Public Opinion in England regarding
the Crimean War, 1853-1856

A Thesis Presented for the Degree of
Master of Arts

BY
Diathea Centura Scholl, B. A., B. Sc. in Ed.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
1923

Approved by Wilber H. Siebert
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I. Brief Account of the Crimean War ________________ 2

Chapter II. The Opposition of the War______________________ 10

Chapter III. Pro-War Sentiment ________________________ 26

Chapter IV. The Pulpit and the Periodical Press__________ 40
PUBLIC OPINION IN ENGLAND
REGARDING THE CRIMEAN WAR 1853-1856

CHAPTER I
BRIEF ACCOUNT OF THE CRIMEAN WAR

For many centuries in Europe the one question that has never failed to stimulate strife and discord among the powers is the Eastern Question, an unsolved problem which the Crusades left to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹ Thus we approach the Crimean War, which broke up thirty years of general peace in Europe.

Russia has always considered herself the protector of Greek Christians, and has hoped to re-establish Christianity in the Mosque of St. Sophia at Constantinople. Therefore, she has worked toward one goal for centuries, namely, Constantinople; for Russia without Constantinople has no practicable outlet to the sea. At the same time the Russians considered themselves protectors of the two sacred shrines, the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem and the Church of the Holy Sepulchre at Jerusalem, thus bringing themselves into conflict with similar claims of the French, who supported the Latin Church.²

England feared a Russian protectorate in Turkey and a French protectorate in Egypt. Hence, she felt that the future of Turkey should be regulated by a conference of the powers. British foreign policy is always quick to be alarmed at the rise of a rival.

In 1850 Napoleon III took up the cause of Roman Catholics in the Near East, deliberately lighting the torch of religious fanaticism.³ Thereupon, Lord

¹ Latimer, E. W., *Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century*, 103.
² This dispute between the Greek and Latin churches for the guardianship of these shrines has been maintained for centuries.
³ Marriott, J. A. R., in *The Near Eastern Question* calls Napoleon III the "immediate firebrand."
John Russell accused France of being the first to disturb the status quo in Europe. Napoleon in 1851 tried to enlarge the privileges of the Latins and began negotiations for this purpose with the Sultan of Turkey. The Greek Catholics, who had had control of the shrines since 1740, became aroused and appealed to Russia, which at once opposed the negotiations (between the Sultan and Napoleon III), by which the latter had almost obtained the former’s recognition of his demand for custody of the Holy Places. Such interference by Russia angered the Sultan, who went so far as to send documents to the French chargé d’affaires and to the Greek head at Jerusalem, whose language was not identical.

Russia sent Prince Menschikoff to Turkey in March, 1853, to demand full control over the Holy Places, and the Czar’s protectorate over the Greek Church in Turkey—these items to be embodied in a formal treaty. The Sultan objected to these demands; and Prince Menschikoff found that he was opposed by England as well as by Turkey.

Indeed, England was interested in the situation more than any of the other powers. She wanted Turkey to continue in Europe, because the presence of the infidel nation was a guard for her possessions in the Far East, especially for India. Hence, we find England standing as a barrier to Russian ambition in the Near East and strongly demanding the integrity of Turkey.

The Czar, when visiting in England in 1844, had spoken of Turkey as falling to pieces and had urged that it would be well for England and Russia to come to an understanding on the matter. He sent a memorandum to the British Government regarding the understanding he had suggested between the two powers, but it was filed away and never answered by England. Nicholas accepted this silence as indication that England sympathized with his ideas on the Eastern Question. On January 9, 1853, the Archduchess Helen gave a ball at her palace in St. Petersburg. During the evening the Czar said to Sir

4 Kinglake, A. W., Invasion of the Crimea, I, 57, says “Russian ambition was sanctified by religion.”
5 India has been England’s pride since she lost the American Colonies in 1783.
6 The Greville Memoirs for March 24, 1853, contain a footnote which speaks of the memorandum which caused the Czar to rely on the Ministers (then in power), who had made an agreement during his visit of 1844 in support of Russia in her protection of Greek Church and had done this without consulting France.

[ 3 ]
G. Hamilton Seymour concerning the prospects of Turkey: "We have on our hands a very sick man, and it will be a great misfortune if, one of these days, he should slip away from us before the necessary arrangements are made." The Czar insisted that the interests of both countries depended "upon almost the same questions" and wanted "terms of close amity" between the two nations. As Turkey was in a critical state he thought it necessary for the two powers to come to an understanding. He did not want Russia to occupy Constantinople permanently, nor would he allow any other nation such an advantage. The Balkan lands could become autonomous, but under his protection. Seymour answered the Czar, saying that he rejoiced to hear such language, but they must bear in mind that countries do not die in a hurry. "Turkey will remain for many a year," he said, "unless some unforeseen crisis should occur." He vigorously opposed the union of England and France. But the English Government refused to discuss the dissolution of Turkey, pointing out that "an agreement in such a case tends very surely to hasten the contingency for which it is intended to provide," and thought that the Czar should make no agreements behind the backs of France and Austria.

Lord Stratford de Redcliffe was sent to Turkey, April 5, 1853. He hated and dreaded Russian influence there and felt that the matter would have to be settled by war or diplomacy. He advised the Sultan to refuse Russia's demand. As a result, Prince Menschikoff and his staff left Constantinople on May 22, which meant a declaration of war between Turkey and Russia. The Czar had been holding his army in readiness and now ordered it across the River Pruth. On occupying the territory beyond the river, Russia said it was not war, but a "material guarantee" to secure the concession of her just demands. But France and England dispatched fleets at once and advised the Sultan not to resist, forcibly, the Russian invasion of the principalities.

The Vienna Note of July 31 came about through the efforts of England, France, Austria, and Prussia. It was a basis for reconciliation, but was not accepted. Out of this grew the alliance of France and England of April 10.

---

7 Eastern Papers, Part V (for 1854) in Annual Register, 1854.
8 Ibid.
9 Gordon, Sir Arthur, Earl of Aberdeen, 253, says: "By whatever motives he was actuated, it is not the less the case that a large—perhaps the largest—share of responsibility for the Crimean War must rest upon Stratford."
The Queen of England in her speech of August 8, 1853, said, "The Emperor of the French has united with Her Majesty in earnest endeavors to reconcile differences, the continuation of which would involve Europe in war."\(^{10}\)

On October 5 Turkey demanded the evacuation of the provinces by the Russian troops within 15 days; and on October 23 Turkey declared war. The Czar sent his fleet out to Sinope,\(^{11}\) where a small Turkish fleet was at anchor in the bay, and the former completely annihilated the latter. This incident aroused the indignation of France and England and is regarded as the "immediate prelude to the war."\(^{12}\) The British public were greatly angered, and Sir James Graham wrote: "I have been one of the most strenuous advocates of peace with Russia until the last moment; but the Sinope attack and recent events have changed entirely the aspect of affairs. I am afraid that a rupture with Russia is inevitable."\(^{13}\) The destruction of the Turkish fleet also caused a conflict between the two parties within the British Cabinet. One element, led by Lord Aberdeen, believed firmly in the Czar and thought peace could be maintained by meeting the Russian demands; the other element, under Lords Palmerston and Stratford, believed no less strongly in the regeneration of Turkey and thought peace could be promoted by convincing Russia that she would have other powers to deal with in case of war.

At a meeting of the British Cabinet in January, 1854, it was decided that the allied fleets (those of France and England) should enter the Black Sea. On February 7, 1854, the Russian ambassador left London; on the same day the English ambassador left St. Petersburg. In England it was believed that the alliance with France was security for the peace of all Europe. One man declares: "Sure I am that if the advisers of the Crown in this country act in cordial concert with the Government of the Emperor of the French, and if the forces of the two countries in the Mediterranean are to act in concert, then it will be almost impossible that any war can disturb the peace of Europe."\(^{14}\)

The Crimean War, which lasted until 1856, now began. Kinglake says that the "invasion of the Crimea so tried the strength, so measured the enduring

\(^{10}\) Annual Register, 1853.
\(^{11}\) Sinope is a town upon the Turkish Coast of the Black Sea.
\(^{13}\) Parker, Life of Sir James Graham, II, 226.
\(^{14}\) Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, I, 327.
power of the nations engaged, that, when the conflict was over, their relative stations in Europe were changed, and they had to be classed afresh." 15 Europe had decided that the Czar was not to be allowed to convert the Black Sea into a Russian lake. England entered the war because she thought she was vitally concerned in the affair. The main causes of the war were three: first, the ambition of Napoleon III; second, the designs of Nicholas I; and third, England's maintainance of the integrity of Turkey as a means of checking the Russian advance toward India.

A British fleet was sent to the Baltic under Sir Charles Napier, and on April 5 Lord Raglan's forces reached Gallipoli. Marshal Saint-Arnaud was the French commander. Though the Russians withdrew from the Danubian Principalities, the allies decided to strike "at the heart of Russian power in the East, Sebastopol."

The Battle of the Alma, in which the Russians were defeated, took place on September 20, 1854. Because of the French opposition, this victory was not followed up by the allied forces with a siege of Sebastopol at this time. The battle of Balaclava on October 25 (in which occurred the charge of the Light Brigade made famous by Tennyson) and the battle of Inkerman on November 5, together with the gale of November 14, which proved disastrous to the allies, were the beginning of real suffering on the part of the troops, which lasted until the end of February, 1855.

Hamley says that "the nation shook with universal tremour of anger and grief as these scenes of suffering were told" through the English Press. "The feeling found expression in two ways, very different, but both very natural—the one was an absorbing desire to afford immediate relief; the other, a fretful craving to find scapegoats, and make them atone for all this suffering." 17 The English established three large hospitals in Asia Minor nearly opposite Constantinople, and Florence Nightingale and her corps worked diligently there. By the end of January there were 5,000 sick in these hospitals.

16 Hamley, *The War in the Crimea*, says that this statement was emphatically used in "*The Times*' of July 24.
In the latter part of 1854 the powers drew up a memorandum known as the "Four Points,"\(^{18}\) which provided:

1. that Russia should abandon all control over Moldavia, Wallachia, and Servia;
2. that Russia should relinquish her claims to control the mouths of the Danube;
3. that all treaties calculated to give Russia a preponderance in the Black Sea should be abrogated, and
4. that Russia should renounce the claim she had made to an exclusive right to protect Christians in the Ottoman Dominions.

During the time of suffering in the Crimea, Sardinia's entrance into the war on January 26, 1855, under the terms of the treaty of Turin which provided for the cooperation of 15,000 Sardinian troops, gave much encouragement to the allies. On March 2, 1855, came the death of Czar Nicholas, the instigator of the war.\(^{19}\) To him it was a holy war, but the battle of the Alma was his deathblow.\(^{20}\)

Because Sebastopol was regarded as a menace, forces were directed against the fortification by the middle of May, 1855. The health of Lord Raglan, commander of the British forces, broke down in June,\(^{21}\) and his death soon after caused much grief. The siege of Sebastopol lasted three weeks (August 15 to September 9), during which time the allies destroyed the fortress. In the meantime, Lord Palmerston, Prime Minister of England since the Aberdeen Ministry fell, sent a sanitary commission to report upon conditions in the Crimea. Sebastopol having been taken, many thought the object of the war had been gained. Napoleon III and Cavour were ready for peace but not Palmerston, because he mistrusted both France and Austria. Nevertheless, on January 16, 1856, the new Czar, Alexander II, accepted the four points together with the neutralization of the Black Sea; and on February 1 a protocol was signed at Vienna by representatives of the five powers.\(^{22}\)

\(^{18}\) Annual Register, 1854.
\(^{19}\) Marriott, *The Near Eastern Question*, 246.
\(^{21}\) Latimer, *Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century*, 158, says that "he had been assailed in Parliament during the winter, and harassed and hindered in every way."
Peace was concluded in the Treaty of Paris on April 15, 1856, the principal terms of which were as follows:

1. The Sublime Porte was formally admitted, on invitation of the six powers (including the King of Sardinia), to "participate in the public law and concert of Europe," and the powers engaged severally to respect, and collectively to guarantee, "the independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire."

2. The Sultan, "in his constant solicitude for the welfare of his subjects," announced to the powers his intention to ameliorate their condition "without distinction of creed or race"; and the powers, recognizing "the high value of this communication," expressly repudiated their "right to interfere, either collectively or separately," in the internal affairs of Turkey.

3. The Black Sea was to be neutralized and its waters and ports opened to the mercantile marine of every nation, put permanently "interdicted to the flag of war"; and there were to be no arsenals, either Russian or Turkish, on its coasts.

4. Kars was to be restored to the Turks and the Crimea to Russia.

5. The navigation of the Danube was to be open on equal terms to ships of all nations, under the control of an international commission.

6. Southern Bessarabia was to be ceded by Russia to Moldavia, and the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia were to remain under the suzerainty of the Porte. Russia renounced her exclusive protectorate over them, and the contracting powers collectively guaranteed their privileges. They were to enjoy "an independent and national administration with full liberty of worship, legislation, and commerce, and were to have a national armed force." In each province a national convention was to be held to "decide the definitive organization of the Principalities."

7. The liberties of Serbia were to be similarly guaranteed.

Significant in history is the Declaration of Paris, which was drawn up at the same time, and contained the following stipulations:

1. that privateering be abolished;
2. that blockade must be effective;

---

24 The United States was asked to consider this, and accepted all but the first provision.
3. that a neutral flag should protect an enemy's goods, except contraband; and
4. that neutral merchandise, except contraband, should not be seized under an enemy's flag.

The results of the war were far-reaching; it weakened Russia and checked her advance against Constantinople for two decades\textsuperscript{25}; Turkey was able to retain it's hold in Europe, under the supervision of the powers; Sardinia gained recognition at the peace conference, and Napoleon III gained the English alliance. Furthermore, the Crimean War opened an era of great wars in Europe, although, for nearly sixty years thereafter, Great Britain ceased to be a military factor in European politics, for she was no longer in a position to interfere effectively in wars limited to land warfare, owing to the fact that her economic and political development had not been accompanied by a similar growth in the military sphere.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Fueter, \textit{World History}, ch. 22.
\textsuperscript{26} \textit{Ibid.}
CHAPTER II

THE OPPOSITION TO THE WAR

During the entire war the opposition was a strong factor and had to be recognized. At various stages from 1853 to 1856, this faction added recruits to its cause, and the spokesmen were always ready to express their convictions at any opportune moment; but various degrees of opposition were manifested.

Because of the very nature of the British Government, by which the ministry is responsible to the House of Commons, it is essential to consider the ministry's policy and action in time of crises.

Lord Aberdeen, Prime Minister at the time, was antagonistic to Turkey from the beginning. He hated the very thought of war, and used to say that no war would be undertaken with his concurrence.\(^1\) Aberdeen did not want to fight Russia because he was a friend and admirer of the Czar; therefore, he drifted, and while "faced toward peace, he was always going towards war."\(^2\) And, though the English Cabinet was of the opinion that the Porte should be advised not to answer Russia's invasion of the Danubian Principalities by a declaration of war, through the domination of Lord Stratford,\(^3\) the English representative in Turkey, the Sultan gradually came to declare war on Russia on October 23, 1853.

Lord Aberdeen's real attitude is shown in his letters during his premiership.\(^4\) On October 17 he told Gladstone that the Turks have "step by step drawn us into a position in which we are more or less committed to their support." On November 6 he wrote to Palmerston, stating his views very clearly:

---

1 Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea*, I, 410, says, "Lord Aberdeen's hatred of war had the character of a disease—his feeling and opinions were all against war."
3 Lord Stratford had an antipathy to Russia and was always desirous of thwarting her at any turn.
4 Gordon's *Earl of Aberdeen* presents his letters on this period in Ch. 9.
"When the great rupture of diplomatic relations took place . . . the great object we proposed to ourselves was to preserve peace by advising such reasonable and timely concessions on the part of Turkey as might be made without any real sacrifice of the dignity or independence of the Sultan. This has been our policy throughout the dispute, and it is the policy which, as it seems to me, we ought still to keep steadily in view . . . If the Turks should reject our advice, and should be obstinately bent on war when we are laboring for peace, I confess that I am not disposed to sacrifice our freedom of action and to permit ourselves to be dragged into a war by a Government which has lost the requisite control over its subjects. . . I have no wish to abandon Turkey; on the contrary, I fully concur in the policy which seeks to preserve it. . . I believe that its preservation at this moment is a European necessity. I would, however, endeavor rather to preserve it by peace than by war; for war . . . whatever may be its immediate result, is full of danger to the existence of the Turkish Empire. . . I should be perfectly prepared to oppose, even to the extremity of war, the possession by Russia of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, and I think that this decision would be justified by England and by European interests."

Up to the beginning of October, 1853, the public was pacific. But after the Sinope Massacre, the Times (which had supported Aberdeen) clamored for "decided measures"; and Aberdeen, with a heavy heart, had to concur several months later in the declaration of war. He decided that the interests of peace would fare better if he remained as head of the Government during hostilities; and after war was declared, his one object was to reestablish peace. This accounts for his advocating the invasion of the Crimea.

Gladstone, Chancellor of the Exchequer, also abhorred war and disavowed any obligation to uphold the integrity of Turkey. His peace principles were all the stronger because he knew that war is costly. The public felt that it was certain that he would not be a partner in the Government if war were declared. However, by remaining in office, he and Aberdeen "paralyzed the efforts of those who wished to prevent war, for Gladstone had assured the public

---

5 Cf. Martin, Prince Consort, II, 428, ff.
6 Aberdeen had gone to war reluctantly to insure the security of Turkey, and opposed everything that would widen the scope of the war.
that the enterprise was blameless and pure." The Eastern Question was one of the central interests of Gladstone's life, and through his letters and personal observations we can realize this. On October 7 he wrote to Mrs. Gladstone that at the cabinet meeting some startling things were said, but he hoped that England would not be involved in war. He argued against Palmerston's proposal that England should furnish Turkey with naval assistance. In a letter to Lord Aberdeen, dated October 12, he spoke of the existence of a peace and war party in Manchester, though he thought that the peace feeling was the stronger, and that the majority favored the course that the Government had pursued. In a speech at Manchester, Gladstone said that there was "necessary for regulating the distribution of power in Europe, and the absorption of power by one of the great potentates of Europe which would follow the fall of the Ottoman Empire, would be dangerous to the peace of the world; it is the duty of England, at whatever cost, to set itself against such a result." In conversation with Aberdeen he said, "We are not fighting for the Turks, but we are warning Russia off the forbidden ground." He felt that feeling rather than argument made the Crimean War popular.

Downing Street held that it would be a shame to protect Christian races through treaties between the Sultan and the Czar, when they should be safeguarded by treaties between the Sultan and the Five Powers. Moreover, the Duke of Newcastle as War Minister did not give satisfaction because he was distrusted. Gladstone declared that "Newcastle was for putting down by force the Christians of European Turkey."

---

7 Kinglake, *The Invasion of the Crimea*, I, 413, says "Gladstone stood charged to give alarm of danger."
8 At Manchester, Gladstone unveiled a statue of Peel, and thus had the opportunity to see the status of public opinion there.
9 Morley, *Life of Gladstone*, Vol. I, 484, says that Gladstone felt that the Crimean War was the vindication of the public law of Europe against a wanton disturber.
10 In 1881 Gladstone said to Morley, "as a member of the Aberdeen Cabinet I never can admit that divided opinions in that Cabinet led to hesitating action, or brought on the war. (Morley, I, 495.)
11 *Quarterly Review*, 1855, says "though the public will support a Government which does its duty, it will take little more to raise a tempest of anger against men who jeopardize everything out of delicacy to one colleague or jealousy of another."
The debates in Parliament show clearly that the opposition was a very definite faction.\textsuperscript{12} In the House of Lords the Earl of Malmesbury in August, 1853, said: "We are on the brink of a great war and yet know nothing of what has passed in negotiations between Russia and England . . . and because of the Halifax and Carlisle speeches of Sir Charles Wood and Sir James Graham, the Czar was impressed that we were indifferent to the French alliance, and that thus he had been tempted to aggressive courses." Mr. Layard felt that "peace is best preserved by a firm and dignified attitude, letting the world know that, anxious as England is for peace, she is prepared for war"; and he held that the results of English policy would be that every weak state in Europe which had depended on England would see that it was useless to struggle any longer against the encroachments of Russia. Sir John Pakington said that the whole country desired peace, but he felt that such desire was not to continue longer than the honor of England demanded. Lord Dudley Stuart attacked the policy of the Government as "pusillanimous," and said that "the integrity and independence of Turkey might have been maintained without entering into war. If the fleets of France and Great Britain had only been in Besika Bay when they ought to have been . . . the ambitious designs of the autocrat would have been frustrated at once. If we had only had not a minister of Austria, not a minister of Russia, but a Minister of England, none of these deplorable events would have occurred to disturb the tranquillity and to endanger the peace of the world." Mr. Monekton Milnes believed that since Turkey was in financial difficulties, England ought not to have encouraged her in opposing Russia. Mr. Muntz said that if there had been a minister who would have told Russia that the crossing of the Pruth meant war, Russia would not have crossed, and that "the only questions mooted by the Government now were what would be the expense, and would war be agreeable to the different tradesmen of the nation? All sense of what England once was has been entirely lost. . . ."

