THE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONCEPTS
OF THE ARMY ORIENTATION PROGRAM

A Thesis Presented for the
Degree of Master of Arts
By

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Approved by:

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INTRODUCTION

American attitudes on political, economic and social questions are constantly influenced by a wide variety of stimuli. Our educational system, the daily press, radio and periodicals exert a continuing force on the public mind. Special interest groups methodically disseminate various propaganda.

During war-time the armed forces of any nation become an almost dominating factor in formulating public opinion. Particularly does an army condition the attitudes of its own soldiers. On many occasions our own military forces have caused deep and abiding changes in the thought patterns of America.

At the outset of the recently concluded struggle with the Axis Powers, the army of the United States began to assemble a service for education and propaganda. It was called in succession Morale Services, Orientation, and Orientation and Education. Finally in 1944 the title, Information and Education Division, was hit upon and was used for the remainder of the war. Our American armed forces have set up propaganda departments in other wars. But the effort to influence soldier opinion during World War II was tremendous in comparison with any that had been tried before.

Within the Information and Education Division,
Orientation became one of the nine branches devoted to education and propaganda. Orientation was a part of the whole program to formulate an intellectual basis for fighting the war, and to instill an understanding of the problems and challenges of peace in our own country and internationally.

It was the particular aim of Orientation to help condition the mental attitudes of American soldiers for combat. The inculcation of blind hatred of the enemy was rejected as an unworthy objective for soldiers of a democracy. Rather it was conceived that, if the American soldier had knowledge of and appreciation for the ideals of democracy, and a belief in the justice of American war and peace objectives, he would be mentally ready for the rigors of the battle-fronts.

In attempting to achieve an appreciation of democratic ideals and an understanding of the justice of our side in the minds and hearts of our troops, a vast amount of data was produced and a comprehensive program set up for its dissemination. The program and data of Orientation considered a great number of controversial issues in the fields of economics, politics and social relationships.

It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the orientation approach to these issues to determine what economic, political and social concepts, if any, were espoused by the Army through the orientation program. A study such as this is valuable to the political scientist,
if there are reasonable grounds to believe that orientation did influence the soldier mind. There is no exact means for measuring the program's effectiveness. But, because of the size and scope of the effort, it is in keeping with all experience in education and propaganda to believe that the army approach to political, economic and social problems did sufficiently stimulate soldier thinking to merit the research of a thesis.

The data for this thesis are for the most part official War Department directives and publications issued for the orientation program. Among these are examples of every type of material, and all the directives used in orientation. In addition, articles from Harper's Magazine, Saturday Evening Post, Collier's, New Republic, and other periodicals were used. The pamphlet on Un-American Activities released by the House Wood-Hankin committee is a part of the data for the construction of several chapters.

Besides these published materials, the writer has drawn upon his personal experiences in orientation work on several air fields in the continental United States. Some of the interpretations are colored by the writer's own acquaintance with discussion classes for enlisted soldiers, and from associations with the planning and administration of the orientation program. Lecture notes, acquired during a period of attendance at the Orientation School, Lexington, Virginia, form a part of the data.

The first chapter outlines the organization and
administration of army orientation. The second chapter deals with orientation concepts in economics and politics in the United States. The third chapter is concerned with a study of the orientation "line" on problems of social relationships. The fourth chapter examines the orientation approach to foreign affairs and international organization. The fifth and last chapter is devoted to an over-all evaluation of the program and to setting down some conclusions.

It is to be remembered that orientation was but one of nine branches of the whole propaganda department. The Information and Education Division utilized many other devices to mold soldier attitudes. It was the special function of orientation to set up soldier discussion groups. In the accomplishment of this function, orientation was charged with selecting appropriate discussion topics, and with the preparation of data to explain and define the topics chosen.

While Yank, Stars and Stripes, Armed Forces Radio, and other Information and Education media did exert an important force on the soldier mind, it is the writer's belief that orientation discussions influenced a far greater number of American soldiers than our other propaganda methods, and that the discussion program made a more lasting imprint on soldier thinking.
CHAPTER I

ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF ORIENTATION

During World War II the Axis nations steeled their soldiers for combat by instilling hate and fear, by lies and deception. Apparently the enemy program of indoctrination was successful during the early years of the conflict, especially when accompanied by superiority of arms. Upon American entry into the war our army was confronted with the question of how best to build mental attitudes capable of sustaining troops on the battle-fronts. This was a difficult task with American raw material, citizens recently from unwarlike, almost apolitical environments. The time was short. To the credit of army leaders, the copying of fascist techniques was discarded as unworthy and impractical. Instead, military officials charged with the responsibility for training soldiers chose another means to implant the spiritual strength necessary for combat. Our efforts in military indoctrination were directed to instilling intellectual convictions that the ideals and purposes of America's participation in the war were worthy of the sacrifices demanded.

The intellectual approach to the problem of soldier morale was not set in motion without criticism. The idea that men could be motivated to defeat and kill the enemy
by appeals to reason was repugnant to many military minds. In May, 1943 this appeared on the subject of combat morale:

"The view is apparently maintained in official quarters that with data in mind, much like the scholar issuing from his library, Americans will conquer the most efficient fighters the world has ever seen, the Japs and the Nazis.

The conviction that data are sufficient to produce a fighting emotional attitude is derived largely from the fact that most of the persons in power suffer from what might be called pan-intellectualism. Being intellectuals and reacting emotionally to facts and data, they make the mistake in thinking that all other persons react similarly. For the soldiers welfare and for the survival of his country the formulation of battle spirit must be skillfully integrated into deep emotional reactions of hatred toward the enemy and religious devotion to the ideals of America."

General "Blood and Guts" Patton, who boldly expressed his idea of democracy when he said he could not see any difference between the Nazi party and the ways of the Democratic and Republican parties, was one of the outspoken critics. Others, regular army officers, plus some new but enthusiastic "fighters", were openly scornful of the program. The writer's personal recollection of four or five commanding officers of air stations lists only one sympathetic to the plan of motivation by ideas.

Since the purpose of this paper is not to justify or undermine the validity of this approach to the problems


of morale, generally called Orientation or the Information and Education Program, the writer will not concern himself too much with why the Army chose this means. However, the views of those approving the intellectual approach are interesting. John Dollard in his Fear in Battle, a study of three hundred and seventy-five returned veterans of the American brigades in the Spanish War, writes that identification with cause is a powerful antidote to fear.

"The inevitable fear of battle has a powerful opponent in the profound conviction of the justice and importance of cause."

Another report on the factors in morale holds as follows:

"Of men who had a high measure of faith in the cause and the future, forty-eight per cent had a high degree of zeal."

One last citation before passing on to a consideration of the history of orientation, Colonel Milton A. Hill, writing in the Infantry Journal had this to say:

"What I mean here is something to give American fighters the desire to kill their enemies. I think of it as spiritual training although I don't care what you call it. I don't mean a blind unthinking hatred based on lies and psychological deceit from the high command which is what the Jap soldier had in his heart. But I do mean a spirit just as strong or stronger because it can be based on the truths of this war."

2. Outline of the Factors of Morale, prepared by the Faculty of the School for Special Services, Lexington, Virginia, (March 1944), p. 15.
Orientation History

"Probably the first orientation discussion in our history occurred on July 5, 1776, when the troops were gathered for a reading of the Declaration of Independence. There followed a discussion in which the soldier took part on the grounds and reasons for the war."1 Tom Paine was our first writer of orientation pamphlets. George Washington, in addition to encouraging Paine's work, issued general orders to be read to all soldiers. Their content and purpose were strikingly similar to some orientation materials today. In the War of 1812 General Andrew Jackson issued division orders including one entitled, "For What Are We Going to Fight".2

During World War I, orientation work among our troops was carried on mainly by civilian agencies. Upon the recommendation of Dr. Raymond B. Fosdick, head of the civilian agencies, and with the approval of the then Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, an army branch concerned with morale was set up. This new branch was headed by Brig. General Edward A. Munson. During World War I this service published a huge amount of propaganda, some sixty-five million leaflets, to our own troops and for enemy consumption. Wilson's Fourteen Points were emphasized in the pamphlets, both to give ideological conviction to our own soldiers and to convince the enemy that they had nothing to

2. Ibid., p. 27.
fear from allied victory. General Von Ludendorff said of these leaflets, "Germans were not beaten, but tricked by American propaganda". And from Von Hindenberg, "The enemy seeks to poison our spirit."

There is no way of measuring accurately the success of World War I orientation among our own soldiers. But we do know that the doughboy of 1918 was imbued with a high zeal for the purposes and justice of American participation in the conflict. "To Make the World Safe for Democracy" was not empty oratory in 1917 and 1918. It was a call American troops took to their hearts and for which they were willing to fight and die.

Between the wars the morale branch languished with the rest of the Army. But on July 29, 1940, with the coming of the period of emergency, the War Department set up a morale division in the office of the Adjutant General. In March, 1941, a morale branch began to function under the supervision and control of the Army Chief of Staff.

The army reorganization caused the creation of the newly named Information and Education Division to take the responsibility for soldier morale. Major General Frederick H. Osborn was placed in charge of the new division. The orientation section became one of the nine branches of the Information and Education Division which included Research, Information, Education, Orientation, Executive, Operations and Planning, Field Service, Analysis in Planning, Special Projects, and continued so until the end of the war.
Army Purpose for Orientation

What purpose did the army have in establishing Orientation? The program was a part of the training to produce efficient fighting men. It was that training aimed at building intellectual and ideological motivations in the minds and hearts of American soldiers so that the war aims of the United States might be accomplished. It was the overwhelming first objective of our war aims to totally defeat the Axis Powers. Orientation was charged with implanting the conviction that only unconditional surrender would be acceptable.

Further:

"We fight to preserve for ourselves and for the people throughout the world the chance to learn or continue learning how to govern themselves and how to live with one another."1

Orientation had the duty of teaching an understanding of the peace aims of the United States:

"The only possible justification for war is the fashioning of a less imperfect peace; also the military victories are indeed meaningless if the peace arrangements built upon them satisfy the victor less than the arrangement that led up to the war. Such arrangements must eventuate in an organization of both local and world society which seeks to be constructive rather than destructive for such is the definition of peace."2

War Department Circular No. 360 outlines the official duties of the orientation program as follows:

2. Ibid., p. 2.
1. To organize and supervise the conduct of army orientation course, and to obtain from available sources such definitions of the military mission as are related to orientation and the army orientation course.

2. To prepare and circulate materials for use in the army orientation course, and relate orientation activities.

3. To maintain a current orientation center containing files and library materials relating to the subject matter and principles of orientation.

4. To provide camp and unit newspapers with materials relating to orientation.

5. To arrange for and present lectures and motion pictures showing relative to orientation and to initiate, supervise, and guide voluntary orientation activities relating to morals.

6. To obtain materials for and to disseminate news summaries.

7. To organize and provide for conducting orientation meetings for officers.¹

The functions and activities of orientation were defined in the same directive:

"To formulate policies, plan and supervise procedures for orientation of military personnel and the background, causes, and current phases of the war and current events relating thereto, and for eventual return to civilian life; to prepare and select War Department materials for these purposes, including films, recordings, pamphlets, fact sheets, books, maps, and weekly reports of military and world events."²

Orientation had another purpose not so directly a part of the avowed greater military aim of producing the best

2. Ibid., p. 2.
soldier, and not so clearly set forth in army directives. The fact sheets and other instructional material clearly indicate that it was a part of the orientation aim to condition soldier responses to questions of a political, social and economic nature.

Guiding Principles for Orientation

Certain principles were early formulated to guide orientation officers and discussion leaders:

"There is never any justification, in any circumstance for the employment of material which is known to be false. The editorial rule, when in doubt leave it out, holds good. When information appears to be valuable and useful but has not been wholly authenticated, it is best stated as such. But that which is known to be false or is only vaguely rumored is to be avoided."¹

"For a short while only can morale be stimulated by dope of false propaganda. Then like a drug the more the victim swallows, the more has to be prescribed. Finally it ceases to work at all."²

Orientation did not attempt to gloss over the brutal necessities of war:

"All war is retaliation, all acts of war are reprisals and everything pertaining to the enemy is a military objective. The eye for an eye principle is old testament doctrine. In war's new testament, if the enemy shoots your toe, you shoot his head."³

Orientation movies pictured enemy atrocities in all their barbarism. But the indoctrination of utter hatred of the enemy was rejected as a practical training device.

². Ibid., p. 3.
³. Ibid., p. 6.
"It does not follow that instruction in hatred or consistent use of methods of incitement are means to the end in view. Such methods if pursued recklessly are likely to arouse the contempt of the soldier, bring him to question the validity of his own cause, and defeat the purposes of all indoctrinations. Let him become convinced of the complete justice of his cause, and of the malevolent character of the enemy as well as their power to destroy all of his treasures and he is mentally prepared to discharge the task at hand. If in addition to being informed on subjects such as those, the soldier is imbued with the true offensive spirit combined with the willpower which will not recognize defeat, hatred will come automatically in the required degree as he moves closer to the point of impact."1

It was one of the guiding principles of the orientation program that all information to the armed forces be kept clean in language and in thought. The orientation creed in regard to questions of race, religion and national origins will be treated in a later chapter, but, in a general way, the attitudes of tolerance and attempts at understanding sought by the program were expressed in Thomas Moore's poem:

"Shall I ask the brave soldier who fights by my side In the cause of mankind, if our creeds agree? Shall I give up the friend I have trusted and tried If he kneels not before the same altar with me? From the heretic girl of my soul should I fly To seek somewhere else a more orthodox kiss? Nay, perish the men and the laws that try Truth, valor and love by a standard like this."2

Selection and Training of Orientation Personnel

Major General F. H. Osborn, the Director of the Information and Education Division, directed that only men who

exhibited these basic beliefs be graduated from the Information and Education School at Lexington, Virginia:

1. Belief in the inviolability of the individual. This belief is basic to the American tradition. It is both a religious and an ethical concept, and in its practical application is the basis for the American way of life.

2. A belief in the democratic processes of government in the United States; that democracy is practical; the belief of Abraham Lincoln in the soundness of the majority opinion of the common man properly informed. This again is a concept basic to American life.

3. Also ideas which flow inevitably from these beliefs such as: freedom within the law is essential to our way of life; the principle of freedom applies to others as well as ourselves; peace is preferable to war, but not at the price of freedom; tolerance of race and religion is essential to freedom.

The basis for selection of orientation officers and impliedly for enlisted assistants was officially stated in War Department Circular, No. 360:

"Information and Education officers will be selected on the basis of their understanding of and their belief in the mission of Orientation, Information and Education as described in this Circular; their understanding of the importance of all components of the army including those stationed in zone of interior, and their ability to present their views clearly and convincingly. Officers for this duty should have a background of training or experience as instructors or interpretive writers, and should be able to relate the current discussion topics to the personal interests of the individual." 2

There is some question whether the letter or spirit of Circular No. 360, or the directions of General Osborn, were followed closely in choosing orientation personnel.

