How Plan Implementation Fails: Examining the role of Experience, Expectations, and Externalities

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

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Abstract

Plans developed as a result of Hurricane Katrina and the Mississippi Renewal Forum, including the *de facto* nullified SmartCode, three vacated SmartCode Community Plans, and two tabled and non-adopted Comprehensive Plans failed. Further indicated by a gap between Plan vision and on-the-ground results, other authors and scholars point to the process of Plan implementation as the key to this failure. Despite this observation, a case study of implementation does not exist. Also, few academic case studies that explore the implementation of Plans exist. To explore ‘Why Plans Fail’ this dissertation employs a Case Study approach, rooted in Grounded Theory Methodology and the Constant Comparative method. Five methods of analysis include two forms of Plan evaluation, document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and a new exploratory method of Tenure Analysis. Findings derived from analysis explore the roles of implementation experience, expectations, and externalities in Plan and policy failure. The research concludes by arguing for further case studies, a careful rethinking of how the American Planning Association approaches their advocate role, and that Planners should stop treating implementation like the ‘black box’ of the Planning and Plan-Making process.
Dedication

For Darcy;
My best friend and future wife.

My parents, Keith and Terri;
Your love and support guided me through this process, and I am forever grateful.
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My sincerest Thank You to all who have helped me along the way; In particular, my Faculty Advisor and mentor Dr. Jennifer Evans-Cowley, Committee Members Dr. Rachel Kleit and Dr. Bernadette Hanlon; Other mentors Kyle Ezell & Dr. John Gilderbloom; Ken Holland and staff past and present at the Gulf Regional Planning Commission, the Southern Mississippi Planning and Development District, Kelsey Johnson with staff at Gulf Coast Community Design Studio, and Jason Reece and Matthew Martin at The Kirwan Institute; Friends at the Gulfport Historical Society, with a special thanks to Paul Jermyn and Betty Shaw for your resources and support; Harrison County’s Paul Barnes and employees in the Chancery Clerks office; Ben Requet; My friends at Ohio State including Vijay Gadepally, Allison and Jonathan Vecchiet, Allen Cochran, Jonathan Nutt, Brittany Port, David Foust, Nick Balow, Jacob Hindin; Other friends in my life including Harrison White, Derrick Drake, Eric Kiser, Kirk Laughlin; my fellow PhD Candidates and Students in the Department of City and Regional Planning; and lastly, my two furry research assistants Peaches and Bourbon, the French Bulldogs.
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Chapter 1. Dissertation Introduction, Problem Statement, Research Question, and Outline

Dissertation Introduction

This dissertation examines the implementation and eventual failure of post-Hurricane Katrina redevelopment plans for Gulfport, Mississippi. As the second largest city in Mississippi and the largest on Mississippi’s Gulf Coast, Gulfport is considered the state’s economic engine. This chapter introduces Gulfport, Mississippi and sets it within its context along the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The chapter opens with the story of Hurricane Katrina in the days leading up to its landfall. It follows this by detailing the initiation of the Governors Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, the Mississippi Renewal Forum. It then overviews narratives of recovery and how plans created or inspired by the vision outlined by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport affected recovery, renewal, and rebuilding. The problem this dissertation identifies follows, along with the research question. The chapter ends by providing a brief outline of the dissertation.
Hurricane Katrina and a Governor’s Commission

On August 8, 2005, a small subtropical wave\(^3\) formed off the coast of sub-Saharan Africa and began to move towards the Leeward Islands.\(^4\) As the strong easterly winds moved west, the wave shifted toward the Caribbean over the next five days, slightly strengthening into a minor storm on August 13, 2005. Approximately 1,000 miles east of the Lesser Antilles in the Leeward Islands, just a little west of halfway between continental Africa and the chain of Caribbean islands, it still appeared to be a small disturbance. The National Weather Service (NWS) issued an advisory and named the storm Tropical Depression No. 10. However, this status was short-lived. The next day winds\(^5\) had torn the depression into two minor weather events: a marginally powerful storm\(^6\) that tracked toward the north; and a low-pressure system of remnants that tracked west-northwest.

A few days before Tropical Depression No. 10’s formation, another small tropical wave formed over waters north of Venezuela and tracked northward. Meeting up with the remnants of Tropical Depression No. 10 just south of Puerto Rico, the wave and remnants formed a small weather system over the warm waters of the Caribbean and began tracking toward eastern Cuba and Hispaniola. As this storm moved closer towards the United States, the convection began growing and began dumping significant amounts of rain over eastern Cuba. On August 23, 2005, the NWS named the storm Tropical Depression No. 12, and the Mississippi Emergency Management Administration (MEMA) drafted its first report on the system.

As Tropical Depression No. 12 tracked north toward the Bahamas, it engaged a westerly wind that began pushing the developing system towards Florida. Over the next 24 hours, the low developed quickly, and the pressure dropped from 1006mb to 985mb.

\(^3\) Tropical Waves are “trough or cyclonic curvature maximum in the trade-wind easterlies. The wave may reach maximum amplitude in the lower middle troposphere.” (National Hurricane Center, 2015).

\(^4\) The Leeward Islands are a chain of islands southeast of Puerto Rico.

\(^5\) Specifically, vertical wind shear known as a Tropical Upper Tropospheric Trough (or, ‘TUTT’ for short) disrupted Tropical Depression No. 10 (National Hurricane Center, 2015).

\(^6\) In meteorological terms, this is termed a convective front.
Coalescing off the coast of Florida, the NWS renamed Tropical Depression No. 12 as Tropical Storm Katrina. By August 25, the storm had intensified slightly and was deemed Hurricane Katrina as it made its first landfall north of Miami, Florida as a Category 1 hurricane. Believing the storm had the potential to land somewhere on the Gulf Coast, governors began initiating emergency plans and activating the National Guard. As Katrina passed over Florida toward the Gulf of Mexico, the storm weakened slightly. However, once over the warm waters of the Gulf, the storm intensified dramatically.

Concern began to grow on August 26 when a Hurricane Hunter aircraft, based out of Keesler Air Force Base in Biloxi, Mississippi, the recorded pressures a declining at a rapid rate. It became evident the hurricane was expanding in size. By 5 AM on August 27th the pressure had dropped to 945mb and the NWS upgraded Hurricane Katrina to a Category 3. That afternoon New Orleans instituted voluntary evacuations of low-lying coastal areas. Other coastal cities, such as Gulfport, Mississippi, began doing the same and passed a preemptive ‘State of Emergency’ resolution. The State of Mississippi also preemptively declared a ‘State of Emergency.’ Over the night of August 27, the storm intensified further. By five AM of August 28, the pressure had dropped to 935mb, and Katrina became a Category 4, and by 11 AM the pressure dropped to 907mb and the winds had ticked upward to 150 knots, making Hurricane Katrina a remarkable Category 5 Hurricane (Medlin et al., 2015).

The rapid intensification of the storm activated protocols for mandatory evacuations, the second in two months.7 Despite the ominous and threatening storm, Robert Latham, director of MEMA, was worried people were underprepared due to hurricane fatigue (Norman & Scallan, 2005, August 28). A few weeks prior, evacuations were ordered for Hurricane Dennis, which made landfall over Florida’s Panhandle. Of those who did decide to evacuate, many were having difficulty leaving cities and towns.

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7 Hurricane Dennis, a Category 4 storm, made landfall at the Florida Panhandle on July 10, 2005. The 2005 Atlantic Hurricane Season remains one of the most active seasons on record.
Despite contraflow\(^8\) evacuation plans, traffic backups caused delays throughout the region, as seen in Figure 1. Furthermore, many of those that were evacuating were only moving a few miles inland, where they believed they would be safe. This view of what was “safe” was based on Hurricane Camille in 1969. Many residents decided simply to stay put and ride out the storm for better or worse. James Patterson Smith (2012) notes Mrs. Virginia Adolph, a Planning Commissioner for the City of Gulfport, saying that many people simply stayed because they feared vandalism, or to safeguard their neighborhood from looters. She noted that others stayed for their dogs and cats because emergency shelters do not permit pets.

Figure 1. Introduction. Evacuation traffic before Hurricane Katrina

On Saturday, August 27, the severity of the storm began to set in. A National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) buoy off of Alabama recorded waves more than 30 feet, indicating that storm surges would likely top the 12-14 foot seawall along the Mississippi coast. Shortly after, all the coastal casinos on the Gulf

\(^8\) Contraflow is an engineering term, where all lanes of traffic flow opposite of their usual direction. In disaster planning, this means that all lanes flow one direction, away from the disaster. In the case of Mississippi, this means north.
Coast were ordered closed by the Mississippi Gaming Commission, as seen in Figure 2. Mandated closure, according to Smith (2012), was an unpopular move with Casino management. Meanwhile, MEMA ordered supplies, such as tarps, ice, water, food, and tools from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The Mississippi National Guard placed units and equipment in the northern portions of counties to act quickly during and after landfall. Mississippi Power Company was lining up additional crews and trucks to restore utilities to the coast as soon as possible. Local police and fire departments were also readying for the storm by filling gas tanks, and positioning vehicles on higher ground.

*Figure 2. Introduction. Casino closures in advance of Hurricane Katrina*

In Harrison County, the Civil Defense Offices located on 23rd Avenue in downtown Gulfport were to be the local base of operations. The Harrison County Board of Supervisors and the Mayors of Biloxi, D’Iberville, Gulfport, Long Beach, and Pass
Christian met that morning to discuss evacuation plans. By Sunday morning, word had spread that The Weather Channel’s Jim Cantore had come to the Gulf Coast, meaning that The Weather Channel (TWC) expected the storm’s devastation to be worst in Mississippi. Recently elected Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr did segments on The Weather Channel before the storms landfall from the top story of the Armed Forces Retirement Home tower. Other storm chasers descended on the coast. Jim Edds, a professional storm chaser, decided to film the storm from the Copa Casino parking garage and the Mississippi Coliseum in Gulfport (Edds, 2013). Mike Theiss (Theiss, 2010) set up at the Holiday Inn in Gulfport.9

Later that afternoon, President George Bush issued a preemptive disaster declaration, something that was unprecedented before Hurricane Katrina. The Sun Herald was also preparing plans to print newspapers in a different location, and have them shipped in to be a source of information. Smith (2012) notes that about 200 Vietnamese fishermen began tying their boats to trees, riding out the storm as they usually had done. About 125 of Gulfport’s African-American residents sought shelter in First Missionary Baptist Church in Handsboro, a neighborhood in northern Gulfport. Others sought refuge at the Little Rock Baptist Church in Gaston Pointe in Gulfport.

At about 11:30 PM on August 28, 2005, Smith (2012) notes that Warr and TWC’s Cantore ended a live segment and went outside to see the wind and rain picking up. By 6:00 AM on August 29, the Gulfport/Biloxi National Weather Service public alert radio station, KIH-21, had gone offline after losing power. By 7:00 AM, the Copa Casino barge had broken free from its mooring, and the storm surge was inundating U.S. 90, which sits atop the 12-foot seawall in Gulfport. At 7:10, The Sun Herald reported a gust of 118 miles per hour in Pascagoula; By 9:00 AM, the lobby of the beachfront Gulfport Holiday Inn was four feet underwater, or approximately 16’ above sea level. At 10:00 AM, the storm surge had reached its peak at 24 feet above sea level, and by 10:20 AM the surge was receding, and the wind began to increase. Between 10:20 AM and noon, the most

9 Now the Courtyard Gulfport Beachfront, located at 1600 E Beach Blvd, Gulfport, MS 39531
powerful sustained winds, well over 80 miles per hour, ripped through the Gulf Coast, gutting water-logged buildings down concrete slabs.

Despite preparation before the storm’s landfall, no one had predicted just how powerful the storm was, as Smith (2012, p. 33) writes:

From public officials to ordinary citizens, thousands had miscalculated Katrina’s destructive potential on August 29, 2005. Places that intelligent people thought to be safe turned into watery traps. Hundreds endured life threatening horrors, or witnessed life-giving heroics that day. Prayers were lifted. Prayers were answered. However, from infants to old folks, 1577 souls, including 238 Mississippians, did not live to tell of it.

In the aftermath, Downtown Gulfport “looked like a battlefield” per Smith (2012) and “looks like Nagasaki” per Joe Spraggins, Harrison County’s Emergency Management Director (Barbour, 2015). Government buildings that were to serve as meeting places following the storm were badly damaged and unsafe to use. Gulfport’s City Hall had its first floor gutted, and nearby First United Methodist Church was a near-complete loss. Historic homes on Second Street and beachfront mansions were washed away. Power was out, sewer lines and natural gas lines had ruptured, phones were completely offline. Gas stations were unable to pump fuel for generators and vehicles. Popular restaurants, The Olive Garden and Ryan’s Steakhouse were destroyed. Books from Gulfport’s Public Library had been washed out of the building and strewn across the city. At the Port of Gulfport, three million pounds of frozen chicken and pork, in blue bags, washed into West Gulfport, where it began thawing and rotting in the late summer heat (Smith, 2012). The Copa Casino barge floated a quarter of a mile from its mooring, and the Grand Casino Barge was found atop U.S. 90, as seen in Figure 3.
Figure 3. Introduction. Gulfport’s Grand Casino barge atop U.S. Highway 90

Governor Haley Barbour (2015), in his Katrina memoir, details the destruction at a state level: 2.5 million power outages; thirty-eight 911 call centers down, three million without land line phones, 170 drinking water and wastewater sites destroyed; 60,000 housing units destroyed and another 160,000 damaged. Katrina’s rising surge blew manhole covers off of sewer and drainage systems; the receding surge “caused a vacuum, sucking alligators and DVD players and lots and lots of sand” into critical underground infrastructure. Entire neighborhoods were ‘slabbed’ or washed off their foundation.\footnote{The term ‘slabbed’ has entered the vernacular of the Mississippi Gulf Coast to describe losing everything after Hurricane Katrina. Residents throughout the coast host slab parties to celebrate the anniversary of Hurricane Katrina. (Miles, 2007, August 26).}

In the days after the storm, emergency crews worked to clear as much debris as possible. Police and fire departments were aiding and rescuing South Mississippians. The Mississippi Department of Transportation worked to clear Interstate Highway 10 and the U.S. Highways. Utility crews began arriving, working to restore electricity, gas, and phone lines. Hancock Bank, unable to access their records, and The Peoples Bank handed out emergency cash in $100, $500, and $1,000 increments, recording them as handwritten IOUs. Chevron gave fuel to anyone who was able to make it to the refinery. While the
four days following the storm were near anarchy, emergency crews and local leadership worked diligently even as others criticized FEMA’s leadership as lacking.

Amongst the chaos, on Wednesday, August 31, 2005, Barbour received a phone call from Sun Herald President & Publisher Ricky R. Mathews. Standing the parking lot of the Sun Herald, Mathews suggested the formation of a commission to aid in recovery, similar to the Governor’s Emergency Council formed after Hurricane Camille to unify recovery efforts. The same day, the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation, the charitable foundation of Knight Ridder Corporation, then-owner of the Sun Herald, announced two emergency grants of $500,000 for the American Red Cross and $500,000 for the Salvation Army (Knight Foundation, 2005, August 31). Later that afternoon, between press conferences and phone calls, Haley Barbour held a meeting with his internal staff. In the meeting, Barbour directed Jim Perry, Policy Director, to staff and direct the new commission, thus initiating the beginnings of the Governor’s Commission on Recovery Rebuilding and Renewal (Barbour, 2015).

On Friday, September 2, 2005, Barbour announced the formation of a commission, but the details were scarce and had yet to be worked out. The same day Micheal Barranco, an architect from Jackson, Mississippi, reached out to several of colleagues including Florida-based architect Steven Mouzon. As Mouzon writes in 2015 (August 29),

Michael said ‘Steve, we’re assembling a Governor’s Commission to figure out how to rebuild the Mississippi coast and we’d like you to come and speak to us about rebuilding according to the principals of New Urbanism.’ I said ‘That’s far too big a job for me; let me call Andrés Duany.’ The next morning I went to [the Duany Plater-Zyberk offices, in Miami Beach, Florida] and met Andrés, and he

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11 The Governors Emergency Council was created by Governor John Bell Williams on September 9, 1969. It was chaired by Dr. J. Chester McKee and put forth a series of recommendations to rebuild following Katrina. Among the most prominent recommendations was that the coast should form a system of regional governance. These recommendations were compiled in the book, The Mississippi Gulf Coast Comprehensive Development After Camille (Governors Emergency Commission, 1972).

12 The two $500,000 grants are typically lumped together as a $1,000,000 grant that is part of the $2 million appropriated for the Mississippi Renewal Forum (Knight Foundation, August 31, 2005).
said ‘that’s too big for me as well; we need to call the entire Congress for the New Urbanism.'

The Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) is an organization of design and planning professionals who advocate for form-based solutions. Duany, and his wife Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, the namesakes of the architecture, engineering, and planning firm Duany Plater-Zyberk or DPZ, are prominent New Urbanists. Famous for the book Suburban Nation (Duany, Plater-Zyberk, & Speck, 2000), along with the planned Traditional Neighborhood Development (TND\textsuperscript{13}) of Seaside, Florida, which starred in the 2003 film The Truman Show, DPZ was widely considered the leading New Urbanist firm. Mouzon was also a prominent acolyte of CNU and was with PlaceMakers at the time (Langdon, 2005, October). PlaceMakers differed slightly from DPZ due to their focus on consulting for the development and adoption of form-based codes. Barranco did not yet have the national profile that Duany and Mouzon had, but he was a prominent member of the Mississippi CNU chapter due to his work on several New Urbanist projects, including Lost Rabbit in Madison, Mississippi. Barranco was the consulting Town Architect for the TND approximately ten miles north of the Mississippi State Capitol.

The next day, Saturday, September 3, 2005, Duany and Mouzon reached out to John Norquist to organize CNU’s efforts. Norquist had left his role of Mayor of Milwaukee, Wisconsin after 16 years to become the President of CNU in Chicago.

On Sunday, September 4, 2005, Barbour was on the coast working on initial recovery efforts. Despite the still chaotic environment, South Mississippi’s business and civic leaders convened at the Sun Herald offices in Biloxi to discuss the sprouting idea of a Governor’s Commission including the work to be done. Barbour (2015) recounted the three major takeaways from this meeting:

First, the planning effort needed to be focused on South Mississippi, not just the Coast, and not just individual communities and individual counties. Our planning

\textsuperscript{13} Traditional Neighborhood Development is a planned neighborhood that balances public and private uses and employs form-based code (FBC).
and programs had to be done with the entire geographical area in mind. Second, the more people who could become involved, the better. People throughout the affected areas needed to know that their part of Mississippi was going to get help to be rebuilt, and they were going to have a say in that process. Third, the leader of this planning process did not have to be from the coast… The post-Katrina landscape offered a real opportunity to get leaders and citizens of the Coast and South Mississippi to think and act regionally, and some of the people in the room were clearly pushing for that.

Barbour announced that he was in the process of searching for a suitable chair, or ‘Recovery Czar,’\textsuperscript{14} that wasn’t from the coast because, “my own experience, confirmed by the meeting, was that the three counties and eleven incorporated municipal governments didn’t have a history of working together well. Not only was there a lot of competition among the communities and various elected leaders, there was a lot of jealousy.”

The search for a Recovery Czar did not take long, as Barbour noted after the meeting that he only had one person in mind. The following day, Monday, on September 5, 2005, Barbour invited James ‘Jim’ L. Barksdale to the Governor’s Mansion to discuss the commission and to ask Barksdale to be its chairperson. Barksdale, one of the more prominent citizens of Mississippi, had previously been the CEO of Netscape and internet giant America Online, or AOL. Barbour, per his memoir, sought to stress the apolitical nature of recovery and intentionally chose Barksdale because he was a direct personal opponent from his days as a lobbyist for Microsoft. On top of the political benefits associated with the move, it was later announced that Barksdale would donate an additional $1 million to complement the $1 million from the Knight Foundation (Knight Foundation, 2005, August 31).

\textsuperscript{14} In United States politics the term ‘Czar’ is used to denote an individual appointed by an executive authority to address an ad hoc issue. The Administration of President George W. Bush re-popularized the term by appointing 35 ‘Czars’ over his eight-year tenure (Henig, 2009).
The budding commission immediately got to work organizing and coordinating with federal, state, county and local level governments, lining up additional volunteers and staff, and aligning resources. Among the first decisions of the Commission was that the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) would be responsible for the direction and disbursement of Federal recovery funds. Barbour (2015) notes the natural fit, as the MDA was the state level body responsible for the disbursement of Community Block Development Grants (CBDG), from the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Furthermore, MDA Director Leland Speed was a retired, and notable, real estate developer in the State of Mississippi, leading rebuilding efforts. Selection of Leland also greased wheels politically. Mississippi, unlike Louisiana, was a fully Republican State, which would greatly benefit the state as Republicans held both chambers in the 109th Congress and the Presidency.

On September 9, 2005, Barbour announced the Commission in its entirety and gave the Commission 11 days to commence work. Barbour recalled in 2015, “At some point during this process, Leland Speed, who was then chief of the Mississippi Development Authority, asked me if I had ever heard of Andrés Duany, an architect and urban planner from Miami. Leland told me Duany was at the forefront of a group called The New Urbanists, who were designing new and exciting city centers and neighborhoods, and that I should contact him about getting involved.

Barbour directed Speed to reach out to Duany, and on September 12, Duany flew to the Gulf Coast to tour the devastation. Following his tour, Duany briefly met with Barbour (Langdon, 2005, October). In the meeting it was decided that Duany was to organize resources to direct a “Mississippi ‘Mega-Charrette,’” or, “an established practice in architectural education: a collaborative, critical, high-intensity, problem-solving session addressing a particular design issue, often for a deadline”, to guide rebuilding efforts (Langdon, 2005, October, p. 4; Passell, 2013, p. 39).

Philip Langdon, the Senior Editor and writer for the New Urban News a trade publication extolling the virtues of New Urbanism, showered praise on Duany. Langdon
(2005, October) mentions Duany as the person responsible for the idea and organization of the Mega-Charrette, mentioning Mouzon and Barranco in passing. Langdon quotes Mouzon as saying, “Governor Barbour has seen plans of a DPZ project [Lost Rabbit] and was quite impressed. Mr. Barbour apparently loves what he has seen of the New Urbanism, and is trusting it to work on the seashore of his entire state.” (Langdon, 2005, October, p. 5). Furthermore, Langdon noted that New Urbanism had political supporters on both sides of the aisle, quoting Nathan Norris, an Alabama native and founding principal of PlaceMakers as saying, “[New Urbanists] understand the relationship between transportation, regional planning, neighborhood planning, energy policy. … we have folks who can connect the dots. Here in hurricane country, it is difficult to find opposition to our ideas.” (Langdon, 2005, October, p. 4).

As the Commission began developing, Duany kept CNU members abreast of developments on the Mega Charrette project over the next several weeks via email. In one such email, he notes, “The Mississippi coast has been completely devastated. The buildings are gone, but the land is dry and the infrastructure is in place. [The coastal region] will therefore be the first to move forward.” (Langdon, 2005, October, p. 5). Early on members decided to provide their work for overhead only volunteering their time to, “differentiate ourselves from the carpetbaggers who will soon disgrace themselves,” as Duany argues (Langdon, 2005, October, p. 5).

Robert Steuteville, Editor and Publisher of New Urban News, outlined the perspective of New Urbanists as they prepared for the Mega-Charrette as “Looking to the past as we rebuild.” Steuteville’s view was that the coast would rebuild in a manner that was not copying the past, but “unafraid to plunder [the past’s] riches.” He dismissed “architectural elites,” and was particularly sensitive to New Olean’s based, Tulane University Dean of Architecture Reed Kroloff comments. Further indicating this sensitivity is the incorrect capitalization of titles, as he is referred to as the “dean of architecture at Tulane and former editor of Architecture magazine [sic].” (Steuteville,

15 Lost Rabbit, Mississippi is a TND, or planned community northeast of Jackson, Mississippi, the state capital.
Steuteville quotes Kroloff’s comments from National Public Radio’s show All Thing’s Considered as saying, “Some of what [New Urbanists] talk about is terrific, but its wrapped far too often in the treacly, sugar-coated, neoprecious architecture that tries to recreate your grandmother’s hometown for no reason, other than that Americans are just besotted on historicism.” (Steuteville, 2005, October, p. 2; Siegel, 2005, September 14).

Despite the initial pushback, on September 20, 2005, the inaugural meeting of the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal occurred in a tent in the parking lot of Gulfport Premium Outlets, the outlet mall just southwest of the Interstate Highway 10 and U.S. Highway 49 intersection. President Bush, on his third visit to the coast since the storm, opened the meeting with a speech. President Bush directed Mississippi’s leaders to lay out a vision for their future. During the meeting, people brought up planning and specific ideas for considerations. Specifically, leaders wanted to make their communities more livable and protected from future hurricanes. The Mississippi Renewal Forum was also announced during this first meeting.

On, September 21, 2005, the day after Mississippi Renewal Forum was announced, Duany sent out email to affiliated CNU members titled “Katrina Notice 8G: General Explanation” (Hawthorne, 2005, December 4), to explain the goals of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and provide instructions to those who would be contacted. Duany noted that individual CNU members “will be working for just our overhead costs” which Langdon (2005, October, p. 5) notes is a “fraction of the firms’ usual billing rates.” Meanwhile, Barbour and staff turned their attention to a Special Session of the Legislature and further developed their special appropriation request for Congress. Among the largest developments of this period was during the passage of an inland gaming bill, signed on October 8, 2005 – which would allow casinos to move from water to areas 800 feet from the water (Admin, 2005, October 17).

In the development and run-up to the Mississippi Renewal Forum, CNU started assembling professionals willing to volunteer their time. Additionally, because of damage to so many buildings along the coast, the Isle of Capri casino located in Biloxi,
Mississippi was selected to be the base of operations for the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Interestingly, this decision limited participation in the Renewal Forum. A razor wire line, established in the aftermath of the storm, isolated the Isle of Capri on the Biloxi peninsula. The razor wire and police checkpoints placed to deter looting and control ingress and egress, meant that only invited local leaders could attend the Mississippi Renewal Forum, a point reinforced by a multi-article series in the Sun Herald.

Despite the limited initial involvement, the Sun Herald noted that public input sessions, styled as ‘town hall’ meetings, would occur following the charrette, and for the charrette session, “the public is participating in the forum through its elected officials.” (Tortorano, 2005, October 11). Prominently placed on the front page of the Sunday, October 9, 2005, edition of the Sun Herald, the first of the multi-article series was Jim Barksdale’s (2005, October 9) open letter prefacing the Mississippi Renewal Forum, writing,

Teams of highly-qualified local and out-of-state professionals will work with county and municipal officials and others to create a bigger and better Mississippi Gulf Coast. It is important to emphasize that these tools and designs will be made available to the citizens of the Coast, but not forced upon you. The people of the Coast will make the decisions. We only want to provide good ideas and resources that can help us move forward together.

The following day, Monday, October 10, 2005, Sun Herald published the second part of the series, a Question and Answer session with Will Longwitz, Communications Director for the Governor's Commission (Lee, 2005, October 10). Sun Herald reporter Anita Lee asked questions about the formation of the commission, equity, party responsible for paying for the charrettes, and how to small businesses and local government fit into the equation. On the issue of equity, Longwitz says, “Local people are going to have an opportunity to come to all these meetings and participate if they decide that’s what they want to do. If they decide they want to stay at home, that’s going to be up to them.”
Between Monday afternoon and Tuesday morning, most of the Renewal Forum participants arrived on the coast (Langdon, 2005, December), and the Sun Herald ran another front-page article detailing the launch of the forum, calling it the “largest community planning effort ever undertaken.” (Tortorano, 2005, October 11). Steve Filmanowicz and Irina Woelfl (2005, October 10) re-summarized and echoed similar sentiments on the eve of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, saying,

The effort is unprecedented. Never before have so many resources been assembled so quickly to aid rebuilding across a broad area. But the process behind the forum is familiar to New Urbanists, who use collaborative meetings, called charrettes, to achieve community consensus in complex planning efforts. Among the participants in the forum are experts in environmental protection, road and transit planning, social issues, economic development, and the design of residences, neighborhoods, and town centers. The group also will include urban designers and town planners who have devoted years to studying the architecture and layout of traditional Southern towns.

Barbour (2005, October 12) further articulated the intent of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, saying that it was a “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to rebuild the right way and make the Coast bigger and better than ever. What we do now will decide what the Coast will look like in 10 years, 20 years and beyond.”

For the next seven days, Duany and CNU architects and planners worked with committees, local leaders, architects and planners to begin detailing a paradigm shifting grand vision for the future of the Mississippi Gulf Coast.\(^{16}\) Cities along the coast were not going to just recover and rebuild; they were going to renew; the new Mississippi Gulf Coast would be ‘Better than Before.’ Aware of the opportunity created by Hurricane Katrina, the Mississippi Renewal Forum were laid the ‘Plans on the Table’ for eleven coastal Mississippi cities, as the Sun-Herald wrote in a Pulitzer-winning piece (2005,

\(^{16}\) As the goal of public policy, there is a deep and vast literature on the ideas of paradigm shift. It is, however, important to note that the commonly agreed on the idea predecessor to a paradigm shift is a policy opportunity window usually spurned by a catastrophic event and politically active amateurs (Kindggon, 2003).
October 18). Local governments expected FEMA and MEMA to flush vast amounts of money through the Republican Congress to a Republican State with local Republican governments; infrastructure was going to be rebuilt, improved, and styled for aggressive growth. At the same time growth and development were on the way, Mississippi was embracing its romantic past to set the tone for its bright future; seaside towns once visited by powerful elites like Al Capone and President Woodrow Wilson, as seen in Figure 4, would once again welcome outsiders with ‘Southern Charm,’ sweet tea, and a side of grits.

*Figure 4.* Introduction. President Woodrow Wilson playing the Great Southern Golf Course.

‘**Better than Before**’

‘Better than Before’ is a common trope of the American lexicon. The ideas of ‘Better than Before’ underlie the new and increasingly prevalent ‘Build Back Better’ framework, which has increasing ties to sustainability and resilience literature (Kennedy et al., 2008; Kelman et al., 2015) provide planning professionals with new ideas and tools following major natural disasters. In utilizing the Build Back Better framework, Planners and policymakers turn the idea of disaster on its head. Monday (2002) asserts that disasters are an opportunity, not a catastrophe and that the chance to build back more
both sustainably and resiliently is possible because of the clean-slate left in the wake of disaster. Accepting this premise, the underlying idea of opportunity is the belief that people, communities, and regions can change for the better after a disaster – in pure form; disasters are opportunity windows. Founded on the optimistic belief that tomorrow will be better than yesterday, Mississippi reflected this belief. Figure 5 reproduces the graphic illustrating Monday’s (2002) idea.

![Illustration of Disaster as Opportunity](image)

**Figure 5.** Introduction. Monday’s (2002) Illustration of Disaster as Opportunity

Interestingly, the very concept of ‘Disaster as Opportunity’ is a common thread throughout the American lexicon. President John F. Kennedy popularized the phrase in a speech to the United Negro College Fund in 1959, said, “When written in Chinese, the word ‘crisis’ is composed of two characters, one that represents danger, and one represents opportunity.” (Mair, 2009). Despite the Kennedy’s intuitive use of the phrase, the interpretation of the written Chinese word crisis, or wēijī, is a misinterpretation, as seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Introduction. Chinese Characters of Wēi and Jī

Wēijī is a two-part word composed of the independently written words of wēi, or ‘disaster,’ and jī, which is incorrectly interpreted as ‘opportunity.’ In an attempt to correct its use, Mair (2009) and Zimmer (2007) point out that jī does not mean ‘opportunity,’ but instead directly translates to a ‘turning point.’ Compounded, wēijī is a ‘disaster turning point’ or, as the direct translation suggests, ‘crisis.’ Despite this correction, the troupe is still common. Mair (2009) comments that its use is “practically everywhere … in the world of [American] quick-buck business, pop psychology, and orientalist hocus-pocus” (Mair, 2009). The troupe has been used recently by both Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice (Kessler, 2007, January 19) and Vice President Al Gore on several occasions (Zimmer, 2007). Zimmer (2007) notes the troupe makes an appearance in an episode of the popular animated American sitcom, The Simpsons (Kirkland, 1994). In that particular episode, the character Lisa, the intelligent and insightful daughter of the series protagonist, Homer, says to her father, “Look on the bright side, Dad. Did you know that
the Chinese use the same word for ‘crisis’ as they do for ‘opportunity?’” The response from Homer has turned into an internet meme, indicated by Figure 7:

![Figure 7](image.png)

*Figure 7. Introduction. Homer Simpson and the American trope of ‘Disaster as Opportunity.’*

Homers portmanteau of ‘crisis’ and ‘opportunity’ into ‘crisitunity,’ while intended to be a critique of the American perspective, has also entered into the American popular culture lexicon. ‘Crisitunity’ can be found on popular website Urban Dictionary (Fat Michael, 2015) and in an A.V. Club, a popular subsidiary of satire website The Onion, listicle “Simpsons Quotes For Everyday Use” (Bahn et al., 2006). Establishing the ‘Disaster as Opportunity’ troupe as purely American helps to frame the core ideas of ‘Build Back Better,’ sustainability, and resilience.

The ideas underlying ‘crisis as opportunity’ are also relatable to the opportunity window literature in the field of public policy. Kingdon (2003) theorizes opportunity windows in his seminal work *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Kingdon (2003) argues opportunity windows open when the three streams of problem, politics, and policy converge. Using this framework, it becomes easy to critique the ‘Disaster is Opportunity’
trophe. Disaster, as a problem focusing event, is merely a part of the problem component necessary for opportunity; policy and politics are still missing from the equation.

Furthermore, treating disaster as a single problem is reductionist: in post-Katrina Mississippi, Hurricane Katrina was a singular focusing event that exacerbated existing structural problems and created new ones. The lack of housing, destroyed infrastructure, lost jobs, economic instability, and resource destruction that followed, while interrelated, are independent problems, each with complex solutions. Solutions for these problems require politically diverse alliances and an array of policies. While stakeholders can unite around the idea of building back ‘Better than Before,’ determining what the ‘Better than Before’ vision for the future is a complex and challenging task. Assuming vision is determined and has sufficient support, policies to achieve the vision add another layer of complexity. Planning attempts to solve these issues by utilizing citizen stakeholders and politicians to create visions, goals, objectives, and recommendations. Plans provide long-term policy, development, and recovery guidance. In Mississippi, this planning initiative was the previously described Mississippi Renewal Forum, sponsored and initiated by the Governor’s Commission on Recovery Renewal and Rebuilding.

**A Narrative of Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal**

In the years since Hurricane Katrina, as coastal residents have begun to move on and rebuild their communities, there has been an intensive effort to draw lessons from the storm. These narratives attempt to package the big lessons of recovery and the legacy of rebuilding efforts neatly. The results derived from this endeavor paint a grand overarching narrative which assumes success in Mississippi. Marc Landy (2015, August 27), reflecting on the tenth anniversary of Katrina for the Rockefeller Institute of Government writes, “…cities and towns along the Mississippi Gulf Coast exemplify local government success.” On the tenth anniversary of Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, this opinion was similarly reinforced by other writers. The Washington Post’s DeNeen L. Brown writes, “Ten years later, significant rebuilding has occurred along Highway 90. Downtowns have been transformed into what the state’s recovery commission calls a
‘Mississippi Renaissance.’ Harbors have been rebuilt to better withstand future storms. Beaches and barrier islands once washed away have been restored. Last year, casino revenue topped $1.5 billion, beating the pre-Katrina haul.” (2015, August 26). Kathleen Koch, a former CNN Reporter, also supported this narrative in a column for USA Today titled, “Mississippi’s often forgotten Katrina resurrection,” where she argued, “Few realize that the massive hurricane veered east at the last minute and roared onshore at the Louisiana-Mississippi state line, making the Magnolia State ground zero.” The subheadline reiterated the narrative, “On hurricane's 10th anniversary, we should recognize Magnolia State's struggle, triumph.” (2015, August 24).

This narrative is also the state of Mississippi’s corporate narrative. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, Governor Haley Barbour promised, as detailed previously, to rebuild ‘Better Than Before,’ saying, “Hurricane Katrina wiped out many things on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, but she did not and could not wipe out our resolve to recover and rebuild bigger and better than before.” (Office of the Governor, 2005). While the phrase ‘Better than Before’ is a common refrain after major natural disasters, and following Hurricane Katrina it became a clarion call – a mission beyond recovery.

Ten years after this clarion call, Gerald Blessey, the Gulf Coast Housing Director for the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA) affirmed that Mississippi had moved from Recovery to Renaissance. He continued, in the official press release from MDA’s Disaster Recovery Division, “Mississippi’s response to Hurricane Katrina is a model for disaster recovery. Governor Barbour’s pragmatic and compassionate leadership set a new national standard for managing disasters. In Mississippi’s Katrina response, something historic is happening, defying the stereotype of ‘Mississippi last’: the spirit and leadership of Mississippians are turning adversity into renaissance.” (Blessey, 2009).

Governor Haley Barbour (2015) also took the ten-year anniversary as an opportunity to publish a victory-lap memoir, Americas Great Storm: Leading Through Hurricane Katrina. Barbour (2015) continuously praises the leadership of all involved in the recovery process. Barbour only breaks cadence to admit obvious mistakes.
Addressing many of his vocal critic’s head on, Barbour deftly asserts that recognizing mistakes are a part of strong leadership, thereby affirming the premise of his work.

The New York Times’ Campbell Robertson (2015, August 28) is semi-critical of Mississippi officials, and ends his article by affirming the narrative of successful recovery, saying: “Indeed, a dozen cranes can be seen from the [Mississippi] beach now, saluting the casinos that have fought their way back from storm and recession, the lots still empty in the old working-class neighborhood of East Biloxi, the bustling downtown of Gulfport and, miles to the north in the piney woods, a brand new trailer with a satisfied occupant.”

Despite the efforts to package the recovery in Mississippi as a success, planners are far more measured in their assessment. Gavin Smith (2011, p. 57), who served as the Executive Director of the Mississippi Governor’s Office of Recovery and Renewal from January of 2006 through January of 2007, notes in his volume on post-disaster planning that the Renewal Forum plans partially affirms the Mississippi narrative, saying that the Plans were a “moderate success” concerning “blending of older neighborhood patterns, which mirrored many of the New Urbanists principles, with newer, post-World War II development.” However, Smith also notes that the plans “lacked a strong implementation component.” Emily Talen, who was one of the Social Equity specialists who participated in the Mississippi Renewal Forum writes, “two years in, the New Urbanist plans have met some [social equity] success – designing for small affordable housing units and introducing new types of zoning.” (Talen, 2008, p. 285) However, she notes, similarly to Smith, that “the plans are highly idealized formulations, and many factors will likely work against the implementation of social equity in these terms.” (2008, p. 283). Evans-Cowley and Gough (2009, p. 457) also conclude, “the good intentions of the New Urbanist consultants to create better communities using New Urbanism have had limited success.”

Smith (2011), Talen (2008), and Evans-Cowley and Gough (2009) each suggests that the plans developed by the Mississippi Renewal Forum were not responsible for a successful recovery. This argument, by extension, would imply that the long-term
recovery of the Mississippi Gulf Coast has been less successful than anticipated. Notably, they each point to the problem of implementation.

Problem Statement

The Implementation Problem

Smith (2011), Talen (2008), and Evans-Cowley and Gough (2009) each point to the implementation of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plans as a problem. The Mississippi Gulf Coast is a vast region, with 12 cities in three counties. Not all of these communities embraced and implemented the ideas provided by the New Urbanists. Furthermore, each community had different ideas about what to or not to implement. Notoriously, Biloxi, led by Mayor A.J Holloway, rejected the ideas developed by the Mississippi Renewal Forum. New York Times reporter Jim Lewis writes, “Playing post-hurricane politics in Biloxi is like trying to sword-fight on a rolling log, and as the months wore on, almost everyone found something to object to in the Congress for the New Urbanism's [or Mississippi Renewal Forum] plan” (2006, May 21). Other cities, such as the historic resort towns of Bay St. Louis, Long Beach, along with, “many of the smaller, wealthier towns, like Ocean Springs and Pass Christian, were enthusiastic about adopting them; New Urbanism, after all, reconstructed the kind of life they'd been living all along.” (Lewis, 2006, May 21).

Despite Biloxi’s rejection of these ideas, the adjacent city of Gulfport, the largest city on the Mississippi Gulf Coast and second largest in the State of Mississippi, embraced the ideas proposed by the New Urbanists. Then-recently elected Mayor Brent Warr, as seen in Figure 8, quickly became known as the one of the most involved mayors, with Sandy Sorlien and Leland Speed writing, “The recent Gulfport SmartCode Charrette was remarkable in that Mayor Brent Warr and City Councilman Brian Carriere were in the studio for the entirety five days, often with colored pencils in hand helping
the designers mark the T[ransect]-Zones\textsuperscript{17} citywide.” (2006, p. 338). Mayor Brent Warr, in thanking the John S. and James L. Knight Foundation for funding of the charrette said, “Thanks to the Mississippi Renewal Forum and the City’s planning workshops, we have conceptual plans to rebuild a bigger and better Gulfport.” (Knight Foundation, 2006, Oct 13).

![Image](image.png)

Figure 8. Problem Statement. Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr, President George W. Bush, Principal Phyllis Bourn, Governor Haley Barbour in Gulfport

In the aftermath of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, the City of Gulfport, and in particular Mayor Brent Warr, began working to implement the ideas proposed by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. Among the chief recommendations of the plan was the development and adoption of SmartCode to replace the aging Euclidean\textsuperscript{18} Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1972. To implement the vision of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, the framework required the development of individualized Community Plans to apply SmartCode at the neighborhood level. Gulfport successfully pursued grant money to fund several additional charrettes in the immediate aftermath of Katrina and the Mississippi Renewal Forum. These charrettes led to the

\textsuperscript{17} Transect Zones, labeled T-1 through T-6, are zoning classifications based on urban form, rather than use. They are a key component of SmartCode, the zoning code promoted and utilized by New Urbanism.

\textsuperscript{18} Euclidean Zoning, named for the village of Euclid, Ohio, is zoning that separates land uses.
initiation, development, or adoption of a SmartCode Framework, six Community Plans, Architectural Guidelines, and two Comprehensive Plans.

However, ten years after the storm, few of these plans continue to function as intended. One community plan was never completed, and three of the five adopted SmartCode community plans have been vacated. The two community plans that remain intact have been substantially impacted by the modification of the SmartCode framework. Modifications include the demotion of SmartCode through its incorporation into the existing zoning code, and a reframing of its form-based requirements, the keystone of SmartCode regulatory framework. In simpler terms: the SmartCode was *de facto* nullified (Lee, 2012, February 29).

Furthermore, the HDR 2010 Comprehensive Plan, intended to merge existing regulatory zoning with SmartCode and to replace the maligned and delayed t & Associates 2004 Comprehensive Plan, was tabled 2010. Its second iteration, which was modified by the Planning Department of the City of Gulfport to remove all references to SmartCode, was briefly resurrected in 2012. Notably, it was the same document prepared by HDR with sections simply and haphazardly ‘cut’ or removed from the document. The 2013 Comprehensive Plan resurrected version was also tabled indefinitely in 2014, meaning that the problematic 2004 Comprehensive Plan remains the primary guiding document for city development. It is also worth noting that the 2004 Comprehensive Plan was initiated in 1997 as an update of the city’s first 1968 Comprehensive Plan, completed the year before Hurricane Camille. In effect, the city is still operating on a Comprehensive Plan initiated almost two decades ago for a pre-Hurricane Katrina landscape.

The failure of the plan implementation is further confirmed by the gap between plan vision and the on-the-ground results. An analysis of the initial Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport reveals just how sizable the failure of plan implementation was. Among the most prominent of implementations failures are the stymied and politically expensive effort to relocate a set of CSX railroad tracks. Implementation also failed to establish a secondary transit system. Efforts to relocate truck and rail access to the port
via a closed-access Interstate Highway connector were never initiated. Legislation for the Transfer of Development Rights (TDR\textsuperscript{19}) never materialized. Redevelopment of a neighborhood center of Old North Gulfport and Turkey Greek was placed on the City Council’s agenda twice, but never voted on. The master plan and redevelopment strategy for Pass Road from U.S. Highway 49 to the city line has not materialized.

When examining the actions of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport that could be considered in-progress, they read less like actions and more like lofty goals of any major city. Gulfport sought to create a city parks system, redevelop the port to include tourism, recreation, cultural, and commercial activities, prepare and implement a landscape master plan, determine locations for live-work units and prepare model unit types. Each of these actions has no measurable end in sight. The gap between the vision and the on-the-ground results of recovery is even starker when examining the images of Gulfport. Figure 9 provides the vision from the cover of the Redevelopment Master Plan Charrette Book for Gulfport Mississippi, and Figure 10 is a scene from Google Earth from January 26, 2015.

\footnotesize{\textit{Figure 9. Problem Statement. Redevelopment Master Plan Charrette Book Birds Eye Rendering}}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{19} Transfer of Development Rights (TDR) is a process where a property owner voluntarily transfers development rights on a piece of property to increase density on another piece of property.}
Despite the heralding of success from many quarters, there have been limits to the success of implementation and in some cases failures. A blog post from 2008, which now serves as the front page the Mississippi Renewal Forums legacy web page, states plainly: Here’s the bottom line: Every problem, and therefore every alternative solution, is more complex than we imagined. It’s also clear that many of the challenges to recovery pre-dated the hurricane. For instance: A growing gap between household incomes and the costs of housing and insurance; infrastructure planning out of synch with growth; and political institutions pulled in opposite directions by the need to adapt to change and a determination to protect the status quo.” (Brown, Doyon & Miller, 2008, October).

**Defining Planning Failure**

Before exploring plan implementation failure, it is important to understand how literature broadly understands planning failure. It is also important to note at the outset that there is a gap between planning failure and plan implementation failure. Plans are a product of the planning process. Planning is the process by which a plan is developed.
Clarifying this nuance is critical to distinguish planning from plans.\textsuperscript{20} Despite this, defining planning failure informs plan implementation failure.\textsuperscript{21} Within North American Planning literature, there are three prominent theories to describe planning, and each has a differing perspective on failure: Rational Comprehensive, Communicative, and Pragmatic planning theory. This section defines planning failure for the three dominant planning theories, and then weaves a narrative to understand how planning failure is defined in this work.

Within the Rational Comprehensive planning theory framework, planning failure distinguishes itself from other planning theories by its heavy emphasis on the evaluation of planning by evaluating the plan at each stage of the process. Baer (1997, p. 331) details his Plan Document making process (adopted from [Alexander, 1992]) of Problem Diagnosis, Goal Articulation, Prediction and Projection, Design of Alternates, Plan Alternative Testing, and Evaluation. This process is followed by Implementation, Outcomes, and post hoc evaluation. In other words, if the problem is incorrectly diagnosed, there is potential for planning failure; if goals are not clearly articulated, there is potential for planning failure; if predictions and projections are incorrect, there is potential for planning failure, and so on and so forth. Baer adds the post hoc evaluation layer to this, where he explores the differences between intended results and the reality with or without a plan; this is the source of other approaches to plan evaluation known as the conformance and performance approaches.\textsuperscript{22} At the end of his article, Baer (1997) concludes that planners should develop their own criteria to evaluate plans.

Within the Communicative planning theory framework, planning failure distinguishes itself from other planning theories by focusing on the discursive process, or the processes by which the plan is developed. While difficult to define in a manner which is broadly applicable to literature (Oliveira and Pinho, 2010), Communicative theorists

\textsuperscript{20}A more detailed review of this assertion is found in the Literature Review chapter.

\textsuperscript{21}Conversely, Oliveira and Pinho (2010) define planning success in an attempt to justify a new evaluative framework.

\textsuperscript{22}The literature review explores the conformance and performance approaches in more detail.
(including Booher Healey, Innes, and Sager) as members of the post-modern tradition, see positivist failings of the rational model and attempt to develop a more true-to-life ideal. Communicative theorists attempt to solve the problems by expanding the planning process. In practical terms, this means the inclusion of community members affected by planning decisions. Planning failure in this regime would entail the inability of all citizens to participate in the process of plan making. Taking cues from Marxian approaches, planning failure is assumed until the iterative process plays out in full. The acceptance of planning failure is one strength of this approach. Despite that strength, the Communicative Planning Theory approach suffers from other problems; namely it’s approach is time and resource intensive and incomplete without full participation.

Pragmatic Planning, who’s primary proponent is Hoch, is less firm on defining success and failure than its theoretical counterparts. While Hoch (2002, p. 64) notes that planning failure was critical in the development of new ideas around implementation, and points to the work of Dietrich Dorner to explain that Planning practitioners often act in a “narrowly rational fashion,” he frames Planning around the ideas of incompetence and competence. Planning failure is due to the incompetence; conversely Planning success is due to the competence; despite this, Hoch (2002) neglects to define competence, but loosely it is understood as an understanding of the planning process.

To define planning failure for this dissertation, this research looks to all three theories as a way to inform understanding what constitutes failure. Planning can fail three ways; First, building off of the rational comprehensive planning regime, planning failure is rooted in the plans themselves, as well as a failure of plan conformance and performance. Second, building off of the communicative planning regime, planning failure occurs by limiting participation in the plan making process. Third, building off of the pragmatic planning regime, planning failure is caused by incompetence.

Research Question

Using the definition of planning failure, and the previous observations of other scholars on the failure of implementation, this dissertation seeks to explore how and why
implementation failed. Three failures that this dissertation explores are first, the visual confirmation of the gap between vision and the on-the-ground results in Gulfport, Mississippi confirms conformance and performance failures. Second, the limited participation identified by Talen (2007) led to planning and plan implementation failure. Third, the complexity identified by Brown, Doyon, and Miller (2008) demonstrates the lack of competence. While easy to identify these failures, Smith (2011), Talen (2008), and Evans-Cowley and Gough (2009) do not explore what caused these failures. This dissertation asks the question why? More precisely: Why did the plans generated for Gulfport, Mississippi fail to realize the vision outlined in the Mississippi Renewal Forum and subsequent plans?

**Dissertation Outline**

This dissertation, structured into seven chapters, explores the implementation of ideas outlined by the 2005 Redevelopment Master Plan Charrette Book for Gulfport, Mississippi (Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport), dated October 31, 2005 as well as subsequent plans informed by the ideas in the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. In exploring the implementation of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport and subsequent plans, this dissertation explores why the on-the-ground reality differs from vision outlined by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. The intent of this dissertation is to tell a piece of Gulfport, Mississippi’s story of recovery after Hurricane Katrina and begin to understand how communities can more broadly avoid plan implementation failure.

This first chapter opened with the story of Hurricane Katrina and the immediate response of the state, and the promise to rebuild ‘Better Than Before.’ It then then details the origins of the ‘Better than Before’ trope to provide critical context. From there, the chapter introduces the narrative of recovery in Mississippi and explores the perceptions planning of success and failure in the ten years since Hurricane Katrina. It argues that while the narrative of recovery in Mississippi has been one of success, and that research into the implementation of plans suggests otherwise. Brown, Doyon & Miller (2008),
Smith (2011), Talen (2008), and Evans-Cowley & Gough (2009) each note that failure of planning efforts, specifically those related to the Mississippi Renewal Forum, are due to the failed implementation of those plans. When examining the implementation of plans in Gulfport, Mississippi, this argument is reaffirmed through the differences between plan vision and the on-the-ground results of recovery. Due to this difference, the opening section argues that an in-depth study of plan implementation is merited to provide a more detailed narrative of failure.

The second chapter reviews literature and consists of four parts. First, Kingdon’s (2003) opportunity window framework is reviewed in depth to more precisely define and determine the conditions necessary to move a policy, or plan, onto a decision agenda. This is followed by a framing of the role of plan making and ends by identifying ‘the implementation gap.’ The second section reviews planning’s literature to further explore the implementation gap, and identifies planning’s limited literature on the subject. The last section outlines frames planning approaches to implementation using literature from public policy.

The third chapter provides an overview of the research design, or the research approach, tactic, methodology, method, and methods utilized and applied in the research. The chapter begins by introducing and outlining the foundations Grounded Theory. The second section briefly revisits the literature outlined in Chapter 2 to outline the research design other case studies utilize. The third section of the literature review outlines this dissertations research design, with an emphasis on methods.

The fourth chapter analyzes the Plans involved in the research by applying an evaluative framework, and a qualitative ‘plan reading’ framework. It applies the American Planning Association (APA) Comprehensive Plan Standards for Sustaining Places (CPSSP) Framework and Ryan’s (2011) Plan Reading methods. The fifth chapter builds on plan analysis and uses document analysis, semi-structured interviews, and ad hoc tenure analysis methods to construct coding and generate axial and theoretical analysis.
The sixth chapter takes the analysis and develops findings centered on the role of experience, expectations, and externalities. First, it details finding on the roles of community, governance, and planning experience. Second, it details finding on role of redevelopment, development, and time expectations. Third, it reviews findings on disaster externalities, federalism, and externalities related to other cities.

The seventh chapter reviews several implications of the research, discusses limitations.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

This chapter presents a literature review of plan and public policy implementation literature and methods broken into four sections. The first reviews Kingdon’s (2003) policy opportunity window framework, and links policy opportunity windows to Plan opportunity windows. The second section frames Planning as a profession where Planners make Plans and ends by concisely identifying the implementation gap in Planning. The third section further explores the implementation gap in Planning literature. The fourth section outlines public policy’s three-generational approaches for the study of implementation to classify Planning literature.

The first section examines how policy moves from a policy agenda to a decision agenda using Kingdon’s (2003) policy opportunity window framework, and applies lessons to Planning to build a foundation for analysis. The section begins with a review of the Garbage Can and Organized Anarchy approaches to policy making, and the references to the approach in Planning literature. Given the limited literature in Planning, an examination of the internal and external actors involved in moving a policy to the decision stage. The section also includes a review the problem, policy, and political requirements necessary to merge the three streams, creating a policy opportunity window with leads to policy adoption.

The second section of the literature review lays the groundwork necessary to identify the implementation gap in Planning. First, it demonstrates that Plan making is foundational to Planning, or that Planning is Planners making Plans. Because Planning
professionals have a desire to separate ‘good’ from ‘bad’ Plans, the evaluation of Plans is a primary concern of Planners. Following this demonstration, the contexts of Plan making and evaluation in the United States are explored through three common theoretical perspectives. This section ends by arguing that rational planning efforts, built on the dominant rational theory perspective, have long neglected the contextual study of implementation.

The third section of the literature review builds on the first by exploring Planning’s implementation gap. It systematically reviews Planning literature that refers to implementation. In doing so, it demonstrates that Planning is aware of a gap in its literature on implementation. The section concludes by arguing that Planning lacks sufficient methods to understand implementation, and looks to public policy’s approach, methodology, method, and methods.

