THE UNITED STATES AND THE
FIRST MOROCCAN CRISIS

A Thesis Presented for the
Degree of Master of Arts

by

William Mason Baker, B. S.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
1947

Approved by:

[Signature]
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHAPTER</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. GLOBAL BACKGROUND</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. ROOSEVELT'S RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. PRE-CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS, Part One: Initial Phases</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS, Part Two: Negotiations Over the Police</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS, Part Three: The Climax and End of the Conference</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Whatever value this study may have lies in its presentation of the diplomacy of the United States during the First Moroccan Crisis in its European context. Specifically, the thesis has been to show, first, that the actions of the United States government were those of a partner in a close diplomatic coalition with the French. Several of the pronouncements of the United States government are, in fact, shown to have been first planned jointly by agents of the two governments.

But, in the second place, it has been shown that President Theodore Roosevelt's government had well defined aims and that Roosevelt himself was quite willing to operate through a coalition with the French to achieve those aims. The aims thus achieved were, (1) the restoration of the balance of power and the maintenance of peace, (2) the faithful continuance of friendship of the United States with its allies, France and England, and, (3) the restraint of its potential enemy, Germany. A fourth aim, the maintenance of the open door in Morocco, was not achieved. But the interests of the United States in Morocco were negligible, and though much was made publicly of the importance of this objective, it seems doubtful that it was considered of great importance particularly in relation to the others.

The work is the outcome of the past year's study, by
the author, in modern and contemporary European history with Professor George A. Washburne, Chairman of the Department of History at Ohio State University. The author is therefore much indebted to him not only for his many helpful suggestions in preparing this work but for his inspiring instruction throughout the year. The writer wishes also to express his gratitude to Professor Francis P. Weisenberger, who read most of Chapters I and III and made many helpful corrections thereupon. Also, the author is much indebted to the various librarians of the Ohio State Library who have many times been of assistance in locating materials and in borrowing volumes from other libraries for use by him. And last but certainly not least the author wishes to express his appreciation to Mrs. Helen K. Erdman for her excellent stenographic work in the preparation of these pages.
CHAPTER I

GLOBAL BACKGROUND

One cannot state categorically the exact date on which the first Moroccan Crisis began. It was the outgrowth of a long chain of events extending at least as far back as the Congress of Berlin. For it was here that the old Concert of Europe was abandoned and the Balance of Power Concept again became the order of the day in international diplomacy. The grouping of the powers, which the German Kaiser and Francis Joseph as well as Sir Edward Grey and Theodore Roosevelt were to fear might result from the first Moroccan Crisis, can now be seen to have really begun in 1879. In the broad sweep of events from 1879 to 1914 the chief point of significance about the first Moroccan Crisis is that it marks a crystallizing of the two groups which composed the balance of power at that time. In the heat of the crisis each group was forged so solidly that its cohesion was maintained until the beginning of the First World War.

It does not lie within the scope of this study to examine all the diplomatic ramifications and heated cross currents which bear indirectly upon it. To do so would require an entire volume. However, there are at least three factors which bear very directly upon the diplomacy of Tangier and Algeciras.
The first is the Entente Cordiale signed by England and France on April 8, 1904; the second, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 which resulted in a serious weakening and defeat of Russia; and the third, the rising power of the United States in international affairs.

The grouping of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Italy, Romania, and Serbia on the one side and of France and Russia on the other had caused the British to decide to abandon the policy of "splendid isolation" which had been pursued not altogether successfully since 1815. In 1898, 1899, and 1901 Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, the British Colonial Secretary, tried to effect an alliance with Germany. Failing as a result of the German lack of political astuteness and diplomatic ineptness, England then turned to France. The resulting agreement was to the initial advantage of England. She had made a friend out of a powerful enemy and her isolation was a thing of the past. But she was later to find that the price of such friendship was entanglement in that friend's feuds.


2 Ibid., p. 129 et seq.

The Entente Cordiale concluded between the two countries settled all colonial disputes of consequence. In the terms of the settlement France recognized the permanent nature of the British occupation of Egypt in exchange for British permission to France to institute reforms and to preserve order in Morocco. Secret articles of the Entente contemplated the eventual portioning of Morocco between France and Spain. Terms were agreed upon between France and Spain October 3, 1904.

Gooch tells us how old Bismarck used to say that even with the documents one could not write history for one could not know what was in the minds of those who framed them. The acuteness of this observation is particularly apparent when one considers Delcasse's failure to obtain the assent of Germany to the French move on Morocco. M. Théophile Delcasse had become French Minister of Foreign Affairs in June, 1898. He had early determined upon the acquisition of Morocco and in December, 1900 had concluded a secret agreement with Italy, the weakest power in the rival triple alliance. Delcasse obtained Italy's assent to France's proposed action in Morocco in exchange for French permission to Italy to acquire Tripoli.

The failure of Delcasse to purchase the acquiescence of Germany is generally considered to have been a major blunder.

4 Ibid., p. v.

5 Fay, op. cit., p. 145.
The injury to Germany's prestige is usually stressed as the main and, in some instances, the only factor in determining the attitude of the German Foreign Office. Germany's grievances were actually threefold. In the first place her economic interests had been ignored. It is generally considered that Germany's economic interests in Morocco were negligible. Sir Thomas Barclay, however, a recognized authority on the subject, has pointed out on the other hand that they were considerable. Germany's total tonnage of ships calling at Moroccan ports was, in fact, larger than France's although smaller than England's. "At all ports [in 1901] except Safi, England is an easy first; but as between France and Germany the latter is ahead at Casablanca, much ahead at Mazagan, and overwhelmingly ahead at Safi. At Mogador Germany shows a tonnage of 44,000 against France with 24,000." The significance of the above statements is apparent when one considers that the quarrel over Morocco was principally between France and Germany, that German business men with foreign trade interests were among the most vociferous adherents of colonial expansion, and that in its final

---


8 Gooch, op. cit., lets England out by saying that it was harmless for England to come to an agreement with France over Morocco. It was France who erred in not making a similar agreement with Germany, pp. 59-60.
analysis it was the port of Casablanca that Germany hoped to obtain through the Conference of Algeciras.

In the second place Germany had suffered a major blow to her prestige at the conclusion of this bilateral agreement over territory in which she had a major interest. The blow wounded her national pride and at the same time weakened her position among the nations of the world. Germany had a right, according to the standards of the day, to demand "compensations." This phase rose more and more to the forefront as the Moroccan pot began to boil, and will be discussed at other points in this study.

Then, finally, the German government was apprehensive in general over an agreement of any kind between France and England. The German government, remembering the approaches of Joseph Chamberlain, had good reason to be apprehensive over any secret provisions which it might contain. Germany still expected that the British would be around a fourth time for an alliance, as a rapprochement between such traditional rivals as England and France or England and Russia was thought to be impossible. The German government was undoubtedly gravely concerned at any threat to the balance between the two systems of alliance. She would naturally be glad of any opportunity to pry England away from France and later, at the Algeciras Conference actually tried to do so.

Count Tattenbach, the Second German Delegate, told Sir Arthur Nicolson that "the Conference offers you an unique occasion to recover your liberty. Profit by it and let us make arrange­ments." Such tactlessness caused the British delegate to exclaim to Henry White, the First American Delegate, "The damned Germans have had the audacity to offer us inducements to get us away from France!" But that the main purpose of Germany's intervention at Morocco was to test the relations between England and France is disproved in the light of the above-mentioned factors. Germany had entered the colonial game at a late stage, Morocco was still open, Germany had business interests there, and, in short, it was much too valuable to let slip through one's fingers without a murmer.

The United States had a very considerable economic interest in the Far East and had shared with Great Britain and Japan a monopoly of the foreign trade of Manchuria. Russia's obstructionist tactics in this latter zone had given all three


12 Fay, op. cit., 179; Nevins, op. cit., 262.

a common purpose and the Japanese attack on Russia was made under the shadow of the alliance with England and the benevolent neutrality of the United States. The Anglo-Japanese treaty offered Japan a free hand in Korea and in case of war stated that if another power came to Russia's assistance, meaning Germany or France, the British Navy would be thrown into the balance for Japan.  

Roosevelt similarly, in a secret agreement, granted the Korean sphere of influence to Japan. And when the Russo-Japanese War began Roosevelt himself stated that he notified Germany and France in the most polite and discreet fashion that "in the event of a combination against Japan . . . I should promptly side with Japan and proceed to whatever length was necessary in her behalf."  

At the same time the German Kaiser doubtless influenced the Czar in the Russian policy that led to war. In February, 1904 Germany indicated her pro-Russian attitude by asking that the neutrality of China be respected only "outside the sphere of military operations." Since the fighting was in Manchuria, Russia would be free to take that area after defeating Japan. But the United States government modified the phrase so as to include Manchuria also and Germany cheerfully acceded. Roosevelt

14 Pringle, op. cit., p. 376.
15 Ibid., p. 377.
stated that it was, however, "a good thing to give Germany all the credit for making the suggestion ... Germany behaved better than any other power."\(^{16}\)

Roosevelt's policy in the Far East was to promote American interests through the maintenance of a balance of power. At first he felt Russia was more dangerous than Japan to that balance of power but when Japan began to appear as the certain victor, to the astonishment of the world, he changed his support to Russia and began negotiations for peace. He found, to his surprise that England would not support him in this move.\(^{17}\)

When the Kaiser visited Tangier on March 31, 1905 and challenged the French position there, France too became interested in ending the war, for Russia's strength might be needed to offset Germany in Europe. There was, then, a side to the German intervention at Morocco of a purely opportunistic nature arising out of the Russo-Japanese War. Russia was defeated and weakened, not only from the military loss but from internal disorders as well. Theodore Roosevelt himself finally came to believe that Germany was acting like a "big bully" in jumping on France when France's ally was of no immediate value.\(^{18}\) The

\(^{16}\) Ibid., p. 378.

\(^{17}\) Ibid., p. 379.

French particularly stressed this side of the question. In the crisis that later developed over the acceptance of a conference to settle Morocco, M. Rouvier, the head of the French government, had come to the defense of his Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Théophile Delcasse. The attitude of the German government had changed greatly, he stated. On the 23rd of March, 1904, Delcasse had informed Rodolin, the German Ambassador, of French plans for Morocco which would improve conditions of commerce to the benefit of all and would maintain the political status quo. Rodolin found the declaration "very natural and perfectly justified." On the 12th of April, Bülow had told the German Reichstag that Germany's interests in Morocco were only of a commercial nature and, although those rights would be protected he had "no reason to believe they would be injured or ignored." The change in the German position came as a result of the Russian defeats, said M. Rouvier.

That Germany could see that the balance of power had been upset by Russia's defeat and weakness and that she was glad to take advantage of it, even though Russia was still a potential ally, can be easily seen. Sir Edward Grey was quick to see the relation. He was even willing to make a temporary concession to Germany in Morocco.

"Time," he said, "was on the side of France.

19 Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 3, 4, and 9; Nevins, op. cit., p. 265.
For the recovery of Russia will change the situation in Europe that will in the long run decide the position of France and Germany respectively in Morocco." In Grey's historic memorandum of about the 20th of February, 1906, he wrote: "There is at least a prospect that when Russia is re-established we shall find ourselves on good terms with her. . . . If it is necessary to check Germany it could then be done. The present is the most unfavorable moment for attempting to check her. 20

Another factor of considerable importance from the Russo-Japanese War angle, was the fact that the German government (particularly von Holstein) feared or pretended to fear that a result of the Far Eastern War would be the partition of China among France, Great Britain, Russia, and Japan. To offset this Germany drew closer to President Roosevelt in the last months of 1904 and 1905. Roosevelt was interested in maintaining the open door in China and Manchuria and naturally drew close to Germany during the peace negotiations. 21

The Kaiser wrote the Russian Czar on the 3rd of June, 1905 that if anyone could persuade the Japanese to soften their terms for peace with Russia it was Roosevelt. He wrote to the Czar that "should it meet with your approval, I could easily place myself privately en rapport with him as we are very intimate." 22


22 Pringle, op. cit., p. 385.
But Roosevelt began to mistrust both Russia and France as the Conference got under way. He likewise suspected the British of wanting to make trouble. He had asked the British to persuade their Japanese ally to moderate her terms for peace but he met with little encouragement. Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Ambassador at Washington had been instructed by the British Foreign Office that he was not to urge moderation on the Japanese Ambassador. The German government attempted to seize the opportunity to capitalize on Roosevelt's mistrust of England, France, and Russia in order to win his support at Morocco by saying Germany simply wanted an extension of the open door policy at Morocco.

In the New World important changes had taken place which were to bear directly on the crisis and Roosevelt's part in it. He had roundly applauded Cleveland for his part in the Venezuelan crisis of 1895. Then came the events of 1898 which signaled the fact that the United States was no longer engrossed in internal growth alone. The support by the English of the United States against Germany at Manila foreshadowed future action.

23 Anderson, _op. cit._, p. 160.
24 Pringle, _op. cit._, p. 387; Anderson, _op. cit._, p. 243.
25 Anderson, _op. cit._, p. 185.
1902 Roosevelt had insisted that both England and Germany settle their difficulties over Venezuelan debts to those countries through arbitration. The United States in the person of its President seemed about to recognize its position in relation to the other nations of the world.

Another event, the Perdicaris affair of 1904, has been said to have been "an incident that led to the participation of the United States in that meeting of European diplomats" (the Conference of Algeciras). Actually this event had little or no connection with any future participation by the United States in a matter of such grave international implications as the first Moroccan Crisis. If there is any connection it is in the mere coincidence of the affair having taken place in Morocco. Perdicaris, an alleged American citizen, and his English son-in-law, Varley, had been kidnapped and held for ransom by Raisuli, a native chieftain. Mr. Gummere, American Consul at Tangier, reported the situation as serious and immediately requested an American warship. Anderson notes that "both the British and the American governments requested the good offices of the French government in effecting the release. Mr. Hay, the American Secretary of State, gave assurance that if more serious action were subsequently necessary in Morocco, it would not take place without a

26 Shaw, op. cit., p. 157; Tardieu, op. cit., p. 5.
previous exchange of views with France. Thus he acknowledged France's special position with reference to that country. But this action of Hay did not commit the United States in any way to defend this special position of France in the future, nor did it imply that the United States did not recognize that Germany had interests in Morocco. In view of these facts, the statement of Anderson would not appear to contradict the main conclusions drawn.

Perdicaris was kidnapped May 18. On June 33 Hay sent his dramatic message to Gummere, "We want either Perdicaris alive or Reisuli dead." The same day it was read to the Republican National Convention then in session in Chicago. It was probably designed more for the consumption of the delegates than for the purpose of frightening the Moroccan ex-cattle thief. At any rate it was used by Roosevelt to stir the lethargic convention to life and "brought forth the expected cheers." Mr. Perdicaris reached Tangier on June 24 "as the result of negotiations which had been conducted at the same time that Secretary Hay was writing his message in Washington." Apparently the

---

27 Anderson, op. cit., p. 131, footnote 45.

28 Ibid.

29 Pringle, op. cit., p. 389.

message had no effect on final arrangements as the Moorish Court paid the ransom to Raisuli and received a bill of $4,000 additional from the United States.

The event showed the state of anarchy which existed in Morocco but countless other events had previously made this clear. For the United States, what began as an effort to protect one of its citizens in a lawless area had degenerated into a political demonstration. For it was later discovered that "Roosevelt knew when he authorized the message that Perdicaris was not even an American citizen."31

CHAPTER II

ROOSEVELT'S RELATIONS WITH FOREIGN DIPLOMATS

The relations of the United States with France, England, and Germany from 1903 to 1905, have been briefly dealt with in Chapter I, but the personal relationships involved should be briefly mentioned. Albert Shaw states that Roosevelt at one time remarked to him that "now that poor G____ is dead, the German Emperor is my most prolific correspondent!" The statement is probably an exaggeration but it does make clear the essential point that Roosevelt and Emperor William II were on intimate and friendly relations.

Roosevelt and the Kaiser were naturally drawn together through the mutual interests of their countries in the Far East as the year 1905 approached. Baron Speck von Sternburg, the German Ambassador at Washington, reported that if the President were reelected "he would like to go hand in hand with Germany in Eastern Asia." In another report he quoted Roosevelt as saying, "the only man I understand and who understands me is the Kaiser." Von Bulow had advised the Kaiser

---

1 Shaw, op. cit., p. 161.
that "the President is a great admirer of Your Majesty and would like to rule the world hand in hand with Your Majesty, regarding himself as something in the nature of an American counterpart to Your Majesty."\(^2\)

That these evaluations were extravagant can be seen by events which took place both before and after they were pronounced. Roosevelt had at first taken a pro-Japanese and therefore anti-German attitude in the Far Eastern question. He was aware of the German lack of sincerity in asking that China's neutrality be respected only "outside the sphere of military operations." But when mutual interests drew the United States and Germany together he was glad to have the Kaiser's friendship.

This friendship was a means of enlisting Roosevelt's aid to the German government in the Moroccan question as late as the Spring of 1905. This is clearly indicated in the following chapter, by Roosevelt's attempts on behalf of Germany to secure British consent to a Conference on Morocco and to better British-German relations. After the Kaiser's Tangier appearance Roosevelt wrote Taft that "I wish to Heaven our excellent friend, the Kaiser, was not so jumpy and did not have so many pipe dreams! Tell Speck . . . that I shall wait until I get home before I try to discuss it with him."\(^3\) This passage indicates clearly


\(^3\) Ibid., p. 391.
that Roosevelt was still sympathetic to the German side though beginning to feel some irritation at German methods.

