When Hawks Are Doves and Doves Are Hawks:
Reevaluating Elite Foreign Policy Beliefs

Dissertation

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By

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*****

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To My Parents
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INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Cold War, the foreign policy debate has taken many new and unexpected twists and turns. For instance, syndicated columnist Anthony Lewis, noted Cold War and Gulf War dove, labeled George Bush a "gutless wimp" for allowing Serbs to overrun Bosnia. He (Lewis 1994a:19) was dismayed at the Clinton Administration's inaction after the Sarajevo ultimatum declaring it a "bewildering policy of weakness." He (Lewis, 1995) continues to call for US decisive action in the Bosnian situation arguing that the only way to stop Serbian aggression is with a threat of serious punishment. If one did not know better, Lewis could be considered a foreign policy hawk. Yet, looking back a few years to the Persian Gulf War, we see a different Lewis (1991:15), a dove claiming that the war is unnecessary and unwise.

Yet, Lewis is not alone in his support of US military action in Bosnia. He has an unlikely partner, Richard Perle, former Assistant Secretary of Defense under Ronald Reagan and current American Enterprise Institute fellow. Perle (1994:35), Cold War and Gulf War hawk, insists that the US must lead its allies against Serbian aggression and back-up what appear to be idle threats and show resolve. This includes NATO airstrikes and arming the Bosnian Muslims. Perle's Bosnian stance is in line with his past reputation as one of the leading hawks of the Reagan Administration. Yet, the fact that Lewis and Perle are "birds of a feather" leaves one puzzled.
To complicate matters further, both Lewis and Perle are at odds with syndicated columnist and former Conservative presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan. Buchanan (1994:17), Cold War Hawk turned Gulf War and Bosnian War Dove, argues that the US should not intervene in the Balkans. In the Post-Cold War era, he first advises against US involvement in the Persian Gulf War and then cautions the US against becoming committed in the Bosnian situation. He argues that any American action will lead into a quagmire where US ground troops will eventually become involved. He contends that the US should instead concentrate upon its own national interests narrowly defined. This stance may seem surprising given Buchanan’s past alliance with Perle on most Cold War foreign policy issues.

Labels such as "doves" and "hawks" capture the notion that hawks favor policy prescriptions that are militaristic and interventionist showing strength in the face of one’s adversary. Doves, on the other hand, believe that provocation undermines resolution. They favor cooperative and non-military foreign policy. At first glance the examples above indicate that the end of the Cold War has led foreign policy elites to change their past foreign policy orientations as they confront a new global reality. The fact that both Perle and Lewis support interventionism and militarism to address the Bosnian situation and Buchanan no longer seems to support a "hardline," and instead asks Americans to "come home," shows the need to reevaluate the "hawk" and "dove" labels accorded these individuals. The one-time Dove, Lewis, has grown talons whereas the former hawk, Buchanan, has come home to roost. The Bosnian situation is just a recent addition to the flips and flops characteristic of elites
trying to make sense of the US role in the uncertain foreign policy arena that is the Post-Cold War world.

Here another interpretation is offered. What has been transformed is not the dispositions and attitudes of these elites as they struggle to define the proper US Post-Cold War international role, but the international landscape and thus the contours of the foreign policy debate. Stating it another way, varying international environments allow different foreign policy dispositions to emerge. It can be argued that the person’s basic belief structure has not changed, it is the situation in which that person finds himself or herself that allows various aspects to appear. Different aspects of foreign policy belief systems will emerge in seemingly unusual ways now that the Cold War has ended. In the past, labels such as hawks and doves were evoked to categorize people according to the type of foreign policy output they promote, militarism or accommodation respectively. These labels were formed and fit the Post-World War II and Cold War international environment. However, we now find they are not as useful in the Post-Cold War era.

This dissertation argues that it is invaluable to identify the foreign policy dispositions that are the basis of foreign policy belief systems which, in turn, lead to various policy intentions given the situation at hand. This approach recognizes that individuals may adopt the same foreign policy means but have radically different foreign policy ends in mind. Thus, although Lewis and Perle make strange bedfellows during the Bosnian War, this should not lead one to conclude that in the Post-Cold War world they have the same foreign policy belief systems. Similarly,
because Buchanan and Perle were former comrades during the Cold War does not indicate that their vision of America was the same although they both pursued containment of the Soviet Union. This realization leads to the main question of this dissertation, "Why do American foreign policy elites support the policies that they do?"

Ultimately, the answer is found in individuals’ perception of how the national interest is promoted. Chapter I reviews literature that conceptualizes the genesis and formation of the national interest. It concludes that to understand how explications concerning the national interest vary, it is important to identify the beliefs opinion leaders bring to the foreign policy debate. Chapter II proceeds with a survey of the various constructions of foreign policy beliefs depicted by scholars. It argues that the current focus on militarism and internationalism as underlying dimensions of foreign policy belief systems is inadequate because it fails to acknowledge that preferences for militaristic and international policy options are based upon a Cold War reality that categorizes people according to their foreign policy preferences. But, as discussed above, as the international environment changes these categories will no longer capture the individual’s foreign policy beliefs and lead one to conclude that their beliefs have changed when in fact they have not. Instead, a more fruitful endeavor would be to identify the beliefs that dispose individuals to support various policies in different environmental settings.

This dispositional variable is identified as a national identity. It is made up of two belief components. The first classifies the individual according to their affect
toward the state, in this case whether they believe in their state's superiority. The other focuses upon the international system, specifying whether the individual believes in a responsibility toward the global community or domain. The beliefs concerning both components of a national identity produce four foreign policy dispositional types: Imperialists who believe in responsibility in the international arena and their state's superiority; Nationalists who believe in their state's superiority yet have not extended their identity to include the global community; Internationalists who identify with a global community yet do not believe their nation is superior; and Parochials who do not perceive their state as being superior nor feel responsible for the international arena. It is hypothesized that each national identity type will: 1) have its own unique way of interpreting international situations; 2) perceive actors as harboring various levels of threat; and 3) dispose them toward specific types of foreign policy intentions.

Chapter III discusses the methodology employed to construct and measure the variables designed to capture foreign dispositions, threats, and intentions. The research design consists of content analyses of documents from a single source over time. The population examined will be the foreign policy "elite," those individuals actively involved in the foreign policy debate. These opinion leaders invest their careers on interpreting and understanding the international system and thus have highly organized and well-developed belief systems that can be identified and tracked during the Cold War and into the Post-Cold War policy debate.
Chapter IV begins the empirical analysis of whether the national identity construct is a dispositional foreign policy belief. It asks the question "To what extent do the dispositions Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, and Parochialist manifest in the foreign policy debate?" Chapter IV assesses at what level elites identify with the US. It is hypothesized that the foreign policy dispositions identified in Chapter IV will constrain other foreign policy beliefs, specifically attitudes toward other international actors and foreign policy intentions. Chapter V continues the empirical analysis by investigating the link between foreign policy dispositions and perceptions of other international actors and the threats they may pose. It is proposed that those most favorable to United States will be unfavorable to the Soviet Union and other international actors, stereotype them, and perceive threat from them.

Foreign policy dispositions will also constrain foreign policy intentions. Chapter VI concludes the empirical analysis by linking the dispositions to foreign policy intentions, or policy prescriptions. It surveys how each foreign policy disposition leads to beliefs concerning: 1) where US foreign policy is directed (global or restrained); 2) what type of policy the US should employ (militaristic or non-militaristic); 3) who the US should consult and work with when internationally involved (unilateral vs. multilateral); and 4) how the US should interact with other international actors (dominant or cooperative).
CHAPTER I
NATIONAL INTEREST

Introduction

"Why do foreign policy elites support the policies that they do?" The answer is obvious, one may answer, "Because the policies are in the national interest." Yet, this answer causes more confusion then illumination. As George and Keohane (1980:223) attest,

The criterion of national interest, which occupies so central a place in discussions of foreign policy, should assist decisionmakers to cut through much of this value complexity and improve judgments regarding the proper ends and goals of foreign policy. In practice however, national interest has become so elastic and ambiguous a concept that its role as a guide to foreign policy is problematic and controversial.

Yet, one need only listen to the nightly newscast or read the most recent issue of Foreign Policy to continually encounter this most elusive term. The apparent ambiguity and elasticity of the concept has not led to its detraction.\(^1\)

As an analytic tool, scholars have employed the term national interest to describe, explain, and evaluate the sources or the adequacy of a nation's foreign policy. As an instrument of political action, it is used to justify, denounce, and propose policies (Rosenau, 1970:34). Consequently, it has meaning to groups of

\(^1\)See Modelski (1962:70-72).
individuals and is a motivator for international action. But, to effectively explain why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do, it becomes imperative to understand what the "national interest" entails. The remainder of this chapter focuses upon various scholarly perspectives and their definitions of the national interest. One group argues that it is associated with specific class interests, others disregard its origin and assume interest is the same motivation for all states, namely, the pursuit of power. Some specify identifiable discrete objectives that delineate the national interest, while still others claim it is derived from individual decision makers' perceptions and thus varies accordingly.

This chapter concludes that the best way to conceptualize the "national interest"--in a way that will explain why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do--is to regard it as the conceptual output produced by individuals as they consider the most advantageous way for their state to respond to world events. This determination will vary according to specific foreign policy dispositions that are, in turn, based upon conceptions of the state's national focus.

National Interest as Economic Interests

Students of the Marxist perspective claim that the national interest is nothing more than the product of societal needs derived from the capitalist economic system.\(^2\) What is good for a healthy functioning capitalist order becomes the defining agenda

\(^2\)See Tucker (1978) for an account of Marx and Engels' dialectical materialist perspective of the history of the class struggle.
for the state in the international arena. In such analyses, either these needs are linked to distinct individual capitalist group’s economic goals or the general viability of the capitalist economic order. These approaches can be labeled instrumental and structural respectively (Weisskopf, 1974).

Those who argue that the national interest is congruent with the powerful bourgeoisie’s interests and preferences, take an instrumental perspective when they depict the relationship between capitalism and the state’s domestic and international behavior (Baran and Sweezy, 1966; Kolko, 1969; Miliband, 1969; Magdoff, 1969). The state is the bureaucratic manifestation of the interests of the dominant class, the bourgeoisie. In this view, government officials are the handmaidens of highly powerful societal groups who are vying to protect and extend their specific economic interests.3 Those that control the economic system control the political system. Thus, most international activity is explained by tracing the national interest to the business interests of multi-national corporations, namely the national interest is defined according to the protection of foreign investment.

Structural Marxists, on the other hand, contend that, more generally, the capitalist system’s structural needs are what define state’s national interest and propel it to certain international behavior (Hobson, 1965; Lenin, 1985). Structural Marxism claims that the state can be likened to an autonomous unit that must preserve the viability of the capitalist system. Although assorted scholars link different reasons for

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3For an example of this type of analysis, see Kolko and Kolko’s (1972) explanation of US involvement in world affairs during the Cold War.
a capitalist society to become involved in foreign ventures, all scholars will define the national interest as the requisite of the interests of a capitalist society. This, they argue, explains why the state may not act in the interests of identifiable capitalist groups in its foreign policy behavior in every instance. In fact, it may act in just the opposite way. But, on the whole, it will act for the good of the system at large. This is why, according to Lenin (1985:8), that to "understand and appraise the modern war and modern politics" it is necessary to study the "question of the economic essence of imperialism."

The common thread running through both types of analyses is that a capitalist state’s international behavior is largely for the good of domestic economic viability based on foreign economic expansion. The conscious or unconscious actions of state officials are due to the pressure exerted by the needs associated with a domestic

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4 For example, John Hobson’s (1965) analysis of the Boer War was the basis of a theory of imperialism that was adopted and later refined by schools of Marxist thought. To sum his work, Hobson argued that imperialism results from the maladjustment within the domestic free market economy, in which a wealthy minority oversaves while an impoverished or "bare subsistence" majority lacks the purchasing power to consume all the fruits of modern industry. Through empirical analysis, Hobson discovered that there is a tendency in capitalist societies of overproduction and underconsumption. This produces domestic economic disorder caused by the natural progression of capitalism. This leads to the logical end of finding new markets for surplus capital, namely ventures abroad. Capitalists are then tempted to use their government in order to secure markets, or "flag will follow investment" (Hobson, 1965:73). V. I. Lenin (1985), on the other hand, regarded imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism where monopoly finance capital, not industrial capital, would lead to foreign ventures. The struggle of capitalists to avert the secular tendency to a falling rate of profit would lead to investment abroad. This would later turn to political control as well.
capitalist economic order. State interest is congruent with these needs. Thus, the national interest is defined as the summation of economic necessity.

But as Krasner (1978) has demonstrated through critical case study analyses of foreign investment, US foreign policy has not always been driven by rational economic interest either to promote individual or societal order. In fact, Krasner found evidence to the contrary. For example, from 1945 to 1989, the US has used either covert or overt force to prevent communist regimes from assuming power mostly in unstable third world societies. It can be argued that the rise of a Communist regime that rejected capitalism and nationalized industry would be detrimental to the United States’ economy and threatening to its national interest (Kolko and Kolko, 1972). Krasner (1978:333) quite convincingly argues that ideology was the variable driving US foreign investment strategy during this time period. He states,

The United States wanted to remake the world in its own Lockean liberal image....The nonlogical manner in which American leaders pursued their anticommunism is not compatible with a structural Marxist position. The absence of means-ends calculations, coupled with misperception, led to policies that undermined the coherence of American domestic society, particularly in Vietnam.

Krasner's Vietnam study demonstrates that US foreign policy is sometimes driven by interests defined according to political ideology, not by economic well-being. A Marxist may retort by quoting their intellectual fore father, Karl Marx, that "The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force" (emphasis original) (Tucker, 1978:172). Political ideology, they argue, is
constructed by the ruling class to secure the base for the division of labor and the accumulation of capital. Yet the United State’s obsession with pursuing a war in Vietnam flies in the face of this assertion. Applying containment policy to southeast Asia could not be interpreted as furthering the cause of capital accumulation and led to a domestic questioning of the very ideology that the Marxists would claim the capitalist class was supporting.

The study of US national interests based upon a Marxian definition could not, as Krasner shows, even account for all cases of foreign investment. Cases abound where political impulse is stronger than economic impulse especially during the Cold War. It is a mistake to account for international action by economic determinism even in the economic arena. The economic variable cannot carry full explanatory power (Waltz, 1979; Viotti and Kauppi, 1987:416). Thus, it is unlikely that other issue areas, such as global security or diplomatic initiatives, could be explained adequately according to economic motivations.

National Interest as the Maximization of Power

As in the Marxian analysis, scholars using a realist perspective can be divided according to instrumental and structural definitions of the national interest. They argue that the motivation for states’ behavior stems from either the nature of political man or the nature of the international political system.

Realism’s instrumental view assumes that a collective body, such as the state, will reflect an individual’s political motivation base, namely the drive for power.
Enumerated in his six principles of political realism, Morgenthau (1967:5) states, "The main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power." All rational statesmen think and act according to this pursuit. Thus, all states will conduct foreign policy to protect or promote their political and territorial integrity because, as Morgenthau contends, the national interest "is not defined by the whim of a man or the partisanship of party but imposes itself as an objective datum upon all men applying their rational faculties to the conduct of foreign policy" (1967:33). Logically then we can deduce the national interest entails rational statesmen: 1) resisting efforts by other states to gain domination; 2) avoiding upsetting the balance of power in the international system by an opponent's demise; 3) changing ally systems to perpetuate the balance of power (Krasner, 1978:37).

Structural Realism focuses not on the nature of man, but the nature of the international political system (Waltz, 1959, 1979). They claim that the anarchic structure of the international system produces a self-help system where each state must account for its own security and well-being. This security dilemma puts states into a constant condition of conflict until a balance-of-power develops according to the distribution of the power among the actors in the international system (hegemonic, bipolar, multipolar). This structure compels individual states to behave in predictable ways.5 This conclusion has led scholars to "black-box" the state and to deny that

5Unfortunately, studies differ in their explanations of how the balance-of-power system determines state action given varying power configurations. See Deutsch and Singer (1964), Kaplan (1966), Rosecrance (1966), and Waltz (1979) for contending
individual states have unique characteristics or particular motivations that distinguish them from each other, other than their niche in the international balance-of-power system.

In either type of realist analysis, the power at a nation’s command relative to that of other nations is an objective reality and serves to determine what the state’s *true* interests should be (Rosenau, 1970:35). But, the main problem with the defining the national interest as the pursuit of power is that a circularity soon develops. Power is both an end to be desired and a means toward that end.

Some Realists claim this is a simplistic summation of their views (Waltz 1979). But, even if we no longer take "the pursuit of power" literally and assume that power is a means toward security, we are still faced with a very narrow conception of the national interest. Power is really only an instrumental goal of national interest rather than a fundamental value in and of itself (George and Keohane, 1980:219). And, security is only one state goal. There are other objectives that individuals can enumerate that are important and prescribe that the state should pursue. As one author concludes, "pursuing the integrity of the nation’s normative order, promoting the international competitiveness of its economy, and preserving the health of its natural environment, are also vital interests that are but incidentally predictions and explanations.

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6There has been some discrepancy over what constitutes objective measure of state power. Geography, demographic, resource, and geopolitical factors are the criteria commonly used to define state power (Kindleberger, 1970; Knorr, 1975; Hart, 1976). But, for an examination of power as a relational concept see K. J. Holsti (1967:197-209) and Baldwin (1985:161-194).
promoted (and occasionally even undermined) through the pursuit of national power" (Nincic, 1992:158). In fact, Keohane (1983:515) argues that "states concerned with self-preservation do not seek to maximize their power when they are not in danger...they recognize that a relentless search for universal domination may jeopardize their own autonomy." Kennedy (1987) echoes this point in his book *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

In sum, the realist conception of national interest fails to capture other national aims and interests that are not directly related to threats to security (Krasner, 1978). As was the case in the economic determinism of the Marxian definition of the national interest, Realist’s power/security determinism falls prey to the same criticism.

**National Interest as Discrete Objectives**

Recognizing the problems that Realist’s have by limiting their conception of national interest to security, other authors have specified and enumerated objectives a state can pursue the sum of which defines the national interest (Osgood, 1953; Aron, 1966). These analyses begin with indicating fundamental values that are objectively labeled "irreducible" when speaking of the national interest. These are usually cited as physical survival, the health of the economy, and the sanctity of the society’s basic normative order (George and Keohane, 1980:224; Nincic, 1992:161). There have been attempts to add prestige, national aggrandizement (Osgood, 1953:5-7) and glory (Aron, 1966:73-76) to this list.
But, it is very debatable whether national interest can ever be objectively defined. We may all agree that security, economic prosperity and liberty are values that define the national interest. But, when and at what level can we further acknowledge that these values are threatened? There are dramatic periods in history when this threat may not be in doubt, such as the bombing of Pearl Harbor and United State’s entry into World War II. Yet these periods are few and far between, established states rarely face threats to their territorial and political integrity. Foreign policy is usually made in a climate of uncertainty where the threat to values is subjectively interpreted. As Nincic (1992:163) states,

The further one advances in acquiring something that one values (be it tangible or intangible) or the further one seems to be from losing it altogether, the less the incremental utility attached to each additional level of attainment on that good. As a result, it becomes less and less clear whether the last level of attainment is truly a matter of vital national concern.

We see this dynamic in other areas of political life as well. Revolutions do not occur at the level of most abject repression and poverty, or the world’s poor would be constantly in revolt. Instead, as Gurr (1970:13) points out, men rebel due to the "discontent arising from the perception of relative deprivation." It is the gap between people’s expectations, desires, and beliefs in terms of what they are entitled to and their perceived circumstances and capabilities that generates revolutionary discontent. It is the "rising expectations" born from economic growth and mass communication, in which desires and expectations rise faster than they can be satisfied. This situation is intensified if a relative decline in the standard of living follows from a rapid increase. Thus, objective measures of living standards would
not predict revolutionary activity because it was the rising expectations that created certain perceptions of future loss that drove behavior.

This phenomenon can be applied to foreign policy as well. There is no doubt that military capabilities matching a threatening enemy are valued and can be agreed upon to insure that one's state is not attacked, especially in a hostile environment. But debate over the level and kind of weapons to assure this deterrence is a common occurrence, hence the ongoing debates over the Strategic Defense Initiative and military spending. "Thus, even if one agreed on the values that could at some level define the national interest the point at which they are vital enough to qualify would remain uncertain" (Nincic, 1992:163-164).

These examples highlight the fact that there are a variety of values and determinants influencing how best to define and pursue the national interest. At this juncture, the question becomes who decides which interests should be given preference? What are the priorities assigned to a nation's foreign policy and what are the trade-offs involved? In sum, the national interest cannot be objectively defined, it is based upon beliefs and perceptions about foreign policy priorities and trade-offs inherent in this ordering. To adequately capture this dynamic, the national interest must be defined according to the perceptions of those most interested in the welfare of the nation state as it confronts an uncertain international arena.
National Interest as State’s Interests

This is the stance that Krasner (1978:10) adopts in his book *Defending the National Interest*. He defines US national interest inductively as the collection of the American central decision-makers’ preferences which are persistent over time and have a consistent ranking of importance (Krasner, 1978:13). He infers the national interest from the statements of key decision makers and foreign policy behavior. The national interest is whatever the state does. It is the national objectives revealed in practical politics.

This seems logical, construct the national interest through the words and deeds of leaders over time. But, Krasner makes two assumptions that are not wholly valid. First, ultimately one can speak of the "state" having goals and desires which culminate in the national interest. Second, national interest can be constructed by the analysis of the preferences of American central decision makers that have proven to be remain consistent over time.

In his analysis, Krasner (1978) promotes a "statist approach" to the study of foreign policy. The state is conceived of as a set of roles and institutions having peculiar drives, compulsions, and aims of their own that are separate and distinct from the interests of any particular societal group. Thus, Krasner inductively builds the state’s interest by the aggregation of interests that are displayed by an entity

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7Krasner uses the analysis of the public record and case studies of decisions made to identify the order of importance attributed to different foreign policy goals.
known as the "state." In this approach, he characterizes a non-entity, the state, as having interests.

A common critique against attributing human characteristics to a non-entity is that a "state" does not have interests, people do. Thus, analyses that amorphasize the state are critically flawed. But more importantly, if we can identify varying preferences of individual decision makers why do we, then, need to attribute these interests to state interests? A response to this question found in Krasner’s writings would be that if there is a homogeneity found in decision maker’s perceptions of the national interest then the aggregation to the state level is unproblematic. Yet, this highlights another dilemma in Krasner’s analysis, his portrayal of homogeneous interests found within administrations.

He argues that the national interest can be defined because American decision makers have sought a consistent set of international goals. By looking at cases involving foreign investment, Krasner found that American leaders had three basic aims that were consistent over time allowing for the generalization of "state interests." These are: 1) securing international raw materials markets, 2) insuring security of supply, and 3) promoting broad foreign policy objectives.

But, to get an inclusive idea of national interest according to Krasner’s own definition, all foreign policy statements and behavior must be analyzed, not just specific case studies. To be fair to Krasner, he focused upon the issue area most pertinent to discrediting a Marxian and Liberal explanation of foreign policy, foreign economic investment. But, by examining a limited foreign policy area, as Krasner
has done, it would appear that the investment in raw materials needs to be protected and is a major foreign policy concern. But, as in the case of the man looking for his keys under the lamppost because the light is better there, Krasner's interest in certain foreign policy issues led him to construct the "national interest" in preordained ways. Krasner has not seen the totality of foreign policy to be able to make the determination that there is a consistency to the national interest and that it does not fluctuate from individual or administration.

This omission is apparent in the last state interest that he specifies, "promoting broad foreign policy objectives". Promoting broad foreign policy objects is a very large and non-homogeneous category. As the history of US relations with Latin America demonstrates, the United States' broad foreign policy objectives in that region have been to promote stability, democracy, and human rights. Yet, as Lars Schoultz's (1987) book *National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America* demonstrates, individuals with the Carter and Reagan administrations had very different beliefs concerning the causes and consequences of Latin American instability for US security.⁸

Thus, permanence of foreign policy objectives from one administration to the next is difficult to establish because foreign policy goals are the product of perceptions of what constitute the national interest. Varying leaders or groups will have different perceptions based upon their interpretation of the international arena.

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⁸Schultz argues that most policy officials believe that instability in Latin America is caused by either poverty or Communist adventurism which is either a threat to US security or not.
Also, some leaders may pursue the same foreign policy goals and tactics for different reasons. For example, a communist and economic nationalist may both pursue autarky in their foreign economic relations given their disdain for dependent relationships, but, their perceptions of the international arena can be at odds. The communist believes that once capitalism is eliminated states will live in virtual harmony free of exploitation. A economic nationalist, on the other hand, believes that self-sufficiency is the only way to survive in an anarchic hostile environment regardless of its economic structure. Another scenario is that varying "views" may not be actualized because their proponents are not in power positions. But, it may only be a matter of time, or even the next election, until these views are embraced.

Varying administrations also have demonstrated levels of homogeneity of beliefs among policy makers. When Carter took office in 1976 he was intent upon institutionalizing diverse points of view. Carter chose Vance and Brzezinski as Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, respectively, as his two main foreign policy advisers. Vance, who held positions in the defense and foreign service during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, advocated a continuation of detente with the Soviet Union and further negotiations on a wide-range of issues. Brzezinski’s Polish background and his status as a professor of Soviet politics at Columbia University led him to recommend hardline policies toward the Soviets, demanding further concessions on many issues, a major one being arms control. These differing conceptions of the national interest battled during the Carter presidency other issues relating to events in countries and regions as diverse as Iran,
China, and the Horn of Africa. At the end of his tenure, Carter relied more and more on Brzezinski's worldview, which led to a failed hostage rescue attempt and the resignation of Vance who had promoted continued negotiations with the Iranian revolutionaries.

Recognizing the breakdown of foreign policy consensus characterized by the Carter Administration, the Reagan "team" sought and cultivated homogeneity of beliefs. It literally conducted "one of the most thorough purges in State Department history" (Destler, Gelb and Lake, 1984:97; Pastor, 1992), especially among those making US policy toward Latin America. The dismissal of Assistant Secretary of State for interamerican affairs, William Bowdler, and the forced retirement of both El Salvadorian ambassador Robert White and Nicaraguan ambassador Lawarence Pezzullo are just a few examples of the extent of the Reagan shuffle. Interestingly enough, William Bowdler's replacement, Thomas Enders, was also dismissed after serving for two years for questioning the Reagan Administration's monolithic views. He was replaced by Elliot Abrams who distinguished himself, especially on Latin American issues, as a true Reagonite. These current foreign policy examples highlight the error in assuming homogeneity of perceptions and interests when defining national interest within administrations. Instead, competing perceptions is a more accurate descriptor for defining the national interest.

National Interests as Competing Perceptions
Lack of homogeneity within foreign policy groups is the underlying concern in Richard Cottam’s (1977) book *Foreign Policy Motivation*. Cottam (1977:78) concentrates upon the varying perceptions individuals have of the international environment and how these images of other international actors affects their motivation for international action. He likens himself to a chemist, constructing the underlying compounds which comprise a state’s motivational system. Thus, there are a variety of motivational structures comprising an array of identifiable foreign policy goals.⁹ Foreign policy is the outcome when one of the motivational systems imposes itself upon the governmental structure. In other words, the national interest is what the nation, i.e., the decision-making group or individual in power, decides it is (Furniss & Snyder, 1955:17).

Establishing this, Cottam highlights the differences between "modal" beliefs of foreign policy interest groups and the "prevailing view," which designates the construction of reality most congruent with the thrust of a government’s foreign policy. The interest group’s views can be compared to the prevailing view to make an assessment of the relative influence that particular groups have on foreign policy outcome.

Unlike Krasner, Cottam does not view the national interest as culminating into the state’s interest, but the prevailing view comes about through competition and the

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⁹Some of these are economic (vested interests in trade, investments, or looting), communal (grandeur, participant excitement, frontier dynamics), messianic (religious, cultural, and ideological) governmental (bureaucratic, military, domestic vested interests) or defense (Cottam, 1977:34-43).
imposition of one's perception of reality to state action through a sometimes unadaptive bureaucracy. This is an important distinction between Cottam and Krasner's work. Where Krasner sees consistency between decision-makers' views which produces the national interest, Cottam regards the national interest as that which is most congruent with the perceptions of individuals or groups in power. There is a realization that there are a variety of competing motivational systems constructed by varying perceptions of the national interest out there in the policy realm waiting for their day in the sun.

Although Cottam identifies "modal" and "prevailing" views which adds a complexity to the conception of the national interest, his examination falls short. He does not identify the basis for these competing views. What is the underlying structure of the beliefs among competing groups, such as the "New Left," an "American dove," Senator Barry Goldwater, or Senator J. William Fulbright, which produces such divergent descriptions of the national interest? Why is it that these groups have various rank orderings of importance for the need for military defense, the desirability of cooperating with other international actors, and the need to promote the American way of life to other countries of the world? If these perceptions of the international arena vary in identifiable ways, how will they respond to change in the international environment? How would Cottam's analysis account for apparent hawks becoming doves and vice-versa?

Cottam recognizes that images change as threat and opportunity vary given perceptions of the changing international arena. But, he does not provide guidance
for predicting when some groups' international perceptions will change and in what ways this transformation is likely to occur. In other words, how does perceptions of the "national interest" transform in response to the change in the international arena?

CONCLUSION

What is the national interest? This is still an elusive question. From the above review, it is obvious that the national interest is a concept that is subjective, relative, and dynamic. It is subjective because, as Cottam (1977) points out, it depends on the belief system, personality, and role of the definer. Rosenau (1970:36) agrees, summing,

Men are bound to differ on what constitute the most appropriate goals for a nation. For, to repeat, goals and interests are value-laden. They involve subjective preferences, and thus the culmination of national interests into a single complex of values is bound to be as variable as the number of observers who use different value frameworks.

The national interest is relative because it relies upon individuals' interpretation of their state's size, power, and national image relative to other international actors. As these factors change differing perceptions arise claiming what is best for the nation state. The national interest is also dynamic because perceptions of what constitutes it have changed as US's economy and power have grown (Pastor, 1992:29). A review of the history of US diplomacy from isolationism to internationalism illustrates this point very well. President Wilson had to convince Americans that the US had a global interest to the defense of Europe. As US power grew so did its perceived interests. Forty years after World War I, the US's national
interest was linked to the instability of a tiny country in Vietnam. In the Post-Cold War era we hear competing prescriptions for what is best for US interests. Republican presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan asks Americas to come home claiming that the US is over-extended and does not have the ability or interest in structuring a new world order. At the same time, syndicated columnist Charles Krauthammer (1991:26) warns that the United States is the only international actor who has the ability and will to solve global issues.

It would seem that the only way to examine why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do is to examine how they define the national interest. This is achieved through the exploration of "the use of the formula by responsible statesmen and publicists and by discovering the things and patterns of conduct-public and private-embraced within the scope of the formula" (Beard, 1966:26). But, it is more then just identifying the "scope of the formula." It is classifying how individuals perceive their state's role in the international arena. It is the subjective interpretation of their nation state in relation to other actors. The totality of this conception is a foreign policy belief system. The following chapter reviews works done on the structure of foreign belief systems. It then explores how the conceptualization of a national identity based upon beliefs concerning a responsibility in the international arena and state superiority can account for the variation in elites conception of the national interest.
CHAPTER II
FOREIGN POLICY BELIEFS

Introduction

Chapter I argued that speculation about the direction of US foreign policy in a New World Order must entail an analysis of what constitutes the national interest. The current chapter asks the question "What are the beliefs and values that form the basis of the national interest?" It begins with a review of studies that examine the structure of foreign policy belief systems and argues that the current focus on militarism and internationalism as underlying dimensions of foreign policy belief systems is inadequate and misleading. This focus is insufficient because it fails to acknowledge that preferences for militaristic policy options are based upon threat perceptions that can change as the international environment evolves and because it is based upon a Cold War reality that categorized people by foreign policy prescriptions. The proposal is made that as the international environment changes these types will no longer capture foreign policy beliefs. Instead, a more fruitful endeavor would be to identify the beliefs that dispose individuals to support various policies in different environmental settings.

This chapter asserts that an individual's perceptions of their state's national identity is the foundation for a foreign policy belief system and predisposes
individuals to interpret international environmental stimuli as harboring varying degrees of threat and to react either with militaristic or cooperative foreign policy prescriptions. Perceptions of national identity are made up of two underlying dimensions: views on national superiority and about responsibility issues in the international arena. Variance on these dimensions is postulated to produce four possible foreign policy orientations -- Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, or Parochialist. Viewing the structure of foreign policy belief system in this way makes them more dynamic and allows speculation about how they may have changed as the international environment moved from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War world.

Cognitive Theory and Foreign Policy

In 1948, Hans Morgenthau (1960:6) stated,

To search for the clue to foreign policy exclusively in the motives of statesmen is both futile and deceptive. It is futile because motives are the most illusive of psychological data, as distorted as they are, frequently beyond recognition, by the interests and emotion of actor and observer alike.

This declaration of the inadequacy of using psychological variables in foreign policy analysis led a generation of scholars to shun the use of cognitive variables in their theories of international relations. Yet, since this time, advances made during the cognitive revolution in psychology¹ have enabled analysts to speculate about "what goes on in individual's heads."

¹This orientation challenged the dominate behaviorist tradition in psychology that only focused upon observable human behavior in the form of stimulus responses.
Cognitive theorists claim that words such as "knowledge," "thought," "feeling," "plan," and "description" express the idea that we can model aspects of the world in our minds and in our speech (Baars, 1986:149). There is a place between the neuronal and socio-cultural level in which language, problem solving, and classification are explained. A tier where representations capture cognitive phenomena, from visual perception to story comprehension (Gardner, 1986:383). This notion affirms the common logic that "what we think influences what we do."

Adopting this epistemological frame to foreign policy analysis, scholars seek to identify and understand the mental representations individuals use that influence how they interpret the international environment. As Jervis (1976:28) asserted "It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others." It is hoped that this knowledge would lead to a comprehension of why individuals favor certain policy options over others, react to international events in contentious ways, or learn from past foreign policy experiences.²

²How individuals interpret and respond to their environment has been of interest to students of foreign policy decision-making since Snyder, Bruck and Sapin's (1962) introduction of psychological variables and models in the study of foreign policy decision-making. This work brought to the forefront the importance of how individual decision-makers perceive reality, and construct a "definition of the situation." They illustrated that there often exists a contradiction between what is labeled objective reality and the way decision-makers perceive that reality. Arguing against the rational actor model—which assumes individual accurately perceive the environment, conduct an exhaustive search for information, rank preferences, and maximize benefits and minimize costs (Allison, 1971)—they contended that decision-makers' perceptions of the international environment shape and are closely connected to policy preferences. See Steinbrunner (1974) for an elaboration of the analytic model of decision-making verses the cognitive model. See Holsti (1970) for a
An awareness of beliefs that policymakers bring to the decision context is thought to lead to an understanding of foreign policy behavior. For example, Deborah Larson (1985), examining the Truman Administration's beliefs, traced the origins of the Cold War and the pillars of a containment policy. Jerel Rosati (1987) depicted how the Carter administration's quest for global community was constructed (or inhibited) by the manifestation of the rival beliefs of top-ranking policy officials and their contending policy proposals. Both these studies highlight how beliefs that were adopted by officials influenced the direction of US foreign policy in consequential ways.

Yet, we need not only point to current scholarship to cite the significance of using cognitive variables in the study of foreign policy. One of the earliest and best endorsements for utilizing this approach comes from Quincy Wright (1955:433) in his opus entitled *The Study of International Relations*.

International relations cannot, therefore, be confined to intergovernmental relations and conclusions based on the assumption that they [i.e., psychological studies] fail to provide an adequate foundation for prediction and control. The minds of individuals who constitute the world's population, the influences that affect them, and the influences they exert, both domestic and foreign, must be taken into account by examining their minds.

discussion of individual difference in the definition of the situation. See also Shaprio and Bonham (1973) for an initial review of this literature.
Subsequently, cognitive representations that describe an individual’s psychological milieu have proliferated in international relations scholarship.\(^3\) There are almost as many concepts as there are studies, each having its own specific connotation.

For example, scholars interested in general beliefs concerning the political arena have analyzed belief systems (Rosati, 1987, 1991), worldviews (Barber, 1974) and operational codes (Leites, 1953; Holsti, 1970; George, 1979; Walker, 1977).\(^4\) Others, interested in how individuals view various international actors, have concentrated upon images (Kelman, 1965; Brecher, Steinberg, and Stein, 1969; Boulding, 1959; Jervis, 1976; R. Cottam, 1977; M. Cottam, 1986, 1995; Herrmann, 1985, 1986, 1988) and mirror images (Gladstone, 1959:132). Some prefer to focus upon how decision-makers interpret specific events or how they construct a definition of the situation (Snyder, Bruck and Sapin, 1962; Holsti, 1970) or represent a problem (Sylvan and Thorson, 1992). There are those who construct maps of the links or interconnectedness between individual’s cognitions of a specific environment (Shapiro and Bonham, 1973; Axelrod, 1976) while others pinpoint how decision-makers use historical analogies (Hybel, 1989; Khong, 1992). It seems there is a convergence upon recognizing the importance of studying cognitive variables in foreign policy.

\(^3\)See the edited volume by Singer and Hudson (1992) for a current review of Political Psychology in International Relations scholarship.

\(^4\)Although Leites (1953) originally used the operational code as a generalized code of an aggregation of individual beliefs, namely the Bolshevik mindset, it has since been used to classify the cognitive representations of specific policy makers. For an examination of studies that focus upon a single individual’s belief system or operational code see Holsti (1967) on John Foster Dulles and Starr (1984) and Walker (1977) who studied Henry Kissinger.
analysis, but little agreement over what these concepts capture and the definitions used to describe them.

