THE CUBAN QUESTION
AS REFLECTED IN THE EDITORIAL COLUMNS OF MIDDLE WESTERN NEWSPAPERS;
(1895-1898)

DISSERTATION
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A number of studies have been made during recent years on the influence of American newspapers in precipitating the Spanish-American War. These studies, however, have been too restricted as to area to justify the generalizations ventured or to show the true relationship between press opinion and the causes for the declaration of war.

It has been, therefore, the purpose of this study to show this relationship for a large and important area—the Middle West. The editorial columns of more than forty of the region's leading journals were analyzed for the period 1895-1898. The analysis covered approximately 10,000 editorial pages which yielded more than 5,000 pertinent editorials. From this bewildering wealth of material an effort has been made to reconstruct the attitude of Middle Western newspapers toward the Cuban question and to indicate its probable influence in bringing about American intervention in 1898.

In presenting the result an effort has been made to follow a topical-chronological arrangement and to fit the summation of editorial reaction into a substantial framework of related diplomatic and political events. This, of course, involved constant reference to the standard government documents, while pertinent discussions in contemporary periodicals and the Junta's propaganda were relied upon to give solidarity to the body of the thesis. The monographs of Wisan and Wilkerson served as useful comparative guides while Millis' recent volume was helpful in charting the narrative which follows.
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INTRODUCTION

The term "Middle West" has long been associated rather loosely in the national vocabulary with the area drained by the waters and tributaries of the upper Mississippi. For this reason the generally accepted meaning of the expression has been adopted for the purposes of this study. More specifically, however, the region embraced in this survey included the states created out of the old Northwest Territory and the additional states of Nebraska, Kansas, Iowa, Missouri, Colorado and a portion of Kentucky.

The relative importance of this region in the life of the nation has been so great that its significance has become the dominant theme of a school of American historians and, in addition to its influence geographically and numerically, its leadership in national affairs during the 1890's was of sufficient import to make the study of the region's attitude and influence on foreign policy of value and interest to American scholars.

Although the economy of the Middle West during the period under consideration was basically agrarian, there was an increasing tendency toward the industrialization of its urban centers. These already included more than a score of cities of considerable size and importance, the location and distribution of which may be seen from the accompanying map. (p. ix.)

It was in these respective areas and their adjacent
hinterlands that the important metropolitan newspapers were published and circulated.

In order to discover the attitude of all segments of Middle Western opinion on the Cuban question the leading Republican, Democratic and Independent journals in each of these Middle Western cities were examined in the newspaper files of the Library of the Ohio Archaeological and Historical Museum and in the Periodical Division of the Library of Congress. In no case did the lack of availability of particular papers handicap the objectives of the survey. For these reasons it is felt that this study has been sufficiently extensive as well as intensive to validate the resulting conclusions.

Although it is difficult to make generalized statements regarding the exact influence of the Middle Western newspapers in bringing about the Spanish-American War, their editorial comment would seem to indicate that they contributed to that end. Their chief influence, however, was not effected through sensational journalism—as the studies previously made have assumed—but rather through continuous emphasis on a number of basic factors which led to war. These factors were: the fundamental interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta and the implications of the Cuban question in the domestic politics of the United States.
This study of the influence of Middle Western newspapers in bringing about the Spanish-American War suggests that definitive interpretation of the relationship between the war and American newspapers must wait until an analysis of newspaper opinion has been made for the entire country.
1. Cedar Rapids
2. Cincinnati
3. Chicago
4. Cleveland
5. Columbus
6. Davenport
7. Denver
8. Des Moines
9. Detroit
10. Dubuque
11. Indianapolis
12. Kansas City
13. Lincoln
14. Louisville
15. Milwaukee
16. Minneapolis
17. Omaha
18. Sioux City
19. Saint Louis
20. Saint Paul
21. Topeka
22. Wichita

Map of the Middle West: Showing area by states with location and distribution of cities whose newspapers were included in this study. (Adapted from map appearing in the Chicago Record, September 9, 1935, p. 2.)
Chapter I

The Cuban Insurrection and the Revival of "Manifest Destiny"

On February 24, 1895, at Baire, near Santiago de Cuba, the insurrection for Cuban independence was launched. Conflicting reports concerning its extent and significance were soon received and reviewed by the leading journals of the larger cities along the Atlantic seaboard. Subsequently, this same news was distributed by the standard press agencies to the metropolitan dailies of the hinterland where it was likewise served to the reading public. In this area, however, only a casual interest was shown concerning the insurrection until the Spanish gunboat, Conde de Venadito, fired on the American filibuster, Alliance, some ten days later. That time, however, may be considered brief indeed in the history of a question which had perplexed American statesmen intermittently.

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1 For this and the details of the events which finally led to the Spanish-American War, see Joseph E. Wisan's exhaustive study, The Cuban Crisis as Reflected in the New York Press, (1895-1898), N. Y., 1934.

2 The Conde de Venadito was referred to in a one column headline in the Cleveland Plain Dealer as "A BOAT WITH AN OUTLANDISH NAME." (March 16, 1895, p. 1, c. 6.)
since the beginning of the nineteenth century. In any event, one could not reasonably expect the editors of Mid-America to devote as much space to foreign affairs as did their more internationally-minded contemporaries in the East. Besides, being rather provincial in outlook, the editors of the great "corn and hog" belt were not disposed to disappoint their respective "publics" by the substitution of foreign news for the standard daily diet of national, regional, state and local news. Land-minded and essentially domestic in point of view though they were, the editors of Middle Western newspapers, nevertheless, gradually aroused themselves from their comparative lethargy of things international in import to indulge early and actively in speculation concerning the potentialities of a Cuban revolution pregnant with opportunities for journalistic exploitation and vital to the realization of a national policy long and devoutly wished. Because these early speculations were significant in reflecting the general attitude of the Middle West toward the Cuban question and in indicating the trend which public opinion on it was later to take, a few typical illustrations may be noted by way of introduction.

A number of editors predicted failure of the Cuban insurrection. The Ohio State Journal, for example, thought the uprising "just another revolution" and "so far not at all
dangerous to Spanish rule." The same idea was expressed a week later when it said, "The present trouble is but one of a series of outbreaks that have occurred at intervals for years." The Sioux City Journal expressed sympathy for Cuban independence but said that our sympathy did not assume a vital, active or efficient form due to the fact that there were too many "professional patriots" leading the movement. It also suggested that if the Cubans really wanted independence and deserved it that they should "rise in a national movement, in dead earnest, in union, and in high resolve to find victory or death." "The failure of the revolutionary movement can safely be predicted," said the Omaha Daily Bee, while adding that the independence of Cuba was doubtlessly "still remote." Nevertheless, it pointed out that the spirit was there and would in time prevail. The World-Herald, future political organ of William J. Bryan, agreed with its rival in general tone when it expressed the idea that there was no "real" revolution in Cuba, but added somewhat paradoxically and in a spirit of piety, "May the good angel of the rights of humanity

Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 27, 1895, p. 4, c.2.
Ibid., March 8, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
Sioux City Journal, February 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
Omaha Daily Bee, February 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
be with the rebels," thereby admitting serious trouble.⁷

A little tardily the Detroit Free Press lamented that another Cuban "fiasco" had practically collapsed because of lack of "fortitude and perseverance" and conjectured that the Cubans would remain the victims of Spanish tyranny until some other nation came to their assistance, or Spain herself lost a distinct nationality as one of the results of "that inevitable war in Europe."⁸

The Globe-Democrat of Saint Louis felt that the insurgents lacked the traits requisite to the independence for which they were fighting, although it expressed sympathy for them.⁹ In Minnesota, the Saint Paul Pioneer Press stated that it might not be too late for Spain to retain her hold on Cuba providing she imitated the wiser and more far seeing policy of the Saxon peoples in promoting local autonomy.¹⁰ The Cincinnati Times-Star predicted the failure of the revolt "until the present administration at Washington comes to an end."¹¹ Alluding to the activities of the "yellow" journals of the East, it remarked lightly, a few days later, "The insurgent force seems to be

⁷ Omaha World-Herald, February 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
⁸ Detroit Free Press, April 21, 1895, p. 12, c. 1.
⁹ Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, March 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 2.
¹⁰ Saint Paul Pioneer Press, March 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 3-4.
¹¹ Cincinnati Times-Star, February 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
mainly composed of newspaper correspondents armed with pencils, kodaks, and like deadly weapons." One Michigan editor thought Cuba's cause hopeless because of the superiority of Spanish numbers, the failure of "yellow jack" to aid the insurgents, and the suppression of filibustering expeditions from the United States. It said that only the "remote and improbable interference" by this country would insure Cuban success. On another occasion, the editor of this same paper said more specifically:

Lacking leadership, rent by jealousies and treacheries among their generals, out of stores and ammunition, shoeless, coatless, gunless and discouraged, the soldiers battling for liberty and right cannot hope to master their enemies.

The Cincinnati Times-Star shared with the Detroit Journal a fear of Cuban failure due to the preponderance of the Spanish military forces. By March 15th, however, it was warning Madrid that Spain could not much longer retain her grip on Cuba. "If sagacious, she (Spain) will strike a bargain with the United States. Ultimately Cuba will become a part of our territory."

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12 Ibid., March 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
13 Detroit Journal, July 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
14 Ibid., November 5, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
The editorial just cited is illustrative of the manner in which the editors of the Middle West were gradually aroused to consider the possibilities of the elimination of Spain from the affairs of this hemisphere. Many of them remained in doubt for some time concerning the likelihood of Cuban victory, but eventually, as in the manner just noted, most of them came to predict its ultimate success.

The early comments of Middle Western editors on the Cuban insurrection contained allusions to the traditional policy of the United States with regard to Cuba. A Minnesota paper told its readers, for example:

"It is the fixed policy of this country, that if Spain parts with Cuba, no European power shall have it. That is a national policy and a good policy. And it is pretty certain that Cuba will one day be under the stars and stripes and the most popular winter resort in the union. Nevertheless, it thought, "The Cubans should be patient and wait. Spain will be glad, within the next ten years, to sell Cuba for a wad of $10,000,000."}

From the foregoing expressions of editorial opinion on the

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15 Cincinnati Times-Star, March 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
16 Minneapolis Journal, February 27, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
Cuban insurrection, it is apparent that a number of papers of the Middle West predicted its failure. As indicated immediately above, most of them gradually came over to the view that it might possibly succeed. At any rate, there was universal hope that it would. These more pessimistic editors were outnumbered, however, by those who made initial prediction of insurgent success. A few examples of this sort will suffice to illustrate.

The Saint Louis Republic said, a week after the revolt began, "Americans sympathize with the struggle of the Cubans for home rule and consider with favor the possibilities of union," with the United States. A representative Wisconsin paper maintained that the Cubans were stronger than during any previous revolt and that the war was not likely to be a short one. Neither the Kansas City Journal nor the Kansas City Times noted the Cuban situation editorially prior to the Alliance affair, but upon its occurrence, predicted insurgent victory. The more widely read Kansas City Star, remarked rather

17 Saint Louis Republic, March 7, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3.
19 Kansas City Journal, February 24-March 16, 1895, et passim.
20 Kansas City Times, February 24-March 16, 1895, et passim.
humorously relative to that event that as far as Cuba was concerned, "The United States is like the matter-of-fact husband who remarked of his invalid wife: 'I do wish she would get well or something.'" The unsolved features of the Cuban question were being recognized as inimical to the interests of the United States.

A typical Nebraska journal predicted Cuban success on the grounds that the rebels had the advantage of a superior knowledge of the topography of the island and entered a strong plea in favor of the "moral" support of the struggling insurgents.

Other reasons confirming a belief in Cuban success were expressed elsewhere in the Middle West. The Indianapolis Journal predicted victory because the Cubans were ably led in the field by Cuban generals and in this country by a well organized and active junta. In Ohio, both the Leader and the Plain Dealer of Cleveland, together with the Enquirer

21 Kansas City Star, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
22 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), April 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 5.
23 Indianapolis Journal, March 8, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
24 Cleveland Leader, March 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
25 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
26 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
of Cincinnati, predicted Cuban success on general grounds, while at Columbus, the editor of the Evening Dispatch, in reviewing the history of previous revolts for its readers, outlined the activities of the Cuban juntas in the United States as a factor which would vitally contribute to the success of the insurgents. 27 Several other editorials, favorable to Cuban success, also appeared in the last mentioned paper during the period immediately following the outbreak of the insurrection. 28

Before many months Spain realized that the revolt had assumed serious proportions and accordingly planned to send a large military expedition to Cuba to insure its immediate suppression. Reports of this action were interpreted by many of the papers as a symbol of insurgent strength. 29

The Chicago Tribune suggested very early that the United States should try to buy Cuba and that if Spain refused to sell, "the least intimation to the Cubans that the United States would stand by them, a little winking at violations of neutrality laws, and the quiet furnishing of assistance would

27 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
28 Ibid., March 29, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., April 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
29 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), August 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Tribune, June 29, 1895, p. 12, c. 2-3.
result in a revolutionary movement the Spaniards could not put down. There might be a war with Spain, but incidentally she would lose Cuba and this country get it."

The Times-Herald, also of Chicago, believed the Alliance affair would result in disclosing that the revolution had assumed more serious proportions than the world had been led to suppose, while the Daily Inter Ocean, also of the same city, urged strict neutrality under existing circumstances, doubted the existence of an insurgent government, yet entered a strong plea in support of American sympathy for Cuban success which it felt was justified on humanitarian grounds. Similar views were expressed elsewhere in the Middle West.

The foregoing illustrations may be taken as typical of the manner in which the news of the insurrection in Cuba and its early developments were received by the newspapers of the Midwest. They are significant in that they reveal a division of opinion as to the possibilities of the success or failure of

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30 Chicago Tribune, March 19, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3.
31 Chicago Times-Herald, March 22, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2.
32 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2.
33 Sioux City Journal, September 1, 1895, p. 12, c. 1; Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
the movement. It should be noted that more of them expressed an original belief in the former than in the latter possibility and that those papers which were originally skeptical of Cuban success showed soon that they might be led to change their views. A variety of arguments were presented to substantiate belief in the possibilities of insurgent victory and all of the editors uniformly expressed sympathy for the struggling Cubans. At least one paper was willing to make a political issue of the Cuban question, while two others recognized the mission and potential influence of the Cuban junta in this country. The remarks of still another editor foreshadowed the methods later used by the "yellow" journals of the East. Thus, in one way or another, the editors showed an interest in the ultimate solution of the problem of Cuba. The suggestions looking toward this included: purchase, promotion of Cuban independence, "union" with the United States, or acquisition even through forceful intervention. The latter method was not, of course, a serious consideration upon the immediate outbreak of the insurrection. Nevertheless, as may be seen presently, during the early phases of the revolt, the editorial pages of Middle Western newspapers clearly show that the spirit of "manifest destiny" had been revived, and that, in so far as the editors reflected public opinion, the Middle West was ripe for its application to the Cuban situation in some positive way. The manner in which this was reflected may now be indicated.
By way of preface, it may be well to make a few general remarks concerning the theory just alluded to and to point out its peculiar application to the Cuban question. The doctrine of "manifest destiny" was a theoretical abstraction ingeniously adopted by the American people to rationalize the national policy of the United States with regard to territorial expansion and the domination of the Western hemisphere. Its basic premise was postulated on certain fundamental "national interests" of the United States. With regard to the Caribbean, these interests were essentially economic, military, political and humanitarian and since Spanish control of Cuba prevented the realization of these interests and this policy in that region, it was quite natural that the theory should have been specifically applied as a method of eliminating the Spanish factor from the political equation of New World problems.


There were a number of reasons, however, more or less independent of the Cuban crisis of 1895, which contributed to the revival of the doctrine of "manifest destiny." The process of American expansion had developed in the American people an imperialistic disposition, but with the disappearance of the frontier, about 1890, this tendency was thwarted. A period of confused and misdirected energy followed which was further confounded by the Panic of 1893. Accordingly, serious domestic problems resulted which our statesmen failed miserably to solve while the national life sought a suitable reorientation. Thus, for reasons of remote historical development and because of immediate perplexing domestic issues, the nation was predisposed to follow the paths of least resistance and to resume the process of national expansion, not "westward" this time, as Bishop Berkeley's poem had prescribed, but southward, yet expansion nonetheless.

In following this course of action, the people, to some extent at least, were but following the behavior patterns which


37 See the epigraph based on Bishop George Berkeley's poem: "On the Prospects of Planting Arts and Learning In America," as stamped on the back cover of the early editions of Bancroft's *History of the United States*. Julius W. Pratt has pointed out the part played by John L. O'Sullivan in fixing the term "manifest destiny" in the national vocabulary. (Julius W. Pratt, "John L. O'Sullivan and Manifest Destiny," *New York History*, XIV, pp. 213-234.)
had been conditioned by the country's trek across the continent and nowhere was this psychology more evident than in the Middle West. As to the problems of domestic reform, these might be diverted or left temporarily to the fate of laissez-faire, unless one could say that the Cuban question eventually became a conscious diversion from the perplexing problems of internal politics.

For these reasons the theory of "manifest destiny" assumed an interest to the people of the United States in 1895 comparable to that expressed prior to the Civil War. Accordingly, events in Cuba soon engaged the attention of the press of the entire country. In the Middle West, the theory was soon applied to the situation, and in one way or another, consciously or unconsciously, the editorials of this region showed an early interest in its fulfillment by promoting either Cuban independence or the island's annexation to the United States.

That there was a desire for the acquisition of Cuba expressed by the editors of Middle Western newspapers is shown by the following expression of editorial sentiment. "Cuba lies so close to the United States that many are in favor of annexation, and ultimately that may be the fate of this and the other West India Islands. England in British North America and Spain in the Spanish Indies are the relics of European power in America. These relics will be swept away someday," said the
"The abolition of foreign influence on this side of the Atlantic, or on this side of the Pacific, is looked upon with great favor by the people of the United States. The destiny of this continent is ultimate freedom from foreign influence," it reiterated a few days later. In similar vein, the Detroit Journal maintained, "The dial of destiny points to Cuban independence, "either by purchase," "annexation," or "otherwise," while the Globe-Democrat of Saint Louis thought that "someday" we might acquire Cuba by "purchase," though "not by conquest," unless it would be to prevent a European power from interfering in the insurrection. The Sioux City Journal was opposed to the annexationist policy of the New York Herald on grounds that it was undesirable "at this juncture" but thought that the United States might acquire the island "when their interests require it." Opposition of the foreign press to Cuban annexation by the United States was noted from time to time in the editorial

38 Iowa State Register (Des Moines), March 9, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
39 Ibid., March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
41 Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, March 21, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3.
42 Sioux City Journal, May 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
columns of Middle Western newspapers. On one occasion the London Times argued that the negro problem in Cuba would be a bar to the annexation of the island to the United States. To this, the Indianapolis Journal replied that the United States had no serious negro problem in the state of Alabama where the population was predominantly colored, and further maintained that such problems in Cuba could be solved easily by American immigration to the island in the event of its acquisition. On another occasion, the Journal, editorializing on "The Future of Cuba," alluded to the opposition of certain English and Mexican papers to the annexation of Cuba to the United States. It pointed out that all of these papers had made the United States a "prominent factor" in determining the fate of Cuba, and that each of them had reluctantly admitted that the island would probably someday be annexed to the United States. "This probability," said the Indiana editor, "grows out of such considerations, geographical, commercial and political as to render it unnecessary to make any spirited effort to try to control the course of events."

Perhaps it was this confidence in our ability to consummate the theory of "manifest destiny" in the Caribbean
that rendered it unnecessary for the editors of Middle
Western newspapers to insist immediately upon a policy of
expansion by conquest. At any rate, the editorial comment
of representative papers in this region indicated a very
definite interest in the possibilities of the direct annexation
of Cuba or its acquisition through the intermediate step of
the island's independence from Spain, nor were the editors
slow in revealing their grounds for such action.

Many of them were quick to see in Cuban independence
potential advantages to the interests of economic imperialism.
The Cincinnati Times-Star said, for example:

The real liberators of the ill-fated
island will not be bandits and political
adventurers, but merchants and capital-
ists who will in time give her such
government at home and such alliances
abroad as her growing business interests
demand. 45

The Kansas City Journal thought that Cuba either as an
American state or under the protection of the United States
would afford a very valuable "market" for our manufactures
and a source for the investment of American surplus capital. 46

The Sioux City Journal expressed the same point of view in

45 Cincinnati Times-Star. March 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
46 Kansas City Journal. April 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
lamenting the economic losses caused by the interruption of
American trade with Cuba due to the war. Indicating a
disposition to favor forcible intervention, it added, "War
is costly, but sometimes it is worth all it costs." General
Weyler's edict placing an embargo on Cuban tobacco in May
1896 was looked upon by the Chicago Times-Herald as a "very
substantial reason why this country cannot look with indiffer­
ence on the Cuban struggle." The same view was indicated
by the Indianapolis Journal.

The interruption of trade, due to the insurrection in
Cuba, was accompanied by serious losses especially to American
cugar refineries, concerning which the Saint Paul Pioneer
Press insisted, "It is for the interest of the United States,
for business reasons, if no other; that the war in Cuba should
end...."

In fact it is not difficult to trace a "saccharine
influence" in the economic aspects of the Cuban question from
the very beginning of the revolt. The background for this was

47 Sioux City Journal, October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
48 Chicago Times-Herald, May 21, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; Ibid.
June 1, 1896, p. 6, c. 1.
49 Indianapolis Journal, October 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid.,
November 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 5.
50 Saint Louis Pioneer Press, February 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
well put by an Indiana editor in the following language:

There is a trail of sugar all through the Cuban question... To begin with, there is reason to believe that the reciprocity treaty between the United States and Spain, concluded in July, 1891, had a marked effect on the recent history of Cuba. By this treaty Cuban sugar and molasses were admitted to the United States free of duty in return for the free admission to Cuba of a number of important American products and manufactures. It was believed when the treaty was negotiated that the Cubans, once having enjoyed the benefits of the free admission of a long list of American products, would never consent to go back to the old system of Spanish extortion under the guise of higher duties. These benefits were enjoyed for but a short time. The Democratic party, by repealing the reciprocity treaty and restoring the old system of extortion and oppression, thereby contributed very seriously to the impulse of revolution in Cuba. Thus sugar became one of the factors of the present situation. 51

It should be noted that the paper just quoted was Republican in party affiliation and perhaps, therefore, somewhat biased in regard to the action of the Democrats in repealing the Cuban tariff. Nevertheless, the excerpt indicates the manner in which the sugar interests of this country were taking in the commercial implications of the war for Cuban independence. One Ohio Valley paper said that the American sugar trust had loaned $1,000,000 to the Cuban insurgents on condition that they destroy the sugar plantations on the island. 52

51 Indianapolis Journal, March 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
52 Cincinnati Times-Star, October 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
paper in the same vicinity quoted the current issue of *International Trade*, a commercial magazine, as estimating that American refiners would be obliged to pay at least an additional $45,000,000 for the 1896 supply of raw sugar because of the Cuban situation and reasoned statistically that this would mean an average annual per capita increase in the cost of sugar to the American consumer of seventy-five cents.53 A little later, the editor of this same journal, defended our "American dollar princes," representing American capital invested in Cuban sugar, against an attack made by a Spanish senator before the Cortes.54

In discussing the effects of the repeal of the reciprocity treaty with Spain, as reported by the *Monthly Bulletin* of the Bureau of American Republics, the Saint Louis *Republican* lamented, "The flour trade of this city with Cuba was damaged considerably in abrogating the reciprocity treaty between Spain and the United States," and went on to cite statistics in proof of its contention.55 It further thought that Cuba would be a valuable acquisition not only from the standpoint of "direct commerce," but, as a link in the chain of trade with

53 *Columbus Evening Dispatch*, April 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
55 *Saint Louis Republican*, April 18, 1896, p. 6, c. 1.
the mainland of South America where it would powerfully develop the progress of the Americas in that direction. "Annexation would be more profitable to the Cubans than to us, but it would also be an immense gain to our commercial life." 56

Preferring independence to annexation as a means of realizing the objects of economic imperialism in the Caribbean, the Cincinnati Enquirer said rather significantly:

A friendly republic in Cuba would be a pleasant sight to see from the decks of our merchant vessels as they pass through the Straits of Florida going to and from our Gulf states, and as they pass between Cuba and Haiti on their way into and out of the Caribbean Sea, with passengers for the Pacific, via Panama. 57

Henry Watterson, able editor of the widely read Courier-Journal and subsequently the author of a history of the Spanish-American War, 58 wrote a long and philosophical editorial justifying the "spirit of mercantilism as the basis of modern civilization," when Senator Mills of Texas accused the "mercantile spirit" of being back of our reluctance to

56 Ibid., March 7, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3.
57 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
58 Henry Watterson, History of the Spanish-American War, Columbus, Ohio, 1898.
recognize Cuban independence which he urged on grounds of "national honor." 59

The desirability of controlling the commercial life of the Caribbean did not stand alone as a factor in a policy which looked toward more complete domination of affairs in that area. For, as a corollary to the expansion of the sphere of American commercial influence in that region, there developed the corresponding necessity for its protection through an adequate policy of military defense. The logic of economic imperialism, therefore, made imperative the justification of American desire for Cuba on grounds of military strategy. 60 Associated with the idea of protecting American commerce was also the desire of a naval base policy on the more narrow grounds of national security.

The political exponents of this policy included some of the most outstanding leaders in the United States, of which

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59 Louisville Courier-Journal, January 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3. The view recently developed by Julius W. Pratt (Op. cit., pp. 230-278), to the effect that American business men were at first opposed to war with Spain over Cuba does not invalidate the fact that economic imperialism was one of the basic interests of the United States in the Cuban question and that it was one of the arguments used by Middle Western editors in justifying intervention.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge was the leading example. Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, retired U. S. Naval officer, representing the Navy Department, was the unannounced propagandist for a Caribbean naval base policy ostensibly on the more narrow grounds of national self-preservation. These and other able men in both camps were joined by the editors of American newspapers in shaping public opinion in favor of expansion for reasons of military strategy; if indeed, they did not express the identical desires of the inarticulate masses.

The overtures of this doctrine were very effectively made by Senator Lodge in the March issue of the *Forum* magazine in an article entitled, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy." This article was strongly expansionist in tone and dealt primarily with the desirability of Hawaiian annexation, at that time opposed by the Cleveland administration, but covered the case of Cuba and the Caribbean by allusion and implication. In

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62 Lodge actually said, "England has studded the West Indies with strong places which are a standing menace to our Atlantic seaboard. We should have among those islands at least one strong naval station, and when the Nicaragua canal is built, the island of Cuba, still sparsely settled and of almost un-abounded fertility, will become to us a necessity. Commerce follows the flag and we should build up a navy strong enough to give protection to Americans in every quarter of the globe and sufficiently powerful to put our coast beyond the possibility of successful attack." (p. 17).
reviewing Senator Lodge's article, the Ohio State Journal at Columbus intimated that the United States should go slow on the question of annexation on economic grounds, but emphatically stated that, "There are interests essential to the defense of the country which must not be neglected or abandoned." The Iowa State Register expressed the same idea in an editorial entitled, "Do We Want Cuba?", when it said, "Cuba is an important naval base over which the United States cannot afford to allow any other outside power to obtain or exercise any control." The possibility of Cuban annexation inspired one journal to say as early as September, 1895, that such might be accomplished on "broad national" grounds, "military, political and commercial," provided it could be done honorably and without war. More specifically it said of Cuba:

It commands the approaches to a large part of our southern coast, and if the Nicaraguan canal is ever built it will command the approaches to that. In the event of a naval war it would be valuable as a point of defense and as a coaling station, and would be a material offset to England's valuable possessions on this line.

63 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
64 Iowa State Register (Des Moines), April 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
65 Indianapolis Journal, September 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
On another occasion, a few months later, this same theme was further elaborated when it said of Cuba's importance from a military standpoint:

It dominates not only the Gulf of Mexico but all the approaches thereto. It lies broadside to the track of our commerce with Mexico, and, what is still more important, to the trade between New Orleans and Europe and the North Atlantic seaboard.... That an island lying so near our coast, controlling such great interests and of so great commercial value should belong to a European power is an anomaly which the logic of events cannot endure permanently. 66

A representative Minnesota editor, in discussing the desirability of Cuban annexation from the standpoint of commerce and defense, said regarding the latter:

From the strategic point of view, Cuba would be invaluable to the United States, especially after the Nicaragua canal is built. It commands the Gulf of Mexico absolutely. Stretching from a point a few hundred miles south of Key West, almost to Yucatan, (sic) Cuba is the queen of the Gulf. The harbor of Havana is one of the best in the world and is defended by commanding forts. 67

It went on to argue in favor of Cuban acquisition for military reasons by pointing out the advantages to be derived from the completion of the plans of Henry M. Flagler, Standard

66 Ibid., January 31, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
67 Minneapolis Journal, April 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
Oil Magnate, to extend the Jacksonville, St. Augustine & Indian River Railroad to Key West. Later, in 1896, when the Spanish patrol captured the Competitor, an American filibustering vessel, the editor just quoted, presented his case even more emphatically by saying that Cuba as "the key to the gulf" should be in the hands of the United States and the Gulf would be an "American lake." 68

One of the leading papers of the Great Lakes region pointed out, at the beginning of McKinley's administration, that one of the most popular moves that the new president could make would be "to take steps for the United States to own the island of Cuba." It thought, "We could hardly say at this stage of the game, what the old man said to his son, 'John, get money; get it honestly if you can, but get money!" But a reluctance to adopt a Machiavellian policy with regard to Cuba did not prevent this editor from reiterating the implications of the island's desirability from the standpoint of economic imperialism and national defense. He conjectured:

If any other European power than Spain held the island it would be a perpetual menace. In peace we need that island for its minerals and the production of sugar; in war we need that island to prevent its being made a base of supplies or a harbor of refuge....for our enemies. 69

68 ibid., May 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
69 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
The same view was frequently noted by other Middle
Western papers in more generalized discussions on our coast
defense, a topic engaging their interest with increasing
frequency after the outbreak of the insurrection in Cuba. The close association between a demand for the control of
Cuba for military reasons and the protection of American
commercial interests in the Caribbean, was also frequently
pointed out.

While the editors of the Middle West were reflecting a
sentiment in favor of the acquisition of Cuba on grounds of
military strategy identical with those being propounded by
leaders such as Senator Lodge, the Navy Department was being
admirably represented by Captain Mahan, whose writings
appeared from time to time in leading periodicals. A typical
article appeared in the October issue of Harper's magazine.

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70 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November 14, 1896, p. 4,
oc. 2; Ibid., November 16, 1896, p. 4, oc. 1-2.
71 Indianapolis Journal, July 19, 1897, p. 4, oc. 2; Ibid.,
November 12, 1897, p. 4, oc. 2; Milwaukee Sentinel, September 3,
1895, p. 4, oc. 2.
72 For a complete bibliography of Mahan's writings see,
William E. Livezey, "Alfred Thayer Mahan, American Expansionist;"
(Doctoral Dissertation), The Ohio State University, Columbus, 1937.
73 Alfred Thayer Mahan, "Strategic Features of the Gulf Of
Mexico and the Caribbean Sea," Harper's, October 1897, xCV., pp.
680-691.
and the perspicacious comments made thereon by the editor of a representative Middle Western journal are worthy of quotation and may serve to conclude the illustrative data which revealed a desire for the acquisition of Cuba on grounds of military strategy. Of Mahan's article, this editor said:

His treatise obliges us to draw the conclusion that no opportunity to secure possession of Cuba should be lost. He does not touch this phase of the question directly, but he does by implication. The position of Cuba is such that any nation holding it could exercise absolute control over the gulf and completely shut up the Mississippi and the Southern coast ports.74

But the theory of "manifest destiny" could not be completely rationalized on the basis of economic imperialism and national self-preservation. It was quite natural, therefore, that the editorials of Middle Western newspapers should appeal to the conflict in political ideologies between the United States and Spain as additional grounds for the expulsion of the latter from the New World. Political idealism, accordingly, runs like a bright threat through the editorial columns of the Middle Western newspapers from the very beginning of the revolt in Cuba. A few examples will confirm this contention.

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74 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), October 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
That Spain was a "political anachronism" on this continent was clearly indicated by an Indiana editor who remarked, "Medieval Spain has no business on this hemisphere." It was also argued that the revolutionary movement in Cuba was but the local manifestation of the world-wide extension of the republican form of government, and specific reference was made to the progress of democratic movements subsequent to the American and French revolutions. The successful revolts of the other Spanish American colonies were cited and the republican developments in the Transvaal, Brazil, and Hawaii were interpreted as strong indications that "before the end of the century Cuba will (also) become a republic." The Cleveland Plain Dealer criticized the conservative elements of Europe for sympathizing with monarchial Spain as running counter to this trend of world opinion and explained, "The natural sympathy which the ruling classes of Europe have toward revolutionary movements is at the foundation of the prevailing sentiment against the United States and Cuba. Each country is seeking to subjugate the free and retain the enslaved."

75 Indianapolis Journal, April 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
76 Ibid., January 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
77 Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 17, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
Spain's answer to America's belief in the inevitable triumph of international democracy was to restate and promote the doctrine of Hispanism. Emilio Castelar, eminent Spanish statesman, in an interview with the Madrid correspondent of the New York Herald, was reported to have made the extravagant statement that Hispanism would not only insure the retention of Cuba, but be a means by which Spain would eventually regain domination over her former colonies in the Western hemisphere. This was promptly denounced by a representative Middle Western paper as preposterous.⁷⁸

In support of the contention that the American political system was superior to that of Old World Spain, other effective arguments were used. "Cuba pays tremendous taxes in strict accordance with laws in which she has no voice," said one editor in condemning this "taxation without representation," and to this an Iowa editor added, "No English or nordic race would tolerate what the Cubans have."⁷⁹ Another editorial appearing in a Des Moines paper was even against the "absolute" annexation of Cuba because the island was possessed of too many "semi-educated Spaniards" whose "temperaments and ideals" were diametrically opposed to the democratic institutions of

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⁷⁸ Indianapolis Journal, July 28, 1895, p. 12, c. 2.
⁷⁹ Sioux City Journal, March 17, 1895, p. 12, c. 1.
the United States. Nevertheless, it went on to say:

The United States is destined to be the controlling influence on this continent. The best interests of the country do not demand annexation of surrounding territories, but the preservation of free governments for them.80

In anticipation of the ultimate independence of Cuba as one of the results of the insurrection, a leading Michigan paper went a step further:

In a few years the liberty-loving and progressive peoples of Cuba, in close sympathy with the institutions and interests of this country, would constitute a majority of the population and voluntary annexation would be the logical outcome of such considerations.81

A similar view was expressed by the same paper on another occasion when it pointed to the undoubted popularity of adopting a policy that would make sure "when Cuba shall cease to be ruled from beyond the sea, that her star shall shine in the azure field of the American flag."82 An Illinois paper nearly stated a democratic philosophy of history incidental to its expressions of political idealism invoked by the Cuban insurrection. Relative to an incident in which Dupuy De Lome,

80 Iowa State Register (Des Moines), March 17, 1895, p. 6, c. 1.
81 Detroit Free Press, August 5, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
82 Ibid., June 9, 1895, p. 12, c. 2-3.
the Spanish minister to the United States, had addressed the American "people" through the medium of the Associated Press in an effort to allay unfavorable opinion in this country against the Spanish policy in Cuba the editor of the paper just mentioned said:

We take it as a notable sign of the times that this representative of the most autocratic government in Western Europe finds it wise to address himself to an audience of the sovereign people. 83

That the early events of the Cuban insurrection stimulated the press of the area under consideration to reveal its hopes for the ultimate triumph of its political idealism was shown by a statement to the effect that eventually democratic forms of government were desirable for Spain as well as for Cuba. The statement reasoned, "If the outbreak...in Cuba shall ultimately result in a Cuban republic and a Spanish republic, who shall say that the relations of nations or the cause of humanity will have suffered?" 84 A little later, a contemporary editor from the same state contended that, "This republic has got to be too big and too great to be selfish. It is our province to help

83 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 9, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3.
84 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
other people in the new world to become republics."  

Thus, foreshadowing the Wilsonian idealism of a later date, the above materials, and those of similar import notable elsewhere in this dissertation, show quite clearly that the editors of representative newspapers in the Middle West brought their political idealism to the assistance of their more basic motives of economic imperialism and military strategy to justify the renewed policy of "manifest destiny" which accompanied the revival of the Cuban question in 1895.

Closely associated with the American espousal of Cuba's cause on grounds of political idealism, were expressions of its deep-seated humanitarianism. We have already noted the extent to which early editorial comment revealed general sympathy for the suffering Cubans. This sympathy was universal and gradually crystallized so as to demand humanitarian action on behalf of the insurgents. Its particular expressions in a typical editorial dealing solely with sympathy for the Cubans; in editorials reflecting the relation of the missionary zeal to imperialism; and its manifestations in indigenous poems,

85 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 2, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
86 Infra., IV, pp. 304-305.
87 Supra., I, pp. 10-11.
which also appeared on the editorial pages of the daily newspapers of the Middle West, will suffice to illustrate.

A typical editorial devoted wholly to the question of American sympathy for the Cubans may demonstrate the crystallization of the spirit of humanitarianism and support the incidental remarks along these lines presented elsewhere. 88

In a long editorial entitled, "American Sympathy for Cuba," the editor of an important Ohio Valley organ warned Spain that the great conscience of the American people was being aroused by the Cuban situation, and that unless something was soon done to satisfy the demands of the Cubans, there was likely to be "overt" interference of some sort on the part of the United States' Government, "to say nothing of the common people who are in close sympathy with the oppressed people of the island." Alluding to the obligations of official neutrality according to our treaties with Spain, it said:

There is no power given under the sun that can prevent the American people from not only sympathizing with the Cubans, but extending material aid in spite of all obstacles that a government eager to carry out such treaties which Spain might impose. 89

89 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
It went on to say that the public demonstrations and "sympathy meetings" being held in various parts of the country showed "how the idea of friendliness to friendless Cuba is manifesting itself in a way that Spain must understand." It further said that the American people would watch the contest in Cuba with "unabated interest" and that the people of this country would not be deterred by the force of "a musty and worm-eaten treaty" from tendering their "sympathy", if not "open aid" to the cause of Cuban independence. Drawing a telling argument from American history, it concluded its plea for Cuba on humanitarian grounds by this statement:

> It isn't so long ago that they (the people of the United States) were in sore need of the assistance and cooperation that they now so freely offer to Cuba. The shot fired at Lexington in defense of American freedom and independence is yet reverberating around the world.*90*

As will be noted in a later connection, the fire of humanitarianism was kept burning very effectively by the Cuban *Junta* which fed its flames with atrocity stories or fanned them at huge mass meetings designed especially for that purpose.*91* Humanitarianism was also mentioned very prominently in the

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*90* Los. cit.