By the Summer of 1905, Roosevelt had cooled perceptibly toward the Kaiser. He described him in June as "that autocratic zigzag" and just as peace negotiations began to settle the Russo-Japanese War, he told Sir Mortimer Durand—"I know Springy thinks I am inclined to fall under the influence of the German Emperor, but he is wrong. . . . I don't trust him."4 Roosevelt continued on the best of terms with Sternburg and states at more than one point in the Whitelaw Reid letter that he was on excellent terms with him. On Sternburg's death Roosevelt wrote White—

"Yes, I sincerely mourn Speck's loss. I cannot be sorry for the gallant little fellow himself, for life was one long torture for him. I have never met a man for whom I had a higher respect or regard. It is very hard on the Baroness."

Roosevelt's change in attitude can be ascribed, I think, to several factors. First of all, he realized, I am sure, as soon as he had time to study the situation, that he could not oppose France and especially England to befriend the Kaiser; secondly he became suspicious that the Germans were looking for something more than the open door in Morocco; thirdly, he had become disgusted with the Germans who had even threatened war in order to obtain a conference to settle the Moroccan question. These points

4 Pringle, op. cit., p. 379.

5 Roosevelt to White, 10 Sept., 1908, cited by Nevins, op. cit., p. 296.
are discussed elsewhere in this study and are simply enumerated here to lend perspective to the following.

Roosevelt's volte face had occurred to no small degree as a result of the advice given him by the French Ambassador, Jules Jusserand. I think it is highly significant of the interest which France attached to the establishment of good relations with the rising power in the new world, that she sent to the United States as Ambassador in 1902 a career diplomat of twenty-six years experience in Tunis, London, and Copenhagen. A profound student of Medieval English Literature and a man of varied talents, Jusserand was to serve as Ambassador to the United States for twenty-three years, i.e., until his retirement in 1925.

It should be noted here that Jusserand's career in the United States was distinguished from start to finish and he was on the friendliest and most intimate of terms not only with Roosevelt but with each of the Presidents whose tenure fell within his term of office. He married an American, became President of the American Historical Association, and was presented with honorary degrees by a half-dozen of America's leading universities. A man of the first order of intelligence, he wrote learned treatises on Historiography, English Literature, and the technique of Diplomacy, in addition to other works on the history of his own career.

Jusserand very shortly became a close friend of Roosevelt and Roosevelt, lacking well informed diplomats in Europe, came
to rely on men like him and Sternburg for information. It was undoubtedly easier for Jusserand to catch the President's ear than Sternburg, for the national interest of the United States clearly implied support of France (and England) rather than Germany. Roosevelt himself understood this and realized that the countries' interests must be considered first. The French themselves realized this well. Andre Tardieu, the French spokesman for the Conference states that

He knew what was right and wise. It was through this sense of the rightness and wisdom of our proposals, commented upon by an Ambassador who was for him a personal friend, that we took hold of his mind. Roosevelt states frankly at several points in the long letter to Whitelaw Reid, that he could not have acted as he did without the services of Sternburg and Jusserand but he adds that he was on more intimate terms with Jusserand than with Sternburg, But such states it mildly. This remarkable French Ambassador who could become President of the American Historical Society could also become an unofficial advisor to the President almost on a level with the Secretary of State. I shall try to show this clearly as the story unfolds. The President on the 25th of April, 1906, wrote Jusserand a letter generously giving him

6 Pringle, op. cit., p. 392.

7 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 82.

credit for the settlement of the Algeciras Conference—a letter more remarkable for its truthfulness than generosity in my opinion.

One of Roosevelt's objectives during the First Moroccan Conference was to maintain the open door in Morocco. Had he known that France had already made secret agreements partitioning Morocco between herself and Spain, it is doubtful that he would have given France such active support throughout the crisis. He was informed of the existence of these secret treaties by Sternburg but, according to his own word, refused to believe the story. That he did not must be credited as a diplomatic victory of Jusserand's. There is little doubt but that Jusserand was aware of his government's secret arrangements with Spain to partition Morocco. But the matter could be interpreted in different ways. One could say that the French police were simply going in to restore order to Morocco and that the political status quo and the open door would be maintained. Such was the answer which Delcassé had given Radelin at Paris and Jusserand was probably instructed to reflect this official view at Washington.

But there is a question unanswered. In the course of the negotiations it will be seen that Roosevelt took the view that there could be no assignment of spheres in Morocco without the open door being annulled. Jusserand must have known that his government sought to have the Conference confirm its arrangements

---

9 Roosevelt to Jusserand, April 25, 1906, cited by Dennis, op. cit., p. 507.
with England, Italy, and Spain. Towards the end of the Conference Roosevelt after having succeeded in eliminating Germany from any share in the Moroccan spoils found, himself, that France really intended to divide Morocco into French-Spanish spheres. Jusserand, thereupon, expressed considerable disgust at his own country's furtiveness and lack of frankness. Roosevelt in a letter to White of April 30, 1906, expresses himself as follows:

I may add that Jusserand, who is a trump, toward the end became very much disgusted with what he evidently regarded as a certain furtiveness and lack of frankness in the French in handling their case. I gained just the opinion you did of both the French and German diplomats. Until the Conference met I felt that France was behaving better than Germany, but toward the end it seemed to me that neither one was straightforward.10

In the Whitelaw Reid letter, written after the Algeciras Conference was over and Roosevelt saw clearly that France wanted separate spheres for herself and Spain, he still says that he does not believe in the existence of the secret treaties which provided for the division of Morocco between France and Spain. Jusserand was at this time a career diplomat of thirty years of distinguished service to France but one cannot help but wonder how he could have inspired Roosevelt with such a faith that truly moves mountains.11

10 Cited by Nevins, op. cit., p. 280.

11 Roosevelt's words--"I had not at any time credited the three powers [England, France, and Spain] with having made the several propositions they were alleged by the German government to have been made." Roosevelt to Reid contained in Bishop, op. cit., pp. 475-76.
While Roosevelt was on excellent terms with Sternburg and Jusserand, his relations with the English Ambassador, Sir Mortimer Durand, were cold indeed. The violent prejudice against Durand seems to have had slight basis according to one prominent authority. But it was undoubtedly helped along by the Ambassador's faithful execution of his orders not to urge the Japanese to moderate their demands on Russia at the peace negotiations at Portsmouth. Neither did it help matters any when Durand was instructed by his government to give Roosevelt no excuse to present himself as arbiter in the Moroccan dispute, as will be shown later.

Unhappily for the British, Roosevelt's close friend Sir Cecil Spring-Rice was in England. On the 27th of December, 1904, Roosevelt wrote him that

Unfortunately there is no one in your Embassy here to whom I can speak with even reasonable fullness. I wish to heaven you would come over, if only for a week or two, and I think it would be very important for your government.

Spring-Rice consented to a visit reluctantly as he did not wish to reflect upon Durand whom he liked and respected. The visit undoubtedly bore fruit for Spring-Rice was well acquainted with the tangled diplomacy of Europe, but relations with Durand remained the same.

12 Pringle, op. cit., p. 381.

13 Ibid., p. 387.

14 Cited by Pringle, op. cit., p. 381.
CHAPTER III

PRE-CONFERENCE DIPLOMACY

The head of the French Mission at Tangier, St. René Taillandier, was ready by the end of 1904 to propose to the Sultan of Morocco the reforms which the Anglo-French Entente contemplated. They read as follows:

1. French instructors were to reorganize the Sultan's army.

2. A Franco-Moroccan treaty was to be drawn up excluding the political influence of other nations.

3. France was to control the Sultan's finances.¹

The Sultan was actually handed this list of reforms on the 15th of February, 1905. On the 21st of February the Sultan, in a conversation with Kühlmann, the German Consul, accused France of invoking a "mandat de l'Europe."² The Sultan called an assembly of notables which Kühlmann encouraged to reject the French reforms. Immediately the French press, on the one side, began to demand that the assembly be dismissed while Bülow, on the other advised the opposite.³ The German

¹ Fay, op. cit., p. 182.
² Tardieu, op. cit., p. 6.
³ Fay, op. cit., p. 182.
government claimed that the carrying out of the French reforms would mean the control of Morocco by France and the loss of Moroccan trade to Germany. This, of course, was the obvious truth. It is eloquently shown in a conversation of Sir Charles Hardinge, the British Ambassador to Russia with Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador at London. Hardinge declared that

I was surprised at his alluding to three arms [at Tangier] and asked what he meant. He said Infantry, Cavalry, and Artillery! ... who has ever heard of police with artillery? I told him he had better keep that idea dark as the Germans had already said that the French intended to get hold of the Moorish Army.

Kühlmann's reports, however, were encouraging to his government. England was indignant at France over the Dogger Bank affair. Delcasse, he thought was caught between Russia-English tension and could only settle Morocco with German acquiescence. He further reported that the American Vice-Consul had said that "Germany has not spoken, and until then, we cannot believe that anything definite has been decided."5

Germany began to think of the possibility of United States' intervention in Morocco three months before the Kaiser's fateful appearance at Tangier. In January, 1905, von Bülow inquired as to whether the United States would be affected by the administrative reforms to be urged upon Morocco by France.6 In February von Bülow instructed Sternburg as to the extent of American interests

4 Gooch and Temperly, III, p. 246.
5 Fay, op. cit., p. 161.
in Morocco and told him to tell Roosevelt that Germany wished to maintain the open door in Morocco and could do so only with the participation of the United States. Prior to this message Sternburg had written that Roosevelt was "apparently already interested in Moroccan affairs and that for the first time he had shown distrust of France."

On the other hand, if one is to trust the official report of the French government written by André Tandieu, the French Ambassador at Washington, Jules Jusserand, had been working overtime, had successfully countered the German arguments, and, finally, had actually obtained at this early date (possibly even before the Kaiser's appearance at Tangier) a promise that the United States government would intervene at the propitious moment in favor of France. The following paragraphs are quoted from the official French story and their importance seems evident.

The United States had been from the first day the object of German advances. At the beginning of January, Baron Speck von Sternburg, the German Ambassador, sent M. Root a note that was at once an apology for the foreign policy of his country and--he at least thought--the proof of its present moderation. In this note he recalled what important concessions they [Germany] had accorded us in allowing us the police of the border district of Algeria [Algerian-Moroccan border] and, from this false assumption, contended that they had gone as far as they should in recognition of our special interest. He then indicated how excessive it would be to charge us still with organizing the police in the rest of Morocco, and the danger, moreover, that the organization would entail to freedom of commerce. He rejected, therefore,

7 Ibid., citing G.P., Chapter XX, Part 1, No. 6558.
the mandate accorded to France.

Sternburg then presented three plans for Morocco: first, the police by sectors; second, the police by a secondary power such as Sweden, Denmark, Holland, or Switzerland; and third, the police to be in charge of the Sultan who would freely recruit the instructors. Sternburg stated that Germany was supporting the interests of the powers and hoped that the United States would support her. At the same time the Germans in the United States began diatribes against the "covetous French" and strongly urged the United States to adhere to the German theme.

The maneuver would possibly have succeeded (especially the argument of "the open door") if, on the one hand, the indiscretion of the press campaign had not irritated M. Roosevelt and M. Root; if, on the other hand, the French Ambassador at Washington, M. Jusserand, had not put himself on guard against the argument of Baron Sternburg. M. Jusserand exposed the sophistry of the German affirmations; noted that neither Germany nor any other power had been able to "accord" us anything at all concerning the Algero-Moroccan border, the police of this frontier being made the object of a direct agreement between the Sultan and us from 1845 to 1902; claiming, as a result, the right of France to defend in the rest of Morocco its "special interest" recognized by Germany; showed, finally, that the police established by the Sultan were inefficient, that international police would be a source of conflict; that only France with her Algerian troops could efficiently organize this police—limited, however, to the cities of the coast, and perfectly reconcilable with freedom of commerce. Supported by the British Ambassador, who had received from London the order to associate himself with the moves of his French colleague, M. Jusserand expressed his points first to M. Root, who promised to take account of them in his communications with M. Roosevelt, who recognized equally their valor. From the beginning, as a result, our argument was presented at Washington in all its force and the American government was able to appreciate its logic.

But the French Government felt it should be on more solid ground with the American Government. Bompard and Nélidof had asked
Count Lamsderf that the Czar intervene personally with the German Emperor and it was decided to ask Roosevelt also to promise his intervention.

The desire expressed by us did not meet any more objections at Washington than at Saint Petersburg. As Count Lamsderf had done, Mr. Roosevelt contented himself with remarking that it would be necessary to reserve this move as a supreme resource, to await a favorable occasion, to avoid compromising success by a premature move. We had, therefore, the certainty that at the critical moment a double moral action would be exercised in our favor.8

On the 6th of March, 1905, Sternburg came to Roosevelt with a message from the Kaiser asking that Roosevelt join him in asking the Sultan of Morocco to reform his government and in pledging to maintain the open door there. The two countries then "would support him [the Sultan] in any opposition he might make to any particular nation (that is to France) which sought to obtain exclusive control of Morocco."9 Roosevelt answered by saying that he did not think the interests of the United States were sufficiently great to warrant his interference but expressed his great friendliness and belief that Germany's policy was to maintain peace.10 There were further interviews between Sternburg and Roosevelt. Shortly after the above exchange of views Sternburg quoted Roosevelt in a dispatch as

8 Tardieu, La Conférence, pp. 160-62.
10 Ibid., p. 468.
saying that if he became involved in Morocco he "would expose himself to the most severe attacks" and further that if he should "encourage the Sultan to hopes, I would have to be prepared also for further steps. But, as a matter of principle, I never take a step in foreign policy unless I am assured that I shall be able eventually to carry out my will by force. I shall instruct my new Minister at Morocco to get into close touch with his German colleague."\(^{11}\)

Apparently the German government took no steps to advise other governments besides the United States of her attitude. A year of sphinx-like silence had followed the signing of the Anglo-French Entente. Then on March 23 the German government announced the appearance of the Kaiser at Tangier which occurred March 31. The Kaiser stated that he hoped that Morocco would continue as a free and open country, referred to the Sultan as an independent sovereign, and declared that German interests there would be protected. After this announcement Bulow suggested that an international conference of the signatories to the 1880 Madrid Treaty be called to settle the question. Although it will be discussed at other points, it should be noted here that the Kaiser was himself a moderate on Morocco, preferring not to irritate France.

\(^{11}\) Dennis, op. cit., p. 488. Citing G. P., Chapter XX, Part I, No. 6559.
when there was still a possibility of uniting the continent into a grand alliance to maintain the peace (and challenge England). It was Bülow who forced the Kaiser to land at Tangier, and who precipitated the whole crisis.\textsuperscript{12}

On April 5 Sternburg brought another dispatch from the Kaiser to Roosevelt. In this the Kaiser stated that he would have to insist on a conference of the powers to decide the Moroccan question. He asserted that Germany must look to her interests although she was not primarily interested in her own particular gains but in the equal rights of all nations. In addition he maintained that German dignity was involved. "As soon as France discovers that Germany meekly submits to her bullying, we feel sure that she will become more aggressive in other quarters and we do not consider a demand for a revision of the Treaty of Frankfort to be far off." Sternburg then reported that the Kaiser's information was that England would only give France "diplomatic support" in Morocco and that he hoped this would keep France isolated.\textsuperscript{13}

On April 13, Sternburg wrote that Italy had assured the Kaiser of "sympathy with his position" and had expressed the


\textsuperscript{13} Bishop, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 469.
belief that France would only continue an aggressive policy in Morocco if she felt she would be supported eventually by arms by England. The Kaiser then added that he believed that the attitude of England would depend upon the attitude of the United States and asked us to tell England that we thought there should be a conference.\textsuperscript{14}

The German government now became insistent. On April 25 and May 13 Sternburg repeated his request that the United States government intervene to bring England and Germany together on Morocco. England had taken a position of opposition to the conference and would only drop it if the United States gave her a hint to do so, the Kaiser stated. Finally in the dispatch of May 13 the Kaiser stated that if he did not get the support from the powers for a conference and maintenance of the open door he "would have to choose between the possibility of a war with France and the examining of those conditions which France may have to propose, so as to avoid a war."\textsuperscript{15}

In its desire to obtain Roosevelt's interference in Morocco the German government's diplomacy had advanced from rational persuasion and requests of a gradually increased insistence, to the blunt threat of war if she did not. Germany

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., p. 469.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 470.
argued that only United States' intervention with England could make possible a conference and the open door in Morocco without which war was a distinct possibility. Roosevelt then was left with the responsibility of averting war.

Other methods of persuasion were not neglected. The Kaiser said that he had refused a bilateral treaty agreement with France as he was disinterestedly championing the cause of the world. "This," commented Roosevelt, bore a "distinct note of self-righteousness." At another point the Kaiser contended that England, France, and Russia possibly with Japan, aimed to partition China. "This last supposition seemed to me mere lunacy, if it was put forward with sincerity," Roosevelt observed. This partitioning by England could be stopped also by opposition from the United States. This was an attempt to draw the United States and Germany together in Morocco through their mutual difficulties in the Far East. Roosevelt was trying to maintain the open door in China, so the Emperor pointed out that the violent anti-German renewal in England was due to Germany's attempt to balk the dismemberment of China. Roosevelt did not comment on this so the argument may have had some effect.

A very persistent pressure was maintained. On May 29 the Kaiser, through Sternburg, informed Roosevelt that the

---

16 Ibid., pp. 470-71.
English and French had offered him a sphere of interest in Morocco but that he had refused as he stood for the status quo, the open door, and equality for all. Two days later the Kaiser viewed the gravity of the situation stating that he saw the Moroccan question "not as an isolated question, but as one which might develop into a starting point for a new grouping of the powers." He reiterated that everything depended on the attitude of Roosevelt as England would certainly drop her opposition to the conference if the United States indicated she wanted the conference. The following day the Germans made a different approach by a dispatch pointing out that the United States was a signatory to the Madrid Convention of 1880.

