Copyright by

Charles Daniels Blend

1956
THE TRAGIC HUMANISM OF ANDRÉ MALRAUX:
AN ESSAY OF INTERPRETATION

DISSERETATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State University

By

CHARLES DANIELS BLEND, B. A., M. A.

The Ohio State University
1955

Approved by:

Adviser
Department of Romance Languages
Preface

This essay has as a basis two major assumptions: that, viewed as whole, the works of André Malraux form a tragic poem on a humanistic theme and that such a poem can produce an attitude toward human existence that is both noble and productive. Such hypotheses as these of course require considerable proof; therefore, much of the early part of this paper will consist of an effort to justify the use of the foregoing terms.

The nature and component elements of Malraux's humanism will be discussed as well as their presence and evolution in his writings. The last two are particularly important in view of the frequently made charge that Malraux has done a complete volte-face, and the use of such phrases as "l'impossible déchéance d'André Malraux." By examination of his works in chronological order it will be demonstrated that, far from undergoing any radical revolution, the ideas stated in his early works proceed through a steady evolution that enriches but does not fundamentally alter them. To use Malraux's own image, they are like the tree that grows continually while still retaining, in another form, the original seed. As in
a musical composition, the themes are all present; what takes place is a shift of emphasis. For Malraux, this can be stated in oversimplified terms by saying that he moved from action to art. We hope to show that this shift is made within one attitude toward human existence and that one of the major reasons for it lies in the necessity to "vaincre sans se trahir," a leit-motif that runs through all his work.

Malraux himself would be the last to consider his attitude toward life as an isolated phenomenon in the history of world though since he makes it quite clear that each new creation nourishes itself on its predecessors and contemporaries and then revolts against them to synthesize something new of its own. For this reason we will try to indicate other currents of thought that contributed to the formation of Malraux's philosophy. Like much of French and other Occidental thinking, Malraux's has it roots deep in ancient Greece and to be even more specific in AEschylus. One of the points that this dissertation will attempt to demonstrate is that if there are intermediaries between Malraux and Hellenic thought they are not to be found so much in the Renaissance as in Pascal, Nietzsche, and those who developed the existentialist philosophy such as Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Heidegger. There are, in addition, remarkable parallels with ideas
expressed by such men as Alfred de Vigny, Flaubert, Unamuno and Albert Camus. In most or all of these cases there are important differences as well as similarities. At least one other influence made itself felt in the formation of Malraux's world-view: his frequent and intimate contacts with the Orient. All of these parallels and divergences will be noted as the individual aspects occur in the consideration of Malraux's works, rather than in any special unit of the dissertation.

The ultimate purpose of this essay is to present all of foregoing elements as fused into a poetic vision of the world and man's destiny which is Malraux's own, and which of the visions of his predecessors, most resembles that of AESchylus and his heroic Promethean concept.
Dedication

To the memory of my brother, the late George W. Blend, Captain, Cavalry, AUS, with whom I knew la fraternité virile, and who showed by example that life can be lived with dignity while one is fully aware of approaching death.

C.B.
Acknowledgements

Above all I should like to express my gratitude to Professor Don L. Demorest of Ohio State University for the unstinted help and encouragement that he gave me in the preparation of this essay. Secondly, I wish to thank my wife Rhoda C. Blend not only for her inspiration, but also for the extensive aid she has given me by proofreading, collation, and similar tasks including the compilation of bibliography.

My thanks are also due to the Institute of International Education and the government of the United States for the Fulbright grant for study in France, without which it would have been impossible for me to obtain much of the necessary material.

Last but far from least I should like to thank my subject André Malraux for his kindness in reading the article that contained the nucleus of this dissertation and giving me valuable comment on it.
# Table of Contents

List of abbreviations .......................................................... ix

I. **Humanism and Tragic Poetry** ................................. 1

- Meanings of humanism, the Greek tragic vision, Malraux's tragic vision,
  Malraux as poet, fertility of tragedy

II. **Toward a Promethean Humanism** ................. 55

- Man-universe relationship in Greece, Christianity; rise of science, the
  Promethean tragic current, Pascal, the role of Nietzsche, The Birth of
  Tragedy, contemporary humanism

III. **The Sources: Absurdity, Anguish and Revolt.** 109

- The decline of faith, the collapse of systems, rise of the absurd, action
  versus anguish, the sens héroïque, valeurs versus assouvissement, action
  becomes revolt.

IV. **Ethos, or the Struggle with the Beast** ........ 154

- Man's internal flaw as extension of destiny, the dilemma of force, the
  individual and the order, isolation, la dignité humaine, le sens héroïque,
  martyrdom, vaincre sans se trahir, la fraternité virile, ethical debate
  in L'Espoir, the three books

V. **A Humanistic AEsthetic, or the Struggle with the Gods.** 267

- The artist as rival of the gods, art as re-creation, the vistory over death and time, resurrection and metamorphosis, art as interrogation.

VI. **The Fundamental, or the Struggle with the Earth.** 321

- La notion d'homme, the failure of the intellectuals, the walnut trees of Altenburg, young Berger's experience, awareness of the fundamental
struggle, the need for experience, from experience to conscience.

VII. The Problem of the Absolute... 355
The universal desire for an absolute, undesirable results of absolute, isolation, dogmatism; the religious and political parallel, the break-up of the absolute, the role of history, the relativized absolute.

VIII. The Individual and Society... 374
Rejection of extreme individualism, role of christianity, the individual nourished by society and enriching it in turn.

Conclusion... 387

Bibliography... 403
Table of Abbreviations

Works by Malraux

DJE   D'Une Jeunesse Européenne
LALC  Preface by Malraux to L'Amant de Lady Chatterly by D. H. Lawrence
LC    Les Conquérants
LCA   La Création Artistique
LCH   La Condition Humaine
LE    L'Espoir
LMA   La Monnaie de l'Absolu
LMI   Le Musée Imaginaire
LMISM Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale
LNA   Les Noyers de l'Altenburg
LTM   Le Temps du Mépris
LTO   La Tentation de l'Occident
LVR   La Voie Royale
LVS   Les Voix du Silence
PNL   In Panorama de la Nouvelle Littérature, edited by Gaëtan Picon.
QLO   Preface by Malraux to Qu’Une larme dans l’océan by Manès Sperber.
S     Preface by Malraux to Sanctuaire by William Faulkner
Sat   Saturne
SC    Scènes Choisies

ix
Works by Nietzsche

N, BGE  Beyond Good and Evil
N, BT   The Birth of Tragedy
N, EH   Ecce Homo
N, Z    Thus Spake Zarathustra

Other Works

AMTI André Malraux and the Tragic Imagination by W. M. Frohock.
AR  The Anatomy of Revolution, by Crane Brinton.
CFN  The Contemporary French Novel by Henri Peyre.
DC  Descriptions Critiques by Claude Roy.
EM  An Essay on Man, by Ernst Cassirer.
Ex  Existentialism by J. P. Sartre.
F,Corr Correspondance, Gustave Flaubert.
F,TSA La Tentation de Saint Antoine, Gustave Flaubert.
GT  Greek Tragedy by H. D. F. Kitto.
GW  The Greek Way to Western Civilization by Edith Hamilton.
HC  Homage to Catalonia by George Orwell.
HS  Humanismes et Sainteté by Charles Moeller.
K  The Philosophy of Kant
LF  Une Littérature de Fossoyeurs by Roger Garaudy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PB</td>
<td>Prometheus Bound</td>
<td>Aeschylus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RTP</td>
<td>A la Recherche du Temps Perdu</td>
<td>Proust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGM</td>
<td>Servitude et Grandeur Militaires</td>
<td>Alfred de Vigny</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHE</td>
<td>A Short History of Existentialism by Jean Wahl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMM</td>
<td>The Shaping of the Modern Mind by Crane Brinton</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STV</td>
<td>Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida</td>
<td>Miguel de Unamuno</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UP</td>
<td>The Uses of the Past</td>
<td>Herbert Muller</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWI</td>
<td>The World as Will and Idea</td>
<td>Arthur Schopenhauer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I

Humanism and tragic poetry

Je ne sais d'assurés, dans le chaos
du sort,

Que deux points seulement, la souffrance
et la mort

Tous les hommes y vont avec toutes
les villes,

Mais les cendres, je crois, ne sont
jamais stériles.

Alfred de Vigny, Paris

It would perhaps be difficult to find two terms
which have been subject to more varied interpretations than
have humanism and poetry. Like the word democracy, which
along with them has its roots in ancient Greece, they have
come in the course of time to mean many and varied things
to a large number of men, widely scattered in space, time,
and ideology. Relating as they do to an effort to grasp
concepts or abstract ideas, rather than simply to depict
or interpret concrete physical reality, they have lent them­selves easily to multiple versions, each new one being
filtered through the background, personality and purposes
of the individual or group in question. It is significant
that in the short work Existentialism in which Jean-Paul
Sartre defends his philosophy as humanistic he states that there are at least two possible humanistic attitudes. (EX, 58) The exact nature of these approaches is the subject of a later discussion in this essay; the important point being, that in reply to this statement, one of his interlocutors, M. Naville, says that there are at least five or six, and that today everyone considers himself a humanist. (EX, 77)

The word poetry has had a no less varied fortune, starting from its original meaning as a creative work and passing through innumerable interpretations, even being extended to cover such items as postcard versification. As with humanism, there have been almost as many definitions as there have been people interested in the matter.

When, therefore, one attempts to fuse the two terms, it is much the same as constructing an equation that consists of nothing but variables, the saving factor being that for many of us poetry itself bridges the gap and makes available ideas and relationships that are beyond the power of mathematics, science, or expository writing to explain. The introduction of the element of tragedy would at first appear to further confuse the issue since few concepts are more diametrically opposed in the average mind than those of tragedy and humanism, the latter ordinarily being associated with optimism. Here we shall attempt to prove however that a fusion of the components of poetry, tragedy and humanism
is possible, that they are present in the works of André Malraux and that the tragic view of human destiny can be productive. Tragedy is so pervasive, even in Malraux's humanism, that it would be equally accurate to refer to him as a tragic poet of humanism or as the poet of a tragic humanism. Malraux has said of one of his novels, *Le Temps du Mépris*, that:

Le monde d'une oeuvre comme celle-ci, le monde de la tragédie est toujours le monde antique; l'homme, la foule, les éléments, la femme, le destin. Il se réduit à deux personnages, le héros et son sens de la vie. (LTM, 11)

This essay will try to demonstrate that this is the world of all of Malraux's writings, a tragic one, and that as the last line of the epigraph to this chapter states les cendres ne sont jamais stériles.

Most of the earlier interpretations of the word humanism turn around two central ideas: the study of ancient writings, largely Greek, and an emphasis on things human as compared to things divine. A detailed consideration of Malraux's works reveals not so much an advocacy of extended study of Greek thought as the fact that he himself has acquired a world-view which, in its major lines, is very similar to that of the great men of the heroic age of Athens. His references to these men as *ces philosophes qui enseignaient à vivre, ces dieux qui changeaient avec leurs statues*, (LVS, 72) and his frequent use of AESchylus in particular
as a standard of comparison leave little doubt as to his familiarity with, and admiration for, Hellenic culture. Malraux states quite frankly that from his point of view the fundamental discovery of the Greeks was the *mise en question de l'univers*. (LVS, 72) If we can postulate then that Malraux's view of the world is tragic and that his works show interest in the ancient Greeks that is sufficient to qualify him as a humanist in this respect, we must then show that his world-view does parallel that of some of the Attic philosophers, writers and poets. This is a key point, because in view of the enormous heritage that we have received from the Greeks it seems superfluous to state, that whatever their view of human destiny, it was a fertile one. We must now try to determine the nature of that attitude.

Professor Herbert J. Muller of Purdue University has written a book in which he proposes the tragic interpretation of human history as the most pertinent and productive one, and he has significantly called his work *The Uses of the Past*. Realizing that if he is going to base his approach on tragedy he must begin with a study of the people who created it, Professor Muller devotes a great deal of his space to the consideration of the ancient Greeks. In summing up his evaluation of the aims of Hellenic civilization he states that:
The supreme goal of their culture had been the making of men-free, conscious, self-reliant, fully developed men. For me, the last word about Greece belongs to the supreme humanism that created its unique glory. (UP, 137)

In itself, this statement contains nothing that is either new or startling; that the Greek ideal was the well-balanced complete man is accepted by the vast majority of those who have devoted themselves to humanistic studies. For the moment the important thing in this passage is the double presence of the words conscious and humanism, since the use of the first of them always implies the question: conscious of what? The answer to this becomes clear in the following lines from the same pages:

Even the tragic poets, who taught the nemesis of pride, expressed the pride of humanism. The Greeks were the originators of Tragedy because of their very zest for life, which made them feel more poignantly than other peoples 'the pathos of mortality,' the ultimate vanity. (UP, 137)

Here then we arrive at the crux of the problem, the creation by the same people of the concept of the complete, conscious man, and of Tragedy, which in the end must lead to the annihilation of this same man. There is little room for error in the interpretation of these lines. The prime requirement, the very essence of tragedy, lies in a full consciousness that the end of individual human existence is death. At this point in consideration of tragedy as a source of fertility, one more element must be introduced. Even if one feels sure that the end of life is death his
outlook is not necessarily tragic in the Greek sense. For it to become so he must feel that this life itself is worth living. In other words he must experience the zest for life of which Professor Muller speaks.

There is ample evidence to support an assumption that this tragic awareness was a common phenomenon among the ancient Greeks. One of the leading scholars in the field, Professor H. D. F. Kitto, states that this attitude was habitual with them. (G, 59) In *Humanisme et Sainteté*, Moeller refers to this lucid acceptance of a tragic destiny as one of their most attractive traits. (HS, 77) Edith Hamilton is even more specific in depicting the attraction that great numbers of the Greek citizenry felt for the tragic turn of thought.

Tragedy is an achievement peculiarly Greek. They were the first to perceive it and they lifted it to its supreme height. Nor was it a matter that directly touches only the great artists who wrote tragedies; it concerns the entire people as well, who felt the appeal of the tragic to such a degree that they would gather thirty thousand strong to see a performance. In tragedy the Greek genius penetrated farthest and it is a revelation of what was most profound in them. (GW, 177)

If then we view the Greek theater as a symbolic manifestation of the Attic vision of human destiny we see that for them man is an actor in a tragic drama and that he is fully conscious of his fatal flaw—his mortality.

In his classic work on the subject, *The Greeks*, Professor Kitto quotes the passage containing the image of
the leaves and the trees in Homer's *Iliad* in order to illustrate the basic nature of this tragic sentiment of life as it was experienced by the creators of Hellenic culture:

As is the life of the leaves, so is that of men. The wind scatters the leaves to the ground: the vigorous forest puts forth others, and they grow in the spring season. Soon one generation of men comes and another ceases. (G, 61)

There are several things worth noting in these few lines from the greatest of all epic poets. Nothing is more vital for a profound comprehension of the essential quality of Greek thought and creative activity than to realize that Homer sang of the heroic achievements of men while he was fully aware that they must eventually disappear from the face of the earth. There is no promise held out here of another life to come for the individual generations, as entities they cease. Each human being then is conscious that his existence as a personality is a transitory one. There is, however, the other side of the medal: men pass from the scene but man goes on indefinitely. We must say indefinitely, not necessarily eternally because at best the eternity of man is only a hypothesis, confirmed for some, it is true, by mystic experience or by religious faith. That the Greeks had these is extremely doubtful. What remained was the question concerning the unknown, which, if anything, would serve only to deepen the sense of tragedy.
To return to our image, a tree is not eternal, its life is a long, unpredictable quantity. The Greek attitude toward the problem of the eternity or the passing of mankind was neither one of affirmation nor one of categorical denial; it was, to use Malraux's terms *l'opinion* *êtres* question qui fut *la voix même de la Grèce*. (LVS, 72) To the certainty that the individual life would end in death was added therefore the tragic uncertainty as to whether or not the ultimate destiny of humanity and all its works was oblivion. This, as Edith Hamilton points out, is brought home poignantly by Greek tragedy. "Greek tragedy brings before us the strangeness that surrounds us, the dark unknown our life is bounded by." (GW, 177)

Of all the Attic tragedies, the one which perhaps dramatizes more than any other the distilled essence of this vision of human existence is AEschylus' *Prometheus Bound*. The Titan, unjustly chained to the rock of his destiny, is fully aware of the implications of his situation and of the fact that there is no way out of it except an abject surrender which would place supreme and final authority in the hands of Zeus. It is worthy of note also that, although the Greeks were fond of incarnating their gods in human form, Zeus does not appear in person in this play. He remains a vague, malignant force, never seen, which embodies the reasons for Prometheus' fate. Even the two agents which act for him
are abstractions: Power and Force. With reference to this unfathomable quality of Zeus, Professor Kitto cites the remark: 'His mind is an abyss which no eye can fathom' from Pohlenz Griechische Tragödie. His comment on it is that it is 'true, tragic, completely AEschylean and must never be forgotten.' (GT, 21) In short this is a struggle with an invisible, unknowable destiny, with which the victim can never actually come to grips.

However, although Prometheus knows his fate and knows that it is unjust, his spirit is unbroken and he resolutely faces his destiny rather than to yield and accept a humiliating defeat. In all this his greatest grandeur derives from the fact that he wills to resist while fully conscious that this decision condemns him to a horrible fate. The direct inheritor of his AEschylean awareness was not the humanistic scholarship of an optimistic Renaissance but Pascal's:

L'homme n'est qu'un roseau, le plus faible de la nature, mais c'est un roseau pensant. Il ne faut pas que l'univers entier s'arme pour l'écraser: une vapeur, une goutte d'eau, suffit pour le tuer. Mais quand l'univers l'écraserait, l'homme serait encore plus noble que ce qui le tue, parce qu'il sait qu'il meurt, et l'avantage que l'univers a sur lui; l'univers n'en sait rien. (Pascal, 488)

This is not meant to imply that Pascal's attitude coincides entirely with that of Prometheus. The latter defies the gods while Pascal says that rien n'est plus lâche que faire le brave contre Dieu. (Pascal, 422) What they have in common is the grandeur that derives from the fact that they are
aware of the extreme precariousness of their position. Both also know that their intellect cannot give them the ultimate answer as to why it should be so. After all, in spite of his great abilities, Prometheus could not come to grips with Zeus. In his Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche, whose influence Malraux acknowledges, pin-points the problem of this final tragic awareness and its effect:

When to his dismay he sees how logic coils around itself at these limits and finally bites its own tail—then the new form of perception rises to view, namely tragic perception.... (N, BT, 1081)

To sum all this up, the *sine qua non* of tragedy is an attribute which belongs to man alone: the consciousness, perception, or awareness of the presence of destiny. It is difficult to conceive of a tragic cow.

Up to this point we have treated the concept of the fatal flaw as being the representation of forces which, in a sense, operate on man from the exterior. This, of course gives only one aspect of the situation and therefore both falsifies and over-simplifies it. There are also the elements that are inherent in men and which work toward their destruction. These are the attributes that fall under the general heading of the term "fatal flaw" as Aristotle employs it and which we shall see Malraux refer to as manifestations of *la bête* or *le démon* in man. In the final analysis they are the defects in human nature that damage or destroy the possibility of harmonious relationships.
between men and which often lead to the annihilation of men individually or in groups. They are simply the operation of destiny on a different level. In one form or another and in varying degrees they are, like mortality, omnipresent. To deny the existence of this flaw is to take a position that is as false as to assume one which is blind to the transitory quality of human life. Both of these aspects of destiny work for the destruction of man, and both must be consciously faced and fought. It is here that AEschylus and Aristotle complement each other, the former being primarily occupied with the exterior forces, the latter dealing largely with the interior ones. As Professor Kitto states, there is no direct relation between the Prometheus Bound and Aristotle's theory. (GT, 21) Prometheus is the victim of an unjust situation into which he is forced by powers external to himself, and the essential tragedy resides in his full awareness of this fact, and his reaction to it. In his Greek Tragedy Kitto repeatedly emphasizes this particular point.

The essence of Old Tragedy was the solitary hero facing his own destiny or playing out an inner drama of his own soul-like Pelagus. (GT, 33)

For the essential drama is precisely his present mind. (GT, 63)

The solitary hero is everything; and not what he does, but what he feels and is. (GT, 67)

If we turn to a consideration of a tragedy with which
Aristotle dealt, Sophocles' *OEdipus Tyrannus*, we find the fatal flaw operating from within man, but the hero is still aware of its existence. Why else did OEdipus dig out his eyes, unless he was conscious of the defect in himself and wished to look within in order to face it squarely?

At this point it is necessary to recapitulate briefly what has been established thus far and then to discover to what degree the conclusions reached can also be applied to the ideas of André Malraux. All of the scholars considered have concurred in the belief that Tragedy represents the most profound and typical contribution of ancient Greek culture, that it is an artistic manifestation of the Attic attitude toward human existence, and that this attitude is the product of the opposition of two factors: a love of life and a consciousness of its limitations. These latter in turn take three major forms. Man, who would like to know and understand his destiny as a species, is aware that he cannot do so. Although he fully appreciates life he is cognizant of the fact that he is mortal. He is conscious that he has within himself certain defects that can destroy his life or that of others. From this triple awareness springs the Greek tragic sentiment of life.

Perhaps the best way to begin to compare this world-view with Malraux's is to keep in mind the Homeric image of the trees and leaves referred to earlier while considering
the following passage from *Les Voix du Silence*:

Le temps emporte toutes les formes du passé dans la métamorphose qu'il impose au monde entier des hommes et dont notre conscience coïncide avec celle de la durée même; et cette conscience, n'est plus le sentiment d'un voyageur, l'homme, semblable à lui-même devant des paysages changeants de temps, c'est le sentiment que symbolise la graine qui devient arbre-mais les lois de l'arbre nous sont familières...Tout art des vivants insère l'homme dans la grande métamorphose de l'art des morts. *(LVS, 625)*

This is but one of the many times that Malraux uses a tree as symbol for the human race. It is true that we find here an implication of development and expansion that is not contained in the passage from the *Iliad*, however Homer was writing back near the beginning of recorded history and therefore had little or no perspective from which to view possible change and enrichment of mankind. Malraux, on the contrary, stands at the other end of more than two thousand years of constantly accumulating historical knowledge, including a familiarity with the cultures that preceded Homer that is probably far more extensive than the bard himself possessed. In itself this fact would suffice to explain the difference between the two images.

On the vital point the two passages are in agreement: the end is death. If there is any doubt as to what Malraux means by the laws of the tree, the last sentence of the passage, ending as it does with the word *morts* should dispell it. Three pages further on in the same work he changes to
a musical image in order to demonstrate quite clearly that he, like Homer, is writing an epic of man's achievements with a lucid awareness of its final outcome: "Mais cette voix survivante et non pas immortelle élève son chant sacré sur l'intarissable orchestre de la mort." (LVS, 628)

The parallel between Malraux's vision of human existence and that of the Greek tragedians becomes even more striking when in reference to our mortality he says: "Il y a en nous une faille tantôt éclatante et tantôt secrète, qu'aucun dieu ne protège toujours." (LVS, 628)

Here we have returned to the idea expressed earlier that one of man's fatal flaws is the fact that he must die, and that in awareness of this lies one of the sources of tragic feeling. The passages just quoted are of course all from Malraux's *Les Voix du Silence*, which, with the exception of the three volumes of *Le Musée Imaginaire de la sculpture mondiale*, (mostly plates, with very little text) constitutes the most recent expression of his philosophy. This tragic vision of man's existence limited by death has been the point of departure for all of Malraux's works from the beginning of his literary career, and he has never really deviated from it. In his earliest important work, *La Tentation de l'Occident* we find the statement that: "La conscience totale du monde est: mort, et vous l'avez bien compris." (LTO, 125)
In view of the importance that we have seen the ancient Greeks give to awareness and consciousness, the presence of the word conscience here as well as in the first passage cited from Les Voix du Silence is important as indicating an emphasis from first to last on the necessity for man to be aware of the true nature of his destiny. Frequently throughout this essay, I have chosen to retain the French word conscience, rather than to employ its usual English translations: consciousness, awareness, etc. This was done because none of the English equivalents seem to convey the particular spiritual intensity that writers such as Malraux give to the term conscience.

As we have said earlier with reference to the Greeks, the fact that a man is conscious that the ultimate end of all life is death is not in itself necessarily tragic. That Malraux even at this early date in his career regarded this awareness of man's mortality as tragic is made abundantly evident by the letters which Ling writes to his European correspondant.

Les rares visages apaisés que je voudrais aimer, un destin tragique pèse sur leurs paupières baissées: ce qui vous les a fait choisir c'est de les savoir les élues de la mort. (LTO, 30)

Vous avez chargé l'univers d'angoisse. Quelle figure tragique vous avez donnée à la mort. (LTO, 36)

These particular passages represent the point of view of an Oriental who is studying European culture and
who takes an extremely critical attitude toward it. As a
device for the analysis of a society this is nothing new;
Montesquieu used it with great effect in his *Lettres Persanes*
to pillory what he rejected in the France of his time. This
parallel in technique should not however lead one to make
the mistake made by a recent article on Malraux, (New Yorker,
Nov. 6, 1954, p. 54) namely to conclude that *La Tentation
de l'Occident* represents a rejection by him of such European
attitudes as the one implied by the foregoing quotations.
The remedy offered by Ling is an Oriental one of contemplation
and meditation, with no tendency toward action, and ending
in a peace where the problem of human mortality is of no
importance—a sort of Nirvana. Had the A.D. of the book
accepted this solution the assumption that Malraux had
chosen the peaceful Oriental attitude in preference to the
tragic one would have been justified. However, the last
word is the European’s and it is a specific rejection of
anything that will dull his awareness of life's tragic
dimension: "Sans m'incliner, je t'apporte chaque jour la
paix en offrande. Lucidité avide, je brûle encore devant
toi, flamme solitaire et droite." (LTO, 125)

To realize how close this is to the spirit of antique
tragedy we have only to recall Professor Kitto's statement
that the essence of this tragedy was the solitary hero facing
his destiny and playing out his soul-drama. (GT, 33) In *La*
Tentation de l'Ocident it is true that Malraux rejects many aspects of the Europe of the period, but not the lucid consciousness of the fact that man, who is mortal, would like to be immortal. Whether his field of activity be archeology or politics, art or revolution, not only is the hero of any of Malraux's works aware of life's tragic quality but he realizes also that nowhere but in this awareness can he find a genuine basis for his life and actions. Garine, engaged in a revolution, while no more than half believing in it, is penetrated with le sentiment de la vanité de toute vie, (LC, 169) and sets this up as the basic principle of his action: "Pas de force, même pas de vraie vie sans la certitude, sans la hantise de la vanité du monde." (LC,229)

The feeling expressed in these lines very closely parallels that which Professor Muller refers to as the source of Greek tragedy: the pathos of mortality, the ultimate vanity. (UP, 137) In La Voie Royale, Perken and Claude Vannec are engaged in an archeological expedition, and few things better illustrate man's ability to create something that will go on after his death than do the ruins which archeologists discover. In spite of this both men are fully aware that la mort est là...comme l'irréfutable preuve de l'absurdité de la vie. (LVR, 106)

In his discussion of the Homeric tree image cited earlier in this chapter Professor Kitto says that from this
awareness of mortality springs the passionate tension which is the spirit of tragedy. (G, 61) If with this in mind we consider the following passage from La Voie Royale we find that one of its leading characters is experiencing exactly this same tension, arising from the same source:

Mais accepter vivante la vanité de son existence, comme un cancer, vivre avec cette tiédeur de mort dans la main...(D'où montait, sinon, d'elle, cette exigence de choses éternelles, si lourdement impregnée de son odeur de chair?) (LVR, 40)

We are dealing here with a man who is not only going after monuments of a dead past while tragically aware of the fleeting nature of his own life, but who is also fully conscious of the fact that in this awareness is the true source and basis of his action for he says that: ce n'est pas pour mourir que je pense à ma mort, c'est pour vivre. (LVR, 108) This concept of living in the full awareness of death is tied all the more closely to Greek tragedy when we examine, in the light of Professor Kitto's reference to "passionate tension" as a source of tragedy, the lines which immediately follow this last quotation:

Cette tension de la voix n'était celle d'aucune autre passion: une joie poignante, sans espoir, comme une épave tirée des profondeurs aussi lointaines que celle de l'obscurité. (LVR, 108)

What we have here is basically the same statement as the one by which Professor Kitto defines the source of tragedy. A passionate tension produced specifically by the conflict between the knowledge of death and the desire for life.
The exact nature of this tension, *une joie poignante* is reserved for discussion in another context later in this chapter. It suffices for the moment to point out the essentially tragic quality of Malraux's world view in the in this novel. Although the term tragic occurs rarely or not at all in the story itself the author himself refers to it in a brief note at the end of the book as the *initiation tragique* of a projected series of books. In it one also finds a second of the forms of tragic awareness which is characteristic of the ancient Greeks: man's inability to know his ultimate destiny or the reason for his existence—the dark unknown which Edith Hamilton says Greek tragedy brings to us (GW, 177) and which Malraux calls *cette insupportable préméditation de l'inconnu*. There can be no doubt that he regards this particular type of tragic perception (to borrow Nietzsche's term) as a basis for a way of life since he states quite directly that *l'absence de finalité donnée à la vie était devenue une condition d'action.* (LVR, 40)

With *La Condition Humaine* the scene shifts back to revolutionary action, but the basic motivation remains the same. The title itself immediately brings to mind the Pascalian image for man's fate: a group of imprisoned men who each day see some of their fellow prisoners killed and who know that the same fate awaits them. This book, generally regarded as the greatest of Malraux's novels, is an epic
of man's struggle to improve his own life and that of others, but it is a tragic epic of *l'homme qui souffre et qui sait qu'il mourra.* (LCH, 176) In an analysis which covers just about every major character in the book Gisors says that all of them suffer from the knowledge of their mortality, and that with the exception of Kyo they require some sort of anodyne to dull their awareness of it. (LCH, 271) Kyo is also conscious of this flaw but faces it resolutely. Without referring to it as such Gisors makes it very clear that the starting point for all of them is still the consciousness that although man might like to be immortal he is not.

Tous souffrent, songea-t-il et chacun souffre parce qu'il pense. Tout au fond, l'esprit ne pense l'homme que dans l'éternel, et la conscience de la vie ne peut être qu'angoisse. (LCH, 400)

The next Malraux book to appear was *Le Temps du Mépris.* Early in this chapter we quoted a passage from the preface in which the author stated that the world of this work was the world of antique tragedy. (LTM, 11) From the point of view of comparison with Greek tragedy it is interesting to note that this book, which refers to AESchylus in the preface, is like the *Prometheus Bound* the story of a man unjustly imprisoned for what he at least interprets as service to men: organizing them to defend their rights as workers. One needs only to recall that Prometheus was chained to his rock for giving fire to the human race and the parallel
becomes obvious. Internally it is further connected with the Promethean legend by the use of four separate times of a vulture image. The significance of these images will be analysed later; at this point they are simply presented as one more evidence of the relation between Greek thought and the work of André Malraux.

L'Espoir, which followed Le Temps du Mépris was primarily concerned with the complex problem of the Spanish Civil war and of all of Malraux's works it is the one the least permeated with this tragic awareness. To use a phrase which Malraux later employed: il y avait trop de guerre au ras du sol pour l'angoisse métaphysique. (LNA, 181) However, even though it is not discussed at length, the tragic sentiment of life is definitely present and serves as a driving force. In a passage which recalls to mind Gisor's remarks on the subject in la Condition Humaine Garcia says:

Pour un homme qui pense la révolution est tragique. Mais pour un tel homme la vie aussi est tragique. Et si c'est pour supprimer sa tragédie qu'il compte sur la révolution, il pense de travers, c'est tout. (LE, 283)

Although the man who makes this statement has confidence in the ability of the revolution to rectify certain social evils he is fully aware that it can do nothing about the essentially tragic quality of life itself. Garcia, like Kyo, is involved in revolution for the highest of motives: because he believes that it will improve the life of the
people around him. However, he does so with a full knowledge of the finite nature of human existence—not even the revolution can make man eternal.

Like L'Espoir, Les Noyers de l'Altenburg is more tranquil in tone than Malraux's earlier works but the element of tragedy dominates it from beginning to end. Earlier we mentioned that the title of La Condition Humaine evokes the Pascalian image of condemned men forced to witness the execution of their fellow prisoners. In this most recent of Malraux's novels to date this image is quoted practically verbatim from the Pensées. It is referred to many times in the course of the book, and several of the characters use it as a starting point for the development of their ideas, (LNA, 97, 98, 139) but all of them accept the fact that it is a true picture of the human condition.

Une fois de plus Pascal me revient à la mémoire: "Qu'on s'imagine un grand nombre d'hommes dans les chaînes, et tous condamnés à mort, dont les uns étant chaque jour égorgés à la vue des autres, ceux qui restent voient leur propre condition dans celle de leurs semblables...C'est l'image de la condition des hommes. (LNA, 289)

Les Noyers de l'Altenburg is not basically a book of nihilism or despair, nor is its relatively tranquil quality a sign of resignation. To the contrary, I hope to demonstrate that its primary note is calm confidence. In spite of this, nowhere in Malraux is it made more evident that on the universal scale man counts for nothing, and that awareness of
this is experienced tragically.

Nous savons que nous n'avons pas choisi de naître, que nous ne choisirons pas de mourir. Que nous n'avons pas choisi nos parents. Que nous ne pouvons rien contre le temps. Qu'il y a entre chacun de nous et la vie universelle, une sorte de crevasse. Quand je dis que chaque homme ressent avec force la présence du destin, j'entends qu'il ressent-et presque toujours tragiquement, du moins à certains instants-l'indépendance du monde à son égard. (LNA, 127)

In these few lines all of the external facets of the workings of tragic destiny come into full focus and man stands revealed as the powerless plaything of forces over which he has no control, and which he is even prevented from understanding fully by the presence of une sorte de crevasse between himself and the universal. It would have been difficult to find a better word to express the fundamental nature of this tragic awareness than a crevasse, which is a flaw in the earth's surface. Basically a crevasse or gap consists of nothingness, ungraspable and insurmountable. There is a gap between man's ability to conceive the idea of immortality and his inability to attain it. There is another between his consciousness of his position and his anguishing knowledge that he cannot understand why it should be so. Finally, there is the enormous gap between the formulation of the concept of an ultimate destiny of the human race and the inability to perceive exactly what that destiny will be. On the metaphysical level, the tragic sentiment, for the Greeks as for Malraux, is the product of
the conscious facing of the fact that these gaps exist.

The lucid acceptance of such conditions imposes a terrible burden on men and it is certainly understandable if the majority of humans choose some other attitude. Regardless of any shortcomings they may have as individuals, the heroes of Malraux's works, be they fictional or artists who actually lived, do accept them and face them. If we can grant this consistent attitude on the part of the men about whom Malraux writes, and the fact he directly states it as the basis for action in a philosophical work, *Les Voix du Silence* as proof that it reflects the tragic weltanschauung of the author himself, then we should be able to apply to Malraux the same epithet which Edith Hamilton applied to AEschylus: "a soul great enough to bear a new and intolerable truth." (GW, 127) The truth although no longer new is none the less true. Miss Hamilton adds: "that is AEschylus, the first writer of tragedy." It is also André Malraux, a writer of twentieth century tragedy, or to put it more accurately, a writer of tragedy in the twentieth century. The writers change with the passage of the centuries, the essence of tragedy does not.

Earlier in this chapter we noted that for the Greeks destiny was a two edged sword working both externally and internally against man since he also contains within himself flaws which work toward his destruction. The type to which
Aristotle referred and which Malraux calls either the démon or the bête in man. Just as with the exterior aspects of destiny, so is Malraux from his earliest works aware of the existence of this other tragic flaw in man. The presence of the demon is just as tragically permanent as is that of death and must be struggled against with a full awareness that his duration will be equal to that of man himself.

The optimistic doctrines of consistent human progress which developed in the eighteenth century in western Europe and of which the United States and Russia are today the leading exponents reposed to a great extent on the belief that the advance of human knowledge and technical progress would gradually eliminate the démon from man. The rejection of this doctrine by Malraux and men like him, usually referred to as pessimists, has always derived quite simply from the tragic conviction that nothing will remove the démon. His continuing presence must be recognized and an unending struggle against him carried on. This then is the final aspect of tragic awareness.

In Les Conquérants it is the demon that makes Garine and the narrator feel a sort of fascination for the tortured body of Klein and it is the action of this flaw pushed almost to the ultimate that reduces Grabot to a pathetic and ridiculous animal in La Voie Royale.

The bête is omnipresent in La Condition Humaine and
the book has hardly begun before we find that Tchen is aware of this conflict in human nature as he finds himself écrasé à la fois par l'horreur et le goût du sang. (LCH, 50) The guard who beats the harmless fool in the prison is an example of the beast in man taking over complete control and here for the first time Malraux associates the action of destiny on this level, with its action on the external level by his reference to it as: "une immonde fatalité, comme si le pouvoir eût suffi à changer tout homme en bête." (LCH, 338)

With the use of the word fatalité, which has always been used as a term to describe the inexorable working of destiny, in this context of human degradation we begin to get the first glimpse of a theme that will become more and more evident in Malraux's works. When a man gives in to the démon in himself he is doing nothing more or less than to act as an instrument of destiny for the destruction of man. That is to say that on the human level he reduces man to the same state of dependence that the other aspects of destiny reduce him to on the cosmic level. Action on the two different levels is further associated in this book by the statement concerning another vicious performance that it had: ce qu'a toujours de sacré la présence de l'inhumain. (LCH, 180) Once again inhuman action and that which is out of man's grasp have the same effect.

We have said earlier that Kyo carried on revolutionary
activity for the betterment of mankind while fully aware of the nothingness to which all human effort may ultimately come. He also does so with a full consciousness of man's tragic inner flaw, not only in others but in himself:

Kyo se débattait de toute sa pensée contre l'ingnominie humaine: il se souvient de l'effort qui lui avait toujours été nécessaire pour fuir les corps suppli­ciés vu par hasard: il lui fallait, littéralement, s'en arracher. Que des hommes puissent frapper un fou pas même méchant, sans doute vieux, à en juger par la voix, et approuver cette supplice, appelait en lui la même terreur.... (LCH, 338)

However superior to Garine and Perken Kyo may be in some respects, he too is aware of the fact that he has in him the same flaw, the same destructive potentialities, the same démon.

This brings us once again to Le Temps du Mépris, in which Kassner, like Kyo, is working for others. Malraux, as we have already seen, associates this novel with the world of antique tragedy. If these two men were really complete Marxists they should believe that what is bad in man is simply a result of economic servitude and can therefore be removed by freeing him from this burden. Although Le Temps du Mépris revolves around one of the very few of Malraux's Communist heros who never questions party doctrine, the author's tragic vision of man is unaltered and we find that the demon is still present in the lieux interdits du coeur où sont ac­croupis la torture et la mort. (LTM, 84) The picture of a crouching beast evoked by these words conveys exactly the
nature of this flaw. It is ever present and ever alert, awaiting only the slightest let-down in order to spring into full, terrible activity. The moment at which this particular awareness is attributed to Kassner also has its significance. He is not in the presence of torture or death when this sentiment passes through him; he is witnessing a mass meeting of the people who support his cause, including his own wife. In short, nothing destroys his awareness of the flaw in human nature.

_Le Espoir_ has often been considered as an apologetic for Communism and the revolution but there is a recurrent note in it that is not one of Marxist faith in the perfecting of man by a change in the social order. To the contrary, one finds García's categorical statement that aucun état, aucune structure sociale ne créé la noblesse de caractère. (LE, 282) This is further reinforced by his remark that: "Le perfectionnement morale, la noblesse sont des problèmes individuels, où la révolution est loin d'être engagée directement." (LE, 157) These observations like those from _La Condition Humaine_ and _Le Temps du Mépris_ are made by men who are working for what they hope will be a better and more just society. They are nonetheless completely aware that even this better life will not extirpate the demon from man. The last quotation in particular makes this obvious. By reducing it to an individual problem Malraux makes it clear
that regardless of the framework within which he lives man will always have this tragic flaw, and that he will have to face it and fight as an individual. In L'Espoir Malraux uses both la bête and le démon with reference to the destructive potentialities inherent in the human being. The constant awareness of their existence, both in individuals and in groups, is underlined by the warning: "Il savait qu'il ne faut pas tenter la bête en l'homme...la vengeance contre l'atroce rend les masses aussi folles que les hommes." (LE, 220)

It is in this same book that we find the first example of a tendency that Malraux will develop more fully in later works: that of referring to manifestations of this flaw in man as aspects of le démon. In a remark that has theological overtones one of the characters says: "Les cathédrales luttalent pour tous avec tous contre le démon, -qui d'ailleurs a la gueule de Franco." (LE, 39) Here Malraux is as close to the religious attitude concerning the demon in man as he ever gets. He is on common ground with the theological position in recognizing that human nature has this evil in it but he is no more prone to blame it on the doctrine of original sin than were Greeks who did not know such a doctrine existed. The other point of divergence is the one which deepens the tragic significance of this fatal flaw. The religious man can turn to God for help in con-
trolling this element in his nature and if he succeeds the reward of paradise may be his. The person who regards human existence as fully tragic in the same way that Malraux and the Greeks do must however accomplish this task alone and unaided while aware that any chance he might have of being personally rewarded for it will end with his life. Like Professor Kitto's solitary hero of old Tragedy he must play out his soul-drama by himself. The significance of the increasing development of this theme of mankind's Aristotelian fatal flaw in the novels which mark the high water mark of Malraux's faith in the revolution is inescapable. Whatever be his degree of confidence in the movement toward a better world it could not blind his tragic awareness of the permanence of the démon in man.

One of the most dramatic demonstrations of man's fatal tendency to destroy man, in all of Malraux's works is the gas attack on the Russian front in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. No episode that he ever wrote points up more sharply his conviction that the advance of science and technical progress have no effect whatever on the terrible shortcomings in human nature. Scientifically speaking, the gas attack is a complete triumph and the Russian front line troops are wiped out. The effect on Vincent Berger, however, is the same as that of prison brutality on Kyo: a horrified awareness of man's leaning toward evil.
Ce n'était pas la paralysie devant le danger, c'était le bouleversement panique; sans doute les croyants appellent-ils présence du démon une semblable visite de l'épouvante. L'Esprit du Mal ici était plus fort encore que la mort.... (LNA, 230)

As the passage states, some types of religious believers may consider that such a horrible situation is due to the presence of the devil, but for Malraux it is not necessary to look any further than man himself and the flaw in his nature. Earlier in the book he has said very simply and directly that *il faut connaître l'homme pour reconnaître les voies du démon.* (LNA, 126)

One might expect that in the art works which followed these novels this particular phase of tragic awareness would decline but the converse is true. In addition to the books that make up *Le Musée Imaginaire* and *La Psychologie de l'Art* proper Malraux has written another, *Saturne,* devoted entirely to one artist: Goya. Along with this he wrote the introduction to a complete collection of Goya's etchings. It has been the custom of some critics, notably Claude Mauriac, to place a great emphasis on the importance of eroticism in Malraux's novels, but it is not the Goya of *La Maja Desnuda* who most deeply interests him. The thread which runs through all of the great Spaniard's etchings is man's inhumanity to his fellows, and one of the two paintings from which *Saturne* takes its title depicts a giant man devouring a smaller one. A graphic, plastic delineation of *le démon* in man. The other,
allowing a giant dreaming with his head among the stars represents the noble half of man's duality. The aspects of Goya's art which most profoundly affect Malraux are those in which the demon is present, and any doubts as to what he (Malraux) means by this term are completely dispelled, for he at last gets around to defining it: "...pour un agnostique une des définitions possibles du démon est: ce qui en l'homme, aspire à le détruire. C'est ce démon-là qui fascine Goya." (Sat. 110)

These lines situate the démon as well as define him. He is simply a personification of those fatal flaws in human nature, the defects, which if not ceaselessly fought and controlled, will bring about man's misery and destruction. The prefatory pour un agnostique and the phrase en l'homme center the problem squarely in man and in no transcendental source. In short, we are, as was stated earlier, face to face with the question of the Aristotelean hamartia stated in somewhat different terms, but with the essence unchanged.

One also finds in Saturne, by implication at least, Malraux's rejection of any attitude, religious or otherwise, which tends to obscure awareness of the omnipresence of le démon. The author of Les Voix du Silence makes it very clear that he has little feeling for the art of Raphael and the Italian school around him, an art distinguished to a great degree by its peaceful, tranquil Madonnas. In Malraux's
terms a "reconciled" art. Basically he rejects it because in his eyes it depicts a false world. The fundamental reason for its falsity is set forth in *Saturne* where he says: "l'italianisme n'est autre chose que l'expression du monde où le démon n'existe pas." (Sat, 11)

For Malraux then, truly great art, like tragedy, demands a full consciousness of man's internal flaw as well as of his external one, and in this work on Goya we get further evidence that the author associates the working of the two very closely. Man's inhumanity has the same effect as the nonhuman aspect of destiny. Malraux is once more speaking about the Goya of the *Caprichos* and the *Desastres de la Guerra* when he says: "C'était à la mort métaphysique, et d'abord à son expression peremptoire, la cruauté, que Goya entendait répondre." (Sat, 111)

For Malraux, this Goya who was obsessed with man's cruelty to his own kind, that is to say, with the démon in man, was the immediate predecessor of modern art. Whether or not this is actually true is naturally subject to dispute by art critics and historians, but the important thing here is that this is the situation as Malraux sees it. Therefore, in *Les Voix du Silence*, which is in almost every respect the most complete synthesis and expression of his thought and philosophy, one would expect to find the role of the démon integrated into the work and playing an important part in it.
This is so, and using both the terms démon and bête the author leaves no doubt concerning the permanence, complexity and danger of their presence in man. He feels that one of the reasons for the renaissance of interest in barbaric and fetish arts lies in the fact that they show the ever-presence of the devil. In lines which both repeat and expand the concept of le démon expressed in Satyrne Malraux states that:

De la guerre démon majeur, aux complexes, démons mineurs, la part démoniaque, présente plus ou moins subtilement dans tous les arts barbares, rentrait en scène.
Son domaine est celui de tout ce qui en l'homme, aspire à le détruire. (LVS, 539)

Thus the theme of man's inherent tragic flaw in all the multiple variations of its manifestation runs through the act of faith that is Les Voix du Silence, just as we have seen it do in all of Malraux's preceding writings. The attitude toward awareness of this condition is just the same as at the end of La Tentation de l'Occident where A.D. offers his peace of soul as a sacrifice to the flame of lucidity. (LTO, 125) As in Satyrne, any thing that ends to obscure consciousness of this evil is rejected. Feeling that Rembrandt was aware of it and showed it in his art Malraux speaks of the necessity to être Rembrandt et non Raphael. (LVS, 538) If religion is not completely satisfactory here as an answer to the tragic flaw, the idea of progress is even less so. From Malraux's point of view Judeo-Christian
religion is probably closer to the truth because it at least recognizes the permanent presence of le démon, while the doctrine of progress accepts the probability of his decline and eventual complete extirpation. This optimistic concept is categorically rejected. Referring once more to the rebirth of interest in barbaric art, and applying the term tragique to the type of awareness that this rebirth implies, Malraux gives what he feels to be its true significance.

Ce que veut arracher l'art tragique à coups de résurrections barbares, c'est d'abord le poing imposteur dont la civilisation clôt la bouche de la destinée. Telles de nos resurrections ne mettent pas seulement en question la peinture, mais l'homme. Ce qu'attaquent d'abord toutes ces idoles peintes, c'est l'optimisme occidental. (LVS, 538)

The complex of destructive potentialities which make up man's internal flaw is therefore just as tragically permanent as his mortality and as we have said earlier it operates toward the same end: the reduction of man. It can actually be said to be one of the two major aspects of his inalterably tragic destiny, complimenting on the terrestrial level the action of death and absurdity on the universal level. Destiny is such an important word in Malraux's works that almost every critic who has written on him has tried to explain what he (Malraux) means by it. I have chosen to accept Malraux's own definition of it as expressed in two very poetic lines from Les Voix du Silence: "Le temps coule peut-être vers
l'éternité, et sûrement vers la mort. Mais le destin n'est pas la mort, il est fait de tout ce qui impose à l'homme la conscience de sa condition." (LVS, 628)

Here we have Malraux's full tragic view of human destiny, of which death is only the most obviously certain part, the fatal flaw which runs like a surface vein from one end to the other of his writings, and conditions all his thought and activity. As if this were not enough his tragic man must go on toward his death aware that he will never be able to fully grasp the reason why is is in such an absurd and dependent position. In Malraux's concept of man, as in the case of Prometheus, there is a heroic grandeur to be had by facing this fate with open eyes, and defying it up to and including the moment one is overwhelmed by forces over which he has no control. The maintenance of this heroic attitude is, however, made more difficult by the omnipresence of the inner flaw: the hamartia of Aristotle, the démon or bête of André Malraux. This last, if not faced with full awareness of his permanent presence, will debase and destroy man on the human level just as surely as external forces of destiny will do so on the cosmic level. Man's inhumanity can make of human existence on earth the same sort of absurd dependency that mortality and the unknown make it seem to be in the universe as a whole. Most of mankind, faced with this two-level action of destiny, has
taken refuge from it in religion, science, or a philosophic progress, all of which constitute in one way or another an affirmation of the possibility of solving or at least explaining the problems involved. Like the Greeks, who really conceived the idea of destiny, Malraux rejects these affirmations, feeling that they falsify or obscure the true nature of destiny. For Malraux, man can attain his full grandeur (indeed as we have seen it is the only way he can have a true basis for life and action) in nothing but a full awareness of the double edged nature of his tragic situation, and in endless struggle against it. In his own words man must mettre l'univers en question, (LNA, 129) interrogate and challenge rather than affirm. What we shall refer to as Malraux's humanism is fundamentally nothing more nor less than this struggle against destiny's manifestations on the human and universal levels. As in the case of OEdipus, which dramatizes this battle on the human level, and of Prometheus, which does so on the universal one, the fight is carried on with full consciousness of the overwhelming odds against its ultimate success.

At this point we have seen that these different aspects of tragic awareness were present in the thought of the ancient Greeks, and more particularly, that they served as a basic source for their creation of tragedy. The same double thread (internal and external manifestations of destiny) has been
traced through all of Malraux's works. Both Malraux and the ancient Greeks view man as caught between forces that work from without and within to impose on him the fact that he is mortal and dependent whereas he would like to be immortal. It is therefore basically the same Weltanschaung which produced Greek tragic poetry and the works of André Malraux.

* *

Assuming that we have established that Malraux is a tragic writer in the Attic sense of the word we must next proceed to support the assumption that he is a tragic poet in the tradition of AEschylus. To Professor Frohock must go the credit for first emphasizing the fact that Malraux is essentially a poet, and must be read as such in order to be fully appreciated. As a matter of fact, even one of the apparent defects which Professor Frohock speaks of in Malraux's China novels, their lack of complete and accurate details, (AMTI, XII) is actually a device of the tragic poet, if we can accept Professor Kitto's word on the subject. The latter writes: "The tragic poet does not dramatize the course of the war, but uses the events, some of them, in order to present what he thinks to be its real significance." (G, 184) Malraux uses much the same terms to refer to Le Temps du Mépris, his own tragédie antique: "Les rapports qui permettent au roman sa complexité ne figurent pas ici." (LTM, 11)
There can be little doubt that the object of such a book as *La Condition Humaine* is to show what Malraux feels to be the true significance of the struggle it depicts. Also, it would be difficult if not impossible to reconstruct the whole course of the Shanghai insurrection if one had nothing but this book from which to draw. In this sense, Malraux is following the pattern of the tragic poet as Professor Kitto outlines it.

Professor Frohock's basic reason for treating Malraux as a poet (i.e. his books are documents of what he felt more than of what he thought) (*AMTI*, XII) is in my opinion an excellent and completely acceptable one. It is also worth considering in the light of Edith Hamilton's remark that "tragedy's one essential is a soul that can feel greatly." (*GW*, 131) Thus, if we grant that Malraux's works are tragic and accept Miss Hamilton's and Professor Frohock's emphasis on feeling as a valid one we see that Malraux's books are a fusion of tragedy and poetry. Miss Hamilton actually considers the former to be inseparable from the latter:

> Tragedy belongs to the poets. Only they have 'trod the sunlit heights and from life's dissonance struck one clear chord'. None but a poet can write tragedy. For tragedy is nothing less than pain transmuted into exaltation by the alchemy of poetry. (*GW*, 127)

Like many other authors, Malraux frequently expresses his ideas on literature in prefaces that he writes to other
books. In the one that he wrote for the French edition of William Faulkner's *Sanctuary* we find a statement concerning the tragic poet which on every essential point coincides with Miss Hamilton's definition of tragedy as given in the last sentence of the preceding quotation:

> Le poète tragique exprime ce qui le fascine, non pour s'en délivrer (l'objet de la fascination reparafra dans l'oeuvre suivante) mais pour en changer la nature; car, l'exprimant avec d'autres éléments, il le fait entrer dans l'univers relatif des choses conçues et dominées. Il ne se défend pas contre l'angoisse en l'exprimant, mais en exprimant autre chose avec elle en la réintroduisant dans l'univers. (S, IV)

The action of the tragic poet, according to Malraux, and the one which Miss Hamilton says produces tragic poetry are the same: the transformation of the anguish of existence into another product. Anyone who has followed Malraux's tragic heros through his works knows that this is what takes place in his literary creations—tragic poems in prose.

There are still other things which incline one to think of Malraux as a tragic poet in the Greek sense. We have previously noted the emphasis which both he and the Greeks put on an interrogation or questioning of the universal order of things: *la mise en question*. It is precisely to this attitude that Edith Hamilton attributes the origin of tragedy, and once again poetry is woven into the fabric:

"The spirit of inquiry meets the spirit of poetry and tragedy is born." (GW, 127) Malraux's tragic inquiry into the problem
of man's fate is therefore by nature essentially poetic. Our earlier examination of the sources of Greek tragic awareness also showed that it derived to a great extent from the fact that man, who would like to be immortal, was confronted with the true, transitory nature of his existence, and we have seen this same element present in all of Malraux's writings. With this in mind let us turn to the remarks on poetry made by Malraux in the preface which he wrote for Manès Sperber's *Qu'une larme dans l'océan*:

> Car toute confrontation de l'éphémère et de ce qu'il voudrait éternel appartient à la poésie... Si le roman devient le successeur, non de la poésie de chevalet, mais du poème tragique, ce n'est ni par les mots au sens où l'entendait Mallarmé, ni par les idées. C'est apparemment par une confrontation, à travers les faits, de l'homme et de l'univers-confrontation dont le génie d'Eschyle est inséparable comme celui de Shakespeare. *(QL0, XIX)*

Here Malraux is defining tragic poetry and the novel which may succeed it in terms which apply to his own work. The important thing however, is that, as we have seen, this confrontation also constitutes the essence of Greek tragic poetry. We should then, in view of this as well as the preceding evidence, be justified in referring to him as a tragic poet.

In the foregoing quotation he associates the confronting of man and the universe with AEschylus, and accurately so, since we have seen that the latter dramatizes it in *Prometheus Bound*. Thus the works of André Malraux
derive from the same vision of man as do those of AEschylus; a sombre and heroic vision in which man is faced by unconquerable odds which he defies with an unbroken will. It is perhaps significant that there are striking parallels between the careers of the two men as well as between their works. No one should be surprised that the warrior who fought against the Persian hordes at Marathon sees the world in much the same fashion as the maquis who refused to admit during four years of one-sided struggle that the German armies had completely crushed France. This background of battle is reflected in the same way in both their works. Most critics have remarked, and justly so, that Malraux has never created a female character who really rings true. The few that occur in his novels are impregnated with his own militant attitude. Speaking of Clytemnestra's account of the fall of Troy, Edith Hamilton remarks that it sound less like a woman than like an old soldier's reminiscences. (GW, 134)

We have already gone at length into the nature of Malraux's tragic world vision, and there is no need to restate it here, but if we keep it in mind while examining Miss Hamilton's interpretation of AEschylus the similarity between the two men is too striking to be missed.

Mankind he saw fast bound to calamity by the working of unknown powers, committed to a strange venture, companioned by disaster. But to the heroic, desperate
odds fling a challenge...Life for him is an adventure, perilous indeed, but men are not made for safe havens. And, at the worst, there is that in us which can turn defeat into victory.

In a man of this heroic temper, a piercing insight into the awful truth of human anguish met supreme poetic power, and tragedy was brought into being. (GW, 135)

Both men have this same grim, tragic view of man's situation. AEschylus' response is to consider human existence as an adventure, to hurl a challenge at destiny, to create tragedy. Malraux too has written tragedy and he calls man l'acteur de la plus vaste aventure. (LVS, 634)

As for the challenge flung back at an inexorable and ironic destiny, we have these words from the last paragraph of La Création Artistique:

...mais peut-être est-il beau que l'animal qui sait qu'il doit mourir, en contemplant l'imparable ironie des nébuleuses, lui arrache le chant des constellations; et qu'il le lance au hasard des siècles, auxquels il imposera des paroles inconnues. (LCA, 216)

The writings of André Malraux, and those of AEschylus give off the same fundamental note: conscious defiance of a destiny known to be tragic. It is for this reason that we have chosen to refer to Malraux's humanism as Promethean.

If the reasons we have given for referring to Malraux as a tragic poet (emphasis on feeling, interrogation, and the conflict between the eternal and the ephemeral, etc.) are valid, then his works form a tragic poem, the essence of which is AEschylean.
A detailed analysis of Malraux’s poetic images would be the subject of a different type of study but there are two of them that merit treatment here due to their close relationship to the legend of Prometheus. The first of these, the recurrent theme of the vultures in *Le Temps du Mépris*, is the less important of the two because it is a conscious device used by Malraux to link the work more closely to antique tragedy. It is not however without significance. When we recall that Kassner is being beaten and tortured in a Nazi prison, because he has acted, to the best of his lights, on behalf of mankind, the analogy with Prometheus becomes apparent. Nietzsche had said of the latter that because of his Titan-like love for man Prometheus must be torn apart by vultures. *(N, BT, 967)* Prometheus who brought fire, and Kassner, who brought the light, are both unjustly suffering for their actions, and the Nazi guards who come to beat Kassner are, like Zeus in *Prometheus Bound*, nothing but the vaguest of outlines. Actually the vulture image occurs three times in this short work and each time it is associated in one way or another with human cruelty. All of the appearances of the vulture take place during Kassner’s ordeal in prison and all are largely the results of a semi-delirious reliving of his past life.

Il avait été obsédé par le cauchemar d’un aigle enfermé avec lui dans une cage, et qui lui arrachait des morceaux de chair à chaque coup de son bec en
pioche, sans cesser de regarder ses yeux qu'il convoitait. Le vautour approchait, gonflé de tout le sang noir de l'obscurité, mais la musique était la plus forte. (LTM, 33)

...les derniers lambeaux du firmament reculèrent jusqu'au fond du monde de l'angoisse et prirent peu à peu la forme d'un vautour. (LTM, 36)

Sur le sol nocturne, les corps tombés dessinent un grand vautour au bec énorme et aux ailes arrachées. (LTM, 44)

The parallel between the first of these passages with the vulture tearing at Kassner's flesh and Prometheus who has his liver eaten by the same bird is obvious. In view of the importance that both Malraux and the Greeks give to lucid awareness the significance of the untouched eyes also seems inescapable. They symbolize the consciousness of destiny, that conscience which gives man his true grandeur. All of these images are connected with Kassner's sufferings at the hands of his fellow man, and the last of the three shows us a vulture formed by the dead bodies following a mass execution. It seems safe to assume therefore that the vulture symbolizes the internal tragic flaw of which we have spoken—man's inherent potentialities for destruction and cruelty. The association of the vulture with the firmament in the second quotation would tend to support our hypothesis that Malraux visualizes this inner flaw or démon as acting for the reduction of man in the same ways as do the cosmic aspects of destiny. If one views Malraux's works as a tragic poem in the tradition of AESchylus' Prometheus
Bound their fundamental unity becomes more and more apparent.