The fourth section briefly reviews implementation literature in public policy. It begins by outlining Goggin’s (1986) widely cited three-generational structure in implementation research. Goggin’s (1986) structure informs analysis. Applying this structure to Planning’s literature expands Planning’s foundation and approach to implementation analysis. Within this Three Generation structure, the first generation, initiated by a series of “pessimistic” case studies in the early 1970’s, reintroduced implementation as the “missing link” in the public policy process (Pülzl and Treib, 2007). Case studies gave way to the second generation of implementation literature in the late 1970’s which sought to theorize ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to implementation. The third wave of implementation literature, initiated in the early 1990’s, uses case studies to examine hierarchical ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to improve implementation processes. These ideas are then linked to the three representatives of generations in planning implementation literature. This in-depth review details Derthick (1972), the second generation Gittell (1992), and the third generation Ryan (2006).
Describing Policy and Plan Opportunity Windows

Kingdon (2003), in attempting to understand why some policies are adopted over others, argues that the convergence of problem, policy, and politics steams leads to the modification of decision agendas. Employing a modified Garbage Can approach to policy creation, he traces the movement of policy from the policy agenda to the decision agenda. Kingdon (2003) identifies key actors and their roles in that process; paying particular attention to the emphasis of each role and how their respective expertise plays into that movement.

Kingdon (2003, pp. 2-3) simplifies the policy process to 1) agenda setting, 2) alternative generation and selection, 3) selection of preferred alternative, and 4) implementation of alternative. Kingdon’s (2003) model attempts to understand how the first and second processes move an idea or policy from obscurity to agenda prominence. In defining agenda, Kingdon argues that it is the list of “subjects or problems” government is paying attention to at a particular point in time. The Governmental agenda is the list of subjects or problems getting attention at a specific point in time; a decision agenda is the list of subjects or problems that are up for an active decision. Applying this distinction to Planning: Plans, as policies adopted to guide development of cities, may contain multiple agendas, as signified by the goals, objectives, and recommendations of a Plan. A Planning agenda is the list of subject or planning problems getting attention at a specific point in time; a Planning decision agenda is the list or plan(s) that address subjects or planning problems are up for an active decision.\(^{23}\)

To explore how a policy moves on to the agenda, or how a plan becomes a Plan, Kingdon (2003) employs a modification of Cohens, March, and Olsen’s (1972) Garbage

\(^{23}\) Building upon the distinction between little ‘p’ and capital ‘P,’ vision and goals that move from first step of ‘agenda setting’ to the second step of ‘alternative generation and selection’ become ‘plans;’ ‘plans’ that move from the third step of ‘selection of preferred alternative’ become capital ‘P’ Plans in the transition. Selection is not equated to policy or Plan adoption; non-adopted policies and Plans are still possible so long as a legislative decision (vote) or executive decision has been taken on the policy or Plan in question. It should also be noted that legislative and executive decisions are not exclusive to elected officials, but also those enabled by de facto or de jure legislative or executive agency.
Can, or Organized Anarchy model of Public Policy. Kingdon (2003) arrives at this theoretical framework by observing, 1) a policy idea can come from anywhere; 2) tracing policy idea origins is a process of infinite regress; and 3) policy idea leaders are non-existent. Kingdon (2003) then goes on to critique different models of public policy decision making. First, Kingdon (2003) targets the rational comprehensive decision making model, noting the problems with case study approaches and how they reveal the rational comprehensive approach as a top-down ideal, not a accurate depiction of reality. Second, he critiques Lindblom’s (1959) incremental treatment, noting that while incrementalism is a strategy employed by those in government, it cannot describe how policies move from policy agendas to decision agendas. Third, Kindgon (2003) critiques the Cohens, March, and Olsen’s (1972) Garbage Can or Organized Anarchy model, which he then builds on.

The Organized Anarchy model of policy making that has three general properties: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation. Problematic preferences refers to the inability of all actors to clearly define what they what is in a policy. Unclear technology refers to the unclear roles actors play in the policy development process. Fluid participation refers to actors who have moved into and out of the policy development process, further muddying policy ownership. Cohens, March, and Olsen’s (1972) identify four streams that run through the three previous properties: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. Kingdon (2003) refines these four streams into three streams, which he argues run through the decision making processes of the Federal government; these streams are problems, policies, and politics. In essence, Kindgon (2003) argues that it doesn’t matter if policy originates with an identifiable individual. Rather, all that matters is that the policy streams aide in determining when a potential window of opportunity opens for a policy to move onto a decision agenda.
In Planning, the ‘Garbage Can’ or ‘Organized Anarchy’ approach has not taken root. There are few mentions of the idea in major American Planning Journals.\(^{24}\) Wechsler and Backoff (1987), in the Journal of the American Planning Association, briefly describe how Strategic Planning outcomes may be derived using the ‘Garbage Can’ Approach. Innes and Booher (1999b, p. 15) link the ‘Garbage Can’ process, in spirit, to ‘Bricolage’ methods. They also point to Forester (1996) writing, “[Forester] suggests that for participatory, interactive decision making, the garbage can is not an adequate metaphor, because choices, problems, participants, and solutions meet, interact, and transform one another in such an exploratory process. The garbage can model falls short because it misses this interactive exploration.” In the Journal of Planning Education and Research, Jamal, Stein, and Harper (2002, p. 174) adopt a similar stance to Forester (1996) and Innes and Booher (1999b) by arguing against the “neo-pragmatic” approach, saying, “Planning is not merely an activity conducted in a ‘black box’ or a ‘garbage can’ (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972). People are involved in anticipatory, relational, and contested narratives (Mumby 1987, 1988) both in strategic planning and in strategic visioning. Their beliefs and values are central to the [Planning] conflict.” In another reference, Sager and Ravlum (2005) quickly reference a Swedish author on the Garbage Can model.


agenda adoption, which a careful reading of Kingdon (2003) reveals is not the intent of his framework.25

Returning to Kingdon’s (2003) framework, at the Federal Government level he identifies actors who are both inside and outside of government who are responsible for the transition to decision agenda. Inside actors, or internal stakeholders, are lumped into three sub-categories: ‘The Administration,’ Bureaucracy, and Legislative. Administration officials include those closest to the Executive, or President. This includes the President, Executive Staff, and political appointees. The Bureaucracy consists of bureaucratic staff charged with implementing shifts in policy and bureaucratic line26 charged with the day-to-day management of policy. Legislative stakeholders include elected legislators and their staffs. Outside actors, or external stakeholders, include interest groups, consultants, academics, researchers, media, political parties, election-related stakeholders, and the corpus of public opinion. Kingdon (2003) makes a note that while these stakeholders are external, the visible and invisible networks created between internal and external stakeholders are critical in consensus formation, which moves policy from policy agendas to decision agendas, addressing critiques of the Garbage Can approach. Table 1 re-summarizes these groupings.

25 Kingdon (2003, p. 3) argues “success in one process does not necessarily imply success in others.” In other words, Kingdon (2003) is aware that if a policy moves onto the Decision Agenda that adoption and implementation are not guaranteed; a policy can move onto a decision agenda and fail, a strength of this particular model.

26 Kingdon (2003) builds his argument on the assumption on hierarchical organization in which Line Bureaucrats perform specific tasks, like workers on an assembly line, to support Bureaucratic Staff.
Table 1. Literature Review. Kingdon’s (2003) Internal and External Actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal Government Actors</th>
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<tr>
<td>President</td>
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<td>Executive Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Appointments</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Line</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislators</td>
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<tr>
<td>Legislative Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Interest Groups</td>
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<td>Consultants</td>
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<td>Academics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Researchers</td>
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<tr>
<td>Media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Political Parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>Elections-Related</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Opinion</td>
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</table>

Kingdon (2003) then moves into describing the three streams of problems, policies, and politics, outlining a series of requirements for a policy to move from policy agenda to decision agenda. He begins by linking the problem, policy, and politics chain; Problem recognition leads to the formation and refinement of policy, which operates in a political realm.

To recognize a problem, four criteria must be fulfilled. First, systematic indicators identify a problem in need of addressing. Both statistical and political indicators are usable. Second, a focusing event, crisis, or symbol pushes indicators into view. A focusing event, crisis, or symbol greatly increases visibility of a problem and also sets up an impetus for policy action. Third, feedback concerning the existing policy sharpens focus and more clearly defines the problem addressed by policy. Kingdon (2003) does
note the issue of problems fading; another focusing event, crisis, symbol may distract from the initial problem, or inability to solve the problem may lead to the problem fading, or moving off the policy agenda. Fourth, the problem must be clearly defined. Kingdon (2003) notes the roles of sociopolitical values, comparisons, and categorizations in defining problems, but resolves that a clearly defined problem results in a finely attuned policy.

The Policy Stream deals with the creation of a particular policy solution. It consists of three criteria sub-categories: policy communities and ‘soup,’ criteria for policy survival, and a policy ‘short list.’ Policy communities and ‘soup’ refer to the mix of policy communities, entrepreneurs, ideas, and politicking which Kingdon (2003) deems a ‘softening up.’ Criteria for survival include the policy’s technical feasibility, policy value among internal and external actors, and anticipation of future ‘constraints’ or hurdles to policy adoption and implementation. The policy ‘short list’ provides for the criteria of internal and external actor policy consensus, the familiarity of the policy, and the importance of the policy regarding its ability to solve the problem.

The political stream develops criteria that attempt to contextualize the political effects of on agendas. It consists of four criteria: national mood, political organization, government turnover and jurisdiction, and political consensus. National mood refers to the general “comfort” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 146) of external actors with the policy. Political organization refers to how the internal and external actors fall-in-line with the policy, and whether or not they “block” or “promote” the policy (Kingdon, 2003, p. 150). Within government, turnover of key personnel examines the role of internal actors and their relationship with the policy. Actors can ‘turnover’ in two ways; first, they replacement of internal actors occurs. Second, internal actors change their position on a policy. Government jurisdiction refers to the policy’s relationship with existing laws and jurisdictions, particularly at the Federal level.

Table 2 re-summarizes the categories and criteria necessary to move policy from a policy agenda to a decision agenda, formatted as a check list.
Table 2. Literature Review. Kingdon’s (2003) ‘Checklist’ for Decision Agendas

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Problem Stream</th>
<th>Policy Stream</th>
<th>Political Stream</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indicators</td>
<td>Policy Communities &amp; Policy &quot;Soup&quot;</td>
<td>National Mood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Focusing Event, Crisis, and Symbols</td>
<td>Policy Communities</td>
<td>Political Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td>Policy Entrepreneurs</td>
<td>Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Problem Definition</td>
<td>Policy Ideas, Not Policy Pressure</td>
<td>Turnover of Key Personnel</td>
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<td></td>
<td>&quot;Softening Up&quot;</td>
<td>Jurisdiction</td>
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<td>Policy Survival</td>
<td>Political Consensus Building</td>
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<td>Policy Technical Feasibility</td>
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<td>Policy Value Acceptability</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Anticipation of Future Constraints</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy Short List</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy Emerging Consensus</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy Familiarity</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Policy Importance</td>
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</table>

On implementation, Kingdon (2003, p. 31) minimizes the importance of the policy stage in his research, noting that it’s the job of “career bureaucrats” to implement policy. Implementation is also outside the scope of his penultimate research question. Despite this, Kingdon (2003) sees tremendous value in their process roles. In the few comments Kingdon (2003) does provide, he notes the difference between bureaucratic staff and line. Bureaucrats have three assets: longevity, expertise, and human relationships within ‘the administration’ and the legislative branch. Kingdon (2003)
argues that the bureaucratic line is preoccupied with administering existing programs, and have little time left for ‘pushing new ideas.’ Bureaucratic staff, however, are responsible for implementing large shifts in policy. They’re critical for policy advice and consultation, however they are seldom originators of ideas, bolstering their importance in the system. Within the Federal system, bureaucratic staff bandies about ideas to “keep ideas alive and in circulation during lean times,” which Kingdon (2003, p. 32) refers to as the “wishlist.” Ultimately, the wish list is important in the movement of policy ideas from Policy Agenda to Decision Agenda.

Understanding how a policy moves from policy agenda to decision agenda is applicable to Planning. Using Kingdon’s (2003) framework, plans are vision and ideas and Plans are the physical manifestations of the same vision and ideas, capable of adoption and implementation. After reviewing the evaluative frameworks of planning, it is easy to argue that Plan adoption and implementation are viewed as the same process. Once a Plan is adopted, it is no longer the responsibility of Planners to implement the Plan; it is the role of Planning’s “career bureaucrats.” However, to answer the research question and to understand ‘Why Plans Fail’ an examination of implementation is required. Because Planning lacks a robust framework to examine implementation, this dissertation relies on public policy’s three-generational approach to understanding implementation (Goggin, 1986). The following section will briefly review this Goggin’s (1986) three-generational structure and relate case studies in Planning to generations in public policy implementation analysis and research.

**Planning Is Planners Making Plans**

Ernst Alexander, citing Geoffrey Vickers (1968, p. 98) frequently argues, using the capital ‘P’ that “Planning is what Planners do.” (1992; 1995; 2015). Despite arguing this, Alexander’s caveat is that this tautological solution creates the problem of answering

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27 Hoch (2007) is the most concise in differentiating capital, or big ‘P’ Planning from lower case, or little ‘p’ planning. Capital ‘P’ Planning refers specifically to the profession of Planning where the role of Planners is to spatially plan “to cope with urban complexity.”
‘What is it that Planners do?’ While answers to this question are a source of much debate, the common refrain among Planning professionals and scholars is that Planners make Plans (Ryan, 2011). Combining these ideas allows for a very simple explanation of what Planning is: Planning is Planners making Plans.28

The American Planning profession has systematically reinforced this belief through both professional and accrediting organizations, such as the American Planning Association (APA), the Association of Collegiate Schools of Planning (ACSP), the Planning Accreditation Board (PAB) and the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP). Brent Ryan (2011) confirms this position in his award-winning *Journal of the American Planning Association* (JAPA) article on Plan reading. Ryan argues that Plans have been the currency of the Planning profession for the past 100 years. While Plans are the currency of Planning, there are varying perspectives on the roles and intent of Plans, which further complicates the Plan making process. Due to this complexity, there are several arguments concerning approach to Plan-making in the United States and Canada, which relate to three theoretical positions: rational, communicative, and pragmatic.

Rational Planning adherents believe that Plans role is a prescriptive document, and should be as comprehensive as possible. Regions, cities, towns, and communities widely utilize Comprehensive Plans. Comprehensive Plans intend to guide the spatial use of land and to solve urban problems (Alexander, 2015). Planners, after making the Comprehensive Plan, typically become less involved in the implementation. Instead, parties charged with implementation receive Comprehensive Plans and are charged with their implementation.

Planners spend significant time and energy at the front of the Plan-making process to increase the likelihood that plans are implemented (Sager, 2003). This is because Planners are also seldom responsible for the implementation of Plans they make. One characteristic of a ‘good’ plan is the plan's initial quality and implement-ability (Berke &

28 Alexander’s (2015) work on the conception of what Planners do suggests that increased specialization may yet be another solution to the problems a tautological solution creates; notably he argues that Planning theorists are the only group that do not qualify ‘Planning;’ i.e. Transportation Planning, Urban Planning, Regional Planning, etc.
Godschalk, 2009). Because of this, the bulk of Planning Literature on Plan-making is focused on what Ernst Alexander calls *ex ante* evaluation. *Ex ante* evaluation is, literally, ‘before the event’ or evaluation before implementation (Oliveria & Pinho, 2010). Traditional *ex ante* approaches to evaluation include Cost-Benefit Analysis, PBSA\(^{29}\), GAM\(^{30}\), PIPP\(^{31}\) and Multicriteria Evaluation\(^{32}\) (Oliveria & Pinho, 2010; Sager, 2003).

When it comes to evaluating the implementation and the *ex post facto* (or, ‘after the fact’) results of Plans, there are two tactics used: performance and conformance analysis (Oliveira & Pinho, 2010). The performance approach attempts to understand how well the Plan performed against its stated goals and objectives. The most common performance approach is plan monitoring with indicators during implementation and a comprehensive performance evaluation *ex post facto*. The conformance approach attempts to understand the link between the on-the-ground outcomes and the prescriptive Plan (Alexander 2006). One notable Plan conformance-approach is Plan Implementation Evaluation (PIE) method described by Laurian et al. (2004).

Communicative Planning adherents believe that Plans (and more broadly the ‘Acts of Planning’) are emancipatory tools and processes (Innes, 1995; Innes & Booher, 1999; Khakee, 1998). Communicative Planning facilitates Habermas’s (1985) discursive process. The discursive process is iterative and leads to the creation of episteme, or knowledge, which leads to communicative action. Describing this iterative approach as ‘Knowledge-To-Action,’ communicative action, in turn, would then lead to the emancipation, or the freeing of society. Oliveria & Pinho (2010), summarize the Communicative Planning approach but de-emphasize the importance of Guba & Lincoln’s (1989) evolutionary assertion, which is embraced by Khakee (1998). As foundational to Communicative Planning’s approach, Khakee (1998) build and links

\(^{29}\) Planning Balance Sheet Analysis Plan Performance methods was introduced by Nathaniel Lichfield in 1956 (Sager, 2003).

\(^{30}\) The Goals Achievement Matrix (GAM) Plan Performance method was introduced by Hill in 1966 (Sager, 2003)

\(^{31}\) PIPP is Policy or Plan Program-Implementation-Process (Alexander & Faludi, 1989)

\(^{32}\) Multicriteria Evaluations (Buckley, 1988; Voogd, 1988) also include Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) and Community Impact Evaluations (CIE).
evaluation scholars Guba & Lincoln (1989) work and on Communicative Planning scholar Innes (1995) ideas by arguing that, *Planning and evaluation are inseparable concepts*. Khakee (1989) argues that Planning is in the midst of an evolution, and that Planning needs new forms of evaluation to understand the fruits of Planning. These new forms of evaluation should focus instead on the effects and context of the discursive process. Innes & Booher (1999) further detail discursive process effects in complex adaptive systems (CAS), calling them first, second, and third order effects. However, a caveat of their work is that these ordered effects are only partially reflective of the iterative process of plan creation.

Rounding out American approaches is Pragmatism. Hoch (2014), citing Ryan (2011), argues that Plans are vision, and Plans intend to guide the pragmatic action of realizing vision. Hoch’s perspective, rooted in the tradition of American Pragmatism developed by the Metaphysical Club in the late 1890’s, views Plan making as a necessary for pragmatic action; it aligns interests and stakeholders, unites vision, and facilitates decision making, and implementation action. In many ways, it is an implementation-focused approach. Despite the signaled strength of this approach, it rational and communicative perspectives dominate Planning theory literature.

While each of these theoretical frameworks embraces the Plan making process in different ways, the APA, as the unifying entity of planning professionals promotes the community comprehensive plan the primary tool of Planners. APA’s continued emphasis on the use of the Comprehensive Plan neatly aligns the APA with the rational Planning perspective, even if all Planners do not share that belief. Ryan’s (2011) article on reading Plans builds on his previous (2006) work examining the implementation of Plans; his observations from both articles reinforce this perspective. Ryan (2006) argues that Planning is so heavily focused on Plan-making that there is a “relative paucity” of case study literature concerning the implementation of Plans; in other words, there is a sizable gap in the literature on the implementation of Plans.
The Implementation Gap

Broadly, Planning literature lacks conversations on Plan Implementation generally and Failure specifically. Despite this, Planning has long had an interest in the implementation of Plans. Notably, Planning can be credited with initiating the study of policy implementation. Altschuler (1965), Rabinovitz (1969), Derthick (1972), Wildavsky (1973) and Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) are canon pieces of literature within the implementation study subfield. Few case studies of implementation have been completed since the early early 1970’s, with Gittell (1992), and Ryan (2006) confirming this assertion. Furthermore, Gittell (1992) and Ryan (2006) are perhaps the only two pieces of literature dedicated to studying implementation after policy adoption in the time since.

This is not to say that Planning does has forgotten about implementation, to the contrary; it was the failure of Plans and their implementation that sparked North American Planning scholars to rethink and reimagine Planning theory. Specifically, the failure of federal Urban Renewal programs and the Great Society forced planning to consider how to reconcile the gap between promises (or vision) and on-the-ground results. New theories replaced pure rational approaches that led to those failures; Transactive, Radical, Negotiative, Implementation, Strategic, and Communicative Planning were all posited over the 15-year period colloquially known as ‘The Crisis in Planning.’ (Faber & Seers, 1972a; 1972b).

This intensely creative and introspective period of theorization greatly improved the diversity of ideas within Planning. Furthermore, it redefined the role of the professional Planner is more ways than it is possible to list concisely here. In North America, the crisis had been somewhat resolved in the mid-1990s. Several adaptations and incorporations of Habermas’s (1985) ideas on communicative action into planning appeased post-positivist academics and the multiplicity of perspectives turned from a liability into an asset (Beard & Basolo, 2009). Rational adherents, responding to critical critiques, softened their approaches. Pragmatism, as a third-rail approach, has also remained a stalwart, if not near exclusive, North American perspective.
Despite this intensely creative period, few case studies of implementation were completed. The increased theorization of Planning meant theory testing took priority over Plan testing. The corollary to theorization was the rise of Evaluation in Planning. Rationalists, responding to critique, sought to separate ‘good’ and ‘bad’ plans through evaluation. These scholars developed scores of new strategies, both formal and informal, to address critics and grievances (Olivera & Pinho, 2010).

Alexander & Faludi (1989) tidily summarize this transition. Wildavsky (1973) in his seminal article, “If planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing” argues that the implementation failure of national Planning caused a wide swath of policy makers and citizens to lose faith in Planning. Reinforcing the previous narrative, that loss of faith caused Planners to deeply question their professional roles. Wildavsky (1973) observed this crisis of confidence and asked, “Why is planning so elusive?” which Alexander & Faludi (1989) interpret as Wildavsky asking, “What good is planning?” Alexander & Faludi (1989, p. 128) argue, “If Wildavsky’s premises are accepted, his conclusion is irrefutable: planning cannot be evaluated, and is, in essence, an act of faith… [However] less extreme definitions of planning than Wildavsky’s … make evaluation possible without making demands that are impossible to meet.”

In adopting a less extreme definition of success and failure, Alexander & Faludi (1989) argue that their approach to implementation evaluation would be more nuanced than Wildavsky’s. They argue that using ex post reconstructions of decision makers ex ante perceptions in the development of a Plan, while difficult, is not impossible. They point to historians as analysts who are capable of these reconstructions, as they also understand the power of context. Alexander & Faludi (1989, p. 139) suggest the utilization of the PPIP model for the ex post evaluation of Plan implementation. They argue, in advocating for this model, that, “the process of developing and implementing policies, plans, and programs is complex, and evaluating that process cannot be simple

Oliveria & Pinho’s (2010) article, “Evaluation in Planning: Advances and Prospects,” is a careful selection of title; Evaluation in Planning refers to the myriad of evaluative frameworks within Planning; this includes summative and formative forms of both evaluation and assessment, addressing both Plan making process and Plan outcomes within multiple theory and evaluative frameworks.
either... While policy and planning must face uncertainty, we must be able to judge policies, plans, and their effects.”

In the time since Alexander & Faludi (1989), much of Planning focuses on either the measurement or judgment of plans for their success or failure or the iterative use of Plans to facilitate the discursive process. Both of these focuses rely on the agreed upon assertion that Plans, as complex tools, have complex outcomes. Rational theorists have adeptly developed an entire sub-body of literature on the monitoring of Plans, which evaluate the performance and conformance of Plans concerning their implemented outcomes. Communicative theorists have adapted the discursive process and the lessons from critical and postmodern theories and applied them to Planning. Communicative theorists suggest that Planning is an iterative discursive or communicative process where continuous implementation of Plans leads to the formation of new knowledge, which simultaneously leads to further discursive and communicative action, or more Plans. Implementation aims to achieve outcomes of the ‘first’ and ‘second’ order (Olivera & Pinho, 2010).

Despite this focus, over the past 40 years’ Planning has engaged in little research on Plan Implementation failure. Furthermore, because of this oddity, a concise literature review on implementation in Planning would require a literature review of evaluation. It is rare that implementation and evaluation are not mentioned in the same argument; some of the most prominent articles over the past several decades on implementation and its ties to evaluation are presented to provide a brief history of Planning scholars reinforcing this point:

- Alterman and Hill (1978, p. 274) write, “While the ultimate purpose of plans is their implementation, there has been surprisingly little systematic attention devoted to the relationship between planning and implementation, or plans and their performance.”
- Callkins (1979) writes, “The current state of the art of planmaking and supporting analysis is based on minimal data inputs and, what is probably
more important, insufficient feedback on the efficacy of plans and policies during their implementation.”

- Gittell (1992), in examining the implementation of economic development plans argues that the federal-local/macro-micro gap in policy implementation needs to be further studied, and provides four case studies of renewal in Lowell, New Bedford and Jamestown Massachusetts and McKeesport, Pennsylvania.

- Talen, in several articles (1996a; 1996b, p. 248; 1997) examines implementation. In the article, “Do Plans Get Implemented?” she argues for evaluative methods specific to planning. Before doing so, she argues, “The fields of policy implementation analysis and program evaluation, which study how, why and to what degree policies and programs are implemented, have generated a prolific body of published research since their inception in the early 1970’s… there has been a curious lack of parallel inquiry into the implementation processes involved in the planning field.”

- Burby (2003, pp. 33-34) argues that significant attention had been paid to “good plans and planning practices for communicating with citizens and building consensus” but less attention has been paid to “plans that matter,” which… bring about governmental action on issues they address.” To find plans that matter, Burby examines “stakeholder involvement and the strength of plans… [and their effect on] the degree to which plans are implemented”

- Brody, Highfield, and Thronton (2005, p. 75) write, “Although a large amount of research has been conducted on the measurement and prediction of plan quality, there has been little systematic empirical work to determine the quality of plan implementation subsequent to approval [or Plan adoption].”

- Berke et. al (2006) correctly writes, “The implementation of plans has been ignored for decades in the field of planning. Since the mid-1990’s planning scholars have given considerable attention to defining the characteristics of
plan quality and evaluating the effects of plan-making practices on plan quality. However, few investigations have focused on the influence of the plan and the implementation practices that bring about action on the issues raised by plans.”

- Those who have engaged in case studies note the weakness of plan implementation literature. Ryan (2006, p. 36), referenced in the first paragraph of this section, argues in planning’s most recent case study of plan implementation, “motivation for the [case] study is the relative paucity of literature examining downtown plan implementation... Seminal studies such as Altschuler (1965), Rabinovitz (1969), Pressman and Wildavsky (1973), Derthick (1972), and Gittell (1992) all examined the short-term (less than ten-year) implementation context of particular plans.”

In addition to the lack of literature that examines the implementation of Plans, Planning has also historically lacked a literature that examines the political nature of Plan implementation. Rational Comprehensive Planning ignores the political side of planning, almost entirely. Communicative Planning accepts that politics are a part of the equation, but rely heavily on the underlying foundations of the Communicative ideology to support their analysis. Pragmatic Planning is perhaps the most realistic in linking politics and Plan Implementation, but limited literature on the subject is due to the limited number of adherents. In addition, because Planning lacks a robust framework for the study of implementation and how the political sphere impacts it, this dissertation looks to outside and allied fields to inform research approach. Public Policy, as an allied field, does have a framework to understand implementation.

**Three Generations of Implementation Study in Public Policy**

The ‘Crisis in Planning’ was among the problems that re-ignited the interest in the study of implementation. Early pieces of work include Alan Altschuler’s (1965) book, *The City Planning Process: A Political Analysis*, which conducted a case study to examine the role of Planners and their relationship with communities and Plans. Francine
Rabinovitz (1969) also conducted a case study to explore similar issues in her book, *City Politics, and Planning*. Rabinovitz examines the political effectiveness of Planners within city governance. Most directly related to Planning is Martha Derthick’s (1972) examination of the Great Society’s Model Cities Program failed implementation. Despite these previous works, Jeffery Pressman & Aaron Wildavsky (1973) broke open the study of implementation. Pressman & Wildavsky’s (1973) seminal study on the failure of the Economic Development Administration program (also a Great Society program) in Oakland, California is widely credited with launching the field of implementation study (Hill & Hupe, 2002; Püzl & Treib, 2006).

Since Planning engaged in the study of implementation, there have been three distinct generations of implementation study in public policy, as argued by Goggin (1986). In recent summations of implementation literature, Hill & Hupe (2002) and Püzl & Treib (2006) cite Goggin (1986) and affirm that public policy has self-organized around the three-generational approach. The first generation of literature emphasized the use of case studies to examine implementation. The second generation, building on the first, sought to theorize approaches to implementation. The third generation sought to test theories developed during the second generation as a way to improve the implementation of policy.

The first generation of plan implementation literature is what Hill & Hupe (2002) describe as marked by “pessimistic” case studies on the failure of Policy and Planning. Both Hill & Hupe (2002) and Püzl & Treib (2006) cite Goggin et al. (1990) and place Derthick (1972) and Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) in this category. However, Hill & Hupe (2002) place a caveat on this first generation of research; research on implementation began before 1970 but went by a myriad of other names. Regardless, Pressman & Wildavsky (1973) is the common starting point for literature reviews on implementation.

The second generation of implementation literature focused on the theorization of ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches to implementation. Püzl & Treib (2006) list ‘top-down’ scholars as Van Meter and Van Horn (1975), Bardach (1977), Nakamura and
Smallwood (1980), and Sabatier and Mazmanian (1980). ‘Top-down’ implementation scholars argued that the most efficient form of implementation is initiated at the top of a hierarchical governance system. Pülzl & Treib (2006) contrast this with ‘bottom-up’ scholars, which include Lipsky (1971, 1980), Ingram (1977), Elmore (1980), or Hjern and Hull (1982). ‘Top-down’ scholars argue the opposite; street-level bureaucrats and citizens, as those responsible for implementation of public policy, should initiate and develop policy.

The third generation focused on ‘doing more with less’ ethos that developed during the Ronald Regan and George H. W. Bush Administrations. It also tried to bridge the gap between ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ approaches by developing new theory that incorporated aspects of each into it. Because of this, Hill & Hupe (2002) refer to this as a ‘synthesizing’ generation, just as Goggin et al. (1990) did. Because it bridges ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up,’ it is also titled hybrid implementation theory. To further bridge the gap and test theories, Goggin has argued that an increased number of comparative case studies and statistical analysis’ are needed to test theories (1986). Fixsen et al. (2005) summarize this referring to Goggin (1986) saying, “With respect to implementation, there is no agreed-upon set of terms, there are few organized approaches to executing and evaluating implementation practices and outcomes, and good research designs are difficult when there are ‘too many variables’ and too few cases.”

**Linking Public Policy To Planning**

Drawing linkages from Public Policy to Planning aides in understanding the position of similar work in Planning. Public Policy’s Hill and Hupe (2002, p. 2) argue that the core purpose to examine implementation is to understand “‘What happens between policy expectation and (perceived) policy results… There has been a concern to explain ‘what happens’ and a concern to affect ‘what happens,’ with inevitably many of those interested in the first question being interested in the second too.” Ryan (2006, p. 36) argues that he has a similar purpose to examine implementation of Plans:
Providence’s downtown redevelopment was accompanied and guided by a series of dramatic physical plans. Providence not only consistently issued downtown plans during the 1960 to 2000 period, but it consistently implemented many of the propositions of those plans as well… [The] major goal [of research] is to understand precisely what Providence’s downtown plans proposed, and which plan ideas were implemented. Did Providence’s much-vaunted redevelopment success reflect a correspondingly widespread plan implementation?”

As Ryan (2006) identified, there have been few case studies in Planning on implementation. Furthermore, comparing case studies to the three-generational structure of public policy literature, allows stratification of Planning’s case studies. Table categorizes sources identified by, and including, Ryan (2006) into Public Policy’s three-generational structure.

Table 3. Literature Review. Three Generations of Plan Implementation Study

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<th>First Generation</th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
<th>Third Generation</th>
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Note. Bold indicates reviewed literature.

Reviewing highlighted literature in Table 3 provides a sample from each generation of implementation research. Derthick (1972) is selected from the first generation because of its early and direct relationship to planning. Gittell (1992) is then reviewed as a second-generation study. Gittell (1992) uses Inductive Theory Building to promote a Top-Down theory of implementation. Lastly, Ryan (2006) takes a nuanced look at implementation of Comprehensive Plans and promotes a hybrid approach to Plan Implementation, a common thread of the Third Generation.
First Generation: *New Towns In-Town*

Martha Derthick’s (1972) *New Towns In-Town* reported on the failure of the President Lyndon B. Johnson’s Model Cities Program Initiated in 1967, the Model Cities Program sought to use existing legislation and existing surplus federal land, much of which had been cleared by urban renewal, to create new racially and socially diverse communities to combat the social ills of the inner-city. Derthick’s case study of the programs failure is powerful in its brevity and descriptive nature. As presented and argued in later chapters, the story of the Model Cities Program and the Mississippi Renewal Forum failure is remarkably similar, despite a difference in scale.

Derthicks book’s title is in reference to Harvy S. Perloff’s (1966) well-known article in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*,34 “New Towns Intown.” In that article, Perloff laid out a vision of an “integrating concept” of planning that would lead to the “elimination of poverty and disadvantage.” Perloff, as a leading scholar and educator in Planning,35 held substantial influence in the field. In fact, *New Towns Intown* was a long form version of Perlloff’s Washington Post article, Rehabilitate Cities on the Installment Plan” (Perloff, 1965, October 31). In both articles, Perloff identifies that surplus vacant land, cleared by urban renewal, has the potential to be put to better use and infuse life into declining urban areas.

Perloff argues, “Any of the things we are trying to do in our cities--the modernization of the city plan and plant, the provision of better housing and facilities, the elimination of poverty and disadvantage--can be greatly advanced by an overall integrating concept. The New Town Intown is such an idea.” (1965, October 31). In developing a new “urban community” from “scratch,” it would ensure that the “urban community [is] conceived as an integrated and harmonious whole.” (1966, p. 155).

34 *The Journal of the American Institute of Planners* is now the *Journal of the American Planning Association*, the journal of record for Planning.
35 Burns & Friedmann (1985) compiled an honorary collection Perloff’s essays shortly after his death.
Pointing to examples such as Reston, Virginia as replicable across the United States, Perloff identifies three areas that are ripe for the development of his ‘New Town’ ideal: Georgetown, Washington D.C; Greenwich Village, New York City; Old Town, Chicago. Furthermore, as a national program, it could be organized and implemented by the newly formed Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Allowing this new department to create and implement the New Towns Intown program would, “enable us to reach out for the creation of truly great and beautiful cities, where humanistic values dominate and where full use is made of the evolving partnership in urban affairs between government and private enterprise. This is a fitting challenge for a great nation.” (1966, p. 161). In other words, Derthick’s title choice is a not-so-subtle post-modern critique of Perloff’s idea and the modernist, scientific planning ethos he advocates.

Derthick (1972) begins her critique outlining the origins and objectives of the Model Cities Program. Derthick opens the book by saying it was President Johnson who came up with the idea of the Model Cities Program on the morning of August 24, 1967, with Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Special Assistant to President Johnson. Califano organized a meeting for the following day, August 25, 1967. In that meeting, between department heads and representatives from General Services Administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Justice, the Bureau of the Budget and other agencies, it was agreed that they would create a pilot Model Cities Program project in Washington D.C.

Derthick argues that this was quickly agreed on because, “as the federal government’s own city, it would be relatively responsive to his initiative. Action there would be highly visible and thus effective as a demonstration to others cities and members of Congress of what could be done.” (1972, p. 4). Two days later, on Sunday, August 27, 1967, the group that had met at the White House transformed into a task force. Heads and representatives from various government agencies, including HUD, walked the former National Training School for Boys site in the northeast portion of the

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36 Reston, Virginia also plays an important role in New Urbanism, as it is frequently cited as inspiration for New Urbanists, per Passell (2013).
District of Columbia. On August 28, 1967, three days following the initial idea and meeting, the group reconvened to propose a “balanced residential community of 4,000 to 5,000 housing units… [with] a mixture of social classes… 1,200-1,500 units were to be public housing and another 1,800 to 2,200 would be 221(d)(3) [or, workforce\textsuperscript{37}] housing. Only 800 units would be conventionally financed [or, market rate] housing.” (1972, p. 5).

With the groundwork for the pilot project in place, Model Cities Program was announced to much fanfare two days later, on August 30, 1967. From conception to inception, the Model Cities Program pilot program was assembled in a little under a week by the Executive Office. Fittingly, Derthick (1972, p. 7) describes the program as “invested with the executive virtues – energy, speed, and flexibility.” President Johnson hoped that the demonstration project would show “every mayor and congressman could see it [or, redevelopment] could be done.” (1972, p. 5). With the groundwork in place and HUD as the overseeing department, HUD staff members visited 48 cities in three weeks. At the end of this initial survey, HUD officials documented 509 pieces of federal surplus property and identified 22 cities with suitable property for redevelopment. This number was further whittled down because many surplus properties were unavailable due to leases. Ultimately, seven cities had land available to implement an MCP pilot-project.\textsuperscript{38} Derthick then writes vignettes for each project; a summary of each is provided below:

- ‘Project One’ at Fort Lincoln in Washington D.C. became mired in Presidential and Federal politics. It was ultimately killed by the Nixon Administration despite support from the city of Washington D.C.;

\textsuperscript{37} 221(d)(3) allows for the Federal Government to fund subsidized rental housing for moderate income families. Specifically, these families have an income at or below 95\% Area Median Income (AMI), adjusted for family size. This shares significant overlap with the Workforce Housing category, which per HUD definition is less than 100\% AMI, but generally over 60\%, adjusted for family size (United States Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013).

\textsuperscript{38} Fort Lincoln, Washington D.C.; Fort Sam Houston, San Antonio, Texas; Thomasville, Atlanta, Georgia; Watterson Model Town at Nichols Army Hospital, Louisville, Kentucky; Clinton Township, Detroit, Michigan; New Bedford, Massachusetts; Fort Funston and Fort Miley, San Francisco, California.
The San Antonio project was opposed, and effectively killed, by Democratic Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez. Gonzalez, who initially supported the program, but changed tack following a meeting with the Commanding General of Fort Sam Houston. The General argued that the land that the Model Cities Program had selected wasn’t surplus, as it was needed to retain the 4th Army in Gonzalez’s district;

Thomasville, near Atlanta, Georgia, was delayed by changes to development standards, and a lawsuit. After stalling, the project then became subject to local protests, and local government balked;

The Nichols Army Hospital project in Louisville, Kentucky had government support, but race riots and local governments queasiness toward inciting additional riots doomed the project for two mayors;

In Clinton Township, near Detroit, an inexperienced development firm with ties to the United Auto Workers Union was selected to develop the project. Unable to attain the land for the price they wanted, and unable to attain Section 235 and 236 financing for the project, the project failed on the “general competence” of the developer (1972, p. 67);

Residents in New Bedford, Massachusetts organized protests led the City Council to mandate that all development at the site was single family residential. Additional protests led city council members to vote down the project entirely, against the wishes of the Mayor;

Conservationists and historic preservationists killed the efforts at Fort Funston and Fort Miley in San Francisco, California. Further damaging implementation was the relationship between San Francisco’s Mayor and the City’s Planning Commission and Board of Commissioners.

In the last chapter, Derthick (1972) writes a post-mortem of the program and identifies four key failures: 1) Limited Knowledge; 2) Limited Stock of Aid; 3) Limited Use of Aid, and; 4) Inflation of Objectives.
About Limited Knowledge, Derthick’s concludes that the President’s, and by virtue the Federal Government’s, “distance from local politics made it difficult for him to analyze the housing problem from the perspective of local officials.” (1972, p. 84). Within this section, she provides other failures: local objections to development, failure to anticipate local objections, HUD’s distance from sites, and relative detachment from local affairs.

Limited Stock of Aid and Limited Use of Aid are interwoven issues, but related to similar problems and issues. Derthick identifies that the programs were not properly incentivized (stock), nor did the federal government have an effective understanding of the existing incentives it could utilize (use). Local governments that were to endure the brunt of development had limited investment and limited interest in direct housing development. Even though some Mayors, like those in Washington D.C., Louisville, New Bedford, and San Francisco, supported the projects they could not come to terms with other local government officials who were opposed to the projects. Furthermore, the use of surplus land may have doomed the program from the start. There was a reason the land was surplus; very little local interest existed to redevelop the land in the first place.

Lastly, for the Inflation of Objectives, Derthick (1972, p. 91) argues, “A final cause of the program’s failure was that federal officials had stated objectives so ambitious that some degree of failure was certain. Striving for the ideal, they were sure to fall short. Worse, striving for the ideal made it hard to do anything at all.” Further complicating the inflation of objectives, the politically remote HUD and the Federal Government had defined the goals and objectives; they had defined the parameters of success before the project had been initiated. Even worse, they had defined the parameters of success independent of local knowledge.

The architects of the project also naively assumed that redevelopment was a certainty because the Federal Government was direct in its involvement, and the land was an opportunity in waiting. These same architects also assumed that racial and social integration through design was possible. As Dertick (1972, p. 92) further argues, “They assumed that different social classes and races could be integrated through a shared
attachment to a place and the symbols, lifestyle, and activities associated with it… The quest for innovation further inflated objectives and produced a host of economic, technical, and political problems in the final plan.”

In summary, Derthick argues because of its “impulsive origin and improvised character” and “central position in the governmental system” that the Model Cities Program was doomed from the beginning. She argues that the position of central government is free from the chains of local burden; they can act quickly on ideas, and dream the ideal in the name of innovation. In simple terms: they did not understand, nor did they take the time to understand, the political and practical requirements necessary to implement their plans.

Derthick’s (1972) work stops short of offering solutions. As a product of the Urban Research Institute at the Brookings Institution, it was not her goal. In the Foreword written by Secretary Califano, the other person in the room with President Johnson when ideating the Model Cities Program, he writes, “It falls on detached analysts – free from the bias of self-engagement, free from the need to measure success through a narrow prism, and free from the urgency of inaugurating yet another program to help solve the urban community development problem – to review what has gone on before. Even if these analysts cannot tell us what should be done in the future, at least they show us clearly what happened in the past.” (1972, p. vii).

**Second Generation: Renewing Cities**

Gittell (1992) explores the decline and renewal of four cities: Lowell and New Bedford Massachusetts; Jamestown, New York, and; McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Specifically, he focuses on micro-scale economic development plans, as opposed the macro-scale plans developed by state and federal authorities. The micro-scale economic development plans were of particular interest to Gittell because of their mix of public, private, and community-based initiatives. Furthermore, they focused on localized approaches to problem-solving. Using a case-study format, Gittell analyzes the implementation of plans to “uncover what is going on, what works, and what does not
work.” (1992, p. 2). He builds his argument on the theoretical and methodological foundations of Inductive Theory Building, which utilizes Grounded Theory, where case studies are analyzed with both traditional quantitative data and observations. This research approach also allows Gittell to discuss non-tangible factors such as corporate and civic involvement, labor and management relations, political leadership, and local citizen participation. Furthermore, it allows Gittell to engage and test existing theory, as well as develop new theory.

In the first and second case studies of Lowell and New Bedford Massachusetts, Gittell outlines an example of successful economic redevelopment and contrasts it with a less successful one. Lowell was the second planned industrial city in the United States and is approximately 25 miles from Boston. Following the decline of the textile industry due to market shifts and organized labor, the city lost half of its manufacturing jobs between 1914 and 1937. Despite short bursts of job growth, by 1960 Lowell had the highest unemployment in the state. Gittell (1992, p. 71) describes the city as “paralyzed by hopelessness and a preoccupation with the way things were.” New Bedford was older than Lowell and arguably had more history. Despite that, the decline of the whaling and textile industries led to a long period of economic stagnation. New Bedford was targeted by both Urban Renewal and the Model Cities Program, yet both had failed to live up to their promises and led to a politically contentious environment.

Both cities initiated economic redevelopment plans. In Lowell, a new ad hoc committee of local business leaders named the Central City Committee (CCC), an offshoot of the New England Regional Commission, developed and implemented the Economic Development Strategy, or EDS. In New Bedford, the city formed an Economic Development Task Force consisting of public and private interests. However, each effort had significantly different outcomes.

In Lowell, The EDS was successful in developing business and repurposing old textile buildings. The EDS was so successful that the CCC was effectively disbanded by the City Council, which perceived it as a threat to their political power. Council made the CCC ‘advisory,’ which took away the power it had to further implement the EDS.
Despite this hurdle, Gittell credits the creation of the Lowell Development and Financial Corporation, which evolved out of the CCC recommendations, as the main source of renewal. He also points to the Lowell Plan, created by a consortium of private business outsiders to coordinate redevelopment. Their coordination with the city council and the planning department allowed private dollars for use in the revitalization of public infrastructures, such as theaters and reinvestment projects.

In New Bedford, a few minor victories followed the failure of the Model Cities Program and Urban Renewal initiatives. New Bedford was able to initiate historic preservation efforts, but more broad economic redevelopment efforts stalled. Recommendations from the city’s Economic Development Task Force pitted Mayor and Chamber of Commerce’s priorities against City Council’s. Furthermore, neighborhood groups and City Council representatives felt left out of the redevelopment planning process. The ‘exclusive’ nature of participants in the planning process weakened support for broad-based economic revitalization and doomed the efforts.

In the conclusion of the New Bedford analysis, Gittell offers a few topical lessons, some of which are more general to planning. Interestingly, his first lesson is that crisis, or the perception thereof, motivates action. His third lesson is that implementation’s sensitivity to citizen’s moods, “pessimism, acquiescence and fear of change,” are largely resolved through consensus building. He further argues that innovation and balance between public and private interests help foster redevelopment, and the inclusion of neighborhood groups builds consensus.

In the third case study, Gittell examines attempted preservation efforts in Jamestown, New York, and compares them to efforts in Lowell and New Bedford. Jamestown, New York. He finds that two initiatives were largely responsible for maintaining stability in Jamestown: a committee on labor and management, and a city development committee. The labor and management committee, or Jamestown Area Labor and Management Committee (JALMC), created a forum for cooperative efforts to aid local industry. The city development committee, or Chautauqua Regional Community
Foundation (CRCF), was formed by heads of various foundations and organizations as a non-profit economic development agency.

The JALMC was a powerful organization with a narrow mission: to improve labor-management relations to retain and attract manufacturing jobs. Jamestown was a ‘strike happy’ town, but through the JALMC forum, labor and management worked to reduce the number of strikes at local manufacturing plants. This organization was also able to acquire Economic Development Administration (EDA) funding for a ‘quality-of-work-life’ program in 1973. Meanwhile, the CRCF was less successful but still useful. Initiated in 1986, the CRCF sought to address all the things the JALMC could not, with the largest target being downtown Jamestown. While the steering committee included a diverse group, their recommendations read, as Gittell argues, like a ‘wish-list’ of projects for the city with few actionable ideas that the expertise at the table could engage.

In the fourth case study, Gittell explores the decline of McKeesport, Pennsylvania, and the larger Monongahela Valley region. Long a steel town, similar to nearby Pittsburgh, McKeesport’s rise and decline followed the rise and decline of the U.S. Steel Corporation and their labor counterbalance, the United Steel Workers. Because the town was a relatively small town before US Steels arrival, when the company located facilities there it created a larger region dependent on the steel industry. Furthermore, as the regions lone industry US Steel had strong influence or outright control over city politics, social services, and education. Gittell argues McKeesport’s mantra during this time was to, “keep U.S. Steel happy.” (1992, p. 136). The USW, a national organization, also had a significant effect on the city. While McKeesport tried to “keep US Steel happy,” the USW adopted confrontational tactics and the relationship between national management and labor eroded. The spillover effects to McKeesport were sizable as many steel mills closed.

As the center of the Monongahela Valley region, a regional economic development approach was initiated but quickly rebuffed. In another attempt, the American Institute of Architects, AIA, founded the Regional Urban Design Assistance Team (RUDAT) to transform some old steel mill sites into various attractions (such as a
steel mill museum and a site for a garden conference). RUDAT initially received local praise but faced regional pushback. A third initiative was the development of a Community Development Corporation, or CDC, to fund smaller redevelopment efforts within the Monongahela Valley region. Gittell (1992) finds that not enough time has passed for to evaluate the results of the CDC. Gittell (1992) concludes that the city leaders failed to use the crisis, which put forward new initiatives, effectively. Gittell (1992) also notes the low expectations of government, and economic barriers to success. Furthermore, local officials, “lacked experience; political savvy, and independence to initiate new development efforts.” (Gittell, 1992, p. 156).


Ryan (2006, p. 37) provides a 40-year historical case study of plan implementation for Providence, Rhode Island. As a very narrow analysis, he examines the physical implementation of seven major downtown plans by charting what the plans intended to do, why they were conceived, and what they accomplished from a physical standpoint. To do this, Ryan employs the use of GIS maps that detail development. From a methodological perspective, Ryan utilizes a conformance based method that examines what the plans aimed to do, and if the outcomes matched the intended outcomes as outlined plans. Ryan uncovers that “not only were most individual plan ideas not implemented, but even those recommendations that were acted upon were only partially realized. By 2000, less than 25 percent of the individual ideas that had been proposed in Providence’s downtown plans since 1960 had been implemented even in part.”

While a short article, with relatively straightforward findings, Ryan (2006, p. 57) posits some interesting questions toward the end of his analysis:

Why were certain portions of the plans realized but not others? Were some plan ideas easier to implement than others, or was implementation the result of serendipity? Another equally compelling question is raised by the contrast between the completeness of Providence’s plan ideas and the
incompleteness of their implementation. If incomplete implementation was a persistent reality, why were Providence’s downtown plans always proposed as complete urban designs? … How might a plan’s proposals acknowledge that incomplete implementation is likely a best-case scenario? One can imagine that planning for incompleteness might necessitate a substantial shift in the way plans are formulated and proposed. Or is the ideal of complete implementation so deeply entrenched that plan creators will never be able to accommodate the possibility of incompleteness?

He concludes his work by arguing that there are no guarantees of future plans conforming to past plans; the “integrated’ whole” consequences of planning, while not realized, still contributed to subsequent planning efforts. Ryan (2006) relies on the idea of incremental planning as a means to engage in further planning; or, the gaps between the plan vision and results mandate more planning. While Ryan (2006) makes a conscious decision to stay away from the political considerations of implementation (he argues that others had done it before him), the reader is left wondering if planning has the potential to learn from a more politically centered analysis of plan implementation. He goes as far to suggest that because planning’s study of implementation is relatively limited that there is a rich body of plans that we have yet to examine.

**Literature Review Conclusion**

Literature exploring the implementation process in planning, while in short supply, is still valuable. Goggin (1986) sees the unique value of case studies in advancing the understanding of implementation processes, as do Gittell (1992) and Ryan (2006). Building on this belief, understanding each case study, and the conclusions they arrive at, aids in the analysis of implementation for this research project. Carefully outlining their findings informs, first, what theories this research could and should confirm or dispel and; second, what this researches contribution to the literature is. The section following
will pay close attention to the methodology, method, and methods employed by this research.
Chapter 3. Research Design

This chapter provides an overview of the research design, or the research approach, tactic, methodology, method, and methods utilized and applied by this dissertation. The chapter begins by introducing and outlining the foundations of the fourth version of Corbin & Strauss’s (2015) Grounded Theory Methodology. The second section briefly revisits the literature outlined in Chapter 2 to outline the research design other case studies utilize. The third section of the literature review outlines this dissertations research design, with an emphasis on methods.

The first section of this chapter details grounded theory. Grounded theory (GT) is a robust methodological framework that seeks to explain phenomenon through ‘grounding’ qualitative research in data. This method allows researchers to build theory, or an explanation, of phenomenon. Corbin & Strauss’s (2015) methodology promotes the constant comparative method, which requires researchers to constantly examine and re-examine data, analytical process, and derived themes. GT’s historical and theoretical underpinnings, data analysis protocol, shortcomings and benefits are detailed.

The second section details other Plan implementation scholar’s research design. This brief section revisits the literature reviewed in the second chapter and outlines the research approach, tactic, methodology, method, and methods to inform the selection of the same for this dissertation. It pays particular attention to the quantitative and qualitative methods involved.
The third section details this dissertation's research design. It begins by concisely framing research approach, tactic, methodology, method, and four methods utilized for the dissertation’s analysis. It then explains each of the methods, or tools, utilized to conduct research. The five methods employed by this research include: two forms of plan analysis, textual analysis, semi-structured interviews, and *ad hoc* tenure analysis.

Plan analysis methods are detailed to provide two differing perspectives. The first Plan analysis method detailed is the American Planning Association’s (APA) Comprehensive Plan Standards for Sustaining Places (CPSSP) Program (APA CPSSP). The APA is currently promoting CPSSP as a new way to evaluate and score community Comprehensive Plans. The second Plan analysis method detailed are Ryan’s (2011) ‘Plan Reading’ methods. Ryan’s (2011) methods emphasize contextually reading Plans critically to gain an understanding of how social and political contexts are manifested within Plan documents.

Following Plan analysis methods, Textual analysis methods employed in this research are detailed. As a classic method of qualitative research, textual analysis complements Plan analysis by providing context of Plan implementation. To increase research quality, and to triangulate lessons between Plan analysis and textual analysis, gaps between Plan analysis and textual analysis are filled analysis of semi-structured interviews. Conducted with individuals involved in the development and implementation of plans, semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to deeply prod and build narrative. The last of the methods described is tenure analysis. Tenure analysis, as an *ad hoc* methods, is utilized to with the other three methods to interpret and build theory.

**Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) Grounded Theory**

Grounded theory (GT) is a research methodology increasingly employed by qualitative researchers. GT allows researchers to generate theory to explain phenomenon. The name ‘Grounded Theory’ refers to the generation of theory grounded in data (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Increasingly, there are various forms of GT available for use. This is because qualitative methods scholars argue each GT methodology is specific to the
theory it builds on (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Other well-known versions of GT include Charmaz (2014) and Urquhart (2013). This dissertation employs Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) fourth edition methodology, outlined in their book Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory. This methodology was selected for three reasons; 1) Anslem Strauss, along with Glaser (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) pioneered GT; 2) Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) methodology is the most accessible, and widely used, of GT alternatives, and; 3) the theoretical underpinnings of GT best allow exploration of the research question. The following subsection reviews GT in three parts. First, it provides a summary of GT’s history and an overview of theoretical underpinnings. Second, it outlines how data is analyzed using Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) GT methodology. Third, it details shortcomings of using Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) GT methodology.

**Grounded Theory Historical & Theoretical Overview**

Selection of methodology requires the researcher to lay bare epistemological and ontological assumptions. In brief, ontological beliefs refer to the metaphysical nature of being, while epistemological beliefs merge role of logic, either deductive or inductive, and ontological belief to understand the formation of knowledge. Detailing assumptions aids in research critique, theory refinement, and theory formation. Furthermore, well-developed methodologies have robust epistemological foundations. This subsection reviews the historical and theoretical foundations of GT. It begins by reviewing GT’s epistemological foundations. It then explores the roles of researcher action and interaction, advice for GT researchers, and the ethics of the GT methodology.