The position of Roosevelt now seems clear. Dennis notes that whether or not it were true that the entire question of an international conference rested with President Roosevelt, "even the alleged responsibility was a grave one, for if the Conference did not take place war might well result." That the President had been influenced by the argument presented by Sternburg seems evident if one accepts the German report in Die Grosse Politik. He told Sternburg:

17 Dennis, op. cit., p. 490.
I feel very indignant at the attitude of England in the Conference question, especially when there are voices to be heard in France favoring the Conference idea. It seems as if England in Morocco wants to dispose as it sees fit of the rights of others. I shall let the British Charge come here and tell him my opinion. My endeavors to bring about harmony between Germany and England in the Morocco question have met with but slight success. I have received on the British side the same old answer: "England cannot forget Germany's hostility during the Boer War." My reply was: "How is it that England has forgiven France, which pursued the same policy?" I have asked the recently departed British Ambassador [Durand] to emphasize it to the King and Lord Lansdowne that I emphatically wish to see an improvement in the relations between Germany and England . . . .

A clearer picture of the President's position is contained in a letter written a week or so earlier to William Howard Taft, then Acting Secretary of State, while on a bear hunt in Colorado. "The Kaiser's pipe dream this week," he said, "takes the form of Morocco." Then he continued:

I do not feel that as a government we should interfere in the Morocco matter. We have other fish to fry and we have no real interest in Morocco. I do not care to take sides between France and Germany in the matter.

At the same time if I can find out what Germany wants I shall be glad to oblige her if possible, and I am sincerely anxious to bring about a better state of feeling between England and Germany.

Both England and Germany feared an attack from the other, he said, but Germany's attitude in embroiling herself with

---

France over Morocco was positive proof she did not intend to attack England. England erred in attributing the same power of continuity of aim to the German government which it had from 1864 to 1871.

I do not wish to suggest anything whatever as to England's attitude in Morocco, but if we can find out that attitude with propriety and inform the Kaiser of it, I shall be glad to do so. But I have to leave a large discretion in your hands in this matter for if we find that it will make the English suspicious—that is, will make them think we are acting as decoy ducks for Germany—why we shall have to drop the business . . . . Remember, however, that both parties are very suspicious. You remember the King's message to me through Harry White and his earnest warning to me that I should remember that England was our real friend and that Germany was only a make-believe friend. In just the same way the Germans are always insisting that England is really on the point of entering into a general coalition which would practically be inimical to us—an act which apart from moral considerations I regard the British government as altogether too flabby to venture upon.19

Now, turning to the volumes of Gooch and the British documents, the British attitude can be clearly seen. The British were advised of Roosevelt's desire to see better relations between England and Germany and to know Lansdowne's views for communication to the Kaiser. They were expressed thus: England has no intention of attacking Germany and does not expect an attack from Germany. The Anglo-French Agreement contained nothing detrimental to other powers as regards Morocco and no

difficulty should arise unless the German government was "determined to take advantage of what was at most a diplomatic oversight in order to make mischief, or to disturb the status quo by demanding cession of a Moorish port." Gooch later excuses England by saying,

It was Lansdowne's misfortune, not his fault, that a welcome reconciliation should have been accompanied by our entanglement in a wholly unnecessary Franco-German quarrel about Morocco. We can scarcely blame him for failing to warn Delcasse of the danger of ignoring his formidable neighbor for it was the business of France to look after herself.

The British Ambassador at Washington was instructed to say nothing which could be interpreted as an invitation to the President to act as mediator between England and Germany.

As early as February and March Roosevelt, according to the German documents, had tried to bring England and Germany together in a new triple Entente. The German government had been favorable but the British government had accused Roosevelt of being hoodwinked by the Kaiser. For the second attempt by Roosevelt in May, he was again accused of being under the influence of the Kaiser. This he vehemently denied

20 Gooch, op. cit., pp. 55-56.
21 Ibid., pp. 59-60.
22 Ibid., p. 56.
in a letter to Henry Cabot Lodge on May 15 which reads in part as follows:

It always amuses me to find that the English think that I am under the influence of the Kaiser. The heavy witted creatures do not understand that nothing would persuade me to follow the lead of or enter into close alliance with a man who is so jumpy, so little capable of continuity of action, and therefore, so little capable of being loyal to his friends or steadfastly to an enemy. Undoubtedly with Russia weakened Germany feels it can be fairly insolent within the borders of Europe. I intend to do my best to keep on good terms with Germany, as with all other nations, and so far as I can to keep them on good terms with one another; and I shall be friendly to the Kaiser as I am friendly to every one. But as for his having any special influence with me, the thought is absurd.24

The British government answered Roosevelt's appeal with a statement that it did not wish better relations with Germany and "it had even hinted broadly to the Secretary of State that Great Britain could take care of her affairs alone." Roosevelt then added to Sternburg that he could do no more without exposing himself to an incivility.25

Roosevelt did not know it at the time, but on April 22, about a week before his second attempt to bring England and Germany together, England had already irrevocably taken her stand with France. Lansdowne's telegram appears to me of


great importance, not only because it doomed from the start any attempts of Roosevelt to bring England into the German camp, but also from the larger point of view in that it was the first indication that England had launched upon a program that was to forge the Entente Cordiale into a military alliance. It read as follows:

It seems not unlikely that German government may ask for a port on the Moorish coast. You are authorized to inform Minister for Foreign Affairs that we should be prepared to join French government in offering strong opposition to such a proposal and to beg that if question is raised French government will afford us a full opportunity of conferring with them as to steps which might be taken in order to meet it. The German attitude in this dispute seems to me most unreasonable having regard to M. Delcassé's attitude and we desire to give him all the support we can.

Roosevelt had handled matters through the latter half of April and May in Colorado where he "sought to kill bears with one hand while with the other he wrote letters to von Sternburg and to Secretary Taft in Washington." At the end of May he returned to Washington where he found both Jusserand and Sternburg concerned over the possibility of war and both of the opinion that their government should make concessions. Sternburg, he felt, was not entirely in


27 Dennis, op. cit., p. 489.
sympathy with his government; Jusserand on the other hand "sympathized absolutely with the general French indignation with Germany, but felt that it was better to yield so far as the conference was concerned, if it could be done honorably, rather than have war." He found Sir Mortimer Durand bitter about Germany and ready to risk war over the French refusal to consent to a Conference. This Roosevelt thought was "sagacious" on the part of England, as France would have to take the brunt of the land fighting and the German fleet was no match for the English. England would certainly seize the German colonies. He did not think this "valorous" however, and this attitude together with the fact that England was giving him no support in his attempt to mediate between Russia and Japan increased his suspicion of England and made relations with that country difficult. 28

The German government had placed the responsibility for averting war squarely on Roosevelt's shoulders. The attempt to accomplish this by winning England over to the German side had failed. He therefore, if he wished to avert the war which appeared on all sides to be imminent, had no other course than to approach France herself. Although suspicious of France's motives in China and in spite of the fact that he had just made

two efforts to win England away from France and thus force a conference, Roosevelt was willing to work with France to avoid war. I think it very significant that it is at this point in Roosevelt's annotated letters that he speaks for the first time of his friendship for France. He says: "I desired to do anything I legitimately could for France, because I like France and I thought her in this instance to be in the right; but I did not intend to take any position which I would not be willing at all costs to maintain." Three pages later Roosevelt comments more fully:

It really did look as if there might be a war and I felt in honor bound to try to prevent the war if I could, in the first place, because I should have felt such a war to be a real calamity to civilization; and in the next place, as I was already trying to bring about peace between Russia and Japan I felt that a new conflict might result in what would literally be a world conflagration [Germany had played skillfully on this position of Roosevelt]; and finally, for the sake of France [nothing is said about Germany]. Accordingly I took active hold of the matter with both Speck [Sternburg] and Jusserand, and after a series of communications with the French government, through Jusserand, got things temporarily straightened up . . . . I told him [Jusserand] that as Chief of State I could not let America do anything quixotic, but that I had a real sentiment for France; that I would not advise her to do anything humiliating, or disgraceful but that it was eminently wise to avoid a war if it could be done by adopting a course which would save the Emperor's self-esteem . . . .

29 Bishop, op. cit., p. 475.

30 Ibid., p. 478.
Roosevelt then argued that there would be great danger to France from war as they would not have a great deal of help from the armies of her allies. On the other hand if a conference met and practically all the powers sided with France, Germany could not very well attack French interests or make war on France.

England, France, and Italy had all strenuously denied the German government's statements that those countries would agree to give her a sphere of interest in Morocco. But on June 11 Sternburg quoted the Kaiser again to the effect that France would allow Germany a sphere in Morocco. This, Germany must refuse as the Sultan of Morocco had asked for the conference through Germany's council and Germany was pledged by her honor to stand by him. The Kaiser was then quoted as again referring to the possibility of war thus: "We may be forced into war not because we have been grabbing after people's land, but because we refuse to take it." The Kaiser was further quoted as saying that Rouvier had informed Germany that England had asked for an alliance with France. England, declared the Kaiser, would support France with arms in order to eliminate German opposition to English ambitions in China. The Kaiser again stated that if Roosevelt would give England a "hint" to support the Conference idea he would help the cause of peace without taking a risk. If he would not do this he at least had sufficient influence to prevent
England from entering into a war coalition with France. 31 How the Kaiser could ask Roosevelt to intervene in England again is difficult to comprehend. He undoubtedly incurred Roosevelt's resentment and disgust although probably not his surprise. Such crudeness and ineptness in diplomacy on the part of the Germans was a characteristic of the period and at times, such as at Tangier and at various points during the Algeciras Conference, seems about on the level of the proverbial bull in a china shop.

In France, meanwhile, the question of a conference had caused a Cabinet crisis. Delcassé had been adamant in his insistence that there be no conference, but, in the face of a threat of war, other members of the government had backed down. Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador at Paris had gained the impression that Rouvier himself was not in sympathy with the policy of his Minister of Foreign Affairs and began a movement to have Delcassé removed. 32 A considerable block in the French government felt that the acceptance of a conference would be a humiliation for France but the opposition grew stronger. A telegram from Lansdowne on June 5 uncompromisingly supported Delcassé against the idea of a conference could not save him and he resigned the following day. 33

31 Ibid., p. 478.
33 Gooch and Temperley, British Documents, III, p. 89.
Two days after the "fall of Delcassé" Lansdowne talked with Metternich, the German Ambassador. Lansdowne argued that France's position of power in Morocco did not involve any wrong to others. Metternich replied that he understood France's position as a policeman was necessary but if she laid hands on the whole country and its administration the other powers could not be indifferent. The French government would come to terms, he said, "if England did not stiffen their backs." Lansdowne then said that England "had no reform program for Morocco."

Metternich afterward reported to his government that "despite his dislike of a conference, the Foreign Secretary had no wish to see the situation become more acute. 34

Metternich's appraisal of Lansdowne was probably correct but France had still not surrendered. Gooch notes that:

The chief offender had gone but the Quai d'Orsay remained. Three days after Delcassé's fall the Premier begged Germany not to press the conference which he envisaged as the humiliation of France. The humiliation, commented Bülow, had been on the side of Germany, and she could not throw over the Sultan. France was waver­ing between surrender and intransigence, and if she thought that the Kaiser had altered his attitude there would be trouble. Accordingly Radolia informed Rouvier in very serious tones that Germany stood with her whole strength behind the Sultan to preserve his independence and the status quo if the Conference were declined. The tension was relieved when the anxious Premier hinted that participation would be easier if the program were discussed in advance. Meanwhile Italy's delay in accepting the Conference revealed how little Germany had to expect from Rome. 35

34 Gooch, Before the War, p. 61.
35 Ibid., p. 258.
A week after the fall of Delcasse, Germany answered Rouvier's hint by saying that "if France would accept the idea of a conference in principle, Germany was ready for an understanding which might make it unnecessary." Lansdowne told Metternich at this point that he thought "France, who was suspected by Germany of designs on the integrity of Morocco and on the commercial rights of other powers, should explain her ideas." But he added that "if they [the French] maintained their refusal [to accept a conference], so most certainly should we." 36

France agreed to the Conference on the 25th of June. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs had instructed Jusserand two days previously as follows: "When communicating to the President our reply [in accepting the idea of a conference] to the German note, be good enough to tell him that his ideas and advice inspired it." The French Foreign Minister then added, however, that he saw nothing to prove that a conference would settle the question. The German position was not determined. The German Ambassador at Paris had stated that it was to be only a matter of form and etiquette to reassert the convention of Madrid, but would go no further in setting up a

---

36 Ibid., pp. 61-62.
program. At the same time the Emperor used the most menacing language toward France at Washington, Rome, and Madrid.\footnote{Bishop, op. cit., p. 479.} It was probably in part to assuage the belligerent German government that Roosevelt dispatched a suavely generous message of congratulations upon this "genuine triumph for the Emperor's diplomacy."\footnote{Ibid., p. 483.} This, says one of the foremost authorities on Roosevelt, was "in accordance with his custom which clouded the real facts of his attitude toward the German Kaiser."\footnote{Pringle, op. cit., Chapter "Imperial years."} von Bülow, when he agreed to discuss a program, had explained to Tattenbach that "there would have to be real though limited reforms . . . since Germany had obstructed the French scheme" for reforms as mentioned in the published sections of the Anglo-French Entente. But Rouvier continued to hold out for something specific saying that a conference would be useless if an agreement had been reached in advance and dangerous if it had not been reached. He therefore could not accept the conference without a clear understanding as to the proposed reforms. von Bülow replied that he was "surprised and distressed and that he could not anticipate the decisions of the Conference. The situation . . . was serious and it was a mistake to play with fire." In addition to this official reply
von Bülow sent a private message to Rouvier stating that the Moroccan government had offered Germany "a position which would make her mistress of the situation. If an understanding with France proved impossible, she would claim a free hand." 40

The scene now shifts to America. The dispatch from Rouvier to Jusserand on the 23rd of June had concluded: "The insistence with which the Emperor has appealed to him [Roosevelt] has left the way open for the President to take the initiative that we expect from his friendship." 41 On the 25th of June Jusserand sent a dispatch to the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs which is quoted in full here. It is significant in itself that Roosevelt was given a complete copy of this dispatch along with others from the files of the French Ambassador. It implies much as to Roosevelt's personal as well as official relations with Jusserand. But the document is truly remarkable in that it present well-nigh incontrovertible evidence that Roosevelt and the French Ambassador were now planning their action in concert.

[Translated from the French]

I talked with President Roosevelt tonight regarding the reasons for urgent intervention on his part in order to avoid the break with which Germany would seem to


41 Bishop, op. cit., p. 480.
desire to menace us. In order to bring him into touch with the situation, I used the data contained in your two telegrams.

My appeals were most favorably received. The President declared to me that he would have this evening a very earnest conversation with Baron Sternburg, during which he would insist, in the first place, upon what the Emperor owes to himself, and also upon his solicitude for his fame in history, for no one would understand, or pardon wars entered into for frivolous reasons. He will emphasize the very real successes achieved by German diplomacy, and also the fact of our adhering to his idea of a conference, under conditions regarding the details of which it is impossible not to come to an understanding. He will, on the other hand, allude to the risks to be run, citing the opinion of French experts on the condition of the French army, and saying that it is not used by me simply to make an impression, but it is really what they think of the army and that a German victory is by no means assured. He will mention finally the support which without doubt would not fail us and which would be very formidable for Germany. 'I would like to be sure that my words would bear fruit,' Mr. Roosevelt added, 'but unfortunately I am not; however, in any event you can be sure that I will be as energetic as possible in favor of an amicable understanding and that I shall neglect nothing which appears to me as being conducive to such an end.'

I informed the President of the sentiments which Your Excellency instructed me to express to him. He did not desire to let me finish, saying that what he was doing was only too natural to warrant any thanks. [!] I added that the telegram which I had received from the President of the Council expressed much gratitude, but not the least surprise. 'There,' said the President, 'is the real compliment which gratified me.'

The message to the Kaiser was shrewdly planned to induce the Kaiser to state his program for the Conference. There was to be an appeal to his vanity, a build-up of the Germans as the victors already in a diplomatic sense, and a firm note

42 Ibid., pp. 480-81.
of warning as to French military strength and the strength of her allies in case of war. Roosevelt wrote three letters to Sternburg on the 20th, 23rd, and 25th of June respectively. The first two need not be considered, as their contents are covered in the letter of the 25th. But this third letter should be carefully considered to ascertain how nearly Roosevelt carried out the plans which Jusserand explained in his letter of the same date to the French Foreign Minister. The letter reads as follows:

My dear Mr. Ambassador:

I have received from M. Jusserand the following extract from a telegram sent to him by M. Rouvier.

"You reported to me your conversation with President Roosevelt, who asked you to inform us that, according to his views, much prudence should be used in present circumstances, and that we ought to consider the idea of a conference as a concession we might make...[sic]. Be so good as to tell the President that his reflections and advice have received from us due consideration and have caused us to take the resolution we have just adopted. We had first thought that, in order to remove the erroneous impressions held about our action in Morocco, it would be enough to show that it threatens no interests whatsoever. But now we have gone further and have declared that we are ready to accept a conference, in spite of the serious reasons we had to entertain objections against such a project."

I shall ask, Mr. Ambassador, that in forwarding the information to His Majesty you explain that it is of course confidential.

I need hardly tell you how glad I was to secure this information from the French Ambassador. As you know, I
was at first extremely reluctant to do anything in the matter which might savor of officious interference on my part; and I finally determined to present the case to the French government only because I wished to do anything I properly could do which the Emperor asked, and of course also because I felt the extreme importance of doing anything possible to maintain the peace of the world. As you know I made up my mind to speak to France rather than to England, because it seemed to me that it would be useless to speak to England; for I felt that if a war were to break out whatever might happen to France, England would profit immensely, while Germany would lose her colonies and perhaps her fleet. Such being the case, I did not feel that anything I might say would carry any weight with England, and instead I made a very earnest request of France that she should do as the Emperor desired and agree to hold the Conference. The French government have now done just what, at His Majesty's request, I urged should be done.

