupied by firms or held by speculators at extravagant prices. Later Tisdel verified this unpleasant situation.

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16 Germany, Instruc. (1880-1887), No. 66. Frelinghuysen to Kasson, Dec. 9, 1881.


18 Navy Depart., European Squadron Letter (1885), No. 3. Ibid.

19 Ibid., No. 26. English to Sec. Whitney, May 2, 1885. Rec. June 19, 1885. Since English found coal available at the Congo at the lower price than we could ship it, he labeled it an unwise and unnecessary measure. Too, there was 'insufficient depth at Banana to service our flag ships.
In execution of the Navy's other prescribed duties, the protocol features of salutes to the Governor of the State and to the Association's flag were fulfilled on April 30, 1885. In addition, American ships cruised in such a manner with the English that Portuguese ships of war removed themselves from sight. 20

The reports of official personnel on this cruise and maneuver were oddly enough characterized by two discrepancies. There was no complete agreement except on the coaling station. Only English and Taunt felt that Americans could endure the climate of the Congo. Bridgman and Tisdel thought otherwise. Taunt, the only one who thoroughly investigated the country, alone felt that Americans had a possible chance for profitable exploitation of that part of Africa. His view was conditioned on the completion of the proposed railway around the rapids originally envisioned by Stanley.

In breaking with tradition, the impeccable Iowan sacrosanctly listed the alleged desires of the country. Moralistically, he held that recent African discoveries should be utilized for the civilization of the native races. The slave trade should be abolished and a neutralization of the area against aggression should be effected. This would certainly mean an avoidance of international conflict. Since the envy of all nations was aroused, a delimitation of the region would bring peace, civilization and commercial progress. 21 Action also should be taken to avoid a monopoly of privileges and commercial enterprise within the area. The summary of the


above considerations was often identified as the so-called Ameri­
can Proposition.22

We felt sufficiently strong, on the break, to take a positive
stand on other important issues. We acquired territory for the
establishment of Liberia from native African tribes by "legitimate
deeds of cession". Thus, we recommended that foreign occupation
should be established with the consent of the natives abandoning
the older assumption of right from original discovery, notwith­
standing the sensational discoveries by Stanley an American citizen
flying our flag.23

We supported the admission into the Congo Basin of Christian
missionaries. However, the Commission finally settled on the phrase
that "all the missions should be treated on an equal footing".24

Our neutrality proposition which was to exempt the entire area from
war even included all the fresh and salt water routes.25 This did not
meet the approval of the French and the Portuguese. The same two
also objected to the American slave trade declaration which would
have given neither rest nor refuge to violators. In part, it read:

Each power binds itself to employ all the administrative
means within its power to put an end to this traffic and to
punish those who engage therein.26

More acceptable was the weaker stand of powers engaging in cooperation
for the suppression of slavery and the slave trade.

22Ibid., p. 7.
25Ibid., p. 73.
26Ibid., p. 145

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With the additional opposition of Holland and Germany, teeth were withdrawn from our effort to place rigid restrictions upon liquor sales in the Congo Valley. Objections were sustained on the basis of a search of foreign vessels by foreign authorities. In the language of the "Philadelphia lawyer", it was agreed "to conciliate the rights of humanity with the interests of commerce in-so-far as these interests may be legitimate".27

The United States did not refrain from discussion of "formalities of occupation" which could have entangled it in a question of conflicting claims. Rather, it suggested that the basis should rest in native consent. Finally two rules were accepted by all the Powers. A notification had to be addressed by the occupying Power to all attending the Conference. The Power had to acknowledge obligations with the proper assumption of authority and respect to rights for liberty of commerce and transit.28

In his report of January 12, 1885 to the Secretary Kasson was much disturbed by the House's demand for information on the American policy at the Conference. He apparently felt that this Congressional group did not understand the real scope and purposes of the Conference. To Kasson, Stanley had discovered a "no man's land" which passed under control of the I.A.A. whose authority was based upon native consent. Meanwhile, France and Portugal with ineffective occupation and weak and questionable jurisdiction, were imperialistic

27 Ibid., p. 152.
rivals to carry civilization to fifty or sixty million natives. Thus, the region was ripe for international strife and rivalry. Conflict would exclude the largest buyer of the chief products of Central Africa, ivory, palm oil and rubber. Strife would also exclude this same section from becoming our largest consumer of cotton goods. 29

In addition to the textile industry, to Kasson, American interests, both material and moral, were equal to those of any other enlightened nation. The only exception was in the area of colonial possession. Doubts and contrary views were in the minds of some Congressmen, upon recall of repeated praise of the Stanley exploits and the use of our Navy. Kasson felt it necessary to give a practical emphasis to American interests to erase the fears of Congress. He reminded them that he sought to secure equal rights for Americans and American commerce. Moreover, he desired security of privileges for the present and the future irrespective of foreign governmental control.

Kasson then summarized those deliberations which he considered as American gains. By acceptance of the invitation, we enjoyed trade equality in the commercial declaration. We had not suffered through long lapses of time or resorted to possible loss in reciprocity concessions of our own markets. We secured freedom of navigation on the monopolized Niger as well as on the Congo. We secured a declaration against commerce in slaves and the slave trade. The propositions of neutrality and formalities of occupation were still pending. Kasson described the Conference as a consultative and recommendatory body. Mentally tensed from the problem of

easing the members fears, he then conscientiously but erroneously conveyed the idea that the Conference was similar to that of the International Postal Conference.\(^{30}\)

Should not the Secretary of State have come to the defence of Mr. Kasson? No comment was necessary with a lame-duck Congress anticipating a change of political regime. Nevertheless, as though with prescience of mind, Frelinghuysen made the following comment:

> From all that preceded, it will not (sic) be seen that this Government, in taking part in the Congo Conference of Berlin has not departed from the traditional policy; on the contrary it has followed good precedent.\(^{31}\)

Almost a month later, the minority report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee replied to both Frelinghuysen and Kasson with a contrary view.

> Certainly, all those are beneficent and desirable objects. But at least for us in the United States they were and are, when to be worked out in Berlin for Africa, European objects.\(^{32}\)

\(^{30}\)Ibid., pp. 149-150.

\(^{31}\)New York Tribune, January 30, 1885.

\(^{32}\)House Report No. 2665 (February 28, 1885), Minority Committee Report, p. 24.
CHAPTER V
KASSON AT THE CONFERENCE

When the occasion presented itself, John Adam Kasson was as strong an internationalist as one could find. The article of this neo-isolationist on "The Monroe Declaration", written from a nationalist concept, gave evidence of an American who took great pride in the fact that our influence prevailed favorably from Moscow to Madrid. He was a strong adherent of this Doctrine as an established basis of foreign policy, but he felt that it in no wise contradicted our tradition of extending American commerce throughout the world. Moreover, he looked upon the Doctrine as an aid for our neutrality which engaged the good will of other nations.\(^1\) Thus, he felt that the United States of America, with its emphasis upon democracy, was in the best position to take the lead for the facilitation of trade and intercourse. Imbued with this Yankee restlessness, impressed by the rich spaciousness of the mid-West, he perhaps unknowingly but conscientiously took the role of a "Big American".

This profile reflected the general character and class of the people with whom he was associated or affiliated. A close friendship existed between the Fish and Kasson families.\(^2\) C. P. Huntington and Robert E. Patterson, of the Pacific Railroad Commission, regarded him with unusual interest, stating that "Kasson is an able fellow and we have never lost any money on him".\(^3\) Upon the vacancy

\(^2\) Kasson Papers. Letter, Fish to Kasson, March 24, 1881.
\(^3\) Ibid., Letter, C. P. Huntington to J.A.K., April 8, 1882. The former sought postponement of the meeting of the New Mexico Legislature in 1887 fearing the danger of "wasted interest" being attacked. Robert E. Patterson to J.A.K., September 23, 1887.
of the ministerial post in Austria, six Senators on March 26, 1877 without his knowledge recommended him to the Secretary of State. They were William B. Allison of Iowa, John C. Ingalls of Kansas, H. B. Anthony of Rhode Island, O. P. Morton of Indiana, A. A. Sargent and Newton Booth of California. 4

His address to the Brooklyn Revenue Reform Club in 1884 was further evidence of his role as a Big American. Although his subject was "Free Trade Not the International Law of the Almighty", he was a supporter of "free trade and protection". At the same time, he affirmed it the duty of every citizen to support all legislation which made the United States independent of foreign countries in war as well as in peace. 5 Such was our internationalist at the Congo Conference.

At the time of his arrival in Berlin, Kasson found a "strain upon the relations existing between (our) Legation and the German Government". By the time that the Conference got underway, the rapport between our personnel and the German Government showed improvement. By refraining from a request for a personal interview, the assuming of a dignified reserve in public and social gatherings, and bridling his tongue, Kasson made a very favorable impression upon Prince von Bismarck. Moreover, on November 17, 1884, he immediately learned through diplomatic channels that only he, Bismarck, and Leopold II were aware that Germany had committed herself to recognition of the Association and its flag. 6


Before that day came to a close, Kasson concluded from additional personal conversation with Bismarck that relations were resumed and on an agreeable and amicable status. Significantly, he stated that:

I further concluded that the recognition referred to may have been in orders to the German naval squadron now on its way to the African coast and we may hear that they have saluted the flag.  

From this comment, it appeared that he and Tisdel had compared notes on the "flag salute". Simultaneously it was an indirect urge to hasten our own naval plans. It would also appear that Bismarck and Leopold were in accord on the use of our recognition as a precedent of international formality as well as a leaf to insert in their national planning of policy.

Two days before the start of the Conference, Sanford and Stanley arrived in Berlin as a part of the American delegation. Stanley who was our American "Expert" was soon made use of by Bismarck in whetting the appetite of the German Colonial Association of Berlin.  

Quite coincidentally, Kasson, on the same day of their arrival, received notices and circulars of the meeting of Universal Cotton Exposition to be held in New Orleans.

The Conference had hardly opened when Kasson was made to realize that Britain and Germany differed on the future of the Niger basin. It was only natural that the former and heretofore owner unchallenged possessor sought separate treatment of the Niger. Meanwhile, Germany expressed acknowledgment of the territorial limits of the Congo Free States and conceded the South bank of the Congo at Stanley Pool to

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7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
the Association. It will be remembered that it was claimed by de Brazza for the French. However, Germany's action and continued discussion brought on the delicate question of the neutrality of the conventional basin (trade area drained by the river system) on the Congo. This paved the way for the introduction of the so-called American Plan of Neutrality.

Kasson, imbued with patriotic idealism, fought for the extension of American trade. In the plan, the Powers were to treat all free commercial territories as had been designated along with their water routes as the territory of a neutral. Here no act of war would be committed by any nation engaged in trade. From this area no article of contraband would be supplied either belligerent. Each signatory Power would be expected to enforce respectful consideration of the contraband stipulation. France and Portugal strongly opposed it.

What was his thinking behind this proposal? It would exempt this territory from war, stabilize the new government and give it peace, civilization and humanity. It would ensure the safety for whites, make for security of property and advance religious interests. It would further make for productive labor and avert decimation of the native population as had occurred with the Indians in America.


10Ibid., No. 95. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, December 8, 1884. Rec. December 22, 1884. Document Diplomatiques Francais (1884-1885), pp. 34-35. The French viewed the adoption of American principles as creating, in time, states out of colonies, pursuant to a situation analogous to Switzerland and Belgium. It was also a renunciation of the rights of war without which the inherent immunities to this regime were expressly guaranteed.
There would be no Power political rivalry and imperialistic wars over African colonies... American trade would boom!

Two weeks later and during recess of the Conference, some members of Congress took outspoken and candid exception to our acceptance of the invitation and particularly to our participation. This was reported by the Times (London) which was not too favorably disposed toward the Conference. It immediately caught the attention of Sanford who had suffered a setback in his African railroad schemes at the meeting of the Association. Disturbed, Sanford finally decided to write a letter to the Department in the hopes of dispelling the fears of our leaders. In it he gave a summary account of events leading up to the Conference and the part the United States played through Stanley and himself. He had worked for recognition to avoid the Association being designated as "Pirates" with an unrecognized flag. He claimed that his efforts had also helped us.

It does not become me to speak of my part in the transaction save to say that active participation from its inception, with the African International Association had impressed me as it progressed with the importance to our commerce and manufactures to our races of African descent and to civilization, if this vast region which the munificence of King Leopold was opening to civilizing influences could be made free to our merchants and missionaries and equally to the enterprise of our colored citizens.

The above section was written to appease varied interests including the veterans of the Blue and the Gray. The entire purpose of the letter was defeated with his admission that he had actively

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11 Cong. Record, XVI, Part I, pp. 446, 461, Jan. 5, 1885. Hilary A. Herbert of the House (Dem. - Ala.), and Perry Belmont (Dem. - N.Y.). On Jan. 9, 1885, the Belmont resolution was reported back from House Foreign Affairs Committee (See page 980).

12 Diplomatic Corr., Germany XXXVII. Letter filed under Germany. Sanford to Frelinghuysen, Jan. 14, 1885. Rec., Jan. 27, 1885. 112
engaged, "outside of the Conference, in promoting the settlement of differences and conflicting claims between France, Portugal and the Association".\textsuperscript{13}

Just prior to recess of the Conference for the Christmas holiday season, Kasson successfully gained a change in the proposal which governed navigation on the Congo. Originally, it was worded to govern not only the Congo but such navigation outside of the jurisdiction of the Signatory Powers and could easily have been interpreted to include the Mississippi River. The changed version encompassed rivers or waters "destined to" regulated between the Powers signing the Act. Two other propositions were for a time difficult to resolve, prohibition of traffic in slaves and restriction of traffic in spirituous liquors.\textsuperscript{14}

On the liquor situation, Kasson, in an attempt to put teeth in it, gained adoption of the "right of territorial authorities to control its use within their jurisdiction". On slavery, his efforts resulted in the Powers pledging themselves to employ all administrative means to put an end to the slave trade and punish those who engaged in it. The core of his neutrality proposition, in which Britain sought a restriction solely to the geographical limits, demanded first a recourse to mediation or arbitration.\textsuperscript{15} He displayed an enthusiasm which blinded his usually tactful political and domestic foresight. Although the European Powers had agreed to amendments for our behalf, they could easily be broken. Nevertheless,\textsuperscript{16}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}.
  \item \textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}, XXXVI, No. 110. Kasson to Prelinghuysen, Dec. 22, 1884. \textit{Rec.}, Jan. 5, 1885.
  \item \textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}.
\end{itemize}
Kasson looked with optimism to the resolution of all issues and after the holiday adjournment to January 5, 1885.

In the next despatch, Kasson briefed the Secretary on the progress of the Conference. The important committee of the Association had met twice, adopting the slave trade declaration on January 7, 1885. Formalities was the significant item under deliberation. On this, the French had objected to the British suggestion of extension of the provision to acquisitions in the interior as well as on the coast. After Britain had proposed a less rigid provision in regard to protectorates, and also saneness in definition of limits to be given in notification required, the editorial committee attempted to take charge. It was unable to do so until suggestions by Kasson were approved. He inserted a minimum requirement which the occupation could have as right of recognition. He held also that each Government was free to judge all other points affecting the validity claims. With his eye on trade, he added that the United States would also support the principles of assurances and responsibility in the formalities.  

The hopes of Kasson seared to unusual heights of optimism between February 8, 1885, and February 16, 1885. France and the Association settled their differences. The latter gave recognition to the former, which in turn exerted pressure upon Portugal for the same purpose. From this action French opposition to the American proposition was expected rapidly to fade. Moreover, his success with other unrelated problems made it possible for him to give

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greater attention to the final form of resolution of the Conference for signature by the United States.\textsuperscript{17}

On the day that he wrote a new accord between the Association and Portugal, he also sent Frelinghuysen a letter of congratulation upon retirement. The Secretary previously had stated that he desired none of regret, so Kasson courteously thanked him for past considerations. Meanwhile, not unlike Sanford, Kasson failed to give heed and concern to the political pulse back home.\textsuperscript{18} He remembered that a lame-duck is often useless as a support. A new administration was about to assume control.

From Saturday, January 31, 1885 to the middle of February, members of the Conference deliberated on the final form of the resolutions to bring it to a close. The European Powers wanted it in the form of a Treaty but they were favorably disposed to consider American scruples. Due to the traditions of our foreign policy, Kasson wanted the resolutions in the form of a separate act, a Declaration which the treaty could embody. To the editor of the Conference, Baron Lambremont, he gave two proposals.

If the Conference resorted to a Treaty, then he would prefer a project of an Article of the Treaty. This would permit a subsequent adhesion to the Declaration contained in the treaty signed by the European Powers. He would consider also a form for the proposed resolutions to bring it to a close. The European Powers wanted it in the form of a Treaty but they were favorably disposed to consider American scruples. Due to the traditions of our foreign policy, Kasson wanted the resolutions in the form of a separate act, a Declaration which the treaty could embody. To the editor of the Conference, Baron Lambremont, he gave two proposals.

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\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, No. 160. The Association was expected to sign the final Act. No. 163. Germany gave thanks to U. S. for protection of citizens in Chinese ports. Samoan incident settled. No. 167 Germany issued the White Book, "German Land Claims to Fiji Island". Bismarck entertained the members of the Congo Conference.

\textsuperscript{18}\textit{Ibid.}, Nos. 170, 176. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Feb. 16, 1885. \textit{Rec.}, March 2, 1885. Also see material to footnotes No. 50 and 51.
separate act of adhesion. It would have to make the distinction between adhering to the Treaty and adhering to the five declarations which it would contain. He felt that the only alternative was to resort to a final Protocol. This would establish American agreements in due form. They would be confirmed as finished diplomatic acts when each Power had duly ratified them. Berlin would be the depository of this Protocol.

The Treaty was not signed and Kasson awaited our Secretary's instructions. Meanwhile, the title of General Act was adopted with the decision to embody all declarations therein. Each Power was accorded only one vote in the deliberations but the Act was to be signed by all Plenipotentiaries of the Governments represented. The privilege of adhesion was granted to non-signatory Governments. Kasson felt that he could sign it without a violation of traditional policy. To him, it was only "a plain and orderly Certificate of the rules agreed upon for the benefit of commerce of all non-African nations, and the maintenance of peace in the newly discovered regions".

On February 9, 1885, Kasson composed and sent four long despatches to Secretary Frelinghuysen. In one he forwarded the adopted American neutrality proposition with its modifications. Even though

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20 Ibid.

21 Ibid., No. 170. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Feb. 16, 1885. Rec., March 2, 1885. The alarmists would be extremely dubious of the clause, "maintenance of peace in the newly discovered regions".

22 See Appendix E.
the philosophy of Article 10 was idealistic, it could easily be argued by die-hard isolationists that it did not comport with the maintenance of our "liberty of action". The same view could be taken on the second clause of Article 11, and that part of Article 12:

Those Powers engage, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more friendly Powers.23

To Kasson this was "a pledge of great importance to the future peace of these regions". It was "the embodiment of a principle of modern progress for the adoption of which the enlightened American opinion has been", Kasson added. To him it was not arbitration, but was a station on the road to it.24

Probably with a feeling that history would prove him correct, Kasson quoted verbatim the reply which he received February 20, 1885.

Your one fifty-seven received. If conference recommends rule for accession of non-signing powers to five declarations, we will consider advisability of acceding; but we cannot at present sign a formal treaty. Our understanding was that Conference should limit action to recommending the several powers to adopt united or ("74382" supposed 54382) uniform rules, and this government expressly held itself free to reject any or all the conclusions as recommended. Frelinghuysen.25

The Iowan replied that, due to his own objections, the Conference adopted the form of the General Act. He recalled that the members had successively discussed and adopted the declarations in a spirit of unity. The Act took effect only when each Power notified the Conference. The Power could reserve a year for ratification.

23Ibid.
He held that the present form was satisfactory and that he would sign it if authorized. Telegraphic instructions were requested.

Frelinghuysen then answered that:

We would prefer a simple act to be communicated to the Government calling the Conference, as was done with our Meridan Conference, thus leaving that Power transmit (sic) in inviting others to join in adopting results. If this is not acceptable then you may sign simple act as your telegram describes making whatever declarations necessary to secure absolute freedom to the United States.\(^{26}\)

Legally trained, Kasson compared the Protocol of the Meridan Conference with the General Act, and found them essentially different in subject matter, form and the recording of opinions.

In the Congo Conference, no resolution could be adopted without unanimity. In respect to commerce and navigation positive evidence of activities in trade had to be established because upon this proof was contingent national and personal rights. Without such commercial activities the rights of nations and the immediate interests of commerce would be left "at loose ends". He also felt that our own commercial interests made it highly necessary to secure the advantages proposed by a direct engagement to be assumed by the African possessory powers. Delay would probably lead to complications and possibly a change of policy by those states. Kasson, imbued with these ideas wrote the following to Thomas Bayard, a Democrat and Secretary of State:

There was no possible danger in our signature, because we had made no concessions of sovereignty, assumed no guarantees of privileges to other nations as the Possessor Powers had done. We were grantees not grantors. It would seem unwise in us to postpone the day when the granted privileges should take effect.

\(^{26}\)Ibid.

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So soon, therefore, as the Final Act took the form of a recital of the calling of the Conference, of the several declarations adopted, with provisions for adhesions, and for the taking effect of the Declarations, I could see no reason on the part of the United States for desiring a delay which might be utilized by the African possessory governments to the prejudice of the rights and interests of the other groups of nations. It was already ascertained that any less positive form would not be accepted. I may add that without solid reasons for objections to this form, it would have been ungracious for me to insist on a wholly inconclusive Protocol, after the Conference at my request abandoned the proposal of a Treaty, in order to meet the views of the United States Government.27

This statement was the guiding principle for action by our Minister. The ultimate decision for affixing the signatures of Sanford and himself was left to his discretion.

Did Kasson give more weight to the occasions of concurrence of opinion on the part of himself and the Secretary than he did to those of conflict? The unfound papers of Frelinghuysen, if ever recovered and opened to scholars, may reveal answers to this query.28

The Secretary and Kasson were agreed on his policies which effected an unusual extension of the commercial zone of the Congo. The knowledge of the needs of the Congo possessed by Stanley were of inestimable value to the development of the trading area. The progress made caused Kasson to plan amending the Declaration so that all of Central Africa would be described as neutral territory and no longer


28Princeton University is attempting to locate personal papers of Frelinghuysen without results to date. (Letter in the writer's possession from Arthur E. Fox, Feb. 11, 1954.)
subject to future acquisition; likewise, the commercial zone could be extended. He dreamed of complete success of his program that would evoke total recognition of the "Trustee Government" operating according to our rules of commerce and free navigation. Kassons' proposals were adopted on December 1, 1884.30

Concurrence and approval were also given to Kasson when he strongly stated that, due to the discoveries of Stanley the American, "we could, via International Law..., lay claim" to that zone or section. This was followed by an explanation for our recognition of the authority of the Free State.31

Similar expressions were accorded Kasson from Frelinghuysen upon receipt of his very keen analysis of German action on the west coast of Africa. Due to the lack of time to keep his Department fully aware of German aspiration in this area, he wisely clipped an article from a London press. This was a description of the German Blue Book which the Reichstag had published. Kasson gave to it an uncanny and prescience interpretation of German imperialism.32

Just a few days before Christmas 1884, the Secretary found it necessary to bring Kasson back in line on our foreign policy.


32Ibid., No. 75. Frelinghuysen to Kasson, December 23, 1884. See also Times (London), December 5, 1884.
Your one hundred-nine contemplates delimitation of rival claims on the Congo by the Conference. Referring to instructions of October 17, you will see that our attitude as to territorial claims prevents us, without bringing ourselves before the Conference on the question of jurisdiction, from following your suggestion, last clause in your despatch.  

This was a time when Sanford, in a discreet and adroit way, could have given Kasson inestimable help; however, due to his anxiety and lack of status, prudence and circumspection were lost.

Kasson was intensely interested in the success of his program and in securing authorization to sign the Act. No other explanation was found following his misinterpretation of the last three sets of numbers of the above despatch: "if you clause your despatch". In his reply, he further stated that "no departure was at any time contemplated". The Secretary's short reply to Kasson's unnecessary long cable by no means gave the representative permission to sign the Act.

In answer to your cipher telegram, delimitation mentioned did not refer to consideration of the Conference. That was not in contemplation. My despatch only referred to outside negotiations with Governments.

Kasson displayed exceptional insight on the interplay of power politics. He had the ability of discerning the long range programs of various European Powers whose actions he predicted with unusual accuracy. In evidence was his correspondence of November 20, 1884, enclosing an address by the Marquis Penafiel of Portugal. It was

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33 Germany Instruc., XVII, Telegram, Jan. 15, 1884.


35 Germany Instruc., XVII, Cipher telegram Frelinghuysen to Kasson, Cabled Feb. 6 or 7.
filled with the marked marginal notations of Kasson which anticipated the future conduct of Portugal outside and in the presence of the Conference. He observed that the references of both Italy and France on the liquor traffic were critical of America by their absence of comments. He gleaned from the Emperor’s address to the Reichstag that Germany was concerned about maritime rivalry and colonial ambitions in Africa.36

His sense of timing enabled him to choose the moment most advantageous to present the views of the United States on African questions. Kasson stressed the significance of Stanley as the first discoverer and the import for English and American friends, a point that was omitted in his correspondence to the Secretary. Moreover, he placed emphasis upon the lack of civilized authority and jurisdiction claimed by white men other than Stanley.

By omission of the fact, Kasson admitted our unwillingness to lay claim to the area and thus our adherence to traditional foreign policy in this respect. The interest of the United States was concerned with the possible elimination of conflicting nationalities, especially with neutralization "against aggression with equal privileges for all". Hence the United States supported the activities of the International Association, which was backed by the high and philanthropic patronage of Americans and Europeans. From her point of view the de facto government in the Congo was given support because of its adherence to the principles of equality and liberty to immigrants, to commerce, and to all foreign interests. His concluding remarks were to the effect of saying, "Let us have peace

in this scramble for Africa...

which shall be subjected to this beneficial rule. Let us set an example of 'peace and freedom'... whereby the black will learn from the dominion of the white... and we shall have the development of useful commerce free to all the world."37

John Francis, our Minister to Austria, was very impressed by Kasson's diplomatic insight on power politics. In this vein, he wrote from Vienna.

You have had real work to do in Berlin, but with less oppression we feel here at this capital that German power has the faculty of extending itself. I have been impressed with this from several little incidents, and your able and vigorous despatch... was stoutly confirmatory of the fact that Germany's influence (goes) beyond her own borders.38

Alphonso Taft, Minister to Russia stationed at St. Petersburg, was unable to keep fully abreast of matters. Before tendering his resignation, with confidence in Kasson, he sought certain information. Querying him as to whether or not efforts to pursue his present policies in the Congo was becoming tedious, Taft inquired, "Does little Portugal propose to bottle up the Congo Valley, with its warships at the mouth?"39

Previously treated, yet in support of his awareness, were his views on the German Blue Book. Two additional comments of Kasson were apropos.

It is worth reading as indicating the spirit which animates the two Governments respectively in dealing with African questions, perhaps it may be said with all foreign affairs. It is a true miliating (sic) record for the English Secretary.40

37 ibid.
38 Kasson Papers. Francis (Vienna) to Kasson at Berlin, Dec. 5, 1884.
39 Ibid. Alphonso Taft to J. A. Kasson, February 8, 1885.
His willingness to make use of the Navy was still another indication of his awareness of effective power politics. The idea, however, was by no means new to him at this time. Over two years earlier, a certain Mr. John Roach wrote to him of the need and advantages for both a real Navy and a merchant marine. The suggestion of Leopold probably made him more cognizant. The machinations of Portugal and France undoubtedly nourished the idea in his mind, whereas the burning desire to extend American trade bore it to fruition. The last two phases were descriptively depicted in his despatch number one hundred and nine.

Reverting to the Conference, on December 22, 1884, it was prolonged due to the alleged secret purposes of France and Portugal. By a secret understanding, France was attempting to extend her coast lines northwardly and Portugal southwardly to the same river, the Congo. If this was done, each with a rendezvous for a fleet in time of war could always threaten British and German vessels enroute to and from their colonial possessions in Africa or beyond the Cape of Good Hope. For this reason, Kasson fought strenuously for the American Proposition of Neutrality. This was, perhaps one of the strongest proofs that Kasson looked upon the role of the United States as the balance-wheel in international diplomacy and world politics. With the advantages of geographical location and a traditional foreign policy, to him, we, as a rapidly growing nation were fitted to play that role.

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Recognizing the strenuous activities of both Leopold II and Bismarck to secure unanimous recognition, Kasson felt that their efforts would help deter French-Portuguese military schemes. Surely the successful acceptance of his plan would do so. At that moment, he petitioned the Secretary for adherence to our Declarations as a regular and recognized signatory Power.\textsuperscript{43} Of greater significance and importance was his second query for use of the United States Navy.

\begin{quote}
Would it not be worthy of consideration by the President to send orders to our Diplomatic Agent (sic) on the Congo, or a naval vessel itself with orders to negotiate with the local chief for the best district on the lower Congo for a coaling station, contracting for exclusive jurisdiction along the best stretch of river coast.\textsuperscript{44}
\end{quote}

Of equal significance to the queries was the time that elapsed between the date the message was sent and its date of reception. No less than twenty-one days intervened. On the contrary, a dispatch No. 110 of less importance was mailed the same day, and was received one week earlier. Again, one wondered if by chance, this, too, was circuited by way of England.

The reply on the use of the United States Navy gave to Kasson "the greatest of satisfaction". He felt that, should France be disposed to enforce her claims by the strong arm, the presence of our naval forces, under the instructions given to the Rear-Admiral, might restrain their action and modify their purpose. Incidentally, the absence of any "and/or" phrase following the condition of restraint was taken as additional evidence that a verbal agreement or understanding existed between the United States and England. The acme of his satisfaction was expressed in this phrase of expectations.

\textsuperscript{43}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{44}Ibid.
The American factories at some point or points, of communication with the populous interior seem indispensable to the successful establishment of a market for American cottons, knives, arms, and other goods (whiskey?) adapted to native consumption, as well as to collect the gums, oil, ivory, etc., delivered in exchange for them.\textsuperscript{45}

He had further hopes that our Government would establish, very soon, consular representations on the Congo in support of an American trading post. Then we could operate in much the same manner as the English on the Niger. He had no doubts of the support of an American association of merchants who would be devoted to African trade.\textsuperscript{46}

Kasson's concept of European policy, a study in imperialism and an analysis of the foreign policies of France, Germany and England was the most valuable contribution which he left to the Department. It contained his views, made famous by later authorities of the dynamics of imperialism who knew little or nothing of him. After a review and explanation of French policy from 1870 to the Congo Conference, Kasson made the extremely significant observation on the character of French foreign policy.

French policy of colonial extension is as resolute as it is rash. It is not restrained by a public conscience, but acts without other restraint than possibly a counter-acting force, equal or superior to their own.\textsuperscript{47}

On Germany, he had the following to say:

She is now determined to make colonial establishments a part of her imperial system and policy. It startled Europe as much as it gratified the German people. Bismarck has done no act which has been more welcome to his

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., No. 115., ibid., Dec. 29, 1884. Rec., Jan. 20, 1885.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{47} Diplomatic Corr., Germany XXXVII. No. 120. Kasson to Frelinghuysen, Jan. 5, 1885. Rec., Jan. 24, 1885. Marginal comment. Sent to Senate Foreign Relations Com., Feb. 25, 1885.

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nation than the inauguration of this colonial policy.
It will be continued. It has reached... the African
cost, and (in my judgment) will extend to the islands
of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{48}

He maintained that England was "already seeking to anticipate
her rivals at numerous points". He felt that Germany had respected
the rights of the weak by obtaining their consent to acquisition. The
others, and especially France, were regarded as accepting the dictates
of their national interests. Germany might follow their example.
He observed that the Powers already had strong navies. Now they
were still increasing their strength to make them adequate to
enlarge colonial needs. Probably, with either a feeling of guilt or
insecurity, he wrote:

This rule, of self-interest alone, supported by a
powerful Navy, is one of the most alarming features of the
immediate future.\textsuperscript{49}

The manner in which Kasson labored to gain an American victory in
the Conference signified an awareness of national sensibilities. It
was also seen in the way he sought to allay the fears expressed in
editorials appearing in the New York Tribune. The editorials made
no criticism of Conference action or that of our representatives.
They expressed the feeling that:

We are "entangling" ourselves with European affairs,
and are forsaking the traditions which our fathers gave to
us, as guides for our national policy, in the trembling
infancy of the Government.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{49}Ibid. The remainder of the despatch calls attention to our
negligence in procrastination on the Isthmian Canal. He feared a
"european grab".
\textsuperscript{50}Ibid., No. 125. Kasson to Frerlinghuyse, January 7, 1885.
Rec., January 23, 1885.
The humorous but guarded reply to this fear by Kasson evoked the comment "Good", that was written along the margin by a sympathizer within the Department.

There is room to raise the question whether the rules given for the guidance of childhood will be equally profitable if applied to all the stages of strong manhood. 51

This lengthy despatch contained argumentative polemics by which he hoped not only to refute but also to erase the charges, doubts and fears of both editor and solons. Probably he had hopes that sections, if not all of it, would be published. Like a lawyer presenting the case, he held that the discovery by an American excited the ambitions of Europe to appropriate this vast region as an outlet for their surplus commercial productions. They were all the more anxious in the absence of claim on our part. Nevertheless, all the neutral and non-colonial powers were interested in avoiding this result most of all the United States. The Conference was then convened so that this exclusive policy should not be applied to any signatory Power acquiring rights in the Congo country. Series of rights were established equally for both possessory and non-possessory powers. They were freedom of trade for all, freedom of navigation and the establishment of minimum formalities which restrained aggressive colonial powers against non-colonial governments like the United States. 52 Thus the last principle was an instrument of peace.

Kasson attempted to clinch his refutations with these comments:

No clause of any declaration contemplates or suggests an "alliance".... There is no joint understanding for future enforcement. Perfect liberty of action is reserved to each government, except in what it accepts as limiting. 53
CHAPTER VI
POST CONFERENCE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

The new administration of Grover Cleveland received only minor correspondence from Kasson in the middle of March. As a part of the progress report of the Congo Conference, the President was informed that all business was in order, even to the concluding session held on February 26, 1885. The General Act was signed by all the Plenipotentiaries. Each country received a printed original with its own Plenipotentiary signing first. During this same session, Bismarck read the Act of adhesion on the part of the International Association of the Congo. Notice of this event was taken in the Protocol. The General Act included the assent (subject to ratification), of all the recognized African Powers except the Sultanate of Zanzibar. Kasson had the original for the United States in the Legation awaiting safe transmission to Washington by special hand.¹

Additional correspondence sent a week later involved the acquisitiveness of Germany on the eastern shore and of France on the Atlantic coast. Kasson felt that the European Powers, especially France and Germany, moved so rapidly for colonization in Africa that it was impossible for cartographers to keep pace with them. He informed the Department that the Society for German Colonization was guided by Dr. Karl Peters and Count Felix Behr-Bandelin. This Society was the spearhead for German activity in the questionable domains of the Sultan of Zanzibar who was to be pressured to adhere

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¹Diplomatic Corr., Germany XXXVIII, No. 190. Kasson to Bayard, March 2, 1885. Rec., March 16, 1885. The strange instructions on its transmission is treated below. It had no connection with our unsatisfactory relations which were occasioned by bad meat and problems of naturalizations. Cf. No. 194.
to the Resolutions of the Congo Conference.²

On the western coast of Africa, the Spanish held claim to certain portions which were not within scope of the Conference. From about 26° to 21° and south of the Canary Islands, the area was regarded by the Spanish as a herring home and good for fishing. The hinterland from the coast was of no commercial importance but the coastal and fishing areas would make possible employment of many men from the islands as fishermen.³

Correspondence was not however to remain on a minor level between Kasson, the benevolent and big American, and Thomas F. Bayard, the learned little American, Secretary of State.⁴ Our first imperialist sent to the new Secretary, following his first fortnight in office, a memorandum on the "General Act of the Berlin Conference". It was more of a socio-legal premise by which Kasson made his first attempt to convince the Secretary who opposed commitments beyond those of a strong internal development. The first of his five-point argument in justification of our participation dealt with the conditions of Central Africa. After giving a list of goods desired by both the retarded peoples and civilized nations, Kasson held that:

Already American cottons find their way there; and American missionaries are already instructing them in knowledge and religions.⁵


³Ibid., No. 199. ibid. On the same day, he forwarded his original General Act which was signed. See his No. 200.


He added that, since the start of the Conference, there had been a race on for colonial acquisitions in the hopes of gaining absolute control of these foreign markets. It was possible that eager rivalry would bring on aggression. The new Government, without Army or Navy, could not hold up against France and Portugal. Moreover, the Powers' struggle for the African coast was rough on the trade of non-colonial governments.

All the Powers seemed to exhibit attitudes that would engender peaceful activity in the region. Thus, their objective was to secure universal freedom of trade in the region, freedom of navigation in all waters of the Congo and Niger similar to the internationalization of the Danube in Europe and to agree to accepted formalities of occupation. To him, these were the reasons for holding a conference, which was his second argument. As though to convince a legal opponent, he continued it with consummate skill and logic.

You will observe that no question of the form of government, no question of boundaries, or of possession, no question of national rights in any form was included in this invitation. No such question has been suggested as within its scope. No previous possession could be annulled or disturbed. No right of arbitration was imagined. The "understanding" (his new name for the Conference) was to be exclusively for the future, without jurisdiction over any existing rights.... Each government, powerful or feeble, had a veto on the action of all others. The "understanding" proposed, unanimous consent was necessary.... It would require a timidity, even cowardice, rarely seen in America, to discover danger to the United States in entering such a body, where the United States would hold an equal veto over all its action....

His third argument was presented as "Reasons For Participation by the United States". It was probably the best essay over attempted

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6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
by an American diplomat in behalf of extension of our trade. In
calling our attention to a sore and dependent condition, he began:

There are still faint patriotic hopes in America that
we shall sometime be able to export manufactured goods
direct, under our own flag, to foreign countries. Certainly
there is a general public sentiment that such a result is
desirable. Other nations have already established profit­
able trade factories in the Niger and Congo regions, through
which some of our merchandise is finding its way over
foreign routes, and some African products coming to us.
If commercial enterprise is not utterly dead in America,
there is reason to hope for future direct relations in which
the profits now paid elsewhere will be retained by us.
Some enterprising Americans are already interested there;
and a considerable number of American missionary stations
are already inaugurated, and many more contemplated which would
claim our protection.

A sufficiently enthusiastic American—like the American
Minister at Berlin, for example—might hope some day to hear
that an American commercial vessel, bearing the national flag
would enter these African rivers with American goods on board,
which were not sent by way of England or Holland.8

He buttressed the above exhortation in the realistic and
political temper of a wishful but practical "fencemender". In the
moral tone of Yankee entreaty for the underdog he anticipated a
specific future for the American Negro.

It might well be in the order of Providence that the
excess of this rapidly growing population would in the
future, under favorable auspices for their liberty and secu­
ritv, find a new and attractive field for their awakened
energies by migration to many salubrious parts of their
ancestral country, where they would introduce the practical
arts, as well as become the agents of introducing enlighten­
ment, order and new industries. To a white American, the
world was indebted for the effective discovery of Central
Africa. It would not be a surprising sequence if the world
should not owe to black Americans the effective establish­
ment there of Christian civilization and productive
industry.9

8Ibid.
9Ibid.
He was extremely critical of the inefficient conduct of American trade. This Conference demanded our interest in the regulation of international commerce. In Kasson's sight, to refuse and neglect this duty was the abdication of one of the prime objects of government. Had we not been excluded from trading in some quarters for many years? In others, were we not heavily burdened? "We were still struggling by special treaties to obtain access to them". He then posed questions of divinative and ever growing import.

For whom should be opened the new markets of Central Africa, destined to the next century's growth and development?...Should it be left to the chances of war to devour the territory of the Congo Association, and thus destroy the freedom and equality of trade which they had pledged to us? Should it be left to the option of riparian powers to exclude our shipping from the great rivers, our traders, our missionaries from the great territories in question?.... In a word should we leave the next century a heritage of the same struggle for access to the African markets which during the present century have characterized our separate struggle to obtain access to the West and East Indian colonies?10

Kasson held that it was impossible for us to answer these questions other than in favor of our national interests. To him, the queries were resolved by the acquisition of every right which was desirable for our commerce, enterprise, the migration of our citizens, the navigation of our vessels, our civilization, and for religious worship. He felt that our signatures settled matters for all time; "for principles (went) with possession of the soil".11

In his mind, Kasson was absolutely positive that, by our participation, no change had occurred in our traditional foreign policy.

10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
He called attention to the background of Washington's advice and his interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as published in the *North American Review*. Vigorously, he maintained that we were not obligated in any manner whatsoever. In concluding his fourth argument, he gave an explanatory statement as to the cause of the adverse view.

The contrary impression, if it exists, arises from the reports in the journals, confusing with the Conference the outside negotiations for recognizing the governments and rights of territory, which went on at Paris, Lisbon, and elsewhere, during the period of the Conference, but which were wholly foreign to its own deliberations.\(^\text{12}\)

The last section of Kasson's socio-legal memorandum was his answer to the question of whether or not the resolutions of the Conference merited our approval. He held that the principles had undergone a democratic treatment. They had been exposed to free discussion after which they had been freely agreed to by the majority of the nations. Moreover, the United States as a non-possessory power, had been a special beneficiary of the resolutions. With the gain of free and equal access to all the country and its waters for our vessels and goods, Kasson could not refrain from throwing a political punch at his opponents.

Thus, with a single signature the benefit of many separate treaties of navigation and commerce is secured to us in perpetuity, without yielding an equivalent as must be done in special treaties. No closed commercial colonies can hereafter be found in all that region. It was my appreciation of this advantage which induced me to propose... an enlargement of this free territory beyond the Congo Basin.... And this was done, thus doubling its size.\(^\text{13}\)

As though to silence his critics and gain even their grudging approval, he recalled that he had fought for the interests of Americans of both races in the extinction of the slave commerce. He had

\(^\text{12}^{\text{Tbid.}}\)
\(^\text{13}^{\text{Tbid.}}\)
sought, with fair success, a neutralization of the region which bound all nations to maintain a neutral attitude in time of war. He had gained free navigation for all the world on the Congo and Niger rivers and their tributaries. The only fees was the charge imposed for the benefit of commerce, "and those were carefully limited".

On the matter of acquisitions of African territory, he had proposed the principle of native consent. This was in advance of his time. He probably thought that even his patriotic critics would give approval to the General Act.

The despatch, which he sent ten days later for the correction of a mistranslation of an extract from the New York Herald, was only the post-climax to his last memorandum. A series of articles on the work of the Congo Conference by a Mr. George von Bunsen, a German citizen was released by the Nation, a Berlin weekly. His articles attempted to throw light on the acts of the recent Conference, and conveyed the impression that good work had been done by Germany first and then by the United States. As a political opponent of the Government there in power, he took the position that Germans hoped that neither the American Congress nor the President of the United States should associate themselves in any way with the pending House action of keeping aloof from European Powers. A London cablegram to the New York Herald conveyed an opposite interpretation of von Bunsen's news. Kasson corrected the Herald's version of Bunsen by

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\textit{Ibid.} Note that Bayard was without comment on this memorandum. He only referred to it as having been received. Tansill was silent, although it was the start of Bayard's service in the Department.
Four days prior to sending the above message, Kasson, sensing that he was persona non grata to the new administration, submitted by cable a laconic resignation to take effect July the first. Meanwhile, rather unusual instructions on the transmission of the American original of the signed Act of the Conference, were sent to him by his new Chief, the Anglo-phil, Bayard.