GT’s epistemological foundations are rooted in the writings of American Pragmatists John Dewey and Margaret Mead from the late 19th and early 20th century. According to Corbin and Strauss (2015), Strauss was heavily influenced by Dewey and Mead’s ideas on the formation of knowledge, or episteme. It is the position of Dewey and Mead that episteme is created through action and interaction. Corbin and Strauss’s (2015)
prescriptive GT embraces this belief and provides a process for researchers to act and interact with the data.

Corbin and Strauss (2015) argue GT is a reflective inquiry process by which relationships between action and interaction are explored. These actions and interactions include temporal scales; the relationships between 'knowing,' or belief and culture; human experience; cumulative nature of knowledge as it relates to truth and validity; pragmatic use of knowledge as basis for action, and; the aesthetics and ethics of abstract languages and meaning (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, pp. 18-20). Corbin and Strauss (2015, p. 22) also have thirteen ontological, or worldview, assumptions. They argue that without reflecting on these assumptions, researchers may affect the way that they interpret the data.

Corbin and Strauss (2015) also provide advice for qualitative researchers. The piece of advice given throughout their text is that GT research is a fluid and flexible process. Because of this flexibility and fluidity, along with the nature of ‘reality’ within GT, a Corbin and Strauss (2015) accept that a full reconstruction of ‘reality’ is impossible. Theories created as a part of the GT methodology are, therefore, constructed and incomplete; they are part of the constructivist paradigm. Or, as Corbin and Strauss (2015, p. 26) write, “theories are constructed by researcher out of stories that are constructed by research participants who are trying to explain and make sense out of their experiences and lives, both to the researcher and themselves.” GT methodology also allows researchers to practically apply knowledge gained from analysis, linking theory, practice, and pedagogy.

Lastly, the GT methodology has a strong relationship to research ethics; ensuring the value, dignity, respect, and confidentiality of those involved in research is paramount to ensuring that knowledge derived from GT is of high quality, or “pertinent and acceptable to the persons to whom they are directed.” Corbin and Strauss (2015, p. 27). GT methodology takes the moral and ethical obligations of the researcher seriously, and has a built in system of checks and balances to prevent researchers from entering into ethically grey territory. Throughout this process, Corbin and Strauss (2015) advise
researchers to be sensitive to participants and data interpretation. While Quantitative research requires researchers to be objective, qualitative researchers, unable to be objective in their analysis, are required to be sensitive to data and data interpretation. GT researchers, therefore, must be sensitive and be concerned with the ethical and moral obligations of the research.

Analyzing Data Using Grounded Theory

The Constant Comparative method is the avenue by which a GT researcher conducts analysis. There are three levels of coding analysis within the constant comparative method: open, axial, theoretical. Corbin and Strauss (2015, p. 68) outline that GT researchers begin with open coding analysis while collecting the first pieces of data, through the end of data collection. Axial coding follows this, which in turn informs the last phase of theory generation.

Open coding is similar to brainstorming, and done in a fluid manner. Corbin and Strauss (2015, p. 68) outline that GT researchers begin generative analysis and open coding while collecting the first pieces of data. For this reason, Corbin and Strauss (2015) prescribe researchers to keep journals, or notes, beginning with the generative process. These notes, or memos, can be both hand written, and cataloged digitally. These memos are considered lower level concepts. As a part of Corbin and Strauss’s (2015) constant comparative method, they prescribe the deployment of the microanalysis open coding technique later in the data collection phase. Microanalysis is an exploratory open coding that allows researchers to deeply explore certain elements of their data to generated depth and develop abstract high-level concepts. During this phase, it is possible for the researcher to expand or contract the scope of research, and identify what low level concepts are repeatedly identified.

Axial Coding is the second phase. Axial coding more deeply traces the action and interaction among data. In this process, memos are refined and expanded; abstraction is lessened and clear themes begin to emerge. While similar to open coding, the notable difference is that at this point, the researcher is satisfied that the data allows for themes to
emerge and data collection ceases. Axial coding also entails the refinement, classification, and categorization of open codes.

Theoretical coding is the last phase. In this coding the researcher moves from analysis to understanding and representing. Theoretical coding phase entails an articulation of how data acts and interacts. It allows the researcher to draw out larger themes to unify the mid-level and low-level concepts identified by the open-coding stage, and refined in the axial-coding stage. Axial coding is also transformed into theory, or explanation of phenomenon. The core category emerges, abstraction is further lessened, and themes are clearly articulated.

Grounded Theory Shortcomings and Benefits

Despite the ‘Checks-and-Balances’ built into GT by Corbin and Strauss (2015), there are still a number of shortcomings with the methodology. First, GT methodology is not a complete representation of reality. Rather, the GT provides a theory of phenomenon specific to one or several cases. This makes scalar generalization difficult and incomplete, and limits the research’s use to inform major generalization. Second, GT is easily critiqued for methodological ‘slurring.’ While selection of one specific GT methodology reduces the likelihood of ‘slurring,’ researchers using one form of GT are still interpreting the methodology for their own deployment. Third, GT methodology is time-intensive. GT forces the researcher to deeply act and interact with data, increasing the amount of time needed to conduct GT research. Fourth, because GT is time-intensive, a deep commitment to research is necessary. This weakness also means that researchers are likely to insert bias in to analysis, and outside review of research is critical to minimizing this bias. Fifth, replicating GT research is challenging. While increasing the methodological, method, and methods rigor reduces problems of replicability, it does not eliminate challenges.

Despite these shortcomings, GT methodology has significant benefits. First, the explanation of phenomenon that GT allows is deeper than many quantitative or qualitative methods. GT at least partially fulfills Geertz’s (####) requirements of ‘thick
description. Second, methodological slurring has the potential to yield new GT derivatives that reduce future slurring. Third, while time intensive, the cumulative benefits of GT research justify the time needed to engage the data. Fourth, committing to research embeds the researcher in the data, allowing the researcher to more deeply prod action and interaction between data. This is a significant advantage to GT research. Fifth, while replicability is a challenge, different researchers can use GT to examine the same set of problems differently and draw very different conclusions. If conclusions are the same, the generalizability of conclusions increases; if conclusions are of high research quality, which is similar to quantitative methodology’s validity, they are further generalizable (Corbin & Strauss, 2015).

**Review and Summary of Other Research Designs**

Identifying research design used by other scholarly work aids in the selection of research design for this dissertation. Research design refers to specific parts of the research program. Teasing out each part or the program aids the reader in understanding this dissertation’s strategy to examine phenomenon. Research design consists of five parts: research approach, tactic, methodology, method, and methods. Spending time to detail and outline each aspect of research design provides a framework to understand findings and helps the reader value research quality.

Research approach refers to the way a researcher conducts research. Because a researcher’s approach frequently is dependent on their research question, there are different tactics applied once a research approach is selected. Research approach refers to the selection of a quantitative, qualitative, mixed methods, or advocacy/emancipatory approach. Tactics align and overlaps with different research approach’s. Example tactics include case studies, surveys, and direct observation.

Methodology, Method, and Methods are the other three components of research design. Despite their similarity, each has a specific meaning in the research design. Methodology, according to Corbin & Strauss (2015) refers to a way of thinking about and studying social phenomenon. Method is separate from methodology, but uses
methodology as the foundation. In selecting and constructing method, a researcher identifies how they are to examine social phenomenon. Method relates to methods, which are the “techniques and procedures for gathering and analyzing data.” (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 1). Corbin and Strauss liken methods, in nonprofessionals’ terms, to tools utilized by a researcher. Methods are highly specific and formulated. Methods frequently complement and overlap other method, methodology, tactic, and approach.

Table 4 provides a summary of Derthick’s (1972), Gittell’s (1992), and Ryan’s (2006) research design in the terms detailed above.
Table 4. Research Design. Literature Summary of Approach, Methodology, Method, and Methods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>First Generation</th>
<th>Second Generation</th>
<th>Third Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Research Approach</strong></td>
<td>Qualitative</td>
<td>Mixed Methods</td>
<td>Mixed Methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactic</strong></td>
<td>Comparative Case Study (7 Cases)</td>
<td>Comparative Case Study (4 Cases)</td>
<td>Single Case Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methodology</strong></td>
<td>Applied Research</td>
<td>Grounded Theory</td>
<td>Applied Research²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Method</strong></td>
<td>Comparative Analysis</td>
<td>Inductive Theory Building</td>
<td>Comparative Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Methods</strong></td>
<td>Qual: Textual Analysis</td>
<td>Qual: Textual Analysis²</td>
<td>Qual: Textual Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qual: Interview</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.**

1. Economic Analysis was specific to Gittell’s (1992) research question.
2. Ryan’s (2006) methodology, per the definitions outlined in the dissertation, are methods for this chart.
As seen in Table 4, each author utilizes a Case Study tactic, but differs in research approach and methodology. Derthick (1972) is the only author that uses a purely qualitative research approach, while Gittell (1992) and Ryan (2006) utilize a mixed methods research approach. Derthick (1972, p. xv) spends a limited portion of her book explaining her methodology and method. Footnote 1 in her book details that her analysis is reconstructed from HUD files and the narratives of Federal officials. These narratives were then vetted with qualified readers for accuracy. Gittell (1992) and Ryan (2006) both use a mixed methods research approach, which relies heavily on the delineation of specific methods. Notably, their tactics differ with Gittell (1992) examining four cases and Ryan (2006) only examining one.

Concerning methodology, Derthick (1972) and Ryan (2006) both utilize an applied research methodology. This pragmatic methodology allows them to answer their research questions without being bogged down by the implications of selecting a specific theoretical framework, but opens their research design to critique. While Ryan (2006) details the method and methods as a part of his methodology, he stops short of titling his methodological approach. Ryan (2006, p. 37) utilizes a comparative analysis of “historic and existing built form to examine the degree of implementation of plan ideas.” Gittell (1992), however, is specific in his use of Inductive Theory Building as method. Gittell’s (1992) particular brand of Inductive Theory Building, however is not clearly spelled out. As indicated previously Glaser & Strauss’s (1967) Grounded Theory methodology underlies Gittell’s (1992) inductive method approach.

Methods specifically employed by these authors are also of interest. Derthick (1972) examined existing government documents (textual analysis) and interviewed federal government officials. Her research was conducted pre-Institutional Review Board40 (IRB), and thus was not subject to review. Gittell’s (1992) work utilizes several quantitative economic analyses’, such as economic, employment, and shift-share

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39 Gittell (1992) calls ‘Inductive Theory Building’ methodology, but this increased thought on methodologies reclassifies Inductive Theory Building as a method.

40 The Belmont Report is responsible for the creation of the Institutional Review Board Process.
analysis, but then moves into a textual analysis which includes analysis of governmental documents and interviews with relevant participants. Ryan’s (2006) analysis utilizes textual analysis of downtown plans and a biography of Providence Mayor Buddy Cianci (Stanton, 2003). Ryan (2006) analyzes Plans, as public documents, by peeling away the different layers of Plans to understand the difference between what the Plans promised and what was eventually implemented. To measure the degree of implementation, Ryan (2006) examined the physical environment in time sequence, which is presented in the form of maps contained within the article. Plan reading methods were later formalized in Ryan’s (2011) article, which references Ryan (2006).

**Dissertation Research Design**

Methods for this dissertation reflect methods of previous case studies. Each of these scholarly works, along with literature on Grounded Theory from Corbin & Strauss (2015), advised the selection of research design. Table 5 outlines this dissertation research design.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Generation</th>
<th>Third Generation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Kenitzer (2016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Approach</td>
<td>Qualitative; ad hoc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactic</td>
<td>Single Case Study</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodology</td>
<td>Grounded Theory (Corbin &amp; Strauss, 2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>Constant Comparative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qual: Ryan (2011) Plan Reading Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qual: Textual Analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Qual: Semi-Structured Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Exploratory: <em>ad hoc</em> Tenure Analysis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similar to Derthick (1972), Gittell (1992), and Ryan (2006), this dissertation utilizes a Case Study tactic. Specifically, the case study for this research is the City of
Gulfport, Mississippi January 2005 and May 2016. To engage in the case study, the dissertation uses Corbin & Strauss’s (2015) Grounded Theory methodology, updated in the fourth edition of the seminal handbook *Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*. This dissertation utilizes grounded theory because it allows researchers to inductively explore data to form explanations, or theory, to explain phenomenon. Utilizing the constant comparative outlined by Corbin & Strauss’s (2015), the researcher is required to constantly question and adjust research results based on the introduction or reinterpretation of new data.

The constant comparative method ensures higher research quality. Corbin & Strauss (2015), after a lengthy discussion on the relationship between the quantitative research requirements of validity and reliability and their qualitative counterparts, argue research quality is the goal. To fulfill the conditions of research quality, they offer a menu of conditions. These conditions include, but are not limited to: 1) methodological consistency; 2) clarity of purpose; 3) self-awareness; 4) training in how to conduct qualitative research; 5) sensitivity to participants and data; 6) willingness to work hard; 7) ability to connect with creative self; 8) methodological awareness, and; 9) strong desire to do research (Corbin & Strauss, 2015, p. 346). Figure # details how these conditions were satisfied for this research study.
Table 6. Research Design. Conditions and Considerations towards Research Quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Condition</th>
<th>Consideration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of Purpose</td>
<td>Intention of research is to develop theory to explain phenomenon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-Awareness</td>
<td>Researcher is aware of bias and involvement in research.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative Training</td>
<td>Research accepts epistemological and ontological limitations of grounded theory methodology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sensitivity</td>
<td>Research provides and deeply engages multiple perspectives to report on richness of data. Research is also sensitive to participants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Willingness to Work Hard</td>
<td>‘Shortcuts’ have been limited by the researcher; an intensive deep-dive into case study has taken place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connect with Creative Self</td>
<td>‘Making Meaning’ of data for research is a creative endeavor; ideas are creatively sketched repeatedly and iteratively.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodological Awareness</td>
<td>Research is aware of potential criticisms, shortcomings and gaps of methodology.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Desire to Research</td>
<td>Researcher has strong desire to research; Believes and views this research as important for filling gaps of knowledge within Planning and Public Policy literature, as well as improving implementation of both Plans and policy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Conditions and considerations made towards research quality also reinforce methods selection, or the tools for analysis. The six following subsections detail methods of plan analysis, textual analysis, semi-structured interviews, and *ad hoc* tenure analysis.

**Methods 1 and 2. Data and Overview**

Examine the gap between Plan vision and the on-the-ground results, and the role implementation plays in that gap requires an understanding of what the Plans intended to do. Plan analysis provides this understanding. This dissertation employs two types of Plan analysis methods to understand different facets of each Plan. The first of the methods employed are the American Planning Association’s (APA) Comprehensive Plan Standards for Sustaining Places (CPSSP) Program (APA CPSSP) descriptive evaluative framework, which applies to the evaluation of Comprehensive Plans. The second of the methods employed are Ryan’s (2011) ‘Plan Reading,’ which provides a critical descriptive understanding of the social and political contexts manifested in the Plans themselves. Furthermore, concretely outlining the specific Plans that are the subject of the Plan analysis methods specifies the scope of the research. Table 7 details the Plans that are subject to the Plan analysis, and the Plans that are of primary interest to this dissertation.
Table 7. Research Design. Plan Document Analysis Details

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SmartCode Charrette Book</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SmartCode Framework</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Gulfport Community Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi City Community Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Gulfport Community Plan</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handsboro Community Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florence Gardens Community Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Westside Community Plan</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gulfport 2030 Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2030 Comprehensive Plan</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes.
1. Plan Reference Title refers to the shorthand titles for each Plan. See Chapter 5 for Plan details.
2. City Council approved funding for Private Contractor Jeff Bounds to complete North Gulfport Community Plan on May 8, 2007; that plan was never completed or adopted; alternatively, “the community’s plan for the Turkey Creek and North Gulfport Neighborhoods” was completed in August 2011, but has not been adopted by the City of Gulfport to guide development of the neighborhood.
3. SmartCode Framework is a regulatory document; Community Plans utilize the SmartCode Framework to describe the physical intent of the Plans. As such, Community Plans are the focus of Ryan’s (2011) Plan Reading analysis.


APA feels (and our members confirm) that we have a critically important role in promoting the importance and value of comprehensive planning. Although many resources exist on this topic, there is limited guidance and assistance available for communities seeking to develop high quality comprehensive plans that are both relevant and effective today. The standards, developed as a part of this project, are meant to serve as the concise, go-to resource for desired content for comprehensive plans for sustaining places.” (American Planning Association, 2015).

To make Comprehensive Plans relevant and effective, APA CPSSP utilizes a framework of components; six principles, two processes, and three attributes. Principles are “normative statements of intent” (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015, p. 2) concerning land use, transportation, housing, energy, and infrastructure. Processes are the “planning activities” (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015, p. 3) of participation and implementation. Attributes are “plan-making design standards” (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015, p. 3) such as the content and coordination of Plan strategies and recommendations. Within each principle there are standards. Communities attain standards on a five category normative
Plan scoring procedure of Not Applicable (N/A), Not Present (0), Low Achievement (1), Medium Achievement (2), and High Achievement (3). Table 8, adapted from the framework (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015, pp. 21-23) describes the plan scoring procedure standards of achievement.

Within the six principles, two processes, and three attributes there are between 7 and 11 identified ‘Practices;’ These practices are numbered using a multi-level numeric list (example: 1.7, where 1 represents a “Principle,” and 7 represents the “Practice;” illustrated by Table 9). Practice scores are aggregated and tabulated both raw and as a percentage. The sum of all scores and the points possible for those scores are then tabulated for each respective principles, process, and attributes. Sub-Aggregated Scores are then Aggregated once more and divided by the number of possible points to determine the “Plan Score Percentage.” However before the score is calculated up to 15 additional ‘Bonus Points’ can be awarded to the score. To earn these points, a Comprehensive Plan must “demonstrate a high degree of quality and innovation in principles, processes, or attributes. Such plans should represent new and creative plan making, methods, layout, implementation models, or other innovative features.” (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015:57). In addition to the direct scoring of the Plan, the Scoring Matrix provided by the APA includes a section for notes that identify the where principle, process, and attribute practices are located within documents. Notes generated as a part of the grading process are also valuable qualitative data that allows open and axial coding of framework observations. It also allows allows researchers to develop contextual relationships between other methods, strengthening research quality.

To grade Comprehensive Plans, the APA notes that the framework should employ both the quantitative and qualitative information to arrive at an appreciate score. Once all points and practices are are assessed, the final score is rated. Scores less than 70% are rated ‘Non-Designated.’ Scores between 70% and 79% are ‘Designated’ at a “Basic” level. Scores between 80% and 89% are ‘Silver,’ or “Medium” in achievement. Scores 90% or higher are ‘Gold,’ and demonstrate “Advanced” achievement (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015:57).
Table 8 summarizes the Plan Scoring Procedure Criteria, as outlined by Godschalk & Rouse (2015). Table 9 provides an example of Plan criteria.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Processes</th>
<th>Attributes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Assigned only if it can be demonstrated that community conditions or legal constraints prevent the use of the practice. Since they are subtracted from the overall potential plan score total, Not Applicable scores do not penalize the plan rating.</td>
<td>Unlikely to be assigned for process evaluation since all plans must address participation and implementation.</td>
<td>Unlikely to be assigned for attribute evaluation since all plans must address the basic content and characteristic practices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Present</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Assigned if the practice is applicable but not referenced or included in the plan. Not Present scores do reduce the plan rating.</td>
<td>Assigned if the process practice is not addressed in the plan.</td>
<td>Assigned if the attribute practice is not addressed in the plan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Assigned if the practice is mentioned in the plan at a basic level, but is not carried further.</td>
<td>Assigned if the process practice is mentioned in the plan, with no supporting data, analysis, or other documentation provided.</td>
<td>Assigned if the attribute practice is minimally addressed in the plan based on data, analysis, written and graphic communication, or other demonstrable form of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Assigned if the practice is discussed in the narrative, goals, and policies of the plan, but is not carried forward to implementation steps.</td>
<td>Assigned if the process practice is discussed to some degree in the plan, with minimal supporting data, analysis, or other documentation provided.</td>
<td>Assigned if the attribute practice is moderately addressed in the plan based on data, analysis, written and graphic communication, or other demonstrable form of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Assigned if the practice is defined and addressed through data, analysis, and support, and included in goals, policies, and implementation actions of the plan.</td>
<td>Assigned if the process practice is fully addressed and completely defined in the plan, with supporting data, analysis, or other documentation provided.</td>
<td>Assigned if the attribute practice is fully addressed in the plan based on data, analysis, written and graphic communication, or other demonstrable form of support.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principal</th>
<th>Practice</th>
<th>Concept Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livable Built Environment</td>
<td>1.7 Encourage design standards appropriate to the community context.</td>
<td>Design standards are specific criteria and requirements for the form and appearance of development within a neighborhood, corridor, special district, or jurisdiction as a whole. These standards serve to improve or protect both the function and aesthetic appeal of a community. Design standards typically address building placement, building massing and materials, and the location and appearance of elements (such as landscaping, signage, and street furniture.) They can encourage development that is compatible with the community context and that enhances sense of place. While the design standards will not be specified in the comprehensive plan itself, the plan can establish the direction and objectives that detailed standards should achieve.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Method 2. Ryan’s (2011) Plan Reading Analysis

Ryan (2011) details his Plan analysis approach as ‘Reading through Plans.’ Ryan (2011) argues that Planners are typically concerned with the vision, goals, objectives, and strategies of Plans. Instead, Planners should more critically examine Plans by examining socio-political and temporal contexts to reveal deeper meaning. This meaning is useful in providing context to the performance and conformance evaluation of planning efforts. To reveal this deeper meaning, Ryan (2011) argues that examining Plans for their factual, contextual, and temporal meanings reveal broader underlying intentions and assumptions. Furthermore, Plan reading requires Planners to interpret the visual components of Plans as if they were art. Assessment of factual meaning begins with a direct outline of the Plans physical form, content, and conditions. Contextual reading seeks to situate the Plan in a scale of social and political contexts. Temporal Plan reading places factual and contextual reading into a temporal frame, both past and present, to reinforce that Plans are subject to the thought and ideas of a particular timeframe.

Factual Reading – Factual reading entails examining and cataloging observable features of a Plan. Researchers document the Plan by document name, author, publishing date, length, and medium (paper or digital). Factual analysis also entails the examination and cataloging of maps, images, tables, and other diagrams. Cataloging and examination of cover art is also a part of this analysis. This is because ‘reading’ cover art allows the researcher to develop an interpretation reinforced by information and recommendations in the plan. It also may provide the ‘big idea’ of a Plan.

Contextual Reading – Ryan (2011, p. 310) argues that Plans are a statement on the “social and political values of its time.” A Contextual reading requires the researcher to document visual manifestations of a Plans social and political context. Concerning social contexts, Ryan (2011) argues that Plans have a relationship with the social past. Well known large-scale social movements, such as progressivism, environmentalism, and the American Civil Rights movement, and political movements, such as socialism, neo-liberalism, and fascism, had their discrete influence on the Plans. Furthermore, movements
in Planning, such as Garden Cities, post-war suburbanization, gentrification, and urban renewal, are also manifested in Plan documents. Visual interpretation requires Planners to trace and record these contexts through visual interpretation. Contextual readings also allow researchers to peer more in depth at the intentions of those who wrote the Plan; Plan-making, like art, embraces the creative license of Planners who emphasize certain aspects of the Plan over others.

**Temporal Reading** – Building on the factual and contextual reading of Plans, Ryan (2011) argues that exposed gaps also require Planners to temporally read Plans. This is perhaps the most challenging aspect of Plan reading because it requires the Plan reader to have an in-depth understanding of not only the subject-city but also local knowledge over the timespans before and after the Plan. It also prods the Plan reader to understand the Plans factual and contextual analysis as a snapshot, as a cultural artifact. A Plan is a momentary document, a physical manifestation of ideas at a specific point-in-time. Contextual events before the Plan directly affect its content. Despite this hurdle, Ryan (2011) argues that it using direct observation researchers can is easily identify the degree of Plan implementation by examining conditions before and after the Plan. Similar to the Plan performance evaluation approach, direct observation allows researchers to understand the various degrees of implementation at specific points in time. Ryan (2011) suggests several avenues understand implementation, but emphasizes the use of aerial photography. Other methods such as Windshield Surveys (Derry et al., 1985) would be useful as well. This dissertation utilizes contemporary windshield ‘surveys’ and aerial images from Google StreetView™. These uniform and systematic survey approaches aid references to match on-the-ground results with Plan vision, goals, objectives, and recommendations. As freely and openly accessible resources, via the internet, they have added benefits.

**Method 3. Textual Analysis**

Utilizing Plan reading as an exclusive method has its limitations. Notably, because the researcher cannot go back in time to understand the specific temporally aligned perspectives of Plan making participants, other sources have the potential to yield insights
into that process. Derthick (1972) and Gittell (1992) both utilize government documents to fill in gaps of their research, however they both note weaknesses with this approach. Governments, while good at record keeping, often do not wholly represent the perspectives of the time. To engage those perspectives other text sources can be utilized. Ryan (2006), for example, utilizes a biography of the Mayor of Providence to fill gaps in context.

To answer ‘Why Plans Fail,’ document analysis utilizes 769 pieces of documentation, summarized in Table 10. Documents analyzed are grouped into five categories: Local Media; Official City of Gulfport Documents; Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal (Governor’s Commission) and the subsequent Mississippi Renewal Forum documents; New Urban Media, and; Other.
Table 10. Research Design. Data Spectrum Summary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Local Media</th>
<th>City of Gulfport</th>
<th>Governors Commission &amp; Mississippi Renewal Forum</th>
<th>New Urban Media</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sun Herald</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WLOX</td>
<td>156</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GulfCoastNews.com</td>
<td>70</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi Business Journal</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City of Gulfport</td>
<td>90</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governor’s Commission</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi Renewal Forum</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Urban News</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Town Paper</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Media</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Government</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBTOTAL</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>769</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Local Media is the largest sub-collection of data. Within this sub-collection, the three most important sources are traditional print and broadcast media, with GulfCoastNews.com service as an alternative source. The sub-collection includes 184 data from the Sun Herald, the local paper-of-record; 156 stories from WLOX, the local television station-of-record; 70 stories from GulfCoastNews.com; 144 news reports from the Mississippi Business Journal, a state trade publication periodical.

The Sun Herald, owned by McClatchy Newspapers beginning in 2006, and owned previously by Knight Ridder Media, is a medium-sized daily newspaper. Despite a 44% decline in Daily Circulation and a 32% decline in Sunday Circulation between 2005 and
2015, the newspaper is still a prominent voice on the Gulf Coast. It also reaches over 870,000 Unique Visitors via website according to the 2015 Security and Exchange Commission Filing. WLOX, the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s local American Broadcasting Company (ABC) and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) affiliate, maintains a 41 dBu Service Contour of 278 radial miles located in Biloxi Mississippi. It is the most powerful TV broadcast station on the Mississippi Gulf Coast at 30.24 kW. WLOX is also the most prominent local television station and is best known for local celebrity Robin Roberts of ABC’s Good Morning America. GulfCoastNews.com is owned and published by Burton Communications LLC, registered with the State of Mississippi by Agent Keith Burton (who also the publisher, writer, and editor for GulfCoastNews.com), and his son Keith Burton, Jr., of Biloxi, Mississippi. Online since 1998, and incorporated in 2002, GulfCoastNews.com is an independent site. The site provides commentary on local news and politics, as well as providing an alternative forum for South Mississippi residents. The Mississippi Business Journal is a small circulation (~5,000) periodical trade publication based out of Jackson, Mississippi. It records major business stories for the state and provides commentary on how politics affect the wider business community.

Textual Analysis coding as the foundation of the research findings, was conducted in five stages. The first stage utilizes Open Coding techniques and conducts a Word Frequency analysis. Utilizing the built-in Word Frequency Analysis in NVivo 10, the first stage analysis generated a list of the 500 most frequent words for each of the 5-word frequency typologies. These five typologies range from “exact” word counts, or Level 1, to “similar” word counts, or Level 5. The progression of abstraction allows a low-level to high-level word frequency analysis. The second stage utilizes Open Coding techniques by rank-scoring and re-ranking all Top 40 words, across five typologies, to generate a list of common words to derive themes, per Corbin & Strauss (2015). The third stage develops axial micro-themes by categorizing common words. The fourth stage develops Axial themes developed from Axial micro-themes. The fifth stage expands the list of axial

themes based on insights from the two Plan reading analysis’. Results and coding are reported in vivo, or using the direct content from data to describe reality. This aids the researcher in developing themes and theory that more closely represent reality. Furthermore, when combined with the social, political, and temporal contexts, becomes particularly powerful in explaining phenomenon (Corbin & Strauss, 2015). Data collection, cataloging, and analysis was done using a personal computer running Microsoft Windows 9, with the qualitative data analysis (QDA) software NVivo 10 and Microsoft Office Suite.

**Method 4. Hybrid Structured/Guided Interview**

While Plan reading and textual analysis are frequently enough to weave a narrative, there is still a potential for narrative gaps. To fill gaps in narrative, a hybrid structured/guided interview approach, as described by Patton (2008) is employed. Patton’s (2008) approach, informed by Grounded Theory (GT) methodology, provides a robust procedure for undertaking interviews. The interview sample is derived from listed-involvement in Plan documents. To increase the ‘net’ of the sample, and to address potential omissions, interviewees were also asked to provide additional contact information for other individuals who would benefit the research. This technique is commonly referred to as a Snowball Sample.

Selected interview respondents will respond to the structured, or standardized questions (located in Appendix A) with the opportunity for additional questions guided by the answers of the structured questions. This approach allows further exploration of issues identified at the time of the interview, but also for an efficient use of interviewee time by minimizing the number of interviewee responses. Furthermore, this approach allowed for side-by-side comparison of responses, with follow-up interviews on an as-needed basis. Follow up questions will structured similarly to elicit responses would allow for side-by-side comparison (Patton, 2008).

Logging, recording, interview consent, advisement of confidentiality, release of confidentially, and transcription occurred for each interview. Logging confirms that the respondent consents to the interview and its audio recording; that the respondent is advised
of confidentiality, and allowed to waive it for the research, and; that research was completed under the auspice of the Institutional Review Board at the Ohio State University (IRB 2015B0179).

Ten respondents were interviewed for the dissertation. Table 11 lists all 11 interviews (one respondent was interviewed twice), transcribed length, and conversation times. The total number of transcribed words is 98,815 or with approximately 11 hours of recorded conversation. Table 12 describes the role of each interviewee, in brief.
Table 11. Research Design. Interview Date, Transcribed Words, and Time

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Transcribed Words</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greg Holmes</td>
<td>7/7/2015</td>
<td>4417</td>
<td>24:24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Carbo</td>
<td>7/16/2015</td>
<td>5878</td>
<td>53:02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly Morse</td>
<td>7/20/2015</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>N/A(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Bounds Part I</td>
<td>7/27/2015</td>
<td>9149</td>
<td>52:49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurie Toups</td>
<td>7/27/2015</td>
<td>7960</td>
<td>53:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Bounds Part II</td>
<td>7/28/2015</td>
<td>20707</td>
<td>2:09:27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Schloegel</td>
<td>7/28/2015</td>
<td>3014</td>
<td>19:39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous Consultant</td>
<td>3/4/2016</td>
<td>7082</td>
<td>56:40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad Emerson</td>
<td>3/7/2016</td>
<td>7543</td>
<td>56:38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Jones</td>
<td>3/7/2016</td>
<td>7480</td>
<td>52:55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrés Duany</td>
<td>3/24/2016</td>
<td>11565</td>
<td>1:19:14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total Time: 11:01:09

Note.
1. Interview conducted via e-mail.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interviewee</th>
<th>Role</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greg Holmes</td>
<td>Planning Administrator; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Carbo</td>
<td>Director of Development; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly Morse</td>
<td>Advocate; Mississippi Center for Justice, Biloxi, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Bounds</td>
<td>SmartCode Consultant, Interim Director of Development; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurie Toups</td>
<td>Director, Mississippi Main Street Program; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Schloegel</td>
<td>Mayor; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous Consultant</td>
<td>Consultant; United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad Emerson</td>
<td>SmartCode Consultant; Huntsville, AL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Jones</td>
<td>Director of Development; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Carrier</td>
<td>City Councilmember; City of Gulfport, MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrés Duany</td>
<td>Director; Mississippi Renewal Forum; Miami, FL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Method 5. Tenure Analysis

While triangulating the narrative between Plan analysis, textual analysis, and hybrid-structured interviews, it became apparent that the governance experience and policy opportunity windows had a large impact on the timing of policy action. Kingdon (2003) details his framework for opportunity windows and policy change in *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*. Illustrating opportunity windows is difficult; furthermore, illustrating opportunity windows and their relationship with governance experience adds another layer of complexity to an already daunting task. One potential solution to this problem is the use of tenure analysis, developed *ad hoc*, to illustrate opportunity windows.

While tenure and governance experience are two different concepts, they are interrelated. Measuring the amount of time, or tenure, a person has served a specific city organ acts as a relative measure of experience. When multiple individuals are serving a specific city organ, their tenure can be averaged to illustrate the relative experience of that city organ. When the average tenure of multiple city organs is then averaged, an illustration of city tenure emerges. Combined with an understanding developed through triangulation of other methods, a more detailed understanding of governance, experience, and tenure emerges. Tenure analysis, within this work, is not a standalone piece of analysis; rather, it complements the other methods utilized by this dissertation to illustrate different facets of the story.

To conduct the exploratory *ad hoc* tenure analysis, Government appointment documents collected as a part of the textual analysis were utilized. Documents that state dates of appointments, resignations, and election results were utilized to develop a measure of tenure. This includes records from the City of Gulfport and the Mississippi Secretary of State. Tenure for this method was measured in months. Strict rules were applied to documents to develop an accurate estimate of tenure. If members were appointed before the 15th day of a month, they received credit for the full month. If they were appointed after the 15th day of the month, they received credit for a half month. Since the Planning Commission lacked formal attendance records, attendance was
compiled for a 3-year period (between 2005 and 2007) using transcripts. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, at least one member of the Planning Commission left the area and did not resign the position, meaning that they were an inactive member. As the lone instance of this challenge, it minimally affected the outcomes of the data analysis. The tenure analysis was completed for a 20-year period, between January 1995 and January 2016 to establish a baseline for analysis. Tenure prior to 1995 was also accounted for based on appointment documents. Within the tenure analysis, the average tenure of each member was calculated on a monthly basis. These averages were then averaged together in two ways; first, an average that weighted each body (Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission) equally; second, an average that weighted each individual's tenure equally.

Research Design Conclusion and Limitations

There are three major limitations of this research:

First, A complete analysis of documents between 2005 and 2016, related to Planning and the Plans is, and will always be, incomplete. While great time and effort was taken to ensure that the narrative generated as part of the qualitative research is as accurate as possible, there are potential gaps in narrative. Despite this, research findings and conclusions are defensible by the researcher due to the saturation of the researcher in the methods, data, and research process. For all findings, several pieces of data are utilized, and thematic structures are sufficiently broad to capture variations in narrative.

Second, Not all individuals involved in the Planning of post-Katrina Gulfport were interviewed. Several respondents did not want to be recorded, despite offers of anonymity; several respondents did not respond to multiple attempts of contact; other respondents were not locatable. Despite the best attempts of the researcher to engage individuals who were involved in each and every Plan analyzed, there are several notable exclusions. These include Governor Haley Barbour, Current Mayor Billy Hewes, Gulfport Chief Administrative Officer Dr. John R. Kelley, Mayor Brent Warr, Councilperson Ella Holmes-Hines, Former Mississippi Main Street Gulfport Director Lisa Bradley, two SmartCode Planning consultants, a former employee of Mr. Joseph
Lusteck, Citizens involved in the Westside, Mississippi City, and Handsboro neighborhoods. Deceased individuals include Mr. Joseph Lusteck and Councilperson Libby Milner-Roland. Despite these omissions, it is the researchers opinion that a breadth and depth of stakeholders were engaged, and that the on-the-record comments in public meetings were able to fill gaps in narrative.

Third, as an individual using the APA CPSSP (2015) and ‘Plan Reading’ methods, additional reviewers would have provided different insights and would have allowed for inter-rater reliability. Despite this, it is the opinion of the researcher that the others scoring and ‘reading’ the Plans would find similar results. Concerning research quality, careful considerations were made to ensure that documents were referenced and places where the plan met requirements were documented. Appendix B provides detailed results of the APA CPSSP (2015) analysis.
Chapter 4. Plan Analysis

In the ten years following Hurricane Katrina, following the progress of Planning efforts entails an examination of the Plans used to guide the redevelop the coast. Examining the failure of these efforts, as defined at the end of the first chapter, provides a deeper understanding of how the Plans and Plan Making impact the failure of Planning. This chapter analyzes the Plans developed for Gulfport, Mississippi using two lenses. The first approach applies the American Planning Association (APA) Comprehensive Plan Standards for Sustaining Places (CPSSP) Program to understand how the current Comprehensive Plans grade against the currently identified best practices in Planning (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015). The second applies Ryan’s (2011) Plan Reading methods to understand the social and political context that Plan Evaluation does not address.

Methods 1. APA CPSSP

Introduced in the previous chapter, CPSSP framework normatively evaluates and grades Comprehensive Plans against practice benchmarks and is useful in understanding how a Plan meets the benchmarks of ‘good’ Planning (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015). Explored by the first section of the chapter, CPSSP is only applicable to the three Comprehensive Plans listed in the previous chapter. The CPSSP framework evaluates plans against the APA’s sustainability practice benchmarks for Comprehensive Plans and determines if they meet the benchmarks of the framework. Plans fail by not meeting the performance targets set by the benchmarking framework. Broken into four subsections, the
first subsection presents the summary CPSSP results and reports the CPSSP scores. The second subsection reports the detailed CPSSP results and scores for the 2004 Comprehensive Plan. The third subsection presents CPSSP results and scores for the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The fourth subsection presents results and scores from the 2013 Comprehensive Plan.

**Summary of Plan Analysis**

Table 13 reports scores of three Comprehensive Plans according to APA CPSSP methods outlined in the previous chapter. Scores less than 70% are rated ‘Non-Non-Designated.’ Scores between 70% and 79% are ‘Designated’ at a “Basic” level. Scores between 80% and 89% are ‘Silver,’ or “Medium” in achievement. Scores 90% or higher are ‘Gold,’ and demonstrate “Advanced” achievement (Godschalk & Rouse, 2015, p. 57). Appendix B provides a full report of Plan scoring.
Table 13. Methods 1. APA CPSSP Scoring Results

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Points Possible</td>
<td>Score</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCIPLES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livable Built Environment</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>27%</td>
<td></td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilient Economy</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwoven Equity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Community</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5%</td>
<td></td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Regionalism</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL PRINCIPLES SCORE</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8%</td>
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<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCESSES</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authentic Participation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td></td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountable Implementation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL PROCESSES SCORE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTRIBUTES</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Content</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td></td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinated Characteristics</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL ATTRIBUTES SCORE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>31%</td>
<td></td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REVIEWER PLAN SCORE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BONUS POINTS AWARDED</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FINAL PLAN SCORE</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td></td>
<td>63%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of Achievement</td>
<td>NON-DESIGNATED</td>
<td></td>
<td>NON-DESIGNATED</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. 1. The 2013 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan is nearly identical to the 2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan, save for references to SmartCode.
All three Comprehensive Plans fail to meet the ‘basic’ designation benchmark under the APA CPSSP – a score of 70% or higher achieves designation. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores the lowest of the three Plans at 12%. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores the highest of the three Plans at 63%, 7% shy of ‘basic’ designation. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan and 2010 Comprehensive Plan score highest in the Livable Built Environment Principles and score lowest in Accountable Implementation Processes. The 2013 Comprehensive Plan is a modified version of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and scores a 56%. All of the scores for the 2013 Comprehensive Plan under Principles are identical to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan except for practice scores within the Livable Built Environment Principle. The highest scores for the 2013 Comprehensive Plan are within the Responsible Regionalism Principle, and the lowest scores are within the Authentic Participation Process.

The only high achieving Practice in all three Comprehensive Plans is the Coordinated Characteristics Processes Practice 10.7 Comply with applicable laws and mandates. All three Comprehensive Plans fulfill the legal requirements set forth by the State of Mississippi (Miss. Code, 1972, §17-1-1). Table 14 details the 18 Practices not included in any of the three plans.
Table 14. Methods 1. APA CPSSP Non-Included Practices for Three Comprehensive Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principles</th>
<th>Practice</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Livable Built Environment</td>
<td>1.10 Implement green building design and energy conservation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>2.4 Enact policies to reduce carbon footprints</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>2.5 Comply with state and local air quality standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>2.6 Encourage climate change adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony with Nature</td>
<td>2.7 Provide for renewable energy use</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilient Economy</td>
<td>3.4 Promote green businesses and jobs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resilient Economy</td>
<td>3.7 Plan for post-disaster economic recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interwoven Equity</td>
<td>4.9 Promote environmental justice</td>
</tr>
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<td>Healthy Community</td>
<td>5.1 Reduce exposure to toxins and pollutants in the natural and built environments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Community</td>
<td>5.3 Plan for the mitigation and redevelopment of brownfields for productive uses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healthy Community</td>
<td>5.6 Plan for access to healthy, locally-grown foods for all neighborhoods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responsible Regionalism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Processes</td>
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<td>Accountable Implementation</td>
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<td>8.8 Adjust the plan as necessary based on evaluation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attributes</td>
<td>Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consistent Content</td>
<td>9.1 Assess strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The following three sections below expand on the CPSSP Plan Analysis summary by reporting the results for each Comprehensive Plan, using the scoring guidance language outlined in Table 8 in the previous chapter, and representative examples. Each section reports a summary of the scoring, detailed in Table 9 in the previous chapter, and then provides an overview of practice score for each Principle, Process, and Attribute.

**2004 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan**

**Summary** – Scoring 12%, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan fails to meet CPSSP standards for ‘basic’ designation. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan is weakest in Processes, scoring 4%. While the 2004 Comprehensive Plan fulfills all of the legal requirements of a Comprehensive Plan set forth by the State of Mississippi (Miss. Code, 1972, §17-1-1), it largely does not exceed those requirements. The only places where it notably exceeds minimum requirements are in areas related to the preservation of buildings, and the emphasis on using infill in urban areas (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 116).\(^{42}\) Citing the requirements of the State of Mississippi’s enabling ordinance, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan includes provisions for Land Use, Transportation, Community Facilities, Drainage, Water, and Sewer, as well as goals and objectives. These requirements also act as chapter titles and subtitles within the document.

**Principles** – Scoring 8%, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan does not meet the appropriate number of Principles to achieve designation. Within this category, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan only moderately achieves for two practices: 1.1 Plan for multi-modal transportation, and 1.6 Plan for infill development. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan does not match practice characteristics in the CPSSP framework. The vision of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan is to guide the physical and economic of Gulfport through the year 2025. It seeks to “balance the community’s gross needs and the individual’s interest in using his property as he sees fit.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 336).

**Livable Built Environment** – Within Required Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores highest in Livable Built Environment practices at 27%.

Despite this, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan does not meet basic requirements of Livable Built Environment. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan does not address practices regarding regional transportation investments, complete streets, green building, and discouraging development in hazard zones. While the 2004 Comprehensive Plan extensively references historic preservation (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, pp. 114-116), it carries the recommendation into Goals, but contains no actionable recommendations. For example, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 115) says, “A more aggressive step would be for the City of Gulfport to fund and support preparation of a Historic Preservation Plan. This is a serious step beyond inclusion of a Historic Places component in its Community Facilities Plan.”

**Harmony with Nature** – Within Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores lowest in these practices at 0%. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan’s Community Facilities Goal 7 does “encourage” conservation (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 34), but the goal and objectives within the 2004 Comprehensive Plan do not overlap with the 10 practices listed in the CPSSP grading matrix.

**Resilient Economy** – Within Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 5% on Resilient Economy practices. With one low-achieving practice, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan does not mention aspects that align with the concept definition of Resilient Economy. While one of the Plan’s primary intents is to foster economic development, (scoring low achievement in practice 3.1 Provide the physical capacity for economic growth) the 2004 Comprehensive Plan has fulfills the basic requirement, but does not further carrying the objectives through the rest of the document.

**Interwoven Equity** – Within Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 4% on Interwoven Equity. With one low-achieving practice, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan has mentions one reference that aligns with the concept definition of Interwoven Equity: 4.6 Upgrade infrastructure and facilities in older and substandard areas. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan identifies deficiencies related to public facilities (specifically parks; Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 137). However, it the Plan addresses it at a basic level and does not carry actionable recommendations further to interweave equity.
**Healthy Community** – Within Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 5% on Healthy Community. With one low-achieving practice, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan has one mention that aligns with the concept definition of Healthy Community: 5.5 Provide accessible parks, recreation, facilities, greenways and open space near all neighborhoods. The Community Facilities chapter of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, pp. 123-141) addresses the accessibility of parks and schools at a basic level by providing a detailed analysis of parks, describing requirements for future parks, and articulating suggested improvements. It fails to exceed basic levels because the document lacks actionable recommendations following this analysis.

**Responsible Regionalism** – Within Principles, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 4% on Responsible Regionalism, with one low-achieving practice: 6.1 Coordinate local land use plans with regional transportation investments. While the 2004 Comprehensive Plan has a chapter dedicated to Transportation Planning, it only briefly mentions and addresses regional transportation concerns (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 80). The 2004 Comprehensive Plan’s only mention of regional systems aside from transportation is the Plan’s support for a regional storm water management system (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 36).

**Processes** – Scoring 4%, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan meets few requirements concerning supporting data, analysis or other documentation necessary to meet Processes benchmarks. Processes benchmarks attempt to ensure that communities engaged in the development of a Comprehensive Plan have reached out during Plan preparation to inform the Plans regional compatibility and implementation. While the 2004 Comprehensive Plan does mention that community input was a part of the process, the document does not provide the number or type of public meetings, participants, what they said, or how their input was incorporated into the Plan (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 1).

**Authentic Participation** - Within Processes, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 5% on Authentic Participation, with two low-achieving practices. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan mentions process regarding practice 7.1 Engage stakeholders at all stages of the planning process; and 7.7 Continue to engage the public after the
comprehensive plan is adopted. Adoption legislation and body text in the 2004 Comprehensive mention that public engagement occurred, but provide no further information, analysis or documentation, saying, “and after public hearings and public input on the plan, review, and revision by the governing authority; the final draft of City of Gulfport Comprehensive Plan was accepted by the Gulfport City Council.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 1).

**Accountable Implementation** – Within Processes, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 0% on Accountable Implementation. While there is a whole section on the Implementation of Land Use recommendations, it fails to align with the language in the CPSSP grading matrix. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan document recommends developing implementation plans following adoption of the Comprehensive Plan (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 78). In the particular case of the Transportation element, the Plan notes that the implementation of the recommendations is outside the authority of the City of Gulfport, and instead says, “Major Highway improvements are largely funded and built by Mississippi Department of Transportation. Port of Gulfport improvements are funded by the Mississippi State Port Authority.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 91).

**Attributes** – Scoring 31%, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan minimally addresses Attributes practices. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan lacks data, analysis, communication (written or graphic), or other demonstrable forms of support. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan also wholly fails to address many Attributes practices.

**Consistent Content** – Within the Attributes, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 29% on Consistent Content. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan demonstrates a consistent, but minimal, factual base. For example: the 2004 Comprehensive Plan develops evidence based population projections and goals, but does not address implementation. The Plan articulates Goals, but Objectives do not tightly align, and are also difficult to measure. It develops a vision of the future, but key maps, tables, and graphics are unclear and do not convey the intent and relationships in the plan. Due to low support from minimal factual base and vision, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan also has minimal goals and objectives support. Minimal data, analysis, communication, or other forms of support also weaken policies to guide decision making in the 2004 Comprehensive Plan.
Coordinated Characteristics – Within the Attributes, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan scores 33% on Coordinated Characteristics. Within this category, the plan has its lone high-scoring practice: 10.7 Compliance with applicable laws and mandates. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan provides sufficient analysis of the State of Mississippi’s Planning enabling legislation (Miss. Code, 1972, §17-1-1; Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 1). It directly ties the legislation to the 2004 Comprehensive Plan by separating the plan into chapters titled after the legislation’s requirements. Aside from the high scoring 10.7 practice, the rest of the document has weak data, analysis, communication, or demonstrable forms of support.

2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan

Summary – The 2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan fails to meet standards for ‘basic’ designation. Scoring 63% the 2010 Comprehensive Plan is weakest in the Processes Practice, similar to the 2004 Comprehensive Plan. Developed by consulting firm HDR the 2010 Comprehensive Plan is 7% away from designation. In addition, One of the intents of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was to develop a path that would merge the existing 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance with the 2007 SmartCode Framework, noting, “As the City works towards the realization of key objectives—the revitalization of Downtown, the creation of new Town and Neighborhood Centers, the rebuilding and revitalization of neighborhoods—these [SmartCode] principles should serve as a foundation for decision-makers and key stakeholders.” (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 38).

Principles – Scoring 65%, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan has high achieving Livable Built Environment practices but low achieving practices in other categories. Overshadowing moderate achieving practices in Resilient Economy and Responsible Regionalism are the low achievement scores in Harmony with Nature, Interwoven Equity and Healthy Community Principle Practices. Furthermore, one repeated practice absence in Livable Built Environment, Harmony with Nature, Resilient Economy, and

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Responsible Regionalism is the non-inclusion or reflection of environmentally friendly or “Green” practices.

**Livable Built Environment** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores highest in the Livable Built Environment, scoring 91%. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan addresses Livable Built Environment goals, policies, and implementation actions through data, analysis, and support. For example, land use analysis indicates opportunities for redevelopment (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 28) and Infill Development specifically listed as a strategy (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 45). The 2010 Comprehensive Plan also provides for neighborhood centers and town centers (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 46) which places higher density development around nodes to emphasize walkability and bikeability. Within this category, the plan demonstrates high achievement for all but one sub-Practice; 1.10: Implement green building design and energy conservation.

**Harmony with Nature** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 47% on Harmony with Nature. Within the category, four non-present practices lower the score. Notably, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan does not address ‘Green’ practices, such as carbon footprint reduction, climate change adaptation, renewable energy, and solid waste reduction. While some moderately achieving practices included in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan emphasize solid waste reduction and water conservation, the practice is not carried forward to implementation. For example, 2010 Comprehensive Plan Goals 8.1, 8.2, 8.3 identify several initiatives to protect and manage streams, watersheds and floodplains (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 143), but the Plan does not address water conservation.

**Resilient Economy** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 71% on Resilient Economy. Of the seven practices, five are graded high achievement, with two graded as non-present. For example, 3.3 Plan for transportation access to employment centers garners high-achievement by having Transportation Goals that articulate a multi-modal network that also takes into account employment centers (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 98). Non-present practices include: 3.4
Promotion of green businesses and jobs; 3.7 Plan for post-disaster economic recovery. “Green” principles of practice 3.4 are not included or reflected in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Furthermore, the only mentions of disaster in the document are references to Hurricane Katrina and grants affiliated with the long-term recovery of the storm (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 53). The plan does not advocate for pre-disaster Planning.

**Interwoven Equity** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 67% on Interwoven Equity. Four high achieving practices include the provision of different housing types, plan for the improvement of at-risk, distressed, and disadvantaged neighborhoods, accessible services and facilities for minority and low-income neighborhoods, and measures to upgrade infrastructure. Each of these high achieving practices relates to the inclusion of SmartCode. For example, the Plan explores areas that are vulnerable to natural hazards, but stops short in identifying why at-risk populations are at risk, beyond the immediate threat of flooding (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, pp. 137-142).

Among the non-scored and low-scoring practices are considerations towards environmental justice and workforce diversity, respectively. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan does not reference environmental justice. Basic development of recommendations on workforce development also hinders the score. For example, 2010 Comprehensive Plan Objective 6.4.2 refers to workforce development, but its link with the larger plan is weak (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 114).

**Healthy Community** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 29% on Healthy Community. In this category, there is only one high achieving practice: 5.5: Provide accessible parks, recreation, facilities, greenways and open space near all neighborhoods. Plan. 2010 Comprehensive Plan Goals and Vision include and reflect efforts to place public parks and infrastructures in clusters. Included in goals, policies and implementation actions, transit clusters with SmartCode are similar to Transit Oriented Development. Aside from this high-achieving practice, the other six practices are low achievement or not present. These practices include access to food, brownfield mitigation and redevelopment, and efforts to reduce exposure to crime, toxins and pollutants. For
example, the Plan’s public safety element focuses on the reconstruction of police infrastructure, not on environmental design (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 101). In addition, while the document plans for facilities such as health care providers, schools, public safety facilities, and arts and cultural facilities, service equity is not a concern.

**Responsible Regionalism** – Within Principles, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 78% on Responsible Regionalism. The 2010 Plan addresses regionalism in Plan in goals, policies. It draws strong links to regional infrastructure, transportation, transit, housing, and Plans through its goals, policy, and implementation. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan also develops a strong set of population projections to 2030, informed by both regional and local analyses (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 29). The two practices under Responsible Regionalism Principle Practice in which the Plan has a low or non-achievement grade are: 6.8 Include regional development visions and plans in local planning scenarios and; Practice 6.3 Coordinate local open space plans with regional green infrastructure plans. The low achievement score for 6.8 is due to the non-inclusion of the regional vision. Non-achievement grade for 6.3 Green Infrastructure is similar to other non-achievement practice grades relating to ‘Green’ practices.

**Processes** – Scoring 33%, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores ‘basic’ achievement in Processes. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan provides minimal data, analysis, or other documentation to support processes. For example, while the plan had a website devoted to the development of the plan, the site is no longer available and was not as robust as other websites for other Comprehensive Plans around the same time. In addition, while the plan engaged local residents, it is unclear exactly what groups were engaged and how frequent the engagement occurred outside of the weeklong feedback session on the working plan draft (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 3).

**Authentic Participation** - Within Processes, the plan scores 43% on Authentic Participation. While higher than the score from the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scored moderately better on public participation. In the document,
HDR Community Planning + Urban Design documents that they met with city staff, and various interested members of the public, business community, and government representatives (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010, p. 3). A vague timeline is present on the website that intends to disseminate the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, but this timeline is very limited in its scope, and not available in the document. Furthermore, HDR Community Planning + Urban Design moderately engaged the community to set goals, principles, objectives and actions. While the Plan did receive a high-achievement practice score for its digital Plan and website, in 2010, the Plan had no other digital or social media presences.