We must now turn to see what views Richard Cobden, one of the chief leaders of the opposition in Commons, had during the year 1853. As early as January 1, 1853, he wrote to his brother of seeing numerous "Warlike Mani-

\textsuperscript{12} The running narrative of these discussions was obtained from the \textit{Annual Register, 1853-1856}, and the quotations from the speeches from Hansard's \textit{Parliamentary Debates} of that same period.
festeos” at the Reform Club. On September 13 he spoke thus: “The Mahome-
tans cannot be maintained in Europe as a governing class in a territory, the
great majority of whose population are Christians . . . Lord Palmerston
had the impudence to get us and pledge himself to the fact that no people have
effected such improvements in the last twenty years as the Turks! And our
Radicals are bellowing for Palmerston and Turkish independence. Is it not
time for men of common sense to found a political hospital to cure such
idiots?!” In the House of Commons he declared that there was unanimity
of opinion that the conduct of Russia was “treacherous and violent”, and he
rejoiced over the alliance between England and France—but “there was a
growing conviction in men’s minds that the integrity and independence of the
Turkish Empire, as a maxim of policy, had become an empty phrase and nothing
more.” Continuing his argument, he said that he believed that the importance
of trade with Turkey was greatly overrated and that the Government did right
in resisting the cry for war.

John Bright, “the Warrior of Peace”,14 showed the world “how a war
can be patriotically denounced, with permanent effects upon opinion in favor of
keeping peace.”15 He wrote to Cobden,16 on December 24, 1853, that “all that
is passing around us only shows how fearfully unsound our people are on war
and intervention, and how necessary to teach them by a free press”; and on
December 27 he assured Cobden that they were in a minority and that the Parlia-
mentary session looked “unpleasant”. . . “How men”, he added, “can prefer the certain and enormous evils of a war, to the dim and vague prospect
of remote injury from Russian aggrandisement, is beyond my understanding.”

Disraeli, remotely connected with the war and having no responsibility for
it, made his position felt through The Press, his official organ of publicity, by
writing forceful articles for that newspaper. As early as May 4, 1853, he said:
“If war break out—and the present prospect is that war will break out—this
dread calamity must be placed to the account of this man (Aberdeen), and this

13 Hobson, J. A., Richard Cobden, the International Man (his Life and Cor-
respondence), Ch. 5.
14 Trevelyan in his Life of John Bright so designates Bright.
15 Ibid., 218.
16 Cobden and Bright were “the traitors”, “the Russians”, because they ad-
vocated peace.
man alone." He always was of the opinion that the war was the disastrous result of a coalition in which two opposing principles of foreign policy were struggling for ascendancy. In the Press of September 24, 1853, he stated that "the formation of the Aberdeen Ministry was the signal for the Cabinet at St. Petersburg (now Petrograd) to commence its attack on the independence of Porte." 

The Press of June 18 carried to the people the warning that "a single blunder in the conduct of our foreign affairs may cost us much as a series of bad harvests" and that Russia would not attempt to advance her projects except when Great Britain was napping. Just a month later, after the Russians had crossed the River Pruth, Disraeli wrote that "it is no longer a question whether it is a case for war—it is war." And the patriotic support of the war, though combined with a persistent exposure of the vacillation of the ministry, was the keynote of Disraeli's speeches through all the sessions of Parliament.

Though the Queen and her consort, Prince Albert, were consulted very little as to procedure, we find their opinions were desired and considered. Queen Victoria wrote to her uncle Leopold, King of the Belgians, on March 29, 1853: "I hope that the Oriental Question will be satisfactorily settled. . . . The Emperor of Russia thinks the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire very imminent, which I really think is not the case." In June she informed him that she did not know how war could be avoided. Yet she hoped that any outbreak could be averted, and wrote to Lord Aberdeen on November 5, 1853: "The subject of Lord Stratford's private letters . . . exhibit clearly on his part a

---

17 Twenty years later in a speech at Manchester on April 3, 1872, Disraeli spoke in the same vein. "The Crimean War," he declared, "need never to have occurred. . . . There was not the slightest chance of a Crimean War when we retired from office; but the Emperor of Russia, believing that the successor of Lord Derby (Lord Aberdeen) was no enemy to Russian aggression in the East, commenced those proceedings with the result of which you are familiar. I speak of what I know—not of what I believe, but of what I have evidence in my possession to prove—that the Crimean War would never have happened if Lord Derby had remained in office." (Monypenny and Buckle, *Life of Disraeli*, III, 517.)

18 Disraeli was a member of the House of Commons and directed many speeches against the Ministry from that position.

19 Queen Victoria's views are ably given us in Benson and Esher, *The Letters of Queen Victoria*. 

[15]
desire for war, and to drag us into it. . . It becomes a serious question whether we are justified in allowing Lord Stratford any longer to remain in a situation which gives him the means of frustrating all our efforts for peace.”

Prince Albert was very much interested in public affairs, and wrote frequently concerning conditions in England to Baron Stockmar.20 Voicing the dilemma in England, the Prince wrote: “We can hardly desire to compel the Turks to yield to the Russians, or encourage the Russians to decline what we have ourselves acknowledged to be just and equitable. . . Our fleet cannot return . . . [from Besika Bay] until the question is settled.” Then on the 21st, he wrote: “We are paralyzed through not knowing what our agent in Constantinople is or is not doing. The public here is furiously Turkish and anti-Russian,” and on September 27, “Aberdeen is quite right, and is to be honored and applauded for maintaining, as he does, that we must deal with our enemies as honorable men, and deal honorably towards them.” In a memorandum presented to the Cabinet for consideration on October 21, 1853, the Prince concluded that the war ought to be carried on “unshackled by obligations to the Porte and will probably lead, in the Peace which must be the object of that war, to the obtaining of arrangements more consonant with the well-understood interests of Europe, of Christianity, liberty and civilization, than the reimposition of the ignorant barbarian and despotic yoke of the Mussulman over the most fertile and favored portion of Europe.”21

The beginning of 1854 brought much discussion in Parliament on the question of England’s entering the war. The Earl of Derby contended that “Russian policy had been aggressive for the last 150 years”; while Mr. Hankey eulogized peace and the Government for having preserved it. The Earl of Ellenborough said that war was inevitable, but acquitted the Ministry from responsibility for it; and on February 6, 1854, he said: “I have no doubt we are at the commencement of one of the most formidable wars in which this country has ever been engaged. I deeply regret that the people of this country do not

20 Baron Stockmar, a former tutor of Prince Albert, was always his devoted friend, adviser, and admirer. The letters are found in Martin’s Life of His Royal Highness, The Prince Consort.

21 Martin, Prince Consort, II, 427.
appear at all aware of the magnitude and probable duration, or of the dismal consequence."22

On February 14, 1854, a debate took place in the House of Lords regarding the policy pursued. Earl Grey thought that the Government was at fault for allowing the country to be dragged into the quarrel for, said he, "it is no part of our duty, as a nation, to undertake . . . the general redress of wrongs and to protect every weak state which may be oppressed by a more powerful neighbor. We have no business to interfere in disputes of other nations. Will the people of England and France allow their great power to be used, and the blood of their soldiers and sailors to be shed, in order to bring under the yoke of Mahommedan oppression their fellow Christians?" Aberdeen, in defending his Ministry, said that they had done the best they could to preserve peace, and he himself thought that "every additional day that peace has been maintained has been an advantage."23

On February 17 in a debate in the House of Commons, the Opposition vehemently voiced itself against the war and the Ministry. Mr. Layard said that Turkey was not worth defending; and while Lord Dudley Stuart charged that the ministry lacked boldness, Lord Jocelyn condemned the government for lacking vigor. Disraeli said that the "Ministers have been influenced either by credulity or connivance—if the former, a severe war; if the latter, a vacillating war. The Opposition will never despair." Mr. Roebuck said that it was the duty of the Government to preserve peace, and not rush into war.24

At this time we find the peace advocates, Cobden and Bright, trying to calm the restless and warlike spirit in the country. Cobden, always an advocate of tact and moderation, wrote on March 9, 1854, against holding public peace meetings, because such demonstrations would add to the difficulty of the Peace Party. On the other hand, Bright had interviews with the high officials, and recorded his conclusions in his journal. On February 8 he said that he found Lords Aberdeen and Granville to be strong for peace, and thereupon he blamed the Government for "having committed themselves to intervention."

22 Debate in Lords, Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXX, 262-267. (January 31 to February 27, 1854).
23 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXX, 546, ff.
24 Ibid., 831, ff.
On March 22, Bright visited Aberdeen, who felt that hostilities with Russia were unavoidable and wanted "most sincerely to avert the horrible calamity impending over Europe."

In his speech of March 21, Disraeli showed his view of the responsibility of the Coalition for an unnecessary war: "The war has been brought about," he maintained, "by two opposite opinions in the Cabinet. Those conflicting opinions have led to all the vacillation, all the perplexity, all the futility, all the timidity, and all the occasional violence to which this question has given rise. . . . It is a coalition war. Rival opinions, contrary politics, and discordant systems, have produced that vacillation and perplexity, so that at last you are going to war with an opponent who does not want to fight, and whom you are unwilling to encounter. What a mess for a great country! and all brought about by such distinguished administrative ability! . . . I will not propose a vote of no confidence in men who prove to me every hour that they have no confidence in each other."25

When war came a week later, Aberdeen announced that he had been friendly to the Russian alliance because he believed it would be for the best interests of England—but now that he was compelled to make war, he should "carry it on with the utmost vigor, only for the sake of securing a speedy peace." Bright said in the House of Commons on March 31, 1854: "Alliances are dangerous things. It is an alliance with Turkey that has drawn us into this war. I would not advise alliances with any nation, but I would cultivate friendship with all nations. If this phrase of the 'balance of power', the meaning of which nobody can exactly make out, is to be brought in on every occasion to stimulate this country to war, there is an end to all hope of permanent peace."26

It was not until in the fall of 1854, that the people realized the significance of the war, for the English forces suffered from privations, want, and sickness, due mostly to carelessness. Disraeli, who had visited in Devon and Cornwall in October, wrote to Lord Henry Lennox: "The Whigs throughout

25 When war was declared Disraeli blamed Aberdeen because of the understanding between him and the Czar regarding Turkey, while the interests of France were ignored.
26 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, CXXXII, 198, ff.
the west of England have entirely renounced the Coalition.'" Disraeli had strongly opposed the expedition to the Crimea; and now that hardships and tales of the misery came from the front, public opinion was intensified against the Ministry through his attacks. On October 12, Sir Robert Peel originated by a letter in the Times a subscription list, and in two weeks all the money received was rushed to the field of battle. Other undertakings were the Patriotic Fund and the sending of chaplains and Miss Nightingale and her corps of nurses.

Nevertheless, regardless of the reports of suffering from the Crimea, came Cobden's statement of December 3, 1854, to the effect that he had been in Lancaster and found the war spirit rife than he had expected, "for it was pervading all classes—it is a moral epidemic."