I have to instruct you to send it (to) our Legation at London, by some reputable American citizen making the journey. When you transmit it, advise the Minister at London and request him to forward it to the Department by the despatch pouch. Requesting you not to incur any expense in the transmission of the document. It was quite evident that the Secretary found it necessary to issue these peculiar instructions. (I have to instruct you to send) was not necessarily the courtesy required from a Democratic Secretary of State to a Republican Minister abroad. Why to London? Why not direct? It would seem to indicate a verbal understanding or a gentleman's agreement on the part of the United States and Britain against any possible continental intrigue. It is possible that this incident was part of a bigger undertaking in opposition to Bismarck's check on Britain and "his equilibrium of the seas". Alfred T. Mahan, a confidant of the Secretary, made it a duty to keep in touch with key Cabinet personnel and in this status was able to wield

15 Ibid., No. 213. Kasson to Bayard, March 26, 1885. Rec, April 13, 1885.
16 Ibid., Kasson to Bayard, March 22, 1885. Rec, March 23, 1885.
17 Germany Instruc. XVII. No. 120. Bayard to Kasson, March 19, 1885.
18 Crowe, op. cit., pp. 68 and 219.
influence on policy matters. Execution of the instructions certainly gave a pretext for the personnel of both nations to consider a more serious problem than preserving a parchment. Moreover, the remainder of the message gave false leads to any possible foreign interception and no indication of an "understanding". Although Bayard was a thrifty Huguenot and famous for interest in big finance, it is doubtful that those instructions were typical of those specific characteristics. It would be unthinkable to associate it with the "enormous expenditure" mentioned by Horace White.

Additional evidence of Anglo-American cooperation in Western Africa was seen in the Liberian Settlement discussed in the correspondence of Lowell to Granville. We presumed that the British authorities of Sierra Leone would be equally concerned with Liberia in not permitting the establishment of a French colony on (Kent Island) "the common boundary".

Another piece of post-Conference correspondence was the forwarding of the German White Book which related to the Congo Question. It was sent in request to Instructions No. 110. Kasson did not let the opportunity go amiss to use it as leverage against any possible critics of American participation. In his summary of the book, he held that it presented the German view of the origin and object of the Conference. The book held that the Conference's purpose was purely commercial and not political as was erroneously supposed by


20Ibid., p. 338.

21Diplomatic Corr., Gr. Br., CLI. Lowell to Granville, Jan. 7, 1885. Later in a Lowell to Bayard (April 25, 1885) possibly the President of the United States would be arbiter between England and Russia, maybe the German Emperor. "It was but a stockmarket game, 'no war'", said Lowell.
the uninformed critics in America. Kasson also held that it pictured a regularly developed effort to secure commercial equality for all nations in their trade with an uncolonized country. It was looked upon by the Germans as a successful effort in the interest of peace and good understanding between all nations. The book was documentary proof on the desire of other Governments to prevent Anglo-Portuguese commercial monopoly in the Congo and West Africa.

The accidental irony of history appeared in the fact, that precisely one year from the day when Portugal signed her treaty with England, securing her right to apply to these Congo regions the old exclusive colonial policy, the signatures were made to the "General Act" of the Berlin Conference which completely abolished there the system of colonial exclusiveness. Beneficial of whose action will grow with passing years, and will be even more appreciated by posterity than by present generations.22

As to the Congo Question, summarily, the remainder of the new German White Book showed additional evidence of "pressure on Portugal", and likewise, a Franco-German maneuver to force England to submit the Niger question. Incidentally, the correspondence indicated that Kasson could piece together a political puzzle.

Another minor but significant piece of correspondence sent to Secretary Bayard was an enclosure from Tisdel -- an extract from a letter in the Times (London). This particular disclosure was one which hinted that British lethargy to German actions on the coasts of Africa was not one of a suspended policy as much as what was a "deal". To Bayard, it could have also held significance because of the expressed view that Britain (alone) did not have sufficient men,

money or materials to check growing German ambitions. 23

The remaining minor items involved communications on the
unsettled Bark Sicilian Case, the Portuguese gain of Dahomey in
the French settlement of boundary dispute and a receipt of the
Portuguese White Book, each of which reflected tension between
Portugal and the United States over Congo policies. 24

23 Special Agents XXXII. Tisdel to Bayard, Aug. 25, 1885.
Rec., Sept. II, 1885. See also Times (London), Aug. 20, 1885,
letter from Zanzibar.

24 Diplomatic Corr., Portugal XXXII. Wilbor to Bayard, May 23,
1885. XXXIII, Nos. 25, 36. Lewis to Bayard.
CHAPTER VII
THE REACTION OF THE CLEVELAND ADMINISTRATION

From his position in Berlin, Kasson had hopes that the reaction
of the Cleveland administration to Africa and especially the Congo
would be favorable. The balance of European power was carefully
adjusted in 1885. The Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria and Italy
was formed. Great Britain was uncommitted to either the Alliance,
France, or Russia. In the era of imperialism, all possible empire
areas save two had been secured. One was the New World from which
Europe was barred by the key plank in our foreign policy. The other one, presented problems in the Congo affair. The Con-
ference, however, was the means whereby the European countries settled
their differences rather than resort to conflict. Adjustments were
made frequently outside of the meetings. Meanwhile, the United States,
in its efforts, took the lead in the Conference by boosting trade
and dissipating the possibilities of war in Central Africa. American
propositions introduced by Kasson withstood the test of critical debate
and discussion and the United States attempted to serve as a balance-
wheel to Europe and the world for peace. Kasson was keenly alive
to the situation.

1Henry Morton Stanley, Africa; Its Partition and Its Future.
(New York City: Dodd Mead and Company, 1898), p. xi. Stanley errored
in saying the Entente existed in 1885. England signed with France in
1904. The Triple Entente was signed in 1907. Writing in 1898, he was
unable to see the extension of imperialistic rivalry in the Far East
with devices of spheres of interests, treaty ports and the open door
policy.

2Diplomatic Corr., Germany, XXXVII, No. 158. Kasson to Sec.,
Feb. 7, 1885. Rec., March 3, 1885. The despatch indicated a change
of favorable sentiment in Germany touching the United States and its
export trade. Business men and parliamentary leaders promised to
kill an unfavorable tax on American products in the Reichstag.

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On February 9, 1885, he forwarded letters from an American temperance unit which he felt should have been sent to the Department of State. These, because of his work at the Conference, expressed the humanitarian or moral interests of large groups of fellow Americans. The National Temperance Society of the United States approved our action at the Conference on the prohibition of the manufacture and sale of liquor on land or water in the Congo country. Secretary R. B. Howard of the American Peace Society, by vote of the organization, sent a letter which indicated the American popular interest in settling disputes peacefully by arbitration and mediation. The group acknowledged the neutrality plan as a civilizing effort. Corresponding Secretary J. N. Murdock of the American Missionary Union stated that his organization approved of participation in the Conference and strongly supported American neutrality and efforts for peace in the Congo.³

A less laudatory view was taken by another organization which awaited the Governments' reaction by deed. In view of the prompt and energetic measures taken by the European Powers for the advantages of African commerce and the hesitancy or lack of preparation on the part of the United States Government, the American Colonization Society was sorely disturbed. Referring directly to Liberia, but with a sharp eye on the Congo, it held that:

America unfortunately, has scarcely made a single move in that direction, yet she has a stepping stone in Liberia, which by enlarged fostering care, might soon become

advantageous to us as England has made her colonies in Asia and Africa.4

Concerned and dissatisfied, it questioned seriously our inactivity;

Do not American manufacturing and commercial interests, and American dignity require that steps should be at once taken for the establishment of steam navigation to West Africa, for the exploration of its interior within and beyond the borders of Liberia, and for the promotion of select immigration to the young African Republic?5

Apparently Leopold II sensed the change of interest toward the Congo from the results of the election. Or perhaps he felt that American foreign policy was susceptible to the call of the dollar. At a dinner given by the King in honor of the new Minister, Lambert Tree,6 Leopold II discussed the subject of American support of a narrow gauge railroad project. The plan entailed a cost of five million dollars and was underwritten by an English syndicate, one of whom was Henry M. Stanley. To bridge the falls of the Congo, the company was to be given 10,000 acres for every mile of constructed railway. Upon completion, it was to be given one-half of the State's revenues until such time as the project would pay six percent on its capital stock. The syndicate was guaranteed one million pounds for the project.7

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5Ibid., p. 94.
6The National Cyclopedia of American Biography (New York City: James T. White & Company, 1896), VI, 161-162. Tree was a thrice unsuccessful democratic nominee for federal office as circuit court judge. He tried the famous Aldermaniac cases in Chicago and was appointed to the Brussels post by Pres. Cleveland in 1885. With wealth and an accomplished wife, court life was found enjoyable. Cordial relations existed between Leopold II and Tree.
7Diplomatic Corr., Belgium XXIII, No. 31. Tree to Bayard. Also see Foreign Relations (1886), p. 18.
The comment on the King's action by Tree was indicative of the fact that a good briefing and complete understanding were cleared between Bayard and Tree before the latter left for his post. Admittedly, Bayard was preoccupied with Pacific problems, there was still a paucity of correspondence between these two on the Congo Question. In the early spring of 1886, the door was left ajar with monopolistic privileges for American participation. Bayard almost flatly refused to give consideration to the railroad project. Tree, however, was anxious that American capital should also profit from the agreement where the English had not lost "their capacity for driving a shrewd bargain."9

The election revealed that the Democrats were unfavorably disposed towards our participation in the Conference. It was accurately observed by one authority that both Cleveland and Bayard left no doubt that "they planned a quiet and unadventurous foreign policy". Both detested imperialism. Nevins alleged that the work of Cleveland in checking imperialistic tendencies has seldom been given its true value.

His refusal to encourage foreign investments, and above all, his and Bayard's stern tendency to view foreign questions in a moral light, strengthened a national psychology quite inimical to imperialist tendencies.10

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8Diplomatic Corr. Belgium XXIII, No. 28, Tree to Bayard, Dec. 11, 1885. Rec., Jan. 2, 1886 (np). "I refer to these observations of the King, only as tending to indicate the keen interest which he continues to feel in that distant land". Bayard indicated that Tree should ignore the hints regardless of the neutrality of that distant region where this Government had no interest or control of any kind. See Instructions.

9Ibid., No. 59, (Confidential) Tree to Bayard, March 19, 1886. "Rec., March 31, 1886 (np).

The biographer of Bayard gave a clear picture of his subject's attitude toward American economic imperialism. It was strictly one of "no entangling alliances" with any power when Bayard entered office. With his appointment the Secretary's attention was brought to the matter of German economic and political control. He indicated that German financial control should not be regarded as a title to governmental control. Nevertheless, he made no comment on the possibilities of United States ratification of the General Act and the Kasson's assertion that a "day would soon come when we would deeply mourn over our lost opportunities". Although the paths of Bayard, the Democrat, and Kasson, the Republican, crossed on two occasions during their careers in Congress, there was no evidence that either incident had any later effect on their concepts of foreign policy.

It should be noted that the actions of Cleveland and Bayard, especially the latter, on the Congo policy were greatly influenced by Sidney Webster, a park-bench statesman. Bayard's unofficial adviser on foreign policy even before he was sworn into office was the New York international lawyer, Sidney Webster. He was in his late fifties, a Yale and Harvard graduate and had been private secretary

11Tansill, The Foreign Policy of Thomas F. Bayard, p. xxxvii.


to President Pierce. Webster was a close friend of Manton Marble, who served as a director of the Illinois Central Railroad and often wrote anonymous articles to the press. 14

On the day prior to the Inauguration of 1885, Webster sent a letter to Bayard advising him to drop the Congo scheme as quickly as possible. He suggested this course after having been informed by Perry Belmont of the House’s attitude. For condemnation of the resolutions he held that:

The way only are (sic) on wrong grounds because (of) not discriminating between commercial and political alliances. And yet it may be that Blaine, Curtin, and Phelps crowd conducted a policy of commercial separation and isolation. 15

Webster informed him that his job was one of a "post beset" and of going where he was needed most. He meant that Bayard should give his attention to the most pressing problems. He then suggested that the declarations, which he called treaties, should be withdrawn from the Senate from the schemes and discussions of Blaine. Although held up by the Chief Clerk of the Department, there was danger of their ratification because "the weak Frelinghuysen influenced the boys and girls in the State". He was quite aware that the President would be criticized for this action but justified it in the following manner:

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14 Who Was Who In America (Chicago: A.N. Marquis Company, 1942), p. 775. Manton Marble was a New York journalist who wrote the political platforms of ’74, ’76 and most of 1884. In 1885, he was a special envoy to the government of Great Britain, France and Germany. He was an adviser to President Cleveland and played a significant role in the Monetary Conference of Marble Papers. He worked for the World 1862-1876 and the New York Evening Post.

15 Papers of Thomas F. Bayard LXXI, Feb. 27 - March 11, 1885. Sidney Webster (Nassau St.) to Sec. Bayard, March 3, 1885, pp. 14:212-14:215. Hereafter referred to as Bayard Papers. Note that all volumes are in manuscript form.
A withdrawal of treaties by the President may be "worth the risk" because it will bring the party quickly into line on the order to stop flirting with foreigners till we have put our house in order.\textsuperscript{16}

Six days later, Webster wrote again to Secretary Bayard. He advised him to list on paper the reasons for the withdrawal of the treaties. He held that the financial consideration of the country was such that President Arthur probably would have done the same as he now suggested. If they were not withdrawn and they were ratified, he argued, we would not have the naval strength to support or enforce them. That was a feature which President Arthur had not anticipated when he was carrying on negotiations. Webster urged Bayard to insert the argument by way of the bill on governmental bonds so as "to get hold of the financial structure". He informed the Secretary that he would come to Washington on the following day.\textsuperscript{17}

The correspondence from our Legation at Brussels in March by no means encouraged Bayard to take a more favorable attitude toward the Congo Question. In fact, it was just to the contrary. Within the lower house of the Belgian Parliament, the Declarations of the

\textsuperscript{16}Ibid. On the same day that Webster wrote to Secretary Bayard, Horace White addressed a letter to Webster indicating that he had sent the Belmont Minority Report to the New York Evening Post. See p. 14219.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibid., p. 14332. Cf. New York Staat Zeitung, March 19, 1885. About a fortnight after the Webster visit, the press observed that "the Central American question has against all expectations outstripped with our new administration the Congo Question, although the latter as to time, preceded the former. From credible sources we learn that our State Department, notwithstanding \textit{(that)} the Berlin General Act \textit{(had already been signed on February 26, had)} yet received no official information of that important affair, and hence has been spared the necessity to take position on this important question."

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Berlin Congo Conference were regarded as a treaty. To the Belgians, they were synonymous with the General Act. Beerneart, in presenting it at the Belgian Premier's desk, held that it would neutralize the principles which governed "the international water courses of Europe and America and assure navigation." The consistent use of the term "treaty" and Europe's feeling that the General Act was applicable to water routes in America only hardened Bayard against ratification and our participation on an international commission of this Conference. To him it was a violation of the "weak Frelinghuysen's" principle of liberty of action. Later when he was informed by Fish of the military rebellion in the Congo, Bayard was probably still less inclined to give favorable consideration to ratification of the General Act. Complications could easily develop from the Belgium's prohibition of the introduction of improved firearms and ammunition. The measure could prove a serious blow to our own manufacturers as well as to those of Belgium.\(^1^9\)

Bayard on September 11, 1885 sent out four letters bearing on the Congo. One, in reply to the King, bore the signature of President Cleveland, but was presumably written with the aid of the Secretary. The others were written by Bayard and sent to Tree and Mr. van Estvelde, the Foreign Secretary of the new Congo State.

\(^{16}\) Diplomatic Corr. Belgium XXII, No. 316. Fish to Bayard, March 19, 1885. Rec., March 31, 1885 (np). No. 304. Fish also earlier forwarded a letter of Leopold II who turned on his charm and hospitality and unsuccessfully sought the support of President Cleveland.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., No. 358. Fish to Bayard, Aug. 20, 1885. Rec., Aug. 31, 1885. Lt. Storms of the Belgian Army, employee of I.A. C., felt that the new State had defaulted by excluding Tanganyka. As Emile I of the area, he refused to abide by the Conference.
Cleveland's letter to Leopold was one of congratulations on the new status of the Independent State of the Congo among the nations of the world. He stated that we would observe with "benevolent expectations" its growth, prosperity, and peace in carrying civilization to the peoples of the Congo. To Tree, Bayard gave the Frelinghuysen reminder that Kasson and Sanford had exceeded their instructions. The United States, however, still reserved its liberty of action regardless of that "international treaty." Since the Congo was now a sovereign State, he saw no need signing the General Act. Had we not been the first to extend good will long before the Congo Conference? The letters indicated long study and preparation on the part of Bayard and the Department, and especially during the President's absence from Washington. 20

Almost a year later, the correspondence on extradition indicated that Bayard was adamantly opposed to signing any type of treaty with the Congo State. In fact, it would seem that in spite of his knowledge of the status of the new State, Bayard was inclined to look upon the Congo State as a Belgian colony. He felt that it should have adopted the extradition policy of Belgium in this matter. He further held that:

The Government will consider the advisability of negotiating a convention of extradition with the Congo State; but at present the remote prospects that such a treaty will be found necessary or useful does not suggest urgency. 21

20 Foreign Relations (1885), pp. 60-62. There was not one word bearing on ratification in the President's letter. It was a plethra of diplomatic platitudes. The reference to Kasson and Sanford threw ill-reflection upon both and especially upon the former. It could have been presented in better taste.

21 Ibid. (1886), pp. 30-31. The idea was really Adee's. See Diplomatic Corr. Belgium XXIII, April 17, 1886.
Both the official and unofficial correspondence from Tisdel served to strengthen the conviction in Bayard's mind that the United States should pursue a "hands-off policy" with the Congo Question. From Hanover, Germany, on May 6, 1885, while recovering from the Congo fever, Tisdel wrote to Bayard a letter which gave additional support to the traditional isolationist's view. He informed Bayard that he purposely avoided comments on the Upper Congo or "Free States of the Congo". He preferred to report to the Secretary in person. He left no doubt in the latter's mind that the many public statements favorable to the Upper Congo were "criminally exaggerated" and known in Brussels.

There are no "Free States of the Congo", nor has (sic) there ever been, excepting on paper in Brussels. There is no Government there. There are a few white men at different points in the pay of the King of the Belgians, but they can do nothing. Zanzibar men do the work, while Houssas (from the Gold Coast) act as guards. But the Houssas and the Zanzibar men are rapidly leaving and when they are gone no white men can remain.

I found want, misery, starvation, sickness, and death in many quarters beyond Vivi. It was something appalling.

The Hon. (?) Henry S. Shelton leave (sic) tomorrow for Washington. He is despaired because I could not see the Congo as he sees it from the Brussels point of view. He knows nothing about the Congo. I beg you to hear me and then judge between. I have no Railway or Commercial Company to float at the expense of others. 22

In the late fall of 1885, Tisdel sent an official communication to Bayard which covered West African trade and the need for consuls at various points. He strongly favored increased and better consular service in the Canaries, Cape Verde, Loando, Benguela, Mossamedes, Banana, Principe, St. Thomas and Bolona. He made it quite clear that our men were underpaid and could not carry out the duties

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22Bayard Papers LXXV, p. 15182. Personal to the Secretary.
assigned them on the meager salaries unless they were wealthy and accepted their posts only for prestige. Consuls from other countries were paid twice as much as ours. He felt that reorganization would result in a great benefit to our merchants and manufacturers.

On the Congo proper, Tisdel was not as violently opposed to Americans attempting to trade there as in his earlier report.

At present little or nothing can be expected from the unwholesome lands, or the merciless natives of the remote interior. Nor do I think the trader will bother himself to search for unknown or doubtful fields so far away from the coast, when, within his reach, almost at the very door of his factory, all of his requirements can be fulfilled. Yet if success attends the efforts of Leopold II,... the requirements of traders must be largely augmented, all of which will increase the demand for the same class of manufactured goods which are now required for the coast trade.23

The outlook for American participation in the African costal trade underwent such a change between the April and October reports of Tisdel as to gratify and please him. Traders had followed his recommendations as to the manner in which American merchants should proceed in order to share in the rich pickings afforded by the African coast. Anticipating a change in our shipping laws, Tisdel felt that, if the enterprising American merchants were aided by the Government, they could place their goods in successful competition with those of other nations. He anticipated that the time would not be far distant when the American flag would be seen in all the ports of the islands and the coast to which he referred.

The valuable natural products of these countries are required by our people, and with our rapid increase in population, this want is becoming greater year by year....

All of these commodities are purchased on the barter and trade plan, little or no money being required, excepting in the extreme south, and in the Loango, and Gold Coast settlements. Here there is an opening for our cotton goods, beads, brass, wire, arms, powder, spirits, flour, lumber, hardware, cutlery, canned goods and notions....

Again I ask, will our merchants compete for this growing trade?24

Had any doubt on a change of Congo policy remained in the mind of Bayard to May 11, 1886, it would certainly have been erased by the receipt of an eleven-page letter from Tisdel who was then located in South America. This communication contained a detailed account of Sanford and Stanley's schemes in the founding of the "Free States of the Congo". It was also a devastating response to Stanley who had made attacks against Tisdel through the press. Of the greatest significance, this letter alone vindicated the position taken by Bayard on the Congo Question.25

Not only did the Tisdel letter of May 6, 1885, give additional cause for nurturing the Bayard view toward the Congo Question, but the letter also counteracted considerably any possible delayed action to the request of Sanford who appealed to Bayard on March 25, 1885.

After praising Bayard for protection of our citizens in Central and

24Ibid. Note that E. L. Baker, a consul of twelve years service, complimented Tisdel for the information gathered on the commercial possibilities of that part of Africa. He saw the report in the newspapers. Letter sent from Buenos Aires. Found in Bayard Papers - LXXXIX, 16196. LXXXI, 16488 has letter of recommendation. LXXXIII, Tisdel to H. L. Bryan, Dec. 22, 1885. Tisdel held that he would always be found among those faithful to Bayard. Preservation of letter which was forwarded indicated Bayard's regard for Tisdel.

25See Appendix C.
South America, he sought the Secretary's aid for approval of the General Act of the Conference.

I do see that the Act General of the Berlin Conference has yet been presented to the Senate. I hope it meets with your approval. All the Conferences are the results of the Recognition by us of the African International Association by the advice of the Senate last April. I hope you have time to look into this and judge the great benefits secured for our commerce and manufacturers and to our African races, to say nothing of the gain to civilization to harrow freedom to which have been the outcome of that Recognition which I take pride in having helped, secured from your lukewarm predecessor, through the Senate.26

Unlike Sanford, Kasson, upon receipt of request for his resignation, adroitly sought to salvage some permanent results of his overall efforts by referring to the Democratic platform which pledged a respectful Navy.

With a sincere wish for the success of your administration of the Department, and with an earnest hope for the speedy restoration of a Navy sufficient to secure respect abroad, as well as reestablish our proper influence in South America, and the assured domination of interests in Central America,27

While stationed in Berlin, Kasson gave the strictest attention to German activities in the Pacific. Sensing that his work in the Berlin Congo Conference had gone for naught, he analyzed the policies of the European Powers, and in his swan song called attention to the menace of our future by European Powers on the Pacific. An

26 Bayard Papers LXXX, p. 14575. To this, Bayard made no comment except on Central America.

27 Ibid., p. 14572. Kasson to Bayard, April 6, 1885. A Lewis W. Mayer of San Francisco sent Bayard a letter dated April 23, 1885 seeking the Congo consulate. Bayard replied on May 11, 1885 that funds were not available. Mayer wrote again on Sept. 14, to which was sent a similar reply on September 22, 1885. Actually Bayard was not interested in the Congo. See LXXX, 16324.
outstanding authority, Bemis, observed that Bayard, who adhered to
the traditional policy of avoidance of entangling cooperation with
foreign countries, found it hard to maintain. It meant a struggle
against forces which drew America into closer touch with the rest
of the world. The odds against Bayard's policy grew, and thus he
ignored our status in the Atlantic, and particularly the Congo
Question, to check-mate rivalry in the Pacific. 28

Kasson's reaction to the first Annual Message of President
Cleveland on the Congo Question was possibly typical of that
experienced by many would-be internationalistic or imperialistic
members of the new administration. They sincerely thought that by
his action we had lost a golden opportunity to increase our trade,
power and prestige. 29 Obviously, the Cleveland administration's
hesitancy on submitting the protocols to the Senate was indicative
of nationalistic isolationists who viewed the question differently.
Belmont a staunch supporter of this Democratic administration held
that the Foreign Affairs Committee was opposed to the acceptance of
the invitation to the Conference and looked upon participation as
"a reversal of our traditional, established and approved foreign
policy." Quickly to resolve the question, one senator observed that
Cleveland took definite action on the matter.

28 Samuel Bemis, American Secretaries of State (New York City:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), VIII, 104. Cf. Tansill, The Foreign Policy
of Thomas F. Bayard, p. 23. Also Diplomatic Corr. Germany XXXVIII,
No. 230, Kasson to Bayard, April 13, 1885.

29 See Appendix F for Grover Cleveland's reaction on the Congo
Question. Cf. Middleton, op. cit., p. 102. Author conveyed idea
that Frelinghuysen was under Cleveland administration whereas he
was under Arthur.
Almost the first act of President Cleveland was to withdraw from the Senate the protocols of the Congo Conference, which the Arthur administration had transmitted for ratification. This ended our participation in the Congo Conference. The withdrawal was a conspicuous example of the President's absolute discretionary power to submit for ratification to, or to withdraw from, the Senate treaties that have been already negotiated.\textsuperscript{30}

It seems quite probable that Cleveland's action and message provoked Kasson to clarify his own position by submitting an article to the public through the channels of the press. Thus, he wrote "The Congo Conference and The President's Message which appeared in The North American Review".\textsuperscript{31} The printer's ink had hardly dried before Kasson sent it as an enclosure to the President's private secretary, Daniel Scott Lamont, who assisted in writing the first Annual Message. Kasson felt that the President would be "inspired and informed" to reexamine his views expressed in the message if he found that he had been misinformed. Of this Kasson was positive. In his lament to Lamont, he placed the matter on more than an official basis.

Personally, I desire to correct the misjudgment he appears to have formed of my official action at the Conference. But since this is a question of the public interest instead, which will be for him a much stronger motive.\textsuperscript{32}

The contents of this particular article has been analyzed very keenly by Keyes. In a detailed manner, he pointed out the key arguments of Kasson against Cleveland's stand. Briefly, it was

\textsuperscript{30}Belmont, op. cit., p. 334. It was a precedent which President Wilson overlooked.


\textsuperscript{32}Cleveland Papers LXXXVII, p. 21903. Kasson to Lamont, February 1, 1886.
claimed that the signatures did not make the United States appear as signatures "without reserve or qualification". The President, ignoring both the text and international usage, was ill-advised. His message was made the vehicle of an erroneous statement. In spite of all the previous considerations which the office had given to this region, we had no diplomatic or consular arrangements or securities unless we adopted those of the Berlin sessions. The Congo Conference whose sole purpose was to promote peace, was on a higher plane than that of the postal one. Moreover, we held a common interest in the establishment of liberty and equality of trade, missionary endeavor and possibilities of six million here of African races in useful emigration. We were the principal consumer of the Congo chief products.33

The article then called attention to the short-sightedness of the Secretary of State under the Cleveland administration. Why would the Secretary object to any of the Congo Conference's declarations? With reference to guarantees of security to commerce and industry, Kasson held that the Secretary failed to see the distinction between the single promise of a government to respect an existing neutrality and an alliance to enforce neutrality on a warring State. To Kasson, this blunder was put into the mouth of the President, for we were not pledged to send material, money, or suffer loss of land.34 The point upon which the Cleveland administration chose to make the policy was exactly the one which

34Ibid., pp. 262-266.
Kasson felt it was fitting to terminate his argument.

But this pledge of our "good offices" is hardly startling enough to shock the timidity of an administration which represents the spirit of the American people.

The only grounds upon which the President is made to rest his objections to the work of the Conference do not exist. If they existed the work ought not to be and would not be ratified by the Senate. Being non-existent the Act should be approved by both President and Senate in justice to the present and future interests of the United States, and in the interests of civilization itself. If too late to adopt it by simple ratification, it should be accepted by "separate act", for which it makes provision.35

Those like Kasson who were interested in American shipping might have recalled the pugent editorial of the New York Herald of Monday, May 13, 1878, which held that it was imperative to increase both our naval and merchant marines. Almost a month earlier, one might have observed also that the Times (London) of April 26, showed clearly that Britain's strength and policy rested squarely upon adequate shipping and naval strength which we sorely lacked.36

The United States Navy Department, a willing cooperator on the Congo Question, echoed the same sentiments while the Conference was in session. The Secretary of the Navy later held that we had not a ship to compete fully with the vessels of any important power. He further added comments similar to the previous year.

This country can afford to have, and it cannot afford to lack, a naval force at least so formidable that its dealings with foreign powers will not be influenced at any time, nor even suspected of being influenced, by a consciousness of weakness on the sea. While still striving to build

35 Kasson, loco. cit., p. 133.
36 Clippings found in the Kasson Papers.
up its merchant marine and to multiply its relations with foreign markets, it can not be expected much longer to tolerate such expenditures for a Navy which could not for a moment defend even its diminutive commerce against any considerable power. 37

Thus, in the light of a recognized weakness, our Navy took a calculated risk in carrying out the real purposes of the salute plan. On a power basis we did not have the strength to meet any formidable unforeseen contingencies.

The conscientious work of Kasson at the Conference was negated by a number of factors. As a Republican, he suffered from a change of administration where bipartisanship foreign policy was entirely lacking. Hence, his work was not given the fullest consideration. Even if it had been otherwise, his toil still suffered from lack of adequate home contact and a live wire publicity committee. The basis of original interest of the United States was not established on a sound footing. The original weakness of the Free States of the Congo prevailed sufficiently to put a blight on the whole affair. Again, if this had been otherwise, the lack of adequate maritime forces, both public and private, made it impossible safely to exploit his endeavors to the fullest. Too, it was necessary to give serious attention to pressing matters in the New World and the Pacific. The desirable and favorable conditions were missing and, in an accumulative manner, they darkened the prodigious efforts of Kasson who imperialistically argued for both peace and progress for the Congo in Africa.

The impact of the Congo Conference on our Congress tended to produce a negative effect which was not readily recognized by the

press or public. Undoubtedly, the communications sent back by Tisdel in late 1884 played an important part. He informed Frel-linghuysen and Morgan that the "Free States" did not exist. Moreover, in his view, the Congo did not hold the trade prospects which had been visualized. If Tisdel sent similar letters to others such as his railroad employers from whom he probably had leave of absence, that news would have been not likely kept a secret.

Anti-participation sentiment prevailed in Congress long before the receipt of Tisdel's communications that slavery existed in the so-called "Free States of the Congo." Herbert A. Hilary, a Democratic Representative from Alabama, was skeptical of our participation and presented a resolution on January 5, 1885, which was referred to the Foreign Affairs Committee. On the same day, Perry Belmont from New York introduced a resolution which inquired into the question of erecting and maintaining a State. His resolution also held that our participation constituted an alliance which was a departure from our traditional policy. On January 9, 1885, the Foreign Affairs Committee adopted Hilary's resolution and reported back Belmont's. At the close of the month, the President sent to Congress the report of the Secretary of State on the matter. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee received the preliminary report of Tisdel, which by no means satisfied them. On February 5,

38 Supra, Chap. III, pp. 79-86.
39 Cong. Record XVI, Part I, p. 446.
40 Ibid., p. 464.
41 Cong. Record XVI, Part II, p. 1087, Jan. 30, 1885.
1885, the Committee obviously dissatisfied, indicated clearly that it desired Tisdel's final report the President complied exactly nine days later.42

A few days later, action on the part of another park-bench statesman, Manton Malone Marble, was instituted. Dubious of the conduct of the new Congress, Marble felt that the leading men in the House would give an ear to the admonitions of New York's ex-Governor, Samuel J. Tilden. To erase the philosophy of Kasson, he wrote:

When you get tired of reading won't you dictate such a resolution as you like the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to have apropos of the Congo Conference and as the conclusion of a Report of the Committee reciting the history of the whole thing and stating the incongruity of the conduct of the present executive with our past policy in respect to foreign broils, from the dictum of Jefferson to the action of Marcy on the Land Dues (sic) - a wise and hitherto uninterrupted policy of separate and aloofness practised upon Europe and publisher concerning ourselves.43

Marble was a close friend and associate of Sidney Webster, Perry Belmont, Charles O'Conor, Bayard, Alvey A. Adee and David Manning. With the exception of the last-named, all played a prominent role in the Congo Question. Marble took the matter of foreign affairs seriously. On the same day that the Congo Conference adjourned, he drafted a resolution for the House which repudiated


the Berlin meeting. He reechoed the traditional view that "it is 
now as it has ever been the established and approved policy" of the 
people of the United States to refrain from "entangling political 
alliances" and "preserve peace and amity with all nations." 44

Marble wanted no part of the entire affair. The last part of his 
resolution was a rejection of the acts of the President in accepting 
the invitation and sought additional repudiation in the following 
manner:

We do therefore reject publickly and refuse a compro­
mittal of the present or future neutral rights or duties of 
the United States, or any other rights or duties of this 
government in Africa or elsewhere, or any relation of this 
Government and their States with any European Power or 
with any new States or sovereignties in Africa. 45

Congressional opposition appeared again when, on March 3, 1885,
Curtin presented a resolution which held that prospects of 
commercial advantages in nowise warranted a departure from our 
traditional philosophy. Kinder than the other resolutions, it gave 
a left handed compliment to the delegates for carefully limiting 
their powers to commercial interests. Nevertheless the House found 
it unfortunate as a departure from the policy "which forbids the 
Government... to participate in any political combination or move­
ment outside of the American continent." 46

The influence and work of Monton Marble were not in vain. A 
comparison of the draft found among his collection with that of the 
Minority Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee shows some
striking similarities. Certain expressions were identical. Although no materials were found with the Tilden stamp, the ideas which he presented to Tilden were certainly found in the section of the report signed by Perry Belmont. The members of the Minority held that they were not unmindful of the effort taken in the development of Africa. They protested against participation because it was "a precedent liable to become pregnant with foreign discord and unrest." The substance of Belmont's long dissertation of protest encompassed all the old arguments with the addition that we should have declined the bid rather than desecrate our revered policy.\(^47\)

As though alone in the wilderness, only one strong voice cried out in the halls of Congress in behalf of the Conference delegates. Senator Morgan, a Democrat from Alabama who had spent time on the Foreign Relations Committee, took exception to Cleveland's message to Congress. Morgan feared that "some unnecessary animadversion" had been made upon the Conference and especially upon the Minister who had participated in it. He sought authorization for the Foreign Relations Committee to make an authentic English version "of it about which there(could) be no dispute." Moreover, the President had failed to submit to the Committee or Congress any of the papers that related to Conference. Hence, Morgan felt that some misapprehension or misinterpretation on the part of the Executive prevailed relative to the Conference. It appeared quite possible that Morgan was in communication with Kasson who felt that his political character and conduct had been impugned. Motivated

\(^47\) 48th Cong. 2nd sess., House Report No. 2655.
by the Iowan, the Senator on January 14, 1886, introduced his resolution on the question of "misapprehension."

Several occasions arose in the eighties and nineties where, as a result of incidents the unsuccessful attempts were made to secure approval of the General Act of Berlin. Even foreign governments watched to see if the protocols would be ratified.

All of the versions on failure of ratification were correct so far as they went. They did not go far enough. Keyes placed the brunt of responsibility on Cleveland. Stolberg-Wernigerode placed it at the doors of the President and the State Department. No one, not even modern students, gave any consideration to the policy and personnel of the Democratic figures involved. No attention was given to other foreign problems which distracted from the Congo Question. No one even guessed that there were unofficial statesmen who wielded an unseen but heavy influence on our foreign policy and the more so with the turn of an election.


CHAPTER VIII
A DECLINE OF INTEREST IN THE CONGO

The change of administration, which was accompanied by a reversal of policy on the Congo Question, was sufficiently effective to bring about a considerable decrease of interest in the Congo affair. With the possible exception of Senator Morgan and perhaps one or two others, the Democratic hierarchy was perfectly willing to let this interest cease. In fact, by July 26, 1901, our relations with the Congo Free State were such that we notified the Brussels Government to authorize the British consul to assume charge of American interests in the Independent State.¹

It should not be assumed from the above observation that a completely homogeneous trend of disinterestedness prevailed on the Congo Question. More accurately, in January, 1885 a sharp division of interest existed, not the least of which could be easily identified by the reflection of organs of the press. A case in point were the contesting views of the interests of the American Colonization Society and those of a financial organ which reflected a more influential and powerful clientele. Enviously eyeing the new guardian of freedom of the great African river which was being opened to commerce, the former gave this imperialistic view:

It has been our policy in the past to hold aloof from any joint action with the Powers concerning matters which may result in diplomatic alliances. But the interest of the United States in the development of African trade cannot wisely be ignored, and if by cooperating with European Governments we can influence a just and proper control which

¹Department of State, Other States, I, E-P, Secretary General to Secretary of State. Brussels. Rec., August 21, 1901.
shall give us a fair share in the work and rewards of opening up the Congo valley, the wisdom of such action is apparent.\footnote{African Repository LXI, No. 1, January, 1885. The italics are mine.}

On the contrary, an offensive distaste, plus a studied and deliberate discontent with the conduct of our Congo policy, existed in the minds of a large sector of the mercantile and financial groups. After feeling the pulse of his public, the editor of the \textit{Commercial and Financial Chronicle}, during the recess of the Congo Conference reflectively wrote as follows:

A more brilliant course may be preferable now, involving contact with European politics, colonial settlements in other parts of the world, the defense of canals built in foreign countries, a large Navy and Army, permanently heavy taxes... as much like the old country governments as it is possible to develop on American soil....

But what we particularly dislike, and are sure is unwise and impolitic is the entering upon this new policy without notice or discussion, or rather the sliding into it almost unconsciously as it were.... In fact it is a move quite out of keeping with our established custom... and it may be right, if Europe is about to cut up all the weak nationalities of the world into pasture lots, for us to have a corner in these new grazing grounds. But if such be our purpose, it is not due to the conservative sentiment which has heretofore predominated in the country's councils, to make this change deliberately and only after a most unmistakable expression to the nations desire for it. It is a bold leap - where it leads us requires study.\footnote{The Commercial and Financial Chronicle XL, January 3, 1885, p. 5. Editorial, "The Congo Congress and the Nicaragua Canal."}

The position of Bayard was to exclude the Congo Question from our foreign policy as much as possible. A series of minor foreign events strengthened him in his position in the period from September, 1886 to March, 1888. Railway schemes led the series in the early
phase of this era. The first of such plans involved the Congo Free State Government with the English Railway Syndicate. According to Tree, the terms of the agreement gave to a few Englishmen extraordinary rights and privileges, enormous territorial grants, the right to collect State duties, and the exercise of powers "appertaining only to Sovereignty." The negotiations which were carried on entirely in September of 1886, failed to materialize. After mature consideration, the officials of the Congo Government concluded it would not be politic to enter into such an agreement. Failure of the negotiations was announced on September 24, 1886, in the rooms of Stanley in London where the deliberations were attended.4

This agreement was first submitted to the eminent international authority, Sir Travers Twiss, who overlooked the fact that the agreement contravened the terms of the Berlin Conference of 1885. With reconsideration on the part of the Congo Government, failure occurred on the second attempt. The unexpected death of the scheme provoked severe criticisms from the London Times on September 25, 1886. The journal accused the Congo Government of engaging in political and commercial intrigues with England's rivals whereas the truth of the matter was that the Congo Government backed out of a very bad bargain.5 Bayard, without doubt, felt relieved that neither Americans nor the United States Government had been involved in this fiasco in any manner.

The indifference manifested by the Department toward Congo affairs was ineffective in deterring Leopold II from making overtures

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5 Ibid.
to Mr. Tree. Hence, on November 23, 1886, the Secretary received another communication from Brussels describing a second railway project. In this instant the Companie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie was organized for the construction of a railway on the Congo. This firm, a Belgian concern, was approved by the King, and received liberal terms and privileges from the Congo State Government. Aware of Bayard's hands-off policy, but under pressure from royalty, our Minister claimed that we were being informed in view of our "benevolent interest" in progress in this remote region as well as "to the finding of new channels for trade and commerce."

Although some controversial items were omitted from the official printed record, marginal deletions of Tree's entire original explanation favoring our trade extension, gave a more than fair indication of the attitude of Secretary Bayard.6

In spite of the fact that the Congo was regarded as a "buffer State" and under a neutral Power, the conduct of the other Powers in bringing on the "War Scare of 1887" automatically lessened American interest in the Congo. It was the opinion of Tree that, with new improved guns in so many hands, it would not be surprising if, quite unexpectedly, war would break out before the close of the year. Under those conditions, even Europeans found it difficult to believe that efforts to localize it would terminate in success.7

The concept and growth of the Congo Free State as a Belgian colony stiffened the Department's indifference to Congo affairs. The idea

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6Ibid., No. 162. Tree to Bayard, November 8, 1886. Absence of comment and indifference were also indicated one week later by the Department upon receipt of the news of the establishment of a steamship line between Antwerp and the Congo. See No. 164 (np).

7Ibid., Nos. 199 and 204. Tree to Bayard, Feb. 6 and 19, 1887. 167
originated from a letter of Mr. Van Betvelde, Minister of Finance, in support of a lottery project to secure a Congo State Loan from Belgium. Tree, who thought that the bill would pass the Chamber of Deputies without any opposition, also made the following observation on the colonial concept:

If it (the Congo State) gives reasonable hope of becoming a profitable enterprise, this idea will doubtless (sic) grow rapidly in the Belgium mind, but while there are any risks in the venture the utmost caution will be observed with regard to any investment in or responsibility for it. 8

The publication of the treaty between Stanley on behalf of the Congo State and Tippo-Tib, Arab leader and slave dealer produced an unfavorable interest in the Congo on the part of America rather than a favorable one. Lacking sufficient troops to police the area, the agreement was made with this Arab who was reputed to have had 1,600 strong soldiers. To the State, it was an "adroit and economical method" of procuring the recognition of its flag and authority at the rate of $30 per month. At this period in the life of the Congo State, the Arabs were noted for selling slaves and ivory. Thus the King was severely criticized for making a treaty with a slave dealer. 9

The confiscation of an American missionary boat, Henry Reed, was another incident which did not lend itself to American goodwill. Complaint was bitter because it was forcibly confiscated by

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8 Ibid., No. 210. Tree to Bayard, Feb. 28, 1887. Rec., March 14, 1887. In his 318 which was deleted from Foreign Relations (1888), I, 40-ll. Tree noted that "the propensity of the average individual of either sex to gamble was not reckoned upon in vain." His financial information was sent to our Treasury.

Henry M. Stanley enroute with aid to the English in the Sudan and later by Lt. Vangele of the Stanley Pool station who was assisting him. Incidentally, Rev. G. Billington, who reported the affair on behalf of the American Baptist Missionary Union, was forced to send on August 3, 1887, the letter to the British Consul, Mr. Newton. We had no consul or representative to the Congo Free State. Hence, Bayard instructed Tree to make a vigorous protest, to request that there be no reoccurrence and that an investigation be made into such arbitrary acts with effective reparations given to the owners.10

The most irritable event among the series of incidents was the issuance of an impolitic regulation requiring foreign vessels to hoist the Congo flag while on certain water routes of the Independent State of the Congo. The regulation quoted by Bulletin Officiel No. 5 (May, 1887, 3rd year) read as follows:

Every private vessel navigating waters of the Independent State of the Congo up the stream beyond the falls of Leopoldville will be required to hoist at its stern, the flag of the State. If she possesses papers establishing her foreign nationality, she may hoist in addition, the flag of her own country.11

Tree considered it hardly necessary or expedient to give notice to this flag regulation which was entirely different from that which prevailed elsewhere throughout the world. To this action on the part of the Congo Government, Bayard protested vigorously, and

10 Belgium Instructions (1871-1890), No. 90. Bayard to Tree, December 7, 1887. Note. The missionary group came to a premature peaceful settlement with the Congo Government during the period of the flag incident. The Congo Government held that the incident was a mistake and reparations were made. Foreign Relations (1888), 29-33.

instructed Tree to identify the ownership and nationality of the Henry Reed which had again become involved in a Congo controversy. With reference to the Congo flag decrees of April 30, 1887, he held that the Congo Government was in error.