**Accountable Implementation** – As the lowest scoring Required Process the 2010 Comprehensive Plan scores 25% on Accountable Implementation. The Plan provides minimal data, analysis, or other documentation on Accountable Implementation. For example, the section on transportation has two halves. The first half, with detailed data and analysis, has strong implementation actions. The second half has minimal data, analysis, nor does it include actionable projects.

**Attributes** – Scoring 80%, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan highly achieves on most content and characteristics. HDR Community Planning + Urban Design carefully thought out and constructed the 2010 Comprehensive Plan document. This thought manifests itself in the documents written and graphic communication.

**Consistent Content** – Within Attributes, the plan scores 75% on Consistent Content. Data and analysis inform the 2010 Comprehensive Plan’s vision and sets policies to guide decision-making. However, the plan lacks a SWOT\(^\text{44}\) analysis, which limits the score. Examples of high achievement include the easy-to-read maps, graphics, tables that convey ideas in simple English; and clear statement of Goals and Objectives.

**Coordinated Characteristics** – Within Attributes, the plan scores 85% on Coordinated Characteristics. The most notable issue with coordination is the lack of ties to state and federal planning efforts. Another concern is the absence of specific elements, such as key aspects of social equity, climate change, local food, green infrastructure, and

\(^{44}\) Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
energy. Despite these omissions, the Plan is easy to read and attractive to look at; the Plan clearly articulates the overall vision for the City of Gulfport.

**2013 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan**

**Summary** – The 2013 Comprehensive Plan for Gulfport (2013 Comprehensive Plan) is an updated version of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, that sought to represent a change in land use policy. In 2012, the City of Gulfport vacated three of five community plans that built on the 2007 SmartCode Framework. Another piece of legislation, adopted at the same time, placed the SmartCode Transect Zones into the existing traditional zoning framework. To reflect these changes, the City of Gulfport modified the 2010 Comprehensive Plan to remove all references to SmartCode. They also updated several maps and the cover page of the document. This section reviews changes in the 2013 iteration of the Comprehensive Plan document. Overall, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan achieved a score of 56%, down 7% from the 2010 Comprehensive Plan score.

**Principles** – Scoring 62%, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 3% less than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The difference in score comes entirely from the Livable Built Environment Principle Practice.

**Livable Built Environment** – Within Principles, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 76% on Livable Built Environment, 15% lower than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Removal of SmartCode references from the Comprehensive Plan negatively affects scores of several practices (City of Gulfport, 2013, pp. 15-16). Lack of implementation carry forward hinders scores of: 1.2 Plan for transit-oriented development; 1.6 Plan for infill development, and; 1.7 Encourage design standards appropriate to the community context. Removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document deemphasized Transit Oriented Development (TOD) and urban infill recommendations (City of Gulfport, 2013, p. 51). Removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document also resulted in lower scores the design standards recommendations. The City of Gulfport

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45 See p. 125 for illustration.
adopted design standards in 2012, but only applied those standards downtown instead of the whole city, as was recommended by the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

**Processes** – Scoring 18%, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 15% lower than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Weakened by the lack of additional community input and the removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document, both Authentic Participation, and Accountable Implementation garnered lower Processes scores.

**Authentic Participation** - Within Processes, the plan scores 14% on Authentic Participation. Among practices, this practice experienced the largest drop in score, losing 29% between iterations of the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plan. The City of Gulfport did not modify the text for the 2013 Comprehensive Plan to reflect increased public participation. The 2008 community meetings held for the 2010 Comprehensive Plan would have been five years old for the 2013 Comprehensive Plan. Furthermore, loss of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan website further limited 2013 Comprehensive Plan resources and citizen participation, limiting the data, analysis, and documentation available and contained within the plan.

**Accountable Implementation** – Within Processes, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 21% on Accountable Implementation, 4% less than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document only marginally affects the score. The Process practice affected by the removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document was sub-Practice 8.1 Indicate specific actions for implementation. Mentions of implementation are present, but supporting data, analysis, and documentation is not present.

**Attributes** – Scoring 71%, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan is slightly less consistent and coordinated than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan.

**Consistent Content** – Within Attributes, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 71% on Consistent Content, 4% less than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The 2013 Comprehensive Plan uses the original 2010 Comprehensive Plan fact base. Furthermore, changes to the 2013 Comprehensive Plan document lowers document consistency and makes printing challenging, damaging the written and graphic communication. The
majority of the document is 8.5” x 11”, except one large map on the .pdf page 65 that is 11” x 17”.

*Coordinated Characteristics* – Within Attributes, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan scores 70% on Coordinated Characteristics practices, 15% less than the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. Cut and paste differences between the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plan documents demonstrate a lack of coordination throughout the document. Below, in Figures 11 and 12, a side-by-side comparison of the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plan documents demonstrate the results of cut-and-paste efforts. In Figure 11, the effects of this cut-and-paste approach are visible; the loss of an overview of existing conditions greatly reduces the graphic communication of the 2013 Comprehensive Plan. In Figure 12, removal of SmartCode references from the Plan document also left significant gaps in the documents text, reducing the written communication in the 2013 Comprehensive Plan. Removal of SmartCode references in the Plan Document is also incomplete. While the City of Gulfport *de facto* nullified SmartCode in 2012 (Lee, 2012, February 29), and the 2013 Comprehensive Plan references SmartCode more than ten times in-text and in one map.

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*46 The future land use map does not have a page number.*
Figure 11. Methods. 2010/2013 Comprehensive Plan Planning Context Comparison

3.0 PLANNING CONTEXT

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Information provided in this chapter is to be used for planning requirements and to provide a foundation for planning recommendations, programs, and policies presented in the balance of the Plan. The Plan builds on a common core of current city, county, and regional planning efforts, a common of population, housing, and economic conditions affecting the City, and a common of planning efforts and policies for the State. The Plan process has been structured to enable a single, comprehensive system of planning for the City, its residents, and its businesses. This structure includes the following:

- A common of comprehensive plan and policies
- A common of planning levels
- A common of stakeholders
- A common of planning standards
- A common of planning procedures
- A common of planning documentation
- A common of planning reviews
- A common of planning resources
- A common of planning systems
- A common of planning policies
- A common of planning objectives
- A common of planning recommendations
- A common of planning implementation
- A common of planning monitoring
- A common of planning evaluation
- A common of planning reporting
- A common of planning coordination
- A common of planning education
- A common of planning outreach
- A common of planning partnerships

3.2 EXISTING CONDITIONS

Building an understanding of demographic, economic, and land use conditions is the first step in developing comprehensive plans and policies to achieve the City's vision for quality development. The Plan includes the following:

- A common of comprehensive plan and policies
- A common of planning levels
- A common of stakeholders
- A common of planning standards
- A common of planning procedures
- A common of planning documentation
- A common of planning reviews
- A common of planning resources
- A common of planning systems
- A common of planning policies
- A common of planning objectives
- A common of planning recommendations
- A common of planning implementation
- A common of planning monitoring
- A common of planning evaluation
- A common of planning reporting
- A common of planning coordination
- A common of planning education
- A common of planning outreach
- A common of planning partnerships


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Methods 2. Ryan’s (2011) ‘Plan Reading’ Analysis

The section presents applied analysis of Ryan’s (2011) Plan Reading methods. Plan Reading methods, introduced in the previous chapter, analyze plans three ways: factually, contextually, and temporally. Using this framework, Plan implementation success or failure is determinable by examining the intent of the plan and its conformance and performance relative to the procedures identified by the plan. The APA CPSSP, used to grade three Comprehensive Plans in the previous section, lacks the ability to provide Plan development and implementation context. For example, there are reasons why a plan may emphasize certain types of goals over others. While the CPSSP tool is useful, it is only half of the Plan analysis story. Using Ryan’s (2011) ‘Plan Reading’ analysis methods (Plan Reading methods) helps to tell the other half of the story.

Per the methods outlined in the previous chapter, the Plan Reading analysis is broken into three sub-analyses: factual, contextual, and temporal. This analysis section
engages the Plan Reading methods to analyze ten plans. The first Plan analyzed is the pre-Katrina 2004 Comprehensive Plan. Nine other plans analyzed in this section are post-Katrina plans. Order of adoption determines Plan review order. In instances of non-adoption, as is the case with the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plans, status date determines review order. Two plans not reviewed in this analysis are the SmartCode Framework and North Gulfport Community Plan.

Documents are analyzed Factually in two parts. First, Factual Analysis begins with Table 15 which reviews the Plan Reference Title, Plan initiation date, Plan adoption date, Plan status, and Plan status date collected from public records. Table references on the left side of Table 15 indicate the location of the first part of factual analysis. Tables 16 – 25 continues this analysis by providing twelve fields to analyze each plan factually. The first field provides a thumbnail of each Plan’s cover and the second field provides the Plan’s formal title. The third field lists the date of the plan, as presented in the document and the fourth field indicates the file creation date and time. The fifth field provides document authors. In places where private firms are authors, the Plan document did not identify specific authors. The author field also provides locations of private firms, listed in parentheticals. Fields six through nine provide document details, including the length of the document in real pages, the medium used for Plan analysis, the color parameters of the document, and document size, both physical (in inches) and digital (in Megabytes, or MB). Fields ten through twelve report the count of Maps, Images, and

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47 The SmartCode framework is a regulatory document. It does not contain policy recommendations.
48 SmartCode Consultant Jeff Bounds initiated development of the North Gulfport Community Plan, but the Plan was never completed.
49 Real pages indicates the number of printable pages, as counted by Adobe Acrobat. Several Plan Documents have pages missing or errantly numbered. In-text citations use the real page number to identify pages, as opposed to page numbers located in-text.
50 CMYK: Four Process Color (for Print); RGB: Display Color (for Digital viewing); BW: Black and White (for Print or Digital viewing).
51 Maps are top-down images intended to represent a plans dimensionality. “Birds-eye” style views are not included as maps, and are counted as images.
52 Images are graphic representations within Plan documents. If no captions are present, contiguously represented graphics are counted singularly; if caption is present, images are counted as a single graphic representation.
Tables. Second, the Factual Analysis also includes a detailed summary of each Plan, on a chapter-by-chapter basis. The Factual Analysis pays specific attention to how the Plan communicates policy using maps, images, and tables.

Contextual Analysis follows the Factual Analysis. Contextual Analysis, per Ryan’s (2011:310) approach, places Plans in their social, political, and visual contexts. Social Context refers to the motivating factors for Plan development, adoption, and implementation. Framing the interests of the community developing the Plan also adds to the Social Context. Political Context frames the political support or conflict in the development, adoption, and implementation of the Plan. Visual context describes how the Plan visually, or graphically, communicates policy. It also examines how graphics, maps, and images affect the presentation of policy within the Plan. Contextual Analysis also uses social, political, and visual contexts to describe the Author Intent. Author intent is surmised from an analytical understanding of how contexts relate and play off one another.

Temporal Analysis follows Contextual Analysis. Temporal Analysis, per Ryan’s (2011) approach, requires the reader to have an in-depth understanding of not only the subject-city but also local knowledge over the timespans before and after the Plan. It also prods the Plan reader to understand the Plans factual and contextual analysis as a snapshot, or cultural artifact. Temporal Analysis employs relevant context, including utilization of aerial imagery and windshield surveys, to describe the temporal conditions both prior and after the Plan.

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53 Tables are either tables, charts, or informational graphics (such as pie-charts and process charts) that contain non-graphic representations, such as text and solid color charts.
Table 15. Methods 2. Factual Analysis Summary of Plan Documents

<table>
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Notes.
1. SmartCode Framework was incorporated into the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of June 29, 1979, City of Gulfport Ordinance 1501, via City of Gulfport Ordinance 2746 (Planning Commission Case Reference 1203PC014).
2. Community Plans vacated by City of Gulfport Ordinance 274 (Planning Commission Case Reference 1110PC088).
3. Florence Gardens and Westside Community Plans are Quasi-Active because while still enforced, SmartCode was incorporated into Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1979, City of Gulfport Ordinance 1501, via City of Gulfport Ordinance 2746 (Planning Commission Case Reference 1203PC014). Florence Gardens is a Low-Impact Development (LID) new-build subdivision; Westside is an existing neighborhood, located along U.S. Highway 90, immediately west of Gulfport’s Central Business District.
4. On August 22, 2012, City of Gulfport closed out HDR’s contract for the Comprehensive Plan, citing the need to save money.
2004 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan


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54 Dots per Square Inch; resolution of scan.
55 Native filename refers to the title the digital file was given by the individual who exported the digital document.
Seen in Table 16, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan lacks a cover page, but is 177 real pages, as provided. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan was read digitally in Adobe Acrobat. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan contains seven maps, zero images, and 44 tables. Notably, the Table of Contents lists nine maps, but only seven are present in the document. The document includes extensive typographical errors.
### Table 16. Methods 2. 2004 Comprehensive Plan Factual Analysis

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Structured into six chapters, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan document states on the eighth page that it complies with Mississippi’s enabling legislation. Chapters of the document, as noted in the previous APA CPSSP analysis, follow the statutory guidance. These chapters include Introduction, Goals and Objectives, Population and Economy, Land Use, Transportation, and Community Facilities.

The Introduction details the philosophy underlying the document. The guiding philosophy is of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan is to make it easier for private landowners to develop land in accordance with the laws of the State of Mississippi. The documents first sentence is, “The purpose of the City of Gulfport Comprehensive Plan is to provide policy guidance for the City regarding its future growth and development.” In further detailing the underlying concepts, Lusteck & Associates (2004, p. 8) use the word development or variations of the word in six of 11 underlying concepts.

The second chapter outlines the Goals and Objectives of the Plan in four sections. First, the chapter overviews the overall Goals and Objectives for the 2004 Comprehensive Plan. Goals and Objectives for the three recommendations chapters of Land Use, Transportation, and Community Facilities follow. Lusteck & Associates (2004) detail four major goals for the 2004 Comprehensive Plan. One to two sentences describe each of the four goals, and each goal provides bullet points, which contain objectives. Subsequent Land Use, Transportation, or Community Facilities goals or objectives do not have a direct relationship to the aforementioned Comprehensive Plan goals and objectives.

The Land Use section identifies four goals, with objectives listed as bullet points below. Objectives are negative towards undesirable land use development and positive toward desirable land use development. For example, LU-5 states, “To provide for an equitable balance between private property rights and legitimate community interests.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 27)

The Transportation section has 48 goals and objectives, which are bundled together. Distinctly different from the other two sections, 22 of the 48 goals and objectives seek to “provide” transportation infrastructure. 18 of 22 goals and objectives
that use “provide” argue, generally, for increasing the capacity of streets and off-street parking. For example, goal and objective TR-3: “To provide a roadway system with sufficient capacity, safety, separation, access, convenience, attractiveness, and alternatives to provide the potential for accommodating public needs for circulation, enhancing and unifying the City’s appearance and providing the opportunity for making individual travel choices.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 29). Four of 22 goals and objectives that use “provide” relate to street trees, bicycle routes, and sidewalks. For example, TR-29 says, “To provide for tree preservation and landscaping within and along road rights of way throughout the City, where possible.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 31). Some goals and objectives discuss limiting traffic congestion and on-street parking. For example, TR-39 says, “To prevent, reduce, and where possible eliminate through traffic from residential neighborhoods.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 32). Other goals and objectives discuss increasing access to developable land and development. For example, TR-18 says, “To provide access to developed and developable real estate and a roadway framework for developed and developable areas of the City and its Planning Area.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 30).

The Public Facilities goals and objectives move back to the same format as the Overall and Land Use goals and objectives. Similar to the Transportation section, use of the word “provide” is present in six of the 13 goals. Each of these goals relates to the hard infrastructure that the city is capable of providing. Some of the objectives under these goals are imprecise. For example, one objective under CF-7 reads, “To discourage development of environmentally sensitive areas in favor of their appropriate reservation and management consistent with established standards.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 34).

After Community Facilities goals and objectives, another section of goals and objectives for drainage, water, and sewer utilities follow. These goals and objectives are within the Community Facilities chapter, and listed in the document table of contents, but are not listed on the first page of the Goals and Objectives chapter. These sections have goals that read like objectives, and many objectives that read like objectives,
recommendations, or actions. For example, Goal CFW-2 read, “Encourage and increase conservation and efficient use of water resources.” One objective under it reads, “Authorize a task force to focus on groundwater use, monitoring, conservation, and preservation.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, pp. 40-41).

Lusteck & Associates (2004) construct the factual basis for the plan in the Population and Economy chapter. They present a population history and project the population to 2025; they project between 2000 and 2015, a 31% population increase, from 71,000 to 93,000. Between 2000 and 2025, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan anticipates a 50% population increase. As of 2014, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated population for the City of Gulfport at approximately 72,000, or a 1.5% increase. Concerning economy, Lusteck & Associates (2004) put together an analysis of Labor Force and Employment. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan has no other projections.

The Land Use chapter overviews existing land use history and plots future land use. Immediately following projections, it provides a number of policies divided into substantive, residential, commercial, industrial, and open-space. The chapter projects future land use, and the number of needed units, but provides no justification for future land use decisions. Additionally, the Future Land Use Map (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 62) is not in color, rendering it unreadable. Policy and zoning recommendations follow. There are 30 policy recommendations and five Zoning recommendations. Policy recommendations are written as paragraphs and do not include actions. Zoning recommendations are brief, but offer actions, such as Zoning Recommendation 2: Add Adult Entertainment Regulations (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 77).

The Transportation chapter has concise recommendations and detailed maps. Expectations of growth detailed by population projections justify transportation recommendations, such as the expansion of roadways from two to four or six lanes, the extension of certain roads, and the expansion of transit service to major attractors. Other recommendations include the continued expansion of the Port of Gulfport (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, pp. 86-88), continued development of the Gulfport-Biloxi Regional
Airport (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, pp. 88-90) and the creation of a four-lane east-to-west surface roadway using the existing CSX Railroad Corridor.

The Community Facilities chapter addresses housing, schools, public buildings, historic places, and parks and recreation. On housing, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan examines building permitting data, and identifies future housing issues. The plan argues for separating housing from other uses. On schools, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan reproduces and supports recommendations from Gulfport Public Schools. On historic places, the plan argues for preservation of historic structures and the need for infill, particularly in the downtown area. Historic Preservation and infill are two facets of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan not explicitly stated by the zoning and planning enabling legislation (Miss. Code, 1972, §17-1-1). Lusteck & Associates (2004, pp. 113-114) note the importance of preservation for infill and adaptive reuse, particularly in “the City [of Gulfport’s] downtown and beachfront areas [which] have a unique historic character.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 17). In the discussion of historic preservation, there is also a reference to combatting “suburban sprawl” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 114). On Parks and Recreation, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan projects a deficiency of 19.25 acres of park land over the duration of the Plan. The 2003 Comprehensive Plan recommends the development of four to eight Neighborhood playgrounds, six to nine Community Playfields, two additional major community parks, development of a SportsPlex (baseball, softball, tennis, soccer, and swimming pools), nine neighborhood centers, and three public 18 hole golf courses (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 141).

**Contextual Reading** – There are three major contexts important to the development of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, one social and two political. Concerning the social contexts, Gulfport anticipated significant population growth. Concerning political contexts, the expansion of casino gaming and annexation of Orange Grove to the north of the city also had impacts on the plan, with the former buoying growth expectations, and the latter initiating the development of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan.

**Social Context** – The Comprehensive Plan took almost ten years from initiation to adoption. Over this period, Gulfport experienced robust local and regional growth and
anticipated growth for the foreseeable future. Gulfport’s leaders believed the city was benefitting from the rapidly developing and suburbanizing Sun Belt region, known for warm winters, inexpensive real estate, construction, energy, and transportation costs (Frey, 2002). Growth in the Sun Belt was largely in the form of condominiums for both vacationers and relocating Rust Belt ‘Snow Bird’ retirees. While Florida’s peninsula saw the largest share of growth, Florida’s panhandle and coastal Alabama, particularly Gulf Shores, also saw an increase of condominium tower construction. By the mid-1990’s, condominium towers dotted coastlines and Mississippi’s coastal leaders began fielding calls from developers interested in developing similar condominium towers along its man-made 26-mile sand beach. Gulfport, advantageously situated in the middle of Harrison County, had eight-miles of beachfront property and saw this as an exploitable asset in the 2004 Comprehensive Plan.

*Political Context* – The expansion of gaming, annexation of Orange Grove both affected Plan development. In addition to the anticipated population boom, city officials also believed they had the proverbial ‘Ace’ in the pocket; in 1990, the state of Mississippi expanded gaming. Mississippi’s Gulf Coast quickly became the third largest gaming economy in the U.S., only behind Las Vegas, Nevada and Atlantic City, New Jersey. In 2004, the 12 casinos along the Mississippi Gulf Coast generated just over $1.2 billion in annual revenue, accounting for more than 70% of Mississippi’s gaming income (Mississippi Gaming & Hospitality Association, 2015). Aside from the large number of tourists casinos brought to the coast, casinos were also investing in leisure activities such as golf and sport fishing. Beach going, previously a popular attraction, grew in popularity leading to the development of souvenir shops along the coast. In addition, throughout the 1990’s and into the early 2000’s several hotels also opened on the beach. By the late 1990’s and early 2000’s, the Gulf Coast Tourism Bureau’s tagline was “Playground of the South.” This context explains why the park placed a heavy emphasis on the development of three new public 18-hole Golf Courses, and development of the beachfront.
Aside from the casino and tourism boom, Gulfport anticipated that the impending population boom would be suburban in nature, following the annexation of Orange Grove. Gulfport first adopted zoning in 1940\textsuperscript{56}. Between 1940 and 1970, the city experienced a boom in population and more than doubled in size\textsuperscript{57}. On April 2, 1968, the City of Gulfport adopted its first Comprehensive Plan. Developed by consultant Archibald (Arch) Reese Winter of Mobile, Alabama,\textsuperscript{58} Gulfport’s Development Master Plan intended to direct future development for the next 25 years. However, between 1970 and 1990 the population of Gulfport stabilized around 40,000 residents, with many of the new residents moving to unincorporated portions of Harrison County, or in and around the Orange Grove area. The 1994 annexation of Orange Grove added 25,000 residents and 33 square miles of area to Gulfport. In addition to anticipating a significant population increase, the existing 1968 Development Master Plan did not address areas outside the former political boundaries of the city. This political impetus drove development of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan.

\textit{Visual Context} – Overall, the plan is not particularly interesting to look at. The majority of the document is text heavy. The document lacks a cover page. Limited illustrations make it difficult to link policy to physical planning for the built environment. While maps in the 2004 Comprehensive Plan provide some visualization of land use decisions, the maps are not comparable to one another; The current land use maps is in black and white and future land use map is in color, but at rendered in a very low and unreadable resolution. In addition, the factual analysis noted that the City of Gulfport’s planning staff likely inserted the maps, their haphazard appearance, along with three missing maps.

\textit{Authors Intent} – Lusteck & Associates intent for the 2004 Comprehensive Plan is clearly stated: “The Comprehensive Plan serves as a policy guide for the physical and

\textsuperscript{56} Ordinance 611, Adopted August 15, 1940.
\textsuperscript{57} Population of Gulfport in 1940 was 15,000; by 1960, Gulfport had grown to about 30,000. In 1970, despite the population loss from Hurricane Camille, Gulfport’s population was just over 40,000.
\textsuperscript{58} The contracted cost for the 1968 Archibald Reese Winter plan was $41,000, or $317,500 in 2016. $25,000 was paid to Mr. Winter, and $16,000 went to support staff.
economic development of the City of Gulfport.” (Lusteck & Associates, 2004, p. 10). The author’s intent was to develop a highly technical Plan that anticipates robust growth and development. The document details, at length, what development it anticipates but is less specific to where new development should go.

**Temporal Reading**

**Prior Plan Conditions**—Gulfport’s growth is visible in aerial imagery of the newly annexed Orange Grove. While much of the area developed in the 1970’s, there was an increase in the suburbanization of the area in the 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 13 uses Google Earth to demonstrate growth in the Orange Grove area, near the intersection of Three Rivers Road and O’Neal Road, with new development, occurring between 1992 and 2004, highlighted in red.

*Figure 13. Methods 2. Temporal Development along Three Rivers Road, 1992-2004*
**Post Plan Conditions** – Since the 2004 Comprehensive Plan is still the guiding policy document for the City of Gulfport, it is difficult to assess the *ex post facto* conditions. Despite this, more than 12 years after adoption, the Plan is ill equipped to deal with the current challenges that face the City of Gulfport. Hurricane Katrina, and subsequent Planning efforts fundamentally reshaped the political and social landscapes of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. This plan does not address challenges created by or after Hurricane Katrina; in addition, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan has not been updated since adoption.

**Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport**

**Factual Analysis** – Exported as a digital document, and published in November, 2005, the Gulfport team for the Mississippi Renewal Forum wrote the *Redevelopment Master Plan Charrette Book [for] Gulfport, Mississippi*. Following Hurricane Katrina, over 200 professionals affiliated with the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU) volunteered six days on Mississippi Gulf Coast to develop redevelopment plans for 11 coastal communities. Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, completed by a team of 17 people with four team members from HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning was “Full of hope for the redevelopment opportunities that Katrina’s destruction offers, Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr still intends to bring a renaissance to the Mississippi Coast’s largest city (pop. 71,000), with its large-scale port, faded downtown financial district, and timeworn antebellum mansions.” (Alimanestanu et al., 2005, p. 32).\(^5^9\) Internally, the document notes that Robert Alminana and Christopher Ross of HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning prepared the document. The Plan document is 43 pages, and contains 73 images and 20 maps. The Plan document is 72 DPI exported as a CMYK .pdf image. The Mississippi Renewal Forum’s legacy page hosts the document. All of the documents elements are in color. Table 17 summarizes these features.

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\(^5^9\) Alimanestanu et al. (2005) references the 2005 Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport
Table 17. *Methods 2. Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport Factual Analysis*

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The document is broken into several parts; first, the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport introduces the process and background of the Plan. Second, the document provides recommendations. Third, an overview of existing conditions provides the foundation for the subsequent expansion of recommendations. The remainder of the document expands on the provided recommendations.

The cover image of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport is a birds-eye view rendering of what the future Gulfport would look like. The documents authors do not provide the a specific year for this vision. The rendering demonstrates the scope of ideas contained therein and indicates Port of Gulfport as a focus of the plan. The rendering includes two cruise ships, a redeveloped Jones Park, the extension and redevelopment of U.S. Highway 49, the creation of an elevated roadway extending into the port, and the placement of a new Monte Carlo-esque casino adjacent to the new Bert Jones Yacht Harbor. The rendering de-emphasizes the existing downtown, with only a few buildings illustrated using color. The rendering excludes working portions of the port; containers nor container ships are present in the rendering.

The introduction of the document details the origins of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, and points to Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour and advocate for New Urbanism, Andrés Duany. The document presents a “conceptual” redevelopment strategy following Hurricane Katrina, saying, “The manifest potential of Gulfport to successfully redevelop into one of the most physically attractive, economically viable and socially progressive communities in the South was apparent to every team member almost from the outset of the project.” (Alimanestanu et al., 2005:4). The introduction also outlines the overall goals of the document as:

- Reestablishing the mixed-use prominence of the downtown;
- Optimizing the locational and functional opportunities associated with the Port;
- Optimizing the locational opportunities associated with Gulf-front property as well as selected locations away from the water;
• Reinforcing and strengthening the character and structure of older neighborhoods throughout the City;
• Creating linkages and functional diversity among newer neighborhoods;
• Establishing regional transportation diversity;
• Reinforcing the underlying regional ecosystems.

The remainder of the introduction contains numerous photos. The page 6 documents storm damage. Page 7 documents the tour team members took on the second day of the charrette. Page 8 and 9 document the Charrette Team and the Public Participation Process. Page 10 uses a series of illustrated historic postcards to draw architectural design inspiration. Page 11 presents images from other ‘best-practice’ cities the new Plan of Gulfport hoped to emulate. Images highlighted beach scenes such at St. Petersburg and Tampa, Florida; Cannes and Nice, France, and, Havana, Cuba. It also highlights the Casino districts of Monte Carlo, Monaco.

The page dedicated to strategies outlines 7 numbered priority actions and 24 bulleted additional actions. The priority actions are the major recommendations of the document. They are:

1. Redesign and re-build Jones Park, immediately, as one “perfect place;”
2. Relocate northward the CSX railway tracks that currently run along the ROW parallel to Highway 90;
3. Redesign this former CSX ROW as an urban boulevard that includes the potential for future transit;
4. Develop urban design guidelines, including architectural standards, for all major redevelopment areas within the City;
5. Regain ownership of the eastern portion of the Port facilities from the State;
6. Re-plan and redevelop the Port into a combined facility including industry to the west, and tourism, recreation, cultural and commercial activities to the east;
7. Create a citywide network of parks and accessible open spaces, with greenway connectors throughout the City.

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Of the 24 bulleted Additional Actions, seven deal with transportation issues. Seven mention downtown Gulfport. Three additional actions address neighborhoods (Turkey Creek and Old North Gulfport). Five actions argue for policies, such as the adoption of SmartCode, Transfer of Development Rights, Mississippi Main Street, Landscape Master Plan, and development of a Business Incubator. Two actions argue for preservation of open land. Other recommendations include acquiring the old Veterans Administration facility from the Federal government to re-use as a national medical facility, and to determine locations and develop models of live-work units.

Following these recommendations, Existing Conditions and Neighborhood Structure detail Gulfport’s form before the storm. Existing Conditions separates new from old urban fabric and highlights a number of special districts, such as a college campus the regional airport, and military operations. Neighborhood Structure utilizes 5-minute walk-sheds\(^\text{60}\) clustered around major attractors\(^\text{61}\) to detail the residential form of neighborhoods. The proposed SmartCode regulating Plan Map for the city of Gulfport then uses this information to draw boundaries between transect zones, or T-Zones. Labeled 1 thru 6, the transect zones are proposed via map and are detailed on the following two pages. As the major land use recommendation in the document, the document defines transect zones using Figure 14 to illustrate density from natural to urban core transects.

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\(^{60}\) Distance a person can walk in 5 or less minutes.

\(^{61}\) Major attractors are places that attract residents aside from housing. These can include schools, churches, shopping centers, large businesses, etc.
The three following maps detail additions to the Transportation and Parks system to improve connectivity, transit, and alternative transportation infrastructure. For increased transit connectivity, the Plan argues for the reuse of the CSX railroad corridor to establish a new four-lane east-to-west road, the creation of a new elevated Port Connector road, extension of several roadways around the Regional Airport, and the redevelopment of the Port of Gulfport. Improvements to transit include the development of Bus Rapid Transit, a Street Car system along Beach Boulevard, realignment of a rail system, and extension of bus transit routes. The Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport also spends significant time detailing parks and open space. The Plan suggests the creation of a parks network connected through a series of pedestrian and bicycling infrastructure.

The Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport also includes a discussion of nine intervention areas and architectural standards. Three of these intervention areas are pieces of public or semi-public land, and six are neighborhoods. The three pieces of property targeted by the Plan are a ‘greyfield site,’ VA Hospital site, and the Port of Gulfport. The six neighborhood intervention areas are Downtown, Westside, Soria City, Old North Gulfport, Turkey Creek, and the Cowan Road/Mississippi City intersection.

The last page of the document details various residential architectural standards. Notably,
the document emphasizes development in downtown. There are eight maps and thirteen images of downtown in this last section; elements such as the elevated roadway connector, harbor casino, and Jones Park are emphasized. Figure 15, taken from the document, highlights this vision of Downtown Gulfport.
Figure 15. Methods 2. Mississippi Renewal Forum Vision for Downtown Gulfport
**Contextual Reading** – The social contexts of Hurricane Katrina’s Landfall and New Urbanism, political contexts of direct involvement from the Governor and the newly elected local leadership inform the reading of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport.

**Social Context** – Hurricane Katrina made landfall over Bay St. Louis on August 29, 2005, reshaping social dynamics of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. The catastrophic losses create by Katrina frayed neighborhood social fabrics; thousands of residents lost their homes, entire neighborhoods were lost to storm surge, and the city’s economy was destroyed. To help rebuild the Mississippi Gulf Coast ‘Better than Before,’ six weeks after Hurricane Katrina the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal hosted the Mississippi Renewal Forum. The Mississippi Renewal Forum, organized by Andrés Duany and the Congress for New Urbanism (CNU), brought in over 200 professional architects, planners, and engineers. For five days, volunteers and local leaders developed plans for a post-Katrina landscape.

HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning collaborated with Gulfport’s newly elected Mayor and City Council to develop plans for the devastated city. Gulfport, as the economic hub for the Mississippi Gulf Coast region, sustained significant damage to downtown and the Port of Gulfport. Generally, Gulfport sustained the most social and economic social damage south of the CSX Railroad Tracks. This included portions of neighborhoods, from east-to-west, or Mississippi City, Handsboro, Second Street, Soria City, Downtown, and Westside.

There are also social contexts concerning the Mississippi Renewal Forum itself. The role and stature of the CNU around 2005 was nearing its peak, and critics were numerous. Aaron Passell (2013) broadly positions the Mississippi Renewal Forum plans within the context of the larger New Urbanist movement in his book *Building the New Urbanism*. Passell (2013, p. 103) argues, “CNU’s high-profile involvement in Gulf Coast rebuilding effort broadcast New Urbanist ambitions for greater influence and opened them to opposition on a new front.” He further argues that the Renewal Forum itself was
a potential “trajectory changing” moment for CNU and New Urbanism, making the ideas a “known quantity to more of the country” limiting the ability of CNU and New Urbanists to “operate on the landscape in unquestioned fashion.” Passell (2013) notes the sharply divided opinions on New Urbanism. Mother Jones’ writer and well-known urban thinker Mike Davis was critical of the work done by New Urbanists. Passell (2013, p. 92) cites Davis (2005, October 25) who writes “In the end, however, what was important was not the actual content of the [Mississippi Renewal Forum] charrette, nor the genuine idealism of many participants, but simply the legitimacy and publicity that CNU gave to [Mississippi Governor Haley] Barbour’s agenda. [Andrés] Duany, who never misses an opportunity to push his panaceas to those in power, has foolishly made himself an accomplice to the Republicans’ evil social experiment on the Gulf Coast.”

**Political Context** – Two political contexts are important to frame the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. First, the direct involvement of Governor Haley Barbour in the Development of the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal and Mississippi Renewal Forum. Second, the start of a new Mayor and City Council two months prior to Hurricane Katrina, and three months prior to the Mississippi Renewal Forum after a campaign that brought Planning and development issues to the forefront.

Governor Haley Barbour organized the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal just one day after Hurricane Katrina. Governor Barbour’s appointees, in turn, staffed the Governor’s Commission with staff out of the Governor’s Office and the Mississippi Development Authority (MDA). The roster of the Governor’s Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal also included Barbour’s son, Henry Barbour as its director; Brian Sanderson, current Legal Counsel to the Republican Governors Association, as its legal counsel. Director appointments to the Governors Commission included politically powerful individuals. Governor Barbour, himself, appointed Jim Barksdale, former CEO of Netscape as its Chairperson. Barksdale, with the consult of Governor Barbour, in turn appointed a veritable who’s-who of Mississippi power-players. These individuals included Ricky Matthews, Editor of the Sun Herald;
Derrick Johnson, President of the Mississippi NAACP; Joe Sanderson, CEO of chicken producer Sanderson Farms; Jerry St. Pé President of Ingalls Shipyard, and; Anthony Topazi, President of Mississippi Power. Other politically powerful individuals associated with the Governors Commission had ties to local business group Coast 21, as well as local governments of Gulfport, Long Beach, Ocean Springs, Pass Christian, and Bay St. Louis. Another among the notable participants what future Gulfport Mayor, and then Hancock Bank CEO George Schloegel.

Another political context is the change in Gulfport’s leadership between the adoption of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan and the Mississippi Renewal Forum. The retirement of four-term Mayor, Ken ‘The General’ Combs, and the June 2005 election of new Mayor Brent Warr along with five of seven new City Councilmembers changed the dynamic of city government. In addition to the political changes, the 2005 Mayoral campaign brought many of Planning issues and challenges facing Gulfport to the forefront. These topics included downtown revitalization, Jones Park, expansion at the Port of Gulfport, construction of an elevated port connector roadway, casinos, cruise ships, relocation of the CSX tracks, and consolidation utility services. Many of the campaign issues discussed over the previous eight months made their way into the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport.

Visual Context – The Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan contains numerous colorful illustrations that tie together the recommendations of the Plan. The cover art of the Plan boldly states the vision; and other images build on that vision. Illustrations of casinos and new hotels on the expanded downtown realize the boldest of the plans visions which align with the social and political contexts. The plans visual context is consistent and illustrated in the same visual language (colors, aesthetics, etc.) as other Mississippi Renewal Forum plans.

Authors Intent – The visual contexts reaffirms the social and political contexts; the author’s intentions are to describe a ‘Better than Before’ vision of what Gulfport

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62 Coast 21 later becomes the Gulf Coast Business Council
could be in 20 to 25 years. The Plan also lays out recommendations that complement the ‘Better than Before’ vision.

**Contextual Reading** – Nearly all of the ideas in the 2005 Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan had been widely discussed prior to Hurricane Katrina. To demonstrate this, this subsection provides political and social context to the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plans. Between the adoption of the 2004 Comp. Plan in March of 2004 and the development of the Mississippi Renewal Forum in late 2005, the most significant political and social change was the retirement of four-term Gulfport Mayor, Ken ‘The General’ Combs, and the June 2005 election of new Mayor Brent Warr. While the campaign was contentious and often dirty (Dash, 2005, March 11), Warr was widely seen as a political outsider who could come in and reset the politics of City Hall. Despite this outsider status, nearly all mayoral candidates articulated similar visions on issues such as downtown revitalization, Jones Park, expansion at the Port of Gulfport, construction of an elevated port connector roadway, casinos, cruise ships, relocation of the CSX tracks, and consolidation utility services. The Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport reflects consensus on many of these issues.

**Temporal Analysis**

**Prior Plan Conditions** – Between the adoption of the 2004 Comprehensive Plan and the development of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, Hurricane Katrina destroyed large swaths of coastline. Figure 16 demonstrates the extent of damage in the Downtown Gulfport and Port of Gulfport area.
Figure 16. Methods 2. Downtown Gulfport, Port of Gulfport, Copa Casino Barge post-Katrina

Post Plan Conditions – Of the seven ‘priority actions’ and 24 ‘additional actions’ detailed, only two have been completed, two could be considered in-progress, and three have outright failed. Of the 24 additional actions, 11 have been completed, five are in progress, and seven have failed. The only two successes have been the redevelopment of Jones Park, and the creation and adoption of architectural design standards for major redevelopment areas. Figure 17 illustrates The Barksdale Pavilion, named in honor of Jim Barksdale, the Chair of the Governors Commission. It is the most prominent new feature of the redeveloped Jones Park in 2016.
Figure 17. Methods 2. Jones Park and Barksdale Pavilion in 2015, 10 years post-Katrina

SmartCode Charrette Book

**Factual Analysis** – Exported as a digital document, and published in April, 2006, the *SmartCode Charrette Book for Gulfport, Mississippi* is a follow up to the 2005 Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan. Completed by HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning, the SmartCode Charrette book, along with the SmartCode Framework, cost $153,000, with the Knight Foundation contributing $108,000, the Governors Commission contributing $25,000, and the City of Gulfport Contributing $20,000. Robert Alminana and Susan Poliwka prepared the document for HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning. The document is 32 pages, and contains 65 images and 20 maps. The Plan document is 72 DPI exported as a CMYK .pdf image. The Mississippi Renewal Forum’s legacy page hosts the document. All of the documents elements are in color. Table 18 summarizes these features.

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Table 18. Methods 2. SmartCode Charrette Book Factual Analysis

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Plan Title: SmartCode Charrette Book [for] Gulfport, Mississippi

Plan Publish Date: April 4, 2006

Export Date & Time: April 25, 2006; 09:01:21 AM

Author(s): Alminana, Robert; Poliwka, Susan; HDR Town Planning (Tampa, Florida); Alimanestianu, Joanna; Alminana, Robert; Bounds, Jeff; Carver, DeWayne; Daigle, Anne; Deupi, Victor; Hall, Laura; Henderson, Susan; Holden, Josie; Kuehne, Oliver; Martorell, Knight; Olsen, Johnny; Poliwka, Susan; Preus, Christian; Ross, Christopher; Sorlien, Sandy; Wright, William

Length: 32 Pages

Medium: Digital (Adobe PDF 1.6)

Color (Native/View): CMYK/RGB

Document Size: 17" × 11" (7.13 MB)

Maps: 20

Images: 65

Tables: 0
The document is broken into several parts; first, the document overviews the background of the document. Second, the document overviews the Charrette process. Third, the document largely reproduces Pages 10 and 11 of the Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, which contain a series of illustrated historic postcards and images to draw architectural design inspiration. Fourth, it reintroduces SmartCode. Fifth, it provides renderings and diagrams from the second Charrette, with a focus on downtown. Sixth, it looks at the Westside, Eastside, and Soria City neighborhoods.

The cover image of the SmartCode Charrette Book, as seen in Table 18, is a large rendering looking down the proposed extension of U.S. Highway 49 into the newly developed entertainment district south of the existing downtown, utilizing the former Chiquita storage flat-lot facility. On the right side of the image is the historic U.S. Post Office Building, with its terracotta roof. Next to the historic structure are newer 9-to-10 and 12-13 story buildings offset left. On the right side, a two-story arcade overhangs a new section of sidewalk and with another 9-10 story building directly behind it. The brick covered street, lined with non-native deciduous trees, utilizes a small new aquarium pavilion with a dolphin statue on top as its visual terminus. The image reaches upward into a blue sky, and is set at dusk or early morning. The image reinforces street walls, and exaggerates building heights. In addition, there are no parked or moving cars.

The first section of the document provides a brief timeline of the documents production, from Hurricane Katrina to February 28, 2006. It details the history of SmartCode Planning, and recalls the cover image from the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, as well as the activity of the Mississippi Renewal Forum itself. The following page details the subsequent SmartCode Charrette and details the objectives, reproduced below (Alminana & Poliwa, 2006, p. 4):

- To offer direct and immediate help to the homeowners in deciding whether to rebuild their damaged or destroyed properties and how best to do it;
- To listen to citizens, community leaders and elected officials over and over again, to hear what they have to say about their future;
- To publicly present and discuss ideas about the planning of the city;
• To offer some of the tools that will help Gulfport achieve a balanced development in a beautiful and prosperous environment;
• To help the community and its leaders prepare an updated urban development code in the form of a calibrated SmartCode;
• To help implement the visions and recommendations of ongoing planning efforts.

The following two pages are nearly identical to pages 10 and 11 of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, and highlight beach scenes such as St. Petersburg and Tampa, Florida; Cannes and Nice, France, and Havana, Cuba. It also highlights the Casino districts of Monte Carlo and Monaco.

The following three-page section on SmartCode introduces a draft of the SmartCode Framework document, overviews what SmartCode does, and justifies the use of SmartCode as a land use development and control tool. Among justification statements, the 2006 SmartCode Charrette Book details that SmartCode seeks to reintroduce traditional and compact neighborhoods, limit sprawl, encourage urban infill, relieve traffic congestion, reduce transit times, reduce Planning Commission and City Council work on land use decisions, improve quality of life, and improve property values. The work of the 2006 SmartCode Charrette, summarized by the document, was about calibrating the SmartCode framework to the City of Gulfport. Calibrated elements include setbacks, heights, lot widths, T-Zone boundaries, special districts, regulations and variance procedures, and regulating text. In the middle of the SmartCode section, the SmartCode Charrette Book details three recommendations. First, that the SmartCode should be an optional overlay throughout the city. Second, that the SmartCode should be mandatory in downtown Gulfport. Third, that the city should establish a design and architectural review process by hiring or contracting a city architect. The remaining portion of the SmartCode section, Pages 9 and 10, re-use and update several images from the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. Page 9 illustrates the proposed Transect Zone Map, and illustrates the transect zones, seen previously in Figure 14. Page
10 re-details the connectivity and public park networks maps present in the 2005 Renewal Forum Plan.

Page 11 presents an updated graphic for the design of Jones Park. Aligning with the 2005 Renewal Forum Plan’s first recommendation to make Jones Park “one ‘perfect place’” (Alminana & Poliwka, 2005, p. 12), a updated rendering is detailed in the 2006 SmartCode Charrette Book, Accompanying text on the page details programming and facilities detailed by the rendering. The caption of the image recalls famous Planner and Landscape Architect Fredrick Law Olmstead, saying, “Fredrick Law Olmsted, the father of landscape architecture, once said, ‘such public grounds, are a necessity for civilized urban living.’ A new Jones Park is such a necessity for the New Gulf Coast.” (Alminana & Poliwka, 2006, p. 11).

The following twelve-page sub-section re-details and further renders ideas for the Port of Gulfport, downtown and casinos. The sub-section contains eight street cross-sections that detail maximum building heights of seven stories, differing from the cover image. Updated renderings of the Port of Gulfport further detail the new aquarium, cruise ship port, and casino site adjacent to the existing Bert Jones Yacht Basing. Three potential casino building renderings on Page 17 posit two potential types of architecture available. The first casino building utilizes the Spanish Revival architectural style of the former Great Southern Hotel. The second casino building is a cross or hybrid of Italianate and Greek Revival styles, similar to the nearby Beau Rivage Casino in neighboring Biloxi. The remaining portion of the downtown section provides an overview of the urban form, solutions for the nearby train depot, and building heights to calibrate SmartCode.

The following sub-section provides an overview of changes to Westside, Eastside, and historic neighborhoods. Proposals for Westside include the redevelopment of 17 blocks into mid-rise (4-5 story) residential buildings. Pages 25 thru 30 propose development for the geographically larger Eastside neighborhoods. This section emphasizes the redevelopment of the heavily damaged, historically significant, and

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64 The Beau Rivage is the sister casino to the Bellagio, an Italian themed Casino in Las Vegas, Nevada.
federally owned Gulfport Veterans Affairs Hospital. For the areas between Cowan Road and Tegarden Road, known locally as Mississippi City, the 2006 SmartCode Charrette Book proposes 14-story condominium towers along the beachfront. The following two pages detail proposed changes to the historically black neighborhoods of Soria City, Old North Gulfport, Turkey Creek, which include the placement of a Katrina Cottage village.

**Contextual Reading** – Political and visual contexts overshadow the social context of the SmartCode Charrette Book. Politically, the decision to recommend adoption of the SmartCode regulatory framework as ‘optional’ created conflict between the Planning Commission, City Council, and Mayor. Visually, the SmartCode Charrette Book has more detailed renderings, graphics, and images that increase the value of the document, visually, over 2005’s Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport.

**Social Context** – Following the Mississippi Renewal Forum in October 2005, several public feedback sessions held throughout the Mississippi Gulf Coast drew overflow crowds and stoked excitement. The first meeting at the Orange Grove Community Center, located in Gulfport, was standing room only with more than 200 attendees (WLOX, 2005, October 19). Mayor Brent Warr and Gulfport’s City Council used the popular momentum after the Charrette and feedback sessions to hire HDR for a SmartCode Charrette. This step was the first toward the process of implementing SmartCode, one of the policies proposed by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport.

**Political Context** – SmartCode is a regulatory framework that intends to replace existing Traditional, or Euclidean Zoning. Traditional zoning delineates and separates uses, and emphasizes uniform densities across zones. SmartCode integrates uses and emphasizes mixed-use to enable high density, reducing reliance on automotive transportation. The Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport suggested the adoption of SmartCode to achieve the proposed vision.

The 2006 SmartCode Charrette has represents a political compromise over the mandatory regulatory framework; notably, HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning recommends that the SmartCode should be adopted as an optional overlay for the city,
but still be mandatory for Downtown Gulfport. Counter to the intent of the 2005 Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, the only justification HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning provides for this change is, “We believe that when offered a choice [to use SmartCode or the existing Gulfport Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1972], developers and citizens will quickly realize that using the SmartCode is simpler and more predictable, therefore safer for their applications or their neighborhoods.” (Alminana & Poliwka, 2006, p. 8).

Visual Context – The SmartCode Charrette Book further details ideas from Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. The SmartCode Charrette Book contains and visually recreates the visual context of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. However, SmartCode Charrette Book narrows focus and emphasizes the importance of Downtown Gulfport, the Port of Gulfport, and Jones Park. Ideas for Downtown, the Port, and Jones Park posited in the SmartCode Charrette Book are simultaneously more and less ambitious than ideas posited by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. On the more ambitious side, many of the buildings illustrated as three-to-four stories in the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport were re-illustrated at seven-to-thirteen stories in the SmartCode Charrette Book. While two of the additional stories in the SmartCode Charrette Book reflect the additions of parking garages to the lower floors of buildings along the coastline to align the FEMA’s new Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM), additional stories increase the overall density. In addition, the SmartCode Charrette Book places more emphasis on the potential cruise ship port, and spends significant time detailing its elements. On the less ambitious side, the SmartCode Charrette Book significantly scales back the geographic areas of higher density outlined by the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport (Alimanestanu et al., 2005; p. 27; Alminana & Poliwka, p. 15; 2006, p. 9). The 2006 SmartCode Charrette Book also significantly scales back the illustrated amounts of urban infill along the railroad tracks and in the existing downtown area. The SmartCode Charrette Book entirely removes references to the placement of a new roadway along the CSX Railroad Corridor, as seen on the right in Figure 18.
Author Intent – The visual context of the SmartCode Charrette Book suggests that HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning’s intent was to further refine and detail the proposals introduced in the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport. In addition, the SmartCode Charrettes were the first step in the development of the SmartCode. The Charrette re-engaged stakeholders in planning efforts after a brief pause over the holiday season.

Temporal Reading – Provided below is a review of temporal conditions prior and after the SmartCode Charrette Book.

Prior Plan Conditions – Little changed temporally between the SmartCode Charrette Book, published a little more than four months after the initial Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, and the completion of the 2006 SmartCode Charrette Book document

Post Plan Conditions – Over the next year, the City of Gulfport would work on developing, or “calibrating” the SmartCode Framework for adoption. The City of Gulfport hired Jeff Bounds, who briefly served as interim Director of Development.
Despite the recommendation from HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning to adopt SmartCode as an optional overlay, the City Council voted to adopt the SmartCode Framework as mandatory in areas that had prepared community plans.

**Old Gulfport Community Plan**

**Factual Analysis** - Exported as digital document, and published in June, 2007, the *Old Gulfport Community Plan: An Existing-Community Plan under the SmartCode of the City of Gulfport, Mississippi* is the first community plans adopted. Initially an appendix of the SmartCode Framework, it was separately adopted on February 13, 2007. The Old Gulfport Community encompasses the Central Business District of the City of Gulfport, or Downtown Gulfport. The Plan is composed of two parts; a regulatory framework, and four sets of maps. The Old Gulfport Regulatory Framework is an appendix to the larger SmartCode Framework. Within Community Plan, the Old Gulfport Framework goes beyond the SmartCode Framework by outlining density bonuses for the district, separate from those in the framework. The four sets of maps included at the end of the document are two Feature Identification Maps, three Streets & Parking Plans, One Regulating Plan which outlines transect zones, and two Special Requirements & Options Map, which detail special features of the district. Maps, combined with the regulatory text, articulate the plans vision. Table 19 summarizes this analysis.

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65 HDR Town Planning (2007a) refers to the Old Gulfport Community Plan.
### Table 19. Methods 2. Old Gulfport Community Plan Factual Analysis

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**Plan Title**: Old Gulfport Community Plan: An Existing-Community Plan under the SmartCode of the City of Gulfport, Mississippi.

**Plan Publish Date**: June 6, 2007

**Export Date & Time**: August 6, 2007; 08:14:24 PM

**Author(S)**: HDR Town Planning (Tampa, Florida)

**Length**: 17 Pages

**Medium**: Digital (Adobe PDF 1.6)

**Color (Native/View)**: CMYK/RGB

**Document Size**: 8.5” × 11” (3.65 MB)

**Maps**: 0

**Images**: 0

**Tables**: 6
The Feature Identification maps details thoroughfare improvements. Improvements identified by the map include the placement of bicycle lanes on 22nd and 19th Street, a reconfiguration of 29th Avenue and two portions of 26th Avenue into commercial, slow speed, streets. Two other projects include the creation of a Beach Boulevard Multiway and a reconfiguration of the intersection at 15th Street and 20th Ave. The Beach Boulevard Multiway plans for wider sidewalks and larger tree planter areas. The intersection of 15th Street and 20th Ave is reconfigured with an avenue transition that provides a median tree planter.

The Streets and Parking Plan Map provides detail on the street grid and details bicycle trails, as well as plants on each street and traffic calming. The Regulating Plan details the boundaries of downtown transect zones, or T-Zones. T6, the densest of T-Zones, makes up the core of Downtown, and along the beachfront portion of downtown. This quickly transitions to T5 and T4 zones, one and two blocks, respectively away from the downtown core. The last maps detail special aspects of the plan for density purposes and setbacks for some streets. In the T6 zones, setbacks range from 12' to 16.' It is also in this map where specific retail opportunities are recommended.

**Contextual Reading** – One social context and two political contexts affect the reading of the Old Gulfport Community Plan. First, the Old Gulfport Community plan places a heavy emphasis on the eight to 10 block area destroyed or damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Second, the boundaries selected for the Old Gulfport community plan intentionally excluded residential areas. Third, newly adopted FEMA Flood insurance Maps increased the area of Old Gulfport within the 100 Year Flood Plain.

**Social Context** – Hurricane Katrina significantly damaged downtown Gulfport. Many buildings had their entire first and second floors flooded and damaged by the storm surge and 100+ mile per hour winds. Key anchor businesses, such as Hancock Bank, were unable to reopen in the immediate aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, and handed out small loans and I.O.U.’s. Other buildings were damaged by shipping containers which had been swept away from the Port of Gulfport by storm surge. Due to the extreme damage caused by Hurricane Katrina, Downtown Gulfport, or ‘Old Gulfport’ was the
first on the list of Community Plans to develop and adopt following the adoption of the SmartCode Framework a few months prior. The Old Gulfport Community Plan focuses on the most damaged blocks along the 13th Street and 14th Street corridors.

**Political Context** – There are two political contexts: First, the boundaries selected for Downtown Gulfport excluded residential areas. Because stakeholders were business owners and the city, there was little, if any, public dispute over the intentions of the Old Gulfport Community Plan. Second, newly adopted FEMA Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM) significantly increased the area of Old Gulfport within the 100 Year Flood Plain. Within the 100 Year Flood Plain newly constructed or buildings requiring reconstruction if more than 50% damaged were required to be elevated between 10’ and 12’ above ground-level. While the City of Gulfport fought the new standards, as they significantly alter the ‘look’ and ‘feel’ of Downtown Gulfport, the City did incorporate FEMA requirements into the Old Gulfport Community Plan.