The fact that music has the power to make the vulture withdraw leads us to the consideration of the second of Malraux's groups of images with which we will deal here. It is more vital, more AEschylean, more persistent in Malraux's works and it sums up his concept of man's fate, as well as symbolizing what can be done about it. The image can be called the song of defiance. The most complete form if the often-discussed portrayal of Nietzsche singing in the tunnel in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. (LNA, 96) The philosopher, already half mad and near death, is being taken home by rail. The train passes into a tunnel and in the darkness and chaos Nietzsche's voice breaks into a song never before heard, a song which one of his companions refers to as sublime. Like the prison of Pascal, the tunnel with its blackness and confusion symbolizes man's fate. The chant which rises above all the noises of the voyage is man's defiance of his destiny, the divine element of resistance in him which refuses to surrender and creates something new as a direct challenge to the gods. In its essence this is exactly the same as the verses which Prometheus, chained to his rock, hurls at Zeus. Almost without exception, the people who have studied Malraux have seen this incident as his expression of human destiny and the way to revolt against it. This interpretation seems
entirely accurate to me. Perhaps even more important is the fact that this Promethean vision has appeared in a more rudimentary, but basically unaltered form, in several of his earlier works. It would therefore appear to be a poetic image which imposes itself on the writer rather than one which, like the vulture image, was chosen to fit a special work or situation. The full significance of the image may not have been clear even to Malraux when he first put it down, and possibly did not become so until much later. In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg we have Nietzsche facing death, darkness and madness by creating and singing a song, in La Voie Royale we see "l'image ancienne d'un chef barbare prisonnier comme lui, plongé vivant dans la tonne aux vipères, et mourant en hurlant son chant de guerre." (LVR, 129)

The fundamental elements of this situation are the same as in the one dealing with Nietzsche, only the setting is different to fit that of the earlier novel. We have already noted the effect of music on the vulture in Le Temps du Mépris: it forced him to withdraw. The song of defiance has moreover a very close parallel in this book where Kassner, looking over his prison cell, where the sound of music had reached him finds that "Il n'y avait rien autour de lui, rien qu'un creux géométrique dans la pierre énorme, et dans ce trou de la chair à supplice; mais dans ce trou il y aurait mes chants russes et Bach et Beethoven." (LTM, 32)
These three forms of the image are further tied together by the nature of the place in which the victims find themselves: *une tonne, un tunnel, un creux, un trou*. All of them are basically swallowed up in a hole.

In *L'Espoir* the situations are much different but the essential factors are the same. Old Alvear, waiting for possible death at the hands of Franco's Moors says:

> Si les Maures entrent tout à l'heure, la dernière choses que j'aurai entendue sera ce chant d'espoir joué par un aveugle...Ce ne sont pas les dieux qui ont fait la musique, monsieur Scali, c'est la musique qui a fait les dieux. (LE, 234)

Outside his window a blind man is singing the *International*. *L'Espoir* provides us, however, with an even more exact example of the song of defiance. This time it is a republican soldier in battle and destiny takes the form of an enemy tank that is coming toward him. "En son coeur, sans quitter du regard le tank qui vient vers lui, il chante le chant profond des Asturies. Jamais il ne saura davantage ce que c'est qu'être un homme." (LE, 171)

It is to be noted that he faces the tank squarely, fully aware of what it can do to him. He will never know better what it is to be a man. To be a man then for Malraux is to face a hazardous destiny, with full consciousness of its potentialities, and with a song of defiance on one's lips. AESchylus' Prometheus incarnates this same attitude.

In *Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture mondiale*
Malraux tells of another example of the song of defiance, this time connecting it directly to tragedy and to his own art theory.

One might object that we have read more of Prometheus into these passages than Malraux intended since he does not mention the Titan in any of them. However, if we turn again to Saturne where Malraux is talking about Goya's artistic protests against the existence of evil, we find this art is associated with Prometheus: "Goya n'est pas, parce qu'il figure les tortures, le rival du dieu qui les permet; mais parce qu'il fait de chacune d'elles un cri du hululement nocturne de Prométhée. (Sat, 155)

This concept of the cry of defiance is carried still further in Les Voix du Silence, where Malraux mentions Prometheus frequently. In a passage which recalls the one from Saturne but which is given a much broader application, the promethean accent is once more present:

Le hululement prométhéen qui trouva son plus ample accent chez Rembrandt et chez Michel Ange, se déploie sur l'art jusqu'à devenir le cri que l'Europe hurle à la mort. (LVS, 339)

The same note of defiance of destiny which rings in AEschylus' Prometheus Bound also echoes in the tragic works
of André Malraux. Prometheus and Malraux's man, chained to the rock of their fate, fully aware of its enormity and their dependence, defy the gods with a cry, the essence of which is a protest against the injustice of the situation in which fate placed the human being.

* * *

The symbolic cry of defiance leads us to the third and final problem of this chapter: justification of the hypothesis that the tragic vision of life can be fertile and productive of a humanism, in other words to prove that, in terms of the epigraph we have chosen, les cendres ne sont jamais stériles. Essentially, what must be done is to make of the cry itself something worthy and beautiful, to live with an attitude that makes the injustice of man's fate stand out as all the more unjust by comparison with what man has made of himself.

There is justification for fearing that this type of tragic weltanscharung could have disastrous effects. Since the promise of ultimate victory is removed it would be very easy to fall into a feeling of complete futility, leading eventually to nihilism. In his study of the Greeks Professor Kitto recognizes this danger and also gives the reasons why he feels that the worst did not take place.

This strain of tragedy which haunts Greek thought has nothing to do with gloom; the Greek loved
laughter just as he loved life. It was I think, the product of these two great qualities which we have been contemplating in Homer, intellectualism and humanity... One can imagine such an outlook, so remarkably free from illusions, developing into an arid religion and breeding a resigned and hopeless fatalism, but it was combined with this almost fierce joy in life, the exultation in human achievement and human personality. (G, 60)

The catalyst is therefore a joy and exultation in the possibilities that life offers for human accomplishment, an essentially humanistic concept. Much earlier in this chapter we quoted a passage from *La Voie Royale* in which Perken said that he thought about his death, not in order to die, but rather to live. (LVR, 108) To his statement was appended the commentary: "Cette tension de la voix n'était celle d'aucune autre passion: une joie poignante, sans espoir, comme une épave tirée de profondeurs aussi lointaines que celle de l'obscurité." (LVR, 108)

Used in this context, the *joie poignante* would seem to be the same as the one to which Professor Kitto refers. If Perken thinks of his death in order to live, and feels this joy, he must be aware of life's potentialities. Even at the end of the novel, when he knows that his death is only a matter of hours, or at the most days, he insists on utilizing the last moments of his life in an effort to fulfill his aims.

In a passage quoted previously Edith Hamilton also remarked that the ultimate effect of tragedy was not pain
but exaltation. (GW, 127) She also calls attention to the fact that while we may speak of the depths of pathos we generally say the height of tragedy. (GW, 128) In view of the enormous richness of Greek thought and art it would appear that their tragic viewpoint did not prevent them from making the most of their existence on earth.

Considering his influence on Malraux, Nietzsche's opinions on the implications of tragedy are enlightening, and they bear out those of Miss Hamilton and Professor Kitto. The German philosopher deals with the problem in several of his works, always adhering to the concept that tragedy is a source of inspiration. In Ecce Homo, he calls it the highest form of life affirmation, (N, EH, 861) and says that it is the very proof that the Greeks were not pessimists. Beyond Good and Evil tells us in one place that "There are heights of soul from which tragedy itself no longer appears to operate tragically." (N, BGE, 415)

The basic requirement is what Edith Hamilton sees in Aeschylus, "a soul great enough to bear a new and intolerable truth." (GW, 127) The tragic truth may be hard to bear but the rewards for doing so are great, according to Nietzsche. Speaking in the language of images that characterizes Thus Spake Zarathustra he states his belief that mankind's greatest accomplishments must come from the most profoundly tragic awareness.
Whence come the highest mountains? so I once did ask. Then did I learn that they come out of the sea. That testimony is inscribed on their stones, and on the walls of their summits. Out of the deepest must the highest come to its height. (N, Z, 169)

All three of these writers appear to concur that the Greeks built the civilization and culture that was to become the model for the humanists, not in spite of their tragic vision, but because of it. Providing that he has the necessary will, the consciousness of his tragic destiny can lead man to try to realize the utmost possibilities of his life—the true end of any valid humanism. This is what Malraux feels to be the essential attribute of Greek tragedy, the conversion of the cry of defiance into a finished product bearing the stamp of human will. This idea is expressed first in *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* and later in *Les Voix du Silence*:

La confusion me parait venir de ce qu'on a cru—
dans l'idée que nous nous faisons de la tragédie
grecque c'est éclatant!—que représenter une fata-
lité était la subir. Mais non! c'est presque la
posséder. Le seul fait de pouvoir la représenter,
de la concevoir, la fait échapper au vrai destin,
à l'im placable échelle divine; la réduire à
l'échelle humaine. (LNA, 128)

In *Les Noyers* this could be dismissed perhaps as just one of the many contradictory opinions expressed therein, but essentially the same passage occurs in *Les Voix du Silence*, which is a direct expression of Malraux's philosophy:

Et le peuple d'Athènes, qui connaissait les thèmes tragiques, n'admirait pas en l'art qui les faisait
tragédies la défaite de l'homme, mais au contraire la reconquête, la possession du destin par le poète. (LVS, 74)

Here then we are at the pivotal point in the justification of the tragic vision as a source for humanism. It can stimulate man by the spectacle of what he can do in defiance of the action of destiny. Malraux's vision of man is basically the same as that of AEschylus as shown in Prometheus Bound, his work a tragic poem on this theme. Tragic poetry and tragic vision we have seen as a source of constructive action. All of these combine to reveal Malraux's whole serious literary production as a fusion of tragic poetry and humanism. The human attitude that is necessary to make the former productive of the latter is a Promethean one. The will to face destiny and to make the act of defying it a noble and fertile one. In a passage dealing with the nature of the element of fascination in Greek tragedy, Malraux has summarized this attitude so clearly that his words make the best possible ending for this chapter: "C'est la conscience simultanée de la servitude humaine et de l'indomptable aptitude des hommes à fonder leur grandeur sur elle." (LVS, 628)
II

Toward a Promethean Humanism

All human arts are from Prometheus

Dare now to be tragic men for ye
shall be redeemed.

Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy

At the beginning of the preceding chapter we spoke
of the difficulty inherent in any effort to define the word
humanism and of the multiplicity of interpretations that
our epoch in particular gives to the term. We must, however,
attempt to justify its use in relation to the works of André
Malraux. In order to do this we shall try to set forth its
essential characteristics, situate Malraux's version in its
proper historical and philosophical context, and trace
briefly the currents of thought which led to what we refer
to as a Promethean humanism.

It was during the Renaissance that "humanism" as a
term first came to be generally employed. At that time the
connotation was largely a scholarly one, for it was related
mainly to a rebirth of interest in the study of the civilili-
zation and writings of ancient peoples, with the major emphasis on the Greeks and Romans. Although such a narrow definition as this is obviously unsatisfactory for our purposes, the shift in the direction of human thought that it reveals has implications that are vital for the process which led to such humanisms as that of Malraux. I refer to the swing of the pendulum from an almost total concentration on the divine toward a growing awareness of man and his possibilities. This is indicated by the root word "human," and is reflected in Michelet's definition of Renaissance humanism as la découverte de l'homme par l'homme. As a corollary, it involved another concept which was to be common to all future humanisms: man should develop his spiritual, intellectual, and physical potentialities to the utmost. Without this last, no humanism is worthy of the name. Religious and secular philosophers can and do differ on the origin of these potentialities, but in order to justifiably refer to themselves as humanists they must advocate their exploitation for the benefit of man. The completion of the pendulum swing toward the emphasis on man takes one, not to the Renaissance philosophies, but back to the Greeks and Protagoras' dictum that "man is the measure of all things." The Renaissance did not go this far, but more than two milleniums after Protagoras, in Malraux's La Tentation de l'Occident, Ling will decide that the basic tendency of the
Greek world is to mesurer toute chose à la durée et à l'intensité d'une vie humaine. (LTO, 48) The cycle is complete.

The fundamental nature of all civilizations is most clearly manifested by their conceptions of man's three basic relationships: with himself, with his fellows, with the universe. Of these, the last was perhaps the dominant one because humanity has often derived its rules governing the first two from what it felt to be the true nature of the third. Man has always tried to discover whether or not he had any real role in the universe, and if so, to find out what it was. In his attempts to fit himself in the over-all picture, death always presented the problem to which he could get no direct answer, the barrier which his mind could not cross. This was, however, the one gap that it was absolutely necessary to span if he was to establish a worthy position for himself in the cosmos. The solutions, if any, which societies proposed, went a long way toward determining their attitude toward human existence. The most common solution was the creation of a theology.

Since the Renaissance humanists went back to the Greeks, it is proper that we examine the approach that the latter took to the problem of relating man to the universe in spite of his mortality. All that we have seen in the preceding chapter leads us to believe that for the Greeks, particularly as typified by AESchylus, there was no affirm-
ative answer. Man died, his role ended; all he could do was to question the justice of such a situation and defy it by making the most possible out of his existence. There being no after-life held out, and, therefore, no purpose in orienting earthly existence toward it, man would tend to concentrate almost all of his efforts toward the fullest possible use of his life-span. The Protagorean attitude that we have just seen is a natural, if, perhaps, somewhat extreme result of such a situation.

There was only one way of going beyond death: to create something that could be passed on to succeeding generations. This was immortality only in the stoic sense of the word, that is to say, within the movement of human events. Protagoras' saying still applies, for if the standard of measurement here is not that of individual men, everything is seen in terms of Man, the species. Human interest is centered in the life of this world.

This, then, was the man-universe relationship as visualized by the people whom the Renaissance humanists took as a model. It is a tragic, heroic, and defiant vision, best symbolized by Prometheus, who, chained to the rock of his destiny because of his love for man, repents nothing of what he has done, but takes pride in the fact that in direct contradiction of Zeus' orders, he has struggled to make something out of man. Everything he did constitutes a mise en
question of his destiny.

Between the period of the glory of Athens and that of the glory of Florence, there took place a development that was to change the entire picture. This was, of course, the rise of Christianity. Occidental man had found a vision of the universe in which he played an important role in the whole structure. There was the possibility of an eternal life after death, a life along side which earthly existence appeared relatively insignificant. The pendulum swing moved from the almost pure human of the Greeks to the almost pure divine of Medieval Christian theology. The official church was established and grew in power until it was able to make and break temporal rulers. Man's view of his place in the order of things even seemed to be confirmed by the science that then existed. The Ptolemaic cosmology placed the earth in the center of the universe and made every thing else revolve around it. It is interesting to note that Ptolemy post-dates the Greeks.

This was the screen through which, according to Malraux, most of the Renaissance humanists saw the world, and the one through which their ideas concerning the ancient Greeks were filtered. What was for AEschylus a dramatization of man's destiny became simply an interesting myth for the Renaissance man who was operating in a Christian context. It is this general tendency to see the universe only within
the framework of Christianity that, in Malraux's eyes, makes the Renaissance view of the universe inferior to that of the Greeks.

La Renaissance n'est antique qu'à la façon dont Montaigne est pafen; et peut-être sa seule ressemblance profonde avec la Naissance grecque est-elle en ce que, comme celle-ci, elle est inséparable d'une mise en question de l'univers; mais à l'intérieur du christianisme. (LVS, 268)

For a full comprehension of Malraux's humanism it is important to recognize here exactly why he is inclined to by-pass the Renaissance mise en question and to consider that of the Greeks as more valid. The reason is not Christianity per se. It is simply that in accepting Christianity as true, the men of the period approached the questioning of man's role in the universe with a preconceived notion of what the role was. This the Greeks did not have and, therefore, from Malraux's point of view, their mise en question was a purer one. For him, any consideration of the problem which started with a preformulated idea of the human-universe relationship, whether it be religious, scientific, or rationalistic, would lose part of its validity by that very fact.

In Les Voix du Silence, Malraux propounds his concept of a culture des Grands Navigateurs (LVS, 602) in which humanity, like the great explorers, would be engaged in a voyage across the unknown with no idea of the shape or size of the ocean or of the ultimate point of arrival. A full
discussion of this vision of man belongs at the end of the chapter, but it must be mentioned here because he follows it with a sentence which shows exactly where he felt that the Renaissance humanist, with his Christian orientation, stands in relation to it: "La Renaissance, obsédée de passé mythique et ordonnée par un Christianisme encore puissant, n'en connut que des éclairs." (LVS, 602)

The last phrase of this passage shows that Malraux is far too perceptive to treat the Renaissance as a solid uniform block. As he says, flashes of the pure question did exist, and in the preface to Manès Sperber's *À une larme dans l'océan*, he lists some of the Renaissance greats whom he felt had experienced them: "Shakespeare, Cervantes, Rabelais (voire le dernier Michel-Ange...) sont énigmatiques, et l'obscurité de chacun est question." (QL0, XX)

The fundamental soundness of Malraux's view of the Renaissance, still dominated by Christianity, but lighted by occasional glimmers of a more fundamental questioning, is perhaps best illustrated by the case of Galileo. His new theory of the universe, which reduced the world to an insignificant position, knocked one of the basic props out from under the structure which placed man and an anthropomorphic god at the center of it all. The official church was fully aware of the danger to its position that was inherent in Galileo's concept, and it was powerful enough
to force him to recant. The truth was buried; but only
temporarily, for the long war between science and theology
was now under way.

This conflict gave rise to factions which represented
almost every conceivable nuance, from pure theology to
pure science, and the two extremes were perhaps the best
off of all of them. If a man's faith in his religion was
entirely unshaken, he achieved thereby a certain degree of
serenity. For the man whose trust in science and human
reason was complete, it was only a matter of time. Given
enough of this last, the human race would discover its true
place in the universal structure as well as all the laws
that governed its functioning. Once the latter were found
and applied, all human problems would be solved.

For the thinker whose position was somewhere between
the two extremes, and who, therefore, embodied in himself
elements of the conflict, the problems that it posed were,
depending upon his own feelings, of a scale that ran from
serious to tragic. For Descartes, whose bent was primarily
scientific and philosophic, it was serious, and he set about
the construction of his demonstration of the existence of
God. For Pascal, who combined brilliant intellectual gifts
with a deeply religious nature, the conflict was anguishing
and tragic. When reading the Pensées I cannot escape the
feeling that they were written as much to convince Pascal.
himself of the truth of Christianity, as to demonstrate it to others. In addition, we must not forget that it was a Pascalian image for man's fate that Malraux used in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, and that this same pensé is a possible source for the title of La Condition Humaine. In spite of many vital differences, the current of metaphysical anguish which flows from Pascal, and which, perhaps, has its true Christian origins in the Confessions of St. Augustine, will become an integral part of philosophies and humanisms such as that of André Malraux. The direct main stream, channeled like the Renaissance by Christianity, leads, however, not so much to Les Voix du Silence as to Søren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling and Sickness unto Death on the despairing side and to Jacques Maritain's Humanisme Intégral on the more hopeful one. Its most tragic manifestation in the twentieth century is perhaps the Del Sentimiento Trágico de la Vida of Miguel de Unamuno who devoted much of his life, and his tremendous intellectual capacities, to an effort to find belief, and failed.

The similarity between Pascal's vision of the human condition and that of André Malraux has already been noted. Both of them speak of exactly the same remedy for combating the anguish caused by awareness of this condition. I refer, of course, to action used as an anodyne for anguish. The author of the Pensées tells us that rien nous plaît que
le combat, (Pascal, 389) and that on cherche le repos en combattant quelques obstacles. (Pascal, 394) Speaking of a rabbit hunt he gives us the motivations and results of our activity:

Ce lièvre ne nous garantirait pas de la vue de la mort et des misères, mais la chasse-qui nous en détoure-nous en garantit.
Ils ne recherchent en cela qu'une occupation violente et impétueuse qui les détourne de penser à soi. (Pascal, 392)

Man, according to Pascal, uses action to dull his awareness of his fate. Three hundred years later, in La Voie Royale, Claude Vannec will reflect: "Le jeu commençait; tant mieux. Il chassait l'inquiétude: il fallait aller plus loin, avancer comme cette auto qui s'enfonçait dans l'air noir, dans la forêt informe." (LVR, 57)

This passage alone, referring to one character in an early book, would perhaps not justify the parallel with Pascal, but much later, in Les Voix du Silence, we find Malraux practically echoing Pascal by saying that si le combat ne remplace pas l'absolu, il permet de l'oublier. (LVS, 480)

The two men see alike on another important matter. Pascal accepts Christianity for himself and Malraux does not, but where science is concerned, both of them realize that the results are not an unmixed blessing. Pascal's stand is categorical: "Tout ce qui se perfectionne par progrès pérît aussi par progrès." (Pascal, 412) Malraux's statement
is far less absolute but nevertheless it implies, too, that scientific progress alone is not the answer: "A partir de la bombe atomique, et même bien avant, on a compris que ce que le XIXe siècle avait appelé progrès exigeait une lourde rançon." (LC, 259)

Up until now we have pointed out some of the similarities between Pascal and Malraux. It is obvious, however, in spite of these parallels, that the philosophy of a Christian such as Pascal does not coincide with that of an agnostic like Malraux. An understanding of the points at which they diverge reveals much about the Promethean nature of Malraux's humanism. Both men start with an anguishing awareness of man's precarious and in some ways absurd position in the universe. In the decision as to what to do about the situation, lies the parting of the ways which separates Malraux not only from Pascal, but also from all the Christian thinkers who stem from him. Pascal turned to God and the church for the answer. Those who followed him all tried, with varying degrees of success, to reconcile their vision of human existence with that of Christianity. Malraux's decision was to defy the human condition and struggle against it, entirely within the framework of human existence. The contrast between the two attitudes can be shown by a consideration of some of the most famous Pensées and of what Malraux's position would be in relation to them.
Let us first turn to the brilliant passage in which Pascal tried to capture and succeeded, to a degree rarely equaled, the essence of man:

Quelle chimère est-ce donc que l'homme? Quelle nouveauté, quel monstre, quel chaos, quel sujet de contradiction, quel prodige! Juge de toutes choses, imbécile vers de terre; cloaque d'incertitude et d'erreur: gloire et rebut de l'univers. (Pascal, 531)

Malraux would undoubtedly agree with this picture of man as a contradictory mixture of grandeur and baseness as far as it goes. Even the phrase *rebut de l'univers* coincides pretty closely with his reference to man as un accident de l'univers. (LVS, 635) If, however, we compare these lines with the quotation at the end of our preceding chapter, we find that while they are permeated with a conscience de la servitude humaine, they say nothing of man's indomptable aptitude à fonder sa grandeur sur elle. (LVS, 628) For both men, the human being has the grandeur that comes from awareness of his position, but in Malraux's attitude there is an element of defiance and revolt that is not present in Pascal's—a Promethean element. Here we might add that Nietzsche also shares with Pascal and Malraux, among others, the vision of man as a compound of contradictory qualities. "If we could conceive of an incarnation of dissonance - and what else is man?" (N, BI, 1087)

In another celebrated Pensée Pascal says that nous
He is probably referring to the many divertissements that man employs in order to avoid contemplating his fate. From Malraux's point of view, however, the very religion that Pascal embraced could very well fall under the heading of the things we put before us to blind ourselves to our mortality. We have already seen that the former rejects anything that obscures this type of tragic awareness.

Finally, we return to Pascal's prison image for man's fate, where we see that this vision which was a major factor in leading its creator into religion, produces an entirely different reaction in Malraux. Pascal turns to God for protection against the human condition but Malraux turns to man:

Jean venais de découvrir quelque chose. Quelque chose d'important. Dans la prison dont parle Pascal, les hommes sont parvenus à tirer d'eux-mêmes une réponse qui envahit si j'ose dire, d'immortalité, ceux qui en sont dignes. (LNA, 97)

Once again, a statement like this taken out of the context of a novel, could be dismissed as one more example of the dangerous game of choosing a character and then stating that he represents the author's position. In Le Musée Imaginaire, however, Malraux is speaking directly, and he takes exactly the same stand:

Le plus grand mystère n'est pas que nous soyons jetés au hasard entre la profusion de la matière
et celle des astres; c'est que, dans cette prison,
nous tirions de nous-mêmes des images assez puis-
santes pour nier notre néant. (LMI, 139)

Faced with an almost identical vision of man, Pascal
and Malraux have therefore moved in diametrically opposite
directions. For the former, the answer was essentially
submission and God, for the latter, revolt and man. The
similarity as well as the difference between the attitudes
of the two men is well illustrated by the following lines
from Les Voix du Silence. The first sentence sounds so much
like Pascal that one might think that the author of the
Pensées had written it; the second is pure Malraux.

Survie misérable qui n'a pas le temps de voir
s'étendre les étoiles déjà mortes, mais non
moins misérable néant, si les millénaires accumu-
lés par la glaise ne suffisent pas à étouffer
dès le cercueil la voix d'un grand artiste.
(LVS, 639)

The stream of development that flows from Pascal's
anguish has therefore split and taken two different channels.
Pushing this river image still further one could say that
the mainstream is characterized by its effort to stay within
the banks of Christianity, or at least, of God. The off-
shoot which leads to Malraux stays within the purely human
channel and its central current is never more than a variant
of Malraux's les hommes sont parvenus à tirer d'eux-mêmes
une réponse. (LNA, 97) For Malraux, Pascal, like the Renais-
sance, would be operating within Christianity.
For reasons that will become obvious later in this chapter, it is important to make one thing clear at this point. If, as we have said, the religious current will not lead to Malraux, the scientific and rational one, which until some time in the nineteenth century grew steadily stronger, will not do so either. This last seemed, at the period of its greatest power, to be on the verge of sweeping everything else before it. As obstacle after obstacle fell before scientific investigation and the application of reason, there seemed to be justification for believing that man's mind, given enough time, would be able to solve all the problems of his existence and the true age of gold would be attained. Reason and science had shaken the very foundations of the religious structure and were rapidly being enthroned by many as the new gods. Human reason was moving in to replace the earlier deities. Compared to the scientific and religious currents, the stream that leads to Malraux (which we might refer to as Promethean tragic) was, during most of the centuries between the time of AEschylus and the present, small and perhaps formless.

During the nineteenth century its real modern growth began, and ever since then it has steadily picked up force and cohesion. The god of reason and science had to a large degree displaced the supernatural one, but now he too began to show flaws. There was a growing awareness that his
ability to solve all human problems had been vastly overrated. The idea of a preformulated structure for the relations between man and the cosmos, whether conceived theologically, rationally, or scientifically, began to come apart at the seams. From the wreckage arose the specter of the absurd. It appeared more and more to many thinkers, that where man had expected to find order and, perhaps, eternal life, there might be really nothing but chaos, nothingness, and death.

The signs of this decline grew more and more manifest in French literature as the nineteenth century wore on. It produced just such writings as the lines from Alfred de Vigny that serve as the epigraph to the first chapter of this essay. Vigny illustrates both major phases of the collapse of system. In Le Mont des Oliviers he will stoically refuse God while in La Maison du Berger he will attack scientific progress. Servitude et Grandeur Militaires contains passages that read like Pascal, but even more like Malraux. Either of these last two could have written: c'est la lutte qu'il nous faut toujours (SGM, 70) but only Malraux would have been likely to refer to this struggle as: "une sorte de combat corps à corps contre la destinée, une lutte qui est la source de mille voluptés inconnues au reste des hommes." (SGM, 69)

The title with its Servitude et Grandeur, recalls
Malraux's remark that was used to conclude the preceding chapter. Prometheus was beginning to come back into his own.

The growth of the absurd, with all its tragic implications, made itself felt in the literary creations of Gustave Flaubert, and perhaps even more so in his Correspondance. This man, whose refusal to conclure is a beautiful illustration of the decline of faith in all systems, put into the mouth of the devil in La Tentation de St. Antoine, a mise en question which brings the absurd into full focus:

*Pendant le sommeil de la vie, l'homme comme un dieu engourdi, sent confusionnement qu'il rêve. Mais si jamais ne venait le réveil? si tout cela n'était qu'une dérisión, qu'il n'y eût que néant. Oh! Oh! tu ne conçois pas que le néant puisse être? Mais si c'était l'absurde au contraire qui fût le vrai? (F, TSA, 172)*

Bouvard et Pécuchet is a biting attack on those who think they will find the answers in science and knowledge; in a letter to George Sand he dismisses the religious structures that promise immortality:

*On se paye de mots dans cette question de l'immortalité, car la question est de savoir si le moi persiste. L'affirmative me paraît une outrecuidance de notre orgueil, une protestation de notre faiblesse contre l'ordre éternel. (F, Corr, VI, 126)*

The attitude that he recommends in a letter to Ernest Feydau could well serve as the motto for those who, like Malraux, believe in the defiance of man's fate: "Il faut qu'on soit à la hauteur du destin." (F, Corr, IV, 341)
Flaubert and Vigny are signs of a major return to the surface of the Promethean tragic current of human thought, but they are really representative of its embryonic and still somewhat formless phase. For example, Hugo, in his *Le Satyre*, takes up the Promethean theme but deals with it in an optimistic fashion. Many of the elements were present, but they had not yet congealed. Someone had to put all of the components together in order to give the current form and direction. This was the role of Friedrich Nietzsche. From his flows the stream that takes us directly to the humanism of André Malraux. However winding and twisting the process of development leading up to Nietzsche may be, the line from him to Malraux is so direct that one would have justification in saying that, if, from the point of view of humanism there has been a single most important major or intermediary between the Greeks and Malraux, it is not the Renaissance, but rather the author of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. This is not to say that Malraux accepts Nietzsche *in toto*. As we examine various aspects of the former's humanism we shall see that there are points on which he directly contradicts the German philosopher. In addition, we must keep in mind that Malraux's contention is that the usual interpretations of Nietzsche's writings are wrong. (PNL, 279) To date he has not presented his own version, so anything we say with regard to it will naturally
be completely hypothetical.

Nietzsche's most important function, however, was to consolidate the diverse manifestations of what we have called the Promethean tragic attitude into a coherent philosophy. The transcendent God, and the God of science and reason, had each had his turn in orienting human thought ever since the rise of Christianity. Then, in *Thus Spake Zarathustra* Nietzsche wrote: "Dead are all the Gods: now we desire the Superman to live." (N, Z, 83)

Every structure, religious or secular, which sheltered man from his destiny, was swept away for those who accepted these lines because Nietzsche consigned the scientific as well as the religious structures to the cemetery of the gods. In *The Birth of Tragedy* he speaks of "the evil slumbering in the heart of theoretical culture," (N, BT, 1048) as well as of the need to "deny the claim of science to universal validity and universal aims." (N, BT, 1048)

Such a position negates all the interpretations of the man-universe relationship which had dominated occidental thought for almost two thousand years, and destiny, in the Greek sense of the word, reappears in full force. Many men had come to feel that all of the carefully built religious and scientific theories can do little about the action of fate, and Nietzsche says: "With this knowledge a culture is inaugurated which I venture to call a tragic culture."
The followers of Nietzsche, rejecting almost everything that has occurred in the interim, return to the same attitude toward the universe as the one which fostered Greek tragedy. They also have something that the Greeks did not have: the knowledge that two thousand years of religion and science had not succeeded in solving the problems of destiny. Only when this failure has been fully recognized can the tragic vision come back into its own, for, as Nietzsche writes:

There is an eternal conflict between the theoretic and the tragic world view; only after the spirit of science has been pursued to its limits and its claims to universal validity destroyed by the evidence of these limits may we hope for a rebirth of tragedy. (N, BT, 1041)

He puts into the mouth of Zarathustra the words that reject the divine answer just as surely as the foregoing lines reject the scientific one: "But we do not at all want to enter the kingdom of heaven: we have become men—so we want the kingdom of the earth." (N, Z, 355)

Here we begin to get the note of defiance, and of the will to concentrate on making the most of terrestrial life, that will characterize Malraux's humanism. Prometheus' protest and defiance.

Je suis devenu homme are almost the last words of La Création Artistique and variations on this expression occur throughout all of Malraux's works. It is noteworthy that Gisors says of Clappique, who has taken refuge from
facing his destiny in everything from narcotics to gambling, that he may do anything else, but that il ne pouvait devenir homme. (LCA, 313)

For Nietzsche, the answer to the awareness of the reappearance of destiny is the "dare to be tragic men and ye shall be redeemed," (N, BT, 1063) that serves as the epigraph for this chapter. This is really nothing more or less than a Promethean call to recognize the rebirth of tragic destiny, with the additional element of the absurd. Since the time of the Greeks, man had been conditioned by centuries of rational thought and orthodox religious thought to think of his life and its relationship to the universe in terms of purpose or sense. The Nietzschean attitude eliminated all of these ideas of purpose along with those of immortality, and the growing conviction that man's role in the universe was without purpose and therefore absurd, added to the already tragic picture. To accept the challenge to be a tragic man under such circumstances, imposed a heavy burden, for few things do more to impede action than awareness that in the long run it will possibly have no real sense. Nietzsche knew this and he referred to the reaction to absurdity as "the great disgust". During the twentieth century this was to become the nausée of the Existentialists, and in the following chapter, we shall see that the problem of the absurd runs through all of Malraux's
In order for man to make anything of his existence within this framework of absurdity and death, it is necessary that this disgust be overcome. If it were not conquered, the result would not be a humanism, but a nihilism. Nietzsche recognized the need to win this victory. For this reason he has his favorite creation, Zarathustra, say of himself that he is "the surmounter of the great disgust." (N, Z, 300)

The acceptance of the double challenge of a tragic, absurd, destiny, and the sense of futility that it entails, followed by the decision to fight against it, marks a real ascendance of the Promethean tragic attitude in the western world. A Prometheus fastened with one more chain: absurdity. It has had repercussions that have grown ever stronger. Heidegger's act of "Resolute decision" in which man takes upon himself his past, present, and future, (SHE, 18, 19) is actually a restatement of Nietzsche's "dare now to be tragic men". It leads directly to Albert Camus' L'Homme Révolté and the works of André Malraux. Less so to the Sartrian school of Existentialism. The atheistic existentialists have in common with Nietzsche the feeling of absurdity and disgust, and both of them derive the concept of "freedom" from that of man's lack of purpose in the universe. The note of defiance that characterizes
Nietzsche, Malraux, Camus, and others like them, is, however, curiously absent in the Sartrian philosophy. Sartre speaks of being condemned to freedom and he says in Existentialism that "the existentialist thinks it is very distressing that God does not exist." (E, 26) This is a far cry from Nietzsche's "I emancipated them from bondage under purpose" (N, Z, 183) and the exultant "dead are all the Gods: now we desire the Superman to live". (N, Z, 83) And different from Malraux's animal who knows that he is going to die but nevertheless tears the song of the constellations from the nebulae and hurls it to the hazards of the centuries. (LCA, 216) The difference is Prometheus.

In the preceding chapter we have called attention to some of the many times that Malraux refers to Prometheus and to AEschylus. Nietzsche also devotes a great deal of time to a study of the Titan and the man who dramatized him. An examination of some of the passages in which the German philosopher treats this matter will go a long way toward showing not only why we have termed Malraux's humanism Promethean, but also why we feel that Nietzsche is by far the most important intermediary between AEschylus and Malraux. The very close interrelation between these two hypotheses that is revealed by an analysis of Malraux's work in the light of Nietzsche's study of Prometheus Bound, also suggests that an interpretation of the concept of the
*Übermensch* in terms of the Titan might be valuable. Malraux has not given his opinion on this aspect of Nietzsche's philosophy, but it could well be that it is one of the points on which he believes him to be misunderstood. Popularly the superman has been visualized as a person who felt that he had the right to use other people however he chose for the attainment of his personal ends. Malraux, with all his avowed indebtedness to Nietzsche, has never condoned such an attitude, and, in fact, his concept of human dignity is a direct negation of this type of philosophy. It seems likely therefore that this is one of the places where he finds the popular interpretation unacceptable. I should like to suggest another that is much more in line with Malraux's humanism.

In very many respects it is possible to equate the Superman with Prometheus. The latter was a Titan, and the Titans stand at the same level in the scale of beings as does the Superman; more than a man but less than a god. Prometheus fought for man against the wrath of Zeus but he was above the former and below the latter in the hierarchy. Having killed off all the Gods, Nietzsche establishes the position of the Superman with relation to a scale of which he represents the highest development. Zarathustra speaks of the time when man is in the middle of the course between animal and Superman. (N, Z, 83) Whether seen from above or
below, both Prometheus and Superman occupy the same position relative to man. The Titan was created in this position; man must attain it by an effort of will, rise above himself by his own efforts. This struggle to reach a higher level is the secret which life gives to Zarathustra: "I am that which must ever surpass itself." (N, Z, 125) The phrase "man is something to be surpassed" occurs so many times in Thus Spake Zarathustra, that it begins to sound like a leitmotiv. In almost the last words of the preface to Le Temps du Mépris Malraux speaks of ce par quoi l'homme est homme, ce par quoi il se dépasse,...(LTM, 13)

We have spoken earlier of the extreme effort of the will required in order to act toward a goal while feeling that, on the universal scale, human existence has no real sense. For Nietzsche it can be given sense by the effort to raise man to the level of Superman; Zarathustra says to his followers:

Sombre is human life, and as yet without meaning: a buffoon may yet be fatal to it.
I want to teach men the sense of their existence, which is the Superman, the lightning out of the dark cloud-man. (N, Z, 15)

Man must give his own existence any sense that it is to have, and this can be accomplished only by an act of his own will—a decision to reject anything that will turn him from concentrating his struggle on his earthly existence.

The Superman is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the
I conjure you, my brethren, remain true to the earth, and believe not those who speak unto you of superearthly hopes. Poisoners are they whether they know it or not. (N, Z, 6)

We find the echo of these lines in Les Conquérants with its: "Mon père me disait: 'Il ne faut jamais lâcher la terre'." (LC, 209) They will also come to mind when Malraux says of Goya:

La condition humaine est aussi une prison, et ceux qu'il y hait d'abord ce sont les trafiquants d'Espoir. Devant politiciens et médecins, il se contentait de ricaner: si les moines l'obsèdent c'est parce qu'ils sont imposteurs au nom du Christ. (Sat, 122)

The attitude or conscience that Nietzsche incarnates in Zarathustra, and the superman, are the essence of a humanism such as Malraux's. What it really does is to point out the path of redemption that is promised in the previously quoted "dare now to be tragic men and ye shall be redeemed!. Starting from an awareness of his tragic and absurd position, man can save himself by the will to surpass his condition and create a sense for his existence. Additional support for an interpretation of the Superman in terms of Prometheus is provided by the fact that the foregoing is also the true meaning of the Prometheus myth as Nietzsche understands it. We have only to compare the picture of Superman defying the Gods and struggling to rise above himself with the following passage from The Birth of
Tragedy in order to see that Nietzsche visualizes the Titan and his own creation in much the same way.

Man, rising to the level of the Titans, acquires his culture by himself, and compels the Gods to ally themselves with him, because in his self-sufficient wisdom he holds in his hands their existence and their limitations. The most wonderful thing, however, in this Prometheus fable, which according to its fundamental conception is an essential hymn of impiety, is the profound AEschylean yearning for justice.

(N, BT, 996)

From the first line of this passage it seems obvious that there is a direct association in Nietzsche's mind between the Titan and the Superman, for both are the result of the same process—man rising above himself by his own efforts. At the end of Le Création Artistique Malraux will say that one of the prerequisites of humanism is that man be able to say: "J'ai refusé ce que voulait en moi la bête, et suis devenu homme sans le secours des dieux." (LCA, 216)

The similarity with the Nietzschean concept of Prometheus and of the Superman, is unmistakable particularly if one keeps in mind that the refusal of the beast in himself is an absolute requirement for the rise of man. Malraux carefully avoids the use of the term "superman," probably because it has come to have a connotation that he does not wish attached to his philosophy. It is also very possible that too much attention has been given to the destructive phase of Nietzsche's ideas, the clearing away that is necessary before reconstruction can begin. His intention that
this destruction of the old orders should be really a
prelude to the raising of mankind as a whole, is shown by
the following lines from Beyond Good and Evil:

He who divines the fate that is hidden under the
idiotic unawareness and blind confidence of 'modern
ideas' and still more under the whole of Christo-
European morality-suffers from an anguish with
which no other can be compared. He sees at a
glance all that could still be made out of man
through a favorable accumulation of human powers
and arrangements. (N, BGE, 497)

Admittedly the first half of this passage, with its
attack on established morality, could be dangerous if mis-
applied. In this respect, however, it calls to mind a
remark once made about Machiavelli. It was said that he saw
that Italy was sick, and he had the courage to prescribe
poison.

There are other aspects of these lines that are very
closely related to Malraux's humanism. We have already
spoken of his emphasis on the necessity for conscience or
awareness of man's fate as a true basis for the building
of a life. Here Nietzsche says the same thing but does so
in a reverse fashion. For him it is the unawareness of
fate that prevents full utilization of human potentialities.

The last sentence is by far the most important one
for any study of a humanism, because the concept of raising
the level of man by a full employment of human powers, is
the heart of the truly humanistic attitude, including that
of the Renaissance. Equally vital is the fact that the
emphasis is on raising man, not just an individual. A philosophy that would advocate nothing but the cultivation of the self would be egotistic rather than humanistic. The greatest possible development of mankind implies the fullest use of the man to man relationship. The superman is popularly visualized as being purely egocentric, but the passage just quoted has exactly the opposite meaning. The author speaks of making something of man. For Nietzsche, the significance of AESchylus' Prometheus is not so much in the raising of oneself but rather in the raising of all mankind along with oneself.

This Titanic impulse to become as it were the Atlas of all individuals, and on broad shoulders to bear them higher and higher, farther and farther, is what the Promethean and the Dionysian have in common. In this respect the AESchylean Prometheus is a Dionysian mark, while in the aforementioned profound yearning for justice, AESchylus betrays to the intelligent eye his paternal descent from Apollo, the god of individuation, the god who sets the boundaries of justice. And so the double personality of the AESchylean Prometheus, his conjoint Dionysian and Apollonian nature. (N, ET, 999)

Here, as in the preceding passages, it is a question of elevating man rather than a man, and the repeated mention of justice does not coincide very well with the idea of one individual raising himself at the expense of others—Superman as he is popularly pictured. There is reason to believe, therefore, that ultimately, at least, Nietzsche's conception of the Superman was not so much a few select
individuals who stand out above the rest, but a humanity lifted by its own efforts. Someone, it is true, must start the process, and in so doing, he may have to be destructive, particularly in the early stages. The starting and the destruction set these leaders apart from the people around them, and herein lies the danger. In order that the action and destruction be performed for the benefit of the human group rather than at its expense, the leaders must be motivated and disciplined by the "titanic impulse" of which Nietzsche speaks—the desire to take others up with you, and not just a few, but "all individuals". This is Prometheus as Nietzsche visualizes him, and we have seen in the passage from Beyond Good and Evil that this same elevation of mankind is the ultimate purpose behind the early destructiveness of Nietzsche's own philosophy. Zarathustra said to his followers: "Let your bestowing love and your knowledge be devoted to the meaning of the earth." (N, Z, 81) This is the advice that is given to the future Supermen, and if we are to believe Nietzsche it was his "Titan-like love of man" (N, BT, 967) that caused Prometheus to be condemned to his rock. Man by his own will rises to the level of Prometheus, in the same way he rises to that of the Superman. In both cases the vision also includes the raising of humanity. The interpretation of the latter in terms of the former, seems at least a
valid hypothesis. A full length analysis of *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, in the light of the earlier *Birth of Tragedy*, might prove very revealing.

More important for the purposes of this essay is the fact that Nietzsche defined Prometheus and the Superman in much the same terms as Malraux defines humanism. In all three cases man starts with a *conscience* of his tragic and absurd relationship to the universe and in all of them he struggles to rise above his original level, drawing entirely upon human resources and remaining true to the earth. The differences are really only variations in terminology. In Nietzsche, man struggles to become a Titan or to become Superman; in Malraux he struggles to become fully *Man*, to live up to the highest that is in him. For Malraux, as for Nietzsche, this rise must be shared.

Demander 'si l'homme est mort,' c'est affirmer qu'il est l'homme et non son déchet, dans la mesure où il s'exige de s'ordonner en fonction de sa part la plus haute, qui se limite rarement à lui. (LVS, 494)

The idea that man becomes most completely man only by living oriented toward the highest that is in him is a recurrent note in all of Malraux's later works, and nowhere are his profound connections with ancient Greece more evident. The idea expressed therein comes straight from Aristotle's *Nichomachean Ethics*. "For a man, as far as in him lies,
should make himself immortal, and do all in his power to live in accordance with the highest part of himself." (A, 236)

All of this struggle to rise is of course contingent on the will to do so, for without this man remains mired in absurdity and chaos, a cosmic joke. The will therefore assumes the importance that Schopenhauer had assigned to it earlier in his The World as Will and Idea: "Will is the thing-in-itself, the inner content, the essence of the world." (WWI, 217) The sense of the world will be then, as Nietzsche said, exactly what man wills it to be, and unless he is also motivated by the "Titanic impulse" to take the rest of humanity with him, the world will have no other sense than that of the jungle. Instead of rising, man will sink back to the animal. This impulse, therefore, has an importance equal to that of the conscience of destiny and the will to struggle against it in order to try to give life a sense. The key words of Malraux's humanism will be conscience, volonté, tenter, and, as we shall see later, interrogation.

The "Titanic impulse" of which Nietzsche speaks will become the "sens héroïque" in Malraux's works. The full discussion of this concept belongs to the chapter on ethics, but a brief mention of it is necessary here in order to show the connection with Nietzsche and with Prometheus. Malraux first uses the term with reference to Kyo in La
Condition Humaine. The context in which it is used makes it obvious that we are dealing with the same urge to raise humanity as the one that Nietzsche assigns to Prometheus:

Le sens héroïque lui avait été comme une discipline, non comme une justification de la vie. Il n'était pas inquiet. Sa vie avait un sens, et il le connaissait: donner à chacun de ses hommes que la famine, en ce moment même faisait mourir comme une peste lente, la possession de sa propre dignité. (LCH, 80)

True heroism in Malraux's philosophy, as in Nietzsche's interpretation of Prometheus, requires a connection with the body of humanity rather than a separation from it.

If this passage, taken from a work of fiction, were the only one dealing with the heroic concept it could be dismissed as representing the viewpoint of a single character. But Malraux makes it clear in his preface to Le Temps du Mépris that man must be related to a collectivity to be truly heroic.

Romain de l'Empire, chrétien, soldat de l'Armée du Rhin, ouvrier soviétique, l'homme est lié à la collectivité qui l'entoure; Alexandrin, écrivain du XVIIIe siècle, il en est séparé. S'il l'est sans être lié à celle qui la suivra, son expression essentielle ne peut être héroïque. Il est d'autres attitudes humaines. (LTM, 13)

This insistence on the society-individual relationship will continue through all of Malraux's writings from La Condition Humaine to the present, and will be discussed in the chapter on the "Individual and Society". It is a prime requirement of any true humanism. The important thing at this point is that Malraux's sens héroïque equates almost exactly with
the "Titanic impulse" to see humanity raised to its full
grandeur that Nietzsche sees to be the true essence of
AEscylus' *Prometheus Bound*. In this extremely close
rapport between Nietzsche's interpretation of the Greek
play, and the basic elements or starting points of Malraux's
humanism, lie our reasons for referring to this humanism
as Prometheus, and for feeling that the major intermediate
stage between AEscylus and Malraux is not so much the
Renaissance, as Nietzsche. With the latter's writings,
the Promethean tragic current of human thought once more
came fully into its own. The vision of man, aware of his
tragic destiny, but fighting against it to give his life
a sense by living up to what is best in him, is, with one
added factor, still essentially the one dramatized by
AEscylus. Prometheus with one more chain-the absurd.

If the suggested interpretation of the Superman in
terms of Prometheus has any validity, an interesting thing
emerges from a study of Malraux's works. The real supermen
in his books are not Perken, Garine, and Ferral as generally
supposed, but Kyo, Katow, Kassner, Manuel, and Goya. There
is all the more justification for believing that these men
represent Malraux's vision of true supermen because in *Les
Voix du Silence* he rejects the egocentric variety. "L'individu
retranché sur lui-même s'aperçoit qu'il n'est pas
grand'chose, et que les "surhumains" dont il s'exalte ont
tous assumé un lourd poids d'humanité." (LVS, 494) For Malraux therefore, the result of this effort to rise would not be something above man, but rather man himself living up to his greatest human potential.

The course of occidental history after the time of Nietzsche only served to deepen the sense of tragedy and absurdity. In Thus Spake Zarathustra and in many of his other works there is a strongly affirmative note in his reference to man. Without the gods, and without a pre-conceived scientific structure, he could raise himself, create a destiny for himself here on earth. This tone of affirmation was to gradually weaken after Nietzsche. From saying what man could do, the emphasis shifted to what he could try to do.

The twentieth century, with two world wars and organized mass murder, all scientifically planned, presented a picture of barbarism unequaled in history. Whatever was left of the illusion of a steadily improving humanity withered and died in the heat from the crematory ovens of the concentration camps. The démon in man was just as strong as he had ever been, and the human race was faced with a sharper dilemma than ever before. Science was obviously here to stay, at least as long as man himself was around. The power of the human race to transform the world by means of applied reason had enormous possibilities for good, and
there were many fields where the value of science was, and still is, undeniable. Unfortunately, science's potenti-
alities for evil are likewise very great. Science could not save man nor give him the answer to his destiny, but the twentieth century saw developments in the field that made it look as though man's brain-child might destroy his creator. Like man himself, science was dualistic. The technical capabilities of the human race for evil and destruction had increased far more than its moral stature. The result of this was that man himself had now been mis
en question. This was a stage that Nietzsche did not reach.

In *Les Voix du Silence* Malraux traces the changing attitudes toward science. He is far too realistic to deny that science has positive value, but he echoes Nietzsche's refusal to grant it universal validity.

Non que la science fût réellement attaquée; son aptitude à résoudre les problèmes métaphysiques le fut, par contre, de façon mortelle. L'Europe avait vu surgir ces grands espoirs sans contre partie; nous savons maintenant que nos paix sont aussi vulnérables que les précédentes, que la démocratie porte en elle le capitalisme et les polices totalitaires, que science et progrès permettent les bombes atomiques, que la raison ne suffit pas à rendre compte de l'homme. (LVS, 538)

These lines carry the decline of faith in science and progress even further than Nietzsche did, and there are probably two major reasons for this. The first is that Nietzsche did not live to see the more menacing implications
of science assume the proportions that they were to reach during the second twenty-five years of the present century. Secondly, Nietzsche does not seem to have been seriously preoccupied with the problem of the démon in man—the true reason that science threatens human existence. The démon, or man's internal fatal flaw, characterized by Malraux as tout ce qui, en l'homme, aspire à le détruire (LVS, 539) had simply acquired superior weapons for this destruction. This made his presence more dangerous and more obvious. As Malraux puts it: "On a compris que le monde était redevenu dualiste, et que l'immense espoir sans passé que l'homme avait mis en l'avenir n'était plus valable." (LC, 258) The world had always been dualistic, but the fact had been forgotten by some of its more optimistic inhabitants. Once more it was becoming increasingly apparent that one of the greatest obstacles preventing the human race from accomplishing a worthy destiny while on earth was man himself. Prometheus with an Aristotelean flaw. Where humanity is concerned, the concept of mettre en question must now be expanded to include se mettre en question. This is the attitude which forms the basis of Malraux's humanism, a conscience that everything, man included, must be mise en question. From here on, it is a matter of volonté, tenter, interroger, with nothing preconceived. In Les Voix du Silence, Malraux sums up in one sentence the entire
process from the first faith in science to the ultimate 
mise en question. "Nous savons de reste que le pouvoir 
transformateur de l'homme commença par mettre le monde en 
chantier et finit par mettre l'homme en question." (LVS, 601)

On the same page, Malraux not only calls this 
emphasis on interrogation the major characteristic of oc­ 
cidental civilization, but also relates it directly to 
the ancient Greeks. "Notre civilisation est séparée de 
celles de jadis (sinon de tous leurs aspects) à l'except­ 
tion de la grecque, par le primat qu'elle reconnaît à 
l'interrogation." (LVS, 601)

Here we have Malraux's own statement that the 
closest parallel, with the attitude that he espouses, is 
to be found in the civilization that produced Prometheus 
Bound. Now, however, the Titan must struggle against the 
external action of destiny, and against the destructive 
tendencies of his own internal flaw which also seeks to 
destroy him, the Aristotelian flaw about which Sophocles 
and Euripides wrote tragedies.

Concurrently with the decline of faith in reason 
and intellect, another phenomenon was taking place in Europe 
which also contributed to the formation of Malraux's humanism. 
This was a growing emphasis on the importance of intuition. 
Philosophically, this tendency reached its most complete 
expression in the works of Henri Bergson; artistically, in
the novels of Marcel Proust. The contribution that intuition makes to Malraux's philosophy is a spiritual one: it supplies the element of faith. One might well wonder if, in all this emphasis on negation, death, interrogation, and struggle, there is any faith in a fundamental element in man, any continuity to his existence. This is a vital point because it is one on which Malraux and Oswald Spengler deal with the same problem. For the latter the answer was, as is well known, negative. Civilizations lived and died without communicating anything to the ones that followed. For Malraux, however, the answer is affirmative, and knowledge of this fact is not acquired intellectually, but rather intuitively. Signs of it appear in his earlier works, but it is not until a more contemplative Malraux writes *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* that he deals at any length with the nature of the fundamental element of continuity. In the preceding chapter I mentioned that I felt the predominant note of *Les Noyers* to be one of calm confidence rather than of despair. Awareness of the presence of this element of continuity is one of the major reasons for this note. Vincent Berger has been listening to the intellectual arguments for and against the idea of continuity in man. To all appearances, the negative side has beaten down the arguments of the opposition, and won the discussion. Berger, disheartened but not convinced, goes out into the walnut groves.
While contemplating the trees and meditating on the discussions, he begins to feel a growing awareness of an affirmative answer.

La plénitude des arbres séculaires émanait de leur masse, mais l'effort par quoi sortaient de leurs énormes troncs les branches tortues, l'épanouissement en feuilles sombres de ce bois, si vieux et si lourd qu'il semblait s'enfoncer dans la terre et non s'en arracher, imposaient à la fois l'idée d'une volonté et d'une métamorphose sans fin. (LNA, 151)

Endless will and endless metamorphosis in man's struggle with the earth; the fundamental element of man's continuity and, at the same time, a capsule description of Malraux's humanism. For this reason, one of the major chapters of my analysis of this humanism will be entitled "The Fundamental, or, the struggle with the earth." All intellectual efforts to find this element had failed; the presence of the truth was revealed intuitively, and by almost pure chance. The parallel with Proust's process is striking. At the end of the book, Berger's son has a similar experience when he sees two old peasants and their farm that have all just survived a battle. (LNA, 285-9)

His reaction to the discovery of the secret is much the same one that Proust experienced on tasting the madeleine. Young Berger says: "Je sais maintenant ce que signifient les mythes antiques des êtres arrachés aux morts. A peine si je me souviens de la terreur; ce que je porte en moi, c'est la découverte d'un secret simple et sacré. (LNA, 292)
Proust had said: "J'avais cessé de me sentir médiocre, contingent, mortel." (RTP, V. I, 70)

In most respect, Proust and Malraux are at the antipodes, but both reflect the growing awareness of the value of intuition. The question of the fundamental will be treated at length in the aforementioned chapter of this essay, but to support the assertion that this intuitively obtained vision of the "fundamental" is the true one for Malraux himself, we need only to recall the tree image from *Les Voix du Silence* cited in the preceding chapter. (LVS, 625)

At this point, all of the major developments that contributed to the formation of the attitude which produced Malraux's Promethean humanism are present. Most of the same elements also contributed to the growth of existentialism, a philosophy with which Malraux has many points in common, but also several important differences, some of which we have already noted. Since the rise to prominence of existential thought is largely contemporaneous with Malraux's career, the similarities and divergences will be treated as their counterparts are discussed in Malraux's humanism.

We have traced the decline of faith in systems, religious or secular, which promised either to solve the problems of man's destiny on the cosmic level or to eliminate
the démon from him on the earthly one. Along with this process ran the stream of anguish over man's fate, most eloquently expressed in its early phases by Pascal, and which was to split into religious and non-religious currents. The theological structures which man had erected in answer to the problems of his destiny were threatened and partially superseded by scientific and rational ones. In the nineteenth century there began to be a serious decline of faith even in these last gods, and, along with destiny in the Greek sense of the word, the specter of the absurd haunted many thinking men. Nietzsche discarded all the gods and called for a return to the Promethean tragic attitude; struggle to make the earth and man himself the sense of the world. This was followed by an increasing awareness that man himself, due to his démon, was a major stumbling block in the path toward the accomplishment of Nietzsche's concept of a worthy destiny on earth. Everything, including man, was now en question, the preconceived structures having lost their validity as universal formulae.

The growth of the absurd was largely due to the fact that modern man, unlike the Greeks, had before him the spectacle of more than two thousand years of relatively unsuccessful effort to solve the problems posed by the internal and external manifestations of man's fate. Human destiny seemed to be compounded of death, chaos, and absurdity.
That was the fundamental vision, and contemplation of it was certain to lead to a gnawing anguish. Before, Malraux, Pascal, Flaubert, and Vigny, to mention just a few, had spoken of the value of action, giving the word its widest possible interpretation, as a remedy for this anguish. If man was to have any dignity at all, he must, by an effort of will, organize this action in such a way that it becomes a revolt against his destiny. The revolt, in turn, must be of such a nature that it will give dignity and stature to the human picture as a whole, enable man to become more fully man, not just serve for the glorification or satisfaction of a single individual. This is a vital point, because, even if man is mis en question, he is still the measure of all things for philosophers like Malraux, he is the thing which must be given dignity and stature. With all preconceived structures swept away, man must struggle to discover values that will give human existence the most possible beauty and sense. The violation of the dignity of any person detracts from the possibility of attaining that goal. This is the ethical center of Malraux's humanism, the holding at bay of the beast in man, the ever-present enemy that threatens to destroy his last chance for dignity. For this reason, the chapter dealing with this aspect will be entitled "Ethos, or the struggle with the beast." Man's battle against his inner flaw.
For Malraux, and those who, like him, are a result of the Promethean tragic current of human thought, the problem of destiny on the cosmic level is unsolved and will forever remain so. At the end of all consideration of the matter, stands death and the unknown, just as it did for the Greeks. No ultimate victory is promised, but man can win a relative victory through the creative act: the production of works which reduce the world to the human, and which transcend the death of their creator to pass on to future generations. This aspect of the struggle is a direct revolt against man's absurd position in the universe. As Malraux puts it: tout art est une leçon pour ses dieux (LVS, 624) and l'art est un anti-destin. (LVS, 637) The chapter concerning this aspect of his humanism will be called "A Humanistic Aesthetic, or the Struggle with the Gods."

In all times, man has had to take everything that has kept him alive as well as everything he has created either directly or indirectly from the earth, which in its turn tries continually to take it all back. This, according to Malraux, is the fundamental element of continuity in human existence. As stated previously, this facet of his humanism will be referred to as "The Fundamental, or the struggle with the Earth".

We shall discuss other aspects of Malraux's philosophy, but these three struggles are the major ones, and
all the others are related to them in one way or another. The fact that they are struggles, and not structures to be filled out, cannot be emphasized too strongly. It must be remembered that it was a collapse of systems that brought men like Malraux to their concept of the attitude. It was only after this breakdown had taken place that man could start the revolt against it. This problem will be dealt with at length in the chapter following the present one: "The Sources: Absurdity, Anguish, and Revolt."

To try to treat this humanism in terms of a preconceived plan would be contrary to Malraux's express statement concerning it, and would at the same time deprive it of one of its major values: universalism. A structure may include many things, but by its very nature it must also exclude even more. Malraux makes it very explicit that he considers this lack of preconception a major advantage. First he speaks of the humanism itself: "Notre résurrection n'est pas au service d'un humanisme préconçu; comme Montaigne elle appelle un humanisme pas encore conçu." (LVS, 631) Then he says of the aesthetic, that is an integral art of this humanism, "Et c'est parce qu'elle n'est pas préconcevable, qu'elle est pour la première fois, universelle." (LVS, 607) It is precisely the lack of universality that Malraux criticizes in the formulae that the past has produced for the advancement of mankind, and he feels that the unformu-
lated and exploratory type of culture which he proposes may remedy this shortcoming.