Although the United States was not a party to the General Act, the Congo River was opened to the world at large and shared by their vessels and citizens. Any type of United States vessel had the right to fly our country's flag. Flying correctly our own emblem was a duty which the Congo law contravened, and it was wrong on two counts. First, plurality of flags rendered a vessel liable to suspicion. Second, the Congo law was in direct violation of international law that one hoists his own flag at the stern and mast. Thirdly, it temporarily subordinated one's national emblem to the Congo flag. The regulation further implied that the Congo had the right to say whether a foreign vessel should fly its own flag in Congo waters. This was in the province of each country to do so regardless of papers of title.  

Aware that an error had been committed, but in the attempt to save face and still gain its desired ends, the Congo Government imposed a modification of the regulation. It now required foreign vessels to hoist the Congo State flag on some part of the vessel and yielding the right to place it at the stern. England, Russia and Germany objected and desired knowledge of what ends were to be served. Holland, well-established in the Congo, acquiesced in the effort to hold its trade. We were not in accord and continued a vigorous protest. Incidentally, in the long-drawn-out arguments,

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12 Foreign Relations (1888), p. 27.

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Italy sought to know what policy we were following. Finally, the Congo Government decided to let the regulations remain inoperative on American vessels.\textsuperscript{13}

The final investigation of the Congo flag incident revealed that the Congo Government was reluctant to recall the decree because the King's signature was affixed. The original idea came from the minds of Congo officials who realized both the paucity and inadequacy of their naval forces. Ironically, the force was composed of two unarmed river boats plus one or two others which were the joint property of Henry S. Sanford and some Belgians. These officials and the Sanford group felt that the more frequent exhibition of the Congo State flag, which would be secured by requiring vessels to hoist it, would give a "factitious Strength" to the Congo Marine. Tree observed that it would be difficult to make the Congo flag regulations inoperative against us if operative against other Powers. More likely it would be permitted to die quickly since the authorities admitted by implication that its promulgation was a mistake. Tree considered the decree substantially a dead letter.\textsuperscript{14}

During the middle of the summer, the Minister forwarded information concerning a Congo decree which probably caused potential covetous American investors to look askance at the remote region. The decree made a distinction in the alienation of real estate between property in the soil and property in mines. Mineral riches,
if any, and the right to work the mines, were reserved to the State. A special concession was needed to work mines, a legal fact which possible American investors should know.\(^{15}\)

Regardless of the series of events which occurred from 1886 to 1887, the American Colonization Society was still dubious of our policy on the Congo Question. The group gazed longingly on trade estimates of the Congo. Following the Annual Message to Congress, the Society seriously questioned it in the January issue of its journal.

Was the Presidential Interpretation correct? Did the General Act mean an assumption of obligation on the part of the American Government to enforce neutrality of the Congo or merely to respect it?\(^{16}\)

The Society could not forget that we were the first to recognize the flag of the International Association, even before it developed into the Congo Free State. Of greater significance were the trade estimates on the Lower Congo which burned the Society's memory. According to its findings, the annual value of a small portion of the river traffic lying between the sea and the Yellala rapids was approximately $114,000,000 by 1883. Amazingly this was barely five years after Stanley's exploration. Without vouching for the above estimate, the Society dreamed of riches on the Upper Congo. Here trade was less easily reduced to figures but it had an enormous extent beyond all question. Here again, it accepted the Stanley prediction that the annual normal value of commerce would not fall short of $350,000,000.\(^{17}\) Within the Society, however, there was a

\(^{15}\)Ibid., No. 367. Tree to Bayard.

\(^{16}\)African Repository LXIII, No. 1, Jan., 1887, p. 8.

\(^{17}\)Ibid., p. 7.
"doubting Thomas" who cautioned a saner view.

Yet you would do well to remember that tapping African trade is not like striking oil in America, which some writers would have you believe. There will be no sudden gush. It will develop by slow accretions as the fruits of industry, foresight, and the spread of labor among the natives.18

Meanwhile, an aspect of humanitarian interest flitted across the scene through missionary endeavor. The American Board of Mission united with other American missionary societies, including the Presbyterians, the Methodist, and the Baptist's Boards in appealing to the United States Government to aid in preventing the exportation of distilled liquors to Africa. It was their unanimous hope that some practical way would be devised for the suppression of this harmful traffic. To them, it was fearfully corrupting both the foreigners who engaged in it and the natives who were supplied by it.19

Evidence prevailed which indicated that an exceedingly small number of American Negroes were concerned over Congo affairs. Their interest was centered in the dollar rather than in the divine. Several public meetings attended by leading colored men of the area were held in New Orleans with the idea of establishing direct trade with West Africa. On these occasions, letters from a number of men of prominence and influence were often read with interest. Among such missives was one from a Democrat, Senator Morgan of Alabama, who obviously did not see eye to eye with the new administration. In part, it read as follows:

It seems that a vast trade could be done on the Niger and Congo and along the coast. I earnestly hope that direct and regular steam communication may be had between the city

18Ibid., p. 15. View of Mr. Joseph Thomson on the trade of the West Coast.
19Ibid., p. 20

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of New Orleans and Liberia. This would open up a traffic that would ultimately grow into vast proportions. We could scarcely find a country with which we could carry on commerce with so little capital, on the old plan of bartering cargoes of our manufactures, etc. I am not trying to induce our Negro population to emigrate, though I know that they are preparing to return to Africa and will go there sooner than white people desire. But I am earnestly the advocate of any proper measures that will prepare the country as a field for their commercial and missionary work. It is time this way had been made open for them.... It was for this reason that I felt so concerned to have the Congo country made a free State, as has been done by the Berlin Conference.20

It is an irrefutable fact that opposition to the Congo policy was voiced even prior to the opening of the Conference. Had there been a bipartisan foreign policy, it probably would have remained true even after the Conference for it was a natural thing for political parties to differ on matters of that sort. However, the presence of a mind as Manton Marble among the Democrats tended greatly to accentuate the difference between the two major political groups. It is also an accepted fact that he was one of the important platform makers for the Democratic party at the National Convention held in Chicago in 1884. As proof of his interest in the matter were two pieces of manuscript materials found among his collection. In composing a satisfactory policy for the party, the original yellow work sheet has the first two paragraphs in resolution form:

To promote and preserve peace, commerce, and friendship with all nations, but to favor entangling political alliances with none, has been from the beginning, the established policy of the United States.

The desire to extend our commercial relations with all nations, peoples, and tribes, but we covet no province, we desire no conquest but those of peace, we entertain no ambitious projects of European territorial aggrandizement by diplomacy or war.21

20Ibid., p. 18.

21Marble Papers LVI, pp. 12232-12233.
Marble was a strict adherent to a foreign policy underwritten by the admonitions of the political Fathers and the Monroe Doctrine. In his first draft typed copy he placed heavy emphasis upon the Doctrine. He earnestly maintained that we should abstain from intermeddling with European sovereigns' concern. With special regard toward the Congo Question, he desired that his party;

would place issue also for the people's decision the question whether the ends of foreign policy shall be, as advised by the Fathers of this country - entangling alliances with no nation, peace and amity with all nations. 22

Two months later, and during the Conference, the New York Herald which sponsored the Stanley mission suggested strongly that we should take a conservative policy. It announced that a neutral line was the only wise one for this country to follow. It would keep us free from dangerous European entanglements. The Herald sensed that the invitation was flattering and that European diplomats laughed at us. "The fact remains that we have thrown overboard the traditions of our foreign policy," was its tardy warning. 23

We reluctantly accepted the thesis of a Congo commercial policy as within the framework of our foreign policy and separate from that of the political phase of our foreign relations. Hence, on the matter of trade, it assumed the following position:

Since West Africa shall be opened impartially to the trade of all nations... the result would have been the same whether the United States had not been represented at the Conference. With Congo politics and Congo administration, we have no business to meddle. 24

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22 Ibid., p. 12240.
24 Ibid.
On Christmas of 1884, another leading journal presented a sober editorial in contrast to the happy season. It held that the exploits of Stanley offered no sane reason for "disregarding the chief causes for National diplomacy." It recognized the achievements of our delegates at the Conference who had received flattering tokens of interest and respect. However, sober-minded Americans could not conceal their fears and doubts and be deluded by compliments. Rumor had it that we were the pawns of Bismarck. If this were true, one would not have long to wait to see an American man-of-war anchored at the mouth of the Congo in a belligerent attitude toward some European nation. Bemoaning the fact that our other press had failed to unite and prevent our participation, the Tribune reiterated that the Congo Question was always a matter for European diplomacy. It was not for America. As though depositing its editorial gift with an "I told you so", it concluded:

The Tribune contended at the outset that the United States ought not to be drawn in this complication. It has seen no reason to shift its ground.25

The action of the Belgian Government in the fall of the following year presented this journal with still an additional opportunity to come forth with another subtle and sage observation. A plan was afoot to send paupers to the Congo country as colonists. Unable to accommodate themselves in the struggle for existence in a thickly populated region, they were apparently to find it easier in a tropical region where production was bountiful and competition was unknown. Quite plainly, there were other considerations to be reckoned with, namely the climate, their health (for many were without superior

energy, diseases, and least we forget, the natives. The journal humorously observed that paupers were the cheapest material which Belgium could use to test the country. Had it resorted to able-bodied criminals, the Congo natives would have had valid moral grounds for objection. Since the press took this form of criticism, one needed no strong imagination to think what way a prejudiced Department of State might also be tempted to react.

Apropos to the comment on the Department, with men like John Bassett Moore and Alvey A. Adee in it, the policy-making personnel probably looked upon this distant region as the Congo Free State in name only. According to the Berlin sessions no Power was to set up a protectorate unless due notice was given. Meanwhile, the Conference desired to keep the Congo economically international. It sought to provide a scheme of neutrality by creating a commission to maintain freedom of trade and navigation. Unfortunately, it was provided with neither funds nor authority. Thus freedom was only in the name for, sooner than expected, Leopold took over. With the receipt of the Tisdel correspondence on May 11, 1886, the Department, in the lingo of present protocol, preferred to "put the Congo on ice."

The political party platforms of 1888 continued to present different points of view on foreign policy. In them, one can easily isolate the veiled references to the Congo Question. The Democrats, the party in power, meeting in St. Louis, preferred to run on their

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27 Hoskins, op. cit., p. 41.
recent record. As if with a backward glance the party affirmed that:

It has adopted and consistently pursued a firm and prudent foreign policy, preserving peace with all nations, while scrupulously maintaining all the rights and interests of our own Government and the people at home and abroad.  

Two weeks later, the Republican Party, as though to symbolize its elephantine memory, inserted in its platform comments which critically recalled the "withdrawal act" of President Cleveland, and the lack of support of American trade in that far away region or into better markets. Seeking to regain power it attacked aggressively.

The conduct of foreign affairs by the present administration has been distinguished by its inefficiency and cowardice. Having withdrawn from the Senate all pending treaties effected by the Republican administration for the removal of all foreign burdens and restrictions upon our commerce and for its extension into better markets, it has neither effected nor proposed any in their stead. Professing adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, it has seen with idle complacency the extension of foreign influence... and of foreign trade everywhere....

Granted that other important international affairs were pressing at this time we hit an extreme low period of diplomatic relations with the Congo. Evidence of this fact came to the fore in the correspondence extending over six months, whereby in 1901 we sought from British authorities the protection of American interests. Actually we were without a consul in the Congo Free State from 1895 to 1911. Some consideration was given to this phase of relationships in 1907 but United States consular relations were not resumed until four years later.

29The Republic (St. Louis), June 22, 1888, p. 4.
30Foreign Relations (1901), pp. 205, 206; (1907), Part II, 1807, 1808; (1911), pp. 13-14.
Had the Department of State and future administration been saddled successively with the likes of Bayard and Cleveland, interest in the Congo would not have died. Civilizations were becoming less foreign to each other. Faster than people realized then, the Old World and the New were shrinking into one. Mechanical inventions and improvements were ending geographic isolation. In the United States business had expanded and had become imperialistic. Notwithstanding the myth of isolation, expanding commerce tightened economic bonds but capital accumulated from profits also sought outlets for expansion.

Evidences of the above forces were legion. Upon their appearance, formerly where concern for the Congo was dormant or latent, the result was more often regarded as a revival of interest. An expose typical of a hidden incident was the action of a commercial convention held in Pensacola, Florida, on November 12, 1886. Particularly attracted to the so-called "Dark Continent", it passed the following resolution:

Whereas the western coast of Africa... with its many resources, and on account of the proximity to (our) southern ports invite the extension and prosecution of Commerce between these ports and Africa.

Resolved that we in the Convention assembled, call the attention of the country at large, and of American capitalists in particular, to the great commercial advantages for the extension of trade to this country. 1

As if to give audience and entertain this idea, on February 25, 1887, Mr. William Rice, Representative from Massachusetts, by request

1African Repository LXIII, No. 1, January 1887, p. 31.
submitted a petition to the Senate Committee on Appropriations in support of the Congo National Emigration Steamship Company.\textsuperscript{2}

A contributor to a popular periodical of the era opined that missionaries and economic opportunities went hand in hand. In his thinking, God had opened the Dark Continent by way of the Congo and, almost immediately, commerce began to thrive. Believing that the Almighty had revealed the future of Africa in the valleys of the Mississippi and the Amazon, he felt that it was America's duty to God to realize His program in the development and peaceful exploitation of this sable region. It was both Divine will and a Christian mission to drive slavery, slave hunting, the rum traffic and cannibalism from the Congo Free State. In their place would be substituted railways, river boats, steamships and all the other peaceful pursuits of a progressive civilization.\textsuperscript{3}

The contributor also contended that this action on America's part would not constitute an engagement "in entangling foreign alliances." He argued that, as a cosigner of the Ashburton Treaty, Congress did not look upon this action as a departure from traditional policy to assist other nations to stamp out the slave trade. We should begin now to assist Britain. Provoking laughter and applause from remarks on the size of our Navy, he added that one of its functions was not to deport freedom to Africa but to aid Britain in suppressing the slave trade on the high seas. He observed that we had refrained from the decision of the Brussels Antislavery Conference

\textsuperscript{2}Cong. Record, XVIII, Part 3, p. 2302.

\textsuperscript{3}Joseph Cook, "American Opportunities in Africa", Our Day, A Record of Current Reform, (Boston, Mass: Our Day Publishing Company, 1890), V, pp. 490-499. This was originally a Monday lecture and one of a series given at Fremont Temple.
which advocated the establishment of garrisons and armed vessels in the waters of Central Africa. Even though it was to eliminate this evil, we feared entangling political relations. This fear is regarded as insufficient excuse to justify the failure of Congress to assist a line of steamers to introduce American trade on the banks of the Congo. At the same time, our missionaries, to whom Americans owed a deep obligation, established there some of the best missions and mission schools in the world.  

A strong supporter for a large navy and merchant marine, Joseph Cook argued that our failure to subsidize steamship companies placed us behind the times. Our inertia would mean that we would continue to lose out to the British and the European Powers on the high seas and even in South America. In Cook's thinking, our country could enjoy an immense market in the Congo. One of the richest regions on the earth, the Congo had the products, camphor, gum, wood, palm oil, rubber, ivory, mahogany and minerals which we strongly desired. All could be secured by barter at a profit. It was alleged that Mr. Huntington, our railway king, who had already invested in African railroads, advised young men that the Aladdin of commercial enterprise was soon to be the Congo.

Perhaps Cook used "the tears of bereavement in the Civil War" as lenses through which to view a solution to both our national and international problem. To him, the colored scholar, preacher, politician, author, reformer and mechanic who often faced a sad fate in this

\[4\text{Ibid.}\]
\[5\text{Ibid., p. 496.}\]
country could become an able and regenerating force in Africa. Although he did not visualize wholesale schemes of emigration, he thought that the sublime ambition of many frustrated Negroes would be to devote their lives to raising the standard of living of their brothers in Africa. Moreover, Brussels recently had approved of a proposition wherein a colony of Negroes from America would settle in the Upper Congo. Both Europe and a certain segment of America felt that this move would greatly facilitate the peaceful introduction of industry and commerce.  

The American Colonization Society was fully aware that, for Europe, Africa was a field for diplomatic manipulation, commercial enterprise and philanthropic endeavor. However, the Society thought that European colonization, paupers notwithstanding, was out of the question. Nevertheless, it felt that an Anglo-Saxon civilization would dominate African land. To the Society, not only did the distant region present America great opportunities for trade, it was also a haven for the radical solution of a perplexing domestic problem.

In the spring of 1891, the Society was severely critical of the liquor traffic which existed between this country and Africa. The bulk of this was reputedly carried on with the Congo. The Society stated that, in the year ending June 30, 1890, 275,000 gallons of distilled liquor had been taken out of bond for exportation to five ports in

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Africa from the port of Boston. The native taste for American "fire water" was greater than estimated, if we were to believe allegedly official figures quoted by a well-wisher of the Congo. Between the years of 1883 and 1888, annual shipments from the Massachusetts Bay area never fell below 575,000 gallons and reached as high as 737,000 gallons. The Society supported by the Negro bishops of the period favored shutting off this flowing fountain or closing the port of Boston through which such traffic flowed.

When reporters questioned Sanford back in the United States in the spring of 1889 on commercial possibilities in the Congo, they did not have in mind the liquor traffic. Sanford quickly indicated that American trade should realize excellent profits since the Congo provided regulation for the free admission of goods. Leopold reputedly was favorably disposed toward American merchants. They, however, were retailing English goods in the Congo even though he preferred the American brands. This class of goods seldom appeared. Sanford added that, if American manufacturers would take hold, they would push English and German trade out of the Congo and bring themselves untold wealth.

Senator John T. Morgan of Alabama, the most ardent supporter of the Congo Free State in Congress, befriended the missionary son of a very close friend who was to keep warm the Senator's interest in that far off region. Samuel N. Lapsley, an agent of the American Presbyterian Congo Mission, wrote Morgan a very long letter from Luebo Congo,

8Ibid., p. 41.
9Cook, loco. cit., p. 496.
on November 9, 1891. In reply to one written by Morgan on June 23, Lapsley described the good, bad and indifferent features of the government. He pictured the way in which the State engaged in both slavery and conscription. He told of the chartering of the Katanga Company, a kind of an East India Company, which was accorded control of the known rich mining district. He predicted that this firm would save the State from bankruptcy and, with cautious administration, would also put the country on a sound basis. Of greater importance to us was his description of the activities of our American missionaries. Successful in conveying the concepts of Christianity, they were also skillful and prosperous as commercial agents. They helped to make American business opportunities worthwhile.  

Morgan assumed a feeling of personal satisfaction in view of the attitude of a new administration. He felt that it would be more favorable to the Free State. Morgan forwarded on the fifth of February the letter which described great Congo trade possibilities for our citizens to President Harrison. Too, it must be remembered that we had participated recently in another conference involving the Congo. Relative to trade and commerce and a renewed interest in this region, President Harrison in his reply held that:

> It does seem that there is quite an American spirit of development moving in the Congo Basin; and I agree with you that we ought to participate in a fair degree in the commercial opportunities which are offered.  

\[1\] Morgan Papers IV, pp. 699-703, Lapsley to Morgan, Nov. 9, 1891.  
\[2\] Ibid., p. 708, Harrison to Morgan. February 8, 1892.
By 1900, the philosophy of economic imperialism, which had been in operation in the Congo fifteen years earlier, was now supported by the self-imposed protector of American liberties, the press. Charles A. Conant of Boston, an ardent apostle and defender, held that governmental responsibility was not only a role of large capitalists but that all proposed expansion of civilization was dependent upon "the governing races." He held that the real issue was how best to make productive use of capital. A well-known journal which agreed held that Conant was only supporting a capitalist's view of forcible extension of the Government of the United States to protect surplus capital in undeveloped areas.\(^{13}\) It should not be forgotten that it was in this period that Leopold sought funds from the Belgian Parliament for the operation of the Congo and dropped the hint that the Congo could become a Belgian colony. After September 1891 the Congo State accorded rubber concessions in certain zones. Leopold, under guise of State monopoly, changed the past policy of permitting private traders to exploit the area. When the State did not attract immigrants as Leopold had anticipated,\(^{11}\) he made his offer to the father of the American rubber trust, Charles Flint. The King's price was too high. Flint planned to bargain on a more favorable occasion. Of this, more anon.

The revival of interest in the Congo Question within the United

\(^{13}\)Springfield Republican, May 29, 1900, p. 6.

States became so strong that we were officially represented at the Brussels Conference of 1889–90. Hence near the close of the latter year, President Harrison in his second Annual Message devoted some attention to the main aspects of this gathering, and the interest that American people felt in its work. Of the utmost significance were his comments to the effect that:

Meanwhile negotiations have been opened for a new and completed treaty of friendship, commerce and navigation between the United States and the Independent State of the Congo.15

A year later, President Harrison, in his third Annual Message again called attention to matters in the Congo. Significantly, he noted the extension of ratification time given to this country. The Senate had adjourned without taking action on the Brussel measures for the suppression of the slave trade in Africa and the reform of the Congo State's revenue tariff.16

The above matters were taken under final considerations in the Senate on January of 1892. Later, when some citizens were quite uncertain as to the exact nature of the United States' policy and its recent relationship to the Congo, the Tribune presented an explanation. By the abstention of President Cleveland, the Senate had never ratified the General Act of Berlin. This did not, however, keep us from official participation in the Brussels Antislavery Conference. We favored suppression of the slave trade. In ratifying the act in January 1892, the Senate made it clear that the United States had no intention of acquiring territory in Africa nor of

15 Richardson, op. cit., p. 5543. Executive Mansion, December 1, 1890.
16 Ibid., p. 5621. Executive Mansion, December 9, 1891.
interesting itself in European affairs. Thus, the press wanted it known that we had no legal right to intervene in matters pertaining to the Congo.\textsuperscript{17}

Nevertheless, both President Harrison and Senator Morgan looked forward to the resumption of consular relations with the Congo. A reorganization of our diplomatic system would provide them with that opportunity. Moreover, they were assured of further assistance from a Mr. Blaine who was not related to the politician but had recently been appointed a commercial agent at Boma.\textsuperscript{18}

Speaking of executive action, one might have expected President Cleveland in his second administration to react to Congo affairs in much the same manner as he did in the first. However, in his Annual Message of 1893 he was attuned to the moral movement which had pushed us into the late Brussels Conference. Thus, he supported Article XII of the Conference Act for the suppression of the slave trade and the restriction of certain injurious commerce in the Congo. Considering it our duty to quell the slave trade which handicapped civilizing efforts he recommended that:


\textsuperscript{18}Morgan Papers. IV, p. 708. President Harrison to Senator Morgan. February 8, 1897. On July 9, 1892, Mr. Joseph E. Roy of Chicago, Chairman of the Committee on African Ethnological Congress, requested Kasson to prepare an address for the Committee on Africa to be read at the World's Columbian Exposition. He was given the subject title of The Function and Power of the Congo State in the Redemption of Africa. See Kasson Papers, (1892).
an act be passed prohibiting the sale of arms and intoxicants to natives in the regulated zones by our citizens.\textsuperscript{19}

Kasson, who suffered disappointment from the action taken by Cleveland in his first administration, never missed an opportunity to explain what it meant to us and to the world to participate in the Congo Conference. On September 19, 1896, he was given the opportunity to address the opening naval class at Annapolis. He recalled the disposition of compulsory mediation which he had proposed, and remembered its rejection at the Congo Conference by France alone; appropriately he selected as his topic, \textit{Arbitration: How Far Is It Practicable?} After recalling various attempts by the Powers to obtain solutions without recourse to war, Kasson, perhaps unconsciously justifying the cadets' calling, saw only glowing prospects for the future.

For some unknown questions, for some unknown conditions of the future, the dreadful right of war will be, and for the present ought to be, retained for that security of independence, liberty, and civilization which have so largely owed to it their modern progress and security. We shall still look to the political points of bayonets to reflect on us the desired sunshine of Peace.\textsuperscript{20}

The frequency with which our newspapers reported fighting the Free State three years later was such as to give reality to Kasson's conclusions.\textsuperscript{21}

Although there was vacillation in our country's interest in the Congo, the Democratic Party for the most part was adamantly opposed to

\textsuperscript{19}\textit{Richardson, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 5868. Delivered December 4, 1893.}


\textsuperscript{21}\textit{Springfield Republican, September 2, 1899. See any other leading Journal for this month.}
any political and diplomatic relations with the State. When the National Democratic Party met in Indianapolis in 1900, it fulminated in caustic criticisms to the renewed interest of the Republicans in the Congo. Declaring that their rival's adherence to the Monroe Doctrine was "manifestly insincere and deceptive", the Democrat platform took the following stand:

We approve the wholesome doctrine and earnestly protest against the Republican departure which has involved us in so-called world politics including the diplomacy of Europe and the intrigue... and we especially condemn the ill-conceived Republican alliance with England, which must mean discrimination against other friendly nations, and which has already stifled the Nations' voice while liberty is being strangled in Africa.22

An analytical examination of the Democrats' platform of 1904 does not reveal a clear case of inherited Congophobia. Their dogmatic statements were without proof and could be regarded only as surmises. Nevertheless, the feeling prevailed that no great dynamic change had occurred within the party on this score. The Democrats were definitely against colonialism or imperialism.

We oppose as fervently as did George Washington himself, an indefinite, irresponsible, discretionary and vague absolutism, and a policy of colonial exploitation no matter where or by whom invoked or exercised.23

The Democrats also took exception to the Ship Subsidy Bill which, it was alleged, would supply that governmental aid to shipping, the consummation devoutly wished by former consuls of Africa. The Party

22 New York Tribune, July 6, 1900.
23 Ibid., July 9, 1904, p. 2.
designated it as an iniquitous appropriations of public funds for private purposes. It was regarded further as a wasteful, illogical and useless attempt to overcome old Republican handicaps to develop American commerce on the sea. The Democrats preferred a shipbuilding program which would not entail new or additional burdens on the people "and without bounties from the public treasury."24

Did our American Negro play a role in the revival of interest in the Congo? Concomitant factors cannot but help give an affirmative answer to this inquiry, although the evidences are somewhat fragmentary. Again, it is not to say that unanimity of interest prevailed here. B. J. Ramage, a student of African affairs, observed that the movement on the part of the Powers to control Africa was not predicated mainly upon prestige. A variety of tropical products was to be found in Africa. The civilized world was rapidly becoming more dependent upon them for its comforts. The need produced covetous nations of the temperate areas who sought a settlement of differences in the partition of Africa. Although we remitted our claim of original discovery by Stanley, Ramage felt that we should not be disinterested in such matters. He wrote that this country would be moved by irony of events to take part. It was inevitable not only because of the need for a change of policy in international affairs but because of our growing Negro population. With an increase in numbers, Negroes would be obliged to look elsewhere for homes. Ramage erroneously assumed that Negroes, like the Indians, were

24 Ibid.
more or less wards of this Government. In his publication, it appeared that a considerable number could be domiciled in the Congo.  

Undoubtedly the lot of some Negroes was such that they would readily have accepted Liberia or the Congo. There were, however, those whose sincere interest in their brothers' return may be seriously questioned. There was certainly a very strong personal and business or economic motive for their action. The group in consideration was the Colored National Emigration and Commercial Association. According to its letterhead, it was organized in Nashville, Tennessee by the great Emigration Convention held there on October 7, 8, and 9, 1901. Its headquarters were in Atlanta, Georgia. The membership fee was three dollars per year payable in advance by one dollar every four months. It proposed to purchase a ship for emigration and commercial activities to any country "where all men have their rights regardless of color."  

Writing from his church office in Philadelphia, William H. Heard, then late Minister to Liberia, and president-to-be of the above organization, sent congratulations to Senator Morgan on his successful election in the primary saying:


26Morgan Papers, XVII, p. 3395. W. H. Heard to Morgan, March 30, 1903. Official personnel were President W. H. Heard, a Methodist Bishop; Vice-President Howard Jones of Findley, Ohio, Vice-Presidents N. E. Serritt, D.D., and Robert H. Duncan; Secretary (Miss) L. F. Lemon; Agent and Supervisor W. H. Young, D.D.; Editor and Counsellor William A. Pledger, and Treasurer, Bishop H. M. Turner. Twenty-two others from Africa, Canada, and the United States served as State vice-presidents. It had a journal, Voice of the People, which was published in Atlanta.
I do this as a Negro and one who loves Africa. I hope you may remain in the United States Senate and fight out your colonization scheme of my race. Yours for the success of my race in Africa.27

About three years later, the organization, through President Heard, extended an invitation to the solon to speak to the Body on June 24, 1903, in his home state at Montgomery. With the political acumen which a successful and wise campaigner gains over the years, Senator Morgan forwarded a polite refusal. He indicated that his failure to speak was not in criticism of the organization. He was aware that anything he might say would not escape the criticisms. He felt that he could do no good and that he might provoke evil by intermeddling with their movement. Before closing his letter with thanks for the invitation, Morgan made the following promise and pertinent prediction:

If a general, free and voluntary movement for African emigration should be peacefully and properly organized by your race, in numbers sufficient to make it a matter of national concern, I will be of the number who will give friendly consideration to national measures for its promotion, within the just limits of the national power. I do not expect such a movement in my day, and have given little thought as to the extent and character of the assistance that the United States might give to such an organized movement.28

On an earlier occasion in Washington, reporters questioned Senator Morgan on the purpose behind his resolution which allegedly sought

27 Ibid., IX, p. 1732. Wm. H. Heard (Pastor of the A.M.E, Church, 7th Street below Dickinson St,, Phila.), to Senator Morgan, April 17, 1900.

28 Ibid., XVII, p. 3395. Heard to Morgan, March 30, 1903, pp. 3399-3401. Morgan to Heard, April 2, 1903. A nephew of Bishop Heard, Prof. Beverly Heard of Central State College at Wilberforce, Ohio stated that the scheme was not one of strict humanitarian impulse, but was more a business venture in which he himself later was to do accounting work. From an interview, July 31, 1931.
ratification of the General Act. At this particular time, wide
interest was taken by the public for the suppression of the slave trade
in the Congo. Many Americans felt that we should initiate some type
of movement whereby international pressure would bring this to an
end. His reply to the press, which indicated that metamorphosis had
occurred, was quite different from that given to the emigration
organization.

My reason for desiring this is that it may be able to
encourage Negroes of this country who have wealth and enter­
prise but have not standing and never will have here to
engage in trade in that country. Ultimately, I have in view
a general immigration of Negroes from the United States to
the Congo. They came from that country and should return.
Here their civilization is wasted; there it might be devoted
to the building up of a Government and country that shall be
a credit to them.29

The interest of both black and white in "back to Africa" or "back
to the Congo" schemes has naturally met the test of time. It appeared
unlikely that Senator Morgan was acquainted or corresponded with the
educated Negro from Virginia, John M. Langston. Undoubtedly, the
former would have regarded the latter as an "uppity" Negro or even a
radical, for on this matter they differed diametrically. To a similar
argument, Langston made a reply at Fremont Temple in a Monday Lecture­
ship on February 10, 1890.

Eight million of us are here, and we are not going away.
I am an American. I am here and I am going to stay here. I
am going to stay here until the Constitution is accepted from
one end of the land to the other (applause)... until we have

29New York Tribune, December 10, 1889, p. 2. Two days before the
Morgan action, a Mr. Blair introduced a resolution promoting the World
Colored Peoples Exposition, underwritten by the Government at one-half
million dollars, to be held in Chicago. Morgan's resolution sought to
increase the trade between the Congo and our country. See issue of
same paper Dec. 10, 1889, p. 2. See also Cong. Record, XXI, Part I, 125.
made our country... what she ought to be by my vote and my influence and any power I have of mind, or soul, or body....30

The association of Morgan with the movement of "back to the Congo" was apparently well-known in Boston. At least it appeared to have had that reputation among the minority group in this section. Dihdwo Twe, a Liberian student of Burdette College, 18 Boyleston Street, kept himself posted on United States-African affairs. Hence, in January of 1907, he wrote a letter to Senator Morgan thanking him for the great work which he had done for the helpless natives of the Congo. Twe also complimented him on his emigration plan but explained to him that, due to its source, "others look at it as developing from race prejudice."31

Dihdwo had a plan for the movement of Negroes to Africa which antedated that of the West Indian Negro, Marcus Garvey, with his Black Star Line. He had visions of obtaining a concession on rubber and mahogany from the Liberian Government by December of 1907. He then thought he would use this grant with a concern which had its own steamers. He would negotiate with this American firm to transport emigrants back to Africa at a low rate, then he would bargain with the Liberian Government to pay the fare of those poverty-stricken emigrants. By some financial gymnastics, he expected that the company would be willing to transport emigrants and deduct their fare from the firm's

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30See Our Day V, pp. 254 ff.
31Morgan Papers, XXII, p. 4352. Dihdwo Twe to Senator J. T. Morgan, Jan. 24, 1907.
lease of the concession. Dihdwo planned to travel throughout America and lecture to the Negroes on the freedom and open country of Africa, to which they could go and which they could help develop if they so chose. He alleged that contact with members of a rubber corporation had been made the previous Christmas. This unidentified firm also favored the plan. 32 No additional information was found relating to Dihdwo Twe.

One of the most striking individuals whose efforts revived interest in the Congo was the first American Negro historian, George Washington Williams. He was born in Bedford Springs, Pennsylvania on October 16, 1849. As a veteran, according to his story, he fought in both the Civil and the Mexican Wars. As a resident of Ohio, he was the first Negro to serve in its legislature from 1879 to 1881. Later he found it more convenient to settle in Worcester, Massachusetts.

According to a partial date list extracted from Williams's diary by an outstanding authority, 33 the ex-legislator took an unusual interest in Congo affairs. During the winter of 1883-1884, he wrote a series of articles on African Geography in which he combatted Portugal's claim to the Congo. In either the late winter or early spring of 1884, this gentleman presented an argument to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations urging recognition of the Congo flag.

32 Ibid., There was no indication whether Dihdwo Twe ever received the personal letters which he sought from Morgan to help him in this venture.

33 The chronology of his interest was taken from the notes of Professor John Hope Franklin, Howard University, Washington, D. C., who saw diaries of Williams in the possession of a Mr. W. H. Slaughter, a collector of Washington, D. C.
He noted the date of April 10, 1884, when this occurred as if he were very instrumental in that action. Incidentally, there is considerable proof that Williams had contact with Leopold II long before the recognition problem appeared. Of that, more will follow later. Williams held that he published an "elaborate historical paper" on the Congo on August 21, 1889. It would appear that he did this anonymously or had it printed in the columns of some obscure publication. In either August or September of the same year, at the reunion of the Boston Antislavery leaders, he urged the United States participation in the forthcoming conference on the slave trade in Brussels. Probably in late September, Williams left for Belgium where he stayed two months. Two days prior to Christmas of 1889, he called on President Harrison to whom he gave a promise to prepare a memorandum on why the United States should ratify the General Act of the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885). He also talked with John Sherman, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, who encouraged him to submit one.

By early January 1890, he was back in Brussels where he talked with Leopold and others. On January 21, 1890, he crossed the Channel and went to London. One week later, he went to Liverpool and made preparations to sail. Two days later, he was aboard the British Steamer Gaboon headed for the Congo.34

34 Ibid. See also, George W. Williams, A Report Upon the Congo State and Country to the President of the Republic of the United States. Written at St. Paul de Loanda, Province of Angola, October 11, 1890. Copy in the archive of the American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Massachusetts.
Before this Government accorded recognition to the International Association, Williams corresponded with King Leopold on the matter of the labor situation. He suggested a plan to the King whereby individuals from the Negro colleges in the country would compete in tests, on a national basis, for key economical and political jobs within the Free State. According to the press, Williams went so far as to contact the educators at those colleges with a view to facilitating the scheme. Both Leopold and Williams thought that our trained Negro personnel would operate more efficiently in the Congo than any other racial group.\textsuperscript{35} Apparently, the change of administration put a crimp in the plan and moreover, there was a number of important figures who disapproved of the plan.

The original action of George Williams in reviving interest in the Congo was a letter of July 27, 1889, to the editor of the Worcester Evening Gazette. It urged this country's participation in the Brussels Conference of 1889. This action resulted in a four page printed circular, containing Williams' letter to the editor of the Gazette, together with a reprint of an editorial on the same subject. From those who were in favor of the United States taking some positive steps, Williams requested some aggressive action by the following plaintive queries:

\begin{quote}
Will you write to or speak to the Senator from your state, the Representative from your Congressional District and urge them to vote for some measure that shall define the position of the American people on this question? Will you ask your pastor to speak about it on Sunday from the pulpit?
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{35} \textit{New York Tribune}, March 2, 1890, p. 16.
GEORGE W. WILLIAMS.
or in the prayer meeting? Will you call the attention of the editor of your paper to this circular, and ask him to write an editorial on the subject? Will you read Prof. Dumond's article on "Slavery in Africa" printed in Scribner's Magazine for June, and ask your friends to read it? Will you do what you can to organize public meetings to give expression to the human and Christian sentiment of your community on this thrilling theme? 36

Those circulars were scattered throughout the area and the state by the Anti-slavery Society. Williams, who had the talent of engaging the favor and good will of important people of the financial and political world, soon found himself in Washington on this matter. 37

From his chronology it is known that he went to the Congo. His assignment resulted in three important reports left to posterity. They rate serious consideration in this thirty-year story touching on the imperialistic phases of our forgotten history.

His findings and conclusions on the proposed Congo railroad were probably made at the instigation of American railway investors, possibly Mr. Charles P. Huntington. Gross negligence and inefficiency was an understatement of the efforts of the Congo-chartered Companie du Congo pour le Commerce et l'Industrie. During three and one-half years, the corporation received $5,000,000 from the State, but not one mile of road bed, of the projected 247 had been laid, and less than four miles of survey were completed. Williams held that the difficulties were almost insuperable. The route was rocky, the river was not


37 Prof. John Hope Franklin, judging from Williams diaries which are inaccessible to the writer held that Williams was in friendly relationship with Huntington, the railroad magnate.
regularly navigable and supplies were expensive. Moreover, Belgian engineers were young and inexperienced, and ill health plus service expiration took a heavy toll of the more experienced men. He calculated that maintenance would be a costly item during the rainy season if the line were ever completed. The labor mortality of the whites was fifty percent. Severe treatment of the natives not only impaired efficiency but made the workmen suspicious of the white.\(^3^8\)

There was great expectation that this proposed road would tap an extremely rich area of Africa. Such visions were fired by the eloquent descriptive exaggerations of H. M. Stanley. As a professional historian and investigator, Williams could not suffer to pass unchallenged the Stanley statements which were calculated to mislead or deceive the friends of humanity and progress.

It is not an agreeably (sic) task to have to say these things of a man whose valor, perseverance, sufferings and triumphs (sic) have sent a thrill of admiration throughout the civilized world, but it is the stern duty of history to prevent error from being canonized instead of truth, which must be written with an iron pen.\(^3^9\)

He calculated that $40,000,000 would be needed to build the railway. With the best skill, management and machinery of Europe and America, Williams felt it would take six to eight years to complete.

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\(^3^9\) Ibid. Williams called attention to Stanley's The Congo Free State II, p. 355. He took every item from Central Africa quoted by the journalist. He listed market price and annual tonnage to show constant error.
the job. He keenly observed that Africa needed the blessing of a practical modern labor system. In it, body and soul should be given prime consideration. This would "not fail to teach the natives the primal lesson of history: For in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat thy bread."  

Williams' next report was in the form of an open letter to Leopold II. It was written on July 18, 1890, at Stanley Falls. Disappointed at what he found in the Congo, he publicly indicated the ruler on fifteen counts for mismanagement of the Congo. He commenced with challenging the ruler's title to this area. Feeling that Leopold's policy was detrimental to the natives, he alleged that the brilliant program of fostering care and benevolent enterprise was entirely missing. He charged the King with oppression and slavery and a deficiency in moral, military and financial strength. He held him responsible for the tragedy of the Congo and appealed to the world for judgment.

From his Report to the President, it was seen that Williams' trip to the Congo was of extreme significance. Since he had the favor of President Harrison, the Senate awaited his findings before it reconsidered signing the General Act with a view to bringing pressure to

\[^{40}\text{Ibid.}\]


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suppress the slave trade. Williams had an excellent memory on activities bearing on recognition of the Congo. He also added bits of information which explained the ease with which Sanford worked. Williams claimed that he, himself was at the Brussels Conference for two months, although he failed to designate Honorable Edwin Holland Terrell as our delegate. He did not omit Sanford. Williams alleged that Leopold II did not want him to go there and sought his abstention from the Congo for a period of five years. He believed that such action was motivated by Sanford and Stanley who had secured Leopold's claim of the area by spurious treaties. He covered all the route over which Stanley had gone, but he made no comment or reference to Tisdell. In spite of the fact that the Senate viewed any interest in Congo matters as endangering national policy, (the Monroe Doctrine) Williams, apparently for sentimental reasons, desired us to stand by the Congo.\textsuperscript{42} This last wish on his part was in direct contrast to the comments made to Secretary of State Blaine. After speaking of his friendly relations with Lieutenant Taunt, he advised Blaine in this fashion:

\begin{quotation}

The State of the Congo is in no way deserving your confidence or support. It is actively engaged in the slave trade, and is guilty of many crimes against humanity.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quotation}


\textsuperscript{43}Department of State, Miscellaneous Letters, September, Part I, 1890. George W. Williams to Sec. of State Blaine, Sept. 15, 1890. Williams died August 2, 1891, the death of a Casanova in Blackpool, England. See Consular Dispatches, Liverpool LI, No. 135. Wm. Wharton to Acting Sec., Aug. 27, 1891.
The fundamental cause which brought on the Brussels Conference rested in the background of a labor situation in the Congo. Finding it very discouraging to work the natives of the region and also to make the most of Kroo and Zanzibar men, Leopold II seriously considered the employment of American Negroes as supervisory and administrative personnel from Louisiana. Strauch, Secretary-General of the Congo State dissuaded Leopold from attempting to carry the plan into effect. He felt that the salary which the Americans would demand would be at least twice that of the Zanzibarites. Moreover, they were too accustomed to the comforts of civilization and were unlikely to prove docile.

With work to be done, slavery was resorted to in the Congo Free State. Obviously, the advance of a European Power in Africa was not accomplished without suffering. The natives were dispossessed of their lands. Retreat only added more fuel to the situation. Numerically weak, the Europeans found it to their advantage to enter into treaties with the more powerful tribes. No scrupled prevailed in taking advantage of animosities and tribal feuds. A few naive people doubtless accepted the King’s word that he was not guilty. He was certainly responsible for not cracking down on contractors who resorted to the system.

\[14\] Stenger, Institut Royal Colonial Belge Bulletin XXIV, Part 4, 1197-1198. Even as late as 1898, the Congo State seriously considered the use of Chinese coolies as a labor force in the country. Ibid., Part 3, pp. 828-832.

\[15\] New York Tribune, Feb. 21, 1892.
An American missionary observed that as late as November 9, 1891, the slave system still prevailed. He wrote that:

The State does not forbid slaveholding, but tries to suppress the trade in its roughest phases. It often happens after a war that a number of slaves or prisoners fall into the hands of the State. These are taken under its guardship working or serving as soldiers during seven years, during which they get regular pay and rations, and at the expiration of which they are free to go.... All white men are at liberty to ransom slaves on the same seven years plan.46

The pressure of public opinion with its strong antislavery sentiment in the United States was one of the important factors for our participation in the Brussels Antislavery Conference. Incidentally, the factors in Europe for its assembly were both benevolent and non-benevolent. The majority of the Powers were opposed to Arab and Portuguese support of the slave trade. Moreover, all of the Powers were none too pleased that Leopold II, who had outwitted them, should build a colonial empire on slavery conscription and the use of liquor for money. Under the cloak of altruism, the Powers decided to install a realistic program for shrewd imperialists. They would establish a tax upon liquor exports to Africa. They were also to establish a tariff for a continent that had never had trade barriers. The anti-slavery measure would keep the natives under control for colonial

46Morgan Papers, IV, pp. 702-703. Lapsley to Morgan, Nov. 9, 1891. Later in the same letter, he held that slaves were recruited from the darker tribes such as the Boluba. He failed to designate the recruiters, Arabs and Portuguese. See Hubbard, loco. cit., pp. 113-114, Cf. (Worcester) Evening Gazette, July 29, 1889. Editorial on African Slavery.
army conscription. Obviously, a curtailment of fire arms and liquor would prevent native uprisings.\(^7\)

The astute King saw that liquor control by the Powers would bring a basic change in the stipulation of the Berlin Act preventing imposts or excise on goods into the Congo Free State and the Niger Basin. It was to have remained in force for twenty years. Removal meant an accommodation for revenue for the Congo State. Acquiescence, ironically, would seem to indicate that he was on the same antislavery platform as Queen Victoria and the papal representative, Cardinal Lavagerie.\(^8\)

Of the two main United States officials at the Brussels Conference of 1889-1890, one was Henry Sanford, Special Minister. He labored over a period of fifteen months for which he received, at the insistence of his friends, $7,500.\(^9\) Honorable Edwin Terrell of San Antonio, Texas was our main representative at this conference. As a delegate to the Republican National Convention, he had seconded the nomination of General Harrison, and on March 30, 1889, had been appointed Minister to Belgium. He spoke for the United States under special commission at the Antislavery Conference of 1889-90. In the face of much criticism, he eliminated the Congo tariff measures from

\(^7\) Middleton, op. cit., pp. 144-146.