*91* *Infra.* II, pp. 94-104.
editorials which attempted to rationalize our declaration of war in 1898.\textsuperscript{92}

Running parallel with the popular demands for a more vigorous Cuban policy on grounds of common humanity, one may find corresponding traces on the editorial pages of Middle Western newspapers of a belief that God was on the side of Cuba and that it was the religious duty of the United States to intervene on its behalf. In fact, a missionary zeal in the imperialism of the Cuban question had been evident even before thoughts of American expansion had been interrupted by the Civil War.\textsuperscript{93} And with the renewal of the Cuban problem in 1895, the former tendency was again reflected from a variety of religious sources.

One such source was sermons delivered from the pulpits of protestant churches in the United States, a typical example of which may be found in a sermon delivered by a Reverend Ellison, pastor of the First Baptist Church of Indianapolis. In his

\textsuperscript{92} \textit{Infra., IV, pp. 305-310.}

\textsuperscript{93} \textit{Ohio State Journal} (Columbus), August 2, 1861, p. 4, c. 2. This paper quoted the Cincinnati Enquirer as favoring the annexation of Cuba in order to substitute American Protestantism for Spanish Catholicism which was described as, "scandalously wicked." The writer is indebted to John O. Marsh, Acting Curator of History, the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Museum, Columbus, for this reference.
enthusiasm for protestant Christianity in Cuba, this minister alluded to a religious act of Ex-President Harrison in these words:

'If a certain well-known man in this country gets the nomination for president, the result will not be lessened or respect be shown because last Friday he conducted a prayer meeting in New York. (In which sympathy for Cuba was expressed) The people are with such a man, heart and soul.'

That Harrison understood the principal foundations of our political system to be the "separation of church and state and religious liberty," and that his religious views with regard to human suffering in Cuba should be noted "in the pulpit," was regarded with "pride" by the editor of the Cincinnati Enquirer, who published a much more religiously flavored editorial on Cuban sympathy on Christmas evening, 1895. Here again the editorial which appeared under the title, "The Pulpit and Patriotism," was occasioned by a sermon, this time, however, from a New York City minister, the Reverend James D. Ramsey. Mr. Ramsey had criticized the administration in Washington for its "peace at any price" Cuban policy and in support of the minister's crusading zeal, the Enquirer remarked:

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94 Cincinnati Enquirer, November 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.

95 This incident was used by the Enquirer for political purposes in defense of the Cleveland administration's inactivity on the Cuban question.
The shedding of blood is an awful thing, but the religion which these reverend gentlemen preach was born in blood on Calvary, and there have been wars ever since those in which David killed Goliath and the Philistines were defeated by a powerful man wielding the jaw bone of an ass. 96

The inference was that there was even Biblical justification for forceful intervention on Cuba's behalf. Somewhat less militant in tone, the editor of this same paper, in a Sunday editorial which appeared a few months later, entreated its readers to "Let nobody forget Cuba in his supplications today." 97

The close relationship between humanitarianism, religion, and economic imperialism is reflected in the comments made by the Columbus Evening Dispatch on a Memorial Day address delivered by the Reverend Dr. Fishburn at Columbus in 1896. The minister's reference to the desire of the American people to see Cuba free and ultimately annexed to the United States had been received by his audience with great applause. In commenting on this reaction, the Evening Dispatch remarked that as soon as independence or annexation should come to pass, "American capital would make it (Cuba) one of the most

96 Ibid., December 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
97 Ibid., March 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
prosperous islands of the earth." The economic basis of the religious expressions on the Cuban question was further demonstrated by the action of a group of Youngstown (Ohio) clergymen, who, in order to show their disdain for everything Spanish, tabooed the Spanish onion at a church banquet. The same thing was also reflected by a Chicago editor who used a religious argument in an editorial which expressed hope for Cuban independence or annexation as a means of extending the Middle Western market for flour, beef and machinery.

Not only was God and religion thought to be on the side of the Cubans by the exponents of a more vigorous Cuban policy. It was said even by some that God's wrath would descend upon the nation for failing to liberate Cuba from the yoke of Spanish tyranny. Suggestive of the superstitions of Medieval Christianity, one editor seriously maintained that our reluctance to act on the "legacy" of General Weyler's atrocities in Cuba would bring divine retribution upon the people of the United States in this manner:

Under the scourge which the Almighty will

98 Columbus Evening Dispatch, June 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
99 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
100 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 27, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
inflict upon nations that do not do their duty, who knows that cholera, yellow fever or some worse disease may not be generated from out this tortuous hunger and filth and spread over the country? Does it not seem as though even self-preservation, if not pity and sympathy, should prompt the people and government of the United States to speedy and effective action on behalf of the patriots of Cuba?101

In addition to editorial sympathy, and "pulpit patriotism," a third source of humanitarianism appeared on the editorial pages of Middle Western newspapers in the form of provincial verse. That the poets played a part in arousing sympathy for the Cubans and in urging a more vigorous policy was reflected in the following stanzas of a poem by an unidentified author appearing on the editorial page of a representative Middle Western newspaper upon the outbreak of the war with Spain. It asked:

When war clouds roll with lightning threat
And men seem likely to forget,
Who come, the patriots pace to set?
The poets.

Who were the first to feel the thrill
Of Sympathy with Cuba ill,
And who the first to steel the will?
The poets.102

101 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
102 Poem: "A Regiment of Poets," author unknown, Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
But before the outbreak of the war these popular poets followed the course of events in Cuba very closely, and their verse mirrored Middle Western sentiment on the Cuban question about as clearly as the conventional editorial. Poems bearing such titles as; "For Cuba," \(^{103}\) "The Song of the Eagle," \(^{104}\) "In Cuba," \(^{105}\) "Cuba," \(^{106}\) "A Song For Cuba," \(^{107}\) and "Hear Their Cry," \(^{108}\) are all proof of this statement. A few examples may be noted more in detail. One poet wrote on the European amazement at American sympathy for the insurgents:

Amazed, perhaps! But wondering Europe,
knows
That this republic of the free and freed
Can pity the oppressed, view human woe
And speak a sympathy that's more than
greed!\(^{109}\)

\(^{103}\) Poem: "For Cuba," by Louise V. Boyd, reprinted from the Chicago Record, in the Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 7.

\(^{104}\) Poem: "The Song of the Eagle," author unknown, Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 5.

\(^{105}\) Poem: "In Cuba," by Bennett Bellman, originally printed in the Philadelphia Times, February 1896, and reprinted in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 12, 1896, p. 8, c. 7.

\(^{106}\) Poem: "Cuba", by T. C. Harbaugh, Cincinnati Times-Star, December 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.

\(^{107}\) Poem: "A Song For Cuba," by S. G. Lamb, reprinted from the Chicago Record by the Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 7.

\(^{108}\) Poem: "Hear Their Cry," author unknown, Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.

\(^{109}\) Poem: "All Europe Amazed," author unknown, Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
The militancy of Mid-Western verse was better reflected in these lines of T. O. Harbaugh written as early as 1896:

The mailed arm the tyrant owns
Stricken must fall to rise no more;
The shadow of Hispania's thrones
Must blight no longer Cuba's shore;
Arise! ye lovers of the right;
Strike fast, O sons of liberty!
United in your purpose, smite,
And bleeding Cuba will be free.

Another representative paper of the Great Lakes area introduced a long editorial plea for action on the Cuban question by quoting several lines of philosophic verse. This was immediately followed by pungent and rhetorical prose interrogation. It asked:

Are the Cubans to be deserted? Is liberty to lie bleeding there? Is hope to be driven from out the stout hearts that have battled so long for freedom? Do the people of this country know how they have suffered and struggled and hoped against hope?....Is there a God of justice? Is there a God of sympathy, that takes cognizance of the struggles of heroic men and women in their efforts for liberty and for life in these days in which we live? If so, will he not touch the hearts of the people of civilized countries, yea, this so-called civilized America, and in some way lead them to the help of the Cubans, to crush those cruel Spaniards that are only obeying the will of the Spanish crown that

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is trying to perpetuate its power over these people, so as to inflict on them still heavier burdens, if possible than they have been forced to bear for two centuries? Something must be done; something will be done. Liberty must not die in Cuba. Freedom must rise again.

From the foregoing illustrations, it is quite clear that the poetry of imperialism, like the "imperialism of righteousness," had come to reflect the humanitarian interests of the Middle Western editors on the Cuban question. It is not strange, therefore, that Spain's defeat in the war which finally came should have been considered by organized religion as the working of God's will and by the poets as the natural consummation of "poetic justice." At any rate, the expressions of humanitarianism, economic imperialism, military strategem and political idealism, which appeared on the editorial columns of Mid-western newspapers during the early phases of the Cuban revolt, indicate that the Spirit of "manifest destiny" was again abroad in the land.

\[\text{Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 4.}\]

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDITORIAL POLICY
ON THE CUBAN QUESTION

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The belief in the inevitability of the consummation of
the revived spirit of "manifest destiny" became the doctrine
upon which the editors of Middle Western newspapers rational-
ized the fundamental interests\(^1\) of the United States in the
Caribbean. There were in addition, however, certain other
factors which contributed to the development of rather
consistent editorial policy on the Cuban question. These
included Spain's alleged violations of the fundamental
interests outlined above, the organized activities of the
Cuban Junta and the political aspects which the Cuban
question assumed in the domestic politics of this country.
It will be the purpose of this chapter to indicate the part
played by each of these factors in determining the trend of

\(^1\) Although these interests viz., economic, military,
political and humanitarian have been treated separately here-
in, it should be noted that they frequently received joint
editorial consideration. For typical examples see,
Cincinnati Enquirer, May 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 2 and Detroit Free
Press, August 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
editorial opinion on the question of Cuba and to suggest the nature of the policies thus evolved. 2

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The manner in which Spain's presence and her incompetence violated the basic interests of the United States in the Caribbean has already been intimated; and to show that these violations continued to be a determining factor in the formation of editorial policy, it will be necessary only to cite, in addition, the sources of confirming editorials devoted to each of the interests thus involved. The economic, 3

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2 These policies are discussed separately and in detail hereafter. See Chapter III, "Editorial Solutions of the Cuban Question," pp. 171-286.

3 (a) Particular reference to the protection of American property interests in Cuba may be found in the editorial comment on the Mora Claim, e. g., Detroit Journal, June 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., July 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; July 8, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; August 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Omaha Bee, June 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), August 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 20, 1895, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., August 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; June 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City Times, June 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 2. For the reaction of the press of New York City to the Mora Claim consult, Wisan, Op. cit., pp. 86-87.

(b) For press reaction to Weyler's embargo on tobacco see, Detroit Journal, May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, May 21, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 4-8; Ibid., March 2, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., May 28, 1897 p. 4, c. 3; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., June 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
military and political interests can be disposed of in this manner. However, due to the fact that Spain so specifically violated American humanitarian interests through her alleged mistreatment of American citizens, and since this conduct played such a vital part in the development of editorial policy, it seems appropriate at this point to make a few additional observations under that heading before the other factors which contributed to the crystallisation of editorial policy are considered.

A few editors anticipated future friction with Spain over this issue and warned American citizens quite early against dabbling in the troubled waters of war stricken Cuba.

(c) The best summary of Spanish violations of American commercial interests is to be found in the chapter dealing with, "Editorial Rationalization of War," q. v. Infra., IV, pp. 286-310.

(d) The diplomatic correspondence pertaining to the economic interests of the United States in Cuba may be found in the appropriate volumes of The Foreign Relations of the United States, Washington, D. C.

The menace to the military interests of this country of a weak and incompetent Spain in the Caribbean had been adequately shown, (Supra, I, pp. 22-28.

Spanish violations of the American conception of political idealism has been fully illustrated elsewhere. (Supra, I, pp. 28-33.

Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 6, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2.
Nevertheless, the revolt had been in progress scarcely more than two weeks before journalistic rumors were afloat to the effect that such persons had been imprisoned by the Spanish authorities under suspicion of pro-Cuban activities. And a month later the editor of the Indianapolis Journal sounded the clarion call for the protection of Americans in Cuba by urging its regional colleagues to respond to the "Unnoticed Murder" of a newspaper correspondent, who, it said, had been shot by General Campos for attempting to report the "facts" relative to the military strength of the insurgents. Campos' action was described as "a wanton and unnecessary outrage quite characteristic of Spanish methods," while the fact that the incident had "excited little if any public interest" was gravely lamented.

The aggressive attitude assumed by the majority of the Middle Western editors, however, left nothing for the nationalistic journalists to lament, for the protection of American nationals in Cuba was almost unanimously insisted upon by them. This seemed especially true in those cases where the nationals happened also to be Cuban correspondents of American newspapers. Said one editor on the expulsion of

7 Detroit Journal, March 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
8 Indianapolis Journal, May 31, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
the correspondent John Sowers, "It would doubtless relieve Spain's embarrassment somewhat if Americans in Cuba would either stay or clear out and stop fussing. They may yet give the Spaniards a similar alternative."  

The attitude of the press toward the arrest of Ona Melton, a Cuban correspondent of a Jacksonville, Florida paper who was captured and court-martialed along with another American citizen and the entire crew of the competitor, a Cuban filibustering expedition in May 1896, is another case in point. On account of this incident, "the nerveless, do-nothing policy" of the Cleveland administration was attacked, demands were made for the invocation of our treaty rights which guaranteed "civil trial" in such cases, and the "bombardment of Havana" was suggested as a remedy for such abuse.  

The fate of Melton and the competitor's crew was followed with much concern by the editors of such papers as the Chicago Tribune.

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9 Cincinnati Times-Star, September 23, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
10 Melton was described as a fine young man, 23 years of age and a college graduate.
11 Indianapolis Journal, May 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
12 Ibid., May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
13 Chicago Tribune, May 12, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., May 14, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; May 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; June 6, 1896, p. 7, c. 2; July 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
and the title of one of its editorials, "Indignity To Cuban Correspondents," suggests the typical attitude of Middle Western editors toward this incident.

Melton and the crew of the Competitor were finally released after much editorial protest and considerable pressure from our State Department. The news of the Spanish decision to follow this course was interpreted as an evidence of a "change" in Spanish policy to placate the new McKinley administration and the final release of the prisoners was regarded as a "distinct concession." No doubt the editors felt that they had played a prominent role in bringing about the desired result.

During 1896, several other cases involving the mistreatment of American citizens were reported. Among those which

14 Ibid., December 25, 1896, p. 6, c. 4.
15 Ibid., November 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.

Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, May 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Detroit Free Press, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Enquirer, May 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., November 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 17, 1896, p. 8, c. 1; Ibid., November 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Kansas City Star, May 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 20, 1897, p. 32, c. 4.

16 Indianapolis Journal, March 20, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
17 Ibid., November 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
brought forth the editorial wrath of Middle Western editors
were the arrest of Walter Dygert (an American adventurer),
an unnecessary attack in their Cuban home on the Farrar
brothers by Spanish troops, the serious abuse of Jose and
Manuel Delagada and the ruthless expulsion of W. W. Gay,
Cuban correspondent of the New York World. Much of the
general comment on the Cuban question contained condemnatory
reference to the inhuman treatment of American citizens in
Cuba and the growing concern of the editors over this issue
was frequently reflected through the medium of gruesome
cartoons which depicted the methods of Spanish brutality in
this regard.

The year 1897 brought to the attention of the press a
number of even more serious cases involving American citizens.
Among the most important were those of Sylvester Scovel,
Julio Sanguilly, and Dr. Ricardo Ruiz. Scovel, Cuban

18 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, June 7, 1896, p. 32, c. 3;
Detroit Journal, April 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
19 Ibid., April 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
20 Ibid., June 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
21 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, June 17, 1896, p. 12, c. 5.
22 See for example, Saint Louis Republic, July 19, 1896,
p. 12, c. 2.
23 A good example of a cartoon of this design is to be
found in the Cincinnati Tribune, (September 4, 1896, p. 4, c.
2-8.)
correspondent of Joseph Pulitzer's New York World, was arrested for violating the military edict governing Spanish censorship of press releases leaving Cuba and his imprisonment met with such wide disapproval on the part of Middle Western editors that the legislatures of a number of states in that region passed resolutions demanding his release. A similar resolution was presented in the United States' Senate calling for the release of Sanguilly, a naturalized citizen of this country who had been confined in prison since February 24, 1895, on grounds of complicity in connection with the initiation of the insurrectionary movement. Senatorial debate on this resolution ceased only when it was learned that Secretary Olney had arranged for his pardon through diplomatic channels.

The discussion previously indulged in on the floor of the Senate, however, revealed a reluctance on the part of certain Senators to extend the protection of this government to "naturalized" Cuban-American citizens whose citizenship, it was said, had probably been obtained through fraudulent

24 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Indianapolis Journal, February 9, 1897, p. 1, c. 2; Ibid., February 20, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; Milwaukee Sentinel, February 8, 1897, p. 2, c. 1; Chicago Tribune, February 7, 1897, p. 1, c. 6.

25 Congressional Record, 54 Cong. 2 Sess. XXIX, Pt. 2, p. 1762, February 18, 1897. Such resolutions were passed by the State legislatures of Indiana, Illinois, Nebraska, Minnesota and Iowa.
Editorial comment on the Sanguilly case also varied. Said the editor of the Ohio State Journal:

It is not clear that Sanguilly is deserving of the sympathy manifested in his behalf. He belongs to that class of Cubans who are using American citizenship to shield them in their operations against the Spanish government....But the protection of our flag should not be extended to adventurers who use its power and prestige for the purpose of rebellion and unlawful acts against a friendly government. 27

The editor of the Detroit Journal had previously condemned this "American Citizenship Merchandise," and had remarked satirically in connection therewith that "The missionary and the filibuster joins hands with the jingo to show into what disrepute we have grown abroad. 28 The Indianapolis Journal agreed substantially with the Ohio State Journal which later condemned a rumor that Sanguilly was on the point of departure for Cuba with a filibustering expedition. It said:

If this is true, Sanguilly has taken his life in his own hands, and if caught deserves to be summarily executed by the Spanish authorities. And the

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27 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
28 Detroit Journal, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
29 Indianapolis Journal, March 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
State Department will not have a word to say on his behalf.30

But the Senatorial sponsors of the Sanguilly resolution had, nonetheless, many editorial supporters in the Middle West. The Chicago Inter Ocean approved the demand for Sanguilly's release,31 the Chicago Tribune thought the issue might wait the more vigorous policy which it anticipated from the incoming McKinley administration,32 while the attitude of the more bellicose segment of the Mid-Western press was reflected in the statement of the Omaha World-Herald which said that Sanguilly's long imprisonment, Spain's prolonged delay in releasing him, and his belated pardon was "humble pie for Uncle Sam," and suggested that:

A few dynamite torpedoes would out all red tape in a few moments. Red tape should no longer stand in the way of protection to American citizens who have fallen under the displeasure of the insulting Spaniards.33

The case of Dr. Ruiz also involved Spanish mistreatment of an Americanized citizen. Ruiz, the graduate of a Philadelphia dental college and having participated in the Ten

30 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), May 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; 31 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, February 26, 1897, p. 6, c. 3. 32 Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1897, p. 12, c. 4. 33 Omaha World-Herald, March 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
Year's War, was arrested during the course of the revolt of 1895 on the pretext of being an accomplice to a train robbery and thrown in prison where he was found dead after a short period of solitary confinement. Despite the fact that he had not thought enough of his adopted country to remain in it, his arrest and subsequent death were the subject of much editorial comment in February 1897, when news of his death reached the United States. An investigation was demanded; Olney was urged not to wait the inauguration since the protection of the lives of American citizens "would be neither distasteful to Major McKinley or to Mr. Sherman." It was hoped that the Ruiz affair would "arouse the American people to action" on the Cuban crisis and protests against Cleveland's delay in the matter were pictured with telling effect through insinuating cartoons. It was maintained that Ruiz had been

34 Chicago Record, February 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
35 Ibid., February 23, 1897, p. 6, c. 2. Sherman became McKinley's Secretary of State.
36 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
37 Columbus Evening Dispatch, (February 24, 1897, p. 1, c. 2-7) displayed a cartoon under the title, "A Humiliating Spectacle," which showed Cleveland warming his hands over a comfortable stove and casually replying, "It Ain't My Funeral," to the pleas of a figure which stood behind him representing Uncle Sam who was trying in vain to arouse the president through placards bearing such captions as, "Outrages," "Spanish Imprisonment of American Citizens," and "Spanish Indignities."
arrested on "flimsy" evidence, while his death was
pronounced an "outrage", "climacteric," "demonical," and an adequate reason why it was "our business" to end the
state of affairs in Cuba which was producing such horrors.

In self-defense, Spain claimed that Dr. Ruiz had
committed suicide. But this was countermanded by editorial writers who preferred to believe the post-mortem report of
Consul-General Lee which attributed his death to "violence."

Somewhat more positive than in the Sanguilly case, this editor said the continuation of such brutalities might "compel"
the United States to resort to force against Spain. Although
he said we did not desire war, he asserted that "American
citizens will be protected at all hazards." And in response
to Lee's request that battleships be placed in Cuban waters,
in keeping with this sentiment, the same editor paused to
point out that the new administration would be faced at the out-
set with a problem demanding a high quality of statesmanship in

A cartoon of similar import appeared in the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, (January 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-4.)

38 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
39 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 25, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3.
40 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, February 25, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
41 Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
42 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 2, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
43 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
order to exact justice to Spain and Cuba and "yet preserve our national prestige."\textsuperscript{44} This was true indeed, but only a few thinking editors, such as Lucius W. Nieman of the Milwaukee \textit{Journal}, were willing to assist the new president in advising against the extension of the protecting hand of this government to the undeserving "naturalized" citizens whose pro-Cuban activities threatened to involve us in serious trouble with Spain. Said Nieman, "We should have no veneered citizens of the Ruiz-Sänguilly type to embroil us in international difficulties."\textsuperscript{45} But the sound of Nieman's voice soon died away amid the shouting and tumult of more vociferous editorial fulminations which accompanied the accession of McKinley to the White House.

Even the new president's statesmanlike effort to get fuller information concerning Cuban conditions in general and the Ruiz case in particular, through an investigation by Senator Calhoun, were ridiculed\textsuperscript{46} as "an excuse for delay and for the continuance of the policy of the former administration, which was roundly and repeatedly denounced by the party of the

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid., February 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
\textsuperscript{45} Milwaukee \textit{Journal}, March 3, 1897, p. 6, c. 1.
\textsuperscript{46} Cleveland \textit{Plain Dealer}, April 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 4.
present administration and the people generally," said a leading democratic organ from McKinley's own state. The Calhoun mission was supported, however, by the Republican editors who interpreted as an evidence of guilt Spain's efforts to block an open investigation of the circumstances surrounding Dr. Ruiz' death. The Democratic press, nevertheless, still belittled the Fabian tactics of the Calhoun Commission, although one editor in that political camp showed a willingness to settle the case for suitable damages and generous guarantees against future outrages rather than go to war over the unfortunate doctor. When the Ruiz family filed claims against Spain for $75,000 reparation, a typical representative of the opposition press said, "If McKinley has the backbone he is supposed to have he will demand payment" and "if Spain should refuse to pay we should send the Navy Department to collect," it added.

Eventually, McKinley was to accept the challenge of such insinuating remarks. But in the interval the subject of

47 Ibid., May 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
48 Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., June 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
49 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
50 Detroit Free Press, June 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
51 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 18, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
protecting American citizens in Cuba assumed distinctly partisan aspects in the editorial comment of both the Democratic and the Republican papers. Paradoxical as it may seem, however, the editors of both major parties generally insisted on the protection of American citizens whether natural born or naturalized and although they could not agree on the proper course of political action, they found common purpose and universal accord in urging the protection of American nationals on humanitarian grounds.

In final analysis, Spain alone was to be held accountable for violating the rights of our nationals in Cuba and in this manner she had contributed to the evolution of editorial policy on the Cuban question. At least the editors said so in their attempts to rationalize the declaration of war in 1898.

52 Louisville Courier-Journal, January 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Detroit Free Press, March 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 6, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.

53 Sioux City Journal, February 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 13, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Cincinnati Times-Star, May 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Tribune, February 25, 1897, p. 6, c. 5.

54 See for example the case of Charles Aguirre, a naturalized citizen of the United States who was reported to have been "tied to the tail of a horse and dragged to death" because of expressing insurgent sympathies and engaging in insurgent activities. (Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 22, 1897, p. 4, c.2.)
Fortunately for the United States, it seemed apparent that the realisation of its innate interests in the Caribbean might be eventually consummated through the excuses offered by the stupidity of the Spanish violations of American interests in that area. If, however, Spanish folly was not sufficient to arouse the nation to pursue such action as would satisfy its collective ego on the score of "enlightened self-interest" or the impulses of "manifest destiny," the energetic activity of the Cuban Junta on its own behalf, readily added a third factor contributing to the development of an editorial attitude which eventually recommended the proper course of political action on the Cuban question.

The Junta was the general legation of the Cuban Republic abroad and was first officially appointed on September 19, 1895, by the Constituent Assembly that formed the insurgent government, which at the same time (after the death of its former chieftan, Jose Marti', in May 1895) elected Estrada Palma its president and chief representative abroad, with authority to carry on diplomatic relations with other countries. Its American headquarters were located at 120 Front Street, New York City, where through its secretary, Quesada, and its newspaper, El Porvenir, edited by Trujillo, an active and effective propaganda was made to support the

55 Encyclopedia Americana, N. Y. 1897, XVI, p. 252.
insurrectionary movement in Cuba.

The Junta proper was composed primarily of naturalized Cubans living in the United States, while its American counterpart, the Cuban League, was made up principally of bona fide American citizens whose pro-Cuban sympathies led them, under the direction of the members of the regular Junta, to organize affiliated clubs which were located throughout the entire country. These two organizations, working in close cooperation with the American press, had as their twofold purpose the assistance of the Cubans through the instigation of material and moral aid, both of which were imperative to insurgent success.56

This practical program formulated by the leaders of the Cuban Junta was hypothecated on the premise that their own objectives could be achieved only through aid secured from the United States whose interests, in turn, might be at least partially consummated by promoting Cuban freedom through the indirect means of securing the recognition of the insurgents as belligerents. The United States, therefore, served as fertile soil for the production of the much needed material aid and, as pointed out elsewhere, the Mid-West whose imperialism

had already been revived furnished a pregnant psychological area in which the Junta's propaganda agents could cultivate the growth of pro-Cuban sentiment.

So with the patriotic zeal and the realism which the exigencies of the situation demanded the Junta began quite early to organize the tangible methods designed to accomplish its major objectives. The first of these involved the fitting out of filibustering expeditions to supply the insurgent chiefstains in Cuba with material aid in the form of the accoutrements of war. 57

Organized on American soil, these expeditions against a

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57 For the history and legal aspects of such expeditions in the United States, see Roy Emerson Curtis, "The Law of Hostile Military Expeditions as Applied by the United States," American Journal of International Law, (January 1914, VIII, pp. 1-37 and April 1914, VIII, pp. 224-253.) James J. Roche, "By Ways of War. The Story of the Filibuster; (Boston, 1901) is a good general account of former filibustering expeditions to Cuba and the Caribbean. The exploits of William Walker and the Virginibus tragedy of 1873 are given special consideration. For the Lopez fiasco of 1851, see R. F. Logan, "The First Cuban Expedition". (Southern Magazine, July 1894, IV, pp. 608-614. Prior to the Spanish American War filibustering expeditions organized in the United States were primarily under the direction of Americans. Perhaps one would not be far wrong in saying that American intervention in Cuba in 1898 was nothing more than a glorified filibustering expedition under the sanction and camouflage of international law.
friendly power violated the ambiguities of international law, our treaty stipulations with Spain and the neutrality statutes of the United States. Realizing that she could never hope to suppress the revolt so long as the insurgents received a steady stream of military supplies through such channels, Spain invoked the rules of international comity and her treaty provisions with this country, complained against the permissive attitude of our Federal authorities in the prosecution of the expeditions which were apprehended, condemned the American press for condoning and abetting these unlawful enterprises and sought in accordance with its own prerogative to intercept all suspicious vessels cruising in Cuban waters by the maintenance of a rigid naval patrol around the island. These efforts brought friction with the American government and aroused much popular opposition to Spain in the United States. The incidents connected with filibustering, therefore, only added to the concatenation of events which made for the development of systematic editorial policy on Cuban affairs. This fact may be amply demonstrated by an analysis of the comment covering specific cases.

The first of these, the Alliance affair, occurred on March 8, 1895, and has already been mentioned in another connection. 58

58 Supra., I, p. 1.
The facts surrounding this case were never correctly ascertained because the contentions of Captain Crossman of the *Alliance* conflicted with those of the commander of the offending *Conde de Venadito*. The incident, however, was satisfactorily settled on May 16, 1895, when the Spanish government disavowed the act pursuant to several months of protracted diplomatic correspondence.

In the meantime, the incident served to reveal the editorial attitude of the press on the Junta's filibustering enterprises and assisted the editors in formulating more consistent policy on the Cuban question. The Taft controlled *Times-Star* of Cincinnati, ordinarily opposed to the Cleveland foreign policy, approved with hearty praise Secretary Gresham's

59 *Foreign Relations, 1895, II*, p. 1177. Gresham to Taylor, March 14, 1895. The Spanish authorities maintained that the American boat was engaged in the process of landing a filibustering expedition within Spanish jurisdiction off Cape Mayse, that the boat had been ordered to "heave to" for visit and search, and that only when the American captain had refused to comply had he fired blank shots across her bow. Crossman, on the other hand, claimed that he had been fired upon by shotted shell and pursued for about twenty miles because he chose not to accede to the demands of the Spanish commander. Our State Department held that the Windward Passage, through which the *Alliance* was passing when fired upon, was a natural international highway, that the American rights to the freedom of the seas applied and extended to within "one league" of the Cuban coast, and that these rights were not violable as long as no state of war existed.

60 *Ibid., 1895, Pt. 2*, pp. 1177-1185.
early demand for a prompt apology and labeled his action as "downright Jacksonianism." "The Eagle screams in the right key," in response to this "flagrant insult," it continued,61 while giving Spain the unhappy alternative of choosing between "An Apology or a Fight."62 The Times-Star also viewed the incident as an excuse for reconsidering Cuban annexation and, in accordance with that possibility, approved the departure of a group of Cincinnati recruits who left soon thereafter for active service with General Gomez and the insurgents.64 Its imperialistic attitude was further shown by its endorsement of a press statement made by Senator Frye, who, when questioned on the prospects of an immediate settlement of the Alliance difficulty, was quoted as saying:

'Unfortunately..., it looks as if Spain would make the required apology, and if so, all would soon be settled. I had hoped it would be otherwise, and that Spain would assume such a belligerent tone that it would be necessary for the United States to go over and take possession of Cuba. We certainly ought to have that island to round out our possessions as they should be, and if we

61 Cincinnati Times-Star, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
62 Ibid., March 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
63 Ibid., May 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
64 Ibid., May 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
cannot buy it, I for one, should like to have an opportunity to acquire it by conquest."

The Leader, chief Republican paper of Cleveland, was equally jingoistic and demanded that we "make Spain salute the stars and stripes." Why Doesn't Spain Answer?" it editorialized in the imperative mode upon Spain's delay in replying to Gresham's demand for an apology. Other editors expressed similar impatience, while the Cleveland Plain Dealer, which had urged the president to pursue a more vigorous foreign policy, took the Alliance affair as an appropriate opportunity to prod the chief executive along in that direction. In one-column headlines it warned its readers, "YOUR UNCLE SAM IS THINKING OF WARMING SPAIN'S JACKET," and followed through the next day with a "WOW! WOW! HERE IS A GOOD
CHANCE TO LET THE OLD EAGLE SCREAM! 71 Let this "insult to our flag" be a means to "make Cuba free," it said in a gloating editorial, 72 while its growing contempt of Spain was shown a few days later in a headline which ran, "OH THE HEATHEN! A BOAT WITH AN OUTLANDISH NAME ASSAULTED THE ALLIANCA. IT WAS THE SPANISH WARSHIP CONDE DE VENADITO." 73 Interestingly enough the American public was soon to receive daily lessons in "outlandish" Spanish names through the convenient medium of an ubiquitous propaganda, while the continued demands of the press for an apology in the Alliance affair 74 revealed an attitude which showed that the editors would be quite intolerant of further incidents of similar import. 75 One paper stated with sadistic delight that Americans could look at "philosophical complacency" in Spain's troubles in this "outrage" 76 which was regarded by another as "an illustration of the survival of what in an individual would be called

71 Ibid., March 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 5.
72 Ibid., March 20, 1895, p. 1, c. 5.
73 Indianapolis Journal, March 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
74 Omaha Daily Bee, March 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
75 Ibid., March 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
'meanness'." Described in similar terms by still another editor, the incident was cited to prove the "moral" decay of the Spanish nation whose "insolence" was also condemned. And when it was rumored that the American demands for an apology would be countered with a bill for damages accrued incidental to the departure of filibustering expeditions from American soil, Spain was advised "to keep her shirt on and seek no quarrel with the United States."80

A number of Middle Western editors, however, were less bellicose concerning the Alliance incident. One thought, for example, that Senator Frye's statement on the acquisition of Cuba by conquest was "strange folly," since the matter might be settled amicably.81 Another thought Gresham's note to Spain had been too strong, unless the facts corroborated the American view of the case.82 Even then it thought Spanish pride should not be overlooked in the final effort to settle the issue which it felt might be accomplished through arbitration, according to the precedents established in the settlement

77 Kansas City Star, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
78 Saint Louis Globe Democrat, March 28, 1895, p. 6, c. 2.
80 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), April 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
81 Kansas City Times, March 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
82 Indianapolis Journal, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
of the Venezuela boundary dispute. The extreme action on the part of either government was advised against and the prediction was made that the use of force to avenge the incident or to annex Cuba to the United States would not be permitted by Europe. The New Orleans Picayune was denounced for advocating the annexation of Cuba as reparation for the insult and by mid-April it stated that the Alliance affair had "lost its importance." The precariousness of the Spanish position at home and in the Caribbean would expedite her disposition to meet the American demands and make it unnecessary for us "to brush up our guns", said the editor of a representative paper from the same section.

But the editors of the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Cleveland Plain Dealer were not willing to dismiss the matter so lightly. The former paper at first indicated that there was "not much to fret about," although it claimed Spanish guilt and approved Gresham's note. This temporary support

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84 Ibid., March 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
85 Ibid., March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 4.
86 Ibid., March 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 3-4.
87 Ibid., April 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
88 Omaha World-Herald, March 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
89 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
of the administration, however, gradually disappeared as it shifted to a more imperialistic position and warned that the Cuban annexation spirit in this country might be stirred up again. Becoming impetuous with Spain's delay in tendering the desired apology, the remedy of political democracy was thrust at the pacific chief executive in these words: "Let the people watch the President and hold him to strict account if he should trifle with this momentous issue (italics mine) and allow this country to rest indefinitely under the disgrace of a blow from Spain unresented." With a "resolute and energetic administration in Washington" it said a bill would be instantly presented to Spain demanding the cession of Cuba for the Alliance insult. There was "no reason why Cuba should not be a part of the United States within the next thirty days," it said in an editorial adjacent to which a long list of editorial reprints appeared under the caption of a column bearing the title, "Let's Fight." The Enquirer's belligerency increased as it continued to denounce Spanish

90 Ibid., March 18, 1895, p. 4, e. 2.
91 Ibid., March 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 4.
92 Ibid., March 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
93 Loc. cit., c. 4.
"Lies About The Alliance," while it reviewed unsympathetically "The Spanish Crisis" on the Peninsula and refused to consider the incident closed.

Editorial demands for an apology were frequently accompanied by arguments in favor of a larger navy to take care of similar incidents which were predicted in the future, while some observed that the editorial comment on the case under consideration showed political partisanship. Reminiscent of the congressional Braggadocio of the War-Hawks of 1812, one editor said, "If the worst should come the president might send the Fourteenth Regiment, O. N. G. (Ohio National Guard), to Barcelona or Cadiz. It could clean up the whole Spanish outfit." And from the rolling hills of far away Missouri Valley came the echoes of "manifest destiny"
 intimating that we should go to war, take Cuba and annex it as one of the terms of peace. The Cubans could be made suitable for American citizenship by a little experience, it stated in ridiculing Gresham's "fake heroics" and "tin pan display." In the end it was never known definitely whether the Alliance was actually guilty of filibustering. Her suspicious conduct, nevertheless, had led the Spanish patrol to challenge her mission in Cuban waters and the editors should have been satisfied with Spain's official apology. But unfortunately, many of them were unwilling to let the matter drop. One paper claimed that "it was not much of an apology" after all, since Spain had promoted the commander of the offending vessel to a position of "higher" rank in the Spanish navy; and to Spain's contention that the United States was obliged to prevent filibustering expeditions from leaving American ports, it was stated that our obligations extended only to "flagrant" violations of our neutrality laws and that we were not bound to go "one step beyond" in the interests of continuing Spanish neutral

102 Kansas City Journal, March 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
103 Ibid., March 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
104 Ibid., March 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
105 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), May 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
rule on this continent. 106

The steady exploitation by the Junta of such expressions of sentiment led President Cleveland to issue an official neutrality proclamation on June 12, 1895. The necessity of this course had been predicted upon the outbreak of the insurrection 107 and, although many editors approved the "official" action of the president, they cast their "unofficial" sentiments on the side of the insurgents for one reason or another. 108 The Milwaukee Journal claimed that "until notified of a state of war in Cuba or of a blockade we can't be held responsible to Spain for the doings of American citizens, nor can Spain exercise the right to stop our ships or search them even in her own ports." 109 While approving the spirit of the President's proclamation, the Indianapolis Journal asserted:

(This Government)...is not responsible for and, even if it wished, could not

107 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Indianapolis Journal, June 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
108 Indianapolis Journal, June 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; Minneapolis Journal, June 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, June 12, 1895, p. 6, c. 1; Ibid., June 18, 1895, p. 6, c. 2; Kansas City Star, June 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Milwaukee Journal, June 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Omaha Daily Bee, June 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Chicago Times-Herald, June 12, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2.
109 Milwaukee Journal, June 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
prevent the growth of popular sympathy with the insurgents. Spanish rule in Cuba is a political anachronism and a misfit, and neither international law nor international comity can prevent the American people from hoping that the revolution will succeed.\footnote{\textit{Indianapolis Journal}, June 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; \textit{Ibid.}, June 16, 1895, p. 12, c. 2-3. The same spirit was again reflected in an editorial stimulated by a speech of Estrada Palma, \textit{q. v.}, \textit{Ibid.}, September 7, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.}

Admitting the proclamation "very properly issued," a representative Minnesota paper was stimulated to record editorially:

\begin{quote}
While it is 'manifest destiny' that our country will one day possess this rich island, the time is not yet. When we acquire it, we shall acquire it in a lawful way, either by purchase or, if we engage in a war with Spain some day, Cuba will be the first spoils of war to fall into our hands and that will be legitimate.\footnote{\textit{Minneapolis Journal}, June 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.}
\end{quote}

The essence of this policy was also maintained by many other Mid-Western editors.\footnote{See references in footnote 108.}

A large segment of Middle Western newspapers openly opposed the President's neutrality proclamation and the filibustering activities of the Cuban \textit{Junta} met with their overt approval. The Cincinnati \textit{Times-Star} stated that the
proclamation implied the recognition of a state of belligerency, regretted that Cleveland had followed the precedents of Pierce and Grant during the former uprisings in Cuba and lamented the fact that he had not followed the example of Spain herself, who, in the War of 1812 had permitted the use of Pensacola, then Spanish territory, as a base of hostile operations against the United States. The Cuban-Americans were eulogized for their "grit", "non-mercenary motives," "love of liberty," and "extraordinary pluck," in their efforts to assist the insurgent cause against such odds as the navies of Spain and America, the Customs Service of the United States and the vigilance of Spanish consuls and American authorities. The administration was condemned by the Detroit Journal for its lack of patriotism in failing to yield to the popular demands on behalf of the Cubans and the valuable aid anticipated from the successful launching of three filibustering expeditions was reviewed with pleasure. This sentiment

113 Cincinnati Times-Star, June 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
114 Ibid., June 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
115 Ibid., June 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
116 Ibid., June 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
117 Ibid., September 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
was also expressed by the Cincinnati Enquirer, which attacked the administration for serving as a Spanish policeman against the Cuban expeditions. The Cleveland Plain Dealer hoped that Spain would mistakenly fire on one of the American battleships sent to patrol our southern coast, thereby giving this government grounds for forceful intervention in Cuba. The expense connected with the enforcement of the president's neutrality proclamation was used as an argument attacking its validity and to show that both parties in the struggle should be given equal chances of success through the recognition of the Cubans as belligerents. The Saint Paul Pioneer Press favored a liberal interpretation of the federal neutrality statutes while a representative paper from the seat of populism objected to permitting a consignment of munitions being shipped to Weyler in Havana. Lamented the editor of the Pioneer Press:

An American who sells or attempts to sell anything to the Cubans is treated as a criminal. An American who sells

118 Cincinnati Enquirer, October 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
119 Ibid., July 26, 1895, p. 6, c. 1.
120 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 27, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
121 Ibid., July 26, 1895, p. 6, c. 1.
or attempts to sell anything to the Spaniards with which to slaughter the men, women, and children in Cuba, is treated as a law abiding citizen.\textsuperscript{123}

But Dupuy de Lome, who succeeded Muraga as minister to the United States in September 1895, pointed out in Harper's Weekly that the difficulty faced by the Spanish representatives in securing the observance of our neutrality statutes was due more to "lack of co-operation of the local authorities, than to any lack of zeal on the part of the State Department." One editor maintained, nevertheless, that:

\begin{quote}
The government knows very well that these expeditions leave the North Atlantic seaports rather than Key West, where a pretended watch is kept for unlawful expeditions. While the watch is kept at Key West the filibusters sail out of New York and other ports, and accomplish their purpose in Cuba.\textsuperscript{125}
\end{quote}

Be that as it may, the filibustering operations of the Junta went on apace despite the efforts made by Spain and the United States. From June 12, 1895, when the President's first proclamation of neutrality was issued, until the end of that year, a number of unlawful expeditions were reported in the

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{123} Omaha World-Herald, October 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 1. \\
\textsuperscript{124} Harpers Weekly, September 1895, XXIX, p. 330. \\
\textsuperscript{125} Minneapolis Journal, August 23, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
\end{flushleft}
press. Almost immediately after the Spanish minister had expressed his "profound gratitude" to Cleveland for "the measures adopted by the Government of the United States to prevent infringements of the law and attempts against the peace and security of a friendly nation," complaints were made against violations which the proclamation purported to forestall. The George W. Childs, the Lark, the Commodore, the James Woodall, and the Laura were among the vessels accused of unfriendly activities. Protests against unfriendly conduct in Saint Tammany Parish, Louisiana, the shipment of munitions from Cedar Keys, Florida, and the activities of certain members of the Cuban Junta were also lodged with our State Department.