Les grands mythes de ce siècle, liberté, démocratie, science, progrès, convergent sur le plus grand espoir qu'ait connu l'humanité depuis les Catacombes. Lorsque les marées du temps auront usé, au fond fraternel de l'oubli, les débris de cette ardente prospection, sans doute s'apercevra-t-on, qu'aucune ne fut aussi soucieuse d'apporter à tous les hommes leur propre grandeur. (LVS, 487)

Cette ardente prospection refers to the efforts from the nineteenth century on, to work toward a universal humanism, toward a culture which, due to the fact that it does not have a preconceived pattern, does not know where it is going, but on the other hand, does not exclude anything that it may discover on the way—une culture de Grands Navigateurs.

A une tradition, c'est-à-dire à une culture qui, dans tous les domaines, entendait se concevoir, il l'art moderne contribuait à substituer une culture qui ne se conçoit pas. Qui oppose un domaine de recherches à un système d'affirmations. Dans laquelle l'artiste-et peut-être l'homme-ne sait que d'où il part, quelles sont ses méthodes, sa volonté et sa direction. Un art de Grands Navigateurs... Mais une culture de Grands Navigateurs peut-elle se concevoir? (LVS, 602)

The reference here is primarily to art but Malraux uses almost identical terms in a lecture on the subject of humanism given under the auspices of UNESCO. He lists the volonté de conscience and the volonté de découverte as the fundamental European values, then, returning to the navigateur image, he shows in a humourous fashion how these two volontés and the navigateur, which is their product, are superior to preformulated dogmas.
C'est le refus d'accepter comme un dogme une forme imposée, parce que, après tout, il est tout de même arrivé que des navigateurs aient découvert des perroquets, mais il n'est pas encore arrivé que des perroquets aient découvert des navigateurs. (LVS, 602)

In none of these passages is there any mention of an ultimate point of arrival, nor of definite things that man will discover in his voyage—a trip that is bounded by death and the unknown. The human race must continue this endless attempt to discover values with a full awareness that the final outcome may well be annihilation. Such a vision of human existence is tragic in exactly the same sense that Prometheus' struggle with Zeus was tragic, particularly if we remember that at the end of AEschylus' play the Titan sinks into the bowels of the earth amid thunder, lightning, and flame. Malraux is well aware of the tragedy, and he states in this same passage, that from his point of view, the only possible humanism is a tragic one.

Il y a un humanisme possible, mais il faut bien nous dire, et clairement, que c'est un humanisme tragique.Nous sommes en face d'un monde inconnu; nous l'affrontons avec conscience....Et nous ne pouvons fonder une attitude humaine que sur le tragique parce que l'homme ne sait pas où il va, et sur l'humanisme parce qu'il sait d'où il part et où est sa volonté. (PNL, 499)

Here Malraux is speaking of his humanism in terms that relate directly to those of the passage in which he speaks of the effect of Greek tragedy: la conscience simultanée de la servitude humaine et de l'indomptable aptitude
He further associates his humanism with ancient tragedy by saying of the latter in this same lecture: "Elle [la tragédie grecque] est mise en question du destin de l'homme: au destin de l'homme, l'homme commence et le destin finit." (PNL, 500)

Tragedy puts man's destiny in question by an effort of man's own will, and thereby permits him to found his own grandeur by the act of questioning; the ability to do this being man's part divine according to Malraux. The purpose of this Promethean humanism is to try to do the same thing.

Des hommes courbés sous ce destin se sont relevés pour partir inlassablement vers la nuit, pour rendre intelligible l'immense confusion du monde et transmettre leurs découvertes au lieu d'en faire des secrets, pour tenter de fonder en qualité victorieuse de la mort le monde éphémère, pour comprendre que l'homme ne naît pas de sa propre affirmation, mais de la mise en question de l'univers. (PNL, 500)

If we examine these passages in which Malraux speaks of his concept of humanism, we find that, as already stated, in addition to the adjective "tragic" which he applies directly to it, the key words are conscience, volonté, mettre en question, and tenter. The humanism itself can be defined in terms of these words. The basic one is conscience, because the entire process starts with an awareness of man's tragic, absurd, position and of the grandeur that is inherent in struggling against it. From this point
on, it is a matter of the volonté to mettre en question every aspect of human destiny, including man's own weaknesses. The final step is tenter to discover the values that will permit man to make the utmost of his time on earth. The conscience of man's tragic position is simply another way of saying that l'homme sait d'où il part and il ne sait pas où il va. The où est sa volonté indicates the will to try to find the paths to the greatest dignity for the entire human race. It will be noted, that in almost all respects, this humanism is mainly a matter of attitude or conscience. The double awareness of a tragic destiny, and of the grandeur that comes from recognizing it, and struggling to rise above it.

Basically, the central, unifying, thread of Malraux's humanism is ethical. Destiny, it seems, has placed man in an unjust position. All of its manifestations, both internal and external, move to reduce, crush, and destroy him. Whether the struggle is against the gods, against the earth, or against himself, it is carried on to rectify a situation, and is therefore essentially ethical. From this fact derives the remarkable unity of Malraux's attitude, regardless of the field of activity in which he happens to be operating.

The ethical core also takes us back to Prometheus, with his consciousness that he is being wronged, that he is essentially powerless against his fate, but who, never-
theless, continues an unbroken struggle against it while fully aware that he cannot win. *Prometheus Bound* presents essentially the same vision of human existence as do Malraux's works. The tragic conscience that forms the basis of life for both of them is beautifully expressed by Miguel de Unamuno when he writes: "Como que la vida es tragedia, y la tragedia es perpetua lucha, sin victoria, ni esperanza de ella." (STV, 19)

However, from Malraux's viewpoint, and here the Promethean attitude is most obvious, *il n'est pas nécessaire d'espérer pour entreprendre.* (LC, 260) This is the état d'âme that over two thousand years of human history have produced in Malraux and others like him. What has really taken place, according to Malraux, is that we have made a spiral, and we are back above Prometheus on his rock, a Prometheus made even more tragic by his awareness that over two milleniums of struggle had failed to produce a completely satisfactory solution. The Titan is still chained to his rock, and man is still chained to his destiny. The former faces his fate with open eyes, Malraux says *nous sommes en face d'un monde inconnu, nous l'affrontons avec conscience.* (PNL, 499) The attitude is Promethean in both cases.

There remains the problem of determining whether or not it is humanistic. The common ground on which all humanisms meet is the desire that the human potential be realized
to the fullest possible degree. For Malraux, as for Prometheus, man is either without the gods, or struggling against them. The avowed purpose of all this purely human effort is to make the most of man's existence on earth. Malraux stated this directly in the passages that we have examined from *L'Humanisme Tragique*, and it was precisely his efforts to improve human existence that sent Prometheus to his fate. The central preoccupation in both instances is man, and what to do about him. Since the desire is to raise man to his fullest stature, this Promethean attitude is also a humanistic one. We are well within the limits set down by Crane Brinton in his *The Shaping of the Modern Mind*.

Let us then, accept humanism as a kind of cover-all under which may be grouped all men whose world view is neither primarily theological nor primarily rationalistic. (SMM, 24)

The human being, the full complex human being, is for the humanist a standard. To oversimplify, his slogan might be: Neither superhuman (theism) nor subhuman (mechanism). (SMM, 43)

In the terms of these lines Prometheus may well have been the western world's first humanist, and we have seen that Malraux represents a return to the same attitude. Any position that purports to consider the full human being cannot overlook religion, which is, in many respects, man's most characteristic creation. Here again there is a strange parallel between Malraux's position and the Promethean legend.
It was largely due to the efforts of the Titan that Zeus was established as the ruler of Olympus. For Malraux too, it is man who creates the gods. Religion therefore falls within the scope of his universal vision of humanism because it is part of man's struggle to reduce the universe to human comprehensibility, and anything that bears the stamp of the human will to do this, is a part of humanism. It is not a satisfactory attitude for Malraux himself for two reasons. He does not believe that religion gives the truest picture of human existence, and to varying degrees, it turns man's attention from what for him is man's real destiny, l'aventure humaine, la terre. (LNA, 91) His position is implicit in the following lines from L'Humanisme Tragique:

"Car l'homme crée ses dieux avec tout lui-même, mais il crée son art le plus haut avec le monde réduit à l'image de son secret toujours la même: faire éclater la condition humaine par des moyens humains." (PNL, 500)

In the chapter on "The Problem of the Absolute" we shall deal in greater detail with Malraux's position with respect to religion. Suffice it to say here that it is when historical perspective has removed a religion's absolute quality that it can become part of a universal humanism.

The above secret is also the secret of Malraux's humanism: the will to accept man as essentially tragic and to carry on a heroic and unending struggle against all
aspects, interior and exterior, of his destiny, and to make the most of his existence. All of this is done by man alone, drawing on purely human resources. It is l'aventure humaine, the voyage of discovery. The rewards that it has to offer we shall see as we examine the various aspects of Malraux's humanism. Not the least of them are the ethical concept of la dignité humaine, and the related social one of la fraternité virile, the brotherhood of common struggle. The basic requirement, for both Prometheus and Malraux are conscience and volonté.

The details are matters for the following chapters; the fundamental sources and the basic elements of Malraux's humanism can best be understood by referring to three passages from his recent works. In Les Voix du Silence he writes about the role played by awareness of destiny in the struggle to establish a new humanism.

La conscience que nous avons prise du destin, aussi profonde que celle de l'Orient mais singulièrement plus peuplée, est à celles de jadis ce qu'est notre musée aux cabinets d'antiques, d'une autre taille que les spectres de marbre, il [le destin] est l'Apparition du XXe siècle, et c'est contre lui qui tente de se constituer le premier humanisme universel. (LVS, 628)

The consciousness of man's tragic destiny, peopled by the vision of over two thousand years of largely unsuccessful effort to solve its problems, is at the source of this humanism, and we note that the emphasis is on tenter. Malraux defines humanism at the end of La Création Artistique,
and later, in the last lines of *Les Voix du Silence*. In both cases he begins with the words: "L'humanisme, ce n'est pas dire: 'ce que j'ai fait, aucun animal ne l'aurait fait.'" (LCA, 216) What follows says essentially the same thing in both books, since the gods incarnate many of the forces that crush man. There is, however, a change from *je* to *nous*, indicating perhaps a greater emphasis on fraternity and common effort. The later of the two passages also includes the verb *vouloir*, probably to underline the importance of the will. The last half of the two passages, given in the order in which Malraux wrote them, bring us to the essence of his humanism.

L'humanisme,....., c'est dire: 'J'ai refusé ce que voulait en moi la bête, et suis devenu homme sans le secours des dieux.' (LCA, 216)

and:

L'humanisme,....., c'est dire: 'Nous avons refusé ce que voulait en nous la bête, et nous voulons retrouver l'homme partout où nous avons trouvé ce qui l'écrase.' (LVS, 639)

Prometheus could do no more.
III

The Sources: Absurdity, Anguish, and Revolt

It is a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing. *Macbeth*, V, 5.

*Mais Macbeth signifie quelquechose.*
*
*les Voix du Silence*

Up until now we have been concerned mainly with the historical and philosophical processes which produced the type of world-vision embodied in the works of André Malraux; from this point on we shall deal largely with the manifestations and evolution of this vision as they appear in Malraux's own writings. However, before this last can be undertaken, a few preliminary remarks are necessary.

By and large, the emphasis has been placed on the negative results of the aforementioned processes, the decline of faith in all the formulae that offered even a tentative solution of the problems of human destiny. For men like Malraux, the human mind created the gods in answer to these problems, only to have human reason and science weaken them.
at a later date. Reason's failure in the effort to discover a significant role for man in the universal scheme of things was even more signally complete. The end result of science's examination of the universe was to make it seem very probable that the human race could completely disappear without even causing a noticeable ripple in the cosmic order. The more than two thousand year search for purpose finally reached the conclusion that there was none, or at least none that reason was capable of grasping. For the man without religious faith, human existence, particularly in its relation to the cosmos, was at the same time tragic and absurd.

There are, unfortunately, certain very real dangers inherent in the position which regards man as metaphysically absurd and without purpose. These range all the way from nihilism to the assumption that since life has no sense there is nothing wrong in destroying that of others. These attitudes, of course, compound the absurdity, but that is no deterrent if one has already accepted it as man's only possible destiny, and is content to live in it. If human life has no dignity it is of little importance what one does with it. For Malraux, as for Albert Camus, the answer to the problem of man's tragic, absurd destiny is to revolt against it, and through the nature of the revolt itself to give a dignity to life.

The question of action is related to that of revolt.
A mind that has been conditioned, as most occidental minds have been, by the concepts of mortality and immortality, as well as by the idea of purpose, cannot ordinarily accept the tragic and absurd vision of human existence without experiencing a gnawing anguish. We have already spoken of the value of action as an anodyne for this anguish. The fundamental problem in the relationship between action and revolt is that the two terms are by no means synonymous. Action can become revolt, but it can also contribute to the absurdity of existence. Its efficacy for deadening the feeling of anguish is in direct proportion to its intensity, and does not necessarily have anything to do with the end to which it is directed. For these last purposes, opium, eroticism, alcoholism, and gambling can serve just as well as action, and they certainly do not constitute a revolt against destiny.

However, for there to be revolt, it is necessary that some form of action take place, using the term action in the broadest possible sense. The vital issue, therefore, is to choose a form of action that does embody a revolt against absurdity, and which, due to this fact, will have a double advantage. It will still have its value as an anodyne, and will at the same time supply the dignity which can come only from a revolt. This choice is primarily ethical in nature and is closely connected with the "titanic
impulse" and the sens héroïque with which we dealt in the preceding chapter. Although the complete treatment of this matter concerns the chapter on ethics, a brief comment is required in order to clarify the connection between action and revolt. The heroic sense would certainly lead one to choose the correct form of action, but it does not, in itself, explain the two basic types from which one must make the choice. For Malraux, human activity falls into two major domaines: that of assouvissement and that of vraies valeurs. (LVS, 528) The first includes everything that is simply a flight from destiny: pointless or wrong action, opium and all those things which have no purpose except to assuage the anguish of existence felt by one individual. The second, by its very name, indicates the type of action directed toward giving life on earth the greatest possible dignity. By acting in the domaine of vraies valeurs, as opposed to that of assouvissement, one converts action into revolt. Without this no humanism is possible, for Malraux's humanism is nothing more or less than this revolt.

The various aspect of the revolt will each be the theme of a separate chapter. In this one we shall trace the concepts of tragedy and absurdity through Malraux's works, show the anguish which results from awareness of them, and finally show the beginnings of action and revolt. In a word, we shall show what we feel is the well-spring of his
humanism. Two of Malraux's very early works, *Lunes en Papier* and *Royaume Farfelu*, have been deliberately left out of this essay, because, like most of the critics, we feel that they are simply an experiment in fantastic writing that Malraux quickly abandoned.

The first work of any real significance to appear from Malraux's pen was *La Tentation de l'Occident* (1926), a series of imaginary letters exchanged between a European travelling in the Orient and a Chinese visiting Europe for the first time. The epistolary form, combined with the obviously high intellectual level of the correspondents, gave Malraux the opportunity to express his ideas in detail, setting forth not only his vision of the current European state of mind, but also the process that led up to it. In one short paragraph we are taken from the beginning of the struggle between reason and theology to the moment of awareness that man may be his own worst enemy.

Pour détruire Dieu, et après l'avoir détruit, l'esprit européen a anéanti tout ce qui pouvait s'opposer à l'homme: parvenu au terme de ses efforts, comme Rancé devant le corps de sa maîtresse, il ne trouve que la mort. Avec son image enfin atteinte, il découvre qu'il ne peut plus se passionner pour elle. Et jamais il ne fit d'aussi inquiétante découverte. (LT0, 124)

The struggle of reason and science to replace God by man has produced decidedly unsatisfactory results according to these lines. Man may or may not have succeeded God,
but here we see the indications that he is far from satisfactory as a deity. The downward tendency has, however, not yet reached the nadir in the preceding passage, which takes it only to the point of growing uneasiness concerning man as God's replacement. As a potential deity, man follows God out of the picture. "La réalité absolue a été pour vous Dieu, puis l'homme; mais l'homme est mort, après Dieu, et vous cherchez avec angoisse celui à qui vous pourriez confier son étrange héritage." (LTO, 105)

This whole process by which man first undermined God, and then himself, is summed up symbolically by Ling's remark that: "Après la mort du Sphinx, OEdipe s'attaque à lui-même." (LTO, 49)

The anguish which comes from contemplating the spectacle of man's lack of success in solving the problem of his destiny, even to the extent of being a temporary God on earth, a more extreme version of the "pathos of mortality" which was felt by the Greeks, begins to manifest itself already in this very early work by Malraux. It is Ling who states that the result of this unsuccessful battle against man's mortality is anguish. "Vous avez chargé l'univers d'angoisse. Quelle figure tragique vous avez donnée à la mort." (LTO, 36)

This is the tragic sentiment of life in its aspect which most nearly resembles the Promethean awareness of fate,
but for modern man there is also, as we have said, the specter of cosmic absurdity to complicate the issue, the relative failure of the effort, begun by the Greeks themselves, to find a sense for human existence, an order of the universe in which man would have a vital function. Ling associates the beginning of this struggle with the Greeks, and at the same time states what he feels that it has lead to in modern times. "Au tourment intellectuel des Grecs, à l'inquiétude pure qu'ils trouveront en tentant de donner à la vie un sens human, se joignent votre angoisse et vos gestes d'aveugles." (LTO, 49)

The purpose of the *gestes d'aveugles* has been to attempt to find the universal structure, to reduce everything to a point where it can be comprehended by the human mind. The closer that man can come to this goal, the nearer he will be to justifying an order in which he is a permanent and important factor. Ling sees this as the basic direction taken by all occidental thought. He also feels that it is fundamentally a process of self-delusion and that it starts with an erroneous presupposition: that there is a permanent element in man.

[L'esprit occidental] veut dresser un plan de l'univers, en donner une image intelligible, c'est-à-dire établir entre des choses ignorées et des choses connues une suite de rapports susceptibles de faire connaître celles qui étaient jusque-là obscures. Il veut se soumettre le monde, et trouve dans son action une fierté d'autant plus grande qu'il croit
le posséder davantage. Son univers est un mythe cohérent. (LTO, 93)

Mais vous croyez qu'il y a dans ce que vous appelez Homme quelquechose de permanent qui n'existe pas. (LTO, 94)

All of the systems have therefore lost validity; man appears to be nothing but an ephemeral phenomenon in a universe that could well do without him, his carefully built structures, nothing but a myth. The search for order has been replaced by an awareness of absurdity, and Ling says that: "Au centre de l'homme européen, dominant les grands mouvements de sa vie, est une absurdité essentielle." (LTO, 54)

The foregoing passages, it is true, all illustrate the interpretation of the European intellectual scene by an Oriental. However, A.D. agrees with his version, and adds one more important element. This is a factor that is vital where conscience and revolt are concerned: volonté. This last is necessary in order to have an honest basis for life, and for the following reason. The idea that man's universal role is absurd may be unpleasant to accept, but if one feels that this vision is the true one, he must will to face it and not delude himself. "Il n'est pas d'idéal auquel nous puissions nous sacrifier, car de tous nous connaissons les mensonges, nous qui ne savons point ce qui est la vérité." (LTO, 51)
Here we are dealing with the volonté de conscience which Malraux will later list as one of the two major European values. In *La Tentation de l'Occident* the will to be aware produces a consciousness of the tragedy and absurdity of human existence, an awareness which, as we have said, always carries with it the inherent danger of a resulting nihilistic attitude. This possibility is implicit in the following statement by the European, A.D. "L'absurde, le bel absurde, lié à nous comme le serpent à l'arbre du Bien et du Mal, n'est jamais tout à fait caché, et nous le voyons préparer ses jeux les plus séduisants avec le concours fidèle de notre volonté." (LTO, 124)

Obviously this is the nadir of the entire spiritual process, and if it were not surpassed there would be nothing that even resembled a humanism. Fortunately, however, the type of mind that can early accept the tragedy and absurdity of existence because of a will to conscience, and not as an a posteriori justification for an absurd life, is not likely to accept nihilism. Almost by its very nature it is bound to revolt. The decision to face the situation, and to revolt, regardless of what it costs in the way of mental suffering, and to carry on unbroken, is the note on which the book closes: revolt. The concept of opposing lucidity to absurdity indicates the determination to use the former as revolt against the latter. All of this is implied by the
final: "Sans m'incliner, j'apporterai chaque jour la paix en offrande. Lucidité avide, je brûle encore devant toi, flamme solitaire et droit." (LTO, 125) Ling's accusation that the end result of Occidental thought professes for two thousand years, in matters related to destiny, has been tragic anguish, and awareness of absurdity is perhaps only too true. The answer, however, is not resignation or flight from the unpleasant reality, but rather to turn and struggle against it.

The over-all picture is not as completely black as it might appear in the grim vision delineated above. Although the power of western reason has ended, according to Ling, by demolishing, one by one, all of the concepts concerning a universal purpose for man's existence, this final destruction has in itself an element that compensates, at least in part, for the fact that it has replaced order with tragedy and absurdity. This is the double idea of liberty and possibility. If man's existence is absurd on the cosmic level, not serving toward any end, then all of the constraints that are necessarily imposed by orientation in a specific direction can be thrown off. Man is free and a world of possibilities is open to him. Long before either Malraux or the Existentialists, Nietzsche had proposed this idea with his "I have emancipated them from bondage under purpose." (N, Z, 183) The effect of this declaration of freedom, with
the concomitant expansion of possibilities, was felt by almost all the agnostic philosophers who came in contact with *Thus Spake Zarathustra*, either directly or indirectly. Heidegger believed that our existence is characterized by the fact that things are possible to us. (SHE, 14) In defense of his own philosophy, Sartre associates the non-existence of God with the concept of all-possibility. "Dostoievsky said, 'If God didn't exist, everything would be possible.' That is the very starting point of existentialism." (Ex, 27)

*La Tentation de l'Occident* is, as we have seen, largely devoted to the death of deities: gods, science, and man himself, with a consequent predominant sentiment of absurdity. The major emphasis is placed on the negative or destructive aspects of modern thought, on what A.D. refers to as son besoin d'un classicisme négatif, appuyé presque tout entier sur une horreur lucide de la séduction. (LTO, 88) These last words are really nothing more than a restatement of the necessity to face the true nature of the human situation, tragic and absurd though it may be, and to reject any of the more attractive proposals that may obscure the clarity of this vision. For Malraux, as for Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Sartre, the acceptance of destiny has its rewards. If man's existence is not directed toward any ultimate purpose, then, as A.D. says: *la vie est le domaine*
infini des possibles. (LTO, 93) This is the conclusion that must be drawn from the tragic-absurd awareness of existence if it is to produce anything resembling a humanism. The idea of possibility makes it possible to leave nihilism behind and conduct a true revolt, one that will lead to positive, constructive activity. In view of the fact that La Tentation de l'Occident preceded L'Être et le Néant by almost two decades, it does not appear that Malraux was influenced by the present French schools of Existentialism in the formation of this aspect of his philosophy. A more likely assumption is that both of them drew on Nietzsche and the philosophic currents which sprang from him.

Absurdity, anguish, and revolt, the starting point of Malraux's version of humanism, are all present in La Tentation de l'Occident, his earliest significant work. Even at this early stage in his evolution, the will not to accept nihilism, the sine qua non for revolt against it, is evident. There is not much indication of the directions that the revolt will take but there is an emphasis on art that presages Les Voix du Silence and points up the strong cyclical unity of Malraux's thought. The tendencies toward the more violent forms of action that characterized his works from Les Conquérants to L'Espoir, are not in evidence here.

The tone of D'Une jeunesse européenne, Malraux's next important work, differs but little from that of the
book which preceded it. However, being only an essay, it is more limited in scope and it too concentrates on the negative quality of contemporary thought. If proof were needed that the opinions of Ling and A.D. concerning the end results of Occidental intellectual activity are also Malraux's own, this short text would furnish them. The note of disillusion is heard throughout, along with those of despair and loss of purpose.

Notre civilisation, depuis qu'elle a perdu l'espoir de trouver dans les sciences le sens du monde, est privée de tout but spirituel. (DJE, 145)

Que les constellations d'un désespoir semblable à celui qui suit les amours désespérées, dominent toute une jeunesse attachée à l'esprit, on n'en saurait douter. (DJE, 147)

Once again we are skirting dangerously close to the borders of a nihilistic attitude, a fact of which the author, as the following passage will show, is aware. At the time this essay was written (1927) the first world war had only been over for nine years, and we find in the work definite indications that proximity to that masterpiece of futile waste, and the deception that followed it, contributed to the negative nature of Malraux's thought at that time.

Notre époque, où rôdent encore tant d'échos, ne veut pas avouer sa pensée nihiliste, destructrice, foncièrement négative. Et une autre cause, plus voilée, pousse tous ceux qui, en Europe, ont découvert la vie au lendemain de la guerre, à interroger sourdemment la pensée des plus grands d'entre eux. (DJE, 148)

Fortunately, even in the midst of all this negativism,
there is the seed from which revolt can develop. We note in the second of these three passages that the attachment for *l'esprit* still exists despite the results it may have produced. The will to lucid comprehension, in itself a revolt against absurdity, is unbroken. The last quotation illustrates two tendencies that have important implications: the inclination not to accept nihilism, and the idea of interrogation, which later becomes the core of Malraux's humanism. Prometheus is already beginning to revolt, spiritually, against the order of destiny.

Of all Malraux's literary creations, Garine, in *Les Conquérants* (1928), is perhaps the most deeply and completely permeated with the sentiment of absurdity. In a postface to the definitive edition of this novel (1949) Malraux referred to it as a livre d'adolescent (*LC*, 247), but in the same passage he calls Garine "Un type de héros en qui s'unissent l'aptitude à l'action, la culture et la lucidité." (*LC*, 248)

This first great novelistic hero of Malraux's, with all his contradictions, incarnates important developments in his creator's evolution. The ideal of lucidity, already noted in the earlier works, is, by Malraux's own statement, an element of Garine's make-up. He feels most deeply the absurdity of human existence, not only on the universal level, but also in the relationships of society. The
reasons for this last are basically ethical and are therefore dealt with in the next chapter. Suffice it to say here that he had suffered a humiliating trial which engendered this feeling that human society was absurd. "C'est après ce procès que l'impression d'absurdité que me donnait l'ordre social s'est peu à peu étendue à presque tout ce qui est humain." (LC, 170)

Comments on the absurd are so frequent that they assume the nature of a leitmotiv, and almost without exception they are connected with Garine.

Jouer sa vie sur cette carte sale, ridicule, qu'il n'avait pas choisie, lui était intolérable. (LC, 65)

Pierre trouva ce même sentiment d'impuissance navrante, de mépris et de dégoût que l'on éprouve devant une multitude fanatique, devant toutes les grandes manifestations de l'absurdité humaine. (LC, 66)

Le sentiment de la vanité de toute vie, d'une humanité menée par des forces absurdes. (LC, 169)

Garine, however, has a remedy against the anguish caused by awareness of the absurd that his predecessors, in Malraux's works, did not have. He is the first of the heros to speak about the value of action as an anodyne, unfortunately without much attention to its results. This could be one of the reasons why Malraux considers the book adolescent.

Mon action me rend aboulique à l'égard de tout ce qui n'est pas elle, à commencer par ces résultats. (LC, 215)

Se lier à une grande action quelconque et ne pas la lâcher, en être hanté, en être intoxiqué, c'est peut-être... (LC, 74)
Here we hear again the echo of Baudelaire's *Enivrez-vous*.

The effect of action may be strong enough to deaden the one who performs it to the results, but there is ample evidence in the book that although the foregoing lines would not seem to so indicate, Garine also sees his own activity in terms of a revolt against the absurd. Action does not, as we have previously indicated, necessarily mean revolt. Conceived of purely in terms of a soporific against anguish, it can be viewed as an admission of defeat. The will not to be beaten must be present before any type of action can be considered as revolt. This last is, of course, nothing more than a starting point, and far more is needed in order to produce a humanism. Without it, however, the first step cannot be taken. As is proper in a tragic humanism, nothing is said about ultimate victory, the call is simply to refuse to be defeated, just as it was for Prometheus. This is the driving force in Garine's life. "Il y a tout de même une chose qui compte dans la vie: c'est de ne pas être vaincu." (LC, 211)

In the case of Garine the will to fight is supplemented by the desire to direct the struggle against the absurd itself and thereby to reduce it, at least on the human level. Once again the idea of a nihilistic existence is rejected. The following statements also show that Garine's indifference to the results of his action was more apparent than real.
Et pourtant, il me semble que je lutte contre l'absurde humain, en faisant ce que je fais ici. (LC, 169)

On peut vivre en acceptant l'absurde, mais on ne peut vivre dans l'absurde. (LC, 230)

Garine is a long way from being an ideal humanistic hero, basically because he is spiritually isolated from all but a very few members of the human race, due largely to a humiliation that he has suffered at the hands of society's legal processes. Nevertheless he does contain, in germ, the fundamental elements from which many aspects of Malraux's humanism will grow. Garine is fully aware of the tragedy and absurdity of existence but refuses to accept defeat. The fact that he chose to orient his action in such a way that it benefitted the struggling coolies of Hong Kong rather than their oppressors, forecasts the ethical trend of Malraux's development. There is little time for art as such in Les Conquérants, but Garine's, On ne se défend qu'en créant (LC, 231) would do very well as an epigraph for any of Malraux's books on art. As compared with La Tentation de l'Occident and D'Une Jeunesse européenne, Les Conquérants represents a progression from simply meditating on the problem of man's fate, to a stage where méditation is combined with action which seeks to do something about this same fate. The action itself may leave much to be desired, but there are understandable reasons for this, not the least of which lies in the fact that Les Conquérants is, to use
the author’s own words, un livre d’adolescent.

In La Voie Royale, death comes to the forefront and assumes its role as the major cause of human anguish. There is less preoccupation with the absurdity of social institutions, possibly because the action of the novel takes place in the jungles of Indo-China. This isolation tends to make the protagonists concentrate largely on the more metaphysical aspects of tragedy and absurdity. Malraux, as we noted in an earlier chapter, saw this work as a tragedy. For Perken, as for Garine, human existence has no sense, but in the eyes of the former, it is death more than social injustice that points up life’s absurdity.

Vous savez aussi bien que moi que la vie n’a aucun sens: à vivre seul on n’échappe guère à la préoccupation de son destin....La mort est toujours là, comprenez-vous, comme...comme l’irréfutable preuve de l’absurdité de la vie. (LVR, 106)

Perhaps it is because the two protagonists are more or less isolated in the jungle, and struggling for their very existence against forces which can culminate in death and annihilation, that La Voie Royale has more the tone of old tragedy than do Malraux’s earlier works. The foregoing passage well illustrates this change of tone. One gets the feeling that the problem here is Man, whereas for Garine it was mainly a man, Garine himself. By means of this isolation Malraux has succeeded in generalizing his approach.

Although Malraux’s later heros will not be as isolated
as Perken and Vannec, his work will never lose this tendency to visualize things in terms of mankind as a whole. Although the characters of his books live and suffer as human individuals, their meditations on the problems of destiny will usually be couched in general terms. Perken's statement that death is the irrefutable proof of life's absurdity is typical of this.

Like Garine before them, Perken and Vannec use action to deaden the feeling of anguish produced by awareness of tragedy and absurdity. "Le jeu commençait; tant mieux. Il chassait l'inquiétude." (LVR, 57) "Mais ce jeu me cachait le reste du monde et j'ai parfois singulièrement besoin qu'il me soit caché." (LVR, 62)

The full significance of this last quotation about cutting off the sight of the rest of the world becomes clear in the light of Pascal's image for La condition humaine. All of the prisoners see their own fate embodied in that of their fellows who are daily executed in front of them. Man is the prisoner of destiny, at least in the sense that he can do nothing that will keep himself from dying. There is, however, in La Voie Royale, a distinctly Promethean note, a protest that the gods that have placed man in this prison of mortality have done him an injustice.

Presque tous ces corps, perdus dans la nuit d'Europe ou le jour d'Asie, écrasés eux aussi par la vanité de leur vie,...se consolaient avec les dieux. Ah!
qu'il en existât, pour pouvoir, au prix des peines éternelles, hurler, comme ces chiens, qu'aucune pensée divine, qu'aucune récompense future, que rien ne pouvait justifier la fin d'une existence humaine. (LVR, 178)

These, the next to the last words of the novel, adolescent as they may seem, sound very much like Prometheus crying that the worst that Zeus can do to him will not prevent him from denouncing the injustice that he is suffering. The similarity to AESchylus' Titan does not end here. Perken affirms his will to revolt in words that Prometheus himself might have used: Je ne veux pas être soumis. (LVR, 107)

As an individual, Perken is not disciplined by the "titanic impulse" to make of his own revolt the revolt of all mankind. He thinks almost purely in terms of himself and is, therefore, like Garine, unsatisfactory as a humanistic hero. However, if we treat him, not as an individual, but as the symbol of Malraux's vision of the human race as a whole struggling against its destiny, then Perken incarnates many basic elements of Malraux's humanism. It is he who states that awareness of mortality can lead to the fullest possible use of one's life span. "Ce n'est pas pour mourir que je pense à la mort, c'est pour vivre." (LVR, 108)

This passage has already been considered in detail in the chapter on tragedy as a source of productive action. It is simply an early embryonic form of Malraux's
later statement concerning mankind's aptitude for founding its grandeur on awareness of its servitude. The concept of humanity's desire to rise above its condition is presented, in *La Voie Royale*, by means of Perken's wish to "Posséder plus que lui-même, échapper à la vie de poussière des hommes qu'il voyait chaque jour." (LVR, 41)

Death is the leading adversary for Perken, just as for Malraux himself. Deeply imbued with the feeling that this antagonist will put an end to his existence once and for all, Perken feels the need to accomplish something that will last beyond his own death. It is for this reason, mainly, that he says: "Je veux laisser une cicatrice sur cette carte." (LVR, 60)

In his own limited field of activity, Perken wants to do exactly the same thing that all creative production does on a larger and more worthy scale: win a temporary victory over death through something that will be passed on to succeeding generations.

We must repeat that as an individual, Perken is not satisfactory from the humanistic point of view. Preoccupied only with himself, he resembles a slightly modified version of the popular conception of the Nietzschean superman, not the interpretation we have tried to present in the preceding chapter. He does personify, however, awareness of the tragedy and absurdity of human existence as seen from the cosmic
level, and also the will to revolt. I have chosen to treat him as a symbol, albeit an incomplete one, for Malraux's tragic vision of humanity struggling against its destiny, because he does possess the foregoing qualities, and because his remark about thinking of death in order to live lies so near the heart of Malraux's attitude.

There is, in La Voie Royale, an all-pervading sense of isolation, a feeling of complete separation from the larger aspects of human society. The reasons for this are probably many, and they may include a desire on the part of the author to heighten the tragic tension by means of an unusual isolation, a possibility that we have already mentioned. This same separation could partially account for the defects of Perken and Vannec as humanistic protagonists: they think only in terms of themselves. However, as we have noted, the conclusions that they reach usually have a general significance. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that another purpose for isolation was to promote meditation on the problems of the human condition. Professor Frohock, in his recent work on Malraux, has called attention to the latter's "shamanistic" quality, which involves a pattern of withdrawal and return. (AMTI, 137-141) La Voie Royale is a product of Malraux's period of extreme isolation from Europe, that part of the pattern which is most propitious for consideration of philosophic and spiritual questions. Both the strong points and the defects
which the book possesses from the humanistic viewpoint, are understandable in terms of this withdrawal. Enlightenment obtained, it then becomes a matter of returning to humanity and applying the knowledge gained. The return begins with *La Condition Humaine*.

Typical of the preoccupation with the philosophic problems of man's fate that colors *La Voie Royale* is the following debate which takes place in the mind of Claude Vannec. We find therein virtually all of the major source elements for Malraux's humanism: the feeling that all the orders have broken down, followed by an awareness of absurdity which leads to anguish and the will to revolt. The passage in question is extremely dense and it seems better, therefore, to present it first and then discuss its implications.

Que faire du cadavre des idées qui dominaient la conduite des hommes lorsqu'ils croyaient leur existence utile à quelque salut, que faire des paroles de ceux qui veulent soumettre leur vie à un modèle, ces autres cadavres? L'absence de finalité donnée à la vie était devenue une condition de l'action. À d'autres de confondre l'abandon au hasard et cette harcelante préméditation de l'inconnu. Arracher ses propres images au monde stagnant qui les possède.... Ce qu'ils appellent l'aventure, pensait-il, n'est pas une fuite, c'est une chasse: l'ordre du monde ne se détruit pas au bénéfice du hasard, mais de la volonté d'en profiter. (LVR, 40)

In these few lines almost all the basic factors that have contributed to the formation of Malraux's *weltanschaung* are brought into focus, and the various steps which
culminated in this attitude are shown here in their logical progression. Once again we are dealing with absurdity, anguish, and revolt. The word absurd does not actually occur, but the breakdown of all systems, as well as of the concept of purpose for human existence, is implicit in the question that opens the passage. The second sentence recalls the necessity to face the pointless nature of existence and to act with it in mind. The idea of abandon au hasard, or nihilism, is then rejected. In essence, the words arracher ses propres images au monde stagnant qui les possède contains much of the heart of Malraux's art theory. The words describe the accomplishment of the great artist as Malraux sees it. We need only to recall the closing words of Les Voix du Silence with their declaration of defiance, to note how close the parallel really is. "Mais il est beau que l'animal qui sait qu'il doit mourir, arrache à l'ironie des nébuleuses le chant des constellations." (LVS, 639) Even to the verb arracher, the idea of art as defiance of destiny is the same. The definition of adventure in terms of a hunt rather than a flight indicates the will for a true revolt as compared to an attitude where action would be nothing more than a soporific. With all the drawbacks that detract from La Voie Royale as a humanistic document, it does contain this basic requirement for a productive attitude: the decision to turn and struggle
against the chaos of destiny instead of fleeing from it. The final sentence is a restatement of a vital and familiar theme. The breakdown of the concepts of order and purpose for man's role in the universe offers him the opportunity to work toward a destiny for himself, unimpeded by any preconceived formulas or limitations. What we have once more, therefore, is the theory of infinite possibilities as visualized by Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, and Camus, and stated earlier by Malraux himself in La Tentation de l'Occident. For Malraux, as for the others mentioned, this destiny is a limited one, cut short by death, which puts an end to all possibilities where the individual is concerned. That awareness of mortality is the driving force behind this will to utilize life to the utmost is shown by these words which immediately follow the passage we have just considered. "L'austère domination dont il venait de parler à Perken, celle de la mort, se répercutait en lui avec le battement du sang à ses tempes, aussi impérieuse que le besoin sexuel." (LVR, 40)

With the exception of the "titanic impulse" to work with humanity as a whole, all of the fundamental prerequisites for a Promethean tragic humanism are present in La Voie Royale. The conscience of fate as being tragic and absurd, the will to revolt, so far as is possible, against this destiny, the knowledge that the struggle has immense potential-
ities for man, are manifest from one end of the book to the other. There is even, in Claude Vannec's protest against the injustice of man's fate, a note of the profound AEschy-lea

ny earning for justice to which Nietzsche refers in The Birth of Tragedy. We have already discussed some possible reasons for the absence of rapport with mankind as a group that is a major characteristic of La Voie Royale. To these might be added, of course, the fact that it is an early, youthful, and consequently incomplete, work.

In La Condition Humaine the revolt takes on direction and purpose, and the characters are, to varying degrees, connected to different aspects of social activity. Kyo, in particular, fulfills all the requirements for the true Promethean attitude that is the basis of Malraux's humanism. Unlike the author's earlier heros, he possesses the "titanic impulse", the desire to make of his own revolt that of all humanity. It is with reference to Kyo that Malraux uses for the first time the term le sens héroïque, the equivalent of Nietzsche's "titanic impulse".

Le sens héroïque lui avait été donné comme une discipline, non comme une justification de la vie. Il n'était pas inquiet. Sa vie avait un sens, et il le connaissait: donner à chacun de ces hommes que la famine, en ce moment même, faisait mourir comme une peste lente, la possession de sa propre dignité. (LCH, 80)

The full implications of these lines are matter for the chapter on ethics. The passage is presented here to
show that the revolt has reached a point where it can produce a humanism, that is to say that it is conducted for humanity and not for just an individual. The idea expressed here that life can have a sense, has a double importance. First, because it affirms the possibility of leaving absurdity and nihilism behind, if the will to do so exists; human existence can have a sense if man himself is determined to give it one. The use of the verb donner here is vital. The human race must create a purposeful existence for itself on earth because, on the universal level, the vision is unchanged from that of Malraux's earlier works. Where the cosmos is concerned, man is still ephemeral and absurd. Most of the reflection concerning this aspect of man's fate is left to Kyo's father, old Gisors, and his variations on this theme recur throughout the entire book. Gisors recognizes that man has always needed to try to fit himself into a role in the universe. "Tout homme est fou, pensa-t-il encore, mais qu'est-ce qu'une destinée humaine sinon une vie d'efforts pour unir ce fou et l'univers." (LCH, 400)

The failure of these efforts and the consequent awareness of the absurd are implied, not only by the use of the word fou in these lines, but also by such passages as the one where Ferral finds himself humiliated by a bird which he has received from a mistress who has just rejected him. The bird is characterized as ridicule comme l'univers
entier, et qui se foutait incontestablement de lui. (LCH, 300) The starting point is therefore the same one that it has always been for Malraux: man desires to find a worthy and permanent role for himself in the universe but comes inevitably to the conclusion that he is temporary, and that far from being necessary, he is absurd in a cosmos that could easily do without him. As always, awareness of this absurdity leads to anguish, and we find Gisors reflecting that: "Tous souffrent, songea-t-il et chacun souffre parce qu'il pense. Tout au fond, l'esprit ne pense l'homme que dans l'éternel, et la conscience de la vie ne peut être qu'angoisse." (LCH, 400)

In none of Malraux's works is the anguish of human existence more omnipresent than in *La Condition Humaine*. The logical result of this fact is that the novel also contains a profound treatment of the question of defenses, or anodynes, for this anguish. It is Kyo who first links the two, by quoting his father:

Mon père pense, dit lentement Kyo, que le fond de l'homme est l'angoisse, la conscience de sa propre fatalité, d'où naissent toutes les peurs, même celle de la mort....Mais que l'opium délivre de cela, et que là est son sens. (LCH, 180)

Later Gisors himself develops this idea more fully. In a passage which once more calls to mind Baudelaire's *Enivrez-vous*, he discusses a number of the remedies used by men to dull their anguish. Whether these take the form of
action or of drugs, their purpose is always the same: to act as an anodyne.

Il faut toujours s'intoxiquer: ce pays a l'opium, l'Islam le haschich, l'Occident la femme....Peut-être l'amour est-il surtout le moyen qu'emploie l'Occidental pour s'affranchir de sa condition d'homme.

Sous ses paroles, un contre-courant confus et caché de figures glissait; Tchen et le meurtre, Clappique et sa folie, Katow et la révolution, May et l'amour, lui-même et l'opium...Kyo seul, pour lui, résistait à ces domaines. (LCH, 270)

That Kyo should be the only one who does not need a soporific is in itself significant. The first of Malraux's major characters to devote himself to man is also the first not to be tortured by the vision of man's fate, the first to definitely think of his life as having a sense. The conclusion seems obvious; the real answer to the anguish and absurdity is the heroic sense. As in the case of Nietzsche's "titanic impulse," the revolt must be conceived in terms of humanity, not as centered in a single individual. At the other end of the scale is Clappique, who lives only for himself, and who will go to any extreme to avoid facing the true nature of existence. When Malraux has Gisors say of Clappique that he cannot become a man he is condemning him in what for Malraux would be the strongest possible way.

Il pouvait cesser d'exister, disparaître dans un vice, dans une monomanie, il ne pouvait devenir un homme. 'Un cœur d'or, mais creux'. Gisors s'apercevait qu'au fond de Clappique n'étaient ni la douleur ni la solitude, comme chez les autres hommes, mais la sensation. Gisors jugeait parfois les êtres en supposant leur
vieillesse: Clappique ne pouvait vieillir: l'âge ne le menait pas à l'expérience humaine mais à l'intoxication-érotisme ou drogue où se conjugerait enfin tous les moyens d'ignorer la vie. (LCH, 313)

To be a man, then, according to Malraux, is to lucidly face destiny, tragic and absurd though it may be, and to rebel against it, not in a self-centered fashion, but in such a way that the human race as a whole will achieve the greatest possible dignity. For the first time all of these elements are present so it is not surprising that also for the first time we find a phrase that could serve as the motto for his entire humanistic attitude: "Au lieu des dieux, la force humaine en lutte contre la terre." (LCH, 394) Prometheus is now in full revolt against his fate.

Le Temps du Mépris, which followed La Condition Humaine, is the shortest and most stripped down of Malraux's novels. It shows, as we have already noted, considerable evidence of having been modeled on AEschylus' Prometheus Bound, concentrating on the unjust imprisonment and torture of one man for having aided mankind. That such a novel should appear immediately after the one in which Malraux, for the first time assembled all the elements of the Promethean attitude, seems striking. Kassner is undergoing too much physical suffering to spend a great deal of time on metaphysical considerations, but there are, however,
flashes that show the pattern of anguish, absurdity, and revolt. This is particularly true if one keeps in mind the parallel between the fact that Kassner is in prison, and Malraux's statement in *Saturne* that *la condition humaine est aussi une prison*. Where else was Prometheus?

The following passage which deals with Kassner's state of mind after he had been tortured could be taken as the image of what man must do in the prison of his destiny. In the near madness that comes from suffering and isolation, weird images, based on the important events of his past life, pass through Kassner's mind. He recognizes that something must be done in order to preserve his sanity. He must cease being passive and submit these images to his will. In short, he must revolt.

Une chasse vertigineuse lançait son esprit vers les images qui maintenaient sa vie. Il fallait organiser cette chasse, la transformer en volonté. Bakounine prisonnier rédigeait chaque jour en imagination un journal entier....Les images suscitées par la musique, rapides, n'avaient été que des spectacles; il fallait les faire entrer dans la durée. Tout le problème de la captivité était de cesser d'être passif. (LTM, 39)

The key importance of the human will is obvious in these lines, for without it there is no possibility of putting an end to passivity. The concept that man can make a destiny for himself, provided that he possesses the will to do so, is also reaffirmed in *Le Temps du Mépris*, where, as earlier in Malraux's works, it is related to the idea
that awareness of man's fatality can provide him with the freedom to accomplish great things. Kassner reaches this conclusion while musing over a life line that he had cut in the palm of his hand with a razor when a child.

In essence, the Promethean attitude is all here: the awareness of a tragic destiny and the will to resist it by a tenacious effort toward making human existence a thing of dignity.

Along with *Le Temps du Mépris*, *L'Espoir* marks Malraux's closest adherence to the revolutionary activities of the Communist party. It is probably for this reason that there is less metaphysical speculation in these two books than is customary in his works. In addition to the fact that he was working toward a specific end, the defeat of Fascism, during this period one can also surmise that the intense activity that characterized this phase of his was, to a degree, acting as an anodyne for his anguish. This, it must be made clear, was only a question of degree, because there are times when, refusing to remain submerged, the old preoccupations with human destiny manifest themselves just as they always have in Malraux's writings. They make their presence known even in descriptive passages, such as
the one in which the occupants of a falling airplane are said to be *entraînés dans le rythme absurde des choses terrestres.* (LE, 109) The problem of humanity's over-all role, the concept of "man" is still around and still unsolved.

Voilà vingt ans que Scali entendait parler de 'notion de l'homme' et se cassait la tête dessus. C'était du joli, la notion de l'homme, en face de l'homme engagé sur la vie et la mort! Scali ne savait décidément plus où il en était. (LE, 305)

In a passage that will be analyzed more closely in the chapter on ethics we find Garcia repeating Gisors' earlier statement that thinking about human life leads to a feeling of tragedy.

Pour un homme qui pense, la révolution est tragique. Mais pour un tel homme, la vie aussi est tragique. Et si c'est pour supprimer sa tragédie qu'il compte sur la révolution, il pense de travers, c'est tout. (LE, 283)

Garcia is one of the characters in *L'Espoir* who defends the extreme measures taken by the Communists to win the war in Spain, but even he regards life as basically tragic. It would seem, therefore, that no activity or affiliation of Malraux's ever altered the fundamental nature of his vision of human existence. Tragedy and absurdity are ever present. The book itself is a testimonial of revolt, and of revolt that has an essentially Promethean quality. Whatever be their background, all the major characters in the novel are battling for the same goal: that
Spain, in particular, and the world in general, can have a worthy existence. The key element of revolt, the human will resisting the action of destiny, is implied by the fact that these men, many of whom have the tragic vision of life, carry on the battle to better mankind's time on earth, while they are fully aware that, on the universal level, this time counts for nothing. The will in action is explicit in the following passage where the wounded aviators are fighting against destiny's most powerful weapon: death. "Mais ce n'était pas la mort qui, en ce moment, s'accordait aux montagnes: c'était la volonté des hommes." (LE, 343) These lines refer to the struggle to get some badly wounded men to medical aid before they die from exposure and loss of blood. Man's will wins a temporary victory over death.

Absurdity, anguish, and revolt are thus all present in L'Espoir. There is perhaps less emphasis on the first two because an extremely active form of the third is in full swing. The title itself is an indication of how far the revolt has progressed. How far it can go is indicated by the last lines of the book, which bring us back to the theme that man's destiny may be tragic but that it also offers tremendous possibilities. "Manuel entendait pour la première fois la voix de ce qui est plus grave que le sang des hommes, plus inquiétant que leur présence sur la terre: la possibi-
Despite the fact that it contains a great deal of action, *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* has the most contemplative tone of all Malraux's novels. Everything about the book, action, meditation, or intellection is designed to bring into focus one central problem: what is the true nature of human destiny? The novel is therefore built around a question, and man's revolt against his fate has assumed the form by which we have defined Malraux's humanism: an interrogation, a quest for basic values, an attempt to reduce the world to human comprehensibility. Against a universe which has placed him in a tragic and absurd role, man opposes the will to question not only this name universe, but himself as well, a will to conscience. Action of a variety that consitsutes an interrogation is the ultimate form of revolt, for it challenges the blind action of destiny with that which is highest in man-his spirit, his conscience. This consciousness transformed into human products, be they Greek tragedy, modern painting, or a just social order, is by its very existence a mise en question of a destiny which would have it otherwise. The universe is aware of nothing, by being aware of his condition, tragic and absurd though it may be, man can rise above both the universe and his condition. This is what Malraux refers to as la noblesse que les hommes ignorent en eux, la part victorieuse du seul
animal qui sache qu'il doit mourir. (LNA, 250) Man can do nothing that will really change the universal order of things, or the universal chaos as the case may be, but he can question the universe, an act which is in itself a revolt rather than a submission. It is in direct reply to Müllberg's Splenglerian arguments that Count Rabaud says: "Quelque chose d'éternel demeure en l'homme-en l'homme qui pense...quelque chose que j'appellerai sa part divine: c'est son aptitude à mettre le monde en question." (LNA, 147)

Malraux himself would not go so far as to affirm that there is anything eternal in man but in all the works which follow Les Noyers de l'Altenburg he will refer to man's divine ability to put the universe in question. In view of the fact that he was chained to a rock, and physically helpless against Zeus, this same mise en question would appear to be the true quality of Prometheus' revolt.

The use of such terms as "divine" and "eternal" should not mislead one into believing that Malraux feels he has discovered a permanent and important role for man in the universe. Quite to the contrary, the whole attitude of interrogation arises from the awareness that there may be no such role. Vincent Berger poses the question of man's function and answers it in two successive sentences. "Mais qu'est-ce que l'homme venait donc foutre sur la terre! O flamboyante absurdité! (LNA, 198) Walter Berger says in
reference to the human race that we are jetés au hasard entre la profusion de la matière et celle des astres. (LNA, 98) Later in the novel it is again Walter who associates man's position with the feeling of tragic anguish. "Quand je dis que chaque homme ressent avec force la présence du destin, j'entends qu'il ressent-" et presque toujours tragiquement, du moins à certains instants-" l'indépendance du monde à son égard." (LNA, 127)

The most constant reminder of man's tragic and impermanent destiny is, as it has always been in Malraux's works, death. Human mortality still interposes an insurmountable barrier between man and eternity, and causes anguish by denying immortality to a species which is capable of conceiving of it. This most powerful manifestation of man's fate makes its presence felt throughout Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. Death's role in the drama of human existence is stated in a fashion which calls to mind Gisors' remarks in La Condition Humaine. "Quand l'homme avait cessé d'être prisonnier du cosmos, il avait rencontré nécessairement la mort: se concevoir fut se concevoir mort; il avait donc commencé à lutter contre la mort." (LNA, 136)

Earlier in this essay we called attention to the Pascalian overtones in this novel, and particularly to its tendency to visualize man's fate in terms of the prison image from the Pensées. Immediately after recalling this
image young Berger speaks of the anguish that comes from such a vision, and for Malraux, it is the true one of human existence.

Combien une telle méditation peut crisper les hommes sur leur pauvre part de bonheur. Je me souviens de mon père...Peut-être l'angoisse est-elle toujours la plus forte; peut-être est-elle empoisonnée dès l'origine, la joie qui fut donnée au seul animal qui sache qu'elle n'est pas éternelle. (LNA, 289)

The driving forces of absurdity and anguish are thus just as vital in Malraux's most recent novel as they were in his earliest ones. We have already discussed the fundamental nature of the revolt that permeates Les Noyers, but a brief consideration of other references to it will show clearly, not only its Promethean, but also its agnostic character. Two things stand out sharply in the following passages: first that they both start from the prison image, second that they speak of man drawing on resources that are entirely within himself. One of them is simply a continuation of Walter Berger's remark that man is cast at random among the stars.

Le plus grand mystère n'est pas que nous soyons jetés au hasard entre la profusion de la matière et celle des astres; c'est que, dans cette prison, nous tirions de nous-mêmes des images assez puissantes pour nier notre néant. (LNA, 98)

The second deals with the reaction of a fellow passenger to Nietzsche's song of defiance in the railroad car.

Je venais de découvrir quelque chose. Quelque chose d'important. Dans la prison dont parle Pascal, les
Ik7

horames sont parvenus à tirer d'eux-mêmes une
réponse qui envahit, si j'ose dire, d'immortalité, ceux qui en sont dignes. Et dans ce wagon...—Et dans ce wagon, voyez-vous, et quelquefois ensuite—je dis seulement: quelquefois...—les millénaires du ciel étoilé m'ont semblé aussi effacés par l'homme, que nos pauvres destins sont effacés par le ciel étoilé. (LNA, 97)

These lines show both the nature of the revolt against destiny and the major direction that it will take in Malraux's works to come. The emphasis will be on man's art: the revolt against the gods. The Promethean and agnostic nature of the struggle is emphasized even more strongly in another of Walter Berger's statements. He goes back to Greek art for an example of man's struggle to raise himself entirely by his own efforts and without the aid of the gods. The final line is practically a statement of purpose of Malraux's humanism.

Mais je sais que certaines œuvres résistent au vertige qui naît de la contemplation de nos morts, du ciel étoilé, de l'histoire...Il y en a quelques-unes ici. Non pas ces gothiques; vous connaissez la tête de jeune homme du musée de l'Acropole? La première sculpture qui ait représenté un visage humain; libéré des monstres...de la mort...des dieux. Ce jour-là, l'homme aussi a tiré l'homme de l'argile. (LNA, 98)

The last words of L'Humanisme Tragique are: "De vous l'angoisse contemporaine comme du reste, nous nous servions, une fois de plus, pour tirer l'homme de l'argile." (PNL, 501)

The absurdity, anguish, and revolt pattern is unbroken, and Prometheus' "titanic impulse" to raise humanity
is present to discipline the revolt into the path of a true humanism. These preoccupations are so fundamental with Malraux that they are even reflected in his analysis of Goya in *Saturne*. He speaks of "la question éternelle: 'Quel est le sens de la vie puisque l'homme est mortel?'" (Sat, 111)

The Pascalian image for man's fate is still the most accurate one for Malraux, and we find him writing in *Saturne* that la condition humaine est aussi une prison. (Sat, 122) The absurd still makes itself felt because, in addition to referring to l'acharnement de l'humanité à coordonner le monde à sa mesure (Sat, 154), Malraux applies to Goya almost the same comment that he had applied to Garine much earlier. "Il fait du courage auquel il voue son génie une dépendance de l'absurde, dont ce courage avait semblé le délivrer." (Sat, 115)

The concept of the artist as a rebel against the gods is stated in *Saturne* in terms so direct that they could easily serve as the epigraph for *Les Voix du Silence*. "C'est l'art lui-même qui fait de l'artiste le rival des dieux." (Sat, 89) Malraux says of Goya himself that ce qu'il comprend, c'est que son adversaire est la Création, (Sat, 118) and that Goya transpose de la gravure à la peinture le style de l'angoisse. (Sat, 82) Not even the idea of interrogation is missing, for Malraux writes of a Goya qui met en question
The familiar elements of absurdity, anguish, and revolt are all here. Whether or not they actually motivated Goya can be, and probably has been debated by art critics who have read *Saturne*. What is important for this essay is the fact that they are still motivating André Malraux.

*Les Voix du Silence*, which followed *Saturne*, is at once the most specific and the most general of Malraux's works. Specific because it is primarily preoccupied with the plastic arts, general because nowhere is it so apparent that Malraux's attitude toward art and toward social action, the two major phases of his life, derive from the same basic convictions concerning the nature of human destiny. The vision, compounded of absurdity, tragedy, anguish, and heroic revolt, that produced *Kyo* also produced *Les Voix du Silence*. Art is one of the highest forms of man's struggle against his destiny, and as such is the subject matter of the chapter on Malraux's aesthetics. Our purpose for the moment is only to show that the same vision of human existence is still behind the artistic aspect of the revolt.

In the preceding chapter we quoted a passage from *Les Voix du Silence* to the effect that science had failed to resolve any metaphysical problems and had been unable to give man the answers to the major questions posed by his destiny. (LVS, 538) For Malraux, Christianity also had
failed to meet this challenge.

Une Chrétienné incapable de répondre aux questions millénaires que posent à l'homme, la vieillesse, la mort, et toutes les formes du destin, comme à celles qu'avait posées Jésus, allait tenter de les oublier. (LVS, 466)

The attack here is against the formal theological structures which claim to give answers, not against the spirit, here personified in Jesus, which questions. In any case faith in all the structures erected against destiny had declined and man was face to face with the tragic and the absurd. There can be no doubt that this is still true for Malraux, because even in this work which exalts art and the artist, he states, categorically, that l'art ne délivre pas l'homme de n'être qu'un accident de l'univers. (LVS, 635) The essential absurdity of human existence is further underlined when Malraux quotes the celebrated lines from Macbeth, le monde est une histoire pleine de bruit et de fureur, qui ne signifie rien. (LVS, 523) Man's revolt against the absurd is shown by the words that immediately follow those of Shakespeare: mais Macbeth signifie quelquechose. The basic fact remains that man has no role or purpose in the universe, a universe which for Malraux is also absurd. The best that man can do is to struggle to make the most he can of an existence that is surrounded by absurdity. "Arts et civilisations ont lié l'homme à la durée sinon à l'éternité et tendu à faire de
Man's art and his civilization are therefore the highest forms of his revolt against destiny, they are the result of his battle against the chaos and anguish of existence. In Malraux's eyes *l'art est un anti-destin*.

Art and civilization are also the desired ends of any true humanism. As always for Malraux, this revolt against the absurd must be carried on in full awareness that in the end it will end in death and annihilation, for in *Les Voix du Silence* we hear the tragic note that the ultimate fate of all this human effort is probably oblivion.

Sans doute un jour, devant les étendues arides ou reconquises par la forêt, nul ne devinera plus ce que l'homme avait imposé d'intelligence aux formes de la terre en dressant les pierres de Florence dans le grand balancement des oliviers toscans. (LVS, 638)

In the midst of this sombre vision the human will must remain unbroken and man must fight for the limited victories that are within his reach. The tone of *Les Voix du Silence* is still Promethean for Malraux recommends *conquête et non soumission*. (LVS, 569) Within the framework of man's existence on earth, victories over his fate are possible if the spirit is strong enough for the battle. Art is one form of this conquest, but there are many others, and Malraux writes that "Chacun de nous éprouve que le saint,
le sage, le héro, sont des conquêtes sur la condition humaine." (LVS, 631)

Basically, revolt is the work of man's mind and spirit. His conscience of his absurd, tragic position in the universe is the source of the grandeur by which he rises above the destiny which placed him there. By his very awareness and questioning of the blind forces to which he must ultimately fall victim, he is superior to them. In Malraux's terms this is "l'intrusion de l'homme parmi des forces dont il n'était que l'enjeu--l'intrusion du monde de la conscience dans celui du destin." (LVS, 628) Conscience is for Malraux man's finest attribute, the one whose very exercise implies the beginning of all revolt against man's destiny.

