Promoting Trust Building in a Unified Korean Society: 
The Arts-based Policy Strategy for Social Cohesion

Dissertation

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Abstract

With trust building and social cohesion as an essential part of a unification process on the Korean peninsula, this study is guided by the following research question: *How can the arts contribute to the social cohesion of a unified Korean society and what arts-based policy strategy can be developed and operationalized?*

Thus far, most scholarly research regarding a Korean unification has dealt with political and economic factors. However, precedent cases of unification (e.g., Germany) exhibit that solely institutional integration cannot create a truly cohesive society, which is central to unification. It is essential to acknowledge that political and economic unification cannot encompass the social cohesion of two societies that have developed in irreconcilable directions over the last 60 years of division. Also, the true meaning of unification can be articulated only after building a unified civil society where trust and a sense of belonging have been restored amongst citizens from both South and North Korea.

Although the two Koreas historically stem from one nation – the Joseon Dynasty, South and North Korea have developed distinctive cultures under their different political regimes. In the discourse of unification, therefore, the chasm in politics and culture between the two separate societies must be at the center of discussion. Recognizing the importance of social cohesion, this research asserts that the arts can facilitate bridging people who hold different ideological and cultural values, building trust, and constructing one national identity for Korean citizens. It employs concepts related to ‘soft power,’ ‘trust,’ ‘public purposes of the arts,’ and ‘nonprofit.’

This study engages in qualitative research designed to inform the creation of an arts-based policy strategy to stimulate social cohesion in a unified Korean society. It is designed
based on document analysis and case studies using grounded theory. It aims at understanding the cultural gap between South and North Koreans and ultimately developing an arts-based policy strategy, which employs the arts as a catalyst for restoring trust between people of the divided societies on the Korean peninsula, as part of a peaceful unification.
Dedication

To my mom and dad
Acknowledgements

Above all, I give all honor, glory and praise to the Lord, my God. “And He has said to me, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for power is perfected in weakness’” (2 Corinthians 12:9a; NASB).

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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

Looking at the prospect of unification on the Korean peninsula, this research seeks to identify how engaging with the arts could stimulate trust building and social cohesion, while acknowledging social cohesion as an essential part of the unification process. The type of unification that this research takes on as a baseline is a peaceful, democratic way of unification. To date, most scholarly discussions regarding the Korean unification have dealt with political and economic aspects which can be regarded as institutional unification. However, precedent cases of unification exhibit that such institutional integration cannot solely create a truly unified society.

During the last 60 years of division, although the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) historically stem from one nation, the Joseon Dynasty of over a 500-year history, they have developed distinctive cultures under their different political regimes. In the discourse of unification, therefore, the chasm in culture and social values between the two separate societies must be part of discussion. What should be sought out to restore the gap is building trust through bridging people’s divided minds and creating a national identity for a unified Korean nation.

This study reviews the literature on the history, socio-politics, and arts in South and North Korea. It interprets and analyzes the historical background of the Korean peninsula from the end of the Joseon Dynasty through Japanese occupation, division, to the current status quo of the two Koreas. In addition, how different social, political, and cultural values have emerged and remained in the peninsula is also examined. After identifying the social impact of the arts, the study focuses on the process of unification in the Korean peninsula.
Recognizing the importance of social cohesion in unification, this research adopts the idea that the arts can facilitate communications between the people holding different ideological and cultural values. In searching for a way to advance social cohesion through the arts, this study employs concepts related to ‘soft power,’ ‘trust,’ ‘nonprofit,’ ‘public purposes of the arts,’ and ‘lesson-drawing.’ Also, in this study, I use the term ‘culture’ only to indicate the arts and related notions. To describe ‘political culture’ then, such terms as norms and values are used. In this respect, this dissertation research focuses on arts-based policy strategy which employs the arts as a vehicle of trust building, regarding it as a crucial process of achieving social cohesion.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

Over 60 years of division on the Korean peninsula has developed a cultural gap between South Korea and North Korea. This division includes language, social norms, and a set of values reflecting respective political regimes and ideologies. The southern part of the peninsula, which has adopted and consolidated a liberal democracy and a free-market economy, became largely multicultural amidst globalization. In the meantime, North Korea has rigorously criticized the liberalized South Korea for its democratization, market-oriented economy, and adaptation of western cultures – especially American culture. Initially, North Korea, unlike the South, adopted Marxist-Leninist communism, and later created its own communist ideology – the so-called Juche Idea (Oh & Hassig, 2000; Kihl, 1994).

The gap between the two regions began to deepen in earnest after the Korean War. The three-year war not only set the geographical and political division of the Korean peninsula, but also led the two Koreas to lose their trust toward each other. Distrust between the two Koreas was explicitly exhibited through their counter-espionage activities and North Korea’s acts of terror in a series of incidents until the early 1980s. The distrust put South Koreans in fear of a potential second Korean War.
The South Korean government’s vigilance against communism was reflected in the educational curricula. Until the early 1990s, the moral education in schools included criticizing and being hostile toward communism and North Korea. This type of education was legitimate at the time because, in a collective sense, North Korea was viewed as South Korea’s enemy. Among strategies the government employed, utilizing the arts appeared to be quite effective for educating South Koreans to be wary of communism and North Korea.

**Narrative: The Arts as an Instrument**

When I attended elementary school (1987-1992) in Seoul, South Korea, it was during the time period of strategically employing the media, such as TV animation series, and schools inculcated young students with the idea that communism is evil and of course, that North Korea represents evil communism. As a consequence, students at a young age, even before comprehending what democracy and communism mean, had two simple equations embedded in their minds.

\[\text{Democracy} = \text{Good and Right}; \quad \text{Communism} = \text{Evil, Wrong, and Scary}\]

During my early school years, until my fourth or fifth grade as I remember, one of the effective educational tools for infusing these ideological equations in those little minds was a poster competition held each semester. The competitions were executed during class hours, and pupils were asked to draw a poster conveying a clear message that ‘we (not “I”) hate the communist party,’ which represented the North Korean government. Although the intention of this indoctrination might have been to criticize the government in the north, for children to distinguish between the North Korean government and North Korean people would have been

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1 The poster competition was stopped at my sixth grade in elementary school, which was in 1992. The substantial change of the South Korean government’s view toward North Korea that was reflected in the change of education curricula can be explained, in part, by the victory of democracy in the Cold War. According to Chung, the new international mood in the post-Cold War had set the South Korean civil society free from restraints of ideology. Though the ideological pressure had been reduced, traces of the ideological conflict still remain in South Korean society today (Lee & Cho, 2012).
beyond their capability. In order to motivate young students, prizes were awarded for those who created an “outstanding” poster. Here, the outstanding work was judged based on not only its artistic excellence, but also its success at delivering the hostile message toward the communist party in the northern region.

**Rationale of the Study**

Despite the hostile attitude between the two Koreas, there also has been a yearning for unification and peace on the Korean peninsula. People of both the South and North were once a family and a considerable number of individuals were displaced during the war and thus separated from their families. Over time, most of the people who had to leave their families and hometowns in the other half of the Korean peninsula have become elderly citizens. With the change in the demographic profile of the peninsula, the wish for unification may be weaker than before when the generation that experienced the war composed the majority of the peninsula’s population. Nevertheless, according to opinion polls conducted by research centers of a national university and government agency, many Korean citizens still hope for a peaceful unification of the two Koreas.

Consequently, two very opposite sentiments – yearning for unification and rejecting North Korea’s regime – ironically co-exist in public opinion in South Korea. The short narrative, which is based on my personal experience during my school years, illustrates that the ideological war and demonization of the North have helped to develop a deep chasm between the South Koreans and the North Koreans. It is highly likely that South Koreans’ antagonistic view of North Koreans can hinder social cohesion when unification occurs in the Korean peninsula. The Institute for Peace Affairs’ 2011 publication clearly indicates social cohesion in the unified

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2 The Institute for Peace Affairs (IPA) is a nonprofit, nonpolitical research institution in South Korea. IPA is dedicated to opening dialogues for issues of Korean unification and North Korea and shaping unification plans based on collaboration with national and international institutions (IPA, n.d.).
Korea as a critical issue that needs to be resolved. The authors of the publication recognize that creating bonds amongst citizens from both sides would be challenging. Thus, in addition to political and economic integration, cultural integration is an essential part of the unification agenda.

The narrative also exhibits that art was an effective propagandistic instrument to encourage young students to develop a common ideological and political mind as good South Korean citizens. This narrative also generates an idea that if the arts were effective methods in alienating people’s minds for a political purpose at one time, they could be utilized conversely, bridging people’s minds. In the field of arts policy, many studies point out that the arts can facilitate communications and promote understanding between community members and help relax strained public relations of different countries. Cultural diplomacy is one endeavor that finds advantages in employing the arts, and uses various forms of the arts for reconciling international relations, connecting the hearts and minds of different people, and building trust. Some other implications of using the arts for that purpose are community development and social cohesion.

For instance, in a discussion about Arab-American identity and the arts, Jamal (2010) declares that the arts can be deemed as a package which projects cultures and identity belonging to a certain group of people. Moreover, the package tends to interact with the given social and political contexts. By using the package, which is the arts, Arab-Americans have been trying to portray their accurate identity as Arab-Americans and communicate with mainstream Americans.3 Another compelling study exhibiting a use of the arts for social cohesion is Matarasso’s (1997) work which is based on multiple case analyses. Matarasso (1997) asserts that participation in the arts can lower social exclusion and isolation. However, the results do not

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3 Jamal (2010) declares that “Arab American identity is normally bound up with the social, cultural, and political realities of the homeland [and also,] … the ongoing conflicted based relationship between the United States and the Arab world…” (pp. 74 & 76).
come for free. Through the various projects, he perceives that “intercultural understanding is not an incidental by-product which can be left to look after itself” (p. 28).

In the respect of bringing a community together, researchers and program participants have witnessed the impact of the arts resonating people’s life and culture and look to its effectiveness in unpacking stories and long-held perceptions. As a reflection of such a reconciling process of a society, employing the arts can be an effective policy option for stimulating social cohesion in a newly unified society. In particular, the arts can be a significant mechanism for fostering communication and restoring trust between once-divided people and overcoming their misunderstandings and cultural differences.

Although a chasm between the two separate societies has been recognized as a problem, we must remember that the two Koreas still share some commonalities in cultural assets and heritage. The same cultural attributes, such as language and traditional arts with centuries of history, may provide a place where a social cohesion process can begin, in pursuit of a fully unified, democratic society – which is the desired state of a unified Korea.

![Inter-relational Cultural Construction in Unified Korean Society](image)

*Figure 1.1 Inter-relational Cultural Construction in Unified Korean Society*
1.3 Research Questions

As aforementioned, under different regimes and social systems, people in South and North Korea have developed and consolidated distinctive cultures and a set of values over the last 60 years. This study first identifies the cultural gap between the two separate societies as well as the factors that have engendered the gap. Identifying the cultural gap derived from historical and socio-political factors can provide insight into formulating an arts-based policy strategy that can be implemented to address the problem – filling the gap and restoring trust, which will ultimately lead to achieving social cohesion.

With recognition of the importance of social cohesion as an ultimate goal of complete Korean unification, this study defines the unification process and identifies steps of social cohesion, in order to address the articulated research questions. Recently, Korea Culture and Tourism Institute (2012) published a research paper proposing a long-term policy plan and strategies for South-North cultural integration. This research argued that the Korean unification process has three sequential stages: preparation, institutional integration, and completion of unification. However, in reality, one may wonder what the completion of unification would look like if such a clear distinctive finish line ever exists. Thus instead, I modified the final stage – as focused on ‘ongoing efforts for social cohesion.’ Following these stages, the authors of the publication suggest four steps of a social cohesion plan: cultural exchanges, cooperative projects, institutional integration, and social cohesion, as shown in Figure 1.2.

What should be stressed here is that pursuit of social cohesion between South and North Korea can not only stimulate political unification in the phase of preparation, but also facilitate the successful, complete unification – that is, social cohesion. Considering the impact of the ongoing social cohesion from the preparation to the unification, it would be less logical for this dissertation research to focus solely on either before or after unification. Therefore, instead of the unification timeline, I decided to situate this research in the context of social cohesion.
Figure 1.2 Projected Stages of Unification and Social Cohesion of Korea (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012; Modified)

While cultural exchanges and cooperative projects (e.g., traditional arts restoration and the study of literature in the Joseon Dynasty times) help achieve institutional integration and social cohesion, each stage of the social cohesion generates different social outcomes, from building social capital to restoring trust and developing a shared civil society (see Figure 1.2). Of these outcomes in the process of social cohesion process, ‘trust building’ has been a focus of my research. I have sought to identify how the arts can stimulate trust building as well as what policy strategies can be formulated in order to facilitate trust building by using the arts in the institutionalized setting.
It is also important to stipulate a scenario of unification, since the actual unification has not yet occurred on the Korean peninsula and it is also difficult to predict when it may come about. The scenario that this dissertation presupposes is the advent of unification through concurrence between South Korea and North Korea. Many existing studies of Korean unification by South Korean scholars largely take a peaceful, democratic way of unification as a desirable scenario. Also, considering the North Korea’s mismanaged economy resulted in the current long-term famine and its growing isolation from the international community, it is more plausible for the South Korean government to take a leading role in the unification process. In that case, it is possible that citizens from the northern region may feel they are second-class citizens of the united nation, just as East Germans perceive themselves in the reunified German society.

In order to prevent North Koreans from feeling isolated or marginalized, therefore, trust toward the newly established government and social system should be built among the citizens from the north. At the same time, trust must grow amongst fellow citizens. Especially, what is pressing is to find a way of deconstructing the antagonistic view toward the North Korean people that South Koreans carry and then creating a collective identity of the unified Korean citizens altogether.

Considering the multidimensional, complex circumstances of this issue, this study is guided by the following primary research question: How can the arts contribute to the social cohesion of a unified Korean society and what arts-based policy strategy can be developed and operationalized? Ultimately aiming at formulating arts and cultural policy strategy for trust building in the unified Korean society, this research investigates three sets of questions listed below.

**Identifying Problems:**

- How have the two Korean societies been distinctively developed since the division?
• How are different social and cultural values reflected in their views on their counterparts?
• How may the differences between South and North Korea impede the social cohesion of a unified Korean society?
• What may have cultivated distrust between South and North Korea?

**Trust Building for Social Cohesion:**

• What is the definition of trust in the socio-political context of a democratic unified Korean society?
• What types of trust are considered to be desirable for citizens from the South and the North?
• How may engaging with the arts stimulate building of thin trust among people who have rarely interacted for the last 60 years?

**Policy Strategy Formulation:**

• What types of policy strategies have been implemented in the past to stimulate social cohesion on the Korean peninsula or at least reduce the socio-cultural gaps between South and North Korea?
• What can be learned from German reunification and South African social cohesion and national identity formation process?
• How can the arts be employed to facilitate trust building and mutual understanding amongst fellow citizens?

1.4 Methodology and Research Design

**Methodology**

This dissertation study engages in qualitative research designed to inform the development of an arts-based policy strategy to stimulate social cohesion in a unified Korean society; and an arts-based policy strategy is an outcome of this research. It is designed based on document analysis and case studies using grounded theory. For preliminary research, most of the data has been gleaned from various types of documents and archival records, including former studies about unification, government policies regarding unification, and surveys reporting on the cultural, social circumstances on the Korean peninsula. Collecting and analyzing those documents from
diverse, yet relevant fields regarding unification expect to provide a holistic understanding of the research issue and help to obtain a multifaceted view on the circumstances surrounding it.

This study interprets and analyzes the historical background of the Korean peninsula from the end of the Joseon Dynasty to Japanese occupation, division, and the status quo of the two Koreas. In addition, I analyze how different social, political, and cultural values emerged and remained in the peninsula. In order to develop policy strategies for the Korean case, I employ a case study method and select two South Korean-based cases. Both cases are performing arts presenting organizations consisting of North Korean defectors who are now living in South Korea. Since their inceptions, these two case organizations have been dedicated to promoting unification on the Korean peninsula through North Korean performing arts programs. Their extended roles can be conceived as efforts to create mutual understanding and social cohesion between two Korean nations. The selected case studies are distinctive from each other in terms of organizational structure – one is for-profit organization and the other is not-for-profit. Investigating the ways of for-profit and nonprofit organizations serve the same cause of promoting unification and why each case organization chose to work in the current organizational structure can provide an important aspect to developing arts-based policy strategy.

Interviews are also conducted to investigate a case study of the two defectors’ performing arts groups. Those interview participants who personally have experienced social, cultural gaps between the two Koreas have provided their knowledge and experience about arts programs whose objective in part is to reconcile relations between South and North Koreans. Interviews conducted for this research are in a form of either in-depth or focused group, depending on each research participant’s will and level of participation. Coupled with that, a small-scale survey has been conducted as well, to learn the audiences’ profiles and brief perspectives on the performances of the defector art groups.

In addition to the two case studies, this research also includes document analysis of two complementary international instances – German reunification and South African national
identity formation strategy. What makes studying German reunification so beneficial is, for example, its similar attributes to those of the divided Korea – in particular, political ideology and culture. Though 40 years had passed after division, East and West Germany stemmed from one cultural root and Hancock and Welsh (1994) argue that this fact actually helped stimulate Germany’s reunification. Hancock and Welsh (1994) identify the cultural attributes as “the same language; common religious traditions; shared historical memories; and a rich legacy of classical and modern arts, literature, and music” (p. 7). These attributes are the same for Korea; the two Koreas also share the same root of culture, such as language, Confucian cultural tradition, history, and traditional arts with centuries of history. With regard to this, analyzing German reunification contributes to identifying the role of a shared cultural background in the unification process and promoting social cohesion of a unified Korea.

Analyses of German reunification and South African national identity formulation cases are expected to provide applicable lessons of social cohesion and strategies for national identity building. Based on these learning strategies from both cases, an arts-based policy strategy aiming for trust building amongst citizens is formulated. However, despite similarities between these two cases and the Korean case, the circumstance of Korean unification is distinctive. Having acknowledged that, ‘lesson-drawing’ is also explored to assess the utility of the German and South African models. Likewise, the use of different sources and methods – academic documents (both theoretical and practical), government archives, anecdotal essays, and interviews – contributes to enhancing the validation of this research (Creswell, 2007).

**Design of the Study**

This research consists of seven chapters. This chapter, Chapter One, opened the discussion by introducing widely agreed upon background information about unification on the Korean peninsula and an overview of the research structure. In this chapter, I used a personal narrative about my early school years in South Korea to illustrate the role of the arts during the divided
years and my argument that arts programs can contribute to building trust for social cohesion in the unified Korea.

Chapter Two traces the contemporary history of the Korean peninsula from the end of the Joseon Dynasty to the recent decades of the two Koreas. Exploring the historical background has contributed to formulating the problem statement of this dissertation. Examining the history of Korean politics and culture from the early 1900s to Japanese occupation, the Korean War, and the status quos of the Koreas provides a critical view on social and cultural gaps between the South and the North. It is also crucial to understanding the chronology of unification policies that have been devised by the Ministry of Unification since the late 1960s on the Korean peninsula and learn about the government’s interest and changes in its policy direction. Such an overview may inform how South Korean administrations have differently implemented unification policy agendas and how the policy agendas have been adjusted by each administration. I also analyze surveys and opinion polls conducted by South Korean research centers to learn about the social mood regarding unification on the Korean peninsula in recent years.

Chapters Three and Four consist of a literature review to formulate the conceptual framework of this research. In the third chapter, the social impact of the arts is reviewed. In the fourth chapter, Nye, Jr.’s (2004) concept of soft power is reviewed to discuss the power of the arts to link to the context of Korean unification and social cohesion. I employ Offe (1999), Putnam (1993; 2000) and Sztompka's (2000) studies to explicate the idea of trust in the socio-political context. I also adopt Wyszomirski's (2000) study in order to connect and develop the concept of trust in the domain of arts policy. In order to develop an analytical framework, the fourth chapter also includes lessons from German reunification and South African policy experiences about social cohesion and national identity formation. Furthermore, I refer to Rose’s (1993) ‘lesson-drawing’ and attempt to find a way to employ the concept in a policy agenda for improving the trust level and Kingdon’s (2003) policy agenda setting to formulate an arts-based policy strategy in later chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter Five demonstrates the grounded theory approach (Charmaz, 2006) and the methods used in this study, followed by how the conceptual framework is structured. Chapter Six discusses and elaborates the analysis process and findings of this research, which serve as a foundation for developing arts-based policy strategy. In Chapter Seven, I construct an arts-based policy strategy for social cohesion and trust building and demonstrate its operationalization. Also, it discusses how the developed policy strategy may be applied to the process of Korean unification.

1.5 Significance and Limitation of the Study

Through the process of this dissertation research, the social impact of the arts, both individual and collective, is elucidated. The expected outcome of this study is an arts-based policy strategy for the social cohesion of a unified Korea. This policy strategy is generated by speculating on the role of the arts in connecting the people of South and North Korea, helping them overcome the fear of one another based on their memory of the Korean War, and restoring trust. Furthermore, this study is expected to contribute to understanding the context of the research topic and perceptions of the people who comprise the domain of North Korean defectors’ performing arts in South Korea by using the grounded theory approach.

However, since it is impossible to gain access to North Korean artists and residents living in North Korea, this study is limited only to the perspective of North Korean defector performers living in South Korea. Therefore, this study might reflect the gap between those currently living in North Korea and the North Korean defectors who participated in this study, since they have been exposed to South Korean culture.
CHAPTER 2: KOREAN HISTORICAL AND CULTURAL FRAME

2.1 The Division: turmoil on/around the Korean peninsula

Because of the Korean peninsula’s favorable geopolitical location, the Joseon Dynasty, which was a predecessor nation of the contemporary two Koreas, experienced many wars and invasions of neighbors throughout its history of over 500 years. At the beginning of the twentieth century when world power dynamics were getting restructured, western nations tried to expand their influence into Asia. In that political turmoil, the Joseon Dynasty as a nation encountered a critical turning point of having to decide whether to open its market to the western countries or keep its reputation of being a Hermit Kingdom. Before it could make this decision, however, the Joseon Dynasty was annexed by Japan in 1910.

During the subsequent 36 years of occupation, the Japanese government industrialized the Korean peninsula and reformed Korea’s bureaucratic system, mostly in order to fulfill the demands of Japan and its people in the islands. Politics on the peninsula, however, had no experience of reformation from the past monarchy structure as an independent state. Thus, the Korean independence movement during the colonial period became a foundation for the independent Korean governments in the future. Groups that led the Korean independence movement include (1) the Shanghai Provisional Government, (2) Kim, Ku’s Korean National Party, and (3) the Manchurian guerillas, in which Kim, Il-sung served as a commander during the Japanese occupation (IPA, 2011).

When defeated in World War II in 1945, Japan was expelled from the Korean peninsula. However, the Korean peninsula did not immediately gain independence. One of the primary reasons was the existence of multiple leaders with different ideologies and visions for Korea. A
more striking cause was the Yalta Conference in February 4-11, 1945, where “President Franklin D. Roosevelt proposed a U.S.-Soviet-Chinese trusteeship over Korea” (Oberdorfer, 2001, p. 5). Therefore, when the liberated Korean peninsula came to a moment of establishing a new modern form of government, different ideologies and the interference of great powers delayed the birth of one new government in that land.

During the Cold War, the two super powers of the postwar era, the United States and the Soviet Union, tried to balance their power on the Korean peninsula. As a result, on August 15, 1948, under the supervision of the UN General Assembly, the U.S.-backed Republic of Korea (South Korea) was established in the southern part of the peninsula, which was below the thirty-eighth parallel line. On September 9, 1948, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) was proclaimed under Soviet tutelage in the northern part (IPA, 2011).

Likewise, two separate Korean governments were established in 1948; however, the then leader of North Korea, Kim, Il-sung, who once served in the Manchurian camp commanded by the Soviet army, dreamed of communizing the entire Korean peninsula (Eckert et al., 1990). Kim, Il-sung viewed South Korea as a puppet of the United States and then planned to “save” South Koreans from “an oppressive foreign-dominated government” (Oh & Hassig, 2000, p. 6). In pursuit of this goal, the northern government invaded the South Korean territory, thus starting the three-year Korean War on June 25, 1950. However, Kim’s plan for unifying Korea through military force ended in failure. With the entry of United States and UN forces, the North Korean army barely survived and only managed to secure the northern half of the peninsula thanks to the Chinese army’s armed support. Despite the failure, he did not let it harm his political position in North Korea. Rather, he blamed his political competitors in the North and took the failure of his war plan as an opportunity to purge his competitors (IPA, 2011). Kim thus became a despot in the North and since then, Kim’s kingdom has continued to this day through his son and grandson.

Though the actual war has ended, technically, the Korean peninsula continues to be at war, since the war ended in a truce, not a peace treaty. The first president of South Korea,
Syngman Rhee, wanted to take revenge on the North, which never happened, and pursued unification by expanding northward; and so he refused to sign the peace treaty agreement (Chung, 2012). As a result, even after the two Koreas agreed to tentatively end the war in 1953, there has always been a threat of potential war that might erupt again.

In the post-war period, the two Koreas became further estranged; and, today’s political structures in the South and the North, respectively, have been consolidated. The conflicting political ideas and systems adopted by each of the two Koreas stimulated further separation not only politically, but also socially and culturally. Perhaps some recently seeped-in information from the outside world and prolonged poverty and hunger might have quietly led to the North Koreans’ disappointment in communist society. But still, such dissatisfaction of North Korean society cannot mitigate the socio-cultural dissonance between two Koreas. Likely, deprivation of engaging with an advanced civil society as well as their long socialization into the *Juche Idea* has created barriers in the social cohesion processes, which would be a significant part of a successful unification. When considering to what extent South Korea has been culturally and socially liberalized today, the dimensions of a cultural gap between the two Koreas should be identified and researched.

The following two sections in this chapter provide a brief historical background of how each society of the South and the North were consolidated based on their political ideologies and historical events after the division. Understanding the ideological and political backgrounds can provide intrinsic cultural attributes of a society. Also, tracing the socio-political shifts helps to identify currently held cultural values and social norms in both the South and North.

### 2.2 North Korea: the *Juche Idea*

Although comprehending the *Juche Idea* through a brief demonstration is difficult because of its breadth and endless application, examining how this political ideology was constructed and evolved over time is important, especially for grasping the North Korean social system as well as
its people’s culture and set of values. The Juche Idea is a central principle that all North Koreans must respect and follow. In order for that to be possible, North Korea has ceaselessly inculcated the idea in its people through utilizing all possible schemes and tools. Therefore, knowing where and how the Juche Idea applies can help people, who do not have much information and contact with them, to better understand what social values and cultures northern Koreans are likely to carry.

The meaning of the term Juche (주체) connotes autonomy, independence, self-reliance, self-identity, and a philosophical notion of ‘subjectivity’ (Kihl, 1994; Oh & Hassig, 2000). The term was used to legitimize a collective national identity and also to control the masses – making sure they were not “polluted” by imperialistic ideas and cultures. In a collective sense, first it was used to describe North Korea’s national pride declaring that “the mental attitude of people capable of carrying out politics by themselves, without being subject to outside influence” (Kihl, 1994, p. 144). For social control purposes, the concept of Juche was exploited as “when anything is wrong with [the people, they] must find the reason in [themselves], not elsewhere …” (Oh & Hassig, 2000, p. 26). By exploiting the meaning of Juche in these ways, Kim, Il-sung created the unique North Korean communist ideology, and thus further justified his dictatorship to the masses.

Even in the post-Cold War era, the fundamental concept of the Juche ideology has remained consistent, instead of sharing the same fate with many other communist allies. When most parts of the communist eastern bloc collapsed and began to democratize, the cult ideology had to be emphasized greatly in order to maintain the regime. For that reason, the core concepts of the Juche Idea, such as commitment to socialism, self-reliance, the leader’s cult of personality, and loyalty to the leader, have been thoroughly interwoven with life of the masses.

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4 The cult of personality around the leader became a key element of Juche in the 1980s and 1990s. As North Koreans’ life became difficult and the international communist society confronted critical situation, an absolute status and a decisive role of the leader were greatly emphasized (IPA, 2011).
Concept of the Juche Idea

Initially based on Confucianism and Communism, the *Juche Idea* was first introduced by Kim, Il-sung in 1955 during his speech to Korean Workers’ Party (Oh & Hassig, 2000). The *Juche Idea* was initially based on Marxist-Leninist Communism and the Confucian tradition that places “high value on hierarchical human relations” (Kihl, 1994). More specifically, Confucianism views society “as one big family headed by a wise, stern, benevolent father to whom unconditional respect and gratitude are owed” (Oh & Hassig, 2000, p. 22). In 1392, “Confucianism [originated in the period of ancient China] was proclaimed the reigning ideology of the [Joseon] Dynasty by its founder, King T’aeso …” (Kihl, 1994, p. 144). This concept of *father* became a foundation of the today’s “cult of Kims” – the leader of North Korea.

Also, Marxist-Leninist Communism once played an important role in the *Juche Idea*, at the initial phase of founding the North Korean nation, emphasizing egalitarianism and democracy. However, the term “Marxist-Leninist” was excluded from the 1980 charter of the Korean Worker’s Party, with the justification that it is an imported Western ideology (Oh & Hassig, 2000; Kihl, 1994). To illustrate, Article 4 in the 1972 version of the socialist Constitution declared that North Korea is “guided in its activity by the [*Juche Idea*]…, a creative application of ‘Marxism-Leninism’ to the conditions of our country” (The Socialist Constitution, 1972 as cited in Kihl, 1994, p. 143). But later, the revised 1992 version of the socialist Constitution dropped the reference to ‘Marxism-Leninism’ from the statement by simply declaring North Korea is a *Juche* country (Kihl, 1994). This modification has been known as Kim, Jong-il’s work, the son of the founding leader, Kim, Il-sung. Through this transformation of North Korean communism, the *Juche Idea*, greater emphasis was placed on the role of the leader, rather than on the role of either the working class or the party (Kihl 1994). In addition, the two Kims were able to transform the national ideology to the cult ideology.

Although the core of the *Juche* ideology puts emphasis on mass-line democracy, democratic centralism, and egalitarianism theoretically (Oh & Hassig, 2000; Kihl, 1994), the
more apparent function of the idea is related to a political purpose which is to solidify Kim’s power and to indoctrinate the people of North Korea. Because of this, when Kim, Jong-il modified the *Juche Idea*, he considered changes occurring in both inside and outside society and tried to accommodate those ideas that may affect his father and his authoritarian leadership position. These changes were in preparation of passing down Kim, Il-sung’s leadership position to his son. Regarding to the preparation timing of inheritance, scholars and specialists on North Korean Studies speculate and largely agree on that the preparation secretly began between 1992 and 1994. According to Hyun-sik Kim, a former professor at Pyongyang University who escaped from the North in the 1980s, it was in 1974 when Kim, Il-sung unofficially passed his power, yet not entirely, to his son, Kim, Jong-il. Also, since 1974, until Kim, Il-sung died in 1994, the father and son had governed the authoritarian state together (Kim, 2007). Therefore, the 20 years between the junior Kim’s unofficial appointment and the later official takeover of the leadership was a critical period for the two Kims to justify the inheritance of the position and to consolidate junior Kim’s absolute power. During the transition, Kim, Jong-il modified the *Juche Idea* based on the needs of legitimizing and expanding his political influence in North Korea.

*Social Control through the Juche Idea*

To maintain the authoritarian dictator’s state, social control has been a crucial measure, strictly complying with the *Juche Idea*. First of all, education is strategically utilized to control North Korean society. To note, when social control comes into play in the realm of education, it is easy to turn into thought control. It seems that Kim, Il-sung well recognized the power and impact of education. In support of this argument, Oh and Hassig note that “[Kim, Il-sung] stipulated that the educational curriculum consist of political education in *Juche* and communism, as well as general education and physical education” (2000, p. 140). In addition, the testimony of Kim (2007), the former professor at Pyongyang University, confirms that in North Korea, political study comes before knowledge building and any other educational activities. Based on the *Juche*
Idea, political study is required of students as early as in kindergarten and the indoctrination continues throughout their lives. For instance, political study is combined with education when students learn and sing songs in class like “Thank you Marshal Kim, Il-sung for bringing us up as future pillars of society” (Oh & Hassig, 2000, p. 141). Through requiring ceaseless political study, the Kims could remold the people’s minds, bind their creative thoughts, and constrain their adaptive behavior.

Another tactic for social control is censorship. Strict censorship and restrictions of foreign-sourced information can prevent unwanted situations in the North, such as agitation of the society and dismantling belief in communism, more specifically, in the Juche Idea. Instead, North Koreans receive news and information only from the state-owned radio and television. Furthermore, the North Korean government also secretly watches the activities of the masses. With the emergence of the Internet, North Korea also established a thoroughly controlled technology system, which is known as the ‘mosquito net strategy’. Not only can a limited number of people access the Internet, but all activities online are also tightly monitored. Under the Korean Worker’s Party (KWP) Congress and the Supreme People’s Assembly, there are security organizations, such as the Security Command and the General Political Bureau that are sub-organizations of the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces (MPAF), and the Ministry of People’s Security (MPS), whose goal is to permeate the society and monitor North Koreans’ private and public life (Oh & Hassig, 2000). Thanks to the tight and strict social control which can be observed in every sector of society, the masses in the North rarely question the regime and validate Kim’s ideology, Juche.

In addition to social control, the historical background of the Korean peninsula also partly explains why North Koreans have acclimated to the authoritarian state. As aforementioned briefly, from the Joseon Dynasty to the Japanese occupation and up to the current Kims’ regime, North Koreans have never experienced a contemporary, democratic politics and have been “woefully deprived of the opportunity to advance socially and politically” (Oh & Hassig 2000, p.
9). As soon as the peninsula was liberated, the then-super power states, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, stepped in to oversee the peninsula. Consequently, Kim, Il-sung began to rule the northern region and institute his own communist regime. Therefore, for North Koreans, a participatory political setting would be very foreign; as a result, they probably had to naively trust their leader and the totalitarian political institution.

2.3 South Korea: Democratization and Civil Society

While communism and the Juche Idea are characterized in the northern half of the Korean peninsula, the half in the south opened its door to democracy. Until democracy paved the road in the South, however, South Korean civilians had to fight against the three authoritarian regimes of Syngman Rhee; Park, Chung-hee; and Chun, Doo-hwan (Kim, 2000). Since its inception, the South Korean government has proclaimed itself to be a democratic state; however, the first actual democratic administration was not established until 40 years later. In 1987 at last, a general turned president, Chun, Doo-hwan’s resignation and the first time direct and open presidential elections marked the beginning of the democratic society of South Korea. Thus, the democratization of South Korea can be deemed as a relatively recent transition in Korea’s history. In the less-than-30 years since establishing a functioning democracy, South Korean society has been consistently evolving through accommodating the socio-political surroundings and cultural attributions of the nation.

Regarding South Korea’s democratization, scholars such as Young-hwan Kihl (1984) and Sunhyuk Kim (2000) point to civil society groups as an influential force of bringing down the authoritarian regimes and leading to a successful transition to democracy. Political scientist Sunhyuk Kim (2000), for instance, asserts that “[d]uring the pro-democracy struggle and up until the authoritarian breakdown in June 1987, civil society groups had always been effecting political changes in [South] Korea. Particularly, the resurrection, reactivation, and remobilization of the
people’s movement groups played a leading role in facilitating the authoritarian breakdown (p. 95)” at various stages of South Korea’s democratization consistently.

**Emergence of Different Civil Society Groups**

The first president, Syngman Rhee’s administration (1948-1960) is seen as the first authoritarian regime of the South. The crisis under Rhee began with the successive constitution amendments he made in 1951 and 1954. By removing the two-term restriction of a presidential term, Rhee legalized his re-elections; and moving further, he also manipulated the electoral process. Rhee’s increasingly dictatorial leadership and corruption moved students and urban intellectuals to revolt against his regime (Kihl, 1984). As a result of the so-called April Revolution in 1960, Rhee fled to Hawaii as an exile.

The second authoritarian regime was that of President Park, Chung-hee (1961-1979), who was a general turned president. During his first and second terms, Park’s successful implementation of the first and second five-year plans (1962-1971) brought rapid economic development to the nation. Consequently, Park was reelected for a third term with 51.2 percent of voters’ support. Despite his victory in the election, Park proclaimed a reformation – so-called *Yushin* (Revitalization) in 1972, to secure and strengthen his political power. By carrying out the *Yushin* program, “the Park regime dissolved the National Assembly and re-placed it with an emergency cabinet, prohibited all activities of political parties, and revised the constitution” (Kim 2000, p. 57). Park’s *Yushin* was far against democratization; therefore, students began a pro-democracy movement in the following year and protested against the Park regime. The pro-democracy movement was getting more structuralized and grew, eventually leading to the emergence of *Jaeya*.

*Jaeya* (재야), which literally means ‘out in the field’ or ‘out of power’, referred to national movement associations that persistently resisted and challenged the authoritarian regime. According to Kim’s (2000) demonstration about *Jaeya*, “[i]t was a loose assemblage of dissident
groups composed of social movement activists, politicians, writers, youth groups, journalists, and lawyers. [...] The leadership of [the] national Jaeya organizations included such renowned dissident activists as [Yun Po-sun, President Kim, Dae-jung, and Ham, Suk-hun etc.]” (pp. 58-59). Jaeya also played the role of an opponent political party, usually including checks on the first political party and its abuse of power, under the monopolized political system, in which there was no legal authorized second political space.

With national Jaeya movement associations, religious organizations also formed civil society groups and got involved in mobilizing democracy in South Korea. In the beginning before participating in the civil society movement, these religious organizations had kept a distance from politics and were not engaged with a political movement because of their belief in separation from politics. However, Park, Chung-hee’s continued severe suppression and threats to students and laborers led religious groups to join the pro-democracy movement. Mostly composed of Korean Catholic and Christian communities, a major part of religious organizations’ work was advocating human rights and democracy (Kim, 2000).

The end of the second authoritarian republic came all of a sudden; in October 1979, then-director of the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA; now renamed the National Intelligence Service), Kim, Jae-kyu assassinated President Park, Chung-hee. Park’s unexpected death put the entire society of South Korea into shock, but at the same time made transition to a democratic society more plausible. However, democratization did not occur right away. Between the evening of December 12, 1979 and the early morning of the next day, Chun, Doo-hwan, who became another general turned president, dominated the South Korean army. Then, as a next step, Chun illegally assumed the KCIA’s directorship in April, 1980 (Eckert et al., 1990). The series of Chun’s aggressive actions amplified political protests by students and laborers; and also marked the beginning of the third authoritarian regime.
Responding to the new Martial Law Decree No. 10, proclaimed under Chun’s order, on May 18, 1980, citizens of Gwangju gathered on streets and protested for liberation and democratization of the nation. Nonetheless, Chun reacted harshly to the Gwangju uprising. He deployed military force and brutally suppressed civilians in the region. Thereafter, Chun also passed various institutional regulations and legislations that rigorously restricted basic democratic freedoms. Because of the third authoritarian regime’s severe suppression of pro-democracy movements, civil society groups were greatly decimated. Since late 1983, the overconfident Chun regime misjudged its status quo – constant growth in economy and mute civil society movements – and began to relax its tight restrictions and control of civil society. However, the political relaxation led to a revival of civil society groups in South Korea (Kim, 2000).

Thereafter, the civil society groups stepped forward to form a unified coalition. In 1985, they established the People’s Movement Coalition for Democracy and Reunification (PMCDR) and returned to fight against Chun’s authoritarian regime. The creation of the PMCDR is especially meaningful in the process of South Korean democratization. It is because the coalition encompassed political dissidents drawing on “the triple solidarity of students, laborers, and religious leaders” (Kim, 2000, p. 87). Reflecting various sectors in a civil society, the PMCDR later collaborated with the opposite party as well, demanding the withdrawal of the military authoritarian regime and open, direct presidential elections. This grand coalition between the civil social groups and a political opponent group finally established the democratic election

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5 This decree contains the order of “[closing] down universities, [prohibiting] demonstrations both indoors and out, [imposing] prior censorship of the press, [outlawing] criticism of the incumbent and past presidents, and [prohibiting] the manufacture and spreading of rumors” (Kihl, 1984, p. 79).
6 The Gwangju uprising [from May 18 through 27, 1980] involved up to 100,000 civilians, including university students, labors, and even ordinary citizens. “The [re-entered Korean Army to Gwangju on May 27, 1980] had arrested 1,740 civilians, 730 of whom, mostly students, were detained for investigations [by midday]. The final death toll for the uprising was officially put at 230, although unofficial estimates ranged from 600 to 2,000” (Fowler, 1999, p. 270).
7 The presence of the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) – whose commander is filled by U.S. General – in the bloody, indiscriminate suppression later triggered ‘anti-Americanism’ in South Korea. There was an idea that the crackdown could have been prevented and South Korea’s transition to democracy would have arrived earlier (Eckert et al., 1990; Fowler, 1999; Oberdorfer, 2001; and The fourth Korea Foundation Global Seminar, 2012).
system in June, 1987 after long struggles for revision of the Constitution and democratization of South Korea.