The progression of the revolution brought additional

126 For. Rel., 1895, Pt. 2, p. 1195, De Lome to Olney, June 14, 1895.
127 Ibid., pp. 1195-1196, De Lome to Olney, June 24, 1895.
128 Ibid., p. 1199, De Lome to Olney, September 17, 1895.
129 Ibid., p. 1200, De Lome to Olney, September 19, 1895.
130 Ibid., pp. 1200-1201, De Lome to Olney, September 19, 1895.
131 Ibid., p. 1206, De Lome to Olney, November 23, 1895.
132 Ibid., p. 1196, De Lome to Olney, June 29, 1895.
133 Ibid., p. 1198, De Lome to Adee, September 8, 1895.
134 Ibid., p. 1193, Muragua to Gresham, April 4, 1895; Ibid., p. 1203, De Lome to Olney, October 7, 1895.
complaints of this sort during 1896 and 1897. The J. W. Hawkins was accused,\textsuperscript{135} the William Todd was fired upon by a Spanish gunboat off the Isle of Pines,\textsuperscript{136} and the Competitor, an American schooner, was captured near San Cayetano, searched for contraband of war\textsuperscript{137} and its crew seized and court-martialed.\textsuperscript{138} Early in 1897, the Ward line mail steamship Valencia was fired upon by the Spanish warship Reina Mercedes while in process of leaving Guantanamo Bay for Santiago de Cuba\textsuperscript{139} and the success of the Junta's filibustering activities in defiance of the President's neutrality proclamation is shown in the report of the Secretary of the Treasury which revealed that, between June 11, 1895 and November 30, 1897, sixty expeditions were attempted.\textsuperscript{140}

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid., p. 1209, De Lome to Olney, January 26, 1896. 
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid., 1896, p. 696. Olney to De Lome, March 28, 1896. 
\textsuperscript{137} Ibid., p. 711, Williams to Rockhill, April 30, 1896, et seq., pp. 711-750. 
\textsuperscript{138} Supra, II, pp. 48-49. 
\textsuperscript{139} For. Rel., 1897, p. 502, Sherman to De Lome, May 29, 1897. 
\textsuperscript{140} House Document, 326, 55 Cong. 2 Sess. See Curtis also. (Op. cit., pp. 248-249.) Twenty-eight of these expeditions were frustrated through the efforts of the Treasury Department, five were prevented by the Navy Department, four were intercepted by the Spanish naval patrol, two were wrecked, one driven back to the port by storm, one succeeded through the protection of British soil, and the fate of another was unknown. Spain
Not all of the cases mentioned in the reports of the Treasury Department or those referred to in the correspondence of the Spanish minister with our State Department, however, received editorial mention in Middle Western newspapers. Those mentioned by the editors included the Laurada, the Nepenthe, the Carry Lane, the Commodore, the Bermuda, the Competitor and the Three Friends. But the comment on the incidents surrounding the activities of these vessels was sufficient to indicate the trend of opinion on filibustering.

The arrest of the Laurada early in 1895 caused one editor to remark that it was "humiliating to see the administration apparently so eager to crush liberty in Cuba,"\(^{141}\) while the popular approval for the Laurada's subsequent acquittal in the federal court at Wilmington, Delaware,\(^{142}\) was interpreted considered seventeen of them violations of our neutrality laws. Nine vessels were involved in these attempts; five proceeded by steamships of considerable size; twelve went on tug boats and one pilot boat, each less than one hundred tons; and, two of the five expeditions went aboard the American owned Laurada.

\[^{141}\text{Minneapolis Tribune, January 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.}\]
\[^{142}\text{The decision was followed by an organized torch light parade through the city celebrating the verdict.}\]
as signifying the spread of "pro-Cuban fever." This was further indicated in an editorial which admitted that the nature of the merchandise found on board the Lauroda "quite clearly pointed toward (her) conviction." But later when the captain of this vessel was reported to have received a letter from the Spanish consul in Philadelphia offering him a reward of $10,000 for information leading to the capture of Cuban filibusters in Spanish waters, the Saint Louis Republic condemned the effrontery of such bribes as an "usurpation" of American authority in an editorial under the sanguine caption of "Spanish Blood Money."

Editorial comment of the Cincinnati Enquirer on the case of the Nepente, an American yacht fired on by a Spanish gunboat during a "pleasure" cruise around the Florida coast soon after the President's proclamation was issued, was also revealing. Said the Enquirer:

We are not blind to the possibilities that their (the filibusters) foolishness may be, in the long run, a good thing for the United States. It seems to have produced a state of affairs than can certainly not fail to stiffen the backbone of our State Department....The release of

143 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), September 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
144 Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
145 Saint Louis Republic, August 5, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
Cuba from Spanish domination is as certain as the lapse of time, and her ultimate annexation to the United States is scarcely less probable. That the Government of the United States does not embrace the present opportunity to seize Cuba is in the nature of extraordinary luck for Spain. 146

The Spanish attack on the Carry Lane in July, 1896, stimulated another equally interesting sentiment from the same paper:

"It is time for our government to go out of the beaten track to find excuses, reasons and pretexts for retaliation. What is the use of feasting? Of course, we want peace, but peace is a proposition which can be overlooked. What is our navy for?" 147

In discussing this incident the Detroit Journal admitted that "possibly the Spaniards have real occasion once in a while to resent the impudence or mollify the bravado of a bold Jack Tar like Captain Quick of the schooner Lane." But stated that the action of this government in the Alliance affair had shown that it could and would act when necessary. 148

American disgust with General Weyler's concentration decrees also stimulated editorial encouragement to American filibustering expeditions. 149 And during the following year

146 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
147 Ibid., July 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
148 Detroit Journal, July 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
149 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
when such an expedition on board the Commodore sank with another cargo of supplies for the Cubans, the fact was, of course, deeply regretted. 160

The initial failure of the Bermuda on a similar venture was likewise lamented, but its second and successful effort was regarded significant because "It demonstrates that persons in this country who are disposed to help the Cuban cause can find a way to do so despite the inhibitory rules of the government and in defiance of the quick-witted and alert officers of the revenue cutter service." 151 Decisions of the Supreme Court were cited, in connection with comment on the Bermuda's activities, to show that "until we recognize the Cubans as belligerents there is nothing in our neutrality laws to prevent the fitting out and arming of vessels to be used against the Spanish men of war." 152 "It (filibustering) Is Not Forbidden," in the absence of a recognized state of war and the prediction was made that before long a regular filibustering line would be in operation between Cuba and New York. 154 "Uncle Sam is not responsible for the failure of the

150 Detroit Free Press, January 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 5-6.
161 Detroit Journal, March 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
152 Milwaukee Sentinel, March 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
153 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
Spanish watchdogs stationed around Cuba to detect, seize and destroy such expeditions," said an editor who boasted of the Bermuda's devious methods of evading the officials.155

The capture of the Competitor in April 1896, which was accompanied by the seizure and court-martial of her crew, part of which were American citizens, provoked more editorial comment than any other filibustering incident with the possible exception of the Alliance affair.156 This incident was used widely as an argument to force the administration to recognize the Cubans as belligerents,157 and in this manner became involved in the Campaign of 1896.158 A Republican editor warned Cleveland, for example, of the political consequences which would follow his failure to prevent the execution of the American members of the Competitor's

155 Cleveland Plain Dealer. April 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
157 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, May 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Minneapolis Tribune, May 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City Journal, May 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., May 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., May 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Milwaukee Journal, May 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
158 Infra, II, pp. 149-150.
crew\textsuperscript{159} and although such expressions were labeled as "partisan haste" by Democratic editors,\textsuperscript{160} the editor of an Independent organ also warned that "nothing could be more disastrous than the injection into the presidential canvass of such questions as would arise from the execution of the verdict of the Court-martial in the \textit{Competitor} case."\textsuperscript{161}

A statement made about this time by the Mexican minister at Madrid to the effect that "The Yankees are suffering from the presidential fever"\textsuperscript{162} showed that even a foreign observer was sagacious enough to discern the relationship between our domestic politics and our foreign policy.\textsuperscript{163}

But neither political expediency nor journalistic advice could deter Cleveland in his persistent determination to maintain the unpopular policy of official neutrality by discouraging the filibustering activities of the \textit{Junta}. Accordingly, on July 27, 1896, a second proclamation of neutrality

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Columbus Evening Dispatch}, May 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
\item \textit{Milwaukee Journal}, June 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
\item \textit{Chicago Times-Herald}, May 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
\item \textit{Columbus Evening Dispatch}, July 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
\item Reports that Spain would counter our demands in the \textit{Competitor} case with claims against the United States on account of filibustering were not seriously considered by the press. (\textit{Chicago Record}, August 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; \textit{Cincinnati Commercial Tribune}, November 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4.)
\end{itemize}
was issued in which the President stated that the "citizens of the United States and others within its jurisdiction" failed to appreciate the meaning and operation of our laws. These were again invoked, as were also the recent decisions of the Supreme Court, and American citizens were once more warned against unneutral activities on behalf of the insurgents.

The reaction of Middle Western newspapers to the President's second proclamation of neutrality was not much different from that which had accompanied their attitude toward his earlier promulgation. It was again generally admitted that Cleveland had done his "official duty," but, as in the case of his former proclamation, it was thought inadequate. One paper said no doubt many of the expeditions would "carry it (the proclamation) along with them to enlighten the voyage to Cuba."

164
Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, N. Y., XIII, pp. 6126-6127.

165
Kansas City Star, July 31, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Journal, September 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.

166
Chicago Times-Herald, August 1, 1896, p. 8, c. 1.
Another labeled its enforcement a "farce," and it was repeatedly maintained that American "sympathy" for the struggling insurgents could not be dampened by the empty verbiage of a presidential executive order. One editorial writer recommended a modification of the old proverb, "Blood is thicker than water" to read "Sympathy is stronger than neutrality laws," while another blamed Cleveland for:

....turning a cold shoulder to the struggling patriots... as well as to the wishes of American citizens who sympathize with them and who have recently given expression to that sympathy in the national conventions of all parties and factions.

Another editor hoped that the Dauntless, which was being temporarily held on suspicion of violating the President's proclamation, would soon be released so that she could continue to supply the insurgents with material aid clandestinely.
Spain's release of the _Competition's_ crew, not long after Cleveland's second neutrality proclamation was announced, failed to satisfy the vitriolic editorial writers of the Middle West. Said a typical representative of this sort:

> In declining to execute them (the American members of the crew) Spain has done nothing magnanimous, nothing worthy of praise, nothing which she was not compelled to do. She has simply crawled out of an untenable position after many months of delay, and if she expects compulsory action to hoodwink us into the belief that she is doing us a great favor because of her love for us, then she is mighty mistaken. 172

Obviously, Cleveland's second effort to foster a spirit of neutrality, had no more effect upon preventing filibustering than it had upon the attitude of the editors. This is clearly shown in the case of the _Three Friends_ which was regularly engaged thereafter in filibustering movements facilitated by the New York _Junta_. On one occasion this vessel was congratulated upon its escape from capture by the Spanish patrol. 173

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172 Milwaukee Journal, January 2, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Detroit Free Press, July 12, 1896, p. 12, c. 3.

173 Chicago Record, December 26, 1896, p. 12, c. 4.
after having been arrested on charges of filibustering, the judge's argument for acquittal on grounds that a state of war had not been admitted by Spain, was used by a number of papers to urge the recognition of Cuban belligerency.174 The legality of filibustering on this account was maintained by the press even up to the outbreak of the war in 1898175 and Palma of the Junta tried to strengthen the claim by calling editorial attention to the minority opinion of the Supreme Court issued in reversing the decision of the District Court in Florida,176 while the London Times was quoted as saying that Europe could not object to American filibustering activities because of its own historical precedents.177

In consideration of the activities which have just been outlined it should be born in mind that they were organized and conducted under the auspices of the Junta. Jose Marti',

174 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 20, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., January 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 3-4; Ibid., January 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.

175 Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Milwaukee Journal, November 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Leader, December 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.

176 Louisville Times, March 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; See also, Yale Law Journal, V, P. 283.

177 Louisville Times, April 6, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
the revolutionary genius who so energetically launched the first of the expeditions, had been killed in an insular skirmish in May 1898, but the Junta carried on under the able leadership of Estrada Palma. Soon after the revolt got under way a "Cuban Delegation" was established in Washington with headquarters in the Raleigh Hotel, where Quesada and Rubens started "an information campaign" to facilitate the procurement and distribution of material aid to the insurgents and to gain the recognition by the United States of belligerent rights for their de facto government.

Thereafter, the Washington unit of the "Cuban Legation" divided its "real if not so widely advertised honors with the so-called yellow press in bending the minds of the people toward a just consideration of Cuba's plight and legitimate aims." Writing a generation later, one of the members of the Junta has defined the purposes of the Washington club as follows:

...We had in Washington a little war of our own which was to continue for three years, depending moreover on the progress of the real war in Cuba. This war in Cuba, in turn, depended on the war between the American Government

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179 Ibid., p. 107.
incited by Spain, and the Expeditionary Department of the Cuban Junta, which had to supply the major war with a steady flow of munition supplies. 180

As early as the fall of 1895 General Gomez further emphasized the importance of material aid to the insurgent cause. 181 And the pro-Spanish ex-mayor of Havana, in attempting to discourage such aid indicated that whatever strength the insurrection showed had been derived "more than anything else from external aid." 182 Similar utterances delivered elsewhere by this gentleman were, of course, denounced editorially by Middle Western newspapers. 183

In the meantime, the members of the "Cuban Legation" in Washington were finding other ways and means of accomplishing their purposes. Through a certain Lieutenant Rodgers they were able to meet and gain the ear of high officials in government circles. "On a Sunday morning," one of them records, "Lieutenant Rodgers took us to the Lafayette Square house of...

180 Ibid., p. 109.
181 George Reno, "Operating an 'Underground' Route to Cuba," Cosmopolitan, August 1899, XXVII, p. 431.
183 Detroit Free Press, August 18, 1895, p. 12, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), July 5, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
Senator Don Cameron of Pennsylvania. Henry Adams (the historian) was there and so was Henry Cabot Lodge. Both Cameron and Lodge had reasons of their own for espousing the Cuban cause and, as in the case of the American press, the Junta was wise enough to exploit them. It is doubtful that Lodge was stimulated solely by such visits to advocate a more vigorous Cuban policy or condone the methods of the Junta in securing material aid for the insurgents through filibustering. The imperialism of that scholar in politics was of more subtle origin. Nevertheless, his literary efforts revealed his bitter opposition to Cleveland's neutrality proclamation and that he was willing enough to flaunt the law in an endeavor to assist the Junta in rendering material aid to the rebels. One might logically infer, therefore, that the "information campaign" of the Washington "Legation" had an influence on a definition of the Senator's position.

It thus appeared that almost every circumstance favored the realization of the first of the Junta's aims. Even "Divine Providence" seemed to have made the necessary arrangements in Cuba for the successful completion of filibustering.

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expeditions. Testified a contemporary writer, who described the island as "A Guerilla Eden:"

\[\text{Nature seems purposefully to have accomodated West Indian filibusters with...observatories, in the form of the numerous small islands scattered along the west coast of Cuba, which enable a hidden privateer to watch the movement of the hostile gunboats.}^{186}\]

The mainland was also described as a "paradise for native insurgents and the hades of their foreign enemies."\(^{187}\)

That the Junta took advantage of these natural factors has been shown in the numerous accounts since written by participants in these enterprises\(^{188}\) and it cannot be doubted from the foregoing data that the Junta took similar advantage of the disposition of the American press and American politicians.

It is difficult to estimate accurately the amount of material aid which the filibustering expeditions landed in

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187 Ibid., p. 381.
in Cuba, but one paper estimated in 1895 that the fund collected for its procurement amounted to $3,000,000 and frequent editorial pleas for additional contributions were made thereafter. Early in 1896, the Junta proposed a $10,000,000 Cuban bond issue redeemable ten years after Spain had been driven from the island. The bonds were to be liquidated from Cuban revenues collected later and set aside for this purpose. The proposal was approved editorially as an opportunity for Americans "to give practical expression of their sympathy" and was also cited as proof of the stability of the provisional government which in turn entitled it to de jure recognition. One of the most active members of the Junta has since stated that on one occasion Richard Croker, then sachem of New York's Tammany Hall, gave the Junta $80,000 from surplus campaign

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189 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
190 Ibid., December 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; December 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
191 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
192 Indianapolis Journal, April 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
funds, "for the sick and wounded Cubans." Early in 1896, a typical Middle Western editor stated in an editorial on "The Cost of Cuban Freedom" that the Junta had collected $3,210,000 from all the world during the Ten Year's War and that two-thirds of that amount had been raised in the United States. Therefore, if the people of this country would raise an additional one-half that amount in aid of the revolt of 1895, this writer maintained the freedom of Cuba would be insured "without forcing the United States government into war with Spain and the expenditures of many times that sum."

The alert Junta, realizing quite early the advantages to which American generosity might be put on behalf of the Cuban Revolutionary Party, organized its activities to give ample opportunity for tangible expressions of moral support. The facilities of the American press were already at its disposal and a second vehicle was adopted in the form of rabble rousing "Sympathy Meetings." The method was simple,

194 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., January 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
195 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, June 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
yet psychologically sound; Press and crowd stimulation of American humanitarianism; response, American intervention in Cuban affairs.

The first of these meetings, held in Chicago's Music Hall on October 1, 1895, was regarded by the Chicago Tribune as significant because it represented "all classes of society in Chicago." In applauding the remarks of one of the speakers at the meeting it said, "Now let other cities follow the example and roll up to Washington a tide of public opinion that shall sweep the sluggish men in the seats of Congress toward liberty." It also lauded the sentiment of a prayer rendered by one of the speakers on Cuba's behalf. The Cleveland Plain Dealer thought the Chicago meeting should arouse the administration to the favorable consideration of Cuban belligerency, while the Chicago Inter Ocean asked "Help For Cuba," because the "law of humanity" demanded it and said that the meeting's significance had been increased.

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196 Chicago Tribune, September 26, 1897, p. 12, c. 2; Ibid., September 30, 1895, p. 6, c. 4.
197 Ibid., October 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 2.
198 Ibid., October 2, 1895, p. 32, c. 2-3.
199 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 27, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
200 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, September 30, 1895, p. 6, c. 2.
by its spontaneity. A separate reportorial account gave in detail the names of the speakers, a brief summary of what each had said on Cuba's behalf, and a resume of the resolutions adopted. In Ohio, the Chicago meeting was cited to show how rapidly the pro-Cuban sentiment was spreading in the Middle West and it was used as a basis for a prediction that such demonstrations would bring action by the fifty-fourth Congress encouraging to the insurgents. In an editorial which announced this meeting, the Chicago Times-Herald recommended that the gathering demand, "not Cuba 'reformed' not Cuba appeased, while her oppressors are forging stronger chains for her bruised limbs, but Cuba free!" To the Nebraska State Journal, the Chicago meeting appeared to be very "timely," while its resolutions of protest against Spanish atrocities were regarded as the "unanimous opinion of Americans." Many other editors in the Middle West took

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201 Ibid., October 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 2.
202 Ibid., October 1, 1895, p. 2, c. 2-6.
203 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
204 Ibid., September 29, 1895, p. 28, c. 2.
205 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
note of the meeting\textsuperscript{206} and an Indiana editor pointed out the significant concession made on the speakers' platform to the press, boasted that such assemblies were "distinctly American institutions," alluded to similar meetings elsewhere in the Middle West, and welcomed the prospects of such a gathering in Indianapolis. On the meeting's resolutions in favor of Cuban belligerency it said, "The government is not responsible for public sentiment or the expression of mass meetings, but through these it can be forced to act."\textsuperscript{207} Such convocations appeal to the "higher law" once so potent in public opinion, said the editor of a widely-read Wisconsin paper.\textsuperscript{208}

Only a few papers failed to sympathize fully with the objectives of the Chicago meeting.\textsuperscript{209} Those who did, based their position on the contention that the situation in Cuba was not serious enough to warrant any positive action by the government on behalf of the insurgents.\textsuperscript{210}

\textsuperscript{206} Cincinnati Enquirer, October 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2; Milwaukee Sentinel, October 6, 1895, p. 12, c. 1.
\textsuperscript{207} Indianapolis Journal, November 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
\textsuperscript{208} Milwaukee Journal, October 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
\textsuperscript{209} Minneapolis Journal, October 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{210} Ibid., October 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
Nevertheless, the editorial comment on similar meetings outside the Middle West reflected the growth of pro-Cuban sentiment on account of the Junta's activities at these assemblies. Such a gathering at Philadelphia in November 1895, caused the Chicago Tribune to conjecture that when Quakers, who were ordinarily "averse to war..., grow belligerent, it is a sign that the country is getting stirred up."\(^{211}\) Philadelphia was therefore applauded for emulating Chicago's example in sponsoring pro-Cuban sentiment.\(^{212}\) Arranged by the local Junta, an impressive assembly convened at the Academy of Music where resolutions were adopted favoring the recognition of the Republic of Cuba. Copies of these were sent to the President and both houses of Congress, after having been signed by an important array of committee men, among whom was included the signature of no less a personage than John Russel Young, the Librarian of Congress, who attended the meeting.

Speeches sympathetic to Cuba were also made, both by members of the Washington "Legation" and civic leaders of Philadelphia and elsewhere. For the principal address,

\(^{211}\) Chicago Tribune, November 6, 1895, p. 6, c. 4.
\(^{212}\) Ibid., November 6, 1895, p. 6, c. 3.
Governor Claude Mathews of Indiana was invited to give his views on Cuban conditions. Reported at full length in the Philadelphia Times, and later reprinted by the Junta as a propaganda pamphlet, the Governor's speech was typical of Cuban sympathy expressed at similar meetings held elsewhere. Reaching the first climax of his speech, Mathews said that the insurgents deserved our "moral encouragement" since their cause was that of "human freedom" and "Christian civilization." In his second burst of sympathetic oratory he warned against "indifference and inaction" on our part "as the chosen people" whose duty it was to deliver Cuba from her oppressor. Carefully disclaiming any ulterior motives by this government in the proposed action, he went on to point out that this did not mean the annexation of Cuba "at this time," but that it involved "the purer, more unselfish question of national liberty, of human rights, and of broad

216 Ibid., pp. 9-10.
217 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
humanity." In conclusion Mathews indicated that regardless of our "official" duty to observe the obligations of international law, as individual citizens we might "span the dividing waters with hopeful, generous sympathy and bid godspeed to the Cuban patriot in his sublime hope and his holy ambition." For, said the speaker, "His cause is just, the right shall prevail, and in God's own time Cuba will be free." Philadelphians were thereupon given the opportunity to please the Lord and assist the Cuban's "holy ambition" by contributing to the Junta's revolutionary fund.

Back in the Middle West a meeting similar to that just described was held at Cleveland and addressed by members of the Cuban Junta, while at Cooper Union in New York City, one presided over by Charles A. Dana, editor of the New York Sun, was lauded by a Middle Western paper as "powerfully significant."

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218 Ibid., p. 15.
221 Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 23, 1895, p. 4, c. 4.
222 Detroit Journal, November 29, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
During 1896, other meetings were held in the area under consideration. In October of that year, a Cuban carnival in Cincinnati was addressed by Quesada, Zayas and Rolloff of Junta. The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, reviewing the event under the suggestive caption of "Vive Cuba Libre," pointed out that the affair had brought much "substantial aid to the struggling Cubans." Observed the Tribune, as a result of the meeting:

Can anyone wonder that the sympathies of the people whose independence was achieved under similar conditions should go out to those who are fighting for their freedom? Can anyone wonder that Dr. Henry Lincoln Zayas thrilled his audience as he told the story of Cuban wrongs and outrages?...Civilization will yet act on behalf of the downtrodden....in Cuba. 223

The same sentiment was also expressed by the Times-Star which estimated that about 3,000 people attended the carnival. 224

A meeting of similar import was held at Cleveland in December 1896, like the Cincinnati gathering was addressed by the "Cuban exiles" whose review of Cuban affairs met with the

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223 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, October 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
224 Cincinnati Times-Star, October 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
usual editorial applause. The Indianapolis Sentinel called attention to such a meeting at Franklin, Indiana, "presided over by the president of the college, and addressed by preachers, doctors and lawyers" who resolved that the United States take possession of Cuba and hold it until the people of the island could form a government of their own.

In January 1897, "The Cuban Sympathy Meeting" held at the Board of Trade Auditorium in Columbus was reviewed with favorable editorial comment by the local papers of that city and may be taken as typical of many others held elsewhere in the Middle West. Convened under the auspices of the local chapter of the Cuban League, which counted among its members more than 1,000 of the leading citizens of Ohio's capital, its secretary, State Librarian O. B. Galbreath, reported a successful meeting at which pro-Cuban speeches and prayers were delivered from a platform bedecked by American and Cuban and to the tune of martial music rendered by the Fourteenth Regiment Band of the Ohio National Guard. Fidel G. Pierra spoke on behalf of the Junta and a Colonel Kilbourne, the local president, explained the objective of the League as designed:

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225 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
226 Indianapolis Sentinel, December 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
227 Columbus Evening Dispatch, January 26, 1897, p.4, c. 2.
....to secure for Cuba by all lawful, peaceful and honorable means, the political independence which her patriots are now endeavoring through tremendous sacrifice of treasure and life to gain; to encourage them with our sympathy and moral support; and to arouse the whole nation to demand the end of the campaign of devastation and murder in that island. 228

The meeting's "sympathy and moral support" were extended to the Junta in the following telegram which Secretary Galbreath dispatched to:

T. Estrada Palma, Delegate of the Republic of Cuba:

A public meeting representing the business, labor, religious and political interests of this city sends you greetings. May the merciful Father of all prosper the cause of liberty on your beautiful island. Long live the republic of Cuba! 229

Numerous other "Sympathy Meetings" were promoted by the Junta and held under the sponsorship of the local units of the Cuban League in other Mid-Western cities. 230 There was evidence in the papers of at least one important Middle Western city that the Junta had expanded its propaganda activities

228 Ibid., January 26, 1897, p. 5, c. 5-6.
229 Loc. cit.
230 Detroit Journal, February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., March 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; April 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
just before war was declared to include the stage as well as the platform. It cannot be doubted, therefore, that the Junta stimulated the growth of popular sentiment in favor of the insurrectionary movement and that in so doing it contributed to the evolution of editorial policy on the Cuban question. The by-products of this achievement, in financial contributions, recruits, liberal interpretations of our neutrality laws, the establishment in Congress of a sentiment in favor of recognizing Cuban belligerency and finally, in American intervention by force of arms, all showed that the Junta had done its job well indeed, perhaps too well to suit the interests of the insurgents, who so bitterly opposed our intervention devoid of American recognition of the Cuban Provisional Government, which the war resolution failed to provide.

Even greater "moral support" for the insurgents was aroused through the Junta's exploitation of American newspaper facilities then that resulting from the "Sympathy Meetings" outlined above. At least one thing which made this possible was the fact that an anti-Spanish bias had resulted

231 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 8, 1898, p. 10, c. 7.
232 Detroit Journal, April 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
from Weyler's censorship decrees. The normal methods of collecting the news concerning events in Cuba thus thwarted, the problem of gathering Cuban information, therefore, played directly into the hands of the Cuban Junta. The reporters of the New York papers were accordingly encouraged to call everyday at a specified time at the Junta's headquarters, where they received gratis the "news" of the latest developments of the revolution. The "information campaign" of the Washington unit of the Junta has already been mentioned and it has since been stated that newspaper correspondents besieged the headquarters for written matter about Cuba. Wherever they could, Cubans encouraged the continuous spread of feeling. "Day and night 'The Cuban Legation' at Washington worked. Demands for facts, historical references and news from the front poured in on Quesada," a participant in this new literature of propaganda has since stated in explaining the sources of Cuban war news.

It is impossible to say just to what extent the Junta caused the editors of Middle Western newspapers to predict the

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233 Supra, II, pp. 59-61, 94.
236 Ibid., p. 209.
237 Ibid., p. 105.
success of the revolt, but we have already seen that they showed their disposition to do so quite early. We do know that the Junta made an organized effort to stimulate moral aid through American newspapers and that its program consisted of several very tangible methods of appealing to the American people. These included the building up of a general belief in the possibility of Cuban success, the corresponding belief in Spanish failure, and an appeal to American sympathy through the circulation of Spanish atrocities.

The editorial arguments advanced in support of the success theory of the Junta were almost legion. The resistance of the patriot army to the larger and better organized Spanish army was cited to prove that the insurgents were no mere "rabble" of marauding guerilla bands; stories of Cuban victory were circulated as evidence of their military strength; the testimony of the Junta, Harper's Weekly.

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238 Supra, I, pp. 6-10.
239 Minneapolis Journal, September 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, September 29, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Chicago Times-Herald, October 24, 1895, p. 6, c. 3; Ibid., December 26, 1895, p. 6, c. 3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 9, 1895, p. 4, c. 4; Ibid., December 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
240 Chicago Record, October 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; January 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
241 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 4.
quoted in support of rebel progress; while numerous editorials to the same effect contained arguments of even less validity. It was maintained that the barbarous methods of Spanish warfare would strengthen the Cubans numerically by driving the non-combatants to their assistance.

In order to develop American confidence in the insurrection, the ability of the staff of the Cuban army was emphasized. The exploits of General Gomez were lauded to prove that a government showing such military strength was entitled to enjoy the belligerent status and the General was eulogized for conducting the revolt according to the "rules of civilized warfare."

Needless to say, the grandiose claims of the Junta on

242 Chicago Record, December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
243 Chicago Times-Herald, January 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, July 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., November 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Milwaukee Journal, November 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
244 Indianapolis Sentinel, April 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
245 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
246 Detroit Journal, December 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
247 Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
behalf of Gomez were refuted by the Spanish officials who claimed that his health and old age were hindrances to his success in the field, and his death was reported on numerous occasions.249 The papers of the Middle West refused to accept these views and said, on the contrary, that Gomez' Stoicism was a "boon to Cuba libre."250 Rumors that the insurgent commander-in-chief was suing for peace were also denied,251 because nothing short of complete independence would be accepted by the "intractable" General.252

A few papers occasionally discredited the extravagant views of insurgent strength, but they hastened to express their belief in eventual success of the uprising.253 A much more active portion of the editors preferred to believe the existence of a strong provisional government, the details of which were very appropriately outlined by Gomez two days

249 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 4.
250 Detroit Free Press, July 19, 1896, p. 12, c. 2; Omaha World-Herald, December 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
251 Detroit Journal, January 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
252 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
after the second anniversary of the outbreak of the revolt. 254

When reports of military engagements lagged, the people were assured that the insurgents were merely resting in the mountains and swamps where they were accumulating supplies for further depredations on the Spanish lines. Of course, such editorials expressed the hope that the needs of the insurgents would be met with the necessary provisions. 255

The activities of General Antonio Maceo, famed mulatto insurgent leader, also provided many editorials predicting Cuban success. Reports of Maceo's death in December, 1897, were accompanied by rumors that he had been treacherously ambushed behind the Spanish trocha. The papers refused to believe this at first and when the fact was finally confirmed, his exploit in crossing the trocha was interpreted as evidence of growing rebel strength. 256 Spain was criticized for rejoicing over the death 257 of this brave "friend of human liberty," 258 whom one editor regarded as "the greatest colonial

254 Chicago Tribune. March 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
255 Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4.
256 Chicago Record, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
257 Ibid., December 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
fighter since Toussaint L'Ouverture.\textsuperscript{259} Rumors of Maceo's death were referred to as "Weyler bluff\textsuperscript{260}" and it was asserted that even if dead the proven ability of General Ruiz Rivera, his probable successor, would enable the insurgent army to carry on the struggle for liberty.\textsuperscript{261}

Similar praise was given General Calixto Garcia by editors who based their accounts of that leader on the eulogies concocted by the New York Junta\textsuperscript{262} and the desire for Cuban success caused certain editors to interpret even the most ridiculous incidents connected with his activities as good omen.\textsuperscript{263}

The theory that the competence of the Cuban general staff would insure Cuban success was supported by exaggerated stories concerning insurgent victories. Such reports came mainly from Cuban sources. Quesada, Secretary of the New York

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\textsuperscript{259} \textit{Detroit Journal}, December 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{260} \textit{Ibid.}, December 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{261} \textit{Ohio State Journal} (Columbus), December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{262} \textit{Sioux City Journal}, March 31, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.  \\
\textsuperscript{263} \textit{Omaha World-Herald}, March 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; \textit{Louisville Courier Journal}, March 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
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Junta, Fuentes, President of the Boston Junta, and a "Cuban Merchant" in Philadelphia were quoted early in 1895 as predicting insurgent success for these reasons. The great cost to Spain in putting down the insurrection which the insurgents were waging with such success against such great "odds", by guerilla tactics and with the aid of insular pestilence, were cited to show Spanish failure and the validity of the Cuban claim for recognition. And to the legends of the foregoing generalities the exact number of Spanish soldiers killed in battle was added to give a tone of authenticity to the growing myth. Between February and August, 1895, for example, 15,000 Spanish troops were reported killed. In December of that year a story to the effect that 12,000 insurgents defeated 80,000 Spaniards in Matanzas
was circulated, while the insurgent drive into the Spanish strongholds of Havana province toward the end of the year was described in minute detail and interpreted as still further evidence of insurgent strength. The fact that the rebels' raid on the suburbs of Havana had been accompanied by a hasty withdrawal devoid of a prolonged siege, was regarded as "not surprising" but common sense, since the insurgents did not have the advantage of heavy artillery. They would retire instead to the surrounding area and make "the most fertile provinces of Cuba...present the appearance of the Shenandoah valley at the close of the late war," said a pro-Cuban editor, who by the review of such exploits assisted the Junta in perpetuating the theory of Cuban success.

During 1896, other arguments were presented. The necessity of martial law in pro-Spanish sections like Havana

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272 Cincinnati Times-Star, December 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
273 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
274 Ibid., December 25, 1895, p. 5, c. 3; December 29, 1895, p. 28, c. 2.
275 Cincinnati Times-Star, December 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
was considered an evidence of Spanish collapse. In January 1896, an optimistic editorial predicted the capture of Havana and the subsequent capitulation of Spain in Cuba which would be followed closely by American intervention, since the interests of "commerce and humanity" demanded it. The insurgent method of making Cuba a "worthless burdensome dependency on the country which misgoverned it through the destruction of plantations and industries" was condoned editorially, but the less severe methods by which General Campos hoped to suppress the revolt were criticized.

The failure of the Spanish troops to halt the insurgent "invasion" of the western provinces of Cuba, rumors that Weyler would be forced to resign, and reports that the Spanish efforts to put down the revolt were not popular in Spain, were all used to fortify the arguments already

278 Ibid., January 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; See also, Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
279 Cleveland Leader, January 17, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
presented. A "private" letter from Consul General Lee, to the effect that Weyler would be unable to suppress the rebellion was used as official confirmation of the opinion which supported Cuban victory and the statement of a visitor to Cuba that the trocha was a "farce", was given serious editorial consideration. But a report which purported to show that royal troops had won 16,000 victories in the first eighteen months of the war was ridiculed. The unity of the Cuban army, "composed of all classes," was also emphasized as favorable to Cuban success, while it was made to appear by the Junta that Spain intended to saddle the cost of suppressing the rebellion on the unfortunate insurgents.

The Junta fully realized the appeal which these arguments had to the American people and it hoped, by presenting them through the generous co-operation of the newspaper editors, to make an end of "the bloody career of the Spanish butcher

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283 Sioux City Journal, April 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
284 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, June 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
286 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, November 20, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
287 Ibid., December 1, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2.
in this hemisphere, "by bringing about American intervention.

