THE JAPANESE-AMERICANS IN THE UNITED STATES
BETWEEN 1945 AND 1965

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts

by

Yukio Morita, M.A.
The Ohio State University
1967

Approved by

Francis P. Wessenbrugge
Adviser
Department of History
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the assistance and kindness that many people have extended to me while working on this thesis. The greatest appreciation must be expressed to my adviser, Professor Francis P. Weisenburger, who has encouraged a foreign student to continue the study of American history, and who has made numerous suggestions for improvements in the form and content of this thesis. Without his sincere and friendly support, it would not have been completed.

I have been able to carry out my research with a financial assistance from the History Department and the Graduate School at The Ohio State University. My gratitude goes to Professor Weisenburger, and Professor Sydney Fisher, Chairman of the Graduate Committee.

I am also grateful to Professor Lowell Ragatz, who recommended me to the University; Mr. Shichinosuke Asano, president of the Nichibei Jiji of San Francisco, who gave me his valuable autobiography; Mr. Yasuo Hori, who sent some materials issued by the Foreign Ministry of Japan; and the families of Osuga, Kyogoku, Ota, all of whom gave me the privilege of interviews and permission to cite their talks or letters concerning their experience during and after the relocation center life.
PREFACE

The writer's interest in the subject of Japanese immigration dates back to 1957 when he was a graduate student at Kyoto University, Japan, and read Carl Wittke's *We Who Built America* (1st ed., Prentice-Hall Inc., New York, 1939). He has had many firsthand contacts with Japanese-American families in Columbus since he came to study at The Ohio State University in the fall of 1965. The question always raised in his mind, as he talked with them, was this: What factors contributed to the evacuation of approximately 112,000 persons of Japanese origin on the West Coast in 1942? Another question was, how they recovered from the difficulties and the hostilities inflicted upon them for many years.

Fortunately, the first problem has been discussed by many American scholars, even if the final conclusion has not yet been reached. The second one seems now to be under examination. To the best of the writer's knowledge, no book in the field has as yet been published. He, however, has no intention of dwelling upon all aspects of the Japanese-Americans after World War II. Rather, the aim has been to discuss how they rid themselves of many intolerable barriers, with the support of the Japanese-American Citizens League, in the resettlement period, 1943-1952,
which came after relocation. For this purpose, source materials
have been relied upon as much as possible. Most of them are of
great value and they are generally unobtainable in Japan.

The University of California at Los Angeles has now almost
finished a comprehensive study of Japanese immigration and plans
to make public its five years' results in the spring of 1968. As
compared with that research, this thesis is, needless to say,
far from complete. But the writer believes that his efforts
exerted in this study will serve to give him an impetus for further
research.
CHAPTER I

THE RETURN OF THE 442d COMBAT TEAM

It was on June 22, 1946, that the Japanese-American 442d Regiment Combat Team sailed from Leghorn, Italy, aboard the Wilson Victory, bound for New York.¹ The Nisei soldiers were returning home after almost three years of combat in Italy and France. The 100th Infantry Battalion² had been in Italy since the fall of 1943 and had participated in the successful Allied assault on the Cassino-Anzio area in the winter and spring of the following year, which brought the capture of the Italian capital on June 4, 1944.³ After that the team was joined by its more recently trained counterpart, the 442d Combat Team,


² It was built originally around a prewar Nisei National Guard unit in Hawaii and composed mainly of Nisei volunteers from the Islands. The plan for its formation was devised by the War Department in June, 1942. After a training period, first at Camp McCoy, Wisconsin, and then at Camp Shelby, Mississippi, the 100th landed at Oran, Africa, on September 2, 1943. J. A. Krug and D. S. Myer, WRA A Story of Human Conservation (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 121. Hereafter cited as WRA A Story.

on June 11 in Rome. The new unit was fighting "with distinction" to capture Pescara, Florence, and Pisa. In October, 1944, it spearheaded the attacks on the Vosges Mountains in eastern France and succeeded in snatching the U. S. 36th Division's "lost battalion of Texans" from the encircling Nazis. An editorial of the Stars and Stripes for June 3, 1945, recalled the occasion, saying "that was a pretty tough assignment, a pretty dirty job in the hands of Americans whose families were being beaten up by the families of other American lads." These actions cost the unit approximately 2,300 casualties in three weeks. After the build-up of the force, the 442d returned to Italy--in the final coast-to-coast offensive against the German armies in the spring of 1945. The battles were fought, according to the San Francisco Chronicle, by all of the Allied veterans of "all races and creeds." The unit proved to be as great a fighting outfit as any, and the campaign ended on May 2, with the surrender of Germany.

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4 On January 28, 1943, the War Department issued a plan to create a combat team for the Army composed of loyal American citizens of Japanese descent. Some 5,000 Nisei volunteers were added to the already serving armed forces, and they arrived in Naples on May 28, 1944. Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, pp. 110, 121-123.

5 Marshall, op. cit., p. 45.

6 Quoted by the Nation, June 9, 1945, p. 635, and by the New York Times, June 4, 1945.

7 The San Francisco Chronicle, August 20, 1945.

8 Ibid. See also Marshall, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
During the days the Nisei boys suffered great losses:

From the time the 100th Battalion landed at Oran and during the 240 days that unit spent in the front lines, the 442d [which included the 100th] had 650 men killed in action, 4,349 wounded in action and 4,881 men who suffered from combat-induced illness, such as frostbite, battle fatigue, trenchfoot and general illness.9

The total number of the wounded and diseased--9,230--was three times their original battle strength; however, such heavy casualties were not in vain. The Nisei soldiers, who were "given the opportunity to serve this country," to borrow the words of President Roosevelt, had not hesitated in accepting the opportunity to show themselves to be "loyal to this country."10 Their utmost effort aroused the sincere admiration of their friends in arms and President Truman.

9 The New York Times, July 3, 1946. Summarized casualties of the two combat teams in the summer of 1945 are found in Krug and Myer, The Evacuated People A Quantitative Description (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 127. But it is said that the figures were not complete. Hereafter cited as A Quantitative Description.

10 The President wrote a letter to Secretary Stimson, made public on February 4, 1943, in response to the proposal of the War Department to create a Japanese-American combat team. He said: "No loyal citizen of the United States should be denied the democratic right to exercise the responsibilities of his citizenship, regardless of his ancestry. The principle on which this country was founded and by which it has always been governed is that Americanism is not, and never was, a matter of race or ancestry. A good American is one who is loyal to this country and to our creed of liberty and democracy. Every loyal American citizen should be given the opportunity to serve this country...." See The New York Times, February 5, 1943.
Nearly 3,000 Nisei soldiers were, by the courtesy of
Brigadier General Francis H. Oxx, of Leghorn, Italy, allowed
to be in the van in the V-J Day parade on August 18, along
with 15,000 Americans. Simultaneously with his favor, came a
petition with the signatures of Co. D. 168th Infantry and 34th
Division, both stationed there. The petition declared:

The undersigned members...in appreciation of the
herioc and meritorious achievements of our fellow
Americans in the 100th Inf. Bttn. and 442d Inf.
Regiment do hereby assert that our help may be counted
upon to convince the folks back home that you are
fully deserving of all privileges with which we our-
selves are bestowed.

It is a privilege and honor to acknowledge the
members of the 100th Bttn. and 442d Regiment as fellow
Americans. We are duly proud to say "well done" to
you and yours....11

While visiting wounded Nisei troops, who had served in
his command in Europe, in a Honolulu hospital on April 29, 1946,
General Dwight D. Eisenhower also extolled them as "brave soldiers
who did a magnificent job."12 Such newspapers as the Stars and
Stripes and New York Times were also favorable to them, asserting
that they were, by any test, "a fine type of American citizen."13

In parallel with such public praise, numerous awards had been
given to them: for example, Sadao S. Minneri, of Los Angeles,

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11 The San Francisco Chronicle, August 20, 1945.
13 The Stars and Stripes, June 3, 1945, quoted by The New
became the first winner among the Japanese of the Congressional Medal of Honor for his gallantry in action during the Italian campaign of 1945, and the entire 442d was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation. A mere enumeration of the winners becomes dull, and the list may be incomplete. It is, therefore, better to rely upon an article which appeared in the New York Times:

"Go for Broke," was their slogan, the Nisei equivalent for "shoot the Works." How thoroughly the 442d lived up to its meaning was reflected in the 3,600 Purple Hearts and almost 2,000 other decorations, including the Congressional Medal of Honor, won in their drives.

In short, no less than seventy per cent of the original 3,000 men and 5,000 replacements had decorations. As a result, the Japanese-American team was one of the most decorated units of its size in American military history, but it should be noted that the honor had been won by the Nisei boys' blood, sweat, and tears. Even more important than their combat record, however,

14 Ibid., June 3, 1963. The Congressional Medal of Honor was later given to Sergeant Hershey Miyamura, a Nisei from Albuquerque, New Mexico, for his service in the Korean War. Sgt. Kinjo E. Noboru was recommended for the honor at the beginning of 1967. He was a Hawaii-born Nisei and is now in the U.S. Army in Vietnam. See The Rafu Shimpo, January 18, 1967.

15 Ibid., June 3, 1965. See also Ibid., January 3, 4,1945.

16 Ibid., July 4, 1946. See also Time, July 22, 1946, p. 22; the list of decorations and citations presented to the 442d combat team up to August 7, 1945, is found in Krug and Myer, A Quantitative Description, p. 127.
was the report of their commanding officers that their morale
had been as good in camp as it was in combat. 17

The Nisei troops arrived in New York the afternoon of
July 2, 1946. The team's vanguard, some 500 strong, left the
Wilson Victory at Pier 84 on the Hudson River. They received
the official welcome of the city of New York. Shortly after
that, they departed in ferries for Jersey City where they boarded
a train for Camp Kilmer, New Jersey. President Truman had been
waiting for the arrival of these men. He invited them to come
to Washington, D.C., on July 15. At 2 p.m. that day they began
a half-hour parade, starting at 4th Street and Constitution
Avenue northwest and proceeding west on Constitution to the
Ellipse, while more than 10,000 persons watched and applauded
in the drenching rain. The Nisei GIs formed on the Ellipse, and
the President appeared at 2:30 p.m. Ten active members and four
inactive members, patients at Walter Reed Hospital, were
selected to occupy seats of honor directly behind Mr. Truman's
reviewing party of military and civilian notables. 18

connection with it, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Anderton, who
was once in charge of the Nisei in operational intelligence, told:
"...During the two and a half years, 800 Japanese-Americans were
stationed in Brisbane, Australia, there was not a single court-
martial among them, not a single case of being absent without
leave, not a single case of drunkenness, nor a single case of
18 The names of special guests are listed in The Washington
Post, July 15, 1946.
"The Commander in Chief," the Washington Post reported,

"stopped a number of times to shake hands with various enlisted men and officers," after which he gave a speech:

...You are to be congratulated on what you have done for this great country of ours. I think it was my predecessor who said Americanism is not a matter of race and creed, it is a matter of the heart. You fought for the free nations of the world along with the rest of us. I congratulate you on that.... You are now on your way home. You fought not only the enemy, but you fought prejudice, and you have won. Keep up the fight, and we continue to win--to make this great republic stand for just what the Constitution says it stands for: the welfare of all the people all the time. Bring forward the colors.19

There were, however, not only the famous two combat teams but other Japanese-Americans who helped the cause of their adopted country, even if their activities were apt to be overshadowed.20 Several hundred Nisei girls, it is said, worked voluntarily in the Nurses' Corps and the Women's Army Corp.21 Many Nisei youth served against their ethnic brothers of Japan, partly through the participation in bombing Tokyo in "Liberator

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19 Ibid., July 16, 1946.

20 Reasons are that they had not ordinarily served in active combat teams and thus had not suffered casualties comparable to those of the 442d and that the War Department persistently refused to sanction any publication of these activities and would not even approve any references to them by the War Relocation Authority in speeches or releases of any kind. Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 129.

bombers" and chiefly through intelligence work. 22 Some had been instrumental in the radio psychological war against Japan, which was under the direction of the Office of War Information. 23 Others had acted as translators or linguists of information in Japanese. The former Lieutenant Colonel John E. Anderton said in retrospect of three years' work:

...approximately 94 per cent of all intelligence in the Pacific went through the hands of these Nisei. ...General Charles A. Willoughby...had said that the war would have lasted at least two years longer if it had not been for the Nisei boys...every campaign was based on information they gained.24

In this way, before the war was over, a total of 33,300 persons of Japanese ancestry, according to the Public Information

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22 For example, Tsgt. Ben Kuroki, who was born in Hersher, Nebraska, had flown "27 missions" to Tokyo since the fall of 1944. "When asked how it felt to bomb Tokyo, Kuroki...responded: 'I don't feel any different from any other American.'" The San Francisco Chronicle, August 20, 1945. His mother, however, had been severely attacked, and her friends, the Rev. Kyogoku and his wife, had made their utmost effort to console her and to persuade the people around her that Nisei boys should serve this country. This story has been disclosed by Mrs. Kyogoku on April 8, 1967.


24 The San Francisco Chronicle, May 8, 1946. His opinion was affirmed on November 19, 1966, by the retired Colonel Sidney, former head of the Nisei intelligence division of the Pacific area, before the meeting in San Francisco of some 500 Americans and Japanese all of whom worked together. See The Rafu Shimpo, November 21, 1966.
Division of the War Department, served in the United States Army in World War II.  

Last, but not least, even most of the Issei had tried to be loyal to America, too, in mind and heart. First of all, the Japanese-American Citizens League issued the declaration on the evening of December 7, 1941, emphasizing their loyalty to America and the rupture of friendly relations with their fatherland. And there were many Issei like Mrs. Masaoka, who told her sons when the war came: "Boys, your job is to go out and fight for the United States, because it is my country." A non-American citizen of Japanese ancestry declared: "I am willing to fight for any government which gives me a gun to fight against fascism." Those Issei in Hawaii were very cooperative with the authorities, for example, in building defense lines along the coast and


visiting wounded soldiers in hospitals. Also active were priests, who sometimes propagated the war cause of the United States and sometimes talked with Nisei boys who wanted to be in battle.

While the activities were gradually brought to the attention of the American public, the War Relocation Authority began a systematic effort to counteract the "blanket charges" against the Japanese-Americans, whose splendid records were without doubt instrumental in advancing the resettlement program of the War Relocation Authority. But, if their loyalty had been proved, it does not mean that the tables were soon turning in their favor. They had to "keep up the fight" in the country, as President Truman said.


31 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 122. See also Ibid., pp. 128-129.
CHAPTER II

THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY

Before beginning a discussion of this problem, it is necessary to sum up the general current of the evacuation by the timetable presented in Appendix I. (1) The short period of free evacuation was between January and March 28, 1942. This was at first executed by the free will of evacuees to move out of the prohibited zones and then by the Wartime Civil Control Administration, the Army agency. (2) This first step was soon followed by the forced mass evacuation. Carried out from large areas on the West Coast, under WCCA, it involved the removal of 110,442 Japanese, aliens and citizens alike, to the fifteen assembly centers or the ten relocation centers between March 29 and November 29, 1942. (3) "Loyalty Registration" took place in the relocation centers between February 20 and March 3, 1943, and led to the formation of the 442d Infantry Regiment and the segregation of apparently disloyal people to the Tule Lake relocation center.

On March 11, 1943, about a week after Loyalty Registration was completed, Director D. S. Myer of WRA sent a letter to Secretary Stimson, making public what the top Staff of WRA of Washington had been thinking and planning about the future of
the evacuees. While describing the lack of morale at the center, Myer urged the adoption of Plan C, as it was called in the letter, or, "partial repeal of the exclusion orders under a plan which would permit immediate return to the evacuated area by Nisei certified as eligible for war plant work, Japanese-American veterans of the First World War, and immediate family members of Nisei currently in service." In a reply, dated May 10, Stimson said that any consideration of relaxing the restriction by the War Department would be "premature." On the other hand, the WRA officials firmly believed that evacuees should leave the centers to take up life promptly in normal communities, thus improving their morale and economic future. WRA immediately took some measures for resettlement.

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2 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 124.

3 Ibid.

4 (a) WRA established during 1943 main field offices in Chicago, Cleveland, Kansas City, Salt Lake City, Denver, New York City, and Little Rock, Arkansas. (b) During the same period some 35 subordinate field offices for rather specific localities had been organized. (c) WRA gave certain limited type of financial assistance to those who wanted to move out of the relocation centers after March 20, 1943, grants for transportation to destinations, subsistence while traveling, and for subsidizing needy evacuees for one month while they were getting settled in their new areas. Ibid., pp. 124, 134, 139-340. Krug and Myer, Impounded People, p. 143.
Under these circumstances Japanese-Americans gradually began to appear in many communities between January, 1943, and December, 1944. This resettlement had several characteristics. (1) The higher tide of movement was seen in warmer seasons, the lower in October, November, and December. For example, the peak in 1943 was May (23.6 per cent, a total of 3,108 persons); another one in the following year was August (30.4 per cent); the lowest tide was January, 1943 (3.9 per cent).  

(2) Generally speaking, Nisei between the ages of fifteen and thirty-four had been the main component of the movement. Those people numbered 24,843 out of a total of 35,989 resettlers.  

(3) The resettlement concentrated in the North Central States, and in the intermountain region, although it was, according to WRA, spread in every state except South Carolina.  

During the period, the resettlers went toward the following states:

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5 Krug and Myer, *A Quantitative Description*, p. 41.  
6 Ibid., p. 150.  
8 Krug and Myer, *A Quantitative Description*, pp. 42-45. It is noticeable that rather few people went towards the West Coast. Only 194 persons made California their destination; 524 went to Oregon and 852 to Washington. This was due to racial discrimination on the West Coast, which will be discussed later, and the attitude of WRA. Secretary Stimson rejected the proposal of partial repeal of the exclusion orders by Myer. But the latter continued the resettlement policy. As a result, many West Coast citizens asserted that WRA was indulged in a deliberate policy "in defiance of military orders." See Krug and Myer, *WRA A Story*, p. 126.
Illinois 7,652 (including 6,559 in Chicago)
Colorado 3,135 (including 1,299 in Denver)
Ohio    2,854 (including 1,820 in Cleveland)
Utah    2,427 (including 1,007 in Salt Lake City)
Idaho   2,084 (including    215 in Caldwell)

During 1944 the volume of resettlement continued steadily as
during the preceding year so that the WRA had a definite plan for
closing the relocation centers. The Jerome relocation center,
the last of the centers to begin its function on July 15, 1942,
was the first to close on June 30, 1944. 9 By December 17, 1944,
about 35,000 evacuees had left the centers on indefinite leave,
with approximately 80,000 people still remaining. 10

It was that day when the recommendation of Myer was given
an opportunity to be executed openly and fully. The War Depart-
ment on December 17, 1944, announced the modification of the
exclusion orders. Major General H. C. Pratt, Commanding General
of the Western Defense Command wanted to terminate mass exclusion
and proposed the adoption of:

a system which, while continuing to exclude and con-
trol those individuals who still remain loyal to Japan
and are considered to be potentially dangerous to the
military security of the West Coast, will restore full
liberty of action to all those who have been cleared
by the Army....

9 See Appendix II.
10 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 143. Krug and Myer, A
Quantitative Description, p. 109.
It is my sincere hope that the return of those persons of Japanese ancestry who choose to come back to the coastal areas may be accomplished without undue incident. I am confident that the fine American citizens of the West Coast will realize that the present is not the proper time for controversy.  

The mass evacuation had been done on a basis of race. But, as is clear from this statement, the War Department decided to give free action to those individuals who had been loyal to the United States. Following this announcement, General Pratt issued another proclamation, prescribing that the department order put into effect at midnight January 2, 1945.

Coincident with the lifting of the exclusion orders, Myer, Director of WRA, announced on December 18 that the relocation centers were to be closed within eighteen months after January 2, 1945, and that all seasonal leave was to be terminated. Myer cited the following five reasons for adopting the closing of the

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11 The San Francisco Chronicle, December 18, 1944.

12 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 143. All closing dates were to be announced in reference to each of the relocation centers, except the Jerome center, which had already been closed, and the Tule Lake segregation center. Krug and Myer, The Relocation Program (Washington, D.C., 1946), pp. 75-77. The agency had since 1943 encouraged the resettlement of evacuees and had at the same time maintained the centers as a place for refuge for them as long as they were not welcomed or approved to return to their old homes on the West Coast. One reason for continuing the relocation centers, however, was extinguished by the December 17 proclamation. WRA was to further the resettlement program. After December 20, 1944, WRA acted only as agent for the War Department and the Department of Justice in detaining in the centers individuals placed in restrictive categories. See also ibid., p. 51.
centers:

1. Center living was bad for the evacuees....It was generally destructive of good work habits, of the sense of responsibility on the part of family heads....
2. The nation, still at war, needed the skills and manpower represented by the center population.
3. The Congress would undoubtedly question the necessity of appropriating funds to continue the centers....
4. As long as this segment of the population remained concentrated in the centers, they were more vulnerable to campaigns directed against them by their enemies....
5. If centers were to be liquidated, it should be done during the wartime period of high employment when relocation opportunities were favorable.13

On December 18, 1944, the Supreme Court ruled that "the Japanese-Americans of unquestioned loyalty to the United States not be detained in war relocation centers."14

It was very natural that the revocation of mass Japanese evacuation brought immediately varying responses from the Americans on the West Coast. Those protesting groups had long harbored prejudice against Japs, the attitude typically shown by General

13 Ibid., p. 49.

14 The New York Times, December 19, 1944. The rule was made in the case of ExParte Mitsuye Endo (323 U.S., 283). This is referred to by Nakama, George Akira, The Japanese-Americans in the United States during the Second World War (Unpublished Master's Thesis, The Ohio State University, 1955), pp. 52-55. Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled the same day that the West Coast evacuation was constitutional (in the Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S., 214); see ibid., pp. 48-49.
De Witt, who said that "A Jap's a Jap."  Also guilty of prejudice was the California State Senate, which was severely scored by Secretary of War Stimson and the Pacific Coast Committee on American Principles and Fair Play. Those praising the lifting of mass exclusion orders pointed out that the war records of the Japanese combat teams in Europe were outstanding, that the Japanese-Americans were citizens, and that "their constitutional rights had been denied them without due process of law." Governors Warren (California) and Osborn (Arizona) were willing to comply with the War Department order. Even Ray D. Williamson, ex-Assemblyman and grand president of the Native Sons of the Golden West, declared that "we can have no quarrel with the military and the FBI in permitting the return of those persons of Japanese ancestry."

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15 The San Francisco Chronicle, April 14, 1943. He continued: "...It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not....I don't want any of them....They are a dangerous element....There is no way to determine their loyalty." There are many similar statements by General De Witt on record. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are undiluted." John De Witt, Final Report Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942 (Washington, D.C., 1943), p. 34. Hereafter cited as Final Report.

16 The San Francisco Chronicle, December 18, 1944.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.
On the other hand, the altered situation was not agreeable to most of the evacuees. They showed, in general, a marked amount of apathy to the announcement of the authorities.\textsuperscript{19} It seems rather strange, because the proclamations sought to restore full freedom of movement. They did not, however, want to leave the centers: "This is a city. You can't close a city."\textsuperscript{20} Nor did

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{19} Krug and Myer, \textit{WRA A Story}, p. 145.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid.
\end{flushright}
they hope that the centers would be abolished. 21 To counteract
the apathy and to explain clearly the liquidation program of WRA
before center mass meetings, Myer frequently visited each of
the eight centers with little success. 22 During the first six
months of 1945, 17,485 persons moved out, but 62,558 were still
in the centers. Among them approximately 18,000 were ineligible
for departure owing to detention orders by the War Department
and the Department of Justice; some 44,000 were apparently

21 These feelings were based on a small, tentative pamphlet
of WRA and obvious facts perceived by the evacuees, which were,
for example, listed in a preamble to the twenty-one recommenda-
tions to the WRA Washington office. The pamphlet was distrib-
uted in the spring of 1942. It made two or three references
to the relocation centers as war-duration communities. Upon
this "slender basis" many of the evacuees asserted that WRA
promised to keep the centers open for the duration of the war
(ibid., p. 146). At the suggestion of the Topaz community
council--composed of the Japanese delegates--thirty represen-
tatives from seven centers except Manzanar and Tule Lake met
together at a meeting in Salt Lake City, Utah, on February 9,
1945. They discussed the liquidation policy for a week. The
adopted recommendations of February 16 were mainly "a plea for
more extensive and far-reaching relocation assistance," to which
WRA of Washington replied later. In the preamble, however, the
delegates showed that they were questioning the effectiveness
of closing the centers. Several articles in it are to be cited
here: 2. There has been an almost complete destruction of
financial foundations built during over half a century.
3. Especially for the duration, the war has created fears of
prejudices, persecution, etc. 6. The residents have
prepared to remain for the duration because of many statements
made by the WRA that the relocation centers will be maintained
for the duration of the war. 7. Many residents were forced to
dispose of their personal and real properties, business and
agricultural equipment, etc. 9. There is an acute shortage
of housing...The residents fear that adequate housing is not
available.

22 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 146.
planning to stay until the centers were to be closed. WRA's goal was not quite achieved by June 30, 1945. WRA, accordingly, decided to initiate a series of measures to effect terminal departure of all the evacuees while giving consideration to their transportation and job problems. For this purpose, WRA successively issued three announcements. The first was made on June 22. It ordered that some units of Poston and Gila River relocation centers be closed in September and that the residents move outside all camps. The second came on July 13, and provided a schedule of closing dates for all centers except Tule Lake between October 15 and December 15. The third announcement, made public on August 1, just two weeks before V-J Day, was known as Administrative Notice No. 289. It authorized each relocation center director to establish by force weekly quotas for relocation of remaining

23 These figures are arranged from the lists in Krug and Myer, A Quantitative Description, pp. 30-40. See also Krug and Myer, The Relocation Program, pp. 75-76.

24 Ibid., pp. 47, 74. WRA A Story, p. 147. The days in which these instructions of WRA were issued were the ones after the European war had ended. Troops from Europe had to be transported across the American continent to the Pacific. WRA had, however, had considerable success in negotiations with the American Association of Railroads and the Office of Defense Transportation for the resettling of people. WRA wanted them to be carried in fewer days. At the same time, in December, 1945, WRA instructed district offices along the West Coast to conduct an intensive interview program for the evacuees to decide the kinds of problems they would be encountering and to help them find permanent housing.


residents during the last six weeks of operation at each WRA center. Along with these orders of WRA, the Western Defense Command issued on September 4, Public Proclamation No. 24, removing the restrictions on the return of individuals to the evacuated area, and thus the last barrier to resettlement vanished.

During September most government restrictions concerning the hiring of citizens of Japanese ancestry were removed, both in war plants and Federal service.

27 Ibid., p. 78. One of the WRA officials said in connection with the third order: "This was the only time in the history of the WRA program when the agency resorted to a threat of physical force in order to complete its relocation schedule... WRA adopted... Administrative Notice No. 289 with conscious reluctance but with a profound conviction that it had no truly feasible alternative." See Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 148. This notice was followed two weeks later by V-J Day. It is very difficult to state which of these two developments had the more important influence in the resettlement program, as WRA admitted. But it is said that it was "the cumulative effect of the two events which finally convinced even most of the 'die-hards' that a return to private life was inevitable and would have to be accepted," Ibid., pp. 150-151.


29 Krug and Myer, The Relocation Program, p. 79. Later the restrictions were thoroughly repealed. On June 2, 1952, the House of Representatives passed a bill (H. R. 7641). It was to provide certain Federal Employees of Japanese ancestry with rights they would have had if not evacuated during World War II. President Truman signed the bill, July 15, 1952. See Public Law 545 in United States Statutes at Large, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 66 (Washington, D.C., 1952), pp. 634-635.
These authoritative measures increased the volume of resettlement during the last four months of 1945, and all of the centers except Granada were closed before the scheduled dates. Finally, after the closure of the last field office on May 15, 1946, WRA terminated its official programs on June 30, 1946.

In the long history of the resettlement of the evacuated people, WRA had been consistently the agency for implementing the resettlement program, although it was sometimes at odds with the War Department and the Department of Justice. The story of resettlement program, however, does not stop here.

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30 The resettlement rate in the nine relocation centers was as follows: June, 1943, 71.3 per cent; July, 76.9; August, 145.0; September, 299.8; October, 397.3; November 391.1; and December, 142.3. Krug and Myer, A Quantitative Description, p. 41.

31 Krug and Myer, The Relocation Program, p. 79. See also Appendix II. The New York Times for November 18, 1945, reported that centers were becoming "ghost towns."

32 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, xiii.
CHAPTER III

SOME PROBLEMS DURING AND AFTER THE RESETTLEMENT MOVEMENT

In compliance with the resettlement program of the War Relocation Authority, the people moved and did so especially after January 2, 1945, the day when the modification of exclusion orders became effective. Needless to say, it brought a large number of problems of adjustment, especially those relating to economic, housing and social matters. Since much has been discussed on these topics, this chapter concentrates on four: (1) The geographical change in the distribution of the evacuated people after release from the relocation centers; (2) The repatriation of the disloyal Japanese-Americans; (3) The restoration of the renounced United States citizenship; and (4) The Japanese evacuee claims.