Bright wrote a public letter to Absalom Watkin, which was published in the Times of November 3, 1854, as follows:

"The question of this present war is in two parts—first, was it necessary for us to interfere by arms in a dispute between the Russians and the Turks? and secondly, having determined to interfere, under certain circumstances, why was not the whole question terminated when Russia accepted the Vienna note? The seat of war is 3,000 miles away from us. We had not been attacked ... not even insulted in any way. Two independent Governments had a dispute, and we thrust ourselves into the quarrel. That there was some ground for the dispute is admitted by the four Powers in the proposition of the Vienna note. But for the English Minister at Constantinople and the Cabinet at home, the dispute would have settled itself, and the last note of Prince Menschikoff would have been accepted, and no human being can point out any material difference between that note and the Vienna note, afterwards agreed upon and recommended by the Governments of England, France, Austria, and Prussia. But our Government would not allow the dispute to be settled. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe held private interviews with the Sultan—did his utmost to alarm him—insisted on his rejection of all terms of accommodation with Russia, and promised him the armed assistance of England if war should arise.

"The Turks rejected the Russian note, and the Russians crossed the Pruth, occupying the Principalities as a 'material guarantee'. I do not defend this act of Russia: it has always appeared to me impolitic and immoral; but I think it likely it could be well defended out of Vattel, and it is at least as justi-
able as the conduct of Lord John Russell and Lord Palmerston in 1850, when they sent ten or twelve ships of war to the Piræus, menacing the town with a bombardment if the dishonest pecuniary claim made by Don Pacifico were not at once satisfied.

"But the passage of the Pruth was declared by England and France and Turkey not to be a casus belli. Negotiations were commenced at Vienna, and the celebrated Vienna note was drawn up. This note had its origin in Paris, was agreed to by the Conference at Vienna, ratified and approved by the Cabinets of Paris and London, and pronounced by all these authorities to be such as would satisfy the honor of Russia and at the same time be compatible with the 'independence and integrity' of Turkey and the honor of the Sultan. Russia accepted this note at once—accepted it, I believe, by telegraph, even before the precise words of it had been received in St. Petersburg. Everybody thought the question now settled; a Cabinet Minister assured me we should never hear another word about it; 'The whole thing is at an end', he said, and so it appeared for a moment. But the Turk refused the note which had been drawn up by his own arbitrators, and which Russia had accepted. And what did the Ministers say then, and what did their organ, the 'Times' say? They said it was merely a dherence about words; it was a pity the Turk made any difficulty but it would soon be settled. But it was not settled, and why not? It is said that the Russian Government put an improper construction on the Vienna note. But it is unfortunate for those who say this, that the Turks placed precisely the same construction upon it; and further it is upon record that the French Government advised the Russian Government to accept it, on the ground that 'its general sense differed in nothing from the sense of the proposition of Prince Menschikoff'. . . . The Turks declared war, against the advice of the English and French Governments. . . . So, at least, it appears from the Blue Books; but the moment war was declared by Turkey, our Government openly applauded it. England, then, was committed to the war. She had promised armed assistance to Turkey—a country without government, and whose administration was at the mercy of contending factions; and incapable of fixing a policy for herself, she allowed herself to be dragged on by the current of events at Constantinople. . . . At this moment England is engaged in a murderous warfare with Russia, although the Russian Government accepted her own terms of peace, and has been willing to accept them in the sense of England's own interpretation of them every since they were offered; and at the same time England is allied
with Turkey, whose Government rejected the award of England, and who entered into the war in opposition to the advice of England. Surely, when the Vienna note was accepted by Russia, the Turks should have been prevented from going to war, or should have been allowed to go to war at their own risk.

"We are not only at war with Russia, but with all the Christian population of the Turkish Empire, and we are building up our Eastern policy on a false foundation—namely, on the perpetual maintenance of the most immoral and filthy of all despotisms over one of the fairest portions of the earth which it has desolated, and over a population it has degraded, but has not been able to destroy."27

This letter, circulated throughout England by the newspaper press, together with the news of the suffering of the troops in the Crimea, brought much complaint and criticism of the Government.

Lord Derby urged that the Government had not considered the greatness of the undertaking upon which they had entered. Bright declared before the House of Commons, December 22, 1854, that it grieved him to see the pall of sorrow that was over the land, and added: "Let it not be said that I am alone in my condemnation of this war, and of this incapable and guilty administration. And even if I were alone, if mine were a solitary voice, raised amid the din of arms and the clamours of a venal press, I should have the consolation I have tonight... the priceless consolation that no word of mine has tended to promote the squandering of my country's treasure or the spilling of one single drop of my country's blood."28

At the opening of 1855, the attention of all classes was concentrated upon the war, to the exclusion of every other topic. In Parliament there was a general debate on the state of the army, and Mr. Roebuck in the House of Commons wanted a formal inquiry into the whole administration of the war. Disraeli's Press of January 27, 1855, emphasized the necessity of a War Cabinet. Mr. Bright, seeing this opportunity, turned all his energy toward peace, and in so doing assumed a conciliatory manner. Though conditions in the Crimea greatly improved during 1855, the people were out of sorts with the administra-

28 Hansard's *Parliamentary Debates*, CX XXVI, 883-893. (December 12, 1854 to March 1, 1855.)
tion, and as a result, the Aberdeen Ministry fell, with a majority of 157 votes against it in the House of Commons, Palmerston, a strong advocate of the war, becoming Prime Minister. 29

The Peace Conference held at Vienna was the first diplomatic opportunity for settlement. Bright’s speech of February 23, 1855, known as the “Angel of Death” speech, gave him great prominence in the cause of peace. He said: “I am certain that there are many homes in England in which there now exists a fond hope that the distant one may return—many such homes may be rendered desolate when the next mail shall arrive. THE ANGEL OF DEATH HAS BEEN ABROAD THROUGHOUT THE LAND; YOU MAY ALMOST HEAR THE BEATING OF HIS WINGS . . . it is on behalf of all classes that I make this solemn appeal. I tell the noble Lord [Palmerston] that if he be ready honestly and frankly to endeavor, by the negotiations about to be opened at Vienna, to put an end to this war, no word of mine, no vote of mine, will be given to shake his power for one single moment, or to change his position in this House. I am sure that the noble Lord is not inaccessible to appeals made to him from honest motives and with no unfriendly feelings.” 30 But the Vienna Conference broke up because Russia did not accept the stipulation concerning the Black Sea. 31

Nevertheless, much discussion followed on war and peace. The Earl of Ellenborough moved resolutions condemning the conduct of the war, the Earl of Hardwick criticized the naval operations, and the Earl of Winchelsea thought that the war was unnecessary. Gladstone declared that the war should not be continued just for the sake of military glory. Mr. Sidney Herbert said that he was in favor of war “only after much deep thought,” and now he favored peace because the original objects had been sought and gained.

After the fall of Sebastopol on September 9, 1855, England did not incline toward peace; but Disraeli at once launched a movement for peace through the Press. The issue of September 29 had the following letter to the people of England:

29 Cobden wrote on February 7, 1855: “I do not think that Palmerston is less likely than Lord Aberdeen to make peace. He is a great sham and not nearly so warlike as his foolish dupes of adulators have believed.”
30 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXXVI, 1755-1762.
31 Ante, 7.
"The present moment is critical. The aspect of the war is changing. It is passing into a new phase, and the country needs the guidance of its natural leaders. . .

"We can not say that every object for which the war was originally undertaken has been conceded by negotiation or won by arms. Russia no longer claims those exclusive privileges which placed her in perpetual antagonism with the Turkish Government. She has resigned her claim to the guardianship of the Principalities. She is willing to admit Turkey into the European System—a point itself of vital importance—and to guarantee, in accord with the other contracting Powers, the independence of its Government and the integrity of its territory. She is also disposed to place the free navigation of the Danube under the superintendence of collective Europe. One obstacle only remained—the supremacy of Russia in the Black Sea. That supremacy is now destroyed. The last Russian ship has been sunk or burnt, and Sebastopol is in ruins. . .

"England and France have no longer any object in maintaining the war. They entered on it reluctantly, and for a specific purpose—the defence of the Turkish Empire. That purpose has been attained. Circumstances may render it absolutely necessary for them to continue the contest; they cannot force Russia to make peace, but their policy must be, if they remain true to their original cause and professions, to prosecute war only until satisfactory terms of peace can be obtained. The reduction of the Russian Empire was assuredly never contemplated when their alliance was formed. . .

"The statesmen of this country have never been favorable to wars of extremity or wars of aggrandisement. Our policy from the first was not to overthrow, but to maintain, the balance of European power."32

Peace negotiations began early in 1856 and came to an end by the treaty of Paris, April 15, 1856. The Press of January 19, 1856, announced that peace was resolved on: "Lord Aberdeen's Peace Government, against its will, drifted into war, and Lord Palmerston's War Government, equally against its will, has drifted into peace. . . We forced Lord Aberdeen to engage in a war necessary to the honor of England, and to the security of Europe; we have forced Lord Palmerston to agree to peace now that the objects of the war are accom-

32 Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, IV, 28.
plished." When peace began to be assured, Bright and Cobden worked hard to get negotiations accepted, regardless of the attempts made from time to time to renew the strife. Bright wrote to Sir George Grey on January 2, 1856: "If Lord Aberdeen and Mr. Gladstone had acted up to their convictions in 1853, there would have been no war, or they would not have been responsible for it. If Lord Russell had acted on his convictions after his return from Vienna, he would not have placed himself in a position where his best friends have found it impossible to defend him. If the moderate men in the Cabinet now dare to act up to their convictions, we shall probably have peace,—if not, then recklessness may carry the day, and the end none of us can foresee, and few dare even to speculate upon. . . To save a Government,—to obey the howlings of the newspapers, to shun a transient unpopularity,—are poor excuses for the crime and agonies of 'one more campaign.' . . To involve a country in debt and peril, and to bring about or permit multitudes of men to be slaughtered, and whole regions to be desolated, for the sake of acting harmoniously with colleagues in a Government, is not a weakness only—it is a crime for which our language has no name." Likewise Cobden was active, and wrote a pamphlet entitled, "What Next? and Next?'', which was an "argued plea for immediate settlement" on the ground that England had nothing to hope for in the way of a decisive victory, if the war continued. In a letter of January 14, 1856, he said: "Peace will not come through the good sense of the English Government, but in spite of them."

However, the public opposed the peace projects because they wanted glory for England, the surrender of Sebastopol having diminished the discontent. The Earl of Derby regarded the peace as commensurate with the sacrifices, and called it "the capitulation of Paris", for it failed to provide against Russian expansion, one of the reasons of the war. Although the treaty was

34 Trevelyan, *Life of John Bright*, 238.
36 Queen Victoria wrote to the King of the Belgians May 22, 1855, "We cannot come to any peace unless we have such guarantees by decided limitation of the fleet which would secure us against Russian preponderance for the future." (Queen Victoria's *Letters*, 161.)
not intended as a permanent settlement, Disraeli felt that it was reasonable and rendered a great service to the public by promoting and preparing the “national mind for a reasonable peace,” through the Press.\(^{37}\) Thus we find that the Opposition showed great hostility to the war and its administration from the beginning of the war fever in the spring of 1853 to the time when their objections were directed against the peace in 1856.

CHAPTER III

PRO-WAR SENTIMENT

Pro-war sentiment in England during the Crimean War was spontaneous and contagious. England had not experienced a war for thirty years, and the mass of the people were eager for their country to enter the fray, because they were desirous of action and naval glory. They felt that the Czar’s aggression upon the Turks was a just cause for hostilities, and their sympathy was aroused for Turkey because she was weaker than her foe\(^1\) and especially because they looked upon Russia as a menace to their Indian possessions.

Lord Clarendon brushed aside the Czar’s claim to a protectorate over 14,000,000 Christians living within the Sultan’s domains, and avowed that England was determined to maintain the independence of Turkey. The Duke of Newcastle, Minister of War, was enthusiastic for war. He shared the feelings and opinions of the English people, and was anxious to invade the Crimea and to destroy Sebastopol.\(^2\)

Lord Palmerston believed in the regeneration of Turkey and suspected Russia. He did not fear war, and “to his easy optimism it seemed a light task for England and France united to overcome the forces of Russia.”\(^3\) He advocated, with reason, measures of greater energy on the approach of the war. On July 7, 1853, he wrote to Lord John Russell: “I think our position, waiting timidly and submissively at the back door, whilst Russia is violently threatening and arrogantly forcing her way into the house, is unwise, with a view to peaceful settlement.\(^4\) Palmerston formed his opinions and held fast to them.

\(^1\) Kinglake, The Invasion of the Crimea, I, 404, says that the temper of the English people was an obstacle to peace, because they desired war. On page 485 he declares that England “did much to bring on the war, first by want of moderation and prudence with which she seemed to declare her attachment to the cause of peace, and afterwards by exceeding her eagerness with which she coveted the strife.”

\(^2\) Ibid., 122.

\(^3\) Gordon, Lord Aberdeen, 250.

\(^4\) S. J. Reid in his Lord John Russell presents this letter.
December 10, 1853, he wrote to Aberdeen: "Will you allow me to repeat in writing what I have more than once said verbally on the state of things between Russia and Turkey? It appears to me that we have two objects in view—one, to put an end to the present war between those two Powers, the other, to prevent as far as diplomatic arrangements can do so a recurrence of similar differences, and through such differences renewed danger to the peace of Europe. Now it seems plain that, unless Turkey shall be laid prostrate at the feet of Russia by disasters in war, an event which England and France could not without dishonor permit, no peace can be concluded between the contending parties unless the Emperor consents to abandon his demands, to evacuate the Principalities, and to renounce some of the embarrassing stipulations of former treaties, upon which he has founded the pretensions which have been the cause of existing difficulties. . . . What I would strongly recommend, therefore, is that which I proposed some months ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian Government and the Russian admiral at the Sebastopol should be informed that, so long as Russian troops occupy the Principalities or hold a position in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian ship of war can be allowed to show itself out of port in the Black Sea. . . . With regard to the conditions of peace, the only arrangement should be that the treaty to be made between Russia and Turkey should be an ordinary treaty of peace and friendship, and that all stipulations for the Principalities, etc., should be contained in a treaty between the Sultan and the Five Powers."\(^5\)

Lord John Russell did not agree fully with Lord Palmerston's views, for he believed that England was powerful enough to act alone. He was very sensitive to the censure of Parliament, and was anxious to take steps to preserve peace and conciliate public opinion. Russell thought that Constantinople should be deemed to be attacked if a Russian soldier crossed the Danube.\(^6\) He said that the war was one made on behalf of the liberties of Europe, and he had a large share in arousing the spirit of the people in favor of war. Even when peace became a possibility, he insisted that peace without honor was unthinkable and war preferable, which shows how firmly he believed in the necessity of pre-

\(^5\) The Marquis of Lorne in his *Lord Palmerston*, 205, gives this letter.
serving the independence of Turkey. On March 20, 1853, he wrote to Lord Clarendon: "The Emperor of Russia is clearly bent on accomplishing the destruction of Turkey, and he must be resisted." His policy was to unite with France, and to demand the Russian evacuation of Turkish territory. On September 19, 1853, in a speech at Greenock he said: "While we endeavor to maintain peace, I certainly should be the last to forget that if peace cannot be maintained with honor, it is no longer peace. It becomes then but a truce—a precarious truce, to be denounced by others whenever they may think fit—whenever they may think an opportunity has occurred to enforce by arms their unjust demands either upon us or upon our allies." Several days later he placed his view before the Cabinet, saying: "If Russia will not make peace on fair terms, we must appear in the field as auxiliaries of Turkey; if we are to act in conjunction with France as principals in the war, we must act not for the Sultan, but for the general interests of the population of European Turkey."

There was a divided opinion in the Cabinet, which did much toward arousing the antagonism of the warlike element. On June 5 Clarendon took a gloomy view of the situation, for he had a middle position in the Cabinet between "the opposite opinions of those who are for more stringent measures and those who, like himself, are for patience and moderation." Then on July 12 Clarendon had to persuade Aberdeen to adopt a course congenial to public opinion, which "however inclined to peace and abhorrent to war, is not at all disposed to connive at the aggrandisement of Russia, or to submit to the insolent dictation of the Czar."

By the middle of August the public mind had become persuaded that war was inevitable. In the House of Lords Clarendon asserted that the question had become European in character, a thing he desired because it would lead to a satisfactory and permanent conclusion. On August 16 Lord John Russell af-

7 Monypenny and Buckle, Life of Disraeli, IV, 3, says "Lord John was a stiff opponent of Russian claims."
8 Reid, S. J., Lord John Russell, 225, says, "as Foreign Minister he had a policy but no power to enforce it, while Aberdeen had no policy and had power to keep Cabinet from taking any decided course."
10 Greville Memoirs, VII, for June 5, 1853.
11 Ibid., July 12, 1853.
12 Ibid., August 8, 1853.
firmed that: "This question of the maintenance of Turkey is one that must always require the attention of any person holding in his hands the foreign affairs of this country. This can only be secured by a constant union between England and France." Lord Palmerston did not regard Turkey as being in a state of decay and advocated that it should be maintained, for if England and France said that Turkey should not be molested by any other Power, the dictum would be enforced.

The "Massacre" of Sinope aroused much indignation and war spirit in England, for this event inflamed the desire for justice. Prince Albert wrote to Baron Stockmar on December 27, 1853: "The defeat at Sinope has made the people quite furious, treachery is the cry, and guided by a friendly hand, the whole press has made 'a dead set at the Prince'. . . . We are getting nearer and nearer war, and I entertain little hope of its being averted." The public suspected everybody favoring peace, and especial wrath was directed against Prince Albert, violent attacks in the press being made against him. He was called "the chief agent of the Austro-Belgian-Coburg-Orleans clique, the avowed enemies of England, and the subservient tools of Russian ambition", and it was charged that "our foreign policy was mainly directed by the Prince Consort."

His Royal Highness was attacked because of his correspondence with foreign courts, for his interference with the army, for his dislike of Palmerston. Greville states that "the attack against the Prince and charges against him are that he has been in the habit of meddling improperly in public affairs, and has used his influence to promote objects of his own and the interests of his own family at the expense of the interests of this country; that he is a German and not English in his sentiments and principles; that he corresponds with foreign princes and with British ministers abroad without the knowledge of the Government and that he thwart the foreign policy of the Ministers when it does not coincide with his own ideas and purposes . . . . there is a profligate and impudent mendacity among the masses, and they are stirred up against the Prince, who but several weeks ago was extra-ordinarily popular." On February 1 he records that "Parliament met yesterday, and there was a greater crowd than usual to see the

13 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXXIX, 1800 (July 11 to August 20).
14 Martin, Prince Consort, II, 553.
15 Greville Memoirs, VII, for January 15, 1854.
procession. The Queen and Prince were well received; but the enthusiasm was bestowed on the Turkish Minister, the mob showing their sympathy in his cause by vociferous cheering the whole way."

16 To such a height did the excitement run than, as the Prince wrote, "My being committed to the Tower was believed all over the country, nay, even that the Queen had been arrested. People surrounded the Tower in thousands to see us brought to it." When Parliament met, it at once cleared up this difficulty, and showed the people that the Prince was working in the interests of England very heartily.

John Delane, editor of the London Times was a "great power behind the throne." He was averse to foreign wars, and would not allow the interests of Turkey to take precedence over those of England, for, as he said: "If you wish peace, you must be ready for war." His policy was to "labor unceasingly for the preservation of peace without the loss of national prestige in this great crisis." On September 5, 1853, he wrote to the Times correspondent at Constantinople a letter showing his characteristic attitude toward the war, as follows: "You seem to imagine that England can desire nothing better than to sacrifice all its greatest interests and its most cherished objects—to support barbarism against civilization, the Moslem against the Christian, slavery against liberty, to exchange peace for war—all to oblige the Turk. Pray undeceive yourself. For political purposes we connive at the existence of the Turk: he fills a blank in Europe, he is a barrier to a more aggressive Power. We had rather have the Straits in the hands of King Log than King Stork; but we have no love for the Turk. We suffer him, and will not permit the Russian to dispossess him; but we are not blind to the fact that he is rapidly decaying, and if we were slow to fight for him when he had more vitality, we are less than ever inclined to do so when he is invisibly fading away and when no amount of protection can preserve his boasted 'independence and integrity.'" On October 6 he wrote to Dasent: "As to the war, I still do not believe it will reach us. I look forward rather to a kind of armed negotiation. . . Neither Turk nor Russ will be fool enough to cross the Danube, and spring will find them without change of position, but fewer and weaker."

16 Greville Memoirs, VII, for February 1, 1854.
17 Martin, Prince Consort, II, 562.
18 Dasent, John Delane, 1, 168.
19 Dasent, his biographer, was his nephew.
The first three months of 1854 showed that public indignation was aroused and demanded action. In the Greville Memoirs we get evidence of this militant spirit. The entry for January 15 shows how the public directed their attacks against the Prince. The entry of February 9 states that "nobody now thinks of anything but of the coming war and its vigorous prosecution. The national blood is up, and those who most earnestly deprecated war are all for hitting as hard as we can now that it is forced upon us. The publication of the Blue Books has relieved the Government from a vast amount of prejudice and suspicion. The public judgment of their management of the Eastern question is generally very favorable, and impartial people applaud their persevering efforts to avert war, and are satisfied that everything was done that the national honor or dignity required. . . The war is certainly very popular, but I don't think its popularity will last long when we begin to pay for it, unless we are encouraged and compensated for our sacrifices by some very flattering successes."  

In the Parliamentary sessions there was much discussion previous to the declaration of war. The Marquis of Clanricarde thought that the only way to deal with the Russians was to put a plain straightforward question and insist on the same kind of an answer. Clarendon was willing to support a just and righteous conflict in behalf of the Turks. Mr. Horsman was against the Russian advance and thought that all Europe should unite against her. On March 10 the Earl of Shaftesbury said that though England was fighting for Mahomedanism, he preferred Turkish to Russian civilization because Turkey had permitted much more advancement. Sir Robert Peel said that, after Russian aggrandisement was crushed, arrangements should be made for ending Turkish rule in Europe. Clarendon on March 31, 1853, maintained that "We enter upon war for a definite object—it is to check and to repel the unjust aggression of Russia and to secure a peace honorable to Turkey. . . We are not now engaged in the Eastern Question, but it is a battle of civilization against barbarism for the independence of Europe."  