Absurdity and anguish run therefore, if we have proved our point, from one end of Malraux's work to the other. The major changes that have manifested themselves during this chronological treatment of the sources of his humanism lie in the nature of the revolt. This last, always present, has steadily broadened, deepened, and taken specific directions. Each of the directions will be the subject of a subsequent chapter. The ensemble of this revolt is Malraux's tragic humanism.

The whole pattern for the sources of this humanism: awareness of absurdity, tragic anguish, and tragic revolt can best be summed up by returning once more to a passage
that we have previously quoted from *Les Voix du Silence*. The true source of Malraux's humanism is "la conscience simultanée de la servitude humaine et de l'indomptable aptitude des hommes à fonder leur grandeur sur elle."

(LVS, 628)
IV

Ethos, or the Struggle with the Beast

Violence is the sphinx by the fireside, and she has a human face.
Bronowski, The Face of Violence

Perhaps the greatest single element of unity in the works of André Malraux, as in the Prometheus Bound, is the fact that they are fundamentally ethical in conception. Both on the universal and on the human level, man, as Malraux sees him, is the prey of forces which seek to reduce and annihilate him, the victim of an unjust destiny. The immensity of the cosmos and his own mortality bring to the human being the awareness of his humiliating position; in relation to the universe he is trivial and temporary, an ephemeral, cosmic absurdity. The picture is darkened even further because man has in himself flaws which tend to bring about his servitude and destruction on earth, and thereby to complete the action of destiny. The ethical continuity of Malraux's philosophy stems from the conviction that man's inhumanity to man is simply one aspect of the
total functioning of a destiny which reduces man to dependence and absurdity. Therefore, the man who acts in such a way that he humiliates or destroys another human being, is acting as an instrument of destiny toward the destruction of humanity. In so doing he has compounded the absurdity of existence and thus committed the ultimate crime. Malraux, as we have already noted, refers to these destructive flaws as either the bête or the démon in man and defines the latter as tout ce qui en l'homme, aspire à le détruire. (Sat, 110) This chapter will be devoted to the struggle against these internal manifestations of destiny.

For a humanism whose purpose is to give dignity and stature to a creature which, is not only dependent and absurd, when seen from the universal level, but who also contains within himself elements that threaten to annihilate even the possibility of a worthy existence on earth, the basic problem lies in the necessity to find an ethical minimum that will prevent the destruction of this last earthly opportunity to rise above servitude and absurdity. Since the reduction of one human being detracts by that much from the stature of the human picture as a whole, this minimum had to be based on the individual. By the very fact that he is a human being, with a conscience that can make him aware of suffering and servitude regardless of whether they are
imposed by the universe or by man, each person possesses a minimal value. The basis for Malraux's ethic is the recognition of this fundamental value which he calls la dignité humaine. The ethical minimum for a decent existence on earth is that this inherent dignity must not be violated in any human individual.

In the final analysis this is not very different from Kant's first practical imperative that each human being should be treated as an end in himself and never as a means. (K, 178) Philosophically, this can be debated on the grounds that the individual is being used, in Malraux's humanism, toward an end: the greatest possible dignity for the human race as a whole. On the practical level of human relationships however, both the Kantian formula and Malraux's have the same purpose: to prevent one person from using another for his own ends.

Obviously, the ideal to be worked toward is a human society in which these minima would be universally applied, and the dignity of no individual violated. This naturally implies some sort of action to correct social situations in which the dignity of individuals or groups is being systematically infringed upon. Unfortunately, due to the flaws in human nature, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the ideal without frequently violating the ethical minimum in the process. The dilemma is further intensified

by another human weakness. A person or group which may begin by transgressing on this minimum for the loftiest of reasons, ends up, more often than not, by being corrupted in turn and violating it for their personal or group purposes. They betray the very cause they set out to support. We are face to face with the ethical paradox concerning the use of force.

Nowhere is the influence of the years he spent in contact with the orient more marked in Malraux's writings than in the passages where he deals with the ethics of force. This preoccupation first shows itself in the discussions between Ling and A.D. in *La Tentation de l'Occident*, and reaches its most acute and highly developed stage in the debates on the same subject in *L'Espoir*. Within a very short time after the appearance of this last novel, Malraux abandoned violent revolutionary activity as a form of social rectification. He never goes so far as to accept the extreme point of view of some oriental philosophers, that the use of force is never justified under any circumstances. When the cause is as clear cut as was the defense of France against the German armies, Malraux is still very capable of taking action. He has apparently, however, renounced as corrupt all the political organizations such as the Communist party, which initiate violent action themselves under the pretext that they are promoting
The exact part played by Nietzschean philosophy in Malraux's movements toward and away from Communist revolutionary activity is difficult to determine with certainty. Nevertheless, there is one conjecture that seems reasonable, although the communists themselves would strongly deny the association. The part of Nietzsche's teachings which emphasizes the fact that a leader must necessarily first destroy old values, violently if need be, may very well have been one factor that lead Malraux to associate himself with revolutionists who were doing just that. Nietzsche had said "and he who hath to be a creator in good and evil-verily, he hath first to be a destroyer, and break values in pieces." (N, Z, 126) A growing awareness that this same group was actually betraying the values they claimed to espouse brought about the consequent rupture. Not only Malraux, but also Koestler, Hemingway, Silone, Orwell, and Sender, to mention just a few, had the same awakening and at roughly the same time: the Spanish Civil War.

Malraux's works contain another ethical precept that goes a long way toward explaining his abandonment of revolutionary activity in favor of a greater emphasis on art. According to Garine, the important thing in life is not to be beaten. However, as we examine Malraux's later
works we will find Perken and Kyo modifying this by saying that it is also necessary to be loyal to one's own beliefs, to *vaincre sans se trahir*. To be unbeaten is vital, but to maintain one's basic principles is equally so. I am inclined to believe that the essential reason why Malraux discarded revolutionary action is that he felt that none of the available instruments for this type of struggle against destiny offered the possibility of victory without self-betrayal. There remained art—the struggle against the gods.

In this respect there is a remarkable parallel between Malraux's career and that of a man about whom he wrote an essay: Colonel T. E. Lawrence. Like Malraux himself, Lawrence was engaged in a long campaign to rectify a political injustice—the domination of the Arab tribes by the Turkish Empire. Militarily he was victorious, but he felt that the results of his action were morally betrayed by his government. Lawrence then turned to writing. Malraux sees him as a tragic man struggling against the burden of human destiny. His statement as to what Lawrence was searching for in action and in art could well apply to Malraux himself. "Ce qu'il avait demandé successivement à l'action et à l'art: vaincre le sentiment de dépendance de l'homme." (PNL, 280)

Since we have drawn numerous parallels between
AESchylus and Malraux, one more minor item is perhaps worthy of mention. In the former's play it is Power and Force who chain Prometheus to the rock.

The dilemma of force is at the heart of many of the letters that make up La Tentation de l'Occident. Ling feels that the extreme oriental attitude toward the use of force, a complete rejection, must probably be modified if China is to continue to survive. A major reason for his trip to Europe is to search for a possible solution to this problem. He is of the opinion that ancient Rome best embodied an ethic based on force, and he therefore visits the ruins and monuments of that city in his quest for the answer to his problem. The result is complete disillusion. "Hélas! j'aurais voulu trouver là la force dont ma race a un si douloureux besoin, et, devant sa plus belle image, je n'ai pu cacher mon dégoût." (LTO, 43)

Ling's negative reaction to a political order rooted in the use of force is due, not only to his Oriental background, but also to an awareness of some of the dangers inherent in the employment of power. In his remarks we find evidence of the same type of position as that taken by some of the philosophers of Anarchism. Power and force corrupt those who wield them and the situation can deteriorate to the point where, from being the master of power, one becomes its servant. A society which has used power and force as instruments then degenerates into one where they become an
end in themselves, and the members of the society are simply a means to power rather than its masters. The end result is degradation of both the society and the individual. Ling is still referring to Rome when he writes the lines that voice his knowledge of the menaces implicit in the use of force.

Cette ville apprend à servir pour dominer. Leçon des soldats grossiers! Il y a dans l'acceptation par toute une race, de l'idéal qui règne ici, quelque chose de bas et de vulgaire. Que des hommes soient courbés à ce point m'irrite.... C'est la force qui doit servir, et un maître plus haut que son allégorie ordonnée. (LTO, 43)

In these lines we can already see indications of ideas that will later lead to Malraux's break with violent revolutionary action. The most efficacious use of force results in hommes courbés, and these are the men who are accepting force in order to employ it, not even the ones that are supposedly its victims. Hommes courbés are fundamentally contrary to the ethical basis of Malraux's humanism—the concept of human dignity.

When Ling visualizes force as a weapon in the hands of the oppressed millions of his own country, he becomes aware of still more of its menacing potentialities. These people are familiar with nothing but suffering and injustice, and have a natural desire for vengeance against the individuals and groups who are holding them down. Here we come face to face with one of the most acute aspects of the
dilemma of force. On moral grounds it is impossible to
deny that they have the right to a more just and fuller
life. In addition, it appears that they must use force in
order to attain it. The problem arises from the fact that,
through no fault of their own, they are conditioned not to
ideas of justice but to those of injustice and hatred.
What happens when power is placed in the hands of people
with such a background as this? Ling asks this question
about his native China. The answer is perhaps the mass
public executions of small landowners that followed the
Communist rise to power in that country.

C'est de l'injustice que nos millions de malheureux
ont conscience, et non de la justice; de la souffran-
tce, et non du bonheur. Le dégoût qu'ils ont de leurs
chefs les aide à comprendre ce qu'ils ont de commun.
J'attends avec quelque curiosité celui qui viendra
leur crier qu'il exige la vengeance et non la justice.
La force des nations a beaucoup grandi lorsqu'elle
s'est appuyée sur l'éthique de la force. Quels
seront donc les gestes de ceux qui accepteront de
risque la mort au seul nom de la haine? (LTO, 118)

To discover what Malraux feels is the answer to this
last question, we need only to study the terrorist Hong in
Les Conquérants. Driven by his hatred, the latter commits
murders which damage the efforts of his own side and he
must therefore be destroyed. Hong's cause is just, but
force in the hands of an individual or group whose sense of
proportion has been warped by hatred and injustice, may end
up, not only by unnecessary destruction of others, but also
by the annihilation of those whom it should serve. La
Tentation de l'Occident offers no solution to the paradox posed by the apparent necessity for force and the menace inherent in its use. It has proved just as insoluble for mankind as it has for Malraux, who accepted and then rejected violence as a means of social rectification. One thing is certain, however: even at that early date Malraux is aware that force can be an aspect of the démon in man, and must consequently be kept under constant guard.

Directly related to the problem of force is that of order, since one of the most common justifications for the employment of power is that it is being used to attain order. This last generally takes the form of a political or religious structure, and thereby raises another problem: Does the individual exist for the order or vice-versa? Ling's position in this respect is stated in personal terms, but it incorporates an ethico-political concept that we shall see Malraux reaffirm at frequent intervals in his career: the state exists to serve its citizens. As Ling puts it: "Si je m'abaissais jusqu'à l'ordre, je voudrais qu'il fût fait pour moi, et non moi pour lui." (LTO, 43)

This position is, of course, the direct opposite of the totalitarian ideal, be it Fascist or Communist. It can be deduced with perfect logic from Malraux's vision of humanism as a struggle against human destiny. For him this destiny is fait de tout ce qui impose à l'homme la conscience
de sa condition. (LVS, 628) The condition, with respect to the universe, is one of dependence. It is to be expected, therefore, that he would reject the state-individual relationship which makes man the helpless servant of the social structure. To do the opposite would be to duplicate the action of destiny and further reduce man to servitude.

Unfortunately, order is not necessarily good order for, as Malraux will say later, it also exists in prison. (LE, 225) In addition it will not solve the basic problems involved in man's struggle against the bête. For Malraux this last is primarily an individual matter, and no order, political, social, or religious can take the demon out of man. Each person must, in the last analysis, carry on the battle by himself. Genuine civilization is not, therefore, a matter of external order but rather the result of individual internal victories over the bête. At this stage in his evolution, Malraux has not yet begun to use the terms bête and démon, and the concept that moral improvement is an individual, as compared to a social struggle, will not be stated directly until he writes l'Espoir. Nevertheless, Ling has already laid the groundwork when he writes to A.D. that "...l'idée de la civilisation et celle de l'ordre sont chaque jour confondues. La civilisation n'est point chose sociale, mais psychologique; et il n'en est qu'une qui soit vraie: celle des sentiments." (LTO, 29)
In essence at least, Ling has stated here an important facet of Malraux's ethical attitude: no social order can do much about the bête in the individual; each man must fight his own.

One more aspect of the question of power must be considered before leaving La Tentation de l'Occident to deal with the ethical implications of Malraux's other works. This is the "will to power," which Nietzsche believed to be the greatest driving force behind human activity. Malraux is inclined to diverge somewhat from the ideas of the German philosopher on this particular point. The latter praises this drive but Malraux's attitude toward it is never favorable. Ling uses the simile vide comme une âme de conquérant, (LTO, 71) which condemns, by implication at least, the desire for power. The European, A.D. refers directly to the "will to power" in terms that are even more skeptical and derogatory in view of the fact that Malraux consistently attacks the dogma of political parties.

Le développement de soi-même qui a pour but la conquête de la puissance n'est pas soutenu par une affirmation, mais par une sorte de constante adaptation, par une sorte d'opportunisme, ou par l'acceptation des dogmes d'un parti.(LTO, 122)

One of the most interesting characteristics of La Tentation de l'Occident is its tendency to present most of these ethical problems in the form of questions. Actually only two positive precepts can be derived from the various
matters that we have examined: moral improvement is an individual rather than a social matter, and the order exists for the individual rather than the other way around. The big difficulty is in the ethics of the use of force, and Malraux does not have the temerity to proffer an absolute solution. The dilemma remains unsolved.

In some respects Les Conquérants is a dramatization of tentative solutions, and its characters incarnate different approaches to the rectification of social evils. As in the earlier book, we are presented with Oriental pacifism in contrast with Occidental force. Not only do we have Tchen-Dai, who is opposed to the use of force; the novel also contains a considerable discussion of Mahatma Gandhi, the twentieth century's greatest apostle of passive resistance. At the other end of the scale are Hong and the members of the International. Garine represents the decision to use force in the social struggle so he naturally opposes the stand taken by Tcheng-Dai. He does not, however, treat the latter's ideas as absurd, and Gandhi is viewed with respect by all concerned. It is noteworthy that in this book, where the motives of many of the characters are open to question, those of Gandhi and Tcheng-Dai are always respected.

Au centre de l'oeuvre de Gandhi est le désir douloureux, passioné, d'enseigner aux hommes à vivre. (LC, 87)
Mais Gandhi est un saint. (LC, 51)
Sa vie entière est une protestation morale. (LC, 98)

By the time Les Conquérants appears, Malraux himself is engaged in revolutionary action, which indicates that he has, temporarily at least, cast his lot for force as an instrument of social rectification. Nevertheless, this continuing debate on the subject, which will crop up again in L'Espoir, indicates that he is still preoccupied with the dangers implicit in the use of violence. As in La Tentation de l'Occident we find an awareness that in setting up a system for the most efficacious employment of force, the men whom it is supposed to benefit are likely to become nothing more than implements. Tcheng-Dai does not want this to take place with his countrymen. "Je dirais que je ne puis voir sans regret mes compatriotes transformés en cobayes." (LC, 117)

Although Garine is affiliated with the group which is organizing the use of force, he too is aware of the threat that the organization may become an end in itself and the men nothing but tools. He bitterly criticizes Borodine for having set order so high that he has forgotten he is dealing with men.

Il est domine de nouveau par l'insupportable mentalité bolchevique, par une exaltation stupide de la discipline. "Il n'y a pas de demi-mesures en face de la révolution!" Ah! la! la! Il y a des
demi-mesures partout où il y a des hommes, et non des machines....Il veut fabriquer des révolutionnaires comme Ford fabrique des autos! (LC, 222)

Once again we are confronted with the danger that in the struggle to raise man in defiance of destiny we may reduce him even further, thereby acting in the same fashion as destiny itself.

Nowhere in Les Conquérants is the idea expressed that either the revolution or the new social order will improve man himself. The only reference to the subject more or less reiterates the position taken by Ling in La Tentation de l'Occident, and it occurs in Garine's analysis of Tcheng-Dai. It must also be remembered that the latter, much more than Garine, is working toward a juster social order, and that despite his pacifism he is not the advocate of a do-nothing stand. Like Gandhi, he hopes to achieve his ends by non-violent action. There is a strong parallel between Tcheng-Dai's philosophy and Ling's statement that the only true civilization is based, not on external order, but on the high sentiments of individuals, their personal victories over their own démon.

In contrast to the Communists in the book, who hope to attain human solidarity by means of a system imposed from outside, we see that Tcheng-Dai, like Ling, associates solidarity with the victory of the individual over himself.
On le croit capable d'action: mais il n'est capable que d'une sorte d'action particulière, de celle qui exige la victoire de l'homme sur lui-même....Chez lui, comme chez les chrétiens, l'action s'accorde avec la charité; mais la charité, qui est, chez les chrétiens, compassion, est, chez lui, le sentiment de la solidarité. (LC, 99)

As we follow the development of the theme of human dignity in Malraux's works we will find that it becomes more and more closely associated with the idea of fraternity, dignity not being possible unless one can be part of the rest of mankind. The first vague glimmering of the relationship is present in the foregoing discussion of Tcheng-Dai. For Malraux, no true sentiment of solidarity can be felt except between those who possess their human dignity. Therefore what must be done is not so much to treat with pity and compassion those who are denied equality by social injustice but to raise them to the level where solidarity is possible—that of a human being in full possession of his dignity. From Malraux's point of view this is infinitely preferable to those aspects of the religious attitude which try to teach the oppressed to bear their suffering. His position here is very analogous to the Marxian attack on religion as the "opiate for the masses". In an earlier chapter we quoted a passage from Saturne in which Malraux said that Goya hated the trafiquants d'espoir in the Spanish prisons, and most particularly the monks who came to comfort the prisoners. Hong's feelings are much
the same.

Parce que la vie d'un homme de la misère est une torture longue. Et ceux qui enseignent aux hommes de la misère à supporter cela doivent être punis, prêtres, chrétiens, ou autres hommes. (LC, 150)

The extreme quality of this statement is in all likelihood due to Hong's background and perhaps to the early date of the book itself. Nevertheless Malraux will always reject a position which advocates the acceptance of suffering and injustice in favor of one that believes in struggling to rectify them. As in the case of his stand on the individual-state relationship this is a logical result of his view of human existence. If, as we have said, his humanism is basically one of struggle against an unjust destiny, then it is natural to expect that he would also believe in fighting to overcome the earthly manifestations of this same destiny. That, in Malraux's eyes, human suffering acts as one of destiny's implements for reducing man to absurdity, is made very clear by Garine's remark: "La souffrance renforce l'absurdité de la vie, elle ne l'attaque pas: elle la rend dérisoire." (LC, 230)

The whole concept of the relation between suffering and lack of solidarity, as well as absurdity, has a direct bearing on the case of Garine. He is not motivated, as we have already mentioned, by the "sens héroïque," and he feels completely isolated, even from those for whom he is
fighting. "Je n'aime pas les hommes. Je n'aime pas même les pauvres gens, le peuple, ceux en somme pour qui je vais combattre." (LC, 74) Along with this feeling of separation, Garine also suffers, as we have already noted, from the most profound sentiment of the absurd to be found in any of Malraux's heroes, since he not only sees man's position in the universe as absurd, but he also has the same opinion of human society. "Je ne tiens pas la société pour mauvaise, pour susceptible d'être améliorée; je la tiens pour absurde." (LC, 67)

These attitudes, very serious defects from the humanistic point of view, can, like the violent attack on religion, be explained in terms of the early stage in the author's evolution, the extreme romantic disillusion of a livre d'adolescent. However, there is another way of approaching them which makes them understandable in relation to Malraux's own ethical position. This has to do with Garine's trial and imprisonment for supplying poor women with money for abortions. The moral correctness of Garine's action is open to debate, but is not discussed in the book. For our purposes here what is important is that Garine was subjected to a humiliating trial and condemned for something that he had done which he believed to be right. For Garine, who already believed in man's cosmic absurdity, this injustice brought absurdity to the human
level. That society's instrument of justice, the courts, should inflict injustice made humanity appear all the more ridiculous to him. "C'est après ce procès que l'impression d'absurdité que me donnait l'ordre social, s'est peu à peu étendue à presque tout ce qui est humain." (LC, 170) In short, we are once more confronted with evidence of Malraux's belief that human injustice extends the action of destiny by reducing man to absurdity on earth. This is related in turn to the problem of isolation and we find Garine saying, with reference to himself: "Il n'y a pas de comparaison profonde pour ceux dont la vie n'a pas de sens. Vies murées." (LC, 230) Vies murées. The end result of Garine's trial and imprisonment has been to isolate him, for, in causing him to view humanity as absurd, it has cut him off from any profound communion with his fellows. By imprisoning a person unjustly, one duplicates on the individual level the situation of the human race as seen from the universal level, and the absurdity of existence is made complete. Malraux will not develop this theme fully until he writes Les Noyers de l'Altenburg and we shall discuss it at length in that part of the chapter. Suffice it to say here that one of the characters remarks that treating a man in this fashion isolates him just as surely as stranding him on a desert island. Afterwards life becomes a long effort to find the rest of humanity. Garine is cut off; the general direction of Malraux's successive works after Les Conquérants
will be toward the rediscovery of the rest of mankind. Thus, even Garine's apparent defects serve to illuminate an important aspect of Malraux's ethical attitude and at the same time to show once more to what a high degree the major elements of his position derive from his fundamental vision of man's fate. If, in his eyes, *La condition humaine* is a prison, then unjust imprisonment on earth is an extension of this condition.

Garine is human and therefore contradictory. In spite of all his talk about his isolation and the incurable absurdity of human society he makes repeated statements which indicate that he is trying to improve the lot of some of society's more downtrodden members. Many of these remarks show a strong ethical sense as well as striking the first notes of themes that will run through all of Malraux's later works. Garine functions as a propagandist for the Kuomintang, and his approach to propaganda acts strongly on the masses *en leur donnant la possibilité de croire à leur propre dignité*. (LC, 21) These words mark, to the best of my knowledge, the first appearance of the concept of human dignity in any of Malraux's novels. It is not discussed in any detail in *Les Conquérants*, but beginning with *La Condition Humaine* it will become the ethical core of Malraux's philosophy. Unlike Kyo, Garine does not state that he has joined the revolution in order to restore dignity to those who are
deprived of it, but at least he is aware of it as a basic standard of value. The term dignity is not used in the book by Garine himself, but by Gérard, who is explaining the former's techniques to the narrator. From Gérard's further remarks we gather that this dignity is almost synonymous with life itself. After having said that the Chinese masses were being given the possibility of believing in their individual dignity, he adds that cette révolution-ci est en train de donner à chacun sa vie. (LC, 21) By comparing these words with the ones quoted previously, which follow the same formula down to the use of the verb donner, we can deduce a fundamental element of Malraux's ethical position. Individual dignity is so vital that no true life is possible without it. To the degree that one's dignity is violated he is deprived of real life. What this really says is that no man has the right to disregard the value of another and even more certainly has none to use him as a means to an end.

In essence, this brings us back to Kant and at the same time to the dilemma of force. How can the restoration of dignity be achieved without violating it in the process? How can a society be attained where each man is an end value without using him as a means during the struggle? This is the tragedy inherent in any effort to convert ethics into political and social action. In L'Espoir,
which immediately preceded Malraux's abandonment of revolutionary action, he will specifically refer to this dilemma as tragic. Although there is no such statement in *Les Conquérants*, there is, late in the book, an indication that Garine has become aware of the paradox. It is interesting to note that he prefaces his remark with the words *j'ai appris*, definitely indicating a growth during the course of the novel. He says to the narrator: "*J'ai appris aussi qu'une vie ne vaut rien, mais que rien ne vaut une vie.*" (LC, 216)

The apparent contradiction in this sentence disappears if we consider the two halves on different levels, and in so doing we discover once more how naturally Malraux's ethics derive from his vision of human destiny. The first words can be taken as a reiteration of his belief that, viewed from the universal level, human existence is absurd and purposeless, without value. In the second half is embodied the refusal to accept this absurdity as the standard for life on earth. Thus, the very essence of Malraux's humanism is contained in this short, seemingly paradoxical sentence. In the struggle to give the human picture as much dignity as possible, each man's life has an irreplaceable worth. Unfortunately the tragic dilemma of the use of force remains basically unresolved. To lift man as a whole to the highest point above absurdity it is
necessary that each individual be granted his full dignity, but this apparently cannot be accomplished without destroying and coercing many other men in the process. Malraux's so-called revolutionary novels, Les Conquérants, La Condition Humaine, Le Temps du Mépris, and L'Espoir, as well as his own personal activity, are witnesses to his decision that revolutionary action, with the sacrifice of the few for the benefit of the many, is at least the lesser of the evils. This position will be maintained only just so long as Malraux feels that the revolution is actually working to improve the lot of mankind. Once he loses faith that this is true the position is no longer tenable. Whatever his personal motives for participating in the revolution may be, Garine does believe that his action is benifiting the oppressed Chinese masses. "J'ai crée leur espoir. Leur espoir. Je ne tiens pas à faire des phrases, mais enfin, l'espoir des hommes, c'est leur raison de vivre et de mourir." (LC, 170)

The emphasis on the word espoir here is perhaps significant in view of the fact that Malraux's last revolutionary novel is called L'Espoir. The hope that official Communism is moving toward the amelioration of social injustice leads to Malraux's endorsement of revolutionary action, violent if need be. The betrayal of that hope
brought about the renunciation of such action. This, as we have already said, is rooted in the necessity to win in life without betraying oneself in the process, an ethical note that will be struck frequently in Malraux's later works. It is Garine who first speaks directly of remaining loyal to one's own beliefs, although this is the implicit meaning of the last words of *La Tentation de l'Occident*. Garine tells the narrator: "Je ne cherche pas à avoir raison, je ne cherche pas à te convaincre. Je suis simplement loyal à l'égard de moi-même." (LC, 230) When it is no longer possible to combine revolutionary activity with this fundamental loyalty, the former will be abandoned. In view of the emphasis that Malraux has always put on conscience, the ground work for his eventual break with the party was laid already when Nicolaïeff, a party leader, condemned Garine for having too much conscience individuelle. (LC, 228)

With all his faults, it appears that Garine has more ethical and moral stature than he is usually given credit for by many critics who tend to regard him as typical of the popular version of a Nietzschean superman. For reasons that we have already discussed, he is cut off from any deep communion with the rest of humanity. Nevertheless, in a passage which implies the same aversion as we saw in Hong toward those who teach men to bear injustice, we find
that Garin does not believe that his lack of love for humanity prevents him from acting effectively in its behalf. "Qui l'enfant doit-il préférer, de la nourrice qui l'aime et le laisse se noyer, ou de celle qui ne l'aime pas, mais sait nager et le sauver?" (LC, 147) Of course the ideal would be the nurse who both loved and knew how to swim. Unfortunately, where man's various organizations are concerned the two abilities generally seem to conflict with each other and we are once more confronted with the dilemma of effectiveness versus ethics, the tragedy of human social relationships.

What ethical concepts to aid in man's struggle against his démon can we then derive from Les Conquérants? By far the most important is that of human dignity, the value inherent in every individual, the awareness that the humiliation of any man adds to the absurdity of human existence. Directly related to this is the idea that to kill or unjustly imprison a human being is to extend the action of destiny, and damage man's only opportunity to rise above absurdity and servitude. The book indicates a commitment to the course of revolutionary effort to restore dignity to those who are denied it. This effort will, however be conditioned by awareness that it is violating basic ethical principles, as well as by the necessity to remain loyal to one's fundamental beliefs, the conscience
individuelle. The true sens héroïque and feeling for community of effort are generally lacking, although there is progress in that direction. Perhaps it is significant that the next to last word in the novel is fraternelle.

If La Voie Royale shows any advance at all over Les Conquérants it is precisely in this matter of fraternity. Although they are isolated from the rest of the world, Perken and Claude Vannec are united in a human bond far superior to any found in the earlier work. This is the first of Malraux's novels in which the word fraternité appears with any frequency and it is a brotherhood of common struggle against the forces which seek to annihilate the two men, in this case the jungle and the savage tribesmen. The germ of Malraux's concept of la fraternité virile, which is essentially a fraternity of common effort in the battle against the manifestations of destiny, is therefore present in La Voie Royale. Here it is tied very closely to the idea of loyalty between men, the only concrete ethical step forward from Malraux's previous writings, but one which indicates that the process of rediscovering humanity is under way.

Le loyalisme est un des rares sentiments qui ne me semblent pas pourris. (LVR, 55)

Il ne pouvait compter que sur des hommes à qui il était humainement liés, sur des hommes pour qui le loyalisme existait: les siens. (LVR, 170)
Garine could never have spoken of being *humainement lié*.

Two things are particularly noticeable with respect to these quotations. The first is that basically loyalty is a value of struggle, one upon which a combatant depends and that it derives naturally from Malraux's vision of man in struggle against destiny. Secondly it is important to note that we are again dealing with a value that is rooted in the individual, not on an order imposed from above. We are reminded of Ling's words that the only true civilization is one of the sentiments.

There is no question in *La Voie Royale* of revolutionary action or social reform, and the problems of human dignity and the use of force are not discussed. However we do find an indication that Malraux still associates the imprisonment and humiliation of a human being with the action of destiny. Here we also get the further suggestion that it contributes to absurdity through the annihilation of lucid thought. In this case Perken and Vannec are surrounded and confined by savages who are intent on their destruction. The effect is that of man, a prey of his destiny. "Toute pensée précise était anéantie par ces têtes aux aguets: l'irréductible humiliation de l'homme traqué par sa destinée éclatait." (LVR, 128)

This is related in turn to another ethical position that is vital in any humanism which offers no promise of an
afterlife, or more accurately, is based on the assumption that there is none. If death ends human existence once and for all, then, as of the moment of death no compensation is possible for anything that one has suffered on earth.

Il savait qu'il allait mourir, que sur la grappe d'espoirs qu'il était, le monde se renfermerait, bouclé par ce chemin de fer comme par une corde de prisonnier; que rien dans l'univers, jamais ne compenserait plus ses souffrances passées ni ses souffrances présentes, être un homme, plus absurde encore qu'être un mourant. (LVR, 174)

Malraux will return to this problem in L'Espoir. For the moment it is sufficient to point out how much more serious it is to kill under circumstances which make death the end of all possibility.

La Voie Royale also provides us with another example of Malraux's preoccupation with the problem of power and its deteriorating effect on those who wield it. The person in question is Grabot and it must be remembered that he ends up reduced to a sub-human level, a near idiot, tied like an animal to a stake by the very people on whom he had exercised his power. Perken says of him that le pouvoir doit se définir pour lui par la possibilité d'en abuser. (LVR, 94) The author's disapproval of Grabot's attitude is shown by a remark that Perken makes about him. Along with Clappique, he is the only character in Malraux's novel who is said not to be a man. "Il n'a jamais réfléchi
qu'à lui-même, qu'à ce qui l'isole plutôt, mais comme
d'autres pensent au jeu ou au pouvoir. Ce n'est pas quel-
qu'un, mais c'est sûrement quelque chose." (LVR, 94)

With this condemnation of the desire for personal
power and the tendency to think only in terms of oneself,
the stage is set for La Condition Humaine and the sens
héroïque.

With La Condition Humaine, Malraux's humanism, and
therefore the ethical elements in it, can be said to have
entered a fully positive phase. As we have already said,
the heroes of the earlier works, Garine, Perken and Vannec,
as individuals, have defects which make them unsatisfactory
as humanistic protagonists. Generally speaking these defects
always come back to their isolation from, and lack of feel-
ing for, the rest of humanity, a serious drawback where
humanism is concerned. This is not true of Kyo, and the
reason for his superiority is precisely the fact that he is
motivated by the sens héroïque. In the chapter on Promethean
humanism we discussed the heroic sense and pointed out the
parallel with Nietzsche's "Titanic impulse" to raise all of
humanity instead of just oneself. Its presence in La Condi-
tion Humaine marks a long step forward on the path towards
rejoining the rest of mankind after the isolation that marked
the earlier works. With the appearance of the sens héroïque,
Malraux's ethic definitely becomes one of participation in
the human struggle.

When the term is first applied to Kyo, we not only find out what it means, but also some of the personal rewards that it offers: life now has a sense and the anguish that tormented such men as Perken and Garine has disappeared.

Le sens héroïque lui avait été donné comme une discipline, non comme une justification de la vie. Il n’était pas inquiet. Sa vie avait un sens et il le connaissait: donner à chacun de ces hommes que la famine, en ce moment même faisait mourir comme une peste lente, la possession de sa propre dignité. (LCh, 80)

These lines demonstrate the close association between the sens héroïque and the concept of dignité, the former being simply the awareness that every person has a right to the latter, and the determination that those who have been deprived of their dignity shall have it restored. By so acting, one gives a sense to both his own life and that of others and refuses to accept complete absurdity as the destiny of man. The heroic sense also parallels the Apollo­nian element that Nietzsche sees in Prometheus' make up: "Apollo as ethical deity, exacts measure of his disciples, and, to that end, he requires self knowledge." (N, BT, 966) Fundamentally this is an ethic of participation, of human solidarity where one functions as a part of mankind, not as an isolated factor. It does not however imply that social action is the only way to achieve this end. For
the time being the social struggle is Malraux's major preoccupation, but, as we shall see in later chapters of this essay, he considers other forms of human activity, such as the arts, equally valid. All that is really necessary is that they be part of the struggle against man's fate. In the preface to Le Temps du Mépris, Malraux makes it clear, that in his opinion, heroism is not possible unless one is either a part of the collectivity around him, or engaged in preparing the one that will follow.

Roman de l'Empire, chrétien, soldat de l'armée du Rhin, ouvrier soviétique, l'homme est lié à la collectivité qui l'entoure; Alexandrin, écrivain du XVIIIe siècle, il en est séparé. S'il l'est, sans être lié à celle qui la suivra, son expression essentielle ne peut être héroïque. Il est d'autres attitudes humaines.... (LTM, 13)

In view of these two elucidations of what he means by heroism it now becomes possible to refer to Malraux's ethical position as fully humanistic, and, as we mentioned in an earlier chapter, Promethean. We are dealing, not with the dignity of a man, but with the dignity of man. This last, nevertheless, cannot be completely attained unless each individual possesses his own dignity, intact, and inviolate. La Condition Humaine provides us with the first direct attempt to explain what is meant by dignity, and characteristic of Malraux, it is defined in terms of what it is not. Kyo is being interrogated by Koenig, Chiang Kai Shek's police chief. In reply to a question,
Kyo says that he became a communist because he thought it would make dignity possible for those with whom he was working. When asked what he means by dignity, Kyo replies:

"Le contraire de l'humiliation." (LCH, 343)

The essence of human dignity lies therefore in an absence of humiliation, in the recognition of the integrity of each individual. We note too that the central ethical current of Malraux's philosophy still runs in the same channel for, basically, dignity also consists of avoiding the reduction of any man to servitude which reproduces the absurd position of man in the cosmos. As in Les Conquérants, so also in La Condition Humaine it is made clear that in depriving a man of his dignity by humiliating him, one is also cutting him off from the rest of the world. Even Koenig realizes this for the author makes the following comment on him. "Il avait vu assez d'épaves des guerres civiles de Chine et de Sibérie pour savoir quelle négation du monde appelle l'humiliation intense." (LCH, 319)

Obviously then, for any man to possess dignity it is necessary that he be able to feel that his own life and work have value and sense in themselves, and are not just the means to someone else's ends. By implication therefore we return to the spirit of the Kantian imperative that no man should use another for a means, because in so doing he denies him his dignity. In Kyo's eyes, this is exactly
what is being done to the Chinese workers for whom he is fighting. "Il n'y a pas de dignité possible, pas de vie réelle pour un homme qui travaille douze heures par jour sans savoir pourquoi il travaille. Il fallait que ce travail prît un sens, devint une patrie." (LCH, 80)

Although the last words of this passage reflect Malraux's strong Marxist orientation of the period, they do so in a fashion that is perfectly consistent with the metaphysical origins of the author's humanism. With work here, as with Kyo's life in the quotation concerning the sens héroïque, it is a matter of giving a sense to human existence; in short of refusing to accept the absurdity of man's universal position as his final destiny. Even at this epoch of close cooperation with the Communists Malraux still conceives of the revolution, not in terms of political and historical doctrine but in terms of the human will in struggle against man's fate. It is Kyo who states that le marxisme n'est pas une doctrine, c'est une volonté. (LCH, 81) Small wonder that a number of theoretical Marxists were wary of this book. Its basic concepts, even when they almost coincide with the Marxist position, always from Malraux's vision of man's fate and not from the inevitable functioning of the Hegelian dialect in the historical process. For Malraux, the effort to raise all individuals from humiliation to dignity is simply one facet
of the human will in battle against destiny, the fight to keep the bête in some men from violating the dignity of others.

The pages which tell of Kyo's time in prison, prior to his death, emphasize even more strongly the fact that a man who is completely dependent on another, and therefore, just a means rather than an end in himself, is humiliated and deprived of his dignity, actually stripped of his real self. These men who are imprisoned and tortured are no longer really men. Again we notice that this humiliation imposed by the démon in man reproduces in the individual the same feeling of isolation and humiliation that is caused by awareness of man's absurd, dependent position in the universe. It is a fatalité. Man's bête has duplicated on an earthly scale the prison of la condition humaine.

Pourtant, il ressentait jusqu'à l'envie de vomir l'humiliation que ressent tout homme devant un homme dont il dépend: impuissant contre cette immonde ombre à fouet, dépouillé de lui-même. (LCH, 334)

Si conforme aux légendes, l'abjection du gardien ne lui semblait pas pleinement réelle: et, en même temps, elle lui semblait une immonde fatalité, comme si le pouvoir eût suffi à changer presque tout homme en bête. Ces êtres obscurs qui grOUillaient derrière les barreaux, inquiétants comme les crustacés et les insectes colossaux des rêves de son enfance, n'étaient davantage des hommes. Solitude et humiliation totales. (LCH, 336)

The use twice of the adjective immonde, both times in reference to the jailer, leave little doubt of the author's
opinion of men who thus reduce their fellows. The close relationship between humiliation and solitude we have already discussed in the case of Garine. Lest there be any doubt that it is the former that produces the latter in the present instance, we point out that Kyo is not physically isolated from his fellow prisoners; he is actually lying on the ground between two of them. The fact that the solitude and humiliation are total emphasizes the fact that this suffering has destroyed the last vestiges of dignity, and that on earth as well as in the universe the person concerned is isolated and absurd. Old Gisors points out that this type of suffering, which really serves no one, brings the absurd into human life. "Toute douleur qui n'aide personne est absurde." (LCH, 370)

From Malraux's point of view, the ultimate destiny of man is of course death. Thus when the suffering inflicted on one man by another ends in the death of the victim then destiny's destructive action for the reduction of man has been duplicated from beginning to end and the supreme absurdity reached. This relationship between death and destiny will be stated directly in L'Espoir; it is already implicit in Kyo's remark: "La souffrance ne peut avoir de sens que quand elle ne mène pas à la mort, et elle y mène presque toujours." (LCH, 59)

The parallel between the action of the external
aspects of destiny's action and that of its internal aspects, the bête in man, are obvious. The end result in both cases is death and absurdity.

In both of the foregoing quotations there is the possibility that suffering can have a sense if it aids someone, and Kyo's own death is an exception to the position he takes in the above statement. The way in which it can aid others shows to what a degree Malraux's ethic has become one of participation, for we are dealing here with the idea of martyrdom for a cause. Like the church itself, Malraux is fully aware of the value that those who have died for an idea have in advancing it. In fact his terminology becomes religious when he speaks of légendes dorées. The extremely close similarity between religious fervor and revolutionary zeal is treated at length in Crane Brinton's The Anatomy of Revolution. Malraux refers to this parallel directly in L'Espoir, and there is ample evidence both in La Condition Humaine and in Le Temps du Mépris that he is cognizant of the parallel. In the excerpt quoted from the preface to the latter work it is noteworthy that he lists both the chrétien and the ouvrier soviétique as connected with the collectivity which surrounds them. (LTM, 13)

Kyo and Tchen both think of their death in terms of martyrdom, and both, in contrast to the preceding quotations which speak of absurd and senseless suffering, feel that their
death is giving an added sense to human existence.

Tchen Donner un sens immédiat à l'individu sans espoir et multiplier les attentats, non par une organisation, mais par une idée: faire naître les martyrs. Peut-être écrivant, serait écouté parce que lui, Tchen, allait mourir: il savait de quel poids pèse sur toute pensée le sang versé pour elle. (LCH, 277)

Kyo Il aurait combattu pour ce qui, de son temps, aurait été chargé du sens le plus fort et du plus grand espoir; il mourait parmi ceux avec qui il aurait voulu vivre; il mourait comme chacun de ces hommes couchés, pour avoir donné un sens à sa vie. Qu'est valu une vie vivre pour laquelle il n'est pas accepté de mourir? Il est facile de mourir quand on ne meurt pas seul. Mort saturée de ce chevrotinement fraternel, assemblée des vaincus où des multitudes reconnaîtraient leurs martyrs, légende sanglante dont se font les légendes dorées! Comment, déjà regardé par la mort, ne pas entendre ce murmure de sacrifice humain qui lui criait que le cœur viril des hommes est un refuge à morts qui vont bien l'esprit. (LCH, 361)

Kyo's lines reflect to an amazing degree the tone in which Nietzsche speaks of the "consummating death". "The consummating death I show unto you, which becometh a stimulus and promise to the living. His death, dieth the consummating one triumphantly surrounded by hoping and promising ones." (N, Z, 75)

In this concept of suffering for the benefit of humanity, Malraux's ethic is also on common ground with true Christianity, no matter how different his point of origin may be. At the same time it also is in the Promethean current, that of the Titan condemned because he had aided man. In dying or even risking death so that the
life of others can have a sense and their dignity be restored to them one meets the highest ethical demand. Even if life is lost in the process, the overall cause of human dignity has advanced in its struggle against the bête in man, the battle to keep absurdity from being man's earthly destiny.

At the ethical antipodes from Kyo, stands Ferral, who not only would never sacrifice himself for others, but who, in every sense, lives entirely for himself. The very fact that Ferral is a capitalist in a novel with a strong Marxist slant is in itself indicative of the author's disapproval of the attitudes he incarnates. Nevertheless Ferral is never denounced in the typical communist fashion as an "exploiter of the masses," although this appellation is certainly suitable in his case. He is condemned by his own words and actions, which violate the basic tenets of Malraux's ethical position. With respect to the ideal of self-sacrifice for the advancement of humanity, typified by Kyo, Ferral says to the latter's father: "Ne trouvez-vous pas d'une stupidité caractéristique de l'espèce humaine, qu'un homme qui n'a qu'une vie puisse la perdre pour une idée."(LCH, 270)

Ferral is incapable of thinking in terms of anything except his own self-interest and the satisfaction of personal desires, therefore a position such as Kyo's is completely
incomprehensible to him. This is emphasized by the fact that Gisors has an answer to the foregoing question, but since the response consists of an idea of Kyo's, he does not wish to discuss it with Ferral. This idea is based on the concept of dignity and shows once more the degree to which Malraux's heros, even when they are active Communists, function, not as an expression of party doctrine, but as a manifestation of the author's vision of human destiny. Kyo's idea is couched in terms of *la condition humaine* and *dignité*, not those of the class struggle.

It is apparent then that Ferral has no conception of the dignity inherent in each individual and thus he is entirely unable to understand any sacrifice unless it is to one's own interest. By itself, this shortcoming simply indicates a lack of basic values, but it is not necessarily destructive. Unfortunately this unawareness of the worth of others, combined with an egocentricity such as Ferral's, can easily lead to the violation of other people's dignity in order to satisfy personal desires. Such is the case
with Ferral. Gisors believes that everyone defines intelligence by stating what he wants most in life, and Ferral's definition is: "La possession des moyens de contraindre les choses ou les hommes." (LCH, 268) What Ferral wants most therefore is to be able to use others as a means to his own ends. He lives by the humiliation of others, whether they be those who work for him or his mistress Valérie. In his preface to Lady Chatterly's Lover, Malraux makes a remark concerning the book's eroticism which also applies accurately to that of Ferral. "C'est l'individu, maintenant, qui n'est plus qu'un moyen." (LALC, 8) Ferral's life therefore is a consistent violation of human dignity and he himself becomes an instrument of destiny in that he contributes to the absurdity and humiliation of human existence. In its essence the driving force in Ferral's personality is nothing more or less than the will to power since his definition of intelligence is actually a definition of power. By simple deduction then it becomes clear that, as Malraux sees it, the desire for personal power is a threat to the concept of human dignity, in short it is a form of the bête in man, its abuse a victory for this same bête. If we keep in mind the fact that Ferral does possess power and uses it to humiliate others, then we realize that the menace inherent in Kyo's comme si le pouvoir eût suffi à changer presque tout homme en bête
(LCH, 336) is fulfilled.

Malraux's treatment of the will to power in Le Condition Humaine shows how vital the sens héroïque and the awareness of the dignity of others are in his ethical stand for he considers the desire for power only an intellectual explanation of man's wish to escape the human condition, to rise to the level of the gods and to act at will. Gisros explains it in this fashion to Ferral:

D'ailleurs, les hommes sont peut-être indifférents au pouvoir....Ce qui les fascine dans cette idée, voyez-vous, ce n'est pas le pouvoir réel, c'est l'illusion du bon plaisir. Le pouvoir du roi, c'est de gouverner, n'est-ce pas? Mais l'homme n'a pas envie de gouverner: il a envie de contraindre, vous l'avez dit. D'être plus qu'homme dans un monde d'hommes. Echapper à la condition humaine, vous disais-je. Non pas puissant: tout puissant. La maladie chimérique, dont la volonté de puissance n'est que la justification intellectuelle, c'est la volonté de déité: tout homme rêve d'être dieu. (LCH, 272)

The exercise of power acts then as an anodyne, or even more accurately as a drug which gives man the illusion that he is free from the action of destiny and that there are no limits to what he can do to satisfy his desires. It is therefore just one more of the intoxicants such as opium, alcohol, or eroticism which delude man about his fate. Unfortunately, it is infinitely more dangerous than these last because its employment entails the violation of human dignity in other individuals. Gisors had good reason for not wishing to discuss Kyo's ideas with Ferral;
the latter's way of life contradicted everything Kyo stood for. Basically of course the difference between the two men is that Kyo was motivated by the *sens héroïque* with its concomittant awareness of human dignity, Ferral by the search for sensations, either through eroticism, which he thought of in terms of power and the humiliation of his partner, or in controlling the destinies of others by means of his financial organizations. Both men were in a sense trying to rise above the human condition but Ferral, undisciplined by the *sens héroïque*, never achieved anything more than momentary illusions of success for, as he recognized himself, *sa volonté de puissance n'atteignait jamais son objet.* (LCH, 276) Kyo, on the other hand, attained even in death a sense of fulfillment, of having accomplished something for mankind.

In the preceding chapter we stated that for Malraux the *sens héroïque* would lead one to act in the field of *valeurs* compared to that of *assouvissement*. Where *La Condition humaine* is concerned, Kyo, with his struggle for human dignity represents an option for the former, Ferral, with his version of eroticism and his drive for power, a choice for the latter. If we go ahead for the moment to *Les Voix du Silence*, where Malraux discusses the question of *valeurs* and *assouvissement* it becomes clear that Kyo's conduct fits the pattern of the former, Ferral's that of the
latter.

Le domaine de l'assouvissement n'est pas un domaine de valeurs mais de sensations; il ne connaît qu'une succession d'instants, alors qu'arts et civilisations ont lié l'homme à la durée sinon à l'éternité, et tendu à faire de lui autre chose que l'habitant comblé d'un univers absurde. (LVS, 523)

Les assouvissements sont bien différents des sentiments sur lesquels les civilisations fondent leur relation avec le cosmos et la mort: les hommes assouvissent leurs goûts, et sont voués à leurs valeurs... Les vraies sont celles pour lesquelles ils acceptent la misère, la dérision et parfois la mort. (LVS, 528)

Kyo, guided by the sens héroïque, has chosen the vraies valeurs, and in so doing has acted in a fashion to participate in the struggle of the human race against its destiny, to add dignity and stature to the picture of man's life on earth. In the assouvissement of his desires through the humiliation of others Ferral became an instrument of destiny, and thus represents a triumph of the bête. Long before Malraux had fully developed either the idea of the heroic sense, or that of the two domaines of action, they were already present, in germ, in La Tentation de l'Occident. If we keep in mind Ferral's emphasis on eroticism, and Gisors' remark that only Kyo resisted the domaines of intoxication, (LCH, 27) then the first half of the following sentence applies to Ferral, the second to Kyo. "Le plaisir voluptueux, et celui de la nouveauté, séduisent aisément des esprits médiocres, mais ils seraient sans force contre ceux qui sont préparés à les combattre. (LTO, 87)
Kyo is prepared by the sens héroïque, while Ferral comes under the classification of an esprit médiocre, which, to a man driven by the desire to dominate, would be the most humiliating of terms.

The position of the author with respect to the ethics of Kyo and of Ferral is quite clear, and is perhaps best shown by his treatment of the final ends to which they come. We have already noted that the keynote of Kyo's death is one of exaltation, and fulfillment, even though the immediate battle has been lost. Ferral on the other hand is humiliated, first by his mistress, who makes him appear ridiculous, and in the end by the men to whom he went for financial aid. He finds himself, by his own standards, in the humiliating position in which he had placed others. It almost seems as though Malraux is inflicting poetic justice.

Mais il était battu: ayant fait de l'efficacité sa valeur essentielle, rien ne compensait qu'il se trouvât en face de ces hommes dont il avait toujours méprisé la personne et les méthodes, dans cette position humiliée. Il était plus faible qu'eux, et, par là, dans son système même, tout ce qu'il pensait était vain. (LCH, 390).

Ferral is actually being punished in terms of Malraux's concept of human dignity which the former has lived by violating. What he regarded as the essential value, efficiency, is not a true value at all, and in Ferral's case this was always attained by the reduction
of human beings. We have already seen force and order, the major components of efficiency, condemned as ends in themselves in *La Tentation de l'Occident*. Having sought to escape destiny by compounding its action in making other men absurd, Ferral is punished by finding himself reduced to humiliation and absurdity. He feels the full force of destiny. There is a striking parallel between the words used to describe Ferral in the foregoing passage, and those used to picture the feeling of Perken and Vannec when it appeared that they were about to be murdered by savages. "Toute pensée précise était anéantie par ces têtes aux aguets: l'irréductible humiliation de l'homme traqué par sa destinée éclatait." (LVR, 128)

We have only to change the scene from the jungles of Indo-China to those of the big business world to realize that Ferral is also being tracked down by his destiny. The author's comment on the end of Ferral's affair with the mistress whom he had humiliated ties his downfall even more closely to the concept of universal absurdity. Expecting to find Valérie, Ferral finds only a caged bird that she had left to ridicule him. Even Ferral now recognizes that his efforts to humiliate another have ended in his own humiliation and absurdity.

La force de Ferral, sa lucidité, l'audace qui avait transformé l'Indochine et dont la lettre d'Amérique venait de lui faire sentir le poids écrasant, aboutis-
The moral to be drawn from this long comparison of Kyo and Ferral is clear. The only path to a life that makes sense and which gives satisfaction lies in a course of action whose purpose is to restore the utmost possible dignity to mankind as a whole, to do all that one can to prevent absurdity from being man's ultimate destiny. The whole ethical position turns around the concept of the inviolable dignity of the human individual, this dignity being defined in *La Condition Humaine* as the contrary of humiliation. The absolute ethical minimum for human conduct is therefore to live in such a way that you never humiliate another person. This of course precludes using him as a means to one's own ends. The noblest way of life is one dedicated to a cause, even to the point of dying for it, of restoring their dignity to those who have been deprived of it. In so doing, one gives a sense to his own life, masters the démon in himself, and contributes to man's struggle to rise above the absurdity of his destiny. This is the domaine of true values. Not the least of the rewards for a life lived by these standards is the sentiment of *la fraternité virile*, the brotherhood of mankind's common effort, for although Malraux's vision of human existence is one of unending battle against the forces of destiny, he tells us in *La Condition Humaine* that *le plus fort des
The worst way that one can live, therefore, is to satisfy personal desires through the violation of other people's dignity, for such action represents a triumph for the bête, the defeat of man by the internal manifestations of the forces of his destiny.

Such are the most important ethical elements of La Condition Humaine. In many respects, they coincide, where application is concerned, with the teachings of the great religions and philosophies. However, as is usual with Malraux, they derive logically from his own vision of human existence, forming integral parts of the overall struggle of man against a destiny which tends to reduce him to servitude, humiliation, and absurdity. The large number of times the expression "to give a sense to life" occurs in all the preceding quotations is significant. The answer to an absurd destiny is to act so that life on earth is given the greatest possible sense.

There are other ethical precepts of Malraux embodied in La Condition Humaine and among them perhaps the most important, is the already discussed necessity to win in life without betraying one's basic principles. As might be expected, it is Kyo who emphasizes this point. In the speeches that he gives to the coolies he is organizing, he tells them that vous ne devez pas être marxistes pour avoir...
raison, mais pour vaincre sans vous trahir. (LCH, 81) In these few words is incorporated the reason for Malraux's ultimate abandonment of revolutionary action by means of the Communist party. The Spanish Civil War and the Hitler-Stalin pact made it clear that even if Malraux won there by accepting official Marxism, it would be at the cost of self-betrayal.

Although La Condition Humaine is evidence of a decision to resolve, at least temporarily, the ethical doubts concerning the use of force in favor of revolutionary violence, there are signs that Malraux is still aware of some of the menaces inherent in the use of violent methods. One of the most serious of these is the fact that a person who resorts to these methods, even for the best of purposes, is constantly in danger of being corrupted by them. Then, with all his inclinations toward violence, recognizes this threat, for he tells Kyo: "Dans le meurtre, le difficile n'est pas de tuer. C'est de ne pas déchoir. D'être plus fort que ce qui se passe en soi à ce moment-là." (LCH, 178)

The simple fact is that it is dangerous to enter the domaine of the bête in man, even for the best of reasons.

One of the most remarkable things about La Condition Humaine is the persistent note that something must be done to rectify the suffering of oppressed humanity. This sentiment probably made it easier for Malraux to accept
revolutionary action as the lesser of the available evils, and at the same time led to a rejection of that part of the religious attitude which consoles men in their suffering rather than helping them to rebel against its causes. Tchen shows the same harsh reaction to this phase of religion that we have noticed in Malraux's earlier novels. When the missionary, Smithson, asks him what political faith will be aware of the world's suffering, Tchen replies: "La souffrance, j'aime mieux la diminuer que d'en rendre compte. Le ton de votre voix est plein de...d'humanité. Je n'aime pas l'humanité qui est faite de la contemplation de la souffrance." (LCH, 200)

Tchen's viewpoint is of course very one-sided, but its also part of the general tone of the book, which is that the time has come for direct action, and that contemplation must play a secondary role. Even old Gisors, the philosopher of the novel says that aujourd'hui, la sérénité était presque une insulte. (LCH, 227) The call to action is sounded even more clearly by Kyo's conviction que les idées ne devaient pas être pensées mais vécues. (LCH, 79) This last could well be considered the theme of Malraux's own life. Where La Condition Humaine is concerned it portends an active effort to try to raise part of humanity above the humiliation and absurdity in which the bête in others has placed it.
The major ethical advances in *La Condition Humaine*, are the sens héroïque, the development of the concept of human dignity. These we have already discussed at length. Out of them grows *la fraternité virile*, the feeling of brotherhood that is the reward for participating in the overall human effort to make a worthy destiny for mankind. So great is the progress in rejoining humanity compared with the isolation of the earlier novels, that even Tchen will say that *la seule chose nécessaire est de ne pas être seul.* (LCH, 2:47) This idea of participation even goes so far as to include the concept of suffering and martyrdom for a cause. This last prepares the way for *Le Temps du Mépris*, where Kassner and the man who dies for him are applying that very concept.

We have already called attention to the parallel between the situation of Kassner and that of Prometheus, both of whom are imprisoned and suffering because they have worked for the benefit of mankind. Although Kassner's willingness to accept martyrdom, if need be in order to advance the cause, is the most important example of its kind in *Le Temps du Mépris* there is another in the novel which closely resembles the case of Christ. Kassner's work and abilities are extremely important to the organization for which he is working and therefore his death at the hands of the Nazis would be a serious loss. The Germans do not know
that their prisoner is really the Kassner for whom they have long been searching. In order to assure Kassner's release and safety an unknown, and less vital comrade tells the Germans that he is Kassner, although he knows that it means torture and certain death. This unknown has thus voluntarily suffered martyrdom, not so much for Kassner himself, as for the humanity which Kassner serves. This is the outstanding case of self-immolation in all of Malraux's works, and one where the similarity to the Christ story is obvious. It also serves to show once more the strong relationship between revolutionary and religious fervor. Kassner's comment when he learns of the sacrifice is religious in tone. We also note that for Malraux the truest form of brotherhood derives from this type of struggle.

"Et un homme s'était donné pour lui! O dérisión, appeler frères ceux qui ne sont que du même sang." (LTM, 79)

The emphasis on fraternity is even stronger in Le Temps du Mépris than in La Condition Humaine and its nature is discussed in greater detail. These discussions leave no doubt that la fraternité virile is the brotherhood of the common struggle to lift man above absurdity, suffering, and humiliation.

Il avait un goûù profond de l'amitié; et pourtant de sentir qu'ils étaient unis non dans leurs personnes mais dans leur passion commune l'émouvait davantage. (LTM, 67)
L'action commune liait les deux hommes à la façon d'une vieille et dure amitié. (LTM, 69)

In Le Temps du Mépris it also becomes apparent that there is a very close relationship between dignity and fraternity. The groundwork for this had already been laid in the earlier novels where the idea was advanced that the humiliation of an individual which deprives him of his dignity, also tends to isolate him from the rest of mankind. This isolation of course makes fraternity impossible as long as it lasts. We have already said that unjust imprisonment in particular has this effect, and have pointed out that it accounts, at least in part for Garine's feeling of being separated, even from those with whom he works most closely. That it takes times to re-find the rest of humanity after such an experience is shown by Kassner's reactions following his release. "Kassner avait commencé à retrouver la terre: mais l'idée qu'il n'était resté que huit jours l'en sépara de nouveau; le réel était comme une langue qu'il eût tour à tour connue et oublée." (LTM, 65)

Kassner had only been in prison for eight days but time for someone in prison is not the same as that of a free man. In a passage which evokes Baudelaire's Quand le ciel bas et lourd pèse comme un couvercle, Malraux depicts the crushing effect on the human spirit of time spent in such circumstances. It reproduces the feeling of dependance that is caused by awareness of la condition humaine, which
as we have already noted is also a prison, according to Malraux.

When we remember that Malraux defines destiny as tout ce qui impose à l'homme la conscience de sa condition, (LVS, 628) we see how directly his attitude toward imprisonment derives from his conception of human destiny.