(1) The geographical change in the distribution of the evacuated people after release from the relocation centers was indicated August 19, 1947, almost five years after the evacuation was forced, when Robert K. Candlin, Chief of the War Agency Liquidation Unit, said:

...60 per cent of the Japanese-Americans removed from the West Coast at the start of the war had returned to their former home areas....55 per cent of the country's
Japanese-Americans now live in Washington, Oregon, and California, compared with 88.5 per cent in those states in 1940.¹

Before the tenth biennial national convention of the Japanese-American Citizens League in Salt Lake City on September 4, 1948, Mike Masaoka also indicated this figure, although it is uncertain upon what basis he relied.² It is evident that various social situations made possible the wider distribution of persons of Japanese descent in the postwar days:

(a) A primary deterrent to resettlement on the West Coast in the same numbers as in the prewar period was the spirit of ill feeling, based on deep racial prejudice against the evacuees. Of the numerous difficulties experienced by them, several examples may be given. Adequate housing could not be easily found for most of the evacuees, particularly in the Los Angeles and San Francisco areas.³ "The chief problem that remained unsolved in the former exclusion area in the early spring of 1946 was

² Ibid., September 5, 1948.
³ Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 126.
housing," Myer admitted. The following articles of the New York Times illustrate the housing difficulty:

A mere two of the 5,500 residents of the Manzanar Center left January 4, 1945, and headed for South California...the critical housing situation is one factor limiting a migration to the Coast (January 5, 1945).

The Rev. Tom Matsumoto, director of the Home Missions Council of American, told an audience of New York social workers that 65,000 permanent homes must be found by the end of 1945 for the evacuees (April 19, 1945).

Even four heroes of the 442d Combat Team expressed their major complaints, among which were difficulties in finding houses and getting into college (July 6, 1946).

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Many terrible, unfortunate incidents happened one after another.\(^5\) An American Legion Post in Hood River, Oregon, erased the names of sixteen Nisei soldiers from the community honor roll on December 2, 1944, to the great indignation of fair-minded people in the country.\(^6\) Leases of an informal nature, by which the evacuated people turned over their West Coast farms and businesses while they were interned, were a deterrent to their return.\(^7\)

Such organizations as the Masters of Grange in five western states,\(^8\) the California Farm Bureau Federation,\(^9\) and the International

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\(^5\) For example, Secretary Ickes issued a public statement on May 13, 1945, denouncing the perpetrators and demanding more effective protection for the returning Japanese evacuees, and he reported twenty-four instances of "violence or open intimidation" within the previous four months in California against them; fifteen shooting attacks; one attempted dynamiting; three arson cases; and five threatening visits (The New York Times, May 1, 1945). These hostilities continued in the following year. An attempt was made by vigilantes to burn and dynamite a shed of Japanese-American in Placer County, California (ibid., January 21, 1945). Desecration of twenty-four Japanese graves in Fresno, California, was another instance (ibid., March 24, 1945).


\(^7\) The New York Times, December 22, 1944. According to the paper, the number of the West Coast farms operated by Nisei and aliens in 1940 was 6,118, of which 1,197 were fully owned by the Japanese and 378 were partially owned by them.

\(^8\) They represented at least 125,000 farmers in Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and California. See The New York Times, August 25, December 22, 1944.

\(^9\) Ibid., December 21, 1944.
Teamster's Union in Seattle, 10 and such communities as the Hood River Valley (Oregon), the White River and Kent (both in Washington), and Placer County (California) 11 were specially notorious for threats, hostility, and violence to the returning Japanese-Americans. 12

(b) WRA under these circumstances had great uncertainty about sending the evacuees back to the West Coast, even after January 2, 1945, and in spite of the order of the War Department, December 17, 1944. Since the evacuees also showed uncertainty about returning, WRA made efforts, as before, to persuade the bulk of them to settle in the East and the Middle West. 13

(c) Many evacuees complied with the directions of WRA in resettlement and sometimes responded to inviting letters sent by the earlier resettled groups almost everywhere in the country. For example, families of Japanese-ancestry—an average of 175 every month in 1944—were asking WRA to ship their household

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10 Ibid., June 17, 1945.
11 Ibid., February 25, 1945.
12 It is a mistake, of course, to assume that hostilities continued for a long time. A decrease in incidents after the beginning of 1946 accelerated general acceptance by the West Coast. It was chiefly due to more strict enforcement of state laws against the racial terrorists and strong public opinion in the United States. For example, the CIO International Longshoremen's Union recommended that its members work with Japanese-Americans who held membership (ibid., May 28, 1945). The American Civil Liberties Union mailed a check for $1,000 in reward for information leading to the conviction of a terrorist (ibid., August 26, 1946). See also Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 127.
furniture from California to the East and Middle West, where they wanted to start life anew. 14

(d) Such urban communities as Chicago, 15 Denver, 16 Salt Lake City, 17 Cleveland, 18 and New York City 19 in general had very little anti-Oriental bias and were willing to help the resettling people integrate into the community and to provide special assistance in housing, employment, and welfare problems. It should be noted that these cities had had field offices under WRA since the spring of 1943, a factor which must have been helpful in settling the evacuated people outside the West Coast. Also such rural communities as Seabrook, New Jersey, 20 and the big R. E. Wilson cotton fields at Wilson, Arkansas, 21 invited substantial numbers of the evacuees. The residence of

the Japanese-Americans in these areas, however, was of shorter
duration than in urban communities. 22

Thus, those who survived the relocation center life became
widely distributed throughout the Middle West, the intermountain
states, and the East. Resettlement in the South was rather
sparse. 23

Concerning the widespread distribution brought about by
resettlement, Myer, the former director of WRA, commented on
April 5, 1947:

The dispersal...is a direct by-product of the
evacuation and the relocation program. And that
dispersal is healthy for the nation and for the Nisei.
It means that the Nisei have learned the vastness of
his country. He has discovered the economy, the poli-
cies, the culture, the attitudes of the Middle West,
the South, and the East.... 24

22 By mid-summer of 1946, 2,300 evacuees resettled at
Seabrook, being employed in the processing plant and on special
jobs. The number decreased to about 1,700 in 1948 and to 600
or 700 by the end of 1955. A similar tendency prevailed on the
estate of Wilson. By February, 1944, some 10,000 people were
employed, but as of 1960, just one successful, wealthy family
remained. Most of the other families returned to California.
Permanent resettlement in Wilson failed on the grounds that
the evacuees had difficulties with the marriage of their
children and that a Californian way for farming was followed
without consideration of the climate, soil, and marketing.
Seabrook lost many resettlers for different reasons. The work
on farms was seasonal; wages were low; Nisei disliked village

23 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 137. Krug and Myer, The
Relocation Program, p. 91.

24 Krug and Myer, People in Motion (Washington, D.C., 1947),
p. 31.
To this problem, the answers of three evacuated families are also worth quoting here:

(a) The Osuga family: Our children, James (first son) and May (first daughter), had already left Tule Lake in May, 1943, and Heart Mountain in August, 1944, respectively, for Columbus, Ohio. While lodging at an American's home, they were studying at college. They wished to remain there, where they did not feel that they were being discriminated against on racial grounds. Therefore, my wife and I decided to join them, and we said good-bye to Heart Mountain in August, 1945. We arrived at our destination the same month. It might be said that our children assumed the responsibility for calling us to the "outside." It had proved to be greatly satisfactory to us. Financial resources, which had not been seriously reduced by a prolonged stay in the camps, enabled us to live comfortably. As in Sacramento, Columbus offered many opportunities for obtaining cleaning work and for educating our other two children. Apart from my family, the dispersion of many persons of Japanese ancestry, I am sure, had been helpful in terminating our largely confined contact with American culture and society, which was very characteristic to us in the prewar days. That's why the proverb "one lost, two found" comes home to me.25

(b) The Kyogoku family: While we were at Topaz from September, 1943, to September, 1945, we intended to return to Fresno, our second home town. I should say that my husband's heart disease for many years provided a focus for the decision of our family. Even the younger daughters agreed with the parents in reorienting our way of life, which was based on the propagation of Buddhism by their father....My husband often repeated in the prewar period that California should not be a "Nippon mura" (a village of Japanese), which sometimes aroused public indignation. Without the relocation center experience we might be still ignorant of the outside world except the West Coast, I believe. From the standpoint of propagating Buddhism, no one can deny the fact that the dotting of the Japanese-Americans

25 Interview with Mr. Osuga on April, 1967.
throughout the country has brought far-reaching results in its spread. It is only recently that Chicago and Cleveland, for example, have had Buddhist churches: eight in Chicago and one in Cleveland.26

(c) The Ota family: We came to Columbus after my husband took leave from the relocation center of Jerome, Arkansas7 to see about a job in New Jersey at Seabrook Farms. After staying a week he decided it was too similar to the living conditions in the camp there. Upon leaving Seabrook Farms he visited Columbus where we had a camp friend. He took him to his place of employment and showed him around. He worked at a housing village as a painter. My husband liked the city and the job offered him. So we decided to come and live here....In California we were very clanish and had very little to do with the other citizens of our towns or cities. Now that we live among the other races, we are creating good will and making and have made very good friends....We have been very well accepted and even prefer some of our Caucasian friends to our older Japanese friends. It is much easier living here than the West Coast because we don’t have to keep up with the Jones so much....We miss some of the activities of the Coast but others have taken its place. Our church was the one thing we did miss, but now there is a Buddhist Minister here in Columbus and we have services on different occasions....We like to be mingled with people other than our race. It makes for a better understanding among different cultures....27

The interviewed families, therefore, shared the common opinion: the Japanese-Americans’ dispersion has been a good channel for both peoples to have deeper, wider contact with one another.

(2) The repatriation of the disloyal Japanese-Americans:

As the main segregation movements were completed in a comparatively

26 Interview with Mrs. Kyogoku on May 1, 1967.
smooth way, WRA assumed that Tule Lake and the other nine relocation centers would be "harmonious communities" after the separation took place in 1943. It, however, proved to be a dream, at least as it concerned Tule Lake. The segregated people did not settle down. They were constantly at odds with the center staff, having mass demonstrations and strikes. Following the worst strike on record, the military police assumed control of the center for five months. Also they were in continual disagreement with one another as the years 1943 and 1944 went by. The people in the center were divided into three groups advocating their political views. A minority group was loyal to the United States with a cool attitude towards those who aggressively attacked WRA. A second minority group was composed chiefly of "mild country folk" who desired to be repatriated to Japan. Under pressure from extremists they became radical, disloyal, and repugnant to the United States government, displaying drastic actions. They relied upon violence and force even within their own group. The majority group included

28 Cf. Appendix I.
29 Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, pp. 64-65.
30 Cf. Appendix I. See also Krug and Myer, Impounded People, pp. 175-176. Reasons for this unhappy situation were complicated. It was partly due to the coercive supervision and management of the center staff and partly due to the indifference of them to most people's taste for the Japanese way of life. And the people were also short of leadership.
three-fifths of the occupants in the center. Being conservative and disloyal, they did not seek "any favor but to be left alone to pursue their ambition of returning to Japan," if possible, at the earliest date. 31 Under these circumstances President Roosevelt signed on July 1, 1944, Public Law 405. 32 It prescribed a method of renouncing their citizenship of the United States during a state of war. This law made no reference whatever to persons of Japanese ancestry. It was actually to be applied to American citizens of any descent; however, it was aimed at obstinate, disloyal people at Tule Lake. 33 This law greatly encouraged such persons to influence successfully large numbers, in a belief that a Japanese victory was imminent. With enthusiasm they organized the Sokui Kikoku Hoshidan (the Society to Serve the Emperor on Speedy Repatriation) in December, 1944. 34 The Hoshidan adopted renunciation

31 Ibid., pp. 183-185.

32 It provided that a person should renounce his United States citizenship by "making in the United States a formal written renunciation of nationality, in such form as may be prescribed by, and before such officer as may be designated by, the Attorney General, whenever the United States shall be in a state of war and the Attorney General shall approve such renunciation as not contrary to the interests of national defense." See United States Statutes at Large, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 58, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1943), 677. Attorney General Biddle, it is said, had recommended to Congress in the early spring of 1944 the bill which was finally enacted, and WRA at first opposed it. See Krug and Myer, WRA A Story, p. 72.

33 Ibid.

34 Krug and Myer, Impounded People, p. 186.
of United States citizenship as its chief program and attracted those deeply imbued with Japanese traditions and "thousands of young men." The group was willing to respond to hearings held by a team of representatives sent from the Department of Justice the same month. As a result, between December 22, 1944, and April 18, 1945, Attorney General Biddle approved 5,500-odd renunciations (including 95 per cent of those at Tule Lake) under the provisions of Public Law 405. Of those renunciants at the centers who desired to return to Japan, 4,406 left Seattle on Army transports from November 25, 1945, to February 25, 1946, by arrangements of the Department of Justice. The first group of approximately 1,500 landed at Yokohama at the end of 1945.


36 Ibid. It should be noted that by the time the Department of Justice was ready to begin its renunciation hearings at Tule Lake, the War Department was planning to revoke the exclusion orders, and the WRA was putting the final effort for its resettlement program. The director of WRA tried to persuade the Department of Justice officials that this was "the worst possible time" to conduct renunciation hearings at Tule Lake. But the Department went ahead with its plan.

37 The number of renunciants is given as 5,589 by Krug and Myer, A Quantitative Description, pp. 177-179, and as 5,537 by The New York Times, August 14, 1956. WRA and the Department of Justice decided to transfer the renunciants of the Hoshidan and the most ardent Nisei from Tule Lake to the internment camps near Bismarck, North Dakota, and Santa Fe, New Mexico.

Japan was, however, no longer the Japan they imagined. Some were confronted with starvation, and others felt out of place. Repatriation was not necessarily successful. 39

(3) The restoration of the renounced United States citizenship: Almost simultaneous with the passage of the bill (H. R. 3566) was the movement for restoring citizenship. In spite of

39 Ibid., pp. 173-177. The New York Times, May 2, 1948. A family in the category is cited in Leonard Broom and John I. Katsu, The Managed Casualty: The Japanese-American Family in World War II (University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1956), pp. 159-169. Roger Baldwin of the American Civil Liberties Union was invited to Japan by the War Department and General MacArthur's headquarters. According to his report, approximately 3,000 out of 4,406 persons who had been repatriated to Japan desired to go back to the United States, as of May, 1947. On the other hand, the United States had nearly 2,000 Japanese "treaty merchants" who had to be deported to their country. They came to the United States under the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with Japan (1911). It was abrogated by the United States in January, 1940. Having lost their status under the treaty, they were ineligible for citizenship and had to be deported. But the attention of officials, members of Congress, and American citizens in various parts centered on the fact that they had been loyal in the United States during the war and that most of the repatriates were in a bad plight in Japan. General public opinion of the United States did not want to deport some 2,000 Japanese treaty merchants. The deportation of twenty-four merchants was halted in January and April, 1947. And finally President Truman signed Public Law 863 on July 1, 1948. It authorized the Attorney General to suspend their deportation. JACL greatly welcomed the law. See The New York Times, May 29, 1946; January 28, April 29, 1947; March 28, 1948. United States Statutes at Large, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 62, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1949), 1206.
the protest of the Attorney General's office in Washington, Federal Judge Louis E. Goodman of the San Francisco District Court ruled to restore United States citizenship to those who sought to regain it. His first decision came on April 30, 1948, and was followed by those on August 23, 1948, March 21, 1949, and January 20, 1951. Of the 5,500-odd renunciants, about 4,700 repented and sought to regain citizenship soon after the war ended. Judge Goodman ruled that 4,315 were entitled to citizenship, and nearly 2,220 were given it back. On August 26, 1949, the United States Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals at San Francisco affirmed restoration of citizenship to three Japanese-American women. Justice William Denman wrote the court's decision, which stressed the "unnecessary, cruel and inhuman treatment" of Japanese-Americans and scored the former General De Witt:

...To our incarcerated fellow citizens, the beguiling words "evacuation" meant deportation, "evacuees" meant prisoners, "relocation center" meant prison and single rooms, some crowding in six persons, meant cells, as they in fact were.... The German mob's cry of "Der Jude" and his De Witt's/ statements—"Jap's a Jap: He should/ be wiped off the map"—have not a remote relationship

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40 The reason was that his decisions would create an "intolerable" expense to conduct an investigation prior to restoring citizenship. See The New York Times, August 24, 1948.
41 Ibid., August 24, 1948; March 22, 1949; January 21, 1951.
42 Ibid.
in the minds of scores of thousands of Nisei whose constant loyalty has at last been recognized. 43

The decision was "a new declaration of independence" for the 4,315 persons who had asked restoration of their citizenship. 44 The Department of Justice also recognized that many people gave up allegiance to America "out of fear and hysteria" during the agitation of ultra-nationalists in the centers. 45

On August 13, 1956, the Department took a step toward righting an injustice that arose out of World War II. As a result, the citizenship of 1,157 Japanese-Americans, it was reported, would be restored immediately, and at least 1,000 pending suits would be decided in favor of repentant renunciants. 46

(4) The Japanese evacuee claims: The 82d Congress since the spring of 1948 had discussed three bills for persons of Japanese descent. They were: H. R. 3566, which became Public

43 Ibid., August 27, 1949. The three women, who were restored to citizenship on August 26, 1949, testified that renunciation of citizenship during their confinement in evacuation centers was "not of their own free will but as the result of undue influence, mistake, misunderstanding, and coercion."