During Chun’s regime in the 1980s, three features of civil society movements can be observed, which might help grasp foundational elements of the current democratic civil society of South Korea. First, both civil society and political society presented improved systematic organizational capability, especially through their collaboration. The second is the emergence of the three ‘min’s – minjung (the people, mostly middle and/or lower class), minju (democracy), and minjok (nation) – as “a broader interpretation of democracy.” Kim (2000) argues that each connotes “an autonomous economy to stop the exploitation of the people,” “a democratic constitution,” and “national reunification” (p. 89). Even though democratization in South Korea has been settled, it would be critical to understand how the three ‘min’s in the 1980s directed the then-civilians to comprehend the concept of democracy or the Koreanized idea of democracy. Considering this historical background, in discussions of a social plan, especially regarding social cohesion issues for a unified society in the Korean peninsula, it must be recognized that the resistance against dictatorial leaders and the success of democratization have largely influenced today’s South Korean cultures and the minds of South Korean civilians.

**Social Movement Participation of the Middle Class and New Civil Movements**

The role of the middle class in the civil society movements appears as an important moving force in the success of democratization in 1987. The middle class in South Korea was formulated while the national economy was growing throughout the 1970s and 1980s. The growth of the economy also brought a change of South Koreans’ view on socio-political values. According to a public opinion survey in South Korea conducted in the early 1980s, South Korean citizens “viewed a greater share in political decision making and a larger measure of personal freedom as

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8 In Kim’s (2000) account, the Koreanized idea of democracy contains “a mixture of democratization, national reunification, and anti-imperialism (anti-Americanism)” (p. 102).
more important than economic priorities” (Fowler, 1999, p. 274). Ordinary citizens represented the increased desire for democratization through supporting the civil society movements in both direct and indirect ways. Later, a series of revelations of the Chun regime’s immoral, violent, and repressive actions to control the society further mobilized the angry middle class citizens to participate in civil society movements (Kim, 2000).

After the democratic transition in 1987, the civil society groups in South Korea appeared to be marginalized. However, they were not completely demobilized; rather, a new trend of civil movements emerged and proliferated. Since 1988, an increased number of citizens’ movement groups (시민운동단체) were created, that aimed at monitoring and improving diverse social, political issues, such as women, environment/green, people with disabilities, consumers’ rights, religion, and unification etc. Following the trend, an umbrella organization called the Korea Council of Citizens’ Movements (KCCM, 한국시민단체협의회) was established in September, 1994 and the KCCM has coordinated the various citizens’ movement groups (Kim, 2000).

Among many issues as listed, unification has been one of the crucial issues for civil society groups, even though its degree of importance has decreased primarily because of economic crises both in South and North Korea. An economic crisis occurred first in the North, leading to serious famine, which in turn promptly shifted South Korean civil society groups’ attention from unification to humanitarian aid movements (Kim, 2000). In 1997, South Korea was hit by a severe economic crisis which originated in Thailand. The critical event, which is also referred as the IMF crisis, in South Korean society turned the civil movement groups’ focus away from the issue of unification, though temporarily, to the economic recovery of South Korea.

According to the White Paper published by South Korean Ministry of Unification (2013), eight civil society groups gathers together on May 3rd, 2012 to discuss about Korean Unification and preparation process of it. Related to this, Chung (2012) views that the democratization of South Korea has impacted on growth of a unification movement’s power and space in the society
In addition to the value of peace in Korean unification, Chung also points out the important role of civil movement groups in peaceful unification. This brief overview of South Korea’s democratization and political timeline offers an insight into how the process of democratization that South Korean civilians experienced may have impacted the construction of the collective democratic culture and identity of a unified Korea.

2.4 Chronological Survey of the Korean Unification Discourse

Before the 1970s, South Korea’s unification policy had maintained a rigid and uncompromising stance and excluded the option of having dialogues with North Korea. A drastic shift from this position took place during the Park, Jung-hee administration in 1970 to a fairly progressive and flexible unification policy. In his speech titled ‘Toward Peaceful Unification,’ then-President Park declared the South Korean government’s readiness to employ “measures for gradual eradication of artificial barriers between the South and the North” for Korean unification (Kihl 1984, p. 209). Consequently, during the 1970s, South and North Korea came to an agreement to pursue a peaceful unification in the peninsula and South-North dialogues began (Chung, 2012). In August 1971, as an initial step, the South-North Red Cross preliminary talks commenced and in the following year, the July 4th South-North Joint Communiqué was arranged. As announced, the Joint Communiqué in 1972 containing the three principles of national unification, upon which both South and North Korea agreed, was proclaimed stating that “unification should be achieved through (1) independent Korean efforts ‘without being subject to external imposition or interference,’ (2) peaceful means, that is, ‘not through the use of [armed] forces against each other,’ and (3) a greater national unity, ‘transcending differences in ideas, ideologies, and systems’” (Kihl, 1984, p. 206; Kihl, 1973). Although they agreed upon the three principles of Korean unification, each of the Korean regimes proposed unification plans that only met their own political ideas. This discrepancy can be partly explained by the fact that the two Koreas each interpret the terms used in the principles differently.
In the 1980s, policy gaps between the South and the North remained, and the two countries continued to maintain different plans for completing the process of unification. North Korea had specified a plan of establishing ‘the Democratic Confederal Republic of Koryo’ to retain its communist ideology; on the other hand, South Korea did not compromise pursuing the development of unification constitution and the nation-state through democratic elections (Kihl, 1984; Chung, 2012). In the following decades, South and North relations appeared to be inconsistent while experiencing a series of events, including the end of the Cold War, North Korea’s nuclear tests, the South-North Korean Summit Talks, and North Korea’s recent attacks on South Korea.

**South Korean Policy for Unification and the Ministry of Unification**

Since the beginning of unification discourse, the South Korean government has pursued a ‘people-oriented liberal democracy’ as its unification philosophy and the government has adopted the threefold unification principles: democracy, independence, and peace (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.). Based on the bedrock values, the South Korean government’s unification policy was developed in the 1970s as follows: “(1) the institutionalization of relaxed tension in the Korean peninsula; (2) a gradual, functional, and step-by-step approach to solving the unification problems; and (3) the use of the unification issue as political capital by the incumbent leadership” (Kihl, 1984, p. 206). After a couple of revisions, in 1994, Kim, Young-sam’s administration supplemented the previous policy and proclaimed ‘the 3-step Unification Plan for Korean Ethnic Community Building,’ whose basic structure is inherited by the current administration (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.). While maintaining the fundamental direction of the unification policy, each administration strived to design slightly distinctive policies reflecting its vision and political choice and changed relations and circumstances around the Korean peninsula. In that context, the current Park, Geun-hye administration formulated three steps of ‘Administrative Tasks’ consisting of (1) “normalizing inter-Korean relations through a
trust-building process,”9 (2) “embarking on small-scale unification projects that will ultimately lead to a complete integration of the two Koreas,” and (3) “taking practical measures to prepare for unification by strengthening unification capabilities” (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.). This ‘Administrative Tasks,’ compared to the 1970s threefold unification policy, places more emphasis on the practicality of policy to enhance social capital related to unification discourse and recognizes the importance of the social cohesion of the two Koreas.

In order to achieve effective implementation of unification plans and strategic policy development, the South Korean government, unlike other countries, established the Ministry of Unification. The ministry’s primary objectives include providing for the nation’s unique political circumstances and pursuing a peaceful way for unification with strategic policy plans in an institutional setting. The birth of the Ministry of Unification can be traced back to 1968. After a revision of the Government Organization Act (Law no. 2,041), a former agency of the current ministry, ‘the Board of National Unification,’ was established in March, 1969. Until shaping the current structure of the ministry, it experienced multiple transitions through modifications of legislature and mergers and establishments of bureaus (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.).

An overview of the structural re-organizations throughout the ministry’s history presents its changes of focus that may have reflected then-relations between South and North Korea and each administration’s direction on the path to unification. The following discussions incorporated in chronological order are rooted in the data provided by the Ministry of Unification’s website and excerpt only relevant transition points. First in July, 1989, the Unification Policy Office was created and took over policy making functions from the South-North Dialogue Secretariat. In December, 1990, the status of the Board of National Unification was raised to the level of a Vice

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9 Meaning and objectives of ‘trust-building process’ proposed by President Park, Geun-hye when she was a candidate are not identical with the trust building that this dissertation research employs at its center. Trust building in this study is one of the subordinate, yet independent, concepts to ‘social capital’. Contrastively, the current administration’s trust-building process indicates thereof in the realms of the military and politics (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.).
Prime Ministerial ministry and so was authorized to coordinate policy-related ministries. Six years later in December, 1996, the Humanitarian Affairs Bureau was created for the first time and the Education Center for Unification was renamed the “Institute for Unification Education” as a result of an integration of the Education Bureau and the Public Information Bureau. Finally in February, 1998, under the government’s reorganization program, the board became the Ministry of Unification, 30 years after its inception. With the new restructuring during the 1990s, the ministry appeared to strengthen its function of policy making and to add another strategic approach to build relations with North Korea, through humanitarian projects.

In January, 2004, under Presidential decree 18251, the South Korean government revised and promulgated the organization of the Ministry of Unification and its offices. Through this revision, the Ministry had consolidated functions related to economic cooperation and cultural exchanges between South and North Korea. For that reason, the Humanitarian Affairs Bureau changed its name to the Social and Cultural Exchange Bureau.

However, as soon as the next administration was embarked in February, 2008, the Ministry of Unification’s organizational structure was downsized, “thereby weakening its functions in information analysis and economic cooperation” (The Ministry of Unification, n.d.). Moreover, the Social and Cultural Exchange Bureau returned to the Humanitarian Affairs Bureau, and its tasks of social and cultural exchanges were transferred to the South-North Exchanges Bureau, which was previously called the ‘South-North Economic Cooperation Headquarters.’ Eliminating the words ‘social and cultural’ from the name of the bureau may imply the then-government’s reduced interests in cultural exchanges between South and North Korea, perhaps due to North Korea’s consecutive armed provocations in 2009 and 2010. In fact, during the sequential years, no civilians crossed the border for an arts and cultural exchange activity, in contrast to 46 people in 2008, according to the Ministry of Unification’s latest statistics on the ‘Number of Cross-border Visitors for Cultural and Social Exchanges.’
Later in May, 2009, through another revision of the organizational structure of the Ministry, the Humanitarian Affairs Bureau was abolished in the end and the South-North Exchanges Bureau became the Exchanges Bureau, by simply dropping ‘South-North’ from its name. The series of changes through organizational re-structuring conducted during the Lee Myung-bak administration may suggest that the government broadened a scope of exchanges; however, another interpretation would be that the Lee administration did not fairly consider the impact of cultural exchanges as a unification policy measure. Although the unification policy in recent years has not been favorable in terms of arts and cultural exchanges, the existence of the Ministry for over 40 years is testament to the persistent hope for unification in South Korea.

**Inter-Korean Integration Index (IKII) and the Unification Consciousness Survey**

In this section, I will review published data that has been offered to quantify the status quo of political, economic, and social cohesion encompassing citizens’ consciousness about inter-Korean relations and unification. The Institute for Peace and Unification Studies (IPUS) at Seoul National University has been publishing two annual research series that are relevant to this dissertation study: ‘the Inter-Korean Integration Index (IKII; 남북통합지수)’ (2013a; 2014) and ‘the Unification Consciousness Survey (통일의식조사)’ (2013b). To generate the IKII, the IPUS has analyzed primary data published by different national and international organizations such as the Ministry of Unification, (Korean) National Statistical Office, the World Bank, and the United Nations, as well as data the institution has collected through surveys and other supplemental methods. For the Unification Consciousness Survey, on the other hand, the IPUS has conducted face-to-face interviews by using a structured questionnaire each year around the same time between July and August through Gallup Korea (IPUS, 2013a; 2013b).

Firstly, the IKII is a threefold index: person-to-person exchanges (관계통합), institutional integration (제도통합), and shared-consciousness (의식통합). Among those three sub-indices,
‘person-to-person exchanges’ and ‘institutional integration’ are characterized as the ‘structural integration’ (구조통합) index. The authors of the index note that “the frequency of [person-to-person exchanges] inter-Korean exchanges and the institutional stabilization [integration] can indicate the status quo of structural integration each year” (IPUS, 2013a, p. 6). Discretely, the shared-consciousness index demonstrates citizens’ consciousness about a Korean unification and inter-Korean relations, derived from citizens’ personal experiences related to North Korea, perceptions about North Korea, and stereotypes about North Korean defectors, etc.

Additionally, each IKII index has three distinct categories of ‘political integration’, ‘economic integration’, and ‘socio-cultural integration’. In the publication, the authors define the socio-cultural integration as “restoring the cultural attachment and social membership [of citizens from South and North Korea] and thus creating solidarity across the [unified Korean] society” (IPUS, 2013a, p. 9). With regard to this dissertation research, further review of the IKII will focus on the socio-cultural integration category of the shared-consciousness index, rather than the other categories. Also to note, although each category’s index is calculated and translated into points, I will mainly review and interpret the pre-calculated data which are indicated in percentages, rather than the indexed points. Pre-indexed percentages are used rather than the calculated index numbers because they are raw and would therefore provide unmediated survey results.

To measure the socio-cultural integration category of the shared-consciousness (의식통합) index, the authors have tested five factors as follows: (1) awareness of the counterpart’s socio-culture\(^{10}\) (culture); (2) acceptance of the citizens from the other part of the Korean peninsula; (3) relief of hostility; (4) socio-cultural homogeneity; and (5) expectations for social equality in the

\(^{10}\) For a literal translation, ‘socio-culture’ would be a correct way to put it; however, reviewing the survey question used for this particular factor shows the authors tried to indicate a general concept or larger spectrum of ‘culture.’ Therefore, from this point on, I will consistently use the term, ‘culture,’ instead of ‘socio-culture,’ yet limited to this tested factor. Its question statement is provided in the following paragraph.
aftermath of a unification (IPUS, 2013a). For comparison purposes, opinions of South Korean citizens and North Korean defectors who currently reside in South Korea have been collected by each factor.

According to the latest report published in 2014, the socio-cultural integration category of the shared-consciousness index has shown substantial fluctuations from 2008 through 2013. The authors assume that these fluctuations may be caused by circumstantial factors surrounding the Korean peninsula that affect the consciousness of citizens from South and North Korea about socio-cultural integration (e.g., North Korea’s third nuclear test in 2013 and the [temporary] closure of Gaeseong Industrial Complex) (IPUS, 2014). Moreover, the same research reveals that the 2013 shared-consciousness index is lower than it was the previous year and the leading factors for the decline are shown as: awareness of the counterpart’s culture, acceptance of the citizens from the counterpart, and relief of hostility (IPUS, 2014).

First, to learn about citizens’ awareness of the counterpart’s culture, the participants were asked the following question: “Have you accessed [or watched or listened to] South/North Korean broadcast, films, dramas, music before?”\(^{11}\) (IPUS, 2014, p. 152) In 2013, 27.3% of South Korean participants answered positively, whereas 85.9% of North Korean defector respondents said, “Yes” (IPUS, 2014). From the large gap of cross-cultural experience between citizens from South and North Korea, what can be assumed is that South Korean citizens may have had neither enough opportunity to experience North Korean arts and culture, nor had much interest in that culture.

In turn, the second and third factors, ‘acceptance of the citizens from the counterpart’ and ‘relief of hostility,’ might help to gauge South Korean society’s readiness in trust building amongst citizens from either South or North Korea in the process of social cohesion. Regarding

\(^{11}\) Although it was not clearly stated, I assume that for North Korean defectors who participated in this survey, the question was probably asking whether they had had access to such South Korean cultural products before leaving North Korea or at the latest before entering South Korea. Otherwise, the survey would have yielded 100% positive answers, which would have had no valid meaning.
acceptance of the citizens from their counterparts on the Korean peninsula, the participants were asked “how friendly do you feel when you meet citizens from South/North Korea?” (IPUS, 2014, p. 154) To this question, 42% of the respondents from South Korea and 79.9% of the participants from North Korea answered positively (IPUS, 2014). To some extent, this particular question, asking about friendliness toward each other, can also be linked to the next factor to be discussed, ‘the relief of hostility’. In order to learn how much citizens may have overcome hostility toward their counterpart socially and politically constructed over the 60 years, the participants received the question, “what do you think South/North Korea would be to North/South Korea?” (IPUS, 2014, p. 155) Interestingly, 16.4% of South Koreans answered that North Korea is considered to be an enemy of South Korea. On the other hand, 20.1% of North Korean defectors responded that South Korea is seen as a hostile object to North Korea (IPUS, 2014, pp. 154, 156). The results of the two questions above confirm that there is still a long way to go to overcome the hostile sentiments and build trust amongst people from the two Koreas.

For the fourth factor, ‘socio-cultural homogeneity,’ the IPUS (2014) used two questions. The first question asked how the participants feel the difference in language usages; the second question asked about the difference in customs and manners between South and North Koreans. Participants’ answers revealed that both South Korean respondents and North Korean defector respondents see considerable differences in languages and customs between the two nations. The 2013 survey results show that 14.7% of South Korean respondents and 4.7% of the North Korean defector participants answered, “there is no difference” or “…little difference” regarding language difference. Similarly, 14.2% of South Korean participants and 8.1% of the defector participants found there was no or little difference between the customs and manners of the two nations. Furthermore, survey results indicate that more defector participants than the South Korean participants recognized gaps in the languages and customs of South and North Koreans. The defectors’ higher recognition of the difference has been a consistent trend since the IPUS (2014) began to administer the series of surveys.
The IPUS (2014) tested the last factor, ‘expectations for social equality in the aftermath of a unification,’ by asking the following question: “How do you expect the gap between the rich and the poor to be close after a unification?” (p. 159). In the responses to the survey conducted in 2013, 14.8% of the South Korean participants answered positively by checking either ‘very much’ or ‘somewhat,’ while 85.3% of the North Korean defectors indicated a positive expectation. This trend of the defectors’ much higher positive response than those of the South Korean participants regarding narrowing the gap in socio-economic equality between the two nations remains unchanged, with only negligible ups and downs in the percentages since 2010 when the question was used (IPUS, 2014).

While reviewing the questions about the factors and the interpretations of their answers, I noticed a blurred distinction between the regime and the people, which may cause confusion and lead to inaccurate generalization. For example, the subject of the hostility-related question was the government, not the people. However, when looking at the statement of its interpretation in the publication, the subject was changed to the people who participated in the research, instead of the government. For this reason, I had to accommodate the discrepant use of the subject and change it identically to the question in the translated statement as written in the previous paragraph. Given these inconsistencies and the focus of this dissertation research on trust amongst people, and not between two regimes, direct application of the IPUS’s (2014) findings to the current research may not be appropriate. However, the IKII research can be used a supplemental resource for an overview of the social cohesion status quo in South Korea.

Next, the Unification Consciousness Survey (2013b) was compiled with an acknowledgement of the idea that “understanding and knowing citizens’ perceptions, attitudes, and thoughts about exchanges and cooperation with North Korea is critical” (IPUS, 2013b, p. 5). It is because the citizens’ perspectives about a unification would not only affect the nation’s unification policy formulation but also play a pivotal role in achieving unification through well-planned, reflective strategies (IPUS, 2013b). This survey consists of five categories: ‘opinions
about a Korean unification’; ‘awareness of and attitude toward North Korea’; ‘attitude toward the North Korean defectors’; ‘North Korean policy assessment’; and ‘awareness of the South Korea’s international relations with neighbor nations.’ In this dissertation research, I will selectively focus on the first three categories.

In the 2013 opinion poll about a Korean unification, the survey reveals that the younger generation, from the age group of 19 – 29, is inclined not to see the necessity for a unification, and this tendency is becoming more visible each year (IPUS, 2013b, p. 28). Moreover, the older survey participants show stronger support for a fast unification, whereas the younger respondents reveal satisfaction with the status quo of division or not much interest in a unification (IPUS, 2013b, p. 34). Therefore, according to this survey poll, older generations in general tend to long for a unification more than younger generations do.

Regarding South Korean citizens’ consciousness of and attitude toward North Korea, the IPUS (2013b) has surveyed the experience about North Korea, more precisely North Korean culture, that the participants may have had. According to its findings, a fewer number of participants have visited North Korea, such as Geumgangsan (a tourist site that used to be open to South Koreans), Gaeseong, or Pyongyang in 2013, and a lower percentage of respondents have accessed or experienced North Korean broadcast, movies, and novels in the same year (p. 73). It was not indicated in the publication, however, whether there is a possibility that the source of North Korean cultural products the participants have accessed might include South Korean TV programs (e.g. ‘남북의 창’/A Window between South and North Korea). On the other hand, the survey tells us that each year contacts between South Korean citizens and North Korean defectors appears to be increasing (IPUS, 2013b, p. 73).

Authors of the Unification Consciousness Survey (2013b) point out that “the South Korean citizens’ awareness and attitude about [over 25 thousands of] North Korean defectors residing in South Korea is deemed to be important – [because] interactions between South Koreans and North Korean defectors can be a decisive factor in their social relations and roles as
members of the community” (pp. 110-111). In addition, the interaction between the two groups of people would impact not only their awareness of a unification and social cohesion, but also their adjustment to the changes in the process of re-constructing their social identity as a member of the nation (IPUS, 2013b).

Through the survey, the IPUS (2013b) also has attempted to identify possible relations between South Koreans’ experience and knowledge of North Korea or its culture and their degree of acceptance of North Korean defectors. For the indicators of ‘the experience about North Korea,’ the study includes a visit(s) to North Korea, contacts with North Korean defectors, and access to North Korean culture. To measure the acceptability of North Korean defectors to South Koreans, the authors used indicators such as feeling friendly toward the defectors, types of (desirable) relations with the defectors (especially marriage), an acceptable size of North Koreans defecting to South Korea, and the increase of governmental support to the defectors. However, the IPUS (2013b) could not find a statistically significant correlation between South Koreans’ experience with North Korean culture and people and their acceptance of the North Korean defectors. As a result, they have concluded that “mere increase in number of contacts with North Korean defectors would not bring the enhancement of the South Korean citizens’ acceptance of the population” (IPUS, 2013b, p. 214).

With regard to statistical results, it seems that the indicators used need to be further articulated through identifying the different types of the cultural contacts and/or experiences, because depending on levels of participation in the arts, research outcomes can vary. Moreover,

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12 The survey includes four questions to observe the relationship between the two factors as follows: (1) Have you ever visited North Korean regions such as Mt. Geumgang, the Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and etc.? (2) Have you ever met North Korean defectors? (3) Have you ever viewed North Korean TV programs, films or read novels, etc.? and (4) Have you ever participated in aid projects for North Korea? (IPUS, 2013b, pp. 309-312).

13 Questions used for these indicators are (1) How friendly do you feel toward the North Korean defectors? (2) How do you feel about having a relationship of neighborhood/co-worker/business partner (co-investor)/marriage partner with North Korean defectors? (3) What kind of action do you think the (South Korean) government should take toward the North Koreans who want defect to South Korea? and (4) How do you feel about the following statement: the (South Korean) government should increase financial support for the North Korean defectors? (IPUS, 2013b, pp. 337-342 & 344)
as aforementioned, it would have been beneficial to illustrate that the cultural contacts included in that survey were watching South Korean TV programs about North Korean culture, attending North Korean defectors’ arts programs, or participating in creating North Korean arts works.

Nevertheless, the IKII (2013a; 2014) research and ‘the Unification Consciousness Survey’ (2013b) conducted by the IPUS can serve as a primary source. Indeed, it is not an easy task to capture and quantify people’s consciousness and perceptions of social concerns and national issues. Yet the IKII and the Survey provide valuable information about the social mood and citizens’ consciousness regarding a unification through surveying the North Korean defectors currently living in South Korea as well as South Koreans. Their efforts to see and link the cultural factors and people’s perceptions regarding relationship building and unification contribute to enhancing the legitimacy of this research as well.
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Social Uses and Impact of the Arts

With a long-held belief in instrumentality of the arts in close relation with legitimizing its public funding, arts advocators and administrators have dealt with pressure to prove what the arts can contribute to society by producing social, economic, and even political outcomes (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008; McCarthy et al., 2004). Such an inclination has generated many studies demonstrating the social and economic impact of the arts, and furthermore, political uses of the arts. Among the multiple aspects of the arts in use, my dissertation research focuses on the social impact of the arts, rather than their economic and political influence.

For legitimacy of public funding for the arts, arts advocators and administrators have been emphasizing and promoting the positive impact of the arts which benefit both individuals and groups in society. However, Belfiore and Bennett (2008), authors of a publication, *The Social Impact of the Arts*, observe through historical review about the arts that their impact on human beings and societies presents not only positive, but also negative influences. The origin of the negative view can be traced back to Plato in the fifth century BC and was developed by a number of Renaissance theorists. The negative impact of the arts to which Belfiore and Bennett (2008) referred include the assertion that “the arts provide a flawed imitation of reality”; “the arts are misleading when considered as an adequate source of knowledge and understanding”; “the arts corrupt by stimulating the irrational side of man”; and “the arts distract from worthier matters” (pp. 40-41). These points in the list above might stem from imaginative, representative, and innovative characteristics of the arts by indicating them as dangerous challenges to an intellectual society.
In addition, authors of a research report, “Gifts of the Muse: Reframing the Debate About the Benefits of the Arts,” indicate another negative implication of using the arts that “in the 19th century, […] the arts were promoted as a means of civilizing and assimilating immigrants” which probably originated in the idea of cultural imperialism or colonialism (McCarthey et al., 2004, p. 2). Further discussion about the negative tradition of the arts would be beyond the scope of my research. However, acknowledging the fact that the arts have two sides, which are revealed depending on the purposes of their use, is necessary especially for helping to identify the focus of my research in the social uses and impacts of the arts.

The arts have a profound impact on people and society, which goes “beyond [encountering] the artefacts and the enactment of the event or performance itself and [has] a continuing influence upon, and directly touch[es], people’s lives” (Landry, Bianchini, Maguire, & Worpole, 1993, p. 50). In other words, the arts have transformative power over personal and social development and empowerment (Belfiore and Bennett 2008; Galloway 2009; McCarthy et al. 2004). In this respect, this chapter reviews relevant literatures on the social impact of the arts and attempts to identify how the arts have been used to advance social goals – such as social cohesion, tolerance, trust, mutual understanding, and catharsis through self-expression. These selected social objectives are closely related to the social cohesion process in the Korean peninsula and also perceived as desirable social impact for unification.

**Culture’s Essential Role in Public Planning**

In a research paper, “The Fourth Pillar of Sustainability: Culture’s essential role in public planning,” Jon Hawkes indicates that the concept of culture is somewhat complicated and widely inclusive. In Hawkes’s (2001) account, culture “denote[s] the social production and transmission of values and meaning” and also simultaneously implies people’s “way of life,” such as customs, language, art, norms and tradition (pp. 1 & 3). Put simply, culture has two meanings pervasively accepted and used in public discourse; one is “values” and the other is “a slightly expanded
notion of the arts” (Hawkes, 2001, p. 4). Based on the defined concept of culture, Hawkes contends that “use of culture” can advance public planning and reflect social aspiration.

According to Hawkes, in an extent of culture, ‘values’ consist of an array of social values. The desired values underpinning public planning include “participation, engagement and democracy; tolerance, compassion and inclusion; freedom, justice and equality; peace, safety and security; health, wellbeing and vitality; creativity, imagination and innovation; love and respect for environment” (Hawkes, 2001, p. 7).

For those values to be expressed and fulfilled, instruments are needed; and the arts have played that role of facilitating the manifestation of social values. With regard to this, David Yencken states that in the context of cultural policy, “when practical action is proposed, the main focus has been on the role the arts [which] can play in the fulfillment of a wide range of public functions” (Ibid). Indeed, the arts have the capacity to stimulate people’s various creative techniques when they are practicing the arts; and in this process, the manifestation of social values can also be attained. The creative techniques involved in arts practices are listed as follows: “improvisation, intuition, spontaneity, lateral thought, imagination, co-operation, serendipity, trust, inclusion, openness, risk-taking, provocation, surprise, concentration, unorthodoxy, deconstruction, innovation, fortitude and an ability and willingness to delve beneath the surface, beyond the present, above the practical and around the fixed” (Hawkes, 2001, p. 24).

These techniques, which one can develop while practicing the arts or engaging with arts activities, are considered critical for people who are also members of a society to adapt to today’s fast-changing social circumstances (Hawkes, 2001). Participation in the arts also helps people to allow flexibility so that they would be better at embracing differences and diversity. In this sense, engaging the arts, especially in a group, plays an important role in enhancing tolerance and practicing democracy through cooperative works with others.
The Social Impact of the Arts

Eleonora Belfiore and Oliver Bennett, co-authors of a publication, *The Social Impact of the Arts: An Intellectual History*, applied a historical review to revisit the widely accepted views on the impacts of the arts on society. Recently, a number of arts and cultural government institutions and advocators in different places – for instance, Canada, South Korea, the UK, and the US – have recognized the ‘transformative power of the arts’ in their cultural policies and underlined “the ‘art is good for you’ rhetoric” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 194). However, through tracing back the origins of the current beliefs about the benefits of the arts, Belfiore and Bennett observe not only the positive, but also the negative impact of the arts. In an effort of indicating the unbiased social impacts of the arts, the authors conducted “textual analysis, with a view to identifying recurring themes and claims relating to the social function of the arts and the effects of the artistic experiences on people” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 38).

The list of positive social impacts of the arts the two authors address include catharsis, personal well-being, and education and self-development at large. All these impacts seem to concern impact on the individual or, “what the arts ‘do’ to individuals” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 35). For cathartic functions of the arts and participation in arts activities, they identify six aspects as follows: moralistic/didactic catharsis; emotional fortitude; moderation; emotional release; intellectual catharsis; and dramatic or structural catharsis. These different interpretations of catharsis share a common understanding about it, that is, “as ‘purgation’ of excessive or undesirable emotions through the theatrical experience” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 82). Based on this idea, the most widely accepted and proven cathartic function among the six aspects is ‘emotional release or outlet.’ Moreover, it has been known that theatrical experience make it possible to dissolve oppressed emotions and physical experience in the past (Belfiore & Bennett 2008).

In relation to quality of life, ‘personal well-being’ is considered as one of the benefits that the arts induce. Belfiore and Bennett observe from Western thinkers’ and health scientists’
literatures that arts production and consumption are deeply related to ‘pleasure giving’ and ‘the therapeutic role/function’ which are subsumed in personal well-being. According to Western thinkers such as William Morris, John Dewey, and Johan Huizinga, “pleasure, well-being, sense of fulfillment can result from aesthetic experiences…” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 96). The aesthetic experiences in Dewey’s (1980 edn) account “refer to both the case of artistic creation – art as ‘a process of doing or making’ – and the aesthetic experience as ‘appreciative, perceiving and enjoying’” (p. 47 cited in Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 99). In addition, setting involved in arts activities, especially creating, offers a good opportunity of self-expression and through such an opportunity of releasing one’s inner challenges and difficulties, people can experience emotional restoration and healing.

With a focus on poetry – a form of the arts, Belfiore and Bennett demonstrate how the arts have been perceived as a means of ‘education and self-development’ for centuries and such an argument has been expanded and developed. For example, the Latin poet Horace (65-68 BC) suggested that “the true aim of poetry is to instruct” and along the same lines, Freidrich Schiller (1795) argued that “artistic experiences widen the individual’s intellectual horizon” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, pp. 120 & 122). In a further developed context, Cynthia Freeland asserts that the arts can develop cognitive skills by stating “[from artworks,] we acquire fresh knowledge, our beliefs are refined, and our understanding is deepened” (John, 2001, p. 331). From the series of statements written in different times and spaces, what we could observe is that people have long believed that the arts can promote intellectual activities and/or processes not only by delivering messages but also through stimulating cognitive processes.

Overall, what these two publications suggest is that the arts have been employed to foster the accomplishment of a variety of social goals, from self-development to social cohesion. Based on the review of these literatures and supplemental research, I select six of the most common and relevant impacts of the arts. The list includes social cohesion, trust building, mutual
understanding, tolerance, catharsis, and healing. All of the impacts are discrete, but some of them are interrelated.

3.2 Different Social Goals through the Arts

Social Cohesion

According to the federal Policy Research Sub-Committee on Social Cohesion in Canada, social cohesion refers to “the ongoing process of developing a community of shared values, shared challenges and equal opportunity within [a nation], based on a sense of trust, hope and reciprocity among all [citizens]” (Jenson, 1998, p. 4). In accordance with that, the Commissariat général du Plan in France also defines social cohesion as “a set of social processes that help instill in individuals the sense of belonging to the same community and the feeling that they are recognized as members of that community” (Plan, 1997). Critical points the quoted definitions have made is that social cohesion is the ‘ongoing’ process – something that today’s society has ceaselessly pursued, rather than achieved – and it can be accomplished upon trust constructed among citizens including mutual understanding, for example. Therefore, it is important in the context of social cohesion to cultivate individuals’ capacity for accepting differences (or building tolerance about differences) of social members at multiple levels and then trusting them based on mutual understanding.

Although the arts alone cannot produce social change or impact, they can surely facilitate the processes of change in society. Jon Hawkes (2001) acknowledges an essential role of the arts and culture in the process of integrating society by stating that “[c]ultural capital is the glue that holds a society together; social capital is the lubricant that allows it to operate smoothly” (p. 18). Indeed, the arts, a mix of various symbols and metaphors containing messages, have the capacity to expand individuals’ understanding of others and the world. Participating in the arts can provide opportunities for people to question their unchallenged old ideas and beliefs, and to gain
more accepting perspectives about different cultures and views through creative and exciting indirect experiences (Matarasso, 1997; McCarthy et al., 2004).

The following case illustrates how the arts can promote cultural diversity and social cohesion. In Portsmouth, the UK, the HOME festival\(^\text{14}\) was held with an attempt to encourage citizens to understand their fellow citizens who hold diverse cultural backgrounds by engaging and presenting minority cultures in the city during the event. In 1996 when the festival was held, the city of Portsmouth had 188,000 inhabitants and 5% of the residents were recognized as ethnic minority. During the HOME festival, a variety of cultural groups – African, Bangladeshi, Caribbean, Chinese, Indian, Punjabi, Vietnamese and more – representing the ethnic minority participated and were advised by professional arts event consultants funded by City Arts (Matarasso, 1997).

Through the arts festival, the city has achieved many social outcomes, but its most apparent impact was “the enhanced profile and confidence of the city’s ethnic communities” (Matarasso, 1997, p. 30). Although it was observed that not all citizens, especially those who are considered as the majority, fully enjoyed the celebration of minority cultures and showed disappointment, Matarasso (1997), who surveyed the impacts of the festival, found that the event was successful in improving the awareness of different cultures in the city and providing an opportunity for building contacts among the participants – both the audience and presenters.

This case demonstrates how participation in the arts plays a role in creating a social bond among citizens and can help marginalized people to nurture a feeling of social inclusion. According to Matarasso (1997), such social inclusion may also encourage people “to want to take part [in more social activities as democratic practice since] participation is habit-forming” (p. 77; emphasis in original). In that sense, it affirms how participation in the arts can mobilize social

\(^{14}\) The HOME festival was promoted by Portsmouth City Council. Programs presented during the festival include African dance, Baboma Combat, Carnival, Chandalika Dance Theatre, Chinese Lion Dance street Performances, Multicultural market, Punjabi folk Songs, Raqs Sharqi demonstration, School projects, Vietnamese Music Band, Visual Arts Program, Visual Mistries Choir, and Writing (Matarasso, 1997).
goals like social cohesion through citizens’ autonomous civic engagement. However, in order to consolidate such impact of the arts, sustained involvement in the arts like this festival is indispensable (Matarasso, 1997; McCarthy et al., 2004).

**Trust**

While reviewing the literature regarding the social impacts of the arts, I received the impression that trust building alone has not been sought out as social impacts through the arts. However, a number of literatures recognize trust as a crucial aspect of social capital in the context of social cohesion. With regard to this, Robert Putman (1993) articulates a bilateral relation between trust and cooperation. In his statement, “[t]rust lubricates cooperation. The greater the level of trust within a community, the greater the likelihood of cooperation. And cooperation itself breeds trust” (p. 171). If we apply this relation to the discourse of social impacts of the arts, we may conclude that participation in the arts contributes to not only creating networks, but also building trust through its inherited voluntary, cooperative circumstance.

As argued, people who get involved in avocational arts groups appear to become more open to trusting others because of their cooperative arts-making experience with strangers who happen to come and go (Wali, Severson, & Longoni, 2002). According to Alaka Wali, Rebecca Severson, and Mario Longoni’s research about the informal arts scene in Chicago, IL, “[t]he inclusive character of informal arts practice […] induce[s] trust and solidarity among participants, and promote[s] greater understanding and respect for diversity” (2002, p. xvi). One interviewee in the research also testifies that he used to be very insecure and distrustful of others but, while participating in his drum circle, he decided to change his old attitude and accept people for who they are. Through engaging with strangers in the drum circle, it seems he became more open to new contacts and was able to build some type of rapport with other members.

In a similar vein, people who trust their neighbors appear to take civic action more actively than those who do not have much trust in their neighbors (Larsen et al., 2004). This
argument can be carried to the extent that, “weak ties,” in Granovetter’s terms, would be considered more important than “strong ties” in a large community such as a nation.

‘Strong’ interpersonal ties (like kinship and intimate friendship) are less important than ‘weak ties’ (like acquaintanceship and shared membership in secondary associations) in sustaining community cohesion and collective action. ‘Weak ties are more likely to link members of different small groups than are strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular groups.’
(Granovetter 1973, [1376] as cited in Putnam, 1993, p. 175, emphasis in original)

Similarly, Barbara Misztal (1996) asserts that “trust may range along a continuum or spectrum from personal to abstract. A more abstract form of trust is likely to be of growing importance in modern society” (as cited in Newton, 1997, p. 580). In fact, it is impossible for every citizen to have interpersonal relationships with one another which will lead to building personal trust or “strong ties” at the national level. Therefore, in regard to my research topic – concerning trust building for social cohesion at the national level, building abstract trust should be a focus.

**Mutual Understanding and Tolerance**

Mutual understanding also can be seen as a critical building block in the pursuit of social cohesion. Although the impact of the arts on promoting mutual understanding and tolerance among citizens from different cultural backgrounds may vary depending on social circumstances as well as the structure of arts programs, many studies univocally argue for how fruitful it is to employ arts projects while pursuing mutual understanding both in international and domestic circumstances.

In the international context, to increase mutual understanding, one of the most frequently discussed and employed arts activities would be cultural exchange. In 2009, the Kennedy Center held a cultural exchange event titled ‘the Arabesque Festival: Arts of the Arab World’ for three weeks in Washington, D.C. The Arabesque Festival involved 800 Arab artists from 22 different member nations of the League of Arab States and provided meaningful opportunities to the American public to “explor[e] the contemporary cultures of the world’s regions through music,
dance, theater, film, fashion, food, and the visual arts” (U.S. Center for Citizen Diplomacy, 2010, p. 18). This festival successfully illustrates how an arts program can generate mutual understanding between estranged cultures. Through presenting a wide spectrum of Arab arts and culture, American audiences could have a better understanding of Arab cultures which have been unknown or mistreated especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in 2001. Moreover, residents of the greater D.C. area, whose cultures are from the Arab world, were able to restore their cultural confidence. Not only in the U.S., but also in the Middle Eastern region, it has been also observed that cultural activities like arts programs seem to play an important role in enhancing mutual understanding between the cultures of the two regions. According to the 2003 Pew survey, “Middle Easterners tend to [react] more favorably [toward American arts and culture] such as music, movies, and television than to American foreign policies” (Shin, 2009, p. 4).

Along with cultural exchange programs, engaging in informal arts activities also helps to develop people’s tolerance because of its inclusive nature. Informal arts groups are usually “welcoming participants of all skill and confidence levels […] and […] flexible about attendance, scheduling, and pricing” (Wali, Severson, & Longoni, 2002, p. 41). In addition, participants of informal arts groups commonly share their ‘love of art.’ This sentiment contributes to developing their tolerance toward other participants and “inconvenience to cross boundaries that represent the unfamiliar and potentially uncomfortable” (Wali, Severson, & Longoni, 2002, p. 49). That is, while sharing the same interests in the arts, people can overcome differences that other participants bring in and, at the same time, they enhance their tolerance and understanding.

**Catharsis and Healing**

Thus far, it has been observed how participation in the arts has committed to cultivating civic engagement and resulted in profound social impacts. In addition to the collective impact on a society, the arts also benefit individuals through expressing oneself while doing creative activities. One of such impacts is catharsis, which Belfiore and Bennett (2008) interpret as
“purification of excessive or undesirable emotions through the theatrical experience” (p. 82). In the context of artistic interaction – more specifically, theoretical practices, Freud and Breuer devised the “cathartic method” with recognizing that repressed negative emotions developed within an individual can cause psychological symptoms; therefore, “[t]he cathartic method is centered on the importance of the release of the emotional state that was originally associated with the traumatic experience” (Breuer and Freud, 1955 [1893-5], as cited in Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 86).

As shown, emotional release or catharsis, which seems to be facilitated by arts activities, can heal individuals who are suffering from a traumatic experience and help them leave behind their troubled feelings (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008). In Oakland, CA, there is one group that gathers together to cook and eat dinners and share life stories. The members are mostly from Southeast Asia and also survivors of sexual exploitation. This participatory art program is called the Southeast Asian Unity through Cultural Exploration (SAUCE); and Banteay Srei is the organization that administers the SAUCE program (Lewis, 2013). Banteay Srei’s focus group is women “who have been traumatized by the refugee experience” (Lewis, 2013, p. 4). Banteay Srei devotes herself to helping the young ladies and women through participatory arts-making programs, including “participatory cooking, storytelling, health education, and photography” (Ibid).

Cooperation like creating arts together, sharing stories, and self-expression through the arts has contributed to empowering the program participants, building community, and healing their troubled minds. Indeed, researchers in art therapy and clinical domains believe that the creative process of arts-making has the capacity to encourage people to communicate through symbolic images and this self-expression leads to healing (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008).

To conclude, indicators that most literatures commonly demonstrate include social cohesion, community empowerment, quality of life or wellbeing, and personal development. Some of the key words that did not receive much recognition as the words in the list above, yet
are considered critical for the Korean unification research, would be trust, tolerance, and mutual understanding. These social goals are also interrelated with social cohesion and relevant to the process of building a new collective identity as one nation.

3.3 Types of Relevant Art Forms

In the previous section, I mainly examined the social impact of the arts centering on the instrumental benefits that the arts produce. However, most people who participate in arts activities usually do not consciously pursue such social impact through engaging in the arts. Rather, the intrinsic value that the arts possess attracts people to take part in artistic programs. That said, authors of the research publication, “Gifts of the Muse: Reframing the Debate About the Benefits of the Arts,” indicate that “[p]eople are drawn to the arts not for their instrumental effects, but because the arts can provide them with meaning and with a distinctive type of pleasure and emotional stimulation” (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. xv).

Among the reasons people are drawn to the arts is that the arts express human feelings such as “pain and comfort, excitement and repose, and life lived and felt” (McCarthy et al., 2004, 43). Then, reciprocity of those feelings between artists – whether amateur or professional – and spectators through the art works turns out to be indirect communication. Such communicative experience can be engendered because the arts present “a created reality based on a personal perspective [of the artists] that includes the whole uncensored human being with all its feelings, imaginings, and yearnings” (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. 44). Then also, people who encounter the arts think, question, and discuss with others what they viewed (McCarthy et al., 2004). That is, the instrumental effects of the arts tend to emerge through pursuit of the intrinsic value of the arts.

With regard to this, here I attempt to demonstrate what types of arts and arts programs can stimulate the desirable social impacts of the arts in the context of social cohesion. Because individuals’ experience through the arts as well as benefits from their experience tend to spill over to the entire society, “many . . . [intrinsic effects of the arts] can lead to [not only] the
development of individual capacities [but also] community cohesiveness that are of benefit to the public sphere” (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. 44). In this respect, discussing about what types of the arts individuals experience may bring wanted results to a society would be necessary.

With entry into the complex, postmodern society and the development of technology, concepts and forms of the arts have been evolving and have become more inclusive (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008). The following is the changes over decades in the National Endowment for the Arts’ (NEA) perception of the arts which has been reflected its funding categories. As revealed, it has constantly expanded and reframed as its understanding and definition of arts activities have evolved.

- Fine arts, including architecture, painting, sculpture, landscape architecture, museums, and design (1953)
- Fine and visual arts, performing arts, literature, architecture and allied field, design, crafts, motion pictures, radio and television as created by professional artists and nonprofit arts organizations (1963)
- Those forms of human creativity that are expressed through the arts, including amateur, nonprofit and commercial segments such as the entertainment and copyright industries as well as the diverse heritage of the many ethnic communities (1997) (Lecture, Wyszomirski, 2010)

As such, more diverse forms of the arts are acknowledged as “arts” in current society – from amateur/informal arts to professional arts served by different arts sectors, from nonprofit to commercial. The expanded concept of the arts and forms might suggest that institutions came to recognize the transformative power of those informal, mass arts in citizens’ lives, which have long been underestimated. With the recognition of more diverse types of the arts, we can currently observe citizens’ participation in the arts “in a variety of commercial, nonprofit, informal, or governmental settings” (Stern & Seifert, 2009, p. 13).

Although people practice and enjoy a variety of arts forms, there has been a long-held bias about the arts, as can be seen in the following statements. ‘High art’ is good and brings positive impact, whereas ‘low art’ or mass/popular art can be harmful to people and arouse the lowest level of emotion (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008). In the same vein, many tend to believe ‘high art’ is for the privileged class, thus only people who are wealthy, well-educated intellectuals (the
so-called ‘elite’), and professional artists would appreciate and understand the high arts (DiMaggio, 2000; Stern & Seifert, 2000). This kind of perception can make some people hesitate to participate in such art forms categorized as ‘high art’ – e.g., the symphony orchestra, operas, and ballet.

Nonetheless, these forms of ‘high art’ have been popularly employed for cultural exchange programs which aim at improving diplomatic relations. During the Cold War, the Soviet-U.S. cultural exchanges had also involved symphony orchestras, operas, and dance performances, in addition to plays, ice shows, and Jazz music. For inter-Korean arts exchanges, there have been momentous events using classical music – e.g., 2012 joint performance of Maestro Chung Myung-Whun of the Seoul Philharmonic Orchestra, North Korea’s Unhasu (은하수) Orchestra, and the Radio France Philharmonic Orchestra in France; and the 2008 New York Symphony Orchestra’s performance in Pyongyang, North Korea. Although the arts form used was the western classical which is heavily rooted in the European cultural tradition, those arts exchange events were viewed as symbolic and meaningful collaboration efforts by gathering the skilled performers from South and North Korea together at one place.

Despite of its significance, to clinch such a large scale of arts exchange events, an equivalent amount of resources is also required; thus, it can only be an occasional event. Learning from great success of the Soviet-U.S. exchange programs during the Cold War (Richmond, 2003), the inherently granted understanding of western classical arts to the citizens of both nations may have played a certain role in connecting the sentiments of participants as a foundation of relationship building. In that respect, traditional arts (or Korean classical art forms) and cultural heritages shared between the South and North would be an adequate approach to expect the similar outcomes of connecting two divided people.
Traditional and Folk Arts

Traditional arts and folk arts – these two terms, it seems, have been used interchangeably to refer to almost the same types of the arts in English-speaking countries or more widely in most places in Europe. Joost Smiers (2005), the author of *Arts under Pressure: Promoting Cultural Diversity in the Age of Globalization*, indicates “the term folk art, or folklore, has often been used to indicate traditional forms of art” (p. 114). Recent usage of the term, though, shows that it has become more inclusive. According to Smiers, “[the] meaning [of folk arts] has been extended to more popular forms of art as well, encompassing the whole range of artistic creations from local communities – with the exception of arts from the higher social strata – before the cultural industry took over important segments of cultural life” (Ibid).

Smiers’s notion of folk arts conveys that folk arts seem to emerge from and live within the middle- or lower-classes, rather than high- or upper-middle classes. Along the same lines, Peterson (2011) explains the origin of Smiers’s idea as follows: “the term folklore emerged in nineteenth-century Great Britain and Europe, during a time of colonization and rising romantic nationalism, to describe the pure cultural expressions of a peasant class” (p. 3). Different from the Western idea of traditional arts, in Korea at least in the South, traditional arts denote both folklores that had emerged and were enjoyed by ordinary people or the working class and different arts that were performed in the royal court. In other words, the notion of ‘traditional arts’ conceived in Korea would encompass classical art forms and folk arts.

By acknowledging the Korean notion of traditional arts, we can speculate how the traditional arts can be employed in the process of social cohesion. Before doing that, however, we need to note there may be a gap in interpreting some of the traditional arts between the South and the North. It is reasonable to think so, because traditional arts tend to reflect today’s society

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A recently used definition of ‘traditional culture and arts’ in a 2012 legislative bill for promotion of traditional cultural industry in South Korea articulates it as the inherited Korean ethnic arts such as dance, music, art, architecture, culinary, garments, handicrafts, martial arts, and *hanji*, traditional Korean paper handmade from mulberry trees, etc. (Lee & Yoon, 2012, p. 22).
and values and transform them accordingly. As indicated by Smiers (2005), with the transformation of today’s society from traditional to a modern or industrialized society, “traditional forms of music, dance, storytelling, and visual representation [also have reflected the change in society as a consequence]. Those that do exist have nevertheless been influenced, in one way or another, by modern trends” (p. 113). This point of view leads us to see the need for researching the changes of traditional art forms by reflecting current trends on each side of Korea, while considering the use of traditional arts in the strategic process of social cohesion.

The traditional arts and heritages can be divided into two kinds: tangible and intangible. The intangible forms of heritages like performing arts tend to be more susceptible to embracing changes of the time and social circumstances than the tangible ones because of their versatility of forms and contents. Considering the flexibility in expression, traditional performing art forms can be used in various ways to stimulate Koreans’ interaction as well as social change. In the case of tangible cultural properties – the mostly immovable structures of palaces, architectures, parks, and artifacts – can serve as effective media for bringing together citizens and scholars from the South and North. Discussing historical sites and artifacts would allow people to share their knowledge and stories regardless of conflicting political views. With regard to this, Peterson (2011) argues “[f]olk and traditional arts can […] create space for dialogue that enables full and authentic engagement with others” (p. 1). Some of the examples of social impact that folk and traditional arts are expected to produce include “intergenerational connection and understanding; broker conversation, opportunity, and access to resources; and link history to contemporary issues toward deeper understanding” (Ibid).

Building an intergenerational connection and understanding would be beneficial to Korean society especially for helping younger generations who have not experienced the Korean War, to understand their elders who have been yearning for the unification on the Korean peninsula for a long time. Moreover, if traditional arts can be another strategy, an insightful lens for interpreting history and contemporary issues, Korean traditional arts would contribute to
enhancing mutual understanding as well as creating social bonds between people from the South and the North. For example, the outdoor theatrical, the so-called Madang Play (마당극), which has appeared to attract more audiences than other genres of traditional performing arts, can be a good candidate for that use (Kim et al., 2012).

Peterson (2011) also discusses additional “key values and processes of [traditional arts] work grounded in social change:”

- a commitment to viewing artistic expression within a broader holistic view of culture, privileging vernacular arts’ and humanities’ voices, perspectives, and interpretation;
- an appreciation of documentation and ethnographic skills as tools for self- and community awareness; and
- a belief in conversation, dialogue, and personal narrative as tools for community empowerment and social change. (p. 5)

These benefits show how engaging with the traditional arts may produce desired social changes in the process of Korean unification by facilitating dialogues in society and increasing mutual understanding.

**Mass/Popular Arts: The Media**

In most societies, people tend to view the mass arts and culture as the lower arts, which are not valuable as much as classical or traditional arts, perhaps because most of the mass arts are easily accessible and not so difficult to understand. For instance, in 1933, Leavis and Thompson (1950 [1933]) dared to write that “the mass media arouse ‘the cheapest emotional responses’, so that ‘films, newspapers, publicity in all forms, commercially-catered fiction – all offer satisfaction at the lowest level” (p. 3).

However, Johnson (2005) refutes the tacit view on the mass or popular arts by arguing that “in fact […] [popular] culture is getting more intellectually demanding, not less” (p. 9). An important point in Johnson’s argument is that the view considering popular culture as substandard would be obsolete and not so relevant these days. Now we live in a time when various types of
arts are enjoyed and appreciated; and of course, popular arts are a part of the wide range of the arts. Mills and Brown point out today’s society consists of different arts and cultures from high to pop-culture. They state: “[i]n practice, community cultural development involves a wide range of art forms, from performance to visual arts, from film and video to writing, oral history and storytelling” (Mills & Brown, 2004, p. 6).

These two conflicted perspectives on the mass or popular arts can be understood as a demonstration of the change in people’s perception about mass culture today – from negative to neutral or to positive. Even if some people might still be holding such a negative view of the popular arts, it would be difficult even for them to refuse the power of the media in today’s modern society.

Lee, Chang-Hyun and Kim, Seong-Joon (2007) identify the social impact of the mass media in today’s society stating that it plays a role in transferring social norms and values from one generation to the next, maintaining social order, and forming public opinion; and therefore, they ultimately contribute to enhancing social integration (p. 203). In the same vein, Kenneth Newton (1997) argues that the mass media also have substantial power to promote trust at the national level. Newton (1997) notes: “[t]he mass media may also be important for the generation of abstract trust […] Some emphasize the capacity of the electronic media [i.e., social networking service] to act as an integrating and homogenizing force that increases levels of political knowledge, competence, interest, sophistication, and activity – the cognitive mobilization school” (p. 581). As demonstrated, the impact of the mass media – including popular arts through the media – is indeed influential as it can change viewers’ minds and actions.

Thus today, people consider the media as an important source of knowledge and information about a wide range of issues in our society. North Korea cannot be an exception of this trend; such influence of the media has been observed on the Korean peninsula.
According to an article, “North Korean Residents’ Viewing of South Korean Video Works: The Creation and Implications of Subculture,” North Koreans have been watching South Korean media productions, such as dramas, movies, and news, even though it is strictly prohibited by the North Korean government (Park and Kang, 2011). Park, Jung-Ran and Kang, Dong-Wan, the authors of this research point out the North Koreans’ exposure to the South Korean popular arts has helped them learn about the life and culture of South Korea and to deconstruct the pre-existing negative images about the South – not only about the society, but also about the people – that their government has promoted and infused. According to in-depth interviews with 33 North Korean defectors, North Koreans seem to have both fear and a sense of indifference toward the South Korean people. Some of the interview participants testified they used to think South Koreans are unsympathetic, cold-hearted people. However, the media, especially drama which contains ordinary people’s life stories, help them realize South Koreans are also human; and so to overcome their wariness and come to feel a connection to the people in the South. Park and Kang’s research also illustrates how the North Korean refugees who participated in the interview could possibly come to believe and embrace South Korean contemporary cultures and trends while still living in North Korea. Two most common causal factors are (1) repeated exposure to South Korean TV shows and (2) confirmation of what they have seen when they share it with their trusted contacts.

Park and Kang’s study provides a hint of the essential information brought by the recent influx and acceptance of South Korean popular arts and culture in the North. More importantly, it proves the capacity of the media may be effective for social cohesion and Korean unification. Although the South Korean media has flowed into the North through black-market exchanges and not an official route, it has still helped the numbers of North Korean people to experience and

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16 The research data was derived through in-depth interviews with 33 North Korean defectors representing different socio-economic backgrounds from merchants to farmers, laborers, housewives, and government officials in North Korea. The age group of the interviewees also differs from their 20s to 40s and all of the selected interviewees came to South Korea after the year 2000 (Park & Kang, 2011).
embrace South Korean pop-culture in a positive way. However, what we should remember is that the media and pop-culture can also engender negative impact on viewers.

Park and Kang’s 2012 research, “A Study on the North Koreans’ Acceptance of South Korean Media and Their ‘Distorted Images of South Korea’,” discusses concerns of the undesirable impact of the South Korean media on North Korean viewers and furthermore, on Korean unification. What they point out is that:

Commercial media intrinsically maximizes violence and sensationalism in content, which means there is also a possibility that North Koreans’ negative perceptions of South Korea can take deep root, by being exposed to South Korean media. […] When the negative aspects of South Korean society are highlighted in South Korean media, it adds to the North Koreans’ perceptions of the South Korean government and citizens molded by the education and propaganda and, their distorted perceptions of South Korea will further expand and take deeper roots. (Park & Kang, 2012, p. 270)

As demonstrated, the South Korean media might feed North Korean viewers’ already-existing biased ideas about the South, and so may delay social cohesion. By recognizing the potential negative impact of the media, when employing popular arts and the media as a strategic tool for integration, it would be a necessary device for helping viewers – either South or North Koreans in this case – to develop a critical eye through education in order to judge the described images and information on the media about each other fairly (Lee & Kim, 2007). Doing so may reduce the risk of taking distorted views from the media and alienating people from the other side, the South or the North.
Encountering the arts in forms of the media would emphasize the spectator role of the arts participants – that is, one would not be directly participating in the creative process. Although this type of participation also draws viewers into the ‘communicative experience’ by stimulating them to speculate, wonder, and share their ideas, such a spectator role is considered passive, contrary to art-making or volunteering – which is deemed as active engagement with the arts. In this regard, Maria R. Jackson (2008) argues that “a healthy community includes a continuum of opportunities for [both] active and passive cultural participation at different skill levels.” Also, she goes on to note that “a wide range of opportunities for cultural participation [should be provided to community members] – to produce art work, teach, learn, judge, and support the arts; to participate as audience and consumer, amateur, professional, teacher, critic, trustee, volunteer, committee members and so forth” (p. 97). People’s arts making experience within a community – whether amateur or professional and formal or informal – contributes to preserving, inventing, and asserting identities of community and confirming their existence (Jackson, 2008).

In addition to empowering community, “[i]nformal arts are an important avenue for broad-based public participation” (Jackson, 2008, p. 98). This statement implies that through participating in community-based arts activities, people can learn how to participate in society. Similarly, Carole Pateman (1970) also writes that “we learn to participate by participating” (p. 105). By thinking of these two arguments above, we may reach the conclusion that citizens can learn how to participate in society through their engagement with the arts and as a consequence, it

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17 People tend to interchangeably use informal arts, amateur arts, and participatory arts when they refer to avocational arts programs. Regarding the definition of such terms, Betsy Peterson (2011) tries to articulate them in her account as follows: “[t]he phrase ‘informal arts’ […] emphasizes the social or non-arts settings and contexts for the activity and has been embraced by several individuals. Some use the term ‘amateur,’ highlighting the avocational quality or the absence of credentialed, professional arts training, or some say ‘vernacular’ to underscore the sense of ‘second-natureness’ or embedding in everyday life. Still others favor the term ‘participatory arts’ to note the element of direct, hands-on individual and community engagement that is central to much of this cultural expression. In its most neutral and broadest usage, cultural participation simply denotes the ‘wide array of ways in which people engage in arts, culture, and creative expression’” (p. 3).
may engender enhancement of their civic engagement. Indeed, there is a case to be made when people gather to acquire techniques of doing the arts, they would also gain tips to engage with a society and build networks. Informal embroidery circles in the Southeast Asian Mien Community in Oakland, CA perform as a channel for participants “to exchange experiences and information about adapting to the United States,” in addition to learning their traditional craft (Jackson, 2008, p. 98). Within such circumstances – where people who share the same interests gather together and build relationships, participants tend to build networks and expand their horizons.

Those community-based arts programs can be available because there are also many volunteers who participate as teachers, trustees, and more. Through engaging with the participatory arts programs, those volunteers too can enjoy cooperation and expanding their networks. In that respect, John Stuart Mill and Alexis de Tocqueville assert that “networks of voluntary activity create trust and cooperation,” which can invigorate a community (Newton 1997, p. 577). Trust building is thought of as a critical process of any kind of relationship. Therefore, when thinking that the act of participation gives rise to trust (Putnam, 1995), we can reach the conclusion that direct involvement in the arts in any position and in any form needs to be encouraged to increase the trust level of a community, as a part of the strategic unification plan.

Another primary feature of community-based participatory arts is that they appear to be decentralized. When designing an arts-based unification strategy, it would be important to keep in mind that there are many different forms and channels of opportunities to engage with the arts. Through observing the field of folk arts practice in American communities, Peterson (2011) demonstrates that “[the folk arts] is fairly dispersed and decentralized, occurring in informal or community settings” (p. 5). What is more, decentralization has appeared not only in the genre of the arts, but also in venues where participatory arts are held. According to Jackson (2008),
They are found in a variety of places, including formal cultural presentation venues such as museums and theaters, small and midsize organizations where artists gather to make art and produce events, and in community cultural centers. But they also occur with great frequency, formally and informally, in places and through organizations that are not primarily concerned with the arts, such as schools, churches, parks, community centers, social service organizations, social clubs and benevolent societies, and sometimes businesses and commercial retail establishments. (p. 92)

This observation suggests that the options of strategy for arts-based policy plans aiming at social cohesion can be varied. Therefore, it would be important to be informed of the wide range of options and be open to creating different channels for citizens to engage with the arts under the goal of social cohesion.

3.4 Use of the Arts in Inter-Korean Relations

According to a recent article, “An Analysis of Cultural Exchanges between South and North Korea with a Proposal for Future Exchanges,” by the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism, performing arts exchanges have played an effective role in pacifying tensions between South and North Korea generated by political confrontation and military force (Park et al., 2013). Despite the effectiveness of arts exchange programs, Lee (2001) points out that sometimes they are too costly because the North Korean government often requires financial aid in return for conducting those programs. To improve that, some assert that cultural exchange programs need to switch their focus from pacifying government relations to facilitating the relations of South and North Korean citizens (Lee, 2001; Park et al., 2013). However, in truth, the North Korean government has been reluctant to allow its people to have contact with South Korean arts and culture (Park et al., 2013).

With the constraint of direct contact with the people in North Korea, a considerable number of research has concentrated on North Korean defectors’ adjustment to South Korea, in order to analyze how they respond and try to overcome the cultural differences in their new lives. Those precedent studies may ease the way for my research in grasping North Korean defectors’
hardships in terms of cultural difference in living in South Korea, which more people would encounter when unification comes about. However, what is relatively less uncovered in existing research, compared to how North Korean defectors have dealt with the new cultural circumstances in the South, is how South Koreans have reacted to the inflow of North Korean defectors and how they have acknowledged their culture. While pursuing social cohesion as an ultimate goal of Korean unification, ways of facilitating mutual respect should be speculated. Therefore, it is critical to investigate the ways in which participation in the arts can contribute to helping South Koreans discard their feeling of being different (i.e., superior) toward North Korean arts and culture and understand them better. Therefore, in order to stimulate trust building between the people of the South and the North in the process of unification, this dissertation research includes an analysis of the North Korean cultural programs provided to South Korean citizens.

**Selecting Korean Arts Cases**

The first arts exchange programs between South and North Korea took place in 1985 in Seoul and Pyongyang. During the 1990s and 2000s, the South-North cultural exchanges showed an increase in numbers. Although that increase was recorded as a meaningful stride in South-North Korea relations, the limited impact of the cultural exchanges was still not enough to fill the gap between South and North Korea. Perhaps, primarily caused by unstable political relations and the threats of using military force on the Korean peninsula, inconsistencies in the cultural exchanges have had negative consequences.

In the meantime, cultural difference between South and North Korea has been recognized as a pressing issue that may impede accomplishing a complete, successful unification. According to my review of recent research documents discussing Korean unification, social cohesion and cultural integration are essential parts in the process of Korean unification (Korean Ministry of Culture, Sports & Tourism, 2013; Lee, 2001; Lee & Kim, 2007; Park & Kang, 2011, 2012; Park,
Oh, & Lee, 2011; Park & Yang, 2011). With this recognition, some studies recommend strategy and policy plans for social cohesion, while others stress North Koreans’ consumption of South Korean culture and cultural conflicts North Korean refugees have been experiencing in South Korea.

However, within the current circumstances on the Korean peninsula, in which crossing the border is strictly prohibited to unauthorized people, scholars and researchers cannot access, nor have contact with, people in North Korea for data collection. North Korean defectors, who now live in South Korea or in a third country, are almost the only source researchers can reach for gathering information about North Koreans’ cultural life and their perceptions of South Korean people and culture. But considering the fact that individuals can share only what they have personally experienced or heard from others, even through North Korean refugees, we would get partial information from one storyteller that may or may not represent their own age group, gender, social class, and so on. Therefore, researchers who wish to see North Korean society may have to start from scratch and continue solving a puzzle until they find the information they need. Such a limited, challenging research environment may have affected the outcomes of the studies, producing a gap between their research findings and the real situation. Nonetheless, until the opening of North Korea, defectors’ testimonies will serve as the most reliable source of information about life, in this case ‘cultural life,’ of people in the North.

An interesting tendency has been also observed through the review of previous Korean unification research. That is, there are more studies taking approaches to North Korean defectors’ cultural adaptation and cultural consumption in South Korea when discussing cultural and social cohesion, compared to demonstration of South Korean people’s perception of North Korean arts and culture. Looking into the cultural adaptation of North Korean defectors is critical, of course, because they, who would understand both South and North Korean cultures, are all potential key players in connecting South and North Koreans with their knowledge of different cultures and values, when unification occurs. However, the significance of social cohesion in the process of
unification would include attaining mutual understanding and respect for the other side’s values and culture in both the South Korean and North Korean communities. With an emphasis on the two-way efforts for mutual understanding and social cohesion, scholarly information weighted toward one side calls for the need for filling the gap and researching the other side for designing well-balanced and well-informed policy strategies.

The 2012 Korea Culture and Tourism Institute report, entitled “Directions and Stages of Cultural Cohesion between North and South Korea for Building a Cultural Community,” suggests some strategic plans of fostering South Korean citizens’ understanding of North Korean culture through interactions with North Korean art works. In pursuit of building a national consensus for South-North cultural integration, this report proposes creating new institutions to increase accessibility to North Korean arts and culture in the South. Through the new institutions, the report suggests providing cultural programs such as screening North Korean animations, exhibiting visual arts, creating participatory arts program, and organizing lectures and discussions about North Korean arts and unification.

To an extent, creating new institutions and working through them may play a role in reducing South Korean people’s sense of difference (i.e., superiority) or even repulsion toward North Korean culture. However, having additional infrastructures cannot be a substitute for developing programs based on scrupulous research in accordance with a comprehensive strategy for unification. In addition to the efforts for increasing opportunities of experiencing North Korean art works, it is necessary to draw the genuine interest of South Korean citizens to North Korean arts and culture. Drawing South Korean citizens’ attention to North Korean arts can be important for fostering mutual understanding; yet, virtually, it may not be such an easy task. Researchers report that South Koreans who have been spoiled by art works made of various cutting-edge technology do not find North Korean arts interesting or attractive (Lee, 2001; Park, Oh, & Lee, 2011). But, still seeking a way to help South Korean citizens feel more relevant to North Korean arts is essential.
Within the challenging circumstances, exploring and analyzing existing arts programs about North Korean culture – e.g., programs run by art groups of North Korean refugees – can provide useful insights into developing arts-based policy strategy for social cohesion. Identifying potential social impacts generated by such programs that provide information about North Korean culture may help envision further use of the North Korean cultural programs in the arts-based strategy for social cohesion and unification. For these reasons, I have decided to include evaluation of programs offered by art groups of North Korean refugees in my dissertation research as a case study.

**The Private Sector’s Active Engagement with the South-North Korea Cultural Exchanges**

As aforementioned, following the first cultural exchanges that started in 1985 between South and North Korea, there was an increase in cultural exchanges until 2008. Through a review of the cultural exchanges and collaboration projects between the two Koreas, I found that a considerable portion of the exchange and collaborative programs was organized by the private sector, including major broadcasting companies, corporations, and various types of nonprofit – arts, humanitarian, religious, research institutions, and more – organizations (Park et al., 2013). For example, founded in 1996, The Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture (한겨레통일문화재단) organized a concert titled ‘the First Yoon, Yi-Sang Concert for Unification’ (제 1 회 윤이상 통일음악회), which was held in 1998 in Pyongyang, North Korea. Also, the Writers’ Association of Korea (한국작가회의) established the June 15 Writers’ Association of Korean People (6·15 민족문학인협회) in 2006, which is a co-operated nonprofit organization by South and North Korean administrators and writers. From its inception in 2006, until 2008, the June 15 Writers Association of Korean People published three journals in both South and North Korea (Park et al., 2013; The Hankyoreh Foundation for Reunification and Culture, 2013).
Although further research should follow for clarification, it seems many quango\textsuperscript{18} organizations also have taken part in the South-North Korea cultural exchanges. The National Orchestra of Korea (국립국악관현악단), Busan International Film Festival, and The Goyang Cultural Foundation are quango organizations that have contributed to organizing the South-North Korea cultural exchange programs and/or promoting North Korean arts to South Korean citizens (Park et al., 2013). The tendency of substantial involvement of private and quango organizations in the cultural exchanges may imply the attitude or strategy of the South Korean government toward cultural exchanges with the North. Through refraining itself from direct engagement with the exchange programs, the South Korean government may have kept its distance from taking any other political action to assure the effectiveness of the cultural exchanges. In this respect, analyzing the private nonprofit organizations’ role in the exchange projects as well as public-private partnerships in them may offer useful insight into planning an arts-based strategy for unification.

However, the political impact of those cultural exchange programs cannot be neglected when planning and conducting the exchanges. Needless to say, until institutional unification is accomplished, working within the National Security Law is something that cannot be compromised. As a consequence, all the private sector-led exchange programs must receive an authorization by the Ministry of Unification. Considering that, exploring what types of exchange projects have been authorized and successfully conducted might provide a glimpse into the South Korean government’s strategy about cultural exchanges with the North. In relation to that, reviewing the National Security Law, which seems to set up a boundary of those programs to

\textsuperscript{18}‘Quango’ is the acronym for “a quasi-autonomous non-government organization or quangos” (Flinders and McConnel, 1999; Hood, 1986, as cited in Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009; emphasis in original). According to Christensen and Laegreid (2003), “quangos share many of the same characteristics as public enterprises but usually are more at arm’s length from government, functioning as quasi-independent, self-organizing actors” (as cited in Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009).
some extent, may be informational as well, although the political impact is beyond the scope of this research.

**Arts-Based Programs as Preparation for Korean Unification**

As of December 2012, a total of 24,616 North Korean defectors have come to South Korea searching for a new life and it is revealed that 69% of them are females (The Ministry of Unification, 2013). From 1999 to 2011, there was a consistent increase in the number of entries of North Korean defectors to South Korea. With the change of circumstances in North Korea, however, the rate of North Korean defectors’ entry into the South has shown a decrease. With the increasing number of North Korean defectors entering the South since the late 1990s, the South Korean government has conducted multiple programs in recent decades in an effort to prepare for unification. In the context of social cohesion, the government’s strategy seems to have a threefold approach in general: (1) supporting North Korean refugees’ successful adaptation in the South through socializing education; (2) promoting arts and cultural exchanges[^19] between the South and the North; and (3) promoting unification to South Korean citizens through campaigns and education (The Ministry of Unification 2013; Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2011).

In practice, many social adjustment programs concentrate more on North Korean defectors’ economic independence and settlement, rather than their cultural adaptation in South Korea. According to “A Study on Cultural Adaptation Plans of North Korean Defectors,” a 2012 Korea Culture and Tourism Institute research document, most of the current social adjustment programs offered to North Korean defectors by public and private institutions have not adequately devised cultural programs supporting their cultural adaptation in the new social environment in the South. Regarding this issue, the report also fairly points out the need for

[^19]: Often, the North Korean government requires economic aid or reward in return for the cultural exchanges. Because of that, there criticism of this type of government-to-government cultural exchange (Lee, 2001; Park & Yang, 2011; Park, Oh, & Lee, 2012).
multi-faceted cultural programs and suggests a wide range of program options covering communication skills and education of history and traditional culture, as well as arts therapy and support for healthy self-identity establishment (Park & Yang, 2011).

While a majority of institutions has placed great emphasis on North Korean refugees’ economic capacity building, the 3∙4 School (셋넷학교) has been known for its arts-and-culture-oriented education since its inception in 1995. Located in Wonju, Gangwon province (강원도 원주), the ‘3∙4 School’ is a private, nonprofit institution serving teenagers who also escaped from North Korea. As a successful alternative school specialized in educating teenagers from North Korea, the ‘3∙4 School’ is dedicated to guiding students to learn and practice freedom and independence through participation in various cultural programs (Park & Yang, 2011; The 3∙4 School, 2013). As indicated on the institution’s website, the curriculum of the ‘3∙4 School’ includes various cultural activities as follows: traditional arts and religions, understanding international cultures, music, art, dance, plays, and cultural exchanges with South Korean peer groups. By engaging with multiple types of arts and cultural activities, the institution aims at inducing students to build a strong personal identity; learn to respect difference; and develop self-learning techniques and flexible thinking ability.

Moreover, the school’s elective courses and workshops involving band music as well as creating and performing plays have led its students to find outlets of self-expression. Having been encouraged to experience different cultures – not only South Korean but also international – students of the ‘3∙4 School’ could have direct contact with people from different cultural backgrounds and also build relationships with new contacts. Briefly to note, a list of the provided cultural programs in which those consequences can be expected includes participation in regional festivals for teenagers, holiday events, and international volunteer activities.

Within the current circumstances, what seems to be most challenging for planning an arts-based social cohesion strategy is a lack of analytical framework to fairly evaluate the
propersness or effectiveness of such arts- and culture-based programs designed for North Korean refugees. Theoretically speaking, these participatory cultural programs have supported students of the ‘3·4 School,’ who undoubtedly have struggled with confusion and great stress between the two different cultures to which each belongs, for their ways of settling a unique new identity and embracing various perspectives in a democratic society. However, it is difficult to figure out virtually how successful the programs would have been and if engaging with the arts has brought out the desired impact, due to lack of analytical information.

Nonetheless, there are three insightful findings from the case of the ‘3·4 School.’ First, the private sector initiated to provide an arts-and-culture-based education; and second, teenagers from North Korea enjoy participating in South Korean popular culture. Moreover, unlike South Korean history education, the North Korean academic curricula do not place much emphasis on history and traditional art forms of the previous dynasties on the peninsula. North Korean education is found to focus primarily on 20th-century history. With regard to this, teaching our shared Korean history and traditional art forms can play an important role in developing the personal identity of North Korean refugees as Korean – neither South Korean nor North Korean, but both.

On the other hand, how South Koreans perceive and understand North Korean arts and culture is equally essential in the process of unification, yet remains blurry. Woo-young Lee (2001), author of “Research about South Koreans’ Acceptance of North Korean Culture”, addresses an issue related to cultural exchanges between South and North Korea. Lee points out the importance of South Koreans’ experience and acceptance of North Korean arts and culture when preparing for unification, especially if social cohesion is the ultimate goal. It is a fair argument because for the sake of social cohesion, two-way understanding should be achieved.

According to 2013 Unification White Paper of South Korea, the Information Center on North Korea (북한자료센터) located in Seoul has provided a monthly event of screening North Korean films since 1990. Recently, the service of film screening has been expanded and became
available in eight different cities of South Korea, where people can watch North Korean films by request, provided a group of over 20 eligible people from universities or approved institutions submit the request. However, because of national security, access to North Korean arts works offered by public institutions is still only granted to limited populations.

As a substitute, South Korean citizens may experience North Korean culture by attending private performing arts organizations consisting of North Korean defectors. Some of the performers in the organizations are professional artists who are trained and used to work in North Korea and the rest of the members seem to be amateurs. As shown in Table 1, these four arts groups are dedicated to introducing North Korean arts and culture to people in the South and filling the gap between the South and the North.

In addition to introducing North Korean culture to South Korean people and reducing the fear that South Koreans may have from an abstract knowledge of North Korea, works of these art groups also help North Korean refugees to admit that their culture is not something to hide or feel ashamed about in South Korea or any other place and to raise their self-esteem. But again, in order to analyze the social impact of these art groups’ performances on South Korean citizens and social cohesion, more concrete data needs to be collected, such as frequency of performances, places where the performances take place, profiles of attendants, and so forth. Moreover, exploring the involvement of the public agencies or institutions would also be useful to learn about partnerships between the private and public sectors; and to determine whether those partnerships are effective in practice.

To clarify formative assumptions regarding the focus of my research, the subsections demonstrate case selections based on the review of the precedent research about Korean unification. Also, it suggests reviewing institutional guidelines, such as the National Security Law and other related government guidelines for the private-led cultural exchange projects, with the belief that the review might give useful insight into current the South Korean government’s
policy direction about cultural exchanges as well as into the development of an arts-based unification strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Organization Type</th>
<th>Established Year</th>
<th>Program Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group (평양백두한라예술단)</td>
<td>for-profit</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Through dance, vocal and instrumental music performance, committed to informing the actual circumstances of North Korea and educating the national security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Arts Group (평양예술단)</td>
<td>social enterprise</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Playing instruments, vocal, dance, and comic talk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Folk Arts Group (평양민속예술단)</td>
<td>nonprofit</td>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Traditional dancing performance, choir, solo vocal performance, and church music</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Unification Arts Group (평양통일예술단)</td>
<td>nonprofit/pre-social enterprise</td>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Folklore dance, vocal, plays, and church music</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.1 Art Groups of North Korean Defectors in South Korea

Webpages of the arts groups. (Translated, modified and updated.)

* The number of members tends to change frequently, and makes it difficult to know the exactly number.

In the following chapter, I will discuss aspects of trust building relevant to the current situation on the Korean peninsula as a key analytical element for my research. Furthermore, I will explore why approaching the identity construction of the citizens of a unified Korea from the horizontal level would be more appropriate for this research which concerns social cohesion.

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20 Additionally, I was able to find more arts groups consisting of North Korean defectors through online search as follows: NahmNahm BukNyo Unification Arts Group (남남북녀통일예술단), One Nation Arts Group (거례하나예술단), Pyongyang Flower-Ocean Arts Group (평양꽃바다예술단), Pyongyang Halla Nation Arts Company (평양한라민족예술단), Pyongyang Arirang Art Company (평양아리랑예술단), Pyongyang Whistle Arts Group (평양휘파람예술단), Pyongyang Silver Arts Group (평양실버예술단) and possibly more. There is an additional list of arts groups in both forms of nonprofit and for-profit, although many of them did not identify their organizational structure on the website.
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH FRAMEWORK

This chapter focuses on demonstrating the conceptual structure of this dissertation research, based on the logic of assumptions on which the study rests; scholarly concepts adopted for the study; and two precedent cases of other nations. The first section explains why this research appropriates the horizontal approach to look at the use of the arts for social purposes. One of the reasons for choosing the horizontal approach is the abuse of the arts for political purposes which can usually be observed in a top-down approach. The following section provides how and why related concepts, such as soft power and trust, can shape the theoretical research frame to be used as a lens of interpreting the research cases selected for this study. The last section presents the experiences in building social cohesion and reshaping national identity after periods of significant changes in Germany and South Africa, such as reunification and the end of apartheid, respectively. Learned lessons about nationwide reconciliation processes from the precedent cases will be used later in this research to develop an analytical frame.

4.1 Horizontal Level Approach

With a recognition of “the civilizing power of the arts,” oftentimes, cultural activities have been conducted to “shape public morals and behaviors” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 153). Such involvement of political intentions into cultural policy can be viewed as social control and even as correcting the social behavior of certain groups of people, in accordance with the invented (not inherited) common cultural values and traditions identified by groups in positions of authority. In truth, having shared cultural values, beliefs, and practices in a society can ease the way of accomplishing social cohesion and building a collective (or national) identity (Mulcahy, 2008).
However, when constructing a collective identity with the engagement of political purpose or *inventing* idealized cultural values, there is an imminent risk of “oversimplify[ing] cultural complexities and marginaliz[ing] inconvenient minorities and their communal expressions” (Mulcahy, 2008, p. 209).

Indeed, negative social impact of using the arts has also been observed in history. Corruption and distraction, moral improvement and civilization, political instrument, and social stratification and identity construction\(^{21}\) are the negative aspects indicated by Belfiore and Bennett (2008). If not all, most of these traditions concern the employment of the arts in political (or socio-political in a broader sense) purposes. However, what should not be misunderstood here is that the inclination does not connote that every political intention of using the arts should be regarded as negative. Clearly, there have been cases of misusing and manipulating the effects of the arts for the sake of specific political intentions – for instance, “uses (and abuses) of the arts and culture for propaganda purposes in non-democratic and totalitarian political systems” (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 193). In that case, common cultural values and traditions often are *invented* and promoted in a favorable tactic of the politically dominant group of the society.

Because of the underlying risk of promoting assimilation and moderation in cultural values, heavily relying on top-down (vertical) strategies in pursuit of cohesive society may cause criticism and disagreements between social groups. For the European Union (EU) in the process of dealing with cultural differences and creating a continental identity, EU has received criticism for its top-down definition of the invented European heritage, “with which European integration

\(^{21}\) Although Belfiore and Bennett did not clearly state that these impacts are negative, the development of the discussion is toward how the arts have contributed to “humanizing” citizens and “the formation of the perfect citizens,” which not only presents political intentions in the uses of the arts, but also, the manipulating power of the arts in accordance with the ruling class’s interests (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008, p. 145). In relation to that, the authors also discuss how the arts were used in colonial states under imperialistic ideas.

\(^{22}\) Social stratification and identity construction might not be necessarily viewed as negative impacts of the arts. What the authors demonstrate is that the arts, especially their consumption, can represent one’s social status, which may affect social stratification. Moreover, even though individuals select products to express them based on their aesthetic values, pre-defined and/or pre-existing concepts of the arts and culture may impact one’s identity construction in society (Belfiore & Bennett, 2008).
[is] driven by bureaucrats and politicians rather than civil society” (Miller & Yúdice, 2002, p. 181). Similarly, Yoon (2009) also argues that EU’s cultural policy was de facto a means of European market integration, by pointing out the overlapping timeframe during which the EU’s slogan, ‘unity in diversity,’ was introduced and the creation of an EU single market proceeded (p. 207). In other words, strictly speaking, EU’s cultural policy was linked with economic and political purposes.

In truth, with the slogan of ‘unity in diversity’, on the other hand, the concept of EU’s continental identity formation also emphasized respecting each member state’s national identity and regional cultures. In a description of the EU’s institutional identity-building process, Sassatelli (2006) argues that EU’s strategy of cultural policy presents “incremental and consensual policy style” (p. 30). Nevertheless, Shore (2000) interprets the policy strategy as a mere political tactic to achieve its bureaucratic objectives. According to Shore’s (2000) statement, “the discourse of unity in diversity is seen as a rhetorical escamotage to hide an effectively centralizing, top-down approach, still failing to give a definite content to its abstract and ambiguous slogans” (as cited in Sassatelli, 2002, p. 441).

Distinct from its political intention, EU cultural policy and strategies deployed to bridge different nationalities of member states and to create the European identity might provide applicable lessons with national identity building for a unified Korea. However, due to its top-down approach embedded in neofunctionalist policy orientation as well as its involvement of intergovernmental actions, EU’s continental identity building seems to be less related to the horizontal focus of this research.

The horizontal focus highlights people-to-people relationships and social networks, while also reducing the likelihood of abuse of the arts and culture. Citizens in horizontal relationships

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23 As stated in “Article 128 of the Treaty on the European Union [(TEU)] signed in 1992 in Maastricht (now 151 in the amended Treaty of Amsterdam) […], ‘The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore’” (CEC, 1992 as cited in Sassatelli, 2002, p. 440).
appear to construct successful civic communities, compared with those who are involved in vertical relationships. According to Robert Putnam (1993), social networks on the horizontal level primarily bring “agents of equivalent status and power [together]” (p. 173), whereas “a vertical network […] cannot sustain social trust and cooperation” (p. 174).

The concept of the horizontal level encompasses person-to-person relations (individual), as well as people-to-people relations (collective). The boundary between individual and collective levels is blurry in the context of the social impacts of the arts. In pursuit of social goals, the impact of the arts can be found both at the individual and the collective levels; furthermore, its impact on individuals can have a ripple effect on a group of people or even an entire society. Matarasso (1997) demonstrates in his research, “Use or Ornament?: The social impact of participation in the arts,” how the individual impacts of the arts can be expanded to the collective level by stating that “…multiple personal changes are the building blocks of wider social impact which the arts are said to produce” (p. 14). In other words, if one end of a linear scale is the individual and the other end is the public, in the middle of the two, there is an area of overlap, where the arts influence “individuals’ personal lives and have a desirable spillover effect on the public sphere” at the same time (McCarthy et al., 2004, p. xii). Such an inseparable attribute observed between the individual and the collective impacts legitimizes researching the social impact of the arts at both levels.

Therefore, focusing on the horizontal approach seems to be appropriate for this research because the horizontal level not only encompasses both the individual and the collective, but also excludes a coercive push from one direction to the other, such as political use of the arts and attempts of assimilation for political purpose. Also it seeks reciprocal relations while encompassing both the individual and the collective impacts of the arts. Within the horizontal focus, the autonomous process must be emphasized in trust generation, national identity construction, and social cohesion, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The direction of social cohesion
process (which this study seeks) is from individuals to groups or communities and then to the national level, including reciprocal relations between individuals and social groups.

![Diagram of the Horizontal Direction of Social Cohesion](image)

*Figure 4.1 The Horizontal Direction of Social Cohesion*

### 4.2 Conceptual Framework

This study of social cohesion in a unification process is grounded in two major concepts: *soft power* (Nye Jr. 2004) and *trust* (Offe, 1999; Putnam, 1993 & 2000). These concepts are used to demonstrate how the arts can stimulate generalized trust between the divided people of the Korean peninsula. To articulate this process, additional well-received academic assertions are combined including national identity construction (Melucci, 1989; Offe, 1999), public purpose of the arts (Wyszomirski, 2000), and nonprofit structure (Hansmann, 1980), as shown in Figure 4.2.

While reviewing these concepts, I found a relation between the arts, national identity, and trust. The arts contribute to fostering an inclusive community by searching for a shared collective- or national identity that stimulates trust building by bridging divided groups and communities. As a result, a linear relation can be established between the arts, national identity, and trust. In addition to that, the concept of ‘public purposes’ brings normative rationale into the research frame and ‘nonprofit structure’ functions as a mobilizing force which carries out an arts-based
strategy to be fulfilled. This relationship is formulated into a conceptual framework in this dissertation, which will be further developed and tested to demonstrate how the arts can foster social cohesion on the Korean peninsula.

Figure 4.2 Conceptual Framework

Soft Power: why an arts-based strategy for Korean unification?

Circumstances of the Korean peninsula are complex, as all of the political, economic, and cultural matters are intertwined. This also means that we cannot achieve unification and social cohesion through the impact of the arts alone. The transformative power of the arts is one of the alternatives that either South Korea or North Korea could use to win over its counterpart, depending on situations and circumstances. According to Nye, Jr.’s (2004) demonstration about ‘soft power,’ just like hard power, soft power is one way you can use to obtain the results that you desire. Nye, Jr. (2004) further illustrates:

You can command me to change my preferences and do what you want by threatening me with force or economic sanctions. […] Or you can appeal to a sense of attraction, love, or duty in our relationship and appeal to our shared values about the justness of contributing to those shared values and purposes. (pp. 6-7)
In other words, an arts-based strategy for unification is one of the cards you can use to facilitate a peaceful, democratic unification on the Korean peninsula. Indeed, the South Korean government has continued to employ economic and political approaches to improve relations with North Korea for unification. In the case of economic strategy, it has been a one-way effort for some time, from the South to the North. Although economic aid seems to be what the North Korean government wants the most because of its severe financial deficits and the famine, merely relying on inducements has proven to be ineffective to lead the inter-Korean relations to reconciliation or peace. For example, ceasing South Koreans’ tours to Mt. Geumgang in North Korea and suspending the operation of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex in North Korea indicate the ineffectiveness or insufficiency of inducements.

A political approach to Korean unification is even more complicated, since it involves more stakeholders than two. In the realm of politics, Inter-Korean relations has been discussed not only at the South-North talks, but also at the six-party talks since its division. Partly because the United States also has greatly supported North Korea financially as Noland (2000) states, “North Korea is already the largest recipient of US assistance in Asia” (p. 13). In addition, Yoon (2013) clarifies the technical fact around the Korean peninsula by pointing out that in the Constitution of South Korea, the Korean territory is indicated as the entire Korean peninsula. In truth, the right to oversee the North Korean territory is not automatically endowed to the South Korean government even if North Korea were to collapse. In that case, the United Nations is authorized to first hold an election in North Korea to ask the citizens what they would like to see happen; that is, through the election, they will make a decision either to merge into South Korea or establish a new nation state on the territory.

In addition to the complexity of the political approach, Inter-Korean relations are difficult to predict, especially concerning with North Korea’s military force. Such an unstable environment surrounding the Korean peninsula also has highly affected South-North cultural
exchanges. Thus, it is uncertain whether a policy window may open for arts-based strategy for unification and a policy agenda.

Despite this uncertainty, performing-arts exchanges have been employed mostly at critical moments in terms of political relations between South and North Korea and have also generated adequate outcomes. Based on their previous success, performing arts exchanges have proven to be an effective tool for changing a bad mood in the relations of the two governments. Moreover, the component of people-to-people exchanges involved in the performing arts exchanges is known to be sufficient to open dialogues; this is also why the North Korean government tends to be reluctant to have this type of exchanges with democratic societies and blocks direct contact between program participants (Park et al., 2013).

Culture is one of the primary resources for the soft power, along with one nation’s political values and its foreign policies, as Nye, Jr. (2004) identifies. He also defines ‘culture’ as “the set of values and practices that create meaning for a society” (Nye, Jr., 2004, p. 11). In the realm of politics and international relations, the soft power is strategically utilized to manipulate and shape what counterparts want; Nye, Jr. (2004) writes:

Co-optive power [, referring to the soft power,] – the ability to shape what other want – can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes other fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. (p. 7)

As discussed, the capacity of cultural approach has been argued to be useful in politics, particularly to accomplish one’s political goals without a collision between nations. Yet unification on the Korean peninsula is not a simple political issue; it is a more complicated process consisting of economic, political, and social concerns. Therefore, in the process of unification, there would be more occasions to use arts-based strategies that are versatile.
**Trust: Building Thin (Social) Trust**

According to Luhmann (1988), ‘trust’ has remained in the periphery and not been a popular topic to be researched in terms of both theoretical frameworks and empirical research, in the field of sociology. Perhaps the lack of research on trust might be related to the challenging attribute of contemporary society, which is characterized as “mobile, complex, differentiated, and as a consequence, largely opaque” (Offe, 1999, p. 56; Sztompka, 2000). Nonetheless, scholars in various realms such as political science, economics, and sociology have attempted to identify trust in different phenomena. In a quick glance, precedent research topics examined in different fields include how trust affects and functions between citizens and government (Dunn, 1988; Hardin, 1999); impact of trust in the process of monetary transactions (Dasgupta, 1988); and trust amongst groups and people in a civil society (Luhmann, 1988; Putnam, 1993 & 2000).

In that, there is a widely shared view of social trust as an essential attribute of a democratic political society (Almond & Verba, 1965; Inglehart, 1988; Parry, 1976; Silver, 1985, cited in Sztompka, 2000). Piotr Sztompka (2000), who has studied ‘trust’ in both theoretical and empirical accounts in a post-communist social order, indicates trust is a crucial component in civic culture, civil society, cultural capital, social capital, and civilizational competence, and “also linked to postmaterialist values” (pp. 14-15). For example, between trust and participation which is one of the core concepts in social capital, a reciprocal relationship can be observed. In Putnam’s (1995) account “the more we connect with other people, the more we trust them, and vice versa” (as cited in Sztompka, 2000, p. 15). On the flip side, lack of trust can also delay a desirable impact of trust in a democratic, civil society. As Offe (1999) observed, “The rapid and successful transition to post-authoritarian modes of governance and the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes is seen to be greatly hindered by the absence of trust” (p. 43).

When considering this study’s assumption of a peaceful, democratic way of unification on the Korean peninsula, it would be legitimate to presume that Offe’s observation about the negative impact of the absence of trust on a successful transition to ‘post-authoritarian modes of
governance and the consolidation of liberal democratic regimes’ can be a scenario that a unified Korean society could encounter after a unification. By remembering the political socialization that was (or is still) imposed by two opposing regimes during the divided years, we can anticipate that, in the right aftermath of a unification, a unified Korean government will confront issues caused by the absence of trust between citizens from South and North Korea, if proper precautionary measures (e.g., through policies) are not implemented prior to a unification.

As aforementioned in ‘Different Social Goals through the Arts’ in Chapter Three, trust is associated with ‘strong interpersonal ties’ and ‘weak ties’; and depending on the different levels of interpersonal ties, ‘thick trust’ and ‘thin trust’ can be observed, respectively (Granovetter, 1973; Newton, 1997; Putnam, 2000). Thick trust, according to Bernard Williams, tends to be generated through “intimate familiarity” and personal contacts “between people, often of the same tribe, class, or ethnic background” (Newton, 1997, p. 578; Putnam, 1993, p. 171). On the other hand, thin trust is related to the “more amorphous, secondary relations” arisen among ‘the generalized other’ (Newton, 1997, p. 578; Putnam, 2000). Thin trust, therefore, is more tied up with the complex, opaque modern society than thick trust. Also, Putnam (2000) states that thin trust is more ‘useful’ in the societal context because of its inclusiveness of extended networks.

As further articulated by reflecting recent social traits, there are two additional concepts of trust relevant to thin trust – ‘abstract trust’ (Newton, 1997) and ‘social trust’ (Putnam, 2000). First, abstract trust is, according to Newton (1997), “not built on the personal relations of primordial society, nor on secondary relations in formal organizations. In contemporary society, abstract trust may be generated by the all-important institutions of education and the media” (p. 580). In addition, Newton (1997) also acknowledges the potential impact of culture on the generation of abstract trust emerging in recent days. By illustrating a citizenship research (Conover and Searing, 1995) which addresses the change of people’s tendency of ‘regarding’ their nationality from the genealogical foundation, Newton (1997) argues that formation of abstract trust may not be limited in the boundary of a nation; rather, it can expand across borders.
through consumption of other nations’ cultures. Indeed with the advancement of technology, we currently have more diverse channels to interact with others and their cultures both directly and indirectly. In this regard, Luhmann (1988) indicates that ‘television culture’ can provide an extended form of personal experience which will affect the development of trust. Although there also exists disagreement on such “mass media effects,” Newton (1997) asserts that “The mass media may also be important for the generation of abstract trust” in this globalized world (p. 581).

Next, social trust is “strongly associated with many other forms of civic engagement and social capital” (Putnam, 2000, p. 136). According to Putnam (2000), given equal conditions, people with higher social trust tend to participate more actively in civic and community life, and show higher degrees of trustworthiness and respect to others. Conversely, Putnam (1993) also points out that “Social trust in complex modern settings can arise from two related sources – norms of reciprocity and networks of civic engagement” (p. 171). In other words, trust tends to stimulate people’s active engagement with a civic society; at the same time, participation in social networks like community life also help to generate trust. This observation suggests social trust and civic engagement may “mutually reinforce” one another (Putnam, 2000, p. 137).

Moreover, what should be noted here is that social trust is neither identical with political trust nor encompasses it. As Putnam (2000) argued,

Trust in other people is logically quite different from trust in institutions and political authorities. […] Empirically, social and political trust may or may not be correlated, but theoretically, they must be kept distinct. Trust in government may be a cause or a consequence of social trust, but it is not the same thing as social trust (p. 137; emphasis in original).

That is, it may be undeniable that there is a reciprocal relationship between social trust, which can be described in the horizontal dimension, and political trust, in the vertical direction. However, through a theoretical lens, there is apparent distinction between them. In this respect and to apply this to a Korean unification discourse, social trust seems to be what Korean society needs to aim at in pursuit of social cohesion.
To a general extent, furthermore, trust can be engendered based on the knowledge people have attained through different experiences, from the personal to the impersonal. In Offe’s (1999) account, “Trust is a thoroughly cognitive phenomenon. It depends upon knowledge and belief” (p. 55). In the process of building trust, people tend to probe and confirm trustworthiness (Offe, 1999). In the same vein, Luhmann (1988) also points out that trust involves a decision-making process as to whether or not to take a risk. Based on these factors, we may reach the understanding that trust is a result of decision-making as to whether to take a risk after judging based on one’s knowledge and belief. In this respect, the memory of the Korean War remaining in people’s minds of the two Korean nations is likely to work as a hindrance in building trust among them. Furthermore, knowledge that the people of South and North Korea could gain about each other seems to be quite limited, somehow distorted, and often negative. While searching for a way to peaceful unification on the Korean peninsula, therefore, finding a method of fostering positive, yet correct, information is perceived as crucial to helping overcome the pessimistic view both sides have constructed about the other.

Also, when people belong to a group or community, they can generalize trust for those who share the same interest or identity with them. In other words, when people are familiar or “know the tradition, culture and values of a particular group,” an adequate condition for generalizing trust is formed (Offe, 1999, p. 63). Offe (1999) further articulates:

Invoking the shared belonging to some community – be it an extended family, a religious group, a location, a college, service in a military unit, a nation, or many others – and its presumably distinctive history, identity, or spirit, may also trigger the chain effect of trusting, recollection, obligation, and reproduction of the trust relation. (p. 63; emphasis added)

This environment of generalizing trust can be perceived in relation to people’s collective identity building as citizens of a unified nation.
(Re)Constructing National Identity for Trust Generation

As stated in the previous section, being bonded as a shared identity may facilitate trust building amongst fellow members of a community, society, or nation. Regarding the impact of national identity on trust building, Offe (1999) claims that if there is a common national identity representing all of the citizens, even political disagreements might not pose an obstacle to generalizing trust. In his statement, “[n]ationality and national identity would […] perform a trust-conferring function bridging political divisions, anonymity, cultural diversity, and the strangeness of the vast majority of my fellow-nationals” (p. 59).

However, worthwhile to note, national identity may not be something naturally given as traditional thinkers might assume. Rather than taking national identity as granted or fixed, recent discussions have paid larger attention to the ‘malleable and fluid’ characteristics of a collective identity like a national identity (Griswold, 2013). Similarly, Melucci (1989) emphasizes “how collective identity is not fixed but a process” by further demonstrating that

Collective identity is an interactive and shared definition produced by several interacting individuals who are concerned with the orientations of their action as well as the field of opportunities and constraints in which their action takes place…. Collective identity formation is a delicate process and requires continual investments. (pp. 34-35, as cited in Griswold, 2013, p. 99; emphasis in original)

With the acknowledgment of collective identity as a process, then how to develop a national identity, favorably in a most agreeable and inclusive form, should be conceived crucial.

In the process of restructuring the national identity of a unified Korea, what should be pondered would be how to reflect the different values and cultures of South and North Koreans. Witnessing the growth of the representation of multiple cultures in one society, there is concern about the adequacy of building a national identity, in terms of assimilation. For example, Jenson (1998) asks, “[c]an citizens’ identities be both varied and multiple, without threatening social cohesion, or is adherence to a single national vision necessary?” (p. 36). This question challenges the idea of developing national identity in terms of a fair reflection of the multiplicity of citizens’ values and cultures. This problem might be compromised, if not resolved, by adopting the
bottom-up approach in the process of (re)constructing national identity. This concept of national identity building should be distinguished from national image building, which seems to be more accommodating of the top-down approach.

In light of the bottom-up approach, a limited involvement of government in the national identity building process seems to be desirable, especially within a horizontal focus. As indicated earlier in this chapter, the European Union’s bureaucrat- and politician-driven European integration strategy has received criticism for its top-down approach which puts it at risk of assimilation (Miller & Yúdice, 2001). Additionally, Williams (1999) who observes nationalism in Spain and the United Kingdom also asserts the ineffectiveness of assimilation policies posed for matching regional, minority cultures to “a single [dominant] political identity” (p. 9). On the other hand, even bottom-up social phenomena by grassroots participation are not free from the effect of the larger setting of politics, including government policies and structures, which is a top-down process (Newton, 1997). Similarly, in Putnam’s (1993) account,

> Any society … is characterized by networks of interpersonal communication and exchange, both formal and informal. Some of these networks are primarily ‘horizontal,’ bringing together agents of equivalent status and power. Others are primarily ‘vertical,’ linking unequal agents in asymmetric relations of hierarchy and dependence. In the real world, of course, almost all networks are mixes of the horizontal and the vertical. (p. 173)

Due to the co-existence of the horizontal and vertical directions witnessed in social networks, solely relying on the horizontal dimension might be impractical in the national identity building process. Instead, while emphasizing the horizontal approach in the identity construction strategy, maintaining an arm’s length with governmental involvement in the process might be more realistic and appropriate.

In that respect, South Africa’s decision to adopt a combined approach as a strategy for social cohesion and national identity may suggest related policy strategy options, which may reduce the risk of assimilation. In 2012, the President of South Africa Jacob Zuma said:

> Promoting social cohesion, nation building and a sense of national identity […] will require a joint effort from all sectors of society to achieve. […] while the
government was embarking on a number of programmes to promote national unity and reconciliation, this was a continuous two-way process particularly in a society that had emerged from three centuries of colonialism and apartheid. [...] this was not a strategy that government should design alone. (SANews.gov.za, August 7, 2013)

In his statement, President Zuma pointed out the insufficiency of a top-down strategy in national identity building and social cohesion, even though he may have implied the participation of the elites in the ‘two-way process,’ instead of grassroots engagement. Learning from the South African example, therefore, combining the top-down direction of facilitation through arts-based policy strategy and the bottom-up approach demanding grassroots social networks may lead the process of national identity building away from the risk of assimilation.

Figure 4.3 Combined Approach to National Identity Building

**Public Purpose of the Arts and Nonprofit Structure**

For trust generation in the unified civil society on the Korean peninsula, this research looks into the public purpose of the arts pertinent to the bottom-up approach, that is, civic engagement with emphasis on grassroots participation. Regarding how the arts can produce public values in a
structure of public policy, Margaret J. Wyszomirski (2000) identifies five basic public purposes, based on observing the history of U.S. government actions regarding the arts and key policy documents like the U.S. Constitution. The five primary public purposes to which the arts can contribute are as follows: “(1) furthering the quest for security, (2) fostering community, (3) contributing to prosperity, (4) improving the quality and conditions of life, and (5) cultivating democracy” (p. 60).

The five identified public purposes include a wide range of policy issues that the arts can address and impact from social to political (i.e., national security) and economic (i.e., prosperity). Thus, to adequately narrow down and match this research focus, two of the most relevant purposes among the five public purposes are reviewed in this study – ‘community’ and ‘cultivating democracy.’ First, ‘community’ pertains to the collective impact of the arts and desired outcomes of this purpose are social values. While pursuing such social goals as social cohesion, representativeness, and equality, various types of arts programs and activities can be employed to contribute to “manifesting identity, encouraging communication, and cultivating civic pride” (Wyszomirski, 2000, p. 66). When the arts are utilized for manifesting identity, here ‘identity’ connotes different levels of identity, from the individual to group/community, to national levels.

From classical to contemporary times, participating in arts programs can induce the natural practice of democracy and promote democratic values. Regarding the role of the arts in ‘cultivating democracy,’ two primary policy concerns that the arts seem to address are as follows: “building social capital and moral resources and maintaining the political system through procedural correctness” (Wyszomirski, 2000, p. 71). As Putnam (1993) points out, civic engagement can foster creating social bonds between different people and groups and contribute to engendering trust through cooperation and interactions because “networks of civic engagements facilitate communication” and the communication among individuals stimulates the improvement of cooperation and mutual trust (p. 174). Furthermore, Putnam (1993) asserts that
“networks of civic engagement that cut across social cleavages nourish wider cooperation” (p. 175). Likewise, social participation can “create horizontal networks of engagement” in a broader social context (Wyszomirski, 2000, p. 74). As part of such social engagement networks, therefore, participating in artistic and creative activities with fellows provides a common cultural experience and help form the bedrock of understanding diverse cultural values through communication, cooperation, and trust.

Also, it has been argued that arts and cultural activities sometimes “address or mobilize public opinion on political or social issues” (Peterson, 2011, p. 1) and create social capital and cohesiveness in communities (Crane, 2011). More precisely, folk and traditional art forms, which are familiar to many citizens, can effectively work to foster communication in open spaces and encourage people to engage with the arts (Peterson, 2011). Involving informal arts24 activities has been known to bring participants “a feeling of connectedness and belonging, trust, and organizational skills and a habit of civic involvement” (McCarthy, 2004, p. 15). For better efficacy from participating in arts activities, initiating or mediating structures would be necessary; and nonprofit organizations serving for arts communities often play that role.

Wyszomirski (2000) states that when nonprofit organizations “forge bonds of trust and cooperation” among strangers, especially through informal arts activities, the nonprofit communities can be a democratic instrumentality (p. 71). Nonprofit organizations mostly provide public goods and/or play an intermediary role, largely because they receive subsidies from the government or private funders (Hansmann, 1980). Under a shared cause in the setting of nonprofits, people gather together and work toward achieving their goals. In that process, trust becomes enhanced between the nonprofit organizations and beneficiaries of their services –

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24 “Informal arts comprise a broad range of "citizen" arts in the forms of folk arts, popular culture, and casual or hobby arts. Informal arts activities [seem to] include: visiting historical parks and neighborhoods, craft fairs, and outdoor performing arts festivals; attending arts events at places of worship and schools; and personal performance and creation of art, such as playing a musical instrument, singing in a choir, or doing creative writing” (NEA, n.d.).
usually community members or unspecified citizens. Moreover, trust is sought out internally amongst board members, trustees, and officers to fulfill their organizational mission together (Handy & Kats, 1998). Within such a cooperative environment, nonprofit organizations serving community arts programs “tend to operate out of specific physical spaces[,] organizational resources including: leaders, a board, funding internal financial management, partnerships, communication tools, etc.” (Crane, 2011, p. 4). These activities through nonprofit organizations facilitate fulfilling a vital democracy.

In the process of social cohesion, the Korean government should search for a fully unified civil society, in which every citizen participates in shaping a shared national identity and in which citizens are encouraged to engage in fair and open communication with one another and with decision makers. Regarding the role of the arts as facilitating an inclusive community, Benjamin Barber (1997) states:

> the arts have … the capacity simultaneously to offer expression to the particular identities of communities and groups (including those that feel excluded from the dominant community’s space) and to capture commonalities and universalities that tie communities and groups together into a national whole. (as cited in Wyszomirski, 2000, p. 15)

In truth, if a society – highly likely a multicultural society – represents (or pursues) one dominant culture, “an asymmetrical relationship […] between the cultural hegemony and the marginalized other” can be created (Mulcahy, 2008, p. 197). What the arts can contribute to the imbalance in a society reduces socio-cultural tensions “between the center and the periphery” by providing opportunities to express communities’ culture and identity (Ibid). As outlets of expression, the arts can provide a platform for social members to find and confirm their shared national identity, regardless of their historical and ideological differences.

Similarly, Offe (1999) also addresses the necessity of mediating institutions to build trust beyond the circle of one’s group. This kind of need is especially required in post-communist societies where people tend to trust others who have relations with them directly and indirectly. However, in order to cultivate a democratic society, “we need to trust [social] agents beyond
those whom we ‘know’ from close and extended observation. What is needed are trust-mediating institutions capable of motivating and constraining the behavior of decision-makers as well as of ‘everyone else’ ” (p. 79). Therefore, through proactive involvement of nonprofit arts organizations as mediating institutions, trust can be engendered among citizens at the national level, and thus a vital democracy can be cultivated.

To sum up, ‘soft power’ was discussed in the beginning of this section by demonstrating how the transformative power of the arts and culture are employed to accomplish diplomatic purposes. In the national context, on the other hand, the transformative power of the arts can be used for bridge building amongst fellow citizens to generate ‘thin trust,’ which is more pertinent to the complex modern society than ‘thick trust.’ Putnam (2000) also asserts that people who have participated in civic and community life tend to display higher levels of trust and mutual respect. In that, nonprofit organizations can play a mediating role by providing opportunities of civic engagement and thus fostering horizontal networks. Therefore, this dissertation research focuses on the strategic use(s) of the arts and culture, especially through participation in the arts, to build national identity and a cohesive society. In the following section, I explore how other nations, which have been dealing with similar national issues as the two Koreas, have strategically implemented the arts and culture to overcome their problems through policy.

4.3 Analytical Framework

This section is comprised of three parts discussing (1) the German reunification, (2) South African national identity building, and (3) policy strategy development. In order to turn collected and analyzed data into policy recommendations to be implemented, I will review precedent cases of unification and national identity building in other countries and make an attempt to derive lessons which may be applicable to the Korean unification discourse. About unification, I will explore how Germany engaged the arts and culture before and after its reunification. Similarly, I will how the South African government has employed cultural policy strategies in the process of
reconciliation and of building a new national identity. The identification of the lessons of German reunification and the experience of South Africa in identity formulation is expected to inform this research in developing of an arts-based policy strategy in the discourse of Korean unification.

Following a contextual overview of the two precedents, I will attempt to structure an analytical frame to generate an arts-based policy strategy by adopting Kingdon’s (2003) policy formulation, Rose’s (1993) lesson-drawing, and Wyszomirski’s (2013) triple-bottom line in cultural policy.

**Cultural Policy for Social Cohesion in the Process of German Reunification**

According to Castles and Miller (1993) and Martiniello (1997), in the discourse of migration, three models of social cohesion policy have been observed. These are the differential exclusionary model, assimilationist model, and multicultural model (cited in Hur, 2012). The assimilationist model is what West Germany seemed to opt for, to achieve social cohesion with the East German refugees and immigrants in its territory. This model is also deemed to be a policy that the South Korean government has adopted to socialize North Korean defectors to settle in South Korea (Hur, 2012). The assimilationist model primarily pursues to lower the chances of social conflicts by encouraging and supporting the migrated minority groups to assimilate with mainstream culture(s) and society. However, in reality, not only is assimilating groups of people a difficult task to accomplish, but such attempts can also cause social conflicts and collision between groups of different cultures, which can be extended to social division (Zehraoui, 1995, as cited in Hur, 2012, p. 276).

According to Hur (2012), discussing West Germany’s social cohesion policy toward the new comers from East Germany which informs South Korea’s equivalent policy about North Korean defectors, West Germany’s policy for East Germans seems to focus on their economic independence. The logic behind the policy was based on the
assumption that economic independence and job security would ensure East Germans’ settlement and expansion of their social networks in West Germany. In the West German government’s scenario, if the economic stability-oriented policy worked out successfully, then it should have eventually brought about the social cohesion (p. 279).

Nevertheless, in truth, the manifestation of cultural differences between East and West Germans gradually intensified. The longer the period of separation was, the greater was the chasm that appeared in the two nations’ worldviews as a result of each state’s distinctive socialization (Hur, 2012, p. 280). Hur (2012) suggests three phases of the mentalität (way of thinking or mentality) differentiation process observed in the two German nations as the maintenance of homogeneity phase (1945 – the late 1960s), the appearance of differentiation phase (until the mid-1970s), and the intensification of differentiation phase (until reunification in 1990) (p. 280).

While the two German nations’ distinctive mentalität was being constructed, there also were efforts to build bridges among the divided people through arts and culture, leveraged by both private and public initiatives. Yang and Kim (1991), who have researched cultural exchanges before and after German reunification, indicate two important transitional events in the history of inter-German cultural exchanges: the Basic Treaty in 1972 and a Cultural Agreement in 1986. From the year of the division to the Basic Treaty (1945 –1972), cultural exchanges were attempted and conducted mostly by private initiatives. Exceptional times also existed when political relations posed an obstacle to the exchange activities, such as the beginning of the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961 (Yang & Kim, 1991, p. 23). Because there was no treaty or agreement on the cultural exchanges between East and West Germany during this time, most cultural events were conducted by private initiatives on a small scale. Exchanged genres of the arts include play, opera, and orchestral music, and for Goethe Institute events and the Bach Festival, artists from both German states came together in East Germany. Even though such activities were led by private entities during the earlier phase of the cultural exchange efforts,
unlike the East, the West German government sponsored the cultural exchange efforts (Yang & Kim, 1991, p. 24).

After the two German states signed the Basic Treaty in December 1972, cultural exchanges were reinforced between East and West Germany (Yang & Kim, 1991). During this period, scholar and student exchanges began and more diverse arts forms and artists were exchanged, like jazz performers, pop singers, writers, publications, films and TV programs. A comparison of the numbers of films and performances sent to the counterpart shows that West Germany more actively sought and engaged in cultural exchange opportunities. Furthermore, the Basic Treaty triggered discussions about a Cultural Agreement between the two states. Finally in May 1986, after 13 years of debate, which also includes the three years of the exchange discontinuation period (1966-1969), the Agreement was made (Yang & Kim, 1991, pp. 24, 30).

The Cultural Agreement brought about a significant increase in private and public cultural exchange activities. According to Yang and Kim (1991), from October, 1988 to March, 1989, there were 563 cultural exchange projects planned by state governments, civic organizations, and university and research institutions, among others. The 384 arts exchange projects constituted more than a half of the total projects (p. 25). The time period between the Cultural Agreement and the German reunification (1986-1990) showed that the West German government was proactive in leading the cultural exchanges with the East Germany. The large influx of West German cultural products, from music to visual art, and from theatre to literature, into East German territory acknowledged the positive impact of culture on the upcoming reunification (Yang & Kim, 1991, p. 25).

Such a trend of imbalance of cultural influx from West to East tended to be sustained even after the reunification. As Banchoff (1999) writes, “In economic, social, and cultural terms, […] reunification brought about extensive changes, mainly in the East” (p. 145). Based on the following statement of Blacksell (1999) explaining why ‘reunification’ is a more proper term to describe the two Germanies’ union than ‘unification,’ one can infer how West German culture
prevalts over East German culture and is tacitly regarded as contributing the majority of ‘culture’ in forming the reunified Germany's national identity.

During 1990, when frantic preparations were being made for a united Germany, there was some debate as to whether the process should be referred to as ‘reunification’, or ‘unification’, the distinction being that the former embodied an explicit historical continuity, including a single national identity, while the latter signaled a new beginning. [Here.] ‘reunification’ has been used quite intentionally, because the new Germany is clearly an extension of [West Germany] as originally constituted, and [West Germany] itself claims to have evolved directly from the Deutsche Reich of 1971 (Blacksell, 1999, p. 32).

According to what Banchoff (1999) and Blacksell (1999) indicates above, West Germany’s previous assimilationist strategy, which performed as socialization of the East Germans who came to live in the West, seems to have extended through the reunification process and beyond.

In contemplating reasons for retaining the migration policy strategy, the given ‘frantic preparation’ circumstances could be one of them. As known to many, indeed, the reunification of Germany occurred at a fast speed. The rapid merger of East and West Germany engendered some drawbacks, and one of the significant issues being discussed recently has been ‘social cohesion’ following the reunification. A seed of the problem can be traced to the initial preparation process of German reunification. Winkler (1994) notes when the German Unification Treaty was created under West Germany’s leadership, East Germans were “not invited” to participate in the social dialogue (p. 226). In addition to such exclusion, different cultures of East and West, developed during the divided years, hampered social integration. While pursuing true unity, reunified Germany had to confront the two cultures, which somehow conflicted with each other. Hancock and Welsh (1994) testify “cultural and not material differences are widely perceived as the major stumbling block in the formation of a unified German society with [shared political norms and values]” (p. 317). In the German case, it seems that the new federal states of Germany at first dismissed the cultural difference, which developed through political socialization and consumption of popular culture, and reacted to the existing difference after it
became an issue (Yang & Kim, 1991; Hur, 2012). Again, Germany’s social cohesion process too was implemented based on assimilation; more specifically, East Germans had to accept and adopt the norms and socio-political values of West Germans (Grüning 2011; Hancock & Welsh, 1994; Hur, 2012; Yang & Kim, 1991).

The new German government seemed to believe that emphasizing its old national culture alone would be sufficient to resolve the existing social and cultural chasms between the two groups that had experienced more than 40 years of separation. The new government made an effort to retrieve its cultural heritage which may facilitate reconciliation amongst its citizens. German cultural policy is dedicated to the restoration and preservation of cultural heritage and to developing a cultural infrastructure in the former East German territory, especially for the first ten years following reunification (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012, p. 23). The Unification Treaty Chapter VIII Culture, Education and Science, Sport – article 35 reveals the new German government’s commitment to revitalizing of its historic cultural capital, as follows:

(1) In the years of division, culture and the arts – despite different paths of development taken by the two states in Germany – formed one of the foundations for the continuing unity of the German nation. The position and prestige of a united Germany in the world depend not only on its political weight and its economic strength, but also on its role in the cultural domain. The overriding objective of external cultural policy shall be cultural exchange based on partnership and cooperation. […]

(4) The cultural institutions which have been under central management to date shall come under the responsibility of the Länder [or regional state] or local authorities in whose territory they are located. In exceptional cases, the possibility of the Federation making a contribution to financing shall not be ruled out, particularly in Land Berlin.

(5) The part of the former Prussian state collections which were separated as a result of post-war events … shall be joined together again in Berlin. The Prussian Cultural Heritage Foundation shall assume responsibility for the time being. Future arrangements shall likewise involve an agency that is responsible for the former Prussian state collections in their entirety and is based in Berlin…. (Hancock & Welsh, 1994, p. 366)

From 1991 to 1993 following reunification, the German federal government allocated 2.8 billion Deutsche Marks for cultural heritage conservation projects in the former East German
territories, thus providing emergency funds to 230 heritages and cultural institutions (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012, p. 23). Also until 1994, cultural fund (kulturfonds) endowment was established and largely supported cultural programs in the eastern part of the country. These programs included: (1) funding play and orchestra organizations and heritage museums in the former East German territories, (2) supporting former East German artists and arts institutions that emerged at the times of the Eastern bloc’s collapse, (3) planning for the artists’ welfare, (4) offering fellowships for arts students in the nation and abroad, and (5) conserving of leading industrial culture (Yang & Kim, 1991, p. 33). Moreover, the federal government continued to provide funds until 2004 to preserve national treasures located in the eastern part of the country, under the project title, the ‘Kulturelle Leuchttürme’ (Cultural Lighthouses). The German government also allocated about € 100 billion to the cultural sector in the former East German territories, as the second Solidarity Pact (an economic plan) came into force in 2005 (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012, p. 23).

Despite of the extensive scale of investment in the arts and cultural heritages, the reunified Germany’s cultural policy received criticism of its attempts to uproot the elements of East German culture. As a counter-effect of the elimination effort, a subculture (Teilcultur) emerged as a substitute of the East German culture amongst the former East German people (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012, pp. 24-25). This subculture was perhaps a reflection of the former East Germans’ hesitation to accept the West German culture in the midst of their ‘identity crisis’ as well as while still “viewing one another with resentment and suspicion” (Banchoff, 1999, p. 145). It is likely that “the effects of West German dominance have contributed significantly to the crisis of East German identity and the lack of community-building in the [re]unified Germany,” as Hancock and Welsh (1994, p. 318).

Three points can be taken from the German reunification and its cultural policy, as applicable lessons to the Korean case. First, it is never too early to begin preparations for social cohesion. Although there were periods of discontinuation, arts exchanges between the two
German states were conducted almost throughout the years of separation. Nevertheless, reconciliation and creating solidarity do not appear to be successful at least in the first one or two decades after reunification. Perhaps it was because of the imbalance in exchanges as discussed. Next, assimilationist strategy toward defectors from the counterpart can be easily retained even in the social cohesion policy after unification, if there is no proper policy that is ready to pick up and use. Germany, especially West Germany had prepared for reunification for a long time, however; it turned out that its policy was developed mostly focusing on institutional unity, rather than social and cultural. Solely investing in and emphasizing cultural heritage and national culture proved to be not enough to generate a sense of community or solidarity as one society. Last, cultural policy emphasizing a dominant culture can impede the generation of the ‘generalized social networks’ and social cohesion. The South Korean government also needs to pay attention to this lesson point because the Unification Consciousness Survey reports that the rate of North Korean defectors’ experience of South Korean arts and culture exceeds South Koreans’ experience of North Korean culture (IPUS, 2013b).