\(^8\) Ibid., p. 146.

the General Slave Act. He had them incorporated into a separate act suscribed to only by the signers of the General Act of Berlin. Our Government supported him in this move.  

Terrell was on the Commission Technique organized under the provision of a separate declaration on import duties made on July 2, 1890 to set up a complete tariff system for the conventional basin of the Congo. In 1891, he negotiated and signed a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the Congo Free State.  

The press made it quite clear to the public that our participation in this affair did not mean any changed adherence to our traditional policy. Thus, there was no valid reason why we should not continue the slave treaties. The Tribune made the following observation relative to ratification:

While it (the treaty) authorizes our Government to attach to its acts of ratification a frank statement, that it is not, by agreeing to this treaty, to be understood as expressing any opinion as to the character of the claims of sovereignty in Africa advanced by the Signatory Powers or any of them, nor as to the method pursued for the acquisition of African soil by European Governments or trading companies operating under their protection, nor as giving their sanction to any new pretensions by such Governments or trading companies arising out of military or other proceedings authorised by this treaty against the slaves. These conditions will meet all objections waged against the Act.

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51 Ibid. Cf. State Papers LXXXII, pp. 55, 80. It sought a suppression of the slave trade and the curtailment of the importations of fire arms, ammunition and liquor in Africa.
when it was discussed in the Senate in February, and clearly expressed, they will under our adhesion to the act safe, wise, and helpful.52

The press, and perhaps those who were keenly interested in the Congo from a commercial - financial point, were aware of the fact that the State was reputed to be more of an economic burden on the King than had been anticipated. Discussion bandied back and forth that some Power or Powers would probably have to take it over. It was also rumored that Leopold prolonged the confinement of his unhappy sister, Carlotta, so that he as executor of her estate could invest her fortune in the Congo for his own benefit. It was under his complete control on a charge of insanity that she was incarcerated in a Belgian retreat and it also alleged that he poured her fortune in the "hole in Africa." Of greater expectation was the belief that the Belgian Government, already practically responsible for the State, would take over the Congo. Plans were set in motion to that effect, but the Brussels administration decided to postpone the move until the following year or later.53

52New York Tribune, January 6, 1892, an Editorial.
53Ibid. October 5, 1895, Editorial page. New York Times, February 23, 1890, p. 19. The European public felt that there was truth in the matter due to the King's refusal to assent to Queen Victoria's permission to visit Carlotta, her cousin. The State lottery and the hiking of tariff rates served only to give added credence to the rumor.
During the session of the Congo Conference following its holiday recess, American missionaries were as concerned about their status in the Congo as were the merchants about freedom of commerce. It was brought to attention of Kasson that the American group was concerned over the protection of missionary groups. Kasson gave special attention to this problem. He was active in making it practically obligatory for each protecting Government to establish and maintain in the area subject to its control sufficient authority to keep and observe peace, and to accord respect to acquired rights. Within the Congo and all other areas involved, there was acknowledged the right of free conscience and of unrestricted observance and propagation of religious faith. This American tradition of religious freedom was, for the first time, recognized and acknowledged in an international body. To the optimistic Kasson, it was extremely significant, for he reasoned that:

There is but one step in logic from this to the general admission that if the principle is just for Central Africa, it is also just for Africa, and for all the people of the Earth.¹

The first religious group to enter the Congo was the Baptist Missionary Society of London in 1877. Second in respect to time was the American Baptist Missionary Union. No information has been found

thus far which accurately stating that the American group of Baptists' presence was due to the influence of the English unit or the result of recognition of the Association by President Arthur who was a member of this denomination. One writer held that the American group took over the Livingstone station and founded in 1879 in its place the Inland Mission. Before the turn of the century had hardly passed, the aggressive American Baptists had established fourteen missions in a land predominantly Catholic.²

The American Colonization Society in apologizing for its delinquencies in supporting American missionary effort, claimed that this force was our best sphere of influence in all Africa. On the West Coast, five different denominations prevailed. These were the Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregationalists and Episcopalian. Our country accounted for 204 workers of both sexes operating 359 stations and outstations. By 1891, they had constructed 181 churches with 10,051 communicants and were assisted by 617 trained natives. This was just a start on some 200 million souls. Incidentally, the Baptist as a Protestant group still lead in the Congo,³ whereas the Negro missionary before the twentieth century generally was conspicuous by his absence.

The foreign clergymen in the Congo were more or less an index to the white population of the Congo. In 1890-91, according to the


³African Repository LXVII, No. 2, pp. 59-60.
Missionary Herald some 800 whites resided there in the Congo and about 80 or ten percent were missionaries. By 1908, there were 2,813 white inhabitants, 1,713 of whom were Belgians. As to the native population, it probably would have interested Stanley, had he lived in 1927, to learn that there were then 7,692,573 native Congolese. This last figure was an official census count. Those in the "bush" were not tabulated.¹

Although it has usually been held that the missionary was primarily concerned with the saving of souls, he was, nevertheless, not averse to economic gain when opportunity presented itself. As a rule the missionaries were very observant of business possibilities, and frequently presented pertinent information for the benefit of the capitalist. For example in 1890, the African authority, Mr. Keltie, estimated the West African trade was about fifteen million pounds sterling whereas that of the Congo was about one third as much. His estimate was based to a large extent on information gained from missionaries. It was held that these statistics were only suggestive of "what large development of African trade was capable with the progress of population, order, and civilization".²

Undoubtedly there were some ministers who felt that the business

¹The Missionary Herald, LXVII, August 1891. See editorial, Crisis XXXVI (1924), 18. Ibid., XXXIV, (1927), 307.

side was the most outstanding phase of a minister's life. A Rev. A. W. Halsey made it quite clear where he and others like him stood. Said he:

Let us frankly admit the business side is a most important element in the life of every missionary... David Livingstone... the greatest missionary in the last generation, among other things, never ignored the details of business and gave attention to affairs that would have made him a great captain of industry had he gone to Africa simply to exploit as Leopold of Belgium has done.

It has long been recognized that the lot of the missionary was not an enviable one. The peaceful admonition of turning the cheeks often left him mauled from head to toe. The aggressor in such action was not always the native, but rather those traders and merchants from other civilized countries and sometimes that of his own. The Stanley-Peace affair was the most prominent case involving American missionaries. Upon refusal of the Baptist Society to accord Stanley permission to use the river steamer S.S. Peace to rescue Emin Pasha, the famed explorer literally confiscated the boat.7

When officially informed, the Congo Government disapproved of Stanley's action, although he was enroute to the relief of England's agent, Emin Pasha. Before the boat could be returned to its proper

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7 Henry Morton Stanley, In Darkest Africa, Or the Quest, Rescue and Retreat of Emin Governor of Equatoria; 2 Vols. (New York City; Charles Scribners & Sons, 1891) I, p. 11;7; Robert Arthington of the Baptist Missionary Society writing from Leeds, refused Stanley's petition; Letter was dated January 15, 1887.
owners, a Congo official with superior rank commandeered the vessel
to fulfill a mission assigned to him. The officer was ignorant of the
manner in which the boat had originally been put into the service of
the State. When the Divine registered protest, the Congo officials
assured the Department of State that a satisfactory adjustment would
be made. The Congo Government held that all confiscation was con-
demned and that justice could be gained from its courts. 8

Even for educational purposes, American missionaries often found
the going rough. A Dr. Dye, an American clergyman was involved in
rather a unique case in this respect. He sought unsuccessfully to
get a Congolese to America for to aid in the translation of a personal
work. Dye was faced with rigid legal stipulations which certainly
looked after the welfare of the Congolese but which, at the same time,
made it difficult for a poor missionary to meet the requirements. It
was mandatory to guarantee in cash at Court, the native's return pas-
sage. The Congolese had to be assured of labor and a guarantee of
life and liberty. He was to be accorded the best sanitary traveling
conditions. The aborigine, himself, had to be almost a perfect speci-
men of health and not to have suffered from any diseases. 9 The

8Diplomatic Corr. Germany, XXV, No. 289, Tree to Bayard, Jan-
Stanley's version was that he had contracted for its use; he, however,
avoided designating the time and area of use. Trouble also occurred
in the flag problem which has already engaged our attention. See also
Foreign Relations (1999).

Consul-General Clarence Rice Sloquem to Hon. Robert Bacon, Assistant
Secretary of State. Note Baron Leopold Dhanis, present attaché
held that no native has ever emigrated to the United States.
incident not only revealed an attitude of American missionaries but the policy of the Congo Free State toward the immigration of the native.

Approximately three months later, criticism against the Congo atrocities reached such a pitch in our country that Senator Lodge was led to present a resolution in the Senate. The effect in Brussels resulted in a semi-official "lambasting" of American missionaries by the editor of the Independence Belge. He wrote as follows:

"Humanitarianism would appear to be as popular in Washington as in Liverpool, but before aiding the Negroes of the Congo, the Americans ought to extend their protection to their own Negroes who suffer under the terrible Lynch law, which a Southern Senator has recently eulogized in the open Senate. The Committee of Foreign Affairs of the Senate has doubtless forgotten also that the Washington Government declined to ratify the Act of Berlin of 1885 because it recognized the fact that it had no interest in Central Africa and consequently could not intervene in the affairs of the Sovereign States. The Americans should refresh their minds by reading over the message of President Cleveland in 1886, the text of which we published some weeks ago and they will see the Congophe missionaries who have inspired the Lodge resolution wish to drag the Washington Government in a clumsy enterprise unworthy of the great Republic of the North".  

The roughest action against foreign missionaries occurred in the case of the Kasai Company filing a suit of libel against the American Presbyterians in the Congo. This particular missionary was bitterly hostile to the system of forced labor resorted to by the concession companies and obviously ignored by the Congo Government. Its members vehemently attacked this condition in the mission press. They

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10 Independence Belge, January 28, 1907, An editorial, "Congophobia"
compiled and published a neat breakdown of the finances of all the companies in the area. It showed dividends and total investment amounting to $60,745,468.68. Some corporations paid as much as fifty percent per year. Hence native laborers had no time to hear the gospel. The dwellers finding escape impossible were trying to save their bodies and lives from maim and mayhem. Ignoring the attempt to save their souls, the denizens struggled to increase the dividends of absentee investors. The Kasai Company claimed that the Mission's article had "sullied its reputation and respect". It was soon revealed that the Belgian Government owned fifty percent of the shares. Thus, the Congo Reform Association brought it to the attention of our State Department that it was the Belgian Government and not the Kasai Company which in reality filed suit. 11

The particular missionaries against whom the Kasai firm sought action, were the Reverends W. M. Morrison, H. W. Sheppard and L. C. Vass of Leubo, Congo. Successful prosecution of the suit would have invalidated the rights and work of the American Presbyterian missionary forces. Unfortunately, in terms of the law's long delay, the incident occurred when serious Belgian parliamentary considerations were given to the matter of annexing of the Congo. By the end of the year, instead of amicable progress having been made, the matter was

complicated by a land regulation of the Kantanga District restraining alien tenure of land.\textsuperscript{12}

The problem had now become one of insuring American individuals the right to purchase land. A Mr. Woolsey, a State Department employee, prepared instructions to counteract the Congo views. He sent them to Mr. Adee who, in his revision, held that Americans had the right to purchase land on three counts. First was by the Original Declaration which was signed by the representatives of the Association and this country. The second basis was Article II of the Treaty with the Congo signed January 24, 1891. The third was on the Belgian Government's recent promise of guarantee. Adee was in a quandary due to our policy of nonrecognition. We had not recognized Belgium's annexation of the Congo formally as a fact de jure. Daily intercourse, however, necessitated dealing with de facto possession and administration by Belgium. Incidentally, Great Britain was in the same position. The question was, how far to go without de jure recognition? Adee successfully decided to work on the problem via 1884 Declarations.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{12} Numerical File CXCIV, Memorandum, December 4, 1909. Adee to Dr. Scott. On hold-up re transfer or annexation, see Numerical File DCCXGII, 12053-12053/9.

\textsuperscript{13} Numerical File, CXCV, See Adee's Memo along with Woolsey Prepared Instructions following Nov. 7, 1910. A long note was sent by the Department on October 10, 1910. The title was "Right of the Americans to Hold Land in the Congo". The Belgian Government indicated that our Nationals had the right of settling and buying property but that the Belgian Government was under no obligation to sell its public land.
In the present Belgian Congo, an area dominated by the concept and rule of white supremacy, it was recently held that the natives often say: "Before the white man came, we had the land but no Bible. Now we have the Bible but no land." The question arose as to whether there were any Negro missionaries presently engaged in soul saving and whether there had ever been such. Baron Leopold Dhanis, present attache of the Congo in Washington, held that none were there in the summer of 1954. However, he left the strong understanding that they would receive a cordial welcome. In fact, one got the veiled impression that no other type or professional group was desired.

There were indeed several pioneers of this great American minority in the Congo as missionaries. Rev. William Sheppard, who was born in 1867 and died in 1927, was a close companion of Rev. Samuel N. Lapsley, who enjoyed Senator Morgan's friendship. Sheppard was a student at Hampton and later at Tuscaloosa Theological Institute. The contributor to the introduction of Sheppard's publication Experiences of a Pioneer Missionary in the Congo, claimed that Sheppard


15From an interview with Attache Dhanis of the Belgian Embassy in June 1954, Washington, D. C. It should be remembered that the Belgian Congo is predominantly Protestant. Yet even those from here might conceivably aid to shorten the years viewed by the acting governor of the Congo that, "the territory might be ready for self-government within 100 years", not to mention offsetting the Soviet impact.
always kept Lapsley to the front and himself in the background. Sheppard was rated as one of the two founders of the Presbyterian Mission. He sailed for the Congo in 1890 and served there until returning to America. He assumed a pulpit in Louisville, Kentucky in 1912.

Clinton C. Boone, a medical missionary, was a graduate of the Leonard Medical School at Shaw University in Raleigh, North Carolina. He later took a course in Mechanical Dentistry at Bedee Dental School in New York. He was a member of the Lott Carey Baptist Foreign Missionary Convention which organized in Washington, D.C., in 1896. He also belonged to the American Baptist Foreign Missionary Society of Boston, and represented both organizations in the Congo from 1901 to 1906. A companion missionary was his wife Eva R. Coles Boone, who accompanied him to Africa in April of 1901. Incidentally, as a result of a bite by a poisonous worm, she died at Mpalabala, Congo, on December 8, 1902.

Boone gave generous credit to Stanley for creating a friendly feeling for America in Africa, especially by way of the Stars and Stripes. This medical missionary was very observant of native habits and saw the possibilities of cotton trade goods, but not to the

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astounding extent as Stanley would have us believe. Whether from professional jealousy or failure of the Catholic missionaries to send better men, Boone observed that they and the natives had troubles over the natives' women, wine and wages for road work. The Congo authorities were forced to take up these matters. He gave a succinct appraisal of the atrocities. He blamed the Belgians for maltreatment of men, women and children, their using the lash and overworking the people. On the other hand, a loss of limb was frequently due to bad sanitary conditions and a lack of medical attention.

Although there is some doubt as to his racial identity, John H. Weeks was thought to have been another Negro who spent time in the Congo as a Baptist missionary. He may have been American born but it seems more likely that he was educated in England and was supported by the Baptist from England. Even though the American Negro did not respond to missionary work in the Congo in great numbers, both America and Europe could take some solace in the excellent quality and caliber of those who gave themselves freely to the cause.

American missionaries were keenly alert respecting economic factors bearing on the Congo. The nature of their work made them sharply aware of the labor situation. Practically all of them

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18 Ibid., pp. 2 - 20

19 Ibid., pp. 70 & 76.

regarded compulsory labor as a negative factor in the granting of concessions as a poor method of labor recruitment; as an extremely hard system on labor potential; and a policy where rate and cost created antagonism between employer and employee and endangered the reserve of the country.

Specifically, the Belgian Government sold the privilege to collect rubber throughout the Free State Territory. It was alleged that the Government authorized the use of force in securing service for the rubber and other industries. At least one could safely say that the Government at Brussels was silent when forced labor was resorted to by the concessionaires. It must be remembered that stockholders demanded dividends. Thus, pressure was placed on agents of average or less than average morality and humaneness. Often they found it profitable to use a native military force which was picked from cannibalistic tribes. It should also be remembered that many people of the region were reluctant to work. Their needs were few and pay was poor. They were policed by cannibalistic foes. The police and the concessionaires made the labor regime one of great injustice and cruelty. Competition between firms did not lessen the situation.

The press and alert American missionaries could have informed themselves easily of the inhuman treatment from the published reports

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22 Ibid., pp. 212-213.
of the British vice-consul, Mr. Mitchell who was stationed in the area. He informed the public on native conscription and the continuance of slavery. Prospective workers were hunted in the forests by soldiers and brought in chained by the neck like criminals. They were conscripted to serve in the Army or put to work as laborers. One American missionary and traveler contended that the dogs in his kennels were better treated than twenty blacks which he saw along the Congo. 23

American missionaries fully realized that the good Samaritan concept was unheard of in the relations between employer and native worker. Heavy pieces of iron were placed under the scales by the concessionaire agents to cheat the natives. Lumps of false materials were placed in measures. Natives were often beaten just before their term closed, so that they would run away without pay. Moreover, when natives had carried loads for some distance, they often were accused by the agents of theft so as to have an excuse for not paying them. 24

The rate for labor was one which the civilized worker did not envy. The most common payment per man was one or two yards of calico and a certain measure of salt per year. It was nothing unusual to pay a native worker thirty-one cents and a knife valued at twelve cents for a full year's work. A village of 240 was forced to provide one ton of food-stuff for which they were paid the total meager

24 Weeks, op. cit., p. 151.
sum of $3.80 per year. Profits were high with rubber selling at $5.25 per basket. The highest wage found was eighty cents per month to steamer boys. The Belgians added a ration of rice which was insufficient to keep the steamer boys from deserting to the French who paid eighty cents in cash per day.²⁵

Under the above conditions, it was not long before specific evidence on criminal mistreatment of large masses of native labor was brought to the fore. These charges, which were given wide publicity by the press of Great Britain, Germany, France and even in Brussels were originally propounded and spearheaded by Roger Casement, British consul at Boma.²⁶ The main charges against Leopold II were three. He was accused of making slaves of twenty million natives whom he had promised to protect. The treatment which they received laid the basis for the atrocity stories. Secondly, he was accused of breaking his promise to keep the Congo open to trade. He had, in reality, closed it to all nations. The third accusation declared that, he had retained all of the revenues of the country and its trade for himself.²⁷

Mr. Henry Wellington Wack, an American lawyer, from New York became a paid agent of Leopold. He wrote that the King had personally

²⁶Gracey, loco. cit., p. 212.
²⁷Davis, op. cit., p. 94.
expended upwards of 3,000,000 francs per year for the founding and maintenance of the State. Wack deplored the fact that, only Leopold II seemed sincerely interested in improving the lot of the Congolese. Implying that the monarch was the true philanthropist, he wrote as follows:

Indeed no one felt disposed to support an African enterprise which promised to yield only enlightened niggers. 28 Wack was, however, unable to convince his readers. They were reassured that the shrewd and wily King would not be so foolish as to throw recklessly in a bottomless hole in darkest Africa the sum of 3,000,000 francs per year unless he anticipated a golden return by way of ivory tusks, black rubber and other products.

Official corroborating evidence in the support of the charges was soon made by three consuls. Clarence R. Slocum wrote to our Assistant Secretary of State that, if his report of December 1, 1906, from Boma were given to the press, he would be restricted greatly in his activities in the Congo Free State. He described the State as a great commercial enterprise which sought to exploit ivory and rubber. State taxation on river craft precluded private competition. As a result of increasing taxation and various restrictions, only five national firms of the members of the Berlin Congo Conference were allowed to trade. Obviously, this was not in harmony with the Berlin Act of 1884-1885. 29 He further stated that no money was in

circulation and that taxes were paid in kind, usually in rubber. The State also got one of every two ivory tusks with each elephant killed. Meanwhile no public utilities or improvements of any kind were made from the taxes.30

Almost a year later, James A. Smith wrote from the Congo stating that high native taxation existed. Moreover, bad treatment of natives made for cessation of voluntary work. He held that the Congolese was not lazy, but that the taxes were unjustifiable. To him, it was quite plainly seen that the Congo Government openly violated its obligation to the inhabitants. This was also a transgression of the Berlin Act of 1884-1885.31

According to a communication of William H. Handley, our consular representative in the Congo, the Belgian Government's policy of forced labor was not to its best interest economically. He felt that their employment system plus the effects of sleeping sickness would revert in a serious depopulation. This would harm commerce to a very considerable degree. He was quite positive that the Congo Government's labor policy was in direct violation of the Berlin Act which distinctly bound the Powers:

...to watch over the conservation of the indigenous population, and the amelioration of their moral and material conditions of existence.32

30Ibid., See A. J. Wauters, Le Mouvement Geographique, (January 1906), pp. 1-5 ff. In his critique "La Case de l'Oncle Tom", internal evidence showed slavery under both blacks and whites.


Grover Clark, an astute scholar of modern imperialism disrobed the more recent exploiters of their guise of morality. He easily recognized Divine mission as the cloak of altruism which covered their ruthless aggression. It was "royalty's as well as the West's attire in allegedly conveying civilization to the Congolese." Moreover, in the successful gain of territory, which was internationally approved, the sovereignty of the civilized Power was supposed to be absolute over this indigenous group.

However where moral waves occurred, and the administration of the territory became too brutal, public protest from other powers have led to the extent of interference. An editor, in reflections on "The King and the Congo" in 1906, was very dubious of intervention and the investigation of Congo affairs by the entire group of signatories of the Conference of 1884-1885. Aware that Leopold II was considering very seriously instituting certain reforms, the editor interpreted the move as a fact of tacit admission that there had been serious abuses. He viewed the measures with a definite amount of skepticism. The King's agents had the power arbitrarily to determine the form in which the taxes were paid and the value of the goods or of the labor with which they were paid. Nevertheless, recognizing the pressure of universal morality, the editor wrote that:

Moral considerations do now and then count for a good deal, even for more than the sovereign ruler of an independent state may be able to withstand.

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34Ibid., p. 213.
It has long been evident that the Congo Reform Association had a very prominent part in developing adverse world opinion respecting inhumane state of affairs in the Congo. One of its most successful techniques was the use of memorials. Hence, a significant petition was presented to the President in 1904. It was signed by the executive members of the Congo Reform Association, its supporters, members of the British Parliament, the Antislavery Society, the Aborigines' Protective Society and officials of the International Arbitration and Peace Association. From the contents of the request, it was plain that all other Powers took for granted our philanthropic interest in recognition of the Congo. Of greater significance, was the Powers' expectation that the United States would move to intervene to eliminate violence and oppression on the basis of our past actions and our separate treaty of 1891 with the Congo and because of the profound interest in the welfare of the Negro in America. 36

It should not be inferred that the humane interest of American citizens was whetted wholly through the efforts of the Congo Reform Association. Granted that the United States has not fulfilled the expectations of critics at home and abroad, the country has always maintained sufficient moral fervor to be concerned about maltreatment of the down-trodden. Our leading official representative who was at the Congo Conference, was often reminded of this fact by

36Department of State, Memorial presented to the President of the United States of America, concerning affairs in the Congo State, by the Congo Reform Association, supported by the British and Foreign Antislavery Society, and the Aborigines' Protective Society. October, 1904.
letters sent to him between 1906 and 1907. One such writer was deeply moved by a descriptive statement of the cruelties of Leopold's soldiers. A professor from Drake University sought, through Kasson, certain documents from the State Department for classroom purposes. A lady sent to Kasson Mark Twain's "King Leopold's Soliloquy". Those letters were more or less typical of the strong humanitarian interest which was still manifested in the Congo.37

Both the religious and secular press took a growing interest in preventing mayhem which was apparently condoned by Leopold. A Methodist periodical, *The World Wide Missions*, in February of 1902, published an open letter of petition and an appeal by the Secretaries of the Forty Foreign Missions Boards. In fairness to the interest of all, they sought action to eliminate the Congo atrocities. To the State Department they expressed themselves as follows:

We submit that simple issue thus presented involves a primary test of national and international honor, and that longer withholding of manifestation of this measure of international concern for these words of the nations would leave upon all powers responsible for it a lasting reproach.

If the convening of an international conference was important in the opening of the Congo territory, it would seem that a conference for a review of the issue in all its phases is indispensible for wise and just dealing now.

In the name of humanity, of international justice, of regard for the primal rights of man, we would ask that you will use the full power reposed in governments by the Supreme Ruler in the interests of an immediate discharge by the nations of their responsibility of guardship over the remnant of the humble people who a generation ago,

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37Kasson Papers. L. J. Kasson (Des Moines) to John H. Kasson, April 14, 1906; Prof. F. I. Herriott to Kasson (DC), July 28, 1906; Mary F. Gray to Kasson (DC), January 5, 1907.
without choice of their own, were brought out of their isolation into relations with the world of men and states. 38

Seven months later, The Missionary Review of the World published an article by E. D. Morel, President of the Congo Reform Association, which sought to arouse Americans from their lethargy respecting the Belgian treatment of the Congo natives. This lengthy publication presented what was regarded as documentary proof of ill-treatment in this section of Africa. Pictures displayed men, women and children who were either maimed, beaten or shot by native police or white agents. 39 Two years previously, another missionary had written in the same journal a description of the atrocities which were considered as common occurrences. He held that there were suspended mutilated limbs of bodies on stocks, such as knees which were hacked off or hands severed at the wrists. Limbs were broken with revolver bullets. Some collectors staked naked natives to the ground in a burning sun or resorted to use of the hippo whip. The right hand of some women were severed when their husbands failed to produce the desired quota of rubber or other goods needed by the agents. In other instances, natives' districts and villages were fired to terrorize the collectors to gather more. An American soldier, Captain Guy Barrows, substantiated the above to the Associated


Press on January 2, 1902 in London, following six years of service in the Congo. \(^{10}\)

Many people expected immediate results in conveyance of international pressure. Still more individuals anticipated an immediate cessation of ill-treatment to the natives. One observer felt that it continued because of the cupidity of Leopold and the apathy and the indifference of people in general. He was also of the opinion that the silence of Elihu Root, American Secretary of State, and Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Secretary, were big factors for its continuance. \(^{41}\) Meanwhile the Congo Government continually denied the charges but the Tribune suggested a more sensible course.

It might be the better part of wisdom for the Congo Government, instead of resisting, to invite and facilitate the fullest possible international scrutiny of its affairs. The national interest of the powers in its affairs and their moral responsibilities and privileges in relation to them are obvious and indisputable. \(^{42}\)

Incidentally, the deletions from Henry Lane Wilson's number forty-four was certainly in line with Secretary Root's silence. However, this particular report in general dealt with a synopsis on "The Truth in the Congo". As such, there were several paragraphs dealing with British sources. Wilson, who probably desired to be

\(^{10}\)Gracey, loco. cit., p. 214.

\(^{41}\)Davis, op. cit., p. 97. Cf. New York Times, Dec. 19, 1906. See Congo Atrocities. Leopold II was extracting through atrocities an annual sum of $10,000,000, seemingly approved by the United States and Great Britain.

as objective as possible, introduced those paragraphs with "it is alleged". Nevertheless, the tenor of the entire report was closely parallel with the other reports sent by our consul and the observations made by the missionaries. The following quoted section gave an insight into the reluctance of our Department to intervene or meddle into the affairs of a European Power:

Looking at the various points, the Report deals with, (viz.,) land policy, taxes in labor, military expeditions, concessions, depopulation, adoption of abandoned children, the recruiting of soldiers and workmen and the judicial organization, one sees (and this point is especially important) that the Commission, far from blaming the system adopted by the State, openly and heartily approves of it.43

The gentlemen of the fourth estate did not launch on a specific crusade against the atrocities in the Congo. However, the general tone of the American press between April and December of 1906 certainly left it clear that the citizens of the United States desired better rule in the Congo. On March 31, the executive personnel of the State of Massachusetts circulated a petition asking relief for the Congo Free State, which was sent to the President of the United States. Moreover, a personal letter was sent by Governor Curtis Guild Jr., which endorsed the petition.44

The editor saw no grounds of morals, law or reason why we should set the affairs of the Congo right and at the same time leave Santo Domingo to its fate. The Tribune reporter at the same time wrote of


44New York Tribune, March 31, 1906. This particular paper was chosen as typical of those which were interested in the Congo Question.
the efforts of Secretary of Treasury, Oscar Straus and a minister
who were urging us to take the lead in International arbitration to
end the Congo horrors. The Reverend Herbert S. Johnson spoke of
the work of the Belgian Commission of Inquiry which did not white-
wash Leopold. He alleged that the Commission tabulated over 6,000
hands cut from human beings.\footnote{Ibid., April 9, 1906. Cf. Editorial page six. April 11, 1906.} At the same time, Dr. William N.
Rice, on behalf of the Methodist Church, sought action or help of
the Pope in conjunction with other churches.\footnote{Ibid., April 11, 1906.}

In October of the same year, the American Board of Foreign
Missions sent to Secretary Root a resolution which was unanimously
adopted. Signed by President Capen, Dr. Washington Gladden of
Columbus, Ohio, and President Angell of the University of Michigan,
it strongly condemned cruelty in the Congo. Approximately a month
later, the Presbyterians petitioned the State Department to get
results under the Brussels Act. Simultaneously, the Episcopalians
in a resolution urged the Government to take such action with the
great Powers of Europe as would put an end to cruelty and murder and
secure in its place the just and philanthropic treatment of the
native population. The latter were originally guaranteed upon the
formation of the Congo Free State.\footnote{Ibid., October 13, 1906. Rec., November 15, 1906.}

In December, the Interchurch Conference of the Evangelical
group took a strong stand against the atrocities. The Reverend E.
B. Sanford, secretary of the executive committee, in an address to the Protestant Evangelical Churches of Baltimore, took issue with the noted Cardinal Gibbons. The Cardinal, who apparently was misinformed, made a strong speech in defense of Leopold II and his operation of the Congo. Sanford, who incidentally, was not related to Henry Sanford, Leopold's employee, made a stronger rebuttal. Similarly, Reverend Dr. H. Gratton Guinness of London, while visiting in America, likewise took the Cardinal to task. Unfortunately none of the above disputants lived long enough to read the Belgian archival material of Leopold's own officials. This data indicted the King on his conduct of operating the Congo Free State.

Concern for the Congo Question was a serious matter with President Theodore Roosevelt. He was frequently left with a feeling of inadequacy and frustration because he could not react in the manner which the American people desired. To Honorable Oscar Solomon Straus he wrote:

Large numbers of people, including for instance Andrew D. White, have headed one petition, and the Governor of Massachusetts is heading another, asking that we interfere about the Congo Free State. ... I do not have to tell you, my dear Straus, what apparently some others are wholly unable to understand, namely, that it is a literal physical impossibility to interfere in any of these cases, save in the most guarded manner, under penalty of making this nation ridiculous and aggravating instead of ameliorating the fate of those for whom we interfere.

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48 Ibid., December 19, 1906. The Cardinal had only to check the New York Tribune of June 6, 1906. Here was reported grave charges against the King by Mr. Vandervelde. Cf. Morgan Papers, XXII, l3l3. Two of the three members of the Commission of Inquiry were Catholic.

In August of that year, Mr. Roosevelt corresponded with a steel magnate on the matter of securing some way "effectively to interfere in the Congo Free State to secure more righteous government". Roosevelt found no satisfactory way to interfere there, in Turkey about the Armenians, or in Russia about the welfare of the Jews. He refused to place himself out on a limb. In evidence, he made this explanation:

The one thing I won't do is bluff when I cannot make good; to bluster and threaten and then fail to take the action if my words need to be backed up.\(^50\)

Mr. Roosevelt was quite aware that Leopold granted commercial concessions to American citizens to assuage American feelings. He was also aware that, instead of easing the situation, it only aroused our humanitarians to further action. Moreover, there appeared to be a move on the part of some Republican Conventions to insert the issue in their platform. At least, Roosevelt was aware that Massachusetts had avoided doing this while sympathizing for the persecuted Jews in Russia. However, a Republican worker felt otherwise. Thus, Roosevelt forewarned Henry Cabot Lodge:

Moody starts this afternoon for Massachusetts. It seems to me he has excellent ideas about a platform. The only tomfoolery that any one seems bent on is that about the Congo Free State outrages, and that is imbecile rather than noxious.\(^51\)

By January of 1907, Mr. Roosevelt had resigned himself to the fact that our action on the Congo Question was a matter of limit for

\(^50\)Ibid., No. 3993 to Andrew Carnegie, August 6, 1906.

\(^51\)Ibid., No. 4086. Roosevelt to Lodge. Washington, October 2, 1906.
effectiveness and dignity. We should not resort to words which could not be backed up in deeds. Our humanitarianism apparently was straining his patience for thus he wrote to Dr. Lyman Abbott, noted Divine and famous lecturer:

I am all the time being asked to interfere for the Jews in Russia, Armenians in Turkey, natives of the Congo Free State.... But you know as well as I do that it would be simple nonsense to start such a crusade unless the country were prepared to back it up; and the country has not the remotest intention of fighting on such an issue.52

Although the history of the Congo had taken on a new look quite different from that to which he was accustomed, Senator Morgan again found that he was connected closely with it. In view of requests for his aid and the aggressive program of the Congo Reform Association, he sought a clarification of its action. John Daniels, Secretary of the Association wrote to him on January 8, 1907 in answer to Morgan's query. He was informed that the Association was not a sectarian movement. Protestants, Catholics, Jews and agnostics gave it their aid. The Senator was advised that two of the strongest books for the Association were written by Catholics, Cattier and Ver Meersch. He was made aware of the strong stand taken by J. P. Morgan, Lyman Abbott, Robert C. Ogden and others, whose charges against Leopold were not susceptible of refutation.53

Typical of the letters which Morgan received from persons who felt that he was a devotee of American humanitarianism was the one


sent by a Mr. J. B. Murray. Writing from 80 Broadway in New York City, he urged the Senator to use his influence to withdraw our recognition from that "trade association".

If you agree with me in this, will you not write to, and use your influence with, the President, and, too, ask him to withdraw any recognition we may have given to that flag and do all else in his power to stop this worse than slave trade?54

The clamor of the American public was reflected in the President's message to Congress on December 3, 1907. He held that our "aim is disinterestedly to help other nations where such help can be wisely given without the appearance of meddling".55

Two years later, President Taft held that the question on Belgian annexation of the Congo was "still sympathetically open". We were aware that many suggestions had been brought forth to improve the lot of the native. Our attitude of benevolent encouragement was, ... coupled with hopeful trust that the good work... so ardently desired... will satisfy the demands of humane sentiment throughout the world.56

Apparently, President Taft was overly optimistic. In April of that very year, Henry Wilson sent a report to the Department which indicated that the Belgian urge for the franc was too great to eliminate forced labor. Official consideration on this specific matter occurred in the deliberations of the Belgian Chamber of

54 Ibid., J. B. Murray to Morgan, March 11, 1907. Murray was motivated by an exposé of the New York Times of December 19, 1906.
55 Foreign Relations (1907), p. 61.
56 Ibid., (1909), pp. 11-12.
Deputies. Vandervelde, the leading liberal, voted for the repeal of forced labor weakly inserted in a colonial law of exploitation. He was also unsuccessful when the Chamber desired this type of labor for the Great Lake Railway. By a vote of 72-35, on April 1, 1909, his resolution which follows was defeated:

... that forced labor was a crime,... intended to benefit the shareholder (and was) a violation of Article II of the Government of the Congo.57

The effort to shield or protect the King from the charges hurled at him took an unusual turn in October of 1904. To soften or erase the attack of Morel at the International Peace Conference, a special messenger, M. G. Francoite was despatched to President Roosevelt by the Government. The Belgian Government requested the President to use his good office in mediation between Russia and Japan for restoration of peace and full cessation of the Russo-Japanese War. That move was designed to take the public spotlight away from Leopold's Congo policy. Its effectiveness was offset by the unsuccessful address of Cardinal Gibbons. It was planned to be an assist to Baron Moncheur, the Belgian Minister, who sought to ease criticism by defending the King.58

The Belgian Protective Association of America not only attempted to defend the Congo Administration but was the chief sponsor of a movement to prevent the United States from taking steps "to end the

57 No. 479. Henry Lane Wilson to Secretary Knox. April 2, 1909. It was voted down on the assumption of the fact that the railroad would soon be completed, making the measure unnecessary.

58 New York Daily Tribune, October 8, 1904.
atrocious cruelties of the Congo". It had organized branches throughout the country. Members of this group constantly reiterated the view that the charges against Leopold II and his Congo policy were "unfounded and unjust and inspired by religious rivalry and commercial jealousy". In late December of 1906 and early January of 1907, the Protective Association wrote Secretary Hay and President Roosevelt to refrain from any act of intervention, and from encouraging the same, in the Congo affair.\(^5^9\) The Protective Association was ineffective in stemming the tide of petitions which motivated the introduction and successful adoption of the Lodge resolution in 1907.

The disposition of the accusations by Stanley in defense of the King and his Congo policy was unique and amusing. To him, the charges were legends which were fabricated for travelers. Unfortunately these people had been exposed too long to African winds and had become the prey of "climatic maladies".\(^6^0\) Obviously, he overlooked the fact that by the same tokens, his letters of castigation of Portuguese officials, American consuls and missionaries could be classified likewise as the result of the influences of climate. He rationalized in saying that France, the United States, Germany or Great Britain could not have managed the Congo better than Leopold. Nevertheless, with the Kipling concept, he felt that the white man must remain

\(^{5^9}\) Kongo Minor File (1906-1910), XXXIII, Letters of Protests, October 30, 1906, (np). The Suffolk County Branch of the American Federation of Societies was similar to the Belgian Protective Association. Only three negative papers were found in the preceding volume. The ratio of pro-interventionists to the B.P.A. was about 50 to 3.

\(^{6^0}\) Wack, op. cit., p. 399.
master of the Congo.\textsuperscript{61}

Mr. Wack, Leopold II's agent accused Reverend W. M. Morrison of Lexington, Virginia of being the source of American agitation. Wack further alleged that Morrison was influenced by British merchants and fanatics. He felt that the root of Morrison's plea came from the Presbyterian preachers' charge that his missionary group had not been given equal and adequate consideration. Wack also bawled that the Congo affair was none of Uncle Sam's business. He felt that we would suffer acute embarrassment if we permitted the Congo Reform Association to guide us into a conspiracy against Leopold. Wack advised us to follow the example of Cardinal Gibbons, who incidentally had been recently elevated from the position of Archbishop.\textsuperscript{62}

The Congo Free State Consul General at Baltimore, James Whiteley, and later a financial partner of T. F. Ryan, frequently came to the defense of the State and the King. He wrote letters to the press in denial of Congo mutilations. On other occasions, he took to task those who criticized the King for alleged cruelties in the Congo. He was especially bitter against Reverend Johnson who quoted the figure of 6,000 hands lost by the natives. Whiteley held that the total was nearer a dozen and the natives were to blame in such cases.\textsuperscript{63}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{61}Ibid.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{62}Ibid., pp. 386, ff. On page 292, Wack accused the mining and rubber interest of conspiring against the Congo Free State.
\end{flushright}

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{63}Ibid., December 3, 1906.
\end{flushright}

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IN THE RUBBER COILS
SCENE: THE CONGO "FREE" STATE.
In a letter to the same journal in November, he again defended the King's rule. Ever officious, he took an impertinent delight in restating the position of the United States as enunciated by Root in February of 1905. "The United States has no treaty right to intervention".64

On or about December 10, 1906, Leopold II made a statement to the press in defense of his rule. He did not deny that cases of misjudgment had not occurred in the past on the part of Congo officials. Even cruelties and crime had occurred. He stated that there were a number of prosecutions and condemnations before the Congo tribunals for these offenses.

But I do deny that every effort, as far as possible has not been made in the past to stop the ill-treatment of the natives, not only by the whites but also by the natives themselves.65

Leopold disclaimed making a huge fortune. He claimed that he had no investments in the Congo. As one would expect, this brought on laughter.66

The best analysis of this critical part of the Leopold II period has been made by James H. Gore to whose complete and accurate translation of the activities of the Commission of Inquiry and action of Leopold's Committee of Recommendations we have already referred. To investigate conditions in the Congo, a Belgian decree

64Ibid., December 3, 1906.
65The Times (London), December 11, 1906.
66Ibid. It was on this occasion that he spoke on American investments and on the American Congo Company in which the Belgian investors had one-half the shares.
of July 15, 1904, created a Commission of Inquiry. It was to be appointed by the Congo State Attorney. Another decree of July 23, 1904, gave to it the power of the State Attorney and unlimited authority in the reception of pertinent testimony of all sorts. There was also no limitation on the duration of its appointment. A Government despatch of September 5, 1905, instructed the Commission to devote all its efforts to the complete discovery of the truth. The Commission left Antwerp on September 15, 1904, for the Congo.67

Its period of investigation extended from October 5, 1904 to February 21, 1905. Its leading members of the Commission were Edmond Janssens, Giacomo Nisco, E. de Schumacher and V. Denyn. The translator was Henri Gregoire, a young native African who spoke excellent French and the peculiar language of the country, the Mongo.68

The logical classification of criticisms according to the Commission, related principally to: (1) legislation bearing on land and the freedom of trade; (2) the system of forced labour and abuse of which resulted from the exercise of compulsion; (3) military expeditions, holding of hostages, ill-treatment, mutilation, etc.; (4) the system of concessions; (5) depopulation and its causes; (6) guardianship assumed by the State or Catholic missions over abandoned children; (7) the recruiting of soldiers and laborers;


68 Ibid., p. 6.
and (8) the administration of justice. 69

When the Commission investigated the land situation, it found that the law of the Free State had never defined the clause "land occupied by the natives". Furthermore, the courts had never had the occasion (nor had never been given the opportunity) to pass upon this question. In 1904, one considered only native villages or that area under cultivation as "native land". The prevailing attitude was based on the decrees of 1892-1893. The official view was that the State held inviolable right to all unoccupied land. The Congo land policy also made possible the prohibition of native freedom to travel or move except by a permit. All natural products of the soil were the property of the State or the concession company. Hence, only garden and agricultural products were marketable by the native. 70

The most complex problem or question with which the Commission had to deal was the ever present one of taxation. At this stage, the State had not resorted to the use of money. Possibly the idea of barter in which the exploiting white gained the better exchange was uppermost in mind. Taxation was not imposed on the principle of individual liberty. Likewise, it was not carried out on a basis of prestation, as in a performance of something due upon obligation. 71

A royal decree of December 5, 1892, which was not published in the Bulletin Official, instructed the Congo Secretary of State "to

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69 Ibid., p. 16.
70 Ibid., pp. 18, 20 & 24.
71 Ibid., p. 30.
take whatever steps he may deem necessary or practical to assure
the exploitation of (the private domain). This was a reference to
the entire territory of the Upper Congo, an area of 800,000 square
miles known as the "Domaine Privé". Close and long observation
revealed the fact that the Congo administration gave "le pourvoir
d' y puiser le droit d' exiger". The members of the administration
drew from the secret decree the right to make assessments. A decree
of November 18, 1903, presumably changed the arbitrary discretion of
this delegated right to the agents of companies. This decree,
which set a uniform law for the taxation of natives, proved unfavor­
able. It was simple to see why. The agents fixed the tax rates
far in excess of forty hours per month. Moreover, the assessment did
not vary with fluctuations in population, resources or distances of
transportation or portage.