Those who inflict such suffering on their fellows are different from other men only in that the bête in them has gained the upper hand. Like Kyo, Kassner finds that the guard who beats him has nothing in particular to distinguish him from other men. "Kassner était certain de se trouver en face de la cruauté ou de la volonté d'humiliation, et pourtant à peine devinait-il de ce visage autre chose que son regard d'acheteur d'esclaves." (LTM, 49) The implication therefore, is that this is latent in all men, an aspect of the ever-present démon. It is not the attribute of any special type or class of men. La volonté d'humiliation was also one of the driving forces in Ferral's nature. However, where prison guards of this kind are concerned, Malraux, condemns them in terms that leave no doubt as to
his own feelings in the matter. "Dans tous les pays, ceux qui choisissant ce métier sont d'ordinaire ce qu'il y a de plus ignoble." (LTM, 24)

All of these things are simply different aspects of the potential cruelty in all men, signs that the bête has taken over and caused some men to torture and humiliate others, to isolate them from their kind. Strong and dangerous though this destructive element in man's make-up may be, there is another that is equally strong and which tends to counteract it: the feeling of fraternity. "Aucune parole humaine n'était aussi profonde que la cruauté, mais la fraternité virile la rejoignait jusqu'au plus profond du sang, jusqu'aux lieux interdits du cœur où sont accroupis la torture et la mort." (LTM, 84)

Thus, virile fraternity, the sentiment of being a participant in the struggle of the human race against the destructive action of destiny, is a force which can hold back the cruelty in human nature. Nothing could be more logical, since awareness that the struggle is one of all mankind would deter anyone who felt he was really a part of it from humiliating his fellow combatants and thereby detracting from the possibilities of success. In its fundamental nature, la fraternité virile is essentially the same thing as the sens hérofique, since both imply the sentiment of being a part of all mankind on the march to
Dignity too is almost synonymous with fraternity, for we find Malraux defining it, like fraternity, as the force to be opposed to suffering and cruelty. "Il pensait confusément que l'homme était parvenu à être homme, malgré les cachots, malgré la cruauté, et que seule sans doute la dignité pouvait être opposée à la douleur." (LTM, 90)

Dignity, fraternity, and the heroic sense are therefore so inextricably interwoven that they are really just aspects of an integral whole and the purpose of the whole is to give a sense to human existence, to counteract the humiliation and absurdity of existence by realizing the utmost possible dignity permitted by destiny. In short, the foregoing quotation, primarily ethical in nature, contains by implication the whole core of Malraux's humanism. It forecast his definition of humanism as the ability to say j'ai refusé ce que voulait en moi la bête et suis devenu homme sans le secours des dieux. (LCA, 216) In what are almost the final words of the novel we learn that Kassner feels that the end result of the struggle in which he is a participant is to give a sense to man's life and that somehow or other the forces of the bête will be defeated. "Il semblait à Kassner, qu'englouti de tout le sang qu'il venait de traverser, le sens du monde naissait, et que la vie la plus secrète des choses allait être accomplie." (LTM, 91)
The true sense that man can give to his existence lies therefore precisely in the battle against the aspects of a destiny which tends to deny man any dignity at all, and more specifically, in these revolutionary novels against those elements in man himself which work toward this same end. The greatest reward that participation in this battle has to offer is the feeling of fraternity, of being a member of the brotherhood, not of a particular group, but of the common struggle of all mankind.

This tremendous feeling of fraternity paved the way for L'Espoir, the product of an event, the Spanish Civil War, which many regarded as the finest example of large scale fraternal action against a threat to human dignity that the world had yet seen. In the novel itself this movement by individuals of many lands to defend the people of Spain against Fascism, is referred to as the Apocalypse de la fraternité, (LE, 88) and the word fraternité occurs countless times throughout the book. For men like Malraux it probably seemed as though the moment had finally arrived when men of good will everywhere would cooperate to fight the forces of humiliation and destruction. Although L'Espoir ends before it became obvious that this great hope was to be once more betrayed, the elements which brought about the betrayal are already reflected in the book, the last of Malraux's revolutionary novels, the last which contains
any advocacy of official communism.

In *L'Espoir* the problems involved in the ethics of action are posed in the most acute form to be found in any of Malraux's novels. There is, however, no question as to whether or not action was justified in order to resist the Fascists, and although he has broken with Communism, Malraux to this day refuses to deny Republican Spain. (LC, 265)

The ethical problems in *L'Espoir* derive mainly from the nature of the disciplinary measures applied by the Communists within the ranks of the Loyalists, in the name of order, strength, and efficiency. These last three items, it will be remembered, are at the heart of Ling's ethical discussions in *La Tentation de l'Occident*; the debates on the ethics of action that punctuate *L'Espoir* have the same core as those of the earlier work but have a more immediate tone because it has now become an affair of direct application, as compared to philosophic meditation.

Franco's armies, supported by German and Italian troops, tanks, and planes were advancing, and it was necessary to create a force effective enough to oppose them, even if doing so entailed some injustice toward people who were loyal to the government. Of all the characters in *L'Espoir* it is Hernandez who sees most clearly the tragic contradiction that is inherent in the situation.
Les mythes sur lesquels nous vivons sont contradictoires: pacifisme et nécessité de défense, organisation et mythes chrétiens, efficacité et justice, et ainsi de suite. Nous devons les ordonner, transformer notre apocalypse en armée, ou crever. (LE, 156)

Even though _L'Espoir_ in the main still seems to indicate Malraux's continued acceptance of the Communist party as the best available instrument of social action, the ethics of the party's activities in Spain are debated to a degree unheard of among the faithful. They reflect the author's growing uneasiness concerning the true aims of the organization. The extreme gravity of the military situation nevertheless required that quick effective action be taken and the Communists appeared most capable of taking it. When someone asks Garcia what he thinks of the Communists he gives a reply that could well be Malraux's own reason for choosing in favor of them for the time being.

"Mon ami Guernico, répondit-il, dit: 'Ils ont toutes les vertus de l'action- et celles-là seules. Mais en ce moment c'est de l'action qu'il s'agit.'" (LE, 356) It is indicative of the inner struggle between necessities and principles which contradict each other in this novel, that, in contrast to this provisional endorsement of the Communists, the book also contains the lines which the latter use to try to prove that Malraux has become a Fascist. This is usually done by quoting the following remark of Manuel's,
but omitting or overlooking the significance of the final words. "A la fois actif et pessimiste, un homme, c'est ou ce sera un fascist, sauf qu'il y a une fidelité derrière lui." (LE, 125) In view of Malraux's career and of his belief that nothing will remove the démon from man, the terms active and pessimist seem to fit him very well. Thus, by ignoring the element of faith in the last clause, the Communists claim to have convicted Malraux out of his own mouth. This of course completely overlooks the fact that Les Voix du Silence is fundamentally a statement of faith in the ability of the human spirit to challenge the action of destiny. Alba's reply to the foregoing remark already forecast what the Communists would do with it and places their efforts in that respect in their proper perspective. "Les communistes disent toujours de leurs ennemis qu'ils sont des fascistes." (LE, 124)

The political conflicts that mark the novel are, however, nothing more than a dramatic externalization of the ethical preoccupations that we have found in Malraux's previous works. These are present to such a high degree in L'Espoir that necessity for making a choice which will violate some of them assumes the proportions of tragedy, a tragedy which is due precisely to apparent necessity to sacrifice ethics to political efficacy. Garcia, in a discussion with Scali, goes right to the heart of this conflict.
Depuis quatre mois, nous sommes tous peuplés de cadavres, Scali; tous, le long du chemin qui va de l'éthique à la politique. Entre tout homme qui agit et les conditions de son action, il y a un pugilat (l'action qu'il faut pour vaincre, hein! pas celle qu'il faut pour perdre ce que nous voulons sauver). C'est un problème de fait et de... talent, si l'on peut dire, ce n'est pas un sujet de discussion. (LE, 283)

That situations should arise in which a man is required to violate the dignity of others in order to preserve that of a greater number, is, in Malraux's opinion, part of the tragedy of human existence. For him, no thinking man can be unaware that violent action, even toward the most desirable of ends, has tragic implications. Once again it is Garcia, who, like Malraux himself, has elected to act, who puts his finger on the fundamental tragedy of the dilemma.

Du moment que nous sommes d'accord sur le point décisif, la résistance de fait, cette résistance est un acte: elle vous engage, comme tout acte, comme tout choix. Elle porte en elle-même toutes ses fatalités. Dans certains cas, ce choix est un choix tragique, et pour l'intellectuel il l'est presque toujours, pour l'artiste surtout. Et après? Fallait-il ne pas résister?

Pour un homme qui pense, la révolution est tragique. Mais pour un tel homme la vie aussi est tragique. Et si c'est pour supprimer sa tragédie qu'il compte sur la révolution, il pense de travers, c'est tout. (LE, 282)

Malraux was so acutely conscious of the tragic implications of political action at this period that preoccupation with the problem is reflected in his other works. In the Etude sur Laclos which appeared two years after L'Espoir, he quotes Napoleon's phrase La tragédie maintenant, c'est la
politique. (SC, 335)

As we have already mentioned, the major reason for the tragedy inherent in this political choice was that all of Malraux's basic attitudes concerning the relation of ethics to human destiny had come back to the surface with a vengeance. Since, as always, death is the final result of the action of destiny in Malraux's philosophy, the problem of whether or not one man ever has the right to inflict it on another is of paramount importance. To an even greater extent than *La Condition Humaine*, *L'Espoir* emphasizes the point that suffering followed by death is the greatest evil that a human being can experience and consequently that to submit a person to this process is to commit the worst of crimes against him. It is Hernandez who says that: "Ce qu'on ne pourrait pas supporter, ce serait être sur, quand on vous gifle ou qu'on vous assomme, qu'après on vous tuera. Et qu'il n'y aura rien autre." (LE, 166)

What we have here is nothing more or less than a duplication of the Pascalian prison image for *la condition humaine*, with the added element of suffering inflicted prior to death, suffering that is due to the action of the internal aspects of destiny, the bête in man. In short, Malraux makes us aware once more that to act in this manner toward other men is to carry the process of destiny to its ultimate conclusion. Man's internal flaw has produced exactly the
same results as those parts of destiny over which he has no control. As always therefore, Malraux's ethical position is the product of his vision of man's fate. Hernandez puts the problem in terms that show that destiny is still the basis for Malraux's stand.

La chose capitale de la mort, c'est qu'elle rend irrémédiable ce qui l'a précédée, irrémédiable à jamais; la torture, le viol, suivis de la mort, ça c'est vraiment terrible...
Mais, que la...tragédie de la mort est en ceci qu'elle transforme la vie en destin, qu'à partir d'elle rien ne peut plus être compensé. Et que même pour un athée-là est l'extrême gravité de l'instant de la mort. (LE, 182)

In the long run the action of destiny too is irremediable, and in Les Voix du Silence Malraux refers to awareness of the irremediable as la plus lourd expérience humaine. (LVS, 416) If we recall once more that Malraux's definition of destiny is tout ce qui impose à l'homme la conscience de sa condition. (LVS, 628) we see how clearly his ethics are an integral part of the struggle against destiny.

The two chapters in L'Espoir which deal with Hernandez in prison awaiting execution, and which include the remarks of his that we have just quoted, show remarkable parallels between Malraux's thought and that of Pascal, Dostoïevsky, and Heidegger. Hernandez' situation duplicates point by point that of the prisoners in the image of man's fate. He knows he is condemned to death and each day he
sees some of his fellow captives taken out and executed. His meditation on the matter is as tortured as Pascal's own, for as Hernandez himself says, *les condamnés ne pensent qu'à la mort.* (LE, 181) Rarely has the essence of a metaphysical position been dramatized more effectively.

Malraux has long been an admirer of Dostoevski's works, and in *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* he has one of the characters say that *The Idiot* would be one of the three best books to have along if one were marooned on a desert island. Hernandez' remarks concerning the horror of suffering while one is fully aware of being irremediably condemned to death are much the same as those made by Prince Myshkin in the aforementioned novel.

Think! if there were torture, for instance, there would be bodily suffering and wounds, bodily agony, and so all that would distract the mind from spiritual suffering, so that one would only be tortured by wounds till one died. But the chief and worst pain may not be in the bodily suffering but in one's knowing for certain that in an hour, and then in ten minutes, and then in half a minute, and then now, at the very moment, the soul will leave the body and that one will cease to be a man and that that's bound to happen; the worst part of it is that its certain.... There is the sentence, and the whole awful torture lies in the fact that there is certainly no escape, and there is no torture in the world more terrible. (*The Idiot*, 20)

Malraux differs of course from both Pascal and Dostoyevsky in that they are Christian believers where he is an agnostic. Thus death itself perhaps makes things even more irremediable for him than for them. Nevertheless
all three are on common ground as to the crushing effect of a condemnation to death. It is on the question of impossibility of compensation after death that Hernandez' statements are very similar to Heideggerian ethics. Heidegger, whose vision of man's forlorn position in the universe is much the same as Malraux's own, reaches a very similar conclusion concerning the significance of the moment of death. Life, for Heidegger, is characterized by the fact that things are possible to us, and death in his terms is the impossibility of all possibility. (SHE, 144) For him as for Malraux therefore, nothing can be compensated as of the moment when life ends. This is the point that Nietzsche calls the eternal, fatal "too late". The melancholia of everything complete. (N, BGE, 600) Although Malraux's attitude shares many common points with those of Pascal, Dostoyevsky, and Heidegger it represents a fusion bearing the distinct mark of his own spirit, that of an active participant in the most acute crises of the twentieth century. In a period which has taken human life on a hitherto unequaled scale, Malraux has become increasingly preoccupied with the value and dignity of that same life. For a philosophy which, as we have seen, views death as the final proof of the absurdity of human destiny, and whose entire constructive effort is a struggle against this absurdity, the question of whether or not anything
justifies killing is a vital one. The interior battle between justice and necessary action is still undecided as far as Malraux is concerned. What did come out of this ethical debate in *L'Espoir* was the awareness that to justify violence, even remotely, the ends for which it is performed must be beyond all doubt part of the struggle to enhance the dignity of man. For Malraux, it was becoming more and more apparent that the present communist party was not moving toward the accomplishment of this purpose. *L'Espoir* contains passages which forecast the eventual break and the most direct accusation against the actions of the Communists is leveled by the Négus, an anarchist.

Mais pas de 'dialectique'; pas de bureaucrates à la place des délégués, pas d'armée pour en finir avec l'armée; pas d'inégalité pour en finir avec l'inégalité; pas de combines avec les bourgeois. Vivre la vie comme la vie doit être vécue, dès maintenant, ou décéder. (LE, 147)


The last lines of each of these quotations bring us right to the heart of the problem and it is an ethical, not a political one. It will be noted that basically the Négus states his objections in terms of conduct rather than
of political doctrine and that the last line of the second passage could well be taken as a summary for all the rest. The accusation, "Vous n'êtes plus fidèles" is no different than the one that Promethea hurled at Zeus "Tis the disease of tyranny, no more, to take heed of friendship," (PB, 13) it is also tantamount to saying that with the party as the instrument of social rectification it was no longer possible to vaincre sans se trahir, être loyal envers soi-même. The growing awareness of this fact made an eventual break inevitable if Malraux was not to violate this basic tenet of his own ethical position. Although L'Espoir reflects, in such passages as those of the Négus, the possibility that the real aims of the party might be very different from the pretended ones, the book appeared (1937) before the course of events converted this possibility into a certainty. Hence Malraux's continued, if reserved support of the party. With respect to this, it is interesting to compare the foregoing passages with George Orwell's comments in his book Homage to Catalonia. Like Malraux, Orwell, who fought in the P.O.U.M. (Anarchist) militia, at first believed the Communists claims that their actions were necessary to insure victory. His account, which appeared a year after L'Espoir in 1938 has much the same tone as the Négus' accusations, but events during the time that elapsed between the two books proved the accuracy of the latter's denunciation.
On the whole I accepted the Communist viewpoint which boiled down to saying: We can't talk of revolution till we've won the war, and not the P.O.U.M. viewpoint, which boiled down to saying: We must go forward or we shall go back. When later on I decided that the P.O.U.M. were right, or at any rate righter than the Communists, it was not altogether on a point of theory. On paper the Communist case was good one; the trouble was that their actual behaviour made it difficult to believe that they were acting in good faith. The often-repeated slogan: "The war first and the revolution afterwards," though devoutly believed in by the average P.S.U.C. militiaman, who honestly thought that the revolution would continue when the war had been won was eye-wash. The thing for which the Communists were working was not to postpone the Spanish revolution to a more suitable time, but to make sure that it never happened. This became more and more obvious as time went on, as power was twisted more and more out of working-class hands, and more and more revolutionaries of every shade were flung into jail. (HC, 70)

This disillusionment was experienced by almost every one of the first class writers who entered the Spanish war with the feeling that at last mankind was going to act fraternally to oppose a growing menace. Not only they, but also the Spanish general, El Campesino, who from being a Communist hero ended up in a Russian concentration camp, had the same rude awakening. The primary purpose of this essay is not political and we have presented the foregoing discussion mainly because it bears on a major facet of Malraux's own ethical attitude. The reasons for his original acceptance of revolutionary activity as a weapon against man's fate were: ethical, the reason that he ultimately rejected it was likewise ethical. The ends to which
the official revolution was moving were not of a high enough order to justify the violation of one of the basic ethical facets of the struggle against man's fate. To kill and imprison others is difficult to justify even for the best of causes, to do so for a very questionable one is completely unacceptable in terms of an ethic such as Malraux's.

The word ethics and its variants appeared very rarely in Malraux's earlier works but in *L'Espoir* they occur so frequently that they color the entire novel, as well as emphasizing how acute the problem had become for the author. For some of the characters in the book the internal ethical conflict is so intense that some kind of anodyne is necessary if the person is to act. This is the case with the Italian pilot Sembrano, who finds in danger the relief that he is seeking. "Quand il bombardait seul, il bombardait très bas: le danger qu'il courait, qu'il s'ingéniait à courir, résolvait ses problèmes éthiques. (LE, 79) The extremely close parallel between the situation of Sembrano, who protects himself from an ethical anguish by means of intense action and danger, The fact that the anguish-action relationship also lies at the source of Malraux's whole humanism underlines once more the fundamental unity of his thought. Everything is part of the overall battle against destiny. Hernandez, who like Kyo suffers martyrdom for the revolution, is acting for ethical reasons. "Le capitaine
est un homme très honnête, pour qui la révolution est un
mode de réalisation de ses désirs éthiques." (LE, 152) The
man who becomes a revolutionary in order to help bring about
the realization of his ethical ideals, is, according to
Crane Brinton's *The Anatomy of Revolution*, a relatively
common phenomenon. Dr. Brinton's description of this type
of individual fits Hernandez exactly.

Indeed, one of the distinguishing marks of revolu-
tion is this: that in revolutionary times the
idealist at least gets a chance to try and realize
his ideals. Revolutions are full of men who hold
very high standards of human conduct, the kind of
standards which have for several thousand years
been described by some word or phrase which has the
overtones that 'idealistic' has for us today.
(AR, 127)

These words also apply very well to Magnin, who, of
all the characters in *L'Espoir* has been most frequently
associated with Malraux himself. Like Malraux, Magnin is
French and also like Malraux he was an important officer in
the air arm of the International brigades. Magnin's reasons
for participation in the Spanish war are likewise ethical,
and certainly idealistic.

Le rêve de liberté totale, le pouvoir au plus noble
et ainsi de suite, tout ça fait partie à mes yeux
de ce pour quoi je suis ici. Je veux pour tout un
chacun: une vie qui ne se qualifie pas par ce qu'il
exige des autres. (LE, 89)

The importance of these lines can hardly be overestimated
in any study of Malraux's ethical position, for, incorporated
in Magnin's statement of why he is participating in the
revolution, we find what can be considered the minimum ethical requirement for human conduct, as visualized in Malraux's philosophy. I refer to the last line of the passage with its ideal of a life that is not qualified by what one demands of others. If applied fully and universally this dictum would of course do away with all humiliation of one person by another, all violation of human dignity, in short it would eliminate that which treats man's last chance for a worthy existence. As a guide to individual conduct it would require each man to master the bête that is in him.

All of these passages serve to demonstrate that the primary preoccupation in L'Espoir is ethical and that the reason for Malraux's participation in the revolution are also ethical. There is another passage in the novel which forecasts his eventual abandonment of revolutionary action, a passage which links this separation to ethics. Here for the first time Malraux uses the phrase that will become the core of his humanism, la mise en question. "L'attaque de la révolution par un intellectuel qui fut révolutionnaire, dit, Scali, c'est toujours la mise en question de la politique révolutionnaire par...son éthique, si vous voulez." (LE, 278) In these few words we have the story of Malraux's break with the party. As represented by the communists the revolution did not stand up under a mise en question by Malraux's ethic.
Contributing to Malraux's growing doubts concerning revolutionary action was another factor which had nothing to do with the Communist party as such. This is the feeling that anyone engaging in violent action, even for the best of purposes, is in danger of being corrupted by that action. We note that in the passages where the Négus accused the Communists of perfidy, he states that they have become degenerated, the implication being that they have not always been so. As is the case with many of the ethical problems in L'Espoir, this one had already been touched on in La Tentation de l'Occident, where we found Ling very cognizant of the deteriorating possibilities inherent in the use of force. Although in the later novel the accusation is made by an Anarchist, for whom the corrupting effect of power is a point of doctrine, it is not, as we have seen, without precedent in Malraux's works. Ling had more or less forecast what would happen to the Party in this respect. One should not assume from this last however that in L'Espoir the menace of deterioration is discussed only with reference to the Communists, or even strictly with reference to power. Puig, for instance, is aware that in subjecting people to suffering and mistreatment, their thought can be deformed making them at least potentially capable of destructive action simply as revenge for what they have undergone.

"Quand on contraint une foule à vivre bas, ça ne la porte
pas à penser haut. On n'enseigne pas à tendre l'autre joue à des gens qui depuis deux mille ans n'ont jamais reçu que des gifles." (LE, 30, 31) When, in La Tentation de l'Occident, Ling voiced his concern over what would happen when China's millions, conscious only of injustice, had the power to avenge themselves, he was recognizing the same dilemma that Puig poses in the foregoing lines. The right to justice of people who through no fault of their own have been reduced to the point where they are aware of little else but hatred, and who are therefore likely to inflict injustice in their turn. Man's inhumanity to his fellows has created here an ethical problem that no one, including Malraux, has succeeded in solving.

The question of deterioration through too much contact with violence appears in still other forms in L'Espoir. Garcia, who has supported strong action, is bothered by the fact that in war one inevitably absorbs some of the enemy's attributes. From the tone of the passage we can assume that they are undesirable ones. "Une des choses qui me troublent (sic) le plus, c'est de voir à quel point, dans toute guerre, chacun prend à l'ennemi, qu'il le veuille ou non." (LE, 357)

It appears therefore that the menace is ever-present and multifaceted. By wielding power or force oneself, by being the victim of them in the hands of others, or even by simply being too long in contact with them, by all these
paths man, according to Malraux, runs the risk of degeneration. All of these various facets derive however from one central core of danger, that of the béte in man, for all of them, in one way or another tend to make man become accustomed to the destructive action of his internal flaw. When Malraux writes of Garcia that il savait qu’il ne faut pas tenter la bête en l’homme, (LE, 220) he sums up in a few words all that we have been discussing in these pages and once more justifies the reference to the ethical aspects of his humanism as "The struggle with the bête." L’Espoir also refers to man’s destructive potential as le démon and puts the emphasis on the struggle against him. Lopez’s remark concerning him is the first example of a technique that Malraux will employ later on when he actually defines the démon: that of assigning to the démon the face of things or people, who in his eyes threaten human dignity. "Les cathédrales luttaient pour tous avec tous contre le démon, –qui d’ailleurs à la gueule de Franco." (LE, 39) These lines, like those in La Condition Humaine which deal with martyrdom show tendency on Malraux’s part to realize that in many aspects of his humanistic struggle he is on common ground with the great religions.

In La Tentation de l’Occident we found Ling writing to the effect that the only true civilization was one of individual sentiments and that the social and political structures had little or nothing to do with elevating man
morally or ethically. The conclusion reached was that each man must struggle against his own bête in the long run. That ethical conduct is primarily an individual and not a social or political problem is a fundamental precept with Malraux. Thus it is not surprising to find this point of view stated in various forms by several of the characters in L'Espoir. Ximenes and the elder Alvear use the terms that most strongly recall those of Ling.

If, while reading Ximenes words about the only way to become a man, we keep in mind Malraux's definition of humanism as the act of becoming a man by refusing the beast in oneself, we see again how consistently Malraux's ethic stems from his overall vision of human destiny. Although Garcia is an active supporter of the revolution, he also feels that it has nothing to do with moral improvement, which for him as for the others, is an individual affair.

"Le perfectionnement morale, la noblesse sont des problèmes individuels, où la révolution est loin d'être engagée directement." (LE, 157) Somewhat later in the novel Garcia categorically rejects the idea that any social or political
structure will elevate man's fundamental character. "Aucun état, aucune structure sociale ne crée la noblesse de caractère ni la qualité de l'esprit." (LE, 282) This is not meant to imply that no social order is better than another for moral and ethical growth, a concept which would be the direct negation of Malraux's attitude in the social struggle. It goes without saying that a social order based on justice would be more conducive to nobility of spirit than one in which injustice and oppression were the order of the day. To make it clear that he admits the possibility of this, Garcia adds, after the preceding remark, the comment that Tout au plus pouvons-nous attendre des conditions propices. Et c'est beaucoup. (LE, 282) One can therefore still fight for a social order which will aid man in his struggle with the bête in him.

If this cross-section of opinions from L'Espoir can be assumed to reflect Malraux's own position, the fundamental problem of ethical improvement is basically an individual one. In the final analysis each man must come to grips with his own démon. Malraux has never suggested anything to the contrary and Ximenes, Alvear, and Garcia see the matter in exactly the same light as did Ling in La Tentation de l'Occident. True civilization must come from within the individuals that make it up, not from any order or formula imposed from without.
L'Espoir reflects still another of Malraux's ethical preoccupations which first manifested itself in La Tentation de l'Occident, a preoccupation which can serve as the best possible answer to those who accuse him of totalitarian leanings. In the early novel Ling stated that the social order should be made for himself and not vice-versa, the implication being of course that the state should exist for the man, and not the other way around. The Négus says exactly the same thing about political parties in L'Espoir. "Les partis sont faits pour les hommes, pas les hommes pour les partis. Nous ne voulons faire ni un Etat, ni une église, ni une armée. Des hommes." (LE, 249) This is the point of view not only of the Négus but also of Souen in La Condition Humaine. In reply to talk about making a new China he says: "Je ne veux pas faire la Chine, dit Souen, je veux faire les miens avec ou sans elle." (LCH, 218) Thus we find both the Chinese and the Spanish revolutionists echoing Ling's sentiments that the purpose of the social order is to serve the individuals of which it is composed. All of them reject the totalitarian ideal in which man exists only to serve the state. Does this represent Malraux's own stand? In a political speech delivered in 1948 he stated that la garantie de la liberté, c'est la force de l'Etat au service de TOUS les citoyens. (LC, 272) Thus, for Malraux, the function of the state is to serve its citizens. As we stated earlier this is the only one of the two available positions which
is consistent with Malraux's humanism. A philosophy based on man's struggle against the servitude of destiny is hardly likely to increase that servitude by creating an additional one on the social and political level. The state must therefore aid man in the battle against his fate, not provide still another humiliation for him.

The matter of the humiliation of man leads directly to another important ethical element in L'Espoir. In La Condition Humaine Kyo had defined dignity as the contrary of humiliation. Still adhering to his tendency to define things in terms of their opposites, Malraux, in L'Espoir states by means of Barca that Le contraire de l'humiliation c'est la fraternité. (LE, 75) If we recall Kyo's definition of human dignity as the contrary of humiliation it then becomes clear that for Malraux dignity and fraternity are practically synonymous, since both are defined as the contrary of the same thing: humiliation. To recognize the dignity of others therefore is basically to recognize their fundamental right to be a participant in the brotherhood of human struggle. The failure to recognize a man's individual dignity deprives him of the possibility of this fraternity, at least so long as the humiliation endures.

In the immense feeling of solitude and isolation which marks so much twentieth century writing, including Malraux's earlier works, it is important to note that Malraux has
evolved to a point where he sees in fraternity the essence of human dignity. It is true that this is a fraternity of struggle, a fraternité virile but that is the nature of life itself as Malraux visualizes it, and even Tchen knew that le plus fort des liens est le combat. (LCH, 109) All that is necessary in order to meet the minimum requirements for being a part of this human fraternity is to possess one's own dignity and to act in a fashion that does not violate that of nay other person. This last is in itself a victory in man's struggle with the bête, a refusal to be beaten by the internal aspects of destiny.

Of all the forms of humiliation that deprive man of dignity and fraternity, imprisonment is, as we have seen, the one that most deeply preoccupies Malraux. This may, as we have already noted, be due to the fact that unjust imprisonment duplicates on earth his vision of the human condition in its relation to the cosmos. Beginning with Garine, all of Malraux's heros who have been imprisoned have as a result suffered from the feeling of being cut off from mankind, and this even after they were released. Kassner it will be remembered, had difficulty maintaining contact with the world around him after only eight days in a Nazi prison, so destructive of fraternity is such confinement and humiliation. In L'Espoir we find the Négus repeating the idea stated earlier, in La Condition Humaine, that this type of suffering deprives a man of his essential
human quality. "Quand les hommes sortent de prison, neuf fois sur dix leur regard ne se pose plus. Ils ne regardent plus comme des hommes." (LE, 146) Imprisonment therefore has cut these men off from fraternity with their fellows to such a degree that they feel they are unable to even look at other members of the human brotherhood. From Puig too we learn that in prison it is difficult to conceive of fraternity as it exists among free men. "En prison, dit Puig, je n'imaginais pas qu'il y aurait tant de fraternité." (LE, 30)

Malraux's attitude toward unjust condemnation forms, as we have already mentioned, an integral part of his overall attitude toward human destiny. The human condition being for him a prison to which man is condemned against his will, the unjust incarceration of any man can do nothing but extend this condemnation into the last realm where man has any possibility of giving dignity and stature to the human picture: his life on earth as part of a human fraternity. Such injustice is therefore simply one more aspect of the action of destiny, an action which, if unchecked, will culminate in the death of man and the ultimate triumph of absurdity.

Although Malraux does not believe that anything will ever erase the tragic flaw in human nature which makes men inflict injustice on each other, he does feel that there is
also in man a deep desire for justice and that he will struggle to attain it. This ineradicable hope that an unjust situation will be rectified is what maintains the human battle against the action of the démon. Old Alvear, in a passage which many feel gave L'Espoir its title, tells of this weapon in man's fight for justice. "Il y a un espoir terrible, et profond en l'homme.... Celui qui a été injustement condamné, celui qui a trop rencontré la bêtise, ou l'ingratitude, ou la lâcheté, il faut bien qu'il reporte sa mise." (LE, 232)

This profound and terrible hope is closely related to Nietzsche's interpretation of the Prometheus Bound, for essentially it is no different from the "profound AESchylean yearning for justice" (N, BT, 996) that the author of The Birth of Tragedy sees as the keynote of AESchylus' tragedy. When the hero is also animated by the "titanic impulse" or sens héroïque as are such men as Kyo, Kassner, and Hernandez this yearning for justice becomes a desire that not just the individual, but all mankind, shall enjoy it. This then becomes the highest form of fraternity, the brotherhood of struggle against injustice both cosmic and universal, against the prison of man's fate and its earthly counterpart, unjust imprisonment by man. Malraux's ethic is still that of Prometheus fighting both against the chains to which Zeus has unfairly condemned him and the agony caused by the
vultures which daily devour his liver. As we have mentioned in the section on *Le Temps du Mépris*, it is possible to consider these vultures as symbols of man's inhumanity to man, the phase of destiny which threatens to destroy the fraternity of human effort.

If the desired result of this humanism of search and effort is to give man as a whole the greatest possible dignity and stature it is logical to assume that it can best be attained when the struggle is viewed as a common one by the greatest possible number of individuals. By taking part, and being permitted to take part in this march of mankind toward the accomplishment of a destiny, one partakes of the virile fraternity by humiliation or imprisonment is to be recondemned to the absurdity and solitude that is characteristic of man's position in the universe. Anything that damages this fraternity also detracts by that much from the overall dignity that can be given to the human picture for Malraux makes it clear in *L'Espoir* that fraternal action can accomplish things that individual action cannot. Alvear states that: "Les hommes unis à la fois par l'espoir et par l'action, accèdent comme les hommes unis par l'amour, à des domaines auxquels ils n'accèderaient pas seuls." (LE, 233) Thus it is clear that any action which humiliates an other person, depriving him of his dignity and hence of his fraternity, at the same time reduces the possibility of ennobling man as a whole.
In view of the fact that there are obviously millions of people in the world who are cut off from this fraternity by the humiliation they suffer at the hands of others it would seem that there is a clear cut mandate for those who are members of the brotherhood to fight to extend this privilege to those who are deprived of it. Unfortunately however, there are, as we have already seen, many factors which cloud the issue. In general, the ones that we have examined in Malraux come back to the central idea that the instruments of struggle tend to become corrupted by the force that they wield. In short, there is always danger in tempting the bête in man. The ethical problems involved in taking action in the battle to expand human dignity and fraternity have still another and more anguishing facet in L'Espoir. This is the awareness that all action is a two-edged proposition, doing evil as well as good. Most of the characters in L'Espoir are conscious of this in varying degrees. Garcia puts it directly and succinctly. "Or les moyens de l'action sont manichéens parce que toute action est manichéenne." (LE, 279) Magnin, the French air officer is bothered by exactly the same question. "L'action est l'action, et non la justice....Ce n'était pas pour l'injustice qu'il était venu en Espagne." (LE, 117)

In an earlier chapter we pointed out the extreme value which Malraux places on conscience in man, indicating that for him a great part of man's grandeur lies in his
consciousness of the implications of his position and acts. One has only to apply this concept to that of the manichean quality of all action in order to see the tremendous moral burden it places on any one who elects to act strongly, even for the betterment of mankind. Although the action is performed in order to expand fraternity, the one who acts must be fully aware, that by its very nature, his action will also violate this same fraternity. The heart of the dilemma is contained in Ximenès' words to Manuel: "Vous voulez agir et ne rien perdre de la fraternité; je pense que l'homme est trop petit pour cela." (LE, 290)

Perhaps it would not be too much of an exaggeration to say that most of the tragedy of L'Espoir is inherent in this short sentence. Malraux's ethical position has evolved to the point where he sees in the concept of fraternity the finest possible answer to the anguish of man's fate. At the same time he has become acutely conscious that the struggle to attain its widest possible application exacts a terrible price in anguish. This tragedy of action is a far more fundamental one than that of the conflict between ethics and politics discussed earlier in the chapter. Its problem lies not in the corruption of the instruments of social action but in the very nature of action itself. There are causes, like the defense of France against the Germans, whose purity Malraux does not question. Even this, however,
does not efface the fact that action performed in behalf of such causes is still dualistic in nature. This inherent and unavoidable tragedy is reflected in Ximénes's remark about certain portraits.

Avez-vous regardé les portraits ou les visages des hommes qui ont défendu les plus belles causes? Ils devraient être joyeux-ou sereins, au moins.... Leur première expression, c'est toujours la tristesse. (LE, 31)

In a discussion between Hernandez and Garcia concerning the nature and function of revolution, we find the latter, who is himself a revolutionary, taking the position that the men who are most human are not the one's who take revolutionary action. When Hernandez asks him why revolutions cannot be made by the most human men, he replies: "Parce que les hommes les plus humains ne font pas la révolution, mon bon ami: ils font les bibliothèques où les cimetières." (LE, 155)

As is often the case with Malraux's remarks, this one is somewhat cryptic and leaves something to be desired as an explanation. Nevertheless, by implication it contains the idea that as man becomes more and more human he becomes less and less capable of taking violent action. By extension we can assume that this is largely due to the fact that Malraux has come to feel that all action is manichean. Hence the tragedy of the situation. His whole humanism is a fraternity of action to make the world of
man more human, but violent action, which appeared necessary in the struggle toward this goal, is by its very nature to some degree destructive of fraternity.

Under such conditions strong action becomes difficult in the best of circumstances. When one becomes aware, as was Malraux, that the chosen instrument of social action, the official revolution, has become corrupted, then further adherence becomes impossible. Malraux's next book, Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, still reflects its author as a participant in violent action, but action for the actual defense of France, where there was no question about its justice. L'Espoir brings Malraux's revolutionary phase to a close.

By and large L'Espoir represents an intensification and clarification of Malraux's ethical preoccupations rather than a new contribution to them. Almost all of these problems were present in the earlier works, and many of them already existed in germ in La Tentation de l'Occident. Since L'Espoir is, of all Malraux's works, the one the most deeply concerned with ethics as such, a brief summary of the ethical positions reached therein is perhaps in order.

Considered from the point of view of man's struggle against the absurdity and servitude of his destiny, the most important single element is probably the definition of fraternity in terms which make it synonymous with human dignity, both being the contrary of humiliation. As a further development of the theme of fraternity it was stated that man
could accomplish things by fraternal action that he could not by individual action, thereby implying that in the former lies the best answer to man's fate. Correlative with this concept was the awareness that humiliation or unjust imprisonment of a person not only violated his dignity and isolated him from fraternity, but also reduced the possibility that mankind as a whole possesses for creating a worthy destiny for itself. To imprison and torture a man and then to kill him was seen to constitute an earthly duplication of man's position in the cosmos.

Violent action still seemed to be necessary in the struggle against the démon, but the fact that it had at least two major drawbacks was recognized. The first was that it tended to corrupt those who used it, the second was that by its nature all such action is manichean. Where all forms of social order are concerned, it was stated that they should exist to serve the individual rather than vice-versa, but that they had little or nothing to do with improving the moral and ethical stature of man. This last remained fundamentally an individual problem, each man having to master the bête that was in him. As a guide in this individual struggle, Magnin posited the ethical ideal of everyone having a life that was not qualified by what he demanded of others.

As a whole then, the ethical tendencies in L'Espoir can be said to have reached two major positions. Fraternal
human action is the ultimate answer to the absurdity, servitude, and humiliation which Malraux sees as the major characteristics of man's position in the universe. Consequently, it is also the best answer to the destructive action of man's own inner flaw, his bête. The second position is that this fraternity can best be achieved, not through the formal social and political structures, but rather by means of individual struggle for self-improvement. This Ling had already stated in *La Tentation de l'Occident*. However, *L'Espoir* is as impregnated by the feeling of fraternity as the early work was marked as strongly by that of isolation. There was, therefore, no need as yet in *La Tentation* to reconcile the idea of fraternity with that of individual moral and ethical improvement and to relate the latter to the lifting of mankind. In *L'Espoir* old Alvear succeeds in synthesizing fraternity, individual effort, and social improvement in a passage which goes far toward summarizing the whole ethical message of the book.

Je veux avoir des relations avec un homme pour sa nature et non pour ses idées. Je veux la fidélité dans l'amitié, et non l'amitié suspendue à une attitude politique. Je veux qu'un homme soit responsable devant lui-même-vous savez bien que c'est le plus difficile, quoi qu'on en dise, monsieur Scali- et non devant une cause, fût-elle celle des opprimés... Si chacun appliquait à lui-même le tiers de l'effort qu'il fait aujourd'hui pour la forme du gouvernement il deviendrait possible de vivre en Espagne. (LE, 232)

If *L'Espoir*, with its ethical debates, forecasts
Malraux's separation from revolutionary activity, *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* is the true transitional work in his shift of emphasis from the struggle with the bête to art, the struggle with the gods. Ethical discussions are not lacking in this most recent of Malraux's novels, but compared with the feeling of immediacy that characterized them in *L'Espoir*, they have here a tendency to become general and philosophical. This is in keeping with the overall tone of the book, which is one of meditation on the major aspects of man's fate. This work shows us a much more contemplative and less agitated Malraux.

All of Malraux's novels have a strong autobiographical element, for Malraux writes them with his life. This element is further strengthened in *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* by the fact that the author has chosen to give the leading protagonists the family name of Berger, Malraux's own nom de guerre while he was with the fighting French forces. By the time this novel appears, final developments in the Spanish Civil War and the Hitler-Stalin pact have completely disillusioned Malraux with Soviet Russia and official communism as instruments of social rectification. In the novel, Vincent Berger has had an experience that closely parallels Malraux's own. He has been travelling all over Asia on behalf of a pan-Turkish movement known as Touran. In the end he becomes aware that the movement is not what it first appeared to him and his illusions are shattered.
If we substitute Russia and communism for Touran and the myth in the passage describing Berger's awakening, we have the story of Malraux's own relation to the revolution.

L'existence du Touran avait été à ses yeux si évidente, que jamais il ne l'avait mis en question. De même qu'avant Luther d'innombrables chrétiens étaient venus à Rome sans y voir la simonie; de même que les anglophones français du XVIIIe siècle revenaient de Londres sans y avoir vu la puissance de l'aristocratie qui y créait les yeux; de même, tous ces mois durant, il n'avait saisi, retenu, mapproché les faits qu'en fonction du mythe touranien. On ne voit pas plus un pays où s'incarne un mythe auquel on croit qu'on ne voit une femme qu'on aime. (LNA, 71)

The hypothesis that this is essentially Malraux talking of the death of his dream of social rectification through Russia and Communism is strengthened by its strong similarity to remarks that he made in the postface of the definitive edition of Les Conquérants (1950). There he speaks of the agency of the international political myth and adds that:

Ce que nous avons appris, c'est que le grand geste de dédain avec lequel la Russie écarte ce chant de l'Internationale qui lui restera, qu'elle le veuille ou non, lié dans l'éternel songe de justice des hommes, balaye d'un seul coup les rêves du XIXe siècle. (LC, 249)

Les Noyers de l'Altenburg is, however, less directly concerned with the social struggle, as such, than anything Malraux has written since La Voie Royale. In fact, one often gets the idea that such devices as that of Touran in the foregoing passage are used in order to permit him to lift
the level of discussion from immediate application toward the realm of philosophic thought. The fundamental ethical themes are nevertheless still very much present in *Les Noyers*, with emphasis on the relationship of dignity and fraternity with humiliation. More than any other of Malraux's novels, *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* makes it very clear that to humiliate a person cuts him off from the fraternity of mankind. It is perhaps typical of the difference in tone between this book and *L'Espoir* that while in the latter this question was discussed in terms of current imprisonment and suffering, in *Les Noyers* the discussion is based on three books. During the intellectual conversations at Altenburg Thirard states that the three best books a person could take with him if he had to go to prison would be *The Idiot*, *Don Quixote*, and *Robinson Crusoe*. Thirard's defense of his selection is so indicative of Malraux's position on the humiliation-fraternity relationship that it merits being quoted in its entirety:

> Or remarquez bien, c'est le même livre, le même!
> Dans les trois cas (sa parole devint moins précipitée) un homme nous est donné initialement comme séparé des hommes, Robinson par le naufrage, Don Quichotte par la folie, le prince Muichkine par sa propre nature, par vous voyez ce dont il s'agit...disons par l'innocence. Les trois solitaires du roman mondial. Et que sont ces trois récits? la confrontation de chacun de ces trois solitaires avec la vie; le récit de sa lutte pour détruire sa solitude, retrouver les hommes. Le premier lutte par le travail, le second par le rêve, le troisième par la sainteté. Je suis un peu rapide en ce moment, simple vue à vol d'oiseau! Je sais, je sais (il imitait
un contradicteur imaginaire et haussa les épaules précipitamment), Daniel de Foe n'était pas naufragé, Cervantes n'était pas fou, Dostoievsky n'était pas saint!

Comme si l'humanité manquait d'îles désertes, comme s'il n'y en avait pas dans tous les coins! Mais les rues sont parsemées d'îles désertes! Et il y a partout un moyen décisif d'être retranché de la communauté des hommes: c'est l'humiliation, la honte. /italics mine/

Or remarquez que les trois grands romans de la reconquête du monde ont été écrits, l'un par un ancien esclave, Cervantes, l'autre par un ancien bagnard, Dostoievsky, le troisième par un ancien condamné au pilori, Daniel de Foe. (LNA, 119)

The position taken here is exactly the same as that taken in L'Espoir: the deadliest enemy of fraternity is humiliation, which reduces man to solitude. And here again we pick up the Nietzschean thread, for in Zarathustra he had spoken of isolation such as that of Cervantes. "Art thou a slave? Then thou canst not be a friend." (N, Z, 59) It is interesting to note that the process of rejoining humanity which Malraux sees as the fundamental characteristic of each of these novels is precisely what takes place in his own works. From the isolation that marked Garine they have progressed steadily toward the fraternity of L'Espoir and Les Noyers de L'Altenburg.

Once again we note that this fraternity-humiliation-solitude relationship is a natural and logical derivative of Malraux's vision of human destiny. Due to the action of the external forces of destiny, man finds himself, with respect to the universe, in a position of servitude, humiliation, and solitude. His best weapon against this aspect of
destiny is a fraternity of human action. When the internal forces of destiny, the démon in man, bring on humiliation, this fraternity is destroyed and solitude becomes complete.

Fraternity, which we have seen to be synonymous with dignity, is therefore the best answer to all the crushing aspects of destiny, whether they be the external or internal ones. As a weapon in the struggle against the gods it belongs to the following chapter of this paper. As an arm in the struggle against the bête it has steadily acquired strength in Malraux's philosophy. There is perhaps no better example of fraternity in action against the démon in all Malraux's novels than the scene of the gas attack in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. The Germans have employed a new and deadly poison gas in an attack on the Russian forces on the Eastern front. The gas is highly effective, and the Germans advance into the trenches of the Russians, who are helpless and dying from it. The German soldiers are, however, horrified at the sight of the mass destruction of their enemies. Their reaction is a fraternal one. Each German tries to carry a Russian out of the infected area and save his life. The beast is at large and a feeling of fraternity which transcends the official political conflict is man's instinctive reply to it. Malraux says that: "Il y avait dans tout le mouvement, dans la façon dont l'Allemand tenait le corps une fraternité maladroite et poignante." (LNA, 224) This
destiny is a fraternity of human action. When the internal forces of destiny, the démon in man, bring on humiliation, this fraternity is destroyed and solitude becomes complete.

Fraternity, which we have seen to be synonymous with dignity, is therefore the best answer to all the crushing aspects of destiny, whether they be the external or internal ones. As a weapon in the struggle against the gods it belongs to the following chapter of this paper. As an arm in the struggle against the bête it has steadily acquired strength in Malraux's philosophy. There is perhaps no better example of fraternity in action against the démon in all Malraux's novels than the scene of the gas attack in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. The Germans have employed a new and deadly poison gas in an attack on the Russian forces on the Eastern front. The gas is highly effective, and the Germans advance into the trenches of the Russians, who are helpless and dying from it. The German soldiers are, however, horrified at the sight of the mass destruction of their enemies. Their reaction is a fraternal one. Each German tries to carry a Russian out of the infected area and save his life. The beast is at large and a feeling of fraternity which transcends the official political conflict is man's instinctive reply to it. Malraux says that: "Il y avait dans tout le mouvement, dans la façon dont l'Allemand tenait le corps une fraternité maladroite et poignante." (LNA, 224) This
fraternal reaction is closely related to the feeling on the part of the men that there is something inherently wrong in subjecting any man to such destructive forces. This sentiment is expressed in the protest of one of the German soldiers. "Non, l'homme n'est pas fait pour être moisi."

(LNA, 228) What he is really saying is that such killing is a violation of the concept of human dignity, for dignity has nothing to do with social, racial, or political lines. It is, as we have already noted, a value which according to Malraux is inherent in each and every individual.

Peasants have an important place in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, and it is to a peasant soldier that Malraux gives the lines which state his belief that dignity must be universal.

"La dignité, si un homme en a, il en a partout, sans ça moi je dis qu'il en a nulle part." (LNA, 228) Thus, in the truest spirit of humanism, this dignity, this right to be a full participant in the fraternity of human effort, belongs not to any special group but to every man.

In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg Malraux consistently refers to the elements in man which are destructive of dignity and fraternity as the démon. The incident of the gas attack is an excellent example of this and at the same time of the fraternal reaction which opposes the démon and his effects.

Cenn'était pas la paralysie devant le danger, c'était le bouleversement panique; sans doute les croyants appellent-ils présence du démon une semblable visitation de l'épouvante. L'Esprit du Mal ici était plus
fort encore que la mort, si fort, qu'il fallait trouver un Russe qui ne fût pas tué, n'importe lequel, le mettre sur les épaules et le sauver. (LNA, 233)

This movement toward a suffering enemy had a precursor in La Condition Humaine. Even Tchen, isolated as he is, is overcome by the feeling of oneness with a wounded fellow man.

Ca ne me regarde pas, pensa Tehen, c'est un ennemi. Mais avec un trou de chair au lieu d'une jambe, mais ficelé. Ce sentiment qu'il éprouvait était beaucoup plus fort que la pitié; il était lui-même cet homme ligoté. Son angoisse était d'être blessé au ventre; elle lui était pourtant moins intolérable que la vue de cet être torturé, que cette impuissance humaine dans la douleur. (LCH, 116)

Fraternity may be man's best answer to the challenge of his fate, but from Malraux's point of view it is no more capable than are religion and progress of extirpating the démon from man. As in the case of the gas attack it can win victories over man's internal flaw, but the flaw itself still remains, a constant menace to human dignity. Furthermore, if man is forced to be in frequent contact with cruelty to others, he tends to become calloused to it and the fraternal reaction may no longer take place. Although heartened by the actions of the German soldiers during the gas attack, Vincent Berger is aware of this sobering fact: "Le barrage de la pitié ne serait pas efficace plusieurs fois. Il n'y a qu'à mourir que l'homme ne s'habitue pas." (LNA, 241) What we have here is simply a restatement of the warning in L'Espoir that one must not tempt the beast in man.
Although he frequently refers to the démon in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, Malraux will not actually define what he means by the term until he writes the study on Goya. He is, nevertheless, moving in the direction of a definition, and the point at which he comes closest to it reflects a mixture of the Christian theological approach and the Greek concept of fatality. For Malraux the Greek myths are partly an exteriorization of the démon that is inherent in man. Venus' hatred, which brought Phèdre to destruction, is, in terms of this interpretation, only a dramatized externalization of a flaw in Phèdre's own nature. Christianity reversed the process, taking these myths and incorporating them in human nature under the title of the démon.

Et que toute psychologie est la recherche d'une fatalité intérieure. Le coup d'État du christianisme, c'est d'avoir installé la fatalité dans l'homme. De l'avoir fondée sur notre nature. Un Grec était concerné par ses héros historiquement-quant il l'était. Il extériorisait ses démons en mythes, et le chrétien intérieurise ses mythes en démons. Le péché original concerne chacun. La crucifixion concerne chacun. (LNA, 241)

Thus, the Greek idea of hamartia, the Christian one of man's corrupt nature, and Malraux's of the bête or démon in man have much in common as to their essential quality. All of them are a fatality which works toward the destruction of man. It is on the origin and method of fighting this fatality that Malraux differs from the other two. There is, however, probably not too much real difference
between the Greek and Christian positions and Malraux's.
For the Christian this fatality is due to man's fall from grace in the earliest biblical times and the most efficacious aid that he can have in the struggle against it is faith in God. Even if the Greeks dramatized the various aspects of this fatality in the form of myths it was still for them, as for the Christian, a flaw in man's nature, and a tragically permanent one. This is essentially Malraux's position too, and he says that \textit{il faut connaître l'homme pour reconnaître les voies du démon}. (LNA, 110) For Malraux, this \textit{démon} is in man, he is there to stay, and man can turn to no one but himself for aid in the struggle against him.

From these discussions concerning the nature of the \textit{démon} it is but a step to Malraux's statement in \textit{Saturne} that \textit{pour un agnostique, une des définitions possibles du démon est: ce qui en l'homme, aspire à le détruire}. (Sat, 110) It is typical of the ethical unity that we have seen in Malraux's works that this definition of the \textit{démon} should first occur in a book devoted to the analysis of an artist. The ethical preoccupation is, however, never absent from the art works, for, as we have said earlier, for Malraux art and ethics are just two different facets of the human struggle against destiny. The basic starting point for the battle is the same as it has always been, for he tells us in \textit{Saturne} that \textit{L'absurdité métaphysique est intacte}. (Sat, 114) Art
and ethics both fight against human absurdity. What Malraux's art books do with the struggle with the bête is to make it clearer than ever before that this struggle stems from the same overall view of human destiny as that which begets art, the struggle with the gods. In the works of Goya Malraux finds the two facets of the struggle so interwoven as to be inseparable. It is not for nothing that the essay takes its titre from one of Goya's paintings depicting a giant man devouring a smaller one, a plastic delineation of the démon. And after the foregoing definition of the démon Malraux adds, c'est ce démon-là qui fascine Goya. (Sat, 110)

The tragic permanence of this démon in man is emphasized by the word irrémediable which rings throughout this art study, as tragic as any novel Malraux ever wrote. The author's dismissal of any of the formulas which promise victory over the démon once and for all is shown in an attitude which he attributes to Goya.

Mais si Goya pense que l'homme n'est pas venu sur la terre pour y être coupé en morceaux, il pense qu'il doit y être venu pour quelque chose. Pour y vivre dans la joie et l'honneur? Pas seulement: pour s'y accorder au monde. Et son inlassable prédication, renforcée par la guerre, c'est que l'homme ne s'accorde au monde qu'en s'aveuglant de puérilité.

(Sat, 112)

This untiring preachment may or may not be Goya's but it is certainly Malraux's, reinforced by two world and numerous revolutions. It is simply a solemn ethical warning, pessimistic if one wishes to call it so: nothing will remove
the démon from man. The only safety lies in recognizing this and being on constant guard. All else is puerility.

In **Saturne** Malraux continues the technique, begun in *L'Espoir*, of attributing to the démon the forms of the various things that humiliate men and cause them anguish. It will be noted that except for the added element of nightmare these are the same things that *L'Espoir* and *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* listed as cutting men off from the fraternity of their fellows. (*LE*, 146, 232; *LNA*, 119, 128)

"Les démons ont désormais trouvé leur véritable forme, l'atroce. Depuis sa maladie Goya cherchait ceux que reconnaît du premier coup l'angoisse commune des hommes: l'humiliation, le cauchemar, le viol, la prison." (*Sat*, 92)

Prison remains, as it always has been for Malraux, one of the worst manifestations of le démon, producing in its victims the feelings of humiliation, isolation, and dependence. Prometheus spoke of: "This outrage and igno­miny of bondage," (*PB*, 23) In words which recall those used to describe Kyo's prison experience, he writes that there runs through one series of Goya's etchings une unité de bagne: le sentiment de dépendance. (*Sat*. 76) At another point he returns to the idea of Cervantes' slavery, which, as we have seen in *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg*, was the reason, according to Malraux, that the great Spaniard created a hero who was cut off from the fraternity of mankind. Malraux
starts with a description of the horror of the night of the executions pictured in Goya's Les Fusillades du Trois Mai, goes on to mention other horrible nights, both fictional and real, and concludes with the remark on Cervantes.

'C'est par une nuit pareille, Jessica, que levrent faisait trembler les feuilles en silence...' O chant d'amour! C'est par une nuit pareille, Macbeth, que tu entendis 'Tu seras roi', et c'est par une nuit pareille que la forêt marcha sur Dunsinane. C'est par une nuit pareille que Sâfîl vint chez la sorcière d'Endor, qu'Hélène vit revenir les premiers morts de Troie, qu'Alexandre fit crucifier, celui qui lui avait enseigné la sagesse; que brûlèrent Rome, Persepolis, Alexandrie et Babylone; que l'héritier de Timour jeta aux poissons de son bassin turquoise toutes les perles de Samarcande; que les compagnons investis de Cortez écoutèrent hurler les prisonniers espagnols dont on arrachait le cœur au battement des gongs; c'est par une nuit pareille que Cervantes apprit qu'il était esclave. (Sat, 89)

Thus prison and slavery are for Malraux the ultimate form of man inflicted suffering, the dark night in which the bête in man comes the nearest to complete triumph and human existence is reduced to solitude, humiliation, and absurdity, for in none of Malraux's works is the fact that such suffering on earth duplicates man's dependent condition in the cosmos made more clear then in Saturne for it is also in this work that he states that la condition humaine aussi est une prison. (Sat, 122) The extremely close association that exists in Malraux's philosophy between the action of the démon and the metaphysical problem of man's destiny is shown in the way he links the terms,
metaphysical and cruelty in one of his comments on Goya's motives for paintings. "C'était à la mort métaphysique, et d'abord à son expression pèremptoire: la cruauté, que Goya entendait répondre." (Sat, 111)

It is clear, therefore, that human cruelty, the result of man's internal flaw, is simply a part of that larger destiny against which man must struggle ceaselessly or be reduced to absurdity. Although the menace of the démon is present in almost every page of Saturne, as in the greatest of Goya's works, one finds there also the weapon to use against him: fraternity. Malraux uses the word frequently with references to the Spaniard's art and says, at one point, that la fraternité féconde l'art de Goya. (Sat, 119)

As Malraux visualizes him, Goya, perhaps more than almost any other artist combines in his work both the struggle against the gods and the struggle against the bête. He attains a fraternity of action on both levels, a privilege granted to very few. That much of his art is a protest against the human injustice that is the mark of the bête, is obvious. The struggle against the gods is a matter for the next chapter of this essay. This close intertwining of the two struggles may or may not have been really true of Goya, but it is certainly true of Malraux. Though Saturne is primarily a book on art, Malraux interprets some of the works with which it deals in terms of the current social
struggle. His rupture with the Communists, for what he considers their lack of good faith, has been discussed already in detail. In *Saturne*, Malraux sees in Goya's *Disasters of War*, which deal with the French invasion of Spain, and the consequent disillusionment of liberals like Goya, who had believed in the French revolution, a parallel with the relations between men like himself and the Communist party. "Les Désastres prennent tout leur sens quand on sait qu'ils ne sont pas seulement l'oeuvre d'un patriot amer, mais aussi d'un ami trompé, l'album d'un communiste après l'occupation de son pays par l'armée russe." (Sat, 110)

The extremely close interrelationship between the ethical and the artistic aspects of man's struggle against his destiny continues into Malraux's most recent important work, *Les Voix du Silence*. This book, nominally a psychology of art, is actually a synthesis of Malraux's entire philosophy and furnishes the best possible proof that the vision of human destiny which motivated the revolutionary novels also provides the driving force for his essays on art. Nowhere is this made clearer than when, in *Les Voix du Silence*, he refers to the artistic struggle and the social struggle in exactly parallel terms. "L'accusation de la condition sociale mène à la destruction du système sur lequel celle-ci se fonde; l'accusation de la condition humaine, en art, à la destruction des formes qui l'acceptent."
The battle against the various manifestations of destiny is therefore one, and it is essentially ethical in nature. As we noted earlier in this same chapter it is in Les Voix that Malraux sets up the standards for the choice between vraies valeurs and assouvissement. (LVS, 523, 528) the ethical choice that makes the difference between a Kyo and a Ferral or Clappique, between a Goya and the men who made the official portraits of Hitler and Stalin.

Man's fatal flaw, his démon, which threatens to destroy him and everything he is trying to build, is still very much a danger to be reckoned with. In fact the increasing awareness of the démon and his destructive potentialities is one of the things that has, in Malraux's opinion brought about the current renaissance of interest in barbaric art. The history of this century has shown that far from weakening, the menace of the démon is greater than ever, for man has placed in his hands weapons capable of destroying civilization and bringing about the death of man. Due to the démon in himself, the continued existence of man is en question, hence the revival of barbaric art, in which the démon was alway present.

L'histoire-l'histoire qui obsède l'Europe comme l'interrogation du Bouddha ravagea l'Asie-était née: non plus une chronologie, mais l'axièuse interrogation du passé pour découvrir le destin du monde. La civilisation occidentale commençait à se mettre en question. De la guerre, démon majeur, aux complexes, démons mineurs, la part démoniaque, présente plus ou
There can be no doubt, in the light of such words as these, that Malraux is still deeply preoccupied with the struggle against the bête, and that he sees it is a fundamental part of man's fight against his destiny. The last sentence makes it obvious, too, that we are still dealing with a flaw in man himself, for it is nothing more or less than a restatement of the agnostic definition of the démon that we encountered in Saturne. What is most noteworthy in this passage, though, is the fact that the power of the démon has reached the point where no affirmation concerning the future of man is possible any longer, and the human race must se mettre en question. In short, man must move forward in the ethical struggle or die. Thus, rather than reflecting a decline in Malraux's consciousness of the ethical problem, Les Voix du Silence finds it more acute and urgent than ever.