**National Identity Building in Post-Apartheid South Africa**

“Apartheid effectively created two nations; one white, the other black. South Africa became two political communities in a single national territory” (Baines, 1999, p. 2). During apartheid, South Africa not only was divided by racial difference as Baines notes, but it also lost its basis of solidarity as one nation. According to Ramutsindela (1997), the differentiation process between dominant white minority and African majority resulted in South Africa lacking “common ground on which national identity could be developed” and construct multiple “national entities” (pp. 100, 103). In the transition to democracy that occurred in 1994, therefore, South Africa’s nation formation policy contained a quest for constructing a new national identity to encourage citizens to accept different community members as their fellow citizens (Baines, 1998). To build a unified nation, South Africa also strove to erase traces of discrimination from the apartheid era by
promoting equality and diversity. For instance, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) used “the process of disclosure and reconciliation as catharsis, thereby uniting a very fragmented society through the experience of healing” (Mistry, 2001, p. 8). Likewise, South Africa began to search for an overarching national identity and to promote unity while at the same time striving to maintain equality in diversity.

In the process of nation-building, as the TRC has been conceived as a ‘bridge-building’ process, the Constitution of South Africa lays out a rational foundation for social bonding and building a new national identity (South African Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, 2014). Especially a logic of connecting somehow conflicting concepts of diversity and unity is articulated in South Africa’s Constitution. As stated in the Constitutional Guidelines,

it shall be the state policy to promote the growth of a single national identity and loyalty binding all South Africans. At the same time, the state shall recognize the linguistic and cultural diversity of the people and provide facilities for free linguistic and cultural development (Degenaar, 1991, p. 13, as cited in Ramutsindela, 1997, p. 108)

Ramutsindela (1997) indicates that “The [Government of National Unity (GNU)] and the final constitution [observe] cultural differences but subject them to a common national identity” (p. 107). Additionally in the preamble of the new constitution, the ethos of unity in diversity is clearly conveyed as follows: “we, the people of South Africa, […] Believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity” (Republic of South Africa, 1996 as cited in Ramutsindela, 1997, p. 108). The slogan, ‘unity in diversity’ had been worked through the ‘rainbow nation’ campaign with the African National Congress (ANC) government under the leadership of then-President Nelson Mandela (1994-1998) (Baines, 1998; Mistry, 2001).

‘The Rainbow Nation’ campaign celebrates cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity in South Africa. In accordance with ‘unity in diversity’, its concept also puts an emphasis on “the

co-existence of collective and individual identities, [that is,] different cultures but shared South Africanness” (Mistry, 2001, p. 12). The metaphor of ‘rainbow’ is well described in McAllister’s (1995) statement. He notes:

The rainbow symbolises a range of cultural groups represented by discrete colours and hues which blur into one another; none of which is completely distinct but each is essential to the composition of the entire spectrum. The rainbow is incomplete without each of the colours, but none of the colours or strands is dominant over the other (as cited in Baines, 1998, p. 6)

In this respect, the rainbow nation of South Africa exhibits a core value of its national identity as “a highly mediated imaginary belonging which co-exists with rather than subsumes other sub-national identities” (Baines, 1998, p. 6). Also, it is important to note that social identities in South Africa are perceived to be fluid. With the end of the apartheid era, social identities had to be renegotiated along with the change of socio-political structure and the formation of new normative principals in South Africa (Baines, 1998). The reconfiguration of identities, furthermore, expanded into the process of constructing a new national identity.

To disseminate the rhetoric of a rainbow nation to the public, the media, in broadcasting and commercials, was used as a ‘cultural carrier’ (Baines, 1998). Baines (1998) reported how the media was employed to promote a united South African national identity. In the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC)-TV, a public broadcaster, a TV program called ‘Simunye – We are one’ was repeatedly aired. Even the commercials of some private companies involved the message of a united nation. For example, a brewery company’s slogan, ‘One Beer, One Nation’ was used for Castle Lager promotion. In addition to promoting national unity through the media, the new South African government attempted to overcome the demarcation of the past by redistricting local governments. Regarding this policy, Ramutsindela (1997) remarks that “The mixing of racial and tribal groups into common local government has implications for the ‘rainbow’ national identity being forged because it means subjecting tribal and ethnic identities to a collective identity” (p. 107). That is, mixing groups of people with different cultures and values
within the same local government could be the South African government’s policy, with aims of encouraging the citizens’ increasing interactions and thus to naturally form a shared identity.

The South African case, thus far, reveals that the government took a leading role in the national identity building initiatives in South Africa through establishing the new Constitution and conducting the rainbow nation campaign. However, the merging of different socio-cultural groups into a common local government reveals a different approach to the mere top-down approach, because doing so can facilitate a collective identity from the grassroots level. The top-down approach in South Africa seems to have continued until the establishment of ‘Advocates for Social Cohesion,’ a citizen engagement program consisting of a group of influential people representing different sectors across culture, economics, and politics. The appointed members of ‘Advocates for Social Cohesion’ are expected to commit to ‘the National Social Cohesion Summit’ report submitted to the nation’s president, and to work toward building a caring nation with mutual respect (South African Department of Arts and Culture, 2012a). Although ‘Advocates for Social Cohesion’ is composed of the elite, the inclusion of citizens in the policy formulation process is noteworthy.

In recent years, the use of the ‘rainbow’ metaphor has almost disappeared and been replaced by the South African government’s emphasis on social cohesion and nation-building in national policy. Interestingly, the South African Department of Arts and Culture (DAC or the department) has taken a leading role in the policy initiative for social cohesion and nation-building. The DAC’s vision statement captures its tasks in fostering artistic values and economic and social impact of the arts and culture as follows: “We are a thriving arts, culture and heritage sector contributing to sustainable economic development, leveraging on partnerships for a socially cohesive nation” (DAC, 2014). Also, the 2012 National Social Cohesion Summit report identifies the department’s role in social cohesion and nation-building initiatives as public custodian of the diverse cultures, languages and heritage of the people of South Africa and as the national leader in providing public support for the development of innovation across the full spectrum of the arts as creative,
economic and social practices, and as bearers of a dynamic society. (DAC, 2012b)

In other words, this statement can be interpreted as a public entity, and the department’s role includes promoting cultural diversity and social empowerment through funding and other types of support for arts activities that impact society.

As a part of implementing its mission, the department runs a program that fosters dialogues among community members for social cohesion. Although further information about the program is not available, the department illustrates that the program’s objective is to provide platforms for communities “to identify projects that help in nurturing, understanding and cooperation between different communities” (DAC, 2013). Therefore, rather than creating a program for its citizens, the DAC appears to have a program which stimulates local or provincial governments to find and develop adequate a program for their residents. In addition, the department has been also employing diverse arts disciplines to promote social cohesion and nation-building, according to the department’s work briefing. In this report, the department has supported festivals to stimulate citizens’ participation in diverse cultures celebrated in South Africa. Also, through theatre productions, non-racist ideas and multicultural beliefs and practices have been promoted. Unlike festivals and theatres, on the other hand, exhibitions, especially heritage landscapes, involve challenging issues related to South Africa’s politically sensitive history. Portrayals of South African cultural legacies and rich histories are acknowledged for carrying “huge potential for building national identity and social cohesion”; but at the same time, they also represent people’s struggles in the apartheid era (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). It is noteworthy that the heritage exhibitions, memorials, and monuments can further serve as reminders of the struggles of apartheid. Instead of cultural heritage, thus, the DAC tends to use national symbols, such as the national flag, to stimulate national identity building and social cohesion (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). For national symbols are not only artistically representing national pride but also connote the nation’s spirit, value, and cultures.
The department’s national leader role in social cohesion and nation-building would be impossible without the South African government’s acknowledgement of the impact of the arts and culture on a society. The ‘Medium Term Strategic Framework on priority outcomes for 2014-2019’ (MTSF) report (2014), which was composed to provide a framework for policy plans of local, provincial, and national government during the electoral term, recognizes the crucial impact of the arts and culture (South African Department of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), 2014a). The MTSF demonstrates:

Cultural activities and art can also play a major role in facilitating the sharing of common spaces. In addition art can foster values and facilitate dialogue and healing, thus restoring pride among African, Indian and Coloured South Africans. The country must support and encourage the production of art work and stories that facilitate healing, nation building and dialogue (DPME, 2014b, p. 4).

Furthermore, the MTSF report contains a total of 14 ‘priority outcomes’ and for each outcome it briefly indicates which ministry is responsible for which actions of policy implementation with desired outcomes. Under each priority outcome, multiple sub-outcomes are listed. For ‘Outcome 14: Nation Building and Social Cohesion,’ five sub-outcomes are listed: (1) fostering constitutional values, (2) equal opportunities, inclusion and redress, (3) promoting social cohesion across society through increased interaction across race and class, (4) promoting active citizenry and leadership, and (5) fostering a social compact (DPME, 2014b). Each sub-outcome is followed by actions and what the DAC is responsible to implement:

- Promote the Bill of Responsibility, Constitutional values and national symbols amongst children in schools
- Use National Days as a platform for promoting Constitutional values
- Build non-racialism through community dialogues and hosting of national summit on Action Plan to combat racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance
- Promote social cohesion in schools
- Promote heritage and culture: Ensure government invests in the cultural and creative industries, particularly in film, music, arts and craft, books and

publishing; Honour and celebrate our collective heritage by promoting our
diverse cultural identities; Promote our new museums and monuments and
preserve existing ones to depict and preserve the heritage of our people;
[and] Promote a Liberation Heritage Route that honours the heroes and
heroines of the struggle
• Transform the utilization of currently marginalised languages
• Use international events to promote South Africa as a diverse socially
cohesive nation
• Crafting a social compact for a more democratic; equal and more prosperous
society derived from the social cohesion summit

Some of the listed actions are designed to implement through cooperation with other assigned
ministry. The list of actions confirms that the DAC is in charge of not only the prosperity of the
South African arts sector, but also socio-cultural issues at the national level. Each action is also
paired with indicator(s) for its assessment and a target to reach. For example, to judge the
success of policy implementation about ‘promoting social cohesion in schools’, ‘number of artists
placed in schools’ has set as an indicator and ‘10% increase of schools offering an ‘arts’ subject’
by the year of 2019 as a target (DPME, 2014b).

The South African government also attempts to identify the level of ‘forging a new
overarching identity’ which is one of the projected social impacts of the policy agenda,27 ‘nation
building and social cohesion.’ In order to examine the country’s status quo in terms of forging a
new overarching identity, national pride, self-awareness as a member of the country, and
consciousness about national symbols will be tested, through three ‘impact indicators’ – (1) pride
in being South African, (2) identity based on self-description, and (3) the 5-point Likert-type
index: national symbols flag/constitution/national anthem as very important (DPME, 2014b).

In summary, the South African government formulated and implemented a policy agenda
for social cohesion and nation-building since its new beginning of the nation, in the post-
apartheid era. In the social cohesion and nation-building process, national identity building was

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27 The impact indicators consist of five categories: fostering Constitutional values; equal opportunities
inclusion and redress; promoting social cohesion across society; active citizenry and leadership; and forging
a new overarching identity.
emphasized more during President Mandela’s administration than subsequent administrations. However, it seems that creating an overarching collective identity has been a part of the national policy agenda for social cohesion since the inception of the new South Africa and constantly implemented at the local, provincial, and national levels. Furthermore, the impact of the arts and culture has been recognized and thus the DAC has engaged with policy discussions, planning, and implementation at the national level accompanied with taking a guiding role for local and provincial governments. Efforts of employing the arts and culture to open public dialogues about long existing social issues in South Africa can provide learning lessons for the case of the Korean peninsula.

However, a large part of the South African policy agenda has remained a top-down approach. Regarding this, Waskashe, Director General at the DAC, addressed the insufficiency of top-end intellectuals’ engagement with social cohesion issues as a failure factor of the policy strategies. A need for balance in the policy discussions is also observed, which can be resolved by inviting experts, researchers, and people who work in the field (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010). Indeed, as Waskashe suggests, an ‘organic’ approach would be crucial in the process of social cohesion and national identity building even though it may take longer and pose a challenge. As a precedent case, such South African policy makers’ discussions about shifting gears from top-down to an ‘organic’ strategy can provide a lesson that the horizontal approach for national identity building may not lead the way to success.

**Formulating Policy Strategy: Triple-Bottom Lines and Lesson-Drawing**

Compared with the German and South African cases, the social cohesion process for Korean unification is situated in its own distinctive circumstances in terms of time and place. Not only are the cultural, economic, and political circumstances of the problem that each nation encounters distinct, but the governance system, degree of democratization, and arts that work in each place are also different. Nevertheless, there exists a contingency between the precedent experiences of
the two countries and the Korean case, which makes it possible to draw lessons from Germany and South Africa for developing a policy strategy for the new Korea. With the German Reunification, first, geo-political separation accompanied by an ideological confrontation between democracy and socialism is one of the substantial commonalities that the circumstances of the Korean peninsula resemble. In the case of South Africa, although there were not two different states in one nation, severe discrimination and demarcation by race had created hostility between the two races. Thus, the psychological and physical division over time caused the new South Africa to seek reconciliation and social cohesion. This problem is likely what a unified Korean society would encounter. Hence, the cultural policies implemented in Germany and South Africa have been gathered to inform an arts-based policy strategy for the uncertain, future socio-political situation on the Korean peninsula. To legitimately borrow the policy strategies practiced in Germany and South Africa or adopt lessons of what not to do, this research refers Rose’s (1993) concept of lesson-drawing.

According to Rose (1993), lesson-drawing is a practice, rather than a theory, which concerned with transferring what is learned from selected cases (or lessons) to problems that public officials deal with. In his terms, additionally, “A lesson is a detailed cause-and-effect description of a set of actions that government can consider in the light of experience elsewhere, including a prospective evaluation of whether what is done elsewhere could someday become effective here” (Rose, 1993, p. 27). To note, lesson-drawing can be adopted between local or state/provincial governments in the same nation, as well as from international cases.

The lesson-drawing process is comprised of four analytical steps, starting with ‘searching experience’ for policy programs, to ‘abstracting a cause-and-effect model’ of the observed, ‘creating a lesson,’ and ‘drawing a prospective evaluation’ (Rose, 1993). However, a full description of the lesson-drawing process, from searching to making a prospective evaluation, is beyond the scope of this research. It is partly because lessons from the German Reunification and South Africa’s national identity building can be considered secondary source of information for
an arts-based policy strategy development, in addition to the findings of the case analysis
designed and conducted for this research. Therefore, applying the entire process of lesson-
drawing would not be feasible for this research.

There are five possible ways of lesson-drawing: (1) ‘copying,’ (2) ‘adaptation,’ (3)
‘making a hybrid,’ (4) ‘synthesis,’ and (5) ‘inspiration.’ ‘Copying’, is considered simple, but
challenging to do, more so when the experience or policy program to copy is an international
case. Next, ‘adaptation’ can be useful “when a program in effect elsewhere is the starting point
for the design of a new program allowing for differences in institutions, culture, and historical
specifics” (Rose, 1993, p. 31). ‘Making a hybrid’ is creating a lesson by combining selected,
useful measures of two different programs. Similarly, a ‘synthesis’ also combines different
elements from different places, but familiar to the one that is adopting, and then transforms it to a
new program reflecting its own distinctive circumstances. ‘Inspiration’ is, on the other hand, a
relatively less analytic way of lesson-drawing because this type of lesson-drawing uses the
experience of elsewhere as a reference to develop a new and original program.

It is difficult to clearly identify which type of lesson-drawing may be used in this
research, since this study did not select and focus on any specific policy programs, but looked
more broadly at precedent cases of social cohesion and national identity building in other nations.
Also, there could be cross values – especially between adaptation, hybrid, and synthesis – to some
extent. Roughly, however, what this research attempts to do may be close to ‘synthesis,’ for it
combines elements from the precedent cases that are culturally, socially, and politically relevant
to Korean case and attempts to develop a distinctive arts-based policy strategy for the social
cohesion of a unified Korea.

Accompanied by the lesson-drawing practice, Wyszomirski’s (2013) concept of triple-
bottom line for arts policy will be adopted in generating implications from the case analysis of
this research, North Korean defectors’ arts practices. Three principal organizational values that
have been highly regarded in the nonprofit arts sector are “financial sustainability, artistic vitality,
and recognized public value” (Wyszomirski, 2013, p. 156). Wyszomirski (2013) derives the triple-bottom line through her observation of National Endowment for the Arts’s (NEA) substantial involvement in a meta-policy constitution. In the beginning of constructing the triple-bottom line standard, she indicates: “Each bottom line was first cast as a problem or deficit for which the NEA had to develop a policy solution through a process of learning and adaptation” (Wyszomirski, 2013, p. 157). Following the same rationale, this research likewise attempts to uncover ‘bottom-lines’ which may need a policy solution through identifying issues or problems addressed in the collected data, then develops arts-based policy strategies that address those issues.

As aforementioned, in order to operationalize the findings and lessons analytically, an arts-based policy strategy needs to be developed. For policy strategy design, from identifying problems to opening policy windows, this study adopts Kingdon’s theory of policy formation. In Kingdon’s (2003) account, “[a] governmental agenda is a list of subjects to which officials are paying some serious attention at any given time” (p. 196). However, not all policy subjects get the attention they deserve; some receive a great deal of attention, while others are overlooked. Kingdon states that “[a]gendas are not first set and then alternatives generated; instead, alternatives must be advocated for a long period before a short-run opportunity present itself on an agenda” (2003, p. 206). There is less chance for new ideas to be adopted as a policy agenda right away; “[i]nstead, people recombine familiar elements into a new structure or a new proposal” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 124). In other words, a large set of alternatives contributes to constructing sound public policy.

Developing policy agenda and alternatives involves “three streams of processes: problems, policies, and politics” (Kingdon, 2003, p. 197). First and foremost, recognizing problems is important in policy design. For problem recognition, indicators, focusing events, and feedback from existing policy programs address social needs for governmental policy actions or resolutions. Once a problem is identified, policy options that can cope with the existing problem
need to be formulated. The stage of policy formulation “involves identifying and assessing possible solutions to policy problems or, to put it another way, exploring the various options or alternative courses of action available for addressing a problem” (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p. 110). In this process, a policy option should identify “the technical and political constraints on state action” (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009, p. 135) and demonstrate its feasibility by featuring a mix of multiple policy instruments. Another important factor that should be considered in the policy formulation process is “the ‘cohesiveness’ or ‘closedness’ of policy subsystems” (Howlett, Ramesh, and Perl, 2009, p. 136).

These guidelines for developing a policy, more specifically, an arts-based policy strategy in the case of this research, consider forming a frame filled with the lessons drawn from the cases of Germany and South Africa and triple-bottom lines of the North Korean defector arts programs and organizations within the context of social cohesion. Consequently, as an outcome of the study this research develops an arts-based policy strategy in Chapter Seven.
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapters, historical background, relevant concepts and research have been reviewed and synthesized into a conceptual framework for this research. In addition to developing the framework, this dissertation research also involves analysis of existing cases. Employing a case study is an important part of this research especially considering it is designed to inform an arts-based policy strategy to stimulate social cohesion of a united Korean society. Examining the case and emerging interpretations reaped at the end of the analysis process are expected to lead us to comprehend the circumstances of North Korean defectors’ arts practices engaging South Korean audiences and also to discern gaps between theoretical logic and the ecological reality in the field. Moreover, meanings and a holistic view about the social phenomenon distilled from the grounded theory approach serve as crucial informing sources in creating a cultural policy strategy. In other words, accompanied with conceptual discussions, the case analysis will produce essential inputs in speculating and articulating how to narrow the gap or improve the reality through using a cultural policy strategy.

This dissertation research is engaged in qualitative research which is known to involve “an interpretive, naturalistic approach to the world” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2000, p. 3). According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), “qualitative researchers study things in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of, or to interpret, phenomena in terms of the meanings people bring to

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28 In Creswell’s (2013) account, natural settings are where qualitative researchers have direct interactions with research participants over time; they include any granted spatial constraints or setup of the research. Creswell further illustrates the setting as follows: “qualitative researcher often collect data in the field at the site where [research] participants experience the issue or problem under study. They do not bring individuals into a lab (a contrived situation), nor do they typically send out instruments for individuals to complete, such as in survey research. Instead, qualitative researcher gather up-close information by actually talking directly to people and seeing them behave and act within their context” (p. 45).
them” (p. 3). In other words, a qualitative researcher strives to understand the perspectives of the research participants and to perceive the subject matters or problems of a study closely to the participants’ view, through interactions at various degrees, observations, and other practices.

This dissertation research adopts the Interpretivist perspective. While wrestling on the ground of qualitative research, commensurability stood out as an unavoidable issue to ponder as a researcher in an interdisciplinary academic domain. Admitting the complex and unfixed nature of the arts administration and policy domain, I have attempted to engage with logical empiricism, the progressed positivist way of perceiving the issues at the stage of developing an arts-based policy strategy. Indeed, the interdisciplinary inquiry of this research appears to demand a somewhat creative methodological research setting. Since informing an arts-based policy strategy to stimulate social cohesion in a process of a Korean unification is a projected outcome of this research, the objectivity and validity of the study’s findings to a minimum extent is inevitable in developing an applicable policy strategy.

In this chapter, within the layers of the research structure, – that is, a conceptual model, case analysis, and policy strategy development, I attempt to map out the threefold methodological design of this research: philosophical assumptions in which this research is situated; how to research the researched; and lastly, what methods were used to conduct this research. While demonstrating my study’s methodological organization, I will discuss justifications of my approach to the research inquiry and explain how I implemented a combination of the multiple methods: participatory-observation, semi-structured interviews, and grounded survey.

5.1 Situating the Study in (Fluid) Paradigms

Denzin and Lincoln (2000) define a paradigm as “basic sets of beliefs and feelings about the world and how it should be understood and studied” (as cited in Kezar 2004, p. 43). In other words, a paradigm not only sets a theoretical and methodological boundary of research, but also embodies a perspective through which a researcher looks at research problems. Usher (1996), in
the same vein, refers to “a paradigm” as “a framework” (as cited in Glesne, 2010, p. 5) that
guides a researcher in the process of speculating and determining what types of questions should
be investigated and what theories, concepts and methods need to be employed in search of
acceptable answer(s). Therefore, identifying a paradigm wherein a research is situated can guide
the researcher to articulate assumptions of research as well as methods, and finally to forge a
bedrock of the study (Glesne 2010; Kezar 2004). Therefore, in this section I attempt to situate the
study in a paradigm fitting with the direction of the research after exploring relevant scholarly
discussions of paradigms, proliferation, and commensurability.

Paradigms have been classified into four categories29: Positivism, Interpretivism, Critical
Theory, and Poststructuralism (Glesne, 2010; Lather & St. Pierre, 2007; Sipe and Constable,
1996).30 But generally, classification of paradigms is not considered rigid or permanent. The
paradigms are a rather “loosely bonded grouping of assumptions, philosophies, and theories” and
may have changed over time reflecting changes of scholarly thoughts and worlds (Glesne, 2010,
p. 6). In addition, Laurel Richardson points out that the paradigmatic categories “are fluid,
indeed what should be a category keeps altering, enlarging […] and] even as we write, the
boundaries between the paradigms are shifting” (as cited in Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 167).
Although the fluid or blurred of distinctions between paradigms has been observed and widely
accepted in the field of qualitative inquiry, such characteristics should not be considered to be the
equivalent of ‘commensurability’ of paradigms (philosophies) – in other words, fluidity between
paradigms may not allow the researcher to “blend […] elements of one paradigm into another”
involuntarily (Lincoln & Guba, 2000, p. 174).

29 There can also be a fifth paradigm, if we included ‘Neo-positivism,’ so-called post-post, as referred to in
30 As Glesne (2010) and Sipe and Constable (1996) indicate, different scholars may use different
terminologies of paradigms. For example, as Glesne (2010) notes, ‘Postpositivism’ sometimes refers to “a
less strict form of positivism, [and at other times to] all the paradigms other than early positivism” (p. 7).
In Denzin and Lincoln’s publication, Handbook of Qualitative Research (2000), I found paradigms are
categorized using different terminology from that of Lather and St. Pierre (2007). Thus, to avoid
confusion, I have identified the terms of paradigms to which this research adopts.
Regarding commensurability of paradigms, there have been different views and understandings among scholars in qualitative inquiry. As one of the claims, Lincoln and Guba (2000) acknowledge that previously conflicting paradigms “may now appear … to be informing one another’s arguments” (p. 164). However, such ‘interbreeding’ is plausible, they think, “if the models (paradigms) share axiomatic elements that are similar, or that resonate strongly between them” (p. 174). Also, if a research only attempts to “‘pick and choose’ among the axioms of [paradigms that] are contradictory and mutually exclusive,” commensurability becomes contestable (p. 174). While Lincoln and Guba conditionally approve commensurability, Nespor seems to be embrace commensurability by questioning an origin of incommensurability. In Nespor’s (2006) account, incommensurability may not be naturally born; rather, it may be “purposefully constructed to strengthen world boundaries,” which also can refer to framed paradigms (p. 116). Another perspective, which can be seen as somewhat radical, held by some other scholars (e.g., mixed-methods adherents) is that the incommensurability (incomparability) thesis has expired. This claim appeared to live a short life with the resurgence of scientific based research, yet mixed-methodologies remain in ascendancy (Denzin, 2008). To sum up, despite the difference in degrees, the qualitative research field is inclined to endorse the commensurability of paradigms.

Such recognition of commensurability appears to pertain to paradigm proliferation. In the context of proliferation, Lather (2006) observes the direction in which research of our time is moving as follows:

in a context of a historical time marked by multiplicity and competing discourses that do not map tidily onto one another, … [the move] from a narrow scientism … toward an expanded notion of scientificity more capable of sustaining the social sciences … [is] toward a recognition that we all do our work within a crisis of authority and legitimization, proliferation and fragmentation of centers, and blurred genres. (p. 47)

Additionally, Lather (2006) asserts that a growing number of researchers in the education field tend to endorse that their works are produced within “a disunified science and its contested,
polyvocal and in-flux nature” (p. 47). Even though Lather’s statement is grounded in the context of education research, the ‘polyvocal and in-flux paradigmatic nature’ is not be something only education researchers encounter; many others whose research lies in the boundaries of qualitative inquiry also have been dealing with or within it. The embodiment of increasingly diverse viewpoints in the qualitative society and researchers’ endeavor to “make novel connections” have attested to the proliferation of paradigms (Nespor, 2006, p. 123).

With regard to that, especially interdisciplinary researchers strive to build new connections between different concepts and notions. Perhaps, the nature of interdisciplinary research domains imminently demand the researcher to practice the multiplicities in proliferating paradigms. While my research adopts the interpretivist paradigm to understand socio-cultural phenomena and research participants’ actions and ideas, I also attempt to engage in positivist idea, more specifically, the ‘logical empiricism paradigm’ in Glesne’s (2010) terminology, at the phase of creating arts-based policy strategy.

As Glesne (2010) explains, logical empiricism is deemed as a modification of positivism, and thus sometimes is identified as postpositivism – in this case referring to a less strict form of positivism (see the footnote 30). Since this is modified positivism, its worldview slightly leans toward the postpositivist family (referring to the rest of the paradigms). Thus, most researchers within logical empiricism adhere to the belief that “the world is not knowable with certainty. [However,] they continue to use and value procedures and languages associated with the scientific method and to assert that research can reveal ‘good enough’ objective facts that can assist in making generalizations and predictions regarding social behavior” (Glesne, 2010, p. 6). Efforts to produce an arts-based policy strategy in this research engage in objectivity to a certain extent as well, in order for the strategy to be applicable to social problems. However, this study does not rely on the scientific method. Rather, it focuses on understanding the (projected) roles of the North Korean performing arts and culture the research participants have been presenting and its possible meanings in Korean society, while pursuing social cohesion in a unified Korean
society. In other words, despite involving objectivity, this study mainly looks through the interpretivist lens.

The interpretivist traditions’ view of the world is that “reality is socially constructed, complex, and ever changing” (Glesne, 2010, p. 8). Works within Interpretivism aim to understand as large as the world and society and as small as situations and issues from the research participants’ perspective(s). In order to achieve this goal, researchers interact with the participants while avoiding “active intervention” and strive to understand their social contexts and reflections on their experiences (Glesne, 2010; Sipe and Constable, 1996, p. 160). Glesne (2010) articulates how interacting with participants helps researchers possibly grasp their collective cultures and notions.

…realities [constructed by people’s actions of interpreting and meaning making] are viewed as existing, however, not only in the mind of the individual, but also as social constructions in that individualistic perspectives interact with the language and thought of the wider society. Thus, accessing the perspectives of several members of the same social group about some phenomena can begin to say something about cultural patterns of thoughts and action for that group (p. 8).

To note with emphasis, if a researcher builds a reciprocal relationship with research participants, the participants are not considered to be ‘subjects’, but valued informants who guide the researcher to learn about how they view the world (Belenky et al., 1986, as cited in Sipe and Constable, 1996; Glesne, 2010).

In addition to interaction with participants, there are more attributions attached to the interpretivist research approach. As shown, ‘Table 5.1’ is organized by Glesne (2010) to juxtapose the positivist and interpretivist approaches in order to distinguish between the two paradigms. Based on this table, I attempt to illustrate how this research partly borrows a couple of featured values from logical empiricism (positivism), while remaining within the interpretivist boundary. As marked with checks next to the lists, this study has adapted the interpretivist way of assuming, aiming, approaching, and playing the researcher’s role. On the other hand, from the modified positivist approach, generalizability and objective portrayal seem to be applicable of the
listings. When developing a policy strategy, some findings of this study may need to be
generalized in order to go into effect as a policy because policies do not solely focus on one
particular case, but rather attempt to be used for improving a generalized phenomenon to benefit
the public. Also, my role as a researcher has rested on both ‘objective portrayal’ of what I have
observed during the data gathering process; and ‘empathic understanding’ mostly emerged during
close observation and data analysis. Detailed descriptions of my observation will be addressed
later in the Section 5.3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Positivist Approach</th>
<th>Interpretivist Approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>• Social facts have an objective reality</td>
<td>• Reality is socially constructed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Variables can be identified and relationships measured</td>
<td>• Variables are complex, interwoven, and difficult to measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Purposes</td>
<td>• Generalizability</td>
<td>• Contextualization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Causal explanations</td>
<td>• Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prediction</td>
<td>• Interpretation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Research Approach</td>
<td>• Begins with hypotheses and theory</td>
<td>• May result in hypotheses and theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Uses formal instruments</td>
<td>• Researcher as instrument</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Experimental</td>
<td>• Naturalistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Deductive</td>
<td>• Inductive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Component analysis</td>
<td>• Searches for patterns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Seeks the norm</td>
<td>• Seeks pluralism, complexity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reduces data to numerical indices</td>
<td>• Makes minor use of numerical indices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Uses abstract language in write-up</td>
<td>• Descriptive write-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher Role</td>
<td>• Detachment</td>
<td>• Personal involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Objective portrayal</td>
<td>• Empathic understanding</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 Checklist: Positivist versus Interpretivist Approaches (Glesne, 2010, p. 9)
5.2 Methodological Structure of the Research

Grounded Theory Approach: How to Research the Researched

The process of grounded theory research can be illustrated as a linear structure: starting from data gathering and ending with writing up theories that are generated through analysis, including (possibly multiple) returns to the data collection phase (refer Figure 5.1). Glaser and Strauss (1967), who contributed to developing grounded theory, articulate the methodological strategies as “developing theories from research grounded in data” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 2; emphasis in original). Charmaz, whose works are devoted to extending Glaser and Strauss’s grounded theory in the direction of constructivism, indicates two threads of grounded theory: objectivist and constructivist (Charmaz 2000; Glesne 2010). Objectivist grounded theorists (e.g. Glaser) tend to adopt traditional positivist assumptions including an objective external reality, unbiased data collection, technical procedures, verification, and generalization. On the other hand, constructivist grounded theory, which falls in the middle of positivism and postpositivism, “celebrates firsthand knowledge of empirical worlds” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 510) and “recognizes the mutual creation of knowledge by the viewer and viewed” (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Schwandt, 1994, as cited in Charmaz, 2000, p. 510).

In grounded theory, conceptual theories about the researched are produced as a result of its analytic process in an inductive course. The analytic process comprises steps of theoretical sampling, separating and sorting, which are usually referred to as coding, and synthesizing collected data (Charmaz, 2006; Glesne 2010). Such a systemic analyzing process is deemed one of the benefits of grounded theory as it guides the researcher to move forward step by step. However, Charmaz (2000) also recognizes the criticism that the grounded theory approach can impede learning about participants’ experience and views. Such criticism perceives the step-by-step procedure of grounded theory as ‘fracturing data’ that leads “to separating the experience from the experiencing subject, the meaning from the story, and the viewer from the viewed” (p. 521).
Given the conflicted perceptions over grounded theory methods, I agree with that each step of its analytic process reflects interactions between the researcher and participants within the social phenomenon the researcher explores. It is because the methods not only permit, but also encourage the researcher to return from analyzing to data gathering when s/he finds gaps and holes to fill during the analysis process. In other words, the grounded theory approach allows the analyzing process to intervene with the data collection process to gather more relevant and proper information. Therefore, grounded theory’s analyzing process is reciprocal with data collection. Through the reciprocal process, profound stories emerge. This distinctiveness vitalizes the grounded theory approach and emphasizes the method’s “inherent bent toward theory and the simultaneous turning away from acontextual description” (Charmaz, 2000, p. 522).

My research involves two periods of data gathering, both of which were conducted in South Korea. Initially, during the first round of data collection, I planned to gather data through observation, interviews, and a survey. Based on the plan, prior to conducting interviews, my data collection process began with observations and relationship building with potential research participants. My observations have not only been richly informative, but also prompted some modifications of pre-organized interview questionnaires, grounded survey questionnaires, and interview participant lists for recruiting. Later, when analyzing the collected data during my first trip to South Korea, I found the need to add ‘comparative data’ and then to adjust my plan for the second round of data collection. Likewise, going back and forth between data collection and analysis is considered essential in grounded theory approach. More details of data gathering and employed methods will be illustrated in Section 5.3.

Such action of going back and gathering delimited data is referred to as ‘theoretical sampling.’ Charmaz (2000) articulates how conducting the theoretical sampling is pivotal in a process of theory development and why as follows:

…we would seek comparative data in substantive areas through theoretical sampling to help us tease out less visible properties of our concepts and the conditions and limits of their applicability. … Theoretical sampling helps us to
define the properties of our categories; to identify the context in which they are relevant; to specify the conditions under which they arise, are maintained, and vary; and to discover their consequences … theoretical sampling demands that we have completed the work of comparing data with data and have developed a provisional set of relevant categories for explaining our data. (p. 519)

In other words, theoretical sampling helps to fill the gaps and holes in data and thus to delineate a profound theory. Figure 5.1 below exhibits the procedures that this research has undertaken with the grounded theory approach situated in the interpretivist paradigm.

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**Figure 5.1: Research Setting**
Case Study: What is to be Researched

Through the grounded theory approach, a performing arts group of North Korean defectors living in South Korea was researched as a case. The aim of this case study is to understand the complex circumstances of their performing arts practices and the different perspectives of the research participants on the situations in question who are directly or indirectly constructing the field.

Case studies became one of the widely adopted methods in both quantitative and qualitative inquiries. As it is practiced broadly, researchers in different disciplines have used case study in diverse ways, by accommodating their discipline’s tradition. Therefore, the notion of ‘case’ also encompasses a wide spectrum from an individual to “the village, the event, and the program” (Stake, 1995 as cited in Glesne, 2010, p. 22; Glesne, 2010). Nonetheless, Platt (1992) and Yin (2008) seemingly adhere to a definition of the case study as a fully structured, complete course of a research method. From their perspective, the case study is a methodological strategy which encompasses all stages from research design to analysis involving “in-depth and often longitudinal examination with data” (Glesne, 2010, p. 22), and therefore, case studies should not be confused with merely employing fieldwork and/or participant-observation (Yin 2008).

On the other hand, Stake (2000) indicates that “Case study is not a methodological choice but a choice of what is to be studied. [It is because as] a form of research, case study is defined by interest in individual cases, not by the methods of inquiry used” (p. 435). Stake’s notion of case study is not necessarily a denial of the case study as a methodological research strategy. Rather, Stake (2000) endorses a more inclusive concept of case study, by identifying a case as either single or multiple, and either simple or complex, as long as it has “specificity [and] boundedness” (p. 436). Considering the different views on the case study – employing it as a methodological approach versus as a tool for research, this research employs the latter approach, viewing the case as what is to be researched.
Stake (2000) also attempted to classify the case study in three categories as follows: intrinsic, instrumental, and collective. With heuristic orientation of the categories, Stake (2000) admits, though, that research may not comfortably fit in the classification.

- Intrinsic case study: if it is undertaken because, first and last, the researcher wants better understanding of this particular case. [And] in all its particularity and ordinariness, this case itself is of interest.
- Instrumental case study: if a particular case is examined mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization. The case is of secondary interest, it plays a supportive role, and it facilitates our understanding of something else.
- Collective case study: it is instrumental study extended to several cases (p. 437).

In this respect, it would be a proper demonstration of my case study to place it in the instrumental category. Through studying a case, I aim to understand a particular context which the case organization represents and to learn about the social impact of performing arts practice.

In the following section, finally what methods have been implemented and how the data have been collected will be demonstrated.

5.3 Research Methods and Data Collection

Data Collection

In qualitative inquiry, multiple methods are frequently employed to clarify meanings; to prevent misinterpretation of data; to “secure an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon in question,” and thus to enhance the rigor and profundity of the research (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994 as cited in Fine, Weis, Wessen, & Wong, 2000, p. 119; Denzin and Lincoln, 2000; Stake, 2000). As such, adding a layer of one method to another is called ‘triangulation’; and it also serves as an indicator of the credibility of the study mostly in qualitative research (Lather, 2007). Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994) following statement also articulates the notion of triangulation with regard to validity: “Triangulation is not a tool or a strategy of validation, but an alternative to validation” (Fine et al., 2000, p. 119), which has been considered to be “the problem, not the solution” in the social
sciences (Lather, 1993, p. 675). In this respect, I have employed layers of multiple methods: semi-structured interview, grounded theory, and participatory observation.

In order to establish reliability of their research, many qualitative researchers collect and deploy a selection of the data such as “detailed fieldnotes, a team approach, participant confirmation of accuracy of observations, mechanized recording of data (tape recorders, videotapes, photographs), use of participant quotations, and an active search for discrepant data” (Lather, 2007, p. 5162). As listed below, I also have collected data including fieldnotes and visual data through observations, audio recordings of interviews, documents obtained at the performance sites and from interview participants, and grounded survey conducted at two event venues.

List of data gathered from the field:
- Field notes
- Visual data: photographs of performances (researcher-created)
- Archival materials: programs and brochures of the observed performing arts groups
- Recordings: 8 individual interviews, and 1 group interview with 3 individuals
- Grounded survey: conducted at two venues

Data collection for this study involves two rounds of travels to South Korea in a total period of over three months for the two visits. Not limited to Seoul, the nation’s capital, I was able to observe the socio-cultural phenomenon in question and the case organization’s performing activities in different regions of South Korea: Anseong, Ansan, Gimpo, Hanam, Incheon, Masan, Muju, Siheung, and Seoul. Prior to the two rounds of research trips, I also spent about a three-week period conducting preliminary research in South Korea that had two primary objectives: (1) to survey the general yet relevant cultural scenes for and of North Korean defectors and (2) to begin recruiting potential research participants and gather contact information. During this period, I had the opportunity to visit Hanawon (하나원), the Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees31 Hwacheon branch, for an arts event organized by a recently launched

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31 The Settlement Support Center for North Korean Refugees (Hanawon) has three locations in Anseong, Seongnam, and Hwacheon as a branch. Hanawon is an institution supervised by the Ministry of Unification
Unification Ministry-affiliated nonprofit organization, UniShare (유니쉐어). Since the Hanawon branch was located in quite an isolated place, I had to pass through a strict security process to enter the facility building. The arts event was planned for the residents of Hanawon, with about one and a half hours of running time. Programs were comprised of South Korean amateur choirs and duet performances and sing-alongs with attendants. After that, the real fun began with the participation of the attendants. Some of volunteers from the audiences were invited to come up to the stage and sing a song they chose with karaoke background music. It was a very intriguing scene to observe how the audiences sang the South Korean pop songs so well and furthermore, how the arts were used not only to entertain the attendants, but also to help thaw the tensions the new comers from North Korea might have felt.

Including the preliminary step, this case research can be demonstrated in the following consecutive five phases: (1) survey and preparation, (2) data gathering I, (3) data analysis I, (4) data gathering II, and (5) data analysis II. Timelines of the case study with methods being used are displayed in Figure 5.2. By obtaining the information through the preliminarily survey phase, preparation for the first data gathering trip was undertaken. During the preliminary survey and preparation period, interview questions and survey questionnaires were developed and underwent the IRB review process. Also, before leaving for Seoul in late October, 2013, I initiated a conversation with the executive director of the case performing arts group by phone. In the following sections, I will discuss each method used for data collection and illustrate the data gathering process in thick description.

where most North Korean defectors who came to South Korea were required to stay for a limited time period to properly adjust and live in South Korean society. The Unification Ministry declares the purposes of the facility as follows: (1) to “provide social adjustment education and vocational training for dislocated North Koreans under protection”; (2) to “supervise daily lives of dislocated North Koreans under protection”; and (3) to “support dislocated North Koreans to get legal status and residence” (The Ministry of Unification, 2014).
Figure 5.2 Description of Case Study: Methods and Timelines

**Observation**

I embarked on the case study of this dissertation research with observations of the research field and its surroundings. I have classified my observations in three tiers: close observation, distant observation of mostly performances, and background observation, which is constant observation of the cultural events pertaining to the unification discourse, yet not directly related to the case itself; having less relevance, a description of the last type of observation will be limited in this study. To inform the atmosphere of close observation, places where I made the observations include the back stages of performance sites and car rides with a few of interview participants on trips between event sites in different cities and regions. This type of observation played a critical role in building relationships with potential interview participants who were members of the case organization, Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla (PBH) arts group, before moving on to the interview.

Observation opportunity was dependent on organizations’ performance schedule. That is, if a case organization had a small number of schedules for performance, that meant I too had a limited chance to observe. The first phase of data gathering, at the end of the year 2013, was considered a busy season for the PBH arts group; therefore I was able to attend different types of arts events based on the executive director’s selection. In contrast, during the second term, at the end of May and into June, 2014, a large number of performances, regardless of their genres and
venues, were cancelled due to the Sewol ferry tragedy\textsuperscript{32} and the nation’s mourning. Performances seemed to begin to reopen in June. Under the circumstances, I was able to conduct a few observations during my second visit. The log below shows the events I was able to attend to conduct my research.

Throughout the observation process, my researcher position in this study can be described as ‘observer as participant,’ especially when I was closely observing the PBH arts group. In Glesne’s (2010) term, ‘observer as participant’ refers to the researcher who “remains primarily an observer but has some interaction with study participants” (p. 64). Thinking of a spectrum spanning between an observer on one end and a participant on the other end, my role was more frequently that of an observer (Glesne, 2010). After a couple of visits to the PBH performance sites and meetings with the executive director, I was invited to follow the arts group from the beginning of the day till the end when the group had performances or tours. I thus joined the group on several occasions, during which I made close observations. The days I spent with the PBH not only allowed me to witness various aspects of its performances and the field of North Korean defectors’ performing arts, but also led me to naturally engage with the group’s minor tasks before and after a performance. While assisting the PBH arts group with insignificant tasks during the tour such as helping to load and unload the performers’ instruments and costumes for shows and occasionally giving the executive director a ride, I was sometimes introduced by the executive director as the “road manager” of the arts group and at other times as a “reporter” investigating the company.

\textsuperscript{32} The incident occurred on April 16, 2014. The latest death toll is 294; 10 bodies are still missing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Venue</th>
<th>Date &amp; Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>A cultural event organized by the National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC), Jungnang Municipal Chapter</td>
<td>Jungnang-gu Community Cultural Center</td>
<td>11/5/2013 2:30pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>Asia Culture &amp; Economic Network: A Night of Korea-Japan Cultural Exchange</td>
<td>Best Western Seoul Garden Hotel</td>
<td>11/15/13 7pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>2013 Siheung Citizens’ Unification Festival, by the NUAC, Siheung Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Siheung Continuing Education Center</td>
<td>11/22/13 2pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of PBH Arts Group</td>
<td>(Presentation) Korea-China cultural exchanges event organized by the NUAC, Incheon Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Incheon Cultural Center</td>
<td>11/24/13 7pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>A part of education program at the Institute for Unification Education (a Korean Japanese group attended)</td>
<td>Institute for Unification Education</td>
<td>11/27/13 11am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of PBH Arts Group</td>
<td>(Presentation) the NUAC, Muju Provinicial Assembly’s Unification Education for Citizens</td>
<td>Muju Community Welfare Center</td>
<td>12/12/13 10am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>The annual cultural event organized by the Association for National Unification of Korea, Gyeongsangnam-do Province Assembly</td>
<td>Masan MBC (Munhwa Broadcasting Corporation)</td>
<td>12/12/13 3pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>A concert organized by the NUAC, Hanam Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Hanam Art Center</td>
<td>12/17/13 6 pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>A concert organized by the NUAC, Seodaemun Municipal Chapter</td>
<td>Seodaemun Culture and Sports Center</td>
<td>12/27/13 1pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Unification Arts Group</td>
<td>Opening performance (20 minute long) at Baudeogi Pungmul (folklore arts) performance</td>
<td>Anseong Municipal Namsadang performing arts center</td>
<td>6/8/14 2pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of PBH Arts Group and two members</td>
<td>(Performance) Unification Education by the NUAC, Ansan Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Ansan Jung-Ang Elementary School</td>
<td>6/11/14 10am</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Director of PBH Arts Group</td>
<td>(Presentation) Unification Education organized by the NUAC, Gimpo Provincial Assembly</td>
<td>Gimpo Ha-Sung High School</td>
<td>6/11/14 2pm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group</td>
<td>Corporate contract performances (performing at product promotion events)</td>
<td>Incheon Royal Tourist Hotel</td>
<td>6/11/14 4: 30 &amp; 7pm (2 times)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pyongyang Unification Arts Group</td>
<td>Opening performance (20 minute long) at Baudeogi Pungmul (folklore arts) performance</td>
<td>Anseong Municipal Namsadang performing arts center</td>
<td>6/14/14 4pm</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 5.2 Observation Log*
However, I could not have attained such opportunities for close observation without the preliminary steps I took, of distant observation, which I mostly conducted by attending performances and watching them from a distance. At the beginning of the observation phase, I only had short and very formal conversations with the executive director, who was my contact person most of the time. It was understandable because the beginning of the observation phase is also considered a nascent stage of relationship building with the PHB arts group. While making distant observations, I gathered fieldnotes, photos, and documents. The fieldnotes were collected in different styles depending on the source of information and observations, such as descriptive, jotted, and reflective with questions that emerged. These collected materials became not only data to be analyzed, but also a source for initiating lively conversations and smooth interactions with the research participants later, during close observation.

In Glesne’s account (2010), descriptive notes should contain details as accurate as possible, so that they can be helpful even “a year later, to visualize the moment, the person, the setting, the day” (p. 8). I also attempted to write descriptive notes, which are based on jotted notes taken at field sites. Below, I included an excerpt from my narrative vignette which I wrote after coming back from the first round of field research, based on the descriptive part of my fieldnotes. Focusing on describing the atmosphere of the event before the performance began, this narrative may be useful in providing an idea about the context of the case study.

Narrative Vignette: Based on fieldnotes on the third performance observation I (Descriptive)

The title of the event I observed on November 22, 2013 was “2013 Siheung Citizens’ Unification Festival.” The event was in three parts: (1) Siheung residents’ festival, consisting of informal arts performances presented by three representative age groups – the youth, adults, and the elderly; (2) PBH arts group’s performance; and (3) a raffle for attendants. Organized by the National Unification Advisory Council (민주평화통일자문회의), Siheung Provincial Assembly, this event began at 2 p.m. at the main auditorium of the Siheung Continuing Education Center (시흥시 평생학습 센터 대공연장). The Siheung Continuing Education Center is a light grey building that looks quite substantial from the outside. It is surrounded by residential buildings like high-rise apartments, and
different kinds of shops. The easy accessibility and name of the building symbolize the center’s public role in the city of Siheung.

Though the main auditorium was located at the basement level of the center, it was not difficult to find. There were many paper arrows kindly guiding people in the direction of the event venue. Thus people who were visiting the hall for the first time like me could find the place without difficulty. Plus, the festival was a free public event and open to everyone; but I noticed that people my age rarely attended such an event. As I entered the lobby, I saw female ushers who looked mostly in their 40s or older, wearing traditional Korean dress, called Hanbok. As soon as I picked up programs (just in case I picked up two), I tried to leave the lobby and find a seat in the auditorium because I noticed that people, who were standing or wandering around the lobby area, began to stare at me.

The event had a full house. The auditorium was filled with some young students and adults, but consisted mostly of an elderly population. The younger kids, occupying one-third of the left front seat section, were all wearing traditional Korean dress. They seemed to be waiting to go on stage to perform. The rest of the seats were filled by elderly citizens who looked like they were in their 60s or older, if not the personnel of the organizing agencies.

In addition to descriptive notes, researchers also take reflective and analytic fieldnotes generally about their feelings, ideas, and impressions of what they have observed during the day (Glesne, 2010). Initially, in order to maintain objectivity, my fieldnotes tended toward being descriptive, mostly containing factual information focusing on, for example, program contents and demographic profiles of the audiences and of the event organizers.

I also jotted down my feelings, thoughts, and things I wondered about which was quite a natural process for me as a researcher who has been trained to analyze socio-cultural phenomena. My reflective notes were mostly generated when I encountered unexpected scenes that conflicted with my assumptions. In them, I captured instances when I was somewhat “surprised,” “intrigued,” and “disturbed” (Glesne, 2010, p. 77). Such notes turned out to inform my interview questions.

The text below is another narrative created based on my observations of the same day described in the previous vignette. However, this narrative is more reflective and express my personal feelings and thoughts. Particularly the observation addressed in my reflective notes led me to grasp the ecology of the North Korean performing arts market in South Korea and also to ponder about how it has evolved into its current structure. This kind observation might be
something that the research participants did not want to reveal in the first place to me, a researcher and an outsider.

Narrative Vignette: Based on fieldnotes on the third performance observation II (Reflective)

Although the “2013 Siheung Citizens’ Unification Festival” was the third time that I observed the PBH arts group’s performance, at the event venue I was formally introduced to the members of the arts company for the first time by the executive director who also played the role of “gatekeeper.” Later she explained why she did not introduce me to the members sooner, saying she had to “test my passion” to learn about her company and its arts programs. Listening to the reason made me wonder about how many people in the past may have contacted her to observe and study the work of the company but did not follow through, causing her to regret having agreed to letting them in. After the PBH arts group’s performance at the center, the executive director called me to the group’s dressing room. Although it was a dressing room, it looked more like a small meeting room; there were no mirrors but one large table and sofas, where about seven people could sit.

When I was entering the room, every member was busy packing instruments and costumes that they used at the show and kind of ignoring me. After enduring 10 or 15 minutes of the awkwardness, I was finally able to introduce myself to them and explain why I came to watch their performance, emphasizing the fact that my research interest is solely in their performances and the organization, not in their personal life stories. Unfortunately in return, they still remained cold and only some of them responded with short answers. This reaction was not quite different than I had imagined. Noticeably, there was tension and distrust in the air and I thought their wariness toward me probably was due to my socio-cultural status as an outsider. Perhaps, the members might also have wanted to test whether I could be trusted on their own terms, just as the executive director had done before introducing me to the members. Or, they simply believed here was another researcher who showed up to get things from them that she needed.

Later, when the ice between the members and me had still not thawed, the executive director invited me to join them for dinner. The dinner, as she explained, was offered by one of the supporters of the company. But later, I found out that the dinner was not just a free offer or a kind invitation for a meal to express gratitude to the North Korean defectors for their work. It was another event where they had to perform and then the dinner was provided. I do not know whether they got paid properly for the performance. But the executive director told me on our way to her apartment that she agreed to having her group perform that evening because she wanted to consolidate a relationship with the supporter thinking of future contracts and/or some other types of support.

Although not in full, this may explain why the guests at dinner, which was a buffet, didn’t show much reaction to the performance. The event was a reunion, not a mission-oriented performance. The audiences were there to catch up with one another, not to learn about North Korean arts and culture. For that reason, this performance looked to me rather like a dinner show performance,
very informal and brief. What struck me most and made me feel even embarrassed for the North Korean defector performers’ sake was witnessing the ignorant reactions of the guests at the venue to their performance. However, it was an invaluable experience to observe an event that was not mission-oriented and how the North Korean arts company may have struggled to survive in the competitive performing arts market in South Korea.

**Semi-structured Interview**

The structure of the interview questions for this study is multi-faceted, centered around the North Korean defectors’ performing arts presentations. The questions also were developed to identify the complexity of the case including its internal (organizational) and external (ecological) structures within the field and its functionalities in the society, from the research participants’ perspectives. To obtain a holistic view of the case, I had recruited a total number of 11 participants joined the interview conversations in either interview setting – individual or group interviews. Five individuals from the PBH arts group participated in the interviews. In addition, I conducted three more interviews with those who had been working with the PBH arts group directly and indirectly. To have comparative data, I also recruited two key personnel of the Pyongyang Unification Performing Arts Group (PU arts group) to join the interview. I also interviewed a partner of the PU arts group, expecting to get an outsider’s perspective on the work of the comparative case’s work. Interviewing the participants from the comparative case provided fuller views on the North Korean defectors’ performing arts presentations and the field, as well as a better understanding of the case through comparison (see Glesne, 2010). Figure 5.3 below illustrates the interview design and the relationships of interview participants with their affiliations.
With an emphasis on the reciprocity between the participants and me, the researcher, this study adopts the semi-structured interview method. Having participants engaged with “segments of the interview” can benefit a study because “reciprocity … creates space for the researcher to probe a participant’s responses for clarification, meaning making, and critical reflection (Galletta, 2013, p. 24). Moreover, in the interview process, “the semi-structured interview can be structured into segments, moving from fully open-ended questions toward more theoretically driven questions as the interview progresses” (Galletta, 2013, p. 24). As aforementioned, the interview participants of this research have been treated as informants who provide their perspectives and experiences regarding the research topic, rather than considered as research subjects. In that respect, open-ended questions performed effectively in gathering substantial information and also clarifying already collected data. As each interview conversation progressed, thematically structured questions tended to emerge pertaining to each participant’s role in the field such as a performer, a contractor, or a partner and pre-formulated questions were
promptly adjusted to participants’ views and reflections on the topic. Interview questions prepared prior to the field work can be found in Appendix A.

The location for the interviews was usually selected based on the participants’ preference and convenience. Thus, it was sometimes a public space such as a coffee shops or an event venue to a private space like a participant’s home and office. Duration of recorded interview time mostly fell between 30 minutes to an hour. I also exchanged pre-conversations with interview participants prior to the formal interview recording, which were especially useful when participants looked nervous about the formal setting of the interview being recorded. In those cases, I began the conversation casually by turning off the recording device and instead took notes. Then afterwards, when the participants seemed ready for recording, I began to ask them questions. Often those questions had to be repeated when I turned on the audio recorder so that their answers could be recorded. I found these exchanges prior to the formal interview somewhat useful because when I repeated some of the questions to the participant during the recording, s/he could respond in a confident and a more affirmative tone.

Considering the complex and sensitive nature of the Korean unification discourse and the vulnerable socio-political status that some of the interview participants, mostly North Korean defectors, may have endured, research ethics and politics emerged as an important issue during the interview process. With regard to this, part of my responsibility as an interviewer was to ensure participants’ privacy and prevent the leaking of any unwanted and irrelevant information about themselves to the public. Therefore in this research, protecting the interview participants from uncovering “dangerous knowledge,” in Glesne’s (2010) term, has been one of the primary research ethics to maintain (p.42; emphasis in original).

Grounded Survey

The last method piece of triangulation is the grounded survey, in addition to participatory observation and semi-structured interview. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, I obtained multi-faceted
data through conducting interviews with participants representing different interest groups, at the same time, consisting of the North Korean performing arts market, whether directly or indirectly. However, this is solely demonstrating the presenter side. To complete the puzzle, opinions of those who have attended the North Korean defectors’ performances at least once were needed. Learning South Korean audiences’ reflective thoughts after experiencing the North Korean defectors’ arts practices can provide an evaluative opportunity if the intended purpose of the arts practices have been successfully conveyed and received. Especially using the survey questionnaire that were constructed based on the information collected through observations and interviews during the first data gathering phase consolidated the consistency of the case study. For example, questions to the audiences like ‘did you enjoy today’s arts event and program’ and ‘do you think this arts event helped you to understand of North Korean arts and culture’ was revised based on the testimony that the program contents of North Korean defectors’ performance has been tailored to satisfy the South Korean audiences by feeding their artistic tastes and preferences.

Likewise, the survey questionnaire underwent significant and minor modifications in terms of its length, format, and wording after the first data collection stage. The first modification was a minor one made after having a third-eye review of the questionnaire with the help of a person who is not from the field of arts policy and administration, but knowledgeable about surveys and experienced with some quantitative methods. She is a native Korean speaker and has pursued her doctorate at OSU. Based on this reviewer’s comments, the survey draft was properly modified with a focus on wording or difficult/confusing terms.

Another modification was needed during observation in the field. A lack of information about the demographics of potential audiences required a major modification, as I had to cut the survey from five pages to one page in length, excluding the open-ended questions from the new draft. In the original five pages, the questions ranged from a question asking about a genre of the frequently attended arts to open-ended questions asking people’s opinion about the North Korean
defectors’ performance. At the events, the actual attendants were comprised of elderly citizens in their 60s or older; therefore, the first approved draft of the survey questionnaire was found to be inappropriately long for the elderly to complete.

The grounded survey was finally conducted over the course of two days in June, 2014 at two different locations, the Anseong Municipal Namsadang Performing Arts Center (Namsadang Arts Center) and Sejong University in Seoul. At the Namsadang Arts Center, people who attended the opening show presented by the PU arts group participated in the survey. And at Sejong University, members of the National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC), Jungnang Municipal Chapter, who have attended the North Korean defectors’ performances multiple times answered the questionnaires. Each survey was conducted with the help of the executive director at the Namsadang Arts Center and the general manager of the NUAC, Jungnang charter, respectively. More details about the grounded survey will be provided in the next chapter of analysis.
CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction

Overview of the Case under Study and other Organizations

This chapter analyzes the data collected through interviews, observations, and grounded survey. Before beginning the analysis, it presents an overview of the researched North Korean Defectors’ arts groups based in South Korea and the related South Korean organizations closely working with the arts groups, to give a general impression of the unique field of North Korean performing arts in South Korea and provide useful background knowledge for the analysis and implications of this research. As a case organization of this study, the Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group was closely observed and researched; and another North Korean defectors’ arts group, Pyongyang Unification Arts Group, was added to this research when it became necessary to make a comparison of organizational structures. In addition, the National Unification Advisory Council, one of the biggest contractors for North Korean Defectors’ arts groups, was explored.

The Pyongyang Baekdu-Halla Arts Group (평양백두한라 예술단; PBH) was observed over two phases of field observations, first in the winter of 2013 and then again in the summer of 2014. The PBH was established in July 2003. The main purpose of its arts activities is to inform South Korean citizens about North Korean arts to and create a common culture between the two Koreas in preparation for unification (Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Most of the group members consist of female North Korean defectors who received formal arts education or used to be affiliated with local arts propaganda squads in North Korea. Based on my observations, the arts group usually performs with its ten members; but when additional singers or dancers are needed, guest members are recruited by the executive director from her network of
North Korean defector performers. In the aspect of governance, instead of hiring administrators or officers, the executive director of PBH oversees administrative works (e.g. contracting and financial management) and a couple of key members assist her under guidance.

The PBH is a small for-profit organization registered as a value-added tax-exempted business (Ibid). According to Article 26 Section 16 of the South Korean Value-Added Tax Act, commodities and supplies (distribution) of created arts productions, arts and cultural events, and amateur sports events are subject-matter of value-added tax exemption (“Ministry of Government Legislation, Information Center,” 2014). Therefore, the tax exemption status does not seem to be given as a special favor for a business run by a North Korean defector. As a for-profit, the PBH has performed at diverse occasions and has been working with different types of South Korean organizations from product promotion events for a contracted business to festivals organized by local and regional governments. Among many, the National Unification Advisory Council (NUAC) is one of the biggest contractors of PBH.

As stated on its webpage, “The NUAC is a constitutional institution established in accordance with Article 92 of the [South Korean] Constitution [declaring that the NUAC] may be established to advise the President [of Republic of Korea] on the formulation of peaceful unification policy” (NUAC, 2014). Primary functions of the NUAC include consulting the South Korean President by request regarding unification policy development and implementation through consensus of political parties and the public. For that reason, arts events are not among the organization’s primary projects, but rather a means to accomplish its objective of promoting peaceful unification to citizens. Nevertheless, the organization’s provincial assemblies and municipal chapters tend to organize a performing arts event at least once a year, accompanied by educational workshops and soccer matches (NUAC; Hee Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014). Given 17 provincial assemblies and 229 municipal chapters existing in domestic regions, the total number of yearly performances organized by the entire NUAC approximately 246,
which can have significant impact and provide many opportunities to the North Korean defectors’
arts groups based in South Korea.

On the other hand, the Pyongyang Unification Arts Group (PU), launched in June 2007, is registered as a nonprofit organization in the Gyeonggi province since 2010. The PU’s mission is to promote peaceful unification and create solidarity through the arts. Like the PBH, a majority of the PU members consist of female North Korean defectors. In addition to eight female performers, there are two administrators and a male guest singer working for the organization. However, in PU the artistic director is the only member who received formal arts education in Pyongyang (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014). In other words, most PU performers are amateurs who have been learning dance from the group’s artistic director after coming to South Korea. Likewise, the PU seems to put greater emphasis on its mission beyond artistic or technical excellence. According to the PU board’s director Pyong-il Kim, PU’s mission always comes first and should not be compromised by other values such as profit seeking by enhancing artistic excellence. This does not necessarily mean that the PU does not pursue artistic value. Kim explained that due to the limited number of professionally trained North Korean defectors in South Korea, some North Korean defectors’ arts groups recruit Korean-Chinese performers, but they conceal the fact (personal communication, June 22, 2014). B. Bahng, the executive director of the PU, also claims that what makes North Korean arts distinctive includes performers’ smiling faces while performing, and their elegant costumes, rather than their topnotch technical skills (personal communication, June 15, 2014).

Another noteworthy aspect of the PU is that Pyong-il Kim, the board’s director, is South Korean who also serves as the principal of the Canaan Nong-goon School33 after his father; in addition, he is the board’s director of the Peace Unification North Korean Defectors Association
In fact, the PU does not have a board or board members, except for the board’s director. Hence, the board’s director’s role in the organization might be less complicated than those of many U.S. nonprofit organizations holding periodical board meetings; other than that his leadership in searching for potential sources of funding and assisting the organization’s financial sustainability appears to be the same as many U.S. nonprofits. Since the inception of the PU, Pyong-il Kim as the board director has overseen and supported the arts group by providing performance opportunities in the nation and abroad and introducing private funders through his network (Pyong-il Kim, personal communication, June 22, 2014). Examining his engagement with the North Korean defectors’ arts group may offer useful insight into potential interactions between South Koreans and North Korean defectors through arts activities while pursuing the same goals and values.

As a nonprofit, the PU also has been designated as a ‘Preliminary Social Enterprise’ by local governor(s) for three years. From 2011 to 2014, the designation was renewed periodically for a total of three terms. Since renewal for a ‘Preliminary Social Enterprise’ was allowed up to three times, the PU completed filing and is currently under review to be certified as a ‘Social Enterprise’ (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Social Enterprise is a relatively young policy that began to be enforced since the enactment of the law on the Promotion of Social Enterprises in July 2007. It was implemented with the objectives of job creation, increasing demanding social services, and promoting the social contributions of the business sector (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency, 2014). In this respect, the designation of ‘Preliminary Social Enterprise’ by governors or ministers indicates organizations or corporations that are still underqualified to be certified as a ‘Social Enterprise.’ To be eligible, a preliminary social

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34 The Peace Unification North Korean Defectors Association (평화통일 탈북인 연합회) is a nonprofit organization whose members are now over 7,000 of North Korean defectors. The Association also assists North Korean defectors to adjust to South Korean society through providing different programs, such as those offered by the Canaan Nong-goon School, sightseeing tours and retreats in regions of South Korea, volunteer programs (Pyong-il Kim, personal communication, June 22, 2014).
enterprise can and should improve to fulfill the requirements for a social enterprise during the three-year maximum term. Besides the realization of social purposes, for example, a preliminary social enterprise needs to prove that its decision making process has involved its stakeholders’ participation and that it has generated profits more than 30% of its labor cost (Korea Social Enterprise Promotion Agency).

A social enterprise is neither a nonprofit, nor a for-profit organization; rather, it comprises both types, while concentrating on social contribution through its commodities or services (refer to Figure 6.1). By becoming a social enterprise, the PU can expect the benefits of receiving some practical support as subsidized consultations and educations about governance and financial management, as well as governmental subsidies and tax exemption. Such benefits are available based on the conditions of a subject enterprise and related laws. For instance, Article 13, the South Korean Law on the Promotion of Social Enterprises, allows the central and local governments to exempt the social enterprise taxes and to subsidize part of its employment insurance, industrial accident compensation insurance, and pension insurance (Ministry of Government Legislation, Information Center, 2014). As a nonprofit, the PU has received substantial support from the Anseong city government in Gyeonggi province, from introducing performance opportunities to providing places to live and practice, as well as an automobile. However, being certified as a social enterprise may bring the PU the opportunity to grow more independently and build its organizational sustainability, while serving society through its performances. Though it is unidentified how the social enterprises system can affect the arts group’s artistic excellence or advancement.
Besides the common missions – informing South Korean about North Korean arts and promoting unification, a brief overview of the two North Korean defectors’ arts groups addresses different organizational features between the PBH and the PU, depending on organizational structure, either for-profit or nonprofit (Table 6.1). Furthermore, these features provide a glimpse into each group’s organizational spectrum related to the structural characteristics, such as relationships with the government or equivalent organizations, regions where their performances have been presented, and the artistic excellence of performers. Based on this information, assumptions can be made regarding the way the structural characteristics of nonprofit and for-profit may impact the process of cultivating social cohesion and trust generation.

For example, the PU, as a nonprofit, has received various types of support from the Anseong city government, which led the arts group to become an Anseong-based organization that mostly performs in the local area. Such a regionally focused presentation of North Korean performing arts may be useful in building a certain level of trust between the local South Korean residents and the defector performers through consistent exposure and interactions. Also, being a recipient of city government funding may grant credibility to the PU as a reliable performing arts group in the region. Unlike the PU, the PBH does not receive direct government funding. Instead, it has obtained performance opportunities in different places and regions by closely working with the NUAC, which consists of affiliated assemblies and chapters throughout the nation and abroad. In addition, as a for-profit organization, the PBH is not restricted to
performing commercially. Profit oriented organizational structure therefore can be one of the motivations for the arts group to perform at diverse places with higher frequency, than mission-focused nonprofits. In this respect, the PBH can take a more advantageous position to send out messages about a unification and social cohesion in the Korean peninsula to larger populations in different regions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organizational Type</th>
<th>Organizational Feature</th>
<th>Professionalism of Performers</th>
<th>Diversity in Governance</th>
<th>Support from Government or Equivalent Org.</th>
<th>Areas Recently Performed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>For-profit</td>
<td>Profit seeking</td>
<td>Mix of educated artists and amateurs</td>
<td>No participation of South Koreans in governance</td>
<td>Contracts with NUAC assemblies and chapters</td>
<td>Tours in different occasions and regions in South Korea and abroad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonprofit; Preliminary social enterprise</td>
<td>Engagement with social service such as volunteer activities</td>
<td>Amateur performers except for the artistic director</td>
<td>Having a South Korean participating in governance</td>
<td>Anseong city government’s support</td>
<td>Regular opening performance at Namsadang Auditorium in Anseong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1 Comparisons of Organizational Structure and Features between PBH and PU

Regarding the professionalism of the two arts groups’ performers, the PBH has a greater number of performers who trained as professional artists in North Korea than does the PU. It is unclear whether or not there is a link between having more artistically skillful performers and organizational structure. However, it is not difficult to conclude that North Korean performing arts presented by well-trained defector performers would be more effective in attracting audiences and informing them about North Korean arts and culture. For better understanding of different
structural characteristics and of each group’s contributions to the social impact of the performance, categories that emerged from the data analysis are elaborated in Section 6.2.

**The Interview Questionnaire and its Logic**

As illustrated in the methodology chapter, in part of the data collection, a semi-structured questionnaire to interview stakeholders and a grounded survey questionnaire to survey audiences were constructed. The semi-structured questionnaire was employed when interviewing nine participants of PBH and PU directors and performers, the NUAC Junghang Chapter’s general manager and council member, PBH’s partner organization – DoodRock’s executive director, and PU’s working partner personnel – Anseong Namsadang Auditorium’s executive director, either one-on-one or in a group setting. The semi-structured interview values reciprocity and its broad form secures a space for the participants’ answers to shape theoretical conversations autonomously (Galletta, 2013). Hence, the questionnaires for this research were created in a broad open-ended format deemed as a suitable device for a grounded theory study (Charmaz, 2006, p. 26).

Moreover, the questionnaires were modified and adjusted to resonate with the interview participants’ position (e.g., performer, director, partner, etc.) and their affiliated organization’s characteristics and roles in the domain of North Korean defectors’ performing arts. In that way, appropriate questions could be posed to different participants. The interview questions for this research also contain elements of both ‘informational interview’ and ‘in-depth nature of an

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35 The DoodRock is a nonverbal percussion performance group whose performances are rooted in the Korean traditional percussion band, *Pungmul* (풍물) but have been re-arranged by incorporating the western Rock rhythm and beat into the traditional form. A private corporation, DoodRock has been working with the PBH for about three years, holding joint performances (Yong-hoon Yoo, personal communication, June 22, 2014; DoodRock, 2014).

36 The Anseong Namsadang Auditorium was built exclusively for the regular performance of Anseong City Namsadang Baudeogi Korean Traditional Percussion Band in 2010. The PU has been performing at the 20 minute opening of the Namsadang performance for about two years (Namsadang Baudeogi, 2014; Pyong-il Kim, personal communication, June 22, 2014).
intensive interview’ (Charmaz, 2006). The informational interview was adopted to obtain objective information, including organizational structure and the purpose of the performance. At the same time, the in-depth nature of intensive interview questions is central in this research because the intensive interview is known to “[foster] eliciting each participant’s interpretation of his or her experiences” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 25).

This study’s interview questions can be classified into four groups by topic, in addition to the initial open-ended questions and ending questions, which can be found in Appendix A. The four sets of questions can be described as follows: (1) organization-related (2) objectives and purposes of the arts activities (3) impact of the arts/performances (at the personal and social levels) and (4) challenges and obstacles in presenting North Korean defectors’ arts programs. However, the questions were not necessarily asked in any order, considering an organic flow of conversation. First, the organization-related questions mainly focused on asking about administrative circumstances and decisions made. These questions intended to obtain a general understanding of the North Korean arts groups based in South Korea and their organizational values.

*Organization related questions*

Why did you decide to register your organization as a nonprofit/for-profit?
What types of support have you received from which organization or person? If you cannot give the exact name of the person or organization, please indicate with a category such as ‘private foundation,’ ‘individual,’ and/or ‘a government agency.’
What types of partnerships have you made with an external entity in order to operate your organization and arts program?
Since when has your organization (NUAC) conducted cultural programs? If there are some exemplary artistic projects in which you were involved while serving the organization, please indicate and describe your experience.

The next cluster of questions led the interview to open up the conversation related to the research topic. Each participant was asked about reasons why s/he was engaged in arts programs as a founder, a performer, and/or a presenter. Also, participants’ motivations for presenting North Korean performing arts to South Korean citizens were discussed. While demonstrating their
motivations, most participants tended to reveal not only the mission of their arts program, but also their personal reasons for participating in arts groups, including practical issues like financial benefits. Interviews with the participants affiliated with South Korean organizations such as the NUAC, Doodrock performance team, and Anseong Namsadang Auditorium, brought extended perspectives on the topic.

Objectives of the arts activities
What was your motivation for founding your organization?
- What were your expectations/intended outcomes of your arts programs (presented by North Korean defectors)? Why?
What do you see as the role(s) (in society) of the arts programs that the organization is presenting?
Why were you, or what led you to be involved in this arts program and the arts group (PBH or PU)?
What is your purpose(s) in working with North Korean defectors’ arts group and presenting their performances to South Korean audiences?
- What is the expectations and/or the intended outcome of your (joint) program? Please indicate specifically.

Questions pertaining to the impact of the North Korean defectors’ performances were developed to facilitate participants’ perspectives on the role of the arts activities in society and in the participants’ lives. As discussed in the literature review, the impact of the arts appears to be wide – from social cohesion and trust building, to catharsis and healing. Therefore, this set of questions also aimed at addressing the diverse impact of participating in the arts activities.

Impact of the arts/performances (at the personal and social levels)
What factors drove you to choose the arts (to accomplish your organization’s mission)? Why?
What does it mean for you personally to participate in the arts organization and its performances?
- What impact do you feel have had on organizing/participating in the arts program(s)?
What have you achieved through providing the arts program(s)? Please indicate specifically.
Based on your experience (of presenting performances), what do you think is the impact of interaction between North Korean defectors and South Korean audiences?
Why do you believe your program is important?
Do you think that South Koreans’ interest in North Korean defectors’ performing arts has increased? Please explain why or why not.
In addition to what other arts organizations may commonly struggle with, those North Korean defectors’ arts groups might have some extra hardships because of the defectors’ vulnerable social status. The following interview questions concern challenges or discouraging situations the defectors may have encountered when presenting the repertoires enjoyed in North Korea. What is more, the questions could invite the participants to discuss the issues pertaining to cultural difference or lack of understanding between the South and North Korean people.

**Challenges and obstacles**
What challenging moments/problems have you confronted while organizing and presenting the arts programs in South Korea?
- How did you handle that?
What challenges have you faced while working with North Korean defectors’ arts groups?

**Grounded Survey Questionnaire and its Purpose**
Accompanied by the semi-structured interview, a grounded survey was conducted targeting South Korean citizens who have attended North Korean defectors’ performances. The survey was expected not only to allow a glimpse into how South Korean viewers responded to the defectors’ performance, but also to observe whether or not the performance was well received by the audiences and further, whether it achieved its intended purpose – that is, whether it informed about North Korean arts and culture and promoting trust building. The grounded survey questionnaire is composed of two parts: demographics and six research topic-related questions. Demographic questions include gender, age group, native place, and education of the respondents. The topic-related questions can be divided into three groups by their objectives. They were designed to focus on learning how South Korean audiences respond to the North Korean defectors’ performance and to gauge whether the defectors’ performing arts has engendered the intended impact on the viewers.

**Grounded Survey: Six research topic-related questions**
How much are you interested in Korean unification?
Did you enjoy today’s arts event and program?
Did this arts event help you to get interested in North Korean arts and culture?
Do you think this arts event has helped you to understand North Korean arts and culture?
Do you think this arts event can help to reduce your sense of difference /incompatibility with North Korean defectors?
Do you think this arts event can help to reduce your sense of difference /incompatibility with North Korean people?

As shown, the first two questions serve as general questions asking participants’ consciousness of unification by self-judgment and their response to the defectors’ performance. The next pair of questions are intended to learn whether the performing arts experience has generated the desirable impact on the audiences, especially whether they helped to increase the participants’ interest in and understanding of North Korean arts and culture. The objectives of the last pair of questions were to demonstrate the impact of the performance on the trust building process by lowering the perception of difference and/or incompatibility with North Korean defectors and furthermore, with people living in North Korea.

The survey was conducted during the second phase of field research with two distinct groups at different venues. Finding adequate and available events and venues for conducting the survey was more challenging than expected because after the Sewol Ferry tragedy in April, 2014, the entire nation had fallen into mourning and many performing arts productions voluntarily halted their performances for some time. By June, 2014 when the planned second field research was conducted, the performing arts sector seemed to be back to business; however, the defectors’ socially and politically sensitive arts programs still remained at a minimum. Fortunately, the performance of Namsadang Baudeogi Korean Traditional Percussion Band was resumed in June, and therefore, the PU’s opening performance was back on stage. Consequently, the first survey was conducted at the Anseong Namsadang Auditorium on June 21, 2014. The surveys were distributed to the general audiences with the help of the ushers. Since the PU’s opening had about a 20-minute running time, the survey distribution had to stop halfway through the performance to make sure only those audiences that watched at least half the performance would
participate in the survey. Another important characteristic of the audiences at Namsadang would be that most of them purchased tickets highly likely to attend the performance of Namsadang Baudeogi, rather than that of PU’s. This factor may contribute to understanding the perceptions of the South Koreans in general who do not have some interest in North Korean arts and culture.

On the other hand, the next group that participated in the survey consisted of the NUAC Jungnang Municipal Chapter’s council members. Prior to conducting the survey with the NUAC council members, it was necessary to confirm whether or not they were heavily involved in the defectors’ performances at NUAC events and whether they were univocally supportive of presenting the defectors’ work. It is because their strong and prejudiced opinions would generate unreliable survey results. Regarding these concerns, Ms. Hee Kim, the chapter’s general manager, assured the researcher that there have long been debates over the defectors’ arts programs and there exist diverse thoughts about them (phone conversation, June 23, 2014).

Additionally, even though the council members may have attended the North Korean defectors’ performances more than once, program development and arrangement are the general manager’s responsibility, not theirs (Hee Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014).

Consequently, the survey questionnaires were distributed and collected on June 24, 2014 by the assistant of the chapter’s general manager at Sejong University’s auditorium where the NUAC Seoul Regional Conference was held. Then on the next day, the answered questionnaires were picked up at the office of the Jungnang Chapter. The NUAC council members’ responses to the survey might suggest how those involved in civic activities of promoting unification may perceive the impact of the North Korean arts presentation on social cohesion. Furthermore, comparing the council members’ collective answers with those of the general audience prove to yield useful data for this research.

In November, 2013, the PBH has performed at the Jungnang Chapter’s arts event which was observed for this research.
6.2 Overview of the Interview Data: Description and Preliminary Analysis

The gathered data through the semi-structured interview and the grounded survey has been analyzed. For the interview data analysis, the grounded theory approach has been adopted as described in the methodology chapter. Before beginning the data analysis, this section explores the context of collected data and compares the perspectives of the participants on the research topic, based on the categories (and subcategories) generated thus far through the grounded theory analysis process. Presenting the categories in those structures may help to grasp complicated data more easily. The categories (and subcategories) were developed through grouping and sorting the codes generated through line-by-line coding. According to Charmaz (2006), a category “may subsume common themes and patterns in several codes,” but it should be conceptual and remain consistent with the data (p. 91). Once an abstract version of categories is developed, it also undergoes constant comparison and identification of the inter-relations among the categories to understand each category more precisely (Scott, 2004).

Categories in Three Layers of Context

First, the categories at this stage are demonstrated in three layers of contexts (see Figure 6.2) by adapting Galletta’s (2013) levels of analytical frame. In Galletta’s (2013) original text, the three contexts include (1) the historical and sociopolitical context, (2) structural conditions, and (3) relational context (p. 20). These contexts, however, have been modified and layered to fit the data of this research as follows: (1) the cultural and social context; (2) the structural and administrative circumstances; and (3) the conceptual context – social impact of the arts. The outer layer consists of categories indicating cultural and social conditions of South Korean society within which the North Korean defectors’ arts programs are produced and received. Next, the middle layer contains categories addressing the structural circumstances and administrative environment of the defectors’ performing arts domain. Finally, the inner layer of context, covers the social impact of the arts, including concepts of interaction, trust, and social cohesion, etc. The
categories in different layers also tend to interact with each other at different degrees of relevance. However, in the display of contexts in Figure 6.2, in order to produce an abstract contextual outline, the inter-relationships are not spelled out. These relationships, which can elevate our understanding of the ecology of the defectors’ performing arts domain and the impact of their arts activities, are unpacked and conceptualized later in this chapter (Charmaz, 2006).