There were various types of imposts or taxes placed upon the
natives. The tax on ground nuts (peanuts) was quite too high. The
imposition made the cultivation of this product unprofitable for
both State and natives. The tax on food supply was disproportion­
ately planned. Where long journeys by adult males were involved, this
charge frequently fell as a responsibility on the women. It was
placed upon chickwangue, fish, game and domestic animals. The un­
fortunate part rested in the fact that the native was exposed to
constant cheating. The tax of obligatory labor involved cutting
wood, post work, rowing and carrier work. It was a poor system, with

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72 Ibid., p. 33.
73 Ibid., p. 37.
almost no pay and under despotic personnel. It was a type of tax which incurred native disfavor. It exposed families to long periods of separation. Worse yet, it entailed the use of overseers of the aggressive cannibal. As a tax, natives were required to harvest domain products. They led a miserable life in gathering rubber. They were exposed to bad weather, beasts, thirst and were often without adequate food and medical care.74

In military expeditions of the State or constabulary forces of the companies, whites, too often, resorted to coercion. The Commission secured ample evidence of mutilation, flogging, rape, murder and brutality. The volume of their findings was in such quantity that it was necessary to supplement the main body of the report with an appendix.

The Committee of Recommendations of 1905 whose personnel constituted of various outstanding governmental officers from Belgium and the Congo Free State was created for two purposes. It was to blue print proposals, suggestions and create practical means for carrying them out. As previously stated, instead this Committee assumed an unexpected stand. After reading the findings of the Inquiry Commission, the Committee whitewashed Leopold. Far from blaming the system adopted by the State, the Committee approved it.75

Mr. Adee and Secretary Root read both the "Gore enclosure" and La Verite sur le Congo, originally a semi-official organ, and

74 Ibid., p. 43 ff.

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concluded that the charges of bad conditions and rule in the Congo were gross under-statements. They were aware that the latter publication had originally worked in the interest of the Congo State and the King. The issue of La Verite sur le Congo of June 30, 1906 was a direct contradiction to its previous efforts. The conclusions of our diplomatic officials did not mean that caution would be immediately thrown aside in a rash move to satisfy the American public of humanitarianism. They were realists.

Some telescopic post-views of Leopold's inhumanity to man revealed not only a difference in treatment but also a difference in outlook between the rampart era of imperialism and the more modern view of progress. Thus, Clark observed that brutality finally aroused a storm of public outburst and protest in Europe and the United States which the Belgian Government could not ignore. Hence, in 1908, the Belgian Parliament removed the Congo from Leopold's hands and put it under the Belgian administration as a colony.77

In a very recent publication, both Leopold and Stanley were severely criticized for their treatment of their dusky Congo subjects. Their genuine admiration for Dr. Livingstone "went hand in hand with the treatment of Negroes which would have scarcely won the approval of the great Scottish missionary". Any consideration for reforms and

76 Numerical File (1906-1910), CICVII. Case 1806, Annex I.

77 Clark, op. cit., p. 72. "While he lived, however, he saw to it that the profit from rubber, ivory, the illicit slave trade and other products and activities went into his own private pockets."
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76 *Numerical File (1906-1910)*, CXCVII. Case 1806, Annex I.

77 Clark, *op. cit.*, p. 72. "While he lived, however, he saw to it that the profit from rubber, ivory, the illicit slave trade and other products and activities went into his own private pockets."
implied that Leopold was very realistic. He did not deny that
Leopold was materialistic and without scruples. This particular
scholar felt that the Congo labor tax was the only method which
could be exacted by the commercial agents as well as the govern­
mental agents.81 The concept of the only method may well be
questioned. Certainly, the manner in which it was carried out was
revolting and repugnant.

81Buell, op. cit., II, pp. 429-32 ff. The author noted that
Leopold, who allegedly spent millions on his mistresses, put the
national conscience to sleep by giving Belgium the most magnificent
public works in Europe. p. 433.
CHAPTER XI

INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS, MOGULS AND LOBBYISTS

From almost every point of view the way in which Leopold II exploited the Congo in 1887 failed to appear attractive and favorable in Wall Street. In terms of personal interest, the King saw the desirability of eliminating foreign stockholders from his enterprise. Buying them out, he avoided all possible critics. Thus, since 1887, the Congo ceased to be international in any real sense of the word. However, special monopolies which caught the eye of international investors were awarded from time to time. Even in these, Leopold was always a heavy shareholder.¹

Granted that this was part of the period when our State Department under Bayard was cool toward the Congo, there was, perhaps, another important factor—the labor problem. The natives were not then concerned about the regeneration of Africa. Their immediate needs were relatively easy to satisfy. The result was that agents who felt the pressure of their absentee investor—employers began to use the "lazy Congolese" in forced labor.² This was a stigma which Wall Street generally tried to avoid if possible. Meanwhile Leopold and the Belgian investors unexpectedly found it necessary to spend more money than had been anticipated on the suppression of revolts by natives "who found on closer acquaintance, that they objected to

¹Hoskins, op. cit., pp. 42. ff.
European 'protection'. Even apart from such uprisings, it was alleged by the famous English railway expert, Varian, that the annual native African death rate in railway construction was about seventy-five percent.

It is also possible that some potential Wall Street investors might have been deterred temporarily by rumors of deficits in the operation of the Congo territory. It was well-known that good government was lacking. This defect plus generally deplorable conditions, excused on the grounds of "lack of revenue", were not the best possible inducements to foreign capitalists. Notwithstanding the fact that the Congo State later resorted to loans and the payment of native taxes in rubber, investors might have suspected that the treasury was systematically pillaged by the King. The Official Bulletin of June 1902, page six which deals primarily with Parliamentary debates, makes some reference to this diversion of funds. There was also a disclosure of a similar nature in a publication of Professor Cattier of Brussels University to the effect that pillaging and misrule were reasons for the deficits.

Buell has succinctly described the gain of King Leopold from the Congo venture. He was a huge stockholder in every concession granted. Although the Belgian Government got 23,000,000 francs on transfer of the property in 1908, Leopold got the usufruct. The Congo paid the

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3Bartlett, op. cit., p. 96

Royal family, by governmental stipulation, a sum equal to that of any amount invested by the government in Public Work projects in the Congo. In the summer of 1907, Leopold established a trust fund, Foundation de Niederfulbach, to which he secretly transferred fourteen million francs and also bonds valued at thirty million francs. This organization was under German and Belgian trustees. According to one will, fifteen million francs were left by Leopold. Actually it was eighty. He systematically juggled the transactions and took out of the Congo far more than indicated.⁵

Our official reaction to the trade possibilities of West Africa, however, could have caused others in Wall Street to take a more venturesome outlook. The summary report for trade on the West Coast under Secretary Olney appeared promising for the future. The area which included the Congo seemed to offer a larger field for the increase of American trade in manufactured goods. The products of the West Coast, palm oil, kernels, oil seeds, rubber and ivory would enjoy large consumption here. This would have insured a return trade in any effort made for the enlargement of our commerce. The report strongly held that if we had direct trade, we could have bought $3,600,000 of our $15,000,000 annual rubber import directly from first


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hands. During the next four years, there was a constant recommendation for steamship lines running to the West Coast. By 1902, we officially had taken a greater interest in foreign trade.

The United States is becoming more and more alive to the fact that foreign trade is a good thing to hold on to even during the flush times, and is more likely to be of immense value at a turn of a tide. Soon we shall have a large surplus of manufactured goods which we must export.

There will be a more strenuous rivalry for even yet, we cannot be said to be manufacturing expressly for export to any large extent.... However in the Continental agitation "for the improvement of Governmental facilities, such as the consular services, the work of commercial agents, the publication of industrial and commercial reports for the promotion of trade", competition will be keener.

At the same time that our administration and legislators were concerned about world trade, the African angle, in particular, Leopold II, was willing to grant large areas of land or monopolies over the products of the soil in the Congo as a means of securing capital for various developments. His concession policy did indeed attract investors. For example, a decree of March 11, 1902 established the Katanga Railway Company with a capital of one million francs. Sixty percent by the Congo Independent State was subscribed with forty

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7 5th Cong. 1st sess. House Doc. 481, (1899-1900), XCVI, p. 89.


The trade report of the Fifty-eighth American Congress had an alert eye on Africa. It was made quite clear that the continent was on the march. Emphasis was placed on the abundance of its natural resources. It was noted that the country was very favorably disposed to the United States. The need for direct communication was again stressed. Our Consul-General, J. B. Smith of Boma Congo, in the following year reiterated this need in commenting on our trade outlook.

There was not an article of foreign trade either in imports or exports in which the United States could not profitably participate if we sought activity in a direct manner.

Incidentally, in 1907, over $4,000,000 of goods were imported by the Belgian Congo. Of this sum, cotton goods totaled $1,116,000 and the remainder of the goods entered were all available for export in the United States.

It should be remembered that the King did not find it absolutely necessary to make new financial ties in the United States for the exploitation of the Congo. Sanford, who was in his employ had numerous wealthy friends back in this country. The ex-Minister himself invested

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10 Varian, op. cit., pp. 206 ff. Williams was the successor to Cecil Rhodes in railway building. Varian was the chief engineer.


heavily in the Sanford Exploring Expedition, a subsidiary of the Société Hollandaise de Rotterdam. Of greater significance was Leopold’s financial relations with J. Pierpont Morgan. The latter had invested large sums in the Chinese Railroad in Leopold’s behalf. The American stockholders and Leopold between them held the monopoly. The King expressed deep regret to Senator Lodge when it was obvious that control was going into Chinese hands. President Roosevelt reversed his decision and turned over the American interests including Leopold’s to the Chinese Government. To the monarch this was evidence of the peculiarities of the American Government.11

Mounting pressure, however, made it imperative that Leopold turn abroad in the effort to raise capital for exploitation of the Congo. Sanford’s commercial venture was not successful. Rivalry on the part of English interests plus the atrocity exposures of Morel and Casement made it difficult for Leopold to interest European financiers. Within his own country, the Socialists led by Emile Vandervelde were extremely critical of financial and political operations in the Congo.15 The interest of the United States had eased Leopold’s worries about respect for the flag, support at the Conference


15Frankel, op. cit., p. 77.
and recognition of the Independent State of the Congo. Why not let us again pull the royal chestnuts from the fire? Should he as King listen to Wack who advised him to "let a streak of red, white and blue run through the yellow and black in the Congo"? When the atrocity stories received world-wide publicity, Wack again made the suggestion to Leopold.

Open up a strip of territory clear across the Congo State from east to west for benefit of American capital. Take the present concessionaires by the throat if necessary and compel them to share their privileges with the Americans. In this manner, you will create an American vested interest in the Congo which will render the yelping of the English agitators and Belgian Socialists futile.\footnote{ibid.}

Unknown to the King, a group of prominent American business men became seriously interested in forming a rubber trust in 1892. This movement was led by Charles Flint, founder of the Rubber Trust in the United States. He was successful in bringing about the formation of the United States Rubber Company with tangible assets of $12,000,000. Samuel P. Colt, President of the United States Rubber Company in 1906 requested Flint to negotiate for the entire output of crude rubber from the Belgian Congo.\footnote{ibid.} The great increase in the consumption of

\textbf{New York American, December 11, 1906.} In 1905, Wack made this statement to the King who appears to have held such ideas long previous to their Spring discussion. Besides the reference of color to investment by the United States, he meant yellow for Congo sand and black for the natives, a greater number of whom are incidentally brown.

\textbf{Charles Ranlett Flint, Memories of An Active Life, Men, Ships and Sealing Wax,} (New York City: G. P. Putman and Son, 1923), p. 300. The original directors were J. Edward Simmons, President of the New York Stock Exchange; John J. Waterbury, President of Manhattan Trust; Robert M. Galloway, President of the Merchant National Bank and. Colonel Wm. Barbour, Flint later sold out and was succeeded by an A. H. Alden according to Marvin Scudder of Investors' Agency.
rubber goods and attendant high prices of the raw products were two of several factors which caused Flint, Colt and others to seek a rubber combine. It was likewise feared that the outbreak of a world war would leave us in a precarious position.

Thomas Walsh, an American mine owner, in business relations with Leopold, cabled the King suggesting that he confer with Flint on rubber matters. A meeting was consequently arranged at Laerken Palace in Belgium where Flint took full notes. Leopold expected Flint to transact a cash deal and sought twenty times the annual income from the Congo rubber exports. When he sought $15,000,000 over the market value of the property involved, Flint turned down the offer of the King.\(^{19}\)

Failure to conclude an arrangement with United States Capitalists was a severe disappointment to the King. He was fully aware that the Belgian Parliament was planning to remove the Congo from his private purse to the nation's public charge.\(^{20}\) The King did not, however, give up hope. Count Henry I. Kowalsky, whom Leopold II had hired in 1906 for 100,000 francs to favorably publicize him in America, wired the King to contact Thomas Ryan, another American financier. Leopold was informed that Ryan had ample means at his disposal and that he was

\(^{19}\)Ibid.

of Catholic faith. The information was substantiated by Henry W. Wack, who made a similar recommendation.

The possibility of a deal with Ryan was too good to let pass. Leopold probably was alert to the fact that Bernard Baruch was keenly interested in rubber production. Baruch was acquainted with a new project sponsored by William A. Lawrence, to take rubber from the guayule plant. In search for cheap rubber, Baruch sent men on explorations in all the tropical districts of the world. He did not omit the Congo and its tributaries where two men lost their lives.

It is highly unlikely that Leopold was unaware that Thomas F. Ryan was a member of the Continental Rubber Company. It came into existence through the figure heads of a bonding firm, the Registrar and Transfer Company. The Continental Rubber Company was organized on January 6, 1906. It was incorporated in Jersey City with a capital of $30,000,000 on January 8, 1906. This firm was a subsidiary of the United States Rubber Company. The names of Ryan, the Guggenheims, E. B. Aldrich, Senator Nelson Aldrich of Rhode Island and John D.

21O'Connor, op. cit., p. 178. Ryan was "the adroit, nauve, noiseless man in American finance". He was the "hero of New York's traction scandal, of Equitable Life and the Tobacco Trust".


23Carter Field, Bernard Baruch: Park Bench Statesmen, (New York City: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1944), p. 60. The unstable political condition coupled with this new process caused Baruch to take up the search. Baruch later felt that he had failed to obtain the interest of the Guggenheims in the search for rubber sources and thus sold his shares. Baruch (page 63) was originally an important figure in the affairs of the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, a fifty million dollar concern chartered in New Jersey in 1877. It was also connected with the rubber trust.
Rockefeller Jr., were most prominently associated with the new corporation. A Mr. W. H. Ellis, a broker publicized the fact that the firm was out to reduce the cost of rubber from $1.37 per pound to ten to twenty-eight cents per pound. 24

With the stage thus set, Ryan, probably after consultation with the rubber trust, set out on a European tour. Both O'Connor and Holbrook failed to take into consideration the fact that Ryan had spent the previous summer in Brussels accompanied by his personal counsel. 25 O'Connor later stated that Ryan, when approached by the King in the late summer of 1906, indicated that he was in no mood for business. Holbrook maintained that Ryan took a nonchalant attitude of looking at a concession which was to reorganize, finance and exploit the Congo rubber plantations. 26 Both views were consistent

24 The Department of Commerce and Labor. Bureau of Corporations, File No. 4627. A James Rudolph Garfield Report "The American Congo Company, General Information Obtained at Request of the Department of State". See Continental Rubber Company in this Report. This is the first time that the Report, released from restriction in April, 1906, was used for research purposes. At the request of Robert Bacon, Acting Secretary of the State Department and Secretary Root, Secretary Oscar Straus of the Commerce and Labor Department instructed James Garfield, Commissioner of the Bureau of Corporations, and son of ex-President Garfield, to investigate the American Congo Company. In 1906, Wilson wrote from Brussels in despatches Nos. 131 and 137 that it was more a Belgian concern. The request for investigation occurred in a correspondence on December 12th and 18th, 1906. Garfield operated through the real work-horse of corporation research, Marvin Scudder's Investors' Agency. Hereafter called the Garfield Report. Cf. Journal of Commerce, January 9-10, 1906.


with the cool savvity of this six-foot American potentate.

To make the offer more attractive, Leopold stated that the upper reaches of the Kasai apparently contained minerals as well as rubber. Sir Robert Williams of the Kantanga Company had recently approached him for mineral rights. Too, the crafty Leopold might have had information of the work of George Grey, brother of the famous English statesman. Grey, in 1902 proved the existence of a great copper belt in the southern Congo which was 250 miles in length. Incidentally, this discovery disproved the report of the well-known Belgian geologist, Professor Cornet, who held that the geologic structure of the area was unfavorable to mineral deposits.27 Ryan knew that his friends, the Guggenheims, were specialists in the field of mineral exploitation. He immediately cabled Daniel Guggenheim who forthwith turned the problem over to John Hays Hammond and Alfred Beatty, a close associate of the Guggenheims.28 Beatty took the first boat to Europe.

The Beatty investigation terminated in a royal concession to Ryan and the Guggenheims signed on November 9, 1906. There was organized the Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo. This firm was capitalized at 10,000,000 francs. Fifty percent of it was


28Holbrook, op. cit., p. 294 ff. Hammond was a Yale and Freiburg graduate and mining engineer for Cecil Rhodes who paid a fine of £125,000 when the engineer was condemned by the Boers. Hammond later joined the Guggenheims at $225,000 per year plus one-fourth interest in all mineral findings or discoveries which he made. His aide was Beatty, a Columbia University mining engineer who was paid $27,000 per year. Both were brilliant.
put up by Ryan and his associates; additional members, twenty-five percent and Leopold twenty-five percent. Its board of directors was to range from six to nine members. Nominated by the King, the personnel of the first board was Barons P. Bacyens, president and A. Goffinet, J. Jadot, A. de Brown de Tiege, E. Parmintier, A. Chester Beatty, William H. Page and James Whiteley. Usually designated as Forminieré, the firm had the right to prospect for minerals in the unassigned public domain for six years. In this area, which was forty-five times the size of Belgium, the firm could exploit the mines which it found for ninety-nine years.29 However, one of every three mines operated belonged to the State.

Mr. Ryan who had several interviews with Leopold, returned to this country in September, 1906. However, he left his personal attorney, Mr. William H. Page Jr., in Brussels to conclude negotiations for the rubber concession in the Congo. Coincidentally, Colonel Samuel P. Colt, President of the United States Rubber Company, arrived from England just before Ryan's return. Colt had just completed negotiations for the absorption by his corporation of the most important crude rubber concern in Great Britain and on the Continent, the London firm of Alden, Symington & Co.,30 which was tightening its hold.


30New York Tribune, September 14, 1906. See item "Big Rubber Deal On". Morgan was allegedly interested in the purchase of the Anglo-Belgian-India Rubber Co. Dividends were 500 francs per share in 1905 and profits were $1,500,000. The Syndicate was a merger of fourteen companies. Cf. Bulletin Officiel, November 1906, pp. 504 ff. on Ryan and Page Jr.
Controlled by Americans, the new firm thereafter known as the William Symington & Company, Limited, was to finance all purchases of crude rubber for the American rubber companies. 31

Upon his arrival in New York, Ryan, along with the Guggenheim brothers set in motion plans for organizing the American Congo Company. 32 Ryan found it necessary to return to Brussels in October to close contracts, but returned the same month. 33 Working with prearranged plans, the financial agents speedily incorporated the American Congo Company in the names of S. Davis, A. F. Gerbe and William H. Thompson on October 22, 1906 in Albany, New York. Only Gerbe could be identified. He was a clerk in the Registrar and Transfer Company which conducted a business of incorporations. 34 According to the various newspapers, the directors of the American Congo Company were the officials of the Continental Rubber Company.

It was originally capitalized at $510,000 but this sum was soon increased to $25,000,000. Both the New York Times and the Independence

31 Garfield Report No. 4627. File 1 2310. Rec. December 21, 1906. Upon arrival Colt, kept mum on trust activities. File V 302. Rec. December 31, 1906 (C & L) acknowledged January 3, 1907. (Bureau of Corp.). Alden was left with authority under certain conditions, among which was the delegation of his power to the New York Commercial Company. The file also showed Ryan's firms were financing the U.S. Rubber Company. Both Ryan and Colt were either directors or personnel officials in various trust companies and rubber firms.

32 Holbrook, op. cit., p. 294. They also organized later The Intercontinental Rubber Company.


34 Ibid. Cf. New York Times, October 23, 1906. See also "Les Americans Au Congo", Mouvement Géographique, December 1906. The article stated that the American Congo Company was incorporated on October 16, 1906.

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Belge designated the chief stockholders of the new corporation as Thomas F. Rye, Edward B. Aldrich, the two Guggenheims, Harry Payne Whitney, John D. Rockefeller Jr. and Bernard Baruch.35

What were the terms under which the American Congo Company was to operate in the Congo Free State? James A. Smith, our Consul-General, wrote from Boma that the preliminary work was confined to the area of Stanley Pool. For the collection of rubber, the company gained a ninety-nine year lease covering 1,250,000 acres in certain specified sections.36 It was later revealed that experiments employing Lawrence techniques were to be conducted with the variety of rubber plants. The concession involved an agreement to replant fifty feet of guayule for every 200 pounds of rubber extracted. Moreover, the syndicate for sixty years had rights to 12,000 acres on each bank of the navigable streams and a ten year option on at least 1,000,000 additional acres.37 The American Congo Company had exclusive rubber rights to 2,470,000 acres, not including the last two acreage totals mentioned. This was an area about the size of Connecticut.


36Consular Report, Boma, June 29, 1907. James A. Smith, American Capital in the Kongo". Cf. Appendix - G gives information on two firms. See map showing investments, Appendix - H.

It is apropos to mention at this point that the Société Anonyme Belge gave consideration to both rubber and coffee plantations in the Congo in the early nineties. Mr. R. Dorsey Mohun, our commercial agent at Loando and Boma from 1892-1894, reported that the Société had hired a Mr. Warren C. Unckles, an American from New York and a long-time resident of Costa Rica, to develop the coffee and rubber trade. Unckles employed ten Central Americans from Costa Rica and Nicaragua as cutters to show the natives how to cut the rubber properly for milking and preparation for shipping.\footnote{Garfield Report. See yellow sheet, Jan. - Apr. 1906. Rec., Jan. 3, 1907. Acknowledged Jan. 3, 1907.}

What were the financial arrangements between Leopold and Ryan? In Belgium, Ryan and his friends organized two syndicates which were to exploit the forest and mining resources on the one hand and rubber plantation and agricultural products on the other. The amount of capital involved was 3,500,000 francs, or about $700,000. One-half of the stock went to King Leopold as compensation for the concession. The other half was split between the American investors and Belgian subscribers. The concession expressly stipulated the right of exploitation of mineral as well as vegetable resources.\footnote{New York American, December 13, 1906. Cf. Consular Report, Boma, June 27, James A. Smith. See extract as Appendix - I.}

Within the first five years of the twentieth century, American rubber magnates, determined to form a trust and corner the world's raw supply of rubber, kept an alert eye and ear on Leopold and the Congo. A close study of the Garfield Report, the European, English
and American press and monographs by Buell, Flint, Holbrook, O'Connor and others reveals that the "trust" subtlety planned and patiently waited to take over the Congo rubber supply. As Ryan probably thought, they played the game for themselves with profit and satisfaction resulting for all parties.

These keen businessmen cannot but have been fully cognizant of reasons why Leopold was prone to grant concessions to American capitalists. It was no secret that Leopold was in dire danger of losing control of this vast region to his own country without gain or profit. The fiery Vandervelde, was a relentless foe who constantly spurred the liberals to attack the Leopold regime in the Congo.\(^\text{40}\)

Moreover, Wall Street tycoons who found it as easy to take a jaunt to Europe as a housewife does to go to the dime store, quickly saw that time and excessive indulgence were taking their toll from the King. He lacked drive of his former years.\(^\text{41}\) Then too the anxiety and alacrity with which he made his approaches to our financial giants were indicative that his African plans had gone awry and that he was financially involved.

As a third reason, his regime was under the world's sharp scrutiny and criticism. The bitterest criticisms of his inhumanities came from America. He who criticizes will frequently offer both suggestions and aid. No Solomon was required to divine that it would be a neat move to gain or profit from America again by letting her carry the burden

\(^{\text{40}}\) O'Connor, op. cit., p. 178.

\(^{\text{41}}\) Holbrook, op. cit., pp. 293-295 ff.
of exploiting the Congo. Through concessions, it would turn the ire of American humanitarians elsewhere.\textsuperscript{42}

International investors and capitalists are of necessity interested in power politics. Hence, it is inconceivable that our financiers were blind to the fact that negotiations and concessions to England and France would not necessarily bring a cessation of criticisms of Leopold's regime in the Congo. Quite to the contrary -- as imperialist powers, the indignant European countries were in a better position to place him in an embarrassing situation. Moral indignation might terminate in \textit{Realpolitik} by envious, jealous and covetous nations. The position of the Congo Free State as sort of a political buffer state in Africa could be lost.\textsuperscript{43}

Last but not least, the alert American could see as well as Leopold that negotiations with the European Powers including Britain might arouse the wrath of the Belgian Parliament. All were aware that they were in an age of revolution and reform. Greater profit was to be gained with the latter. Leopold was not unmindful of the fact that the American public rose in revolt against the Spanish atrocities in Cuba, even though America had no territorial rights there.\textsuperscript{44} Even the Belgian authority Stenger admits that the Lodge resolution spurred him to negotiate.

Coexistent with the above reasons were the actions of the American

\textsuperscript{42}Buell, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 443.
\textsuperscript{43}\textit{Washington Times}, December 13, 1906.
\textsuperscript{44}\textit{The New York American}, December 13, 1906.
financiers who were connected with the rubber trust. A studied re-
view and an analysis of their moves proves provocative as well as
profitable. First, the despatch of Charles Flint to Europe in early
1906 to dicker for the Congo rubber supply was a deliberate act. Un-
doubtedly, much planning went into it. The purpose was readily admit-
ted.\textsuperscript{45} Failure on the first attempt did not mean a shelving of the
idea.

Second, it is common knowledge that J. P. Morgan was Leopold's
fiscal agent in America. It is also a well established fact that
Morgan was interrupted by the King to talk business on every European
trip which he made. It is not too much to reason that this American
tycoon discussed the possibilities of the rubber situation of the Con-
go with cronies and friends who were active members of the rubber
trust.\textsuperscript{46}

As to the third move, a likely feature was the psychological im-
pact of the Lawrence process of rubber extraction. Under the patent
control of Rockefeller, the method was calculated to aid immeasurably
in reducing the cost of rubber. Cornering the rubber supply under
American financial control would surely cause the European independent
operator, to squirm. Leopold, who had the reputation of a keen operator
most certainly was aware that these conditions eventually would affect
adversely the profits of the Congo raw rubber output.

\textsuperscript{45} Flint, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 300.

\textsuperscript{46} \textit{The New York Tribune}, September 14, 1906.
The *Journal of Commerce* which frequently gave releases on future economic matters stated in July that the Continental Rubber Company would attempt to reduce the price of rubber to a maximum of twenty-five cents a pound and a minimum of ten. Moreover, since this firm owned one-fourth of the rubber lands of Mexico, it would attempt to bear the same relations to the rubber industry as Standard Oil did to petroleum. The news of price reduction and control eventually reached the smaller operators engaged in the wholesale production and marketing of rubber. The wily and wise ones stayed alert, for they got the news sooner.

Fourth, it is inconceivable to believe that the members of the "trust" were unaware that the English firms which very recently operated rubber concessions in the Congo were *persona non grata* with Leopold. By the same token, this position also held firm and true with the Congo Free State. The displeasure of the Belgians arising out of Morel's and Casement's activities and the barring of English syndicates from the Congo reserves made it easier for Colonel Colt to absorb Alden Symington and Company. The *New York Times* regarded the Colt deal as a continuation of an absorption program launched previous in the month of May. At that time, the Rubber Goods Manufacturing Company, a $50,000,000 firm, was taken over.

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47 *Journal of Commerce*, July 9, 1906. Cf. *New York Sun*, Nov. 21, 1906. The price fluctuated from $0.875 to $1.225 per pound. *London Times*, December 11, 1906. Leopold stated rubber was then selling at $2000 per ton. The Americans intended to reduce it to $200-$500 per ton.

needs only to remember that Colonel Colt was a member of the Continental Rubber Company which was involved in the May action.

Of greater importance was the fact that, according to the Garfield Report, A. H. Alden of A. H. Alden Company Ltd., in England was earlier offered participation in the American Congo underwriting. 49

The fifth point adds further evidence that the trust had its attention centered on the Congo rubber plantations. The disinterested attitude and actions of Ryan "sojourning in Europe" when summoned by the Catholic monarch were only good business techniques. Due to the tales of Congo atrocities and the public's determinations to eliminate them, even American financiers wanted to avoid as much as possible the opprobrium of association with Leopold. 50 At the same time, Baruch's comments as reported by his biographer indicated that the "trust syndicate" could have entertained the same view to gain control. Moreover, Ryan was an obvious choice to renew negotiations following Flint's failure. Thus, the tycoons of Wall Street reasoned in the manner of Baruch that:

Neither Leopold nor Ryan gave a rap for public opinion, and neither hesitated at a ruthlessness to attain his ends. 51

49 Garfield Report, File V-302. Green Sheet. Mr. Scudder, owner of the Investors' Agency, errored when he indicated this information was gained on January 2, 1906. He meant January 2, 1907. The American Congo Company was not then formed — October 22, 1906 was its date of incorporation. Transmittal stamps show that information was sent on January 2, 1906, and received the next day. The Agency took the case in December of 1906.


51 Field, op. cit., p. 67 ff. On the theory that Ryan was acting for the "trust", one should take with a degree of skepticism Baruch's view that Ryan was extremely flattered by patronage of royalty. Ryan's concessions to the King, although extremely high, were still within the limits of "trust". Too, with the Guggenheim contact, Ryan had no thought about loss in the risk.
Last but by no means the least, American speed in negotiating was a very important factor in the trust's method of operation. Holbrook was aware that Ryan moved promptly and without hesitation. He desired to take the advantage before the Belgian Parliament acted to put additional pressure on Leopold. Ryan was also operating in his own personal interest. He was fully cognizant of the fact that immediate action on the part of himself and Dan Guggenheim would bring them greater returns in mineral wealth.  

The official records of both the Belgian Government and our own reveal that the American Congo Company and La Société Internationale Forestièr et minière du Congo, generally known as the Forminière, were both formed after visits of American financiers to Europe. Thus, whereas the United States failed in the nineteenth century to extend its political and economic control in the Congo, concomitant forces now made it possible for the extension of American economic power in this area during much of the first quarter of the present century. Documentary sources, particularly the Garfield Report, indicate that American financiers were more alert on the Congo Question with Leopold than many writers have led the public to believe. They were interested greatly in Congo rubber possibilities and were quick to take advantage of mineral and other prospects. Their concern was deep before Flint took leave to negotiate with Leopold. They were thoroughly aware of the King's predicament. With flexible planning, following the Anglo-Belgian split, without regard to religion or creed, they were determined to corner the crude rubber market. They

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52 Holbrook, op. cit., p. 294 ff. "Ryan thought that Dan's Exploration Company ought to look into it. Quickly too, lest the Belgian Parliament get in its licks first."
accepted the opportunity afforded by the advent of the American Congo Company. Incidentally, Ryan and his associates later gained minority interests by purchase in the Anglo-Belgian-India Rubber Company and the Katanga Company. They thus became part rulers over an empire larger than all of New England, New York, New Jersey, Delaware and half of Pennsylvania.53

Once the American "rubber trust" gained a foothold in the Congo, it sought to extend its power and to exploit additional resources in the area. The Inter-Continental Rubber Company capitalized at $14,000,000 was incorporated in New Jersey on December 6, 1906. It purposed to consolidate the Rockefeller and Guggenheim-Ryan rubber interests in this country and in Africa. It was authorized not only to deal not only in rubber — it also had the right to operate steamship and railroad lines.54 This latter activity had been the plea of our consuls in Africa for over two decades.

The reaction of the American public was probably reflected in the Tribune's editorial opinion on "The Congo". It took no credit in the suggestion that the sovereign of the Congo State had induced Americans "to invest in that region for the sake or in the hope" preventing our country from supporting an investigation or interfering with the "abominable practices" there. The editor felt that no American corporation would "countenance the abuses which were charged against Leopold and his administration". He also believed that our Government could not be inveigled to serve as a screen. In fact, our

53New York American, December 13, 1906. See "Americans Become Part Rulers". Cf. New York Times, December 7 and 8, 1906. See also the Wall Street Journal, December 8, 1906, p. 5. It was alleged that the U. S. Rubber Company was connected with the trust syndicate only as a possible rubber purchaser.

54New York Times, December 7 and 8, 1906.

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interest would be a way to expose and correct abuses. Reflecting the calmer interest on the justification of American capitalists in the Congo, he wrote:

Nor is it supposable that Americans required any urging to enter that field of industry and commerce. It is now nearly twenty years since the late C. P. Huntington said in the Tribune that the best opening in the world for a young man with a little capital was to be found in rubber plantations in Central Africa. The enormous increase in the demand for rubber since that time, and the consequent rise in its price, have abundantly demonstrated the soundness of this judgment. Nor is there any ground for fear of a reaction and the disuse of rubber. On the contrary, the advance in electrical science and industry, the multiplication of automobile vehicles and many other developments of civilization assure an increasing demand for that article.55

What were the results regarding rubber exploitation in the American Congo development plan? Nothing much came of it. In fact, so far as this particular phase was concerned, this Congo development was disappointing. This was due largely to the rapid development of the Malayan rubber plantations. The coveted guayule process was actually never given a real trial in the Congo.56

Mining, however, was a different story. Here was a bonanza! The gold reserves in which Ryan was interested were just north of those known as King Solomon's Mines. The outlook for gold in this area was one of the best in the world. It was exploitable to the fullest, but the real profit came from diamonds, especially the industrial variety, rather than copper and gold. Easily obtainable, the diamonds were found in alluvial deposits which extended over the

56O'Connor, op. cit., p. 180. Holbrook, op. cit., p. 294 ff. Field, op. cit., p. 67. Concession properties were not disturbed as the Free State became a colony of Belgium on October 18, 1908 by a vote of 83-54. See Buell, op. cit., II, p. 444.
Belgian border into Angola. Labor in the diamond field involved no problems of distrust, suspicion and barbed-wire compounds as in South Africa. The Congolese did not understand the value of diamonds found in the Kasai.57

What were the profits to Ryan and Guggenheim on the diamond deal? The answer to that question has not been made a public record. One can safely state that they were better than good. It is alleged that, between 1921 and 1926, the two gained exclusive rights to all of the diamond deposits which their engineers had discovered to 1926. These rights were granted for a period of ninety-nine years. Upon the death of Ryan in 1928, he willed about twenty million dollars to the Roman Catholic Church. He left an estimated estate of over $200,000,000, of which Congo diamond mines were a real significant part. 58

The Ryan-Guggenheim interests still maintain stock in the Forminiere. The Belgian consul in New York, recently stated that the syndicate held twelve percent of Forminiere. Incidentally, Forminiere, a subsidiary of de Beers produces over sixty-two percent of the world's industrial diamonds. The Belgian Consul added that the American stock was split among the various heirs. The Ryan group was reputed as owning twenty-four parts of this division. Baron Leopold Dhanis, present attaché in Washington, vehemently denied

57 O'Connor, op. cit., pp. 180, 181. Forminiere built native style village stocked the farms with seven thousand cattle and kept store prices low even during the World War.

58 Holbrook, op. cit., p. 294. O'Connor, op. cit., p. 182. Incidentally, the grandson Thomas Fortune Ryan II, heir to one of America's great fortunes apparently died of a heart ailment or stroke in La Jolla, California on April 30, 1954. See Washington Post-Gazette, May 1, 1954.
that the Belgian Government placed pressure upon the American group to sell its Congo stock. Nevertheless, it was admitted that there had been a sale of approximately thirty-eight percent of the original stock.  

The national political tone with reference to the Congo as reflected by the major parties between 1892 and 1904 did not indicate any consistent, clear-cut contrasting views. The Republican party in 1892 continued its traditional stand on the Monroe Doctrine. Nevertheless a growing feeling of imperialism provoked it to sponsor a strong extension of the United States foreign commerce. It also advocated an increase of the merchant marine and a big Navy. The party likewise believed in the Republic's achievement of manifest destiny in its broadest sense. It is beyond the scope of this study to attempt to correlate national party platforms on foreign policy with the organization of American combines. It was perhaps a coincidence that a rubber trust began its action under the foreign policy view of a party which went to the hilt on "manifest destiny". Party-wise, in 1892, the Democrats were strong adherents of real reciprocal trade. They denounced the enlargement of our foreign markets where other countries supplied the same or similar agricultural products. They were interested only in the Americans. Manifest destiny affected them only to the degree of maintaining a Navy sufficient for national defense and for the "honor and dignity of the

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59 An interview on Tuesday, June 8, 1954, at the Belgian Embassy in Washington, D. C., on Wednesday morning June 9, 1954, telephone request for the information was made by Baron Dhanis to New York. Witnessed by Professor Rayford W. Logan.

60 The Minneapolis Tribune, June 10, 1892, p. 1.
country abroad". Even their condemnation of the oppression of peoples in distant lands was not very forceful.61

By 1896, the foreign policy platform indicated that, except for the Armenian massacres, both parties were very much concerned with Western Hemispheric affairs and events in the Hawaiian Islands. Since this was the occasion of the split among the Democrats, the Indianapolis group supported the policy previously adhered to by the Cleveland administration.62 This meant no relations with the Congo or the minimum contact possible.

In 1900, it was no surprise that the Republican Foreign Policy platform sought a larger merchant marine. This was about two years after the Spanish-American War. In less than a month following their opponents' convention, the Democrats criticized them for an alliance on unacceptable conditions in Africa. With reference to tales from the Congo, their plank read in part that:

We especially condemn the ill-concealed Republican alliance with England, which must mean discrimination against other friendly nations, and which has already stifled the Nation's voice while liberty is being strangled in Africa.63

Four years later, the position of the political parties with regard to Africa and especially the Congo were in reverse. The Democrats were interested almost exclusively in Pacific affairs. They supported an open-door policy for world commerce in the Orient and in European affairs along traditional concepts. The Republican party advocated the elimination of crimes such as the persecution of

61New York Tribune, June 10 and 23, 1892.
63New York Tribune, June 21 and July 6, 1900.
Jews in Russia, massacre of the Armenians, and the enslavement of and atrocities against Africans in the Congo. Moreover, the party sponsored tendering our good offices to settle such matters. 64 Thus, the electorate was exposed in some degree to party thinking on the Congo Question. Leopold's lobbying attempts of America received a far more sensational reception than the news of American investments in the Congo. This was undoubtedly due to the treatment given it by the Hearst Journal in New York City. The New York American was a feeder for other papers of the Hearst chain throughout the country. The revelation also came at a time when the Congo Reform Association was putting forth efforts in this country to arouse international censure and correction of the Congo abuses. The actions of the hard and realistic barons of international investments provoked the associations suspicion and charges of the men of conniving with the Belgian King.

The concept of possible connivance was not restricted to America. In fact, the very first hint of such was forwarded to the New York Tribune with an Antwerp date-line of November 19, 1906. After describing the extent of the territory granted in the Congo cession to the American Congo Company, the release made the following comment:

The press generally regards the concession as being a clever move on the part of the Congo government to involve the United States in any future international complication which may arise owing to the conduct of affairs of the Independent State. 65

On the following day, a writer for the Times (London) reflected upon the position taken by Sir. Edward Grey in response to a deputation

64 Ibid., June 23 and July 9, 1904.
which protested against Congo abuses and sought British intervention for abatement. Action looking toward the same end had been taken by the first Lodge resolution. This anonymous journalist informed King Leopold that this double action was "the plainest warning yet addressed to the King", which he would do well to heed.\(^{66}\) As mentioned previously, two days later, the New York Tribune justified the action of Americans investing in the Congo. More significantly, it held that nothing could inveigle our Government into serving as an apologist for Congo atrocities.\(^{67}\) By such a statement it might have had in mind vague rumors of Leopold's secret lobby which had been operating here for some two years.\(^{68}\)

The Hearst's New York American made its first big expose of the Leopold lobby functioning in the United States on December 9, 1906. It declared that the Belgian monarch obviously had a paid lobby to influence Congress. This was vehemently denied by those on the King's payroll. Later, however, Belgian writers acknowledged the existence of such a lobby. They believed that discovery of its existence led the monarch to accept early annexation of the Congo by Belgium.\(^{69}\) The King was already upset by the Lodge resolution.

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\(^{66}\) (London) Times, November 21, 1906.


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and the Hearst fusillade was an important factor in terminating
his hold on the Congo.

A Belgian writer, J. Stenger, and the New York American agreed
on the personnel of the reputed syndicate. Five men were
involved, the leader being, Baron Moncheur, the Belgian Minister
to the United States. Moncheur never lost an opportunity to advance
his Sovereign's cause to members of Congress. His excessive
persistence led to sharp rebuke by certain Senators and Represent­
atives who accused him of improper interference with the course of
legislation. The fact that his wife was an American, the popular
daughter of General Powell Clayton, our former Ambassador to
Mexico, and a power in Republican politics in the Southwest alone
prevented an open break with him. The Baron freely averred he did
not deem it improper to work against our intervention.

The second listed member of the King's lobby was Colonel Henry
I. Kowalsky, whose military title was of old dubious world heritage.
He was a lawyer from San Francisco and New York City. Extracts
from his notebooks showed that he was paid $45,000 in cash for his
services. Moreover, a memorandum given by Secretary Cuvelier stated
that Kowalsky was promised $20,000 additional in Belgian state bonds
at three percent interest if no action was taken at the first
session of the Fifty-ninth Congress. Obviously, the press paraphrased

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70 Ibid. Cf. New York American, December 16, 1906. They were
Baron Moncheur, Henry J. Kowalsky, Henry Wack, Professor A. Nerineox,
Consul-General James Whiteley. Others whom Hearst involved were
Thomas G. Garrett, Senator Morgan, Secretary Root, Ryan & J. P. Morgan.

71 New York American, December 10, 1906. In answer to a question
from Scott McReynolds, a member of the American Press staff, the Baron
held that the lobby paid no attention to him.
Kowalsky's instructions which had been issued by the King. They required him

... to enlighten Senators and Congressmen as to the justice of our cause and to ward off the passing of unfavorable resolutions by them.

He will be careful not to call at the White House except in case of absolute necessity and not to put forward his title of legal adviser to the State but in judicial questions. He will make no public speeches except after taking the Belgian Minister's advice.\textsuperscript{72}

Judging by the extant copies of his letters, Kowalsky applied himself religiously to his task. They probably were secured surreptitiously for release by the American.\textsuperscript{73} They embraced periodic lobby reports to the King of Belgium and to Chevalier de Cuvelier, Secretary of Finance of Belgium. They were used by the Hearst publications to support charges that our Government's failure to act against atrocities was due to this particular lobby's activities.