Now in turn I most earnestly and with all respect urge that His Majesty show himself satisfied and accept this yielding to his wishes by France. . . . I say with all possible emphasis that I regard this yielding by France, this concession by her which she has said she could not make and which she now has made, as representing a genuine triumph for the Emperor's diplomacy; so that if the result is now accepted it will be not merely honorable for Germany, but a triumph [more stress]. You know that I am not merely a sincere admirer and well-wisher of Germany, but also of His Majesty. I feel that he stands as the leader among the sovereigns of today who have their faces set toward the future, and that it is not only of the utmost importance for his own people but of the utmost importance for all mankind that his power and leadership for good should be unimpaired. I feel that now, having obtained what he asks, it would be most unfortunate even to seem to raise questions about minor details, for if under such circumstances the dreadful calamity of war should happen, I fear that his high and honorable fame might be clouded. He has won a great triumph; he has obtained what his opponents in England and France said he never would obtain, and what I myself did not believe he could obtain. The result is a striking tribute to him personally no less than to his nation, and I earnestly hope that he can see his way clear to accept it as the triumph it is.
With high regard,

Sincerely yours,

Theodore Roosevelt

Roosevelt commented on the above as follows:

I wrote to Speck [Sternburg] the following three letters, all of which I showed to Jusserand before I sent them, as I did not wish there to be any suspicion of double dealing on my part; and Jusserand is a man of such excellent judgment, so sound and cool headed, and of so high a standard of personal and professional honor that I could trust him completely. Indeed it was only because both Jusserand and Sternburg were such excellent men, that I was enabled to do anything at all in so difficult and delicate a matter.

Roosevelt's last sentence puts an air of fresh innocence on the whole thing, but when one compares it with his following statement some of the freshness begins to fade.

At this time [middle of June, 1905] I was having numerous interviews with both Jusserand and Speck. With Speck I was on close terms; with Jusserand, who is one of the best men I have ever met, and whose country was in the right on this issue, I was on even closer terms.

When one compares the contents of the two letters all innocence has vanished into the light of common day and it is clear that Roosevelt did much more than to show the letter to Jusserand—the two had planned their action together in advance of either letter.

France wished a program outlined "guaranteeing in particular that solemn international undertakings, which have for

43 Bishop, op. cit., pp. 483-84.
44 Ibid., p. 481.
a long time been public property, should not be brought into question. 46 In spite of Roosevelt's letter of the 25th the German government could not agree with the French over the wording. It was the "solemn international undertaking" between France, on the one side, and England, Spain, and Italy on the other, that she hoped to circumvent by a conference.

There was a great deal of arguing back and forth and, according to Roosevelt, both Jusserand and Sternburg told him that their governments had practically reached an impasse. Roosevelt states that:

Finally I made a pencil memorandum as follows: "The two governments consent to go to the Conference with no program, and to discuss there all questions in regard to Morocco, save of course where either is in honor bound by a previous agreement with another power."[4] I gave a copy of this memorandum to Jusserand and the memorandum itself to Speck, and after they had transmitted it to their respective governments I received the assent of both governments to the proposition. 47

This paragraph requires some comment. In the first place even with a cursory examination one can say that Roosevelt's memorandum said in effect that while there would be no program (which was in opposition to the expressed desires

46 Ibid., pp. 485-86.
of the French), at the same time no subjects would be discussed at the Conference which conflicted with the status of Morocco as established by the French treaties with England, Spain, and Italy. That Jusserand understood this, is clear from the following:

Jusserand forwarded my memorandum in a dispatch to his home government on June 28, which ran in part as follows: [First three paragraphs omitted]

"The President in no wise contends that this is a perfect and unalterable formula, but he hopes that it perhaps may offer the basis of an understanding and therefore he had it submitted to the Kaiser by Baron Sternburg on the afternoon of Sunday. He is certain that the scope of such an understanding would be to eliminate from discussion the advantages of which we have assured ourselves with various foreign nations, for we have not obtained them except in consideration of making corresponding concessions to their profit, which must remain irrevocable and which we are in honor bound to live up to. The acceptance therefore of a formula of this nature would be, in short, the realization of the program desired by us."

If Roosevelt had not intended the memorandum as Jusserand interpreted it, it seems certain that he would have contradicted Jusserand's statement. That he did not appears as almost conclusive evidence that the document not only was framed to mean what the French interpreted it to mean, but

48 Ibid., p. 485.
was, in addition, the result of another joint effort by the
two. The original penciled memorandum which was presented to
Germany may have given rise to the term "scrap of paper" used
during the period after the Algeciras Conference. Roosevelt
had reassured Jusserand by telling him that "the important
point was for them [the French] to get the kernel of the nut
and they did not have to consider the shell."

The German Kaiser was not aware of this last remark,
nor of the fact that Roosevelt and Jusserand were now working
in close accord. In the crisis over the idea of a conference,
Germany had won largely through the efforts of the President.
Now, the Kaiser was highly pleased over the latest move of
Roosevelt. Perhaps he was so charmed with the idea of having
the original penciled copy that he read only the first clause
of it. At any rate he expressed himself in a great outburst
of generosity through a letter of Sternburg's dated June 28
which concludes as follows:

The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case
during the coming Conference differences of opinion
should arise between France and Germany, he, in every
case, will be ready to back up the decision which you
should consider to be the most fair and the most prac-
tical.

In doing this he wants to prove that the assistance
which you have rendered to Germany has been rendered
in the interest of peace alone, and without any selfish
motives.

Believe me, Mr. President

Yours most sincerely,

Sternburg. 49

49 Bishop, op. cit., p. 486.
In the same letter, however, Sternburg stated that Delcassé's followers were trying to force his program on Rouvier and that England was "making a frantic effort to prevent the acceptance of the invitation to the Conference by the Council of Ministers, which meets today." It even appeared to the German Ambassador at Paris that the Rouvier government might be overthrown. In order to ease the situation, the German government on June 30 made a concession by denying that it meant to question the Anglo-French accord. It was ready to make further concessions the following day but M. Rouvier agreed to the Conference. Rouvier then asked that an "agreement" be written embodying the terms of the German Concessions. After much bickering a final draft was agreed upon on July 8. Germany promised

...to pursue no goal at the Conference which would compromise the "legitimate interests" of France in Morocco or that would be contrary to the rights of France resulting from treaties or arrangements and harmonizing with the following principles: sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire; economic liberty without any equality; utility of police and financial reforms, the introduction of which will be regulated for a short period by way of an international accord; recognition of the situation created for France with reference to Morocco by the contiguity, over a long stretch, of Algeria and

---

the Sherifian Empire, by the particular relations which result therefrom between the two neighboring countries, as well as by the special interest which results therefrom for France to obtain in the Sherifian Empire. 51

The memorandum of Roosevelt's had been a classic study in contradiction; the final agreement elaborated upon that contradiction, carrying it to dogmatic lengths. 52 On July 11 Roosevelt received from Jusserand the following communication:

I leave greatly comforted by the news concerning Morocco. The agreement arrived at is in substance the one we had considered and the acceptance [sic] of which you did so much to secure. Letters just received by me from Paris show that your beneficent influence at this grave juncture is deeply and gratefully felt. They confirm also what I guessed was the case; that is, that there was a point where more

51 Ibid., citing G.P., XX, No. 6767.

52 Gooch overlooks the contradiction. He states that "the declaration of July 8 pledged the signatories to these principles—the independence and integrity of Morocco, commercial equality, and reforms under international auspices," Volume I, p. 259.
yielding would have been impossible; everybody in France felt it, and people braced up silently in view of possible great events.53

The program therefore settled nothing; it merely postponed the argument until the Conference opened which was, of course, to the advantage of France. Rouvier could interpret it as he chose. On the 10th of July he told the French Chamber that "Germany did not dispute the special interest of France, her special interest to maintain order, her arrangements with Morocco, England, and Spain, and that she admitted the usefulness (?) of reforms to be introduced through an international accord [but not "administered by an international police]."54

There was another flurry over the actual topics to be discussed, as the general statement agreed upon certainly did not provide anything resembling an agenda. But the German government suddenly became dilatory for the Kaiser was on his way to visit "that preposterous little creature" (as Roosevelt called him), the Russian Czar. (The German government would not sign an agenda until the 28th of September).55

(e) Björkö.

The German government had asked that the Conference be held at Tangier and had protested the appoint of Révoil, a French

53 Bishop, op. cit., p. 486.
54 Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 10, 11.
diplomat openly hostile to Germany. Roosevelt's aid had been enlisted to win acceptance of these points but by the end of July the German government was willing to drop both matters. The reason? On July 24 the Kaiser had obtained the Czar's signature to a treaty between Germany and Russia, the effect of which would be revolutionary and world-shaking—so the Kaiser thought. There was no need further to quibble over such small points as Revoil, or Tangier, or the agenda for the Conference, or probably even over Morocco. World-shaking events were occurring and, as a matter of fact, France herself would be absorbed into a mighty brotherhood combining the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Entente with the Kaiser at the Helm. And then one bright day the fair young knight (the Kaiser) would sally forth from his fortress in full battle array to slay the hateful dragon (England, of course) and all would be welded into one great brotherhood of man (the wretched English having thus already been disposed of).

The move had been carefully timed for Russia was weakened by a military defeat and by internal revolution. It could be argued with the Czar that a Russo-German alliance would no longer conflict with Russia's treaties with France for the spirit of revanche was now dead in France. Such was clear by the fact that Delcasse had been dismissed and France had agreed to a Conference to settle the Moroccan question.

56

56 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 263-64.
The Kaiser wrote Roosevelt the following letter which, however, Bülow would not agree to have sent:

The Emperor and I have concluded an agreement to lend each other mutual help in case any European power shall attack one of us, and France is to be cosignatory to it. In fact, Germany enters the dual-alliance—originally concluded against it—as a third party. It being the leading power of the triple-alliance, the latter and the dual-alliance—instead of glaring at each other for [no] purpose at all—join hands and the peace of Europe is guaranteed. This is the fruit of our understanding about Morocco, the fact, upon which you sent me so kind compliments. I am sure that this grouping of powers is leading to a general "detente," will be of great use in enabling you to fulfill the great mission of peace which Providence has entrusted to your hands for the good of the world. 58

As France was about to join with Germany and Russia she should not be irritated by pushing the Moroccan affair. 58

But, to make a long story short, Lansdorf vetoed the treaty on the Russian end and Bülow threatened to resign on the German, if the treaty were put into effect. Nicky penned a diplomatic epistle which began wonderfully well with, "This document, of immense value, ought to be strengthened, or made clearer," but ended in a complete funk with "... the Björköe Treaty ought to be put off until we know how the French will look upon it." 59

To Bülow the Kaiser thereupon threatened to kill himself, imploring the latter to "think of my poor wife and children," (although he probably envisaged being carried to Valhalla in a chariot of fire) while to the Czar he wrote a letter which was an attempt to trap "that preposterous little creature" like a rat

58 Fay, op. cit., pp. 176-77.
58 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 263-64.
59 Fay, op. cit., p. 177.
by claiming that * * what is signed is signed! And God is our testator! Bulow did not resign but the fleeting vision of Russian alliance had faded into the light of common day.

In October, almost simultaneous with the Kaiser's receipt of the Czar's letter previously cited, occurred another event equally calculated to bring everybody quickly down to earth. One Lauzanne, an influential champion of Delcasse, wrote in the Matin a series of three articles in which he stated that if Germany should attack France, England was verbally committed to mobilize her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and land 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein.

When Metternich arrived at Number 10 Downing Street shortly after this bomb burst he found Lansdowne was "out." But the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Thomas Sanderson, assured the German Ambassador that the British government had never promised military help to France, that the possibility of war between France and Germany had not been discussed by the Government and the landing of troops in Schleswig-Holstein was a fairy tale. He observed with a jest that "to begin with we have not got 100,000 men to land anywhere." But it did not seem so funny to Metternich for he remarked that perhaps the promise of armed help came from an influential source outside the government. Gooch states that "the Ambassador's hypothesis was shared by the Kaiser, who minuted on the report: 'The King gave Delcasse the promise, not the government.'

---

67 Anderson, op. cit., pp. 263-64.
Gooch, like a good English historian, then adds that "whence it came remains unknown to this day." 61

The net result was to intensify the suspicion of the German government that England and France had entered into an alliance, and to increase the general feeling of irritation and tension which mounted steadily up until the Conference began. Bülow became engrossed in efforts to win the other powers to the side of Germany, realizing that Germany's position at the Conference would be ludicrous if, after threatening war if a Conference were not called, arrived at the Conference to find all the powers against her. He first tried to reassure his allies Austria-Hungary and Italy that "we pursue no separate advantages but only freedom and economic equality." Radolin at Paris was instructed that

our endeavor at the Conference will be towards a peaceful agreement in which both sides are satisfied for the time. We do not aim at a diplomatic triumph over France, and we could not admit a French triumph over us. We demand in Morocco nothing beyond the open door for all nations, and on this we cannot yield. If France accepts it fully, the success of the Conference is assured.

The German position was made clear however by the instructions given the German delegates to the Conference. "Germany must have control of the police in one of the ports, but she should never stand alone or merely receive the support of Morocco." 62

61 Gooch, op. cit., I, 60.

62 Ibid., p. 260.
CHAPTER IV

HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

Part One: Initial Phases

Throughout the year 1905 both France and Germany had played with all their skill for the support of the rising power across the Atlantic. As the date approached for the opening of the Conference to be held at Algeciras both countries confidently believed that they had won the United States to their side. The official instructions given to Mr. Henry White and his associate Samuel Gummere did little to dispel this contradiction. The United States wished "equal rights in Morocco with other governments" and an effective Moroccan police force to insure that the door would stay open and would lead somewhere. Financial reforms should be instituted in such a manner as to avoid discrimination in favor of any country. "Fair play," the instructions ran, "is what the United States asks for Morocco and all the interested nations, and it confidently expects that outcome." But according to these instructions the United States was to play a highly partisan role—she was definitely to intervene to protect the downtrodden, oppressed Moroccan Jews (the government was already thus pledged to

1 Nevins, op. cit., pp. 266-7.
certain Jewish societies). The story of how the Moroccan Jews actually were delivered from their oppressors is an amusing one which will be told toward the end of Chapter V. It is a minor point in itself and has been omitted from all of the studies which I have been able to examine. But from a broader point of view it is significant.

"Such was la façade officielle of the American policy," says André Tardieu, the French Government's astute young spokesman. "For, in fact, a power of the rank of the United States does not take part in an international meeting such as that of Algeciras without its action being very sensible." The official instructions were taken over to the Senate and shown to the principal members—for which purpose they were probably intended in the first place. Senator Bacon and others had already criticized the involvement of the United States in what was declared to be a quarrel which did not concern it and was apt to lead to complications. This group had opposed the United States' participation in world politics and had offered strong opposition to the annexation of the Philippines.

2 Tardieu, op. cit., 65.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 63.
As a matter of fact the United States was already committed to a policy altogether different from that expressed in the instructions. On August 23, 1905 President Roosevelt had written White that he wanted "to keep on good terms with Germany, and if possible to prevent a rupture between Germany and France. But my sympathies have at bottom been with France and I suppose will continue so. Still I shall try to hold an even keel." On the 28th of November, 1905, Secretary of State Root sent White two personal and confidential notes. In one it was noted that France might have "legitimate" special interests in Morocco which needed a safeguard and if this were true, he should not oppose their protection.

In the second note there was the reminder that White's associate was to be Gummere who was thought by some to be pro-German.

This if true must not be allowed to throw us over into even apparent antagonism to the Anglo-French entente or to make us a means of breaking that up. It is useful to us as well as agreeable. Keep the American end of the business on an even keel. Keep friendly with all. Help France get what she ought to have, but don't take the fight on your shoulders. Help limit France where she ought to be limited, but don't take that fight on your shoulders. In the broader and really important part that the Conference is to play in the politics of Europe, keep the peace, and make it as difficult as possible for any one to pick a

---

5 Roosevelt to White, August 23, 1905, cited by Nevins, 266-7.
quarrel. You are chosen because you know that broader
field and how to act.\footnote{Nevins, \textit{op. cit.}, 268.}

The commitments made before the Conference to Jusserand
and the \underline{private} instructions to White were a carefully guarded
secret of which even Tardieu was not aware only three years
later. The United States in the eyes of the world (excluding
France and Germany) was thus able to enter the Conference "free
of all engagements."\footnote{Tardieu, \textit{op. cit.}, 63.} She could therefore wield a very strong
influence on the side of the power with which she finally sided.

\section*{b. White's Appointment.}

The appointment of Mr. Henry White to be the principal
United States delegate at the Conference is in itself signifi-
cant. His friendship with Roosevelt had been longstanding and
intimate and Roosevelt described him on numerous occasions both
before and after the Conference as the United States' most cap-
able diplomat. His appointment was thus indicative of the im-
portance attached by his government to the Conference and the
part it expected to play in it.

White's experience and ability as a diplomat made it pos-
sible for him to pursue a realistic policy and to realize as much
as Roosevelt that the Anglo-French entente was "useful" to the
United States. On the other hand most of his diplomatic career
had been pursued in England and he had a marked affinity for both the English and the French. He could thus enter wholeheartedly into steps necessary to carry out his instructions to do nothing to cause a rift in the Anglo-French entente and, by inference, to endeavor to strengthen it. White had intelligence and skill and would be able to operate in the practical workings of the Conference in such a way as not to appear to contradict the principle of the Monroe Doctrine.