One reason for this conceptual proliferation is the nature of the phenomena under study. By their very character, ideational elements are intangible. They can concern abstract (belief systems\operational codes) or concrete (problem representation) phenomena or events. They can refer to self (identity), others (enemy-images\mirror images), or situations (definition of the situation). Classifying cognitions by groups and types has required extensive conceptualization and operationalization.5

This theoretical propagation seems to uphold Foucault's (1972) critique of the social sciences, namely that conceptualization is essentially "wording" rather than a reliable mirroring of an essentially unaccessible reality. Words do not represent reality because their "meanings are imprecise, ever-changing, context-dependent, inter-subjectively untranslatable, culture-laden, and value-laden...Words always connote more than they denote" (Puchala, 1995:11).

Keeping this in mind, so to speak, yet "getting on with the job at hand," what does this mean for the current investigation into foreign policy beliefs? This dissertation will not add another "concept" to the already over-populated "discourse". Instead, the traditionally used term "belief system" will be employed. Belief system is defined as a set of ideas and thoughts concerning the environment that are

5For a discussion of the evolution of cognitive approaches to the study of foreign policy see Rosati (1995).
organized and held relatively constant over time (Rosati 1987:16). This seems reasonable since we are interested in individual's beliefs and their organization regarding the foreign policy issue area.

**Belief System Structure**

Cognitive theory is based in the assumption that humans are "cognitive misers," limited in their capacity to deal with incoming information. Since individuals can not be attentive to all aspects of the environment, they selectively engage it by building cognitive categories that are acquired through the socialization process and past experiences. Scholars have labeled these stereotypes, schemata (Hastie, 1986), and heuristics (Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982). What is common to these treatments is their agreement that humans process information according to categories which are theory-driven. These categories help with explication of a highly complex and uncertain environment in order to simplify assessment and choice (Fiske and Taylor, 1984; Lau and Sears, 1986). Belief system construction serves an important function for the individual, it promotes efficiency because once formed, cognitive categories become ongoing information-processing units arranging incoming information in accordance to preexisting mental constructs. This structure reduces the need for information from the environment because once activated expectations embedded in the categorization will fill in gaps (Fiske, 1986).

This theoretical base allows speculation in a number of ways. The development of a coherent set of beliefs that interrelate or are structured makes it
possible to predict attitudes on some issues by knowing attitudes on others. For example, in one of the earliest studies that tried to link political beliefs and policy preferences, Converse (1964:207) defined "constraint" as "a configuration of ideas and attitudes in which the elements are bound together by some form of constraint or functional interdependence... although not necessarily a logical consistency."

Expanding his analysis of the covariation between what he labeled liberal/conservative values and attitudes on various policy issues, Converse (1964) concluded that the mass public exhibited interdependence between liberal/conservative values and attitudes on domestic issues but they did not have a coherent structure or stability to their foreign policy beliefs. Simply put, the values individuals hold, labeled either liberal or conservative, did not covary with their foreign policy preferences. The deduction drawn was that the public did not think much about foreign affairs and that their beliefs were simplistic and undifferentiated, a coherent structure was not formed thus could not be found.6

Later studies questioned the validity of this inference. Scholars argued that among the various policy domains that comprise the political environment, the international sphere is perhaps the most complex and uncertain. "International events that occur around the globe are remote, fluid, and extraordinarily complicated" (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1989:1103). If we are cognitively predisposed to structure beliefs into a system for efficiency's sake, then beliefs concerning the foreign policy issue area should be the place where a structure is found. The stance adopted was

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6Studies by Almond (1950) and Kinder (1983) come to similar conclusions
that foreign policy preferences were indeed constrained by specific beliefs or values, but not according to a traditional liberal-conservative value system (Mandelbaum and Schneider, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1984, 1990; Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987, 1990). The foreign policy domain was significantly different from the domestic political arena so that other "values" were constraining attitudes on foreign policy issues.

Foreign Policy Belief System Content

One of the most influential research projects analyzing the structure of foreign policy beliefs has been Holsti and Rosenau's "Foreign Policy Leadership Project." This survey, initiated in 1976 and readministered every four years, began as an analysis of a perceived reorientation of foreign policy beliefs associated with the breakdown of the Cold War foreign policy opinion consensus developed around the containment doctrine\(^7\) (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1979, 1984, 1986). They contended that the splintering of this consensus reflected deep cleavages that defined several quite coherent but almost mutually-exclusive ways of thinking about foreign affairs in the aftermath of the Vietnam War.\(^8\) These differences, they argued, were linked to both the variance in individual's perceptions of Soviet motivation and capabilities and lessons learned from the Vietnam War. Divergent prescriptions about

\(^7\)See Barnet (1987) for a review of the pillars of containment policy.

\(^8\)For discussions of the breakdown of the Cold War consensus, see Kegley and Wittkopf (1982-83); Mandelbaum and Schneider (1979); and Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981).
the conduct of US foreign policy were portrayed in three types of foreign policy attitudes: 1) cold war internationalists, who saw the Soviet Union as an expansionistic force that needed to be contained and advocated increased military spending and demonstration of American will; 2) post-cold war internationalists, who down-played the East-West conflict and recommended the promotion of a stable and just world through negotiation, compromise, and cooperation; and 3) semi-isolationists, who stressed the danger in remaining internationally involved and highlighted domestic problems as the major concern of American policy.

Subsequent studies highlighted a major flaw in the Holsti and Rosenau endeavor. Critics contended that the early Holsti and Rosenau (1984) categorization of foreign policy types was rich in detail and description but lacked a theoretical base. Labeling types of foreign policy beliefs without reference to the underlying dimensions inherent within them did not allow comparison between different survey data or/and various time periods (Ferguson, 1986; Kegley, 1986; Wittkopf, 1986; Chittick and Billingsley, 1986).

In response, Wittkopf (1986, 1990) posed a two dimensional structure to foreign policy belief systems based on an inductive analysis of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations’ elite and mass survey. He argued that the dimensions which structured elite and mass belief systems and constrained foreign policy attitudes were: 1) support-oppose militant internationalism (MI); and 2) support-oppose cooperative internationalism (CI). Crossing these two dimensions identifies four foreign policy types or attitude clusters: hard liners who support militant but oppose cooperative
international interactions; **internationalists** who promote active US involvement through a combination of conciliatory and conflictual strategies in their international behavior; **isolationist** who opposed both militant and cooperative internationalism; and **accommodationists** who embrace cooperative internationalism but shun militarism.

Wittkopf's initial proposition that internationalism and militarism are the dimensions that structure foreign policy beliefs has been embraced by other scholars as well. Holsti and Rosenau (1988, 1990) and Holsti (1994) adopted the Wittkopf dimensions, reanalyzed their earlier work and found support for this dimensionality. Hinckley (1992) adopted the Wittkopf scheme and divided it further. He proposed six military dimensions of foreign policy attitudes based upon whether the individual supported the use of military forces abroad (yes or no) and the type of international involvement proposed (unilateral, multilateral, or isolationist). The specification of type of involvement added a more explicit description of kind of international actions the individual preferred. This expansion produced six foreign policy orientations: Hardliner, Soft, Internationalist, Accommodationist, Forceful, or Restrained.

Although the addition of Wittkopf and Hinckley's dimensions enhances the Holsti and Rosenau venture, it lacks an argument for determining how the two dimensions, militaristic and cooperative internationalism, were established other than through inductive factor analysis. Are militarism and internationalism the values inherent in and of themselves when we think of international affairs? Why is it that individuals structure their beliefs according to these values and are these the only ones? Maybe more importantly, when would we expect a change in foreign policy
beliefs since the end of the Cold War given these two constraining variables? There needs to be an a priori reasoning for establishing the dimensions or values that structure foreign policy belief systems and some specification of when and why we may expect change in them as the international arena evolves. The dichotomous values adopted by most foreign policy scholars, militarism and international involvement, are unsatisfying because they do not provide the tools for answering the above questions.

Recent works by Chittick and Billingsley (1989) and Chittick et al. (1993) address part of this concern. They propose three underlying dimensions and nine schools of thought describing foreign policy belief systems. The dimensions were derived from three domains they consider relevant to any person contemplating the international arena. They define domain as a "set of values or interests" that are held by an individual as they confront their world. In the international environment these include; 1) security, determining whether the state is threatened or not in its environment, 2) identity, indicating how independent the state desires to be from its environment, and 3) prosperity, categorizing how the state perceives opportunities to enhance its well-being in the environment.

Applying these domains to the construction of foreign policy belief systems, values toward the security, identity, and prosperity domains represent three dimensions that structure foreign policy belief systems; militarism--nonmilitarism, multilateralism--unilateralism and internationalism--isolationism, respectively. The
unique positions that individuals take on these dimensions reveal nine identifiable types of foreign policy belief systems (Chittick et al., 1993:1-2).9

The Chittick et al. (1993) work takes an important step toward articulating the logic behind the construction of foreign policy values which lead to belief preferences. Yet their conceptualization of "domain" is static although how an individual perceives the international environment (security, identity, and prosperity) is dynamic in identifiable ways. For example, whether a person contends that a state is secure and prefers what the above authors label military or non-military strategies depends upon perceptions of other actors and the threats that they pose. These perceptions change as other actors' abilities and behaviors vary. This becomes crystal clear as we identify US foreign policy makers' articulation of the important international issues during the rise and fall of the Soviet Union, as the once monolithic "evil empire" becomes a "friend."

Also, there are degrees and levels of military involvement. Do you send a warning shot or do you drop an atomic bomb? Both entail the use of military instruments, but the intent is radically different. Also, varying belief systems may support militarism in some cases and not in others depending upon how threat and opportunity are perceived by individuals. The studies above fail to account for

9Through an impressionist account of the post-Cold War foreign policy debate conducted in opinion journals from 1989-1992 they find support for their dimensions and foreign policy types, which are: Multilateral-Militant-Internationalist; Multilateral-Nonmilitant-Internationalist; Multilateral-Militant-Isolationist; Multilateral-Nonmilitant-Isolationist; Unilateral-Militant-Internationalist; Unilateral-Nonmilitant-Internationalist; Unilateral-Militant-Isolationist; and Unilateral-Nonmilitant-Isolationist.
situational variance and how different belief systems will interpret varying degrees of threat and opportunity given how they are predisposed to view the international environment. Individuals may perceive that certain actors are "unreasonable" or crazy, nothing less than an atomic bomb will stop them. Others, the ones perceived as more rational, need only friendly "persuasion" until they "see the light." In sum, an assessment of the actors and issues that confront individuals as they interpret the international arena are of vital importance in the determination of the types of instruments used by policy makers.

What most studies of foreign policy belief systems fail to take into account is that as the international environment changes the Cold War foreign policy types constructed according to a militaristic and internationalist dimensionality may no longer apply to the same individuals. For example, during the Cold War, Wittkopf's Hard Liner type favored international activity and supported military might. Yet, a Hard Liner may only have favored international activity given the extreme threat they perceived from the Soviet Union, a comparable power, they believed, bent on undermining the American way of life through its promotion of Communism. Logically, during the Cold War the Hard Liner supported increased defense spending and ventures that would lead to the containment of the Communist menace, such as Third World intervention and increased NATO presence in Europe, highly militaristic and international behavior. A member of the elite having these beliefs during the Cold War and favoring such policies was Patrick Buchanan. But, one can imagine that in the Post-Cold War world some individuals who once supported the "hard-
line," like Buchanan, now want Americans to "come home." As he recently stated (Buchanan, 1995:45), "This president of the United States (Clinton) has to stop thinking about some utopian New World Order and start thinking about America first."

Buchanan's international and military beliefs were derived from the threat of Communism, not an underlying belief about the inherent need to address all global situations and to do so with militaristic policies. Thus, it is not surprising that the US commitment to NATO and resolving Third World instability would no longer be in the "national interest" according to Buchanan once the dreaded communist threat was gone.

Yet, Wittkopf (1994) and Holsti (1994) do contend that the "militant internationalism" and "cooperative internationalism" scheme holds up in the Post-Cold War world. But, given their focus upon non-panel survey methodology to analyze foreign policy belief systems, conclusions drawn concerning belief system stability refer to the overall structure of the aggregation of types of beliefs based on attitude preferences. Thus, comparison between individuals and time periods to ascertain foreign policy type appropriateness is not possible. If we desire cummulation in the analysis of foreign policy belief systems, we need to develop dimensions and types that are not contingent upon a changing domain, i.e. security, or the realities based on our Cold War experiences. The strategy pursued here is to identify foreign policy beliefs or values that are precursors to the dimensions and types advocated in the above studies. These are core or dispositional foreign policy beliefs. They determine
how environmental input is interpreted which, in turn, ascertain threat perceptions and foreign policy intentions or attitudes.

Core Foreign Policy Beliefs

The reason certain beliefs are labeled central is that many other cognitive elements, such as periphery beliefs, are dependent upon or derived from them (George, 1979:101). Usually core or central beliefs are logical ends or "primitive beliefs." Primitive beliefs are those "which demand no independent formal or empirical confirmation and which require no justification beyond a brief citation of direct experience" or trustworthy authority (Bem, 1970:6-7).

Hurwitz and Peffley (1987) described the relationship between core and periphery beliefs as "vertical constraint." Like Converse (1964), they contended that beliefs elements acquired at some earlier time will "constrain" other beliefs. But, vertical constraint introduces causality rather than just covariation. Abstract core beliefs, or primitive beliefs, will constrain periphery or concrete ideas or policy options relevant to the situation at hand.10

10The assumption that beliefs systems are vertically constrained has not been accepted by all scholars. Some have argued that the correlation of abstract belief elements with specific policy attitudes may not be a top down relationship, but rather a bottom-up one. Expressions of general beliefs may be reflections of attitudes toward specific policies.

But, there are two reasons why this is not probable when we are examining ideological foreign policy belief systems. First, as Tetlock and McGuire (1985:161) note, it is more economical to derive specific beliefs from general principles than to attend to every event and construct principles from constant evaluation of the environment. As argued above, the international arena is a highly complex and uncertain arena which makes it even harder to attend to all aspects of the
Applying this to foreign policy analysis, central foreign policy beliefs influence attitudes relating to how the US government should behave in the international arena. These central beliefs are the dimensions proposed in the Wittkopf (1986), Hinkley (1992) and Chittick et al. (1993) studies—militarism, internationalism, multilateralism and unilaterialism. Yet, Hurwitz and Peffley propose an underlying value or belief that informs these dimensions. They define values as "more personal statements regarding the individual's priorities and concerns" (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987:1106). For instance, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) found that Americans shape their individual foreign policy preferences around their assumptions concerning the nature of the US's main adversary during the Cold War, the USSR. They contended that varying degrees of threat and trust of the Soviet Union will lead to foreign policy postures such as militarism and containment which, in turn, could predict attitudes on concrete policy issues such as nuclear policy, defense spending, and Contra policy.

Second, when the judgement task is complex, such as when one is dealing with international relations, people will resort to the use of heuristics to make sense of the world. Since these heuristics are general and abstract, they can be applied to a variety of situations. They provide interpretation for analogous stimuli. This characteristic gives the belief system its permanence because core beliefs are permissive, they allow considerable room for discretion within broad outlines of behavior, thus they are not easily delegitimated (Blum, 1994:14).

Examples of postures would be militarism, isolationism, and containment (Hurwitz and Peffley, 1987:4).

For example, the morality of warfare and the degree of ethnocentrism the individual displays.

This finding is not surprising to international relations scholars who, for the most part, agree that perceptions about the Soviet Union's motivation and capability have guided US foreign policy beliefs since the end of WWII (Hermann, 1984).
But, beliefs about the Soviet Union, they further argued, were derived from higher core values such as patriotism, moral traditionalism, and religious fundamentalism. These are at the pinnacle of foreign policy belief systems.

A simpler way of stating the above is that certain beliefs can be considered dispositions and others intentions. This may seem confusing because all aspects of belief system are ideational elements. But, a dispositional belief answers the question why a certain person is cognitively disposed toward a specific intention. The intentional dimension—would include both postures and policy strategies—embraces a determination of the choices implicated in a policy and the motivation underlying its pursuit. The logic behind this is that people do not intend their beliefs, but beliefs do underlie and inform intentions and can be viewed as a causal factor in their explanation (Carlsnaes; 1986:102-103).

Analyzing foreign policy beliefs in this way depends on a determination of foreign policy dispositions, how these dispositions are linked to interpretations of the international arena, i.e. threat perceptions, and how dispositions and perceptions manifest in foreign policy intentions. The remainder of this chapter explains the utility of analyzing foreign policy beliefs through this conceptual lens. It first establishes foreign policy dispositions by focusing upon individual’s beliefs concerning perceptions of their state’s superiority and responsibility in an international arena. These perceptions are then linked to the variance into situational interpretations and likely threats perceived. It proceeds to speculate what foreign policy prescriptions, or
intentions, individuals will propose based upon their national identity. It ends with a summary of the national identity dispositions, threats, and intentions.

FOREIGN POLICY DISPOSITIONS

As discussed above, the task of perceiving the international arena requires an assessment of international threat and opportunity. This is contingent upon which actors and issues the person identifies as dangerous to their nation state, the individual’s perception of their own state’s capabilities to carry out preferred foreign policy goals, and the desire to extend national influence thereby enhancing prestige or opportunity to give others its benefits. This assessment is based upon the beliefs an individual holds concerning their "national identity," which, it is argued, is a dispositional variable at the core of a foreign policy belief system.

National Identity

There is considerable contention in the scholarly community over the meaning and origins of how individual identity and loyalty become entwined into a sense of collective self and leads to definition of the national ingroup. Some trace the process of acquiring a national loyalty to antiquity (Amstrong, 1982; Smith, 1986). Others claim it was derived from monarchs in their attempt to relinquish political power from religious institutions, such as the Catholic church, by emphasizing the secular and commercial character of the nation-state (Hayes, 1926: 30-60; Carr, 1945; Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1985). Either way, "modern state structures, combined with the
eighteenth-century revolutionary call for popular participation in politics, created the potential for a qualitatively different tie between people and the state, which in critical circumstances evolved into nationalism" (Dahbour and Ishay, 1995:1). But, whatever its historical origin, one need only reference the intense fighting in the former Yugoslavia, Somalia, or Rwanda to support the contention that how people identify with a national collectivity has important consequences for stability in the international community.

The literature in social psychology defines a "social identity" as a concept of self that moves away from individual uniqueness toward becoming an "exemplar of some social category" (Turner et al., 1987:50). This definition is derived from the "self concept" which is the product of reflexive dialectic between the self as subject and the self as object. It is the "composite of characteristics associated with the individual resulting from social interaction and social position. Self-evaluation is the subjective value placed upon these characteristics" (Breakwell, 1992:3) rendering efficacy or estrangement. A social identity raises personal identity to a higher level of abstraction in the perception of self and others. It is "a sense of affinity with a community's sense of being at one with its future as well as its history" (Erikson, 1974:27-28). The process of constructing a social identity unites the individual with a

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14 See Campbell (1992) for a challenge to the traditional western narrative of how states were formed.

15 The study of social identity has become increasingly important in political psychology research that seeks to understand the roots of intergroup conflict. Studies ranges from the examination of the individual psychology of prejudice (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; others) to modern nationalism (Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 1985).
community. Individuals place emotional significance on their membership within the social grouping (Tajfel, 1978), producing feelings of belonging and affinity based upon shared values as well as alienation and hostility toward other groupings.

Recently, the identity concept has emerged within international relations scholarship, most notably in the Post-Modern paradigm. Unlike social psychology, which focuses upon both the affinity and estrangement aspects of identity, the Post-Modern construction of identity spotlights the creation of difference between "self" and "other" (Shapiro, 1987; Der Derian and Shapiro, 1989; Connolly, 1989). (Re)introducing the concept of national identity, Campbell (1992:8)\textsuperscript{16} states, "The constitution of identity is achieved through the inscription of boundaries which serve to demarcate an 'inside' from an 'outside', a 'self' from an 'other', a 'domestic' from a 'foreign'." In his view, there can not be a national identity without a reference to the "other". The "logic of identity" requires an assessment of difference. In this analysis, identity is recast and emphasizes "exclusionary practices, the discourse of danger, the representation of fear and the enumeration of threats" (Campbell, 1992:77). National identity is constructed by negative differentiation from others, not affinity with others.

\textsuperscript{16}Campbell (1992:246) resists the label "postmodern" claiming that anything "described as postmodern is immediately associated with a number of 'well-known' features, even if neither the argument being analyzed nor the works from which it draws sustenance bears any resemblance to its' representation." But, the scholarly discourse necessitates, for the most part, categorization of thought and argumentation. For the current purposes, Campbell's work fits into a postmodern classification fairly well.
Yet, this focus is not true to the complexity introduced by the social psychologist's conceptualization of identity. The Post-Modernists have focused only on part of the identity construct. Having an identity does entail noticing the "other" as different, but it also requires that some of the "others" are similar, hence the self can "identify" with them. This aspect focuses upon inclusion and sense of self by interaction with others.

In addition, what the Post-Modernists fail to acknowledge, and what social psychologists would stress, is that varying individuals specify what constitutes the "self" and "other" at various levels of inclusion. As Breakwell (1992:19) states, "It is a mistake to assume that a 'social identity' is necessarily claimed by all who fall in a defined category." Where the person constructs the social, or national, identity and how that identity is perceived is not a given. We cannot assume, as Campbell and others (George, 1992) are prone to do, that there is an "American national identity" that can be constructed without reference to the individuals who fabricate and may or may not share the identity.

It is true that a particular manifestation of the American "national identity" will construct the "other" in terms of danger and threat. But, since individuals vary in the degree and level of their identification with their nation state, of what this identification may or may not entail, and of who it does or does not include, a more fruitful analysis of how the national identity construct influences US foreign policy is the investigation into how individuals construct their national identities. This dispositional element is based upon how individuals identify with their state
(nationalism) and how they identify with the international community (internationalism).

Political thinkers have wrestled with the balancing of the particularist (national/self) and univeralist (international/other) components of social identity. Examples include: the Enlightenment's views of international and nationalism exemplified in the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant; Liberalism's stance on nationalism demonstrated in John Stuart Mill and Max Weber's musings; The link between Conservatism and nationalism specified by Edmund Burke; Socialism's desire to unite a global community personified in the writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, Rosa Luxemburg, and Lenin; Fascism and Nazism's integral nationalism espoused by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini; and current notions of internationalism found in the writings of Woodrow Wilson.\(^{17}\)

International relations scholars speculate about the abolition of the state system in favor of ordering an international community of nations, or world government. They discuss the feasibility and benefits of this arrangement as well as the drawbacks to the current state system (Deutsch, 1966; Deutsch, 1969; Mayall, 1990). However, when analyzing beliefs about international relations one needs to consider the current reality that there are nation states as well as the global community of nations.

\(^{17}\)See Dahbour and Ishay (1995:1) for a tour de force of nationalism based upon an ideological basis. It purports to analyze how "manifestations of nationalism can be better understood by placing them in the context of major political traditions such as liberalism, conservatism, and socialism."
The long and illustrious history of political thought and scholarship that pits the national against the international has led to the view that nationalism and internationalism are two poles of the same dimension. This obscures what are in fact fundamentally two different dimensions of a national identity. For example, if we consider Carlton Hayes' (1926:6) definition of nationalism—a "modern emotional effusion" aroused by the nation-state—to be accurate, then the conception of nationalism encompasses an affective component linked to perceptions of the nation state.\textsuperscript{18} Internationalism, or what Sampson and Smith (1957) label "world mindedness," on the other hand, represents the feelings individuals have about their responsibility for other nations or the global community. Strong affect for the nation state does not entail a corresponding perception of responsibility to the international system or vice-versa. An identity can be multifaceted and does not preclude inclusion in a variety of groupings.

The intermixing of affect for the nation state and responsibility in the international arena is abundant in the literature on US foreign policy. For example, Krasner notes (1978:15) that since World War II there has been a shift from interest-oriented foreign policy to ideological foreign policy based largely upon the resulting growth of America's global power position. This power potential "allows the turning outward of America's vision of a properly ordered society into the international system." Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) and Hurwitz, et al. (1993) see another trend

\textsuperscript{18}Affect is a generic term for the range of feelings and emotions a person can experience.
arguing that an affective bond for one's nation engenders pride and support which translates into preferences for "an aggressive pursuit of national interests; into an intense anti-communism, presumably out of the belief in the superiority of the 'American way of life'; and into an isolationist posture" (Hurwitz, et al, 1993:253). On the other hand, superiority, contends Deutsch (1953:247), "implies the ability to act out with little or no modifications the behavior implicitly in our memories and in the configurations of our personal preferences and values" onto the international system. Each author mentions positive affect for the nation state, in this case US superiority, yet comes to differing conclusions about what that affect means for international action, either an inward or outward orientation.

An affective bond with the nation state can produce "isolationism" as often as it is "internationalism." The reality is that national affect can be present with the urge to universalize domestic achievements (internationalism) or to separate the nation state from the global community (isolationism). Taken on its own, national affect can manifest in two foreign policy orientations, either withdrawal or internationalism. Consequently, a national identity with strong affect for the nation state may have an active foreign policy orientation as readily as one determined to withdraw. National affect alone can not account for an isolationist or internationalist orientation. Therefore, a conceptualization of national identity that focuses solely on either nationalism or internationalism may fail to distinguish between the different types of internationalist and nationalist orientations to world affairs. This highlights an important aspect of national identity that is missing in the scholarly literature, it has
two dimensions, a domain component (responsibility in the international arena) and an
national component (affect toward one's own nation state).

Responsibility in the International Arena

As discussed previously, most studies analyzing US foreign policy beliefs
focused upon "faces of internationalism" (Wittkopf, 1990). Scholars typically capture
this dimension by analyzing whether individual respondents believe the US should be
involved in world affairs, preferring policies aimed at an active United States role in
international institutions like the United Nations, or concentrate attention on problems
at home, such as urban decay. The responses to these questions produce an
internationalist or isolationist orientation to foreign policy.

Conceptualizing internationalism as part of a national identity is more than
favoring international involvement at a specific juncture. Identifying the state as
having a responsibility in the international arena encompasses notions of whether a
person identifies with the global community as the place of US operation. Individuals
identity with and draw different boundaries around an area of responsibility. Given
this identification, beliefs concerning the US role in world affairs can be radically
different.

Those who have extended their national identity to believe in a responsibility
toward a global community are truly "international" in their foreign policy
disposition. US Ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, sums up this stance well
when she states,
If there is one overriding principle that will guide me in this job, it will be the inescapable responsibility...to build a peaceful world and to terminate the abominable injustices and conditions that still plague civilization.

These globally-minded individuals feel a responsibility toward the international system. They believe in the creation of a world order and consider the American role in this task as indispensable.

Scholars have compared an internationalist orientation to an isolationist one. The traditional notion of isolationism holds that support of any global initiatives would disqualify a person from being labeled an isolationist. But, as one author points out, "Isolationism is not like pregnancy; a little of it is quite possible..." (Tucker, 1985:17). This statement captures the notion that individuals can, at times, prescribe US international activity but still not believe in a US role. They may support a domestic, regional, or bi-lateral area of responsibility, claiming that the US does have a responsibility to order areas outside its borders for specific purposes, but this does not mean that the individual has identified with the international global community. Quite the contrary, the only responsibility the United States has is to itself.

This interpretation captures the reality of the international system today. A shrinking globe and US's international history and power renders the traditional sense of isolationism archaic. Few, if any, would argue that the US is able to worry only about what goes on inside its own borders. But, a distinction can and should be made between those individuals that are truly "globalist," meaning that their national identity is extended to the international arena, and those who have not made the same
commitment. These two different orientations will respond and behave very
differently to the litany of international events. This reinterpretation of the
internationalist/isolationist dichotomy based upon a national identity that perceives a
responsibility toward a global society as one of its components adds a different spin
on belief system construction.

National Affect

As discussed above, beliefs concerning a responsibility to a global community
do not preclude beliefs concerning one’s own national identity. Identity can be
extended to many groupings in many ways. Thus, it is important to characterize not
only if an individual identifies with a global community, but, how they identity with
their own nation state.

In a review of the literature on nationalism and group loyalty, Druckman
(1994) contends that individuals implicitly scale groups in the environment. The
perception or the judgment of distinctiveness involves some kind of comparison
between what is being perceived and a standard (Doob, 1964:93). The tendency to
identify with, favor, and promote the "ingroup" has been well-documented (Brewer,
1979; Brewer and Dramer, 1985; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Tajfel, 1982).
Individuals enhance their own sense of self-worth by promoting the group in which
they identify. "Self esteem is further increased by the belief that one’s own group is
'better' than another group. Thus, members’ self identity becomes tied to the
reference group and to ensuring its importance and worth compared to other groups" (Hermann and Kegley, 1995:10).

Through the process of comparison, people become more acceptant of the group they consider similar and distance themselves from groups they consider the most dissimilar. The continual interaction with the familiar group reinforces perceived differences with other groups. "Those in the ingroup can be trusted because they are similar; those in the outgroup are distrusted because they are different and hostile" (Hermann and Kegley, 1995:9).

Yet the tendency to favor the ingroup at the outgroups’ expense varies according to individual. For example, in one of the early and most influential works on national affect, Adorno et al. (1950) compared genuine patriotism, which simply meant "love of country," with what they labeled "pseudopatriotism," or nationalism. Nationalism was interpreted as "blind attachment to certain national cultural values, uncritical conformity with the prevailing group ways, and rejection of other nations as outgroups" (p. 107). It is the unshakable faith that one’s state surpasses all others in its excellence leading to "lofty pride in its peculiarities and its destiny’ (Hayes, 1926:26). While nationalism, like patriotism, entails love of one’s country (Doob, 1964), it is complicated by power and superiority elements rendering a relatively independent dispositional dimension (Feshbach, 1987:321; Kosterman and Feshbach, 1989). Nationalism conotates feelings of national superiority that culminate in the need for power and dominance.
An "extreme" form of group identity that rests on feelings of superiority has been labeled ethnocentrism. Ethnocentrism is a concept that identifies an attitude that "one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it (Doob, 1964:101). Each group nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders" (Sumner, 1906:12-13). An ethnocentric social identity regards those of other cultures as incorrect, inferior, or immoral. Berry (1984:365) asserts that ingroup identification or attachment predicting outgroup prejudice is a "near universality of this typically negative ethnocentric pattern."

In sum, to begin to answer the question "why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do" it is important to distinguish the base of a foreign policy belief system that, in turn, predisposes individuals to construct varying notions of the national interest and pursue policy strategies and tactics toward that end. Using national identity as the starting point answers the questions: "Is the global arena the place of US operation? and "Does the US interact with other international actors from a position of superiority or from a position of one among equals?" Crossing these two dimensions of national identity, four foreign policy dispositions are produced: 1) Imperialists (IMP) who believe in their country's superiority but also consider their state to operate in the international arena; 2) Nationalists (NAT) believe their nation is superior yet do not identify with the global domain; 3) Internationalists (INT) who perceive their state has a role in the international arena yet do not feel their nation is superior, and 4) Parochialists (PAR) who consider
domestic concerns to be the most important yet do not perceive their state as superior. Figure 1 graphically represents how the foreign policy dispositions types are constructed given the positive or negative answer to the above questions. The following two sections speculate how these foreign policy dispositions interpret international situations and actors and what foreign policy intentions they will be likely to propose.
National Identity Dispositions
State Superiority

Yes
Imperialist
Internationalist

No
Nationalist
Parochialist

Figure 1
THREATS

There are two ways to perceive threat, from either situations and/or other international actors. But individuals vary in their interpretation of both situations and actors. One would expect that a national identity would influence how an individual interprets the international environment and how they view other international actors. How one defines self leads to how other actors are perceived. As Campbell (1992:78) states, "The constant articulation of danger through foreign policy is not a threat to a state's identity, it is its condition of possibility." Campbell's basic thesis is that we know ourselves by the construction of our enemies. There is truth in this statement. However, from the review above, it is possible to theorize how a national identity predisposes foreign policy elites to view international threat.

Situations

Beliefs concerning domain of responsibility, either self or global, leads to various ways of interpreting international stimuli. If a belief system is oriented toward the international domain, then it is predisposed to regard international events as more salient. Since this identity defines the US role as one of orderer and participant, it is highly vigilant when it comes to world events. The US national interest is defined according to the health and well-being of the international community. Threats to the community become threats to US interests.
On the other hand, an identity that does not believe in responsibility in the international arena may actually perceive a threat if the US becomes internationally involved. International activity is a betrayal of the United States' role or purpose, especially if that activity can not be linked to very specifically defined US national interests--namely independence of action and securing the vital resources necessary for continued existence. Maintenance of the global community is not a priority, thus threats to other's existence are not a concern.

Actors

Threat perceptions also arise if the individual believes in their state's superiority. If identity is embedded with moralism and natural hierarchy, ie. ethnocentrism, the other is not in the same moral space as the self. Other international actors are held in contempt. However, if one has a sense of responsible in the international arena, then others are not seen as a threat as long as they do not interfere with US national interests narrowly defined. On the other hand, if one also believes in the responsibility to maintain the international arena, then the ability to internationalize domestic achievement becomes important. US national interest is defined as exportation of the US way of life. Those actors who do not wish to replicate this ideal are seen as a threat. In this scenario, national honor and reputation must be protected.

Nonsuperior types who believe in responsibility in the international domain are not as likely to view other actors as threatening. However, since the US has an
responsibility in the ordering of the international arena, states that cause "disorder" must be disciplined and controlled. This tendency can be exasperated in the Post-Cold War arena since the relatively "stable" world where each superpower took care of their own "block" is past. Those who believe in a global role now face the vast and growing threat of social and political disorder in the Third World.

FOREIGN POLICY INTENTIONS

As we have seen, national identity's dispositions lead to the interpretation of the international environment in a number of ways. It also leads to the formulation of policy options or foreign policy intentions. It suggests where policy is likely to be directed and how it will probably be carried out. Policies can be recategorized according to: 1) where they are directed (global or restrained); 2) what type they are (militaristic or non-militaristic); 3) who they propose is appropriate to work with (unilateral vs. multilateral); and 4) how they conceptualize this interaction will occur (dominant or cooperative).

Where they Act: Global or Restrained

As discussed above, concluding that one's state has a responsibility in the international arena disposes the individual to consider international events as salient to the well-being of the state. Such people are likely to believe the United States should become involved in certain global situations. Individuals' belief in their state's responsibility in the international arena will predispose them to consider global
initiatives as important to the national interest. Resolving chronic global problems and upholding global norms and values are two policy areas that are of concern. Thus, knowing a person has a belief in a responsibility in the international arena allows speculation for where the individual will focus their policy agenda.

How They Act: Militarism vs. Non-Militarism

The question concerning what type of policy instruments an individual believes will advance their country’s national interest is answered by identifying the second aspect of their national identity—their belief in their state’s superiority. Since superior national identities regard others with disdain they are more hostile and likely to see the actions of others as threatening. It can also be argued that since a superior national identity is embedded with moralism and natural hierarchy, other international actors are not in the same moral space as the self. This allows inhibitions against violence and killing to be disregarded. Since force is effective and not prohibited in this belief system, it is often the policy choice preferred.

With Whom They Act: Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism

Beside where foreign policy is directed and what type of policy is proposed, scholars (Hinkley, 1992; Chittick and Billingsley, 1993) have argued that elites have varying beliefs concerning the desirability of having the United States act independently or with other international actors. Beliefs concerning multilateralism
and unilateralism answers the question who should be involved with the implementation of US foreign policy.

A policy of independence in foreign relations would leave the United States free at all times to act according to its individually defined security interests, to have complete control over its destiny. A policy of cooperation and collaboration, on the other hand, may restrict the US in its pursuit of its defined interests, but would further the collectively defined interests of the global community. Current foreign policy belief theorizing offers no explanation of why individuals prefer independent or cooperative international interactions. Speculation about how beliefs concerning responsibility in the international arena and national superiority can provide some of the needed rational.

Persons who believe their nation is superior but do not have a corresponding belief in responsibility in the international arena, Nationalists, favor separation from the international community given beliefs of superiority and the tendency for them to regard other international actions as corrupting elements. They will not readily become involved in international issues. However, when they do respond to international issues, freedom of action to deal with the threat to the nation’s security is highly valued. Unilateral action is preferred.

Persons with non-superior beliefs yet believe in responsibility in the international arena, Internationalists, by contrast, take part in collective action, seeing their role as a cooperative partner rather than a dominating force. Because they do not believe in their state’s righteousness nor its infallibility, they prefer to uphold
group norms and decisions. They believe the pursuit of the state's right of independence of action will lead to competition, conflict, and eventually instability. Much of their identity is contingent upon their place within the group of nations.

Those that do not believe in their state's superiority and do not purport a global responsibility, Parochialists, are not likely to be involved in issues that concern the international community. However, they do not see a threat from interactions with other global actions, nor do they see the need of independence of action. When involved, they will prefer, like the Internationalists, to cooperate with other international actors.

Others that believe in their nation's superiority and believe in its responsibility to the international arena, Imperialists, will favor policies in which the US ultimately is able to secure its global vision for its self and the international community. Like the Nationalists, Imperialists also have a desire to have control over US destiny. Yet, the Imperialist believe the US should provide leadership and become the "trustee for civilization." Those with superior national identities will have the tendency to influence others to follow their desires by whatever means are necessary. Coupling this with their tendency to establish hierarchy, the outcome is policies that are exploitive, domineering, and manipulative. In this scenario, it is not always easy "to distinguish between real and apparent multilateralism" (Krauthammer, 1991:25). Like the Internationalist, the Imperialist will support "collective security," but, only if it is analogous to the perceived needs of US national security. Thus, the belief in superior national identity with a responsibility in the international arena will prefer to use
multilateral policies as long as "others" abide by their leadership. How they interact with other nations is by preferring dominant multilateral policies. If need be they will always have the ability to act alone. The Imperialist will take matters into their own hands.

Below is a summation of each national identity type including the disposition, threats and intentions.

NATIONAL IDENTITY TYPES

Imperialist

Disposition

A person who possess a belief system that regards its nation as superior and considers their domain to be global in scope can be labeled an Imperialist. The superiority element establishes a self-directed belief system. The Imperialist believes that their nation is a world power and has the capabilities and the right to structure the international arena. In this view, internationalism wishes to end complexity by reforming the world. It views its nation as a treasured universal model and the outside world should be made to conform more closely to its design. In the US case, it is the activation of the Exemplum Americanum into the Pax Americana (Bartlett, 1974:1-2). Thus, internationalism turns into interventionism. Globalism in this case is moral separateness and the belief in a special destiny projected outward into the world. These perceptions dispose the individual to a highly internationalist orientation
with the purpose of establishing its hegemony over other nations. The world should conform to the Imperialist’s image of "America for everyone." For example, Jim George (1994:209) argues that "The 'particular meaning of humanity' privileged in the United States is that centered on political pluralism, capitalist economics, and the modern sovereign individual, (obstensibly) 'free to choose'." Imperialists will want to export this conception of humanity. All should be democracies based on our image.\textsuperscript{19}

\textit{Likely Threats}

Given its belief in its global mission and its active involvement in the international arena, the Imperialist has the tendency to see as many threats as it does opportunities. This can be attributed to the Imperialist’s national identity which is extended to include the whole global community. Given an Imperialists’ beliefs in superiority, there is a tendency to view "national honor" and keeping international status as an important national goal. Since their nationality possesses the highest civilization and the greatest destiny, they are determined that their state and nationality shall be treated by other states and peoples with due deference. They are insistent that others shall regard them as they regard themselves (Hayes, 1926:134). International actors that rebel against its hegemony in any realm will be seen as a threat. Rejection of any of its cultural, political, or economic programs is viewed as

\textsuperscript{19}The Imperialist type is closest to Hosti and Rosenau’s (1984) Cold Warrior and Wittkopf’s (1990) hardliner.
a challenge. The Imperialist will adopt a paternalistic attitude toward less capable renegades and sentence punishment.

Ethnocentric orientations reduced complexity of perceptions in the international environment and portrayed other international actors in very simplistic stereotypic ways, based on the typical enemy image (Finlay et al., 1967; Shimko, 1992). Extreme threat will be perceived from a more capable challenger and more severe measures will be taken. Other international actors will be described in stereotypic ways, either as an alley, enemy, or child (Cottam, 1977; M. Cottam, 1986, 1994; Holsti, 1979).

**Intentions**

The Imperialist seeks to "impose their will on a recalcitrant world" (Tucker, 1985:17). This disposition leads to an orientation that only wants to transform the world, but recreate it in its own image. This leads to many types of messianism; economic, cultural, and political. Cultural messianism is where "an imperial power and its people seek to substitute a broad range of their own social mores for those of a people who are under their influence" (Cottam, 1977:39). In times past, cultural messianism was expressed in such terms as the "white man's burden," "modernizing," or "nation building." More recently, phrases such as "new world order" and "world policeman" convey the same intentions. It is the desire to spread one's own norms and values to other peoples of the world. Political messianism concentrates more on the spread of political values that offers programmatic directions which will define the
political terrain for other countries (Cottam, 1977:40). In the US case, this means the imposition of democratic values and ideals. Economic hegemony imposes the imperial power's economic system, in this case capitalism, to other countries.

"The world is my oyster..." aptly describes this orientation, and as Hayes (1926:182) sums,

To the ardent (imperialist) the attainment of unity and independence by his nationality appears as the culmination and acme of aeons of human history, but who is he that he should stay the onward and upward progress of the human mind and the human spirit? If his nationality has been guided by Providence through innumerable centuries and untold suffering and led one to emerge at length as the contented chosen people par excellence among all others on the Earth, may it then stop short with a glorious and powerful national state all its own? Why henceforth should it hide its light under a bushel? Is it not clearly designed to be throughout all ages a light to lighten the Gentiles? Should it not communicate some of its own inherent valor and virtue to less fortunate nationalities? Should it not extend its beneficent sway and civilizing influence over backward peoples? Obviously!

The Imperialist believes that the prosecution of national interest are not only in its interests, but the global communities' interests as well. A world that mirrors the Imperialist's image of self will bring peace and harmony to the international community.

The Imperialist will try to build coalitions around preferred policy. However, Imperialists will act alone in the international arena to fulfill defined national interests that largely promoting the Imperialist's way of life. International actions are highly militaristic, to "get the job done." Imperialists are the types that propose militaristic policies and dominant multilateral or unilateral actions, not because they inherently support militarism, but because of their highly ethnocentric orientations they want to lead, dominate, and impose their way of life onto the international community. Other
global actors are not at the US’s level, thus they do not have to be consulted or included in global actions. These orientations only trust that the US can do the appropriate job.

Nationalist

Disposition

A belief system that considers its nation to be culturally and politically superior yet does not have a global identity can be labeled a Nationalist. Similar to the Imperialist, beliefs of moral and political superiority produces feelings of specialness for the Nationalist. But where the Imperialist wants to remake the international system according to its model, the Nationalist views the nation state as a treasure that must be preserved from the world’s corruption. The Nationalist rejects the world’s complexity and is suspicious of other’s lifestyles. This belief system harbors xenophobic tendencies and forms a tight ingroup around a defined nation state or close ally system.²⁰

Examples of these tendencies can be identified in the writings of various authors during the Cold War. Some claimed that international organizations harbored communist plots to infiltrate the US. Examples would be the United Nations as being run by a "gangster regime" that seeks to spread communist collectivism (Hoar,

²⁰The Nationalist orientation is not represented in the Hosti and Rosenau framework nor is it apparent in the Wittkopf scheme. More than likely the Nationalist was confused with the Hardliner and Cold Warrior foreign policy types during the Cold War and the Isolationist orientation in the Post-Cold War world.
1980:51) and even the World Council of Churches was a hidden communist movement. Others believed that there was a conspiracy from within American society that hoped to "merge the US in a new world order with the communists" and literally end nationhood (Stang, 1980:101). The Council on Foreign Relations, the Trilateral Commission, and international finance groups were all seen as covers to involve the US in world activities and sacrifice national independence for world government run by communists (Stang, 1980). As Patrick Buchanan (1988:371-72) states,

That the United States should, in 1986, be acquiescing in the UN's having become the greatest spy nest in history, operating on American soil, is a mark of the moral confusion that afflicts much of our national leadership...As the UN daily reminds us, today's world is a different place from 1960. The United States no longer has any compelling interest in the survival of scores of the 150-plus regimes represented there.

These examples highlight the extent of the xenophobic tendencies found within the Nationalist disposition.

**Likely Threats**

Unlike the Imperialist, the Nationalist has not extended its national identity to include the global community. Thus, it is unlikely that a Nationalist will perceive as many potentially threatening elements in the international arena as the Imperialist. Given the general disposition to remain isolated from other countries, many of the world's problems will not concern the nationalist. This belief system will actually see a threat from international involvement. But there are international threats perceived. These will generally come in two forms: 1) an undeniable direct military threat, 2) threats to its ability to be self-sufficient, such as threats to vital resources, and 3)
threats that have the potential to infiltrate and undermine the moral fabric of its society (examples today would be drugs, terrorism and immigration). Extreme threat will be seen by a perceived highly capable and expansionary adversary that has a different culture or political and economic system. Concurrent with the establishment of this ingroup loyalty there is also the tendency to form outgroup hostility, namely other international actors.

**Intentions**

The Imperialist’s belief of cultural superiority coupled with an international orientation disposes the individual to have highly dominant, interventionist, international intentions. But the Nationalist’s belief system predisposes it to favor isolationism because of its tendency to recoil from alien things. Interactions with the outgroup, i.e. other international actors, may corrupt the nation state’s way of life. Thus, the ingroup must be protected. Thus, the nation must be secured and protected from outside interference, the less interaction with the outside world the better. This produces a fortress mentality where the nation is secured from the outside but self-sufficient at the same time, to keep the nation strong.

Since other countries are perceived as culturally inferior and not part of the ingroup, there is a tendency to be confrontational and militaristic. The nationalist needs to protect its nation state from the threat posed by other countries whose beliefs are antithetical to its own. It must be militarily ready to protect itself and have the resources to do so. When internationally involved, Nationalists will prefer to act
unilaterally in dealing with other international actors. This disposition is marked by a unilateralist orientation that prefers to disengage selectively from international commitments to ensure freedom of future action.

**Internationalist**

**Disposition**

The Internationalist's national identity considers its state to have a global domain, but unlike the Imperialist, it does not perceive its culture to be superior to other global actors. This national identity sees its nation as part of a truly global community. It is a wish for the unity of mankind, a common affirmation of certain universal principles and purposes. In the words of E. H. Carr (1945:45), it is the belief that

The driving force behind any future international order must be a belief, however expressed, in the value of individual human beings irrespective of national affinities or allegiance and in a common and mutual obligation to promote their well-being.

This belief system is "other" oriented and places a value on interdependence. Individuals with this value system have as their primary reference group mankind, they have positive affect for other countries and see their nation state as a vital member of the international community. Withdrawal from the international arena is not a morally acceptable option for the Internationalist. The US has the obligation to create conditions or/and institutions that could deal effectively with the world's problems. They must form a cooperative global community where stability, order,
economic growth, and prosperity can flourish. Internationalists believe there are too
many concerns that can not be addressed within the confines of traditional state
security concerns. Current global issues affect all international actors. Thus, issues
such as poverty, inequitable distribution of resources, self-determination, and regional
antagonisms are major concerns for the entire global community and the
Internationalists.\textsuperscript{21}

\textit{Likely Threats}

Barring an undeniable direct military threat, the internationalist is not
predisposed to be easily threatened itself, yet sees many threats to the global
community at large. The internationalists believes in national self-determination and
its nation’s responsibility to promote order, stability, and prosperity in the
international arena. This belief system disposes the Internationalist to intervene in
other countries to impose solutions yet it also does not want to dominate.

The Internationalist believes that the international system is intricately
connected, like a web. Thus, disturbances in one area will affect the whole global
community. Since the Internationalist has extended the identification of self to a
collective self, American welfare and security is then tied to the global community.
This orientation predisposes the Internationalist to become actively involved with the
problems facing the global community.

\textsuperscript{21}The Internationalist type fits the Holsti and Rosenau Post-Cold War
Internationalist and the Wittkopf Accomodationist.
Intentions

Unlike the Imperialist who also perceived an international domain, the Internationalist does not consider its nation to be superior and does not want to impose its own political, cultural, or economic design to solving global problems. The Internationalist will prefer its interactions with other nations to be cooperative. Thus, there is a feeling of responsibility to be internationally involved, but not dominate. National self-determination is an important concept that must not be violated. The likely orientation to world affairs is to partake in multilateral solutions to international problems. This resolves the conflict because it is trying to solve the problem but is not only imposing its own will, it has the backing of others. Thus, internationalists are predisposed to be highly active in international arena but usually with the help of multinational institutions. This does not mean that military action will not be called upon. These tactics, if supported by a broad consensus, will be utilized. These are the "conscientious warriors." Seeing the collective good as being furthered by collective action leads the Internationalist to believe that a policy is "good" as long as it is done collectively.

Parochialist

Disposition

The descriptor parochialism has commonly been associated with a less than positive connotation. Webster's New International Dictionary defines it as "the quality or state of being parochial; esp: selfish pettiness or narrowness (as of
interests, opinions, or views)." The use of parochial in this study focuses upon the "narrow" part of its definition. The Parochialist has a confined area of interest and opinion because, like the Nationalist, national identity has not been extended to the international community. But, unlike the Nationalist, the Parochialist does not consider its nation state to be superior to other global actors. Parochialists may not have extended self-identity to national identity. Thus, the issues and problems of the global community are sufficiently removed from their lives and concerns that their salience is very limited.\(^\text{22}\)

While Internationalists and Imperialists argue that the US has a responsibility to shape world events, Parochialists contend it should disengage. No nation can control international events. The Parochialists see no compelling reason for the US to rid the world of its ills. The US should be selective in its engagements, and define its national interest very narrowly, few international issues need concern it. "Every international problem cannot claim American paternity, so it does not necessarily have a unique or effective American solution" (Rosenau and Holsti, 1984:126-7).

*Likely Threats*

International threats are few, only direct military confrontation is truly a threat to the Parochialist. The Parochialist does not tend to view other international actors in stereotypic terms, but this orientation is not likely to care about them either.

\(^{22}\)This orientation toward world affairs captures the Isolationist orientation proposed by Holsti and Rosenau (1986) and Wittkopf (1990).
Parochialists may become interested in global issues that have a direct impact upon their local communities, such as loss of jobs or environmental degradation. However, the larger link from the local to the global will not be made.

**Intentions**

Parochialists will purport a very constrained role for their nation in the international arena and define its national interests very narrowly. Few international issues need to concern the it. It does not have the answers to the world’s problems. Its concern is within its own borders. Preferred state is to take care of own problems and not be involved internationally. This belief system it a truly isolationist one.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The following table (Table 1) summarizes the dispositions, likely threats, and intentions associated with the four foreign policy belief systems.
### TABLE 1
FOREIGN POLICY BELIEF SYSTEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dispositions</th>
<th>Likely Threats</th>
<th>Intentions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Imperialist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior/Global Domain</td>
<td>•Sees equal threat and opportunities</td>
<td>•World Policeman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•World Power</td>
<td>•Instability</td>
<td>•Globalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Reform World</td>
<td>•Rebels</td>
<td>•Interventionism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Establish Hegemony</td>
<td>•Those who reject ideals</td>
<td>•Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>•Capable challenger</td>
<td>•Dominant/Multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•Militaryism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nationalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Superior/Domestic Domain</td>
<td>•International involvement</td>
<td>•Fortress mentality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•State Preservation</td>
<td>•Meddlesomeness</td>
<td>•Militarism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Xenophobia</td>
<td>•Things that Undermine social fabric (drugs</td>
<td>•Unilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Tight ingroup around nation</td>
<td>terrorism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>state</td>
<td>immigration)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Internationalist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Superior/Global Domain</td>
<td>•Threats to global community at large (poverty,</td>
<td>•Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>self-determination</td>
<td>•Promote order stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Worldminded</td>
<td></td>
<td>•Humanitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Interdependence</td>
<td></td>
<td>•Multilateralism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>•Inclusive ingroup</td>
<td></td>
<td>•Problem solving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Parochialist</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not Superior/Domestic Domain</td>
<td>•Only direct military threat</td>
<td>•&quot;true&quot; isolationist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>•constrained and limited role</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The remainder of the dissertation investigates the assertions in Table 1. Chapter III discusses the methodology employed to construct and measure the variables designed to capture foreign dispositions, threats, and intentions. Chapter IV begins the empirical analysis of whether the national identity construct is a dispositional foreign policy belief. Chapter V continues the empirical analysis by investigating the link between foreign policy dispositions and perceptions of other international actors and the threats they may pose. Chapter VI concludes the empirical analysis by linking dispositions to foreign policy intentions, or policy prescriptio
CHAPTER III

METHODOLOGY

Introduction

Chapter II argued that to understand why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do one must examine their conception of the national interest produced by the content of their foreign policy beliefs. The core element of this belief system was labeled a national identity. It was hypothesized that this identity predisposes individuals toward specified interpretations of international situations and actors and foreign policy intentions. The current chapter provides detailed information concerning the methodology employed, categories constructed, and measures taken to identify and explore the relationship between foreign policy dispositions and their perceptions and intentions.

It begins with a discussion of the drawbacks to survey research. It proposes instead to analyze belief systems as they are manifested in exchanges between opinion elites actively involved in the foreign policy debate. This inevitably requires a form of content analysis. The remainder of the chapter enumerates how the content categories—dispositions, threats, and intentions—were operationalized and measured.
The Poverty of Survey Research

The most commonly used procedure for identifying foreign policy belief systems is to construct typologies from public opinion survey responses and monitor these over time (Converse 1964; Holsti, 1979; Holsti and Rosenau, 1979, 1984, 1986; Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Chittick and Billingsley, 1986, 1993). This approach can be criticized for a number of reasons. Namely, surveys prime respondents’ answers to questions, they do not tap a belief system’s range, and they cannot distinguish change in individual belief systems.

Questionnaires shape an individual’s responses implicitly given how the questions are formulated and stated (Mueller, 1969; Kegley, 1986). More to the point, the process of asking questions may "prime" respondents and frame their responses. We are all familiar with the famous saying "Now that you mention it..." This common adage reflects what one author warns, "Questionnaires shape what people think about, which, in turn, shapes what people think: what is placed on someone’s mind influences others’ impressions of what is in his mind" (Kegley, 1986:450) (emphasis original). Therefore, public opinion surveys artificially construct or give the illusion of well-formulated foreign policy belief systems that are not really there (Converse, 1964, 1970).

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1One notable exception to this is Rosati’s (1987) assessment of change in the belief systems of central foreign policy decision-makers in the Carter Administration. Content analysis was employed to establish and evaluate the changing nature of their beliefs.
Using survey data also limits the ability to determine different types of belief systems. Surveys can not possibly be designed to determine the range of beliefs that are found among a group of respondents. This is illuminated by examining one of the most prominent and ongoing survey’s of foreign policy public opinion—the Holsti and Rosenau Foreign Policy Leadership Project. Ferguson (1986) notes that this survey continually omitted questions designed to capture beliefs about the international economic system, most notably trading issue preferences. During the Cold War, this exclusion may be understandable given the superpower confrontation in the bipolar international system. Most leaders (and scholars) devoted their attention and discussion to "high politics" that focused upon security concerns. "Low politics," namely economic and diplomatic initiatives, were seen as relatively unimportant. This focus led the Holsti and Rosenau study to miss identifying an important belief group that Ferguson distinguishes as the "Economic Nationalists," those who are "staunchly nationalist and outspokenly protectionist opponents of the New Deal" (Ferguson, 1986:414). Ferguson regards these elites as highly internationalist during the Cold War on security issues yet very isolationist/protectionist on economic ones.

In a similar vein, Rosati and Creed (1991) note that although Holsti and Rosenau classified three notable belief systems--Cold War Internationalism, Post-Cold War Internationalism and Semi-Isolationism--from their survey data, they failed to define three others that Rosati and Creed uncovered through an extensive content
analysis of the Cold War foreign policy debate.\textsuperscript{2} These additional belief systems were
categorized according to responses to five broad questions.\textsuperscript{3} The conclusion drawn
from these examples is that researchers using survey data must ask the right questions
to tap the diversity of beliefs. A failure to anticipate all possible options or beliefs
limits what the researcher can conclude and may skew the results.

In recently proposed and ongoing surveys (Wittkopf, 1994; Holsti and
Rosenau, 1993) there has been an attempt to add "low politics" questions concerning
trade policy, immigration and the global environment. This is a move in the right
direction given the current state of the international system. Yet, one wonders
whether these additions reflect a trend in the field of international relations
scholarship or an important element in peoples’ foreign policy belief systems. To
complicate matters further, the addition and subtraction of questions in an ongoing
survey may capture a continually shifting foreign policy agenda but limits the ability
to make longitudinal comparisons. It seems researchers that utilize surveys are
"damned if they do, damned if they don’t."

The last criticism of survey research rests on the ability of surveys to capture
change in belief systems. Survey research relies upon the belief that "attitudes

\textsuperscript{2}These are; Global Crusaders, Global containers, Selective containers, Global
reformers, Global transformers, and Selective engagers.

\textsuperscript{3}The questions were: 1) How do the authors depict the international system? 2)
Who are the major international actors? 3) What are the major contemporary foreign
policy issues facing America? 4) What lessons are derived from history? 5) What are
the author’s recommendations for future American foreign policy? (Rosati and Creed,
19??:14).
evoked by a set of survey questions when aggregated can capture the affective, cognitive, and connotative components underlying a coherent belief system" (Kegley, 1986:452). Monitoring these attitudes overtime will demonstrate stability or change. Yet, since surveys deal with large aggregates, they cannot possibly distinguish between individual belief systems (Rosati and Creed, 1991). Thus, it becomes impossible to understand how specific belief systems may respond to dramatic international events, such as the end of the Cold War. Kegley (1986:454) sums it best by stating;

"Grouping precludes testing for the determinants of individual's belief changes or for the sources motivating individual leaders to jettison one belief category and embrace another. Instead, this design only allows us to make inferences about stability in the overall structure of leaders' beliefs, in the number and types of attitude clusters that define the distributions in the combined data.

The fact that surveys prime respondents' answers to questions, are unable to reflect a belief system's range, and can not distinguish change in individual belief systems led Kegley (1986:467) and others (Rosati and Creed, 1991; Chittick and Billingsley, 1993) to suggest that a more appropriate way to study foreign policy belief systems was to use content analysis of the foreign policy debates of policy makers and intellectuals, as carried out in the leading policy journals. This type of analysis makes it possible to tap a realistic belief system's range and variety and follow its evolution. But, more importantly, it allows a more theoretically relevant and realistic study of how individuals think and act within a social and political context.
Public opinion surveys treat individuals as a register of opinion and sovereign source of public will; they are seen as private holders of beliefs (Kegley, 1986:450). In opposition to this, research on individuals actively engaged in the foreign policy debate views cognition as a social act where human understanding is constituted through ceaseless dialogue within a community. In this sense, expressions of 'opinion' are not taken to be registers of some set of psychological dispositions fixed within the individual mind. They are instead understood as passing contributions to an open-ended dialogue in which people within a political culture simultaneously appeal to socially recognized interpretive themes and contribute to the dialogue by which these themes and understandings are affirmed or transformed (Kegley, 1986:451).

This epistemological base comes closer to capturing how belief-collectivities are integrated and serve as social levers to mobilize mass support or persuade others of their legitimacy thus influencing thought and behavior. The construction of foreign policy beliefs, an assessment of their changing nature, and their impact upon policy making must be based upon the dialogue between the elites actively involved in the foreign policy debate.

Research Population

Haas (1992:3) has identified what he has called "a knowing elite" that are a newly emerging group of "professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within
that domain or issue-area." These groups convey to policy makers new patterns of reasoning which could, in turn, encourage the pursuit of new avenues of policy making.⁴ He documents the infiltration of these experts' advice into the policy planning activities of the government in domains such as the environment, technology, health, population, nuclear, and macro economic and fiscal policy.

The penetration of experts into the foreign policy-making process has also been documented. Destler, Gelb and Lake (1985) label these individuals the "Professional Elite". They contend that since the 1970's

Power was passing almost imperceptibly from the old Eastern Establishment to a new Professional Elite, from bankers and lawyers who would take time off to help manage the affairs of government to full-time foreign policy experts, from an essentially homogeneous group of centrist and pragmatists to those with views that tended toward (and sometimes were at) the ideological extremes of American political thought, and from an essentially bipartisan or nonpartisan approach to a highly political one (Destler, et al, 1985:91).

Since modern foreign policy is both complex and technical, policy makers need a continuous flow of material to deliver on complex international issues. Politicians rely upon experts for advice and justifications for their chosen policy. The Elite are courted equally by the media and legislators for their ideas which could as easily challenge as legitimate administration foreign policy. (Many of their rank, most notable being Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew Brzezinski⁵, and Jeanne Kirkpatrick, have

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⁴Academics have recognized the impact their work has on the policy making process. Keohane (1986:3-4) quotes Keynes saying "practitioners are prisoners of 'academic scribblers,' whose views of reality profoundly affect the contemporary actions of practical people."

⁵In fact, Brzezinski first came to Jimmy Carter's attention while he was governor and part of a group known as the Trilateral Commission. The Carter's initial
competed for and held important foreign policy making positions within the government.) Subsequently, the new Elites seek influence openly in the public domain and are masters at using words and symbols. The writing game has quickly revolutionized policy debates. Books and journal articles are the lifeline of foreign policy debates.

Varying groups of foreign policy "elites" may not share specific beliefs on policy issues, but they do share the characteristics that Haas (1992:3) regards as important indicators of what have become known as "epistemic communities": 1) normative and principled beliefs about the social actions of the US government in foreign relations; 2) causal beliefs about the nature of international relations and the underlying reasons for the actions of international actors; 3) criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in foreign relations; and 4) a common policy enterprise, foreign affairs, where their professional competence is directed to enhance human welfare.

These collective attributes make foreign policy opinion elites ideal candidates to analyze the structure of foreign policy beliefs for two reasons: they have highly organized and well-developed belief systems (given the large amounts of time they spend interpreting the workings of the international arena to establish, argue, and debate policy positions) and their beliefs have a degree of influence on US foreign policy decision-makers.

**Research Method:** Content Analysis

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inexperienced in foreign affairs led him to rely heavily upon other's views.
Individual's belief systems cannot be directly measured, they must be inferred either from direct behavior or through communication. Since the elites that are of most interest to this study are not available for examination given their geographic distance, an analysis of their written or spoken words will be undertaken.

Content analysis is the investigation of communication and is a procedure for making inferences by objectively⁶ and systematically⁷ identifying the specified characteristics of messages (Mueller, 1963:217; Holsti, 1969:14; Johnson and Joslyn, 1995). As a research technique, it has been widely used by scholars who study cognitive variables in foreign policy decision-making (Holsti, 1969; Holsti, 1970; George, 1979; Walker, 1977; Rosati, 1987, 1990; Rosati and Creed, 1991; Chittick and Billingsley, 1993).

Content analysis is an advantageous research methodology for a number of reasons. First, it is nonreactive, those analyzed are unaware of the study or even the fact that their writings are being scrutinized. Thus, contamination of individuals' beliefs or responses from the study is not a consideration. Second, content analysis allows the investigation of political phenomena over time without having to rely upon memory reconstruction of events or recollection of beliefs participants may, or may not, have had. Content analysis lends itself to longitudinal analysis better than interviews or direct observation (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:253). Third, and most

⁶Each step must be carried out on the basis of explicitly formulated rules and procedures.

⁷Exclusion or inclusion is done according to consistently applied rules.
important, content analysis will capture the beliefs inherent within the public record. As mentioned above, this is the arena where the foreign policy elite focus their attention and try to influence both policy makers and the public.

**Research Data Source and Sample**

The US foreign policy debate is well-represented in the content of leading opinion journals. American opinion leaders, the foreign policy elite, rely upon these outlets to express their points of view. Opinion journals provide the researcher with a "running record" of the foreign policy debate which is accessible, inexpensive, and covers an extensive period of time (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:240).

A survey of opinion journals dealing with foreign affairs produced the following sixteen journals for the sampling frame: *American Opinion, American Spectator, Commentary, The Nation, The New Republic, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs, Dissent, The Monthly Review, The National Interest, The National Review, Political Affairs, The Progressive, Public Interest, Washington Quarterly, and World Policy Journal*. These sources can be categorized as ranging the spectrum from the far left to the far right. This allows inclusion of various foreign policy belief systems.\(^8\)

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\(^8\)The journal sample is inclusive of the journals most commonly analyzed by scholars examining foreign policy beliefs (Rosati and Creed, 1991; Chittick, Billingsley, and Travis, 1993). The list was supplemented after consultation with two leading scholars of foreign policy belief systems, Ole Holsti and Eugene Wittkopf. Expert opinion concluded that this sample represents an exhaustive list of opinion journals that focus upon foreign policy.
The totality of articles written with a foreign policy issue area was compiled from all journals for the years spanning 1985-1994. These years were carefully chosen to reflect upon the main question of the dissertation, "why do foreign policy elites support the policies that they do?" As you will recall, the dissertation began by relating the apparent flips and flops of elites' foreign policy preferences after the end of the Cold War. To analyze elites' dispositions, perceived threats, and intentions and assess which are stable it is important to chose articles during and after the Cold War. Thus, the last years of the Reagan Administration, characterized by renewed hostilities toward the Soviet Union (1985-88), and the years directly after the end of the Cold War (1989-94) were chosen as an appropriate timeframe.

Two methods were employed to amass the articles. The first was a topic search, foreign affairs or foreign policy, for each journal indexed either on Lexus-Nexus or CD-ROM for the ten year span. These were then down-loaded to computer disc. Not wishing to rely solely on the computer indexing of the journals, the article list was then cross-referenced with a manual search of the indexes for each journal. (The manual search was the primary technique used for the journals not indexed on the computer.) This was to ensure that the computer search was inclusive of all articles with a foreign policy slant. All articles that did not specify one author were then discarded (examples include journal editorials or articles with dual-authorship). Table 2 lists the numbers of articles surveyed from each journal.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journal</th>
<th># of Articles with Foreign Policy Subject Matter 1985-94</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Washington Quarterly</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td>183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Review</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Policy Journal</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Interest</td>
<td>118</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Spectator</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Progressive</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Monthly Review</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Interest</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commentary</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Opinion</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissent</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The New Republic</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Affairs</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2731</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The above table represents the population of articles written in a ten-year span that deal with foreign policy issues. Of course it would be better to collect data from the whole foreign policy article population. Thus we could be sure that the cases observed reflected accurately the population under study. However, the sheer volume of articles generated makes analyzing the population in its entirety is a daunting task. Instead, a sample of the population was analyzed.

The sample population was produced by adopting a decision rule: Any author who wrote a minimum of four articles during the Cold War (1985-89) and four articles after its end (1990-1994) from the article population would have their articles included in the sample. This decision rule made logical sense for three reasons. First, to assess the nature of change in belief systems, a sufficient number of documents were needed for each author in each time period. Second, a suitable amount of written pages for each author needed to be generated so that conclusions concerning belief systems were based upon a variety of sources and a sufficient number of pages. Third, no criterion other than the author's prolificness was the determining factor for inclusion in the sample. This criterion supports the earlier contention that the construction of foreign policy beliefs and an assessment of their changing nature must be based upon the dialogue between the elites actively involved

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9All article entries were entered into the computer. A search was then conducted by author to produced the sample following this decision rule.
in the foreign policy debate. Those that contribute the most to this exchange have a better chance of influencing the debate.\textsuperscript{10}

Those individuals actively involved in governmental policy making, or who are spokesperson for varying governmental agencies, were discarded, as were non-US citizens. The reason for these dismissals is threefold. Policy spokespersons' articulations and policy positions may not accurately reflect their own thinking about foreign affairs, but their department's stance. Also, one can not be sure of the authorship of works that are assigned spokespersons' names. Government documents are often prepared by unidentified bureaucrats or are the product of committees.\textsuperscript{11} In either case, one would be hard pressed to link with confidence the beliefs found within the the written document assigned to these elites. Finally, the complications of linking a US national identity to non-US citizens is avoided.

The above decision rule produced an article sample written by the following seven foreign policy elites:

\textbf{Zbigniew Brzezinski} - Senior Advisor at the Center of Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University.

\textbf{Charles William Maynes} - Editor of \textit{Foreign Policy} and \textit{New York Times} guest editorialist

\textbf{Morton Kondracke} - Contributor and senior editor to the \textit{New Republic}.

\textsuperscript{10}Eugene Wittkopf's vital input concerning journal sources and this decision rule is readily acknowledged.

\textsuperscript{11}See Holsti (1976:45) and M. Hermann (1972) for elaboration of this point.
Michael Klare - Five College Professor of Peace and World Security Studies and director of the Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies.

Robert Tucker - Professor of American Diplomacy at Johns Hopkins University's School for Advanced International Studies.

Charles Krauthammer - Syndicated columnist.

Joseph Nye - Ford Foundation Professor of International Security at Harvard University.\(^\text{12}\)

The total number of articles for each author and time period is listed in Table 3 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 indicates a discrepancy between number of articles for each policy elite included in the sample. This could potentially cause concern. Content analysis

\(^{12}\) In 1993, Joseph Nye entered service in the Clinton Administration as Director of the National Intelligence Council. Although he became part of an administration, none of his articles was written while he was in office.
is only beneficial if the documents being coded accurately reflect the writings of the population under study. A discrepancy in amount of written work among the authors may make comparisons difficult. However, a closer examination of actual page numbers to be coded for each author in Table 4 exhibits more congruency between the authors' written word.
TABLE 4
NUMBER OF JOURNAL PAGES ANALYZED FOR EACH AUTHOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Pages</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>155 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>166 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>134 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>100 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>132 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>109 pgs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>172 pgs.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The average number for each author was 125 pages. Klare (100 pages) and Krauthammer (109 pages) were at the low end of the spectrum whereas Nye (172 pages) and Maynes (166 pages) topped the group. Looking at the number of articles, verses the number of pages, an interesting relationship occurs. Krauthammer was by far one of the leaders in the number of articles written (37) yet produced the least amount of pages.\textsuperscript{13} As indicated in Table 5 below, his discourse was such that he often wrote in sources more focused on relating "opinions" rather than scholarly commentary. Nye, on the other hand, was the least prolific in the number of articles produced, yet generated the most pages. His analyses were found in journals that are geared toward more theoretical and scholarly accounts of foreign policy events, such

\textsuperscript{13}In fact, although Charles Krauthammer became part of the sample given the decision rule, the actual articles collected for the sample was increased by adding \textit{Time}. The reason for this was that although he wrote the appropriate amount of articles they were sufficiently shorter than other authors producing a minimum number of pages. The addition of \textit{Time} to the sample lead to an increased number of articles but a more appropriate number of pages to content analyze, although still lower than the overall sample.
as *Foreign Affairs* and *Foreign Policy*. Thus, more elaboration, argumentation, and at times historical accounts, are required (not to mention the obligatory literature review) to support an argument.

One way to produce congruency was to eliminate articles from the sample for authors who had higher page counts. Yet, because each author’s written work portrayed some aspects of the foreign policy debate in different years, the decision to purge certain articles seemed arbitrary. Also, the sample size was not extensive in the first place, reduction would be merciless.

Instead, a decision was made not to content analyze history or literature reviews as part of the author’s disposition, perceived threats, or intention. This was reasonable because: 1) those who used this device were the ones with higher page numbers; and 2) it would be difficult to attribute an analysis of history or other’s written works as indicative of the current author’s foreign policy beliefs. When the author did use history and literature reviews to argue for their own positions they did so in "current time" and this was appropriate for coding. What is meant by "current time" is that the history was used to interpret a specific situation at hand. As will be discussed below, the dissertation employs both quantitative as well as qualitative content analysis. During qualitative content analysis, the coder was able to interpret history’s use in the current discourse as indicative of beliefs concerning policy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Journals Authors Wrote In</th>
<th>Brzezinski</th>
<th>Maynes</th>
<th>Kondracke</th>
<th>Klare</th>
<th>Tucker</th>
<th>Krauthammer</th>
<th>Nye</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Washington Quarterly</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Policy Journal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Interest</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Republic</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Nation</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Progressive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As Table 5 indicates, all authors, except Kondracke, have one common journal outlet, *Foreign Affairs*. Many share others, more consistent with political views and policy proposals compatible with the editorial slant of the journal. For instance, Klare, a prominent liberal, prefers *The Nation*, a noted progressive journal. Whereas Krauthammer express himself in the *New Republic*, a conservative journal. As one would expect, the two editors, Kondracke and Maynes, wrote most often in their own journals. On the whole, the overlap of journal sources is more than welcome. It is evidence that all views will be well-represented in the analysis of the public opinion debate, they are also speaking to a variety of audiences.

**Research Design**

The research design utilized is a panel study.\(^{14}\) Measurements of dispositions, threats, and intentions were taken from the documents written by the seven foreign policy elites for two distinct time periods\(^{15}\), the Cold War (1985-89) and Post-Cold War (1990-94). This design allows observation of change over time (Elifson et.al, 1982) and provides a pre-test of foreign policy beliefs prior to the end of the Cold War (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:137).

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\(^{14}\)A panel study is "a cross-sectional design that introduces a time element" (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:136). In a panel study the researcher takes measurements of the variables of interest within a sample population on the same units of analysis at points in time.

\(^{15}\)Holsti (1969) acknowledges that this is the single most frequently used design in content analysis research.
Document Coding

There are two ways to code documents, either classifying their "manifest content" or "latent content." The manifest content is the visible occurrence of an indicator, in this case the appearance of a certain word, which is then counted. The number of times a word is counted is then indicative of some prespecified concept. This is known as quantitative content analysis. Conversely, specifying the latent content of a document captures its underlying meaning. The scholar makes a qualitative assessment of how the concepts are depicted in the text. This requires an interpretation from the analyst regarding the unit of analysis (Babbie, 1986:272).

Quantitative content analysis has the advantage of ease and reliability because it gives specifics of how documents are measured. The presence or absence of a word does not require interpretation other than noticing its existence. In fact, the introduction of computer programs has eliminated the propensity for human error in counting words. Qualitative analysis may not be as reliable due to subjective interpretation of passages, but has the benefit of assessing the true meanings behind a document, thus, lending greater validity. Obviously there is a trade-off inherent within each method.

In this study, both qualitative and quantitative content analysis were employed given the specifics of the task at hand. In both cases, coding categories were constructed to be as explicit as possible regarding the type of meaning to look for in the written document given the variables that were measured. This reduces the amount
of interpretation needed in the coding process yet recognizes that meaning is not restricted to the presence or absence of a certain word.

**Recording Unit**

There are five ways to delineate units to be analyzed by content analysis: 1) syntactical units, 2) referential units, 3) physical units, 4) propositional units, and 5) thematic units (Krippendorff, 1969:60-61; Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:245). Once again, two recording units were employed given the measurement task at hand. When constructing images or belief systems from textual analysis, thematic analysis was used (Holsti, 1969:116). Themes are conceptual rather than grammatical and are better suited to analyze works whose main purposes are to convey thought processes or persuasive argumentation. When referring to specific modifiers of actors then the actual referential unit was the recording unit.

**Reliability**

The best way to demonstrate the reliability of content analysis is to show intercoder reliability. Reliability is "a matter of whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to the same object, would yield the same result each time" (Babbie, 1986:109). The more consistent the results given by repeated measurements, the higher the measuring procedure.

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16Holsti (1969:116-117) also proposes five units: single world or symbols, themes, characters, grammatical units, or items.
In this study, reliability was demonstrated by having two individuals examine the same documents and follow the same coding rules. One individual was blind to the hypothesis of the study. Both did not know the author of the article, the year the article was written, or the journal in which it appeared.

After three hours of training, an initial intercoder reliability test was performed. Four documents were chosen that were not part of the sample. An intercoder reliability score of .64 was produced. Inconsistencies were discussed to mutual agreement. After two more hours of training, a second test was performed on four more documents yielding an intercoder reliability of .85. Satisfied with this score, both coders proceeded with coding the documents. Periodic meetings were arranged to discuss problems or questions. After one month of coding one document was coded by each coder producing an intercoder reliability score of .88.

The rest of the chapter elaborates upon the content categories and coding procedures used to specify foreign policy dispositions, threats, and intentions.

**DISPOSITIONS**

To assess the author's national identity or foreign policy disposition, two questions or themes were asked of each document: "Does the author indicate that the US has responsibility in the international arena?" and "Does the author's written work convey superiority?" Coding categories were constructed to capture these theoretically informed variables. Specific reference to empirical indicators of the
concepts superiority and international domain were based on attributes that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive according to a nominal coding scheme.

Content Categories

*International Domain*

In Chapter II it was argued that the traditional conception of national and international being on a continuum was misdirected, they measured two quite different dimensions. Nationalism referred to feeling toward the nation state whereas internationalism focused upon how a national identity viewed their state’s responsibility in the international arena.

In identifying the author’s disposition for responsibility for a international arena, each document was coded according to the domain that the authors argued the US should exert its influence. In international relations, this is translated into a size or area of influence the state has in the international arena.

Following Wish’s (1980:536-37) categorization, an individual can perceive that the US has influence or should have influence in the following domains: 1) domestic, being limited only to its own internal affairs; 2) regional, controlling only a specifically defined region; 3) dominant bilateral, ordering a large sphere of influence; or 4) global, having a responsibility for the entire international system. Each of these categories were considered mutually exclusive.

A document was coded domestic if the author argued that the US should only concern itself with its own domestic affairs. The author could argue that the US is
already over-committed and should scale back, or that now that the job is done the
US should concentrate upon its own internal affairs. A document was coded regional
if the author expressed concern that the US has a responsibility to maintain political
or economic stability in certain limited areas surrounding its boarders or in a
specifically contained area having strategic importance such as the oil reserves of the
Middle East. A document was coded dominant bilateral if the author described the
US as having a "sphere of influence" that it must preserve outside the immediate area
surrounding it. Finally, a document was coded global if the US was depicted as
having a global mission that required the maintenance of the world order or specific
responsibilities to a global community.

If an article was coded domestic, regional, or bilateral than the author’s
orientation was considered to not believe that the United States has a responsibility to
a global community. On the other hand, if the article was coded global, then it was
considered to be arguing for a responsibility to the international domain.17

Superiority

The categorization of a national identity according to its responsibility in the
international arena is relatively straight forward. Notions of domain are usually tied
to an abstract geographic continuum ranging from domestic to global. Categorizing

17See Appendix A for a specification of the system of enumeration for the
category referring to a responsibility in the international arena.
articles as possessing a superior national identity, on the other hand, is not as easily
done for two reasons. Superiority is both a relative and multi-dimensional concept.

The definition of superior entails beliefs that an object is, "Of a higher nature
or kind" affecting an attitude from the perceiver of "disdain or conceit" leading to a
superior evaluates something as a "higher kind" it is relative because it is based on
the rank-ordering between two things. In international relations, actors in a social
strata, ie. the international arena, are compared to one's own nation. Thus, an
individual's conception of his or her state's superiority resides largely in the
perception of other national actors in the system.

When making the judgement of superiority, one must identify which "kind" or
aspects they are basing their superior judgement upon. A superior national identity
could be based upon an opinion leaders' conception of their state's military
capabilities, econo-technological levels, political system, and cultural characteristics.
Judgements concerning superiority in all these "kinds" or aspects of the state build
upon a person's over-arching notion of national superiority (K.J. Holsti, 1970:242).
To capture the totality of the superior concept, all aspects of state superiority were
coded. These include military, economic, political, and cultural.

Military superiority relates to an individual's overall assessment of their state's
military might. It can be based upon US advancement in military technology,
possession of certain hardware (quality or quantity) and the nature of its fighting units
(e.g. "American has the best fighter pilots in the word," "Our men and women have
superior fighting abilities....," "we have the capabilities to.......". The author may indicate that the US is weak in some areas, but, the overall impression is that the US is superior to most, international actors.

Economic superiority is linked to how the United States' economic system functions. If the author refers only to capitalism being a superior system this does not necessarily apply to the United States. If, on the other hand, an elite argues that capitalism is the only acceptable economic system, and the US is superior because it follows this economic design, then this is an indication of economic superiority. If specific aspects of the US economic system are specifically mentioned as superior to other countries and is a model that should be followed then it was coded as a manifestation of superiority (e.g. "American work ethic," "our material comforts or well-being," "consumerism," "American know-how," "American inventiveness," "abundance").

Political superiority is when an author refers to aspects of the US political system that make it superior when compared to other countries (e.g. "US's interpretation of democracy," "tolerance," "our historical heritage," "our judicial system," "fairness"). Also, mentions of the "US model" that other countries should follow is another indication of superiority. Although less tangible than the other two indicators of superiority, this aspect of superiority is readily available in author's work.

Cultural superiority is when the author refers to general cultural characteristics, beside political and economic, that make the US a superior country.
Examples include: "the American way of life," "our history as a great nation," "our people's character," "the moral fabric of our society," "our respect for human life," "our respect for human rights," "our never say die attitude". As Morton Kondracke (1988:14), arguing against Jesse Jackson’s foreign policy stance advises,

Face it, America's interests would not be safe with this man in power, Fundamentally, he does not believe in the moral superiority of Western values...Clearly some tasks are impossible, but Jackson and his friends seem to counsel the abandonment of democracy worldwide, leaving the field to scoundrels.

The above indicators of superiority--military, economic, political, and cultural--capture the full domain of the concept, so that the meaning of the concept superiority has face validity\textsuperscript{18} and content validity\textsuperscript{19}.

An additional measure was employed to tap the level of author identification with the nation state. Modifiers referring to the United States were analyzed to ascertain their favorability. The higher the proportion of favorable US mentions compared to overall mentions the more indicative of a belief system with strong affect toward the nation state. To measure ingroup favorability, an assessment of the word or phrase referring to the United States was made to determine level of author favorability. Overall, if the referential unit indicated favorability (e.g., "great," "peace-loving," "progressive," "successful," "prosperous"), or strength (e.g.,

\textsuperscript{18}Face validity is "when the measurement instrument appears to measure the concept it is supposed to measure" (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:83).

\textsuperscript{19}Content validity determines the full domain or meaning of a particular concept and then makes sure each is represented in the measurement technique (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:85).
powerful, capable, prepared, made great advances, has boundless resources), it was
coded as favorable. If the modifier did not meet these criteria, it was coded neutral.

THREATS

Three indicators were used to enumerate whether and what kind of threat was
present within the elites' documents. The first analyzed modifiers of the USSR
(Russia) and other international actors. The second examined the content of the
authors' images of the Soviet Union (Russia), and the last employed a thematic
analysis of whether the author expressed threat in the article.

Unfavorable Modifiers

Referential units (Krippendorff, 1980) linked to an express object--in this case
the Soviet Union (Russia), or other international actors--were analyzed to discern
level of unfavorability.20 All references in the sample articles to the Soviet Union
(Russia), or other international actors (countries or international organizations) were
underlined. If the unit was unfavorable (e.g., "weak," "imperialist," "colonialist,"
"unfriendly," "hostile") or suggested meddlesomeness in the affairs of others
(e.g.,"China is aggressive," "the UN has no right to interfere," "the USSR is a
warlord") it was coded unfavorable. If the modifier did not meet these criteria, it was
labeled neutral.

20The coding procedure for identifying unfavorability modifiers follows Margaret
Enemy Image: Context Units and Content Categories

An image of a nation constitutes the totality of attributes that a person ascribes to that nation (Scott, 1965:72). As one can imagine, this total can be numerous and time-consuming to amass (Shimko, 1991:13). But, some perceptions of national attributes are more important than others for the analysis of the international environment. For instance, when one thinks of Mexico, he or she may recall the beautiful sunsets, Rivera’s murals, and the Alamo. When he or she thinks of the United Kingdom, rainy days and the current antics of the Royal Family may come to mind. But, these perceptions may not be pertinent to the conduct of a state’s foreign policy, unless of course one "Remembers the Alamo!"

Some national attributes that a person assigns and recalls about a country are more appropriate to the analysis of foreign policy than others. As mentioned above, those with an enemy image sees the other as powerful, aggressive, and culturally different. Thus, the cognitive content of an image of the Soviet Union (Russia) should revolve around three general characteristics: goals, motivations and capabilities.²¹

²¹Although for the current study only the attributes of intentions, motivations, and capabilities were chosen, other scholars have included other attributes given their research agenda. These include the above plus: ultimate aims, specific aims, the opponent’s preference function, unity of the government, bargaining style, and probable strategy (Snyder and Diesing, 1977:308); decisional style, locus of decision making, and the interaction of domestic forces (R. Cottam, 1977; M. Cottam, 1986; Herrmann, 1986).
Goals

Knowing an opponent's intentions will allow for a state to respond appropriately. Determining whether a nation is "status-quo" or "imperialistic" is one of the great dilemmas of world politics (Morgenthau, 1967). Thus, foreign policy elites exert significant efforts to assess the intentions behind other state's foreign policy behavior. Given the importance of this assessment and the consequences of a "wrong reading" this is the arena debated most readily when the Soviet Union's behavior is analyzed. When referring to the Soviet Union foreign policy goals, there are typically four differing objectives that individuals infer (Cottam, 1977; Holsti, 1967; Snyder and Diesling, 1977; Shimko, 1991). These are: 1) unlimited expansionist/destructionist; 2) limited expansionist/revisionist; 3) status quo/defensive; and 4) accommodating.22

Unlimited Expansionist

In the unlimited expansionist model of Soviet intentions, the USSR is perceived as aiming to radically transform the international system. It seeks world domination and the creation of a "one-world communist state." It is driven to establish its political supremacy worldwide and hopes to eliminate alternative political systems by which it can establish a universal communist political order (Milburn et al,

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22The discussion and categorization of images of the Soviet Union is based largely on the research done by Shimko (1991) in his analysis of US policy maker's images of the Soviet Union and policy preferences for arms control negotiations.
1982:56). The Soviet Union wishes to be the world hegemon. It will expand both militarily and through the fostering of revolutions abroad (Shimko, 1991:15). The demands and actions of a state with these intentions are perceived as unjustifiable, illegitimate and unreasonable because they are not motivated by defensive considerations just imperialistic tendencies.

**Limited Expansionist**

The Soviets can be pictured as motivated by expansionist desires, but their goals judged as more limited. They do not seek a radical transformation of the entire international system just the extension of their influence. "A revisionist state seeks to improve its position vis-a-vis other states but does not aim toward the achievement of a hegemonical position; it desires great influence, not world domination" (Shimko, 1991:16). Thus, the Soviet Union may take advantage of opportunities to expand its power base, as any other power would, but is not driven by an unquenchable need for world domination. Thus, the intentions of a limited expansionist state are viewed as reasonable or normal. They may be threatening in certain areas, but they are predictable and hopefully stopable (Jervis, 1976).

**Status Quo**

Status quo can be assigned to perceptions that the USSR is primarily concerned with the maintenance of its current position in the international arena. They may seek to thwart any change that has the potential to produce a rudimentary shift in the
distribution of power (George and Keohane, 1980:100) and try to preserve the existing balance. Here, the adversary is motivated by preservation not domination. It does not seek to change or disrupt the balance, just maintain its current position (Cottam, 1977; Holsti, 1967:95; Shimko, 1991:16). Thus, international behavior is attributed to the normal maintenance of the status-quo which is accepted as legitimate.

**Accommodating**

The last intention that can be attributed to the USSR’s international behavior is accommodation. Here the Soviet Union is perceived as willing to make provisions that diminish its current status in the international arena. In this scenario, the Soviet Union is accepting international circumstances that lead to a loss of power. It is seen as backing away from commitments and retreating from the global arena. This image is an image of an opponent in decline (Cottam, 1977; Shimko, 1991). It may be doing this for a variety of reasons. But, more than likely it is argued that the USSR is being forced into accommodation given internal and external challenges that it faces (Shimko, 1991:17).

The perception of the USSR’s goals or intentions can be ranked to capture the level of threat perceived. The belief that the Soviet Union’s goal is world domination (unlimited expansionist/destuctionist) would indicate high levels of threat perceptions and a great feeling of insecurity. Views that categorize the USSR as limited expansionist should have a moderate amount of threat inherent within this belief, but since this goal is not boundless it is understandable and the challenge can be easily
met. The least amount of threat perceived should come from the belief that the Soviet Union is status quo or accommodating.

**Motivations**

Not only is it important to discover what a country's intentions are, but why they have those intentions in the first place, or what motivates them, needs to be considered. Cottam (1977:31) defines motivation as "a compound of factors that predispose a government and people to move in a decisional direction in foreign affairs." You may know what the target hopes to achieve but an assessment of why they are behaving in this way should be addressed.

Shimko (1991) makes the distinction between perceptions of other countries' motivations in two ways, those that are perceived to be *dispositional* and those that are *situational*. If the motivations behind a policy are viewed as dispositional, then the expectations of the country to change its behavior are limited as long as the dispositions driving the policy remain unchanged. If, on the other hand, the motivations are situational, then change should follow from change in circumstances surrounding the behavior, i.e. the international environment or actions from another party. Threat perceived from dispositional variables is more enduring and intense because of the lack of control. Motivations linked to situational factors are manipulable and easier to control.

The dispositional variables are ideology, totalitarianism, culture, geography, history, leadership characteristics, and vested interests. Situational variables include
power politics or reaction to threats form other states. Overall, if Soviet goals are perceived as threatening (i.e. expansionist) then usually motives attributed to this goal should be of a dispositional variety, meaning by and large they are beyond the US's control. The only way to defend your nation from a state motivated in this manner is to confront and contain. Less threatening USSR goals, such as defense, are usually linked to situational motivations such as a reaction to the balance of power or threats from other states. Thus, dispositional motive variables are linked to high threat perceptions, where situational motive variables are usually associated with low threat indicators. Enemies are most likely perceived as being motivated by dispositional factors outside the state's control.

**Capabilities**

Whether one perceives the Soviet Union as threatening resides in perceptions of its intentions and motives, but also with its abilities to achieve its goals. Thus, capabilities must be assessed. Capabilities are not measured independently, a reference point needs to be established. The perception of the Soviet Union's capabilities are in direct relation to the person's perception of their own country's power. In this case, Soviet capabilities are perceived as either superior, comparable or inferior to the United States.

If the USSR's capabilities are described as superior to the US it is not due to any great achievement by the USSR. Instead it derives its strength from the United States' unwillingness to meet the full challenge of global competition. The US is
reluctant to employ its full potential, which would prove to overwhelm the Soviet Union. The USSR disguises its political offensives to acquire military superiority. Because of US reluctance to meet the Soviet challenge head on, the Soviet Union has achieved military superiority.

The USSR can also be depicted as having comparable abilities to those of the United States. In this view, the Soviet Union is committed to establishing and maintaining the balance of power with the US and will greatly sacrifice to gain both strategic and nuclear parity. It will strive for alliance coalitions and expansion of its sphere of influence to balance US power. But, the only real strength the USSR has is military might, thus it usually relies on military force. Adventures in the Third World are done to either balance the power or extend national influence. But, neither superpower can control Third World states as the era of mass participation and nationalism rises (Milburn, 1982:58).

Lastly, the Soviet Union can be described as having inferior capabilities to the United States. Here the Soviets may have an objective military might, but not the strategic weapons and thriving economy of the US, all in all it is an inferior power.

A stereotypical view of the Soviet Union as an enemy will entail a threatening Soviet Union that is able to carry out its goals because it has superior capabilities to the US and the US is unwilling to meet its challenge. A less threatening opponent is perceived in a Soviet Union who is much weaker than the US. Perceptions that the Soviet Union has comparable power to the US can go either way. There is a concern, but level of threat perceptions will depend upon the other variables.
Table 6 sums how the content categories will reflect an enemy image of the Soviet Union (Russia) from the categorization of perceptions of its intentions, motives and capabilities given the indicators specified above.\textsuperscript{23}

TABLE 6
ENEMY IMAGE OF THE SOVIET UNION

| Goals:          | Unlimited/ | Status Quo/ |
|                | Limited    | Accommodating |
|                | Expansionist |          |

| Motives:       | Dispositional | Situational |
|                | Variables/    | Variables   |
|                | Mixed         |            |

| Capabilities:  | Superior/     | Inferior    |
|                | Comparable    |            |

| Enemy Image:   | Yes           | No          |

The rank order of importance among these attributes in the construction of an enemy image is the actors goals, the capabilities to carry them out, and then the motivations behind the goal.

\textsuperscript{23}Appendix B lists the coding categories relevant to assessing threat.
Author Threat

The last indicator of threat was a thematic content analysis questioning whether the author felt threatened by the Soviet Union (Russia). Threatening was defined as "to give an indication of danger or distress; to be menacing" (Webster's New World Dictionary).

INTENTIONS

The beginning of this chapter spent much time criticizing survey methodology. It specifically castigated surveys' tendencies to prime respondents' answers to questions, its inability to tap a belief system's range, and its failure to distinguish change in individual belief systems. Yet, one strength of survey research is its ability to measure issue-specific attitudes through pointed questions. This capability has made survey research one of the most familiar political science research tools (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:266-287).

The data collection technique to capture foreign policy intentions will capitalize upon the strength of survey research by focusing upon issue specific attitudes yet do so in an unobtrusive manner eliminating the priming affect. The research method used is called a "simulated interviewing." Krippendorff (1980) introduced the notion of "simulated interviewing" through an example of a data-collection effort whose main purpose was to construct a history of child-rearing techniques. Given that the information sought covered a 300-year period, it was
impossible to conduct "interviews" with live individuals. Instead, documents written for a variety of purposes were compiled and analyzed. Specific questions were asked of each text to capture the desired information. Similarly, to uncover the nature of different policy proposals found within the foreign policy debate, a survey questionnaire was devised to tap the range of foreign policy prescriptions within the article sample. In essence, these articles were analyzed through a simulated interview or survey.

The Survey

The survey was constructed to capture a range of foreign policy options available to the state and the minds of the foreign policy elite. There are a variety of ways to promote foreign policy goals or objectives that are categorized in a number of ways. Aron (1966) and Morgenthau (1966) reduce the classification to two, either war or diplomacy. Baldwin (1985) expands this list to propaganda, diplomacy, economic statecraft and military statecraft. C. Hermann (1984) extends the inventory even further to include: diplomatic, domestic political, military, intelligence, economic, scientific/technological, promotive, and natural resources.

For the current purposes, a shorter list is more preferable since the nuances and intricacies of actual policy making is not the concern of this work. Instead, categories of tactical instruments that come closest to laymen terms are preferred. Therefore, the survey's policy preferences content revolves around three tactical
mechanisms used for interactions between states. These can be arranged according to military, diplomatic, and economic techniques.

Within each tactical area, questions about specific policy recommendations are posed to tap the author's preferences from textual passages. Because the "interview" was not with live respondents, many of the concerns for questionnaire construction--efficiency, brevity, and wording, type, and order of questions--were discarded. However, replication and the ability to compare research results across studies is an important consideration when devising a research aid. Repeated use of questions from previous studies makes this comparison easier (Johnson and Josly, 1995:266-269). However, a number of questions used in other surveys, such as the Holsti and Rosenau's "Foreign Policy Leadership Project," were designed to capture both the underlying foreign policy dimensions posed by the researchers (ie. cooperative and militant internationalism) and beliefs concerning specific foreign policy issues.

Realizing the importance of replication, yet forgoing the questions that would duplicate the findings in Chapter II concerning the foreign policy orientations, this initial look into foreign policy elite's beliefs will focus exclusively upon policy prescriptions. Toward this end, the simulated survey will use some of the questions posed in the "Foreign Policy Leadership Project" modified for the current task at hand. For example, a question concerning military beliefs is asked in the Foreign Policy Leadership Project Survey (FPLPS) as follows:
Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with these recent US foreign and defense policies...

Signing a strategic arms reduction treaty with the former USSR. Proposing unilateral reductions in US intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The question in the simulated survey is also interested in understanding elites’ beliefs concerning military policy, in this case nuclear policy, and instructs the coder in the following way:

Nuclear Policy: What position does the author take on pursuing arms agreements with the Soviet Union?
   a) does not limit nuclear weapons - the author believes that the US should develop new nuclear technologies.
   b) limits a substantial amount - the author will support the limitations of arms that will affect a stable relationship with the Soviet Union, keep new technologies to stable stalemate.
   c) keeps at current level - the author is happy with the current level of nuclear capabilities, it is enough to assure mutual destruction
   d) bans all weapons - the author proposes the banning of all nuclear weapons.
   e) n/a - the author does not talk about nuclear policy.

Another example comes from the diplomatic arena. The FPLS asks:

How effective do you consider each of the following as an approach to world peace?

Collective security through alliances
Strengthening the United Nations and other international organizations

The simulated survey requests the coder to answer the following two questions:

Alliance Structures: What is the author’s position on NATO?
   a) maintain as leader - the author argues that the NATO alliance is vital to US security interests and must be maintained at all costs. Will assign US the leadership role and maintainer of alliance structure.
   b) support with resource commitments - the author supports the NATO alliance but does not argue for a maintenance or leadership role for the US. The US is seen as an equal partner.
   c) support without commitments - the author supports the NATO alliance politically, but fears entangling alliance structures and wishes
to remain autonomous. Thus, will not advocate US maintenance or resource commitments
d) reduce support - the author supports the NATO alliance but would like to reduce the amount that the US maintains it.
e) n/a - the author does not mention NATO.

What does the author think should be the US position on the United Nations?
a) support fully as leader - the author argues that the United Nations is vital to US security interests and must be maintained at all costs. Will assign US the leadership role and maintainer.
b) support fully but conditionally - the author argues that UN is vital to US security but should not be supported unless it follows US desires.
c) support fully as member - the author argues that the UN is vital to global security and should be supported fully as cooperative partner.
b) support with resource commitments - the author supports the United Nations but does not argue for a maintenance role for the US.
c) support without commitments - the author supports the United Nations politically, but fears entangling alliance structures and wishes to remain autonomous.
e) withdraw - the author believes the US should withdraw from the United Nations.
f) n/a - the author does not mention the United Nations.

There are many more examples. A full explication of the questions posed in the simulated survey is found in Appendix C. Overall, one hundred and forty questions concerning US foreign policy prescriptions were asked of each article.

CONCLUSION

This chapter proposed an alternative to survey research as a means of uncovering foreign policy beliefs. Through the construction of content categories, it painstakingly explicated how the foreign policy debate, as carried out in the leading public opinion journals, can be analyzed through content analysis. To assess the foreign policy disposition, each document was coded according to the presence or absence of economic, military, political, or cultural superiority. Then all references
to the United States were evaluated to assess whether they were favorable or neutral. Lastly, a determination of the size or area the author argued where the US should exert influence was made. These assessments would categorize the article as reflecting an Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, or Parochialist orientation.

To measure threat perceptions, the articles were categorized according to three indicators. The first cataloged the modifiers referring to the Soviet Union (Russia) and other international actors as unfavorable or neutral. The second examined the content of the authors' image of the Soviet Union (Russia) found within each text. The last classified the article according to whether the author expressed threat from the Soviet Union (Russia) within their writing. To classify foreign policy intentions, a simulated survey was constructed. It indexed specific foreign policy prescriptions found within each article.
CHAPTER IV
FOREIGN POLICY DISPOSITIONS

Introduction

Chapter II argued that an individual’s national identity is the base of a foreign policy belief system. It is the dispositional element that produces various interpretations of other international actors and leads to different types of foreign policy intentions. The current chapter asks whether elites can be differentiated according to the proposed dispositions—Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, and Parochialist—based upon beliefs about national superiority and responsibility to the international community. The expectation is that a specific author’s articles should consistently reflect the same foreign policy orientation.

INTERNATIONAL DOMAIN

As was related in Chapter III, an author’s disposition for a responsibility to an international domain was obtained by coding each article according to the domain that the authors argued the US should exert its influence. The four possible areas coded were: 1) domestic; 2) regional; 3) dominant bilateral; 4) global. The articles were then categorized according to whether they portrayed a responsibility toward the
global community. If so, they were considered global if not they were categorized as other. Table 7 lists the results of this catalog.
TABLE 7
PERCENT OF AUTHOR'S ARTICLES
ACCORDING TO DOMAIN

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Global</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>55% (6)</td>
<td>36% (4)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>75% (9)</td>
<td>8% (1)</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>56% (24)</td>
<td>40% (17)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>56% (9)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
<td>78% (7)</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>45% (17)</td>
<td>33% (12)</td>
<td>24% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>72% (8)</td>
<td>27% (3)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table above indicates, most authors' articles indicated a responsibility in the international arena, with the exception of Tucker whose articles generally portrayed the United States as not being responsible toward a global community. Kondracke had a mix of articles in each category. This finding is congruent with earlier conclusions by Wittkopf (1984) and others that elites are more internationalist than the general public.

But, this finding may also point to a flaw in the coding category or the journal sample. The categorization of an article according to domain was based on one thematic indicator. A multi-variable indicator may have captured more subtle differences. Also, the journal sample focused exclusively on international affairs. This made sense, to analyze the foreign policy debate one needs to focus upon the source of that debate--foreign policy journals. But, this inherently excludes those who
do not focus on international issues because of their focus upon domestic issues. One way around this problem would be to oversample journals with a domestic focus. Yet, oversampling in domestic issue journals, or looking at those elites not interested in foreign affairs, would not shed light on the main question of this study—"Why do foreign policy elites support the foreign policies that they do?"

**SUPERIORITY**

Even though the measure of superiority identified in Chapter III—encompassing military, economic, political, and cultural superiority—has face validity, it may not have construct validity. Construct validity is "When a measure of a concept is related to a measure of another concept with which the original concept is thought to be related..." (Johnson and Joslyn, 1995:85). In other words, are the measures military, economic, political, and cultural superiority valid constructs that measure the concept national superiority?

Although all notions of national superiority are perceptual, it can be argued that various contestation of superiority—military, economic, political, and cultural—are based on both "objective" or/and "subjective" criteria. For instance, claiming that the United States is militarily superior to other countries of the world is based upon objective indicators, such as number and kinds of weapons, technology, and size of service forces. Shown these statistics, most would argue that the US is militarily superior. Similarly, economic indicators such as Gross National Product, trade surpluses, investments, etc. are indicative of a healthy United State's economic system
that many would not contend, although in the Post-Cold War world this claim is becoming more and more contested.

However, claims of political and cultural superiority are not based upon objective criteria. There are no "output" measures to support this stance other than "our way is better." Claims of superiority in these two arenas are considered to be subjective, based upon the evaluator's affect for the United States. It is hypothesized that these are the two indicators of superiority that will discern the truly superior national identity.

To test this proposition, each author's articles were categorized according to the various measures of superiority to see if any distinguishing patterns occurred between the authors. The most stringent test of a superior national image would be if the article possessed all aspects of superiority. Table 8 displays the findings.
TABLE 8
PERCENT OF EACH AUTHOR'S ARTICLES LISTING ALL ASPECTS OF SUPERIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>27% (3)</td>
<td>64% (7)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>84% (10)</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>96% (41)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56% (9)</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>22% (2)</td>
<td>67% (6)</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>14% (5)</td>
<td>62% (24)</td>
<td>24% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>27% (3)</td>
<td>73% (8)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 8 indicates, the most stringent criteria of national superiority was not able to distinguish between the foreign policy elites. It is interesting to note however that Brzezinski, Tucker, Krauthammer, and Nye all had a small but significant percent of their articles claiming superiority in all superior domains. Since the hardest criteria was displayed, let us look at the easiest, the percentage of the author's articles that had any of the superior indicators. Table 9 below reports these results.
TABLE 9
PERCENT OF EACH AUTHOR’S ARTICLES
LISTING ONE ASPECT OF SUPERIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>73% (8)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>58% (7)</td>
<td>26% (3)</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>76% (34)</td>
<td>7% (3)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
<td>13% (2)</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>78% (7)</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>60% (22)</td>
<td>16% (6)</td>
<td>24% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>82% (9)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas most authors did not have all aspects of superiority present in their articles, all had a large percent of their articles will some aspect of superiority and a small percent of articles with no mention of superiority. Maynes had the highest percent of articles with no superior mentions, but, this percent is not significant to differentiate between the authors. This upholds either the proposition that superiority is not a good differentiator of foreign policy belief systems, or, that the multi-dimensional indicator of the concept superiority does not differentiate the authors. If this is the case, then according to the argument above, cultural or political superiority are the better indicators since they are based upon a subjective criterion. Tables 10
and 11 explore this proposition first by distinguishing between economic or military superiority in the first table and political or cultural superiority in the following one.

**TABLE 10**
PERCENT OF EACH AUTHOR'S ARTICLES LISTING ECONOMIC OR MILITARY SUPERIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>73% (8)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>58% (7)</td>
<td>25% (3)</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>52% (21)</td>
<td>47% (20)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
<td>12% (2)</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>58% (5)</td>
<td>33% (3)</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>55% (20)</td>
<td>21% (8)</td>
<td>24% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>73% (9)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 11
PERCENT OF EACH AUTHOR'S ARTICLES
LISTING POLITICAL OR CULTURAL SUPERIORITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Superior</th>
<th>Not</th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>64% (7)</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>16% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>55% (24)</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>67% (6)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>50% (22)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>24% (10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>46% (5)</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These two tables demonstrate that by using political and cultural superiority as indicators of superiority it is possible to distinguish between most authors. In Table 10 we see that most authors have some mention of military and economic superiority in their written work. But, as evident in Table 11, Klare has no mentions of political and cultural superiority in his writings and Maynes has a small percent (17).

Whereas Brzezinski, Kondracke, Tucker, and Krauthammer have mentions of cultural or political superiority in half or more of their articles. Thus, political or cultural superiority will be used as the two indicators of a superior national identity.

Crossing the variables superiority and international domain, Table 12 indicates the percentage of each author’s articles that fit each orientation.¹

¹The percentages were rounded up to nearest whole percent.
Overall, the descriptive indicators of the four dispositions are able to classify the seven foreign policy elites’ articles. Brzezinski, Nye, and Krauthammer are the clearest cases of an Imperialist orientation, Maynes and Klare overwhelmingly fit the Internationalist orientation, and Tucker\(^2\) can be categorized as a Nationalist. Kondracke’s articles fall across the range of orientations, yet he can be classified as having an Imperialist disposition. As was feared earlier, a Parochialist disposition did not emerge amongst the authors.

\(^2\)The one article that fell into the Imperialist orientation was actually miscoded. Throughout the whole article, Tucker (1994/95) reconsiders “The Triumph of Wilsonianism?” Thus it would seem that he was arguing for a global US role. However, at the end of the article, he clearly states that the US should be concerned only with its national interest and not worry about a global community.
Kondracke's articles fall across the range of orientations, yet he can be classified as having an Imperialist disposition. As was feared earlier, a Parochialist disposition did not emerge amongst the authors.

One may question Maynes, Klare, Krzthammer, and Kondracke's dispositions given that a significant percentage of their articles could not be classified either according to domain or superiority. The coding instructions explicated that if the coder was not absolutely sure of the article classification in any of the coding categories they were to categorize it as either "indeterminent" in cases of uncertainty or "not applicable" if they believed the article did not address the question asked of the coding sheet. This decision rule created a large number of non-codeable material. It also produces high confidence results.

A closer look at the specific articles not coded for each author reinforces the disposition placement. Maynes' two articles not classified argued for the reduction in the type of interventionism that the US was currently employing. He (1985b) first criticizes the "Reagan Doctrine" for being militaristic and uncompromising in its foreign policy. This has led, he believes, to the subsequent loss of opportunities in four areas: 1) arms control and defense spending; 2) Third World conflicts; 3) international monetary relationships; and 4) US-Soviet relations. These "Lost Opportunities," he believes, would have lead to more peaceful relations in the global community. In the other article, he (1991) then cites US actions in the Gulf War, arguing against current US policy. Maynes believes that the US should work through the UN to establish collective security the US should not act as a world policemen or
partake in unilateral action. We should establish regional based collective security since regions know their own needs better. Since these articles were critical of current US policy yet did not argue for a specific US role they were classified as indeterminent. Upon further reflection, it would seem that they uphold a globalist orientation. Neither of the articles, however, claimed US political or cultural superiority.

Klare had the highest number of articles not categorized. An inspection of their content demonstrates why. Three articles are critical of current US policy. They argue against the type of intervention that the United States has used in past and plans on using in the future given largely given its militaristic and unilateral nature. Examples he uses include: the Gulf War (Klare, 1991b); the War on Drugs (Klare, 1990a)--which he likens to the war in Vietnam; and Pentagon defense strategy and spending--he labels (1993c) it "The Two War Strategy" (two strategy meaning that the Pentagon is gearing up to fight middle powers like Iraq). The current US policies were seen as dominating and not allowing other countries to determine their own futures and prescribed that the United States should work with other international actors and institutions to find global solutions. Like Maynes, however, both articles are critical of US policy but did not specify an area of US influence.

Two of Klare's remaining non-codeable articles were strategy articles for the peace movement's (Klare, 1991a) next steps after the Gulf War and ways to reduce global arms sales by using the United Nations (Klare, 1992a). The last article that was not categorized because it compared and evaluated presidential candidates Bush
and Clinton based upon Klare's (Klare, 1992c) evaluation of the international enemies
the candidates will create. Since none of the above articles addressed aspects of US
superiority the coder was not able to categorize them. The coding rules did not allow
the coder to assume that because an author did not talk about the US cultural or
political system that it was appropriate to classify the article as non-superior.
However, an overview of the article's content does not lead one to question Klare's
placement as an Internationalist.

Krauthammer's eleven articles that were classified as either a Nationalist or
Parochialist had a common characteristic--they referred to the US's role as being
"dominant bi-lateral." This is important distinction to make because it indicates that
the author was not arguing for a domestic or regional domain. All the articles, except
one, pre-date 1989. A common feature of Cold War across all authors' articles was
the tendency to talk about the international arena as being "bi-polar." Thus, when
authors were arguing for an area of responsibility for the United States they often
spoke of a US dominant bi-lateral role during the Cold War. What is a better
indicator that Krauthammer is definitely an Imperialist than his insistence after the
Cold War that the US is the world's only superpower and we now are in an era of US
supremacy where the US should pursue its global designs (1989a, 1989c, 1989d,

The articles that could not be coded for Krauthammer had a variety of
characteristics yet can definitely be interpreted to be Imperialistic. One article
(Krauthammer, 1987b) discusses how the US has to pay "The Price of Power." This
article clearly argues against isolationism but does not specify a domain. It does however have numerous references to aspects of the US political and cultural systems that are superior. Another did not mention an international domain but asks instead "What has Happened to Totalitarianism?" It addresses the nature of totalitarianism and the freedom of the human spirit. It is riddled with references to US political and cultural superiority (Krauthammer, 1986d). Continuing with the superiority theme, another article explains the "Secret of our Success" (Krauthammer, 1989a). Although it does not prescribe a domain, it does explain why we are winning the Cold War--American adaptability, our great culture, and unique way Americans instituted capitalism. Thus, although these articles did contain superiority elements, the domain could not be specified so they dropped out of the coding scheme.

A number of the articles were specifically addressing international issues yet it was not clear how to categorize Krauthammer's disposition concerning US responsibility to a global domain. One article (Krauthammer, 1985e) supports star wars, another funding the Contras (1985a). Two articles were very concerned with the German unification (Krauthammer 1989b, 1990c) portraying a reunited Germany as a great threat to US security. One chided the "Liberals" for taking credit for the end of the Cold War, he asks, "Where were you while I was fighting the Soviets?" In these articles Krauthammer seemed to be interested in international issues, yet, disposition was not based upon policies, but explicit arguments related by the author supporting or stating a "responsibility in the international arena." In fact, another of Krauthammer's articles could be categorized according to domain--it explained to the
reader the "Curse of Legalism" (Krauthammer, 1989c), meaning that international law interferes with the US pursuing its interest and ability to order the international system—yet a specific reference to US political and superiority was not evident. But to infer a superiority indicator would not be a stretch.

One of Krauthammers' (1993c) articles that actually argues against US responsibility to a global arena questions US involvement in Bosnia. He concludes that the US should not intervene. Ironically, an earlier article (Krauthammer, 1992b) argued that using the UN or collective security to solve the Bosnian dilemma was ineffective and a facade and that the only country that could "solve" the problem was the United States. However, a year later Krauthammer apparently reevaluated his stand arguing that the US should have taken decisive action early on and impose a solution, now it was too late. Overall, a review of Krauthammer's articles supports the Imperialist disposition placement.

Kondracke was the hardest author to place within an orientation, he has close to equal numbers of articles in each orientation. He also had the highest number of articles to categorize, meaning that surveying each for an emerging pattern would require extensive analysis. However, based upon the tone and content of his articles, this author feels confident placing Kondracke in an Imperialist disposition. Yet, a caveat is warranted. Surveying Kondracke's article content supports the Imperialist orientation given his clear and stringent argument for US responsibility in the international arena, his support for the exportation of the US vision of democracy (Kondracke, 1988c, 1988d, 1987b), and the claim that the US should lead the
international community (1991b). However, in Kondracke's case, it was harder to separate specific references to US responsibility to an international domain from the policies that he purported. It would be a mistake to confound intentional indicators, specific policy preferences, with dispositional ones, responsibility in the international arena. Political and cultural superiority traits were definitely present, in most, but not all, of his articles. Kondracke spoke more about economic foreign policy than any other author. This subject led him to discuss economic superiority rather than political or cultural superiority.

Although there is variation within authors concerning their article placement on the variables the scheme does have the ability to categorize the authors' articles according to the variables superiority and domain and was able to differentiate foreign policy elites' written work.

An additional measure of national identification was employed to further specify the extent or intensity of the authors' national identity as it relates to national affect. Instead of thematic content analysis, this second investigation employed referential appraisal. All United States' references were examined to determine whether the modifiers were favorable or non-evaluative. Scores for each author were produced by comparing favorable US references to overall US references across a ten-year time period. If the author demonstrated a high proportion of US references as positive, then evaluation of the nation state is considered not only positively affective but indicative of an extended self identity to a national identity. Perception of self is tied to the reference group, ie. the United States.
The distribution of authors' proportional favorable mentions was standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Individual scores were converted into z or standard scores, or the number of standard deviations that the individual's mean score varies from the group mean. Figure 2 situates the authors on a continuum ranging from the most favorable toward the United States to those non-evaluative.
Favorability Toward US

![Bar chart showing standardized scores for different authors with positive scores indicating favorability and negative scores indicating non-evaluation.]

Positive scores indicate favorability
Negative scores indicate non-evaluation

Figure 2
As indicated in Figure 2, the authors vary considerably around the mean in terms of their favorability toward the United States. Krauthammer and Kondracke are most favorable and are on the extreme end of favorable. Brzezinski, Nye, and Tucker hover around the mean in terms of their favorability. Maynes and Klare are on the other extreme compared to Krauthammer and Kondracke. They are non-evaluative of the United States, meaning, for the most part, their modifiers are not favorable. But this does not mean that they are unfavorable.

To make comparisons between authors, favorable reference scores per article were averaged within the authors' body of work. This produced a mean percent. A Standard Deviation was also determined to indicate fluctuations concerning the favorability measure among the articles. Table 13 compares authors on their US favorable references.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (IMP)</td>
<td>.7028</td>
<td>.222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (IMP)</td>
<td>.6971</td>
<td>.262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>.5751</td>
<td>.236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>.5734</td>
<td>.203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>.5556</td>
<td>.202</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>.3406</td>
<td>.270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>.3341</td>
<td>.172</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the times that Krauthammer mentioned the United States, close to three-fourths of the time he used favorable modifiers. Kondracke follows close behind this score with close to seventy percent favorable US mentions per article. Brzezinski, Tucker, and Nye spoke favorably over half the time they mentioned the United States. On the other hand, when mentioning the United States, Klare and Maynes only one third of the time used favorable modifiers.

These findings lend validity to the above thematic content analysis of the same documents capturing elements of political and cultural superiority. As you will recall, Klare had no mentions of US political or cultural superiority in his writings and Maynes had a very small percent (17%). Brzezinski, Kondracke, Tucker, and
Krauthammer, on the other hand, had mentions of cultural or political superiority in half or more of their articles. Those that believe in US cultural and political superiority also have positive affect for the nation state. The congruence of these two findings supports the conceptualization of the superiority variable as well as allows a greater confidence in identifying superior national identities.

Beside lending credibility to the coding scheme, the "US favorable" measure also points to an interesting dispositional difference among US foreign policy elites. Individuals can be differentiated according to the extent they identify with their nation state. The foreign policy opinion elites can be divided into three groupings. The first group, Krauthammer and Kondracke, can be labeled "US Super Identifiers" (USSI). They could not mention the United States without attaching a positive modifier to it. This indicates strong identification with the United States. In fact, in these authors' articles more than the others, the United States was interchangeable with the personal pronouns "we" and "us". Their personal identity has become intertwined with the group identity to such an extent that the author spoke about the US as if they personally were indistinguishable from it. These two authors identify so strongly with the United States that threats or criticism of the United States are seen as personal attacks or affronts. Likewise, critical self-reflection and evaluation were usually not part of these author's discourse. Most articles aimed at criticizing or negatively portraying other international actors or justifying US behavior.

The second group, Brzezinski, Tucker, and Nye, are labeled the "US Identifiers" (USI). They identify with the United States given their favorable
portrayal of it over half the time they mention it. But, they have not extended their self-identity to the same degree as the Super Identifiers. Within their articles the personal pronoun references are not interchangeable, although in some of Tucker's articles this does occur.

The third group, Maynes and Klare, are the "US Non-Identifiers" (USNI). On average they attach favorable modifiers to the United States one-third of times they mention it. These two authors have not intertwined their identity with that of the United States. This does not mean they are unfavorable of the United States and feel apart from the national community. On the contrary, although a majority of the twenty-eight articles written by these two authors were questioning current United States foreign policy, only four articles contained modifiers that could be construed as unfavorable of the United States as an entity. This negative reaction was due to the "folly" of US militaristic response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. On the whole, however, Maynes and Klare's references to the United States were non-evaluative. They did not contain positive or negative valence. Their insistence that the United States was pursuing policies instituted by misguided or misinformed individuals does not indicate unfavorableness toward the United States, just fault-finding with US policy makers. Their ability to separate themselves from the national identity allowed critical evaluation, which they employed on numerous occasions.

This additional referential analysis indicates that within national identity dispositions--Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, and Parochialist--it is possible to further divide the types according to degree of national identity salience. For
example, Imperialists and Nationalists can be sub-divided according to their level of national affect. This produces "Super Imperialists" and "Super Nationalists". The higher valiance these authors have concerning their national affect can dispose them to be more extreme in their perceptions and behavior. This assertion will be examined at more length in the following chapters. Currently, the following section explores whether a national identity disposition is a stable belief element.

**STABILITY OF FOREIGN POLICY DISPOSITIONS**

One can expect greater continuity and less change in belief systems due to the very nature and structure of mental constructs. Humans interpret information in ways that tend to confirm rather than challenge these structures. This makes sense since the purpose of the constructs is to help with the selective interpretation of information from the environment.

As discussed in Chapter II, core beliefs are thought to be principle to a person's cognitive system because many other cognitive elements are reliant upon them (George, 1979:101). Because they are at a higher level of abstraction they allow room for interpretation and are harder to falsify. As Jervis (1976:170) explains, "If a person's attitude structure is to be consistent, then incremental changes among interconnected elements cannot be made. Change will be inhibited, but once it occurs, it will come in large batches. Several elements will change almost simultaneously." Stated differently, change in a core belief sets off a chain-reaction where dependent beliefs will also be altered. This type of change requires a massive
overhaul of a belief system which, by and large, will be resisted by a consistency seeking human. Thus, dispositional variables of a foreign policy belief system should be stable across time given the structure of the system. But, this does not imply that belief systems do not change in response to new stimuli. The expectations of when and how beliefs change rests mainly on the underlying theoretical perspective driving the theory of cognition. Theories of belief or attitude change can be categorized as either depicting cognitive constructs as resistant to change (cognitive consistency theories) or more malleable (attribution theories).

Cognitive Consistency

Cognitive consistency refers to the tendency individuals have to maintain their beliefs even in light of overwhelming contradictory evidence. Leon Festinger's (1957) theory of Cognitive Dissonance explains this phenomena. He contends that inconsistencies within a cognitive system causes the individual to feel an uncomfortable tension and then motivates him or her to remove that sensation. Since beliefs have varying parts that are highly interdependent and mutually coherent, new information can change beliefs disturbing this balance. Internal consistency is off-line and needs to be restored since people prefer that their cognition "makes sense" or fits together.4

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3Some individual's cognitive structures are more complex than others and may have contradictory beliefs that seem to co-exist perfectly well.

4This notion is taken from "balance theory." See Insko (1967) chapter 8 for a discussion of Heider and Newcomb's balance theories.
Individuals will vary in their tolerance of inconsistency in their belief systems as well as their behavior. They will also differ in the ways they reduce this inconsistency. They can reject or degrade the information, search for additional consistent information, make their behavior consistent to their image, or change their image (Bem and Fender, 1978). Consistency theories predict that the path of least resistance is usually the one followed. Change in specific parts of a belief system will happen before change in other parts given their varying interdependence.

Applying this to the foreign policy setting, one would argue that in day to day experiences individuals rarely have the time or the inclination to question the fundamental premises underlying the policies they purport. If reexamination of policy does take place, it is usually associated with change in periphery beliefs, such as those concerning tactics or strategy. This is logical, since these beliefs are less important and will not require a magnitude of change in the belief system. Core beliefs on the other hand are more resistant to change because other foreign policy beliefs are reliant upon them (Larson, 1991:389; Spiegel, 1991:264). This reluctance to change leads individuals to engage in psychologically defensive behavior, bolstering their core beliefs and assimilating new information into their already formulated view of the world or ignoring it if it is contradictory (Jervis, 1976).

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5 For examples of individual differences in cognitive consistency see Abelson et al. (1968) edited volume.

6 For example, Spiegel (1991) found that US officials very rarely changed overall goals in their policies toward the Middle East, instead strategies or tactics were manipulated to achieve the same goals.
When would we expect change in a foreign policy belief system? Cognitive consistency theories contend that change will preferably occur in an incremental fashion. Only after repeated failures to find a tactical solution will a new strategic approach be sought. Then, only when continued failures to come up with a strategic solution will leaders reconsider the basic goals or objectives of the current policy. Central or dispositional beliefs are reevaluated only if a persist crisis of legitimacy occurs. It takes a serious failure in policy for this to happen (Lavoy, 1991:742; Tetlock, 1991:28-31). 7

**Problem Solving**

In direct contrast to consistency theories that describe the whole cognitive system as resistant to change, attribution theory shifts the focus away from humans as consistency seekers toward viewing individuals as problem-solvers (Kelley, 1967). In this view, people are "naive scientists" who infer, as best they can, causes of events, discern attributes of other actors and social situations and understand cause and effect relationships with the intention of predicting future trends. All this is done with the anticipation of exerting some control over the environment. 8 Change, according to

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7In his study of the Soviet Union's policy of perestroika, Blum (1994) argues that belief systems possess a tremendous amount of stability and only change in response to profound and wide-ranging failures of policy.

8Attribution theory argues that decision-makers exaggerate the importance of dispositional over situational factors in explaining the undesirable behavior of others, and a tendency to attribute greater coherence and meaning to other's behavior than reality warrants.
attribution theory, occurs because individuals actively seek out information from the environment and formulate casual explanations. New beliefs are based on a person's own diagnosis of the causes of an event through the interpretation of the changing environmental context.

Applying attribution theory to foreign policy, individuals are described as actively involved in discerning the causes of international events and ways that US foreign policy can affect the situation. They are open to feedback from the environment, search for new information, and actively update their existing beliefs and reformulate new definitions of the situation. Unlike policy makers who have to support policies they propose given their commitment, one could argue that foreign policy elites may be more open to reevaluate the situation. The only thing they have riding on the policy is their reputation.

Whether human beings are consistency seekers or naive scientists is a debate that will continue for some time. But the obvious answer is that they are both. Certain personality variables and environmental conditions will lead a person to delve out information, distort information, or discount information. This, in turn, leads to change or preservation of a cognitive representation. But, there is a common agreement between these theories that a dramatic alteration in the environment will precipitate a reevaluation of the environment, even when consistency tendencies run high. Here is where the structure of belief systems plays an important role in theories of belief change. Greater or lesser change in the cognitive belief system would be
expected given how change in perceptions about the international environment affects central or dispositional beliefs.

The End of the Cold War and Foreign Policy Beliefs

The impact of external events has been recognized by foreign policy scholars as one of the main factors behind change in cognitive representations (Rosati, 1986:26-28; Holsti and Rosenau, 1986:33). Interestingly enough, most cite international crises or failure as the main impetus (Haslam, 1991; Spiegel, 1991; Levy, 1992).9 Charles Hermann (1990:12-13) sums:

All the material examined seems explicitly or implicitly to assume that change is driven by failure. The inadequacy of an existing schemata to account for some critical experience forces the individual into a learning mode that may lead to restructuring of his or her mental model.

In Chapter II it was argued that a national identity was a central variable and the basis of foreign policy belief systems. It is the dispositional variable that is causally related to foreign policy intentions such as goals, strategies, and tactics. Generally, a national identity is a variable highly resistant to change. But, if some event led to reevaluation of a central belief we would expect change in elements constrained by the beliefs. Converse (1964:208) labels this "dynamic constraint" inferring that there is a "high probability that change in one idea-element would psychologically require some compensating change in the status of idea-elements

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9For example, Richard Ned Lebow (1981), specifically examining image change, looks at twenty-six occurrences of international crises and concludes that crisis due to the behavior of the adversary may force a revision of the image associated with the opponent.
elsewhere in the configuration."¹⁰ Thus, it is possible for a person to reevaluate a national identity.

For example, Holsti and Rosenau (1986) and others (Wittkopf, 1990; Wittkopf Maggiotto, 1983) noted the breakdown of the foreign policy consensus after the Vietnam War. It can be argued that this change coincided with the inability of the US to win the war. Studies have documented the various arguments for the United States’ perceived ineffectiveness (Sumner, 1982). Those who blamed governmental bureaucracies, US will, or poor strategy did not change their perceptions of US abilities and Soviet meddling. Instead, if the proper strategy was followed, or the US had the "will" to win the outcome would have been different. However, others believed (Kennen, 1993) that the containment doctrine was misplaced or that the instability within Vietnam did not signal an expansion of Soviet influence but a nationalist movement were more likely to conclude that the US did not have the ability to order the international arena, or that they need to. In this case, an event from the environment led to a reassessment of a central core variable, national identity in some belief systems. This, in turn, led to the reevaluation of American foreign policy goals, strategies and tactics in the 1970’s and afterward.

Yet, the end of the Cold War can hardly be labeled a crisis. If anything it is perceived by a great majority as a success of American post-WWII containment

¹⁰This is true unless the structure of the belief system is extensive or it exhibits a “horizontal structure”. What this means is that there are more than one prior belief that have the inferred belief as its conclusion. Thus, an inferred belief, is less susceptible to change if only one of the prior beliefs in its vertical structure is changed (Bem, 1070:11; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981:185).
policy. This poses an interesting question. If the literature is correct, and change in beliefs is precipitated by foreign policy failure, what happens when foreign policy is perceived as a success?

In this case, those prone toward cognitive consistency will believe the US national identity has been reinforced. The end of the Cold War legitimated the pervious belief system. Those that believed in US superiority will have their self-image reinforced. The collapse of communism was a direct indicator that others should follow the US way of life. Thus, the expectation is congruency between foreign policy dispositions during and after the Cold War. Tables 14 reports the percent of the author’s articles that fall within each orientation per era.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Imperialist</th>
<th></th>
<th>Nationalist</th>
<th></th>
<th>Inter-nationalist</th>
<th></th>
<th>Parochialist</th>
<th></th>
<th>Not Coded</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post-Cold War</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
<td>Cold War</td>
<td>Post Cold War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (USSD)</td>
<td>24% (6)</td>
<td>75% (9)</td>
<td>16% (4)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>8% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>24% (6)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>8% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (USSI)</td>
<td>15% (5)</td>
<td>44% (4)</td>
<td>35% (12)</td>
<td>22% (2)</td>
<td>15% (5)</td>
<td>33% (3)</td>
<td>29% (10)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (USI)</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>80% (4)</td>
<td>17% (1)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (USI)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25% (1)</td>
<td>60% (3)</td>
<td>50% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>25% (1)</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (USI)</td>
<td>29% (2)</td>
<td>75% (3)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>25% (1)</td>
<td>29% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>42% (3)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (USNI)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>29% (2)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>60% (3)</td>
<td>57% (4)</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (USNI)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>80% (4)</td>
<td>46% (5)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>20% (1)</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14 indicates that, for the most part, the author's belief system dispositions remained stable across the ten-year time period. Maynes and Klare's writing signify an internationalist orientation in both time periods. Tucker has a Nationalist orientation in both periods. Brzezinski's orientation in the Cold War is divided among the Imperialist, Nationalist and Parochialist orientations, yet the Imperialist orientation seems to capture him the best. This placement is confirmed in the Post-Cold War era where a majority of his articles are classified as Imperialistic. Kondracke is the hard case. He seems to be leaning toward a Nationalist orientation during the Cold War, but switches to an Imperialist orientation in the Post-Cold War era.

During the Cold War, Nye's writing could be classified in all orientations except Nationalist, although most articles fit the Internationalist orientation. This classification scheme does not fit the Post-Cold War era where his articles take on an Imperialist orientation given the increased reference to US political or cultural superiority. Looking at his articles, his Cold War discourse is focused upon US dominant bilateral relationships characterized by the Superpower confrontation. There are undertones however of a responsibility in the international arena. Thus, although during the Cold War his articles were classified as dominant bilateral, his Parochial standing could be interpreted to lean more toward an Internationalist.

As cognitive consistency would predict, those who believed in US superiority and responsibility in the international arena, the Imperialists, become even more convinced of the US right to order the international system now that the Cold War is
over. The US "way of life" has proven superior. They are more dogmatic after the Cold War because their international orientation, they believe, has paid off. Their articles can be more readily classified according to an Imperialist orientation. This coalescing is not as apparent in the other dispositions.

The majority of Maynes and Klare’s articles still fit within their respective dispositions, but not as readily as during the Cold War. Since Maynes and Klare are more situationally oriented, given their low US identity scoring, their belief systems, and thus their articles, may not be as dogmatically oriented. This allows greater fluidity in their analysis and disposition. However, their article placement does also indicate a definite Internationalist disposition. Tucker, although still within the Nationalist orientation, shows fluctuation. With such a small number of articles categorized it is hard to make any definitive statements concerning his disposition stability.

Given the percentages in Table 14, it appears that there is stability in the dispositional elements of a foreign policy belief system. But, is this also true statistically? A t-test designed to capture change was administered. The authors were treated as subjects studied under two different conditions, the Cold War and Post-Cold War international environment. If the dispositional elements of an individual’s foreign policy belief system are in fact core beliefs, they should stay stable between the two time periods. If change in the authors’ disposition between the Cold War and Post-Cold War occurred, then the test should register a significance.
The highest percentage evident in Table 12, "Percent of Authors' Articles per Disposition," determined which foreign policy disposition label was assigned to each author. Brzezinski, Krauthammer, Kondracke and Nye were judged to be Imperialists, Maynes and Klare were labeled Internationalists, and Tucker was considered a Nationalists. The percentage of each authors' articles falling within these types were considered their "scores." Scores under one condition, the Cold War, were then subtracted from those under the other, the Post-Cold War, to yield a set of difference scores. The mean differences were then compared with the standard error. A "Matched Subjects t-Test" was used. The result was $t = -1.418$ with a two-tail probability of .2059. Given the degrees of freedom, to indicate significant change in the dispositions, the $t$ value would have to reach $t = 2.447$. This result, $t = -1.418$, indicates that although the international environment had been dramatically transformed given the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, we do not get a corresponding change in the author's foreign policy dispositions. Given the small number of articles per orientation per era, a few articles changes would cause great fluctuation in the percentage scores falling within each orientation. The fact that the $t$-test did not show change is actually very impressive.

This same pattern of stability is seen when comparing the proportions of favorable US modifiers found within the author's articles during and after the Cold War. Figure 3 and Figure 4 below exhibit the standardized distribution of US favorable mentions amongst the authors based on a mean of zero and a standard deviation and variance of one. Individual mean scores were converted into $z$ or
**Figure 3**

**Favorable Toward US Cold War**

![Graph showing standardized scores for authors' favorability towards the US Cold War. Positive scores indicate favorability, negative scores indicate non-evaluation.]

**Figure 4**

**Favorable Toward US Post Cold War**

![Graph showing standardized scores for authors' favorability towards the US Post Cold War. Positive scores are favorable, negative scores are non-evaluation.]

Positive scores indicate favorability. Negative scores indicate non-evaluation.
As one would expect, Figures 3 and 4 indicate virtual congruence with the earlier results concerning the orderings of the authors on US favorability during each time period. The scores of those favorable—the Super US Identifiers and the US Identifiers—and those non-evaluative—the US Non-Identifiers—still easily fall into their respective groupings when placed on the continuum above and below the mean. Relatively speaking, the pattern amongst the authors holds up between the two time periods.

Table 15 below displays stability in the unstandardized proportion of the times the author mentions the United States they do so in a positive way. Krauthammer and Kondracke retain their Super-US Identifier status in each time period. Tucker, Brzezinski, and Nye can still be considered US Identifiers and actually increase their favorable mentions in the Post-Cold War world. Maynes and Klare are still US Non-Identifiers in both time periods, although like all authors, their favorable mentions of the US increase after the Cold War. The Standard Deviation of the means across all authors is fairly low indicating that authors' mean measures of US favorability were not fluctuating across their articles. Klare is the only author where his portrayal of the United States fluctuates across the two time periods. It seems that in his Post-Cold War era articles the United States is being evaluated according to its behavior in the international arena.
TABLE 15
THE PROPORTION THE AUTHOR MENTIONS THE US IN FAVORABLE TERMS BY TIME PERIOD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War</th>
<th></th>
<th>Post-Cold War</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std Dev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Super Identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>.678</td>
<td>.261</td>
<td>.758</td>
<td>.273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>.674</td>
<td>.208</td>
<td>.761</td>
<td>.247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Identifiers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>.537</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.616</td>
<td>.191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>.559</td>
<td>.323</td>
<td>.591</td>
<td>.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>.515</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.625</td>
<td>.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Non-Identifier</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>.231</td>
<td>.202</td>
<td>.407</td>
<td>.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>.363</td>
<td>.111</td>
<td>.330</td>
<td>.322</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CONCLUSION

The question that began this chapter was "To what extent do the dispositions Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, and Parochialist manifest in the foreign policy debate?" The answer resided in an analysis of seven foreign policy elites' written work during and after the Cold War. Once the dispositional elements of elites' foreign policy belief systems--superiority and responsibility in the international arena--were identified through analysis of their articles, it was possible to inspect the percentage of their articles falling within each purported disposition type. The fact that a large percentage of each author's articles could be consistently placed within
the same orientation supports the argument that the dispositions Imperialist, Nationalist, Internationalist, and Parochialist are important foreign policy orientations and provide a useful categorization tool to describe foreign policy beliefs. These dispositions also show stability across time periods.

A distinction was also made between those authors that identify and those that identify strongly with their nation. This adds a level of salience to the national identity and introduces a continuum within foreign policy dispositional types. Thus, one can distinguish a "Super Imperialist" from an "Imperialist" and a "Super Nationalist" from a Nationalist. This addition may account for variance within the same foreign policy dispositional type as they interpret international threat as well as formulate foreign policy intentions. The following chapter examines how beliefs concerning responsibility in the international arena and national superiority constrain perceptions concerning other international actors and the construction of threat.
CHAPTER V

THREATS

Introduction

In the previous chapter, findings supported the contention that foreign policy opinion elites’ articles can be differentiated according to their national identity distinguished according to the presence or absence of beliefs concerning US superiority (political or cultural) and a sense of responsibility for the global community. The labels accorded these individuals were: Imperialist who believe in US superiority and international responsibility; Nationalist who displayed attitudes of US superiority yet do not feel responsible for an international domain; Internationalist who do not exalt US superiority yet are world-minded; and Parochialist who do not proclaim US superiority nor believe in responsibility in the international arena. It was also shown that these dispositions stayed stable from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War world.

Toward explaining why foreign policy elites support the policies that the do, the current chapter explores whether these views of the world are autonomous, dispositional, core attitudes that constrain other foreign policy beliefs. This chapter will specifically focus upon individuals’ perceptions and interpretations of other international actors and the threats that they may pose. It begins with a discussion of

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research analyzing the elements of an "ethnocentric syndrome." This syndrome, it is argued, explains how superiority is linked with attitudes and behaviors toward other individuals and groups, in particular, the foreign policy arena. It hypothesizes that the presence of highly favorable attitudes regarding the United States will correlate strongly with unfavorable attitudes toward the Soviet Union (Russia) and other international actors. It then examines the cognitive aspects of ethnocentrism analyzing whether a superior US national identity is associated with negative USSR enemy-image. Finally, it questions whether those who believe in US superiority are more likely to express feelings of threat concerning the international arena.

COGNITIVE ASPECTS OF ETHNOCENTRISM

In his book *Folkways*, Sumner (1906) made three general theoretic claims about ethnocentrism: 1) certain attributes of social life go together as a syndrome; 2) the "ethnocentric syndrome" is functionally related to group formation and intergroup competition; and 3) all groups show this syndrome (Levine and Campbell, 1972:8).

The word syndrome implies that each aspect or attitude of the syndrome correlates positively with the other aspects. Surveying various studies on ethnocentrism, Levine and Campbell (1972:12) summarize 20 attitudes hypothesized to correlate and define a "ethnocentric syndrome." (See Table 16).
TABLE 16
ELEMENTS OF AN ETHNOCENTRIC SYNDROME
ATTITUDES AND BEHAVIOR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Toward Ingroup</th>
<th>Toward Outgroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. See selves as virtuous and superior.</td>
<td>1. See outgroup as contemptible, immoral, and inferior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. See own standards of value as universal, intrinsically true.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. See selves as strong.</td>
<td>3. See outgroups as weak.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sanctions against ingroup theft.</td>
<td>4. Sanctions for outgroup theft, or absence of sanctions against.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Sanctions against ingroup murder.</td>
<td>5. Sanctions for outgroup murder or absence of sanctions against outgroup murder.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Cooperative relations with ingroup members.</td>
<td>6. Absence of cooperation with outgroup members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Obedience to ingroup authorities.</td>
<td>7. Absence of obedience to outgroup authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Willingness to remain an ingroup member.</td>
<td>8. Absence of conversion to outgroup membership.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Testing the validity of all ethnocentric attitude correlations or their universal application is not the desire or intent of this study. More importantly, a survey of Table 16 reveals that not all attitudes characteristic of the ethnocentric syndrome are relevant to the foreign policy domain. For example, attitudes regarding sanctions for theft and murder, obedience to authorities, and membership conversion are all important attitudes that become relevant to the functioning of a state's civil society,
but hardly applicable to an international domain that lacks a centralized authority and upholds national citizenship making membership conversion difficult. On the other hand, attitude clusters correlating superiority with contempt, strong with weak, and cooperation with dissension are attitudes that are germane to the international policy domain and are important in the study of international relations. These aspects of the ethnocentric syndrome foster attitudes and behavior that lead to misunderstandings, hostility, instability, and ultimately a readiness to use violence for conflict resolution. These attitudes and behaviors are highly relevant to students of foreign policy.

Sumner's original insights into how superiority manifests itself in the relationship between groups has been the focus of numerous studies. For example, Sherif and Sherif (1953) contend that threat and intergroup competition exaggerates ingroup virtues and magnification of outgroup vices while Deutsch (1953) argues that the greater the group's ethnocentrism the more intense are the pressures for homogeneity. Yet, an analysis of how the construction of a national identity, based upon beliefs of state superiority, influences the behavior between states has not been examined.

This chapter will make inroads toward this task by investigating how beliefs about national superiority affect attitudes toward other international actors. Specifically, it will focus upon three propositions derived from the ethnocentric syndrome: 1) Those most favorable toward the United States will also be most unfavorable toward other international actors; 2) Those who perceive the United States as superior will form an enemy image of the Soviet Union (Russia); and 3)
Those who perceive the United States as superior will feel threatened by the Soviet Union (Russia). The following three sections will examine each of these propositions.

**INGROUP FAVORABILITY AND OUTGROUP UNFAVORABILITY**

As noted earlier, studies in social psychology have documented individuals' tendencies to favor the ingroup (Brewer, 1979; Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Messick and Mackie, 1989; Tajfel, 1982) and hold the outgroup with disdain. This was due to individuals' implicit scaling of other groups, becoming more acceptant of those they consider similar and wary of those they consider different. Disparaging other groups leads to enhancing one's own self-worth and esteem.

One could argue that this tendency becomes more salient as individuals think about other international actors. Those from other cultures can differ in the way they look, talk, behave, believe, and structure their cultural and political systems. Social distance, as well as geographic distance, separates many national groupings. When comparing outgroups within and across borders, Levine and Campbell (1972:160) note that,

> In terms of modern nations, the contrast occurs between the individual's perception of ethnically distinct outgroups in his own nation, about who he is likely to have partially valid stereotypes formed around the most salient aspects of his own interaction with them and strongly biased by the structural context of this interaction, and his perception of foreigners, about whom he has even less information and is thus freer to devise autistic fantasies.
The tendency to regard "foreigners" more negatively is complicated by an increasingly "shrinking globe" which fosters competition between groups for the necessities of life, leading to escalating unrest and violence.¹

During the Cold War, the differences between the Soviet Union and the United States could not be more pronounced. They differed on most social characteristics--cultural, political, social, economic--yet had one common attribute, superpower status. The Cold War international environment, produced by the superpower global rivalry and the social attributes characteristic of the United States and Soviet Union, set the stage for the formation of the classic ingroup favorability and outgroup unfavorability dynamic. It is thought that the "strongest and most threatening outgroup should be the target of the most ethnocentric hostility from the ingroup" (Levine and Campbell, 1972:39). Yet this dynamic is not automatic. Individuals had varying beliefs about the Soviet Union even during this era of intense competition. It is purported that a superior US national identity will dispose individuals to favor the United States and hold the outgroup with disdain while those who do not consider the US superior will be less likely to do so. In addition, those who identify strongly with the United States will show this pattern to a greater extent.

¹Realistic group conflict theory (Sumner, 1906; Sherif and Sherif, 1953; Boulding, 1962) posits that group conflicts are rational manifestations of groups pursuing incompatible goals and are in competition for scarce resources.
Methodology

It test the above hypotheses, Levine and Campbell (1972:13) suggest the following:

If ingroup members describe ingroup characteristics and outgroup characteristics in such a way that the number of good and bad characteristics attributed to each can be computed, then the proportion of good characteristics (in terms of the ingroup’s evaluation) should be more than one half for the ingroup and less than one half for the outgroup, and the higher is the self-adulation index, the more disparaging should be the net image of any outgroups.

As discussed in Chapter III, modifiers referring to the United States, Soviet Union (Russia), and other international actors were evaluated to determine whether they were favorable to the United States and unfavorable to the Soviet Union (Russia) and other international actors. Those mentions that were favorable to the US were compared to all mentions of the United States to construct a mean favorable score. The same was done for unfavorable references toward the USSR (Russia) and other actors.

USSR (Russia) Unfavorability

An interesting dynamic unfolds when we analyze the mean proportion of favorable US modifiers per article compared to the mean proportion of unfavorable USSR (Russia) modifiers within the elites’ writings. Overall, a strong correlation between an author’s verbal indicators of favorability toward the United States and unfavorability toward the Soviet Union (Russia) was found. This was indicated by a
Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .75 reflecting a strong relationship between degree of US favorability and USSR unfavorability within the foreign policy elites’ written words. This coefficient signifies that 56% of the variance in the dependent variable, unfavorability of the USSR, is explained by the independent variable, or favorability to the US. The overall correlation between US favorability and USSR unfavorability suggests that there is a linear relationship between the two variables—the greater the favorability toward the United States the greater the feelings of unfavorability toward the Soviet Union (Russia). Yet, this overall relationship does not explicate each author’s level of USSR (Russia) unfavorability.

To obtain comparison among the authors, the distribution of USSR (Russia) unfavorability scores per author were standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation and variance of one. Individual scores were converted into z or standard scores, to determine the number of standard deviations that the individual’s mean score varies from the group mean. The authors’ US favorability, reported in the preceding chapter, was used as a comparison measure.

The Figures 5 & 6 below represent authors’ z scores on the variables US favorability and USSR (Russia) Unfavorability for a ten-year time period (1984-1994).
Favorability Toward US

Figure 5

Unfavorability Toward the USSR

Figure 6
Overall, those individuals most favorable toward the United States are also the ones most unfavorable toward the Soviet Union when placed on a continuum. In fact, the two patterns closely mirror each other. The US Non-Identifiers, Maynes and Klare, were non-evaluative of the USSR (Russia). The US Super-Identifiers, Krauthammer and Kondracke, were for the most part, unfavorable of the USSR (Russia). However, the most interesting difference between the two groupings is the highly USSR (Russia) unfavorable attitudes of Brzezinski and Nye, US Identifiers. We would expect unfavorable attitudes given their level of US identification, but it is surprising that they surpass Krauthammer and Kondracke in their unfavorableness when their measures were standardized. However, relatively speaking, they are still within expectable ranges.

To take a closer look at each authors’ dispositions toward the Soviet Union, Table 17 examines the proportion of times the author mentions the USSR (Russia) in unfavorable terms.
# TABLE 17
THE PROPORTION THE AUTHOR MENTIONS THE USSR IN UNFAVORABLE TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Super-Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (IMP)</td>
<td>.798</td>
<td>.275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (IMP)</td>
<td>.785</td>
<td>.321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>.790</td>
<td>.130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>.540</td>
<td>.372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>.520</td>
<td>.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Non-Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>.466</td>
<td>.416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>.409</td>
<td>.429</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Super US Identifiers, Kondracke and Krauthammer, are joined by Brzezinski as those most unfavorable toward the Soviet Union (Russia) with close to eighty percent of their USSR (Russia) mentions as unfavorable. This evaluation fluctuates throughout the articles which is not surprising given the end of the Cold War. The exception is Brzezinski whose assessment of the USSR (Russia) stays stable across the ten-year time period. The US Identifiers, Nye and Tucker, on average have disparaging things to say about the Soviet Union (Russia) over half the time they mention it. But, they also display more variation within their articles as shown in the increased standard deviation. Klare and Maynes, the US Non-Identifiers, had non-evaluative things to say about the Soviet Union (Russia) around
sixty percent of the times they spoke about it. These findings support the contentions that those most favorable toward the US will also be most unfavorable toward the USSR (Russia).

Overall, all authors, except Brzezinski, exhibit a relatively high standard deviation. The US Non-identifiers' standard deviation is higher than the rest of the group. The high standard deviation indicates that there were fluctuations in their evaluation of the Soviet Union across the ten-year time period. A look at the authors' writings across the Cold War and Post-Cold War eras may shed some light on this finding.

**Cold War vs. Post-Cold War**

The end of the Cold War had a profound effect on the US-Soviet rivalry. The collapse of the Soviet Union not only signaled that the USSR could no longer partake in a global competition with the United States, but that it was significantly changing the structure of its political and economic systems—it was literally "coming in from the cold." This dramatic international event should cause a reassessment of the former Soviet Union and its status as an outgroup member in the post-cold war period.

A quasi-experimental design was followed taking measures of USSR unfavorability at two distinct time periods—the Cold War (1985-89) and Post-Cold War (1990-94). Breaking the data down by time period an interesting pattern emerges. During the Cold War, the correlation between US favorability and USSR
unfavorability becomes even stronger with a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .89 which indicates that during the Cold War 64% of the variance in the dependent variable, unfavorability of the USSR, is explained variance with reference to favorability toward the US. Yet, in the Post-Cold War era, this relationship disappears. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is -0.05. These results indicate that although during the Cold War favorability toward the United States was linked to unfavorability toward the Soviet Union this connection can not be assumed in the Post-Cold War era, the null hypothesis can not be rejected.

To compare the authors between time periods, the distribution was standardized with a mean of zero and a standard deviation and variance of one. Individual mean scores were converted into z or standard scores, or the standard deviation that the score varies from the mean in each time period. Figures 7 and Figure 8 compares the authors in each time period on the variable USSR (Russia) unfavorability.
Unfavorable Toward USSR Cold War

![Bar chart showing standardized scores for various authors with a mean score of 0.]

Authors: Maynes, Klare, Tucker, Nye, Brautigam, Kondracke, Krautham

Positive scores are unfavorable
Negative scores are non-evaluative

Figure 7

Unfavorable Toward Russia Post-Cold War

![Bar chart showing standardized scores for various authors with a mean score of 0.]

Authors: Maynes, Klare, Tucker, Nye, Brautigam, Kondracke, Krautham

Positive scores are unfavorable
Negative scores are non-evaluative

Figure 8
Contrasting unfavorability toward the USSR during the Cold War to unfavorability toward Russia in the Post-Cold War world the pattern of author placement, as did the correlation, falls apart. The Super US identifiers, Kondracke and Krauthammer, although highly critical of the USSR during the Cold War become the forerunners in their non-evaluative statements of Russia in the Post-Cold War world. The US Non-Identifier, Maynes and Klare, increase their unfavorable USSR (Russia) mentions, Klare slightly and Maynes dramatically. Tucker, Nye and Brzezinski, US Identifiers, lead the pack in unfavorability toward Russia in the Post-Cold War world.

The unstandardized proportions in Table 18 below show an interesting configuration between the two eras.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cold War Mean</th>
<th>Cold War Std Dev</th>
<th>Post-Cold War Mean</th>
<th>Post-Cold War Std Dev</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Super Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>.830</td>
<td>.213</td>
<td>.698</td>
<td>.424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>.840</td>
<td>.266</td>
<td>.452</td>
<td>.464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>.816</td>
<td>.134</td>
<td>.759</td>
<td>.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.156</td>
<td>.607</td>
<td>.533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>.468</td>
<td>.321</td>
<td>.666</td>
<td>.471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-Identifier</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>.142</td>
<td>.192</td>
<td>.542</td>
<td>.465</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>.506</td>
<td>.092</td>
<td>.450</td>
<td>.497</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of the group, the Super US Identifiers dramatically decrease their unfavorability from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War era, Kondracke even cuts his unfavorable mentions in half. The US Identifiers, Tucker and Nye, increase their unfavorable mentions as does the US Non-Identifier, Maynes. Klare decreases only slightly his low mean proportion of unfavorable mentions. The low standard deviations in the authors’ means during the Cold War indicate stability in their evaluations of the USSR from 1985-1988. In the Post-Cold War era, however, the
standard deviations for every author increase, showing great fluctuations within the articles. Brzezinski is the only elite who continues to be sure of his negative evaluation of the USSR and then Russia.

How can we account for this pattern of change? As argued above, Super US Identifiers’ identities are so intertwined with their national identity, they are more prone to construct ingroups and outgroups. They perceive two types of international actors, those who are part of the ingroup and those who do not belong. The US Super Identifiers regard other countries as objects to be evaluated. Those in the ingroup can do no wrong and those in the outgroup no right. Thus, during the Cold War one would expect that US Super Identifiers would regard the number one outgroup, the USSR, with disdain, which they overwhelming did with over eighty percent unfavorable mentions. However, the collapse of the Soviet Union, now Russia, presents an interesting dilemma for the US Super Identifier given their simplistic "us-them" dichotomy. Is Russia now "us" or "them"?

Cognitive consistency theory would predict that a dramatic change in the international system, such as the end of the Cold War, would lead to a dramatic conversion once consistency could no longer be maintained. The collapse of the Soviet Union required reevaluation of this global actor. For the Super Identifier, the USSR no longer fit its assigned "object" category. This explains how an extremely negative evaluation of the USSR during the Cold War is miraculously transformed toward a more non-evaluative status.
The US Non-Identifier, on the other hand, have not intertwined their identities with the nation state. Consequently they do not perceive other countries as objects but as subjects pursuing policies. Unlike the US Super Identifiers, the US Non-Identifier do not perceive "bad countries" just "bad policies". Given this perception, we would not expect the US Non-Identifier to go through a radical reversal of their USSR (Russia) evaluation. We would expect to see continued fluctuation of evaluations per article given the policies pursued by the USSR, now Russia. This seems to be the pattern. Maynes, in fact, increases his negative evaluation of Russia considerably.

The US Identifiers have characteristics of both the Super Identifiers and Non-Identifiers. Although they identify with the United States, they have not done so to the same extent as the Super Identifiers. Thus, they are unfavorable toward the Soviet Union given their tendency toward the ingroup/outgroup dynamic. However, they are not prone toward a dramatic conversion like the Super Identifiers after the Cold War. The Identifiers have not simplified the Soviet Union to the same extent as the Super Identifiers. They have just enough of a reflective capacity to remain suspicious and vigilant in their evaluation of USSR (Russian) policy. Russia must prove itself to become a member of the West's community of nations. Thus, negative modifiers increase slightly given their attempts at evaluation from a still suspicious stance. This is supported by the variance noted within their articles in the Post-Cold War era.

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2I thank Charles Hermann for this observation.
Brzezinski is an interesting case because his unfavorable modifiers for both the USSR and Russia remain at the roughly same level (75%) in both time periods. The consistency of this evaluation is amazingly stable across the ten-year time period. This finding leads one to question whether his evaluation is based upon his US national identity. What may be the motivating factor behind this apparent disdain for Russia is his Polish identity. This assertion will be examined in more detail later in the chapter.

Although the rise in standard deviations concerning Russian unfavorability in the Post-Cold War era was attributed to the authors' national identities, a less interesting, yet plausible, reason for the discrepancy can be attributed to the coding technique. Unfavorableness toward the Soviet Union (Russia) was indicated if the author used words such as "weak," "unfriendly," "hostile," and "imperialistic" or suggested meddlesomeness. Thus, modifiers that talked of the Soviet Union's collapse or other "unfavorable" events would be coded as unfavorable toward Russia. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union's collapse is an objective fact rather than a subjective interpretation. Thus, it is possible that the times an author mentioned the Soviet Union or Russia in the Post-Cold War era they were relating unfavorable conditions within the country given its demise. The coding rules do not facilitate distinguishing between objective fact and the author's subjective interpretation. However, it is interesting to note that the authors were still focusing upon the negative when aspects of Russia.
Other International Actor Unfavorability

The proposition that ingroup favorability is correlated with outgroup unfavorability can also be explored looking at the correlations between US favorability and unfavorability toward other international actors. The logic behind this is that a person highly favorable to the ingroup, i.e. the United States, will see most international actors in unfavorable terms. We should get a stable correlations given that, on the whole, most other international actors did not undergo a radical transformation, as the Soviet Union did, from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War world. Thus, the overall unfavorability toward other actors should remain constant across both time periods.

US favorability and unfavorability toward other international actors over a ten-year period correlate .34. We can assume that 11% of the variance in the dependent variable, unfavorability of other international actors, is explained variance with reference to the independent variable, or favorability to the US.

Although the correlations found between the independent variable, US favorability, and the dependent variable, other actor unfavorability, is not as impressive as that found between US favorability and USSR unfavorability during the Cold War, this finding is still striking given the coding scheme. Reference to other international actors did not recognize type or identity of the actor. Countries such as France, the United Kingdom, and Canada--those countries considered allies--were appraised as "other actors" as were Iraq, North Korea, and Cuba--those countries

---

3The Soviet Union (Russia) was not counted as part of this group.
considered by many to be enemies. This coding procedure was adopted given the
difficulty in an a priori distinction of which countries could be identified as
"objectively" our enemies, those in the outgroup, and those "objectively" our allies,
or those belonging to the ingroup. Instead, it was contended that highly superior
national identity types should see most international actors, no matter who they are,
as part of the outgroup.

Once again, the distribution was standardized with a mean of zero and a
standard deviation and variance of one. Individual scores were converted into z or
standard scores. Figures 9 and 10 compare the authors to each other on the variables
US favorability and other actor unfavorability.
Favorability Toward US

Figure 9

Unfavorability Toward Others

Figure 10
The figures give an overall impression that the ordering of the authors is similar when placed on a continuum of US favorability and other actor unfavorability. As was expected, US Non-Identifiers, Maynes and Klare, are non-evalutative of other international actors. The US Super-Identifiers, Krauthammer and Kondracke, on the other hand, are the most unfavorable toward other international actors. The two US Identifiers, Brzezinski and Tucker, however, are definitely not as unfavorable, relatively speaking, as the other Identifier, Nye.

Table 19 below reports the unstandardized means of the proportion of times the author mentioned all other international actors they did so in unfavorable terms.

### TABLE 19
THE PROPORTION THE AUTHOR MENTIONS ALL OTHER ACTORS IN UNFAVORABLE TERMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Super Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>.712</td>
<td>.188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>.640</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>.617</td>
<td>.126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>.512</td>
<td>.179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>.430</td>
<td>.224</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Non-Identifiers</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>.316</td>
<td>.228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>.501</td>
<td>.313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Once again, a clear pattern emerges. The US Super Identifiers, Kondracke and Krauthammer, are also the individuals most unfavorable when mentioning other international actors. They are once again joined by Brzezinski, a US Identifier, who had unfavorable things to say about other international actors sixty percent of the time. The most non-evaluative of other international actors is Maynes, a US Non-Identifier, who was non-evaluative seventy percent of the time other actors were mentioned. The two Identifiers, Nye and Tucker, are unfavorable between forty and fifty percent of the time they mention other international actors, which is what would be expected from US Identifiers. The interesting case, however, is Klare. Although a US Non-Identifier, his unfavorable mentions are at the same level as the US Identifiers. However, his unfavorableness is not as stable as the other authors given that he has the highest standard deviation, showing great fluctuation throughout his writings.

**Cold War Post-Cold War**

Unlike the pattern found when comparing the correlations between US favorability and USSR unfavorability during that Cold War and after, the configuration found between the two time periods when comparing the correlations of US favorability and other actor unfavorability is rather stable. During the Cold War, the correlation between US favorability and other actor unfavorability is a Pearson Correlation Coefficient of .32. Around 11% of the variance in the dependent variable, unfavorability of other actors, is explained variance with reference to
favorability toward the US. In the Post-Cold War era, this correlation remains virtually the same. The Pearson Correlation Coefficient is .36 indicating around 13% of the variance in other actor unfavorability is explained variance with reference to favorability of the United States. Overall, the magnitude of the relationship is stable.

Table 20 below compares the unstandardized proportion of the mean unfavorability scores toward other international actors across the two time periods.
TABLE 20
THE PROPORTION THE AUTHOR MENTIONS
OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
IN UNFAVORABLE TERMS PER ERA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Cold War Mean</th>
<th>Cold War Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Post-Cold War Mean</th>
<th>Post-Cold War Std. Dev.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Super Identifiers</strong></td>
<td><strong>.728</strong></td>
<td><strong>.187</strong></td>
<td><strong>.643</strong></td>
<td><strong>.189</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>.681</td>
<td>.168</td>
<td>.555</td>
<td>.301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Identifiers</strong></td>
<td><strong>.674</strong></td>
<td><strong>.100</strong></td>
<td><strong>.548</strong></td>
<td><strong>.128</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>.406</td>
<td>.117</td>
<td>.461</td>
<td>.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>.501</td>
<td>.127</td>
<td>.530</td>
<td>.271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US Non-Identifiers</strong></td>
<td><strong>.170</strong></td>
<td><strong>.130</strong></td>
<td><strong>.420</strong></td>
<td><strong>.233</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>.400</td>
<td>.273</td>
<td>.551</td>
<td>.333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the Cold War, a clear pattern emerges where US Super Identifiers are the most unfavorable of other actors, US Identifiers are the next most unfavorable, and the US Non-identifiers are least unfavorable with Maynes only having unfavorable things to say about other actors 10 percent of the time compared to Kondracke with 72 percent unfavorable mentions. In the Post-Cold War era, this pattern holds but is not as pronounced. The US Super Identifiers, although still the leaders in their unfavorability decrease their scores somewhat. The US Non-Identifiers unexpectedly increase their unfavorable mentions dramatically.
An explanation for this increase is found within the specific author's writings in the Post-Cold War. Both authors devoted most of their time addressing nuclear proliferation and the arms races. Their portrayal of countries like North Korea and Iraq is highly unfavorable given that both authors prefer a halt to the dissemination of nuclear weapons. Thus, their unfavorability is based more upon a few specific actors' policies rather than an over-arching unfavorability toward the actors themselves. In fact, Maynes argues for a thaw with North Korea.

Since the internationalists value global order and stability, they will see other international actors who pursue policies that upset this balance in an unfavorable light. Thus, their articles concentrated upon actors pursuing certain policies. Compared to the non-identifying Internationalists, the US Super Identifiers and Identifiers were more concerned with distinguishing countries that were a threat to the United States for a variety of reasons. Krauthammer and Kondrakke emphasized the threat a reunited Germany will pose for the international community.

This section clearly demonstrates that how elites portray other international actors is largely determined by their level of identification with the United States. Those more favorable of the US are also more unfavorable toward other international actors. The following section examines whether superior national identities are more prone to construct an organized image of the USSR (Russia) namely, the enemy image.

Superior National Identity and the Formation of an Enemy Image
During the Cold War, the existence of a major international competitor forced foreign policy opinion leaders to assess the level of threat the Soviet Union posed to US interests. In fact, scholars well-versed in US foreign policy continually contended that perceptions about the Soviet Union's (Russia) motivation and capability have guided US foreign policy beliefs since the end of WWII. For example, Hurwitz and Peffley (1990) find that Americans shape their individual foreign policy preferences, such as defense spending and nuclear weapons development, on their varying degrees of threat and trust of the Soviet Union. Threat perceptions led to foreign policy postures or strategies such as militarism and containment which, in turn, predicted attitudes on concrete policy issues such as support for sending military troops abroad. Holsti and Rosenau's (1979, 1984, 1986) types of foreign policy belief systems implicitly have at their base varying perceptions of the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Research on individual foreign policy belief systems also echo this finding. The operational code literature has argued that one of the core beliefs that has the propensity to constrain other foreign policy beliefs has been perceptions of the fundamental nature of one's opponent (George, 1979, 1980:231). But, what determines how individuals perceive other international actors, especially their main global rival?

As demonstrated above, there is no doubt that favorability toward the ingroup leads to unfavorability toward groups perceived as different, i.e. most other international actors. But, the question is whether this unfavorability is indicative of a
bundle or package of organized cognitions that form an image. As M. Cottam (1994:10) explains,

> Often images function like stereotypes: they contain "facts," which we hold as true, which enable us to interpret the behavior of others, and which tells us how we can and should respond to that behavior.

Using an image, the subject can recognize the target, categorize it, and respond appropriately to the environmental context. In this sense, an image functions at two levels, it acts as a perceptual filter that individual’s use to interpret and organize the environment and then facilitates the individual’s processing of new information because once the object is identified as a case of the type a stereotype will be applied. Images thus tell us what information is correct or false, relevant or irrelevant, and what policy alternatives we should pursue--linking unfavorable perceptions with policy proposals. This section hypothesizes that individuals that have superior national identities are more likely to form images of other international actors based on a stereotype. One such image is the enemy image.

Much scholarship is devoted to analyzing the enemy image and its impact on relations between states and groups. Studies find that those who hold an enemy

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4 Beside enemy images, scholars have identified stereotypic images such as barbarian, alley, degenerate, satellite, imperial and child to describe some other international perceptions (Holsti, 1967; R.W. Cottam, 1977; M. Cottam, 1986; Herrmann, 1986).

5 Scholars have devoted the most time to specifying the attributes of the enemy image, which include: goals-unlimited expansion; motivation-ideology, logic of totalitarianism, vested interests; strategy-back down to firmness, exploit restraint, untrustworthy, violates agreements; decision style-rational/unified actor (Holsti, 1962, 1967; Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1985; Jervis, 1970, 1976).
Much scholarship is devoted to analyzing the enemy image\(^5\) and its impact on relations between states and groups. Studies find that those who hold an enemy image perceive the other as an actor with evil ambitious, suspect intentions, and a motivation to dominate other countries, if not the world (Holsti, 1962, 1967; Finlay, Holsti, and Fagen; 1967; George, 1979; Snyder and Diesing, 1977; Jervis, 1970; Scott, 1965). Along with these perceptions is the belief the actor has the ability to carry out its intentions given that its capabilities are equal to, if not greater, than one’s own state.

As one will recall, Sumner’s (1927) original scheme purported that ethnocentric individuals saw the ingroup as virtuous, superior, and strong yet believed the outgroup was immoral, inferior, and weak (Levine and Campell, 1972:12). Reevaluating this dynamic, taking into account outgroup capabilities and perceived threat to the ingroup, Sherif and Sherif (1953) purport that ethnocentric types will stereotype outgroups as strong, aggressive and effective, rather than despising them as weak, cowardly, stupid and lazy (Levine and Campbell, 1972:40). There is a

\(^5\) Scholars have devoted the most time to specifying the attributes of the enemy image, which include: goals-unlimited expansion; motivation-ideology, logic of totalitarianism, vested interests; strategy-back down to firmness, exploit restraint, untrustworthy, violates agreements; decision style-rational/unified actor (Holsti, 1962, 1967; Cottam, 1977; Herrmann, 1985; Jervis, 1970, 1976).
correspondence between the aspects of the ethnocentric syndrome, based upon beliefs of national superiority, and the formation of an enemy image (Burton, 1969; Kelman, 1986; Suander, 1987). If national identity is the basis of a foreign policy belief system, then a superior national identity is likely to stereotype the outgroup, the Soviet Union, in typical enemy terms. However, it could be argued that the causal arrow between image and threat is going the other direction. Herrmann (1986) contends that enemy images arise due to the individual’s need to justify actions they believe are in their state’s best interests in response to perceived threat and opportunity. He states,

...perceived threats and perceived opportunities both incline the subject to act, and put pressure on the cognitive processes related to defining the situation. The result is a tendency to construct an image of the situation for personal and public consumption that releases the subject from moral inhibitions and allows the subject to deal with the threat or opportunity without restraint. The threat will be killed with pride and the opportunities taken without embarrassment (p. 183).

In Herrmann’s (1988, 1985) work, perceptions of threat, opportunity, capability, and cultural differences determine the imagery that the subject will use to define the situation. Enemies are created along with the negative modifies associated with the target in cases where individuals see threat from a rival. If, on the other hand, opportunity is perceived and a weaker, culturally inferior country is involved, then a dependent or child image will be constructed. In sum, the perception of the environment, either as threatening or opportunistic, determines what action the person

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6For a conceptual discussion of national images see Boulding (1959).
deems appropriate and the image is produced to justify needed actions based upon the abilities and culture of the other.

Taking issue with this assertion, one could argue that threat is a perceptual variable in the first place (Herrmann, 1986, 1988; Pastor, 1992). It seems more likely that the disposition to perceive threat is contingent upon a social identity which scales and classifies groups. There is a variability among individuals and belief collectivists as to the degree of threat in the environment. It can be argued that this
variability is produced by dispositional variables inherent within a national identity. Herrmann misses this point because his work aggregates to the state level.

It is logical then that those having a superior national identity will regard outgroups, those most unlike the nation, as threatening and their actions considered malign if the actor has the appropriate capabilities. This is the famous "bad-faith-model" proposed by Holsti (1970) during this examination of John Foster Dulles. No matter what action the USSR took, it was considered to have ulterior motives.

A recent critique by Hermann and Kegley (1995) of the democracies and war literature (Dixon, 1994; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Lake, 1992) demonstrate this point well by arguing that the reason democracies do not fight may result from the fact that leaders and the public identify countries that classify themselves democracies as part of their ingroup, and therefore, as worthy of protection and support rather than competition and conflict. Conversely, it is those governments who are not democratic who cannot be trusted. Because autocracies' political cultures do not share similar norms, values, and perceptions of the world, they are always potentially threatening (Hermann and Kegley, 1995:10).

Anecdotal evidence of the relationship between Nicaragua, Cuba, and the United States seems to support this claim. During the Cold War, US policy makers linked the Soviet Union to a world-wide communist movement bent on undermining the US's sphere of influence. The fact that Fidel Castro remained leader of Cuba and the Sandinistas rose to power in Nicaragua were clear examples of Soviet meddling in the US's own backyard (Schoutz, 1987). By December 1989, however, President Bush was embracing a reforming USSR. Earlier, the USSR was continually blamed for supporting the revolutionary movement in El Salvador, yet, with the apparent end
of the Cold War fingers were exclusively pointed at Nicaragua and Cuba. When the Sandinistas maintained they were not responsible, Bush claimed that they were lying "to out Soviet friends" (cited in Pastor, 1992:84). Although the Sandinistas and Castro became the US's biggest problem in its neighborhood, one would be hard pressed to claim that the United States saw a security threat from these two actors once the Soviet Union was no longer in a position to potentially export revolution. Instead, the reforming Soviet Union was transforming into an entity, one more like the United States, so much so they were becoming our "friends." Cuba and Nicaragua, on the other hand, were still considered part of the outgroup. But, since the 1990 displacement of the Sandinistas by the UNO coalition in Managua--whose campaign was largely organized and financed by the United States (Booth, 1990:467-482;)--Castro is the only "bully" on the block. This can explain the continued embargo against Cuba, despite its withdrawal from an active foreign revolutionary policy and the continual negative, stereotypic portrayal of it in the press and among policy makers.

Although the above examples support the contention that a national identity can account for the formation of negative stereotypes, threat can come in many forms, not just from differentiation. The causal arrow probably goes both ways. Initial outgroup differentiation causes actions to be interpreted in negative ways. A capable challenger heightens threat perceptions and the stereotype is reinforced or exaggerated.
Thus, one would expect the following:

_Hypothesis 3: Those with superior national identities will portray the Soviet Union in enemy image terms._

Below is a discussion of how each worldview is likely to portray the USSR during the Cold War.

**National Identity and Image of the Soviet Union**

_Inperialists_

Given its belief in superiority and responsibility toward and international domain, an Imperialist would be highly threatened by a capable power possessing a different cultural, political, and economic system. Given this disposition, an Imperialist would be prone to portray the USSR in typical negative enemy image terms. The USSR would be depicted as having a goal of unlimited imperial expansion. It is not just another great power whose ambitions bring it into conflict with other nations. It has revolutionary global aspirations that include destruction of the current state system and replacing it with an imperial system modeled after its own will. The motives driving the Soviet Union would be characterized as dispositional. They have the perception that the logic of totalitarianism and ideology are the driving motives behind Soviet policy since a totalitarian state can not abandon expansionist ideology that legitimate its dictatorship. Soviet foreign policy is neither sensitive to changes in leadership or American policies. This of course makes it impossible to bargain with the Soviet Union or have a peaceful coexistence,
confrontation is the only option. Soviet capabilities are perceived by the Imperialist as vastly superior to those of the US. Failure to keep pace with Soviet defense spending encourages it to embark upon expansionist policies.

**Nationalists**

Nationalists would be as equally threatened by the USSR as the Imperialist. However, whereas the Imperialist sees the Soviet Union as a challenge to its global ambitions, the Nationalist would perceive the spread of international communism as the main threat to US security because it has the potential to undermine the US way of life. The Soviet Union just happens to be an international actor with the ability to spread the scourge. Thus, the Nationalist, like the Imperialists, would perceive the USSR’s international objective as being the unlimited expansion of communism. The main motivating force behind USSR policy would be an ideology that dictated world domination and the "burying" of the US. This situation is especially threatening if the United States was surpassed with military might.

**Internationalists**

Because Internationalists are not highly ethnocentric, their view of other international actors would not be as stereotypical or as hostile. They would be more focused upon the policies of the actor rather then stereotyping the actor as an object. During the Cold War, Internationalists should view the USSR as a status quo, or in some cases even, a defensive world power. Its foreign policy motives should be
considered complex and largely driven by two factors, threats from others on its
territory and temptations to take advantage of low risk gains. All in all the USSR
should be perceived as behaving as any other world power would. Its capabilities will
be seen as comparable to those of the US. Linked together, these beliefs may
indicate concern with the threat from the USSR, but the USSR will not be portrayed
in enemy image terms.

Methodology

As detailed in Chapter III, each author’s articles were evaluated to determine
how the USSR (Russia) was portrayed. This revolves around perceptions of the
Soviet Union’s intentions, motivations, and capabilities. An enemy image of the
USSR would contain the following attributes: 1) its goal is world domination
(unlimited expansionist/destructionist); 2) its motives are attributed to dispositions
inherent in the state such as ideology, totalitarianism, culture, geography, history,
leadership characteristics, and vested interests; and 3) it capabilities are equal or
superior to the United States. We would expect that the Imperialists and the
Nationalists, especially the Super-Imperialists, would attribute the stereotypic enemy-
image characteristics to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. We would also
presume that Internationalists would not do so. Table 21 below displays the
percentage of the authors' articles that contain either all the aspects of the enemy image or none of the attributes of an enemy image.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{7}The "other" category in Tables 21, 22, and 23 indicates those articles that do not mention the USSR (Russia) or an assessment of the USSR's (Russian) goals, motivation or capabilities could not be made by the coder.
### Table 21

**Enemy Image:**

**Percent of Authors' Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>All Attributes</th>
<th>No Attributes</th>
<th>Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>2% (1)</td>
<td>58% (25)</td>
<td>5% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S-IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
<td>53% (20)</td>
<td>8% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S-IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>36% (4)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>11% (1)</td>
<td>33% (3)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NAT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
<td>27% (3)</td>
<td>0% (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>0% (4)</td>
<td>33% (1)</td>
<td>8% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>13% (2)</td>
<td>25% (4)</td>
<td>6% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The table above reports that the only author who portrayed the Soviet Union in classic enemy image terms in a significant percent of his articles was Brzezinski.

This is not surprising given the earlier finding concerning his unfavorability of the USSR, attributed mostly to his Polish identity. However, this does indicate that when discussing the Soviet Union, most authors did not relate the USSR's intentions, motivations, and capabilities within each of their articles. Table 23 below lists how each author portrayed the USSR during the Cold War.
### Table 22

**Percent Authors' Articles Attribute Enemy Image Characteristics Cold War**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>USSR Goals</th>
<th>USSR Motivation</th>
<th>USSR Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (S-IMP)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(27)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (S-IMP)</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
During the Cold War there is no doubt that Brzezinski, an Imperialist, used a stereotypic enemy image to describe the Soviet Union. A large percentage of this articles perceived the Soviet Union as highly capable power (76%) desiring to expand its sphere of influence (83%) given its inherent dispositional variables (83%). Nye, also an Imperialist, is more perplexing. He clearly displays some elements of the image, specifically identifying USSR dispositional motivations and comparable capabilities. The main component of the enemy image, however, is the belief concerning expansionist goals. This is clearly not present. He mostly contended that the USSR had limited expansionist or accommodating intentions.

Tucker, a Nationalist, follows a different pattern. He perceives the Soviet Union as having the goal of expanding its empire (60%) and having the ability to do so (80%), yet the motivation for this behavior is attributed to situational factors (60%) as well as dispositional ones (40%). We would expect a Nationalist to attribute Soviet motivation more to ideology, a dispositional variable. Thus, Tucker does fashion an enemy image of the USSR, but, his explanation of Soviet motivation in some articles does not fit the pattern.

Maynes, an Internationalist, on the other hand, does not cognitively construct the USSR as an enemy. All articles attribute Soviet intentions as defensive or accommodating, although the specification of Soviet motivation is lacking (60% of his articles did not talk about motivation). Maynes does, however, contend that the Soviet Union has comparable capabilities to the United States. Yet, without the accompanying goal or intention of expansion, specification of equivalent capabilities
does not an enemy make. Many allies have equal capabilities. Klare, another
Internationalist, mirrors Maynes' discourse yet the image is not as clear. Although
more of his articles do not consider the Soviet Union as having expansive goals
(60%), a significant portion do (40%). Coupling this with superior capabilities and
the indication that Klare does contend that the USSR is motivated by dispositional
variables in some of his articles (although the largest percent do not address Soviet
motivation) a judgement concerning whether Klare stereotypes the USSR in enemy
terms is hard to make. Yet the fact that some of the enemy characteristics are present
is a surprising finding.

Another revelation is the configuration of both Krauthammer and Kondracke's
cognitive content of the USSR. Although we would expect the crystallization of an
enemy image for these two authors given their Super Imperialist orientation, this was
not supported in the data. Although there are indications of the enemy image in a
portion of their articles, they equally represent the USSR in non-stereotypic imagery.
There is no distinct pattern formed. What is maybe more telling is that both of the
authors have a majority of their articles in the "Other" category. This category was
reserved for articles that either did not mention the USSR or did not specify Soviet
goals, motivation, or capabilities.

Table 23 below examines the Post-Cold War writings. Of all the authors,
Brzezinski is the only one whose articles still portray Russia with an enemy-image
stereotype. Although this pattern fluctuates among his writings, it is still present to a
degree. Kondracke, Klare, Tucker, and Krauthammer definitely do not portray
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Russian Goals</th>
<th>Russian Motivation</th>
<th>Russian Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Enemy</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(6)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kondracke (S-IMP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (S-IMP)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(0)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The examination of whether a national identity could account for the formation of an enemy image was a mixed bag. The Imperialists and Nationalists did construct an enemy image more readily than the Internationalists, but given the small number of articles in each time period it is hard to make any overwhelming conclusions from the data. No clear response pattern could be found in the author’s explanations of the Soviet Union’s (Russia) intentions, motivations, and capabilities. But, although an enemy image was not readily discernable, author’s threat perceptions of the Soviet Union followed the pattern predicted for the enemy image. The tables below display the results of an overall assessment of the extent exhibited in the author’s articles. This was determined by the asking the coder to make an assessment of each article: Did the author portray the Soviet Union/Russia as threatening? We would expect once again that those who believe in US superiority will perceive the USSR (Russia) as threatening. Table 25 below displays the results.
TABLE 24
PERCENT OF AUTHORS' ARTICLES
THAT CLAIM RUSSIA/SOViet UNION IS THREATENING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>38%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although many authors still had articles that could not be classified, the ones that were classified supported the expected pattern. The Imperialists and the Nationalist's articles portrayed threat more than the Internationalists’ articles.
CONCLUSIONS

This chapter analyzed the extent to which a foreign policy disposition based upon a national identity would constrain beliefs concerning other international actors. The results of correlational analysis found strong support for the hypothesis that those most favorable to United States will be unfavorable to the Soviet Union and other international actors. However, this high level of unfavorability did not translate into a stereotypic enemy image of the Soviet Union as was expected. Although those who identified most readily with the US were more threatened by the USSR and constructed aspects of the enemy image, the total image was not evoked. The following chapter continues the empirical analysis by investigating whether foreign policy dispositions constrain foreign policy intentions.
CHAPTER VI
INTENTIONS

Introduction

Why do foreign policy elites support the policies that they do? The foundation upon which to answer this question has already been laid. The previous chapters' findings support the proposition that specific superior national identities depict other international actors in unfavorable ways and perceive threat more easily than their cohort. How one interprets the international arena, as threatening or not, and the person's assessment of the nature of the other international actors will influence and effect foreign policy choices.

The current chapter investigates the extent that a national identity also constrains foreign policy prescriptions. It begins with a brief review of the typical way scholars have categorized foreign policy belief preferences—internationalism/domestic, militarism/non-militarism, and unilateralism/multilateralism. It argues that a reconceptualization of these output categories based upon a foreign policy belief system with national identity as its core, can account for the difference in seven elites' foreign policy prescriptions. Specifically, it refines categorization and will account for change in policy prescriptions from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War world. In Chapter II, it was
proposed that policies can be categorized according to: 1) \textit{where} they are directed (global or restrained); 2) \textit{what} type they are (militaristic or non-militaristic); 3) \textit{who} they propose to work with (unilateral vs. multilateral); and 4) \textit{how} they conceptualize this interaction should occur (dominant or cooperative).

FOREIGN POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

\textbf{Internationalism vs. Isolationism}

When addressing the question where policy is directed, most analysts have made a distinction between those individuals interested in the United States pursuing policies aimed at an international arena and those concerned solely with a domestic policy domain (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1979, 1984, 1986; Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Chittick and Billingsley, 1986). In Chapter II it was argued that the distinction between an international and a national policy arena was an inaccurate distinction. The realities of international relations and the "shrinking globe" make the traditional separation of the state from the international community, known as isolationism, impractical and not descriptive of current foreign policy preferences. Instead, internationalism was reconceptualized as beliefs individuals have concerning whether their state is responsible to an international domain. This sense of responsibility is part of a national identity.

Concluding that your state has a responsibility in the international arena disposes the individual to consider international events as salient to the well-being of
their state. It answers the question of when and if they believe the United States should become involved in certain global situations. It is the difference between those hoping to get by (Parochialists), those hoping for a stronger America (Nationalist), those hoping for a better world (Internationalists) or those hoping for both (Imperialist). Individuals' belief in their state's responsibility in the international arena will constrain other foreign policy attitudes, such as supporting global institutions, resolving chronic global problems, and upholding global norms and values. Thus, a belief in a responsibility in the international arena allows speculation for where the individual will focus their policy agenda.

**Militarism vs. Non-Militarism**

The question concerning what type of policy instruments an individual believes will advance their country's national interest is answered by identifying the second aspect of their national identity--their belief in their state's superiority. The tendency to favor militarism was an underlying dimension found in earlier foreign policy belief system studies (Holsti 1979; Holsti and Rosenau 1979, 1984, 1986; Wittkopf, 1986, 1990; Chittick and Billingsley, 1986). Yet, an explanation of why individuals favor militaristic policies, other than militarism for militarism's sake, has been lacking.

The findings in the preceding chapter provide the lacking explanation. It was demonstrated that superior national identities tend to form a tight ingroup around the nation state which leads to scaling other international actors with reference to themselves. This causes a negative depiction of others which enhances self-esteem.
Stereotypes are a manifestation of this negativity toward outgroup. In the international arena, this is specifically tied to an enemy image of other capable global actors. Once the image is in place, the international environment will constantly be interpreted in ways that confirm the beliefs inherent within the image. This dynamic, it is argued, tends to heighten threat perceptions and predispose the individual to purport policies that deal with conflict resolution in confrontational and militaristic ways.

It can also be argued that since a superior national identity is embedded with moralism and natural hierarchy, other international actors are not in the same moral space as self. This allows inhibitions against violence and killing to be disregarded. Since force is effective and not prohibited in this belief system, it is often the policy choice preferred. This is especially true after the Cold War. The disappearance of the Soviet Union from the international scene means that intervention and militarism no longer carry the same risks and costs, i.e. a Soviet response.

**Multilateralism vs. Unilateralism**

Beside where foreign policy is directed and what type of policy is proposed, elites have preferences concerning whether the state should be able to act independently or in conjunction with other international actors. In Chapter II, these beliefs were identified as either unilateralism or multilateralism respectively. This answers the question who should be involved with or considered in the implementation of US foreign policy.
It is hypothesized that Nationalists favor segregation from the global community given beliefs of superiority and the tendency for them to regard other international actors as corrupting elements. They will highly value freedom of action, preferring unilateral policies. Internationalists, by contrast, will want to take part in collective action. They see their role as part of an international community of nations and prefer to champion international norms and group decision-making. Multilateralism will be chosen. Parochialists are not likely to be interested in international issues. But, the rare time that they are they will prefer cooperative multilateral relations with other international actors. Imperialists will initially favor multilateral policies in which they are the leader and definer of the coalition of nations. But, "collective security" will only be sought as long as it fulfills US national interest. The minuet the going gets tough, the Imperialist gets tough too and takes matters in their own hands. Thus, they will prefer dominant multilateral policies but will just as quickly turn to unilateralism.

From the above discussion, five hypotheses can be generated from the proposition that foreign policy prescriptions are based upon an individual’s belief about their state’s responsibility in the international arena and its superiority:

**Hypothesis 1:** National identities that believe in a responsibility in the international arena will support policies that advance global norms and institutions.

**Hypothesis 2:** Superior national identities will support more militaristic policies than other national identities.

**Hypothesis 3:** Superior national identities that do not believe in a responsibility in the international arena will support unilateral policies.
Hypothesis 4: Non-superior national identities will support multilateral policies.

Hypothesis 5: Superior national identities that believe in a responsibility in the international arena will support dominant multi-lateral policies.

The following sections take an initial look at how a national identity disposes the foreign policy elite to favor certain policy prescriptions or intentions.

Methodology

As discussed in Chapter III, a simulated survey was constructed to tap the range of policy prescriptions within the elites’ written articles. Questions concerning US foreign policy tactical areas—military, economic and diplomatic—were posed and authors’ responses were constructed from the textual passages and fit into categories that where explicit and mutually exclusive. Although a wide-range of foreign policy prescriptions were anticipated in the construction of the simulated survey, given that one hundred and forty questions were asked of each article, most coding sheets contained excessive amounts of "n/a"s or missing data. Authors could not possibly address all foreign policy issues within one article, although at times it seemed like some tried. Given this fact, making bold generalizations about the specific content of elites’ foreign policy belief systems and comparing results between the elites with such a small number of responses would be misguided, as would claiming decisive results concerning the above hypotheses. Instead, this chapter provides an initial look at how reconceptualizing foreign policy beliefs according to a national identity can lead to a more fruitful area of inquiry.
Toward this goal, survey items were aggregated to indicate a response pattern. In other words, the authors' US foreign policy prescriptions were categorized as fitting a certain "type" of policy. In this case, could specific authors' articles be characterized as containing policy recommendations that were global, militaristic, multilateral, unilateral, or dominant multilateral? Anecdotal evidence from author's articles were used to supplement the findings.

GLOBALISM

A globalism indicator was constructed to tap where elite's foreign policies were directed. Four questions were posed that categorized beliefs concerning: 1) the desirability of forming alliance structures; 2) the need to promote universal values and norms; 3) the utility of supporting international institutions; and 4) the necessity of addressing global issues. The specific questions used in the simulated survey were:

18. What is the author's position on NATO?
   a) maintain as leader
   b) support with resource commitments
   c) support without commitments
   d) reduce support.
   e) n/a

19. What is the author's stance on human rights?
   a) supports measures and enforces
   b) supports measures and promotes
   c) verbally supports
   d) should not support e) n/a

20. What does the author think should be the US position on the United Nations?
   a) support fully as leader
   b) support fully but conditionally
   c) support fully as member
d) support with resource commitments
e) support without commitments
f) withdraw
e) n/a

151. *Does the author argue that global issues such as population growth and income inequality are important concerns for the United States?*

   a) yes
   b) no
   c) n/a

If the author claimed that the United States should maintain NATO as a leader or support NATO with resource commitments then they were considered to support global initiatives. If they verbally supported NATO but were unwilling to make tangible commitments or argued that the US should reduce its support, then that was indicative of beliefs against globalism. If the author supported the promotion and/or enforcement of human rights then they also were upholding globalism. If they did nothing but verbally supported or argued against human rights standards then they were rejecting the institutionalization of a global human rights standard. If the author promoted the United Nations by claiming a leadership or member role, or supported it with resources, then they were upholding a global institution. If, on the other hand, they did not want to commit resources to the UN, they were considered not to support global institutions. If the author argued for withdrawal from the United Nations it was not considered arguing for or against a role for the US in the international arena. This answer could be indicative of unhappiness with current UN policy. If the author agreed that global issues were a concern for the US then this supported globalism, if they disagreed then it did not.
The author's articles were then cataloged as either supporting or rejecting
global policy prescriptions and then categorized according to the sum of the globalist
policies inherent within each. The expectation was that Internationalists and
Imperialists should have advanced globalist policies whereas Nationalists would not.
Table 25 below reports the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reject Global Policies</th>
<th>Support Global Policies</th>
<th>Articles not Fitting Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>27% (3)</td>
<td>64% (7)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>8% (1)</td>
<td>92% (11)</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>28% (12)</td>
<td>60% (26)</td>
<td>12% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S-IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>12% (2)</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
<td>44% (7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>45% (4)</td>
<td>22% (2)</td>
<td>33% (3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NAT)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>21% (8)</td>
<td>3% (1)</td>
<td>76% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(S-IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
<td>82% (9)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one would expect, for the most part, those that believed in a responsibility in the international arena—Brzezinski, Maynes, Kondracke, Klare, and Nye—also prescribed policies that were classified as global. Tucker, the lone Nationalist had a larger percent of his articles favoring non-global policies. Given the large percent of author’s articles that did not address the questions posed—Krauthammer, for example, had a very large number—it is important to review the arguments behind a representative of each foreign policy orientation. Those chosen were: Tucker (NAT), Krauthammer (S-IMP), and Maynes (INT).

National Identity and Globalism

Because a Nationalist does not believe in the US’s responsibility toward other international actors their prime foreign policy focus would be the preservation of the United States and the advancement of its "national interest" very narrowly defined. This does not include the advancement of global norms, such as democracy, human rights, or freedom, or international institutions such as the United Nations.

In reviewing internationalist and isolationist foreign policy orientations, Robert Tucker (1985:18) admits that,

The identification of the collective self with something larger than the self has been a principal source of what justice men have been capable of showing in their collective relations. Yet in a world marked by great disparities of power, this identification, which is at the tap root of concern, has also been a principal source of injustice.

What he means by "injustice" is exporting values, beliefs and norms to peoples that cannot, as of yet, comprehend their significance. Tucker’s belief in US political and
cultural superiority leads him to question whether the US should remove itself totally from the community of nations given their corrupting elements. Instead, he concludes (1990b:109), the US should just interact with the "right" nation states, i.e. those most like the United State.

Our alliance with the free nations is a value in itself because nations, like individuals, need friends and kindred spirits. Their need may not be nearly as great-they are after all, more self-sustaining than individuals-but it is still very considerable.

Thus, Tucker sees the necessity of interaction with "kindred spirits" yet is unsure of "others". He feels compelled to draw distinctions between nations that "nourish" and "maintain" their "freedom" and the "others" who, for a variety of reasons, can not. Thus, although the US should scale back its commitments and interactions in the international community at large, it may still promote relations with those most like the United States. The Nationalist's belief in its states' superiority has led to a formation of a foreign policy disposition that draws a distinction between what constitutes the national interest and what constitutes folly.

The focus upon preservation of the nation state and a tight-knit group of "friends," however, does not preclude that under certain international circumstances the Nationalist will feel compelled to become active in the international arena, supporting policies that at times may have erroneously characterized the Nationalist as a globalist. For example, during the Cold War, Tucker supported containment policy to enhance US security against its global rival, the USSR because the US was "protecting kindred states against a conventional military threat" (Tucker, 1985:19). However, he was clear in his argument that what might be interpreted as a globalist
policy, ie. his support of the containment policy, is based upon security concerns, not a global crusader role. He (1986:75) explains,

Containment is a policy whose essential feature is the organization of power to counter power. The great object of such a policy is-at least in the first place-to order the world, not to reform it (emphasis added). The American tradition, however, is not congenial to the outlook that must inform such a policy...Forsaking the role of crusader need not mean abandoning the objective of making the world safe for democracy. It means only recognizing that the cause of freedom may ultimately best be furthered through a strategy of indirection rather than through crusades.

Tucker's articles were filled with the argument that the US should be an example to others rather than a crusader. In most articles he explained that international activity can either enhance or jeopardize US security (Tucker, 1985, 1986, 1993, 1993-94), the important thing for US policy was to recognize this fact. Claiming Hans Morgenthau as an intellectual forefather, Tucker believes that the prudent statesman should only pursue international policies that have the ability to address events that will directly threaten US security. According to Tucker, these are few and far between. In the Post-Cold War era, in fact, he finds it hard to imagine any foreign event that can threaten the freedom of the United States, a continental power protected by two oceans and 10,000 nuclear warheads.

Tucker worries about the trend in US policy in the Post-Cold War era that has focused upon an global orientation. He (1990b:111) warns,

With the ending of the Cold War, the United States will presumably change from leader of an alliance formed to counter the threat of Soviet power to leader of a community of nations that needs the American presence in order to maintain a still fragile peace and stability. In practice, this change in function from that of defending freedom to that of ensuring order is apt to prove critical. Not only is the latter function a considerably more complicated one, it is also a much less appealing one...(Containment) never seem(ed) to imply
that we should play the role of policeman to the world. It did imply that we might one day have to free the world, though not to police it.

Tucker (1993-94:97) purports again and again that containment was not for the promotion of freedom but to defend freedom. During the Cold War, containment allowed Western societies to grow strong and flourish, setting an example that even adversaries would envy. In fact, he attributes the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the apparent victory of the West and its way of life not to American adventurism—largely supported by the Reagan Doctrine of which he was very critical (Tucker, 1986)—but to the West’s illustrious and superior cultural and political institutions. Tucker concludes (1993-94:97)

It was the power of example protected as it was by the power of arms, rather than efforts that sought directly to extend the democratic revolution, that constituted the great agent of reform.

This stance leads Tucker to argue that the United States should not become a crusader exporting democracy, human rights, or capitalism throughout the rest of the world.

"While freedom is the highest of political values, this does not make its universalization a proper interest of foreign policy" (Tucker, 1985:23).

Tucker’s interest in promoting global alliances is very specific. During the Cold War, Tucker supports NATO, given its vital role in the containment doctrine, but tempers that support. He (1986:65) states,

But containment also expressed the conviction that even if America’s physical security might somehow be preserved in a world where the Soviet Union dominated Western Europe (and in time perhaps the Middle East and East Asia as well), America’s role in such a world would be no more than marginal, if indeed that. This same conviction persists today, though in attenuated form, and must largely account for the persistence of a security commitment to
Western Europe whose abandonment would not risk our physical survival but whose retention does (emphasis added).

During the Cold War Tucker saw the NATO commitment as a necessary evil. It was a risk, but it contained the Soviet Union. In the Post-Cold War era, however, the substantial commitment to forces in Europe and other places should be scaled back given that the global threat from the Soviet Union has passed. He states (1990b:109),

The reasons that prompted this country to play the great role it did for half a century are no longer valid. A new world has come into being, one in which America’s security in both its narrower and it broader dimensions is no longer at serious risk. This being the case, it must be asked, why should this country persist in efforts that respond to circumstances now past? Why should it continue to maintain substantial forces in Europe and in the western Pacific? Whose interests are served by its doing so?

In sum, Tucker’s belief in US superiority and a responsibility only toward self, or a select few nations, convinces him that the US should be discriminating in its foreign commitments, not promote universal values or institutions just set a good example, and protect its security through strength.

Interestingly enough, during the Cold War, Nationalists and Imperialists could find “common ground” for their foreign policy commitments. Both were active internationally given their belief about the desirability of pursuing a containment policy. However, the reasons behind this international commitment differed radically. For an Imperialist, international activity is not a matter of expediency, it is a matter or pride. Krauthammer (IMP) (1985d) states,

To disengage in the service of narrow nationalism is a fine foreign policy for a minor regional power, which the United States once was...For America today it is a betrayal of its idea of itself. Most of all, it seems a curious application of American conservatism, which usually holds liberty to be the highest of political values. Does that idea now stop at the nation’s shores?
Krauthammer supports emphatically the US responsibility toward a global domain. He may temper this with the admission that "We cannot slay all the dragons at once." However, in the same breath he chides that, "There is no dishonor in slaying them one at a time" (Krauthammer, 1991b:88).\(^1\) Whereas Tucker argued that the best way the US could secure freedom and democracy worldwide was to be an example, Krauthammer sees the US role as one of a knight confronting dragons in its crusade to set the world right. He (1985c:11) contends,

> An American foreign policy should be confident enough to define international morality in its own, American terms. If we take our own ideas about democracy, rights, and self-government seriously, then it is the height of parochialism, and worse, to believe that these values are applicable only to a few largely white Western countries.

Ironically, Krauthammer and Tucker both accuse the other of ethnocentrism. Tucker sees the crusader as being messianic imposing "injustice" whereas Krauthammer claims Tucker's xenophobic tendencies are exclusionary. The reality is that they are both right and both exhibiting superiority. Claiming that only some states can rise to the "American standard" or every state must rise to the "American standard" is equally ethnocentric. The operative variable that distinguishes these two orientations

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\(^1\)An interesting aside that is very telling is that Krauthammer (1987b) believes that "The Price of Power" may even require that we sacrifice democracy at home by limiting the participation in the debate on public policy. It is for the long-run well-being of our own democracy that this may occur. Krauthammer (1987c:24) states, "Promoting it (the democratic ideal) abroad is an American vocation, for which we have long sacrificed blood and treasure. The constraints on our democracy required for the running of an alliance are another form of sacrifice, a kind of foreign aid program in which the transfer is made in the coin of democratic practice rather than cash."
is their belief in a responsibility toward a global community. The Imperialist's national identity supports such an outlook whereas the Nationalist does not.

In fact, the Imperialist's global orientation becomes even more pronounced in the "New World Order" given what they perceive as the "apparent victory" of the US way of life. Krauthammer (1990:96) asserts,

> History has been severe with America. After reluctantly joining and decisively winning the three great wars of this century, America is permitted no rest. It keeps getting stuck with the job not just of protecting itself but of imposing order on a disorderly world. Collective security is only the latest myth seized upon by Americans desperate to believe they have found their well-deserved escape from the burdens of history. Unfortunately they have not. The Gulf War is held up as an example of what the sole superpower must do to order the international arena.

The Gulf War is also the watershed mark of the end of the Vietnam syndrome. Krauthammer (1991a:100) speculated that a victorious US would emerge with "its self-image, sense of history, even its political discourses transformed," America will became the dominant world power, self-confident and assured. Krauthammer congratulates the Gulf War for shaking Vietnam's constraining legacy and allowing the US to fulfill its global mission, extending global norms and values, as long as they are US norms and values.

The belief that the only way is the American way explains why most of Krauthammer's articles could not be classified as having policies aimed at globalism. If an author advised that the US should withdraw from the United Nations then it was classified as being indistinguishable according to a globalist category. The reason being that one may support advise withdrawal from the UN if it does not follow US desires. This shows displeasure with the policies of the institution not disapproval of
a global orientation. In Krauthammer’s case, most of the articles that could not be
classified advised the US to "Let it Sink," referring of course to the United Nations.
The main reason for this stance was that members were not going along with US
wishes.

Internationalists will agree with Krauthammer, and other Imperialists, about
the need for the US to be active in the international arena. Given that these two
orientations believe in a responsibility in the international arena, they recognize that a
US global role is for the benefit of mankind. However, the Imperialists’ discourse
bases its international activity upon its superiority, the US global role was designed to
recreate the world. The Internationalist focus instead upon reforming the world. To
meet global challenges, states must work together. The fact that states have
traditionally looked out for number one has led to conflict, competition, and the
"tragedy of the commons". Individual national interest can not be separated from the
interests of the community of nations. Maynes (1990a:18) states,

The goal of US development policy should be less to help particular countries
and more to cooperate with others on global problems like population growth,
environmental degradation, and the spread of communicable diseases.

Yet, because the Internationalist does not believe in their country’s superiority,
they do not believe that the United States has all the answers. Internationalists uphold
the right of national self-determination within the global community. They try to
resolve the tension between a state’s concern for its ability to order its domestic
politics and its ability to abide by a community standard of norms and values, ie.
democracy and human rights. For example, Maynes takes the Imperialists to task for their desire to spread the American way of life. Maynes (1990a:17) explains,

    But, in general, the variety of democracy that America implants by force in other countries is likely to wither there. America can avoid serious mistakes if it responds with financial and political help to request from local democratic forces, which presumably know their own country better than outsiders, rather than attempt to impose its model on people who may find it inappropriate or irrelevant.

It is obvious from the above passage that the Internationalist firmly believes in a global community that has certain standards, yet, is unwilling to define what this entails.

    The comparison between the Internationalist’s disposition to help others nations develop their own institutions, values, and norms, the Imperialist’s desire to impose the US’s set of institutions, values and norms, and the Nationalist’s dismissal of other nations’ ability to adopt the US’s institutions, values, and norms is a good example of how a national identity constrains foreign policy prescriptions.

    This section demonstrates and explains the variation of policy prescriptions concerning where US policy should be oriented. The following one investigates what type of policy instruments are preferred.

    MILITARISM

    Policy instruments can be classified according to whether they promote force and coercion or diplomatic means toward a specified end. The Simulated Survey asked questions designed to categorize policy prescriptions according to whether they
championed a militaristic foreign policy agenda or not. The questions below construct this category.

14. What position does the author take on defense spending?
   a) increase
   b) present level
   c) decrease
   d) eliminate
   e) n/a

15. What is the author's position on US conventional forces in Europe?
   a) increase
   b) present level
   c) decrease
   d) eliminate
   e) n/a

Does the author think we should:

17. Develop SDI?
35. Send troops to Nicaragua?
36. Send troops to El Salvador?
37. Send troops to Angola?
38. Send troops to Cambodia?
39. Send troops to Afghanistan?
40. Send troops to Bosnia?
41. Send troops to Somalia?
42. Send troops to Kuwait?
43. Send troops to Korea?
44. Send troops to Somalia?
45. Send troops to Rwanda?
46. Send troops to Bosnia?
103. increase military aid to the Salvadorian government?
104. increase military aid FMLN?
105. increase military aid Sandinistas?
106. increase military aid Contras?
107. increase military aid Khmer Rouge?
108. increase military aid Cambodian government?
109. increase military aid Sihanouk rebels?
110. increase military aid Angolan government?
111. increase military aid UNITA?
112. increase military aid Israel?
113. increase military aid Serbia?
114. increase military aid Somalia government?
115. increase military aid Somalia warlords?
116. increase military aid Bosnians?
117. increase military aid Rwandan government?
118. increase military aid Rwandan rebels?
119. increase military aid South Korea?
120. increase military aid India?
121. increase military aid Pakistan?
122. increase military aid PLO?
123. increase military aid South African government?
124. increase military aid Iran?
125. increase military aid Iraq?

If the author argued that the US should increase or keep at the same levels defense spending or troops in Europe then the policy prescription was considered militaristic. If they argued to reduce these amounts or eliminate them, then the policies were categorized as rejecting militarism. If the author also claimed that the US should develop the Strategic Defense Initiative or/and send troops or increase military aid to the above countries then the policy program was considered militaristic. If they rejected these proposals then the policies were indicative of non-militarism.

The author’s articles were categorized as either supporting militaristic or non-militaristic policy prescriptions. If they did not respond affirmatively or negatively to the questions then the response was considered non-applicable. We would expect that Nationalists and Imperialists will be more militaristic than Internationalists and Parochialists. Table 26 reports the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Non-Militaristic Policy Prescriptions</th>
<th>Militaristic Policy Prescriptions</th>
<th>Articles not Fitting Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
<td>64% (7)</td>
<td>18% (2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>41.5% (5)</td>
<td>17% (2)</td>
<td>41.5% (5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (IMP)</td>
<td>4% (2)</td>
<td>44% (19)</td>
<td>51% (22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>69% (11)</td>
<td>6% (1)</td>
<td>25% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>12% (1)</td>
<td>44% (4)</td>
<td>44% (4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (IMP)</td>
<td>2% (1)</td>
<td>59% (22)</td>
<td>39% (15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>0% (5)</td>
<td>46% (5)</td>
<td>54% (6)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
These finding show a clear pattern of response. A higher percent of Brzezinski, Kondracke, Tucker, Krauthammer, and Nye’s policy proposals are militaristic when compared to Klare and Maynes (although Nye and Kondracke have a high percent of articles not fitting either category). A closer look at the summation of militaristic policy prescriptions per article per author reinforces this trend. Thirty-five percent of Kondracke’s articles and twenty percent of Krauthammer’s had three or more militaristic policy prescriptions. Kondracke, in fact, had one article with twenty-two militaristic prescriptions. The Super Imperialists were highly militaristic. Conversely, the articles by the Internationalists, Maynes and Klare, that were considered militaristic had only one militaristic policy prescription each.

National Identity and Militarism

An examination of the Internationalists’ articles uncover arguments designed to reject militaristic policy responses. Klare and Maynes were highly critical of US policy during the Cold War and after mainly because they believed it too readily embraced militaristic policy options. Administration policy that they were disparaging of include: 1) the US military response to both the Gulf War (Klare, 1990b, 1991a, 1991b; Maynes, 1991a, 1991b) and Third World instability (Klare 1985a, 1989, 1990c; Maynes, 1988); 2) arms sales (Klare, 1988-89a, 1992a, 1993b); defense spending (Klare 1993a) and the war on drugs (Klare, 1990a). Speaking for the US peace movement, Klare (1991a;365) highlights a non-militaristic US foreign policy agenda based upon, "Global demilitarization, nuclear/chemical nonproliferation and
arms export restraint." In fact, all the Internationalist's articles had some element of disagreement with US initiatives that the authors argued were too militaristic.

The basis for this critical perspective can be found in Maynes' (1985c) review of the "tools" of the foreign policy trade. In "Logic (diplomatic), Bribes (economic), and Threats (force)," Maynes (1985c:114) contends that force is outdated given advances in technology (countries will be forced to resort to weapons of mass destruction), communications (which have effectively rendered the policy of divide and conquer ineffective), and international mores (established in the wake of the Nuremberg War Crimes). He prescribes instead policies of diplomacy and tolerance for greater political diversity. In the "New Decade" these sentiments are reinforced with Maynes (1990b:11) listing the most important US foreign policy priorities being: 1) promoting equality between the center vs. the periphery; 2) advancing the power of ideas over the power of weapons; 3) enhancing multilateralism; 4) advancing democratic accountability; 5) supporting a newly defined NATO role; and 6) fostering a new global development model. He (1990b:21) even supports the two superpowers placing their militaries under a UN umbrella, where they will become involved in peacemaking and peacekeeping. The UN auspice will also allow arms control verification.

The Internationalist's national identity has not drawn ingroup-outgroup boundaries. It sees the United States as part of a cooperative community of nations. Subsequently it does not regard other international actors as inherently threatening, although it may regard policies pursued by community members as misguided and
destabilizing. Given that national security is based upon community security it does not consider force to be the first line of defense. Instead consent is preferred.

Imperialists reject the Internationalist disposition toward ruling out force and focusing instead upon cultural, diplomatic, and economic exchanges that promote understanding. They largely contend this strategy is infeasible. Krauthammer (1985d:19) states, "No one seriously believes that cultural exchanges will secure American interests anywhere. Its effects are at best diffuse and very long-term." He asks, "What to use in the meantime?" Diplomacy, Krauthammer (1985d:20) contends, is nothing more than "talking" to "tyrant" leaders with whom the US has trouble "communicating". "The problem with economic weapons," he continues, "is not just the sincerity of its advocates. The fact is that poverty in most of the world is endemic and totally unresponsive to any manageably American economic intervention." His answer to international problems is for the US to efficiently and effectively deal with them, ie. with force if necessary, and usually it is necessary in Krauthammer's eyes.

Looking at a specific issue, arms control, Krauthammer believes the agreements have produced a false sense of stability and security. There can be no place between disarmament, as the Internationalists would support, and armament. Krauthammer (1988c:28) argues,

In a world of total disarmament, the premium on cheating, hiding, and secret rearmament would be extraordinary. Lacking a retaliatory threat, every country would be at risk from nuclear breakout and blackmail by every other country. In a world of Qaddafis and Khomeinis and Saddams Husseins, ignoring for the moment the Soviets, there could not be a more unstable nuclear regime.
Suspicion against other country's intentions lead to the conclusion that total defense in the form of nuclear deterrence is the only option for US security. This belief continues into the Post-Cold War era. Krauthammer (1991d:68) warns,

But the end of the Soviet threat does not mean the end of nuclear danger. The real danger is proliferation, and proliferation has just begun...15 countries will acquire ballistic missiles...Moreover Soviet leaders have been rational and thus deterrable...We cannot be so sure that will be true of Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya, the nuclear powers of the future.

After the Cold War, Krauthammer welcomes the START talks because, ironically, it ends superpower arms control talks. Krauthammer sees the Soviet Union as a reformed nation joining the community of responsible states. Now, Krauthammer turns his attention away from a former enemy, now characterized as "rational," and focuses instead on "How to Deal With Countries Gone Mad" (Krauthammer, 1987e). (A year earlier during the INF Treaty talks, Gorbachev offered the "zero option" to destroy all INF European forces. At this time Krauthammer (1987a) wondered if it was a Soviet "trap" or just plain stupidity.) He explains (1991c:68) that now the United States can "finally free out attention for the real threat; the ballistic missile brandished by the smaller, newer, angrier powers of the very near future" (p.68). He concludes that the Strategic Defense Initiative should be pursued even more seriously.

Superiority in the Imperialist's national identity causes other international actors to be viewed in both threatening and stereotypic ways. A philosophic commitment to militarism and a rejection of arms control are two manifestations of this orientation. Another is militaristic intervention in the Third World. For
example, American paternalism and militarism rings loud and clear in Krauthammer’s (1993b:78) advice on the Somalian campaign,

Places like Somalia have to be handled in the old way. Not post-cold war, but again pre-cold war; given over in trusteeship to some great power willing and able to seize and rule it, as France once ruled Lebanon. Third World nations don’t like that idea because it smacks of colonialism. And so it does. It is colonialism. But no one has come up with a better idea for saving countries like Somalia from themselves.

Somalia is not the only African country that needs saving from itself, Rwanda (Krauthammer, 1993b) must also be set straight. Troops also were needed during the Gulf War (Krauthammer, 1992b). Military aid is prescribed for the Contras in Nicaragua (Krauthammer, 1987g, 1989d), the Salvadorian government in El Salvador (Krauthammer 1985a), the UNITA rebels in Angola, and Prince Sihanouk’s forces in Cambodia (Kampuchea) (Krauthammer, 1988a). The Imperialist’s national identity disposes it to become actively involved in "setting the world right" and seeing other international actors as potentials threats to this mission. Subsequently, militaristic policies are purported to deal effectively with securing the "national interest.

Nationalists may not support the same policy ends or goals as an Imperialist, given that they do not believe in the US responsibility in the international arena, but there is an agreement upon the "hawkish" means employed when international action is needed. For example, Tucker (1993-94) condemned the "Wilsonian ideal" that envisioned a world community "based on consent more than on coercion" for combining grand ends with modest means. At the time, according to Tucker, Wilson’s mistake was making the world safe for democracy rather than making the world safe from Germany. Peace must be "secured" with force not "created" from
consent. He regrets the "dark reality" of global politics, but does not think it should be ignored as Internationalists often do.

This philosophic commitment toward militarism did not find tangible expression in many of Tucker's articles although at times it did ring loud and true. This can be attributed to the Nationalist's orientation toward a restrained global role. However, an interesting exception to this general orientation is Tucker's staunch support of Israel with increased US military protection (1992b). This call to arms for Israel, so to speak, was in response to what Tucker believed to be the Bush Administration's misguided policy toward resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict. By putting pressure on Israel to give up its strategic defenses, the Bush Administration was jeopardizing Israel's security. He states (1992b:22),

The administration is no longer content to see the actors in the Middle East drama deal with their conflicts largely in their own way provided traditional American interests are not jeopardized. For those interests-assured access to oil and Israel's security (emphasis added)-no longer reflect the extent of the Bush administration's ambitions....In the Bush administration's new order, interest demands that Israel's former freedom of action be severely circumscribed. This can only mean that the strongest military power in the region relinquish the strategic independence that until the Gulf War formed the hallmark of its policy.

Tucker blames US global ambitions for changing a situation and relationship that was stable and in the US best interests, narrowly defined.

This stance is very interesting. It is understandable for Tucker to demand that the US preserve its access to oil, Nationalists desire the ability to secure strategic resources to promote their own national security. What is not as comprehensible is
Tucker’s conclusion that the continued existence of Israel is, in his definition, a matter of US national security.

An explanation is that Tucker has extended his national identity to include Israel, it is part of the ingroup. Israel is an US extension. Thus, its ability to promote, defend, and continue its existence is of vital concern for Tucker. This finding underscores the need to examine how individuals construct their identities and how they include and exclude other national actors within their group. This extension of the ingroup to include other international actors can have affects on foreign policy preferences as we see with Tucker’s strong ties to Israel.

MULTILATERALISM, UNILATERALISM, AND DOMINANT MULTILATERALISM

The two sections above addressed where foreign policy was directed and the type of policy instrument used. The current section explores how a national identity disposes foreign policy elites to decide who should partake in the formulation of foreign policy. Should the US pursue multilateralism or unilateralism? Multilateral and unilateral categories were established by the author’s affirmation or negation of US action depicted in the following sets of question:

56. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Central American conflict?
57. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Middle East conflict?
58. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Angolan conflict?
59. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Cambodian conflict?
60. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Bosnian conflict?
61. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Somalian conflict?
62. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Rwandan conflict?
63. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Korean conflict?
64. follow the lead of the UN (international actors) in the resolution of the Gulf conflict?

47. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Central American conflict?
48. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Middle East conflict?
49. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Angolan conflict?
50. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Cambodian conflict?
51. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Former Yugoslavia conflict?
52. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Somalian conflict?
53. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Rwanda conflict?
54. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Korean conflict?
55. unilaterally initiate and promote a settlement in the Gulf conflict (Kuwaiti)?

The expectation is that superior national identities will support unilateral policies while non-superior national identities will support multilateral initiatives. Tables 27 and 28 depict the percentage of articles supporting and rejecting multilateralism and unilateralism.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reject Multilateral Policies</th>
<th>Support Multilateral Policies</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
<td>9% (1)</td>
<td>82% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>0% (6)</td>
<td>50% (6)</td>
<td>50% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (IMP)</td>
<td>14% (6)</td>
<td>2% (1)</td>
<td>84 (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>0% (3)</td>
<td>19% (3)</td>
<td>81% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>0% (9)</td>
<td>0% (9)</td>
<td>100% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (IMP)</td>
<td>18% (7)</td>
<td>0% (7)</td>
<td>82% (31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>0% (11)</td>
<td>0% (11)</td>
<td>100% (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author</td>
<td>Reject Unilateral Policies</td>
<td>Support Unilateral Policies</td>
<td>Not Applicable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski (IMP)</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes (INT)</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke (IMP)</td>
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<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare (INT)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker (NAT)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer (IMP)</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>82%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye (IMP)</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one can see, most articles did not address the issues specified in the questions above. A large percent of each authors' articles fell in the "Not Applicable" category. However, if we examine the percentages of articles that answer the questions, then we find that the hypothesis is tentatively supported. The Internationalists, Maynes and Klare, support multilateral initiatives and reject unilateral initiatives to a greater extent than their fellow foreign policy elites. Those that believe in US superiority and addressed the questions--Krauthammer and Kondracke--favored unilateral policies and rejected multilateral initiatives.

National Identity and Multilateral vs Unilateralism

The unilateral vs multilateral distinction was a topic that although not prevalent across the author's articles, it was a topic specifically addressed specifically within a few of the author's articles as they debated the appropriate focus of US foreign policy. Given their belief about a responsibility toward a global domain, Internationalists support multilateral institutions to a great extent. They saw the United Nations and other regional organizations as important tools for resolving global issues, and supported initiative associated with them. For instance, during the Cold War and at the height of UN-bashing, Maynes claimed that the United Nations was "A Cause Worth Fighting For." He (1985a:236) argued that "The disappearance of the United Nations would mean the end of the constructive side of American's international role. It remains, therefore, an ideal and an institution worth fighting for."
Internationalists envision multilateralism as part of a new orientation toward world affairs since the issues now facing the global community can not be solved by any one state. Maynes (1990b:12) sums this belief as he explains that in the "New Decade,"

Most of the major issues on the international agenda involve the efforts or politics of a number of states. Examples include arms developments like nuclear, chemical, or conventional proliferation; environmental or economic concerns; and medical or social developments like AIDS or drug addiction. The task of the coming years will be to find the most effective international responses to these issues. Answers will almost certainly involve a growing numbers of international organizations or regimes.

In fact, Maynes sees a role for multilateralism in most policy prescriptions, such as containing ethnic conflict (Maynes, 1993), political and economic development in the Third World (1988), and international instability (1993-94). Rejection of unilateral action is seen in Maynes' discussion of past United States' policy which was devised without foreign consultation. He (1990b:4) states, "They (other international actors) are less likely to follow the lead of a country that tramples widely shared norms and denigrates widely supported institutions."

Because it does not want to identify a "standard" or "take independent action" the Internationalist orientation focuses upon process more than outcome. In this case multilateralism may become an end in itself, despite what policy outcome that multilateralism is directed toward. Conversely, policies that only fulfill United States' national interest narrowly defined, will be seen as unjustifiable and thus not pursued. Maynes (1993-94:9) seems to recognize this danger when stating that,

America is still hampered in its approach because it wants to preserve its semi-permanent role as supreme arbiter. That is a role America may not be able to
afford over the longer run...America cannot escape its immediate responsibilities, but it needs a vision of where it is heading, not simply a mechanical endorsement of more multilateral machinery in the area.

In contrast to the Internationalist orientation, Nationalists strenuously reject multilateralism. Although not addressing the specific foreign policy initiatives depicted in the simulated survey, the content of Tucker’s articles makes clear his unilateral orientation. He (1985:17) promotes the belief that the US needs to rely exclusively upon itself. Tucker (1985:17) states,

The importance attached to retaining complete independence of action in foreign policy requires no special explanation. To be able to separate one’s fate from the fate of others is always desirable, though rarely possible.

His prescription is that America needs to redraw its security perimeter to restore the United States’ freedom of action. He believes, as a Nationalist would, that multilateralism leads to the US being drawn into commitments that serve not its interests but that of others.

In reference to the desirability of collective security in a Post-Cold War world, Tucker (1993-94:97) questions the United Nations’ effectiveness. He compares the success of the Gulf War to the apparent failure of the Bosnian crisis. The commitment to act through the United Nations during the Gulf War was not a vote of confidence in the institution’s effectiveness. He cites that President Bush’s acknowledgement that if he had not obtained UN sanction for forcible measures against Iraq the US would have done so with allies or unilaterally. He believes that the Clinton Administration, on the other hand, has claimed a leadership role in the New World Order yet has to reconcile the urge for unilateral action with the
commitment for multilateralism. He must either forego a position of world leadership, which would suit Tucker just fine, or pay the price the maintenance that this position entails, i.e. unilateralism.

The Nationalist’s belief that multilateralism is neither effective nor desirable leads it to totally disagree with the Internationalist concerning the Gulf War. The Internationalists perceived the Gulf War as a dominating US action not take in consent but in coercion. They also perceived it as being highly militaristic and undesirable. The Nationalist, on the other hand, considered the Gulf War a perfect example of US leadership and effectiveness. It "led" the community of nations in a quick and fairly painless (for the US) international endeavor. The US must ensure access to the oil of the Persian Gulf (Tucker, 1992:20). Militarily, all actions were needed and justified to get the job done. Thus, if the US must be involved internationally, the Gulf War was the picture perfect international action.

Although one would expect that an Imperialist orientation would support multilateralism, we see that in one case, Krauthammer, this has not happened. In fact, Krauthammer advances unilateralism. The topic of many of Krauthammer’s articles convey the necessity of the US having the right and ability to structure and behave internationally as it pleases. Examples include: "If Necessary a Superpower Acts Alone" (1987f), "Can America Stand Alone?" (1990b), "Unipolar Moment" (1991f) and "The Lonely Superpower" (1991c). He (1991c:26) reasons,

Both the multilateral dodge and the isolationist abdication are no answer to the dilemmas of a unipolar world. There is no escape. If we want stability and tranquility in the world, we will have to work for it, impose it, sometimes on our own. It will not come as a gift from the Security Council. It will not
come of itself. It will come only from an America working to shape a new world order.

Interestingly enough, Krauthammer's support of unilateralism proceeds from a recognition of "failed" multilateralism. Yet, what he regards as a failure confirms his Imperialist orientation.

Multilateralism is not longer an appropriate tool for US foreign policy because it restricts US behavior. He (1985d:20) explains,

Multilateralism means something very different today than it did in the immediate postwar period. Then, when the United States was by far the overwhelming power in the world, multilateralism was indeed the preferred means for American action-and was no real restraint on it. In 1950 the United States could push through a "uniting for Peace" resolution in the General Assembly, and in effect, act unilaterally in Korea under multilateral auspices...multilateralism does not materially restrict behavior. It is, in fact, an advantage in that it gives their actions at a legitimacy that they might otherwise not possess.

However, today Krauthammer (1985d:20) believes that multilateral institutions, especially the UN, have been "captured" by a hostile Third World majority. He advises that the US should bail out of the UN given that it "has become a place where weak Third World countries can ventilate their resentments in rhetorical and pseudo-diplomatic attacks on the West" (Krauthammer, 1987c:21) and is a "menace to the very language of Western liberalism" He believes that regional institutions, like the OAS, are paralyzed by "reluctant allies." In this scenario, multilateralism becomes a hinderance to American action, as does international law. In "The Curse of Legalism" Krauthammer (1989c:50) advises that since international law hurts US ability to pursue its national interest it should be disregarded,
Now, using military force may be the best way to stop Libya from producing poison gas. The policy decision is difficult. But it is a policy decision, not a legal judgement. In this case, as in many of the tough ones, the law-international law-is an ass. It has nothing to offer. Foreign policy is best made without it.

The assumption that Imperialists will pursue multilateralism was based upon the idea that feeling a responsibility in the international arena would lead to the desire to lead other international actors. However, in the case of "Super Imperialism" it would seem that a heightened sense of superiority and the desire to install ones own vision onto the world overcomes that desire to try to lead one's followers. Those who oppose the Imperialist's vision become "hostile" children and others "reluctant" allies. The former can be disregarded while the latter overcome. This finding distinguishes two types of multilateralism. "True multilateralism," where opinions and preferences of others are valued, and "dominant multilateralism" where superiority dictates that a multilateral policy will be abandoned if one's own preferences are not adopted.

This finding leads to the last supposition which proposes that Imperialists will favor dominant multilateralism more than those with the other worldviews. To test this proposition the questions indicative of a globalist orientation identified above were reanalyzed to specify those responses that were dominant in the global realm. If the author believed that the US should: 1) maintain NATO as a leader; 2) support and enforce human rights; and 3) support the United Nations as a leader or conditionally, then this response pattern is indicative of a dominant multilateral orientation. One
would assume that an Imperialist would support such policies. In addition the following question was analyzed:

5. *How does the author think the US should exert its influence?*
   a) a subordinate ally?
   b) an equal status ally or cooperative partner/leader?
   c) a dominant ally/leader?
   d) an example or model for others to follow?
   e) indeterminate
   f) n/a

Responding that the United States should be a dominant ally/leader or a model for others to follow indicates domination. The table below indicated the results.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Reject Dominant Multilateral Policies</th>
<th>Support Dominant Multilateral Policies</th>
<th>Not Applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brzezinski</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(9)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maynes</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kondracke</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>93%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(40)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Klare</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(INT)</td>
<td>(11)</td>
<td>(4)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tucker</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(NAT)</td>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
<td>(2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Krauthammer</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IMP)</td>
<td>(1)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nye</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3)</td>
<td>(8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As one would expect, neither Tucker (Nationalist) or Klare (Internationalist) supported dominant multilateral policies, for very different reasons of course. Tucker does not believe in acting with other international actors and Klare does not believe in dominating them when you do. The surprise above is to see that a large percent of Maynes', an Internationalist, articles support dominant multilateralism. A distinction between Maynes and Klare becomes apparent. Citing the Persian Gulf War, Klare contends that the motivator for the "so-called multinational force" was for America to show its status as a global superpower. What the US should do is "pursue noble objectives like peace, tolerance and cooperation for their own sake...We must reject the global military role advocated by President Bush and adopt a new foreign policy based on US partnership with, not leadership over, other international actors" (Klare, 1990b:418).

This sentiment is expressed in Maynes' writing but it takes on a different tone. Starting with the end of the Cold War, Maynes (1993-4) tries to devise a way that great powers can exercise their "power more responsibly." He argues for two cooperative approaches. The first is for the dominant powers to abided by collective action through the UN Security Council, what he labels "muscular multilateralism". The second would be to work toward a decentralized international system, where great powers order the world through "benign spheres of influence" (Maynes 1993-94:11). The UN role in this arrangement would be to legitimate or censure and sanction the powers' actions within their spheres.
One could argue that both these alternatives are problematic, and Maynes readily points out their flaws. However, what is more interesting than the policies' feasibility is Maynes' belief that multilateralism needs to be "ordered" or "championed" by great powers. This is a theme that is pervasive throughout his writing. Maynes' foreign policy goal seems to ultimately be non-dominance by the great powers. However, to get to that point, Maynes believes dominance is required. In fact, a reformulation of the United Nations "could provide that grand ambition that both the American and Soviet people seem to need. It could fulfill their missionary impulse constructively and peacefully" (Maynes, 1993-4:4)

As discussed above, dominant, or "muscular" multilateralism takes on a different tone in Krauthammer's writings. The ultimate goal is indeed US dominance. While some Internationalists see an enlarging circle of friends that the United States will lead (Maynes, 1993-94:6) an Imperialist seeks a new world order in which it can dominate.

CONCLUSION

Why do foreign policy elites support the policies that they do? Hopefully by now part of an answer has been provided. This chapter has investigated four characteristics of foreign policy intentions: Where should the US direct policy? What types of instruments should it use? Should the US act alone or in concert with other nations?, and How should the US act when it is involved? Using a national identity as a core belief that constrains foreign policy intentions this chapter has provided
answers to these questions. Those whose national identity focuses on responsibility in the international arena will direct policy toward resolving global issues and supporting norms and values. They will support initiatives directed at the global community. Militaristic policy options will be chosen by those with worldviews that believe in their state's superiority given that they regard other international actors with disdain and have the tendency to form ingroups and outgroups. Superior types will also favor unilateral action when involved in the international arena unless, in the case of the Imperialist, they can dominate multilateral actions.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

This dissertation began with a question, "Why do foreign policy elites support the policies that they do?" To provide an answer, it was deemed important to consider various interpretations of what constitutes the "national interest". Chapter I reviewed scholarly perspectives' on the construction of the national interest. It came to the conclusion that the national interest is a subjective, relative, and dynamic construct properly analyzed through the examination of individual's views, most notably their foreign policy belief systems.

Thus, the question why foreign policy elites support the policies that they do was answered by reference to their beliefs concerning the international arena. This response seemed rather self-evident; however, Chapter II's review of current studies analyzing foreign policy beliefs uncovered a fatal flaw in these endeavors. Their supposition has been that belief systems are inherently militaristic and either internationally or domestically focused but they did not provide an explanation or rational for how these dimensions arise and, more importantly, how beliefs respond to change as the international environment transforms. It was argued, instead, that a more profitable inquiry is to identify core beliefs that constrain other more periphery
beliefs. The core of a foreign policy belief system disposes the holder to certain interpretations of the international environment and subsequently specific foreign policy intentions. But, unlike perceptions and intentions, foreign policy dispositions are stable entities that do not dramatically change across time. Viewing belief systems in this way can account for apparent change in foreign policy beliefs.

It was hypothesized that various constructions of one's identity vis a vis the nation and the world would dispose the individual toward certain foreign policy preferences. Applying the identity concept to international relations, it appears to have two components, one focused on the view of one's own country—whether it is superior—the other centering around how responsible one feels toward the international community. The variance in these components of identity produce four foreign policy dispositional types: Imperialists who believe that they both have a responsibility toward the international arena and their state is superior; Nationalists who believe in their state's superiority yet have not extended their identity to include the global community; Internationalists who identify with a global community yet do not believe their nation is superior; and Parochialists who do not perceive their state as being superior nor do they feel responsible to the international arena.

Through content analysis of the foreign policy debate, as carried out in leading opinion journals, Chapter IV found that the dispositional types could differentiate seven foreign policy elites' writings during and after the Cold War. Although examples of Imperialist, Nationalist, and Internationalist were discovered among the elites, a Parochialist disposition was not identified. This was attributed to the content
analysis sources used. Chapter IV also classified the extent to which the elite identified with the national entity. These findings allowed differentiation within foreign policy dispositional types, such as identifying Super Imperialists who had a high level of state identification. Overall, the dispositions and level of state identity proved stable through time.

It was asserted that elites support the foreign policies that they do because their beliefs concerning their states’ role and position in the world lead them to varying perceptions of international situations and actors, namely whether they are threatening or not, and preferences for specific foreign policy intentions, such as militarism, unilateral/multilateralism, or the support of global institutions and norms.

Chapter V was devoted to testing the hypothesis that those that identify strongly with the United States are more likely to view other international actors unfavorably, stereotype them, and feel threatened by them. The results of correlational analysis found strong support for the hypothesis that those most favorable to United States were also unfavorable to the Soviet Union and other international actors. However, this high level of unfavorability did not translate into a stereotypic enemy image of the Soviet Union as expected. Although those who identified most readily with the US were more threatened by the USSR and constructed aspects of the enemy image, the total image was not evoked.

Chapter VI linked the foreign policy dispositional types to intentions. It hypothesized and found support through statistical and anecdotal evidence that those with a feeling of responsibility in the international arena (Internationalists and
Imperialists) support policies that advance global norms and institutions. Those who believe the US to be superior (Imperialists and Nationalists) support militaristic policies and US unilateral action more than those not focused on US superiority. Conversely, Internationalists support multilateral policies and are non-militaristic. Imperialists support dominant multilateral policies as long as they promote their construction of the US national interest.

REFLECTIONS ON THE DISSERTATION PROJECT

Methodology

Content analysis of the foreign policy debate as exhibited in public opinion journals was employed to answer the main dissertation question why elites support the foreign policies that the do. This methodology was adopted instead of traditional survey research given the latter’s drawbacks, namely, that surveys prime respondents’ answers to its questions, they do not tap a belief system’s range, and they can not distinguish change in individual belief systems.

The rewards of this research strategy are many. Analyzing the actual foreign policy debate, instead of asking questions on surveys, allowed one to note what was conspicuously lacking within some elites’ foreign policy discourse. This supports the contention that non-opinions are important indicators of belief systems (Converse, 1970). Many conclusions can be drawn, such as, what issues and topics are important to the elites and how these vary across individuals.
Examining the actual foreign policy debate also produced insight into which foreign policy dispositions were more likely to support or criticize US foreign policy. The findings in Chapter IV correlated strong identification with the nation state to the perceived need to bolster US foreign policy and not critically reflect upon it. Conversely, those not strongly identified with the US were more critical and reflective. This was attributed to social identity theory that postulates that to maintain positive self-esteem, those who identify strongly with a social grouping will contend the ingroup can do no wrong and the outgroup can do no right. Criticism of the social entities’ behavior is seen as a critique of self, this is unacceptable to the high identifier.

Also, surveys cannot provide the longitudinal analysis that was a vital component of this dissertation. The cognitive change exhibited in the US Super Identifiers from unfavorability toward the Soviet Union to non-evaluative status in the Post-Cold War period found in Chapter V was a surprising conversion. This level of change would not have been captured in traditional survey methodologies that do not employ panel studies.

However, there are definite drawbacks to content analysis of the foreign policy debate. The main one being the small number of articles and responses produced. The dissertation was limited in its ability to draw meaningful conclusions based upon the small number of articles placed within the variable indicator categories. For instance, when identifying foreign policy intentions, most authors did not address the issues posed in the simulated survey. Thus, not only were the number of articles
produced for each author low, this was exasperated by the fact that most articles did not address the many issues relevant to US foreign policy. This may lead to interesting conclusions about what was on the author’s mind and what was not, but, it inhibits the ability to answer the main question of the dissertation: "Why do elites support the foreign policies that they do."

A solution that addressed this problem was to supplement anecdotal evidence from the author’s actual articles. This task was definitely worthwhile. It brought back the totality, richness, and logic of the foreign policy debate. This meaning had been lost on the author while attempting rigor and nonsubjectivity through the construction, or more appropriately deconstruction, of the foreign policy debate by pigeon-holing various aspects into content categories that corresponded to the analytic variables of interest. Rereading the articles again after this task brought new perspective and a stronger conviction that to understand the meaning of the foreign policy debate it is important to see it as a whole entity. The analysis of first the modifiers, then the content categories, then the article as a whole, then comparing authors’ works over the ten-year time period was a daunting task, however, it was worth the effort. Each one of these steps provided meaning and insight into the foreign policy debate. One without the other would have only given part of the story.

Dispositions

The main contribution of this dissertation is its introduction of identity as a cognitive construct into research on foreign policy belief systems. This addition
provides a logic for the formation of beliefs concerning where authors direct policy, what instruments they use, and how they conceive the US should behave with other international actors. It also accounts for change in foreign policy perceptions and intentions between the Cold War and the Post-Cold War international arena.

One of the dissertation’s most interesting findings was the differentiation between the various elites views of US superiority. This finding allowed within type differentiation. Thus, the Imperialists could be divided into two subgroups, one called the Super Imperialists the other merely the Imperialists. This differentiation accounted for variation across the elites in their perceptions of others and their intentions. Those who identified strongly with the US were more unfavorable toward others, supported militaristic policies to a greater extent, and preferred unilateral action. These finding indicate that identification with the nation state has definite consequences for international perceptions and behavior.

Although the dissertation classified level of identity directed to the state, it did not classify level of identification with the global community just whether or not they identified. It was assumed that those who identified, the Imperialist and the Internationalist, did so to the same extent. However, logically if level of identity toward the nation state varies across individuals it should also differ for the international community. Thus, one could speak, for instance, of Super Internationalists.

Speculating further, the introduction of a Super Internationalist can account for the differences between the two Internationalists, Maynes and Klare. As you will
recall, the most striking variation between the two was found in their unfavorableness toward other international actors--Klare was unfavorable at a significantly higher level than Maynes--and their intentions--Maynes supported more dominant multilateral policy initiatives. If one assumes that Klare's level of identification with the international community is much higher than Maynes, then we may be able to account for these differences.

For example, if Klare is in fact a Super Internationalist his identification with the international community would be so strong he would perceive greater threat from actors trying to disrupt or violate the norms of the community, the United States included. This explains his critical articles of the United States as well as his unfavorable modifiers of other countries who were pursuing policies he believed promoted global instability. This interpretation is supported in a review of his articles. Most of the unfavorable mentions are specifically related to countries pursuing policies that, in his mind, are questionable. These revolve around militarism, such as arms exportation and nuclear proliferation (Klare, 1988/89, 1990a, 1990b, 1990c, 1990d, 1992a, 1992b, 1993a, 1993b).

As discussed earlier, the Super Imperialists, because of their strong identification with the nation state, view other actors as objects and are more unfavorable to other state entities. The Super Internationalists, in contrast, might base their unfavorability on the entity's actions, not on the entity. Militaristic and uncooperative policies hurt the stability and integrity of the global community. It is their actions not who they are that causes the less than favorable evaluation. Super
Internationalists are probably not concerned with threats to the nation state, but threats to the global community.

Besides accounting for unfavorability toward other actors, introducing Klare’s Super Internationalist status could also explain his commitment to non-US dominating multilateralism. As discussed earlier, Maynes favored dominant multilateralism in the short run to establish structures that he believed would foster non-dominating cooperation in the long-run. Klare, on the other hand, would not support dominant multilateralism no matter what end, given its violation of a community of nations where none imposes their will on the others.

In sum, although the above discussion is speculative, support for it is found in specific author’s writings. In the future, a fruitful area of inquiry would be to construct a measure that taps level of identification with the global community and differentiates unfavorableness of policy vs. entity to see if a correlation exists.

**Threats and Intentions**

One of the clearest findings in the dissertation was the correlation between US favorability and other (including USSR) unfavorability. The conclusion that national identity has an affect upon how others are perceived and treated in the foreign policy arena is an important one. However, national identity is only one type of identity. Individuals’ other identities can equally influence perceptions of others and foreign policy intentions. Through the dissertation’s analysis, this point was highlighted in two cases.
The first was Brzezinski’s unfavorability toward the Soviet Union at a level that was beyond that predicted given his US identification. This apparent disdain for the USSR and Russia stayed stable across the ten-year time period while every other elite’s unfavorableness went down. His unfavorableness was not directed toward other international actors at the same level. It also prompted Brzezinski, more than any other elite, to form an enemy-image stereotype of the Soviet Union. It was concluded that Brzezinski’s Polish identity contributed significantly in his views toward this global actor.

In another case, Tucker, a Nationalist, extended the US national interest to include the preservation of the state of Israel. This was surprising given his claim that it was important to narrowly define US national interest. Tucker (1992) did not support this extension by arguing that it was for strategic interests. Instead, the threats to Israel’s existence were interpreted as threats to US interests.

This theme was also found in Krauthammer’s (1988) writings. But, not all elites shared this sentiment. Kondracke (1987), the other Super Imperialist, supported policies that Tucker would claim violated Israeli security. Both Tucker and Krauthammer have an identity, maybe a Jewish identity, that supports foreign policy issues not necessarily predicted by their national identity. These two examples, and the dissertation, demonstrate that identity is an important cognitive construct that influences threat perceptions and foreign policy initiatives. Further research into US foreign policy preferences should assess the connections between the multiple identities individuals can have and their policy preferences. It can ask two important
questions: When identities come into conflict how is the contention resolved? Under what conditions do the different identities become salient?

Future Research

The findings in the dissertation can be the focus of future research in a number of ways. First, the data set can be expanded to include more foreign policy elites. As you will recall, the decision rule that produced the article sample only included authors that wrote four articles in the Cold War and Post-Cold War world. Decreasing this number to three articles will double the author population to fourteen. These additions may challenge the four-fold typology and produce more within type differences. However, difficulty in drawing conclusions from the data given the small number of articles per person would be even more pronounced.

A solution to this problem might be to reevaluate the unit of analysis. Instead of using the article, maybe paragraphs or sentences could be used. However, given the discussion above about the holistic aspects of the articles themselves, deconstructing them to the paragraph or sentence level does not seem appropriate.

Another tactic would be to conduct indepth interviews with the foreign policy elites examined in the dissertation. Interview questions could be devised with the findings of the dissertation in mind. Open-ended questions would provide the elite with a chance to expand on vital issues and speculate about future US policy. These additions would supplement the data already collected.
The last tactic would be to devise questions from the insights gained in the dissertation that can be used in a public opinion survey. This may seem to fly in the face of earlier criticism of survey methodology. But, devising survey questions after the type of analyses conducted in this dissertation provides rational for the questions. Also, it would be interesting to examine how strong affect for the nation leads to type of foreign policy pursued. Questions have already been devised that tap national affect, such as the Adorno’s F-scale.

CONCLUSION

Why do elites support the foreign policies that they do? It would be a mistake to conclude that one variable or factor can account for the wide-range of foreign preferences. However, this dissertation has shown that the introduction of beliefs concerning a national and international identity dispose, not determine, elites to perceive other international actors in certain ways and propose types of policy initiatives. These findings deal with central tendencies at the expense of nuances and precise details. There is no doubt that the four-fold scheme will not be able to classify some foreign policy belief systems, but, it is a good place to start. Examining dispositions introduces a dynamic that can account for change in behavior given change in the environment.

This dissertation began with an account of a baffling situation. It related the apparent transformation of foreign policy hawks into foreign policy doves and vice versa. Anthony Lewis, Cold War and Gulf War dove, appears to have turned into a
Post-Cold War hawk given his support of military intervention in the Bosnian situation. Patrick Buchanan, Cold War Hawk turned Gulf War and Bosnian War Dove, disagrees with Lewis and argues that the US should not intervene in the Balkans. This prescription is also at odds with a former Cold War policy ally, Richard Perle, who continues his support of militarism in the Post-Cold War era. He proposes a NATO military response and arming of the Bosnian Muslims as an appropriate response to the crisis. We can now speculate upon Lewis and Buchanan’s puzzling foreign policy stances on Bosnia, given their past foreign policy prescriptions, and Perle’s apparent stability.

The question whether the United States should intervene in Bosnia highlights a different type of case than those experienced during the Cold War. During the Cold War, international instability was assessed on the basis of how it would affect the perceived balance of power largely based upon threat perceptions of the Soviet Union. Lewis, a Cold War dove relabeled Internationalist, did not perceive the USSR as a threat. Because of his affinity with the global community and the non-superiority in which he held the US, he pursued multilateral and cooperative policies. Containment was not the over-riding security concern, questions of global equality and peace were.

Elites who saw threat from the USSR, most notably the Cold War hawks relabeled Imperialists and Nationalists, Perle and Buchanan respectively, saw international instability as an indication of Soviet meddling. It was in the US national interest to confront the USSR at every turn and pursue a containment policy. Proxy
wars fought on foreign soil were common during the Cold War. Militaristic policies were chosen to get the job done.

On most international issues the Imperialists and Nationalists were of one mind, they were both Cold War Hawks pursuing stability through strength and militarism. However, although the means were the same, the two ends were very different. Given the Imperialists’ desire to order the international arena and their belief in US superiority, they perceived that only the US had the ability and will to lead the West in its coalition against the evil empire. The Nationalists, focused upon the nation state and perceiving it to be superior, also pursued a containment policy just as vigorously as the Imperialist; however, their goal was not to order the international system but to protect the US from contamination and domination of a capable challenger bent on exporting a corrupt ideology.

The end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union has transformed the international arena and has allowed the dispositions to manifest themselves in surprising yet consistent ways. Perle continues to believe in the US’s right and responsibility to order the international arena. He is a Cold War hawk who is keeping the faith. The instability in Bosnia has produced a situation where US credibility is being called into question (1994a, 1994b). He (1995:A21) states,

Sadly, dangerously, Clinton lacks the courage of his convictions. And every member of Congress knows that a weak and indecisive president, acquiescing to allied demands, has been signing Europe’s tune since his policy ran into opposition from weak governments in Britain and France...Hardly anyone in Washington now believe that diplomacy will succeed or that America’s NATO allies have either a serious policy or the will to implement one...They are angry that NATO forces, including US air forces, have been subordinated to the United Nations.
Perle calls for the lifting of the arms embargo and promotes unilateral US action given the "paralytic" UN and the "humiliation" of NATO. The United Nations should be withdrawn, and the US should bomb the Serbians forcefully. He believes that Bill Clinton was misguided in his attempt to abide by allies' wishes if they contradicted the US ability to get the job done. Perle, the Imperialist, chooses to respond to global instability, unilaterally, with militaristic policy options. He contends that collective action has proven ineffective because the United States has allowed its allies and the UN to tie its hands.

Lewis, although supporting US intervention in Bosnia, has come to the same conclusion as Perle but from a radically different route. His concern, by and large, is not US credibility, but the credibility of an international norm that promotes human rights based on the Geneva convention (1994a, 1994b). He believes the "civilized world" must reaffirm the principles of Nuremberg, under which waging of aggressive war was defined as a crime under international law. His multilateral orientation supports the United Nations in their initiatives although faulting the specific strategy of treating victim and aggressor alike (1994). He does not argue for the UN removal (1994, 1995:31) because "abandoning Sarajevo would be a defeat for what the West claims to stand for." As long as progress is being made toward the final goal, stopping Serb aggression, Lewis is fine with multilateralism. He now, though, believes that the US must take a strong stand to stop the crimes against humanity.

However, Lewis (1991) did not apply this same standard during the Gulf War. He did not see an over-riding global concern. He thought instead that the Gulf War
was based on US national interest, ie. oil, and thought the Bush Administration was too quick to adopt military tactics without working through United Nations and developing rather than imposing a solution (1991a).

The dove Lewis seems to becoming a hawk on the Bosnian question. He has become a "conscientious warrior" by supporting humanitarian interventionism. In the new world order, this type of intervention is seen as legitimate because it is done for the good of others and not for national self interest but global interests. As Bill Clinton, maybe another Internationalist, remarked in his Inaugural Address, Americans will act when "the will and conscience of the international community is defied."

Nationalists, who supported the "hard-line" during the Cold War, like Buchanan, now want American to "come home" (1991a). As he (1995:45) recently stated when referring to President Clinton, "This president of the United States has to stop thinking about some utopian New World Order and start thinking about America first." Active international involvement during the Cold War can be attributed to the threat of Communism, not an underlying belief about the inherent need to address all international situations and to do so with militaristic policies.

This becomes clear in the Post-Cold War world as Buchanan quickly changes his Cold War tune. He (1991c) questioned US involvement in the Gulf War and took then President Bush to task on the campaign trail. He now argues against US involvement in Bosnia under any circumstances. However, this stance is not attributed to a dovish nature, on the contrary. Reflecting upon the Gulf War, he
claims that the best outcome was that it allowed testing of new weapons and is more committed to his conviction to develop the Strategic Defense Initiative (1991a, 1991b). These are hardly dove-like statements. Instead, the Post-Cold War arena has allowed Buchanan to express his nationalist tendencies defined by the US not having a responsibility in the international arena and the need to protect the US from outside influences. Although opposed to the Gulf War Buchanan saw it as a success because it was quick, it got the job done (militaristically), and it was led by the US (1991c).

Foreign Policy dispositions can help to differentiate policymakers and foreign policy elites' reactions to the change in the international arena as we move from the Cold War to the Post-Cold War world. Hawks really do not become doves and doves do not become hawks. There is an underlying "method to their madness." This dissertation has argued that what has been changed is not the elites' foreign policy dispositions, but the international arena that allows different aspects of foreign policy belief systems to emerge. At first glance, elites' conversion of "kind" of policy purported--militaristic, international, cooperative--may be interpreted as peculiar to an outside observer. Yet, what has not been taken into account is the dynamic aspects of foreign policy belief systems. This dynamism emerges if we identify core foreign policy beliefs which, in turn, interpret the international environment and form policy in response.
APPENDIX A

Coding Sheet Dispositions

Now that you finished coding the first part and underlined the references to the US and other international actors, please answer the following questions. Note in the margins of the article's text the section and question number where the answer is found. Also indicate on the coding sheet which page #(s) and paragraph(s) led you to make your conclusions. I may need to go back to the article to verify your answer so try to make it as easy as possible to track down your answer. Section I.

1. Does the author convey that the US has superior military capabilities compared to other countries? This is the author’s overall assessment. It can be based upon US advancement in military technology, possession of certain hardware (quality or quantity) and the nature of its fighting units (e.g. "American has the best fighter pilots in the world," "Our men and women have superior fighting abilities...", "we have the capabilities to.......". The author may indicate that the US is weak in some areas, but, the overall impression is that the US is superior to most, international actors.

    a) yes, there is indication that the author thinks the US is militarily superior
    b) no, the author talks about military capabilities but does not convey superiority
    c) n/a, the author does not talk about US military capabilities
2. Does the author convey that the US has a superior economic system? If the author refers only to capitalism being a superior system do not code, unless you get the impression that only capitalism is an acceptable economic system and the US is superior because it follows that economic design. If specific aspects of the US economic system are specifically mentioned as superior to other countries and is a model that should be followed then code (e.g. "American work ethic," "our material comforts or well-being," "consumerism," "American know-how," "American inventiveness," "abundance").

a) yes, there is indication that the author thinks the US is economically superior to most, if not all other international actors

b) no, the author mentions the US economic system but either does not indicate superiority or is actually critical of the capitalist system

c) n/a, the author does not mention economics
3. Does the author convey that the US has a superior political system? The author lists aspects of the US political system (e.g. "US's interpretation of democracy," "tolerance," "our historical heritage," "our judicial system," "fairness," that make it superior and a model for other countries to follow.

a) yes, there is indication that the author thinks the US is politically superior to most, if not all other international actors.

b) no, the author mentions the US political system but either does not indicate superiority or is actually critical of the US political system.

c) n/a, the author does not mention the US political system.

4. Does the author list general cultural characteristics, beside political and economic, that make the US a superior country? (e.g. "the American way of life," "our history as a great nation," "our people's character," "the moral fabric of our society," "our respect for human life," "our respect for human rights," "our never say die attitude").

a) yes, there is indication that the author thinks the US is culturally superior to most, if not all other international actors.

b) no, the author mentions US cultural characteristics but either does not indicate superiority or is actually critical of US culture (e.g. "We are an imperialist nation; our way of life puts stress on the environment, etc.").

c) n/a, the author does not mention cultural characteristics

5. Where does the author think the US should exert influence?

a) domestic/regional - the author argues that the US should only concern itself with its own domestic affairs or the affairs of a very limited region. This can take the form of either contending that the US is already over-committed and should scale back and concentrate on its own internal affairs or contend that the US has a responsibility to maintain political or economic stability in certain limited areas. These areas are few and specifically defined and are of strategic concern due to proximity (i.e. Latin America) or essential resources (i.e. the Middle East).

If "a" please list the regions or countries here:
b) dominant bilateral - the author describes the US as having a "sphere of influence" that it must preserve outside the immediate area surrounding it. This sphere is not linked to specific resources, but directly related to a competition with another global actor. The US must extend its influence to any area that is not currently in another's sphere or where a power vacuum may exist, there is a competition that the US must partake in.

c) global - the US is depicted as having a global mission that requires the maintenance of the world order or is a leader that has specific responsibilities to uphold on a worldwide scale. This is outside a competition with another global actor.

d) the author argues against current interventionism but does not specify proper domain.

e) the author argues against isolationist sentiment but does not specify proper domain.

f) n/a
APPENDIX B

Threat - Enemy Image

The next set of questions pertain to the author’s statements concerning either the Soviet Union or Russia. After reading the statements, please indicate which lettered response portrays the author’s statements.

What does the author say are Russia’s/Soviet Union general foreign policy goals?

a) unlimited expansionist/destructionist - the author indicates that Russia/Soviet Union seeks to transform the international system and eliminate other powers. It wishes to create a one-world communist state according to a master plan. It desires to be the sole hegemon.

b) limited expansionist/revisionist - the author contends that Russia/Soviet Union is expansionist but has more limited goals and does not seek to destroy the United States. It would like to expand its sphere of influence and obtain new conquests. It is a global power that wants to expand.

c) expansive - the author indicates expansive goals in Russia/Soviet Union foreign policy but there is no specification of what type or if it is limited.

d) status quo/defensive - Russia/Soviet Union is described as wishing to maintain its current position, it does not wish to expand. The author may attribute this to Russia/Soviet Union’s satisfaction with its current position or vigilance that it will not erode.

e) accommodating - the author depicts Russia/Soviet Union as willing to make accommodations that will diminish its current status. This is can be attributed to factors inherent within its own system (ie. poor economy) or due to US pressure and its success at containment.

f) indeterminant - the author does not relate Russia/Soviet Union’s goals.

e) n/a - Russia/Soviet Union is not mentioned
What does the author say motivates Russia/Soviet Union Foreign Policy? (indicate as many as appropriate).

a) ideology - the author contends that Russia/Soviet Union is still inspired by the writings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin either directly (specific reference to some passage that propels the Russia/Soviet Union to follow that design) or indirectly (ideology will color the ways the Russia/Soviet Union perceive the world).

b) totalitarianism - the author predicts that Russia/Soviet Union is driven to international action due to the logic that a totalitarian regime must expand to remain legitimate.

c) culture - the author mentions specific elements of Russia/Soviet Union culture that shape its foreign policy (e.g. its political system, economic system, etc.).

d) geography - the author attributes Russia/Soviet Union foreign policy to aspects that have to do with it geographic character (such as its being land-locked or in need of certain natural resources that it does not possess).

e) history - the author contends that specific goals that drive Russia/Soviet Union foreign policy have always led to international action and always will whatever regime is in power.

f) vested interests - specific sociopolitical groups in Russia/Soviet Union society are mentioned by the author as having interests that they impose upon Russia/Soviet Union foreign policy (the most common interests mentioned are the military, or political elites).

g) leadership characteristics - the author perceives that personalities, personal motives, or perceptions of the current Russia/Soviet Union leadership can account for its foreign policy.

h) power politics - the author argues that Russia/Soviet Union is driven by the same factors as other states in an anarchic international arena, the logic of a balance of power system.

i) external threats - Russia/Soviet Union is regarded as reacting to threats posed by other states, its policy is reactive not proactive.

j) n/a - Russia/Soviet Union is not mentioned
What does the author say are Russia/Soviet Union's overall capabilities compared to those of the United States?

a) **superior** - the author depicts Russia/Soviet Union as being militarily superior to the United States either because it has more military might (or what ever other power indicators are mentioned) or because the United States will not meet the Russia/Soviet Union challenge.

b) **comparable** - the author gives equal capabilities to the US and Russia/Soviet Union. This does not require the author to assign equal capabilities in each area of strength (such as nuclear capabilities, economy, conventional capabilities, etc.) or the possession of nuclear weapons on both sides creates parity. But the overall assessment must be that due to the strength in different areas the US and Russia/Soviet Union are roughly at parity.

c) **inferior** - the author contends that the Russia/Soviet Union does not have the capabilities that the US does and is a weaker state.

d) **indeterminant** - it is impossible to make a judgment because strength and weaknesses are distributed across varying areas, but, no overall assessment is made of total capabilities.

e) **n/a** - no mention of Russia/Soviet Union

Overall, does the author think the Russia/Soviet Union is threatening? Threatening is defined as "to give an indication of danger or distress; to be menacing" (Webster's New World Dictionary).

a) yes
b) no
c) n/a
APPENDIX C

Simulated Survey

The rest of the questions concern the author’s prescriptions for US foreign policy. To help you make judgements about these policies please refer to all the passages where the author specifically refers to the US or where the US is a referent. All "should", "must", and "will" references to US international activity are important. These are the textual units of analysis. References to the US in the present tense (is, are, is now, currently, etc.) are indicators of current US policy and may not be what the author prefers. Read these over very carefully to see if the author agrees with current policy or is just stating what it is to refute or argue for other activities. You also should be aware that a large portion of the text may be a summary of other people’s arguments so the author can refute these policy options. It is important that you distinguish between what the author is prescribing, or the author’s perceptions and positions, from what they are refuting. The passages that include the should, must, and will references will be indicators of prescribed foreign policy behavior.

From the materials you have read, please indicate what the author prescribes the US government should do according to the following issue areas. If the author does not mention their specific preference on the following issues please mark N/A.

14. Defense Spending: What position does the author take on defense spending?

   a) increase - the author prescribes the US should increase current expenditures on defense.
   
   b) present level - the author is content with current spending on defense.
   
   c) decrease - the author believes the current level that the US is spending on defense is too high and should be decreased.
   
   d) eliminate - the author wishes the US would suspend all expenditures on defense.
   
   e) n/a
15. Conventional Forces: What is the author’s position on US conventional forces in Europe?

   a) increase - the author prescribes that the US should increase current troop levels.

   b) present level - the author is content with the current troop level.

   c) decrease - the author believes the current level of troops should be reduced.

   d) eliminate - the author believes that we should bring all troops home.

   e) n/a

16. Nuclear Policy: What position does the author take on pursuing arms agreements with the Soviet Union?

   a) does not limit nuclear weapons - the author believes that the US should develop new nuclear technologies.

   b) limits a substantial amount - the author will support the limitations of arms that will affect a stable relationship with the Soviet Union, keep new technologies to stable stalemate.

   c) keeps at current level - the author is happy with the current level of nuclear capabilities, it is enough to assure mutual destruction

   d) bans all weapons - the author proposes the banning of all nuclear weapons.

   e) n/a

17. Strategic Defense: Does the author think we should develop SDI?

   a) yes

   b) no

   c) n/a
18. Alliance Structures: What is the author's position on NATO?

a) maintain as leader - the author argues that the NATO alliance is vital to US security interests and must be maintained at all costs. Will assign US the leadership role and maintainer of alliance structure.

b) support with resource commitments - the author supports the NATO alliance but does not argue for a maintenance or leadership role for the US. The US is seen as an equal partner.

c) support without commitments - the author supports the NATO alliance politically, but fears entangling alliance structures and wishes to remain autonomous. Thus, will not advocate US maintenance or resource commitments

d) reduce support - the author supports the NATO alliance but would like to reduce the amount that the US maintains it.

e) n/a


a) supports measures and enforces - the author argues for actions that would put pressure on other governments to abide by human rights and would like the US to enforce these measures unilaterally. Sees human rights as an intrinsic good.

b) supports measures and promotes - the author promotes actions that would encourage human rights but does not want the US to enforce human rights issues, use the UN or other international body.

c) verbally supports - the author verbally supports universal human rights but does not think the US should actively promote it as an international issue.

d) should not support - the author indicates that the US should not support or impose human rights standards in other parts of the world.

e) n/a - there is no mention of promoting or ignoring human rights.
20. What does the author think should be the US position on the United Nations?

- a) support fully as leader - the author argues that the United Nations is vital to US security interests and must be maintained at all costs. Will assign US the leadership role and maintainer.

- b) support fully but conditionally - the author argues that UN is vital to US security but should not be supported unless it follows US desires.

- c) support fully as member - the author argues that the UN is vital to global security and should be supported fully as cooperative partner.

- b) support with resource commitments - the author supports the United Nations but does not argue for a maintenance role for the US.

- c) support without commitments - the author supports the United Nations politically, but fears entangling alliance structures and wishes to remain autonomous.

- d) withdraw - the author believes the US should withdraw from the United Nations.

- e) n/a

21. Should the US government restrict the import of foreign products to protect American jobs?

- a) no - the author does not support barriers to trade for any reason.

- b) yes - the author favors tariffs on many imported products due to the impact on American jobs.

- c) n/a

If "yes" answer question 22. If "no" skip.
22. Under what conditions should the US government restrict the importation of foreign products?

a) the author does not believe the US government should be involved in the regulation of international markets.

b) the author favors tariffs on many imported products due to the impact on American jobs.

c) the author favors trade barriers to specific foreign products as a retaliation for the unfair trading practices of a certain partner.

d) the author argues for increased governmental involvement in international markets for a variety of reasons.

23. Should the US government initiate free trade zones?

a) no - the author argues for trade restrictions.

b) yes - the author supports the construction of free trade zones.

c) mixed - the author favors free trade zones but only with certain partners for strategic reasons.

d) n/a

24. Does the author list opportunities for the US in foreign markets?

a) yes - the author indicates that there are many foreign markets that the US should tap.

b) no - the author talks about international trade but does not promote US ventures in other markets.

c) n/a
25. Does the author argue that for the US to be secure and prosperous we need to open new markets?

   a) yes - the author argues that for the US to be strong and prosperous we need to open new markets.
   
   b) no - when speaking of international markets the author does not argue that we need to open new markets.
   
   c) n/a

26. Does the author argue that the strongest states are trading states?

   a) yes
   
   b) no
   
   c) n/a

27. Does the author think that American products have a competitive edge?

   a) yes
   
   b) no
   
   c) n/a

28. Environment: Does the author think that environmental concerns are of vital interest to US international security?

   a) yes
   
   b) no
   
   c) n/a

29. The author argues that:

   a) Society should emphasize utilizing and/or transforming nature to meet human needs.
   
   b) Society should emphasize preserving nature for its own sake, for aesthetic and/or moral reasons.
   
   c) n/a
30. The answer to environmental problems is found:

   a) in greater scientific and technological progress.
   b) in basic changes in the nature of society.
   c) n/a

31. Does the author think that economic growth is more important than environmental protection?

   a) yes
   b) no
   c) n/a

32. Does the author think that environmental protection and the economic development of the third world are incompatible goals?

   a) yes
   b) no
   c) n/a
33. When discussing Nuclear Proliferation, would you characterize the author as a;

a) proliferation pessimist - little can be done to mitigate nuclear proliferation and that we must live in a "nuclear-armed crowd"?

b) proliferation optimist - while you can't stop nuclear proliferation altogether, you can manage the problem to arrange outcomes that avoid the worst case scenarios?

c) pro-proliferationist - a world of more nuclear weapons is welcome because they will ultimately deter wars. Proliferation is seen as the ally of international stability?

d) non-proliferation optimist - all nuclear proliferation can be stopped, perhaps even reversed, some even talk seriously about moving on toward a totally denuclearized world system?

e) selectivists - differentiate between two types of states, good and bad proliferation. Bad proliferation is when "rogue" states possess weapons. Proliferation can be seen as "stabilizing" or "destabilizing" depending on the states involved.

f) universalists - oppose further proliferation and advocate the use of all means possible to enforce non-proliferation.

g) indeterminant; the author talks about nuclear proliferation, but a coherent stance on the issue does not appear.

h) n/a; the author does not talk about nuclear proliferation

34. Does the author consider nuclear proliferation to be a grave international threat?

a) yes
b) no
c) n/a
Circle yes or no to the following questions according to the preferences of the author. If you do not know, leave blank.

International Intervention: Given the current situation, should the US government:

**send troops to**

35. Nicaragua? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
36. El Salvador? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
37. Angola? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
38. Cambodia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
39. Afghanistan? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
40. Bosnia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
41. Somalia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
42. Kuwait? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
43. Korea? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
44. Somalia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
45. Rwanda? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
46. Bosnia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)

**unilaterally initiate and promote a diplomatic settlement in the**

47. Central American conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
48. Middle East conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
49. Angolan conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
50. Cambodian conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
51. Former Yugoslavia conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
52. Somali conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
53. Rwandan conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
54. Korean conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
55. Gulf conflict (Kuwait)? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)

**follow the lead of the UN or other international actors in the resolution of the**

56. Central American conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
57. Middle East conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
58. Angolan conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
59. Cambodian conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
60. Bosnian Conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
61. Somali conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
62. Rwandan conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
63. Korean conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
64. Gulf conflict? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
increase preferential trade agreements with (most favored nation status)

65. South Africa? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
66. Nicaragua? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
67. El Salvador? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
68. Angola? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
69. Cambodia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
70. Israel? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
71. China? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
72. Bosnia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
73. Somalia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
74. Rwanda? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
75. South Korea? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
76. North Korea? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
77. Kuwait? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
78. Iran? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
79. Iraq? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
80. India? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
81. Pakistan? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
82. Japan? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
83. Russia/Soviet Union? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
84. Former Soviet Republics? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)

impose economic sanctions against

85. South Africa? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
86. Nicaragua? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
87. El Salvador? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
88. Angola? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
89. Cambodia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
90. Israel? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
91. China? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
92. Bosnia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
93. Somalia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
94. Rwanda? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
95. South Korea? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
96. North Korea? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
97. Kuwait? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
98. Iran? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
99. Iraq? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
100. India? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
101. Pakistan? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
102. Japan? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
increase military aid (advisers, hardware, etc) to the

103. Salvadorian government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
104. FMLN? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
105. Sandinistas? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
106. Contras? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
107. Khmer Rouge? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
108. Cambodian government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
109. Sihanouk rebels? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
110. Angolian government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
111. UNITA? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
112. Israel? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
113. Serbia? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
114. Somalia government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
115. Somalia warloads? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
116. Bosnians? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
117. Rwandan government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
118. Rwandan rebels? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
119. South Korea? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
120. India? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
121. Pakistan? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
122. PLO? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
123. South African government? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
124. Iran? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
125. Iraq? (a. yes  b. no c. n/a)
increase economic or humanitarian aid to the

126. Salvadorian government? (yes, no)
127. FMLN? (yes, no)
128. Sandinistas? (yes, no)
129. Contras? (yes, no)
130. Khmer Rouge? (yes, no)
131. Cambodian government? (yes no)
132. Sihanouk rebels? (yes no)
133. Angolian government? (yes, no)
134. UNITA? (yes, no)
135. Israel? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
136. Serbia? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
137. Somalia warloads? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
138. Bosnians? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
139. Rwandan government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
140. Rwandan rebels? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
141. South Korean government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
142. Indian government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
143. Pakistani government ? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
144. PLO? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
145. South African government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
146. Iranian government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
147. Iraq government? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
148. Russia/Soviet Union? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)
149. Former Soviet Republics? (a. yes b. no c. n/a)

151. Does the author argue that global issues such as population growth and income inequality will eventually have reprecussions for the US?

   a. yes
   b. no
   c. n/a

152. Does the author argue that the US should provide general humanitarian aid to needy countries?

   a. yes
   b. no
   c. n/a
153. Does the author argue that the US should provide general economic aid to promote self-help systems in other countries?

a. yes
b. no
c. n/a
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