To a limited extent to Hearst accusation was true. A significant point in this direction was the case of the missionaries' memorials. Protesting strongly against the abuses in the Congo, Congressman Denby of Michigan sought the aid of Senator J. T. Morgan to have the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee act favorably upon this petition from his constituents. The important point to remember was the lack of a report of the "Senate Sub-Committee on the Foreign Affairs Committee" (sic). No consideration was given the

\textsuperscript{72}Ibid.

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., December 11, 1906. Kowalsky held that some one close to the proprietor stole the letters from his private files.
JOHN T. MORGAN, ALABAMA.—PHOTOGRAPHED BY BELL.

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memorials even after Morgan introduced them on April 19, 1904.74 According to the American, and confirmed by correspondence in its files, Kowalsky secured the services of Thomas G. Garrett who was misrepresented as Senator Morgan's secretary. The latter was a clerk of two Senate Committees. Of greater importance was his position as Acting Secretary of the Sub-Committee of the Foreign Relations Committee. Garrett, who was paid for his aid to this lobby, kept Kowalsky informed on every move of the missionaries. However, there was no actual proof that Garrett's aid was the prime reason why the Committee failed to give it favorable consideration. Secretary Root was more responsible for our silence than was Garrett or the lobby. It was possible, however, that Kowalsky had been informed by Garrett on matters affecting the Congo.75 Incidentally, the Bulletin issued by the Belgian Institut ignored Garrett in its discussion.

Senator Morgan, who professed great surprise at Thomas G. Garrett's action, took steps on December 12, 1906 looking towards the secretary's dismissal from the Foreign Relations Committee. Simultaneously, Kowalsky issued a release to the press declaring that the Garrett correspondence referred only to a scheme for diverting immigration to the South.76 It should be injected that Senator

74The Denver Post, December 10, 1906. The reporter of the Hearst Syndicate should have known that it was the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
75New York American, December 10, 1906.
76New York American, December 13, 1906. See news items on "Garrett's Dismissal" and another "Kowalsky Explains Letter".
Morgan did not dismiss Garrett. Instead, he held that it was the duty of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms to do so. The Senator in a letter to Mrs. Garrett suggested that her husband had written false information to Kowalsky that furnished the lobby agent with a pretext. Kowalsky in reality thus held that Morgan was a tool who could be influenced by a man falsely claiming to be the Senator's secretary. Senator Morgan further stated:

That he wrote the letters to Kowalsky that were printed in the *New York American*, cannot be denied, and that they were highly improper is equally untrue. No matter whether they were written for a pay or for the vain and foolish purpose of gaining favor with Kowalsky or King Leopold, in the promotion of his immigration enterprise. In either case, they were compromising to my duty and conduct as a Senator, and to my honor as to matters in which the public service is concerned.

After such conduct, I cannot accept the service of Mr. Garrett in my Committee. 77

Other letters which were the property of Kowalsky were released. In one Garrett was indiscreet to the extent of telling the agent, "Command me if I can serve you". The press then revealed another instance which showed that Kowalsky worked through Garrett to block Morel's efforts. It also printed portions of Kowalsky's letter to the Belgian official, Cuvelier. Here he indicated that the group of Massachusetts atrocity protesters led by Governor Guild were blocked. Allegedly this came by the quiet and effective interposition of Kowalsky through Senator Morgan. Henry also wrote the King of efforts which had been put forth to stymie the drive of the *Boston Peace Missionary Society*. 78 In another letter to Leopold,


78*New York American*, December 11, 12, 1906.

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the Colonel contended that he had paid $1,000 to one of the leading publicists of the country, said to be a friend of President Roosevelt. For this, the publicist was expected to prepare a defense of the Congo administration under the King. The American held that this publicist accompanied Kowalsky who went to Washington to present a letter from Leopold and a signed photograph of the King. 

In each letter written by the agent to Leopold or Cuvelier, he mentioned some member of the lobby. The list with the exception of Nerincex, identified by the Belgian writer, Stenger, is identical with the group with which Kowalsky was associated. Identification of personnel and contacts were very interesting. Descriptions of his own efforts, however, were completely incriminating. Thus, on one occasion he wrote as follows:

However in the meantime, I gained the friendship of Colonel Garrett, Senator Morgan's trusted secretary. I then got the ear of Senator Morgan. I became a visitor to his home, and today we are good friends - actual not fancy friends. I then reached out and got to Dr. Booker T. Washington; I worked on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations; I saw Senator day after day; I found myself growing stronger and stronger; my Western Senators and Congressmen, on my account, taking a personal interest.

Later Kowalsky experienced a few sleepless nights when he was made to realize that the Belgians placed no further value upon his services. He was requested to fulfill an important mission to Nigeria. Upon investigation, he learned that it was a diseased fever-ridden spot. He successfully fought for a revocation of the request but not without mental anguish.

79Ibid., December 10, 1906.
80New York American, December 11, 1906. On another occasion he attempted to counteract Mark Twain who worked for the Reform Association.
81Ibid., December 14, 1906, p. 2.
The publicity agent, Henry Wellington Wack, was the third important member of the lobby. His work, The Story of the Congo Free State, has been mentioned previously. The work was used copiously by Baron Moncheur in 1906 in his refutation of several memorials hostile to the Congo Free State. All were presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Wack was a lawyer from St. Louis who settled in New York. While practicing, he became an attorney for an English patent medicine firm. Lieutenant-Governor Timothy L. Woodruff and associates sent Wack to London as managing director when they acquired interests in the concern. While abroad, Wack met Leopold. It was apparent that Wack was hired for literary purposes. Now a retired lawyer, businessman and author, he was expected to refute the destructive critics of the Congo administration. Yet, it was also extremely important that secrecy would be maintained in regard to his receipt of a retainer from Leopold for services rendered.82

Following the Hearst expose, Wack did not deny that he had visited Senator Morgan. He stated that he had gone to advise Morgan that missionaries in the Congo were not treated badly. Wack explained that he had been reliably informed and alleged that his investigations showed Leopold's critics to be those who had failed to secure concessions in the Congo.83

Professor A. Nerincex of Lucerne, Switzerland, was the fourth member of Leopold's lobby. He was responsible for a favorable tone

82 New York American, December 10, 1906.
83 Ibid., December 14, 1906.
in educational circles. Taking up his abode in Washington, he ultimately became affiliated with the George Washington University. He lectured on international law and comparative constitutional law. He gave the general explanation to his friends that he was "counsel to the legation". His intimate friends alleged that they were informed by him that he was on a special assignment for Leopold II. From its investigation, the American found Professor Nerincex guilty.

There is the best of authority for the statement that Nerincex induced certain learned educators to write articles for influential periodicals deprecating any movement by this nation looking for intervention in the Congo. The admission by the author of one of these articles that Nerincex had collaborated with him was obtained by an American representative.

With the passing of the first session of the Fifty-ninth Congress, and with it the suppression of all resolutions and memorials presented by the missionaries anxious to have the United States take the initiative in the reconvening of the Berlin Conference, Professor Nerincex terminated his connection with George Washington University and returned to his post at Lucerne.

The fifth member of King Leopold's ill-balanced American lobby was Consul-General James Whiteley of the Congo Free State. Although reporters frequently mispelled his name, they were quite aware of the fact that he was quick to come to the defense of the Congo administration. From his residence in Baltimore Whiteley, who was a director in the Ryan concession, sent a flood of letters to various Congressmen and Senators. He sought to influence them with respect to the Congo matter then pending before Congress. His insistence was regarded as an infringement and an infringement by members of

Hence, in a letter to Leopold dated April 30, 1906, Kowalsky who had received complaints of the Consul-General, warned the King of Whiteley's danger.

For the very same sort of intrusion the English Ambassador and likewise the Spanish Minister were recalled. My desire in calling your attention to this matter is to avoid any humiliation of having Your Majesty's Government recall the Consul-General.\footnote{85U. S. Statutes Section 5335. With interest to influence a measure or conduct in relation to a controversy with the United States, one could be fined $5000 or serve six months to three years.}

It was an accepted fact that such a lobby existed. Kowalsky did not deny that the letters, purporting to be copies of the communications sent to the King of Belgium, were his. However, he vehemently claimed that they had been "doctored". On Tuesday, December 11, 1906, Kowalsky produced a temporary injunction to retain the Star Publishing Company in New York from printing the letters. He held that the letters were stolen and sold to the company. He also stated that the letters were private, confidential and contained statements which if printed would be injurious and prejudicial to other persons. The letters were returned to him that evening.\footnote{86New York American, December 11, 1906. Cf. New York American December 14, 1906. Also December 17, 1906 on expulsion of the Britisher Sackville-West for interference in a political election.} He was nevertheless, unsuccessful in preventing their publication because his case did not come up until the following Friday and by that time, the complete collection had been printed from duplicates.

Additional evidence of the lobby's existence on this side of the Atlantic besides the release of Mr. Garrett's letters and Whiteley's conduct was the incriminating position of the Minister of
Belgium, Baron Moncheur. When approached by Scott McReynolds of the American staff, he admitted engaging in conversations on the Congo memorials. He felt that our intervention was unjustifiable. As to the other members of the lobby he admitted that they did all they could in the King's behalf. He, however, added that they paid no attention to him. In justice to the Minister, it is quite possible, as he inferred, that certain members of Congress took the initiative in engaging in conversation with him. Some took an interest in Congo matters which offered Moncheur the opportunity to sell his idea on non-intervention.

On the other side of the Atlantic, in the General Archives of Belgium, in Brussels, Stenger, the Belgian authority, found evidence of the correspondence between the King and Kowalsky. Letters signed by the latter, consisting of four documents written in the week of January 20-28, 1907 and referring to the past events. Additional communications as evidence were found in the Foreign Affairs Archives of Belgium. The authority stated that they had been sent to Leopold in the strictest confidence.

The exposure of this lobby by the American reflected badly upon the State Department, Congress, the rubber "trust" and its associates. The State Department was looked upon as being guilty both by association and deed. Mr. Denby of Michigan from the House on April 10, 1904, informed Secretary Root of the sentiment in his constituency on the Congo atrocities. Our Government was requested

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to act to ameliorate the bad conditions. The representation was repeated in early 1906. The reply by Root to Denby on February 15, 1906, printed as a House document and widely circulated by the press, read as follows:

We are not parties to the other more commonly cited general act of the Congo (signed at Berlin on February 26, 1885). Our treaty relation to the Congo State is that of one sovereign to another, wholly independent of any relations created by or deducible from the general act of Berlin, which applies only to its signatories. It is questionable whether the treaty rights of the signatories extend to intervention by any one or more of them in the internal affairs of any of them. The Congo State absolutely denies any right on their part to intervene in its affairs, and none of the other signatory Powers appears to controvert that denial. However this may be, it is certain that the United States has no treaty right of intervention. We could not rightfully summon or participate in any international conference looking to intervention, adjudication or enforcement of a general accord by other African Powers against the Congo State.

The position described above appeared to Root as the only logical one for this country on the matter of the Congo Question. We had adhered to that stand since the failure to sign the General Act. Nevertheless, we had hoped that Britain would take the lead on the question and we likewise left no doubt in the mind of the Brussels Administration where we stood. Meanwhile the White House, Congress and the State Department were receiving a steady stream of memorials calling for early and decisive action on the matter.

The State Department was by no means blind to the situation. Evidence in memoranda in departmental files are proof to this fact. A communication received from E. D. Morel, dated at Liverpool, England on November 5, 1906, was sent to the President. This

particular correspondence indicated an enclosure of his book *Red Rubber.* It also sought verification on an enclosed cabled message which allegedly represented the President's and our Government's views on the Congo Question. A draft of thanks was written on one of the two green slips. The other, initialed by Alvey H. Adee, second Assistant Secretary bore the date November 16, '05. The year should have been 1906. The stamp of the Secretary's office gave November 16, 1906 as the date of its receipt. The earlier date certainly might involve Adee as an accomplice in rubber deals and hands-off policy. Of greatest significance were his comments ere the expose by the *American.*

The paper (press) intimate that King Leopold is making a new move in the direction of organizing a Belgian Company for the exploration of Kongo rubber districts, the American rubber trust to be admitted to a share in its operations and profits. In other words, he proposes to shift his present personal responsibility for the state of things in the Kongo on the shoulders of the Belgian and American Corporate trusts.91

It should be remembered that this observation was made eleven days after the actual date of November 5, 1906, of the American Congo Company's agreement with the Congo Free State in Brussels. Obviously, Adee was alert from a reading of both European and American newspapers. Even granting that the Department gave no consideration in a Department meeting to this "watchdog's" observation (and that was not likely), the green slips from Adee never passed without notice or comment.

91Numberical File, (1906-1910), CXCI, Case 1806/3-5. Reply to Morel, November 19, 1906. Two green slip memoranda were attached to the communication. The above information relative to Adee's erroneous date was again checked and verified through correspondence with Mrs. Julia Bland Carroll of the Diplomatic Record Section on August 3, 1954.
Objectively to view the Department's position, it should be noted that, less than a month following Adee's observations, the press in referring to Root's letter of February 15, 1906, made a specific charge.

More than any other single instance, perhaps, it was responsible for no action being taken on the memorial of the missionaries asking for intervention.\textsuperscript{92}

The press of other localities generally were influenced by the expose in New York. The \textit{American} boasted that, within five hours after its copies reached the streets of Washington, Senator Lodge introduced a resolution which pledged the Senate to any action which the President might take toward ending the alleged inhumanities.\textsuperscript{93}

The press failed to add that this Executive action was to be within the framework of our traditional foreign policy. Continuing, it held that "almost simultaneously", Root changed his mind and informed a visiting group of ministers that he was in favor of concerted action on the part of the Powers. The previous statement was made to carry more weight through intimating guilt by association. It was recalled that Root had been Ryan's attorney on a $2,000,000 deal several years previously. The Assistant Secretary of State, Robert Bacon, was a former Morgan partner who was or had been Agent for Leopold. Arguments of Root had been used by Consul-General J. D. Whiteley a partner of Ryan and associated with Kowalsky in the Leopold lobby.\textsuperscript{94}

Soon after the Lodge action came the second

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{92}Pittsburgh Sun, December 11, 1906.
\item \textsuperscript{93}New York American, December 10, 1906.
\item \textsuperscript{94}Ibid., December 10, 11, 12, 1906.
\end{itemize}

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announcement, a Root opinion given to Thomas Barbour of the Congo Reform Association. This too intimate collusion was printed by the Hearst papers.

At Washington yesterday (December 11, 1906) Thomas S. Barbour of the Congo Reform Association, stated that he had been authorized by Secretary Root to make the announcement that Mr. Root had given the Congo Reform Association definite assurance that the Administration is in hearty sympathy with and will support the movement for the Powers signatory to the Berlin Act to take international action for relief of conditions in the Congo.95

The question of whether Secretary Elihu Root was guilty of collaborating with the lobby and financiers probably remained in the minds of some people until the appearance of Philip Jessup's biography in 1938. Others who had an immediate impulsive distaste for the Hearst publications probably assigned no thought of guilt to Root. Jessup held that there was nothing in the Secretary's private files or the archives of the Department of State which indicated that he was active in promoting the interests of Ryan, Morgan, Rockefeller and the Guggenheims.96 Jessup maintained that the lobby was initiated by Leopold who sent Count Kowalsky to the United States to enlist the aid of American capital in developing the Congo. According to Jessup, the efforts of the Count bore fruition in the organization of the Forminiere which was incorporated on November 9, 1906. The author continued with the observation that:

It would have been quite natural and almost a matter of routine for the Secretary of State to facilitate the negotiations under such circumstances but it does not appear that his aid was sought or needed.97

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95 New York American, December 12, 1906.
97 Ibid.
Although one is inclined to believe Mr. Jessup, his surmise on the basis of an absence of information in the files, is not necessarily incontrovertible proof that aid was not sought. If it were sought and given, the same type of reaction would surely have been manifested in view of the international criticism, the moral position of the United States, an aggressive President who sometimes made his own foreign policy and certainly because of the changing view relative to free labor. Nevertheless, it appears that Mr. Root would not engage in rendering aid to the tycoons surrounding Leopold. With Adee, who felt strongly respecting the atrocities, at the one end, and Henry Lane Wilson, who suggested in his No. 131 on November 19, 1906 that the American Congo Company be treated "with caution if not suspicion" at the other end in Brussels, Root would have been deeply in the middle. Moreover, there were and are always crusaders in Congress who deem it a personal and patriotic duty to eliminate corruption in Government. In addition, considerable weight must be given to the fact that Wilson's letter provoked the Department to order an investigation into the identification and activities of our rubber trust Moguls. Initiated by Bacon, this investigation was in process two days after the expose. Root accepted this procedure which was in sharp contrast to his silence in regard to the Hearst story.

Was Congress guilty of succumbing to the influence of Leopold's lobby? The Denver Post, typical of many newspapers within the country, held that certain members at least were deceptive. Although hearings

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were held by the sub-committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, no favorable consideration ensued. The paper stated that a partial cause for this inaction was due to the defection of Senator Morgan's secretary, Thomas G. Garrett, who succumbed to the financial lure of the lobby. There was also the intimation that Kowalsky and other members of the group enjoyed some degree of success. Implicated as having a community of interest with the lobby were E. B. Aldrich, son of the Republican leader in the Senate, and members of Wall Street such as Morgan, Bacon, Ryan, John D. Rockefeller Jr. and the Guggenheims.99

There was never any doubt respecting Garrett's guilt. He was a weak, poorly paid individual who attempted to appease his ego and ease large family responsibilities by cooperating with the lobbyists. Although Senator John T. Morgan had figured in every important Congressional scene connected with the Congo, no proof was found to place him in a guilty status. Taking into consideration the personnel of the Executive Branch, it does not appear likely that the Senate would dictate to the President and the Department of State. Therefore, aware of the Department's policy which had previously been supported by many, the Senate referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Thomas M. Patterson resolution of December 18, 1906. This called upon the Committee to investigate all the facts in connection with the lobby and to report the results of its investigation to the Senate promptly.100

The files of the Congo case reveal that numerous groups reacted in the manner of the Peoples' Sunday Alliance of Denver. On January 2, 1907, in a telegram, it sent thanks to President Roosevelt, Senators Lodge and Morgan and Mark Twain for the resolutions. It commended them and the Senator for prompt action in expelling the lobby maintained by Leopold. 101

On February 18, 1907, Mr. Carmack, acting for Mr. Morgan submitted a resolution which requested the President to inform the Senate of all American companies and syndicates which were collectors of rubber in the Congo Free State if this were not incompatible with public service. Every possible bit of information in this connection was requested, not only for the Congo, but likewise in regard to British firms in Liberia. 102

Less than a fortnight was lost in the despatch of the above resolution. On February 27, Democrat Senator Augustus Bacon of Georgia replied to a note of the same date from Senator Morgan. Bacon consented to a favorable report on the Senate Resolution Number 267 of that session. Senator Bacon's position was an index to the view of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Attached to Bacon's letter was a copy of the report on the resolution. 103


102 59th Cong. 2nd sess. Senate Resolution No. 267. No reason was found for Senator Morgan's failure to act on his own behalf. By his own admission in his letter of December 31, 1906, to Mrs. Garrett, a Doctor Fry confined him to his room and bed during the latter part of December and probably in early January 1907.

103 Morgan Papers XXII, pp. 4356, 4357 ff.
One item was found to be very disturbing in the light of subsequent events. It was alleged by a Hearst reporter that a certain group of governmental officials were able to see the inside workings of the whole affair. One anonymously analyzed the procrastination of our Administration in taking an aggressive step.

The Ryan-Morgan-Rockefeller combine have already secured the concessions which they sought in the Congo. An investigation of the situation there, which will go all over the ground already covered by the testimony of the missionaries who have witnessed the outrages, can be sufficiently prolonged to permit the combine to clinch all of its deals it has on foot there and after that it will be all right for the United States to take a noble stand.

If true, the decision to act reluctantly was previously planned and probably weeks before the above comment. Moreover, the combine likely was informed that the Belgian Parliament would act as favorably on recognition of concessions about December 21, 1906. The resolution of December 10, 1906, could not generate into offensive action in sufficient time to handicap the combine. By the same principle the view was probably taken toward the Carmack resolution of February 18, 1907 which did not reach the Senate until February 27, 1907. It certainly did not indict any American investors.

Nevertheless, the Report's content expressed a tone which reflected the constant stream of protest against the Congo inhumanities. There were ten pertinent points emphasized by the Report. (1) Rubber, among the list of other items, was recognized as a growing international product of commerce. (2) No imputation was made

104 New York American, December 11, 1906. See Column titled "Cruel King Says Morgan of Leopold".
105 Ibid., December 13, 1906.
against the conduct or purposes of the concessionaires or Uncle Samoney Almighties. Although no identifications were made of persons or firms, favorable recognition was given to their monopolistic efforts to gain control. (3) It contended that Leopold made fortunes by cruelty and that his earnings belonged to the people of the Congo Free State. (4) References to cruelties were strongly based upon the reports of missionaries, governmental officials, travelers and particularly the report of Leopold's Commission of Inquiry which he attempted to withhold from the public. (5) It requested the President to act for the relief of Congo "inhumanities" within the framework of our traditional foreign policy as suggested by the recent Lodge resolution. (6) It declared that the United States' real interest in the Congo Question was based on a moral and national duty owed to people in the United States of African descent. To many of these people, the Congo Free State was their fatherland. It was the duty of the Government to see that no handicap was placed by Leopold which prevented exiled Negroes from returning there. To the objective social analyst, this comment was nothing less than the political pap moistened by crocodile tears. (7) Included was a lengthy historical resume of the political development of Free States. (8) Attention was then called to our late contesting of Leopold's sovereignty and kingship over the Congo Free State. Although no legal reason was given, the protest probably was based upon announcements by members of the

106 The term "Uncle Samoney Almighties" was coined to indicate that returns on investments made did not meet the expectations of American financiers or those seeking American Dollars.
Belgian Parliament who claimed that the King had violated the Belgian Constitution. (9) It was suggested to the Uncle Samoney Almightyes that their contract needed confirmation by all signatories of the Berlin Act. However, we are all aware that due recognition was voted every concessionaire prior to the annexation of the Congo Free State by Belgium. In addition, the Report felt that the investors should have notified our Government. If they had not done so already, the Government was instructed to inquire into the reasons for such dereliction. (10) The Government was further instructed to find out whether the concessions granted by Liberia to British interests served as barriers or impediments to debar exiled Africans.¹⁰⁷ The contents of the Report revealed no overt evidence of relations with the Leopold lobby. Yet, impressed by the country's vast natural resources, we were willing to intercede and to exploit them on the pretext of aiding exiles in America who were of a second and third generation or more. They had no intention of returning to Africa. Our development in the direction of world leadership made it incumbent that we find solutions to the closely related domestic and international problems that involved investments. Our sense of Christian ethics, however, tempered decisions that were in the offing. Thus, seeking peace of mind, the last paragraph held the following concept:

The native resources of Central Africa present vast stores of treasures to invite their aid in developing the wealth of that country and it is time that the United States should interpose its just powers, whether (sic) they maybe,

¹⁰⁷ Morgan Papers. XXII, p. 4357 ff.
in aiding these exiles to establish their sovereign rights in the country that God has given them.  

John Cookson, in the most recent general treatment of this entire matter admitted that the atrocities existed. As editor and consultant to the Belgian equivalent of our own Voice of America, this English writer held that:

We cannot saddle Leopold or the Belgian people as a whole with the entire blame.... It was a part of the pattern of the age. But any suggestion that a peculiar capacity for cruelty and desecration was one of the talents of Leopold and his people is quite untenable.

People readily recognize that some of the Belgian citizens were nineteenth century pioneers of African exploitation. They also know that Hearst was prone to exaggerate—he had his papers to peddle. But to condone the atrocities is Hitlerian and fascistic. At least it was slavery at its worst. To say that the "Belgians" were the kindliest of people "anywhere" or "anyway" is an attempt to excuse that regime on the basis of the characteristics of that age. Even in this day, we agree that wrong prevails. Yet to add that "Belgians" were a minority in Africa in those days is to imply that they had to protect themselves by resort to similar irregularities found in other countries, is to beg the question. It is only another expression of the Kipling ideal, "White might makes right, a la Malan." Omitting the Socialist and true religionist, the so-called "realistic Belgians" with their lash and their lobby, even in the face of a "smear campaign", were wrong.

108 Ibid.
110 Negro ministers who traveled in Belgium prior to World War I saw the public works and buildings constructed by Leopold from his Congo gains. During the war many preached sermons on "A Just Retribution" in remembrance of the atrocities and Leopold's lobby. From an interview with Mrs. B. Walker Watson, formerly of Fisk University, now at 3100 Park Place, Washington, D.C.
111 Cookson, op. cit., p. 51.
Prior to the fatal month of December 1906, our Government displayed a passive concern over reform being instituted in the Congo Free State. The passivity of our position was based politically upon our traditional foreign policy. After the Brussels Antislavery Conference, adherence to this policy where the Congo was involved compelled us to assume a hands-off attitude. Nevertheless, the constant reception of adverse criticisms from our missionaries, travelers and representatives abroad gave cause for stronger concern. With the exposure of the Leopold lobby by the Hearst's New York American, came simultaneously the redoubled activities of the Congo Reform Association of America. From the total impact, there developed a growing sentiment for diplomatic effort for reform in the Congo.

The Congo Reform Association of America an active propagandistic organization was the outgrowth of a similar one which originated in England.¹ In September 1904, Secretary E. D. Morel of the British Society came to the United States and in October spoke in Boston in behalf of the unhappy and down-trodden Congolese. He was specifically charged to petition President Roosevelt to exert his influence in behalf of Congo administrative reforms.² The American society was organized soon after. It was headed by Dr. G. Stanley Hall, President

¹Mouvement Geographic, (August 1906), XXIII, p. 424.
of Clark University. The First Vice President was the famous American writer and humorist, Samuel Clemens or Mark Twain with John Daniels as Corresponding Secretary. Dr. Robert E. Park a professor from Boston was Secretary. Dr. Thomas S. Barbour, Secretary of the American Baptist Missionary Union, was its Commissioner General. The national headquarters were set up at Tremont Temple in Boston. The officials stoutly maintained that it was neither commercial nor sectarian. Its members were "Protestant, Catholic, Jews and even agnostics".3

New England, the cradle of American liberty was wisely chosen the headquarters of this Reform Association which systematically brought pressure to bear on Washington. A mass meeting in protest of further Belgian atrocities was held in New Haven on February 7, 1906. A petition signed by Yale professors and members of the Yale corporation was sent to Congressman N. D. Sperry in Washington. This petition stated in part:

We are convinced that some representation should be made which shall make known the indignation with which we have learned of the horrible atrocities and cruel oppressions, the slavery and tyranny and the savage crimes staggering the imagination, which are practiced in the Congo by those intrusted with authority. We think some influence should be exerted to accomplish a change of policy in the administration of the Congo Free State.4

Similar gatherings were held throughout New England. Typical of these was the Boston mass meeting of March 8, 1906, which called upon the President and Congress to act. The affair was presided over

3Morgan Papers. XXII, p. 4343.

4New York Daily Tribune. February 8, 1906. It was signed by the officials of the Law School, Sheffield Scientific School and the academic department.
President Hall and included among the speakers Rev. John H. Harris, for many years a missionary in the Congo State. Resolutions calling on the President and Congress to deal with the Congo situation were adopted. The resolutions held that since the United States was the first power to recognize the Independent Congo Free State, it was fitting that we should be foremost in efforts to ameliorate the plight of the helpless Congolese. Likewise was there the recommendation in aiding the Africans to take all possible steps, either by remonstrance, correspondence or otherwise. Meetings of this type later spread throughout the entire eastern section of the United States.

Two particular features, which the American branch of the Association inevitably resorted to get results were the recommendations of a special reading list and the distribution of resolutions in printed form. The list included Morel's Leopold's Rule in Africa, Bourne's Civilization in Congoland and various periodical articles. Among the latter were Rev. W. M. Morrison's "Personal Observations of Congo Misgovernment", The American Review of Reviews, July 1903; Paul R. Reischl's "Real Conditions in the Congo Free State", published in the North American River, February 1904; E. D. Morel's "Belgian Treatment of the Congo Native" and Rev. H. E. Scribner's "Instances of Belgian Cruelty in Africa", both found in the September (1904) issue of The Missionary Review of the World; Robert E. Park's "Recent Atrocities in the Congo State", from The World To-day of October 1904; and Booker T. Washington's "Cruelty in the Congo Country" in The Outlook, October 8, 1904. There also was included a document presented

Ibid., March 9, 1906.
to the Senate by Senator John T. Morgan. It had the title "Memorial Concerning Conditions in the Independent State of the Congo". 

Reams of resolutions in printed forms were circulated among those presented at every mass meeting called by the Association. This was also done at other meetings of a general reform character throughout the country. Recipients were requested to make duplicate copies for their various organizations, to solicit signatures and to send them to their Congressmen and Senators in Washington. A typical example of a Congo Reform Association resolution reads:

Whereas the statements of a multitude of veracious eye witnesses regarding the appalling outrages inflicted upon the native population of the Congo have been confirmed by the conclusive testimony of an official Commission of Inquiry appointed by Leopold himself,

Whereas, a Conference of fifty-two missionaries, representing six different countries held January 11th, 1906, unanimously declared that these cruelties continue unabated and that millions of defenseless people seemed doom to annihilation,

And Whereas the so-called Reform Edicts issued by King Leopold in June 1906, are on their face utterly inadequate, and are left to be enforced by the very officials who are immediately responsible for the present abuses,

Therefore be it resolved that, we __________, voice our conviction that for the Nations to allow the situation in the Congo to continue unremedied is a failure in Christian duty, and that we urge our own Government to do everything in its own power to bring to an end crime against God and Man.

Clippings from the press revealed that the Reform Association and its sympathizers were occasionally checked by the opposition. The

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\(^6\)Kongo Minor File (1906-1910), XXXIII. This volume is composed of petitions, letters, requests, memorials and miscellaneous materials, sometimes chronologically arranged. It has not been indexed.

\(^7\)Kongo Minor File (1906-1910), XXXII. Miscellaneous materials filed without page numbers.
Belgian Consul in Chicago, Charles Henrotin, remained firm in his defense of the Congo Free State. He denied that he had attempted to withhold from the public the findings of the Kings investigation committee sent out by Leopold to report upon the alleged atrocities. On March 15, 1906, he claimed that he had just received an English translation of the report which was creditable to the Free State and was available for public information.

Equally significant were the antireform activities on the part of various organizations as the Belgian Protective Association mentioned previously. Even more important was the Senate resolution of January 11, 1892, adduced by many as demonstrating American intervention in Congo affairs. This was the basis of Root's reply to Denby. In this resolution ratifying the Brussels Conference Treaty of 1890, we disclaimed any interests in or designs against the possessions and protectorates of other powers. The treaty also had a strong antislavery clause. Root with his eye on this feature made a public release which read that in spite of the precedents he would try to find some lawful and just means of suggesting action which would aid the natives.®

Within a week, H. P. McCormick, Corresponding Secretary of the Boston branch of the Reform Association, challenged Mr. Root's views on the nature of the 1892 resolution. McCormick held that this famed measure, far from presenting an argument against interference on behalf of humanity, accentuated our duty so to do. To him, the reservation of the resolution only threw into relief the absorbing interest supporting our presence at Brussels and justifying our ratification of the act. He held further that:

Leopold II., König der Belgier. Nach Photographie.
This "interest" was the safeguarding and guaranteeing of the welfare of the native African population. Our government in ratifying the Brussels Act declared to the world, "in the name of God Almighty" its "firm intention of putting an end to the crimes and devastations engendered by the traffic in African slaves" and "of efficiently protecting the aboriginal population of Africa", and further to define its intention, entered this disclaimer of any political or territorial interest in Africa.9

The seal of the United States had been placed upon the act, hence, to McCormick, we had rendered a pledge to guard millions whose destiny had been intrusted to Leopold II. The Sovereign's faithlessness did not release us from our own obligations. Any attempt to stand aloof would commit us to "the just charge of something meaner and more cowardly than hypocrisy".10 His letter was written not only to show why we should act on the Congo Question, but also to forestall any further arguments against interference which might be ascribed to Mr. Root.

When, in June of 1906, the Belgian Foreign Office, under Secretary Culvelier, held that the Belgian Parliament, let alone a foreign government and the Congo Reform Association, had no right whatsoever to interfere in Congo affairs, the Tribune, took a firm stand against this devastating view. This paper reminded the Foreign Office that it was the strongest of moral rights to expect the Congo affairs to be conducted humanely. Moreover, it was on the basis of morality and enlightenment that King Leopold originally sought the sanction and support of the Powers.11

Additional moral support was given by nationally known men who petitioned Root to take action aimed at preventing the Congo

9Ibid., April 16, 1906. Letter to the editor dated - Boston, April 17, 1906.
10Ibid.
Government from disgracing civilization. These included Dr. Lyman Abbott, Robert C. Ogden, Congressman William H. Douglas, William Jay Schieffelin, J. Cleveland Cady and J. P. Morgan. It should be carefully noted that this group of signers did not charge the Congo Government with flagrant abuse or evils. Rather, it listed the findings of the Commission of Inquiry, and called attention to the fact that no positive action had come forth from the Congo Government since its appointment. The signers offered their support in whatever measure Secretary Root might take to get the Powers to remedy the evils. Their communication was symbolically forwarded to the State Department on Christmas Day.\(^{12}\)

A comment in the London Morning Post held that the United States would participate in any conference called by the Powers or by Great Britain. Due to our having failed to ratify the Berlin Act, we could not take the initiative in calling a halt to the unwarranted abuses. It was noted that our administration resisted pressure to act placed upon it by religious groups and various individuals. Morel, a leader of the English Congo Reform Association, wanted from Mr. Root clarification of the exact position of the President, Department of State and Congress.\(^{13}\) Adee, who handled this request indicated that we were interested in the matter.

\(^{11}\)New York Tribune, June 19 and June 24, 1906.

\(^{12}\)Ibid., December 26, 1906. The evils of the Congo listed by them were oppressive labor taxes, land appropriations which isolated or imprisoned the natives within their territories, rape and murder by sentries from hostile tribes, abuse from the concessionaries, mutilation of governmental wards, miscarriage of justice and the use of expeditions to bring about a reign of terror.

\(^{13}\)Numerical File, CXCI, Case 1806/4-5. The original source for the London Morning Post, November 5, 1906 was a cabled message from a reporter in Washington, D. C. Also see previous chapter.
On November 20, 1906, an important deputation representing the various creeds and political parties of Great Britain called upon Edward Grey, Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. Its request for the elimination of the "African Chamber of Horrors", a descriptive term applied to the Free State, came on the eve of the Congo debate in the Belgian Parliament. The significance of the British incidents was seen in Sir Edward's attitude and comments. Unless the Belgian Government took steps to improve the conditions in the Congo, Great Britain would propose international action. Grey further stated that his Government would welcome cooperation from any of the Powers and that there was not the slightest desire to secure political advantages for Great Britain. This statement was construed as a direct invitation to the United States to exert concerted action with the British Government.

From mid-November throughout the month of December 1906, the American press continuously needled our Department of State and urged it to take steps to facilitate a strict and searching international investigation of the Congo. Reporters certainly suffered no lack of material, as a check of the New York Tribune Index will demonstrate. There was the story on American investments in the Congo. It was soon followed by the nation-wide release on Leopold's lobby. The redoubled effort of the American Congo Reform Association produced much chaff and wheat for public consumption. Thus with the seeming reluctance of our Government to act, the press was never without a headline for

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11New York Daily Tribune, November 21, 1906. See "May Act in the Congo".
the public. The editor of the Tribune felt that, in spite of the validity of the charges, we should regard an inquiry in the highest sense desirable, if not indeed imperatively necessary.  

Little incidents unknown to the scholars and the press of that period had accumulative effect in keeping the State Department seriously concerned about the Congo Question. Schools and colleges added their share to the flood of petitions. The council of upper-classmen at Howard University for example, on December 8, 1906, submitted a ringing plea for American manhood to assert itself. In a petition among the distinguished signers calling for action were President David Starr Jordan of Stanford University, Edward H. Clement of the Boston Transcript, W. T. Hardie of New Orleans, H. St. George Tucker of Lexington, Virginia, John W. Foster of Washington, D. C., and Victor F. Lawson of the Chicago News. Some individuals were pronounced in their feelings. Abraham Guggenheim of Boston felt so strongly on the issue that he wrote the Secretary of State a laconic letter.

We are told that the Secretary of State can stop it if he wishes to. There is no need of saying more.  

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15 Ibid., November 23, 1906.
16 Kongo Minor File (1906-1910) CXCI. See December 8, 1910.
17 See Appendix J, a list taken from Kongo Minor Files (1906-1910), CXCI.
18 Numberical File (1906-1910) CXCI. See date November 26, 1906 with signature of Abraham Guggenheim. A search of the genealogical chart failed to place him among the clan. It seems unlikely that one from the family would lose sight of the fact that most important decisions of State are made following the completion of big financial deals. It was given the usual answer by O. G. Stanton while working under Chief Charles Ray Dean.
Individuals employed by the Department of State were of course expected to refrain from voicing their sentiments on the question. Mr. Church Howe, who had been stationed at Antwerp and who was reassigned American Consul-General at Montreal, was one who violated this convention. He was severely taken to task for a discussion of the Congo problem at a farewell banquet given just prior to his departure - Adee composing the formal rebuke:

It matters not that your remarks are said to have been eulogistic of the Congo Administration. The neutral nature of your office precludes alike advocacy and criticism of the political acts of the Government. Your action was against Section 435 of Consular Regulations - enjoining avoidance of public speeches.

You will furnish no other occasion for criticism.¹⁹

Consideration to petitioners depended somewhat upon their status in life. The group headed by J. P. Morgan and Dr. Lyman Abbott was treated deferentially. This could hardly be avoided since their names made news. Thus, on December 26, after Secretary Straus and Acting Secretary Bacon had made a visit to the White House, Secretary Root made a comment to the press. He stated that this country could only politely urge Belgium to greater activity. Almost with the same breath, he added that the petition from Morgan, Abbott and others would be taken into consideration with other communications on the subject.²⁰

The typical reply to protests from lesser persons and groups usually received the signature of either Adee or Bacon. After a

²⁰New York Tribune, December 27, 1906. Telegraphed from Washington, D. C. on December 26, 1906. There was also the Denby reply to Root treated previously, which became an eye-sore to the Secretary by September.
short paragraph of acknowledgment, it was followed by a second paragraph. Commonly disposing of the matter in one sentence, it read:

The subject is not one of indifference to this Government which is giving its earnest attention in the light of treaty and international comity. 21

The original impulse and action on diplomatic efforts to bring about reform were not to be found solely in the efforts of the Department of State. Rather it was more a simultaneous action on the part of both the Senate and the Department. On December 10, 1906, Senator Morgan submitted a resolution which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and ordered to be printed. On January 25, 1907, it was reported out by Mr. Lodge with an amendment, the enclosure parts of which were ordered deleted, and to insert those parts which were printed in italics.

Whereas the reports of the inhuman treatment inflicted upon the native inhabitants, of the Kongo Free State have been of such nature (and so well sustained) as to draw the attention of the civilized world and excite (both the indignation and) the compassion of the people of the United States; Therefore be it

Resolved. That (in the opinion of the Senate of the United States the time has come when the affairs of the Kongo Free State should be made the subject of international inquiry and) the Senate respectfully advises the President that he will receive its cordial support in any steps he may deem it wise to take in cooperation with or in aid to any power signatories of the treaty of Berlin which will seek to ameliorate the conditions of the Kongo Free State and redress any evils now existent there. 22

21 Numerical File (1906-1910), DCXC. Case 9600/62. See also Case 9600/166A.

It should not go unnoticed that the version of the resolution sent out on December 11, 1906 by the Tribune Bureau of Washington, D. C., was a combination of both the original and deleted passages. Incidentally, beneath this particular version of the Lodge resolution as it appeared in the Tribune, was a detailed denial of lobbying by Henry I. Kowalsky.\textsuperscript{23}

Mr. Lodge, who was generally recognized as a very close friend of the President and looked upon by the American press of the nation as spokesman for the administration, permitted no let-up by the Senate on its attention to the Congo Question. Moreover, sensitive to the flood of memorials and consular reports on native mistreatment in the Congo, Senator Lodge felt it necessary to present another resolution on February 15, 1907. This one exhibited more hope than Secretary Root's reply given exactly one year previously:

\textit{Whereas it is alleged that the native inhabitants of the Basin of the Congo has been subjected to the inhuman treatment of a character that should claim the attention and excite the compassion of the people of the United States; Therefore be it Resolved, That the President is respectfully advised that in case he shall find that such allegations are established by proof, he will receive the cordial support of the Senate in any steps, not inconsistent with treaty or international obligation, or with the traditional American foreign policy which forbids participation by the United States in the settlement of political questions which are entirely European in scope, he may deem it wise to take in cooperation with or in the aid of any of the powers signatories of the treaty of Berlin for the amelioration of the conditions of such inhabitants.}\textsuperscript{24}

Now it is pertinent to make observations on the Lodge resolutions as seen by Root's biographer, Mr. Jessup. He noted the fact that the

\textsuperscript{23}New York Tribune, December 11, 1906.

\textsuperscript{24}61st Cong. 1 sess. Senate Documents IX. Senate Misc. Doc. No. 147, p. 23.
Senate sought an international inquiry on the affairs of the Congo and would fully support the President if he cooperated in such a movement. But international cooperation on our part was conditioned. This 1907 resolution contained a strict isolation policy. Flexibility in a straight-jacket was sought by Executive wisdom or flexibility which was Kassonic. It was necro-isolationist in character. Pursuit of this goal was confined within the framework of our traditional policy. Absolute freedom of action was required. There would be no agreements or alliances verbal or written, implied or otherwise.

Most certainly there was constituent pressure on Senator Lodge. It should not be forgotten that the American Congo Reform Association with headquarters in Tremont Temple was in his senatorial district. Moreover, from Massachusetts came the impact of religious and other groups. Although leading political figures condemned the insertion of the Congo atrocities in political platforms, the question could not be completely ignored.

Mr. Jessup recorded that, on the same day (December 10, 1906) that Lodge presented his resolution, Root conferred with the President. Immediately following the talk, the Secretary sent specific instructions to Chargé Carter in England indicating that this country would be glad to cooperate with Great Britain on a basis of the Anti-slave Trade Act of July 2, 1890 since public opinion here was deeply moved. On January 16, 1907, Root informed Lodge that Grey considered that the passage of his resolution would have a beneficial effect. Grey might have anticipated the welcomed chain reaction that was

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25 Jessup, op. cit., p. 63.
26 Ibid.
experienced in England, as well as the fact that the King and the Congo administration would be prodded to initiate hurriedly reforms in the Free State. Important members of the rubber trust were fully aware that beneficial results would accrue to the American moguls. Did Grey have a similar idea? Grey felt that there was

... a general impression among the Belgians that the other signatory Powers were rather indifferent to the subject and in this connexion he reverted again to the question (of the resolution and cooperation) of our Minister in Brussels, he thought that the moral effect of the general resolution by the Senate would be most beneficial in removing this impression, and for other reasons as well.27

Letters and petitions sent by Morgan, Ogden and others sent to the State Department in part should be accepted as a partial answer to Grey's reflections. The aristocrats of British wealth reacted similarly. Both with interests in the rubber trust had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Yet, in relation to the Lodge resolution, it was still an effort in the attempt to bring about reforms in the Congo. Moreover, the contents of the February 27, 1906 report already discussed, certainly demonstrated sympathy toward our financial interests. 28

Just when the State Department thought that machinery was fully set to cooperate with Great Britain in putting pressure on the Congo Administration, a diplomatic hitch and temporary impasse developed. Wilson, who had been chafing at the bit for action, realized that he

27 Numerical File (1906-1910), CXIII. Case 1806/94-95. (Confidential) Carter to Root, January 23 (?), 1907. Italics are mine.