The unreliability of the "news" predicting Cuban success was seldom admitted by Middle Western editors, for most of them fell in line with the Junta's object of making the recognition of belligerency or American intervention dependent upon the military success of the rebels. Congressional consideration of such contingencies, prior to 1897, showed to what extent the propaganda of the Junta and the press were bearing fruit and the tone of editorial comment did not change until war was finally declared. In the interval, the further successes of the Cuban generals became the subject of additional editorial exploits. Attempts were made to confirm the reports of Cuban victories by presenting the testimony of disinterested eye-witnesses and mysteriously from the prison cell of Sylvester Scovel, unfortunate victim of journalism's victory campaign, came the wisdom which only a martyr could divine—that the 'patriot' impulse of the Cuban

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288 Cincinnati Times-Star, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
289 Milwaukee Journal, January 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
290 Cincinnati Times-Star, January 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
291 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 16, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
292 Detroit Journal, February 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
army, in contrast to the 'professional' attitude of the Spanish expedition, would insure further insurgent victory.

The news of such a triumph near Thanksgiving, 1897, was interpreted by an editorial friend of Cuba as a "new incentive to devoutness or to festivity." "Climate, Time and Justice," were also said to be on the side of the Cubans and a similar thought was expressed by a contemporary writer in the Cosmopolitan magazine who remarked that "July and August are the greatest Generals" of the insurgents, because then yellow fever paid its most devastating call upon the Spanish hordes stationed in Cuba. But a more realistic editor thought "The First Great Cuban Victory" was the refusal of the Bank of Spain to grant further loans to the Spanish government for the purpose of putting down the insurrection. Finally, when continued Cuban success resulted in the recall of Weyler and the delegation of General Blanco to "pacify" the island,

293 Chicago Tribune, March 1, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
294 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, November 24, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
295 Detroit Journal, April 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
297 Cincinnati Times-Star, October 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
Hannis Taylor, Cleveland's minister to Spain, maintained that such a policy had come "too late," that Spain was incompetent to cope with the situation, and urged that the administration announce in unequivocal terms its intentions to proceed upon our own responsibility to put an end to the war. The papers quite agreed.

The editorial treatment of the Junta's success theme was essentially constructive in its propaganda technique, but naturally implied a corresponding negativism in emphasizing Spanish failure. It was maintained at the outset that Spain's army had been weakened because her most capable officers had refused to serve in Cuba, "Spain's Hard Contract" was emphasized, while the censored reports of events in Cuba became topics of derogatory editorials criticizing the "Able Spanish Prevaricators." The size of the insurgent army was exaggerated by the Cuban correspondent of the Chicago Inter Ocean, whose interview with Gomez was interpreted by the

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299 Cincinnati Commercial-Tribune, November 6, 1897, p.6, c.1-2.
300 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), March 19, 1895, p. 4, c.3.
301 Columbus Evening Dispatch, July 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
302 Ibid., February 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
Columbus Dispatch not only as a triumph for journalism, but also as a material aid to the cause of the rebels. The testimony of the Surgeon General of the United States Marine Hospital was quoted in 1895 to show that Spain’s inability to prevent the spread of yellow fever from Cuba to our southern coast would necessitate American intervention. By the following year, yellow fever was reported as making “Spain’s cause hopeless by decimating her troops.” Even the report of the chief of the Spanish Sanitary Corps was distorted to prove that a “real war” existed in Cuba and that disease was making such fearful inroads on Spanish military strength that Spain could not hope to suppress the revolt.

Spanish failure, it was said, was also assured by the senility and “afflictions of (her) querulous old age” and the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, in outlining the causes for the “Decline of Spain” concluded that Cuba was as good as lost.

303 Ibid., January 28, p. 4, c. 2.
304 Minneapolis Journal, July 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
305 Cleveland Leader, June 2, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
307 Chicago Times-Herald, June 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
309 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 2, 1897, p. 23, c. 8.
Insurrection in the Philippines was taken as a symbol of the incapacity and corruption of the Spanish colonial system and the "threatened" uprising of 1896 in Puerto Rico was given a similar interpretation. To show the failure of the Spanish colonial system and to justify the revolution in Cuba, a Kansas City editor compared England's generous treatment of Canada with that of Spain's mistreatment of Cuba. As further proof of Spanish inability, stupidity and ultimate failure, the testimony of Europeans was cited. The claims of the Spanish queen that the sympathies of Latin-America were with Spain in the Cuban revolt were discounted as "ridiculous," the London Times was quoted to show that in its opinion the last vestige of Spanish colonialism would be swept from the western hemisphere, and the internal strife on the Peninsula was again repeated to show that Spain was powerless to solve the Cuban question.

310 Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), November 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 4.
311 Chicago Record, September 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., December 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
312 Kansas City Journal, August 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
313 Detroit Free Press, April 26, 1896, p. 16, c. 2-3.
314 Indianapolis Journal, May 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
315 Chicago Record, September 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
316 Chicago Tribune, November 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 3-4.
Many unusual arguments were set forth to prove the inevitability of Spanish collapse. In an editorial on "Cuban Horses" one editor seriously maintained, and not without some degree of truth, that the superiority of the Cuban mounts, which were of "mustang origin", would enable the insurgents to outdistance the less hardy and larger animals which the Spanish government was transporting to Cuba for the pursuit of the guerrilla bands into the swamps and mountains. Complete failure was predicted for Spain as the result of a statement made by a distinguished military authority criticizing the methods of the Spanish generals in Cuba. The removal of several thousand troops from Cuba early in 1897, because of wounds and sickness was regarded as "an indication of Spanish defeat" and the decision of the Spanish Government to send a vast army of replacements to Cuba in August 1897 was regarded as an evidence of "Spain's Mad Desperation." On more than one occasion the editors commented with pleasure on Spanish

317 Columbus Evening Dispatch, January 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
319 Cincinnati Times-Star, April 2, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
320 Detroit Free Press, August 31, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
military reverses in the island. 321

During the course of the revolt, the Junta and the press bolstered up the general coterie of arguments martialed to show that Spain could not quell the virus of rebellion by special efforts to prove the failure of the Spanish generals, Campos, Weyler, and Blanco. The regime of Captain-General Campos during the early phase of the revolt of 1895, although comparatively humane, was subjected to much editorial abuse before it was superseded by Weyler's program of devastation in January 1896. Since Campos was recognized as Spain's greatest soldier, his failure to suppress the revolt of 1895 with ease was emphasized by the Junta and generally cited by the press as evidence of Spanish incompetence. 322 Expressions of similar import in the leading French and English papers were quoted to the same end. 323 It was stated that no other

321 Milwaukee Sentinel, October 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
322 Indianapolis Journal, July 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 11, 1896, p. 12, c. 4-5.
323 Detroit Journal, May 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), May 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Columbus Evening Dispatch, July 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2; January 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Indianapolis Journal, October 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., July 24, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Sioux City Journal, November 18, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
324 Cincinnati Times-Star, July 18, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; Detroit Journal, August 24, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
soldier of equal ability could be found to replace Campos whose unwillingness to compromise the military objectives of Spain with the demands of the insurgents for reform, was interpreted as futile. It was asserted that since his failure could not be attributed to lack of men or means, he would become the "scapegoat" for the Conservative government of Spain in its efforts to stave off its decay. To this it later attributed the loss of Cuba, the inevitability of which seemed apparent despite the strength of Spanish arms. After "The Downfall of Campos," one Middle Western editor anticipated that within a few months the flag of free Cuba would be floating over the palace of the Captain-General in Havana.

The inauguration of a more aggressive military policy under General Weyler, who succeeded Campos, was regarded as a

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325 Cleveland Leader, January 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Milwaukee Journal, January 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 26, 1896, p. 28, c. 3.
326 Columbus Evening Dispatch, January 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
327 Detroit Journal, January 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
328 Indianapolis Journal, January 19, 1896, p. 12, c. 2.
329 Ibid., January 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
330 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 28, 1896, p. 6, c. 3-4.
331 Kansas City Times, January 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4.
fatal "new deal" for Spain, "and his methods of the Turk" were regarded as additional assurance of Cuban liberty, since Spain's "challenge to Western civilization" would be accepted. This "challenge" was taken up gladly by the editors of Middle Western newspapers, who quickly entered the battle against Weylerism equipped with editorial concoctions.

Weyler's punishment of the newspaper correspondents who persisted in making reports adverse to the interests of Spain augmented the disposition on the part of many editors to predict his failure. He was therefore depicted as cowardly and his censorship berated in a satirized verse as "Spain's Editor General," the words of which ran:

Oh, put by my sabre, so time stained and rusty;
Its years of labor were few.
My valor clings close to a weapon more trusty;
So bring me my pencil of blue.

'Twere folly to drift with the chances of battle,
Where doubts come in spectral review,

332 Minneapolis Journal, January 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
335 Indianapolis Journal, March 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
When, despising rude war with its flare
and its rattle,
I'm safe with my pencil of blue.

Reports, reputedly received from abroad, were quoted to show
the unreliability of Weyler's own news releases.

The efforts of Weyler to end the revolt through the
famous concentration system was pronounced as barbaric butchery,
and it was claimed that the insurgents would retaliate with
equally brutal tactics. The desire of the new Captain-
General to delay his final campaign until the end of the rainy
season was discredited by an editor who said that the real
reason why "Weyler Extends the Time" was to allow the effects
of his barbarous achievements upon the outside world to wear
off. Weyler claimed that his failure was due to American
encouragement of the insurgents, but this explanation was
regarded by the press as an admission that "he can't cope with
the situation and uses us as an excuse."

The Cincinnati Times-Star thought that such utterances suggested

336 Poem: "Spain's Editor-General," Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 3, 1896, p. 4, o. 3.
337 Cincinnati Times-Star, June 3, 1896, p. 4, o. 3.
339 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 29, 1896, p. 6, o. 3.
340 Kansas City Journal, May 6, 1896, p. 4, o. 2.
341 Cleveland Leader, May 12, 1896, p. 4, o. 2.
failure and that Spanish military losses and the failure of the home government to negotiate a $200,000,000 loan with which to support Weyler's army indicated "the winding up chapters of the affair."  

Early in the winter of 1896, Weyler attempted to fulfill this earlier promise of suppressing the revolt. The press claimed, however, that Weyler had actually been called upon by the Spanish government to suppress the revolt or quit and that, therefore, he had been forced "to take the field" in order to retain his command. The editors awaited the approach of his "decisive campaign" with much skepticism and his return to Havana after a futile offensive against the scattered insurgent bands was followed by numerous 'I told you so' editorials. One of these interpreted his return as a further symbol of defeat and advised the United States to

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342 Cincinnati Times-Star, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
343 Ibid., September 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
344 Chicago Record, November 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., November 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
345 Detroit Free Press, November 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
346 Cincinnati Times-Star, November 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
347 Cincinnati Enquirer, November 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, November 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Milwaukee Journal, November 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
*'Stand by' ready for action,' since the resulting chaotic conditions in Havana would probably necessitate American intervention.

Having made it emphatically clear under the regime of Campos that Spain could not put down the insurrection by "fair" military tactics, the press consistently stated that neither could she hope to do so by "foul" means. Many editors, claimed that Weyler, nevertheless, would next stoop to the methods of "bribing" the Cuban leaders. It was pointed out by the Junta, and the press agreed, that such methods would demoralize the Spanish army. One editor accused Weyler of prolonging the war for reasons of personal profit and an article in the Forum was cited in proof of a similar contention. Weyler was compared by another editor to Iago in Othello, as one who "has increased his personal fortune from many sources and would prefer to see

348 Cincinnati Enquirer, November 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
349 Milwaukee Journal, November 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
350 Sioux City Journal, November 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
351 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
352 Thomas Gold Alvord, Jr., "Is the Cuban Capable of Self Government," Forum, September 1897, XXIV, pp. 119-188.
the war continue."  

Early in 1897, it was stated editorially that the loyalists in Cuba were turning to the side of the insurgents, because they realized that the burden of Weyler's prolonged campaign would result in the virtual confiscation of all property in the island should Spain be victorious in her efforts to suppress the revolt. The press would thus admit nothing save failure for this "modern Duke of Alva," whose corruption was confirmed by "Blanco's Sensational Report" that when Weyler had been recalled he had taken with him not only his staff, but that in order to hide his dishonesty, he had also taken the military archives which were essential to an intelligent continuation of the campaign by his successor.

Weyler's recall was the subject of editorial rumors before the convening of Congress in 1896 and anticipated

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353 Cincinnati Times-Star, February 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
354 Ibid., February 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
355 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, July 1, 1897, p. 6, c. 2;
Ibid., August 17, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
356 Detroit Journal, May 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
357 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November 24, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
358 Indianapolis Journal, November 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
as a future triumph of public opinion against his uncivilized methods of warfare. When he was actually recalled by the Sagasta ministry before the convening of Congress in December, 1897, the fact was regarded as a decided concession to American opinion and as an admission of Spanish retreat. These results had been predicted by the Cincinnati Times-Star which said on the occasion of Weyler's original appointment to replace Campos:

The sending of General Weyler to Cuba to achieve by barbarous methods what General Campos had failed to accomplish by a legitimate kind of warfare was a remarkable act of stupidity. It shows how thick-headed is the Spanish Government and how utterly impervious to the enlightened spirit of the age. If Spain had any statesman of ordinary acumen he would know that an attempt to conquer Cuba by savagery would arouse sympathy in the United States for the insurgents to the point of resentment and fan the flame of popular indignation in America over the hard Spanish rule in Cuba. He would know that the pressure of sentiment in this country would inevitably bring about intervention by the United States in aid of the Cuban patriots....Spain has now been awakened to a realization of the fact that her desperate report to barbarism to regain

359 Ibid., November 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
360 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), December 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
her hold on the island is a failure.\textsuperscript{361}

From the beginning of Weyler's regime the editorial argumentation used to prove his failure was supplemented by abusive cartoons\textsuperscript{362} and poems.\textsuperscript{363} One of the latter predicted Spanish defeat by contrasting her former greatness with her present malady in the following words:

Alas! How low hath been thy fall  
Oh, land of noble ghosts!  
On history's page we may recall  
Thy mighty men and hosts;  
But now thy pigmies creep about  
Unknown in deed or name—  
Gonsalvo to a Campos droops,  
The Cid to Weyler—shame! \textsuperscript{364}

The substitution of Blanco for Weyler and the passing at sea of the ships which returned Weyler to the Peninsula which carried Blanco to the Caribbean, inspired another son of Clio to write:

\textsuperscript{361} Cincinnati \textit{Times-Star}, February 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{362} \textit{Ibid.}, March 7, 1896, p. 1, c. 4-6; \textit{Ibid.}, April 2, 1896, p. 1, c. 3; May 13, 1897, p. 1, c. 4-7.
\textsuperscript{363} See poems by unidentified authors as follows: "Weyler Unmasked," Columbus \textit{Evening Dispatch}, September 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; "The Sultan Wants Weyler," \textit{Ibid.}, October 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; "Decadent Weyler," Cleveland \textit{Plain Dealer}, February 18, 1897, p. 4, c. 5; "The Weyler and the Fly," \textit{Ibid.}, May 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 5.
From Spain to Cuba, from Cuba to Spain,
The generals passed on the rolling main-
The thrifty butcher to store his swag
The genteel soldier to buy and brag.

Editorials equally as caustic as the poetic insinuation just given, accompanied the arrival of Blanco in Cuba. His plan to "purchase" the loyalty of the insurgent generals was denounced by the American press, and a report that he had drawn $380,000 from the Bank of Havana with which to purchase the Cuban leaders in Santa Clara province was referred to as proof of his personal depravity and military incompetency.366 And to show that Blanco would also fail the Junta published a letter to that effect written by General Gomez just two weeks before the mysterious sinking of the Maine.367 With that event the Junta and the press had something much more visceral upon which to base their attack.

To make Spanish failure even more apparent the Junta and the press seized every opportunity to emphasize the inevitability of Spanish collapse because of political chaos and

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365 Poem: "To and From Cuba," author unknown, Columbus Evening Dispatch, October 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
366 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 28, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
367 Ibid., February 3, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
economic bankruptcy at home. To prove this, magazine articles, the testimony of important personages, reports of "Cuban backfire in Spain," the defeat of the Carlists in national elections, historical precedent, Spanish corruption and Spanish bankruptcy, the change of ministries in 1897, and the opinion of American writers were all cited. Spain was described as the "sick man of Europe," whose

368 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), November 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
369 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
370 Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 4; Ibid., August 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
372 Cleveland Leader, December 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
373 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
374 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
375 Milwaukee Journal, June 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., June 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
377 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
disintegration, it was said, was especially symbolized by the assassination of Premier Canovas. And an editorial entitled, "Spain's Weakness Our Opportunity," revealed to what extent the American press rejoiced in that weakness. Occasionally, unfavorable comparisons were made between the relative merits of the fleets of the United States and Spain. One editor predicted the internal collapse of Spain during "The Ides of March," and curiously enough this appeared on the same day that the notorious De Lome Letter was released to the press by the Cuban Junta. But, the most telling editorial argumentation predicting Spanish defeat because of her internal "crisis" was brought to a grand finale by strumming the discordant strings of Spanish "bankruptcy."

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378 Milwaukee Journal, October 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., October 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Milwaukee Sentinel, October 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
379 Chicago Times-Herald, August 9, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
380 Ibid., November 22, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
381 Cincinnati Times-Star, November 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 6, 1898, p. 12, c. 2.
382 Ibid., February 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
383 Minneapolis Journal, July 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2; Milwaukee Journal, August 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Times-Star, August 29, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., September 28, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Nebraska
Through the vehicle of the American press the Cuban Revolutionary Party also received "moral support" from the circulation of Spanish atrocity stories. These were prevalent in the general comment on the Cuban question during the first year of the revolt and the theory of Spanish depravity was developed through them as the revolt continued. Many of the editors' reaction to these stories implied that civilization had progressed beyond the stage of barbarism, and many of them regarded Spain's treatment of Cuba as a sort of political activism in their unconscious application of the Darwinian hypothesis to the anticipated millennium.

State Journal (Lincoln), May 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, June 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; January 2, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; April 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Indianapolis Journal, December 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Free Press, March 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), August 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.

384 Chicago Times-Herald, April 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., June 8, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2.
385 Ibid., July 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3.
386 Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
388 It should be of some significance in this connection to note that Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, which was published in 1889, reached the height of its popularity in the mid-nineties.
It was natural, therefore, that American writers\(^\text{389}\) and
the editors of Middle Western newspapers\(^\text{390}\) should lament
the "extermination" of the Cubans by the gruesome methods
allegedly used by the Spanish troops. And despite the fact
that Dupuy De Lome pointed out in a letter to the editor of
Harper's Weekly that the press was none too diligent in its
search for the truth with regard to these stories,\(^\text{391}\) such
protests had little effect on editorial attitude with regard
to them. One editor was candid enough to admit that Spanish
atrocities were "exaggerated", but hastened to add that "for
all of that it will have a good effect for Cuba."\(^\text{392}\) Another
confessed that the pro-Cuban accounts of Spain's uncivilised
warfare "must be taken with many grains of allowance," but
continued:

> The war is a war of extermination and
annihilation, of savagery and butchery,
and its getting to be high time for the
United States to intervene in the

\(^{389}\) Clarence King, "Shall Cuba Be Free?", Forum, September
1895, XX, pp. 50-65.

\(^{390}\) Chicago Times-Herald, September 24, 1895, p. 6, c. 3;
Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.

\(^{391}\) Harper's Weekly, August 1895, XXXIX, pp. 821.

\(^{392}\) Columbus Evening Dispatch, November 22, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
Most of the editors, therefore, agreed with the statement of
the Chicago *Times-Herald*, which said that "Spain is rapidly
furnishing reason to be called the China of the West." On
a previous occasion it had remarked: "Cuba may be the
'brightest jewel in the crown of Spain.' But at this distance
it looks like a cinder in the little king's eye." And even
before the advent of Weyler, the editors made it appear that
Spain had indeed become a mote in the eye of Uncle Sam, for as
we shall presently see, the atrocious deeds attributed to that
"bloviating" Spaniard caused a blinding inflammation of the
Uncle's vision.

The inauguration of Weyler's concentration decrees in the
early part of 1896 gave the *Junta* and the disgruntled Cuban
newspaper correspondents an opportunity to feed the American
editors with tangible proof of Spanish brutality. Henceforth,
Weyler became the living symbol of all that was low and

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393 *Kansas City Times*, December 27, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.
394 *Chicago Times-Herald*, October 1, 1895, p. 6, c. 1.
Even the fund voted by the Cortes for his campaign was referred to as "A Budget of Blood," and one editor conjectured that the American people would welcome open friction with Spain because of her uncivilized methods of warfare and thought the annexation of Cuba was none too severe punishment for its continuation. Others reflected general disgust at Weyler's alleged terrorism and many urged intervention through force or the more peaceful means of recognizing Cuban belligerency.

Whenever possible, the editors bolstered up their general arguments against Spanish atrocities by reference to specific
incidents associated with Weyler's method of warfare. Accordingly, the trooha was denounced, the harrowing incidents related in the Senate by Sherman and Barrows were cited, and the merciless shooting of non-combatant Cubans in Matanza province became the subject of editorial notation.

But editorial comment on Cuban atrocities was based partially on the accounts of Cuban correspondents of American newspapers. Murat Halstead of the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune was the author of several stories, while William E. Curtis of the Chicago Record circulated others. Upon Weyler's expulsion of the correspondents of the New York Journal and the New York Herald, a Middle Western editor was stimulated to remark that this action had been taken because

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400 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 4-5; Milwaukee Journal, December 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
401 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
402 Detroit Journal, March 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., May 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
403 Sioux City Journal, April 5, 1896, p. 12, c. 2.
404 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
405 Chicago Record, April 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
Weyler feared to have the truth with regard to his regime told in the United States. 406 The atrocity stories of James Creelman 407 and Charles Govin were frequently illustrated in gruesome detail by sketches drawn from descriptions "by eye witnesses." 408 A "reliable" correspondent told the story of how:

In one town a woman, with a baby in arms, was bayoneted because she declined to give a soldier a cup of water. In another town a woman resented an insult and forthwith was accused of treason. She was tried, convicted and shot. 409

Another paper carried an editorial on Weyler's atrocious treatment of "a minister of the gospel and an American citizen," while the numerous accounts of the death of General Maceo were accompanied by editorial accusations of barbarity. 411 A typical

407 Ibid., May 20, 1896, p. 6, c. 3-4.
408 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, September 18, 1896, p. 1, c. 4-7.
410 Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
411 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, August 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Omaha Daily Bee, December 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., February 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Cincinnati Times-Star, December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 26, p. 12, c. 3-4.
editorial on "What Spanish Brutality Betrays" gave the morbid
details of the death of Maceo and the son of Gomes who had
died defending his general's body.412

It is not difficult also to trace the hand of Estrada
Palma and the Cuban Junta413 in many of the atrocity stories
circulated in the newspapers and that the Junta was satisfied
with the editorial results of its atrocity campaign is shown
in a telegram which on one occasion Palma sent to a Middle
Western editor. The message ran:

We congratulate you and the people of
the West for the noble stand you have
taken, and we sincerely hope that your
efforts on our behalf will be fruitful, as
the cause of Cuba is the cause of free-
dom. No wonder that it should excite
the universal sympathy of liberty-loving
Americans.414

The efforts of the Junta to capitalize on the sympathy thus
aroused is also shown in press reaction to a Cuban carnival
held for the benefit of the insurgents at Madison Square Garden

412 Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 8.
413 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 29, 1896, p. 12, c. 3-4;
Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 2;
Ibid., December 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
414 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, December 15, 1896, p. 4,
c. 2.
in May, 1896.

Press opposition to Spanish atrocities and Weyler, their perpetrator, did not subside during 1897. Other cases of barbarism were recited, statistics of atrocious murders were paraded, and confirmed by official testimony of various kinds. The general comment on the Cuban question was also filled with editorial indignation at the inhuman treatment of the insurgents and others at the hands of Weyler, "the butcher." Editors protested the shooting of captives and

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416 Infra., II, pp. 142-146.
417 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 2, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; December 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Detroit Journal, February 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
418 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., February 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; May 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; May 14, 1897, p. 1, c. 1-2 and 4-5; September 20, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-4; Louisville Courier Journal, January 13, 1897, p. 5, c. 1-2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, October 8, 1897, p. 6, c. 1.
419 Detroit Journal, January 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., March 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Cleveland Leader, February 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 8; Indianapolis Journal, April 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 3-4; Cincinnati Times-Star, April 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 3-4; Louisville Courier-Journal, June 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Chicago Tribune, July 27, 1897, p. 6, c. 4.
non-combatants without trial and the pending execution of General Rivera, captured insurgent leader, was denounced by the press, the Junta and Congress. One paper became infuriated upon a report made by Consul-General Lee concerning an incident in which an American citizen had been thrown in prison and denied the essential comforts of life for merely possessing "Cuban postage stamps." Another story depicted the sale of ten Cuban orphans at public auction by a Spanish colonel. The majority of the captives were described as girls between the age of ten and fourteen and the bidding was reported as "lively," the buyers being mostly "women of low repute." The oldest of the victims, "a beautiful Cuban girl of fourteen summers," was said to have been bid off by a "woman who is known throughout Cuba." Of similar import the story was told of how "A woman whose beauty inflamed the lust of a General, and whose virtue aroused his hatred, was thrown into prison in company with the vilest of her sex, by

420 Cincinnati Times-Star. January 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
421 Cleveland Plain Dealer. April 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Paul Pioneer Press. April 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.
422 Cleveland Leader. March 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
423 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune. February 21, 1897, p. 12, c. 1-2.
her baffled persecutor....424

After reading such accounts in the papers, it is not strange that we find a provincial poet writing thus of Weyler:

Of Tokat's massacre he dreamed;
Smiles played upon his lips
And little thrills of strange delight
Coursed to his finger tips.

He woke and then recalled his dream,
Fierce Moslem's bloody work,
And murmured, 'Were I not of Spain,
I'd like to be a Turk!'425

The most noted case of the atrocious abuse of Cuban womanhood at the hands of Spanish troops was that of the imprisonment of Evangelina Cisneros, daughter of the president of the de facto Cuban government. The story ran that she had been detained following her resentment of the insults of a Spanish officer. The reports of her rescue by Karl Decker, Cuban correspondent of the New York Journal and the accounts of her mistreatment in the meantime were so exaggerated, however, by the New York papers that Middle Western editors for the most part showed a growing suspicion of the devices of Eastern journalism and tended to discount its veracity.

424 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, August 21, 1897, p. 12, c. 4.
425 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
For this reason one editor thought De Lome's rebuke of the "yellow press" for its sensational exploitation of the Cisneros case was well "deserved," but, this did not prevent the editor of this paper from showing the usual disgust at Spanish barbarity symbolized in the reports of the case. Another editor feared that Senorita Cisneros might be "caught and crushed between the wheels of New York journalism" and thought her proposed rescue by Decker was "unlikely." But when accomplished this was hailed by a more jingoistic paper from the same state as a triumph for journalism.

Quite in contrast was the reaction of the Louisville Courier-Journal, which on one occasion blamed the New England Junta for the circulation of a story telling about the cremation of a whole Cuban family in a sugar hogshead. More specifically it said:

We have 'supped on horrors' chiefly from Tampa, but also from Jacksonville.
Chattanooga, Oakosh and Kalamazoo, from which have come long cables with accounts of Spanish atrocities which put to blush the most agonizing incidents in the 'Book of Martyrs' or the woeful 'Adventures of Captain Riley.' The farther away from Havana the stories are dated, the more incandescent they grow. Not all great Neptune's ocean can wash away the blood with which the correspondents have inundated the journals, but it is notable that most of the work had been done a safe distance from the seat of war.431

Even the statements made by the released prisoners of the Competitor failed to allay the atrocity stories of the American press. This fact stimulated one Middle Western editor to write that "falsehood and misrepresentation" had been resorted to by the friends of Cuba to make it appear that Spanish rule in Cuba was barbarous.432 Journalism's misrepresentations were also reflected in a pertinent verse on "The Fall of Weyler," which wondered what would become of the special correspondents after his recall.433

Despite a tendency on the part of certain editors to

431 Louisville Courier-Journal, January 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 3-4.
432 Cleveland Leader, November 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
433 Poem: "The Fall of Weyler," author unknown, Cleveland Leader, October 9, 1897, p. 12, c. 5.
assert their own individuality and independence of the yellow journals of the East, the general comment on the subject of Spanish atrocities showed that most of them, nevertheless, had fallen victims of their own desires and those of the Cuban Junta, by placing Spain in a bad light and an analysis of this comment revealed the evolution of suggestions for the editorial solution of the Cuban question on that account. 434

Atrocity stories during 1898 continued to be circulated through editorials, 435 cartoons 436 and poems. 437 Even as late as 1899 the deplorable conditions of Cuba after the war

434 See for example: Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; June 6, 1897, p. 12, c. 1-2; August 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., September 21, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; October 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Saint Louis Republic, December 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.

435 Detroit Free Press, January 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, January 14, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., January 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; February 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; February 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Indianapolis Sentinel, March 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Louisville Times, March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Times-Star, April 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-3; Ibid., April 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-3; Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

436 Columbus Evening Dispatch, January 20, 1898, p. 1; Ibid., March 25, 1898, p. 1.

437 Detroit Journal, August 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
were attributed to the atrocious operation of Weyler's
decrees and, of course, Spanish atrocities were mentioned
prominently in the editorial rationalization of the war of
1898.

But the Junta did not depend entirely on the exploit-
ation of the facilities of a friendly American press to bring
about "moral" support for the insurgent cause. On the island,
insurgent propaganda was distributed through a number of
newspapers; it reached the United States through El Porvenir,
which was published in New York and given wide circulation along
the Atlantic seaboard, from where its accounts of the progress
of the revolution were frequently cited by American editors.

The Junta also engaged in a campaign of propaganda
pamphleteering that did not subside until its mission had been
fulfilled. Some of these pamphlets were written by members

438
Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 23, 1899, p. 4, c. 1-2.
439
Infra., IV, pp. 305-310.
440
Thomas W. Steep, "Cuban Insurgent Newspapers," National
Magazine, May 1898, VIII, pp. 147-150. These papers included
El Cubano Libre, near Caye del Rey; Boletín de la Guerra, in
Camaguey; La Republica and La Sanidad, in Las Villas; and La
Independencia, at Manzanillo.
of the Junta in the United States and elsewhere. Others were written by sympathetic Americans or consisted of pro-Cuban speeches made by American leaders or pro-Cuban articles written by American authors which were reprinted in pamphlet form for the propaganda purposes of the Junta. In this manner the American people were given pro-Cuban pictures of the Cuban situation in concentrated form. By such methods the editors of the Middle Western newspapers, were gradually brought to consider the possibilities of solving the Cuban question.

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The frequent allusions to the political factors involved in the Cuban question made incidentally in the foregoing

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See for example, Clarence King's article, "Shall Cuba Be Free?" Op. cit., as reprinted in pamphlet form by the Junta, n. p., c. 1895.
discussion, suggests the important part such considerations played in the evolution of editorial policy on the Cuban problem. These factors, true to the workings of the American political system, were closely related not only to the national interests embodied in the doctrine of "manifest destiny," to Spain's alleged violations of these interests, and to the propaganda activities of the Junta, but were also manifestations of and related to the enlightened self-interests of party politics reflected in the conflicting trends of American foreign policy during the 1890's. These conflicts involved a struggle in the American ideology between the dogma of traditional isolation espoused by the Democrats, and the new dogma of triumphant imperialism adopted by the Republicans. This conflict was naturally accentuated by events in Cuba, the editorial comment on which revealed a degree of political bias almost from the beginning of the insurrection. Let us look at the facts.

As early as midsummer 1895, representative Republican editors recognized the political implications of the Cuban question. Accordingly, they took every opportunity to criticize Cleveland's attitude toward the Cuban revolt. The
President's official neutrality was condemned as pro-Spanish\textsuperscript{446} and, although his positive demands for the settlement of the Mora Claim pursuant to the \textit{Alliance} affair were generally approved, opposition editors for political reasons accused Cleveland of selfish motives. One of them maintained, for example, that:

\begin{quote}
\textit{...The claims had been parcelled out among a coterie of New York lawyers—among them such close friends of the President as William R. Grace, Charles R. Flint, and Cleveland's law partner, Francis L. Stetson.}\textsuperscript{447}
\end{quote}

One Republican editor depicted the political potentialities of a more vigorous Cuban policy in a cartoon which represented Uncle Sam standing spraddle-legged over the narrow waters separating the coast of Florida from Cuba. The stars and stripes were shown waving symbolically in the Cuban breeze while the caption beneath boasted "What Uncle Sam Would Do If We Had Another Sort of Administration."\textsuperscript{448} Other editors insisted on the recognition of Cuban belligerency and attacked

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{446} \textit{Detroit Journal}, August 8, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{447} \textit{Kansas City Journal}, August 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.  \\
\textsuperscript{448} \textit{Cincinnati Times-Star}, August 30, 1895, p. 1, c. 2-4.
\end{flushright}
the administration for not granting it. Cleveland's reference to Cuba in his annual Message to Congress in December 1895, was denounced for its "patronizing, now-my-children sort of way" and for its rebuke to "natural sympathy" of the American people for Cuba. One editor, in a lengthy discussion warned the President concerning the political consequences of such "cold" statesmanship, for through such methods the Republicans hoped to evolve an issue with which to supplant the party in power.

Even a portion of the Democratic editors showed dissatisfaction with Cleveland's Cuban policy. Typical was the view of the Cincinnati Enquirer, which advised the State Democratic Conventions of 1895 to put in their platforms "a plank of good, sound American doctrine," consisting, among other things, of an expression of "sympathy" for the Cuban patriots. Aside from its political importance such a policy, the Enquirer also justified it on the grounds of "national honor" and "self-

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449 Cleveland Leader, September 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
450 Kansas City Journal, December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
451 Iowa State Register (Des Moines), December 4, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2.
452 Cincinnati Times-Star, December 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
453 Cincinnati Enquirer, June 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
preservation."\textsuperscript{454} Eventually this paper became so disgusted
with the lack of "Americanism" in Cleveland Cuban policy that
it was willing to boost Governor McKinley for the Presidential
nomination on the Republican ticket. In analyzing the
situation it said:

\begin{quote}
\textit{...A vigorous and patriotic foreign
policy...} (is) the question which the
Republicans will seek to put forward
in Congress next winter...\textit{Of course
Congress will not accomplish anything}....
Mr. Cleveland will stand in the way....
But the Republican leaders will not want
results. They will be delighted to have
the question kept open for the purpose
of their Presidential campaign.\textsuperscript{455}
\end{quote}

The subsequent debates in Congress on the Cuban question showed
that such was the case, and it goes without saying that the
\textit{Enquirer} was disappointed with the President's meagre reference
to that issue in his annual message to the fifty-fifth
Congress.\textsuperscript{456} Even the Omaha \textit{World-Herald}, which at that time
professed allegiance to the objective realm of Independent
journalism, claimed that the President was out of step with

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{454} \textit{Ibid.}, October 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
\textsuperscript{455} \textit{Ibid.}, July 5, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
\textsuperscript{456} \textit{Ibid.}, December 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; December 4, 1895,
p. 4, c. 1-3.
\end{flushleft}
popular sentiment on the Cuban issue. 457

The editorial comment of 1895, however, was but a preface to the Presidential election of 1896 and the fact that the Cuban question was regarded as politically significant for the approaching campaign of that year was reflected in the long debates which the deluge of Cuban resolutions evoked in the first session of the fifty-fourth Congress. Although the Senate and the House resolutions differed in the method proposed, all of them were designed to answer the popular demand for American aid to the insurgents, while most of them embodied the central theme of granting belligerent rights to the de facto Cuban government.

The details of the Congressional debates on these various resolutions have already been adequately treated, 458 and it will not be necessary to repeat them here in order to indicate their political implications. The first concrete result of these debates was a concurrent resolution recognizing a state

of war existed in Cuba. Although adopted by the Senate on February 28, 1896, and approved by the House on April 16th, this was stubbornly ignored by Cleveland as a mere expression of Congressional sentiment. Suffice it to say, however, the Republican editors in editorial and cartoon took the opportunity of criticizing his deafness to "the voice of the people." Cried the editor of the Sioux City Journal "Oh, for an hour of Jackson or Lincoln! Oh, for a president with a larger heart and a smaller head!"

Among the Democratic papers, the more discerning editors lamented the "new departure" that the congressional debates on foreign affairs signalized, and accused the Republicans of introducing the pro-Cuban resolutions for the purpose of embarrassing the Democratic administration. The Cincinnati

459 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
460 Ibid., April 8, 1896, p. 1, c. 3-5.
461 Cincinnati Times-Star, March 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., April 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
462 Sioux City Journal, April 26, 1896, p. 12, c. 1.
464 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 12, c. 2.
Enquirer thought it recognised the hand of Senator Lodge in similar resolutions adopted by the Massachusetts Republican Convention. It suggested that "John Sherman might be out for President on a platform of 'free Cuba'." and warned the Democrats that "For any delay in complying with the will of the American people, as expressed by their representatives, the President will be held to strict account by the people of this country."

But President Cleveland could not be held accountable to anything except his own conscience, and the National Democratic Convention which met at Chicago early in July, 1896, got only a weak plank indicating the party's "sympathy" for the insurgents' struggle for freedom and independence despite the fact that many of the delegates had gone to Chicago with stronger Cuban resolutions in mind.

The National Republican Convention, however, meeting previously at Saint Louis in mid-June, readily adopted a Cuban

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466 Ibid., March 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
467 Ibid., March 4, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
468 Louisville Courier-Journal, July 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3.
plank embodying almost identically what the proposed Democratic plank had contained. Perhaps the conservative party of America was staking its chances of victory on putting forward the issue of Cuba and the tariff in order to divert the ominous clouds of radical reform which they saw gathering in the West. But during the closing hours of the Chicago Convention the Republicans suddenly discovered that they would be forced to subordinate their sham political offensive to a vigorous defensive against the enemies of Bryanism and free silver. Consequently, the issues of Cuba and the tariff did not figure as prominently in the campaign as they might otherwise have done. A few of the Republican editors had predicted as much before the platforms were defined; and speaking for the Democrats, Henry Watterson pointed out with his usual sagacity that while the politicians were willing enough to plunge the country into war for Cuba, they were "not willing to risk the loss of any votes upon

470 Kansas City Journal, May 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Milwaukee Sentinel, June 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., June 21, 1896, p. 18, c. 1.
the issue." The deletion of the Cuban issue per se from
the Campaign of 1896 is further evident from the conspicuous
absence of editorial comment on the subject until after the
election, and by the fact that Republican editors used
Weyler's "flat dollar" and inflationary measures in Cuba as
a basis of attack on free silver rather than as an indication
of Spain's financial desperation in attempting to suppress
the revolt.

But the responsibility which accompanied the victory of
the Republican party in 1896 had a sobering effect upon its
Cuban policy. The writings of Republican editors and the
correspondence of Republican leaders also indicated a fear
that the Democrats might attempt to embarrass McKinley
precisely as the Republicans had embarrassed Cleveland. Even
the outgoing president became subtly aggressive in his last

471 Louisville Courier-Journal, July 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3.
472 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), September 20, 1896, p. 4,
c. 2-3; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), September 25,
1896, p. 4, c. 2.
473 Chicago Tribune, November 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid.,
December 3, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; December 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3;
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, November 22, 1896, p. 12, c. 2;
annual message to Congress and suggested that "the time might come" when the United States should be obligated to interfere in the Cuban situation. The Republican editors weakly insisted that the time was already at hand while secretly hoping that Cleveland would be persuaded to pull the Cuban chestnut out of the fire for their party. Of course, they expressed dissatisfaction with Cleveland's message to Congress, but before the inauguration of McKinley they indicated their implicit confidence in the latter's ability to handle the situation in a manner truly American and consistent with their previous professions.

This sudden change in the attitude of the Republican press in its effort "to cut in ahead of sober public opinion" was noted and the editors tried to explain away their...

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475 See references in note 473.
476 Chicago Tribune, December 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, December 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Kansas City Journal, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Journal, December 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Iowa State Register (Des Moines), December 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Times-Star, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
477 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 10, 1897, p. 2, c. 2.
reversal of positions on the Cuban question in confused rationalizations.

Independent papers also recognised this shift in the Republican position and the Democratic editors adopted the attitude formerly held by their opponents by demanding a vigorous Cuban policy.

In the meantime the Republican leaders tried desperately to force the onus of settling the Cuban question upon the retiring president. Senator Lodge visited the president-elect at Canton apparently with the aim of facilitating that end and at the beginning of Cleveland's last Congress Senator Cameron of Pennsylvania laid a resolution before his

478 Loc. cit., c. 3.

479 Chicago Record, December 4, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; January 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.

480 Milwaukee Journal, January 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, December 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., December 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; January 5, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2; January 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; January 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; January 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; January 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; February 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, December 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Free Press, November 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.

his colleagues calling for the recognition of Cuban independence. If passed this could have produced no result save war, but fortunately, it was modified so as to offer to Spain the friendly services of the United States in ending the Cuban revolt.\footnote{482}

Seeing that the time was indeed ripe for such a political move, the Junta, for reasons of its own, seized the opportunity to manufacture more atrocity stories, to hold additional "Sympathy Meetings," and to assist the politicians in whatever way it could in the efforts to force the issue to a crisis. Members of the Cuban "Legation" in Washington appealed to leading Republican senators\footnote{483} and it showered other members of Congress with propaganda pamphlets.\footnote{484}

But despite the concerted efforts of the Junta and the Republicans to bring the Cuban question to a climax before the inauguration of McKinley, President Cleveland would not abandon his position of official neutrality.

\footnote{482} Congressional Record, 54 Cong., 2 Sess. XXIX. Pt. 1, p. 39, December 9, 1898.
\footnote{484} See the Hoels Collection of the Junta's pamphlets in the Library of Congress.
We have already noted the moderation in the tone of the Republican press after the election of 1896 and following McKinley's accession to the White House its comments were equally cautious and conservative while it patiently waited for the new president to formulate his Cuban policy.

On the other hand, the more bellicose note which has already been observed among the Democratic editors, after the defeat of their party in 1896, was further evident in their comment on McKinley's inauguration and their editorial

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486 Loc. cit.
487 Kansas City Journal, March 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 8;
Milwaukee Sentinel, April 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2;
Indianapolis Journal, May 18, 1897, p. 4, c. 2;
Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2;
Ibid., May 18, 1897, p. 4, c. 2;
May 20, 1897, p. 1, c. 3-7; May 28, 1897, p. 1, c. 3-7;
Ohio State Journal (Columbus), June 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 3;
Ibid., June 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 1;
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3;
Ibid., May 20, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2;
May 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2;
June 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2;
September 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; October 11, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
488 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2;
Cincinnati Enquirer, March 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2;
Minneapolis Journal, March 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
discussion of the Cuban question during the months which followed. An explanation for this may be found in the statement of the Milwaukee Journal

which said:

Not so long ago it was the office of the Republican organs and the Cleveland baiters to abuse the administration for its course toward Cuba. It was accused of cowardice, hard heartedness and indifference, the demand for immediate recognition of Cuba, for war ships and gun powder. The Republican platform in effect decided with the extremists. Up to the 4th of March, many Republicans were for this kind of a program....Up to that time it was the other fellow's fight. But not a change has come over the scene. Responsibility has brought sobriety.

A little later the Cincinnati Enquirer, its jingoism increasing directly in proportion to its freedom from responsibility, criticised the president's "Fooling On the Cuban Question."

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Milwaukee Journal, March 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., April 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2;

Detroit Free Press, May 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., May 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; August 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 22, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., May 22, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Louisville Courier-Journal, May 22, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., May 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; January 27, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.

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Milwaukee Journal, March 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.

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Cincinnati Enquirer, May 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
and the Louisville Courier-Journal put the situation to the Republicans in the following embarrassing questions:

What do the Republicans mean by their procrastinating policy on this question? They were incessant and savage in their criticism of the Cleveland Administration for a similar policy. Have they neither courage nor consistency now that it devolves upon them to act instead of criticize? 492

The answer was obvious.

Some explanation of the ambiguity of the McKinley policy may be found in the domestic circumstances existing after the election in 1896. In this connection it should not be forgotten, that the narrow escape from defeat at the hands of the Bryanites must have unsettled the conservatives more than they were willing to admit. Above all, it should not be overlooked that the difficulty of the struggle by the Republicans in 1896 to regain the power which they had inherited as one of the legacies of the Civil War made them realise what might happen when the suggestive thinking of men like Henry George 493

492 Louisville Courier-Journal, May 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
493 Henry George's Progress and Poverty was still widely read at this time.
and Edward Bellamy was harnessed to a political dynamo such as Bryan symbolized. This "nationalist" movement, as it was earlier called, though suffering a temporary setback, was therefore still alive and potentially dangerous. Then too, in addition to the Cuban question, there remained the tariff and the currency questions and the all-important task of stimulating the rapid return of business prosperity which Hanna had promised during the campaign.

So on the domestic policies of the Republicans, as on their Cuban position, the victory of 1896 had sobering effects. Senator Chandler, even two months before the election, had predicted as much. Writing for the *North American Review*, he had said:

> The time of trial of the Republican party will come after its approaching victory. It will then be in order to determine whether it is the slave of the rich capitalists, of the promoters of trusts and monopolies, and the bloated bondholders, as the Bryan Democrats...and the Populists will

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494 Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, as pointed out elsewhere, was reaching the height of its popularity during this period.

content. Its mission just now is to prevent repudiators, Anarchists, Socialists and other enemies of organised society from achieving the first success in the work of tearing down the whole social fabric upon which rests the peace and prosperity of our country.496

As Chandler had predicted, Bryan refused to accept the results of the campaign as a final settlement, either of radical social reform or of the money question.497

For these reasons, the Republicans must have looked with apprehension toward the future campaigns of 1899 and 1900. Judging, therefore, from these considerations, the declaration of the Saint Louis Convention of 1896,498 and the events which ended with the Spanish-American War, the attitude of the Republicans on the Cuban question was a by-product of the American party battle.

Suffice it to say McKinley found himself in an embarrassing


498 Henry Litchfield West, "From the Political Point of View," Forum, October 1898, XXVI, pp. 168-169.
dilemma on March 4, 1897. As leader of the Republican party he was pledged to prosperity if not necessarily to peace, and his main difficulty arose over the proper selection of methods to achieve the former and preserve the latter. His peaceful attitude toward Spain, between the date of his election in 1896 and his inauguration, his cautious omittance of the Cuban matter from his inaugural address, and the Fabian tactics which he pursued with regard to the Cuban revolt prior to midsummer, 1897, indicate that he was attempting to solve this dilemma through peaceful means. This policy was approved by the American business men who had been instrumental in putting McKinley in office and who professed to agree with his policy because they feared that friction with Spain over the Cuban question would lead to the disruption of commercial enterprise.

Be that as it may, events in the meantime had been taking place which made it impossible for the President to delay longer. Cuban resolutions had been debated in Congress, the Junta and the Democratic editors had been busy with their pamphlets and propaganda, Theodore Roosevelt, ardently pro-Cuban, had

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been made an Assistant Secretary in the Navy Department, Consul General Lee had requested the presence of battleships in Havana harbor to protect American life and property, and widespread famine was reported throughout Cuba.

Therefore, when Congress adjourned in June and the rainy season began in Cuba, McKinley took the opportunity to define his Cuban policy although still "divided between his desire for peace and the fact that a pacific policy would be unpopular and politically dangerous." He had already temporized by sending a commission to investigate conditions on the island and by asking Congress to vote $50,000 for the relief of American citizens stranded in Cuba. In July, however, he sent General Stewart L. Woodford to Spain with a letter of instruction which defined, for the first time, the official attitude of the Republican administration toward the Cuban question. The essence of McKinley's letter contained a demand for the termination of the Cuban insurrection and the granting of some sort of autonomy to the Cubans. But, unlike the Cleveland policy, it failed to make the United States responsible for securing the desired results.

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501 Ibid., p. 80.
A number of disconcerting things happened, however, before Woodford reached Madrid and the Spanish government could reply to McKinley's demands. Conservative leader, Canovas had been assassinated and succeeded by the more liberal and conciliatory Sagasta. The rescue of Evangellina Cisneros had received due attention by American newspaper editors, and Theodore Roosevelt had taken "precautionary" naval measures in case Spain decided to fight instead of comply with our demands. Nevertheless, on October 23rd Sagasta answered in a note which amounted to complete acceptance of McKinley's position. Weyler would be recalled and the more humane General Blanco would be sent out to Cuba to end the insurrection and inaugurate a program of autonomy.

But despite the fact that the administration press seemed to be satisfied with the President's Cuban policy, the insurgents, the Junta and the Democratic editors showed

502 Kansas City Journal, December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Journal, January 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Saint Louis Globe Democrat, February 10, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3; et al.


504 Minneapolis Journal, December 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 22, 1898, p. 1, c. 2-3; Ibid., January 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
that they would not accept autonomy as a solution of the Cuban question.

In the meantime, the President had (on December 24, 1897) followed his provision of relief to American citizens in Cuba with the proclamation which extended "charitable relief" to the suffering Cubans. On humanitarian grounds, both the administration and the opposition papers gave their approval of this course. Only occasionally did a Democratic editor perceive that McKinley had ulterior motives of a political nature in his pacific handling of the Cuban problem. But undoubtedly McKinley did have political motives in sending the U.S.S. Maine to Havana harbor in order to protect American life and property which Consul-General Lee claimed was threatened by the "riots" of the anti-Autonomists.

505 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 4; Ibid., December 30, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Detroit Journal, January 27, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Indianapolis Journal, March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 6, 1898, p. 12, c. 1-2; Ibid., March 7, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Cleveland Leader, March 20, 1898, p. 6, c. 4; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

506 Detroit Free Press, December 28, 1897, p. 12, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.

507 Indianapolis Sentinel, March 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
For the moment, however, it appeared that prosperity might continue its gradual return uninterrupted by serious difficulties over the Cuban crisis. But McKinley had not reckoned with "fate" or the connivance of the Cuban Junta. And as we shall see later, the reaction of the editors of Middle Western newspapers to each of these imponderables was not devoid of political bias.

From the foregoing data it would appear that between 1895 and 1898 there were at least four factors which contributed to the development of editorial policy on the Cuban question. These were the fundamental interests of the United States in the economic, military, political and humanitarian implications of "manifest destiny", Spanish violations of these interests, the incessant propaganda of the Junta (carried on through the medium of the press and other vehicles), and the partisan manner in which the Cuban question became involved in American politics.

An analysis of editorial comment on these factors show that some solution of the Cuban question would be favored by all the interested parties. But it was difficult indeed to

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Infra, III, pp. 245 ff. and 258 ff.
find a solution which would satisfy all concerned. The
reaction of the editors to some of the proposed methods has
already been indicated incidental to the foregoing discussion.
Others were enumerated by McKinley in his annual message to
Congress in 1897 and included in addition to autonomous reforms
some form of recognition or intervention. There were, however,
a number of other solutions which were suggested ranging all
the way from strict neutrality to a war of conquest. All these
proposals received the editorial consideration of Middle Western
newspapers and we shall now turn our attention to a more
systematic analysis of these various proposals for the solution
of the Cuban question.
CHAPTER III

EDITORIAL SOLUTIONS OF THE CUBAN QUESTION

The factors which contributed to the development of editorial policy on the Cuban question naturally stimulated the editorial consideration of a wide variety of proposals for its solution. These included neutrality, purchase, arbitration, recognition of belligerency or independence, autonomy through diplomacy, charitable relief to American citizens and the Cuban patriots and intervention through war. These solutions fall logically under three categories and for purposes of analysis they have been grouped under the appropriate headings of non-intervention, peaceful intervention and intervention by force of arms. Non-intervention involved the plan to purchase Cuba from Spain and the policy of official neutrality. Peaceful intervention included the methods of arbitration, recognition of belligerency or independence, autonomy through diplomacy, charitable relief to the Cubans and intervention for the protection of American life and property. Intervention by force of arms obviously involved war.
Of the two non-intervention proposals, that of official neutrality, which paralleled the last two and one-half years of the Cleveland administration, has already been discussed; and, while that providing for the purchase of Cuba was mentioned throughout the course of the revolt, it will only be necessary to make a few observations to indicate that the editors regarded the method of solving the Cuban question very lightly.

During the first year of the Cuban insurrection there was occasional reference to the possible sale of the island by Spain. As early as March the possibility of such a course was mentioned rather casually by the Detroit Journal and the Minneapolis Journal conjectured that within the next ten years Spain would be willing to sell Cuba for $10,000,000. A little more seriously, the Milwaukee Journal advised Spain that it would be far more profitable for her to sell the island to the

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1 Supra, II, pp. 59-149.
2 Detroit Journal, March 2, 1895, p. 4, o. 1-2.
3 Minneapolis Journal, February 27, 1895, p. 4, o. 3.
United States than to continue her futile effort to suppress an increasingly expensive rebellion, and a month later the Cleveland Plain Dealer adopted a favorable position with regard to rumors of a proposition made by the rebels to purchase their independence from Spain for $300,000,000. The Minneapolis Journal added somewhat later that, while it was 'manifest destiny' that the United States should someday acquire Cuba, this should be done in a "lawful" manner, either by "purchase or legitimate "warfare," and showed its preference for the former method in these words:

The best way to do, if the nation is determined to have Cuba, is to make Spain a square spot cash offer of $75,000,000 for the island and the possibility is that she will sell out. Try it, anyway. That would be cheaper than war with Spain.

There were additional rumors afloat during 1896 concerning the sale of Cuba, but they received little attention in the editorial columns of Middle Western newspapers. The same was
also true of a reported statement of President Cleveland, who, in order to dampen the rising war spirit, told a group of bellicose Congressmen that he happened to know that the United States could buy the Island of Cuba for $10,000,000. Regardless of whatever truth Cleveland's statement contained, the closing days of his administration brought forth a House resolution calling for the official purchase of Cuba. But the bill received no further consideration by Congress and there was a dearth of editorial comment on it. Only one journal in the Middle West took the occasion of its introduction to point out the desirability of removing Cuba "from the arena of international debate" in this or some other way.

Between McKinley's inauguration in 1897 and the declaration of war against Spain in April 1898, other plans to purchase Cuba were suggested. One of these involved a group of American capitalists who proposed to act as guarantors of Cuban bonds sufficient to reimburse Spain for the island on condition that the United States supervise the island's future financial

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10 House Resolution, 10211, 54 Cong. 2 Sess.
11 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), January 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
affairs. But typical papers such as the Cincinnati Enquirer\(^\text{12}\) and the Sioux City Journal\(^\text{13}\) opposed the plan because it would lead to "disgraceful dealings between the owners of the bonds and officials of the United States", while the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune thought its realization would be thwarted by Spain's unwillingness to sell or the insurgents' refusal to buy.\(^\text{14}\) The Chicago Times-Herald, however, thought that such a plan might be followed if accomplished by "peace and honor"\(^\text{15}\) and the Iowa State Register said that we could afford to buy Cuba and make its people a present of their liberties rather than invite war with Spain.

A few suggestions for the purchase of Cuba, equally as weak as those already mentioned, were made during the stirring days which followed the publication of the De Lome Letter and the mysterious sinking of the Maine. But these were not taken

\(^{12}\) Cincinnati Enquirer, May 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
\(^{13}\) Sioux City Journal, March 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
\(^{14}\) Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, June 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
\(^{15}\) Chicago Times-Herald, June 25, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
\(^{16}\) Iowa State Register (Des Moines), September 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
seriously by the editors either of the Democratic\(^17\) or the Republican\(^18\) papers generally. Only the Cleveland Leader considered purchase at that late date as a possible solution of the Cuban crisis. Said that Republican organ, "If what we aim at is peace..., the difference between purchase and war is one of means and not the end sought."\(^19\) But judging from the course taken by the Republican party, in which the Democrats and the country concurred, something more was wanted. At any rate, McKinley gave up quite early any thought of the solution of the Cuban question through purchase.\(^20\)

From the foregoing comments it would thus appear that there were no vigorous editorial champions of the proposal to solve the Cuban question through its purchase from Spain. However, the editors showed quite clearly that they would

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\(^{17}\) Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 6, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Enquirer, February 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.

\(^{18}\) Cincinnati Times-Star, January 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 23, 1898, p. 5, c. 1-2.

\(^{19}\) Cleveland Leader, March 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 4.

\(^{20}\) Samuel Flag Beis, American Secretaries of State, XI, p. 44.
oppose the island's transfer to any European power in this manner. Such a suggestion would be protested "in thunder-tones whenever the occasion may arise," said a typical editor in applying the doctrine that on this continent "our fiat is law." At least one other editor agreed that such would be the case and no doubt the others assumed that the transfer of Cuba to any other power than the United States would be so inimical to the interests of this country that they deemed it unnecessary to labor their opposition to such proposals editorially.

Of the peaceful methods of intervention suggested editorially for the solution of the Cuban question, that of arbitration or mediation received the least consideration. Despite the precedent set for such a course by Cleveland in his settlement of the Venezuela boundary dispute, its application to the settlement of the Cuban crisis was seldom made by the editors and on the whole it was taken even less

21 Cincinnati Times-Star, November 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
22 Ibid., January 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
23 Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, January 22, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
seriously than the proposals of purchase. Unknown to the editors, however, in April 1896, Cleveland offered to act as mediator between Spain and Cuba provided the former would agree to outline and inaugurate a program of reform in the island. But the secrecy of these negotiations which Spain refused to accept, gave the editors no opportunity of expressing their opinion on the matter. The Democratic editors seldom discussed the possibilities of mediation on their own initiative, probably because of Cleveland's determination to maintain a policy of non-intervention through strict neutrality, and the Republican papers could not entertain such a plan as long as their party insisted on a more vigorous Cuban policy. Even after the election of 1896, only a few Republican editors intimated that the United States would consider the possibility of arbitrating the Cuban question. Undoubtedly they were motivated in part by a desire to assist McKinley in his effort to bring about the promised prosperity

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Detroit Free Press, November 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., May 23, 1897, p. 15, c. 1.  

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Indianapolis Journal, December 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
through peaceful means, but more than likely the fundamental reason which explains the dearth of editorial comment on arbitration as a solution of the Cuban problem was the basic assumption that some other solution could be found which would not jeopardize the traditional policy of the United States toward its unilateral supremacy over the affairs of the Western hemisphere.

II

The scheme most seriously considered for peaceful intervention in the Cuban crisis involved the various proposals for granting belligerent rights to the insurgents. The expediency of such a plan usually presents itself to interested countries in similar cases of revolution and the idea of this course on the part of the United States in the instance of the Cuban insurrection of 1895 was no exception to the rule. The legality of recognizing the belligerency of an insurrectionary government is dependent upon a number of generally ascertainable facts. But the difficulty of establishing their existence in the Cuban crisis of 1895 led most of the international lawyers


27 For details consult references cited in note 25, this chapter.
to oppose the extension of such rights to the Cubans during their struggle for independence. Disregarding the possible illegality and doubtful value of granting belligerent rights to the insurgents, the political scientists and popular writers favored it on grounds of sentiment and expediency.

To some extent at least, the proposal to solve the Cuban question through this peaceful means was based fundamentally on the "interests" of the United States in the events associated with the revolt in the Caribbean. These interests, furthermore, were abetted and stimulated by the propaganda of the Cuban Junta, whose objectives, although not primarily concerned


with the recognition of belligerency per se, advocated such a course because it would throw the moral support of the United States on the side of the insurgents, place the struggle on the basis of recognized warfare and have the ultimate effect of securing independence from Spanish authority.

The interests of the Junta in promoting this policy were adequately reflected in all phases of its numerous activities between February, 1896, and April, 1898, and especially in the propaganda pamphlets which it circulated. Articles appearing in leading magazines, speeches of American Senators, addresses made by members of the Cuban clubs, petitions to the American people and government officials and especially prepared arguments in favor of Cuban belligerency, were


33 See two speeches delivered by Fidel G. Pierra, one at Chихering Hall, New York City on October 10, 1895, the other at Washington, D. C., on October 31, 1895 and published as a Pamphlet, "Facts About Cuba," n. p., c. 1895.

34 See, "Petition of Tomas Estrada Palma for the Recognition by the United States of the Belligerency of the Cubans," addressed to Richard Olney, Secretary of State, and constituting
printed in pamphlet form and distributed during the course of the revolt.

The interest taken by the United States in recognizing Cuban belligerency has already been indicated in our discussion of the events associated with filibustering and, as we have just noted, was reflected in the periodical literature dealing with the subject. The action of Congress and the editorial comment of American newspapers also showed the further concern of the country in this proposal. Quite logically, therefore, the reciprocal stimulation which accompanied these manifestations of interest, for a time at least, had the effect of crystallizing editorial opinion in favor of official recognition of Cuban belligerency.

Even before the convening of Congress in December, 1895, it was evident from the trend of editorial comment that most of the editors had come to recommend such a course as a


35 See for example, Pamphlet, "Argument of John R. Dos Passos, Esq., of New York in favor of Recognition of Cuba by the United States," n. p., c. 1896; Pamphlet, "The United States and Cuba," by John Guiteras, Philadelphia, 1896; and one by W. D. Washburn, Jr., "Cuba and Spain Our Plain Duty," Minneapolis, February, 1898. All of the above pamphlets and many more of similar import may be found in the Hoes Collection in the Library of Congress.
national policy. This was certainly true of a majority of representative Republican papers in the Middle West. In the case of the Chicago Inter Ocean, whose first comment on the subject began early in May, the evolution of a policy favoring the recognition of Cuban belligerency may be traced quite clearly. More cautiously, the Indianapolis Journal developed a similar policy between June 30 and October 30, while long before the convening of Congress, the Detroit Journal, the Ohio State Journal and the Chicago Tribune, recommended the favorable consideration of recognition by that body. The Saint Paul Pioneer Press, Omaha Bee, Milwaukee

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36 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, May 6, 1895, p. 6, c. 4; Ibid., July 25, 1895, p. 6, c. 2; July 31, 1895, p. 6, c. 2; August 13, 1895, p. 6, c. 4; August 15, 1895, p. 6, c. 1; September 1, 1895, p. 32, c. 2-3; September 2, 1895, p. 6, c. 4-5; September 14, 1895, p. 12, c. 1-2; October 18, 1895, p. 6, c. 3-4; September 25, 1895, p. 6, c. 1-2; October 15, 1895, p. 6, c. 1; October 25, 1895, p. 6, c. 3; November 8, 1895, p. 6, c. 4.

37 Indianapolis Journal, June 30, 1895, p. 12, c. 2; Ibid., July 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; August 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; September 19, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; September 24, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; October 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.

39 Detroit Journal, October 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.

40 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), September 6, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.

41 Chicago Tribune, October 5, 1895, p. 12, c. 4; Ibid., October 8, 1895, p. 8, c. 4.

42 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, September 7, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., October 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 4; December 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 3.

42 Omaha Daily Bee, September 20, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.
Sentinel and Columbus Dispatch adopted the same policy still more reluctantly.

The editorial popularity of recognizing Cuban belligerency was also evident among a number of Democratic editors. Although the attitude of the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Detroit Free Press was more aggressive than that of the Kansas City Times, which originally doubted the value of recognition, the Saint Louis Republic, which opposed it, and the Indianapolis Sentinel, which adopted a

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43 Milwaukee Sentinel, October 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
44 Columbus Evening Dispatch, September 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., October 18, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; November 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; December 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
45 Cleveland Plain Dealer, September 5, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., September 9, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; September 23, 1895, p. 1, c. 3; September 23, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; September 24, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; September 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; September 30, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; October 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; October 7, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; October 10, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; October 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; October 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; October 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 3-4; November 13, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; November 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; November 23, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
46 Cincinnati Enquirer, August 1, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., November 11, 1895, p. 4, c. 1.
47 Detroit Free Press, September 25, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; October 12, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
48 Kansas City Times, April 16, 1895, p. 4, c. 1-2.
49 Saint Louis Republic, September 24, 1895, p. 6, c. 1.
conservative attitude on political grounds, the majority of the papers representing the party in power showed a disposition in favor of the extension of belligerent rights to the insurgents.

The attitude of a cross section of editorial comment of typical Independent editors reveals essentially the same disposition toward this course as that shown in an analysis of the editorial comment of the Republican and Democratic papers.

Furthermore, the stereotyped arguments both for and against the recognition of Cuban belligerency appeared in the general editorial comment which prevailed prior to the meeting of Congress in December, 1896. Stock arguments against recognition included the obligations of international law, the dangers of war with Spain, the uncertainty of the military and political ability of the Cuban de facto government, the dubiousness of the insurgents' receiving any actual benefit from such a course, and the fear that American property in

50 Indianapolis Sentinel, November 15, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.

51 Chicago Times-Herald, September 13, 1895, p. 6, c. 3; Ibid., September 27, 1895, p. 6, c. 1; Minneapolis Journal, October 14, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; Omaha World-Herald, December 8, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City Star, December 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.
Cuba would be jeopardized.

The standard arguments in favor of recognizing the Cubans as belligerents were postulated on more emotional grounds and involved a fundamental desire on the part of the American people to give their moral assistance to a down-trodden people. As Amos S. Hershey said a little later, the favorite argument of the newspapers was that "'the Spaniards are cruel, therefore, we ought to recognize the belligerency of the Cubans.'" Based more on feeling than on the technicalities of international law and practicality, this basic argument found expression in specific rationalizations which included the reasons of American sympathy, namely, Spanish misrule, Spanish atrocities, and our moral duty to humanity. It was also maintained that such action would benefit the Cubans materially, and that the insurgents deserved recognition because they were winning, because they had a stable de facto government, and because recognition conformed to the Monroe doctrine, historical precedent and the recent examples set by certain Latin-American countries.

Obviously, the emotionalized arguments in favor of the recognition of Cuban belligerency were more appealing to the
American people than the arguments embodied in the cold facts presented in support of the obligations of international law. And if we add to the former, the arguments advanced in support of the fundamental interests of the United States, the propaganda activities of the Junta and the political manifestations of the Cuban question, we have the factors and conditions which led to the consideration of such a policy by the first session of the fifty-fourth Congress, meeting in December, 1896, as well as the succeeding congresses convening between that time and April, 1898.

In short, by December, 1896, the stage was set for the official performance in behalf of the insurgents; and the Junta, eager to draw the curtain for the opening scene, sent Secretary of State Olney a "Petition..., for the recognition by the United States of the belligerency of the Cubans." But despite Olney's cold disregard of the Junta's formal appeal, and Cleveland's unalterable policy of neutrality, which he repeated in his annual message, Congress responded to the petitions of the Junta (along with others more purely American in origin).

54 Wisan points out that these petitions emanated from every conceivable type of source of which he lists fifteen. (Op. cit., p. 102.)
the memorials of state legislatures and the demands of
the American press, by debating on a deluge of resolutions
introduced to secure the recognition of belligerency. The
debates made it possible for the editors to turn from general
to specific arguments for and against this suggested line of
action, and a conspectus of events in Congress may serve as a
basis for a more intelligible analysis of the course of
editorial opinion thereon.

In the Senate the most important resolutions were intro­
duced by Call of Florida and Allen of Nebraska; while in
the House those introduced by Sulzer, Bingham, Fletcher,
Willis, Gibson, and Linton were significant. In January
Senator Kyle introduced a weak resolution and in February

55 Q. V., for 1 Sess. 54 Cong., Sen. Doc., 19,105. For 2
Sess. 54 Cong., Cong. Rec., p. 120.
56 For 1 Sess. 54 Cong., see Sen. Res., 4, 51, 97 and 105;
also House Res., 34, 57 and 179. For 2 Sess. 54 Cong., see
Sen. Res., 176. For 1 Sess. 55 Cong., see House Res., 54 and
60 Ibid., January 10.
61 Ibid., 122, January 20.
62 Ibid., 135, January 27.
Senator Morgan submitted a drastic belligerency proposal. Soon thereafter, Senator Cameron went even a step further and recommended instead, the recognition of the independence of the Republic of Cuba.

The ensuing debate in the Senate finally resolved itself into a controversy over whether the executive or the legislative branch of government had the power to recognize belligerency. Senators Allen and White attempted to compromise the situation by substitute proposals, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs finally combined the Morgan and Cameron resolutions before adoption as a concurrent resolution. This resolve expressed the opinion that a state of war existed in Cuba, that the United States should extend the rights of belligerents to both Spain and Cuba, and that the good offices of the United States should be offered to Spain for the

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64 Cong. Rec., XXVIII, 54 Cong. 1 Sess., p. 1317.
65 Ibid., p. 1552.
66-69 These footnotes eliminated in revision.
70 Ibid., p. 1978, February 20. See also Wisan, Op. cit., pp. 110. This controversy is covered by Beale and the Solicitor's Journal, Op. cit., but was not settled since the resolution which was adopted took the form of a concurrent resolution.
72 Ibid., February 28.
recognition of Cuban independence.

On February 27, Chairman Hill of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported a resolution of the House Committee, directing the President to recognize Cuban belligerency, and on March 2 the House adopted its own resolution after rejecting the Senate resolution mentioned above. On April 3, however, the House conferees recommended the adoption of the Senate resolution formerly rejected and after additional debate adopted it on April 6 by a vote of 247 to 27.

President Cleveland did not feel compelled to follow the advice of Congress in these concurrent resolutions, and in his annual message to the second session of the fifty-fourth Congress dismissed the proposal to recognize Cuban belligerency as "a proposition no longer urged because untimely and in practical operation clearly perilous and injurious to our interests." We have already seen that the victory of 1896 had a sobering effect upon the Republican attitude toward the Cuban question in general. The closing days of Cleveland's administration, therefore, did not witness any pronounced activities on the part of Congress for the recognition of Cuban belligerency.

However, the Senatorial consideration of such a course during the first session of the fifty-fifth Congress, showed

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74 Supra, II, pp. 160-169.
that the possibility of attempting to solve the Cuban question in this manner had not been entirely abandoned by 1897. Senator Morgan's joint resolution calling for the recognition of Cuban belligerency was revived and finally passed May 20 by a vote of 41 to 14. The House, however, failed to concur, thereby sparing the new president the necessity of assuming a more definite position on the Cuban question during the first few months of his administration.

The action of the American Congress on the subject of Cuban belligerency, although never officially carried out, had the effect, in addition to clarifying editorial opinion on the Cuban question, of precipitating a cabinet crisis in Spain. This resulted in the overthrow of the Conservative Canovas and the elevation of Sagasta, a Liberal, to the premiership and before Congress met again in December, 1897, McKinley had determined to attempt solution of the Cuban question through diplomatic negotiations with the new Spanish ministry. In his annual message to Congress, he accordingly opposed recognition as contrary to our traditional policy and, although a poll of the House conducted by the New York Journal showed that 184

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members were still in favor of the recognition of Cuban belligerency. The possibilities of solving the Cuban question in this manner were no longer given serious thought. Senator Cannon did, however, introduce a resolution in February providing that unless Spain recognize the independence of Cuba by March 4, 1899, the United States would "on that date recognize the belligerency of the Cuban patriots." But the reading of this phrase of the resolution was a faint echo in comparison to the vociferous eloquence which had resounded in the halls of Congress during the "belligerency crisis" of 1895 and 1896. Mr. Cannon's resolution was referred to committee where it died together with the general idea of recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents.

It is difficult to disentangle, with complete satisfaction, the editorial policies of Middle Western newspapers as shown in their response to Congressional action in regard to Cuban belligerency. Most of the editors, however, seemed to be disappointed in the conspicuous absence of Cleveland's concern over the Cuban question as evidenced from his annual message to

Congress in December, 1895. The majority of them, regardless of party affiliation, appeared to be irritated because he had not shown a preference for the recognition of Cuban belligerency, which they had previously advocated, instead of choosing to remain strictly neutral. Only a few papers approved of the President's non-intervention policy and Congress was now urged to take the situation in hand by recognizing the insurgents. Of course, the introduction of the Call and Allen resolutions in the Senate and those in the House soon after, were applauded and discussed at length. The Junta added its weight to the movement by pamphlets, the contents of which were cited by the editors, while the usual arguments in favor of recognition were repeated with increasing frequency during the closing days of 1895.

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78 For Republican papers see, Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 4, 1895, p. 6, c. 2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, December 4, 1895, p. 6, c. 1; Chicago Tribune, December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2. For the Democratic papers see, Detroit Free Press, December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2.

79 Indianapolis Sentinel, December 4, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Minneapolis Journal, December 3, 1895, p. 4, c. 2-3.

80 Chicago Tribune, December 17, 1895, p. 6, c. 2-3; Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2, et al.

81 Detroit Free Press, December 21, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 27, 1895, p. 4, c. 3; December 29, 1895, p. 10, c. 3; Detroit Journal, December 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 21, 1895, p. 12, c. 4.
During the months which followed the reconvening of Congress in January 1896, there was an increase in the editorial discussion of the ensuing debates on the recognition of Cuban belligerency. The Chicago Tribune continued its belligerent attitude,\(^{82}\) the Indianapolis Journal came to the conclusion that such a policy was a mixed question of "fact, politics and sympathy"\(^{83}\) and feared that war might result if carried to its logical conclusion.\(^{84}\) But the Ohio State Journal refuted the idea of any such outcome\(^{85}\) and after the House concurred in the Senate resolution favoring recognition on April 6 concluded that since Cleveland would probably do nothing about the matter, Congress should go a step further.

\(^{82}\) Chicago Tribune, January 16, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; Ibid., January 22, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; February 5, 1896, p. 5, c. 1-2; March 1, 1896, p. 30, c. 2; March 3, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; March 4, 1896, p. 6, c. 3-4.

\(^{83}\) Indianapolis Journal, March 1, 1896, p. 12, c. 2.

\(^{84}\) Ibid., February 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; February 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; March 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; March 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 8.

\(^{85}\) Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
and acknowledge Cuban independence. Spanish atrocities were used by the Columbus Dispatch as a further plea for the recognition of Cuban belligerency. It also said that recognition would instill in the minds of the Cubans "a feeling of friendship" for the United States and frequently advocated the recognition of Cuban independence. It claimed that Cuba had a stable *de facto* government and that the United States should extend to it the benefits of material aid and "moral" encouragement through the recognition of its stability. After the Barcelona demonstrations against the American consulate, which symbolized Spanish reaction to the Congressional debates on the belligerency resolutions, the Dispatch insisted that now our "national honor" demanded a type of intervention even more drastic than the recognition of Cuban belligerency implied. The precedent set by Spain

86 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
87 Ibid., February 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
88 Ibid., February 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
89 Ibid., February 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
90 Ibid., March 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
91 Ibid., March 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
in recognizing the Confederate states during the American Civil War and the commercial and strategic interests of the United States in Cuba were also emphasized by this paper as historical arguments in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents.

The arguments set forth by the Saint Paul Pioneer Press were equally as interesting as those of the Columbus Dispatch. It maintained that recognition was demanded by "humanity and civilization", by Spain's brutality as demonstrated by her court-martial of the Competitor's crew, and because of the usual line of arguments.

After repeating the standard arguments in favor of recognizing the belligerency of the insurgents, the Chicago Inter

\[\text{Ibid., March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., March 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.}\]
\[\text{Saint Paul Pioneer Press, February 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., February 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., May 18, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.}\]
\[\text{Ibid., February 29, 1896, p. 6, c. 1; March 4, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.}\]
\[\text{Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 30, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; Ibid., February 16, 1896, p. 28, c. 3; February 18, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2.}\]
Ocean approved the action of the Senate in February, urged the House to concur, especially after the Barcelona riots, and before the house finally passed the Senate resolution on April 6, quoted the propaganda of the Junta to show that American business interests demanded recognition of belligerency for commercial reasons. Of course the action of the House on April 6 was applauded. The delay on the part of the President in taking action on this resolution was attributed to the approaching presidential campaign and his appointment of the aggressive General Fitzhugh Lee, Southern Democrat, to fill the vacancy created by the resignation of Consul General Williams in Cuba, was interpreted as a political stroke to satisfy the Jingoes in the coming campaign. The Inter Ocean, however, approved of Lee's appointment because, "...as a soldier...of a de facto government that was suppliant for acknowledgment as a belligerent power, the Consul General

100 Ibid., February 28, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; February 29, 1896, p. 12, c. 2; March 2, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
101 Ibid., March 3, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; March 4, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; March 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2.
102 Ibid., March 17, 1896, p. 6, c. 4.
103 Ibid., March 27, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; March 28, 1896, p. 12, c. 1-2.
104 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; April 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; April 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
105 Ibid., May 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2.
may be expected to manifest a friendly feeling toward the
Cubans."\textsuperscript{106} Its further approval was given to Lee's appoint-
ment because, "he comes from a family brought up on the
American idea of eliminating the monarchical form of government
from this continent."\textsuperscript{107} Lee's report of conditions in Cuba
was quoted in confirmation of the existence of a state of war
in the island which the concurrent resolution of April 6 had
assumed.\textsuperscript{108} Cleveland was maligned for further inaction on
the basis of that resolution,\textsuperscript{109} condemned for issuing his
second neutrality proclamation,\textsuperscript{110} and advised by the Inter
Ocean that "prudence, policy, and humanity," demanded that he
heed the opinion of Congress and the country for peacefully
recognizing the Cubans as belligerents.\textsuperscript{111}

Other representative Republican papers in the Middle West

\textsuperscript{106} \textit{Ibid.}, April 15, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3. Lee had been an
officer in the Confederate Army during the Civil War.
\textsuperscript{107} \textit{Ibid.}, April 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
\textsuperscript{108} \textit{Ibid.}, June 22, 1896, p. 5, c. 1-2; June 24, 1896, p. 6,
c. 5.
\textsuperscript{109} \textit{Ibid.}, July 25, 1896, p. 12, c. 3-4.
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Ibid.}, August 1, 1896, p. 6, c. 5.
\textsuperscript{111} \textit{Ibid.}, August 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 4; August 25, 1896,
p. 6, c. 8.
pursued much the same policy on the belligerency issue as that revealed in the editorial comment of the papers whose comment has been outlined immediately above. A few of them, however, consistently opposed the recognition of Cuban belligerency. The Milwaukee Sentinel, for example, argued that the insurgents had presented no proof of the existence of a de facto government; that the United States should follow a neutral course, at least until Spain had utterly failed to put down the revolt; that atrocities were not confined to one side in the conflict; and that the debates on the belligerency resolutions were a mistake because it

112 Sioux City Journal, April 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), June 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Detroit Journal, January 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; March 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2. See also the further comment of the Chicago Tribune, May 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 1-2; Ibid., May 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; June 11, 1896, p. 36, c. 4.