The reference to war as a démon majeur should answer once and for all those critics who see in Malraux's life and writings an endorsement of Nietzsche's apparent exaltation of it in Thus Spake Zarathustra. (N, Z, 47) Malraux's own position was stated in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg in the almost prayer-like invocation: "Ah que la victoire demeure avec ceux qui auront fait la guerre sans l'aimer." (LNA, 271)

If the démon and his threat to human dignity are
present throughout the pages of *Les Voix du Silence*, fraternity is no less so, and the work contains numerous indications that Malraux still considers it to be the contrary of humiliation. This is true to such a degree that Malraux even interprets popular reaction to different paintings in terms of these two opposites. He writes of paintings that humiliate and of others that are fraternal.

Peut-être les humbles ne s'étaient-ils sentis rejetés par les tableaux jésuites, mais ils l'avaient été à coup sur par Poussin, par Watteau, par Gainsborough; l'imagerie du moins, ne les avait pas humiliés. Pourtant si le sentimentalisme des foules se satisfait d'une expression qui lui semble fraternelle, il s'accorde à d'autres expressions à condition qu'elles demeurent sentimentales. (LVS, 499)

The basic relationships between man and man, as well as between man and destiny are therefore exactly the same in Malraux's philosophy, whether he is dealing with art or with ethics, and his works derive a fundamental unity from this fact. The spirit that motivates the foregoing expression is no different from that which leads him, also in *Les Voix du Silence*, to refer to the France of the first years of the revolution as *la Nation de l'an II, la fraternité des hommes qui n'étaient plus sujets*. (LVS, 481)

Humiliation and servitude are the same thing everywhere, and for Malraux fraternity is still the best weapon against them.

Actually, *Les Voix du Silence* carries the concept
of fraternal action even further than any of Malraux's earlier works, deepening it in the process to the idea of communion. As in L'Espoir, the precept is advanced that common action can produce results beyond those of the purely individual variety.

Des milliers d'êtres humains peuvent être unis par la foi ou par l'espoir de la révolution, mais (sauf dans le langage des propagandes) ils ne sont pas alors des masses, ils sont des semblables: unis souvent par l'action, toujours par ce qui, à leurs propres yeux, compte plus qu'eux-mêmes. Toute vertu collective naît d'une communion. (Italics Malraux's) (LVS, 513)

In the matter of communion Malraux is on common ground with the best that is in religion. That religion, while it is struggling for existence, has much in common with revolution at the same stage, is a fact of which not only Malraux, but also Crane Brinton (AR, 201-217) and many others have long been aware. Malraux speaks of the art of a living religion (one that has not become rigid and dogmatic) in terms that apply equally well to the role of communion in his own humanism. "Et l'art d'une religion vivante n'est pas celui d'une assurance contre la mort, mais celui d'une défense contre le destin par une immense communion." (LVS, 494) The point at which both revolution and religion no longer offer this communion is the business of the chapter on the dangers of the absolute. Suffice it to say here that as long as they are struggling against the problems of human destiny in a fashion that can include
all of mankind they are part of the same fraternal effort.

Malraux emphasizes the necessity for common action in still another way: by pointing out that the isolated individual can do very little. It is perhaps even more important that the passage in which he does so also rejects the idea of the Nietzschean "superman" as he is popularly understood. "L'individu retranché sur lui-même s'aperçoit qu'il n'est pas grand'chose, et que les 'surhumains' dont il s'exalte ont tous assumé un lourd poids d'humanité." (LVS, 191) Thus Malraux's vision of man's battle against the destructive effects of the démon does not entail the idea of a man or group of men who are superior to the rest of humanity. Each man must, it is true, fight his own bête as an individual, but only in order to be and to permit those with whom he comes in contact to be likewise a part of the human fraternity. The desired end, where Malraux is concerned, is to deepen and broaden this fraternity, extending it to all who desire it, not to set any man or group of men apart as being superior to the rest. The goal, as stated in Les Voix du Silence, is to apporter à tous les hommes leur propre grandeur. (LVS, 187) Only in the accomplishment of this aim can the human picture be given the greatest possible dignity. Only by mastering the bête to the point where all men possess their dignity intact can man rise to the ultimate degree above the absurdity and servitude to which destiny would condemn him.
Although, as we have said, Malraux's humanism has many points in common with the great religions there are others on which it diverges. The differences are due not so much to the original beliefs of the various faiths but to the directions they have taken after consolidating themselves. On the basis of his concept of an overall human fraternity, he objects to the tendency of formalized religions to exclude from salvation those who do not accept the faith in its entirety. After observing this characteristic, particularly in bourgeois society, Malraux adds *mais le Christ est venu racheter TOUS les hommes.* (LVS, 481)

To the degree that this last is the ideal of members of the faith, Christianity and Malraux's secular humanism have the same sense of human fraternity.

There is, however, one point of Christian ethics with which Malraux takes definite exception; the suffering of the innocents. This may well be because his vision of life offers no recompense in an after world for such suffering, whereas Christianity does hold out the possibility of heavenly salvation for earthly suffering. To illustrate his own position Malraux draws on the passage from *The Brothers Karamazov* where Ivan Karamazov tells the story of the peasant baby who is torn to pieces by the general's dogs before his mother's eyes. Ivan's question is, of course, Why such evil in the world? The aforementioned Christian
position on the matter is unacceptable to him, and, one
gathers, to Malraux.

Si la rançon du monde doit être le supplice d'un
seul enfant innocent par une brute, je rends mon
billet... disait Dostoïevsky par la voix d'Ivan
Karamazoff: depuis son retour du bagne il n'avait
cessé de jeter au visage le supplice des enfants
innocents, l'irréductible question du phthisique
de l'Idiot, celle que devait reprendre Tolstof
dans Ivan Illitch. (LVS, 536)

Earlier, with respect to this same problem of the existence
of evil, Malraux had written in Saturne of "le dialogue
qui se poursuit depuis les chants sumériens, entre la
bouche close d'un enfant supplicié et la face millénaire-
ment invincible- et peut-être inexorable - de Dieu." (Sat,
119)

Of course neither Dostoyevsky nor Malraux intends
to imply that Christianity approves such brutality. Malraux's
objection to the Christian theological position is that it
attempts to explain such sufferings in terms of an eventual
salvation, and thereby to convey the idea that they should
be borne. Long before Malraux wrote the above lines his own
position on the matter in question was forecast by the per-
haps harsh and exaggerated denunciations of those who teach
people to accept suffering that are contained in Les Conqué-
rants (LG, 3150) and Saturne. The condemnation of les traf-
fiquants d'espoir in this last work is closely paralleled
by Prometheus: "Nor by false pitying speech misguide; for
glozing words I deem the worst disease." (PB, 29) Tchen's
la souffrance, j'aime mieux la diminuer, que d'en rendre compte (LCH, 200) states it most directly. Christianity, as well as other religions, also works to diminish suffering, a fact of which Malraux is well aware. However, the attempt to explain suffering in terms of a universal order could easily detract from the effort to eliminate or reduce it, and therein lies a reason for Malraux's objection. Seen from the point of view of his philosophy, such brutality is simply the result of the action of the bête in man and, far from possibly contributing to an eventual salvation, it is one more step downward on the path toward the reduction of humanity toward absurdity and servitude. Thus there is no way, as he sees it, of justifying any attitude which tells any man to bear such pointless suffering as that described by Ivan Karamazov. Each person who is humiliated or who suffers from human cruelty reduces by that much the dignity that can be given to the human picture as a whole. Therefore the only acceptable attitude toward such things, in the light of Malraux's world vision, is, as with destiny itself, revolt.

All of the aspects of man-inflicted suffering relate in one way or another to the idea of an imprisonment on earth which duplicates the prison of la condition humaine. In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg one of the characters stated that Dostoyevsky's prison experience produced in him the feeling
of isolation which marks his character of Prince Myshkin in The Idiot. In Les Voix du Silence it is said to have lead to an increased awareness of suffering and of society's injustice, the tortured children which Dostoyevsky flung in the face of the society of his time. When we recall too, that unjust imprisonment was a major cause of Garine's feeling of isolation and absurdity, the thread of ethical unity which runs through Malraux's work stands out clearly. The preoccupation with imprisonment that has marked his work from the beginning to the present is due simply to the fact that unjust confinement, particularly when accompanied by suffering and death is the concentrated essence of all that tends to reduce man to absurdity, solitude, humiliation, in short it is the bête's ultimate accomplishment. By means of it he reproduces on earth the humiliating position of man in the universe and makes absurdity his final destiny.

The major ethical tendency of Les Voix du Silence is a synthetic one. Basically it offers nothing that has not already appeared in Malraux's previous works. What it does is to fuse the various elements into a whole and to reveal more clearly than ever that this ethical struggle is just one phase of a larger whole: man's battle against his destiny.

Having now traced the ethical current, however
superficially, through the thirty years of Malraux's literary production to date, what can we say by way of recapitulation, what it has to offer that will aid in man's struggle against his inner bête, the fatal flaw which threatens to reduce him once and for all to absurdity and eventually to bring about the death of man? The end to be achieved can be stated quite simply: it is an overall fraternity of the human race engaged in a struggle to give its existence on earth the greatest possible dignity, to raise it to the highest possible degree above the absurdity to which destiny would condemn it. This ultimate goal can be attained only when every human being is in possession of his dignity, intact and inviolate. Thus human dignity signifies the right to participate fully in this fraternal struggle. The noblest and most satisfying form of human activity is that which is guided by the sens héroïque, the will to struggle for the restoration of dignity to those who are deprived of it.

The basic commandment in this battle against the bête is that one shall not do anything to humiliate another man, anything that will make of him a means and not an end in himself. The only way he can be considered as a means is that by the full possession of his own dignity he adds to that of the human picture as a whole. Humiliation is the surest way to be cut off from this dignity and fraternity,
and of all the forms of humiliation, unjust imprisonment, particularly when it ends in death, is the worst for it forces on man's earthly existence a duplication of the position of solitude and servitude in which destiny has placed mankind, as a whole, with relation to the universe. A political corollary of this is that for Malraux, the system exists for the individual, not vice-versa. Otherwise the system becomes just one more servitude that imposes on man an awareness of his humiliating position.

The struggle to rectify social situations in which groups of people are deprived of their dignity by others is beset by several inherent dangers. Most of these reduce to the fact that it is always perilous to tempt the beast in man. Power and violence tend to corrupt those who have too much contact with them. The struggle is further complicated by the fact that all action is manichean, inflicting injustice as well as correcting it. This places a tremendous moral burden on those who declare for strong social action and makes it absolutely necessary that they be certain of the purity of the cause, that they be able to vaincre sans se trahir.

In the final analysis the struggle against the bête must be an individual one, for Malraux's position is that no social order can bring about nobility of spirit. Each man must make his first contribution to the growth of human
fraternity by mastering his own bête.

For Malraux, this inner flaw in man is inerradicable and could very conceivably bring about the death of man. The concepts of fraternity and dignity are no more than guideposts in the endless struggle to find values that will prevent this final tragedy from taking place. They are by no means offered by Malraux as a guarantee that it will not take place, for although they can resist the action of the bête they can never fully eliminate him from man. The bête now has access to weapons of such destructive power that the continued existence of man himself is in question and one can ask if man too is dead. However, Malraux's ethical philosophy does offer hope in this critical situation and his answer to the question concerning the death of man both points out the direction and summarizes his whole ethical message. "Demander 'si l'homme est mort', c'est affirmer qu'il est l'Homme, et non son déchet, dans la mesure où il s'exige de s'ordonner en fonction de sa partie la plus haute, qui se limite rarement à lui." (LVS, 494)
THE TRAGIC HUMANISM OF ANDRÉ MALRAUX:
AN ESSAY OF INTERPRETATION

Volume II

DISSERTATION
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State
University

By

CHARLES DANIELS BLEND, B. A., M. A.

The Ohio State University
1955

Approved by:

Adviser
Department of Romance Languages
V

A Humanistic Aesthetic, or the Struggle with the Gods

As composer, riddle reader, and redeemer of chance, did I teach them to create the future, and all that hath been—to redeem by creating. Nietzsche, Zarathustra

On ne se défend qu'en créant. Les Conquérants

C'est l'art lui-même qui fait de l'artiste le rival des dieux. Saturne.

Man, as Malraux visualizes him, is a solitary, fleeting accident, cast by destiny into a universe so vast and so indifferent to him that even his short existence in it seems to be of no significance, and all about him appears to be chaos. Fortunately or unfortunately for him, depending on the point of view, this ephemeral creature possesses a spirit capable of conceiving of the idea of eternity and immortality, he has a mind that desires to see this enormous, chaotic universe reduced to his own scale and comprehension. He has, in short, his own vision of how it should be ordered, and this vision includes an important and permanent role
for man himself. The same consciousness which enables him to form this vision also tells him that it is unattainable, that the gods or destiny have placed an insurmountable barrier between the order of which he dreams and the position in which he finds himself. Creation is not as man would have it, and his dream of immortality is cut short by death. Where he would have dignity, eternity, and order the gods have condemned him to absurdity, death, and chaos. Of all of these, death is, for Malraux, the aspect of destiny which conflicts most directly with man's vision of stature for himself, for "Il n'est pas moins dans la nature de l'homme de se vouloir immortel que de se savoir homme." (Sat, 114)

Such, according to Malraux, is the split position in which man has been placed by the gods, the term gods being used here simply to personify the external aspects of destiny, as compared with the bête for the internal ones. Death is in ever-present opposition to immortality, and even in his short life span the order of things is not of his choosing. Malraux's philosophy of art grows out of this weltanschauung just as naturally as his ethical position derives from his vision of human destiny. When he writes in Les Voix du Silence that, en art, la vie commence toujours, au sens de la vie, (LVS, 236) he is showing us the well-spring of his own artistic vision. At another point
in the same work he puts matter in a somewhat different fashion: "Tout art est l'expression, lentement conquise, du sentiment fondamentale qu'oprouve l'artiste davant l'univers." (LVS, 412) This is destiny as Malraux sees it and from his point of view no art can be truly great unless it started with the artist's concept of destiny and struggles against that destiny. In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, one of the characters makes a remark concerning the analysis of man which he feels is at the base of the modern novel. This same remark applies equally well to Malraux's attitude toward all forms of art. "Mais il est clair que cette analyse, seule, ne serait pas un art. Pour qu'elle le devienne, il faut qu'elle entre en lutte avec la conscience que nous avons de notre destin." (LNA, 127)

It is from the aspect of this relationship between art and destiny that we shall discuss Malraux's aesthetics in this chapter. A full length treatment of what might be called the internal aspects of his aesthetics would require an entire book, and André and Jean Brincourt have already given a clear exposition of its major elements in their recent work, Les OEuvres et les Lumières.

Three points in particular should be made clear before turning to the actual consideration of art and destiny in Malraux's writings. The first is that while art is for Malraux a form of struggle against man's absurd and perhaps
unjust position in the universe, it does not deliver him from it. "L'art ne délivre pas l'homme de n'être qu'un accident de l'univers." (LVS, 635) The artist may therefore in a sense triumph temporarily over some phases of destiny, but he cannot fundamentally alter man's role, or lack of same, in the cosmos. The second point is that although Malraux feels that art is perhaps the highest plane of man's struggle against the forces of destiny, he by no means feels that it is the only one. Les Voix du Silence contains mention of others such as science and history, and in an amusing paraphrase of a line from Hamlet, Malraux recognizes that there are worthy aspects of the struggle which do not come within the scope of his Musée Imaginaire. "Il y a plus de noblesse et de bonheur au monde, Horatio que dans votre musée." (LVS, 339) The final and perhaps most necessary point is to try to define what Malraux means by the word "art". By far the greatest number of his references to art have to do with the plastic arts, and most of them concern sculpture and painting. Later in this chapter we shall see him define the artist as a man who creates forms. This would tend to indicate that he views art itself as the creation of forms. This is very well for the plastic arts, but a rather difficult definition to apply to some of the others, such as music and literature. It is worthy of note that the writers to whom Malraux most often refers-AEschylus, Cervantes, Shakespeare, and Dostoievsky-
did not invent new literary forms, but that, according to the requirement for art set forth in the foregoing quote from Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, their works definitely qualify as art. In one of his few references to music, Malraux writes, in Le Temps du Mépris, of music's power to lift men slowly toward la fraternité virile, (LTM, 35) which does relate it to the problems of human destiny. In its broadest sense, then, Malraux evidently means by "art" the transformation of an awareness of destiny into any of the art forms.

Like all the rest of us the artist finds himself, according to Malraux, faced with the fact that the gods have placed him in a monde impur, in the sense that it is not as man would have it. The great artist, in Malraux's philosophy, is both aware of this destiny and in revolt against it. This attitude may or may not be a conscious one on the part of the artist himself, but Malraux writes that quoi que l'artiste en affirme, il ne se soumet jamais au monde. (LVS, 332) He is therefore like Prometheus, in continuous revolt whether he knows it or not. Malraux states directly that l'art est un anti-destin (LVS, 637) and this concept of the struggle against destiny is for him the true source of the creative drive that lies behind all great works of art; in his own words it is la coulée profonde qui les suscite. (LVS, 631) He also uses the idea of the elements common to
all art to defend Le Musée Imaginaire against a possible charge of eclecticisms: "Notre pluralisme, loin d'être un éclecticisme, un goût de mille formes, se fond sur notre découverte d'éléments communs à toutes les œuvres d'art."

(LVS, 555) This theory of the creative process gives Malraux's writings on art a cohesive unity, and at one and the same time makes them an integral part of his overall humanism, since as we have already seen, this vision of man in battle against his destiny lies at the foundation of his entire philosophy.

With respect to art itself, this basic art-destiny relationship which Malraux sees as the origin of the creative drive, makes it possible to classify his art theory as what Ernst Cassirer in his Essay on Man calls a philosophic synthesis. "But a philosophic synthesis means something different. Here we seek not a unity of effects but a unity of action; not a unity of products but a unity of the creative process."

(EM, 96) (Italics Cassirer's)

Fundamentally there are two major ways in which the artist is privileged to carry on his fight against destiny. The first is that he can create things that will continue to exist after his death, thereby winning a temporary victory over it. The matter of the continued function of art works is a complicated one in Malraux's philosophy and will be discussed in detail later in this chapter. At this point we shall simply support the hypothesis of art as
victory over death and time by two quotations from Les Voix du Silence.

Aux yeux de l'artiste les choses sont d'abord ce qu'elles peuvent devenir dans un domaine privilégié où elles échapperaient à la mort. (LVS, 273)

Chacun des chef-d’œuvres est une purification du monde, mais leur leçon commune est celle de leur existence, et la victoire de chaque artiste sur sa servitude rejoint, dans un immense déploiement, celle de l'art sur le destin de l'humanité. L'art est un anti-destin. (LVS, 637)

The first sentence of the second passage leads us to the other major phase of the artist's struggle with the gods. He can, in his art, recreate the forms of the world as he, a man, would have them. Malraux's definition of an artist stems directly from this interpretation of his function. "J'appelle artiste celui qui crée des formes." (LVS, 308)

In the light of this definition, the full significance of the third epigraph of this chapter becomes clear. The artist is a rival of the gods because, like them, he creates. He takes the "impure" forms that creation placed in the world and through his art he submits them to the purification referred to above. That is why Malraux will write of Goya that ce qu'il comprend, c'est que son adversaire est la Création. (Sat, 50) This Promethean defiance of the gods is heard in one form or another throughout the entire length of Les Voix du Silence. Such sentences as les grands artistes ne sont pas des transcripteurs du monde, ils en
sont les rivaux (LVS, 459) and tout art est une leçon pour ses dieux (LVS, 624) set the tone for the whole work. What the artist actually does by means of his creative process is to perform a metamorphosis of the chaos and the impure forms he finds around himself, transforming them thereby into other forms which are designed according to the desires of the human will, ones that are significant from man's point of view. This is only one aspect of the matter of metamorphosis in Malraux's art philosophy, the other will be discussed later in this chapter.

This power of the artist to transform the world into forms that are meaningful to men is another point on which Malraux's philosophy shows its relationship to that of Nietzsche. The German's position differs in some respects from Malraux's, but by and the large the two coincide. Malraux probably would not agree that the artist creates man's goal, but the rest of the following passage from Thus Spake Zarathustra, is in the main also typical of Malraux's attitude. "The creating one! It is he who createth man's goal, and giveth to the earth its meaning and its future." (N, Z, 218) The future of the world is a doubtful proposition according to Malraux, but the Nietzschean concept of the creative person giving sense to the chaos of the world is essentially the same as that expressed in these lines from Les Voix du Silence.
Il semble que tout art commence par la lutte contre le chaos. (LVS, 299)

Le monde est une histoire pleine de bruit et de fureur, qui ne signifie rien—Mais Macbeth signifie quelque chose. (LVS, 523)

At another point in Les Voix du Silence Malraux elaborates on this idea of a world made intelligible by means of man's creative power, expanding it to include all of the things that man creates in order to improve his life.

En tant que créateur, l'artiste n'appartient pas à la collectivité qui subit une culture, mais à celle qui l'élabora, même s'il ne s'en soucie pas. La faculté créatrice ne le soumet pas à une fatalité devenue intelligible, mais le lie au millénaire pouvoir créateur de l'homme, aux cités reconstruites sur les ruines, à la découverte du feu. (LVS, 414)

Like many others of Malraux's ideas, this concept of a world re-created on the measure of man already existed in germ in his earliest works. When, in La Tentation de l'Occident, Ling wrote of the Europeans that vous voulez un univers cohérent, vous le créez, he was not only commenting on the theoretical structures that man builds, he was also describing the function of art that we have just been discussing. If, for Malraux, the artistic interpretation of the world and of man's relation to the cosmos is a truer one than those raised by the sciences, the religions, etc., it is simply because the latter, in claiming to have an answer to destiny are, according to him, actually denying its true nature. The artist, to the contrary, makes no such claims. All he claims to do is to transform his conscious-
ness of destiny into an art form, thereby reducing it to the human scale. This last is a representation and an interrogation of destiny, not an answer to it.

It is important to keep in mind the fact that this recreated world of art is fundamentally a mise en question of the world as destiny created it, including man and even the art forms themselves. Where the artistic expression is concerned, Malraux says that: "Le musée impose une mise en question de chacune des expressions du monde qu'il réunit, une interrogation sur ce qui les réunit." (LVS, 12) In the case of man himself, art implies a mise en question of the human being as creation made him, by the simple fact that it can create a people without sin, without the bête that threatens to destroy man. For this reason Malraux feels that if there is a judgment day, man should be judged not on the basis of a form over which he had no control, but rather on that of man as re-created by art.

Que les dieux, au jour du Jugement, dressent en face des formes qui furent vivantes, le peuple des statues! .............
Il n'y eut jamais sur terre qu'un seul peuple chrétien sans péché, et ce fut un peuple de statues. (LVS, 62)

The importance of such a plea as that expressed in the foregoing lines is, of course, extremely doubtful, but nevertheless it does convey Malraux's view of art as a recreation of the world as well as the fact that he thinks of the statues in terms of purified men. Both of these
ideas are combined in another passage in Les Voix du Silence, a passage which also emphasizes the fact that for Malraux art too is a quest, not an affirmation.

La succession, l'apparente contradiction des écoles ont ajouté la conscience d'une queste passionnée, d'une récréation de l'univers en face de la création. Après tout, le musée est un des lieux qui donnent la plus haute idée de l'homme. (LVS, 13)

Thus we see that Malraux, as usual, associates the ideas of quest and questioning with the finest that is in men. The apparent contradiction shown by the various schools, when placed side by side in a museum (a contradiction which serves to underline the fact that all of them are representative of a quest), is once again a development of an idea that Malraux had expressed in an earlier work. Ling had already noted, unfavorably, this aspect of European museums which Malraux himself regards so highly.

Vos musées ne m'apportent point de plaisir. Les maîtres y sont enfermés; ils discutent. Ce n'est pas leur rôle, ni le nôtre de les écouter. Et je suis toujours déçu par ces lieux où vous préférez la satisfaction de juger à la joie plus fine de comprendre.

Le musée enseigne hélas! ce qu'attendent de la beauté les étrangers. Il incite à comparer, et amène à sentir surtout, dans une nouvelle œuvre la différence qu'elle apporte. (LTO, 77)

Ling may disapprove of the masters who dispute within the confines of a museum, but for Malraux, the dialogues between the conflicting points of view represented in a varied collection of paintings are among the most fertile contributions which art has to offer us. A.D., however, sees
all of the collected differences in terms that forecast the Musée Imaginaire with its art assembled from all times and all areas. In fact, one could say that the embryo imaginary museum was one of the temptations of the occident that give the early work its title.

Mais ce n'est plus l'Europe ni le passé qui envahit la France en ce début de siècle, c'est le monde qui envahit l'Europe, le monde avec tout son présent et tout son passé, ses offrandes amoncelées de formes vivantes ou mortes et de méditations. Ce grand spectacle qui commence, mon cher ami, c'est une des tentations de l'Ocident. (LTO, 87)

In a sense too, Ling has failed to see the forest for the trees. He is so conscious of the differences and contradictions that he misses the most fundamental point, the spirit that is common to them all, or to use Malraux's own words, la coulée profonde qui les suscita. As we have already noted, this reference to a deep current comes from Les Voix du Silence. The high degree to which ideas developed in this work are already present in rudimentary form in La Tentation de l'Occident is shown by Malraux's use of a river image for A.D.'s rebuttal to Ling's denunciation of the European attitude toward art.

Voilà la revanche de l'esprit. Le fleuve des formes vivantes gronde en lui comme une rivière souterraine, mais il en tire ces grandes formes simples, fussent-elles être emportées plus tard, pour régner sur les autres et les soumettre à ses jeux. (LTO, 88)

The parallel between the thought in the two works is so close
that it even extends to the idea of revenge. There is little difference between the first line of the foregoing passage and the one in *Les Voix* where Malraux says of art that *Il est l'éternelle revanche de l'homme*. *(LVS, 634)* Prometheus is still in revolt against the gods, and to quote from AE's play, "all human arts come from Prometheus." *(PB, 22)*

The similarity between this vision of the artist in struggle against the gods, and the situation of AE's *Prometheus Bound* did not escape Malraux. All truly great works of art must, according to him, derive from consciousness of, and struggle against, destiny. At one point in *Les Voix du Silence* Malraux attempts to clarify the distinction between these relatively few great works and the enormous mass of those which do not, in his eyes, merit this exalted classification. He writes:

"Mais elles (les œuvres) sont aussi, plus rarement, celles de la partie souterraine de l'artiste ou de sa part d'Arcadie et, plus rarement encore, celles des parts semblables de l'humanité, d'une permanence humaine évidente ou mystérieuse, d'un sentiment fondamental ou d'un rêve toujours vivant, la Nativité de Giotto, les Pèlerins d'Emmaüs de Rembrandt, la Kermesse de Rubens, la Nuit de Michel-Ange, le Saturnne de Goya. La rencontre d'Eschyle et de Prométhée. *(LVS, 458)*

Malraux is certainly enough of an artist to be aware of the dramatic value of placing an item last in a cumulative series, and that is exactly where we find the meeting of AE and Prometheus. In his preface to
Manès Sperber's *Qu'une Larme dans l'océan* Malraux had also made this same association between the concept of the artist versus destiny and the works of AEschylus. In speaking of the process by which the novel could become the successor to the tragic poem, he wrote: "C'est apparemment par une confrontation, à travers les faits, de l'homme et de l'univers, confrontation dont le génie d'Eschyle est inséparable comme celui de Shakespeare." (QLO, XIX) It would seem, therefore, that Malraux considers the Greek tragedian's version of the Prometheus legend to be perhaps one of the purest artistic representation of man's eternal struggle against his destiny. AEschylus, it will be remembered, was also mentioned in the preface to *Le Temps du Mépris*, one of Malraux's earlier statements concerning his artistic attitude. The approach to him there was closely related to Nietzsche's concept of "the profound AEschylean yearning for justice", and Malraux placed the Greek writer at the opposite pole from those who, like Flaubert (as Malraux visualizes him), believed that the artist as artist should remain detached and impartial with respect to the people he creates, or the social problems he portrays.

Flaubert (pour qui la valeur de l'art était la plus haute, et qui, en fait, mettait l'artiste au-dessus du saint et du héros) ne créant que des personnages étrangers à sa passion, pouvait aller jusqu'à écrire: 'Je les roulerai tous dans la même boue,-étant juste.' Une telle pensée eût été inconcevable pour Eschyle... (LTM, 11)
For the purposes of this essay, the important thing about the foregoing lines is that they imply that AEschylus was in a sense an écrivain engagé, like Malraux himself; the Prometheus Bound, an artistic rendering of the struggle against the injustice of the gods. The various references to AEschylus in Malraux's works, combined with those which associate the idea of great art with Prometheus (e.g. LVS, 458), tend to confirm the hypothesis that fundamentally Malraux conceives of the artistic struggle against the gods as an ethical one, that is to say, as part of an effort to rectify an unjust condition. As such, art integrates completely and naturally into this humanism of man's battle against his destiny. In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, Vincent Berger defines art in terms which put it squarely on an ethical basis.

Notre art me paraît une rectification du monde, un moyen d'échapper ; à la condition d'homme. La confusion capitale me paraît venir de ce qu'on a cru-dans l'idée qu'ensu nous faisions de la tragédie grecque c'est éclatant! — que représenter une fatalité était la subir. Mais non! c'est presque la posséder. Le seul fait de pouvoir la représenter, de la concevoir la fait échapper au vrai destin, à l'implacable échelle divine; la réduit à l'échelle humaine. Dans ce qu'il a d'essentiel, notre art est une humanisation du monde. (LNA, 128)

Berger equates rectification and humanization in these lines by making art equal to both of them, thereby making it clear that for him, art, as well as the concept of humanization—the basis of Malraux's whole humanism—is essential—
ly ethical in nature. One has only to recall that Malraux defines humanism as refusing the bête, and becoming a man without the aid of the gods, in order to see clearly that art, as part of this struggle against destiny, has basically an ethical function. The refusal of the bête leads to the humanization of man, he becomes more fully man. The humanization of the forms of the universe and of destiny, expressed as art, leads to style. In the course of the same discussion in which he refers to art both as rectification and as humanization, Berger also equates the latter of these two terms with stylization.

Qu'est-ce que l'acanthe grecque? Un artichaut stylisé. Stylisé c'est-à-dire humanisé, tel que l'homme l'eût fait s'il eût été Dieu. L'homme sait que le monde n'est pas à l'échelle humaine; il voudrait qu'il le fût. Et lorsqu'il le reconstruit, c'est à cette échelle qu'il le reconstruit. (LNA, 127)

Thus Malraux's concept of style in art, like all the other aspects of his humanism, derives from the same vision, and it is a Promethean one, of man struggling against the situation to which destiny has condemned him. We would perhaps not be justified in stating so directly that for Malraux style and forms in art are attempts to fight destiny if we had only Vincent Berger's words as evidence. However, like so many of Malraux's ideas, this one was already present, in rudimentary form, in La Tentation de l'Occident. Time, which carries man toward death, is one of the leading manifestations of destiny, and even in
this early work Malraux visualized forms as weapons against its action.

Toujours, l'esprit de l'Occident s'efforce de donner aux choses auxquelles il attribuait de la valeur un caractère durable. Il y a en lui une tentative de conquérir le temps, d'en faire le prisonnier des formes. Mais cette tentative même n'est possible que dans un monde organisé par lui. C'est lui qui se couronne et réduit au néant l'existence de ce qu'il ne doit pas écrire. (LTO, 85)

The feeling that Malraux already knew that these early lines contained the central core of his overall art theory is strengthened when he has A.D. follow them with the remark that il n'y a plus d'art que je ne puisse comprendre. (LTO, 85) Almost thirty years later, in Les Voix du Silence, Malraux was to combine the ideas expressed in the foregoing passage with those found in the passages from Les Noyers de l'Altenburg to show that for him art is man's challenge to his destiny.

Et le peuple d'Athènes qui connaissait les thèmes tragiques n'admirait pas en l'art, qui les faisait tragédies, la défaite de l'homme, mais au contraire sa reconquête, la possession du destin par le poète.

Tout artichaut porte en lui une feuille d'acanthe, et l'acanthe est ce que l'homme eût fait de l'artichaut si Dieu lui avait demandé conseil. Ainsi la Grèce, peu à peu, amène-t-elle à la dimension humaine les formes de la vie lui ramène-t-elle les formes étrangères....Le nu grec deviendra sans tares et sans héritée, comme le monde grec est un monde conquis sur sa servitude, celui qu'eût créé un dieu qui n'eût pas cessé d'être un homme....Les formes choisis par l'homme réduit à l'homme; les formes par lesquelles l'homme grandit ses valeurs jusqu'à l'idée qu'il se fait de l'univers. (LVS, 74)

Malraux is here at the very core of his vision of
art, a vision which sees in the greatest of art the metamorphosis of destiny itself, a process by which everything which reduces man to servitude is transformed into a product which bears the stamp of human will. Once again it appears that Malraux considers Greek tragedy to be the ultimate height attainable in this field, probably because it is a conscious transformation of destiny into an art form. Man, by his ability to recreate the world around him, escapes, at least partially, from the servitude of destiny. He can, by the effort of his own will, choose from the forms that the world offers and remake them as he would have them: humanized. If we can accept Malraux's own explanation of the psychology of the tragic poet, then we see that his art theory is simply an aspect of his own tragic poem of humanism. This he had already expressed much earlier in his preface to the French edition of Faulkner's *Sanctuary*. "Le poète tragique exprime ce qui le fascine non pour s'en délivrer (l'objet reparaîtra dans l'oeuvre suivante) mais pour en changer la nature, car l'exprimant avec d'autres éléments, il le fait entrer dans l'univers relatif des choses conçues et dominées." (F, IV)

On this concept of the ability of the human will to re-form the world, Malraux's philosophy of art rejoins Nietzsche's concept of the creating will.

All "It was" is a riddle, a fragment, a fearful choice—until the creating will sayeth thereto:
"But thus would I have it."
Until the creating Will sayeth thereto:
"But thus do I will it! Thus shall I will it!" (N, Z, 155)

This transforming facet of Malraux's philosophy of art also tends to strengthen the hypothesis of the spiritual relationship existing in his own mind between his ideas and those of AEschylus. Speaking, in Saturne, of Goya's sentiment of the universe he brings the matter back to Prometheus.

Mais il Goya est un artiste, et ce sentiment devient par là irréductible à l'absurde: aussi profonde que soit la dépendance, aussi constant que soit le sceau secret de la mort, l'artiste ne les croit pas à l'avance vainqueurs de l'instant vertigineux où l'homme les possède en leur imposant sa transfiguration. Goya n'est pas parce qu'il figure les tortures, le rival du dieu qui les permet; mais parce qu'il fait de chacune d'elles un cri du hululement nocturne de Prométhée. (Sat, 155)

Destiny and the world, as transformed by art, are therefore primarily a victory of the human will. In Malraux's terms this is a conquête, and the idea of art as conquête is one of the predominant themes of Les Voix du Silence. It is a vital conquest for Malraux because it is a field in which it is possible to vaincre sans se trahir, for although he says frequently that art is conquête et non soumission (LVS, 622, 569) he also says that: "Pour nous l'art est continuité profonde par la parenté secrète de ses œuvres, continuité historique parce qu'il ne détruit jamais tout ce qu'il a hérité." (LVS, 625) Art therefore does not
require the compromise with the forces of destruction that is apparently necessary if one is to conquer in the field of revolutionary action.

The reference in the earlier passage (LVS, 74) to a god who would not have ceased to be a man is indicative of a long-standing preoccupation of Malraux's, one which once more underlines the fact that his whole philosophy derives from the same world-vision. We note too that this concept of a being who partakes of the attributes of both gods and man has a Promethean quality. What else were the Titans? Man, in his ability to create forms does, according to Malraux, possess a god-like attribute. Hence the remark, quoted earlier, that art makes the artist the rival of the gods. Man's re-created forms are however a victory of his conscience and will, a conquête, and conquest, says Malraux, is a type of action which men can perform but which gods cannot. Since they are all-powerful the gods do not need to, and essentially cannot, conquer, for conquête, in this sense, implies a struggle against tremendous obstacles. For the gods no such obstacles exist. Thus man, in his artistic struggle against the gods, can do something which his opponents cannot: he can oppose his will and consciousness against a superior force and win a satisfying conquest. But it will be a temporary one, for Malraux is fully aware that man cannot attain the immortality of the gods. Although the concept that gods have attributes that man would like
to possess and vice-versa, is expressed in terms of art forms in _Les Voix du Silence_, the basic principle had been laid down in _La Condition Humaine_ when old Gisors said to Ferral that: "Un dieu peut posséder, mais il ne peut conquérir. L'idéal d'un dieu, n'est-ce pas, c'est de devenir homme en sachant qu'il retrouvera sa puissance; et le rêve de l'Homme, de devenir dieu sans perdre sa personnalité." (LCH, 273)

Malraux's novels of action and his treatises on art are to such a high degree variations on the same basic theme that he frequently uses much the same terminology in order to describe the different types of phenomena present in them. We have just noted that Gisors' remark to Ferral has much in common with lines from _Les Voix du Silence_ which deal with the artist's re-creation of the forms of the world. There are others where the parallel in language is even more striking. Like all of the characters in Malraux's novels, Perken, in _La Voie Royale_, is struggling against the action of destiny, and mainly against death. When Claude Vannec asks how he intends to implement this struggle, Perken replies: "Exister dans un grand nombre d'hommes, et peut-être pour longtemps. Je veux laisser une cicatrice sur cette carte." (LVS, 60) Perken will combat his destiny by leaving on the map a scar that will endure after his death and perpetuate his existence in the minds of other men. Artistic styles,
like Perken's action, alter the world, and create something that counteracts destiny by transcending death and passing on to later generations. It is not surprising therefore that Malraux refers to styles in terms that strongly recall the foregoing lines. "Rien ne donne une vie plus corrosive à l'idée du destin que les grands styles, dont l'évolution et les métamorphoses semblent les longues cicatrices du passage de la fatalité sur la terre." (LVS, 44)

The supposition that the same fundamental vision animates the two works, written a fifth of a century apart, is further supported by the presence in both of them of passages which not only employ almost the identical terms, but use them to refer to the same facet of Malraux's art theory: that of taking forms from the world to convert them into those of art. Both passages also contain the idea, fundamental for a profound comprehension of Malraux's philosophy, that art, like all the other aspects of man's struggle against his destiny, is primarily an adventure in which man's will meets the challenge of the chaos and death which destiny has flung at him. In *La Voie Royale* Claude Vannec had said:

A d'autres de confondre l'abandon au hasard et cette harcelante préméditation de l'inconnu. Arracher ses propres images au monde stagnant qui les possède....Ce qu'ils appellent l'aventure, n'est pas une fuite, c'est une chasse: l'ordre du monde ne se détruit pas au bénéfice du hasard, mais de la volonté d'en profiter. (LVR, 40)
The elements which make up this passage are will, adventure, the confrontation with the unknown, the tearing away of images from the earth. Given the will to do so, man can challenge the unknown, undertake the adventure of reducing the forms of the world to those of man's choice. Claude had already stated Malraux's concept of the birth process of art works, for the latter was to recapitulate this same sequence in Les Voix du Silence.

L'art naît précisément de la fascination de l’insaisissable, du refus de copier les spectacles; de la volonté d'arracher les formes au monde que l'homme subit pour les faire entrer dans celui qu'il gouverne. L'artiste pressent les limites de cette incertaine possession; mais sa vocation est liée, a son origine puis à plusieurs reprises avec moins d'intensité au sentiment violent d'une aventure. (LVS, 318)

The artist, it will be noted, is aware that there are limitations to this victory of his, that it cannot give man immortality or a vital role in the universe. Claude Vannec knew too that his own adventure was always under l’austère domination de la mort. (LVR, 40) The artist, like every other participant in this humanistic struggle of Malraux's, must undertake it fully conscious that the human adventure is not really important as far as the cosmos is concerned. It is to make the world significant for man that the artist carries on his work, and Malraux writes in the final pages of Les Voix du Silence: "Qu'importe Rembrandt à la dérive des nébuleuses? Mais c'est l'homme que les astres nient, et c'est à l'homme que parle
Rembrandt." (LVS, 639)

Once again Malraux has returned to the theme of the relationship that art bears to a universe which seems to deny man and his works. Perhaps even more than the gods, the stars and the nebulae seem to be, for Malraux, symbolic of a universe which reduces man to insignificance, for the answer to the question posed in the preceding quotation is obviously: nothing. In this vision of man contemplating the silent, implacable, and indifferent universe one hears, in part, the echo of the stoic attitude of an Alfred de Vigny who wished to reply to it by un froid silence. This cold silence was more apparent than real, for Vigny, like Malraux, saw in art a challenge to this impassible universe. For, although Malraux knows full well that Rembrandt is of no importance compared to the passage of the nebulae, there are moments when man's artistic conquests seem to have won a victory over them. It is Walter Berger in Les Noyers de L'Altenburg who says:

Je veniaïs de découvrir quelque chose, quelque chose d'important. Dans la prison dont parle Pascal, les hommes sont parvenus à tirer d'eux-mêmes une réponse qui envahit si j'ose dire, d'immortalité, ceux qui en sont dignes. Et dans ce wagon.... Et dans ce wagon, et quelquefois ensuite... je dis seulement quelquefois... - les millénaires du ciel étoilé n'ont semblé aussi effacés par l'homme que nos pauvres destins sont effacés par le ciel étoilé. (LNA, 97)

Et dans ce wagon refers to Nietzsche's song in the railroad tunnel, a song which transformed the consciousness
of destiny into an art product: music. Awareness of the human condition has therefore yielded something which surpasses that same condition. Knowingly, or unknowingly, the great artist, according to Malraux, tries to overcome this condition. In *Les Voix du Silence* he will write of Poussin and Rembrandt, neither of whom may consciously have had such an idea, that "Poussin stylise son personnage, Rembrandt éclaire le sien, pour les faire échapper à la condition humaine." (LVS, 104) Art, as a defense against the human condition and its most potent element, death, has been a central point of Malraux's position since his earliest writings. We have already seen that in *La Tentation de l'Occident* reference is made to the effort to make time prisoner of forms. (LTO, 85) And when, in *La Voie Royale*, Claude Vannec, after trying to explain his attitude on art to Ramèges, says that il me comprendrait tellement mieux s'il sentait que ce qui m'attache là c'est l'acharnement des hommes à se défendre contre leur mort par cette éternité cahotée, (LVR, 45) he provides us with the key to a full comprehension of Malraux's own position. It is Garine who tells us exactly what this defense consists of: "On ne se défend qu'en créant." (LC, 231)

Earlier in this essay we quoted a passage by Malraux to the effect that T. E. Lawrence was seeking, by means of art, to conquer his feeling of human servitude. (PNL, 280)
Almost without exception the lines cited in this chapter tend to convey that same impression, with respect to artists in general. It then becomes a question of determining whether or not this effort is successful. On the cosmic scale the answer would appear to be negative, for we have seen Malraux state directly that art does not deliver man from being an accident of the cosmos. In the stoic sense, that is to say within the flux of human events, the answer seems, on the contrary, to be affirmative. The great artist, at least, appears to be able to rid himself of the feeling of dependence and servitude, and even in a sense to triumph over destiny. The words délivrance, libéré, and libre are constantly associated with the creation of the great works of art. This type of victory was already forecast when Walter Berger said that there were moments when destiny seemed to be effaced by man. (LNA, 97) From the point of view of the artist, at least, Malraux leaves no doubt that the great ones are freed from the servitude of destiny by their works.

L'histoire de l'art entière, quand elle est celle du génie, devrait être une histoire de la délivrance: car l'histoire tente de transformer le destin en conscience, et l'art de le transformer en liberté. (LVS, 621)

For Malraux then a history of art would be the history of an effort to transform the conscience of destiny into liberty. The emphasis, as always with Malraux, is on
the idea of *tenter* for, not even at its most exalted is his humanism anything but one of continuous struggle and search. The implication of these lines however, is that the effort can be at least partially successful. This is born out by another passage in *Les Voix du Silence* in which it is stated that the successful re-creation of a part of the world by the artist frees him from the feeling of dependence. "En elle *l’oeuvre capitale* disparaît le désaccord dont a surgi son génie: il a perdu le sentiment de sa dépendance. De même elle est pour nous une parcelle du monde orientée par l’homme." (LVS, 459)

The foregoing passages deal only with the feelings of the artist himself and say nothing concerning the ability of art to deliver those who see and understand it from servitude to destiny. At another point though, Malraux, speaking of *les oeuvre capitales*, does say that this sentiment of deliverance is transmitted to those who comprehend what art really has to say, and that all truly great art is linked by this same deliverance.

Et nous distinguons enfin ce qui les unis toutes à tant d'autres: l'artiste par sa lente conquête s'y est puissamment libéré de sa dépendance, qu'elles apportent à tous ceux qui entendent leur langage le plus persuasif écho de sa libération: la postérité, c'est la reconnaissance des hommes pour des victoires qui leur semblent promettre la leur. (LVS, 462)

Art as victory over destiny is affirmed in different ways throughout *Les Voix du Silence*, and not only in the
sense that the artist has succeeded in delivering himself and those who comprehend him from the feeling of dependence. In this matter of the relation between the idea of dependence and the artist, the link connecting Malraux to both Nietzsche and AESchylus is extremely close. For Nietzsche, as for Malraux, the dependence is shared, gods and man, particularly the artist being interdependent. In the Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche sees AESchylus' Prometheus Bound as the symbol of this reciprocal relationship. "When he thought of these deities, the Greek artist, in particular, had an obscure feeling of mutual dependence: and it is precisely in the Prometheus of AESchylus that this feeling is symbolized." (N, BT, 997) Toward the end of the book Malraux advances the idea that those forms which man has succeeded in seizing and re-creating on the human scale constitute an actual victory over some of the gods and demons. For him the museum contains not only the forms of the world which have been reduced to the human but also gods who have undergone the same transformation.

The victory, it will be noted, is only a partial one for man has by no means succeeded in reducing all of the
gods to the human scale. The fact that he can do this to any of them represents a major victory in the battle against destiny, a victory that is perhaps more significant than any attainable in the other struggles of which Malraux's humanism is composed. In the combat with the bête, nothing more than a successful holding action appears to be possible even within the scope of human existence. These gods, capture in man-created forms, represent a substantial victory, at least within this same scope.

For Malraux, this artistic victory is part of our heritage from ancient Greece. Just as it was the Greeks who first captured, in their tragedy, the essence of man in conflict with destiny, so also was it they who created not only the humanized gods, but also men who were freed from both gods and the bête, from destiny itself.

L'art grec est le premier qui nous semble profane. Les passions fondamentales y prirent leur saveur humaine; l'exaltation commença de s'appeler joie. Car même les profondeurs sont celles de l'homme; la danse sacrée dans laquelle apparaît la figure hellénique, c'est celle de l'homme enfin délivré de son destin. Les figures ne viennent pas du sable babylonien, elles s'en libèrent en même temps que les hommes, comme les hommes: au destin de l'homme, l'homme commence et le destin finit. (LVS, 73)

On the surface this passage seems to convey the idea that the Greeks had actually succeeded in freeing man from the action of destiny, an accomplishment which from Malraux's point of view is, in the final analysis, impossible,
at least where the individual human personality is concerned. The Greeks themselves were well aware that man himself could not ultimately escape the force of destiny, an awareness to which their creation of tragedy bears eloquent witness. The true significance of the preceding lines is that Greek art created a world within which man, re-created by that same art, was free from destiny. When Phidias sculptured a human being, his creation was liberated from the oppression of the gods, the action of the bête, and even from death itself. Within the framework of human existence it triumphed over destiny. Though Phidias himself might, and certainly would die, his statue would not. It would continue to represent what Malraux refers to in Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale as l'énigmatique présence dans la vie de ce qui devrait appartenir à la mort. (LMISM, 54) As such it is a victory in art's struggle with the gods. In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg Malraux had already recognized this Greek accomplishment, for Walter Berger had said:

Mais je sais que certaines œuvres résistent au vertige qui naît de la contemplation de nos morts, du ciel étoilé, de l'histoire....Il y en a quelques-unes ici. Non pas ces gothiques; vous...vous connaissez la tête du jeune homme du musée de l'Acropole? La première sculpture qui ait représenté un visage humain, simplement un visage humain; libéré des monstres...de la mort...des dieux. Ce jour-là, l'homme aussi a tiré l'homme de l'argile. (LNA, 98)

This last sentence puts man, at least the artist, in a
position parallel to that of the biblical god who made man from clay.

This re-created world with its destiny-free men must not, according to Malraux's philosophy, be considered as an end in itself. It is representative of a search for the highest powers in man and a man free of all that reduces him to dependence. Taken as an end, this world, even when successfully created, is fictional and not real, and as such is no more valid than any other of the structures that man has built in answer to the problems of destiny. The vital function of this recreated world is that it serves, by its very existence, to mettre en question the impure world from which it was derived. The statue, free at the same time of death and of the démon which threatens the existence of mankind, constitutes a mise en question of man himself and this is the ultimate function of modern art as Malraux sees it. The ancient Greeks took the first step; modern man, enabled by the Musée Imaginaire, to view art as a whole, took the second. Conditioned by his historical past and his threatened civilization, he saw in these old forms, a new sense, or rather an extension of the old one. The process by which they took on this new sense is metamorphosis and it will be discussed later in this chapter.

We must return to Malraux's consideration of Greek art in order to pick up the thread of another aspect of his
vision of art as a whole, and it is a thread that once more ties Malraux's philosophy of art tightly and integrally to the effort of which his humanism is composed. Art, like the struggle against the bête, is movement toward fraternity, a movement open to all those who will to be part of it. The only thing necessary for participation is the ability and the desire to understand what art has to say. For Malraux, of course, art carries the message of man consciously battling his destiny. When, in L'Espoir, Shade says of the Mexican revolutionary artists that their work is un langage de l'homme en lutte (LE, 39) he is really speaking for all the artists Malraux considers truly great. All of these artistes giants, and all who are attuned to their voices, les voix du silence from which the book takes its title, are comrades in a great fraternal adventure. This adventure offers fraternity not only horizontally but also vertically, that is to say that not only does it include members of the same time period but it also plunges into the past to make AESchylus as much a part of the fraternity as Malraux himself. Every artist who has transformed his conscience of destiny into an art product, as well as every person who understands them in this sense, is a part of this fraternal effort. For a philosophy which starts with man isolated in the cosmos, and men isolated from each other, this tremendous fraternity represents a considerable
victory. For Malraux it was the Greeks who first won it and their art even succeeded in linking man to the cosmos. "L'art grec n'est pas un art de solitude, mais celui d'une communion avec le cosmos dont il fut amputé par Rome." (LVS, 633) At another point in Les Voix du Silence he develops this idea more fully and associates it with a pouvoir divin in man.

Au sens où Amphitrite fut la déesse de la mer, la figure qui rendit secourables les flots, l'art grec est notre dieu de la Grèce: c'est lui et non les personnages de l'Olympe, qui nous l'exprime dans sa part la plus haute, victorieuse du temps et fraternelle, puisque c'est à travers lui seul qu'elle nous atteint à l'âme. Il exprime ce qui à travers la Grèce et inséparable d'elle, fut la forme particulière d'un pouvoir divin dont tout art est le témoignage. L'Homme que suggère la multiplicité de ces pouvoirs est l'acteur de la plus vaste aventure, et aussi la souche profonde d'où montent les surgeons qui tout à tour s'enchevêtrent et s'ignorent; telle victoire qu'il remporta sur les démons de Babylone retentit sourdement en quelque coin secret de notre âme.

De la Naissance d'Aphrodite au Saturne de Goya, au crâne aztèque de cristal, les archetypes radieux ou funèbres qu'il rapporte répondent aux sursauts du grand sommeil trouble que l'humanité poursuit en nous, et chacune de ces voix devient l'écho d'un pouvoir humain tantôt maintenu, tantôt obscur, et souvent disparu. En lui le délire épars du monstre de rêves s'ordonne en images souveraines, et le cauchemar saturnien prend figure de rêve secourable et pacifié. Il plonge dans le temps aussi profondément que l'homme du sang, et, c'est lui qui nous fait rêver de la première nuit glacée où une sorte de gorille se sentit mystérieusement le frère du ciel étoilé. Il est l'éternelle revanche de l'homme.

Malraux had already formulated, in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, the concept expressed in these lines. There.
he emphasizes, once again, the fraternity in depth and the pouvoir divin of the artist that make such a fraternity possible. Even more than the passage just quoted, the one from the earlier novel conveys the feeling that the artist's victory is a victory for all those who understand him. It is the privilege of the artist to be able to present this conquest of space, time, and death to the rest of humanity. The fact that the ability to do this is referred to as a pouvoir divin should not mislead one into believing that Malraux's humanism is no longer agnostic. Men find this divine power au fond d'eux-mêmes. They use it, according to Malraux, in order to struggle against that which really transcends them: destiny, manifesting itself here in the forms of time and death. Count Rabaud, in the course of the Altenburg gatherings, makes the remarks that contain the germ of the foregoing passage from Les Voix du Silence.

As stated here this idea contains nothing that is startlingly new or original, and Malraux makes no such claims for it. In fact it is characterized by Vincent Berger, at
the time, as subtilement banale, commune alors à nombre
d'intellectuels. (LNA, 112) Rabaud's presentation is over
simplified, and perhaps somewhat romanticized, but neverthe-
less is does contain the nucleus around which will be formed
much of Malraux's theory of art as a link between epochs
and civilizations. This link is vitally important for it
constitutes a large part of Malraux's rebuttal to Spengler's
hypothesis that civilizations live and die without communi-
cating with each other. On the artistic level Malraux's
reply to Spengler is the concept of metamorphosis, and Rabaud
was approaching it when he spoke of art's ability to make
distant destinies fraternal and revealing.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the actual
nature of metamorphosis, one point should be made clear with
respect to its function as a reply to Spengler. It is only
to the absolute quality of the Spenglerian position, that
there is no communication, that Malraux's theory forms a
refutation, for he does not believe, any more than Spengler,
that civilizations, separated in time, transmit the most
profound aspects of their life to each other. As early as
La Voie Royale Malraux had written that en profondeur toute
civilisation est impénétrable pour une autre. (LVR, 45)
The experience of life in a culture is the true essential
of that culture and this cannot be communicated. Malraux
recognizes that metamorphosis cannot accomplish this profound
communication and that therefore the results which we can
derive from the various cultures, brought together by art,
will not consist of the sum total of their attributes.
It will be a new product, the exact nature of which we
cannot conceive in advance. Like Malraux's humanism it
is a struggle, a search for values.

Nous pouvons unir la connaissance des Pères de
l'Eglise à celle des grands penseurs de l'Inde,
non l'expérience chrétienne des premiers à
l'expérience hindouiste des seconds; nous
poumons tout unir sauf, l'essentiel.
Notre culture n'est donc pas faite de passés
conciliés, mais de parts inconciliables de passé.
Nous savons qu'elle n'est pas un inventaire,
que l'héritage est métamorphose, et que le passé
se conquiert; que c'est en nous, pour nous, que
devient vivant le dialogue des ombres où se
plaisait la rhétorique. Qu'échangeraient, au bord
du Styx, Aristote et les prophètes d'Israël,
sinon des injures? Pour que pût naître le dialogue
du Christ et de Platon, il fallait que naquit
Montaigne. Or, notre resurrection n'est pas au
service d'un humanisme préconçu; comme Montaigne,
elle appelle un humanisme pas encore conçu.
(LVS, 621)

The idea of a dialogue between Plato and Christ,
by means of Montaigne, leads us directly to the major aspect
of metamorphosis. Obviously the separation in space and
time between the first two makes an actual physical dialogue
an impossibility. However, Montaigne, as the inheritor of
all the recorded wisdom of both of them, is in a position
to create a dialogue between them. No one can claim of
course, that this dialogue is exactly what the two men would
have said had they been able to converse with each other.
The important thing however, where the life of art is concerned, is the new product; Montaigne's creation, whose form and content cannot be predicted in advance. As Malraux says above, it is not an inventory, it is a metamorphosis. The result of Montaigne's fusion of Christ and Plato will be something that is a transformation of both of them. This new creation will have been conditioned by several factors, by the passage of time, by the fact, indicated above, that Montaigne does not have available the essential experience of Christ or that of Plato. Most important of all it will be given a new and different significance from that of the original words of the two men by Montaigne himself, and by the civilization that reads his works. The significance that a civilization sees in past works of art is determined partially by the work itself and partially by the state of the civilization that views them. In the dialogue between these two factors lies the essence of metamorphosis, a process by which art is not only resurrected but renewed. It can be, but is not necessarily, a means by which man's artistic heritage is constantly made fertile and reproductive. It is man's greatest possible victory in the struggle against time, death, and the gods. Each succeeding culture has at least the possibility of drawing a new significance from the works of the past. In so doing it gives renewed life to the work itself for as
Malraux wrote in the postface to the definitive edition of Les Conquérants: C'est seulement chez l'héritier que se produit la métamorphose d'où naît la vie. (LC, 251) In Les Voix du Silence he develops more fully the idea of metamorphosis, relating it directly to a victory over death and to the concept of a dialogue between the work and the succeeding men who come in contact with it.

La métamorphose n'est pas un accident, elle est la loi même de la vie de l'oeuvre d'art. Nous avons appris que si la mort ne contraint pas le génie au silence, ce n'est pas parce qu'il prévaut contre elle en perpetuant son langage initial mais en imposant un langage sans cesse modifié, comme un écho qui répondrait aux siècles avec leurs voix successives: les chefs-d'oeuvre ne maintiennent pas un monologue souverain, mais un dialogue invincible. (LVS, 66)

Metamorphosis is then, for Malraux, the very life of the work and despite the confident tone of the foregoing words it is a precarious life. Nothing could be more mistaken than to assume that it is a continuous, automatic process, a guarantee of eternity for the work of art. At best it is, to use the term taken from La Voie Royale, une éternité cahotée. (LVR, 45) In a passage from Les Voix du Silence which also rejects the Nietzschean concept of the eternal return, Malraux discards the idea that metamorphosis implies an inevitable continuing progress in art.

La précision qu'apporte l'histoire aux conquêtes de l'art approfondit leur sens, mais ne rend jamais complètement compte, parce que le temps de l'art n'est pas la durée de l'histoire...Une histoire de l'art, et non une chronologie des influences, ne
saurait pas plus être celle d'un progrès que celle d'un éternel retour. (LVS, 621)

Not only is the process of metamorphosis not that of progression, but also there is no guarantee, according to Malraux, that it will absolutely take place. In a speech which forms part of the postface to Les Conquérants he states categorically that resurrection and metamorphosis are completely unpredictable.

Le problème qui se pose ici, c'est précisément de savoir ce qui assure la transcendance partielle des cultures mortes.

Je ne parle pas ici d'éternité, je parle de métamorphose. L'Egypte a réapparu pour nous; elle avait disparu pendant plus de quinze cents ans. La métamorphose est imprévisible? Eh bien! Nous sommes en face d'une donnée fondamentale de la civilisation, qui est l'imprévisibilité des renaissances, mais j'aime mieux un monde imprévisible qu'un monde imposteur. (LC, 259)

There is no certainty therefore as to when the metamorphosis and resurrection will take place, and none that it even will take place. This position is entirely in accord with the over-all quality of Malraux's humanism, that is to say search and interrogation rather than a preconceived structure. If there is no certainty that metamorphosis will come to pass there is always the possibility that it will. Like the Egyptian culture of which Malraux speaks above, a work of art may disappear from all contact with civilization, lie dormant, and then due to a particular set of circumstances come back to life with a new significance. It may do this because for Malraux,
the life of a culture or work of art, subsequent to the death of their creators, is always bound by the idea of possibility.