But in spite of the fact that White was entrusted with the practical details of the actual representation of the United States at the Conference, it would be a mistake to infer that he was instrumental in formulating the general policy of his government there.\(^8\)\(^9\) His instructions were clearly defined, the government's policy had been formulated months before, and the reins were firmly in the hands of the President himself. This is evident from the nature of the instructions themselves and will be shown to be the case at the crucial points in the Conference. This was the view of the French government as expressed by Tardieu and the French knew better than any other foreign government the actual state of affairs in this respect. It is true that White was in charge of practical details, but any American representative would have to be allowed a certain latitude and the freedom

\(^8\) Pringle, *op. cit.*, 394, seems to infer this.

\(^9\) See Nevins' chapter on Conference, especially 269. He gives the impression that White actually dictated the government's policy.
to seize opportunities as they presented themselves. As a matter of fact one of the tests of the efficacy of a diplomat is his ability to make the most of opportunities presented in carrying out the general policy of his government. White was chosen in the place of the American representative already in Morocco because he would be in sympathy with this general policy and Gum- mere was considered doubtful, and also, to repeat, because it was considered that he would be more skillful than the latter in seizing opportunities and in the practical politics of the Conference.

The first meeting of the Conference took place on the afternoon of the 16th of January, 1906, in the Hotel de Ville, Algeciras. Before entering the Conference room von Radowitz, the first German delegate, called the representatives to order and nominated the Duke of Almodovar, the Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, as president of the Conference. The Duke was unanimously elected and the delegates then entered the Conference chamber where he opened the first session with a brief address. He stressed the point that any reforms should be based on the principles of the sovereignty of the Sultan, the integrity of Morocco, and the Open Door. Both French and German delegates expressed their adherence to these principles and the Conference adjourned. 10

The program for the Conference was prepared by certain of the Second Delegates who, for the most part, were the diplomatic representatives of their government at Tangier and were best acquainted with the situation.\textsuperscript{11} It had been agreed that these subjects would first be discussed in informal sittings. The first such meeting took place on the afternoon of the 16th of January to consider the suppression of contraband of arms and ammunition. A special committee was named to study the matter and by the 24th of January all of its recommendations were adopted except one which was to be first approved by the Sultan. Next on the agenda was the matter of tax reforms and an informal meeting was called for the 25th to consider it.\textsuperscript{12}

After some discussion it was voted to raise taxes slightly on certain luxury articles used primarily by foreigners and it was provided that foreigners should no longer be exempt from the payment of such taxes. At this point Mr. White made a proposal that has been omitted by others but which seems to me significant. He proposed that the measure allowing foreign consuls to keep a percentage of the taxes they collected for expenses be made only temporary. A permanent measure would make it necessary for the Sultan's government to pay such a percentage after it came into a position where it could collect its own taxes. The Spanish representative

\textsuperscript{11} White and Gummere to Root, February 12, 1906, U. S.

\textsuperscript{12} White to Root, January 25, 1906, U. S.
quickly rose to his feet and objected, whereupon Mr. White withdrew his proposal. Here was the first faint rumble of the guns in what was to be a major conflict over the dismemberment of Morocco. The United States delegate had clearly indicated that he did not wish freedom of commerce restricted in any way—such would promote the interests of the United States—and the Spanish delegate had made it clear that his government stood for actual control of Moroccan finances without looking forward to the day when that control would be given back to Morocco.

By February 7 there was complete agreement on the matter of tax reforms. Thus far the formal meetings had given the impression of mutual good will and agreement. But the agenda had been carefully planned so that the questions upon which there was a general area of agreement would be discussed first. The question of an international bank to control Moroccan finances and of an effective police force to maintain order had yet to be brought before a formal meeting of the Conference. But behind the scenes the delegates had long since come to grips with these problems and a dogged struggle was already in progress.

Both France and Germany distrusted each other to an extreme

13 White and Gummere to Root, February 12, 1906, U. S.
and for such a Conference should have sent their ablest diplo-

mats. But the first German delegate, Von Radowitz, was "ageing,
feeble, and hesitant" while Tattenbach, the second German dele-
gate, was "hustling, arrogant, and dogmatic." To the French the
former usually appeared tired and bored while the latter was fre-
quently ill-mannered and, at times, even threatening. The
French delegate, Revoil, was an experienced diplomat but had
been educated for the legal profession and had practiced law
for several years. He was exceedingly ingenious in discussion
but seemed to think he could win his points by a whirlwind legal
argument. But it was soon evident to White and others of the
delegates that his "astonishing fluency of speech was more often
used to conceal than explain his true meaning."

Outside the delegates of the two principal adversaries,
the Conference was a congregation of the ablest diplomats which
the countries represented could produce. White was the frequent
guest of his friend the British plenipotentiary, Sir Arthur Nic-
olson, with whom he played bridge. He enjoyed these visits par-
ticularly as they afforded him the opportunity of getting away
from the hotel where he and the other delegates were quartered.
At home, Nicolson's government had changed hands but its policy
actually remained the same. Lord Lansdowne had promised the

14 Nevins, op. cit., 270.
15 Tardieu, here and there.
16 Nevins, op. cit., 270.
French aid in case of war but when Sir Edward Grey took office on December 11, 1905 he would give France nothing more than a pledge of benevolent neutrality. But he made it clear to the Germans that in case of war public opinion in Great Britain would compel the government to intervene on behalf of France. 17

The aged and distinguished Marquis Visconti Venosta represented Italy. He had been prominent in Italian politics for half a century and, in addition to being a lovable personality was pro-French. A great deal of significance had been attached to his substitution for Signor Silvestrelli who was regarded as under German influence. 18 If Italy had merely taken a "tour de valse" with France at the turn of the century, she was, in Venosta's hands, to emerge from the Conference completely seduced by that country.

The Hôtel Reina Christina was, from the outset, swarming with reporters. In order to negotiate the delegates went from chamber to chamber under the eyes of the journalists who were famished for news. If someone announced with gravity that yesterday the French delegate entered the room of the American or that the Russian went down to the room of the Austrian, they would seize upon it and greatly enlarge and distort it.

17 Dennis, op. cit., 497-8.
18 Nevins, op. cit., 266.
In the evening in the *Salon* or the smoking room, where the delegates went for relaxation after an exacting day around the table decorated with the colors of each nation, there was the same promiscuity—"impossible to isolate oneself after a vehement discussion, impossible to protect oneself against the questioners who had paid ten pesetas for the right to eat and question. It was a sort of *paquebot* where everyone came to resume the rivalries of the world. One can imagine the nervousness that resulted."

"*We are here,*" said one of the delegates, "for the sins of Europe and the Reina Christina is a hotel of atonement." *Pax hominibus bonae voluntatis,* replied the aged Marquis Visconti Venosta, Nestor of the Conference.\(^{19}\)

White worked hard to relieve the tension and was doubtless able to succeed to a considerable extent in the preliminary stages of the Conference.\(^{20}\) During the first days of the Conference Count Tattenbach came to White and said that Germany wished to emerge from the Conference "*ni vainqueurs ni vaincus.*" White replied that this was a beautiful sentiment but that in his opinion the country which yielded its contention on the police question would be regarded as *vaincu*.\(^{21}\)

---

\(^{19}\) Tardieu, *op. cit.*, 92. All understood this subtle thrust at the Germans.

\(^{20}\) Nevins, *op. cit.*, 269-70. His claims are somewhat extravagant.

Such proved to be the case. The crux of the conference turned out to be the question of the police. On the 23rd of January at London Metternich told Sir Edward Grey that Germany would reject any mandate granted to France or to France and Spain jointly to carry out reforms in Morocco. On the same day at Algeciras Von Radowitz expressed regret to White and Venosta that the important part of the Conference was about to begin without an understanding between Germany and France on the police. He seemed to want private conversations with the French on the subject—which was a source of considerable irritation to White. The Conference had been called to settle this question at Germany's request and it seemed incongruous that she should now prefer to settle the main phase of it in negotiations only with France. White expressed his indignation at this reversal of position a number of times in his official reports to Secretary Root.

On February 12 Sir Edward Grey wrote privately to Nicolson the following:

I am afraid the result of the Conference is likely to be no better than you anticipate. It seems to be recognized, however, that we have acted up to the letter and in the spirit of the Anglo-French engagements, and this is very greatly due to you... I wish I could make any useful suggestion, but my impression is that the Germans do not want the Conference to arrive at any solution which is

---

22 Gooch II, 13-14 citing G.P. XXI, 103-5.

23 Tardieu, op. cit., 138.

acceptable to France on the lines of our Entente with her. 25

I think Germany's change of mind can easily be explained. She had come to the Conference believing she had inveigled the United States into supporting her by professing a strict adherence to the open door; Russia was too weak to be of assistance at the moment; and Great Britain's friendship would finally be accepted at the Conference and the Anglo-French Entente would be a thing of the past. But when the tactless Tattenbach had no success with the English, when it was seen that the United States was not so pro-German as it had been thought, and when it became plain that Russia, Italy, and Spain would all vote against Germany, the German government could see she had got more than she had bargained for and would have been more successful without any Conference at all.

CHAPTER V

HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

Part Two: Negotiations Over the Police

White had felt from the beginning that the Open Door would not last long if France were given sole control of the police.\(^1\) But on February 3 Révoil proposed to Von Radowitz that the mandate for the police be shared with Spain. He indirectly intimated to Von Radowitz that, in addition, France might agree to the addition of a third power to share the mandate.\(^2\) Here was the first concession by one of the contending parties and even though it was insignificant in itself it served to break the deadlock between the French position of sole control and the German position of general internationalization. It was a basis for further negotiations.

The insignificance of the "concession" itself is clear from the fact that France and Spain had already entered into a secret agreement whereby a small portion of Morocco opposite Spain would go to that country while the remainder would be taken over by France. Having already secretly taken Spain in on the bargain and having agreed to the Conference on the basis that the arrangements

\(^1\) Nevins, op. cit., 271.

with Spain and Italy were not to be affected, France could now publicly concede the sharing of the mandate of the police with Spain. The third power which the French government had in mind was undoubtedly Italy, with whom she also had a treaty relating to Morocco and who could thus also be easily controlled.

Henry White may or may not have known of the secret Franco-Spanish and Franco-Italian agreements, but when France announced she would share the police in general with Spain, White expressed himself as thinking she was "essentially right and fair in her stand." On February 4, the day after the French announcement, Von Radowitz discussed it with several of the delegates, including White. White was more affirmative even than Cassini or Venosta in support of the French. He said he felt it was no longer a matter of a threat to the open door and that the Franco-Spanish proposition seemed "the maximum of what equity and logic would require of France." Perhaps they would want to establish certain guarantees as to the fashion in which the mandate would be filled; in any case he did not think it would be a question of the addition of a third power. White then said that he intended to recommend the Franco-Spanish combination to his government.

This sentiment for France on the part of the so-called "neutral" countries seemed to have considerable effect on the

3 Nevins, op. cit., 272.

4 Tardieu, op. cit., 153.
German delegates. On the 6th of February Count Tattenbach met Count Cassini in the hall of the hotel and said to him in a very loud voice,

"This can't go on. It must come to an end. I have asked Von Radowitz to telegraph the same to Berlin. It is not very difficult however. What do we wish? Guarantees for commercial freedom. As to the police, we will be very indulgent." 5

But on the same day that Révoil had proposed the concession of sharing the mandate of the police with Spain, Von Radowitz had suggested in accordance with instructions from Von Bülow that the Sultan should actually control the police and that there should be an international control superimposed to insure that the police were actually in the hands of the Sultan. 6 Révoil answered that the Sultan was generally incompetent and the proposal, therefore, was unacceptable. On the 6th of February Révoil handed Von Radowitz a memorandum which softened the French position by saying that France would consent to examine the question of surveillance of the police but only after the nationality of the police had been agreed upon. 7

The German plan was, in part, one of three alternative plans which Sternburg had presented to Roosevelt on the 23rd of

5 Ibid.


January as acceptable to Germany. The plan as it had been presented at that time was simply that the Sultan have actual control of the police. It was a French journalist, one M. de Lannesan, who had published a plan adding the section providing for international control. On the 30th of January Von Bulow telegraphed the United States government that Austria, Russia, and Italy were favorable to the plan and asked that the United States government intervene to secure its acceptance. But when the plan was presented at the Conference, the United States delegate was found to be among those opposing it and still favoring the French proposal.

On February 6 White wrote Secretary Root that he did not think France would yield on the matter of the police. She thought her national dignity was involved. She had been in Morocco for some time, had 70 million francs invested to 5 millions for the Germans, and resented the idea that she was not fair. But the conversation mentioned previously of Tattenbach with Cassini that same day and another of Von Radowitz with White and Venosta the day before, had left all with the idea that Germany would agree.

On the 8th of February, however, Von Radowitz talked with White and Venosta again. He did not accept the French proposal.

---


9 Nevins, op. cit., 271.

10 Tardieu, op. cit., 172.
but brought forth another German proposal. It differed from the three plans presented at Washington and from four others communicated in the course of the Conference. The Sultan was, by this one, to have control of the police but there should be "instructors" from three secondary powers. Von Radowitz told White he did not wish to present this new proposal personally to Revoil but desired, instead, that he, White, do so. He then told White that he would receive instructions anyway to accede to this line of action. White, who had not received any such orders, and who "probably was sure, according to his latest instructions from M. Root, of not receiving such instructions, refused with vivacity the acceptance of the role that was offered him."11

On the same day the other German delegate, Count Tattenbach, told White that Germany would not yield from her position that the police be chosen from three minor powers.12 White seems to have believed him for he wrote to Secretary Root three days later that in his opinion the Germans felt they could not get what they wanted in the Conference and wished a rupture so they could deal with France alone.13 White's fears were seen to be justified for on February 13 the German government sent the following telegram

11 Tardieu, op. cit., 172.
12 Nevins, op. cit., 271.
to Rome, Washington, Vienna, London, and St. Petersburg:

No reason for a further retreat is evident. The principle of sacrificing one's own interests merely because they block the way for another power would lead to such serious consequences that we consider a disruption of the Conference as the lesser evil. 14

But White still continued to work hard to prevent such a rupture from taking place. On the 13th of February he telegraphed his government, "I have little doubt when foregoing proposal is rejected . . . a communication from the President to the Emperor will have great weight, and probably effect settlement. Meanwhile I hope to obtain French assent to third-power principle." 15

On the same day, 13th of February, Roosevelt through Secretary Root asked White what he thought would be a fair settlement. "Here," says Nevins, "was White's great opportunity for usefulness—and he did not let it slip. At once he sounded the French as to the utmost limits to which they would go, while he approached the Germans on the subject of concessions. After long talks M. Révoil and Von Radowitz both drew up memoranda for him. As a result, he cabled on February 16 a series of suggestions approved by the French and intended by White to form the basis of a proposal which Roosevelt should make to the Kaiser." 16

The "great opportunity," however was that of the French and they certainly "did not let it slip." Neither was White


16 Nevins, op. cit., 274.
the fair-haired boy whose purpose it was to see that justice and fair play resulted. He was at the Conference to see that France got "what she ought to have" which meant "the kernel of the nut," leaving Germany with the shell. Mr. White may have asked the German as well as the French delegates for memoranda, but the evidence which I shall now submit leaves me with the inescapable conclusion that he was pro-French, not an impartial arbiter, and not open and above board in his diplomacy. He immediately entered into highly secret conversations with the French delegate and played an important role in the conception and execution of what was, in effect, a brilliant master-stroke of diplomacy.

The two conflicting proposals facing the Conference at this juncture were the German plan to allow the Sultan to choose certain "instructors" from three minor powers and the French plan that Spain and France jointly be charged with a "mandate of police" in Morocco. Let us now look at the story as told by the official French spokesman, André Tardieu.

According to him, neither party would budge at the moment. Then France found that she could accept as much of the German proposition as to abandon the phrase "mandate of police" and to say that the control of the police would be in the hands of the "instructors" under the Sultan, though they would be exclusively French and Spanish—"the practical result would be the same."
(This idea, says Tardieu, occurred to Rouvier and Révoil at about the same time.) But this further "concession" would have to be indirectly presented to the Germans. If it were given to the Germans directly in answer to their last note they would take it as a sign of weakness and demand other impossible concessions.

It was then decided that the "concession" could best be presented by "a third party in the form of an impartial transaction, to the two parties concerned." M. Révoil was anxious that above all the matter be approached this way. He asked Mr. White in this connection if he could count on his intervention. White had been among those delegates who had indicated to M. Révoil a desire to see a settlement along the line of the Franco-Spanish Formula."

White, in answering Révoil, did not limit himself merely to approving the idea of having this new French concession presented by the United States government as a compromise.
"After having promised his French colleague to appropriate the project that he would . . . present at the propitious moment as an American transaction, he offered him spontaneously to have it recommended to Berlin by President Roosevelt." Révoil saw that it would be only to the advantage of France to have this done and, obtaining a promise from White to absolute secrecy, the proposition was formulated. The White-Révoil conversations took place on the 14th and 15th of February.

The vital second paragraph of the formula ran as follows (my translation from the French):

The instruction, the discipline of the corps of police, the control of their administration and of their pay, will be confined to the officers and non-commissioned officers of France and Spain who will assist equally the Sherifian authority in the exercise of command. These officers will be named by His Sherifian Majesty on the presentation of the legation which they relieve. The resources necessary for the payment of troops will be furnished by the state bank.