- **Cultural and Social Context:**
  - Cultural difference; Hindering factors to social cohesion; False accusations of NK provocations toward NK defectors; Existing mood of disinterest in unification; Unfamiliarity and unpopularity of NK arts and culture; Difference in the arts; Features of NK arts; Distinctiveness of SK arts; Different arts policy of two Koreas

- **Structural and Administrative Circumstances:**
  - For-profit NK defrectors' arts group; Justification of including SK pop music; Program development strategies; Circumstances of NK defectors' arts field; Difficult factors for NK defector arts groups to overcome; The need to ensure NK defectors’ better life; Current state of governmental support; Nonprofit NK defectors' arts group; Other types & foci of NUAC cultural events

- **Conceptual Context - social impact of the arts:**
  - Purposes of NKD performances; Impact of NK defectors' performances; Meanings of NK defectors' performances to themselves; Cultural stimulus for a unification; Impact of the arts; Use of traditional folklores; Positive reactions of audiences; Negative reactions of audiences; Artistic quality of NK defectors' performances; NK defector performers' vision for their future career (post-unification); Lost authenticity in NK defectors' performances; Lack of communication between NK defectors' arts groups and SK org.s; What NK defectors' arts groups are missing; Questioning the effectiveness of the NK defectors' performances; For better practice and impact of NK arts; Status quo of cooperation between SK and NK defectors' arts groups; Outcomes of cooperation between SK and NK defectors' arts groups

Figure 6.2 Categories in Three Layers of Context

The cultural and social context of the North Korean defectors’ arts domain is comprised of categories that pertain to cultural differences between South and North Korea and South

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38 All categories and subcategories that emerged from the data analysis are listed in Appendix C.
Korean citizens’ weak consciousness of unification. The category of cultural difference contains codes indicating cultural gaps, distinct characteristics and values of the arts, different artistic tastes, different lifestyles, different social values and mentality, and communication errors. Some of the interview participants also pointed out distinctive North Korean arts policies that result in gaps between South and North Korean arts. These include the North Korean arts education system and reformation of traditional genres (I. Kim; Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013).

While South Korea has been making an effort to conserve traditional arts, it is known that North Korea has reformed the Korean traditional art forms. I. Kim, the technical director of the PBH, reported that North Korea “modernized and developed” the Korean traditional music genres by adapting Russian culture. As he said, “some traditional music, like folk songs (민요) played in South and North Korea seem to be similar, but actually they are different, due to [the North Korean arts policy of] reforming the traditional arts” (personal communication, December 20, 2013). I. Kim’s observation implies that even traditional art genres have evolved differently between South and North Korea. Thus, simply believing and emphasizing that the traditional arts are commonly shared culture might lead to naïve policy decisions regarding the use of the arts for social cohesion and trust building.

Another distinctive North Korean arts policy captured in the data corpus is the arts education system. According to the executive director of the PBH,

the North Korean government selects cute-looking kindergarteners and provides them fully-funded performing arts education [or training]. These kids must pass the bar in order to continue their arts education in the advanced levels. After going through all the levels, only those who survive to complete their university level of arts education can join a professional arts group [in Pyongyang]. (Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013)

Y. Kim’s description of North Korean performing artists indicate that those who received formal arts education in North Korea are highly likely to have spent most of their lives for practicing and
learning their artistic specialty. Meanwhile, those who did not get selected by the government, even if they had artistic talent or wished to practice the arts, were excluded from arts training.

The cultural and social context also reflects South Korean citizens’ weak collective consciousness regarding a unification, which therefore appears to pose a hurdle. Categories related to collective consciousness include ‘Hindering factors to social cohesion,’ ‘False accusations of NK provocations toward NK defectors,’ and ‘Existing mood of disinterest in unification (Figure 6.2). Although there was a minor voice of interview participants who expressed their optimistic perspectives on the citizens’ increasing interest in unification, the majority have either experienced or viewed somewhat negative aspects of people’s awareness of unification or attitude toward the North Korean defectors. Jeon, a NUAC council member affiliated with the Jungnang Municipal Chapter, pointed out that “not only the young generations, but also the adult populations tend not to be much interested in a unification. Thus, to attract audiences, cultural events for promoting unification have to be entertainment-oriented” (Young-sun Jeon, personal communication, June 18, 2014).

Besides such acknowledgement of South Korean citizens’ little attention to a unification, a few North Korean defector participants reported their experience about South Koreans’ false accusations of North Korea’s provocations toward the defectors. According to S. Kim,

> Since we are a ‘North Korean’ [defectors’] arts group, there were times when [our performances] were affected by North Korean situations [inter-Korean relations]. … While we were on tour, the Yeonpyeong Island incident occurred. … People reacted with complaints about our performance; the scheduled event in the afternoon [was cancelled]. (personal communication, December 19, 2013)

A. Kim, another North Korean participant, also added: “it’s politics. … We are innocent, but because we work under the title of ‘North Korean,’ we are the target of such cursing and resentment” (personal communication, December 19, 2013). As these interview participants

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39 On November 23, 2010, North Korea fired dozens of artillery shells at Yeonpyeongdo Island located near the border between South and North Korea. Two South Korean marines and two South Korean civilians were killed (BBC, 2014).
shared, the domain of North Korean defectors’ arts not only needs to overcome cultural differences that have developed during the years of division, but it also has to accommodate versatile social moods caused by political issues or inter-Korean relations.

Regarding the circumstances of organizational structure and administration, ‘for-profit’ and ‘nonprofit’ categories are observed. Additionally, a considerable number of categories and subcategories show links to tough circumstances of the North Korean defectors’ performing arts domain. For example, a category named as ‘difficult factors for North Korean defectors’ arts groups to overcome’ and a subcategory of ‘unpopularity and unfamiliarity of North Korean genres’ have emerged through the inductive way of analysis. Such categories and subcategories indicate the competitiveness of the South Korean performing arts domain, of which the defectors’ arts groups are a part, and they address the challenges in financial sustainability of North Korean defectors’ arts groups. In Y. Kim’s understanding, “In South Korea, [cultural contents] that do not carry marked traits easily fade away. South Korean audiences demand excellent quality of the arts […] as well as multi-talented artists who can sing, dance, and play instruments all at the same time. It is different from North Korea.” She mentioned that, in that regard, the defectors’ performance is relatively less competitive than South Korean productions (personal communication, December 20, 2013).

In the same vein, other defector performer participants also commonly addressed the highly competitive environment of the South Korean entertainment market and, in their opinion, the “unfair” wage rates they receive compared to South Korean pop stars. The performers expressed their belief that their performance is underappreciated and underpaid compared to well-known South Korean entertainers or performers (A. Kim, S. Cho, & S. Kim; Y. Kim; B. Bahng, personal communications). B. Bahng commented, “to be honest, for a single South Korean singer, a great amount of compensation is paid, whereas we earn so little; it hurts our feelings” (personal communication, June 15, 2014). These categories show how the participants understand the domain where the arts groups belong. Rather than viewing the North Korean
defectors’ performing arts as an independent field, the defector participants recognize it as a part of the South Korean entertainment market. This perception seems to be reflected in the arts groups’ program development and performances.

Finally, categories consisting of the conceptual context include social cohesion-related subcategories as follows: ‘creating a social mood for unification and social cohesion,’ ‘informing North Korean arts & cultural values,’ ‘creating a shared culture,’ ‘filling the gap by informing,’ and ‘interaction and reciprocity.’ These subcategories denote both what values the interview participants aim to achieve through their performances and what they have witnessed and experienced in terms of social impact. Cho, a defector performer of the PBH, shared her conversation with one of the audience members who was also a displaced person: “There was an elderly man who is from the same hometown as me. Even I can’t remember everything [when I have been gone a short time compared to him], but he remembers everything such as stores and buildings like that. I was so surprised by witnessing that” (personal communication, December 19, 2013). S. Kim, a guest defector performer of the PBH, added:

Not only the elderly population, but also young students at elementary schools showed excitement and responded warmly. When we sometimes visited elementary schools for a performance, students approached us after the show and talked to us like ‘you are beautiful! When do you think a unification would happen?’ even though they don’t understand North Korean music well. … When kids talked like that, I felt… ah… my heart kind of ached. (personal communication, December 19, 2013)

These anecdotes shared by the participants describe how their performances can open opportunities of interactions and how such reciprocity between the defector performers and the audiences occurred at performance sites through their direct contacts.

In addition, there is a category concerning the impact of the performance activities on the defectors who are the performers. During the interviews, some participants remarked that their engagement with the arts activities affected their new identity construction in South Korea with new cultural and social norms. A. Kim, a choreographer of the PBH, mentioned that “[dancing] is the only thing I can professionally offer and earning an income by what I am great at brings
satisfaction to my life” (personal communication, December 19, 2013). In the same vein, S. Kim said:

> arts activities are what I have done since the time I lived in North Korea. … Starting a new work is challenging for everyone, yet it’s even harder for the defectors. [In that sense,] presenting the arts that we learned and have been practicing [for a long time] is rewarding and helps us earn our living. … For performers, appearing on stage means a lot in their life so continuing arts activities in South Korea gives me a feeling of accomplishment and it’s like achieving my dream. (personal communication, December 19, 2013)

While some defector performers affirm their identity by continuing their performing career, other performers established a new position in their career and identity. Based on having started her artistic career when she was in North Korea and her defector social status, Y. Kim positioned herself as a “unification-culture preacher” and “a peace preacher” (personal communication, December 20, 2013). Moreover, working with fellow North Korean defectors created a small community for them in which they feel bonded and comfortable as they share the same challenges (A. Kim, S. Cho, & S. Kim, personal communication, December 19, 2013). The interview data suggests that the direction of the impact of the arts program appears to be both inward to the participants and outward to society.

**Comparison by Organizational Structure**

Another way to give an overview of the data in categories examined in this research is to compare the categories (and subcategories) by the perspectives of the interview participants. In Chapter four on the conceptual framework, the instrumental role of nonprofit organizations in civic society and their potential impact on forging bonds of trust and cooperation were demonstrated. Building on nonprofits’ role in civic society, this section compares categories and subcategories of the nonprofit (PU) and for-profit (PBH) organizational structures and characteristics and identifies the impact and implications of their performances.
As the subcategory – ‘reasons not to be nonprofit’ – shown in Figure 6.3 implies, the PBH was decided to be a for-profit organization because the founding leader saw very little benefit in being a nonprofit organization. According to the executive director of the PBH, nonprofit organizations seem to have lower self-sufficiency than for-profit organizations, because they tend to rely on external funding sources rather than earned income (Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Moreover, government funding is limited and temporary. For that reason, the PBH, as a for-profit organization, has valued its organizational independence and productivity in terms of financial sustainability. The technical director of the PBH added that the company has achieved increasing organizational stability within its for-profit organizational direction (I. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Nevertheless, both the
executive director and technical director expressed their willingness to accept financial support if available, while admitting that that is an oxymoron (I. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Rather than financial support, participants of the PBH said that some patrons sent them gifts, including a laptop, outerwear team uniforms, foods like kimchi, and fruits and vegetables. Such in-kind donations deliver special meaning to the performers because they not only meets their needs but also show the senders’ affection for them (I. Kim; Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013).

As the PBH participants indicated above, it seems that one of the deciding factors in determining their organizational structure is related to financial benefit, like profit making, instead of committing to serve public values through their arts programs. In that regard, a question might arise how a for-profit organization can find a balance between profit making and promoting a unification and trust building – public purposes that are the pivotal aspect of the organization. For instance, when the PBH performs at an occasion for commercial purpose, like a product promotion, how would its performance be reflected in the audience’s view – would the audience receive it as a message regarding a Korean unification and informing North Korean arts or, simply as entertainment to dazzle potential customers? How this might impact the entire North Korean defectors’ performing arts domain can be another dilemma a for-profit defector arts company may encounter.

On the other hand, registered as a nonprofit organization, the PU has been dedicated to its mission, which is to promote peaceful unification and reduce the feeling of difference between South and North Koreans through the arts (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Regarding the motivation of becoming a nonprofit, PU’s executive director responded that she was inspired by South Korean citizens who helped people in need, even though they were not prosperous themselves. Hence, the PU has participated in social work programs for example at senior care centers or prisons. Furthermore, PU’s executive director expected that serving those people in need as North Korean defectors may help improve their images (Ibid). In other words,
being a nonprofit organization was not only for the pursuit of its organization’s mission, but also for deconstructing certain stereotypes about the defector group, which might be related to socialization efforts.

Moreover, another organizational feature of the PU pertaining to its structural characteristics is found to be its low financial sufficiency, which is also captured in the subcategories of – ‘largely relying on government funding’ and ‘lacking fundraising skills.’ According to the board director of the PU, the PU welcomes donations from their patrons and audiences; however, it has not been putting effort into fundraising activities or expanding its funding pool. Rather, the organization has highly relied on the director of board’s networks to find sponsors for the PU’s arts activities (P. Kim, personal communication, June 22, 2014). The different types of support from the local government of Anseong have resulted by the government’s initiative, and not the PU’s efforts to find funders (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014).

Based on the participants’ description of their organizational structure and the rationale behind choosing a nonprofit, it seems the PU has emphasized social service more than developing its own self-sufficiency. The PU’s governance style described by the PU participants reflects how they perceive the ecology of nonprofit organizations. The PU’s dependence on government funding and on the board director’s networking as well as its lack of fundraising efforts leads one to wonder whether the North Korean defectors really understand the concept and management of nonprofits. It may be that the nonexistence of nonprofits in North Korea impedes the defector arts professionals from comprehending the full extent of the concept of being a nonprofit. In the case of the PU, the involvement of the South Korean board director who has experience with leading nonprofit organizations may have helped the PU leaders to run a nonprofit organization in South Korea. In the case of the PBH as well, even though it is a for-profit business enterprise, there may have been a similar confusion about nonprofits, which led the company to accept in-kind donations from South Koreans and to express its willingness to receive financial support.
Comparison by Participants’ Position

As shown in Figure 6.4, this section compares categories that contain perspectives of (1) the South Korean stakeholders/partners and (2) the North Korean defector performers/administrators. Comparison by the positions of these two groups attempts to examine the different perceptions of the defector arts groups, the groups’ impact, and their circumstances, by looking at performer/administrator versus contractor/partner and the participants’ native birthplace. This comparison assumes that the participants’ distinctive cultural and socio-political background probably affects the construction of their perceptions. Identifying diverse angles on the North Korean defectors’ arts groups may enrich our understanding of their role and status quo, and consequently, can aid in developing an arts-based policy strategy. Exclusively for this analysis, codes were re-categorized by position; and the list of the categories and subcategories can be found in Appendix D.

**Common Categories:**
- Impact of NK defectors' performances -- transformative power of the arts, interaction and reciprocity, informing NK arts & cultural values, promoting a unification, cultural stimulus to a unification, and financial sustainability of the performers
- Cultural difference -- gaps in cultural and social values and mentality
  - Unfamiliarity and unpopularity of NK arts
  - Performers' welfare - healing and catharsis, and daycare

**Defectors' Arts Groups:**
- Justification of including SK pop music
- Efforts for program development
- Focused values of the performance
  - A for-profit arts group
  - Values of Nonprofit

**External Stakeholders/Partners:**
- Lost authenticity in NK defectors' performances
- What the defectors' arts groups are missing
- Lack of communications between the defectors' arts groups and SK organizations
- For collaboration beyond cooperation
- Organizational aspects of the NK defectors' arts groups

*Figure 6.4 Comparison by Participants’ Position*
Participants from both groups commonly acknowledge the following categories: ‘impact of the North Korean defectors’ performances,’ ‘cultural difference,’ and ‘performers’ welfare.’ First, the category of impact of the defectors’ arts activities on their attendants subsumes the subcategories: ‘the transformative power of the arts,’ ‘interaction and reciprocity,’ ‘informing participants about North Korean arts and cultural values,’ ‘promoting unification,’ and ‘enhancing the financial sustainability of the performers.’ Participants of the PBH and the PU identified some of the listed impact that they believe they achieved. Through interacting on stage and at event sites after the performance, the participants reported that they experienced a sense of solidarity, reconciliation, and reciprocity with the South Korean audiences. In a similar vein, the South Korean external stakeholders mentioned that the impact of the defectors’ performances seems to pertain to reconciliation, mutual understanding, and bridge building and bonding. For example, the general manager of NUAC Junanang Chapter explained that personal contact helps to change people’s biased perceptions of North Korean defectors. In addition, she witnessed that arts programs encourage people to realize South and North Koreans can live together in harmony (H. Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014).

Additionally, most participants recognized cultural difference between South and North Korea and South Korean citizens’ unfamiliarity with North Korean arts and culture. Most of the participants from the arts groups pointed out distinctive style and forms of the arts, whereas many participants from the external stakeholder group addressed different lifestyle and languages. Performers’ welfare was also addressed by many participants as an issue that needs to improve. Since most performers are female and frequently tour different cities and regions, the performers who have young children talked about their need for daycare (A. Kim, S. Cho, & S. Kim, personal communication, December 19, 2013). The category of the ‘performers’ welfare’ also encompasses the need for social devices to ensure better quality of life for the performers. Due to their busy schedule and long distance tours, some arts groups seem to be exhausted to earn a living rather than to feel catharsis or find meaning of live. Therefore, the defector performers
need a support system in order to heal psychologically from their traumatic and stressful experience of living in exile and adjust to a new place (H. Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014).

Although the two groups share a common ground, each also emphasizes different opinions. One of the central issues over which the defector arts groups and the South Korean contractors or partners have conflicting opinions appears to be the inclusion of South Korean contemporary pop genre in the defectors’ arts programs. As shown in the categories that emerged from the data of the arts groups, the defector groups justify performing South Korean repertoires in order to attract South Korean audiences, since North Korean music is not well known in South Korea. On the other hand, the external stakeholder group claims that lack of authenticity in the defectors’ performances and imitating South Korean pop music and dances would besmirch the meaning and value of arts programs.

Categories that emerged from the arts group interviews describe the participants’ thoughts about performing South Korean genres as follows: justification of including South Korean pop music, efforts for program development, and pursuing the value of the performance. According to Bahng, the defector performers strove to present North Korean vocal styles when singing South Korean repertoires and to make their performance accessible to their audiences (personal communication, June 15, 2014). They also consider performing what South Korean audiences would enjoy as crucial.

However, the NUAC personnel and other South Korean partners seem not to agree on the issue with the defector arts group. Categories that emerged in conversations with the South Korean group include lost authenticity in the North Korean defectors' performances and what the defectors' arts groups are missing. When many North Korean defector arts groups were formed, their programs focused on presenting original North Korean arts pieces excluding ideological elements. However, the programs were later changed, dropping the original repertoires and including South Korean pop songs. These changes prompted criticism from some viewers that
the defector arts groups need to work on program development and reconsider presenting more authentic North Korean arts.

Besides the controversy of the repertoire, the South Korean participants have pointed out some organizational aspects of the defector arts groups. The particular group of participants claim that most defector arts groups tend to show relatively unstable or even disorganized governance structures and styles. Suggested clues include a hiring system that heavily relies on networking, short lifespan of organization, disorganized income distribution and entertainment-oriented, amateurish artistic direction (Jeon, personal communication, June 18, 2014). Other categories developed only through the external stakeholder group encompass ‘lack of communications between the defector arts groups and partnering South Korean organizations’ and ‘collaboration beyond cooperation’. Even though some South Korean arts organizations or contractors have been working with the defector arts groups, the South Korean participants indicated that there have been limited communications exchanged between them. The participants recognize that current cooperation with minimal interaction with the defector arts group would not help to present a more harmonious or better quality of productions (Kang-seok Seo, personal communication, June 21, 2014). While the participants have expressed their willingness to collaborate with the defector performers beyond mere cooperation, speculating how and what circumstances may foster the two groups’ collaboration and close interaction seems to be needed.

6.3 Grounded Survey Analysis

In this section, the findings of grounded survey data analysis will be presented. Descriptive analyses and t-test have been conducted by utilizing SPSS 22.0. The frequency analysis focuses on describing the survey participants’ demographic profiles. On the other hand, the t-test identifies whether or not there is a difference in means between two groups of survey
respondents, the general audience and the NUAC Jungnang Chapter council members for each question.

**Descriptive Analysis**

The grounded survey questionnaire consists of four questions about demographics and six research topic-related questions using the 7-Likert scale. Out of a total of 83 surveys collected, 81 surveys were valid for analysis: 53 respondents from the general audience group and 28 respondents from the NUAC council member group. The characteristics of the survey participants are presented in Table 6.2. Overall, the characteristics of the general audience appear to be more diverse than those of the NUAC council members. In the case of the NUAC council member group, a majority of the respondents were female (78.6%) and all respondents were 36 years old or older. On the other hand, 22.6% of the general audience participants fell into the age group of ‘18 or under’. Additionally, most of the respondents were born in South Korea, while one of the NUAC council members who participated in the survey was originally from North Korea. In terms of education, 41.5% of the general audience respondents were Bachelor’s degree holders, and 53.6% of the council member participants were high school graduates.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Characteristics</th>
<th>Total Respondents n (%)</th>
<th>General Audience n (%)</th>
<th>NUAC Council Member; n (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>29 (35.8%)</td>
<td>23 (43.4%)</td>
<td>6 (21.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>52 (64.2%)</td>
<td>30 (56.6%)</td>
<td>22 (78.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 or under</td>
<td>12 (14.8%)</td>
<td>12 (22.6%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19-35</td>
<td>11 (13.6%)</td>
<td>11 (20.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36-50</td>
<td>30 (37.0%)</td>
<td>21 (39.6%)</td>
<td>9 (32.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>51-65</td>
<td>24 (29.6%)</td>
<td>9 (17.0%)</td>
<td>15 (53.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 or older</td>
<td>4 (4.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 (14.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Native place</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>79 (97.5%)</td>
<td>52 (98.1%)</td>
<td>27 (96.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Korea</td>
<td>1 (1.2%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 (3.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other country</td>
<td>1** (1.2)</td>
<td>1** (1.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary graduate</td>
<td>10 (12.3%)</td>
<td>10 (18.9%)</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>Junior high/Middle</td>
<td>4 (4.9%)</td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
<td>2 (7.1%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>High or equivalent</td>
<td>21 (25.9%)</td>
<td>6 (11.3%)</td>
<td>15 (53.6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Some college</td>
<td>9 (11.1%)</td>
<td>8 (15.1%)</td>
<td>1 (3.6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bachelor’s</td>
<td>31 (38.3%)</td>
<td>22 (41.5%)</td>
<td>9 (32.1%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Master’s</td>
<td>4 (4.9%)</td>
<td>3 (5.7%)</td>
<td>1 (3.6%)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Doctoral</td>
<td>2 (2.5%)</td>
<td>2 (3.8%)</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81 (100%)</td>
<td>53 (100%)</td>
<td>28 (100%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The age grouping is grounded in the participants’ observations about different reactions to the North Korean defectors’ performances. Also, the ‘19–35’ age group includes the population of ‘echo baby boomers,’ ‘36–50’ includes a second baby boom generation, and ‘51–65’ includes the first baby boom generation (Statistics Korea, 2010).

**This participant indicated s/he was born in the United States.

Table 6.2 Frequency Description Results
In this section, the results of the survey questions, asking how the defectors’ performance may have impacted the respondents’ perceptions about North Korean arts and culture as well as North Koreans, are presented. Overall, most of the survey participants seemed to agree that the defectors’ performances may facilitate narrowing the gaps between South and North Korean people, as exhibited in Figure 6.5. The survey results also show that most of the participants from both groups seemed to be interested in unification, but the NUAC council members exhibited higher interest than did the general audience. To the question asking if they enjoyed the defectors’ performance, the general audience answered more positively than did the council member group, by a minuscule margin.

For the remaining four questions, the council member respondents showed stronger agreement than did the general audience group. In other words, the group of NUAC council members engaged with civic activities of promoting unification expressed higher tendency of
believing that the North Korean defectors’ performance may contribute to enhancing interest and understanding of the North Korean arts and culture and facilitating reconciliation with North Korean defectors and North Korean people. What is noteworthy is, on the other hand, that compared to all other variables, both groups of respondents exhibited weaker agreement that the defectors’ performance had an impact on understanding North Korean arts and culture. Even though the numerical difference between the particular question and the others was very small, one may ask why the survey respondents perceived the defectors’ performance as less effective in enhancing the South Korean audiences’ understanding of North Korean arts and culture.

Indeed, seeing the survey result of marking the lowest score in ‘better understanding of North Korean Arts & Culture’ is somewhat worrisome. It denotes that the North Korean defectors’ performances are not effective enough to inform the North Korean arts and culture, which was pointed out by the defector performers as one of the main objectives they pursue. This survey result confirms the concerns addressed by the South Korean stakeholders/partners regarding the current state of the North Korean defectors’ performances. As aforementioned, some South Korean interview participants argued that the defectors’ arts programs are ineffective to increase awareness about unification and North Korean arts and culture (see Figure 6.4). Their argument is reflected in the categories and subcategories listed in Appendix D: ‘entertainment-oriented,’ ‘lost authenticity in NK defectors’ performances,’ and ‘artistically underqualified performances.’ Therefore, it may be necessary for the North Korean defectors’ arts groups to consider restructuring their repertories to improve the cultural diplomatic function of their performances.

As exhibited in Table 6.3, T-test results supports that there was a statistically significant mean difference between the general audience and the NUAC council members in their responses to all questions, except for the question asking how much they enjoyed the show. That is, the numerical difference between the two respondent groups displayed in Figure 6.5 is identified as significant in terms of statistics. Although it would be difficult to prove with this survey result,
the identified significant mean difference suggests there might be a factor that led to the differing responses between the two groups. Identifying the factors may provide useful information to develop an arts-based strategy policy for trust building and social cohesion.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Statistic</th>
<th>Mean Difference</th>
<th>t</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Unification consciousness</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.523</td>
<td>-5.273</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enjoyed the NK defectors’ performance</td>
<td></td>
<td>.107</td>
<td>.371</td>
<td>.289</td>
<td>.712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest to NK arts and culture enhanced</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.954</td>
<td>-2.831</td>
<td>.337</td>
<td>.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better understanding of NK arts and culture</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.968</td>
<td>-2.703</td>
<td>.369</td>
<td>.011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowered feeling of difference to NK defectors</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.626</td>
<td>-1.797</td>
<td>.348</td>
<td>.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lowered feeling of difference to NK citizens</td>
<td></td>
<td>-.605</td>
<td>-1.785</td>
<td>.339</td>
<td>.078</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 6.3 T-test Results: Significance in the Mean Difference*
*Note: Equal variances are assumed, except for the variable ‘unification consciousness.’*

Thus far, the grounded survey results have indicated that overall, the respondents who attended the North Korean defectors’ performance perceived the impact of the arts program positively. In the next section, the distilled categories will be compared with one another to find emerging theory(ies).

### 6.4 Data Analysis Using Grounded Theory Approach

To develop a theory based on emerging patterns and/or themes in an inductive direction, categories and subcategories from the data have been sorted and integrated through the process of finding interactions and inter-relations among them. Charmaz (2006) indicates that the process of sorting facilitates “the theoretical integration of your categories. Thus, sorting prompts you to
compare categories at an abstract level, [and it also] fosters your efforts to refine comparisons between categories” (pp. 115, 117). Throughout the process of sorting, the researcher engages and interacts with the data by negotiating, dialoguing, and understanding (Charmaz, 2006). Hence, the researcher’s understanding would constitute a theory. Charmaz (2006) further demonstrates that theoretical understanding [can be viewed] as abstract and interpretive; the very understanding gained from the theory rests on the theorist’s interpretation of the studied phenomenon. Interpretive theories allow for indeterminacy rather than see causality and give priority to showing patterns and connections rather than to linear reasoning. (p. 126)

Based on this notion of theoretical understanding of the collected data, a conceptual matrix for this research is constructed which projects interrelationships among the categories.

Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) introduce the conditional/consequential matrix, an analytical device that can be adopted for “mapping conditions, contexts, and consequences” with emerging categories (Charmaz, 2006, p. 119). The conditional/consequential matrix serves “as a way of providing a visual representation of the observed transactions in the empirical world and their interactions and inter-relationships” (Charmaz, 2006, p. 118). In this research, the matrix is employed to depict holistic interpretive perspectives of the observed reciprocity of feelings and perceptions through the North Korean defectors’ arts. This study, therefore, designs a matrix by adopting the technique of the conditional/consequential matrix.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arts (Soft power)</th>
<th>Public purpose (Socio-political normative)</th>
<th>National identity (Social cohesion)</th>
<th>Nonprofit (Civic engagement)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Circumstances** | • Existing mood of disinterest in unification  
• False accusations of NK provocations toward NK defectors | • Unfamiliarity and unpopularity of NK arts and culture  
• Cultural gap | • Communication errors  
• Disorganized governance structure  
• Short organizational lifespan |
| **Purposes** | • Creating a social mood for unification and social cohesion  
• Informing NK arts & cultural values  
• Arts programs as means to promote unification | • Creating a shared culture  
• Filling the gap by informing | • Interaction and reciprocity  
• Efforts to inform and engage |
| **Actions** | • Improving NK defectors’ image through volunteer activities  
• Use of traditional folklores | • Performing SK repertoires in the NK arts style  
• To attract SK audiences  
• Use of traditional folklores  
• Trying to meet the standards of hosts and audiences | • Active socialization: learning about nonprofit |
| **Outcomes** | • Cultural stimulus for a unification  
• NK defector performers’ vision for their future career (post-unification)  
• Financial sustainability  
• Career development (of NK defector performers)  
• Working with NK defector fellows as a psychological and emotional buffer | • Bringing people together through the arts  
• Positive reactions of audiences | • SK finding the joint program meaningful (feeling each other’s support on stage)  
• SK feeling affection for NK defectors’ arts groups  
• Positive reactions of audiences |
| **Obstacles** | • “Unfair” wage rates (compared to SK pop stars)  
• Lack of networks navigating for more opportunities in the field  
• Competitiveness of the SK arts market  
• Ineffective programs to inform about NK arts and culture  
• Entertainment-oriented programs | • Lost authenticity in NK defectors’ performances  
• Mix of professionally trained- and amateur performers  
• Limited time for practice  
• Need to improve artistically  
• Ineffective programs to inform about NK arts and culture  
• Entertainment-oriented programs | • Largely relying on gov’t funding  
• Lacking fundraising skills  
• Lack of communication between NK defectors’ arts groups and SK organizations  
• Joint programs not carefully planned  
• Profit-focused joint projects  
• Negative reactions of audiences |
| **Suggested Counter-measures** | • The NK defector performers’ welfare (healing & catharsis)  
• Financial support  
• Need for the MCTS’s involvement | • Use of human capital: professional artists  
• Program development & quality assurance | • More interactions with the audiences  
• Collaboration beyond cooperation between SK & NK defector artists |

| Social Impact: **Trust** | Unification preparation; Promoting unification | Solidarity; Bridge building | Interaction; Reciprocity |

*Table 6.4. Conceptual Matrix of the Social Impact and Factors to Improve*
The matrix developed for this study, by arranging categories and subcategories, is shown in Table 6.4. The vertical line of the matrix represents the process of generating social impact through the North Korean defectors’ performing arts; and the horizontal line represents the conceptual framework, which demonstrated how the arts facilitate trust building. On the vertical line are included circumstantial indicators, purposes of the defectors’ arts groups, actions taken by the groups, and the outcomes of their performances. On the horizontal line are included public purpose (socio-political normative), national identity (social cohesion), nonprofit (civic engagement).

The outcomes sometimes accomplish the defector arts groups’ purposes for their performances; at other times, stumbling blocks may delay the intended objective. Thus, the obstacles and countermeasures identified by the interview participants are presented separately on the lower end of the matrix. The matrix also demonstrates a pattern of how the North Korean defectors’ arts activities can kindle (thin) trust by generating social impact identified at the bottom of the matrix. Social impact includes unification preparation/promoting unification, solidarity/bridge building, and interaction/reciprocity. The data analysis revealed that social impact is derived from both what the defector arts groups have pursued through their arts activities and what some of the interview participants have either experienced or observed while they were contributing to the domain of the defectors’ performances in various capacities. Social impact also represents the desired outcome of promoting unification which can be fostered by implementing the suggested countermeasures.

The categories and subcategories arranged in the matrix according to the process of social impact are cross-sorted horizontally too. With this arrangement, the matrix also depicts interrelationships of the emerging categories within the conceptual framework developed in this research. As illustrated in the conceptual framework, the arts contribute to fostering an inclusive community by bridging divided groups and communities thereby promoting national identity and trust building. Resting on this concept, the horizontal line represents how the North Korean
defectors’ performing arts are pertinent to three notions listed in the conceptual framework: ‘public purpose,’ ‘national identity,’ and ‘nonprofit structure.’

First, with regard to public purpose, the defector arts groups aim at creating a social mood toward social cohesion and unification through performing Korean traditional folklores and North Korean performing arts. The interview participants endorsed the transformative power of the arts that the defector arts groups brought. The performances served as a stimulus for a unification to some extent. In addition to the desirable collective outcome, some of the participants also indicated how the performances have generated a positive impact at the personal level, particularly for the defector performers.

Enhancing the North Korean defectors’ quality of life in South Korea is considered one of the most important tasks in preparing for a unification because successful settlement of the defectors in their new home can predict a brighter future for South and North Koreans living together when the border has been opened. In that respect, the defector participants have indicated that performing on stage has been a crucial source of their income; and working with fellow defectors has brought them a sense of belonging and feeling of comfort living in the new society. Creating a small community, to which they feel attached and which helps to enhance their financial sustainability and so they can settle in the South, can be considered the initial step in preparing for unification. Moreover, the defector performers have acknowledged the need to take leadership roles in informing people from the North about democratic values after a unification, granting them a vision of their future careers.

However, the circumstances of the performing arts field for the defectors do not seem to be always optimistic. The interview participants have recognized political tension and unstable inter-Korean relations as factors impeding the way to a peaceful unification. Some of the defector performers have mentioned they have experienced physical threats at performance sites from outraged protesters who were nearby. Likewise, North Korea’s provocations and armed force attacks like the Yeonpyeong Island and Cheonan warship incidents caused consecutive
cancellations of the defectors’ performances and the false accusations against the performers (A. Kim, S. Cho, & S. Kim, personal communication, December 19, 2013). On the other hand, some South Korean participants brought up a few obstacles regarding the program contents of the defector arts groups. They have indicated that some defector arts groups’ performances seem to be inadequate, that is, they were too entertainment-oriented, failing to accomplish the objective of promoting unification. Those participants argued that original North Korean arts should be focused on and presented, even though eliminating any propagandistic components would take more time and effort.

Second, national identity and social cohesion appeared to be fostered by emphasizing the commonalities between the nations through performing Korean traditional folk songs and dances. In terms of circumstances, however, the interviewees still perceived different cultures, social values and mentalities of South and North Korean people as posing a hurdle to constructing a common national identity for social cohesion. They identified creating a shared culture and closing the gap between the two nations by informing South Koreans about North Korean arts and culture as intended objectives of the North Korean defectors’ arts groups. The defector performers reported that in order to fill the chasm that opened the two countries over 60 years of separation, they attempted to showcase authentic North Korean techniques of singing and dancing even when they perform South Korean repertoires. Also, they believed that the inclusion of South Korean pop repertoires in their program helped to draw South Korean audiences’ attention better and thus contributed to bringing people together more effectively.

However, as aforementioned, South Korean external stakeholders criticized the defectors’ performances for increasingly adopting South Korean commercial arts at the expense of North Korean arts, thus weakening the desirable impact. Indeed, there is a discrepancy, to an extent, between what the defector arts performers insist they are doing (i.e., presenting original North Korean arts) and what they have been observed doing (i.e., increasing their repertoire of South
Korean commercial arts). What may cause the discrepancy between a justified reason of their performance and actual conduct would also need further speculation.

Third, some interview participants also endorsed characteristics of nonprofits, such as civic engagement and volunteerism, can stimulate interactions and reciprocity among the participants of North Korean defector performances (performers, administrators, volunteers, and the audiences). For example, the NUAC Jungnang Chapter has local volunteers to serve at the defectors’ arts events which can open up opportunities for the South Korean volunteers to interact with North Korean arts and culture (H. Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014). In the case of the PU, its efforts to learn about nonprofits led its members to engage with South Korean society more actively, such as participating in social services. Also, direct contact at performance venues accompanied by the performers’ efforts to engage and interact with the attendants can encourage mutual exchanges of feeling and sentiments. Cooperative actions among the South and North Korean arts professionals also appear to generate feelings of human affection. According to the executive director of Anseong Namsadang auditorium, even though interaction and cooperation between the PU and Namsadang auditorium have remained minimal, working with PU members on a regular basis for more than one year has made him feel some type of attachment to them (K. Seo, personal communication, June 21, 2014).

However, the technical director of the PBH has shared that personal contact sometimes has involved unpleasant confrontations that were provoked by a few South Korean attendants’ condescending attitudes toward the defector performing arts troupes (I. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Sadly, such negative consequences of direct contact often seem to threaten reciprocity building and furthermore, impede creating trusting environments. Another obstacle some South Korean participants pointed out is lack of communication between North Korean defectors’ arts groups and their South Korean partner organizations. Even though they are scheduled together on the same performance, most of the time they perform separately, and they thus tend not to interact much with each other. The participants did not give reasons for
neglecting such opportunities to interact; therefore, they engaged in only loosely planned joint performances. With regard to organizational capacity, it was observed that there is need to improve the self-sufficiency of the North Korean defector arts group (e.g., equipping members with fundraising skills; or reducing PU’s high reliance on a single funding source).

The interview participants also suggested some countermeasures might be applicable for the observed obstacles that delay the social impact of participating in the arts. The countermeasures related to arts-based strategies listed in the matrix include (1) financial support, (2) the North Korean defector performers’ welfare (healing & catharsis), (3) program development & quality assurance, and (4) more interactions with the audiences. The participants’ rationale for providing financial support to the North Korean defectors’ arts groups is that it can lessen their financial burdens and allow them to concentrate on achieving their objective of promoting unification through their performances. In a similar vein, paying attention to the defector performers’ welfare was brought up as an important aspect of preparing for a unification.

The South Korean interview participants also mentioned that they preferred not to use South Korean repertoires for instant good reactions and entertainment. They expected presenting performances with artistic advancement and excellence would draw the South Korean audiences and inform them with original North Korean arts and culture. In that respect, Jeon pointed out “volatilization of memory” by arguing that the entertainment-oriented performances of the defector arts groups would not last too long in the memory of the audiences (personal commutation, June 18, 2014). Rather, some South Korean participants believed developing participatory arts programs that can invite audiences to actively engage in performances would enhance reciprocity between South Korean audiences and North Korean defector performers.

Based on these suggested countermeasures and findings described in this analysis chapter, the following chapter elaborates and discusses about implications for arts-based policy strategy.
CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS FOR ARTS-BASED POLICY STRATEGY

This chapter will focus on elaborating implications of the research findings demonstrated in the previous chapter. The implications will rest on the threefold analytical framework developed and described at the end of Chapter Four by adopting triple-bottom lines for nonprofit arts (Wyszomirski, 2013), lesson-drawing (Rose, 1993), and an arts-based policy strategy development based on Kingdon’s (2003) policy formulation literature. It should be noted before entering the main discussion that although the North Korean defector arts domain is comprised of both nonprofits (and social enterprises) and for-profits, this research focuses on the nonprofit organizational structure. The most important reason for that would be nonprofits are deemed more feasible in pursuit of public benefit or social cause, whereas for-profits’ primary objective is profit making. Moreover, in the process of generating (thin) trust, civic engagement and volunteerism are considered to be of crucial value; therefore, this chapter will mainly concentrate on identifying the implications of the research findings in the nonprofit sector.

7.1 Triple-Bottom Line of Operating the North Korean Defectors’ Performances

According to Wysomirski (2013), the triple-bottom line – financial sustainability, artistic vitality, and recognized public value – can serve “as a new organizational performance and accountability standard that has spread across the nonprofit cultural sector” in terms of a meta-policy (p. 157). It is because the triple-bottom line can be understood as an outcome of gradual institutionalization of multiple policy values that the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) has forged in the past decades. The process of reframing key policy values – that is, the triple-bottom line – has started from identification of problems or deficits in the arts and cultural
sector (Wyszomirski, 2013). By adopting the process, therefore, this study also begins by identifying what problems have been recognized in the analysis.