114 Ibid., March 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 4.

115 Ibid., February 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 4, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.


feared that these resolutions would increase Spanish irritations without giving the Cubans any material benefit. The Saint Louis Globe-Democrat and the Omaha Bee were about as cautious as the Milwaukee Sentinel, while the Cleveland Leader, although showing a tendency to favor some sort of action helpful to the insurgents, recognized that the problems rising out of Cuban belligerency would be "manifold." The Minneapolis Journal, an Independent paper, joined this minority group of Republican papers in opposing recognition because it feared war would result.

The editorial attitude of representative Democratic papers on the debates in Congress during this period seemed even more

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118 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; April 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; May 17, 1896, p. 12, c. 1-2; May 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; June 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.

119 Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, January 17, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., February 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; March 3, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; March 6, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; March 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; March 25, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; April 7, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.

120 Omaha Daily Bee, March 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.

121 Cleveland Leader, February 25, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; Ibid., March 2, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; June 26, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.

122 Minneapolis Journal, January 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., February 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; February 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; March 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; March 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; March 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
aggressive than that of the leading Republican papers. Such papers as the Indianapolis Sentinel moved from a position of comparative objectivity in January to a full endorsement of the action of Congress in April. The Saint Louis Republic also gradually abandoned Cleveland's policy of neutrality and formulated a policy favoring Cuban belligerency on grounds of humanity and the Spanish mistreatment of American citizens. Only the Milwaukee Journal consistently opposed the action under consideration. It maintained that recognition would make the United States liable for damages, and hurt the insurgent cause by "irritating without mitigating" the situation. The Jingoes were warned concerning the dangers of European intervention if belligerent rights were

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granted Cuba, but it was, nevertheless, aware of the probability of ultimate intervention by the United States in the Cuban crisis. The attitude of the Detroit Free Press also showed general opposition to the idea of recognizing the Cubans as belligerents, the extent of its wavering being determined by a mixture of motives both humanitarian and partisan, while for a time it vacillated between approval and disapproval of the Congressional deliberations. Although the Free Press vigorously defended Cleveland for his opposition to the proposed action of Congress, its real sympathies were unmistakably with the insurgents in their desire for belligerents' rights.

129 Ibid., March 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
130 Ibid., April 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; February 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
131 Detroit Free Press, February 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; February 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
132 Ibid., March 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
133 Ibid., March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 14, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
134 Ibid., April 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
135 Ibid., April 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; April 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; June 2, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
136 Ibid., June 12, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
But imperialism was reflected more clearly by such important Democratic papers as the Cleveland Plain Dealer and the Cincinnati Enquirer in their editorial comment on the belligerency debates in Congress than it was by the more conservative papers just mentioned. Before the passage of the Senate's belligerency resolution the Cleveland Plain Dealer showed a preference for the recognition of Cuban independence, but it voiced its approval of the Senate's belligerency resolution in the following "Belligerent Rhyme:"

A mighty wave of loyalty
Sweeps by with no deterrent
And big and little dogs of war
Float on the swift concurrent

If further defended the Senate's action and thereafter joined the "dogs of war" in howling for Congressional approval of the Senate resolution. The tenor of its monotonous wail was based chiefly on the chord that Spain herself admitted the

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137 Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., February 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 4; February 23, 1896, p. 8, c. 1 and 3; February 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 8.
existence of a "state of war" in Cuba, to which it synchro-
nized a chorus of testimony from important personages for the
purpose of additional resonance. The attitude of the
Cincinnati Enquirer was even more aggressive than that of the
Plain Dealer. This is shown by its constant repetition of the
usual arguments in favor of belligerency of the Cubans, by
the fact that it insisted upon a joint instead of a concurrent
resolution, and by the fact that it came to advocate the
more drastic course of recognizing Cuban independence.

Between April and June 1896, editorial discussion of
Cuban belligerency gradually gave way to the more pressing
issues of domestic politics. Party conventions and the campaign

\[140\] Ibid., March 1, 1896, p. 8, c. 1; March 2, 1896, p. 1,
c. 4-7; March 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 3 and 4; March 5, 1896, p. 4, c.
2; March 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; March 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3;
March 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; April 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 4; April 7,
1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; April 12, 1896, p. 8, c. 1; April 14, 1896,
p. 4, c. 3; April 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; May 3, 1896, p. 8, c.
3-4; June 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; July 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.

\[141\] Ibid., February 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid.,
February 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1;
March 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; March 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; April 3,
1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; April 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.

\[142\] Ibid., March 6, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.

\[143\] Ibid., June 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
itself precluded much serious consideration of the Cuban question until after the election in November. By that time the changed political situation at home called for editorial reorientation of Cuban policies. Thereafter many of the Republican editors formerly opposing the Cleveland neutrality stand and his disregard of the concurrent resolution of the previous April, now modified their criticism. Several of them immediately abandoned the idea of further consideration of Cuban belligerency. Only a few of them continued to entertain the idea half-heartedly.

On the other hand, representative Democratic papers took the opportunity to insist upon a much more vigorous Cuban policy than they had advocated before the election. This was especially true of the Saint Louis Republic and the

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144 Sioux City Journal, December 5, 1896, p. 12, c. 1; Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Leader, December 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; Omaha Daily Bee, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, December 5, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 7, c. 2; December 9, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.

145 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Minneapolis Tribune, December 3, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 4, 1896, p. 6, c. 3; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.

146 Saint Louis Republic, December 3, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 8, c. 2.
Cleveland Plain Dealer, while the Detroit Free Press, for a time, opposed recognition of Cuban belligerency and finally, showed an inclination to favor it. The trend of the editorial comment of the Independent World-Herald of Omaha was much the same as that of the leading Democratic journals in the Middle West.

Congressional consideration of the Cuban question in the second session of the fifty-fourth Congress centered around the Cameron resolution for the recognition of Cuban independence, while that of the first session of the fifty-fifth Congress, which ended in July, 1897, was climaxd by the passage on May 20 of the Morgan resolution which provided for

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147 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; December 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-4; December 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; November 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; November 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; November 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4.
148 Detroit Free Press, December 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., December 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.
149 Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.
150 Omaha World-Herald, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., November 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
the recognition of Cuban belligerency.

The debates on the Cameron resolution diverted attention from a primary consideration of the subject of Cuban belligerency and, although some of the editors failed clearly to distinguish between the recognition of belligerency and the recognition of independence, their incidental editorial comment on Cuban belligerency showed a change in emphasis on that subject which was probably motivated by considerations of political partisanship.

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(a) See the general comment of the following Republican journals: Milwaukee Sentinel, December 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Detroit Journal, December 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; November 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; December 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; November 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; December 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Leader, December 15, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 4; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; December 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; December 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; December 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Indianapolis Journal, December 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 27, 1896, p. 12, c. 2; Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 10, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; December 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.

(b) For the Democratic comment see: Detroit Free Press, December 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 18, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 20, 1896, p. 16, c. 1-2; December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; December 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; and 2-3; Indianapolis Sentinel, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Enquirer, December 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid. December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid. December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 5-7; December 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.
An analysis of the editorial comment on the Morgan resolution shows much the same alignment on the question of extending belligerent rights to the insurgents. 152

During the months which passed between the adjournment of the first session of the fifty-fifth Congress and the declaration of War in April 1898, the possibilities of solving

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(a) For the attitude of representative Republican dailies see: Milwaukee Sentinel, April 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., May 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; May 23, 1897, p. 12, c. 1; May 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; May 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Journal, January 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; January 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; April 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; April 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; May 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 21, 1897, p. 1; Ibid., May 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; January 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Leader, May 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, March 5, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., March 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Sioux City Journal, May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 24, 1897, p. 1, c. 4-7; Omaha Daily Bee, March 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), January 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.

(b) For representative opinion of Democratic papers on this point see: Louisville Courier-Journal, January 20, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; March 21, 1897, p. 2, c. 1-2; May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Indianapolis Sentinel, March 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., May 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cincinnati Enquirer, January 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; May 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; June 2, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., January 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; January 16, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; May 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; May 27, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; June 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3. See Detroit Free Press (May 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 1 and June 13, 1897, p. 16, c. 2) and Milwaukee Journal (May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 1 and May 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 1) for exceptions.
the Cuban question through peaceful recognition of Cuban belligerency was given secondary consideration to attempts to solve the question by other means. As we have seen elsewhere, the continuation of the internecine conflict in Cuba led McKinley to prescribe a program of autonomous reforms for the island. There was also a great deal of talk about the recognition of Cuban independence running parallel to the comment on recognizing Cuban belligerency. But on the latter possibility, editorial comment was desultory and divided much in the same manner as that previously indicated. A few of the Republican editors advocated such a policy rather weakly, but they seemed primarily interested in assisting the President in bringing back the promised prosperity by supporting him in his efforts to preserve the peace upon which the party leaders thought prosperity depended. The attainment of the same ends seems to have been the major concern of the Republican papers which opposed further consideration of solution though the belligerency proposals, while typical

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163 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, September 22, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Cincinnati Tribune, September 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., November 23, 1897, p. 5, c. 2; Dubuque Tribune, February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

164 Omaha Daily Bee, December 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; February 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Cleveland Leader, December 7, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-2; Ibid., January 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 4; January 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; January 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln).
of the opinion of the leading Democratic journals, were the Cleveland Plain Dealer 155 and the Saint Louis Republic. 156 Said the latter: "The McKinley policy of delay has had an equitable trial, and it has been found lacking in results." 157 But before forceful intervention was resorted to, a number of other peaceful methods were also discussed and cast aside. One of the most important of these was the proposal to recognize the independence of the Cuban "Republic."

It was evident from the very beginning of the insurrection of 1895 that Cuban independence was considered as generally compatible with the wishes of the American people. This desire was also reflected in the activities of the Junta and, as we have seen, its advocacy, even of the recognition of belligerency, was a matter of means to that end rather than an end in itself. Aside from the statements to this effect which were introduced rather subtly in the Junta's belligerency propaganda, this organization eventually circulated a separate class of

March 27, 1898, p. 12, o. 2; Detroit Journal, January 20, 1898, p. 4, o. 1-2; Ibid., January 25, 1898, p. 4, o. 1-2; Milwaukee Sentinel, December 7, 1897, p. 4, o. 2; Ibid., November 10, 1897, p. 4, o. 2.

155 Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 19, 1897, p. 4, o. 3; Ibid., December 28, 1897, p. 4, o. 1; January 1, 1898, p. 4, o. 3.
156 Saint Louis Republic, November 10, 1897, p. 8, o. 2.
157 Ibid., November 17, 1897, p. 6, o. 2.
pamphlets, which, along with certain newspaper editorials, urged the American government to go a step beyond the mere recognition of Cuban belligerency and accord de jure recognition to the provisional government of the island.

From the standpoint of international law and American precedent the United States could have found ample grounds for making a decision in favor of such action. But from the standpoint of expediency there were grave considerations, including the possibility of war with Spain and European intervention on the side of the latter, which made for official hesitancy and half-hearted gestures on the matter. Although Spain had had the unquestionable legal right to recognize the belligerency of the Confederacy during the Civil War, the Federal government had, nevertheless, regarded this mild action as "unfriendly" and there was no reason to think that Spain would react differently if we now adopted the more drastic proposal to officially recognize the so-called "Republic" of Cuba.

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159 The opposite reaction had been symbolized by the Barcelona riots against the American consulate protesting Congressional action on belligerency.
Regardless of the possibilities of war, however, the idea of recognizing Cuban independence found enough encouragement from political scientists, popular writers, the Junta, and a small group of American newspapers, to bring forth Congressional debates, if nothing more, on the possibilities of attempting to solve the Cuban question in this manner.

During the first session of the fifty-fourth Congress, one House and four Senate resolutions called for such a course, while the existence of an independent insurgent government was implied in a Senate order which provided for the printing of the "constitution of the new Republic of Cuba." The most important of these resolutions were sponsored by


162 See for example, "Appeal of the Cubans," by Estrada Palma and "The Real Conditions of Cuba," by Senator Proctor, printed in pamphlet form by the Junta, N. Y., 0. March 1898.

163 House Res., 47.


165 Sen. Doc., 78.
Senators Allen of Nebraska and Cameron of Pennsylvania, both of whom introduced strong recognition proposals in December 1895, but the paramount consideration of the belligerency resolutions left them undebated. On February 10, 1896, Senator Cameron presented another resolution and on February 26 Senator Allen introduced a joint resolution calling on the President to recognize the independence of Cuba by executive proclamation.

The final outcome of the debates which followed came in the form of a compromise which made the recognition of Cuban independence secondary in importance to the recognition of Cuban belligerency. But the President took no action on the unsolicited advice which Congress thus tendered.

Before the second session of the fifty-fourth Congress assembled in the following December, both major parties had in their party platforms expressed themselves in favor of Cuban independence. The Democrats had stopped with a mere expression of sympathy for the Cubans "in their heroic struggle

166 Cong. Rec., 54 Cong. 1 Sess., XXVIII, p. 25.
167 Ibid., p. 1552.
168 Ibid., p. 2146.
for liberty and independence," while the Republicans had more boldly expressed the belief that the government of the United States "should actively use its influence and good offices to restore peace and give independence to the island." And, although the Republican victory of 1896 had tempered the attitude of the party with regard to its Cuban policy, several resolutions advocating the recognition of Cuban independence were introduced during Cleveland's last Congress by Republican leaders—ostensibly in fulfillment of campaign pledges, but surreptitiously in an effort to force the onus of solving the Cuban question upon the Democrats. Cleveland, however, gave the Republicans in Congress little opportunity to achieve their purposes. The Mills resolution, demanding that the United States take possession of Cuba, and the Cameron and Call resolutions providing for the recognition of Cuban independence, may, therefore, be considered as direct answers to the President's Cuban policy. The President thereupon

170 Ibid., p. 536.
retaliated by stalling for time. He intimated that he was about to open negotiations for the purchase of Cuba, while Secretary Olney announced that the recognition of new governments was an executive rather than a legislative function and appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee asking it not to adopt the pending resolutions. Despite these efforts, however, the Cameron resolution was reported out and debated. But in the House Speaker Reed opposed the idea and the resolutions were dropped after Congress reconvened in January, 1897.

Only two resolutions calling for the recognition of Cuban independence were introduced during the first session of the fifty-fourth Congress which met between March and July, 1897, and these were not debated. More than a score of similar bills were introduced in the Congress which declared war in 1898, but the recognition of Cuban independence at that time was debated as a condition of forceful intervention rather than as a possible solution of the Cuban question.

174 Reference omitted in revision.
through peaceful means.

The inconsequential action of Congress on the recognition of Cuban independence probably reflected a lack of popular enthusiasm for the idea. At least the fact that only a small minority of papers representing each of the major parties advocated its adoption would seem to confirm this statement.

The attitude of the Cincinnati Enquirer and the Cleveland Plain Dealer may be taken as typical of Democratic opinion on this issue, and the latter paper may be used for purposes of illustration. Shifting from a position favoring the recognition of belligerency to one favoring recognition of complete independence immediately after McKinley's inauguration, the Plain Dealer set out to justify the recognition of the latter course by the use of a host of interesting arguments. It quoted the official proclamations of General

177 This did not mean, however, that the "independence" of Cuba was not desired, but that it might be secured through other means.

178 Cincinnati Enquirer, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.

179 Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 19, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 6-7; December 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3.

180 Ibid., March 20, 1896, p. 40, c. 3.
Gomes, and cited trade statistics, Spanish atrocities, speeches of Senators and the Cuban consular reports to show why Cuba should be recognised. It ridiculed one paper for applauding "The Decline of Jingoism," but reflected its own particular brand of jingoism in partisan attacks on the vagueness of McKinley's Cuban policy.

The typical attitude of Republican papers toward the recognition of the Cuban Republic was shown by the editorial comment of the Chicago Inter Ocean and the Chicago Tribune. The former maintained that this course would not only be popular in the United States, but that recognition was the only course left open for the solution of the Cuban question.

181 Ibid., March 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 3-4.
182 Ibid., March 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.
183 Loc. cit., c. 2-3.
184 Ibid., May 20, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
185 Ibid., May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
186 Loc. cit., c. 2.
187 Ibid., May 23, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; May 31, 1897, p. 4, c. 4; June 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; June 20, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2; June 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; August 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3.
188 Ibid., July 11, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.
189 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 8, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
190 Ibid., December 20, 1898, p. 40, c. 3.
In support of this position its arguments were very pungent. It quoted a letter written by "President" Cisneros and obtained for the "headquarters of the Cuban Republic;" quoted a letter written by "President" Cisneros and obtained for the "headquarters of the Cuban Republic;"\(^{191}\) appealed to the mission of America's political idealism;\(^{192}\) and paraded the precedents of American history, especially those of Edward E. Hale.\(^{194}\) It pointed out the issuance of Cuban coins by the de facto government;\(^{195}\) claimed that insurgent victories were evidences of governmental organization and strength;\(^{196}\) and in the same vein, it called attention to the plans of the insurgents to hold elections.\(^{197}\)

\(^{191}\) Ibid., January 20, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; January 21, 1896, p. 8, c. 3; February 10, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.

\(^{192}\) Ibid., February 11, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; for details of government of Cuba, Ibid., May 11, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.

\(^{193}\) Ibid., December 14, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.

\(^{194}\) Ibid., May 14, 1897, p. 6, c. 4. Hale's diplomatic correspondence was published and circulated by the Junta in pamphlet form "to show that almost from the very first the United States took toward Cuba a sympathetic attitude and that as early as 1825 the establishing of a protectorate over the island was considered in a friendly way by Spain...."

\(^{195}\) Ibid., July 14, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.

\(^{196}\) Ibid., September 12, 1897, p. 40, c. 1-3.

\(^{197}\) Ibid., March 23, 1897, p. 6, c. 1.
recognition of Cuban independence would not bring war as some claimed and even if it should, it boasted, "Let It Come."

For some time during the summer of 1897, however, it half-heartedly supported the delay of McKinley in formulating his Cuban policy, but argued thereafter that the Cubans had shown enough evidence of progress toward self-governm ent to warrant independence. It also insisted unequivocally that independence was preferable to the autonomy which McKinley proposed for Cuba in the fall of 1897.

The policy of the Chicago Tribune was even more favorable to the recognition of Cuban independence than its neighbor the Inter Ocean. It hoped to terminate the war in this fashion, thereby putting an end to the disruption of American trade.

198 Ibid., September 24, 1897, p. 6, c. 5-4.
199 Ibid., December 16, 1896, p. 6, c. 2.
200 Ibid., May 28, 1897, p. 3, c. 2; June 7, 1897, p. 6, c. 4; June 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3.
201 Ibid., September 5, 1897, p. 36, c. 4.
202 Ibid., December 15, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2; January 17, 1897, p. 28, c. 1-2; January 23, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; February 7, 1897, p. 2, c. 3; February 10, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; October 6, 1897, p. 6, c. 2.
203 Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1896, p. 6, c. 4.
204 Ibid., March 15, 1896, p. 34, c. 2; March 25, 1896, p. 6, c. 3.
the unfair Spanish colonial system and the barbarous methods of Spanish warfare. Recognition, it felt, would have "both moral and legal effects" conducive to efficient self-government in Cuba.

Regardless of party affiliations, however, a majority of the Middle Western editors opposed the recognition of the independence of the Cuban "Republic" by the United States. As early as 1896, the Milwaukee Sentinel adopted a conservative attitude toward this possibility and maintained it during 1896. In discussing the Cameron resolution in December of that year, it expressed the fear that:

If this new policy is adopted and extended, the year 1897 will mark an innovation in the conduct of our relations with foreign bodies, an innovation which substitutes our wishes for our knowledge as a basis for our conduct, and which will lead us into untried and probably dangerous ways.
The Cleveland Leader thought a "better way" could be found for solving the Cuban question, fearing that a costly war would follow recognition and suggested that instead of spending money for that purpose Americans could better manifest their sympathy for the Cubans by subscribing to the Junta's funds. 212 The Saint Paul Pioneer Press also showed its opposition to recognition on much the same grounds, while in an editorial entitled "Do We Want War?," the Detroit Journal indicated a similar reaction to the Cameron resolution. The Journal questioned the advisability of recognizing a government which had nothing but a military department and challenged the existence of civil agencies either in form or place. Before it would lend its support to an American policy of recognition it asked the Junta to afford specific proof of responsible local government, a well established system of taxation, an efficient postal service and an effective national legislative body. 214 The Ohio State Journal feared that if the

211 Cleveland Leader, December 15, 1896, p. 6, c. 2-3.
212 Ibid., December 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 4.
213 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, December 30, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
214 Detroit Journal, December 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; December 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.
Cameron resolution were adopted it would surely lead to war since there was "in fact no independent government existent in Cuba to make international relations with the insurgents possible." It therefore begged that "calm judgment" be allowed to prevail and, in contrast to the view expressed by the Chicago Inter Ocean, that the mission of American idealism be permitted to salvage Cuba for democracy. The Journal maintained:

We are not a Don Quixote nation, to undertake to right the wrongs of all the world. As a nation we have obligations to Spain, She was our friend in the cause of American independence second only to France. Her methods now are brutal and revolting, but our national faith pledged in our treaties is not to be lightly taken even if our sympathies are afire for the Cuban cause.216

Interestingly enough, however, the chief concern of this paper seems to have been the fear that a war sure to result from the recognition of Cuban independence might also jeopardize the promised return to good times and economic prosperity.216 Congress was accordingly warned that the proposed recognition of Cuban independence...
independence was "Opposed By The Business Interests."217

Other important Middle Western papers such as the Journal
and Sentinel of Indianapolis, the Sioux City Journal,
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, Columbus Dispatch, Detroit
Free Press and the Milwaukee Journal joined the foregoing
papers in presenting, in various forms, the standard arguments
against the recognition of the Cuban government. Perhaps they

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Ibid., December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.

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Indianapolis Journal, December 20, 1896, p. 12, c. 2-3;
December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; December 27, 1896, p. 12, c. 2.

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Indianapolis Sentinel, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.

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Sioux City Journal, December 20, 1896, p. 12, c. 1; Ibid.,
March 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; May 24, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; September
23, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.

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Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, December 10, 1896, p. 4,
c. 2-3; Ibid., December 15, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; December 21,
1896, p. 4, c. 2; November 13, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2.

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Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 26, 1896, p. 4, c. 1;
December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.

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Detroit Free Press, December 20, 1896, p. 16, c. 1-2; Ibid.,
December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; December 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 2
and 2-3.

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Milwaukee Journal, December 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid.,
December 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 28, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2;
January 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; May 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; May
22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 6, 1897, p. 12, c. 2; December
6, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.
were correct in opposing it on the grounds that it would lead to war, for, as Theodore S. Woolsey stated in the Yale Law Journal, the recognition of Cuban independence under the existing claims of the insurgents would have been a "slap in the face," and we were not yet sure that we were prepared to accept the consequences in case Spain refused to turn the other cheek.

During the period which marked the consideration of recognizing the belligerency or the independence of the Cubans, two official attempts were made to solve the Cuban question by peaceful intervention. These involved the Cleveland and McKinley offers to facilitate autonomous reforms in Cuba through diplomacy. The alleged bad faith which Spain had demonstrated in regard to instituting the reforms promised in the Treaty of el Zanjón, which had terminated the Ten Years War in 1878, predisposed a vast section of American sentiment to distrust any attempt of this sort on the part of Spain and to predict insurgent rejection of any such settlement of the Cuban question during the revolt of 1895. Only a few

226 This was evident from the general editorial comment from the beginning of the revolt in February 1895.
editors occasionally expressed the opinion that if Spain would grant to the Cubans a form of political autonomy such as England had granted to Canada, the differences between them and the mother country might be amicably adjusted. 227

Believing that this might be done and that the pro-Cuban sentiment in America could be placated and Spain persuaded, with the aid of the United States, to grant a measure of local government acceptable to the insurgents, President Cleveland, through his Secretary of State, Olney, addressed a confidential note to the Spanish government on April 4, 1896, with this purpose in view. 228 On June 4, Olney received the Spanish reply through minister Dupuy De Lôme, who, after reminding the United States of the voluntary proposals of reform announced by his government previously on March 15, 1895, tendered his government's polite but firm refusal to accept Washington's suggestion until the insurrection had been suppressed, and insinuated that the United States might help bring about this result by a more energetic enforcement of its own neutrality laws and by endeavoring to "correct the mistakes of public opinion" in the United States through "exposing the

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227 See Columbus Evening Dispatch, August 17, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Times-Herald, October 10, 1895, p. 8, c. 1.
228 For. Rel., 1897, pp. 540-544, Olney to De Lôme, June 4, 1896.
plots and calumnies of its rebellious subjects."

The negotiations mentioned above, however, were not made public. There were a few editorial rumors as to what had taken place, but most of these indicated that autonomy would not be accepted as a solution of the Cuban question. A similar reaction was evident in editorial response to the public announcement of the autonomy proposals which Cleveland again offered Spain through his message to Congress in December. He failed, however, to reveal the fact that Spain had already tendered her unequivocal refusal. Editorial speculation on the President's message, and the general comment which followed revealed grave doubts concerning Spain's ability to inaugurate autonomous reforms in Cuba.

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229 Ibid., pp. 544-548, De Lome to Olney, June 4, 1896. In response to Spain's complaint Cleveland issued on July 27, 1896, a second proclamation of neutrality as a further warning against filibustering.

230 Kansas City Star, April 21, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, April 24, 1896, p. 6, c. 2; Detroit Journal, April 22, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; Ibid., May 16, 1896, p. 4, c. 3-4; June 9, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.

231 Cleveland Leader, December 27, 1896, p. 4, c. 5-4; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, December 26, 1896, p. 12, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 29, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City Star, December 7, 1896, p. 4, c. 3.


233 Sioux City Journal, January 24, 1897, p. 12, c. 1; Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Journal,
while the Junta emphatically stated that nothing short of complete freedom could induce the insurgents to lay down their arms.

But the real cause for the defeat of this first effort to solve the Cuban question by autonomy was embodied in Spain's refusal to accept our good offices to that end.

The second official effort to solve the Cuban question through diplomacy was attempted by McKinley several months after his inauguration in March 1897. The new President's political avoidance of reference to the Cuban problem in his inaugural address foreshadowed his determination to

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234 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Free Press, January 5, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.

follow the course of his predecessor. This had been approved by a considerable portion of the press, and Administration editors now hastened to interpret the release of American prisoners in Cuba as an evidence of the vigorous Cuban policy promised in the Republican platform of 1896. In the meanwhile, McKinley sought to formulate a solution for the Cuban question before editorial patience became exhausted.

The solution which McKinley struck upon was contained in a confidential letter of instructions, under date of July 16, 1897, which General Stewart L. Woodford, the new minister to Spain, was instructed to deliver to the Spanish government.

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Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 4, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; March 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Indianapolis Journal, March 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., March 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; March 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Leader, March 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 20, 1897, p. 1, c. 2-3; Iowa State Register (Des Moines), March 7, 1897, p. 8, c. 3; Detroit Free Press, March 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; The Cleveland Plain Dealer did not quite agree. (Ibid., March 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; March 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; April 30, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.) Others which did were Chicago Times-Herald, March 9, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; Kansas City Star, March 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Record, March 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 1.

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Chicago Tribune, March 15, 1897, p. 12, c. 3; Cleveland Leader, March 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., March 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Journal, March 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; March 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2. For the more aggressive attitude of a Democratic paper see, Saint Louis Republic, March 9, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2.
Amounting to an ultimatum, the letter demanded in effect the termination of the Cuban revolt and a system of autonomy "honorable to (Spain) and just to her Cuban colony."

Unfortunately, McKinley's proposal failed to offer, as Cleveland's had done, our cooperation in guaranteeing the reforms which he demanded. The dilemma into which he had been placed in his effort to satisfy public opinion and bring prosperity through peace was thus transferred to a Spanish government already threatened by political instability at home and an impossible revolt abroad.

The transfer of political power in Spain following Woodford's arrival on the continent made it necessary for him to make representations to the outgoing Conservative ministry, as well as to the incoming Liberals. Woodford predicted that the reply of the new Spanish regime would be

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238 For. Rel., 1898, p. 558. Sherman to Woodford, July 16, 1897.

239 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, August 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), August 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, August 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Detroit Journal, September 30, 1897, p. 4, c. 1. The Cleveland Plain Dealer was an exception. (August 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.)


241 Ibid., pp. 580-581. Woodford to Sherman, October 6 and 16.
unsatisfactory, but prospects for realizing the objectives of his mission were brightened by virtue of the fact that colonial reform had been an important feature of the platform of the Liberals during the election just won. And when Sagasta accepted McKinley's demands on October 23, and submitted a plan of autonomy for Cuba on November 25, a ray of hope illuminated the White House. To further facilitate the realization of Cuban reform, Woodford had endeavored to convince the ambassadors of Great Britain, Russia, France, and Germany that our proposals to Spain were justified.

But editorial speculation on Woodford's mission and Spain's reply continued to show a deep-seated distrust in Spain's willingness and ability to inaugurate the autonomous proposals.

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244 Ibid., pp. 581-589. Woodford to Sherman, October 26.
245 Ibid., pp. 617-644. Woodford to Sherman, November 27.
248 Ibid., pp. 576-570. Woodford to Sherman, October 5.
249 Ibid., pp. 580. Woodford to Sherman, October 11.
A general belief also prevailed that the Junta would still accept nothing short of complete independence.  

In her reply Spain showed that she was painfully aware of the difficult position into which she had been forced. Accordingly, she signified her regret that the United States had not offered some more definite means by which she could
hope to guarantee the successful operation of McKinley's demands. Unfortunately, these omissions were not forthcoming. Nevertheless in his December message to Congress, McKinley promised Spain that the United States would postpone any further consideration of intervention until the program of reform suggested by Sagasta had been given a reasonable trial.

The Spanish ministry almost immediately revoked the reconcentration decrees in Cuba and replaced Weyler by the more humane Blanco, who despite the steady resistance of the insurgents, now set out under Sagasta's direction to put Cuban autonomy into effect.

After McKinley's qualified acceptance of Sagasta's proposals, the press was divided on the feasibility of autonomy

September 11, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; September 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; October 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; October 3, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; October 5, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; October 8, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; October 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; October 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; October 13, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; October 19, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; October 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 6, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2; November 21, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; November 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 26, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 3; November 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Times-Herald, May 19, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., September 28, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; October 10, 1897, p. 21, c. 1; November 29, 1897, p. 6, c. 3.

for the Cubans. Many of the Republican editors formerly doubting Spain's sincerity in the matter now endorsed the President's policy, and were supported by the more conservative Democratic organs.

The more jingoistic papers, however, condemned the Spanish proposals, criticized McKinley for accepting them as a satisfactory solution of the Cuban question and maintained that the autonomy had come too late. This position was

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252 Columbus Evening Dispatch, December 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., December 10, 1897, p. 1; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., December 22, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Indianapolis Journal, December 25, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 26, 1897, p. 12, c. 2; December 29, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Journal, December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Leader, December 8, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, December 7, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-3; Ibid., December 12, 1897, p. 6, c. 1; December 20, 1897, p. 6, c. 1-2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, December 1, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., December 7, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., December 10, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Saint Louis Pioneer Press, December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City Star, December 6, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Chicago Record, December 7, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3.

253 Detroit Free Press, December 3, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Journal, December 20, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.

254 Iowa State Register (Des Moines), December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1; Sioux City Journal, December 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., December 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; December 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Tribune, December 7, 1897, p. 12, c. 3; Ibid., December 11, 1897, p. 12, c. 2-3; December 14, 1897, p. 6, c. 3-4; December 17, 1897, p. 6, c. 4; Indianapolis Sentinel, December 9, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 15, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Louisville Courier-Journal, December 28, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 8, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.
also supported by the militant propaganda of the Junta in opposition to autonomy, \(^{255}\) by the tone of the consular correspondence on general Cuban conditions, \(^{256}\) by the reports of Consul General Lee, who emphasized the anti-Autonomist "riots" in Havana, \(^{257}\) and by popular writers who discussed the subject of autonomy in leading American periodicals. \(^{258}\) The revelations in the De Lome Letter with regard to Spanish insincerity and the suspicious position into which Spain was placed by the mysterious blowing up of the Maine, removed whatever possibility remained for the success of autonomy.

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255 Gonzola de Quesada, "The Spanish Idea of Autonomy; A Birthright For a Mess of Potage," Pamphlet, Washington, D. C., December 23, 1897. The editorial comment of Middle Western newspapers was filled with references to the statements of members of the Junta, to the effect that the insurgents would not accept autonomy.


257 Ibid., passim.

The press, therefore, gradually abandoned any serious defense of reform as a solution for the Cuban question.

From the beginning of the Cuban revolt, the American people pledged themselves to the material assistance of the insurgents through the medium of the Cuban Junta. Most of the money collected went to support the military operations of the Junta's Expeditionary Department in the island, but many of the people who gave undoubtedly believed they were contributing to alleviating the civilian population made destitute by Weyler's reconcentration decrees. As early as April, 1895, at least one sensational scheme for the organized charitable support of the insurgents was reported, and there were probably many others. The Cincinnati Enquirer, in outlining this scheme, intimated that "later on it may be

259 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Indianapolis Journal, February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Cleveland Leader, January 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., January 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 4; January 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 4; January 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 16, 1898, p. 12, c. 1; April 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, January 3, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Ibid., January 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3; January 30, 1898, p. 36, c. 4; Milwaukee Sentinel, April 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, January 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 29, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Milwaukee Journal, January 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
different; our assistance then may take a different form.\textsuperscript{260}

There was thus the happy possibility that unofficial charity might lead to intervention of a more severe type.

But the first charitable intervention of an official nature was designed to alleviate not the starving rebels but some six or eight hundred American citizens who found themselves stranded on the island. To meet their needs, President McKinley asked Congress in May, 1897, to appropriate a relief fund of $50,000.\textsuperscript{261} Made while the Morgan resolutions were being debated in Congress, this request was almost immediately voted. The press approved with equal promptness. The act of relief to American citizens, therefore, undoubtedly set the psychological pattern for the charitable intervention on behalf of the Cuban population which McKinley offered later.

One editor observed rather sagaciously that the only difference between the President's relief plan and that proposed in Morgan's belligerency resolution was one of "method", since both plans "pave the way for war."\textsuperscript{262} Whether McKinley was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[Cincinnati Enquirer, April 14, 1895, p. 9, c. 9.]
\item[261\textsuperscript{261} Cong. Rec., 1 Sess. 55 Cong. XXX, Pt. 1, p. 1081; Sen. Doc., 86.]
\item[Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 21, 1897, p. 4, c. 2.]
\end{footnotes}
deliberately paving the way for future intervention, we do not know. But it was quite logical that he should move from the official relief of American citizens to the official relief of the suffering Cubans. That the latter action was conditioned by the former is a safe inference. Furthermore, since he had begun by first alleviating our own citizens, he could not be accused of violating the Christian dictum that 'Charity begins at home', and it should not be forgotten in this connection that McKinley was a devout Christian.

Overtly, however, McKinley was moved toward charitable intervention by the consular reports which pictured conditions in Cuba as horrible. In response to this state of affairs, he appropriately issued the day before Christmas, 1897, a proclamation appealing to the American people for gifts of money, food and clothing to relieve the distressed Cubans. Collections were to be administered through the Secretary of State and the materials distributed through Consul-General Lee in Havana.

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263 Sen. Doc., 230, 95, 97, 261, 266, 405, 415, 710, 718, 723, 725 and 727; 1 Sess. 56 Cong.

264 For. Rel., 1898, p. 655.
Unfortunately, this plan was disturbing to the Spanish and unsatisfactory to the Junta. It was irritating to the Spanish because it stigmatized them in the eyes of international public opinion and made them realize that charitable intervention might be followed by forceful intervention. Accordingly, the Spanish objected to the use of American naval vessels for the transportation of relief supplies to the island. The insurgents objected to charitable relief because it threatened to undermine their basic strategy—that of keeping the rebellion alive by the devastation of the island. Naturally the relief of the native population and the successful inauguration of autonomy would defeat the possibilities of insurgent victory. Therefore, the Junta opposed both.

The American people, on the other hand, responded to the President's appeal in a spirit fully in keeping with the Christmas season, while the press gave its columns unstintedly to publicizing the scheme and to facilitating the collection and shipment of relief supplies to Cuba. At the suggestion of Louis Klopsoh, proprietor of the Christian Herald, McKinley appointed a National Relief Committee early in January.

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265 For. Rel., 1898, p. 655.
The newspapers served as a convenient agency for the collection of money and supplies, publicly acknowledging all contributions. By February, 1896, two shipments were made each week and the Herald sent General Lee a corps of twenty-five nurses. With money raised by this paper, Clara Barton was guaranteed $10,000 a month for carrying out the projected plan, and in March the distribution of Cuban relief was delegated to the American Red Cross and other relief agencies. The Lee Orphanage was established in Havana, where a "Silent Sufferers' Fund" was set aside for those particularly distressing cases that preferred "to suffer in silence" rather than make their needs known.

"The records of the world do not afford an example of such magnificent Christian diplomacy as this!," said the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune in an altruistic editorial on "The Glory of It." In praise of this "Christian method of warfare," it went on to express its hope that:

...Churches, societies, individuals, corporations, commercial bodies, railroads—all who can give, either little or much—will unite to make this relief campaign for the starving Cubans a tremendous and impressive evidence of our own inalienable rights to intervene

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In keeping with this spirit, the alert editor of the Ohio State Journal sent Fannie Brigham Ward to report "upon the distribution (of relief) among the people of the island." But according to her first Cuban letter, which appeared under the title "Life and Death in Cuba's Capital" and which depicted "How Weyler Murdered 200,000 people," her real purpose was to bring "our inalienable rights to intervene in behalf of humanity" into more effective operation. One might detect the same undercurrent in the editorial comment of the more conservative Detroit Free Press, which welcomed charitable intervention as an opportunity to try the efficacy of the Christian philosophy "'If thine enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink; for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire upon his head.'" This pragmatic application of Christian methodology would have this sadistic effect:

While keeping alive thousands of human beings and reducing the necessity of

267 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 7, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
268 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
269 See Bible, Romans, 12:18.
armed intervention on the score of humanity, it will make our position strong, whatever happens, and the Spanish position in the event of war weak and morally indefensible. Charitable intervention is the best policy we can pursue while waiting the issue of this Spanish-Cuban matter. 270

A little less guarded, and perhaps more truthfully, the Cleveland Leader suggested that our "waiting" would result in a decision determined by our "commercial interests" in Cuba, as well as by "the dictates of humanity." 271 It thus appeared that we were prepared to follow charitable relief by a less altruistic intervention. As Millis has said,

Once we were associated...(in charitable intervention), our attitude must have undergone a change. (For) it is with difficulty that one retains one's enthusiasm for the objects of an expensive charity; and, indeed, the American people by this time were already giving signs of being just a trifle tired of the heroic Cubans. 272

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But while "Christian diplomacy" was being propounded so enthusiastically by the agencies of American philanthropy, and

270 Detroit Free Press, March 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
271 Cleveland Leader, March 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 4.
Spain was striving to initiate autonomy in Cuba under irritating handicaps, Consul-General Lee became once more solicitous for the protection of American life and property in the island.273 However, on the morning of January 24, 1898, Lee's anxiety was relieved upon seeing the American flag symbolically waving from the mast of the U. S. S. Maine in Havana harbor.