On the matter of control which had been brought up in the German note of the 13th of February, France agreed to "reports from the Italian legation communicated by it to the powers." The matter of control could not be discussed further until the nationality of the "instructors" was agreed upon. Such was to be the nature of the proposal which Roosevelt would make to the Kaiser. M. Révoil would reply meanwhile with a more general statement. So much for the French story as told by M. Tardieu.17

From the available records it is clear that the matter of

17 Tardieu, op. cit., 179-181.
Roosevelt's personal intervention with the Kaiser had been thought of as early as the Spring of 1905. Then the Kaiser himself, on June 28, 1905, had invited Roosevelt's intervention by promising to accept whatever proposal he thought just. By the 13th of February, when White suggested Roosevelt's personal intervention, such action was in the minds of German, American, and French statesmen all. The German government had already tried twice, on the 30th of January and the 8th of February, to obtain that intervention on their behalf but had failed. On the 13th of February it was clear to all that the Conference had reached a deadlock and was at its most critical stage to date. It would be difficult to ascribe to either country credit for taking the initiative in proposing the line of action adopted. It simply grew out of the situation. Roosevelt was already prepared to have his country intervene and France was already prepared to ask for that intervention before the White-Révoil conversations took place. The so-called concession of changing the mandate of the police phrase to "instruction" of the police, as even Tardieu admits, was not a concession at all—any more than either of the other French concessions—but was simply a means whereby the intervention of the United States could be enlisted.

I think we can accept Tardieu's statement that White "spontaneously" volunteered more than Révoil asked by having the President intervene personally. As a matter of fact the

18 Anderson, op. cit., 355, 357.
President was so interested in intervening personally that before White and Revoil could fix up the formula and White could get it to him in answer to his request for what White thought would be "a fair settlement," he had already "intervened" on his own hook and simply recommended the French-Spanish "mandate of police."

While these highly secret maneuvers were in progress the British government began to feel the gravest concern over what appeared to be a hopeless deadlock. On the 14th of February Grey and Metternick had a lengthy conversation. Metternick declared that the police should be organized from three minor powers but Grey had expressed the opinion that only France and Spain could organize the police effectively. Metternick then replied that control of the police would be the starting point from which France would gain control of Morocco. 19

On the 19th of February Metternich informed Grey that his government intended to continue its opposition to French-Spanish control of the police as he who had the police had Morocco. "France realized that fact," says Gooch, "and was prepared to wreck the Conference for her aim."

Grey expressed his regret at the complete deadlock. If the Conference failed owing to Germany's rejection of a proposal acceptable to the other powers, it would postpone

---

a rapprochement between London and Berlin. "If England always used the entente to side with France against Germany," snapped the Ambassador, "Germany would have to regard her as her enemy." "There had been no question of always siding with France," replied Grey. "Morocco was the only case, and it was covered by the treaty. If that difficulty were removed, the British government hoped to show that the entente was not to be operated in an anti-German sense." When Metternich remarked that, even if the Conference failed, Germany did not desire war with France, Grey replied that it was much too soon to talk of anything so serious. "I could only say again that in such an event public feeling in England would be so strong that the British government would be involved in it, and that was why I was so anxious to find a possible solution." Here was a second warning to Berlin.

Grey was now deeply disturbed. In an historic memorandum of about the 20th of February he expressed the fear that the Conference would end in a deadlock and that ensuing difficulties in Morocco might lead to war.

"If there is war between France and Germany it will be very difficult for us to keep out of it. The entente and still more the constant and emphatic demonstrations of affection (official, Naval, political, commercial, municipal, and in the press), have created in France a belief that we should support her in war. If this expectation is disappointed the French will never forgive us. There would also, I think, be a general feeling in every country that we had behaved meanly and left France in the lurch. The United States would despise us, Russia would not think it worth while to make a friendly arrangement with us about Asia, Japan would prepare to re insure herself elsewhere, we should be left without a friend and without the power of making a friend."

On the other hand the prospect of a European war and of our being involved in it is horrible. I propose

20 Ibid., 15.
therefore, if unpleasant symptoms develop after the Conference is
over, to tell the French Ambassador that a great deal of effort
and, if need be, some sacrifice should in our opinion be made
to avoid war. To do this we should have to find what compensa-
tion Germany would ask or accept as the price of her recognition
of the French claims in Morocco. I should myself be in favor of
allowing Germany a port or coaling station if that would ensure
peace, but it would be necessary to consult the Admiralty about
this, and to find out whether the French would entertain the
idea, and if so what port? The real objection to the course
proposed is that the French may think it pusillanimous and a
poor result of the entente. I should have to risk this.  

While Grey was torn between conflicting visions of war on the
one hand and the loss of prestige and friends and the wrecking of the
British policy on the other, he was still hopeful that a choice be-
tween such alternatives would not be necessary. Time, he noted, was
on the side of France. "For the recovery of Russia will change the
situation in Europe to the advantage of France, and it is the situa-
tion in Europe that will in the long run decide the position of France
and Germany respectively in Morocco." The British government was pre-
paring for a rapprochement with Russia. "An entente between Russia,
France, and ourselves would be absolutely secure. If it is necessary
to check Germany it could then be done. The present is the most un-
favorable moment for attempting to check her."  

While Sir Edward Grey was viewing with alarm the dilemma

21 Gooch, op. cit., 16.
22 Ibid., 14.
which, for the first time, could be seen to confront the British Empire as a result of the entente, events were moving rapidly behind the scenes. On the 16th of February White sent his reply to Roosevelt's request for his idea of what would be "a fair settlement," in the form of the White-Revoil formula. Tardieu states that the formula was drafted exclusively by the French and accepted by White as drafted.\(^{23}\) I have not been able to find any evidence in the American documents to refute this contention but one naturally asks why Révoil and White were closeted for both the 14th and 15th of February if some discussion did not take place. What probably happened was that the formula was drafted during the conversations, with M. Révoil taking the initiative.

If, as Nevins states, White obtained a similar formula from the Germans, I can find no evidence that it was given serious consideration or even forwarded to Washington. As a matter of fact, White ended his communication of the 16th of February with a statement that Germany should either accept the French proposal for "instructors" or end the Conference. He stated that he was opposed to several weeks more of sittings with the police question still unsolved.\(^{24}\) On the other hand Tardieu states, to repeat, that Roosevelt had already intervened in support of the French

\(^{23}\) Tardieu, op. cit., 250.

\(^{24}\) Anderson, op. cit., 362; Nevins, 274.
before he had a chance to receive a reply from White to his request for his idea of what constituted a fair settlement. If such be true then we have absolutely irrefutable evidence that the request for White's idea of a "fair settlement" was simply diplomatic double-talk and eye-wash for the official records—-that Roosevelt had no intention at the time of acting in any other capacity than that of protagonist for France. No record of Roosevelt's jumping the gun has been found, however, in the American documents at the disposal of the author. This would not indicate a great deal as the correspondence in question would be among much other material kept secret. The secondary works that have been used for the German point of view include such excellent works as those of Anderson and Dennis—-and neither mentions this premature move of Roosevelt's. This, too, should not be considered as a refutation, for even Dennis makes no note, if he were aware of it, that the Roosevelt proposal embodying the Revoil-White formula did not originate with Roosevelt himself.

The statement of France's official spokesman reads as follows:

When M. Roosevelt became acquainted with this text he had anticipated our wishes. And the personal intervention that he had promised us had already occurred. Without waiting on our part a new request, he had telegraphed to the German Emperor to recommend to him purely and simply the
French-Spanish solution \[\text{i.e., using the "mandate of police" phrase}\]. Forty-eight hours afterwards the imperial answer arrived at Washington: it was a categorical refusal. Without stopping, M. Roosevelt judged that the text which M. White sent him gave him a natural occasion to reply. And in noting the initial refusal, he suggested to William III, by a second note, the possibility of a compromise.  

Roosevelt began this dispatch by reminding the Germans of their request of the 29th of January, that he should intervene and propose that the powers "entrust the Sultan of Morocco with the organization of the police forces within his domains and to allow him certain funds, and to establish an international control with regard to the management of these funds, and the carrying out of the whole plan." Advices now from Algeciras indicated to him that the time was ripe for such proposals but he would have to be more specific as to international control to be effective. But anyway he did not consider the proposals "to interfere with the accomplishment of the end Germany had in view in securing the Conference."

The recommendations read as follows:

1. That the organization and maintenance of police forces in all the ports be entrusted to the Sultan, the men and officers to be Moors.

2. That the money to maintain the force be furnished by the proposed international bank, the stock of which shall be allotted to all the powers in equal shares (except for some small preference claimed by France, which he considers immaterial).

3. That duties of instruction, discipline, pay, and assisting \[\text{sic}\] in management and control be entrusted to French and Spanish officers and non-commissioned officers, to be appointed by the Sultan on presentation of names by their Legations.

That the senior French and Spanish officers report annually to the government of Morocco, and to the government of

Italy, the Mediterranean power which shall have the right of inspection and verification, and to demand further reports in behalf of and for the information of the powers. The expense of such inspection, etc., etc., to be deemed a part of the cost of police maintenance.

4. That full assurances be given by France and Spain and made obligatory upon all their officers who shall be appointed by the Sultan, for the open door, both as to trade, equal treatment, and opportunity in competition for public works and concessions.

Almost immediately the Kaiser replied and again it was, in effect, a "categorical" refusal. The Kaiser fully agreed on points 1, 2, and 4, but, he complained, point 3 "covers in the main the last French proposal." The Kaiser had examined this proposal a second time in view of the second enunciation of it by the President but this has not been able to convince him that a settlement on such lines could be considered in harmony with the principle accepted by the Conference that all powers are to receive equal treatment. . . . This would place the police forces entirely into their [French-Spanish] hands, and the police organization would be tantamount to a Franco-Spanish double mandate and mean a monopoly of these countries, which would heavily curtail the political and the economic positions of the other nations.

The Kaiser then expressed the opinion that the Sultan should be allowed to choose freely his police forces from the different nations. In order to curb French fears that the Sultan might give a preponderance of influence to the Germans, it should be stipulated that the Sultan was to choose his police officers in an equal manner from at least four nations. Furthermore France would be

---

26 Root to Sternberg, February 19, 1906, contained in Bishop, 490-91.
given special rights in Tangiers and perhaps in another port, all the police there being French. In all the other ports the police would be mixed. "In case," he concluded, "it should be possible to widen your proposal for mediation according to the above suggestions, Germany would gladly negotiate on this new basis and the Emperor would be highly gratified if you should be pleased to further offer your mediation." 27

The above proposal was another formula differing from the others and especially from one made at about the same time to Count Witte and another by Bülow to Baron Courcel. 28 In these other proposals there was not a word of the port to be given to France alone, or of the international police with Germany included in the other ports. Instead these proposals harked back to the Lanessan proposal and the German proposal of the beginning to haul the police in all of the ports headed by instructors that the Sultan would freely recruit.

At the time, as a result, when a solution seemed imminent, ... Germany did not know what she wished or if she knew, she did not say so. And whether in the name of the Chancellor or in the name of the Emperor, two radically different systems being presented simultaneously by a Chief of State and a Chief of Government, who could expect an answer either more serious or more sincere? 29

And now, in the official French work of Tardieu, comes one of

27 Sternburg to Roosevelt, contained in Bishop, 491-93.
28 Tardieu, op. cit., 250.
29 Ibid.
those classical examples of the manner in which diplomatic negotiations are carried out. It is a remarkable evaluation of the ability of Americans to carry on such negotiations and it is still further proof of the existence of a Franco-American diplomatic coalition. In spite of its length it seems to me its significance justifies its being unearthed and presented here for the first time.

Under these conditions [refers to above quote], it only remained for us to obtain the energetic intervention of M. White to the course of the discussion which he had only lately begun to follow. But here we ran into domestic [internal] difficulties ... Without the details being known, the diplomatic activity exhibited by the government of the United States was not completely ignored. When two Ambassadors, however discreet they may be, carry dispatches of Chiefs of State, as Ambassadors are obliged to go themselves [in such a case] and carry the decoded text to the person to whom it was destined, it gives rise to a coming and going easy to be seen. Even at Algeciras, everybody knew that M. White had clearly taken part in our favor during the private conversations, but especially the last five days. And it was well understood that he had not acted without instructions. The opponents of the President were only on the lookout for a public occasion to lay hold of M. Roosevelt red-handed [sic] a careful translation of the idiom intervening in Europe and forgetting the Monroe Doctrine. It was necessary, therefore, to be prudent, and a vote in a meeting would be an imprudence. Neither M. Roosevelt nor M. Root were, by nature, partisans of abstention [1]. And both had voluntarily taken in the plenum [full or open meetings] of the Conference the same attitude that they had deliberately adopted whether at Algeciras or at Berlin. But situations are much stronger than wishes. And if M. White had marked as clearly as the President and Secretary of State his preference for the French policy, what had been possible in private conversations or secret correspondence would not have been in broad daylight [i.e., in the open meetings of the Conference]. Several members of the government insisted, however, on respecting the traditional rules. Therefore,
after a secret discussion, it was decided that M. White, if the question came to the forefront in the form of a ballot (or vote), would take his inspiration from his basic instructions and would abstain from pronouncing on a debatable question that did not directly interest the government of the United States; in every case this abstention would be accompanied by a comment that could not be interpreted as against us and, as long as the unofficial action continued, that action would work to our advantage. M. Roosevelt renewing his assurance to us. Up to the end, therefore, if circumstances lent themselves, the American government would maintain its efficacious course and would remain in the groove [sic], the useful defender of our propositions.

White, himself, thought it very amusing that so little was done in the open sessions and wrote to his wife that it was "very amusing how most of the members of the Conference don't in the least know what is going on."31

---

30 Ibid., 251-52.

31 White to Wife, cited by Nevins, 274.
CHAPTER VI

HENRY WHITE AND THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

Part Three: The Climax and End of the Conference

The Kaiser had made an actual concession from the original German position for complete internationalization when he proposed giving France one (or two) ports exclusively while German police would share on an equal basis with three other powers (probably meant to include France and Spain) the police in the others. Although his proposal was made to Roosevelt on about the 22nd of February, Roosevelt did not answer until the 7th of March. Meanwhile the Conference approached the problem of an international bank of Morocco.

As has been indicated previously, the French concessions to date had not really been concessions at all but simply diplomatic feints and parrying, while behind the scenes France jockeyed for the power necessary to win Morocco for her. The battle for the United States had been won and the so-called neutral powers had taken their places behind France. The American press was now strongly in favor of France. Roosevelt had explained to Sternburg that the American

---

1 Tardieu, op. cit., 252. "The New York Times said in a rather long article on the Moroccan question: 'The lack of success of the Conference would leave Germany in a very difficult position and we do not think that it is this that William II wishes. It would leave, moreover, things in a worse state than they appeared. It was Germany who deliberately made of the Moroccan question an international question, and if, as a result of its attitude, the Conference actually gives up, its [Germany's] responsibility would be greatly increased. The state of things is such in Morocco that grave disorders can break out there at any moment, and France is the only power which, by its location, would be able to take prompt and efficacious measures if such an eventuality presented itself.' The Globe and Evening Post were quoted in a similar vein."
people were rapidly siding with France. Such was obvious and had already been noted by the German Ambassador in his dispatches to his government. In short, the Conference was lost to Germany—that was an obvious and foregone conclusion. What then of Germany's second possible alternative—disruption of the Conference and the possibility of war? It was to be admitted that countries that would not support Germany in a Conference would not be likely to support her in a war. On the other hand such countries could not necessarily be counted upon as dependable war allies and on the positive side for Germany there was always her ally Austria-Hungary who could be depended upon in war. But could she?

Early in the Conference Francis Joseph had declared that in his opinion a vote on the police "would find England, Spain, Russia, and probably the United States on the side of France, with Italy at best folding her arms. Such a division and the resulting failure of the Conference would lead to a new grouping of the powers, Russia separating herself from the central Empires and joining England and France. It was urgently desirable to avert such a catastrophe."  

2 Nevins, op. cit., 278.  
3 Gooch, op. cit., 262-63.
The third alternative left to Germany, unless she wished to risk a war without allies, was that of compromise. This the Austrian government urged Germany to do. Count Welsersheimb early in the proceedings advised that the German plan number three (as proposed to Roosevelt) was impossible as a basis of negotiations. On the 12th of February, Count Goluchowski, the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, expressed to the German Ambassador his opinion that plan number one was also unworkable. He viewed the situation as "rather serious" and then, without further preliminaries, stated flatly that "Morocco was not worth a war." Count Wedel, the German Ambassador at Vienna, immediately advised his government that, as a result of domestic difficulties, Austria had no desire to become involved in war.

I have endeavored to make the German position clear. She could not win the Conference; if she waged war she would probably be without allies; the only sensible course left was to try to compromise. This she was attempting to do in the concession proposed by the Kaiser. It is essential that one understands Germany's position at this time. Otherwise it would be necessary in the pages following to attribute to Messrs. Roosevelt, White, and Root the qualities of diplomatic miracle-men instead of highly astute politicians and opportunists. In diplomacy as well as

---

4 Anderson, op. cit., 358.

in battle, the decision rests on fire-power and maneuver with the emphasis on fire-power. Neither miracles nor a conception of fair play has played much of a rôle to date.

White could now undoubtedly see that the power had ebbed away from the German side and that she was isolated. It now remained but to use that power. On the last day of February White wrote his government that "perhaps if opportunity offers, a hint to Berlin that our government deprecates delay on general principles might be efficacious." On the 5th of March he cabled Root that he again felt a rupture was imminent, this time over the bank.

The opportunity was at hand, the stage set for the historic dispatch which Roosevelt now sent to the Kaiser dated the 7th of March. In the reply to the Kaiser's letter of two weeks previous Roosevelt asserted that he could ask France to make no further concessions and would therefore drop the matter except that "the events which led to the Conference . . . forbid me to omit any effort within my power to promote a settlement of differences." He informed the Kaiser that he had assured France of fair and impartial treatment in case a Conference should be called (inferring of course that in spite of his friendship with the Kaiser he was morally bound to treat France justly.).

6 Cited by Nevins, 275.
7 Ibid.
8 Tardieu reminds one that this was the third dispatch, 297.
Roosevelt then reminded the Kaiser of Baron Sternburg's letter of the 28th of June, 1905, which read as follows:

The Emperor has requested me to tell you that in case, during the coming Conference, differences of opinion should arise between France and Germany, he, in every case, will be ready to back up the decision which you should consider to be the most fair and the most practical.