44 Ibid. On January 18, 1951, the Ninth Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a District Court decision of Federal Judge Goodman who found that those renunciations were null and void.

45 Ibid., August 14, 1956. Judge Goodman was one of the judges who admitted that the renunciation of citizenship was done in unusual, coercive situations. See Ibid., April 30, 1948; March 22, 1949.

Law 863, as cited before; H. R. 3999 (the evacuation claim bill); and H. R. 5004 (the naturalization and immigration bill). The three bills were earnestly supported by the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL), because they were supposed to meet the resolutions of its Denver session in 1946. The enactment of the first two laws, therefore, was highly praised by Mike Masaoka, national legislative director of JACL, before the delegates of its tenth biennial national convention on September 4, 1948. In connection with the movements of JACL, reference to the special effort made by the United States government concerning the Japanese evacuate claims should be made.

President Truman gave his approval to Public Law 886 (the former H. R. 3999 bill) on July 2, 1948, or the day following that on which Public Law 863 was signed. An article in the Nation stated the significance of the new law:

47 The session adopted three-point legislative programs that Congress should restore "the status of some Japanese aliens," pay the wartime claims of West Coast evacuees, and provide the Japanese immigrant "the privilege of becoming a naturalized citizen of the United States." The New York Times, September 5, 1948. See ibid., March 27, 1948.


49 The law is listed in United States Statutes at Large, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., Vol. 62, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1949), 1231-1233. It purported to indemnify the Japanese-Americans for losses suffered "on or after December 7, 1941." The gist is as follows: (a) Under this act the Attorney General was authorized to pay "any award not exceeding $2,500" for each claim which had to be filed by January 2, 1950. (b) The Attorney General should consider claims to such damage or loss of real or personal property as was "a reasonable and natural consequence of the evacuation or exclusion." (c) "Damage or loss or account of death or personal injury, personal inconvenience, physical hardship, or mental sufferings" were specifically disallowed.
Since it provided for only a token indemnification, the measure's importance lies in the fact that it recognizes a degree of federal responsibility for this particularly harsh and constitutionally dubious wartime procedure. To date, however, little has been done to implement the legislation.  

Upon this law some 5,000 claims asking a total of $20,000,000 had been filed by the beginning of December, 1948, and Deputy Attorney General Peyton Ford disclosed in March, 1951, that a total of $133,125,104 had been claimed by 22,945 families during a period of eighteen months.  

But the filing of the claims was slow and difficult. Ford said that if some other arrangements were not adopted--such as the compromise settlement proposal for the smaller claims--it would take twenty years to dispose of all of the claims.  

The Department of Justice estimated in 1952 that "it would take 100 years to process them." One hundred years! It was no wonder that the Department made such an estimate, because in the

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50 The Nation, February 12, 1949, pp. 171-172.

51 The New York Times, December 18, 1948; March 26, 1951. The figures shown by The San Francisco Chronicle for April 18, 1948, are different from those in the former paper. According to it, $135,000,000 for 23,725 families had been filed during the period. Approximately 23,000 claims were for small sums and some 7,000 were major claims, totaling $95,000,000 for Bay Area nurseries and other valuable properties. At any rate, a conservative estimate of the total economic losses suffered by the evacuees had been set at between $350 million and $400 million. A total of the original claims ($133 or $135 million) represented about one-third of actual losses. See Anne M. Fisher, "Debt of Dishonor," The Reporter, February 5, 1952, pp. 21-23.

52 Ibid.
first three years of the program it processed only 576 claims, dismissed 197, paid an average of only $450 on the rest (on 379 claims), and spent almost $1,500 in expenses on each claim, three times as much as the actual payments. Congress was forced to devise a more expeditious system, and its effort resulted in the passage of the H. R. 3142 bill on August 9, 1951, which adopted the compromise settlement amendment. Congress also approved $90,000,000 on April 17, 1952, for implementing it. Masaoka said in connection with this vote:

We felt justice never would be done...Our people agreed to take only 75 per cent payment on small claims under $2,500. Remember...they're asking only three-fourths of the actual cash losses....But this is a

53 The San Francisco Chronicle, August 18, 1952.

54 The bill became Public Law 116, signed by President Truman on August 17, 1951. See United States Statutes at Large, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 62, Part 1 (Washington, D.C., 1952), 192. See also The New York Times, June 12, 1951. Especially Warren G. Magnuson, Senator from Washington, pushed forward the revision of the 1948 law. For example, Magnuson explained the purpose of his amendment bill on April 17, 1952: "...it was devised to expedite the settlement of smaller claims, bringing substantial saving in administrative costs for the Government and speedier payments to the claimants...for the claimants who wish to settle his claim under the compromise formula. There is first an automatic 25 per cent cut of his possible award, no matter how justified his claim may be." See Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4068. Upon this law the Department of Justice hoped to settle some 17,000 of these smaller claims by the end of June, 1952, and recommended a sum of $9,000,000 under the compromise formula. This, however, had not been paid because of lack of funds.

55 Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4070.
good beginning. It will be a great hope to aged and needy claimants. Above all, it makes us feel that Uncle Sam really wants to right an old wrong.\textsuperscript{56}

One could give more examples of actions of Congress relating to this problem. But it is sufficient here to point out that Congress always took pains to expedite payments of the Japanese evacuation claims, as was shown in the amendments of 1956.\textsuperscript{57} The Japanese claims section of the Department of Justice closed its evacuation claim program on November 17, 1958. From December 17, 1949, when the first claimant received a check for $303.36, to the closing date, 26,552 claims totalling $36,824,240 were paid.\textsuperscript{58} Of great assistance in administering the program were

\textsuperscript{56} The San Francisco \textit{Chronicle}, April 18, 1952.

\textsuperscript{57} Particularly Magnuson and Samuel W. Yorty, Representative from California, were urging the necessity of processing the evacuation claims at the earliest possible date. See \textit{Congressional Record}, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 4068-4069 and \textit{Congressional Record Appendix}, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 3117. They thought that the evacuation was "one of the tragedies of World War II." They, therefore, asserted that the United States could and should act promptly in behalf of those who had been waiting for several years for some sort of settlement. The Senate passed the bill of H. R. 7763 on June 29, 1956, which was signed by President Eisenhower on July 9, 1956 (Public Law 673). That year five other bills were introduced: H. R. 7972, by Representative Oline E. Teague, Democrat of Texas, January 3; H. R. 8167, by Representative John F. Shelley, Democrat of California, January 5; H. R. 8962, by Representative Bernice F. Sisk, Democrat of California, January 31; H. R. 9080, by Representative Chet Hodifield, Democrat of California, February 6; and H. R. 9128, by Representative Clyde G. Doyle, Democrat of California, February 7. See \textit{Congressional Record}, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 29, 172, 1739, 2133, 2270.

\textsuperscript{58} The \textit{New York Times}, December 18, 1949; July 25, 1962. Mr. Rogers, Attorney General said that not more than three per cent of the claims were dismissed (\textit{ibid.}, September 18, 1958). According to the Internal Revenue Service, all but 3,000 of the settlements were made for $2,500 or less (\textit{ibid.}, July 25, 1962).
Assistant United States Attorney General George C. Doub and Enoch E. Ellison. They received awards for the efficient manner in which they proceeded with the program at the fifteenth biennial JACL national convention on August 25, 1958, in Salt Lake City.  

In reference to the Japanese evacuee claims, two more points should be added. Since Congress failed to specify whether or not compensation for these claimants should be tax-free, the Internal Revenue Service, with the support of the Department of Justice, contended in 1962 that taxes should be imposed on the awarded evacuees. JACL, needless to say, protested against the plan. The New York Times took sides with JACL, insisting that "making the compensation subject to tax is another injustice that demands speedy correction." On the other hand, criticism on the legality of the mass evacuation continued to a great degree. As is well known, Eugene V. Rostow, Professor of Law at Yale, was the first to make public his doubts as to the legality of the measures by which the Japanese-Americans were put into confinement without so much as a military trial. His main

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59 The San Francisco Chronicle, August 26, 1958. Sidney R. Yates, Representative from Illinois, reported on August 20 that these two gentlemen would receive awards from JACL (Congressional Record Appendix, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 7464-7465). There is an article, which praised the earnest efforts of Doub and Ellison, in Harper's Magazine, October, 1958, p. 4.


61 Ibid., September 6, 1962.
assertion was that "public opinion and the Congress must accept the premise that the Supreme Court has now held our relocation program illegal." Very recently, on April 25, 1967, the Senate Democratic leader, Mike Mansfield, expressed his opinion of the same purport:

It would be my hope that the Supreme Court would now make a judgment on whether the mass evacuation was legal and justified so that an incident of this kind would never again occur in the history of the Republic unless completely justified and on solid legal ground.

Indeed, a period of resettlement was over, but it should be emphasized that there some problems to be solved, which stemmed from the forced evacuation.


63 The Rafu Shimpo, April 26, 1967.

64 For example, yen claims commanded the attention of the Japanese-Americans. The Attorney General ruled in 1957 that the seized deposits in California branches of the Yokohama Specie Bank Ltd. (the present Tokyo bank) should be paid at the postwar rate exchange rate of 361.5 yen to a dollar rather than the prewar rate of more than four yen to a dollar. More than 1,800 Japanese-Americans did appeal and in 1964 they reached a compromise with the government, receiving about 49 per cent of the amounts claimed. Justice John M. Harlan of the Supreme Court ruled on April 10, 1967, that 4,100 Japanese-Americans more were entitled to $10 million payments at post-war rates. See ibid., April 10, 1967. The editorial in Life for April 28, 1967, said that "it is regrettable that even in making restitution, the highest court has not passed judgment on whether the mass evacuation itself was legal and justified." See ibid., p. 4.
CHAPTER IV

REPEAL OF THE ALIEN LAND LAWS AND THE JAPANESE-AMERICAN CITIZENS LEAGUE

While the Japanese-Americans were interned in the relocation centers, the California state legislature in 1943 reinforced the second Alien law of 1920, whereby the seizure of lands, transferred or invested by ineligible aliens in the past, was authorized. It also appropriated $200,000 for a prompt enforcement of the new law in 1945; throughout California more than 100 offenders had been arrested by the middle of November, 1945.  

1 The first Alien Land Law of California was passed by the state legislature in 1913. Enacted on August 10, 1913, it applied to the Japanese-Americans "without actually mentioning them." The act provided that "aliens ineligible for citizenship could not acquire real property in the state unless specifically permitted to do so by treaty." The Japanese formed corporations to evade the 1913 law and to own or lease land in which "American citizens owned a majority of the stock" or bought land in the name of the minor, American-born Nisei. The California general election of 1920 approved the second Land Law, by a vote of 666,348 to 22,086. The law was reinforced in 1923, 1927, 1943. In 1923 it was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Thereafter, the Japanese-born immigrants could not generally engage in agriculture in California, except as laborers. See Carl Wittke, We Who Built America (Cleveland, Ohio, 1964, revised edition), pp. 482-483.

A period of terror came down on those who were returning from
the camps. ³ Fred Oyama, a Nisei of sixteen years of age, was the
first victim in 1944. His father, Kajiro Oyama, bought for him
two small tracts amounting to eight acres in San Diego, Califor-
nia, the first tract when his son was six years old and the second
tract when he was nine. The father, an ineligible citizen for
naturalization, was "a competent and proper person" to be
appointed Fred's guardian. He, however, did not file the annual
reports which the Alien Land Law required of all guardians. In
1942 Fred and his family were evacuated from San Diego to the
relocation center. During their internment, the State filed a
petition in 1944 to declare an escheat of the two tracts, because
the conveyances in 1934 and 1937 had been with intent to violate
and evade the Alien Land Law. The Oyama land was seized by the
state in 1944, soon after the family returned to their home
city.⁴ They immediately appealed in the Circuit Court of Appeals
with little success, chiefly because of insufficient financial
resources due to almost three years of internment.

At this juncture, in the fall of 1945, Mr. Kozaburo Koda,
whose lands had also been confiscated, championed the proposition
that a society be organized without delay for the purpose of
supporting the rights of the Oyama case and promoting in general

³ Asano, op. cit., 95.
the Japanese-American interests. To his proposal the Japanese-American Citizens League (JACL) and most of the victims of the land law replied in the affirmative. After two, rather hasty, informal meetings sponsored by JACL, approximately 100 delegates met first together in Stockton, California, December 6, 1945, and organized the Society for Promotion of the Japanese-American Civil Rights. The representatives from almost every community of the state approved unanimously the sincere assistance of the rights of the Oyama family. In a candid statement to their colleagues and the general public, they made an earnest appeal for $100,000:

Steadily and strictly the California Alien Land Law has been administered to our great detriment.... The seizure of lands was already witnessed in the thirty-eight localities. If the Oyama case is adjudged legal, lands held by the Japanese-Americans could not be free from confiscation in the future, either. Since many situations are very serious, we must ask for the prompt solution of wartime claims, inadequate housing, and insufficient social security...Confronted with these circumstances, we feel it absolutely indispensable that we, as a whole, must fight for the common cause and help

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5 Asano, an old friend of Koda and the founder of the Nichibei Jiji in 1946, says: "When asked to help organize a society in behalf of my brethren, I immediately said O.K. I could not but feel indignant at injustices by the state of California....It seems as if it wanted to flog dead horses, or exhausted people because of confinement....I made up my mind--I must fight thoroughly!" See his Autobiography, pp. 93-94.

6 Ibid., pp. 97, 262.
one another. Without tiding over this crisis, our promise, both physically and spiritually, would never be bright.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 263-264. This statement was written by Mr. Asano, secretary of the Society for Promotion of the Japanese-American Civil Rights. It was originally in Japanese.}

The Society for Promotion of the Japanese-American Civil Rights succeeded in acquiring a sufficient donation to have as legal advisers Messrs. James Purcell and William Felter, prominent lawyers in the San Francisco bar, to appeal the Oyama case to the California Supreme Court. An eight-month battle in court, terminating October 31, 1946, resulted, however, in nothing either for the Oyama family nor for the Japanese-Americans.\footnote{Ibid., p. 265.} The court regarded the Oyama land as state property on the grounds that Fred Oyama lost nothing because he received nothing—-as soon as the gift transaction of land had taken place, the real property escheated to the state of California, because Kajiro Oyama had not filed the report; therefore, it was not considered a \textit{bona fide} gift by the state.\footnote{Race Relations, V, Nos. 3 and 4 (December, 1947-January, 1948), 88.}

The Society for Promotion immediately decided to take an appeal to the United States Supreme Court, as had been suggested at the first convention in Stockton. The suit was initiated on October 22, 1947. Some favorable situations encouraged the
society to pursue the cause. First, JACL was successful in its campaign against the so-called Proposition 15, which called for the various amendments to the 1920 Alien Land Law to be added to the California Constitution.10 "For the first time," the Utah Nippo, November 6, acclaimed, "the Nisei took initiative."11 Second, in 1947, both the Nisei Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) of Sacramento, California, and the California Council of the American Veterans Committee passed resolutions to initiate the movements to repeal the second Alien Land Act of the state.12 Third, greatly cooperative with the Society for Promotion was the American Civil Liberties Union, which filed briefs of amicus curiae, asserting the illegality of the California Alien Land Law.13 Fourth, A. L. Wirin and Dean G. Acheson argued for the defendant.14

10 Ibid., IV, No. 3 (October, 1946), 153. The proposition was voted on at the November election in 1946. As of the end of the month, with 13,766 out of California's 15,296 precincts reporting, "Yes" vote was 709,038; "No," 1,028,651; and over 2,000,000 votes were cast.

11 Ibid.


The Oyama decision of the United States Supreme Court was given on January 19, 1948. By a vote of 6 to 3, it prevented California from barring ownership of land by Fred Oyama. Chief Justice M. Vinson wrote the majority opinion. California, as mentioned just before, held that Kajiro Oyama had bought the land in his son's name as a subterfuge, and he failed to file annual guardianship reports after the original transactions; therefore, a bona fide gift was unjustifiable. Chief Justice Vinson, however, held that the state took "a statutory prima facie presumption" and that a bona fide gift was legal unless any countervailing evidence was offered to the courts to prove either an inference of a bona fide gift or lack of it. He stated:

...The Alien Land Law, as applied in this case, deprives Fred Oyama of the equal protection of California's laws and of his privileges as an American citizen....the State has discriminated against Fred Oyama....He was saddled with an onerous burden of proof which need not to be borne by California children generally....Fred Oyama lost his gift, irretrievably and without compensation....The only basis for this discrimination against an American citizen, moreover, was the fact that his father was Japanese, and not American, Russian, Chinese, or English....15

In addition, he concluded that the California Alien Land Law is "contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment." 16

The decision of the Supreme Court began to influence attitudes in the state of California. Its legislature adjourned the 1948 session without any further appropriations for enforcing the Alien Land Law. 17 According to Attorney General Fred Howser of the State of California, a total of 79 cases had been filed under the law since 1913, among which 73 were filed against Japanese, 59 arose after 1942, and some 20 of them had been settled. Therefore, there were approximately 40 cases pending in California courts. These cases were to be dismissed by a statement of January 27, 1948. 18

With this announcement the Society for Promotion and the American Civil Liberties Union expressed their satisfaction; the latter regarded Howser’s action as "a step toward eliminating

16 When the Oyama case was before the Supreme Court of the United States, an article of importance on the future of the California Alien Land Law appeared. The article concluded that it "is a symbol of racial intolerance and prejudice." Edwin E. Ferguson, "The California Alien Land Law and the Fourteenth Amendment," The California Law Review, XXXV, No. 1 (March, 1947), 61-90. The author is a former solicitor of the War Relocation Authority.

17 Race Relations, V, Nos. 7 and 8 (April-May, 1948), 182. Up to that date, the California legislature appropriated $200,000 in 1945, and an additional $65,000 was approved in 1947. The sum was at the disposal of the Attorney General for the investigation and prosecution of land escheat cases.

18 The San Francisco Chronicle, January 18, 1948.
racial discrimination in California."¹⁹

It was, however, only a temporary satisfaction that they attained. Asked by the state legislature in March, 1948, to present his interpretations of the Oyama Case, Howser repeated his view that "for all practical purposes the California Alien Land Law was a dead letter, at least for the time being."²⁰ But, as the three justices of the United States Supreme Court stated, it was not invalidated as violative of the Constitution. The officials of the Society for Promotion, therefore, felt it indispensable to make the California Alien Land Law a dead letter forever and unconstitutional. They once again arose to fight for the cause. Sei Fujii, a Los Angeles newspaper publisher and member of the Society, bought property there in 1948 as a test case.²¹ With a wholehearted assistance of the Society, Fujii sued for land ownership in the Superior Court in Los Angeles at the end of 1949. The court, however, held that the land escheated to the state; in other words, the court's decision upheld the State of California, because Fujii was an ineligible Issei for naturalization, and his ownership was illegal. He sued to recover title in the State Court of Appeals in Los Angeles.

¹⁹ Asano, Autobiography, p. 271.
²⁰ Race and Relations, op. cit.
Shocked at the course of the appeal, the Society for Promotion filed another suit, as the second test case, in the Superior Court in Los Angeles.\textsuperscript{22} It was the case of Haruye Masaoka \textit{v.} California.\textsuperscript{23} Those who supported the case did not believe the proverb that he who pursues the two hares catches neither; nay, they seriously desired to catch one of them.\textsuperscript{24} Fortunately, both cases were decided in their favor. The Masaoka case was won on March 17, 1950, on the grounds that the California Alien Land Law conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment.\textsuperscript{25} About a month later, on April 25, the State Court of Appeals made a unanimous decision on the case of Fuji\textit{i v.} California. The court reversed a Los Angeles Superior Court ruling on a unique basis; the Charter of the United Nations. Justice Emmet H. Wilson, who wrote the Appeals Court decision, said that the Charter guarantees

\textsuperscript{22} \textit{Ibid.}, 67.

\textsuperscript{23} The New York Times, November 26, 1950. See also The San Francisco Chronicle, April 18, 1952. Ike Masaoka, the first Nisei who volunteered for the United States Army, bought a lot in Pasadena, California, November, 1949. He transferred it to his 92-year-old mother, an alien ineligible for naturalization. The Pasadena lot was paid for by the five Nisei brothers by using their veterans' benefits. But under the California Alien Land Law the property was escheatable to the state. Then Ike went to court to establish the mother's right to own the land. They pushed the case in accord with "the state law requiring that children help support their parents."

\textsuperscript{24} \textit{Kato, op. cit.}

\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Ibid.;} The San Francisco Chronicle, March 18, 1950.
respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without regard of race, color, or religion and because the Alien Land Law discriminates against Japanese...its restrictions are untenable and indefensible.26

To summarize, an alien could not be prohibited from owning land in California because of racial backgrounds; under the decision Sei Fujii was allowed to retain ownership of his land. The United Nations legal authorities admitted that this case was the first one "in which the Charter has been used as the principal basis for a ruling by a court in the United States."27 The first application of the Charter to the suit caused an immediate,

26 The San Francisco Chronicle, April 25, 1950. The decision was based on the principle that the U. N. Charter is a treaty between the United States and other nations and that "the Federal Constitution provides that all treaties take precedence over State laws." See also The New York Times, April 26, 1950.

27 Ibid., April 26, 1950. It is said that the only other instance in which a decision was based on the United Nations Charter had been the invalidation in 1947 by the Magistrate's Court at Ottawa, Canada, of an anti-Semitic housing ordinance.
far-wide argument among lawyers and political scientists.28

But, the unanimous opinion of the State Court of Appeals stated that the Alien Land Law "is not in violation of State and Federal Constitutions." In due time, Attorney General of California, Fred Howser, and the Society for Promotion made appeals

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28 The argument was centered on whether the Charter of the United Nations is a treaty and particularly whether the treaty is "self-executing"—i.e., does not require any implementive legislation to internal laws. The self-executing point had been made by Chief Justice John Marshall in 1829, when he said: "A treaty is...to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of the legislature wherever it operates to itself, with the aid of any legislative provisions." (Ibid., May 16, 1950.) Most of the disputers were of the opinion that it had not been disputed that the Charter is a treaty. The argument of the self-executing point, however, lingered on. It depended on the interpretation of the Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. For example, Mr. Quincy Wright, Professor of Chicago and a member of the Committee on International Relations considered these articles of the Charter to be self-executing. (Cf. The New York Times, June 5, 1950.) On the other hand, Mr. Manley O. Hudson, Professor of International Law at the Harvard Law School and Chairman of the U. N. International Law Commission suggested that the State Court of Appeals decision "failed to take account of the self-executive factor." His opinion greatly encouraged Howser to challenge that of the court. (Cf. Ibid., May 11, 1950.) On April 17, 1952, in the decision of the California Supreme Court, Justice Gibson wrote: "It is not disputed that the Charter is a treaty, and our Federal Constitution provides that treaties made under the authority of the United States are part of the supreme law of the land and that the judges in every state are bound thereby. A treaty, however, does not automatically supersede local laws which are inconsistent with it unless the treaty provisions are self-executing... It is clear that the provisions... of the Charter, which are claimed to be in conflict with the Alien Land Law, are not self-executing." (Ibid., April 20, 1952.) For further details on the problem of "self-executing" see Ibid., April 30, May 11, May 14, June 4, June 6, June 9, June 16, and June 23, 1950. No articles on this problem appeared in The New York Times thereafter.
to the State Supreme Court. It began to argue them after the middle of June, 1950. Almost twenty-two months went by before the final decision of the State Supreme Court was handed down.

In a 4 to 3 decision on April 17, 1952, it held that the State Alien Land Law was unconstitutional. Chief Justice Phil Gibson declared:

The law is obviously designed and administered as an instrument for effectuating racial discrimination, and the most searching examination discloses no circumstances justifying classification on that basis. It does not follow that a person has no stake in the economic and social fortune of a State merely because the Federal law denies him the right to naturalization. His American-born children are citizens, and, having made his home here, he has a natural interest, identical with that of an eligible alien, in the strength and security of the country in which he makes a living for his family and educates his children. The real purpose of the law was the elimination of competition by alien Japanese in farming California land, and this discriminatory nature rendered it invalid under the Constitution.

The nightmare created by the Alien Land Law vanished for the first time in thirty-two years. The cause pushed forward by the Society for Promotion under JACL resulted in a final victory; it closed the door on further discrimination. All that had to

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29 On June 5, 1950, Howser submitted to the State Supreme Court a petition, which included a statement by Professor Hudson. He insisted that the State Court of Appeals decision on the Fujii case be reviewed and that the supremacy of state laws be established over the Charter. See ibid., May 11, June 6, 23, 1950. Kato, A Hundred-Year History, II, 68.

30 The San Francisco Chronicle, April 18, 1952. The decision affected the Masaoka case about a month later. For a further discussion of the case of Sei Fujii v. California (38 C.2d 718), see California Reports: Reports of Cases Determined in the Supreme Court of the State of California, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Bancroft Whitney Co., San Francisco, 1952), 718-770, particularly 718-739.

31 Kato, op. cit., p. 69.
be done was to erase the Alien Land Law of 1920 from the California Statute books, because it had been approved by the general election that year. For this purpose, JACL succeeded in offering Proposition 13 for the November election, 1956: 2,684,902 votes were for repeal of the law and 1,311,640 against.  

In connection with the revocation of the California Alien Land Law, it should be pointed out that there were similar laws in other states. As the following table shows, ten other states had enacted land laws. The scarcity of materials limits attention as to what became of some of them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>States (Years in which Alien Land Laws were enacted)</th>
<th>Total Population as of 1940</th>
<th>Total Resident Aliens</th>
<th>Resident Japanese Aliens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Arizona (1917)</td>
<td>499,261</td>
<td>30,699</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana (1921)</td>
<td>2,363,880</td>
<td>16,601</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Mexico (1922)</td>
<td>531,818</td>
<td>12,123</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idaho (1923)</td>
<td>524,873</td>
<td>5,936</td>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana (1923)</td>
<td>559,456</td>
<td>13,639</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oregon (1923)</td>
<td>1,089,684</td>
<td>33,859</td>
<td>1,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kansas (1925)</td>
<td>1,801,028</td>
<td>16,180</td>
<td>10</td>
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<tr>
<td>Utah (1943)</td>
<td>550,310</td>
<td>10,100</td>
<td>829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wyoming (1943)</td>
<td>250,742</td>
<td>5,745</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas (1943)</td>
<td>1,949,387</td>
<td>2,838</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cf. California (1920)</td>
<td>6,907,384</td>
<td>526,937</td>
<td>33,569</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 Ibid., Also see The New York Times, September 3, 1956.

Utah, the last state to enact it in 1943, became the first western state to repeal it: on March 20, 1947, the State House of Representatives approved the action of the Senate by a vote of 48 to 2. The Alien Land Law was condemned as a "bad example of war hysteria."34 Oregon followed Utah; the State Supreme Court ruled on March 29, 1949, that the Alien Land Law was unconstitutional, and the law became a dead letter.35 Idaho revoked the Alien Land Law on March 4, 1955, with the signature of the Governor on a bill repealing it.36 The repeal movement went on. The State of Washington has presented proposals three times since 1960 to the people to wipe out the Alien Land Law from its state constitution: the general election on November 8, 1960, showed that with 5,006 out of the 5,200 precincts reporting, 414,457 votes were for repeal and 499,997 against; as a result of the third general election on November 16, 1966, the figures stood 285,955 for repeal and 357,404 against. They were with 5,300 reporting out of Washington's total of 5,800 precincts.

JACL, assisted by various civil groups and newspapers, has propelled

34 Race Relations, IV, No. 5 (December, 1946), 153-155; IV, No. 9 (April, 1947), 290. It is believed that the Utah Veterans of Foreign Wars, the largest group in the Intermountain area, spearheaded the repeal movement. The Utah Alien Land Law was not as strict as the California law.

35 Kato, op. cit., p. 69.

36 Ibid.
the cause. 37 As of 1962, Arizona was fighting for the repeal of the Alien Land Law. 38

Highlights of some of the important incidents, rules, and decisions, which would affect the interests of Japanese-Americans, have already been noted. There is no question that the government, including Congress, has taken up the heavy burden to improve the plight of Japanese-Americans. It is also clear that JACL has been in the foreground of the movement advocating their cause. Of all the organizations established in the United States in the course of this century by the Japanese-Americans, perhaps none represented their interests more broadly and promptly than JACL, particularly after World War II. A knowledge of the nature of JACL will offer better understanding of our story. 39

37 The Rafu Shimpo, November 19, 1966.
38 Kato, op. cit., p. 70.
39 The following account is taken from such records as Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 14604-14605; ibid., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 13219-13222, in which Walter H. Judd, Representative from Minnesota, paid a tribute to JACL on its 25th anniversary; ibid., 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 3824-3825; United States Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings Before the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration, 78th Cong., 2d Sess., Part 29, 11137-11156; ibid., Part 30, 11449-11470. Hereafter cited as the House Hearings.
The first biennial national convention was held in Seattle, 1930. The organization has had no connection with the Japanese government nor with any agency functioning within Japan. It has been "nonpartisan" rather than "non-political." In the prewar period JACL paid its major attention to promotion of the general welfare of both the members and outsiders. It was a sort of fraternal order which met a period of bitter trial during World War II. First of all, it was forced to express its creed so as to dispel the suspicion and alarm with which Americans and even some Japanese continued to view it. Mike Masaoka, national secretary of JACL, stood before the House sub-committee on the national defense migration in San Francisco on February 23, 1942, and announced the League's creed, explaining the alphabetical sequence of the letters J-A-C-L:

"J" stands for justice....
"A" stands for Americanism. We believe that in order to prove ourselves worthy of the justice which we seek,

The beginning of JACL was about 1921 in Seattle. But officially the first convention was held there in 1930, where some 112 Nisei, representing ten local civil clubs in Washington, Oregon, and California, met together. Successive biennial national conventions were held in Los Angeles (1932), San Francisco (1934), Seattle (1936), Los Angeles (1938), Portland (1940), and Salt Lake City (1942). The JACL national headquarters have been in San Francisco since 1934. On June 21, 1937, the organization was incorporated under the laws of the state of California. Not until 1941 was it possible to pay the staff. In the spring of 1942, JACL had approximately 20,000 Japanese-American members of 62 chapters in 300 communities throughout the country. JACL celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1955 with more than 15,000 active members in 88 chapters in some 32 states and the District of Columbia.
we must prove ourselves to be, first of all, good Americans—in thought, in words, and in deeds... We believe that we must live for America—and, if need to be, to die for America....

"C" stands for citizenship.... We must accept and even seek out opportunities in which to serve our country and to assume the obligations and duties as well as the rights and privileges of citizenship....

"L" stands for leadership. We believe that the Japanese American Citizens League, as the only national organization established to serve the Americans of Japanese ancestry, is in a position to actively lead the Japanese people residing in the United States....

Summed up briefly, the...league is devoted to those tasks which are calculated to win for ourselves and our posterity the status outlined by our two slogans: "For better Americans in a greater America," and "Security through unity."41

To demonstrate the principles of Americanism, JACL obeyed the mass exclusion orders, even though at first disagreeing with them, and the biennial national convention in Salt Lake City in 1942 adopted a resolution demanding the right to serve in the United States armies, which had been denied them by selective service after the outbreak of the war. The resolution later paved the way for the formation of the 442d Regimental Combat Team.

After the end of hostilities, JACL promoted the more thorough realization of its ideals as three resolutions were adopted in the first postwar convention in Denver, 1946.42 At the same

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41 House Hearings, Part 29, 11139.

42 This has been already referred to in Chapter III. The resolutions concerned the restoration of the Japanese-Americans' status, the evacuee claims, and naturalization.
time, the convention appointed Mike Kasaoka as a lobbyist. 43

His night-and-day exertions attracted the hearty cooperation
of many Congressmen, from the West as well as from other sections
of the country, Republicans and Democrats alike. JACL, therefore,
"has been able to eliminate legal sanctions which at one time
numbered more than 500 discriminatory statutes directed against
people of Japanese ancestry," John F. Shelley, Representative
from California, stated on July 25, 1956. 44 The repeal of the
Japanese Exclusion Act of 1924 has been without doubt the most
splendid success that JACL has ever had.

43 As is well known, because of the intricacies of legislative
rules and practices, ex-Congressmen or former administrative
employees are desirable for lobbyists. Masaoka was never in
politics. His only public career was a full-time secretary of
JACL after 1941, the position for which he volunteered. But
his most distinguished character--courageous, scrupulous, agile,
and prudent--got obstacles out of the way. JACL's national
convention in San Francisco in 1952 rewarded Masaoka in recog-
nition of his entire devotion to the cause. The Masaoka family
came to Fresno, California, in 1905, and later moved to Salt Lake
City. Mike was born in 1915, and his father was killed when he
was nine years of age. Haruye Masaoka reared six sons and two
daughters. The five sons went into the United States Army during
World War II. Mike was the first Japanese-American to volunteer
for the 442d Regimentary Combat Team. He was a graduate of the
Westside High School in Salt Lake City and also of the University
of Utah. The above account is based on The House Hearings, Part 29,

44 Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., 14604-14605.
CHAPTER V

FOR MORE LIBERAL NATURALIZATION AND MORE LIBERAL IMMIGRATION

Soon after the Denver convention in 1946, JACL recognized the necessity of propagating the cause of the naturalization among those of Japanese ancestry throughout the country. Supported by the Society for Promotion, JACL established the Anti-Discrimination Committee, a cooperating agency between Issel and Nisei for the cause, in December, 1946.¹ Mike Masaoka was dispatched to Washington as national legislative director of the Committee and as a lobbyist in the Eightieth Congress beginning in January, 1947. The Committee led a campaign for the funds to support Masaoka. Missions were sent almost everywhere in the country and out to Hawaii; between 1947 and 1952 donations amounted to nearly $643,000, including $158,900 from the people of California.² The campaign


² Ibid., pp. 274-275. Kato, A Hundred-Year History, I, 76, 87. Four persons were sent to Hawaii to make an appeal to the Japanese-Americans: Keizaburo Koda, Kihei Ikeda, Joe Masaoka, and Susumu Togasaki. They were very important members of the Anti-Discrimination Committee. During a four months' stay (February to June, 1948), they succeeded in persuading the Japanese-Americans in Hawaii to assist the movement for naturalization and for organizing the Committee to Equalized Naturalization. Thus, those of Japanese ancestry living in the Continental United States were able to go hand in hand with their colleagues in Hawaii. As to the 1940 census, incidentally, there were 37,353 Issel in Hawaii as compared to 47,305 in the United States proper.
was remarkably successful. It was now possible for Haseoka to begin his activities without concern for finances.

In order to secure the legislation desired, he devoted himself to persuading Congressmen of the loyalty of most of the Japanese-Americans, aliens and citizens alike, during the war. As a result, five bills proposing to remove restrictions on the naturalization of Japanese-Americans were introduced in both houses in 1947. Among them was the Judd Bill (H. R. 4418), introduced on July 26, 1947. Representative Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, was "proud of having been associated with JACL's postwar programs from the beginning." He, like the others, wanted to eliminate the racial barriers in United States naturalization laws. Besides that, he hoped to terminate the racial obstacles in its immigration policy. This was the chief reason that his bill was most attractive to the Committee. Needless to add, JACL joined in supporting the bill. Boise Valley chapter, Idaho, of JACL, petitioned the House:

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3 (a) H.R. 45: introduced by Representative Charles R. Clason, Republican of Massachusetts, on January 3, 1947. (b) S. 602: introduced by Senator William Langer, Republican of North Dakota, on February 14, 1947. (c) H. R. 2112: introduced by Representative Philip J. Philbin, Democrat of Massachusetts, on February 20, 1947. (d) S. 1655: introduced by Senator J. Howard McGrath, Democrat of Rhode Island on July 18, 1947. And (e) H. R. 4418.

4 Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 13221.
...We feel our parents are entitled to those rights because of their display of good citizenship and also for our boys of the Four Hundred Forty-second and One Hundredth Battalion who fought so courageously believing that their parents would eventually obtain rights of citizenship guaranteed by our Constitution.  

The bill, however, got caught in the closing rush. It (H. R. 5004) was again brought up on January 19, 1948. Testimony and public opinion on it were reported to be overwhelmingly favorable. Particularly, Joseph C. Grew, former Ambassador to Japan, and Robert M. Cullum, ex-area supervisor under the War Relocation Authority, gave eloquent and convincing statements in favor of the bill. Finally, on March 1, 1949, the Judd Bill (H. R. 199) was passed by a vote of 336 to 56 votes. Its several provisions, however, almost immediately aroused the hostility of the majority of Chinese on the West Coast and the British West Indians because

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5 The petitions from many chapters of JACL are recorded in ibid., 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1691.

6 See Grew's address in Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 2387-2388; Cullum's address in ibid., 382-384. Grew urged, in reference to the world situation, the approval of equality for those of Japanese descent in immigration and naturalization laws of the United States. Almost the same point of view was expressed by Cullum. Moreover, representatives of both major parties from the West Coast supported the legislation. See The New York Times, March 2, 1949.

7 Congressional Record, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., 1692.
of the restrictions on them. They made every effort to prevent its passage; the Judd Bill thus came to a deadlock. The Washington Anti-Discrimination Committee and JACL had to decide whether they should compromise with the opposition or make their own way. They found, after some consideration, that there was no alternative but to push further their own cause; and they gave support to the Walter Bill. It is to be remembered that it was in the spring of 1949 that the Committee was firmly determined to advocate non-discriminatory naturalization. The Walter Bill, however, did not meet the expectations of the committee. Briefly speaking, it was passed by the House on June 6, 1949, but the Senate shelved it three times prior to August 18, 1950. The Committee had been

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8 The law was to make it impossible to bring the Chinese wives and children of American citizens to the United States, and for any single colonial possession, a standard of an annual quota of 100 was to be established; therefore, the residents of the British West Indies, who had theretofore entered the United States under Great Britain's overall quota of 66,000 were strongly against the Judd Bill. For further details, see The New York Times, March 3, 17, 20, 26, 1949; April 21, 1950. The main points of the bill in favor of Asiatics are as follows: (a) the Japanese, Koreans, and Polynesians would be beneficiaries, subject to quota limitations. The annual immigration ratio was one-sixth of the number of inhabitants from any country in the Continental United States in 1920. Japan, for example, would receive an annual quota of 185. (b) The bill was to lift the barriers to the naturalization of those people.


10 The Senate shelved it on October 17, 1949, and June 6, 1950.
impatient. Their efforts seemed to be of little or no avail.

The supporters also were shaken in their trust in the Committee:

...Nearly four years have passed since the Committee
began to advance the cause...No sooner was the [Walter]
Bill passed by the House than it met the unexpected,
fierce opposition of the Senate. The Committee should
have given one more push. We raised every year additional
contributions from the people. They understood in mind
that money was absolutely necessary for the cause, but in
heart desired to be asked for money no longer.\textsuperscript{11}

The Committee had to soothe the supporters, while stressing the
significance of continuing the movement.\textsuperscript{12}

In due time, the Eighty-first Congress of 1950 had adjourned,
and the Eighty-second Congress was convened in January, 1951.

Representative Francis E. Walter, Democrat of Pennsylvania,
introduced his new bill (H. R. 2379) on February 5. Also
Senator Pat McCarran, Democrat of Nevada, chairman of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary, introduced his bill (S. 716) on
January 29.\textsuperscript{13} Both bills were later to be united in an omnibus

\textsuperscript{11}Asano, \textit{op. cit.}, 283.
\textsuperscript{12}\textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{13}He was chairman of the Judiciary Committee. As early as
October 15, 1949, he urged in Rome "a speedy tightening of
immigration controls" particularly to those coming to the
United States from the Curtain area. On April 20, 1950, he
proposed a bill of more than 250 pages long, in which he sought
to have Congress rewrite completely the immigration and
naturalization laws. In connection with the Japanese-American
citizenship, he said the bill would be applied to "the fathers
and mothers of Nisei Japanese...." McCarran introduced a new
April 21, 1950; January 1, August 28, 1951. \textit{Congressional Record},
82d Cong., 1st Sess., 714. Three letters of JACL to McCarran
are found in \textit{ibid.}, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5092.
bill (H. R. 5678). Nevertheless, this time, too, many factors did not warrant the Committee's expectation of its being debated at the earliest date.\footnote{14} Not until after April 23, 1952, did Congress begin to debate H. R. 5678 in a very real sense;\footnote{15} and the House approved its final draft by a vote of 203 to 53 on June 10. The following day the Senate acted similarly, and on June 13 the bill was sent to the President. Mr. Truman did not say, according to the New York \textit{Times}, "whether he would invoke a veto, although he has been represented persistently as disliking the bill from top to bottom."\footnote{16} It was, however, generally believed that if he approved the McCarran-Walter Bill, it would surprise

\footnote{14} The main feature of the omnibus bill--the quota system--aroused the greatest degree of opposition; the Senate was slow in appointing the committee on the omnibus bill; Senator Herbert Lehman, Democrat of New York, and Senator Huber H. Humphrey, Democrat of Minnesota, were the chief opponents of McCarran. Congress had many urgent bills to debate such as the Civil Defense Bill, the Draft Bill, and the Pension Bill, all of which were, needless to say, connected deeply with domestic interests. For Lehman and Humphrey, see \textit{The New York Times}, May 14, June 10, 12, October 1, 1952; April 28, 1958; February 6, 1959. \textit{Congressional Record}, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5775-5801.

\footnote{15} The House began to debate the bill on April 23. Two days later it was passed by a vote of 206 to 68. The bill went to the Senate, where a substitute bill (the Lehman-Humphrey Bill) was waiting for a decision. The Senate rejected the latter on May 21 by a vote of 51-27 and passed the McCarran-Walter Bill the following day with about a dozen members present. It was immediately sent to the conferees for a final draft.

\footnote{16} \textit{The New York Times}, May 22, 1952; see \textit{ibid.}, June 2, 18, 26, 1952.
the Capitol. He vetoed it on June 25, and discussed some major disadvantages in his message:

...The bill would continue, practically without change, the national origins quota system, which was enacted into law in 1924....
...through this bill we say to them people of Italy, Greece, and Turkey: You are less worthy to come to this country than Englishmen or Irishmen....
...We do not need to be protected against immigrants from these countries of Eastern Europe....
...Certain rights of native-born, first-generation Americans would be limited....
...All our citizens returning from abroad would be subjected to serious risk of unreasonable invasions of privacy....
...The bill is intended to overrule the decision of the Supreme Court or other Federal Courts.... 17

But the veto was overridden; 278 to 113 in the House on June 26; 57 to 26 in the Senate on June 27, 1952. 18 The McCarran-Walter Bill became effective six months from that day.

The Anti-Discrimination Committee was not ignorant of the defects of the bill which had been pointed out by the President in his veto message. During the days in which debates in Congress became more and more heated, Masaoka, national director of the Committee, said:

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18 Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 8225, 8267. See also The New York Times, June 27, 28, 1952. In both houses, party lines were shattered. In the House, voting to override were 107 Democrats and 170 Republicans; in the Senate, 25 Democrats, mostly from the South, and 32 Republicans.
...the omnibus bill is compromise legislation, it will not satisfy every individual in every respect. The test should not be whether a Utopian situation is created but whether the Walter omnibus immigration and naturalization bill is an improvement over existing laws. We...are of the judgment that, after all the factors have been carefully weighed, the Walter omnibus immigration and naturalization bill makes substantial improvements in the present law.

Enactment of this legislation does not preclude later amendments; quite the contrary may be true... The way to better law is a step-by-step proposition of improving basic legislation through appropriate amendments. The Walter omnibus immigration and naturalization bill, by bringing order out of chaos, is a logical first step.19

Judging from his remarks, Masaoka wanted something that would be better than existing immigration laws. What he thought was better concerning the proposed measure? First, by the annual quota system, Japan would be able to send 185 immigrants to the United States. If the law was, as President Truman claimed, discriminating against Asiatics, there was no denying that it marked a significant advance by eliminating complete exclusion which had been in practice since 1924.20 Second, of greater

19 His opinion was disclosed in a letter to Representative Chet Holifield, dated March 12, 1952. See Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2225-2226. Masaoka repeated the same viewpoint on June 29, 1952. See The San Francisco Chronicle, June 30, 1952.

20 Truman said in his veto message: "...I want all our residents of Japanese ancestry, and all our friends throughout the Far East, to understand this point clearly. I cannot take the step I would like to take, and strike down the bars that prejudice has erected against them, without, at the same time, establishing new discriminations against the peoples of Asia and approving harsh and repressive measures directed at all who seek a new life within our boundaries...." The New York Times, June 26, 1952.
practical and personal concern to him, as chief of the
organization representing persons of Japanese ancestry who
had been living in the United States for many years, was that
naturalization privileges were to be granted. He declared:

...Today, according to the most reliable census
figures, approximately 88,000 resident aliens are
ineligible for naturalization because of race, 85,000
of whom are Japanese....We sincerely feel that it is
far more important to secure naturalization privileges
for our 85,000 aged parents now than to increase the
risk of closing this opportunity for citizenship by
demanding the politically impossible concession of
substituting for immigration purposes place of birth
for land of ancestry....

His opinion was shared by many of his supporters. The
Judd Bill was already out of sight. But another desirable
measure from the Japanese-American view--the McCarran-Walter
Bill--had been on the verge of death in June, 1952, too. It
had been necessary to act with the greatest enthusiasm, or this
statute would be gone forever. Therefore, it was not altogether
without reason that the Committee made its heated appeal more
urgently than ever before, while the vetoed bill awaited its
reconsideration by Congress.

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21 In a letter of Masaoka to Mr. Holifield, dated March 12,
1952. See Congressional Record, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., 2226.


23 For example, many JA CL chapters addressed telegrams to
Congress in June, 1952. See Congressional Record, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., 8266-8267.
There is little evidence to show that the appeals of Japanese-Americans were decisive in the repassage of the McCarran-Walter Bill. Nevertheless, there had not been a movement for more liberal naturalization and immigration laws since the outset of Japanese immigration, in which the people in Hawaii and the United States proper made conscious efforts by showing both patience and zeal. The history of JACL and the Anti-Discrimination Committee for five years and a half after 1946 can be identified with the increasing influence of the Japanese-Americans, who after twenty years' period of exclusion from immigration and citizenship faced a new era. 24

To a surprising degree, the Japanese-Americans seem to have been a rather indifferent to such criticism of the McCarran-Walter Act, as has continued to the present. At the same time, they favored increases in the Japanese quota and repeal of the annual national origins system, as a matter of faith. When a Senate Judiciary panel discussed the 1952 law on December 1, 1955, Masaoka, speaking for the JACL, praised the statute, while eight other witnesses showed disfavor. 25 In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, Japanese-Americans had been largely excluded from political and social participation, yet they were now beginning to assert their rights and interests in the national political process.

24 The Rafu Shimpo asked eighty-two Issei and Nisei on the West Coast through the questionnaire: What was the most impressive experience in their life after World War II? To this question, twenty-four replied that the passage of the McCarran-Walter Bill was most worthy of notice. See the paper for January 1, 1967.

biennial national conventions of JACL held in Seattle (1962) and Detroit (1964), respectively, the delegates resolved that they sought "meaningful and comprehensive civil rights for all Americans," without regard to race, color, creed, or national origin, as well as "liberalized immigration opportunities for all peoples of earth."\(^{26}\)

On July 23, 1963, President Kennedy urged Congress to abolish the quota system of immigration.\(^{27}\) Congress, however, did not take any action. President Johnson, with whom Congress was very cooperative, tried to bring about greater liberalization of the immigration laws.\(^{28}\) After the House opened debate on a bill (H. R. 2580) on August 24, both houses approved it on

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\(^{26}\) *Congressional Record*, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 10282-10284.


\(^{28}\) In a message, dated January 13, 1965, the President urged Congress to consider the revision of immigration laws. See *ibid.*, January 14, 1965.
September 30. 29 Mr. Johnson signed Public Law 89-236 on October 3. 30 It became effective on December 1, 1965. Although it is difficult to state accurately the effect of the laws of 1952 and 1965 on persons of Japanese ancestry, a brief discussion is in order. In the first place, by the end of 1956, or four years after the McCarran-Walter Act became effective, a total of some 25,000 Issei were naturalized. 31


30 United States Statutes at Large, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. 79 (Washington, D.C., 1966), 911-922. The main purpose of the act is to abolish the national origins quota system. Its chief features are as follows: (a) The number of aliens "lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence...shall not in any fiscal year exceed a total of 170,000." This figure applies to all countries of the world, excluding those of the Western Hemisphere. (b) "The total number of immigrant visas...to natives of any single foreign state...shall not exceed 20,000 in any fiscal year." Thus, Japan, which had been limited to an annual quota of 185 each in the past, can send now 786 emigrants annually. (c) The act established for the first time a ceiling on immigration from the countries of the Western Hemisphere, the number of immigrants from which "shall not exceed a total of 120,000" in any given fiscal year. (d) It permitted the entry of refugees by setting up an annual quota of 10,200 for this purpose exclusively. (e) First preference was granted to close relations of United States citizens or resident aliens. The next priorities went, under a complicated percentage formula, to the members of arts, sciences, and professions and to skilled workers. (f) "During the period from July 1, 1965, through June 30, 1968, the annual quota of any quota area shall be the same as that which existed for that area on June 30, 1965." In accordance with this clause,"quota numbers not issued or otherwise used during the previous fiscal year...shall be transferred to an immigration pool."

In the second place, it was after the enactment of the 1952 law that the number of Japanese immigrants to the United States increased. Between the end of December, 1952, and the end of March, 1966, Japan sent nearly 64,000 immigrants. Under the new immigration law of 1965, Japan was given greater immigration privileges. The total annual quota became 786 (compared with a national quota of 185 under the McCarran-Walter Act). In the fiscal year of 1965 (April 1, 1965-March 31, 1966), 3,260 persons entered the United States as immigrants. This figure was lower than an annual average of 4,887 between 1954 and 1964, a period during which apparently a large proportion of non-quota immigrants (war brides, spouses of American citizens, and their minor unmarried children) came to the United States. Incidentally, in the fiscal year of 1965, Japan sent only 800-odd immigrants to the United States, Canada, and South America. With the rise of the standard of living as a result of political and economic reforms and the increasing demand for labor in domestic industries in the post-war period in Japan, Japanese immigration will

\[32\] For further details on Japanese war brides, see The New York Times, December 24, 1948; August 20, 195; November 17, 1951; March 8, 20, 1952; November 7, 1954; and November 9, 1955. For a sociological treatment on them, see The Rafu Shimpo, January 1, 1967.
probably decrease in numbers in the future. But it is characteristic that the Japanese immigrants in recent years have been those with technical skills rather than farmers. 33

CHAPTER VI

THE CONTRIBUTION AND FUTURE

During the period under discussion, the Japanese-Americans experienced the resettlement after the relocation center life, fought for the repeal of restrictive laws (Federal and State), and secured their legal status seemingly for all time to come. At the same time, in 1952, the Japanese Exclusion Act was abrogated. Their cause was achieved under leadership of the Japanese-American Citizens League, the only national organization for them, as well as by the cooperation and understanding on the part of the American public. Representatives Walter H. Judd, John F. Shelley, and William A. Dawson, all of whom had favored JACL, made their speeches in the House to the effect that if it had not been for JACL, it was doubtful whether residents of Japanese origin in the United States could enjoy the "healthy and promising" status which had become theirs.

Now that they received the priceless citizenship, they have been more welcome in the American society. In judicial circles,

1 Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., 13219-13222.
2 Ibid., 2d Sess., 14604-14605.
3 Ibid., 85th Cong., 2d Sess., 12573-12575.

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Federal Judge Clarence G. Galston in Brooklyn, New York, appointed Shozo F. Tsuchida, a Nisei, of California, as his law clerk in 1948; Stephen C. Tamura, a California native, attained the position of Orange County Superior judge in the spring of 1966; a Pasadena Nisei had the distinction of having the first appointment as deputy purchasing agent in Los Angeles County in February, 1967; and Ben Kiyoshi Takahishi was admitted as a lawyer in 1966, who emigrated to America in 1948 and became a naturalized citizen in 1958 under the McCarran-Walter Act.

In the military field, Takeshi Yoshida, of Washington, was the first Nisei to enter the United States Naval Academy, in 1949; in 1951, Joe Akagi, of Houston, Texas, was the first Nisei to become an ensign, at the Alamada Naval Air Station, California.

In the arts field, Mako Yashima became an Oscar nominee in the Best Supporting Actor category of the 39th annual Academy Awards early in 1967. Helen Funai had become a Hollywood

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5 The Rafu Shimpo, February 21, 1967.
6 Ibid., February 2, 1967.
7 Ibid., December 6, 8, 24, 1966.
9 Ibid., February 24, 1951.
10 The Rafu Shimpo, January 7, February 16, 20, 1967.
star, and Minoru Yamazaki, a Detroit-born Nisei and an internationally known architect, has been the master architect of Wayne State University, as well as for many famous buildings in Detroit and throughout the United States and the free world.\footnote{12}

Although the list of this kind might be prolonged more, a glance must be given to the political world. For the first time in history, an American of Japanese parentage became a member of the United States House of Representatives.\footnote{13} In the first state election of July 29, 1959, in Hawaii, Daniel K. Inouye, a Democratic candidate, defeated Charles H. Silva, the former Territorial

\footnotetext{11}{The Nichibei Jiji, January 1, 1967.}
\footnotetext{12}{Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 12084.}
\footnotetext{13}{At this time, too, Hiram L. Fong, a fifty-two-year-old businessman and lawyer of Chinese descent, became a member of the United States Senate. He is a son of sugar plantation laborer who came to the islands from China in 1872. He was the first American of Chinese origin to become a Congressman. Incidentally, seeking office were 56 Nisei, including Inouye, 12 Chinese-Americans, 3 Korean-Americans, and 2 Filipino-Americans. Forty-two office seats were captured by Americans of Asian descent. S. W. King, Chinese in American Life (Seattle, 1962), pp. 63, 228, 237-238. The New York Times, July 30, 1959. The vote in 1959 went strongly to the Democratic party. There are several reasons. In 1955, people of Oriental descent in Hawaii made up something like three-fifths of the population, and in this three-fifths, those of Japanese ancestry outnumbered all others combined by almost two to one, and almost all of them were young. When hundreds of those young men came home from the service during World War II, they found a more favorable public opinion. The Democratic party has tended to represent the non-\textsc{haoles} (the Hawaiian word to mean non-white men) since 1954. See Philip Woodyatt, "When Coconuts Dropped on the G.O.P.," The Reporter, December 1, 1955, pp. 28-31.}
Director of Institutions, by a vote of 111,733 to 51,058.\textsuperscript{14}

Inouye was a young Nisei lawyer,\textsuperscript{15} and he said when elected:

\begin{quote}
I'm little scared....I consider it a sacred duty entrusted to me by a people who determined to prove their worth as equal members of our nation....I do not consider my election victory as a personal victory....\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

In addition to Inouye's being elected as a Representative, forty Nisei were elected to the state legislature. On November 8, 1960, Inouye easily won renomination in his bid for a second term, and two years later was able to sit in the United States Senate through JACL's assistance.\textsuperscript{17} Here is definite proof that racial prejudice is not strong in Hawaii. In 1964 and 1966, moreover, Japanese-Americans in Hawaii sent to the United States House Democrat Matsunaga M. Spark and Democrat Takehito Mink Patsy. Tokemoto has the honor to be the first lady representative of Asian blood. These two recent elections were also supported by the funds of

\textsuperscript{14} \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{15} Inouye was born in Honolulu in 1925, son of a naturalized Japanese clerk and was graduated from the University of Hawaii and George Washington University Law School. In 1943, he enlisted in the 442d Regimental Combat Team, just as did Mike Masaoka. He lost his right arm by a German grenade in Italy and received fifteen decorations. After World War II, he became a lawyer in his home city; Territorial Representative in Oahu in 1954 and 1956; and Territorial Senator in 1958.


\textsuperscript{17} \textit{Ibid.,} October 3, November 10, 1960. \textit{The Rafu Shimpo, November 16, 1966.}
Particularly noticeable was the November election of 1966 in Hawaii. Out of 126 winners, 60 were Americans of Japanese descent; 2 for the United States House; 11 for the state Senate; and 28 for the state House and others.

In the Continental United States, there is no Congressman of Japanese origin. But it does not necessarily mean that the people are indifferent to American politics. In November, 1966, Japanese-Americans in southern California campaigned successfully to elect Ronald Reagan as Governor. On November 13, they established an organization with the title of Japanese-American Republicans. According to the newly elected chairman, Taro Kawa, "we (Nisei) are now bent on expanding our activities to encompass a larger area of GOP philosophy." The organization sent a Nisei businesswoman as delegate to the Republican State Central Committee Convention in Sacramento, California, from January 14 to 16, 1967. No one knows whether the Japanese-American Republicans will help to strengthen the Grand Old Party and whether the

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20 Kawa reported that the group for Governor-elect Reagan had netted $5,000 after expenses and political advertisements in the local newspapers. The sum was presented to Reagan's campaign headquarters. See ibid.

21 Ibid., January 12, 1967.
organization will be acknowledged as a major agency, like JACL, in gaining wide recognition of the Issei-Nisei communities in California as well as throughout the country. It, however, might be safely assumed that Americans of Japanese blood are taking an active interest in the politics of the United States in the hope of realizing a more equal, more liberal society.

Along with their political activities, it seems that they desire to be a bridge of understanding and assistance between the United States and Japan. They have definitely felt a concern for the destiny of Japan. As the Japanese-Americans resettled throughout the country, they heard of the bad plight of Japan. Asano, president of the Nichibei Jiis, initiated through the paper a campaign to extend assistance to the Japanese, which soon influenced persons of Japanese origin in America, Canada, and South America. After the end of 1945, more then thirty "Help-the-Motherland-Societies" were organized in the United States. In June, 1946, the Licensed Agencies for Relief in Asia (LARA) was established by the American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Work Abroad. The societies cooperated with LARA, sending some $180,713 worth of food to the Japanese for a year after October, 1946.22 This sum was approximately 20 per cent of enormous relief goods

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collected by more than 1,000,000 Americans. This relief campaign lasted until 1952. When Asano was granted an audience with the Emperor, His Majesty and Her Majesty in Tokyo in May, 1950, they deeply expressed their thanks.

The relief efforts supported by the Japanese-Americans were less unnoticed among the Japanese. The chief reason was, as the report of the Welfare Ministry of Japan points out, that there was then few publications to give publicity to the activities. The situation, however, has changed. For the first time in history, nearly 850 Nisei delegates from various parts of the United States attended the International Nisei Convention in Tokyo from October 25 to 28, 1957. They organized the Joint Action Committee for the Nisei to "express themselves on problems in United States-

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23 Ibid., p. 21.
24 Asano, op. cit., pp. 163-174. According to the report of the Welfare Ministry of Japan, the Emperor was greatly concerned with LARA and the relief movement supported by the Issei and Nisei. See LARA Kinen-shi, pp. 31-32.
25 About the first International Nisei Convention, see The New York Times, October 26, 27, 1957. It was suggested in 1956 by Governor Seiichi Yasui of Tokyo after he met several members of the newly founded Nisei Business Men's Association in Tokyo. Welcoming addresses to the opening session were delivered by Premier Nobushke Kishi, United States Ambassador Douglas MacArthur, Jr., and Hijime Sato, Acting Governor of Tokyo.
Japanese relations."\(^{26}\) The Committee remains active.\(^{27}\) The Japanese government cannot be indifferent to these activities, and on November 3, 1966, for example, eleven Issei residing in the United States were awarded the Fifth Order of Sacred Treasure.\(^{28}\) The government is now scheduled to celebrate in 1968 the 100th anniversary of Japanese immigration: the first 153 persons emigrated to Hawaii in June, 1868.\(^{29}\) It is true that the Japanese emigrants were once looked down upon every by their friends as "Kimin" (displaced or deserted persons), not as "Imin" (emigrants). But they are today attracting wide attention of the Japanese because of their merits in the past and in the present.

As we have seen, the Japanese-Americans are trying to contribute something to the two countries. As long as they keep it in

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\(^{26}\) The Joint Action Committee decided to enlarge the organization, to promote scholarship exchanges, cultural meetings, and to encourage Nisei from America to go to Japan in support of these broad objectives.

\(^{27}\) The Joint Action Committee, which covers nearly fifteen nations where persons of Japanese ancestry reside, held the 8th International Convention in Tokyo, May 16 to 20, 1967, under the auspices of the Japanese government. See The Rafu Shimpo, January 4, May 16, 1967.

\(^{28}\) Ibid., October 31, November 2, 1966. All of them were praised for their enthusiasm in developing United States-Japanese relations.

mind that time alone does not settle everything and the American public favor their cause, their contributions and future will be bright. It may be well to cite two statements in closing this chapter. One is the convention theme adopted in the JACL's biennial meeting in Salt Lake City in 1948, and the other is the California Senate Resolution No. 101, adopted on February 22, 1967:

Past is Prologue
There was a dream my father dreamed for me
A land in which all men are free--
Then the desert camp with watchtowers high
Where Life stood still, mid sand and brooding sky--
Out of the war in which my brothers died
Their muted voices with mine cried--
This is our dream, that all men shall be free--
This is our creed, we'll live in loyalty--
God help us rid the land of bigotry
That we may walk in peace and dignity. 30

The resolution declares:

Despite the fact that most of the evacuees lost everything--homes, business, property and all worldly goods except what they were permitted to carry on the evacuation buses--they prevailed over adversity and proved their loyalty and worth by rebuilding their lives after the war. 31

30 Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 12575.

31 The California Senate made the resolution to observe the 25th Anniversary of the 1942 West Coast evacuation. It was unanimously adopted on the motion of Democrat George R. Moscone and drafted by seven senators, including him. The Rafu Shimpo, February 28, 1967.
APPENDIX I

A CHRONOLOGY OF THE EVACUATION IN 1942 AND 1943

1942

January 29: Attorney General Francis Biddle announced two prohibited zones, one in San Francisco, the other around the Municipal Airport of Los Angeles and required the removal of all enemy aliens from these areas before February 24.1

February 13: A West Coast congressional delegation sent a letter to President Roosevelt recommending the "immediate evacuation of all persons of Japanese lineage...aliens and citizens alike" from the "entire strategic area" of California, Oregon, and Washington.2

February 14: General John L. De Witt, Commanding General of the Western Defense Command, sent a memorandum to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, recommending that piecemeal voluntary evacuation of enemy aliens from small zones under the auspices of the Department of Justice be superseded by forced mass evacuation from large areas, under War Department auspices, of not only enemy aliens but "all Japanese."3

February 19: President Roosevelt issued Executive Order No. 9006, authorizing the Military Commander to exclude any

2 Ibid.
or all persons from any area on the West Coast as might be required on the grounds of military necessity.\footnote{4}

February 20: Secretary Stimson delegated to General De Witt the authority "to carry out the duties and responsibilities imposed by said Executive Order for that portion of the United States embraced in the Western Defense Command...."\footnote{5}

March 2: General De Witt issued Public Proclamation No. 1. This established Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. Military Area No. 1 comprised the western half of Washington, Oregon, California, and the southern half of Arizona, from which "any Japanese, German, Italian alien, or any persons of Japanese ancestry" would be excluded.\footnote{6}

March 11: General De Witt formed the Wartime Civil Control Administration (WCCA) by General Order, No. 35. It was the army agency responsible for the first phase of the evacuation, which was completed on November 3, 1942, when WCCA transferred the final contingent of evacuees from the Fresno assembly center to the Jerome relocation center. Under the direction of WCCA, voluntary migration of evacuees began on March 21. For example, WCCA transferred that day some 2,100 persons from Los Angeles to the Manzanar relocation center.\footnote{7}


\footnote{5} Final Report, p. 25.

\footnote{6} Report of the Subcommittee, pp. 113-114. "Public Proclamation" is a public announcement of the Commanding General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, dealing with the conduct of civilians within Western Defense Command, having the force of law and issued under authority of Executive Order No. 9066.

\footnote{7} Ibid., pp. 32, 104. Final Report, pp. 48, 66, 357.
March 18: Executive Order No. 9102 created the War Relocation Authority (WRA), the civilian agency and heir of WCCA. The first director of WRA was Milton S. Eisenhower, who was succeeded by Dillon S. Myer from June 17, 1942, to June 30, 1946. 8

March 27: General De Witt issued Public Proclamation No. 4, "freezing" all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1 as of "12:00 midnight, P. W. T., March 29, 1942." 9

March 29 to June 6: A total of 100,313 were moved out of Military Area No. 1 by Civilian Exclusion Orders No. 1 to No. 99; they removed from military Area No. 1, 90,307 persons of Japanese origin to fifteen assembly centers and 10,006 directly to relocation centers. 10

June 27: The first Civilian Exclusion Order No. 100 for Military Area No. 2 was issued by De. Witt, and by Nos. 100-108, 9,337 persons of Japanese blood were removed from the area to the relocation centers by August 8. 11

March 21 (the beginning of evacuee occupancy at Manzanar) to November 3 (the last transfer movement from the Fresno assembly center to Jerome): There were 110,442 evacuees--259 from Arizona; 92,785 from California; 3,714 from Oregon; 12,892 from Washington; and 792 from not specified areas. During the period, direct evacuation to the relocation centers was initiated during the middle of May. The regular transfer movement from assembly centers to the relocation centers was begun the middle of June and ended on November 3. 12

July 6: In Tule Lake--a local mess-hall strike broke out. 13

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8 Ibid., p. 43.
11 Ibid., pp. 357, 365-366.
12 Ibid., p. 362.
August 5: In Tule Lake—conflicts between Issei and Nisei broke out.\textsuperscript{14}

August 15-September 5: In Tule Lake—strikes in two of the largest work units broke out (the farm workers and the construction crews). Both groups gained WRA's only concession, the improvement in food; however, their demands for clothing allowance and payment of back wages had not been met. Then, the construction workers called another major strike on September 3 and ended on September 5 successfully.\textsuperscript{15}

October 12 and 13: In Tule Lake—a general "slow down" strike was seen in the mess hall, to which WRA yielded by dismissing the unpopular Caucasian supervisor and improving food for the evacuees.\textsuperscript{16}

October 17 - November 24, 1942: In Poston—the struggle between evacuees acting as "\textit{Inu}" ("dogs," informers) to the FBI and "Kibei"\textsuperscript{**} lingered on. Two kibei were arrested on November 15. These incidents culminated in the strike against WRA on November 19. Finally WRA, not the FBI, settled it and "a superior adjustment" was achieved between the evacuees and the administration authorities.\textsuperscript{17}

December 5 - December 13: In Manzanar—on December 5, a Nisei youth was beaten by a gang and severely injured. The following day several persons, including a kibei junior cook, were arrested and placed in jail. Popular reaction was immediate: some were for the Nisei and others for the kibei. WRA could not settle for the contention, and the commanding officer of the military police was authorized to declare martial law. Evacuees, who pressed in vain the commanding officer for the release of the kibei, jeered and made insulting gestures to policemen. They, therefore, threw a number of tear gas bombs in to the crowd on

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[14] Ibid.
\item[15] Ibid., pp. 42-43.
\item[16] Ibid., p. 43.
\item[17] Ibid., pp. 45-49. * - It means any person of Japanese ancestry born outside of Japan who has been to and returned from Japan and, particularly, American-born Japanese who have received some of their education in Japan.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
the evening of December 6: ten evacuees were wounded, two died. On December 13, twenty-odd persons on the death lists and black lists were, with their families, removed from Manzanar to an abandoned camp in Death Valley.  

1943

January 28: Secretary of War Stimson made public a plan for creating a voluntary combat team of persons of Japanese blood.  

February 5: The press released President Roosevelt's letter to Stimson, which reiterated the same standpoint.  

February 8: The War Department and WRA worked out a plan for the implementation of the entire program for organizing the combat team. The two agencies reached a joint agreement for the registration of all persons of seventeen years of age or older prior to enlistment and resettlement.  

February 20 - March 3: "Loyalty Registration" was continued in the ten relocation centers. Two registration forms, which had been prepared in Washington, were to be processed as an application for leave clearance: (a) One for male citizens of Japanese origin (seventeen years of age or older) with the seal "Selective Service System" at the top and including twenty-eight questions. They were, in general, to be answered in the presence of the representative of the War Department. (b) The other formula was for female citizens and Issei males and females. It was headed "War Relocation Authority Application for Leave Clearance" and included thirty-one questions. As a result, the evacuee population in each center was split into two groups: A Yes-Yeses group, who were a majority, answering the registration questions affirmatively; A No-Noes group, who were a minority, except in Tule Lake, either refusing to answer the questions or answering them negatively.  

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18 Ibid., pp. 45, 49-52.  
19 Ibid., p. 56.  
21 The Spoilage, p. 57.  
July 2: A Senate resolution (S. Res. 166) in the 1st Session, 78th Congress, requested WRA to segregate persons of Japanese ancestry loyal to the United States from other disloyal persons.23

July 15: WRA, in conformity with the Senate action, issued an Administrative Instruction No. 100, whereby the Tule relocation center was selected for the segregation center for disloyal persons. The plan involved the transfer of loyal Tuleans to the other nine relocation centers, and of the No-Noes group in them to Tule Lake.24

September 13 - the middle of May, 1944: The main segregation movement was undertaken. Between September 18 and October 11, the No-Noes group in each center moved to Tule Lake. The old Tuleans composed 34 per cent and transfers 66 per cent of the 18,422 persons. The Yes-Yeses group of Tule Lake movement went to nine other relocation centers between September 13 and the middle of May, 1944.25

November 1 - January 14, 1944: In Tule Lake--traffic accidents on October 15 seriously injured eight workers, and, one of them died soon afterward. These accidents, caused by the carelessness of WRA, brought a long series of protest against the authorities. It culminated in the encirclement of the WRA administration building by the crowd on November 1. The demonstrators forced Director Myer to consent to see the negotiating committee. The committee asked unsuccessfully the removal of Mr. Best, head of Tule Lake, who had been denounced by the residents and various Caucasians. At last the army took over Tule Lake on November 4, and declared martial law on November 13. It was not until January, 1944, that martial law was lifted up and the administration returned to WRA.26

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23 *The Spoilage*, p. 84.
APPENDIX II

THE TEN WRA RELOCATION CENTERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CENTER</th>
<th>LOCATION COUNTY (STATE)</th>
<th>WORK STARTED</th>
<th>ESTIMATED COST TOTAL</th>
<th>PER ACREAGE CAPITA</th>
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<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$56,842,000</td>
<td>$471</td>
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<td>Manzanar</td>
<td>Inyo (Calif.)</td>
<td>3/10/42</td>
<td>3,764,000</td>
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<td>Poston</td>
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<td>3/27/42</td>
<td>9,365,000</td>
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<td>Modoc (Calif.)</td>
<td>4/23/42</td>
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<td>Pinal (Ariz.)</td>
<td>5/1/42</td>
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<tr>
<td>Minidoka</td>
<td>Jerome (Idaho)</td>
<td>6/5/42</td>
<td>5,837,000</td>
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<td>Granada</td>
<td>Prowers (Col.)</td>
<td>6/12/42</td>
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<td>Heart Mountain</td>
<td>Park (Wyo.)</td>
<td>6/15/42</td>
<td>5,095,000</td>
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<td>Desha (Ark.)</td>
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<td>Topaz</td>
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Sources:


<table>
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<tr>
<th>ACREAGE FOR FARMING</th>
<th>THE OPENING DATE</th>
<th>EVACUEES' CAPACITY</th>
<th>PEAK POP.</th>
<th>POPULATION DATE</th>
<th>DAYS IN OPERATION</th>
<th>DATE CLOSED</th>
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1 Since about 45 per cent of the evacuees were engaged in agriculture before the war, the Authority naturally looked first of all for areas with good farming possibilities. Soil, water supply, climate, and growing season had to be favorable. At the same time it was necessary to find lands readily accessible to electric power lines and to rail and highway transportation. In order to avoid displacing large numbers of people, the site selection crews had to center their attention on lands which were undeveloped or sparsely settled. And since the Army cannot afford in time of war to disperse its manpower for protection of numerous small communities, the Authority had to locate areas capable of supporting a population of at least 5,000 evacuees.

2 On July 13, 1945, closing dates for all relocation centers were announced. Granada was to close on October 15, Minidoka and Topaz, November 1; Gila River and Heart Mountain, November 15; Poston and Manzanar, December 1; and Rohwer, December 15.
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Cf. * - Shows sources are originally written in Japanese. All of the citations from them have been translated by Yukio Morita.