**Visual Context** – Visually, the Old Gulfport Community Plan is a highly detailed technical document. Using the SmartCode Framework, Community Plan, and Community Plan Maps together requires the reader to understand the package of SmartCode. To visually ‘read’ the context of the Community Plan Map, the reader must engage in a three-step process. First, the reader must identify a feature of interest. Second, the reader must find the feature reference in the Community Plan Regulating Document. Third, the reader must refer to the SmartCode Framework document to interpret the recommendation of the Community Plan Regulating Document. The alphanumerically organized Community Plan Regulating Document describes recommendations. For example, in the Old Gulfport Community Plan the 29th Street Redesign is one feature. Referring to the Community Plan Regulating Document, 29th Street follows thoroughfare standard “CS-80-44.” The SmartCode Framework explains this designation; CS stands for a Commercial Street. The number 80 tells the reader there is an 80’ of Right of Way available. The number 44 tells the reader that the road has and 44’ of paved width. This type of street is a low-speed (25 MPH) street. In other words, this is a low speed, narrow, low-density urban street.
**Author Intent** – The intent of the document is to act as a regulating document for the Old Gulfport Community. In addition, a major intent of the plan is to redevelop the historic core of Gulfport. As a political issue in both the 2004 Comprehensive Plan and the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport, the Old Gulfport Community Plan is the first step toward recovery and renewal.

**Temporal Reading**

**Prior Plan Conditions** – Prior to the adoption of the SmartCode Framework, Downtown Gulfport had successfully created a chapter of the Mississippi Main Street Program in 2006. After the adoption of the SmartCode Framework and before the adoption of the Old Gulfport Community Plan, the Mississippi Main Street Program was awarded a $3.6 million Façade Restoration Grant and a $7.6 million Streetscape Restoration Grant from the MDA Community Revitalization program, funded by Katrina Supplemental CBDG program. The Façade Restoration Program updated and restored more than “80 privately owned buildings” which “received grants ranging from $25,000 to $100,000.” (Toups, 2015, April 22). The Streetscape Restoration Grant added “enhancements” such as “sidewalk paving, parallel parking along 25th Avenue, expanded sidewalk areas at intersections, well-delineated crosswalks, street trees, special accent planting, ornamental lighting, street furniture – such as metal benches, bike racks and placeholders for public art.” (Toups, 2015, April 23).

**Post Plan Conditions** – The major post-adoption temporal dynamic that affected implementation of the Old Gulfport Community Plan was the 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, which led to the Great Recession. The Great Recession significantly slowed redevelopment and development in Gulfport at an inopportune time. Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, Mayor Warr and City Council enacted a building moratorium for the Downtown Gulfport area, until the adoption of SmartCode. The City of Gulfport adopted the SmartCode Framework on February 14, 2007, shortly after the peak of the national building boom, and removed the moratorium around the same time. Several months after adoption of SmartCode, the sub-prime mortgage market would collapse. By mid-July 2007, the Dow Jones and NASDAQ achieved their peaks before moving into their
precipitous decline. Three months later, on October 16, 2007, the City of Gulfport adopted the Old Gulfport Community and Mississippi City Community Plan, in tandem. Two months later, In December 2007, the Great Recession begins, lasting until June 2009. In 2012, due to the perceived lack of new development in Gulfport’s Downtown, the City of Gulfport vacated the Old Gulfport Community Plan.

Mississippi City Community Plan

**Factual Analysis** - Exported as a digital document, and published in June, 2007, the *Mississippi City Community Plan: An Existing-Community Plan under the SmartCode of the City of Gulfport, Mississippi* is the second community plan adopted following the adoption of the SmartCode Framework, adopted on February 13, 2007.⁶⁶ The Mississippi City Community lies approximately 3 miles east of Downtown Gulfport. Table 20 summarizes this analysis.

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⁶⁶ HDR Town Planning (2007b) refers to the Mississippi City Community Plan
Table 20. Methods 2. Mississippi City Community Plan Factual Analysis

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The Mississippi City Community Plan, similar to its Old Gulfport counterpart, is composed of two parts; a regulatory framework, and four sets of maps. The Mississippi City Regulatory Framework was also an appendix to the larger SmartCode Framework, but adopted separately from it on February 13, 2007. However, the Mississippi City Plan differs from Old Gulfport Community Plan by its focus on establishing two clusters of high density T6 and T5 development, one around Courthouse Road to the west, and one know as Mississippi City Center to the east. The four sets of maps included at the end of the document are two Feature Identification Maps, three Streets & Parking Plans, One Regulating Plan which outlines transect zones, and two Special Requirements & Options Map, which detail special features of the district. Maps, combined with the regulatory text, articulate the plans vision.

The Mississippi City Community Plan’s most notable feature is the development of retrofitted and redesigned street grid, complete with service alleyways that enabled a grid development pattern that substantially differed from the pre-Katrina pattern. In the older Courthouse Road cluster, in the western portion of the neighborhood, a network on streets reconnects pre-Katrina cul-de-sacs to Courthouse Road. Other streets are redesigned and retrofitted for on-street parking to simplify and extend a traditional street grid into existing residential areas. In the Mississippi City Center cluster, an extensive series of new through streets and service alleyways also attempt to remove pre-Katrina sprawl by creating a new grid that utilizes two roundabouts. In addition, the Mississippi City Community Plan carries forward recommendation of the 2004 Comp Plan, Renewal Forum Plan, and SmartCode Charrette for a new east-to-west connector utilizing the CSX right-of-way.

The Transect Zone Regulating Plan builds on the transportation elements by detailing boundaries of two notable overlay districts: a 16th Street Corridor Overlay, and a Beach Boulevard Overlay. The 16th Street Corridor Overlay sought to create a new urban commercial corridor along 16th Street. The Beach Boulevard overlay includes the placement of a private promenade on the north side of U.S. Highway 90 that covered by awnings, balconies, trees, and shaded by multiple story buildings.
**Contextual Reading** — Two social, one political, and one visual context affect the Mississippi City Community Plan. First, Mississippi City was the original location for the Port of Gulfport, increasing the site's historical value. Second, developments of areas around Mississippi City, prior to Hurricane Katrina, were suburban in nature, creating limited connectivity within the neighborhood. Third, Mississippi City was the first Community Plan that required citizen participation; this participation would lead to conflict over split-zoned parcels. Fourth, the highly technical nature of the Mississippi City Community Plan increases the complexity of applying and ‘reading’ the Plan.

**Social Context** — Intended by investors to be the location of the Gulf and Ship Island Railroad terminus prior to the American Civil War, the original Mississippi City community around Courthouse Road is older than Gulfport. Developing a plan for Mississippi City, as one of the oldest communities in Gulfport, was a symbolic step for post-Katrina recovery. In addition to the area's historical value, Hurricane Katrina’s storm surge caused significant damage to Mississippi City south of the CSX railroad tracks. While not as dense as the Old Gulfport neighborhood, the plan called for creating two smaller urban clusters around the major north-to-south streets of Courthouse Road and Cowan Road, which sought to organize space between neighboring Biloxi and Downtown Gulfport. In addition, retrofitting the street grid increases the connectivity of the Mississippi City cluster, shifting the future development pattern from suburban to urban. This retrofitting emphasizes the role of the pedestrian, and places lower value on the automobile, a key tenant of New Urbanism.

**Political Context** — The Mississippi City Plan is also notable because it was the first community plan adopted that required resident stakeholders to participate. Despite stakeholder participation, the areas of the plan that were most detailed were vacant properties or the owners were unable to participate in the development of the Community Plan Maps. While remaining residents participated in the planning process, the lack of broad involvement resulted in a dozens of split-zoned contiguously owned parcels,
meaning that a person would own multiple parcels in a row but would have two different zoning districts that applied to their land.

**Visual Context** – Nearly identical to the Old Gulfport Community Plan, the Mississippi City Community Plan is a highly technical document that requires the ‘reader’ to have a detailed knowledge of SmartCode. The same three-step process for reviewing the Old Gulfport Community Plan Map is necessary to understand major features of the Mississippi City Community Plan.

**Author Intent** – Identical to the Old Gulfport Community Plan, the intent of the Mississippi City Community Plan is to act as a regulating document for the Mississippi City Community. The authors intended to develop a newly interconnected and much denser style of development than what was previously there. Reflecting on the SmartCode Charrette Book, the plan intended to develop 5-to-6 story condominium or apartment towers along the coast, with density falling off inland into 2-3 story townhomes and single-family residences.

**Temporal Reading**

**Prior Plan Conditions** – The Mississippi City area was one of the hardest hit areas of Gulfport during Hurricane Katrina. As one of the lower lying areas on the coast, Figure # shows the inundation limits from the 25’ storm surge illustrative of the extent of flooding. Flooding damaged or destroyed nearly every building south of the CSX Railroad tracks, including commercial structures along the north-to-south Courthouse Road, centered in Figure 19 below. Figure 19 illustrates the flooding, with the color blue indicating the flood inundated areas; the thick yellow line indicates the 100-year floodplain; red and orange lines indicate wave heights of 1.5 and 3 feet, respectively.
Post Plan Conditions – After the adoption of the SmartCode on October 16, 2007, Gulfport’s City Council adopted The Mississippi City Community Plan at the same time as the Old Gulfport Community Plan. Both plans were affected, long term, by the effects of the 2007 Financial Crisis and subsequent Great Recession of 2007-2009, but Mississippi City did not benefit from the Façade and Streetscape Restoration Grants (Toups, 2015, April 22; 2015, April 23), which helped attract businesses back to the Downtown Gulfport area. Of the two urban clusters the plan called for, only one experienced any development. Two buildings were constructed at the intersection of Courthouse Road and US Highway 90 - a replica of the historic Mississippi City Courthouse, which was unable to retain a stable tenant, and a beachwear and souvenir store. In 2012, the City of Gulfport vacated the Mississippi City Community Plan.

Handsboro Community Plan

Factual Reading - Exported as a digital document, adopted in February 2008, and published in December, 2008, the *Handsboro Community Plan: Regulating Plan* is the third community plan adopted following the adoption of the SmartCode Framework,
adopted on February 13, 2007. Handsboro lies approximately 3 miles east of Downtown Gulfport, and is adjacent to the Mississippi City Community, which lies to the South. The Handsboro Community Plan is one page, CMYK. Unlike other Community Plans, the Handsboro Community Plan was not adopted with a regulating plan document, and instead relies on the SmartCode Framework and a separate flier that defines applicable transects zones. This flier, not a part of the Regulating Plan, is included in the meeting minutes from Community Plan adoption. The Plan was prepared by Hall-Alminana for $35,000. The City of Gulfport and developer split the cost of the plan, paying $17,500 apiece. Hall-Alminana, as the author, was an offshoot of HDR|LCA+Sargent Town Planning; Robert Alminana, AICP, left HDR to found a new firm with Laura Hall in early 2007.

The Handsboro Regulating Plan has three notable features. First, the plan centers on the intersection of Pass Road and Cowan Road; a prominent intersection within the City of Gulfport. At this intersection, buildings are zoned T5, or as the accompanying handout articulates, an Urban Center Zone. T5 zones contain two to six story townhomes, apartments, and offices, which are predominately attached. Second, a Density Receiving Area, or a Density Bonus Receiving Zone, where increased density in other portions of the plan allows for reallocation of density to the receiving area. With regard to the Handsboro Community, a density transfer into this portion would allow an additional two stories to a structure. Third, there are three Neighborhood Conservation Zones, zoned T3. Neighborhood Conservation Zones, detailed in the 2007 SmartCode Framework, are areas with strict architectural controls where modifications to structures must be approved by the Architectural Review Committee. The T3 classification is called a suburban zone that is exclusively residential. Table 21 summarizes this analysis.

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Hall-Alminana (2007) refers to the Handsboro Community Plan
Table 21. Methods 2. Handsboro Community Plan Factual Analysis

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Note.
1. Hall-Alminana, Inc. was formed after Robert Alminana left HDR Town Planning in early 2007; Laura Hall was the other Principal of the firm.
**Contextual Reading** – One social and one political context is relevant to the Handsboro Community Plan. First, the Handsboro Community Plan is the first Community Plan adopted outside the purview of the February 2006 HDR SmartCode Charrette, and subsequent SmartCode Charrette Book. Second, the Handsboro Community Plan is visually easier to interpret and less technical than the Old Gulfport and Mississippi City Community Plans.

**Social Context** – The Handsboro Community Plan was the first community plan initiated by the City of Gulfport following the adoption of SmartCode. Gulfport’s City Council awarded Consulting firm Hall-Almiana the contact on July 17, 2007. Seven months later, City Council adopted the Handsboro Community Plan Map. As the first plan developed outside the immediate prevue of the SmartCode Charrette, the plan Handsboro Community Plan is significantly less complex than the Old Gulfport and Mississippi City Community Plans. Handsboro differs from Old Gulfport and Mississippi City in several ways. First, Handsboro is located on Bayou Bernard, away from the beachfront. Second, Handsboro did not suffer the catastrophic losses from flooding that communities along the beachfront did. Third, it was the least wealthy of the communities planned, to that point in time. Fourth, Handsboro contained an existing cluster of suburban style development along Pass Road, including retail strip centers and moderate-income housing.

**Political Context** – Similar to the political conflicts created by the Mississippi City Community Plan, the Community Plan Map for Handsboro contained split zoned parcels. Concerned residents circulated a petition and were able to bring the Community Plan Map back before City Council to amend properties. This led effort led to a new December 2008 map that reflects changes to eliminate the split-zoned parcels.

**Visual Context** – Notably, instead of being a highly technical document like the Old Gulfport Community Plan and the Mississippi City Community Plan, Hall-Alminana and the City of Gulfport employed the use of an accompanying handout that details the density of each T-Zone. The handout uses real-world images, similar to local environments, to describe and demonstrate the physical appearance of preferred
development density. Figure 20 is the document utilized by the Community Plan to describe the T-Zones.

*Figure 20. Methods 2. Handsboro Community Plan Handout*

**Author Intent** – The intent of the document is to act as a regulating document for the Handsboro Community, but the authors also attempted to make plan easily accessible to residents not familiar with the SmartCode Framework. Use of graphics allow stakeholders to visualize future development of their neighborhood. It is also clear that the authors intended to reinforce the intersection of Pass Road and Cowan Road, along with the existing residential development pattern of the Handsboro community.

**Temporal Reading**
**Prior Plan Conditions** – A minor difference between the Old Gulfport, Mississippi City Community Plans, and the Handsboro Community Plan was that the latter was developed and adopted in the midst of the Great Recession. While the worst of the crisis had yet to come, the inopportune timing of development and adoption of the Handsboro Community Plan is notable.

**Post Plan Conditions** – Political conflicts over split zoning and the desire to attract new suburban style development led to the plans demise (in particular a CVS Pharmacy at the intersection of Pass and Cowan Road). In 2012, the City of Gulfport vacated the Handsboro Community Plan, citing the inability to attract new development to the area.

**Florence Gardens Community Plan**

**Factual Reading** – Exported as a digital document, and published in November, 2007, the *Florence Gardens, City of Gulfport Mississippi; New Community Plan Submittal* is the only privately funded community plan, for a private development, adopted by the City of Gulfport.68 Completed by PlaceMakers, the Florence Gardens Community Plan is 17 pages, and contains 13 maps and 2 tables. The Plan document is 72 DPI exported as a CMYK .pdf image. It contains both raster renderings and vector maps.

The Plan consists of two master plans, an environmental plan, three transect maps, four pages on thoroughfare standards, five pages on civic features, and one page on street frontage. The plan is loosely grouped around three neighborhood clusters within the Florence Gardens community, determined by ¼ mile pedestrian sheds, centered on civic function spaces located in each cluster. The three neighborhood clusters range in density from T5 to T1, with most development planned as T4 and T5. Notably, the Florence Gardens plan does not re-plan existing development. These existing developed parcels are sizably larger than newly planned parcels. Table 22 summarizes this analysis.

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68 Dyer & Blackson (2007) refers to the Florence Gardens Community Plan
Table 22. Methods 2. Florence Gardens Community Plan Factual Analysis

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**Contextual Reading** – Social and visual contexts inform the reading of the Florence Gardens Community Plan. Differences between Florence Gardens and other Gulfport communities affect the social contexts. Visual differences between the Florence Gardens Community Plan and other Community Plans also impact the reading of the Plan.

**Social Context** – The Florence Gardens Community Plan is different from other Community Plans for Gulfport in three ways. First, Florence Gardens is a new greenfield community. Second, Florence Gardens is located the furthest away from Downtown Gulfport. Third, the Florence Gardens Community Plan was the only community plan not developed with public money. The Community Plan for Florence Gardens is similar to other New Urbanist ‘Traditional Neighborhood Development,’ or TND, styled plans such as PlaceMakers Lost Rabbit project in Madison, Mississippi; DPZ’s Roswell, Georgia, and DPZ’s Chesire, Black Mountain, North Carolina. TND’s and SmartCode go hand-in-hand. TND’s are characterized by dense town centers, surrounded by walkable neighborhood streets; the further away a housing units is from a town center, the less dense the development pattern.

The initial sketch plan map for the Florence Gardens community was submitted to Gulfport’s Planning Department via Seaway Development Company LLC on December 22, 1999. Martin Goldin, a Gulfport businessperson, established Seaway Development Company LLC in 1997. Following sketch map approval Martin Goldin organized Florence Gardens, LLC in August of 2000 to subdivide the land. The first plat map for 10 homes in Phase I-A was filed with the City of Gulfport in May 2005. Following Hurricane Katrina and the Mississippi Renewal Forum Charrette, Florence Gardens, LLC engaged PlaceMakers, a consortium of New Urbanists across several states and without an official address, to develop a SmartCode Plan that complimented Florence Gardens initial land conservation approach.

**Political Context** – Florence Gardens, as a new development, did not encounter the political issues and challenges of others communities, and other Community Plans.
**Visual Context** – The Florence Gardens Community Plan is visually engaging and non-technical in ways that other Community Plans in Gulfport are not. The Florence Gardens Community Plan uses renderings to sell the development to potential buyers. Multiple renderings illustrate different facets of the neighborhood, and clearly delineated public and private spaces give the plan added visual heft. Even the title of the Community Plan (Florence Gardens, City of Gulfport Mississippi; New Community Plan Submittal) is different from the other Community Plans.

**Author Intent** – The intent PlaceMakers, confirmed by the social and visual context, is to sell Florence Gardens as a viable community alternative to suburban style development.

**Temporal Reading**

**Prior Plan Conditions** – Prior to Hurricane Katrina, the development of Florence Gardens had been limited. In 2004, the first of the plat approvals moved through the Planning Commission, with the final approval coming in May 2005.

**Post Plan Conditions** – Shortly after Hurricane Katrina, construction on several new homes in Florence Gardens began. Over the past 10 years, 80-90 homes have been completed. The plan anticipates over 400 new homes at full build out. Currently, the SmartCode community plan is still in effect for Florence Gardens. Any new construction must conform to the 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, which has a portion dedicated to SmartCode.

**Westside Community Plan**

**Factual Reading** – Extracted from the Gulfport 2030, Comprehensive Plan [for] City of Gulfport, Mississippi, the Westside Community Regulating Plan is the fifth Community Plan adopted by the City of Gulfport.69 Costing $35,000, the City of Gulfport community plan contributed $30,000 and the Island View Casino contributed $5000.

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69 HDR Community Planning + Urban Design (2008) refers to the Westside Community Plan
Completed by HDR., the Westside Community Plan is 1 page, and contains 1 map. The extracted Plan document is 72 DPI exported as a CMYK .pdf image.

The Plan consists of one regulating plan map. While both Island View Casino and Gulfport Memorial Hospital are outside the boundaries of the Westside Neighborhood, with the former defining the eastern boundary of the Plan Area and the latter defining the northern boundary, the Plan utilizes both sites as development attractors. The Westside Community Plan codifies three different densities: T4+, T4L, and T3. The Plan Map zones the area around the Gulfport Memorial Hospital and Gulfport Middle School footprints T4+, or an intensive mixed-use zone conducive to medical office buildings and three-to-four story mixed use structures. The Westside Community Plan Map zones several parcels around the Island View Casino, and along the beachfront as T4L, or a medium mixed-use zone conducive to significant mixing of commercial and residential. The remaining residential portions of the neighborhood are zoned T3, or Suburban. Table 23 summarizes this analysis.
### Table 23. Methods 2. Westside Community Plan Factual Analysis

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Note.

1. HDR Town Planning (HDR|LCA+Sargent, Town Planning) changed its name to HDR Community Planning + Urban Design between 2007 and 2008
**Contextual Reading** – There are two contexts important to the development of the Westside Community Plan. First, the Westside neighborhood is a socially close knit and highly engaged community in Gulfport. Second, a temporary moratorium on development was issued to protect the neighborhood while the SmartCode Community Plan was under development.

**Social Context** – The Westside Community is one of the oldest neighborhoods in Gulfport. Historically, some of the city’s wealthiest residents lived in the Westside neighborhood. Hurricane Katrina significantly damaged the residential area south of the CSX Railroad Tracks, but the neighborhood is highly engaged in the political affairs of the city. Westside residents and Councilperson Libby Milner-Roland asked the City of Gulfport to allow them to develop their own SmartCode Community Plan.

**Political Context** – Westside’s residents actively participated in the development of the SmartCode Community Plan. For the time the document was under development (February 2008 to April 2008), the City of Gulfport issued a moratorium on development. The Westside Community Plan reflects the wishes of residents who sought to preserve the pre-Katrina Single-Family residential built form of the neighborhood. Demonstrating this, the Westside Community Plan enables a maximum zoning of T4, which is lower than the maximum of T5 zoning in both the Mississippi City and Handsboro Community Plans, which had a similar density and development pattern prior to Hurricane Katrina.

**Visual Context** – Visually, there is little context that can be drawn from examining the Westside Community Plan, other than noting its relative simplicity, similar to the Handsboro Community Plan.

**Author Intent** – The authors intended to represent the interests of Westside residents. Many properties previously zoned to enable higher density were ‘down-zoned’ to preserve the Single-Family residential built form of the existing neighborhood.

**Temporal Reading**

**Prior Plan Conditions** – Hurricane Katrina significantly affected the Westside neighborhood. Lying south of the CSX Railroad tracks, Figure 21 shows the inundation limits from the 25’ storm surge. The CSX Railroad tracks acted as a levee-of-last-resort;
stopping the inundation from stretching further north. While flooding did impact the Westside Community, the majority of buildings were not inundated to the same extent as homes and structures in Downtown Gulfport and Mississippi City. Figure 21 illustrates the flooding, with the color blue indicating the flood inundated areas; the thick yellow line indicates the 100-year floodplain; red and orange lines indicate wave heights of 1.5 and 3 feet, respectively.

*Figure 21. Methods 2. Westside Community FEMA Inundation Limits*

**Post Plan Conditions** – The Westside Community has retained its Single-Family residential urban form. The Westside Community Plan, along with the Florence Gardens Community Plan, is still an active plan. Windshield surveys indicate little redevelopment has occurred along the beachfront. Two to three blocks back from the coast, the neighborhood boasts a number of homes that have been redeveloped and updated.

**2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan**

**Factual Reading** – Exported as a digital document, and published in February 2010, *Gulfport 2030, Comprehensive Plan [for] City of Gulfport, Mississippi* was a non-
adopted plan intended to replace the 2004 Comprehensive Plan for the City of Gulfport. HDR prepared the 2010 Comprehensive Plan between April 10, 2008 and August 22, 2012. March 30, 2010 and July 28, 2011 HDR presented the Plan to Gulfport’s City Council, which tabled adoption on both occasions. A third hearing on the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was scheduled on October 19, 2011, however the hearing is not represented in meeting minutes for October 18, 2011 or November 3, 2011. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan is 150 pages long and contains 27 maps, 19 images, and 25 tables. The document is 72 DPI, exported as CMYK.pdf. Images contain photographs, renderings, and maps.

The 2010 Comprehensive Plan has a green cover, with a prominent white band across the front. Contained in the white band are the words ‘Comprehensive Plan’ in contrasting orange. A custom logo designed for the Plan sits above the white band. This logo includes an allusion to the coastal nature of Gulfport through the inclusion of ocean waves at the bottom of the logo. The logo also employs a forward-looking, but not too modern font. The dominant color of the cover suggests that the plan is ‘green’ or sustainable and modern. Small bubbles, which look like photo focus glare, add a layer of depth to the cover. From a distance, the pattern of bubbles appear to be consistent with a photo of the ocean, or water body, such as the Mississippi Sound with the Sun positioned over the upper left hand corner.

The 2010 Comprehensive Plan has eight chapters. The introduction chapter states the purpose, authority, process, and organization of the plan. The second chapter details the vision and plan goals. The third chapter explores the planning context by outlining existing conditions, projections for 2030, market potential, and development capacity. The fourth chapter details future land use and identifies conditions, issues and opportunities, a land use plan, and land use goals and objectives. The fifth chapter develops the same conditions, issues, and opportunities, and offers recommendations, goals, and objectives. The sixth chapter details improvements for community facilities.

70 HDR Community Planning + Urban Design (2010) refers to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan
The seventh chapter details improvements for public utilities. The eighth and final chapter details natural systems.

The first chapter details three plan purposes. First, the plan seeks to develop and redevelop quality neighborhoods including downtown and commercial corridors. Second, the plan seeks to conserve natural and cultural resources. Third, the plan seeks to outline future investments in transportation, community facilities, and capital improvements. To meet these purposes, the plan lays out the process. The process included background research, engagement, and outreach. Citizens then reviewed the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and comments reflected.

The second chapter on Vision and Goals details the major goals of each subsequent chapter. There are six major components of the vision: First, the plan seeks to make Gulfport “A Great Place to Live, Learn, Play and Prosper;” this is followed by a vision that Gulfport has a “Diverse & Vital Economy; Vital Centers & Corridors; Strong & Sustainable Neighborhoods; Connected Places; Unique Assets; Quality Facilities & Services.” (HDR Community Planning + Urban Design, 2010:6-7). The second chapter of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan also details goals for each of the subsequent chapters. Five Land Use Goals center on economic development, efficient development patterns, sustainable neighborhoods, regulations, and growth. Six Transportation goals emphasize long-range planning, interconnected roadway networks, complete streets, transit, bicycling, and the restoration of the Port of Gulfport. Five Community Facilities goals seek to ensure that facilities are adequate, accessible, coordinated, and safe. The only goal of the public utilities chapter is to ensure efficient and cost-effective utilities. The Natural Systems chapter has four goals: protection and conservation of natural systems; hazard mitigation and flood damage prevention; systematic management of coastal resource, and; the development of a greenway system.

The third chapter reviews existing conditions and previous Plans. Citing twelve Plans ranging from the neighborhood to regional scale, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan articulates its place in the hierarchy of plans. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan then reviews the existing population, housing characteristics, employment, existing land use, and
development capacity. The chapter details the population estimates used for the development of the Plan. Between 2010 and 2030, HDR and the City of Gulfport expected an increase of 46,000 residents for the city, outpacing both the Gulf Regional Planning Commission and Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality trend lines, with the city expanding to 120,000 residents. In addition, Woods & Poole anticipated an addition of 57,500 jobs to Gulfport between 2012 and 2030, with the largest growth coming from Wholesale Trade, Services, and Government. In total, the plan highlights that 19,500 new housing units, 1.5 million square feet of new office space, 1.9 million square feet of new industrial space, and 1.5 million square feet of new retail space.

The fourth chapter uses information from the previous chapter to outline future land use. The Plan doubles down on the systematic use of SmartCode. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan articulates the creation of a system of town centers and neighborhood centers, connected by a series of east to west corridors. These corridors include Pass Road, the CSX Railroad Corridor, I-10, the Bayou Bernard Industrial Area; and new north to south corridors, including the I-310 Port Connector, and extension of 34th Street into Orange Grove. Residential urban and suburban neighborhoods, interspaced with large employment districts, exist within the transit network. The Plan argues for increased neighborhood level scale planning, and the redevelopment, or continued development, of downtown, the Veterans Affairs Hospital site, the Gulfport SportsPlex and Mississippi City. At the end of the chapter, the boundaries of Gulfport are detailed. The chapter also outlines future areas for annexation, extending the northern boundary of Gulfport approximately 20 miles north of the existing central business district.

The fifth chapter reinforces the east-to-west and north-to-south connectors and focuses on the redevelopment of the exiting Chiquita Terminal at the Port of Gulfport, similar to the Mississippi Renewal Forum plan. The chapter emphasizes increased roadway connectivity, and an expanded roadway network for the city for major roadways, and complete streets design framework for local roadways. It includes
provisions for bus transit and bicycle infrastructure, with a bicycle trail and share-way system the most highly emphasized aspects of the alternative transit infrastructure.

The sixth, seventh, and eighth chapters are shorter than the preceding chapters. Chapters six and seven are required elements per Mississippi State Law and provide few details. The sixth chapter outlines improvements to community facilities such as the Gulfport Police and Fire Departments, Schools, Public Libraries, Parks, Sand Beach, Golf Courses. The plan focuses on the placement of community civic centers, an emphasis of SmartCode. Similar to the 2004 Comprehensive for Gulfport, the sixth chapter details the then ongoing expansion on the regional water and wastewater infrastructure. The seventh chapter on Natural Systems addresses soils, topography, coastal and aquatic resources, flood hazard areas, wetlands, natural open spaces, greenways, and trails. Notable recommendations include watershed management planning, use of Low-Impact Developments (similar to Florence Gardens), and creation of a greenway system, that unites parks and open spaces. Table 24 summarizes the factual analysis.
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**Plan Title** | Gulfport 2030, Comprehensive Plan [for] City of Gulfport, Mississippi  
**Plan Publish Date** | February 2010  
**Export Date & Time** | 3/31/2010 2:13:07 PM  
**Author(s)** | HDR Community Planning + Urban Design (Tampa, Florida); Hall Planning & Engineering Inc. (Tallahassee, Florida); Economic Research Associates (Jackson, Mississippi).  
**Length** | 150 Pages  
**Medium** | Digital (Adobe PDF 1.6)  
**Color (Native/View)** | CMYK/RGB  
**Document Size** | 8.5" × 11" (22.08 MB)  
**Maps** | 27  
**Images** | 19  
**Tables** | 25
**Contextual Analysis** – One social and two political contexts are the critical in framing the development and eventual tabling of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The Great Recession, indictment of Mayor Warr, and changes in City Government leadership had influence on the 2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan.

**Social Context** – The Banking Crisis, Great Recession, Foreclosure Crisis, and Insurance Costs affected 2010 Comprehensive Plan. The City of Gulfport hired HDR to draft the 2010 Comprehensive Plan in April 2008, in the midst of the Great Recession. By the time the plan was presented to Gulfport’s City Council on March 30, 2010 the Foreclosure Crisis was beginning to affect the Gulfport-Biloxi market. According to the Mississippi Business Journal, in the first quarter of 2010 RealtyTrac reported that the number of foreclosures in the Gulfport-Biloxi market spiked at 369, up 195% from the previous quarter (Wright, 2010, April 29). In addition to the unfavorable economics of the period, stagnant development was also being driven by high flood and wind insurance costs; often, insurance costs were equivalent to a mortgage, or more (Newsom, 2010, August 27).

**Political Context** – There are two Political Contexts. First, the indictment of Mayor Warr. Second, changes in Mayoral, City Council, and Planning Commission leadership. In January 2009, Mayor Brent Warr received a 16-count Federal Grand Jury Indictment for Fraud stemming from his acceptance of money for his storm damaged home. Due to legal pressures, Mayor Warr opted out of his re-election bid. Former Hancock Bank CEO and well-known local George Schloegel ran for Mayor and assumed the role in July 2009. In the same election, four of the seven City Councilmembers lost in their Primaries and new Councilmembers took their place. Concerning the Planning Commission, between July of 2008 and December of 2009, 7 of the 11 Planning Commissioners left the commission. In addition, three of the seven Planning Commission replacements appointed by Mayor Warr before his exit lasted less than two years.

**Visual Context** – The 2010 Comprehensive Plan also has a large number of illustrations and maps. The 2004 Comprehensive Plan has limited graphics; graphics included in the plan are also hard to read. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan uses visual
graphics effectively to aid the reader visualizing the intended contexts. While the
document is still text heavy, there is also sufficient white space to break text into
meaningful sections. Bold and italic fonts are used sparingly, and intently. Document
item numbering is consistent and clear. Tables are easily readable and pertinent to the
text. Rationale for recommendations are concise, and refer to factual the factual basis
constructed in previous chapters.

Authors Intent – HDR and the City of Gulfport intended for the Plan to be the
bridge that led to reconciliation between the 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance and
the SmartCode Framework. While the 2010 Comprehensive Plan did not specifically
articulate changes, it set forth a vision that embraced SmartCode as the guiding
regulatory framework.

Temporal Context

Prior Plan Conditions – The temporal effects of two different administrations
working to develop the 2010 Comprehensive Plan affected the creation and adoption of
the Plan. The administration of Mayor Warr initiated the development of the 2010
Comprehensive Plan in April of 2008. Mayor Warr left office at the end of June 2009,
and the new administration of Mayor Schloegel was responsible for adopting the
Comprehensive Plan, following its presentation in February of 2010. In addition, prior to
Mayor Schloegel’s administration, Mayor Warr replaced 7 of 11 Planning
Commissioners. Many of the Planning Commissioners were operating on expired terms
that began prior to Hurricane Katrina. Furthermore, 3 of Mayor Warr’s replacements to
the Planning Commission served less than one year.

Post Plan Conditions – Since the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was tabled
indefinitely by Gulfport’s City Council, post-plan temporal conditions are unaffected by
plan.

2013 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan

Factual Reading – Exported as a digital document, and published in May 2013,
2030 Comprehensive Plan [for] Gulfport, Mississippi was a non-adopted plan intended to
replace the 2004 Comprehensive Plan for the City of Gulfport. The document is nearly identical to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan prepared by HDR between April 10, 2008 and August 22, 2012. The 2013 Comprehensive Plan removes almost all references to SmartCode due to extensive changes made to the SmartCode Framework. On April 18, 2012 the SmartCode Framework, adopted on February 13, 2007, was absorbed into the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1972, and three community plans for Old Gulfport, Mississippi City, and Handsboro were vacated, returning their plans and code to a modified SmartCode based in traditional zoning.

The 2013 Comprehensive Plan is 148 pages long and contains 26 maps, 18 images, and 21 tables. The document is 72 DPI, exported as CMYK .pdf. The 2013 Comprehensive Plan has a modified cover. The 2010 Comprehensive Plan green and white cover is replaced by a black cover that highlights U.S. Highway 49 and 13th Street. Cover photos were approximately one block from each other. The top photo was taken around dusk, and the bottom photo was taken at night. Both photos show portions of the Hancock Bank Tower, and highlight the improved streetscapes. Both images also contain overexposed cars driving by. The lower image highlights the Half Shell Oyster House, a restaurant that was a part of the Façade Restoration Program.

Similar to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan is organized into eight chapters. The introduction chapter states the purpose, authority, process and organization of the plan. The second chapter details the vision and plan goals. The third chapter explores the planning context by outlining existing conditions, projections for 2030, market potentials and development capacity. The fourth chapter details future land use and identifies conditions, issues and opportunities, a land use plan, and land use goals and objectives. The fifth chapter develops the same conditions, issues, and opportunities, and offers recommendations, goals, and objectives. The sixth chapter details improvements for community facilities. The seventh chapter details improvements for public utilities. The eighth and final chapter details natural systems.

---

The first chapter details three plan purposes. First, the plan seeks to develop and redevelop quality neighborhoods including downtown and commercial corridors. Second, the plan seeks to conserve natural and cultural resources. Third, the plan seeks to outline future investments in transportation, community facilities and capital improvements. To meet these purposes, the plan lays out the process. The process included background research, engagement, and outreach. Citizens then reviewed the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and comments reflected. Despite the removal of SmartCode references in the rest of the document, SmartCode sill makes an appearance in the Plan Purpose section.

Identical to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan uses the second chapter to detail major goals of each subsequent chapter.

The third chapter offers the foundation that these goals, and subsequent recommendations are built on. Citing seven plans, instead of twelve plans, the plan articulates its place in the hierarchy of plans. Uses the same projections and data from the 2010 Comprehensive Plan, but none of the numbers were updated.

The Fourth Chapter is where the most obvious retractions of SmartCode are. Sections in the 2010 Comprehensive Plan that reference SmartCode were removed from the document and text blocks reorganized on the page. This is most obvious on pages 47 and 48 where one recommendation jumps pages mid-sentence. There are also several errant appearances of SmartCode in places. At the end of the chapter, on page 65, a larger map future land use map is inserted into the document. This map highlights three zoning classifications: residential, commercial, and industrial. No mention of Transects are made. The remainder of the document is left untouched, and all of the pages from the 2010 Comprehensive Plan are preserved in the document. Table 25 summarizes factual analysis.

183
### Table 25. Methods 2. 2030 Comprehensive Plan Factual Analysis

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Characteristic</th>
<th>Analysis</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
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<table>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>City of Gulfport (Gulfport, Mississippi)</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Tables</td>
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**Note.**

1. The City of Gulfport’s Planning Department modified the Gulfport 2030, Comprehensive Plan completed by HDR Community Planning + Urban Design; Hall Planning & Engineering Inc.; Economic Research Associates. This version is stripped of references to SmartCode.
**Contextual Reading** – Four social and three political contexts aid in reading the plan. The social contexts of slow redevelopment, a lagging economy, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and a large Gulf of Mexico hypoxic, combined with the political contexts of a self-imposed single term limit, rise of the TEA Party, and threats to incumbency frame the context of the 2013 Comprehensive Plan.

**Social Context** – Slow Redevelopment, lagging economy, the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and a large Gulf of Mexico hypoxic zone contextually frame the 2013 Comprehensive Plan. Concerning slow redevelopment, Gulfport’s City Council became increasingly frustrated with the slow pace of housing and commercial redevelopment, particularly near the coastline. Following Financial Crisis, Great Recession, and Mortgage Crisis, redevelopment and development did not return to anticipated pre-Katrina levels. Increasingly, limiting development SmartCode was blamed for limiting development as many of Gulfport’s residents assumed development was “waiting on the sidelines” (City of Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23). Others residents did not understand why many of the chain restaurants, like Outback Steakhouse, had not yet come back.

Adding further frustration was the April 22, 2010 BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, which lasted until July 15, 2010. The Deepwater Horizon was an Oil Rig in the Gulf of Mexico, approximately 120 miles from Gulfport. While a series of barrier islands protected Gulfport from the worst of the oil spill, ‘tar balls’ appeared on several of Gulfport’s beaches. In addition to the environmental harm of the BP Horizon Oil Spill, the spill also damaged tourist perceptions of the Mississippi Gulf Coast. Many tourists assumed that the color of the Mississippi Sound, already known for its murky water, was due to increased ‘brown’ oil in the water. The large hypoxic zone in 2011, or ‘Dead Zone’ in the Gulf of Mexico compounded the negative environmental effects of the Oil
Spill, damaging seafood harvests, a pillar of the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s economy, two years in a row.\textsuperscript{70}

\textbf{Political Context} – Mayor Schloegel’s self-imposed single term limit, TEA Party Advocates, and threats to incumbency frame political contexts of the Plan. In February 2010, Mayor George Schloegel, just seven months into his tenure, announced he would not seek re-election (Wright, 2010, February 25), limiting any policy shifts, such as adoption of a new Comprehensive Plan, to a single term. Around the same time, the conservative leaning Taxed Enough Already, or TEA Party rose to prominence and placed increased pressure on cities, including Gulfport, to reduce taxes and trim budgets. TEA Party Republicans also began running for seats at the state and Federal level, often against Republican incumbents derided as RINO’s, or ‘Republicans In Name Only.’ In 2012, the TEA Party threatened Mississippi’s Senior U.S. Senator Thad Cochran, who narrowly survived a Primary Challenge from State Senator Chris McDaniel, Freshman U.S. Representative Steven Palazzo of Biloxi/Gulfport, and U.S. Representative Roger Wicker of Tupelo. Threats extended to local government as well; early in Schloegel’s tenure, the City Council removed the public hearing period from City Council meetings largely because of TEA Party activists (Burton, 2009, July 8).

\textbf{Visual Context} – Similar to the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, the 2013 Comprehensive Plan haphazardly cuts elements from the 2010 Comprehensive Plan relating to SmartCode. Entire sections of text are missing, and text moves from one page to another with large interludes of white space.

\textbf{Authors Intent} – The City of Gulfport intended to remove all of the references to SmartCode following the vacating of three Community Plans and the \textit{de facto} nullification of the ordinance.

\textbf{Temporal Context}

\textsuperscript{70} Severe flooding in American Midwest region in the spring of 2011 led to the opening on the Morganza Spillway for only the second time since its creation in 1930’s. The flooding resulted in large amounts of agricultural runoff flowing into the Gulf of Mexico, resulting in algae blooms, which take oxygen out of the water as they decompose.
**Prior Plan Conditions** – Prior to the Comprehensive Plan, the City of Gulfport vacated the Old Gulfport, Mississippi City, and Handsboro Community Plans. They also modified SmartCode, and incorporated its best aspects into the existing 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance (Gulfport City Council, 2012, April 17). In addition, the redevelopment of Jones Park was completed, and the “Grand Re-Opening” in May 2012; fulfilling the first priority recommendation of the 2005 Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport.

**Post Plan Conditions** – Since the 2013 Comprehensive Plan was tabled indefinitely by Gulfport’s City Council, post-plan temporal conditions are unaffected by plan. State Representative Billy Hewes III. Hewes became Mayor in July 2013, after the City Council tabled the 2013 Comprehensive Plan. In the time since, Gulfport has not engaged in any city level or community Planning.

**Plan Analysis Conclusion**

Using the APA CPSSP and Ryan’s ‘Plan Reading’ Analysis methods describes some of the issues and challenges associated with the implementation of plans, but the limited context provided by each only provides a partial explanation of Plan failure. To more robustly explore Plan failure, the following chapter reports results from the Document Analysis, Semi-Structured Interviews, and ad hoc Tenure Analysis. These methods build on the APA CPSSP and Ryan’s (2011) ‘Plan Reading’ Analysis methods to tell a more complete story of Plan failure by peering into the context and real-time processes of implementation.
Chapter 5. Document, Interview, and Tenure Analysis

Examine Plans used to redevelop the coast as standalone documents neglects the context that developed around the plans in the ten years following Hurricane Katrina. This section provides other context to plans and analyzes documents, interviews, and governance tenure to understand plan failure. To do so, it reports results and findings of Methods 3: Document Analysis; Methods 4: Interview Analysis, and; Methods 5: *ad hoc* Tenure Analysis in three parts. First, the chapter reports the results of open and axial coding processes utilized for Methods 3: Document Analysis. Second, it reports the results of axial coding for Methods 4: Interviews. Third, it reviews the cache of appointment documents utilized in the Methods 5: *ad hoc* Tenure Analysis. Fourth, it reports theoretical coding results, or the key findings of document, interview, and *ad hoc* tenure analysis.

**Methods 3. Document Analysis Open and Axial Coding Results**

Figure 22 expands provides greater detail to Table 10 in Chapter 3 by temporally charting data aggregated on a monthly basis to illustrate document narrative density.
Figure 22. Methods 3. 10-Year Data Spectrum

- Other
- Mississippi Renewal Forum & Governors Commission
- City of Gulfport
- Local Media (Sun Herald, WLOX, GulfCoastNews.com, Mississippi Business Journal)
Figure 22 shows two major spikes related to news coverages. The first spike, between October 2005 and July 2006 is related to the destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina, the creation of the Governors Commission for Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, and the subsequent Mississippi Renewal Forum. The second spike, between November 2008 and March 2009 is related to the adoption of plans and a third charrette conducted by DPZ for Gulfport’s Development Commission.

**Open and Axial Coding Results**

Systematic refinement of open and axial document coding begins to illuminate answers to the research question. This section presents results of the open and axial document analysis. Results are systematically analyzed and refined using five stages of open and axial coding. The first stage of open coding used five different typologies of NVivo 10 word frequency analysis, ranging from ‘exact’ words to and similar word grouping. The second stage of open coding analyzed frequency and rank across the five typologies. The third stage of open coding classified frequent words into micro-themes. The fourth stages categorized micro-themes into axial themes. The fifth stage expanded analysis of micro and axial themes. The five following subsections present the results of each analysis stage.

**First Stage, Word Frequency** – Utilizing the built-in Word Frequency Analysis in NVivo 10, the first stage analysis generated a list of the 500 most frequent words for each of the 5-word frequency typologies. These five typologies range from “exact” word counts, or Level 1, to “similar” word counts, or Level 5. The progression of abstraction allows a low-level to high-level word frequency analysis. The top 40 words from each frequency typology were pulled. Table 26 presents results from this topical analysis.
Table 26. Methods 3. First Stage Open Coding, Top 40 Words

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level 1 (Exact)</th>
<th>Level 2</th>
<th>Level 3</th>
<th>Level 4</th>
<th>Level 5 (Similar)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 Gulfport Plans Gulfport Gulfport Gulfport</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>2 City City Mississippi Act Mississippi</td>
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<td>3 Mississippi Gulfport Katrina Mississippi Katrina</td>
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<tr>
<td>4 New Mississippi Including Katrina Leaders</td>
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<tr>
<td>5 Plan Develops Street District Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>6 State Builds County Leaders Months</td>
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<td>7 Development Areas City Change District</td>
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<td>8 Community Housing Plan Municipal Change</td>
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<tr>
<td>9 Housing Community’s May Artifacts Things</td>
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<td>10 Public New Hurricane Things Including</td>
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<td>11 Port Using Biloxi Regional Hurricane</td>
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<td>13 Area Projects Road Activities Artifacts</td>
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<td>14 Building Ports Rebuilding Months Activities</td>
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<td>15 Coast Publicly Council Construction Regional</td>
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<tr>
<td>16 One Providing Renewal Hurricane Construction</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 Planning Programs Beach Including Municipal</td>
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<tr>
<td>18 Use Designs Along Plan Open</td>
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<tr>
<td>19 Program Katrina Many Make Downtown</td>
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<tr>
<td>20 Gulf Including Mayor Gathering Make</td>
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<td>21 May Coasts Housing Abstract Plan</td>
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<td>22 Street Works Community Get County</td>
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<td>25 Also Funds Place County Council</td>
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<td>26 Commission County Port Road Ordinance</td>
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<td>27 Hurricane Needs Coastal Organizations Players</td>
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<td>28 Areas Years FEMA Council Organizations</td>
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<td>37 Water Requiring Also Period Area</td>
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<td>38 Council Parks Environmental Property Authority</td>
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<td>39 People Hurricanes Made System Coastal</td>
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<td>40 Million Commissions Coast Along FEMA</td>
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</table>
**Second Stage, Word Frequency** – Within the Top 40 list, there are 111 words present. 52 of the 111 words appeared more than twice in the analysis. Of those 52 words, four appeared five times, nine appeared four times, seven appeared three times, and 32 appeared two times. Words were compared laterally across the five-word frequency typologies, and then re-ranked based on how the number of times the word appeared (max. 5), and the rank of that word within lists, divided by the number of appearances. Table 27 details the results of the second stage word frequency analysis.
Table 27. Methods 3. Second Stage Open Coding, Lateral Word Frequency and Rank

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<tr>
<th>Re-Rank</th>
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<th>Re-Rank</th>
<th>Word &amp; Frequency</th>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. 1: Words in bold are search terms.
**Third Stage, Micro-Theme Classification** – Re-ranked Top 40 words were then grouped into micro-themes, driven by open-coding analysis and a reading of source materials. Figure 23 details micro-themes.

*Figure 23. Methods 3. Third Stage Open Coding, Micro-Theme Generation*

- Community: People and Property Owners;
- Development: Building, Construction, and Growth;
- Environmental: Coastal, Gulf of Mexico, and Water;
- Federalism: Local, District, Municipal/City, County, Region, State, and Federal Government;
- Governance: Mayor, City Council, Commission, Ordinance, and Organization;
- Leadership: Action, Leaders, Mayor, and Work;
- Disasters: BP Oil Spill, Economy, FEMA, and Hurricane Katrina;
- Other Cities: Biloxi;
- Planning: Plans and Zoning;
- Redevelopment: Design, Downtown, Funding, Funds, Millions [of Dollars], Housing, Needs, Port [of Gulfport], Recovery and Renewal;
- Time: History, Historical, and Months.

**Fourth Stage, Axial Theme Creation** – Further refining of open coding terms and themes led to the creation of three axial themes to understand plan failure. Organizing micro-themes generated from open coding creates three new themes employed by the axial coding process. Figure 24 details the open coding micro-theme groupings, and their consolidation, for the creation of axial coding themes.
Figure 24. Methods 3. Fourth Stage Open Coding, Axial Theme Creation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Externalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Disasters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Redevelopment</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Federalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other Cities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fifth Stage, Axial Theme Expanded Analysis** – Further defining experience, externalities, and expectations, and their relationship with plan failure allows expansion of axial themes. Broadly, experience and expectations relate to the decision-making processes of implementation, with externalities serving as the third leg. Experience, the first axial theme, is assembled from open coding micro-themes of community, governance, leadership, and planning experience. Expectations, the second axial theme, incorporates open-coding micro-themes of redevelopment, development, and time. Externalities, the third axial theme, is assembled from open coding micro-themes of disasters, environmental factors, Federalism, and impacts of other cities.

The first axial theme of experience provides a rich narrative of plan initiation, adoption, implementation, and failure to detail the experience of Gulfport, Mississippi in the ten years since Hurricane Katrina. Reading through documents, axial coding reveals that experience has an important impact on planning failure in Gulfport. Community, governance, leadership, and planning experiences enrich this narrative and create linkages between experiences. The narrative generated also allows exploration of expectations and externalities in the following subsections.

Expectations, the second axial theme, examines the redevelopment, development and time expectations. Redevelopment expectations are those expectations set in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina by the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Development expectations are the expectations set after Hurricane Katrina, but less directly relatable to experience and externalities set by the storm. In other words, development expectations
have clear links to the expectations set by the 2004 and 2010 Comprehensive Plans and local development climate. In addition to development and redevelopment expectations, many expectations have a clear link to time expectations. These include the real and romanticized historical development patterns of Gulfport and the wider Gulf Coast, along with the present and future expectations of redevelopment and Development.

Externalities, the third axial theme, examines how other disasters, such as the financial collapse, mortgage crisis, and Great Recession, and BP Oil Spill all impact experience and expectations. Environmental issues such as beach closures and environmental standards also impact experience and expectations. Federalism, or the structure of governance, also has an impact on plan failure.

Based on the analysis of Open Coding and a careful reading of source documents, axial themes had expanded coding criteria. Documents were re-coded axially using keywords taken or modified from the larger 500 word lists developed in the first stage open coding procedure. Figure 25 provides a listing of axial coding keywords utilized by the fifth stage procedure.
**Figure 25. Methods 3. Fifth Stage, Axial Theme Expanded Analysis Keywords**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Externalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ability</td>
<td>Commission</td>
<td>BP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Commitment</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Competency</td>
<td>Documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor</td>
<td>Owners</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Complexity</td>
<td>Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Method</td>
<td>People</td>
<td>Enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Complication</td>
<td>Expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awareness</td>
<td>Comprehension</td>
<td>Practice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaders</td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Habit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-Up</td>
<td>Coordination</td>
<td>Honesty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capacity</td>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Principle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change</td>
<td>Plans</td>
<td>Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City Council</td>
<td>Learn</td>
<td>Property</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity</td>
<td>Decision Making</td>
<td>Routine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Code</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>Structure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambition</td>
<td>Days</td>
<td>Future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Likelihood</td>
<td>Design</td>
<td>Millions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate</td>
<td>Desire</td>
<td>Promise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objective</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Need</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible</td>
<td>Downtown</td>
<td>Goal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Optimism</td>
<td>Emotions</td>
<td>Growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipation</td>
<td>Possibility</td>
<td>Help</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assume</td>
<td>Expectations</td>
<td>Historical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Months</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td>Past</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumption</td>
<td>Fear</td>
<td>History</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building</td>
<td>Funding</td>
<td>Hope</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction</td>
<td>Funds</td>
<td>Port</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BP</td>
<td>Employee</td>
<td>Gulf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biloxi</td>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>Employee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Casino</td>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>Insurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City</td>
<td>Federal</td>
<td>Job</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>FEMA</td>
<td>Katrina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>County</td>
<td>Flood</td>
<td>Local</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis</td>
<td>Gambling</td>
<td>Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Gaming</td>
<td>Municipal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Government</td>
<td>Oil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy</td>
<td>Growth</td>
<td>Politics</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Methods 4. Interview Analysis Axial Coding Results

Using axial themes generated from document analysis as the methodological foundation for qualitative findings, axial coding from interviews fill gaps in textual narratives. This section reports interview data to build support for axial themes. Transcripts were coded axially using the same terms identified by document axial coding. Since the intent of the interviews is to fill narrative gaps, Table 28 details presence of thematic axial coding, with ‘Y’ representing Yes, or present, and ‘N’ representing No, or not present.

Table 28. Methods 4. Interview Axial Coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interview</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Externalities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Greg Holmes</td>
<td>7/7/2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Carbo</td>
<td>7/16/2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reilly Morse</td>
<td>7/20/2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeff Bounds</td>
<td>7/28/2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laurie Toups</td>
<td>7/27/2015</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chad Emerson</td>
<td>3/7/2016</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Larry Jones</td>
<td>3/7/2016</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Andrés Duany</td>
<td>3/8/2016</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian Carriere</td>
<td>3/8/2016</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anonymous Consultant</td>
<td>3/14/2016</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following chapter provides detailed analysis of axial themes to build findings around experience, expectations, and externalities. Finding utilize quotes from interview respondents and text located within document analysis to develop a narrative around each finding.

Methods 5. ad hoc Tenure Analysis Results

Using axial themes generated from document analysis as the methodological foundation for qualitative findings, ad hoc Tenure Analysis builds and expands on the experience theme. This section reports results of the ad hoc Tenure Analysis in three
sections. First, it re-overviews the procedure for collecting data and reports input data utilized. Second, it reports data generated from the analysis. Third, notable peaks or valleys in data are aligned temporally with details pertinent to axial themes to present results of *ad hoc* Tenure Analysis.