Roosevelt then stated that he considered that his previous proposals were fair and urged the Emperor to accept them in the spirit of his unqualified commitment of the 28th of June. He then stated that "I do not know whether France would accept it [his recommendation of the four points] or not. I think she ought to do so. I do not think that she ought to be expected to go further." He then pointed out that France's position in Morocco had changed from her pre-conference status where she was responsible only to the two powers with whom she had treaties, to her present status whereby she accepted a joint mandate with Spain under responsibility to all to maintain equal rights for all nations. Another power (Italy) would oversee France and Spain and enforce the maintenance of this equality by requiring "full and complete reports" and by having "the further right of verification and inspection." This again was no concession by France, for Italy was in on the original deal and was secretly committed not to interfere with France in Morocco in order to be allowed to take Tripoli.

If Germany accepted his four-point "compromise," Roosevelt continued, he would consider it a "triumph of German diplomacy which had accomplished the declared object for which Germany had
intervened. On the other hand

... if the Conference should fail because of Germany's insisting upon pressing France beyond the measure of concession described in this proposed arrangement [his four-point program], the general opinion of Europe and America would be unfavorable, and Germany would lose that increase of credit and moral power that the making of this arrangement would secure to her, and might be held responsible, probably far beyond the limits of reason, for all the evils that may come in the train of a disturbed condition of affairs in Europe.

Roosevelt then concluded his letter by stating, "I most sincerely hope that Your Majesty may take this view and throw upon France the responsibility for rejecting, if it is to be rejected, the suggested arrangement."\(^9\)

This letter is of considerable importance and deserves some comment. One must agree with the statement at the beginning that "events which led to the Conference" obligated Roosevelt "to promote a settlement of differences," but he was obligated, as the evidence previously presented shows conclusively, to see that these differences were settled in favor of France.

The use of the commitment which the Kaiser made to Roosevelt in his letter of the 28th of June, 1905 is of significance from two different points of view. It was one of Roosevelt's aces and it was shrewdly played at the right moment. But one should not take the extreme view of attributing everything to this maneuver. It must be considered in relation to the entire

---

\(^9\) Root to Sternburg, March 7, 1906, contained in Bishop, I, 494-95.
picture which I have already tried to paint, i.e., that the power had already ebbed away from Germany to France and that Germany was therefore already tottering on the brink of complete defeat at the Conference and a loss of her allies for war. One should not be so naive as to think that a maneuver of this kind by itself could win a major diplomatic encounter. It could succeed only with the power behind it.

The German commitment is significant in the second place for the argument and confusion it produced within the German Foreign Office. There were important differences in the original wording of the commitment as sent from Berlin and that which Sternburg presented to Roosevelt. Bülow's mortification and embarrassment knew no bounds when he saw the message of Roosevelt's quoting the Sternburg version. He even threatened to disavow the Ambassador but did not do so.¹⁰ In view of the fact that only a few days previously the German Foreign Office had presented two different plans at about the same time, the above incident seems to confirm the fact that there was much confusion and incompetence in the Foreign Office. White wrote that he had reason to believe that the Kaiser was not kept well informed by Bülow of the negotiations. Both Anderson and Tardieu, the two authorities on the entire Conference negotiations, express themselves from time to time as believing that the Kaiser and his Chancellor

were not agreed on what the German policy should be at Algeciras. Such a view is held by Fay and other writers on the general diplomacy of the pre-World War I period.

As to Roosevelt's statement that he did not know whether France would accept the four-point program which had been sent him by White and which he had recommended, I leave it to the reader to form his own opinion.

Roosevelt's statement that France's position at the time was different from her pre-conference position places him in error. In view of the secret agreements, Spain was already to share the mandate of Morocco with France. To place Italy in charge of seeing that the nature of the mandate was carried out guaranteeing freedom of commerce, was simply adding a touch of high comedy. For France, to repeat, had another secret treaty with Italy giving the latter what amounted to the right to gobble up Tripoli in exchange for Italy's observance of France's position in Morocco. Roosevelt stated that he did not believe the tales that had come to him of the existence of the secret provisions of the treaty. One must take the President's word.

Roosevelt's assertion that if the Germans would accept his four-point program he would consider it "a triumph of German diplomacy," should also be taken with a grain of salt. The Germans could plainly see that "he who has the police has Morocco," and it was undoubtedly clear to Roosevelt whose policy was pro-French. It was merely a promise to ease the blow for Germany
whose government was already having trouble with its international business men.

Then, finally, there was the threat, not particularly veiled, that if Germany did not come across she would suffer a great loss of "credit and moral power" in both America and Europe. Perhaps the threat was not veiled at all for in this or his next communication to the Kaiser, Roosevelt threatened to publish the diplomatic correspondence relating to Morocco for all to see.\(^{11}\) This would have made the Kaiser's position inside Germany as well as outside, difficult indeed. This threat was delivered verbally to Sternburg and Roosevelt himself does not give the exact date of its delivery. But it may have been interpolated verbally to fortify the threat that Germany would lose "credit and moral power," if she did not accede to the Roosevelt proposal.

On the 3rd of March the French, British, Russian, Spanish, and Portuguese delegates expressed openly their belief that the police should be left to France and Spain.\(^{12}\) It was of course admitted that the United States and Italy also favored that solution leaving Germany and Austria-Hungary to themselves. The first German attempt at compromise had obviously failed. The only course of action left to Germany was to try again.

---

\(^{11}\) Roosevelt to Reid, contained in Bishop, I, pp. 467-503.

\(^{12}\) White and Gummere to Root, March 27, 1906, U. S. State Papers.
The German delegates had said that the assignment of Morocco to France and Spain alone did not offer a guarantee of the open door and commercial equality for all nations. But on the 8th of March the German position was considerably modified. Von Radlowitz rose and announced that Germany could not leave the police under France and Spain alone without a guarantee of the supervision of the manner in which they would carry out their duties.13

The Austria-Hungarian delegate then rose and proposed that French police be assigned to the ports of Tangier, Safi, Rabat, and Tetuan; the Spanish be assigned to Mogador, Larache, and Mazagan; at the eighth port, Casablanca, the Inspector General would reside and be in command of that part while charged with inspecting the police at the other seven and reporting this inspection to the diplomatic corps at Tangier.14

"There was a general feeling," said White and Gummer in their report to Secretary Root, "that for the first time a proposal had been made on the subject of the police which, if not actually acceptable, would serve as a basis for negotiations and not improbably, with some modifications, for settlement."15

The Austrian proposal had undoubtedly been prepared well in advance of its announcement by both the German and Austria-

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
Hungarian governments. Its announcement on the 8th of March must be considered thoughtfully in the light of the two events of major importance of the day before. After a silence of two weeks Roosevelt suddenly brought forth "his big stick" to force Germany to accede to the French position; on the same day in France, after a Cabinet crisis resulting from the usual argument over a budget, the Rouvier government collapsed. Curious, isn't it, that Roosevelt jumped into the fray with his big stick at the exact moment when the French government was paralyzed by internal dissention. (But the movies clearly show that if one is captured in darkest Africa by native cannibals: one can always depend on an eclipse of the sun just as one is about to be put in the pot.)

It is a tribute to the force of Roosevelt's threat of the 7th of March that the Austrian proposal was announced at this time in view of the fact that the French government was in the throes of a serious internal quarrel. It is a further tribute to the force of Roosevelt's threat that the French delegates, in spite of the fact that their government had collapsed, were able to take their usual strong stand. White cabled his government on the 8th that France "would agree to a Swiss or Dutch Inspector General [which the German government had suggested] but never to his having command in any port."  

16 White to Root, 8th of March, 1906, cited by Nevins, 276.
After the Austrian plan had been announced, Von Radowitz had then proposed that the French plan and the Austrian plan should be synthesized for a final settlement. Here was a truly generous spirit of conciliation. But the crisis in France continued and the German attitude stiffened. On Saturday afternoon, the 10th of March, Sir Arthur Nicolson called on Von Radowitz and congratulated him on the concessions of his government. He then said to him (quoting from Tardieu),

"There is nothing more now but the attributing of Casablanca to the Swiss [i.e. command of the port] that is inadmissible for France. Give her the satisfaction of renouncing it as she has renounced for you opposition to the inspection."

To his great surprise, Sir Arthur, who expected an immediate adherence, received an altogether different reception. M. Von Radowitz found it natural that France make a concession to Germany in accepting the inspection. He did not admit that Germany should, in exchange, make a concession to France in accepting the repression of the Swiss police at Casablanca.

"My government," he declared, "has spoken its last word. This last word is the Austrian project just as it is, with the inspector and the Swiss police at Casablanca; you can take it or leave it."

The same evening [Saturday, the 10th of March] and the following Monday [12th of March], Count Cassini and the Duke of Almodovar went in turn to see their German colleague. He was still more categorical. He no longer was contented with affirming that his instructions were irrevocable. He declared that they had been renewed to him the 11th and, entering into the picture himself, he gave "his word of honor" that it was not a matter of a bluff [word used in the English] and a marchandage, but of a considered announcement and an unshakable resolve.

17 Tardieu, op. cit., 312.
On the 14th at a new meeting of the General Commission he was not content with being intransigent; he was aggressive and menacing, so much that M. Regnault had to bring him back quickly to a more courteous tone.

The German intransigence was due, says Tardieu, "not at all from the object of having Swiss instructors commanded by a Swiss Inspector General at Casablanca." The truth was that "the Imperial Chancellery wished to see the French Ministerial crisis continue ... had taken hope in this situation of achieving that which she had given up from the 3rd to the 7th of March [i.e., the complete internationalization in some form of Morocco]." In other words, the German government wished to take advantage of the cabinet crisis to achieve its original aims although the German press insisted that this was not the case. 19

On the 13th of March William II replied to the Roosevelt communication of the 7th of March. The reply was transmitted by Sternburg in the body of a letter of the latter's to Roosevelt. The Kaiser's message began as follows:

As to the information of my Ambassador, mentioned by you, I can only assure you, Mr. President, that I am gladly willing to take your advice as a basis of an understanding. In this sense your proposition contained in Mr. Root's letter of the 19th ultimo has been earnestly considered at once. In principle I consented to it, provided that it be given a form to meet the international side of the question.

The Kaiser then explained that he realized that a mandate given to France and Spain by the Conference differed "in a judicial

18 Ibid., 313.
19 Ibid., 315.
"sense" from any action of France in Morocco based on the treaties with England and Spain. (He did not mention the treaty with Italy). But such would still give France economic control "if no sufficient international counterpoise were created." The only question in the Kaiser's mind was whether Roosevelt's control measures were sufficient from an international point of view. "In this respect," the Kaiser continued, "I think the idea has been developed in a proposal of mediation brought forward by Austria-Hungary. This proposal almost covers yours."

After thus quoting the Kaiser, Sternburg himself continued:

I may add that on March 11 the German representative at Algeciras was informed by all his colleagues, including the British and American, that after the foregoing concessions made by Germany during the sessions of last Saturday the French opposition could not be justified. In this sense they have spoken to Mr. Révoil. 20

On the 12th of March a dispatch from Algeciras to the Lokal Anzeiger also contained the assertion that the English and American delegates were for the Austrian proposal. 21 It seems certain that White actually was for the Austrian proposal although I find no categorical statement of his in writing to that effect. In a comprehensive review of the Conference he stated tersely that

... the chief difference between them being that in the former the instruction of the Moorish police is to be left to French and Spanish officers

20 Sternburg to Roosevelt, March 13, 1906, contained in Bishop.

21 Tardieu, op. cit., 316.
in all the eight ports of Morocco, whereas in the Austrian proposal such would be the case in seven ports only, and in the eighth a Swiss or Dutch officer would command, with the additional duty of inspecting the organization and working of police in the other seven ports.

After the meeting during which the Austrian proposals were made was adjourned, he cabled Secretary Root.

General opinion favorable to Austrian proposals even Russian and British Ambassadors thinking it might, with modifications of detail, be accepted by France and that she could not afford to break up Conference by rejecting it. Casablanca is port in which German interests pre­dominate. 23

As to the English, both Grey and Nicolson were delighted as to the latest German move. "The Germans have been wonder­fully conciliatory," Nicolson wrote on the 8th of March. Two days later Grey wrote Nicolson that "Germany has conceded the substance and it would be a great pity if France sacrificed the substance to the shadow." 24 Nicolson, it is true, did go to the German delegates, but at the request of the French, to ask them to give in on Casablanca also, but when the Germans would not he told Révoil that there could be "no question of breaking up the Conference on that issue when a favorable is­sue was in sight." Révoil was disappointed but still thought the Germans would yield. At the same time Sir Edward Grey told Cambon that the French should allow the Swiss at Casablanca

22 White and Gummere to Root, March 27, 1906, U. S. State Papers.

23 White to Root, March 8, 1906, Archives of State Depart­ment, cited by Dennis, 503.

24 Pringle, op. cit., 396.
rather than let the Conference fail.

I was sure [said Sir Edward Grey] that opinion here and impartial opinion everywhere regarded Germany as having given way on seven-eighth of the question; she had, in order to save a little prestige, reserved this one small point which could not in practice endanger French interests, for it would not bring in Germany, who apparently asks for nothing for herself.

Grey and Nicolson yielded to French intransigence, however, and Nicolson loyally promised Révoil that "we shall support you, whatever you do," but both deplored the French position. The German government was fully aware that this was the British position.27 Grey wrote Bertie

I think the French made a great mistake in not closing at once with the German concessions at Algeciras. They could have made it appear to be a diplomatic victory for themselves. It was so regarded by everybody outside France at the time. Now of course it is too late. Had the Conference broken up before the Austrian proposal as to the police was made, Germany would have been to blame; public opinion in Europe and (what is more important) public opinion in England would have looked on her as a tiresome bully. Now, if there is a break up, people will say that France is unreasonable and did not know how to take her advantage when she had it. You can see that even The Times correspondent at Algeciras thinks France ought not to break off on such a wretched point as Casablanca, which I believe is a useless hole. However, if she does, we shall back her up.28

Grey's advice to Cambon and Nicolson's advice to Révoil produced a sharp reaction in Paris. Several deputies argued

25 Gooch, II, 18.

26 Tardieu, op. cit., 316; Gooch II, 18.


28 Gooch, II, 18 (Grey to Bertie, March 14, 1906).
that it was the first sign of the intention of the British Liberal
government to resume a policy of isolation and withdraw sup-
port from France. 29 Grey hastily dispatched an indignant tele-
gram stating that "any advice Nicolson has given Revoil has been
on the understanding that this support would be continued." 30

The Russian, Italian, and Austrian governments all had
agreed to ask France to accept the Austrian proposal. 31

To the French it appeared that the Germans had reversed
their position that the Austrian and French proposals should be
synthesized into a final agreement. The Germans, Tardieu com-
plained, now spoke only of the Austrian proposal which added to
the French proposal the special régime of Casablanca and "the
abusive extension of the powers of the inspector." 32

On the 15th March William II sent a stronger telegram to
Roosevelt than that of the 13th in which he recommended the Aus-
trian proposal. In this one the Kaiser denounced French covet-
ousness, the avidity of French banks, the appetite of French
colonials, and asked the President to recommend the Austrian pro-
posal. On the 17th the Kaiser sent a third dispatch stating ex-
plicitly that Italy, Russia, England, and Spain had abandoned

30 Ibid. (Grey to Bertie).
31 Anderson, op. cit., 384.
32 Tardieu, op. cit., 308.
France. The United States should therefore agree to the Austrian proposal and it would be accepted by the Conference. 33

The German government was obviously trying to strike while the iron was hot—but only to put through the Austrian proposal. Nevertheless Tardieu expostulates with great vehemence against this procedure. 34 And the French delegates at Algeciras were depressed and worried, in part due to the internal difficulties at home but mostly due to the fact that the German government was attempting to make the most of the situation to try to put through the Austrian proposal. "They [the French delegates] knew . . . the ardent desire to finish and to be relieved of responsibilities that had animated certain of the plenipotentiaries . . . and when they evaluated the chances that a new vote reserved to them they were inclined to pessimism." The French position was not helped by the fact that the anxiety and nervousness of the French delegates could be plainly seen by all. 35

On the other hand the Germans' contentions at Washington and in the other capitals of Europe that all the countries were

33 Ibid., 319-20.

34 "Of the regrettable processes which, from the beginning of the affair the German diplomacy had used against us, this was the least defendable. For this prodigious naked intrigue against our country, at the hour when a ministerial crisis weakened it morally and gave it the appearance of a ship without a pilot; this assertion of our isolation, an assertion which could be justified by nothing, as they had several hours afterwards to state publicly, this fierce indictment, etc. etc." 319-20.

35 Tardieu, op. cit., 322.
unanimous in their support of her, had forced Russia and England, bound by treaties with France, to denials. This together with the knowledge transmitted by Jusserand that Roosevelt was again about to intervene, strengthened the French in their intransigence.

Roosevelt's intervention was in the form of a letter to the Kaiser and was delivered to Sternburg on the 14th of March, the same day that the Cabinet crisis ended in France with M. Leon Bourgeois the new head of the government. Root was authorized to send the same statement to White who would show it to the British and French delegates. It was sent to White on the 17th of March.

In this communication Roosevelt emphatically refused to accept the Austrian plan. Nicolson must have been amazed when White showed it to him— to say nothing of what the redoubtable Mr. White himself must have felt about it.