28 Morgan Papers, XXXIII, pp. 4356 ff. See treatment in the preceding chapter. Even the admonition to notify our Government was sympathetic and advisory.
held no credentials to the Congo Free State. Hence, for that reason he could not maintain official correspondence with it. An adept Minister, he reported to unofficial means to convey his Government's message.29

Wilson should have been accredited to the King in his dual capacity, as King of Belgium and as Sovereign of the Independent State of the Congo. Blue memoranda slips attached to Wilson's Number 146 indicated that we had not been fully accredited to the Free State since 1891. Despite our treaty of 1891 in which we recognized the State, we still lacked sufficient standing. Wilson, who approved full accreditation, thought that the use of a third party in such transaction was an unsatisfactory way of conducting business. In reality, however, few of the Powers were accredited. The situation played admirably into Leopold's hands.30

On February 4, 1907, the President instructed Mr. Loeb, his personal secretary, to forward to Mr. Root the correspondence of Mr. H. E. Rood, editor of Harper's. Rood had enclosed Ralph A. Dacrand's article, "The Germ of Corruption in the Congo Free State" found in the Fortnightly Review of January 1907. More significantly, Rood suggested to the President the appointment of a Joint High Commission to investigate conditions in the Congo. Since we had no designs on the area, he wrote the following as a humanitarian suggestion:

I most respectfully beg to express to the President my unqualified belief that his countrymen would heartily endorse his actions should he deem it wise to invite certain of the Powers to consider at once the advisability of immediately appointing a Joint High Commission of Inquiry not to hold

sessions in some European capital but to proceed as expedi-
tiously as possible to the Congo Free State, with authority
and under instructions to make there an exhaustive exami-
nation of the situation, - in the remote regions as well as
near the Coast - and to report thereupon at the earliest
practicable moment. Under the concerted action the truth
could not be suppressed; and that would be an amelioration
of alleged intolerable conditions the day cablegrams reached
the Congo conveying news that such a step had been suggested
the President. There can be no doubt, furthermore, that
such a step, taken in the name of common humanity, would
command universal approval.31

The deliberations of the Belgian Parliament were of such long
duration in 1907 that the expected Root-Grey conversations did not
begin until November 19, 1907. On that day in the American Embassy,
Reid revealed the Root attitude on the Congo situation to Sir Edward
Grey. The latter had sounded out several countries on the matter and
felt that simultaneous representations should be made. That particular
moment was not, however, the proper one. To avoid the cry of
foreign interference, action should follow the disposal of the
problem by the Belgian Parliament. Grey was willing to cooperate
and was very glad that we took an interest in the matter and held
similar views. He promised to keep this country alert on any changes
in the situation. He held that the problem was a serious one for
both the Belgians and Leopold.23

Cables of December 5, 1907 indicated that the British, in co-
operation with the United States desired to use private hints to warn

31Numerical File (1906-1910), CXII. Case 1806/104-106. Rood
to President Roosevelt, February 1, 1907. Pleasantville Station,
New York. The letter also contained comments of a missionary Mr. S.
P. Verner of South Carolina who praised the natives and held that the
criticisms were exaggerations. Very soon after it was necessary to
confine Mr. Verner for mental illness.

32Ibid., Case 1806/178-179, No. 216. Whitelaw Reid to Secretary
Root.
Belgium of the English-speaking peoples' attitude. Wilson was sent a cipher cablegram advising him that he would probably be instructed on the following Monday as to what action we would take. Meanwhile, he was directed by Adee to keep us informed. Secretary Root for some unexplainable reason gave no reply to the British until December 16, 1907. His answer was an attempt to conform to the tone and spirit of the Berlin Act to which we were not officially a party. American activity actually arose through being a party to the Brussels Act of 1890.

We are free and indeed morally constrained to express our trust and hope that every successive step taken by the active signatories will assure to the well-being of the native races and execute the transcendent obligations of the Brussels Act, in all of its humanitarian prescriptions, especially as to Article Two. In these regards, the interest of all the signatories are identical.33

Copies of this reply were sent to our representatives in London and Brussels. They were instructed to impress the above considerations on their British colleagues. Within discretion, they were to do likewise with any other colleague who might approach them on this subject. Root made it clear to our officials that we were not to take the lead in this matter. He desired joint philanthropic action with Great Britain in handling the Congo problem.34

A report of Consul-General James Smith, which was written at Boma on November 20, 1907, but received on December 30, 1907, provoked

33 Ibid. See also Case 1806/184, December 13, 1907. A note from Bacon to Adee which stated that we desired cooperation with Great Britain and that we did not want to go into it alone. Case 1806/190, December 20, 1907. In a memo from Adee to Bacon, it was held that we had been trying for three years to secure British cooperation.

34 Numerical File (1906-1910), CXIII. Case 1806/184-190.
a comment which gave a description of the State Department's real attitude. Mr. Adee wrote in a memorandum to the Secretary that the reports bore out

... what you said the other day about the nature and effects of the corvee, now euphemistically called "taxation in labor" - a system as old as the Pyramids, the Bible and its bondage.35

After reading the report of it on the morning of January 9, 1908, Mr. Root sent copies to Wilson and Reid. Along with this, was despatched a resume of all previous communications on the Congo Question. He wanted Reid to impress upon the British the need for immediate concerted action on the Congo situation. By nightfall, Root with a stronger determination to act sent another message to Wilson.

I can understand that their opinion (British view) may have good foundation, but I do not feel willing to continue indefinitely the policy of silence. I do not think we ought to stand silently by and permit a transfer of sovereignty over the Congo to Belgium unless it be upon terms which will plainly make it possible for the Government of Belgium to redress the abuses. If there is any danger of that, and there would seem to be, I wish to give notice before it is done that the United States considers that the treaty to which it is a party is being violated and to insist that the violation shall cease, so that Belgium will take title with full notice.36

Root further indicated that representations could be made with greater force by Great Britain since she had joined with Leopold in inviting the Powers to the Brussels Conference. While we did not wish to interfere or to prejudice Belgian Parliamentary action, our Secretary desired that there be no delay in notifying Belgium that we

35Ibid., Case 1806/198-199. See blue slips dated January 9, 1908. They are attached to case number.

expected strict fulfillment of the treaty stipulations which was at least a moral obligation. Root, however, still had hopes of British cooperation.\textsuperscript{37}

The death of Prime Minister de Trooz and the advent of Schollaert as his successor led Root to hope that conditions would soon be improved. He thought that the new Minister was amenable to change and that Sir Hardinge, the British Minister in Belgium, now would press hard for the elimination of atrocities in the Congo.

Hardinge, was on his own and, with proverbial British patience, preferred to await development. He also felt that action in a transitional period would be unfair and ill-considered. We, however, regarded his views as mere procrastination. Root was informed by Wilson that succession by the new Premier, Mr. Schollaert made no change in the Belgian Government's program.\textsuperscript{38}

The team of Chargé Carter in London and Minister Wilson in Brussels continued with greater vigor to urge the British to take the lead in joint action on the Congo affairs. By January 21, 1908, the British conceded that the time for concerted effort had arrived. Two days later Hardinge, at Wilson's insistence, took the lead because of the British interest in questions of administration and territory.

Both made representations to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Davignon. Wilson emphasized the fact that public opinion was deeply concerned over conditions in the Congo area. He emphatically stated that we had neither commercial aspirations nor territorial

\textsuperscript{37}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}

ambitions. We reserved our right of approving any annexation until assured that the same would effectively provide for the humanitarian provisions of the Berlin Act as reinforced in the Brussels Act of 1890. We hoped that safeguards for execution of the Brussels Act would satisfy international opinion in the United States. Wilson also added that the pressure of additional Powers would facilitate these humanitarian safeguards.39

Due to the complicated interests of Britain, Hardinge's observations to the Belgian Foreign Secretary were far more extensive than Wilson's. Davignon made no comment at this interview. His reply to this joint action was made on January 29, 1908, at which time he left a memorandum copy and translation of the Belgian reaction. His answer may be regarded as a polite diplomatic thumb-nosing accompanied by a few remarks of pride and promise. His answer, which appeared in the Belgian Gray Book (1908), was directed mainly at Great Britain. He emphasized the point that his Government would adhere to its obligations but that when the Belgian Chamber considered the matter in 1895, there were no observations from abroad. He made it clear that, following the annexation, Belgium, as in the past, would adhere to all treaties between the Congo State and foreign Powers.40

Mr. Wilson assumed a watch and wait policy. He was later instructed to continue to cooperate with the British in the event the


40Foreign Relations (1908), pp. 540-542 ff.
Belgian proposals were not in accord with the views of the two Powers. Meanwhile, the matter of annexation of the Congo was put aside until relations with the Crown were completed. The settlement resulted in an elimination of the royal domain by way of compensation. An annual payment was to be made to the King.

From the biographical treatment of Root by Jessup comes proof that Root and the State Department were still under heavy public pressure. We also learn that Root followed the policy of stimulating Britain to take the lead as a signatory of the Berlin Act. On February 21, 1908, he wrote to Dr. Barbour of the Congo Reform Association and described the efforts we had made to prevail upon Great Britain to make strong representations upon the basis of the Berlin Treaty. In a letter to John Parsons of New York City, he later explained our limitations.

We have been doing everything which seemed to be possible to bring about a change of conditions.... We have the least grounds for interference of any of the great Powers. Nothing has been neglected, nothing will be omitted in the future. Of course, we cannot send an Army to the Congo to take possession of the country and administer it ourselves. It is only by moral pressure that we can accomplish anything. This we have been exercising in conjunction with England, but to do it publicly would result in complete disaster by creating resentment in Belgium against foreign interference.42

During the Belgian parliamentary discussion of the colonial law to safeguard native welfare, Sir Edward Grey, through his Minister,

41 Ibid., pp. 544 and 550.
42 Jessup, op. cit., II, p. 64. Cf. Numerical File (1906-1910), CXCIV, Case 1806/328. Three days later, Wilson sent Root editorials whose tone suggested that British action was unwarranted and unjustified. They looked upon the action as pressure for the advantage of British interests and incompatible with the dignity and honor of the Belgian people. See 61st Cong., 1 sess. Senate Doc. No. 147, p. 67. No. 301, Wilson to Secretary, February 27, 1908.
suggested a policy to Belgium. We did the same. Grey, however, was more interested in support than in actual concerted action. His policy entailed three important points. First, he wanted the natives to be relieved of excessive taxation. Second, he sought the grant of sufficient lands to the natives to insure sustenance and enough surplus produce to enable them to buy and sell as in other European colonies. Third, he sought the right of acquiring land for factories and trading posts for traders of all nationalities. Grey suggested in addition, that a staple currency be established. The natives would not then be compelled by direct or indirect means to render labor without remuneration. There was also the suggestion to make larger grants of land to the natives. Properly executed, these suggestions would prevent future abuses. Incidentally, Grey also sought the right of acquisition of land for British missionaries, merchants and settlers. There is no doubt that British trade would profit by these changes.

On April 7, 1908, our recommended reforms were submitted to the Belgian Foreign Office. They were somewhat along the line of the British, but were more elaborate in certain respects. Five proposals in all were made. First, that the native population will be relieved of excessive taxation. Second, that forced labor be halted. Third, that natives be accorded permanent tenancy of tracts of land sufficiently large to afford sustenance. Fourth, that traders and settlers of all nationalities be permitted to secure unoccupied tracts of land needed for the prosecution and development of peaceful commerce at

reasonable prices in any part of the Congo. Fifth, we suggested the establishment and maintenance of a judiciary which would assure equal and exact justice to all. Beyond all doubt these reforms, if carried to full fruition, would silence the complaints of our humanitarians. But the most satisfied group of our citizenry would be the Uncle Samoney.

Neither the British nor our Moguls were disappointed by the action of Root and the Department on April 8, 1908, the day following the presentation of our recommendation to the Belgian Government. Despite difference of emphasis, there could be no doubt that Britain and the United States were in accord on Congo matters. With respect to freedom of trade following Belgium's anticipated annexation of the Congo as a colony, and differences of opinion regarding commercial questions as distinct from humanitarian ones, Root told the British ambassador that he had instructed Wilson to join England in making representations. To Wilson he ordered, "you will... support the line proposed to be adopted by the British Minister for Foreign Affairs." Both Britain and the United States wanted the Belgian Government to recognize commercial monopolies established by the Free State in so far as there were consistent with the principle of freedom of trade under the Berlin Act. If this were done, our treaties would give us the same favorable treatment enjoyed by any other power. But the Belgian Government remained silent on the matter.

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45 Foreign Relations (1908), pp. 561, 563.
From this point, new discussions followed. It should be remembered that, up to this point, communications on the part of the two Powers with Belgium had been conducted in an unofficial manner. Both Great Britain and the United States wished to avoid any embarrassment to the Belgian Government. Matters have worked out very satisfactorily from the English-speaking Powers. On the contrary, the Belgian Foreign Office officials, probably irritated, held that whatever views we presented immediately after annexation must be understood as official. To this, Root finally agreed on May 9, 1908.  

Continuous concerted action brought to the fore two important propositions, native forced labor on taxation and compulsory arbitration. In anticipation of annexation, they were submitted to the Belgian Government. In the memorandum of April 16, 1908 to the Belgian Foreign Office, we held that our views reflecting all forms of slavery or quasi-slavery in the Congo were so well-known that we left the presentation of the full argument to the British. We simply requested that, in the event of annexation, the Belgian Government would adhere to the Brussels Act relative to the native races giving special attention to Article Two and Five. The United States and Great Britain did not want to compete with slave labor. Reference to compulsory arbitration dealt solely with commercial and economic questions that would occasion a dispute which could not be reached through ordinary diplomatic channels. Such disputes might arise from a conflict of interpretations of existing treaties.

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47 Foreign Relations (1908), p. 569.
On May 9, 1908, Root indicated his approval of both the suggested five-point program and the cooperative reply on it returned by the Belgian Government. However, the Belgian answer to the above propositions was not in the same vein. Belgium did not see eye to eye with the United States on the matter of slavery. The Belgian Government considered the labor tax a legitimate form of taxation. It was allegedly collected only from those who were unable to pay it in currency. The Belgians claimed that all other Governments had always demanded it in their colonies. Nevertheless, one could easily document the fact that the Congo Free State had been very remiss in instituting a national currency. The Belgians declared that this tax was merely a provisional one but could fix no date for its elimination. The Brussels' comment that, "in the meantime the labor tax would be collected in a humane and moderate manner", could be interpreted as an admission that it had previously been carried out quite differently.\(^8\)

As if to divert attention from their own inadequacies, the Belgians criticized the treatment of the Negro in America, implying that the attitude of Southern members of Congress left no room for pointing fingers of scorn at Belgian activities in the Congo. Their criticisms of ill-treatment of the American Negro antedated the present charges of foreign governments against the United States. However, unknown to the Belgian Government, but serving as additional proof for foreign criticism almost at that very moment was the suggested program of John E. Camp. With less bitterness than shown by race-baiters and haters, he wrote the President of the United States on September 21, 1908, to sponsor a program calling for the return of

\[^8\text{Ibid., p. 575.}\]
Negroes to Africa. He urged that this country should purchase the three Congo areas, the Belgian, French and Portuguese and recommended that they be used as a commercial dumping ground and as the future home of the American Negro. The venture, he held, would yield large returns because of agricultural and rubber possibilities. The South would have no further problem and the Negro would be placed on his own footing.49

A very strong difference of opinion prevailed between Belgium and the United States on arbitration. The Brussels cabinet found it difficult to admit that Belgium alone of the possessory powers should adhere to compulsory arbitration while under Article Twelve of the Berlin Act it was optional for other signatories. The United States of course, was neither a possessor nor signatory. The Belgian Government held that, following annexation of the Congo, if it were invited to use the Hague Tribunal as a last resort, the matter would be given just consideration in the light of Article Eighty-four of the Act of the Hague Conference. The Brussels reply called attention to the similarities of requirements and difficulties in arbitration under the Hague Conference and Berlin Act. Possessors or signatories would have to bind themselves as parties to litigation or acceptance of the interpretation by the arbitral award.50

This reply of July 12, 1908, delivered to the State Department on July 21, also held that the Belgian Government would have to adhere to constitutional regulations according to Article Sixty-eight of the


50 ibid., p. 576.
The assent of both Chambers was needed. The Belgian Foreign Office consequently felt that a direct understanding, after annexation, among all the Powers holding territories in that region, was better than the Root suggestion. In this respect, its approach was similar to the Bayard policy of bilateral rather than multilateral agreement. But, it must be admitted that it was an unwise and unsuccessful attempt to eliminate the United States from the arena on humanitarian and commercial protestations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 577.}

The arbitration problem was interrupted and prolonged by the serious attention given to annexation by all interested parties. Before Root, who was occupied by questions of laws, decrees and governmental acts returned to the problem of compulsory arbitration, annexation had been affected. A treaty of November 28, 1907, to that end concluded between members of the Government and the Congo Free State, was finally approved on March 5, 1908.\footnote{Numerical File (1906-1910), CXCIV, Case 1806/140. Wilson to Secretary of State. Cf. 61st Cong. 1 sess. Senate Misc. Doc. 147, p, 120. Also see Foreign Relations (1908), pp. 538 and 534.}

To Root, the Belgians' technique of handling the arbitration matter was, in part, a case of either overlooking certain treaty regulations in which both were involved or one of intentional neglect. Thus in his communication of January 11, 1909, he gave attention to both humanitarian and commercial rights. He re-emphasized his interpretations of the Brussels Convention of July 2, 1890, the bilateral treaty of January 21, 1891 with the Independent State of the Congo as well as the 1864 declaration of the Commercial Association which
preceded the Congo State. 53

In the reply of June 12, 1909, received by Root two weeks later, the Belgian Government indicated that it had not changed its views on arbitration disputes involving the Congo. The general principles of the Berlin Act were still viewed as valid and paramount. The Belgian Foreign Office still felt that the United States should sign the Act or accept the decisions imposed by the registered opinion of possessory powers. On the other hand, despite activities connected with European affairs, the United States was still attempting to adhere to worn out traditional concepts on a bilateral basis. Nevertheless, Belgium did not cut clear the cord of cooperation. Still adhering to the settling of Congo disputes in multilateral action based upon the Berlin Act, the Foreign Office stated that:

This course would offer the immense advantage of insuring the general observation and a uniform interpretation of the clauses of the Act of Berlin. But the King’s Government confines itself to suggesting and commending this course; it does not assume to impose it. 54

Irrked by Yankee persistency, in their memorandum of June 12, 1909 to Root, the Brussel officials could not understand how Belgian assurances could be questioned. In answer to our criticisms on the matter of concessions, they indicated that an announcement on the sale of land had been issued as early as February 16, 1909 in the Bulletin Officiel. Another sale was scheduled for July 2, 1909. The officials held that there would be no scarcity of land for Belgian and foreign commercial houses or for missionaries. They added that six applications from Protestant associations for land were on file. Their

54 Ibid., p. 414. Italics are mine.

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reply tartly implied that the Belgian Government's prerogative to exercise this right in the new colony as it saw fit was incontestable. 55

The memorandum also indicated that the American Cabinet was naive in its ideas concerning property rights of the Congo people. Moreover, the note held further that to carry out the American concept of native and communal tribal property, the Congo would be turned into native ownership. Such action would run counter to all legal principles not to mention the actual conditions in the Congo. We were also criticized for failure to take into consideration the constituent legislation governing the land system of the colony. Some of the principles extended back to a decree of 1886. These sought to insure the maximum enjoyment of the lands occupied by the natives whether this was in severalty or in common. 56

In the attempt fully to justify its stand on matters in the Congo, the Belgian Government recalled that only six months had elapsed since the transfer had been effected. American experience following the establishment of control over the Phillipines should have demonstrated that miracles could not be formed in so short a time. The note asserted the Belgian Government's sole right to determine the land policy in its colony as had been done by England, France and Germany in their African possessions. 57

The plight of laborers appeared to have evoked a healthy interest. The various governmental agencies were in complete accord respecting

55 Ibid., p. 410. Memorandum to Secretary of State, June 26, 1909.
57 Ibid., p. 412.
the desirability of bringing about without delay tangible improve­ments in their status. The Chamber favored a free labor regime in the Congo. The payment of taxes in money was entirely acceptable. Yet, Wilson wrote on March 17, 1909 that forced labor continued to prevail on public project works. To complete the Great Lakes Rail­way, the Belgian Government authorized the contractor to collect men for forced labor at the rate of pay of twenty-one cents per day. The agreement which had a potential life of five years was regarded by Wilson as instituting a chain-gang regime. It is only fair to add that other concession companies were not granted the right to use forced labor.58

Relative to commercial intercourse, it was restated in the note that the Belgians had not lost sight of the international obligations referred to by Root. Nevertheless, his attention was directed to the statement of the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Chamber of Representatives on April 15, 1890. This was to the effect that all obligations assumed by the Congo Independent State could not survive annexation. This position, the Foreign Office noted, was also backed by international law, and had been assumed by the American Secretary of State Sherman in dealing with Japan after annexation of the Hawaiian Islands.59

On the matter of arbitral proceedings, the Belgian Foreign Office called attention to the fact that it had indicated its position previously. It subtly called to our attention that, we had refused

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59 Foreign Relations (1909), p. 413.
ratification of the Berlin Act. Brussels felt that first consider-
ations on any contentious questions were still the responsibilities
of the signatories of the Berlin Act of 1885. Herein, uniform
interpretations could be gained. In regard to the convention of
January 21, 1891, a political change had occurred. Belgium would
nevertheless treat American missions the same as others, but would
like our assurances of their good conduct. 60

However, John Daniels, the Secretary of the Congo Reform Associ-
ation, American branch, reflected a disturbed attitude. On February
20, 1909, he inquired from the Department whether it had received
information regarding the alleged efforts of Belgium to isolate the
United States from Great Britain. The attempt was to have been based
on a suit brought against certain American missionaries. They were
the Reverends Morrison, Vass and Shepperd, ministers of the Presby-
terian Missionary Society in Luebo. 61 Incidentally, cessation of
publication and recall to America of the parties involved paved the
way for the peaceful settlement of this affair.

On February 21, 1909, the question of the feasibility of making
available important news to Daniels again arose. On this occasion,
it involved the information that the heir presumptive, Albert, Leopold's
nephew, was going to the Congo in May to investigate abuses with an
eye to needed reform. If such a release was handled properly, it
would accrue to the Department's advantage. Less pressure would be

60Ibid., pp. 412-413.

61Ibid. Case 1806/520-521. Cf. Times (London), February 26,
1909. Grey held that Great Britain would continue to cooperate with
us. He stated that it was senseless to prevent annexation. Belgium
was the only logical contender. He later stated that he would re-
cognize the fact, even though differences had not been settled.
exerted by the Reform Association. It would be satisfied in the knowledge that progress in the Congo was about to begin and its official personnel had advanced information. For Adee and other members in the Department, with less pressure from moralists, more time could be given to securing the rights of our nationals in the Congo colony. The release was sent to Daniels on March 8, 1909.62

The eventual outcome of Albert's visit was a new deal for the natives. The British took the point of view that the land policy instituted by the Belgians was mechanical but not necessarily beneficial.63 Our State Department assumed its usual watch and see attitude. Adee again commented to Bacon, "Is this a step in the direction of reform in the interest of the natives and the Open Door?"64

Adee was one within the State Department who did not let his patriotism blind him to realities. On March 19, 1909, he penned a memorandum explaining his patience with Belgium on the complex problem of annexing an under-developed region. Coincidentally, the same thought was expressed to us three months later by the Belgian Government in regard to the Congo Question. Adee noted on another slip the comparison of the United States with the Philippines.

If I mistake, not, we had a great deal of trouble and worry in carrying out reforms in the Philippines after annexation - and if the Powers had demanded a categorical

64 Ibid., p. 186. This document is a copy of one to which the note was attached. Cf. Numerical File (1906-1910), CXCV, Case 1806/529-530. Adee's note was found there.

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schedule of effective reforms as a condition of recognizing our annexation of the islands, we might have been embarrassed.65

On April 1, 1909, in genuine seriousness, the editor of the Boston Transcript wrote that we had taken the leadership of the movement to see justice done in the Congo. Our position was due to the stand taken by Secretary Root. Our inflexible status brought forth an ultimatum.

Root notified Belgium that this Government would never recognize the taking-over of the Congo territory by Belgium unless the Leopoldian claim to all vacant lands without regard to immorial (sic) communal and tribal bounds and interests in those lands were disavowed.®®

To the Transcript, recognition meant that the King had to dispose or transfer those large holdings of land known as "Crown Domain", and "Private Domain". Belgian and American syndicates were to part with those concessions, where the natives were held enforced and not paid for their labor. The natives had a right to their own labor and produce. Reducing them to landless slaves meant that Leopold had shut out all commercial interests except his own.67

If all the wrongs listed by the Boston Transcript had been corrected before the First World War, an impasse still would likely have prevailed between our country and Belgium. The fundamental difference between the two revolve around essentially the matter of trade.

65 Numerical File, (1906-1910), CXCV. Case 1806/538-539. Cf. 61st Cong. 1 sess. Senate Doc. No. 147, p. 205. "The American Government especially since receiving the Philippines from the hands of Spain will doubtless find such a period of time is insufficient to put into final shape decisions that can only be reached after long preparation and meditation".

66 Boston Transcript, April 1, 1909. An Editorial, "The Lead Is Ours In The Congo".

67 Ibid.
Complete acquiescence to Great Britain and the United States would have paved the way for complete economic predominance of the Powers. The diplomatic arguments to gain their ends revolved on the answer to the question whether or not all obligations assumed by an Independent State survived annexation by another. Relief for Belgium was in the negative reply, a principle of international law.\(^{68}\)

Progress in Congo improvements lagged along unduly. On December 2, 1909, Ambassador Wilson observed the change in British Foreign Policy relative to Congo matters as indicated by the *Times* (London), a semi-official organ. The item of interest was an editorial written by Valentine Chirol who spent two weeks in Brussels investigating the Congo Question. Significantly, it was written after consultation with the British Legation in Belgium. It indicated a virtual reversal of the British Congo policy. In substance, the item concluded that amelioration of conditions in the Congo could be left to the Belgian public and colonial administration. This view was in harmony with that of the British Minister previously expressed in despatches.\(^{69}\) With the death of Leopold II on December 17, 1909, the British remapped their policy on Congo affairs. They obviously gave the new Government under King Albert a chance to rectify mistakes and make good. Great Britain was moreover keenly aware of the potential armament race attending the advent of the London Naval Conference and the Second Hague Peace Conference. These considerations undoubtedly caused a shift in its Congo policy.

\(^{68}\) 61st Cong. 1 sess. Senate Doc. No. 147, p. 206.

\(^{69}\) Numerical File (1906-1910), CXCI. Case 1806/655.
Disappointed in the shift, we planned no similar change. The reports from our official staff substantiated the action taken by the British Foreign Office. Charles P. Bryan, a Chicago born diplomat who had served in China, Brazil and Switzerland on March 18, 1910 wrote reassuringly to the State Department.

The optimistic views expressed in his despatches on this subject by my predecessor, Mr. Wilson, seemed fully justified. There evidently prevails throughout Belgium universal and determined public opinion set on ameliorating the conditions which have existed in the African domain. The Sovereign and his able adviser... are competent to intelligently follow their policy of reform and to fulfill the pledges made to their people.... The Congo will be wrested from savagery and become an empire such as England has founded on every continent.70

Upon receipt of the report on the situation in the Congo, the State Department took an attitude of inaction but still looked with a benevolent expectancy toward contemplated reform.71 Although the new King had scarcely become accustomed to the responsibilities of the throne, he felt that it was urgent to settle the Congo Question. The European situation was becoming more tense. Even though it was necessary to be friendly with one's neighbors, the young King of necessity had to find time to develop the Belgian Army. The Congo Question, in the minds of the King and his wise counselors, had to be resolved before Europe should become embroiled in a conflict.72

From the American angle, a look behind the scenes with the policy makers is always revealing. After annexation, our State Department chief's found the period between February and March of 1909 as

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71Ibid.
72Foreign Relations (1910), p. 36.
one of the toughest. Adee believed that Great Britain would accept
Belgium's proposal of submitting certain issues to the Hague
Tribunal. There was no guarantee that either would give attention
to American interests since the modus operandi would be the Berlin
Act of 1885. To Mr. Bacon, Adee made on a blue slip, a pert
notation that:

...this is a very discouraging sign. It looks as if
Great Britain were pulling away from us, and is ready to
accept a result of arbitration which under the terms of
Baron Moncheur's note of November is not open to us. Should
not a copy go to Mr. Reid to inquire as to the fact of the
matter.73

In the real jockeying for economic advantages, policies of
arbitration conflicted. The Belgians held to the policy enunciated
in the Berlin Act which we never ratified. Should contention neces­
sitate settlement, only the possessory Powers would render the
decision. The United States preferred to operate on the 1884 Declara­
tions. Still assurances from the European Buffer State would not
mean it had no right to differ. The Powers, all rivals of the United
States, would more than likely side against us. The principle of
freedom of trade was not denied nor was there any idea of revoking the
1884 Declarations. Belgium would try to live up to the treaty but
would arbitrate on a policy best suited to its national interest. It
took the same position on the missionary question relative to the sale
of land, the lease and construction of buildings. We made the choice
of 1884 Declarations. For its own welfare, Belgium agreed only in
operation but not to the point of arbitration proposals.74

73 Numerical File (1906-1910), CXCIV. Case 1806/522. Memorandum
Adee to Bacon, February 21, 1909.
In his post mortem on the Root ventures, Jessup fails to give any treatment to the real core of the question regarding Belgian-United States differences on elimination of evils in the Congo. This is not to say that he was unaware of the situation. He made the observation that:

The administration of the Congo was a cold-blooded exploitation of the natives, with instances of cruelty and inhuman treatment which aroused public sentiment in both the United States and Europe.\textsuperscript{75}

But Jessup regarded the entire affair as one of sentiment and morality. He admitted that, in spite of the earlier treaties, we had with the Congo, there was nothing we could do save fight. Congress would not declare war to save black souls in Africa. "People demanded action on the Congo. We went the limit which wasn't far".\textsuperscript{76}

Root did not wait for the affair to end before giving his version of the Congo problem. On February 20, 1906 he wrote the following to Congressman Denby:

If the United States had happened to possess in Darkest Africa a territory seven times as large and four times as populous as the Philippines, we too, might find good government difficult and come in for our share of just or unjust criticism.\textsuperscript{77}

Wearied by his long tours of diplomatic service, Henry L. Wilson in his book of Memories found it too burdensome to come to grips with the full implications of the Congo Question even after retirement. Perhaps the regulations of office prevented him from stating the real facts. In an unofficial role, he informed us that Leopold had looked upon the Congo as his private patrimony. The King regarded our interference

\textsuperscript{75}Jessup, \textit{op. cit.}, II, p. 61.
\textsuperscript{76}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77}Ibid., p. 62.
as gratuitous intermeddling in the affairs of the Congo. 78

Despite the tenor of the times, the press on the eve of the First World War made some pertinent observations on the Congo situation. There was the realization that, with the death of the parent Congo Reform Association, the ills of the Congo had ended. It was debatable whether they were. More than likely they were then inactive and dormant. Chain-gangs are still found. Nevertheless, The New York Times felt that three landmarks had been scored and five objectives obtained. The former consisted of the issuance of the Casement Report in 1904, the publication of the Committee of Inquiry Report in 1905, and last, the visit of Edmund D. Morel to this country to form an American branch association. 79 Following ten years of hard work, after formally paying tribute to E. D. Morel, the Association disbanded in London on June 16, 1913. Five objectives which it obtained were:

(1) Its abolition of atrocities in the Congo. (2) Eliminating of the main features upon which slavery was build. (3) A greater separation of political administration from the commercial element. (4) Direct taxation instead of the irregular demand for rubber quotas. (5) Freedom of trade in the Congo. 80

With the death of the Congo Association, taps for it were played by the First World War. But even in death as in birth, three of its natural characteristics, like the reflexes of a severed limb

78Wilson, op. cit., p. 162.
80Ibid. In paying a tribute to Morel, attended by the VIP of England, it was claimed that he struck a blow for human justice by forcing open the doors of six different nations.
demonstrated signs of life. First mining under the Guggenheim-Ryan interests in 1914 was so profitable that it detracted from the attention of the Barnes-Keaton expedition, a group under the auspices of American Museum of Natural History. Second, our consul, describing war conditions and economic opportunities predicted large profits for those who could export all manner of products to the Congo, then cut off from Europe. And last, royalty was still trying to keep the Congo neutral. King Alphonso of Spain initiated a neutrality move in this direction. He wanted to apply the Berlin Act. It was alleged that we were also in favor of this move. The Spanish King held that the use of black troops against white troops was fraught with danger, especially to the white settlers. The Manchester Guardian opined that, even for peace with the attitude of Germany, it would be hard to do so --- that is to keep the Congo neutral.

Both the King and the editors could recall the admonitions of Mrs. French-Sheldon, an English-woman who spent a small fortune as an African traveler in 1892. Kindly received by all the natives, she espoused an idea of civilizing the Africans in direct contrast to that employed by whites. She held that the darker brothers sought tools (not armaments). They wanted hammers, hoes, saws, nails and handlooms for weaving. She favored this kind of assistance in aiding them to develop their civilization rather than "forcing the bitter pill of

82 Ibid., December 12, 1914, p. 11.
83 Ibid., June 29, 1915.
Although she expressed the sentiments of the more enlightened public in her day, these views of self-determination were to gain the core in our Point Four Program of economic assistance to what we, for lack of a better term, called the "backward nations" of the world. Thus, international assistance is a better bridge for trade than imperialistic exploitation. This aid foregoes the aches of a "just imperialism".

A cardinal point in this intensive study of our intermittently imperialistic associations with the Congo revealed the constant factor of commercial and trade relations. Within the decade prior to 1884, the policy of extension of trade was given unquestioned approval by the Department of Navy and State. This same policy provoked the clarion call of our consuls in Africa throughout the period of the Congo Question. In addition, it was a recognized principle that the national emblem had to be carried to the African Coast before the merchant flag could be safely or profitably exhibited.

The resultant efforts of Henry M. Stanley, who was regarded as an American citizen unofficially carrying our flag into the hinterland of the Dark Continent, revealed to the imperialistic European Powers, the Congo. This African section was available for competitive exploitation. Despite its known policy of avoidance of European affairs, America was caught in the toils of imperial entanglements and unsuccessfully attempted to join in the full exploitation of the Congo and to protest against the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty - since this

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would have created a monopoly of trade and harmed our possibilities.

Moreover to insure our share of trade in this area, the Arthur administration, represented by the Republicans with Senator John Tyler Morgan, a Democrat from Alabama, as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made the greatest break up to this date from the traditional policy of remaining aloof from European affairs. In breaking not only did the Department send official representation to the Congo Conference, the President through Congress also authorized Willard P. Tisdel as agent to the Congo country to investigate and facilitate our trade in the Congo Basin. In addition, the Secretary of State unsuccessfully resorted to use of our weak Navy in a tardy attempt to secure a naval depot and trading bases along the Congo coast. Obviously this was the use of military power to expand trade. Summarily, the above facts constitute our second cardinal point. Meanwhile, prodigious efforts were put forth by John A. Kasson, our representative at the Conference, for acceptance of what was called the American Plan. To him, ratification of the Declarations of the Conference meant fostering our national interest, which was nothing less than the duty of our Government to gain healthy access to international trade.

We may likewise conclude that, the national election of 1884, typical of succeeding elections, brought a change of administration without the heritage of a bipartisan foreign policy. Thus, ratification of the Declarations of the Conference was not effected by the Cleveland administration. Its official and unofficial advisors felt that international trade, the neutrality of the Congo and the alleged moral concern for the American Negro, who was expected by some to return to his native land, were insufficient reasons to forego the
Founding Fathers' policy toward foreign affairs. The Cleveland administration realized that we were in no position of strength to compete with jealous European rivals for African spoils. Moreover, with its anti-Congo policy, it also found another adequate reason to hold aloof, such as the Tisdel reports, the interpretation of the Conference proposals as a treaty, the Tisdel letter, the war scare of 1887 and other reasons to support its position.

We may also conclude that our rigid hands-off policy under Cleveland brought about a temporary decline of interest in the Congo. Yet, the inevitable forces of change in both the moralistic and materialistic aspects of American life facilitated a revival. The spirit of liberalism and the dignity of man, made a mockery by Leopold, and his system of exploitation (no worse than that of Powers in areas in which we were not then interested) provoked bitter criticisms from missionary groups as well as from the various consulates. Pressured by domestic and world opinion, we participated in the Brussels Anti-slavery Conference of 1889-1890. Our ulterior yet consistent motive - to build up our African trade - was made quite obvious by the treaty of commerce, navigation and friendship resulting from the meeting. This treaty was preceded by the semi-official reports of a negative character of George W. Williams and later followed by the action of our financial giants to gain control of the Congo raw rubber supply for both personal and national interests.

Despite the contrary opinions of most writers, it has been presented beyond reasonable doubt, that Leopold II, who patiently calculated to outwit our international investors, unknowingly became the final pawn in their world-wide rubber combine. Extremely glad that they appeared during his most embarrassing business moment, he never fully realized the great extent of their control of the rubber market or of the wealth
to be realized from their mineral exploitation. Meanwhile, during the rubber trust's period of organization, the Belgian King resorted to the use of a costly lobby to offset the criticisms of missionaries, consuls and the Congo Reform Association, and to avert international inquiry into inhumane conditions in the Congo.

Prior to the exposure of the lobby's efforts to prevent an international inquiry, the rubber trust, which was sensitive to public opinion, accomplished its objectives with Leopold, Sovereign of the Congo Free State. Coincidentally, important members of the State Department previously had been associated with the moguls of the rubber combine. Without overt evidence, a Hearst publication, The New York American, readily assumed that such personnel was guilty by association. Nevertheless, the State Department took the Congo Question under advisement and finally exerted sufficient diplomatic effort to bring about reform in the Congo.

In retrospect, a concise summary can be made in the answers to four specific questions: (1) Did the diplomacy of the United States vis-a-vis the Congo Question concern itself with American interests and initiative in the Congo as a diplomatic one in the strictest sense or was it economic? Beyond the shadow of a doubt, our interest and initiative in the Congo were in the strictest sense economic. Our consuls recommended trade extension. From the very beginning, despite Leopold's duplicity, Congress and the State Department were favorable. Our big financiers later took a keen interest and some of their handwork remains today. Regardless of vacillating moments, the economic factor was the prominent one throughout the period of the Congo Question. Diplomatic interest oscillated slightly with our attempt to be the balance-wheel in European affairs during Fralinghuysen's last six months of office. Diplomacy played its greatest
role in the early nineties and in the decade of 1904 - 1914. On both occasions, interest came from moral considerations which had an economic basis. Public opinion opposed both slavery and forced labor. Too, for us trade and barter were better facilitated without those systems. Of unusual minor interest in the economic realm were the abnormal suggestions to dispose of our domestic problem, the American Negro. All ideas entailed a back-to-Africa movement.

(2) Did the diplomacy of the United States concern itself with the opportunity of the United States to invest in the Congo or to get compensation elsewhere? We did not give considerations to investments on that type of a quid pro quo basis. With the Stanley discovery in mind, we, as the first to accord recognition to the Association and later to the Congo Free State, felt that Yankee foresight had gained the advantage on the European Powers where trade was concerned in the Congo Basin. Even later, when it was necessary to cooperate with the British to place pressure upon Leopold as King of the Congo Free State, we refrained from any negotiations involving the remotest possibility of compensations elsewhere. Our method of dealing with Germany on the Samoan Question at the time when we demonstrated a revival of interest in the Congo was irrefutable evidence that we were not concerned with such compensations.

(3) Did United States diplomacy concern itself with Conference relations and with the participating Great Powers which might become embroiled in conflict as to the possible effect on our growing world position? It has been shown that we took an unexpected course in accepting the invitation and in participating in the Conference. By the latter action, the American neutrality proposition, which exempted
the entire area including water as well as land from war, was accepted, and eased tension on the part of the competitive European Powers. As a nation which sought a leading position among commercial States, we visualized greater gains from a peaceful existence. Propositions curtailing slavery and the slave trade were likewise credited to this country. Significantly, the formalities of occupation on a basis of native consent, was a new emphasis which we introduced to the Powers. Despite the fact that we participated on the principle of complete liberty of action, the manner and conduct in which Kasson operated gave an added measure of respect to our growing world position.

(4) Did our diplomatic enterprise respecting the Congo Question concern itself with the relationships to others effect our growing status as a creditor nation which had need for expanding investments after 1898? It was readily seen that our State Department did not concern itself with expanding investments in the Congo after 1898 until negotiations on the part of our investors and the Congo Free State had been fully transacted. It was, however, always interested in the protection of our interests. Our growing status as a nation in this area after 1898 was not the primary interest of the State Department. However, it undoubtedly was the concern of Wall Street which presented a past relationship sufficiently to cause some to believe that a definite tie existed between it and the State Department. In anticipation of war, our financial group cornered the world's raw rubber supply and thus secured control of the Congo supply. Incidentally, due to other stipulations in the agreements, our investors made the greatest profits from the mining of industrial diamonds. Their descendants still hold some of the original stock, yet our status
as a creditor nation in the Congo today has changed. That is an interesting story for another investigation.
APPENDIX A

DECLARATION EXCHANGED BETWEEN UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF THE CONGO

The International Association of the Congo hereby declares that by Treaties with the legitimate Sovereigns in the basin of the Congo and that of the Niadi-Kialun and in adjacent territories upon the Atlantic there has been ceded to it territory for the use and benefit of Free States established and being established under the care and supervision of the said Association in the said basins and adjacent territories, to which session the said Free States of right succeed.

That the said International Association has adopted for itself and for the said Free States, as their standard, the flag of the International African Association, being a blue flag with a golden star in the center.

That the said Association and the said States have resolved to levy no custom house duties upon goods or articles of merchandise imported into their territories or brought by the route which has been constructed around the Congo cataracts; this they have done with a view to enabling commerce in Equatorial Africa.

That they guarantee to foreigners settling in their territories the right to purchase, sell, or lease lands and buildings situated therein; to establish commercial houses, and to carry on trade upon the sole condition that they shall obey the laws. They pledge themselves, moreover, never to grant to the citizens of any one nation any advantages without immediately extending the same to the citizens of all other nations, and to do all in their power to prevent the Slave Trade.

In testimony whereof, Henry S. Sanford, duly empowered therefor by the said Association, acting for itself and for the said Free States, has hereunto set his hand and affixed his seal this 22nd day of April, 1881, in the city of Washington.

(L.S.) (Signed) H. S. Sanford.

Frederick T. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State, duly empowered therefor by the President of the United States of America and pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate, heretofore given, acknowledges the receipt of the foregoing notification from the International Association of the Congo, and declares that, in harmony with the traditional policy of the United States, which enjoins a proper regard for the commercial interests of their citizens while at the same time avoiding interferences with controversies between
other Powers as well as alliances with foreign nations, the Government of the United States announces its sympathy with, and approval of, the humane and benevolent purposes of the International Association of the Congo, administering as it does, the interests of the Free States there established, and will order the officers of the United States, both on land and sea, to recognize the flag of the International Association as the flag of a friendly Government.

In testimony whereof he has hereunto set his hand and affixed his seal this 22nd day of April, A.D., 1884, in the city of Washington.

(L.S.) (Signed) Frederick T. Frelinghuysen

APPENDIX B

INSTRUCTIONS TO C. C. EARL ENGLISH TAKEN FROM A COPY

Navy Department
Washington, D. C.
December 5th., 1884

Sir:

In view of the fact that an American citizen, by his discoveries in Africa, was the first to reveal the importance of the Congo country to the commercial interests of the world, this Government seems justified in claiming a special influence in determining questions touching all foreign arrangements for the administration of that region, and especially in regard to the rules as to its commerce.

You are therefore directed to instruct the Commanding Officer of the U.S.S. Kearsage to proceed to the vicinity of the mouth of the Congo, with the view of ascertaining whether a healthful point, well situated for a commercial resort can be found on the lower Congo, not already lawfully appropriated by another Power; and whether a concession can be obtained from the native authorities for the exclusive use of a limited district for a depot and factorial establishment for the benefit of American citizens in that region. It is desirable that the Kearsage should remain some time in the vicinity of the Congo, both for the purpose of obtaining all the hydrographic information possible, as well as to report upon the action taken along the banks of that River by the representatives of European Powers.