On February 24, 1854, Queen Victoria wrote to Aberdeen saying that

---

20 Ante, 29.
22 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXVII, 141-198 (March 28, to May 8, 1854).
she must urge "Lord Aberdeen to consider with the Cabinet whether it will not be essential to augment the army at once. . . Considerations of home policy make this also advisable; the country is eager for war at this moment, and ready to grant men and money." The sentiment for war grew stronger every day. Entries in the Greville Memoirs prove the steady growth of war spirit:

"Feb. 20: The House of Commons as well as the country are so excessively warlike, that they are ready to give any number of men and any amount of money, and seem only afraid the Government may not ask enough. . . It is disgusting to hear everybody and to see all writers vying with each other in laudation of Stratford Canning, who has been the principal cause of the war. They all think that, if he had been sincere in his desire for peace, and for an accommodation with Russia, he might have accomplished it, but on the contrary he was bent on bringing on the war.

"Feb. 25: The rage for this war gets every day more vehement, and nobody seems to fear anything, but that we may not send money and men enough in waging it. The few sober people who have courage enough to hint at its being impolitic and uncalled for are almost hooted down, and their warnings and scruples are treated with indignation and contempt.

"March 20: The publication of the secret correspondence with Russia has excited great interest, and does great credit to the Government; but it increases the public indignation against the Emperor, because it exposes the extreme duplicity of his conduct."

Lord John Russell announced his position in April, 1854, saying: "for my part, if most unexpectedly the Emperor of Russia should recede from his former demands, we shall all rejoice to be spared the pain, the efforts, and the burdens of war. But if peace is no longer consistent with our duty to England, with our duty to Europe, with our duty to the rest of the world, we can only endeavor to enter into this contest with a stout heart. May God defend the right, and I, for my part, shall be willing to bear my share of the burden and responsibility."

In June there was much discussion concerning the immediate invasion of

---

23 This letter is in Queen Victoria’s Letters, III.
the Crimea. Delane was an active advocate of this project. On June 15 the *Times* declared: "The grand political and military objects of the war can not be attained as long as Sebastopol and the Russian fleet are in existence; but if that central position of the Russian power in the south of the empire were annihilated, the whole fabric, which it has cost the Czars of Russia a century to raise, falls to the ground. . . . The taking of Sebastopol, and the occupation of the Crimea, are objects which would repay all the costs of the present war, and would permanently settle in our favour the principal question in dispute. A peace which should leave Russia in possession of the same means of aggression would only enable her to recommence the war at her pleasure."  

Lord Lyndhurst was always jealous of English honor. He advocated war with Russia; and, after hostilities were declared he vigorously assailed Russia and insisted that "in no event, except extreme necessity, ought we to make peace before we had destroyed the Russian fleet and laid prostrate Sebastopol." In the session of 1854 he urged the Aberdeen Ministry to act with more vigor and decision, and emphasized the fact that the status quo would not content the nation. His famous speech in the House of Lords on June 19, 1854, was in complete accord with Delane: "We have shut up the Russian fleet in the harbour of Sebastopol. It has the mortification of feeling that it cannot encounter the combined force without the certainty of entire destruction. The Russian Government had all the characteristics of Asiatic barbarism—aggression and lust of territory. We must not make peace without destroying the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and razed the fortifications by which it is protected. As long as Russia possesses that fleet and retains that position it will be idle to talk of the independence of the Sultan. Russia will continue to hold Turkey in subjection, and compel her to yield obedience to her will . . . I believe that if this barbarous nation . . . should once succeed in establishing itself in the rest of Europe (which may Heaven in its mercy avert) it would

 Sir Edward Cook in Delane of "The Times", 62, says: "The Times was in the forefront of the popular clamour which hounded the country into a declaration of war against Russia in March, 1854 . . . it was an inspiring force throughout the Crimean War and led public opinion."


Atlay, J. B., *Victorian Chancellors*, I, 159.
be the greatest and most fatal calamity that could befall the human race.'"29

Such aggressive sentiment aroused the nation. On June 25 it was reported that the "people are wild about this war, and besides the general confidence that we are to obtain very signal success in our naval and military operation, there is a violent desire to force the Emperor to make a very humiliating peace."30 On July 9 we get further evidence of the war sentiment for it is then recorded that "the foolish public, always extravagant and impatient, clamour for attacks upon Sebastopol, and are very indignant that this place is not taken."31 Queen Victoria in writing to her uncle Leopold, King of the Belgians, on October 13 spoke of the feeling aroused: "We are, and indeed the whole country is, entirely engrossed with one idea, one anxious thought, the Crimea." On November 7 she went into more detail, saying: "We have but one thought, and so has the whole nation, and that is—Sebastopol. Such a time of suspense, anxiety, and excitement, I never expected to see, much less to feel. The feeling against Russia and the Emperor, who has to answer before God for the lives of so many thousands, becomes stronger and stronger as each mail brings the report of fresh victims of the obstinate resistance of the besieged. Peace is further distant than ever, and I fear the war will be lengthened, and finally become a general one."

Delane expressed his opinion of the Four Points proposed for peace in a letter to his nephew, Mr. Dasent, from Constantinople dated September 7, 1854: "I hope my letter from Vienna was in time to prevent . . . approving the four propositions as bases for a treaty of peace. Their acceptance at the very moment that Sebastopol was endangered proves Russia's weakness; and if it saves it from destruction, we shall have all the work to do again—and probably without France for an ally. Such a peace will neither be approved by Parliament nor the country, and it would be ruin to support it. . . We should pay dearly . . . if we consented to let Nicholas off so lightly." Upon his return to England Delane urged the Government to provide for the welfare of the soldiers in the Crimea, as he realized that Sebastopol could not be taken soon. The Times was outspoken in exposing the suffering of the troops, and

29 Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, CXXXIV, 306-319 (June 13 to July 10, 1854).
30 Greville Memoirs, VII, for June 25, 1854.
31 Ibid., for July 31, 1854.
through Mr. Delane’s efforts the public saw the necessity of sending Miss Nightingale to the field of action.

To appreciate the temper of the country, let us turn to the Greville entries for the last few months in 1854:

"November 13: At Worsley all last week; nothing was thought of but the war, its events and vicissitudes. The tardiness of intelligence and the perplexity and agitation caused by vague reports and telegraphic messages drive everybody mad; from excessive confidence, the public, always nose-led by the newspapers, is fallen into a state of alarm and discouragement.

"November 23: It is dreadful to see the misery and grief in which so many are already plunged, and the universal terror and agitation which beset all who have relations engaged in the war. But the nation is not only as war-like as ever, but if possible more full of ardour and enthusiasm, and thinking of nothing but the most lavish expenditure of men and money to carry on the war.

"December 11: In the present temper of the country, and while the war fever is still raging with undiminished violence, all appeals to truth and reason will be totally unavailing. . . The progress of the contest has changed the nature of public opinion, for now its principal motive is the deep interest taken in the success of our arms and the safety of the bank of heroes who have been fighting in the Crimea. This is, of course, right and patriotic, and a feeling which must be common to those who have been against, and those who have been for the war.

"December 20: The great complaint now is the want of organization and good arrangement in the Crimea, and generally at and about the seat of war, the confusion that has taken place in the forwarding and distributing of supplies, and the want of all expedients for facilitating the service of its various branches."32

Public sentiment was instrumental in causing the fall of the Ministry in January, 1855. The Greville Memoirs give us the best reflection of this sentiment:

"February 4: No one can remember such a state as the town has been in for the last two days. No Government, difficulties apparently insurmountable, such confusion, such excitement, such curiosity, everybody moving about cran-

---

32 Greville Memoirs, VII, for the entries noted.
ing for news, and rumor with her hundred tongues scattering every variety of statement and conjecture. . . The Queen will have recourse to Palmerston, the man of the people, whom they are crying out for, and who, they fondly imagine, is to get us out of all of our difficulties.

"February 19: There seems to be a general feeling of distrust and dissatisfaction. . . For the first time in my life I am really and seriously alarmed at the aspect of affairs, and think we are approaching a period of real difficulty and danger. The press, with the Times at its head, is striving to throw everything into confusion, and running much against the aristocratic element of society and of the Constitution. The intolerable nonsense and the abominable falsehoods it finds out day after day are none the less dangerous because they are nonsense and falsehoods, and backed up as they are by all the regular Radical press, they diffuse through the country a mass of inflammatory matter, the effect of which may be more serious and arrive more quickly than anybody imagines. Nothing short of some loud explosion will make the mass of the people believe that any serious danger can threaten a Constitution like ours, which has passed through so many trials and given so many proofs of strength and cohesion. But we have never seen such symptoms as are now visible, such a thorough confusion and political chaos, or the public mind so completely disturbed and dissatisfied and so puzzled how to arrive at any just conclusions as to the past, the present, or the future. People are furious at the untoward events in the Crimea, and cannot make out the real causes thereof, nor who is to blame, and they are provoked that they cannot find victims upon whom to wreak their resentment."

Sympathy had been aroused because of the wretched conditions in the army, and great interest was maintained in the debates in Parliament over the question of whether or not negotiations should take place. The Marquis of Granby was opposed to the cessation of negotiations, while Sir William Molesworth declared that peace on Russian terms would be "ignominious and dangerous,—a concession of defeat." Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton thought England had gone to war for justice and for adequate securities for maintaining that justice; thus he could not agree to the Russian terms. Likewise, Mr. J. G. Phillimore favored a vigorous prosecution of the war to a satisfactory end. Mr. Horsman warned that England must guard against Russia's "long-studied and deep-seated policy." And Palmerston significantly voiced his convictions by saying, "it is no longer a conflict of party. . . We must give Her Majesty the
best support in prosecution of the war to the attainment of a safe and honorable peace.”

Queen Victoria wrote to the King of the Belgians on May 22, 1855, that the “state of affairs is uncomfortable and complicated just now, but our course is straight; we cannot come to any peace unless we have such guarantees by decided limitation of the fleet, which would secure us against Russian preponderance for the future.”

In June an outrage against international law and common humanity was committed by Russians at Hango upon a British boat’s crew. The Russians had paid no heed to the British flag of truce, and had brutally murdered the English as they set ashore some of their prisoners. This attracted the attention of Parliament and filled the country with horror and indignation against Russia. Lord Brougham said: “if ever the land cried for blood, it is now.”

As a result of this event, there was a cry for administrative reform. Lord John Russell was expelled from the Cabinet by parliamentary censure, but resigned before notice of it reached him, for his conduct at the Vienna conference had “shaken the confidence of this country in those to whom its affairs are entrusted.”

---

33 Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, CXXXVIII, 974-1091 (May 3 to June 21, 1855).
34 Esker, Letters of Queen Victoria, III, 161.
35 Lord John felt that he could not purchase the help of Austria by breaking up the alliance with France. The publication of a dispatch from Count Buol (of Austria) brought a storm against Lord Russell, for it said he was friendly to the Austrian proposals and in the House of Commons had spoken contrarily. The press fell on him with fury, asking him why he had not advocated such terms in the Cabinet if he thought them reasonable. Lord John was forced to leave unsaid words which were necessary for his own defence—and resigned.
36 A letter to Lord John by Solomon Hailes, July 22, 1855, shows how the working people considered him: “I am a working man... Allow me, sir, to express a hope that you will not be depressed in spirit in consequence of the brutal attacks of the whole press on your fair character. The press do not in so doing represent the people (at least of my order), who, on the contrary, look to you as the only man that can carry England through her troubles.”
After Sebastopol was taken on September 9, peace negotiations were seriously considered. Greville said that “in spite of the undiminished violence of the press, the prevailing opinion is that there is a beginning of a change in the public mind and an incipient desire for peace.”

In January, 1856, came a “fresh glimmering of peace”, for public opinion was inclining toward the acceptance of the Russian proposal. On January 17, 1856, Queen Victoria told Palmerston that “if the peace can now be concluded on conditions honorable and secure, it would not be right to continue the war for the mere purpose of prospective victories. It will, however, be obviously necessary to continue active preparations for war up to the moment when a definitive Treaty of Peace is signed, in order that the Russians may not find it for their interest to break off negotiations when the season for operations shall approach.”  

Greville gives his opinion of affairs in his entry of January 31, 1856: “Who would ever have thought that tidings of peace would produce a general sentiment of disappointment and dissatisfaction in this nation? There are, however, sundry symptoms of an approaching change in the public mind. The press is much perplexed; the newspapers do not know what to say. They confidently predicted that there would be no peace, and urged the people to go on clamoring for war as long as they could.”

Greville states that the announcement of the peace in London was “received joyfully by the populace, not from any desire to see an end of the war, but merely because it is a great event to make a noise about. The newspapers have been reasonable enough, except the Sun, which appeared in deep mourning, and with a violent tirade against peace.” Clarendon hoped that England would not be dissatisfied with the peace, while Palmerston said that it was “an arrangement which effects a settlement that is satisfactory for the present, and which will probably last for many years to come, of questions full of danger to the best interests of Europe.”

37 Esher, *Letters of Queen Victoria*, III, 211.
41 *Ibid.*, 233, contains this letter of Palmerston to Queen Victoria concerning his attitude toward the settlement.
The pro-war spirit was so vehement throughout England that the enthusiasm of the people forced the Government to act, under the Aberdeen Ministry, against Russian aggression, and under the Palmerston Ministry, to accept peace in 1856. Still, there was disappointment at the close of the war, because many thought that the political results were not satisfactory. However, events of twenty years later will have to be considered before one can form a satisfactory opinion as to the degree of success which the treaty attained.
CHAPTER IV

THE PULPIT AND THE PERIODICAL PRESS

"THE COALITION AND THE PEOPLE"

O suffering people, this is not our fight,
Who called a holy crusade for the right.
The Despot's bloody game our tricksters play,
And stake our future, chance by chance, away.
O darkened hearts in desolate homestead!
O wasted bravery of our mighty dead!
The flower of men fall stricken from behind;
The Knaves and Cowards stab us bound and blind.
With faces turned from battle, they went forth:
We marched with ours set stern against the North.
They shuffled lest their feet should rouse the dead:
We went with resurrection in our tread.
They trembled lest the world might come to blows:
We quivered for the tug and mortal close.
They only meant a mild hint for the Czar:
We would have bled him through a sumptuous war.
While they were quenching Freedom's scattered fires,
We kindled memories of heroic Sires.
They'd have this grand old England cringe and pray,
"Don't smite me, Kings; but if you will, you may."
We'd make her as in those proud times of old,
When Cromwell spoke, and Blake's war-thunders rolled.
They to the passing powers of darkness fawn:
With warrior joy we greet this crimson Dawn.
We would be free, or sleep in glorious graves.
State-Spiders, Here or There, weave webs alike;
These hold the victims, while the others strike.
The Dwarfs drag our great Banner in the mire:
We ask for men to bear it high and higher.
O stop their fiddling over War's grim revel,
And pitch them from your shoulders to—the Devil.

Gerald Massey

1 Massey, Gerald, Poems, 298.
Public opinion manifested itself strongly during the war. Especially was it directed against the Ministry. In the church and in the periodical press the spirit ran high; and the many pamphlets, poems, and lectures on the war were diligently considered by the populace.

Before England entered the conflict war literature began to appear. In December, 1853, came four treatises on the Eastern Crisis: (1) the work of "Veritas," entitled "The Partition of Turkey an Indispensable Feature of the Present Political Crisis," which proposed the division of the Ottoman territory among the European powers, giving the least to Russia; (2) "The Eastern Question an English Question," by L. H. Gill, which favored Turkey; (3) "The Present Crisis, or the Russo-Turkish War and Its Consequences to England and the World" by "Coningsby"; and (4) Mr. Laurence Oliphant's "The Russian Shores of the Black Sea in the Autumn of 1852."²

The year 1854 was very fruitful in this respect. It would be almost an endless task to consider all the literature of that time. However, the outstanding publications were: "Speculations on the Eastern Question" by a soldier, January 28, 1854, which urged that the Russians be driven back into the Steppes and that boundary lines be changed; "The Prince and the People", a poem in two cantos, by Mrs. Youck Smythies, which defended Prince Albert against the popular outcry; "Songs of the Present" from the Times, which contained such poetical outbursts as "One on the Russians", "The Fever Ward" and "The Turkish War: an Heroic Poem, descriptive of Events transpiring in the East." Two books which influenced the reading public were Thomas Carlyle's "Shall Turkey Live or Die?" and Nemo's "A Word to the British Public before Entering into Hostilities with Russia." Mr. Macquen in his "The War: Who's to Blame?" thought that the Russian cause was righteous and that France and England were engaged in a mad undertaking. Two influential pamphlets were: "The Betrayal of England," by W. Coningham, which attacked Palmerston as the evil genius of the country, and Cobbett's "Reasons for War Against Russia in Defence of Turkey," which voiced the opinion that Russia was at the bottom of all the trouble for she wanted to check English commercial power.

² The Athenaeum, December 31, 1853.
wrote on the subject. The Rev. T. G. Horton wrote a very patriotic pamphlet, entitled "A Voice from the Pulpit on the Coming War"; the Rev. J. S. Boone wrote "Two Sermons on the Prospect of the War"; while the Rector of St. James, Mr. J. E. Kempe, spoke three different times on the war under the sermon titles of "Be not high-minded", "The Lawfulness of War", and "Humble Yourselves." The Rev. Thomas Cooper devoted himself to the lecture platform throughout England, talking three or four times daily and attracting the people by lecturing on Wyld's "Model of the Crimea and Sebastopol." Charles Kingsley spoke on the war from his pulpit. In a sermon, entitled "England's Strength", he said: "for 300 years no foreign foe had set foot on English soil, and we almost alone, of all the nations of Europe, have been preserved from those horrors of war, even to speak of which is dreadful." In another sermon on "Providence", delivered after the fall of Sebastopol, he declared: "I do not complain of the war. I honor the war. I thank God from the bottom of my heart for this great and glorious victory, and I call on you to thank Him, too, for it. I am none of those who think war sinful. . . We must save the generations unborn from Russian tyranny and Russian falsehood, and Russian profligacy, and Russian superstition, but . . . look at the mere waste which it brings of God's blessings. . . Whence has all this waste come? Simply because these Russian rulers have chosen to seek first, not God's kingdom, but their own."5

As early as July, 1852, the question of national defence was brought to the attention of the nation through Blackwood's Edinburgh Magazine, which suggested the attitude of present-day preparedness: "In manufacturing boroughs the belief had spread most widely that war is an evil which has entirely disappeared from the world; that pacific influences and moneyped power will henceforth entirely regulate the affairs of nations. Mr. Cobden never expressed an opinion which met with a more cordial response in Free Trade Hall, Manchester, than when he said, two years ago that all danger of war had now passed away, that nothing could now withstand commercial interests and influence of capital

3 The Crimea was shown in maps and illustrations so much that England became familiar with the subject. Mr. Wyld also made a model of the Battle of the Alma.
4 Kingsley, Charles, Sermons for the Times, 114.
5 Ibid., 211.
and we should trust entirely to the Peace Congress for the decision of disputes of nations. . . Now no man can look around him and not see, not only that the chances of war are great, but that they are imminent—great armaments have arisen in all countries of Europe and because of jealousy of France have directed looks toward England. Military spirit is high. . . Our real danger is in Manchester—it is not the strength of our neighbors, but our delusive idea of security, which is our real danger.”

By the spring of 1853 Mr. Cobden’s pamphlet, entitled “1793 and 1853”, precipitated a very heated controversy on the subject of peace and war. The numerous pamphlets of the Peace Party, which included such titles as “Olive Leaf for Youths” and “Bond of Brotherhood for Adults”, contained good, pious, and pernicious teachings. The party’s pledge was never to countenance military operations in the “League of Universal Brotherhood.” The influence of these pamphlets was far-reaching. Blackwood’s declared: “There is nothing of the belligerent spirit among us, and we do not want any olive leaves to demonstrate the propriety as well as the advantages of keeping the peace. Our conviction is, that no ministry, who should act on other than pacific principles, could remain in office for a week.”

By the autumn of 1853 the spirit became much stronger. This is evidenced by various periodicals. On July 23 The Spectator declared: “We are slow to move; but if once we move, shall we once retreat, if with whole heart and a firm right hand we place all our trust in ‘God and the Right’?”

An article, entitled “England’s Interest in the Eastern Question—the Reason Why”, gave to the people a decided pro-war sentiment: “The honor and reputation of England is pledged, that on her part at least there shall be no step backward. She owed this to Turkey, which has acted by her advise—to France, which relies upon her steadiness and fidelity—to herself, for she has much at stake upon the issue of a crisis. . . If she now recedes before Russia, her prestige both in Europe and Asia will be shaken to its foundation. Whatever it may cost, she must now make good her ground. It is well known that the Emperor of Russia has been emboldened to his aggressive course of action by three deliberate

---

6 Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine, LXXII, 2, for July, 1852.
7 Id., LXXIII, 364, ff., for March, 1853.
8 Ibid.
9 Living Age, XXXVIII, 560, for August, 1853, contains this excerpt.
calculations: that England could not act cordially with France under her present government in any cause whatever; that she would not be able to effectively man her navy; and that the Peace-at-any-Price and the Economy-at-any-Cost School were powerful enough to prevent her engaging in a war for any European purpose. . . We should show him now, by our words, by our attitude, by our resolute behavior, by our ready acceptance of all risks, that he has mistaken our position. . . It does not consist either with the dignity, the safety, or the peace of a great nation like England to be satisfied with a hand to mouth policy—a diplomacy of expedients, delays, temporary palliatives, and delusive anodynes. We must look the danger and the necessity fairly in the face; see clearly the purpose which we have in view; examine deeply the best means of attaining that purpose; and then pursue and adopt those means resolutely, pertinaciously, in spite of all distractions, in defiance of every obstacle, in contempt of cost.”