Although it was maintained that the Maine's mission was entirely peaceful, we can now see in the act of sending it a repetition of the same psychological pattern which had been set in our Cuban relief program. At any rate, official intervention on behalf of the Cubans was preceded by intervention on behalf of American citizens.

Yet the Maine was cordially received by the Spanish officials in Havana. Said the Chicago News upon the arrival of the Maine at Havana:

(This is)...the most convincing of all possible tokens that every danger of rupture has passed, and that our relations with Spain are now on a rock-bottom peace basis, shows that the vulgar herd, as usual, had been altogether wrong in its idea of

the significance and purpose of battleships. 274

The Spanish Vizcaya was soon anchored in New York Harbor as a symbol of the continuation of peaceful relationships between the two countries.

But to political realists such as Roosevelt, Lodge and Captain Mahan, the movement of battleships symbolized something else. Secret preparations for the eventuality of war therefore went on adape. Commodore Dewey was given drastic instructions concerning the Pacific, and the North Atlantic Squadron was ordered to drift toward the waters of the Caribbean. 275 Such were McKinley's methods of protecting American life and property by sending the Maine on her peaceful mission to Havana. Unfortunately, however, he had failed to reckon with the imponderables of history and these in final analysis were what turned the tide toward forceful intervention.

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In retrospect one might logically think that a man of

274 Chicago News, January 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2. See also Ohio State Journal, January 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

275 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 25, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
McKinley's reputed political acumen would have made due allowance for the eventuality of unforeseen events—if he sincerely wished to solve the Cuban question by peaceful means. After all, McKinley was well aware of the fact that a large segment of the American press had shown from the beginning of the revolt an active interest, not only in the Cuban insurgents, but in expansion by conquest. Furthermore, although they had been unable to agree upon any one of the various methods suggested for the solution of the Cuban problem, the editors had shown that they favored "intervention" in some form. In an attempt to evaluate the succession of events leading to war one wonders then whether

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See especially Chapter I and in addition the following editorials favoring annexation: Indianapolis Sentinel, October 6, 1897, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., May 17, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; November 12, 1897, p. 4, c. 2-3; November 23, 1897, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Times-Herald, March 4, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Chicago Tribune, March 16, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 5, 1897, p. 32, c. 3-4; Detroit Journal, March 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), June 17, 1896, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., December 5, 1897, p. 12, c. 2-3; Minneapolis Tribune, February 10, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, November 18, 1897, p. 6, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, January 21, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 7, 1895, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., August 26, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; March 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; September 29, 1897, p. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, October 2, 1895, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., March 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4; Saint Louis Republic, February 9, 1898, p. 8, c. 1.
there was not method in McKinley's madness in affording the Junta and "destiny" so wide a margin of opportunity in which to operate.

Perhaps such an interpretation is entirely too harsh, since only a prophet could have divined the occurrence of the two unfortunate incidents which followed McKinley's dispatch of the Maine to Havana. But since much of statesmanship lies in a full knowledge of the known facts and since McKinley was in a position to know these facts, the kindest thing one can say of his policy is that it was unstatesmanlike—if peace was his ultimate objective.

The original blunder, however, which crystallized the tide of intervention and fanned the war spirit, and which now makes McKinley's diplomacy appear second rate, was not his own but that committed by the Spanish minister to the United States. For upon the morning of February 9, 1898, Senor Dupuy De Lome had the humiliating experience of reading, on the front page of Washington newspapers, the facsimile of a private letter written during the preceding December to his personal friend Canalejas, who, after a brief visit to the United States in the fall of 1897, had proceeded to Havana to gather first hand information concerning the Cuban situation.

Throughout the course of the Cuban insurrection, De Lome
had tirelessly yet diplomatically represented the interests of his government in the United States. Although roundly hated by the Junta and one or two occasions perhaps over zealous in his attack on the press for its pro-Cuban sentiment he was generally regarded by Washington society and the press as a very capable man and above all "A Discrete Diplomat."

Moreover, the visit of Canalejas to the United States had been friendly and entirely unofficial. It was, therefore, regarded as most important "for the reason that he will be able to correct many false notions that prevail in Spain concerning this country and its people." It was believed that "much good" would flow from the publication of his impressions after his return to Spain, for as editor of the leading Spanish daily (El Heraldo of Madrid) he would have "all Spain as his audience."

Anxious to assist Canalejas in whatever way he could and to inform him of sentiment in the United States, De Lome showed the sincerity of his own patriotism by writing Spain's "most

278 Detroit Free Press, December 30, 1897, p. 4, o. 5-6.
279 Chicago Times-Herald, November 12, 1897, p. 5, o. 6-7.
eminent journalist an analysis of the political situation in America. Based primarily on McKinley's message to Congress in December 1897, De Lome's letter described McKinley as: "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd, besides being a common politician who tries to leave a door open behind himself while keeping on good terms with the jingoies of his party." After casting a few disparaging phrases at the "newspaper rabble" that swarmed in the American hotels, he pointed out that:

It would be advantageous to take up, even if only for effect, the question of commercial relations, and to have a man of some prominence sent here in order...to carry on a propaganda among the Senators and others in opposition to the Junta.

Thus almost in one breath the Spanish minister had maligned the character of the President of the United States, insulted American journalism, castigated the Junta and revealed the insincerity of his government's efforts to negotiate a commercial treaty with this country.

But this was a private letter and as some one said "there was only one chance in a million" that it would ever reach the public eye. That chance came, however, because of the

unfortunate neglect of Canalejas's private secretary who in making preparation to leave Havana for Spain allowed the letter to fall into the hands of an enterprising Cuban sympathizer who sometime in January, 1898, placed it into the anxious hands of the New York Junta. The Junta, with its characteristic opportunism, made an appropriate translation of this letter and waited the approach of the most strategic moment in which to release its content to the American public. So when the Maine anchored in Havana, and while General Lee's reports of "riots" and "local disturbances" in the Cuban capital, were inflaming the public mind, the Junta calculated that the most auspicious moment for the release of the letter had arrived. Accordingly, on February 9, the "De Lome Letter," was given to the American public.

Informed the night before that the Junta would release this letter on the following morning, De Lome, confessing its authenticity and realizing that its publication would make him persona non grata to the government of the United States, immediately cabled his own government asking to be relieved of his post. Thus when he was approached early the next morning

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by the representatives of an astounded State Department, he was able to inform them not only of the letters authenticity but that the Spanish embassy was already in the hands of a charge d' affaires.

Contrary to the prevailing view, the press of the entire country did not demand war on account of the De Lome Letter. In the Middle West editorial opinion was characterized by varying degrees of aggressiveness and conservatism. The views of the papers representing the conservative group are worthy of note. The Iowa State Register stated that, "while the provocation is great, the American people will not allow it to disturb them so as to swerve them in the course of right dealing between Spain and Cuba," and hoped that nothing more serious than De Lome's dismissal would result.\[282\] The Indianapolis Journal thought the incident might "possibly" lead to war, though "probably" not, and expressed the view that it would have the effect of strengthening the autonomist movement in Cuba.\[284\] The Dubuque Daily Times gradually came

\[282\] *Iowa State Register* (Des Moines), February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
\[283\] *Indianapolis Journal*, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
\[284\] *Ibid.*., February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
to the conclusion that officially the De Lome Letter had nothing to do with the Cuban question. The Kansas City Journal first refused to believe its authenticity and maintained that the method of its acquisition by the Junta would weaken it. It further condemned a New York minister for his "Pulpit Sensationalism" over the matter, praised McKinley's magnanimous attitude toward the affair, referred to Spain's apology as "entirely satisfactory," and tried to counteract the jingoism of the "yellow press" of the East by running a red inked headline which read "AN APOLOGY FOR A 11 P. M. EXTRA OF REPRINTED WAR FAKE, 24 HOURS OLD IS ENTIRELY UNNECESSARY." The Omaha Daily Bee also doubted that De Lome was the author of the letter, and showed a willingness to accept the Spanish explanation as satisfactory.

285 Dubuque Daily Times, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and 2-3.
287 Ibid., February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
288 Ibid., February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
289 Ibid., February 20, 1898, p. 1.
290 Ibid., February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
291 Omaha Daily Bee, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
292 Ibid., February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
Leader reflected a similar attitude and criticized the attempt to make political capital out of the incident. It also said that too much emphasis had been placed on that portion of the letter which had to do with De Lome's reference to the President and insisted that McKinley's true Americanism had been understood since:

The whole letter shows that De Lome considered notable Spanish success in Cuba, both military and political, absolutely essential to the safety of his country from American intervention. He had evidently been convinced that the administration had no intention of allowing the Cuban war to drag on indefinitely, and the Spanish minister was far from making the mistake of supposing that President McKinley is in any sense on the side of Spain.

Two days after publication of the letter, the Milwaukee Sentinel remarked that since the letter was "of no very great importance to anyone except M. De Lome," the "incident is now closed." The Detroit Free Press condemned the Cuban Junta for its "contemptible trick" in securing the letter, and said

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293 Cleveland Leader, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
294 Ibid., February 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4.
295 Ibid., February 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 4.
296 Milwaukee Sentinel, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
"The peaceful temper of the American people has not been in the least disturbed" by the incident. The same view was also expressed by the Milwaukee Journal, which opened its columns to letters from conservative readers to show that the "plain people" deprecated war as a possible outcome of the affair. Since "the Governments of the United States and Spain are not in the hands of the sensational newspaper correspondents and presumably not in the hands of feather-heads, the De Lome incident would seem to be closed," maintained the Louisville Courier-Journal.

Another group of Middle Western editors, although essentially conservative, showed a tendency to lean toward an aggressive attitude in regard to the De Lome incident. The Chicago Inter Ocean, for example, maligned the "bastard journalism" displayed by the "uitlander" press in its sensational treatment of the affair. But it predicted the instigation of

297 Detroit Free Press, February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
298 Milwaukee Journal, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
299 Ibid., February 26, 1898, p. 12, c. 2.
300 Louisville Courier-Journal, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
a more vigorous Cuban policy and said the letter illustrated "the danger of trusting to the right to triumph through diplomacy." After De Lome was recalled, the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune seemed willing to dismiss the matter but intimated that the letter might be used as an excuse for intervention in Cuba. The Saint Louis Globe-Democrat interpreted the letter as a symbol of Spanish insincerity and predicted that it would become a subject of political partisanship. Although eventually willing to consider the matter closed, the Chicago Tribune's editorial comment emphasized the fact that the letter indicated a confession on the part of Spain that she had failed to put down the revolt and that she could not be trusted in future negotiations. The same sentiment was

301 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, February 10, 1898, p. 6, c. 3; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; February 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; February 13, p. 36, c. 3; February 15, 1898, p. 6, c. 1.

302 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 10, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; February 14, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 15, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 16, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.

303 Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, February 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 2;

304 Chicago Tribune, February 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., February 12, 1898, p. 12, c. 2; February 16, 1898, p. 6, c. 3; February 19, 1898, p. 12, c. 3.
expressed by the Cincinnati Times-Star, which attacked the Toronto Saturday Light for its criticism of the manner in which McKinley had handled the situation. The Saint Paul Dispatch showed a similar reaction to a corresponding view of the London Spectator, while the Columbus Dispatch showed a restrained bellicosity toward the affair in both editorial and cartoon.

An additional group of Middle Western newspapers, however, were less willing to dismiss the De Lome letter so lightly and used it as a pretext for advocating further intervention in Cuba. Among these were the Minneapolis Tribune, the Saint Paul Pioneer Press, and the Detroit Journal. De Lome was described by these papers as "a man sent to lie at a foreign court for the benefit of his own nation." They further insisted, despite the ex cathedra nature of the letter, that De Lome must disavow its contents. The ensuing apology was characterized as

305 Cincinnati Times-Star, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
306 Ibid., February 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
307 Saint Paul Dispatch, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
308 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
309 Ibid., February 12, 1898, p. 1; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 1.
310 Minneapolis Tribune, February 15, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
311 Saint Paul Pioneer Press, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
a "labored denial" of "circumlocution." They also intimated that war might be justified because of the incident. This sentiment was also reflected by the Cincinnati Enquirer, which stated that De Lome had been "largely instrumental in circulating falsehoods about the situation in Cuba." Its comment on the case showed political partisanship, dissatisfaction over the Spanish apology and an element of jingoism. The Ohio State Journal pointed out that De Lome had not only insulted the President of the United States in a private letter but that he had previously defamed American womanhood in a book written in 1878. Therefore, rather than accept the Spanish disavowal of the letter it intimated that we ought to "trounce" Spain in order to "teach the proud Castillian manners." The Daily Capital of Topeka stated that while we

311 Detroit Journal. February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
312 Cincinnati Enquirer, February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
313 Ibid., February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
314 Ibid., February 16, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
315 Ibid., February 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
316 Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
317 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
318 Ibid., February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
already had ample grounds for intervention in Cuba, the De Lome Letter now made it "imperative." This was also the sentiment of the Sioux City Journal. The Cleveland Plain Dealer stated that it might forget the personal implications of the letter but not the intimations of Spanish insincerity. It attempted to prove from history that Spain had always been our enemy, quoting from the English National Review to confirm its position. The Chicago Record wished to make the De Lome Letter serve as a basis for a more vigorous Cuban policy, while the Kansas City Times used the episode as a partisan attack on McKinley that was even more scurrilous than the De Lome Letter. Said this editor:

We all know certainly that Mr. McKinley had tried; while advancing the interests of Spain, to bunco the American people

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319 Topeka Daily Capital, February 11, 1898, p. 4, o. 2.
320 Sioux City Journal, February 12, 1898, p. 10, c. 1-2; February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
321 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 10, 1898, p. 1, c. 6-7; Ibid., February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; February 11, 1898, p. 1; February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
322 Ibid., February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
324 Chicago Record, February 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
into thinking him a sturdy patriot, and even a Cuban sympathizer. We recognize that Mr. McKinley is a chicken-hearted politician, laboring to play on both sides and breaking his pledge to serve Spain while ostensibly eager to assist Cuba. 325

The Indianapolis Sentinel advised McKinley to make political capital out of the De Lome incident, as recommended by Senator Chandler, 326 and the Daily Gazette of Cedar Rapids warned him that hesitation over the incident would lead the citizens of the nation "to endorse the view of De Lome that he is a cheap politician." 327 The Dubuque Telegraph urged the use of the letter as a pretext for recognizing Cuban independence, 328 while the Des Moines Daily News said that the "Voice Of The People" in Iowa demanded action equivalent

325 Kansas City Times, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 13, 1898, p. 12, c. 2; February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
326 Indianapolis Sentinel, February 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
327 Cedar Rapids Daily Gazette, February 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
328 Dubuque Telegraph, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., February 12, p. 4, c. 1.
to forceful intervention. The attitude of the Omaha World-Herald was much the same. The Chicago Times-Herald said that De Lome's Letter "exposed the Machiavellian hypocrisy of Spain," though after Spain's official disavowal, remarked that "what other emergency may arise, the De Lome incident is closed.

If the generally moderated tone of the Middle Western press can be taken as a true index of American feeling on the De Lome incident, probably it could be safely conjectured that American statesmanship could have prevented forceful intervention in the Cuban crisis solely on that account. Unfortunately, however, McKinley's efforts to solve the Cuban question through peaceful intervention were again soon dramatically challenged. But this time it was by intervention of another sort. For on the night of February 15 the battleship Maine was sunk by a mysterious and tragic explosion in Havana Harbor, with a complete

329 Des Moines Daily News, March 5, 1898, p. 4, c. 1. See also Ibid., March 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 24, 1898, p. 2, c. 1-2.
330 Omaha World-Herald, February 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
331 Chicago Times-Herald, February 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
332 Ibid., February 19, 1898, p. 6, c. 2. See also Ibid., February 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 13, 1898, p. 28, c. 2;
loss of the ship and two-thirds of her crew. Thus in the
margin of historical imponderability, created by McKinley
in sending the Maine to Cuba, fate intervened with an event
which overshadowed the Junta's unpredictable coup of
February 9.

The Junta must have regarded this catastrophe as a
stroke of good fortune far exceeding the discovery of the
De Lome letter, while the American imperialists must have
interpreted the incident as the inevitable workings of
"manifest destiny." In any case, the destruction of the
Maine climaxed the long concatenation of events which had
been the by-product of three years of the Cuban revolt.
The key to any further action on the Cuban question obviously
would be the immediate determination of the cause for
this disaster.

Because of American sentiment on the Cuban question, it
was difficult to establish objectively the cause for the
sinking of the Maine. However, the comparative patience
shown by the press in regard to the De Lome letter, and to
Captain Sigsbee's advice that "public opinion be suspended
until further report," revealed that enough patience still

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remained to stem the tide of intervention. McKinley lost no time in attacking the problem of causality by ordering Sigsbee to select a Naval Court of Inquiry from the officers of the North Atlantic Squadron to conduct an immediate and impartial investigation of the Maine disaster.

Realizing the danger of a unilateral investigation, and assuming an attitude of official innocence in the matter, Spain asked that a joint commission examine the causes for the Maine tragedy. But this request was promptly denied by the American naval authorities who spent the following month secretly investigating the incident. In the meanwhile, American newspaper editors indulged in rather ephemeral speculation on the possible causes for and the results of the destruction of the Maine.

The report, in which the Navy acquitted itself of any responsibility for the Maine disaster, was submitted by McKinley to Congress on March 28. Although this report discretely refrained from fixing the source of the explosion on any person or persons, a strong inference of Spanish responsibility was implied through attributing the cause of the disaster to a submarine mine "external" in origin. 334

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In the meantime, while the jingoism in Congress were showing their reaction to the Maine incident with outbursts of patriotic oratory, they were quietly and convincingly informed by Senator Proctor (March 17) of the deplorable conditions in Cuba. This statement, coming from a conservative Republican who had just returned from the island, confirmed all the Junta and the "yellow press" had said about the Cuban situation. Delivered while the country was still impatiently waiting the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, this report had considerable influence in turning the tide of opinion toward forceful intervention, even before the causes for the destruction of the Maine had been fixed.

Although McKinley determined to make his future policy contingent upon the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, he had, nevertheless, pending its preparation, attempted a settlement of the Cuban issue through diplomatic channels. He had also delayed the submission of the report to Congress in the hope that Spain might be persuaded to accede to our demands for an immediate termination of the war. On March 27, he finally instructed Woodford, on the basis of the Reports, to make a

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_Fore. Sec.,_ 1898, pp. 664-713.
further attempt to obtain an armistice until October 1, the immediate revocation of the reconcentration decrees, and if possible the acceptance by Spain of the United States as a final arbiter in the Cuban crisis. On April 10 McKinley was informed by Woodford of the results of his diplomatic efforts. In essence, Spain, desirous of peace, had acceded to all his demands.

But the President had already prepared an intervention message for Congress. In delivering this (April 11) he only casually mentioned the Spanish concessions of the previous day. The result of his message was that he was given the authority to use the land and naval forces of the United States to pacify Cuba. An intervention resolution, modified by the Teller amendment, to disavow imperialistic motives on the part of the United States, was passed by Congress on April 19. This was signed by the President on the following day. The minister immediately requested his passports and on April 21 Spain severed diplomatic relations with the United States. Congress ordered a blockade of all Cuban ports and on April 25

336 For. Rel., 1898, p. 704. Day to Woodford, March 27.
337 Ibid., 1898, p. 746. Woodford to Day, April 9.
formally declared that a state of war with Spain had existed since April 21.

The editorial attitude of a majority of Middle Western newspapers showed, however, that the Maine incident in itself was not regarded as a casus belli. In fact, the early comment showed a decided willingness on the part of most of the editors to follow Sigsbee's advice of suspending judgment and to commit themselves to the "accident" theory in explanation of the Maine disaster. The Indianapolis Journal, for example, urged self-control and conjectured that perhaps "It is time for naval engineers, architects and shipbuilders to inquire whether in evolving a great fighting machine they have not evolved a man trap." 339 The Ohio State Journal also adopted the accident theory.340 It cited the testimony of an English expert to show that the Maine incident could not be used legitimately as an excuse for war341 and criticized the sensational press for jingoism.342 It also praised the calm attitude of McKinley343 and the favorable reception of the

339 Indianapolis Journal, February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
340 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
341 Ibid., February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 5.
342 Ibid., February 27, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
343 Ibid., February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 6, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
Viscaya in the New York harbor as evidence of American self-control in the matter. The Columbus Dispatch supplemented a deluge of editorials by effective cartoons with the same purpose in view. Similar sentiments were expressed by the Cleveland Leader, which urged that the Maine incident be kept separate from the Cuban issue. The general comment of the Milwaukee Sentinel was couched in

344 Ibid., February 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; and February 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

345 Columbus Evening Dispatch, February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

346 Ibid., February 17, 1898, p. 1; February 19, 1898, p. 1; February 22, 1898, p. 1; February 23, 1898, p. 1; February 25, 1898, p. 1; February 26, 1898, p. 1; February 28, 1898, p. 1; March 1, 1898, p. 1; March 5, 1898, p. 1; March 9, 1898, p. 1; March 10, 1898, p. 1; March 14, 1898, p. 1.

347 Cleveland Leader, February 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; February 17, 1898, p. 1; c. 3; February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 3-4 and 4; February 19, 1898, p. 1, c. 6-7, p. 4, c. 2 and 3-4; February 20, 1898, p. 6, c. 4; February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and 3; February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 1 and 2-3; February 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; February 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and p. 1, c. 6-7, p. 4, c. 2-3; February 27, 1898, p. 6, c. 2, p. 4, c. 4; February 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and 4; March 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2, and 3-4; March 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 3-4 and 4; March 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 4 and 4-5; March 6, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2 and 3; March 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and 3; March 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
similar vein, while the vast majority of other Republican papers in the Middle West provided additional arguments of a conservative nature.

The editorial opinion of the leading Democratic and
Independent papers of the Middle West was essentially identical with that expressed by the outstanding Republican journals in that region. The editors of these papers seemed

February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 5, 1898, p. 12, c. 1-2; March 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Detroit Free Press, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 6, 1898, p. 16, c. 1-2; and March 13, 1898, p. 16, c. 1; Louisville Courier-Journal, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; February 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Louisville Times, February 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Kansas City (Missouri) Times, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 20, 1898, p. 12, c. 2; February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Davenport Democrat, February 20, 1898, p. 2, c. 3; February 24, 1898, p. 2, c. 1; February 27, 1898, p. 2, c. 2; Sioux City Tribune, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 20, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3; February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
equally as willing to accept the accident theory and just as vitriolic in their denunciation of the sensational press as were the Administration papers cited above.

Yet this appeal to reason was not entirely unanimous; for subsequent to the Maine disaster a small minority of Middle Western editors tended to place the blame for the Maine tragedy upon the Spanish government and to urge the Administration to pursue a more drastic course toward the Cuban question. 352 Even

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352 Chicago Tribune, February 17, 1898, p. 12, c. 2 and 3; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 2 and 3; February 23, 1898, p. 6, c. 4; February 26, 1898, p. 6, c. 4; February 25, 1898, p. 6, c. 2, 3 and 4; February 26, 1898, p. 12, c. 3, 3-4 and 1-2; February 27, 1898, p. 30, c. 2, 2-3 and 3; March 2, 1898, p. 6, c. 2, 3, 3-4; March 3, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3 and 4; March 4, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4, and 4-5; March 5, 1898, p. 12 c. 2, 3 and 4 and p. 5, c. 6; March 6, 1898, p. 28, c. 2; March 7, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4; Saint Paul Pioneer Press, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Cincinnati Times-Star, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; 1-2; February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; February 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; February 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and 2-3; March 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; March 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; and March 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Indianapolis Sentinel, February 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; March 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Omaha World-Herald, February 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Louis Republic, February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; and February 22, 1898, p. 1; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, February 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Ibid., February 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 2 and 3; February 19, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and p. 6, c. 2-3; February 23, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Minneapolis Tribune, February 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 8, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; Ibid., March 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 3; March 11, 1898, p. 7, c. 2; Cincinnati Enquirer, February 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; February 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; February 24, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; February 25, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2;
the more conservative editors alluded to above occasionally showed signs of wavering under the encouragement of the chauvinistic press and especially because of the trend of events which may be rather clearly distinguished about mid-March.

The editorial comment which appeared between the destruction of the Maine and the declaration of war revealed that a number of significant factors contributed to intervention. In addition to the Maine incident, there was the influence of the Proctor Report, the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, McKinley's war message of April 11, the improbability of European interference in the Cuban crisis and the political aspects of war. On each of these, the editors of Middle Western newspapers expressed views which may in a measure explain the
incongruity of McKinley's action in declaring war after Spain had agreed to all our demands.

Not the least among the factors which turned the tide toward forceful intervention was Senator Proctor's report on Cuban conditions which he delivered in the Senate on March 17. Said the Ohio State Journal, "In his 'Inferno;' Dante pictured nothing more appalling," than the "straightforward narrative" of Senator Proctor; and it continued, "He has convinced the conservative classes of the American people that humanity demands a policy on her part which will free Cuba from the Spanish yoke." Proctor's speech was described by the Milwaukee Sentinel as "the most important report on this subject (of Cuba) that has yet been placed before the public." The Indianapolis Journal, Cleveland Leader, Detroit Journal, Iowa State Register, and other Administration
papers accepted Proctor's statement as a true picture of the Cuban situation and predicted that it would encourage McKinley to pursue a more positive policy. The Indianapolis Sentinel stated that the report was "an index" to the Administration's intentions and the Nebraska State Journal interpreted it as "Proctor's Call to New England." Independent papers such as the Chicago Record and the Chicago Times-Herald and Democratic journals such as the Detroit Free Press, Milwaukee Journal and the Louisville Times agreed essentially with the Louisville Courier-Journal that the Proctor report signified "a new epoch in the Cuban question."

359 Dubuque Daily Telegraph, March 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Topeka Daily Capital, March 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 19, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Tribune, March 26, 1898, p. 12, c. 5.

360 Indianapolis Sentinel, March 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

361 Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), March 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

362 Chicago Record, March 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

363 Chicago Times-Herald, March 19, 1898, p. 8, c. 2.


365 Milwaukee Journal, March 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

366 Louisville Times, March 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

367 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 26, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
The Proctor Report thus served as a focal point around which the interventionist sentiment was centered about the middle of March, 1898. But the trend toward intervention was further stimulated and the "new epoch" in the Cuban question was further encouraged by the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry which McKinley submitted to Congress on March 28. The contents of this report have already been mentioned and it is only necessary to indicate at this point that it was interpreted as a further indication that something must be done to solve the Cuban question—even though definite responsibility for the destruction of the Maine was not fixed on Spain. The day before the report was delivered one editor wrote:

Nine out of ten American citizens doubtless believe firmly that the explosion which destroyed the Maine was the result of the cowardly Spanish conspiracy, and the Report of the Court of Inquiry will not tend to destroy that belief. 368

A number of other editors 369 agreed with the Milwaukee Sentinel.

368 Cleveland Leader, March 27, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3.
369 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Detroit Journal, March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Nebraska State
which predicted that the Report would be "The Beginning of Intervention." Regardless of the inability of the Court of Inquiry to prove Spanish responsibility for the Maine disaster, the Cleveland Plain Dealer implied as much in an editorial which described Spain as "The Cain of Nations." It maintained that Spain must prove her innocence "before the public opinion of the civilized world." The Cincinnati Times-Star was unwilling to give Spain a fair chance to do even that. It said:

The summary of the report sent out by the Board of Inquiry takes away the last hopes of those who wanted the Maine incident admitted as an accident. The United States has proved its claim by expert testimony. Now it is Spain's turn. If she offers a contrary report she will merely hasten the crisis.

Although many of the editors of Middle Western newspapers agreed with the Milwaukee Journal that the responsibility of

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Journal (Lincoln), March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Iowa State Register (Des Moines), March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 30, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Minneapolis Tribune, March 30, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.

Milwaukee Sentinel, March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., March 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

Ibid., March 29, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.

Ibid., March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
the Maine should be kept separate from the Cuban question, the majority of them concurred with the opinion of the Louisville Courier-Journal that "the withdrawal or expulsion of Spain from Cuba" had become imperative to our national interests. A few papers frequently lamented the fact that the President had submitted the Report of the Court of Inquiry to Congress. The Columbus Dispatch reflected the same regret emphatically, while the Indianapolis Journal warned that by turning the issue over to Congress the President was dallying with "the danger of compromising the national dignity and losing the support of the people and other nations."

Perhaps it was the consideration of two factors, namely, the electorate of the United States and the possibilities of

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374 Milwaukee Journal, April 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
375 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Dubuque Telegraph, March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Davenport Democrat, April 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Kansas City Times, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Record, March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Times-Herald, March 30, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Denver Post, April 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
376 Topeka Daily Capital, March 31, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
377 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
378 Indianapolis Journal, March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
European interference that set the tone of McKinley's intervention message. At any rate the editorial comment of Middle Western papers showed that political considerations were involved in the choice of McKinley's course. Said the Chicago Times-Herald, "The vultures circling over the wreck of the Maine in the harbor of Havana have more patience than the political vultures who are poised to take advantage of further delay in regard to Cuba." Yet it stated in an editorial on "Free Cuba or Free Silver" that "between war and free silver" it favored war. The Times-Herald was criticized for this "discordant note in the time of a crisis" by the Chicago Record, which paper also added that "If the President were to act now because of fear of the triumph of his political opponents, he would thereby confess that he ought to have intervened long ago, but shirked his duty." The Dubuque Telegraph also discerned the political implication of the Cuban issue. The Ohio State Journal maintained that the jingoes
wanted war because they believed that hostilities between the United States and Spain "would make it difficult to maintain the gold standard." The Cleveland Leader contended that the Democrats desired war "to strengthen Bryanism and drag down the Republican administration." The public statements of Democratic leaders in such papers as the Milwaukee Sentinel and the Detroit Free Press seemed to bear out this fact.

It seemed, therefore, that the opposition press was willing enough to embarrass McKinley politically over the Cuban question. Although the Republican press defended the party
in power, it definitely recognized the political implications of the issue. 388 Said the Chicago Tribune:

The people want no disgraceful negotiations with Spain. Should the President plunge his administration into that morass, he and his party would be swept out of power in 1900 by a fine outburst of popular indignation. An administration which strains the national honor never will be forgiven. 389

The Sioux City Tribune thought that Spain might likewise prefer war to peace because of internal politics, 390 while the Denver Post condemned the "vacillating" policy of our President in these words:

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388 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., April 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; April 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Topeka Daily Capital, February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-5; Ibid., March 31, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2 and April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, February 23, 1898, p. 6, c. 3; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 4, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; March 30, 1898, p. 1; Indianapolis Journal, January 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 1.

389 Chicago Tribune, February 27, 1898, p. 30, c. 2.

390 Sioux City Tribune, March 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
The time has now arrived when the president must for the sake of his reputation take a positive stand, or if not, step aside and allow Congress to take it for him. The danger in the situation is found in the misconception of our national character by other nations with whom we may sooner or later come into collision. It is the height of folly to have emphasized to these nations the current lie that the American character is commercial rather than martial, for it may cost us enormously one of these days to prove the contrary. A firm, self-respecting course now will be found much cheaper in the end and wherever that may lead, the American people, who are proud of their country and jealous of its honor, are ready to go.

So in the manner just suggested, McKinley's course turned not only upon the consideration of internal politics, but also upon a fear of European intervention as well. The European factor in the Cuban equation had been somewhat casually reflected in the editorial comment of Middle Western newspapers during 1895 and 1896. But beginning about

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391 Denver Post, April 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
392 Omaha World-Herald, December 8, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Times-Star, August 24, 1896, p. 4, c. 1.
393 Cincinnati Enquirer, November 26, 1896, p. 6, c. 1; Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 25, 1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., January 20, 1896, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, September 5, 1896, p. 4, c. 3; Detroit Free Press, December 29,
July, 1897, when it seemed apparent that McKinley would eventually intervene in Cuban affairs, editorial comment revealed an unusual interest in the attitude of Europe toward the Cuban crisis. The general comment indicated that if Europe attempted to meddle in the affairs of the Western hemisphere it would be vigorously opposed by the United States. Accordingly, reasons were developed to show why the countries of Europe could not oppose American intervention in Cuba.

The improbability of European interference seemed especially apparent to a number of papers about the middle of March, 1898. The Ohio State Journal emphasized English friendship and presented the proposition that the Cuban question had always been exclusively an American affair. The Cincinnati

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1896, p. 4, c. 1-2; Ibid., January 23, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Times-Star, March 11, 1896, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., July 1, 1896, p. 4, c. 2.

Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, October 2, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Ibid., October 16, 1897, p. 6, c. 2-3; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, September 26, 1897, p. 36, c. 4; Saint Paul Pioneer Press, January 7, 1897, p. 4, c. 3.

Columbus Evening Dispatch, July 17, 1897, p. 1.

Louisville Courier-Journal, October 14, 1897, p. 4, c. 1-2.

Chicago Tribune, February 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 3; Chicago Times-Herald, March 10, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2 and March 11, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Indianapolis Journal, March 6, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Louisville Courier-Journal, February 26, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; March 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1.

Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 6, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
Enquirer interpreted Sir Julian Pauncefote's official visit to President McKinley as evidence of British friendship, talked sentimentally about "Our British Cousins," warned the other European powers that the United States had become "a great and commanding force in the affairs of the world," and concluded that Europe was "with us" in the matter of Cuban intervention. The Cleveland Plain Dealer watched the attitude of the continental powers with equal concern, quoted Tennyson's poem "Hands All Around" to show that the United States and Britain were one, and maintained that Mexico was also sympathetic to our proposed action. Since English assistance could be counted upon, the Cleveland

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399 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
400 Ibid., March 22, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
401 Ibid., March 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
402 Ibid., March 28, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
403 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; March 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 1 and 2; March 20, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4;
404 Ibid., March 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
405 Ibid., March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
Leader thought we could pursue our course in the Caribbean regardless of the position taken by the other European powers. The Cincinnati Commercial Tribune repeated many of the arguments mentioned above and contended that Europe could not object to American intervention in Cuba because of its own recent imperialistic examples in the Near East and Africa. The Columbus Dispatch said that the United States desired nothing more than "the moral support" of the great European powers, which she was "reasonably certain to get by making sure of the justice of her case before taking action."

The United States was indeed anxious to get the "moral" approval of Europe for the justification of our proposed intervention in Cuba. This is shown in the messages of the Presidents on the Cuban question and by the fact that Woodford had

406 Cleveland Leader, March 11, 1898, p. 1, c. 2.
407 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 16, 1898, p. 6, c. 5; Ibid., March 21, 1898, p. 5, c. 5; April 1, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; April 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 6; May 1, 1898, p. 12, c. 3.
408 Ibid., April 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4.
409 Ibid., April 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 3 and cartoon, p. 1.
considered it one of his primary duties in Spain to convince the European ministeries that our position in regard to Cuba was valid. Woodford's correspondence to the State Department shows rather clearly that the Powers would offer no serious resistance to the steps we proposed to take in terminating the Cuban revolt. Therefore when the Pope sought to arbitrate the Cuban crisis through the offices of his holiness, and a group of European diplomats appealed to McKinley in the name of peace, the latter was in a position to make a polite but firm refusal of both.

European acquiescence, coming as it did just before McKinley submitted his intervention message to Congress on April 11, very likely further encouraged him to pursue the course he followed. It goes almost without saying that McKinley's refusal to countenance European interference in the situation met the approval of the Middle Western editors.

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411 Supra. III, p. 230.
412 Ibid. See references cited in notes on above page.
413 Cleveland Leader. April 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Cincinnati Times-Star, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
414 Chicago Record, April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Journal, April 9, 1898, c. 2-8; Louisville Courier-Journal, April 16, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Denver Post, April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 10, 1898, p. 1, c. 3-4; April 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; April
Furthermore, in his war message he warned that he expected "to have the moral support of the European powers," and to further guarantee that result the Teller Amendment was appended to the war resolution which followed. Said the Milwaukee Sentinel in praising the "President's Timely Wisdom" in delaying intervention, "In consequence we are equipped with arguments for disputed questions before neutral governments abroad...." After war was declared the Columbus Dispatch was therefore able to depict Spain "Abandoned," by the "Concert of Europe." And, although the editors kept their eyes on Europe during the war, it was generally agreed that Dewey's exploit at Manila on May 1 would have the effect of

17, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3; April 20, 1898, p. 1; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Sentinel, April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 5, 1898, p. 1; Ibid., April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; and April 13, 1898, p. 6.

417 Detroit Free Press, April 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
418 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 28, 1898, p. 1. See also April 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
making our strength feared and respected abroad. Europe was thus eliminated as a factor in the solution of the Cuban question.

The tide of intervention had thus been augmented by the Proctor Report, the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry, the political factor in the Cuban question and the apparent improbability of European interference. But the press did not entirely abandon the possibility that peace might be maintained until after McKinley delivered his intervention message to Congress. Even then, many of the Administration papers still hoped for peace until Congress had acted. Furthermore, at this crucial point McKinley's statesmanship failed to rise to the occasion of stemming the interventionist tide. That is, he failed properly to inform the press concerning the progress of his diplomatic efforts and of the fact that Spain, although with reluctance, had gradually yielded to his demands for a

419 Cincinnati Enquirer, May 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., June 2, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; June 14, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4; Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., May 6, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Times-Star, May 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
peaceful settlement of the Cuban question. It would seem therefore, to this extent and to the extent of his message to Congress, that McKinley was responsible, along with the other factors mentioned above, for the final crystallization of the spirit which resulted in war. For in passing the question over to Congress there was little doubt as to what the consequences would be, especially since McKinley was the spokesman for the party in power, if not its leader. There was nothing left for the Republican editors to do save doubtfully hope for peace while actually expecting war.  