J. Frank Dobie, the Texas Professor who spent several years as a teacher in the American University at Shrivenham, England and as travelling lecturer for the Information and Education Division in Germany, makes these observations:

"My official business in Germany was always with Information and Education officers. I met a few, a very few, who were aware of realities beyond the physical. Generally, I wondered, in private, how they came to be picked for their jobs. Often I recalled the story of the old backwoodsman who offered a coon dog for sale; a prospective purchaser pressed for details on the dog's ability after coons. 'Well I'll tell you', said the backwoodsman, 'this dog ain't no account for nothing else so I figured he must be a good coon dog'. The average commanding officer when picking an Information officer usually appointed the one he could most easily and gladly dispense from other duties. I am not forgetting the regular army Lieutenant whom I met in Berlin, with one of the livest minds one could hope to be sharpened by. I am not forgetting the ageing Colonel out of the old regular army who saw to it that his men had chances at all sorts of enlightening literature and discussions. When he revealed his eager liberal mind I understood why he had not been promoted to General. Such stand out as exceptions to Information and Education officers who were efficient only in filling out forms, and making money out of black market operations, and doing nothing beyond the letter of the law."

Mr. Dobie's comments are no doubt largely true, but his criticism could apply just as completely to all administrative branches in the Army. The apathy which Mr. Dobie reports could be found in practically any army headquarters in the world. It was the writer's observation that, in general, Information and Education "brass" was

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a bit livelier than the general run of administrative officers. Those in orientation were usually better educated than their fellow officers, and with some background associated with the work they were doing. And since discussion periods were made mandatory by official directives, even the worst orientation officers were quite careful to select enlisted assistants who could do the work and relieve narrow shoulders of any burden at all.

The writer has a personal recollection of four Air Force Orientation Officers. One had been a music teacher in a California high school before the war, another a history teacher in Alabama. The assistant to the orientation officer at Merced Army Air Base, Merced, California, was a graduate of the University of Alabama. The most interesting and able of the group was a fiftyish former professor of agriculture from the University of Oregon. The first three were captains in rank. The professor from Oregon remained a second lieutenant until the day he received his discharge orders. The four men were interested in orientation. They were well qualified. They planned and executed excellent discussion courses.

The enthusiasm of enlisted assistants was at times short of being satisfactory. On the Salinas Army Air Base, Salinas, California, the twelve or more enlisted discussion leaders once quit their orientation duties en masse when the first sergeant withdrew certain K. P. privileges. These men were not specialists, but they had been chosen to lead
discussions within their own squadrons, and were presumed to have somewhat greater eagerness for the work than was exhibited on this occasion.

Concerning the energy and ability of the enlisted men assigned specifically for orientation duties, Specialists Number 274, there was little to criticize. With few exceptions, they were qualified, avidly interested and efficient. Enlisted men who attended the orientation school at Lexington, Virginia, consistently made higher marks than the officers. The Orientation Digest published by the War Department carried frequent laudatory reports on the achievements of enlisted orientation personnel at the various camps and stations.

At the very outset of the program those responsible for orientation recognized the need for direction, uniformity and coordination to accomplish the objectives set forth in army directives. To help meet this necessity a school for special services was established in the fall of 1943 at Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Virginia. Included in the curriculum was an orientation course for officers and enlisted men assigned to carry out the discussion program. During the operation of the school, thirty-five separate month-long orientation courses were taught.

The selection of Washington and Lee University as a training site might have been more fortunate. The Virginia viewpoint on race relationships was hardly conducive to
appreciation of democratic accomplishments. However, proximity to Washington, D.C. was regarded as advantageous. And the school itself did not take on the prejudices of the region. There was no color discrimination practiced within the confines of the Washington and Lee campus during the period of army occupancy.

It is quite possible that citizens of the Lexington community were shocked to see black soldiers attending classes in the hallowed halls of their Southern University. One white soldier remarked, "I'll bet Lee whirls in his grave like a top when these Negroes walk into this old chapel." It was Lee Chapel, and had been the General's headquarters for a part of the Virginia Campaigns during the Civil War. Students from the adjoining Virginia Military Institute always paused to salute on coming to the front of the Chapel. Some of these were probably disturbed at the situation.

There were no really serious open objections to the presence of Negro troops at the school. However, one or two unpleasant incidents did occur. Once several southern officers became indignant at the prospect of sitting in classrooms with colored Americans; they were too shocked to keep silent. These men were summarily dismissed from the school as unfit for orientation work. Of course, such incidents might have occurred wherever the school's location, but perhaps there was an added boldness by reason of Washington and Lee's southern exposures.
Remembering that even the most important data can be made uninteresting by weary or unsympathetic teachers, it is well to look at the faculty for the orientation course. The director of the school, Lt. Col. Herzberg, had been a dentist before entering the army. Possibly dentists have time for reflection and study between extractions. At least this ex-dentist exhibited a high degree of scholarship, and a philosophic conception of democratic ideals on the occasions he lectured the student body. Lieutenant Niles, who taught courses on the collection and handling of news, had been a news commentator for a large eastern network. Captain Babcock, for courses on American Democracy, had taught at a Wisconsin High School. He was an enthusiastic teacher, but there was some skepticism concerning his scholarship. Lieutenant Sprague, who lectured on the Negro problem, had been an Episcopalian minister. He gave spirited and liberal discourses on the treatment of colored Americans in our democracy. There were rumors that his liberal approach to the problem was not all a matter of his personal convictions. But if his interpretations were prodded somewhat by higher military authority, his lectures gave not the slightest hint that he was not dedicated to the cause of easing racial tensions.

The faculty for the orientation course was uniformly made up of men possessing what we are accustomed to call liberal minds. Some were combat returnees; the greater number served out the war at Washington and Lee. Many
of them were experienced teachers from high schools and colleges. There were fewer advanced degrees among the faculty members than is characteristic of most American colleges and universities. But there was compensation for this in the enthusiasm and diligence displayed by most of the instructors.

The course of training covered a period of four weeks, twenty-eight calendar days, twenty-three and one-half instructional days, and covered a minimum of one hundred and eighty-eight hours of formal classroom instruction. The scope of the subject matter included a wide variety of controversial problems. Here is a list of the subjects taught, selected to indicate the social, economic and political concepts under consideration:

- The German
- Fascism
- The Jap
- World Interdependence
- The Pacific Island
- The German Aggressor
- The Jap Aggressor
- The People of China
- The People of India
- The People of France
- The USA-Traditions
- The American Negro
- The Philippines
- The Home Front
- The Battle of Russia
- GI Bill of Rights
- Business with the USSR
- Peace Aims of the United States
- Lend Lease, Weapon of Democracy
- One of the United Nations
- Panel Discussion on News
- What Are War Criminals
- Fascism in the Western Hemisphere
- Minority Groups and Scapegoats
- Our Allies in Occupied Lands
- The People of the USSR
- The Meaning of Democracy
- Anti-Democratic Forces
- Melting Pot or Minorities
- Living Newspaper-Know Your Allies
- Compulsory Military Training
- Definition and Nature of Propaganda
- Atrocity Stories and the Future of China

The curriculum included, in addition, time set aside for individual conferences with instructors, morale plays and skits, the importance of music for morale, and of course the inevitable military drill and physical training.
Discussion leaders were provided for groups wishing further study of any problem. The lectures on the American Negro led to the formation of several such groups.

The general atmosphere of the school was about as free of military formality as a liberal interpretation of army directives would permit. Formations were kept at a minimum. There was less military precision required in dress than most students had been accustomed to associate with life in the Army. The usual "inspect the hell out of 'em" practice was not present, and the requirements of military courtesy were largely dispensed with. However, the minimum of military climate permeating Washington and Lee was quite enough. There were separate quarters, mess and recreational facilities for officers. Enlisted men and officers did attend the same classes together and enlisted men were permitted to use the same toilet facilities as the "brass".

The school's departure from army "Jim Crow" tradition was about as complete as in any northern university's Y.M.C.A. Colored and white soldiers used the same mess hall, and the same living quarters. The writer does not know of any instances where white and black soldiers shared the same room, but, if this was avoided officially, it was the only concession to the color pattern regarded as inflexible by most white Americans. The interracial arrangements at the school might have provided a beneficial shock to some soldiers from the south. The high quality minds revealed by most of the Negroes was probably a
revelation to many from both north and south. In summation, the orientation course at Washington and Lee University was comprised of excellent subject matter and adequate instruction. The entire course was directed to the point of making certain that no one could avoid the orientation "line" in social, economic and political areas because of ignorance as to its character. The approach to these areas was laid down in detail, and the emphasis was on the point that there was no other. During the war approximately ten thousand officers and men were trained for orientation in the school at Lexington. This is an admittedly small number in relation to the total number in our armed forces. But each graduate was to organize on-the-job-training for enlisted assistants in the principles and data of the program. Furthermore, extension training courses were conducted by the school's faculty in all parts of the world.

The orientation school on the campus of Washington and Lee was the nerve point for all training and data for the course. Leaders who later set up numerous on-the-job-training sessions were trained there. The practices and procedures learned at Lexington served to guide the curriculum and planning of all other schools for discussion leaders.

It is interesting to look at a few of the more successful orientation schools organized at posts or stations in the United States. At Drew Field, Florida, a week long
A training session was conducted for non-commissioned officers: "Instructors included officers, who had completed schooling at the orientation school at Lexington; throughout the course an atmosphere of informality and free discussion was maintained." The curriculum was similar to that in force at Washington and Lee.

Will Roger's Field, Oklahoma, carried on a six day training school for discussion leaders. Personnel from all the air stations in the Third Tactical Division, comprising some six air fields, were eligible to attend. Those who were assigned to the school were carefully screened in advance to determine their background for orientation and their interest in the program.

Here is a description of the curriculum at the Will Roger's Air Field:

"The subject matter covered at Lexington was broken down into a six day 0800 to 1730 daily schedule. After eliminating subjects not pertinent to unit orientation personnel, the balance of the material covered at Lexington was included, such as causes and course of the war, informational media, orientation principles, the returning soldier and practicing and conducting discussion groups."

One of the most successful orientation schools, "In Service Orientation Training School of the Alaskan Division, Air Transport Command", was held at Great Falls, Montana.

3. Ibid., p. 8.
Again the lessons learned at the Orientation School in Lexington served to guide curriculum planning and organization. The classes were devoted to talks on the mission and function or orientation, backgrounds and causes for the war, and problems of the homefront.¹

The overseas orientation training centers were organized in most cases by faculty members from the Lexington Orientation School. Schools to train discussion leaders were set up in Naples, Italy, the Central Pacific Theatre, New Calendonia, England, the Middle East and South America.

The course at Lexington, in particular, and the many other training centers for discussion leaders, played an important part in developing leaders capable of teaching the ideals necessary for proper soldier morale.

The orientation school at Lexington and the other training projects mark the first real attempt by our Army to train leaders capable of teaching men to think about problems of democracy, and the realities of international relationships.

Orientation in Operation

Circular 360 was the chart for orientation organization:

"All military personnel, commissioned and enlisted, shall be given training in orientation through a course to be known as the Army Orientation Course. In regiments, groups, and separate battalions, squadrons, companies and detachments, not less than one undivided hour per week will be devoted to this training during duty

hours, and such training will be directly supervised by regularly assigned officers of the lowest echelons of command."

Orientation personnel was assigned to duty on this basis:

1. Army, Corps, and Division Headquarters and Comparable Air Force Units—One staff officer will be designated Information and Education Officer in the grade of Lieutenant Colonel to carry out the orientation mission. Two enlisted assistants, technical grade 3-4-5 will be assigned.

2. Armored Divisions—Three officers in the grade of Captain and three enlisted men, technical grade 5, will be included in division headquarters to be detailed as Information and Education Officers and enlisted assistants.

3. Regiments, Groups and Comparable Units—One staff officer in the grade of Captain will be designated Information and Education Officer with one enlisted assistant, technical grade 5.

4. Service Commands

a. There will be an Information and Education Division in the headquarters of each service command staffed with sufficient officers to supervise Orientation and Education and Information activities within the service command.

b. Post Camps and Stations—Allotments for posts camps and stations having a troop population of two thousand or more will include not less than one officer in the grade of Captain, and not less than one enlisted assistant, technical grade 5, and this may be increased with commensurate distribution of grades on the basis of an added officer and enlisted man for each two thousand additional troops.

In posts, camps and stations having less than one thousand population, a qualified officer other than the Chaplain will be designated by the Post Commanding Officer as Information and Education Officer in addition to other duties.

5. Zone of Interior Hospitals—The supervision of Information and Education and Orientation relating to hospital patients will be performed by reconditioning divisions and reconditioning personnel.

6. Overseas

   a. Staff Sections—Theatre, department, base, defense, and comparable overseas commanders will establish staff divisions or sections within the headquarters and assign Information and Education personnel to such staff sections within their current allotments.

   b. Task Forces and Comparable Units—In task forces, defense, island bases and similar overseas commands where miscellaneous troops of Army Ground, Air, and/or Service Forces are gathered together, the Commanding Officer thereof is authorized an Information and Education Officer in grade of not less than Captain and one enlisted assistant, technical grade 5, per each two thousand troops.

7. Ports of Embarkation—Port commanders are authorized to establish an Information and Education Branch under Director of Personnel of the Port with a Branch Chief in the grade of Major, and with assistant Information and Education Officers in the grade of Captain, on the basis of one for each two thousand permanently assigned troops, and with such enlisted and/or civilian personnel required to carry out the mission and the functions of the Branch.

8. Training centers, including replacement centers, Army Service Forces Training Centers, and Officer Candidate Schools,
will include not less than one officer who will be designated Information and Education Officer on the same basis as above.¹

The above allotment of orientation personnel indicates that the program extended throughout all branches of the Army. Army regulations required that one undivided hour each week be set aside for troop discussion programs. One hour does not allow a very thorough study of a given problem. But a steady course of weekly hour long conferences on national and international problems leads to the presumption that such a course would exert a noticeable influence upon soldier opinion.

It is to be remembered that the orientation and Information and Education personnel assigned by Circular 360 was for the most part concerned with organizing and supervising the discussion hours. The actual on-the-spot discussion leaders were usually enlisted men chosen from various squadrons and companies on the basis of ability and interest in the program. The orientation officers did bear the sole responsibility for conducting discussion for the commissioned soldiers, possibly on the theory that enlisted men should not discuss and argue anywhere at any time with their "peers".