As demonstrated in the findings in the previous chapter of data analysis, this research has identified obstacles that may delay the generation of the potential social impact of the defectors’ performance (see Table 6.4). The categories (and subcategories) of problems that emerged have been classified by matching them with the notions in the conceptual framework. In Figure 7.1, they have been re-classified, after excluding political and circumstantial factors that cannot be controlled, by applying the triple-bottom line concept as follows: ‘publicly recognized values of the arts,’ ‘artistic excellence/deficit,’ and ‘financial sustainability’ (Wyszomirski, 2013).

To note, a couple of categories appear to fall under more than one bottom line, since the three bottom lines tend to be connected. Even though the triple-bottom line of the defectors’ arts programs emphasizes different aspects, ripple effects among them can be anticipated. A possible ripple effect of could be that artistic inadequacy may not just remain in the boundary of artistic excellence/deficit, but ripple over to the public purpose of the arts program. Another possible ripple effect could be financial deficit influencing the artistic quality of the arts program. Some external stakeholder participants have pointed out their concern that the defectors’ arts programs are too entertainment-oriented, placing much weight on attracting audiences, and can be ineffective in informing the audiences about North Korean arts and culture or in enhancing their awareness of unification. By the same token, such connectedness among the three bottom lines can also pose a challenge to finding an overall balance when there are conflicting values among the three bottom lines. That is, attempting to improve one bottom line may interfere with efforts to develop another bottom line. By recognizing the connectedness of the three bottom lines, the obstacles that emerged from the data have been listed in Figure 7.1 below.
The pursuit of recognized public value, the first bottom line when conducting arts activities, encompasses the instrumentality of the arts, since the arts are employed to produce intended public benefits. In the context of the defectors’ performing arts, the most prominent instrumental benefit of their arts activities is the social impact – such as solidarity, bridge building, interaction, and reciprocity (see Table 6.4) – on facilitating the preparation of unification in the Korean peninsula. The North Korean defectors’ arts groups also proclaimed this instrumental benefit in their mission.

The instrumentality of their performing arts shares that of cultural diplomacy, which is defined as “the exchange of ideas, information, art[s], and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding” (Cummings, 2003, p. 1). Given this definition, the defectors’ arts activities can build a bridge and enhance mutual understanding with people from the North by informing South Korean audiences, who are unfamiliar with North Korean arts culture, about North Korean arts and culture, while pursuing the ultimate goal of promoting and preparing for a unification on the Korean peninsula.
Through the defectors’ arts activities, therefore, interaction and bridge building can be fostered in relationships both between the North Korean defector performers and South Korean audiences, and between the defector performers and their South Korean partners. However, research observations and interviews revealed that the North Korean defectors’ performances are mostly focused on the former relationship, and not the latter. Indeed, some interview participants bemoaned the lack of communication between the defector performers and their South Korean working partners, which is indicated in the category, ‘lack of communication between South Korean organizations and North Korean defectors’ arts groups.’ Considering Putnam’s (2000) assertion that participation in social networks can help generate trust, such an opportunity of building networks through cooperation should not be squandered. Consequently, as part of the efforts to increase the effectiveness of the North Korean defectors’ arts activities in any way possible, mediating device(s) – such as opportunities to develop an arts program together or to exchange their artistic skills – need to be employed to stimulate the South Korean- and defector arts organizations and/or professionals to collaborate with each other.

Another problematic phenomenon observed in the defectors’ arts activities is ‘lost authenticity in North Korean defectors’ performances’ (see Figure 7.1). That is, the trend in their arts programs toward reducing authentic North Korean arts components and increasing South Korean contemporary pop repertoires. Consequently, most South Korean interview participants and even one of the survey respondents claim their current programming seems to be ineffective in informing the audiences about North Korean arts and culture. Even though the survey conducted for this research did not pose an open question, one of the South Korean respondents volunteered her frustration by questioning, how one can possibly learn about North Korean arts and culture when the defector performers present only South Korean repertoires. Of course this one voice does not represent that of the others; however, it expresses how the North Korean defectors’ performances do not meet the South Korean audience’s expectations. ‘Lost
authenticity in North Korean defectors’ performances,’ furthermore, appears to be related to the second bottom line: artistic excellence/deficit.

The Second Bottom Line: Artistic Excellence/Deficit

The second bottom line, artistic excellence/deficit, shares three categories with the bottom line of public value that question the adequacy of the inclusion of South Korean pop repertoires in the North Korean defectors’ performances: ‘ineffective programs to inform about North Korean arts and culture,’ ‘entertainment-oriented programs,’ and ‘lost authenticity in North Korean defectors’ performances.’ In addition to the undesirable trend in performances that merely entertain rather than educate, Seo, the executive director of the Anseong Namsadang Auditorium, criticized the lack of artistic excellence in the PU’s performances, which deprives the South Korean audiences from learning about intriguing North Korean performing arts. His reasoning was that what the PU presents to the audience remains at the level of only mimicking original North Korean dances in rather simple and unsophisticated movements (personal communication, June 21, 2014).

The South Korean stakeholders shared Seo’s view on artistic quality. This view is reflected in the category, ‘artistic quality of North Korean defectors’ performances,’ which subsumes three subcategories: ‘mix of professionally trained- and amateur performers,’ ‘limited time for practice,’ and ‘need to improve artistically.’ These subcategories point to the deterioration in the quality of the defectors’ performances. As revealed in these subcategories, some South Korean participants were especially concerned with the defector arts groups that did not rehearse before an event, used karaoke background music, and consisted of amateur performers who lacked artistic skills.

In Wyszomirski’s (2013) account of the nonprofit arts field, “Over time, artistic excellence was debated in terms of elitism versus populism, cultural diversity, creativity and innovation, artistic deficits, and artistic vitality” (p. 160). In this research case, artistic excellence is related to the latter two concepts, artistic deficits and artistic vitality. These problems appear to
pertain to the defector arts groups’ financial state. According to the general manager of the NUAC Jungnang Chapter, missing rehearsals before the event happens due to their tight and hectic schedules, which enable them to earn more (H. Kim, personal communication, June 25, 2014). Also, using karaoke music can be cost effective compared to hiring instrument players or recording their own background music. However, in their efforts for financial sustainability, they compromise the quality of their performances.

Artistic development also tends to suffer when an organization concentrates on financial stability, since prioritizing revenue generation and therefore focusing on audience development neglects artistic development. A former NEA chairman, Frank Hodsoll observed that during his term in the 1980s there was “…a declining willingness to take risks [for program development], which he attributed to arts organizations focusing primarily on achieving financial stability.” In this regard, including performing popular South Korean commercial arts in the North Korean defectors’ arts program is directly connected to their desire for audience development. As the executive directors of the PBH and the PU shared, in the earlier years, when the program consisted only of North Korean repertoires, South Korean audiences used to walk out at some point during a performance. But after beginning to add South Korean pop music (트로트, teuroteu) to their repertoire, their show succeeded in engaging their audiences (Y. Kim, personal communication, December 20, 2013). Along the same vein, the PU’s executive director also described the organization’s artistic vision as including what the audiences may enjoy, rather than what the performers prefer (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014). However, this vision contradicts their mission of informing about North Korean arts and culture to promote a unification. These are some of the reasons why a deficit in artistic excellence is definitely a problem for the defector arts groups.
The Third Bottom Line: Financial Sustainability

In the third bottom line, financial sustainability, four subcategories are identified as follows: ‘largely relying on government funding,’ ‘lacking fundraising skills,’ ‘lack of networks navigating for more opportunities in the field,’ and ‘“unfair” wage rates (compared to South Korean pop stars).’ Of these subcategories, especially the first two are interrelated and subsumed under the category of ‘nonprofit North Korean defectors’ arts group,’ which indicates lack of self-sufficiency. In the United States, after the endemic problem of financial gaps in the nonprofit arts field was identified, the NEA’s arts policy direction moved forward to fund nonprofit arts organizations so they may develop financial stability and sustainability (Wyszomirski, 2013).

In the case of the nonprofit defector arts groups’ lack of self-sufficiency, they are unique, in that, while they are an arts group, they also consist of defectors. Conversations with the interview participants revealed that the PU has been receiving funding from the local government, from in-kind support such as providing an automobile, a practice room, and a place to live, to indirect funding. In terms of indirect funding, the Anseong city government provides performance opportunities to the PU, such as opening at the regular Namsadang performance and paying the PU for each performance. Such public support from the city government was part of its policy action implemented to ease the North Korean defectors to build self-sufficiency and thus establish their lives in the South (K. Seo, personal communication, June 21, 2014).

On the flip side, the top-down decision making on giving the PU the opportunity to perform at the city-owned Namsadang Auditorium triggered discontent between the PU and the Namsadang performance group, which impeded building friendly relationships. According to Seo, the executive director of the Namsadang Auditorium, the decision to allow the PU to perform before the Namsadang performance did not involve any artistic discussions or administrative negotiations between the Anseong city government and the auditorium, but was made unilaterally by the mayor. After learning this decision, the executive director appealed to the city government to withdraw its decision, in order to avoid artistic dissonance between the
Namsadang’s southern-origin Korean traditional performance and the PU’s North Korean performance. However, the appeal was dismissed because the decision had been made directly by the Anseong city mayor. Consequently, the PU began its opening performances at the Namsadang Auditorium, with which the Namsadang members were unhappy (K. Seo, personal communication, June 21, 2014).

What is more, the rich government funding was not achieved by PU’s development efforts. Rather, the arts group was invited by the city government after performing at the 2012 World Folk Festival (B. Bahng, personal communication, June 15, 2014). Such exceptional public support for a performing arts organization was possible perhaps because the PU consisted of North Korean defectors. In this case, the purpose of funding seems to rest not merely on filling an earnings gap, but supporting the defector group members to settle in South Korea. Therefore, PU’s lack of self-sustainability as a nonprofit organization is associated with issues of the “cost disease” of the performing arts and the settling of North Korean defectors in their new home.

The other obstacles to the financial bottom line for the defector arts groups appear to be the subcategories of ‘lack of networks navigating for more opportunities in the field’ and ‘unfair’ wage rates (compared to South Korean pop stars).’ These obstacles comprise the category of ‘difficult factors for North Korean defectors’ arts groups to overcome.’ The first subcategory shows what the observed North Korean defectors’ arts groups felt as barriers for them to increase their profits. According to Bahng, having limited networks compared to their South Korean pie sharers, as well as a lack of nation-wide networking compromised her organization’s earnings. As a reason for the PU’s limited networks, Bahng pointed out that there is no national support helping them to navigate performance opportunities or build a network (personal communication, June 15, 2014).

In addition, the subcategory, ‘unfair’ wage rates (compared to South Korean pop stars),’ indicates a modest level of payment for the performances of the defector arts groups and how the North Korean defectors felt about the wage they received. Although the PBH and the PU
members did not share during the interview conversations how much they usually receive for their performances, they have complained about the relatively lower paychecks they received from the broker agencies, compared to what other South Koreans make (B. Bahng, S. Cho, A. Kim, S. Kim, & Y. Kim). Without knowing the amount of the salaries the defector arts group and other South Korean performers receive, it would be difficult to discuss or judge this argument adequately. Possible reasons for the “unfair” payment that the defector performers believe they are receiving could be the quality of the performance, name recognition, or it could be that the broker agency is in fact abusing the defectors’ vulnerable social status in South Korea. Also, it seems to be an issue of the circumstances of the domain to which the defector arts groups belong, instead of a sole organizational issue.

These subcategories demonstrate how the North Korean defector participants felt the financial limitations while working in the South Korean arts market. They also allow us to have a glimpse into the defector participants’ perception regarding the economic ecology of the South Korean arts market, as well as their understanding of the defector arts groups’ financial affairs. The defector participants’ arguments partly reveal that their arts groups have relied on profits generated by their performances. However, in the case of the PU, since it is a nonprofit, unlike the PBH, the PU participants’ argument regarding finances begs the question of whether the PU members have a full understanding of what it means to be “nonprofit.” As a nonprofit, they would be expected to fill their income gap through fundraising efforts. Furthermore, the defector participants’ assertions about “unfair” payment implies that they overlook their mission to inform about North Korean arts and culture and regard their arts activities only as entertainment, like those of the South Korean commercial performing artists. This issue especially relates to the first bottom line, public value.

To recap, the identified obstacles – lost authenticity, lack of communications, and lack of fundraising skills, etc. – of the North Korean defectors’ arts groups based on the concept of the triple-bottom line appear to interrelate as the three bottom lines are connected. For the ripple
effect, sometimes conflicting values among the three bottom lines challenge the arts organizations
to find an overall balance; and other times, problems in one bottom line cross over to another
bottom line. Taking the discussions to the stage of policy strategy formulation, the following
section deliberates about policy strategy options derived from lessons of the German and South
African cases.

7.2 Lesson-Drawing from German Reunification and Post-Apartheid South Africa

Having identified the above obstacles in the domain of the defector performing arts through the
lens of the triple-bottom line, this section turns to Rose’s (1993) lesson-drawing from other
international cases. According to Rose (1991),

> Confronted with a common problem, policymakers in cities, regional
governments and nations can learn from how their counterparts elsewhere
respond. More than that, it raises the possibility that policymakers can draw
lessons that will help them deal better with their own problems. If the lesson is
positive, a policy that works is transferred, with suitable adaptations. If it is
negative, observers learn what not to do from watching the mistakes of others. (p.
4) . . . A lesson is […] an action-oriented conclusion about a programme or
programmes in operation elsewhere” in the context of lesson-drawing (p. 7).

Therefore, referring to lesson-drawing in this research does not remain at the stage of policy
learning. Rather, it can transfer lessons from the German and South African cultural policies to
applicable policy strategies in the Korean peninsula based on similar problems regarding the
process of building a national identity and social cohesion that all three countries have
confronted. As discussed in the analytical framework section in Chapter Four, Rose (1993)
classifies lesson-drawing into five types: ‘copying,’ ‘adaptation,’ ‘making a hybrid,’ ‘synthesis,’
and ‘inspiration.’ Among the five, a ‘synthesis’ seems to be the most suitable lesson-drawing
approach for this research and the circumstances of a Korean unification. To reiterate Rose’s
(1993) definition, a ‘synthesis’ refers to combining “elements familiar in different [policy]
programs into a distinctive and fresh whole. The logic is comparable to assembling familiar parts
of human anatomy to produce a unique human figure” (p. 31). Therefore, the cultural policy of
the German reunification and the post-apartheid South Africa will be synthesized to provide lessons for constructing an arts-based policy strategy to facilitate social cohesion and trust building in the Korean peninsula.

First, in the case of Germany, the West German government appeared to have taken a leadership role during the cultural exchanges with East Germany while preparing for the reunification. West Germany had supported cultural exchange initiatives and activities led by the private sector and had succeeded in drawing East Germany’s agreement on the Basic Treaty in 1972 and the Cultural Agreement in 1986 (Yang & Kim, 1991). However, while promoting cultural exchanges with East Germany, the West German government adopted an assimilation strategy toward the East Germans immigrants or refugees living in the West, to merge them into Western society (Hur, 2012). After reunification, the new German government’s social cohesion strategy still manifested the assimilation approach resting on West Germany’s economic superiority over the former East Germany. Consequently, there existed a social mood of pressuring East Germans to accept and adopt the socio-political values of West Germany, which seemed to pose a stumbling block on the way toward social cohesion (Hancock & Welsh, 1994; Winkler, 1994; Yang & Kim, 1991).

Another strategy the new German government appeared to employ was to emphasize its national culture and also to invest large sums on cultural heritage conservation projects in the former East German territories. This cultural policy strategy aimed for social cohesion and reconciliation amongst Germans who had been separated for over 40 years. Despite the emphasis on the national culture that had been enjoyed across the nation before its separation, a subculture of East German culture emerged as a counter effect of the government’s attempt to eliminate the East German culture (Korea Culture and Tourism Institute, 2012). What can be learned from the German reunification and the policy strategies related to the arts and culture includes sole reliance on the traditional culture may not be effective on generating a sense of solidarity as one might expect. In addition, discerning how to deal with the different cultures of a once-divided nation,
whether respecting or rejecting them based on economic and/or political power or lack thereof, can be critical in regarding the culture as an asset or as a problem (Wyszomirski, personal communication, October 22, 2014).

Through speculating the West German government’s cultural policy before reunification and the new German cultural policy in its aftermath, we can derive the following lessons with both positive and negative consequences: (1) proactive engagement of a government in cultural exchanges with its counterpart and support for private initiatives; (2) inadequacy of assimilation approach to merging once divided nations and creating one nation-state; and (3) cultural policy that solely relies on the use of the old previous national culture being less effective.

Next, post-apartheid South Africa’s efforts on creating social bonds and one national identity indicate a gradual transformation in the country’s top-down policy strategy toward involving the grassroots’ in the policy formulation process. Since the creation of post-apartheid South Africa, the government’s leadership in constructing a national identity can be witnessed, for instance, in former President Nelson Mandela’s the ‘Rainbow Nation’ campaign which had reinforced ‘unity in diversity’ and the establishment of the new Constitution laying out national identity building as its rationale. Under President Zuma’s leadership, there has been a shift in the trend of top-down direction. Recently, ‘Advocates for Social Cohesion’ was established, comprised of elites in the society, and not the general public, making a new attempt to embrace the voice of the citizenry in the policy formation process for social cohesion. Consequently, there has been discussion about the need for involving more diverse perspectives at the grassroots level in the development of social cohesion policy (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2010).

Another key lesson point of South African policy on social cohesion and national identity construction would be that the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) has taken a leadership role in conducting the related national policy. Having recognized the critical impact of the arts and culture in forming social environments of solidarity, the DAC convened some meetings and conferences periodically and oversaw relevant programs of local and provincial governments in
South Africa. Two primary lessons drawn from the South African policy experiences would be (1) limitations of the top-down approach in conducting policy for national identity building and social cohesion; and (2) the central role of the DAC from formulation to implementation of the social cohesion policy agenda.

Exploration of the German and South African cultural policy has revealed five essential lessons. In order to make them more applicable referring to the lesson-drawing approach, the five lessons need to be synthesized and adjusted to the context of North Korean defectors’ performing arts domain in South Korea. By integration, the five lessons can be narrowed down into a couple of major aspects, in terms of policy direction. First, a central government should support and foster vibrant cultural exchanges between South Korean arts professionals and North Korean defector artists. In that process, a variety of arts disciplines need to be encouraged to participate both at grassroots and elite levels.

In addition, involvement of the South Korean Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Sports (MCTS) in overseeing the cultural policy about social cohesion and national identity building may enhance the effectiveness of the policy implementation. In case of South Korea, there exists the Ministry of Unification which is in charge of unification-related national policies. For that reason, cooperation between the two ministries needs to be deliberated. For instance, the Ministry of Unification focuses on directing national attention and coordination toward social cohesion and nation identity building while the MCTS takes the lead in the ‘bottom-up’ implementation of the relevant cultural policy (Wyszomirski, personal communication, December 12, 2014). Especially in the initial phase of the ‘bottom-up’ policy implementation, national attention and initiative are needed in order to form public awareness and build grassroots capacity, which enable the governmental leadership to decentralize in the process of social cohesion and national identity building. By taking them into consideration, the following section will be spent on further speculations for addressing an arts-based policy strategy for social cohesion, accompanied by the suggested countermeasures in the findings.
7.3 Implications: Arts-based Policy Strategy for Social Cohesion in the Korean Peninsula

According to Lasswell (1958), public policy refers to government decisions “composed of two interrelated elements: policy goals and policy means operating at different levels of abstraction.” Walsh (1994) defines policy goals as “the basic aims and expectations governments have in deciding to pursue (or not) some course of actions, [and] policy means [as] the techniques they used to attain those goals” (as cited in Howlett, 2011, p. 16; emphasis in original). Also, the term ‘policy goal’ can be used interchangeably with ‘public interest,’ ‘public need,’ and ‘public purpose,’ according to Wyszomirski (2000). Situating these concepts in this research, the policy goal or public purpose that this study deals with would be social cohesion and trust building in the process of a unification and the policy means would become the arts, specifically the defectors’ performing arts. Moreover, the policy means of the defector groups’ performing arts is both a default and a pilot. It is a default, because currently, direct contact and interactions between South and North Korean artists, it is to say, impossible. It is also a pilot, because it can preview some problems likely to arise between South and North Korean artists as they try to work together. However, this research does not only treat the arts as a means to achieve the policy goal, but also acknowledges the impact of the arts on individuals and collective communities.

Cultural policy, in Miller and Yúdice’s (2002) account, has been defined as “the institutional supports that channel both aesthetic creativity and collective ways of life – a bridge between [the aesthetic and the anthropological] registers” (p. 1). The authors describe the two registers in the aspect of cultural policy as follows:

Culture is connected to policy in two registers: the aesthetic and the anthropological. In the aesthetic register, artistic output emerges from creative people and is judged by aesthetic criteria, as framed by the interests and practices of cultural criticism and history. In this world, culture is taken as a marker of differences and similarities in taste and status within social groups. The anthropological register, on the other hand, takes culture as a marker of how we live our lives, the senses of places and person that make us human – neither individual nor entirely universal, but grounded by language, religion, custom, time and space. (Miller & Yúdice, 2002, p. 1)
By recognizing how the arts and culture may play out in the context of public policy, this research has been aiming to develop an arts-based policy strategy for facilitating trust generation in the process of social cohesion and a unification in the Korean peninsula.

A course of developing policy agenda and alternatives, in Kingdon’s (2003) account, involves three streams of processes: problem recognition, proposal formation, and politics (p. 197). In practice, participants, such as the president, members of Congress, civil servants, lobbyists, journalists, academics, etc., tend to specialize in each process; and academics are found to be more involved in policy formulation than in politics (Kingdon, 2003). In the process of policy agenda setting, first a problem is identified, and then a policy proposal is developed and becomes available for officials to implement. In consequence, depending on the national mood or political events, a policy window may be opened for a proposal to be selected as a decision agenda (Howlett, Ramesh, & Perl, 2009). Considering the course of policy agenda and the role of academics in that process, implications of the study findings are discussed and demonstrated below, through formulating an arts-based policy strategy.

**Implications: An Arts-based Policy Strategy**

Earlier in this chapter, this dissertation research identified obstacles or problems in the domain of North Korean defectors’ performing arts and has them situated in the triple-bottom line. In turn, policy suggestions were also drawn by synthesizing the arts-based policy strategies of Germany and South Africa for social cohesion and national identity building. In addition, suggested countermeasures and their related codes obtained through the interviews are embraced in the policy strategy implications with an expectation of further enhancing the applicability and effectiveness of the implications of this research. The codes captured in the suggested countermeasures include (1) promoting the South Korean government’s periodic evaluation of sponsored arts programs’ quality assurance; (2) archiving and preserving North Korean arts by
the MCTS; (3) creating opportunities for collaborative projects between North Korean defector- and South Korean professional artists; and (4) creating a production through collaboration beyond co-operation between the North Korean defector- and South Korean arts professionals.

Putting together these countermeasures and the policy suggestions that were derived earlier in the Section 7.3, an updated framework of an arts-based policy strategy for social cohesion and trust building is constructed, as shown in Figure 7.2. This new framework is a modified version of the conceptual framework (see Figure 4.2), based on understanding the current circumstances of North Korean defectors’ performing arts domain.

![Figure 7.2 Framework of an Arts-based Policy Strategy for Social Cohesion and Trust Building](image)

There tends to emerge interrelationships among the specified policy goals/values (diversity), primary driving force (civic engagement), and the facilitator (government agencies) of the intermediate stages of the process displayed in the modified framework. These interrelationships are exhibited in Figure 7.3, listing detailed countermeasures and objectives. Regarding ‘facilitating role of the government agencies,’ the MCTS and the Ministry of Unification appear to focus on generating momentum to vitalize civic engagement at the grassroots level, so that the nonprofit arts sector can play a mediating role. Such government
intervention appears to be necessary since social cohesion and trust building are in their initial phases, considering the status quo of pre-unification and the extent of South Koreans’ awareness of unification and of North Korean defectors living in South Korea.

‘Diversity’ displayed in the circle of the figure identifies the civic efforts through actions and government supporting systems that need to be pursued in the process of generating ‘thin trust’ through using the arts; that is, possibly something that the North Korean defector artists can contribute. Ways of transforming the policy values into actions may include archiving and researching North Korean arts and culture by engaging with the MCTS and defector artists. Furthermore, with a balance of employing traditional national culture, vitalizing various types of arts disciplines may bring in desirable outcomes, such as expanding a horizon of civic engagement. Aiming at diversity, likewise, may naturally obstruct the attempt to assimilate.

‘Active civic engagement’ appears to be lacking in the current atmosphere of trust generation through the defectors’ performances and should be sought out to create reciprocal social mood between South Koreans and North Korean defectors. In the report of the findings from ‘Animating Democracy’, it is stated that “in arts-based civic dialogue, the artistic process and/or the arts or humanities presentation provides a key focus or catalyst for public dialogue on an issue’” (Americans for the Arts, 2005, p. 55; emphasis in original). Furthermore, active civic engagement needs to be promoted at both professional and amateur levels.
This research suggests artist exchanges between South Korean artists, who are interested in North Korean arts techniques and forms, and North Korean defector artists, who received formal arts education in North Korea. During the interview conversations, there were a few South Korean artists in South Korea who had studied North Korean arts in Japan; and they had convened and performed at a local festival, called ‘Voice of the Nation’ in Seoul (Jeon, personal commutation, June 18, 2014). Coupled with that, collaborative arts projects between South Korean arts professionals and North Korean defector arts professionals can be promoted which can aim to create a new production. Such collaborations might be beneficial for enhancing artistic excellence in terms of adding the values of experimentation and creativity in both the general South Korean arts field and the defectors’ performing arts domain. With regard to overcoming artistic deficit, a former NEA chair, Hodsoll also acknowledged, “a need to encourage the development of new work, experiment with technology, give more attention to artistic development activities” to a great extent (Wyszomirski, 2013, p. 160).
In addition, during an interview, an NUAC council officer who is also a professor in North Korean Studies pointed out that the current defectors’ arts programs seem not much impressive to the audiences and thus they may hardly remember what they saw in the arts programs (Jeon, personal communication, June 18, 2014). Possible reasons include entertainment-oriented, rather than informational contents and increasing South Korean repertoires in the defectors’ arts programs. Also, interactions from a distance, with the performers on stage and viewers in their seats, may not be so effective to make a lasting impression. Therefore, participatory arts programs that provide opportunities for more direct interaction and experience between the defector and South Korean participants need to be implemented.

In order to effectively promote and implement active civic engagement, the government’s institutional supports need to be in place while pursing the policy goal of diversity. As learned from the South African government’s recent shift to engaging citizens’ opinion in the national policy agenda regarding social cohesion and national identity building, the South Korean government also eschews the top-down approach. What can be considered to stimulate civic initiative would be the MCTS’s involvement in mediating between South Korean artists and North Korean defector artists and providing financial support to stimulate such artist exchanges. Also, when funding is granted to such collaborative projects or defectors’ performances, appropriate an evaluation process needs to be followed. As the executive director of Namsadang auditorium has pointed out, grant providers’ evaluations may foster enhancement of artistic excellence and the financial sustainability of recipient organizations (Seo, personal communication, June 21, 2014).

7.4 Discussions: Applying Cultural Diplomacy Strategies to the Unification Discourse
As demonstrated in the interrelational triangle of the three streams – public value, private sector, and public sector – this research suggested how an arts-based policy strategy can be implemented.
Based on the data and findings, it also revealed and discussed the need to create opportunities for increasing interactions between South Koreans and North Korean defectors through the arts.

Building relationships and mutual understanding through the arts rest on the concept of soft power, which has significantly contributed to the cultural diplomacy discourse. To an extent, employing the concept in the unification discourse, which is deemed neither a completely national nor international issue, allows us to examine the unique political circumstances of the Korean peninsula and the consequential complex socio-cultural relations between South and North Koreans. Even though rooted in the same history and traditional national cultures, the two nations carry their own distinctively evolved cultures resulting from their particular socio-political circumstances and norms/regulations. In this respect, bridging the ever-grown socio-cultural gaps through cultural diplomacy tactics, such as informing and interacting, was adopted as an embedded baseline in this research.

The recent trend in cultural diplomacy has been to move away from promoting one’s values and beliefs to the counterpart, which was pervaded during the Cold War, and to emphasis mutuality and two-way interactions. This shift confirms the ineffectiveness of the assimilation approach practiced by wielding the superior powers of economy, international relations, or the military. By pursuing mutual understanding, cultural diplomacy amplifies its benefits. As indicated by the U.S Advisory Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, its benefits include “helping create a foundation of trust with other peoples”; “creating relationships with peoples, which endure beyond changes in government”; “uniquely enabling to reach out to young people, to non-elites, to broad audiences with a much reduced language barrier”; and “fostering the growth of civil society” (U.S. Department of State, 2005, p. 1-2).

The findings of this dissertation research emphasize the importance of implementing collaborative arts projects between the South Korean- and North Korean defectors arts professionals by recognizing and adopting the key values of mutual understanding so that a platform for trust building and social cohesion can be forged. Of course, both nations will have
to make necessary compromises and adjustments, to arrive at a common ground. Considering the interrelationships of the public value, the private sector, and the public sector suggested in this research, collaborative efforts through civic engagement need to be adequately made towards democratic ways of social cohesion and trust building.


DoodRock (n.d.), http://www.doodrock.co.kr/korea/sub1.html


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Appendix A: Interview Questionnaire
Initial open-ended questions
• Could you introduce yourself and your organization?
• Please tell me about your role in the (arts) organization/program?

Organization related questions
• Why did you decide to register your organization as a nonprofit/for-profit?
• What types of support have you received from which organization or person? If you cannot give the exact name of the person or organization, please indicate with a category such as ‘private foundation,’ ‘individual,’ and/or ‘a government agency.’
• What types of partnerships have you made with an external entity in order to operate your organization and arts program?
• Since when has your organization (NUAC) conducted cultural programs? If there are some exemplary artistic projects in which you were involved while serving the organization, please indicate and describe your experience.

Objectives of the arts activities
• What was your motivation for founding your organization?
  o What were your expectations/intended outcomes of your arts programs (presented by North Korean defectors)? Why?
• What do you see as the role(s) (in society) of the arts programs that the organization is presenting?
• Why were you, or what led you to be involved in this arts program and the arts group (PBH or PU)?
• What is your purpose(s) in working with North Korean defectors’ arts group and presenting their performances to South Korean audiences?
  o What is the expectations and/or the intended outcome of your (joint) program? Please indicate specifically.

Impact of the arts/performances (at the personal and social levels)
• What factors drove you to choose the arts (to accomplish your organization’s mission)? Why?
  o What does it mean for you personally to participate in the arts organization and its performances?
• What impact do you feel have had on organizing/participating in the arts program(s)?
• What have you achieved through providing the arts program(s)? Please indicate specifically.
• Based on your experience (of presenting performances), what do you think is the impact of interaction between North Korean defectors and South Korean audiences?
• Why do you believe your program is important?
• Do you think that South Koreans’ interest in North Korean defectors’ performing arts has increased? Please explain why or why not.

Challenges and obstacles
• What challenging moments/problems have you confronted while organizing and presenting the arts programs in South Korea?
  o How did you handle that?
• What challenges have you faced while working with North Korean defectors’ arts groups?
Ending questions

• Do you have any comments or suggestions for the improvement of North Korean defectors’ performances or its field?
• Is there anything you want to add or clarify before ending this interview?
• Is there anyone else I should talk to?
Appendix B: Grounded Survey Questionnaire
1. What is your gender?
   1) Male
   2) Female

2. What is your age?
   1) 18 or under
   2) 19 – 25
   3) 26 – 35
   4) 36 – 50
   5) 51 – 65
   6) 66 or older

3. Where are you originally from?
   1) South Korea
   2) North Korea
   3) Other country

4. What is the highest level of education you have completed?
   1) Elementary school
   2) Junior high/Middle school
   3) High school or equivalent
   4) Some college or vocational/technical school (2 years)
   5) Bachelor’s degree
   6) Master’s degree
   7) Doctoral degree
   8) Professional degree (MD, JD, etc.)
   9) Others ________________

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Questions</th>
<th>Not at all</th>
<th>To some extent</th>
<th>To a large extent</th>
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<td>5</td>
<td>How much are you interested in a Korean unification?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>Did you enjoy today’s arts event and programs?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
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<td>7</td>
<td>Did this arts event help you to have interest in North Korean arts and culture?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Do you think this arts event has helped you to understand of North Korean arts and culture?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
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<td>9</td>
<td>Do you think this arts event can help to reduce your sense of difference/incompatibility against North Korean defectors?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Do you think this arts event can help to reduce your sense of difference/incompatibility against North Korean people?</td>
<td>①  ②  ③  ④  ⑤  ⑥  ⑦</td>
<td></td>
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Appendix C: Categories and Sub-categories Emerged from the Grounded Theory Data Analysis I
Cultural and Social context:
- Cultural difference
  - Communication errors
- Hindering factors to social cohesion
  - Cultural gap
- False accusations of NK provocations toward NK defectors
- Existing mood of disinterest in unification
- Unfamiliarity and unpopularity of NK arts and culture
  - Opaque original meanings and intentions of NK songs to SK citizens and officials
- Difference in the arts
- Features of NK arts
- Distinctiveness of SK arts
- Different arts policies of the two Koreas

Structural and Administrative Circumstances:
- For-profit NK defector arts group
  - Reasons not to be Nonprofit
  - Business component
  - Marketing strategies
  - Financial status quo & in-kind donations
- Justification of including SK pop music
  - To attract SK audiences
  - Unpopularity and unfamiliarity of NK genres
  - Performing SK repertoires in the NK arts style
- Program development strategies
  - Trying to meet the standards of hosts and audiences
  - Joint program with SK team(s)
- Circumstances of the NK defectors’ arts field
  - Competitiveness of the SK arts market
  - NK defector performers’ understanding of the field & their position in the field
  - Arts programs as means to promote unification (NUAC)
  - Political elements in NUAC arts events
  - Disorganized governance structure
  - Short organizational lifespan
  - Entertainment-oriented programs
- Difficult factors for NK defectors’ arts groups to overcome
  - “Unfair” wage rates (compared to SK pop stars)
  - Lack of networks navigating for more opportunities in the field
- The need to ensure NK defectors’ better life
  - The NK defector performers’ welfare (healing & catharsis)
  - Financial support
- Current state of governmental support
  - To support NK defectors
  - Arts and cultural affairs
- Nonprofit NK defectors’ arts group
  - Motivations to become nonprofit
  - Improving NK defectors’ image through volunteer activities
  - Skeptical view on for-profit NK arts groups
• Active socialization: learning about nonprofit
• Largely relying on gov’t funding
• Lacking fundraising skills
• Other types & foci of NUAC cultural events

**Conceptual Context – Social Impact of the Arts:**

**• Purposes of NK defectors’ performances**
  - Creating a social mood for unification and social cohesion
  - Informing NK arts & cultural values
  - Creating a shared culture

**• Impact of NK defectors’ performances**
  - Interaction and reciprocity
  - Filling the gap by informing
  - Efforts to inform and engage

**• Meanings of NK defectors’ performances to themselves**
  - Financial sustainability
  - Career development (finding a job & continuing career as artists)
  - Working with NK defector fellows as a psychological and emotional buffer

**• Cultural stimulus for a unification**
  - Bringing people together thru the arts

**• Impact of the arts**
  - Transformative power of the arts

**• Use of traditional folklores**

**• Positive reactions of audiences**

**• Negative reactions of audiences**

**• Artistic quality of NK defectors’ performances**
  - Mix of professionally trained- and amateur performers
  - Limited time for practice
  - Need to improve artistically

**• NK defector performers’ vision for their future career (post-unification)**

**• Lost authenticity in NK defectors’ performances**

**• Lack of communication between NK defectors’ arts groups and SK organizations**

**• What NK defectors’ arts groups are missing**
  - Need for program development
  - Ineffective programs to inform about NK arts and culture

**• Questioning the effectiveness of the NK defectors’ performances**

**• For better practice and impact of NK arts**
  - Need for the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Sports’ involvement
  - Use of human capital: professional artists
  - Program development & quality assurance
  - More interactions with the audiences
  - Collaboration beyond cooperation between SK & NK defector artists

**• Status quo of cooperation between SK and NK defectors’ arts groups**
  - Minimal or lack of interactions between SK and NK defectors’ teams
  - Joint programs not carefully planned
  - Profit-focused joint projects

**• Outcomes of cooperation between SK and NK defectors’ arts groups**
  - SK finding the joint program meaningful (feeling each other’s support on stage)
  - SK feeling affection for NK defectors’ arts groups
Appendix D: Categories and Sub-categories
Emerged from the Grounded Theory Data Analysis II (by Group)
**Perspective of the PBH**

- Cultural difference
  - Different tastes of the arts
- Hindering factors to social cohesion
  - Cultural gap
  - Existing disinterested/anti-unification mood
  - False accusations of NK provocations toward NK defectors
- Unfamiliar and unpopular NK arts and culture
  - Opaque original meanings and intentions of NK songs to SK citizens and officials
- Impact of NK defectors’ performances
  - Interaction and reciprocity
  - Informing NK arts & cultural values
  - Promoting a unification
- Meanings of NK defectors’ performances to themselves
  - Financial sustainability
  - Career development
  - Finding meaning and energy of life
  - Working with NK defector fellows as a psychological and emotional buffer
- Cultural stimulus to a unification
  - Traditional folklore music affirms and emphasizes commonalities
  - Bringing people together through the arts
  - In the process of creating integrated culture
- Features of NK arts
- Distinctiveness of SK arts
- Different arts policy of the two Koreas
- Justification of including SK pop music
  - Dilemma in program development
  - Audience development purpose
- NK defectors’ mixed feelings about NK
- A for-profit NKD arts group
  - Business component
  - Different types of support
- Efforts for program development
- Competitiveness of the SK arts market
  - Sharing the pool with SK artists and arts organizations
  - “Unfair” wage rates
- Performers’ welfare

**Perspective of the PU**

- Support from a city government
- Impact of NK defector performances
  - Filling the gap
  - Interacting
  - Informing NK arts and culture
- Focused values of PU performance
  - Presenting what SK people enjoy
  - Focusing on distinctive features of NK arts, rather than technical excellence
- Difference in the arts
• Impact of the arts
• Values of nonprofit
  o Volunteer activities
  o Mission driven
• Active socialization: learning about nonprofits
• Motivation of arts activities
• Future vision
• Factors to overcome
  o Lack of network navigating the PU in the field for more opportunities
  o “Unfair” wage rates (compared to SK pop stars)
• Cultural difference
  o Gaps in cultural and social values and mentality
• Financial management and development
  o Largely relying on government funding
  o Lacking fundraising skills

Perspective of the South Korean Stakeholders/Partners
• SK people’s consciousness of unification
• Impact of NK defectors’ arts activities
  o Creating a social mood for unification and social cohesion
  o Transformative power of the arts
  o Financial sustainability of NK defector performers
• NUAC arts events’ focus
  o The arts as a means to promote a unification
  o Volunteerism
• Other types of NUAC cultural events
• Lost authenticity in NK defector performances
• Lack of communication between NK defectors’ arts groups and SK organizations
• What NK defectors’ arts groups are missing (NK defectors’ performance on SK eyes)
  o Artistically underqualified performances
  o Cookie-cutter programs
  o Ineffectiveness to increase awareness about a unification and NK arts
• Cultural difference
• Ensuring a better life for NK defectors
  o NK defector performers’ welfare (healing & catharsis)
  o Financial support
• Organizational aspects of NK defectors’ arts groups
  o Disorganized governance structure
  o Short organizational lifespan
  o Entertainment-oriented
• Questioning the effectiveness of the NK defectors’ performances
• For better practice and impact of NK arts
• Status quo of cooperation between SK and NK defectors’ arts groups
  o Minimal interactions between SK and NK defector groups
• Intended and surprising impact of the cooperation
  o Artistic impact
  o Feeling affection for NK defectors’ arts groups
• For collaboration beyond cooperation
• Unfamiliarity and unpopularity of NK arts
• Circumstances of the NK defectors’ arts field
Perspective of the Researcher: Observations & Research Notes

- Political elements in NUAC arts events
- Age groups of attendants
- Description of NKD arts events
- Efforts to inform and engage
- Audiences’ reactions
- Striving to survive