**Procedure and Input Data Report**

Documents, collected from the Mississippi Secretary of State, City of Gulfport Archives, City of Gulfport Online Legistar, and BoardSync systems were utilized to compile the tenure analysis for a 20-year period (1996-2016) to gain context around the study timeframe (2005-2016). In limited places where government records were not available, NewsBank election results reporting was utilized and referenced with City of Gulfport Documents. Tables 29, 30, and 31 detail month and year each individual moved into their position, the month and year they left their position, and the reasoning behind leaving that position (with the exception of Planning Commissioners), based on the same documents.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mayor</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>End Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ken 'The General' Combs (R)</td>
<td>July 1989</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Lost Primary Runoff (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bob Short (R)</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Lost Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ken 'The General' Combs (R)</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brett Warr (R)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>No Re-Election Bid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>George Schloegal (R)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billy Hewes, Jr. (R)</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 30. Methods 5. ad hoc Tenure Analysis, Gulfport City Councilmembers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>City Councilmembers</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
<th>End Reason</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jimmie T. Jenkins (D)</td>
<td>July 1985</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Lost Primary (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richard Rose (R)</td>
<td>July 1989</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>Resignation (Job)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gordon Allen (R)</td>
<td>July 1989</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricky Dombrowski (R)</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Lost Primary Runoff (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kim B. Savant (R)</td>
<td>July 1993</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Lost Mayoral Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ella Jean Holmes-Hines (D)</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sam Albritton (R)</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billy Hewes, III (R)</td>
<td>July 1997</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Lost Mayoral Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles E. 'Chuck' Teston (R)</td>
<td>July 2001</td>
<td>June 2005</td>
<td>Lost Primary Runoff (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Libby Milner Roland (I)</td>
<td>September 2004¹</td>
<td>June 2013</td>
<td>Retirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gary Holliman (D)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Lost Primary Runoff (D)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jackie Smith (R)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Lost Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brian A. Carriere (R)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Lost Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neil Resh (R)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Lost Primary Runoff (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barbara A. Nalley (R)</td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>June 2009</td>
<td>Lost Primary (R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ricky Dombrowski (R)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenneth L. 'Truck' Casey, Sr.(D)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F.B. 'Rusty' Walker, IV (R)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert 'R. Lee' Flowers (R)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cara Lero Pucheu (R)</td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myles Sharp (R)</td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Present</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note.
1: Libby Milner Roland was elected in a Special Election to fill the seat of Richard Rose, who became a City Manager in neighboring D’Iberville.
Table 31. Methods 5. ad hoc Tenure Analysis, Gulfport Planning Commissioners

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Commissioners</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>End</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>D. P. 'Nick' DeNicola</td>
<td>January 1970</td>
<td>April 2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidney Rushing</td>
<td>August 1977</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. B. Taake</td>
<td>October 1982</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bruce Allen</td>
<td>August 1990</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justus Alexander</td>
<td>August 1990</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Robert F. 'Bobi' Gavin</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles 'Chuck' Hill</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>February 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amos Crouth, Jr.</td>
<td>February 1994</td>
<td>July 2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steve Allen</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>January 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Walter Bristow</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>April 1999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Billy Hewes</td>
<td>May 1996</td>
<td>June 1997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sherman L. Muths, III</td>
<td>November 1997</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Cooper</td>
<td>February 1998</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claudia Keyes</td>
<td>December 1998</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ann Stewart</td>
<td>April 1999</td>
<td>January 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ralph Anderson</td>
<td>December 1999</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elaine Adair</td>
<td>August 2000</td>
<td>February 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lutille 'Coach' Stepney</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Himbert Sinopoli</td>
<td>June 2001</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afton Anderson</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cecil Brooks</td>
<td>October 2001</td>
<td>January 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keith Williams</td>
<td>August 2003</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louis Skrmetta</td>
<td>July 2004</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charlie Hewes</td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald Martin 'Marty' Warren, Jr.</td>
<td>April 2008</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. J. Sellar, Jr.</td>
<td>June 2008</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gerald 'Jim' Favre</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marv Cracchiolo-Spain</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia Adolph</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacques 'James' Pecheu</td>
<td>July 2008</td>
<td>June 2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John H. Johnson</td>
<td>February 2009</td>
<td>September 2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William 'Prince' Jones</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collette Towels</td>
<td>November 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Doug Hancock</td>
<td>December 2009</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Anthony</td>
<td>December 2010</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everette 'Lad' Ladner</td>
<td>July 2012</td>
<td>Present</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*ad hoc* Tenure Analysis Data Report

Figures 26, 27, 28, and 29 report the results Tenure analysis for the Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and tenure averages, respectively.

*Figure 26. Methods 5: ad hoc Tenure Analysis, Mayor*

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**Mayor Tenure Analysis** – Five Mayors have served the City of Gulfport since 1996. The longest serving of those Mayors is Ken ‘The General’ Combs, who served 12 years in office, with a four-year gap between terms filled by Bob Short. Following Combs was Brent Warr, who served for four years between 2005 and 2009. Former Hancock Bank CEO George Schloegel follows Warr. Former State Representative, and current Gulfport Mayor Billy Hewes, Jr. follows Schloegel.
City Council Tenure Analysis – 18 City Councilmembers have served the City of Gulfport since 1996. The longest serving City Councilmembers are Ricky Dombrowski and Ella Jean Holmes-Hines, who have served more than 18 years. In this chart there are three significant drops in tenure. First, in July 1997, the average tenure of a City Councilmember dropped from 7.2 to 4.0 years due to the retirement of Gordon Allen. In the same election cycle, the number of City Councilmembers increased from 5 to 7, following the annexation of the Orange Grove Area. Second, in July 2005, the average tenure of a City Councilmember dropped from 9.2 to 1.3 years due to election results. Two City Councilmembers (Kim B. Savant and Billy Hewes, III) ran and lost their election for City of Gulfport Mayor. Due to election laws, they were unable to simultaneously run for their City Council seats. In addition, Jimmie T. Jenkins lost his Primary outright; Ricky Dombrowski and Charles E. ‘Chuck’ Teston lost their Primary Runoffs, and; Libby Milner Roland was seated 11 months prior in a Special Election to fill the City Council seat vacated by Richard Rose’s resignation. Third, in July 2009, the average tenure of a City
Councilmember dropped from 5.2 to 3.6 years due to election results. Five of Seven City Councilmembers lost their seats; three lost in their Primary’s outright (Jackie Smith, Brian A. Carriere, and Barbara A. Nalley), and two lost in Primary Runoffs (Gary Holliman and Neil Resh). Despite the significant loss of incumbents, and four new City Councilmembers, the average tenure of a City Councilmember was aided by the election of Ricky Dombrowski who previously served on City Council.

Figure 28. Methods 5. ad hoc Tenure Analysis, Planning Commission

Planning Commission Tenure Analysis – Thirty-nine Planning Commissioners have served the City of Gulfport since 1996. The longest serving Planning Commissioner in this period was D. P. ‘Nick’ DeNicola who served the Planning Commission between January 1970 and April 2002, or more than 32 years. In this chart there are two significant drops in average tenure. First, between May 2001 and May 2002, the average tenure of a Planning Commissioner dropped from 9.0 to 5.1 years primarily due to the resignation of Planning Commissioner Bruce Allen and Planning Commissioner A. B. Taake. In this time period
the Planning Commission lost a cumulative 43 years of tenure. Second, between March 2008 and February 2009, the average tenure of a Planning Commissioner dropped from 9.6 to 1.4 years. In this time period the Planning Commission lost a cumulative 73 years of tenure. In April 2005, six Planning Commissioners had been operating on expired terms; following Hurricane Katrina, increased priority on the restoration of immediate needs further delayed the reappointment of Planning Commissioners. In March 2008, more than two years after moving into the role of Mayor, Mayor Warr appointed his first Planning Commissioner, Charlie Hewes. Between March 2008 and February 2009, Mayor Warr appointed nine new members to the then-11 member Planning Commission. Of those nine appointees, two did not serve their full terms and four are still serving today.

*Figure 29. Methods 5. *ad hoc* Tenure Analysis, City Governance Tenure Averages*
City Governance Average Tenure Analysis – Figure 29 reports four averages of City Governance Tenure. First, tenure of all members was averaged, in effect weighting the Planning Commission heavier than the City Council, and City Council heavier than the Mayor, generating the Equal Person Governance Average. Second, the all three city government bodies (Mayor, City Council and Planning Commission) average tenures were averaged, generating the Equal Government Governance Average. Third, the Equal Person Governance Average was averaged across all months, generating the 20-Year Equal Person Governance Baseline of 6.26 Years, or 6 Years, 3 Months, 1 Week (σ_p: +/- 1.64; 1 Year, 7 Months, 3 Weeks). Third, the Equal Government Governance Average Tenure was averaged across all months, generating the 20-Year Equal Government Governance Baseline of 5.57 Years, or 5 Years, 6 Months, 3 Weeks (σ_p: +/- 1.93; 1 Year, 11 Months). The Difference (Δ) Area between the 20-Year Equal Government Governance Baseline and the 20-Year Equal Person Governance Baseline is 0.69 Years, or 8 Months, 1 Week.

Within Figure #, there are six notable features. First, in June of 1997 both Equal Member and Equal Government Tenure Averages drop 1.23 (7.72 – 6.49; 1 Year, 2 Months, 3 Weeks) and 3.45 years (7.70 – 4.26; 3 Years, 5 Months, 2 Weeks), respectfully. This drop is due to election turnover; the Primary Runoff Loss of Mayor Ken ‘The General’ Combs, Retirement of City Councilman Gordon Allen, and creation of two new City Council seats for the then-recently annexed Orange Grove area.

Second, between May 2001 and May 2002, and lasting until July 2005, the Equal Government Tenure Average overtakes the Equal Person Tenure Average. Initiated by the strong average tenure of the Planning Commission, and supplanted by the election of Mayor Ken ‘The General’ Combs and a strong maintenance of incumbency in the 2001 General Elections, reflected in July 2001, replacements in the Planning Commission in maintained the pattern. In other words, in this instance this tenure pattern indicates the tenure strength of the Mayor and City Council, relative to the tenure weakness of the Planning Commission.

Third, in July 2005, both Equal Member and Equal Government Tenure Averages drop from their peak values of 8.37 and 9.58 years, respectively, by 3.50 (8.37-4.88;
Years, 6 Months) and 6.58 years (9.58 – 3.00; 6 Years, 5 Months, 4 Weeks), respectfully. The election of a new Mayor and 5 new City Councilmembers initiated both drops. July 2005 is also important because the Equal Person Tenure Average overtakes the Equal Government Tenure Average, reversing the pattern initiated in May 2001, or four years and two months ago. This tenure pattern indicates the tenure strength of the Planning Commission, relative to the tenure weakness of the Mayor and City Council.

Fourth, between March 2008 and February 2009 both Equal Member and Equal Government Tenure Averages drop from 6.68 and 5.30 years, respectively, by 3.84 (6.68-2.84; 3 Years, 10 Months, 1 Week) and 1.96 years (5.30 – 3.35; 1 Year, 11 Months, 3 Weeks), respectfully. Replacement of 9 of 11 Planning Commissioners during this time span briefly reverses the pattern of Equal Person Tenure Average overtaking the Equal Government Tenure Average; indicating the tenure strength of the Mayor and City Council, relative to the tenure weakness of the Planning Commission.

Fifth, in July 2009, both Equal Member and Equal Government Tenure Averages drop to their lowest points, at 2.50 and 1.88 years, respectively. This also spurs a reversal of the tenure pattern between March 2008 and July 2009, indicating the tenure strength of the Planning Commission, relative to the tenure weakness of the Mayor and City Council. Despite this strength, Equal Member Tenure Average is more than 2 standard deviations ($\sigma_p$) away from its baseline (< 3.00 years) and Equal Government Tenure Average is more than 1 standard deviation ($\sigma_p$) away from its baseline (< 3.64 years).

Sixth, in July 2013, both Equal Member and Equal Government Tenure Averages drop from 5.70 and 5.36 years, respectively, by .29 (5.69 – 5.40; 3 Months, 3 Weeks) and 1.31 years (5.36 – 4.05; 1 Year, 3 Months, 3 Weeks), respectfully. This minor drop was caused by the General Election of 2013. Despite having a new mayor and four new City Councilmembers, Councilmember Ricky Dombrowski’s return to City Council significantly blunted the impact.
*ad hoc* Tenure Analysis Temporal and Axial Results

Figure 30 reproduces all data from the tenure analysis, and aligns the document data spectrum between 2005 and 2016 with tenure analysis. Figure 31 builds on Figure 30 by temporally aligning events listed in Table 32.
Table 32. *Methods 5. ad hoc Tenure Analysis Major Temporal Events*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Timeline</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2005</td>
<td>Warr Administration Begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 2005</td>
<td>Hurricane Katrina Makes Landfall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 2005</td>
<td>Governors Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, Renewal Established;</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Mississippi Renewal Forum Charrette</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February 2006</td>
<td>HDR SmartCode Charrette</td>
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<td></td>
<td>February 2007</td>
<td>SmartCode Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>October 2007</td>
<td>Old Gulfport &amp; Mississippi City Community Plan Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 2008</td>
<td>DPZ Charrette for 5 Sites in Gulfport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>February 2008</td>
<td>Mayor Warr Investigation Announced; Handsboro Community Plan Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2008</td>
<td>Florence Gardens Community Plan Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>January 2009</td>
<td>Mayor Warr Indicted on 16 Federal Counts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2009</td>
<td>Westside Community Plan Adoption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2009</td>
<td>Schloegel Administration Begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>September 2009</td>
<td>Mayor Warr Pleads Guilty to Charges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>March 2010</td>
<td>2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan Draft Presented To City Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2010</td>
<td>Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill in Gulf of Mexico</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>June 2010</td>
<td>2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan Contract Amended</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2011</td>
<td>2010 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan Tabled</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>April 2012</td>
<td>SmartCode, Old Gulfport, Mississippi City, and Handsboro Community Plans are Vacated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>July 2013</td>
<td>Hewes Administration Begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>2013 Gulfport Comprehensive Plan Tabled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Notes.**
1: Indicated by dotted line in Figure 31
2: Indicated by solid black vertical line in Figure 31

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Figure 30. Methods No. 5. Tenure Analysis and Document Analysis Data Spectrum Temporal Alignment
Figure 31. Methods No. 5. Tenure Analysis and Document Analysis Data Spectrum Temporal Alignment w/ Major Temporal Events
In Figure 31, there are four notable clusters of events. First, beginning in July 2005, events \(a, b, c,\) and \(d\), Mayor Warr and a new City Council started in their roles. A little more than a month later, Hurricane Katrina made landfall. Shortly thereafter, the Governor’s Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal was formed, and the Mississippi Renewal Forum Held. Momentum from the Mississippi Renewal Forum was parlayed in the a SmartCode Charrette, conducted by HDR. During this time, all media outlets were saturated with content about Planning and redevelopment plans. Second, between February 2007 and March 2008, events \(e, f, g, h,\) and \(i\) are the events where SmartCode and Community Plans were enacted. In February 2007, the SmartCode Framework was adopted by City Council. Shortly after Community Plans for Old Gulfport and Mississippi City \((f)\), Handsboro \((h)\), and Florence Gardens \((i)\) were adopted. In between, a DPZ Charrette \((g)\) was held to develop redevelopment and development Plans for five key sites in Gulfport \((\text{Downtown, Port of Gulfport, Jones Park, Gulfport SportsPlex, and Gulfport Veterans Affairs Hospital})\). Illustrated by the Data Spectrum, significant attention was paid to Planning efforts during this stint, with a spike in January of 2008 relating to the DPZ charrette. Third, between January and September 2009, momentum behind Mayor Warr and the City of Gulfport began to falter. Previous to January 2009, Warr replaced 7 of the 11 Planning Commissioners, but the effects of this weren’t felt until the indictment of Mayor Warr \((j)\), which ended with a guilty plea \((m)\). With the indictment, Mayor Warr’s opted to not run for reelection, and his tenure ended in July 2009 \((l)\). However, before Mayor Warr left office, one last Community Plan for the Westside Community \((k)\) was adopted by City Council. Fourth, events between March 2010 and August 2013 \((n, o, p, q, r, s,\) and \(t)\) relate to the failure of Planning efforts developed after Hurricane Katrina. Initiated by the hearing of the new Comprehensive Plan in March 2010 \((n)\), the City Council engaged in a discussion on the issues and challenges of SmartCode. Following the environmental disaster Deepwater Horizon/BP Oil Spill in April 2010 \((o)\), Gulfport revised the contract with HDR in June 2010 \((p)\) to look at a way to solve structural differences between the SmartCode and existing Comprehensive Zoning ordinance. Eventually, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was tabled.
in July 2011 (q) and a little less than a year later, in April 2012, SmartCode and three Community Plans were vacated (r). Following the vacating of the SmartCode and Community Plans, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was reworked. With the start of Mayor Hewes administration in July 2013 (s), new priorities were created and the 2013 update to the 2010 Comprehensive Plan was tabled indefinitely in August 2013 (t).

Axially, tenure and temporal analysis complements experience, expectations, and externalities themes. Further exploration of how all three methods contribute to findings follows this section.
Chapter 6. Findings, or Why Plans Fail

Using the axially generated themes of experience, expectations, and externalities, this chapter outlines 26 findings using information and analysis from the Plan Analysis, Document Analysis, Interviews, and ad hoc Tenure Analysis. In the first section, 16 experience findings are detailed. Of the 16 findings, seven relate to community experience, five relate to governance experience, and four relate to Planning experience. The second section reviews seven findings on expectations. Of the seven expectations findings, three relate to redevelopment, three relate to development, and one relates to time expectations. Third, three findings regarding externalities are explored. One relates to disaster externalities, one relates to externalities created by federalism, and one relates to externalities related to other. Table 33 summarizes all findings.
Table 33. Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#</th>
<th>Experience</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Gulfport’s historically inconsistent and uneven utilization and enforcement of zoning and planning ordinances weakened community trust and confidence in Planning and SmartCode efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Gulfport’s insensitivity to socioeconomic and racial divides weakened led to failure of Planning efforts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Investigation and indictment of Mayor Warr eroded community trust and confidence in mayoral leadership.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Gulfport’s citizens lacked capacity to engage and utilize a &quot;new operating system,&quot; or SmartCode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Legal challenges from citizens against the City of Gulfport weakened community trust and confidence in Planning efforts.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Inaccessible Planning documents weakened citizen ability to engage and utilize Gulfport’s Plans and SmartCode.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Community</td>
<td>Regional TEA Party vocally advocated against Planning and SmartCode efforts leading to Planning Failure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Political conflicts over Planning and SmartCode weakening governance engagement, trust, and confidence between Gulfport’s Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and Director of Development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Mayor Warr’s strong desire to implement the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plans, Vision, and SmartCode recommendations created suspicion within Gulfport’s government, weakening engagement and utilization.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
Table 33 continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Governance</th>
<th>Planning</th>
<th>Expectations</th>
<th>Findings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Functional conflicts between Gulfport’s existing 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance and the 2008 SmartCode Framework complicated governance.</td>
<td>Gulfport’s Planning Department lacked capacity to engage and utilize Plans.</td>
<td>“Therapeutic” ‘Better Than Before’ visions promoted during the Mississippi Renewal Forum drove “utopian” redevelopment and development expectations.</td>
<td>Stakeholder expectations of Federal funding were a “distorting prism” that inflated Mississippi Renewal Forum redevelopment and development expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Changes in elected and appointed leadership complicated governance and led to Planning failure.</td>
<td>Gulfport’s City Council and Planning Commission lacked capacity to engage and utilize Plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Conflicts of interest within Gulfport’s government eroded internal support for Planning.</td>
<td>Gulfport’s Mayors, City Council, Planning Commission, and Planning Department resisted citizen engagement and utilization of Plans.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>Planning and SmartCode consultants, hired by the City of Gulfport, became viewed as unwanted “Carpetbaggers.”</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

continued
Table 33 continued

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Redevelopment</td>
<td>Gulfport’s stakeholders incorrectly equated post-Katrina building permits as fulfilling redevelopment expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Optimistic population projections drove unrealistic development and redevelopment expectations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Stakeholder expectations of Gulfport’s Pre-Katrina development patterns, counter to expectations used to justify the adoption of Planning and SmartCode efforts, placed infrastructure dollars north of Interstate 10, into rural areas with limited accessibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>Development</td>
<td>Development and funding expectations led to stakeholders developing the Plans as “wish-lists” of funding-intensive megaprojects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>Time Expectations</td>
<td>Internal and external stakeholders utilized an imagined history to justify unrealistic aesthetic expectations for redevelopment and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Externalities</td>
<td>Findings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>The unpredicted effects of the Financial Crisis, Mortgage Crisis, and Great Recession went counter to expectations, and shaped redevelopment experiences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>Federalism</td>
<td>FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps shaped expectations and the Planning experience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>Other Cities</td>
<td>Competition with nearby communities, combined with unrealistic expectations, negatively shaped the Planning experience.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Experience and Plan Failure

The first set of findings examines the role experience plays in the failed implementation of Plans. Pulling apart the experience of and in the community, governance, and Planning to reveal the complex role experience plays in Plan implementation. Experience refers, broadly, to the engagement and utilization of experience. Engagement experience explores how the community, government, and
planners work together to create. Utilization experience examines the application of engaged experience (working together) to affect implementation and outcomes.

Community experience refers to the community members, or citizen stakeholders, of Gulfport. In Community Experience, engagement and utilization critically examine the roles of trust and confidence. Open and axial coding across document and interview analysis reveals an overlap between community trust and confidence and citizen engagement and utilization experiences. Governance experience refers to the experience of those that are members of Gulfport’s government, not including the Planning Department. In Governance Experience, engagement and utilization critically examine the roles of experiences’ impact on the connection between engaged experience in the form of governance capacity, and utilized experience in the shape of applied governance, or implementation. Planning experience details the relationships between Gulfport’s Planning department and Planning consultants. Open and axial coding demonstrates a connection between attempts at creating capacity through engagement, and then applying this capability through utilization or Plan implementation.

The first 16 findings are grouped into the aforementioned three categories of Community Experience, Governance Experience, and Planning Experience, reflective of their relative, but not absolute, importance and relationships. The first seven findings (Findings 1-7) explore Community Experience. The second five findings (8-12) explore Governance Experience. The following four findings (13-16) explore Planning Experience.

Finding 1: Gulfport’s historically inconsistent and uneven enforcement of zoning and planning ordinances weakened community trust and confidence in Planning and SmartCode efforts.

Before Hurricane Katrina, the City of Gulfport had a legacy of inconsistently and unevenly applying planning and zoning ordinances. George Carbo, Director of Development for the City of Gulfport before Hurricane Katrina, alluded to the inconsistent enforcement of zoning and the uneven application of Planning saying that most cities used
Comprehensive Plans as “loose” guides even if they “conformed tightly” to state law (2015, July 16).

Despite Gulfport’s history of uneven application and enforcement, changes to City Government leadership in July 2005 briefly restored community trust and confidence. Tracy Dash, a reporter for the Sun Herald, covered the city’s election writing, “Change. That is the common word among many, especially those who voted for Warr. Residents said he represents the change and values they want.” (Dash, 2005, May 5). In the same election, 5 of the 7 sitting City Councilmembers would be replaced, creating a new City Government. The Sun Herald’s Editorial Board wrote, following the inauguration, “Given the remarkable turnover at [Gulfport’s] City Hall during the last election, ‘a new way of operating’ was certainly something voters expected.” (2005, August 16).

Shortly after the inauguration of Gulfport’s new City Government, Hurricane Katrina’s landfall altered the coast. Despite the infamous political maelstrom caused by the Federal Government Response, Mississippi’s leaders, including Mayor Warr, gained significant political capital because of their post-Katrina leadership. In a letter to the editor from Gulfport resident Jan DuCote, she writes: “My 5-year-old granddaughter, Haley, recently colored a picture in her kindergarten class and she proudly gave it to me to display on my refrigerator. The picture was of a man in a suit behind a desk with the picture of an American flag behind him. The heading read, ‘The mayor is the leader of our city.’ I asked Haley if she knew the name of our mayor in Gulfport. She thought awhile and then said, ‘Brent... (after a short pause) Warrior.’ I laughed and said, ‘I agree with you. He is a warrior and he will help us win this ‘Warr.’ Thank you, Brent Warr, and all of the [city] council members and staff at City Hall. We will rebuild better.” (2005, November 10).

Despite the citizen support for Mayor Warr, his administration, and City Council, citizens in the various neighborhoods quickly came to distrust City Government in the months and years after the storm. Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds notes that this relationship existed prior to Hurricane Katrina, saying, “I’ve heard a lot of clients and people of the neighborhood who have felt the city has sort of not implemented the [1972 Comprehensive Zoning] Code in a way
that’s consistent with the way that it's written. They feel like maybe, sometimes, the city is getting away with stuff here and there.” (2015, July 27).

Current and former city administrators, such as current Director of the Mississippi Main Street Chapter Laurie Toups, were also aware of “some skepticism” concerning the implementation of Downtown façade and streetscape restoration plans (2015, July 27). Former Urban Development Director Larry Jones adds to this, saying, “When we had traditional zoning, there had been a number of pitch battles with neighborhoods over zoning issues. Sometimes there were zone changes, so people had a real negative impression of the zoning to begin with.” (2016, March 7).

Former elected officials were also aware the city had a poor record concerning historically inconsistent and uneven application and enforcement of planning goals and zoning ordinances. Former City Councilmember Brian Carriere was the blunt in his assessment, stating:

I don’t think it's really up for debate as to whether or not the city was consistent in its enforcement. I think the reality shows the city was more than willing to make concessions if the right applicants filed a petition asking for maybe say a setback grievance or a parking lot grievance or any other sort of concern that they had it basically gave them a special accommodation. It didn't happen for every developer but if you were a … I guess if you were a consistent developer, if it was someone that in a right kind of people, meaning not just in the planning office, or the Mayor's office, but if you knew the right people on the Planning Commission and could get a majority vote there, and they knew the right people on the City Council and can get a majority vote there, you could pretty much do whatever you wanted and get a special exception usage for all sorts of stuff. That was even true after the adoption of SmartCode in Gulfport at least in my four-year tenure that was still true… Since I left, simply by observing as a citizen, I still see examples of exceptions that were made where I know that the actual planning does not allow for what was a built or design in certain areas, but the city has allowed it nonetheless. (2016, March 8).
Carriere, aware of the development of the Westside Community Plan in Gulfport’s oldest, diverse, and politically active neighborhood, details why that community was skeptical. He says,

In Gulfport, the biggest hurdle is whether or not the city is going to be consistent in its enforcement and its application [of zoning and plans]. The city is so known for making exceptions to the right people at the right time, and that makes any sort of overall planning goals impossible… Why do you have rules for a game? Why do you have parliamentary procedure if you’re going to make exceptions to that just so you can use a technical maneuver to get your bill passed? You’re undermining the whole system; the whole foundation of the community plan. (2016, March 8).

In the Mississippi City area, residents were similarly suspicious of the Community Plans. In the adoption hearing for the Mississippi City Community Plan, Bounds states, There were at one public – the first public hearing for the Planning Commission… and this is in response to I something I heard… There were accusations made essentially that there was some interference of the Mayor [Warr] in the process. I am here to tell you, if you know me at all, if you have any consideration for my integrity, that absolutely did not happen. In fact, the Mayor [Warr] did not participate in the workshop process, although his father [Gene Warr] did show up for a particular piece of property. (City Council, 2007, October 16).

**Finding 2: Gulfport’s lack of sensitivity to socioeconomic and racial divides weakened led to failure of Planning efforts.**

Socioeconomic and racial distinctions also fueled suspicion of residents toward the City of Gulfport and led to Plan implementation failure. Advocate and Lawyer Reilly Morse echoed these sentiments, noting that the black community in the historic free-black settlement and neighborhood Turkey Creek felt as if the city did not have their best interests at heart. Morse says, “The City of Gulfport, in the past, has not been a trusted branch of municipal government when it comes to Turkey Creek’s needs. Apparently, the city allowed a developer to site an apartment complex on top of a cemetery in Turkey

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Creek, to cite one example. Likewise, the city at one point attempted a wholesale rezoning of a big chunk of Turkey Creek into industrial use.” (2015, July 22).

Andrés Duany and Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds illustrate a robust socioeconomic divide that contributes to the skepticism toward inconsistent enforcement and uneven application; Duany partially blames the failure on the “under the table” discrimination towards poorer residents, saying “It wasn’t racism, but rich people and poor people.” Duany continues, “[In] Mississippi, … and the coast all over the world and [the rich] manage the beaches and they pay for the beaches. Then there is a enormous hint of this; the people who are less wealthy, who want to use the beaches, and there is a huge conflict. This is what I ran across in Gulf Coast and it was completely under the table and it was never over. I read it very clearly, which is why our plan wasn’t built.” (2016, March 8).

Bounds offered a vignette; in one instance, Mayor Warr told a group of hired consultants that they should not engage a group from the historically poor, and black, Soria City neighborhood. Bounds says,

Laura [Hall, a SmartCode Consultant] didn't know the area, and so she said, ‘Well the Mayor [Warr] says that we've already spent a lot of time, and this is pretty much the same people [as Turkey Creek], the same group that we spoke to before, and we do have limited amounts of time, so we can't keep talking to just one group.’ I pointed out that the two neighborhoods [of Turkey Creek and Soria City] were completely independent, there's really no overlap or connection. The only thing they have in common, particularly, is that they're both largely black areas in terms of historical settlement. (2015, July 28).

Opposite to the lack of concern for socioeconomically disadvantaged areas, was the heightened concern for the redevelopment of the Second Street Corridor, a wealthier and relatively white neighborhood. Bounds notes, “There were some concrete things that were done at the Mayor’s [Warr’s] insistence… I thought it was a bad idea at the time, but the Mayor went forward, insisted as part of the city’s [HDR] Smart Code Charrette, which happened a few months after the Renewal Forum, that the they help individual people who
had property on Second Street to redesign their houses… A lot of people felt that was sort of inappropriate, but at the end of the day, Second Street probably looks a lot better for it.” (2015, July 27).

**Finding 3: Investigation and indictment of Mayor Warr eroded community trust and confidence in mayoral leadership.**

Interview respondents were highly complementary of Mayor Warr; respondents alluded to the notion that Mayor Warr was a natural leader. Respondents also noted their respect for him, and his high investment in the future of Gulfport. Former Directors of Urban Development Larry Jones and Jeff Bounds, SmartCode Consultant Chad Emerson, Mississippi Renewal Forum leader Andrés Duany, and Former Councilmember Brain Carriere each emphasized Warr’s leadership and the effect it had in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Despite their respect for Mayor Warr, each respondent measured their praise due to the investigation and indictment of Mayor Warr, which many noted led to the failed implementation of Plans.

Sometime before January 2008, the Department of Homeland Security initiated an investigation into Mayor Warr for receipt of FEMA Homeowner Grant money for damage to his antebellum beachfront mansion, which he had purchased in 2003 from the Armed Forces Retirement Home and been renovating since. During the Mayoral primary, other candidates and citizens called Warr’s residence into question. (Dash, 2005, March 11). Tracy Dash of the Sun Herald reported at the time, “The residency issue came to a head earlier this week when another candidate, Steve Dickerson, dropped off a packet at the newspaper. The packet contains pictures taken in October and this month of Warr’s boarded-up Beach Boulevard house… The person who gathered the information in the packet also questioned the school where Warr’s children attend. Warr, in his flier, says his daughter, who is in third grade, has attended Gulfport schools since she became school age.” (2005, March 11).

In February 2008, the City of Gulfport confirmed that the Water and Sewer Department was subpoenaed by the Department of Homeland Security to report service for
the Warr’s home, the Federal Government’s first verification step of residency. For the next eleven months, Mayor Warr’s fraud allegations lingered over City Hall. Despite Mayor Warr’s hope that the investigation would end without repercussions in late January 2009, allowing Mayor Warr to run for a second term, Mayor Warr and his wife, Linda, were indicted on 16 Federal Grand Jury counts related to the fraudulent receipt of the homeowner grants totaling $222,798.10. According to the Sun Herald, the Warrs each faced up to 210 years each in prison and up to $4 million in fines (Lee, 2009, January 26).

WLOX also reported on the indictment saying:

Both [Brent and Linda] Warrs seemed visibly shaken as they stood in front of the magistrate and pleaded not guilty to the conspiracy, wire fraud and mail fraud allegations levied against them. Four years ago, they became Gulfport's first family. And then, Katrina hit. That storm suddenly has them trapped in a much more personal legal storm that could have dire consequences. Despite the legal issue, Brent Warr is still mayor of Gulfport. ‘Absolutely. Still fully engaged,’ he said. However, his political future beyond this spring may be in doubt. (Kessie, 2009, January 28).

A little more than a month later, on March 3, 2009, WLOX Kessie’s prediction came to pass; Mayor Warr announced he would not run for re-election. Keith Burton of GulfCoastNews.com maintains an archive of reporting on Warr, titled “GCN Warr Archives.” GCN’s Keith Burton wrote at the time about the erosion of community trust and confidence the indictment caused, saying, “Warr said little at today's City Council meeting. He appeared tired but composed regarding the turmoil now affecting his life and that of his family. But his troubles are not very far from the minds of the City Council nor the city's residents.” (Burton, 2009, March 3).

Interview respondents made similar observations. Emerson, who did not have specific comments on the charges, but noted the effect they caused said, “there was a lot of... the whole investigation of Mayor Warr, there was just a lot turmoil from just a pragmatic perspective.” Emerson expanded on the effect the investigation had on the implementation of plans, saying “Directly, none. Indirectly, I think it served as just another
complicated issue for city and business leaders to deal with in an already complicated time.” Emerson interjected at the end of his comments, “Yes, it undoubtedly had an effect, but I think its effect was not ultimately the reason that things did not work out as comprehensively for the SmartCode in Gulfport.” (2016, March 7).

Duany opened his interview by articulating that the case of plan failure in Gulfport is “highly idiosyncratic” due to the investigation into Mayor Warr. Sympathetic to Warr’s plight, Duany alluded to the effect it had on community trust and confidence, if not the outright failure of planning efforts saying, “Because he was Mayor. I think if he was a normal person, nobody would have given a damn.” (2016, March 8).

**Finding 4: Gulfport’s citizens lacked capacity to engage and utilize a "new operating system," or SmartCode.**

SmartCode Consultant Chad Emerson likened the transition from traditional zoning to SmartCode like moving to a “new operating system” saying, “The challenge was that really was like switching from one operating system to another. Switching from an iPhone to Android or switching, you know, whatever operating system to another one that isn't really compatible.” Toward the end of the conversation, Emerson pointed to just how big the ideas in the operating system were, alluding to the lack of capacity of residents, saying “The Mississippi Gulf Coast, no community in the history of the United States, no region, received more just ideas coming to it.” (2016, March 7).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones (2016, March 7) noted that this had a significant role in the failure of implementation saying, “I think that from the very start, the community was confused about [the SmartCode and Community Planning]. They didn't understand it.” Following this comment, Jones provided a careful dissection of Community Capacity in the years following Hurricane Katrina:

I mean one thing I was trying to do was trying to solicit feedback from the community [on SmartCode], and they just weren't interested. I think they just didn't understand it and weren't going to take the time to understand it. And you have to recall after the storm; people were trying to get their lives back together. They were
trying to get housing. They were trying to get back to their job. Trying to get their kids back in school. I mean they had a lot of personal family issues to deal with. It was very difficult after the storm and I mean just regular life was disrupted. The grocery stores were closed. The banks were closed. You couldn't buy any gasoline. The schools were closed. People were not able to live their housing, so they had a lot of things that they were trying to pull together. And I think that this sort of, I don't know, there just wasn't any interest. Again the [Sun Herald] newspaper didn't understand it. And I tried to reach out to them to get them to sort of help them up, and they didn't really have the understanding for it. So I was always concerned that when it got passed and was implemented that, that's when we were going to have the pushback, and that's what happened. And, I mean, we did everything possible to try to solicit comments during the hearing process because that would have been the time to make adjustments rather than adopt it and then start shooting away at it through amendments. I mean it just - I don't know, it just didn't work out. I think people just stuck to other issues, you know, try to pull their lives back together. (2016, March 7).

Other interviews echoed similar points. An anonymous consultant noted the complexity of Gulfport’s SmartCode. The same consultant surmises that the most difficult thing to interpret in the SmartCode was the “fairly complex system” of density bonuses. They continue, “If you look at SmartCodes that were developed for communities elsewhere on the coast, Gulfport's is by far the most complicated version of SmartCode that’s been delivered to the community... I think that one of the things that happened that caused people to be concerned about SmartCode implementation was that the first set of community plans that were completed were ... I describe them as highly complex plans. They went from the most simple kinds of zoning ordinances to one of the most complex and sophisticated kinds of zoning ordinances overnight. When people tried to interpret the code to figure out what they could do with their property, they had a really difficult time. So although that code allowed for more development that the hoops you had to jump through to achieve more development were really hard to interpret.” (2016, March 14).
The lack of ability to understand SmartCode was also related to the lack of planning prior to Hurricane Katrina. Mississippi Renewal Forum leader Andrés Duany noted this lack of Planning, which was evident in the Mississippi Renewal Forum, saying, “Well, the planning in the first place, there was none. Everybody said ‘You [and the Mississippi Renewal Forum] introduced planning in one big shot in Mississippi. We had none here.’ The combination of being, sort of, at the edges of culture, [that culture] being very individualistic, sort of out there, [politically conservative] right-wing; ‘There was no planning in Mississippi. We wanted you to be aware of that.’ That’s just what I hear, I hear that from a lot of people. ‘No, no! If you introduce sophisticated planning anywhere I am shocked it’s Mississippi.’ I am not saying that I am quoting what people told me.” (2016, March 8).

**Finding 5: Legal challenges from citizens against the City of Gulfport weakened community trust and confidence in Planning efforts.**

As the only neighborhood to directly engage the City of Gulfport to develop a Community Plan, residents of the Westside neighborhood were directly involved in the creation and adoption their SmartCode Community Plan. City Council adopted the SmartCode Community Plan for the Westside Neighborhood in March 2009. However, a legal challenge brought forth by residents who supported SmartCode indicated the weak community trust and confidence in the City of Gulfport’s ability to evenly enforce the SmartCode ordinance and apply community planning techniques. This weakness eventually led to plan implementation failure.

In August 2009, Mayor Schloegel and Gulfport’s City Council approved the reclassification of the parcel from lower density T4 to higher density T3 to allow development of 60 homes on a 4.3-acre parcel, against the wishes of some Westside residents.71 The following month three residents, Robert and Kathleen Kranz and Debra Hilgeman, sued the City of Gulfport for arbitrarily granting the zoning reclassification. In

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71 Gulfport Planning Commission Case 0905PC037
legal terms, plaintiffs alleged the City of Gulfport had engaged in the practice of ‘spot zoning.’ The property’s owner, Dr. Michael Seicshnaydre, argued that the property was zoned for 25-units per acre when he purchased the property, before the adoption of the Westside SmartCode Community Plan. Dr. Seicshnaydre argued that the Westside SmartCode Community Plan down-zoned the property to 5-units per acre, making it unprofitable for him to develop without a change in zoning. Will Symmes, an agent, and lawyer for Dr. Seicshnaydre also pointed to another reason why the housing was so important, saying, “We all have heard about affordable housing and need. Here we are with the property in the right area, almost right off of downtown, that is surrounded by businesses. You have a need for teachers; that we’ve heard about. You have a need in the housing for such. You have a need for other professions, nurses, things of that nature.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2009, July 23).

Westside residents argued Dr. Seicshnaydre’s attempt to up-zone the property deprived them of the same rights they ‘gave up’ as a tradeoff for the adoption of SmartCode. Westside residents argued that the tradeoff was negotiated to preserve the existing moderate-density, single-family character of the community. In arguing this point, they detailed that Dr. Seicshnaydre’s townhome project would be far denser than the existing community fabric, and thus would look out of character. The case also had the support of some of Gulfport’s powerbrokers: Lisa Bradley, then-Director of the Mississippi Main Street Program, future-Mayor Billy Hewes, Port of Gulfport Board Member John Rester, Gulfport Memorial Hospital physician Dr. Joe Salloum, Real Estate Developer Lenwood F. Sawyer, and local Lawyer James K. Wetzel. The Planning Commission voted 7-2 for Dr. Seicshnaydre’s proposal to recommend approval; the City Council voted 4-3 to approve the proposal (Gulfport City Council, 2009, August 18).

In a hearing before City Council, Westside residents such as Mr. Andre spoke against the zoning change, saying, “[I’m arguing for the City Council] to undo the SmartCode density transects so recently determined by the Westside community and approved by the previous City Council. More than 100 members had input into that Westside smart code, and over 1100 hours were spent in achieving that smart code. We
went property by property to know what every property had been, what it was, so we didn't sell anyone short. And we felt like when the City Council approved that and it became part of Gulfport’s smart code ordinance that we the people’s voice had been heard. Now because a landowner [Dr. Seicshnaydre] wants his property density upgraded and has had the means to hire a law firm, who by their own statements could influence the planning commission and did contact the planning commissioners individually to influence their vote, succeeded in persuading the commission to reverse itself resulting in the commission’s recommendation to you, the elected City Council, to reverse the previous City Council’s position.” (Gulfport City Council, 2009, August 18).

Kathleen Kranz, one of the plaintiffs in the lawsuit, was quoted by Keith Burton of GulfCoastNews.com, saying, “‘We are trying to save our neighborhood and the [Dr. Seicshnaydre] development would work against that,’” (Burton, 2009, September 5). In the City Council meeting, her complaint was clearer:

I, like Dr. Seicshnaydre, lost my right to R-2 development and the density it would allow. My husband and I own an acre and a half, six properties, one block from Dr. Seicshnaydre’s property on the railroad. I have well over $500,000 invested in this community in money, in renovation, in sweat equity, in social involvement, and fire loss and prevention. When SmartCode was implemented, I lost my right to R-2 development and I lost my right to T4L zoning. I lost my right to build eight row houses on one side of the street and four on the other side. I lost my right to have commercial development on my three corners of my property. One corner is on 15th Street. We own a whole half a block. If we really wanted to maximize that block in a T4L, we could put 18 units, three stories, a parking underneath, a commercial development on two corners. So we, too, have felt the economic impact of that zoning change, but at least as people we share in zoning, our property values that they compare from one block to the next. My question is why Dr. Seicshnaydre, and not I, deserves to have the economic benefit of a zoning change? Why does he get the economic benefit and not I? I want the same benefits
that he would have. If you give him T4L zoning, I would like to have it, also. As it stands now, he wins, and I lose. (Gulfport City Council, 2009, August 18).

Several months later, on June 6, 2010, Harrison County Circuit Judge Lisa Dodson sided with Westside residents and overturned the rezoning of the parcel. Burton of GulfCoastNews.com reported, “Judge Dodson found that there was no evidence in the record to support rezoning the property, owned by Rail Properties, LLC, to a classification allowing more dense urban development.” (2010, June 6).

Former Director of Development George Carbo points to this case, and other challenges to the Planning Commission and City Council, as part of the reason Gulfport ultimately abandoned SmartCode. He says, “Developers, property owners, did not like how they were being told to do certain things and so development projects failed, or they got into battles, which became legal battles over what the proper zoning should have been. Because of all those battles, Gulfport eventually pulled away from SmartCode.” Carbo continued, pointing specifically to this case, says “In West[side] Gulfport there was a property that wanted to have apartments on it. It would have been able to under the previous code. SmartCode did not allow it to have the density that they previously had. It got into a legal battle until finally the property owner decided that they were just going to donate the property to the city to get rid of it. Because it was no longer, they had spent too much money.” (2016, July 16).

Finding 6: Inaccessible Planning documents weakened citizen ability to engage and utilize Gulfport’s Plans and SmartCode.

Lack of access to Planning documents is what Former Urban Development Director George Carbo called, “the largest hurdles for plan implementation.” (2016, July 16). Carbo argues that not allowing the public to engage documents means that they are not able to properly educate themselves on the future directions of Gulfport. Specifically, the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, the SmartCode Framework, Five Community Plans, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and the 2013 Comprehensive Plan were difficult to access for this research.
After several attempts, Planning Administrator Greg Holmes provided the 2004 Comprehensive Plan utilized by the dissertation. The SmartCode Framework and Community Plans used by this research are available via digital City Council archives scanned from the Gulfport City Council Meeting Minute Books. However, to find each plan, the exact adoption date is needed. Plans are also incomplete, and many are unreadable due to low-quality scans, which render color images rich in information in black and white. Because of the low quality, most Plans were cobbled together from various resources including the SmartCode Framework and two Community Plan documents. Documents were retrieved from Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds personal website72 using WaybackMachine. According to Holmes, the documents were available at one point in time on the City of Gulfport’s website but were removed after the 2013 Comprehensive Plan was tabled indefinitely. Concerning access to other Comprehensive Plans, accessing the 2010 Comprehensive Plan draft was only possible through an archived web page on the Sun Herald’s website. Planning Administrator Greg Holmes provided the 2013 Comprehensive Plan, but with the stipulation that it would remain uncirculated.

Carbo described the rationale behind not making Plans readily available. Saying, I believe it was to control the politics, but it also controlled development… Well, if a developer... it allowed the city to steer a developer into ‘You need to do it this way.’ It was more, you had to rely on them [The City of Gulfport], as opposed to 'look at the plan, figure out where your developments going to go.” He continues, “It was a very closed system. You had to rely on the director of Planning and Development, Larry Jones, to meet with him, to meet with City Hall. In order to get your project going, because the staff was not allowed to interpret what the plan said. They were being told ‘Oh, we'll decide as we go along.’ But the current plan, because they are not readily available to people that are seeking information then it... if a plan is hidden somewhere, people can’t use it. It should be brought out and shown to the public, so that they can rally around different aspects of the plan to

encourage future development. And right now I believe the plan is more hidden from the public. (2016, July 16).

In addition to the challenges of accessing Plans, it was also challenging to access records from the City of Gulfport. While the City has taken significant steps towards organizing and providing Gulfport City Council Meeting Minute Books, modern City Council Meeting Minutes are preserved in three different digital spaces; MCCInnovations Archival Material (1893-2010), Legistar (2010-2014), and their current BoardSync system (2015-Present). The MCCInnovations is cumbersome and moderately effective at registering search terms. Legistar is slow and semi-organized, but has significant gaps in data coverage; some weeks all information is preserved, other weeks only partial records are present. BoardSync has videos of meetings, but the quality of recordings vary widely. In addition, the BoardSync system is not intuitive, making minutes, agendas, and legislation difficult to access.

The difficult experience of accessing public information is not limited to citizens or researchers; Sun Herald Reporter Anita Lee also ran into similar issues. HDR completed the first draft of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and on March 30, 2010, presented the 2010 Comp. Plan to City Council. Despite having a complete draft, the City was unable to provide hard copies to the audience, which upset several residents (Lee, 2010, March 31). A day later, Anita Lee posted a draft of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan on the Sun Herald website, the same one that was used by this dissertation, with the following caption:

The city of Gulfport is connected: Twitter, Facebook, websites, public spaces like city hall. The city even has a Gulfport 2030 website where a new comprehensive plan should be available. But it's not, sadly. The comprehensive plan projects Gulfport's growth and needs through year 2030. It has maps that show suggested road improvements and areas that could be annexed to accommodate growth. The plan can serve as a reference book as the city makes decisions related to growth. Sadly, the last plan sat on a shelf. Doubly sad because these plans are not cheap. This one has been in the works since 2008. The 2030 website started off then with great promise, offering links to resource material and contacts. But the site looks
dated these days. Ward 6 Councilman R. Lee Flowers sure would like to see the plan distributed. He has the plan on computer and says he will make sure it's e-mailed to me so we can post it here. The files are very large, so it might take awhile [sic] to get each section posted, but hopefully you can find links to each section here by day's end. Flowers also plans to place copies at businesses in Ward 6. He doesn't have any community centers or libraries in his ward, which is surprising because Gulfport seems to be the Community Center Capitol of the Deep South. Anyway, Flowers told me this morning: ‘As soon as I got (the plan), I killed a few people's e-mail in boxes. I want it out there. It's a lot to read and consume. I know my take on it will be different from other people's. The more people that look at it, the more response we'll have, the more community involvement we'll get and the more support for the plan we'll have when we adopt it.’ (Lee, 2010, March 31).

**Finding 7: Regional TEA Party vocally advocated against Planning and SmartCode efforts leading to Planning Failure.**

Faced with a budgetary crisis, Mayor Schloegel made resolving the issue his priority but faced immediate pushback from TEA Party advocates. Due to this pushback, and the presence of angry TEA Party members at meetings, City Council voted 4-3 to remove the public comment periods from meetings (Gulfport City Council, July 8, 2009). Burton noted the “clunky start” for Mayor Schloegel, saying, “Considering that people around the country are protesting in TEA party meetings that their government is not listening to them, the city's [of Gulfport] actions Tuesday strongly echoed that sentiment.” (July 8, 2009).

Shortly after, the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and 2008 SmartCode became targets of TEA Party members and right-wing Agenda 21 Conspiracy Theorists. TEA Party members and Agenda 21 Conspiracy Theorists believed that the 2010 Comprehensive Plan and 2008 SmartCode were the vehicles by which Agenda 21, a non-binding United Nations agreement published in 1993 to promote sustainable development, was being implemented. TEA Party members and Agenda 21 Conspiracy Theorists believed, more broadly, that
Agenda 21 is part of a larger conspiracy to consolidate private property rights to establish a ‘New World Order.’ These beliefs in conjunction with what Former Urban Development Director Larry Jones calls the “libertarian ideas about land... ‘that it’s my land, and I should be able to do what I want to do with it’” caused a series of protests at public meetings throughout the Gulf Coast Region (2016, March 7).

The South Mississippi TEA Party identifies the source of the Agenda 21 Conspiracy Theory to commentator former Fox News pundit Glenn Beck. Beck’s short-lived eponymous Fox News show garnered a significant following that culminated in the 2010 Restore Honor Rally in Washington D.C.. Toward the end of his Fox News tenure, in 2011, Beck stoked fears that Agenda 21 was being implemented to deprive United States citizens of land development and property rights. By mid-2011, increased pressure from advertisers on Fox News to cut Beck due to statements on his show resulted in Beck leaving to form his own media company, The Blaze. Since leaving Fox News, Becks new website, and “f-a-c-t-ion” (portmanteau of ‘fact’ and ‘fiction;’ Ritz, 2012, December 2) book ‘Agenda 21,’ doubled down on the Agenda 21 conspiracy theory, taking it to the ends that Agenda 21 sought to establish a New World Order that suppresses land rights and takes away firearms (SouthMSTEAParty, 2012). In Gulfport, several commenters, including the local Chairman of the South Mississippi Tea Party, wrote to The Sun Herald, which placed their Letters to the Editor.

In response to a September 17, 2011 ‘Agenda 21 Property Rights Meeting,’ at the Clearwater RV Park Auditorium in nearby Carriere, Mississippi, Gulfport High School student Matthew Edwards writes, “The tentacles of Agenda 21 have already begun their crushing assault on our country by adoptions of federal, local and state laws and ordinances. I am horrified by the sight of so many people being ignorant to its implementations. I am only in ninth grade at Gulfport High, and there is not much I can do but advocate against it, until the day when it is my generation’s turn to step up, be the leaders and take back our country.” (2011, November 15).

Several months later, an anonymous individual derided the SmartCode in the Sound Off section of the Sun Herald, writing, “Not very smart - Gulfport’s SmartCode has put a
ridiculous strain on efforts to rebuild in the city. How they can keep these strict regulations intact in just one section of the city and not enforce it citywide? This can’t be legal. Take the strain off of West Gulfport, too!” (N.A., 2012, March 1). A month later, South Mississippi TEA Party Chairman John Rhodes Sr. wrote, “Having never been one to subscribe to conspiracy theories, I came kicking and screaming into the dangers of Agenda 21. Until now, I am sure you have never heard of it. It’s a stealth and insidious radical environmentalist attack on our private property rights, sovereignty, and the very foundations of our freedoms. It is here in South Mississippi. Pascagoula is now contemplating adoption under the banner ‘Comprehensive Plan.’” (2012, April 13). In addition to these comments, on April 16, 2012, the South Mississippi Tea Party hosted another meeting at the Gulfport SportsPlex to discuss Agenda 21. The Press Release posted on GulfCoastNews.com states, “Agenda 21 is also known as ‘smart growth’ and is seen by many to be one of the greatest threats to freedom.”

Just two days after the TEA Party meeting at the Gulfport SportsPlex, on April 18, 2012, Gulfport voted to vacate their SmartCode and three Community Plans. Despite the push from Agenda 21 conspiracy theorists, the transcripts from City Council and the Planning Commission in February 2012 also point to a broader loss of community trust and confidence. Marvin Koury, a resident, said in the City Council meeting, “Looking back upon all of this, is we lose our identity. We forget how to trust each other, how to resolve our disputes, how to mediate between each other. That's been the biggest dividing factor of this whole thing.” (Gulfport City Council, 2012, April 17). Koury also spoke about trust in the Planning Commission meeting, saying: “We will never have a hundred percent plan. There is no way to do it. We will go to our grave looking for a hundred percent plan. We have to start somewhere. I think it's time we put our trust in our staff, the trust in the citizens.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).

Then-Mayor George Schloegel noted the effect the TEA Party had in the SmartCode modifications and ultimate failure of Planning efforts, saying,

It was a constant controversy, and when you get the controversy going and the media fanning the fire, the public runs in the other direction. It’s pretty hard to lead
them to place they don’t want to go… I think [City Councilmembers] were against it because they were standing for re-election [in 2013] and they’re going to listen to any negative talk because they’re afraid of their future election. And, so they take the easy way out and try to appease the nay-sayers and as a result, your progress is limited… The television and the newspaper, and some of [conservative] talk radio. They thrive on the negatives. You don’t hear anything about the number of planes that landed safely today, you only hear about the crashes and that’s exactly what comes up from the media and so the public is influenced by that and the public in turn communicates with that City Council members and you get a negative reaction. (2015, July 28).

Finding 8: Political conflicts over Planning and SmartCode weakening governance engagement, trust, and confidence between Gulfport’s Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and Director of Development.