This [White later wrote Root] was one of the most curious episodes of the Conference, and there is no doubt that the eighth port was saved to the French and Spanish police superintendence entirely through the President's action and your admirable note of March 17th, which placed the police question on clear and undisputable ground—the only ground, in fact, upon which France and Spain could legitimately claim the position eventually assigned to them. 36

36 Nevins, op. cit., 279-80.
"The United States," said Roosevelt, "stood for freedom of commerce and the corollary to that principle was that no one power ought to acquire such a control over the territory of Morocco as to justify the belief that she might ultimately come to regard and treat that territory as her own to the exclusion of others." This international position was interposed against the original French claim to single control of the Moroccan police. But France had allowed a second power to share the police and a third power to act as inspector. This, said Roosevelt, would keep Morocco internationalized. It seemed right, furthermore, that France and Spain, because of their position, should be the ones to exercise the mandate.

From our point of view all the reasons which existed against leaving to France the control of all the parts exists against leaving to France the control of some, to Spain the control of some, and to Switzerland, either in its own interest or in the interest of any other power, the control of one. The very fact of division of the ports implies the existence of a special right on the part of the three countries in the ports assigned to them respectively. The immediate effect can only be the creation of three separate spheres of influence, with inferior right and opportunity on the part of all other powers. And the nations to whom these spheres are assigned may be expected in the ordinary course of events to enter into complete control. We do not care whether the inspector, if there shall be one, is Italian or Swiss.

We do not care whether he reports to his own government or to the corps diplomatique in Tangier, or communicates the information he obtains to the powers in any other way. We do consider that the distribution of ports to single powers is wrong in principle and destructive of the declared purpose of both Germany and the United States. If we had sufficient interest in Morocco to make it worth our while, we should seriously object, on our own account, to the adoption of any such arrangement.

We have not, however, any such substantial interest in Morocco as to lead us to take that course. Our chief wish
is to be of service in promoting a peaceable settlement of the controversy which brought the Conference together. Under the guidance of that wish we shall accept whatever arrangement the European powers represented at Algeciras agree upon. If the agreement is upon the Austrian proposal, or upon any modification of it which includes the principle of distribution of ports, we shall regret what we deem to be the failure of the true principle to which we have given our adherence. We still hope that there may be no such result.

Elihu Root

In his letter to Reid, Roosevelt states that while the German government tried to convince him that all the other governments except that of England was for the Austrian proposal, the Italian and Russian governments both expressed to him their belief that Germany was in the wrong and asked that he take some action to prevent Germany from obtaining a sphere in Morocco. Roosevelt then stated that

We became convinced that Austria was a mere cat's-paw for Germany, and that Germany was aiming in effect at the partition of Morocco, which was the very reverse of what she was claiming to desire. She first endeavored to secure a port for herself, and then a separate port, nominally for Holland or Switzerland, which we were convinced would, with the adjacent Hinterland, become in effect German. The French said they would not yield on these points, and, as you know, it looked as if the Conference would come to nothing, and that there would then be the possibility of trouble between France and Germany. Our view was that the interests of France and Spain in Morocco were far greater than those of other powers.

The stories of the discouragement and isolation of the French government were at once confounded by Roosevelt's action.

37 Root to Sternburg, March 17, 1906, U. S. State Papers; Bishop, op. cit., I, 497-499.
38 Bishop, op. cit., I, 489.
The French Cabinet was formed and the edifice of French alliances and friendships appeared more solid than ever. On the question of Casablanca the French position was stronger than it had been before for it was now known that France would give up nothing and that her position would meet the unanimous approbation of her allies and friends. 39

M. Revoil now brought into play all the legal sophistry and cleverness of which he was capable in arguing against allowing Swiss, Dutch, or Belgian officers at Casablanca. 40 But it was the President and the force of the United States behind him and not fast talk which forced Germany (in the guise of Switzerland, Belgium, or Holland) out of Casablanca and Morocco.

Messrs. White and Gummere wrote Secretary Root on March 27 that

We have reason to believe that this expression of our government's opinion affected the situation very materially, as on the 20th instant the German senior delegate informed ours that he thought a proposal would be brought forward at the next meeting by the Austrian Ambassador, modified in accordance with suggestions embodied in a communication received by the German government from that of the United States, evidently your note aforesaid to the effect that there should be French and Spanish officers together in all the ports of Morocco, of which M. Radowitz said his government entirely approved. 41

As a matter of fact, Sternburg had notified the President on the 19th of March of his government's acquiescence to Roosevelt's

39 Tardieu, op. cit., 336.

40 Ibid., 306–07.

41 U. S. State Papers, 1906.
proposals. The German Ambassador reported that

He [the Kaiser] appreciates the fundamental idea of your proposal: cooperation of French and Spanish officers to be about equally divided in each of the ports.

He would readily join in any proposal at the Conference which would contain this mixed system and an Inspector General, to which France already has agreed in principle.

Germany abstains from entering into details, so as to prevent that these should obscure the main points. The telegram concludes in saying that the immediate removal of all misunderstandings is far more important to Germany than the whole Morocco affair.

Roosevelt then made the following comments:

I call your attention to the last paragraph in this telegram of March 19th. I had previously informed Speck in a verbal conversation, that if the Emperor persevered in resisting our proposals and a break-up ensued, I should feel obliged to publish the entire correspondence, and that I believed that our people would feel a grave suspicion of Germany's justice and good faith; but that if the Emperor would yield to what seemed to me our very fair proposals, I should not publish any of the correspondence, and would endeavor in every way to give Germany full credit for what was done; and with that in view would take an early opportunity to have him (Speck) bring a delegation of German war veterans to see me, so that I might make a public statement in praise of the Emperor's position. Two or three days after the Emperor sent his cable saying he had yielded to our request, Speck called upon me to say that the Emperor very earnestly desired that I would make such public utterance. 42

On the 12th of April this was actually done. Roosevelt, speaking in diplomatic generalities, stated that "In no country is there a warmer admiration for Germany and Germany's ruler, Emperor William, than here in America." He then noted that the Algeciras Conference was called at the initiative of Germany. America as

42 Bishop, op. cit., I, 501-02.
a nation * (!) did not have much concern there except to see that justice was done. The Conference, he felt, had bettered the situation in Morocco and, he hoped, relations between France and Germany as well. 43

But this last paragraph takes us ahead of the story. At Algeciras the Conference was still on. This time the danger came from Washington. Tardieu himself best expresses it: "... in the same dispatch of the 17th of March with which M. Roosevelt had rendered us imminent service in checking the Welsersheimb proposition, he had unfortunately slipped [43] And how had the future Bull Moose slipped? Tardieu continues:

He supported . . . the French-Spanish solution; but he interpreted it in the sense that the officers of the two countries would be jointly employed together in the eight ports. In other words he no longer spoke of partition. And it was a police organized uniformly in each port of French and Spanish instructors that he recommended to William II as logical and acceptable.

It was the worst hitch that we might have feared. 44

Loudly did the French moan and expostulate. In the first place the placing of the French and Spanish equally in the different Morrocan ports "conflicted with the French-Spanish treaty." Then, too, there were "great practical inconveniences." The Spanish were not always easy to get along with and there would

43 Ibid.

44 Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 385-86.
be permanent rivalries and conflicts—a Spanish diplomat himself had said, "Our officers are proud. They will not obey those of another country."

But, says Tardieu, to overcome it was difficult. There was the danger of alienating M. Roosevelt on the one hand. On the other the Germans might seize the opportunity to reduce to powder the French-Spanish policy of M. Delcasse. But there were technical difficulties in the way of such German action. Although the Kaiser had accepted the President's proposals on the 21st of March on the condition that the French and Spanish police be equally divided in each port, Germany had already given up Casablanca unconditionally on the 19th of March by an article in the Gazette de l'allemande du nord and by a conversation of Bülow with d'Ostensacken. Anyway "everyone at Algeciras" (except possibly the hapless White?) was agreed that the complication which M. Roosevelt had provoked "involuntarily" (?) was "regrettable."

The Duke of Almodovar thought the mixed police impracticable. . . . Sir Arthur Nicolson requested White not to take it into account and Sir Edward Grey explained to M. Carter, the U. S. Chargé d'Affairs all the difficulties that it would occasion. . . . From our point of view it was impossible that a categorical refusal be transmitted to Washington. But, however, we could say that the French and Spanish officers being . . . simples instructeurs could not in any degree be considered as actual or eventual agents of a policy menacing the integrity of Morocco. [It was also possible to indicate to Roosevelt that the Germans would not make an issue of the mixed police.] He had wished to furnish an area of compromise. The compromise had been achieved. The United States has no

45 Ibid., 386.
46 Ibid., 387.
political interest of its own in Morocco and acting only in the interest of entente, could not but rejoice [?] to see it established. \ldots From the 24th we were sure that M. White would not raise the question of the mixed police and that the Austrian proposal was a thing of the past.49

But the matter was not settled as easily as M. Tardieu seems to indicate. There was the question of how the ports were to be divided between France and Spain. France wished the matter to be settled privately between the two of them whereas Germany felt the Conference should decide the matter. At this point (24th of March) Roosevelt entered the picture again and urged that France and Spain be made jointly responsible in every port regardless of how the ports were divided.48 But the French, British, Spanish, Russian, and Italian delegates agreed that the matter should be settled by France and Spain privately.49 Germany then agreed.

Difficulties arose between France and Spain but the "simples instructeurs" were finally apportioned with the Spanish in Tetouan and Larache, the French and Spanish both in Casablanca and Tangier, and the French in the other four ports.50 The Franco-Spanish Treaty had only dealt with five ports. By this agreement the other three were assigned, one to France alone, the other two to France and Spain together.

As to the Jewish question, White had been requested by Nicolson and Revoil to omit it from discussion as they did not want

47 Ibid., 388.


49 Anderson, op. cit., 392.

50 Ibid., 393.
any subject brought up "not strictly within the program." Mr. Einstein, the Secretary of the American delegation at Algeciras, then made a careful and detailed study of the problem and reported that the abuses to the Jews in Morocco which had been brought to the attention of the United States government, were *de jure* rather than *de facto*. The Jews, themselves, made it clear to the American delegation that they considered themselves well treated. They asked that the United States government, if it did anything at all, simply have the Conference express to the Sultan its appreciation of the toleration he had shown to the Jews in the past and express the hope that it would continue in the future. 51

Secretary Root cabled White on the 27th of March that "you need not present the subject to the Conference at all. You are, however, at liberty to ask for an expression in the sense of your dispatch of January 20. . . . if, upon further consultation, you are of the opinion that it would be of practical benefit." 52

The matter ended with White asking the Conference to indicate to the Sultan its interest in seeing that "the Jews of his Empire and all his subjects without distinction of belief be treated with justice and equity." The proposal was unanimously accepted. 53

---

52 Root to White, March 27, 1906, U. S. State Papers.
53 Tardieu, *op. cit.*, 404.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

What the United States sought to achieve during the First Moroccan Crisis has already been suggested in broad lines in the preceding chapters but it may not be amiss to summarize it briefly here, to inquire as to whether the policy was realistic and practical, and to note the degree of success which the United States government experienced in carrying out that policy.

The American government intervened at Morocco,
(1) to restore the balance of power and maintain peace;
(2) to remain faithful to its friends, England and France;
(3) to restrain its potential enemy, Germany, and;
(4) to maintain the open door in Morocco.

It was a statesmanlike and highly realistic policy. The United States could not help but look askance at any threat to the balance of power resulting in a continent of Europe dominated by a single power. That threat was very real at the time. France's position as a counter to the Triple Alliance was precarious, for her new friend, England, was still held in suspicion and the Entente Cordiale was not seen to be forged into an alliance until after the Conference ended. France's one ally, Russia, was too weakened by military defeat and internal revolution to be of assistance. Germany could well threaten war over
Morocco and did so on several occasions. But the United States, in the person of its illustrious President stepped into the aching void left by Russia's default, restored the balance of power, and, finally, was solely responsible for administering an overwhelming diplomatic defeat to Germany.

It was altogether natural that we should support France and England during this crisis. France was the nucleus of a balancing force against the Triple Alliance on the one hand and was the good friend of England on the other. England, the greatest sea power in the world, whose borders touched ours everywhere, should be our friend or she would be the most powerful enemy we could have. Certainly Morocco did not involve our interests sufficiently to cause us to convert our most powerful friend into our most powerful enemy. Roosevelt had a violent dislike of Sir Mortimer Durand but his policy was not determined nor very greatly influenced by personal relationships. He explicitly stated that the United States must not be the means of breaking up the Anglo-French Entente and that we must be careful not to even seem to oppose it. For this reason alone we could not support Germany in the First Moroccan Crisis for a victory by her there would have meant the destruction of the most important clause in the Anglo-French Colonial agreement which had been the chief basis of the Entente.

To restore the balance of power, maintain peace, and remain faithful to our friends England and France, were the chief
factors in the general strategy which determined the United States' action during the First Moroccan Crisis. But if it was necessary to recognize our enemies it was also necessary to recognize our potential enemies. The German interests in South America were already being developed and were being watched carefully by us, particularly the German economic penetration of Brazil. No wonder that when all the other powers, even including France's friend, England, had agreed to let Germany at least have Casablanca, one of the eight ports on the Moroccan coast, the United States alone refused. It was perfectly natural that the United States did not wish to see Germany on the west coast of Africa that much closer to South America. In the Philippines and at Venezuela the attitude of the German government appeared to confirm the United States' suspicion that Germany was a potential enemy. The threat to us from her grandiose schemes for the continent of Europe has already been discussed.

Then, finally, we wished to maintain the open door in Morocco for the simple reason that this would best promote the development of our business interests there. If Morocco were seized by one country or divided among several, the door would be shut. But this was a minor point. American trade with Morocco was negligible in view of the political grand strategy involved.

As has been shown in the preceding chapter, the United States government carried through the first three points in its
strategy but failed to carry through the fourth. The points have been arranged in order of their importance, however. The first two were fundamental to the national interest and would serve it along general lines. The third and fourth points would serve the national interest specifically and immediately. Of the two, point three, to restrain Germany and keep her out of Morocco, was more important than point four, to maintain the open door and keep us in an economic sense in Morocco. Therefore, although failing to carry through point four, the United States government did carry through the three most important points in its program and was, in general, highly successful.

Roosevelt's methods in carrying out his aims, would be frowned upon in some circles but were the methods that have been generally used in the diplomatic game. He himself had a penchant for surrounding his actions with an air of fair play but was wholeheartedly in favor of France. Early in the pre-Conference negotiations he took the attitude that France should have the "kernel of the nut" in Morocco leaving Germany the "shell." He clearly indicated that nothing was to be done by his government to break up the Anglo-French Entente but insisted that at no time did he believe that that Entente rested largely on the partition of Morocco between France and Spain. But Jusserand, in forwarding to his government the program which Roosevelt drafted for the Conference, stated that he did not believe it would conflict with the arrangements which France had previously made with England,
Spain, and Italy and that Roosevelt felt also that it would not conflict with those arrangements. One would naturally conclude that Roosevelt therefore knew something of the nature of these arrangements.

Roosevelt entered into the closest of diplomatic relations with Jusserand in the Summer of 1905 and the two even planned together the messages which their respective governments would send to Germany. This close teamwork was maintained throughout the year and was continued throughout the Conference in 1906 both by Roosevelt and Jusserand in America and by White and Révoil in Algeciras. If war and diplomacy are similar, as one contemporary writer maintains, then perhaps one may be allowed the use of the phrase "diplomatic coalition" to describe the relations of France and the United States during the First Moroccan Crisis.

The Kaiser was delighted when Roosevelt obtained the conference and worked out an acceptable program. The German Ambassador was given the original penciled memorandum of the program and Roosevelt sent his hearty congratulations to the Kaiser for his victory in diplomacy. The Kaiser in a burst of enthusiasm committed himself irrevocably to the acceptance of any decision made by Roosevelt at the Conference. But although the Kaiser did not know it at the time, Roosevelt's letter of congratulations was the kiss of death and the Kaiser's irrevocable commitment the death trap into which he had been lured by the American big-game hunter. At the crucial moment in the conference when the Germans
had already retreated to a position which was considered by all the other governments except France to be very conciliatory and acceptable, Roosevelt dramatically took charge again. From across the Atlantic the voice of the so-called arbitrator was heard demanding the last bit of "kernel" from the German government. Roosevelt reminded the Kaiser of his commitment, and then threatened to publish the official correspondence of the negotiations. With this he had sprung the trap on his unsuspecting and startled quarry. The German Kaiser immediately acquiesced.

From the standpoint of France, the fact that she emerged victorious when her Russian ally was stricken, must be accredited as a brilliant diplomatic victory. But it rested no less on circumstance. It was perfectly natural that the United States should step into the void. Roosevelt knew this. He knew what his country's interests were and was motivated by them rather than by sentiment for France. He, himself, made this clear to the French government and the French government was well aware that Roosevelt was acting from the point of view of enlightened self-interest.

Roosevelt knew what he wanted and was shrewd in seizing opportunities to carry out his aims. As a result, at the Conference of Algeciras, the most important diplomatic gathering since the Congress of Berlin, the United States was projected suddenly and brilliantly into the diplomacy and politics of the world.
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Classification of the bibliography proved an interesting though, at times, puzzling task. For example, I first very reluctantly classified Tardieu's volume on the Conference as a Secondary Work. But in view of the fact that it was the official report of the French government on the Conference, that M. Tardieu was a salaried official of that government, and that he was given the title of "Honorary First Secretary of the Foreign Office," I reclassified it under "Source Materials" as an official government report.

I was also puzzled as to the classification of Gooch's volumes on Diplomacy. In view of the fact that Gooch had previously edited the British War Documents jointly with Temperley, his volumes almost have the authority of a Source Material. But Gooch was not the spokesman for his government in these volumes so they were classified as "Secondary Works."
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. Source Materials

Official Government Reports:


Official Records:


Published Correspondence:


*Selections From the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918* (Volume II of two volumes). Charles Scribners' Sons, New York, 1925.

II. Secondary Works

Biographies:


 Histories of Diplomacy:


Histories of the First Moroccan Crisis:


International Histories:
