THE KENNEDY CENTER ALLIANCE FOR ARTS EDUCATION NETWORK:
THE STORY OF A NATIONAL ARTS EDUCATION INITIATIVE

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of
The Ohio State University

By

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* * * * *

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This study tells the story of a national initiative started in 1973 to promote arts education nationwide: The Alliance for Arts Education project. The Alliance though housed at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts has been a part of the United States Department of Education's efforts for the past 24 years to promote arts education nationally and has received funding through the USDOE and the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 starting with its reauthorization in 1973. In spite of the Alliance's congressional mandate to promote arts education nationwide, virtually nothing is known about its evolution, contributions, and impact on national arts education policy and programming. This lack of information has hindered educational reformers and policy makers throughout the nation when addressing the pressing issues facing educational reform, especially with arts education. This study begins to fill in this information gap and provides a basis upon which to understand and determine the Alliance's place in the history and development of arts education nationally. The study utilizes both traditional historical and oral history inquiry methods to construct a story that broadly explores the development of this national arts education
initiative by placing it in the political and historical contexts that influenced its evolution. The study also analyzes the Alliances development and evolution in light of the theory concerning public policy development, implementation, and evaluation.
DEDICATED

To the memory of my mother, Catherine A. Killeen,
whose love and guidance are deeply missed

and

to my companion, Terry J. Malinowski,
whose love and support are deeply cherished
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Nationally, many members of the arts education community lament what they see as the marginalization of arts education in America’s schools. They shake their heads and wonder how the federal government over the past few decades could consistently initiate efforts to advance science and math education, for example, in the nation’s schools, while ignoring the contribution that the study of the arts can offer to improving student achievement nationwide. The outcries from the arts education community reached new heights in the late 1980’s when President Bush released his Administration’s plan, America 2000, for reforming K-12 education across America. Painfully absent from America 2000 was any mention of the importance of the arts in the education of our citizens, marginalizing it even further than it already was in the nation’s priorities for educational reform.

Shocking in light of the arts education community’s cries and the Bush Administration’s educational reform plan is the fact that since 1973 the federal
government has consistently funded a national initiative meant to promote arts education nationwide. Additionally surprising is that around this federal initiative has developed a national advocacy network that has at times had a state-level chapter in all fifty-five states and U.S. territories. And even more astonishing is that few in the arts education community know of this national initiative and its efforts or have forgotten that it even exists if once they knew of it. How could this be?

The Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network (KCAAEN) has existed since 1973 and presently claims member organizations in 44 states. Since its inception, this program has been referred to as a national arts education initiative charged with advancing and strengthening arts education in the nation’s schools. Over the years, the Alliance’s mission and goals have frequently indicated that influencing national and state-level arts education policies was part of its primary responsibilities.

Though the National Endowment for the Arts had been in existence since 1965, Sidney Marland, former Commissioner of Education, chose the Kennedy Center in 1973 as the national vehicle for advancing arts education in America’s schools. He saw the Alliance as balancing his agency’s federal leadership in arts education (Marland, Personal Correspondence, April 13, 1973). For all of its history, the Alliance has received federal funds from the U.S. Department of Education for its operation. It was also responsible for a
period of time in the late-1970's with deciding how U.S. Department of Education educational-improvement grants were to be distributed to state organizations for the development and strengthening of arts education across the nation. Surprisingly with this notable national role, little is known about this national arts education initiative.

The Purpose of This Study

The direction for this study does not come from the formal research literature but from the lack of it. The difficulty faced at the onset of this study of the Alliance has been that little formal research or reports exist about this federally funded, national arts education initiative. The preliminary investigation into this topic turned up limited information that gave a historical account of the Alliance, described its accomplishments and contributions, or evaluated its influence on arts education policy in the United States.

As KCAAEN's story has not been told, the primary purpose of this study will be the telling of this tale starting with its inception in 1973. As the tale unfolds, it will be viewed when appropriate in light of several bodies of literature: educational reform, arts education, and public policy.

A secondary purpose of this study will be to better understand the public policy system, that is, how a policy such as the one giving birth to the Alliance comes about, how a policy's legislative mandates are translated into
actions, how a policy changes as it matures, and how formal and informal influences affect a policy's evolution.

Two basic questions guide this study, one primary and one secondary. The primary question is: What role has the Alliance and the Kennedy Center played in advancing and reforming arts education in the United States? In order to construct this understanding, this study will take a historical look at this initiative since its inception in 1973, exploring the following sub-questions:

- What was the original intent of the Alliance project proposed by Sidney Marland and did the original Alliance structure translate his ideas accurately?
- Was Marland the originator of the idea for the Alliance, and, if so, what motivated him to push for this program?
- Once established, how has the Alliance evolved during its history?
- Where exactly have the Alliance's funds come from over the years?
- What programs and services has the Alliance generated throughout the years?
- What have been its contributions to the field of arts education and arts education policy?
- Do the AAE state committees that evolved fit the notion of the state and regional "network" originally envisioned by Marland?
- How have each of these state committees been influenced by the Kennedy Center, and, in turn, how have they affected the evolution of the Alliance? What has caused the number of state committees to decrease over the years from a high of 56 committees in the late-1970's, to a low of 36 committees in the late-1980's?
- Who and what have influenced the Alliance's evolution over the years, and what is the state of being of the Alliance today?
- What are the future plans and vision for the Alliance?
• In other words, what is the full story of this national arts education initiative and its place in advancing arts education in the nation’s schools?

The secondary question that guides this study is: What can be learned about the development and implementation of public policy as a result of the Alliance’s story?

The Need for This Study

"By studying the past, the historian hopes to achieve a better understanding of the present institutions, practices, and issues in education."

Walter Borg and Meredith Gall
Educational research: An introduction (5th ed.).

Kerr, Loveday, and Blackford (1990), in discussing the importance of historical inquiry, state, "[History] offers a standard of comparison across time and circumstances....History represents a means of coming to terms with the present, developing an awareness of previous influences, the continuities and distinctiveness in current conditions, and the range of future possibilities" (p. vii). The Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network has been a major recipient of federal funds earmarked for the advancement of arts education in the nation’s schools since 1973. Yet, very little seems to have been told about the Alliance’s evolution, contributions, and impact on national arts education policy and programming. This study will begin to fill in this gap.
From this study, it is hoped that a basis emerges upon which to understand and determine the Alliance's place in the history and development of arts education nationally. This historical document will also allow for a better understanding of the present-day Alliance program and hopefully assist decision makers in evaluating its effectiveness and future directions. Additionally, this study will add to the body of knowledge concerned with federal initiatives, policies, and funding in education, especially arts education.

Historical research of this type is important to stop the constant "rediscovering of the educational wheel." As Kerr et al. (1990) note, "Historical knowledge helps an individual, group, organization, or community avoid starting at the beginning each time an issue needs to be addressed" (p.vii). While it is important to analyze the problems and mistakes of previous policies, this process does not mean giving license to throw out the old for whatever the current trend happens to be. It is vitally important to understand a program or policy's past in order to acknowledge and build upon its successes. This notion allows for continuity and breaks the pattern of constantly starting anew, as if the arts education "sheet" were blank. The hope of this study is to advance a more thorough and thoughtful way to assess the impact of a national initiative of this type which takes into account the environmental factors influencing its development and evolution.
The Doing of History

From Positivism to Postmodernism

Carl Kaestle (1988) cautions that all historical researchers, no matter what their field, presently share the same methodological problem: there is no single, definable method of inquiry and no new methodologies or ideological consensus that have emerged. John Tosh (1991) supports this notion by reflecting upon the enormous state of confusion among historians concerning the essence of their work. He notes that what is at issue is the nature of historical knowledge itself, that is, whether the study of history is essentially the uncovering of facts or truths, whether facts can be taken as given, and whether historians are objective recorders of these facts.

Harold Pease (1992) describes this confusion or chaos as the "rumblings of paradigms shifting" (p. 247). By this statement, Pease is referring to the situation that exists when a new way of knowing the world, that is, a paradigm, appears and pushes the boundaries of the old paradigms that have been used to structure and organize knowledge. Clearly, a change is occurring within the field of historical research. The shift is shaking the traditional views that have long served the practice of history. But what have these traditional views been, and how are they changing? And what are the implications with these changes for conducting historical inquiry today?
The main tenet of traditional historical inquiry centers around the idea of facts and the secrets that they hold. The task of historians using this form of inquiry, according to Edward Carr (1961), is to uncover the facts of the situation and allow them to speak for themselves. This approach views historians to be passive observers of the world outside themselves who receive data and then reveal the truth which surfaces. Ernst Breisach (1983) explains that the roots of this traditional approach can be found in the work of the late seventeenth-century historian Pierre Bayle. Breisach states that Bayle viewed a fact as truth itself, which when put side by side would reveal through their sheer mass the human past.

By the late 1800's, Breisach indicates the sciences were enjoying immense prestige in the Western world. Many of the scholars of this period were excited about employing the scientific method of inquiry as a way to uncover certain and timeless truths, thus projecting an image of a nonmysterious world without essences and spiritual entities. Tosh (1991) points out that the basis of all scientific knowledge at this time was obtained by the meticulous observation of reality by disinterested, passive observers. By repeating this way of observing many times, Tosh explains, the secrets of the natural world were unlocked by scientists as generalizations flowed logically from the data. As the truth flowed from the data, scientists using this
empirical method were seen as approaching the task of inquiry without
preconceptions or moral involvement.

This empirical theory of knowledge, according to Carr (1961),
presupposes a complete separation between subject and object. "Facts, like
sense-perceptions," he states, "impinge on the observer from outside, and are
independent of his consciousness. The process of reception is passive:
having received the data, he then acts on them" (pp. 5-6). The name given
this philosophy of knowledge in its classic nineteenth-century form, Tosh
indicates, is Positivism (p.132).

During this period, scholars in all fields, including history, felt
compelled to jump on this empirical bandwagon. Breisach (1983) states that
their goal was to transfer its views and methods, which had worked so
successfully for inquiry into nature, to inquiry into human phenomena. Tosh
(1991) asserts that the implications for the practice of history were clear: the
historian's first duty was to accumulate factual knowledge about the past and
then let these facts determine how the past should be explained. As with
positivist scholars studying the natural world, historians using this empirical
approach were seen as neutral observers uncovering the facts and following
them to the truths that they revealed.

Carr (1961) declares that the positivist's focus on facts and the belief
that the facts speak the truth is impossible. While facts are a necessary
condition of a historian's work, that is, the raw materials used by the historian, they are not history itself. He states, "Facts and documents are essential to the historian....they do not by themselves constitute history; they provide in themselves no ready-made answer to this tiresome question: What is history?" (p. 20). He notes that facts only speak when the historian calls upon them, meaning that the historian is the one who decides which facts are brought forth and which are not.

G. Kitson Clark (1967) indicates that history must be more than a presentation of facts in order to mean anything. He argues that it must include an interpretation of the facts to truly be called history. Tosh (1991) indicates that for the contemporary historian, simply following the facts as the positivists would advocate presents a formidable problem. What does a researcher do with the enormous amount of sources available today, especially in this information-rich age? Today's historians, according to Tosh, faced with virtually limitless information would struggle to bring finality to their historical writings through a complete assemblage of the facts. Even with the historians' best intentions to efface themselves in front of the facts, Tosh notes, it is impossible to accomplish this today. This understanding has forced contemporary historians to re-examine the whole notion of historical fact. He asserts that the outcome of this re-examination has been the understanding that facts are not given but selected. This notion has caused a
powerful rumbling to occur shifting the dominant paradigm that has guided the practice of history for so long. The shift has moved it away from the empirical methods of inquiry that have long ruled the field. But where has the shift taken historical inquiry? Is there a new paradigm guiding the practice of history today?

Keith Jenkins (1991) states that history today is viewed as "a series of discourses about the world. These discourses do not create the world...but they do appropriate it and give it all the meanings it has" (p.5). He explains, "History as a discourse is...in a different category to that which it discourses about, that is, the past and history are different things" (p.5). With this information, Jenkins presents the notion that the past is the object of a historian's attention and that the historical writings produced, historiographies, are the ways the historian attends to it. While Jenkins still acknowledges the importance of facts to the historian, he maintains that these raw materials must be embedded in an interpretive framework that gives them the weight, position, combination and significance necessary to construct their meaning. He notes that these interpretive frameworks do not simply arise from the facts as the empiricists believe. While he acknowledges that there may be methods to uncover what happened in the past, there is no method whatsoever whereby one can definitely say what the facts mean.
Carr (1961) cautions that the facts of history never come to us in a pure state as they are always refracted through the mind of the recorder. He advises that when we approach a work of history our first concern should be with the historian who wrote it and not with the facts contained within it. As Tosh (1991) emphasizes, what is left out of historical writings is as important to know as what historians have included. That historians select the facts that they want to include in their writing is not the main point here; what Tosh believes to be much more important is the need to identify the criterion that historians use to make these selections, that is, the philosophical base guiding each historian. Carr (1961) adds another important point to keep in mind about historians as we approach their works: they achieve their understanding or view of the past through the eyes of the present. Historians, Carr reminds us, are creatures of their own age and, so, are bound to it by the conditions of human existence.

While Jenkins (1991) and Tosh (1991) believe that empiricists still have a dominating effect on historical inquiry, that is, that they cannot accept that their truths are ultimately interpretations and, so, still hold to the belief that truth is attainable, the discussion so far has attempted to show that the practice of history is clearly shifting away from the positivist viewpoint. As Jenkins states, "History [today] is a shifting discourse constructed by historians and that from the existence of the past no one reading is entailed:
change the gaze, shift the perspective and new readings appear. Yet although historians know all this, most seem to studiously ignore it and strive for objectivity and truth nevertheless" (pp. 13-14). Tosh (1991) supports Jenkins by noting that the shift occurring in the practice of history must focus on the questions and directions that historians have in mind right from the outset of their research. He feels that historians cannot ever approach research with a completely open mind as they are always operating under certain assumptions, even when they have yet to formulate their research. But if the practice of history is shifting away from its positivist orientation, is there a name for the new way of conducting historical inquiry?

Tosh feels that a scholarly consensus does not exist in the field of historical inquiry. The debate, he asserts, is not as much with the known facts as with the myriad ways of interpreting or explaining them. Jenkins (1991) refers to this lack of consensus as the way things are, and possibly will be, for doing history in the postmodern world. David Elkind (1994) states that postmodernism has been germinating for a long time and is not based in revolt. It instead is a critique of the old ways that looks to build upon their strengths and benefits as it shifts historical inquiry towards the new. Postmodernists, Jenkins (1991) states, see nothing as fixed or solid. This belief, he acknowledges, makes it difficult to define what postmodernism is and of what post-modernists see themselves a part, if anything.
What does seem to be clear, according to Elkind (1994), is that postmodernism is based in the rejection of the notions of universality, progress, and regularity. He states that postmodernism venerates language, rather than thought, and honors human diversity as much as human individuality. Elkind explains that postmodernism believes language to be inherently ambiguous and, so, the truths of reason which employ language must, therefore, be ambiguous as well. He also notes that languages do not progress. What he feels characterizes them are their differences from one another and their embeddedness within a social, cultural, and historical context. Postmodernism, then, is much more concerned with embeddedness, particularity, and irregularity.

According to Paul Klohr (Personal Conversations, 1995)\(^1\) there is no single history in the postmodern world. Instead, he believes, there are many histories due to the past being constructed in terms of selected presents. Postmodernism, Klohr notes, is intent on exposing or deconstructing the pretensions and propaganda that have been used by humans to cloak their actions with each other. He points out that postmodern theorists look to how power, gender, class, and ethnicity shape differing perspectives and

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\(^1\) Paul Klohr is the former Associate Dean of the College of Education at The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio, and is one of the founders of the Reconceptualist movement in educational reform in the 1970's. This movement is discussed in Chapter Two of this study.
interpretive frameworks. These factors, he asserts, must be identified when reviewing historical writings and conducting historical inquiry.

As William Dray (1993) states, historians cannot reconstruct the past without taking a point of view, that is, applying certain preconceptions, or, in Klohr’s words, a selected present. Traditionally, Theodore Hamerow (1987) notes, the point of view used by historians centered around the justification of the established order, the portrayal of its origins, and the celebration of its achievements. This meant that history dealt almost exclusively with the deeds and accomplishments of elites, that is, the individuals and groups who held a dominant position in society. He and Jenkins (1991) believe that postmodernism has decentered the old elites from their positions of prominence, and that this has actually brought about the death of centers in the interpretation of history. Jenkins continues this thought by stating, "[The] old organizing frameworks that presupposed the privileging of various centres (things that are, for example, Anglo-centric, Euro-centric, ethno-centric, gender-centric) are no longer regarded as legitimate and natural frameworks (legitimate because natural), but as temporary fictions which were useful for the articulation not of universal but of actually very particular interests" (p.60).

While there is much confusion – some would say chaos – in the field of historical inquiry due to the shift towards postmodernism, Jenkins feels that there has been a positive outcome. Groups that have traditionally been
marginalized in historical works have been empowered by postmodernism to make their own histories. Hamerow (1987) also feels that the new developments in historical inquiry have produced a solid shift towards a richer understanding and broader vision in the writing of history. He notes that there is increasing concern with the way of life of ordinary men and women, and that yesterday's antiheroes have become the heroes of today, that is, blacks, native-Americans, Asians, and women.

So what are the implications of this shift for the doing of history? Jenkins (1991) proposes two things that are necessary for doing history in a postmodern world. The first he terms reflexive methodology. He means by this that historians need to develop and acknowledge a self-consciously held position. Jenkins believes that all history is theoretical and all theories are positioned and positioning. He advises historians to choose a version of the past and a way of appropriating it that has effects, and that aligns them with and against certain readings and interpretations. He notes that some may believe this to be too biased a way of conducting historical research, but that this criticism is based in the empiricist notion of being able to objectively re-create the past. Jenkins argues that bias is central to the empiricist mode of inquiry, but that it only makes sense if it is put in opposition to unbiased. As postmodern history can be seen as the way groups and classes make sense of the past by making it their own, there is clearly no unpositioned criterion by
which the degree of bias can be judged. He feels, it makes very little sense to declare, for example, that feminists are biased when they may just be making history their own.

The second thing necessary in the postmodern world, according to Jenkins, to help realize a skeptical, critically reflexive approach to the doing of history is to select the content appropriate for the practice. He states, "Other things being equal, my own preference would be for a series of histories that helped us to understand the world that we live in and the forms of history that have both helped produce it and which it has produced" (p. 70).

I believe a quote from Tosh (1991) best brings closure to this section.

The commonsense notion that the business of historians is simply to uncover the past and display what they have found will not stand up. The essence of historical enquiry is selection – of "relevant" sources, of "historical" facts and of "significant" interpretations. At every stage both the direction and the destination of the enquiry are determined as much by the enquirer as by the data. Clearly, the rigid segregation of fact and value demanded by the Positivists is unworkable in history. In this sense, historical knowledge is not, and cannot be "objective"....This does not mean, as sceptics might suppose, that it is therefore arbitrary or illusory. But it does follow that the assumptions and attitudes of historians themselves have to be carefully assessed before we can come to any conclusions about the real status of historical knowledge. (p. 142)

**Historical Sources**

Keith Jenkins (1991) believes that much ink has been spilt over the issue of primary and secondary sources, more than is truly necessary when
discussing the design of one's historical study. While he acknowledges that there is clearly a difference between these two types of sources, there are issues to consider when applying the basic definitions to one's research data. John Tosh (1991) also believes that the difference between primary and secondary sources is less straightforward than it might appear at first sight. He notes that the line of demarcation between the two varies depending on the authorities.

According to Walter Borg and Meredith Gall (1989), primary sources are defined simply as those in which the individual describing the event was present when it occurred. Secondary sources, they continue, are those in which the individual describing the event was not present but relied on someone else for a description, who may or may not have been present at the original event. They feel that most historical research falls into the secondary source category as historians are rarely direct witnesses to the events about which they are writing. Jenkins (1991) would probably accept this simple statement of the difference between these two types of sources as a good starting point for this discussion about primary and secondary sources, but he would want to broaden it some to accommodate the issues encountered by historians as they classify their sources in the postmodern world.

Jenkins believes that holding these terms too narrowly is a remnant of the traditional quest among historians to uncover the truth through their
research. He notes that the term primary equals original in many historians' minds, and that original sources are seen as more genuine and true. Tosh (1991) points out that many primary sources are incomplete, inaccurate, muddled, or purposely misleading. Additionally, reflecting back to the discussion concerning postmodernism in the last section, it is clear that primary sources are also embedded in social, cultural or historical contexts, which must be deconstructed in order to categorize and utilize them.

Tosh (1991) also points out that the distinction between primary and secondary sources is further complicated by the fact that both types frequently appear in the same work. Additionally, a source can be classified as primary in one context and secondary in another, according to both Tosh and Jenkins (1991). For example, a historical work by a Victorian writer about Roman times is a secondary source if we are using it to understand Roman history. This same work may be viewed as a primary source if we are looking at Victorian times and how the people of that period viewed the world. The Borg and Gall definition articulated earlier serves as a good basic understanding of the distinction between primary and secondary sources, especially if this definition is broadened to include the thoughts expressed by Tosh and Jenkins.

More important in the discussion of sources are the notions of authenticity and credibility. Tosh (1991) points out that no source should be
used for historical reconstruction until some estimate of its standing as historical evidence has been made. As a general rule, establishing a source's standing occurs in two steps: 1) external criticism – to test its authenticity, and 2) internal criticism – to establish its credibility and validity. Again, as with deciding whether a source is primary or secondary, establishing its historical standing is more complex than initially thought, especially in the postmodern world.

William Lucey (1984) explains that the essence of the first step, external criticism, is an investigation to obtain all possible information on the origin of the source, and to discover whether the source has been tampered with at any time since its origin. He states that external criticism establishes the fact of testimony, by which he means that the person, place, and time of the testimony are accurate, and that the testimony has survived uncorrupted by any substantial additions or deletions. Once these factors are proven and the source is cleansed of all corruptions, it is said to be authentic. Lucey notes that authorship must not be confused with authenticity as anonymous documents can be proven to be authentic based on other factors. He also indicates that a liberal interpretation of the term author is legitimate in dealing with documents, such as official government papers. He explains that the assistance of others in composing and preparing official papers is taken for granted, and that it is completely proper to attribute them to the official who
signs them. While there is no clear rule as to how much must be proved before a document can be accepted as genuine, the more information available, the more secure a historian should feel in using the source.

The second step in establishing the standing of a historical source, internal criticism, is considered to be more demanding than the external-criticism step. Once a source's authenticity has been established, the historian is ready to deconstruct its discourse to place it in its contextual environment and to establish its validity and authority. Some of the questions to consider in this process are:

- What was the purpose of the testimony?
- What do we know about the source's background: his/her position in life; his/her character, his/her political, social, or religious views; his/her education; his/her expertise?
- What was the setting of the source's testimony?
- What has been included and excluded from the source's account?

While this is not an exhaustive list of questions, it gives a sense of the types of things to consider in the evaluation of a source.

Looking specifically at the evaluation of the testimony's purpose, an issue that arises is whether or not it was produced for posterity. Sources can be sorted into two basic types: those prepared as historical records, intentional documents, and those prepared for some immediate purpose with no intention that they would be used as historical records, unpremeditated documents. Tosh (1991) states that in the hierarchy of sources among
historians, those given the most weight are the ones which arise directly from everyday business or social intercourse, that is, unpremeditated sources. While books and newspapers are important, they are no substitute, according to Tosh, for the direct, day-to-day evidence of thought and action provided by the letter, the diary, and the memorandum, as most of these sources are produced with no thought for posterity.

This is not to say that intentional sources are not valuable. Usually they provide well preserved, chronologically accurate accounts. But historians must keep in mind that these records only include that which was deemed important enough to record. Tosh believes that historical records are forever rigged in favor of the ruling classes which at all times have created the vast majority of the surviving sources. Tosh also reminds us that so many sources perish due to accidents or by design, or are never recorded in the first place due to the position that the person or group held in a society. What is critical in assessing sources developed for posterity is not only what and whose histories are contained within these records, but what and whose histories are not. While intentional records are important to historical inquiry, historians must remember that these records may be terribly incomplete.

A final issue to consider in the evaluation of a source, especially primary sources, has to do with hindsight. Historians favor sources who were near the reported event, especially those who witnessed it first-hand. The
latter source is often deemed to be the best due to the person having personally seen the event upon which they are reporting. But what about primary sources who immediately record their thoughts about the historical event seen versus primary sources who record their version of the event months or years after it occurs? Should we hold each of these sources in the same way? If so, what is the issue that arises in this situation?

Clearly, the primary sources who wait to record their thoughts have the advantage of time and being removed from the intensity of the event. They also have the advantage of hindsight in constructing their version for the historical record. As Jenkins (1991) notes, hindsight allows a person to know more about the past than the people who lived in it. Lucey (1984) cautions that memoirs written after retirement and without the aid of a trusted journal require careful evaluation by historians. He states, "As the years pass, details fade, new ideas and observations color the original impression of events, and seasoned judgments are passed off as first thoughts and opinions on events. And the author of the memoirs is frequently favorable to the writer" (p.76). He also notes that there are numerous examples of errors due to the faulty memory of historical sources, especially the longer they wait to record their historical accounts.

Establishing the credibility of a source is not an easy task. Not only must the source be carefully deconstructed to reveal its orientation, validity,
and authority, but historians must consider the purpose of the source and how close in time to the event the account was recorded. The best situation in helping to determine the credibility of a source is to uncover other sources independent of the source being evaluated who corroborate the version of the events being reported.

Another thought about historical sources comes from William Lucey (1984). He discusses how historical sources are means, not ends in themselves, for the historian. Lucey reminds the historian that their sources are their tools that will be subjected to the categorization and evaluation processes discussed earlier in this section. But one must first find these tools in order to cull from them the testimonies that potentially will be used in the construction of the history. The challenge becomes where the historian goes to find these sources. For this study, the sources divide into two main classifications: written sources and oral sources.

**Written Sources**

According to Borg and Gall (1989), written sources generally fall into two types: documents and quantitative records. Documents might include newspapers, periodicals, institutional files and records, annual reports, strategic plans, surveys, committee minutes and reports, dairies, memoirs, promotional materials, and memorandums. Quantitative records could be considered a subcategory of documents, but for this study they will be
grouped in their own category. These records might include yearly budget records, reports on the numbers of organizations and clients served, and reports of public or private funding support.

When conducting a historical inquiry into the development and evolution of a contemporary federal program or policy, the researcher, most likely, will rely heavily on a few types of these documents in assembling the "paper trail." These might include congressional reports, bills and laws; agency files and records; annual agency evaluation reports on spending to Congress; congressional committee reports; public information materials; and memorandums. It should be emphasized that this list is meant to guide and is not definitive.

The challenge facing a historian of federal policies and programs is where to go to locate the written sources needed for a study. Traditionally, the answer to this question has been fairly simple: written sources are located in libraries and archives, whether public or private. For the most part, this has been true for this study. The following libraries and archives were used to gather the official documentation for this investigation: The Ohio State University Library System, the State of Ohio Federal Documents Library, the Library of Congress, the Smithsonian Institute Archives, various United States Department of Education archives, the National Archives, and various Kennedy Center archives. While some of these archives could be accessed
locally either in-person or via the internet, most of the archival searches for this study required journeying to Washington, DC, to view the documents. The following advice is offered to make archival research trips of this type more productive.

It is important to contact potential archives early in one’s research to determine the procedures for accessing and using each archive, the extent of its holdings, and the services available to the researcher to facilitate utilization of the collection. With a large archive, such as The National Archives, the services offered a researcher can be extensive and can greatly speed up the utilization of fairly complicated indexing systems. An additional benefit with larger archives is that a great deal of preliminary work can be done with an archivist at a facility like the National Archives via the e-mail and the internet to prepare for one’s visit.

A researcher might also need formal authorization from a high-ranking administrator to gain access to an agency or institution’s official records or archives. This process might require the researcher to submit a formal research prospectus to the organization. Many agencies and institutions do not centralize their office records and archives, which means that within these establishments a researcher might need to make contact and gain approval from several offices. Important for a researcher to understand is that locating and securing access to various archives can take a great deal of time to
achieve. All this might have to be completed before one even gets the chance to visit the archive to peruse its documents. Budgeting this into one's time frame for conducting a historical study is vital.

With certain federal-level archives or information services, such as the Congressional Research Service, researchers may need the assistance of their state representative or senator to gain access. This process will require making contact with one's representative or senator's office, gaining his or her cooperation with this matter, and developing a fairly specific research request detailing as clearly and concisely as possible the information needed for the study. While in most cases one's representative or senator's office will try to assist, if one's request is not well formed, it will cause delays and the need to resubmit additional requests to obtain the information. Again, this can add months to the research process.

Once a researcher has secured permission and access to a particular archive, the next step is to determine the condition or usefulness of the collection, hopefully before one travels to the archive's location. Traditionally, the assumption was that libraries and archives would be easily accessible and well organized, allowing researchers to devote their total time to perusing the actual materials. This is basically true with facilities like the National Archives or the Library of Congress. While the indexing systems may be quite complicated, once they are understood, the materials are usually found to be
well organized and easily available. But with the smaller archives, the situation can be quite different and unpredictable.

For this historical inquiry, the records of the Kennedy Center and the U.S. Department of Education were utilized. Within each institution, great variations in the condition and quality of their archives were found. At the Kennedy Center, the archives ranged from the meticulously kept Board of Trustee minutes in the Chief of Protocol’s office, dating back to before the Center was built, to the dusty boxes of haphazardly organized and inadequately kept files of former Education Department administrations.

The situation was the same at the U.S. Department of Education as found at the Kennedy Center. USDOE archives ranged from the files of the Secretary of Education, which were well organized though with no consistent indexing system from administration to administration, to the files of the officer overseeing the USDOE funding to the Kennedy Center. The latter archive consisted of a file drawer of Kennedy Center applications for these funds that had huge gaps in the information kept about these moneys. For example, there was no way, according to USDOE officials, to easily access reliable information on the first decade of funds that flowed out to the Alliance for Arts Education. Additionally, the officer monitoring these particular funds for the past decade seemed to have no real understanding of how the funds were being used and whether they were in keeping with their legislative intent.
Even if researchers follow all the above advice, there will always be circumstances beyond their control that must be dealt with during journeys to gather research. During this study, this researcher spent months preparing for a week's visit to several federal archives in Washington, D.C. A day after arriving to start this intense week of work, the federal government shutdown due to budget disputes in Congress. This meant that all federal facilities were unavailable during that week's research visit. Luckily, as the shutdown was anticipated, anticipatory strategies were put into motion in case this situation occurred. Archivists at the larger facilities were contacted before setting out on the journey. They assisted by pre-pulling many files related to this study, allowing me to concentrate on reviewing the materials as I quickly visited their facilities during a one-day marathon. I also pushed up my visit to the Kennedy Center archives, scheduled for later in the year, as the Center was considered a quasi-government facility. This meant that they were not affected by the shutdown. Being resourceful and flexible are vital traits for any researcher conducting a historical study.

Oral Records

According to Borg and Gall (1989), another important type of historical source is the spoken word. One form of this type of source is that created by the historian through oral interviews of persons who have witnessed or
participated in events of historical significance to the subject under study. This branch of historical research is known as oral history.

While there is a long history of interviewing for the purposes of producing written historical documentation, the use of the actual oral record in historical research finds its roots in the invention of the wire recorder in 1948 (Kynig and Marty, 1982, p. 111). According to David E. Kynig and Myron A. Marty, historians have relied for centuries on eyewitness and participant accounts obtained by asking questions and writing down the answers to produce a written document. But the oral document came into popular use with the wire recorder and its ability to make interviews available verbatim to researchers. While historians could still produce a written record of the interview, it was no longer needed as the only means to preserve an eyewitness’ account. As wire-recorder technology advanced, this made tape recorders, both audio and video, more available to researchers, especially the more portable cassette tape recorders, allowing an oral history movement to blossom (p. 111).

The use of oral histories has become especially popular among historians conducting studies of contemporary histories, especially federal institutional and policy histories. The main reason for this is that historians conducting these latter two types of histories must rely on a modern state’s records for their historical inquiries. These written sources tend to be
memorandums, annual reports, promotional materials, and business-type correspondence, and have grown in the past couple of decades in volume and the tendency to mislead, according to Donald A. Ritchie (1987). A major reason for this is due to the legal environment in which most of these agencies function. Oral history, according to Carl Ryant (1988), becomes a particularly valuable tool to the historian as it can fill in the information gaps left by these carefully crafted written documents or the growing practice of making important decisions without much paper trail left behind (p. 560). Ritchie (1987) adds that a historian can cut through these obstacles by asking questions of the humans who worked in these institutions or designed these policies.

As the field of oral history has taken root and rapidly grown, so too have the issues to consider with its use in a historical inquiry process. Most of the concerns focus around the interviews themselves. According to Ronald J. Grele (1991), oral history interviews, unlike traditional historical sources, are constructed by the active intervention of the historian. He explains that due to this situation, oral documents inevitably carry within themselves a pre-existent historical ordering, selection, and interpretation. This is unlike written records, which are usually not created after the fact by a historians (pp. 133-34).
Grele (1987) also notes that oral histories are products of the time of their creation. While these oral documents may be about events from an earlier time, they reflect the concerns of the times in which they are produced. Grele states, “Thus, in fundamental ways, interviews remain time-bound, as do other documents. A skillful interviewer and a good storyteller can, in tandem, recreate the sense of the past, but it is always done in the present” (p. 571 - 572).

Another issue with oral documents has to do with the person being interviewed. Grele (1987) explains that there is a natural tendency of moving the person being interviewed to center stage in relation to the events being discussed. This might be done by the interviewers or by the interviewees themselves. As Grele reminds us, most people being interviewed do not lie purposely, but the discussions are always filtered through their memories, ideologies, and the person’s vision of himself or herself in history. Historians must stay aware of this tendency and balance all oral documents with other historical sources.

An additional matter for historians is that they must also decide what the final form of an oral history will be. In the past, it was assumed that a written transcript would be created from the interview to preserve it and make it available for future generations of researchers. This incredibly time-consuming practice is being challenged today. Grele (1987) states that many
oral historians now believe the tape, not the transcript, to be the original document. He notes that these historians argue that by imposing a written form on spoken dialogue, the transcript can distort meaning, inevitably contains errors, and conveys none of the meanings imparted through inflection, cadence, tone, or volume (p. 577). The trend among archivists and oral historians, Grele points out, is to urge researchers to consult the oral document, not just the transcripts, even if available, when conducting their studies.

A final concern has to do with the variation in quality of oral history interviews. Grele (1991) notes that many interviewers are poorly trained and that far too many settle for journalistic standards of usefulness. He feels that in many oral history projects there is far too little time devoted to the research necessary to prepare for an interview. Grele states that oral historians are still prone to rush out and conduct interviews without doing the necessary background research on the written record for the study.

Mansel Blackford, a business oral historian at The Ohio State University, advised that an oral historian should hold off interviewing people for as long as possible when conducting a historical study. He felt that until the paper trail for a study is in place, it is important not to start the interviews. He believes that when oral historians interview before they have done this, it will often mean that they will end up having to reinterview people as new facts
emerge from the written record. Blackford noted that reinterviewing certain people may be impossible, especially in the political and business worlds, due to their busy schedules.

One of the best resources available concerning oral history for a researcher new to this area is the Oral History Research Office at Columbia University, New York, NY 10027. This office offers packets of information, publications and workshops to assist with advancing one’s skill with conducting and using oral histories.

Application of Methodology to This Study

In summary of the above information concerning historical inquiry, the sequence of events for this historical study will be modeled after the steps for conducting historical research recommended by Borg and Gall (1989). They indicate that the steps for historical research need to be distinctive to the style of the researcher or sensitive to the subject being investigated, but that several steps seem common to all historical investigations. These steps include the following: “Define the problems or questions to be investigated; search for sources of historical facts; summarize and evaluate the historical sources; and present the pertinent facts within an interpretive framework” (p. 810). While these steps make the process seem quite straightforward, they caution that there are many things to consider as the design for the inquiry unfolds.
As the problems and questions for this study were defined earlier in this chapter, the next step is to deal with the search for sources of historical facts. Borg and Gall point out that historians discover data through a search of historical sources and that the first thing a researcher needs to do is to identify and classify these sources. For this study, it is anticipated that the sources will fall into three basic categories: documents, quantitative records, and oral records.

Documents will include legislative reports and bills, newspapers, periodicals, institutional files and records, annual reports, strategic plans, surveys, committee reports, diaries, promotional materials, and memorandums. These sources will be sorted into two distinct types: those prepared intentionally as historical records (intentional documents), and those prepared for some immediate purpose with no intention that they would be used as historical records (unpremeditated documents). Knowing this distinction is also important when evaluating the authenticity and genuineness of these written materials, as discussed earlier in this chapter.

Quantitative records could be considered a subcategory of documents, but for this study they will be grouped in their own category. These records will include the Alliance's yearly budget records, reports on the numbers of organizations and clients served, Congressional appropriation records, and reports of public or private funding support throughout the Alliance's history.
Oral records will be an extremely important part of this study due to the emphasis on telling the Alliance’s story versus giving a chronological listing of its history. Semi-structured interviews will be used to gather information from individuals who have witnessed or participated in the evolution of the Alliance. These sources will be interviewed either in person or via telephone.

To identify these three basic sources, searches of the data bases available through The Ohio State University’s Library System will be conducted. Additionally, an archivist or reference librarian at the National Archives in Washington, DC, will be contacted to help design a search strategy for the federal government archives appropriate to this study. In addition, the archives at the Kennedy Center in Washington, DC will be utilized if available. From these archival searches and discussions with Alliance staff, a list of individuals to be interviewed for the oral record will be identified, contacted and interviewed.

Following the gathering of historical information about the Alliance from all the above sources, this data will be summarized and evaluated. Each source will be classified into one of two groups, that is, primary or secondary sources. Eventually this information will be woven into a story about the Alliance’s development and evolution, setting the story, where appropriate, into the larger context of educational reform and arts education, and the public policy system.
Personal Issues Facing Historical Inquiry

To understand a text one moves from what is written to what is not written and back again, from what is present to what is absent, from statements to their historical setting.

Cleo H. Cherryholmes
*Power and Criticism*, 1988

Central to the above quote is the notion that as a historian one must deconstruct and evaluate the historical sources available, whether written or oral, about one's topic before utilizing them. This means that a historian must not only establish the standing of the sources, that is, their authenticity and credibility, but must find ways to peel away the layers of meaning that infuse the historical data, as was discussed earlier in this chapter. There are also other issues, hinted at earlier, of a more personal nature that face a historian when conducting a historical study and which I have tried to pay attention to in conducting this study.

Walter R. Borg and Meredith D. Gall (1989) believe that if one chooses to do historical research, then one must become aware of one's biases, values, and personal interests. This awareness is important, they feel, as these factors allow a historian to see certain aspects of a past event, but not others (p. 825). Joan Burstyn (1987) asks historians to deconstruct themselves as part of their historical analysis process. She states that historians often select material and put forth interpretations without the insights from self-analysis to understand the world view guiding their historical
inquiry. She notes that historians often believe that they have been educated
to be objective and, so, do not take into account their own perspectives or
biases while researching, analyzing, and interpreting their data.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. (1992) also discusses the issue of historians
and the influence that their world views can have on historical inquiry. “The
spotlight we flash into the darkness of the past is guided by our own concerns
in the present. When new preoccupations arise in our own times and lives,
the spotlight shifts, throwing into sharp relief things that were always there but
that earlier historians had casually excised from the collective memory. In this
sense, the present may be said to re-create the past” (p.46). While
Schlesinger notes that historians must always strive toward the unattainable
ideal of objectivity, they must also respond to contemporary urgencies...taking
from the past, or projecting upon it, what suits their own society or ideology.

Many researchers refer to the situation that Schlesinger raises as the
bias of presentism (Borg and Gall, 1989; Reinhart, 1989; and Kaesler, 1989).
Presentism is described as a researcher’s tendency to use current concepts
and perspectives to interpret past events. As Kaestle (1988) points out, no
matter how wise educational leaders have been, their powers of foresight
have rarely equaled the historian’s powers of hindsight. He warns that the
danger comes when the historian assumes that the historical actors could
have or should have had the foresight to realize the full consequences of their
ideas. Kaestle's final caution to historians is not to think that they can infer intent of the historical actors from the consequences studied. He feels that the historian must have direct evidence of intent at the time of the event.

Harry Wolcott (1990) also discusses the tendency of researchers to interject their studies with personal opinions, judgments, and recommendations. He feels that researchers using qualitative methods of inquiry are particularly vulnerable to the tendency to go beyond reporting what is and to start making pronouncements of what ought to be. He cautions that a critical divide separates the realms of the observable from the realm of values concerning good and bad. Wolcott feels that historians cannot bridge the gap between description and prescription without imposing someone's judgment. He does not discourage the evaluative dimension of a study, but feels the best strategy to use is restraint. If researchers do offer personal opinions and judgments, he urges that they make sure the origins of these thoughts are understood and acknowledged.

A final issue concerns how researchers conclude their studies. Wolcott encourages researchers to move beyond the use of opinions and recommendations, which are often centered in their own world views. Instead, he encourages the exploration of alternatives to the current practices or the offering of solutions to the current problems that have been observed while doing the research. Using Wolcott's notion, researchers become
resources to those in their studies responsible for making decisions concerning policy or program development by helping them explore the benefits and consequences of different alternatives available to them.

In conducting this study, I have designed into my inquiry process ways for me to personally deal with the issues raised in the above discussion. I am aware that after working in the field of education for many years, I bring to this study certain world views that potentially could get in the way of telling the Alliance's story. For example, one view is that during my career I have rarely witnessed a national policy or initiative being successfully implemented without the input of the potential implementors during the development stage. This does not mean that I am against federal initiatives to improve education, but I do believe that the planning for these efforts must be more inclusive of those actors who will be directly responsible for the success of the initiative as it is taken forth.

To make sure that my personal biases are kept in check, I have tried to heed the above advice hinted at by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. As I have flashed the "spotlight" of historical inquiry into the Alliance's past, I have attempted to use as wide a light beam as possible and to shift this beam periodically to make sure that I am seeing the larger picture. This is evidenced by my going back a decade or more before the Alliance's birth to understand the events leading up to this national arts education initiative. It is
also evidenced by this study’s attempt to document the history of the National Alliance from its inception in 1973 to the present day.

I have also attempted to balance in myself the tendency of historians towards the bias of presentism by immersing myself in the literature of educational reform and arts education for the past four decades. This immersion has taken me back a decade and a half before the Alliance was born in order to understand these realms and the forces shaping their national dialogs. While all of this information may not directly relate to the findings concerning the Alliance, establishing a broad understanding of these national dialogs before starting this study has expanded the perspective I bring to this study and the interpretive framework used in telling the story of this national arts education initiative. So, while it is impossible to eliminate one’s biases, I have attempted to design into the inquiry process for this study ways of exposing and broadening the biases that I potentially bring that might influence the selection of materials and interpretations imposed in the telling of Alliance’s story.

Outline of the Study

Chapter One of this document sets out the purposes and needs for this historical study of the Alliance for Arts Education. It also explores the area of historical inquiry and the issues that a researcher must come to terms with
when utilizing this type of inquiry process. Chapter Two delves into several bodies of literature that assist with understanding the national dialogs concerning educational reform and arts education over the past four decades, and the public policy system. This information will be used in understanding the times during which the Alliance developed and evolved, and its potential impact on the promotion of arts education in America’s schools. Chapter Three starts the actual story of the Alliance for Arts Education. It explores the events leading up to the Alliance’s development, and how this national initiative unfolded in the early years. Chapter Four continues the Alliance’s story by examining the forces that shaped and shifted the Alliance’s evolution and brought it to near extinction by the late-1980’s. The final chapter, Chapter Five, looks at where the Alliance is today, and what lessons can be learned from the story of this national arts education initiative, especially concerning the public policy system.
CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

The primary motivation for undertaking this historical study of the Alliance for Arts Education is that little research has been formally conducted about this national initiative to promote arts education in America’s schools. This scarcity of formal written information on the Alliance has presented the challenge of what literature to turn to in setting a context that might potentially assist in understanding the Alliance’s development and evolution. As will be presented later in this document as the story of the Alliance is told, this national initiative has attempted during different periods of its development and evolution to advance itself as a major national force in a couple of areas related to education, particularly arts education and general education reform. To better understand the Alliance’s standing in each of these arenas, it seems important to explore each area separately.

The first two sections of this literature review will delve into some of the major issues, movements, or reports that were a part of the educational
reform and arts education realms in the past four decades. The goal is to scan both of these areas to develop a deeper sense of the changing national dialog concerning education in America during the time that the Alliance developed and evolved. By establishing a broader understanding of these national dialogs at the start of the study, the aim is to expand the perspective guiding this historical study and the interpretative framework used in telling the story of the Alliance for Arts Education. When it was clear that a national trend or movement in educational reform or arts education directly influenced the Alliance’s development and evolution, this information will be woven into the Alliance’s story in Chapters Three, Four, and Five.

Another body of literature will also be explored due to its potential to assist in understanding the history of the Alliance. This national initiative to promote arts education in America’s schools was conceived by policy makers at the national level and funded by federal dollars. This fact means that the Alliance came about due to a national policy that was developed and then implemented. The final section of this chapter will explore the public policy system to better understand the potential forces and issues that might influence a national policy’s development and implementation. It is anticipated that the information explored in this section of the literature review will be used in the final chapter of this dissertation in reflecting upon the
Alliance's evolution and the lessons that might be learned from this federal effort to advance arts education.

Educational Reform in America

In the January 16, 1997 *Columbus Dispatch*, George V. Voinovich, Governor of Ohio, declared, “We're going to save [Ohio]. We're going to save America” (Johnson, 1997, January 16, p. 1A). How he planned to accomplish this agenda echoed decades of rhetoric in America concerning the cause and the cure for many of the ills that have plagued the United States. Perhaps President Lyndon B. Johnson best summed up what this thing was that held such power, such promise for the nation: “The answer to all our national problems comes down to a single word: education” (Applebome, 1997, January 12, p E4).

Lamar Alexander (1993), former Secretary of Education under President George Bush, also believed that if America wanted to change itself, it had to change the nation's schools and attitude about education. He expressed this belief as he ushered in yet another wave of educational reform in the United States, *America 2000*, that was presented to the American people in 1991. Elliot Eisner (1992), a professor at Stanford University in California, noted when reviewing *America 2000*, that the basic assumption underlying this educational reform strategy of the Bush Administration was
that a student’s performance in school had a significant bearing on the economic well-being of the nation, that is, that the state of America’s economy was intimately linked to the condition of its schools.

Mike Rose, the author of *Possible Lives: The Promise of Public Education in America*, noted this habit in America of seeing education as a cure-all for the problems facing the nation. He stated, “As a society, we have a long history of continually looking at schools as a sort of first line of defense against whatever is defined as the problem du jour” (Applebome, 1997, January 12, p E4). Rose raises the notion that while the problems facing America continue to change, the cause and cure remain the same, that is, education and its reform. He notes that as American society becomes more complex and conflicted, the expectations on education become more contradictory and confusing as there does not seem to exist a national consensus on how education should be reformed.

Chester Finn, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC, questions the logic in America of looking to education as the cure-all. He notes that even with perfect school attendance, American children spend just nine percent of their lives in school from birth to age 18. Finn feels that there is no way that the nine percent can overcome what happens in the other 91 percent of their time. Finn states, ‘I once tended to agree with [President Johnson]...but I’ve been mugged by reality. We’re always been a little naive
about expecting too much from the [nation's] schools....[this habit] tends to let other institutions off the hook” (Applebome, 1997, January 12, p E4).

Eisner (1992) joins Rose and Finn in their concern about America’s belief in education. He laments that this continuous though changing rhetoric concerning the need to reform education pays little attention to the importance of learning. Still, he advises that it is important to understand the basic assumptions that have guided each reform movement throughout America’s history. He states, “All major reform efforts are built on an array of assumptions and guided by a set of expectations that deserve careful examination” (p. 722). The goal of this chapter is to explore the assumptions and expectations of some of the efforts/movements to reform education in America since the late-1950’s.

**General Education Reform — Pre-1970**

**Sputnik**

The launching of the first artificial satellite, *Sputnik*, by the Soviets in 1957 is seen by many as a turning point in America and American education. Americans were stunned by this ominous event that they felt so clearly showed the Russian's technological gain over the United States and just how vulnerable our national security had become. The American public demanded a federal response to the Russian challenge and an answer to why
America found itself in this awkward predicament. The state of America's schools was seen as one of the main reasons behind this dilemma.

Diane Ravitch (1983) points out that there were clear signs of discontent with the quality of American schools long before the crisis that surfaced with Sputnik. She notes that government officials had been concerned for awhile about the shortage of students graduating from America's schools in the fields of science and technology. She also notes that criticism had been growing concerning how the nation's schools were neglecting basic academic disciplines, such as English, history, science, mathematics, and foreign languages.

Foster Wygant (1993) would agree with this assessment. He believes that Sputnik just brought to a head the criticisms of public education in America that had been gathering intensity throughout most of the 1950's. He notes that these criticisms followed several themes. One was that schools had become too liberal and allowed children to run free without enough structure. Another was that parents were upset that their children were not bringing home assignments to complete each night causing the perception that their children were getting further behind academically. There was also criticism concerning how teachers were trained, that is, that they were taking too many courses in methodology and too few courses in subject matter content. Believing that the basics were being neglected, the growing force of
critics called for a return to the intellectual rigor inherent in the academic disciplines themselves.

Ravitch (1983) states, "Sputnik came to be a symbol of the consequences of indifference to high standards. In popular parlance, Sputnik had happened not because of what the Russians had done but because of what American schools had failed to do" (p. 229). Ernest Boyer notes that it took Sputnik to push school improvement to the top of the national agenda. Due to this, Wygant (1993) notes that public funding for education doubled during the next decade following the shock of Sputnik.

**National Defense Education Act**

Ravitch (1983) points out that the active federal-aid lobby for education, defeated constantly in the past in their pursuit to establish the legitimacy of a federal role in supporting education, jumped on Sputnik and the issue of national security as a vehicle for taking their cause forward. Their actions, combined with the general public's demand for a federal response to the Russian challenge, caused Congress to pass the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958. This action set the precedent for the federal government to provide support to schools in response to pressing national needs.

NDEA, according to Ravitch (1983), Wygant (1993), and Boyer (1983), provided fellowships, grants, and loans to encourage the study of science,
mathematics, and foreign languages. It also provided funds to improve the teaching of these three subject areas, though, the Act was later broadened to include support for the humanities and social sciences as well. Additionally, NDEA funded the construction of new schools and promoted the use of television and other audiovisual materials in the classroom.

As Arthur Efland (1990) notes, the period following Sputnik caused educators to engage in a great deal of professional soul-searching that resulted in a major movement for curriculum reform, especially in science and mathematics. Eisner (1971) estimates that well over $100 million was spent on curriculum development in mathematics and science in the ten years following Sputnik. He notes that many of these reform efforts looked to scholars from the disciplines to assist in solving the problems plaguing the nation's schools, especially the high schools. Clearly, the assumption underlying the reform of education at this point in time was that by changing the schools, America’s national security could be improved.

Woods Hole Conference

In his book *The Process of Education*, Jerome Bruner reports on a conference sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) in September 1959, at Woods Hole on Cape Cod in Massachusetts. According

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¹ According to Ravitch (1993), The National Science Foundation (NSF) was established by Congress in 1950 to promote basic research and education in the sciences. NSF initially had little to do with precollege programs. In 1956, due to the manpower shortage in the sciences, NSF started to sponsor curriculum revision projects in secondary school sciences. After the crisis caused by Sputnik, NSF expanded its high school curriculum revision projects.
to Bruner, some thirty-five scientists, scholars, and educators gathered for ten
days to discuss how education in science might be improved in America's
elementary and secondary schools. Bruner notes that the theme for this
conference came from the same question being raised by a large portion of
America's population concerning public education: "What shall we teach and
to what end?" (1961, p. 1). He acknowledged that the impetus for raising this
question was due to the long-range crisis with national security, "a crisis
whose resolution will depend upon a well-educated citizenry" (p. 1).

According to Bruner, the factor that had played the biggest role in
producing the crisis with elementary and secondary science education was
the rise of the American university graduate school and its strong emphasis
upon advanced research and study in the half century preceding Sputnik.
This, he believed, created a situation that separated the top scholars and
scientists from the task of presenting their own subjects in elementary and
secondary schools. The consequence, he felt, was that the school programs
had often been dealing incorrectly and inadequately with contemporary
knowledge. Bruner states, "Now there appears to be a reversal of this trend.
It consists in the renewed involvement of many of America's most
distinguished scientists in the planning of school study in their field" (pp. 3-4).

Wygant (1993) points out that Bruner's notions concerning curriculum
revision were at the heart of the educational reform movement sweeping
America in the early-sixties. Most importantly was his notion that curriculum revision could not be valid without the participation of leading scholars and practitioners in the subject field, as they were the only ones who truly knew the structure of their disciplines.

Another notion of Bruner concerned the role of structure in the teaching and learning of a discipline. Bruner (1961) believed that the teaching and learning of structure, not just the mastery of facts, was at the center of the classic problem of transfer. He states, "If earlier learning is to render later learning easier, it must do so by providing a general picture in terms of which the relations between things encountered earlier and later are made as clear a possible" (p. 12). Bruner also believed that the foundations of any subject could be taught in some form to anybody at any age, as the basic ideas of any subject are as simple as they are powerful. "To be in command of these basic ideas, to use them effectively," Bruner states, "requires a continual deepening of one's understanding of them that comes from learning to use them in progressively more complex forms....[a] curriculum as it develops should revisit these basic ideas repeatedly, building upon them until the student has grasped the full formal apparatus that goes with them" (p. 13).

Efland (1990) notes that the ideas emerging from Woods Hole and advanced by Bruner "treated such problems as content selection and sequence with a disarming ease that had eluded the conventional curriculum
theorists of the period” (p. 238). The curriculum revision movement coming out of the Woods Hole Conference placed an emphasis on inquiry itself as vital to learning versus just learning the conclusions of others. In addition, this movement, according to Bruner (1961), was premised on the central belief that "intellectual activity anywhere is the same, whether at the frontier of knowledge or in a third-grade classroom" (p. 14).

Conant's Report

In 1956, Ravitch (1983) notes, the Carnegie Corporation sponsored a series of studies of public education in America by James B. Conant, former president of Harvard University and then ambassador to West Germany. Surprisingly, his first report in 1959, The American High School Today, became a best seller and became known simply as "Conant's Report." According to Boyer (1983), Conant called for school consolidation and urged high schools to strengthen their curriculum with the goal of producing a comprehensive high school.

Conant believed, Boyer and Ravitch note, that there was persuasive evidence showing that small high schools, those with graduating classes under one hundred students, could not offer students a rich curriculum, especially in upper-level courses. Conant's goal was to create large high schools by consolidating several small ones, giving schools the critical mass necessary to develop a comprehensive high-school curriculum.
Ravitch (1983) points out that in addition to size, a high school under Conant's plan had to accomplish three tasks in order to be considered "comprehensive." First, the high school had to provide all students with a good general education, that is, all students would be required to take courses in English, American literature, composition, and social studies. The next task was to offer noncollege-bound students good, nonacademic electives in the areas of vocational, commercial, and work-study. The final task that a high school needed to accomplish to be considered comprehensive was to provide the academically talented student with advanced courses in a variety of fields, such as mathematics, science, and foreign language. While it may appear that Conant believed in tracking students into separate curricula, Ravitch believes that he did not promote this idea. What he did advocate, she states, is the notion of grouping students by ability-level so that fast and slow students would get the appropriate level of academic challenge.

Boyer (1983) notes that the consolidation movement was already under way when Conant issued his report, but his pronouncement gave additional momentum to this movement. As proof of Conant's impact, Boyer states that from 1960 to 1970, the number of school districts nationally shrank from 40,520 to 17,995, as did the number of small high schools (p. 233).
Elementary and Secondary School Act of 1965

Efland (1990) points out that by the mid-1960’s, the country started to look to education to solve another problem facing America. He notes that federal funding policy started to shift away from programs with a national security agenda towards programs with a strong social agenda. Ravitch (1983) explains that this was due to the leaders in the fight to end discrimination against all groups moving to the center of the national stage under the Johnson Administration. These folks assisted the Johnson Administration, Ravitch states, in crafting the innovative social legislation of 1964 and 1965, that became the essence of his war on poverty in the United States.

On April 9, 1965, one part of Johnson’s war on poverty passed the Congress, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA). Several things assisted with this bill’s passage. One was the precedent set concerning federal funding of education by the NDEA in 1958. Ravitch points out that there had been a hundred years of failed attempts at winning approval for federal support to education, and that ESEA was an enormous victory for those who believed in a federal role in education. Another thing that assured passage of ESEA was the broad consensus that existed in Congress concerning the need to improve the educational opportunities of poor children. This issue became the heart of ESEA under its Title I section.
A final aspect of ESEA, according to Ravitch, that assisted in its passage was the formula used to determine how the Title I funds would be distributed nationally. The *Congressional Quarterly of 1974* states that funds were directed to school districts based on the number of children from low-income families in the area. It notes that this made 95 per cent of the nation's counties eligible for aid, though, the bulk of the funds were to be concentrated on the inner city and impoverished rural areas where the neediest children lived. As the formula was based on each state's average spending per student and on the actual number of poor children served, this meant, according to the *Congressional Quarterly*, that it pleased both the poorer states who served large numbers of students and the richer states who spent more per student.

This bill has been extended, amended, and reauthorized continually since 1965. Most recently, according to the 1994 *Congressional Quarterly*, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-382 reauthorizing the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, renamed the Improving America's School Act of 1994, for another five years with a fiscal year 1995 appropriation of $12.7 billion. The biggest controversy of this reauthorization was President Clinton's proposal to change the funding formula used to distribute Title I funds. He proposed to direct an even larger percentage of these funds to the nation's poorest schools at the expense of more affluent areas. The
lawmakers were not willing to support this proposal as it might jeopardize the flow of federal funds to their school districts. Basically, the funding formula for Title I remained the same as the one found in the original 1965 legislation. This new bill, along with the educational reform bill for Goals 2000 (to be discussed later), also stresses the need for high-quality curriculum content and student performance standards to be developed at the state and local levels.

**General Education Reform — The 1970's**

The 1970's were a time of enormous political and social upheaval in the United States. As Paul Klohr (Personal Conversation, 1995), Professor Emeritus in Education at The Ohio State University in Columbus, points out, it was a period of time marked by the lingering Vietnam War, the invasion of Cambodia, the civilian protests against the war, the shooting of student protesters at Kent State, the civil rights protests along with the killings of blacks in several states, and the Nixon Watergate scandal to name a few events. Each protest movement seemed to have its counter-protest movement, creating a tense and sometimes violent atmosphere across America.

The pressures to change education in the 1970's very much reflected the splits forming in society. One educational reform movement demanded more accountability from the nation's schools concerning their use of public
funds. Another "movement," if it could be called that, seemed intent on breaking down the traditional "walls" of the nation's schools, or in shifting educational reform and curriculum development into a whole new way of conducting business. As the issue of national security faded from the prominent position it held a decade earlier, the nation moved away from the discipline approach to curriculum revision that had dominated the educational reform scene since the Woods Hole Conference. The social issues that had given rise to Johnson's war on poverty and triggered the passage of ESEA in 1965 still held a prominent position on the national agenda but, as mentioned earlier, the use and abuse of federal funds was now being examined.

**Accountability Movement**

According to Klohr, in the 1970's, the funding agencies and general public began to question what was being accomplished with the public moneys being spent on educational reform in America. Eisner (1971) points out that estimates showed well over $100 million had been allocated during the 1960's, just for curriculum reform in mathematics and science. Efland (1990) explains that the continuing rise of educational costs in spite of decreasing school populations as the nation's enormous baby-boom generation finished passing through the schools along with the growing concern among parents about declining achievement test scores were major factors in the demand for accountability. Supporters of this movement for
accountability wanted to know if public funds for educational reform were being used effectively, and just how schools were able to make this assessment.

Efland points out that due to this demand, curricular affairs started to shift from a content focus to an evaluation and measurement focus. Efland notes that this gave rise in the school curriculum to the specification of behavioral objectives and the specification of measurable outcomes for evaluation purposes. As Efland states, "The accountability movement rested on the assumption that management of learning by behavioral objectives was no more than the application of a scientific, value-free technology to the problems of education. This technological approach was seen as an efficient means of providing information on educational effectiveness at the least cost" (1990, p. 250).

The design of a behavioral curriculum, explains Wygant (1993), required that the complexity of each intended learning situation be analyzed and broken down into a progression of smaller, simpler steps that would move the learner towards a specific result. He notes that the outcome and each step along the way would be stated as a behavioral objective in an effort to standardize learning tasks. Technology could then be used to keep track of and give progress reports on students as they moved through a series of steps to an intended outcome. Efland (1990) points out a problem that arose
with this approach was that the technology itself had limits. These limits, he explains, required that learning had to be carved up into small, specific units in order to use technology in the monitoring and evaluation process. This caused learning tasks to be designed to focus on the minutiae, Efland notes, with the resultant loss of larger and deeper understandings of the content.

**Romantic Criticism Movement**

Ravitch (1983) states that in the 1970’s, the educational pendulum also started to swing back towards the more liberal school movement that existed before the Sputnik crisis. In this case, the term "movement" is used loosely as what was actually occurring were several different movements that seemed to have similar intents or goals. To gather these together in one discussion, Klohr (Personal Conversation, 1995) advised grouping them under the label **Romantic Critics**. As happens when attempting to pull together movements that did not necessarily see themselves united at the time in a common cause, this discussion will focus more on the larger themes that possibly connect these groups. The discussion will not attempt to go into the specifics of each movement unless they are necessary to assist with the overall understanding of this section.

Klohr explains that the Romantic Critics believed that not only was change needed in the nation's schools, but that along with it society also needed to be changed. Ravitch states that at this time, the indictment of the
schools was overwhelming. "In the eyes of the critics," she writes, "[schools] destroyed the souls of children....it coerced unwilling youths to sit through hours of stultifying classes, breaking their spirits before turning them out as either rebellious misfits or conforming cogs in the great industrial machine" (1983, p. 237). The goal for educational reform with this group was one of finding ways to set children free to develop in ways natural to themselves. Klohr explains that this was a very romantic notion concerning school reform, thus giving this group its name.

Efland (1990), in describing one of the movements that might be included under the umbrella of Romantic Criticism, states that they resisted the use of behavioral objectives and held holistic or organic views of people and their interdependence with nature. He notes that they valued personal liberty, higher levels of consciousness, and diversity and pluralism. While similar notions concerning the need for change were what connected these separate groups, how they attempted to bring about change separated them loosely into two branches.

The first branch contained the vast majority of players in this movement. According to Klohr (Personal Conversation, 1995), for the most part they were quite young and did not have much experience working with schools. While they clearly wanted to change education, their notions as to how to do this were not always terribly realistic. As he noted, criticism of
these people centered around the fact that they did not have to run the
schools on a day-to-day basis and so could create any dream they wanted
about the best way for them to be run. Ravitch (1983) explains that what
separated these individual movements from one another was largely the
extent to which they assumed that the public schools could be saved, if at all.
She notes that a growing assumption at that time was that out-of-school
activities were equal in educational value, and perhaps actually superior to,
in-school activities. Included in this branch might be the open education
movement, the free school movement, and the alternative school movement.

The other branch of Romantic Critics, the Reconceptualists, stood out
as different from the one mentioned above, according to Klohr (Personal
Conversation, 1995). He points out that while they held many of the same
thoughts about schools as the first branch did, they saw the change
happening in American education in a different light. The Reconceptualists,
of which Klohr was one of the founders, felt that something much bigger was
happening in the field of curriculum development. At that time, he notes, they
looked to the notion of paradigm shifts that had been advanced a decade
Efland explains that Kuhn introduced the idea of the rise and fall of paradigms
in the history of science. Efland states, "A paradigm is a system of ideas,
principles, concepts, doctrines, and approaches which form the
understandings possessed within a field of knowledge that form the basis of its work" (nd, pp. 3-4). When the prevailing paradigm is no longer able to explain phenomena, he notes, a new theory or paradigm begins to emerge which replaces the old one. Efland refers to this change as a shift in paradigms.

The Reconceptualists, according to Klohr (Personal Conversation, 1995), felt that the prevailing paradigm based in a scientific view of curriculum development that had dominated for several decades was giving way to a new theory. Klohr notes that while they did not have a label yet for the change underway, they felt certain that it was happening and that they needed to pay attention to generating a theoretical base for this new way of approaching curriculum reform. In retrospect, Klohr notes, the shift underway was from modernism to postmodernism, which will be explored later in this chapter.

**General Education Reform — The 1980’s**

The 1980’s ushered in another national crisis, which again caused the nation to look at the condition of its educational system. Efland (1990) states that there was a renewed concern about the quality of education in America and this worry refocused public attention towards this arena. Boyer (1983) believes that this push for excellence in education echoed the post-Sputnik era in the United States, the difference being the issue at the root of the crisis. After Sputnik, national security rose to the top of the national agenda as
Americans feared for their physical safety from a Russian attack. In the 1980's, Americans were again worried about their well-being, but this time it was due to the quick erosion of the nation's internationally superior economic position as several other nations challenged it with their advancing economies. As would be expected, economic security rose to the top of the national agenda due to the shock and worry over this matter. Again, the nation was told that if its schools had been doing a better job, America would not find itself in this crisis. Boyer notes that the rhetoric at this time concerning excellence in education was intimately linked to America's economic recovery. Reminiscent of two decades earlier, the nation once again called for tougher standards in mathematics and science to make America strong and more competitive internationally.

A Nation at Risk

In August 1981, then Secretary of Education Terrell Bell created the National Commission on Excellence in Education directing it to examine the quality of education in the United States and to make a report to the nation concerning this matter within a year and a half. Secretary Bell gave the Commission the following charge:

- [ assess] the quality of teaching and learning in our nation's public and private schools, colleges, and universities;
- [compare] American schools and colleges with those of other advanced nations;
- [study] the relationship between college admissions requirements and student achievement in high school;
• [identify] educational programs which result in notable student success in college;
• [assess] the degree to which major social and educational changes in the last quarter century have affected student achievement; and
• [define] problems which must be faced and overcome if we are successfully to pursue the cause of excellence in education.

The Commission issued its report, *A Nation at Risk*, in March 1983, and, according to Lamar Alexander (1993), triggered a national alarm about what our children knew and were able to do. Efland (1990) notes that this report echoed concerns first raised in the late-1950’s after Sputnik, though the issue had changed to one concerning rising economic competition in world markets. The report found large differences in high school diploma requirements across the country. Some examples of these differences are:

• No states required study in a foreign language.
• In 35 states, only one year of mathematics was required.
• In 36 states, only one year of science was required.
• Time spent studying in the United States by its most advanced science students was at least three-times less than in any other industrialized nation.
• Additionally, students in other industrialized nations spent on average eight hours a day in school and a total of 220 days a year. In comparison, students in the United States spent on average only six hours a day in school and just 180 days a year.

The report also offered a variety of recommendations. Some examples of these are:

• Strengthen state and local high school graduation requirements. All American students should graduate with four years of English; three years of mathematics; three
years of science; three years of social studies; and one-half year of computer science. A two-year requirement in foreign language was also suggested but the Commission left this as optional.

- Adopt more rigorous and measurable standards.
- Devote much more time to the learning of basics, along with making the school day and school year longer.
- Hold educators and elected officials accountable for providing the leadership necessary to achieve these reforms.
- Citizens are to provide the fiscal support and stability required to bring about the reforms outlined in the report.

As can be seen, many of the findings and recommendations in the report are reminiscent of other educational reform movements since the late-1950's, such as the discipline and accountability movements. Fowler (1988) points out an indirect benefit of this report. In the 1980's, there was rising criticism across the nation about the fact that the Department of Education had become a cabinet-level agency in the federal structure. These critics called for the elimination of the Department of Education. Fowler notes that the Commission's report silenced this group.

National Education Goals

Following the release of A Nation at Risk, worry grew across America concerning the condition of the nation's schools. According to Alexander (1993), by 1985 the concern had grown so large that the nation's governors took the unprecedented step by devoting an entire year to a single national issue – education. The governors divided into seven task forces, each considering one of the following questions:
• Why not pay teachers more for teaching well?
• What can be done to attract, train, and reward excellent school leaders?
• Why not let parents choose the schools their children attend?
• Aren’t there ways to help poor children with weak preparation to succeed in school?
• Why are expensive school buildings closed half the year when children are behind in their studies and many classrooms are overcrowded?
• Why shouldn’t schools use the newest technologies for learning?
• How much are college students really learning? (Alexander, 1993, p. 10)

In 1986, the National Governor’s Association issued a report as to its findings and recommendations. The report indicates that the governors did not reach a full consensus about the views and recommendations expressed by each of the seven task forces. It states that each task-force report reflects the views of the governors who served on that particular task force. The main purpose of this report, it states, is to assist the governors in building consensus concerning educational reform in their states, in school districts, and in individual schools. The information and directions contained in this report would also be used at a later time to assist President Bush in formulating his educational reform agenda.

George Bush was elected President in 1988, and soon an education summit was planned between himself and all the nation's governors. The summit was held in 1989 at the University of Virginia in Charlottesville. The President and the governors declared that “the time has come, for the first
time in United States history, to establish clear national performance goals, goals that will make us internationally competitive" (America 2000, 1991, p. 35). According to Alexander (1993), what emerged from this meeting was the first National Education Goals, which, he felt, were bipartisan, comprehensive, and direct. The governors pledged to bring these goals to their states and move their states toward them, Alexander indicates. The National Education Goals declared that by the year 2000:

1. All children in America will start school ready to learn.
2. The high school graduation rate will increase to at least 90 per cent.
3. American students will leave grades four, eight, and twelve having demonstrated competency in challenging subject matter, including English, mathematics, science, history, and geography; and every school in America will ensure that all students learn to use their minds well, so that they may be prepared for responsible citizenship, further learning, and productive employment in our modern economy.
4. U.S. students will be first in the world in science and mathematics achievement.
5. Every adult American will be literate and will possess the knowledge and skills necessary to compete in a global economy and exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship.
6. Every school in America will be free of drugs and violence and will offer a disciplined environment conductive to learning. (Alexander, 1993, pp. 11-12)

General Education Reform — The 1990’s

Over three decades of reform efforts have come and gone since Sputnik, and the American education system is still being sharply attacked as being at the center of the problems plaguing our nation. While the national
crises have shifted from national security to racial/equity to efficiency to economic competitiveness, one thing has remained the same since 1957 — the belief that if the nation can find the right way to fix its schools then the nation’s problems, whatever the current ones are, would be solved.

The 1990’s see the same scenario being repeated again. While the nation is still grappling with the economic-competitiveness crisis from the last decade, another national crisis has surfaced that the nation is looking to the schools to solve. Starting with President Bush’s educational reform agenda and continuing with President Clinton's educational reform act, the schools are now being asked to solve the serious social issues plaguing the nation, such as drug addiction, crime and violence, illiteracy, and the balkanization of American society. This section will look at the two educational reform strategies to come upon the national scene so far during the 1990’s, and it will close with a discussion of reforming education in the postmodern world.

**America 2000**

In December 1990, President Bush asked Lamar Alexander to be U.S. Education Secretary. According to Alexander, the first task that he set out to accomplish, with the permission of the President, was to develop a strategy to help the nation reach the six National Education Goals developed by Bush and the nation's governors. On April 18, 1991, Alexander states, President Bush presented this strategy, *America 2000*, to the nation at a special East
Room ceremony. In *America 2000*, the President challenged every town and city in the nation to become an AMERICA 2000 Community by doing four things:

1. Adopt the six national education goals (see previous section).
2. Develop a community-wide strategy to achieve them.
3. Design a report card to measure results.
4. Plan for and support a New American School. (p. 65)

President Bush requested the American business community to set up the New American Schools Development Corporation (NASDC), a private, non-profit, tax-exempt organization. NASDC was given the responsibility for creating these New American Schools across the nation and for raising hundreds of millions of dollars to support seven Design Teams with the charge to develop "break the mold" schools to make U.S. schools the best in the world.

President Bush’s educational reform strategy soon got knocked off track due to several controversial issues. The first issue centered around the President’s strong backing of school choice, that is, letting parents through the use of vouchers decide where their children would attend school. The second issue had to do with the use of the private-sector as a catalyst for creating this change. Alexander (1993) believes that criticism about these two issues took center stage and soon obscured the fact that *America 2000*
had broad national consensus about many of the underlying issues of school reform.

Senator Edward Kennedy criticized the Bush plan and NASDC for its funding request to Congress for $535 million. He states that they asked Congress to set up one model school in each of the 535 Congressional districts despite the "long-standing experience that public schools cannot and will not reform themselves by emulating private education or a few model schools" (1993, p. 21). He mentions that members of Congress debated this proposal and rejected it as they felt that the proposal would exclude too many schools in America and that it would not create the conditions needed for permanent improvement and reform for all schools and students.

Goals 2000

Senator Edward Kennedy (1993) states that the nation finds itself at even greater risk a decade after A Nation at Risk was first published. He notes that since the early-1980’s, federal funding for education has dropped 40 per cent, and that the federal share of education spending for elementary and secondary schools has gone down from 10 per cent to six per cent. He believes that education is one of the great unsolved national problems facing the Clinton Administration.

On March 31, 1994, President Clinton signed Public Law 103-227, entitled Goals 2000: Educate America Act. For the first time, this bill put into
law eight national education goals, which included the six National Education Goals developed by President Bush and the governors in 1989. Clinton's new law also included two additional goals as follows:

- Teachers will have access to programs for the continued improvement of their skills.
- Every school will promote involvement of parents in their children's education. (Goals 2000 bill, 1994, p. 804)

Additionally, Goal three of the original National Education Goals was expanded. This goal indicated that students would demonstrate competence on a periodic basis in five core subject areas: English, mathematics, science, history, and geography. The new goal expanded this to include the following four additional subject areas for a total of nine: foreign languages, civics and government, economics, and arts.

This law established the nineteen-member National Education Standards and Improvement Council (NESIC) to develop national curriculum content for the nine core subject areas and student performance standards to identify what students should know and be able to do. NESIC was also to establish national opportunity-to-learn standards to outline for the nation's schools exactly what needs to be provided so that students can meet these curriculum and performance standards. State and local compliance with NESIC's activities is to be totally on a voluntary basis.

Two oversight boards were created by this legislation. One is a 12-member National Education Goals Panel to oversee and report on the
nation's progress toward the eight goals. The other is a National Skill Standards Board made up of 28 representatives from business, labor, government, and community organizations, to develop a national system of standards and testing to ensure that students have the skills necessary to compete in the work force.

Finally, the bill authorized $400 million over five years beginning in fiscal year 1994 to improve local schools. These moneys will be distributed using the funding formulas for ESEA's Title I and Title II programs. This means that these funds are targeted mostly towards educationally disadvantaged students, who are often from the lower income groups.

Educational Reform in the Postmodern World

Gordon Ambach (1993) points to a Louis Harris poll to show how important the nation's schools are to the American people. He indicates that 71 per cent of the American public support the notion that making our schools second to no other nation is more important than reducing the national debt. He notes that for most of our nation's history, the United States has looked primarily to the state and local levels when developing policy for reform. This, he believes, has changed in the past decade or so due to a rapidly growing concern about the need to strengthen education in the U.S. for national interest purposes. These purposes, Ambach notes, include a growing need to prepare our citizens for international economic competition, national security,
and international peace-keeping. He justifies developing national education standards based on these needs and due to the mobility of our nation's population and the need for educational continuity.

David Elkind, while he would likely be pleased that Americans feel education to be important, would also view Ambach's perspective on how to bring about educational reform as being out of step with the changing times. Elkind views the whole notion of educational reform from a postmodern perspective. He breaks down recent reform movements into three different types: "systemic, teacher professionalization, and school network initiatives" (1994, p. 5). Systemic reforms, he explains, are concerned with the processes and products of education. He believes that recent movements to develop national standards and model school programs for replication fall into this category. The second type, teacher professionalization, seeks to reform education by upgrading the teacher through better selection, training, and licensing requirements. The final type, network reform, is centered around school consortia that attempt to individualize reform and adapt it to the particular needs and circumstances of each school.

Elkind believes that it is the modern assumption of uniformity that underlies most educational reform efforts in recent times. This assumption equates education with the progressive accumulation of knowledge, or with all children in a society moving equally towards common goals. This assumption
also sees educational improvement as being linked to the standardized upgrading of teachers. He asserts that systemic and teacher professionalization reform initiatives perpetuate modern education and the assumptions embodied in it: progress, universality, and regularity.

Elkind quotes Ted Sizer, founder of the Coalition of Essential Schools\(^2\), to express the changing times for educational reform. "There is no one best model [for school reform]." Sizer states, "each school must be shaped by its own people and respect the community it serves" (Elkind, 1994, p. 11). Senator Edward Kennedy also ponders how best to approach educational reform today. He states, "Those who look with nostalgia at their own schooling and see the answer as a simple matter of restoring traditional education ignore today's realities. An education system designed for an agrarian or manufacturing-based society...cannot effectively meet the nation's needs in today's diverse, global, high-tech, information-based economy" (1993, p. 21). Elkind (1994) reinforces these statements by asserting the notion that each school must develop at its own pace and in its own time. He

\(^2\) The Coalition of Essential School, based at Brown University, is a network of schoolpeople who have joined together to develop better schools. Five imperatives guide their efforts:

1. Give room to teachers and students to work and learn in their own, appropriate ways.
2. Insist that students clearly exhibit mastery of their school work.
3. Get the incentives right, for students and for teachers.
4. Focus the students' work on the use of their minds.
5. Keep the structure simple and thus flexible.

The Coalition has no model to "plug in," no program to "install." They believe that for models and programs to succeed, they must arise independently out of their communities and schools.
looks to postmodernism for ideas concerning how best to approach school reform today.

Elkind believes that for reform efforts to succeed in the future, they must assimilate the notions of embeddedness, particularity, and irregularity that are at the heart of postmodern thinking. His notion of postmodernism sees that there is much value in the old ways, which means that he is not advocating a complete rejection of previous reform efforts as he believes modernism did with pre-modern thought. He states, "Once it is recognized that children can get to a common goal by different paths, at different rates, and by different means, it is still possible to have common goals as long as these are appropriate to the particular school and the individual community" (1994, p. 12). He believes that the network reform movement is the only movement translating these ideas into educational practice and explains how he sees that they are accomplishing this.

Elkind states that one of the main themes of the network reform movement is the need for an integrated curriculum, which he notes is not a completely new idea. He explains that the divisions between subject areas, such as math and science, are artificial. When one learns about science of a particular era, he notes, it reflects the arts, philosophy, and literature of the time and vice versa. Elkind states, "Truly integrative teaching involves a commitment to understanding the social historical embeddedness of our
knowledge and to communicating that understanding to students" (1994, p. 11).

Another principle, Elkind states, of the network reform movement is the recognition of the postmodern notion of particularity. This notion is surfacing in the emphasis that academic expectations and standards are constructed from the community context in which the school is situated. It is also being reflected in newer ideas of school management and governance, such as parents, teachers, administrators, and support staff all working to develop school plans, along with new roles for teachers, administrators, and students. Another example, Elkind notes, of the postmodern notion of particularity is the growing appreciation that thinking and learning are domain-specific, shifting away from the notion of universal principles of learning that could be applied across many different domains of learning.

Finally, Elkind explains how the network reform movement is approaching the postmodern notion of irregularity. The movement, he states, recognizes that children learn in irregular ways, which cannot be assessed using standard methods of evaluation. While he does not advocate completely abandoning common ways to measure children's learning, he notes that with systemic approaches to reform, methods of evaluation were used to insure universality and regularity. The network reform approach, he explains, accepts the normality of irregularity.
Elkind concludes that all the money and energy that has been or will be spent on systemic reform efforts, such as the development of national standards, are doomed to failure. While he does not yet know whether the network reform movement has the answers to the complex problem of reforming education, he feels that it has at least recognized that reform efforts must be designed to reflect what is happening in the rest of society. He states, "When we...begin to resolve some of the issues of progress/difference, universality/particularity [and] regularity/irregularity....that will move us far along the highway to a truly postmodern education" (1994, p. 12).

Eisner (1992), reflecting on approaches to reform that Elkind would categorize as systemic, laments that the message these approaches convey to the public and professionals is that the ability to measure, to compare, and to rank is what education is all about. "It is not!" he declares. "Education is about learning how to deal with uncertainty and ambiguity. It is about learning how to savor the quality of the journey. It is about inquiry and deliberation. It is about becoming critically minded and intellectually curious, and it is about learning how to frame and pursue your own educational aims. It is not about regaining [the nation's] competitive edge" (p. 723).
Art Education Since the 1960’s

The previous section reviewed the major educational issues and reform movements during the past three decades. Clearly, a great deal of energy and federal funds have been devoted to improving the nation's schools. In this section, the major movements and events in the reform of arts education in America will be reviewed, relating it where possible to the information in the previous section.

Arts Education — The 1960’s

Efland (1990) explains that the movement to reform education founded in the sciences after Sputnik, provided the model for curriculum reform for the whole of general education, including art education. He notes that as the disciplines approach advanced by Jerome Bruner at the Woods Hole Conference became the focus for curriculum reform in America, all subjects had to jump on the discipline bandwagon or lose their legitimacy. Efland states that in 1961, President Kennedy's advisory committee for science had a direct impact on the arts. The committee expressed concern about the imbalance in federal assistance to the arts as compared to science and wondered whether curriculum reform as it was developing for science education could be applied to the arts.

Harlan Hoffa (1992) points out that August Heckscher, President Kennedy's Special Consultant on the Arts, also expressed concern about the
imbalance in federal assistance for curriculum reform in science education and art education. Heckscher recommended to the President that the U.S. Office of Education at the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (later to be renamed the U.S. Department of Education) correct this situation by instituting broad support for curriculum development in the arts and humanities as it had for science and mathematics since Sputnik. According to Hoffa, Frank Keppel, President Kennedy's newly appointed Commissioner of Education at the USOE, took Heckscher’s recommendations to heart.

**Arts and Humanities Program--USOE**

In July 1963, Commissioner Keppel hired Kathryn Bloom to implement the recommendations concerning arts and humanities education in the Heckscher report to President Kennedy. During her first year at the USOE, according to Hoffa, Bloom headed the fairly isolated Cultural Affairs Branch, which was located under the Division of Library Sciences and Continuing Education. By her second year, all this changed. Hoffa notes that Keppel established a new arts and humanities unit in the Division of Educational Research. This unit was given six professional positions, an almost equal amount of clerical and research assistant positions, and an allocation of $700,000 in research funds for fiscal year 1965. Hoffa points out that Bloom took off with this opportunity and soon developed the Arts and Humanities Program (AHP) at the USOE. Keppel continued, according to Hoffa, to
provide Bloom with the necessary resources to allow the AHP to grow, and he was able to insulate it from the USOE bureaucracy that might have smothered it.

The AHP organized a total of fifteen seminars and several short-term research programs between 1964 to 1968. Laura Chapman (1982) states that these efforts by the AHP set the stage for the Arts in Education movement and stimulated discussions from which three major precedents were set. The first, she notes, was the opportunity for art and music educators to start thinking about major reform to their curriculums. They started to look to the research and curriculum development centers being established with federal funds to find ways that these centers might address the areas of art and music.

A second precedent, Chapman states, followed in the footsteps of the curriculum reform movement that blossomed after the Woods Hole Conference. Imitating the efforts of the science and mathematics curriculum projects, arts educators called upon artists and scholars to assist in defining the arts as a discipline and in developing the curricular materials to support this notion. This gave rise to the idea, as the movement in science education had, of utilizing in the classrooms professionals from the field to demonstrate their methods of inquiry to students. Chapman notes that this strengthened the performance-based, studio curriculum in most schools.
The third precedent, according to Chapman, was set due to the AHP not wanting to appear that it was favoring one art form over another. If an institution wanted to receive federal funds for curriculum development, it had to include research in all the arts, not just art and music.

Hoffa (1992) states that the AHP was quite successful in the 1960's. He points out that over $11 million was invested in arts education research between 1964 and 1970. As the 1970's got going, though, the AHP had neither the funds nor the personnel to support any new research, according to Hoffa. And by the mid-1970's, the program was almost completely dismantled. All in all, Hoffa notes, 185 research projects were completed under the auspices of the AHP, along with its involvement in several long-term research projects, one of which will be discussed later on in this section. The AHP will be discussed more in Chapters Three and Four.

Penn State Conference

In 1965, the AHP sponsored The Seminar in Art Education for Research and Curriculum Development at Pennsylvania State University. Wygant (1993) feels that this seminar, which has become known simply as the Penn State Conference, was the most significant conference of that decade for art education. He notes that much of the thinking that redirected curriculum development in art education since the mid-sixties was articulated in papers presented at this conference. Especially important were the notions
concerning curriculum reform in the arts brought forth by Manuel Barkan of The Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio.

Barkan had been exploring since the early 1960's, according to Efland, how Jerome Bruner's discipline approach to curriculum reform in science could be applied to art education. Efland quotes Barkan explaining that "Bruner does not deny any developmental values which can be derived from engagement in the study of a subject. All he is saying is that the key educational task is to give students an understanding of the fundamental structure of any subject we see fit to teach,...[and that] when applied to the teaching of art this would mean that there is a subject matter of the field of art, and it is important to teach it" (1990, p. 238).

Efland notes that Barkan asked at the Penn State Conference whether the visual arts and the humanities had structures like those in the physical sciences. The most pervasive theme of the seminar, according to Efland, was the notion that art is a discipline in its own right, with goals that should be stated in terms of their power to assist students in engaging independently in disciplined inquiry in art.

Wygant summarizes several points of Barkan's proposal concerning curriculum reform in art education:

- Art education could be conducted as a humanistic discipline.
- The structure of art existed in three domains—the productive, the historical, and the critical—each with its practitioners serving as models for curriculum.
• Teaching should employ both problem-centered and discipline-centered strategies.
• Objectives and activities for learning should be developed through [a] focus on life problems as "organizing centers."
• Because no school system had the capability of developing adequate curriculum guides and resources, the regional centers for research and curriculum development proposed by Elliot Eisner should have the further responsibility for developing, testing, and disseminating guides and unit packages containing all needed resources. (1993, p. 156)

Efland (1990) states that the three domains of curriculum content proposed by Barkan eventually became the hallmark of discipline-centered art education. He notes that this reduced the importance of artistic production in the curriculum. A positive outcome, Efland believes, of the discipline approach was that it shifted the focus of art education away from an excessive preoccupation with self-expression. He states, "As long as this view prevailed, curriculum problems were not dealt with in any systematic way since any designation of content was seen as the imposition of 'adult standards' that were alien to the child. The discipline focus broke this anti-intellectual stranglehold." (1990, p. 244).

Arts in Education Movement

Efland states that for advocates of the Arts in Education movement, art is not a discipline, rather, it is an experience that happens by creating or participating in art activities. Efland notes that this movement had its origins at the AHP in the mid-1960's, and is intimately linked with Kathryn Bloom's career. Efland points out that the AHP had initially reflected the discipline
approach to curriculum development that dominated the nation in the early-1960's. But with the passage of the ESEA in 1965, Efland explains, federal funding policy shifted towards a social agenda, and that this shift affected the AHP. Bloom left the AHP in 1968 to take a position as head of the new Arts in Education Program at the JDR 3rd Fund, where she continued her work with the Arts in Education movement until the fund was terminated in 1979. During her eleven-year tenure at the JDR 3rd Fund, Chapman (1992) indicates, approximately $500,000 per year was invested in pilot projects that emphasized the use of artists and community agencies as resources for learning about art.

Kathryn Bloom wrote, "Arts in education programs do not attempt to define the arts in new ways. Instead, they build upon the values of the arts as they have been honored traditionally.... Professionals with particular expertise in the arts, both within the schools and at the community level, are considered essential to maintaining the quality of teaching and learning in the various fields of the arts and in arts related instruction" (1976, p. 147).

Efland (1990) states that there were several characteristics of this movement. The first was its emphasis on the arts in the plural. The second was its tendency to look outside the school for solutions to educational problems and to regard the schools themselves as part of the problem. Another characteristic of this movement, according to Efland, was its
performance bias, that is, its efforts to expose or involve students in art production or performances. This also gave rise to the use of visiting artists in the classroom. A final characteristic of this movement, Efland explains, was its use of art education for non-art outcomes, such as school morale improvement, student self-esteem improvement, and school attendance improvement. Bloom (1976) felt that when all these factors were in place, then a truly comprehensive arts in education program was the outcome.

Efland feels that the Arts in Education movement was a reflection of its times in the late-1960's and 1970's. He states that this is clear due to its "strong anti-establishment bias, its rhetoric of social activism, and its tendency to eschew school and educators in favor of artists and performers in the somewhat naive hope that the very presence of these individuals would induce change in schools" (1990, p. 247). Chapman, reflecting on this anti-school sentiment, states, "While the arts establishment might have used its growing influence to urge the reform of in-school programs, it has...put a stamp of approval on the very ideas which have served to weaken arts education" (1982, p. 115). This anti-school movement in the arts community has isolated the arts from other subject areas in the schools and left it without the support needed to make it integral to the school curriculum. Efland (1990) does give this movement credit, though, for drawing attention to just how neglected the arts had been in the school curriculum.
Artists-in-Schools Program

Bloom (1976) believed that in addition to the JDR 3rd Fund's Arts in Education Program, which she headed, there were several other agencies who had similar and complementary goals and objectives as her program: CEMREL's Aesthetic Education Program (to be discussed later); the Kennedy Center's Alliance for Arts Education (the topic of this dissertation); and the National Endowment for the Arts' Artists-in-Schools Program. Wygant (1993) states that the NEA's program became widely popular, heavily funded, and sharply criticized by arts educators.

Constance Bumgarner (1994a) explains that the Artists-in-Schools program had its roots in the 1966 Poets-in-the-Schools project at the NEA, one year after the Endowment was established, and has been the base of the Endowment's education policy every since. She indicates that former NEA Chairman Livingston Biddle did not see the Poets-in-the-Schools program as a teaching program but as one meant to enrich a student's learning. He believed the purpose of the program was to allow the poet and child to interact outside the confines of the school's curriculum and class structure. In keeping with the Arts in Education movement, the poets came from the community outside the school to expose students to their ways of thinking and making art. Bumgarner (1994a) also feels that in addition to it being a

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3 This program is referred to in the literature by two slightly different names: Artists-in-Schools and Artists-in-the-Schools. For this discussion, I will use Artists-in-Schools.
supplemental education program, it was also seen as a means of supporting individual artists.

In the late-1960’s, the Endowment, using the basic program design piloted with the Poets-in-the-Schools, implemented the Artists-in-Schools Program, later to be renamed the Artists in Education Program in 1980. Chapman states that this program "became the showcase through which the [Endowment] and arts councils could demonstrate an interest in arts education, employ artists, and win political points by demonstrating that children were being exposed to the arts" (1982, p. 120). Bumgarner (1994a) notes that this program has also had the distinction of being the largest federal program for arts education in the U.S. Chapman (1982) indicates that the Artist-in-Schools budget grew from $145,000 in 1969, to $5.9 million in 1982. This, she laments, occurred at the same time that regular school arts programs and staff were being eliminated in the nation's schools. Hoffa (1992) notes that in the late-1960's and early-1970's, most of the USOE Arts and Humanities Program funds were transferred over to the NEA for the Artists-in-Schools program. Hoffa is not sure how much the Endowment was behind this action, but it significantly hurt the AHP and contributed to its extinction by the end of the 1970's.

Bumgarner (1994a, b) wonders who has really benefitted from the Artists-in-Schools program, as it has been such an important part of the NEA's
efforts in the promotion of arts education nationally. In a study that she conducted about this program in the early 1990's, she notes several findings about the effects of this program at the local level. The first finding was that the program ultimately reached a very small portion, seven per cent at best, of the nation's students, and that of this small group, a disproportionate amount of the students came from middle to upper-middle class suburban and urban communities. Another finding was that the program was not very effective when used in schools that did not already have in place comprehensive, sequential arts education programs. She also found that the learning experiences generated by this program were biased towards performance and rarely included historical, aesthetic, or cultural information. Bumgarner also notes that rarely has this program's practice of sending artists into the schools resulted in a school establishing the arts as a regular school program when one did not exist.

**CEMREL**

In 1967, according to Wygant (1993) and Chapman (1982), the Aesthetic Education Curriculum Program was initiated jointly between The Ohio State University (OSU) and the Central Midwestern Regional Educational Laboratory (CEMREL). Wygant states that this effort grew directly out of the Penn State Conference two years earlier. Chapman indicates that this project was meant to take advantage of the enormous
opportunity in the country for curriculum development initiatives following Sputnik.

The first phase of this project was housed at the OSU and led by Manuel Barkan, Laura Chapman, and Evan J. Kern. They and a team of researchers, Wygant (1993) indicates, had as their task the formulation of theory, conceptual content, procedures, and resources for curriculum development in aesthetic education. After three years, this group produced a monumental handbook, according to Wygant, which was used during the second phase of the project by the curriculum writers at the CEMREL.

Chapman states, "The CEMREL Aesthetic Education Program was intended to address both the creative and appreciative dimensions of music, dance, theater, literature, and the visual arts. The curriculum, designed for use in grades one through six, would be presented through sets of instructional materials which had been thoroughly tried out in schools, then published and marketed. A teacher education program was also planned" (1982, p. 117). Chapman indicates that the federal gamble with arts education was that one well-supported curriculum development program would be the best way to assure that good materials were produced.

The program ran into some major problems. Chapman points out that by the early-1970’s, just as the CEMREL Aesthetic Education program and materials were nearing completion, it was becoming apparent to the nation
that the new science and mathematics materials were not working. In addition, she indicates that it was becoming clear that the arts materials being designed by the CEMREL project were going to be quite expensive to produce. This created a situation where publishers had very little interest in producing these materials as they would be difficult to market due to their expense. Sadly, she believes that the project had a bigger cost for arts education. During the years that the CEMREL Aesthetic Education program was in full swing, she notes, almost all federal support for arts education was directed towards this endeavor to the neglect of the rest of the art education field.

While on the surface this project does not seem to have been successful, Chapman feels that indirectly it has had more influence on arts education than first meets the eye. First, she notes that a large variety of scholarly documents were produced during this project. She also points out that the CEMREL materials became a part of a number of arts education pilot programs sponsored by other agencies, such as the JDR 3rd Fund. Finally, she states that the CEMREL project was instrumental in the design of the Artists-in-Schools program at the NEA.
Arts Education — The 1970's

Coming to Our Senses

In the mid-1970's, a blue-ribbon panel, the Arts, Education and American Panel, formed to study the significance of the arts in the education of American children. The panel of twenty-five members was selected not for their professional experience in the field of arts education, but for their concern about the arts, according to the panel's chair, David Rockefeller, Jr. The panel met five times for three days each to hear testimony, and to review and discuss selected works and materials. The research project lasted for two years, and in 1977 the panel published its report, Coming to Our Senses: The Significance of the Arts for American Education.

In this report, the panel offered ninety-eight recommendations for arts education that were grouped into fifteen areas. As Chapman (1982) notes, clearly the format of the report was meant to shape national policy concerning arts education. She also feels that the recommendations reflected primarily the interests of the NEA, state and local arts councils, and the constituencies of these agencies, namely, the artists and patrons of the arts. According to Chapman, the report called for the additional use of artists and arts councils in the education of children. It supported the notion that the making of art and exposure to art were to be the main focus in an arts curriculum. She notes that the report also advocated the use of the arts as tools for learning in other

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subject areas and for helping to increase school attendance rates. Chapman points out that these recommendations and the others contained in the report reiterated many of the ideas that were promoted during the first decade of the Arts in Education movement.

Efland (1990) notes that while the effort had good intentions, it did not make use of arts educators as resource people. This issue, common to the Arts in Education movement, ended up alienating the exact people that the report was meant to help, Efland feels. Chapman supports Efland’s view by stating that the report was issued and presented to members of Congress without the benefit of prior review by representatives from the professional arts education organizations. She states, "What is significant about [this report] is the willingness of highly influential groups — outside of the profession of arts education — to assume that the school is not, in some fundamental sense, responsible for transmitting knowledge about art to young people; nor is it the most logical agency to do so." (1992, p. 131).

**Arts Education — The 1980’s**

**Discipline-Based Arts Education/ Getty**

The 1980’s brought a call for excellence in education due to the release of the report *A Nation at Risk*. Efland (1990) feels that Discipline-Based Arts Education (DBAE) may be seen as a response to this educational reform movement. As with the National Education Goals developed by
President Bush and the nation’s governors in the 1980’s, Efland notes that DBAE revisits many of the same themes that were first advanced at the Woods Hole Conference during the 1960’s, when curriculum reform centered upon the disciplines.

The designation "discipline-based art education" was first introduced in the mid-1980’s by W. Dwaine Greer (Clark, Day & Greer, 1987), though the foundation of the program goes back to the Penn State and Woods Hole Conferences and to the work of Manuel Barkan of The Ohio State University in the early 1960’s. Elliot Eisner (1990), in justifying a discipline-based approach to arts education, believes that artistic skills and understandings do not come automatically to students through exposure. He emphasizes that students must be nurtured and guided through the acquisition of artistic skills, perceptions, and understandings, and that their stages of development must be taken into consideration when designing the learning experience.

According to Eisner (1987, 1990), the four major aims of DBAE concerning art are: (1) to create it; (2) to perceive and respond to its qualities; (3) to understand its place in history and culture; and (4) to make reasoned judgments about it and understand the grounds upon which these judgments rest. These notions have given rise to DBAE being organized around four art disciplines: art history, art production, art criticism, and aesthetics. Another key feature of DBAE is that the curriculum is sequential. Einser (1987) also
notes that the notion of art as a subject with a content very much like other
general education subjects is central to this movement.

Since DBAE formally came upon the scene in the mid-1980's, it has
sparked much controversy and debate within the arts education community.
According to Greer (1993), two types of criticism seemed to surface. The first
type revolved around the politics of arts education, and the second focused
on the ideas being promoted by DBAE.

Concerning the political side of this controversy, Hamblen (1987)
summed up the feelings of many art education community members with her
comments about DBAE and the Getty Center for Education in the Arts
(GCEA), recently renamed the Getty Education Institute in the Arts. Hamblen
was bothered by DBAE's strong link with the Getty Center for Education. She
wondered in her review of DBAE whether its proponents were acting as
individuals or as spokespersons for GCEA. Eisner and Greer were both
disturbed by this type of viewpoint and took the issue on directly. Greer
(1993) pointed out that even though GCEA never claimed to be the
originators of DBAE and clearly gave credit to its developers, it still became
synonymous in people's minds with the Center. Due to this, he felt that DBAE
was used by the arts education community as a scapegoat for criticism meant
for the Getty Trust and GCEA. In addition, Greer pointed out that there was
another group of detractors whose primary goal was to gain attention for their
own competing approaches to arts education by attacking DBAE and GCEA. With both these groups, promotion of their "political" agendas got in the way of a fair review for DBAE.

Eisner (1990) defended GCEA's role in the promotion of DBAE. He mentioned that the ideas for DBAE had been emerging since the 1960's, but that very little headway was being made in arts education due to sparse government support. According to him, it was the Getty's advocacy of arts education and its financial support that allowed significant movement to be made with these ideas. Eisner makes it clear that the Getty Center for Education in the Arts did not create the conception of DBAE. They decided to adopt it as part of their advocacy efforts. Eisner also pointed out that GCEA was advocating for DBAE as a conception and rationale for teaching art in the schools; they were not promoting a curriculum.

In addition to the political side to the DBAE controversy, there was also much debate concerning its ideas within the art education community. Hamblen (1987) indicated that the inclusion of aesthetics as one of the four disciplines was the most troubling issue facing DBAE. She felt that aesthetics eluded the search for a definitive content that could be given students. DiBlasio (1985), Lanier (1985), and Lankford (1986) all came to the defense of aesthetics as a part of DBAE. DeBlasio felt that its introduction at the onset of schooling assisted in developing aesthetic sensitivity in students. She went
on to discuss how the study of aesthetics served as the foundation for subsequent learning in art studio, art criticism, and art history. Lankford agreed with a question posed by Lanier that seemed to get at the essence of the aesthetic component to art education -- "What is art and why do we respond to it?" (p.49). Lankford felt, though, that another part was needed to make this question complete -- "How should we approach art so that it is meaningful?" (p.50). Lankford emphasized that aesthetics was simply the asking of questions and the search for answers about the nature of art. He added, "[Aesthetics] speaks to artistic expression from the standpoint of the artist and the audience, e.g. how is it that art communicates ideas and emotions?" (p.51). This understanding of aesthetics caused it to stand out as the only one of the four DBAE disciplines that centered on the viewer versus the work of art.

Also troubling some in the arts education community was the perception that what was being promoted as discipline based arts education was just another way of packaging a white-male, Euro-centric approach to the teaching of the arts. According to F. Graeme Chalmers (1987), the notion of DBAE promoted by the Getty Center for Education in the Arts particularly smacked of this narrow approach. In addition to the four restricted disciplines promoted by the Getty Center’s understanding of DBAE, Chalmers noted that the curriculum of each of these disciplines amplified this narrowness. For
example, the study of art history seemed to equal the study of Western monuments with DBAE, Chalmers felt. He urged proponents of DBAE that as art educators in a pluralistic society, it was important to move beyond elitist and narrow conceptions of art education.

Overtime, the criticism of DBAE being elitist and Euro-centric has decreased. The Getty Center for Education in the Arts has embraced a more multicultural approach to DBAE, as was evidence in its 1992 publication, *The DBAE Handbook: An overview of Discipline-Based Art Education*. This publication states that the curriculum of American schools must be sensitive to the changing demographics of the student population. It notes that until recent times, art curriculums have almost overwhelmingly emphasized Western art but adds that this is changing and that the study of art from many cultures is vital. With this in mind, the publication promotes the notion that a discipline-based approach to arts education must integrate into each discipline the study of the art from many cultures.

Another area of criticism about DBAE was raised by Lansing (1986). He saw DBAE as reversing one of art education's greatest contributions to modern education — the learning that occurs through creative self-expression. Lansing stated that he was a strong supporter of the child-centered versus subject-centered school movement. His view was that students in child-centered schools were free from the repressive, adult-
centered approach advocated by the subject-centered schools. He felt that the child-centered schools integrated the intellectual, physical, and emotional for the student, while the subject-centered focused just on the intellectual. Lansing clearly saw DBAE as a subject-centered approach due to it organizing the study of art around the four disciplines.

Einser (1990) potentially provides a balance to this view. Einser stated that an art curriculum "ought to engage youngsters in the making of art, ought to help them learn how to see visual qualities in both art and the environment, ought to help them understand something about the relationship of art to culture over time, and ought to engage them in conversations about the nature of art itself" (p. 424). While this does not totally address Lansing's concerns, it shows that DBAE was meant to actively engage students in their learning and was not meant to be a return to a time when schools worried more about discipline, that is, behavior, than knowledge. The reality was, though, that DBAE went against the creative self-expression approach to art education, since it made art production one of four disciplines in a balanced art curriculum. This potentially meant that less time would be devoted exclusively to creating art, which was the main focus of the approach that Lansing felt important.

Even the term "discipline" in DBAE's title triggered negative reactions due to what some felt was its contrary nature to the artistic spirit. Hamblen
(1987) registered confusion as to whether it was the intent of DBAE proponents to use "discipline" as a noun or verb. She felt that with all the problems in the schools, the use of the term "discipline" was enticing. Hamblen remarked that this might appeal to the general public since it denoted rigor and the disciplining effect of art. Efland (1988) also registered worry about the use of the word "discipline". He questioned whether this term leaned more towards the scientific meaning. If so, would this approach favor the onlooker mode of learning versus the participatory mode, with art becoming an object of learning rather than a quality of experience. These remarks seem to relate back to Lansing's concern discussed earlier.

Efland (1988) also did not accept the notion that the four disciplines must be included in all grades from kindergarten through high school. He felt that equal representation of each discipline was an arithmetic solution, not one guided by an understanding of how children develop, and would produce a curriculum outside the conceptual reach of children.

Criticism also surfaced within the art education community concerning DBAE's goal to be a subject like other general education disciplines. Critics worried that DBAE was claiming that cognition in the arts was identical to cognition in mathematics and science. Einser (1990) addressed this criticism by stating that DBAE advocates were not saying that cognition in the arts was the same as other subject areas. What the advocates were promoting was
the notion of "cognitive pluralism," that is, the breaking down of the old belief that math and science had a monopoly on cognition.

Greer (1993) indicates that much has happened with the DBAE debate since it was first introduced by him in the mid-1980's. He notes that discussions now center more around DBAE's concept versus political agendas aimed at the Getty Center for Education in the Arts. He feels that DBAE's growing success stories and visibility are winning over other art forms, such as dance and theater, to its approach. He notes that a time may be coming when the performing and visual arts may be able to adopt a common agenda for education in the arts. He sums up the changes to DBAE as follows:

[DBAE] seems to define art more broadly, includes art of other cultures, seems to no longer promote only the 100 canons of art made by dead white Euro-American males, seems to embrace the "popular arts" as worthy of serious considerations, no longer equates aesthetics only with aesthetic experiences and responses, realizes the limitations of aesthetic scanning, acknowledges that art has social content as well as form, and is tolerant of contributions of feminist scholars. (p.96).

Greer (1993) also points to a seven-year study conducted by the Getty Center which has shown that where DBAE was instituted, art was more readily accepted as part of general education. He feels that by making the argument for art education in terms of increasing competency, understanding,
and appreciation, it has altered its image as just a "frill" in the minds of school administrators and parents.

Towards Civilization

As written in the preface of the NEA report, *Towards Civilization: A Report on Arts Education*, the 99th Congress in 1985 called for a study of the state of arts education in the United States as part of the Endowment's reauthorization. In May 1988, the above report was presented to Congress with its findings and recommendations. The study was undertaken in cooperation with the USDOE and in consultation with the Committee on Labor and Human Resources of the Senate and the Committee on Education and Labor of the House of Representatives.

The major problems that the report found were that basic arts education does not exist in the United States today, and that there is a major gap between the stated commitment and resources available to arts education and the actual practice of arts education. The report defines basic arts education as a sequential program of study that includes the history, critical theory, and ideas of the arts as well as creation, production, and performance. The report also points out that knowledge and skills in the arts must be tested as is done in other subject areas.

Several of the report's recommendations are as follows:

- Arts education should provide all students with a sense of the arts in civilization, of creativity in the artistic process, of the vocabularies of artistic communication, and of the critical
elements necessary to making informed choices about the products of the arts.

- State education agencies and local school districts should adopt and implement explicit policies to make arts education a sequential part of the basic curriculum for all students in grades K-12. This basic curriculum should include all the arts.

- The U.S. Department of Education and the National Endowment for the Arts should work together to restore to the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) assessments in all the arts.

- The NEA, which is to arts education what the National Science Foundation is to science education, should make the case for the arts being a sequential part of school instruction, and it should assist the development and distribution of curricular, instructional, and assessment models for the benefit of state and local education authorities. (pp. 35 - 36)

Paul Lehman (1992), who participated in developing this report, feels that the NEA must make some fundamental changes in the direction of its arts education efforts if it is to realize the recommendations in *Towards Civilization*. He notes that the Endowment's main educational activity, Artists in Education program (formerly Artists-in-Schools program), is widely seen, despite disclaimers to the contrary, not as an education program but as a full-employment program for professional artists. Bumgarner (1994 a, b) reports the same perceptions in her study into the impact of this NEA program on arts education in the U.S. Both she and Lehman conclude that programs like the ones at the Endowment that emphasize exposure to the arts are not arts education. They recommend that the NEA move towards supporting comprehensive, sequential arts education programs and that they work
towards making arts education an integral part of the curriculum of the nation's schools.

**Arts Education — The 1990’s**

The 1990’s have been marked by great hope and great despair for the arts and the arts education communities. The National Endowment for the Arts entered the 1990’s bruised from the bloody reauthorization battle that it had faced in 1989. Somewhat relieved that most of its funding and programs were still intact and that Congress had imposed very little new restrictive language concerning how funds were to be spent, the NEA tried to get on with business as usual. For the art education community, there was hope that the NEA would make education a more important focus of its total programming as the new NEA authorizing language was favorable towards arts education.

With the release of President Bush’s educational reform strategy, *America 2000*, in the early 1990’s, hope turned to despair for the arts education community. The strategy had adopted as its main goals the National Education Goals developed by President Bush and the nation's governors in the late 1980’s. While *America 2000* called for improving the competency of all the nation's students in five core subject areas, the arts were not included among these, or to be found anywhere else in the plan. The arts and arts education community rose to the occasion to advocate for the importance of the arts in the education of the nation's children. These
efforts soon gained a concession which allowed for arts activities to assist in improving the nation's schools. The arts were not, though, added as a core subject area.

The arts education field won another concession at this time concerning the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). NAEP is considered the "nation's report card" as it takes a national sample of students in grades 4, 8, and 12, and reports on how the nation's students are achieving in certain subject areas. The arts had not been included in this assessment instrument since the late-1970's. The arts and arts education communities were able to secure a commitment that the arts would be included by the mid to late-1990's. This assessment instrument has been developed and administered, although cut back from what was originally committed, and is now scheduled to be repeated every ten years.

Hope returned to the arts education community with the release of President Clinton's educational reform plan, *Goals 2000: Educate America Act*, which was signed into law in March 1994. This act also used the National Education Goals as *America 2000* had, but it modified them to include the arts as a core subject area. The Act has asked each core subject area to develop challenging curriculum and a set of high national standards that communities can use to improve their schools. The Consortium of National Arts Education Associations (1994) has released *The National*
Standards for Arts Education in response to President Clinton's educational reform plan.

The Public Policy System

A policy can be thought of as a set of instructions from policy makers to policy implementers that spells out both the goals and the means for achieving those goals.

Robert T. Nakamura and Frank Smallwood
The Politics of Policy Implementation, p. 32

In reflecting upon the information contained in the first two sections of this chapter, a pattern emerges that is important to note. Most of the issues and movements discussed concerning educational reform and arts education were in response to a growing concern in Congress about a problem rising in the legislative realm. As each concern grew in importance among the members of Congress, they were often met with a congressional action, that is, a public policy meant to respond to the issue. But how does an issue get the attention of members of Congress? What goes into the development of a public policy? What issues surface as a policy is implemented? And how does Congress know if a policy has accomplished what it was designed to do?

In the quote by Robert Nakamura and Frank Smallwood that started this section, the process hinted at for developing public policy seems quite straightforward: write down what is to be accomplished and how it is to be
done for the folks that will be responsible for implementation, then implement. But Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) are quick to point out, as do many other people who are a part of the public policy realm, that this communication between policy developer and policy implementer frequently breaks down creating a failure in the public policy system. Nakamura and Smallwood feel that in order to understand what occurs when a policy is implemented, that it is necessary to explore the related stages of the policy process. They break this process down into three main stages: formulation, implementation, and evaluation. They note that the best way to examine this process is to view it as a system, that is, a set of interconnected elements and linkages.

The purpose of this section of the literature review is to explore this public policy system. While this system can be quite complex, for this discussion it will be organized according to Nakamura and Smallwood’s notion of the stages of the process of developing public policy: policy formulation, policy implementation, and policy evaluation. While these stages are meant to give a sense of order in a policy’s life, Nakamura and Smallwood are quick to remind that the ordered parts can be quite fluid rather than being dominated by a single unidirectional movement from top to bottom or beginning to end. In addition to these stages in the policy development
process, this section will explore the most common failures in the public policy system.

**Policy Formulation**

Historically, according to Nakamura and Smallwood, policy formulation has been viewed as the most formally structured of the three stages in the life of a policy. It is the stage, they note, where "legitimate" policy makers, that is, people who occupy positions in the governmental arena, come together with the authority to assign priorities to certain problems faced by society and to commit public resources towards solving these problems.

John Kingdon (1995) continues this view of policy formulation by noting that ideally policy makers are seen as operating according to a rational, comprehensive decision-making model as they develop policy. According to Kingdon, this means that policy makers first define their goals rather clearly and set the levels of achievement appropriate for these goals. Next, they canvass many, if not all, possible solutions to the problem that might achieve the stated goals. Following this step, Kingdon notes, the policy makers compare the solutions systematically, assessing their costs and benefits, and then they choose the ones that achieve the stated goals at the least cost to the public. Kingdon quickly notes that this ideal view of policy making does not very accurately describe reality. This is not meant to say that policy formulators do not set the general boundaries within which
implementation is to occur, that is, identification of a policy’s goals and solutions. It does say that the policy development process, according to Kingdon, does not follow as rational and comprehensive an approach as often believed. The question then is: What aspects of the policy formulation stage should be explored?

One of the most important components of this stage is the determination of the public agenda (Cobb and Elder, 1972; Kingdon, 1982). According to Kingdon (1995), many problems are brought to Congress for solution. Yet only certain problems capture the attention of people in and around the government. The setting of this public agenda defines the problems or subjects that potentially will be heard or, just as importantly, not heard by Congress. Before policy makers set about their task of defining a policy’s goals and solutions, the issue calling for the need for a policy must rise towards the top of the public agenda in order for it to receive legislative attention. But how does an issue get the attention of members of Congress?

Kingdon (1982) feels that there are several attention-getting forces that affect members of Congress allowing them to gauge the national mood and election repercussions of a problem: the media, lobbyists, and constituencies. He notes that perceptions of the national mood among governmental officials clearly affect the way they attend to an issue. This may mean that these officials will promote certain items that fit the national
mood or will inhibit attention to items that do not. The media, Kingdon notes, is probably the most important of the above three attention-getting forces.

Kingdon believes that members of Congress initially hear about a given problem, fact or interest group viewpoint from the media. He notes that the mass media are capable of the kind of continuous and prominent coverage which makes it virtually impossible for congressmen to ignore an item. Part of the reason for this is that media attention to a problem, fact or interest group viewpoint stimulates interest among the American people in an item. This constituency interest often translates into calls and mail to their congressmen's offices. Additionally Kingdon feels that the media also tend to structure the public discussion about an issue. Due to the ways in which issues are reported and the terms in which they are phrased, the media tend to establish the dimensions along which congressmen and others think about the policy questions involved. Finally, Kingdon observes that it is important to note that the media also play a role in determining which pieces of information will not be brought to the attention of a member of Congress. He notes that rarely will congressmen hear from their constituencies in any volume unless the subject is reported prominently in the mass media.

Another attention-getting force with government officials is lobbyists or special interest groups. Ripley (1983) and Kingdon (1982) believe that these groups may not have much of an impact on the resolution of a problem or
issue, but that they do play a significant role in helping set the agenda on
which Congress and policy makers will act. These groups are also
instrumental in keeping an issue on the public agenda, that is, not allowing it
to fade away before it is acted upon. Ripley notes that the main reason that
interest groups continue to flourish with legislators is due to their major
offering — information. He states that legislators frequently seek out
lobbyists, especially once an issue is on the public agenda, to gain
information on the substance of the issue, on the bureaucratic intent with the
issue, and on constituency opinion and preference with the issue. Ripley
also explains that lobbyists, for the most part, do not concentrate on
changing a congressman’s mind. Rather lobbyists seek out government
officials whom they have identified as supporters and work to reinforce their
views by providing them ammunition to use in pursuing the issues the
lobbyists are promoting.

Kingdon (1995) also notes the importance of special interests groups
on government officials. He believes that if there is widespread agreement
among various interest groups pushing for the same issue, it is more likely
that the government official will go along with them. If there is conflict among
special interest groups, Kingdon states, the officials will look to the balance
of strengths among them. Strengths are viewed in terms of the frequency or
intensity of a group’s communication and their resources. Conflicts among
interest groups can also work against change as the safest route for the legislat
legislator may seem to be the status quo. Ripley (1983) best sums up the impact of interest groups as being dependent more on the harmony of their values with the legislators than on the ability of these groups to wield their "power."

Constituents, whether organized or unorganized, can also be a powerful attention-getting force with members of Congress. Ripley (1983) and Kingdon (1995) feel that this group can have considerable impact on legislators as they can directly affect election results. Ripley notes that members of Congress at times see their constituents through certain filters, such as a particular interest group issue or socioeconomic characteristics. At other times, they deal with their constituents directly. One thing, Ripley assures, is that constituent interests are in one way or another foremost in legislators’ minds. Government officials sense and gauge constituent reactions, Kingdon and Ripley (1982) explain, through various communications that come to them, such as mail, telephone calls, visits to their offices, trips home, newspaper coverage, and conversations with constituents.

Once a problem has gotten the attention of government officials and has risen in importance on the public agenda, it moves to the next component of the policy formation stage, the actual development of a policy and the
narrowing of the solutions meant to address the problem. According to Kingdon (1995), these policy proposals and solutions are generated in communities of specialists. This relatively invisible group, he states, includes academics, researchers, consultants, career bureaucrats, congressional staff, and analysts who work for special interest groups. Ideas bubble up and float around these communities, Kingdon states, and are tried out in a variety of ways to gauge their acceptance among government officials, interest groups, and various constituencies. Kingdon refers to this process as the *policy primeval soup*, by which he means that many ideas float around, bump into one another, encounter new ideas, and form combinations and recombinations (p. 209).

Kingdon notes that at times this part of the process may seem chaotic, but that soon a sense of order comes forth due to the emergence and imposition of criteria. These criteria are used to select certain ideas for survival and to discard the rest. Included in the list of criteria are: technical feasibility, congruence with the values of the community members, and the anticipation of future constraints, that is, budget limits, public acceptability, and politician receptivity. Kingdon believes that during the development stage, recombination, that is, the coupling of already familiar elements, is more important than the appearance of wholly new forms. This strategy for developing policy, he notes, allows for the long and necessary softening-up
process that is critical to get the policy community receptive to a new idea. At times, Kingdon points out, these communities of specialists can be quite tightly knit. At other times, they can be quite fragmented. When fragmented, Kingdon laments, the consequences are disjointed polices, lack of common orientations, and agenda instability.

Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) explain that eventually all the discussions and debates in the policy community need to culminate in a policy statement, as policy makers are not the ones usually involved in the implementation stage. These statements are basically the directives and instructions that policy makers pass on to the policy implementers. Included in these statements, Nakamura and Smallwood state, might be a definition of the problem area, goals to be accomplished, and the population that is to benefit from the policy. Additionally, the statement might articulate the following:

- the suggested approaches by which the goals are to be achieved;
- the key actors who will implement the policy. These actors may be stated directly or could be indirectly indicated by providing resource incentives for others to make claims on the policy;
- the resources to be expended in carrying out the policy; and possibly
- the indicators for measuring the effects of the policy. (Nakamura and Smallwood, 1980, p. 32)

Nakamura and Smallwood note that these statements can range from precise blueprints to rather vague exhortations. They feel that the degree of
specificity in policy instructions ultimately defines the amount of discretion enjoyed by the implementers and evaluators.

**Policy Implementation**

Ripley and Franklin (1982) state that implementation activities are those tasks and activities undertaken after a policy is passed into law. Implementers, according to them, translate the policy’s statements about goals, actors, audience, and resources into concrete actions and programs. They note that the implementation stage can encompass many kinds of actions, such as:

- acquiring resources;
- interpreting the language of the policy and turning it into concrete directives, regulations, and program plans and designs;
- organizing activities by creating bureaucratic units and routines for attacking the workload; and
- extending benefits or restrictions to the target groups. (p. 4)

Ripley and Franklin point out that there are several features of implementation that are important to understand. The first is that bureaucracies are omnipresent during implementation processes, but that they are not omnipotent. They feel that these agencies must bargain for influence during the implementation stage just like any other actors involved. Ripley and Franklin note that while bureaucracies often have legal authority for the implementation of a public policy, this authority is often open to being
challenged due to the vagueness and ambiguousness of the stated
delegation of authority in the policy

A second feature of implementation, Ripley and Franklin state, is that
many federal policies and supposedly national goals rely on units of state
and local governments and some nongovernment units for critical parts of the
implementation process.

The final feature of implementation is that bargaining is omnipresent.
Ripley and Franklin note that policies are assumed to be malleable and never
in their final form. They state that at all stages in the public policy system,
various groups and individuals are allowed to raise both old and new issues.
This allows for continuous access to the policy development process so that
actors can influence the outcomes. Of course, groups and individuals that
did not get all they wanted during the policy formulation stage can attempt to
appeal, amend, and reverse aspects of a policy during the implementation
stage. Ripley and Franklin note that this lack of a single authority in charge
inevitably slows down implementation beyond what the policy formulators
thought desirable.

Policy Evaluation

David Osborne and Ted Gaebler (1992) state that measuring profit in
business is fairly straightforward, but that measuring results in government is
not (p. 207). Eleanor Chelimsky (1985) believes that this is partly due to
confusion in the policy realm between policy analysis and policy evaluation.

Chelimsky states that policy analysis is prospective with the typical question being: What will be the likely effects on a given entity if certain restrictions are put on it? She notes that policy evaluation in contrast is retrospective, with the focus being on the actual effects of the policy. This might include things that have been observed, or that occurred or are occurring. According to Chelimsky, the typical evaluation question might be: What happened to the entity once restrictions were put into effect? (p. 7)

Chelimsky defines evaluation as “the application of systematic research methods to the assessment of program design, implementation, and effectiveness” (p. 7). She notes that information gathered from evaluative activities serve three very broad kinds of purposes:

- policy formulation — that is, to assess and/or justify the need for a new program;
- policy execution — that is, to ensure that a program is implemented in the most cost/effective way; and
- accountability in public decision making — that is, to determine the effectiveness of an operating program and the need for its continuation, modification, or termination. (p. 8)

Chelimsky feels that there are common areas of evaluative information needed by legislators and decision makers in the policy arena, such as:

- the effectiveness of a program;
- client satisfaction or frustration with program services;
- the views of program stakeholders;
- trends in the problem(s) addressed by the program; or
- changes in the dimensions or focus of the program. (p. 24)
The only real difference concerning the needs for this evaluative information by various government officials is the degree of detail supplied about each of the above common areas, she notes. This means that several report versions of the evaluative information gathered may need to be produced to be useful for the various evaluative requirements of a policy. Chelimsky states that an example of these differing needs might be the policy execution information needs of program managers versus the accountability needs of agency heads. Due to these varying evaluative needs, Chelimsky advises that this component of a policy be carefully considered as early on as possible in the policy development process, preferably during the formulation and implementation stages. She notes, that evaluations of policies are few in number and can be terribly costly to carry out. This situation makes the idea of serving numerous evaluative needs with the same evaluation an extremely attractive proposition. But what exactly should be measured during the evaluation stage?

Osborne and Gaebler (1992) offer some thoughts on developing an evaluation process. First, they advise that there is a vast difference between measuring process and measuring results, that is, confusing outputs for outcomes. They suggest that when evaluating a policy, it is important to know what impact it has had on the problem the policy was meant to solve or the clients it was supposed to serve. They note that often evaluative
activities measure how well the services were delivered or managed.

Osborne and Gaebler state that it is a waste of time and money if a policy fails to achieve its desired outcomes, even if it is executed perfectly.

A second thought that Osborne and Gaebler offer is that there is a vast difference between measuring efficiency and measuring effectiveness. Efficiency, they state, is a measure of how much each unit of output costs. Effectiveness, in comparison, is a measure of how well the output accomplished the desired outcome. There is nothing more foolish, they believe, than to do something more efficiently when it should no longer be done. They note that the general public wants efficient government but that they want even more that it is effective. For example, what good is it, they ask, if a state spends less per student than most other states, if its schools are the worst in the nation?

Another thought that Osborne and Gaebler share is that there is an important difference between program outcomes and broader policy outcomes. They note that government officials can measure the outcomes of specific programs developed in response to a policy, but they remind us not to lose sight of the broader goals that a policy is meant to solve. For example, a manager of a job placement program to get welfare recipients off of public assistance might be able to show through an evaluation process that this program is doing an incredible job of placing the target group in jobs.
But they wonder whether the larger policy concerning lowering the numbers of people needing welfare can be viewed as meeting its goal, in spite of a particular program’s success, if the number of people coming onto the welfare roles continues to grow. At some point, they note, government officials must evaluate whether the broader policy goals are being accomplished, in addition to the success of various programs that emerge as a part of the policy’s implementation.

A final thought concerning evaluation from Osborne and Gaebler has to do both quantitative and qualitative analysis. They feel that some extremely valuable results from a policy are impossible to quantify or would be too expensive or tedious to analyze in this way. While they acknowledge that government officials can get enormous insights into performance by looking at relevant numbers, they believe these officials can get equally valuable insights by spending time observing the programs that develop in response to a policy’s goals.

Another aspect to consider when designing the evaluation component of a policy is how this function is to be organized. Chelimsky (1985) proposes two ways of organizing this function: centralized evaluation units or decentralized evaluation units. A decentralized approach is characterized by placing the responsibility for evaluation at the program level versus the central agency level. A centralized approach organizes the evaluation
process to be independent from the program being evaluated. Both of these ways of organizing this function have their advantages and disadvantages.

Chelimsky states that centralized evaluation units have a great deal to recommend them. She notes that they can be sensibly structured, serve all evaluation purposes and needs, and can be held accountable for their performance of this function. She also feels that centralizing this function allows for a more comprehensive and systematic approach to this function, develops a policy memory that is both documented and archived, and is ultimately closer to the top of the decision-making hierarchy and so stands the potential of being more successful in promoting the use of the findings.

Chelimsky also points out that there are some disadvantages with a centralized approach to the evaluation function. She notes that these approaches may find it hard to be independent from an administrator’s ideology or able to stay away from bureaucratic politics. She also believes that centralized evaluative units tend towards deeply held opinions about program policies, problems and the most appropriate matters to look at during the evaluation. This rigidness, she feels, may not allow for enough diversity of opinion to enter the evaluation process. This approach may also exclude participants from the evaluation process who have a legitimate interest in being a part of it.
Chelimsky also discusses the pros and cons of a decentralized approach to evaluation. She believes that decentralized units are in the best position to conduct policy execution types of evaluations. They are also better positioned to ensure the implementation of the evaluation findings by the programs managers. Decentralized units are closer to the nuts-and-bolt’s level of programs and the issues raised by them. She notes that these approaches are further from the top of the hierarchy and so may be freer politically and bureaucratically in carrying out the policy’s mandates. She also points out that there may be more commitment to the implementation activities by the program managers as they are more likely with these approaches to be included in the formulation of the evaluation process.

There are some potential problems with a decentralized approach to evaluation. One issue, Chelimsky mentions, is that this approach is less likely to undertake effectiveness evaluations as the program managers might be more intent on showing how efficient they are at delivering a service. Another issue is that decentralized approaches are typically smaller in size and so find it hard to attract the most highly qualified evaluators. A decentralized approach, she notes, also has a higher chance of duplication of effort as the individual evaluation units may not be coordinated with each other. A final issue that potentially arises, according to Chelimsky, is that the evaluation work done may be dedicated to only the interests of the unit
conducting the process. She points out that decentralized evaluation units have little incentive or capability to ensure support for the differing evaluation needs of a policy’s multiple users.

Public Policy System Failures

Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) state that there can be many failures in the public policy system. One reason for these failures is the breakdown in communication between policy formulators and policy implementers. They note that these breakdowns produce: garbled messages from the formulators; misinterpretations by the receivers; and system failures in terms of inadequate follow-through or compliance with the intent of the policy. Of course, these problems could be avoided the more clearly and specifically a policy’s goals and means for achievement are stated. But what constraints get in the way of producing policy statements that reduce these potential breakdowns in communication?

Nakamura and Smallwood believe that policy makers do their work under a series of constraints, each of which reduces the chance of producing a clear set of instructions for the implementers. These constraints include:

- Technical deficiencies — inadequate knowledge and information about alternative means for achieving a policy’s goals;
- Conceptual complexity — limits on how well the problems are understood and defined; and
- Political coalition-building considerations — limits that can result from the compromises needed to secure agreement for the approval of policies. (pp. 33-34)
Nakamura and Smallwood feel that poorly designed policies can lead to system failures in a number of ways:

1. Designation of inappropriate organizations to carry out the policy:
   - Organizations whose priorities conflict with those of the policy, creating problems of “selective interpretation,” “tokenism,” and “diversion of resources.”
   - Organizations lacking the technical competence to carry out the policy.
2. Making the design too complex to achieve the results in a timely fashion by requiring the serial approval and action of many disparate actors; and
3. Failure to commit adequate resources to the tasks assigned:
   - Insufficient money or
   - Insufficient time. (pp. 42-43)

Kingdon (1995) does not view the breakdowns in communication in terms of constraints and failures but rather as a more realistic description of the policy making system. To begin with, he feels that the ability of policy makers to process information is more limited than ideally thought, where it is believed that they use a rational, comprehensive model for the development of policy [see discussion earlier in this section]. Kingdon believes that policy makers are unable to canvass many alternatives, keep them simultaneously in their heads, and then systematically compare them searching for the most cost-effective means for achieving the greatest benefit to society. In addition, he states that policy makers purposely do not clarify a policy’s goals as this practice is often counterproductive. Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) refer to this practice as the usefulness of ambiguity as it allows policy makers to
construct policies around which majority coalitions can form in spite of the
differences among the coalitions' members. A final belief of Kingdon's (1995)
is that when many actors are involved and they drift in and out of the policy-
making process, the kind of rationality that might characterize a unitary
decision-making structure becomes elusive. As he notes, the conception that
the policy development process proceeds in an orderly, step-by-step manner
is unrealistic.

In addition to breakdowns in communication, there is another failure in
the public policy system that Kingdon raises. He introduces the notion of
missed opportunities in advancing support for policies. Kingdon believes that
three policy process streams operate simultaneously and independently of
each other: the problem recognition stream, the formation and refining of
policy proposal stream, and the political stream.

The problem stream is where various problems come to capture the
attention of people in and around government either through organized
attention-getting efforts or by a focusing event, such as a disaster or crisis.
The policy stream concentrates on generating proposals for potential
problems and is the domain of the policy community of specialists discussed
earlier in this section. Finally, the political stream is composed of things like
swings in national mood and public opinion, election results and changes in
administrations, and interest groups.

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These three streams develop and operate independently of each other but are more likely to advance their causes when coupled with one of the other streams, Kingdon states. For example, a problem is recognized and a solution is available, so the problem and policy streams join forces to advance their cause. Kingdon notes that the probability of an item becoming firmly fixed on the public agenda is dramatically increased if all three streams are linked in a single package, which he feels occurs at critical times. But what are these critical times?

Kingdon calls these critical times the opening of policy windows. He believes that these windows are opened by events in the problem or political streams and provide an opportunity for advocates to advance their causes. He feels that some windows open quite predictably, for example, the scheduled congressional reauthorization of a government program creates an opportunity for members of each stream to push their pet projects or concerns. But some windows open quite unpredictably, for example, when a national election suddenly changes the balance of power in Congress. Kingdon notes that whether a window opens predictably or unpredictably, members of each stream must be prepared for when it happens, that is, their pet proposal at the ready or their special problem well-documented. Kingdon points out that as sure as policy windows open, they also quickly close taking with them the opportunity to advance one’s cause. While eventually, another
window may open to which one can attach one’s cause, for the time being the opportunity has been missed.
CHAPTER 3

SEIZING THE MOMENT: A PRECARIOUS ALLIANCE FORMS

It was a dark and stormy night.... How and where to begin a story is one of the greater challenges facing a historian. The opening line in this paragraph is dramatic and is a line that this historian has often wanted to use, like the great writer Snoopy in the Peanuts comic strip. Yet, it does not seem a fitting start to the story of the Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network (KCAAEN). The Alliance is a federally funded, national arts education initiative that was jointly started in 1973, by the Center and the Office of Education at the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW).

In 1973, Sidney P. Marland, former U.S. Assistant Secretary for Education and a Kennedy Center Board of Trustee, heralded this joint endeavor as a great opportunity for the advancement of arts education nationally. He stated:

much of [HEW's] federal effort in education...has necessarily been directed toward our most pressing educational needs: increasing services to the poor, the handicapped, the
educationally disadvantaged, and many other special categories of persons whom we endeavor to serve....in the Alliance [I see] opportunities for a broad educational relationship with the [Kennedy] Center which will bring some degree of symmetry to our Federal leadership through the affirmative pursuit of creativity and the arts, and their humanizing effect on the education of all persons. (Marland, 1973, p.2)

In closing his remarks inaugurating this new federal initiative, Marland wished HEW's senior management from across the nation the "opportunity to enjoy at first-hand the very impressive resources of the Kennedy Center as a national vehicle for arts education" (Marland, 1973, p.4).

What is striking about KCAAEN's story after this powerful inauguration is that by the end of the 1980's, the Alliance Network was in deep trouble. Nationally, few in the arts education community knew much about this national arts education initiative or could speak about its accomplishments in advancing arts education in the United States since 1973. The Alliance had become so troubled that in the early 1990's, the new chairman for the Kennedy Center, James D. Wolfensohn, several Center staff members, and a national consultant, hired by the new chairman to study the effectiveness of this national arts education initiative and other Center education programs, proposed that the Center cease its relationship with the Alliance for Arts Education.

Documenting the story of the Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network from its inception to this call for the ceasing of
sponsorship of this national arts education initiative is the primary purpose of this study. The immediate challenge becomes where the appropriate place is to start with the telling of this history. Of course, if we were in the Land of Oz wanting to begin our journey to the Emerald City, the advice would be to start at the beginning, which was clearly indicated by the start of the Yellow-Brick Road. For this study, the beginning is not as clear. While 1973 is the year of the Alliance’s inception, we must go back a decade and a half before this to make sense of why HEW would in the first place decide to locate a national arts education initiative at the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D.C.

Being Called to Action

The National Cultural Center Act

On September 2, 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed into law a bill that called for the construction through voluntary contributions of a cultural center in the District of Columbia. Entitled the “National Cultural Center Act,” this bill had been enacted a few weeks earlier by Congress with little opposition. In signing, President Eisenhower urged prompt action on this bill and stated that there had “long been a need for more adequate facilities in the Nation’s capital for the presentation of the performing arts” (D.C. Cultural
Center, 1958, p.310). He felt that construction of this Center would be something of which the entire nation could be proud.

Provisions of this bill as signed into law, Public Law 85-874, established the National Cultural Center as a bureau in the Smithsonian Institute in Washington, D.C. This bureau was to be directed by a board of trustees whose duties, in addition to the sizable task of raising the funds for the Center’s construction, included the following mandates:

1. present classical and contemporary music, opera, drama, dance, and poetry from this and other countries,
2. present lectures and other programs,
3. develop programs for children and youth and the elderly (and for other age groups as well) in such arts designed specifically for their participation, education, and recreation, and
4. provide facilities for other civic activities at the Cultural Center (P.L. 85-874, 1958, p. 1699).

The bill also specified how the membership of the board would be composed. While this list is long and included many high government officials, Members of the Senate, Members of the House, other Presidential Appointees and private citizens, for this study it is important to note two specific designees: the Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Education, United States Office of Education, HEW (P.L. 85-874, 1958, p. 1699).

As stated earlier, Congress expected that construction and maintenance of this national center would be paid for with voluntary contributions. The only assistance that Congress originally gave was $5
million worth of federal land as a site for the proposed National Cultural Center.

On January 23, 1964, the yet-to-be-built National Cultural Center was renamed as the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in honor of the recently assassinated President of the United States. The new law, P.L. 88-260, designated that the Center shall be the sole national memorial to the late President within the city of Washington and its environs. The law also authorized for this living memorial an appropriation, not to exceed $23 million, that would equal the voluntary contributions for construction of this Center. Soon after the Center's opening in the spring of 1971, additional amendments to the National Cultural Center Act provided public funds through the National Park Service for maintenance, security, information, interpretation, janitorial and all other services necessary to the nonperforming arts functions of this memorial to President Kennedy. The Center's Board was still expected to raise voluntary contributions for all the other mandates.

The Kennedy Center Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for Education

In 1969, James E. Allen was appointed U.S. Commissioner of Education at HEW. Before taking this national position, Allen, New York State's Commissioner of Education, was best known as an urban-oriented innovator and concentrated his efforts on reconditioning deteriorating slum schools and championing integration and civil rights. He also served on the
Education Advisory Committee to the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts in New York City for the five years preceding his appointment as U.S. Commissioner of Education (National Cyclopedia, 1977, p. 336).

Upon his arrival in Washington in 1969, Allen was appointed to the Board of Trustees for the Kennedy Center as required by the National Cultural Center Act. Ralph E. Becker, General Counsel for the Center and the Board of Trustees, was particularly interested in Allen's appointment due to his time with the Lincoln Center's Education Advisory Committee. Becker visited Allen in August of 1969, to discuss a growing concern that he had as the Center's 1971 grand opening approached. Becker worried that the Center had yet to act upon one of its mandates as set down in its enabling legislation, that is, to develop programs for children and youth and the elderly (and for other age groups as well) in such arts designed specifically for their participation, education, and recreation. Becker felt that an education program had to be ready to go into effect when the Center opened its doors to the public, and that Allen's experience with the Lincoln Center could greatly contribute to this effort. He urged Allen to address this issue at the next meeting of the Board of Trustees, which Allen agreed to do. Becker promised to discuss with Roger L. Stevens, Kennedy Center Chairman, Allen's involvement with this matter.
As agreed upon for the September 29, 1969 meeting of the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees, Allen commented on the Center's congressional mandate concerning educational activities. He stated:

The performing arts are unique, even in the company of the arts. The intelligence and sensitivity they mobilize convey insights into the human condition — illuminations that heighten man's understanding of himself, his world, and his values through the ages. This, however, is equally true of painting and literature. The performing arts have something more — a kind of magic that surmounts the barriers of difference between people and speaks of the true kinship of mankind. (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 9/29/69, pp. 10-11)

Allen suggested that the Center in its role as the National Cultural Center could have a central role in bringing performing arts education into the educational experience of every child and youth in America and in making live performing arts an integral part of the educational programs for the Nation's schools and colleges. Up to this point, ideas being floated by the Board concerning its education mandate focused mostly on serving the District of Columbia and its environs, and those citizens who attended functions at the Center itself. Allen introduced the notion that the Kennedy Center could reach out nationally and lead the Nation in advancing performing arts education for all citizens.

He then outlined an approach that the Center might take towards this end. The most important step in planning for the Center's educational activities, he felt, would be the hiring of an education director and the
appointment of an education advisory committee, as had been the situation at the Lincoln Center. This committee, he advised, should be chaired by one or more members of the Kennedy Center’s Board of Trustees and should be made up of educators and performing artists who have worked successfully in the development of programs in performing arts education nationally (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 9/29/69). Allen then listed several possible educational activities in which the Kennedy Center might engage, such as, the preparation of teaching materials related to the performing arts; the creation of an artist-in-residence program for communities; and the creation of a Talent Center to serve the special needs of talented youth.

At the next meeting of the Board in January 1970, Senator Edward Kennedy, a member of the Board, raised several education concerns. He mentioned that the Center should consider approaching Congress for support of specific education programs and expressed how impressed he was by Allen’s comments at the last Board meeting. Allen took this opportunity to remind the Board of his recommendation that an advisory committee on education be set up on an ad hoc basis to develop an education plan for this National Cultural Center. Chairman Stevens agreed, possibly due to the comments of Senator Kennedy, and asked Allen to convene a group for this task and to report back to the Board with the group’s recommendations (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 1/26/70).
Allen wasted no time in acting on this task of setting up the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Education to plan an education program for the Kennedy Center. He assigned his Special Advisor on the Arts and Humanities, Harold (Bud) Arberg, to move ahead on this project and gave Arberg a list of potential committee members, all of which agreed to serve. This list included Ralph E. Becker, General Counsel for the Center; Lily Guest, Chairman for the National Council of the Friends of the Kennedy Center; Vivienne Anderson, Director for the Division of the Humanities and the Arts with the New York State Department of Education; Mark Schubart, Vice President for Education at the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts; and Walter King. King, according to Arberg, was a friend of Allen's from his days at the New York Department of Education. Arberg advised Allen that he should include the chief administrative officers of the national performing arts education associations in music and theater. Charles Gary of the Music Educators National Conference, and William Inglis of the American Educational Theatre Association. Arberg also wanted to include a representative from dance but indicated that that association was not really organized yet (H. Arberg, Personal Communication, February 10, 1970).

In his letter of invitation to the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for Education members, Allen wrote that the educational program of a national monument such as the Kennedy Center is potentially a strong force for the
strengthening of performing arts education throughout the country. Due to this potential, he hoped that all invitees would agree to assist him with the task of developing preliminary plans for the educational program of the Center (J. Allen, Personal Communication, February 10, 1970).

The agenda of the first meeting of this group on March 5, 1970, gives a sense of how Commissioner Allen was visualizing the education program for the Center. First on the agenda was a presentation about the Lincoln Center's education program by Mr. Schubart from the Lincoln Center. This was followed by a presentation about how schools in New York participate in the educational programs of the Lincoln Center and other performing arts centers by Dr. Anderson from the New York State Department of Education. Next, Commissioner Allen led the group in a discussion defining educational goals for the Kennedy Center with a national, regional and local emphasis and in a discussion of the potential role of the Office of Education at HEW in the Center's educational programming.

At this meeting, the group came to a unanimous agreement concerning the national scope of the Kennedy Center education program. The professional performing arts education associations expressed wholehearted support of the plan that was being generated for presentation to the Kennedy Center Board. Becker warned the Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the attitudes of the Board members towards an education program, many of
whom, he felt, saw this idea as a foreign concept for the Center. It was suggested that a recommendation be included in the report stating that an education subcommittee of the Board be appointed that would be sympathetic to the notion of an education program and could serve as spokesmen and liaison with the other Board members. The group also recommended that a strong relationship should be established between the Office of Education, the Kennedy Center, the Endowments, and the professional performing arts education associations in relation to the Center’s educational programming (H. Arberg, Personal Communication, March 13, 1970).

On June 4, 1970, Allen sent to Kennedy Center Chairman Stevens the Ad Hoc Committee’s finalized proposal for an education program. He asked that it be discussed at the Center’s Board meeting the following Monday, June 8, 1970, which he had to miss due to delivering a commencement address.

The proposal reinforced the notion that the Center as a national memorial should reach out to the entire nation with its educational programs. The proposal also stated that the education program should be built with three concepts in mind: 1) performing arts education represents a unique and essential element in the education of all persons; 2) the Center should take the lead in establishing models of excellence in performing arts education; and 3) a dynamic education program is the one best means by which the Center can earn broad support locally, regionally, and nationally.
The proposal went on to outline an education program policy for the Center. Essential to the success of an education program at the Center, the document notes, is the unequivocal commitment of the Board to this proposed policy, which states that the Center will:

1. Develop performing arts education programs and projects which will provide national incentives and models of excellence [Recommended programs listed in this section of the document are identical to the ones presented by Allen at the 9/29/69 Board meeting].

2. Work cooperatively in developing its Education Program with such Federal agencies as the U.S. Office of Education, National Endowment for the Arts,...the national professional associations already engaged in performing arts education; and with other appropriate Federal, State, and local organizations.

3. Represent a standard of quality and excellence in all media and styles of performing arts education.

4. Provide an Education Program Staff capable of developing and administering the Program. Staffing proposal included an Education Director reporting to the General Director for the Center, who consults with the Artistic Administrator for the Center and an Education Advisory Committee; a Coordinator of Performing Arts Material Development and Training; A Coordinator for Festivals and Student-Teacher Attendance; and A Coordinator of Artists-in-Schools and Talent Development. All this staff would report to the Education Director. (J. Allen, Personal Communication, June 4, 1970)

The proposal then discussed how the education program could be financed. It was suggested that the Center consider the following options:

- Cost-sharing with recipients of the educational services of the Center.
- Contracts with groups.
- Federal government assistance to establish a basic education program.
• Private support from foundations, corporations, and individuals. (J. Allen, Personal Communication, June 4, 1970)

The plan recommended setting up two advisory committees at the Center: 1) an Education Advisory Committee for the Center’s Education Program, to have a Chair and seven members from the fields of music, theatre, dance, teacher education, administration, media, and curriculum; and 2) a five-member Education Committee of the Board made up of Board members to oversee the Education Program of the Center.

The Ad Hoc Committee for Education’s proposal for an education program was never adopted. Why this happened is unclear due to the condition of the archives kept by the Kennedy Center. What is clear is that the Kennedy Center Board minutes for the June 8, 1970 meeting at which Commissioner Allen wanted the proposal discussed do not report any discussion having taken place concerning the Center’s educational programming. It is also clear that Commissioner Allen could not continue to advocate for this proposal with the Board as he was fired on June 10, 1970, by President Nixon after publicly criticizing the Administration’s military incursion into Cambodia and what Allen considered the Administration’s procrastination in enforcing school integration (Moritz, 1972, p.311).

Sometime during June or July 1970, a discussion about the Ad Hoc Committee’s proposal did take place. It is not completely clear all who
attended this meeting. In an August 21, 1971 letter to Kennedy Center Chairman Roger Stevens, Norman Fagan, Executive Director of the West Virginia Arts and Humanities Council, wrote his critique of an education plan for the Center that was presented at a meeting on the 27th of June or July, 1970, that he attended at Stevens' invitation. Fagan seemed amazed at the degree of unity that existed with the group presenting the plan, which seems to be the Ad Hoc Committee for Education, minus Commissioner Allen. While this would normally be considered a compliment, Fagan's next comment to Stevens sheds a different light. He wrote, "I also felt kind of an undercurrent [among the group] that they just can't wait to get the Center in their clutches (particularly the art education people)" (N. Fagan, personal communication, August 21, 1970).

Why Stevens invited Fagan to critique the Ad Hoc Committee's plan is left to conjecture as no other records exist of their conversations. What is certain is that Fagan was being considered by Stevens to be the Center's first Director of Education, and that Fagan's letter critiquing the Ad Hoc Committee's proposal was used to justify the hiring of Fagan to the Center's Board, the rejection of the Ad Hoc Committee's proposal, and the promotion of an entirely different education program proposal for the Center (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 1/22/71).
Fagan outlined this alternative proposal in the same letter in which he critiqued the Ad Hoc Committee's education plan for Stevens. What is interesting is that Fagan's ideas so paralleled Stevens' views concerning educational programming at the Kennedy Center that one wonders how often in the past they might have discussed this matter. If these discussions did take place, it is entirely possible that they occurred before or as Commissioner Allen and the Ad Hoc Committee for Education were being charged with the task of proposing an education program for the Center due to Senator Kennedy's comments at the January 26, 1970 Board meeting. Fagan's letter to Stevens was written just seven months later.

In his August 21 letter, Fagan advised Stevens that he saw the Center's education program on two levels: 1) a sales promotion effort to sell the Center's scheduled performing arts programs and to develop educational materials to complement them; and 2) a quietly conducted program of laboratory experimentation to develop new methods and materials in teaching the arts. Fagan felt that many school arts programs were directed towards the training of artists but not the training of audiences. He wanted to change this situation as it would better serve the Center. These ideas are ones that Stevens himself believed in as the real purpose for an education program at the Center, that is, the selling of the performing arts programs and the building of audiences to attend performing arts events.
Fagan also agreed with another idea of Stevens to form a professional resident repertory company at the Center with actors and technicians being selected from the top college students in the United States. Additionally, Stevens wanted to set up a national competition for student playwrights and composers. These ideas eventually led to the Center courting the already established American College Theater Festival\(^1\) to relocate itself to the Kennedy Center.

As stated earlier, Stevens advised the Board at the January 22, 1971 Board Meeting that he had hired Fagan as the Center’s first Director of Education and that he felt this action to be justified due to Fagan’s letter critiquing the Ad Hoc Committee’s proposal. Interestingly, he justified the need for a Director of Education at the Center based on the Ad Hoc Committee’s rejected proposal, which had stated that it was vital that the Center hire an education director. A press release issued by the Kennedy Center prior to this Board meeting stated that Fagan was hired to develop for the Center a series of educational programs designed to further on a national basis an understanding and appreciation of the performing arts. How this was to be accomplished was not stated, but the press release showed that the

\(^1\) The ACTF pre-dated the Kennedy Center and was developed by the American Theatre Association with support from Roger Stevens. It was now housed at the Kennedy Center in an effort to showcase exemplary college performing arts programs and students.
Kennedy Center had borrowed another idea from Allen and the Ad Hoc Committee, that is, that the Center should be reaching out to the nation with its efforts in promoting the performing arts.

The Board at this January meeting resolved to ratify the hiring of Fagan. There is no record that this action was questioned by any Board member or that it was even really discussed by the Board. The Board further resolved that the new Director of Education was to develop and propose an education policy and program for the Center in consultation with the Presidential appointed Advisory Committee on the Arts\(^2\); and the Friends of the Kennedy. This was the same charge that a year earlier they had given to Commissioner Allen and the Center’s Ad Hoc Advisory Committee for Education. Why the Board so readily accepted Fagan’s critique and rejected the Advisory Committee’s proposal is not clear. And why they chose not to appoint another education advisory committee of educators and artists to assist with this charge to the new Director of Education is puzzling due to the national outreach goal for educational programming at the Center. What is also noteworthy is that the Board did not ask the new Commissioner of Education, Sidney P. Marland, Jr., who had replaced Allen on the Board, to assist Fagan with this task (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 1/22/71). This situation would change by the following year.

\(^2\) This group is the Kennedy Center’s lay advisory group of 120 members from around the country who are appointed by the President of the United States.
Jumping On Board A Mandate

Deja Vu All Over Again

By 1972, concern was again raised by Congress and several others about the Center not fulfilling the mandate in its enacting legislation regarding educational programming for the citizens of the United States. Julian Euell, Assistant Secretary for Public Services at the Smithsonian, reported on this matter to S. Dillion Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian, to whom the Kennedy Center was required by law to report each year. Mr. Euell indicated that he had attended a Center Board meeting in late-1972, where Senator Edward Kennedy had inquired about what the Center was really doing to fulfill its obligations to educate the American public. Euell wrote that Kennedy felt that the Center clearly was not doing enough, especially as it had let go its Director of Education, Norman Fagan, during the Center's recent economy drive. Euell stated, "I therefore have some reservations about how serious the Kennedy Center people are about education, especially Mr. Stevens, since they are in such a financial bind, committed to making money and running the Center like a commercial house" (J. Euell, Personal Communication, April 27, 1973).

Fagan during his short tenure as Director of Education had started to offer educational activities for the Center. These efforts included activities for

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3 This phrase originated with Yogi Berra.
the District of Columbia and its environs that brought students into the Center itself to access its programs. Little, if anything, was being done to reach out with educational programming to the rest of the nation (Rogers, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996). This situation worried Congress and Senator Kennedy as he wondered what the Center was doing to serve Mr. Jones from North Dakota (J. Euell, Personal Communication, April 27, 1973). Of course, Fagan might have fulfilled this expectation if his tenure at the Center had been longer. By mid-1972, the Center was without an education director and was again without a clear plan for its educational programming.

At that time, Ralph E. Becker, General Counsel for the Center and the Board of Trustees, made another visit to the U.S. Office of Education, as he had done several years earlier in visiting James Allen. Becker asked the new Commissioner, Sidney P. Marland, Jr., for help in fulfilling the Center’s congressional mandate for an educational program. Marland, not sure how to respond to this request, sought the advice of his Special Advisor on the Arts and Humanities, Harold (Bud) Arberg, who had assisted Commissioner Allen and the Kennedy Center’s Ad Hoc Advisory Committee on Education in the development of the education program proposal presented to the Kennedy Center in 1970.

According to Arberg (Personal Interview, June 13, 1996), he saw this new request as a much greater opportunity than just developing an education
program plan for the Center. Arberg felt that this was a chance to pull
together two federal entities, the Office of Education and the National Cultural
Center, to form an alliance at the federal level that would be a model for
potential alliances at the local level. Arberg understood that the Center had
something that his agency did not. The Office of Education’s Arts and
Humanities Program, which Arberg headed and which was on the wane since
the late-1960s, was a grant-making agency and could not by law run
programs. The Kennedy Center, in contrast, was new and was mandated by
Congress to offer educational programs in the arts for all the citizens of the
nation. Arberg’s notion was to jump on board the Center’s mandate, broaden
its plans for educational programming, and form a joint effort for arts
education. This idea would not only assist the Center in fulfilling its legislative
obligation but it would give the Office of Education the program that it lacked
for advancing arts education nationally. He suggested to Commissioner
Marland that the Office of Education propose to the Kennedy Center the
notion of forming a national alliance for advancing arts education in the
nation’s schools.
The Alliance for Arts Education is Born

At the April 4, 1973 Kennedy Center Board of Trustee Meeting, Marland outlined his and Arberg's plan for an education program at the Center, which the Board immediately approved and adopted. He proposed that the Office of Education and the Kennedy Center jointly sponsor an initiative to advance arts education nationally. He called this joint effort the Alliance for Arts Education and stated that it was a potential means of achieving two broad purposes. First, the AAE would enable the Center's performances and services to become available to ever increasing numbers of people throughout the country, including students of all ages, an important goal for the financially strained cultural center. Second, the Alliance would help the Center, as a national symbol of excellence, to become a vehicle and focal point for strengthening the arts in education at all levels, and, hopefully, quell the criticism arising in Congress (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 4/4/73).

Marland's plan also stated that this joint effort would be in cooperation with the four national arts education associations commonly known as the DAM'T group: the National Dance Association, the National Art Education Association, the Music Educators National Conference, and The American Theatre Association. This group, according to Marland, was strongly interested in the concept of the Alliance and wanted to be a part of developing
and implementing a full plan for it. Marland then asked the Chairman of the Kennedy Center, Roger Stevens, to appoint an Education Committee to oversee the development and operation of the AAE. He proposed that Stevens include himself as an ex-officio member of this committee and also appoint three members of the Center Board and three people from outside the Board. At this point, he did not designate that any member of the committee be from the DAM'T group, though, this would change by the time the committee was appointed.

While Marland did not propose funding this program with Office of Education funds, he arranged to furnish through the Intergovernmental Personnel Act a full-time education professional as Director of the AAE project during its initial year. Arberg in his discussions with the DAM'T group about the Alliance mentioned that a director was needed to run the AAE. Tony Reid, Executive Director of the American Theatre Association, recommended Forbes (Buck) Rogers, Education Coordinator of the Oregon Shakespearean Festival Association in Ashland, Oregon. Rogers was interested in the new project and the Executive Director position, and agreed to move to Washington. This allowed Stevens to announce as the Alliance plan was presented by Marland to the Kennedy Center Board at their April 4, 1973 meeting that Rogers had already been hired to oversee the creation of this new program (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 4/4/73).
Once the Board had approved and adopted the notion of the Alliance and the new Executive Director was hired, the Office of Education and the Kennedy Center formally announced this joint effort to the nation. In an April 13, 1973 letter to all the nation’s Chief State School Officers and the HEW Regional Commissioners, Marland outlined the idea for the Alliance for Arts Education and asked their assistance in gaining support nationally for this new federal initiative. Marland explained to them that the Alliance had two purposes:

1. to systematize and facilitate access by students of all ages to the Center’s performances and productions at attractive rates, either singly or in groups; and
2. to design a system of performing arts activities that would help strengthen the arts in education and provide ultimate access to students as performers in the various facilities of the Kennedy Center. These would include the Concert Hall, the Opera House, and the Eisenhower Theatre, as well as the galleries of the Center for the display of visual art. (S. Marland, Personal Communication, April 13, 1973)

Marland then stated that the goal he was pursuing for the Center was to make it a national educational resource for music, theater, film, opera, dance, as well as the literary and visual arts. As quoted in the opening of this chapter, Marland shared with these high-ranking education officials that he saw “in the Alliance opportunities for a broad educational relationship with the Center which will bring some degree of symmetry to our Federal leadership through the affirmative pursuit of creativity and the arts, and their humanizing effect on the education of all persons” (S. Marland, Personal Communication,
April 13, 1973). What he meant by this was not clear and his letter to them did not elaborate.

In this letter, Marland also called for a series of regional meetings in May and June, 1973, to be held in each of the ten cities containing a HEW regional office. The purpose of these meetings was to develop each state's plan for participating in the regional and national phases of the Alliance for Arts Education. It is not clear why he felt that the states would want to participate in this new initiative, though he seemed confident that they would. Harold Arberg, OE's Director of the Arts and Humanities Program, was then designated by Marland to be the principal staff coordinating these efforts for HEW. Marland also indicated that he did not want new organizations springing up across the nation as a part of this initiative. His goal, he stated, was "to build upon existing organizations and resources without necessarily attempting to create more organizations" (S. Marland, Personal Communication, April 13, 1973).

At each regional meeting, Marland wanted the following local representation to attend: regional commissioners and appropriate staff; chief state school officers and their arts and humanities directors; regional representatives of the KC Advisory Committee on the Arts; regional and state representatives from the national professional arts education organizations; arts and humanities representatives from regional universities, and executive
directors from state arts and humanities agencies, if established. These meetings were to be followed by state-level meetings with a similar list of attendees.

A document issued by the Kennedy Center one month later (Kennedy Center, 1973) outlined the main objectives for these meetings as being: 1) the establishment in each state of an AAE committee with an elected chairman and representation as outlined in the Marland memorandum, and 2) the establishment of committee responsibilities. These responsibilities included: representing the broad interests of the arts education organizations throughout a state; establishing a dependable system in each state for carrying out the purposes of the AAE in actually performing services to students; and providing through each state AAE chairman a means of communication with the national AAE committee and its staff. It is not clear from this document who was meant by students and what services they intended to perform for them. It is also confusing as this document calls for the creation of state AAE committees, which seems to conflict with Marland's goal that no new organizations be created.

In a letter to the Chairmen of the National Endowment for the Arts and the National Endowment for the Humanities, respectively Nancy Hanks and Ronald Berman, Marland wrote about the Office of Education's new arts education initiative, the Alliance for Arts Education. He indicated that the
effort was already under way and that a series of regional meetings would soon be taking place to plan for the AAE. Apparently hoping for support from the two Endowments, he wrote, “I believe AAE can become one means of bringing together at the State level all those agencies concerned with strengthening the arts in education....I have a strong feeling that much can be accomplished by making better use of existing organizations working in concert (synergism is the “in” term, I think)” (S. Marland, Personal Communication, April 25, 1973).

A couple of things should be noted at this point. One is that with each new communication released about the Alliance, whether by the Office of Education or the Center, a slightly different spin was given concerning its potential purpose and form. This issue would soon surface as a major concern about the AAE. A second thing is that the notion of the Alliance as a major player in a national effort to advance and improve arts education in America’s schools was surfacing with more frequency in the communications being released and the presentations being made about it.

**Giving Form to a Federal Initiative**

Reflecting on the situation that existed when he arrived in Washington in 1973, as the first Executive Director for the new Alliance project, Forbes “Buck” Rogers stated:

> There was this wonderful synergistic idea of bringing the arts and education together in a marriage at the national level. But you know what, quite frankly, that’s all there was.
There was no money. There was no program. There was no direction. I was given an office in Kennedy Center. I was paid by the Oregon State Department of Education through a transfer from the U.S. Office of Education. I had no budget....There was nothing. There were some good ideas but no program (Rogers, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996).

Roger's assessment of the situation that he found would be echoed in many of the concerns soon to be raised about the Alliance, which will be dealt with in the next section of this chapter.

To remedy this gap between idea and program, the Kennedy Center and the Office of Education went searching for assistance in giving form to the Alliance project. During May and June of 1973, as stated earlier, a series of regional meetings were held to introduce the Alliance to the states and to seek their input. From the federal level, Bud Arberg, Office of Education, and Roger Stevens, Kennedy Center, attended all ten of these regional meetings. Additionally, other members of the Kennedy Center Board, the President's Advisory Committee for the Arts and the Friends of the Kennedy Center attended when their schedules permitted.

Stevens soon reported back to the Kennedy Center Board his conclusions from attending these ten meetings. He stated:

1. There is a desire throughout the country for information concerning the Kennedy Center and an effective way to disseminate information must be developed;
2. A program must be developed so that states can send to the Kennedy Center their programs; and
3. Tourists who come to the Kennedy Center must be encouraged to attend Kennedy Center presentations (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 6/14/73).

Arberg also reported to the Office of Education about these meetings. Basically, he felt that the participants wanted two things from the Alliance project: 1) to find ways to make the Center’s performing arts and education activities available to students and teachers from across the nation, and 2) to make the Center accessible to talented individuals and groups for their participation in productions as career development. (H. Arberg, Personal Communication, July 27, 1973).

What is striking in Stevens’ and Arberg’s reports is the different perspective they held in comparison to the reports written by the regional groups. A summary report for these ten regional meetings was attached to the August 1, 1973 Board minutes. While the design of Phase I of the AAE project was presented at this meeting, no discussion seemed to take place concerning the principal findings from the states. The attached report stated that the state participants:

1. showed little interest in serving as ticket agents or ticket promoters for the Center. For many, the Center is seen as a competing facility, not a national memorial.
2. are interested in AAE as a means of strengthening the arts in the curriculum, and urge a policy statement by the Assistant Secretary for Education in this regard. They see participation by their students in Center activities as a desirable by-product of this principal effort.
3. asked to single out one significant observation as a result of the meetings, it would be that in every case artists and educators found communication amongst
themselves most significant and rewarding. (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 8/1/73)

Both the Stevens and Arberg reports seemed to place the Center as the focal point of the emerging Alliance program in fulfilling the state participants' needs. The reports that surfaced from the regional groups placed the advancement of arts education more at the center of the Alliance project. While this may seem like a minor difference, this incongruity would eventually lead to increasing problems for the Alliance for Arts Education.

Based on the Stevens and Arberg reports, Phase I of the AAE, as mentioned above, was designed and presented to the Board at its August 1, 1973 meeting. This phase was meant to be a pilot program that would take place in ten pilot states with the major goal being for each state to identify, promote and screen arts events in order to select a group in theater, music, dance and the visual arts. These state groups would be showcased at the Kennedy Center during the spring or summer of 1974. Phase I also called for all states to appoint an AAE coordinator at their state department of education (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 8/1/73).

Even before this plan was presented to the Center Board, Roger Stevens, Chairman of the Kennedy Center, wrote United States Representative John Brademas to request funding support for this new educational initiative at the Kennedy Center. In this memorandum, he justified his request by stating that the Alliance was a joint effort between HEW and
the Center, and that one of the goals of this program was to establish the
Center "as a national focal point for strengthening the arts in education at all
levels" (R. Stevens, Personal Communication, June 19, 1973). Stevens
stated that the funds for the AAE would be used for the following activities:

1. To provide the Office of Education with funds to develop
written and audio-visual materials to acquaint students at
the state level with the educational assets of the Center.
2. To provide the AAE state committees with operational
funds for a state chairman so that they can provide
logistical support for AAE programs.
3. To develop symposiums, master-classes, [and]
workshops for groups travelling to Washington and
visiting the Center.
4. To develop "outreach" programs which can be made
available to the states on a matching fund basis.
5. To provide travel funds so that a cohesive mechanism
can be maintained among the various states and the
Kennedy Center. This item would include bringing three
members of each state AAE committee to Washington for
an indoctrination and orientation of the Center and its
educational activities.
6. To provide a working budget to maintain an office for AAE
at the Center." (R. Stevens, Personal Communication,
June 19, 1973)

Stevens requested from Congress an operating budget for FY 1974 of
$500,000 for the Alliance. While Congress did not honor Stevens' full
request, it did appropriate $210,048 for FY 1974 allowing the Alliance to get
up and running.

The first major event staged by the Alliance was an orientation meeting
to the Kennedy Center that was held in Washington, D.C., from September 22
to 25, 1973. Three representatives from each emerging state Alliance
committee or appropriate other state representatives were invited to come
learn about the Center’s activities and resources. In addition to a V.I.P.
experience of the Center, the meeting participants were introduced to the
recently designed Phase I of the AAE plan, which was being called the
showcasing phase. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, Phase I created the
expectation that the state AAE committees would identify exemplary arts or
arts education programs, groups, and individuals from their states that could
be showcased at the Kennedy Center during the summer of 1974.

The meeting also made reference to Phase II of the AAE plan. During
this phase, the emphasis would be on making the arts an integral part of the
curriculum of the nation’s schools. Many of the state participants were excited
about Phase II and wanted to see it as the main priority of the Alliance plan.
The Kennedy Center people acknowledged that this would be an important
phase but emphasized that the need for Phase I was greater in order for the
AAE to create a strong presence in Washington for future support at the
federal level. While the state participants seemed uncomfortable with this
decision, as will be discussed in the next section, they, for the most part,
backed the plan presented. Many returned to their states committed to
beginning work on setting up an AAE state committee.

Following this meeting in Washington, Marland reported to the
Kennedy Center Board about the first nine months in the life of the Alliance,
especially the outcomes of the recent orientation meeting. He stated that an
AAE network organization had been established in all 50 states and that
these people had been oriented to the Kennedy Center, AAE program, and
the project’s expectations for each state organization. He also indicated that
the AAE’s two objectives were now:

1. To create a design to facilitate bringing students from all
   over the country to the Kennedy Center and to generate
   a flow of information around the country concerning the
   Kennedy Center.
2. To make the Kennedy Center a show place at which
   young artists could perform after going through a
   selection process.

These objectives emphasized the showcasing phase of the AAE plan and, as
the earlier reports by Stevens and Arberg, put the Center as the focal point of
the AAE project. The Board was given a formal written report about the
September orientation meeting but only brief mention was made about Phase
II of the AAE plan. The report indicated that this phase would be devoted to
content, though, it did not go on to explain what was meant by this statement
(John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, 6/14/73).

Development of the Alliance for Arts Education moved at a dizzying
pace for the next couple of years. While it would be too lengthy to write about
each new development, it is important to mention some of these to give an
idea just what and how much happened during the first two years. In the
education report made to the Center’s Board at many of their regular
meetings, some of the AAE accomplishments that were highlighted included:

- January 1974 — 24 state-level AAE committees were now active.
- January 1974 — the Office of Education made $500,000 available
to the AAE to assist state departments of education in the
preparation of curriculum in the arts at all levels.
- March 1974 — $100,000 had been received from the Office of
Education for the American College Theatre Festival (ACTF).
- April 1974 — the ACTF was placed under the AAE program.
- April 1974 — the first AAE showcase program was under way as a
states arts festival with events from May to September at the
Center.
- April 1974 — the first AAE music festival was being planned to
feature six university orchestras.
- June 1974 — 38 states had received federal funds for their local
programs.
- June 1974 — in addition to the $500,000 from the Office of
Education for the AAE for the next fiscal year, the Office also
appropriated an additional $125,000 each for the ACTF and the
proposed music festival.
- July 1974 — an executive director was hired to coordinate the
ACTF.
- July 1974 — the first arts for the mentally retarded event was held
as a part of the AAE program. This effort would later be called the
National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped and would sponsor
Very Special Arts Festivals.
- October 1974 — a second meeting was staged at the Kennedy
Center for representatives from states with active AAE committees.
These states were developing comprehensive state plans for arts
education.
- October 1974 — a professional development series of 32 weekly
seminars devoted to the performing arts was planned by the AAE
and the Center programs.
- February 1975 — original showcase event would now take place in
three parts. First, there would be a showcase activity somewhat
similar to the original showcase activities of the Alliance, that is, a
week-long event called the State Arts Festival (later to be renamed
the Imagination Celebration). Secondly, there would be a program
of showcase activities proposed for adoption by the National
Committee by the four professional arts education associations, for
example, national dance festivals, music festivals, ACTF, etc. Finally, Showcase/Special Projects would provide an alternative to these two programs, increasing access to the Center for additional organizations, for example, school groups traveling to DC who wish to perform at the Center in its public areas.

- February 1975 — 48 states and territories were now participating in the AAE program.
- April 1975 — AAE’s first American High School Theater Festival at the Center was planned for August 1975.
- April 1975 — AAE started an intern program for arts education administration.
- June 1975 — the National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped (NCAH) was formed and placed initially under the AAE. The Kennedy Center’s contract with the Office of Education was revised to allow for the hiring of an executive director for this new program.
- October 1975 — the third national AAE meeting took place at the Center with a presentation by the new executive director of the NCAH.
- October 1975 — the first AAE Arts Dialog conference was held in Romania. Arts Dialog was meant to open up communications between art educators in the United States with their counterparts internationally.

In this list alone, which is not complete, there is mention of at least seven different programs serving all levels of education that had emerged as a part of the AAE during the first two years. This does not include the needs of and the services for the 48 state-level committees that also developed during this time. The AAE programs seemed to be falling into two basic categories: those that showcased events at the Center and those that worked with the states as they were asked to develop and promote comprehensive plans for arts education.

Forbes Rogers, AAE Executive Director, indicated that it was during these first couple of years that he became more interested in the AAE’s efforts
to advance the integration of the arts into the K-12 school curriculum. “My thrust was to increase arts education K through 12 nationally and whatever you needed to do to get that to happen,” Rogers shared; “It was networking. It was communicating. It was demonstrating good programs.... That was my motivation. That’s why I loved that program [AAE]” (F. Rogers, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996).

In early 1974, Rogers journeyed to New York City to meet with Kathryn Bloom, who headed the education efforts of the JDR 3rd Fund, to gain her advice about exemplary arts education programs. She had not yet been involved in the discussions or meetings concerning the Alliance. Bloom and the JDR 3rd Fund were involved in funding model arts-in-education programs in several locations throughout the country. She had also served in the 1960’s, as Director of the Arts and Humanities Program, at the Office of Education at HEW in Washington, D.C., the position that Arberg now held. She suggested that Rogers visit one of the JDR 3rd Fund projects to see for himself the conditions that she felt were important for a successful program that integrated the arts into a school’s curriculum. Rogers soon headed to Oklahoma City to visit their Opening Doors Project.

Rogers was excited by what he observed at the Opening Doors Project. He felt that it embodied all the components necessary for successful arts education programs, which he hoped to weave into the AAE’s state efforts:

- It started in the lower grades....
• It had integration into the curriculum. It wasn’t just art but it was integrated into history. It was integrated into literature. It was integrated into mathematics.
• It had hyped teachers. Teachers who were committed. Teachers who were enthusiastic....You had the artist people from community agencies [and cultural institutions].
• [It had] administrative commitment.
• [It had] a school board that believed in it.
• [It had] a state superintendent who believed in it, who is willing to go to bat to change laws.
• [It had] the arts community that believed in it. (F. Rogers, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996)

Rogers indicated that in May of 1974, he hired an assistant director for AAE, Jack Kukuk, who had helped form the Washington State Alliance. Kukuk’s primary duty for the next few years, according to Rogers, was to coordinate the showcase activities for the AAE. This freed Rogers to focus on K - 12 arts education nationally (F. Rogers, Personal Interview, June ’13, 1995).

As 1975 advanced, all seemed to be going well with the Alliance according to most of the reports being given to the Kennedy Center Board, the Office of Education, and to Congress. Not only was Phase I, the showcasing phase, well under way, but it seemed inroads were being made into Phase II, which was meant to advance arts education in our nation’s schools. Federal funds were increasing at a nice pace allowing the Alliance’s programs to proliferate at a remarkable rate. But soon several concerns started to surface
concerning this project, evidence of which crept into an early report to the Center’s Board.

At the Board’s February 25, 1975 meeting, Rogers reported on the Alliance’s progress. He shared that there were many things going well for the Alliance programs. Rogers noted in closing his report that there was frustration, though, at the state-level with the AAE and that the state representatives offered the following recommendations to the Center:

- There is a need of clarification of national objectives,
- Better communication needs to be established [between the states and the Center],
- Information concerning [arts education] funding should be provided to States,
- AAE should provide political clout in identifying State and Federal monies for arts education, (John F. Kennedy Center Meeting Minutes, February 25, 1975)

Interestingly, the concerns that arose during these early years of the AAE would continue to plague this national initiative as it matured, almost bringing about its demise in the early 1990’s.

Concerns Surface About the Alliance

Questions, concerns and suspicions arose immediately as the notion of this federal arts education initiative was brought forth in early 1973. Some concerns grew out of suspicions about what the real intent of the Kennedy Center and its chairman Roger Stevens was in sponsoring this national effort. Other concerns were due to confusion about what the Alliance was and what it was to accomplish.
The Kennedy Center's Intent with the Alliance Project

Concern about the Kennedy Center's involvement in the Alliance for Arts Education surfaced as soon as it was announced that this effort was under way. Julian Euell, Assistant Secretary for Public Services at the Smithsonian Institute, reported to S. Dillon Ripley, Secretary of the Smithsonian, about the Alliance for Arts Education project that was presented at the April 4, 1973 Kennedy Center Board meeting, which Euell had attended for Dillion.

Euell indicated that he was truly disturbed by Roger Stevens' comments as this education plan was voted into being by the Board. He quoted Stevens as stating, "Hopefully this new effort will get those across the nation to come here, not just as tourists, but to plunk down some dough for tickets" (J. Euell, Personal Communication, April 27, 1973). Reflecting upon the Alliance presentation made to the Board, Euell states:

I think any attempt to propel the Kennedy Center into national prominence or to make it an effective force for culture in education...will not be successful....I do not wish to appear overly negative but I doubt if there is any chance at all for these types of programs. Most of the ideas are commercial and have limited box office appeal and at this time the leadership at the Kennedy Center is not concerned with pure educational values. This comes through loud and clear at every meeting that I have attended on your behalf. (J. Euell, Personal Communication, April 27, 1973)

Comments of this sort by Stevens, as Euell had reported, also gave rise to a fear of being exploited by the Center among the state participants at
the initial meetings used to introduce the AAE project. State participant reports from the ten regional meetings staged in May and June 1973, indicated that the states had little interest in becoming ticket agents or promoters for the Center. Somehow this expectation had been communicated to them as so many of the participants made these remarks. Gerald Tollifson and Richard Shoup, founders of the Ohio Alliance for Arts Education, agreed with these regional reports. They both had attended the September 1973 AAE orientation meeting at the Kennedy Center and came away with an uneasy feeling after hearing the Center's presentations about the Alliance. They returned to Ohio not feeling terribly gung ho about being a part of this national alliance and fearful about the real intent of the Center, especially with the initial emphasis being on showcasing programs at the Kennedy Center. Due to comments by Stevens at this meeting, Tollifson and Shoup both wondered if the Kennedy Center wanted the states to become ticket sellers for their events and to promote the Center nationally so that it could get increased funding for its programs. They indicated that even their boss, the Ohio Superintendent of Education, raised this issue when they reported back to him about this orientation meeting (Tollifson/Shoup, Personal Interview, October 1, 1996).

Stanley Madeja, Professor of Art at Northern Illinois University and a well-known figure in the arts education world, shared his observations about
the Alliance during its initial years. At that point Madeja was associated with two national arts education initiatives, one of which was the JDR 3rd Fund. In the late 1960’s, he also had been the Arts Specialist with the Office of Education at HEW under the supervision of Kathryn Bloom. He stated that the real purpose of the Alliance project, as he saw it, was to get the Center off the hook with Congress. “They needed an educational program. They needed it to involve a grassroots-type of movement...to show that the Kennedy Center was reaching constituencies outside of Washington and was not just a performing arts center for Washington” (S. Madeja, Personal Interview, September 9, 1996). His comments also raised questions about the real intent of the Center with the Alliance project. He noted that the Center used a number of the programs that came from the Alliance project to work with Congress to get more support for the Center in general so that they could say that they were fulfilling their mandate.

Forbes Rogers, AAE Executive Director, also supported this perception of the Kennedy Center’s intent. He noted that there was a lot of skepticism in the field about the Alliance project, and that many saw this as an attempt by the Center to increase its funds by selling more tickets. Rogers stated, “I think that very definitely was always an underlying strategy [of the Center] and I can substantiate that” (F. Rogers, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996). He closed these comments by adding that he felt that the Center moved beyond
this thrust as the Alliance project crystallized. He believed that within the first two years of the project that his interests in advancing the arts in the nation's schools became the real priority of the Alliance project. The final section of this chapter will show that this was the case for a short period of time before Rogers left the AAE in 1979.

**Confusion About the Alliance's Purpose**

In the early days of the Alliance project, Rogers noted that there was one question about the AAE that he was confronted with daily by people in Washington and across the nation: “What's the program?” “We didn’t have one,” he commented, “I mean, we didn’t even have [a plan] if we were going to ask them to be ticket agencies and sell tickets to Kennedy Center programs.... It was very frustrating” (F. Rogers, Personal Interview, June 29, 1996). Jack Kukuk, who had started the Washington State Alliance and was brought to the Center as Rogers' assistant director, shared his early impressions of the Alliance project: “I don’t know if anyone had ever given any deep thought to what the Alliance was other than it was going to be good” (J. Kukuk, Personal Interview, June 27, 1996).

The lack of focus and direction hinted at by Rogers and Kukuk was echoed over and over again by others interviewed, either formally or informally, for the study of this federal initiative. Many working with the state-level AAE committees at that time talked about how much fun it was to be
wined and dined by the Kennedy Center in Washington during the first few years, but that they did not really understand what was expected of them.

The idea for the initiative had not come from the states, and so it was difficult for them to understand exactly what was the purpose of this federal program. "My conclusion was that I didn't really see a mission," said Thomas Hatfield, one of the founders of the South Carolina Alliance and the present Executive Director of the National Arts Education Association in Washington, D.C. "I did realize that they were trying to set up alliances in every state," Hatfield noted, "...but I didn’t see it as any kind of national network because I didn't understand what the formal relationship was" (T. Hatfield, Personal Interview, June 14, 1996).

Stanley Madeja also had concerns about the lack of direction and expectations in the early years of the AAE. He indicated, "We [Kathryn Bloom and JDR 3rd Fund staff] were concerned about these early meetings [in 1973] in the sense that they really didn’t have a focus. It ended up that each state pretty much started to do their own thing out there" (Personal Interview, September 9, 1996). Hatfield reinforced this perception, "The AAEs in those days were pretty loose. There were no guidelines that came out of the federal level. It was just pretty much how you wanted to organize it." Hatfield continued, "I didn't get any sense of a national agenda or national
organization in any kind of formal sense that had any structure, job
descriptions, [or] agreements” (Hatfield, Personal Interview, June 14, 1996).

Sadly, this lack of focus and expectation would come back to haunt the
Alliance for Arts Education, especially the state-level committees, during the
1980’s. At the root of the problem would be what Madeja was able to see
right at the beginning: “People really didn’t know what [the AAE] was, so they
created their own things and said do you think this is what it is....Some of
them, because there [were] good people involved, made sense out of it all for
their state” (Personal interview, September 9, 1996). But the opposite would
also be true; some state committees would never be able to build effective
organizations. Additionally, those states that did accomplish this goal would
not necessarily be seen as effective components of the Center’s educational
efforts as it matured and as its needs changed throughout the 1980’s.

A Banner Period for the Alliance

While there was controversy and confusion during the first two years of
the Alliance’s start-up phase, the next few years could be termed a banner
period for the AAE, especially for the state committees. The problems and
concerns mentioned above had not been solved, but this did not matter as the
federal resources flowing into the program or anticipated by the Center
allowed for all the AAE’s many programs to advance without infringing on
each other’s allocations. Additionally, Rogers as head of the AAE was
focusing his energies on the state-level committees and promoting the notion that the Alliance was a major national player in advancing arts education in the nation’s schools.

In the AAE’s annual report for 1976/77, Ann Timberman, AAE’s Assistant Director for State and Local Programs, a newly created position, stated that the Alliance’s two main goals were now to:

- Facilitate a network for communication and cooperation among arts and education groups and agencies; and
- Provide at the Kennedy Center and elsewhere a showcase for exemplary arts education programs and, conversely, to create projects to serve as models for the arts community. (Timberman, 1978, p 5)

While she along with Rogers would focus on the first goal, the second goal now fell, for the most part, under Jack Kukuk, whose title had changed to Director of Programs for Children and Youth, and David Young, Producing Director, American College Theatre Festival.

During this banner period, the AAE by design took a very active role in organizing and facilitating national and state arts education efforts. Conferences and seminars were staged. Meetings were held. Publications and advocacy materials were produced. And information important to advancing arts education was disseminated. The new emphasis was reflected in topics that were on the agendas of the conferences that they staged around the country:
- Arts Education Advocacy — National, State, and Local Concerns and How to Influence Key Decision-Makers in Arts and Education;
- Strengthening Communication Networks for the Alliance;
- Report from the Director of the Education Commission on the States;
- Federal Legislation on the Arts and Arts Education, and Regulations Affecting Them;
- State Legislation in Arts Education; and
- National Arts Education Programs and Advancements. (Timberman, 1978, p 6)

The AAE also supported and expanded its national network of committees. State Committees were now being awarded grants of up to $10,000 each year for projects meant to increase the effectiveness of this national network. The Alliance was actively assisting each state in formulating comprehensive state arts education plans\(^4\) and claimed that half of the states now had one of these plans. Also reported was that the network now had committees in all fifty states and all the U.S. territories (Timberman, 1978, p 5). Three accomplishments of the AAE during this period are worth special note.

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\(^4\) The sources for this study did not discuss what the Alliance project promoted as a comprehensive state arts education plan. As the Alliance’s Executive Director, Forbes Rogers, was aligned with Kathryn Bloom and her Arts-in-Education movement, one might assume that the state plans would be expected to embrace this philosophy for arts education. Essentially, this philosophy recommended that all the arts be included in K - 12 education and that a community’s cultural resources be utilized in the planning and delivery of this curriculum.
Special Projects Act — Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts

While the work for this accomplishment had started a few years earlier, the first funds distributed under this act were in FY 1976. In 1974, Congress reauthorized and amended the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) of 1965. The 1974 amendments were signed into law, Public Law 93-380, on August 21, 1974. These amendments included a new section under Title IV entitled the Special Projects Act. The Act consolidated several old programs and added a few new ones to the ESEA of 1965. The purpose of the Special Projects Act was to give the Commissioner of Education the authority to carry out special projects to meet national education priorities and to experiment with educational and administrative methods, techniques, and practices. Section 409 of this Act reads as follows:

Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts

Sec. 409. The Commissioner shall, during the period beginning after June 30, 1974 and ending on June 30, 1978, through arrangements made with the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts [emphasis added], carry out a program of grants and contracts to encourage and assist State and local educational agencies to establish and conduct programs in which the arts are an integral part of elementary and secondary school programs. Not less than $750,000 shall be available for the purposes of this section during any fiscal year during the period for which provision is made in the preceding sentence. (P.L. 93-380, 1974, p. 556)

This act authorized the first categorical grant support for arts education in the U.S. In addition, what was unusual about this amendment was that it
set a minimum dollar amount to be made available for these grants and
contracts versus a percentage of whatever the total allocation for the Special
Projects Act happened to be each year. It is also important to note that these
funds were to be used to encourage states and locals to develop activities
that would make the arts an integral part of elementary and secondary school
programs.

HEW's Education Office took responsibility for distributing the funds
and the AAE took responsibility for assembling grant-review panels to
determine who received these funds. The Alliance also was responsible for
providing technical assistance, training, and information to the arts education
community throughout the country under this act. By 1978, the language for
this act would be broadened to include arts for the handicapped and arts
education activities outside the formal school structure.

Junius Eddy's Position Paper

In the summer of 1977, Junius Eddy published a position paper for the
AAE entitled, Toward Coordinated Federal Policies for Support of Arts
Education. Assisting Eddy with this project starting in July 1976 was the
National Arts Education Advisory Panel (NAEAP), which was formed by the
Alliance to provide informal assistance to its staff. The NAEAP membership
included those federal agencies which administered visible legislative
programs in arts education, the major national associations of arts education,
and private foundations supporting programs in arts education. Also represented on the group were congressional interests, universities, state and local arts councils, and community arts education programs.

The NAEAP report characterizes arts education as “a field of study that refuses to be fenced in” and puts a great deal of the blame for the poor standing of the arts in the school curriculum on the arts and arts education community itself. The report notes that arts education, unlike many other subject areas, has gone beyond the school house and used community resources in the arts, such as artists, in the delivery of its programs. While this in and of itself is not a bad thing, the report states:

It cannot be denied that arts educators themselves, as well as their community-based allies, have failed to articulate clearly what it is they are really about. This absence of a united and coherent voice to identify emerging needs in arts education and to advocate sound remedial responses has certainly helped confuse its friends in the Federal agencies and in Congress. (Eddy, 1977b, p. 13)

The report also attempted to support the Arts, Education, and American Panel's 1977 report, *Coming to Our Senses*, and focused on one of the major concerns raised in this report. The AEA's report pointed out, according to Eddy, that despite the creation of coordinating bodies, there was significant “duplication or fragmentation of effort among those Federal programs which administer the major legislative programs in arts education” (Eddy, 1977b, p.5). Eddy states that the overall purpose of the NAEAP was:
to assist the Alliance in fashioning a definitive statement with respect to arts education which would set forth fundamental purposes, priority needs and proposed new legislative programs around which its respective constituencies could unite in common cause....It may therefore be regarded as an attempt by the arts education constituency to "get its act together" and thereby provide the basis for coordinated Federal policies aimed at strengthening the role of the arts in American education. (1977b, p. 2)

The report closes by making recommendations about how to accomplish this charge. NAEAP calls for increased funding of several federal arts education programs (including the AAE), coordination of research for arts education nationally, development of excellent curricular materials for arts education, identification of ways that learning in the arts can be evaluated, and better professional development of arts teachers, artists-in-residence, and non-arts teachers.

The language of the NAEAP report was clearly in keeping with the arts-in-education philosophy promoted by the JDR 3rd Fund. This language eventually found its way into the mission of the Alliance and the 1978 reauthorization of the Special Projects Act — Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts.

The Wingspread Conference

Sponsored by the AAE from October 1 to 3, 1978, the conference's purpose was described as "establishing a new coalition in arts education — a
merging of the agendas of the four separate organizations which they represented” (Hoffa, 1978, p. 1). The four organizations referred to were the National Dance Association, the National Art Education Association, the Music Educator’s National Conference, and the American Theatre Association — the DAM’T group. The conference felt that cooperative efforts between these organizations were vital and that the DAM’T group had never developed a grand plan together.

The purpose of this conference was to develop this “grand plan” for the group. While the executive directors of the DAM’T group had formed an informal network, they had not been able to develop a common agenda around which the four organizations could unite. The conference was designed to explore areas for broader cooperation among the arts education associations and to develop strategies to implement recommendations on arts education for education authorities, government bodies, school boards, teachers, and parents (Hoffa, 1978, p. 4).

Hoffa noted that the AAE felt the risk of failure with this conference was high due to the past record of the DAM’T group, their tradition of separatism, and their inability to define a common agenda for arts education in the nation’s schools. The conference was still held, but Forbes Rogers of the AAE warned the participants of the high possibility for failure. He offered the group a set of conference ground rules to make it possible to bring about an overdue
unification of the four associations (Hoffa, 1979, p.5). The AAE believed that cooperation on behalf of arts education was mutually beneficial to both state and national arts organizations in their pursuit of quality education (Hoffa, 1979, p. 48).

The executive directors endorsed and signed an agreement to seek out ways to support each other and to collaborate in the development and implementation of projects meant to advance arts education nationally. They also agreed to join their organizations with the efforts under way at the state level with each state AAE organization.

The Winds of Change

As these three accomplishments show, during the 1976 to 1978 period, the AAE was establishing itself as a major national player in advancing arts education. AAE was becoming known for facilitating cooperative efforts in support of arts education among various and differing organizations at the national and state levels. It was attempting to define and promote a national agenda for arts education behind which the arts education professional associations could rally. It was establishing a state-level grassroots advocacy organization for arts education. And it was advocating for increased public support of arts education initiatives at the federal and state levels.

Organizations at the national and state levels quickly jumped on board the Center’s mandate and the AAE program that was proposed in spite of
grave concerns about the true intent of the Kennedy Center with this program and the confusion about the AAE's purpose. What each organization hoped would emerge as the AAE developed was a national initiative that would enhance their own particular efforts in advancing arts education. Initially, this yearning seemed to be coming true.

As mentioned earlier, the programs of the AAE seemed to be falling into two basic categories during the early years: those programs meant to be showcased at the Center and those programs that were at the state and local levels. For the first several years, the total education program effort of the Center was referred to as the Alliance for Arts Education, although it had various thrusts. This effort's purpose was to form an alliance at the national and state levels among the various organizations that supported arts education, such as the U.S. Office of Education, the national arts education associations, arts organizations, education leaders, private foundations, and the national endowments.

This notion seemed to be shifting by the close of 1978. Instead of referring to their education efforts as the Alliance for Arts Education, the Center now informally called this division the Education Program of the Center that had several programmatic areas. When this new organizational structure formalized itself in 1979, as will be discussed in the next chapter, each program area would eventually have a separate director who would report to
a director for education for the Center. One of these informal program areas, the States and Locals Program, slowly would become synonymous with the Alliance for Arts Education, especially the activities of and services for the state organizations. While this shift was not terribly noticeable during this banner period, this situation would soon change after the resignation of Forbes Rogers in 1979.
CHAPTER 4

NEGOTIATING AMID CONFLICTING MISSIONS: THE ALLIANCE DEVELOPS

In an article written for the *Music Educators Journal* in early 1978, Forbes Rogers, then Executive Director for the AAE, described the basic purpose of the Alliance:

Since 1973, the Alliance has embraced organizations and individuals at the national, state, and local levels with a mutual commitment to the arts as an integral part of the educational process. The national AAE assists state and local AAE organizations by providing a conduit for information and a forum for cooperation. Additionally, AAE is committed to identifying, supporting, and advocating [for] exemplary arts education programs at all levels. (p. 40)

His statement summed up the growing perception of the Alliance at that time as a facilitator of communication among varying and differing arts education groups across the nation and as a mediator crafting a common vision and advocacy agenda for these groups. While this work had really just begun in the two years preceding this article, the Alliance was able to show
that it was having a significant impact in this arena by 1978, as evidenced by several events discussed at the end of the last chapter.

Rogers also wrote about the evolving structure of the AAE as its programs proliferated. By 1978, the AAE’s programs organizationally fell into two major categories: State and Local Programs and The Kennedy Center Programs. He noted that the “State AAE organizations form the backbone of AAE’s national strength and communication network. They provide a framework for communication between various organizations and individuals working toward common objectives....The Kennedy Center programs include such activities as the American College Theatre Festival, Children’s Art Series and Festival, special performances at the Kennedy Center, and ongoing workshops and symposiums related to arts education” (Rogers, 1978, pp. 40 and 41).

Noteworthy about Rogers’ picture of the Alliance is that he saw all educational programming, whether inside or outside the Center, as being under the AAE umbrella. Also worth restating from the last chapter was that by 1978, Rogers was focusing his energies more and more on the state-level committees and on the notion that the Alliance should be a major national player in advancing arts education in the nation’s schools. This image of the AAE along with Rogers’ focus for it would soon bring him into conflict with certain members of the Kennedy Center’s Board of Directors.
According to David Humphrey, former Director of the AAE, Rogers got caught between two wealthy patrons on the Kennedy Center Board, Jean Kennedy Smith and Donna Stone Pesch (Personal Interview, 1996). Smith, sister of President Kennedy, and Pesch held somewhat differing and competitive views concerning the direction of the education program at the Kennedy Center. Smith was considered one of the founders of the Alliance but soon became frustrated as she wanted to see more tangible results from this effort, such as festivals and children’s performances, as she felt these events would bring more notice to the Center dedicated to her brother. The proposal for the National Committee for the Arts and the Handicapped (NCAH) surfaced around 1976, and Smith quickly jumped on board this effort. Smith and the Kennedy Family Foundation, long supporters of programs for the handicapped due to Smith’s sister being mentally retarded, played a big role in starting the NCAH and having it housed at the Kennedy Center. The NCAH quickly grew under Smith’s guidance, and she enjoyed being better able to control this project’s development, making its primary purpose the staging of an annual national arts festival for handicapped citizens. Due to Smith’s passion for this new project and her and her family’s influence at the federal level, she was quickly able to sell the program to Congress securing for NCAH its own federal funds. Within a few years, NCAH established its
independence from the AAE, putting it in competition with the Alliance for the limited federal resources devoted to arts education.

Pesch, who at that time chaired the Center’s Education Committee, wanted the promotion of the Kennedy Center through the education programs to be the priority. She favored programs focused on the special performances and events at the Center, which included showcasing-type activities. Rogers was caught in the middle of these two Center Board members with his state-focused thrust not fitting easily with either of their agendas. By early-1979, Rogers was gone from the Kennedy Center and Jack Kukuk, his former assistant handling the Alliance’s showcasing activities, was introduced by Smith to the Board as the new Director of Education.

**Shifting Directions**

The Alliance’s development started to shift direction towards the end of the 1970’s, as was evidenced by several decisions and events. To begin with, the Center’s education program was formally reorganized and renamed. Next, public funds began to be distributed differently among the education activities that now made up the Center’s education program. And finally, there were changes made to the language of the *Special Projects Act — Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts*, which would be formalized during the bill’s 1978 reauthorization in Congress.
Changes to the Name and Structure

Indications that change was forthcoming to the organizational structure of the Alliance project began to appear as early as 1976. As AAE’s educational programming proliferated at the Kennedy Center during its banner period, its activities, as mentioned in the last chapter, informally started to be grouped into at least two categories: the education activities that directly promoted or showcased the Center and the activities that advanced arts education at the state and local levels. Reports made to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees or information disseminated about the AAE started to show its education programming divided into at least these two categories.

During 1978, the AAE was being referred to more and more within the Center as the Education Program of the Kennedy Center. By late-1978, the periodic education reports made to the Center’s Board went a step further. These reports were now titled “Kennedy Center Education Program” versus the Alliance for Arts Education program. This subtle shift meant that the AAE was now being viewed as one of several education programs at the Center instead of the umbrella under which all educational programming fell.

At the October 18, 1979 Kennedy Center Board meeting, a formal structural reorganization to the Center’s Education Committee was presented. Jean Kennedy Smith, while giving the education report at that meeting, indicated that a new subcommittee structure for this committee had been
instituted. The Kennedy Center Education program would now be split into four programmatic areas: the American College Theatre Festival, the Programs for Children and Youth, the AAE State Network, and the newly formed Arts Coalition Northwest (ACN)\(^1\). Each of the four subcommittees would handle a different component of the education program and would report back to the main education committee with recommendations and findings. The main committee would be responsible for making final decisions concerning the recommendations from each subcommittee and would report to the Board about the progress of each program area.

Another indication of the shift in the organizational structure of the Alliance for Arts Education program at the Center shows up in a staff listing from that time. In the annual state committees’ report to the Center, *Alliance for Arts Education Committee Reports 1978*, which was actually published in 1980, the Kennedy Center listed the following staff under the section “Kennedy Center Education Program”: Bennett Tarleton, Director of the AAE; David Young, Producing Director for the American College Theatre Festival; Barbara Salisbury, Coordinator for the Arts Coalition Northwest, and Carole C. Huggins, Producing Director for Programs for Children and Youth. All four of these managers reported to the Center’s new Director for Education.

\(^1\) The ACN was a new partnership between the Kennedy Center and the Seattle Center to support the latter organization’s education programs and to set up a second site for the annual Kennedy Center *Imagination Celebration*, formerly called the AAE States Arts Festival.
position that was held by Jack Kukuk (p.217). This staff listing indicates that the organizational structure of the education program had formally shifted to match the Education Committee’s subcommittee structure introduced by Smith. The Center’s education program now consisted of four distinct program areas, of which the AAE was one.

In the Kennedy Center’s required annual report to the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution in 1979, Roger Stevens’ comments also indicated that additional shifts had occurred in the way the Center’s educational programming was being viewed. To begin with, Stevens referred to the program by its new title, the Kennedy Center Education Program. He reported that over the past year the Center had developed an entire range of public-service and educational efforts meant to stimulate both national and local interest in the performing arts. He justified this emphasis on the performing arts by asserting that:

As a National Cultural Center, the Kennedy Center bears a specific Congressional mandate to serve children and youth. Toward this end, the Center's Education Programs are committed to cooperating with other cultural centers [emphasis added] around the country in developing model arts education projects and providing a national focus for quality performing arts programming for young people [emphasis added]. (Stevens, 1979. p. 6)

This new language indicated that the Center was no longer just primarily working through the state AAE committees with its educational outreach programming efforts. It was now actively seeking cooperative efforts
with cultural centers around the country, as it had started with the Seattle Center. The biggest shift here was that these partnerships would emphasize performing arts programming and education for young people versus the mission of the Alliance, which was to make all the arts an integral part of the curriculum in the nation's schools.

In September of 1978, the National AAE and the Council of Chief State School Officers (CCSSO) sponsored the Summit Conference on the Arts and Education. The Summit was heralded in its report by Charles Fowler (1980) as the first national meeting of state AAE chairpersons with chief state school officers. The goal of this conference, according to the introductory comments of Jean Kennedy Smith, was to bring "together the decision-makers in the arts and education [communities] from the national, state, and local levels to share concerns and discuss issues that stand in the way of providing quality arts programming for children" (p. 3). The conference hoped to realize this goal by showcasing model programs from around the nation that demonstrated "how the arts can lead to improving learning experiences for children" (p.3).

Fowler's report also indicated that the conference introduced the creation of a new structure under which the state AAE committees would work. The state committees would now be grouped under a regional network with states in the same geographic areas. Initially, there were four regions established. This division blossomed into an eight-region structure during the
1980's. According to Fowler's report, the regional network system was meant to intensify communication among the states to improve arts education programs nationally. This structure meant that the state committees would, for the most part, communicate with the national AAE office at the Center through their regional representatives and would support each other's efforts to advance arts education within their particular region. The regional network system was eliminated in the early 1990's, though it is not totally clear why due to the lack of information available about this decision. From the few comments that did surface during the study about this matter, it seems that the regional network failed with its goal to improve communication among the state AAE committees. This system also seems to have created an additional barrier for the state committees to overcome in negotiating their needs with the Kennedy Center administration.

John Mahlmann, Executive Director of the Music Educators National Conference, remembered this summit and another organizational shift in the AAE that started to take hold around that time. In 1979, Mahlmann was Executive Director of the National Art Education Association, one of the four arts education associations known as the DAM'T group, which was involved in the creation and early development of the AAE. He noted that at the time of the conference, the Kennedy Center's relationship with the DAM'T group started to shift. While this summit was meant to bring together the decision-
makers in arts and education, he noted, "[The Center] didn't invite the professional [arts education] organizations to really participate in the planning or activities...I think that irritated people at the time, not because [the conference] was not good or valuable or needed.... but simply because [the Center] politically excluded defacto those organizations that might have been a part of that [conference] — should have been a part of that" (Personal Interview, 1996).

Mahlmann did acknowledge that the DAM'T executive directors were asked to give one of the presentations at the conference, which is verified by Fowler's conference report. It also seems that one of the four DAM'T executive directors was asked to participate on the planning committee for the conference. What Mahlmann's recollections seem to reflect was the change in the level of participation by the DAM'T group in the Alliance's affairs after the first few years of its development. In the early years, the DAM'T group was intimately involved in the development of the Alliance. In addition, the AAE was spearheading a push to join these four associations in a common effort to advance arts education nationally, as was shown by the 1978 Wingspread Conference discussed in the last chapter. But by the end of the 1970's, the Center had eliminated the DAM'T executive directors from its Education Committee and did not regularly include them in the Alliance's...
activities. This change, Mahlmann felt, narrowed the impact of the Alliance project.

Bennett Tarleton’s appointment as the new National Director of the AAE was also announced at this summit. He became the first AAE director to serve under the new structure that had the AAE as one of the education programs reporting to the Center’s Director for Education. Tarleton indicated that during his two and a half years as the AAE Director, the Alliance and the state-level people that he worked with became very important to him. He noted that the Alliance program was also very important to these state-level people and the work they were doing to advance arts education. He stated, "It seems to me that in the first two or three years when the Alliance was the Kennedy Center education program, that there was a good deal of clarity and people understood what it was about" (Tarleton, Personal Interview, 1996). This situation changed, he shared, around the time he started as Director of the AAE. Tarleton expressed that during his time with the Alliance, "[It] was not of very much importance to anybody else...at the Kennedy Center. We didn't have the glamour and the sex appeal of the Imagination Celebration or the Very Special Arts Festivals. We didn't have the immediacy of Programs for Children and Youth, which brought kids into the Center....When I was [at the Center], there was a great deal of not knowing what to do with the
Alliance, especially because the money situation had changed" (Tarleton, Personal Interview, 1996).

**Changes in the Distribution of USOE Funds**

Gathering information about United States Office of Education funds to the Kennedy Center since 1973, has been an extremely challenging task. For this information, the following sources have been consulted:

- Kennedy Center Board of Trustees Minutes and Financial Reports — some of which are missing;
- Kennedy Center Office of Congressional Relation’s reports on federal assistance received by the Center;
- U. S. Department of Education (formerly Office of Education) files, especially the Center’s Applications for Federal Assistance for the years 1986 to 1997. Files on the Center’s applications and year-end reports for 1973 to 1985 were not found and seemed no longer to exist;
- Congressional Research Office Reports for Congress from 1975 to 1995;
- Kennedy Center Education Department “Archives”; and
- National Archives

What is surprising is how little the available information tells about the public moneys received by the Center for education programming, that is, how it was distributed and used, and how well these funds fulfilled the purposes intended by Congress. What is disturbing is that many of these sources also conflict with each other concerning the funding amounts and the uses of the moneys during each fiscal year. While the information unearthed clearly has flaws, it still has been possible to identify trends with the Center’s use of these funds and how these trends shifted over time. The funding information that did emerge and could be validated is shown on the following pages in Figures 4.1 and 4.2.
Figure 4.1: Department of Education Funding to Kennedy Center — How funds were distributed among Center programs.

Source: Kennedy Center Board of Trustee Minutes for 1973 to 1996.

NOTE: Information available after 1986 does not clearly indicate distribution of public funds among the program areas.

Miscellaneous category can include the following events - music festival, dance festival, Arts Coalition Northwest, Arts Coalition Northeast, etc. These funds were often used for new or experimental programs.
Figure 4.2: Federal Arts in Education Funding under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act

Source: Annual or biennial evaluation reports on programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education and Congressional Research Service's reports for Congress

NOTES: FY 1992 - A one-time increase was provided to allow grantees to switch to funding cycles and begin receiving their awards on or around October 1, instead of July 1. Report did not specify distribution between AAE and NCAH, so this was estimated based on percentage distribution from FY 1991.

FY 1995 - A one-time appropriation of $3 million was provided to Very Special Arts to support the Louisiana International Learning and Technology Center.

FY 73, 75 and 76 funds not appropriated by Congress; Amount financed by Office of Education Salary and Expense Funds.

FY 74 funds given under a special appropriation by Congress to get the Alliance for Arts Education up and running.
In the Kennedy Center's 1979 annual report to the Secretary of the
Smithsonian Institute, Roger Stevens stated:

The varied and extensive programs developed by the Center in response to its legislative mandate have been made possible this year by over $2 million in private, foundation, and corporate contributions. The sole exception has been the Alliance for Arts Education, which operates as a cooperative venture between the Center and the U.S. Office of Education, by virtue of funds appropriated to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. A relatively small portion [emphasis added] of the contracted funds from the Office of Education is also used to support the activities of the American College Theatre Festival and the Programs for Children and Youth. (Stevens, 1979, p. 19)

Stevens' statement acknowledged that by 1979, the USOE funds given to the Center were now being divided among several program areas: AAE, ACTF, and PCY. While his claim that only a small portion of these funds were used to support the latter two programs, the evidence gathered shows a different trend. Of course, the issue may be a matter of semantics, that is, what constitutes a small portion of the total. What Figure 4.1 shows is that the portion of USOE funds going to the Alliance for Arts Education steadily decreased after 1974, until fiscal year 1982. What this chart also reveals is that by the early-1980's, the AAE was receiving only a fraction of these funds, well less than half, as the moneys were shifted to support the showcasing activities of the Center's education program. But what does all this mean?
When the Alliance started in 1973, it was the education program of the Kennedy Center. This meant that 100 per cent of the funds devoted to the Center's education programming went to the AAE. In 1974, the distribution of these funds remained the same in addition to the fact that the moneys for the AAE also increased, as is shown in Figure 4.2. That year, funds for the Alliance project went to AAE's state-level activities and its showcasing events at the Center, with enough funds available to allow growth with all activities. In 1975, the funds from USOE grew by $100,000, from a total of approximately $210,000 the year before to $310,000 that year. All the extra funds were earmarked for the American College Theatre Festival, which administratively was now under the AAE. This meant that while technically the AAE was receiving 100 per cent of the USOE funds, these moneys were formally designated for two distinct program areas, the AAE and the ACTF.

As the AAE's banner period approached, its funding also dramatically increased. In 1976, USOE funds doubled to approximately $610,000. Again, a portion of the funds, about 20 per cent, were earmarked for certain activities. This meant that 80 per cent, or $490,000, was now available for the Alliance project, an increase of close to $200,000 from the year before. This would be the last real dollar increase realized by the AAE for quite a spell.

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2 Creatively the ACTF was still under the guidance of the American Theatre Association, who had developed this program before it was moved to the Kennedy Center.
While USOE funds for the Center's education programming continued to increase to $750,000 in 1977, where it stayed until the early-1980's, the percentage going to the Alliance project started to decline. In 1978, the dollar amount being given to the AAE also started to decrease as a larger percentage of the funds were redirected to the American College Theater Festival and the now formalized Programs for Children and Youth, a performing arts program for students coming to the Center. This decrease coincided with the formal restructuring of the education program at the Center, as discussed earlier in this chapter. This trend continued for the AAE until its funding reached an all-time low in 1981. That year, not only did total public funding for the Center's education program decrease to $687,050 due to the new Reagan Administration, but the AAE now only received 22 percent of these funds, or approximately $152,000. This meant that in 1981, the Alliance project actually received less money than during its start-up period in 1974. That year saw 100 per cent of approximately $210,000 going to this national initiative.

Another aspect of this federal funding that should be considered is the percentage of USOE funds that went directly to the state AAE committees versus to programs based or staged at the Kennedy Center. While the above charts show the distribution of USOE funds among the Center’s main educational programming areas, Figure 4.3 on the following page reveals the percentage of these funds that was given to the states to assist them with their efforts to advance arts education at the state level.
Figure 4.3: Allocation of USOE Funds to State AAE Chapters versus Educational Programs Based at the Kennedy Center

SOURCE: 1986 to 1997 figures gathered from the Kennedy Center Education Department’s Application for Federal Assistance Application to the United States Department of Education for funds designated for KC education programs under the Elementary and Secondary School Act starting with its reauthorization in 1974. Figures compared to total funding for Kennedy Center education programs reported in the annual or biennial evaluation reports on programs administered by the U.S. Department of Education and Congressional Research Service’s reports for Congress. Figures before 1986 taken from the Kennedy Center’s Board of Trustee minutes.

* Projected grants to state chapters. Actual figures not reported.
** Figures for FY 96 and 97 are estimates based on Center’s applications.

NOTES: Funding to state committees includes grants directly given to these committees for operations, programming, or leadership funds. Does not include funds spent on state chapters to bring them to the meetings at the Center.

Funding to Kennedy Center education programs includes all educational programs based at the Kennedy Center’s Education Department including the National Alliance office. These figures consist of the Department’s administrative costs, local educational programming for KC performances, national educational programs and materials for performing arts education, and performing arts festivals.
As Figure 4.3 shows, in the early years a major portion of the USOE funds for the Alliance project were directed to the states. According to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustee minutes for June 5, 1974, of the approximately $310,000 given to the Center for the AAE for FY 1975, over $196,000 was awarded to the emerging state-level AAE committees, which at that time totaled 37 committees. These awards of up to $10,000 were used by the state committees to begin their work to advance arts education in the schools and to develop comprehensive arts education plans for their states. The awards ranged from $1,500 for states just starting to form a committee, to $10,000 for states ready to begin implementing a plan for advancing their local AAE efforts. This meant that in FY 1975, the average state award was over $5,000, with year-end leftover AAE funds being reallocated to the more advanced state committees. From what can be surmised from the Board's meeting minutes for the next year, this pattern of funding continued in FY 1976, with 48 states now having active AAE committees.

Around FY 1977, direct funding for the state committees changed. The National AAE Advisory Committee and the Kennedy Center were shifting more and more of the USOE funds to other education programs at the Center or were developing programs and materials for the states versus giving them the funds to develop and implement their own activities. Additionally, more of the expenses of running the Center's education programs were being charged to
the AAE project. These expenses included salaries and benefits for most of
the Center education staff, travel (including money to bring state
representatives to Washington), conferences, the Board's educational
advisory committee, special projects, curriculum material development,
printing and reproduction, office supplies, and the Center's education program
overhead (John F. Kennedy Center Board Meeting Minutes, July 30, 1980).

By 1979, as these expenses grew and as the AAE's allocation
decreased, the funds remaining for distribution among the states and
territories, which now numbered 56 committees, were quite small. During the
1979 fiscal year, the amount of assistance available to each state was around
$1,000. State committees were expected to use these funds for operational
costs, that is, salaries and overhead (State AAE's to receive, 1980, January
and February). This funding level continued through the next fiscal year. In
1981, with the new Reagan Administration in power, USOE funds to the
Center decreased by about ten per cent. Due to this situation, the Center
proposed a cut of 50 per cent to the state committee funds, which would have
given each state a total allocation of $500 each (Tarleton, Personal
Correspondence, March 24, 1981). Due to large gaps in the financial
reporting of the Center's education program, it is not clear whether this
proposed cut was enacted. Also not available is a record of the state-
committee allocations for the fiscal years 1982 to 1985.
Changes to a Bill

Along with shifts occurring to the organizational structure of the Center’s education program and to the distribution of USOE funds, changes were also being made to the legislative language of the Special Projects Act — Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts that had been written into the 1974 reauthorization language of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA) from 1965. As was discussed in the last chapter, this arts education program was one of many amendments to ESEA in 1974, and authorized the first categorical grant support for arts education in the United States. The legislative intent of this program, as stated in HEW's 1975 Annual Evaluation Report, was to “encourage and assist State and local educational agencies to establish programs in which the arts are an integral part of elementary and secondary school programs” (U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1975, p. 475). According to this same report, the grants or contracts for the $750,000 available under this act were to be awarded on a competitive basis for proposals anticipated from State and local educational agencies (p. 475).

In FY 1975, no grants were awarded as the Final Rules and Regulations for this bill had not yet been published. In July of 1976, the first grants, 89 total, were awarded under this new grant program. The Kennedy Center’s Alliance for Arts Education assisted in the review of the proposals
and provided a variety of forms of technical assistance to grant recipients. Included in the first group of recipients were 41 State Departments of Education, one Bureau of Indian Affairs agency, three Trust Territories, and 44 local education agencies in 31 states. The awards ranged from $2,000 to $10,000, and embraced a variety of activities designed to integrate an appreciation of the arts with educational practices, for example, teacher training programs, conferences, newsletters, and artists-in-residence programs (U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1976, p. 520).

An interesting addition to the language of the 1976 report was that the Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts funds were directed to promote the concept of the arts in education versus arts education. As was mentioned earlier in this study, Forbes Rogers, original Director of the AAE, had looked to Kathryn Bloom of the JDR 3rd Fund for ideas on how to make the arts an integral part of K - 12 education. He did this early in the development of the AAE project, clearly before the first funds were awarded under this new grant program. While Kathryn Bloom was not involved in the development of the original Alliance project in 1973, her philosophy of arts education soon impacted the AAE and the grant program that the Alliance reviewed for USOE. Within a few years, this approach to arts education would become a more formal part of the original bill’s language.
For FY 1977, Congress appropriated an additional $1 million under this legislation, above and beyond the $750,000 grant program. These additional funds were earmarked for specific programs: $750,000 for the Alliance for Arts Education and $250,000 for the newly formed National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped (U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1977, p. 540). This change to the bill’s appropriation formalized public funding for the AAE, which had been receiving special funds from either the Commissioner of Education or Congress since its inception in 1973. The additional funds also allowed the NCAH to completely establish itself and to institute a semi-independent organizational structure from the Alliance and the Kennedy Center. In 1977, the grant moneys under this bill were awarded to 30 State Departments of Education and 47 local education agencies for a similar assortment of activities as was funded the year before.

The 1974 reauthorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act was due to expire on June 30, 1978. This meant that the bill would have to be reauthorized again by Congress to extend funding for the programs authorized under it beyond the expiration date. This reauthorization process was due to occur during the fall of 1977. As President Carter had just taken office in 1977, his administration requested from Congress a one-year extension so it could study the educational programs authorized under the
ESEA before another lengthy extension was enacted (ESEA programs extended, 1977).

According to the 1978 *Congressional Quarterly*, on November 1, 1978, President Carter signed into being Public Law 95-561, which extended ESEA programs for five years, through fiscal year 1983. This reauthorization did not make changes to the fundamental concept behind the ESEA of 1965 and its 1974 amendments. The new bill did reorganize the contents of ESEA and made changes to the legislative language of certain programs. The *Elementary and Secondary School Education in the Arts* program was renamed the *Arts in Education Act of 1978*. In justifying the need for this program, the new law stated:

Sec. 321. ....(b) (1) The Congress finds that — (A) the arts should be an essential and vital component of every student’s education; (B) the arts provide students with useful insights to all other areas of learning; and (C) a Federal program is necessary to foster and maintain the interrelationship of arts and education. (2) It is the purpose of this part to encourage and support programs that recognize and stress the essential role the arts can play in elementary and secondary education. (Public Law 95-561, pp. 2212-2213)

The bill then went on to state what activities were authorized under the ESEA’s *Arts in Education Act of 1978*:

Sec. 322. The Commissioner [of Education] shall carry out a program of grants and contracts to encourage and assist State and local educational agencies and other public and private agencies, organizations, and institutions to establish and conduct programs in which the arts are an integral part of elementary and secondary school curricula. *Activities*
carried out under this part may include arrangements with public and private cultural organizations, agencies, and institutions, including museums, libraries, and theaters, to achieve the purpose of this part. Furthermore, the Commissioner may carry out a program to develop and implement model projects and programs in the performing arts for children and youth, through arrangements made with the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. In addition, the Commissioner may carry out a program for the purpose of identifying, developing, and implementing model projects or programs in all the arts for handicapped persons through arrangements made with the National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped. (Public Law 95-561, pp. 2212-2213)

Some important shifts in this authorizing language should be emphasized. The first item of importance was that this section of the ESEA was now called the Arts in Education Act of 1978. As mentioned earlier, the arts-in-education approach as promoted by Kathryn Bloom seemed to have taken root in the language of this bill and in the education programming efforts of the Kennedy Center. An example of this shift is evident in the bill's language which now gave the Commissioner of Education permission to contract with public and private cultural organizations, agencies, and institutions, including museums, libraries, and theaters. This meant that competition for the grants to promote the essential role of the arts in elementary and secondary education would now be open to a much larger group than it was in the first year of the grant program. Not only would agencies that were a part of the formal education system be able to apply, but the competition would be open to groups outside this system.
Another shift in the 1978 reauthorization language gave the Kennedy Center permission to develop model programs in the performing arts for children and youth. This meant that the Center had formal legislative authorization to develop and expand other programs besides the Alliance. Of course, these programs already existed at the Center, that is, the American College Theatre Festival and the Program for Children and Youth, but now funds could be easily shifted among them. The new language did not direct the Center as to how much of these funds it could use for the performing arts activities. What is clear is that the Arts in Education Act of 1978 still justified giving these funds to the Center’s education programming based on the notion that it was to promote the importance of K-12 arts education nationally at the state and local levels.

Finally, the 1978 reauthorization language also called for the development of model projects or programs in all the arts for handicapped persons. This shift in language made the National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped a formal recipient of a percentage of the funds directed to this ESEA program. While the NCAH had already started to receive funds in FY 1976, under this legislation, its position was now strengthened by the new language in the bill. While funds for the Kennedy Center’s education programming, including the AAE, were now static at $750,000 a year, total funding for the Arts in Education Act of 1978 would increase at a substantial
rate until the Reagan Administration came into power. These increases in funds would be directed towards the grants program and the NCAH, whose funding would double each year until FY 1981.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan became President. According to the *Congressional Quarterly* of 1981, his goal was to cut government spending, so his administration revisited bills that had been approved by earlier administrations. In 1981, the ESEA and its amendments were reconsidered, with the new administration attempting to lump 44 education programs under several block grant programs to the states. They also tried to cut funding for these programs by 25 percent. While, for the most part, Congress rejected this proposal, ESEA was altered and folded into the administration's budget reconciliation bill, PL 97-35, which cleared Congress on July 31, 1981. This reconciliation bill was enormous as many programs of the government were included under it.

The *Arts in Education Act of 1978* survived, that is, it was not one of the ESEA programs that became a part of the block grants to the states. Funds to this program were cut with the Kennedy Center education program and the NCAH losing ten percent of their funds. The biggest loss to the *Arts in Education Act of 1978* was the grant program, which was eliminated by this reconciliation bill. The loss of this grant program coupled with the Center's shifting of its education funds from the Alliance program to the ACTF and PCY
would hamper state Alliance committee efforts to advance arts education at
the state and local levels throughout the 1980’s. Eventually, this situation
would culminate in the Alliance program reaching a point of crisis by the late-
1980’s.

Contending with Multiple Agendas

As the 1970’s came to a close, the direction of the Alliance’s evolution
had shifted taking on a lower priority among the Center’s education
programming. While the Alliance would somewhat reassert itself a decade
later, it is important to understand the dynamics that caused these shifts in its
development, the roots of which go back to its inception in 1973.

Jack Kukuk, former Director of Education for the Center, reflected
upon the early years in the Alliance’s formation. He stated, “The Alliance tried
to be everything to everyone at the same time and did a pretty good job of
juggling and did a lot of good, but [it] helped along a lot of confusion too”
(Kukuk, Personal Interview, June 27, 1996). While the Alliance was able to
juggle the differing needs of its founding groups in the early years due to
continual increases in its funding from USOE, this situation changed as its
funding stagnated towards the end of the 1970’s.

During the late-1970’s, the various groups that had originally formed
the Alliance were now put in a situation of having to “compete” in order to
advance their agendas. John Mahlmann, then-Executive Director of the National Art Education Association, felt that this competition was not terribly adversarial, but that there clearly was a conflict of missions among the founders that was creating shifts in the Alliance's direction. At the time, this conflict was not openly addressed by the Alliance project and quite possibly was not even understood to exist. But the conflict grew.

As Kukuk thought back upon this period in the Alliance's development, he noted, "I think that there was a lot of indecision and confusion at all levels....Everyone had their own agenda. It was an extremely difficult but interesting job trying to work with everyone [and] to hold together an alliance of things that didn't necessarily want to be aligned" (Kukuk, Personal Interview, June 27, 1996). In elaborating on this notion of conflicting missions the following groups that participated in its founding will be explored, at times reiterating some information given earlier in this document: the Kennedy Center; the United States Office of Education; the National Arts Education Professional Associations (the DAM'T group); and the State Alliances. In addition, the National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped and its effect on the evolution of the AAE will be discussed.

The Kennedy Center

In early 1973, the proposed Alliance project seemed to fulfill several urgent needs of the Kennedy Center Board and Chairman, which gave them a
reason to quickly agree to jointly sponsor this national arts education initiative. One need was that the Board wanted to quell rising concern in Congress about the Center due to it not having effectively fulfilled its congressional mandate to offer educational activities for the citizens of the United States. Another need was that Center was financially troubled causing it in 1972 to eliminate its first real education program and education director, Norman Fagan. The Center wanted to find a way to secure public funds to sponsor its mandated educational activities and to bring more paying customers to the Center to attend its performances. An important requirement of this second need was that these federal funds not be given directly to the Center, as Roger Stevens wanted to maintain for fundraising purposes the image that the Center was supported by private donations. Having the Alliance funds filter through the USOE to the Center allowed Stevens to assert that the Center received no direct federal assistance for its programming (Humphrey, Personal Interview, June 13, 1996, and Arberg, Personal Interview, June 12, 1996). A final need was that the Center as the National Cultural Center needed to demonstrate to the members of Congress and the nation’s citizens that it was not just a performing arts center for the people of Washington, D.C. It had to find ways to reach out to the states with its services. These needs were urgent and required an immediate solution. The Alliance project offered this to the Board.
As was discussed in Chapter Three, the original purpose of the Alliance project was vague and confusing, allowing for multiple interpretations of how this mission was to be implemented. The stated objectives for this national initiative seemed to be presented with a different focus depending on the group that was being introduced to the project. When Sidney Marland, former Commissioner of Education, presented the notion of the Alliance to the Kennedy Center Board, his emphasis was on how their joint sponsorship of this initiative would make the Center’s performances and programs more accessible to students, that is, bringing them to the Center to view productions or to perform. This emphasis on the Center and its performances was very appealing to the Board and seemed to enhance its mission as a performing arts center.

Soon, concerns started to surface with certain Board members that this focus was not being understood at the state level as the notion of the Alliance was presented across the country at the original ten regional meetings in May and June, 1973. Jean Kennedy Smith, Kennedy Center Trustee and sister of President Kennedy, wrote Forbes Rogers, first-Executive Director of the AAE, about her concerns. After attending several of the regional meetings, she noted, “I think it should be made more clear [the Alliance] is a Kennedy Center Education Program and not an HEW Program, and that is why there
are no funds. I think this point was confused in some of the minds of the [state] representatives” (Smith, Personal Correspondence, May 11, 1973).

While the Alliance project was never designed to be just a Kennedy Center program, the realization of what this meant for the Center and its mission was starting to sink in with Smith and other Board members as the initiative took form due to outside input from the states and professional arts education associations. The reality was that this project was designed to be jointly sponsored by HEW and the Center, and that the Office of Education gave over $100,000 during the first year of the project to cover salary, travel, and conference costs. But for Smith the concern was that the Center dedicated to her brother was not being understood and duly recognized as being at the heart of this national effort. She noted that many of the state representatives at these regional meetings had never been to the Center for a visit or performance and wondered how they could appreciate the importance of this national performing arts center. Due to this situation, she started to support the idea that instead of going to the regions to hold these introductory meetings for the Alliance, it would be better to bring the state representatives to the Center (Smith, Personal Correspondence, May 11, 1973). The hope seemed to be that once these state-level representatives experienced the Center’s resources, they would understand its importance to the project. While this idea was not implemented for the remaining regional meetings, it
was utilized in September of 1973, when all state AAE representatives were brought to the Kennedy Center for the first major event staged by the Alliance. This event was staged to introduce these representatives to the recently developed plan for the AAE by the Center’s Board and staff and, more importantly, to allow them to experience firsthand the resources of the National Cultural Center.

The Kennedy Center’s desire to be at the heart of the Alliance project was reasserted during the September 1973 meeting in Washington, D.C. At this meeting, the Center’s Board and staff presented what it felt to be the best plan for how the Alliance should develop, especially in its early years. This plan had two phases, of which the first was to be the one initially emphasized. Phase One, informally called the Showcasing Phase, called upon the state AAE representatives to act as review agents or talent scouts for the Center at the state level. In this role, state representatives were to find in their states exemplary arts activities for children and youth that could be sent to Washington, D.C. to be showcased at the Center. This phase would allow the Center to be actively involved with the states while keeping the focus on the Center itself. Phase Two, which the Center’s Board and staff wanted to put on hold, focused on advocating for the arts at the state and local levels as an integral part of the school curriculum in the nation’s schools. While the state representatives were reluctant to go along with the plan as outlined and
prioritized. By the end of their meeting at the Center they agreed to back Phase One as the first priority with the promise that Phase Two would be implemented in the near future.

Another priority for the Kennedy Center was to advance its mission as the nation's performing arts center. The Alliance project's mission was to advance all the arts in the education of the citizens of the United States. But this mission conflicted with the Center's primary mission. Soon after the Alliance was formed, the Center's Board and Chairman started to push the education programming towards more visible signs of the Center's performing arts focus. This thrust found expression in programs, such as the American College Theatre Festival and Programs for Children and Youth. By the late-1970's, the Center was able to shift emphasis with its educational programming away from the promotion of arts in education efforts at the state level to more tangible products that emphasized its performing arts mission and showcased the Center to the nation.

**The Office of Education, HEW**

The idea for the Alliance for Arts Education originated at the United States Office of Education (USOE) in late-1972. It was developed by Harold Arberg, Director of the Arts and Humanities Program (AHP), due to a request from his boss, Sidney Marland, Commissioner of Education. Marland had approached Arberg due to an urgent request from the Kennedy Center for
help in developing an education program that would allow the Center to fulfill its congressional mandate to offer educational experiences for the citizens of the United States. Arberg had been involved several years earlier in assisting an ad hoc committee in the development of another proposal for an education program at the Center due to a similar request from the Center’s Board to then-Commissioner of Education James Allen. This proposal, while focused on performing arts education, promoted the notion of this national center joining forces for its educational programming with USOE, the National Endowment for the Arts, and the performing arts education associations. This proposal was ultimately rejected by the Center’s Board.

With this new request in 1972, Arberg again saw the potential in these groups joining forces to advance arts education nationally, which was the mission of his Arts and Humanities Program at USOE. He proposed this time that an alliance, now to include the non-performing arts, be formed around this agenda and that it be jointly sponsored by HEW and the Kennedy Center. Arberg hoped to use the Kennedy Center’s congressional mandate to do what his program was not authorized to do, that is, to offer arts education programming. The AHP was authorized to distribute grants, not to offer programming. The only way that AHP could get a program going to advance arts education was to support another agency with funds and guidelines.
Supporting a program at the Kennedy Center was very appealing as it would give a national thrust to the promotion of arts education by AHP.

Another issue that was starting to become apparent was that by the early 1970's, the AHP was in a state of decline and would be eliminated at USOE by the early-1980's, under the Reagan Administration. This program had been an extremely vital national force in shaping arts education in the 1960's, under the direction of Kathryn Bloom and the Commissioners of Education while she was at USOE. But support for AHP started to decrease at USOE by the late-1960's, and Bloom left to take a position promoting her national agenda for Arts in Education at the JDR 3rd Fund. With AHP on the decline, it became very appealing to find a means to advance a national advocacy agenda for arts education. The Kennedy Center's mandate to serve the nation with educational activities offered USOE a potential vehicle for advancing its own agenda, giving birth to the notion of the Alliance.

The National Arts Education Associations

In late-1972, John Mahlmann, present Executive Director of the Music Educators National Conference, was Executive Director of the National Art Education Association. Mahlmann noted that the original notion of the Alliance was to be a joining force for the four professional arts education associations known as the DAM'T group: the National Dance Association, the National Art Education Association, the Music Educators National
Conference, and the American Theatre Association. Up to that point, each
association had had a separate agenda based on the constituency that it
served. But in 1972, the hope was that the DAM'T group could join their
constituencies together with the help of USOE to form an alliance with a
common national agenda for arts education.

As was discussed earlier, the idea for the Alliance originated with
Harold Arberg at USOE. Arberg supports Mahlmann’s understanding of the
original notion behind the Alliance project. Arberg indicated that originally, he
had proposed that the project be called the Alliance of Arts Education
Associations (AAEA). This name proved to be too cumbersome, so it was
shortened to the Alliance for Arts Education (Arberg, Personal Interview, June
12, 1996). Forbes Rogers, first Executive Director for the AAE, indicated that
he also understood that this was the notion behind the original Alliance
project. He stated that the AAE was to be a communication network that
would afford the four associations an arena in which to discuss what their
constituencies were doing and how the associations could work cooperatively
in the future (Personal Interview, June 29, 1996).

In the early years of the Alliance project, the DAM'T group was actively
involved in setting the directions for the AAE, along with the Kennedy Center,
USOE, and the state Alliance committees. All four executive directors of
these associations were on the Kennedy Center Education Advisory
Committee of the Center’s Board, which made sense, according to Mahlmann, as their associations already had established outreach networks at the state and local levels (Personal Interview, June 14, 1996).

In these early years, the associations were also funded by the Alliance to develop projects to assist with AAE’s mission of advancing arts education nationally. These projects included efforts like developing advocacy films and materials to promote arts education across the nation. Additionally, the AAE sponsored the Wingspread Conference in 1978, whose main purpose was to develop a common arts education agenda for the DAM'T group (see Chapter Three for more on this topic).

By the late-1970’s, the policies governing the Alliance project were changed by the Center Board to exclude the DAM'T group. Geraldine Otremba, who held a variety of positions at the Kennedy Center from 1978 to 1994, with the last being the Associate Managing Director for Government Relations, indicated that the reason that the DAM'T group was finally excluded was that they were never able to enlarge their scope of activities beyond their individual agendas. She stated that this caused the Alliance to move into a separate sphere totally removed from the professional arts education associations (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996).
Whatever the reason for this shift, Mahlmann feels that the exclusion of
the national professional arts education associations has ultimately narrowed
the impact of the Alliance project. He states

So it became, in that respect, a more parochial
administrative structure for the Kennedy Center. I’m not so
sure that was to their benefit because I think that remains
the problem today where they have programs going out
there, they affect our members, at the same time, we’re not
involved at the national level other than as friends...I don’t
think that this is the most efficient manner of administration
for effecting results. That’s fine and [the Alliance] can
remain a Kennedy Center program, and that’s what it is
more than the broader national program that it was in the
very early years. (Personal Interview, June 14, 1996)

The State Alliances

It is important in understanding the Alliance project to know that it did
not bubble up from the state level. It was conceived at the federal level and
then taken out to the states for support in May and June, 1973, via ten
regional meetings sponsored by the United States Commissioner of
Education, Sidney Marland, and the Kennedy Center. According to many
sources who remember these regional meetings, some of whom were quoted
in the last chapter, there was great confusion among the state participants
centering what the Alliance project was about, what the Kennedy Center’s
real reasons were for being involved, and what the expectations on the states
would be if they agreed to become a part of this project.
Jack Kukuk, former-Director of Education for the Kennedy Center, also remembers these early meetings. At the time of the regional meetings, Kukuk was a state representative from Washington. He noted, “There’s always been skepticism about what the Kennedy Center’s motives were and a lot of that did arise at the early meetings simply because there was no clearly laid out program [for the Alliance project]. I think [the folks from Washington, D.C.] were out trying to figure out how they might be helpful. When some of the people spoke, it really did sound as though they were trying to get people to come to the Kennedy Center and possibly buy tickets. The main negative question at that time: How would this benefit the states?” (Personal Interview, June 27, 1996)

Kukuk raises an interesting question. It is somewhat easier to understand the importance of the Alliance project for the national sponsors and their needs, as was discussed earlier in this chapter. But why did the states agree to participate in this federal arts education initiative when so many concerns and criticisms surfaced with them right from the start? While this study is focused more on the national level of the Alliance project, several possible reasons for the states jumping on board this initiative have surfaced.

One reason, according to Kukuk, was that the states hoped that the Alliance project would be a source of funding for arts education programs at the state level (Personal Interview, June 27, 1996). In the early 1970’s, a
great deal of the federal funds available for educational innovation did not
target arts education. The Alliance project was the first federally funded
initiative meant to promote arts education in the nation's schools. In addition,
arts education was not as high as math and science education on many state
reform agendas. This situation meant that arts educators at the state level
were constantly on the lookout for potential sources of funds to run or expand
their programs. The Alliance project promised to be a source of funds for the
states, especially in its early years.

A second reason that many states wanted to be a part of this national
initiative was due to the glamour of the Kennedy Center. In spite of the
skepticism about the Center's real reasons for being involved in this national
initiative, it was seen as the nation's cultural center located in the nation's
capital. Being able to attach a state's arts education efforts to the Kennedy
Center name potentially gave state representatives immediate recognition
and clout at the state and local levels.

A third reason why some states agreed to join forces with this national
initiative was due to advocacy efforts for arts education already under way in
their states. Gerald Tollifson and Richard Shoup, founders of the Ohio AAE,
stated that this is why Ohio decided to jump on board the Alliance project in
spite of their reservations about the Kennedy Center's intent with this initiative
(Personal Interview, October 1, 1996).
In 1972, a year before the Alliance project was announced, Tollifson and Shoup conceived of a similar project for Ohio. They felt that there was a need to have a non-government entity that could advocate for the arts in Ohio schools. Both Tollifson and Shoup worked for the Ohio Department of Education as arts specialists. As government employees, they were not allowed to advocate in the state legislature for arts education in the schools. Due to this restriction, they formed the Action for the Arts in Ohio Schools Committee (AAOS), whose main purpose was advocacy for arts education. When the Alliance project presented itself a year later, Tollifson and Shoup decided to join forces with this national initiative in the hope that it would facilitate the advocacy efforts started by the AAOS in Ohio, allowing for a much bigger impact on Ohio schools.

A final reason that surfaced as to why the states joined this national initiative was the potential to network with other states about arts education. “I used the early meetings for networking with other state alliances,” said Tom Hatfield, who presently is the Executive Director of the National Art Education Association and was one of the founders of the South Carolina AAE in 1974 (Personal Interview, June 14, 1996). He noted that by networking with other state AAE representatives, he was able to improve South Carolina’s efforts at advancing arts education. Interestingly, Hatfield also commented that in the early years of the AAE, he did not get any sense that the Alliance project had
a formal national agenda that it hoped to advance through the emerging state committees.

The National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped

In January of 1975, the AAE and the Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation co-sponsored a conference in California, to explore the idea of student needs in the arts for the mentally retarded and handicapped. The conference was organized by James Sjolund, Supervisor of Music Education for the State of Washington, and was meant to be a regional program. Soon after this conference, Sjolund proposed to Jack Kukuk, then-Assistant Director of AAE, and Jean Kennedy Smith, Kennedy Center Trustee, the idea that the AAE investigate the possibility of forming another program called the National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped (NCAH). According to Kukuk, Smith immediately jumped on this idea and pushed for it to happen (Personal Interview, June 27, 1996).

By June 1975, just a few months later, the NCAH had been formed; operational funds had been secured from the Kennedy Foundation and Alliance budget; an executive director, James Sjolund, had been hired; and the Kennedy Center’s contract with USOE for the Alliance project had been amended to include direct funding for this new committee (Rogers, Personal Communication, June 12, 1975).
The NCAH quickly established itself as a separate entity from the AAE and developed its own bylaws, mission, board of directors, and organizational structure under which it would function. This meant that the Center Board or the state AAE committees had very little control over this emerging program. The NCAH also started to sponsor Very Special Arts Chapters at the state level, in addition to its national office. These chapters were independent of the state AAE committees and had the primary purpose of organizing and staging Very Special Arts Festivals, annual arts events for mentally retarded and handicapped students. The national Very Special Arts Office managed this entire network and was always very clear about what the state chapters would do and could do. According to Geraldine Otremba, former Associate Managing Director for Government Relations at the Kennedy Center, “[Very Special Arts] was managed with a clear sense of purpose and a clear sense of what [it] need[ed] from [state chapters] and what [state chapters would] in turn receive from [NCAH]” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996). She noted that these organizing principles had been absent from the Alliance project and, therefore, more difficult to mobilize support around.

The NCAH also had a very strong spiritual leader in Jean Kennedy Smith, according to Otremba. Smith took to this project with great passion and brought to it the Kennedy family’s support of undertakings devoted to the mentally retarded and handicapped. One of Smith’s sisters is mentally
retarded and another sister, Eunice Kennedy Shiver, founded Very Special Olympics, an annual sports event for the mentally retarded and handicapped. Smith also did not have a great affection for the Alliance as it developed and wanted to pull back support from it. Scott Stoner, former Director of the Alliance, noted that she did not believe in such things as holding meetings and conferences, as the AAE was primarily doing across the nation in its early years. She was much more interested in sponsoring festivals and performances for students than in advocacy efforts to promote arts education, which she found to be too nebulous (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996).

David Humphrey, former Director of the Alliance, felt that NCAH really gave Smith a project that she could take hold of and push through. Her push, Humphrey noted, was to establish it on its own. “Her efforts were to get it out of the [Kennedy Center] education program, which she did, to make it a special unit in the Kennedy Center, which she did, and eventually to move it completely out of the Kennedy Center but still maintain the Kennedy Center address, which she did” (Personal Interview, June 12, 1996).

Smith soon started to push for additional funding for Very Special Arts and was able to get her brother, Senator Edward Kennedy, behind this project, noted Humphrey (Personal interview, June 12, 1996). Her efforts proved to be quite successful. For FY 1977, the language of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act’s Special Projects Act — Elementary and
Secondary School Education in the Arts' was altered to include direct funding for the AAE and for the NCAH. That year, the NCAH received $250,000 under this act, compared to the $750,000 allocated to the AAE. During the next three fiscal years, the NCAH's allocation doubled each year while the AAE's allocation remained the same. This meant that in FY 80, the NCAH's allocation reached $1,500,000, while the AAE was still receiving just $750,000 (see Figure 4.2).

This funding inequity clearly upset Kennedy Center education staff and state committee representatives, who felt NCAH was getting money that rightfully belonged to the AAE. Nadine Saitlin, Executive Director of the Illinois AAE, indicated that state representatives were told by Kennedy Center staff that the funding inequity was due to Smith's presence on the Center's Board and the power she held (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996). Jack Kukuk, former Director of Education at the Kennedy Center, indicated that the Center's Board saw Smith as one of the main decision-makers for the Education Program due to her early involvement in these matters. He maintained that the Board usually supported whatever direction in which she wanted to take the education program. He noted that this made it difficult to keep the Kennedy Center educational programming going when so much money was being directed towards Very Special Arts (Kukuk, Personal Interview, June 27, 1996). But not everyone saw it this way.
Harold Arberg, former Director of the Arts and Humanities Program at USOE, felt that the NCAH saved the Alliance’s funding. He noted that NCAH and Smith’s pushing for its funding also kept the Alliance funding alive, due to being under the same bill. Arberg stated that the Alliance “would have died on the vine had it not been for [NCAH]” (Personal Interview, June 13, 1996). Otremba noted, “[Funding for] the Education Program at the Kennedy Center was virtually static for the five years that VSA grew dramatically....Education at that point was not a major focus for the Kennedy Center. It was not getting the kind of major attention at the highest levels of management, and I don’t think that there was enough attention from management to see that a program got built that you could request that level of funding for” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996).

While this study can not say conclusively whether VSA’s growth hurt or saved the Alliance, what is clear is that it had an enormous impact on the AAE’s evolution. To Smith’s credit, the NCAH was a very well organized and focused effort. It knew what it wanted to do and set out to do it. This project gave Smith the freedom that she wanted due to its loose affiliation with the Center and to it not being controlled by the Center’s Board, according to a former high-ranking Kennedy Center staff member. But this same staff member wonders what would have happened to the Alliance’s evolution if Smith had not changed her affection for the project. This person felt that if
Smith had stayed involved with the Alliance project, it would have evolved in a much stronger way.

Reaching a Point of Crisis

Derek Gordon was introduced to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees as the new Director for Education at their July 22, 1992 meeting. He was immediately faced with the challenge of what to do with the Alliance for Arts Education, which had been sponsored by the Center since 1973. "The Alliance was a pretty dysfunctional family," Gordon noted. "The group was unhappy in general. There was a lot of discontent among the [state] Alliances" (Personal Interview, October 25, 1996). Gordon shared that even during the interview process for his new position, the new Kennedy Center Chairman, James D. Wolfensohn, brought the topic of Alliance up as one of the first questions to which Gordon was to respond, as it was at the forefront of the Chairman's mind. At issue for Wolfensohn was what the value of this group was and whether the Center should continue its sponsorship of the Alliance (Gordon, Personal Interview, October 25, 1996).

Scott Stoner, former Director of the Alliance, felt that Wolfensohn raised these questions about the Alliance as he knew that Congress might soon be asking the Center to justify how the funds for education were being spent (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996). Wolfensohn was seen as being
very savvy about congressional relations and was not trying as his predecessor Roger Stevens had been to maintain the perception that the Center functioned without direct federal funds. In fact, Wolfensohn was attempting to grow federal funding for the Center and was aware that a strong education program would be an area that could gain increased support from Congress.

Upon his arrival at the Center in 1990, Wolfensohn requested that each department conduct a comprehensive evaluation of itself and prepare a long-term plan of action in relation to its findings. The Education Department engaged in this process using an outside consultant. During the evaluation process, the feasibility of continued support of the Alliance due to problems with this initiative surfaced as a major issue with which the Center had to come to terms. This is why it was at the forefront of Wolfensohn's mind as he interviewed Gordon for the position of Director of Education. The question that must be explored due to the state of affairs with the Alliance that confronted Gordon in 1992 was: What happened to the AAE during the 1980's that created this crisis?

**De-emphasizing an Initiative**

As was discussed earlier in this chapter, the Alliance encountered discord among its founders and their agendas early in the project's development. This situation caused shifts in funding for the Alliance and in
the priority given it among the educational programs at the Kennedy Center by the end of the 1970's. Emerging from this conflict of missions, the dominant forces left to shape the Alliance project as it entered the 1980's was the Kennedy Center and the National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped, which the latter did indirectly by diverting federal funds and Kennedy Center Trustee attention away from the AAE. By the 1980's, the national arts education associations had effectively been eliminated from any official role in the Alliance's development due to changes in Center Board policy concerning governance of the AAE. Additionally, the Arts and Humanities Program at United States Office of Education was near death and had become an impotent player in this national arts education initiative, though, funds for the Alliance project still came though this office. AHP would be eliminated by 1982, due to the Reagan Administration's revamping of the national budget for education and its emphasis on block grants to the states and state control of education.

As the 1980's got under way, the only other group left that could speak for the Alliance project and its role as a national force in shaping arts education was the state Alliance committees. This group had quickly jumped on board the Alliance project during its banner period in the mid-1970's, and claimed 56 committees by 1980, that included all 50 states, the territories, and the District of Columbia. This group, though, was not a united or equal force...
as individual states had been allowed in the early years of the Alliance project to develop as they saw fit due to the lack of clear expectations from the national level. "The lack of communication [about the Kennedy Center's expectations of the state committees] was clearly an issue in those years," according to Nadine Saitlin, Executive Director of the Illinois AAE (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996). She talked about how the states were told that they were to advance arts education at the local level in whatever way was appropriate for their locale. This, she noted, was very different than the situation with the Very Special Arts State Chapters, who were given guidelines about how to develop their state committees. For the Alliance, this lack of guidance, she believes, created such diversity among the state committees during the 1980's, that it was difficult to understand what they were, what they were to do, and how they were to get it done (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996).

Another issue that the state Alliance committees faced as they entered the 1980's, was decreased financial support to the state committees from the national office. While in the 1970's, state committees could receive a grant award of up to $10,000 to assist with the development of their local AAE efforts, by the early 1980's, the amount of the allocations to the states fell to $1,000 or below. This change in funding level occurred at the time that many state committees were just getting off the ground with their efforts. As Saitlin
pondered, “How do you take an organization and sure it up, and make sure it becomes viable when you don't have the kind of operating money to support the staff that you need to make it happen” (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996)?

Responsibility for the Alliance project in the Education Department at the Center had also become an issue during the 1980's. Derek Gordon felt that leadership of the Alliance was the issue next to funding that had helped create the problems that he found with the Alliance upon his arrival at the Center in the early-1990's. He stated that the former Director of the Education Department, Jack Kukuk, did not seem to have been particularly focused on the Alliance and that his interests went in a lot of different directions, such as festivals and international exchanges. During Kukuk's time as Director of Education, according to Gordon, not a great deal was done to build the Alliances or to clarify their agenda, especially on the state level. “I think the [Alliance] network felt that it had been passed around and that it did not have anyone who was really dedicated to what it was doing and that more often as not they were treated as children and not as partners. They were told this is what is going to happen and that's it,” Gordon stated (Personal Interview, October 25, 1996).

In 1983, David Humphrey became the new Director of the Alliance at the Kennedy Center, the fourth director that the project had had in as many
years. According to Humphrey, he soon established a process that was like a grant-giving process for awarding funds to the state Alliance Committees. He set up criteria and guidelines outlining what was expected of a state committee, and how they were to apply for funds from the Center’s U.S. Department of Education (formerly USOE) moneys. Humphrey did not believe that each state committee should receive the same basic grant. He wanted a state’s level of funding to be dependent on its application and fulfillment of the stated criteria. He also introduced the notion that state committees now fell into three categories: Active states, Inactive states, and states with no Alliance affiliation. The criteria used to assess this status and to determine funding levels were:

- that there was a viable organization and leader with a way of passing on power, and
- that the state committee offer programming, that is, planning for comprehensive arts education, or staging Imagination Celebrations or conferences. (Humphrey, Personal Interview, June 12, 1996)

Humphrey also noted that the National Alliance’s ability to advocate for arts education and against decreasing public support was stunted by the Alliance project being located at the Kennedy Center. The Center’s agenda with Congress took priority, often putting the Alliance in a delicate situation. If people in Congress were for assisting the Center, but they were not supporters of arts education in the nation’s schools, the National Alliance was not to go against these people with their advocacy efforts. “So if the Alliance
did what it should for the states,” Humphrey stated, “it was in conflict with the Center. But if it did what the Center wanted, it was judged ineffective” (Personal Interview, June 12, 1996).

The state committees grew more and more frustrated with the shifts that came into being at the Center during the 1980’s. “I remember that there was a lot of frustration with the small amount of money,” Nadine Saitin stated, “because there was a lot of expectation on what that would buy.... I do remember from [Illinois AAE’s] standpoint that when we were trying to raise funds, it was the good news/bad news because we were associated with the Kennedy Center, which made people think there was stability and also made people think that we were being supported by them. And yet, we were going in asking [other funders] for money because we weren’t being supported by them. That amount of money, whatever it was in the early years, and even today relative to what I have in my budget, is still a very small amount of money” (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996).

**Losing an Identity**

As the 1980’s progressed, the Alliance project, especially the state committees, were pushed more and more onto the Kennedy Center Education Department’s “back burner”. The Center started to actively seek higher levels of funding from Congress for its educational programming. These efforts proved successful by the mid-1980’s, as is shown in Figure 4.2. While the
funding increases were initially modest and still fell far below funds being
directed to the National Committee, Arts for the Handicapped, the downward
trend in federal funding for the Center’s education program had ended.

What did this increase in federal funds mean for the Alliance project?
This information is difficult to ascertain from the data available. Figure 4.1
shows funds for the AAE increasing in the 1980’s, as the first half of the
decade progressed. It is not clear that much of this increase trickled down to
the state level or the AAE’s national initiative to advance arts education in the
nation’s schools. What is certain is that programs and operating costs for the
Education Department at the Center were being shifted to the Alliance section
of the budget, helping to explain most of the reported increases in funds
directed towards the AAE initiative during this period.

For example, at the Kennedy Center Board meeting on January 18,
1985, it was announced that the Imagination Celebration, which by 1984 had
grown to 24 sites in nine states, would be shifted administratively from
Programs for Children and Youth to the AAE. This festival program was a
very expensive program to run and funds for it were shifted to the AAE
budget, thus showing up as an increase in Alliance funding for FY 1986.
Additionally, the Board’s October 25, 1984 minutes indicate that the growth in
education funding from Congress would be used for increased operating
costs and for expansion of programs. Most Education Department operating costs traditionally were grouped under the AAE’s budget.

As federal funds grew for the Education Department in the 1980’s, so did its variety of offerings that showcased the Center. Several award programs were instituted that brought exemplary school arts programs and leaders to the Center for recognition. Additional fellowship and intern programs were started that brought arts teachers to the Center to pursue their arts. Festival sites were increased. Professional development workshops for arts educators were offered at the Center. Scholarships for high school seniors were awarded allowing them to pursue study in the performing arts and to perform at the Center. Special events were offered for students to enhance their attendance at Center performances. International exchanges for arts educators were continued. And the National Symphony Orchestra’s educational programming was also added to the Education Department’s growing menu of offerings.

As had been the case in the mid-1970’s, this proliferation of educational offerings in the 1980’s was stunning, causing one critic to call the educational offerings of the Center the “supermarket approach” to education in the arts. Others in the arts education community, though less critical, could not identify what the focus of the Center’s educational programming was or what it excelled at, if anything (Madeja, Personal interview, September 9,

As the Center’s Education Department grew and changed, the state Alliance committees started to feel the identity of their organizations being usurped by the Center’s and Very Special Arts’ needs. The regional representatives for the AAE first registered concern about this matter at the Alliance for Arts Education Advisory Committee meeting on August 17, 1983. One issue that surfaced was the demand being put on state committees due to their coordinating in their states the Imagination Celebrations for the Center. Due to the limited staffing of many of these state committees, this demand forced many of them to de-emphasize the arts education advocacy role that had traditionally been their mission at the state level.

A second issue of concern was that the AAE might be absorbed by the National Committee/Arts for the Handicapped and that the National Alliance office would have to push hard to keep the Alliance project autonomous. Jack Kukuk, Director of Education at the Kennedy Center, acknowledged that this was a legitimate concern of the state committees. He indicated that the Very Special Arts Festival wanted to take over the AAE’s network, and that Jean Kennedy Smith was displeased with the AAE for not cooperating more fully with VSA (AAE Advisory Committee Minutes, August 17, 1983).
In relation to this matter, the issue of funding arose due to what the regional AAE representatives felt was a disproportionate percentage of U.S. Department of Education funds going to VSA. The feeling was that the AAE's goal was to serve all the nation's students, while VSA served five per cent or less of this population. The regional representatives urged the Kennedy Center Education Department leadership to push for increased funding for the states (AAE Advisory Committee Minutes, August 17, 1983).

The state committees also felt a loss of their identity as the Center continued to change and refine its mission and goals for the Education Department throughout the 1980's. The shift in the mission was towards a greater emphasis on performing arts education and the Center being central in the delivery of these services. This shift, as discussed earlier in this chapter, had started in the late-1970's, and refined itself throughout the 1980's. In a report given to the Center's Board at their June 8, 1990 meeting, the Education Department gave the following as its mission and goals:

The John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts, as the national cultural center, celebrates our vast heritage by presenting the finest and most diverse of the performing arts in the United States and the world. It is therefore the mission of the Education Department to provide opportunities for people of all ages and backgrounds to learn about and to experience this diversity through the performing arts at the Kennedy Center and throughout the nation.

The Kennedy Center Education Department carries out the broad educational and cultural mission of the national cultural center by
1. producing and presenting performances for young people and their families
2. providing learning opportunities in the arts for all ages
3. promoting the arts for young people. (John F. Kennedy Center Trustee Meeting Minutes, June 8, 1990)

Towards the end of the 1980's, the Center's Education Department started to put more pressure on the state committees to move in certain directions. At this point, Scott Stoner was the National Director of the Alliance and David Humphrey had moved into the role of Deputy Director of Education at the Center. "When I came on...from a political standpoint, [the Alliance was] fighting for [its] own financial support from the government because it was getting clearer and clearer that the government was less and less likely to continue the support for us at a certain level," Stoner stated. "We were needing to make the case for being effective and, although we had this whole network in place," he noted, "we knew that it was difficult to go up to a given congressman's office and say that this is what this alliance has done in your state, because in many cases, the alliance had not done all that much in the state. They had just been kind of there having a few meetings a year" (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996).

Stoner and Humphrey developed a program meant to assist state committees in stabilizing themselves. Criteria was set up to evaluate a state committee's effectiveness. The goal was to bring each chapter's mission into alignment with the National Alliance for Arts Education and to have them
begin to define their initiatives. To assist with this goal, two types of grants were offered to the state committees:

- Staff Assistance Grants of up to $3000, and
- Operations Grants of up to $10,000. (Stoner, Personal Interview, June 10, 1996).

"We started pushing [state organizations] to have some form of paid staff and really begin to stabilize themselves," Stoner shared (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996). He noted that when he came on board in the late-1980's, most of these organizations were operated on a totally volunteer basis. "[For many state committees] there was no paid staff and, therefore, there was constantly a turnover in the leadership [making it] extremely difficult to maintain any consistency or stabilization... where as [a] state might be very strong and getting a lot accomplished this year, next year, they suddenly lost their president or their chairman of the board and everything just fell apart," Stoner lamented (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996). He felt, though, that this was a typical problem with non-profit organizations.

Stoner believed that there had been a time in the Alliance's history when state committees received larger allocations, but this was cut back as the Center's education program grew and funds were directed to programs that could easily demonstrate their value, such as the Imagination Celebration. He felt that the issue for the Center was how much to allocate resources to programs that have more tangible results versus advocacy.
activities and meetings. He also believed that the commitment on a state committee’s part had to be more substantial as the Center couldn’t continue giving funds to groups that weren’t accomplishing a great deal (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996).

Nadine Saitlin acknowledged that as this transition progressed, there was a sense that the nature of the AAE was being shifted to something that it had not been before. She indicated that by the end of 1980’s, she and her board of directors at the Illinois AAE were less and less willing to go along with the demands being placed on them by the Kennedy Center. The Illinois AAE was considered by many Alliance people at the national and state levels to be one of the most successful state Alliance committees in the nation, and they were pleased with the identity that they had established in their state. The Illinois AAE had also done well in raising funds to support their operations, making their allocation from the Kennedy Center a minor part [later clarified to mean ten per cent] of their total budget. “We felt that we could continue without the Kennedy Center support if it came down to that,” Saitlin stated (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996).

But many state Alliance committees were not in the strong position in which the Illinois AAE found itself in the late-1980’s. The new criteria and the shifting identity weeded out the states that couldn’t make the commitment or couldn’t meet the criteria set up by Center. As the 1980’s came to a close, 20
state committees moved from Active status into the Inactive or None categories.

**Flexing Some Muscle**

As time progressed, David Humphrey, then-Deputy Director of Education at the Kennedy Center, felt that the Center had very little obligation to continue funding the Alliance project. He noted that the language of the legislation funding the Alliance had so changed over the years that by the late-1980's, the AAE was just a small part of the education programming of the Center (Personal Interview, June 12, 1996).

At this same time, others at the Kennedy Center were also raising questions about the Center's continued support of this national initiative. Scott Stoner, former Director of the Alliance, noted, "There was always in various quarters of the [Center] some skepticism of the value of the network or that we should actually be supporting them in the way that we were, and not because anyone felt it wasn't a good thing and that there shouldn't be state advocacy organizations and all that. It was just that given the limited resources that [the Center] had, were we really making any impact as a national institution through this means" (Personal Interview, June 10, 1996)?

Geraldine Otremba, former Associate Managing Director for Government Relations at the Kennedy Center, also had difficulty reconciling support of the Alliance project with the Center's congressional mandate for
education in its 1958 enabling legislation. She stated, “[The 1958 legislative mandate] says ‘present programs for children and youth.’ That’s what the Kennedy Center came back to again and again. That is what it saw as its core mission. And it’s quite hard, frankly, to fit the Alliance into that in a very clear-cut way” (Personal interview, June 18, 1996).

At the beginning of this section of Chapter Four, a discussion was started concerning several events that occurred at the start of the 1990’s, that brought the issue of the Center’s continuing support of the AAE to a head. The first event in 1990 was the arrival at the Kennedy Center of James D. Wolfensohn as its new chairman. In his effort to assume control of the Kennedy Center and leverage more federal funds from Congress, he requested each of the Center’s departments/units to develop a report concerning their programs and to conduct a study to assess the effectiveness of these activities.

Due to this charge, another action was put into motion that played a major role in raising questions concerning the Center’s support of the AAE. In November of 1990, Wolfensohn and the Center’s Education Department engaged The Wolf Organization from Cambridge, Massachusetts, to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of the Center’s Education Department and to prepare for it a long-range strategic plan (Wolf, 1991, p. i). Six months later, The Wolf Organization issued a report containing its findings and
recommendations. The release of this report triggered a final action that brought the issue of the Center’s continuing support of the AAE to a head. It was the development of a preliminary plan for the Center’s Education Department that radically redefined the Center’s relationship to the AAE. But first, let’s step back and look at the report from The Wolf Organization.

The Wolf Report

At a special meeting on May 14, 1991, Tom Wolf presented his findings and recommendations to the Kennedy Center leadership. According to notes from this meeting, Wolf stated that at the outset of the study, he wanted to find out what the image of the Kennedy Center’s arts education program was across the country. Wolf interviewed over 200 people in the arts and arts education communities across the nation. He found that in terms of exemplary arts education programs, the Kennedy Center held no prominent position nationally. This surprised him, due to the fact that the program had received a great deal of funding from the U.S. Department of Education over the years. Wolf stated that this raised a question that he kept in his mind throughout the entire study: Why was the Kennedy Center arts education program not nationally known (Kennedy Center, 1991, May 14, p. 1)? Laura Longley, Director of Public Affairs for the Kennedy Center, reinforced Wolf’s perception at this meeting. She had found that across the country, people in
the media were unaware of what the Center was doing in arts education (Kennedy Center, 1991, May 14, p. 4).

Wolf then went on to outline his findings and recommendations. He noted that in assessing the effectiveness of the Center's educational programming, he compared its offerings to the arts education programs at several other comparable institutions, such as The Lincoln Center, The Los Angeles Music Center, and The Kentucky Center for the Arts. He noted that like these other institutions, the Center's program was primarily arts-in-education focused, which he described as enrichment and exposure to the arts activities meant to supplement ongoing instruction. These activities included concerts, festivals, workshops, clinics, and other events which offered direct live experiences in the arts for young people. Wolf continued by explaining that the Kennedy Center's Education Department also differed from these other institutions in that the great majority of its offerings took place at the Center itself. The other institutions primarily sent artists and performers into schools to serve students (Kennedy Center, 1991, May 14, p. 4).

The Kennedy Center Education Program also lacked another important trait of the education programs at these other institutions, which Wolf felt made the latter group's offerings more successful. He found that each of the other institutions had a distinct point of view about what they were attempting
to accomplish, clear goals, and a focused philosophical approach to education in the arts (Kennedy Center, 1991, May 14, p. 16). He recommended that the Center focus on specific national programs and projects which would serve audiences in ways that clearly enhance the quality and quantity of performing arts in the United States. Wolf felt that this was especially important as the Kennedy Center was really the national center for the performing arts (Kennedy Center, 1991, May 14, p. 31).

The Wolf Report, as it became known around the Center, evaluated each and every education program, of which there were many, that were a part of the Education Department. Several education programs stood out as the type that Wolf felt were appropriate to the Center's mission. These included the American College Theatre Festival and Programs for Children and Youth, and Wolf recommended expansion of these types of activities. The report also advised the Center to de-emphasize or eliminate various programs as they were not in keeping with the Center's performing arts mission or were of poor quality. This group included the Imagination Celebration and several award and fellowship programs.

Wolf also recommended that the Center discontinue its sponsorship of the Alliance for Arts Education and help identify an appropriate national organization with which the state Alliances might affiliate. His
recommendation concerning the AAE was based on the following conclusions reached in his study:

- **Network strength:** Few will dispute the fact that the Alliance network is uneven at best....As a whole, based on interviews for this project, most people believe that the Alliance network is not strong enough to have a major impact nationally in arts education.

- **Quality and impact of work:** In assessing the quality and impact of the work of state Alliances, the report is again mixed. In certain states — particularly those in the midwest — independent observers report that the organizations do excellent work. In other states, their work is not taken seriously by outsiders. In still others, professionals in arts and education cannot even say what the Alliances do.

- **Furthering the goals of The Kennedy Center:** If Kennedy Center Education is attempting to focus on performing arts programming and education, then the Alliances are irrelevant. They simply are not in a position to present programs or provide direct educational services to young people and adults.

- **Kennedy Center visibility:** The Kennedy Center invests over a quarter of a million dollars in supporting the Alliance network. For this investment it gets almost no recognition. (Wolf, 1991, pp. 65 - 66)

Wolf realized that there could be some political fallout if the Center implemented this recommendation to eliminate an initiative that had a visible national program. To circumvent this problem, the report advised that the Center should not simply terminate its support abruptly but should provide a smooth transition to another arrangement so as to offer chances for its continued success. Wolf had even taken the liberty of holding discussions with the staff at the American Council for the Arts (ACA) in New York City, as
they were, he felt, the most logical organization to assume control of the AAE. He reported that they were enthusiastic about the idea of shifting control of the AAE from the Center to them. He noted that ACA’s only reservation about this agreement was funding, but Wolf assumed that they would be able to locate a funding source for the AAE if it was transferred to ACA’s control. (Wolf, 1991, pp. 86 - 87).

Finally, Wolf recommended the Center take a hard look at the legislative language in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act (ESEA), which authorized federal funds for the Kennedy Center education program. Wolf had gone back as far as the 1978 reauthorization of this bill and felt that the Center was not keeping with the legislative intent of the Arts in Education Act of 1978, which was a part of the ESEA (Wolf, 1991, p.19). During the 1978 reauthorization, as was discussed early in this chapter, the language of this section of the ESEA bill was changed to allow the Commissioner of Education to use the Kennedy Center to advance performing arts education nationally. Wolf interpreted this to mean that any non-performing arts education activities at the Center were in conflict with the intent of this legislation. It is puzzling that Wolf did not follow the Arts in Education Act all the way back to its origins during the 1974 reauthorization of the ESEA. If he had done this, he would have seen that the original intent of these funds was for the broader agenda of advancing the arts in the nation’s schools through
the Alliance for Arts Education project. One wonders if he would have called for the Center to discontinue sponsorship of the AAE, if he knew about this?

At the close of the May 14, 1991 meeting at which Wolf presented an outline of his report to the Center leadership, Scott Stoner, Director of the Alliance, asked Wolfensohn what the Education Department should be telling the state Alliance committees during the transition period. What is interesting due to his use of the term “transition period” and the lack of objections or negative reactions by the Center staff during this meeting was that there seemed to be a basic acceptance of Wolf’s recommendations concerning the AAE and its relationship to the Center. While at a later date, Wolf would be totally blamed for the call to discontinue support of the AAE by the Center due to the controversy that arose, at this meeting his recommendations were met with no real arguments but seemed to reflect ideas already being floated among Center staff.

Wolfensohn told Stoner to advise the state committees that for now it was business as usual. In closing the meeting, Wolfensohn asked David Humphrey, the Acting Director of Education due to Jack Kukuk’s resignation, to come up with a plan in consultation with the education staff for the Education Department. Humphrey agreed to have a plan ready by June 7, 1991. Wolfensohn indicated that the leadership group would reconvene in early June to discuss this plan and the recommendations in the Wolf report.
Nadine Saitlin, Executive Director of the Illinois AAE, was asked by Humphrey and Stoner to be a part of an informal ad hoc committee to develop an education plan for Wolfensohn. "I remember very vividly in those early meetings," Saitlin stated, "that...the plan that David [Humphrey] presented just had to do with the performing arts....It was much more an arm for the Kennedy Center to have an identity in the state versus a state identity....What was coming down in this version [of an education plan] that David and Scott [Stoner] were formulating looked much more about a vehicle for the Kennedy Center, their programming, their identity, than it was about states' formulation about advocacy (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996). One member of the ad hoc committee indicated that the impression left with the committee was that it was about David and Scott trying to give Wolfensohn back something that they thought Wolfensohn wanted.

As promised, the Education Department submitted its plan to Wolfensohn addressing the issue of continued support of the AAE. Humphrey in a memorandum to Wolfensohn mentions that he met with a small group of the AAE leadership on the state and regional levels to give them some indication of what was in motion at the Kennedy Center, that is, that FY 1992 would be a transitional year for the AAE and that it most likely would be the last year in which the Center would provide financial support (Personal Correspondence, August 21, 1991). Humphrey urged Wolfensohn
to act quickly on the plan as there could be some political fallout due to this shift in the Center's relationship with the AAE network. Humphrey closed his letter by stating, "A transition with the AAE must be sensitive to the needs and concerns of the network of state organizations that the Kennedy Center created and provide other opportunities for us to utilize this network for our educational purposes as a national institution. There are many political landmines and we must develop a careful process. We should meet with Scott Stoner and Gerry Otremba immediately after Labor Day to devise strategy" (Personal Correspondence, August 21, 1991).

While the fate of the AAE seemed set in concrete by the summer of 1991, all this would change in the next few months due to pressure on Wolfensohn from several forces with very different agendas: internal Kennedy Center forces, state-level forces, and congressional forces.

Geraldine Otremba, then Associate Managing Director for Government Relations at the Center³, indicated that she single-handedly became the enemy of the Wolf report: "I thought it was a dangerous set of recommendations....My reaction to his idea and the direction that he was heading with it was frankly pure and simply [motivated by] what it would mean for the Kennedy Center" (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996). Otremba was especially worried about Wolf's recommendation that the Center discontinue

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³ Presently, Dr. Otremba is the Director of Congressional Relations at the Library of Congress in Washington, DC.
its support of the AAE and felt that he approached the study with this conclusion already in mind. She noted, “The last thing I wanted to see happen was that the only possible evidence of a national program [at the Center] with some grassroots potential go out the door” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996). Several other sources interviewed for this study also complained of the bias that Otremba mentioned. They also felt that Wolf seemed to be promoting a particular agenda through the interview questions for his study.

What Otremba understood was the full history of the USDOE funding for the Center’s Education Department due to her work raising federal funds for the Center. She knew that Wolfensohn had made increasing federal support for the Center his highest priority. Otremba felt that Wolf’s recommendation if implemented would be a “death knell to the Kennedy Center Education Department” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996). She understood that even in the AAE’s diminished condition, some other organization would eagerly pick up this grassroots state-organization. If this happened, it would only be a matter of time before this action affected the federal funds flowing to the Center for its educational programming. “The legislative history made it clear that the Alliance and funding for the Alliance was a cornerstone for funding anything else in education at the Kennedy Center. So, if you lost the Alliance, you would in all probability lose your
claim to that money in the Department of Education, or at the very least be significantly challenged for it” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996). She indicated that the Center could not afford to face this embarrassing situation at the same time that it was going forth with requests to Congress for increased federal funds for the entire Center.

A force that started to flex its muscle with Wolfensohn at the same time that Otremba started her discussions with him was the state Alliance committees. Word soon started to leak out to the states that the Center was thinking of eliminating the Alliance project. While they were not sure they could stop this action, knowledge of the Center’s plans caused the states to join forces to gain a stronger position as they bargained with the Center for their future. The state representatives seemed to also understand what had recently dawned on Otremba.

Dennis Grabowski, a regional AAE representative from Illinois and a member of the AAE Advisory Committee in the 1980’s, talked about the shift in the states’ attitude and interaction with the Center once they understood the AAE’s historical right to USDOE’s funds flowing to the Kennedy Center. He stated, “[The state representatives] couldn’t understand why these other programs [at the Center] had become so important when in the beginning the decision by Congress to pass funds onto the Kennedy Center was for the Alliance. It seemed as if there was a great deal of money that was being
diverted from the attention of developing arts education across the country into programs that were serving the Kennedy Center” (Personal Interview, August 22, 1996). This knowledge started a fire under the state representatives, according to Grabowski; “It’s like all of a sudden the kids become smart and are willing to challenge the heritage that belongs to them, and it took years for that kind of strength to build, and then all of a sudden the states organizations say, ‘Hey, wait a minute, you’re not treating us right. You’re not treating us the way we know we’re suppose to be treated’” (Personal Interview, August 22, 1996).

Due to this renewed vigor, the states pressed the Kennedy Center to have more input into any plans affecting the Alliance’s future. A small transition committee of state and regional AAE representatives was appointed by the Center to assist the Education Department in fleshing out a plan for bringing about a change in the relationship between the Center and the Alliance network. This transition committee met in Chicago on September 4, 1991, to discuss the AAE’s future. According to the meeting’s notes (Kennedy Center AAE, September 4, 1991), Scott Stoner was the only Center staff in attendance due to David Humphrey being ill. First on the agenda for this meeting was a general presentation of the Wolf Report. The state and regional representatives were not given copies of this report. Interestingly, they were told that the document was not public and probably would never
become so. They were also told that the Center management had not yet accepted the report in its entirety. Due to this, the committee decided that they would not expend any energy refuting the findings of the Wolf Report.

At this meeting, the committee did develop a response for Wolfensohn concerning the proposed changes in the Center’s sponsorship of the AAE. They put this response in a letter to Wolfensohn and demanded that Stoner give this directly to the Chairman without editing their comments. In a September 10, 1991 memorandum to Wolfensohn, Stoner attached the committee’s letter. He explained to Wolfensohn about the committee’s demand that he be given the letter directly. Stoner made clear to the Chairman that the committee had met and were aware that Wolfensohn had not yet acted on the plan for the Education Department that David Humphrey had developed during the summer. Stoner indicated to Wolfensohn that the committee was unanimous in its feeling that delaying a communication from Humphrey about the status of the Center’s reorganization and the future of the Alliance, would:

1. further escalate the tension of facing an unknown future;
2. damage the credibility of the Kennedy Center’s intent to deal fairly and equitably with the state AAE organizations; and
3. result in action by the states to push for some Congressional investigation into the Center’s intentions regarding their future. (Personal Correspondence, September 10, 1991)
Stoner told Wolfensohn that he felt the committee’s recommendations were reasonable to facilitate the change in the Center’s relationship with the Alliance. He reminded the Chairman that the goals were ‘1) the state AAE organizations find a less constraining mechanism (i.e. than a cultural institution with a narrower mission) for the broad purpose of advocating arts education in general, and that 2) the Kennedy Center maintain good-faith ties with the field and a means by which a number of state AAE organizations can actively participate in future initiatives within the new Kennedy Center Education Department plan” (Personal Correspondence, September 10, 1991). What is puzzling about Stoner’s memorandum is that while it indicates that he sent a copy to Geraldine Otremba, Kennedy Center Associate Managing Director for Government Relations, it does not seem that he sent one to his boss, David Humphrey, the Acting Director of Education. This is puzzling in so far as it was Humphrey’s plan for the Education Department that the transition committee discussed at its September 4, 1991 meeting.

In their letter to Wolfensohn, the transition committee asserted that while they did not agree with the change under way in the relationship between the Center and the AAE, they assumed that it would happen and wanted the Center to take certain steps with this transition. The committee wrote:

*We recommend that The Kennedy Center take steps to assure that the transition from its eighteen-year sponsorship of a network it created be as satisfactory as*
possible...reasonable time-frame and adequate financial and other support for an orderly transition are imperative if the state organizations are to make appropriate internal accommodations and to allow planning for the potential establishment of a new Alliance network office. Among the Alliances are powerful state allies with many local and congressional contacts useful in the work of assuring that young people experience and become educated in the arts, including the performing arts. (Personal Correspondence, September 10, 1991)

They then gave a three-year proposal (FY 93 to 95) for consideration by The Kennedy Center to phase out its sponsorship of the Alliance organization and assist it with the setup of a new network office. Interestingly, even though the transition committee members had not seen the Wolf Report, their proposal was very much in keeping with the report's recommendations for this transition. The committee asked Wolfensohn for an immediate response to their letter. They closed by reminding him that "The Alliance state leadership to date has not received a communication from The Kennedy Center that clearly relates information about what apparently is an up-coming change of great significance to them....As time elapses, the chance for a mutually satisfying transition greatly diminishes and the possibility of harm to the reputation of The Kennedy Center increases" (Personal Correspondence, September 10, 1991).

Wolfensohn, being very savvy about congressional relations, understood the damage that the state Alliance representatives could do to his campaign to increase federal funds for the entire Center. If they started
calling their state representatives in Congress to complain about the Kennedy Center’s treatment of them, it could prove to be very embarrassing. Wolfensohn, upon receiving the transition committee’s letter, wrote to all the Alliance leadership across the nation. In this letter, he acknowledged the importance of the AAE. He then indicated that the Kennedy Center, indeed, was committed to advancing arts education nationally and that the AAE would be a part of this endeavor, even if changes were implemented. Wolfensohn then assured the AAE leadership that for the next two fiscal years, FY 1992 and 1993, the Center would continue to provide them with some financial support. He made no mention in this communication about the transition committee’s demands for a longer transitional support period or assistance in finding a new sponsor for the AAE (Personal Correspondence, September 16, 1991).

In October 1991, the AAE leadership from around the country attended a meeting at the Kennedy Center. In a letter to Wolfensohn, Stoner commented on how successful the meeting had been. He thanked the Chairman for meeting with the Alliance leadership and informed him that the group was greatly impressed with his (Wolfensohn’s) remarks. Wolfensohn had discussed with them his goal that the Center play a key leadership role in responding to President Bush’s educational reform plan, America 2000, which had recently been released. America 2000 had neglected to include the arts
as important in the education of American citizens, and Wolfensohn wanted to change this and bring the arts into the national educational reform movement. The AAE leadership accepted this challenge to assist Wolfensohn with his agenda.

Wolfensohn also challenged the AAE leadership to take a hard look at the condition of the Alliance network. He indicated that the Kennedy Center would stick with the Alliance for several more years while the AAE leadership developed a plan of action to more clearly focus their efforts for promoting arts education nationally. The AAE leadership established a long-range planning team with five members and a liaison at the Center. The team’s charge was to meet for the next year to evaluate the AAE and to develop a long-range plan of action. This plan would be presented to Wolfensohn sometime in late-1992.

The final force that seems to have shifted Wolfensohn’s view of the AAE came from Congress. Wolfensohn was asked by Lamar Alexander, then U.S. Secretary of Education, to lead a private-sector initiative to sustain the role of the arts in the education of the nation’s citizens. Alexander and America 2000 had been severely criticized by the arts and arts education communities due to leaving the arts out of this educational reform plan of the Bush Administration. Wolfensohn contacted Harold Williams, Chairman of the J. Paul Getty Trust in California, and asked him to join with the Kennedy
Center in this effort. Soon, The Arts Education Partnership Working Group was formed consisting of artists, arts advocates, and arts educators from around the country. The goal of this initiative was to develop a report that would include goals and standards for a national arts education program and recommendations for achieving them. David O'Faltan, then Director of Education at the National Endowment for the Arts, was brought to the Kennedy Center to coordinate this partnership effort (John F. Kennedy Center Board Minutes, April 22, 1992). Puzzling about this project, especially in light of Wolfensohn's comments to the AAE leadership at the October 1991 meeting, is that of the 40 plus members invited to participate in this partnership group, only one was from a state Alliance committee (Arts Education Partnership Working Group, 1993, January).

As the plan for this new initiative fell into place, Wolfensohn discussed it further with the Center's Board of Trustees. He pointed out that the Center had assumed a national leadership role in the area of arts education. He mentioned that the Center would be convening meetings for this national initiative and that the Center would be establishing a national entity to support arts education. According to a high-ranking Center employee attending this meeting, Senator Kennedy, a Center Trustee, was there and heard Wolfensohn's presentation. Kennedy had also been present when the Alliance initiative was presented to the Board 19 years earlier. According to
this source, Kennedy hit the roof when he heard about this new initiative. He was upset because the Center already had an education department and had the Alliance for Arts Education, whose mission was to promote arts education nationally. Kennedy asserted that the Center did not need to support another national entity. The Senator’s reaction caught Wolfensohn by surprise and created a dilemma. The Chairman had already committed the Center to this project and had hired a director for it. While the project continued for another year until it produced the promised report, Wolfensohn is reported to have pulled back from it so as not to antagonize the Senator.

**Turning Crisis into Opportunity**

As this period in the Alliance’s history came to a close, the tide seemed to be turning. While just months earlier, it seemed that the Alliance’s long relationship with the Kennedy Center was at an end, as 1992 dawned, this was less and less certain. As Otremba noted, “Literally I saw the Alliance at the edge of the precipice about to fall off and everything since then [has been] a steady effort to strengthen [the network].” (Personal Interview, June 18, 1996).

The Alliance had a year to evaluate the network and to develop a plan of action that might link it more closely to the new Chairman’s agenda to make the Center a national player in advancing arts education in the educational reform movement of the nation. The Alliance state leadership had also
realized that if they were united in their effort to save the AAE, they, indeed, had a powerful voice that had to be listened to due to the national network that had formed since 1973, even if it did have problems. Wolfensohn also understood that the Alliance was an entity that he had to deal with if he wanted to advance his national agenda for arts education, and if he wanted to continue to build positive relations with Congress. The state Alliance committees could potentially turn their national Senators and Representatives against support for the requests that the Center had before the U.S. Congress.

As was stated earlier in this chapter, Wolfensohn was very savvy in his relations with Congress. He understood that supporting arts education versus the arts would sit better with Congress due to the National Endowment for the Arts being under attack from Congress due to funding several controversial artists and their works. Wolfensohn understood that jumping on the educational reform bandwagon could win him favor in Congress. While some in the arts and arts education communities expressed skepticism about Wolfensohn’s real commitment to arts education, what is clear is that as 1991 ended, it was becoming more and more apparent to him that the Alliance network might be useful in advancing the interests of the Center with Congress and the nation. This is probably why it was so in the forefront of his
mind as he interviewed Derek Gordon in early-1992, for the Center's permanent Director of Education position.
CHAPTER 5

RISING FROM THE ASHES: A REBORN ALLIANCE EMERGES

In July of 1992, Derek Gordon was formerly hired as the permanent Director for Education at the Kennedy Center. It was clear to him that one of the first issues that he had to tackle was determining the fate of the Alliance for Arts Education and its continuing relationship with the Center. While the Center had been contemplating a quick end to its 19-year relationship with the Alliance, it now seemed clear that this action could harm the Center’s support in Congress and its reputation at the state level. The state-level Alliance representatives due to their efforts over the past year had bought some time to negotiate a better transition plan for whatever their collective future was to be.

By the time Gordon arrived at the Center, the one-year challenge that Kennedy Center Chairman James D. Wolfensohn had given the Alliance Network had been extended into a two-year challenge. According to Gordon, the Chairman told the Alliance network that it had two years to figure out what
it was going to do with itself and whether it ought to be at the Center or not.
Wolfensohn added that if in two years the Alliance was able to come up with
something meaningful and productive, then he would support it. But if they
did not, then the relationship between the Center and the Alliance would be
terminated.

Renegotiating a Dysfunctional Relationship

To meet this challenge from the Chairman, Gordon appointed a
steering committee of state and regional Alliance representatives to assist the
Center’s Education Department staff in developing a plan of action concerning
the Alliance’s future relationship with the Center. This group had evolved
from the ad hoc transition committee appointed in September of 1991 to assist
the Center in developing a plan for bringing about a change in the
relationship between the Center and the Alliance network, which was
discussed in the last chapter. At that time, the transition committee had
 asserted that it wanted more time to flesh out this plan and effectively
pressured Wolfensohn to accommodate their request. Wolfensohn then
issued the two-year challenge mentioned earlier. For the most part, the
members of the transition committee became the members of the steering
committee appointed by Gordon with just a few changes.
Another shift also seemed to have taken place with the Chairman and his view of the Alliance. As Gordon and the steering committee started the task of developing a plan to meet the Chairman's challenge, Gordon understood that the recommendation to terminate the Center's relationship with the Alliance that was contained in the Wolf Report had now been completely rejected by the Center's administration. Gordon did not seem to know that the Center had itself floated this notion in addition to the Wolf Report, and it is not clear that he has ever seen the full report. What is clear is that Gordon worked under the premise that the goal of the Chairman's challenge was to make a go of the Center's association with the Alliance versus termination of this relationship. This perspective was also the one with which the newly appointed steering committee began its planning effort.

In the fall of 1993, Kathi R. Levin replaced Scott Stoner as the National Director for the Alliance at the Kennedy Center. Stoner had been appointed to spearhead the development of a national arts education information/dissemination network that would be based at the Center and funded partially through a grant from the National Endowment for the Arts. The Chairman believed this new project to be one of the most important ones undertaken by the Kennedy Center. The goal of this project, called the ArtsEdge network, was to provide access to world-wide arts education information and resources
on the Internet (John F. Kennedy Center Board Meeting Minutes, May 3, 1995).

As Levin assumed her role as the new National Director of the Alliance, she noted that certain decisions had already been made about the future of the Alliance (Personal Interview, November 1, 1996). To begin with, the Center had decided that the AAE would remain at the Kennedy Center. Levin was informed, as was Gordon a year earlier, that the Wolf Report's recommendations had been rejected. She has never seen a copy of this report. Another decision that had been reached was that the appointed steering committee would now be called the National Governance Committee (NGC), which would have a formal role in advising the Education Department's administration about the future of the Alliance, and would be democratically elected by the state Alliance representatives. The National Director, though, would not report to the NGC but to the Director for Education at the Center. This meant that the NGC could not make decisions concerning how Alliance funds were to be spent or the directions to be taken with programming. What they could now do was formally advise.

Levin also noted that when she started at the Center, she was not encouraged to learn much about the Alliance's past as she was told a fresh look was needed for this project. She did learn some of the Alliance's history by attending the October 1993 AAE Leadership Meeting in Washington, D.C.,
where her appointment as the new National Alliance Director was announced to the Alliance network. But, she noted, she was given no historical information about the Alliance by the former National Director, even though he was still employed at the Center.

Levin felt that the first tasks that needed to be tackled with the NGC were the clarification of the relationship between the Kennedy Center and the state Alliances and the codification of policies and procedures for the AAE, for example, how a state Alliance is to choose a new chair for its board. She noted that there were some strained times working with the NGC on this task during her first year at the Center but understood that this was due to the dysfunctional relationship that had nearly brought an end to the Alliance’s formal association with the Center. Levin stated that the members of the NGC, especially its chair Nadine Saitlin, pushed very hard that year for a balance of power for the state Alliances with the Kennedy Center and were successfully able to codify some of this goal into the AAE’s policies and procedures. Additionally, the decision was reached to change the name of the AAE to the Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network (KCAAEN), with an emphasis on the notion of network. Levin feels that the NGC’s effort to codify everything and the name change clarified the Alliance’s relationship with the Center and laid a solid foundation on which the Alliance could grow.
Once the Alliance was a bit more solid, the Kennedy Center Education Department and the KCAAEN engaged Pacific Visions Communications from California to conduct a study on their behalf to take the pulse of the organization through the eyes and voices of current stakeholders. The goal of the study was to provide the foundation necessary to make relevant and informed decisions regarding new strategies to raise visibility and awareness for the Alliance Network and each state Alliance. The study was conducted from November 1994 through February 1995, with its culmination being a two-day retreat with selected KCAAEN leaders and stakeholders to review the findings and to establish the overarching themes and framework for a national initiative to support both arts education and the work of the Alliances (Pacific Visions Communication, 1995, February).

It is interesting to note some of the key findings of this report. To begin with, most of the respondents for the study felt that the mission of the KCAAEN should be focused on advocacy and support for arts education, and should support the state-level Alliances' efforts in these areas. But when asked, very few of the stakeholders could articulate the National Alliance's present mission and were unclear as to what the Alliance was actually doing. Additionally, most of the respondents understood that the Kennedy Center was at the nucleus of the Network, but many did not really understand the nature of this relationship or the role the Center was to play in assisting and
supporting the state Alliances. Still, the vast majority of the stakeholders felt that the KCAAEN's association with the Kennedy Center lent strong credibility to the organization and was a key strength.

Another finding was that the notion of this organization being a network had not been realized and was still just an abstraction. While they note that communication between the national and state levels had improved, there were still some basic weaknesses. These communication issues needed to be solved, it was felt, so that state-level Alliances could be more efficient and effective with their efforts, that is, not reinventing programs and efforts that were already developed at the national level or by other state Alliances. A final finding that surfaced as a major weakness for KCAAEN was insufficient funding for the state Alliances. This lack of funds, the study noted, produced a situation where many of the state Alliances did not have the staffing needed to effectively carry out their missions and goals or to meet the expectations of them by the Kennedy Center.

What is striking about the findings uncovered by this study is how reminiscent they are of previous reports issued throughout the Alliance's history, all the way back to the first Alliance progress report given by Forbes Rogers to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees at their February 25, 1975 meeting (see Chapter 3 for more details on this report).
In response to this study, methods were established to address many of the issues raised by it. Additionally, the notion of all Alliance members joining forces on a national initiative to advance arts education across the country and to create a strong national voice for the KCAAEN was proposed. This initiative was to be designed to complement the Alliance Network’s mission and to bolster activities already under way by state Alliances. Additionally, it was felt that the initiative should focus on the role arts education could play in student achievement to be able to effectively reach key decision-makers at the national and state levels.

Gordon and Levin noted (Personal Interviews, October 25 and November 1, 1996) that out of these discussions grew the idea of a national campaign for student success, with the main goal being to make a better case for the importance of arts education in the nation’s schools. They stated that the plan was to broaden the message to reach beyond the normal group of arts education supporters. According to the campaign overview presented at the October 1995 KCAAEN Annual Leadership meeting in Washington, DC, the campaign, now called the Creative Ticket for Student Success, was designed to move arts education beyond the margins of education by associating it with issues important to the educational reform agenda of policy makers, such as student engagement, assessment, and success. The theme
developed for this campaign was to position arts education as the critical and essential educational component for student success.

Gordon also indicated that there was an internal agenda for the campaign with the Kennedy Center. He felt that due to a need to rebuild an identity for the Alliance (see Chapter 4 concerning the Alliance’s loss of identity), the Center was searching for a way to galvanize the state Alliances around a joint issue to put a national face on the Network. He notes that by giving the state Alliances this campaign, they now had a blueprint of what they ought to be doing, how they should be doing it, and how to establish the needed partnerships for this endeavor. Gordon indicated that he also worked to secure funds from the Tremaine Foundation and the Center itself to assist the state Alliances in positioning themselves to go after Goals 2000 moneys at the state level. Finally, he stated that campaign materials and training activities were being developed to assist the state Alliances with coming on board this national campaign. He added that while the campaign theme and activities were not meant to replace the efforts of individual Alliances, they were meant to enhance these activities.

Difficult Questions

As the Alliance emerges from the shifts in policy that ultimately undermined its evolution during the 1980’s and created the crisis that nearly
ended its relationship with the Kennedy Center at the beginning of the 1990's, one question becomes: Is it in a better position today? This question is difficult to answer as this part of the Alliance's story is still under way and yet to be told. But certain shifts have occurred that may give a sense of the future answer to this question.

Levin (Personal Interview, November 1, 1996) feels the Alliance Network is, indeed, in a much better place today than it was when she arrived at the Kennedy Center in October of 1993. She notes that the Alliance has been strengthened and repositioned due to its becoming involved in the general education reform movement on the national and state levels. She believes that the Alliance today is much more about support for education than support for the arts. This positioning, she is convinced, has meant that KCAAEN has been able to play a major national role in building awareness of the importance of the arts in the nation's schools. A final bit of information she shared is that the number of state Alliances has increased from a low of 36 in the late-1980's to the present number of 44. She sees this as a very positive trend that affirms that the Alliance is back on the right course.

Nadine Saitlin, Executive Director of the Illinois AAE and former Chair of the National Governance Committee, also believes that the Alliance is becoming a stronger network. She notes that financial support for the state Alliances from the Kennedy Center has become greater and that the state
Alliance leadership is more aware of the budgeting process at the Center. She states, “This is the first time that we have ever known [about the total congressional allocation for the Alliance Network]...What the funding level is. What the criteria [for funding] is. It is becoming a cleaner operation in that respect” (Personal Interview, August 21, 1996). She also feels that the campaign grew out of the best interests of the states due to the National Governance Committee’s efforts. Saitlin believes that the underlying principles of the Creative Ticket for Student Success campaign are based on lessons learned at the state level. The campaign, in her estimation, has become a vehicle to do the kind of strengthening that individual states need. She notes that the Alliance has emerged from its crisis period with a greater amount of clarity, a more democratic governance structure, and a better understanding of the leverage that they hold in their relationship with the Kennedy Center.

But has the Alliance been or has it become a major force in the arts education arena nationally? As stated in Chapter One of this document, this question is the primary question that was the catalyst for undertaking this historical study of the Alliance for Arts Education. If one looks to the early years of this national initiative, that is, approximately 1973 to 1978, one might say that, indeed, it was showing signs of becoming a major force in the national arts education arena. It organized national conferences and summits
that brought together many in the arts education community both on the national level and the state level. It attempted to develop a common agenda behind which the arts education community and the national professional arts education associations could rally in their efforts to promote arts education nationwide. And it began the development of a network and strategies to reach out to the state and local levels with funds and technical support to assist folks at these levels who were working to advance arts education in their locales and states.

This, though, has not just been the story of this national initiative and its early efforts. This study has attempted to tell a more complete story of the National Alliance’s evolution from its beginning years to the present day. When one views the Alliance in light of all this historical information, then the answer to the above question is that the National Alliance failed in becoming a major force nationwide. While it has been able to maintain its standing as the recipient of a major percentage of the federal funds earmarked for the promotion of arts education in the nation’s schools, it has not surfaced as a true force in the national arts education community, as evidenced by the comments of prominent people in this community, which have been presented throughout this study. Instead, the opportunity presented by the federal legislation giving birth to the Alliance became used more as a vehicle to promote the particular interests of the Kennedy Center and its narrower
mission which focused around the performing arts. As was presented in this study, the language of this enabling legislation was slowly shifted over the course of the Alliance's history to reflect and advance the agenda of this national performing arts center moving it away from its broader mandate from 1973 of promoting arts education nationwide.

In fairness, it must be emphasized that this study focused mostly on the national level of this federal effort to advance arts education. But the Alliance initiative is also a story of the development of many state Alliance committees and their impact on their particular locales. Several people interviewed for this study made a point of saying that to understand the "real" success of this initiative to advance arts education in our nation's schools, then the stories of the state Alliance committees also need to be told. Sadly, this would have been too enormous a task to undertake in addition to the primary purpose of this dissertation, but it is clear that a great deal can be learned about advancing arts education at the state and local levels from the state Alliance committees. It is hoped that future research will be undertaken to tell the stories of these state Alliance committees.

Finally, in taking the question of whether the Alliance has been or is a major force in the arts education arena a step further, one might ask if the Alliance will be a major force in the future. This question is obviously impossible to answer and could also be the topic of future research into the
Alliance Network. But one can speculate a bit about this possibility based on recent events and efforts under way with the Kennedy Center Alliance for Arts Education Network (KCAAEN).

Since the crisis that beset it at the end of the 1980's, which was discussed in Chapter Four, the KCAAEN has been working to develop a clearer sense of its purpose, to strengthen the state Alliance committee structure, and to develop a way to rally the members of the Network behind a common national effort to promote arts education nationwide. As was stated earlier, both Gordon and Levin (Personal Interviews, October 25 and November 1, 1996) indicated that these efforts to redirect the Network have given birth to the Creative Ticket for Student Success campaign. As Gordon noted earlier in this chapter, by giving the state Alliance committees this campaign, they now have a blueprint of what they ought to be doing, how they should be doing it, and how to establish the needed partnerships for this endeavor. But will this redirection potentially allow the Alliance, and in turn the Kennedy Center Education Program, to become a major force in the national arts education community?

Both Gordon and Levin seem to feel that this is already happening. They point to the number of affiliates nationwide from the arts education community that have signed an agreement with the Kennedy Center to partner the campaign at the national and state levels. Included in this group
at the start of the campaign in 1996 were 18 professional associations, such as the National Art Education Association, Music Educators National Conference, and Educational Theatre Association. Gordon notes that the goal is to make these associations’ members aware of the campaign and to encourage them to support it and participate as the success of this effort is partially dependent on the energy of members of these associations. But when asked if the members or staffs of these associations were involved in the design of the campaign, Gordon said that they were not as this was really an Alliance program and not a program of the affiliates.

When Thomas Hatfield, Executive Director of the National Art Education Association, was asked about the Kennedy Center and the Alliance Network, he knew little about it today or about the campaign that was under way, even though his organization was an affiliate. He stated, “I really don’t know what they are doing. I don’t have any communication with them at all....I haven’t had a meeting with them in five to eight years” (Personal Interview, June 14, 1996). He did note that what he did know about the Alliance and its efforts came from the minutes of the National Goals 2000 Arts Education Partnership Group which was formed in response to the national educational reform agenda proposed by the Bush Administration and later revised by the Clinton Administration.
John Mahlmann, Executive Director of the Music Educators National Conference and one of the founders of the AAE in 1973, does not see the Alliance as playing a major role in the arts education community nationally. "I think that they dropped the ball on that," he states. "There wouldn't have been a need, for example, for the Goals 2000 Arts Partnership Group, perhaps, if [the Kennedy Center Alliance ] had taken that initiative or really exercised a national focus of bringing together the [arts education community] as those original years had done" (Personal Interview, June 14, 1996). He did feel that due to the Alliance dropping the ball with this purpose, that the original DAM'T group eventually formed its own "alliance." The DAM'T group was originally formed in the early 1970's and includes the leadership of the National Dance Association, the National Art Education Association, the Music Educators National Conference, and The American Theatre Association. Mahlmann and Hatfield both note that when the need arose to develop the National Arts Education Standards in 1994 in response to the national educational reform efforts coming out of Washington, DC, that it was the DAM'T group, not the Alliance, that came together and organized this effort to develop these national education standards for the arts. Mahlmann reflected that actually the DAM'T group has become in recent times an alliance as was originally envisioned as the purpose of the Alliance for Arts Education in 1973.
In closing this section, it seems important to reflect back upon the original 1958 legislation that gave birth to the National Cultural Center (later renamed The Kennedy Center), which mandated that the Center provide educational services in the arts for the citizens of the United States. This mandate was the one used to defend the need for the Alliance project in 1973 and to justify federal funding of this initiative since then. It stated that the National Cultural Center would develop programs for children and youth and the elderly (and for other age groups as well) in such arts designed specifically for their participation, education, and recreation. While this mandate did not specifically state that the programs developed must focus around the performing arts, many people assumed that it would be appropriate for a national center for the performing arts to emphasize performing arts education.

But in using this mandate to justify the birth of the Alliance in 1973, these assumptions were put aside when this national initiative to promote education in all the arts was located at the Kennedy Center. As was presented in Chapters Three and Four, eventually a conflict developed between the Kennedy Center’s mission to promote the performing arts and the Alliance’s mission to advance education in all the arts. This conflict has plagued the Alliance project throughout much of its history. This conflict motivated the Kennedy Center over the years to go forth in Congress and shift
the language of the Alliance's 1973 enabling legislation during each reauthorization. Ultimately, these shifts changed the original intent of the Alliance legislation to be more favorable towards the Kennedy Center and its mission.

In 1993 another change occurred but this time to the enabling legislation of the Center itself. Due to an initiative by the leadership of the Kennedy Center, Congress passed new authorizing legislation for the Center which gave it direct administrative control over its own affairs. In a summary report given to the Kennedy Center Board of Trustees at their July 28, 1993 meeting and included in the minutes, it was noted that the language concerning the Center's educational purpose was redefined to better reflect the scope of the education efforts at the Center. The minutes stated that the new language better allowed for the Center to play a leadership role in educational reform on behalf of the arts. The new language also very clearly and specifically charged the Center with a national leadership role in performing arts education [emphasis added]. The report then indicated that Congress had authorized $5 million for programs and policies for this purpose.

It is not clear what the full impact, if any, of this shift in the Center's authorizing legislative language will have on the Alliance Network, whose mission is still the advancement of education in all the arts nationwide. When

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Gordon (Personal Interview, October 25, 1996) was asked about this emphasis on performing arts education, he noted that the Kennedy Center is a performing arts center and so the bulk of the educational programming offered by his department is focused on the performing arts. He indicated, though, that his department supports the Alliance Network’s notion of advocating for all the arts in the education of the nation’s children. But he closed by stating that due to the Kennedy Center being a performing arts center, the primary responsibility of the Education Department has always been and will be to emphasize performing arts education.

Time will tell whether the past conflicts of mission that troubled the Alliance’s evolution have subsided enough to allow the rebirth of the Alliance to continue in a way that is more in keeping with its original intent. The Ticket for Student Success campaign is a good first step in the Alliance’s rebirth. But the issues still remain as to whether the Alliance can ever be a major force in the arts education community nationally, and whether the needs of the Kennedy Center will continue to dominate, directing energy and resources away from this national initiative.

So Now What?

Dr. Lorraine R. Matusak, founder and former director of the National Leadership Program (formerly the National Fellowship Program) at the
Kellogg Foundation in Battle Creek, Michigan, used to challenge each new group of fellows with the same question. She would patiently listen for hours on end as the fellows and consultants for the National Leadership Program debated the various social and political issues facing the world. Finally, she would interrupt and abruptly shift the discussion by asking: So now what? It was clear to her that the fellows, all leaders in their professions, had a handle on the issues and understood where their values were in relation to them, but Matusak ultimately wanted to know what the fellows were going to do about these problems, or what they could learn from them for future reference as decision makers. So, as this study comes to a close, the challenge becomes what can be learned from the Alliance’s history that might assist future policy making efforts in arts education.

As was stated at the beginning of this study, it is seductive for historians to conclude their studies with personal opinions, judgments, and recommendations. It becomes easy due to hindsight wisdom to pontificate about how a program or policy ought to have been developed or implemented, and how wrong the actors were with the choices that they made as the program and policy evolved. As Harry F. Wolcott (1990) reminds historians, when they move from a description of a program to a prescription about how it ought to have been, they are imposing someone’s judgment and not just telling the story. Of course, one can counter that it is impossible for a
historian to eliminate his bias from a study he has undertaken. But the point
that Wolcott emphasizes is that the historian should never assume that the
actors in his study understood or knew the details surrounding their decisions
as the historian does due to hindsight wisdom. As was mentioned in Chapter
One, Wolcott encourages researchers to move beyond the use of opinions
and recommendations, which are often centered in their own world views, and
to explore instead alternatives to current practices or to cull the lessons that
can be learned from an initiative’s efforts. If this notion is followed, the
researcher stands much more of a chance of becoming a resource concerning
future policy or program development.

The main purpose of this study was to tell the story of the Alliance for
Arts Education from its inception in 1973 to the crisis that it faced in the early
1990’s. To bring closure to this study, it seems important to look back over
this history of the Alliance’s development and evolution to see what lessons
can be learned that might assist in advancing future national initiatives of this
type. To better digest each of the lessons learned outlined below, the public
policy literature reviewed in Chapter Two will be revisited to broaden the
discussion concerning each lesson.

Lessons Learned

The first lesson learned from the story of the Alliance concerns
coalition building. When a loose coalition forms among groups with differing
agendas in order to advance the development of and support for a policy, there will be a need later on down the road for these differing forces to formally come to some common agenda and agreements that take priority over the individual agendas of each member of the coalition. If the members of the coalition do not formally develop a common agenda, this situation will invite the differing forces to compete and to potentially come in conflict with each other as the policy is taken forth to be implemented.

A second lesson learned from the Alliance initiative which relates to the first lesson just discussed is that if the policy developed is vague and unclear, which often happens when coalition members have differing agendas, this situation will allow for a great deal of liberty to be taken during the implementation stage by whoever gains control of this process. Additionally, whoever gains control of the implementation process will ultimately be able to alter the original policy to more closely fit their own agenda or mission as the policy periodically moves forth for legislative review or reauthorization.

A third lesson learned from the Alliance’s evolution is that national policies and initiatives frequently stray from their original intent during the implementation stage as they are often implemented by folks who have not been a part of the development stage. This straying may be amplified when the policy statement is vague and fragmented.
A final lesson learned from this study of the Alliance is that when policy developers and implementers do not frequently assess a policy or initiative’s effectiveness and do not learn from its history, they can easily lose track of the policy or initiative’s original purpose and can potentially doom themselves to repeat its mistakes and successes, ultimately making very little progress in the area they hope to affect.

To better understand these lessons learned from the Alliance’s history, it might be appropriate to digest them in the context of the public policy literature reviewed in Chapter Two. The three areas explored in that chapter included policy development, implementation, and evaluation. These areas will be revisited in light of the above lessons learned from this study of the Alliance for Arts Education.

Agenda Setting and Policy Formulation Revisited

John Kingdon (1982, 1995) introduced the notion of the opening of policy windows, that is, periods of time that are advantageous for advancing one’s cause in the public policy system. These advantageous times surface, he proposes, when the three streams that he states are a part of the public policy process, that is, the problem stream, the policy stream, and the political stream, cross and join forces to advance their causes. He explains that the coupling of these streams, especially when all three join forces, firmly fixes an item on the public agenda.
In the case of the Alliance for Arts Education, the events that first started to open its policy window surfaced in the problem and political streams due to members of Congress, especially Senator Edward Kennedy, noticing that the Kennedy Center was not fulfilling its congressional mandate to offer educational experiences for the American people. The Kennedy Center administration clearly wanted to quell this criticism by developing educational programs that focused around the performing arts activities at the Center. The added intent of these efforts was the hope that they would increase the audience and revenues for the performances at the Center. But their initial attempts at educational programs failed. So in 1973, the Center found itself without the resources needed to offer educational activities and desperate for an idea that would appease members of Congress. It went searching for an idea in the policy stream and began discussions with members of the community of specialists devoted to arts education.

Within this community of specialists, ideas had been bubbling up and floating around searching for an opportunity to advance themselves. One idea centered on the Office of Education’s Arts and Humanities Program becoming more involved in a coordinated national initiative to advance arts education across the nation. Due to AHP’s congressional mandate of being only a grant-making agency, it had been able to make inroads at the state level to advance arts education, but it had not been able to back a national
program that might have a greater impact in integrating the arts into the nation’s schools.

Another idea floating around this community of specialists had to do with joining the forces of the various national arts education professional associations together around a common agenda to advance arts education in the nation’s schools. These associations had been focused on their members’ needs and particular art forms, such as music or visual arts, and had not been successful in finding a way of synergistically joining their energies to have a bigger impact on promoting arts education nationally.

At this point, using Kingdon’s notion, the problem stream and the policy stream joined forces in developing a solution to the dilemma facing the Kennedy Center. As was discussed in Chapter Two, Kingdon believes that the development stage is not where new ideas take the lead but is where already familiar elements of ideas floating in the policy stream couple or recombine. Kingdon believes that this recombination stage is vital in a solution’s development in order to soften-up the policy community and gain support from it. While this community and the ideas that are recombined can be tightly knit, Kingdon warns that the opposite can also be true, that is, fragmentation can result which produces a disjointed policy and lack of a common orientation.
In the development of the policy giving birth to the Alliance project, the fragmentation mentioned above seems to have been the outcome of the efforts to recombine ideas floating around this community of specialists. Each specialist that played a role in the development of the Alliance project saw it as an opportunity to advance a pet cause. This is normal behavior among policy makers. But in an effort to quickly form a coalition among these differing forces and agendas, this community of specialists did what Kingdon (1995) and Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) believe happens in this situation: they purposely did not clarify the Alliance policy’s goals as the ambiguity of the situation allowed for a majority coalition to form in spite of the differences among the coalition members. This coalition, as fragile as it was, permitted all the members to jump on board the Kennedy Center’s congressional mandate for education and not miss the open policy window. But the coalition’s fragmentation meant that the policy statement generated was vague and would have to be sorted out during the implementation stage. As Nakamura and Smallwood (1980) remind, the statements produced by these coalitions of policy makers are the directives and instructions that guide implementers as to what the policy’s goals are and how they are to be accomplished. In the case of the Alliance, instead of the coalition producing a precise blueprint for the implementers, it instead settled for a rather vague policy statement.
Could this situation have been prevented? While the ideal is to form coalitions that are more closely knit, Kingdon does not feel it is realistic to expect this situation. He notes that for coalitions the kind of rationality that might characterize a unitary decision-making structure is often elusive. Instead of believing that there is a right way of forming needed coalitions, Kingdon’s intent seems to be to alert policy makers to the reality of the policy development process and the implications of each course of action. If the community of specialists that formed the coalition that generated the policy guiding the Alliance’s implementation had understood Kingdon’s notion, each coalition member might have been more vigilant during the implementation stage to assure that all members’ interests were well served.

**Policy Implementation Revisited**

According to Randall B. Ripley and Grace A. Franklin (1982), implementation in the simplest sense is the tasks and activities undertaken after a policy has been developed. If a policy is a precise blueprint developed by a closely knit coalition, the implementation process will be somewhat straightforward. But if the policy developed is vague and fragmented, it will leave a great deal up to the discretion of the implementers. With the Alliance initiative, the latter situation was true. The agendas that each coalition member wanted advanced were different and somehow needed to be sorted out during the implementation stage. On the one hand, there was the
Kennedy Center agenda which pushed for implementation activities that were focused around the Center. The Center's goal was to bring notice and larger audiences to its performances and remedy the problems that it faced, that is, criticism from certain members of Congress and low revenues from the performances due to small audiences.

The Arts and Humanities Program at the Office of Education wanted to advance arts education in the nation's schools by developing exemplary model programs that could be looked to as a resource. AHP's goal was that through the Alliance initiative, it could attach itself to a national program and use it to influence the direction of arts education across the nation. Additionally, the four arts education professional associations wanted to join their resources together to have a greater national voice for arts education and wanted the Alliance initiative to be a unifying force for themselves.

Ripley and Franklin point out that frequently the implementers of policies have not been a part of the formulation stage and that with federal initiatives, the implementation process is often dependent on state and local governments and nongovernmental units. This was true with the Alliance initiative. While the Kennedy Center wanted the focus of this initiative to be the Center itself, it also needed to demonstrate to Congress that it was providing services as the national cultural center for citizens across the country. This meant that somehow it needed to reach out to the state level
with its programming and services, and the Alliance initiative offered them this opportunity. AHP and the four national arts education professional associations also needed to bring their cause to the state level. As their goals, respectively, were to advance arts education in the nation's schools and to develop a common agenda for all arts education, they needed to find ways to galvanize state and local agencies who could bring this message to the nation's schools, garner state support for arts education, and design curriculum that made the arts a vital part of the education of each citizen.

Not included in the Alliance's policy formulation efforts were representatives from the state and local levels. These actors were called upon by the community of specialists who had designed the Alliance policy to be the primary implementers for this national initiative. Ripley and Franklin point out that policies are never assumed to be in a final form and are thought to be malleable at each stage in the public policy system. How malleable a policy is depends again on how precise the blueprint is that is generated during the formulation stage and handed down to the implementers. In the case of the Alliance initiative, this blueprint was quite vague and could be interpreted in multiple ways depending on who controlled the implementation process.

Competition for control of the implementation process began very early in the evolution of the Alliance project. The state and local agencies initially
were suspicious of this national initiative and the intent of various parties that had been a part of the development of the policy behind this project. They had not requested this national initiative and knew the idea was conceived at the federal level. They were especially distrustful of the Kennedy Center’s involvement in this initiative as it just didn’t make sense that they were at the center of a national effort to develop model arts education programs for all the arts in the schools. But the state and local agencies soon put their suspicions aside as they looked at the potential window of opportunity this federal effort might give them in advancing arts education at the state and local levels. Particularly important to the state and local representatives was the national status of the project which they hoped to leverage into deeper support for arts education on the state and local levels. They also saw the opportunity to secure federal funds that were allocated for this initiative to assist them in advancing arts education in their schools. The state and local representatives quickly jumped on board this initiative and pushed to mold it to assist with their agendas.

Representatives of the Kennedy Center also pushed for more control of this initiative as it became apparent that the implementation activities were starting to head in directions that would not advance the Center’s main agendas. Instead of activities at the state and local levels that would advance arts education, the Kennedy Center representatives pushed for
implementation activities that would return the focus of the project to the
Center and showcase it. This included promoting implementation activities
that favored performing arts education.

The forces that could have been a modifying voice in this competition
were the AHP and the four national arts education professional associations.
Ripley and Franklin point out that while bureaucracies are omnipresent during
implementation processes, they are not omnipotent. They note that these
agencies must bargain like any other actors involved in the implementation of
a policy. Ripley and Franklin state that while these agencies may have legal
authority for the implementation of a public policy, often this authority is
challenged when the policy statement is vague and ambiguous in the
delegation of authority. This seemed to be true with the Alliance
implementation process.

The AHP at the United States Office of Education had been a major
force in the formulation of the policy that gave birth to the Alliance project and
the coalition that formed in support. Not only did it advance the notion of an
alliance for the promotion of arts education nationally, but it kept the funding
line flowing through the USOE to the Kennedy Center. The AHP and OE also
had great support from the national arts education professional associations
and was able to make sure that both of these forces would be a part of the
implementation process. But the AHP/OE soon lost control of this federal
initiative. While AHP’s representatives continued to be a part of the implementation efforts, AHP itself was losing support in OE and was in a state of decline throughout most of the 1970’s. AHP was eventually eliminated in the early 1980’s. Additionally, the Commissioner of Education that had participated in the development and promotion of the policy giving birth to the Alliance soon left the OE as he was a political appointee and was replaced by a Commissioner who did not make arts education a high priority on his agenda.

The four national arts education professional associations also quickly lost control of the Alliance’s implementation process. Their main hope for the Alliance was that the initiative would assist them in developing a common message and in speaking with a unified voice for arts education nationally. But as the Alliance’s implementation process started in 1973, each association was still focused on the needs and interests of its particular constituency and had not yet found a common message behind which they all could rally. In fact, they were still struggling with this goal five years later, which prompted the Wingspread Conference to be held (see Chapter Three concerning this conference). Their inability to speak with a unified voice weakened them as a force in shaping the Alliance’s implementation process.

Due to the situations with AHP and the four arts education professional associations, this meant that the Kennedy Center and the state and local
agencies were the main forces competing to define the direction that the Alliance's implementation process would take. The state and local organizations that formed under this initiative were new but quickly developed as a sizable force. But the representatives of Kennedy Center had the attention of and easy access to some very powerful government officials on the federal level. Within the first five years of the Alliance's implementation process, the Center's representatives were able to amend the language of the Alliance's policy to be in keeping with their own agenda for the Center, eliminate the four national arts education professional associations from having a decision-making voice in the Alliance's development, and shift resources away from the state Alliance organizations to the Center's education programs, thus weakening the state representatives as a viable force. Ripley and Franklin counsel that groups and individuals that do not get all they want during the policy formulation stage can appeal, amend, and reverse aspects of a policy during the implementation stage. This seems to be the case with the Alliance policy.

Policy Evaluation Revisited

Eleanor Chelimsky (1985) states that evaluative information must be gathered to assist legislators and decision makers in the policy arena. She believes that this information can assist in justifying a new program, in ensuring that a policy is implemented in the most effective way possible, and
in determining the continuing need for a policy and the activities it generates. But she cautions that many evaluations end up focusing on efficiency measures versus effectiveness measures. The former measures show how much each unit of output costs, while the latter measures show if the policy and its programs are accomplishing the desired outcome. Effectiveness measures are particularly important, she notes, when looking at the broader goals of a policy.

As the Alliance project evolved, showing the results of its efforts in tangible ways became important. While the Alliance initiative was originally meant to advocate for arts education nationally, this agenda’s accomplishments were difficult to quantify to the Center’s Board of Trustees or to Congress. So, the Center’s administration started to report about the Alliance’s accomplishments in efficiency versus effectiveness terms. As one scans the education reports given at the Center’s Board meetings throughout the years, the Alliance’s accomplishments and later the Education Department’s accomplishments were consistently reported according to how many state Alliances now existed, how much federal funding had been secured, how many people were served by the festivals and educational activities, and finally, how many school children in America were touched by Alliance efforts. Of course, it was much easier to quantify the
accomplishments of a festival versus an advocacy effort, so the former activities became favored by many Board of Trustee members.

Chelimsky warns that those responsible for a policy’s implementation should never lose sight of the policy’s broader goals. She notes that if evaluations are constantly put in efficiency terms, it will be difficult to determine if the original goals of a policy have been accomplished. This seems to have happened with the Alliance initiative. While reports to the Kennedy Center Board often gave head count information, there were few reports that talked about the Alliance’s effectiveness, especially as an advocate for arts education in the nation’s schools. Even the reports issued by the Congressional Research Office to assist Congress with the reauthorization of federal funds for the Alliance initiative were put in efficiency terms, such as the number of grants given to state agencies or children reached by the Alliance’s programs.

The first real effort to evaluate the effectiveness of the Alliance initiative seems to have been in 1990 when the Wolf Organization was engaged by the Kennedy Center to evaluate the effectiveness of its educational programming. The Wolf Organization curiously did not go back to the Alliance’s original policy statement from 1973 when it reported on the effectiveness of this national initiative. Instead, the Wolf Report based its evaluation of the Alliance’s effectiveness on the language contained in its
congressional reauthorization in the late-1970’s. By that point, the original policy’s language had shifted favoring implementation activities that were to be showcased at the Center and further away from the notion of a national advocacy effort for arts education in the nation’s schools. One wonders if the Alliance initiative’s original advocacy agenda to advance arts education nationally would have stayed more in keeping with the intent of framers of the original policy if there had been evaluations conducted right from the beginning that assessed the implementation activities’ effectiveness. Without this information being available, it allowed an ambiguous policy statement to be molded according to the agenda of whoever could gain control of the implementation process.

Was it wrong for this to happen? Not if one views the public policy system as Kingdon does. According to his notions, it’s more a matter of being realistic about how the system operates, accepting the system for what it is, and developing strategies for advancing one’s cause when an opportunity presents itself. With Kingdon’s thoughts in mind, the better one understands this system, the more effective one might be in accomplishing the goals important to one’s agenda, in keeping to a policy’s original intent, or in changing a policy.
Closing Comments

One of the primary purposes of this study has been the goal to experiment with an inquiry method that more holistically tells the story of a contemporary policy, program, or institution. This story-telling method has included the use of traditional historical inquiry processes coupled with the use of oral histories. It is my belief that through the use of this story-telling method, a more complete understanding will emerge of the subject being studied, the context surrounding its development and evolution, and the contributions, if any, it has made to its field. But one might ask why I believe that having this deeper understanding is so important?

I talked in the beginning of this document about a vicious cycle, the reinventing of the wheel, that can occur when decision makers in the policy and program development arenas lack a historical understanding of the policy or program they are attempting to advance. This lack of understanding, I believe, creates a situation where decision makers can unknowingly propose ideas that have been tried out numerous times in the past, thinking them to be new solutions to the problem. This clearly is happening today with the Alliance project as they take forth a campaign deeply reminiscent of the original intent of this national initiative. None of the current Alliance decision makers seemed to understand that the Ticket for Student Success campaign
continues a long history of these types of efforts, especially ones taken forth in the early years of this national arts education initiative.

While this situation in and of itself is not terrible, especially if the ideas being proposed were successful in the past, I believe that it is not an effective way of having a progressive, long-term impact on the cause one hopes to advance, such as arts education reform. Without a historical understanding of a cause, one can be doomed to a cycle of constantly beginning at step one with one’s efforts, not only repeating a cause’s successes but also its failures. Of course, in the short term, one may receive all sorts of accolades about how wonderful the particular course of action may be if it is succeeding. But if a long-term perspective is taken, as was done in this study of the Alliance, it may become painfully apparent that each new effort revisits but does not necessarily build upon its past contributions or remedy its past problems. It is my belief that for a cause to make greater long-term advances, it must build upon the solid foundation provided by an understanding of its past successes and failures, and the forces that have influenced its evolution. This does not mean that a cause should end up trapped by its past. Instead, the notion is that in order to break free from this trap, the impact of one’s present efforts and the potential future paths available for getting to the next stage with one’s cause can only be understood in light of past efforts to advance this cause.
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