L'immense domaine d'art qui monte pour nous du passé n'est ni éternel ni au-dessus de l'histoire; il est lié à celle-ci et lui échappe à la fois comme Michel-Ange à Buonarotti. Son passé n'est pas un temps révolu mais un possible; il n'impose pas une fatalité, il établit un lien. (Malraux's) (LVS, 633)

and

Le Musée Imaginaire est la suggestion d'un passé profond possible projeté par le passé. (Malraux's) (LVS, 637)

The idea expressed in these lines is, of course, largely a restatement of the one contained in the foregoing passage from *Les Conquérants*. In the concept of an unevenly moving artistic time entirely contingent on possibility, Malraux's thought is very close to that of Kierkegaard, at least as the latter is interpreted by Jean Wahl. "Moreover the idea of Possibility is linked to the idea of time and we may contrast Kierkegaardian time, with all its ruptures and discontinuities, to the logical unwinding of Hegelian time." (SHE, 6) On this point we note once more to what a high degree Malraux's ethical and artistic theories have the same central core. Life in art as well as in human existence itself is closely related to the idea of possibility. (Wahl, 144)

Historical time and artistic time are then two very
different things from Malraux's point of view. The work of art exists in both of them and it takes both to explain its resurrection and metamorphosis. Obviously the object itself has to continue to exist in historical time if it is to be considered by a later artist or culture. This is not sufficient to explain the phenomena of resurrection and metamorphosis, which, as we have already seen, can only take place in those who inherit the work of art or the culture from the past. Its new significance, a modification or metamorphosis of the original one, will be largely determined by the conditions of the new artist or civilization which resurrects it. The groundwork of this theory, vital in Malraux's approach to art, had been laid long before Les Voix du Silence, during Claude Vannec's discussions with Ramèges in La Voie Royale.

J'en viens donc à dire que la valeur essentielle accordée à l'artiste nous masque l'un des pôles de la vie de l'œuvre d'art: l'état de la civilisation qui la considère. On dirait qu'en art le temps n'existe pas. Ce qui m'intéresse, comprenez-vous, c'est la décomposition, la transformation de ces œuvres, leur vie la plus profonde, qui est faite de la mort des hommes. Toute œuvre d'art, en somme, tend à devenir mythe.

Les musées sont pour moi des lieux où les œuvres du passé, devenues mythes, dorment, --vivent d'une vie historique, en attendant que les artistes les rappellent à une existence réelle. Et si elles me touchent directement, c'est parce que l'artiste a ce pouvoir de résurrection....En profondeur, toute civilisation est impénétrable pour une autre. Mais les objets restent, et nous sommes aveugles devant eux jusqu'à ce que nos mythes s'accordent à eux. (LVR: 49)
In embryonic form, the whole heart of Malraux's philosophy of art is contained in these early lines. From the second paragraph will develop the concept of the musée imaginaire, the instrument which Malraux uses to consider art as a whole. The basis is laid for the metamorphosis of the art work by the passage or time, by the death of men. He will use much the same terms as those which end the first paragraph of the preceding quotation, to describe the same process in Les Voix du Silence. "Vie en face de la vie, selon sa nature propre; et animée, au sens etymologique, par la coulée du temps des hommes, qui la métamorphose et s'en nourrit." (LVS, 459) It is interesting to note that Malraux speaks of this time process in art in a novel of violence and death like La Voie Royale, while in Les Voix du Silence, he will write of one of its effects that la mutilation est la trace du combat. (LVS, 639) Art, like all the other activities which have preoccupied Malraux, is visualized by him as a struggle.

The real existence of the art work in historical time is not its chronological life, according to the above passage. It is only a period of sleep from which the work is awakened by a special set of circumstances in the person or civilization which contemplates them. Here, although on a different plane, we are dealing with an idea very similar to that of Proustian recall. For Proust, the reoccurrence
in the present of a particular physical situation from the past, brought back the event contingent on that situation. For Malraux, the presence in a civilization of a condition that was an element of a preceding civilization, brings the art of the latter back to life. Malraux's approach to temps, durée, and possibility in the life of an art work has much in common with the ideas of Proust, Bergson, and as we have already noted, Kierkegaard. All of them view historical time, as secondary to that of art.

Although the foregoing lines do contain the germ of the artistic phase of Malraux's reply to Spengler, there is an important step lacking in the passage from La Voie Royale. This is the final stage in the rebirth and renewal of the work of art: the metamorphosis by means of which a later generation reads a new significance into the works of an earlier one. The idea expressed in the last two sentences of the aforementioned passage, that is that even if the most profound element of a culture die with it, the art objects remain to communicate with later generations, is reiterated in very similar terms in Les Voix du Silence.

A supposer que les civilisations disparues soient mortes, leur art ne l'est pas: même si l'Égyptien de l'Antien Empire doit nous demeurer à jamais inconnu, ses statues sont dans nos musées et elles ne sont pas muettes. (LVS, 617)

Up to this point the two passages are very much the
same except for the added idea that the statues are not mute. This last however is the key to the whole process of metamorphosis because it makes possible the dialogue with the past, the dialogue from which will grow a renewed significance for the work itself. The statues are not mute for they speak with the voices of silence which give the book its title, maintaining their half of a dialogue which spans the centuries, giving man's heritage and expanding value and transcending the death of the individual.

Thus the process is completed and man wins one of his finest victories over the forces which tend to reduce him to absurdity, isolation, and nothingness for we find in these lines Malraux's reaffirmation that art is still essentially a struggle with destiny. The end result of the action of destiny would be destruction and the diametric opposite of destruction is creation. Therefore man's creative drive is the spark by which he counteracts the destructive force of destiny. "L'acte créateur maintient au long des siècles une reconquête aussi vieille que l'homme." (LVS, 637) Like many of the other ideas expressed in Les Voix du Silence, this one had its inception much earlier, in La Tentation de l'Occident. It was born when Ling wrote to A.D. what he saw
in Europe:

La création sans cesse renouvelée par l'action d'un monde destiné à l'action, voilà ce qui me semblait alors l'âme de l'Europe, dont la soumission à la volonté de l'homme dominait les formes. (LTO, 25)

Malraux is fully aware that what he interprets here as a completely human conquest could also be explained by a religious person in terms of god. He however, chooses to interpret it in the light of the highest that is in man, man who is conscious that he is probably condemned to eventual nothingness but who transforms this very awareness into something that may be more durable than himself.

Sans doute, pour un croyant, ce long dialogue des métamorphoses et des résurrections s'unit-il en une voix divine, car l'homme ne devient homme que dans la poursuite de sa part la plus haute; mais il est beau que l'animal qui sait qu'il doit mourir, arrache à l'ironie des nébuleuses le chant des constellations, et qu'il le lance au hasard des siècles, auxquels il imposera des paroles inconnues. (LVS, 639)

Like the word imprévisible in the earlier quotations, the term hasard in this one calls attention to the fact that this victory over time and destiny is by no means certain, that it depends to a great extent on chance. This is the same chance that Ling had referred to in a letter to A.D. as ce tragique hasard qui dort au moeur même de votre vie. (LTO, 105) There is however in the foregoing lines a note almost of defiance, an indication that the hazardous path was deliberately chosen, a conscious rejection of the divine
solution which would seem to offer greater peace and security. The whole attitude is much the same as that of Prometheus when he refused to compromise with Zeus, unwilling to exchange his secret knowledge for deliverance from his chains. The tone for this Promethean rejection of a greater power was set at the beginning of Malraux's literary career when A.D. wrote in the final pages of *La Tentation de l'Oc­cident*:

_Certes, il est une foi plus haute: celle que proposent toutes les croix des villages, et ces mêmes croix qui dominent nos morts. Elle est l'amour et l'apaisement est en elle. Je ne l'accepterai jamais; je ne m'abaisserai pas à lui demander l'apaisement auquel ma faiblesse m'appelle._ (LTO, 124)

These early, extreme lines have an adolescent sound but they nonetheless contain the original expression of the attitude which would lead Malraux to view art as a struggle with the gods. They also lead naturally to the idea of être Rembrandt et non Raphaël, (LVS, 536) to his tendency to reject _l'art_ which reflects appeasement and reconciliation in favor of that which transmits the anguish of man's awareness of destiny. With reference to the type of spirit which produces the latter, he had also written in *La Tentation de l'Occident* of its besoin d'un classicisme négatif, appuyé presque tout entier sur une horreur lucide de la séduction. (LTO, 88) Malraux's dislike for _l'art reconcilié_ was formed early and the rejection, of an art based mainly on beauty is,
if we are to believe Nietzsche, incompatible with that of tragic art, Malraux's approach. "From the nature of art as it is usually conceived according to the single category of appearance and beauty, the tragic cannot honestly be deduced at all." (N, BT, 1038)

The emphasis on hazard and chance in the continuing life of the art work also shows his spiritual relationship to the Nietzsche who wrote that: "It is the surrender of the greatest to run risk and danger, and play dice for death." (N, Z, 144) And, "Dare now to be tragic men." (N, BT, 1063)

As a philosophical position it likewise parallels very closely that of Martin Heidegger with respect to the qualities which distinguish man from the other beings. Jean Wahl writes: "According to Heidegger, man, unlike other beings, interrogates himself. In fact, man is that being who questions, endangers, and puts at stake his very existence." (SHE, 19)

The Heideggerian reference to questioning and interrogation returns us once more to the problem of the final result of the process of metamorphosis in Malraux's art philosophy. It is, as we have already mentioned, interrogation or the mise en question of the universe and man. The very passage in which Malraux speaks of unity through metamorphosis also contains an indication as to why the final
attitude is still one of interrogation. "Tous unis, apparemment, par la métamorphose qu'ils subissent dans le domaine qui a remplacé celui de la beauté, comme si les fouilles nous apportaient à la fois le passé du monde et notre avenir." (LVS, 125)

The domaine which has replaced that of beauty reflects Malraux's continuing horreur lucide de la séduction and refers to the creative struggle against destiny. The most important element in this passage however is that the excavations show both the past of the world, and our future. For although the diggings bring back to life some of the art objects of the past, they also present indisputable evidence that for some reason or other a human civilization has died and disappeared from the earth. This has been the fate of all past cultures, and can very likely be the future of ours, and of man himself. One is tempted to think once more of Professor Muller's tragic approach to history, wherein cultures, like men, fall victim to their fatal flaws. Under such circumstances, the metamorphosis of these remains of the artistic past produces not so much an affirmation as a question on the nature and destiny of man.

L'art apporté par la métamorphose est un domaine multiple comme celui de la vie disparue elle-même. Nous le pressons d'une interrogation passionnée, parente de celle que notre art et notre civilisation adressent au monde. (LVS, 625)

This interrogation is more than just an approach to
art and culture, it is for Malraux the fundamental nature of modern art as well as of contemporary Occidental civilization. It has always been so, according to him, with all the truly great artists. With reference to the greatest artists and novelists, Malraux had written as early as 1939 in his *Etude sur Laclos* that *leur art est inséparable d'une question qu'ils se posent sur l'homme et leur attitude la plus profonde est celle de l'interrogation.* (SC, 340) The intervening years have served only to widen and deepen this attitude, for in the introduction to the first volume of *Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale* we find the words: "Or notre conception du monde, par son caractère d'interrogation, est liée à une question sur l'homme et non à une notion de l'homme." (LMISM, 56) The art which is brought back from vanished civilizations by the imaginary museum, particularly when it is viewed through eyes conditioned by the unparalleled destructiveness of the twentieth century, leads to an awareness that there is little to justify any affirmations on the nature, permanence, and destiny of man. By its very existence this resurrected art is witness to the continuity of human creativity, but the destruction of the civilizations that nurtured them is forceful evidence of the diametrically opposite tendency in man. And, as we have seen, the resurrection itself is completely unpredictable. Faced with such a situation, it is natural
that the predominant attitude should be one of *mise en question*, rather than of affirmation, and modern art and culture, which have received the heritage of the "Imaginary Museum" are characterized by their interrogatory nature. Man's cultural and artistic life is therefore, like all phases of life in Malraux's philosophy, a continuous effort of struggle and search. It is a voyage of discovery, over uncharted seas, in quest of values. Malraux calls it a "*culture des grands navigateurs*. This culture is very closely associated with the concept of the *musée imaginaire*, which stimulates in modern art the same attitude of quest and interrogation. As was the case with the humanism mentioned earlier in connection with Montaigne and the dialogue between Christ and Plato, (LVS, 630) there is no preconceived structure for the culture of great navigators. The parallel is natural because in most respects humanism is synonymous with the quest for human culture. Man is embarked on an endless voyage not knowing what he will discover en route, but such a culture concept has the advantage of universality because anything that it does discover can be integrated into it. If there is no preconceived form there are no preconceived limitations. The barbaric art of Africa and Oceania fits into Malraux's imaginary museum just as easily as that of Rembrandt and Goya. All reflect this long voyage in which man interrogates himself, his destiny, and the universe.
Aidé par le Musée Imaginaire que par ailleurs il suscitait, l'art moderne imposait l'autonomie de la peinture. À une tradition, c'est-à-dire à une culture qui, dans tous les domaines, entendait se moncevoir, il contribuait à substituer une culture qui ne se conçoit pas. Qui oppose un domaine de recherches à un système d'affirmations. Dans laquelle l'artiste—et peut-être l'homme—ne sait que d'où il part, quelles sont ses méthodes, sa volonté et sa direction. Un art de Grands Navigateurs....Mais une culture des Grands Navigateurs peut-elle se concevoir? (LVS, 602)

Even this vision of an interrogatory culture is modified in the direction of greater liberty in others of Malraux's writings which are approximately contemporary with Les Voix du Silence. In his lecture to UNESCO on L'Humanisme Tragique he drops both methods and direction from the list of things known by the man of this culture. (PNL, 500) The postface to the definitive edition of Les Conquérants contains a categorical rejection of preconceived direction.

Or cette conquête n'a d'efficacité que par une recherche libre. Tout ce qui s'oppose à la volonté irréductible de découverte est, sinon du domaine de la mort, car il n'y a pas de mort en art—et, mon Dieu, il y a bien un art égyptien,—mais de la paralysie des facultés les plus profondes de l'artiste. Nous proclamons donc la nécessité de maintenir la liberté de cette recherche contre tout ce qui entend en fixer à l'avance sa direction. (LC, 271)

Thus this culture of great navigators eliminates all guarantees as to the final destiny of man, whether they be stated in terms of progress, of religion and God, ultimate destruction, or, as in the case of the Soviet Union, a preconceived theory of history. Any of these might conceivably be the answer, but of none of them can it be said in advance
that it absolutely is. It is typical of Malraux's adherence
to his fundamental precepts in this respect, that in all
writings which would seem to convey his own position on
religion, the references are not to atheism but to agnostic-
ism. The attitude of question, leaving all possibilities
open. This culture offers little to those who desire any
degree of certainty but, "Zarathustra, however, was fond
of all those who make distant voyages and dislike to live
without danger." (N, Z, 171)

The passage from the postface of Les Conquérants,
with its mention of conquête, recherche, and the victory of
art over death could well serve as a summary for this chapter
on man's struggle with the gods. That Malraux conceives
of art in this light there can be little doubt, for in his
lecture to UNESCO on L'Homme et la culture artistique, in
which he outlines his concept of l'humanisme tragique, he
says of this last, that: "Depuis la Grèce, il s'est exercé
contre ce qu'on appelait les dieux. Pas les Vénus et les
Apollons: les vrais, les figures du destin." (PNL, 500)
Art, which for Malraux is the highest expression of this
humanism, can do no less than carry on the same struggle.

In that same lecture we find him continuing the theme
of art as a struggle, to overcome by human means the condi-
tion in which these gods of destiny have placed man.

Tout art est une leçon par ses dieux. Car l'homme
crée ses dieux avec tout lui-même, mais il crée son art le plus haut avec le monde réduit à l’image de son secret toujours le même: faire éclater la condition humaine par des moyens humains. (PUL, 500)

So, in art as in all phases of Malraux’s philosophy, we have returned once more to the theme of the human condition and the human struggle against it. Man, who has created the gods, is symbolically in battle with them, and the secret of his struggle is that he fights to escape from servitude without their aid, par des moyens humains. Prometheus helped put Zeus on the throne of Olympus, and the Titan too had a secret.

In the end this long hazardous struggle, with its resurrections, its metamorphoses, and its fraternity, produces a mise en question of the universe, man, his nature, and his destiny. That it should do this however is the true mesure of the greatness of man, for the question is a result of his conscience of destiny. This is the true source of human grandeur for Malraux: l’intrusion du monde de la conscience dans celui du destin. (LVS, 628) If this is man’s true greatness, and art its highest form, what is more natural than that Malraux should write in the preface to Le Temps du Mépris that on peut aimer que le sens du mot art soit tenter de donner conscience à des hommes de la grandeur qu’ils ignorent en eux. (LTM, 12) Art then is to awaken men to the possibility of grandeur that is inherent in them.
Therefore we can close this chapter on art, and indicate its vital role in Malraux's humanism simply by citing the following words from *La Condition Humaine*: "Il faut introduire les moyens de l'art dans la vie, mon bon, non pour en faire de l'art, oh! bon dieu non! mais pour en faire davantage la vie." (LCH, 352).
VI

The Fundamental, or the Struggle with the Earth

My mother Themis, or call her Earth.
Prometheus Bound.

Thus goeth the body through history,
a becomer and a fighter....Remain true to the earth, my brethren,
with the power of your virtue!
Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra

Mon père me disait: "Il ne faut jamais lâcher la terre."
Les Conquérants

If it can be truly said that the ultimate form of Malraux's humanism is a question on man, it can be stated with equal truth that, more than any of his other works, Les Noyers de l'Altenburg concentrates on an aspect of this question. The Altenburg colloquy poses it and tries to answer it in an intellectual fashion, the rest of the book seeks a reply by other paths. The specific nature of the question is made clear when Walter Berger hands Vincent a paper on which are written the words, "Existe-t-il une donnée sur quoi puisse se fonder la notion de l'homme?" (LNA, 150) It is made even more precise when the former turns to his brother with the comment,
-Cher monsieur Vincent Berger, dit-il, tourné vers mon père, je voudrais bien savoir ce que je pense de l'idée de destin.
"Elle nous amène immédiatement au problème qui s'impose, que nous le voulions ou non, à tous ceux qui, aujourd'hui pensent:
"La notion d'homme a-t-elle un sens?
"Autrement dit: sous les croyances, les mythes, et surtout sous la multiplicité des structures mentales, peut-on isoler une donnée permanente, valable à travers les lieux, valable à travers l'histoire, sur quoi puisse se fonder la notion d'homme?" (LNA, 129)

Within the frame work of the colloquy itself the question was precipitated by the ethnologist Möllberg, who, although he ends up with a Spenglerian view-point, had been in the process of developing une notion de l'homme d'une rigoureuse continuité, une structure de l'aventure humaine. (LNA, 109) His effort is admittedly a failure, and he swings to the opposite, and Spenglerian, extreme: there is no linking or communicating element, no permanent factor. Möllberg thus poses the question in its most acute possible fashion, and to answer him is to answer Spengler. The passages in which the former states his negative position merit being quoted at length because they are typical of Malraux's tendency to present the arguments against the things that he values most, as well as the ones for them. In addition, Möllberg's very negations contain the seeds of his failure, and Malraux's reply to Spengler.

L'homme fondamental est un mythe, un rêve d'intellectuels relatif aux paysans: rêvez donc un peu à l'ouvrier fondamental. Vous voulez que pour le paysan le monde ne soit pas fait d'oubli? Ceux qui
n'ont rien appris n'ont rien à oublier. Un sage paysan, je sais ce que c'est: mais ce n'est pas l'homme fondamental. Il n'existe pas un homme fondamental, augmenté, selon les époques, de ce qu'il pense et croit: il y a l'homme qui pense et croit ou rien. (LNA, 146)

Si les structures mentales disparaissent sans retour comme le plésiosaure, si les civilisations ne sont bonnes à succéder que pour jeter l'homme au tonneau sans fond du néant, si l'aventure humaine ne se maintient qu'au prix d'une implacable métamorphose, peu importe que les hommes transmettent pour quelques siècles leur concepts et leurs techniques; car l'homme est un hasard, et, pour l'essentiel, le monde est fait d'oubli. (LNA, 141)

In the course of this chapter we shall see Malraux answer point by point the questions posed by the first of these quotations. The second, in the picture it paints of human existence, and particularly in the idea of implacable métamorphose, is essentially a true one from Malraux's own point of view. What is false is the peu importe, for if this is unimportant as seen from the aspect of eternity, it is all important seen from that of man. We have already seen Malraux write that Rembrandt is of no importance compared to the eternal movement of the nebulae, but that it is to man that Rembrandt speaks. (LVS, 639)

Müllberg, therefore, categorically rejects the idea of the fundamental man. However, one important point, to be developed more fully later, should be called to attention here. Like Walter Berger, who framed the original question, Müllberg is almost purely an intellectual, and both think
in terms of notions, données, and structures mentales.
A passage from *Le Musée Imaginaire de la Sculpture Mondiale*, already quoted, has told us what Malraux's position with respect to such an approach to the question would be.

"Or notre conception du monde, par son caractère d'interrogation, est liée à une question sur l'homme, et non à une notion de l'homme." (LMISM, 56)

It is only, (and the full significance of this will be treated further in the chapter), when Vincent Berger, who combines experience with his intellectual capacities, enters the discussion that we approach the proper phrasing of the question, the one which Malraux will actually answer. For the moment we shall simply say that the mistake of the intellectuals was to try to deal with the problem in terms of a structural plan, rather than with the experience of the universal human struggle for existence. The new title of the colloquy, permanence et métamorphose de l'homme, comes much nearer to stating the fundamental nature of the question than did Walter Berger's notion d'homme. The intellectual Müllberg may not accept the fundamental man, but it is the experiences of Vincent Berger and his son that have the final word in the novel. An exchange between the ethnomologist and the senior Berger brings the question finally into sharp focus. The former speaks first. "On peut concevoir une permanence de l'homme, mais c'est une perma-
Characteristic of the later Malraux, and true to the nature of his humanism, this is phrased as a question. And although Les Noyers de l'Altenburg deals with the matter at greatest length, the question itself has preoccupied Malraux from the beginning of his career. In La Tentation de l'Occident, a book which, as we have already seen, discourses at length on the collapse of structures, Ling makes a remark that has overtones of Möllberg's Spenglerian negation. "Mais vous croyez qu'il y a dans ce que vous appelez Homme quelque chose de permanent qui n'existe pas?" (LTO, 94)

This is perhaps the young Malraux, long on intellect, and as yet short on experience. By the time he writes L'Espoir he has already crowded into his life more of this last than most men ever do, and his words take on a different tone. Significantly, in view of his increased experience, it is the intellectual notion de l'homme, which has apparently made no progress toward a solution.

Voilà vingt ans que Scali entendait parler de 'notion de l'homme'. Et se cassait la tête dessus. C'était du joli, la notion de l'homme, en face de l'homme engagé sur la vie et la mort. Scali ne savait décidément plus où il en était. (LE, 305)

With the idea of man engaged in life and death, Scali is closer to the fundamental than he apparently knows. Shade, the American newspaperman in the novel, has completely
discarded the intellectual in favor of a fundamental approach, and il n'attachait plus d'importance qu'à ce qu'il appelait idiotie ou animalité, c'est-à-dire la vie fondamentale: douleur, amour, humiliation, innocence. (LE, 43) In the light of a remark of Malraux's, quoted by Henry Peyre in his recent The Contemporary French Novel, to the effect that American novelists understood the fundamental in man but did not intellectualize it sufficiently, (CFN, 190) it is perhaps significant that this attitude should be attributed to an American writer. Malraux himself is far too intellectual to reject the value of the intellect—he simply feels that experience, too, is necessary for comprehension of the fundamental. It is to old Alvéar, who, like Vincent Berger, possesses both experience and intellect, that are given the lines which state the matter in terms of the fundamental.

-Eh! Vous êtes tous fascinés par ce qu'il y a de fondamental en l'homme...
"L'âge du fondamental recommence, monsieur Scali, dit Alvéar, avec une gravité soudaine. La raison doit être fondée à nouveau. (LE, 233)

The postface to Les Conquérants (1949) speaks of man in the same words that Alvéar uses with reference to reason, "l'homme doit être fondé à nouveau, oui: mais pas sur les images d'Epinal." (LC, 260) Alvéar's gravity, and Malraux's own rejection of the images d'Epinal, show that he considers the problem of the fundamental a vital one, not to be treated
lightly. In his lecture on *L'Humanisme tragique* he places the effort to grasp the fundamental in man in the category of duty.

*L'individu et les masses posent de la même façon les problèmes là où ils ne sont pas, écartent le problème fondamental, parce que le problème fondamental il faudrait l'assumer. Il n'appartient pas à l'individu, mais il appartient à chacun de nous de faire l'homme avec les moyens qu'il a et le premier, c'est d'essayer de le concevoir.* (PNL, 499)

This brings the question of the fundamental in Malraux's writings approximately to the period in which he produced the novel containing the Altenburg colloquy on the subject. There, Möllberg's failure to discover the structure he was seeking was prophetic of the failure of the remaining intellectuals of the gathering to refute his Spenglerian arguments. One by one he destroys all of the mental structures set up by the others to support their concepts of permanence and continuity in man. Taking the walnut carvings of Altenburg as his symbol, he says that they derive from no fundamental walnut wood, only from logs. Transferring this to the human level, he says that the truth in man is the animal. (LNA, 146) Vincent Berger, convinced of the intellectual correctness of Möllberg's argument, but feeling instinctively that there is an answer to them, goes for a walk in the woods near the priory. Contemplating the trees, he begins to have a growing awareness, a conscience of the nature of an affirmative answer. That this is a conscience
or awareness, and not a mental or intellectual structure, is, as we shall see later, of primary importance. The passage describing Vincent Berger’s experience is a long one, but it is also one of the most beautiful that Malraux ever wrote and must be read as a whole to be fully appreciated. I shall therefore give it in its entirety, underlining the parts to be specifically considered.

Il avait atteint les grands arbres: sapins déjà pleins de nuit, une goutte encore transparente à l’extrémité de chaque aiguille, tilleuls tout bruissants de moineaux; les plus beaux étaient deux moyers: il se souvint des statues de la bibliothèque.

La plénitude des arbres séculaires émanait de leur masse, mais l’effort par quoi sortaient de leurs troncs énormes les branches tordues, l’épaisseur des feuilles sombres de ce bois, si vieux et si lourd qu’il semblait s’enfoncer dans la terre et non s’en arracher, imposaient à la fois l’idée d’une volonté et d’une métamorphose sans fin. Entre eux les collines dévalaient jusqu’au Rhin; ils encadraient la cathédrale de Strasbourg très loin dans le crépuscule heureux, comme tant d’autres troncs encadraient d’autres cathédrales dans les champs d’Occident. Et cette tour dressée dans son oraison d’amputé, toute la patience et le travail humains développés en vagues de vignes jusqu’au fleuve n’étaient qu’un décor du soir autour de la séculaire poussée du bois vivant, des deux jets drus et noueux qui arrachaient les forces de la terre pour les déployer en ramures. Le soleil très bas poussait leur ombre jusqu’à l’autre côté de la vallée, comme deux épais rayons. Mon père pensait aux deux saints, à l’Atlante; le bois convulsé de ces noyers, au lieu de supporter du monde, s’épanouissait dans une vie éternelle en leurs feuilles vernies sur le ciel et leurs noix presque mûres, en toute leur masse solennelle au-dessus des jeunes pousses et des noix mortes d’hiver. "Les civilisations ou l’animal, comme les statues ou les buches..." Entre les statues et les buches, il
y avait des arbres, et leur dessin obscur comme celui de la vie. Et l'Atlante, et la face de Saint-Marc ravagée s'y perdaient comme la culture, comme l'esprit, comme tout ce que mon père venait d'entendre-ensevelis dans l'ombre de cette statue indulgente que se sculptaient à elles-mêmes les forces de la terre, et que le soleil au ras des collines étendait sur l'angoisse des hommes jusqu'à l'horizon. (LNA, 151-53)

This passage, from which the book takes its title, and which Professor Frohock has accurately called one of the most important in the novel, (AMTI, 133) clearly functions on two different levels. On the literal plane it is, of course, a direct reply to Möllberg's metaphor of the log and the statues with nothing to connect them. Lines 33 to 35 refute this argument showing that the link is the living tree. Without the tree, which through the centuries has been struggling for existence, and drawing its strength and nourishment from the earth, neither the log nor the statue would have been possible.

On the symbolic level it is an allegory of the basic, continuous nature of human existence, of man's struggle with the earth, to convert its elements and forces into sustenance for his own continued existence and development-the fundamental struggle without which neither arts, nor cultures, nor civilizations are possible-the basic volonté, without which the others cannot exist. Lines 28 to 36, beginning with le bois convulsé, (and what a well chosen and typically Malrauxian word this adjective is)
are in themselves the story of human existence with the endless cycle of birth and death of generations. Reading them recalls sharply to mind their Homeric equivalent cited in the first chapter of this essay. (G, 61)

In the idea of endless will and becoming, as well as that of s'enfoncer dans la terre et non s'en arracher (lines 11, 12) the Nietzschean note struck in the first epigraph to this chapter is clearly evident. The metamorphosis mentioned in line 13, as well as the transformation of the forces of the earth into branches (lines 23-25 and 40-41) shows how closely Malraux's vision of the basic struggle against the earth for existence parallels his conception of art. The fundamental struggle with the earth and the artistic struggle with the gods are simply two different aspects of a continuous human effort, carried on at different levels of human existence. Together they constitute Malraux's reply to Spengler.

One other aspect of this passage is of primary significance. We note that culture, esprit, and everything that Vincent Berger had heard during the colloquy are buried under the flow of this fundamental awareness (lines 37-42) and that it is said of the trees that they have a dessin obscuur comme celui de la vie (line 35). These words make it clear not only that this fundamental struggle underlies all the others, but also that the intel-
lectuals were wrong in trying to give the fundamental a definite structural form. We will get no notion d'homme. The vague, mysterious, secret nature of this continuous struggle will be constantly reaffirmed by Malraux.

Vincent Berger's experience with the walnut trees has both a prelude and a follow-up in the course of the novel. There are in fact two follow-ups, the second and most important of which involves his son rather than Berger himself. The prelude gives him a first awareness of a unifying element in man even before the Altenburg discussions take place. In the period following the burial of his father, Berger is contemplating the city of Reichbach.

L'aventure humaine, la terre. Et tout cela, comme le destin achevé de son père, eût pu être autre.... Il se sentait peu à peu envahi par un sentiment inconnu, comme il l'avait été sur les hauts-lieux nocturnes d'Asie, par la présence du sacré, tandis qu'autour de lui les ailes feutrées des petites chouettes des sables battaient en silence....

Comme un destin humain, la vie toute entière était une aventure. Il regardait la multiplicité infinie de ce paysage banal, écoutait le long chuchotement de Reichbach qui s'éveillait, comme, enfant, il regardait derrière les constellations les étoiles de plus en plus petites, jusqu'à l'épuisement de ses yeux. Et de la simple présence des gens qui passaient là, hâtifs dans le soleil matinal, semblables et différents comme des feuilles, paraissait sourdre un secret qui ne venait pas seulement de la mort encore embusquée dans son dos, un secret qui était moins celui de la mort que celui de la vie-un secret qui n'eût pas été moins poignant si l'homme eût été immortel. (LNA, 91, 92, 93)

One is immediately struck by the great similarity of tone and pattern between these lines and those that tell...
of the experience with the walnut trees. There is the same emphasis on nature, on a long view, the same growing awareness of an obscure secret, a secret of life itself. And life, as we have noticed in the other phases of Malraux's activity, is an adventure. This passage brings the awareness around to human life, but the later tree passage is prepared by comparing the people to the leaves of a tree, both different and alike at the same time. The human adventure is definitely the earth. The reference to the fact that Berger, as a child, used to look at the stars in the same fashion that the adult now contemplates the earth, reminds one of Zarathustra's: "I love those who do not seek a reason beyond the stars for going down and being sacrifices, but sacrifice themselves to the earth." (N, Z, 91)

It is precisely when he is sacrificing himself to save a Russian soldier that Vincent Berger has his most acute awareness of the presence of this unifying, fundamental struggle. With a view toward later development of its importance, we must draw attention here to the fact that this final, profound conscience of the fundamental is the product of an active experience. The more or less passive experiences of Reichbach and the walnut grove provided the first glimmers of the secret: only vital experience could produce the éclair that enlightens Berger when he and the Germans rescue their Russian enemies from
the gas.

La pitié pensa-t-il confusément, comme lorsqu'il avait vu revenir les compagnies; il s'agissait d'un élan bien autrement profond, où l'angoisse et la fraternité se rejoignaient inextricablement, d'un élan venu de très loin dans le temps—comme si la nappe des gaz n'eût abandonné, au lieu des Russes, que des cadavres amis des hommes du quaternaire....
Tout à coup le souvenir de l'Altenburg traversa l'obsession de mon père; il était en face de vastes bouquets de noyers... Qu'était même l'aventure terrestre: apparue derrière la fenêtre de Reichbach, auprès de cette Apocalypse de l'homme qui venait de le prendre à la gorge, de cet éclair qui en avait une seconde illuminé les profondeurs chargées de monstres et de dieux enfouis, le chaos semblable à la forêt où possédés et morts fraternels glissaient sous les capotes ensanglantées, gesticulantes de vent. Un mystère qui ne livrait pas son secret mais seulement sa présence, si simple et si despéritique qu'elle jetait au néant toute pensée liée à elle—comme sans doute le fait la présence de la mort. (LNA, 2143)

Although Berger is now more than ever acutely aware of the secret element of unity, its full nature is not revealed, and the last line indicates that all efforts to try to construct it by means of thought are foredoomed to failure. As in Proust's recall process, there is a stage where the intellect is of no aid. There is ample indication, however, that his feeling here is definitely connected with those he experienced at Reichbach and at Altenburg. In addition, the action of the Germans is essentially a fraternal struggle for the continued existence of man. The connection with the idea of the earth is maintained by Malraux's previous emphasis on the fact that these German
soldiers are peasants and workers: those who really struggle for existence. It is further brought out when one of the soldiers reacts to the ghastly spectacle in terms that have to do with the harvest. "Non! l'homme n'est pas fait pour être moisi." (LNA, 248) There only remains to point out that in this incident man's fundamental struggle and his struggle with the bête coincide. Two aspects of the fraternal struggle for existence.

The fullest conscience of the existence of this fundamental secret, as well as the nearest approach to awareness of its nature, are granted to Vincent Berger's son. His realization, too, comes as the result of an experience: he has literally just escaped from death. Caught with his fellow tankers in a German anti-tank trap, they had every reason to expect to be killed. By a near miracle, however, they escaped from the trap and made their way to an abandoned farm where they spent the night. Berger's awakening to the secret begins the dawn of the next day. Everything about the experience reinforces the idea that this unity is the struggle with the earth to make it provide that which is necessary for the existence of man. The peasants, who have fled from the battle, return almost immediately to continue the endless effort. It is they, and their implements of work, that stimulate in Berger a consciousness of the secret. Here is the unending struggle
that goes on in spite of wars, death, and the passing of civilizations and cultures. The struggle with the earth must be maintained or these other things cannot even exist.

Malraux goes to considerable lengths to make it clear that young Berger's experience is intended to parallel those of his father. Much of the same language that was used to describe them is used again to depict the peasants and their work. The ideas of age and endless will expressed in the earlier passage now become the chant-like O vie, si vieille! Et si opiniâtre. (LNA, 288) If we recall for a moment the opening words in Vincent Berger's Reichbach experience, l'aventure humaine, la terre. Et tout cela,... eût pu être autre, (LNA, 92) we see that it is a prelude to the more complete treatment to come later.

Le monde aurait pu être simple comme le ciel et la mer. Et de regarder ses formes qui ne sont, devant moi, que celles d'un village abandonné, condamné; de regarder ces granges de Paradis et ces épingles à linge, ces feux éteints et ces puits, ces églantiers épars, ces ronces voraces qui peuvent-être dans un an auront tout recouvert, ces bêtes, ces arbres, ces maisons, je me sens devant un don inexplicable,—une apparition. Tout cela aurait pu ne pas être, ne pas être ainsi. Comme toutes ces formes uniques sont accordées à la terre!.... la vie qui m'est révélée, ce matin pour la première fois, aussi forte que les ténèbres et aussi forte que la mort. (LNA, 290)

The similarity of form and intent in the two passages is very clear. The paysage banal of Reichbach has become the clothes-pins barns, etc. of a farm. In both cases, the ordinary element of human existence is emphasized:
the fundamental life. In the *formes accordées à la terre* we see again the walnut trees which seemed to *s'enfoncer dans la terre et non s'en arracher*. The Nietzschean injunction to "remain true to the earth" is still in force. The forms and forces of the earth have been transformed into those necessary for human survival.

Both passages call attention to the fact that all of this could very well not have taken place, implying that the human will to carry on the struggle is the real agent at work. The additional element in the later passage of *ces ronces voraces qui peut-être dans un an auront tout recouvert* is not just a mere chance. It indicates strongly that this fundamental struggle with the earth is a struggle, and an unending one. All that man has taken from the earth, the earth will take back if the fight is not constantly maintained. This, as we shall see, is an important point for Malraux.

Thus, Malraux answers Müllberg-Spengler on the literal level of the denial of a continuous element in man. Müllberg had said that there was no fundamental peasant. Malraux replied that the peasant is the truest representative of the struggle against the earth that is basic to all mankind. The answer is stated symbolically in a beautiful fashion when young Berger sees two sprinkling cans. "Devant moi sont deux arrosoirs, avec leurs pommes en champignon
que j'aimais quand j'étais enfant; il me semble soudain que l'homme est venu des profondeurs du temps seulement pour inventer un arrosoir." (LNA, 286) Like art, this struggle is basically a transformation, a metamorphosis. The sprinkling can is a man made object and Berger said of the entire farm that: "Il n'est rien ici qui ne porte la marque de l'homme." (LNA, 288) As in all phases of the effort that is Malraux's humanism, the human will is the predominant factor.

Just as Vincent Berger had done in the previous passages, the peasant in the following raises her eyes to a longer and more distant view. The difference is that she smiles, ironically, even at death. The book ends on this note:

Accotée au cosmos comme une pierre....Elle sourit pourtant, d'un lent sourire retardataire, réfléchi: par delà un terrain de football aux buts solitaires, par delà les tourelles des chars brillants de rosée comme les buissons qui les camouflent, elle semble regarder au loin la mort avec indulgence, et même-ô clignement mystérieux-avec ironie....

Portes entr'ouvertes, linges, granges, marques des hommes, aube biblique où se bousculent les siècles, comme tout l'éblouissant mystère du matin s'approfondit en celui qui affleure sur ces lèvres usées. Qu'avec un sourire obscur repaissais le mystère de l'homme, et la résurrection de la terre n'est plus que décor frémissant.

Je sais maintenant ce que signifient les mythes antiques des êtres arrachés aux morts. A peine si je me souviens de la terreur; ce que je porte en moi, c'est la découverte d'un secret simple et sacré.

Ainsi peut-être, Dieu regarda le premier homme... (LNA, 291)
There can be little doubt that the fundamental is the age-old conflict of the human will with the earth for the survival of man. One gets the impression that the peasant woman knows this instinctively, due to her actual experience with the struggle, and that this struggle for life permits her to put death in its proper place. Having seen wars and other scourges destroy the fruits of the struggle, and having known the ceaseless return to begin the fight anew, she would know the truth of Malraux's remark in *Saturne* that *il reste que les moissons ne sont pas moins éternelles que les fléaux et Cybèle que Perséphore.* (Sat, 154) These words also make it clear to which ancient myths Malraux was referring. The reference to the antique myths and to the smile that carries the mystery of man, brings to mind the fact that throughout *Les Voix du Silence* Malraux indicates that it was the ancient Greeks who first made a smiling statue. Considering the respect in which he holds them it is justifiable to speculate that perhaps he feels that they were the first to be aware of the significance of the fundamental struggle with the earth.

This same smile, when combined with the patient persistence of the peasants in constantly rebeginning their work after the delay and destruction of war, has the same accent as one of Nietzsche's comments on courage. The parallel is even more striking since the peasant was also
able to smile at death. "Courage, however, is the best slayer, courage which attacketh: it slayeth even death itself, for it sayeth: 'Was that life?' -Well! Once more." (N, Z, 173)

With respect to this emphasis on drawing strength from the forces of the earth, Malraux is on common ground not only with Nietzsche, but also with Heidegger. In his interpretation of the latter's philosophy, Jean Wahl writes: "Heidegger has attempted in certain tracts, to erect a kind of philosophy, more myth-like than mystic, in which he enjoins us to a communion with the earth and the world." (SHE, 23)

Malraux's reference to mythes antiques in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, Cybèle and Perséphone in Saturne makes the similarity even more noticeable.

Although the younger Berger's awakening to the secret of the fundamental is the most complete that the novel offers, even there it is made clear that it is a secret, a mystère, and nothing of which an intellectual plan can be drawn. It is not a notion d'homme, it is a continuous force that has moved through men from the beginning of their existence, an element in him that cannot be explained but must be felt. Mysterious and ungraspable though it may be, it links men of all times, and is Malraux's most basic answer to Spengler. Both its importance and its formless quality are brought out in the following passage in which Berger is referring
to his companions in arms: ex-peasants and workers.

De même que l'ami de Stieglitz dans sa prison ne pouvait penser qu'aux trois livres qui tenaient contre la honte et la solitude, je ne pense qu'à ce qui tient contre la fascination du néant. Et de jour perdu en jour perdu, m'obsède davantage le mystère qui n'oppose pas, comme l'affirmait Walter, mais relie par un chemin effacé la part informe de mes compagnons aux chants qui tiennent devant l'éternité du ciel nocturne, à la noblesse que les hommes ignorent en eux, - à la part victorieuse du seul animal qui sache qu'il doit mourir. (LNA, 250)

A formless part linked up by an effaced path.

Nothing could convey more graphically the mysterious, secret nature of this will to the fundamental struggle. Nothing could be further from an intellectually conceivable plan, structure, or notion. Although Malraux has a great deal in common with existentialist thought, he is here at the diametrically opposite position from the Sartre who writes: "Man is at the start a plan which is aware of itself." (Ex, 19)

This chemin effacé of man's struggle to convert the earth to his needs is, by its nature, very closely related to la coulée profonde qui suscita all of the great works of art. Each is representative, on a different level of human existence, of man's will to transform the earth according to his desires and needs. The relationship is further reinforced by the use of the phrase la noblesse que les hommes ignorent en eux. It will be recalled that for Malraux the
sense of the word "art" is to try to make men aware of la grandeur qu'ils ignorent en eux. (LTM, 12)

In the tree, Malraux seems to have found that which best expresses his consciousness of the nature of the human adventure, for after developing it at great length in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg, he picks it up again in Les Voix du Silence.

...; et cette conscience n'est plus le sentiment d'un voyageur, l'homme, semblable à lui-même devant des paysages changeants de temps, c'est le sentiment que symbolise la graine qui devient arbre. (LVS, 625)

L'Homme que suggère la multiplicité de ces pouvoirs est l'acteur de la plus vaste aventure, et aussi la souche profonde d'où montent les surgeons qui tout à tout s'enchevêtrent et s'ignorent. (LVS, 634)

The living tree is still the link.

Like all of Malraux's most important ideas, this fundamental vision of man struggling with the earth, which in turn struggles to take everything back, did not appear for the first time in his later works. It has been present in one form or another since his earliest works. In La Tentation de l'Occident we find it stated in terms that apply equally well to both art and the fundamental. "Cette défense contre l'incessante sollicitation du monde est la marque même du génie européen." (LTO, 64) This is, of course, the very early Malraux speaking. As his experience broadens he will become aware that he has touched on something that has far broader application than simply to European genius.
When Garine says that le gens qui veulent "lâcher la terre" s'aperçoivent qu'elle colle à leurs doigts, (LC, 230) we find ourselves much closer to the true scope of the struggle. By the time that Malraux writes La Condition Humaine he is already surer of its nature, for we find in Pef's letter the phrase, au lieu des dieux, la force humaine en lutte contre la terre. (LCH, 394) The letter is followed by Gisors' observation: "Oui: sans doute les hommes ne valaient-ils que par ce qu'ils avaient transformé." (LCH, 394) With this line, here applied to the struggle with the earth, a large part of Malraux's theory of metamorphosis in art is also put forward, and we are reminded that he said later, in Les Voix du Silence, that the great artist ne se soumet jamais au monde. (LVS, 322)

In Le Temps du Mépris Malraux is beginning to see this struggle in terms of the noblesse inherent in man. Here he refers to it as the sacré. "Ce qu'il y avait de sacré dans l'homme, l'assaut contre la terre... tout l'opinion de monde des hommes, le combat contre la terre inépuisamment nourrie de morts." (LTM, 73) Once again the parallel with art is striking, particularly if we recall what Vannec says of art works in La Voie Royale. "Ce qui m'intéresse, comprenez-vous, c'est la décomposition de ces œuvres, leur vie la plus profonde, qui est faite de la mort des hommes." (LVR, 44) Transformation, both in art and
in the fundamental struggle, is nourished by the death of
generations of men.

When, during the descent from the mountain in L'Espoir,
we find the words mais ce n'était pas la mort qui, en ce
moment, s'accordait aux montagnes: c'était la volonté des
hommes. (LE, 342) we are on the threshold of the revelation
that marks Les Noyers de l'Altenburg. Like Vincent Berger
and the Germans during the gas attack, the men in L'Espoir
are at this point engaged in trying to preserve the life
of fellow human beings, to maintain the struggle. Malraux
makes it clear that this drive for existence is just as
strong as the earth itself. "Tous ces risques consentis,
cherchés; la marche solennelle et primitive de ces brancards,
tout cela était aussi impérieux que ces rocs blafards qui
tombaient du ciel lourd, que l'éternité des pommes éparses
sur la terre." (LE, 342)

Significantly, however, it is a peasant, whose basic
experience is that of the struggle with the earth, who puts
the matter in fundamental terms, emphasizing the endless,
implacable nature of the battle. The element of mystère
was repeatedly mentioned in the parallel passage of Les
Noyers de l'Altenburg. In L'Espoir it is a peasant, son
visage affiné de mystère, who says:

Le principal ennemi de l'homme, messieurs, c'est la
forêt. Elle est plus forte que nous, plus forte que
la République, plus forte que la révolution, plus forte
que la guerre. Si l'homme cessait de lutter, en moins
de soixante ans la forêt recouvrirait l'Europe. Elle serait ici, dans la rue, dans les maisons ouvertes, les branches par les fenêtres, - les pianos dans les racines, ehi ehi messieurs, voilà. (LE, 357)

To confirm the accuracy of this vision one has only to consider the Mayan ruins at Chitchen-Itzá, a magnificent city entirely recaptured by the jungle within a short time after the corn crop failed.

Here is the struggle reduced to its most fundamental aspect. The effort of man to keep the earth from taking back that which he has taken from it in order to fulfill his needs and desires. Man converts the earth but the earth moves implacably to reclaim its own, and in Malraux's eyes it will probably eventually win out. For the peasant's words are not only true, they are, as the following passage from Les Voix du Silence indicates, also prophetic.

Sans doute un jour, devant les étendues arides ou reconquises par la forêt, nul ne devinera plus ce que l'homme avait imposé d'intelligence aux formes de la terre en dressant les pierres de Florence dans le grand balancement des oliviers toscans. (LVS, 638)

This, then, is the fundamental, the struggle to convert the elements and forces of the earth to the benefit of man. It is what Malraux, in Les Voix du Silence, calls la rivalité de la terre et des œuvres humaines. (LVS, 464)

And it might well end in the defeat pictured in the preceding quotation, but like all of the struggles that compose Malraux's humanism, it is the more noble for being maintained
in full awareness of that fact. If it does so end, the earth too, according to Malraux, will have lost an irreplaceable element: that which develops continuously rather than just cyclically, an element that can come only from man. Malraux closes La Création Artistique with the invocation: "O monde épar$ mes, monde éphémère et éternel qui, pour se survivre au lieu de se répéter, a tellement besoin des hommes." (LVS, 464)

Throughout this discussion of the fundamental we have frequently drawn attention to the elements of expérience and conscience, and particularly to the vital necessity of the former. For Malraux, conscience only really derives from expérience; the peasant has the fullest conscience of the fundamental struggle because his very life is a continuous expérience in it. Their lack in this respect was what made it impossible for the intellectuals of Altenburg to find the answer they were seeking. From the very beginning of his career, Malraux has affirmed that experience must come first if one is to have any true grasp of the nature of human life. Expanding the concept of the fundamental to include all the basic experiences of living-suffering, love, hate, heroism, etc., Malraux's position is that you must experience them and transform them into conscience before you can really know what they are. Intellectualization can come later. This principle is set forth in L'Espoir in one of Malraux's
most widely known aphorisms. In reply to the question concerning the best thing one can do with life, one of the characters says: "Transformer en conscience une expérience aussi large que possible, mon bon ami." (LE, 282)

Malraux has never altered this basic stand. The peasant's knowledge of the fundamental is simply the transformation en conscience of his experience with it. I have chosen to discuss the theme of expérience and conscience in this chapter because the former is the link between the fundamental and the latter. The theme of experience as a requirement for conscience as compared to the attainment of the latter by means of an intellectual process, runs through Malraux's writing from one end to the other. It had already been sounded in La Tentation de l'Occident when Ling said: "Connaitre le monde n'est plus en faire un système, non plus que connaître l'amour n'est l'analyser. C'est en prendre une conscience intense." (LTO, 94)

In La Condition Humaine, old Gisors, who is himself an intellectual, puts the matter in even more direct terms, "Connaitre par l'intelligence, c'est la tentation vaine de se passer du temps." (LCH, 268) Of his son Kyo it is said that he had la conviction que les idées ne devraient être pensées mais vécues. (LCH, 79) These words, which along with the parallel passage quoted from L'Espoir, constitute the most frequently cited of Malraux's aphorisms are another
example of his spiritual relationship to Nietzsche. The latter wrote in *Thus Spake Zarathustra*: "Of all that is written, I love only what a person has written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou will find that blood is spirit." (N, Z, 39) These lines could well serve as the credo for Malraux's entire literary production.

Much the same thing is implied by the following sentence from *Le Temps du Mépris*. Although other interpretations are certainly possible it can well be taken to mean that a full conscience of what it is to be a man, derived from the experience of being one, could effectively replace both heroism and saintliness. "Sur cette terre de cachots et de sacrifices où il y avait eu l'héroïsme, où il y avait eu la sainteté, il y aurait peut-être, simplement, la conscience." (LTM, 74)

Malraux's next novel, *L'Espoir*, furnishes not only the key expression of the expérience-conscience relationship mentioned earlier but also a restatement of the idea expressed in *La Tentation de l'Ocident* that knowing love is not the same as trying to make a system of it. "Seulement pour parler d'amour aux amoureux, il faut avoir été amoureux, il ne faut pas avoir fait une enquête sur l'amour." (LE, 280)

In the preface that Malraux wrote for the French edition of Manès Sperber's *Qu'une larme dans l'océan* we find the original expression from *L'Espoir* changed slightly
to become l'expérience humaine devenue lucidité. (QL0, XIX)

Thus, with the fundamental struggle with the earth as with the other struggles which make up Malraux's humanism, one returns inevitably to the theme of conscience. The fundamental itself can be interpreted to apply to all of the basic experiences that are common to all human existence, and have been for all time: love, hate, struggle, suffering, etc. The wider one's experience according to Malraux's position, the fuller will be the conscience of what it is to be a man. This of course would be a basic element in any true humanism, and for Malraux all of the elements of his own version of humanism must converge on the effort to fonder plus fortement la conscience d'être homme. (LVS, 574) This conscience of what it is to be a man, derived from the experience of being one, is the well-spring from which flows man's true grandeur according to Malraux. To grasp its true import in Malraux's philosophy one has only to remember that for him the éternel dérive des nebulae is symbolic of all that reduces man to insignificance, and then see him write of Manès Sperber's book that: "Nous y voyons passer l'éternel dérive de la conscience des hommes au-dessus de l'histoire menaçante." (QL0, XXI)

The failure of the Altenburg gathering to find an answer to the problem of la notion d'homme is directly related
to the matter of conscience. In trying to develop a structure for *l'aventure humaine,* rather than to come to an awareness of what it is to be a part of that adventure, they were, from Malraux's point of view, on the wrong track. They sought an image, and Malraux has written in a personal letter: "Je poursuis moins une nouvelle image de l'homme, qu'une nouvelle conscience." (Personal letter) Man is essentially a struggle, and for Malraux a struggle culminating in a *mise en question.* The walnut tree symbolized that struggle but it would be as difficult to construct an image for the man who carries it on as it would be to look at the tree at any point in its development and say exactly what its final form would be. An image or structure is fixed, or at least predictable; man is becoming—what? Like Vincent Berger, man himself must attain a conscience of the nature of this underlying fundamental unity that flows through the whole human adventure. This would seem to be a vital problem for any humanist, and it is significant that Malraux does not begin to talk of a universal humanism as such until after *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg,* in which he appears to have found that which links all of mankind. The reason why he had to discover it before embarking on the humanism we have been discussing was stated already in *La Tentation de l'Occident.* "Car tout pourrait être tenté par une culture dont les éléments me seraient liés que par leur
présence dans l'homme." (LTO, 87)

These words launched the *Culture des Grands Navigateurs*. With the conscience of the fundamental it set sail.
The Problem of the Absolute

Never yet did truth cling to the arm of an absolute one.
Nietzsche, *Thus Spake Zarathustra*.

Ce qui est en train de disparaître du monde occidental, c'est l'absolu.
*Les Voix du Silence*

There is perhaps in every man, including Malraux himself, the desire for the existence of an absolute, the wish for an unquestionable and ultimate truth. The search for such an absolute and the forms that it has taken when men or societies believed they had found it, have given to most of mankind's movements and cultures their fundamental quality. In addition, this quest for an absolute has, beyond any doubt, led to the production of much of man's finest art.

By far the most universal of the forms taken by humanity's efforts to attain the absolute is religion. Not all religions claim to possess it, but all, in one way or another, seek a final truth that will explain the riddle of human existence and the ultimate fate of man, what might be called the culminating absolute. Below this, how-
ever, there is a whole series of lesser ones. Political structures, cultures, man himself, all have at some time been elevated by their supporters to this exalted level. Next to religion, political theory, more frequently than any of the others, has laid claim to success in the search. The cultural theories that are typical of much German thought have a tendency to consider cultures as absolutes. Man, with his brain and his science, has in fairly recent years been suggested as the answer. There are others, too numerous to mention but we have covered the most important.

The desire for the absolute will probably last as long as man himself and, particularly on the religious level, will doubtlessly continue to produce a large proportion of man's greatest art. From Malraux's point of view, the problem of the absolute does not, however, lie in the search for it, search being a basic part of his own philosophy. The difficulty involves the phenomena that take place when men claim to have discovered it. These will be dealt with in detail in this chapter.

For Malraux, the most vital tendency of the Occident in our time is the movement toward the disappearance of the absolute, the process noted in the second epigraph of this chapter. Stuart Gilbert has translated the title of the third volume of *Psychologie de l'Art* as *The Twilight of the Absolute*. Malraux was already describing the setting of
this same sun in *La Tentation de l'Occident* when Ling wrote to the European: "La réalité absolue a été pour vous Dieu, puis l'homme; mais l'homme est mort après Dieu." (LTO, 105)

In the exact sense God as well as man is still alive. This sentence however refers to their deaths as absolutes. Where religion is concerned the fact that this is Malraux's intended meaning is shown by the following words from *Les Voix du Silence* which refer to contemporary western civilization. "L'agnosticisme n'est pas une nouveauté: le nouveau, c'est une civilisation agnostique." (LVS, 494) It will be noted that here, as everywhere else, that Malraux discusses similar matters the term used is agnostic not atheist. Atheism is itself an absolute, albeit a negative one. It states categorically that God does not exist; agnosticism, Malraux's position, typically, puts the existence of God en question. And although Malraux's humanism is a man-centered philosophy, we have already seen ample evidence that it ends up with man himself en question. Such a humanism cannot be said to be treating man as an absolute. With the disappearance of the absolute, which is essentially an affirmation, it was logical the question, the basis of Malraux's position should appear, and the question is applied to everything, including man. Modern civilization according to Malraux is the first to use art in its entirety as a weapon against destiny. We shall see
in the course of this chapter that it was necessary for the absolute to break up in order for such a thing to become possible.

The absolute is a two-edged sword. Within a group which is struggling toward a common absolute, it frequently produces a spirit of communion or fraternity. This is most demonstrably true in the cases of religions and political structures during the period in which they are fighting to establish themselves. Unfortunately, to a certain degree, even during the time of struggle and to a much greater one after they have consolidated their position, they have a tendency to exclude all those who do not accept the absolute as such. In extreme cases such an attitude prevents any real communication with persons or groups outside the chosen one. This last is the danger of the absolute with which we shall deal most extensively here.

In order to accomplish this we shall first consider the effects of an obsession with the absolute on the individual in Malraux's works. From that we shall proceed to analyze Malraux's position on political and religious absolutes. Finally we shall deal with the break-up of the absolute, its causes and results. One more word should be added before proceeding. Malraux frequently uses the words absolue and fatalité in context which makes them appear to be almost synonymous in his mind. At other times the word
fatalité seems to indicate anything that will inevitably happen, a determinism dependent on the absolute. In any event the two are so closely related that there is little point in trying to separate them.

There are, in Malraux's works, three outstanding examples of individuals who are obsessed with the desire for an absolute: Colonel T. E. Lawrence, and the two terrorists, Hong and Tchen. We shall confine ourselves largely to the last of these since he is actually a creation of Malraux's. Hong too is one of Malraux's brain children but he is essentially only a rough sketch that is filled out later in the character of Tchen.

Tchen is one of the most complicated characters in all of Malraux's novels, and the obsession with the absolute by itself falls far short of explaining him. Although the full significance of this fact is the matter of the next chapter, it must be pointed out here that Tchen had, and lost, contact with a possible absolute: Christianity. Kyo's analysis of Tchen leaves no doubt that he is still haunted by his over-strong desire for the absolute.

Il avait assez écouté son père pour savoir que celui qui cherche aussi âprement l'absolu ne le trouve que dans la sensation. Soif de l'absolu, soif d'immortalité, donc peur de mourir: Tchen eût du être lâche; mais comme tout mystique il sentait que son absolu ne pouvait être saisi que dans l'instant. (LCH, 179)

It is obvious that a man thus driven cannot fit into
any type of social group for long, his very necessity for a personal absolute cutting him off from his fellows. As long as the combat of the revolution provided Tchen with intense sensation, it was possible for him to work with the other men in it, for as Malraux wrote in *Les Voix du Silence*: "Enfin si le combat ne remplace pas l'absolu, il permet de l'oublier." (LVS, 480)

The events of *La Condition Humaine* however make it very clear that even the most intense combat was not enough to connect Tchen to those around him, and he is led to wonder: "Est-ce que le sang même est vain?" (LCH, 125)

Tchen's situation was therefore bad enough even when he was engaged in violent action; when the revolution ended, or when for one reason or another it entered a period of inactivity, adherence to it became intolerable. Old Gisors had discovered this early in his association with Tchen. "Dès qu'il avait observé Tchen, il avait compris que cet adolescent ne pouvait vivre d'une idéologie qui ne se transformât pas immédiatement en actes." (LCH, 79)

No social group can provide action continuous enough to fulfill such a need, so Tchen's need for his own absolute forces him outside of all of them. Construction, which in one form or another is the aim of human societies, requires a common effort of which Tchen is incapable, and he therefore reaches the point where la destruction seule
le mettait d'accord avec lui-même. (LCH, 171) The eventual attitude of all society toward such a man is inevitable. "Le monde qu'ils préparaient ensemble le condamnait, lui, Tchen, autant que celui de leurs ennemis." (LCH, 122)

For Tchen, haunted by the absolute, there is no way out in the world of men and the progression moved to its logical conclusion, becomes a fatalité. "Capable de vaincre, mais non de vivre dans sa victoire, que peut-il appeler, sinon la mort?" (LCH, 75)

Although some of the popular interpretations of Nietzsche would lead one to believe that he would approve such a person as Tchen, there is evidence in Thus Spake Zarathustra that Malraux may be correct saying that such interpretations are in error. With respect to "the pale criminal", who greatly resembles Tchen, Nietzsche writes: "There is no salvation for him who thus suffereth from himself, unless it be speedy death. I tell you, however that his soul wanted blood, not booty: he thirsted for the happiness of the knife." (N, Z, 36) La destruction seule le mettait d'accord avec lui-même. (LCH, 171)

Kyo, who was aware of Tchen's thirst for the absolute, was also conscious that it could lead him to destruction, that it could produce a fatalité. "Peut-être Tchen est-il un éphémère qui secrète sa propre lumière, celle à laquelle il va se détruire....Peut-être l'homme même..."
Ne voit-on jamais que la fatalité des autres." (LCH, 189)

The idea that a man haunted by the absolute carries within himself the possible seeds of his own destruction has remained with Malraux. In his essay on T. E. Lawrence, entitled at one time Le Démon de l'Absolu he returns to the same theme. The similarity is further strengthened because after referring to Tchen as an éphémère producing the light by which it will destroy itself, he says in the later work that the absolute is a flame in which man may burn himself up. The passage also has overtones of Nietzsche's "man who suffers from himself". "L'absolu est la dernière instance de l'homme tragique, la seule efficace parce qu'elle seule peut brûler-fût-ce avec l'homme tout entier-le plus profond sentiment de dépendance, le remords d'être soi-même." (PNL, 282)

Tchen followed the course toward self-destruction indicated in all the above passages, and if he finally attained his absolute, he did so at the cost of his own life, in a gesture which, significantly, served no ends but his own. Even before his death he found himself isolated in the midst of the people on whose side he was fighting and he said of himself: je suis extraordinairement seul. (LCH, 71) Part of this extreme isolation derived, as we have already seen, from the fact that Tchen's drive for the absolute led him to a destructive and undisciplined position
which society necessarily had to reject. Another part of it comes from within Tchen, and involves a characteristic that we shall see Malraux attribute to groups, particularly political and religious ones, which feel that they are involved with an absolute. This is a tendency to feel that all those who do not accept this same absolute are wrong, or at least inferior, an attitude which certainly prevents any profound communication. When Gisors tells Tchen that if he is to live with his fatalité he must transmit it, the latter replies: Qui en serait digne? (LCH, 75)

In the individual then, the obsession with the absolute seems to produce much the same results as the action of destiny itself: isolation, destruction, and death. In short, all of the things against which Malraux's humanism is supposed to be struggling. There is no indication that it will always do so, but Malraux appears to imply that the thirst for a purely personal absolute always has in it the potentiality of self-destruction.

As we turn to Malraux's treatment of religious and political absolutes we find that he is mainly preoccupied with their tendency to prevent any real communication between different groups. This has been, for him, the inevitable result when either a political organization or a religious one assumed that it possessed the absolute. There is, as Malraux and many others have noted, a remarkable
parallel between the attitudes of these two types of groups in such cases. With respect to this similarity we shall refer, on occasion, to Crane Brinton's *The Anatomy of Revolution* which contains a detailed consideration of the matter in the chapter on "The Religious Parallel". The close relationship that exists between the two in Malraux's own mind is perhaps best shown when he has the younger Berger in *Les Noyers de l'Altenburg* lump them together, saying:
"J'avais rencontré les foules militantes d'une foi, religieuses ou politiques." (LNA, 27)

When, in discussing religion as an absolute, Malraux refers to a specific one, it is ordinarily Christianity. In spite of this his approach to the religious aspect of the problem tends to be a very general one. Where politics are concerned however, he concentrates on Communism and the revolution, and as we shall see, he makes a definite distinction between the two. Revolution for Malraux, is essentially the political phase of man's struggle to obtain a better, fuller life for himself, and as such is not really a result of the dogma of any particular political group. It might be pointed out, of course, that revolution which has consolidated itself and established a powerful and rigid government of its own is no longer really revolution. The comparison between religion and revolution extends even to what we might refer to as their two major phases, and to the
attributes possessed by each. Both have a phase during which they struggle for existence and stability. If they are successful in this struggle there generally follows a period in which they become powerful and frequently dogmatic and dictatorial. To bring the matter specifically to the two outstanding examples with which we are dealing, one could say that the first phase for Christianity lasted roughly from Christ to the period following Constantine. For Marxist Communism, from the declarations of 1848 to the early 1930's and the rise of Stalin. When considering Malraux's references to the two, it is important to keep in mind that the first phase of Christianity closed long before his time. He participated in its revolutionary counterpart and saw it come to an end.

During the struggle phase both religion and revolution have in common the virtue of creating a deep feeling of communion and fraternity among the participants, an attribute which they share with Malraux's vision of humanism. In *L'Espoir* he makes two definite comments on similarities in this early phase. "La révolution joue, entre autres rôles, celui que joua jadis la vie éternelle, ce qui explique beaucoup de ses caractères." (LE, 232) And, with respect to the Mexican revolutionists: "Ils avaient en commun avec leurs peintres cette communion souterraine qui avait été, en effet, la chrétienté, et qui était la révolution;
We have seen from Ling's remark at the beginning of the chapter, that he feels religion, as an absolute, had long been dead. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to present sufficient evidence to prove that he himself ever considered Communism as a political absolute. As might have been expected, his first real clash with those who interpreted it as such, occurred during the Spanish Civil War and is reflected in the pages of L'Espoir. A conversation between Magnin, who, as we have seen, closely resembles Malraux, and a Communist political commissar reveals that for those in power at least, the official revolution has passed into the second phase. Magnin's statement can be taken, I believe, as representing Malraux's own attitude. "La révolution passe pour moi avant le parti communiste." The commissar's reply raises the party to the level of an absolute: "Agir avec le Parti est agir avec lui sans réserve." (LE, 16)

Communist critics, in particular, have seized on the split expressed here to point out that Malraux can never fully belong to any movement. Claude Roy in his Déscriptions Critiques uses terms that indicate that he is thinking specifically of the commissar's answer. He writes, in reference to Malraux, of son incapacité d'intellectuel à adhérer sans
réserves intimes à une entreprise. (DC, 233) Although these words contain an element of truth, as does most propaganda, one sees in them also a distorted reflection of *L'Espoir*’s discussions on ethics, the ones treated in chapter four of this essay. In view of the long exchanges between Ximenes and Manuel on the necessity for military discipline, as well as Malraux’s highly successful record as a leader of the Maquis, invariably overlooked by the Communists, Roger Garaudy’s comment on the subject of Malraux’s differences with the party is much sillier than the one just quoted. "Dès octobre, Malraux, refusant de se plier à la discipline des combats, quitte l’escadrille et l’Espagne." (LF, 58) These criticisms deflect consideration of the problem away from its true nature which is simply this. Is or was Malraux able to accept the rule of the Communist party as a political absolute? The answer is clearly that he was not. To most of us it would seem presumptuous to even begin to assume that any political organization was worthy of such an exalted rating, for the faithful it seems to be perfectly reasonable. Malraux’s skepticism concerning the absolute quality of Marxism, and consequently its inevitability, was evident long before he wrote *L’Espoir*. We can leave aside Garine’s outburst on the insupportable mentalité bolchevique (LC, 222) because no one could ever consider him as a true Communist supporter.
We can however turn to *La Condition Humaine*, which the Communists themselves originally praised highly, and examine Kyo, who is genuinely acting for the party. Does he consider Marxism as absolute and inevitable? "Mais il y a dans le marxisme le sens d'une fatalité, et l'exaltation d'une volonté. Chaque fois que la fatalité passe avant la volonté, je me méfie." (LCH, 166)

Translated into modern philosophical terms, a fatalité becomes a determinism, and Marxism as a determinism is one of the fundamental tenets of Communist dogma. Malraux has therefore early rejected Marxism as an absolute and his writings offer nothing to indicate that he was ever converted to the idea. In Crane Brinton's book we find, in the chapter on "The Religious parallel", an indication as to why this deterministic attitude leads naturally to the harsh, unyielding position that the Communists take in *L'Espoir*.

Rigid determinists are also usually ardent proselyters, presumably on the grounds that they are instruments of the inevitable, the means through which the inevitable realizes itself. They do not, however seem to behave as if they held that resistance to their proselyting, refusal of unbelievers to accept their message, were also determined, inevitable, and even pardonable. (AR, 212)

From the belief that non-acceptance is unpardonable, to the attitude that the unbelievers are inferior, or even something less than men, is but a very short step. We have only to recall that it was just such an attitude that permit-
ted the Spanish *conquistadores* to slaughter thousands of Aztecs and Incas with a perfectly clear conscience. That this step has been taken by the official Communists is indicated in *L'Espoir* by old Alvénar's words and it is he who once more points out the religious parallel. For proper understanding of the lines it is necessary to keep in mind that Alvénar opposes the rigourous Communist methods.

*Etre un homme, pour moi, ce n'est pas être un bon communiste: être un homme pour un bon chrétien, c'était être un bon chrétien, et je me méfie. La question n'est pas mince, mon bon ami, c'est celle de la civilisation.* (LE, 281)

Malraux's entire vision of humanism rests on conscience of what it is to be a man. Thus, when being a man is interpreted by any group to mean being a part of that group, it is understandable that he should object strenuously. The least that can be said is that such an attitude is directly contradictory to the idea of an overall human fraternity. Alvénar's last words are indicative of the importance Malraux gives the matter.

We return once more to Professor Brinton's *Anatomy of Revolution* to show the logical progression from acceptance of religious or political absolute to the elimination of those who do not accept it. There is no essential difference between burning a man at the stake for heresy and shooting him for ideological impurity, and both depend on the executioner believing that he is the custodian of the
only absolute truth.

The religious parallel may be pushed a bit further. Our revolutionists are convinced that they are the elect, destined to carry out the will of God, nature, or science. That feeling was particularly strong among the Russian Communists, where in pure logic it should be less strong than among the Calvinists, believers in a personal God. The opponents of these revolutionists are not just political enemies, not just mistaken men, grafters, logrollers, or damned fools; they are sinners, and must not merely be beaten--they must be wiped out. Hence the justification of the guillotine and the firing squad. For our revolutionists display that vigorous intolerance which in the logic of the emotions, as well as in that of the intellect, follows perfectly on the conviction of being absolutely, eternally, monopolistically right. If there is but one truth, and you have that truth completely, toleration of differences means an encouragement to error, crime, evil, sin. (AR, 214)

Anyone who has ever tried to discuss opposing points of view with an ardent Communist has experienced the irritation of being told that anything they (the Communists) may do to attain their ends is right, because they are morally right.

Just as Professor Brinton with revolutionists in general, so does Malraux see in the later development of the Communist party this tendency to believe that it possesses the absolute truth, permitting of no deviations. We find this stated very clearly in the postface to Les Conquérants: "Il n'y a pas de marges: c'est pourquoi le désaccord, même partiel, d'une artiste avec le système, le conduit à une abjuration." (LC, 267) "Staline croit à sa vérité, et sa vérité est sans marges." (LC, 256)
It is to be noted that Malraux, in this last sentence, unlike many of the more virulent critics of Communism, credits Stalin with genuinely believing in his doctrine and not just affecting belief for his own purposes. Professor Brinton takes the same position and in so doing brings the matter back to our central preoccupation: the absolute. "Their belief in the Absolute is not assumed, and is as real as their ability to handle the contingent. And for once the Absolute is practical politics." (AR, 176) No one can ever accuse Stalin of having lacked the ability to convert his absolute into practical politics.

Thus the political and religious absolutes, like Tchen's personal one, have in them enormous potentialities for the isolation and destruction of man. In the case of both types it does not necessarily seem inevitable that they will be destructive. Many a mystic has gone off into the desert with his absolute and harmed no one. It does seem almost inevitable however, that either type will tend to separate those who believe in it from those who do not. As Professor Brinton has pointed out, Christians and Mohamedans no longer kill each other in holy wars but profound communication between the two groups is just about nil. (AR, 261)

As we pass to the question of the break-up of the absolute we see that it is this tendency of the absolute, and most particularly of the religious ones, to isolate
groups of men from each other, that most deeply preoccupies Malraux. He deals with the problem mainly in its relation to art, and almost all of the discussion is to be found in Les Voix du Silence. However, as with many of the fundamental themes of this work, it is heard earlier, in Les Noyers de l'Altenburg.

When Malraux picks up again the theme of separation due to the absolute, he does so in order to demonstrate the disappearance of the latter. This disappearance is for him, as we have mentioned, one of the most significant tendencies of the contemporary period. It is at this point that history makes its most important single contribution to the formation of Malraux's philosophy. History, by seeing each of these religious absolutes in perspective, and by showing that most of them eventually passed from the scene, takes away their absolute quality, which as we note, prevented any profound communication between them.

La force de l'histoire, née avec l'affaiblissement de la chrétienté et même du christianisme, n'est due ni aux sciences modernes, ni aux enquêtes historiques sur la vie du Christ ou du Bouddha; mais à
The belief in an absolute tends to turn the whole of the attention of the believers inward toward the absolute itself, as being the real source of final truth. Under such conditions, feeling that they possess the source of ultimate truth, it is very unlikely that they will have any really important exchange of ideas with outside groups. Almost by definition, anything that does not accord with their absolute will be completely unacceptable. For Christian civilization, the predominant one of the Occident, this turning toward the absolute meant orientation toward God, the Being. As Malraux sees it, it is the passing of this Christian orientation that is the major element in the disappearance of the absolute.

While oriented toward their specific absolute the various men and groups could have no very real communication with each other. However, when the absolute quality disappeared under the impact of history, it left men free
to accept communication in all directions. It was very necessary for this break-up to take place before such an art theory as that of Malraux's *Musée Imaginaire*, which accepts the art of all religions as equally valid, could become tenable. The *Musée Imaginaire* led directly to his vision of an international, exploratory culture, so the importance of the disappearance of the absolute can hardly be overestimated. The relationship between the disappearance of the absolute and the growth of his philosophy of art is stated directly in *Les Voix du Silence*.

Le fait nouveau dont les conséquences allaient transformer à la fois l'art et la culture, fut que, cette fois, une religion n'était plus mise en question par la naissance d'une autre. (LVS, 478)

L'art grec n'est pas un art de solitude, mais celui d'une communion avec le cosmos dont il fut amputé par Rome. Quand le devenir, ou le destin se substitue à l'Etre, l'histoire se substitue à la théologie, et l'art apparaît dans sa pluri-lité et dans sa métamorphose; les absolus métamorphosés par les arts ressuscités, rétablissent alors, avec un passé qu'ils modèlent, le lien des dieux grecs et du cosmos. (LVS, 633)

Thus, when the absolute quality of the religions has left them, it becomes possible to establish a communication between the things that they have produced, a link that was not possible while the orientation toward the absolute was maintained. To use Malraux's own terminology, it is now possible for a dialogue to replace the series of monologues. As compared to the earlier isolation, Malraux
can now write of dieux devenus fraternels, (LVS, 627) a thing they never were while they were absolute. And fraternity, we remember is one of the major aims of Malraux's humanism.

What history and metamorphosis have really done to these absolutes is to convert them into relatives, and in his preface to Qu'une Larme dans l'océan Malraux refers to the relativity of the gods in terms that make it clear that his objections are not to the fundamental religious experience, but to the tendency of religious structures to assume an absolute quality. "C'est l'expression essentielle de l'expérience religieuse, qui semble conduire aujourd'hui les agnostiques à la Relativité des dieux." (QLO, XIII)

These non-absolute, relativized gods cannot constitute for us the same affirmation of a sacred order that they represented for the people who originally worshiped them. By their very diversity and often contradictory nature, they are bound to lead the agnostic civilization of which Malraux speaks, not to an affirmation, but to a question on the existence and nature of God or the gods. Here Malraux returns to the basic nature of his humanism, the question, and this constitutes the great difference between the contemporary agnostic culture and the preceding religious ones. "Nous abandonnons ainsi ce qu'elles eurent d'essentiel, car on n'imagine pas une civilisation du sacré qui
tiendrait son sacré pour hypothétique." (LVS, 591)

This transition from the affirmation of absolutes to an attitude which, due to the fact that those who hold it have before them a long series of relativized gods, advocates only a hypothesis or question on man's search for the absolute, permits the culture of which Malraux speaks to accept equally all religions as evidences of this search. Most religions are preoccupied with that which is eternal in man. The main point on which the contemporary agnostic culture splits with them is the affirmation on the part of some religions that they have found the absolute answer where this element of eternity is concerned. On the social level this new attitude opens the way to completely free interchange and exploration of ideas. On the artistic level it paves the way for the Musée Imaginaire, where the Greek gods can stand side by side with the sculptured crucifixes with no incongruity whatever.

Nous savons que l'art grec n'est ni plus ni moins éternel que l'art gothique. Il s'agit donc d'un art de la part éternelle de l'homme. Cette part existe peut-être, mais notre civilisation ne l'affirme pas, elle la cherche. Les civilisations qui affirmèrent la posséder ne possédaient jamais que la leur. Si le Parthénon, la cathédrale de Chartres et la place du Capitole s'unissent dans notre admiration, la part éternelle de l'homme est à la fois plus humble et plus profonde que ces éclatantes conquêtes. (LVS, 405)

Malraux's contemporary culture looks at the artistic remains of man's past quests for the absolute, fully aware
that they do not mean for the present what they meant for the civilizations that gave them birth. Apart from the fact that they have been relativized by the passage of historical time, by their very existence the artistic representations of these past absolutes are also witness to human creativity.

Bien que nous sachions qu'une tête bouddhique khmère implique des siècles de bouddhisme, nous la regardons comme si le sculpteur en avait inventé l'esprit et la complexité. Elle dispose pour nous d'un 'absolu relativisé'. Magiques, cosmiques, sacrées, religieuses, les grandes œuvres nous atteignent du fond du passé comme autant de Zarathustras inventés par autant de Nietzsches. (Italics Malraux's (LVS, 617)

The major problem of the absolute, with reference to Malraux's humanism, can then be summed up briefly. Man has a desire for the absolute and probably always will. However, when he becomes over obsessed with it, or is convinced he has found it, this absolute acts as a block to human communication and fraternity, one of the major elements of Malraux's humanistic position. As relativized by historical perspective, these absolutes have a link restored between them. They are witnesses of man's unending search for something higher than himself, or at the least, of the highest that is in him.
In the chapter dealing with the ethical aspects of Malraux's humanism we indicated that his ethical position was necessarily based on the dignity and value of the human individual. Fundamentally no ethical system can stray far from this basic point without entering an area where it will be possible to justify any reduction of the individual for the benefit of a larger whole. To treat the individual as an absolute, and we have already seen Malraux's attitude toward the absolute, is to run into almost equally grave dangers. Such a position, pushed to the extreme, could only end with all individuals essentially isolated from each other and no profound communication between men. To say that man is a social animal is to repeat a hackneyed truism, but one that is none the less true. Man is also an animal that is preoccupied with the fulfillment of his personal drives, some of which can run exactly contrary to
the interests of the social group, even if they are not necessarily harmful to it. The problem, therefore, becomes one of trying to discover exactly what the relationship of the individual to the group really is. This has long interested Malraux, and for a humanism with fraternity as one of its major objectives, it is an important matter.

In some circles, particularly Communist ones, it has been fashionable to depict Malraux's position as that of the popular conception of the Nietzschean superman, an advocate of unrestricted individualism. We have tried to show in an earlier chapter our reasons for thinking that the popular interpretation of Nietzsche may be open to debate. Where Malraux is concerned, no one can truthfully say that he advocates extreme individualism unless they have deliberately overlooked the statements he has made on the subject. We have seen that he believes that the state exists for its citizens rather than vice-versa, but it is a long way from this to a position of unrestrained individualism. Such a phrase as *l'homme est rongé par les masses, comme il l'a été par l'individu* (PNL, 499) would seem to indicate that Malraux is seeking a position somewhere between the two extremes. What we shall find him looking for is an attitude toward the individual that will permit his personality to be fitted into the society without losing its essential integrity.
First however, let us turn to a consideration of Malraux's viewpoint concerning the two extreme positions. In the chapter on ethics we have seen him definitely reject the concept that the individual exists only for the social group. It is a simple matter to trace all the way through his writings a parallel rejection of excessive individualism. When he writes in *La Tentation de l'Occident* that les Européens sont las d'eux-mêmes, las de leur individualisme qui s'écroule (LTO, 86) he may not be speaking for all Europeans, but he is certainly speaking for himself. This early work never ceases hammering on the point that extreme concentration on one's self is ridiculous: "l'absurde, c'est-à-dire qu'point extrême du particulier." (LTO, 100) "Se chercher et se fuir est également insensé." (LTO, 70) At the present time he might consider Ling's remark that la suprême beauté d'une civilisation affinée, c'est l'attentive inculture du moi (LTO, 70) as too extreme, but he nevertheless chose it for the epigraph to his essay *D'une Jeunesse européenne*. This work continues the theme of treating the extreme preoccupation with the self as absurd: "Pousser à l'extrême la recherche de soi-même, en acceptant son propre monde, c'est tendre à l'absurde." (OJE, 144)

One of the most frequent reasons that the ultra-individualist gives for rejecting his society is that its ideals are inferior to his and that he is therefore above it.
Although at the time that he wrote *D'une Jeunesse européenne* Malraux was to a great extent alienated from the European life of the period, we find in the work a rejection of this attitude of superiority. He speaks of this European youth as being délivrée de la basse vanité de nommer grandeur le dédain d'une vie à laquelle elle ne sait pas se lier. (DJE, 153)

Ferral's musing in *La Condition Humaine* is the harshest condemnation of extreme individualism to be found in all of Malraux's works. "Peut-être le grand individualisme ne pouvait-il se développer pleinement que sur un fumier d'hypocrisie." (LCH, 385)

We have only to remember what a high rank la fraternité virile enjoys among Malraux's values in order to understand the position of the following lines from the preface of *Le Temps du Mépris*. We note, too, that for Malraux, the motivation behind much of this over individualism is simply a fanatic desire to be different.

Or, l'histoire de la sensibilité artistique en France depuis cinquante ans pourrait être appelée l'agonie de la fraternité virile. Son ennemi réel est un individualisme informulé, épars à travers le XIXe siècle, et né bien moins de la volonté de créer l'homme complet, que du fanatisme de la différence. (LTM, 12)

Individualisme d'artistes, préoccupés surtout de sauvegarder 'le monde intérieur', et fondé seulement lorsqu'il s'applique au domaine du sentiment ou du rêve. (LTM, 12)
Many of Malraux's political critics would be inclined to pass off the preceding remarks as due to the disciplining influence of Communism on his thought and say that with the passing of that influence he returned to a "superman" point of view. Such a criticism does not hold up under examination of his post-World War II writings.

In Les Noyers de l'Altenburg we find the younger Berger writing that ce n'est pas à gratter sans cesse l'individu qu'on finit par rencontrer l'homme, (LNA, 29) and c'est peu que soi-même ici non que l'homme. (LNA, 249) This last remark, made in the midst of the intense danger of the war against the German invaders can be interpreted in two ways. It can indicate Malraux's conviction that the life of an individual is a minor thing compared to the saving of a society based on a concept of human dignity. In addition it can mean that in such a situation, one man alone can do little but that the larger group can accomplish things.

Les Voix du Silence, as we have previously seen, expresses its doubts about both extreme individualism and the popular concept of the "superman".

L'individu retranché sur lui-même s'aperçoit qu'il n'est pas grand'chose, et que les 'surhumains' dont il s'exalte ont tous assumé un lourd poids d'humanité. L'individualisme qui dépasse l'hédonisme se défend mal contre la fascination de la grandeur. (LVS, 494)

Particularly in Malraux's earlier works there is a tendency to associate the rise of extreme individualism
with Christianity and in these works the most unregenerate individualists are orientals who have had contact with Christianity and then lost it: the terrorists, Hong and Tchen. In the change from their original Chinese Confucianist background, which is primarily social, to Christianity, lies, according to Malraux, the reason for the awakening of their consciousness of themselves as individuals. The process is easily traceable. First we have Ling's comparison of the basic moral attitudes of Christianity and Confucianism: "La morale chrétienne se lie à certains profonds élans des cœurs chrétiens; la morale confucianiste est sociale." (LTO, 117) At another point Ling directly attributes the awakening of the awareness of oneself as an individual to Christianity. "Et le christianisme me semble être l'école, d'où viennent toutes les sensations grâce auxquelles s'est formé la conscience que l'individu prend de lui-même." (LTO, 30)

Thus an oriental who has undergone a conversion to Christianity has moved from a position where he considers himself mainly as part of a larger whole to one where he views himself primarily as a separate entity. We do not have to confine ourselves to Ling's remarks in order to prove that Malraux feels, or at least felt, that one effect of Christianity is a feeling of solitude. In his study on Laclos we find the comment: "Quelque profonde que soit
This isolation is the direct opposite of the feeling of being basically a part of a larger whole, the social morality which Ling said was the basis of Confucianism. The nature of the oriental has therefore been split by this experience and when, as it usually does, the contact with Christianity comes accompanied by some of the more energetic manifestations of western thought we find that, according to Ling: "L'individu naît en eux, et avec lui cet étrange goût de la destruction et de l'anarchie." (LTO, 117)

In the matter of the individual, as in many others, Les Conquérants represents an application to persons and situations of ideas that were discussed in La Tentation de l'Occident. Garine, while explaining to the narrator the origin of attitudes such as that of Hong, develops at greater length the thought expressed in the foregoing quotation.

N'est-ce pas un sentiment semblable: celui de posséder une vie particulière, distincte au regard de Dieu, qui fit la force du christianisme? Qu'il n'y ait pas loin de tels sentiments à la haine, et même au fanatisme de la haine, je le vois tous les jours. (LC, 121)

At another point in the same conversation he traces in the Oriental the entire process of contact with Christianity, awakening of the individual, loss of faith, and the growth of hatred and violence. Apparently, orthodox Christianity
while awakening in the individual the sense of his own particular existence, promises recompense in an after life for the injustices he is suffering on earth. When he loses faith, he loses the reward in the other world at the same time. He is therefore, left with the awareness of his individual value, plus awareness that he is suffering injustices with no hope of rectification in a later life. This appears to be the sequence of circumstances that Malraux sees making a terrorist out of Orientals like Hong and Tchen.

Toute l'Asie moderne est dans le sentiment de la vie individuelle, dans la découverte de la mort. Les pauvres ont compris que leur détresse est sans espoir, qu'ils n'ont rien à attendre d'une vie nouvelle. Les lépreux qui cessaient de croire empoisonnaient les fontaines. Tout homme détaché de la vie chinoise, de ses rites et de ses vagues croyances, et rebelle au christianisme, est un bon révolutionnaire. Tu verras cela à merveille par l'exemple de Hong et de presque tous les terroristes que tu auras l'occasion de connaître. (LC, 120)

In La Condition Humaine, we have, to the best of my knowledge, the next to the last of Malraux's novels in which he tends to associate extreme individualism with Christianity. Prior to this, he had applied the theory only to orientals whose attitude toward their own life was sharply altered by the influence of Christianity. Here however he returns to the Occident for his examples.

Peut-être le grand individualisme ne pouvait-il se développer que sur un fumier d'hypocrisie: Borgia n'était pas pape par hasard....Ce n'était pas à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, parmi les revolutionnaires
livres de vertu, que se promenaient les grands individualistes, mais à la Renaissance, dans une structure sociale qui était la chrétienté, de toute évidence. (LCH, 385)

The preface to Le Temps du Mépris disposes, once and for all, of the idea of the individual who thinks he can fully exist and develop without drawing on society. These are the lines that culminate naturally in the statement from Les Voix du Silence that the individual who is forced to rely entirely on himself, finds that he does not amount to much, (LVS, 494) for whether he likes to admit it or not, the individual depends on society for his psychological nourishment.

L'individu s'oppose à la collectivité, mais il d'en nourrit. Et l'important est bien moins de savoir à quoi il s'oppose que ce dont il se nourrit. Comme le génie, l'individu vaut par ce qu'il renferme. Pour nous en tenir au passé, la personne chrétienne existait autant que l'individu moderne, et une âme vaut bien une différence. Toute vie psychologique est un échange, et le problème fondamental de la personne concrète, c'est de savoir de quoi il entend se nourrir....

Il est difficile d'être un homme. Mais pas plus de le devenir en approfondissant sa communion, qu'en cultivant sa différence,--et la première nourrit avec autant de force au moins que la seconde ce par quoi l'homme, ce par quoi il se dépasse, crée, invente ou se conçoit. (LTM, 11)

The reference to Christianity in these lines, has none of the accusing overtones that we saw in the earlier works, and Malraux says in this very preface that the early Christian at least, was lié à la collectivité qui l'entoure. (LTM, 11) What he does say here is that there is a basic
contradiction in the relationship of the individual to the society. By his very nature as an individual, the former opposes the latter but he is always fed by it. To say that all psychological life is an exchange implies that the society, too, is nourished by the individual. It is this second half of the equation that provides the basis for Malraux's way of fitting the individual into society without destroying the integrity of his personality.

In this same preface we have the first step in the development of Malraux's own position in the matter: "Aux yeux de Kassner comme de nombre d'intellectuels communistes, le communisme restitue à l'individu sa fertilité." (LTM, 13)

Rather obviously, Malraux no longer believes that latter day communism, with its rigid demands for absolute adherence to the system, performs this service. Everything that we have previously quoted from the postface to Les Conquérants indicates the contrary. What is important here, however, is not Communism itself, but the idea of the group stimulating the fertility of the individual. Le Temps du Mépris lets the matter drop at this point but it is picked up again in Les Voix du Silence. Expressed in terms of art and the artist, the concept that the individual must necessarily nourish himself, and yet depend on something larger, is constantly reaffirmed:

Nulle grandeur n'est séparable de ce qui le maintient. (LVS, 639)
Car le génie est inséparable de ce dont il naît, mais comme l'incendie de ce qu'il brûle. (LVS, 144)

Et l'art survit plus par ce dont il s'est nourri que par ce qu'il a prêché. (LVS, 481)

The similarity between these lines and those of the earlier preface is quite marked, but Les Voix du Silence carries the idea further than did Le Temps du Mépris. We have noticed that when an absolute had been relativized it became possible for it to become part of the larger human whole, a thing that could never have taken place while it maintained its absolute quality. Malraux's way of finding a compromise in the individual-society relation is the "relativized individual":

Or la même conquête du monde qui suscita l'individualisme moderne, bien différent de celui de la Renaissance, relativise aujourd'hui l'individu. Nous savons de reste que le pouvoir transformateur de l'homme commença par mettre le monde en chantier et finit par mettre l'homme en question. Trop forte encore pour être esclave, et plus assez pour être roi, l'individu ne renonce nullement à sa conquête, mais cesse de trouver en elle sa raison d'être: l'individu 'dévalué' des plans quinquennaux et de la Vallée de la Tenesse ne perd rien de sa force, mais l'art individualiste perd sa puissance d'annexion du monde.

C'est alors que l'interrogation, quelquefois sereine et presque toujours angoissée, prend le pas sur l'annexion: que Picasso succède à Cézanne. (LVS, 601)

On reading these lines, one is tempted to wonder somewhat facetiously if Malraux knows what the Tennessee Valley Authority really is. That, however, is actually immaterial to this discussion. The vital idea here is that
of the individual who still retains his ability of conquest, but does not find his reason for being in his personal victory. Where he must find his personal satisfaction is in that which his victory accomplishes for the group which has originally nourished him, and here we are once more close to the "sens héroïque" with which we have dealt in previous chapters. When a man considers his individuality as an absolute, it is of course impossible for him to take an attitude; hence the individu relativisé. We note, too, that with this step we have returned to the "interrogation" which is the keynote of Malraux's humanism.

If this position meant that the individual must now conform entirely to the formula of the society it would not constitute a compromise, but rather an absolute victory for the group, and a completely subordinate individual. It would also mean stagnation of the group. What Malraux's position implies is that while the individual must recognize that he is part of the society, and that he is nourished by it, he can still use his individual drive. He can go beyond the limits of the society to enrich and expand the society itself. Treating this problem from the aspect of the artist, Malraux says in Les Voix du Silence that this is what the creative individual really does, even if he does not know it: "En tant que créateur, l'artiste n'appartient pas à la collectivité qui subit une culture, mais à
As we said at the beginning of this chapter, Malraux's humanism rests on the value of the human individual, but it would be difficult, if not impossible, to visualize a humanism in which each individual was himself an absolute. In that case every man would fundamentally be completely isolated from every other man, and such a concept as that of humanism, tragic or otherwise, would be absurd. If Malraux's humanism is to a great extent an effort to overcome all that separates men from each other, both as individuals and groups, and to move toward fraternity, then this attitude which permits the individual to realize his potentialities by elaborating the society which nourishes him, is a major and necessary step in that direction.
Conclusion

Ce que l'homme a fait de plus grand, il le doit au sentiment douloureux de l'incomplet de sa destinée.
Mme de Staël, De la Littérature

What then can be said in attempting to summarize this philosophy of life that we have chosen to call the tragic humanism of André Malraux? Where, in the final analysis, does it lead? With respect to the last question it can be definitely said that it does not lead to consolation, in the ordinary sense of the word; nor does it bring us to a formula for the human adventure, and much less to a conclusion for this same adventure. While there is grandeur in the vision of man struggling endlessly against an overwhelming destiny, there is little comfort or consolation. It would no more be possible to design a plan of this struggle than it would be to draw up a battle plan for Prometheus' contest with Zeus. And as Malraux conceives this adventure, it could only be considered as concluded when and if the last man disappears from the face of the earth, and the last human monument disintegrates into dust. This may be its final, tragic conclusion, but if this last
moment does come, the world and the universe, according to Malraux, will be the poorer for the passing of the human adventure. Instead of the process of renewal, which is a result of the human will, the world will sink into a cycle of endless repetition. The element of conscience will have disappeared, for man alone is aware of this epic struggle; the universe, to use Pascal's phraseology, n'en sait rien.

The element of conscience provides a logical starting point for a recapitulation of the major aspects of Malraux's humanism, for they all derive basically from a consciousness of the nature of destiny. Destiny for Malraux is composed of everything that tends to reduce man to absurdity, humiliation, solitude, and death. With the exception of cosmic absurdity, which is a relatively recent human preoccupation, we found, in the first chapter, that it was largely an awareness of these facets of destiny which stimulated the ancient Greeks to the production of their great tragic poetry. The spectacle of man, aware of inexorable destiny, but willing, in the etymological sense of the word, to struggle against it, lies at the very heart of Greek tragedy. Fundamentally this tragic struggle, for the Greeks as for Malraux, was seen to be ethical in nature. This ethical core derives from the fact that this world vision sees as unjust a situation in which man, who can
conceive of order, dignity, fraternity, and immortality, is placed by the gods or by destiny in a position where he is prey to forces which reduce him to absurdity, humiliation, solitude, and death. AEschylus' Prometheus Bound, as interpreted by Friedrich Nietzsche, is the finest Greek dramatization of this ethical struggle.

The same vision of humanity that runs all through Nietzsche's interpretation of the AEschylean tragedy is also the basic motivation of all of Malraux's works. The close spiritual link between the writings of AEschylus, Nietzsche, and Malraux is reinforced, not only by the parallel between the fundamental attitude of all three men toward the universe, but also by Malraux's admitted admiration for Nietzsche and his frequent and laudatory mention of AEschylus and his Prometheus. And it is precisely with respect to the Greeks' vision of man in conflict with the universe that Malraux speaks most warmly.

Since this conflict between man and destiny which motivates Greek tragedy also motivates all of Malraux's works, it appears justified to refer to these last as tragic. The tragic sentiment of life also stimulated the Greeks to the greatest flowering of cultural development that the world had yet known, to a magnificent effort to exploit human potentialities to the fullest degree. This last being the essential aim of any true humanism, it is therefore
justifiable to say that the tragic viewpoint can be extremely fertile-productive of a genuine humanism. And attainment of man's highest quality is precisely the aim of the culture that Malraux espouses:

Que nous l'acceptions ou non, l'Occidental ne s'éclairera qu'à la torche qu'il porte, même si sa main brûle: et ce que cette torche tente d'éclairer, c'est tout ce qui peut accroître le pouvoir de l'homme. Comment une civilisation agnostique écarterait-elle le recours à ce qui le dépasse et souvent la grandit. Si la qualité du monde est la matière de toute culture, la qualité de l'homme en est le but. (LVS, 638)

Here, too, the Aeschylus-Nietzsche-Malraux relationship is very close. Prometheus was condemned for aiding mankind to preserve and strengthen itself. The drive that led him to do this is called by Nietzsche the "Titanic impulse", which in Malraux's writings becomes the sens héroïque.

In drawing a parallel between Malraux's attitude and that of Prometheus, it is worthy to note that the reference in the preceding lines is to a torch that burns the hand that bears it. Prometheus was condemned for bringing fire to man. The importance of the heroic sense in this humanism can hardly be overestimated, for without it the whole thing falls apart. So does tragedy for that matter. When it is present, man's awareness of destiny stimulates him to make the most possible out of human existence. This fertility of the tragic vision can then cause a tragic humanism to evoke the double awareness that Malraux attributes to Greek
tragedy: the simultaneous consciousness of human servitude and of the unconquerable aptitude of men to found their grandeur on that same servitude.

In tracing the historical process which led from AEschylus to the contemporary attitude that produced Malraux's Promethean humanism, the most salient characteristic is the successive collapse of all the systems that affirmed their own ability to answer the problems of human destiny. One after the other, theology, science, and finally man himself were proposed as answers, and all failed to measure up to the task. The result, according to Malraux, was double, the rise of absurdity and the replacement of affirmation by the mise en question. The absurd arose due to the failure of the effort to discover a permanent and vital role for man in the universe. If he had no purpose then his role could well be considered accidental and absurd. He might be a solitary, chance element, of no importance to any overall scheme. The mise en question was a logical result of this same process. Any affirmation of man's permanence or role in the universe did not seem justifiable. Therefore, the honest function left for man was simply to interrogate the universe, himself, and the relation between the two. Such interrogation derives from conscience of destiny, a thing that man alone possesses, and for Malraux it is his part divine.
One of the leading causes for the rise of the specter of the absurd was the growing awareness, caused by the collapse of the idea of inevitable progress, that man has within himself an ineradicable flaw which constantly threatens to reduce even his time on earth to humiliation, absurdity, isolation, and death. This flaw is composed of the complex of destructive potentialities inherent in man. From Malraux's point of view the flaw is as permanent as man himself, and he refers to it as either the bête or the démon. Malraux's insistence on the fact that nothing will really extirpate this flaw from men is one of the major reasons that he is usually referred to as pessimistic. Events would seem to indicate that it might be more accurate to refer to his position simply as realistic. In any event, safety would seem to be on the side of the attitude which regards this flaw as ever present and ever to be fought against.

Malraux's humanism, therefore, consists of a series of interrelated struggles against a destiny which reduces man to absurdity, solitude, and death. Its major elements are its ethical component: the struggle with the bête, man's internal flaw, which threatens even the human adventure; its aesthetic: the artistic struggle against the gods; its fundamental component: the struggle with the earth which attempts to take back everything man has taken from
it. Together, these things against which man struggles are called destiny. Within the framework of the human adventure, the major end result that destiny seems to produce is isolation or solitude. Starting from the same vision of human destiny, all of the aspects of Malraux's humanism appear to tend basically toward one major end: to break down the barriers that cause human isolation in order to achieve a human fraternity.

Before these struggles can take place, however, it is necessary that there be an attitude of revolt, of refusal to accept as final the absurdity to which destiny apparently condemns man. Where Malraux himself is concerned, the starting point is the deep feeling of metaphysical anguish caused by awareness of the absurdity and isolation of the human condition. Intense action of any kind can serve as an anodyne for this anguish, but action itself does not necessarily constitute revolt. For it to do so it must take a path which consciously opposes the direction of destiny and rejects absurdity as man's earthly destiny. In Malraux's humanism one does this by choosing to act in the domaine of vraies valeurs and not in that of assouvissement, for basically this humanism is an effort to discover vraies valeurs. This choice is dictated by the sens héroïque. Action then becomes revolt.

On the ethical level this revolt can be said to
consist mainly of an effort to prevent the bête in man from reproducing within the framework of human existence the humiliation, absurdity, isolation, and death that characterize, for Malraux, the human relationship to the cosmos. The absolute minimum is the recognition of the value of each human individual: la dignité humaine. In action it has the same effect as the Kantian imperative that no one should use another human being as a means toward his own ends. For Malraux, this would duplicate the position of servitude in which man finds himself in the universe. By extension, this same ethical position implies definitely that the state or any other social organization exists for the individual rather than vice-versa.

Humiliation is one of the major effects produced in man by awareness of his insignificance in the universal scheme of things. In order to keep this humiliation from being extended into the human picture, Malraux makes human dignity, his basic value, synonymous with the absence of humiliation. One of the most damaging results of humiliation is the feeling of solitude, or being isolated from the rest of mankind, and this, too, is an earthly reenactment of a phase of destiny. Therefore, Malraux also defines fraternity as the absence of humiliation, making it correspond exactly with human dignity. For Malraux, fraternity
is essentially la fraternité virile, the right of every
human being to participate as a conscious individual in
man's struggle against his destiny, and not to be simply
a humiliating means to some other human being's ends. It
is a brotherhood of struggle.

The heroic sense would seem to dictate that one
should participate in the struggle to restore dignity to
those who are deprived of it. For Malraux's humanism as
for anything else that attempts to deal with this parti-
cular problem there are serious difficulties, as yet un-
solved by the human race. The most serious, perhaps, is the
fact that the fight to restore this dignity to some people
inevitably seems to risk violating that of others. In
extreme cases this can lead to the death of relatively
innocent persons, an extremely dangerous thing according
to Malraux's philosophy which regards death as the end of
all possibility. Under such circumstances, strong action
can be taken only when the motives are of unquestionable
purity. This, in turn, is further complicated by the fact
that few if any of the available instruments for such action
are without corruption. Still another difficulty is posed
by Malraux's tendency to share the anarchist position that
those who wield power and force eventually become corrupted
by them. In the opinion of this writer, it was the cumulative
effects of these difficulties that led Malraux to abandon
violent revolutionary action. They rendered it impossible to *vaincre sans se trahir*.

There is, however, a more positive face to Malraux's ethical medal. He does not believe fundamentally that any social organization can create nobility of spirit, or master the *démon* in individual man, but he does believe that in the end each person must master his own destructive potentialities. As a basic ethical guide along these lines we have Magnin's ideal of a life for each individual that is not qualified by what he demands of others. This should not be taken to mean that Malraux advises acceptance or resignation to suffering inflicted on one by others, for he flatly rejects such an attitude. If, however, everyone controlled his conduct according to Magnin's aphorism, human dignity and fraternity would hold the line in the struggle with the *bête*.

Art, which for Malraux, is essentially the transformation of an awareness of destiny into art forms, provides his humanism with a field of activity where it is possible to win at least a temporary victory without betraying his basic ideals in the process, for art alters, but never really destroys, that from which it derives. It therefore furnishes an element of continuity that runs through all the centuries of the human adventure. Spengler's hypothesis would condemn each of man's successive cultures to the same
solitude that marks man's position in the universe.

Malraux's artistic vision, linking those cultures by means of their art products even after the civilizations themselves have died, answers Spengler with a fraternity that spans both time and space, setting up a dialogue that transcends even destiny's ultimate weapon: death.

Le Musée Imaginaire nous enseigne que le destin est menacé quand un monde de l'homme, quel qu'il soit, surgit du monde tout court. Derrière chaque chef-d'œuvre rôde ou gronde un destin dompté. La voix de l'artiste tire sa force de ce qu'elle naît d'une solitude qui appelle l'univers pour lui imposer l'accents humain; et dans les grands arts du passé, survit pour nous l'invincible voix intérieure des civilisations disparues. Mais cette voix survivante et non pas immortelle, élève son chant sacré sur l'intarissable orchestre de la mort. (LVS, 628)

Directly connected with this concept of survival through art is that of metamorphosis, the means by which man's artistic heritage not only endures but is renewed. Each succeeding civilization that views the art works of former cultures imparts to them a new meaning, a meaning that is conditioned by the essential qualities of their own civilization. Metamorphosis and resurrection in art are completely unpredictable though, according to Malraux, and whether they take place at all is dependent on chance and the concept of possibility. No more in art than in any other field of human activity does Malraux promise a plan for the human adventure.
Art also wins victories over destiny by freeing the artist and those who understand his message from the sentiment of dependence which it imposes on them. This it does mainly through the victory of the art work itself over death and time, and also by the fact that the artist does not accept the forms of the earth as they are, but recreates them according to the dictates of his own will. As with the other phases of Malraux's humanism the end result of this whole artistic process is not so much an affirmation as a search, an interrogation of man, destiny, and the universe. Interrogation implies the work of conscience and we are still on the fundamental Malrauxian theme of conscience versus destiny, for the last pages of Les Voix du Silence leave no doubt that Malraux conceives of art primarily as a weapon against destiny. "...c'est l'art dans sa totalité, délivré par le nôtre, art que notre civilisation, la première, dresse contre le destin." (LVS, 631)

In seeking to answer Spengler, Malraux's humanism also searches for a fundamental element common to all men whether or not they are artists. He finds this in the endless human will to struggle with the earth to make it provide for his needs and desires. This will, without which no art or civilization could exist, is the fundamental stream that carries along with it the whole human adventure. Taken in
its widest sense it can be interpreted to mean the consciousness of what it means to be a man, a consciousness derived from the experience of being one. Here again Malraux emphasizes that any effort to construct an intellectually conceived formula is foredoomed to failure. Nothing will suffice except actual experience transformed into conscience, man's highest attribute. Once more this humanism has moved forward on the path from solitude to human fraternity by trying to find a link common to all mankind, even if that link is a vague and rather intangible one.

Within the framework of human existence Malraux sees the absolutes toward which men have oriented themselves as the greatest block to fraternity. Although the desire for an absolute, and particularly a religious one, is frequently indicative of the highest in man, the absolutes have, when men believe they have discovered them, a tendency to be exclusive of all who do not share the same point of view. The absolute is now breaking up according to Malraux, and it is this break-up which permits the movement toward a humanism of world-wide scope. History has performed the function of placing the various absolutes in perspective, relativizing them, and making possible communication between them.

One more step was necessary in order for Malraux to begin this voyage of grands navigateurs. He had to find
a way to fit the individual into the larger group without compromising human dignity and the individual personality in so doing. His idea of a valid individual-society relationship is one which sees the former as nourished by the latter, who in turn does not surrender his powers, but uses them for the enrichment of the society. This provides a link that is of benefit to both partners.

In all that we have seen here of Malraux's humanism there is nothing affirmed concerning a definite successful ending for quest for values of which it is composed. Even the term Promethean that we have used so frequently throughout this text should not mislead anyone into believing that this humanism is expected to culminate in a type of man for whom Prometheus could serve as an image. What is Promethean here is the conscience demanded: a lucid awareness and acceptance of the fact that the human adventure is essentially a tragic one, plus the will to carry it on heroically even if the end is nothingness. An endless, tragic, heroic struggle: one may not like this vision of human existence, but the function of any honest philosopher is to present the picture as he actually feels it to be. This Malraux does, and his vision of man does not lack grandeur and dignity. It is a humanism, but we would be falsifying Malraux's own viewpoint if we tried to call it anything but a tragic one. The lines cited in the first
chapter of this essay must never be forgotten when considering it:

Il y a un humanisme possible, mais il faut bien nous dire, et clairement, que c'est un humanisme tragique. Nous sommes en face d'un monde inconnu; nous l'affrontons avec conscience....Et nous ne pouvons fonder une attitude humaine que sur le tragique parce que l'homme ne sait pas où il va, et sur l'humanisme parce qu'il sait d'où il part et où est sa volonté. (PNL, 499)

Such an attitude is definitely not that of classical humanism with the latter's tone of optimism, affirmation, and the feeling that whole adventure had an order and an end that man could discover in advance. The affirmative quality of classical humanism is discarded in favor of interrogation, but Malraux feels that this change permits this new humanism to go far beyond the relatively limited scope of the earlier variety, to base humanism on humanity as a whole and not just a segment.

Ce qui est mis en question dans notre culture l'est par le passé des autres: comme si cette culture conquérante et confuse ne tentait de détruire son héritage humaniste que pour atteindre un humanisme mondiale. (LVS, 589)

Here, as always, it will be noted that Malraux does not say what this humanism will do but only what it will try to do. The verb tenter runs through everything connected with it. The destiny against which it is aimed has tremendous force, so Malraux will not even go so far as to say that this humanism will realize itself, only that it will attempt to do so.
La conscience que nous avons prise du destin, aussi profonde que celle de l'Orient mais singulièrement plus peuplée, est à celles des fatalités de jadis ce qu'est notre musée aux cabinets d'antiques, d'une autre taille que les spectres de marbre, il est l'Apparition du XXe siècle, et c'est contre lui que tente de se constituer le premier humanisme universel. (LVS, 628)

This, then, is the essence of Malraux's humanism: a tragic, heroic struggle to make the utmost of the human adventure while fully aware of all that threatens it. When Malraux says that man must be founded anew he means that he must be founded on conscience of all the implications of this struggle, of what it really means to be a man.

If this humanism lacks the optimism, order, and promised ends of the classical variety, it still has its compensations. If the order and ends have disappeared, so have the limitations that necessarily accompanied them. With their disappearance arises a new and broader interpretation of possibility and the liberty of man. With no definite structure to follow and no fixed end to be reached, life becomes truly what Ling had called it: le domaine infini des possibles. (LTO, 93) We can then close this essay by appropriating the last words of L'Espoir to define André Malraux's tragic humanism as the fraternal struggle by men to attain la possibilité infinie de leur destin. (LE, 360)
Bibliography

Books by Malraux

______, *La Tentation de l'Occident* (Paris: Grasset, 1926)
______, *Royaume farfelu* (Paris: Gallimard, 1928)
______, *La Voie Royale* (Paris: Grasset, 1930)
______, *La Condition Humaine* (Paris: Gallimard, 1933)
______, *Tableau de la littérature française* (Paris: Gallimard, 1939)
______, *Oeuvres complètes* (Geneva: Skira, 1945)
______, *Scènes choisies* (Paris: Gallimard, 1946)
______, *Esquisse d'une psychologie du cinéma* (Paris: Gallimard, 1946)
______, *Le Musée imaginaire, Volume I of La Psychologie de l'art* (Geneva: Skira, 1947)
______, *La Création artistique, Volume II of La Psychologie de l'art* (Geneva: Skira, 1949)


_______, *Saturne* (Paris: Gallimard, 1950)


_______, *Le Musée imaginaire de la sculpture mondiale*, Volume I (Paris: Gallimard, 1952)


**Articles by Malraux**


"Où le cœur se partage, par Marcel Arland," Nouvelle Revue Française, 15e année, No. 173 (February 1, 1928), pp. 250-52.


"Contes, historiettes et fabliaux," "Dialogue d'un prêtre et d'un moribond, par le Marquis de Sade," Nouvelle Revue Française, 15e année, No. 177 (June 1, 1928), pp. 853-55.


"Journal de voyage d'un philosophe, par Hermann Keyserling," Nouvelle Revue Française, 16e année, No. 189 (June 1, 1929), pp. 884-86.


"Exposition Fautrier," Nouvelle Revue Française, 21e année, No. 233 (February 1, 1933), pp. 345-46.

"A l'hôtel des sensations inédites," Marianne, (December 13, 1933).

, "Les Traqués, par M. Matveev," Nouvelle Revue Française, 22e année, No. 249 (June 1, 1934), pp. 1014-16.


, "Réponse aux éd.,” Commune, No. 27 (December, 1935), pp. 410-16.


, De Dimitrov à Thälmann: Echec au Fascisme, (Paris: Bureau d'éditions, 4 rue Saint-Germain-l'Auxerrois (Undated pamphlet.)


, "Préface,” Messages personnels, by Bergeret and Grégoire (Bordeaux: Bière, 1945)


, "N'était-ce donc que ça," Liberté de l'esprit, Nos. 3, 4 and 5 (April, May, and June, 1949), pp. 49-51, 86-87, 117-18. (Le Démon de l'absolu)


______, "De l'art et des masses," Liberté de l'esprit, 3e année, No. 22 (June, 1951), pp. 177-180.

______, "Preface," Qu'une larme dans l'océan by Manès Sperber (Paris: Calman-Lévy, 1952)

______, Letter preface to Essai de stratégie occidentale by Général P. E. Jacquot,(Paris: Gallimard, 1953)

______, "La métamorphose des dieux," Nouvelle Revue Française, Part I, 2e année, No. 17 (May 1, 1954) and Part II, 2e année, No. 18 (June 1, 1954), pp. 769-792 and 961-992.


Books about Malraux


Delhomme, Jeanne, Temps et Destin (Paris: Gallimard, 1955)

Frohock, Wilbur Merrill, André Malraux and the Tragic Imagination (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1952)

MacKnight, Roberta, Manifestations Révolutionnaires chez André Malraux (Unpublished thesis, University of Utah, August, 1948)
Mauriac, Claude, Malraux ou le mal du héros (Paris: Grasset, 1946)

Moray, Aloys, À la rencontre d'André Malraux (Bruxelles: La Sixaine, 1947)

Picon, Gaétan, André Malraux (Paris: Gallimard, 1945)
Collection Les Essais.

________, Malraux par lui-même (Paris: Edit. du Seuil, 1953)
Ecrivains de toujours

Savane, Marcel, André Malraux (Paris: Richard-Masse, 1946)
Collection Triptyque-Littérature.

Witherell, Louise Rowa, The Literary Development of André Malraux from his earliest writings through Vol. I of La Lutte avec l'Ange (University of Wisconsin - Unpublished thesis)

Articles about Malraux

"À Paris et ailleurs: bonne promesse; l'invitation au voyage; espoir," Les Nouvelles Littéraires, No. 956 (November 29, 1945)


Cantini, Roberto, "Il disprezzo dell'uomo (André Malraux)," Fiera Letteraria, anno VIII, No. 18 (3 maggio, 1953), p. 1.

Casini, Paolo, "Il 'tono' Malraux," Fiera Letteraria, anno VIII, No. 22 (31 maggio, 1953) p. 4.


Delmas, Claude, "'La tentation de l'Occident'," Liberté de l'Esprit, 3e année, No. 20 (Avril, 1951), pp. 121-123.


Elsen, Claude, "Malraux romancier," La Table Ronde, No. 67 (Juillet, 1953), pp. 135-137.


———, "Note for a Malraux bibliography," MLN, LXV, No. 6 (June 1950), pp. 392-395.


Garcia Calderón, Ventura, "Malraux homme d'action," Les Nouvelles Littéraires, No. 956 (29 Nov. 1945)


Hamilton, George Heard, "Art and The human situation," Yale Review, XXXIX, No. 4 (Summer, 1950), pp. 751-753. (Rev. of Malraux's The Psychology of Art)


"The Human Situation, Malraux and The Novel of Action," 


, "Roman américain et cinéma," Poésie, 45, No. 25 (1945)

"Malraux parle...," Les Nouvelles Littéraires, No. 1071 (11 Mars 1948)

"Man's Quest," Time, Vol. LXVI, No. 3 (July 18, 1955), pp. 24-30


, "Malraux contre la littérature avilie," La Nef, No. 14 (Janv., 1946), pp. 24-34.

_____, "La psychologie de l'art et Saturne," La Table Ronde, No. 30 (Juin, 1950), pp. 136-147.

Modigliani, Jeanne, "S'il y avait une esthétique de l'impérialisme. Sur la Psychologie de l'Art' de Malraux," La Nouvelle Critique, 4e année, No. 31 (Déc. 1951), pp. 31-41.


"Notes about contributors: André Malraux," Transition Forty-Eight, No. 2, pp. 149-150.

Ollivier, André, "La Mythologie d'André Malraux," Critique, No. 6, (Nov. 1946), pp. 483-493.


_____, "Malraux contemporain capital," Biblio, 16e année, No. 10 (Déc. 1948), pp. 3-5.


———, "Notes sur 'La Lutte avec l'ange'," Cahiers du Sud, No. 266 (Juin-Juillet, 1944), pp. 405-416.

Read, Herbert, "Malraux' world of art," The Hudson Review, III, No. 1 (Spring 1950), pp. 140-145

Rees, G. O., "Types of recurring similes in Malraux's Novels," MLN, LXVIII, No. 6 (June, 1953), pp. 373-377.


Sackville-West, Edard, "La lutte avec l'ange," Horizon, XII, No. 70 (Oct., 1945), pp. 242-244.


Sequaire, Julien, "Un fleuve qui aboutit à la mer?" Liberté de l'Esprit, la année, No. 30 (Avril, 1952), p. 122.


"Le Sort d'André Malraux et de Jean Prévost," Les Lettres Françaises, No. 20 (9 Sept. 1944).


Torre, Guillermo de "Diálogo con Malraux," Insula, año VIII, No. 92 (15 de agosto de 1953), pp. 1, 2.


Wilson, Edmund, "Two Survivors: Malraux and Silone," Horizon, XII, No. 70 (Oct. 1945), pp. 245-256.


**Books with chapters, articles, or references to Malraux**


---


Bendz, Ernst Paulus, *Frankot, litteraara essayer* (Malmö: Gleerups, 1950)


Bodart, Roger, *Dialogues européens de Montaigne à Sartre* avec un portrait de l'auteur par Albert Crommelynck (Bruxelles: Edit. des Artistes, 1950)


---


---


Brincourt, André and Jean, Les Oeuvres et les lumières (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1955)

Brodin, Pierre, Les écrivains français de l'entre-deux-guerres (Montréal: B. Valiquette, 1942)


Ganne, Gilbert, Interviews impubliables (Paris: A. Bonne, 1952)

Garaudy, Roger, Une littérature de fossoyeurs (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1947)

Gray, James, On Second Thought (Minneapolis: Univ, of Minnesota Press, 1946)


Rousseaux, André, Ames et Visages du XXe siècle (Paris: Grasset; Montréal: Les Variétés, 1944)


_____, Portraits littéraires choisis (Geneva: Skira, 1947)

Roy, Claude, Descriptions Critiques (Paris: Gallimard, 1949)

Sackville-West, Edward, Inclinations (London: Secker and Warburg, 1949)

Saint-Clair, M., Galerie privée (Paris; Gallimard, 1947)


_____, Les témoins de l'homme (Paris: A. Colin, 1951)

Slochower, Harry, "The Hope of Man: André Malraux," No Voice is wholly lost...Writers and Thinkers in war and peace (New York: Creative Age, 1945), pp. 319-331.

Stéphane, Roger, Portrait de l'aventurier: T.E. Lawrence, Malraux, Von Salomon, précédé d'une étude de Jean-Paul Sartre (Paris ?: Sagittaire, 1950)

Torre, Guillermo de, Problematica de la literatura (Buenos Aires; Editorial Losada S.A., 1951)

Wilson, Edmund, The Shores of light: a literary chronicle of the 'twenties and 'thirties (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1952)

Other Works Consulted


Brinton, Crane; *The Anatomy of Revolution* (New York: Prentice Hall, 1952)

__, *The Shaping of the Modern Mind* (New York: The New American Library (Mentor), 1953)


Cassirer, Ernst, *An Essay on Man* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1953)


Farber, Marvin, *Philosophic Thought in France and the United States* (Buffalo: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950)

Flaubert, Gustave, *Correspondance*, ed. L. Conard (Paris: Conard, 1930)

__, *La tentation de Saint Antoine (Livre)* (Paris: Charpentier, 1938)


Friedrich, Carl J., Editor, The Philosophy of Kant; Immanuel Kant's moral and political writings (New York: Modern Library, 1949)

Hamilton, Edith, The Greek Way to Western Civilization (New York: American Library (Mentor), 1953)


Kitto, H. D. F., Greek Tragedy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1954)


Loomis, Louise Ropes, Editor, Aristotle: On Man in the Universe (New York: Walter J. Black, 1943)

Maritain, Jacques, Humanisme intégral (Paris: Fernand Aubier, 1936)


Muller, Herbert J., The Uses of the Past (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952)


Orwell, George, Homage to Catalonia (Boston; The Beacon Press, 1955)

Proust, Marcel, A la recherche du temps perdu (Paris: Gallimard, 1944)

Revucci, Paul, L'aventure de l'humanisme européen au Moyen Age (IVe - XVe siècles) (Paris: Société d'édition Les Belles Lettres, 1953)

Spengler, Oswald, *The Decline of the West* (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1939)

Unamuno, Miguel de, *Del sentimiento trágico de la vida*, (Buenos Aires: Austral, 1947)


I, Charles Daniels Blend, was born in Marion, Indiana, July 18, 1918. I received my secondary education in the public schools of Hamilton, Ohio and Columbus, Ohio. On discharge from the Army in 1946 I began my undergraduate training at The Ohio State University, from which I received the degree Bachelor of Arts *cum laude* and with high distinction in French in 1949. While an undergraduate I attended school for one summer at Mexico City College and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Following my graduation I studied at the Université d'Aix-Marseille, France as a Fulbright scholar. In 1950 I began my graduate work at the Ohio State University, from which I received the degree Master of Arts in 1952. In 1950 I was appointed graduate-assistant in Romance Languages, which position I held until 1954, when I was appointed Instructor.