Political conflicts between the Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and Director of Development were the most substantial challenges to governance, and these conflicts would eventually create an environment conducive to Plan implementation failure. Despite the relative Republican uniformity of City Government, small political battles hurt the implementation of Planning and SmartCode efforts by eroding community trust and confidence and weakening engagement between governance bodies. Multiple documents, meeting transcripts, and interview respondents point to the role of petty politics in the failure of implementing Post-Hurricane Katrina plans and SmartCode. Three episodes, in particular, describe the problems and challenges between the Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and Director of Urban Development. First, the resignation of Director of Development George Carbo. Second, the conflict between the Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission over appointments to the planning commission. Third, the conflict between the Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission concerning the resignation of Planning Commission Chair Steve Allen.
**Director of Development Resignation** – Mayor Ken ‘The General’ Combs hired George Carbo as the Director of Urban Development before the election of Mayor Brent Warr. The Warr Administration opted to keep Carbo in the transition at the recommendation of the outgoing administration. Following the Storm, Carbo provided support to the Mississippi Renewal Forum charrette but spent most of his time working on the day-to-day operations of getting the City of Gulfport functioning again. Immediately following Hurricane Katrina, there was an immense amount of pressure from the Casinos on the cities along the Gulf Coast to re-open. In Gulfport, the Copa Casino was pushing to reopen, and at the same time requesting to expand the area of land in which gaming was permissible after purchasing the property of the former-Grand Casino, which had opted not to reopen. Former Councilmember Brian Carriere recalls:

The Copa Casino owners purchased that property and then they come into rezone it for gambling. The state, after Katrina, changed the laws about what was considered dockside gaming … they allowed [gaming] to be shore adjacent. So, what is now called Island View Casino, the owners came forward requesting zoning because there was nothing that was zoned for gaming in the city, so they requested zoning of the property that used to be the Grand Casino in Gulfport, and it goes before the Planning Commission and it goes before the City Council. [George] Carbo is you doing his job as the city planner and the Director of Urban Development, and he's bringing it forward. But the Mayor was, as best I can interpret essentially trying to block it. Now, what he said he was trying to do is make sure that the gaming zoning was only specific to the one city block where the building rests instead of including the parking facility in the rest of the property that is included. The significance of that is that if the city had only zoned the structure and not the entire piece of property, it is very likely that the investors and lenders would not have qualified the loan or certified the loan, because when you're talking about six acres of gambling, your gaming versus two acres of gaming, that's a significant value difference in the property and they may not get loan to actually move it forward. (2016, March 8).
Carbo went before the City Council and detailed that it would be against zoning regulations to zone a building’s footprint for gaming, against the wishes of Mayor Warr. Carreire recalls, “Once [Carbo] was finally put on the spot, and of course in a public meeting, he tells the truth as you would hope a person would do. Well that was the beginning of end for him, the Mayor from that point forward is going to everything he can to make his life miserable.” (2016, March 8).

Carbo, also pointed to two other incidents in the lead up to this issue, accentuating the tension this instance created. First, Carbo noted that the Mayor’s office had held up “developments that should have been permitted,” including the Sienna Condominiums Tower project that should have had a permit ready the day before Hurricane Katrina. Carbo noted, “It took months for them to get their permit because after the charrette occurred the Mayor decided, ‘Well, if we were going to go towards design review we need to have them change the style of the balcony, the railings they are proposing.’ The Mayor threatened to fire me, the Director of Urban Development, or any employee who gave them that permit without his expressed approval. The city had no design review abilities for architectural features.” (2015, July 16). Second, conflict over the aesthetic appearance of a townhouse development near Courthouse Road in Mississippi City caused tension. Carbo recalls, “The Mayor decided he wanted to review the architectural style and have different colors on the different railings, possibly change the style of the balconies. And the person [applicant] was rather insistent that it met the code, the building code. They needed to get this development going. That person went before the [Gulfport] City Council to complain that the Mayor was holding up the permit when they met all the codes. And they asked City Council to put pressure on the Mayor. He later told that person, that architect who put forward the plans, that complaining to the City Council was like complaining to his sister. That it wasn't going to get him any further.” (2015, July 16).

However, it was the Copa Casino zoning incident that led to the Carbo resignation. Two weeks after the City Council hearing, Mayor Warr announced at a the March 29, 2006 City Council meeting that Carbo had taken a “sabbatical.” The Sun Herald’s Tracy Dash covered the story at the time, writing, “He (George) and the mayor have talked and they
agree some changes needed to be made and George decided to take a step back and let those changes be made,’ said Kelly Jakubik, Public Information Officer for the city.” (2006, March 30).

Less than three weeks later, an opening for the position of Director of Urban Development was advertised. Again, Dash reported on the story, writing “[Planning Commissioner Afton] Anderson said he is concerned about the state of the Department of Urban Development, adding that a director is ‘sorely and surely needed very quickly.’ The department has been inundated since Hurricane Katrina by residents wanting to rebuild. His concern was echoed by [City] Council President Barbara Nalley, who was out of town when the city announced Carbo’s ‘sabbatical.’” (2006, April 16).

When Jeff Bounds was hired as the Interim Director of Urban Development, part of his task was to restructure the Planning and Zoning Department. It was also clear to Bounds that Mayor Warr had several existing issues with the Planning and Zoning Department. Bounds says,

The conversation I had with the mayor had been very, very specific. And he had indicated very clearly, he was extremely unhappy with the zoning and planning office and the way that it was running, the way that it was getting things done, and the way that issues were constantly landing on his desk… I think a lot of it had to do with the way that the department was organized. Also, there was a constant friction between the building permits out of the department and the planning department and, you know, I almost can’t explain why that is because in general, they should or shouldn’t have that much to do with each other but it was a constant battle there. (2015, July 28).

**Appointments to the Planning Commission** – Appointments to the Planning Commission had been a consistent political football for the City of Gulfport, and the eventual loss of Planning Commissioners weakened the knowledge base of SmartCode needed for Plan implementation. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, many appointees were operating on expired terms. A letter from Rebecca Kremer, Mayor Combs Assistant, to the Deputy Council Clerk, Rhonda Washington, on March 22, 2005 notes six expired terms on
the Planning Commission (Sidney Rushing, Claudia Keyes, Bob Gavin, Elaine Adair, Keith Williams, Ralph Anderson) with another appointment expiring in June 2005 (Coach Lutille Stepney), three months from March 2005. However, no action on the appointments was taken, aside from the email being made a part of the meeting minutes (Gulfport City Council, 2005, April 5).

Mayor Warr came into office in July 2005, but only had a short time in his position before Hurricane Katrina; the City Council’s fifth meeting, on August 27, 2005, was to declare a preemptive State of Emergency before Hurricane Katrina’s landfall. After Hurricane Katrina, the Planning Commission had difficulty making quorum; only 9 meetings between Katrina’s landfall and the one year anniversary occurred and the average attendance at those meetings was 7.\textsuperscript{73} As it became apparent that the Planning Commission were needed to implement SmartCode, Mayor Warr began looking into filling the vacancies.

In June 2006 the Mayor attempted to appoint Mark Fabiano and Brian Billings. The following week, the City Council held a special meeting to rebuke Mayor Warr for seeking to appoint members to the Planning Commission without providing sufficient support in the form of a formal letter. The Minute Book reads, “Councilmember Nalley started the discussion with the Mayor on appointments to Boards and Commissions. Each [Council]member stressed their issues on how prior appointments were brought up for approval. The Mayor agreed when an appointment is submitted for approval, he would provide a brief history with his or her qualifications to hold that seat.” (Gulfport City Council, 2006, June 23). The following month, Billings was successfully appointed to the Board of Zoning Adjustments (Gulfport City Council, 2006, July 18).

Larry Jones, the permanent Director of Urban Development who replaced Bounds noted:

The Mayor was interested in getting people on the Planning Commission that were more forward thinking and that were interested in new ideas. And so we saw some

changing... There struggles with the Planning Commission because they were aligned with some of the City Council people, and they had the close [political] split, kind of like they did on the City Council. But as we got different people in there, we got people that were interested, at least, in looking at new ideas. (2016, March 7).

Former Councilmember Carriere also reflected on the changes to the Planning Commission, saying:

As the Mayor's term progressed, he found that he was getting more and more pushback from not just the Planning Commission, but the City Council and even citizens and even former supporters of his. He didn’t like that the Planning Commission did their job. They [the Planning Commission] knew what they were supposed to do, they knew the code, they knew if something was allowable or not, and they were reluctant to make exceptions. Well, if they didn’t vote the way that he wanted to on certain things, they basically became blacklisted and he would quickly try to push -- since their term was up, try to push them off of the Planning Commission. Most of them were and they were replaced with people that had no experience in city planning, people that had never served on a Planning Commission or any other similar type board. In many cases, the people that he nominated were not even -- they weren't developers, they weren’t builders, they didn’t know about planning; they knew about finances, they knew about education, but they didn’t know about City Planning and city codes. I think that was done intentionally, I think that he was of course expecting he was going to have a second term and that he would have a little bit better control or at least a more cooperative Planning Commission. Of course, it didn’t work out that way. The downside is instead you have -- at least when I left, over half of the planning commissioners were new and I think even more of them were replaced shortly after I left. So, you end up with less experience on a board that is although technically only advisory, it’s still important because it's the first step toward any special exception usage. (2016, March 8).
While Bounds comments provide context to understand why the transition of people off the Planning Commission, seen in the ad hoc Tenure Analysis, happened so quickly. The loss of 73 cumulative years of tenure on the Planning Commission over an 11-month time-span heavily impacted the experience available on the commission to deal with Planning and zoning issues.

**Resignation of Planning Commission Chair** – Planning Commission Chair Steve Allen, a member of the Planning Commission since May 1996, resigned suddenly in January 2008, upsetting the City Council. WLOX reporter Elise Roberts at the time writes,

There was also a resolution on the agenda for the chairman of the planning commission to maintain his seat. Steve Allen has served on the planning commission for the last 19 years. But without warning, he turned in his resignation.

‘He had learned that statements were made about the planning commission statements like, ‘We need a smarter more educated board,’” said Ward 7 Councilwoman Barbara Nalley. However, the mayor says rumors of tension between he and Mr. Allen are simply untrue. ‘There is no disconnect between he and I. I've never had an agreement or a disagreement,’ said Mayor Warr. The mayor mailed Mr. Allen a letter accepting his resignation, and that has some council members upset. ‘I'm disappointed that the leader of this city [Mayor Warr] accepted a letter of resignation from someone who served this city for 19 years without having a conversation with him to find out why he wants to leave. That's upsetting to me. I really thought you were a better leader than that,’ said councilman Brian Carriere. According to other members on the planning commission, Steve Allen wants to withdraw his resignation and continue serving until his term expires, next spring. (2008, January 29).

Planning Commission Chair Allen also created a small political storm by being present at the February 2008 meeting of the Planning Commission, after he had tendered his resignation, calling the recommendations of the Planning Commission. Former Councilman Carriere expanded on the causes of the resignation, saying:
It was really just a matter of old-school politics and of course Planning Commission members, they don't necessarily serve at the will and pleasure, but they do not have to be reappointed, there’s no time limit for them but they do not have to be reappointed. So, yeah, as soon as his term was up -- in fact Steve [Allen] may have resigned even before his term was up, he got so frustrated with it, but if that wasn't the case, that at least when his term was up, the Mayor just said I'm not going to reappoint and that was a big battle because he deserved it, he deserved to stay there and he wanted to stay and he wanted to help, the City Council wanted him but we couldn’t make him stay once he had had that rift with the Mayor, he just decided that wasn’t in his best interest personally to continue forward. (2016, March 8).


Interviews and Documents demonstrate Mayor Warr’s strong desire to implement the vision of the Mississippi Renewal Forum. Multiple respondents spoke to Mayor Warr's direct interest in the implementation of SmartCode. Former Director of Development George Carbo says, “Mayor bought into the concept of the design review, and the Architectural styles of New Urbanism and was trying to implement them.” (2015, July 16).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones says, “Brent wanted to do something, he was very interested in planning. And he wanted to do something that was unique, and take advantage of a bad situation, the hurricane, to sort of reshape the way the community looked… Mayor Warr saw this as a chance to sort of remake the community… And again, this was sort of Mayor Warr’s idea of doing master planning. You know he sees himself as sort of an amateur planner.” (2016, March 7).

Andrés Duany says, “Mayor Warr was fantastic. He led the charrette. He was creative. He was fantastic. We loved him. He was the best mayor. He was the example to everyone. I have the highest regard for him.” (2016, March 8). The Anonymous Consultant says, “Mayor Warr was an advocate for New Urbanism and SmartCode strategies.” (2016,

Even critics realized Mayor Warr’s desire to implement the ideas presented by the Renewal Forum; GulfCoastNews Keith Burton attributes the vision to Mayor Warr as ‘Warrtopia’ in his article “Warr’s vision needs glasses.” (2008, August 14).

This approach, however, created significant friction within the City of Gulfport, and this friction is also partially to blame for plan implementation failure Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds recalls, “And to put it into place, and the Mayor had tried - had a history at that point with the Planning Commission in the months before we even started the Smart Code work. Many members felt threatened by him... There were several planning commission members who believed it [SmartCode] was sort of a Trojan horse of the Mayor to either get more power or to take power away from the Planning Commission; or to manage to pull some kind of a rabbit out of the hat.” (2016, March 8).


Planning Administrator Greg Holmes believes the code had too many functional conflicts to survive implementation, saying,

The more we read into it; the more we actually lived with it and start working with it, we saw some of the the shortcomings... As we got further into it we realized that some of the things that were included in the SmartCode weren't compatible to how we operated and also to existing infrastructure. Its not easy to take a new code and put it on existing infrastructure. It, its not easy to try to apply something to an existing area that been around since the 1800's with existing infrastructure and a street grid. So we ran into trouble when we decided to apply some of these code regulations to areas that were already developed. You know, most codes have to be flexible just because most of the time the zoning ordinance is a living document. Its constant, you know, even flow and change. You got to be able to keep up with the
change in your community and as well as the same thing as stating your reason. Then some of the things in the SmartCode, the version we had, was just so rigid that is was difficult to be able to make those adjustments to keep up with the change in times. (2015, July 7).

Holmes echoed these sentiments the transcripts of the hearings where where SmartCode was incorporated into the existing 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance, saying, “I have different zoning districts all over the City that are maybe regulated slightly different. Right now, I've got five SmartCode zones that are all regulated differently.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23). On the Community Plans themselves, Holmes notes that, “Old Downtown, Mississippi City, and Handsboro have a number of problems that are unique to just those areas.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).

Functional mismatches between the SmartCode and the Comprehensive Code included alleyways, parking, split-zoned parcels, regulation differences between Fire Department, Engineering, and Public Works departments, and the notification processes tied to planning and zoning. Holmes notes that it, “nearly took us about six or seven years into this to realize: 'How can we fix this?' and then took steps to fix it. And now we're in the back end of making those adjustments and pretty much creating something new and different.” (2015, July 7).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones made similar observations saying, “it was difficult for staff, and particularly the Building Department of Planning and Development, to work with these projects going on under different ordinances. And in some cases they were in close proximity from one another. So it was very difficult.” (2016, March 7).

Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds, as the primary architect of SmartCode, also knew that there would be shortcomings, saying, “Let me be as clear as possible: the plan, the Smart Code plan itself, was by no means perfect… There were some things that were going to have to be modified, but they would need to be modified by somebody who understood the system, understood
what the problems were, and was sympathetic to it, rather than somebody who’s just purely trying to dismantle it.” He continues, “The fundamental problem was at the time that we wrote – the time I wrote the code, working with some other people in the city, and with some other consultants … we essentially put some of the design constraints, that you want in place, in the code and essentially removed some of these things from [Mayor Warr’s] desk. [We did it] so you can say ‘this is what the code says because. This is not an issue for the mayor. My hands are tied.’” (2015, July 27).

Transcripts from the City Council hearing tell a similar story. Speaking about the complexity of developing effective Community Plans, Councilperson Ella Holmes-Hines says, “You know, one of the things I found when I did a little research, there wasn’t any really good land use studies done. That was particularly true in Mississippi City and Handsboro. Nobody got out and walked the streets to see what was out there. You know, the last thing we wanted to do was put a new zone label on something and all of a sudden just put it out.” (Gulfport City Council, 2012, April 17). At one point in the meeting, Holmes-Hines asks Holmes, “Greg. We’ve heard a lot of objections and meetings, and then we heard a lot of buy-in. What would you say was the number one demise of SmartCode, $1 million later, meetings after meetings after meetings? This was really hard work right after the storm. What was the one thing that just put this thing on sour?” (Gulfport City Council, 2012, April 17).

Holmes responds, “Well, I’m going to give you an honest opinion that’s my opinion; not the City’s but Greg ‘The Planner’s’ opinion. You know, there’s only been one perfect book ever written, and that’s the Good Book [Bible].” Holmes points to his due process concerns, and the follows it up by saying, “Another thing was just that the [SmartCode] book was cumbersome. You know, the whole aim of [SmartCode] was to make this simple, for anybody to walk in the office and pick up another certificate. You know, we kept a lot of the really great concepts. I’m not going to sit here and bash SmartCode. There’s a lot of wonderful concepts in it. And I tried to keep as much of that as I could.” (Gulfport City Council, 2012, April 17).
However, some residents were skeptical of “dumping” SmartCode, even with its functional problems. Westside resident Rob Rettig, in the Planning Commission hearing, says, “They made a big point that the Westside plan works just fine. It is perhaps because it got a little more thought and a little more care. Why can't we work on fixing the existing community plans in Handsboro, Mississippi city, and Downtown? What this seems like to me, kind of, is trading your '54 Ford for a brand new fully tricked up Cadillac, and you take it right back because you can't find a handle to open the window. Then, the salesman shows you the button, and you just want the handle because that's what you are used to.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).

Another Westside resident, Charles Hutches, says, “I went to all the community meetings, too, and I didn't remember any big public outcry to do away with SmartCode.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).

Andrés Duany was also broadly skeptical of the rationale for changing SmartCode, saying, “I think they said probably, you know, these codes are too complicated. What they really meant was these codes are not allowing us to build the room for sprawl. The codes are loaded, I mean they were Form Based Codes that actually prevented suburban sprawl. It was about walkable compact urbanism. But the powerbrokers, local architects, and the good ole’ boys had it cut right across their practices. They said ‘This is too complicated! It can’t be administered! We are being imposed by outsiders! Blah, blah.’ What they really meant is I can’t build my CVS Drugstore, you know, straight from my computer program without even thinking, and charging for it. That’s really what it was, but that’s not how they represented it.” (2016, March 8).

Finding 11: Changes in elected and appointed leadership complicated governance and led to Planning failure.

Near constant turnover of City Staff and the Planning Commission between 2005 and 2009 also complicated the enforcement and governance, ultimately leading to Plan implementation failure. In June 2007, Sun Herald Reporter Ray LaFontaine wrote, “Larry Jones, the city's director of urban development, is the latest in a flurry of key officials to
walk away from City Hall. His resignation becomes effective later this month. Jones' departure after less than a year on the job, along with several other top-ranking officials who have left City Hall recently, has some Sound Off callers and Internet posters wondering whether Gulfport is coming apart at the seams.” (2007, June 14).

GulfCoastNews.com’s Keith Burton observed the same a year later, saying, “Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr, and its City Council were installed only seven weeks before Hurricane Katrina. Since then, a continuous series of events have shown the Warr administration and the City Council not up to the task of governing the city... Warr has been at war with his own Planning Commission. His administration has also been seeking to rewrite portions of the city’s zoning code and implementing Smart Code ordinances to work around the Planning Commission, which doesn’t see his vision so clearly. A council and mayor that promised when elected to get along, has fallen into complete disarray... Every community leader on the Coast is watching as Gulfport’s government seems to be falling apart. They worry about how these problems will affect their communities.” (2008, April 26).

The change in administrations also affected the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plans. Holmes says, “The reasons [the Comprehensive Plan’s aren’t available] it’s not there is just because basically when we changed administrations a few years ago and it was pushed to get it approved with the Planning Commission, but with new people being on the council it changes as far as, you know, to be honest, it changes is just politics.” (2015, July 7).

Others made the similar observations about the change in leadership and the effects on Plan implementation failure. Former Councilmember Brian Carriere also says, “Basically in around 2009 or 2010, the new City Council came in and essentially voided that plan and everything reset back to the old traditional zoning regulations... It’s pure politics. The new City Councilmember [Ward 5 Councilman Ricky Dombrowski] that represented the district owned a lot of property in that area at that time. He owned quite a bit of property in that community and he did not like the existing SmartCode, the guidelines that he had follow.” (2016, March 8).
An anonymous consultant also pointed to changes in leadership, saying, “I mean, there wasn't – there were, and I don't remember the sequence of activity, but we had received direction from several different directors out of the Planning Department about how to proceed. We had consistent leadership under the development of the [redacted] Community Plan. We went through several administrations, several changes in staff, several ideas about what should be in the plan, and how to conclude it. I think just the strong commitment – the cities commitment to take a more progressive approach to planning appears to have gone away.” (2015, March 14).

These qualitative observations reinforce the findings from Tenure Analysis; changes to the Planning Commission, turnover of City Council Members and Mayors all negatively affected the implementation of plans.

Finding 12: Conflicts of interest within Gulfport's government eroded internal support for Planning. Numerous and sizable conflicts of interest with the Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission were present throughout the implementation and failure of SmartCode. Former Councilmember Brian Carreire put it wryly, saying, “Yeah, a lot of conflict of interest. That is kind of commonplace around here. We get used to seeing it.” (2016, March 14).

Concerning Mayor Warr, Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds relays one instance where there was a Conflict of Interest over property his father owned, and one that had caused conflict and suspicion between citizens, as Bounds recounts:

Mayor's Warr’s father, Gene Warr, who owns a parcel at the intersection of Teagarden and [U.S. Highway] 90 had a shopping center there. I think he'd bought a shopping center there that dated from the 1950’s, probably when he moved here in the 60’s… and he wanted to rebuild, and so he had a grant and saw that he got, you know, a really great architect to lay out a plan for it. But [Mayor] Brent’s [Warr] dad is sort of old school, and he wasn't sold on it. He said it was very, very pretty building… Well, Brent's dad was not sold on the idea largely because he's an old school guy. So [Mayor] Brent’s [Warr] dad [Gene Warr] said, you know, ‘if the
people driving by on the highway can't see that there's a full parking lot, then nobody will come shop there, because that's how people decide where they want to shop' A parking lot that's easy to get to, and that has lots of cars in it is what sells retail anywhere, everybody knows that.’

I remember Mister [Gene] Warr explaining this to me. I try to explain as nicely as possible that – and I think actually that this conversation happened during the Mississippi City Community Planning Charrette. Mister [Gene] Warr came in, and this is when we had this conversation. And he told me, well, he would think about it. He was skeptical.

Anyway, the plan was approved. After the plan was approved, [Mayor] Brent [Warr] called me into his office, he said, ‘Well, you know, my dad's not convinced, and he decided that he really doesn't like the idea, and so he's going to exercise the option and he's going to build the parking lot in front of the building just like it was before.’ And I said, ‘But Brent, that's not an option anymore. The area, they adopted the Community Plan, so that option is not there.’

[Mayor] Brent [Warr] was furious, and this was after we'd had this conversation a million times. He was angry about it and I'm sure his dad was angry too. At any rate that was the point where suddenly the Mayor's office stopped talking to me about any kind of training or anything else. (2015, July 28).

Concerning the City Council, Councilmember Ricky Dombrowski, who voted to repeal SmartCode, was openly against SmartCode prior to the meeting, despite the fact that he stood to benefit from changes to SmartCode. Sun Herald Reporter Anita Lee writes, before the vote:

Dombrowski said SmartCode does not work in east Gulfport, which includes his ward. Dombrowski, the owner of Skeeter’s Restaurant on Tegarden Road [in Mississippi City], is building a new restaurant next door to be called The Tegarden. He said SmartCode would not have allowed him to have parking in front of his business, instead restricting it to the side and back. Many of his constituents
complained about the restrictions in SmartCode, too, he said. SmartCode encourages rear access to properties and on-street parking, but Dombrowski said that is not practical in many areas. ‘We’ve lost potential development because of SmartCode,’ he said while he took a break from ceiling installation at The Tegarden, a steak and seafood restaurant that should open in April. ‘(Rescinding SmartCode has) helped me, too, because I’ll be able to throw in another 15 parking spots here.’ Dombrowski said he did not attend the Planning Commission meeting about SmartCode, but plans to vote against it as a council member. (2012, February 29).

Concerning the Planning Commission, Bounds and Carriere pointed to sizable Conflicts of Interest within the Planning Commission. Bounds and Carriere point to Claudia Keyes, Jacque Pechu as having conflicts of interest. Carriere, but not Bounds, also points to Planning Commission Chair Keith Williams as having a conflict of interest. In Keyes case, she was a realtor. Carriere says, “Claudia had big conflict, but that didn't stop her from participating. It didn't necessarily mean that she profited from anything, but she may have been in a position to block things that she should not have.” (2016, March 8).

Bounds added by saying, “I think she was very, very well intended but my feeling was that, you know, maybe inappropriate for somebody who’s business is focused on the business of the Planning Commission to be on the Planning Commission.” (2015, July 27).

In Pechu’s case, Carriere notes, “He is a developer himself, he's a contractor as well and his wife [Councilmember Cara Lero Pucheu, elected in 2009] serves on the City Council. Both of them have huge conflicts of interest of things that have voted on.” (2016, March 8). Concerning Planning Commission Chair Williams, he was an executive for Hancock Bank at the same time Former Hancock Bank CEO George Schloegel was Mayor of Gulfport. Williams, as Planning Commission Chair, voted to recommend changes to SmartCode. Noting the coincidence, Carriere noted, “I wouldn’t call it coincidence, but you’re being nice.” (2016, March 8).
Finding 13: Gulfport's Planning Department lacked capacity to engage and utilize Plans.

The most significant finding in understanding how experience affected the failure of Plan implementation efforts is that the City of Gulfport’s Planning Department lacked the capacity to effectively enforce SmartCode. Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds notes, “I suppose [SmartCode was] a little bit confusing, but also partly because the employees themselves were from different backgrounds and, you know, not particularly well trained, you know. Generally not, for the most part, most of the employees who were planning department aren’t planners. There were a couple of trained planners, but not many. A lot of the people who do this sort of regular routine work that has to be done in the department are essentially, they’re trained to the existing statute and they basically, were more opposed to change of any kind because they thought as far as stressing their jobs.” (2015, July 27).

Bounds also painted a portrait of the time he was the Interim Director of Development, saying:

I went to work for the city, and for probably about three or four months. About all that I did was manage the department, or attempt to manage the department. It was a little bit of a trying to manage, like trying to manage an open fire [hydrant] plug because part of the problem was probably 80 percent of the property owners in the city of Gulfport ended up having to do repair work after the storm or complete rebuilding. The department was really just completely overrun with people applying for building permits. People were working and the city was, I think, paying overtime and having people, its existing staff, working as much as they could. Honestly, they didn't initially add a lot of staff, so it was really, really difficult for the department to keep up. Of course there were lots of people who were crabby, and they were complaining about delays. It's like you have the same staff that you have under normal circumstances, you really can't expect much more. At any point, the State [of Mississippi] eventually came through with some funding for temporary workers. They were able to supplement in the building permits office. They added a
large number of temporary workers to work essentially as desk workers, as counter workers, to sort of help things through. I met and worked with a lot of very, very dedicated people who worked for the city for most of their lives, and, you know, to be honest I remember thinking I have no idea why they do this because they seem to get an awful lot of abuse, the pay wasn't that good, the benefits were frankly terrible. They had a really hard time keeping even their temporary workers because the casinos would, if anybody was any good, the casinos seemed to swoop in and make much better offers, with better everything. (2015, July 27).

Chad Emerson says, “The more complex ones [or, zoning codes] were the ones that required the municipal manpower and Gulfport was one of the most complex ones. I think it was overly complex and could have been implemented in stages.” Emerson points to the “lack of staffing” and the “chaotic post-Katrina aftermath.” In addition Emerson says that he recalls working with Planning Department employees, “who wanted to soak in as much of the knowledge, including the implementation and just logistics,” but he didn’t recall spending a lot of time educating them on those facets of implementation (2016, March 7).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones pointed to the lack of Planning Department capacity as well, saying that the Planning Department received a lot of pushback from Developers, “It was just starting to be implemented and there were problems with developers sort of interpreting it, staff was not very familiar with it… It was just hard for the staff to sort of work and educate individual landowners as well as developers. So right after that we had sort of problems with that.” Jones also point to problems the Planning Department had concerning transportation, saying, “the biggest challenge was that George [Carbo, Former Director of Development] was actually the director when the storm hit. And they had failed to protect any of their vehicles, so we lost all the vehicles for code enforcement, planning and building divisions, and no vehicles. So we had no ability to get out the field. We had like one car for, or one vehicle for everybody… [Because of all the building permits taken out after Katrina] FEMA was coming to us and saying, ‘Hey this project’s not being elevated.’ And I said, ‘Well, you know, we handed out the building permit right after the storm.’ They said, ‘Well, you
should have been elevated. You should look to the site.’ We had no way to get to any sites. You know, we didn't have any transportation. And that was a problem for a long time.” (2016, March 7)

The anonymous consultant noted, “Another criticism was that they required, - the administration of those documents, the allocation and the administration of those documents, require a pretty sophisticated development community and a pretty sophisticated planning department to apply and administer the code provisions. And there's - it could have gone different ways. I think there was a choice made to create a fairly complex version of SmartCode [in Gulfport] and apply it in different parts of the city. I'm not sure that that was really appropriate.” (2016, March 14).

The anonymous consultant also argues that the Planning Department didn’t fully understand the linkages SmartCode required between plan recommendations, capital programming, and State and Federal regulations. “They were not - really not cared for by Staff or understood by Staff as far as I'm aware.” The consultant goes on to say, “I think there's definitely folks like Greg [Holmes] who were not a fan of SmartCode or New Urbanism since the beginning. He was really an advocate for a more conventional approach to planning and development regulation. So, I think he played along in the beginning. We had a Mayor that wanted it to happen, and then [after Mayor Warr left] he kind of went back to doing things the old way, just because. I think [Former Director of Development] Larry [Jones] was in the same boat.” (2016, March 14).

Planning Commissioner Marv Cracchiolo-Spain, in the hearing to make modifications to SmartCode alludes to the lack-of-support within, saying, “I know that there were some challenges with the other [SmartCode] plans, and I knew one of the things you [Greg Holmes] talked about was merely using this opportunity to learn from the experience. And I understand in terms of [SmartCode] enforcement and understanding from the staff, consistency is good.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).
Finding 14: Gulfport's City Council and Planning Commission lacked capacity to engage and utilize Plans.

Because the Planning Department lacked capacity, or potentially desire, to learn and implement the SmartCode and community planning, they also lacked the capacity to teach the City Council and Planning Commission about the same, ultimately leading to Plan implementation failure. In the Planning Commission hearing where the Commissioners are discussing changes to the SmartCode Framework, Chair Keith Williams says to Planning Administrator Greg Holmes, “Greg, let me mention a few things. When we first started looking at the SmartCode, trying to understand SmartCode – and I would agree taking the staff out because I know that y'all have studied it and maybe one or two folks in the audience that I know, know SmartCode. But the majority of us don't totally understand SmartCode, and, whenever something comes up, we've got to go really look into it.” (2012, February 23).

Planning Commissioner Virginia Adolph also alluded to a “secret book” to help educate the Planning Staff and Planning Commission, saying, “Greg, you know, in those community meetings, I often referenced that secret book that you had under the desk that you wanted to do the overlay, and you have talked about that for a very long time. I want to commend you publicly and the staff for the diligence over the years that as comments were needed and changes.” (2012, February 23).

Interview respondents expanded on these statements. Former Director of Development Larry Jones was blunt in his description of the Planning Commission and City Council's knowledge, saying,

The Planning Commission didn't understand it. The City Council didn't understand it. And I'll be really frank with you, I think some of them approved it without reading it. And just based on the fact, this is what the Mayor wanted to do, is what Staff recommended, which I think is never a good idea.” Jones continues, “My concern was the staff, the planning commission, and the City Council struggling with the implementation because they really didn't understand it [SmartCode], and that was my thought. But again, you know, we weren't policy makers. The policy
makers are the elected officials. So we did the best we could to implement it based on the policy that they sent us. (2016, March 7).

Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds was responsible for educating the Planning Commission. He recalls,

When I initially went to the Planning Commission there were largely older people. It was mostly older men when I first started. The planning commission … process had been broken down because the Planning Commission had taken a really long time to go through the code because the code, SmartCode, was very, very different from standard zoning code. Without somebody to explain it to you, very hard [to understand]. So I started working with the Planning Commission, and again, it took probably three or four months before they began to trust me… Over a few years, basically, we developed this fantastic relationship. I think otherwise, because if it had just been Gulfport, [the adoption of SmartCode] that wouldn't happen. (2015, June 28).

Bounds also pointed to ‘Coach’ Lutille Stepney’s limited understanding, saying “[reading through] SmartCode was more than he was really up for. To go through basically the mass of documents, and all this, and do all the other things in life [after Hurricane Katrina] he had to do. I just felt like it was, it was a lot.” (2015, June 27).

Andrés Duany offered a slightly different perspective on why capacity was lacking, saying,

This is what I noticed in retrospect; even though the elected officials were participating, their lives too had been destroyed and really they weren’t concentrating. So even though they put up a really good show, I happened to notice some of them were living in sewer plants and so forth. They were in shock. Literally posttraumatic stress. So you are working with you people, directly with people, with decision makers, who are not all there. That is number one; you have to realize that that’s a mistake to do that. (2008, March 8).

In addition to the Planning Department, Planning Commission, and City Council not having the capacity to enforce SmartCode, stakeholders within Gulfport’s Government did not want SmartCode to be a regulatory, or mandatory, framework, which led to Plan implementation failure. This was most clear when Mayor Warr articulated that he wanted SmartCode to be ‘optional.’ The Planning Commission bought into this idea, and recommended its adoption as an ‘optional’ overlay. The City Council, however, went counter to this approach, and adopted the SmartCode Framework as mandatory for areas with Community Plans. However, the most of the City Council believed that SmartCode was more of an architectural standards program, and less of a development control.

Former Director of Development Larry Jones said the decision by the Mayor to make SmartCode ‘optional’ was in response to concerns from the development community, saying, “I think that that came out of the political process. Those that didn't understand thought that if it was optional, their constituents, meaning their builders or their residential constituents, could just opt out.” But Jones was non-committal on if Warr developed the ideas on his own, saying, “I don't remember who it came from. But the political compromise was we’ll make an optional, so if you have a problem with it, you opt out. And if you want to do it, then do it.” (2016, March 7).

Former Interim Director of Urban Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds echoed similar points, saying,

“The Mayor kept, after repeatedly explaining over and over again, … coming back and saying, ‘Well, it's optional, so even if we adopt the SmartCode, even if every neighborhood – even if Mississippi City adopts the SmartCode,’ which they all did, ‘Mississippi City adopts the SmartCode and my father who owns property there decides that he wants to build, you know, a standard 1960’s shopping center with a parking strip in front of it, on the beach, with the parking lot facing the beach, in front of the building, well it's optional, so he can do that if he wants to.’ …
Anyway, yeah, it should be very clear to anybody who thinks about it, that's totally unworkable. That's not zoning, that's anarchy.” (2015, July 28).

Bounds expands on this by recalling an interaction between Mayor Warr and Andrés Duany during the DPZ Charrette, saying.

“It came to Andrés’ attention that that the Mayor believed [SmartCode could be optional], and I [Bounds] got called in by both Sandy and by Andrés, and they were saying, ‘What the hell have you been telling these people? They think that once you adopt the code, you can pick and choose what you want.’ I explained to them that I had explained to the Mayor until I was blue in the face… So Andrés gives basically an hour long presentation, I think, at that [January 2008 DPZ] charrette. He explained very, very clearly exactly what optionality meant and also what it didn't mean. That was a point that started a schism between him [Duany] and the Mayor. (Bounds, 2015, July 28).

Warr also emphasized the role of SmartCode in controlling Architectural Design Review, muddling the intent of SmartCode. The Sun Herald’s Ray LaFontaine reported that Leaders [were] confused about zoning, writing, “Warr said Friday he plans to recommend pulling specific architectural standards from SmartCode and installing them into the city's traditional zoning to at least promote architectural harmony citywide. ‘I think we all have to sit down as a group and talk about it and it probably even warrants some more public hearings,’ Warr said.” (2008, February 23).

Finding 16: Planning and SmartCode consultants, hired by the City of Gulfport, became viewed as unwanted “Carpetbaggers.”

The Southern Colloquialism of Carpetbagger refers to people that come into a community to take advantage of a particular political situation or crisis. In this case, many of the Planners associated with redevelopment and development efforts became viewed as outsiders, and this perspective contributed to Plan implementation failure. At the outset of the Mississippi Renewal Forum in 2005, Andrés Duany said that CNU should, “Differentiate ourselves from the carpetbaggers who will soon disgrace themselves.”
Langdon (2005 p. 5, October). In the Planning Commission meeting to vacate SmartCode Community Plans, Planner Greg Holmes brought the point full circle. Holmes pointed to the consultants the city had hired as a part of the problem, saying, “I think some of the problems we had, when some of the consultants came. Everything was quick, fast, and in a hurry. Dropped it off at my desk. Gone. Never see you again. I’ll call you back. It’s two-hundred dollars an hour.” (2012, February 23).

Laurie Toups, Director of Mississippi Main Street, noted the distaste for the word ‘charrette’ in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, saying,

There were so many people out trying to do things all at one time that people were going to cities and offering to do ‘charrettes’, which ended up leaving a bad taste in people’s mouths… There was, or nine years ago, there was an objection to do it because the overuse of it… And we had a lot of that, not only were we all trying to rebuild, but then were inundated with people coming down, going well ‘we need to do this study, just give us fifty thousand dollars, and we’ll make it happen,’ you know. I can for sure say it has heightened our awareness, and when we look at who is going to come in and work with us on a consulting basis or to help us do studies, we research them very carefully [now]. (2015, July 27).

Former Mayor George Schloegel also pointed to outside consultants as part of the problem, saying, “The people who made plans for the rebuilding of coast, that were commissioned by FEMA, anticipated an influx of new residents … we’re going to have a long term problem, because the population did not come back like the master planners predicted it would.” (2017, July 28).

Chad Emerson was also aware of the perception towards outsiders, saying,

Yeah, I think some politicians pushed back because, you know, who are these people coming in to provide some advice when they’re not from here. There were some of the members of the team that were from there. I was fortunate and so were most of the consultants that weren’t based in the Gulf Coast. We got to go home to where we were from in between our trips and conference calls, whereas for them it was a really daily grind, so just to get back to new normal… It was like, let’s help
these people through this terrible tragedy, develop in such a way that hopefully they will standout a generation from now. As this was taking a bad, bad situation and realizing a good result. That was in hindsight noble, it was caring, it was loving and it was bit naive.” (2016, March 7).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones also notes, “There was always – there were concerns because they [consultants] were coming from out of the area, and then long after they're gone, we're still there. Maybe not individually, but we're there as an institution.” (2016, March 7).

Duany points at Federal Government officials as instilling the misconception, saying, “Washington people are even more incompetent than the Mayor in crisis. They are just, you know, it’s unbelievable. But especially people who are not of the culture.” (2016, March 8).

Expectations and Plan Failure

The second set of findings examines the role expectations play in the failed implementation of Plans. Pulling apart the expectations of redevelopment, or recovery, development, and time reveals the complex role expectations play in Plan implementation. Expectation refers, broadly, to the expectations of Gulfport’s internal and external stakeholders. Internal stakeholders are the local citizens, elected and appointed leaders, city staff, and internal consultants. External stakeholders are the regional, state, and national citizens (including visitors and tourists), external consultants, state and Federal leaders and staffs involved with the City of Gulfport. Expectations set by both of these groups, and subsets of these groups, have impacts on implementation.

Redevelopment expectations are stakeholder expectations that speak directly to the restoration and immediate-to-intermediate recovery. Examples of this would be the replacement, but non-update or expansion of particular attractions, infrastructure, structures, etc. In other words, redevelopment expectations are expectations on the replacement of the physical built environment. Development expectations are the stakeholder expectations that seek to expand or newly build aspects of the physical built
environment. Examples of this would be newly constructed or expanded buildings, infrastructure, attractions, etc.

The second set of seven findings are grouped into the aforementioned three categories of Redevelopment Expectations, Development Expectations, and Time Expectations, reflective of their relative, but not absolute, importance and relationships. The first three findings (Findings 1-9) explore Redevelopment Expectations. The second three findings (20-22) explore Development Expectations. The following finding (23) explores Time Expectations.

**Finding 17: “Therapeutic” ‘Better Than Before’ visions promoted during the Mississippi Renewal Forum drove “utopian” redevelopment and development expectations.**

Mississippi Renewal Forum leader Andrés Duany noted the tenor of the forum, saying,

… when we [Congress for New Urbanism] were there [for the Mississippi Renewal Forum] the local elected officials, the people from Washington [D.C], and the people from the Governor['s Office], and the Mayors always made very, very therapeutic lectures. They always preceded us. We [the New Urbanists] were embedded in a political system that was extra ordinarily therapeutic; and that was ‘We’re coming back better than ever!’ [At the time I felt] This is exactly what is necessary to do at that moment because otherwise there is despair.” Duany linked these “therapeutic lectures” to the plans created by the Mississippi Renewal Forum, saying “It was the [State and Local] leaders setting expectation before the forum. We actually acted within the expectations of the political leaders, which was the promise of Utopia. (2016, March 8).

The Sun Herald Pulitzer Prize Winning Editorial, “Plans on the Table,” further articulates the optimism at the end of the Mississippi Rewnewal Forum, saying,

Duany urged those in the room to raise their expectations. Every chain outlet has better and worse models, he said, and South Mississippi should not settle for less.
‘Here what you’re getting is the low-end Wal-Mart. And the reason is that they think you will expect it,’ said Duany. ‘If you have the mentality that your city is a beggar, that you’re grateful for the jobs and the tax base, they will give you the low-end model,’ he said. ‘But if you say, we’re too good for that, if you demand that you get the high-end model, then you will get that.’ The plans that are being shown to local people are simply possibilities for the rebuilding. Coast cities may or may not adopt the plans, even though the designs fit together as a coherent package.” (2005, October 22).

The following day, the Sun Herald’s Geoff Pender commented in his article, ‘Gulfport: It's OK to dream of doing it right,’ on the role of the Mississippi Renewal Forum at reestablishing stability in an unstable time, saying,

It's not rocket science. It's not going to happen overnight, but it's not something other areas haven't pulled off. It's not as scary as some property owners have thought land-use plans were in the past. It's about letting our leaders and planners lead and plan. D'Iberville Mayor Rusty Quave said: ‘I think this planning process has been one of the greatest things to ever happen in the history of this Gulf Coast.’

… As I walked through the halls at the Isle of Capri last week, I saw numerous Coast leaders and urban-planner types - folks I've known for years. Beatific smiles had replaced their Katrina grimaces; they had faraway, dreamy looks in their eyes. I could have sworn a couple were drooling a little… It's an effort to take the lemons Katrina handed us and make lemonade. And if only 4 percent of the ideas brought to the table make it to fruition, South Mississippi will improve by quantum leaps. (2005, October 23).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones, who did not participate in the Mississippi Renewal Forum saw the effects it had on the redevelopment expectations which impacted Plan implementation following Hurricane Katrina, saying, “Well I think they [the Mississippi Renewal Forum Charrette Book for Gulfport and HDR SmartCode Charrette Book] did serve us very high expectations. And then Mayor Warr continued to see how this is an opportunity to basically remake the community.” (2016, March 7).
However, these “Utopian” ideas were useful for some elected leaders, including former Councilmember Brian Carriere. Carriere articulates how the Mississippi Renewal Forum expanded his understanding of planning, saying,

Participating in the Mississippi Renewal Forum really started getting me or pushing me and then plenty of others to think differently. In our communities, here on coastline at least in the decade or two leading up to Hurricane Katrina, everything had been more of a reactive nature. Cities were not nearly as proactive in enticing businesses, enticing development, it was really just a reaction to whoever decided to come in and try to do something. So there weren’t really a lot of incentives that existed. (2016, March 8).

**Finding 18: Stakeholder expectations of Federal funding were a “distorting prism” that inflated Mississippi Renewal Forum redevelopment and development expectations.**

Feeding the “Utopian Visions” described by Mississippi Renewal Forum leader Andrés Duany was the near universal expectation of an “unlimited checkbook” from the U.S. Federal Government. Duany called this expectation the “distorting prism” by which all decisions and Plan implementation failures in the Mississippi Renewal Forum process can be viewed, saying,

Nobody has ever had eight billion dollars; none of the planners have ever confronted eight billion dollars; the people who were working in Mississippi were too inexperienced. Planners, they usually push back when people have infinite wishlists. One of the things we do is say ‘no, no that can’t happen;’ ‘You can’t just move the high school;’ ‘You can’t just, you know, rebuild;’ you know, change the location of the sewer plant. ‘You can’t just sort of build all these affordable housing you want.’ You [Planners] know how to push back, but the dual phenomenon of the Elected Officials making highly therapeutic promises and these billion dollars created what we thought was a utopian project. (2016, March 8).
Document analysis reveals the same finding; Tracy Dash of the Sun Herald reported on the first ‘Tent Meeting’ of the Governors Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal, writing,

Warr said the Governor's Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding and Renewal, better known as the Renaissance Commission, is made up of a diverse group of people who will facilitate the rebuilding of South Mississippi by creating a plan. The plan will help local leaders make decisions about the Coast's future. ‘We will have billions of dollars to rebuild and we'll use that money wisely,’ Warr said. (Dash, 2005, September 21).

In one notorious example of the “distorting prism” effect, coastal leaders pushed Mississippi Renewal Forum planners to incorporate the east-to-west corridor, along the CSX Railroad tracks, into the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plans. At the time it was proposed, The Sun Herald’s Anita Lee reported on the reception the proposal received, writing, “Almost half the audience stood to applaud Barksdale and fellow commission members [Mississippi Development Authority’s] Anthony Topazi and [Future Gulfport Mayor] George Schloegel, who said he hopes the dream of an east-west corridor along the railroad can finally be realized. Schloegel said talks are under way with CSX Transportation about rerouting trains rather than relocating the railroad.” (2005, November 17).

However, when state and local leaders requested funds from the Federal Government, the project quickly drew the ire of conservative Political Action Committee (PAC), Americans for Prosperity which derided the road, saying:

The ‘Railroad to Nowhere’ is what budget watchdogs have nicknamed a $700 million earmark in pending Senate ‘emergency’ spending legislation that would be used to rip up a fully functioning railroad that was rebuilt (at a cost of nearly $300 million) after Hurricane Katrina destroyed it last year. A functioning four-lane highway that runs along the Coast would be moved a few blocks north to where the railroad now exists. A pedestrian-friendly ‘scenic beach boulevard’ would be built where the four-lane highway now exists. In a nutshell, we don't see this project as
an ‘emergency’ that should be funded by federal taxpayers in a must-pass emergency spending bill. The emergency spending bill is only supposed to pay for vital military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and for urgent post-Katrina relief efforts. It's not supposed to pay for local economic development projects like this one, which has been on local officials' wish lists for decades. (Americans For Prosperity, 2006).

Former Interim Director of Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds pointed to a long lineage of Gulfport, and the wider Mississippi Gulf Coast Region and State of Mississippi attitudes towards Federal Funding, saying, “And there's – that general attitude, I think, is sort of pervasive. It's ‘free’ money, so it's like Monopoly money. It doesn't count in the minds of a lot of people.” He expands on these ideas further saying, “The problem is those were not local dollars. Those were largely Federal dollars… So part of the issue is that the city plays a very fast and loose with federal and state money.” (2015, July 28).

Former Mayor George Schloegel also acknowledged the role Federal Funding had in distorting priorities, saying, “do think that we overbuilt in some cases, with some of the infrastructure, because of the money that we had that came from FEMA for rebuilding. Some of our structures that were rebuilt like City Halls and Fire Stations and community centers and so forth, they have been overbuilt somewhat, but the [Harrison] County will eventually improve enough that those will be proven to be prudent for the long haul, even though the operating cost on the short-term can make you have some questions.” (2015, July 28).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones pointed to the initiation of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan as subject to the same “distorting prism” saying, “You know as I recall that money [for the 2010 Comprehensive Plan] was Federal [Community Block Development Grant] money that paid for that. So I think it was looked at as an opportunity to do something that you couldn't normally afford… So I think it was an opportunity to do some master planning with someone else paying for it.” (2016, March 7).
Finding 19: Gulfport's internal stakeholders incorrectly equated post-Katrina building permits as fulfilling redevelopment expectations.

Another challenge for the City of Gulfport was equating Building Permits to measurable growth, even though the City of Gulfport lost 5% of its population between 2000 and 2010, and 2% between 2000 and 2014.74 Despite this, Mayor Warr pointed specifically to building permits as a measure of growth on several occasions; when those expectations turned out to be misguided, there was less faith in the City to recognize growth. As both a symptom and effect on implementation, it’s role had an effect on implementation’s failure. In 2006, The Sun Herald’s Tracy Dash reported, “Mayor Brent Warr on Wednesday dismissed insinuations that rebuilding in his city after Hurricane Katrina is sluggish. He told a group of Coast Chamber of Commerce members Gulfport is coming back strong and boasted of the 16,931 building permits issued since the storm. He said the city's permit office has been overwhelmed by the number of people wanting to repair or rebuild homes or businesses.” (Dash, 2006, March 16).

Mayor Warr’s belief in the city’s growth likely had to do with their liberal permitting policies. In another instance of Mayor Warr using building permits as a measure, he is quoted as saying to the Mississippi Business Journal,

The City of Gulfport is growing. That’s in spite of population loss in some areas of the city and in Harrison County that is attributed to Hurricane Katrina. Before the 2005 storm, the city had a population of 75,000; making it the state’s second-largest city. Mayor Brent Warr now estimates the population at close to 80,000, based on the 13% increase in customers for services provided by the city. Geographically, Gulfport covers 70 square miles. ‘We have thousands of applications for new residential construction in the city’s permitting queue,’ he said. ‘There’s construction all over the city, but more in the areas north of Interstate 10. There’s

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also a big area of growth between Pass Road and I-10.’ (Lofton, 2007, November 5).

Former Director of Development Larry Jones also used building permits as an indicator of success, saying, ‘‘Mayor Warr’s leadership has fostered a post-storm economic boom in Gulfport, which resulted in 22,000 building permits being issued in 2006,’ Jones said. ‘The adoption of Smart Code by the mayor and City Council will provide a flexible template to guide future development in Gulfport.’” (LaFontaine, 2007, June 14). Despite Warr and Jones’ observation and analysis, both would wind up being incorrect.

In addition to the mistakes made using building permits as a method to measure population growth, immediately after the storm many residents and businesses were upset over the fees the City of Gulfport was charging for Building Permits. Residents were also increasingly upset about the long lines at the Permit Office. To resolve these issues, the City of Gulfport first secured a grant to hire six additional staff for the Building Permitting Department. (Dash, 2006, March 16). Following the addition of staff members, fees for permits were the next complaint; WLOX’s Steve Phillips reported at the time, “It's a case of adding insult to injury. The Rylands say it's bad enough Katrina wiped out the family home. Now, they're facing permit fees of more than $3,000 to rebuild.” (2006, May 30).

Shortly after the matter came to the attention of City Council, WLOX’s Toni Miles reported that the City of Gulfport lowered fees to a $100 flat fee, reporting, “At the first of the year, the city's [of Gulfports] home building permit fees were the most expensive on the coast. But Tuesday evening, the City Council voted to reduce fees for rebuilding in Gulfport. ‘We want to come home. It's an impossible situation with the fees that are that high,’ said Gulfport resident Joanne Edwards. Edwards told the Gulfport City Council she's eager to rebuild her home on 2nd Street. But she said she couldn't shell out the thousands of dollars the city was charging her for a building permit. Edwards urged the council to reduce city's fees for rebuilding... The City Council cleared the way for Edwards and many others to rebuild, voting unanimously in favor of a $100 flat fee for plan reviews for new home building permits.” (2006, June 6). In addition, the City of Gulfport grandfather-refunded those who paid building permit fees after Hurricane Katrina (Scallan, 2006, June 7).
However, the $100 flat fee wasn’t low enough according to Mayor Warr. Two months later the City Council voted unanimously to remove the permit fee altogether, with WLOX reporting, “Upon the Mayor's urging, the City did a market comparison with other City's in the region of similar size, and we immediately realized that our fees were too high,” Larry Jones, Director of Urban Development said. ‘With this reduction, Gulfport will be right in line with the average building permit fee in South Mississippi.’” (N. A., 2006, August 9).

Free permits, and the pressure to redevelop quickly, combined with transition from the 1972 Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance to SmartCode and the intention to redevelop using Smart Growth ideas put the Planning Department in a binding position, according to Jones. He says,

Because of what Mayor Warr wanted to do after the storm, people came in with a building permit. As I recall, I don't even think we charged them, not very much. He wanted people to be able rebuild. So we just handed out building permits, initially to anybody and everybody. So we had all these projects, residential and commercial, going on under traditional zoning. And now we had this new [SmartCode] ordinance and we have projects going on under the new ordinance… And all of sudden everybody’s running around with these building permits… [Mayor Warr] wanted to get the community back going to again. Those became a problem as we went on because these people had these grandfather building permits out there. (2016, March 7).

Even after the changes to SmartCode, the idea that Building Permits were tied to real growth was still pervasive in the City of Gulfport. Commenting on if the changes to SmartCode in 2012 had an impact on growth, Planning Administrator Greg Holmes noted, “[Zoning] Its easily explained. Its very user friendly. Just based upon exiting permit numbers you see the difference in growth.” (2015, July 7).
Finding 20: Optimistic population projections drove unrealistic development and redevelopment expectations.

Expectations regarding building permits also played to the overly optimistic population projections that have guided the coast’s development for decades, and their role in Plan implementation failure is notable. Going back to the 1972 Governors’ Emergency Commission Plan, following Hurricane Camille, population projections have grossly over-predicted population growth for not just Gulfport, but the entire Mississippi Gulf Coast. In 1972, the plan estimated that by 1990 the Mississippi Gulf Coast’s population would be between 512,000 and 612,000; in the 1990 Census the three coastal counties had a population of 459,000; between 10 and 25% below projections. For Gulfport, which had a 1970 Census population of 40,791, the same plan predicted that there would be 90,000 or 100,000 residents of Gulfport by 1990. In 1990, the actual population was 40,775, which is less than the Population of 1970. Part of the reason the population declined is that many residents moved outside of Gulfport’s boundaries and into Harrison County. This prompted the annexation of Orange Grove to the north, in early 1990’s which added approximately 35,000 residents to the city for the 2000 Census.

