DEMOCRACY FROM ABOVE?

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRATIZATION

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate
School of The Ohio State University

By

Jon C. Pevehouse, B.A.

* * * * * *

The Ohio State University
2000

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Edward Mansfield, Adviser

Professor Donald Sylvan

Professor Timothy Frye

Approved by

[Signature]
Adviser
Department of Political Science
ABSTRACT

In the past 25 years, democracy has spread throughout the globe. Many scholars have investigated the causes, implications, and prospects of this global movement towards democracy. Most of these scholars have emphasized internal political processes as the driving force of this movement, while eschewing international factors. I argue that international factors, specifically regional organizations, can have an important role in both the transition to and the consolidation of democracy.

I elucidate several theoretically-derived causal mechanisms which could link regional organizations to the promotion and/or protection of democracy. Although the instruments which influence transitions to democracy, as opposed to the consolidation of democracy, differ, the end result is that these organizations can manipulate the costs and benefits of democracy to important societal groups such as business elites or the military. Moreover, I argue that these domestic elites will utilize membership in or accession to regional organizations to advance the cause of democracy. Regional organizations are thus an important policy tool for elites in these nascent democracies.

I test this argument in two ways. First, I undertake two statistical analyses using a data set of all countries from 1950-1992. These analyses test for an association between regional organizations and both democratic transitions and democratic consolidation.
Second, I investigate five cases (Hungary, Peru, Greece, Paraguay, and Turkey) to examine the actual causal processes behind any statistical association between regional organizations and democratization.

I find that there is a strong statistical relationship between membership in certain regional organizations and transitions to democracy. I also find a strong relationship between joining these same regional organizations and the consolidation of democracy. The case studies illustrate that all of the hypothesized causal mechanisms function in at least one of the cases, although some are more common than others. These findings are not only important to international relations theory and comparative politics, but provide loose guidelines for policy-makers who wish to utilize these regional organizations to promote and/or protect democracy.
Dedicated to my mother and father, 
who taught me the importance of 
education, hard work, and modesty;  
and who demonstrated the value of all three.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many graduate students are lucky to find one wonderful advisor with whom they may share ideas and ask for help during the difficult times of dissertation writing. I have been lucky enough to have three advisors who have graciously helped me through this process. I wish to thank Ed Mansfield, who has helped guide this project from the outset. I thank him for all of the time and effort he has spent not only on this dissertation, but in shaping my outlook as a scholar. His hard work and dedication have been an inspiration to me as I begin my own life in the academy. I hope to someday be as valuable as an advisor as he has been to me.

I am also grateful to Don Sylvan, who was a constant source of feedback on both ideas and written work. “Coach” has also guided me through graduate school with valuable all-purpose advice for which I am forever in his debt.

I also wish to thank Tim Frye, who pushed me to think more theoretically about my puzzle. He has exposed me to new literature and ideas which have greatly improved this project.

My graduate colleagues have also been of assistance throughout many stages of this project, including reading drafts and listening to me drone on at length. David Bearce, Pat McDonald, Hiro Fukushima, Kathy Powers, Scott Orr, Kevin Sweeney, and Louise Steen-Sprang have all borne this job with good humor while providing insightful comments.

I have also received valuable feedback from seminar participants at the following institutions: Colorado, SUNY-Binghamton, American, Maryland, Harvard, and Wisconsin. In addition, Dan Drezner, Dani Reiter, Beth Simmons, Joshua Goldstein, Deborah Gerner, Phil Schrodt, Helen Milner, and Leigh Payne have provided feedback on drafts of various chapters.

I would like to thank my family, including my mother, father, sisters, nieces, and nephew, who all provided emotional support which helped to sustain my sanity throughout this process. Finally, my wife, Elizabeth Erickson Pevehouse, has endured my dissertation writing with an extraordinary amount of patience, kindness, and care. Without her love and support, I can honestly say this project would never have been completed.
VITA

March 29, 1973 ......................................Born - Coffeyville, Kansas

1995..................................................B.A. Political Science, University of Kansas

1995 - present.................................Graduate Teaching and Research Associate,
The Ohio State University

PUBLICATIONS

1. Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, David Bearce, "Preferential Trading
   Arrangements and Military Disputes," Security Studies, Autumn/Winter 1999-
   2000, 92-118.

2. Edward D. Mansfield, Jon C. Pevehouse, David Bearce, "Preferential Trading
   Arrangements and Military Disputes," In Power and the Purse, eds. E. Mansfield,

3. Jon C. Pevehouse and Joshua S. Goldstein, "Serbian Compliance or Defiance in
   Resolution, August 1999, 538-546.

4. Joshua S. Goldstein and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Reciprocity, Bullying, and
   International Cooperation: A Time-Series Analysis of the Bosnia Conflict,"

5. Philip A. Huxtable and Jon C. Pevehouse, "Validity Problems in Events Data
   Collection: News Media Sources and Machine Coding Protocols," International
   Studies Notes, Spring 1996, 8-19.

6. Jon C. Pevehouse, "Images of the Other: Negative Stereotyping in the Arab-
   Israeli Conflict," Bard Journal of Social Sciences, September-October 1994, 57-
   62.

FIELDS OF STUDY

Major Field: Political Science
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ........................................................................................................... ii

Dedication ................................................................................................. iv

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................... v

Vita .............................................................................................................. vi

List of Tables .............................................................................................. vii

List of Figures ............................................................................................ ix

Chapters:

1. Regional Organizations and the Democratization Process .................... 1

   1.1 Domestic Actors and International Institutions ................................. 4

   1.2 The Forgotten Nexus ....................................................................... 8

   1.3 The Argument: Regional Organizations and Democratic Transitions .... 12
       1.3.1 IOs and the Liberalization Process ........................................... 12
       1.3.2 The Motives for Pressure ......................................................... 15
       1.3.3 Societal Elites and Acquiescence to Democratic Change .......... 19
           1.3.3.1 Business Elites ............................................................... 21
           1.3.3.2 Military Socialization ................................................. 24
       1.3.4 Legitimizing Transitional Governments .................................. 28

   1.4 The Argument: Regional Organizations and Democratic Consolidation .. 30
       1.4.1 The Perils of Consolidation ..................................................... 31
       1.4.2 Losers and the Threat to New Democracies ............................. 33
       1.4.3 Winners, Credible Commitments, and the Threat to Democracy .... 37
       1.4.4 Credible Commitments and the Consolidation of Democracy ...... 41
       1.4.5 Regional Organizations and Democratic Consolidation .......... 45
           1.4.5.1 Binding Winners: Creating Credible Commitments ............ 46
           1.4.5.2 Binding and Bribing Losers ......................................... 50
4.4 Event History Analysis ................................................................. 156
   4.4.1 Cox Estimates ................................................................. 158
   4.4.2 Weibull Estimates ............................................................. 162
   4.4.3 Heterogeneity Robustness Checks ........................................ 164
   4.4.4 Additional Variables and Tests ........................................... 169
   4.4.5 Selection Effects? ............................................................. 174

4.5 Conclusion .................................................................................. 175

Appendix 4.1 Model Estimates with Interaction Terms ....................... 188

Appendix 4.2 Complete Sample Estimates for the Gasiorowski Data ........ 191

5. Regional Organizations and the Transition to Democracy:
   Evidence From Cases...................................................................... 195

5.1 Case Selection ........................................................................... 196

5.2 Examining the Causal Mechanisms: Transitions to Democracy ....... 198

5.3 Hungary .................................................................................... 199
   5.3.1 Background .......................................................................... 201
   5.3.2 Encouraging the Completion of Democracy: Causal Mechanisms 203
      5.3.2.1 Pressure from the IO and Its Members ............................ 203
      5.3.2.2 The Acquiescence Effect: Civil-Military Relations .......... 204
      5.3.2.3 The Symbolic Effects of IOs........................................... 208
      5.3.2.4 Direct Economic Benefits ............................................ 212
   5.3.3 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................... 215

5.4 Peru: A Partial Success ............................................................... 217
   5.4.1 Peruvian Democracy and the Autogolpe ............................... 218
   5.4.2 IOs and Democratization: The Pressure of the OAS .............. 221
   5.4.3 Did the OAS Make a Difference? ......................................... 224
   5.4.4 IOs and Democratization: Other Causal Mechanisms? .......... 226
   5.4.5 Discussion and Conclusion ................................................... 226

5.5 Conclusion: Assessing the Transition Cases ................................ 228

6. Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy
   Evidence from Cases...................................................................... 235

6.1 IOs and Consolidation: Causal Mechanisms ................................ 235

6.2 Greece ....................................................................................... 236
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Correlation Among Regime Type Variables</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Correlation Among Regime Transitions Variables</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Correlation Among Regime Breakdown Variables</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 International Organizations Included in the Data, 1950-1992</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 Descriptive Statistics of IOs and Democratization</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 Successful Consolidation and IO Involvement</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Democratic IOs and Consolidation</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 International Organizations Membership and Consolidation</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 Estimates of the Determinants of the Transition to Democracy, 1950-1992</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Estimates of the Determinants of Liberalization, 1950-1992</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.4 Predicted Probabilities of Transitions: Polity98 Estimates</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.5 Predicted Probabilities of Transitions: Gasiorowski Estimates</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.7 Estimates of the Determinants of Liberalization and the Completion of Democracy, 1950-1992, with Region-specific Fixed Effects</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>Examples of Polity98 Democracy Scores</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Distribution of Regime Types Over Time: Polity98</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>Distribution of Regime Types Over Time: Gasiorowski</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Number of Transitions by Year</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>Examples of IOScore for Various International Organizations</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>IO Involvement Over Time</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Survival Function: Polity98 Data</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Survival Function: Gasiorowski Data</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS

Democratic transitions and consolidation have become a widely studied phenomenon in comparative politics. The “third wave” of democratization has spurred a considerable body of research examining the origins and consequences of these transitions (Huntington 1991).\(^1\) One topic which has received little attention within this literature, however, is international factors that influence domestic political change.

The weight given to international factors in the democratization process in much of the literature is adequately summarized by the findings of the Wilson Center's multivolume project on democratization, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*:

"one of the firmest conclusions that emerged from our Working Group was that transitions from authoritarian rule and immediate prospects for political democracy were largely to be explained in terms of national forces and calculations. External actors tended to play an indirect and usually marginal role..." (Schmitter 1986: 5)

Democracy is seen as the outcome of a domestic political process that is not influenced

---

\(^1\) Huntington argues that transitions to democracy occur in groups or “waves” over time. According to Huntington, the third wave of democracy began in 1974 in Portugal and continued through the transitions in Eastern Europe in 1989-1990. Of course, interest in movements to and from democracy pre-date the third wave (cf. Moore 1966; Linz 1978).
by actors outside the nation-state. Recent literature in comparative politics, however, questions this sweeping conclusion (Whitehead 1996a; Pridham 1991b). Unfortunately, this new literature has not developed core theories or cross-national empirical findings exploring the association of international factors with democratic transitions or democratic consolidation.

Concurrent with the rise in academic interest in this issue, many policymakers have made democracy promotion a foreign policy goal, while international organizations (IOs) are touted as an important vehicle for achieving these ends.\(^2\) In fact, the IO-democracy link has been a central justification for the enlargement of organizations such as NATO, the EU, even the expansion of NAFTA into a Western Hemispheric Free Trade Association. Yet, without a strong theoretical understanding or empirical evidence of the relationship between IOs and democracy, however, it is difficult to evaluate these claims made by policymakers.

International relations (IR) scholarship discussing international institutions and organizations is also of little help. The vast majority of the international institutions literature has focused on their implications on international outcomes (war, cooperation between states, etc.) rather than their domestic ramifications (cf. Keohane 1984; Mearshimer 1995; Keohane and Martin 1995). A small, but growing body of literature does examine the interactions between domestic and international institutions (cf. Milner 1997; Goldstein 1996). Unfortunately, this research has focused on the developed, stable democratic systems of North America and Western Europe. As I will argue, the

\(^2\) On democracy promotion or democratic enlargement as a goal of US foreign policymakers, see Christopher 1995; Smith 1994; Bloomfield 1994.
assumptions of this emerging literature often fail to hold in autocratic regimes or states in transition to democracy.

The purpose of this work is to contribute a coherent theoretical framework to evaluate the association between IOs and democratization, and provide the first quantitative empirical results pertaining to this issue. The proposition developed and tested here is that regional IOs can facilitate democratic transitions as well as democratic consolidation. This link between regional IOs and these phenomenon, however, arises from very different causal mechanisms. In the case of democratic transitions, IOs can pressure members states to democratize or re-democratize after the breakdown of democracy. In addition, IO membership may serve to reassure domestic elites that their interests will be protected in a democracy through locking-in policies which they value (e.g., protection of property rights or commitment to free trade). Regional IOs may also socialize elite groups not to intervene in the democratic process by changing their attitudes toward democracy.³ Finally, IO membership may help to legitimize transitional regimes making the completion of the democratic transition more likely.

With respect to democratic consolidation, I argue that domestic elites can use membership or accession to regional organizations to further democratic consolidation. Positive and negative incentives to domestic groups, including those elites in power, can convince them to abide by democratic “rules of the game”. First, joining international organizations can raise the costs of anti-democratic behavior by those outside or inside the regime. These costs arise out of the conditional nature of membership in the

³ Empirically, this mechanism has occurred with regard to the military. For example, through involvement in regional military organizations, military officers learn the “proper” role of the military in a democratic society.
organization as well as potential audience costs created through accession to the IO. These costs serve both as a deterrent to potential anti-regime forces and provide a device for new democrats to foster credible commitments to political reform. Finally, accession to regional organizations can confer legitimacy on young democratic regimes which can increase the likelihood of consolidation.

Finally, I discuss which organizations will be likely to promote and protect democracy. I contend that the more homogenously democratic a regional organizations membership, the more likely it will be to pressure autocratic governments to liberalize, provide credible guarantees to allay elite fears, stipulate conditions on membership, and most importantly, enforce those conditions. In short, the more democratic an IO (in terms of its member states), the more likely it will be to supply the political will and pay the economic costs of encouraging and protecting democracy.

The remainder of this chapter discusses, in more detail, how these causal mechanisms function to link regional organizations with democratic transitions and consolidation. Before moving to this discussion, however, I place my argument in the larger context of international relations and comparative politics theory and research.

1.1. Domestic Actors and International Institutions

With the rise of the functionalist literature over forty years ago and continuing with such works as After Hegemony, international relations scholars have debated the merits of international institutions (e.g., Keohane 1984; Mearshimer 1995; Keohane and
Martin 1995). Today, the institutionalist debate has moved from broad conceptual issues (e.g., do institutions matter at all?) to more focused inquiries (e.g., how and under what circumstances do institutions matter?). Beginning with Robert Putnam's (1988) work formalizing the two-level game metaphor, scholars have begun to take a more nuanced view of the interaction between domestic politics and international forces. In Putnam's framework, strategic actors can use international constraints at home to neutralize domestic opposition, or use domestic constraints to enhance their international bargaining strength. The implication is that domestic politics can be shaped by international forces, but can shape them as well (Evans, Jacobson, and Putnam 1993).

Further work has extended this idea of strategic interaction among domestic actors and international forces, especially international institutions. Judith Goldstein (1996) shows how international trade agreements can be used by domestic actors (e.g., the President) to constrain the behavior of other actors (e.g., Congress). Specifically, she shows how an international body with little to no enforcement capability can alter outcomes to favor one actor (the President) over another (Congress) in matters of international trade. Some literature in the study of economic regionalism also discusses this international/domestic interplay. Work by Helen Milner (1997) and Marc Busch and

---

4 Although not its main impetus, the early functionalist literature also demonstrated how the construction of international institutions influenced domestic politics as well. For example, see Haas (1964) and Mitrany (1966).

5 It should be noted that some scholars have argued that while in theory these dynamics may occur, in practice they are rare (cf. Evans 1993). In addition, Reinhardt (1999) argues that the ability to tie the hands of domestic opponents can only occur under very limited circumstances.

6 One challenge of this research question that limits the applicability of some models developed in the new institutionalist tradition is the issue of information. For most models of international-domestic interaction, information at the domestic level concerning the preferences of societal actors is important (cf. Milner 1997). As Chapter 4 discusses more fully, uncertainty is abundant in the transitional and the immediate post-transitional period (Whitehead 1989). There is precious little information about not only the preferences of some of the major actors, but even identifying who the important actors are can be difficult (Przeworski 1991).
Milner (1994), argues that domestic firms demand regional trade organizations due to factors such as the export dependence of firms, firm multi-nationality, and levels of intra-industry trade (Busch and Milner 1994: 268-270). Thus, the bond of international or regional economic conditions and the preferences of firms within a state give rise to international organizations which may impact international cooperation, but find their impetus domestically.

A similar argument is made by Etel Solingen (1994) with regard to the security arena. Her work contends that membership in regional non-proliferation agreements is a function of domestic political coalitions. "Internationalist" coalitions which favor domestic economic liberalization will join these institutions to maximize the benefits received from all international institutions, which can "bank-roll" domestic coalitions (Solingen 1994: 168). Joining regional security frameworks, therefore, is driven by the domestic political concerns of liberalizing coalitions of elites. These works serve as an excellent starting point to make the broader economic and political argument I put forth. Namely, joining and creating international organizations often finds its impetus in domestic politics.

Most work in the international organizations field still adopts the assumption that states join IOs to pursue "common or converging national interests of the member states" (Feld and Jordan 1994: 10). IOs, for the vast majority of this literature, reflect concerns over issues in the international environment that cannot be dealt with domestically (Archer 1992: 48). Thus, institutions are demand-driven and these demands arise out of international coordination or cooperation problems (cf. Martin 1992).
This work speaks to the issue of when and how international institutions matter in two ways. First, it provides evidence of how institutions shape state behavior. Recently, institutional theorists have called for more empirical research to outline “well-delineated causal mechanisms” to explain the impact of international institutions, especially in reference to domestic political processes (Martin and Simmons 1998: 749, 757; Keohane and Martin 1995). By exploring how IOs influence the democratization process, this work elucidates some of the possible ways in which regional institutions interact with domestic politics to influence outcomes. Moreover, it delineates circumstances under which domestic elites may turn to international institutions to substitute for (or bolster) domestic institutions.

Second, by assessing how differences in the membership of institutions create varied outcomes with respect to democratization, this study can show how variations in institutions (on at least one dimension) can influence on state behavior. Again, institutional theorists have lamented a lack of empirical investigation on whether differences among institutions along a variety of dimensions may lead to diverse outcomes (Martin and Simmons 1998). This study makes a contribution to this question by delineating along what dimensions (level of democracy within the membership) this variation matters for specific outcomes (democratization and democratic consolidation).

A major implication of my argument is that both membership and accession to an IO can be used strategically in the domestic arena, especially by autocratic states and states which have recently undergone a transition to democracy. This is not to say that the international functions of IOs are unimportant. Certainly the impetus behind many regional organizations are conditions or issues which states feel they can only cope with
as a group. I would argue, however, that much of the demand for IOs flows from the
domestic political process. Current institutionalist literature assumes the demand for
institutions arises out of international imperatives, yet my contention is that a major
impetus behind attempts to join existing IOs is domestic politics. More specifically, this
demand arises from the need of political elites to cope with real or potential domestic
political upheaval.

1.2. The Forgotten Nexus

Not only does most international relations literature fail to deal with the issue of
international organizations and democratization, but comparative work on the
determinants of democratic transitions largely ignores influences external to the nation-
state. Interest in these external factors has risen, however, largely in response to the
sweeping changes in Eastern Europe. For example, there have been at least three edited
volumes discussing international factors in the politics of regime change during the past
decade (Pridham 1991b; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1994; Whitehead 1996a). While
this literature has been rich in detailed case studies, little theorizing about causal
mechanisms which may work across multiple cases has taken place. Geoffrey Pridham's
(1991a: 21) own frustration with the literature has centered on this shortcoming:

"The main analytical problem, however, is not establishing the relevance of the
international dimension of regime change... Rather, the main problem is one of causality,
of analysing what Almond has called 'the complex dynamic process' of interaction
between international factors and domestic processes."

8
By generating and testing hypotheses about regional organizations’ influence on
democratization through both large-N and case study, I hope to elucidate some of these
processes linking “international factors and domestic processes”.

Various works have touched on the broader issue of international influences on
democratization and three main groups of causal mechanisms emerge from this literature:
diffusion and demonstration effects; epistemic communities and spill-over; and the use of
force. Diffusion and demonstration effect hypotheses hold that the movement towards
democracy in one state will "infect" neighbors with similar motives and bring parallel
moves to democracy. Empirically, there have been clusters of democratization (in both
space and time), which would suggest some empirical veracity to this mechanism
(Huntington 1991: 100-106; Whitehead 1996c). The rise of global trade and the ease of
communications provide transmission belts for democratic ideas and movements, which
can provide an impetus for democracy within states.

The epistemic communities and spill-over arguments are often related to interest
group activity. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) such as human rights
organizations (Sikkink 1996) or political parties which have cross-national secretariats
(Grabendorff 1993), are the interlocutors of democracy in these theories. Similar to the
traditional neo-functionalist arguments concerning organizations and conflict, these
arguments hold that NGOs or other informal organizations transmit technical information
(e.g., how to hold elections) and/or norms concerning democracy (Grugel 1999). This
can lead to a move towards liberalization or can be used to solidify the norms of civil
society within a new democracy.
Finally, many observers have pointed to the use of force by other nation-states as a way to begin or secure a transition to democracy. Examples include the imposition of a democratic government in both Japan and Germany after World War II, or the repeated use of force by the US in Latin America to alter the regime type of governments in that region. "Force" may also entail means short of physical violence. Although this work will discuss pressure from regional organizations as a catalyst for democracy, a significant body of literature discusses unilateral efforts to pressure for democratization. Most of this work centers on Latin America, where U.S. attempts to foster democracy (short of armed invasion) have received attention for several decades (Pastor 1989; Drake 1998).

I have chosen to concentrate on the significance of international organizations for several reasons. First, the impact of international organization is the most under researched of these areas. The IO-democracy link, on the other hand, continues to be asserted by academics and policymakers with little interest in specifying formal hypotheses nor testing them.

For example, in their article discussing IOs, interdependence and democracy, Bruce Russett, John Oneal, and David Davis (1998) find that more democratic dyads (measured by the level of democracy in the least democratic state of the pair) are more likely to be involved in joint IOs. They do not discuss this finding and the variable itself is only a control for their test of the effect of military conflict on IO involvement. Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1996) also link IOs with democratization, but they find

---

7 Although in many cases it is debatable whether the end goal of the US was democratization, this was often the stated justification for intervention. In some cases, democracy did actually result (e.g., Grenada). See Pastor 1989.
that movements towards democracy are associated with a declining involvement in IOs. They speculate that democratization allows states to shed unpopular alliances and organizations joining under previous systems, yet provide no evidence or further theorizing about these findings. Finally, Russett (1998) argues that as a part of the “Kantian tripod”, IOs and democracy are inherently linked and have a complimentary effect on peace, but unfortunately he provides no statistical tests of this argument.

This dearth of research on the link between IOs and democracy is surprising given the surge in interest among policymakers on the topic. As discussions have emerged relating to IO expansion, policymakers have increasingly turned to democracy as a raison d'être for enlarging international institutions. In combination with the explicit foreign policy goal of expanding and securing democracy, the purported association between international organizations and democracy seems to have gained widespread acceptance in the policy community. NATO expansion was couched in terms of "securing democracy" in the Visegrad states (Asmus, Kugler, and Larrabee 1993). Potential EU expansion is regarded in the same light (Ash, Mertes, and Mosi 1991). Proposals to expand NAFTA to the southern cone of Latin America are often justified using a similar logic (Hurrell 1994). While my findings are generally supportive of these contentions, I do find that there are some instances where IOs may not consolidate or encourage democracy. Understanding the causal mechanisms of such a relationship is crucial if policymakers wish to utilize IOs for these ends. The next three sections outline the arguments which link regional organizations to democratic transitions and consolidation.
1.3. The Argument: Regional Organizations and Democratic Transitions

I structure this section to follow the process of moving from an authoritarian system to a democracy, discussing the influences of international organizations at two stages. First, I discuss the process of liberalization or the loosening of control over civil society and/or political institutions. I show that pressures generated from outside of the state in combination with traditional internal forces can compel autocratic regimes to liberalize. Second, I show how IO membership can lead to the acceptance of liberalization since membership can lower the risks which certain elite groups face during the democratization process. Finally, I argue that certain IOs can function as an enabling device by providing a forum to signal and legitimize a transitional regime’s commitment to democratic reform which can assist in completing the transition to democracy.

Chapter 3 provides a statistical test of the argument, analyzing the effect of IOs and various other factors on the probability of a regime making a full or partial transition to democracy.

1.3.1. IOs and Liberalization in Autocratic Systems

The concept of “democratization” may encompass several dynamics. For most scholars of democratic transitions, liberalization is a distinct process from democratization. According to Mainwaring (1993: 298), “Political liberalization refers to an easing of repression and extension of civil liberties within an authoritarian regime, whereas a transition to democracy implies a change of regimes” (italics in original). Following this common distinction in the literature, I divide the democratization process
into two phases: the initial decision to liberalize and attempts to move to full
democratization. This section will concentrate on the former.

One common conclusion of the transitions literature is that elite schisms are an
impetus for political liberalization (cf. Kaufman 1986; Przeworski 1986; O’Donnell and
Schmitter 1986). This process, of course, is not meant to unseat the ruling elites from
power. Liberalization is meant to be a closed-ended process, a “controlled opening of
political space” (Przeworski 1991: 57). Liberalization can lead directly to
democratization, proceed slowly for many years, or end with more repression on the part
of the regime (Mainwaring 1992; Przeworski 1986). Liberalization occurs when
members of the ruling coalition feel they must go outside the current cadre of elites for
“relax social tension” and incorporate new groups that arise under liberalization into the
ruling elite. Ideally, the authoritarian leaders hope to expand their power base through
limited reform—increasing their legitimacy and forestalling calls for deeper changes in
the regime.

Yet, much of the literature is mixed as to what causes the split within the ruling
bloc. Most of the literature favors domestic determinants of the liberalization process,
although there is little agreement on which factors are important. For example,
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) argue good economic times can spur authoritarians to
step down, since they can make a better case for remaining a part of the new system.
More recent empirical work by Haggard and Kaufman (1995b) has confirmed this notion
in studies of several East Asian transitions. In a similar vein, economic crises may serve
as a trigger to split a ruling coalition by creating pressures on authoritarian governments to respond to inflation or a recession (Gasiorowski 1995).

Other sets of conditions may make conditions more propitious for splits in the ruling coalition which could lead towards liberalization. The failure of authoritarians to legitimize and institutionalize their rule may make them more susceptible to political or economic crises (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 15). Barbara Geddes (1998) has argued that military-led authoritarian regimes by their very nature are likely to split given differences among preferences of the military elite (see Chapter 3, Sec. 3.3).

Thus, many studies of the liberalization process treat the impetus for liberalization as an exogenous shock. These shocks may be political or economic in nature, but either will force elites to take some action to restore the legitimacy of their regime. Disagreements then arise within the authoritarian bloc as to the prudent course of action. Some regimes may be able to weather the crisis given a variety of factors ranging from the nature of the current autocratic regime, economic conditions, and/or the past performance of the regime. Other regimes may decide to liberalize in an attempt to restore their legitimacy.

My argument is that one part of this exogenous shock can be pressure from international organizations of which the regime is a member. This pressure can undermine authoritarian rule in two ways. First, it can create economic difficulties for the regime if part of the punishment by the organization is the suspension of trade, benefits, or the imposition of economic sanctions. This can create or exacerbate economic crises which can undermine an authoritarian regime. Second, public condemnation and international isolation can help to de-legitimize a regime at home. If
allies and institutional partners treat the regime as a pariah state, this can impact public and elite perceptions of the regime within the state. Either of these pressures, especially in combination with other domestic strains or crises, can help to weaken an authoritarian regime’s grip on power. As Larry Diamond (1999: 277) has argued, “Concerted international pressure on authoritarian elites could reinforce domestic pressures and persuade authoritarian elites that the costs of resisting demands for democracy exceed the benefits they expect to reap.”

This pressure can arise from a variety of methods and can range from overt de-legitimization of the regime by other IO members through public condemnation and political isolation to direct economic sanctions against the regime or expulsion from the organization. In order to understand how this mechanism works, three inter-related questions will be addressed: 1) Why do member states pressure other non-democratic or semi-democratic members to undertake democratization? 2) Why is the IO the mechanism by which the occurs? and 3) How do member states pressure the regime in question? Although the answers to these questions are inter-related, I will discuss each independently.

1.3.2. The Motives for Pressure

Why would states pressure other states to become democratic? More to the point, why do democratic states often pressure non-democratic states to become democracies? There are two reasons why democratic states may attempt to pressure non-democratic states to liberalize.
First, as a way to boost their own international status, a new or young democracy may pressure former authoritarian partners to make the same move to democracy. In order to distance themselves from former allies or autocratic neighbors, a state may become very vocal against authoritarian regimes. As Pridham (1995) has argued, the act of foreign policy re-orientation can lend legitimacy to new democracies.\(^8\) Thus, new democracies will have incentives to treat autocracies (especially former political allies) as pariah states in order to establish their own legitimacy. Even established democracies, such as the United States, will make the promotion of democracy a major foreign policy priority for reasons of domestic legitimacy. In the words of Laurence Whitehead (1996d: 248), “[S]uccess in supporting democracy abroad has served to reinforce the legitimation of the democratic order at home, and to boost national pride and self-confidence.”

Second, if scholarly research concerning the economic and political advantages of democracies is correct, then one would expect democracies to rationally desire to have more democracies in the world. Research has shown that democracies prefer to trade (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; Bliss and Russett 1998; Polacheck 1997), cooperate (Russett 1993; Chan 1997; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorf 2000), and ally (Gartzke and Simon 1996; Siverson and Emmons 1991; Gubatz 1996) with one another. In addition, democracies better promote economic growth and stability (Keefer and Knack 1995; 1997; Barro 1997). Thus, expanding the number of democracies expands interaction opportunities for existing democracies. Moving from theoretical generalizations to empirical practice, however, may not be so easy. There are certainly specific instances where regime type holds little power to explain economic or political

---

\(^8\) Pridham’s argument is also applied to the case of consolidation, since the foreign policy re-orientation
relations (e.g., U.S. support for the coup against Chile’s Allende, U.S. policy towards the Gulf monarchies, etc.). Nonetheless, in the aggregate, the idea that democracies seem to prefer to trade, ally, and cooperate with other democracies is well established. Thus, given the option and the opportunity (which I will argue IOs provide), a democracy may well attempt to push a non-democratic neighbor or trade partner to liberalize.

Why will regional IOs be a potent source of pressure against authoritarian regimes? Three factors make these institutions more likely to be the instrument of choice for democratic states. First, regional institutions provide a highly visible forum to air complaints against member states. In essence, it provides states with a low-cost "voice" opportunity. The benefits of international institutions in terms of lowering transaction costs has been elucidated in other works on international institutions (cf. Keohane 1984; Martin 1992). Because these institutions provide a readily accessible and highly visible forum for public condemnation or economic sanctions, they provide a ready conduit for this pressure.  

Second, because most international organizations and institutions contribute to increasing the amount and quality of information about the behavior of states, democracies would be more likely to possess information about the autocracy. Knowledge of important opposition actors, the financial foundations of the regime, even relationships with controlling elites are more likely within a regional organization. This information can be used to successfully apply pressure on the authoritarian regime. For

---

may assist in the process of consolidation as well.  
9 Of course this skirts the classic issue of collective action problems in coordinating economic sanctions. First, because institutions are likely to help identify cheaters (for example, through the construction of focal points), concerns over free riding will be lessened within an institution (cf. Martin 1992: for a discussion of focal points see Garrett and Weingast 1993). Second, as I will argue later, certain institutions will be more
example, in a regional trade organization, members will have intimate knowledge about the state of the economy of each member including which sectors are the most vulnerable to economic pressure. While this information may not guarantee the success of the organization’s efforts, it does increase the probability that the pressure can help to de-legitimize the target regime.

Finally, multilateral efforts will often be a favored mechanism of democracies since it minimizes the perception on the part of actors within the target state of direct violations of sovereignty. For example, the United States has been criticized in the past for its unilateral efforts at democracy promotion in Latin America (cf. Drake 1998: 79-81). If efforts to promote democracy are widely perceived as illegitimate in the target state, such intervention will often backfire, creating support for the authoritarian regime. With the support of regional institutions, however, similar efforts can gain legitimacy because of their multilateral nature (Farer 1989; Pastor 1989; Munoz 1998).

How do democracies use IOs to pressure autocratic states? Because the institution provides expanded interaction opportunities, there are a variety of possibilities. First, open and direct verbal condemnation is likely. This can be a effective tool to de-legitimize an autocracy to citizens and elites within the regime. Second, if a state or group of states can build enough support within the organization, threats of sanctions or other punishments (e.g., membership suspension) may be levied against an autocratic state. These actions can provide powerful incentives, especially in combination with other domestic pressures, for a regime to liberalize.

likely to pressure authoritarian regimes, thus not every regional IO will be a source of pressure against their non-democratic members.
One likely scenario for this IO pressure are cases of re-democratization after a member suffers a breakdown of democracy. Regional IOs often assert pressure for the state to re-install the democratic regime. A prime example of this scenario would be the Organization of American State’s pressure on Guatemala after the self-coup of Jorge Serrano. In May of 1993, Serrano dissolved Guatemala’s legislature and courts, and announced that he would rule by decree (Halperin and Lomasney 1998: 137). Led by the democratic members of the organization, the OAS lodged high profile protests and moved to levy sanctions against the regime (Cameron 1994: 169). After five days, Serrano was forced from office by the military, who re-installed a civilian president. Many observers credit the OAS response as an important part of Serrano’s calculations to step down (Halperin and Lomasney 1998; Farer 1996; Cameron 1998).

In the end, IO are an enabling mechanism which increase the probability that democracies can and will push non-democracies to liberalize. These institutions help to de-legitimize autocratic regimes through various means including public condemnation, political or economic sanctions, even expulsion from the organization. Although this in and of itself may not be the most important determinant in convincing autocrats to loosen their grip on power, in combination with other factors, it can provide a powerful impetus for political liberalization.

1.3.3. Societal Elites and Acquiescence to Democratic Change

During decisions to begin liberalization or even immediately thereafter, certain elite groups upon which the autocratic government depends may attempt to veto this action. I will argue that IO membership decreases the likelihood for this veto for two
reasons. First, IOs can create credible guarantees to key constituencies which can assuage these elite group's fears of democracy. Second, IOs can lessen the probability of this veto through a socialization or learning process. This learning process can make elites less inimical to the process of liberalization. This section will discuss each of these two processes as they relate to business elites and the military, respectively. These dynamics may occur at the point of initial liberalization or later, during decisions on whether to complete the transition to democracy and open institutions to fair competition.\textsuperscript{10}

Authoritarians (whether in single-party systems or military dictatorships) depend upon the support of other groups in society for their power. A common theory in explaining the rise of autocracies is that these regimes best protect the interests of these important groups. For example, business elites may fear that democracy will bring radical populists to power or even less-extreme movements which may not protect their property rights or financial interests. The military may fear democratic transitions because of the threat it poses to their institutional interests, especially subordination to civilian supremacy. If these groups fear their interests are threatened by political liberalization, they will likely stand in the way of liberalization efforts (Kaufman 1986: 86). Membership in IOs can help to calm the fears of the groups by either serving as an external guarantor of their rights and preferences, or through socializing them to not veto the democratic process.

\textsuperscript{10}Linz and Stepan (1996) have described this later phenomenon as the opening of "reserve domains"—institutions or policies that were held as unalterable by freely elected governments. Because of the
1.3.3.1. Business Elites

For many business elites in authoritarian systems, democracy can conjure images of populism and radicalism. Research on bureaucratic-authoritarianism in Latin America, for example, argued that business elites supported coups against democracies in the 1960s and 1970s because they felt the military would protect their interests from "the masses" (cf. O'Donnell 1973; Whitehead 1989: 85). These concerns, it is argued, caused middle class business interests and internationalist economic coalitions to support the authoritarian takeovers, often by the military (Kaufman 1986). Even much of the major democratic transitions literature of the 1980s assumes that business interests will naturally ally themselves with authoritarians who are better suited to protect their interests (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 27; see also Payne 1994: 2).

Specifically, the argument holds that business leaders fear nationalization, redistribution, and other policies which would compromise their economic position. Thus, according to this literature, business leaders have a preference for non-democratic regimes which will protect their interests. In a recent adaptation of this proposition, Leigh Payne (1994) argues that business leaders have no strong preferences for any type of government, whether authoritarian or democratic. Rather, any system that will protect their interests may be supported (see also Malloy 1987: 252-3).

Thus, when confronting a situation where liberalization is an option for an authoritarian regime, what kind of calculations will economic elites make in deciding whether to support liberalization or remain backers of the hard-line authoritarian guard? Gary Marks (1992: 51) summarizes this calculation as follows:

existence of these reserve domains, states are often labeled semi-democracies, since the policies of the state

21
“In some cases, the worst that an elite can expect under a strategy of toleration is an unpleasant loss of status and political power that leaves its economic base and religiocultural values secure. In other cases, the call for toleration of political opposition fuels deep-seated fears within the ruling elite about its economic viability, the continued existence of hallowed institutions, or even personal survival ... A political elite will have some estimation of its prospective capacity to protect its basic interests both by building institutional safeguards into the emerging democratic process and by actively competing in it...”

Thus, if elites can find some way of guaranteeing their economic (or political) well-being, they are more likely to submit to liberalization. Of course, one problem faced by these elites is the difficulty in assuring that these “institutional safeguards” are respected by reformers. If they attach a particularly low probability to the survival of these safeguards, they may rationally refuse to liberalize at the outset (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992: 342). To take an extreme example from one observer of Latin American politics, “if open elections seriously threaten complete loss of private property, capitalists will all become authoritarians...” (Sheahan 1986: 163).

My contention is that membership in international organizations can be a credible external guarantee of safeguards for elites, especially economic elites. When policy violates an international agreement, the ability change course becomes diminished. These external guarantees will lessen the perception on the part of business elites that democracy will be dangerous to their interests. In the words of Laurence Whitehead (1989: 84): “A vital element in the process of democratic consolidation is therefore to induce [business interests and propertied classes] to confine their lobbying within legitimate bounds and to relinquish their ties with the undemocratic right. External reassurance (and if possible guarantees) may provide a critical inducement at the

---

are not entirely open for popular debate.
beginning of a consolidation process, although the need for this should diminish as democratization advances”.

The literature on regional cooperation agreements has long argued that these institutions perform these commitment functions. Membership in a regional organization helps to lock-in economic policies and rights enacted by domestic elites (Goldstein 1998: 143-4; Milner 1998: 24; Mansfield, Milner, Rosendorf 2000). For example, free trade agreements codify commitments to free trade and set up a system of verification to monitor the implementation of such reform (Whalley 1998). These mechanisms help to lock-in commitments among states that free trade will continue even in the face of domestic opposition (Fernandez and Portes 1998; Mansfield 1998; Milner 1998: 29).

In the area of property rights, regional economic agreements also help to provide commitments that governments will not engage in opportunistic behavior. Since a common goal of many regional agreements is to lure foreign investment into the region, these institutions provide explicit guarantees about property and investment. In order to lure multinational firms to invest in a region, these arrangements must provide guarantees against opportunistic behavior on the part of host governments—guarantees which would apply to domestic firms as well. As such, these organizations can provide important reassurances concerning to property rights and investments.

Laurence Whitehead has argued that these guarantees codified in the EC/EU were essential to democratization efforts in Southern Europe.11 Because the EC “offered critical external guarantees to the business and propertied classes of southern Europe …

---

11 It should be noted that although Southern European states were not full members of the EC, Greece had its association agreement and Spain and Portugal quickly applied for full membership soon after their transitions to democracy began.
democracy would lose much of its sting for the rich” (Whitehead 1996a: 271). The 
EC/EU insists on adequate compensation for any property taken by the state, and insures 
the relatively free movement of capital and goods (Whitehead 1986). This externally-
monitored and enforced guarantee provided credible protection for economic elite 
interests which essentially bought their acquiescence in the democratization process in 
Southern Europe. This was especially true in Spain (Whitehead 1986) and Portugal 
(Manuel 1996: 75), where economic elites had traditionally been quite hostile to 
democracy. For the Spanish elites who were a potential roadblock to democracy, the 
various stipulations of the EC "provided guarantees and reassurances to those who faced 
the post-authoritarian future with apprehension" (Powell 1996: 297).

These commitments to trade and property may assuage business leaders that even in the worse case scenario of a populist-oriented, democratic government, their interests will be protected. Of course, it is possible that any government (democratic or authoritarian) can withdraw from these international agreements, but they would pay a high cost for doing so. Thus, membership in international organizations reduce the probability for opportunistic behavior, thus increasing the probability for business elites acquiescence to liberalization and therefore, democracy.

1.3.3.2. *The Military and Socialization*

The other group which can be influenced by memberships in a regional organization is the military. Similar to business elites, the military is a powerful group concerned with protecting their interests and institutions (Dassel and Reinhardt 1998). Often, the military stands in the way of political liberalization out of fears for their
autonomy (e.g., subjugation to civilian rule) and for the protection of their institutions (e.g., fears of reprisals for their role in past authoritarian governments) (cf. Przeworski 1993: 31-2; Whitehead 1989: 81-4). Regional IOs can help to assuage the military to acquiesce to democratization by not only providing externally supported guarantees, but by helping to re-orient military officers away from their interest in domestic politics.

Regional security organizations can assure the military of continued support either through the domestic regime or alliance partners. In order to maintain a credible military force as a part of an alliance, a state must provide adequate resources to the military and is often pressured by its allies to do so. These requirements of the alliance help to assure military officers their “piece of the pie”. The military may also receive direct financial or technical benefits from its alliance partners. As highlighted in Chapter 5, this was the case for the Hungarian military. Through the Partnership for Peace program, Hungary received technical military assistance and through NATO, it received assistance in the modernization process. In addition, NATO required that military spending in Hungary be stabilized and even increased. This reversed a downward spiral in the military budget which had created dissatisfaction among military officers. As I show in Chapter 5, PFP/NATO membership was important for the completion of the transition in Hungary.

Perhaps the stronger impact of regional military organizations on the military and their attitudes towards democracy comes in the form of socialization. Regional alliances and military organizations, especially those which conduct joint training operations or maintain permanent institutions (e.g., NATO), help to socialize military leaders in non-democratic member states as to the role of the military in domestic society. This may or
may not be the goal of membership, but because of interaction within the institution, this socialization process may occur.

Other research on the effect of international institutions has identified this process in other areas besides the military (Tharp 1971: 3). Martha Finnemore (1996a) has shown how preferences can arise out of interactions with international institutions and organizations. Strang and Chang (1993) have shown, for example, how the International Labor Organization has influenced welfare spending through interactions and the socialization of domestic elite groups. Most of this research, growing out of sociological institutionalism, does not center on institutions qua formal institutions, but rather international norms (Strang and Chang 1993: 237).\(^{12}\) Still, many examples in the empirical literature focus on formal international organizations such as UNESCO, the ILO, or the World Bank (Finnemore 1996b). Thus, although I specify a specific causal mechanism that is more formal than most sociological institutionalists would stipulate, much of the processes behind the socialization remain the same.

This socialization amounts to persuading military leaders that the role of the military is not that of an internal police force, but rather to protect the state from outside forces.\(^{13}\) As Pridham (1994: 196) has argued, “A more stable way for these [Southern European] governments to internationalize the military role was through integration in a European organization such as NATO”. Moreover, the idea of civilian supremacy over military missions and institutions is often an issue of contention in transitional states. By

\(^{12}\) For a collection of essays discussing the sociological institutionalist view, see Thomas, Meyer, Ramirez, and Boli 1987.

\(^{13}\) I make a similar argument in the context of democratic consolidation. There I contend that the threat of punishment from the IO in the case of a military coup convinces the military to stay in the barracks. Here,
“rubbing elbows” with military leaders of other states who subscribe to these types of doctrines, military elites in autocratic or recently autocratic states are likely to internalize these doctrines themselves, making them more likely to accept full democracy. This issue may be important not only in the military’s acceptance of an initial move towards liberalization, but also the removal of “reserve domains” and completing the transition to democracy.

Perhaps nowhere has this dynamic been more important than the transition to democracy in Spain. Long excluded from NATO membership, after Franco’s death and the beginning of the transition to democracy, NATO accession became a foreign policy goal of the new Spanish regime. Although Spain’s transition had taken place over six years prior, a cadre of military officers attempted a coup against the young democracy in 1981. This highlighted the need to control the Spanish military and keep them away from the domestic political process.

NATO became the vehicle to achieve this goal. According to Pridham (1991: 228), “the belief surfaced in government circles that entry to NATO would help secure the new democracy as it would ‘modernize’ the Army through growing international contacts and direct its attention away from domestic politics” (see also Treverton 1986: 32-3; Boyd and Boyden 1985). 14 This reasoning proved correct as Spain’s army did undergo significant modernization and re-orientation after NATO membership (Hurrell 1996: 161). Thus, through “joint maneuvers”, “modernization”, and “improvements in

14 Interestingly, Spain’s main opposition Socialist Party (PSOE), which had initially opposed NATO membership, acquiesced to accession after the 1981 coup attempt largely for its potential impact on the Army officers (see Tovias 1984: 167).

1.3.4. Legitimizing Transitional Governments

The final mechanism linking IOs to democratization is their ability to help signal internal and external actors that transitional regimes are committed to democratic reform.\(^\text{15}\) As states move from authoritarianism to democracy, they often spend some time as a transitional regime. Also labeled “interim” governments, these regimes exist in an “undefined period in the interval between ‘the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime’, at the outset, and ‘the installation of some form of democracy...’” (Shain and Linz 1995: 7). Thus, the democratization process is not complete and there is no guarantee that the process will end in a coherent democracy.

These interim regimes face unique pressures, mostly due to a “context of volatility and political vulnerability marked by uncertainty, anxiety, and high expectations concerning the future distribution of power and loyalties” (Shain and Linz 1995: 7). This creates an immediate challenge of credibility and legitimacy. Because these regimes come to power after the breakdown of autocracy, yet before elections and the completion of democracy, they must legitimate their regime. The easiest path for doing so is to make a clear commitment to democratic reform (Shain and Linz 1995: 6-9).

\(^{15}\) The problem of making a credible commitment to democratic reform may arise at multiple stages within the democratization process. This section discusses the issue during the transition process. The next section makes a similar argument concerning the period after the transition and once the status of coherent democracy is achieved. That section outlines additional sources of credibility problems in young democracies.
Making a credible commitment to reform can be difficult under these situations of uncertainty, however. This lack of commitment to democracy, in turn, erodes the legitimacy of the regime. As Mainwaring (1993: 307) argues, “Legitimacy does not need to be universal in the beginning stages if democracy is to succeed, but if a commitment to democracy does not emerge over time, democracy is in trouble”. This “trouble” can arise from ‘disloyal opposition’ groups during the transition, or from common citizens who do not trust the new, un-elected regime (Mainwaring 1992: 307).

Membership in certain IOs may assist in completing the transition to democracy by helping to signal the intentions of the interim regime. Specifically, membership in certain regional organizations will be a credible signal that the regime wishes to continue reform. Organization membership can serve as external legitimization for the interim government. Geoffrey Pridham (1994: 26-7) has argued that with respect to issues such as “national pride and credibility” and “the international component of system legitimacy”, membership in international institutions and the general re-orientation of foreign policy can assist in transitional process. For example, by applying and gaining membership to such institutions as the Council of Europe, NATO, and the OSCE, Eastern European interim regimes were able to clarify their intentions with regard to democratic reform. As Chapter 5 discusses, this was especially true in Hungary, where the interim Nemeth regime worked feverishly to gain acceptance into Western organizations, especially the Council of Europe (Kun 1993: 47; Klebes 1999).

---

16 This assumes that regime leaders are genuinely interested in completing reform, which may not always be the case. The problem arises when it is impossible to distinguish those leaders who do want to advance democracy from those who do not, which is the crux of the credibility/legitimacy problem. This section assumes that the interim government does prefer to advance reform, but needs a mechanism to do so.
Although this causal process may link regional organizations to the
democratization process at several points throughout the transition, my contention is that
this process is especially important to assist in the completion of democracy—moving
from an interim government to a full democracy. As such, I will test this argument
separately in Chapter 3. Because the credibility and legitimacy issue can arise throughout
the life of a democracy, however, I return this issue below in the context of the
consolidation of democracy.

This section has discussed the causal mechanisms by which regional
organizations may be associated with democratic transitions. Of course, none of these
causal mechanisms are exclusive and may all be present in any one case. Some of these
mechanisms may also help to consolidate democracy in a state, after the transition to
democracy has been completed. To that end, I now turn to the issue of regional
organizations possible links to democratic consolidation.

1.4. The Argument: Regional Organizations and Democratic Consolidation

This section will outline my theory linking regional organizations to democratic
consolidation. I begin by discussing the nature of the consolidation problem and the
dynamics of domestic politics which can threaten the stability of young democracies. I
then show how regional organizations can assist in the consolidation of democracy by
helping to commit domestic actors to reform by raising the cost of anti-democratic action
on the part of elites. In addition, these organizations provide both positive and negative
incentives for regime opponents to abide by emerging democratic institutions. Finally,
joining regional organizations can help legitimize the new regime, increasing the
likelihood that the common citizen will invest in the new system, furthering the consolidation process. Chapter 4 tests the argument using event history analysis to analyze whether regional IOs are associated with the increased endurance of democracies.

1.4.1. The Perils of Consolidation

There are a multitude of ways to conceptualize democratic consolidation (Gunther, Puhle, Diamandouros 1995; Schedler 1998; O'Donnell 1996; Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992; Shin 1994). Various factors including elite unity to economic stability to mass attitudinal support for democracy have been proffered as definitions and operationalizations of consolidation. Rather than review these multiple conceptualizations at length, I will follow the advice of Giuseppe Di Palma (1990: 31): "when it comes to consolidation, we should try to avoid the impulse to take refuge behind questions of definition... The task, on the contrary, is to focus on the theories...".

The crux of the issue confronted by this chapter is, what factors contribute to the duration of democracy? Can young democracies overcome challenges to their nascent institutions posed by anti-democratic forces which previously benefited from authoritarianism? Will citizens perceive that the new regime is committed to democratic reform and make their own commitment to the democratic process? For democracy to become consolidated, it must overcome these short-term challenges. Pridham (1995: 169) has labeled the short-term obstacles to democracy "negative consolidation", which "includes the solution of any problems remaining from the transition process and, in general, the containment or reduction, if not removal, of any serious challenges to
democratization". This view is in contrast to positive consolidation, which is a long-term attitudinal shift in society towards democratic norms. Other scholars have labeled this immediate issue of regime durability "democratic breakdown" (Schedler 1998). For the purposes of this project, I have chosen to concentrate on this short-term aspect of consolidation, ignoring the long-term aspects of democratic legitimization. While some would object to my characterization of democratic “endurance” as "consolidation", this view does have adherents in the existing literature (Power and Gasiorowski 1997). Moreover, because there is no “widely accepted” criteria for democratic consolidation (McClintock 1989: 133), it would seem that endurance should serve as an excellent proxy for consolidation. In the end, while democratic endurance may not equate directly with consolidation (Shin 1994), it is certainly a necessary condition.