The Democratic press, which naturally interpreted the message as amounting to a declaration of war, was joined by

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Minneapolis Tribune, April 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Chicago Daily News, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Leader, April 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1; Ibid., April 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, April 22, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-3; Ibid., April 13, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Topeka Daily Capital, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Times-Star, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

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Detroit Free Press, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Saint Louis Republic, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Dubuque Telegraph, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Louisville Courier-Journal, April 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, April 16, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Louisville Times, April 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 17, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Sioux City Tribune, April 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
the more aggressive Republican and Independent papers. In a full page scarlet headline, the Kansas City Journal exclaimed: "THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE MAKES A NEW FLAG POSSIBLE: LONG MAY IT WAVE!"423

On April 19 Congress responded to McKinley's intervention message by the passage of a war resolution. This was signed by the President on April 20. Only the nationalistic task of editorial rationalization of a fait accompli remained to be done and in the execution of this task the editors joined hands in an outburst of editorial patriotism.

The foregoing analysis shows that three rather distinct types of methods were considered for the solution of the Cuban question. These were non-intervention, peaceful intervention and forceful intervention. The methods of non-intervention were readily abandoned by the editors who generally preferred some type of peaceful settlement of the Cuban question, but who finally sanctioned war for that purpose.

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422 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Detroit Journal, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Nebraska State Journal, (Lincoln), April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Ibid., April 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Iowa State Register (Des Moines), April 12, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Minneapolis Journal, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Denver Post, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 12, 1898, p. 5, c. 1; Chicago Record, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.

423 Kansas City Journal, April 12, 1898, p. 1.
CHAPTER IV

EDITORIAL RATIONALIZATION OF THE
SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR

Much of the partisanship which had characterized the consideration of the Cuban question during the three years preceding the advent of war disappeared as the United States turned to face a common enemy for the first time in almost a century. The Milwaukee Sentinel observed that the war resolution had made "a revolution in public opinion."¹ The psychological basis for this was ably described in an address before the Pennsylvania Bar Association, while the war was still in progress, which pointed out the obvious necessity for presenting a united front during the crisis.² That the editors considered this their patriotic duty and that they did their task well indeed is shown by the enthusiastic manner in which they immediately set out to justify the resort to force in solution of the Cuban question.

¹ Milwaukee Sentinel, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
Editorial attempts to justify the Spanish-American War fall logically into two general categories. One of these involved the repetition of the fundamental interests of the United States in Cuba, which had been previously expressed in the editorial comment on the various ramifications of "manifest destiny," while the other included a group of miscellaneous reasons, more immediate in origin, but which nonetheless were used as a pretext for the intervention already at hand.

Among the miscellaneous reasons presented by the editors, in their efforts to make our intervention in Cuba "satisfactory to the civilized world," was the argument that after three quarters of a century of demonstrated Spanish incompetence in coping with the Cuban situation, the "time" had come for reckoning at the hands of the United States. Even the conservative Milwaukee Journal agreed to this late in March 1898 and predicted the fulfillment of President Cleveland's speculation.

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3 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
4 Ibid., March 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
5 Ibid., February 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cincinnati Times-Star, February 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
that forceful intervention should come in due course, provided we make it clear "both as to grounds and methods" that our actions would be justified. Another paper quoted the ex-president as in accord with our proposed action because intervention had become "righteous" with "time," and in their demands to "Close The Cuban War" on these grounds, the editors were joined by similar declarations of numerous State legislatures. The testimony of well known authorities on the "right" and "legality" of intervention as illustrated from historical precedent was likewise used as a standard argument in explanation of our action. Personages of no less importance than John Holliday Latane, the historian, and

6 Milwaukee Journal, March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
7 Ibid., March 31, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
8 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
9 Cincinnati Enquirer, February 8, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
10 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 10, 1898, p. 5, c. 1.
11 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 22, 1898, p. 6, c. 5; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; April 7, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Louisville Courier-Journal, April 9, 1898, p. 5, c. 2-3.
12 Chicago Tribune, March 7, 1898, p. 6, c. 2-3; For the article referred to in this editorial see, John H. Latane, "Intervention of the United States in Cuba," North American Review, March 1898, Clxvi, pp. 350-361.
Amos S. Hershey, the political scientist, were cited as favoring forcible intervention on the score that Spain had at last met her Nemesis.

Editorials urging intervention on similar grounds, such for example as that appearing in the Cleveland Plain Dealer, were frequently interspersed with other current reasons for intervention. In general, however, most of the editorials, although referring to the Maine incident as the thing which had brought forcible intervention into the immediate foreground, did not attempt to make that disaster the primary cause of war. It is true that some of the papers claimed war was "The Outgrowth of February 15," that "The Maine, Not Cuba, (was) The Issue," and that "Remember The Maine," should be our slogan. Yet most of them agreed essentially with the observation of the

14 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2. See its review of an article in the Independent by T. S. Woolsey, Professor of international law at Yale.
15 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 20, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2.
16 Cincinnati Times-Star, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
17 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
Detroit Free Press that the historian of the Spanish-American War would undoubtedly designate the Maine catastrophe as only "one of the forces that precipitated the rupture" between the United States and Spain.

Perhaps the remark of the Dubuque Daily Times early in March that "The prospects of success strengthen the prospects of war" was even a more important factor in precipitating the crisis than either the Maine or the De Dome Letter, for underlying that statement was the realisation of American superiority and Spanish weakness. Certainly the reflection of the Times on this point was the typical opinion of practically every paper in the Middle West. "The apparent popularity of war with a large element of the people is doubtless due in some measure to the confident feeling that we would make short

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16 Detroit Free Press, April 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
19 Dubuque Daily Times, March 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
20 Detroit Journal, April 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Cleveland Leader, March 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 15, 1898, p. 1; Ibid., February 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; Indianapolis Journal, March 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Topeka Daily Capital, March 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 19, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Cincinnati Times-Star, April 4, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., May 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2;
work of the Spaniards," said the Milwaukee Sentinel which stated in reply to a critic who lamented the "quiet Western ways" during the impending crisis:

The West is neither asleep or alarmed. It is neither crazy for war nor pusillanimous for peace. It has confidence in the government, in the country, in itself. The West is quiet because it is unnecessary for a sure thing to be noisy.22

Many of the editors favored war because it would consolidate the national spirit and serve as a diversion from the prevailing economic, social and political ills. "The moral atmosphere of the nation will be purified" and "There will be something to worship besides the 'almighty dollar,'" said the Des Moines News. The Kansas City Times, wrote philosophically, in consideration of the "Compensations of War:"

One of the strongest of the processes of evolution is to unfold living entities to higher states...We need to have our ever-boiling-over national pride and enthusiasm

21 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
22 Ibid., April 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
simmered down to pure, practical and applied patriotism from time to time. We swell out mightily when we contemplate the vastness of our commonwealth and the boundlessness of its wealth, comfort and happiness-making resources, and we need to occasionally be reminded that the price of it all is constant vigilance...War kills, but the blood of the patriot brightens the warp and strengthens the woof of the national fabric, and also oils the machinery of the loom, but of the smoke of battle that is fought in the name of liberty there comes a light which lightens the way of freedom's march the wide world over, and when peace comes, evolution's processes raise civilization up to the new level of humanity's unfoldment Goodward. The flower that blossoms in the silence that follows the storm distills the sweeter, the richer perfume. 24

Maintained the Indianapolis Sentinel in a more pragmatic vein:

A war with Spain will free Cuba, punish the Spanish, exploit the United States as a power among the nations of the earth, regenerate the national spirit and divert attention from the desperate conditions of internal politics. 25

Under such conditions and with such happy anticipations, many of the editors hastened to advise the President of the inevitable personal popularity which would accrue to him from

24 Kansas City Times, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
25 Indianapolis Sentinel, April 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 5-6.
a short and brief war with Spain. "Never in the history of this country was there a better opportunity ("to make un-to himself a name imperishable and full of glory"), or one involving so little risk," said the Cleveland Plain Dealer. Admitting that war under these favorable conditions, would result in the future eclipse of the Democratic party because of the resulting tide of nationalism, the editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, in a penetrating analysis on the "Whys and Wherefores" of the approaching conflict, revealed the manner in which that nationalism transcended editorial partisanship:

(War) . . . will invigorate the national spirit. It will animate the rising generation or the South, demoralized and debauched by the Republican attempt at Reconstruction by force of arms, with a new impulse and a new hope. It will give the West something better than inflated money to think about. Even the East—the money-grabbing, the supercilious and selfish East—which knows so perfectly its own country—which wakes up to nothing until the West and South have spoken—which, hugging its riches and its culture, imagines that books,

26 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Louisville Times, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
27 Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 14, 1898, p. 4, c.
particularly books of entry, are everything and brain and brawn are nothing—which takes its cues from Europe and turns its back upon America—even the pampered and stolid East may derive some comfort from the reflection that we shall have to have a war tariff, and that it will still be given the job of building the armaments! New York, the most provincial city on the continent, naturally has much to learn; but Boston and Philadelphia are trying to get a whiff of pure and free air. In this land may we not hope that all of us will be able to join in singing, 'Rally around the flag, boys, rally once again!' 29

The sentiments of Watterson were soon to be epitomized by his repetition of Stephen Decatur's famous slogan "My country, may she always be right. But right or wrong, my country!" 29 Yet, when analyzed more objectively, the national patriotism of which this brilliant Kentucky editor was an outstanding exponent may be translated into the tenets of the philosophy of "manifest destiny," with its compelling premises of economic imperialism, military strategem, political idealism and systematic humanitarianism, the purposes of which were to be consummated through the methods of macht politik.

28 Louisville Courier-Journal. May 31, 1898, p. 4, o. 2-3; Ibid., April 11, 1898, p. 4, o. 2-3. This editorial was inspired by a letter of George Peabody to the New York Times in which he joined Carl Schurz and E. L. Godkin in opposing war.

29 Ibid., April 22, 1898, p. 4, o. 2.
Between February 1895 and April 1898, the various elements of this doctrine were repeatedly expressed in the editorial comment of the Middle West. In no aspect of editorial consideration of the Cuban question was this more evident than in the interest shown in Cuba from the economic standpoint. It is true that during the weeks which immediately preceded the beginning of hostilities that American commercial interests vigorously opposed war. Yet the fact has been overlooked that this sentiment was more an expression of partisan fear on the part of the Republicans who, more than the temporary disruption of business, feared that war would lead to the triumph of their arch enemy inflation and free silver. This temporary opposition to war was superficial and transitional when compared with our historic and basic economic interests in the Caribbean. The germane relationship of these interests to our course of action in 1898 has already been adequately demonstrated in our discussion of the revival of "manifest destiny" in 1895 and has been repeatedly brought out elsewhere. For further proof of this, one need only examine the editorial comment of Middle Western newspapers. It will be found,

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especially from about the middle of March until May 1, 1898, that the economic motive stands out in relief as the Administration papers gradually gave way to the war sentiment and the opposition editors more readily admitted the Marxian implications of our purposes. Representative of the former group during this period, the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, formerly opposing war on commercial grounds for partisan reasons, talked enthusiastically about the advantages a military depot would be to Cincinnati, indulged in optimistic speculation concerning the close economic relations between Cuban iron ore and the coke of Alabama in the event of Cuban independence and noted with interest that the price of Western mules had recently doubled because of army purchases. The Columbus Dispatch observed this change of business sentiment in an editorial on "Bradstreet's Tribute To Patriotism."
while the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune discussed the same development in an editorial on the "Practical Patriotism of American business magnates in giving money, yachts and other facilities for prosecuting the war." As early as February, the Kansas City Journal sensationally advised its readers that "THE TIDE OF PROSPERITY IS ROLLING STEADILY ON IN SPITE OF WAR RUMORS," that "FEBRUARY BANK CLEARINGS SHOW THAT WAR TALK IS NOT INTERFERING WITH BUSINESS," and boasted in March that "THE NATION CAN RELY ON THE GREAT WESTERN GRAIN FIELDS IN EITHER PEACE OR WAR."

Typical of the Democratic press, the Dubuque Daily Telegraph and the Indianapolis Sentinel, blamed Wall Street for the Administration's delay in intervening. The Louisville Times agreed with Senator Thurston who pointed out that war, in addition to arousing the "nobler impulses of a people," would

34 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 29, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
35 Kansas City Journal, February 27, 1898, p. 1.
37 Ibid., March 20, 1898, p. 1.
38 Dubuque Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
39 Indianapolis Sentinel, March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
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34 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, April 29, 1898, p. 6, c. 2.
35 Kansas City Journal, February 27, 1898, p. 1.
37 Ibid., March 20, 1898, p. 1.
38 Dubuque Daily Telegraph, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
39 Indianapolis Sentinel, March 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
lead to the re-employment of labor. The Chicago Inter
Ocean announced early in April that the war tide would be
accompanied by a "return to prosperity." The Detroit
Free Press feared no evil effects of war on business. The
Milwaukee Journal entertained the view attributed to Bismarck
that Cuban liberty was secondary to our "mercenary" motives
and intimated that big business actually favored war. With
an eye on future commercial opportunities in Cuba, the
Cleveland Plain Dealer insisted that we should "away with
pretext," hypocrisy and sentimental bosh over intervention
for humanity's sake and admit that our real motive was the
ultimate annexation of Cuba for commercial exploitation.
After McKinley had delivered his intervention message, the
Denver Post urged Congress to "Act At Once" because delay "is
demoralizing the people and paralyzing business enterprise."

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40 Louisville Times, March 26, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
41 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
42 Detroit Free Press, April 27, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
44 Ibid., March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
45 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
46 Denver Post, April 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Ibid., April 12,
1898, p. 4, c. 2.
There was more to the economic aspects of the war with Spain, however, than its mere relationship to a temporary disruption of our domestic business routine. There was also a desire for commercial empire. As early as 1896 the Engineering Magazine presented this view in an article in which the economic thinking of typical industrial capitalists in the United States must have been reflected. In part the article ran as follows:

With the mind's eye we may stand upon the Cuban shore and gaze upon the commerce of all the Gulf of Mexico, we may trace the barks laden with merchandise upon the Mississippi river, and we may even, in fancy, cast our glance across the Isthmus of Panama and view the busy world that animates the Pacific slope upon the other side. Thus situated, Cuba necessarily becomes a favorite market for United States goods; and, reciprocally, the markets of the United States would receive the attention of the Cuban markets and manufactures.  

Thus as the Spanish-American War approached and the possibilities of turning the dream of commercial empire into an effective reality, the American capitalists must have

consciously realized the unmistakable economic advantages that would accrue to them as a result of war with Spain. Perhaps one of their representatives was the author of an anonymous article which appeared in the Cincinnati Enquirer in March 1898. Pointing out the imperialistic examples being set by European expansionists, this "well known contributor," went on to recapitulate the economic pillars of "manifest destiny:"

These movements (of European imperialism) have been brought about more by the commercial necessities of the rival peoples engaged in them than...by mere desire for the acquisition of territory. With advanced technical education and the enormous growth and perfection of labor-saving machinery, the rewards of capital have diminished, labor is everywhere a drug, discontentment and socialism threaten the stability of governments, and the one practical remedy sought by statesmen, though it prove but a temporary one for these conditions, is more extension of markets. There are but two ways of obtaining these—either by such a policy as will insure trade with foreign nations, or by such a control of new territories as will carry with it control of its commerce. The United States is committed to the policy of protection, which, whatever merits it may possess, does not encourage free interchange of products with other countries, and as it has, like the other great nations, reached a stage where it is threatened with all the dangers

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48 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, March 13, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
which confront them, it is for it, more than any of them, essential that new outlets for its capital, its super-abundant energy and its surplus commodities be found by extending its limits, so as to reach, create and build new markets.

Moving from the general to the particular, by applying the theory of "manifest destiny" specifically to the problem of Cuba, the author went on to say, "The time has come when the mighty current of the fortunes of the world can no longer be resisted." The duty of the United States was therefore made clear. It must "choke off the vampire (Spain) that has sucked... (Cuba's) life blood and establish a firm rule that will protect capital...." In fact American interests were already engaged in accomplishing these results through economic imperialism and actively interested in driving "A Big Foreign Trade Wedge" into the Caribbean even before war was declared.

It has been pointed out elsewhere that the corollary of economic imperialism is military strategy. It has been shown also that the militarists and the imperialists recognized their interdependence as early as 1895. As one might assume,

49 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-4.
50 Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
the connection between the two ideas was not overlooked in 1898 by their editorial exponents who used military strategy as justification for intervention in Cuba. "Every country with expanding commercial interests must try to be in the best possible position to protect its trade in case of aggression and to keep open the great highways on the seas."

said the author of the anonymous article alluded to above in citing the authoritative statement of Captain Mahan whose naval propaganda had emphasized the value of Cuba for strategic reasons. Shaken loose from its ancient political moorings as a result of war with Spain it was predicted that Cuba would legitimately fall within the sphere of our influence and give protection to "our expanding commerce, add immensely to our military strength and greatly re-enforce our weak and until lately waning power upon the seas." 51

Quite naturally, therefore, upon the eve of the Spanish-American War many of the editors seized upon the arguments for military strategy as justification of our policy. Even the Monroe doctrine, which in its original application had been promulgated for reasons of self-preservation, was again invoked

51 Cincinnati Enquirer, March 9, 1898, p. 6, c. 3-5.
on the assumption that "The best defense is a good offense." The obvious danger of a turbulent Cuba passing from the hands of a weak Spain into those of a stronger European power led the editors of realpolitik to regard such possibilities with some degree of justifiable apprehension. Therefore, as the United States embarked upon its course of empire, the editors frequently cited the military psychology of Mahan to show that sea power was essential to national greatness as well as to national defense. In this connection the editors claimed validity for Washington's realistic observation that nations like individuals were primarily selfish in matters involving their security. Occasionally an editor foreshadowed the Schumpaeter theory of imperialism by contending that anyhow we were "Essentially A Martial People."

52 Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, April 22, 1898, p. 6, c. 2; Indianapolis Sentinel, April 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cincinnati Enquirer, April 4, 1898, p. 6, c. 1-2; Ibid., April 21, 1898, p. 8, c. 2-3; Indianapolis Journal, April 15, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; Ibid., April 9, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; April 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3; April 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Journal, April 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

53 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, February 2, 1898, p. 12, c. 1-2.

54 Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., April 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.

55 Ibid., February 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-5.
But it was far easier for the editors to explain away the "Motives Inspiring The Nations" in terms of American political idealism which for over a century had been nursed to maturity on an isolated North American continent. The great democratic experiment having been thus tested, its imperialistic exponents now sought to extend its advantages to others. Said the Chicago Record, "War is likely to prove a gain to civilization and to the cause of civil and political liberty, not only in this hemisphere but throughout the world." One editor maintained that while the Cuban war was the immediate cause of the difficulties between Spain and the United States the real cause of the trouble was the clash of political ideologies. Another saw the war as a struggle of "Republic vs Monarchy," while others pronounced our course "the righteous duty" of "republicanism for humanity." "There is little doubt," said the Louisville Times that eventually "the world will adopt the same system--

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56 Chicago Record, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 1.
57 Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 8, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
58 Louisville Times, April 18, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
59 Omaha World-Herald, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
60 Louisville Courier-Journal, March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 3-4.
that when nations go to war they will fight for themselves and not for a dynasty." Thus viewed, the Spanish-American War can be regarded, if not as a war to 'save the world for democracy', at least as a bloody means of imposing the democratic ideal upon weaker peoples.

The days that witnessed our entry into the war of 1898 not only brought forth editorial propagandists for such a course on the score of political idealism. The editors along with the clergy became the emotional agents for the imperialists' doctrine of "manifest destiny" on grounds of religion and common humanity. The tenor of this theme had already been set during the earlier phases of the Cuban revolt and with the advent of war the editorial columns of Middle Western newspapers and the weekly reports of Sunday sermons bear ample

61 Louisville Times, May 10, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
62 Minneapolis Journal, April 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Sioux City Tribune, April 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Journal, April 20, 1898, p. 3, c. 3; Ibid., April 23, 1898, p. 12, c. 4; Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, March 5, 1898, p. 6, c. 5; Ohio State Journal (Columbus), March 28, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Milwaukee Sentinel, February 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., February 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; February 27, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; Ibid., March 22, 1898, p. 4, c. 4; April 3, 1898, p. 21, c. 1-5; March 24, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; March 25, 1898, p. 4, c. 3-4; April 14, 1898, p. 4, c. 3-4; Cedar Rapids Daily Gazette, April 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 2-3.
testimony of the fact that the editors and the preachers joined hands in creating the myth that the Spanish-American War was a 'Crusade For Humanity.' The Ohio State Journal claimed that humanity alone was justification of our course, while the Indianapolis Sentinel reported that Evangelist Dwight L. Moody had said after reading Senator Proctor's statement on Cuban conditions from the pulpit that, "It is the most horrible arraignment, I say, of Christianity that has ever been made. We must, we must, wipe off that blot!" It was therefore stated that we were the people that God had chosen to carry out the will of the Lord in the Caribbean. The Milwaukee Sentinel recommended that "War As A Relief Measure" was our Christian duty." A Milwaukee minister delivered a sermon on "God In History" in which he indicated that God was on our side in the matter of Cuban intervention.

63 Ohio State Journal (Columbus), April 2, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2.
64 Indianapolis Sentinel, March 23, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
65 Chicago News, March 29, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
66 Milwaukee Sentinel, April 3, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
67 Milwaukee Journal, May 14, 1898, p. 12, c. 1-2. See also Detroit Journal, July 11, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
The militancy of the clergy was also reflected in a prayer rendered by another Middle Western minister who, before war was declared, prayed in the spirit of the crusades:

Oh, Lord, turn the eyes of our mighty ones to that scene not far from our own happy land, where the lives of the innocent are darkened and the helpless die by the sword. Grant to the unhappy island upon our southern coast that freedom from tyranny and liberty for which it cries and if need be show our people that they are chosen to be thy agents and messengers of hope. Let it be peace, O Lord, if it pleases thee; if not, thy will be done.  

In the same city another sermon was delivered on "The Sovereignty of God in National Affairs," while the well known Washington Gladden addressed his congregation at Columbus in similar vein. But lesser Protestant minds than Gladden's likewise wished to impose Christian vengeance upon Spain for Cuban wrongs and some saw in intervention

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68 Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 22, 1898, p. 5, c. 2.
69 Ibid., April 18, 1898, p. 5, c. 4-5.
70 Ibid., April 18, 1898, p. 5, c. 2. See others, Ibid., June 27, 1898, p. 5, c. 1-2; August 5, 1898, p. 4, c. 2; August 8, 1898, p. 5, c. 2; August 22, 1898, p. 5, c. 4; September 12, 1898, p. 4, c. 3; September 19, 1898, p. 4, c. 1-2; December 19, 1898, p. 5, c. 3.
71 Ibid., April 22, 1898, p. 1.
an opportunity to deal a blow to Catholicism. The editor of the Columbus Dispatch said, for example, that the expulsion of Spain from Cuba would make it possible for our missionaries to go there "and preach the everlasting gospel of Jesus Christ—for where our banner waves triumphant stands the word of God!" 72

Thus, not only would our 'Constitution follow the flag,' but with it would go our religious dogma as well. 73 Even the American Catholics, who might logically have sympathized with their spiritual brethren in Spain, showed through their official spokesman, Archbishop Ireland, 74 that they placed their patriotism above creed. The general loyalty of the Middle West to the nation's course in its ostensible crusade for humanity was further shown in editorial and public address. 76 "In Hoc Signo," cried Marse Henry Watterson of the

72 Ibid., June 20, 1898, p. 5, c. 1-2.
73 Ibid., April 18, 1898, p. 6, c. 5; April 21, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; May 9, 1898, p. 16, c. 3; July 3, 1898, p. 16, c. 2.
74 Detroit Free Press, March 1, 1898, p. 4, c. 1; Columbus Evening Dispatch, March 11, 1898, p. 1.
75 Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, May 6, 1898, p. 6, c. 1.
76 Columbus Evening Dispatch, April 30, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
77 Ibid., April 22, 1898, p. 7, c. 3.
It is not a war of conquest. It is not a war of envy or enmity. It is not a war of pillage or gain....We are not going to the musty records of title archives to find our warrant for this war. We find it in the law supreme—the law high above the law of titles in the lands, in chattels, in human bodies and human souls—the law of man, the law of God. We find it in the peals of the bell that rang out our sovereignty from Philadelphia. We find it in the blood of the patriots who won our independence at the cannon's mouth. We find it in the splendid structure of our national life, built up through over a hundred years of consecration of liberty and deference to despotism; we find it in our giant strength, attained in the air and under the skies of freedom and equality, which has not only won and guided the world's bulwark of liberty and law in our Republic, but which this hemisphere shall not be trespassed on by despotism and autocracy, and which now, in the sight of the Powers of the earth and the God of nations, takes one step more and says that liberty and law shall no longer be trampled upon, outraged and murdered by despotism and autocracy upon our threshold. This is the right of our might; this is the sign in which we conquer. 78

It is not strange therefore that a typical Middle Western editor should say of the breakfast enjoyed by Dewey's crew after its destruction of the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, "It

78 Louisville Courier-Journal, April 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 2.
was like partaking of the sacrament at the altar of liberty." Undoubtedly many Americans sincerely believed our victory over Spain in 1898 was sanctioned by Divine Providence. But as we have seen, there were other reasons much more basic than our "Christian duty" which were utilized by the editors of Middle Western newspapers in their attempts to rationalize our intervention on behalf of Cuba.

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Columbus Evening Dispatch, May 20, 1898, p. 4, c. 3.
Although it is difficult to make generalized statements regarding the exact influence of the Middle Western newspapers in bringing about the Spanish-American War, their editorial comment would seem to indicate that they contributed to that end. Their chief influence, however, was not effected through sensational journalism—as the studies previously made have assumed—but rather through continual emphasis on a number of basic factors which led to war. These were the fundamental interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta and the implications of the Cuban question in the domestic politics of the United States.

The basic interests of the United States in the Caribbean were reflected in the editorial columns of Middle Western newspapers during the first year of the Cuban revolt. Embodied in the premises of the revived spirit of "manifest destiny," these interests were stated in terms of economic imperialism, military strategy, political idealism and humanitarianism. These were
the fundamental considerations which determined editorial attitude on the Cuban question. These were the cornerstones upon which the future Cuban policy of the United States rested. The development of these interests, however, was brought about by a number of other factors.

From the beginning of the Cuban revolt the editors of Middle Western newspapers pointed out that Spain violated American interests in the Caribbean and that Spain's presence in that area was inimical to the realisation of America's "manifest destiny." An interesting and effective repertoire of editorial arguments was accordingly evolved to prove these contentions. American economic interests were said to be jeopardized by the interruption of trade, the destruction of American property in the island and by Spanish resistance to the natural expansion of our industrial capitalism. American interests in military strategy and national security were said to be endangered because Spain's strategic possessions in the Caribbean might fall into the hands of a stronger European power. The interests of the United States in the extension of the American political system were said to be obstructed by the "political anachronism" of monarchical Spain in the democratic Western hemisphere. Through editorial, cartoon and indigenous verse, the editors also maintained that Spain violated the
American conception of humanitarianism by her constant abuse of American nationals as well as her own downtrodden subjects. Couched in emotionalized terminology, these arguments contributed to the belief that Spain should be eliminated from the Caribbean, where the United States wanted to broaden her sphere of influence.

The development of a more aggressive Cuban policy was stimulated by the activities of the Cuban Junta, whose headquarters were located in New York City, and its American counterpart, the Cuban League, whose branch units were located in the larger cities throughout the Middle West. These two organizations, working in close cooperation with the American press, had as their purpose the instigation of material and moral aid in promotion of Cuban independence. The practical program of these agencies was hypothecated on the premise that their own objectives could be achieved only through assistance from the United States. The Junta, therefore, devised a number of very tangible methods for achieving its purposes.

For the purpose of rendering material aid to the insurgents, the Junta organized and fitted out filibustering expeditions. Illegal in character, these enterprises led to a number of exasperating incidents, the most notable of which were the Alliance case in 1895 and the Competitor affair in 1896. The Spanish government made frequent complaints to the American
State Department concerning the illegality of these expeditions, in response to which President Cleveland issued (June 12, 1895 and July 27, 1896) two proclamations of neutrality. Nevertheless, the continuous propaganda of the Junta moved federal officials and the editors of Middle Western newspapers eventually to condone the practice of filibustering.

For the purpose of arousing moral support for the insurgent cause, the Junta adopted several methods which showed that its members possessed much more than an amateur knowledge of propaganda technique. Through "Sympathy Meetings", the stage and the pulpit, the members of the Junta told the story of Cuba's wrongs and her heroic struggle for independence. Through the facilities of a friendly press, American humanitarianism was exploited to the fullest advantage; and through the same medium the Junta very cleverly developed a belief in Cuban success by lending the Cuban generals and exaggerating their military exploits. The Junta also evolved a corresponding belief of Spanish failure by discrediting the Spanish Captain-generals in their efforts to suppress the revolt and by gloating over Spain's disintegration at home. It also fed the press with atrocity stories based on the alleged brutality of Spanish warfare. It sought further to promote its objectives through the publication of its own paper (El Porvenir) and through the
systematic preparation and distribution of a deluge of propaganda pamphlets.

As suggested above, these activities of the Junta in promoting material and moral aid for the insurgent cause naturally involved the question of American neutrality and they eventually led Middle Western editors to abandon a policy of non-interference in favor of intervention on behalf of the Cubans. The editorial comment of Middle Western newspapers also indicated that the Junta's activities were instrumental in pointing out to the Republicans the political implications of the Cuban situation. In seeking to discredit Cleveland's policy of neutrality, the opportunistic Republicans, therefore, introduced the Cuban question into American politics.

The Cuban question as reflected in the editorial columns of the Middle Western newspapers showed that editorial attitude was determined to some extent by political consideration. The partisanship which resulted from the editorial discussion was a reflection of a struggle between the waning dogma of Democratic isolationism and the emerging dogma of Republican imperialism. In this struggle the Cuban question became the issue which determined the trend of American foreign policy. This fact was clearly evident during the administrations of both
Cleveland and McKinley.

The partisanship of the Republican press toward Cleveland's policy of neutrality was apparent as early as mid-summer 1895, and became increasingly evident with the approach of the campaign of 1896. The Republicans obviously tried to make an aggressive foreign policy (including intervention on behalf of Cuba) an issue in the approaching campaign. The Democrats, however, successfully diverted the Cuban question so that domestic reform and free silver became the leading issues of the campaign. Nevertheless, the Republicans emphasized the strong Cuban plank in their platform and during the election criticized the Democratic administration for its timidity on the Cuban crisis. The responsibilities of Republican victory in 1896, however, sobered the party's attitude toward the Cuban question. Immediately after the election was over in November, Republican editors reversed themselves and advised a Cuban policy equally as cautious as that which the Democrats had pursued under Cleveland. Yet, ostensibly for the purposes of political consistency, the leaders of the Republican party in Congress urged immediate and positive action on the Cuban question during Cleveland's last Congress, although surreptitiously they tried to thrust the onus of solving that issue
upon the outgoing administration. The Republicans, however, were disappointed in their efforts and received much retributive denunciation from Democratic editors, who pointed out their inconsistencies and sought to embarrass them precisely as they had been embarrassed by the Republicans during Cleveland's regime.

Editorial reaction to McKinley's Cuban policy was similar in its political manifestations to that shown in response to the Cuban policy of Cleveland. McKinley's Cuban policy was subordinated to a difficult task—that of preserving the integrity of the Republican party. The issues of reform and free silver had almost triumphed in 1896 and Bryan and the Democrats announced that these would remain the burning issues of the future. Hanna had promised the Republicans continuation of political control by means of a return to prosperity, and McKinley chose to accomplish these results through peaceful means. In the end, however, he was encouraged to forestall the loss of political control threatened in the elections of 1898 and 1900 by resorting to war with Spain. In the meantime, he endeavored to facilitate the return to prosperity by preserving peace, and accordingly in the fall of 1897 suggested to Spain Cuban autonomy.
In addition to autonomy, however, a wide variety of proposals for the solution of the Cuban question had been given editorial consideration between February, 1895, and the autumn of 1897. These proposals included neutrality, purchase, arbitration, recognition of Cuban belligerency or independence, charitable intervention and intervention for the protection of American life and property. For one reason or another, however, these proposals failed. Autonomy also failed, at first because it was rejected by Spain and later because the United States refused to assist Spain in its effective operation. Neutrality was abandoned because it seemed inconsistent with the realization of American interests in the Caribbean. Purchase was cast aside because Spain gave no intimation that she would sell Cuba to the United States; arbitration was disregarded because the editors considered the Cuban question an American affair; while recognition of Cuban belligerency or independence, although given serious consideration, was not accorded because the insurgents were unable to prove that their de facto government was worthy of de jure status.

Although there was no universal agreement on any one of the proposals discussed, the editors stood on common ground in consistently advocating Cuban independence through "intervention" of some sort. The editorial comment of Middle Western newspapers
between the autumn of 1897 and April of 1898 indicated, however, that intervention did not necessarily mean war. Nevertheless, the comment on the events which followed showed that the basic factors which have been emphasized in this study—the fundamental interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, propaganda activities of the Cuban Junta, and the political implications of the Cuban question in the domestic politics of the United States—were the real causes which led to war. These factors were particularly evident in Middle Western editorial comment on the events which transpired between the fall of 1897 and April, 1898. The political factor was especially apparent during the period; it was the force that determined McKinley's action. A number of immediate considerations, however, gave McKinley moral courage to pursue forceful intervention for political reasons. These immediate factors were the De Lome Letter, the Maine tragedy, Senator Proctor's report on Cuban conditions, the report of the Naval Court of Inquiry on the causes for the Maine disaster, and the probability of European quiescence at American intervention in Cuba. But the tide of intervention did not set in until mid-March, 1898, and McKinley was largely responsible in shaping the events that finally
culminated in war. The objective manner in which the editors of Middle Western newspapers suspended judgment on the insulting De Lome Letter and the Maine disaster, and their detached treatment of the basic interests of the United States in the Caribbean, Spanish violations of these interests, the activities of the Cuban Junta and the political implications of the Cuban question, all indicated that the true causes which led to war were more basically the foregoing factors than the sensational influence of the press in demanding intervention for reasons of increased circulation. As further proof of this thesis one need only examine the editorial attempts of Middle Western newspapers to rationalize the war in April, 1898. Here the editors restated the doctrine of the fundamental interests of the United States as implied in the revived spirit of "manifest destiny." These interests were reiterated in the impelling tenets of American interest in economic imperialism, military strategy, political idealism and humanitarianism. Here the editors recapitulated Spanish violations of the foregoing American interests. Here they reflected the undoubted influence of the Junta's propaganda which emphatically declared through the medium of the press that the insurgents would not accept any solution of the Cuban question short of complete independence. Here, of all places, the political
implications of the Cuban question in bringing about the Spanish-American War were most manifest.

This study suggests that a definitive interpretation of the relationship between the causes for the Spanish-American war and American newspapers must wait until an analysis of newspaper opinion has been made for the entire United States.
The following list of Middle Western newspapers were consulted in this study. They are arranged hereafter according to party affiliation and the date for which each paper was examined has been appropriately indicated.

(A) Republican

Chicago Daily Inter Ocean, 1895-1898
Chicago Tribune, 1895-1898
Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, 1895-1898
Cincinnati Times-Star, 1895-1898
Cleveland Leader, 1895-1898
Columbus Evening Dispatch, 1895-1898
Detroit Journal, 1895-1898
Dubuque Times, 1898
Indianapolis Journal, 1895-1898
Iowa State Register (Des Moines), 1895-1898
Kansas City Journal (Missouri), 1895-1898
Milwaukee Sentinel, 1898
Minneapolis Tribune, 1895-1898
Nebraska State Journal (Lincoln), 1895-1898
Ohio State Journal (Columbus), 1895-1898
Omaha Daily Bee, 1895-1898
Sioux City Journal, 1895-1898
Saint Louis Globe-Democrat, 1895-1898
Saint Paul Dispatch, 1895-1898
Saint Paul Pioneer Press, 1895-1898
Topeka Capital, 1898
Wichita Eagle, 1898

(B) Democratic

Cincinnati Enquirer, 1895-1898
Cleveland Plain Dealer, 1895-1898
Detroit Free Press, 1895-1898
Indianapolis Sentinel, 1895-1898
Kansas City Times (Missouri), 1895-1896;1898
Louisville Courier-Journal, 1896-1898
Louisville Times, 1898
Milwaukee Journal, 1895-1898
Omaha World-Herald, 1895-1898
Saint Louis Republic, 1895-1898
Sioux City Tribune, 1898
(C) Independent

Chicago News, 1898
Chicago Record, 1896-1898
Chicago Times-Herald, 1895-1898
Cedar Rapids Gazette, 1898
Davenport Leader, 1898
Denver Post, 1898
Des Moines News, 1898
Dubuque Telegraph, 1898
Kansas City Star (Missouri), 1895-1897
Minneapolis Journal, 1895-1898

2. Periodicals

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Arden, Edward, "Some Propositions of Nationalism," Chatauquan, January 1898, XIV.
"Autonomy for Cuba," Outlook, April 1898, LVIII.
Bryan, William Jennings, "Has the Election Settled the Money Question?," North American Review, December 1896, CIXIII.
Clark, J. Frank, "Cuba's Struggle For Freedom," Cosmopolitan, October 1896, XIX.
Penn, Emory W., "Ten Months With the Insurgents," Century, June 1896, XXXIV.
Foreman, John, "A Recent Glance at Spain," National Review, April 1897, XXIX.
"Europe's New Invalid," National Review, July 1897, XXIX.
Hart's Weekly, August 1895, XXXIX.

September 1895, XXXIX.


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Lodge, Henry Cabot, "Our Blundering Foreign Policy," Forum, March 1895, XXI.

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Mahan, Alfred Thayer, "Strategic Features of the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean Sea," Harper's, October 1897, CXV.

Midland Monthly, March 1898, X.

Money, H. D., "Our Duty to Cuba," Forum, March 1898, XXV.


Ogden, Rollo, "The Terms of Autonomy," Nation, December 30, 1897, LXX.

"The De Lome Letter," Nation, February 17, 1898, LXVI.


Palmer, William H., "The Argument for Neutrality," Outlook, April 1898, LVIII.

Pratt, Julius W., "John L. O'Sullivan and Manifest Destiny," New York History, July 1933, XIV.

"American Business and the Spanish-American War," Hispanic American Historical Review, XIV.


Reno, George, "Operating an 'Underground' Route to Cuba," Cosmopolitan, August 1899, XXVII.

"The Revolt in Cuba; Its Cause and Effects as Related to the United States," Engineering Magazine, October 1898, XI.

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Tolman, William Howe, "Some Volunteer War Relief Associations," Review of Reviews, February 1899, XIX.
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3. Pamphlets

"Cuba and the United States; Some Pertinent Facts Concerning the Struggle for Independence," Pamphlet, Atlanta, 1897.
"The Cuban Question in Its Own True Light," Pamphlet, N. Y., 1895.
Varona, Enrique Jose', "Cuba vs. Spain; Manifesto of the Cuban Revolutionary Party to the People of the United States of America," Pamphlet, n. p., 1895.
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- House Documents
- House Reports
- House Resolutions
- Senate Documents
- Senate Resolutions
- Senate Reports

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II. SECONDARY MATERIAL

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