The operational set up for orientation was not precisely laid down by army directive except for the one undivided hour per week provision. But there were suggestions

¹ Circular 360, War Department, Washington, D.C., (September, 1944), pp. 3-8.
provided by high officials which were best followed for
the sake of favorable inspection reports. The suggested
plan was to divide the personnel of the post or station
into workable units of not more than forty men if possible,
but never more than a company or squadron. Enlisted assis-
tants were chosen for these groups and charged with the
responsibility for establishing suitable discussion and
information periods.

The writer was associated as an enlisted assistant
with the orientation service on the Salinas Army Air Base,
and later at Merced Army Air Base, both in California.
These stations followed recommended practices, as was done
throughout the army organizations. Orientation hours were
set for each day of the week by the officer in charge.
Discussion groups were chosen alphabetically to include
approximately forty men. Enlisted assistants were assigned
to meet with each group. On each Friday morning all dis-
cussion leaders assembled in orientation headquarters for
briefing. The officer distributed data for the next week's
program, and pointed out the information to be emphasized.
Time was provided in each briefing session for the mulling
over of the past week's classes, and for discussion of any
special problems.

After being briefed and equipped with data, the dis-
cussion leaders were presumably ready to teach efficiently.
The officer in charge prescribed a plan of action to be
followed in the classes. Each hour opened with a summary
of the news compiled from press releases. Orientation centers ordinarily had a press association teletype. Up-to-date maps and charts were part of the data supplied to discussion leaders. After the news summary, the subject for the week was reviewed and commented upon by the orientation assistants. Sources for this part of the session were first Army Talk, issued weekly by the Information and Education Division, and secondly, any research the leader might have undertaken. Thereafter, and to the end of the hour, the meeting was open for questions, disagreements and argument. This part of the discussion period was often quite lively, particularly if the group was not too large. Most discussion leaders made little effort to confine any controversy which might develop, except to keep it reasonably proximate to the subject under inquiry.

Many army camps and stations established regular off-duty discussion sessions on a voluntary basis. This phase of orientation was particularly well developed at Keesler Field, Mississippi, Merced Army Air Base, Merced, California, and at Camp Beale in California. Discussion leaders were made available for these groups, and almost any problem might be the subject matter. A long series entitled The GI Roundtable Subjects, to suggest topics for off-duty study groups, was issued by the Armed Forces Institute at Madison, Wisconsin. Some of the booklets were entitled Can We Prevent Future Wars?, Will There Be Work for All?, What Future for the Islands of the Pacific?. In all, the series totaled
ninety pamphlets covering a wide variety of problems. In choosing the topics, the Armed Forces Institute used the Army's version of the Gallup Poll, *What the Soldier Thinks*, to determine areas of possible interest.

The above paragraphs outline the procedures followed generally on posts and stations within the Zone of the Interior only. However, overseas orientation followed closely the practices described above except for variations pertinent to a particular theatre of war. There was a comprehensive orientation program among so-called "static" troops, those who were in the services of supply and administration. These far outnumbered combat soldiers. There was some attempt to follow troops into the combat zones, but the success of this part of the program was limited.

The orientation plan followed at the 2nd Replacement Depot, Italy is an example of the overseas program.

"The present orientation program is divided into several phases. First there are news bulletins available to the troops at various times of the day. The second phase consists of news lectures given each day except Sundays at 1000 hours to groups as part of their planned schedule. During the hour stress is laid upon news reports with an interpretation of their significance and possible trends. Opportunity is given for a question and answer period after each discussion. There are available to the Depot Personnel maps, articles, graphs, and pictures divided into categories such as "Know Your Enemy", "Why We Fight", etc."

The detail of this chapter is designed to provide a background in the history, organization and administration of Army Orientation so that the reader might gain an appreciation of the size and effort of the program. The remaining chapters are devoted to an examination of Army Orientation to determine just what concepts in Economics, Politics and Social Relationships were propagandized through the media of the discussion program.
A great number of economic and political questions were examined in the orientation program. The regularly scheduled weekly orientation hour was the main instrument for disseminating political and economic information, although voluntary, off-duty, discussion groups helped to bring intelligent consideration of problems in these fields to the attention of army personnel.

*Army Talk* and *The GI Roundtable Series* constituted the main sources for information. There was some provision for additional materials:

"Unit commanders are not restricted to the use of Orientation, Information or Education material provided by the War Department. These may be augmented by such additional materials as seem necessary or desirable. But the responsibility for keeping the selection and use of supplementary material within the policy of War Department provisos and directives lies solely with commanding officers."

A basic reference library was issued to all orientation officers. It included these books on political subjects, *Our Constitution and Government*, by Seckler Hudson, *A Short History of American Democracy*, by John D. Hicks, and *Freedom Speaks*, by D. F. Conners and G. F. Reynolds. The reference library did not contain books on economics.

The materials approved and distributed by the War Department covered a very wide area in economics and politics, and it was seldom necessary, though it would have been desirable, to add supplementary data.

There would have been a better assurance of broader soldier knowledge in the areas discussed by orientation if the Army had provided critical books and magazines on economics and politics in the post libraries. It is true that the reading interest of most soldiers was in completely different channels. But, at least, an opportunity should have been provided for those wishing further study.

Libraries usually had many books of a technical sort, and most of the later novels, but almost never critical studies on economics or politics. Life, Newsweek, Time, The United States News, and Reader's Digest could be found in most libraries, along with Omnibook and technical magazines. But, The New Republic, Nation, Foreign Affairs, Harper's, Atlantic Monthly, and others like them, were hardly ever seen. Probably the most lavishly provided "collateral readings" were the various comic magazines.

There was very little official restraint on the scope of discussion in the fields suggested for inquiry. However, these areas were selected by military authorities, and, although other problems than those proposed could be used, it was the general practice to stay closely within the scope of study outlined in Army Talk, and The GI Roundtable Series. This was not too confining for these sources
covered a wide area of investigation, even into the "dark spots" of our American life. Orientation never considered it necessary to "whitewash" every practice and tradition of our country just because it was American. The Guide for Orientation Leaders laid down this principle:

"Information within a nation which is benefited by a free press is not edited as if there were constant danger that the citizen would become chagrined and rebellious at the discovery that his country is not Utopia. Nor should it be so edited for the armed forces of that nation. The growth of Democracy—indeed, the preservation of it—is dependent upon men looking squarely at its imperfections as well as its virtues and strength. Only a naive minority finds it necessary to believe that present democracy is the "best of all possible worlds," and those who believe otherwise do not draw assurance from being kept in the dark."1

Most commanding officers and orientation officers did not attempt to restrain free discussion of controversial problems. Occasionally, however, "high brass," and even "low brass," did interject their own limitations and interpretations into the orientation program.

The commanding officer of the Salinas Army Air Base, Salinas, California, once suggested that orientation secure Upton Close for a lecture. The orientation officer acted very promptly. When Mr. Close appeared, he proceeded to lambast vigorously organized labor in general, and John L. Lewis in particular. The bias of the Close interpretation of labor's war effort was so bad that the commanding officer, who was actually wholly responsible for the lecture, felt

compelled to disavow officially everything Mr. Close had said.

Sergeant Mark Perlman, enlisted assistant in orientation at Camp Beale, California during the war, the son of Dr. Selig Perlman, head of the Labor-Economics Department of the University of Wisconsin, and himself a former history instructor there, told the writer that the orientation officer at Camp Beale considered his (Perlman's) interpretations on labor and New Deal politics too "red" for use in the discussion hours.

An example of meddling with freedom of soldier expression in political matters comes from an account of the difficulties encountered in publishing the Army newspaper, *Stars and Stripes*:

"On the eve of a critical subcommittee hearing on the bill, Lieutenant Colonel Goodfriend sent to the desk of the Paris *Stars and Stripes* an editorial entitled 'The May Bill Is The Must Bill'.

Two days before the editorial was written there had come from Washington an urgent telephone call. Over the transatlantic circuit to the assembled 'brass' of the I. & E. Division had come the voice of a Colonel in the office of Robert Patterson, then Under-secretary of War. The War Department, the voice declared, wanted an editorial from *Stars and Stripes*, 'the voice of the soldiers', on the May Bill'.

*Stars and Stripes* was in no sense the responsibility of the orientation branch of the Information and Education Division. But the incident reported above serves to

illustrate that "higher military authority" did sometimes interfere with the freedom of soldier expression on political matters.

The discussion periods were supervised to insure that the objectives of orientation were being met. But these objectives were conceived to promote free inquiry into controversial fields of thought.

**Democracy Defined**

The orientation discussions on American political problems did not formulate any particularly new or dynamic concepts. The validity of the democratic theory was deliberated, as well as the practical record of democracy as a philosophy of government. Much that was taught during the orientation hour was probably a revelation to many soldiers, some of whom had no doubt never before thought about democracy as a political theory or even as a system of government.

*Army Talk 120, "What is American Democracy?,"* made a substantial effort to analyze democracy as a political term. The definition so popularly ascribed to soldiers, "It means cherry pie from Mom, and maybe a soda at the corner drug store", was rejected as frivolous and an insult to soldier intelligence. "Democracy means life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and something more, it means human dignity and freedom from fear." The fact sheet proposed this question, "What does Democracy Mean to You?" This

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query aroused a great deal of controversy on whether the American record in certain political fields was defensible.

The data for this orientation subject dwelt at length on our failures in the field of municipal government. "Bossism" in American cities was called a blot on our political record, and the result of citizen refusal to carry out their democratic duty to vote intelligently. The certain "bossridden cities" were not openly named, but it was within the discussion leader's discretion to go beyond the data, and comment on just what cities had succumbed to the "boss" influence, and who the "bosses" were.

Cincinnati was held out as a model among cities in her freedom from corruption and inefficiency. And it was pointed out that Cincinnati had been made "clean" when aroused citizens "had thrown the rascals out."

Political Parties

The practices and history of American political parties were considered in the discussion hour based on Army Talk 124, "Political Parties in America." It was directly stated that the two party system was best for America, and, by inference, third party movements were rejected as impractical and not in keeping with American traditions.

The multiple character of European party systems was called one of the basic reasons for the notorious instability of most of that continent's national governments. The tragic failure of the German "Weimar Republic" was attributed mainly to the "splinter" nature of German political parties at that time.
The advantages of the two party system were listed in the fact sheet as follows:

1. Two parties aid in minimizing opposing interests.
2. One party becomes the tool of dictators.
3. In the USSR there is only one party, the Communist; here there is no unified opposition.¹

Possible objections to the two party setup were stated to be:

1. People might have only a limited choice to express their views.
2. Political parties are often diseased with graft and corruption.²

The Army Talk concluded the discussion of political parties in America with this:

"Because mistakes are made, and because there must be new solutions to new problems, political parties will continue to be essential in this Democracy. The two party system guarantees that the voice of the people shall be heard."³

The Supreme Court

The part played by the Supreme Court in our political life was discussed on the basis of factual material supplied in Army Talk 127, "What is the Job of the Supreme Court?". This included court history, an account of its past and present personnel, and comment on judicial practices in hearing cases.

2. Ibid., p. 8.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
Some statements both interesting and provocative to many audiences were made in the fact sheet. It was said of Hugo Black, "his nomination was confirmed by the Senate after a storm of protest from ultra-conservative leaders."¹ Those who profess to have opinions on public figures have either highly favorable or definitely critical convictions on the character and ability of Justice Black. That his opposition stemmed from ultra-conservative sources would be a gratifying suggestion for some, and quite distasteful to others.

Further, it was stated, "the Supreme Court defends the civil liberties of American citizens."² Certain groups, whose civil liberties are sharply circumscribed, could hardly accept this declaration.

The data provided for orientation on the Supreme Court defended all judicial organization and all judicial powers. There was nowhere a suggestion that possibly certain court prerogatives might be anachronistic for the requirements of a democracy.

Veterans in Politics

Certain political advice to veterans was attempted in Army Talk 114, "The Veteran As a Citizen". It was urged that soldiers become citizens first, veterans second. Further, "Veteran leadership can be dangerous. In some countries selfish veterans succeeded once before in their plans. Hitler and most members of the early Nazi movement were veterans of the first world war German Army."³

1. Army Talk 127, "What is the Job of the Supreme Court?", Washington, D.C., (June 15, 1946), p. 3.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
Two ways in which the veteran could increase his value to the community were stated in the fact sheet as follows:

1. He can develop his own understanding and knowledge of public affairs. He can build a respect within himself and his family for the duties of citizenship. He can, through his acts, personally support actions based on the common good, as against those directed toward selfish aims.

2. He can assert the highest quality of the citizen, leadership. By asserting leadership he can help personally to guarantee the investment in Democracy which he has made during these past few years.¹

The Army in a Democracy

The role of the Army in a democratic nation was the subject of Army Talk 109. Some interesting propaganda for the military services was provided in the fact sheet. Possibly this orientation was prepared to help combat the antagonisms which many soldiers had formed against the Army and all its works. By February, 1946, when the Army Talk was distributed, even the most impervious group of "old army" beneficiaries could be supposed to have sensed some of the hostility which prevailed in the minds of enlisted troops. And such dissatisfactions might have been recognized as possible future embarrassments to military ambitions in the post-war United States.

Even a cursory reading of the issues of Yank, particularly those issues just preceding its "honorable discharge", would have served to disturb even the most complacent

military official. Here is an example of soldier dissatisfaction with Army social traditions:

"Our social customs in the Army are based on the relations of lord and serf. While it is understandable that in feudal times the social customs of the period were carried over into Army life, we should recognize that times have changed. Our modern civilian, accustomed to equality and guaranteed civil rights, is drafted. From the moment he becomes a G. I. any relationship between what he experiences and Democracy are purely incidental....If we fought with weapons as outdated as the customs the Army sponsors, we would be polishing our bows and sharpening our arrows instead of witnessing jet propulsion, and the miracle of the atomic bomb."¹

Many other evidences of attitudes adverse to the best interests of the military establishment could be cited.

The fact sheet, "The Role of Our Army in Democracy," discussed the reasons for civilian distrust of large standing armies:

1. Suspicion of strong national government.
2. Natural defense gives civilians confidence.
3. We traditionally depend upon our citizens in time of war.²

It was asserted in this discussion that the people hold the purse strings, and "no stone is left unturned to insure civilian control of the Army."³

In defense of the proposition that military services

³ Ibid., p. 6.
could never become a threat to democratic freedoms, it was stated:

1. The Army does as it is told.
2. It has never subverted the liberties of the people.
3. It performs non-military functions.
4. Its main function is defense.¹

The really "burning" difference that many soldiers had with the army, its lack of democracy, was not discussed. Military authorities, in the writer's opinion, missed a most important propaganda point. A promise of possible Army democratization would have elicited favorable mental responses from soldiers, most of whom at the time, February, 1946, were about to be discharged. However, armies hardly ever confess any mistakes, and it is probably too much to expect that our own would admit any "dents in its armor."

**Single Department of Defense**

The orientation program was given the duty of propagating army proposals for reorganization of American armed services. The Army sponsored single department idea was the subject for an eight page fact sheet issued by the Information and Education Division. Six of the eight pages were devoted to an obvious advocacy of the army plan. Discussion leaders were cautioned,

"The text of this Army Talk is not to be considered an official statement. As with all Army Talks, however, every

effort has been made to obtain fairness and accuracy in its preparation."1

**Universal Military Training**

The War Department has expended a great amount of effort to sell universal military training to American citizens since V-E Day. Probably its most lavish propaganda for "U.M.T.," is the Fort Knox "showcase for military training." Orientation assumed part of the burden. *Army Talk 155, "Universal Military Training,"* claimed that these public benefits would result from a comprehensive plan of peacetime military training:

1. It would allow rapid mobilization.
2. It would maintain peacetime forces at a high level.
3. It would allow the nation to choose individuals with demonstrated capacity for military leadership.
4. It would help correct incapacitating physical defects.
5. Opportunity would be provided for raising the standard of education for young manhood of the nation and to improve the physical well being of all trainees.

The apparent conflict between a sudden departure by the United States from its traditional position on peacetime military service with the one world proposition, embodied in the United Nations Charter, was explained in this single sentence:

"Until the United Nations is able to guarantee a peaceful world, we must assume the possibility of war, and be prepared for it on a modern scale."¹

Will There Be Future Wars

At another earlier date the War Department had seen fit to distribute propaganda of an entirely opposite nature. In 1944, the booklet, Can We Prevent Future Wars?, was produced under the auspices of the War Department for use by off-duty soldier discussion groups. The pamphlet seemed to maintain that war could and would be avoided through the instrument of international organization because,

"All over the world people are fighting and dying, suffering and sacrificing, praying and purposing that war must not and shall not happen again."²

The failures of the old League of Nations were recited, as well as previously tried unsuccessful means of preventing war. The new device to accomplish an end to all war, an International Armed Force, was held out as the one remaining hope in man's search for means to keep the world at peace. It was recognized that there would be extreme difficulty in securing acceptance of any plan which would in any way limit national sovereignty.

The following questions were recommended for use:

1. Can we have lasting peace?

2. Are nations like individuals?

3. Should the United States join forces with other nations in enforcing peace?

4. Can lasting peace be maintained without force to back it up?

5. What kind of force would be best for backing up our design for permanent peace?

Summary of Orientation on American Politics

It can be discerned from the foregoing paragraphs that some of the orientation program on political questions in the United States was designed to promote certain post-war plans desired by the Army. Universal military training, a single department of defense, and other army projects not discussed in this paper, were propagated in favorable terms by orientation data and through the discussion programs. This phase of orientation occurred after the end of the fighting, when military authorities probably were much concerned with the disheartening prospect of drastic cuts in future military appropriations. It appears doubtful to the writer that orientation made any deep impression on soldier attitudes in regard to these militarily desirable propositions. The frame of mind of the average soldier in late 1945 and early 1946 was hardly responsive to pleas for an expansion of the military influence in American life.

The discussion periods devoted to teaching an understanding of American political theories and practices were worthwhile educational meetings. No startling revelations were disclosed in the sessions, but there was a distinct

effort to inform American soldiers on democracy as a political system.

The field of political inquiry was limited to a rather elementary level of discussion, and most of the Army Talks on governmental problems were issued in early 1946 after a substantial number of soldiers had been discharged. Even so, the orientation discussions in the area of domestic politics did have an effect on the thinking of a large group of troops. Their knowledge of the theories and facts of democratic government was expanded, and it can hardly be doubted that this knowledge tended to influence soldier opinion toward a broader and better conception of American political problems.

The orientation discussions on political questions in the United States seemed to frame these concepts:

1. Every citizen has the duty to vote intelligently.

2. The veteran should take an informed, unselfish leadership in political areas.

3. Our most conspicuous democratic failure, municipal government, can be renovated by intelligent, active citizens.

4. The Supreme Court in its present organization is well suited to the needs of modern democratic government.

5. War can be prevented by an intelligent citizenship in our own country and in other nations through an international police force under United Nations control.

6. A single department of national defense is the best type of civilian control of our armed services.

7. Universal Military Training is essential for America in the present world.
American Economic Problems

The War Department during the first years of American participation in World War II seemed reluctant to sponsor soldier discussions of the so-called controversial questions. American economic problems were avoided by the orientation program until about the middle of 1944. Sometime around that date the more progressive elements in the War Department evidently won at least a partial victory. Army Talks, and GI Roundtable subjects on a fairly wide group of economic controversies began to appear at the various orientation centers.

It is unfortunate that army progressives were not successful earlier in their efforts to liberalize the scope of the Information and Education Program. However, after 1944, countless soldiers did have access to excellent economic factual material, and an opportunity to discuss many important issues in the area of domestic economics.

American Agriculture

In April, 1945, a fairly detailed economic study on American agriculture was distributed by orientation for use in off-duty discussion groups. Almost a year later some of the same material was reproduced in one of the Army Talks, and used in the regularly scheduled orientation periods. The data provided for use in off-duty discussions was an interesting, and comprehensive account of the problems of American farmers. The Army Talk was less detailed, and was evidently designed primarily to provide a sort of vocational
guidance to prospective farmers among our troops. However, a considerable amount of the factual information set out originally for the off-duty program, was incorporated into the regularly scheduled compulsory orientation hour.

The economic chaos which affected our farming population during the thirties, and even as early as 1923 was described in detail. The pamphlet particularly emphasized the social disasters suffered by many rural families during the depression.

A repetition of the farm debacle was foreseen as an aftermath of World War II unless the deflationary spiral in farm prices, which has always followed our wars, could be avoided. Farm prosperity, it was pointed out, depends on two essential conditions,

1. Full employment and high national income to provide people with money to buy the bulk of our farm output at prices profitable to the producer.

2. A large volume of foreign trade which would take care of agricultural surpluses.

The pamphlet throughout emphasized the close relationship between high farm income and high wage levels for American workers. There was the obvious inference that farmers, and labor movement had a great deal in common. This has always been a difficult fact for most farmers to understand because of a variety of factors, not the least of which is their conservative distrust of so-called radical labor organizations. Orientation performed a service in the

direction of promoting better understanding between working-
men and our farm people.

One would be more certain that the program performed
this service, if the GI off-duty discussion groups had been
better attended, or if all of the data had been used in the
regular orientation program. Unfortunately, soldiers did
not exhibit much enthusiasm for the off-duty forums whatever
the problem to be discussed. And, although some of the data
on farm problems provided originally for off-duty discussions
was used in the on-duty program, the greater emphasis there
was on special vocational advice to future farmers.

The importance of the role of government in a continuing
prosperity for agriculture was discussed at great length.
It was foreseen that post-war farmers would be given consid-
erable help by the government,

"Congress has declared that farm
prices must be supported by federal
subsidies, loan and crop purchases
for two years after the war, if far-
mers elect to restrict production.
Everything will doubtless be done to
put a floor under farm prices and
prevent their sudden collapse."1

Cooperatives

A subject closely related to any discussion on agri-
culture was prepared and distributed by orientation in Sept-
ember, 1944. Again this title, "Why Co-ops?," was intended
for use in the off-duty discussion meetings. And this infor-
mation was never reproduced for larger audiences, except
possibly in a supplementary way by some leaders.

1. GI Roundtable, "Shall I Take Up Farming?" war
   Department, Washington, D.C., (April 13, 1943), p. 44.
This was an unfortunate limitation to the effect the pamphlet might have had.

The study of the American cooperative movement was introduced in this way:

"Are Co-ops a cure-all for our economic problems? Do they stifle free enterprise? This is a hot question among farmers, merchants and consumers. What are the facts? This booklet gives both sides of the question. Read it and have your say."1

The history, functioning and scope of Cooperatives in America was recounted in considerable detail. It was predicted that the movement would likely succeed more rapidly in farming communities where people are already used to the idea. This observation was set down,

"Wherever people are being well served by regular business, Cooperatives grow slowly or not at all. If, after the present war, business is forced into keen competition resulting in small profits, and good service to the consumer, the development of cooperation will be discouraged. On the other hand, widening of profit margins through price fixing or other causes, will probably encourage the expansion of cooperative business."2

There was not the hint of possible contradictions between cooperation and the aspirations of our free enterprise system. Rather, "cooperative business thus offers a healthy, competitive challenge to its rival and partner in the American system of free enterprise--commercial business."3

Altogether the booklet on American "Co-ops" is a surprisingly liberal appraisal of the cooperative movement.

2. Ibid., p. 32.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
in this country. Particularly is one surprised when the hostility of most of our business community to the "Co-op" idea is considered. Ernie Adamson, now deposed as "investigator and counsel" for the House Committee on Un-American Activities, would probably have held some "communist" in the War Department responsible for the document.

The booklet on cooperatives was a fortunate undertaking since most of our well known educational devices usually exhibit extreme reluctance to point out any good features which the movement may possess. The business suspicion that cooperation is a threat to private enterprise probably accounts for most of our popular press inhibitions on the subject.

The Tennessee Valley Authority

During the summer of 1946 an excellent study on the Tennessee Valley Authority was distributed for use in the regularly scheduled orientation periods. Senator MeKellar might call the TVA "communist infested," among other things, but the Army Talk, produced under the auspices of the War Department, treated the project as a thoroughly American accomplishment in flood control, farm development, social rehabilitation, and particularly in the field of public power.

"Between 1926 and 1933, the electric bill of this country dropped only 2 per cent. The average kilowatt hour rate in 1933 was about 5½ cents. Yet, within 10 years after the creation of TVA in 1933, the average national rate dropped 33 per cent. In 1933 the average Tennessee
customer was using 548 kilowatt hours. By 1945 he was using 1796 kilowatt hours. The cost per kilowatt hour showed why--5.7 cents in 1933, 1.3 cents in 1945.\(^1\)

The contribution of TVA to flood control in the lower Mississippi Valley was estimated to be worth between one and two hundred million dollars during a big flood.\(^2\)

The benefits in terms of cash income to residents of the Valley was explained in the following quotation from the fact sheet,

"By 1940 the income of the Valley's people averaged 73 per cent higher than it had seven years before. During the same period the income of the whole country was rising only 56 per cent. Store trade in the Valley did 87 per cent more business than in 1933. The Nation as a whole experienced only a 70 per cent increase for the same period. Wages rose 97 per cent in the Valley compared to 84 per cent for the whole country."\(^3\)

The contribution of TVA to winning the war was represented as even more impressive than its peacetime accomplishments.

"The excess power capacity of TVA, so vigorously attacked by its opponents before Pearl Harbor, was able to deliver nearly 2 billion kilowatt hours more than originally called for to the Aluminum Company of America alone. Without this backlog of power, the aluminum for our airplanes might have been too little and too late. As well, without TVA the atom bomb might have been a year or two later in productions."\(^4\)

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2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
4. Ibid., p. 6.
Will there be other TVAs? The Army Talk did not venture an open prediction on possible expansion of the TVA pattern to other areas. But,

"Here in the United States there are large numbers of people who would like to see the TVA pattern tried out in other great river water sheds. Some of these propose to try it on the great Missouri Valley--the breadbasket of America."\(^1\)

The thought that TVA might be a dangerous design for our free enterprise economy was not considered plausible,

"The experiment in the Tennessee Valley has shown that the government and private enterprise can cooperate to develop natural resources for profit and for public benefit during peace and war."\(^2\)

It is lamentable that orientation was not called upon to explain TVA at an earlier date. By July, 1946, the greater part of our Army had gone home. There was remaining in the Army at this date probably close to three million men, compared to the more than ten million in the Army during the years of the war. It is probable that even the smaller number of soldiers comprising orientation audiences during 1946, represents the widest hearing yet achieved by advocates of public power projects such as TVA.

Certainly the everyday information sources available to most citizens, the press, magazines, and radio never have discussed government corporations or public power projects in such a favorable light as this. In fact, there has

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 9.
always been a reluctance on the part of our popular press to treat government projects and public power as anything other than "interference" in the fields which rightly belong to private enterprise.

It is also difficult to state that our educational system has ever given public power the discussion it seems to deserve. The writer has often noted the paucity of most high school text book accounts on the subject. Probably the most widely used text for high school courses in American government, Magruder's American Government, devotes only a few short lines to the problem of public power. To say that America's institutions of higher learning examine comprehensively the field of public power, is to make a statement difficult of proof.

The orientation discussion on TVA filled a considerable gap in the education of most American soldiers. It would seem obvious that data such as that set forth in the Army Talk, "Tennessee Valley Authority," did influence soldier attitudes on the question of who should control the natural resources of our nation.

Post-War Employment in the United States

Many of our citizens in uniform expressed grave concern over the economics of post-war America. Back of most of this concern was the fear of possible mass unemployment in peacetime United States. Some soldiers, no doubt, had vivid recollections of the depression, and feared the same

economic chaos would follow the enforced adjustment of our wartime industrial machine to peacetime markets. Certainly many knew that the same economic forces which had caused the depression were still largely uncontrolled, and capable of wrecking havoc on war-built prosperity.

The Army made some attempt to explain post-war economics to soldiers. In the fall of 1944, a GI Roundtable booklet, "Will There Be Jobs for All?", was issued primarily for off-duty discussion groups. The data of this booklet became also the subject matter for on-duty orientation in many army organizations.

The study of employment problems brought out a number of thoughtful propositions. It was asserted that if only the level of production attained in our record breaking peacetime year, 1940, could be attained, there would be a total of over nineteen million unemployed in this country in 1946. Full employment, then entailed a level of production never before reached by our peacetime economy. ¹

The results of a poll of management made by Fortune Magazine to determine the business solution to unemployment problems was presented in the booklet. Two out of three business executives polled early in 1944 answered, "no", to the question, "Do you think it is a function of government today to see to it that substantially full employment is maintained?" Business would evidently solve the problem of post-war unemployment thus, "Simply remove all war-time

¹. GI Roundtable, "Will There Be Jobs for All?", War Department, Washington, D.C., (September, 1944), p. 13.
controls as of a certain date after the fighting stops."¹

The leaders of American labor held a contrary view on the function of government on maintaining full employment.

"Government not only should act to assure a job for everyone, but should take a leading part in accomplishing full employment. Between the risk of mass unemployment in an absolutely free enterprise or assurance of full employment, at the price of increased supervision of our economy, labor leaders appear to favor the second."²

The pamphlet expressed doubts that private industry alone could be trusted to secure a prosperous peacetime economy. This excerpt from a speech by Eric Johnston, then President of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States was quoted,

"Businessmen with faith in the private enterprise system recognize that they cannot do the job alone. Public works under cities and counties, as well as the Federal Government, have a vital place in our economy."³

Some of the orientation programs developed around the theme, "Will There Be Jobs for All?", became interesting and valuable forums for the discussion of American economic problems. Here is an account of one such discussion held at Ft. Bragg, North Carolina:

"We quoted leading industrialists, governmental agencies, statesmen, trade unionists, economists. The group felt that a country which could perform the miracle of production in goods of war can perform the same miracle in the goods for peace. But some doubts were raised.

1. GI Roundtable, "Will There Be Jobs for All?," War Department, Washington, D.C., (September, 1944), p. 17.
2. Ibid., p. 18.
3. Ibid., p. 30.
There were men in the group who remembered the boom after the last war and the crash that followed. Many came from families that were once on relief. Some had worked for WPA. Some of them were certain that it would happen again—depression—unemployment—want—they were as inevitable as sunrise and sunset. Others said it didn’t have to be that way. The world was learning and moving ahead.  

American Labor  

The purpose of Fact Sheet 29, "Soldiers of Production," was to clear up, if possible, certain misconceptions concerning the contribution of the home front to winning the war.

"Two opinions rather widely held by soldiers are responsible for considerable anti-civilian feeling. They are—

1. That the war effort is being seriously hampered by labor disputes.

2. That war workers are living luxuriously on huge wages.

The serious thing about these opinions is that they are misconceptions based probably on inadequate access to factual material."

The fact sheet went on to analyze statistically the wage position of average American workers. The Bureau of Labor Statistics statement on the percentage increase between 1941 and 1943, 23.4 per cent, was used in drawing conclusions. However, it was pointed out that the estimate fixed by the government agency was probably a bare minimum

indication of the rise in the cost of living during these years. The joint AFL-CIO figure, a 43.5 per cent increase, was cited as probably nearer the real truth on the matter.¹

Using the government figure, 23.4 per cent, the fact sheet estimated that the average worker with three dependents could maintain his 1941 living standard, and have five dollars and sixty-five cents additional each week in 1943. On the same basis, the single worker with no dependents would have an additional twenty-two cents per week in 1943.² This study seemed to dispose pretty well of the idea that American workers were drawing luxury wages during war-time.

In regard to strikes in the war-time United States, the fact sheet had this to say:

"During the first years after Pearl Harbor, the amount of working time lost on account of strikes was one-twentieth of one per cent of the available working time. In 1943, due to widespread strikes in the coal mining industry, the amount of man hour days lost on account of strikes increased over 1942. Even this total was only fourteen one-hundreds of one per cent of the available working time. Approximately two-thirds of the strike idleness during 1943 was due to coal mining strikes.

The no-strike-no-lockout pledge of management and labor has been kept at a rate of ninety-nine per cent according to the Secretary of Labor. Since Pearl Harbor no strike has been authorized by the leadership of the American Federation of Labor or the Congress of Industrial Organizations."³

2. Ibid., p. 4.
3. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
"By all that's holy, then, why is everyone so excited about the strike picture when it is relatively so insignificant?" asked Captain Sargent of the Lexington orientation school faculty, in his lecture on "Soldiers of Production."

The answer to this question is obviously the fact that most soldiers were reading newspapers, and magazines from home, many of which flagrantly overplayed the whole issue. Some newspapers commented editorially on this:

"Undoubtedly press reports have tended to dramatize, and perhaps overplay, the occasional stoppages that have occurred in war production. It is precisely because they are extraordinary that they are newsworthy. It is a good deal more difficult to make good copy out of the day-to-day story of devoted effort in the mines and mills."

There is some thought that the editorial above is only a small explanation for the frequent attacks on labor's war effort, which appeared in our newspapers and magazines, and were voiced by the majority of our news commentators.

Summary of Orientation on Domestic Economics

The Army Orientation Program did not fully examine all the economic issues which seem to be troubling the American scene. Orientation information on American economics was somewhat incomplete; certainly the discussions were undertaken much too late in the war. It is to be remembered that the War Department discouraged soldier deliberations on the so-called controversial subjects until late in 1944.

And the greater part of the economic data did not become available to orientation until 1946.

In spite of its many disabilities, the orientation program did seek to broaden soldier knowledge on the economic problems in America. The liberal economic philosophy apparent in the orientation treatment of cooperatives, labor problems, agriculture, public power, and solutions for unemployment was a new approach to many of our men in uniform.

The orientation program on economics in the United States expressed these concepts:

1. Controversial economic problems are proper subjects for soldier discussion.

2. Labor and agriculture have close economic ties.

3. It is to be doubted that private enterprise alone can solve all our economic difficulties.

4. Our labor force during the war performed magnificently, and did not profit unduly by way of wages or other returns.

5. Cooperatives might be the best answer to consumer and producer dissatisfactions with private business.

6. The TVA is an excellent, thoroughly American, project in flood control, rural rehabilitation, and public power development.

7. The generation of electric energy is a proper field for government control and government ownership.
CHAPTER III
ORIENTATION CONCEPTS ON MINORITY PROBLEMS

When the United States entered the war against World Fascism in 1941, our society was vulnerable because of its social conflicts. The polyglot character of our population, plus deeply rooted group antagonisms which had been allowed to develop, seemed to justify an Axis assumption that these conflicts might disrupt our war effort. The German propaganda minister, Goebbels, once said, "Nothing will be easier than to produce a bloody revolution in America. No other country has so many social and racial tensions. We shall be able to play upon many strings there." Enemy propaganda constantly played on our social and racial differences. Every effort was made to entice our minorities into apathy or open resistance to the war.

The War Department was not blind to the dangers inherent in allowing widespread discontent within the ranks of "minority" soldiers to go unchecked. However, the status-quo mind is nowhere more firmly entrenched than in our armed services, and social reform to banish segregation and discrimination within the services was out of the question. And the Army could hardly be expected to initiate reforms which might disrupt the war effort more than continued discrimination would hinder it.

High military officials did not make any serious moves to alter long practiced "Jim Crow" segregations in the Army.
Measures to combat anti-semitic, anti-Catholic and anti-foreign discriminations were less than adequate. A much more vigorous effort than was expended would have been necessary to wipe out racial and social bigotry in the Army.

However, minority conflicts among American soldiers could not be complete ignored. There were political considerations which required some action on the part of the War Department. The New Deal administration depended quite a lot on votes from minority groups. It was also obvious that our war effort would be much impaired if bigotry and prejudice were not restrained. If the members of minority races or religions were expected to fight well for democracy, recognition of their democratic aspirations in the Army was necessary.

The War Department proposed several partial solutions to minority problems within the Army. No one would expect far reaching social reforms, but military officials could have done many things to ease racial and religious tensions that were not attempted. It continued practices which, if stopped, would not have caused resentment among any sizeable number of soldiers. Segregation in combat units was one practice well beyond what most troops considered a proper setting apart of the races. The supposition that white soldiers and black soldiers would not, side by side, bravely face the enemy, was unwarranted.

The only War Department proposal which did markedly combat bigotry and discrimination was that embodied in the
program of the Orientation Department. It made the only notable military contribution to the cause of better racial and religious understanding. The program set down this principle to guide discussion leaders on minority problems:

"Problems of minorities are a proper concern of the Army only so far as they affect the efficiency of the Army, no more, no less. The Army has been given no authority for the initiation of social reform, but it is charged with the sole duty of conducting its share of the war so that victory will be achieved. One of the present aims of the Army is to obtain full participation in the war effort by such groups, thus giving impetus to the democratic process. On the other hand, the Army cannot ignore or seek to change local customs where to do so would invite serious trouble. Men of all races and national origins must be encouraged and stimulated to do anything done by members of any other groups in accordance with their individual abilities."

Fascism at Home and Abroad

Some soldiers were troubled at the apparent conflict between fighting fascism abroad, and at the same time allowing it to go unchecked in the United States. One of the first orientation programs attempted to explain this incongruity. Fact Sheet 8, "Why we Fight," directed discussion leaders to read the following article to orientation classes:

"'Don't talk to me of Democracy!' he said. 'Don't tell me that I'm fighting a war for Democracy--don't talk to me of the Four Freedoms--when I pull that trigger, will lynching stop? when I thrust my bayonet, will Jew-slaughtering stop? When I toss a grenade, will unemployment cease? When I train the

searchlight on the target, will Catholic and Protestant, Jew and Gentile, White and Black, Native-born and Foreign-born—will they all, once and for all, cease to bicker with each other? Will it make them settle down in peace and harmony? When I die—if I die—will my death really mean that the Four Freedoms: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Religion, Freedom From Want, and Freedom From Fear for all of us and all mankind—will really be here?"

'He was bitter, cynical, spoke as if he were one who feared betrayal. 'Train hard,' they tell us. 'Learn all there is to know about this business of being a soldier—remember what it is that you are fighting for and what the Fascist monstrosity would substitute for it should we lose this war!' the officers say. But I can't believe. Somehow I don't feel free to trust! He was definitely wrought up."

In order to facilitate discussion, these questions were posed for use by the discussion leaders:

1. Would you say that religious and racial discriminations are signs of fascism? Explain why you think so.

2. What other things have you seen which you feel are not in keeping with the basic concepts of democracy? How do you think such practices come about? Why do they persist?

3. Do you think it is possible for racial, religious, and other minority groups to live peaceably, side by side, in social, political and economic equality? Do you think that the Four Freedoms can really be made to work after the victory is won? If so why, if not why not?

In a discourse entitled, "Subversive Propaganda for Our Armed Forces," the House Committee on Un-American Activities attacked the information contained in Fact

1. Fact Sheet 8, "Why We Fight," War Department, Washington, D.C., (September, 1944), p. 2.
2. Ibid., p. 3.
Sheet 64. The writer has been unable to obtain the fact sheet in question; its distribution being stopped by certain unnamed political forces. So the writer is indebted to Ernie Adamson, the "Counsel and Advisor" of the House Committee named above, for the information here. Mr. Adamson points out certain "subversive" observations made in the pamphlet:

"In a long discussion concerning the question, How Can We Identify Native Fascists at work?, the War Department sought to teach that any person who claimed to be any one or all of the following was a Fascist, or was likely to become one very shortly; one hundred per cent American, anti-Jew, anti-Negro, anti-labor, anti-foreign born, anti-Catholic."

The fact sheet criticized by the House Committee on Un-American Activities did not have wide circulation for the reason stated above. That the pamphlet was printed, and circulated for a time, indicates that some members of the War Department understood the need for combating fascist or near-fascist tendencies in the Army. A part of the information contained in Fact Sheet 64 was included in later orientation data which were distributed to the discussion leaders.

On Prejudice

In May, 1945 the Army Talk, "Prejudice, Roadblock to Progress," was distributed to the orientation centers. This pamphlet was a vigorous exposure of the fallacies on which prejudice is based, and a full discussion of the

economic and racial disasters likely to result if such fallacies should persist.

The fact sheet explained how prejudice develops:

"When we are born, we have only the capacity to develop love and hate, and the other human emotions. Whom we learn to like or dislike, love or hate, depends on our experiences--in our home--in our school--in our neighborhood--and the effect these experiences have on us. By the time we have grown up, we already have pictures in our mind of many people with whom we have had little or no contact. We may have a stereotyped picture of negroes as lazy, stupid, happy-go-lucky; of Jews and Scots as stingy and money mad; of Irishmen as hot-tempered, brawling, whiskey loving. These stereotypes are constantly being reinforced through movies, newspapers, conversation and jokes, books and radio. A single story, comic strip or movie may not make too deep an impression. However, when time after time the Negro is presented as a crap-shooting, shiftless character; the Latin as a gangster or racketeer; the Oriental as a slinking, mysterious and crafty person--then deep and lasting impressions are made which go to form prejudices and attitudes."1

Further ways of acquiring prejudice were pointed out. Generalizations such as "all negroes" or "all Jews" or "all those of foreign extraction" tend to spread false ideas about whole groups of people. The feeling of insecurity by reason of economic maladjustments, or personal frustrations, often leads to prejudice.2

A short history of the persecutions suffered by minorities was recounted in the fact sheet. In America, it pointed out, there have been many instances of "scapegoating" of minorities, from the witch-hunts of colonial

2. Ibid., p. 2.
times, to the race riots of Detroit and elsewhere. Always these prejudices have been generated by selfish leaders seeking to cover up their own mistakes or selfish motives.¹

Six dangers of prejudice were listed,

1. Prejudice is contagious.
2. Prejudice makes all of us poorer.
3. Prejudice robs us of minority talents.
4. Prejudice blinds us to the real situation.
5. Prejudice endangers victory.
6. Prejudice endangers world peace.²

It was emphasized that continued minority persecution in America might have disastrous effects on the trust which colored peoples, comprising three-fourths of all people, have in democracy.

"Throughout the world there are millions of people convinced that this is a total war against Fascism and fascist ideas. Their concept of peace includes the hope—even the deter-
nination—that when the war is won, there will be no such thing as "superior" and "inferior" peoples anywhere in the world."³

The fact sheet on prejudice continued:

"There are hopeful evidences that true Democracy is gaining in the United States. When Negroes were freed, 90 per cent of them were illiterate. In 1940, according to the Federal Census, 18 of 20 Negroes could read and write. In a 25 year period, the registration of Negro college students showed an increase of 2400 per cent. In June, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 which declared,

2. Ibid., pp. 4-5.
3. Ibid., p. 5.
'It is a policy of the United States to encourage full participation in the national defense program of all citizens of the United States regardless of race, creed, color, or national origin.' This order required that there be no discrimination because of race, creed or national origin, and set up the Fair Employment Practices Committee to enforce this provision."

On Religious Discrimination

To help promote a broader understanding of the contributions of certain religious groups in America, the orientation program compiled information to combat common misconceptions in regard to Jews and Catholics. There is a widespread belief concerning Jewish participation in business fields. This study made by Fortune Magazine was reprinted for orientation use:

""There is no basis whatever for the suggestion that Jews monopolize U. S. business and industry; the great mass of the 4,500,000 American Jews, like the great mass of American non-Jews, is made up of workers, employed and non-employed. First of all, and very definitely, Jews do not run banking. They play little or no part in the commercial houses like J. P. Morgan, National City Bank, Chase National Bank, Guaranty Trust Co., etc. Among the 35,000 bankers in the United States, the Jews contribute six-tenths of one per cent, whereas the total Jewish population comprises 3.5 per cent of the total number of inhabitants. They have an even more inconspicuous place in basic industry. In brief, Jews are so far from controlling the most characteristic of present day American activities that they are hardly represented in them at all. Jews do not dominate the American scene. They do not even dominate major sections of the American scene.""