New democracies face a high risk of failure (Mainwaring, et al 1992: 8). Empirically, the survival rate of democracies in their infancy is quite low: one-third of all new democracies fail within five years (Power and Gasiorowski 1997). Why are democracies so susceptible to failure in the immediate post-transitional period? Two factors help explain this vulnerability: 1) change in the composition and structure of domestic institutions, and 2) increased uncertainty about both the durability of these institutions and the identity of the relevant actors which influence these institutions (Whitehead 1989: 78-80).

By their very nature, institutions have distributional consequences (Knight 1992). As old institutions are cast aside and new institutions are formed, new "winners" and "losers" arise (Przeworski 1991). Regardless of whether the change is political or

---

17 Although the root of long-term legitimization lies in the regime's ability to overcome these short-term
economic, some groups suffer, while others improve their lot. As J. Samuel Valenzuela (1992: 71) notes, these distributional squabbles flowing from institutional change are the essence of the consolidation process: "while democratic consolidation is basically about the elimination of formal and informal institutions that are inimical to democracy, it takes the form of a struggle between actors who benefit—or think they could benefit at a certain point—from those institutions' existence, and those who do not." Both sides in this struggle can pose a threat to the new democracy—a threat exacerbated by the uncertainty surrounding the transitional period.

1.4.2. Losers and the Threat to New Democracies

Distributional losers often pose the most visible threat to nascent democracies. Unhappy with their new status, some groups may focus only on their short-term deprivations rather than the prospect of future gains under a democratic system (Valenzuela 1992). Any group may fall into this category but two often stand out as potential spoilers in the consolidation effort: the military and business elites.

The military can provide the largest roadblock to democratic consolidation, especially if they were an integral part of the previous authoritarian government (Linz, Stepan, and Gunther 1995; Aguero 1995). There are generally two dynamics which lead the military to move against a nascent democracy. Either institutions are contested and the military feels their leadership is needed to protect their own institutions and the state itself, or a new democracy can attempt to subjugate the military to civilian control, leading to a crisis in civil-military relations.

obstacles. That is, negative consolidation is a necessary condition for positive or long-term consolidation.
Haiti is one of the most recent examples of the military moving against a regime during a time of contested institutions. Less than seven months after Haiti's first elections, President Jean Bertrand-Aristide was toppled by a military-led coup in September 1991. A three-person junta took power amidst massive violence in the small island nation. The leader of the coup, General Raoul Cedras, claimed that the new democratic government had not effectively established itself after elections which justified the coup: "What we need to do now is reestablish the state and control the country" (Inter Press Service 1991).

If the military feels its interests are threatened during a time when institutions are contested, it is more likely to move against its opponents at home (Dassel 1998). Moreover, the military may feel that society has become too polarized and that strong central leadership is necessary to protect "the state" (Huntington 1968: 194-196). Haitian General Cedras' first post-coup pronouncements summarize this view quite succinctly: "The Army is steering the ship of state into port" (Christian Science Monitor 1991). In these cases, democratization suffers a severe setback. In some instances, the military offers to return control of the state to civilians. Their track record is mixed in fulfilling this promise¹⁸, but even in cases where power is returned to an elected government, the very political fabric of a society suffers (Finer 1962) and the probability of recurrent coups increase (Londregan and Poole 1990).

The military may also move against a young democracy if it feels threatened by attempts to establish civilian supremacy. The government is placed in a difficult position

---

¹⁸ In Turkey, the military has a strong track record of "leaving" government (See Chapter 6). In Haiti, it took an invasion of US troops to convince the military government to leave power. Currently, Niger and
vis-à-vis the military and its role in the new regime. On one hand, it is widely recognized that democracy requires civilian supremacy over the military (Linz and Stepan 1996; Valenzuela 1992: 87). Attaining this supremacy can prove a difficult task since the regime must simultaneously try to keep the military loyal to the new democratic regime during this process (Aguero 1992). In the post-1983 return to democracy, Argentina faced such a dilemma. Attempts by President Raul Alfonsin to impose civilian authority on the military had taken great strides in the first part of his administration (Aguero 1995). Eventually, as budget cuts grew deeper and prosecution for human rights offenses grew, the military began to oppose reform. After a series of revolts by mid-level officers, Alfonsin limited the state's prosecution of officers for human rights crimes, weakening his own as well as the subsequent Menem administration (Pion-Berlin 1991). Although subsequent military uprisings failed against the Menem administration, this example illustrates the delicate balance between controlling a post-authoritarian military force while simultaneously holding their loyalty to the new regime.

The military, however, does not often act alone. Other groups may exert similar pressures against the consolidation of the new regime, even pressuring the military for action against the regime (Dassel and Reinhardt 1998). Specifically, business elites can be a salient source of these threats (Whitehead 1989: 84; Kaufman 1986: 101). The lack of protection for property rights, poor economic policy and performance, or excessive regulation can spur economic elites to not only withhold support from a regime, but

---

Pakistan's military has promised civilian elections. It remains to be seen whether these military officers will run for election and whether the elections will be free and fair.
actively work against it. In addition, business elites may decide that they do not want to “share the stage with a wide range of other political interests” and may desire to return to the “comfort and shelter” of authoritarian rule (Whitehead 1989: 85). While these business elites may not possess the resources to directly overthrow the regime, they can sow the seeds of discord which could undermine consolidation of the system or ally with a group which does possess the power to depose the government, such as the military.

Under what circumstances is one likely to find such an alliance between the military and business interests? Existing literature sheds some light on this question. Londregan and Poole (1990) find that economic growth is a key determinant to military coups, but are hesitant to speculate why this is the case. It is important to remember, however, that the military must feel there is an alternative to the current regime before it acts (Przeworski 1986: 52). According to Aguero (1995: 126), elite behavior is important to the perception of the presence of alternatives. Thus, contested institutions function as an enabling factor for military action, while poor economic policy and performance by the new regime may push business elites to ally with the military. With a support base of economic elites, the military would perceive a clear alternative to the existing regime, heightening their propensity to move against democracy.

It is important to remember that losers do not necessarily suffer loses before they move against the system. Merely the perception that they will suffer losses under the new government will be enough to spur them to action. Valenzuela’s earlier quote describing post-transition dynamics included an important phrase: "actors who benefit --

---

19 Recall the previous section’s discussion of the appeal of authoritarianism to business interests. If these ideas of the bureaucratic-authoritarian model are correct, business leaders may be hostile towards
or think they could benefit at a certain point" (emphasis added). Although he is referring to the benefits of the previous authoritarian system, the same logic applies to the new democracy. Actual losses are not a prerequisite for an anti-regime stance.

What is needed is for these potential anti-regime forces to accept democratic institutions and work within the institutions rather than despite them. This issue was discussed in the previous section in reference to elite’s pre-transition behavior (the acquiescence effect), but similar problems can clearly arise in the post-transition environment as well, especially in the early tenure of democracy. Mainwaring (1992b: 309) expresses this idea in the context of consolidation: “In many cases, the actors who supported authoritarian rule remain equivocal at best about democracy as a form of government ... In the early phases of a new democracy, it is more feasible to induce these actors to abide by the democratic rules out of self-interest, by creating a high cost for anti-system action, than to transform their values.” I will argue that membership in certain regional organizations can help to alter the cost-benefit calculations of potential anti-regime groups through increasing the costs for overturning the democratic system. Before elucidating how IOs perform this task, however, I will focus on an equally problematic group for the consolidation of democracy -- the “winners” in the new regime.

1.4.3. Winners, Credible Commitments and the Threat to Democracy

Winners in new democracies could attempt to turn their (often new-found) power into a permanent political advantage. As Lane (1979) and Przeworski (1991) have argued, political power gives rise to increasing returns to scale—political power begets democracy after the transition. Of course, if regional organizations provide guarantees ex ante, this
more political (and economic) power. This "temptation of power" could result in biased institutions, the exclusion of certain groups from the democratic process, a freezing of the pace of reform, even a reversal of earlier liberalization (Hellman 1998). The major difficulty comes when winners must convince other elites (e.g., losers) and the masses that they are committed to democratic reform. If either group (elites or the masses) does not perceive this commitment, consolidation will be highly unlikely. The remainder of this section will first outline why actors in new democracies experience a commitment problem, followed by a discussion of how this problem can undermine democratic consolidation.

Committing to reform is an important issue to new democratic regimes, which face several hurdles in convincing observers that reform is credible.20 The problem can be cast as an information-related issue. Some regimes (democratic and authoritarian) can and do begin reform which they have no intention of completing. Tempted by the ability to bias the system in their favor, new leaders freeze or even reverse liberalization and reform. Partial reform can halt the democratic consolidation process in its tracks. On the political front, for example, “electoral rules may be deliberately designed ... to under-represent grossly significant sectors of opinion, while over-representing others” (Valenzuela 1992: 67). The problem is that it is difficult to know ex ante whether new regimes will engage in this opportunistic behavior or follow through with reform.

The uncertainty over the intentions of the regime arises from a variety of factors. First, there are certain benefits that accrue to those who make certain political reforms opposition may be less of a problem for the new regime.
(loans, increased investment, etc.) which can give non-committed governments an incentive to appear as reformist (Frye 1997). Earnest reformers would benefit from sending a credible signal to distinguish themselves from fraudulent reformers.

Most importantly, new regimes lack a reputation for self-restraint and honoring commitments (Diermeier et al 1998; Linz 1978). Given that the regime is relatively new, external and internal actors have even less information about the true intentions or motivation of the government (Crescenzi 1999). According to Valenzuela (1992: 66), “it is not at all clear that those who take power in such convulsed situations will be committed to building a genuine democracy”. Established governments are much more likely to have built a reputation as honoring commitments to political reform and/or protecting property rights. New regimes have no track record and thus foster no expectations that commitments to reform will be credible.

Adding to this problem is that during many transitions, existing institutions are cast aside by the winners.21 Thus, any reputation that may exist for those in power will be negative: "After any transition from authoritarian rule, the emergent democracy will be a regime in which not all significant political actors will have impeccable democratic credentials" (Whitehead 1989: 78). Since winner's past behavior consisted of gutting or severely altering domestic institutions, their ability to signal credible commitments in the post-transition period will be limited.

---

20 Other credibility problems exist, especially in the realm of economic reform. The others, however, are less acute for transitional regimes. For a discussion of additional credibility problems in economic liberalization, see Rodrik 1989.

21 One could cite the findings of Londregan and Poole (1990: 175) that coups tend to beget coups as evidence of this problem. They find that once a coup occurs, "it has a much harder time avoiding further coups."
Finally, these problems are compounded by the uncertainty which arises from the transition process itself, when elites will often be unsure about the "identity, resources, and intentions of those with whom they are playing the transition game" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 198: 66). In addition, although winning groups may remain winning groups, there is often high turnover in leadership of elite groups in the post-transition environment (Whitehead 1989: 79). In the end, this uncertainty over the type of government (sincere versus dissembling) can limit the benefits of reform for those who are sincere.

In mature democracies, a common commitment strategy is the creation of new institutions. Unfortunately, the option is not wholly credible in this particular political environment. Theories of "endogenous institutions" hold that domestic institutional arrangements often arise because of the preferences of important political and economic actors (Root 1994; North and Weingast 1989). Institutions (such as constitutions) bind these actors to certain courses of action since their initiation and consequences reflect the _ex ante_ preferences of the actors themselves. This binding occurs to confront the problem of credible commitment—namely a fear on the part of agents that _ex post_ opportunism will lead to a collapse of an agreement. Formalized arrangements in the form of institutions thus create a self-enforcing equilibrium. This option, however, faces two major obstacles in new democracies.

First, as previously discussed, the vast uncertainty of the transitional period can obscure information about the preferences of other actors is not widely known (Przeworski 1991: 87). Although this information is not a strict requirement for demand-driven institutions to arise, North and Weingast (1989: 806) note that institutions much
match "anticipated incentive problems" to be self-enforcing. Without knowledge of the basic preferences of actors, this task could prove to be troublesome. In some cases, it may not even be clear who the relevant actors are (Whitehead 1989). For example, will labor emerge as a powerful interest group to oppose reform or will they remain marginalized? Institutions which do not account for such groups are unlikely to be stable. Given this uncertainty, it is difficult to imagine the natural emergence of institutions to instantiate credible commitments.

Second, any commitment to these new institutions will automatically be suspect. Unlike states where institutions have survived for years and are only dissolved by lengthy political and legal processes, transitional states have recently gutted existing institutions. Again, the issue of reputation becomes important. Winners, who now posses a power advantage, have a reputation for using extra-legal means to achieve their goals. This is especially devastating since reputation can be as important as institutions themselves in securing a credible commitment (North and Weingast 1989). In sum, even though institutions may arise because of demand for credibility or to enhance efficiency, the commitment to these institutions themselves is what is lacking in the post-transitional environment.

1.4.4. Credible Commitments and the Consolidation of Democracy

This inability to create credible commitments can spell disaster for the consolidation of democracy. From both an elite and mass perspective, a perception of weak commitment on behalf of the winners in a new democracy can lead these groups to withhold their support from the new regime, weakening and potentially undermining
democracy. Elites often have a deep mutual distrust for one another in the transitional period (Burton, Gunther, and Higley 1992). This absence of trust flows directly from the lack of reputation for keeping agreements and is compounded by the uncertainty of the transitional environment. It can have disastrous consequences for democracy. Those who “lose” in the transition agree to abide by democratic rules since if they later come to power through elections, can attempt to change the policies they dislike (Przeworski 1991). If these elites do not believe political reform efforts are sincere, they will not lend support to the new regime, since they will heavily discount their future probability of winning power. They may also turn against the regime, even utilizing violent measures, especially if alternatives to the democratic regime exist.22

This lack of support on the part of elites can itself undermine democratic consolidation (Mainwaring 1992). It can also lead to reactions on the part of the regime which further undermine the new democracy: "[I]f each political sector concludes that the democratic commitment of the other is lukewarm, this will reduce the motivation of all, and so perpetuate the condition of fragility" (Whitehead 1989: 94). Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman (1995b: 8) elude to this dynamic when they argue that "the fact that so many leaders in new democracies have acted autocratically in crisis situations implies that such behavior cannot be explained simply in terms of personal ambition or lack of concern for democratic institutions". Thus, elites do not feel they can trust winners, while winners feel they are not receiving a commitment on the part of powerful elite groups to abide by the new rules of the game. As Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros (1995: 9) note, this lack of respect for the governing elite's authority, "could be

22 As previously discussed, alternatives to the current regime are often a prerequisite for any group to
compatible with an abridgement of democracy that might ultimately culminate in its transformation into a limited democracy or authoritarian regime." Thus, the bias in institutions does not result from the preferences or greed of the new regime per se, but is a consequence of the lack of a credible commitment to democracy. In a sense, the lack of credible commitment becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy.

One outcome of this process is the self-coup (*autogolpe*), where democratic leaders suspend democracy to protect it (cf. Cameron 1998). One example of this dynamic is the suspension of democracy by Peruvian president Alberto Fujimori in 1992.23 Faced with an armed opposition group as well as a judicial and legislative branch he could not trust, Fujimori suspended the legislature and installed his own government. He justified the coup on the grounds that he needed more power to fight "legislative and judicial corruption" (Galvin 1992), and to improve democracy by making it more “direct, authentic, and, above all, efficient” (Cameron 1998: 125). A major reason the legislature had become so opposed to Fujimori was their worry over his potentially dictatorial style: dubbed the "Little Emperor" by many Peruvian observers, he often accused "special interests" of making too many demands on the state (Hayes 1992). The distrust among Peruvian elites was a major reason for Fujimori's action (Gunther, Puhle, and Diamandouros 1995: 9).

For democracy to endure, the masses must also be convinced that there is a commitment to democracy. Citizens must vote and become politically active for democracy to take root, especially early in the reform process. Because political activity is not costless, the masses must be convinced that their efforts are not in vein, i.e., that
democracy will continue and the process will remain open to them. If citizens do not perceive this commitment on the part of elites, they will themselves remain uncommitted to the process. This is similar to the previous dynamic concerning elites:

“Although commitment to democracy is especially critical for the political elite, common people and especially leaders of popular groups may also care more about preserving democracy than some of the literature suggests. Caring about this issue, of course, may not always lead to an effective ability to contribute to democratic consolidation. But a society in which there is limited support for democracy does not bode very well for this form of government” (Mainwaring 1992: 310).

Shin (1994: 154) also notes that this can spell disaster for the new regime since “it appears that democracy can still be created without the demand of the masses, yet cannot be consolidated without their commitment”. In some cases, this lack of commitment on the part of the masses can combine with elite dissatisfaction to threaten the continuation of the regime (Mainwaring 1992: 307).

Citizens need to see visible, credible commitments that the reform process will continue. This will help to establish the legitimacy of the reform effort for the masses and encourage their participation in the system. Similarly, elites need to be reassured that liberalization is credible so they will support (or at least acquiesce) the system. Winners would benefit from either a way to guarantee their own commitment to reform or a credible signal that they were serious about reform. Either or both of these strategies would increase the commitment of the regime to reform, lowering the probability that either the masses or elite will turn against the regime.

How might international organizations assist new democracies in furthering negative consolidation? Can IOs prevent democratic breakdown? The next section outlines how this process can occur.

23 See Chapter 5 for a more in-depth treatment of this case.
1.4.5. Regional Organizations and Democratic Consolidation

The hypothesis presented here is that regional organizations can facilitate consolidation of new democracies. In this case, IOs are not an outside entity forcing their preferences upon new democratic regimes and domestic actors. Rather, IOs are used by young democratic regimes to consolidate reforms in several ways. First, IOs serve as an external commitment device which winners can use to bind themselves to political liberalization. Often, membership in regional organizations is conditional upon democratic institutions, which creates a credible commitment on the part of the regime. This conditionality creates a commitment since regimes would incur political and economic costs by joining IOs and violating the conditions of their membership agreements. Thus, any reversal of democracy would be costly to winners. Second, these new memberships also provide a public and highly visible external validation of the new regime which can increase the probability that the masses will commit to the new democracy. This external validation can legitimize the new regime in the eyes of citizens, making their support for anti-system actors less likely.

Third, IOs also bind distributional losers through the same commitment mechanism since a reversal of democracy at the hands of any domestic actor will incur punishment from the organization. Losers must calculate whether the costs imposed by reneging on IO membership will undermine attempts to consolidate their power after a coup. If these costs, which can include a loss of trade, economic and/or military aid, international status, or military protection, are significant, losers are more likely to remain loyal to existing democratic rules and institutions. Finally, IOs can provide
positive incentives to “bribe” losers into complying with democratic institutions. Bribes can occur through a direct transfer of resources (economic assistance) or an expansion of the range of resources which can be utilized as side-payments to opponents. The remainder of this section reviews each of these arguments and provides illustrative examples drawn from the consolidation literature.

1.4.5.1. Binding Winners: Creating Credible Commitments

IOs provide a commitment to existing reform efforts by creating mechanisms to increase the cost of anti-regime behavior while simultaneously publicly signaling a commitment to reform. Both mechanisms arise from conditions imposed by the organization for new members or for material assistance. These conditions raise the costs of limiting reform since any reversal of reform will bring an end to the benefits of the IO as well as audience costs. This conditionality is also a credible signal to outside actors and to citizens that the regime is serious about reform, since monitoring and enforcement is controlled by a third party. In addition, the costs associated with membership (fulfilling the initial conditions as well as traditional costs of membership) make the commitment to the IO more credible.

Membership and/or assistance from some IOs are conditional upon domestic liberalization. The European Union (EU) requires all members to be liberal, free market democracies as does the Council of Europe (Schmitter 1996; Klebes 1999). These requirements are highly publicized and rigorously enforced. For example, Greece left the
Council of Europe after the 1967 military coup.24 Turkey has been continually frustrated by the EU's refusal of admission, which has come of the grounds of that state's questionable record of democracy (Whitehead 1993: 159-61). This phenomenon is not limited to Europe: the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) also contains a clause in its founding treaty (the Treaty of Asuncion) which requires all members to have a democratic polity (Schiff and Winters 1998). The OAS, in 1991, created the Santiago Commitment to Democracy, which calls for an immediate meeting of OAS members if any state suffers a reversal of democracy (Acevedo and Grossman 1996: 137).

Conditionality is not a black and white issue. Some IOs are vague as to their conditions of membership. Although the NATO pre-amble contains references to democracy, one of its founding members was one of Europe's most infamous dictatorships (Portugal) and military coups in member states never resulted in major changes within NATO, nor pressure to end authoritarian rule (Greece and Turkey). The North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA) is another example of imprecise conditionality. While there is not a clear clause within the NAFTA agreement calling for democracy, observers have often pointed out that the US criterion for NAFTA expansion probably does include democracy (Whitehead 1993).

One effect of these membership conditions are to set up a system of negative sanctions if the conditions are violated. If a regime were to undergo a democratic breakdown, the benefits of membership could be suspended, as could the state's membership in the organization. Any financial assistance from the organization,

---

24 The fact that Greece left rather than being expelled was simply a technicality. The resolution to expel Greece was on the table when the military colonels defiantly declared they no longer wished to be a part of the organization.
preferential trade arrangements, monetary policy coordination, military protection, even international status brought by membership would all be put at risk by a democratic reversal. These potential cost serves as a deterrent to winners who would undermine liberal reform. At best, violating conditions of membership or agreement will lead to a suspension of benefits. At worst, a violation can bring expulsion from the organization. Given these costs, there is a strong incentive for domestic actors to work within the rules of the system rather than work against them (Hyde-Price 1994: 246). I discuss how these costs can deter distributional losers in the next section.

This conditionality imposed by the IO is not the only source of credibility for reform for winners who utilize these institutions. Joining an IO can bring costly measures which assist in making the action credible. Fulfilling the initial condition of membership can require policy changes and non-trivial financial outlays. Thus, joining IOs is anything but cheap talk. In addition, membership in many IOs often requires either the creation of additional bureaucracy, membership dues (to fulfill the IO's budget obligations), even economic or monetary reform. For example, upon joining the EU, Spain was forced to implement a value added tax (VAT), which required a large restructuring of the domestic tax system (Pridham 1995: 181). Such costs can be a clear signal of the state's commitment to the organization and its conditions.

Even if the conditionality policy of the IO is unclear (e.g., NATO) or there is a possibility of non-enforcement by the organization itself, the process of joining certain organizations can assist in legitimizing the democratic reform process to common citizens. Accession can be a form of “international recognition of a country’s democratic credentials” (Klebes 1999: 3). The domestic political audience is likely to be attuned to
these issues since association with a highly democratic IO is an early chance to break with the vestiges of an authoritarian past (Pridham 1994: 26-27). As Geoffrey Pridham (1995: 177) discusses, there is a symbolic element to regime transitions, and membership in an IO: "There is an evident link ... between recasting the national self-image and opening the way for consolidating democracy". He goes on to argue that acceptance into these organizations plays an important role in legitimizing reform amongst the public: “Undoubtedly, the citizens of [Southern Europe] felt gratification over being treated as equals by international partners ... We may say that external policy practice has confirmed the credibility of the democratic decision-making structures” (Pridham 1995: 191; emphasis added).

Again using the example of Spain, both EC and NATO membership supplied external validation that its isolation during the Franco regime was over and Spain would be accepted into the international community of nations (White 1986; Story and Pollack 1991: 134). In the words of the Financial Times (1986: S1), “The impact of entry for Spain is mainly psychological, but is by no means a negligible one. Achieving membership was the political equivalent of a doctor’s certificate—a sign of acceptance of recognition of Spain as a ‘normal’ country”. This psychological benefit was important to both elites and especially the common citizens (Pridham 1995: 174).

Reneging on international agreements can thus bring heavy reputational and domestic audience costs on the regime. Making international agreements places a state’s relatively new reputation on the line. This domestic loss of face can have electoral
ramifications for those in power in a democracy (Fearon 1994). These audience costs are potentially high and flow from the fact that these young democracies are attempting to establish a reputation as upstanding members of the international community and regional organizations. Losing this membership, thus risks a backlash from both elite and mass publics who would no doubt blame regime leaders for "blowing their chances" at international acceptance.

Thus, international organizations can serve as a device to signal a commitment to democratic reform through the imposition of financial and reputational costs if conditions of the IO are violated. By making international commitments to tie their own hands, winners send a costly signal to both domestic elites and common citizens. Just as important, however, these IO memberships also raise the costs to losers who would attempt to reverse liberalization ex post.

1.4.5.2. Binding and Bribing Losers

Those who lose or perceive they might lose under the new system face a temptation to overthrow or undermine the regime. IO membership provides both positive and negative incentives for these groups to support the new democratic system. The increased costs imposed by violating membership conditions can deter regime opponents from moving against the government, while IOs can provide resources (i.e., side-payments) to gain the support of these distributional losers. The form of this “bribe” can vary. A regime can provide resources directly to the group or enact a specific policy

---

25 Note that there may or may not be a loss of international reputation. What is important is that domestic agents perceive or fear that a young democracy's credibility will be tarnished. This will have potential electoral consequences for a government that blemishes the reputation of the state.
which would assist the group. In the end, the combination of negative and positive incentives provided by IOs can assist in bringing losers "on board", helping to consolidate democracy.

The same costs imposed on winners who would move against their own democratic system would apply equally to losers. The conditions imposed by IOs increase the *ex ante* costs to any elite who would move overthrow the democratic regime. Any military junta or economic elite allied with the military would think twice before embarking on a policy that would cost their economy valuable links including trade and economic assistance from multilateral organizations. These potential costs may serve as a deterrent against coups, even for elites that do not necessarily “buy into” democracy itself. According to Miles Kahler (1997: 308), “Even elites that are not imbued with democratic norms may choose to follow democratic rules of the game in order to win the economic benefits of membership.” Because the conditions are monitored and enforced by third parties, this threat of punishment gains credibility and becomes "an external anchor against retrogression to authoritarianism" (Huntington 1995: 87-8).

One example of this scenario was played out in April 1996 in Paraguay. While attempting to replace a powerful military general early that year, Paraguayan president Juan Carlos Wasmosy found himself the target of a potential coup. The general, Lino Oviedo, not only refused to resign as requested by Wasmosy, but called for Wasmosy to step down and threatened to foment massive unrest in Paraguay. Immediately a host of international actors condemned the act, led by MERCOSUR ministers from the neighboring states of Uruguay, Brazil and Paraguay. The crisis ended with Oviedo
stepping down in disgrace after mass demonstrations in support of democracy. Many observers have noted the importance of MERCOSUR in enforcing its democracy condition: "But for Mercosur, Paraguay would this year almost certainly have gone back to military rule, setting a dangerous precedent for Latin America" (The Economist 1996). The threat of economic isolation and the costs imposed by this expulsion helped turn the tide in favor of democracy.

IOs can also provide positive incentives to support young democratic institutions and governments. They can provide direct material resources to groups or help create credible side-payments in the form of new policies which would otherwise be difficult to guarantee. Why would a regime turn to external means of bribing a group over internal measures? It would seem that internal policy could achieve similar ends at a potentially lower cost. In fact, new democracies frequently do employ these domestic side-payments after a democratic transition (e.g., power sharing agreements). There are two potential problems with such payments, however. First, a regime may not possess the requisite resources to effectively bribe the groups in question. Regimes emerging from transitions are usually not flush with excess resources to distribute to whomever they chose (Haggard and Kaufman 1995a). Second, because of the new democracies' diminished capacity to make credible commitments, it is difficult for those in power to commit to any particular policy as a side-payment. Newly established governments often lack the "institutional structure which supports policy continuity" (Karp and Paul 1998: 335), which implies that any promise of a specific policy is vulnerable to change ex post. Essentially, the same commitment problems that plague a new regime's liberal political

26 The factual details of this example are drawn from Valenzuela 1997. This case is discussed in more
reforms can hinder their ability to make credible promises for internal side-payments as well.

Some organizations such as the European Union and NATO provide direct resource allocations to states. These resources can be used to mollify groups which threaten the regime. One example is the EU's policy towards Greece after its accession in 1981. The rural sector of Greek society was traditionally susceptible to the call of authoritarian movements (Tsingos 1996). To complete the consolidation of democracy, the government needed to garner the support of this segment of society. EC development assistance was used to improve the quality of life for the agricultural sector and "facilitate the full and managed incorporation of the countryside's rural population into the new democratic regime" (Tsingos 1996).\textsuperscript{27}

IOs can also help provide a commitment to certain policies which benefit disaffected groups.\textsuperscript{28} For example, regional trade associations or regional economic associations provide a guarantee that trade and economic liberalization will proceed despite domestic pressures for reversal (Mansfield 1998; Milner 1998). Thus, if trade liberalization is enacted to "pay-off" export-oriented groups, IO membership assures these groups that reform is much less likely to be reversed. Without the IO and its attendant credible commitment, the regime would be unable to guarantee this side-payment. This is a form of increasing the policy latitude of a regime by increasing policy options. In other words, IOs can increase the range of policy resources to a regime which

\textsuperscript{27} The case is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

\textsuperscript{28} This argument mirrors the acquiescence argument, but applies to situations where groups threaten the consolidation, rather than the transition to democracy.
can be used to placate opposition groups. A major issue area where IO membership can assist with consolidation in this manner centers on civil-military relations.

As previously discussed, the military can be a large hurdle to democratic consolidation. As in the Paraguay example, attempts to establish civilian supremacy over the military can be fraught with danger.\textsuperscript{29} IOs, in the form of military alliances, can provide assistance in this area. Not only did Spain's membership in NATO help that country \textit{complete} their transition to democracy, but it assisted in the consolidation process as well. As previously discussed, one impetus to NATO membership was to socialize Spanish military officers to accept civilian control by integrating them with Western military officers. In addition, joining NATO was seen as a way to divert the military's attention away from internal Spanish politics (Pridham 1995: 199). Moreover, NATO membership provided the military itself with access to more resources than had previously been available: "Not only did NATO membership contribute in redirecting Spain's military mission away from previous domestic concerns, it also accelerated military modernization, including participation in supranational technological development projects" (Aguero 1995: 162).

Although many observers have noted that there is no NATO equivalent in South America to serve a similar function (Linz and Stepan 1996: 219-220), current efforts under the auspices of MERCOSUR, including joint training exercises between Brazil and Argentina, may pay similar dividends (Grabendorf 1993: 342; The Economist 1996). In the end, without the regional organization, subjugating the military to civilian control by

\textsuperscript{29} Many comparativists have labeled the problem of de facto military power one of "reserve domain". That is, the military still posses an unquestioned position of privilege over some issues within the state. For a complete discussion of reserve domains and their relation to the military see Linz and Stepan 1996: 67-69.
refocusing the military's attention away from domestic politics would have been more difficult, especially in Southern Europe. This can prove to be valuable in both the transition and the consolidation process.

This section has attempted to construct a theory of how domestic actors might use international organizations to further democratic consolidation by constraining the behavior of potential domestic opponents. Membership may serve as a bribe towards opposition groups who are apprehensive about potential losses under the new government. In effect, regional IOs can “underwrite” democratic consolidation.\footnote{I borrow this term from Tsingos 1996.} In addition to the positive incentives, a commitment to IO membership raises the cost of reneging on political liberalization by any domestic actor, providing a deterrent to the reversal of this reform.

In the end, of course, the “carrots” and “sticks” provided by regional organizations is no guarantee of democratic consolidation. If regime opponents are determined and supported by large segments of society, there may be little any external (or internal) actor can do to dissuade opponents from moving against the regime. Still, if regional organizations can increase the costs of this behavior for both winners and losers, it increases the likelihood of regime survival. This type of dynamic was discussed by Carlos Westendorp, the Secretary-General of EC affairs in Spain: “You can never prevent an adventurer from trying to overthrow the government if he is backed by the real economic powers, the banks and the businesses. But once in the [European] Community, you create a network of interests for those banks and businesses, the insurance
companies, and the rest; as a result, those powers would refuse to back the adventurer for fear of losing all those links" (quoted in Pridham 1991: 235).

However, not all IOs are likely to serve these purposes adequately. To this point, we have only examined the demand for regional organizations in the post-transitional context. Do all international organizations to provide the resources and commitment to consolidate democracy? Will all IOs pressure non-democratic member states to democratize? Clearly, the answer to these questions is no. IOs may lack both the resources and the political will to serve as an external promoter or supporter of democracy. After all, organizations such as the CMEA or the Warsaw Pact will not be willing to condone democratic transitions or consolidation. With this in mind, I now turn to the "supply-side" part of the argument.

1.5. The Argument: The Supply-Side of Democratization

Only certain regional IOs are likely to be associated with democratic transitions and consolidation. There are several causal mechanisms which link these organizations to democratization: pressure from other members to democratize; socialization which could occur through the normal functions of the organization; “bribery” through the transfer of resources; binding and committing both winners and losers to domestic reform through conditionality; increasing the legitimacy of the young regime in the eyes of the masses; and giving credible guarantees to (usually economic) elites to gain their acquiescence to democratic transitions. While it would be helpful to do a simple test of whether membership in a regional organization was associated with the transition to or the consolidation of democracy, since almost every state in the world is a member to
multiple organizations, this proves to be difficult. Moreover, our intuition tells us that only some organizations are likely to perform any or all of the aforementioned functions. Deciding which regional institutions to choose, however, becomes the difficult task.

In order to investigate the relationship between regional organizations and democratization, I assume that those organizations with a higher democratic “density” are more likely to be associated with both transitions and consolidation. By democratic “density” I refer to the percentage of permanent members in the organization which are already considered democratic. Chapter 2 discusses which organizations I have chosen to include in my analysis, how I have defined a “democratic” country, and the measurement of democratic “density” within an organization. In short, my contention is that the more homogenously democratic is the organization, the more likely it will be to “supply” these causal mechanisms to assist in the democratization effort.

First, homogenously democratic regional organizations are more likely to place conditions on membership in the first place. Because membership in conditional institutions is akin to a “club” (Kahler 1997), the current members will judge whether a state is “worthy” to accede to membership. If the organization is “mixed” in terms of regime type, it will be unlikely to have enacted these conditions in the first place, since simply approving conditions on membership would be more difficult to pass in these “mixed” organizations.

---

31 Note that this measure does not refer to the level of democracy within the organizational structure or procedures. From this point forward, any reference to “democratic” IOs should be understood as the aggregate level of democracy among the members rather than a trait of the organizational structure.
32 Not all of the causal mechanisms linking IOs to transitions or consolidation are based on conditions imposed by the organizations. This eliminates the possibility of coding only the level of conditions in a given organization. In addition, this would still not confront the issue of enforcement of the conditions.
Enforcement of these conditions is also an important part of the picture (Bloomfield 1994; Halperin and Lomasney 1998). The credibility of the conditions is enhanced by the fact that a third-party becomes the monitoring and enforcement mechanism (Schelling 1960; North 1990). Empirically, IOs do inflict punishment on those who break conditions of agreements. For example, the EU suspended the Greek association agreement in 1967 after the colonels came to power (Whitehead 1993: 154). Because the outside party is an organization composed of several states however, there is potential for the supply of enforcement to be problematic.

Essentially, I contend that "democratic density" functions as a loose proxy for commonality of interests within the organization. This is not to say that IOs composed of only democracies are completely harmonious. One look at the EU would quickly dispel this idea (cf. Jupille 1999). Compared to a “mixed” IO, however, I hypothesize that the range of shared interests will be larger in a more homogenously democratic IO. One of these shared interests is likely to be democracy promotion. Again, this is not to imply that all highly democratic IOs will work toward this goal. Rather, these IOs are more likely than their "mixed" counterparts to do so, ceteris paribus.

Second, the more democratic an IO, the higher the probability that conditions will be enforced. One important argument highlighted in the democratic peace literature as well as the recent rationalist causes of war literature, is that democracies are more transparent, especially to one another (Fearon 1995; Russett 1993). This transparency means that democratic states are less likely to openly shirk on enforcing conditions of an IO. If a state is deciding on whether to help enforce a conditionality clause (e.g., by suspending free trade or imposing trade sanctions), it is easier to witness the behavior of
fellow democratic members than autocratic members, ceteris paribus. This is important since if another state attempts to work with the offending state outside the organization, other member states might be less likely to push for enforcement against the rule violator. What is important is that among democracies, discovering such cheating is easier to do than among less transparent, less-democratic regimes.

Third, it is also argued that democracies have a "promising advantage", which among other things, can create mutual trust between democracies (Lipson, nd). This, along with the transparency of democracies, make the costs of enforcement in homogenously democratic regional institutions much easier to bear in both economic and military organizations. If a state feels it would bear a large cost while exacting compliance, it is less likely to push for enforcement. It is especially unlikely to absorb these costs if it feels threatened by or in a costly competition with another member state. A state will be more likely to pay to enforce costly conditions if other members of the organization are democracies. Since its fellow democratic members would be more transparent and trust-worthy, it has less to lose. To place this in another parlance, a state facing losses (especially a democracy) will be less concerned with relative gains issues among a group of democracies than a group of mixed regime type.33

The idea that democracies are more likely to fulfill commitments has received empirical support. Brett Leeds (1999) argues that democracies are more likely to fulfill their international commitments. She argues that democratic leaders face potential audience costs for not following through on their international obligations or reneging on

---

these commitments. The implication for my argument is that IOs composed mostly of democracies are more likely to enforce conditions placed on new democratic members.

There is a final demand-side issue to consider as well. These highly democratic organizations are more likely to be tapped for this job by democratizing states. If one of the key mechanisms by which IOs consolidate democracy is creating a credible commitment and signaling to domestic audiences that a state is serious about democracy, highly democratic organizations should provide the “clearest” signal. Joining an IO made up of semi-democracies and autocracies does little to assuage citizens that there is little risk of reversal in the future.

Of course, regional organizations may choose not to enforce these conditions by turning a blind eye toward autocracies (in cases of transition) or democratic breakdown (in cases of consolidation). If the members of the organization deem the costs too high or other “strategic considerations” mitigate the likelihood of enforcement, IOs may do little to promote or protect democracy (Whitehead 1986: 13). The importance of the “supply-side” in the IO-democracy link is especially important for policymaking. If the external guarantees and threats become incredible, IOs may no longer be efficacious in their policies towards democratization. Nonetheless, my contention is that “democratic” regional organizations will be more likely to enact and enforce policies favorable to the development and stability of democracy.

1.6. Organization of the Work

Chapter 2 presents some of the basic data used in this study, including data on democracy, democratization, and involvement in international organizations. The chapter
reviews the justification for the use of certain quantitative data as well as the sample of international organizations utilized in this work. In addition, some basic correlational statistics are computed as an initial test of the association between involvement in regional organizations and democratic transitions as well as democratic consolidation.

Chapter 3 tests the preceding theory of how regional organizations can facilitate the democratization process. The chapter contains a statistical analysis of the impact of IOs on the probability of a successful transition to democracy. Chapter 4 tests the preceding theory of how IOs may be used by domestic elites to consolidate democracy. Chapter 4 concludes with a statistical test of the effect of IO membership on the endurance of democracies.

Chapters 5 and 6 present illustrative examples of how the causal mechanisms linking IOs to transitions and consolidation, respectively. Although the statistical tests of the theories contained in each of those chapters are supportive of my argument, the nature of the tests do not allow one to distinguish which causal mechanisms may be at work. Through a brief analysis of five cases including Hungary, Peru, Greece, Paraguay, and Turkey, I show how the causal processes outlined in the previous chapters perform in concrete historical situations. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes with the implications for this argument for comparative politics, international relations theorists, and policymakers.
CHAPTER 2

DATA DESCRIPTION AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Before moving to a test of the arguments presented in Chapter 1, I will review some of the data used in this work. This chapter will provide a description of the coding procedures used to build the data set, and present some descriptive statistics to give a feel for general trends in the data. Because many of the empirical phenomenon to be operationalized in this and subsequent chapters are elusive concepts, it is difficult to find a consensus on the best measure of these variables. For example, concepts such as democracy, development, and political stability continue to be contested in academic circles. Given this situation, my approach is to balance substantive validity with data availability.

2.1. The Dependent Variables: Democracy and Democratization

The purpose of this study is to analyze the effects of international organizations on the transition to democracy and the consolidation of democracy.\textsuperscript{34} To conduct these

\textsuperscript{34} I discuss the coding procedure for democratic consolidation more fully in Chapter 4, but decisions concerning when a state becomes a democracy and when a state's democracy breaks down are discussed here.
analyses, it is necessary to choose a definition of democracy and operationalize the concept for measurement purposes. For the purposes of this study, I adopt Mainwaring's (1992b: 297-8) definition of democracy. He defines a state as a democracy if it meets three procedural criteria: 1) competitive elections; 2) broad adult suffrage; and 3) protection of minority rights and respect for civil liberties.

I use Mainwaring’s definition because it favors the procedural aspects of democracy (elections, universal suffrage), but does not ignore substantive (or outcome) aspects of democracy (civil liberties). Of course, this definition does not emphasize economic rights or social justice, common substantive aspects of democracy. Few scholars, however, argue that these latter issues are central to basic definitions of democracy (Mainwaring 1992; Shin 1994). Thus, I have chosen a definition which places the bulk of its emphasis on procedural aspects of democracy.

Unfortunately, there is no single measurement of democracy which fully incorporates Mainwaring’s three criteria, although there have been many attempts to operationalize democracy to facilitate its measurement (Dahl 1971; Gurr et al 1990; Alvarez et al 1996). Various authors have emphasized elections or “contestation” (Dahl 1971), institutions (Gurr 1989), as well as civil liberties (Gastil 1990). The one consensus which appears to have been reached is that none of these operationalizations are entirely adequate. The problem becomes more acute when one attempts to differentiate among democracies. Is it possible to classify one democracy as more "democratic" than another? Clearly, most scholars, policymakers, and even the casual observer would want to distinguish Great Britain from Russia or Argentina, where freely
elected leaders who "bypass their parliaments and rule by presidential decree" are often labeled as "illiberal democracies" in the eyes of some observers (Zakaria 1997: 23). Defining a measurement criteria for differentiation, however, can be difficult.\textsuperscript{36}

In an attempt to deal with these measurement issues, I use two different data sets which have been used in quantitative research on democracy and democratization. These data are familiar to many scholars and one of them (Polity) has become something of the "coin of the realm" in quantitative research on democracy. Thus, using these data has the benefit of making any findings from this statistical investigation comparable with past work on related topics such as the democratic peace (cf. Russett 1993; Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998), democratization and war (cf. Mansfield and Snyder 1995), democratic consolidation (Power and Gasiorowski 1995), and external influences on democratization (Reiter 1999).

The first measure of democracy and democratization I utilize is from the Polity98 data set (Marshall 1999), an updated version of the Polity III data (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The Polity data is widely used in cross-sectional research in international relations and comparative politics (Farber and Gowa 1996; Oneal and Russett 1996; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). For most states in the international system, the Polity data code variables which tap the "authority patterns" within each state (Gurr 1989). Eckstein and Gurr (1975: 41) define these authority patterns as the nature of relations among "superordinate and subordinate" political entities at the national level. Most of their measures of these

\textsuperscript{35} For more on the differences between substantive (or outcome) versus procedural definitions of democracy, see Shin 1994: 141-2.

\textsuperscript{36} Of course this also leaves aside the historical context of democracy. For example, was the U.S. a democracy before the Civil War or the enfranchisement of women? Standards of "democracy" may change over time. I should note that while the data used in this work help to confront the problem of spatial
authority patterns tap the nature of political institutions within each state. Specifically, they define seven variables which measure authority patterns through political institutions: 1) regulation of chief executive recruitment, 2) competitiveness of executive recruitment, 3) openness of executive recruitment, 4) monocraticism, 5) executive constraints, 6) regulation of political participation, and 7) competitiveness of political participation.

The first three measures tap patterns in executive recruitment. These variables show “the ways in which superordinates come to occupy their position” (Eckstein and Gurr 1975: 150). The ease in rising to a leadership position within the state is an important quality of democracy and one which should be tapped for the measurement of democracy and democratic transitions. Most individuals would identify a routinized and open process for promotion to societal leadership positions (in legislatures, executive branches, or courts) as an important part of democracy. Thus, these three variables are included to capture authority patterns relating to the executive(s), such as who may become the executive as well as the regulation of the process of promotion.

The fourth and fifth variables measure the responsiveness of national leadership. These two indicators measure the extent to which leaders “must take into account the preferences of others when making decisions” (Gurr 1989: 13). Monocraticism refers to whether executive decision-making in a state takes place within a collective group or by one individual. In addition, the variable measuring executive constraints gauges the official institutional restrictions on the executive’s decision-making authority. Again,

__________________________

comparisons of democracy in their coding, they also attempt to address this inter-temporal issue as well by varying the levels of regime type year-by-year.

65
these measures of responsiveness are important aspects of democracy and contribute to
the attractiveness of using Gurr’s data.

The final two variables measure the extent of political competition. These two
variables measure whether participation in political life is regulated as well as whether
“alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena”
(Gurr 1989: 18). Clearly, the ability to take part in the formation of policy (i.e., through
elections) is an integral part of democracy. Tapping this feature of political institutions is
essential to measure movements to and away from democracy.

Each of the seven variables are coded using an ordinal system. Each variable has
a different number of categories, ranging from three to seven. Gurr (1989) also provides
an algorithm which aggregates the seven component variables to create yearly measures
of autocracy and democracy for each country (Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Gurr 1989). The
resulting autocracy and democracy measures range from 0 (least autocratic; least
democratic) to 10 (most autocratic; most democratic).

Note that the Polity98 data captures two aspects of the Mainwaring definition
quite well. First, Polity98’s emphasis on the regulation of executive recruitment and the
competitiveness of political participation measures the extent to which elections help
govern the political process. Second, the variables measuring openness of executive
recruitment as well as the regulation of participation tap the universal suffrage dimension
of the definition. Those states with elections and universal suffrage will thus be scored as
a democracy according to the Polity98 measurement scheme.

One common practice in research using this data is to take each state’s democracy
level minus its autocracy level (DEMOC_{it} - AUTOC_{it}) to create a single, continuous
measure of democracy. The resulting democracy score runs from -10 (complete autocracy) to +10 (complete democracy). Figure 2.1 shows this continuum of democracy scores, giving examples of countries and years which are coded at several levels of democracy. Using this single measure of democracy, scholars often set "cut-points" or threshold values for labeling regime type. Any regime at or above a certain positive number is labeled a democracy, while any regime at or below a certain negative number is labeled an autocracy. States in between these cut points are commonly labeled anocracies (cf. Jaggers and Gurr 1995; Mansfield and Snyder 1995). For the purposes of this study, I define the threshold values of -6 for autocracy and +6 for democracy.

My choice of the -6/+6 threshold is based on an examination of the democratic transitions literature. Some scholars have used +7/-7 cut points for defining regime type as well as transitions, but Gurr, et al (1990) only provide this as a threshold for a “coherent" democracy or autocracy. Thus, for systems in transition, this threshold may be inappropriate. In fact, many of the Polity variables (e.g., competitiveness of participation or competitiveness of executive recruitment) can be coded as “transitional”, which lowers the state’s overall democracy score. Given my reading of the transitions literature, many states which are not “coherent" may possess these traits such as substantial, but not numerous constraints on the chief excessive (#5) or competitiveness of participation (#2) which is not as high since not all offices have been elected (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Whitehead 1997). Nonetheless, these regimes are
considered democracies by the transitions literature. Given this fact, I feel the -6/+6 cutoff is appropriate.\textsuperscript{37}

Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of these three types of governmental systems over time. A visual inspection of this graph shows that the general trends towards and away from democracy are captured by this measure. First, it is interesting to note that at the beginning of the time period, the distribution of the three systems is relatively equal. Starting in the 1960s, with the decolonization of Africa, the number of autocracies begins to rise steadily as many post-colonial democracies give rise to single-party and "sultanistic" systems (Linz and Stepan 1996). Beginning in the late 1970s, however, the number of democracies begins a steady rise, while the number of anocracies begins to fall. This reflects the beginning of the "third wave" of democratization, as many Latin American and Southern European states begin the move away from military-led and bureaucratic-authoritarian systems to multi-party democracies (Huntington 1991; O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). As the eighties progress, democracy levels continue to rise, now at the "expense" of authoritarian systems, as African and Eastern European states move towards democracy. It is in 1989 that the number of democracies in the world, as coded by the Polity98 data, surpasses the number of authoritarian regimes.

Notice also that very late in the data set, the number of anocracies begin to rise as well. This is no doubt due to those states which did not complete their transition to democracy or have suffered slides away from democracy since their initial transition.

\textsuperscript{37} I should note that while I have not yet systematically tested for the robustness of this threshold across all of the models, a further lowering of the threshold (to -5 or -4) seems to have little influence on the results. Raising the threshold (to -7/+7), however, may weaken some of the findings concerning consolidation. Again, a more systematic analysis is needed to investigate this question.
To create data pertaining to transitions (democratic or autocratic), one examines the variation in democracy scores over time. Any time a state passes a threshold (+6/-6) in a given year, a regime change is coded. Specifically, if a state moves above or below either cut point, a dummy variable is created signifying the type of regime change. Thus, a set of six dummy variables can be created to describe any of the possible changes in regime type. Thus, a set of transitions data can be generated using changes in the Polity scores over time.

In my use of the Polity98 data, a transition to democracy occurs only when a state moves to or above the +6 threshold. I do not combine "complete" democratic transitions with "partial" democratic transitions. That is, for the Polity98 data, movements from autocracy to anocracy are treated differently than a transition from autocracy or anocracy to democracy. In Chapter 3, I label these anocracy-to-democracy movements as completions of democracy and analyze them as a distinct political process. Thus, a democratic transition is coded as completed if a state moves to or above the +6 threshold between the previous year and this year.

Since one hypothesis to be explored is what makes democracy last, it is also necessary to define a variable indicating when a democracy ends. I thus define a variable dealing with the movement away from democracy, or democratic breakdown. This dummy variable is coded "1" if a regime moves from the +6 level or above to a level below this threshold; otherwise, the variable is coded as "0".

---

38 There are three types of democratic transitions: autocratic to democratic, autocratic to anocratic, and anocratic to democratic. Likewise, there are three types of autocratic transitions: democratic to autocratic, democratic to anocratic, and anocratic to autocratic.
As the second source of democracy measures, I use data on democracy and regime change from Mark Gasiorowski’s (1993; 1996) Political Regime Change data set. Gasiorowski codes transitions for only the developing world (Latin America, Africa, Middle East and Asia) from 1815-1992. He distinguishes among four types of regimes: authoritarian, semi-democratic, democratic, and transitional.\textsuperscript{40} Gasiorowski’s definition of democracy includes three main components: competition for political offices, a highly inclusive level of political participation, and a “sufficient level” of civil and political liberties to “ensure the integrity of political competition” (Gasiorowski 1996: 471). Countries are coded as transitioning to democracy if they move towards a “highly competitive, highly inclusive, liberal ideal embodied in the definition of democracy” (Gasiorowski 1996: 471). Gasiorowski’s own definition of democracy is drawn mostly from Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989) as well as Dahl (1971).

This conception of democracy closely matches Mainwaring’s on all three dimensions. Gasiorowski’s measure captures the process of elections, suffrage, as well as civil and political liberties. What is less emphasized in Gasiorowski’s measure are the institutional arrangements of the regime (e.g., checks on executive power, openness of the recruiting process for the executive). Gasiorowski’s conception of democracy emphasizes civil and political liberties more heavily than the Polity98 data.

There are two major reasons for using the Gasiorowski data. First, it will provide a robustness check on the results using the Polity data. Recall that the Polity98 data

\textsuperscript{39} If there is missing data during a transition itself, the year in which the transition is completed is coded. For example, if state \(i\) begins a transition in 1985 and Polity data is missing for 1986 and 1987, but the 1988 data shows the state above +6, state \(i\) is coded as transitioning in 1988.
differs in its measurement of democracy, concentrating on institutional factors to classify regime type. Because the Polity data taps two aspects of our definition of democracy, it is adequate for our purposes, especially since a major focus of this work will be domestic changes in institutions which are essential for democratization. Still, using the Gasiorowski data may allow us to say if the relationship between IOs and democratization and/or consolidation are based only on issues of institutional change. Since Gasiorowski emphasizes other factors such as civil liberties, it provides variation on the measurement of democratization. Comparing these two measures will tell us how robust these results are with respect to the definition of democracy.

Second, Gasiorowski excludes most of North America, all of Europe (east and west), as well as Japan, Australia and New Zealand from his data set. Thus, there is not complete spatial overlap between the Polity98 and Gasiorowski data. While this does present problems and makes comparing the results of the models more difficult, it does provide a check against a common criticism leveled at much of the international institutions work in international relations. Namely, one concern with findings extolling the virtues of international institutions is that they are often driven by the European Union or other "Western" institutions. Thus, the estimates of the models using the Gasiorowski data will not include the transitions of Southern or Eastern Europe. This lack of spatial overlap is thus a powerful robustness check against the influence of the EU. Because the estimates of models using the Gasiorowski data can only provide

---

4 For Gasiorowski (1993: 2), "transitional" does not necessarily imply democratic transition. It is applied to any regime in which "top government officials ... engineer a change from one ... regime type to another."
inferences to the developing world, this guards against any possibility that the findings are driven by a handful of “Western” cases.

Other data sets emphasize civil liberties as well, notably, the Freedom House index (Gastil 1990). I have chosen Gasiorowski over Freedom House because of the limited temporal coverage of the latter. The Freedom House data begins in the early 1970s, while Gasiorowski’s data extends back to 1815. While Freedom House does contain more spatial overlap with the Polity98 data, I feel that this is a smaller problem than the lack of temporal overlap since, as previously discussed, the exclusions in the Gasiorowski data will serve as the basis of a robustness check of the Polity98 findings. I also do not use the Alvarez, et al (1996) data set of regime type. Alvarez and his colleagues only measure one aspect of democracy—whether elections for government office are contested (Alvarez, et al 1996: 4). This captures only one aspect of Mainwaring’s definition and thus inadequately operationalizes democracy for the purposes of this study.

Gasiorowski codes specific transitions for every country, which makes generating the transition variables much simpler. I code a state as undergoing a democratic transition if any of the following movements occur: transitional to democratic, semi-democratic to democratic, and autocratic to democratic.\footnote{For Gasiorowski, I also include a handful of “partial” democratization cases, or movements from autocracy to anocracy. I do this since Gasiorowski’s definition of democracy appears narrower than much of the literature on transitions. Thus, I feared that some transitions from autocracy to democracy would not be included if I excluded all partial transitions. For these cases of “partial” democratization, I read Gasiorowski’s description of the transition itself before I included it in the data set.} Similar to Polity98, I code a dummy variable coded "1" if any of these types of democratic transitions occur and "0" otherwise.
As with the Polity98 data, I also code a variable for the breakdown of democracy. Again, Gasiorowski describes these autocratic transitions in detail. I code a dummy variable "1" if a movement from democracy to autocracy or anocracy occurs. In addition, since in some instances I include "partial" democratization with this data set (see fn. 9), some movements from anocracy to autocracy are coded as breakdowns as well. If no breakdown occurs, the variable is coded "0".

Figure 2.3 shows the distribution of Gasiorowski's coding from 1950 to 1992. Again, a visual inspection of this graph provides preliminary evidence for the general accuracy of Gasiorowski's coding with regard to the trends to and away from democracy in the world. Recall that this data excludes many countries which would be labeled by most as democracies (e.g., the U.S., U.K., Japan, France, the Benelux states, Australia, etc.). Thus, it is not surprising that these data show comparatively higher levels of autocracy than democracy for the majority of the time period under inspection. As with the Polity98 data, the number of democracies and anocracies remain similar over time, yet in this data set, the number of democracies does not surpass the number of autocracies. This is no doubt due to the exclusion of the many Eastern European transitions in Gasiorowski's data set. Nevertheless, the level of democracy does begin to rise steadily in 1974 (the "Third Wave"), as corresponding levels of autocracy fall.

Before moving to some descriptive statistics of these data, I note that this data set begins in 1950 largely because of data availability issues on some of the control variables. Although data on regime characteristics extends back as far as 1800 for Polity98 and 1815 for Gasiorowski, comparable economic data does not exist. Given the importance of these economic factors in accounting for regime transitions and
consolidation, I felt it would not be prudent to rely on the poor economic data before 1950. The data analysis ends in 1992 for similar reasons. Much of the data pertaining to internal and external conflict used as controls in the models is not measured past 1992. Again, rather than not control for these important factors, I have decided to limit the temporal coverage of my empirical tests.

2.2. Descriptive Statistics: Democracy and Democratization

Utilizing the preceding coding criteria for democratic transitions, the Polity98 data contains 52 transitions between 1950 and 1992, while the Gasiorowski data contains 69 for the same time period. Likewise, Polity98 contains 32 instances of democratic breakdown, while Gasiorowski contains 64. Tables 2.1 through 2.3 reveal the statistical similarities and differences among these two data sets.\(^{42}\)

The correlation among these two data sets is not high, which is to be expected given their different operationalizations of democracy.\(^{43}\) Table 2.1 shows the correlations among the basic regime type variables. The highest agreement between the data sets comes on their categorizations of democracies. A statistically significant correlation of \(r = 0.82\) shows some agreement between the two data sets. Their measures of autocracy agree much less, yielding a statistically significant correlation of \(r = 0.66\). The least agreement comes in what each data set considers an anocracy. Comparing across this category yields a low, yet statistically significant correlation of \(r = 0.35\). Gasiorowski’s

\(^{42}\) A transition from democracy to a transitional government would be considered a breakdown as well, but only occurs once in the data (Uruguay 1973), and in that same year, the transitional government gives way to a pure authoritarian government. It is thus coded as a democratic breakdown.

\(^{43}\) Of course these correlations apply only to those cases where both data sets code that particular nation-state. Those cases (e.g., Eastern Europe) where there is no spatial overlap are simply excluded for the
own findings match these, namely, that among several data sets measuring democracy, the correlation between his coding and the Polity data are among the lowest (Gasiorowski 1996: 479). The varied operationalizations in each data set explains the low correlation among their coding of regime type. These differences will serve as an excellent robustness check for the models of both democratic transitions and consolidation.

The correlations presented in Table 2.2 compare the dummy variables marking transitions to democracy for both data sets. In coding transitions to democracy, these two data sets show even less agreement than their coding of regime type. Again, this should not be entirely surprising given each data set's varying operationalization of democracy. For example, expanding protection of individual rights may lead Gasiorowski to code a transition to democracy, but without attendant institutional change, such reform would not qualify the state as a democracy given Gurr's measure. Figure 2.4 shows the number of transitions plotted over time for the two data sets. Each line tracks very closely with the other, yet they are clearly not identical. As such, using both data sets will provide an excellent robustness check for the results in Chapters 3 and 4. Finally, Table 2.3 shows the correlation between each data set's coding of democratic breakdown. This correlation of \( r = 0.87 \) is statistically significant.

If the findings of the models of transition and consolidation are divergent across each data set, this difference could be traced to the different standards and measurement of democracy. It is important to remember that divergent results could also be a result of the lack of complete spatial overlap between the two data sets. Given that the Southern and Eastern European transitions to democracy are not coded by Gasiorowski, his data correlation statistic. This explains why the N for the correlations among the Polity98 data are a little less
pertain exclusively to the developing world. Thus, one inference to make from divergent results across the data sets is that certain processes may differ in the developed versus the developing world with regard to democratization.

2.3. The Independent Variable: Regional International Organizations

The main concern of this project is to assess hypotheses relating to international organizations (IOs) and democratic transitions and/or consolidation. Thus, it is important to discuss the nature and coding of the major independent variable for this study—involvement in international organizations. For a definition of IOs, I follow the work of Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1996: 593), who define IGOs as "associations established by governments or their representatives that are sufficiently institutionalized to require regular meetings, rules governing decision-making, a permanent staff, and a headquarters."\textsuperscript{44} I follow this definition as well as that of Banks who defines international organizations as "composed of more than two states, whose governing bodies meet with some degree of regularity, and which possess permanent secretariats or other continuing means for implementing collective decisions" (Banks and Mueller 1998: viii).

Based on these definitions, I have chosen a sample of the population of IOs to include in this study. I have coded state membership in IOs based on the Banks' Political Handbook of the World. The sample of IOs I have chosen to include is also based on this source, augmented with a few additional organizations (a complete list of these

\textsuperscript{44} I equate IOs with IGOs for this work. Thus, I exclude non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from this investigation.
organizations is shown in Table 2.4). Alternative sources of this data do exist, namely, the Yearbook of International Organizations published by the Union of International Associations (1996). This later source lists far more organizations and includes thousands of non-governmental organizations as well. I have chosen to use Banks' data over the Yearbook because of his selectivity. Banks’ IOs generally consist of regional political organizations such as military alliances, trade groups, and economic organizations. By considering only regional organizations, this does exclude some IOs from this study. First, organizations which have no formal institutions or no regular meetings are excluded on the basis of Banks’ definition. Given the nature of the causal mechanisms (e.g., socialization, bribing, binding, etc.), these organizations are highly unlikely to be associated with these causal processes.

Second, broad political or economic organizations such as the UN and its agencies are also excluded from the present study. Recall from Chapter 1 that regional political, military, and economic organizations such as the EC/EU, the CSCE, Mercosur, and the OAS have been the most heavily discussed organizations in this context. Thus, the small literature that exists on this topic focuses on regional organizations since, according to Whitehead (1996: 395), “the importance of such international dimensions of democratization seems much clearer at this regional level than at the world-wide level of analysis.” For this reason, I have chosen to focus this work on these organizations as a

---

45 These additional organizations are used in Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000. I added regional organizations which met Banks own criteria, but were excluded from his publication. Most of these organizations were regional economic arrangements in the developing world which had not been notified to the GATT/WTO.
46 Banks in his 1998 edition lists 88 IOs, while the 1992 version of the Yearbook lists approximately 1,690.
47 Banks selectivity also helps control for “spin-offs” of extant IOs. As Shanks, Jacobson, and Kaplan (1996) discuss, most of the increase in IOs over the 1980s and 1990s have been organizations with direct affiliations and ties with existing IOs. That is, they are simply “derivatives” of extant organizations.
first systematic, empirical cut at these question. Because larger global organizations such as the United Nations are excluded from this analysis, appropriate caution should be taken when inferring about the efficacy of all IOs in assisting with transitions or consolidation.

Other regional organizations which are technical, cultural, or environmental organizations are also excluded from this study. Again, these organizations may serve very useful purposes for the international community, but they possess very few resources to contribute to transitions to democracy. It should be noted that some organizations which appear to be environmental in nature, such as the CILSS (Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel), are included since they often provide or monitor development assistance both to and between member states. In addition, the CILSS and a handful of other environmental IOs list the promotion of economic development and trade as key areas of work. In these few cases, such organizations are included. Organizations such as the Agency for Cultural and Technical Cooperation, which promotes the exchange of culture among Francophone nations, are not included.

Finally, international and regional financial institutions (IFIs) are not included in this analysis. Although there is tremendous speculation and debate over the impact of these organizations (such as the IMF, Arab Monetary Fund, Asian Regional Development Bank, etc.) on democratization, little systematic research exists on this topic as well. My justification for the exclusion of these types of institutions two fold. First, the major IFIs

---

48 A handful of the organizations included in this study have members that are “extra-regional”. All of these exceptions are cases where the U.S. or Canada is a member of an otherwise “European” institutions (e.g., NATO).
are not regional organizations (the IMF and the World Bank), which places them outside the scope of this present study. Second, I believe the IFIs influence democracy in fundamentally different ways than other regional organizations. For example, membership in IFIs is rarely conditional on anything other than paying the costs associated with membership. The assistance from the IFIs, however, is often conditioned (e.g., conditions on structural adjustment loans). Moreover, the content of these conditions are often not public information and apply to only economic, rather than political, reform. Whether conditions set by the IFIs attempt to promote democracy is a debate in and of itself (cf. Valverde 1999; Bienen and Gersovitz 1985; Kahler 1992). This is, of course, a testable hypothesis which I will not probe in this work, but will leave for future investigations of the relationship between IOs and democracy.

Table 2.4 presents the list of organizations included in these analyses. Although I have chosen to exclude certain classes of international organizations from this study, many of the commonly recognized IOs are included in this sample. Excluding many of the UIA organizations has the effect of excluding such groups as the International Studies Association, the International Postal Union, and the Association of the Chocolate-, Biscuit- and Confectionery Industries of the EEC.\textsuperscript{49} Although limiting the focus of this research to regional political, economic, and military organizations may provide an incomplete picture of the interaction between IOs and democracy, for a first cut at the question of democracy and democratization, I feel this limitation is necessary. In the following section, I discuss how membership in these organizations for each country are coded.
2.4. Coding IO membership

As discussed in Chapter 1, my argument holds that regional IOs are likely to promote both democratization and democratic consolidation by providing resources to members, increasing the costs of anti-democratic behavior by domestic political actors, and signaling a commitment to political liberalization. Again, simple dummy variables are inadequate for conducting an analysis of IO’s effects on democratization and democratic endurance since every state is a member of at least one IO.

One must then devise a coding scheme to differentiate IOs along some dimension, which can be quite difficult. Tom Nierop (1994: 100) has framed the problem in the following way: "Designing a simple, unambiguous, workable and satisfactory framework for the classification of IGOs as to 'political weight' or strength of political links proves virtually impossible". Thus, many quantitative studies of IOs measure only on the number of shared memberships between dyads (Russett, Oneal, and Davis 1998) or the number of memberships for each state (Jacobson, Reisinger, and Mathers 1986). Yet, the preceding theory stresses the importance of the number of democracies in an organization, which may have little to do with the number of states in an IOs.

To this end, I compute a variable to measure the most democratic IO of a state's IO memberships as well as changes in that membership including the accession to IOs which are highly democratic. First, I construct a data set of IO membership using the sample of IOs (shown in Table 2.4) found in Banks and Mueller (1998) and Banks (various years). For each state $i$, I then compute the average level of democracy of all

---

49 The UIA (1996) adopts the broadest possible standards for IOs (which includes both IGOs and NGOs) so that the individual researcher may “make their own evaluation in the light of their own criteria.”
members in the organization except state i.\textsuperscript{50} I use the Polity98 democracy scores to determine the level of democracy in each member state (described above).\textsuperscript{51} For the statistical analyses, I scale the Polity98 scores by adding 11 to each IO’s score, moving the scale from -10 to +10 to +1 to +21. Thus, a state with no IO memberships may be coded as “0”. Now for each state \(i\), which is a member of \(k\) IOs, there are a total of \(k\) IO weights equal to the average level of democracy of the member states of those \(k\) institutions. In Chapters 3 and 4, the variable IOScore\(_{it}\) is equal to the largest value of \(k\) for each state \(i\) in year \(t\). This variable represents the average level of democracy in the most democratic IO of which state \(i\) is a member.

I use only the most democratic organization to measure each state’s IO involvement (versus an average of all IOs) since it should only take one membership to supply any of the causal mechanisms posited by my theory. To this end, in both Chapters 3 and 4, I also utilize a measure of the average level of democracy in all IOs of which state \(i\) is a member. As discussed in those chapters, this particular measure is not statistically associated with the transition to or the consolidation of democracy, suggesting that membership in merely one highly democratic IO is enough for a statistical association to exist.

Figure 2.5 provides some basic descriptive statistics and some case examples for IOScore\(_{it}\). Note that the scores for each IO in the figure represent the average of all members over the life of the organization. Thus, the Benelux Union is composed of all

\textsuperscript{50} This is essential since if state \(i\) is included, it is possible that an organization would become democratic because of a transition to democracy in that state. Thus, we would be measuring the same phenomenon on both sides of the equation.

\textsuperscript{51} I use the Polity98 data rather than Gasiorowski data since the Polity98 data provides a more continuous score of the level of democracy within a state. This makes creating an aggregate measure easier since the
democracies for the duration of the organization. At the other end of this continuum, the GCC is composed of autocracies over its life span. In general, it is true that most of the "democratic" international organizations in this figure are European-based. Still, non-European organizations such as APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the CACM (Central American Common Market), and MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market—not listed in the figure, but with a score of 17.94) are quite democratic in their membership profile.

Figure 2.6 tracks membership and the democratic nature of IOs over time. "Democratic" IOs are those organizations whose aggregate IOScore is above the +17 (recall I have re-scaled the Polity scores by adding 11) threshold set for individual nation-states. Thus, if in any given year, the average level of IOScore$_i$ for all member states is above +17, the IO is coded as "democratic". Figure 2.6 shows the average number of memberships in democratic IOs for all states in the sample per year. Thus, a "1" on the graph would mean that the average state in the data set was a member of at least one democratic IO. The other line tracks the overall number of memberships in IOs, regardless of their "democraticness". Note that the number of IO memberships grows steadily over time, while membership in democratic IOs stays fairly steady until the end of the sample period.

2.5. General Statistical Trends: IO Membership and Democratization

Before moving on to the first chapter of statistical analysis, I will briefly outline some of the general statistical trends between IOs and democratization. To this point we resulting IO score could have the same "cut points" as the regime scores. That is, an IO with an average
have discussed the coding criteria for the major dependent and independent variables. Tables 2.5-2.8 present a series of four basic tests of the relationship between democratic transitions or consolidations and involvement in international organizations. Of course, these relationships should be taken with proper caution, since no other factors are controlled for in the analysis. Still, these numbers provide some basic indicators as to the general relationship I propose.

Table 2.5 outlines the number of transitions and democratic breakdowns in the data along with the average level of IOScore in those cases. Recall that IOScore is the average level of democracy in the most democratic IO of which state $i$ is a member. Some common patterns emerge across both data sets. Note that regimes undergoing a transition to democracy, on average, belong to more democratic IOs than those which are in the process of democratic break-down. In both data sets this difference approaches but does not attain statistical significance using the student’s t-test for equivalence of means.

For both the Polity98 and Gasiorowski data, states which are “finishing” their transitions (moving from anocracy to democracy) maintain memberships in much more democratic IOs than their stable anocratic counterparts. In the Polity data, this difference is almost a full four points higher and is highly statistically significant. Although the equivalent comparison in the Gasiorowski data yields a less dramatic difference, it is nonetheless statistically significant. Thus, states which conclude their transitions to democracy after spending time as an anocracy belong to more democratic IOs than those states which remain anocracies.

\[
\text{democracy level of } +6 \text{ or greater could be labeled a “democratic” organization. See below.}
\]
Moreover, in both data sets, those regimes which are in transition from autocracy to democracy or autocracy to anocracy belong to more democratic IOs than their stable autocratic counterparts. For the Polity98 data, regimes in transition from autocracy to democracy are, on average, members of much more democratic IOs. This striking difference of over five points is statistically significant. A similar result is found in the Gasiorowski data, where the difference is also highly statistically significant.

For partial transitions (autocracy to anocracy), similar trends exist in the data. Here the differences are smaller than in the autocracy to democracy case, yet in both data sets the differences in IOScore between these two groups is statistically significant. These figures provide preliminary evidence of the association between membership in democratic IOs and democratic transitions.

Table 2.6 examines the fate of those states which transition to democracy. The average level of IOScore for a state whose transition will eventually give way to democratic breakdown is smaller than a state which maintains its democracy in both the Polity98 and Gasiorowski sample. For the Polity98 data, this difference is statistically significant (p = .02), while for the Gasiorowski data, this difference is smaller, yet still significant (p = .07). Controlling for no outside factors, membership in a democratic IO after the transition seems to bode well for the survival of democracy.

Table 2.7 examines a similar question. Rather than the level of IOScore, however, this table counts the average number of democratic IO memberships for states which eventually revert to authoritarianism. For the Polity98 data, it is clear that

---

52 In the Polity98 data, transitions from autocracy to anocracy are not included as democratizers, whereas for Gasiorowski, some of these cases are included (see above). Notice that the sum total of transitions for
membership in these organization bodes well for the eventual success of democracy. Although less pronounced, the same trend is present in the Gasiorowski data.

Unfortunately, in neither case are these differences statistically significant. This weaker result could be due to our definition of a “democratic” IO. IOs are only counted in this table if the average level of democracy among all the members is at or above the +17 level (see above). Thus, an IO which has one or two anocratic or even autocratic members are probably not included in this cross-tab.

Finally, Table 2.8 presents the relationship between overall IO involvement and the duration of democracy. Again, those new democracies which belong to more IOs (regardless of their membership portfolio) tend to survive as democracies. Only in the Gasiorowski data, however, is this relationship statistically significant (p = .07).

Although these tests are preliminary in nature, they are quite suggestive of some general trends in the data. Regimes which undertake transitions to democracy are members of regional organizations which are much more homogenously democratic than states which do not make the transition. One conclusion we may take from this finding is that democratic organizations do effectively pressure and facilitate the transition to democracy. This is true no matter which data set is used to measure democracy and transitions.

Similarly, in states which have recently undergone a transition to democracy, membership in a democratic regional organization bodes well for democracy. New democracies which are members of these organizations appear to be less likely to suffer a breakdown of democracy. Although belonging to more organizations whether these

---

the Gasiorowski data (the three transition categories) exceeds the total number of transitions. This is
organizations are considered “democratic” or not also seems to help the likelihood for survival (Table 2.7), the results are only once statistically significant. Thus the idea that only one “democratic” organization can provide the necessary causal mechanisms to protect democracy receives some support in these initial tests. Taken together all of these results suggest that there is an empirical link between membership in certain regional organizations and democratic transitions as well as consolidation.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the coding criteria for the two key concepts in this work: democracy and international organizations. I have operationalized both of these concepts in ways that provide substantive validity balanced with information availability. As a first systematic, quantitative empirical cut at the question of IOs and democratization I have kept these tests relatively focused. Examining only regional institutions, for example, is a way to disentangle if certain types of organizations can assist in the transition to and consolidation of democracy. In addition, the theories discussed in Chapter 1 yield hypotheses that lead us to expect that only certain types of IOs will be associated with democratization. These coding criteria (both choosing the sample and measuring IO involvement) are meant to reflect these hypotheses.

The general statistical trends presented in this chapter provide some preliminary support for the theory. These tests, however, are not meant as the final word on the veracity of my theory. Rather, they establish in a very broad way, the association between democratic IOs and democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. Now because multiple transitions can take place in the same year within the Gasiorowski data.
that we have discussed the coding of the dependent variables, the major independent variable, and noted the general associations within each data set, we move to the first chapter which more fully tests the theory linking regional organizations and democracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Polity98</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democracy Gasior.</td>
<td>0.816***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracy Polity98</td>
<td>-0.359***</td>
<td>-0.359***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anocracy Gasior.</td>
<td>0.031*</td>
<td>-0.140***</td>
<td>0.345***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy Polity98</td>
<td>-0.675***</td>
<td>-0.538***</td>
<td>-0.447***</td>
<td>-0.322***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocracy Gasior.</td>
<td>-0.681***</td>
<td>-0.712***</td>
<td>-0.153***</td>
<td>-0.481***</td>
<td>0.659***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.1:** Correlation Among Regime Type Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98(+6)</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity98(+6)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>.51***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 2935

**Table 2.2:** Correlation Among Regime Transition Variables
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98(+6)</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Polity98(+6)</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>.87***</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

N = 567

**Table 2.3**: Correlation Among Democratic Breakdown Variables
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC (Arab Cooperation Council)</td>
<td>1989-1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACS (Association of Caribbean States)</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>1952-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation)</td>
<td>1989-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab League</td>
<td>1950-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations)</td>
<td>1967-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council)</td>
<td>1966-1975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benelux Union</td>
<td>1950-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation)</td>
<td>1992-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CACM (Central American Common Market)</td>
<td>1961-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAEU (Council of Arab Economic Unity)</td>
<td>1964-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market)</td>
<td>1966-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBSS (Council of the Baltic Sea States)</td>
<td>1992-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDC (Central American Democratic Community)</td>
<td>1982-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEAO (West African Economic Community)</td>
<td>1959-1994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEEAC (Economic Community of Central African States)</td>
<td>1984-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEFTA (Central European Free Trade Association)</td>
<td>1993-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEI (Central European Initiative)</td>
<td>1989-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO (Central Treaty Organization)</td>
<td>1955-1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEPGL (Economic Community of the Great Lake Countries)</td>
<td>1976-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CILSS (Permanent Interstate Committee on Drought Control in the Sahel)</td>
<td>1973-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States)</td>
<td>1991-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombo Plan</td>
<td>1951-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)</td>
<td>1993-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commonwealth</td>
<td>1950-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>1950-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of the Entente</td>
<td>1959-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPLP (Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries)</td>
<td>1996-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EACM (East African Common Market)</td>
<td>1967-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization)</td>
<td>1965-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)</td>
<td>1975-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFTA (European Free Trade Association)</td>
<td>1960-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESAPTA (Eastern and South African PTA)</td>
<td>1981-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU (European Union)</td>
<td>1958-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council)</td>
<td>1981-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group of Ten</td>
<td>1962-1998</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.4:** International Organizations Included in the Data, 1950-1992

(continued)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Years Included</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IBEC (International Bank for Economic Cooperation)</td>
<td>1963-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development)</td>
<td>1986-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOC (Indian Ocean Commission)</td>
<td>1982-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAES (Latin American Economic System)</td>
<td>1975-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAIA (Latin American Integration Association)</td>
<td>1961-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lome</td>
<td>1963-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maghreb Union</td>
<td>1989-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mano River Union</td>
<td>1973-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MERCOSUR (Southern Cone Common Market)</td>
<td>1991-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nordic Council</td>
<td>1953-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAPEC (Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries)</td>
<td>1968-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAS (Organization of American States)</td>
<td>1951-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OAU (Organization of African Unity)</td>
<td>1963-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCAM (African and Mauritanian Common Organization)</td>
<td>1965-1985</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODECA (Organization of Central American States) / SICA (Central American Integration System)</td>
<td>1951-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development)</td>
<td>1961-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OIC (Organization of the Islamic Conference)</td>
<td>1969-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPANAL (Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean)</td>
<td>1969-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries)</td>
<td>1960-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
<td>1994-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)</td>
<td>1985-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC (Southern African Development Community)</td>
<td>1980-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEATO (Southeast Asian Treaty Organization)</td>
<td>1955-1977</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPC (South Pacific Commission)</td>
<td>1950-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF (South Pacific Forum)</td>
<td>1971-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDEAC (Central African Customs and Economic Union)</td>
<td>1961-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU (Western European Union)</td>
<td>1955-1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Type</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Polity98</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes undergoing transitions to democracy...</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes undergoing democratic breakdown...</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All anocratic regimes...</td>
<td>947</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from anocracy to democracy</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All autocratic regimes...</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from autocracy to anocracy</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All autocratic regimes...</td>
<td>2581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from autocracy to democracy</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Gasiorowski</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes undergoing transitions to democracy...</td>
<td>67^54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes undergoing democratic breakdown...</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All anocratic regimes...</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from anocracy to democracy</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All autocratic regimes...</td>
<td>2518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from autocracy to anocracy</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All autocratic regimes...</td>
<td>2518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regimes in transition from autocracy to democracy</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5: Descriptive Statistics of IOs and Democratization

^53 Equal variances are assumed for these t tests. The absolute value of the t statistic is taken since the sign of the statistic is only an artifact of whether the larger or smaller number is designated as “sample #1”.

^54 In years where both a transition and a breakdown occur, the breakdown only is counted.
IOMScore for a country in which...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Student’s t (p of t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity98</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>12.18</td>
<td>2.403**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>15.06</td>
<td>0.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gasiorowski</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>12.05</td>
<td>1.820*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>13.70</td>
<td>0.073</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.6:** Successful Consolidation and IO Involvement

Average Number of Democratic IOs for a country in which...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Student’s t (p of t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity98</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>1.137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>1.19</td>
<td>0.261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gasiorowski</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.981</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.330</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.7:** Democratic IOs and Consolidation

Average Number of IOs for a country in which...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Student’s t (p of t)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Polity98</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>3.55</td>
<td>1.105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.16</td>
<td>0.274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gasiorowski</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition breaks down</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>1.838*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the democratic transition does not break down</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>3.94</td>
<td>0.071</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2.8:** International Organization Membership and Consolidation
Figure 2.1: Examples of Polity98 Democracy Scores
Figure 2.2: Distribution of Regime Types Over Time

Figure 2.2: Distribution of Regime Types Over Time: Polity98
Figure 2.3: Distribution of Regime Types Over Time

Figure 2.3: Distribution of Regime Type Over Time: Gasiorowski
Figure 2.4: Number of Transitions by Year
**Sample Statistics for IOScore**

- mean = 12.05
- median = 11.90
- maximum = 20
- minimum = 1.6

**NOTE:** IOScores are averaged over the life of the organization.

**Figure 2.5.** Examples of IOScore for Various International Organizations
Figure 2.6: IO Involvement Over Time
CHAPTER 3

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY

Perhaps no other issue in comparative politics has garnered more attention and scholarly debate than transitions to democracy. Research agendas in political science are driven, to an extent, by occurrences in the world (Dryzek 1986). The wave of theoretical and empirical investigation into the dynamics and determinants of democratization is certainly no exception. Building on previous literature which discussed the determinants of democratic breakdown, scholars such as Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe Schmitter, Juan Linz, Laurence Whitehead, and Alfred Stepan began writing on the issues surrounding movements to democracy (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Linz and Stepan 1978; Collier 1979). Their writing was largely a response to the transitions of Southern Europe and Latin America in the mid-to-late 1970s and early 1980s. Little did any of these scholars know that these events were only the beginning of a "wave" of democracy which would continue into Africa, Asia, and most dynamically, Eastern Europe (Huntington 1991).

As discussed in Chapter 1, one major set of variables often discounted in these seminal studies of democratization are international factors. The early transition theorists, who would set the tone for the democratization literature, chose to concentrate
on the internal dynamics of the nation-state in transition. They embraced such concepts as *virtu* (the influence of specific individuals) and *fortuna* (the influence of unexpected events)—each representing the importance of random chance and situational factors (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986: 5). In doing so, they eschewed structural variables, including those external to the nation-state.\(^{55}\) The majority of today's descriptive and choice-theoretic work on transitions continues this perspective (cf. Przeworski 1991; Schmitter and Karl 1991). Of course, this approach is extremely useful if the goal is to discuss a single transition. When building a broader theory of transitions, however, it can be useful to turn to structural variables.

Recently, structural explanations have re-emerged in the study of transitions (Ruhl 1996; Haggard and Kaufman 1995a; Gasiorowski 1995). Generally, this emerging literature (re)focusses on factors such as economic conditions or crises and their propensity to constrain or compel the democratization process (or the process of democratic breakdown). In addition, factors such as collective action problems (Clemens 1998), military threat (Thompson 1996), and ethnic homogeneity (Linz and Stepan 1996) have been emphasized. Still, with a few exceptions (Whitehead 1996a; Reiter 1999), most structural-oriented theories still ignore influences which arise outside the state.

The theory put forth in Chapter 1 linking regional organizations to transitions to democracy attempts to bring an external-structural perspective\(^{56}\) to the study of

---

\(^{55}\) In fact, this represented a move back away from the structural orientation of modernization theory. For example, the work of Lipset 1959. For a review of modernization theory work, see Diamond 1992.

\(^{56}\) By "structural" perspective, I mean variables or processes which constrain or condition the probability of an event taking place. See Ruhl 1996 and Clemens 1998.
transitions by integrating these approaches with the current literature on transitions.\textsuperscript{57} By adopting this approach, I do not want to minimize the importance of domestic agents in the transition process. To the contrary, I attempt to show how regional international organizations shape the incentives and constraints for individual agents to act during democratic transitions. Each of these causal mechanisms linking IOs to democratization, however, reside at the structural level. In detailing the factors which shape the environment in which domestic agents act, I hope to paint a more complete picture of the transition process.

In this chapter, I will review the three causal mechanisms which link regional IOs to the likelihood of a transition to democracy discussed in Chapter 1. These mechanisms include pressure emanating from the organization, the acquiescence effect, and the signaling benefits of membership. Each of these mechanisms influence the cost-benefit calculations of domestic actors as they consider beginning the liberalization process or supporting the transition process to completion. As such, I breakdown the process of democratization into two phases: liberalization and the completion of the transition. I expect the first two mechanisms to play a larger role in the liberalization process, while the third should be linked closely with completing the transition to democracy.

The bulk of this chapter is an empirical evaluation of the preceding argument. In all, three tests investigate the association between membership and joining “democratic” regional organizations and 1) all democratic transitions; 2) political liberalization; and 3)

\textsuperscript{57} I should note that it is possible to do each separately as well. Haggard and Kaufman (1995a) represent an extensive attempt to emphasize the importance of structural variables in the democratization process. Grabendorf (1996) represents an attempt to highlight external influences as a non-structural variable.
completion of the transition. After briefly reviewing the causal argument, I turn to the statistical tests.

3.1. Reviewing the Argument

Democratization can encompass multiple dynamics including liberalization within an extant authoritarian regime or completing a transition to democracy by holding free elections. I have argued that regional organizations can influence this process at two stages, the decision to liberalize and moving from a transitional or interim government to a full-fledged democracy.

As outlined in Chapter 1, regional organizations can be linked to the transition to democracy in three ways, two of which directly influence the prospects for liberalization. First, regional IOs may serve as a conduit for pressure on an autocratic regime to liberalize. Much of the literature on transitions to democracy argues that any number of pressures may push an authoritarian regime to liberalize its rule (cf. Przeworski 1991). My contention is that this pressure may come from regional organizations of which the state is a member. This pressure can come in the form of public denunciation, political isolation, even economic sanctions.

Why would IO members apply pressure to non-democratic members of the organization? First, it is a way for other democracies (especially new democracies) to boost their own international status. Second, if democracies prefer to trade, ally, and cooperate with one another for reasons of self-interest (cf. Russett 1993; Polachek 1996; Gaubatz 1996; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorf 2000), then one should rationally expect democracies to prefer more democracies in the world.
IOs will often be the forum of choice for this pressure on non-democracies. Among other advantages to using this multilateral forum (including traditional institutionalist ideas about transaction costs and information availability), there will be less of a perception of sovereignty violations especially as opposed to unilateral pressure. The effects of this pressure can be to exacerbate splits in authoritarian coalitions and/or hasten the de-legitimization of the regime. My contention is that this pressure increases the probability that the regime will democratize. Empirically, this causal mechanism seems to operate most frequently in cases of re-democratization—cases where a state has recently suffered a breakdown of democracy and IO members pressure for a return to the democratic regime.

The second causal mechanism I label the acquiescence effect. Some elites in an autocracy may oppose liberalization because they fear the uncertainty inherent in democracy. Specifically, economic elites and the military fear the potential implications of democracy for their economic well-being and institutional autonomy, respectively. IOs can serve to allay these fears of elites in two ways. First, IOs may lock-in policies to protect elite interests, such as free trade or property rights. For example, the European Union guarantees both unfettered trade and prompt compensation for any economic property taken by governments. Some observers have argued that these guarantees lessened the potential sting of democracy for economic elites in Southern Europe (Whitehead 1986). Second, IOs may also persuade certain elites (e.g., the military) to remain out of the transition process by socializing these groups against interfering with the democratic process. There is evidence that in Turkey, Spain, and Hungary, NATO
membership helped to spur the transition process through the interaction of “Westernized” military officers with other officers from member states.

The acquiescence mechanism can increase the acceptance of both the initial liberalization decision as well as completing the transition towards full democracy.\textsuperscript{58} Elites who would intervene in the course of democratization may halt the process before it begins (the liberalization argument) or before a final move from a transitional regime to a democracy is completed. The third causal mechanism also increases the likelihood that transitional or interim governments will give way to democratic regimes. Transitional governments face many unique challenges, including credibility and legitimacy problems.\textsuperscript{59} Making a clear commitment to continuing the democratization process can help to overcome these credibility and legitimacy challenges. Membership in IOs can help transitional regimes meet these challenges since acceptance in many of these organizations can confer an external “stamp of approval” on these regimes.\textsuperscript{60} Again, this mechanism is likely to be important in completing the transition to democracy, more than in encouraging regime liberalization.

\textsuperscript{58} Note that this mechanism assumes there is some exogenous shock which has led elites to consider liberalization in the first place. While this shock may itself come from IOs, this does not necessarily have to be the case. This pressure may arise from any number of sources, which will be discussed in the next section.

\textsuperscript{59} Credibility problems can arise since often many members of the transitional government were part of the previous authoritarian regime. Legitimacy problems can arise because interim governments are not elected by popular vote. On these issues, see Shain and Linz 1995.

\textsuperscript{60} This mechanism is similar to the one linking IOs to consolidation. There, IO membership and joining certain IOs can assist in the process of consolidation by signaling the commitment of domestic elites to democracy.
3.2. Testing the Argument: General Transitions

If the preceding argument is correct, we should find an association between democratic international organizations and democratization. To test this hypothesis, I use the data on democracy and IOs described in Chapter 2. Recall that I have coded transitions to democracy based on both the Polity98 data as well as Gasiorowski's regime transitions data set. The test of the hypothesis will proceed in three steps. First, I estimate a model to test for the association between democratic IOs and all democratic transitions. The second and third parts focus on two distinct parts of the transition, liberalization and the completion phases. By liberalization, I refer to a movement away from authoritarianism to a semi-democracy or democracy (as discussed above), while I define movement from a semi-democracy (anocracy) to full democracy as a completion of the transition.

To begin, I will estimate the following model:

\[
\text{DemTrans}_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{IOScore}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \Delta \text{IOScore}_{it-1} + \beta_3 \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Contagion}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{PastDem}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{RegConflict}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{IntViolence}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Milreg}_{it} + \beta_{10} \text{Indep}_{it} + \mu_{it}
\]

The dependent variable in Model 3.1, DemTrans, measures the probability that state \( i \) completes a transition to democracy in year \( t \). The coding of this transition variable for both data sets is described in Chapter 2. The first independent variable, IOScore, is also discussed in Chapter 2. It represents the score of the most democratic IO of which state \( i \) is a member in the year \( t-1 \). Given the theory previously outlined, we
should expect existing membership in democratic IOs to make the probability of a
democratic transition more likely. Thus, we expect the coefficient estimate for this
variable to be positive and statistically significant.

The second independent variable, ΔIOScore_{it-1}, is computed to isolate the effects
of joining an international organization. This variable is included since the process of
joining a highly democratic IO may be an important impetus to make the transition to
democracy. This variable is the one-year difference of IOScore_{it-1}. If a state joins a new
IO which is more democratic than any previous IO, the value of ΔIOScore_{it-1} will be
positive. Including this change variable as well as the level variable will allow a
comparison of the effects of joining a democratic organization versus the overall level of
"democratic-ness" in the IO.\textsuperscript{61} The expectation is that the estimate for this coefficient
should be positive in sign.

The next two independent variables, pcGDP\textsubscript{it} and ΔpcGDP\textsubscript{it} represent economic
factors which may be relevant to democratization. The link between economic
development and democracy is a controversial one which has raged for almost 50 years.
Beginning with Seymour Martin Lipset’s (1959: 75) observation that “Perhaps the most
widespread generalization linking political systems to other aspects of society has been
that democracy is related to the state of economic development”, the idea that economic
wealth fosters democracy has become widespread (Dahl 1989). This theorized
relationship has been supported in a variety of empirical tests as well, including work by
Jackman (1973), Bollen (1979; 1983), Bollen and Jackman (1985), Burkhart and Lewis-

\textsuperscript{61} Change in the level of democracy could represent a change in the level of democracy of the same IO.
That is, ΔIOScore_{it-1} may have a positive value because of democratization in other member states rather
Beck (1994), and Londregan and Poole (1996). Thus, the idea that economic well-being creates demands on the part of citizens for responsive government has been described by some as "almost beyond challenge" (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994: 903).

Some, however, have challenged this conclusion, mostly on statistical grounds. Two relatively recent studies have found only a weak statistical relationship between economic development and democracy (Arat 1988; Gonic and Rosh 1988). Recently, Przeworski and Limongi (1997) have shown that economic development may not be related to transitions to democracy, but to sustaining democracy. This spurs the question of whether economic development related to the breakdown of autocracy. After all, it is possible that while economic development may not facilitate democratization, it can facilitate the decline of an autocratic regime (which could give way to an anocracy or another autocracy). Londregan and Poole (1990; 1996) find this to be the case. Their statistical analysis shows that a consistently significant predictor of transitions to authoritarianism is poverty. Haggard and Kaufman (1995b) also stress the importance of economic crises such as poor economic performance (e.g., low growth) in the breakdown of authoritarian regimes.

I have little interest in adding more fuel to the fire of this debate. My purpose in reviewing this literature is to stress the importance of including such factors as wealth and changes in wealth in any model of democratic transitions. Whether the question is phrased as the breakdown of autocracy or the transition to democracy, scholars have

---

62 Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) contend that these studies suffer from statistical problems which undermine their conclusions. Their own study finds support for the development-democracy relationship.  
63 I discuss this theory more fully in the next chapter, which focuses on the consolidation of democracy.
consistently noted the importance of economic factors in influencing domestic politics. To this end, I have included both per capita income in the model, as well as changes in per capita income, to capture the effects of growth rates within the state. I have chosen per capita GDP because it proxies well for the overall level of economic development within a state. It is possible that this measure can overstate the average level of wealth in a country (if wealth is extremely concentrated in a few hands), but generally this measure will accurately reflect the level of economic wealth in a society. Since the democracy-development hypothesis holds that more wealthy societies are more likely to become democracies, this seems an adequate measure for my purposes. In addition, changes in per capita GDP are generally used to proxy for growth rates within states. Again, given current thinking on the role of sudden and/or slowed economic growth in the democracy-development literature, I feel this measure is important to include in the model.

I expect $pcGDP_{it}$ to be positively associated with transitions to democracy, based on theory and the findings of previous research. The expectation of $\Delta pcGDP_{it}$ is less clear, however. While growth and modernization are hypothesized to bring pressures for democratization, low economic growth is especially likely to hit authoritarians very hard, often causing a breakdown of their regime. That is, high growth may give rise to a politically active middle class, but these same growth rates may add to the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime, especially if that regime came to power on the promise of better economic performance. Both $pcGDP_{it}$ and $\Delta pcGDP_{it}$ are taken from Summers et al (1995) and supplemented with data from the World Bank (1998) and Mitchell (1995, 1998).
The variable Contagion_{it} controls for possible diffusion effects from other established democracies. This phenomenon has been given various names: contagion, diffusion, demonstration effects, and snowballing (Huntington 1991; Whitehead 1996). The idea is that the presence of democracies or democratic transitions are likely to encourage democracy in other countries. The actual causal mechanism often differs, but usually includes the transmission of norms via modern media or epistemic communities (O'Laughlin et al. 1998). This "active" version of contagion differs from a more "passive" theory which holds that the number of democracies at any given time sets an important structural limitation on democratization (Przeworski et al. 1996).

To control for this possibility, I introduce Contagion_{it} in Model 3.1. It is a continuous variable based on the number of democracies in state i's geographic region in year t. Thus, it's yearly value is the same for every country in a given region. Depending on which data set is used to measure the dependent variable, however, the value of Contagion_{it} may vary since each data set differs on which states are considered democracies. This variable is measured on a yearly basis to capture changes in the level of democracy in a region. That is, if three states transition to democracy in one year, this will increase the value of the contagion variable by 3. I expect this variable to be positively associated with democratic transitions, since higher numbers of extant

---

64 Of course, IOs effect on democracy could take this form as well. By controlling for this phenomenon independently, however, it will parse out any contagion effect independent of IO membership.
65 I follow the Correlates of War coding of regions which includes: North America, South America, Africa, Europe, Asia-Pacific, Asia, Middle East. See Small and Singer (1994). Although Small and Singer consider the Oceania area as an independent region (Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, etc.), I combine these few states with the Asia region. This makes no substantive difference in any of the models, since in all but a small handful of cases this Pacific dummy is thrown out since no country in that region experiences democratization or liberalization.
democracies should lead to a hospitable environment for the movement to democracy or even pressures from neighboring states to democratize.

Many who study transitions to democracy have argued that past experience with democracy makes a transition to democracy more likely. The idea is that past development of civil society will often survive a period of autocracy and can re-emerge as a foundation for democracy. Interestingly, Przeworski and his colleagues (1996: 43-4) point out that a past history of democracy in an authoritarian regime also means a past history of democratic breakdown, so it is not clear whether this factor works for or against the likelihood of a democratic transition. To control for these dynamics, I include PastDem_{it} in Model 3.1. This variable measures a nation’s past experience with democracy. The variable is coded as a “1” if state i has previously been a democracy, otherwise, the variable takes on a value of “0”. Despite Przeworski’s argument, I expect this variable to be positive in sign—a past history of democracy should increase the likelihood of a democratic transition.

The next two independent variables tap the level of external and internal conflict experienced by a nation-state. RegDisp_{it} measures the number of disputes in state i’s region in year t. Some scholars have argued that regional instability and international conflict will not augur well for the development of democracy (Thompson 1996). The argument, often couched in terms of the democratic peace, is that states require a peaceful international environment to democratize. Democracy can suffer setbacks during crises since leaders will often consolidate their own power in order to mobilize resources to

\[\text{66} \quad \text{The state must have been a democracy between 1950 and year } t. \text{ States which were democracies that suffered breakdowns before 1950 are coded as “0”.} \]

\[\text{67} \quad \text{Regions are defined as in fn. 11.} \]
meet (or make) external threats. In more peaceful times, leaders have no need to control the reigns of the state for security purposes, giving democracy a chance to flourish.\(^{68}\)

Given the extant theory, I expect this variable to have a negative effect on the probability of democracy. That is, the more disputes within a region (which may or may not involve state \(i\)), the less likely a transition to democracy.

To measure the effect of internal violence, I include the variable \(\text{IntVio}_t\) in the model. This variable, taken from Banks (1994), is coded “1” if state \(i\) suffers from anti-government riots, strikes, riots, guerilla insurgencies, or assassination attempts on major government officials in year \(t\).\(^{69}\) I expect this variable to be negatively related to transitions to democracy, since internal violence is unlikely to give way to democracy in the short run (recall that the dependent variable takes on a value of “1” if a transition is completed that year). Although violence is often required to unseat an autocrat, it will be rare for democracy to arise given the civil and economic upheaval accompanying large-scale internal violence (Linz and Stepan 1996: 107-8).

Some scholars have argued that different types of autocratic regimes (military dictatorships, one party systems, etc.) are more or less susceptible to democratization. Most recently, Barbara Geddes (1998: 5) contends that military regimes “carry with them the seeds of their own disintegration.” Her argument is that since returning to the barracks is always a fairly attractive option for some set of military leaders within a country, when faced with a crisis, military regimes are more likely to collapse than other

---

\(^{68}\) Of course, there could be another, more complex causal story: If peace means prosperity, then the economic development and democracy link again becomes important. I do not attempt to evaluate this theory, per se, and leave the question of causal mechanisms aside.

\(^{69}\) Banks (1994) provides a description of his coding criteria for each type of event for the duration of his data set.
forms of autocracy. Past quantitative research has not provided support for this argument. Specifically, Gasiorowski (1995) finds that military regimes are less likely to transition to democracy in his sample of 75 developing countries from 1950-1992. To control for this dynamic, I include MilRegit in Model 3.1. This variable equals “1” if state $i$ is controlled by the military in year $t$. This data is taken from Banks (1994). Given the past empirical findings, I expect this variable to be negatively related to the probability of a transition to democracy.

The final independent variable, Indepit, measures the length of time state $i$ has been an independent nation-state. As an extension of the idea that past experience with democracy may be correlated with democratization, I hypothesize that longer periods of political independence should be positively related to the probability of a transition to democracy. Longer periods of political independence will allow time to foster civil society and independent political parties. The dates of independence are taken from Small and Singer (1994). Finally, $\mu_{it}$ is a stochastic error term.

I should note that the sample for this model does not include all the entire sample in the data set. After all, states which are already democratic cannot experience a transition to democracy. Thus, only states which can undergo a democratic transition (autocracies and anocracies) are included in the estimation of Model 3.1. This explains why the $N$ of each model is smaller than the $N$ of the entire data set and why the

---

70 Banks’ data is coded only through 1989. I have updated the data through 1992, relying on Banks and Mueller (1998) as well as the CIA Factbook (1999).
71 Small and Singer trace the origin of the international state system to 1815 and thus, for all nations who were independent before this date, their date of independence is set to 1815.
72 Technically, those countries which are autocracies or anocracies at $i-1$ are included in the sample. That is, if a state is a democracy in year $t$ because of a transition, it is included, since in the prior year it was either an autocracy or anocracy. Transition years, those years where the outcome of the transition is uncertain, are also included.
estimates using different data sets have different sample sizes (since their definition of
democracy differs).

Finally, in order to assess one alternative hypothesis, I estimate one variant of
Model 3.1. In that model, I substitute NIO\textsubscript{it-1} for \(\Delta\text{IOScore}_{\text{it-1}}\). This variable measures
the number of IOs of which state \(i\) is a member in year \(t-1\). If any regional organization
can fulfill the functions outlined in my theory, regardless of the "democratic-ness" of the
members, this should test for this possibility. If this alternate hypothesis is correct, the
new independent variable should be positive and statistically significant, while IO\text{Score}_{\text{it-1}}
would become statistically insignificant.

3.2.1. **Statistical Results: General Transitions**

Because the observed value of the dependent variable is dichotomous, I utilize
logistic regression to estimate Model 3.1.\footnote{In each specification of the model, I have checked for the inclusion of a correction for temporal
dependence (see Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Beck and Tucker 1996; Beck and Katz 1997). In each case,
a cubic spline function and one to three knots are never statistically significant. This indicates that
temporal dependence is of little concern for these models and thus, no corrective measures are taken.} The estimates of the model and its one
variant are presented in Table 3.1. Note the first column presents estimates using the
Polity98 data, while the second utilizes the Gasiorowski data set. For both data sets,
membership in democratic international organizations is positively related to the
likelihood of a transition to democracy. In addition, both coefficient estimates are highly
statistically significant. Thus, membership in democratic IOs, while controlling for
domestic economic trends, internal and external violence, as well as past experience with
democracy, is significantly correlated with the transition to democracy.
The estimates presented in the third and fourth columns of Table 3.1 include the \( NIO_{it-1} \) variable.\(^{74}\) In one case (Polity98), this new independent variable is statistically significant (at the \( p < .10 \) level), but in neither case does the presence of this variable mitigate the influence of \( IOScore_{it-1} \). In both cases, the level of democracy within the IO has a stronger association with the transition to democracy than the overall number of IO memberships. This provides some empirical support for the notion that the identity of the IO matters in terms of promoting transitions. Thus, not all regional IOs will be able (or willing) to fulfill the functions outlined in this chapter.

To gain some understanding of how important the IO variable is to the prospect of experiencing a transition to democracy, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the predicted probabilities of a transition based on columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.1. The first lines in each table present the “baseline” likelihood of a democratic transition for a state in the data set whose authoritarian system was not a military regime, which has no past experience with democracy, and did not experience any internal violence.\(^{75}\) Note the change in probability of a transition in the second line of each table, where IOScore is increased by one standard deviation from its mean value. For the Polity98 data, the likelihood of a transition increases by seventy percent, while for the Gasiorowski data, the result is a slightly more modest fifty percent. This comparison illustrates the substantive impact of membership in more democratic international organizations.

\(^{74}\) In addition to \( NIO_{it-1} \), I ran each of the models (3.1-3.3) in this chapter substituting a measure for the average IOScore of each state in year \( t-1 \). This measure allows one to take into account all IOs of which state \( i \) is a member. Although this variable always was of the predicted sign, it never attained statistical significance. This is further corroboration that only one democratic IO is needed to supply the functions linking IOs with democratic transitions.

\(^{75}\) These are set as the “baseline” conditions for comparison across all the models. These are the modal values for the dummy variables in the data set. All other continuous variables in the model are set to their mean value for the baseline condition.
The third line of each table presents the predicted probability of a transition in the case where the state is not a member of a regional organization included in the IO sample. These results are quite striking. For the Polity98 data, membership in an IO with the mean level of IOScore increases the odds of a transition over a state with no IO memberships by over 144%. For the Gasiorowski data, the comparable change is over 100%. Thus, IOs have a very strong impact on the likelihood of a democratic and this impact grows as the IO’s membership becomes more democratic.

Most of the control variables are of the expected sign, but not all of the estimates achieve statistical significance. One variable which consistently does not take on the expected sign, however, is per capita GDP. In all four cases this term is negative, but in no case is the estimate statistically significant. Thus, it appears that higher economic development is negatively related to democratic transitions. However, the lack of statistical significance and the very small absolute values of these coefficient estimates should instill caution when interpreting these results. It is probably best to conclude that the overall level of development in a country has little direct impact on the likelihood of transitions. This finding is consistent with the Przeworski and Limongi (1997) argument that higher levels of development are more associated with the continuation, rather than the transition to democracy.

Similarly, change in per capita GDP also shows a very weak influence on the probability of a democratic transition. For the Polity98 data, this variable is negative and statistically significant, but this is not the case for the Gasiorowski data. Because authoritarian governments often come to power in the midst of economic crises,

---

76 Examples of states which are a party to no international organizations over some periods of time in the
economic success can function to legitimize their continued existence, lessening the probability of a democratic transition (O’Donnell 1973). Likewise, poor economic performance (falling growth rates) increases the likelihood of a democratic transition, a finding consistent with past statistical research (Gasiorowski 1995). For the Gasiorowski data, this parameter estimate is not statistically significant. Why do these results vary across the data set? One possible explanation lies in their differing geographic coverage. The lagging growth rates of Eastern and Southern European states immediately prior to their transitions certainly bolster this results in the Polity98 data. Because these cases are absent in the Gasiorowski data, this statistical association is much weaker.

Tables 3.4 and 3.5 shows the predicted probabilities of a transition if the change in per capita income for the “baseline” state grows from the mean to the 75th percentile. Given the small and statistically insignificant coefficients in the Gasiorowski estimates, it is not surprising that this change makes little difference in the predicted probability. For the Polity98 data, however, this rise in growth has a modest impact of an almost six percent rise in the likelihood of a transition.

For both data sets, past experience with democracy and a previous military regime have substantial impacts on the probability of a transition. In all the models of Table 3.1, both of these variables are consistently significant. This finding concerning Milreg$_t$ is in accord with past empirical literature which finds that these regimes are more difficult to overthrow than single-party or personalistic regimes (Gasiorowski 1995), yet contradicts Geddes’ (1998) argument that military regimes may be more susceptible to transitions to democracy. In addition, past experience with democracy (PastDem$_t$) is positively related
to the propensity for a transition. This is in-line with theoretical expectations concerning
this variable, namely that a history of democracy bodes well for the probability of future
transitions to democracy. In fact, past experience with democracy has an enormous
effect on the predicted probability of a transition. In line 4 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, this
variable increases the probability of a transition dramatically for both data sets (in the
case of the Polity98 data from .003 to .031).

Three additional control variables warrant discussion. First, the estimate of the
effect of regional conflicts (RegConflikt) on the prospects for democracy are statistically
significant in the Polity98 data, but not for the Gasiorowski data. The estimates
consistently have the predicted sign across both data sets—increasing regional hostilities
lowers the probability of democracy. Again, the difference in spatial coverage may
account for the fact that only in the Polity98 data is this variable significant. Europe
experiences the highest number of militarized disputes during the vast majority of the
period under analysis, largely because of incidents arising out of the Cold War. Thus, the
lack of democratization for years in Eastern Europe coincided with a high rate of
disputes. Given that these cases are absent in the Gasiorowski data, this relationship is
much weaker in the models estimated using his data.

In consonance with the diffusion and/or contagion hypotheses, the more
democracies exist in a state’s region, the more likely their transition to democracy,
although this result is never statistically significant. Finally, the measure of years since
independence (Indepkt) is occasionally statistically significant in the Polity98 data, but
again, not with the Gasiorowski measures.
Overall, these models provide firm evidence that involvement in international organizations generally, and democratic international organizations specifically, can encourage the process of democratization. This is strong initial support for the theory, especially since other factors which could be associated with transitions (especially those factors which are also correlated with IO membership) are controlled for in this analysis.

3.2.2. Additional Tests: General Transitions

To further assess the robustness of these results, I estimate two additional models. The first model adds region-specific fixed effects to this previous variant to test whether there are systematic differences in the probabilities for transitions across each region. That is, by introducing a dummy variable for each region (defined in fn. 11), we can account for factors which may be important only in certain geographic regions that are not included in the model. Of course, controlling for these unspecified factors may eliminate any association between IOs and democratization. These estimates are presented in full in Appendix 3.1. The key independent variable of interest, IOScore\textsubscript{rt-1}, remains highly statistically significant for both cases. This gives us more confidence in our initial results that IOs are associated with democratic transitions and are not a result of simply an under-specified model.

---

77 On the use of region-specific dummies see Feng and Zak 1999. I have chosen to use the region as the unit of analysis for two reasons: one substantive, one methodological. The substantive reason is that in much of the transitions literature, the region is the relevant unit of analysis. Although most studies concentrate on individual countries, these studies are almost always grouped in terms of regions (cf., O'Donnell and Schmitt 1986; Huntington 1991). The methodological reason is that if one moves down a level of analysis to the individual nation-state, much of the data will be lost since any country which does not experience a transition will be excluded from the data set. While this is not a problem econometrically, it does introduce potential bias in the results since one is summarily excluding “the dog that doesn’t bark”.

119
Finally, it is important to ensure that these results are not undermined by simultaneity bias. That is, if countries first undergo transitions to democracy, then join highly democratic international organizations, a statistical association may exist even though the causal process is reversed. To guard against this possibility, I have lagged the value of IOScore. This is the best insurance against a simultaneity problem, since during the year of transition, the IOScore from the previous year is utilized. Thus, the causal process must begin with a high IOScore, then democratization. Second, I estimate a model identical to 3.1, but I reverse the dependent and major independent variable (IOScore). To show no reverse causation, I measure IOScore in year $t$, and the democratic transition in year $t-l$. In this model, the estimate of the democratic transition variable is not statistically significant, indicating that democratic transitions have little influence on IOScore.

3.3. **Modeling Political Liberalization**

One implication of the theory as outlined in Chapter 1 is that membership in certain regional organizations should be associated not only with general transitions, but political liberalization as well. We should be able to break down the democratic transition itself to see if democratic regional organizations are related to initial political liberalization. I hypothesize that membership in democratic regional organizations, through either the pressure mechanism or the acquiescence effect, should be associated with political liberalization. This section more directly tests this proposition. By changing the dependent variable to examine cases where liberalization from authoritarian

---

78 In addition, $\Delta$IOScore$_{t-1}$ and NIO$_{t-1}$ are excluded. Their inclusion makes no difference in the results.
rule occurs, we can test the proposition that IOs are associated with an initial move towards political liberalization. To this end, I estimate the following model:

\begin{align*}
(3.2) \text{Liberalization}_{it} &= \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{IOScore}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Contagion}_{it} + \\
&\quad \beta_5 \text{PastDem}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{RegConflict}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{IntViolence}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Milreg}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Indep}_{it} + \mu_{it}
\end{align*}

Model 3.2 is nearly identical to Model 3.1.\textsuperscript{79} The one major difference is the dependent variable. Liberalization\textsubscript{it} measures those transitions where a state moves from an autocracy to either a semi-democracy or a full democracy. For the Polity98 data, this means a state must go from below the -6 threshold to between the -6 and +6 cutoffs (i.e., from an autocracy to an anocracy) or above the +6 cutoff (i.e., from an autocracy to a democracy).\textsuperscript{80} For the Gasiorowski data, this includes transitions from autocracy to semi-democracy, an autocracy to a transitional state, and a semi-democracy to a full democracy.\textsuperscript{81} Only in these instances is a state coded as experiencing liberalization. If the state is already an anocracy or democracy, the variable is coded as missing and is excluded from the analysis, since these states cannot experience the event. Otherwise, this variable is coded “0”.

This new dependent variable is meant to capture the process of liberalization in autocratic states. Specifically, this variable should capture initial, yet incomplete

\textsuperscript{79} I exclude \Delta \text{IOScore}\textsubscript{it-1} and NIO\textsubscript{it-1} in the remaining models since they were not statistically significant across the previous models.

\textsuperscript{80} Note there is some overlap between these transitions and the ones modeled in the previous section. This section excludes “completion” transitions (from semi-democracies to full democracies), but includes partial transitions.
movements towards democracy, as well as the full liberalization of the political system.\textsuperscript{82}

If liberalization “consists of measures which, although entailing a significant opening of the previous bureaucratic-authoritarian regime, remain short of what could be called political democracy” (O’Donnell 1979: 8; see also Przeworski 1991), then partial transitions captured by the Liberalization\textsubscript{it} variable should adequately measure instances of liberalization. Of course, there is reason to believe that similar dynamics occur in movements from autocracy to full democracy as well. If the “opening” of the regime moves quickly or goes beyond what its proponents intended, this may become a transition to full democracy. Since there is no a priori ground on which to exclude these regime changes, they are included in this analysis as well.\textsuperscript{83} Thus, if my theory is correct, highly democratic IOs should be associated with these political “openings” since fellow members of the organization may push for political opening and/or elites previously opposed to such policies will now acquiesce to these changes.

3.3.1. Statistical Results: Liberalization

Table 3.2 presents the estimates of Model 3.2. Columns 1 and 2 present the estimates for the model on the Polity98 and Gasiorowski data respectively. In both cases, membership in democratic international organizations is positively associated with political liberalization. In addition, the estimates of these variables are statistically

\textsuperscript{81} I exclude movements from transitional states to full democracies since to be coded as a transitional state for Gasiorowski, some liberalization has already taken place. Even so, the inclusion of these particular transitions makes almost no difference in the statistical results which will be presented.

\textsuperscript{82} States which begin as an autocracy and become “anocracies” or semi-democracies, for both Gurr and Gasiorowski include polities which have “mixed authority traits” (Gurr 1989: 38) and in which “electoral outcomes, while competitive, still deviate significantly from popular preferences” (Gasiorowski 1993: 2).
significant across each data set. These results lend further corroboration to the idea that democratic regional organizations are associated with political liberalization.

The second column of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show the predicted probabilities based on the coefficient estimates in Table 3.2. For the Polity98 data (column 2 of Table 3.4), membership in a democratic international organization with an IOScore one standard deviation higher than the mean increases the likelihood of liberalization over 120 percent. For the Gasiorowski data (column 2 or Table 3.5), the increase is a more modest 37 percent. In addition, as shown in the second row of each table, a state with no IO memberships has a greatly reduced propensity to undergo political liberalization (74 percent lower for Polity98 and 42 percent lower for Gasiorowski). All of these figures are substantively important, showing the importance of membership in regional organizations with respect to the domestic political reform process.

One variable which appears both statistically and substantively important in these models is IntViolence\(_{it}\)—which measures incidents of domestic violence. In both data sets, this estimate is positive and statistically significant. This is not entirely surprising given that a common explanation for attempts to open the political sphere in an autocracy is to respond to domestic pressures against the government (Przeworski 1991; O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Thus, when confronted with mass uprisings, domestic elites may turn to liberalization to quell this violence.\(^{84}\) Tables 3.4 and 3.5 demonstrates how important this variable is with respect to the predicted probabilities. Comparing lines 7

---

\(^{83}\) If only instances of partial liberalization are analyzed, the results are remarkably similar with respect to our independent variable of interest. Namely, membership in democratic regional IOs are associated with partial liberalization in both data sets.
and 8 of Column 2 of these tables (baseline conditions with a military regime, with and without internal violence) shows that the presence of internal violence approximately doubles the probability of liberalization.

Another variable of note in these models is past experience with democracy (PastDem$_{hi}$). For both data sets this variable is positive and statistically significant. Thus, past experience with democracy is associated with liberalization, a finding which accords with much of the theoretical literature on this topic. Past experience as a democracy greatly increases the probability of liberalization in both data sets (more than doubling the baseline probability in both data sets), as seen in column 2 of Tables 3.4 and 3.5.

Finally, for the Polity98 data, regional conflicts appear not to bode well for political liberalization. This is some evidence in support of Thompson’s (1995) hypothesis that peace is a prerequisite for democracy. Unfortunately, this variable is not significant in the Gasiorowski models. Thus, militarized disputes seem to play no role in either encouraging or discouraging the liberalization process in the developing world, while this is not the case once Europe and North America are included. The explanation for this difference lies, as previously discussed, in the Cold War. The MIDs data, on which this variable is based, codes a tremendous amount of MID involvement for states such as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, France, both Germanys, as well as Greece. Given the high number of MIDs in Europe during this period and the complete lack of liberalization in most of Eastern Europe during this period, regional hostilities are found to be negatively associated with democratization in the Polity98 models. Because this

---

84 A less pleasant alternate explanation could be that movements towards liberalization create patterns of domestic violence. This violence could be part and parcel to the process itself or as a result of the electoral process which accompanies democratization (see Snyder and Ballentine 1996).
entire region is not included in the other data set, the coefficient estimate has the same sign, but is not statistically significant.

3.3.2. Additional Tests: Liberalization

As with the previous model, I also estimate a variant of Model 3.2, which includes region-specific fixed effects. Similar to the previous section, I will include dummy variables for each geographic region in addition to the nine variables already discussed. Similar to the previous models, the estimates of IOscore\textsubscript{it-1} remain stable even with the inclusion of these fixed effects (in fact the Gasiorowski estimates are stronger). Again, this is significant support for the idea that membership in democratic IOs can facilitate political liberalization.

3.4. Completing the Transition to Democracy

The second part of the theory relating democratic IOs to transitions involves the effects of IO membership on the probability that a regime moves from the liberalization stage to full democratization. To test this part of the theory, I utilize a variant of Model 3.1, labeled Model 3.3:

\begin{equation}
\text{CompTrans}_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{IOscore}_{it-1} + \beta_2 \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_3 \Delta \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Contagion}_{it} + \\
\beta_5 \text{PastDem}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{RegConflict}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{IntViolence}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{Milreg}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Indep}_{it} + \\
\beta_{10} \text{ELF}_{i} + \mu_{it}
\end{equation}
Again, the major difference between this and the previous two models is the dependent variable. CompTrans$_{it}$ represents changes from anocracy (for Polity98) or semi-democracy (for Gasiorowski) to a full democracy.$^{85}$ The relevant sample also changes. Now, we are only concerned with those states which are currently anocracies or semi-democracies, since they are the only state which can undergo such a transition. If my theory is correct, then involvement in democratic IOs should be positively related to the probability of a finishing transition.

The first nine independent variables are identical to those in Model 3.2. I add an additional control variable which has been linked to the probability of finishing the transition process and becoming a full democracy. ELF$_{it}$ measures the degree to which any state’s population is linguistically homogenous.$^{87}$ Recently, Linz and Stepan (1996) have argued that a key road block to both finishing democratic transitions is the issue of “stateness”. They argue that states which are ethnically diverse, specifically states which have large communities of ethnic minorities create “competing nationalisms within one territorial state” (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). This factor, by undermining the very legitimacy of the state itself, can make completing a transition difficult. They argue that under authoritarian systems, issues of citizenship and the legitimacy of the state are less salient, thus these problem arise only under fragile democratic systems. The expectation

---

$^{85}$ The full results are presented in Appendix 3.1.

$^{86}$ In the case of Polity98, the represents a movement from between the -6/+6 range to at or above the +6 threshold.

$^{87}$ Technically, ELF is a calculation of the probability that two randomly selected citizens speak the same language. Unfortunately, there is only limited data on this variable. Thus, I have assumed that this probability is constant over the span of the data set. While in some cases this is not a tenable assumption (e.g., Lebanon), for many states it is (most of Western Europe and Latin America). Rather than allow data availability to limit the sample when introducing this variable, I have chosen to accept this assumption.
is that this variable will be negatively associated with completing the transition to
democracy.\footnote{I should note that when this variable is added to the previous two models, it never achieves statistical significance, indicating that ethnic homogeneity does not seem to influence general transitions or liberalization.}

3.4.1. Statistical Results: Completing the Transition

Table 3.3 presents the estimates of Model 3.3. In these models, involvement in
IOs shows a much weaker association with democratization. Specifically, only in the
Polity98 model is the independent variable of interest statistically significant. My
hypothesis that membership in IOs can help complete transitions to democracy by
signaling the intent of reformers and/or the acquiescence effect receives very limited
support in these data. It is notable that the only case study which finds this causal
mechanism at work is in an Eastern European transition (Hungary). If, in fact, these are
the only cases where this mechanism functions, then it is not surprising that there is no
association between IOs and the completion of democracy in the Gasiorowski data,
which excludes Eastern Europe. Additional statistical and case work is needed, however,
before concluding that this is an Easter Europe-only phenomenon. Overall, we can
conclude that IO involvement probably has little influence on completing the transition to
democracy.

The third column of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 present the predicted probabilities of this
final type of transition, based on the estimates in Table 3.3. A comparison of the first two
lines of each table shows the differences in the predicted probabilities among the two data
sets concerning the importance of IO involvement in completing transitions to
democracy. Clearly IO membership has a comparatively larger impact in the Polity data. As previously mentioned, this could arise from the fact that the Polity data includes the Eastern European transitions where IOs (such as the EC/EU, Partnership for Peace, or the Council of Europe) probably fulfilled more of a signaling function. Still, this explanation would require further theorizing and testing as to the conditions under which these signaling functions are more likely to occur.

A few of the control variables are worth mentioning. First, as hypothesized by Linz and Stepan, a high amount of ethno-linguistic diversity does not bode well for completing a transition to democracy. ELF is always negative and in the Gasiorowski data, statistically significant. The last line of Tables 3.4 and 3.5 computes the probability of completing the transition to democracy given a higher level of linguistic heterogeneity in a state. Note that in both the Polity and Gasiorowski data, increasing the ELF index by one standard deviation cuts this probability in half, ceteris paribus.

Increases in per capita GDP also do not bode well for completing the transition. The interpretation of this result is similar to that of this finding in Model 3.1. Namely, in good economic times, there are few complaints about the limited nature of democracy or the remaining vestiges of authoritarian rule (see Haggard and Kaufman 1997). Thus, completing the transition to democracy becomes a less pressing issue.

3.4.2. Additional Tests: Completing the Transition

Finally, as a robustness check I estimate a version of Model 3.3 including region-specific fixed effects. The full results are presented in Appendix 3.1. Unfortunately, when one accounts for region-specific effects, any influence of IO membership
disappears. In both of these new models, IOScore_{it}; is not statistically significant. Thus, these results (admittedly weak to begin with) do not appear to be robust. One should conclude that, at best, democratic IOs have a very weak influence on the completion of democracy.

3.5. Conclusion

These statistical results provide substantial support for most aspects of the theory presented in Chapter 1. Of course, as one may notice examining the comparative statics of Tables 3.4 and 3.5, changes in the “democratic-ness” of an IO does not have the largest impact on the probability of a transition to democracy, liberalization or the completion of a transition. Indeed, my argument is not that external factors generally or IOs specifically are the most important factor in determining the fate of an autocratic regime. Rather, I have put forth a hypothesis which holds that one influence on the dynamics of transition and liberalization is the degree of a state’s involvement in certain regional organizations. Factors such as previous experience with democracy, economic stability, and the nature of the previous regime may be more important than variables external to the state. Still, these statistical tests have shown that the external dimension, especially international organizations cannot be ignored.

Of course, these large-N tests cannot tell us which of the causal mechanism function in any given case. Chapter 5 presents two case studies which investigate which of these causal processes are at work. In addition, the study of Turkey in Chapter 6 shows how IO membership influenced the timing of Turkey’s democratization efforts in

---

89 It should be noted that in the case of the Polity98 data, the fixed-effects specification can be rejected at
the mid-1980s. Before turning to these case studies, however, I evaluate the other hypothesis presented in Chapter 1, that regional organizations are linked to the consolidation of democracy.

the p <= .01 level. It cannot be rejected in the Gasiorowski data, however.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOScore$_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.1012***</td>
<td>0.0871***</td>
<td>0.07584**</td>
<td>0.0810**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.55)</td>
<td>(2.87)</td>
<td>(2.39)</td>
<td>(2.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIOScore$_{t-1}$</td>
<td>0.0102</td>
<td>0.0440</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>(0.76)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIO$_{t-1}$</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>0.1839*</td>
<td>0.0621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1.93)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP$_{it}$</td>
<td>$-4.00 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$-4.75 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$-7.26 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$-5.53 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.60)</td>
<td>(-0.83)</td>
<td>(-0.91)</td>
<td>(-0.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP$_{it}$</td>
<td>$-0.0010^{**}$</td>
<td>$-2.64 \times 10^{-6}$</td>
<td>$-0.0009^{**}$</td>
<td>$1.28 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.19)</td>
<td>(-0.14)</td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
<td>(0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion$_{it}$</td>
<td>0.0487</td>
<td>0.0906</td>
<td>0.0505</td>
<td>0.0841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(1.55)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PastDem$_{it}$</td>
<td>1.9584***</td>
<td>0.7630**</td>
<td>1.9098***</td>
<td>0.7218**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.05)</td>
<td>(2.54)</td>
<td>(4.94)</td>
<td>(2.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict$_{it}$</td>
<td>$-0.0699^{*}$</td>
<td>$-0.0120$</td>
<td>$-0.0800^{**}$</td>
<td>$-0.0178$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
<td>(-0.34)</td>
<td>(-2.03)</td>
<td>(-0.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntVio$_{it}$</td>
<td>0.6353</td>
<td>0.0245</td>
<td>0.6507</td>
<td>0.0477</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
<td>(1.47)</td>
<td>(0.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milreg$_{it}$</td>
<td>$-1.7970^{**}$</td>
<td>$-1.4036^{***}$</td>
<td>$-1.8981^{***}$</td>
<td>$-1.4356^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.51)</td>
<td>(-3.23)</td>
<td>(-2.60)</td>
<td>(-3.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep$_{it}$</td>
<td>$0.0069^{*}$</td>
<td>0.0049</td>
<td>$0.0078^{*}$</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>(1.07)</td>
<td>(1.84)</td>
<td>(1.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>$-5.7367^{***}$</td>
<td>$-4.8605^{***}$</td>
<td>$-5.9987^{***}$</td>
<td>$-4.9389^{***}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.78)</td>
<td>(-9.06)</td>
<td>(-11.62)</td>
<td>(-9.37)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 3.1:** Estimates of the Determinants of the Transition to Democracy, 1950-1992.

(continued)
Table 3.1 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( N = )</td>
<td>2695</td>
<td>2248</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>2271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-192.91</td>
<td>-246.58</td>
<td>-191.49</td>
<td>-246.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>84.04***</td>
<td>63.77***</td>
<td>84.60***</td>
<td>67.98***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwhich standard errors.

*** -- \( p \leq .01 \); ** -- \( p \leq .05 \); * -- \( p \leq .10 \); two-tailed tests.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{IOScore}_{it-1}$</td>
<td>0.1437***</td>
<td>0.07523**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(5.61)</td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{pcGDP}_{it}$</td>
<td>$-1.90 \times 10^{-5}$</td>
<td>$-2.93 \times 10^{-6}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.33)</td>
<td>(-0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta \text{pcGDP}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0002</td>
<td>2.18 x 10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.50)</td>
<td>(0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Contagion}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0010</td>
<td>0.1511***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
<td>(2.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{PastDem}_{it}$</td>
<td>1.0505*</td>
<td>1.2111***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.86)</td>
<td>(4.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{RegConflict}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.1302***</td>
<td>-0.0233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.25)</td>
<td>(-0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{IntVio}_{it}$</td>
<td>1.0807***</td>
<td>0.7280**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.66)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Milreg}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.6099</td>
<td>-0.3971</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.46)</td>
<td>(-1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Indep}_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0022</td>
<td>0.0033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.58)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Constant}$</td>
<td>-4.1922***</td>
<td>-5.2435***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-7.98)</td>
<td>(-10.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$N =$</td>
<td>1980</td>
<td>1940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-261.53</td>
<td>-237.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>70.09***</td>
<td>93.77***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** -- $p <= .01$; ** -- $p <= .05$; * -- $p <= .10$; two-tailed tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOScore_{it-1}</td>
<td>0.0855**</td>
<td>0.0770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.17)</td>
<td>(-0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0030**</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.43)</td>
<td>(-1.15)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0102</td>
<td>-0.0042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.18)</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PastDem_{it}</td>
<td>1.6899***</td>
<td>-0.8648**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
<td>(-1.98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0257</td>
<td>0.0508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.59)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF_{i}</td>
<td>-1.9386</td>
<td>-2.3363*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.29)</td>
<td>(-1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntVio_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0120</td>
<td>-0.4615</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.03)</td>
<td>(-0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milreg_{it}</td>
<td>-1.109</td>
<td>-2.1029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.28)</td>
<td>(-1.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep_{it}</td>
<td>0.0081*</td>
<td>0.0096</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td>(1.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-4.7182***</td>
<td>-2.0917*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.15)</td>
<td>(-1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-87.33</td>
<td>-84.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>47.88***</td>
<td>21.30**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.
*** -- p <= .01; ** -- p <= .05; * -- p <= .10; two-tailed tests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Variables at Mean (Baseline)*</td>
<td>0.0034</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>0.0029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in IOScore by one</td>
<td>0.0057</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>0.0072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>standard deviation from mean</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No IO Membership</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>0.0022</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase ΔpcGDP to 75th percentile</td>
<td>0.0032</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>0.0024</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Experience as Democracy</td>
<td>0.0306</td>
<td>0.0208</td>
<td>0.0105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Experience + Military Regime</td>
<td>0.0054</td>
<td>0.0188</td>
<td>0.0046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime + Internal Violence</td>
<td>0.0010</td>
<td>0.0192</td>
<td>0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>0.0006</td>
<td>0.0075</td>
<td>0.0013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in ELF of one standard deviation from the mean</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Based on the estimates in Tables 3.1-3.3.

* = Milreg<sub>i</sub>, Intviol<sub>i</sub>, and Pastdem<sub>i</sub>, all equal 0 in the baseline model.

**Table 3.4:** Predicted Probabilities of Transitions: Polity98 Estimates
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All Variables at Mean (Baseline)*</td>
<td>0.0241</td>
<td>0.0210</td>
<td>0.0404</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in IOScore by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>0.0362</td>
<td>0.0289</td>
<td>0.0531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No IO Membership</td>
<td>0.0120</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.0254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase ΔpcGDP to 75(^{th}) percentile</td>
<td>0.0240</td>
<td>0.0210</td>
<td>0.0372</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Experience as Democracy</td>
<td>0.0524</td>
<td>0.0540</td>
<td>0.0196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Experience + Military Regime</td>
<td>0.0116</td>
<td>0.0474</td>
<td>0.0030</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime + Internal Violence</td>
<td>0.0066</td>
<td>0.0347</td>
<td>0.0062</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Regime</td>
<td>0.0052</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
<td>0.006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in ELF of one standard deviation from the mean</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>-- --</td>
<td>0.0183</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Based on the estimates in Tables 3.1-3.3.

* = Milreg\(_{it}\), Intviol\(_{it}\), and Pastdem\(_{it}\), all equal 0 in the baseline model.

**Table 3.5:** Predicted Probabilities of Transitions: Gasiorowski Data
Appendix 3.1. Fixed-Effect models.

This appendix will present the full results of the fixed-effects models discussed in this chapter. In order to check the robustness of the original results, I add region-specific fixed effects to each model (3.1-3.3). This amounts to creating a set of dummy variables, each coded “1” when state \( i \) is a member of region \( j \). I define regions similar to the Correlates of War project (see footnote 11). All but one dummy variable is added to each model. These results of these revised models are presented in Tables 3.6 and 3.7.

As discussed in the text, for the general model of democratic transition (Model 3.1) and the model of liberalization (Model 3.2), the regional fixed-effects have no bearing on the major result -- that democratic international organizations are positively associated with democratization and liberalization. In all of these models, a chi-square test for the inclusion of these regional dummies allows us to reject the hypothesis that these variables should be excluded from the model. The inclusion of these variables significantly improves the statistical fit of each model.

In addition, the inclusion of the fixed effects does alter the estimates of some of the control variables. In the initial transition model (3.1), the estimates of per capita GDP, regional conflict, and political independence are no longer statistically significant for the Polity98 data, while past experience with democracy is no longer significant in the Gasiorowski model. Thus, some unspecified region-specific factor appears to mitigate the importance of these variable’s importance in the transition process. These same controls increase the influence of regional contagion, however, which is now statistically significant for both the Polity98 and Gasiorowski models. Of course we do not know what region-based factor has induced these changes in the model, unless we are able to
more adequately measure and test factors which may be specific to geographic region. This, of course, is a problem with the fixed-effect approach and the reason I utilize these models only as robustness checks.

Similarly, the estimates of the control variables vary in the liberalization model, as shown in the first two columns of Table 3.7. For the Polity98 data, regional contagion and a previous military regime are now statistically significant. Note also that regional contagion now has the theoretically-expected positive sign. The Gasiorowski estimates do not vary with the inclusion of the regional dummies. The lone exception is that change in per capita GDP is now negative in sign, matching the sign of the other estimates for this variable (although it is not statistically significant). Finally, the chi-square test for the inclusion of these region-specific variables rejects the null hypothesis that these terms should not be included in the model.

The fixed effects do weaken the results for the completion of democracy models (Model 3.3), although only the Polity98 estimates of IOScore were significant in these models in the beginning. Thus, controlling for region-specific factors seems to mitigate the influence of regional IOs in these models. Again, it is difficult to say what factors have this influence, but it should be noted that the chi-square test for the inclusion of these region-based terms cannot reject the null hypothesis that these terms should be excluded in the Polity98 model. Thus, we are on safe ground assuming our non-fixed-effects specification is adequate. In terms of the control variables, the estimates of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and political independence are now statistically significant in both data sets, where previously each were significant only in the Gasiorowski and
Polity98 data, respectively. In addition, past experience with democracy is no longer significant in the Gasiorowski model.

Overall, even with the inclusion of these region-specific fixed-effect terms, these models continue to support the hypothesis that democratic regional organizations are associated with transitions to democracy and political liberalization in the 1950-1992 period. Although the estimates of some of the control variables do change in these models, the estimates of IOScore remain robust.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOScore\textsubscript{it-1}</td>
<td>0.0787** (2.00)</td>
<td>0.1040*** (2.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>2.21 x 10\textsuperscript{-5} (0.34)</td>
<td>-1.86 x 10\textsuperscript{-5} (-0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta)pcGDP\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>-0.0006 (-1.56)</td>
<td>-0.0002 (-0.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>0.2586*** (3.10)</td>
<td>0.1420* (1.79)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PastDem\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>1.6523*** (3.81)</td>
<td>0.5498 (1.61)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>-0.0441 (-0.96)</td>
<td>-0.0631 (-1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntVio\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>0.5168 (1.13)</td>
<td>-0.0606 (-0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milreg\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>-1.9591** (-2.38)</td>
<td>-1.3476*** (-2.83)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep\textsubscript{it}</td>
<td>0.0090 (1.40)</td>
<td>0.0089 (1.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuDummy</td>
<td>-5.0017*** (-3.64)</td>
<td>--.--^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADummy</td>
<td>-2.1024 (-1.50)</td>
<td>-2.0218 (-1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADummy</td>
<td>-1.7608** (-1.96)</td>
<td>-1.5234* (-1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfrDummy</td>
<td>-1.5751** (-2.42)</td>
<td>-0.6393 (-1.38)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.6: Estimates of the Determinants of the Transition to Democracy, 1950-1992, with Region-Specific Fixed Effects

(continued)
Table 3.6 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEDummy</td>
<td>-1.4797*</td>
<td>-1.3095*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.81)</td>
<td>(-1.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-5.1498***</td>
<td>-4.0260***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.47)</td>
<td>(-5.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>20.71***</td>
<td>8.17*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.086</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>2729</td>
<td>2271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-182.94</td>
<td>-242.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>774.17***</td>
<td>69.20***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

\*

--- p <= .01; ** -- p <= .05; * -- p <= .10; two-tailed tests.

\[^a\] Because Europe is not included in the Gasiorowski data set, the dummy for this region is excluded from the model.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERALIZATION</th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOScore_{it-1}</td>
<td>0.1314***</td>
<td>0.1093**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.67)</td>
<td>(2.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>5.79 x 10^{-5}</td>
<td>4.99 x 10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.38)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>\Delta pcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>-2.39 x 10^{-5}</td>
<td>-1.69 x 10^{-5}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.45)</td>
<td>(-0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion_{it}</td>
<td>0.2792***</td>
<td>0.1273*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.46)</td>
<td>(1.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PastDem_{it}</td>
<td>1.0253**</td>
<td>0.9542***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.08)</td>
<td>(2.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict_{it}</td>
<td>-0.1471***</td>
<td>-0.0741</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.29)</td>
<td>(-1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELF_i</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IntViolt_{it}</td>
<td>1.0857***</td>
<td>0.6681*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.47)</td>
<td>(1.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milreg_{it}</td>
<td>-1.1056**</td>
<td>-0.4563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.16)</td>
<td>(-1.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep_{it}</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
<td>0.0053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.36)</td>
<td>(0.91)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EuDummy</td>
<td>-7.0025***</td>
<td>--.--^a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-5.12)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NADummy</td>
<td>-3.6776***</td>
<td>-2.0402</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.52)</td>
<td>(-1.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADummy</td>
<td>-2.8342***</td>
<td>-0.8914</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.13)</td>
<td>(-1.11)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.7: Estimates of the Determinants of Liberalization and the Completion of Democracy, 1950-1992, with Region-Specific Fixed Effects (continued)

142
Table 3.7 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LIBERALIZATION</th>
<th></th>
<th>COMPLETION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AfrDummy</td>
<td>-2.1956***</td>
<td>-0.6191</td>
<td>--.--(^b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.59)</td>
<td>(-1.32)</td>
<td>(0.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDummy</td>
<td>-2.5891***</td>
<td>-1.4749*</td>
<td>-1.2135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.55)</td>
<td>(-1.91)</td>
<td>(-1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-2.9904***</td>
<td>-4.3594***</td>
<td>-4.1643***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.96)</td>
<td>(-5.27)</td>
<td>(-4.44)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Inclusion

| Chi-square    | 25.11***       | 12.70**        | 6.44       | 16.10***    |
| p > Chi-square | 0.0001         | 0.0129         | 0.169      | 0.003       |

N = 1980 1940 725 356
Log Likelihood -240.12 -232.53 -84.11 -76.85
Chi-square 107.39*** 99.24*** 67.06*** 173.45**

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** -- p <= .01; ** -- p <= .05; * -- p <= .10; two-tailed tests.

\(^a\) -> Because Europe is not included in the Gasiorowski data set, the dummy for this region is excluded from the model.

\(^b\) -> There are no instances of African states completing a transition to democracy in the data set. Therefore, its dummy variable is excluded from the model.
CHAPTER 4

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

After the euphoria of the "third wave" of democratization began to subside, both scholars and policymakers turned their attention to the next task: guaranteeing democracy's survival (Huntington 1991). In many cases, this would be a daunting task, including (re)building institutions grounded in democratic practices and (re)legitimating democracy to the major interest groups within the state. Most importantly, it meant overcoming short-term opposition to new institutions by groups which could halt the reform process, even return the state to authoritarian rule.

This chapter discusses the period of time following a transition to democracy and investigates how regional institutions can be used by domestic actors to increase the longevity of democracy. Specifically, membership in regional organizations help to create credible commitments to democracy on the part of new regimes. This commitment helps to convince key elite groups as well as the masses to abide by these new institutions. The commitment arises out of the conditionality often associated with membership in these organizations, which serves to increase the costs of anti-regime action on the part of any domestic group. After briefly reviewing the causal argument presented in Chapter 1, I conduct several statistical tests of this proposition.
4.1. Reviewing the Argument

New democracies face many challenges to their longevity in the early stages of consolidation. As new institutions are built, various elite groups (e.g., business elites, the military) may challenge these emerging institutions, undermining their power and effectiveness. Elite groups who "lose" (or perceive they will lose) under these new institutions relative to other groups in society or relative to their past status, can threaten the new regime and institutions. Two groups often singled out as threats to nascent democratic regimes are the military and business elites.

The military threat to a regime often grows because of their perceived need to protect their own interests during times of institutional change (also called contested institutions; see Dassal and Reinhardt 1998). An alternate source of military threat arises out of struggles over civilian supremacy. Numerous cases of coups or near-coups have occurred as civilian politicians attempt to take control of the military.  

The military, however, rarely acts alone. Other groups, such as business elites, often ally with the military or encourage it to move against a regime when they feel that their interests are threatened by the continuation of a democratic regime. For example, business elites may prefer the protection of their interests which were previously guarded by bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (cf. Kaufman 1986; Payne 1994). The key is to convince these groups to abide by the democratic "rules of the game", even if it is not in their short term interest or if these groups have no normative commitment to democracy.

Ironically, even those who benefit from the new regime and institutions may threaten the continuation of democracy as well. Because there is a risk that these
“winners” may attempt to consolidate their own power, rather than the democratic institutions, other groups (including the “losers” or even the mass public) may not support the new regime. Due to conditions inherent in the post-transitional environment, it is difficult for winners to credibly commit to new democratic institutions. This dynamic does not bode well for the future of democracy, since there is no perception of a commitment to democracy on the part of elites or the masses. In some situations, this lack of support can create a self-fulfilling prophesy, spurring the new regime to renege on its commitment to new democratic institutions.

My argument is that IOs can simultaneously provide incentives for “losers” abide by democratic rules, while (through the same mechanism) increase the ability of new democrats to make credible commitments. The key factor in achieving this goal is conditions created by the regional organizations themselves. These conditions stipulate that the benefits of the organizations (e.g., trade, economic policy coordination, military protections, etc.) are contingent upon the continuation of democracy in the member states. Because moving against a democratic regime would bring these costs against any actors which perpetrated this action, this provides a negative incentive for them to do so.91 These same costs would be borne by “winners” who would attempt to bias the new institutions and consolidate their own power. Thus, membership can help new democrats tie their own hands to make a credible commitment to continue reform. This credible commitment makes it more likely that other elites and the masses will encourage the

---

90 Examples include Argentina in the mid-1980s and Paraguay in the mid-to-late 1990s. On the latter case, see Chapter 6.
91 Recall the discussion in Chapter 1 that enforcement cannot be assumed and that certain types of organizations are more likely to have and enforce conditions relating to democracy.
continuation of these democratic institutions since they will be assured that, even if they "lose" today, they will have an opportunity to "win" tomorrow.

In addition, membership (and joining) certain regional organizations can provide positive incentives to continue democracy. Whether through economic or military assistance, the provision of goods through membership can help to "bribe" potential regime opponents to support new democratic institutions. In addition, membership in some regional organizations will confer legitimacy on new regimes by providing an external validation of their new institutions. This can increase the support of the common citizen for the new regime which can be essential to the consolidation process. This same process also implies that all societal groups face potential domestic audience costs for violating agreements with regional organizations, which can also provide a powerful incentive for the continuation of democracy.

4.2. Testing the Argument

If this theory is correct, democratic regional organizations should increase the chances for democratic consolidation and the survival of democracy. To test this argument, this section will build and estimate several models using the measures of democracy and IO involvement discussed in Chapter 2. The expectation is that membership in certain regional institution with a high "democratic density" will be positively associated with the endurance of democracy. Moreover, the association between joining a highly democratic organization and the consolidation of democracy is likely to be especially strong. Recall that much of the value of an international organization for nascent democracies come from their signaling value in terms of credible
commitments to domestic and international actors. Thus, it is possible that joining a highly democratic IO would have an independent effect from a continuing membership.

The majority of these models operationalize consolidation as a lack of democratic reversal or breakdown. By this, I refer to a discontinuation of existing democratic practice (elections, civil liberties) by any means perpetrated by groups inside or outside the regime. This conception of negative consolidation ignores long-term attitudinal issues while focusing on short-term, observable characteristics.

Given this operationalization, the dependent variable in the following models is the length of time a regime persists as a democracy, labeled DTIME_{it}. This measures the number of years since a transition to democracy until a democratic breakdown (both defined in Chapter 2). Thus, if a transition occurs in state i in 1973, while a breakdown occurs in 1977, DTIME_{it} would take a value of 1 in 1973, 2 in 1974, and so on until 1977 when it would be coded as 5. This counter would stop and the variable would be missing from 1978 until another democratic transition occurred.

DTIME_{it} also takes on a non-missing value if the state begins its time in the sample as a democracy. Although the issue of left-censoring is important to keep in mind, DTIME_{it} begins at 1 for all democratic states entering the sample in 1950 or upon their independence if this occurs after 1950.\textsuperscript{92} Again, the variable is incremented by 1 each year the state remains a democracy. Only a democratic breakdown stops the counter. If a breakdown does not occur for the remainder of the observation period, the counter runs until 1992. As discussed in the next section, event history or duration

\textsuperscript{92} The results of the analysis do not change significantly if the counter is started at a previous point in time. Of course, there will always be left-censoring in our measures of democratic endurance since we have little
models are excellent statistical techniques to deal with this issue of right-censoring (Box-Steppensmeier and Jones 1997).

Any movement from authoritarianism or bureaucratic-authoritarianism to democracy are coded as a democratic transition and DTIME\textsubscript{it} begins counting the year the transition is completed. If the regime moves from a democracy to either remaining regime type, this is counted as a democratic breakdown, and DTIME\textsubscript{it} reverts to missing.

The two data sets discussed in Chapter 2 are used to measure democracy and transitions. Recall that because Gasiorowski does not code Southern or Eastern Europe, the N of the Gasiorowski models in these analyses is lower than the N of the Polity98 models. It should be noted that for the Gasiorowski data, the DTIME\textsubscript{it} counter reverts to missing if a transition from democracy to autocracy occurs, but if a transition from democracy to semi-democracy occurs, the counter stops, but is immediately restarted at 1 since, according to the Gasiorowski criteria, these regimes still contain many democratic traits.\textsuperscript{93} The basic setup of my data is a panel design. The unit of analysis is the country-year. For all event history models in this chapter, I use time-varying covariates.

4.3. Modeling Regime Duration

To test whether democratic IOs are associated with consolidation, I estimate the following model:

\begin{equation}
\text{DTIME}_{it} = \alpha_0 + \beta_1 \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \Delta \text{IOScore}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \text{pcGDP}_{it} + \beta_4 \Delta \text{pcGDP}_{it} +
\end{equation}

---

\textsuperscript{93} Recall from Chapter 2 that several "partial" transitions to democracy were included in the Gasiorowski coding. Moreover, the results are nearly identical if the counter is not restarted and continues until these states suffer a complete breakdown of democracy.
\[ \beta_5 \text{Contagion}_{it} + \beta_6 \text{PBDown}_{it} + \beta_7 \text{RegConflict}_{it} + \beta_8 \text{CivilWar}_{it} + \beta_9 \text{Prez}_{it} + \]
\[ \beta_{10} \text{StableD}_{it} + \beta_{11} \text{Indep}_{it} + \mu_{it} \]

The model is estimated using event history analysis. These duration or hazard models are an appropriate methodology for testing the timing of events.\textsuperscript{94} Each model will tell us the effect of each independent variable (covariate) on the probability (hazard rate) that state \( i \) will fail at time \( t \). "Failure" here is synonymous with democratic breakdown. Recall that the model will be estimated using two different dependent variables based on the two data sets of regime transition. Before discussing the methodology of event history analysis, I review each independent variable of the model as well as other control variables.

The first independent variable, \( \text{IOScore}_{it} \), is the measure of the democratic density of the most democratic IO of which state \( i \) is a member in year \( t \). The coding of this variable is discussed in Chapter 2. The next independent variable, \( \Delta \text{IOScore}_{it-1} \), is computed to isolate the effects of joining a democratic international organization. As previously discussed, the signaling value of joining a highly democratic IO is important to domestic and international economic, as well as domestic political interests. This variable is the one-year difference of \( \text{IOScore}_{it-1} \), thus accession to IOs is measured from \( t-2 \) to \( t-1 \). If a state joins a new IO which is more democratic than any previous IO, the value of \( \Delta \text{IOScore}_{it-1} \) will be positive. Including this change variable as well as the level

\textsuperscript{94} These models have become ubiquitous in political science in the past five years. For a general overview, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997.
variable will allow a comparison of the effects of joining a democratic organization versus the overall level of "democratic-ness" in the IO.\textsuperscript{95}

The next two independent variables tap the economic context of the regime. The first variable, $\text{pcGDP}_t$, measures the per capita GDP levels of each state in year $t$. A large body of literature has developed around the modernization hypothesis which holds that higher income countries are more likely to be democratic (Lipset 1959; Bollen 1979; Jackman 1973). One of the most recent contributions to this debate holds that while it is not the level of income in a state that causes democracy, higher income can preserve a transition to democracy (Londregan and Poole 1996; Przeworski et al, 1996). I include per capita GDP to control for this possibility. I expect higher levels of per capital GDP to be associated with a decreased rate of failure for democracies.

The second economic variable, $\Delta\text{pcGDP}_t$ measures the change in per capita GDP over a one year interval, $t-1$ to $t$. This variable controls for growth rates, which are often found to affect the likelihood of anti-regime activities (Londregan and Poole 1990). Declines in economic well-being, especially over long periods of time, can bring calls for changes in the regime. I therefore expect increases in per capita GDP to be associated with a decreased hazard of democratic breakdown. Both of these economic variables are taken from Summers et al (1995) and supplemented with data from the World Bank (1998) and Mitchell (1995, 1998).

The variable Contagion$_{it}$ controls for diffusion effects from other established democracies. This phenomenon is often referred to as contagion, diffusion,

\textsuperscript{95} Change in the level of democracy could represent a change in the level of democracy of the same IO. That is, $\Delta\text{IOScore}_{it}$ may have a positive value because of democratization in other member states rather
demonstration effects, or snowballing (Starr 1991; Whitehead 1996). The idea is that the presence of democracies or democratic transitions are likely to encourage democracy in other countries. If a state has all democracies for neighbors and if the democratic countries are more pacific towards one another, then we would expect a more hospitable environment for democracy to flourish and survive.

I code Contagion[it] as a continuous variable based on the number of democracies in state i's geographic region in year t. Thus, its yearly value is the same for every country in a given region. Depending on the data set (and thus the dependent variable), however, the value of Contagion[it] may vary (because of their differing definitions of democracy). Because each event history model uses time-varying covariates, demonstration effects through transitions are captured as well. That is, if seven states transition to democracy in one year in a particular region, the value of the contagion variable will increase by 7. I expect this variable to be negatively associated with democratic breakdown, since higher numbers of extant democracies should lead to a hospitable environment for the survival of democracy.

PBDown[it] is the next independent variable and is a dummy variable which equals “1” if the state has undergone a democratic reversal since the beginning of the observation period (1950); otherwise the variable is coded as 0. It is not clear how this variable will be associated with democratic consolidation. Some comparative scholars argue that a past experience with democracy in a state should bode well for new democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996). They reason that civil society and democratic norms will not have to be built from the ground up in these states and the likelihood of
consolidation will rise. Przeworski and colleagues (1996) point out, however, that prior experience with democracy implies prior experience with breakdown as well. While a history of democratic practice may exist, the state also has a history of ending democracy. Przeworski labels this phenomenon political learning and argues that it will can decrease the probability of consolidation.

Since PBD\textsubscript{it} implies a past of democracy as well as a past of democratic breakdown, I have no a priori expectation as to the sign of this variable. As with the contagion variable, this independent variable is indexed to the specific data set used. Once a breakdown occurs, the following year is coded as 1 as are the remainder of observations in the data set for that state.

Two variables are coded to measure the effect of external and internal conflict. RegConflict\textsubscript{it} measures the presence of the threats or uses of force involving state \textit{i}'s region at time \textit{t}. Whitehead (1996), among others, has argued that involvement in military conflict is often associated with regime breakdown since the losers in these conflicts are often forced to take new governments by the victors (World War II is the prime example of this phenomenon). Recently, Thompson (1996) has also argued that for democracy to flourish, a stable military environment must exist. His contention is that war can necessitate the centralization of power in order to mobilize resources. Thus, democratic institutions and processes may take a back seat to these war-related requirements. To control for the effects of external conflict, including war, use of military force, and the threat of military force, RegConflict\textsubscript{it} measures the total number of
Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) in state $i$'s region in year $t$.\footnote{The MIDS data are discussed in Singer, Bremer, and Jones (1996). The data are available at the Peace Science Society International web cite: http://pss.la.psu.edu/MID_DATA.HTM.} If Thompson is correct, disputes should be negatively related to the survival of democracy.

In addition to external violence, internal violence may harm the prospects for democratic endurance. To control for the effects of internal violence, I include the variable CivWar$_{it}$ in the model.\footnote{In Chapter 3, I used a measure of internal violence (IntVio$_{it}$) to control for similar factors. I utilize the civil war variable here for statistical reasons. In several of the event history models, the introduction of the IntVio terms causes problems in the model estimation. Specifically, no standard error is estimated for the variable since in every instance of democratic breakdown, IntVio equals "1". Most of the resulting parameter estimates are similar to models which include CivWar, especially the signs and significance of the IO-related independent variables.} This variable, taken from Small and Singer (1994), is coded “1” if state $i$ suffers from a civil war in year $t$. I expect this variable to be negatively related to the consolidation of democracy, since the presence of mass violence is often a sign of dissatisfaction with the regime. Consolidation will be especially difficult for new regimes who face massive domestic violence, as military and economic elites will have little tolerance for widespread anti-regime activity. Of course, if it is the military or economic elites fomenting this violence, this will be an equally difficult challenge to democratic consolidation.

The next independent variable in this model is Prez$_{it}$. Beginning with the work of Juan Linz (1990), a common argument in comparative politics is that parliamentary democracies tend to be more stable than those with presidential systems. The contention is that presidential systems tend to produce all-or-nothing outcomes which can cause instability among elites in young democracies (Linz 1990). In addition, proponents of this theory contend that immobilism is more likely under young presidential systems
since presidents will square off against legislatures, even if both are controlled by the same party (Przeworski et al 1996).

To control for this possibility, I have coded a dummy variable, $\text{Prez}_{it}$, which equals “1” if a state has a presidential or mixed democracy, and “0” otherwise. Data is taken from Alvarez et al (1996) and updated from the CIA Factbook (1999), Gasiorowski (1993), and Gurr (1990) to include new democracies formed after 1990 (the end of Alvarez et al's coding period). If the preceding theory is correct, presidential systems should be more likely to fail than parliamentary systems, ceteris paribus.

Recall that both democracies which existed at the beginning of the observation period (1950) and recently democratized states are included in the sample for this model. There is reason to believe, however, that those states which begin as "stable democracies" (e.g., the United States, Canada, Denmark, etc.), are less influenced by membership in or the joining of democratic regional organizations. In states which have been democracies for many years, there is little likelihood that membership in a democratic IO will influence the duration of that polity. My theory argues that the major influence of IOs will come in nascent democracies attempting to consolidate their domestic institutions. Thus, to control for the factors which may differentiate established and stable democracies from the newly democratic polities, I code a dummy variable, $\text{StableD}_{it}$, which equals “1” if the state began its tenure in the analysis as a democracy, and “0” otherwise.  

---

98 This also includes a handful of newly independent states which began as democracies. Although these states may be different from the "stable" democracies which this variable is designed to control for, the next independent variable should adequately account for these states.
It is also important to control for how long each country has existed as an independent nation-state. Very young states may have little opportunity to develop stable institutions of any kind, especially since their first government is usually heavily influenced by their colonizer. To control for these influences, I code a continuous variable, \( \text{Indep}_t \), which counts the number of years since state \( i \)'s political independence. Dates of independence are taken from Small and Singer (1994). Finally, \( \mu_t \) is a stochastic error term.

4.4. Event History Analysis

Because the dependent variable measures the duration of an event (how long a state remains a democracy), event history or duration analysis provides an excellent means for estimating this model. Event history models are used to estimate the probability that an event ends between time \( t \) and time \( t + \Delta \), where \( \Delta \) is any positive length of time (in this case, a year). This technique examines the dependent variable and estimates a baseline hazard rate, or the rate at which the "modal" event will end. These models then estimate the influence of a set of independent variables on that baseline hazard function. Some variables may increase the rate at which an event ends, while others may be associated with lengthening the survival time for the units under observation. One decision to be made in using this technique is whether to specify the functional form of the hazard rate in advance. Cox proportional hazard models allows the estimation of a model without specifying the functional form of this hazard rate \textit{a priori}. Given the flexibility of the Cox model, I first estimate Model 4.1 using this technique.
It is important to note that the interpretation of these Cox models is slightly different than traditional regression models. The most important difference is in the interpretation of the effects of individual coefficients on the dependent variable. A negatively signed coefficient estimate means that the hazard rate of experiencing an event (here democratic breakdown) is proportionally lower. In essence, this means that a regime lasts longer. Conversely, a positive coefficient signifies an increase in the hazard rate and a shorter duration for the polity.

While the Cox model certainly allows flexibility in specification of the underlying hazard rate of the dependent variable, choosing an underlying distribution (also called parameterization) of the hazard rate can have advantages. Because the Cox estimation does not use full maximum likelihood, its precision in estimating in small samples is suspect (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Also, the presence of "ties" in the data can cause problems for the Cox method (Yamaguchi 1991), especially if they exceed five percent of the data. In this data set, ties far exceed this five percent margin—for the Polity98 data, 25 percent of the data exits at the five year mark along, while in the Gasiorowski data, nearly 15 percent exit at the three, four, and five year mark. For these reasons, I have also estimated Model 4.1 using a Weibull distribution as the functional form. I chose this distribution based on an examination of the Kaplan-Meier survival functions (Figures 3.1-3.2), in which underlying distribution appears close to a Weibull distribution.99

The Weibull model also allows one to estimate duration dependence in the data. One can often draw substantive conclusions from the existence of duration dependence
(Bennett 1999). In our model, the presence of positive duration dependence would imply that for every year a new democracy lasts, regardless of the value of any independent variable, it is more likely to survive the next year. This idea that simply the passage of time can increase the probability that a democracy remains democratic can be easily tested in the Weibull model. 100 If the estimate of duration dependence is less than 1 and statistically significant, then we can conclude that there is, in fact, duration dependence in democracy. 101 Likewise, an estimate greater than one indicates an increasing hazard rate over time. If, however, the inclusion of several explanatory variables makes the duration dependence parameter ($\alpha$) statistically insignificant, then one can conclude that one has accounted for what makes democracy endure rather than time itself. 102

4.4.1. Cox Estimates

Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.1 present the estimates of Model 4.1, based on the Polity98 and Gasiorowski data, respectively. The first variable of interest, $IOScore_{t-1}$, is negative and statistically significant in both models. Thus, membership in an IO with higher levels of democracy is associated with longer-lasting democratic regimes. Table

99 For an example of a Weibull distribution as computed for a survival function, see Blossfeld, Hamerle, and Meyer (1989).
100 It should be noted that Przeworski et al (1996) reject the entire notion of "consolidation" based on the apparent lack of duration dependence in their model of democratic endurance. It is difficult to evaluate their claims, however, given that they never adequately specify what type of model they draw these conclusions from. It appears they are utilizing a Weibull model, but this is never stated. Moreover, it is not clear what control variables are included in their model.
101 I utilize a relative hazard parameterization for the Weibull estimation (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997: 1441-1442), and the estimated parameter of duration dependence is labeled $\alpha$. If $\alpha=1$, then the baseline hazard rate is constant over time. If $\alpha>1$, the hazard rate exhibits positive duration dependence (the hazard rate grows over time), while if $\alpha<1$, the hazard rate exhibits negative duration dependence (the hazard rate falls over time).
102 Beck (1998) notes that the presence of duration dependence can, in fact, be a nuisance parameter. That is, it could simply imply that the model is under-specified. Thus, one would ideally attempt to include better independent variables to explain the duration of the event.
4.5 shows the percent change in the probability of a democratic breakdown given variations in the values of the independent variables. Thus, given two democracies, each of which belonged to a different set of international organizations, the state which belonged to a more homogenously democratic organization would face 35 percent less of a chance of breakdown than one whose IO membership was less homogenously democratic.\(^{103}\)

The effect of joining a highly democratic IO can be assessed by turning to the second independent variable, $\Delta$IO$\text{Score}_{it-1}$. In both models, the estimate of this coefficient is negative and statistically significant. This indicates that a state which joins a regional organization with a more homogenous democratic membership than any previous organization of which state $i$ is a member, experiences a decreased risk of democratic breakdown. As previously mentioned, this increase in $\text{IO}\text{Score}_{it-1}$ could come from democratization in other members of the organization, but given that the level of democracy within the region of state $i$ is controlled for, this variable should reflect increases resulting from accession to democratic regional organizations. Table 4.5 presents the percent change in the baseline rate if the value of this independent variable is increased one standard deviation above the average. This increase results in a 45 percent drop in the hazard rate for a democracy for the Polity98 data.\(^{104}\) For the Gasiorowski coding, the same change in membership decreases the hazard rate by over 38 percent.

\(^{103}\) All predicted probabilities are based on the Cox estimates. This 25 percent drop is computed using the Polity98 estimates. For the Gasiorowski data, the corresponding reduction is 42 percent. These are based on comparing the value of IO$\text{Score}$ at the mean and IO$\text{Score}$ one standard deviation above the mean for the sample analyzed. This is a change from 11.95 to 18.19. Recall that for IO$\text{Score}$, the traditional democracy scale of -10 to +10 was transformed into a 0 to 20 scale.

\(^{104}\) This is a change in the variable of 1.37. The mean of this variable is 0.19.
The estimates of the economic-related independent variables, pcGDPₖ and ΔpcGDPₖ, are both statistically significant and in the expected direction in three of four cases. Consistent with the political development literature previously discussed, higher levels of per capita GDP are related with longer-lasting democracies. This result is yet another piece of evidence in support of Londregan and Poole (1996) as well as Przeworski’s (1996) argument that higher income levels stabilize existing democracies, rather than create new democracies. The other economic-related independent variable, ΔpcGDPₖ, is consistently negative across the two measures, but varies in statistical significance. For the Polity98 coding, this variable is significant at the p < .05 level. For the Gasiorowski dependent variable, the estimate is negative, but never statistically significant. These results accord with prior literature on growth and the survival of democracy. Regimes which can increase growth face a higher chance of survival, while those who suffer economic downturn are vulnerable to democratic breakdown.

Again, Table 4.5 shows the percentage changes in the baseline hazard rate given variation in per capita GDP. An increase of one standard deviation from the mean for a democracy results in an almost 88 percent decrease in the hazard rate.¹⁰⁵ Likewise, a decline in per capita income from the median to the 25th percentile results in an 80 percent increase in the hazard rate faced by democracies.¹⁰⁶

The Contagionₖ variable is of the expected sign across both models and is statistically significant in both cases. Thus, a higher number of democracies in the region of state i seems to bode well for the survival of those democracies. As shown in Table 4.5, the addition of one democracy in the region results in a nearly 11 percent decline in
the risk of democratic breakdown using the Polity98 data. Likewise for the Gasiorowski data, the same increase results in a nearly 21 percent decline in the risk of democratic failure.

Turning to the measures of conflict, neither external nor internal conflict bodes well for the future survival of democracy. The estimates of the coefficients for RegConflict, are positive in both models, but never statistically significant. These results provide little support for the theory of Thompson (1996), who argues that democracies need a peaceful environment to survive. The estimates of CivWar, show similar effects, although only in the Polity98 data is this estimate statistically significant. Thus, the presence of internal violence increases the probability of a democratic breakdown, although its impact is more pronounced using the Polity98 measure (see Table 4.5). This is a largely intuitive result, indicating that the presence of mass violence in a state creates a dangerous atmosphere for young democracies.

Surprisingly, the length of time a country has been independent does not augur well for their survival as a democracy. For both data sets, the estimate of Indep, is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the longer a state has been politically independent, the more likely that state is to suffer the breakdown of democracy. This result is contrary to the theoretical expectation that “older” states will have developed more stable and active civil societies which could assist in the consolidation effort. It is possible that Latin American states drive this particular result since these are states which have been politically independent for many years, yet still consistently suffer breakdowns of democracy.

\[105\] This is an increase from 3931 US Dollars (1985) to 8250 US Dollars (1985).
The parameter estimates of several control variables are not consistent across the two measures of the dependent variable, which is not surprising given the low correlation among these two measures. For these estimates, PBDOWN_{it}, Prez_{it}, and StableD_{it} vary in sign across each dependent variable. None of these estimates are statistically significant, however, which makes these inconsistent results less bothersome. The presence of a past breakdown of democracy can be a harbinger for future difficulties, according to the estimate of PBDOWN_{it} using the Gasiorowski data. This parameter estimate changes sign utilizing the Polity98 data. The variable is never statistical significant, however. The Prez_{it} variable also yields inconsistent results. The Gasiorowski data supports the argument of Linz (1990), the positive coefficient estimate of this variable indicates that presidential democracies face a higher risk of failure than parliamentary systems. The Polity98 model indicates the opposite association, presidential systems are more likely to survive. Finally, the dummy variable distinguishing existing democracies versus democratizers (StableD_{it}) changes sign between models and is not close to statistical significance.

4.4.2. Weibull Estimation

The third and fourth column of Table 4.1 presents the Weibull estimates of the Model 4.1. As is evident by comparing the first two columns of the table, the change in functional form does have an impact on several of the parameter estimates. For the Polity98 data, both the independent variables of interest are no longer statistically significant, yet both have the right sign. It is interesting to note that the duration

---

100 This is a decrease from 2164 US Dollars (1985) to 988 US Dollars (1985).
dependence parameter (also called the shape parameter) is not statistically significant, indicating the lack of duration dependence.\textsuperscript{107} It is possible that there is a further misspecification of the model and the next section will attempt to deal with this issue.

For the Gasiorowski data, the Weibull model is comparable to the Cox estimates. Note that both independent variables of interest are of the predicted sign and are statistically significant. Thus, given the Gasiorowski data, both membership in a democratic IO and accession to a democratic IO are associated with a lower rate of failure for democracy. The shape parameter is significant in the model as well, indicating duration dependence in the data. Because the estimate of $\alpha$ is larger than one, we can infer that the hazard rate grows over time. This is tells us that although many democracies do fail early in their tenure, there continues to be a growing risk of failure over time.\textsuperscript{108} The fact that the estimate is significant indicates that even while controlling for the factors in Model 4.1, time alone appears to be a force against the consolidation of democracy, which is at odds with the finding of Przeworski, et al (1997). Of course, since the estimate of the shape parameter using the Polity98 data is not significant, this suggests that duration dependence may be a factor only for the developing world. That is, since the Gasiorowski data excludes Europe and North America, it is possible that the model has failed to specify an important determinant of regime duration which would effect the developing world and not these more developed regions. The next two sections will attempt to shed further light on this finding.

\textsuperscript{107} Note that the estimate of $\alpha$ is close to 1 for the Polity98 data. This indicates that an exponential distribution may fit the data better than a Weibull. Estimating an identical model using the exponential distribution yields nearly identical parameter estimates. This is not the case for the Gasiorowski data, where the shape parameter is statistically significant. We will return to this issue in the next two sections.
At this point, the theory has received substantial but not overwhelming support. Three out of the four models in Table 4.1 support the idea that both membership as well as accession to a relatively democratic IO bodes well for the survival of democracy. Because of some anomalies in the results, it is important to check the robustness of these findings. The next two sections will check for heterogeneity in the data and for specification error in the model itself.

4.4.3. Heterogeneity Robustness Checks

A concern with all event history models is heterogeneity (Vaupel and Yashin 1985; Box-Steppensmeier and Zorn 1999). That is, one must be concerned with the prospect that pooling individuals into one underlying hazard rate will obscure important patterns (or create false ones) in the data. While one can endlessly search for the presence of such heterogeneity, the best scenario is when theory can give us a guide to potential sources of this problem. Luckily, in this case, there is reason (both theoretically and empirically) to expect that states which are new democracies face very different pressures on their survival than states which have been democracies for some time.

Of course, this begs the question, how long is "some time"? Rather than designate an arbitrary length of time before declaring a state a "stable democracy", I try to devise a way to single out newly democratic states which is free from any judgment about how long a state must be a democracy before they are stable (since technically, no state is ever beyond the possibility of democratic breakdown). I use a variable which has already been defined, StableDit, to designate democratizers from what we will call

---

108 The good news, however, is that an analysis of the baseline hazard rate reveals that the increase in the
"existing democracies". Recall that this variable takes on a value of "1" throughout the sample for any state which begins their tenure in the sample as a democracy. The idea is that most states which were democracies before the beginning of the sample had been democracies for a long period of time. Examples include the U.S., Great Britain, Canada, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium. It should be noted that several states coded as "existing" democracies do eventually fail. Still, using this method of separating out newly democratized states from states which have more experience with democracy allows a consistent decision-rule as to who is a new democracy and who is not.

My hypothesis is that international organizations will be more likely to help new democracies endure relative to existing democracies. That is, democratic IOs are needed to perform their hypothesized functions in new democracies, whereas there is little demand for these functions in most existing democracies. Although in most of the cases in Table 4.1, the independent variables related to regional organizations were statistically significant, these results will provide a robustness check as well as ensure that our results are not undermined by any hidden heterogeneity. In addition, there is a good possibility that other variables may have different effects depending on whether the state in question is a new democracy or a state which has been a democracy for some time. For example, a new democracy may be more vulnerable to the effects of a regional conflict than an

---

109 This essentially codes a "1" for any state which is a left-censored democracy. It should be noted that the results of Table 4.2 do not change if I do not treat democracy as left-censored at 1950. I thank to Dan Reiter for bringing this to my attention.  
110 There are a small handful of exceptions. One other important note is that newly independent states which begin their "lives" as democracies (after 1950) are also coded as "1" in this data. This is done not only to keep a consistent coding criteria, but since many newly independent former colonies kept the democratic institutions installed by their colonizers (especially in the Caribbean and Latin America). There are, of course exceptions to this rule (especially in Africa).
older democracy. Likewise, the hypothesized negative impact of a presidential system may be much more acute in a new democracy.

The usual strategy for testing for such conditioning effects is interaction terms. Rather than interact StableD_{it} with each independent variable, I have chosen to split the samples based on this variable and estimate the identical model on each subset of data.\textsuperscript{112} Splitting the sample, however, can bring at least three disadvantages. First, the coefficients across the models are not directly comparable in terms of their relative size. Second, there are obvious efficiency losses in the estimation process given the smaller sample size for each model. Third, with split samples, one cannot get a statistical estimate of the variance between models. That is, with interaction terms, one includes the original terms, the interaction terms, and the StableD_{it} term itself. The coefficient of this final term is the estimate of the shift in the intercept when StableD_{it} equals one (i.e., when state $i$ is an existing democracy).\textsuperscript{113} In the split sample approach, we do not get this estimate of the overall shift of the intercept.\textsuperscript{114}

Despite these issues, I felt it would be prudent to adopt the split sample approach for several reasons. First, although the relative size of the coefficient estimates from each model are not directly comparable, their sign and significance are. Moreover, simple exercises in comparative statistics can help evaluate their relative impact on the probability

\textsuperscript{111} Note that in the remainder of these models, I leave in variables such as PBDown_{it} and Indep_{it} to control for experience as well.

\textsuperscript{112} I interact StableD_{it} with both IOScore_{it,1} and ΔIOScore_{it,1} and the results and discussion of those models are presented and discussed in Appendix 4.1. It should be noted that (not surprisingly) these results are quite consistent with the split sample models.

\textsuperscript{113} On the interpretation of interaction terms see Friedrich 1983.

\textsuperscript{114} I should note that one clue which led to the test of this heterogeneity hypothesis occurred when testing for the appropriateness of the proportional hazard assumption in the Cox models. A graphical plot of the hazard rates for each sub-sample in the Polity98 data shows that their survival curves are not proportional.
of democratic breakdown. Second, although we do lose efficiency from cutting our sample size, putting a plethora of interaction terms in the model can have similar effects (i.e., loosing many degrees of freedom). Finally, in this case, many of the interaction terms and their "linear" (un-interacted) terms are highly collinear, leading to questions about the validity of the standard errors (Kennedy 1992).  

Table 4.2 presents the split sample Weibull estimates of Model 4.1. The "democratizers" sample is defined as cases where StableD<sub>it</sub> equals "0". Likewise, "existing" democracies are defined as cases where StableD<sub>it</sub> equals "1". The first two columns of Table 4.2 are the Polity98 and Gasiorowski estimates for democratizers. Note the much smaller sample size for both of these models. Despite this loss of cases, both IO-related variables are statistically significant using the Polity98 data, while the change in IO membership is significant for the Gasiorowski data. This result is significant support for the theory that membership and accession to IOs can help consolidate democracy in recently democratized states.

The third and fourth columns provide the estimates for the remainder of the sample. Interestingly, for the Gasiorowski, both IO-related variables are negative and statistically significant—a result that will be discussed below. As hypothesized, for the Polity98 data, the effect of IOs on existing democracies is much less pronounced than for new democracies. The estimates of both IOScore<sub>it-1</sub> and ΔIOScore<sub>it-1</sub> are negative but not

---

- in fact, they crossed twice. This served as my initial evidence that there were fundamentally different processes at work in each sub-sample.

115 For example, ΔIOScore<sub>it-1</sub> and ΔIOScore<sub>it-1</sub> * StableD<sub>it</sub> correlate at r=.9 in the Polity98 sample and at r=.81 in the Gasiorowski sample. Likewise both economic terms and their interactions with StableD<sub>it</sub> correlate at or above r=.9.
statistically significant. Thus, new democracies seem to benefit the most from the effects of international organizations on democracy.

Two of the control variables change sign across the sub-samples in the Polity98 data (three including the constant), while three change sign using the Gasiorowski data. This, in addition to the fact that several variables do change in statistical significance across each sample, provides support for the decision to create two separate samples. A stronger justification for this decision, however, is provided by the estimate of the shape parameter, \( \alpha \). Note that using the Polity98 data, there is a large difference in the duration dependence of the baseline hazard rate for each sub-sample. Both begin relatively high\(^{116}\) and both decline over time, yet the failure rate for democratizers falls much more slowly (\( \alpha = .7476 \)) than the rate for "established" democracies (\( \alpha = .0389 \)).\(^{117}\) Again, given the large difference in the shape of the baseline hazard rates of these two samples, we can conclude that it is best to model these groups independently.

A brief note on two issues related to the Gasiorowski model. First, note that the sign of \( \text{IO Score}_{it-1} \) in column 2 is incorrect. This estimate shows that membership in a highly democratic IO may actually be associated with an increased probability of democratic breakdown! Of course, the absolute value of this estimate is very small and it is nowhere close to statistical significance, so this result should prompt little concern. Another interesting finding is that the estimates of the shape parameters of the sub-samples of the Gasiorowski data are not nearly as divergent as in the Polity98 data (the difference is almost one-half compared to the Polity98 data). The source of this issue as

\(^{116}\) Although note the difference in intercept. The baseline probability of failure is \textit{much} lower for existing democracies than new democracies. Recall that negative coefficients represent lower hazard rates.
well as the positive sign of $\text{IOScore}_{it}$ comes from splitting the Gasiorowski sample in the same manner as the Polity98 data. Recall that Gasiorowski does not include European or most North American states in his data set. Thus, the vast majority of those states coded as "existing" democracies in the Gasiorowski data are not coded as such in the Polity98 data. For Polity98, "existing" democracies include the U.S., Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and many other European states. For Gasiorowski, "existing" democracies include Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Turkey, Malaysia, and Papua New Guinea. Clearly, these are a very different set of states.

Thus, splitting the Gasiorowski sample may not be such a wise move.$^{118}$ To this end, I will continue to split both data sets and Appendix 4.2 will contain estimates of each of the remaining models on the entire Gasiorowski sample. I will continue to show the split sample models, however, to maintain symmetry between the two data sets. It is important to note that the results actually strengthen when the Gasiorowski data is not split, as one can see by turning to Appendix 4.2.

4.4.4. Additional Variables and Tests

The estimates of the preceding models indicated the presence of some heterogeneity in at least the Polity98 data. Thus, the remainder of the statistical tests will only be conducted on the sample of new democracies as discussed above. This section will include several additional checks for the robustness of these results.

---

$^{117}$ The closer $\alpha$ is to 1, the "flatter" the hazard rate is. When $\alpha = 1$, the hazard rate is constant and an exponential distribution is appropriate.

$^{118}$ Note that the N of each of the "existing" democracy models differs across data sets by over 700 cases. The correlation between the StableD$_{it}$ variables for each data set is $r = .45$ (n=3421).
First, I have chosen to use the lagged value of the change in IOScore over a one year period. Although these results have proved instructive, there is no theoretical reason why change over this length of time should be considered. That is, the effects of joining an international organization could function over a longer period of time. To this end, I create a new variable, Δ3IOScore_{it}, which measures the change in the level of democracy in the most democratic IO of which state i is a member over a three year period, from t-3 to t.\textsuperscript{119} Substituting this variable for ΔIOScore_{it-1} will allow more confidence that the previous results were not simply an artifact of the one year differencing used to create the variable. All other variables in the model remain the same.

The estimates of this model are presented in Table 4.3, columns 1 and 2. For both the Polity98 and Gasiorowski democratizers samples, the variable is negative and statistically significant. The remaining variables are all identical in sign and significance for the Polity98 data and most are almost identical in absolute value (compared to column 1 in Table 4.2). For Gasiorowski, one control variable dips in statistical significance, but all other variables are identical in sign and significance. Again, the absolute values of the estimates are close across models (compare to column 2 in Table 4.2). Thus, we can be confident that the time frame of differencing does little to influence the results.\textsuperscript{120}

Second, the variable ΔIOScore_{it-1} is intended to isolate the effects of joining a highly democratic international organization. As previously discussed, this variable may contain some "noise" in terms of other countries in a state's IO become more democratic. That is, this variable will take on very small, non-zero values if changes in an IOs

\textsuperscript{119} Where it was not possible to compute this due to missing data, two- and one-year intervals were used. This almost always occurred at the beginning of a panel (i.e., 1951 and 1952).
\textsuperscript{120} Four and five year changes yield similar results in terms of the two main independent variables.
membership occur which are not related to the state in question.\textsuperscript{121} Although I have controlled for regional trends in democratization, leaving us more confident that $\Delta \text{IOScore}_{it-1}$ adequately measures these accessions to regional organizations, a cleaner measure could be developed. To this end, I code a new variable labeled JoinIO$_{it-1}$, which equals “1” if a state becomes a member of a democratic IO, equals “-1” if a state exits from a democratic IO, and “0” otherwise.\textsuperscript{122} I substitute this variable for $\Delta \text{IOScore}_{it-1}$ in Model 4.1.

Columns 3 and 4 of Table 4.3 show the estimates of this model. As one can see, in both data sets, the variable is negative and highly significant. Thus, joining a democratic international organization is clearly associated with democratic endurance. The remainder of the coefficients in the models remain nearly identical to those of the original estimation. The only minor change occurs in the Gasiorowski data, where PBDOWN$_{it}$ changes sign, but in both cases is not close to statistically significant. This result provides strong support for the idea that the process of joining a democratic international institution can help democracy endure.

Next, those who have used large-N statistical models to test theories of democratization and consolidation have often argued for the inclusion of region-based variables (cf. Feng and Zak 1999). The argument is that some regions are more or less vulnerable to democracy and/or democratic breakdown for reasons such as culture, history, or even religion. I have attempted to control for these factors by including the

\textsuperscript{121} Despite this, the variable will only take on larger values when state $i$ leaves or joins highly democratic international organizations.

\textsuperscript{122} Recall that "Democratic IOs" are defined as any IO where the average aggregate level of democracy in the IO (not including state $i$) is greater than or equal to 17. Recall that 11 has been added to the traditional Polity98 regime type scores to convert them from a -10 to +10 to a 1 to 21 scale.
variable for regional democracy contagion effects (Contagion_{it}). Still, it is possible that other factors which are associated with various geographic regions are not captured by the contagion variable. To this end, I add a series of dummy variables representing 6 of the 7 major regions of the world (one is excluded as the reference category).\textsuperscript{123} Although crude, these dummy variables should pick up any residual effect that region-based influences have on democratic consolidation.

Table 4.5 contains the estimates of all of the previous split-sample models, with region-based dummies (fixed effects) added. Note that for a variety of reasons, not all region-based dummies are included in every model estimation. The results stay fairly stable even with the addition of the region-based fixed effects. For the Polity98 data, IOScore_{it-1} is no longer statistically significant, indicating that membership in a democratic IO has little effect on the duration of democracy once all regional effects are accounted. All the three variables measuring the effects of joining a democratic IO, however, remain highly statistically significant.

For the Gasiorowski data, a similar pattern holds. Estimates of IOScore_{it-1} are not statistically significant (and very close to zero), while the estimates of the three variables tapping the joining of IOs are negative and highly significant. At the bottom of Table 4.5, I include the chi-square statistic testing for the inclusion of the region-based fixed effects. A significant test statistic can be interpreted as evidence that the dummies should be included in the model, while an insignificant test means that the variables add little information to the model. Note that in five of the six cases, we can reject the null hypothesis that the variables should remain in the model. The implication is that the

\textsuperscript{123} Recall from Chapter 3 that the Asia variable includes Asia proper as well as the Asia-Pacific region.
dummy variables are picking up very little that is not already being captured in the existing model. Regardless, even with the inclusion of the region-based dummy variables, our test for the importance of IOs received support.

Finally, I run the model including "unweighted" variables for involvement in international organizations. Some empirical investigations have measured involvement in IOs by simply counting the number of which a state is a member (Russett, Oneal and Davis 1998). I thus code two variables, labeled NIO_{it-1} and ΔNIO_{it-1}. The first is the number of IOs state \( i \) belongs to in year \( t-1 \). Likewise, ΔNIO_{it-1} measures the change in the number of IOs of which state \( i \) is a member, from \( t-2 \) to \( t-1 \). I include these variable to see if the democratic density argument is robust. That is, if it is only the level of involvement in regional organizations which secures democracy, regardless of the IO's constituent membership, the preceding theory is probably mis-specified.

In only one case is either of these new variables significant. In the split-sample Gasiorowski data, ΔNIO_{it-1} is negative and statistically significant. In all other cases, neither NIO_{it-1} nor ΔNIO_{it-1} has any bearing on how long a state remains a democracy. This provides empirical support for the idea that it is democratic regional organizations, rather than IOs writ large, that are important factors in the consolidation of democracy. All institutions are not alike when it comes to protecting democracy. Membership in some regional organizations is less important than which regional organizations a state belongs. Empirically, those IOs which are made up of other democracies are likely to be the most effective at assisting consolidation in these new democracies.
4.4.5. *Selection Effects?*

One concern with the preceding theory and findings is that there could be a selection process at work. That is, only states which members of regional organizations think are likely to be consolidated are admitted to the organizations. Thus, the process could be endogenous—only democracies which will be successful are admitted, thus the organization’s influence on the process is epiphenomenal. There are several responses to this argument.

First, this argument supposes that organizations will have some clairvoyance concerning the probability of any given state to consolidate their democracy. If this was the case, we should see almost no cases where members of democratic regional organization suffer a breakdown or near breakdowns of democracy. In fact, there are numerous cases of this including Greece, Turkey, and Paraguay. Because the breakdown of democracy can occur at any time, no state is completely secure and it would be extremely difficult to judge the likelihood of this breakdown *ex ante*.

Second, in statistical terms, the effects of IOs in this model have been lagged. Thus, the probability that a state suffers a breakdown of democracy is influenced by its IO membership (and changes in its IO membership) from the previous year. Thus, if a state’s hazard rate drops dramatically between its second and third year (due to changes in other independent variables or the baseline hazard rate) and the state is then admitted to an IO, this change in IOScore will be reflected the following year. Again, this assumes that an observer can judge this decline in the hazard rate of this country and assess their new probability for a democratic breakdown.
Finally, the most powerful evidence against this type of endogeneity comes from an auxiliary regression. Using Model 4.1 as a starting point, I move the dependent variable (survival time) to the right-hand side of the model. I create a new dependent variable, JoinIO, which is coded “1” if a state joins a democratic IO (as defined in fn. 35). The results of this model and several other variants (with additional control variables such as GDP_{it}, NIO_{it}, and the Polity98 democracy score in year \( t \)), indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between the age of a democracy and the probability of joining an international organization. Moreover, the sign of this variable is negative, indicating older democracies are less likely to join democratic international organizations. Given these arguments, precautions, and statistical tests, the issue of a selection bias in the process of joining IOs is not a concern for these findings.

4.5. Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to outline a theory linking international organizations with the successful consolidation of democracy. While the policymaking community has clearly established such a link in their policy rhetoric (cf. Bergsten and Schott 1997), little theoretical or empirical work establishes this important link. Before IOs undertake a wholesale strategy to integrate new democracies, it is important to understand the causal mechanisms by which these organizations might consolidate nascent democracies. This chapter has provided the first empirical evaluation of the association between IOs and democratic consolidation.

These tests were generally supportive of the theory. Of course, the statistical tests did not discriminate between the various possible mechanisms (e.g., bribing versus
binding), but this task will be left to the case studies in Chapter 6 which will examine the 
veracity of the various causal mechanisms on three cases.

In conclusion, IOs are no guarantee of success for new democracies. This chapter 
has shown how joining an IO with many democratic members can assist in lengthening 
the longevity of democratic regimes. Although there are clearly many factors which are 
important for both the consolidation of democracy, this chapter has shown that the 
external dimension of international and regional politics should not be given short shrift. 
While domestic factors may still hold a privileged position in theories of democracy, 
international and regional factors can, at times, be equally important.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Cox Models</th>
<th></th>
<th>Weibull Models</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOScore_{it-1}</td>
<td>-0.0706*</td>
<td>-0.0865**</td>
<td>-0.0544</td>
<td>-0.0853**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.69)</td>
<td>(-2.29)</td>
<td>(-1.11)</td>
<td>(-2.13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIOScore_{it-1}</td>
<td>-0.4415**</td>
<td>-0.3618***</td>
<td>-0.3483</td>
<td>-0.3089**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.11)</td>
<td>(-2.88)</td>
<td>(-1.48)</td>
<td>(-2.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0005***</td>
<td>-0.0004**</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.87)</td>
<td>(-2.55)</td>
<td>(-2.88)</td>
<td>(-2.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0056**</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
<td>-0.0027***</td>
<td>-0.0012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.92)</td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td>(-4.46)</td>
<td>(-0.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion_{it}</td>
<td>-0.1177**</td>
<td>-0.2265**</td>
<td>-0.0739</td>
<td>-0.2198**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.07)</td>
<td>(-2.36)</td>
<td>(-1.15)</td>
<td>(-2.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN_{it}</td>
<td>-0.1770</td>
<td>0.2140</td>
<td>0.1754</td>
<td>0.5041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.69)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict_{it}</td>
<td>0.0244</td>
<td>0.0185</td>
<td>-0.0107</td>
<td>-0.0155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(-0.16)</td>
<td>(-0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar_{it}</td>
<td>0.7767*</td>
<td>0.1008</td>
<td>0.5765</td>
<td>0.2377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
<td>(0.30)</td>
<td>(1.44)</td>
<td>(0.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez_{it}</td>
<td>-0.5926</td>
<td>0.6266</td>
<td>-0.5292</td>
<td>0.6064</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.05)</td>
<td>(1.52)</td>
<td>(-0.88)</td>
<td>(1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StableD_{it}</td>
<td>-0.0580</td>
<td>0.1283</td>
<td>-0.4173</td>
<td>0.2746</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.11)</td>
<td>(0.35)</td>
<td>(-0.79)</td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep_{it}</td>
<td>0.0110**</td>
<td>0.0095**</td>
<td>0.0083</td>
<td>0.0087*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.04)</td>
<td>(2.56)</td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant^a</td>
<td>---.--</td>
<td>---.--</td>
<td>-1.3523</td>
<td>-2.0168**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.17)</td>
<td>(-2.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α^b</td>
<td>---.--</td>
<td>---.--</td>
<td>1.0951</td>
<td>1.3729**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.60)</td>
<td>(2.53)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.1:** Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992 (continued) 177
Table 4.1 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cox Models</th>
<th></th>
<th>Weibull Models</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-75.687</td>
<td>-169.05</td>
<td>-49.782</td>
<td>-72.467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>37.79***</td>
<td>56.60***</td>
<td>36.49***</td>
<td>49.27***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10; two-tailed tests.

^Note that Cox Models do not include a constant. It is absorbed into the baseline hazard.
^Duration Dependence or Shape parameter. The test for significance occurs on ln α.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratizers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Existing Democracies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOScore_t-1</td>
<td>-0.1772*</td>
<td>0.0873</td>
<td>-0.0125</td>
<td>-0.1416***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.91)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
<td>(-0.19)</td>
<td>(-3.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIOScore_t-1</td>
<td>-0.5120*</td>
<td>-0.5204**</td>
<td>-0.3032</td>
<td>-0.3305*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.71)</td>
<td>(-1.97)</td>
<td>(-0.75)</td>
<td>(-1.69)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP_t</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0009***</td>
<td>-0.0008**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.20)</td>
<td>(-3.17)</td>
<td>(-2.57)</td>
<td>(-2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP_t</td>
<td>-0.0062***</td>
<td>-0.0000</td>
<td>-0.0034***</td>
<td>-0.0024***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.88)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(-3.34)</td>
<td>(-2.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion_t</td>
<td>-0.0734</td>
<td>-0.4466</td>
<td>0.0380</td>
<td>-0.1561</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.65)</td>
<td>(-1.38)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(-1.35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN_t</td>
<td>-2.1628**</td>
<td>0.0150</td>
<td>-0.2328</td>
<td>0.8570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.19)</td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(-0.52)</td>
<td>(1.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict_t</td>
<td>-0.0999</td>
<td>-0.0819</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>0.0015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td>(-1.09)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar_t</td>
<td>0.4028</td>
<td>-0.0705</td>
<td>1.6443**</td>
<td>0.6928</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td>(-0.10)</td>
<td>(2.44)</td>
<td>(1.57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez_t</td>
<td>-.9104</td>
<td>2.0498**</td>
<td>-0.0841</td>
<td>0.1279</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.52)</td>
<td>(2.13)</td>
<td>(-0.13)</td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep_t</td>
<td>-0.0182</td>
<td>0.0056</td>
<td>0.0191**</td>
<td>0.0166***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.20)</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>(2.50)</td>
<td>(3.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.5311</td>
<td>-3.2072**</td>
<td>-2.6541**</td>
<td>-2.6617***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
<td>(-2.48)</td>
<td>(-3.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α</td>
<td>2.1119</td>
<td>1.2621</td>
<td>1.0396</td>
<td>1.8636***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.53)</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
<td>(0.15)</td>
<td>(4.02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.2:** Split Sample Weibull Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992
Table 4.2 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Democratizers</th>
<th></th>
<th>Existing Democracies</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity'98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity'98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>1179</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>22.37**</td>
<td>38.92***</td>
<td>44.79***</td>
<td>72.48***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10; two-tailed tests.

*Duration Dependence or Shape parameter. The test of significance is performed on ln α.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOScore(_{it-1})</td>
<td>-0.1735*</td>
<td>0.0771</td>
<td>-0.1916*</td>
<td>0.0660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.89)</td>
<td>(0.79)</td>
<td>(-1.78)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta3)IOScore(_t)</td>
<td>-0.3394**</td>
<td>-0.2875*</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.17)</td>
<td>(-1.65)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JoinIO(_{it-1})</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-12.6042***</td>
<td>-12.2489***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-10.79)</td>
<td>(-6.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP(_t)</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0009</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.14)</td>
<td>(-2.81)</td>
<td>(-1.22)</td>
<td>(-3.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\Delta pcGDP(_t)</td>
<td>-0.0062***</td>
<td>-0.0003</td>
<td>-0.0060***</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.99)</td>
<td>(-0.10)</td>
<td>(-2.65)</td>
<td>(0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion(_t)</td>
<td>-0.0867</td>
<td>-0.4710</td>
<td>-0.0855</td>
<td>-0.4233</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.71)</td>
<td>(-1.46)</td>
<td>(-0.70)</td>
<td>(-1.29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN(_t)</td>
<td>-2.3559**</td>
<td>0.0238</td>
<td>-2.4207**</td>
<td>-0.0434</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.38)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(-2.10)</td>
<td>(0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict(_t)</td>
<td>-0.0846</td>
<td>-0.0828</td>
<td>-0.0925</td>
<td>-0.0601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.98)</td>
<td>(-1.09)</td>
<td>(-1.06)</td>
<td>(-0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar(_t)</td>
<td>0.5564</td>
<td>-0.0069</td>
<td>0.5861</td>
<td>-0.2280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>(0.64)</td>
<td>(-0.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez(_t)</td>
<td>-1.5043</td>
<td>2.068*</td>
<td>-1.9429</td>
<td>1.7971**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
<td>(2.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep(_t)</td>
<td>-0.0201</td>
<td>0.0064</td>
<td>-0.0192</td>
<td>0.0061</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.29)</td>
<td>(0.41)</td>
<td>(-1.18)</td>
<td>(0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.3133</td>
<td>-2.9937*</td>
<td>2.7265</td>
<td>-3.1122**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.30)</td>
<td>(-1.95)</td>
<td>(1.46)</td>
<td>(-2.11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha^a)</td>
<td>2.1256</td>
<td>1.2083</td>
<td>2.2229*</td>
<td>1.2798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(1.68)</td>
<td>(1.04)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.3:** Split Sample Weibull Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992, with Alternate IO Variables  

(continued)
Table 4.3 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>27.78***</td>
<td>37.69***</td>
<td>512.75***</td>
<td>1036.88***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Analysis including democratizers only.

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** = p < .01; ** = p < .05; * = p < .10; two-tailed tests.

*Duration Dependence or Shape parameter.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOScore(t-1)</td>
<td>0.0014</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0345</td>
<td>(-0.29)</td>
<td>-0.0578</td>
<td>(-0.46)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0562</td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>0.0176</td>
<td>(0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0380</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIOScore(t-1)</td>
<td>-0.8814**</td>
<td>(-2.18)</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-0.6159**</td>
<td>(-2.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ3IOScore(t)</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>(-2.07)</td>
<td>-0.3621**</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-0.3180***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JoinIO(t-1)</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-14.6496***</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-14.5324***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-11.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP(t)</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>(-1.40)</td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>(-1.31)</td>
<td>-0.0008</td>
<td>(-1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
<td>(-2.56)</td>
<td>-0.0007***</td>
<td>(-2.73)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0007**</td>
<td>(-2.46)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP(t)</td>
<td>-0.0063**</td>
<td>(-2.55)</td>
<td>-0.0062**</td>
<td>(-2.36)</td>
<td>-0.0057**</td>
<td>(-2.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0005</td>
<td>(-0.17)</td>
<td>-0.0001</td>
<td>(-0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.0007</td>
<td>(-0.23)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion(t)</td>
<td>-0.3760</td>
<td>(-0.99)</td>
<td>-0.3545</td>
<td>(-0.91)</td>
<td>-0.3346</td>
<td>(-0.93)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2570</td>
<td>(-1.49)</td>
<td>-0.2354</td>
<td>(-1.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.2496</td>
<td>(-1.32)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN(t)</td>
<td>-2.6814**</td>
<td>(-2.02)</td>
<td>-2.4221**</td>
<td>(2.15)</td>
<td>-2.3452*</td>
<td>(-1.85)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1164</td>
<td>(0.16)</td>
<td>-0.0780</td>
<td>(-0.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1479</td>
<td>(0.19)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict(t)</td>
<td>-0.0024</td>
<td>(-0.01)</td>
<td>-0.0035</td>
<td>(-0.02)</td>
<td>-0.0202</td>
<td>(-0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1544*</td>
<td>(-1.93)</td>
<td>-0.1553*</td>
<td>(-1.90)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.1386*</td>
<td>(-1.66)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar(t)</td>
<td>1.1763</td>
<td>(1.41)</td>
<td>1.2574</td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>1.2247</td>
<td>(1.37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.5968</td>
<td>(-0.76)</td>
<td>-0.6079</td>
<td>(-0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.7534</td>
<td>(-0.96)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez(t)</td>
<td>-3.6345***</td>
<td>(-2.84)</td>
<td>-2.7488**</td>
<td>(-2.27)</td>
<td>-3.1288***</td>
<td>(-2.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2.2439**</td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
<td>2.4577**</td>
<td>(2.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1.9639*</td>
<td>(1.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep(t)</td>
<td>-0.0181</td>
<td>(-1.04)</td>
<td>-0.0172</td>
<td>(-0.96)</td>
<td>-0.0192</td>
<td>(1.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0286</td>
<td>(1.13)</td>
<td>0.0372</td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.0260</td>
<td>(1.03)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURdummy</td>
<td>-11.2265**</td>
<td>(-2.46)</td>
<td>-10.9330**</td>
<td>(-2.25)</td>
<td>-10.5629**</td>
<td>(-2.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAdummy</td>
<td>-1.4164</td>
<td>(-0.90)</td>
<td>-1.0017</td>
<td>(-0.67)</td>
<td>-1.1309</td>
<td>(-0.84)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.4586*</td>
<td>(-1.93)</td>
<td>-2.2599*</td>
<td>(-1.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-2.5798*</td>
<td>(-1.90)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.4: Split Sample Weibull Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992, with Alternate IO Variables and Region-Specific Fixed Effects

(continued)
### Table 4.4 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAdummy</td>
<td>-0.2752</td>
<td>-4.6339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.20)</td>
<td>(-1.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.6719</td>
<td>-5.6888*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.47)</td>
<td>(-1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.3255</td>
<td>-4.1407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.22)</td>
<td>(-1.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAdummy</td>
<td>-5.0345*</td>
<td>-0.4636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.82)</td>
<td>(-0.75)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-4.0965</td>
<td>-0.1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.52)</td>
<td>(-0.17)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-3.8403</td>
<td>-0.4060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.48)</td>
<td>(-0.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEdummy</td>
<td>-- -- b</td>
<td>0.8344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-- -- b</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-- -- b</td>
<td>0.9307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-- -- b</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.1944</td>
<td>(0.97)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.168*</td>
<td>-2.9281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
<td>(-1.56)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.8213</td>
<td>-2.6897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2880</td>
<td>-2.8278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.58)</td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.9281</td>
<td>-2.6897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.56)</td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-2.6897</td>
<td>-2.8278</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
<td>(-1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha )</td>
<td>2.2459*</td>
<td>1.5037*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td>(1.70)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2656*</td>
<td>1.4384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.74)</td>
<td>(1.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.347*</td>
<td>1.5296*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.33)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>346</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>323</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>12.449</td>
<td>26.976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>12.743</td>
<td>26.612</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>13.535</td>
<td>28.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>1125.87***</td>
<td>231.96***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>819.18***</td>
<td>101.08***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2998.75***</td>
<td>1582.71***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>3.70</td>
<td>7.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>2.58</td>
<td>7.85*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>0.448</td>
<td>0.109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.630</td>
<td>0.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0.651</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

**NOTE:** Analysis including democratizers only.

\*\*\* = \( p < .01 \); \*\* = \( p < .05 \); \* = \( p < .10 \); two-tailed tests.

\( a \) Duration Dependence or Shape parameter.

\( b \) If no country in a region experiences the event (democratic breakdown), the dummy for that region is discarded in the model estimation.

\( c \) Gasiorowski does not include Europe in his data set.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change in Variable</th>
<th>Polity98</th>
<th>Gasiorowski</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in IOScore by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-35.63</td>
<td>-42.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in ΔIOScore by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-45.40</td>
<td>-38.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in pcGDP by one standard deviation from mean</td>
<td>-88.46</td>
<td>-88.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in pcGDP from median to 75th percentile</td>
<td>-79.89</td>
<td>-79.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decrease in pcGDP from median to 25th percentile</td>
<td>+80.04</td>
<td>+80.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN present (=1)</td>
<td>-16.23</td>
<td>+23.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential System</td>
<td>-44.67</td>
<td>+87.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in Contagion of one regime per region</td>
<td>-11.13</td>
<td>-21.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War present (=1)</td>
<td>+117.56</td>
<td>+9.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTE: Based on the estimates in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4.1

**Table 4.5:** Predicted Changes in the Baseline Hazard Rate
Figure 4.1: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Survival Function: Polity98 Data
Figure 4.2: Kaplan-Meier Estimates of the Survival Function: Gasiorowski Data
Appendix 4.1. Model Estimates with Interaction Terms

To test the hypothesis that IOs will have different effects on new versus "existing" democracies, I interact StableD_{it} with both IOScore_{it-1} and ΔIOScore_{it-1}. Since StableD_{it} is a dummy variable, this makes the interpretation of both the IO-related variables and the interaction terms conditional (Friedrich 1983). Despite the addition of the two interaction terms, all remaining variables are identical to Model 4.1.

Table 4.6 presents the estimates of this new model using both data sets and utilizing both a Cox and a Weibull model. To interpret the estimates, recall that since StableD_{it} is a dummy variable, when it is equal to zero, one can ignore the interaction terms altogether. That is, in cases where state i is a new democracy, one examines only the first two lines of the table to see the effects of IOs. The estimates of these variables continue to be negative and the estimate of ΔIOScore_{it-1} is now statistically significant across the board. IOScore_{it} remains negative in all cases, but is statistically significant in only one case. This again is solid confirmation of the idea that joining a democratic IO increases the duration of democracy.

The fact that the interaction terms are positive means only that IOs have an overall smaller effect on existing democracies than in new democracies. For example, to see the effect of joining an IO in an existing democracy, one adds the values of the coefficients for ΔIOScore_{it-1} and ΔIOScore_{it-1} X StableD_{it}. The resulting coefficient is still negative in value, but much smaller than the coefficient for ΔIOScore_{it-1} alone. Thus, it is not the case that involvement or joining international organizations has a negative effect on the duration of democracy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cox Models</th>
<th></th>
<th>Weibull Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
<td>Polity98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$IO_{it-1}^*$</td>
<td>-0.1458</td>
<td>-0.0240</td>
<td>-0.1498</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.04)</td>
<td>(-0.23)</td>
<td>(-1.27)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta IO_{it-1}^*$</td>
<td>-0.6456***</td>
<td>-0.5270**</td>
<td>-0.5701*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.68)</td>
<td>(-2.34)</td>
<td>(-1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$IO_{it-1} \times StableD_{it}$</td>
<td>0.1032</td>
<td>-0.0812</td>
<td>0.1347</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.66)</td>
<td>(-0.66)</td>
<td>(1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta IO_{it-1} \times StableD_{it}$</td>
<td>0.4307</td>
<td>0.2226</td>
<td>0.4293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.42)</td>
<td>(0.82)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$pcGDP_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0005***</td>
<td>-0.0004***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.93)</td>
<td>(-2.67)</td>
<td>(-2.94)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\Delta pcGDP_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0058***</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
<td>-0.0029***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-4.25)</td>
<td>(-1.19)</td>
<td>(-4.64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion$_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.0804</td>
<td>-0.2604**</td>
<td>-0.0304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.10)</td>
<td>(-2.21)</td>
<td>(-0.45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN$_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.1632</td>
<td>0.2102</td>
<td>0.2067</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.62)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict$_{it}$</td>
<td>0.0334</td>
<td>0.0122</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.51)</td>
<td>(0.34)</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar$_{it}$</td>
<td>0.9014</td>
<td>0.0724</td>
<td>0.6742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.61)</td>
<td>(0.22)</td>
<td>(1.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez$_{it}$</td>
<td>-0.6291</td>
<td>0.6773*</td>
<td>-0.5520</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.15)</td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(-0.95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StableD$_{it}$</td>
<td>-1.3675</td>
<td>1.0946</td>
<td>-2.1512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.71)</td>
<td>(0.78)</td>
<td>(-1.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep$_{it}$</td>
<td>0.0099*</td>
<td>0.0107**</td>
<td>0.0071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.90)</td>
<td>(2.37)</td>
<td>(1.20)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 4.6:** Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992, Including Interaction Terms

(continued)
Table 4.6 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cox Models</th>
<th>Weibull Models</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polity98</td>
<td>Gasiorowski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant (^a)</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha) (^b)</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(N =)</td>
<td>1525</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-75.098</td>
<td>-168.572</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>61.52***</td>
<td>59.97***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

*** = \(p < .01\); ** = \(p < .05\); * = \(p < .10\); two-tailed tests.

\(^a\) Note that Cox Models do not include a constant. It is absorbed into the baseline hazard.

\(^b\) Duration Dependence or Shape parameter.
Appendix 4.2. Complete Sample Estimates for the Gasiorowski data

This appendix contains the estimates of the models in columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.2, and of columns 4-6 of Table 4.3. Rather than using the democratizers-only sample, these results use the entire Gasiorowski sample for estimation. Again, the justification for including these full sample results is that because the Gasiorowski sample differs with respect to the inclusion of “stable” democracies, splitting the sample makes less sense theoretically. In addition, estimates of the shape parameter of the underlying hazard rate in the Gasiorowski models showed only small differences in the underlying risk between “stable” and new democracies. Recall that this result differed dramatically from the Polity98 estimates, which had very different distributions of the underlying hazard rates for each sample.

Most of the results using the full Gasiorowski sample are stronger than in the split sample case. The first two columns of Table 4.7 replicate columns 2 and 4 of Table 4.2, respectively. Note that now membership in a democratic regional organization decreases the hazard of a democratic breakdown. Moreover, these two estimates are now statistically significant. In addition, the contagion variable is now significant in the full sample, while the variable controlling for presidential systems is no longer significant.

For the fixed effect models, the full sample results are similar to the split-sample estimates. In all three models, membership in democratic organizations now decreases the hazard rate (before all three were positive in sign), but none of these estimates are statistically significant. Again, the estimates of Contagion and CivWar are now statistically significant, while the estimates for the influence of regional disputes and
presidentialism are no longer significant (although the estimates of regional disputes now has the theoretically-expected sign).

Overall, these models support the previous findings of an association between membership and joining democratic regional organizations and the endurance of democracy. These findings are robust to splitting the Gasiorowski sample by "established" versus new democracies or including all democracies in the analysis. Moreover, while the inclusion of region-based fixed effects does weaken the findings, the overall relationship between the independent variables of interest and democratic endurance remain strong.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Table 4.3 estimates</th>
<th></th>
<th>Table 4.4 estimates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Col. 3</td>
<td>Col. 4</td>
<td>Col. 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOScore(_{it-1})</td>
<td>-0.0890**</td>
<td>-0.0703*</td>
<td>-0.0562</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td>(-1.91)</td>
<td>(-1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔIOScore(_{it-1})</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-0.3567**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ3IOScore(_{it})</td>
<td>-0.1609**</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.25)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JoinIO(_{it-1})</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-14.5941***</td>
<td>--.--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-15.31)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pcGDP(_{it})</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0006***</td>
<td>-0.0005**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.68)</td>
<td>(2.64)</td>
<td>(2.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ΔpcGDP(_{it})</td>
<td>-0.0013</td>
<td>-0.0011</td>
<td>-0.0006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.01)</td>
<td>(-0.83)</td>
<td>(-0.42)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contagion(_{it})</td>
<td>-0.2228**</td>
<td>-0.2190**</td>
<td>-0.2915**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.17)</td>
<td>(2.14)</td>
<td>(2.32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBDOWN(_{it})</td>
<td>0.4810</td>
<td>0.5646</td>
<td>0.4564</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.29)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RegConflict(_{it})</td>
<td>-0.0150</td>
<td>-0.0049</td>
<td>0.0384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.41)</td>
<td>(-0.14)</td>
<td>(0.86)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CivWar(_{it})</td>
<td>0.2724</td>
<td>0.1756</td>
<td>0.7162*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.81)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(1.82)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prez(_{it})</td>
<td>0.6758</td>
<td>0.5774</td>
<td>0.5171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.50)</td>
<td>(1.22)</td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indep(_{it})</td>
<td>0.0086*</td>
<td>0.0086*</td>
<td>0.0091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.67)</td>
<td>(1.75)</td>
<td>(1.14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>StableD(_{it})</td>
<td>0.2764</td>
<td>0.2493</td>
<td>0.2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
<td>(0.61)</td>
<td>(0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EURdummy</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--(^b)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 4.7: Weibull Estimates of the Determinants of the Duration of Democracy, 1950-1992, with Alternate IO Variables and Region-Specific Fixed Effects*
Table 4.7 (continued),

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Table 4.3 estimates</th>
<th></th>
<th>Table 4.4 estimates</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAdummy</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>1.1586</td>
<td>1.1655</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-1.05)</td>
<td>(-1.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAdummy</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-0.6299</td>
<td>-0.7820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.61)</td>
<td>(-0.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASIAdummy</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-2.0505***</td>
<td>-2.0108***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-3.08)</td>
<td>(-3.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEdummy</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>-0.5748</td>
<td>-0.6740</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(-0.57)</td>
<td>(-0.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.9282**</td>
<td>-2.4412***</td>
<td>-2.3727***</td>
<td>-2.3203***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-2.42)</td>
<td>(-3.42)</td>
<td>(-2.82)</td>
<td>(-2.74)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha^a)</td>
<td>1.3522**</td>
<td>1.4269**</td>
<td>1.6030**</td>
<td>1.6006***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.24)</td>
<td>(2.72)</td>
<td>(2.80)</td>
<td>(2.89)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N =</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>789</td>
<td>800</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td>-74.342</td>
<td>-76.287</td>
<td>-63.939</td>
<td>-65.132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>36.41***</td>
<td>1285.95***</td>
<td>70.71***</td>
<td>60.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>478.53***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chi-square</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>18.93***</td>
<td>18.42***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p &gt; Chi-square</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>--.--</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** Analysis includes *entire* Gasiorowski sample.

Figures in parentheses are asymptotic z-statistics computed using Huber/Sandwich standard errors.

\*\*\* = \(p < .01\); \*\* = \(p < .05\); \* = \(p < .10\); two-tailed tests.

\textsuperscript{a} Duration Dependence or Shape parameter.

\textsuperscript{b} Gasiorowski does not include Europe in his data set.
CHAPTER 5

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY:
EVIDENCE FROM CASES

The following two chapters provide five illustrative case studies which take a
more in-depth look at the causal relationship between regional organizations and
democratization. The statistical evidence presented in both Chapters 3 and 4 provide
substantial confirmation of the hypotheses that IOs are related to both the
democratization and the consolidation process. Yet, the macro-oriented nature of those
tests make it difficult to identify the specific causal processes behind the correlations in
the data. Thus, these case studies are presented to help tease out the exact nature of the
link between the independent variable of interest, involvement in regional IOs, and our
two dependent variables, democratic transitions and democratic consolidation.

In all, five cases are presented: Hungary, Peru, Greece, Paraguay, and Turkey. In
this chapter, Hungary and Peru are categorized as a success and partial success as a result
of their respective status democracies. Both provide evidence that IOs can play a role in
both the initial movement to democracy (liberalization in Peru) as well as the completion
of democratic transitions (Hungary). Chapter 6 presents the studies of Greece, Paraguay
and Turkey. Both Greece and Paraguay show how IOs can be associated with the
successful consolidation of democracy through the variety of mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1. Turkey is a key case which provides evidence against these propositions concerning consolidation, but does elucidate the relationship between IOs and democratic transitions. Although I place Turkey with the consolidation cases, the findings from that study do apply to the transition argument as well.

5.1. Case Selection

I have attempted to select cases to maximize variation on several factors in order to enhance the ability to draw valid inferences from these cases to the population at large. With five cases, there are limits to the amount of variation one can build into such an enterprise. Nonetheless, these cases were chosen to introduce variation on the following factors: outcome of the dependent variable, wealth of the state, extent of involvement in regional IOs, and geographic region.

Including cases which vary in outcome is important since it allows one to highlight and explore empirical anomalies. Turkey and Peru are included for this reason. A member of several highly democratic international organizations, Turkey has suffered three breakdowns of democracy in the past forty years. Thus, it is important to discover what processes are at work which provide countervailing evidence to my hypotheses concerning IOs and consolidation. What makes Turkey an intriguing puzzle is that their membership in IOs has helped them to re-democratize, especially in the early 1980s. The case study of Turkey will attempt to illuminate what factors have led to this outcome. Peru, on the other hand, has made progress toward re-democratization with pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS). Yet, many observers of Latin American
politics contend that it has yet to complete its transition to democracy (Hakim 2000). This study will investigate the OAS’s role in this controversy and its current efforts to pressure Peru to advance liberalization.

Although none of the five states are enormously wealthy, there is variation among them in terms of national income. Paraguay (USD 2663 per capita GDP\textsuperscript{124} and Peru (USD 3422 pcGDP) can be labeled “poor” states, while Turkey (USD 4525 pcGDP) and Hungary (USD 5290 pcGDP) belong to a class of “semi-periphery” states which are neither fully developed nor hopelessly underdeveloped. Finally, Greece (USD 9436 pcGDP) represents a developed state, although by Western European standards, Greece barely crosses this threshold. Given the importance of economic pressures and incentives to both the transition and consolidation argument, it is important to introduce variance on this variable to ensure there is no systematic bias in the influence of the causal mechanisms in relation to the income level of the state.

In addition, each of the five have various levels of IO membership, ranging from Turkey with the most (average of over 6 in any given year) to Paraguay with the fewest (average of under 3). According to the theories presented in Chapter 1, only one membership in a highly democratic IO should be sufficient to allow the causal processes linking regional organizations and democracy to function. While the large-N tests supported this general idea (larger number of IO membership were never significantly associated with transitions or democratic longevity), it is important to ensure this same finding emerges in the case studies. For example, it is possible that only in coordination

\textsuperscript{124} Figures are from 1996 expressed in 1987 constant international dollars, based on a purchasing power parity index. Data taken from World Bank 1998.
with each other can regional IOs effectively promote or preserve democracy. These types of nuances would not necessarily appear in the large-N study.

Finally, regional variation is essential if one is to make inferences concerning regional organizations and democracy. These cases provide examples from Europe (Southern and Eastern) and Latin America. This variation allows one to investigate the possibility that the causal mechanisms at work in Peru and Paraguay, for example, are also influencing Eastern European democratization as well. It also guards against the possibility that only certain regional organizations (e.g., the EC/EU) are helpful in the democratization process. Ideally, one would like even more regional variation than Europe and Latin America. Unfortunately, so few transitions have occurred in the Middle East (Turkey is arguably a state in this region, however) and Africa that it is difficult to find well documented cases in these regions. In addition, fewer IOs operate in these two regions meaning reduced interaction opportunities with supranational organizations for domestic elites. In Asia, although more IOs tend to operate in this region, few cases of democratization exist. Because this variation in region is not as large as one would hope, this does influence the scope conditions under which this theory may apply. I will return to this issue in the conclusion of the case material in Chapter 6.

5.2. Examining the Causal Mechanisms: Transitions to Democracy

Each case will be examined for evidence of the hypothesized causal mechanisms linking involvement in regional IOs and democratic transitions. Table 5.1 briefly outlines these mechanisms as discussed in Chapter 1. In addition, any additional “international” causal factors that are present will be highlighted. While the discovery of other causal
processes linking IOs to democratic transitions or consolidation would not necessarily undermine my general argument, it would falsify my hypotheses concerning the actual causal processes behind the statistical correlations. Thus, it is important to make sure that the dynamics which lead to the statistical findings in Chapter 3 are fully uncovered and explored.

Each case study will begin with a brief historical introduction for each country including background information relevant to the case study itself. Then, for each study, I will review each causal mechanism, discussing whether there is evidence of IO influence by these mechanisms. Finally, for each study I will discuss countervailing evidence concerning the impact of IOs on the democratization process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Transition Mechanisms (Chapters 1 and 3)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Diplomatic Pressure by IO Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Sanctions/Punishment by IO Members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acquiescence Effect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Socialization of Societal Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Preference Lock-in for Elites</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimization/Psychological Re-Orientatiation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 5.1:** Hypothesized Causal Mechanisms Linking IOs to Transitions

5.3. **Hungary**

As one of the “velvet revolutions” of 1989 in Eastern Europe, Hungary began its most recent experience with democracy with high hopes. Hungary’s escape from the tutelage of the Soviet Union and its establishment of a multiparty democracy in a
peaceful fashion led to high expectations concerning its economic and political transformation. Unlike some of its neighbors, moreover, Hungary has fared relatively well on its journey towards democracy. Still, its transition to a pluralist democracy and a market economy is by no means a foregone conclusion. Hungary has experienced many bumps on the road to political and economic reform. Nevertheless, it has continued to move towards democracy and a free market system.

This case study will show how Hungary's links to several international organizations has assisted in this journey towards democracy in the years after the "revolution" of 1989. This case provides insight into the causal mechanisms at work linking IOs to the completion of the transition to democracy. Specifically, the three mechanisms which have assisted Hungary in its completion of democracy were: 1) the acquiescence effect of membership in NATO and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) programs helping to reassure the military elite of their continued importance in Hungarian policymaking; 2) the psychological benefit of association with these Western organizations; and 3) direct economic and technical assistance provided by these organizations. I also conclude that over the long term, these IOs will help to consolidate Hungarian democracy, although it may be too early to draw any firm conclusions concerning this finding.
5.3.1. Background

Hungary's past includes several experiences with democracy and partial liberalization. Before 1989, its most recent attempt at liberalization occurred in 1956, when Imre Nagy attempted to liberalize the single-party system by allowing the formation of political parties, unions, intellectual organizations. This liberalization was short-lived, however, as Soviet leaders squelched Nagy's reform attempts, intervening in a “counter-revolutionary” action in December 1956 (Lomax 1991: 155-6). Nagy was arrested and along with many reformers in his government, executed.

Janos Kadar replaced Nagy and ruled until 1989. During his tenure, Hungary took steps to chart a more independent foreign policy from Moscow, especially after Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 (Lomax 1991). Independent civic organizations began to form in 1986-7 and as early as June 1987, public calls for political liberalization became quite common (Kis 1989: 143-52). The string of events which led to the fall of Kadar, however, centered around the 1956 revolution. Beginning in 1988, a movement began calling for the exhumation and proper burial of Imre Nagy's body. With the help of several reformers within the ruling party, the government passed a resolution allowing this action in January 1989. Shortly thereafter, several prominent reformers within the government stopped referring to the 1956 uprising as a “counter-revolution”, but as “a popular uprising against an oligarchic form of rule that had humiliated the nation” (Lomax 1991: 163). These statements touched off four months of an “uncontrolled explosion in independent political activity” (Lomax 1991: 164). By November of 1989, the now re-named Communist party (now the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party—
HSWP) lost its hold on power when 95 percent of Hungarians voted to strip it of its properties and offices (Lomax 1991: 168). Finally, in the spring of 1990, free and open parliamentary elections were held in Hungary. With these elections, Hungary had once again become a multiparty democracy.

Before discussing the evidence linking IOs to the completion of Hungary’s transition to democracy, I will briefly review its IO memberships since 1989. Initially, Hungary was the first Eastern European state to sign an agreement with the EC. In fact, Hungary signed its first trade agreement with the EC before the initial transition of 1989 (Pinder 1991: 32-3). In addition, it signed an association agreement\(^{126}\) which promoted the establishment of a free trade area with EU members in industrial goods while liberalizing trade in many other economic sectors (see below; also Gower 1993: 290-293). It was a leader among Eastern European states in attempting to join NATO and eagerly joined the Partnership for Peace (PFP), an “ante-chamber” for several of the NATO aspirants as well as Russia (Hyde-Price 1996: 243). Finally, it was the first Eastern European member admitted to the Council of Europe (Hyde-Price 1996: 191).

The next section will discuss some of the indigenous regional organization that arose out of the ashes of such organizations as the Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) in Eastern Europe, but Hungary played a leading role in creating and perpetuating these regional organizations as well.

---

\(^{126}\) Unless otherwise noted, many of the historical details from this section are drawn from Lomax 1991 and Korosenyi 1992.

\(^{126}\) This agreement, one of the three signed by the EU along with Czechoslovakia and Poland, became known as the “Europe Agreements”. See Pinder 1991.
5.3.2. Encouraging the Completion of Democracy: Causal Mechanisms

International organizations have played a role in encouraging the completion of democracy in Hungary. Rather than applying overt pressure the HSWP to relinquish power in Hungary, international organizations such as NATO, the EU, and the Council of Europe, among others, provided incentives and mechanisms to assist the legitimization of the transition to democracy so that the emerging institutions and practices in that state would be truly “democratic”. That is, membership in and association with several IOs helped to push Hungary to become a full fledged democracy, rather than becoming caught in an “anocratic” status. As outlined above, three mechanisms encouraged the completion of the transitions, two of which were discussed in Chapter 1. There is little evidence of direct pressure by IO members in order to push the transition to democracy, while one additional mechanism not included in Chapter 1, the provision of direct financial and technical assistance, is found in the Hungarian case. Each of these causal processes will be discussed in turn.

5.3.2.1. Pressure from the IO and Its members

There is little evidence of direct pressure on Hungary to liberalize its political system on the part of IOs. Most of Hungary’s IO affiliations (e.g., the CMEA and the Warsaw Pact) were with organizations guided by the Soviet Union, thus one would not expect pressure from member states through the institution. Even after the initial transition of 1989, direct pressure in the form of threats or sanctions were absent in this case. Because Hungary was a willing “convert” to Western-style political and economic systems, no pressure from Western democracies was necessary.
One IO which does deserve mention in this context is the CSCE, which some observers claim did play an "enabling" role in the Eastern European transitions of 1989. During the first period of détente in the 1970s, the Soviets and their Warsaw Pact allies agreed to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975. One part of the Helsinki Act was to guarantee respect for "human rights and the free contact of peoples" (Pinder 1994: 122). While the U.S. paid little attention to this aspect of the Helsinki Act, opposition groups within Eastern Europe used this treaty as an opportunity to expand their activities and independent political organizations (e.g., Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia and Solidarity in Poland). According to one observer, "without the Final Act ... opposition in Eastern Europe would have been weaker, less coherent, [and] easier to suppress" as full-fledged movements towards democracy began in the late 1980s (Richard Davy quoted in Whitehead 1994: 51). Thus, while there may have been some pressure by IOs during the period of Communist rule, it was much more passive than the type of pressure hypothesized in Chapter 1.

5.3.2.2. The Acquiescence Effect: Civil-Military Relations in Transition

One of the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 1 which links IOs to either political liberalization or the completion of a democratic transition is the acquiescence effect. The idea is that international institutions can either lock-in policies which protect actor’s interests or socialize actors to change their behavior through interactions with these elites. In the case of Hungary, both parts of this causal mechanism are at work. The issue area in which we find this process concerns civil-military relations and the influence of NATO (especially the Partnership for Peace—PFP) and the CSCE.
The external guarantee of policy preferences arises from military spending requirements dictated by the PFP and NATO, which has softened parliamentary attacks on the military's budget and allowed the military to pursue modernization. Besides these externally mandated requirements, financial assistance from the PFP and NATO has helped the Hungarian military to modernize using external resources. Thus, the military has not had to become heavily involved in politics to protect their institutional interests. The socialization aspect arises from integration into broader security arrangements (CSCE, the PFP, and now, NATO) with other democracies. This has helped to socialize military commanders to accept civilian supremacy, a hallmark of liberal democracy.

Integration into the CSCE, the PFP, and later, NATO, has provided large amounts of assistance for the Hungarian military, especially in the form of modern weapons and gear. This came at a critical time when the Hungarian military was suffering from massive budget cuts and extremely low soldier morale (Agocs 1997: 86-88; Bebler 1997: 130). For example, between 1989 and 1991, the military budget dropped nearly 35 percent while over 40 percent of Hungarian tanks were being recycled for scrap metal (Agocs 1997: 87). In addition, crime and suicides among enlisted Hungarian military men reached an all-time high in 1990 (Agocs 1997: 91).

Involvement in PFP and NATO has helped to stabilize Hungary's defense forces from a financial standpoint. First, because it is a member of a multilateral defense pact, it needs to spend less to protect itself while feeling secure from external threats (Gyarmati 1999: 114). Second, NATO now requires increases in defense spending (one-tenth of a percent per year) to keep Hungary's forces within NATO standards (Wright 1998: 3). Finally, Hungary has received large amounts of assistance to modernize and update its
military forces (Wright 1998: 3). Without NATO and PFP assistance, this commitment to modernization would probably not have occurred, especially given pre-NATO defense spending patterns (Gyarmati 1999: 114). By improving the iot of the Hungarian military and guaranteeing some access to resources, these regional security organizations have encouraged the military not to become directly involved in politics.

The second process at work involved the physical integration of Hungarian officers into security-related IOs such as the PFP and the CSCE.\textsuperscript{127} Training and interaction with officers trained in western-oriented styles of civil-military relations helped to “reorient” Hungarian officers towards their new role in a democratic society (Inotai and Notzold 1995: 96; Valki 1998: 99-100). This was especially important given their previous role as both an internal and external security force. Through the re-training of military leaders in Hungary, both the PFP and the CSCE encourage this re-orientation process (Vetschera 1997: 19).

In addition, specific PFP and NATO requirements including transparency of the military budgeting process and national defense planning can help to promote civilian control over the military (Keiswetter 1997: 5). Hungary’s military command structure has undergone a drastic overhaul designed to promote civilian control in order to “reflect NATO principles” (Freeman 1997: A7). These measures can prevent “any national armed force from achieving too much independence of influence in a [NATO] member state” (Valki 1998:103) In the words of one observer, “integration into Western [security] institutions will help democratization by refocusing on the armed forces of Eastern Europe away from politics” (Herring 1994: 109).

\textsuperscript{127} This is also true to a much smaller extent of the EU. See Pridham 1999: 65.
All of these factors have helped to complete the transition process in Hungary. Many observers see the subjugation of the military to civilian rule as an essential part of the transition process (Aguero 1994) and liberal democracy itself (Foster 1996; Keiswetter 1997: 3). While it is difficult to say whether Hungary’s military would have moved against any democratic regime without involvement in these IOs, the NATO/PFP requirements for civilian-supremacy of the military provided a strong incentive to the military elite from doing so (Braun 1999: 19).

It should also be mentioned that an indirect link between NATO and the transition to democracy is through military security itself. The idea that democracies are difficult to create and continue with a significant external threat directly links the provision of security (or at least the perception of security) to the promotion and maintenance of democracy. Thus, given Hungary’s concerns over its own security from its neighbors and from Russia, it is plausible that membership in these security organizations helped the process of democratization, especially in light of Hungarian concerns over nationals in neighboring states (Nelson 1999: 311).

In the end, however, there is little secondary evidence that feelings of insecurity threatened the transition in Hungary.128 The Antall regime did fear a re-emergence of Soviet expansionism (especially in light of the August 1991 coup attempt) and often justified Hungary’s interest in NATO in these terms. Still, there is no evidence that anti-democratic measures were undertaken or seriously considered in response to perceived

---

128 In addition, recall from Chapter 3 that the presence of regional military disputes have no impact on the probability of a transition to democracy in the statistical analyses. While this is only a general pattern in the data and not for Hungary in particular, it does suggest that such influences on democratization are rare in the aggregate.
threats from neighbors or the former Soviet Union. Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs expressed this argument quite succinctly:

“Hungary wants to join NATO not because it perceives an external threat, nor because it seeks protection from it neighbors, but because it regards integration into the European community, that is, membership in NATO, the European Union, and Western European Union, an indispensable condition of its security, stability, and economic development” (quoted in Valki 1998: 96).

5.3.2.3. The Symbolic Effects of IOs

One of the most important effects of involvement in IOs for Hungary has been the psychological legitimization that membership has granted the leadership and the emerging democratic system. Membership in (and to a lesser extent application to) several Western and European organizations provided an immediate signal of foreign policy reorientation for the post-Communist regime. This signal of a pro-Western stance helped to legitimize that country’s transitional democratic institutions for both internal and external actors.

For internal actors, membership in the Council of Europe, NATO, as well as the “Europe Agreements” signed with the EC/UE helped provide credibility to domestic political elites, furthering the process of democratization. Popular sentiment overwhelmingly favors these memberships and even before the rise of multiparty democracy, political elites were given credit for creating ties to the West (Batt 1994: 178). The issue of Hungary’s “orientation” goes back hundreds of years and has always been a salient issue for citizens and political parties alike (Kolozsi 1995: 108; Gedeon 1997: 101). Many Hungarians pin their hopes of successful political and economic reform on their ability to link themselves to the West (Goldman 1997: 212). According
to one scholar of the Eastern European transitions, joining (as well as the potential to 
join) Western international institutions “played a very important role in [new regime’s] 
legitimation by providing some kind of seal of approval or guarantee of their credibility 
vis-à-vis their own societies” (Batt 1994: 176).

Particularly important in this regard are both the Council of Europe and the EU. 
Hungary was the first Eastern European state to join the Council in November of 1990 
(Tuohy 1991: 2; Klebes 1999: 10). For Hungarians, membership was an early “seal of 
approval” from the West for their early democratization efforts (Fitzmaurice 1998: 184; 
Kun 1993: 47). In addition to the psychological benefit, the Council encouraged the 
continuation of the transition by monitoring reform progress agreed upon at Hungary’s 
accession, thus providing “security for democracy” (van Brabant 1994: 455; see also 
Fitzmaurice 1998: 185). In the words of one observer, the Council “provides a valuable 
safeguard against subsequent backsliding on human rights and democratic practices. It 
also has a powerful symbolic value which should not be underestimated” (Hyde-Price 
1996: 193). The EU played a similar role in helping to signal to internal observers the 
regimes commitment to “move West” (Kun 1993: 61). In fact, one of the first policy 
initiatives by the newly-elected Antall government was “the establishment of direct 
diplomatic ties between Hungary and the Community” (Kun 1993: 72; see also Batt 

External actors also perceived this signal as a sure sign that Hungary was 
committed to a policy of political and economic reform. While this may have had a 
positive effect on the Hungarian psyche (external validation of the reform process feeding 
the legitimization process), it also provided a much more direct benefit: private
investment. One observer has argued that even NATO membership provides a spur to such economic activity: “As of 1997, when Hungary started gradually joining [NATO], its international prestige and importance grew as well... Although precise calculations are not available at the moment, NATO member-states enjoy much more favorable financial and business ratings due to decrease political risks” (Gyarmati 1999: 114; see also Valki 1998: 103).

In addition to providing a psychological stabilization for Hungary’s emerging institutions, this “external” source of legitimization for the political elite did prove to diffuse a potentially dangerous situation which could have undermined Hungary’s transition. A major issue of importance between Hungary’s parties, its citizens, and its neighbors is the government’s policy towards ethnic Hungarians living abroad (Kozhemiakin 1998: 80-1; Goldman 1997: 213).

As broader research on the issue of democratization and war has shown, transitional regimes can and do make overt attempts to spur nationalist sentiment regarding certain issues such as ethnic identity (Snyder and Ballentine 1996; Mansfield and Snyder 1995; 2000). Thus, the transitional Antall (or the Nemeth) regime could have easily tried to legitimate itself by arousing nationalist sentiment in Hungary over the Magyar population of her neighbors. In fact, Antall himself made an early statement that he desired to be the “Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians” (there are only 10 million Hungarians in Hungary; see Goldman 1997: 213). His statement was interpreted by Hungary’s neighbors as “a revival of traditional Hungarian revisionist nationalism”

---

129 The next section discusses investment and assistance from the international organizations themselves.
Thus, Hungarian democracy could be undermined by a combination of appeals to extremist nationalism or through the insecurity created by perceptions of such nationalism abroad (Gower 1993: 286).

As Alexander Kozhemiakin (1998) has argued, however, Hungarian parties and other political elite (with a few fringe exceptions) have not attempted to base their legitimacy and popularity on nationalist issues. Rather, "when other sources of political legitimacy are not too difficult to find, nationalist sentiments in Hungary can be contained" (Kozhemiakin 1998: 82). Thus, the external legitimization derived from IO membership serves as a substitute for appeals to nationalism. Kozhemiakin (1998: 83) continues that "Hungarians value their internationally recognized democratic status too much to allow their unqualified desire to protect Magyar minorities to hurt it and, by implication, impede Hungary's efforts to integrate itself fully into the West."

Finally, Hungary's own belief that membership in regional organizations serve as a signal of intentions has been so strong that they have led the way to creating new regional organizations among its neighbors. Central among these has been the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). While it is difficult to say that these indigenous regional organizations had a direct effect in completing the transition to democracy in Hungary, these organizations did serve an

---

130 According to Judy Batt (1994: 183), the question is not "whether nationalism will play a role in Hungarian politics, but whether it will be nationalism of a more moderate variety which can coexist and support the transition to democracy."

131 This argument holds that by arousing nationalist sentiment and creating disputes amongst its neighbors, Hungary would be unable to concentrate on finishing the democratic transition. Rather, as is discussed in the arguments concerning peace and democracy (see Chapters 3 and 4), the expansion of the state security system could undermine the transition.

132 The CEI has undergone several iterations. Originally known as the Adria-Danube agreement, it became known as the Hexagonale in 1990 with the accession of Czechoslovakia. After Poland's accession in 1991,
important purpose for Hungary during the transition. Specifically, CEI and CEFTA showed a willingness among the new Central European democracies to cooperate with one another and signaled their interest in political liberalization, market reforms, and economic integration (Felkay 1997: 103; Inotai and Notzold 1995: 97). Although important ends themselves, for Hungary, these organizations were meant to signal these interests to both NATO and the EU. Thus, the new regional organizations played a facilitating role in the democratization process by signaling the intent of the Hungarian regime for more comprehensive political and economic liberalization (Bunce 1997: 244).

5.3.2.4. Direct Economic Benefits

A final causal process which link IOs to Hungary’s completion of democracy are direct economic and technical benefits which flowed from the organizations. Note that this was not a causal mechanism considered in Chapter 1. In the case of Hungary, the EU and the Council of Europe provided both monetary and technical assistance which facilitated the completion of the transition to democracy.

This assistance was targeted to support a broad array of economic reforms, yet the failure of this economic reform could have spilled over to the political process. The fear is that a poor economy will give rise to anti-democratic (especially nationalist) elements within Hungary, reversing the trend towards greater political and economic reform. As it became the Pentagonal. Finally, with invitations to the former Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia, it became known as the CEI. See Banks and Mueller (1998: 1078).

133 In fact, the EU had explicitly noted that Central European’s ability to “cooperate with one another” was a central issue in their accession to the Union. See Bunce (1997: 251).

134 The second section discussed the economic benefits of NATO membership, which could be considered more of a direct form of bribery (of the military elite). The economic assistance discussed in this section was quite diffuse in that it was not targeted to any social group in particular. Thus, I hesitate to label this assistance “bribery.”
one observer of the Eastern European transitions has argued, “The main threat to liberal
democracy in Eastern Europe apart from the former Yugoslavia is economic insecurity”
(Herring 1994: 111; see also Pinder 1991: 51). Economic crisis can give rise to extremist
groups or undermine public confidence in reform efforts. To counter these possibilities,
several IOs have attempted to help Hungary undertake economic and political reform.

The EU was the first IO to institute a large aid program to Eastern Europe. It
should be noted that the program, known as the Poland-Hungary Assistance for
Economic Reconstruction (PHARE), was undertaken before Poland or Hungary had
signed their association agreement with the Community. Nonetheless, PHARE did step
up its activities after the “Europe Agreements” were signed.\textsuperscript{135} The purpose of PHARE
was to help cushion the problems associated with the transition to a market economy in
Hungary (Hyde-Price 1996: 199; Kovrig 1999: 258-9). Grants included assistance in the
process of privatization, small enterprise development, debt forgiveness, increasing job
training programs, and assisting reform of the financial sector (Pinder 1991: 89-90;

In addition to direct economic assistance, other forms of aid have been provided
as well. The Council of Europe has concentrated on providing technical assistance to
Hungary and the other new Central European democracies (Klebes 1999: 41). In 1990,
the Council created the Demosthenes Program which provides “expertise and experience
acquired by the Council of Europe and its member states in all aspects of the organization
and functioning of participatory democracy” (Kritz 1993: 25). This program has

\textsuperscript{135} In addition, assistance was later extended to other Eastern European states and the Baltics. See van
Brahant 1994: 534. Hungary’s portion of PHARE assistance did decline after the expansion of the
program. By 1994, Hungary received only 8.6 percent of PHARE’s outlays. See Kovrig 1999: 258.
explicitly attempted to “strengthen the reform movement towards genuine democracy” (Hyde-Price 1996: 192). In fact, in response to requests the Council, Hungary has reformed its entire legal system, particularly their criminal codes, to meet standards set by the European Convention on Human Rights (Hyde-Price 1996: 193).

Finally, through the “Europe Agreements”, the EU members states have opened their markets to Hungarian goods. The Agreement also sets a time table for tariff reductions on other goods excluded from the initial agreement (e.g., industrial and agricultural goods) (Koop 1997: 316). The purpose of this Agreement with Hungary is to help support economic and political reforms by contributing to export-led growth while ensuring against “massive protection” of Western European goods “once the initial liberalisation euphoria has passed” (Mayhew 1998: 23). 136 This is especially important given the down-turn in Hungary’s economy during the reform period. Thus, the EU states have attempted to stabilize the Hungarian economy by spurring exports. Although there is some evidence that this agreement has helped, most observers have criticized the EU for not liberalizing trade enough with Central Europe, concentrating instead on protecting their own domestic industries. 137

These monetary, trade, and technical assistance programs provided by IOs continue to encourage the reform process. Whether through economic assistance, export opportunities, or technical assistance, these IOs have provided both a cushion to difficult economic adjustments and information on the best way to undertake these adjustments. Moreover, the explicit conditions attached to this assistance provides a deterrent to those

---

136 On the importance of export-led growth to all the Visegrad states, see Hyde-Price (1996: 201-202).
137 For a review of these arguments and the evidence, see Brown et al 1997: 25-26; Messerlin 1992; and Gower 1993: 289-90.
who would derail the reform process. This continued support from a variety of IOs is important given the long-term nature of the transition process (Pridham 1999: 61).

According to the *Economist* (1993: 20), “The continuation of the region’s [reform] policies depends on the EC, which provides markets to help the countries grow over time and also provides disincentives to extremism. Central Europe might remain stable outside the EC. But its chances of doing so would be smaller, and would shrink over time”.

5.3.3. *Discussion and Conclusion*

Three issues arise when reflecting on this case study. First, one could argue (along the lines of realists) that international organizations were epiphenomenal in this case. That is, Hungary was committed to democracy early and there was never a danger that they would not complete the transition, with or without assistance from international organizations. As pointed out numerous times throughout the study, however, there were several threats to Hungarian democracy which could have easily emerged after the initial political and economic liberalization. Although the radical right has yet to gain widespread support, far right political groups continue to be active in Hungarian politics (Goldman 1997: 200). As previously discussed, appeals to nationalism could have played a part in the unraveling of reform in Hungary. In combination with poor economic performance, these trends could have presented a major roadblock for the completion of the transition to democracy. As one observer noted in 1993, “the future

---

138 On the conditionality of the EC/EU assistance, see Gower 1993: 290-291.

139 For more details concerning these problems and others for the post-transition period in Hungary, see Goldman 1997: 197-211.
[of democracy] is by no means secure” (Kun 1993: 126). In post-transitional settings, I have tried to show that IOs can be extremely valuable in spurring the process to completion. According to Adrian Hyde-Price (1996: 212):

“Western governments and multilateral organizations can provide positive economic and financial incentives for democratic reform in the East. By raising the costs of political recidivism, a significant disincentive can be created which might help deter East European elites from reverting to pre-war patterns of authoritarian populism.”

Second, some could argue that Hungary’s case shows that the relationship between IOs and democracy works in the opposite direction—transitions to democracy increases involvement in IOs, not the other way around. For example, it is not difficult to find a plethora of statements from EU officials claiming that only when Hungary is a full democracy will it be allowed to enter the Union (Palmer 1995: 9). Even though this may point to the fact that a state may join more IOs after they complete the transition to democracy, Hungary demonstrates that many are joined before the completion. For example, the Association Agreement with the EC, CEFTA, entry into the PFP, and accession to the Council of Europe all occurred within a short time after liberalization. Thus, although based on this case one can conclude that liberalization may influence joining IOs, this does not imply that these IOs may not assist in the completion of democracy. Indeed, given the potential start-and-stop nature of the reform process, John Pinder has argued that “stable democracy is not a fait accompli. Economic failure or the rise of destructive nationalism could reverse the [reform] process” (Pinder 1991: 41).

Nonetheless, this case (as well as Peru and Turkey) may illustrate an interesting scope condition of the theory outlined in Chapter 1. Namely, IOs can be powerful forces for the completion of democracy or for re-democratization. In no transition case is there
strong evidence that membership in IOs spurred a state towards an initial liberalization after a long period of autocratic rule. I will return to this issue in the conclusion of this chapter.

Finally, this case highlights an important element missing from the causal mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1: direct economic and technical benefits provided by IOs. It should be noted that some of the financial assistance provided by the EU occurred before Hungary had joined this organization as an associate member. Still, this illustrates another powerful mechanism through which IOs can encourage the completion of the democratic transition. By providing monetary and technical assistance to ease the transition process, IOs can increase the probability of this process coming to fruition.

In conclusion, Hungary demonstrates the power of multiple IOs in assisting the completion of democracy. By providing financial incentives, conditional assistance, external validation and legitimacy, and socialization of military elites, these multilateral organizations can “give practical encouragement to liberal and reforming coalitions in the East, and...impede the emergence of autarkic, repressive and nationalist policies in these fragile polities” (Hyde-Price 1996: 212; see also Snyder 1990).

5.4. Peru: A Partial Success

Peru provides evidence that IOs can help to pressure authoritarians to re-democratization. Through the exertion of diplomatic pressure, the threat of economic sanctions, and the use of the institution as a forum for discussing democracy-related issues, the Organization of American States (OAS) has facilitated the partial re-democratization of Peru. I label this case a “partial” success since to many observers of
Latin American politics, Peru has yet to return to a full-fledged democracy (Hakim 2000). President Alberto Fujimori appeared to be headed for another term as Peru’s president after altering the constitution to allow his candidacy, but the emergence of a strong opposition and continued international pressure has come close to thwarting his attempts at a third term. Although Peru may not be a full-fledged democracy, I will argue that without the pressure of international organizations, specifically the OAS, Peru could very well have slid into full-fledged dictatorship.

5.4.1. Peruvian Democracy and the Autogolpe

Peru’s transition to democracy in 1980 took place under extremely difficult circumstances. High poverty, a well-armed and active anti-government insurgency, a weak party system, and the highest ethnic heterogeneity in Latin America all contributed to the difficulty in building a solid democracy in Peru. These obstacles led one Latin American scholar to suggest that Peru was the “least likely case” for democratic consolidation (McClintock 1989). Unfortunately, these words would be quite prophetic.

Peru’s first two democratic regimes, led by Fernando Belaunde and Alan Garcia, attempted to confront widespread poverty as well as rising civil violence especially in the Peruvian countryside. Neither president experienced much success. By the end of the Garcia administration (1990), inflation had risen to a staggering 7,650 percent. Growth fell by 32 percent through the 1980s (Palmer 2000). Garcia suspended all debt servicing payments to international lenders which further eroded international confidence in the Peruvian economy.
Perhaps the greatest threat to democratic stability in Peru has come from the threat of armed rebellion. Two major guerilla groups seeking to topple the Peruvian government have emerged in the past 20 years. The most widely known group, the Sendero Luminoso, or Shining Path, is a Maoist insurgency known for its extreme violence in both rural and major metropolitan areas (Degregori 1997). From 1980 to 1987, Sendero violence claimed over 11,000 lives (McClintock 1989) and in 1990 alone, over 3,800 deaths were a result of their terrorist attacks (Palmer 2000). The lesser known of the guerilla groups, the Tupac Amaru (MTRA) movement, is less violent, yet still active against the Peruvian government (Durand 1997: 166). Neither Belaunde nor Garcia were able to make in-roads in fighting these rebel groups during their administrations, yet both come under heavy criticism for allowing the military a free hand in dealing with these groups. Critics contend that this action allowed massive human rights violations by the military, which were then reciprocated by the rebels (McClintock 1993: 113).

Peru’s party system is highly fragmented and few of the parties are highly institutionalized (McClintock 1989: 131). Thus, the four major parties in Peru remain independent from one another, yet none are able to establish a coherent base of support. Fighting among the parties is increasingly viewed with disdain, which has led to the alienation of Peruvians from the current party system (McClintock 1989: 130-132).

Finally, Peru’s ethnic heterogeneity provides an additional challenge to democracy. Indian, Spanish, and Asian cultures provide a number of religious and ethnic cleavages which are exacerbated by income inequalities which follow similar dividing lines. These cleavages are exacerbated by a rural-urban division as well. Thus, rural
dwellers tend to be of Indian decent and poor, while urban dwellers are either of Spanish or Asian decent, well-educated, and relatively wealthy. These divisions are exploited by both the rebel movements and the political parties of Peru, exacerbating an already difficult situation.

In 1990, however, a political underdog with no party affiliation rose to power. Alberto Fujimori captured the presidency with an overwhelming majority in that year’s elections. Fujimori was a newcomer to politics and represented a protest vote against the existing party system (Costa 1993: 29). Upon taking office, he moved quickly to consolidate presidential power and improve his relations with the military. While both Belaunde and Garcia had been “somewhat constrained” by their political parties, because of the independent nature of Fujimori’s campaign, he had few constraints when making presidential policy (McClintock 1993: 114; Costa 1993: 30). He used this autonomy to make major changes in Peru, including increasing counterinsurgency efforts, re-establishing relations with the international financial community, deepening efforts at neo-liberal market reform, and entering an agreement with the United States to begin a massive anti-drug program in Peru (McClintock 1993: 114).

By the end of 1991, however, the courts and legislature began to exert their ability to check Fujimori’s power. On several occasions, either the judiciary or the legislature (or both) attempted to overturn Fujimori’s executive orders. In addition, charges of corruption among the Fujimori family were beginning to arise in the spring of 1992. After weeks of rising tensions between Fujimori, the judiciary, and the legislature, Fujimori announced the implementation of a Government Emergency and National
Reconstruction, dissolving parliament and suspending the judiciary on April 5, 1992. Fujimori had instituted a coup against his own government—an autogolpe.

5.4.2. IOs and Democratization: The Pressure of the OAS

Fujimori’s actions were quite popular within Peru. The population had become unhappy with the fragmented party system and the bickering amongst the more powerful parties over Fujimori’s reform efforts. Polls taken immediately after the autogolpe found that an astounding 70 percent favored Fujimori’s actions (Mauceri 1997; Costa 1993: 33). Most observers trace this support to Peruvian’s disenchantment with “politics as usual” and the fact that Fujimori had implemented a series of successful economic reforms.

Fujimori anticipated his actions would be popular at home given the widespread discontent with status quo politics (Cameron 1997: 62-4). What he drastically underestimated, however, was the response from abroad. None of the military officers supporting Fujimori were concerned with external reaction, since in the words of one officer, “the measures were not perceived as a golpe because there was to be no change in the president” (quoted in Cameron 1997: 64). Even the cabinet minister for external relations purportedly told Fujimori that the external situation was “under control” (quoted in Cameron 1997: 65). Yet Fujimori and this supporters were unprepared for the world response to come (Cameron 1997: 64-66).

In 1991, the OAS approved the Santiago Declaration, which gave that group the right to defend democracy in member states (Munoz 1993). The Declaration mandates that the OAS must begin immediate consultations if there is an interruption of democracy.

146 Fujimori’s own party Cambio 90 was formed only in the year of the election as a vehicle for his
in any member state (Munoz 1995: 1). The Declaration does not require an immediate imposition of sanctions, but the meeting of the OAS general assembly in these cases can make decisions regarding any punishment or pressure to be meted out against the offending state. This mechanism was first used in the case of Haiti in 1991. It was also invoked in the case of Peru.

The reaction of the OAS and most of its members was swift and clear: Fujimori’s move was a blow to democracy and he was called upon to restore democracy immediately. The OAS, under the obligations of the Santiago Declaration, publicly condemned Fujimori’s actions and called an emergency assembly meeting in the Bahamas. Before the meeting, Fujimori had refused to receive an OAS delegation investigating the status of human rights in Peru after the coup. There was little expectation that Fujimori would heed OAS calls to restore democracy. In the words of one observer, “it appeared as if the government had little interest in re-establishing democratic institutions” (Mauceri 1997). Fujimori had ruled out an elected assembly to draft a new constitution and promised to undertake sweeping judicial and congressional reforms (Coad 1992: 10).

Fujimori would make an about-face over the next month. International pressure, especially from the OAS and its members played a key role in this process. First, the OAS, under the Santiago Declaration, called an emergency meeting in Nassau, Bahamas for mid-May. The coordination among individuals within the OAS would be a source of pressure on Fujimori. Indeed, after visits from OAS ambassadors, Fujimori decided to attend and address the Bahamas Conference. Specifically, some observers have argued

candidacy; see McClintock (1993: 113).
that the efforts of Hector Gross, an Ecuadorian foreign minister with the OAS, convinced Fujimori to address the OAS assembly concerning his actions (Coad 1992: 10). Without the institutional backing of the OAS, however, it is difficult to say whether Ambassador Gross would have had a similar influence on Fujimori.

Second, the OAS planned to consider placing sanctions on Peru in the wake of Fujimori’s actions. Although there is mixed evidence on whether such sanctions would have been enacted (see Costa 1993: 37; McClintock 1993: 115), the possibility of such action clearly worried Fujimori (Cameron 1997: 66). Carlos Bolona, Fujimori’s Minister of the Economy and a close political ally, had threatened to resign after the autogolpe in fear of sanctions from the OAS and the suspension of assistance from the international financial community (Cameron 1997: 66).

During his visit to the OAS conference, Fujimori committed to a new schedule for elections in Peru for a Constituent Assembly which would draft a new constitution (Graham 1994: 8). This schedule promised elections more quickly than Fujimori had previously indicated, moving them forward several months to November of 1992 (Palmer 1996: 72). He also agreed to suspend his plans for a plebiscite to legitimize his autogolpe. With these announcements and the signing of the Bahamas Resolution, the OAS and its members eased their restrictions on aid and credit to Peru (Kay 1996: 63; Costa 1993: 37). In addition, Fujimori’s concessions forestalled any move towards placing sanctions on Peru within the OAS.

---

141 Fujimori had initially promised a plebiscite on the acceptability of the coup in “18 months to 2 years” (Cameron 1994: 155). Thus, the movement of full legislative elections to November of 1992 was a significant concession.
It is clear that Fujimori and his supporters had not counted on any international outcry in response to the autogolpe (Cameron 1994: 154). Thus, the swift and clear reaction of the OAS and its members surprised and “agitated” Fujimori (Cameron 1997: 66), which certainly contributed to its influence in persuading Fujimori to restore democracy more quickly than he planned. Many Latin American observers have credited the OAS efforts with helping to restore some semblance of democracy in Peru through its pressure on Fujimori (Munoz 1995: 12; Hakim 1993: 42).

5.4.3. Did the OAS Make a Difference?

Some observers have questioned the general OAS commitment to democracy, and, more importantly, their efficacy in the case of Peru. The first argument is mainly that the OAS does not possess the political will nor institutional mechanisms to effectively defend democracy in Latin America. Specifically, the Santiago Declaration does not require anything other than a meeting concerning the suspension of democracy (Hakim 1993: 40). Moreover, in the case of Peru, some have even argued that the lack of a solid defense of democracy in both Panama and Haiti encouraged Fujimori to undertake the autogolpe without fear of reprisals from the OAS (Smith 1994: 40).

Despite these criticism of the OAS as an institution for the defense of democracy, the organization did play a role in convincing Fujimori to back down and even its critics admit that it acted very quickly in the Peruvian case (Hakim 1993). Although it is correct that the OAS is under no legal obligation to impose sanctions to restore democracy, in this case the pressure exerted through the OAS short of sanctions was enough to bring concessions from Fujimori. Thus, at a minimum the OAS serves as a forum to facilitate
international pressure on regimes whose commitment to democracy wavers. In the words of one Peruvian scholar, "international pressure . . . has kept Peru from falling into the hands of a highly authoritarian and repressive government" (Rospigliosi 1994: 55).

Another argument is that the OAS had little to do with Fujimori's decision to begin the shift to back to democracy. Rather, some contend that the United States alone played the important role in convincing Fujimori to back down. In fact, the U.S. did play an important role in this crisis. The U.S. immediately suspended aid to Peru and pressured several aid organizations including the IMF to withhold over $2 billion in financial assistance (Palmer 1996: 71). Some argue it was this U.S. response, not the OAS actions, that drove Fujimori to make concession towards democracy (Economist 1992: 44; Hakim 1993).

While it is true that U.S. opposition to Fujimori was crucial to his concessions, even U.S. officials admit that the OAS facilitated their opposition to his coup. The U.S. coordinated their suspension of aid and diplomatic pressure with the OAS (Roberts and Peceny 1997: 217). This helped to bolster both the U.S. and the OAS response. During this time period, the U.S. was very focused on the OAS as a key actor in both the Peruvian and Haitian crises which were occurring simultaneously. The American ambassador to the OAS stressed the need for a "multilateral framework" in dealing with Haiti and Peru since Latin American states were hesitant to be seen as caving to U.S. wishes (Madison 1992: 1408). Thus, the U.S. and the OAS served to mutually reinforce one another in this case, since the OAS was able to serve as a mechanism by which all interested parties could coordinate their responses to the crisis.142

142 On the coordination efforts of the U.S. in the OAS during the Peruvian crisis, see Cameron 1994: 155.
5.4.4. IOs and Democratization: Other Causal Mechanisms?

In the case of Peru, neither the acquiescence effect nor psychological benefits from IO membership are present. Thus, the only causal mechanism outlined in Chapter 1 which appears relevant in this case is that of external pressure. Note that this is a case of liberalization rather than completion of democracy. More specifically, it is a case of a regional IO’s association with re-democratization. One hypothesis that emerges from this case is that IOs are more effective in cases of re-democratization. This may be an especially strong hypothesis given the final case of transition, Turkey.

5.4.5. Discussion, Conclusion, and Epilogue

Of course, as many observers of Peruvian politics argue, democracy has not been fully restored in Peru. Fujimori continues to hold a tight grip on power and refuses to submit most his (and the military’s) actions to judicial or legislative review (Palmer 2000). While his popularity has waned since the coup, Fujimori retains significant support in Peru. This is in no doubt due to his successful counterinsurgency and economic policies which have increased safety and prosperity in Peru (Hakim 2000). Fujimori’s policies of privatization, for example, spurred tremendous growth in the Peruvian economy. By 1994, Peru was experiencing 12 percent growth and was the “darling of the international financial community” (Kay 1996: 64). Sendero Luminoso’s leader, Abdel Guzman, and several of his aides were captured by Peruvian secret police in September of 1992 and deaths from domestic terrorism fell to under 150 a year in 1998 (Palmer 2000: 60).
Recently, Fujimori has changed the Peruvian constitution to allow himself a third term as president. Critics have argued that United States’ (and OAS) opposition to Fujimori was relatively short lived, allowing Fujimori more latitude to remake a system that is less democratic than before (Hakim 1992: M2, 1993: 42; Cameron and Mauceri 1997: 241). Although the U.S. did withhold financial assistance, after Fujimori’s commitment to the OAS to hold new elections, the U.S. released $400 in World Bank loans in June 1992 (Monshipouri 1995: 121). Furthermore, the OAS has resumed normal relations with Peru, although they have been active in monitoring elections over the past eight years.143

Peru thus appears to be a case where international pressure began the process of re-democratization, but has yet to push it to its completion. According to Peter Hakim, of the Inter-American Dialogue, “It is a tribute to international pressure that Peruvians went to the polls November 22 [1992] for a special election that was supposed to restore constitutional rule. But it was Fujimori—not democracy—that emerged the winner” (Hakim 1992: M2).

Scholars of Peruvian politics had assumed that Fujimori was well on his way to re-election in April of 2000. Fujimori had used his control over state media to smear many opposition candidates and many considered the electoral process problematic (Hakim 2000). Stunningly, a little-known opposition figure, Alejandro Toledo has forced a run-off for the presidential election. Even in the primary election, however, international pressure was important in forcing Fujimori to agree to a run-off. After three

143 Some observers have criticized the OAS role in the Constituent Council Elections, noting that by legitimizing those elections, the OAS has de facto legitimated Fujimori’s actions. See Rospiglosi (1994: 56).
days of delays in reporting election results, public pressure from the U.S. and the OAS as well as opposition demonstrations in Peru forced Fujimori to accede to a run-off (Otis 2000: A30). The chief of the OAS observer mission, Eduardo Stein, portrayed international actions as essential to Fujimori's decision: "There would be real problems of governability if the election results were not accepted by half the country and the international community" (quoted in Rotella 2000: A1).

Although the outcome of the run-off election is still uncertain, international pressure, especially from the OAS has again played an important role in pressuring Fujimori to maintain some standard of democratic accountability. Even though Fujimori may win a third term as Peru's president, there is no doubt he is and will continue to be under the watchful eye of international actors, especially the OAS.

5.5. Conclusion: Assessing the Transition Cases

Table 5.2 presents the findings on the three cases of a transition to democracy. Several conclusions can be drawn from these findings. First, the acquiescence effect, although certainly supported by theoretical material on transitions and international institutions (especially economic regionalism), is at best, moderately supported in these studies. Moreover, only one part of this mechanisms seems to be relevant—the effect of military-oriented IOs on civil-military relations. In Hungary, and to a lesser extent Turkey, membership in highly democratic military IOs seemed to improve the prospects for stable civil-military relations through a socialization process. The involvement of Hungarian and Turkish officers with other (in both cases NATO) officers, helped to
socialize them into accepting civilian supremacy and their proper role in guaranteeing only the external security of the state.\textsuperscript{144}

What was not supported in terms of the acquiescence effect was the interaction of regional organizations and their interaction with domestic economic elites. Recall that one hypothesis was that membership in certain economic-oriented IOs would calm elite fears of threats to their property rights and other policies supported by non-democratic governments since the IO represented an external guarantee of these rights and preferences. I found no evidence of these dynamics in the cases presented here. Moreover, besides the brief examples mentioned in Chapter 1 involving Southern Europe, I could find little evidence for this argument in any other cases of democratic transitions.

I would offer three potential explanations for this finding. First, it is possible that this acquiescence effect plays a large role in the consolidation of democracy, rather than the transition (see Whitehead 1989: 84-5). While this is certainly plausible, one must question the timing of entry into the organization. That is, if elite fears have led to their support of authoritarianism in the past, why would they first acquiesce to democracy, then attempt to join these regional organizations? It would seem that these assurances would be required before the transition occurs. Still, it is possible that these assurances are important after the initial transition, as the implications of new political institutions become apparent.

\textsuperscript{144} For Turkey, I argue that that the speed with which the military left power (and they fact that they did at all) is partially explained by this socialization process. Still, because they directly intervened in Turkish politics in the first place, this finding is weak at best.
A second possibility is that internal guarantees are utilized to assure powerful elites that they will be protected in the democratization process. Power sharing arrangements, exclusion of some opposition groups, or reserved domains could be used to make sure that key elite actors feel protected during the transition period.\textsuperscript{145} Third, it is possible that in most transitions, most of the powerful elite have an innate desire for democracy. If democracy truly is “an equilibrium outcome”, then elites may feel that they can do just as well under an open competition system without having to pay the costs of repression (Przeworski 1991). In addition, they can benefit from the added legitimacy of a democratic system (Mainwaring 1992). There would be little need for elite assurances under these conditions, whether internal or external in form.

The second conclusion I would draw from these case studies as a whole is that membership in IOs is most effective in assisting the completion of democratization (moving from an anocracy to a democracy) and in the process of re-democratization. I could find little evidence that the IOs included in these studies had an impact on moving states to begin the liberalization process unless they had recently undergone a change from democracy to autocracy. The cases of Peru and Turkey are typical in this respect. In both of these cases a significant movement from authoritarianism to anocracy or democracy occurred, but in both instances, it was very soon after a slide towards autocracy. I found little evidence in these or any other cases that membership in international organizations can pressure or facilitate an authoritarian state’s move to democracy when the regime has been in power for many years.

\textsuperscript{145} As discussed in Chapter 1, however, these bargains are difficult to enforce in the transitional environment given the massive uncertainty of that period. In these instances, IOs would be used to increase
There could be several explanations for this pattern. One is that the transition literature on the determinants of liberalization is correct that external factors play a miniscule role in determining when a state begins the process of democratization. Thus, external forces may play little or no role in the process of “splitting” the ruling coalition—a factor which much of the transitions literature argues is an essential prerequisite to liberalization (cf. Przeworski 1991; Schmitter and O’Donnell 1986). Second, autocratic states may stay out of IOs which consist mostly of democracies out of fear that membership could push them to liberalize. If they foresee the influence of these regional IOs, they may opt to stay away from them even if they offer other significant political or economic benefits. These are clearly testable propositions which, if properly investigated through large-N and/or further case study could help clarify this seeming lack of relationship between IO membership and the liberalization process.

Third, the study of Hungary uncovered an additional causal mechanism: the transfer of resources from the IO to the member state. The importance of this transfer (from both the EC/EU and NATO) is evident in the Hungarian study. Considering Hungary was a case of democratic completion rather than liberalization or re-democratization, one hypothesis would be that this transfer of resources is essential for completing the transition to democracy. That is, to overcome the short term challenges of shifting form an interim government to an open political system especially when this is accompanied by a transition to a more liberal economy, IOs can provide valuable economic assistance (whether in the form of direct aid, loans, or increased trade). These short term challenges to the transition are highest when a dual (economic and political)
transition is underway.\textsuperscript{146} States must face the difficulties associated with a political transition (e.g., creating new political institutions, reforming political parties) along with the economic costs of a neoliberal economic transition (e.g., shifting to free markets, privatization of state-owned industries, trade liberalization). These resources from IOs can help to legitimize interim regimes to ensure they do not succumb to internal pressure because of poor economic conditions.

The pressure mechanism was found in two of the three cases examined. Based on these cases, it would appear that pressure is commonly found in instances of re-democratization. Thus, IO member states which suffer a breakdown of democracy are susceptible to pressure through the organization. This is consistent with the arguments of institutionalist theory in international relations. Institutions increase information exchange, assist in the construction of focal points, and lower transaction costs, all of which make it easier to coordinate pressure on a new authoritarian regime. In addition, multilateral pressure can be more effective than unilateral efforts since violations of state sovereignty are less clear-cut in the multilateral setting (Whitehead 1989).

A final conclusion which emerges from the three transition studies is the importance of the legitimization or psychological impact of membership in IOs in only one case. Given the low number of case studies, it is only possible to speculate about the nature of this legitimization process and its relationship to democratization. Still, the case of Hungary suggests that this influence is strongest when the state has a long history of non-democracy. In other words, the more of an authoritarian past a new democratic consolidation than transition
\textsuperscript{146} On the challenges of dual transitions see Bartlett and Hunier 1997; and Armijo, Biersteker, and Lowenthal 1995.
regime must overcome, the more important is membership in highly democratic IOs.

This is somewhat intuitive given that it will be states that have a distant history or no history with democracy that may have a more difficult time signaling their intention (to international and domestic observers) to become a full-fledged democracy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/ Mechanism</th>
<th>Peru</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acquiescence Effect</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimization/</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Weak</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressure</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Assistance*</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*—not included in Chapter 1 causal mechanisms.

**Table 5.2:** Transition Cases and Evidence of Causal Mechanisms

In conclusion, these case studies have provided additional insight into the relationship between regional organizations and democratic transitions. While evidence of several of the causal processes (pressure from member states, psychological factors) discussed in Chapter 1 were found in these three case studies, others were not as well supported (acquiescence effect). In addition, a new causal process was uncovered in the case of Hungary—the direct provision of assistance and technical expertise. Perhaps more importantly, these studies have illustrated what appears to be a strong scope condition of this theory. Namely, IO-induced liberalization seems to only occur in cases of re-democratization. No evidence in these or any other cases has been found to support
the contention that IOs push or facilitate the transition to democracy from years of authoritarian rule.

Despite this exception, however, there is substantial evidence that regional organizations can be associated with the transition to democracy, whether in the case of re-democratization or the completion of the transition. Chapter 3 provided large-N statistical support for this proposition, while these studies have added depth to this finding, as well as some elucidation of the causal mechanisms at work.
CHAPTER 6

REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY:
EVIDENCE FROM CASES

6.1. IOs and Consolidation: Causal Mechanisms

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate three case studies to determine whether the causal mechanisms outlined in Chapter 1 are behind the statistical associations between regional organizations and democratic consolidation found in Chapter 4. The countries examined include Greece, Paraguay, and Turkey.147 Table 6.1 presents a list of the causal mechanisms which will be examined in each case study. In addition, the case of Turkey will include a test for the mechanisms associated with transitions to democracy since that case contains dynamics of both democratic breakdown and re-democratization within a relatively short time frame.

As in Chapter 5, each case will begin with a brief historical introduction for the country including relevant background information. I will then review the causal mechanisms, discussing whether there is evidence of IO influence via these processes. Finally, for each study I will discuss any countervailing evidence which could mitigate the impact of IOs on the consolidation process.

---

147 Chapter 5 outlines the selection criteria for these cases.
Consolidation Mechanisms (Chapters 1 and 4)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Binding—Deters Losers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>—Conditions on Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Bribery of Societal Groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Committing Winners</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>—Conditions on Membership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>—Legitimization and Audience Costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.1: Hypothesized Causal Mechanisms Linking IOs to Consolidation

6.2. Greece

Perhaps more than any other nation in history, the Greek people have experienced an ebb and flow of democracy. From the origins of the concept of democracy in ancient Athens to the movement for independence in the early 19th century to the Greek civil war, the Greek political system has experienced systems of monarchy, autocracy, democracy, and most systems in-between.

The 20th century was no better for the Greek populous in terms of their vacillating experience with democracy. The most significant and highly visible period of change came between 1967 and 1974, when Greek democracy was ended by a military coup and then re-instated. Today, most observers would consider the current Greek regime a consolidated democracy—one with "the most openly democratic regime in modern Greek history" (Diamandouros 1986: 140). But what role, if any, did international organizations play in helping Greece reach this status? This case study will give a brief historical
background of the 1967-1974 period followed by an analysis of the influence of several European organizations on the consolidation of Greek democracy.

6.2.1. Background

The mid-1960s were a time of upheaval for the political system of Greece. From 1955 to 1963, Constantine Karamanlis was the premier of Greece as well as the head of the National Radical Union (ERE).\textsuperscript{148} Under Karamanlis' watch, Greece successfully rebuilt its political and economic systems after its devastating civil war (1946-1949). During this period, the political system was liberalized by a lifting of many repressive laws enacted during the civil war. After Karamanlis' party was defeated by the liberal (but anti-Communist) Centre Union in 1963, Karamanlis went into self-imposed exile. The Centre Union was headed by George Papandreou, a "veteran liberal politician", who within two years was at loggerheads with King Constantine II over the control of the military (Clogg 1979a: 110).

The dispute brought a rupture within the Centre Union which splintered into two opposing factions. July 1965 brought a political crisis between the ERE and both factions of the Centre Union. Unable to stabilize leadership positions in the government, Papandreou and the new ERE chief Panayiotis Kanellopoulos agreed in late 1966 to hold elections the following May. These elections were cancelled, however, when on April 21, 1967 a small group of military officers (who became known as "the Colonels") overthrew the civilian government.

\textsuperscript{148} These historical details are recounted from Clogg 1979a; Clogg 1979b.
The motivation of the colonels is not entirely clear (Clogg 1979a), but a major factor was the possibility of a Centre Union victory in the following month's elections. Papandreou had threatened to put the armed forces under complete civilian control, undermining their autonomy. The coup marked the beginning of seven years of authoritarianism for this Southern European state. During this time, the colonels attempted to legitimize their regime by adopting a new constitution, abolishing the monarchy, and holding presidential elections (in which only one candidate was allowed to compete) (Clogg 1979a: 111-112).

The initial reaction of Greek citizens was one of mostly "apathy" (Clogg 1979a: 111). Popular sentiment did eventually turn against the colonel's regime, however, reaching its zenith during the brutal repression of the November 1973 Athens Polytechnic uprising. The reaction of Europe, however, was not apathetic. In the words of one observer: "In the face of such a general external acceptance of the abolition of democracy in Greece, Western Europe was a particularly eloquent exception" (Siotis 1983: 59). The Council of Europe expelled the colonel's regime from that community of nations (Pridham 1991: 215).146 Equally, if not more important, the European Community "froze" their association agreement with Greece (Tovias 1984: 161; Coufoudakis 1977; Ioakimidis 1994: 141).

The EC-Greek association agreement was signed in 1961. It conferred some of the membership benefits of the EC to Greece immediately and set a time-table for

---

146 Technically, the colonels quit the organization on the eve of the resolution to suspend their membership. See Verney and Coloumbis 1991: 109.
Greece's full entry into the Community by 1974 (Yannopoulos 1975). A small handful of scholars of the Greek transition have argued that the freezing of the association agreement had little effect on the colonel’s regime (Clogg 1979a: 119; also Yannopoulos 1975). Despite this claim, the balance of scholarly research on the subject agrees with Verney and Coloumbis (1991: 109): "Greece suffered immediate financial consequences from the freezing of the Greece-EC Financial Protocol and the agricultural harmonisation talks. But the possible long-term consequences were far more serious." Greece became quite isolated politically and economically from its European neighbors. Whether these events support the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1—that is, whether the EC or other IOs assisted in the transition to democracy will be dealt with in the final section of this study.

Soon after the Athens Polytechnic incident, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus brought a swift end to the colonel’s regime. They proved to be completely unable to mobilize for the war in Cyprus, which proved disastrous for the Greek military’s campaign against the Turks. In the analysis of one observer, preparation for the Cyprus conflict was "a shambles" (Clogg 1979a: 112). This external military crisis brought an internal political crisis as well. Several powerful Greek military leaders called for a return to civilian leadership and within weeks, the colonels had stepped down in favor of a new civilian government, led by Constantine Karamanlis.

6.2.2. The New Greek Democracy

The Karamanlis government faced many challenges in its quest to become a stable, consolidated democracy including coping with a legacy of military repression, re-
establishing ties with European allies, and pursuing economic stabilization in light of the 1970s oil shocks. A central part of his strategy to stabilize his fledgling regime was to push for membership in the European Community. Little more than a year after the fall of the colonel's regime (July 1975), the Karamanlis government applied for full membership (Siotis 1983: 59).

The Community offered many economic benefits to Greece. In hindsight, however, many observers have stressed the political over the economic goals of membership (Ioakimidis 1994: 139; Wallace 1994: 18). Upon submitting the application to the European Commission, Karamanlis himself stated: "I would like to emphasize that Greece does not seek integration solely for economic reasons; it is primarily on political grounds that our application rests, reasons related to the consolidation of democracy and the destiny of our nation" (quoted in Pridham 1991: 226). The Commission acted quickly on Greece's application and in 1979, the Greek-EC Accession Treaty was signed. In 1981, Greece became a full member of the European Union.

Even at the time, despite the widely cited association between Greece's accession to the EC and the consolidation of democracy, few observers articulated the functional mechanisms behind this effect. If a major purpose of the EC was to consolidate democracy, almost no one seemed to elucidate how this would take place. Given the current state of Greek democracy, we may now ask whether the EC played a significant role in the consolidation process. My answer to this question is an unequivocal yes. The next section will elucidate the three causal mechanisms which underlie this answer.

European Union, I will refer to this organization as the EC throughout this case.
6.2.2.1. **IO Membership and Democratic Consolidation: The Causal Mechanisms**

Although some observers give economic issues a backseat in the discussion of Greece’s accession to EC membership, a major issue in the *consolidation* process was economics. The economic benefits (and potential economic benefits) which flowed from EC membership provided a mechanism to simultaneously bind some societal actors through the conditionality of EC membership, while bribing other domestic groups. In addition, the psychological benefits of re-acceptance to the European Community as well as the Council of Europe increased the legitimacy of the new democratic regime while creating potential audience costs for those who would move against democracy. Finally, changes in Greek political institutions required by EC membership further consolidated Greek democracy by increasing these institutions’ openness and transparency—a mechanism not discussed in Chapter 1.

Perhaps the most powerful mechanism constructed by the Community to consolidate democracy and prevent breakdowns of democracy is the clear conditionality of membership. After the 1967 coup, Greece’s political and economic relations with Western Europe became quite contentious (see above). Clearly another slide away from democracy would bring similar sanction from the Community and its members. EC membership thus offered tremendous economic gains to economic elites, all of which were contingent upon meeting the EC’s conditions of membership. These conditions include adherence to EC-mandated economic policies, but also the maintenance of liberal democracy as well. This conditionality was (and is) a credible and costly deterrent mechanism for Greek elites for two reasons: 1) the significant (and growing) dependence of Greece on European trade, and 2) the large flow of financial aid from the Community.
Trade between Greece and EC member states was and continues to be extremely important. As of 1973, EC states accounted for 44 percent of Greek imports and 48 percent of Greek exports (Coufoudakis 1977: 124). More importantly, given Greece's location (bordered to the north by Communist states) along with their external relations (bordered to the east by their traditional enemy Turkey), there was little possibility for substitution of these goods or markets, creating a situation of high dependence with respect to Western Europe (Verney and Coloumbis 1991: 109). Although the geopolitical situation of the region has changed, Greece is still highly dependent on EC member states for trade and markets. The high dependence of Greece makes violations of the EC conditions extremely costly to Greek society. This link was explicitly drawn by Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis in the months before Greece's accession:

"Naturally, we do not expect our nine partners in the Community to become the guardians of Greek democracy. By joining a broader group of like-minded Western democracies, however, our own democratic institutions will be reinforced, through constant contact and interchange, but mainly because from now on Greece will share the destiny of its Community partners... They [prospective dictators] are bound to know that the abolition of democracy entails immediate ostracism from the Community. This could have grave internal and external consequences. So, in this respect, the EC is a safe haven" (quoted in Pridham 1991: 226; brackets in original).

The second reason these conditions are quite credible and costly arises from the direct financial flows from the Community. According to the OECD, almost five percent of the Greek GDP in 1989 came from net financial transfers from EC member states (OECD 1990: 68). Given this tremendous flow of resources, "the cost of a successful overthrow of parliamentarism ... has become forbiddingly high" (Verney and Coloumbis

---

151 In addition, the colonel's hands were tied concerning bargaining over trade and tariffs with Brussels. As of 1971, Greece's trade deficit with the EC states was larger than its total value of all exports (Verney and Tsakaloyannis 1986).
1991: 119). As with trade, financial transfers from the EC to Greece create a powerful economic binding mechanism to continue democracy.

Finally, the psychological impact of EC membership was quite important for the consolidation of democracy. As discussed in Chapter 1, a symbolic re-orientation of a new democratic regime can be an important step in distancing itself from its authoritarian predecessor and establishing its own legitimacy. Given the Greek's international isolation under the colonels, there were strong incentives to quickly establish Greece as a major regional and international force (Coufoudakis 1977). Membership in the Community as well as re-entry to the Council of Europe allowed an easy avenue to achieve this goal.

Similar to other southern European states, Greece had long struggled with its identity as an ally of the U.S., an aspirant to join the EC, and a bridge to the Middle East. Membership in the Community has served an important purpose in "anchor[ing] Greece securely to the West" (Macridis 1979: 147). Membership was a signal of legitimacy for the new regime and a signal of their desire to become part of "the West". By attempting to establish a Western identity, Karamanlis attempted to relay a picture of stability and democracy to both internal and external observers, strengthening the regime (Verney and Couloumbis 1991: 115; Pridham 1991: 226; Pridham 1995: 174-5). The implicit idea was that since western European states did not suffer through coups or the breakdown of democracy, neither would Greece.

Any would-be coup conspirators would pay enormous audience costs (both internal and external) for moving against democracy. Coup leaders would certainly not be able to establish legitimacy in the eyes of external observers which would no doubt
erode their support at home. As a pariah state in Western Europe, Greece would struggle in the political realm as it did in the 1967-1974 period. Assuming the Greek public also cared about its status in the world community, a coup would bring domestic audience costs as well. These costs would entail a lack of legitimization for the new regime which would make it difficult for the non-democratic regime to govern effectively. This is especially true since, although pockets of anti-EC sentiment continue to exist in Greece, overall public support for membership is still very strong (Ioakimidis 1994: 151).  

6.2.2.2. Bribery: “Buying” the Success of Democracy

Not only did economic incentives provide a powerful mechanism for groups such as the military and economic elites to stay out of the "coup business", economic assistance granted by the Community to Greece served as a powerful tool to buy the allegiance of certain actors in Greek society. As Basilios Tsingos has noted, rural Greece had been a traditional stronghold of anti-democratic forces, especially given rural interest's "susceptibility of authoritarian bribes" (Tsingos 1996: 341). EC membership brought monetary aid which was targeted to these rural areas, which had supported the colonels authoritarian regime.

This assistance enhanced rural acceptance of democracy and cushioned the financial costs of the transition to democracy for these actors. According to Tsingos (1996: 341) this financial assistance "positively enhanced the prospects for democracy to the extent that they helped establish a clear, causal connection between democracy, EC

---

152 Anecdotal evidence in support of this proposition is that despite their opposition to Greece's entry into the EC/EU, neither the Socialist Party of Greece (PASOK) nor Greek Communist Party (KKE) have
membership, and the prosperity for the now heavily subsidized countryside". Thus, bribery became an effective mechanism to buy acceptance of democratic politics in rural Greece (Pridham 1995: 184).

6.2.2.3. The EC and Institutional Change

Institutional mechanisms provided another buttressing effect of the EC for Greek democracy. Rather than referring to the conditionality of membership benefits, I refer here to the changes in domestic institutions which arose because of specific requirements of the EC. Joining a regional trade bloc or any other regional institution no doubt entails changes to domestic institutions. In the case of the EC and Greece, administrative reform was required upon Greek accession (Pridham 1995: 192). As one observer has noted, "membership provides an ideal opportunity to bring about the modernisation of the Greek state and bureaucracy, which is long overdue" (Tsoulakis 1981: 110; see also Featherstone 1994). This reform and modernization enhanced the responsiveness and performance of the Greek government, which improved public perceptions of the regime (Pridham 1995: 193).

In addition to this "reform from above", domestic institutions may change through interaction with their counterparts from other member states. In the case of Greece and the EC, membership expanded many social institutions and civic organizations. One of the best examples is that of workers groups. Unions supported Community membership and in fact, benefited from increased contact with the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) (Tsoulakis 1981: 113). In addition, other organizations such as instilled policy changes towards the Community upon their respective election to office (Verney and
interest groups began to flourish in Greece as they "acquired new habits of consultation, dialogue, and information to a degree not practiced in their home countries" (Pridham 1995: 182; see also Sidjanski 1991). While one cannot conclusively say that the development of a professional bureaucracy or of independent civic organizations contributes to democratic consolidation, these developments do contribute to a healthy overall civil society which can be important for the future of democracy (see Kamrava and Mora 1998). This openness of the bureaucracy and civil society, according to observers of Greek politics, "is an extremely important development for broadening the democratic process and diffusing political power" (Ioakimidis 1994: 145; also see Katseli 1990; Verney 1994).

It should be noted that these particular causal mechanisms were not discussed in Chapter 1. The expansion of civil society and the "opening" of government bureaucracy can have an important impact on democratic consolidation. Though both mandated directives and "osmosis", the interaction of individuals and governments can influence behavior and the nature of domestic institutions (Tsoulakis 1981: 110). Although Greece is the only case study where this phenomenon is found, it is a mechanism which future research should not ignore.  

6.2.3. Critiques of the Argument

Of course, the preceding story of EC membership and democratic consolidation is not without problems. First, the EC was not the only major international institution of
which Greece was a member. NATO also had the potential to be a powerful influence on domestic politics in Greece, yet by the transition to democracy in 1974, Karamanlis had promised to remove Greece from the organization. The question may rightly be raised, given the highly democratic nature of NATO membership, why did this institution play no role in the democratization of Greece? Second, if involvement in European institutions serves as a powerful factor preventing democratic backsliding, why did the presence of the EC-Greece association agreement not serve this role in 1967? I will address each of these questions independently, beginning with the issue of NATO.

The response of NATO and its member states to the 1967 coup were muted at best (Garfinkle 1991: 73-4). Arguably the mildest response came from the U.S. itself. The U.S. "expressed with varying degrees of conviction, sadness at the turn of events" (Economist 1975). In the end, NATO took no real action against the colonels. In fact, NATO continued to support the regime with military assistance. Given the U.S. concern with the "southern flank" of Europe and instability in both Greek and Turkey's domestic politics, there was a low likelihood of action against the Greek regime. As discussed in Chapter 1, the will to enforce political conditionality is as important as setting the conditions. Although NATO had the potential to be an effective pressure point for the colonels, it chose not pursue these goals.154 For better or worse, NATO placed its security interests over its interest in the domestic politics of its members. Unfortunately,

---

153 There is also some anecdotal evidence that similar processes occurred in both Spain and Portugal immediately preceding and during their accession to the EU. See Pridham 1991c. It is possible that this is an EU-specific phenomenon, or one relegated to well-established IOs.
154 Dean Rusk's comments on the 1967 situation adequately summed up US interests. "We are now awaiting concrete evidence that the new Greek government will make every effort to reestablish democratic institutions which have been an integral part of Greek political life. I am gratified to see Greece will continue in its strong support of NATO..." (quoted in Garfinkle 1991: 70).
this theme would occur in other instances involving both Portugal and Turkey (see the following case).

In addition, during the war in Cyprus in the summer of 1974, NATO became regarded in many circles as "pro-Turkish". This, along with NATO's implicit support of the junta, led to a public outcry against the alliance. The result was that Karamanlis withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO in 1975 hours after Turkey's second invasion of Cyprus (Papacosma 1985: 196). This foreclosed the option of NATO assisting with the consolidation process. In the end, although both the EC and NATO had potential to pressure the colonel’s regime, only the EC choose to do so.

If in the post-1974 era, the prospect and the realization of Community membership exerted a strong influence on the consolidation, why did the EC-Greece Association Agreement not serve this same purpose in 1967? Although there is little speculation in the literature as to how the colonel’s perceived any potential external response to their coup, there is reason to believe that they assumed their move would be supported by Greece’s main ally, the United States. Because of the military’s staunch anti-communism and support of NATO, they probably assumed (correctly, in hindsight), that the U.S. would be unconcerned with internal Greek politics. Given the support of their “key” ally, the colonel’s probably paid no attention to the potential European response.

A second factor which would bolster this conclusion is that there was little precedent for anti-coup stances on the part of European governments. In 1960, Europe

---

155 Although ironically, the act of withdrawing from NATO was an early popularity boost for the new government, cutting across party and ideological lines to receive broad support throughout Greece.
turned a blind eye to the military-led coup in Turkey (who had a nearly identical association agreement with the EC). The colonel's likely reasoned that the response to their move would be no different. This would also help explain why the Greeks seemed extremely indignant at attempts to exclude them from the Council of Europe. Given this lack of precedent and the lack of salience of Greek's relations with Europe to the colonels (relative to the U.S.), the EC Association Agreement could not serve as a deterrent mechanism to prevent the breakdown of democracy in 1967.

6.2.4. The EC As a Determinant of the Transition?

As Chapters 1 and 3 argue, IOs can play an important role in encouraging the transition to democracy as well as consolidation. Although this process functions through different causal processes, this chapter has pointed to evidence that the EC played an important role in the re-democratization of Greece. Thus, this case does provide some support for some of the mechanisms linking IOs to transitions discussed in Chapter 1. The EC did exert significant pressure on the colonels through the "freezing" of the Association Agreement. Some scholars have gone so far as to credit this action by the Community as a key pressure undermining the regime (Cofoudakis 1977: 130-1). Moreover, this external pressure assisted internal opposition groups in their efforts to unseat the junta (Verney and Tsakaloyannis 1986).

Although this is certainly an important instance of the external pressure mechanism discussed in Chapter 1, the impact of the EC and Greece's membership is strongest when discussing the consolidation of Greek democracy. Although the EC did

---

156 On the strong U.S. ties to the Greek military, including probable CIA involvement in the country, see
bring its economic strength to bare on the colonels, their efforts were not "decisive" in bringing the end of the regime (Tsingos 1996: 326; see also Yannopoulos 1975). Rather, the EC played a larger role in the consolidation of democracy by allowing Greece's entry into the Community during a critical time (Whitehead 1996d: 258). Membership provided economic, psychological, as well as institutional benefits which helped democracy to endure.

6.2.5. Conclusion

Several of the mechanisms at work in this case directly support the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 1. The idea that the conditionality of IO membership binds domestic actors to democratic principles is supported quite strongly in this case. In addition, the idea that IOs may assist fledgling democracies by providing direct economic assistance, which can be used to "bribe" domestic actors is also supported. Finally, the psychological impact of IO membership in providing incentives for officials to obey the conditions of those institutions also receives important confirmation.

As I have argued, IOs are only one factor in the determinants of democratic consolidation. Certainly internal factors, whether agent-specific or structural, are important to this process. The case of Greece, however, is a strong testament to the potential for regional organizations to assist in the process of consolidation. Moreover, this case highlights several of the important causal mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1 including the binding and bribing of domestic actors.

It would be difficult to judge which of these causal mechanisms was the strongest in the case of Greece (economics, institutions, or psychological benefits). My own reading of the secondary record, however, points to economics as a key driving force. Trade interdependence between the extant members and Greece created strong incentives for the continuation of democracy as did the substantial aid flows from the Community. The clear conditionality of these benefits was a strong message to would-be conspirators that the benefits of membership would be suspended if democracy ended. Basilios Tsingos (1996: 338) adequately summarizes this picture in his own take of EC-Greek relations:

"The provision of resources contingent on the presence of democracy—backed by strong, legally binding material commitments based on international treaties and European law, as embodied in a framework of authoritative institutions—helped to convince domestic groups and actors representing large sections of society that threats to democratic values and procedures were tantamount to threats to material interests, thus raising the costs of repression in a manner significantly conducive to the Greek republic's stability, endurance, and political resilience."

6.3. Paraguay: MERCOSUR and Fragile Consolidation

As the third wave of democratization swept Latin America throughout the 1980s, Paraguay remained a holdout for authoritarianism. General Alfred Stroessner clung to power for most of the decade, supported by a powerful cadre of military elites and the Colorado Party, a political machine known for its corruption and intimidation tactics. When Stroessner was finally overthrown in 1989, Paraguay's new leader, Andres Rodriguez decided to follow the rest of Latin America on the path of democracy. Unfortunately, that path has been riddled with potholes and detours. This case study will
examine two major events since Paraguay's democratization. Both of these incidents have occurred within the past four years and demonstrate the fragility of democracy in this small, poverty-stricken state.

Yet, without the assistance of the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR) and its member states, Paraguay would probably have turned off the path of democracy in both of these instances. Although it would be an overstatement to call Paraguay's democracy consolidated, this case demonstrates the efficacy of international organizations instilling a credible commitment to democracy as outlined in Chapter 1. Specifically, this case shows how IO conditionality can be effective in deterring anti-regime forces from moving against a fragile democracy. After outlining a brief history of Paraguayan democracy, the following two sections will discuss two recent events in Paraguay and show how MERCOSUR was indispensable to preserving democracy in both instances.
6.3.1. Paraguay: The Last Banana Republic?

For 34 years General Alfredo Stroessner ruled Paraguay with an iron grip by creating a powerful one-party state and building a tight alliance with the military. Taking power in 1954, Stroessner ended half a decade of political instability in this small South American state (Writer 1996). Staunchly anti-Communist, Stroessner was supported by the United States during the Cold War and behaved no different than many of the other authoritarian rulers of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America (Mora 1997). As the single-party and military-led regimes of the region began their transition to democracy in the 1980s, however, Paraguay remained the exception. Stroessner continued to have a tight hold on power and began supporting smuggling and pirating operations which operated into his two larger neighbors, Brazil and Argentina (Economist 1997a). Reports of widespread corruption and abuses of power by the military earned Paraguay the title of the “last banana republic”.

In early 1989, Stroessner’s health reportedly took a turn for the worse, prompting a crisis of succession among his family members and inner circle of advisors. Finally, on February 3, 1989, General Andres Rodriguez led the army in a coup against his mentor and exiled him to Brazil (Powers 1992). Most observers assumed Rodriguez would follow the programs of Stroessner including his tight grip on power and the suppression of all civil rights (Economist 1997a). To everyone’s surprise, Rodriguez began a program of political and economic liberalization, while attempting to put an end to much of the “criminal economy” which had developed under his predecessor. Rodriguez

\[\text{footnote}{157\text{ This title is still often used today, even after the transition to democracy, largely because of the difficulty in ending the widespread corruption within the Paraguayan bureaucracy. See Faiola 1998.}}\]
appointed himself president, yet presided over the drafting of a new constitution which called for the free election of the President (Wiarda 1995).

One of Rodriguez's major foreign policy initiatives was to join the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). MERCOSUR originated from a free trade agreement between Brazil and Argentina in 1987. Later, Uruguay was included in the agreement and finally, Paraguay was asked to join the formal trade agreement in 1989 (Abente 1989: 88). In 1991, all four states signed the MERCOSUR agreement, expanding their previous trade arrangement by promising to lower trade barriers as well as establish a common external tariff (Pena 1995). Trade among MERCOSUR states has grown at a rapid pace. In fact, off all regional free trade agreements, MERCOSUR is currently the fastest growing trade bloc in the world, with trade increasing 400 percent from 1990 to 1997 (Dominguez 1998). In addition, foreign investment is on the rise and more than $20 billion in shared investment projects are slated between the member states (Pena 1995).

In 1993, Rodriguez fulfilled his promise to step down from the presidency and Juan Carlos Wasmosy, a civil engineer, became the first freely elected President of Paraguay. Still, the Paraguayan economy remained dismal and the transformation to a democracy was not supported by all of society, especially the military. In addition, the legacy of the one-party system stunted early democratization efforts since the party of Stroessner (the Colorado Party) was still in existence and possessed most of the financial resources in the new multiparty system. What makes the situation more difficult is that the military and the Colorado party share many institutional ties (many of the party elite are military officers), giving the military a legitimate vehicle to be directly involved in
civillian politics. Needless to say, this situation makes the young democracy extremely fragile.

In particular, in the last five years, two incidents have brought Paraguayan democracy to the precipice: one involving an intransigent miliary general, the other involving the same general and the leadership of the Colorado party. The next two sections will discuss these events in detail and the role of MERCOSUR in defusing these two threats to democracy.

6.3.2. The “Almost” Coup

On April 22, 1996, three years after assuming the presidency, Juan Carlos Wasmosy summoned General Lino Oviedo of the Army 1st Corps to the presidential palace to inform him that he was being replaced and relieved of his duties. Throughout Wasmosy’s tenure as president, General Oviedo had pressured the president on many issues of policy, including legislation, foreign affairs, even supreme court appointees. Oviedo was also a major player in the Colorado party and had several times intervened in its internal election process. In the words of one observer, “Oviedo’s involvement in governmental decisions and party politics constituted a direct challenge to the president’s authority and a serious threat to Paraguay’s fragile democratic transition” (Valenzuela 1997: 47).

Wasmosy’s meeting with Oviedo, however, did not go smoothly. Oviedo refused to resign and returned to his barracks. In response to a second, but this time public, demand for his resignation, Oviedo warned that he would take over the government by
force if necessary. He threatened to unleash “rivers of blood” on the capital if Wasmosy did not rescind the demand for his resignation.

By the early morning of April 23, the crisis had reached the breaking point. Oviedo had demanded Wasmosy’s resignation and Wasmosy had offered to take a “leave of absence” from the presidency. By noon on the 23rd, two events changed the tide against General Oviedo. First, support for Wasmosy poured in from around the world. President Clinton, almost every OAS member state, many EC members, the secretary-general of the OAS and each foreign minister of MERCOSUR had contacted Wasmosy to encourage him to stand strong. In the meantime, however, Wasmosy had offered a bargain to Oviedo: step down as army General and accept a post as the Defense Minister. This bargain, however, proved extremely unpopular, with mass demonstrations against Oviedo turning to demonstrations against both Oviedo and Wasmosy.

Oviedo’s underestimation of public sentiment proved untimely for his attempted power grab. Oviedo had offered his resignation late on April 23, assuming he would soon be appointed Defense Minister. The following day, Oviedo listened to Wasmosy address the people of Paraguay, expecting to hear himself announced as the new Defense Minister. Rather, Wasmosy, citing the “will of the people” announced that Oviedo would have no official post in the government. Oviedo did not press the issue and disappeared from public view.

What can account for Wasmosy’s sudden dose of courage and Oviedo’s reluctance to push the president after April 24? By most accounts, a major factor was the support of international actors, especially MERCOSUR. Valenzuela (1997) has argued

---

158 The factual details of this account are taken from Valenzuela 1997 and Writer 1996 unless otherwise
that while MERCOSUR was an important factor, internal dynamics such as public
support and competition among service branches led Oviedo to back down. While it may
be difficult to tell what single factor contributed the most to the resolution of the crisis,
most observers agree that MERCOSUR did, in fact, play a key role in defusing the crisis
(see Domínguez 1998).

MERCOSUR demands that all members remain a democracy else they can be
expelled from the organization. At the height of the crisis, President Carlos Menem of
Argentina publicly stated that Paraguay would be expelled from the organization if
Oviedo took control (Writer 1997). Foreign ministers from the three other MERCOSUR
states visited Wasseosy during the crisis to express their solidarity and support for the
embattled president (Perry and May 1996). In the words of the Economist: “But for
Mercosur, Paraguay would this year almost certainly have gone back to military rule”
(Economist 1996c: S6). Although the support of the public and other branches of the
military were clearly additional factors, “it was probably the unhesitant support of
Paraguay’s allies in North and South America which persuaded General Oviedo not to
attempt a coup” (Writer 1997). How MERCOSUR achieved this end will be discussed in
the final section.

6.3.3. A Second Presidential Crisis

After the 1996 threat to democracy, Paraguay’s institutions are still fragile. This
point was underscored in early 1999 when a second major presidential crisis erupted.
Not surprisingly, General Lino Oviedo was responsible for this crisis as well.
In early 1998, the Colorado party underwent a bitter struggle to nominate a candidate for presidential elections that year. Surprisingly, General Oviedo defeated Wasmosy’s political ally Luis Argana in the party primary. Wasmosy then threatened to annul the primary results since Oviedo’s past actions had been a threat to democracy. Instead, Wasmosy had Oviedo arrested (on the charge of “insulting the president”) and used this fact to disqualify him from running for office. The Colorado party then chose Raul Cubas, General Oviedo’s vice-presidential running-mate as their candidate for president. In an odd twist, Cubas’ running-mate became his Colorado party rival Luis Argana, whom Oviedo and Cubas had defeated in the party primary.

In 1998, Cubas was elected president with Argana as his vice-president. The two men continued their rivalry and differed over many policies, especially those concerning General Oviedo. Immediately after his election, Cubas pardoned Oviedo. The supreme court and the legislature rejected this pardon, which was also vehemently opposed by Argana. Oviedo was released and on March 23, 1999, Argana was assassinated on the streets of the capital by masked men dressed in Army fatigues. Although they denied responsibility, both Cubas and Oviedo were linked to the assassination.

This set off a firestorm of public demonstrations against President Cubas, who eventually was forced to resign from office. In the end, however, the transition to the new president, Luis Macchi, was relatively smooth and peaceful. Cubas and Oviedo had threatened to ignore both the supreme court and the parliament, taking power by decree. Yet, Oviedo eventually fled to Argentina and Cubas stepped down as president. What accounted for this relatively smooth end to this potentially devastating crisis?
Again, MERCOSUR played a key role in diffusing this crisis. Negotiations for Cubas’ resignation were directed by the MERCOSUR ministers. Both Presidents Menem of Argentina and Brazilian President Henrique Cardoso publicly threatened Paraguay with expulsion throughout the crisis (Financial Times 1999: 6). In the words of one Paraguayan political analyst, “[Paraguay’s] democracy is so weak institutionally that its continuance is entirely dependent on outside pressures” (Carlos Martini quoted in Financial Times 1999: 6).

6.3.4. IOs and Consolidation: Mechanisms at Work

Why has MERCOSUR twice been effective at helping to preserve Paraguay’s fragile democracy? One of the mechanisms discussed in Chapter 1 is notably absent: bribery on the part of the IO. At no point has MERCOSUR or any other regional organization given resources to Paraguay for the purpose of increasing support for democracy. The binding mechanism (deterring “losers” from moving against the regime) is clearly at work in this case. Specifically, the conditionality of membership and the threat of punishment for violating these democratic conditions has increased the costs of this strategy for coup planners.

Membership in MERCOSUR has provided leverage to deter would-be violators (especially General Oviedo) of democratic institutions within Paraguay. Paraguay has always been extremely dependent on its two larger neighbors, Brazil and Argentina (Abente 1989). This has grown within the context of MERCOSUR. According to Richard Feinberg (1996: A13), “Paraguay’s business and professional classes are now
reliant upon external markets and supplies. Over one-third of Paraguay’s trade flows involve its pact partners’.

It is this dependence along with the conditionality of MERCOSUR membership which provides a strong deterrent to anti-democratic forces such as General Oviedo. In both crises, MERCOSUR ministers immediately threatened Paraguay with expulsion from the common market. In the words of Feinberg (1996: A13), “This credible threat heartened Paraguay’s democrats, sent shivers through the country’s commercial classes, and helped convince Oviedo’s fellow officers that he could not prevail.” Although Valenzuela’s account of the 1996 crisis downplays the role of MERCOSUR, he also argues that the conditions imposed by that organization “will increase the cost of unconstitutional actions in the future” (Valenzuela 1997: 52).

The MERCOSUR conditionality mechanism is hypothesized to function in exactly this manner (see van Klaveren 1993: 119). In Paraguay, this conditionality has been successful. By linking the future of economic benefits of the organization to continued adherence to democratic principles, membership MERCOSUR creates a situation for Paraguay in which “the costs of repression are now far higher than the costs of toleration, making military intervention a more risky venture” (Lambert 1997: 211).

The other side of the commitment coin is that leaders may attempt to tie their own hands by joining regional organizations. While this aspect of MERCOSUR membership did not seem to play a role in these crises, there is evidence that part of the impetus for Rodriguez to join MERCOSUR was related to re-focusing Paraguayan foreign policy by furthering Paraguayan’s integration into the international community (Economist 1997a; Powers 1992: 13). One observer of Paraguayan politics has gone so far as to argue that
economics played only a small role in the decision to join MERCOSUR, rather “the
decision was a essentially a political one, which Rodriguez used to launch his policy of
presidentialist diplomacy and to promote a new international image for the country” (Masi
1997: 178-9). For Rodriguez, joining MERCOSUR was a very open, public way to
commit to political and economic reform. In doing so, he simultaneously created
incentives for both winners and losers in the democratization process to comply with
democratic institutions.

6.3.5. Conclusion

In the end, MERCOSUR is not an iron-clad guarantee of democracy in Paraguay.
Given the absence of a strong civil society, the institutional advantages of the Colorado
Party, and the strength of the armed forces, Paraguay’s democracy is still fragile.
Nonetheless, membership in MERCOSUR has provided a significant economic deterrent
to those who would act against the regime. It has also reinforced reforms by signaling to
domestic and international observers that Paraguay is committed to reform.

Paraguay thus sheds light on how the relationships laid out in Chapter 1 work in
practice. MERCOSUR has performed with flying colors in holding up its part of the
conditionality bargain. Given the importance of the supply-side of these guarantees, this
case proves that clear and swift action on the part of iOs can be effective in consolidating
democracy. If MERCOSUR continues to remain a vigilant organization, prospects for
democracy in Paraguay can only improve (Powers 1992: 15-6).
6.4. Turkey: Failed Consolidation or Successful Liberalization?

Turkey’s sordid history of democracy provides several examples of the breakdown of democracy. Turkey’s military has intervened directly in Turkish politics in 1960, 1971, and 1980, to unseat civilian-led governments. What makes these breakdowns especially important to this work is that in all three instances Turkey was a member of several IOs which were highly democratic. Thus, Turkey appears to provide three cases falsifying the general theory proposed in Chapter 1—that IOs can effectively assist in the consolidation process. For this reason, I felt it was essential to explore the case further.

While investigating the failed consolidation of Turkey, however, I find significant evidence in support of several of the propositions concerning international organizations and transitions found in Chapter 1. Specifically, I argue that IOs served as a strong mechanism to encourage the liberalization process after the 1980 intervention by the military. This study will begin with a very brief history of the development of Turkish democracy. I then examine the failure of IOs to assist in consolidating democracy in Turkey, focusing on the 1980 case. Next, I turn to the question of IO influence in pressuring Turkey to re-democratize after the 1980 coup. I conclude with a brief examination of the current state of EU/NATO and Turkish affairs.

---

159 I limit my study to 1980 for two reasons. First, there are far more detailed secondary accounts of the events surrounding this episode. Second, several IOs were especially active throughout this episode which makes it an even bigger anomaly for my theory.
6.4.1. *The Cycles of Turkish Democracy*

After the First World War, Turkey began its first affair with democracy with the rise of Attaturk and the establishment of the secular state in Turkey in 1923. Attaturk began the liberalization process and continually made steps towards democracy (creating an independent judiciary, increasing parliamentary responsibility, etc.) until his death in 1938 (Henze 1991; also Sunar and Sayari 1986). His chosen successor, Ismet Inonu continued the liberalization process until it reached its fruition in 1946 with the "self-transformation of an authoritarian, one-party system into a democratic, competitive party system" (Huntington 1981: 250). Although the political party founded by Attaturk and Inonu (the Republican People's Party or RPP) maintained control after this initial election, opposition parties began to grow in strength and numbers throughout the 1950s (Henze 1991: 92-3).

Eventually, opposition leader Adnan Menderes' Democrat Party (DP) came to power in May of 1950 (Ozbudun 1995: 230). While continuing the general direction of Attaturk's reform including an anti-Communist, pro-Western foreign policy, the Menderes government began to face increasing opposition from left- and right-wing opposition groups. Finally, in the face of a mounting economic crisis, the military ousted Menderes in 1960, arresting and executing Menderes and his associates (Henze 1991: 94). Within a year, the military government had cleared the way for new elections and a revised constitution in 1961 (Sunar and Sayari 1986).

During this next phase of democracy (1961-1971), new opposition parties again gained ground on the RPP. The RPP's major competition was the Justice Party (JP), headed by Suleyman Demirel. Demirel was avowedly pro-Western and pro-capitalist,
but upon his assumption of the premiership of Turkey in 1965, anti-American feelings were on the rise in Turkey (Henze 1991: 95-7). In addition, the Kurdish minority of Turkey began a coordinated effort to strike economic and military targets, causing outbreaks of civil violence across the country. In this milieu of civil unrest, on March 12, 1971, several leading Turkish generals asked Demirel to step aside. He agreed and the second interruption in Turkish democracy began.

While in power, the military attempted to squash various terrorist organizations while suspending elections (Dodd 1990: 15-7). Scholars of this coup have labeled it the “coup-by-pronouncement” given its peaceful and highly planned nature (Heper 1987: 57). The military attempted to serve as a neutral “caretaker” with respect to political parties by appointing a non-partisan prime minister, Nihat Erim, who would form three coalition governments before the re-introduction of free elections (Henze 1991: 98).

By 1973, the third phase of democracy in Turkey began with the holding of parliamentary elections. Unlike their first experience in the 1960s, the Turkish military made few actual changes to political institutions during this second interruption (1971-1973) (Sunar and Sayari 1986; Heper 1987: 57). Unfortunately, the same factions that had contributed to the civil violence of the 1960s returned to their previous behavior as the 1970s progressed. Turkey once again suffered massive civil unrest in its largest cities involving left- and right-wing extremists. Kurdish rebel groups added fuel to the fire in rural areas, where bombings and shootings became ubiquitous (Henze 1991:103-5).

On September 12, 1980, the military began its third reign over the political institutions in Turkey, unseating Demirel for the second time (Dagi 1996). The crackdown on “rogue elements” was much tougher during this interregnum. The military
established a National Security Council (NSC) to oversee its law-and-order campaign, and in the first eighteen months, confiscated over 800,000 weapons from "liberated areas" (Henze 1991: 105). This began the military's longest and most involved tenure in Turkish politics. The military, under General Kenan Evren, banned all political parties and arrested the leaders of the four largest parties. Between the coup of September 1980 and February 1983, over 60,000 people were arrested (Dagi 1996). Mass trials were held and many civil organizations, including labor unions, were declared illegal. This military intervention was far-reaching and according to one observer, "dramatically changed the domestic political scene" (Dagi 1996: 125).

In 1982, the military leadership of the NSC drafted a new constitution for Turkey. A nation-wide referendum approved the constitution by over 90%. Parties became legal in 1983, yet any politicians active before the 1980 coup were banned from participating in politics (Henze 1991: 107). With the election of Turgut Ozal's Motherland party (the successor to the RPP) in 1983, Turkey returned to the status of a multi-party electoral system.

6.4.2. IOs and Democratic Backsliding: "Failed" Causal Mechanisms?

Why were international organizations unable to hinder the breakdown of democracy in Turkey? Were the causal mechanisms not present in this case or did other conditions mitigate their impact? This section will explore these questions by reviewing which (if any) of the causal mechanisms could have assisted in the consolidation of Turkish democracy before the 1980 coup.
The answer to this puzzle cannot be found in a lack of IO involvement on the part of Turkey. In its attempt to portray itself as a “Western” nation, it joined several Western European IOs in the late 1940s and early 1950s, namely, NATO, the OECD, and the Council of Europe (Muftüler-Bac 1998: 243). In addition, Turkey signed an association agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963 (the Ankara Agreement). This agreement was expanded in 1970 with the signing of the Additional Protocol between the EC and Turkey (Muftüler-Bac 1998: 241). Not only was Turkey an active member of these groups, but each IO’s membership was highly democratic—a sign that these organizations should have been able to play some role in preserving democracy in Turkey.

Which of the causal mechanisms could have operated to prevent democratic backsliding in Turkey? None of the international organizations to which Turkey belonged attempted to bribe any segment of Turkish society. The largest flow of aid and assistance to Turkey came from the U.S. and NATO. The clear purpose of this military assistance was to support Turkey as a bulwark against potential Soviet aggression. Non-military assistance did attempt to engender domestic stability, but there were never conditions relating to the governmental system in Turkey (Henze 1991). The EC did provide some direct financial assistance, but this was general assistance not targeted to any particular group (EC Bulletin 1981).

It would seem that the other causal mechanisms, committing both winners and losers to the continuation of democracy should have been important in this case. By 1980, Turkey continued to retain membership in several IOs which explicitly required a democratic form of government for membership. Many Turks place a high value on
membership in “Western” organizations (see next section), and Turkey conducts a high portion of its trade with EC members. As of 1985, roughly 35 to 40 percent of its exports went to the EC while over 25 percent of its imports originated from Community members (Barchard 1985: 68). These potential costs should have helped to deter the military from moving against the democratically-elected government, yet they did not.

The European response to the coup was quite strong. The OECD suspended economic aid, the EC-Turkey association agreement was frozen (Pridham 1991: 216), and Turkey was suspended from attending the Council of Europe (see Karaosmanoglu 1991: 162; Yesilada 1999). These measures did impose direct economic costs on Turkey, which was already suffering from one of its worst economic crises in history.  

All of these efforts, however, came after the coup. Why did the Turkish military not anticipate this response of IOs to the breakdown of democracy? Why was the conditionality of these organizations and their assistance of little importance to the generals or to opposition groups which had become increasingly violent before the coup? Although there is little secondary evidence relating to the general’s calculations, there is speculation about the absence of concern over these issues.

First, the military probably expected little or no punishment from these organizations or their members since little action had been taken against them in the past. They had barely received a slap on the wrist for their behavior in 1960 which set an early precedent that IOs would pay little attention to internal Turkish politics. Although few organizations had democracy requirements or conditions, those that did took no action with regard to the 1960 coup. The Council of Europe was the major organization which

---

160 On the economic crisis, see Kunihelm (1985: 221).
required democracy as a condition of membership, yet the council made little mention of the coup in its public pronouncements. Moreover, because of the coup’s acceptance domestically and its non-violent nature, it chose to take no action against Turkey (Dodd 1990).

The 1971 coup, however, had resulted in punishment from several European organizations. Economic assistance was suspended by several EC members and calls for a return to democracy soon echoed across Western Europe (see Yesilada 1999: 145). Turkey also had an additional IO tie, the European Community. Nonetheless, if precedent was any guide to the coup conspirators of 1980, they had no expectation that this transgression against democracy would bring any economic or political ill effects. After all, Turkey, was a front-line state against the Soviet threat and held in high esteem by the United States as one of its strongest allies against Communism (Kuniholm 1985: 231). Moreover, many in the military-run government expressed genuine surprise at the severity and the amount of criticism leveled at it by its European counterparts following the coup (Kuniholm 1985: 225). Some observers have even noted that the EC's initial reaction to the military take-over was, in fact, "rather mild" (Dagi 1996: 128). As the length of the military's stay in power grew longer, however, the EC response grew more harsh, including the suspension of aid from the EC (Dagi 1996: 129-30).

Second, even if the Turks expected some hostility from Europe, they certainly expected continued, if not increased, assistance from the U.S. Again, this inference could have been based on past behavior. In the past two coups, the U.S. had stood staunchly by its ally. Since the Truman Doctrine in 1947, Turkey had been a key ally to help protect both the southern flank of Europe and the Middle East. Their geostrategic importance for
US grand strategy led to an interest in Turkey's overall stability, regardless of the type of regime in Ankara. The US embraced the Menderes government after the 1960 coup, even as it began to behave arbitrarily towards its citizenry (Henze 1991). The US did not use its leverage within NATO or the OECD to express concern over the internal situation in Turkey, nor did it encourage either organization to punish the perpetrators of the 1960 coup. Similarly, in the 1971 coup, the U.S. did not react negatively and even pressured its NATO allies to treat the situation with a "business as usual" attitude.

The beliefs of the generals proved well-founded. After the 1980 takeover, the US did pressure the EC, the Council of Europe, and NATO not to punish General Evran's takeover (Dagi 1996: 127). NATO and the U.S. continued to provide military assistance to the regime while helping to push an aid package through the IMF (Dagi 1996: 127; see also Whitehead 1996: 12-17). In the end, the geostrategic importance of Turkish membership in NATO kept that organization from attempting to punish the Evran regime (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 130). It is possible that Evran and his colleagues knew their strategic importance to NATO as well as the U.S. and did not anticipate any response from that organization (Mackenzie 1984: 14).

Third, in the past, European states behaved very differently towards Turkey depending on whether the context of the interaction was bilateral or multilateral. This no doubt contributed to Turkish expectations that European IOs would not punish Turkey. For example, Steinbach (1994: 110) has argued that there is a preference among European states to "distinguish between EC relations with Turkey as a possible future member of the community and bilateral relations with Turkey". Although the Turkish military could have anticipated verbal condemnation from European IOs, they likely felt
their individual trade relations and economic assistance from the members of these organizations would be uninterrupted. In 1980, however, this belief proved incorrect as individual European states did reduce their economic and political ties with Turkey after the coup.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, if the past was any guide to Evren and his colleagues, they likely expected the words of the regional organizations and the deeds of the member states to be quite different.

Finally, the military could have made a simple cost-benefit calculation that any ill effects of condemnation and/or punishment through international organizations were significantly less than the gains from "restoring order" to the Turkish government. In the two years preceding the coup, violence had reached an unprecedented level in Turkey. During the first eight months of 1980, 25,000 "terrorist incidents" were reported and almost 3,000 people were killed in civil violence in Turkey (Henze 1991: 104). By August of 1980, the pace of assassinations and politically-motivated killings had reached twenty-eight a day (Kuniholm 1985: 221). Although martial law had been declared in most of Turkey's provinces, the Demirel government was unable to quell the violence. It was this condition of civil unrest which prompted the Turkish military to act (Henze 1991: 104-5). On top of this civil violence, Turkey was in the grip of an economic crisis with nearly 40 percent unemployment and inflation over 100 percent (Spain and Ludington 1983).

Given this unstable political and economic situation, could any threat by the EC, the Council of Europe or even NATO have convinced the Turkish military not to act? Although it is possible that concern over international responses influenced the timing of

\textsuperscript{161} It is interesting to note that this pattern of distinguishing bilateral from multilateral relations continues
the intervention, the ultimate answer to this question is no. The Turkish military felt that
the very fabric of their state was at risk (Couloumbis 1983: 161). As many observers
have noted, the Turkish military considers themselves the "saviors" of Turkish
democracy (Heper 1987: 58-60). Their response to pre-intervention pressure would
likely have been one of indignation given the military's past of relinquishing power to
civilian governments. In fact, in 1978 Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit froze relations and
negotiations with the EC, demonstrating the lack of concern over breaking off EC-
Turkish relations (Steinbach 1994: 109; Barchard 1985: 63). Although this tension arose
from issues unrelated to Turkish democracy, it was a clear demonstration that Turkey was
willing to pay the price inflicted by poor EC-Turkish relations almost two years before
the coup. Weighed against the cost of allowing civil violence to continue, the benefit of
Turkey-EC relations could well have been a cost General Evren was willing to pay.162

Despite this conclusion, it has also been hypothesized that concern over the
potential EC response to the 1980 coup did, in fact, influence the timing of the action.
Metin Heper (1987: 58-9) has argued that the military allowed the situation in Turkey to
deteriorate (in the areas of civil violence and the economy) in order to solidify internal
and external opinion on the need for a coup. Heper argues that the generals plotted to
intervene much earlier, but in part because of concerns of perceptions from abroad,
waited to move against Demirel. Thus, although this concern over international
perceptions was not enough to prevent the action, this does show that international forces
did play a small role in the process of the military take-over. In the end, however, the

---

162 even today among EU members and Turkey. See Steinbach 1994; Yesilada 1999; Rustow 1993.
pressing civil and economic crisis of Turkey spurred the Generals to take control in September of 1980.

The final issue concerning the 1980 coup centers on the supply-side part of the conditionality argument. Enforcing conditions of membership set by IOs is an important aspect of creating an externally-supported credible commitment to democracy as well as a deterrent to anti-democratic forces. Equally important is the expectation that conditions will be enforced. As this case demonstrates, the lack of action on the part of the EC, Council of Europe, or NATO to punish Turkey in 1960 or 1971 created a dangerous precedent for the military's actions in 1980. Since the generals probably did not expect punishment or expulsion from these organizations, it is difficult for conditionality (and, therefore the commitment mechanism) to be effective. While the EC and the Council of Europe were certainly guilty of this behavior, neither organization had less of a consolidation effect than NATO. NATO (under the leadership of the U.S.) made no attempt to pressure Turkey for democracy before or after any of the three autocratic interregnums, at times reinforcing its support of any regime in Ankara, so long as it maintained its pro-Western stance.

A compounding factor in this supply-side problem is the importance of context. Europeans (and to a lesser extent the United States) have treated Turkey differently depending on the context of the interaction. Because Europe's bilateral behavior is often quite distinct from its multilateral behavior, these mixed signals are no doubt difficult for

---

162 Although this example has concentrated on the events of September 1980, violence was very high during the 1971 intervention as well. A similar argument concerning the perceived costs and benefits of intervention could be made for that episode as well.

163 For example, Burchard (1985: 58) has argued that the Council of Europe often turned a "blind eye" to human rights and democracy violations in Turkey, especially before the 1980 coup.
would-be coup perpetrators to read, thus undermining the mechanism of deterrence which comes with conditionality of organizational membership.

Finally, as I have attempted to reiterate throughout this study, IOs are not a magic bullet. This was a clear case where even with clear signals and a precedent of ill effects from working against democracy, the Turkish military may have behaved in a similar fashion. I have argued that membership in democratic IOs decreases the probability that democracy will fail. They are no guarantee that it will not. IOs can influence the cost-benefit calculations of those who would overthrow a democratic system, but they can do so only to the extent that they can raise the costs of that action. Obviously if the benefits of coups are perceived to be quite large, an IO’s power to influence outcomes may be limited. The history of democracy in Turkey is case in point.

6.4.3. IOs and Turkey: The Pressure for Liberalization

Despite the fact that IOs had little influence in deterring non-democratic forces from toppling democracy in Turkey, these same IOs did play an important role in influencing the timing as well as the process of liberalization after the 1980 military coup. This is especially true of the EC, the Council of Europe, and to a lesser extent, NATO. This section will examine how these three organizations assisted in encouraging the Evren regime to liberalize its authoritarian rule and push subsequent Turkish governments to complete the transition to full democracy.

Initially, I should note that I do not claim that if not for these IOs, the Turkish military would have necessarily attempted to establish a permanent rule in Turkey. In each case, immediately after intervention, the military declared that they had no intention
to remain in power for an extended period of time (Ozbudun 1995: 237). Thus, to say that IOs played a *decisive* role in convincing the military to step down would be overstated. Yet, it is very plausible that the pressure from IOs influenced the timing and the process of liberalization.

The strongest causal mechanism found in this process is the pressure brought by IOs to push Turkey back towards democracy. Turkey's association agreement with the EC as well as their membership in the Council of Europe provided a potent source of pressure on the military regime which held power from 1980 until 1983. Not only did direct financial pressure arise from these organizations, but Turkey's desire to become a full member of the EU exerted an independent pressure to democratize as well (Heper 1992: 107). Turgut Ozal, the Prime Minister from 1983 to 1989, recognized the importance of democracy in Turkey for this purpose: "If Turkey wants to be in the European Community, there has to be democracy in Turkey" (quoted in Muftuler-Bac 1998: 246).

Financially, the EC began to turn the screws on the military regime almost one year after their takeover. Their first move was to *increase* financial assistance to Turkey in June of 1981, then hold that aid, conditional upon improvements in human rights and democratization (Dodd 1990: 62). Simultaneously, Turkish leaders announced their desire to become a full member of the Community (no doubt spurred in part by Greece's recent accession). Observers have noted that this announcement "enabled the European Community to press more rigorously for the restoration of democracy as quickly as possible" (Dagi 1996: 129). Thus, demarches by the EC with respect to Turkey's
domestic situation took on added importance given the push by Turkey for full accession to the organization.

General Evren noted the importance of European behavior towards his regime in his own memoirs. Over 25 entries a year concern his perceptions of the European response to his policies, including expressing relief when the Council of Europe did not permanently expel Turkey (Dagi 1996: 137-8). This first-hand evidence of the military's concern over European actions demonstrates the potential leverage of the Community during this time. Thus, although General Evren did not want to appear pressured during his administration, his "over-sensitivity is a sign that European pressure was there and influencing his decisions" (Dagi 1996: 138).

The psychological dimension of the European-Turkish relationship also provided an important source of leverage for European IOs. For Turkey, membership in the Council of Europe and its association agreement with the EC provided a psychological anchoring of Turkey to the West (Tachau 1984: 199-200; Mackenzie 1984: 22-3). The Council's major actions included sending multiple fact-finding missions to Turkey to investigate reports of human rights abuses and pressure the generals to set a time table for new elections (Dagi 1996: 131-2). Although Turkish leaders continually expressed frustration at these efforts of the Council, they did prove effective on several occasions, including convincing Ankara to accept a 25-member delegation to monitor the return of parliamentary democracy to Turkey (Dagi 1996: 137). Again, rather than a financial pressure, the Council's weapon was mainly a psychological one: "The symbolic, even psychological, significance which Turkey attached to the Council of Europe was a means of influence for the Council..." (Dagi 1996: 131).
Thus, both the Council and the EC were able to exert significant financial and psychological pressure on the military regime to move towards re-democratization. Although these efforts clearly strained Turkey's relations with many states of Western Europe, in the end, "pressures exerted by Europeans nevertheless did accelerate the process of democratization in Turkey" (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 129).

Evidence of the acquiescence effect is quite tenuous. The argument that NATO's contribution to the re-democratization of Turkey flowed from its socialization of officers in the Turkish military is fairly weak. As previously discussed, NATO exerted little direct pressure on the generals. In fact, NATO continued to support the Ankara regime with military assistance and, along with the US, preached a "pragmatic" approach to internal Turkish politics (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 130; Tirman 1998: 60; Couloumbis 1983: 37). Yet it can be argued that Turkey's involvement in NATO helped to ensure that the interventions by the military would be short lived. The military clearly held democracy as the "ultimate, if not [the] immediate, goal" (Heper 1987: 54). Some scholars of the Turkish military contend that this tradition of "returning to the barracks" has been inspired by military leader's involvement in NATO. For example, Ali Karaosmanoglu (1993: 31) has argued that interactions between US and Western European NATO officers and their Turkish counterparts have contributed to their overall respect for democracy:

"Most of Turkey's high-ranking officers have either visited or served in various NATO headquarters in Europe or in the United States. Such experiences abroad gave them an international outlook and contributed to their sense of professionalism…Its commitment to professionalism appears to be one of the reasons the Turkish military has disengaged itself from politics as quickly as possible following each intervention" (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 126).
Because of their continued involvement in politics, however, one must question how much influence NATO has had on the “professionalization” of the Turkish military.

There were limits, however, to the influence of these IOs in the liberalization process. Although I have argued they were effective at pushing for the initial liberalization of the Turkish regime, they were (and continue to be) unable to bring about a completion of the transition of democracy. Turkish democracy is still far from perfect, despite continued pressure from the EU (Yesliada 1999). Still, Europeans continue to push for the full democracy in Turkey. Even since 1983 and the return of elections in Turkey, "a step-by-step democratization has been carried out.... Constant European pressure has even succeeded in drawing the attention of the Turkish leadership to the sensitive issues of human rights and in making the government publicly admit shortcomings and take measures to correct them" (Steinbach 1994: 115).

6.4.4. Conclusion

This final section has demonstrated the presence and efficacy of several of the causal mechanisms concerning democratic transitions from Chapter 1. External pressure to liberalize (from the EC and the Council of Europe) in terms of both financial and psychological mechanisms played a role in the liberalization process in Turkey after the 1980 military intervention. Thus, it is an important case for the study of IOs influence on the process of liberalization and re-democratization.

In addition, it is also an important case falsifying the theory presented in Chapter 1. These same IOs have had little success in influencing the consolidation process in Turkey. I have attempted to sketch an explanation for why the conditions and warnings
of the IOs seem to have little effect on the military's decision to intervene in politics and suspend the democratic process.

Of course, the fact that Turkey does not fit the model as outlined here may not be entirely surprising. In the words of one student of Turkish politics and history, "Model-makers among political scientists have difficulty fitting Turkey into their categories. In the words of Attaturk, it resembles no one so much as itself" (Mango 1997: 4).

6.5. Conclusion: Assessing the Consolidation Cases

Table 6.2 presents a summary of the findings across these three case studies. The strongest influence mechanism of IOs on the consolidation of democracy is found in their membership conditionality. As discussed in Chapter 1, conditionality can serve as a powerful deterrent to anti-regime forces since any benefits of the organization would end if democracy faltered. These case studies provide substantial support for this argument. In both Paraguay and Greece, the conditional benefits of MERCOSUR and the EU, respectively, provide powerful incentives for the continuance of democracy. While in Greece this seemed more of a diffuse incentive, applying to no group in particular, in Paraguay this conditionality was used to deter the military from undermining democracy.

This conditionality also proved important to committing "winners" to reform as well, although less evidence was found in support of this particular causal mechanism. In both Turkey and Greece, the conditionality of membership and benefits played some role in creating a credible commitment to reform for those in power. This conditionality was most effective in signaling this commitment in conjunction with the psychological benefits of membership. The major psychological benefit in these cases involved the idea
of symbolic re-orientation away from past authoritarian regimes which increased the legitimacy of the young democratic regime. Joining IOs was a high profile signal that the new democratic administration was visibly breaking ranks with previous authoritarian governments. This new status is ultimately conditional, however, since membership is contingent on the continuation of democracy. Just as quickly as a regime can re-orient itself through involvement in regional organizations, it could find itself isolated both regionally and internationally. This possibility creates high domestic audience costs if the country were to be punished or expelled by the IO. This psychological benefit attained for joining certain IOs is obviously much higher when there is broad-based support (among the elite and the general population) for inclusion into the regional organization. Thus, conditionality and audience costs seem to work in tandem in helping to enhance the credibility of the commitment to reform.

Bribery appeared to be a factor in only one case, that of Greece. One could hypothesize several reasons for the absence of this mechanism as an effective way to consolidate democracy in other cases. First, it can set a dangerous precedent that anti-system activity or leanings can have a high payoff for would-be agitators. This implies that the regime as well as the IO itself would be hesitant to open the floodgates to more demands for targeted financial assistance. Second, there is a potential difficulty in weaning the targeted group within the new democracy from the assistance. In the case of Greece, the farming sector still receives massive financial assistance under the Common Agricultural Program (CAP). Finally, I would hypothesize that bribery was especially effective in the case of Greece because there was a pre-existing institutional arrangement within the IO (the CAP) which was designed to help a group which could have make the
consolidation of democracy difficult in Greece. If a new program would have been required within the EC, it might have been more difficult to establish this system of financial support for the Greek farmers or any other disaffected group after the transition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case/ Mechanism</th>
<th>Greece</th>
<th>Turkey</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binding—Deterrence of Losers</td>
<td>Strong</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>Strong</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Binding—Commitment of Winners</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological/ Legitimization</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bribery</td>
<td>Moderate</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.2: Consolidation Cases and Evidence of Causal Mechanisms

6.6. Discussion—Assessing the Five Case Studies

The key question that arises when comparing these five cases across Chapters 5 and 6 is why IOs occasionally have difficulty consolidating democracies in the same countries where they were able to pressure for re-democratization? The case of Turkey is telling in this regard. Why were IOs successful in pressuring the Turkish military to speed up and expand the liberalization process, yet unable to deter them from moving against democracy in the first place?\textsuperscript{164} One could turn to variables specific to Turkey (opposition to the secular nature of the state, fears of Islamic fundamentalism, etc.), but we find a similar outcome in Peru as well. Despite the OAS’s clear (if unsuccessful)

\textsuperscript{164} This is contrary to the popular dictum by Schelling (1960) that compellance is more difficult that deterrence.
efforts to undo the democratic reversal in Haiti earlier that year, Fujimori undertook his actions with little regard for that regional institution.

There are several potential answers to this puzzle which warrant further investigation. First, it is clear in the cases of Peru and Turkey that those who perpetrated the actions against the regime never considered (or gave very short shrift to) the influence of the international community, especially the regional organizations of which they were members. Turkish military leaders seemed unconcerned about NATO or EC reaction during the 1980 coup and Fujimori was genuinely surprised that the OAS and its members were against his autogolpe of 1992. This goes to the importance of signaling on the part of the IO that conditions will be enforced if they are abrogated. That is, I would argue that the supply-side of the equation failed in both of these cases, and to a lesser extent Greece in 1967. In none of these cases were there clear and explicit warnings given that anti-democratic action would be met with punishment from the organization. MERCOSUR has been very quick to warn Paraguay on multiple occasions that a suspension of democracy would spell disaster for their membership. The counterfactual is that if similar warnings had come from the OAS (in the case of Peru) and NATO and/or the EC (in the case of Turkey) would these democratic breakdowns have occurred?

A second and related explanation lies in the importance of precedent in the Peru and Turkey case. In the past coups in Turkey, NATO (and to a lesser degree the EC) had been unconcerned with domestic governance issues and seemed completely unwilling to punish Turkey out of concern for broader geo-strategic interests. As discussed in the case of Peru, the OAS’ weak response to the Panama crisis of the late 1980s and their inability
to set a consistent policy towards Haiti in that state’s 1991 coup could have led Fujimori to infer that his actions would be accepted by the OAS. Again, this points to the importance of IOs in acting on the conditions set in membership agreements.

A third possibility to explain this anomaly deals with the level of internal violence and pressures on the state. One commonality across each of these cases of democratic backsliding is that each state was in the midst of widespread civil violence (Peru), a high degree of external threat (Greece in 1967 in Cyprus), or both (Turkey). It is possible that under these extenuating circumstances, even the clearest signal from an IO of impending punishment or sanction will fall on deaf ears. Because of overriding concerns of civil or international war, leaders considering coups may simply not pay attention to other international factors in their decision calculus.

The final possibility is that while the IOs may ultimately be successful in signaling their intent to punish movements away from democracy in member states, those who would overthrow the state may do so regardless. Put in simple terms, even if IOs can increase the costs of democratic backsliding, the coup perpetrators may still believe that the benefits will outweigh these new costs. As discussed in the case of Turkey, many military leaders began to fear an all-out civil war unless drastic action was taken. Under these circumstances, no outside (nor internal) force may convince the military or any other group that a coup is not in their best interests. I would hypothesize that in states experiencing some level of internal violence, this scenario is much more likely.

Of course, it is also possible that some unobserved set of variables which may be specific to a state or a region also would account for this variation in the efficacy of IOs to promote or preserve democracy. Ideally, one would expand the geographic range of
the case studies to guard against this possibility. These cases have been drawn exclusively from Latin America and Europe. It is possible that other dynamics occur in different regions and other organizations. Although there is no strong a priori reason to expect this, in order to maximize the inferential potential of these studies, additional cases from Asia or Africa would be needed.

In the end, there are still many questions concerning the nature of the causal relationship between regional organizations and the democratization process. These case studies have provided some evidence concerning the functioning of these causal mechanisms. They have also spurred the creation of new hypotheses concerning this relationship as well as questions about the conditions under which this relationship holds. Further case work testing these hypothesis is necessary to pin down the nature of these processes.
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

Since 1974, democracy has become increasingly ubiquitous in the world. In the words of one observer, “Democracy seems to have scored an historic over alternative forms of government” (Held 1993: 13). What has accounted for the rise of democracy and its prospects for continuation has remained the focus of a large part of the scholarly community. Despite the widespread interest in these issues, how international factors shape these processes has not received “sufficient attention” from these scholars (Hall 1993: 279).

The purpose of this work has been to investigate the influence of regional international organizations on the process of democratization. By theorizing about, as well as testing the link between this international factor and democracy, I attempted to bring a systematic approach to investigating this phenomenon. Such an effort is essential not only for political science theory and research, but policy-makers as well.

7.1. The Argument

In Chapter 1, I presented several causal processes which could link membership in and the joining of regional organizations to both democratic transitions and democratic consolidation. The root of these causal processes flow not from behavior dictated to
domestic political actors by these regional institutions, but rather from their ability to create both positive and negative incentives for these domestic agents. The regional organizations’ ability to either promote or protect democracy grows out of their capacity to influence the cost-benefit calculations and the perceptions of societal actors, often at the behest of these same domestic actors.

With regard to democratic transitions, regional organizations can provide a low-cost forum for democracies to pressure non-democracies to become democratic. Through public de-legitimization, political isolation, suspension of benefits from the organization, even economic sanctions, regional institutions can increase the costs of remaining a non-democracy for member states. This scenario will be especially likely in cases where a member state suffers from a breakdown of democratic rule (e.g., Peru and Guatemala). In the face of this international opposition, an autocrat may move to liberalize or be unable to consolidate his/her autocratic rule. The institution provides a low cost, highly visible forum for democracies to pressure non-democracies.

Regional organizations may also encourage liberalization through a phenomenon I label the acquiescence effect. Membership in regional organizations may provide protection to the interests of key groups such as business elites and the military. Many scholars have argued that these groups often support authoritarian over democratic rule since autocrats will better protect property rights and the policies which benefit these groups (Kaufman 1986; Payne 1994). Regional organizations can provide these guarantees for property rights and economic policies thus allaying the fears of business.

---

165 Recall that I divide the transition process into two stages: liberalization and the completion of the transition. I argue that pressure from the organization will increase the probability of transition, while the
elites and/or the military. In addition, some regional organizations, especially military alliances, may socialize these important elite groups, such as the military, to not interfere with the democratic process. Evidence of the socialization phenomenon was discussed in the context of the Spanish, Turkish, and Hungarian transitions to democracy.

Finally, membership in regional organizations can help to legitimize transitional or interim regimes to ensure a completion of the democratic transition. Often, interim regimes face problems of legitimacy and credibility since they are not elected and often contain elements from previous authoritarian regimes (Shain and Linz 1995). Membership in and accession to IOs can assist in the legitimization of these regimes since acceptance into these organizations can provide an essential external “seal of approval” to the regime and the transition to democracy.

With respect to democratic consolidation, regional organizations can assist nascent democracies in overcoming challenges to their survival in several ways. First, regime leaders may join IOs to make credible commitments to democratic reform. Because membership and the benefits of regional organizations are often conditional on continued democratic governance, any attempts by the new regime to consolidate its own power will be met with punishment from the organization. This prospect of punishment and of domestic audience costs associated with such behavior contributes to the ability of regime leaders to make a credible commitment to democratic reform. This credible commitment can be essential to the consolidation of democracy as elite groups (e.g., business elites) and the masses could undermine the new democracy if they feel such a commitment is not present.

acquiescence effect will increase the likelihood of a transition at either stage. Finally, I contend that the
These same incentives created by IOs apply to anti-regime forces as well. That is, those groups which oppose democracy out of fears that they will “lose” under the new system, can be deterred from moving against a new democracy since they would also incur these costs (suspension of aid/trade, political isolation, or expulsion) imposed by the regional organization for abrogating the conditions of membership. In addition to these negative incentives, IOs may provide positive incentives as well, including the provision of assistance or locking-in policies valued by these elite (e.g., property rights or free trade). These positive incentives can convince regime opponents that democracy can be palatable, lessening the probability that they will undermine democracy.

Finally, not all regional organizations will be willing or able to engender these causal mechanisms. Some organizations may be unwilling to adopt democracy-related conditions, while others may be hesitant to enforce conditions which have been adopted. My contention is that the more democracies which are members of a regional organization, as a percentage of all organization members, the more likely the organization will be to enact conditions, enforce conditions, and provide a credible external seal of approval of domestic reform efforts. Only organizations with high “democratic density” will be associated with the promotion and protection of democracy.

7.2. The Findings

To test the preceding theory, I utilized both statistical analyses and case studies. The statistical test of the arguments were presented in Chapters 3 and 4. Chapter 3

---

legitimization effect will influence only the completion stage of the transition process.
166 This mechanism is similar to the acquiescence effect, but applies to the period after the transition to democracy.
presented a model of democratic transitions which was tested on data pertaining to
democratic transitions from 1950-1992. The model controlled for many other processes
associated with democratic transitions (and IO involvement) including per capita income,
growth rates, internal and external conflict, type of previous authoritarian regime, past
experience with democracy and contagion effects, among others. The estimates of the
model indicated that membership in democratic regional organizations (those
organizations with more democracies as a percentage of all members, see Chapter 2)
were associated with an increased probability of a transition to democracy. This result
was relatively robust across several variations of the model including the introduction of
region-based fixed effects to control for regional phenomenon excluded from the model.

In addition, Chapter 3 included more focused tests for the two stages of
democratic transitions. The model of liberalization (Model 3.2) tested for an association
between membership in democratic regional organizations and the initial loosening of
authoritarian rule, which could have resulted in a partial democracy (anocracy) or a full-
fledged democracy. Controlling for several other factors, the statistical results indicated a
strong association between membership in democratic regional organizations and
political liberalization. The model of democratic completion, or moving from a partial to
a full democracy, however, received far less support for this association. Only
occasionally was the association between IO membership and completing the transition
to democracy statistically significant.

Chapter 4 tested for the relationship between membership in and/or accession to
democratic regional organizations and the longevity of democracy. This chapter utilized
an event history model to test for this association, while controlling for factors such as
per capita income, growth rates, internal and external conflict, type of governmental system (presidential or parliamentary), past experience with democracy and contagion effects, among others. The results indicated that both membership in and accession to these organizations was associated with longer-lasting democracies. Further tests, including the introduction of fixed effects to the model showed that *joining* democratic organizations had a robust association with the endurance of democracy. In addition, across various measures of joining regional organizations, these results remained quite robust.

Although the large-N, statistical tests presented in Chapters 3 and 4 showed a broad association between IOs and democratization across space and time, it is difficult to know if the causal processes outlined in Chapter 1 are behind these statistical correlations. To this end, Chapters 5 and 6 presented several case studies to see how regional organizations were associated with the transition to or the consolidation of democracy, respectively.

Chapter 5 presented two case studies of democratic transitions: Hungary and Peru. The Hungarian case demonstrated how IOs can assist in the completion of the democratic transition. The study found moderate support for the idea that regional organizations can have an acquiescence effect on societal elites, in this case, the military. The two strongest causal linkages in the Hungarian case are found in the psychological-legitimization benefits of membership in regional organizations and direct assistance (financial and technical) provided by these organizations (e.g., the EU, Council of Europe, the CSCE). The Peruvian case illustrated how IO membership can spur liberalization through the direct application of pressure by a regional organization against
the leadership of a member state. In response to Alberto Fujimori’s *autogolpe* of 1992, the OAS responded with strong condemnation, political pressure, and the threat of economic sanctions if Fujimori did not take steps to return the country to constitutional rule. Although critics have argued that the OAS has not gone far enough to pressure Fujimori, their actions did alter Fujimori’s plans to consolidate his own authority through a national plebiscite which would have granted him near absolute power.

Finally, although contained in Chapter 6, the case of Turkey is another illustration of how regional institutions may pressure for re-democratization after a democratic breakdown. In the aftermath of the military takeover in 1980, several European organizations including the EC and the Council of Europe pressured the Turkish military to return the country to civilian rule. The suspension of economic assistance and of institutional membership to the Council of Europe were a potent source of pressure on the government of General Evren. There is also some evidence that the psychological/legitimization factor was present in the Turkish case, but more as an additional source of pressure on the military regime. Also, there is weak evidence that the military hastened their retreat to the barracks in Turkey because of the socialization effects of NATO membership.

Chapter 6 presented three cases to trace the influence of regional organizations in the protection of democracy: Greece, Paraguay, and Turkey. In the Greek case, traces of all of the causal mechanisms specified in Chapter 1 were present. Accession to the EC provided many benefits to Greece, all of which were conditional upon continued democratic practice. This conditionality helped create a credible commitment on the part of the Karamanlis government to continue democratic reform, while also providing a
deterrent to forces who would move against the young democracy. In addition, the provision of assistance from the EC served to “bribe” certain domestic groups (mostly the agriculture sector) in order to gain their allegiance to the new regime.

Paraguay demonstrated the strong deterrent effect that conditions on membership may have to regime opponents. MERCOSUR membership has supported this fledgling democracy through two crises which threatened to end in military coups. In both cases, the threat of expulsion and the end of the benefits associated with MERCOSUR played a large role in convincing the military to stay out of civilian politics.

Finally, the case of Turkey was presented as a failed case of consolidation. Despite many memberships in highly democratic regional organizations, Turkey has suffered three breakdowns of democracy, each at the hands of the military. This study explored why membership in such organizations as NATO, the EC/EU, and the Council of Europe has not created conditions conducive to the survival of democracy. I conclude that the lack of enforcement of conditions, largely due to Turkey’s geo-strategic importance, plays a large role in making this a failed case for my theory. In addition, I speculate that under some circumstances, although regional organizations may increase the costs of anti-democratic behavior, the benefits of such actions may still outweigh the costs. Both of these explanations play a role in the 1980 military coup in Turkey. In both of the previous cases of military coups (1960 and 1971), European institutions had done little to punish the Turkish military. This history of turning a blind eye towards Turkey, in addition to the dire economic and political situation of Turkey, probably led the military to believe that the costs imposed for such a transgression would be low.
In sum, both the statistical and case-based evidence support the contention that certain regional organizations can play a role in promoting and protecting democracy by altering the incentives of domestic actors. Some of the hypothesized causal processes received more support than others in the case research, while new avenues of causality were uncovered. I return to these in my discussion of future research on this topic.

7.3. The Implications

The relationship between regional organizations and domestic political processes has important implications for both academic theory and political practice. Specifically, these findings challenge current thinking about the role and functions of international institutions in international relations theory, and it calls into question the assumption in comparative politics that the major influences on and determinants of democratization lie inside the nation-state. In addition, the empirical findings and scope conditions discussed in this work establish some important guidelines for policy-makers who wish to use these organizations to foster and/or protect democracy.

7.3.1. International Relations Theory

The “institutions debate” in international relations theory has centered on issues relating to international conflict and cooperation. For example, a common argument/assumption of neoliberal institutionalists is that international institutions are formed to solve coordination problems between states (cf. Keohane and Martin 1995). Ignoring the question of whether international politics are influenced by these institutions in a positive or negative manner, this work has shown that domestic political processes
can be very important to the creation and functioning of international institutions. Specifically, institutional membership can serve domestic political purposes (e.g., signifying credible commitments, creating costs for anti-regime behavior, etc.), rather than or in addition to, international purposes.

This finding is especially important in light of decisions by states to join international institutions. Most of the international institutions literature focuses on the formation of institutions and regimes. Today, much of the activity surrounding international institutions, however, involves the expansion of existing structures. Institutionalist theory is silent as to whether the act of joining these institutions will have a similar impetus as the act of forming them. My findings indicate that decisions of whether to join an institution may be based as much (or more) on domestic political considerations as international ones.

As called for by recent institutionalist work (cf. Martin and Simmons 1999; Keohane and Martin 1995), I have attempted to show not only how institutions matter, but how variation among institutions influence their performance. First, in line with other recent institutionalist works (e.g., Goldstein 1996; Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorf 2000), this work has shown how the direct causal linkages between the international and domestic levels of analysis function. Regional organizations may pressure domestic governments, provide incentives for certain types of behavior, or provide an anchor of legitimacy for interim governments. Rather than merely external agents for change, however, these same regional organizations function as a tool for certain domestic actors. By binding themselves to the rules and regulations of an organizations, domestic agents limit their own autonomy, but other elites' autonomy as
well. These constraints can be essential to encourage the transition to and the consolidation of democracy.

Variations among regional organizations set important limits to these findings. The more democratic the membership of a regional organization, the more credible are its guarantees of assistance and protections, the more interested it will be in promoting liberal reforms, the more likely it will be to set constraining conditions on the behavior of new members, and the more likely it will be to enforce those conditions if they are violated. Of course, variation along other dimensions may be important to an organization's ability or interest in democracy promotion. Other factors such as the distribution of wealth (or military power) among the members, level of democracy within the rules of the organization, or age of the organization could correlate with their efficacy in this area, as well as suggest other causal processes linking these organizations to democracy. Still, we can be assured that along at least one dimension (democratic-ness of membership), variation in institutions matter for outcome.

The findings of this study are also suggestive for several bodies of literature discussed in Chapter 1. The "two-level games" literature suggests that domestic actors will use constraints arising from international institutions to further their agenda domestically, yet domestic political constrains will also be a source of leverage in international negotiations. This study suggests that in post-transitional states, these dynamics may occur quite often. Yet, in these instances, only the "outside-in" constraint is important. That is, domestic agents will use membership in or the joining of regional organizations to limit their own (or their opponents) options domestically, yet it is difficult to conclude that their domestic situation is a source of leverage internationally.
Indeed, it is surprising that post-transitional states do not attempt to leverage more favorable treatment from these organizations. Rather, in their quest for membership and its attendant benefits, domestic elites will rarely press for additional gain. This is clearly evident in the Europe Agreements, for example, where Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic received very few guarantees of open markets in Western Europe, in exchange for future consideration as EU members (Pinder 1991).

The new institutionalists contention that international and domestic institutions interact in distinct and strategic ways also receives support in this study. Although many of the models which underlie this new institutionalist work require complete (or significant) information concerning the preferences of the actors, one finds evidence that domestic agents do use membership in regional institutions to bind their own hands, signal intentions, and make side-payments to disaffected domestic political groups. Despite the fact that information about the preferences (or even identity) of important actors in the transition stage can be scarce, this study suggests that the ideas of the new institutionalists may apply to more than the developed and consolidated "western" democracies.

Finally, the interest group-based explanations for involvement in regional organizations (cf. Solingen 1994) also receives some support, although this research suggests a broader range of concerns which can lead to joining regional organizations. Rather than solely economic-based agendas driving membership in these organizations, I have argued that concerns of domestic legitimacy, placating or paying off other domestic interest groups, as well as binding certain groups can be important factors in the drive to
join regional organizations. Although economic motives are clearly important in many cases, these other interests can be important as well.

In addition, my argument concerning transitions to democracy shows how membership in these organizations can have unforeseen consequences. If "internationalist" coalitions push governments to join regional organizations for simply economic benefits, they may find themselves under pressure from these organizations to liberalize domestically. Even if not an initial requirement of entry to the organization, regional institutions may evolve to include such requirements. A perfect example of this phenomenon is the Paraguay case. Although joined primarily for economic gains, MERCOSUR has become an external source of pressure and strength for that country's democracy.

This study provides empirical support for many other areas of research in international relations, yet also provides additional scope conditions as well as questions concerning the veracity and applicability of these theories. In addition to its contributions to the international relations field, the findings presented here are important for comparative political theory as well.

7.3.2. Comparative Politics

Although much of the research in comparative politics on democratic transitions and consolidation has eschewed international factors, this work has shown that even when controlling for several domestic factors, regional organizations can still play a significant role in the democratization process. In many instances, domestic factors are
the dominant force in shaping democratic transitions and consolidation, but to ignore the role of actors external to the nation-state is to ignore an often potent force for change.

Since membership in a regional organization is inherently a domestic political decision, my argument does not minimize the importance of domestic actors. Rather, I argue that when specifying the influences on these actor’s decisions regarding democratization, international forces can be important. Regional organizations can influence the cost and benefit calculations of these domestic agents by encouraging, committing, or deterring them in a variety of ways. This influence may arise from these actor’s desire to constrain themselves or their opponents in the first place.

Although some literature has developed discussing the importance of international factors in the transition or consolidation process (cf. Whitehead 1996a; Pridham 1994), much of this literature lacks systematic attempts to build theory. Much of the extant work is based on single case studies, which, while important in determining the causal mechanisms in particular instances, does little to help build broader theories which link international forces with domestic political processes. In addition, few cross-case or statistical studies exist in this literature. This work has attempted to fill both these theoretical and empirical voids.

One factor not discussed in my theoretical argument was the dynamics concerning the decision to join a regional organization. In several of the cases discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, some segment of the domestic population voiced their opposition to membership in the regional organization. Future work could concentrate on how that opposition was dealt with in the post-transitional environment (in the cases of consolidation). In other words, how do domestic political processes concerning foreign policy play out in these
settings? This work has concentrated on the broader picture of membership, its impetus, and its effects, yet this question could be equally important to understanding the domestic politics of organization membership.

To ignore the influence of actors external to the state is to ignore an important influence in domestic political processes. For example, the concept of "legitimacy" has been offered as an important factor in the success or failure of the transition and the consolidation process (cf. Mainwaring 1992). This study has shown that an important source of legitimacy for both transitional (e.g., interim) and nascent democratic regimes is acceptance by the international community. One important sign of this acceptance is membership in regional organizations. Again, although other domestic factors certainly influence public and elite perceptions of legitimacy, international factors are often an important constituent of this perception.

Other comparative work has identified other international factors which can influence the democratization process (also discussed in Chapter 1). Two of these (epistemic communities/spill-over and the use of force) actually coincide with causal mechanisms which have been discussed in this study. The epistemic communities/spill-over argument was found in the case work. The importance of regional organizations in providing technical assistance to fledgling democracies to help complete their transitions to democracy was noted in the case of Hungary (see Chapter 5). Although short of the physical use of force, the pressure mechanism used in the Peru case also shows how direct pressure in the form of threats and sanctions can influence the democratization process. Thus, rather than competing explanations, this extant literature offers complimentary mechanisms which can work through regional organizations.
Thus, rather than overturning or rejecting current thinking in comparative politics as to the role of external factors in the democratization process, this study has attempted to clarify how those factors function, their relative importance, and if those factors work in conjunction with other causal mechanisms discussed in comparative politics. As regional organizations continue to expand throughout the globe, the prospects for these institutions to play an increasing role in domestic politics, will grow with time. As such, it is essential that those who study domestic political dynamics consider their influence on domestic politics.

7.3.3. Policy-making

As discussed in Chapter 1, much of the justification for expansion of regional institutions from policy-makers flows from the idea that international institutions can protect and/or promote democracy. This work has shown that simply assuming this link will always function may set the policy-making community up for great disappointments in the future. A major conclusion of this research has shown that the supply-side aspect of the IO-democracy link is an essential part of the picture. Conditions on membership are a key factor in this link. When conditions are not enforced, this threatens the democratic stability of the state in question and also sets dangerous precedents for future threats to democracy in other states. As the case of Turkey illustrates, turning a blind eye to anti-democratic behavior can lead to assumptions on the part of coup perpetrators that similar behavior in the future will lead to a similar response. The IO-democracy link functions largely by IO’s influence on the cost-benefit calculations of domestic agents. If
these agents attach a low probability to the enforcement of conditions, IOs will then only be able to pressure for re-democratization rather than prevent its breakdown.

The lack of enforcement may arise for a variety of reasons. Some members of the organization may refuse to cooperate with economic sanctions against another member state. In these instances, the cohesion of the organization may be valued over encouraging democracy, especially in cases where the member in question is considered a cornerstone of the organization. For example, it is clear that the U.S. was hesitant to press Turkey on the issue of democracy because of their geo-strategic importance in the Cold War. The question is, under what circumstances are conditions likely to not be enforced? I return to this question below.

Another important lesson drawn from this work for policy-makers is the importance of conditions themselves. Because part of the importance of conditions is their “signaling value”—their ability to create credible commitments on the part of new democrats—conditions should be explicit upon accession to the organization. When conditions are not explicit, they are less likely to create credible commitments or deter anti-regime activity (e.g., NATO’s lack of explicit conditionality in the case of Greece and Turkey).

7.4. Future Research Avenues

This work is by no means the definitive statement on the IO-democracy link. Many additional theoretical and empirical puzzles have arisen out of this work which can help to elucidate the relationship between international institutions and democracy. This
section will outline several additional directions which could add to this body of knowledge.

First, several empirical puzzles emerge from the case studies. For example, why do IOs appear to be more effective in engendering re-democratization than democratization? I could find little evidence that long-standing authoritarian regimes were effectively pressured to democratize by regional organizations. Rather, my cases indicate that only when a state suffers a breakdown of democracy is pressure from an IO helpful in the emergence of democracy. Again, more case studies of authoritarian regimes involved in IOs could help answer this puzzle.

Another puzzle which requires more case research is the lack of evidence of the acquiescence effect. If ideas concerning the importance of protection to societal elites (especially business interests and the military) by authoritarian regimes are correct, regional organizations should be able to serve as an effective substitute commitment mechanisms for emerging democracies. Since these organizations lock-in policies for important societal groups, the danger of losing these privileges under democracy is lessened. Despite arguments that this process was important in the Southern European transitions (Whitehead 1986), there is little evidence of this in other transition or consolidation cases.

One explanation for this finding could center on the idea of “reserve domains” (Linz and Stepan 1996). By creating policy guarantees which “lock-in” an advantage for a certain segment of society, these arrangements create policy areas which could be considered off-limits to the new democratic regime. Thus, even in the face of massive opposition to these policies, governments would be bound by their international
commitments. If a new democratic regime fears granting such power to an elite group, they may refrain from doing so. That is, new regimes may want to place no policies “off-limits” for reasons of popular legitimacy. In these cases, they will not utilize regional organizations to protect the interests of key elite groups.\textsuperscript{167} To test these hypotheses, however, more case work is needed on both cases of democratic transitions, as well as motivations to join regional organizations.

Additional causal mechanisms, such as the provision of direct assistance, also provide fertile grounds for new case research. In the case of Hungary, direct technical and monetary aid helped to complete the transition from an interim regime to an elected democratic government. Given these limited findings, it would appear that this process may be more common in the democratic completion stage, yet more case work is needed to test this hypothesis. Similarly in Greece, the EC’s influence in bringing institutional reform to that country provided an additional link between regional organizations and democratic consolidation. More research on these causal processes is warranted.

Another area in which substantial research can take place is expanding the domain of inference for these findings. I included only a sample of relevant regional organizations in the statistical tests of my argument. I specifically excluded several types of organizations (both regional and international) from the scope of this study. Further work could investigate the influence of larger, global institutions such as the United Nations, as well as the international financial institutions (IFIs). It is unlikely that the global, open institutions like the UN and its related agencies influence democratization in the same manner as the regional organizations included in this study since, by definition,

\textsuperscript{167} Of course, this would not explain why authoritarian regimes would not enact these policies if the
these open organizations have no conditions on membership. Thus, other causal mechanisms would be at work if there were a statistical relationship between these organizations and democracy.

Finally, the IFIs and their regional counterparts (e.g., regional development banks) may also play a role in influencing democratization. This influence could be direct, through the conditions attached to assistance, although because many of the conditions in these agreements are not public knowledge, the exact causal processes may differ. For example, the role of creating visible, credible commitments to political reform may be undermined by the secrecy of the IMF and World Bank. In addition, the link to democracy may be indirect, through economic reform. If political democracy requires neoliberal economic reform, these institutions may play a crucial role in the long-term promotion and protection of democracy. Each of these are testable hypotheses, however, which should be investigated using both statistical analysis and case studies.

Finally, besides the “democratic density” of an organization, there may be other correlates of the likelihood of enforcement of democratic conditions. Given the case of Turkey, “democratic density” (IOScore) is clearly not a fool-proof measure for the likelihood of conditions or their enforcement. Controlling for other factors may improve one’s ability to predict under what circumstances these conditions are likely to be enforced. The variable which arises in these cases is geo-strategic importance. The democratic breakdowns in Turkey and Greece were “accepted” by the U.S. because of Cold War military concerns. In addition, the U.S. refused to use its leverage in NATO to pressure either state to re-democratize after the coups. As previously discussed, this prospects of democratization were good.
behavior set dangerous precedents for future adventurers who would overthrow democratic governments.

7.5. Conclusion

The title of this work asks a simple question, can democracy come "from above"? That is, do regional organizations impose or create democracy where it had not existed? The conclusion of this work is that while part of the impetus for democracy may come "from above", the success and endurance of democracy depends on how domestic actors behave "from below". Regional organizations can provide powerful incentives to liberalize, complete the transition to democracy, and remain a democracy, yet domestic agents must ultimately respond to those incentives, whether positive or negative. This cautionary note aside, this study has shown that in many circumstances, domestic actors will respond to, even seek out, these incentives.

In the end, regional organizations can assist in both the transition and the consolidation processes in various ways. This work has shown that there is an empirical link between membership in and accession to regional organizations and democratization. The case studies presented in the final chapters highlighted some of the causal processes surrounding this empirical link. Although this work raised many new questions for further research, there is now some theoretical and empirical basis for both scholars and policy-makers to hope that regional institutions can enhance the prospects for democracy.

By influencing the costs and benefits of domestic agents who are contemplating liberalization, re-democratization, or anti-democratic coups, regional organizations can influence domestic political processes. Through the provision of pressure on
authoritarians, credible commitments to societal elites and new regimes, an external seal of approval and legitimization, and direct economic benefits, these organizations can increase the likelihood of a democratic transition and of democratic consolidation. If the members of these regional organizations can remain vigilant in supplying this pressure, conditionality, approval, and resources, regional organizations may augur well for the future of democracy in member states.
REFERENCES


307


Martin's Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven: Yale
University Press.

Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


Westview Press.

America: The Case of Brazil." In The International Aspects of Democratization:

Dimension." In Democratization in Eastern Europe: Domestic and International

Hyde-Price, Adrian. 1996. The International Politics of East Central Europe.
Manchester: Manchester University Press.

Inotai, Andras and Jurgen Notzold. 1995. “Hungary”. In Central and Eastern Europe on
the Way into the European Union, ed. W. Weidenfeld, 89-110. Gutersloh:
Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers.

October. Lexis/Nexis.

Greece and EC Membership Evaluated, ed. P. Kazakos and P.C. Ioakimidis, 139-


Entanglements in International Governmental Organizations.” American Political


OECD. 1990. Main Economic Indicators. Paris: OECD.


Palmer, David Scott. 1996. “‘Fujipopulism’ and Peru’s Progress.” Current History 95 (February): 70-75.


World Bank. 1998. The World Development Indicators. CD-ROM.