Population estimates present in the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, 2010/2013 Comprehensive Plans are similarly optimistic. The 2004 plan predicts, “The population projection presented envisions Gulfport’s number of inhabitants increasing from 71,127 in 2000 to 107,817 in 2025; Its realization would see the City’s population increasing by 36,690 people or 52% over the 25-year time frame of the Comprehensive Plan.” (2004:42). Table 34, reproduced from the 2004 Comprehensive Plan, places population growth into a pentennial age-group structure.
Table 34. Findings. Reproduced Gulfport 2004 Comprehensive Plan Population

Table III-4
City of Gulfport
Population Projections by Age, 2000-2025

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Under 5</th>
<th>5 To 18</th>
<th>19 to 61</th>
<th>65 Years &amp; Over</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>5,084</td>
<td>15,665</td>
<td>42,271</td>
<td>8,107</td>
<td>71,127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>5,492</td>
<td>16,566</td>
<td>46,922</td>
<td>9,485</td>
<td>78,465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5,834</td>
<td>17,160</td>
<td>51,739</td>
<td>11,070</td>
<td>85,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>6,147</td>
<td>17,697</td>
<td>56,443</td>
<td>12,854</td>
<td>93,141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2020</td>
<td>6,430</td>
<td>18,086</td>
<td>61,193</td>
<td>14,770</td>
<td>100,479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>6,792</td>
<td>18,436</td>
<td>65,770</td>
<td>16,819</td>
<td>107,817</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The 2010 (2010:30) and 2013 (2013:29) Comprehensive Plans, using the same population projections, chart predicted population growth using three projections (Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality, MDEQ; Gulf Regional Planning Commission, GRPC; Census/City, Projections used by Plan) at a penentennial scale, as seen in Figure 32:
In 2014, the Census American Community Survey 5-Year Population estimate (which is more statistically reliable than the ACS 1-Year Population Estimate of 71,750) for the total population of Gulfport was 69,913. Testing the estimate against the projections reveals that, on average projections have 22% error in predicting population growth to this point, as illustrated in Table 35.
Table 35. Findings. 2015 Population Projections Error Gulfport, Mississippi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Projection</th>
<th>2015 Projection Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2004 Comprehensive Plan (2002)</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDEQ (2006)</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRPC (2007)</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010/2013 Comprehensive Plan (2010)</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average Projection Error</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the 2004 Comprehensive Plan projections, completed in 2002, were furthest off at 33%, the plan was developed for a Gulfport that existed before Hurricane Katrina. The projections completed in 2010 for the 2010 and 2013 Comprehensive Plans were the closest to real estimates, coming in with 14% error. Multiple consultants confirmed that the Population Projections were “optimistic,” with one noting, “they were no different than any other population projections being prepared for other cities at the time.” (Anonymous, 2016, March 14).

Former Gulfport Mayor George Schloegel was critical of the population projections, saying, “Well, [population] it’s back, it’s back, but it’s not back to a level that was predicted… We have not met those [growth] levels the planners felt would come, and grow. It just has not happened.” (2015, July 28).

**Finding 21: Stakeholder expectations of Gulfport’s Pre-Katrina development patterns, counter to expectations used to justify the adoption of Planning and SmartCode efforts, placed infrastructure dollars north of Interstate 10, into rural areas with limited accessibility.**

Former Director of Urban Development George Carbo noted that prior to Hurricane Katrina, a “house a day was being built,” demonstrating a significant development pressure along the coast, particularly in suburban areas. After Hurricane Katrina, he says, there was a belief that the same development pressure would return, saying “looking at that [the pre-Hurricane Katrina development pressure], developers said we can come in, build back the
old stock because they're planning on growing. Let’s do this, where we can make a reasonable profit and provide needed services.” (2015, July 16).

Expectations of continued suburban development patterns, in conjunction with optimistic population projections, led to the fast-track construction of new sewer and water infrastructure north of the I-10 Corridor that had been planned by the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) prior to Hurricane Katrina. In Mayor Brent Warr’s 2008 State of the City address, he comments on the progress saying, “Our public works and engineering departments have installed over 54 miles of sewer infrastructure north of Interstate 10. To put that in perspective it is 57 miles from O’Neal Road [in Gulfport] to Hattiesburg.” (2008, March 11). Despite this new infrastructure, it plays a significant role in the failure of Plan implementation for the Plans under examination for this research.

Carbo also commented on the water and sewer infrastructure north of I-10, saying, “One thing that is not better is that, and this goes counter to the New Urbanism style [the recommendations of the Mississippi Renewal Forum], there was infrastructure put up into the county for water and sewer because it was predicted that growth would move away from the beachfront further inland. And so, large utility systems were built in upper part of, middle and upper part of Harrison County, north of I-10, that are underused.” (2015, July 16).

Former Gulfport Mayor George Schloegel further comments, “[The most] negative thing about the Planning after Hurricane Katrina I see is not limited for the municipality [of Gulfport] but instead to the whole county. The people [MDEQ] who made plans for the rebuilding of coast, that were commissioned by FEMA, anticipated an influx of new residents. As a result, they called for a water and sewer system for the entire county that was further inland than where the people live, thinking that new people would rebuild inland. That did not happen, so today we have multi-million dollar water and sewer systems and with very few customers. I don’t how we’re going to survive because you can’t keep water in a water tower without being flushing constantly because it begins to pollute itself.” (2015, July 28).
Finding 22: Development and funding expectations led to stakeholders developing the Plans as “wish-lists” of funding-intensive megaprojects.

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, participants in the Mississippi Renewal Forum worked with local leaders, but as Andres Duany recalled, “the dual phenomenon of the elected officials making highly therapeutic promises and these billion dollars created what we thought was a utopian project.” (2016, March 8)

In Gulfport, these “Utopian” visions were on full display and hindered the implementation of more easily accomplished objectives; the Renewal Forum Plan was a veritable mega-project “wish list” for the city of Gulfport. Even at the time of the Mississippi Renewal Forum, The Sun Herald’s Geoff Pender noticed the emphasis on megaprojects. After pointing to the “drooling” leaders with “faraway, dreamy looks in their eyes” he writes, “As they [Coastal and State Leaders] perused display boards with charts, maps, sketches and photos of what a new South Mississippi could be, they looked like they had seen the Big Rock Candy Mountains, with lemonade springs where the bluebird sings… But I noticed there were scant new ideas and concepts presented. Nearly every one, I recalled, had been presented in some form or fashion through the years. Build town squares and allot more greenspace - yep, heard that one before. Design neighborhoods and retail areas in a more traditional way, to prevent sprawl and its ensuing traffic - must have heard it a million times.” (2005, October 23.)

Tracy Dash of The Sun Herald also called the bold visions into question, writing, “The idea of beautiful neighborhoods, spectacular casinos, a world-class park and walkable communities sounds good. But some wonder if it will work in Gulfport, the second-largest city in the state.” (Dash, 2006, March 3).

The mega-project list included the previously discussed “Railroad to Nowhere.” It also included mega infrastructure projects that would require significant dollars such as the I-310 Interstate Highway, also known as the Port Connector; It advocated for a new expansion of the Port of Gulfport; the redevelopment of Jones Park and adjoining Bert Jones Marina a the reconstruction of the local aquarium, known as the Gulfport Oceanarium; receiving the former Veterans Affairs Hospital site to enable private
redevelopment; the placement of new waterfront casino and nearby hotel; the placement of a cruise ship port. Figure 33, pulled from the cover of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Charrette Book, labels these wish-list items.
Figure 33. Findings. The Post-Katrina Wishlist for Gulfport, Mississippi

Clockwise, from top left:
1: Redevelop Jones Park
2: Redevelop Bert Jones Yacht Basin
3: New Waterfront Casino & Hotel
4: New Cruise Ship Port
5: New Gulfport Aquarium
6: New Port Expansion
7: New Elevated Port Connector
8: New Expansion of Downtown
9: New CSX-to-4 Lane Corridor
Even at the time many of these ideas were proposed, most were not rooted in reality; most of the ideas proposed by the Mississippi Renewal Forum plan have colorful histories associated with them.

The Port Connector, dreamed up by the State Port Authority in 1994 following the ratification of the North American Free Trade Act, or NAFTA, had failed to secure funding on six separate occasions. In May 2004 Sun Herald reporter Geoff Pender wrote an obituary for the project after a bill to toll the potential interstate was defeated in the Mississippi Legislature (2004, May 5). In a last ditch effort to have the road built, the Harrison County Board of Supervisors agreed in to a scheme devised by MDOT to borrow up to $300 million to fund construction of the connector. However, citizens were skeptical that MDOT would follow through on its promise to repay the Harrison County Board of Supervisors in the next major transportation bill (Lee, 2005, January 25).

Expansion at the Port of Gulfport was also a perennial issue. The most recent efforts were initiated following the completion of dredging to deepen Gulfport’s shipping channel to 36’ and the initiation of NAFTA in January, 1994. The Port of Gulfport saw an immediate impact from NAFTA and the shipping boom along Gulf Coast heightened expectations. Between July 1993 to June 1994, the Port of Gulfport had a record fiscal year for shipping tonnage (Porretto, 1994, August 10). To have a better understanding of how NAFTA would affect the Port of Gulfport long-term, they hired Vickerman-Zachary-Miller (VZM) of Oakland, CA to conduct a 15 year planning and expansion study. Costing the State Port $240,000, VZM recommended a sizable expansion to the Port. In October 2000, the Mississippi Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) approved a plan to expand the West Pier of the State Port as a protective measure against the then pending Base Relocation program. The expansion of the 60-Acre expansion of West Pier had a then-target completion date of 2002. The optimistic target was missed and it wasn’t until mid-2004 when visible progress appeared, with the completion several years off.

The redevelopment of Jones Park and Bert Jones Yacht Basin were also perennial projects. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, then resident, and later Planning Commissioner Afton 75

75 1994 Actual Dollars: $240,000; 2015 Adjusted: $385,336
Anderson illustrated the parks condition in 2004 in a Letter to the Editor: “Approaching from the north, a visitor first sees an unsightly billboard. A bit further is Rice Pavilion, rusting away into a pile of junk. Toward the east is an expanse of dead grass and several trees that have fallen victim to an improperly wielded pruning saw. On the eastern end of the park is an unsightly lift station and a water fountain that has no water.” (Anderson, 2004, August 25).

The Sun Herald also noted the challenges facing Jones Park and the adjacent Bert Jones Harbor saying, “The Gulfport Small Craft Harbor and Jones Park area, in a prime location just off at the intersection of U.S. 49 and U.S. 90, has little to offer visitors other than the Ship Island ferry, Marine Life Oceanarium, some charter boats, a restaurant and a couple shops selling cold beer and live bait. The city has developed a series of plans over several decades to expand and improve its waterfront property. It also has considered proposals by private developers interested in building casino resorts on or near the waterfront property. A master plan for waterfront development was created in 1971 and revised or redone in 1979, 1983, 1986, 1992, 1997 [and 2001].” (Cummings, 2004, April 11). The Gulfport Oceanarium, located in Jones Park was a major tourist attraction for the City of Gulfport, but placed in Jones Park made the attraction less attractive.

The Veterans Affairs (VA) Hospital also had a long history of underutilization. Originally, the site was to host the Centennial Exposition for the State of Mississippi, in 1917. However, World War I derailed the plans and delayed construction. Residents hoped once the War was over, the land would be returned and the Centennial Exposition held, but that never happened. During World War I, the U.S. Government turned the site into the Gulfport Naval Training Camp. After World War I, the U.S. Government leased the site to the Public Health Service for transition into a Neuropsychiatric Hospital. Following an executive order, the Public Health Service transferred the site to the U.S. Veterans Bureau, which became the VA in 1930.

Machinations for the 147 acre site were ramping up prior to Hurricane Katrina. In 1999, a Federal Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the VA system initiated the Capital Asset Realignment for Enhanced Services (CARES) program to
examine and recommend changes to placement, size, and quality of existing VA facilities. In 2004, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs looked into closing the Gulfport VA Hospital Site and started a public engagement process to explore the possibility (Government Accountability Office, 2007). In May 2005, the Advisory Panel formed for the CARES program explored facility closure and batted around redevelopment alternatives. Accounting Firm PricewaterhouseCoopers and the Advisory Panel explored options for the property which included creation of a nursing school, a long term care facility, and the placement of a research campus for the nearby University of Southern Mississippi. (Gulfport Local Advisory Panel, 2005, May 12). Others hoped that eventually the property would be finally transferred back to the City of Gulfport for redevelopment, setting the stage for later political battles and the ideas outlined by the Mississippi Renewal Forum.

Concerning a placement of a new casino and waterfront hotel, the City of Gulfport sought to place a Casino on a small parcel of land immediately adjacent to Jones Park and the Bert Jones Yacht Basin. A timeline assembled by the Sun Herald in January 2016 lists these attempts. First, in 1993 New York Casino and Hotel magnate Donald Trump proposed a Casino at the site, only to back out in 1994 due to complications with his existing casinos in Atlantic City. Second, in 1999 Alfred Dana, Jr. proposed the Millennium Casino and Resort, which would have moved Jones Park, as seen in Figure 34. Ultimately, the City of Gulfport ended the casinos bid in 2002 when it said it would honor the original covenant on the Jones Park property, which forbid using the site for anything other than public recreation (N. A., 2016, January 27).
Lastly, Gulfport has consistently attempted to have a major cruise line call the Port of Gulfport home since the early 1990’s. The city has a colorful history with cruise industry, including two what city officials believed to be “auditions” with Carnival Cruises due to Y2K concerns in 1999, and flooding on the Mississippi River in 2003 (Boone, 2000, March 26; Boone, 2003, March 16). However, its most colorful experience occurred with cruise line OdessAmerica in 1994. OdessAmerica announced its expansion to Gulfport to provide service to Mexico and Central America, including Honduras, Belize, and Mexico. Utilizing the 515-foot, 15,600 ton ship Belorusiya-Class Gruziya, (or “Georgia,” for the former Soviet Socialist Republic), a converted Eastern European cruise ferry christened in 1975 for use in the Black Sea. OdessAmerica’s George C. Koch noted that “I know
[Gruziya is] going to look lovely sitting in [Gulfport’s] harbor.” (Taylor, 1995, April 25). Reviewed in Cruise Travel, a trade-publication magazine, the ship was billed as the most prominent former Soviet-bloc ship to enter into the North American market, offering a “microcosm of Ukraine,” (Petrie, 1993:64, September). The cruise’s final night included a 45-minute performance of the ships staff in “ethnic garb, featuring songs and dances of Ukraine.” (Cruz, 1995:69, October). Upon entering the market in 1993, it was described as: “It’s Russian badlands and Ukrainian folk dances, borschmes, blinis, and Chicken Kiev on the dinner menus; and afternoon Russian language lessons in the main lounge. As a further bit of idiosyncrasy, the cruise staff is French Canadian.” (Petrie, 1993:64, September). Its maiden voyage from Gulfport in April 1995 was succeeded by eight other cruises before Odessa America pulled out of Gulfport (Boone, 2000, March 26).

**Finding 23: Internal and external stakeholders utilized an imagined history to justify unrealistic aesthetic expectations for redevelopment and development.**

Another facet of the Mississippi Renewable Forum regarding expectations were the unrealistic aesthetic expectations of redevelopment and new development. Indicated by document analysis the restoration of physical environment, or built history lost in Hurricane Katrina was paramount importance to the residents of Gulfport and the wider Gulf Coast region. When this history didn’t reappear, implementation of the Plans suffered. The Sun Herald ran several articles alluding to this observation; David Tortorano provides the most concise description. Pointing to the Moss Point team at the Mississippi Renewable Forum he writes, “The [Moss Point] team is incorporating members’ own expertise in town planning with the images and memories from local residents about what they cherish – or cherished – about their town. To find out, the team asked locals about ‘the best postcard view’ of Moss Point. For that city, it was downtown and the waterfront, where ships would bring lumber.” (2005, October 19).

Gulfport, with a similar history, also employed the ‘postcard’ technique. During the Mississippi Renewable Forum a beat reporter for The Sun Herald wrote, “A team of architects stood with city officials at the Gulfport Harbor, looking northward toward
downtown and beyond, trying to envision the future. ‘What do you see?’ one of the architects asked. Mayor Brent Warr said he didn’t want a wall of condominiums between the city and the water, but punctuated buildings with openings to provide views would be OK. He talked about the need to preserve Jones Park, while developing a better land use plan for harbor businesses. He also called for the construction of a small harbor for shrimpers that would be visible from U.S. 90.” (Wilemon, 2005, October 14).

A few months later Melissa Scallan, also of the Sun Herald, quoted Mayor Warr saying, “‘We will never have this opportunity again,’ he said. ‘I feel like we have an opportunity now as a city to go forward as a group...to re-create and redevelop something that we’ll never again have the opportunity to do.’” (Scallan, 2006, March 15).

Mayor Warr, and other citizens of Gulfport, had re-imagined the past to inform their decisions for the future. Their selective memories idealized the past as a simpler, more humble time when in fact it was anything but. They had selectively forgotten that postcard images were intentionally idealized at best, or staged at worst; they had overvalued the past. While Gulfport likely had a harbor full of shrimp boats in the past, those years had long faded; those fishermen had moved away from the Port of Gulfport to Pass Christian, Long Beach and Biloxi. Businesses had moved away from the harbor because the city made concerted efforts to place them at industrial parks lining Interstate 10, several miles north of Downtown. Instead of high-rise condominium towers, the plans visualized mid-rise 5-6 story buildings, still establishing a wall between the city and the water, just not to the effect of Miami.

HDR SmartCode consultant Steve Schukraft also called upon the city’s history in the development of the Streetscape Restoration Project, saying, “‘Understanding downtown Gulfport's rich history is the perfect place to start the design process,’ [Steve] Schukraft said. ‘We've been studying historic images, noting the wide, planted medians, generous sidewalks and abundant parking. Through the streetscape project, we want to bring back some of downtown's early 20th-century charm and elegance.’” (Scallan, 2007, May 2).
Planning Administrator Greg Holmes alluded to the impact the lost history had, saying, “Now the only thing that concerns me is just the lack of the development along the beachfront. We lost a lot of really beautiful historic homes. Some of those that had been here since the Civil War. And some of that just history that you never get back.” (2015, July 7).

The Mississippi Renewal Forum Charrette Book and Gulfport SmartCode Charrette Book reinforced looking to the past to advise the future. Idyllic postcard images and photos, such as those in Figures 35, 36, and 37, combined with visions of international coastal communities such as Monte Carlo, Figure 38 and Nice, France led to idyllic renderings of the ‘new’ Gulfport as indicated by Figures 39 and 40.

Figure 35. Findings. Postcard of Pine Hills Hotel
Figure 36. Findings. Great Southern Hotel Postcard

Figure 37. Findings. Image of Historic Cottages in Gulfport
Figure 38. Findings. Image of Casino in Monte Carlo

Figure 39. Findings. Rendering of Future Downtown Gulfport with SmartCode
Externalities and Plan Failure

The third set of findings examines the role externalities play in the failure of Plan implementation. Examining the externalities of disasters, Federalism, and decisions of other competing cities reveals the complex role externalities play in Plan implementation and implementation failure. Externalities refer, broadly, to the external effects on implementation experience, expectations, and outcomes. Externalities affect decision-making processes; sometimes more than the direct effects of accumulated experience and expectations. Expecations and Experience also drive Externalities, to a certain extent, in market-based economies.

Disaster externalities are unpredicted events that shape structural vectors of expectations and experience. Federalism externalities caputre effects of multi-layered bureaucracy that shape expectations and experience. Externalities other cities create competition for scarce resources, heightening economic and social tensions, affecting expectations and experience.
The third set of three findings are grouped into three categories of Disaster Externalities, Federalism Externalities, and Other City Externalities, reflective of their relative, but not absolute, importance and relationships.

**Finding 24: The unpredicted effects of the Financial Crisis, Mortgage Crisis, and Great Recession went counter to expectations, and shaped redevelopment experiences.**

One topic that was brought up in each interview, and that permeated the document analysis, was the effect the 2007 Financial Crisis, 2008 Mortgage Crisis, and Great Recession had on the failure of Planning efforts and SmartCode. Former Mayor George Schloegel blames the unpredicted Financial Crisis, Mortgage Crisis, and subsequent Great Recession for slow post-Katrina recovery, saying, “[Recovery] did not meet my expectations and the reason that it did not – and about 2008 the country nationwide went into a recession and that pretty well put a halt to the economic activity that we were experiencing here. So, that got slowed down and continued to be slowed down because of this longstanding recession.” (2015, July 28).

Former Interim Director of Development and SmartCode consultant Jeff Bounds also notes, “[The] economic decline in 2008, not just here but nationally and outside factors that were unrelated to the planning aspect of things [caused a slow recovery].” (2015, July 27).

An anonymous consultant also noted the challenges of the recession, but pointed to the history of development saying “I also think the slowdown of the national economy [impacted the failure of SmartCode], but it was really the region – the region historically has had very modest or slow rates of development and investment.” (2016, March 14).

**Finding 25: FEMA’s Flood Insurance Rate Maps shaped expectations and the Planning experience.**

Another topic that came up universally was the role of FEMA and their Flood Insurance Rate Maps (FIRM). Former Director of Development George Carbo explains,
The impediments to building back where having to get control of the land and dealing with revised flood elevations that FEMA enacted, basically saying that the Base Flood Elevation for the city is now 18’ above sea level, or the majority of the city, plus the velocity zones and the coastal wave zone having greater elevations with base flood elevations 20’ above sea level, or higher. So, you have to build to that standard as a bare minimum. And then you're going to have to deal with whatever you’re going to build needing to be insurable. And so, for insurance you cannot build or get flood insurance if you're below base flood elevation. You build up, above that base flood elevation, you can get your property insurance if [insurance] companies are writing [policies]. And for a time, many years after [Hurricane Katrina] companies would not write within a mile of the beachfront so you had to pay higher premiums for the few companies that would write a [insurance] policy. And then you also had to deal with wind insurance, building up, exposing you to greater wind issues. And companies were not selling wind insurance near the beachfront, so you had to go into the state Windpool. So having to pay 5% of the value of your home, every year, for insurance, or your commercial structure, which means that in 20 years you paid the insurance company the value of that property. That is just outrageously high. And so, you couldn't get construction loans because the risk was too great. The cost of building just skyrocketed, and the cost of maintenance skyrocketed because of insurance costs.

(2015, July 16).

Finding 26: Competition with nearby communities, combined with unrealistic expectations, negatively shaped the Planning experience.

Planning Administrator Greg Holmes pointed to the competition with other cities as another reason modifications were made to SmartCode, saying in the Planning Commission meeting where SmartCode was modified, “I can personally tell you we lost IHOP. I can personally tell you we lost Pizza Hut. I've got a large drugstore [CVS] that wants to go on the corner of Cowan and Pass Road who will not come here with the SmartCode. I tried
everything humanly possible to meet them, and she just flat out said ‘No.’ It's not about right, or wrong, but I can tell you we are letting people walk. All we are doing is making Biloxi and D'Iberville very happy places because, if nobody else does this – the county has SmartCode, but they don't administer it like we do. It's parallel, in most cases.” (Gulfport Planning Commission, 2012, February 23).

When asked about the development that was lost, Holmes elaborated more on the rivalry between Gulfport and its neighbors, saying,

What ended up happening was a lot of these developers and developments and new retail started going to adjacent cities that didn't have codes as stringent as ours… It was kind hard and a hassle asking people to be more restrictive when all the cities around you have a less restrictive code. You know, the thing about being down here, in this area, all these cities are adjacent to each other so driving from one city to the next you would never know you left from one corporate boundary to another, another city. So, moving from here to let's say, D'Iberville, ain't that big of a jump for a retail development or any type of development. So, it made us kind of stand out in the sense that we were a little more rigid in our code regulations than other cities. So developers going to other places. (2015, July 7).

Holmes specifically pointed at the Big-Box suburban stripmall in D'Iberville called ‘The Promenade,’ saying, “Well, I'll put it to you like this, there a development in D'Iberville called The Promenade and I know that some of those key tenants in that area had had some conversations with us at one point, but ended up going all little bit east to their city.” (2015, July 7).

An especially sore spot was the loss of Gulfport’s Olive Garden, which relocated to nearby D’Iberville following Hurricane Katrina. To understand just how big of a loss the Olive Garden and other restaurants were, The Sun Herald’s Editorial Board published a short editorial on January 6, 2008 saying “Since our [The Sun Herald] offices sit on DeBuys Road, we are regularly reminded that the Olive Garden and Red Lobster restaurants are still vacant lots just down the street on the waterfront. Gone as well are Ryan’s and Cuco’s and Cajun’s and even some eateries without an apostrophe. South
Mississippians rejoiced when the first Waffle House came back to Beach Boulevard. And were delighted to have Wendy's and [Mary] Mahoney’s [Old French House] and Vrazel's back as well. But where's everybody else? The shoreline of Harrison County boasted a smorgasbord of tasty treats before Katrina. Why have so few returned? Our appetites certainly have.”

Another anonymous Sound Off titled in the Sun Herald “Starving for those two,” reads, “How can we get a petition for return of Olive Garden, Red Lobster and other popular restaurants on Beach Boulevard? They are wanted, needed and are vital for redevelopment. They would find themselves overrun with hungry folks, if they would just come back. We need to let them know how much they are missed.” (2008, January 30).

In another article that memorialized the life of a deceased Gulfport Resident, Sun Herald Reporter Tammy Smith reports, “But her favorite dining opportunity was harder to come by after Hurricane Katrina. ‘Her favorite place to eat out was Olive Garden,’ Moody said. ‘Chris said she would drive to Mobile just to get salad and breadsticks, after our Olive Garden was gone. I remember she asked for Olive Garden while she was in the hospital.’” (2008, July 30).

Yet another column in the Sun Herald titled “Waiting for the Olive Garden” that ran on the front page of the Sunday Business section reads, “Psssstt. Wanna know when Olive Garden is going to open? Me, too. In the worst way. Rumors about the return of Olive Garden, which washed away from the foot of DeBuys Road during Katrina, have never stopped simmering. (Its sister property, Red Lobster, not so much.) I've lost track of the number of times somebody has asked when the popular Italian chain will reopen. And we've heard over and over that the replacement restaurant was going to be built here or there. So far it's all rumor, spaghetti speculation if you will.” (Monti, 2008, May 18).

Despite Then-Director of Development Larry Jones May 2008 confirmation that a Olive Garden would open in Gulfport on Tegarden Road (Giardina, 2008, May 19), the restaurant never came. Instead, the Olive Garden opened in D'Iberville's ‘The Promenade’ in September 2009 to much fanfare, and much to the chagrin of Gulfport’s leaders which had worked diligently to get secure the franchise.
Findings Conclusion

In answering the research question of ‘why Plan implementation fails,’ a complex and multi-layered analysis in this case study provides lessons that are generalizable. The interplay between Experience, Expectations, Externalities build on one another; they are equal parts in understanding Plan implementation failure. While there are more experience findings in this particular case study, this may not be true in other case studies.

The following chapter attempts to pull lessons from the findings identified in this chapter and analysis in the previous two chapters to develop a generalizable theory from theoretical coding. It will provide a critique of literature to build a new framework by which Plan implementation failure is both identified and understood. This framework will generate lessons not just for Planning academe, but also for practicing Planners, decision makers, and citizens who seek to be more engaged in their cities Planning processes. In particular, the author hopes that these findings provide a deeper understanding to the problems faced by all coastal communities in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.
Chapter 7. Dissertation Summary, Implications, Future Research, and Conclusion

**Dissertation Summary**

The Introduction chapter details two differing narratives of recovery in Gulfport, Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina. The first argues that recovery met or exceeded expectations; the other identifies a sizable gap between recovery expectations and the on-the-ground results. Those that identify with the narrative of successful recovery believe that the opportunity created by Hurricane Katrina led to a new and improved, or ‘Better Than Before’ Mississippi Gulf Coast, particularly when compared to Louisiana. Those that identify with the narrative of failed recovery see a nuanced narrative of optimism in the post-Katrina aftermath and sobering reality of implementation. Building on the narrative of implementation failure, the dissertation asks the research question: Why did the Plans generated for Gulfport, Mississippi fail to realize the vision outlined by the Mississippi Renewal Forum?

The Literature review begins by exploring the foundations of ‘Better Than Before,’ which in turn led to the development of increasingly prominent ‘Build Back Better’ theory. It then turns to deploying Kingdon’s (2003) Decision Agenda Framework, more commonly known as Policy Opportunity Windows. This provides a link to explain why the ‘Better Than Before’ mantra was so readily embraced by the Mississippi Gulf Coast in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina. Following the discussion of Kingdon (2003), the chapter develops a review of Planning literature on Implementation. The exploration finds that Planning has placed an emphasis on Plan-making and Evaluation in Planning, but not Implementation in Planning and, more specifically, Plan Implementation. The chapter then details Public Policy’s approach to understanding implementation, and applies Goggin’s (1986) three-generational structure to classify existing Plan Implementation literature, situating the dissertation’s research accordingly.

The Research Design chapter overviews the approach, methodology, method, and methods of research. Utilizing a case study approach, framed by Corbin & Strauss’ (2015) Grounded Theory methodology and Constant Comparative method, the chapter overviews the five methods utilized to answer the research question. The first two methods, the American Planning Association’s (APA) Comprehensive Plan Standards for Sustaining Places (CPSSP) Program and Ryan’s (2006) ‘Plan Reading’ provide two different descriptive evaluative frameworks for understanding the Plans, as they are, to determine how much of the Plans are responsible for failure. This analysis builds on Document Analysis, which is the foundation of the Research Design. Semi-Structured Interviews, informed by Patton’s (2008) methods approach, intend to fill gaps in narrative. The fifth, and last of the methods is the ad hoc tenure analysis, developed because of initial findings developed in the first four methods.


The second analysis chapter reports and analyzes results of Document Analysis, Semi-Structured Interviews, and the ad hoc Tenure Analysis. Document Analysis utilizes 769 pieces of data to structure three theoretical themes of Experience, Expectations, and Externalities. Semi-Structured Interviews with 12 respondents involved in the post-Katrina
planning, redevelopment, and development in Gulfport, Mississippi provide additional context to themes to build a narrative that explains Plan failure. Lastly, the *ad hoc* Tenure Analysis temporally relates major events in Gulfport to the Tenure, as a proxy for Governance Experience, of the Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission.

The findings chapter reports 26 findings under the categories of Experience, Expectations, and Externalities to answer the research question. It finds that different experience within the Community and the experience of those engaging in Governance and Planning are partially to blame for Plan implementation failure. It also finds that the role of Redevelopment, Development, and Time expectations affected Plan implementation failure. Lastly, it finds that Externalities, such as Disasters, Federalism, and Other Cities also affect Plan implementation failure.

**Findings and Implications for Plan Implementation Literature**

Exploring the relationships between existing Plan implementation literature and dissertation findings informs how this dissertation contributes, broadly, to Planning’s body of knowledge. Revisiting the Conclusion of the Literature Review in Chapter 2, literature exploring the implementation process in planning, while in short supply, is valuable. Goggin (1986), as the creator of the three generational approach to implementation research in Public Policy, sees the unique value of case studies in advancing the understanding of implementation processes, as do Gittell (1992) and Ryan (2006). Findings of this dissertation align with findings of previous literatures. This section briefly reviews the overlaps between the findings of this case study and the findings of Derthick (1972), Gittell (1992), and Ryan (2006).

Derthick’s (1972) analysis of President Lyndon B. Johnson’s New Towns In-Town Program, as part of the larger Great Society initiative, and subsequent findings have multiple similarities with the implementation of the plans developed as a result of the Mississippi Renewal Forum. While the New Towns Intown program sought to create
“urban communit[ies]’ from “scratch” (Perloff, 1966:155), differing from the Mississippi Renewal Forum plans which sought to develop a path towards ‘Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal,’ Derthick’s (1972:7) observation on the investment of “executive virtues – energy, speed, and flexibility” also apply to post-Katrina Planning efforts.

At the Federal Level, President Bush and Congressional Leadership made tremendous amounts of flexible funding available to the State of Mississippi’s Development Administration (MDA) through Community Block Development Grants (CBDG). At the state level, the same could be said for Mississippi’s Governor Haley Barbour who laid the groundwork for the Governors Commission one day after Hurricane Katrina’s landfall, and appointed MDA Director Leland Speed to ensure that flexible CBDG funds were spent quickly. Governor Barbour’s executive leadership extended to the Mississippi Renewal Forum itself; the meeting with Andrés Duany, instructing him to “Do what you do, and do it well,” also echo’s the “energy, speed, and flexibility” of the initiatives. At the local level, Gulfport Mayor Brent Warr bought into the ideas of the Forum and acted immediately after to begin implementing them; he was an “energetic” participant throughout and after the Mississippi Renewal Forum; he was quick to fund the post-Forum SmartCode Charrettes; he was flexible on the adoption and implementation of SmartCode, making political concessions as needed. Derthick (1972:5) also notes how President Johnson believed the New Towns Intown program would show “‘every mayor and congressman could see [how] it [or, redevelopment] could be done.’” (1972:5). In Mississippi, Governor Barbour, Andrés Duany, and Mayor Warr each echoed this sentiment repeating the desire to rebuild ‘Better than Before,’ and demonstrating the power of CNU’s “ambitions for greater influence,” per Passell (2013:103).

Derthick’s (1972) four findings on failure are also similar to the findings presented in Chapter 6; the New Towns Intown program failed due to 1) Limited Knowledge; 2) Limited Stock of Aid (or incentives); 3) Limited Use of Aid (or use of incentives), and; 4) Inflation of Objectives. In Gulfport, one facet of Plan failure is the limited experience of the Mayor, City Council, Planning Commission, and Planning Staff with SmartCode and Smart Growth ideas. Gulfport’s government lacked an understanding of how SmartCode
incentivized development, and how to use those incentives to drive development. In addition, the inflated expectations for redevelopment and development post-Katrina are similar to the inflated objectives of the New Towns Intown Program. In Gulfport, similar to the New Towns Intown program, stakeholders naively assumed that redevelopment and development was a certainty because the Federal Government was providing vast sums of flexible funding. In addition, stakeholders in both cases believed that because the theories applied to redevelopment were the most cutting-edge, or forward thinking ideas in Planning, that their success was imminent; both Plans, as Derthick (1972) argues, were free from the chains of implementation’s burden. In addition, because the ideas were innovative Gulfport’s government thought they could act quickly; or as Derthick’s (1972) observes, dream the ideal in the name of innovation.

Gittell’s observations in the four case studies of Lowell and New Bedford Massachusetts; Jamestown, New York, and; McKeesport, Pennsylvania are also similar to Gulfport. In contrasting success in Lowell with failure in New Bedford, Gittell (1992) finds that Lowell was successful because of public-private consortiums, similar to Gulfport’s relationships with members of Coast 21 and the Mississippi Gulf Coast Business Council. Gittell (1992) finds that New Bedford’s failure lie in the political conflicts over implementation of urban renewal initiatives and citizen’s pessimism toward the politics of economic recovery, similar to Gulfport residents’ skepticism of city government due to a long history of political conflict between the Mayor, City Council, and Planning Commission. Tying Gulfport to Gittell’s (1992) case study of Jamestown, their ad hoc committee consisting of politically powerful individuals developed a wish-list of development projects. In Gulfport, the Mississippi Renewal Forum constructed their wish list in nearly identical fashion. Politically powerful individuals shaped the reconstruction Plans, and local residents were excluded from the development process. Only after CNU members left the Mississippi Gulf Coast were citizens engaged in community presentations. Concerning the McKeesport case study, Gittell (1992) finds that that the policy of “Keep U.S. Steel Happy” led to political conflict between the United Steelworkers Union, who engaged in confrontational tactics, and the City of Gulfport.
Parallels can be drawn between Governor Barbour and Mayor Warr’s agenda to ‘Keep the State Port Happy,’ which led to a confrontational lawsuit over the re-appropriated $600 Million in CBDG Housing recovery funding, filed by the Mississippi Center for Justice. The spillover effects of both of these confrontations created political discontent between the city, its major employer, and its residents. Gittel’s (1992) observations on McKeesport’s failure to shore up its economy are also easily applied to the Gulfport case study; Local officials in both cases, “lacked experience; political savvy, and independence to initiate new development efforts.” (Gittel, 1992:156).

Ryan’s (2006) findings are also applicable; namely that that there are no guarantees of future plans conforming to past plans; the “‘integrated’ whole” consequences of planning efforts after Hurricane Katrina, while not realized, still contributed to subsequent planning efforts. In Gulfport’s case, this is seen in the rejection of SmartCode and the desires to effectively reuse, adapt, and reattempt adoption of the 2010 Comprehensive Plan in its 2013 Comprehensive Plan iteration. While the 2013 Comprehensive Plan was tabled indefinitely the same year, it will undoubtedly influence future planning decisions and future Comprehensive Plans for Gulfport; the very act of modifying it suggests its value to the Planning Department and Planning Commission.

In summary, the findings of Derthick (1972), Gittell (1992), and Ryan (2006) are similar to the findings of this dissertation for Gulfport. Despite their unifying characteristics, and the overlap between the findings of this research and previous literature, the existing literature has little overlap with one another. Derthick’s (1972) findings broaden the consequences of policy and planning failure at the national level, yet are less generalizable to the local level. Despite this, they are the most familiar, in spirit, to the findings of this research. Gittel’s (1992) findings only apply to economic redevelopment and development at a local level. In addition, Gittell (1992) fails to provide sufficient detail for the expectations of redevelopment and development aside from economic indicators in the form of jobs and wages. This, however, is not surprising as this information forms the basis of analysis. Ryan (2006) only examines changes to physical built environment, and links them to expectation setting in the long term; Ryan (2006) also
punts on the politics of Planning, relying on a lone biographical source to provide a governance narrative.

**Implications for Planning Theory and Practice**

**Implication 1: Research provides another Case Study of Implementation.**

Ryan (2006), toward the beginning of his article identified the “relative paucity of literature” on Implementation in Planning. At the end of the same article, Ryan (2006:61) argues there is still additional need for case studies arguing, “Although hundreds, if not thousands, of downtown plans have been issued for American cities during the past hundred years, planning historians’ knowledge of the implementation of these plans is relatively limited.” The findings and implications of this research agree, and provides a new case study of implementation.

**Implication 2: Research explains ‘Why Plan implementation fails’**

The second implication is that research findings also are useful in understanding the factors that lead to plan implementation failure. This dissertation argues that Plan implementation fail due to the combined failures of experience, expectations, and externalities. Failures of community, governance, and Planning experiences each discretely contribute to the struggles of implementation. Optimistic and unrealistic expectations of redevelopment, development, and time aid in developing context around Plan implementation, tracing the convergence and deviation from what is in the Plan to what was implemented. Externalities, or those factors outside the immediate purview of Plan implementation, also have impacts; disasters, federalism, and competitive externalities such as the financial crisis, layers of governance, and adjacent cities affect real and perceived

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progress. Identifying the major externalities over the course of Implementation reinforces observations of experience and expectations.

Implication 3: Community trust and confidence, as functions of experience, affects Plan implementation.

The erosion of community trust and confidence, indicated by the finding, negatively affect Plan implementation, and led to Plan implementation failure. The experience of stakeholders in the ten years following Hurricane Katrina stoked fears that Gulfport’s government ignored stakeholder’s interests in decision-making and that leaders were unscrupulous in spending federal funding. Combined with erosion of trust and confidence, the City of Gulfport unintentionally disenfranchised citizens by intentionally withholding information, or making it difficult to access. This applies to not only the availability of Plans, but also the limits placed on open meeting public comment periods, access to documents, and communication from bureaucrats regarding processes, decisions, and available resources. They also exacerbated fears of frustrated stakeholders by disregarding comments, holding ‘presentations’ and not meetings with impactful dialogue, and voting on items that leaders should have recused themselves from.

These lessons more broadly apply to Planning Professionals. While existing literature has identified these and similar issues around trust and confidence, it is worth reiterating: the role of ethics in Planning is an important facet of the planning process. Professional Planners have a moral and ethical obligation to educate elected leaders, bureaucrats, and citizens on the roles of Plans and what our Profession intends to do (American Planning Association, 1992; American Institute of Certified Planners, 2016). Planners also have an obligation to engage the disenfranchised; actively listen; initiate impactful dialogue; to make information available, and; to recuse ourselves, as needed.
Implication 4: Changes to Governance Experience create Opportunity Windows at the local level.

The exploratory Ad hoc Tenure Analysis findings reveal a link between Governance Tenure and Opportunity Windows; when taken with other contextual methods Governance Tenure partially describes Governance Experience. In the case of Gulfport, Kingdon’s (2003) three streams aligned twice: once for the development, adoption, and implementation of SmartCode in 2007, and again for the vacating of three community plans and consolidation of SmartCode into the existing Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance of 1972.

In 2007, the Political stream was favorable for the adoption of SmartCode; the 2005 election, identified by the ad hoc Tenure Analysis as a period low average Tenure, aligned with the focusing event of Hurricane Katrina. The Hurricane contrasted problems of the immediate past with the imagined future vision of Gulfport and led to the creation of Policy to resolve those problems. The ‘Better than Before’ vision of the Mississippi Renewal Forum guided development of SmartCode, as policy. Policy entrepreneur Mayor Brent Warr advocated for SmartCode, which led to the adoption of the SmartCode Framework in 2007 and a series of five SmartCode Community Plans.

In 2012, the combined effects of disasters, such as the BP Oil Spill and Great Recession were another focusing event that brought the structural problems of SmartCode into relief, along with the lack of post-Katrina redevelopment and development. Changes to the Planning Commission in 2007, and the election of 2009 created a period of low average tenure, measured by ad hoc Tenure Analysis. In addition, Policy Entrepreneurs emerged seeking changes to the SmartCode, specifically the TEA Party and Councilmember Ricky Dombrowski.
Implication 5: Exploratory ad hoc Tenure Analysis Methods is capable of partially describing or ex post facto identifying, opportunity windows.

Exploratory Ad hoc Tenure Analysis Methods introduced in the dissertation are useful and employable in a variety of contexts. While findings and insights derived from the methods require support from other contextual methods, Tenure Analysis has the potential to be a valuable tool for communities. Researchers, Professional Planners, and Civil Servants have the potential to employ Tenure Analysis to understand a wide range and variety of problems. First, applying tenure analysis to a specific case where time in a position or role affects experience has the potential to reveal new insights. Second, comparative Tenure Analysis has the potential to create additional insights about the role of tenure in policy and Plan development, adoption, implementation, and outcomes. Third, Tenure Analysis, because of its simple approach, has the potential to help cities regulate the tenure of particular Councils, Commissions, Boards, Agencies, etc. Fourth, Tenure Analysis has potential use as an in itinere and ex post facto assessment and evaluative indicator.


While it should be stated at the outset of this implication that none of the Plans reviewed for the dissertation meet APA’s criteria for designation, it became clear over the course of applying the framework that the APA assumes that implementation follows adoption. In simpler terms, the APA’s framework, as is, treats the implementation of a Plan like a black box; a mysterious set of levers and mechanisms that turn the visions of the plan into reality. The APA CPSSP (2015) is another system in a long line of systems designed by North Americans Planners who largely subscribe to Rational Planning theories. Critics of the APA CPSSP (2015) include North American Communicative Planning Theory adherents. While Communicative Planning adherents are more sensitive to the ‘black box’ problem, as noted in the introduction, stressing an iterative approach to Planning that has a
deep understanding of the social mechanisms behind implementation, their perspective negates the complex, rationally driven governance mechanisms that belie the adoption and implementation of policy.

At the end of both Plan evaluation processes included in the dissertation, an *ex post facto* evaluation or assessment skips over implementation, conducting a book-ended examination that matches what the Plan initially envisioned with what the Plan achieved. Rational theorists are frustrated by the question of “What went wrong in the Plan?” while Communicative theorists are frustrated by the question of “What in the Plan-Making Process went wrong?” The APA’s assumption that Plan implementation follows adoption drives the APA CPSSP (2015) framework. By grading Plans immediately after adoption, the evaluative framework lacks the ability to appropriately value a Plan. This is concerning for three reasons:

First, on grading Plans, the APA CPSSP (2015) framework relies solely on the Plan document to account for implementation. In other words, it awards the implementation of the Plan before implementation occurs. The first potential consequence of this approach is that the APA CPSSP (2015) framework rewards Plans being implemented by communities and governments with a low capacity. The second potential consequence is that the framework rewards Plans developed using unrealistic expectations. For example, in the instance of Gulfport, Comprehensive Plans were highly driven by visions that intended to radically transform land use and development patterns. While the Plan received high marks in those categories, the Comprehensive Plan was tabled indefinitely. The third potential consequent is that the framework, unaware of externalities, past, present, or future that affect implementation, awards a Plan that lacks resilience toward those considerations, fundamentally challenging sustainability of Plans.

Second, the bias of the APA CPSSP (2015) framework separates the Planning ‘haves’ from ‘have-nots;’ or the ‘Good’ from ‘Bad’ Plans instead of promoting Planning as a valuable process. Driven by the APA’s idea of Planning ‘best practices,’ the bias toward ‘good’ Planning is present in the evaluative structure and descriptive text. This is a problem for two reasons. First, if the APA intends to be the arbiter of ‘good’ Planning, this
framework falls short because it only provides for a limited set, or a narrow menu of ‘best practices.’ Second, this tactic is worrisome given the history of the APA and Planners as arbiter of ‘good’ Planning. Harvey Perloff and the precursor to the APA employed a similar ‘best practice’ philosophy to develop the ‘New Towns Intown’ Program, which was critiqued by Derthick (1972) leading to the study of implementation. Other ‘best practice’ standards in Planning drove the development of Urban Renewal programs. While this argument easily conjures a slippery slope critique, at the very least it is important to remember the history of Planning’s efforts before we embark on developing a new framework to codify ‘best practices.’ Planning and Planners need to think more critically about how we set realistic and implementable expectations to drive shifts in land use.

Third, the APA CPSSP (2015) places the evaluative emphasis on Plan making; not on implementation or ex post facto evaluation, further treating implementation like a black box and ex post facto evaluation as an afterthought. In other words, the APA CPSSP (2015) is ignoring the realities of Plan implementation. If the APA intended to build a framework that provides value and guidance to the communities and profession it serves, it is the opinion of this author that they have sorely missed the mark. Instead, the APA has created a system that awards Plans a gold star. While awards and trophies look good in cases, the case could act like a shelf where far too many plans have sat and collected dust.

Implication 7: Planning consultants are not a replacement for Planning staff experience and capacity; Cities should be aware of Planning ‘mission creep.’

Consultants are highly technical specialty service providers, and an indispensable part of Planning’s profession. However, many communities utilize consultants as de facto replacements for a Planning staff. For small villages or towns that lack a Planning staff, Consultants are typically the only option, absent an intern familiar with Planning or a group of students from a nearby university. For small to medium sized towns and cities that have a Planning staff, consultants bridge gaps between staff experience and lack of capacity to develop Plans. Only larger cities with well-developed Planning departments benefit from
using consultants as specialists: to conduct special analyses, develop projections, prepare marketing materials, enhance Plan graphics, and initiate one-off ‘statement’ projects.

Small to medium sized communities, lacking well-developed Planning departments rely on Consultants to develop everything from site plans to the largest and most complex Comprehensive Plans. This creates a mismatch between communities, Planning staff, and Planning consultants put enormous strains on the process of Plan making. First, Community stakeholders treat consultants as ‘outsiders.’ Second, this places pressure on Planning staff to mitigate stakeholder concerns and aid consultants. Third, services provided by Planning consultants are highly specific, requiring significant \textit{ex ante} knowledge of problems to be addressed by the Planning consultant. In simpler terms, Planning consultants try to avoid ‘mission creep,’ but communities often lack the knowledge prior to Planning to ensure limited scope. Fourth, by hiring consultants for Planning tasks, some communities give away work that has the ability to build experience or capacity of Planning staff, increasing the value of the Planning experience. Fifth, management of Planning consultants is not always clear; having a clear managing entity provides clear direction. Seventh, and last, Planning consultants do not have responsibility to implement the Plans they develop.

\textbf{Implication 8: Plan Expectations drive implementation, and Planners should be wary of constructing plans on optimistic, but unattainable visions. Communities should balance aspirational ‘wish-list’ approaches to Plan-making with goal-based approaches.}

Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport was a ‘wish-list’ of major projects, as detailed in the previous chapter. In addition, the Plans subsequent to the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan for Gulfport were also overly optimistic in terms of population projections, development pressure, and time necessary for recovery. The ‘Better Than Before’ expectations set by the Governor’s Commission and the Mississippi Renewal Forum framed the Plans in a sense of optimism. While Andrés Duany in particular noted the therapeutic value in the development of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plans, the
expectations set following Hurricane Katrina were unworkable from the moment they were conceived. Furthermore, near-constant expectations of population growth were reinforced by Planning consultants, who were unaware of the long history of over-optimistic population estimates. In Planning for population growth, Gulfport also planned for increased development pressure. They anticipated that people would come back and rebuild immediately. When redevelopment occurred at a much slower pace, Gulfport’s residents began blaming the Plans, largely in part due to their lofty expectations. The Plans became a scapegoat.

Future Research Directions

Future Direction 1: Using a Case Study Approach, examine other failed Planning Efforts to verify findings and theory schema.

If Planning is Planners making Plans, than like Ryan (2006), this research argues that there is value in examining implementation to learn more about the Plans Planners make. Future directions for research include examinations of other SmartCode and post-disaster Planning efforts to verify the findings of this dissertation.

Future Direction 2: Formalize the Tenure Analysis Method, and test using on other case studies.

Tenure Analysis is a potentially powerful tool, as detailed above. Refining and formalizing Tenure Analysis methods for a paper would provide the tools to a wider audience of Planning academics and Professionals. In addition it would allow the methods to be utilized by others interested in locating potential opportunity windows.
Future Direction 3: Explore the potential relationship between Experience, Expectations, and Externalities are related to Politics, Policy and Problems

Kingdon (2003:1) notes that the phrase “an idea whose time has come” (Kingdon, 2003:1) describes a “fundamental reality about an irresistible movement that sweeps over our politics and our society, pushing aside everything that might stand in its path.” The same could be said for Gulfport, in this particular case study; the idea of SmartCode and subsequent SmartCode Community Plans, as a vehicle to implement the visions of the Mississippi Renewal Forum Plan, moved from the Decision Agenda, to adoption, and onto implementation.

The last implication of this research is that Experience, Expectations, and Externalities are capable of framing an Implementation Agenda, similar to Kingdon’s (2003) Decision Agenda. Built on the foundation of Kingdon’s (2003) framework, Experience, Expectations, and Externalities are linked to the three Decision Agenda streams of Politics, Policy, and Problem. Like Kingdon’s (2003) streams, Implementation Agenda is a complex process, and streams operate independently and frequently interact with one another. Convergence of Experience, Expectations, and Externalities, within the framework creates additional windows of opportunity to implement ideas contained within Plans, or movement on to the Implementation Agenda. Figure 41 describes this relationship graphically.
Figure 41. Findings. Potential Convergence of Experience, Expectations, and Externalities for Implementation.

Dissertation Conclusion

Plan failure is common, and if Planners and the Planning profession pay attention before, during, and after implementation to the way Plans are implemented, then we can begin making better Plans. Furthermore, the power of Hurricane Katrina defied expectations of all involved; the surge was higher, the loss was greater, the recovery longer. It is not surprising that in the recovery and rebuilding phase that problems the disaster brought into focus were deeper and more structural than even the most pessimistic individuals anticipated. It took almost ten years for Governor’s Commission on Recovery Rebuilding and Renewal to reach its last stage: Renewal. Symbolic of that step, in July 2015 Gulfport’s City Council voted that the remaining slabs and pilings where homes and businesses once stood should be torn out, and the land returned to its clear state over the next year. While the scars of Hurricane Katrina will last like the scars of Hurricane Camille
for forty years, hopefully Renewal will begin once the last slab is cleared and the last piling is pulled.
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Appendix A: Approved IRB Protocol No. 2015B0179 Interview Script

INTRODUCTION AND PRIMING:

Hello [insert name], this is Zachary Kenitzer from The Ohio State University. How are you doing today?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

... SMALL TALK TO EASE PARTICIPANT INTO INTERVIEW

[Insert name], thank you for volunteering to participate in this research interview for my dissertation. We will work to make sure that no one sees your online responses without approval. But, because we are using the Internet, there is a chance that someone could access your online responses without permission. In some cases, this information could be used to identify you.

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

I have reached out to you previously to gain consent for the interview and I would like you to confirm verbally that you consent for recording, transcription and use of the interviews for research.

[PAUSE FOR YES OR NO, RECORD IN LOGGING TOOL FIELD NO. 7]

I would also like to inform you of your right to confidentiality. This research has been approved by the Institutional Review Board at Ohio State, and if you would like your involvement to remain confidential, all identifying information will be removed from transcripts and held for no more than five years. Would you like this interview to be confidential?
Thank you. To introduce you to the topic of today’s interview, you were selected because of your involvement with planning in the city of Gulfport, Mississippi following Hurricane Katrina. As the tenth anniversary of the storm approaches, examining the legacy of the plans that developed in the years following the storm has the potential to yield new insights into the planning process. Specifically, my dissertation is focused on plan implementation, and lessons learned from planners in the region. I see that your involvement or role in the [Plan Name] is/was [Title from Candidate List]. Is that correct?

Thank you. Today we will be discussing the legacy of several of those plans. Plans that are of primary interest to me are the Mississippi Renewal Plan Redevelopment Master Plan Charrette Book for Gulfport, Mississippi (2005); Gulfport SmartCode (2007); Old Gulfport Community Plan (2007); City of Gulfport Façade Restoration Plan (2007); City of Gulfport Streetscape Restoration Plan (2007); DPZ Downtown Gulfport Infill Plan (2008); Gulfport 2030 Comprehensive Plan (2010). Did you receive those plans?

Thank you. Were you able to review those plans prior to this conversation?

Thank you. I have several structured questions prepared for this interview, but I may ask you to expand or elaborate through other questions. I anticipate that this interview should take anywhere from 15-30 minutes of your time, depending on your response to the questions. Do you have any questions before we start the interview?

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 1:
It has been almost 10 years since Hurricane Katrina has made landfall. What are your perceptions of the 'on-the-ground' results of recovery, and have those results met your expectations of what they should be ten years after Hurricane Katrina?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 1A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 2:

From the list of plans [restate plans if needed], which plan has had the most positive most effect in Gulfport since Hurricane Katrina, and why?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 2A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 3:

From the list of plans [restate plans if needed], which plan has had the most negative effect in downtown Gulfport since Hurricane Katrina, and why?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 3A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 4:
With regard to [Plan or Plans from Question 1], how did implementation effect the outcomes of the plan?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 4A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 5:

With regard to [Plan or Plans from Question 2], how did implementation effect the outcomes of the plan?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 5A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 6:

Almost ten years has passed since Hurricane Katrina; do you believe enough time has passed to begin evaluating or assessing the implementation of plans?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 6A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 7:

Generally, what have been the largest hurdles or challenges during plan implementation?
STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 8:

Generally, were these hurdles or challenges related to the development of the plan?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 8A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 9:

Will the Gulf Coast recover to a Pre-Katrina level, and how long do you anticipate that recovery to take?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 9A:

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTION 10:

Do current plans meet the needs for this recovery to happen, or will future planning be needed?

[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

[IF NEEDED] FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTION 10A:
[PAUSE FOR REPLY]

. . . ASK ADDITIONAL FOLLOW UP PROBING QUESTIONS AS NEEDED

CLOSING AND POST-INTERVIEW

Thank you again, [insert name], for volunteering to participate in this research interview. Following completion of other interviews, would it be fine if I were to re-contact you to ask a few follow-up questions?

[PAUSE FOR YES OR NO, RECORD IN LOGGING TOOL FIELD 12]

Thank you. Have a great day, and thank you again.
Appendix B: APA CPSSP (2015) Plan Grading

See supplemental files.