2. Ibid., p. 7.
Some American soldiers were inclined to describe Jewish participation in the war in derisive terms. For instance, the Quarter-Master Corp was often referred to as the "Jewish Army". And many troops held the belief that most Jews, by one trick or another, had infiltrated into all the "soft spots" in the Administration or Supply Services of the Army. The Air Corps was said to be saturated with Jewish "USO Commandos," and Jews were frequently referred to as mass "draft-dodgers."

To counteract these misconceptions, orientation quoted figures compiled under the supervision of Louis Dublin, Vice-President, and Chief Statistician for the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company:

"Jews comprise approximately 3.5 per cent of the population of the U.S. As of March 1, 1945, more than 500,000 Jews were in the armed forces. They constitute a little more than 4 per cent of the men and women in the service. It is estimated that on March 1, 1945, there were 35,000 Jewish casualties, approximately 7 per cent of the Jewish service. Up to March 1, 1945, total casualties in the armed forces were 340,000 or approximately 7 per cent."

Animosity against those professing the Catholic faith was not nearly so widespread as anti-Semitic attitudes. But there were many instances of anti-Catholic bias in the Army. The writer recalls an Air Corps Corporal who was reluctant to admit his Catholic affiliation. Robert Sherrod, in his account of the battle of Tarawa, writes of the young sailor who had professed to be a Protestant up to

the hour of his death when he asked for a priest.1

Orientation took steps to alleviate anti-Catholic antagonisms. The common misconception that Catholic loyalty to this country was subject to Vatican control was attacked:

"For the past 100 years organizations like the "Know-Nothing" party have been asserting that a good Roman Catholic can't be, at the same time, a loyal American citizen. The Vatican, they maintain, claims absolute and unquestioning obedience in all things, and that as an American citizen, a Catholic must support the church against the state. This slander assumes the existence of a Catholic political party in the United States. Of course, there is no such thing. Catholics, like all other groups, are found in all political parties."2

The fact sheet referred to the fine contributions made by many Catholics. The record of Alfred E. Smith was referred to as one of the examples of worthwhile participation in American government by Catholic citizens.

The orientation sections of a number of west coast army establishments sponsored a series of lectures by a trio of clergymen; a Protestant Minister, a Jewish Rabbi and a Catholic Priest. These lectures were excellent propaganda for religious tolerance.

On National Origins and the Foreign-born

The Army had its share of the common American bias against those of foreign birth or foreign ancestry. Instances of anti-foreign discriminations were not so frequent as anti-Negro or anti-Jewish sentiments, which apparently were widespread. But subtle discriminations did exist. Soldiers

were quick to resent those whose names were markedly "Italian" or "Slavic." Some of America's "one hundred percenters" were, of course, in uniform. Two members of the San Marguerita Italian Community, near Columbus, Ohio, told the writer of occasions when their Italian ancestry was impugned by certain army officers and "non-coms." Both were convinced that discriminations against those of foreign extraction were a fact of army life.

The War Department recognized the possible dangerous effect on our war effort if soldiers of foreign backgrounds should become embittered by their army experiences. In the general instructions to discussion leaders, the Army Orientation Department laid down this guiding principle:

"When a man wears the American uniform, whatever his name or bloodline, he is an American soldier. Let the name speak for itself! We expect and do receive loyalty and courageous service of our men, whatever their background. To speak of a soldier as Polish-born, or of Mexican origin, or of American parentage, etc., is to set him apart as if it were the unexpected to get fealty and courage from such origins. The individual in uniform does not relish any such distinctions."

In Army Talk 70, orientation made this ringing statement on the contributions of "foreign" peoples to our American way of life,

"The men who built and are building America--who clear her forests, span her rivers, dig her coal, plough her fields, work her machines--and are fighting and dying to preserve freedom on battlefields all over the world--are men of every race, creed, color and nationality. Listen to

their names at roll-call. Read their names in casualty lists—like this the
New York Times of 29 March, 1945: Agostino...Cohen...Curran...Grunwald
...Arubec...Ivanoski...Kuzian...Marshall...Thomas...Warblanski...
were any of these inferior?"

It was the practice of orientation to publicize as much as possible outstanding contributions to the war made by members of the minority groups. Army Talk 44, "Who is Getting What Medals and What Decorations," listed these names, Sgt. Marino Gallezo, decorated for bravery, Pfc. Sidney Rosenberg, recipient of the Bronze Star, Sgt. Floyd Edinger, the Distinguished Service Medal, Pvt. Woodall Marsh, a Negro, the Silver Star.2

These further statements were set down in the fact sheet on prejudices:

"What many of us seem to forget is that we are all immigrants or the sons of immigrants. No one has the right to complain about foreigners unless it is the American Indian. The late President Roosevelt said: 'Americanism is not and never was a matter of race and ancestry. Americanism is a matter of mind and heart.'"3

The American Negro

The deepest and most bitter of all prejudices among soldiers was directed against Negroes. The Army was mostly reflecting civilian attitudes on the question; but it seemed to many that soldiers, who before their military

3. Ibid., p. 4.
service had little or no anti-Negro animosity, somehow acquired the most bitter anti-Negro sentiments. One explanation is the fact that most military training centers were located in the south, and soldiers trained there tended to take on the ideas of that region through associations with white southerners.

Supreme Court Justice Frank Murphy writes of the apparent increase in racial and religious bigotry during the war years:

"Propaganda aimed at setting one group against another has found its mark in many instances, and we have seen the sorry spectacle of religious bigotry and racial hatred arise where none had existed before. Or where misunderstandings already existed, we have seen these misunderstandings somehow turned into animosities bitter enough to involve an entire city. And largely because a few hate spreaders have accomplished their assignments."

The Army attempted to alleviate racial tensions among soldiers in many ways. The documentary film, "The Negro Soldier," was produced under the supervision of the Information and Education Division, and distributed for showings during troop orientation periods. The film depicted the valuable contributions made by Negroes to American progress and toward winning the war.

Mr. Warmen Welliver, a white officer formerly with the Negro 92nd Infantry Division, writes of another War Department effort to clear up racial misunderstanding:

1. Frank Murphy, "Race Hate--The Enemy Bullets Can't Stop," Liberty Magazine, (January 6, 1945)
An abortive attempt was made by the more progressive members of the War Department to get circulated a pamphlet written by anthropologists called, 'Races of Mankind'. This booklet proposed to give in laymen's language the latest scientific views on race, and undoubtedly would have had a considerable effect on many white soldiers who had unthinkingly adopted the idea that Negroes are an inferior race. The southern bloc in congress got wind of this plan, and the War Department and the USO called off the distribution. At least 40,000 of the copies did circulate, however, because members of the unit I was in cleaned out the stock of the Del Rio, Texas, colored USO, during a halt on the way to maneuvers.¹

The booklet, Races of Mankind, never reached most orientation centers, but some of the data contained in that source was later incorporated into the program. Here is an excerpt from Army Talk 70,

"Modern Science has revealed that all human blood is the same whether it be the blood of an Eskimo, Frenchman, German, Englishman, or an African Pygmy --except for one basic difference. If you look at the dog tags of the men in your unit, you'll notice that there are four types of blood--O, A, B, AB--and it all has to do with the matter of blood transfusions. Whites, Negroes, Mongolians--all races, religions, nationalities have every one of these blood types."²

The same fact sheet quoted these statements from Army Service Forces Manual No. 5:

"Competent scholars in the field of racial differences are almost unanimous in the opinion that race 'superiority' and 'inferiority' have not been demonstrated despite the existence of clearly

defined and tested differences between individuals within every race.

Scientific knowledge does not support the idea of the inherent superiority of any one race over another. Students of history, psychology, biology, and anthropology are in general agreement that the progress of civilization has had little or no relation to alleged inborn biological characteristics of particular races of nationalities.

It is agreed also that most of the differences revealed by intelligence tests and other devices can be accounted for in terms of differences in opportunity and background. The important consideration at this time, then, is how to offer increased opportunities—both physical and cultural—to all handicapped groups, regardless of race, since these variables account in large part for poor performance and achievement in every group.

Character and personality traits unsuitable in the soldier which may exist among your men are principally the result of environment, not of race.

The Army cannot function efficiently on the basis of theories that individual capacities are definitely fixed by a man's race.

The Army accepts no theories of racial inferiority or superiority for American troops but considers that its task is to utilize its men on their individual merits in the achievement of final victory. A realistic and impartial examination of the evidence on racial difference in ability supports this position."1

The Orientation School at Lexington, Virginia, played an important role in orientation efforts to break down anti-Negro sentiments. The curriculum there included a course devoted to information on the Negro problem in which the fallacies behind anti-black bigotry were freely discussed. Certain statements were made to be learned and believed by those who expected to administer the orientation

program. Those who could not accept the facts as stated because of prejudice, were dismissed from the school as unfit for the purpose of orientation. On several occasions officers and enlisted men with unalterable southern viewpoints on racial questions were sent back to their units.

Here are some statements made by instructors:

1. The apparent disabilities of Negro troops are due, almost without exception, to educational and vocational handicaps; there are absolutely no discernable differences in native ability and native intelligence of whites and blacks.

2. The denial to one group, of liberties, economics, or whatever, degrades all others and deprives in the same measure.

3. Southern industry has long played white workers against black workers; in the tobacco industry whites and blacks used to beat each other over the head; then the CIO came in and united them.

4. One low income group acts as an economic club on the next higher income level.

On the war record of our Negro citizens, these statistics were quoted; sixteen per cent of all volunteers were Negroes, and they comprise but ten per cent of the population; twenty-five per cent of all waiting volunteers are Negroes.

It was stated that a survey made by the War Department revealed that twenty-seven per cent of black soldiers believed their part in the war worthy, and the cause valid; forty per cent of white soldiers believed their part in the war worthy, and the cause valid. It was emphatically pointed out that the low zeal of Negroes for their part in the war, and for the validity of the cause, was due to the discriminations which they had suffered and were suffering at the
hands of whites.

Summary

The orientation program, while an inadequate solution to the facts of discrimination in our armed forces made a valuable contribution to the cause of tolerance in America. Minority problems, being controversial, did not come into the orientation course until fairly late in the war, and did not come to the attention of the largest possible number of soldiers. Despite this limitation, orientation did tend to alleviate racial, religious and "foreign" prejudices of American soldiers.

The orientation materials on minority problems were, without exception, excellent. They were conceived with the fullest appreciation of the highest democratic ideals on which our Nation is built. All ideas which would seek to impose an inferior status on any group by reason of its racial, or religious, or national differences were fully and vigorously attacked. In the writer's opinion, the phase of orientation reported in this chapter was by far the most important achievement of the Information and Education Division. It advanced the hope of all truly democratic peoples for a full and complete world for all, regardless of race, creed, or national difference, a step closer to realization.

The following concepts on minority problems were expressed by the Army Orientation Program:

1. Prejudice is based on lies and deceit, and is unworthy for the soldiers of a democracy.
2. Democracy is gaining throughout the world; minorities are gaining a fuller status everywhere.

3. Fascism must be combated at home as well as abroad.

4. No American makes a less worthy contribution to progress, or to the war effort, by reason of race, creed, or national origins.

5. There is absolutely no discernible difference in the native intelligence, or the native abilities, of any people by reason of racial, religious, or national differences.

6. Prejudice and bigotry among all peoples, everywhere, must disappear if a full and peaceful world for all is to be assured.
CHAPTER IV

ORIENTATION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND WORLD ORGANIZATION

In every war in which nations have been allied together against a common enemy, animosities between soldiers of the different national armies, and misunderstandings between peoples of the allied nations, have been a serious impediment to successful prosecution of the war. It is always easy for the soldiers of one nationality to over-dramatize their own contributions and sacrifices, and to under-rate those of their foreign comrades in arms. During the first world war there were times when anti-French, anti-British, anti-Italian and anti-American sentiments among the allied soldiers seemed more bitter than hatred for the enemy. The United Nations of World War II faced the same difficulties which had plagued earlier alliances. Communist Russia, imperial Britain, dictatorial China and democratic America had many different, and often diametrically opposite customs, religions, politics and economics. It is a small wonder that animosities did develop among these allies.

The Axis was not blind to the propaganda opportunities contained in such a diverse alliance. There was unceasing effort to divide the United Nations, one against the other, or one against all others. The persuasion was skillful. Such slogans as, "It may be American money, but it is your blood which is being spent," "Russia is fighting solely to
promote world communism," or "England will fight to the last drop of American blood," constantly repeated, had a more than transitory impact on soldier thinking.

Each of the United Nations took steps to counter Axis propaganda, and to alleviate resentments. For Russia, Britain and China it was relatively simple to instill respect and appreciation for the soldiers and peoples fighting with them. These nations knew war at first hand. They had made bitter sacrifices—and they placed high value on those who would share their burdens in the fight against the enemy. In addition, these nations had a more cohesive and flexible system of propaganda. They could bring emphasis to any point which needed support.

For America the problem of combating soldier distrust for the other nations of the alliance was more difficult. America had not been attacked. Many soldiers and civilians could see little purpose to American participation in the war. Strong isolationist elements had long preached against the "foreigners," and continued to do so even after Pearl Harbor. Many of our most widely read sources of information felt only slight constraint in expressing distrust and dislike for some of the people on our side. Until fairly late in the war the greater part of our troops had little conception of the brutality of the fascist opposition, except that which they had obtained through orientation talks.

The American Army made every effort to create respect and understanding for our allies. The Army Orientation Program played the most important part among all Army
endeavors to instill appreciation for those fighting with us. The most important objective for all orientation on foreign affairs was the creation of a durable spirit of cooperation between our soldiers and the soldiers of The United Nations.

It was sometimes difficult to look kindly upon British imperial policies, or upon evidences of fascism in China, or perhaps especially upon communist programs in Russia. Orientation did not attempt to condone every practice or policy of these nations. But it gave them the benefit of the doubt, and reiterated that each of the United Nations was fighting for highly worthy objectives, and in the cause of world freedom.

To induce favorable opinions on the British was not difficult. Great Britain and the United States had long been virtual allies. The politics, economics and customs of each were much alike. It was fairly easy to build favor for the Chinese. Here again, the two nations had experienced no serious differences for several decades before 1941. Moreover, most soldiers were little informed on our Asiatic partner; only a few had preconceived animosities against the Chinese people. But the task of building friendship for the USSR faced many obstacles. Almost all soldiers had had a long conditioning by anti-Russian influences. There were deep and bitter antagonisms against "atheistic, communistic" Russia. To put aside their long held anti-Red convictions, most American soldiers were required virtually to make an about face from all that they had previously
believed. It was a difficult transformation, and it was not always successfully made.

Orientation made a strong effort to cover up the defects of our allies, and to bring their virtues to light. The program was at least partially successful—for there was a minimum of anti-allied feeling among our soldiers. All animosities did not disappear. Many antagonisms were too hardy to be dissipated by orientation persuasion. But most soldiers respected the fighting qualities of their foreign comrades, and realized the immensity of the war sacrifices required from the people of the United Nations.

In addition to orienting troop attitudes toward closer ties with the soldiers and peoples of the United Nations' alliance, orientation attempted to educate American troops on American foreign policy, past and future. The program tried to make it clear that the world after the war would require a vastly different American approach to foreign relations than had gone before. American interests in the Pacific, in Europe and Latin America were discussed to instill viewpoints favorable toward full United States' participation in world affairs after the war. Orientation pointed out that the post-war world would bring new and different solutions in China, the Balkans and among colonial peoples. A strong system of international controls was held out as the only possible answer to the universal cry for lasting peace.

Altogether the data on foreign affairs and the discussions in that field, make up a huge amount of material. Many of the ninety GI Roundtable subjects, and more than one hundred and fifty Army Talks and Fact Sheets, dealt with foreign relations and international organization. It would be impossible to write about all this material in one chapter. Neither is it necessary for the purpose of this thesis. The most important orientations on foreign affairs are discussed, and trustworthy concepts can be drawn from these.

The USSR

Orientation faced one of its most difficult tasks when it decided to explain and defend our Soviet Ally to American soldiers. Years of anti-Russian propaganda had instilled deep anti-Red animosities. More recently, the apparent communist aggressions in Finland, and the Russo-German Pact of 1939, had served to strengthen these antagonisms. Only the magnificent fight which the Russians were waging against the Nazis served to lessen anti-Russian sentiment. Without this favorable factor, successful orientation for the USSR would have been impossible. Even so, the program was only partially successful.

Probably the most effective pro-Russian propaganda was the film, "Battle of Russia," which was shown at one time or another to every discussion group. Whatever reservations remained on Russia as a fit ally for democratic America, this film wiped out all doubt as to the fighting ability of Red soldiers, and any idea that the
Russian people were not fully meeting the "equality of sacrifice" criterion.

Whenever possible, discussions of Russia's domestic affairs were avoided. Communism was never defended as a system of government. At the same time, there were none of the bitter diatribes against communism which often appear in the American press. Usually, if nothing good could be said of a particular aspect of Russia at war, no comment was made at all. This does not mean that anti-Russian statements by members of the orientation group were repressed. If a soldier wished to condemn Russian atheism or the economic slavery to which he thought that Russian people were subjected, he was allowed to speak out. But it was the discussion leader's duty to counter, if possible, with some favorable comment on the magnificent battle record of the Russians, or with information on the reestablishment of religion in the USSR.

The War Department laid down this general instruction for orientation in regard to our Soviet ally:

"An effective means toward the upbuilding of confidence in all allies is to avoid invidious comparisons between them. It is not necessary or desirable to defend communism in order to enlist the sympathetic interest of the American soldier in the defense of the USSR. We hold for ourselves the right to determine our own form of government and cannot consistently maintain that any other people has a lesser right, whether their present government is the kind of political system that is most satisfactory to the Russian people has been sufficiently answered by a war in which the political faith of the people as well as of the
armed forces has stood the trial by fire. The Russians are under attack; they are fighting to maintain their right to determine how they shall be governed. Though we do not agree with their political ideas (and they do not believe in ours) we believe utterly in the defense of the principle for which they are fighting. Likewise, it is the defense of this selfsame principle that we stand guard against the infiltrating of communist ideas into the realm of democracy.

The ultimate military consequences are the best evidence of whether the USSR's 1939 attack on Finland and subsequent overrunning of the Baltic Provinces were bare-handed aggressions, motivated by greed for territory, or were done to strengthen the USSR's western frontiers against attack by Germany. The possession of this buffer territory did greatly facilitate the USSR defense when the attack duly fell. Without attempting any moral judgments on the matter, it is enough to state the military fact that had the USSR not acted so, the Allied cause would be weaker today.

The Moscow Pact, one of the strongest Allied acts of the war, recognizes as a first condition of peace the protracted cooperation of the Allies. In view of this agreement, anything written or said that tends to alienate the USSR from the United States may be counted as a self-inflicted wound.\(^1\)

There was an important attempt to defeat the widely held conception that communism aimed at world revolution. Here is a paragraph from Fact Sheet 64, quoted in the pamphlet released by the House Committee on Un-American Activities:

"While the early leaders of communism in the Soviet Union advocated world revolution, Stalin modified that policy in 1927. He exiled Trotsky and others who opposed his position that the greatest Soviet contribution to world socialism

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would be a demonstration to the world that socialism would work in one country. On the record, the avowed Soviet policy has been peace through international collective security, if possible, or strong defenses by its own efforts if collective security failed. Originally excluded from the League of Nations, the Soviet Union joined in 1934. During the next 5 years it took a strong stand for collective action against aggression. After the Munich sell-out in September 1938, pursuing its realistic policies, the Soviet looked to its own protection. The Soviet made a nonaggression pact with Germany in 1939 which the Nazis broke, and a 5-year nonaggression pact with Japan in 1941. Through pledges at the conferences at Moscow, Teheran, and Yalta, and through daily repetitions to its people the Soviet has reaffirmed its aim as lasting peace through international cooperation.\textsuperscript{1}

Orientation made the widest use of material lauding the fighting qualities of the Russians. Fact Sheet 3, "Know Our Allies," contained this statement:

"The world stands in amazement and admiration before the fighting of the Red Army and the embattled peoples at Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and on every part of the 2,000 mile front--it is Russia's supreme contribution to the cause of the United Nations."\textsuperscript{2}

There was some definite evidence that anti-Russian animosities were alleviated after 1944. In that year, What the Soldier Thinks conducted a poll to determine soldier attitudes on Russia. Twenty-four per cent of the soldiers believed that Russia and the United States would fight each other sooner or later, and only thirty-five


\textsuperscript{2} Orientation Fact Sheet 3, "Know Our Allies," War Department, Washington, D.C., (February, 1944), p. 3.
per cent believed that Russia and the United States would get along reasonably in the post-war world. One year after the 1944 survey, another poll of the same group was conducted. This time fifteen per cent of those tested believed that the United States and Russia would eventually fight each other, and forty-six per cent thought that the two nations would get along together reasonably well in the post-war world.¹

The survey indicated a far from satisfactory spirit of friendship between the two allies. But anti-Russian sentiment had declined by 1945. At least some of this improvement could be attributed to the orientation program; the period, 1944-1945, marked its first year as an important part of troop training.

China

Orienting American troops toward closer ties with the Chinese was not without its difficulties, but the task was much less complicated than similar efforts in regard to the Russians. The average soldier had only meagre knowledge about China, and only a few had confirmed anti-Chinese prejudices. However, some soldiers did know enough about Chiang Kai-Shek, the Kuomintang and Chinese civil conflicts to embarrass a program designed to build good will toward the Chinese government and people.

Those who professed to know something about China were acquainted with Madame Sun Yat-Sen's anti-Kuomintang sentiments

and had high respect for her judgement. The writings of such respected authors as Edgar Snow, Agnes Smedly, Evans Carlson and Brooks Atkinson were fairly well known by a number of soldiers. To defend official China against criticisms based on these sources, called for considerable skill.

Fact Sheet 27, "Progress and Poverty in China," and Fact Sheet 28, "What About the Government of China," were largely attempts to "whitewash" the Kuomintang and Chiang. But in April, 1945, word went out to orientation that possibly official China should not in the future be given such clean billing. According to Army Talk 66, "Our Ally China," certain anti-democratic abuses were revealed in the practices of our Asiatic Ally:

"In the early autumn of 1944, Chinese press censorship was temporarily relaxed and American correspondents in China were able to give us a clearer picture of the Chinese situation in general, a situation which came as somewhat of a shock to the American public."

Army Talk 66 went on to disclose some of the facts about the Chinese situation, and to question the policies of the Kuomintang. This question was posed, "Is China Democratic?", and in answer the following was written:

"We Americans have been told many things about China's heroic struggle for human freedom. But there are certain things that may seem startling or even appalling--things that don't seem to fit into the usual pattern of what we think of as a republic. A one-party

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form of government, for example, controlled by the Kuomintang or National People's Party; a president but no popular elections; and governmental control over the press and other institutions that are run as private enterprises in our own country. In other words we find in China that the terms "republic" and "democracy" do not always necessarily mean the same thing. Though China, by abolishing the monarchy, has become a republic, she hasn't yet fully worked out the democratic processes that we think should go with a republican form of government."

A comment on official China was quoted from a New York Times article by Brooks Atkinson:

"These are some of the things for which the Chinese people are to be respected. But for our own self-respect we must be realistic about China's many shortcomings. Some of them are inevitable and cannot be remedied; some of them are due to the incompetence of a government that puts its political security ahead of the war against Japan...."

The role of the Chinese communists in fighting the Japanese was given much more attention than in the previous Fact Sheets, 27 and 28. Chou En-Lai, Chu Teh and Yao Tse-Tung, were listed among the "who's who in the Chinese Situation." They received equal attention with Chiang Kai-Shek, the Soongs and General Wedemeyer. Army Talk 68 continued its appraisal of the communists as follows:

"One of the most serious bars against the realization of full representative government in China is the continuing tension between the Kuomintang and the Chinese 'Communists.' When we speak of the Chinese 'Communists,' we should remember that many competent observers

2. Ibid., p. 3.
say that they stand for something very different from what we ordinarily intend when we use the word 'communist'. In the first place, unlike communists of the orthodox type, they believe in the rights of private property and private enterprise. Their chief interest at present is to improve the economic position of China's farmers. Many of whom own but little land themselves, and rent their land in part or in whole from wealthy landlords. In the second place, the Chinese 'Communists' are not, like those in America, merely a small minority. With the sole exception of the Kuomintang itself, they are easily China's most important single political group. They exercise almost independent control over many parts of North China, where they have been responsible for much of the continuing guerrilla activity against the Japanese....

Some American and other observers who have visited the 'Communists' agree that the things they have been doing in their areas are quite in accord with what we think of as liberal democracy."

Great Britain

Orientation expended little effort to promote the British in American eyes. Most soldiers were already favorably disposed toward the British people, and the British Army. In January, 1944, what the Soldier Thinks revealed that almost eighty per cent of all soldiers stationed in England liked the people of that country.2

There was some attempt to explain and defend the English colonial policies which seemed at variance with democratic practices. The GI Roundtable, "Our British Ally," contained the following on the British imperial record:

"The British people in general give little thought to their Empire. Visitors to England from the dominions are so dismayed by this lack of knowledge and interest that they ask themselves—how did the British ever put an empire together? How do they keep it together? Those who do think about the matter will readily admit that there are dark chapters in the imperial story, but they will insist that at least they are no darker than the chapters telling how other people have handled black, brown, or redskinned races. They may remind us that if the British had not taken a particular area some other nation would have done so, and that historically it was not a matter of free and independent India versus British India, but of British India rather than French, Dutch, Portuguese, or even Russian India. They will point with pride to the developments which turned colonies into dominions, which have already transferred the greater part of Indian rule to the peoples of that peninsula, and will transfer the remainder when those peoples can agree on methods of using it. They will remind us that any picture of crude exploitation of natives has been out of date for at least half a century. And if they know much of our history, they may ask if our own hands are spotlessly clean."1

This booklet plus the film, "Battle of Britain," made up most of the orientation program on Great Britain.

Our Other Allies

Free France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the other smaller nations on our side, were not discussed separately by orientation. Fact Sheet 3, "Know Our Allies," contained a paragraph on the contributions of each of the smaller allies in the war against the Axis. In addition,

off-duty discussions on some of these little partners were held. "The Philippines," "The Balkans," and "Free France" were among the titles in the GI Roundtable series. Guerrilla activities in Greece, Yugoslavia and France were lauded in Army Talk 52, "Guerrilla Fighters--Mostly On Our Side."

U. S. Foreign Policy

The United States' foreign policy between the two great wars has been called unrealistic, narrow and totally inadequate for intelligent American participation in the complex field of world politics. Prior to 1941, and even into the early years of the war, many Americans had only slight information on their country's foreign commitments. And long before our actual involvement in the war, America had definite world obligations which should have been well known to most of our citizens.

American soldiers had casual information on foreign affairs, and the same casual interest in world problems so much in evidence among civilians. Orientation attempted to stimulate soldier thinking to a recognition of America's proper role in world affairs. Isolationist sentiment has always been strong in America, and many soldiers were somewhat skeptical of an expanded American foreign policy. However, during the latter years of the conflict, scientific development in war weapons, war experiences, and orientation, succeeded in broadening the average soldier's conception
of what was proper American participation in world affairs.  
  
Orientation distributed excellent material for discussions in this field, and many informative classes on foreign affairs were held. Fact Sheet 22, "Seventeen Points of U. S. Foreign Policy," and Fact Sheet 26, "U. S. and Affairs Abroad," became the basis for this phase of the program. In these two pamphlets the Cordell Hull declarations on American foreign policy were explained and summarized as follows:

1. The full diplomatic power of the United States must be committed to the military necessities of total victory through cooperation with our allies.

2. Our foreign policy must express as nearly as possible the will of the people of the United States.


4. The earliest possible restoration of order through popular and progressive governments dedicated to democratic achievement.

5. A democratic world organization based on the power of the Big Four Allies, but including all nations for the maintenance of peace, the settlement of disputes and the promotion of a free economy and social and political progress.

Army Talk 69, "Our Interest in the Pacific," outlined especially the problems in the post-war pacific world which would materially change American policy in regard to that vast area. This quotation from George E. Taylor's book,

"America in the New Pacific," was contained in the fact sheet:

"The United States is in a strong position to coordinate these various issues... Out of the great political experience of this country can be drawn ideas which fit the Pacific and the world picture. A country which has admitted men of all races to citizenship, in spite of race prejudices which disfigure the social landscape, can conceive of a world in which race equality would be a political ideal.... Whether the war is short or long there can be no return to the prewar Pacific.... She (America) has committed herself, in external relations, to a broad alliance and therefore to a general solution of the Pacific question."

In answer to the question, What would you say are our present and future responsibilities in the Pacific?", Henry Wallace's booklet, Our Job in the Pacific, was presented in part:

"...Because of the many new factors in the situation as well as the age-old problems which still affect us, such as the low standard of living of most Asiatic peoples, it is vitally urgent that we re-examine the whole question of our place in the Pacific.