In consequence of the very general interest felt in regard to the political and commercial situations along the Congo, it is believed that the position taken by our Government will be strengthened by the presence in that vicinity, for a time, of the Commander in Chief of the Naval Force on the European Station. You will therefore so arrange the movements of the vessels of your command as to be able to proceed in the Flagship Lancaster to the mouth of the Congo, about the first of February next.

While it is important that the health of the officers and crews should not be unnecessarily exposed, and that to protect them every necessary sanitary measure should be adopted, your attention is called to the fact that it is of the first importance that the visit of the Kearsage and that of the Flagship should not be hurried ones. The Kearsage should not leave the vicinity of the Congo until after your arrival, in order that you may be placed in possession of all the information obtained by her Commanding Officer. Your own visit should be of sufficient length to enable
you to collect all the information likely to be of use to the various branches of the Government, or of general interest to the people of the United States. You are directed to select an officer of intelligence and tact to proceed up the Congo River as far as "Stanley Pool", if practicable, for the purpose of aiding you in preparing a thorough and detailed report of your observations to the Navy Department; and it is desirable that he should make a prolonged stay in the interior if requested by the United States Commercial Agent; for which purpose he may remain after the departure of the ship or ships.

The question of the extension of commerce of Western Africa caused the Governments of France and Germany, on the 10th of October last, to invite representatives from Maritime Powers to assemble in conference in Berlin, for the purpose of considering the conditions which would best assure the development of commerce of the basin of the Congo, and prevent disputes and misunderstandings.

The question which it proposed should be considered by the conference now in session, and at which the United States is represented, are: First. Freedom of commerce with the basin and mouth of the Congo. Second. Application of the principles adopted by the Vienna Congress to ensure the freedom of navigation of international rivers, (the principles of which were after applied to the Danube) to the Congo and Niger. Third. Definition of formalities to be observed in order that the station occupied on the shores of Africa may be entitled to recognition.

The results of the conference are not yet known, but a friendly arrangement seems probable.

Enclosed herewith are two copies of a Declaration by the International Association of the Congo together with the official recognition by this Government of the Flag of the Association, to which your attention is called, and one of which should be forwarded to the Commander of the Kearsage with his instructions.

The objects contemplated by the cruises of the Kearsage and Lancaster will be facilitated by joint action with Mr. W. F. Tisdel, the Agent of the United States to the Congo, with whom you are directed to place yourself in communication, and to comply with all his reasonable wishes in connection with the object of his mission, but you will be careful to do nothing which might complicate the political situations.

Rear Admiral Earl English, USN

Comdg US Naval Force on European Station.

Very respectfully,

William E. Chandler

Secretary of the Navy

(2 enclosures)

-Miscellaneous Letters, December, Part I, 1881. Archives, Washington, D. C.-

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LETTER FROM MR. W. P. TISDEL, LATE AGENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO THE STATES OF THE CONGO ASSOCIATION, TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE, WASHINGTON, IN REPLY TO THE CRITICISMS OF MR. HENRY M. STANLEY

502 Calle Florida
Buenos Aires, March 20, 1886

Hon. T. F. Bayard
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C.

Sir,

By the arrival of the American mail today I am in receipt of the "New York Herald" of January 24th, which contains a letter from Henry Stanley, criticising in a most remarkable manner the official reports which I had the honor to make as an agent of the United States to the States of the Congo Association. I have no wish to enter upon a controversy with Mr. Stanley, who rests placidly on the liberal support from the private purse of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, and holds at command an important part of the press columns of the world, chiefly because my duty was to the Government of the United States, and not to Mr. Stanley as he appears to assume.

To you, Mr. Secretary, as head of the Department which honored me with the appointment, I beg leave to address myself in this open letter to confront and answer the statements, in nuances, and misrepresentations made by Mr. Stanley evidently for the purpose of keeping afloat the Congo bauble, which he has found so pleasant and profitable, until he shall be able to drain a little more gold and glory from the coffers of His Majesty, and from a deluded public which he beguiles in dark ways across a still darker Continent.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians, out of pure and elevated motives, thought to build an enduring monument to philanthropy in equatorial Africa; and upon that desire Mr. Stanley has builded in London a private place, where luxury abounds, extravagance dwells, and a costly museum has been erected, into which will dwindle the monument His Majesty thought to see rise in Central Africa; and it is not strange, therefore, that Mr. Stanley should be impatient with the utterance of the truth concerning the case.

Mr. Stanley's criticisms of my Report are based on disconnected and garbled extracts therefrom, and when he can no longer do this he has resort to personal detraction, which, however, fails to prove that the Congo Valley is the paradise which he, unaided by the Almighty, has made. A cause which can only be defended and debated by personal abuse is, from the beginning, a lost cause; and Mr. Stanley is so grossly guilty of this that no gentleman can discuss
the matter with him; hence I am forced to address myself to the
head of the Department, which I have had the honor to serve, and
to whom only I am responsible for my reports.

I am not blind, Mr. Secretary. I have never found a Living-
stone, nor have I crossed a dark continent; but I have travelled
where Mr. Stanley never thought to traveling; more miles have
endured as many hardships, and I can not yield the evidences of my
senses to his gorgeous descriptions, which are unsupported by other
evidences, and which he has made so often that I am not prepared
to say he does not sometimes think them true.

In my report to the Government I have stated plain facts as
they came under my observations, and from reliable officials of the
African International Association; and you, Mr. Secretary, have
seen the evidence of my statements. I thought this my duty, whereas
Mr. Stanley and certain of his associates thought I should serve
their schemes. I might have been blessed with the smiles and ap­
proval of these gentleman had I but allowed Mr. Stanley to relieve
me of the trouble of preparing my reports; indeed, I fear I neglected
a fine opportunity, for when I arrived in Brussels I was invited to
Chateau Gingelon, the residence of ex-United States Minister,
Henry S. Sanford, where was unfolded before me the scheme of the
"Great Semi-Political Commercial Trading Company of the Congo"
(capital to be raised in England) with the intimation that my
fortune would be assured if I should make a prudent and practical
report in harmony with the proposed scheme. When it was known
that I had neglected so fine an opportunity; and had made my reports on
the basis of unvarnished facts and unvarnished truth, I at once
inherited the hatred, malice, and vituperation of Mr. Sanford and
Mr. Stanley, and press and cable, telegraph, and platform were used
against me. Ex-minister Sanford was so good as to write me, at the
same time, a letter of regret, that I had not allowed him to examine
and revise my reports before sending them to the Department. This
letter with many others from Mr. Sanford, are at your disposal.

Let me suggest Mr. Secretary, that you investigate the subject,
and ascertain just why the United States took such an important part
in the Berlin Conference, and why the Congress of the United States
became sponsor for this so-called "Congo Free States," which, in
fact, had no existence. I know that every gentleman in the Executive
and Legislative Departments of the Government who participated in
the considerations of the Congo Question acted with the best inten­
tions, and from the purest motives. The information upon which
Congressional action was based came from one man, and that man was
the Hon. Henry S. Sanford, ex-United States Minister to Belgium.
While he resided in Washington, urging the passing of the Bill which
gave recognition to States not in existence, his "blue ribbon
dinners" were the talk of the town. I do not mean to insinuate that
an American Legislator can be influenced by a dinner; far from it.
But I have heard the ex-Minister from the United States declare time
and again that he wrote the clause about the Congo which appeared in
President Arthur's message; that he supplied all the information to
the Department of State about the Congo; that he passed the Bill in
Congress which gave recognition to a State having no existence; and
that he brought about the call for the Berlin Conference. The information which you would obtain by such an investigation would at least make an interesting chapter in the history of Congo legislation.

Can anyone believe for a moment that if the Congo was as rich as it is reported to be, it would have remained three hundred years unexplored except by the Portuguese, who knew every inch of the country south of the Equator and west of Longitude 15 degrees East? Can you imagine, Mr. Secretary, that the English, who explored the valley of the Congo in the early part of the present century, would have abandoned it if they had found the great wealth claimed for it by Mr. Stanley? Is it possible that the enterprising Dutch traders could have remained two hundred and twenty five years at the mouth of the Congo and never heard of the wonderful deposits of wealth at their very doors? Mr. Stanley went down stream with the current. He could not turn back. He rarely ever landed during his perilous voyage, and if we are to believe him he had to fight his way across the Dark Continent. Yet he comes to the sea with tales which are only equaled in the "Arabian Nights". I cannot deny but that, in part, he states the truth. I have only written in general of the country which I saw. But a distinguished English explorer, Lieu­tenant Cameron, of the Royal Navy, who went to Tanganyka and the Upper Congo, read the wonderful tales of Mr. Stanley; and in a public meeting, held in Merchant's Court, Guildhall, Newcastle, February 23, 1885, Commander Cameron spoke as follows:

"No doubt many of them had read of what Mr. Stanley said in his speech at Manchester. Now I thought that in that speech Mr. Stanley drew a somewhat highly-colored picture. He talked of so many millions of people living in the basin of the Congo. I (Commander Cameron) knew there was a very large population, but I should not like to bind myself down to figures. I have made calculations on different data, and found that they varied so much in the results that I could not bind myself to any figure. Then there was the quantity of clothing the people would wear. Then, again, I thought Mr. Stanley's cal­culations were overdrawn. Again in putting down the exports of the Lower Congo at over 2,000,000 (£) pounds sterling a year, Mr. Stanley has got into error. He had taken a few of the largest trading establishments, struck an average between them and multiplied the result by a total number of such es­tablishments, giving a trade for the Lower Congo which was far in excess of the actual fact".

But the great advantage of the New Congo State to England lay in the adoption of Free Trade. Mr. Stanley in one letter said he had offered all this to England, and as England would not have it he would offer it to some one else, meaning by this sort of language that he would go to the French or Germans and make the bargain with them. In the same strain he has been talking at Hamburg, Cologne, and Berlin, and had been asking for the "whole-hearted German" to go and take the trade up. Well, "the whole-hearted German" had been taking the Camerons, and the effect had been that the Natives refused to have any­thing to do with him."
Mr. Secretary, I have never stated, as has been reported, that I would cause the ruin of Mr. Stanley, nor have I suggested even that I would create a sensation. I did state to the officials in the Congo country that if I ever lived to get out I would tell the truth about the country as I saw it. I have in my possession today letters from many of these same officials, requesting me to make an expose of the whole affair, and other letters from the same gentleman thanking me for having told the truth to the King (meaning Leopold II), and for having published it to the world. I had the pleasure to place in the hands of Colonel Strauch, President of the Association, an autographic letter from one of the highest officials in the Congo, which letter was an appeal for medicines, stores, and for doctors to attend the sick, and I had later advices from the author of that letter thanking me and saying that the Brussels people had taken partial notice of the request.

Mr. Stanley's statement as to the number of men who have been employed by the Association, and the number who have died, may be correct, but if so, it does not tally with the information which I have received from the officials of the Association. In my opinion, it is as far from the truth as is his statement, published in his latest book of romance, that the Congo States have a sea frontage on the Atlantic of 360 miles, when the fact is they have just thirty-eight miles. He is very careful not to speak of the number of expeditions, sent by various governments and geographical societies, which have been completely annihilated. He is careful not to mention the deaths of Dr. Nachtigel, Lieutenant Schultz, Dr. Comber, Mr. Craven, Mr. M'Millan, Mr. Cruickshank, Mr. Condet, Mr. Faron, and many others not connected with the Association, but whose deaths were caused by the bad climate of the Congo. There may be errors in my report, but the wholesale charge made by Mr. Stanley that they are gross exaggerations is maliciously false; and to you, Mr. Secretary, I have demonstrated that the exaggerations are on the side of the great explorer, who has mapped out a country covering an area of 1,500,000 square miles, without ever having left the river which flows through its centre. Mr. Stanley's writings are romantic to say the least, and his "Across the Dark Continent" and "The Free States of the Congo, and how they were Founded", can hardly be accepted as positive proof that he is right and I am wrong, since his works are openly denounced by African explorers of character as gross exaggerations.

I have never in any way associated the name of His Majesty the King of Belgium, Col. Strauch, Mr. Stanley, nor any other person or persons directly identified with the Congo scheme, with fraud, nor have I represented them as "deluding the public with false reports, and enticing innocent persons to their doom". I have, in discharging my duty, stated the condition of the affairs of the Congo as I found them; and as Mr. Stanley was the father of the so-called Free States, I imagine that his egotism has been wounded.

His Majesty the King of the Belgians said to me that my Report simply confirmed the information which had come to him; and His Majesty remarked in the same breath "that Mr. Stanley would never
be appointed Governor of the Congo. It is all very well for Mr. Stanley to tell the readers of the "New York Herald" what he might write about. If he were to write less fiction and more truth, I should have some hope that the Congo States might succeed under the wise and judicious administration of Sir Francis de Winton. I do not question the wealth of the Upper Congo country. Other travellers do, however. I simply say that the country through which I traveled is worthless after passing Vivi, and that white men cannot live there. With money, it is possible to build around the Rapids, or even across the Zanzibar. But I venture to say to take out one dollar's worth of produce by means of this road, the cost will be three dollars. Capitalists will, at least, investigate before they invest their money. Naturally, with the personal guarantee of Leopold II, the money can be raised, but never upon the guarantee of the Free States of the Congo. Has Mr. Stanley ever heard of the Pedro II Railway of Brazil, which was constructed by the Imperial Government, and which runs to the great rich coffee fields of the interior? The first one hundred and fifty miles passes through a country which yields little or nothing; yet beyond, on the highlands, its riches are unparalleled. Two trains each day pass over this line in both directions heavily laden with provisions and stores for the interior and with coffee for export. The passenger traffic is too large. Yet this road has never been made to pay its running expenses. Does Mr. Stanley expect better results from his Congo Railway?

The names which figure on Mr. Stanley's list as having served three years in the Congo country can be very largely culled down. Mr. Tugman was there less than two years, and I carried him in my arms on board the steamer which took him to England, and, though ill myself, I nursed him back to life. Dr. Allard never went to the interior beyond Vivi. He established the pest house, near Boma, and called it a hospital from which very few ever escaped alive, after once passing within its portal, and from which Dr. Allard was compelled to flee three times, taking refuge in the salubrious climes of Mossamedes in South Angola. Mr. Lehrman was never on the Congo east of Vivi, and he went with me to Vivi for the first time. His service was at Grantville, and in the Valley of Quillu, where he has left a most excellent record. Souléz, Micik, Shaw, Valeke, and many others were in Europe when I left, broken in health. Mr. Stanley writes fervently of the little handful of brave men who did manage to pull thru the three years of contract time; but he does not refer to the hundreds of others who, if alive today, are helpless, hopeless invalids - the result of their engagement to serve the International Association in this fever stricken country. Nor does he mention the fact that ninety percent of the missionaries who have ever gone to this country have died; or if living, are invalids. Mr. Secretary, I have the names of every man who has entered the service up to the first of April, 1885, and the notes under the head of "Where are they now?", make a sad chapter in my memoranda of travel.

The suggestion that I was requested by the American Minister in Berlin to leave during the sitting of the Conference is false, and I have need only to refer you to the official correspondence on file.
in the Department, Mr. Sanford and Mr. Stanley suggested it. They did not want me there, yet it was out of courtesy to the American Minister that Mr. Sanford was admitted to the Conference at all. He knocked loudly for three days before the doors were open to him. He went there to advocate his pet "semi-political-commercial" scheme. Do you not remember how quickly, quietly and permanently he was suppressed? Of the magnificent sum of $15,000 to which Mr. Stanley refers, he knows very well that no such sum was used by me. To the Congo Fund today, there is a balance of about $12,000.

Mr. Secretary, I propose that you appoint two special agents and allow me to name a third, and let this commission go over the same ground which I traversed. I will pay one-third of the expense, and if the majority of the commission do not sustain my reports in every particular, I will pay it all. I will gladly be the pilot, and take them step by step over the same ground. My own losses consequent to the acceptance of the Congo "mission" were five times greater than the entire sum voted by Congress, yet I can stand a little more for the sake of vindication of the truth and the exposure of pompous pretence.

It is an easy matter for you, Mr. Secretary, to prove whether or not Mr. Stanley writes the truth, when he says that coal can be bought today in the Congo for $13.75 per ton. Please send to the Navy Department and get the vouchers for coal purchased for the United States steamers "Lancaster" and "Kearsarge" while they were lying at the mouth of the river. The price paid was $28 per ton, and I heard of a small cargo having been shipped for account of the United States Navy from London which cost, laid down in the Congo, above $30 per ton.

Mr. Stanley characterizes the statement which I made that the Congo traveler must wade through swamps as "an absurd truth". I waded through swamps waist deep in the dry season and through one terrible slough was guided by one of Mr. Stanley's most trusted followers, Lieutenant Muller, and with captain Soulez and a large caravan, I swam two rivers, which should have been bridged with some of the timber about which Mr. Stanley raves, but which no one can find.

I saw and traversed about two miles of Mr. Stanley's road, which had been cut through stubble and small forest bordering the river; but I was not able to find the fifteen miles of forest road of which he writes.

I saw some of Stanley's wonderful mountains washed away in a day, leaving only pyramids of clay, towering to great heights. I have stated where solid granite is to be found; but the mountains which I saw were principally of crumbly slate, and the "grim rocky mountains of the Lower Congo" of which Mr. Stanley's book treats, are few and far between. There are rocks and boulders as I have stated, along the river, but the mighty Congo has, nevertheless channelled for itself a course through slate, which the photographs
from Mr. Stanley's camera clearly depicted. Does Mr. Stanley mean to say there are not mountains of earth, of clay, of slate?

Again Mr. Stanley asserts that I have never seen nakedness among the Natives of Central Africa. Had he quoted correctly from my Report, he would have given an explanatory clause. I enclose herewith two photographs, one of a male and one of a female. The camera has been faithful to its work, and I ask you to search out the slightest articles of clothing, except the beads and brass rings which I have described. Other photographs I will file with the Department for Mr. Stanley's inspection when he shall honor the States with his presence. In the United States Museum, Washington, there may be seen many full dressed costumes of African ladies, and which might easily be enclosed in an ordinary letter envelope.

Mr. Stanley writes of schools in the Congo Valley, and questions the veracity of my reports on this subject. He refers particularly to Palla Balla, and states that a flourishing school exists there. It is not true. The schools and mission houses which were constructed in Palla Balla were destroyed by the natives while I was in the country. The Missionaries have made extraordinary efforts to teach a few boys, who have been gathered about the stations; but, to quote from my Report, "I have yet to see a Congo man, woman, or child with whom the Missionaries have made any progress".

I have stated in my Report that beyond Leopoldville explorations have not been made, excepting along the river and its branches, whereupon Mr. Stanley, with characteristic promptness, proclaims it untrue, and mentions the names of persons whom he claims have explored an area of 45,000 square miles between the Congo, Gordon Bennett, and the Njaddi. Will you take the trouble Mr. Secretary to look at the map, and follow north on the longitude of De Brazzaville? You will find all of the country about which Mr. Stanley is of particular to specify, west of the line laid down by me. I do not believe that 4500 square miles of the Congo Valley have ever been surveyed. The descriptive maps are from Mr. Stanley's vivid imagination.

Mr. Stanley boldly asserts that vegetables are grown sufficient for the wants of the employees. Under the shade of a tree in Rinchasa a few radishes and potatoes were produced; and in the cemetery near Vivi Sir Francis de Winton tenderly nursed to maturity a few tomatoes; but, all told, a peck measure would easily contain the vegetable grown in the Congo Valley. In many parts it is even difficult to grow brushwood for fuel, and along the upper river, where Mr. Stanley reports the existence of vast forests, the greatest difficulty is experienced in obtaining fuel for the steam launches.

In this manner, I might go on to the end of Mr. Stanley's chapter, but what good can it do? Proverb says "If you answer a fool after his own folly you are apt to drift in his own way". I cannot make this application to Mr. Stanley, yet the manner in which he writes up the "great Congo country" and the promptness with
which he rushes into print whenever the Congo is seen through other and better eyes than his own is simply folly. Can you name an instance where criticism, unfavorably to Mr. Stanley's idea of the Congo, has not been met with personal attacks from the pen of this great explorer? The suggestion that I was too friendly with the Portuguese, and that I wanted to create a sensation, is as foul as it is false. I wished to be just and I wished to be just and that is what Mr. Stanley cannot understand. Time will tell whether my report will "pass muster" or not. I drew but a mild picture Mr. Secretary. Mr. Stanley says that five Americans have been in the service of the Association. He even gives the names. Do those names, with one exception, strike you as being American? Mr. Montgomery James, of Philadelphia, is the only American in the service of the Association. He may be dead for ought I know. I left him at Isanghila helpless, too weak to be carried to the sea. Mr. Stanley never wanted an American in the Congo. He so declared most emphatically to the United States Vice-Consul General in London (Colonel Mitchell) who had corresponded with the officials of the Association with a view of entering the service.

The trade of the Congo, about which Mr. Stanley raves, is the trade of the coast between the Equator and 13 degrees South; the sea coast and longitude 13 1/2 degrees East; and my reports explain minutely how the produce is gathered, shipped to the Congo and thence to Europe.

The final summing up of the work of the Berlin Conference proves conclusively -

1. That England wanted nothing to do with the Congo, but that she wanted to be let alone on the Niger.

2. That Germany wanted nothing of the Congo, but that she did want Zanzibar.

3. That France wanted only the Niaddi Quillu, which she got, and

4. That Portugal wanted to be let alone in the country south of the Congo.

The eloquence of Mr. Stanley and Sanford secured the recognition of the Free States under the sovereignty of Leopold II of Belgium; but as soon as this recognition was made known, the Chamber of Belgium declared almost unanimously that Belgium should in no way become responsible for the acts of her King in connection with the Congo, the sovereignty of which he had assumed only in his private capacity.

Mr. Stanley has tried in vain to raise capital with which to develop the Congo. He has organized companies for commercial purposes; but all has fallen, as did the famous Manchester trading company, which took the trouble to investigate before calling for funds from its subscribers. All the reports of great loans for the
Congo are without foundation in fact; and the country remains today quite as Mr. Stanley found it, and so, in my opinion, it will remain for all time to come.

The French missionary, Father Augouard, whom it was my pleasure to meet at De Brazzaville, has recently published in the "Missions Catholique", of Paris, an account of his journey from Stanley Pool to the Equator. He states that "The river-side tribes made the Europeans anything but welcome, and at many places he was refused both food and fuel". He further states that he "was obliged to keep away from the banks of the river in order to avoid sanguinary encounters with the natives". Father Argouard asserts "that many of the stations will have to be evacuated".

Dr. Lenz, commander of the Austrian Expedition which has just returned from the Congo, has reported to his government at great length, the report being a flat contradiction of the rose colored views presented by Mr. Stanley. He advises his countrymen to keep away from the Congo. Lieutenant Wanners, of the Swedish Army, just from the Congo, reports in "Nya Dagligt Allehanda" Stockholm, January 19, 1886:

The climate of the Congo is so bad that a European cannot live there. The country is rich far up the river, but can never be made available for commercial purposes".

Charles Challie Long, soldier, traveler, explorer, gentleman, who knows Central Africa thoroughly, delivered an address before a large audience in Chicago, December 17th, 1885. He was questioned also as to the correctness of my reports, and his reply was: "I know the Congo country well, and agree with Mr. Tisdal. He has stated only the plain truth". (See "Chicago Evening Journal", December 18, 1885).

Lieutenant Taunt, United States Navy, who was to have been my companion, but which pleasure was denied me by reasons of unforeseen circumstances, returned from the Congo in December, 1885. This gallant officer confirms, in every particular, my own reports. He reached a higher point on the river than I did, and the far inland country of which he writes so favorably is a country which I did not see, and about which I have not written.

Of these far up countries, I cannot speak; but I prefer to behave to statements of men of well-known experience and undoubted veracity to those of Mr. Stanley, who, as a distinguished African traveler writes me "if nothing, if he is not sensational".

I have in my possession more than one hundred letters from travelers, missionaries, officials, and employees of the African Association, confirming in every particular my own views upon the Congo, as expressed in my Reports. I have nothing to deduct therefrom. I have stated only facts as they have appeared to me, following closely the instructions which I had the honor to receive.
from your illustrious predecessor. My latest advices from the Congo are up to January 29th; and while in some places an improved condition of affairs is reported, the general tone of the latest letters indicates a positive apprehension of inability much longer to cope successfully with the climate, the natives, and the monotony of this useless possession.

To-day the cable informs me that His Majesty the King of the Belgians has appointed De Brazza to be Governor-General of the Congo Free States. I congratulate him upon the selection. Yet my surprise is, nevertheless, great. In October, 1885, when I was honored by His Majesty with an audience, Mr. De Brazza was characterized as a man without principle, and wholly unworthy of notice, or even respect. His Majesty was particularly severe upon Mr. De Brazza, and enumerated many acts of perfidy, as reported to him by Mr. Stanley. Lest this be denied, it may not be out of place to state that the American Minister, who presented me, was a witness to the denunciation of Mr. De Brazza. At the same time, Mr. Stanley was loud in his uncomplimentary comments about De Brazza; and you cannot fail to call to mind the excitement which was produced by Stanley's somewhat famous speech, delivered at a dinner given in his honor at the Hotel Continental, Paris. De Brazza, with his usual good sense, excused this as a post-prandial speech, where wine had spoken, not the man. I refer to this only by way of parenthesis, not wishing or intending to violate any secrets, but to show you that His Majesty the King of the Belgians has changed his mind and that he now calls to his aid the man who, of all others, Mr. Stanley has most cruelly and bitterly assailed. Certain it is, and well it is, the King has not appointed Mr. Stanley to be Governor-General of the Congo. I regret that I am compelled to refer to this incident; and I am sure His Majesty will pardon me, since he himself has found out his mistake and rectified it. He will find many more; and I might point them out now; but I wish not to be an informer, and unless driven to it, I cannot betray secrets which H. M. confided to me.

You were kind enough Mr. Secretary, to return to me the many letters which you had in your possession, and which confirmed my reports. You remarked at the time they were of too personal a nature to be filed in the Department and that my statements had been fully corroborated. Self preservation is the first law of nature. Those letters, with many others of later date, are given again at your disposal; and I count the most thorough investigation as to my every act in the matter of my services as Agent of the United States to the States of the Congo Association. I regret that I was not in the States when the attack was made upon me by Mr. Stanley, that I might have answered him promptly, and from documentary proofs, which are deposited in Washington, and which can be produced upon a receipt of a cablegram from your Department demanding them, and which will also cause my speedy return to my own country, to which I am loyal in every thought and act. My defence, if any there be needed, will be made amongst my own people.

I do not believe that Americans want or should want anything to do with Central Africa. If they do, I warn them to study well
my reports before taking action; and it is my belief that only through the recommendations which I have had the honor to submit can Americans ever hope to gain a desirable foothold on the shores of the dark Continent which I was sent to inspect, and upon which I have conscientiously reported.

General Gordon who gave up his life in Khartoum, a sacrifice to his convictions, and that the honor of England might be maintained, wrote of the Upper Nile as follows: -

"The Soudan is a useless possession. Ever was so and ever will be. Larger than Germany, France, and Spain together, and mostly barren. No one who has ever lived in the Soudan can escape the reflection, "what a useless possession is this land!" Few men can stand its fearful monotony and deadly climate."

Had the brave General Gordon applied these words to the Congo, no more condensed and/or truthful description of the country could have been given than these lines imply.

I have the honor to be Sir ....

W. P. Tisdal

\[Special\ Agents\ (1882-1885),\ XXXII\ (np).\ Rec.,\ May\ 11,\ 1886.\]
The rich and populous valley of the Kongo is being opened to commerce by a society called the International African Association, of which the King of the Belgians is the president and a citizen of the United States the chief executive officer. Large tracts of territory have been ceded to the association by native chiefs, roads have been opened, steamboats placed on the river, and the nuclei of states established at twenty-two stations under one flag which offers freedom to commerce and prohibits the slave trade. The objects of the society are philanthropic. It does not aim at permanent political control, but seeks the neutrality of the valley. The United States cannot be indifferent to this work nor to the interests of their citizens involved in it. It may become advisable for us to cooperate with other commercial powers in promoting the rights of trade and residence in the Kongo Valley free from the interference or political control of any nation.

APPENDIX E

THE AMERICAN NEUTRALITY PROPOSITION WITH MODIFICATIONS WERE ADOPTED

Declaration Relative to the Neutrality of the Territories Comprised Within the Conventional Basin of the Congo

Article 10

In order to furnish an additional guaranty of security to commerce and industry, and to promote, by the maintenance of peace, the development of civilization in the regions mentioned in Article I and placed under the regime of commercial freedom, the High Parties that have signed the present Act, and those who shall hereafter adhere thereto, pledge themselves to respect the neutrality of the territories or parts of territories which are dependencies of said regions, including the territorial waters, as long as the Powers that exercise or that might hereafter exercise rights of sovereignty or protection over those territories, making use of the privilege of proclaiming themselves neutral, shall fulfill the duties entailed by neutrality.

Article 11

In case that a Power exercising rights of sovereignty or protection in the regions mentioned in Article I, and placed under the regime of commercial freedom, shall be engaged in war, the High Parties that have signed the present Act, and those which may hereafter adhere thereto, pledge themselves to lend their good offices to the end that the territories belonging to that Power included in the conventional zone of commercial freedom may, by the common consent of that Power and of the other belligerent party or parties, be placed, for the duration of the war, under the regime of neutrality, and considered as belonging to a non-belligerent State, the belligerent parties shall then forego the extension of hostilities to the territories thus neutralized, and shall not make them serve as a basis for military operations.

Article 12

In case that a serious dissension, having originated on account of or within the boundaries of the territories mentioned in Article I, and placed under the regime of commercial freedom, shall arise between Powers that signed the present Act, those Powers engage, before appealing to arms, to have recourse to the mediation of one or more friendly Powers.

To the Congress of the United States:

The Independent State of the Kongo has been organized as a government under the sovereignty of His Majesty the King of the Belgians, who assumes its chief magistracy in his personal character only, without making the new State a dependency of Belgium. It is fortunate that a benighted region, owing all it has of quickening civilization to the beneficence and philanthropic spirit of this monarch, should have the advantage and security of his benevolent supervision.

The action taken by this Government last year in being the first to recognize the flag of the International Association of the Kongo has been followed by formal recognition of the new nationality which succeeds to its sovereign powers.

A conference of delegates of the principle commercial nations was held at Berlin last winter to discuss methods whereby the Kongo basin might be kept open to world's trade. Delegates attended on behalf of the United States on the understanding that their part should be merely deliberative, without imparting to the results any binding character so far as the United States were concerned. This reserve was due to the indisposition of this Government to share in any disposal by an international congress of jurisdictional questions in remote foreign territories. The results of the conference were embodied in a formal act of the nature of an international convention, which laid down certain obligations purporting to be binding on the signatories, subject to ratification within one year. Notwithstanding the reservation under which the delegates of the United States attended, their signatures were attached to the general act in the same manner as those of the plenipotentiaries of other governments, thus making the United States appear, without reserve or qualifications, as signatories to a joint international engagement imposing on the signers the conservation of the territorial integrity of distant regions where we have no established interest or control.

This Government does not, however, regard its reservation of liberty of action in the premises as at all impaired; and holding that an engagement to share in the obligation of an enforcing neutrality in the remote valley of the Kongo would be alliance whose responsibilities we are not in a position to assume, I abstain from asking the sanction of the Senate to that general act.
The correspondence will be laid before you, and the instructive and interesting report of the agent sent by this Government to the Kongo country and his recommendations for the establishment of commercial agencies on the African coast are also submitted for your consideration.

1 Richardson, l. c., Vo. IX, pp. 4914-15.
The large concessions recently granted to American capitalists by the Kongo Free State have resulted in the organization of two companies known as the "Société Internationale Forestière et Minière du Congo", and the "American Congo Company". The legal seat of the former is at Boma, with its principal office at Brussels. It is, in effect, a Belgian organization in which American capital is interested to the extent of 25%. According to the Statutes of the company, its object is as follows:

1st. The prospecting of mineral deposits; the study and execution of all explorations and workings; the acquiring, purchase, hiring, leasing and transfer of mineral concessions in the Kongo Free State and other African countries; the purchase, sale, and, in a general way, the trade of all mineral wealth, either raw or after having been worked; the establishment of all plants necessary for the extraction, treatment and purifying of the ore, the working of metals and the by-products thereof.

2nd. The working of all the other products of the lands and other concessions that it may own; the purchase, sale, hire or leasing of the forests, lands and wastes; their working; the resale of the ground, the cultivation and replanting of trees, the drying or irrigation; the undertaking on its own account, or for others, or on joint account, of all works in connection with the improvement of the soil, namely; draining and clearing; the manufacturing and trading in manure; the transportation of agricultural products; the buying or hiring of utensils, tools, machines and other necessary or useful chattels in order to attain the above object.

3rd. Survey and eventually build and work any land or river and maritime waterways; organize, in any way it may deem fit, all operations or undertakings of transport which might facilitate obtaining its supplies and the disposition of its products; perform all operations with a view to utilizing the mechanical or electrical power of which it may dispose.

The remaining paragraphs referring to the object of the company refer to its right to acquire an interest in any other company now existing, or to be formed, having the same objects in view, and which would facilitate its operations, and to manage lands in Africa or carry on workings for third persons.

The amount of the capital is fixed at 3,500,000 francs ($700,000) divided into 7000 capital (preferred) shares of 500
francs each. Besides, there are created 7000 dividend shares without designation of value. Of these there is allotted, in compensation for the advantages conceded, to the National Domain 2500 fully paid up capital shares and 2500 dividend shares, and to the Foundation of the Crown 1000 capital and 1000 dividend shares. Of the remaining capital shares, 1750 are subscribed to by a group of Belgians, the Foundation of the Crown subscribing to 580 of them, and the American group 1750. The 3500 remaining dividend shares are apportioned to subscribers of the capital shares, share for share. It will be observed that the Kongo Free State and the Foundation of the Crown, together control, under this arrangement, 8160 of the 14,000 shares issued (5580 of each class), and it is further provided that at each increase of capital they shall receive 5% of the new issue of capital and dividend shares.

The concessions obtained by this Company are enormous, comprising 2,000,000 hectares (5,000,000) acres lying north of the 5th parallel South, and 1,716,500 hectares (4,291,250) acres south of same.

1Revue Géographique, December 1906.
APPENDIX H

CONVENTION BETWEEN THE STATES AND
THE AMERICAN CONGO COMPANY

A decree of the date of November 5, 1906, authorized the Secretary of State to conclude with the American Congo Company a contract given to the latter for sixty years, the right to collect rubber and other vegetable within the following territories:

A first lot to the north of Kasai constituted by a line of 25 kilometers on the longer side of the left bank of the south of Kasai contiguous to the first and formed between the following limits: the mouth of the Kasai as far as the point of juncture with the Moba River; the left bank of the river bed visible from the Moba to its farthest point; from that point on the top line extending between the Congo and the Kwango to the point closest to the Bankana; from there a straight line passing by Bankana and going to the end at the juncture of Stanley Pool, and then along the left river bank to its juncture with the Kasai, these two lots taking a total surface of the area of 1,000,000 hectares more or less without guaranty of surface.

Thenative territories, private properties, territories made a part of the public domain of the State which one finds as enclaves are not a part of the concession. The American Congo Company must respect these conditions not only public but the rent existing private (as well) and those which shall be decreed by the law of the State. The latter shall preserve the right as much as for himself in order that these particulars which shall be authorized to that end, of exploiting the neighboring forests, streams, of cutting wood for the purpose of feeding the steamer boilers and supplying the posts. Wood depots will be established to that effect.

In another concession, the State after an agreement with the Foundation of the Crown, places at the disposition of the American Congo Company about two blocks of 5000 hectares each, along the channels of navigable streams to be chosen in accord with the District Commissaire and the Crown’s delegate. These territories will be at the disposition of the Société for the duration of two years, with the replenishment by mechanical and chemical processes in order to renew trees, the vines of rubber, grasses and other vegetables. The American Congo Company will have on these territories, during the above duration, all the rights to dispose of property and it will notably not be held to the disposition of the law of September 22, 1904 on the collection of rubber of the territories and forests of the public domain, but it will be obligated then to renewish the soil, replace destroyed plants and to replace the terrains to its native conditions in order to provide the bounties of nature.
Another advantage indicated in the above, the State, according to the previous agreement has given the company an option for a period of ten years to buy land of which the total area shall not exceed 500,000 hectares.

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\(^1\)Consular Reports of James A. Smith, Boma, Congo, June 29, 1907.
Better informed, still more astonishingly informed, the correspondent of the Frankfort Times showed me from the same date of his journal: I was told by an unimpeachable source, that since the day before yesterday (the italics are ours) a change in the behavior of the King has come about. The possibility that America, in spite of all her attempts to influence shows herself in favor of a conference. Apparently your despatch has also contributed to the assent of the King. (19 December 1906).

Translation

Mieux informé encore étonnamment informé memé-le correspondant de la Frankfurter Zeitung mandaî à la meme date a son journal: Man hat mir von vertrauens-würdiger Seite versichert, dass seit vorgestern (c'est nous qui soulignons) eine Änderung in dem Verhalten des Königs eignetetret ist. Die Möglichkeit, dass Amerika, trotz aller Beeinflussungsversuche, sich einer Konferenz geneigt zeigt, solldass Ihrige zu dem Nachyeben des Königs beigetragen haben. (19 December 1906)

Translation

Better informed, still more astonishingly informed, the correspondent of the Frankfort Times showed me from the same date of his journal: I was told by an unimpeachable source, that since the day before yesterday (the italics are ours) a change in the behavior of the King has come about. The possibility that America, in spite of all her attempts to influence shows herself in favor of a conference. Apparently your despatch has also contributed to the assent of the King. (19 December 1906).

Stenger, Bulletin Institut Royal Colonial Belge. XXIII, pp. 791, 795.
APPENDIX J

ADDRESSES OF PETITIONERS

William A. Munroe, Cambridge, Mass., American Baptist Missionary Union
President G. Stanley Hall, Clark University
Rt. Rev. Alexander Mackay-Smith, Philadelphia
Bennett H. Young, Louisville, Ky.
Pres. E. Benj. Andrews, University of Nebraska
Bishop William F. McDowell, Chicago
W. A. MacCorkle, Charleston, W. Va.
Edward Cahill, Lansing, Mich.
Edward H. Clement, Boston Transcript
John W. Foster, Washington, D. C.
Washington Gladden, D.D., Columbus, O., President Council
Congregationalist Churches
A. B. Curry, D.D., Memphis, Tenn.
Victor F. Lawson, Chicago News
Bishop J. C. Hartnell, Madeira Islands
Samuel B. Capen, Boston, President Board of Foreign Missions
J. F. Cannon, D.D., St. Louis
President Elmer H. Capen, Tufts College, Mass.
Chancellor James R. Day, Syracuse University, N. Y.
Rev. Charles F. Dole, Boston
James H. Bobb, D.D., Philadelphia
President William E. Huntington, Boston University
Floyd W. Tomkins, D.D., Philadelphia
Bishop Henry Spellmeyer, Cincinnati, Ohio
Frederick Starr, University of Chicago
President James M. Taylor, Vassar, N. Y.
Rev. S. T. Willis, New York
Henry H. Proctor, Boston
Amos R. Wells, Boston
Pres. Nathan E. Wood, Newton Theol. Institute
Clinton Rogers Woodruff, Philadelphia
Rt. Rev. W. A. Leonard, Cleveland, Ohio
President George E. Merrill, Colgate University
President Augustus H. Strong, Theol. Seminary
S. W. Woodward, Washington, D. C.
Rev. Frederick E. Allen, Boston
Charles G. Ames, D.D., Boston
Rev. Richard W. Boynton, St. Paul, Minn.
Rt. Rev. Frederick Burgess, Long Island
Robert E. Speer, Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions
Henry M. King, D.D., Providence, R. I.
William W. Keen, M. D., Philadelphia
Robert J. Kellogg, James Milliken University, Ill.

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Wm. F. King, Cornell College, la.
Alexander F. Chamberlain, Clark University, Mass.
H. Chester, D.D., Nashville, Tenn.
Bishop Cyrus D. Ross, Philadelphia
President Charles L. White, Colby College
Pres. Edwin M. Fiteeat, Furman University
G. Preston, Sec'y Chamber of Commerce
Harold Pattison, Hartford, Conn.
A. B. Philputt, Indianapolis
Daniel A. Goodsell, Brookline, Mass.
President W. H. F. Faunce, Brown University
George C. Whitney, Worchester, Mass.
Rev. George H. Ferris, New Haven, Conn.
Thomas S. Barbour, D.D., Boston
Rev. Samuel Lynch Bailer, Ph.D., Buffalo, N. Y.
P. T. Gates, N. Y.
Charles R. Henderson, D.D., University of Chicago
Rev. Percy S. Grant, New York
President E. Y. Mullins, Southern Baptist Theol. Seminary
Arthur T. Pierson, D.D., New York
E. M. Thresher, Dayton, Ohio
Robert L. O'Brien, Washington, D. C.
J. R. Howerton, D.D., Charlotte, N. C.
James B. Gregg, Colorado Springs, Col.
W. Henry Grant, New York City; Secretary of Foreign Missions Boards in U.S.
W. M. Anderson, D.D., Nashville, Tenn.
Pres. David Starr Jordan, Leland Stanford University
Bishop Edward G. Andrews, New York City
John Wanamaker, Philadelphia
T. S. McPheeeters, St. Louis
Rt. Rev. William N. McVickar, Providence, R. I.
Edwin D. Mead, Boston
William W. Mills, Marietta, Ohio
George W. Bailey, M.D., Philadelphia
Rev. F. J. Rice, South Bend, Ind.
A. J. Rowland, D.D., Philadelphia
Francis H. Rowley, D. D., Boston
Franklin P. Shumway, Melrose, Mass.
H. N. McKinney, Philadelphia
A. McLean, D. D., Cincinnati
S. M. Neel, D.D., Kansas City, Moderator of General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church of U. S.
Robert E. Park, Ph.D., Boston
Robert Treat Paine, Boston
Kerr W. Boyce, D.D., Philadelphia
Bishop Warren, University Park, Colo.
Booker T. Washington, Tuskegee Institute, Ala.
Haynes, D.D., Chicago
Edwin H. Hughes, De Pauw Univ., Greencastle, Ind.
Chancellor D. W. C. Huntington, Wesleyan University, Neb.
Henry C. Leach, Salem, Mass.
Henry C. Mabie, D.D., Boston
L. H. Dorchester, D.D., St. Louis, Mo.
Rev. Wm. C. Gannett, Rochester, N. Y.
President Henry Hopkins, Williams College, Mass.
Arthur S. Johnson, President Y.M.C.A., Boston
Rt. Rev. Chauncey B. Brewster, Hartford, Conn.
Francis E. Clark, D.D., Boston, Mass.
Wm. A. Wilbur, George Washington Univ., Washington, D. C.
Tennis S. Hamlin, D.D., Washington, D. C.
Paul S. Reinsch, Ph.D., University of Wisconsin
Rt. Rev. Henry B. Restarick, Honolulu
W. T. Hardie, New Orleans, La.
President George Harris, Amherst College
Edward M. Hartwell, M.D., Boston
Samuel H. Greene, D.D., Washington, D. C.
Rt. Rev. Arthur C. A. Hall, Bishop of Vermont

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AUTobiography

I, Paul McStallworth, was born in Flatwoods, Alabama, March 4, 1910. I received my secondary education in the public schools of Monongahela, Pennsylvania. My undergraduate training was obtained at Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Pennsylvania, from which I received the Bachelor of Arts in 1936. From Howard University, I received the Master of Arts in 1940. While in residence at Howard University, I acted in the capacity of assistant to Dr. Charles H. Wesley during the year 1939-40. In 1951, I received an appointment as University Scholar at The Ohio State University where I specialized in the Department of History. I held this position for two and one-half years while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.