Some of the new factors are political, like the rise of China and the decline of Japan, the new relationship between Russia and America, the twilight of empire in the East, and the claim of Australia and New Zealand to a voice in Pacific affairs. There are also new economic factors, like the drive for industrialization in the economically undeveloped countries of Asia the the development of substitutes in the West for agricultural raw materials formerly imported from Asia.... The rise of a militant Japan has been the chief dynamic factor in Far Eastern

international relations during the last fifty years. After the war Japan will no longer be militant. 

...A complete view of the Pacific of the future must include Russia and Alaska on the north, Canada and the continental United States and Latin America on the east, Australia and New Zealand on the south, and Eastern Asia on the west."

In army orientation on American foreign policy there was little indication that Russo-American rivalry would be a complicating factor in the post-war world. Rather, orientation seemed to believe that the United States and the USSR would continue their war-time partnership to help solve world difficulties. There were no special fact sheets on the Balkans or on those countries bordering Russia. However, all references to those areas so seriously in controversy between Russia and the United States today, pointed to the need for political and economic reform, and to the probability that left-wing controls would be established there.

This appraisal of Yugoslav guerrillas was contained in the orientation sponsored GI Roundtable booklet, "The Balkans":

"Many Americans and Englishmen who have been in Yugoslavia on missions to the Partisans report that the Partisans are an extraordinary phenomenon. Many of their leaders are Communists, who have close ties with Moscow, and have had long careers as agitators. Such a man is their mysterious leader, Joseph Broz or Tito, a former Croat metalworker, who is now 'Marshal of Yugoslavia.'

But the majority of the Partisans are said not to be Communists. They may have worn red stars on their hats and given the clenched-fist salute. They certainly admire Soviet Russia for her victories over the Germans, and, as Slavs, they share with the Bulgarians a strong affection for the Russians. But they are mostly Yugoslav farmers, Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, who would like to see Yugoslavia re-created and governed democratically, continuing the old agrarian opposition to the dictatorship of King Alexander.

The Partisans came to be bitterly opposed to the government-in-exile and its minister of war. They said that Mihailovich, for his part, fought the Partisans whenever he fought anybody—and there have certainly been many clashes between the two Yugoslav resistance groups. It is charged that Mihailovich, to arm himself against the Partisans, accepted arms from the Italian occupying forces and also frequently dealt with the Germans and with the quisling Nedich. Mihailovich's supporters, of course, deny these charges of double-dealing. However, many of his men have gone over to Tito.1

The same booklet commented as follows on Greece:

"...Like the Yugoslavs, they have kept German troops pinned down, and also like the Yugoslavs, they have been split by political differences among themselves.

But the issue between the two groups of Greek guerrillas is not nearly so well understood. The larger group, the EAM, has some Communist leaders, like the Partisans. The smaller group, the EDES, is more conservative, but still favors postwar social reform. Fighting between the EAM and the EDES has almost always been on a very small scale and the two groups have from time to time been temporarily reconciled.2

Orientation did somewhat alter its program in regard to Russo-American relations after the end of the fighting.

2. Ibid., p. 49.
In September, 1946, Army Talk 140, "What the United States Proposes for Germany," was issued, and interpreted as an answer to unsatisfactory Russian proposals for Germany. In general, however, the program was far from laying a background for the differences between the USSR and the United States which are so plain today.

World Organization

In 1937, only twenty-six per cent of the American people believed that the United States should join a world organization with police power. By May, 1943, three out of four Americans thought that there should be an immediate start on the formation of an international organization. Large majorities in all sections of the country believed that this agency should possess police power to enforce its decisions. In 1946, another survey showed that eighty-six per cent of all Americans favored American participation in a strong world organization with police power.¹

The American Army reflected rather accurately the thinking of the whole country on this subject. Most soldiers believed that some system of international control would be required in the post-war world. However, many of our troops had only slight comprehension of the difficulties involved in setting up such an agency. There was widespread approval for the idea of world organization, but it fell short of being a strong and informed conviction. Many orientation leaders believed that soldier appreciation for

the concept of world government needed to be strengthened considerably if temporary differences between the great powers, or vigorous anti-United Nations propaganda, were to be weathered successfully.

The orientation program sought to establish soldier predilections toward world government on a foundation of intelligence and understanding. It attempted to dispel the doubts many seemed to have in regard to the competence of international planning for peace and economic security.

One source of doubt was the comparison being made between the new and the old international organization, which had failed after the first world war. In an effort to counter fears that the United Nations would have the same defects which destroyed the old League, Army Talk 80, "San Francisco--Charting World Security," made these observations:

"Those who favor the new organization are usually willing to agree that its charter is perhaps not perfect. But the organization has been favorably contrasted to the League of Nations, which was not able to keep the peace. Supporters point to three main reasons why the new organization stands a better chance. First, its planners were in a position to observe and correct the League's weaknesses. Second, the veto is now limited to five big powers, whereas every League member held veto power, making effective action difficult. Third, the United States failed to join the League, and the Soviet Union belonged only from 1934 to 1939, by which time the League had already lost most of its prestige."

Many soldiers held firmly to the conviction that the United States would be required to give up too much of her sovereignty to the world organization. To meet this contention Army Talk 31, "Looking Ahead from San Francisco," contained the following:

"The past ideas of complete sovereignty did not avoid war. No strong nation exercised its sovereignty to stop Japan when it struck China, Italy when it struck Ethiopia, or Germany when it struck at Czechoslovakia....As former Secretary of State Stettinius has said: 'The sovereignty of no nation, not even the most powerful, is absolute. There is no such thing as complete freedom of decision for any nation.' The basis of the Charter is that nations will seek ways in which they can trust one another. Jealously guarding one's complete sovereignty has not protected nations from war. The success of the conference must be based on nations working together as a team."1

On the same subject, this was quoted from a speech made by Anthony Eden:

"We must catch up politically to the point we have reached in science. ...I am unable to see any final solution that will make the world safe from atomic power other than that we all abate our present ideas of sovereignty and take the sting out of nationalism, (of which) every scientific discovery makes greater nonsense."2

There was some objection to the United Nations Organization because, according to the declarations at Yalta,

it was to be based on the Atlantic Charter, which many considered "starry-eyed" idealism, and impossible of achievement in our world. Orientation answered this reservation as follows:

"The Atlantic Charter is a practical goal which can be realized because its principles are neither new nor untried. Boiled down to their essentials, they stand for territorial integrity of nations, security from economic plight and fear, assurance of popular government, and a continued and lasting peace. In short, the Atlantic Charter stands for the actual practice of fundamental democratic principles.

We in the United States have followed these principles for many years. True, these principles are not always carried out in practice. But we are striving to achieve the full application of democracy at home and we have always tried to respect the rights of other nations."

The orientation program reported the deliberations at Yalta, Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco in detail. It was further pointed out that the political-military organization blueprinted at these conferences was probably only a part of the answer to the quest for world peace. Some plan of economic rehabilitation was held out as necessary to implement political-military measures. In this connection, the Bretton Woods discussions were interpreted for discussion groups. A general appraisal of the Bretton Woods plan was contained in Army Talk 79, "Bretton Woods--Investment In Peace":

"...world financial uncertainty can have a great effect on our jobs and prosperity in our own country. Bretton Woods

is a plan designed to combat financial insecurity, just as the San Francisco Conference is concerned with political-military insecurity. The Bretton Woods plan, together with the agreements reached at San Francisco, the Chicago Air Conference, and other United Nations meetings, forms an important part of the world machinery designed to maintain peace....

Control of Atomic Power

"The harnessing of atomic energy may be the greatest single step that man has taken along the road of scientific progress. If these vast new sources of power are properly controlled, we are in all probability on the brink of a new and wonderful age. If uncontrolled, they may bring us to a destruction and misery never before seen on this earth. Mankind truly stands at the cross-roads. May we take the proper turning."  

Discussions upon atomic power did not come into the orientation program until the fall of 1946, except for some observations in Army Talk 106, "One World-Or None," dated January 15, 1946. But the ideas expressed in the fact sheets dealing with questions of atomic control indicate orientation (Army) thinking on the subject.

Army Talk 106 asked the question--"Does atomic war require a change in our ideas of national sovereignty?" and answered as follows:

"Some people feel that our best chance is to maintain our sovereignty, or right to act, as it is. They think that our interests would not be helped by our giving up sovereignty to any degree.

Others believe that the atomic age calls for giving certain national powers to an international body to prevent war. This is much the same way that you delegate your personal right to defend yourself against crime to the city police force. Your state is not big enough to defend itself against foreign attack, so it delegates this power to the nation. People who believe this way say that if every nation insists on its separate right to prevent war, conflict is inevitable. They say that only by establishing world sovereignty to keep peace can we have any guarantee of safety. Foreign Secretary Bevin of Great Britain and Premier Soong of China have gone on record as willing to merge part of their countries' sovereignty with other nations into an international sovereignty to preserve peace.¹

Three fact sheets, Army Talk 138, "Atomic Warfare: What Effect Will It Have On Ground Combat Forces?", Army Talk 146, "How Are We Controlling Atomic Power?", and Army Talk 157, "A New World in the Atom," were distributed after September 1946. These pamphlets contained very little concerning United Nations control for atomic energy. They attempted to explain how the atomic bomb worked, its potentialities for war and peace, and possibilities for defense against atomic weapons in future warfare. The discussions seemed to reflect growing military concern of Russia. The wisdom of handing over atomic secrets to an international organization under present conditions was questioned in Army Talk 138:

"Everyone hopes that some sort of international control can be set up which will be effective in preventing the use of the atomic bomb for the destruction of mankind. To this end

the United Nations has formed the Atomic Energy Commission, which at the present time is considering two plans, one submitted by the United States and the other by Russia. However, at best we are far from a solution of the problem, and it is only being realistic to take that fact into serious account.

It would be very dangerous to rely on international control until such control actually has been set up and we are sure that it is going to work. Until the United Nations is in a position absolutely to guarantee peace, we must continue to consider war as a very real possibility.

And we can assume that if the United Nations cannot prevent another war, neither can it prevent the use of atomic bombs in that war.1

Orientation discussions upon atomic energy indicated a recession from the high spirit of faith and trust in the efficacy of international organization, and in peaceful cooperation among the great powers, evidenced in earlier pamphlets on international questions. There seemed to be a growing conviction that the United Nations organization would not be able to assure a peaceful world, and that the United States must plan its atomic program with this fact in mind.

"It is the job of all Army men to think ahead. We want no more wars. We hope that some way can be found to stop wars before we have another. But we know the future is uncertain. It is our job to be ready."2

Summary

Army orientation for foreign affairs and world

2. Ibid., p. 10.
organization followed the democratic philosophy outlined in
the Atlantic Charter. It sought to instill tolerance and
good will toward other nations, and taught that world
planning through an international organization was the one
great hope of the world for lasting peace and economic
security. The program deviated somewhat from the one world,
brotherhood-of-man, concept in those fact sheets devoted to
discussions of atomic power. There orientation seemed to
reflect distrust for other nations, and lack of faith in
world organization. This part came very late—after most
of the Army had been demobilized. Earlier orientation,
which had taught that nations could be trusted, and that
world organization would work, had a much wider hearing.

Orientation in relation to foreign affairs and world
government formed these concepts:

1. The United States and Russia can and will
cooperate to help solve world problems.

2. There is little democracy in official
China. Chinese difficulties can be
overcome only if all groups are brought
together to work for democratic goals.

3. The foreign policy of the United States
must grow in scope and responsibility.
It must exert an active, democratic
influence in foreign affairs.

4. A world organization with strong police
power to enforce its decisions is the
one great hope for lasting peace.

5. The ideals expressed in the Atlantic
Charter must be the guiding principles
for world organization.

6. Atomic energy control is an international
problem. Some system of world atomic control
must be developed; but the United States can-
not share its knowledge of atomic weapons with
all nations until a peaceful world is assured.
CHAPTER V

EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

In previous chapters orientation concepts concerning political, economic and social questions within the United States and abroad have been outlined. This was the purpose of the thesis. It is a further duty to evaluate these concepts as democratic principles.

In all the discussion material utilized by orientation to promote its program, valid democratic precepts were followed. The propositions in regard to politics, economics, minorities and world relationships were fully American, the word of the House Committee on Un-American Activities notwithstanding:

"This so called indoctrination course was, and will remain as, one of the dirtiest blots on the history of the War Department....Steps should be taken by Congress to prevent the recurrence of such political schemes under the guise of aiding the war effort."

Some interpretations were more liberal than many Americans would like. The democracy envisaged by the orientation program did not compromise with traditions and practices, which on their face are inimical to its highest ideals. The program taught tolerance and respect for all races, religions and national groups. It vigorously assailed the mistaken assumption that a man's ability or

his character, could be determined by the color of his skin, or by his religion or national affiliation. In referring to domestic politics and economics, orientation proposed change and reform in certain areas of our democratic system so that its material benefits could be enjoyed by all. In discussions relating to foreign affairs and world organization, orientation visualized a world made free by adherence to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and made secure by a fully implemented world organization to which all nations would give faithful support.

There is no way to measure the effectiveness of orientation in exact terms. Most soldiers were in solid agreement with the objectives of the program. They were receptive to information upon post-war politics and economics, and in regard to America's part in world affairs after the war. It is certain that information and attitudes are related. Army polls revealed that information concerning controversial issues had a direct bearing upon the formation of favorable attitudes toward democratic objectives. The orientation program expanded soldier knowledge in economics, politics, minority problems and foreign affairs. It follows that it impressed democratic opinions in the soldier mind.

It is difficult to state that soldier attitudes on these questions were of a durable quality. Many individuals

react to their most recent stimulus; and it is more comfortable to conform with local customs in controversial matters than it is to stand for what is right.

In the field of foreign affairs and related world organization, orientation was evidently too optimistic. The program did not foresee the conflicts which beset Meso-American relations today, or any such foreign policy as that outlined in the "Truman Doctrine." Neither did it propose that the United States should give the measure of support to Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kuomintang as is in prospect now. Certainly it never believed that America would be forced into the uncomfortable role of supporting reactionary regimes in China, or in Greece.

This study has resulted in the following over all conclusions in regard to the Army Orientation Program as it spoke out upon political, economic and social questions at home and abroad:

1. The Orientation Program was the most significant and diligent effort to influence soldier opinion yet attempted by the American Army.

2. The Army Orientation Program expressed the highest ideals of democracy in its discussions upon social, political and economic questions in the United States and abroad.

3. The Army Orientation Program followed the democratic declarations expressed in the Atlantic Charter in its discussions relating to foreign affairs and world organization.
4. The Army Orientation Program was too optimistic in its predictions that the day of friendship and cooperation between all nations was at hand. But if the world dilemma is to be solved, the democratic precepts laid down by orientation must be carried forward.
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