In September, 1853, The Westminster Review concluded that “in disposition of Turkey England has little to be gained and nearly everything to be lost—for her political position and commercial interests would be threatened.”

The Spectator of September 10 declared: “The English people dislike the idea of war; least of all would they be inclined to ‘go to war for Turkey’, a state and people so remote from English understanding or Christian sympathy; but in these days of expediency there is one thing that still exercises a confessed sway over the English mind and that is justice—one thing which Englishmen would be eager to sustain, and that is a straightforward minister. By patching up the Turkish controversy with a surrender of the very point contested, English statesmen may stave off their difficulty; but if they abandon their pledge and their straightforward course, while they really conquer no difficulties abroad, they lose the surest of reliances at home, the sympathy of Englishmen and their confidence in a straightforward ‘English policy.’”

10 Living Age, XXXVIII, 565, for August, 1853, contains this excerpt from the Economist of July 16.
11 The Examiner for August 20 states a radical view: “We may lean to peace till we may overthrow it by our very excess of leaning, and this is certainly the danger of yielding to and encouraging an encroaching power like Russia. Well said Lord Russell that the best preparation for war is the exhaustion of all honorable means for the preservation of peace.”
12 Excerpt from The Living Age, XXXIX, 239, for October, 1853.
The issue of September 24 brought forth the idea that "if Russia choose war, then, the consequences be on her and her allies; for on them assuredly, more than on us, will those consequences fall. If they call forth war, England is not bound again to join in defending alien potentates against the results of their own misrule—dangers which never threatened her. We view war as a calamity; but although it is we who detest war most in prospect, we have never flinched from it in action, and we know well that its worst evils are not for us...

compact, strong in material power, at peace with all the world save the lawless desecrators of peace, recent manifestations have shown, that, if stern necessity should come upon us, we need but the opportunity to prove that Englishmen have not lost the old spirit." In commenting on the future course of England in the East, the issue of October 1 declared: "It is never too late to draw back from a wrong course; and the best thing we can do now is to leave those two barbarian states to fight it out between themselves... It is time that those statesmen who will, by their office, be recorded in history as responsible before posterity for sustaining of betraying the dignity of their country, should review the considerations upon which their course must be determined. Their incontestable and primary objects must be to defend English interests, to sustain justice, and to restore, as they have so long succeeded in preserving, peace, but to restore it on a stronger basis.... What can England do? She can, in word and act, make a determined protest against the further growth of a lawless power... it is the mission of England to make the last stand for that public law, and to prevent its being recorded in history that these subversive principles, these lawless acts, have been adopted by the acclamation of potentates without solemn protest."12

In January, 1854, Harper's Magazine said: "The current of popular feeling in England seems to set strongly in favor of Turkey. Large public meetings have been held to discuss the subject at Manchester and Glasgow. Sir Charles Napier at Manchester pointed to the fact that Russia, by being allowed to retain the Principalities, would next move to seize Constantinople." The Quarterly Review spoke more vigorously of the course to be adopted by England in dealing with Turkey: "It is no party question. No country can be more averse from a war than our own; the interests of humanity and our material

12 Excerpt from The Living Age, XXXIX, 381, for October, 1853.
interests are equally opposed to it. Peace may even have been jeopardised by the very anxiety to preserve it. At any rate, we have the satisfaction of reflecting, and the means of proving to the world, that forbearance had been carried to the utmost before we engaged in the tremendous conflict, now, we fear, too imminent. But if the die be cast, and the Emperor of Russia be determined to hazard everything in maintaining and pushing his schemes ... England has but one course to pursue. She must arm herself for the contest with that energy and determination which will prove that she is resolved to carry it through successfully. Cordially united with France, we have little to dread—but there must be no half-measures. The whole resources of these two great countries must at once be brought to bear; Englishmen of all parties must for the time forget their differences in this one great national object."

A great divergence of opinion in the Ministry caused uncertainty throughout the country. Of the criticism which resulted, Lord Aberdeen was the target. Blackwood's Magazine for January, 1854, maintained that "so far from regarding the Coalition as an auspicious event for the interests of the country, we looked upon it as likely to degrade the position and lessen the influence of Great Britain abroad, to lead to a new series of political experiments at home. . . ."

"It is evident to us that the head of the Administration, Lord Aberdeen, was unfitted to deal with the new complications which the altered state of European affairs has introduced ... he was never qualified to be a leader. He has not cultivated friendly relations toward France which are important now."

"A single false move, a vacillating policy, a dishonest attitude, may not only entail upon Europe the miseries of a general war, but may cover the name of this renowned country with disgrace and obliterate the memory of former tests, which have rendered Great Britain honorable and famous throughout the world. We cannot remain dumb witnesses of an act of national dishonor. . . ."

"Lord Palmerston, whose tact and determination were well-known, and who was the only man in the Cabinet capable of conducting foreign affairs, had been removed to another office, and a mere tyro was intrusted with the charge of our European policy."

"It was the duty of the ministry, immediately upon the rupture between

14 Quarterly Review, XCIV, 301, ff.
Russia and the Porte, to have decided what line of conduct they would pursue in event of actual aggression. ... In real action they showed themselves deficient.

"Had Great Britain assumed in time her proper attitude—had she spoken and acted as she ought to have done ... the tremendous evils of a general war, which now appears inevitable, would have been prevented. The fault lay with the Ministry, who ought either at first to have adopted strong measures, or to have kept back the fleet altogether from Constantinople. ... We have arrived at the conclusion that, both for our honor and interest, the aggressive career of Russia should at once be checked, no matter what the sacrifice.

"It is lamentable to think of what has occurred from the irresolute and dilatory tone of the present British Cabinet and the obstinacy and credulity of its chief."\(^{15}\)

The Quarterly Review voiced the complaint: "Had the Government adopted in the first instance a firm and vigorous tone in dealing with Russia, England would have been spared war. The Government should have declared it would not tolerate any interference in the affairs of Turkey." While Lord John Russell insisted that the activity of Russia must be checked, Aberdeen was "whining for peace and throwing cold water on the ardour of the people by constantly enlarging on the horrors of war and the blessings of peace. ... Had we any other at the head of the Government than the man to whose hands are intrusted the destinies of our Empire, we might cherish hope of honorable peace."\(^{16}\) Blackwood's Magazine made a lengthy and violent attack upon the ministry in November, 1854: "If our ministers failed, as we think they did, in indicating to the Czar and his representative in London the part which Britain was bound to take in event of actual aggression, it seems to us that they erred.

\(^{15}\) Many periodicals were against Aberdeen's policy. The Quarterly Review, XCV, for 1854, stated: "We do not think language like Lord Aberdeen's is calculated to secure cordiality of our alliance with France. ... We should rejoice to see the true sentiment of Great Britain faithfully represented by the lofty tone and magnanimous aspect of a Minister to whom Europe looks for the expression of our opinions and solution of our policy."

\(^{16}\) Blackwood's Magazine for August, 1854, and the Dublin University Magazine for June, 1854, spoke in the same vein: "No termination of the war can be considered as a final and satisfactory one that does not put back the hordes of Russia into their own steppes." Living Age, XLI, 545.
still more in not making a sufficient physical demonstration so soon as the Russian forces had crossed the Pruth. . . A decided attitude at the beginning might have saved us from all this bloodshed; for, headstrong as the Czar is, he can still calculate chances, and he must have known that, in event of absolute war, he could not, by possibility, be a gainer. . .

"The Aberdeen Ministry, yielding rather to the torrent of public opinion than influenced by strong and irresistible sense of duty, gave orders for the fleet to move. . . That our Ministers were tardy is not only our opinion, but that of the great majority of our countrymen.

"Lord Aberdeen said in an address recently he considered that any one who prolonged the horrors of war for a single day, when it was in his power to make a just, safe, and honorable peace, would be guilty in the eyes of God and man. He spoke truly, but has it ever occurred to him that those who prolong war by not availing themselves of the readiest means of stifling it, must incur an equally severe condemnation?

"We give credit to the Aberdeen Ministry for having acted for the best, according to their capacity, and ideas which they entertained of what was necessary for the nation’s honor. We have no desire, at a period like this, to weaken the hands of any Ministry—but we must have no more baby speeches in the midst of bloody conflict. . . What we demand is resolute action for the future. . . When the ability of the executive power seems doubtful, or is doubted, it is time for the deliberative to interpose."  

Blackwood’s Magazine emphasized the party attitudes as being a force with the populace. The Conservatives were united in their opinions with regard to Russian aggression upon Turkey. The Manchester party condemned the war and everything belonging to it, and had organized a crusade against military and naval establishments. The Peelites looked with a "cold eye" upon the war, for they did not believe in the vitality of Turkey or in the danger of Russian aggrandisement.

Mr. W. H. Russell, correspondent of the London Times, was an influential

---

17 Fraser's Magazine for July, 1854, 121, argued that "if all England had been polled 15 months ago, from one end to the other, we do not believe that one sane man would have been found who was desirous for war."
leader of the periodical world. In January, 1855, he wrote that the Western Powers went to war for a political object, and not to gratify any private passions or even any national ambition, and that Parliament was vacillating while the demeanor of the nation was infinitely more composed, consistent, and rational. He declared: "A public opinion exists among us, more enlightened, more firm, more tenacious, than that which can be traced in the discussions of Parliament. The English people despise and mistrust trading politicians. Any Minister who will preserve our alliances, cultivate our resources, and conduct the war with energy and judgment, deserves the public confidence."

By January, 1855, public opinion in England was almost wholly in favor of the war. "The wolfish eagerness of Russia to fasten a quarrel upon an inoffensive, and as she thought, helpless neighbor; the desperate valor with which Turkey, despised by her fierce antagonist, and disparaged throughout Europe as a military power, had for months maintained an unequal contest, could not fail to engage the generous sympathies of the English people; but the cruel and unsportsmanlike massacre of Sinope completely aroused their old spirit; peace, commerce, and reform, the favorite themes of the last 20 years were in a moment thrown aside, and the Government were loudly called upon to put forth the might of England in aid of an oppressed and insulted ally."19

Various phases of the war were discussed. Living Age for January, 1855, in an article, entitled "The True Purpose of the War", emphatically expressed the view that England was not fighting "to maintain a decrepit Government," or "to retain in the East of Europe that political and diplomatic influence which we began to fear might be overshadowed by the growing power of our rival"; "we are fighting not for Turkey, but for Europe; not for Medizedan despotism, but for European freedom and civilization; not for Turkey, but against Russia."20 In the same issue the press was given credit for the good service which it had rendered in the war: "It has helped reform the war department; it has aided the Government to know its duty in declaring war; it has made our ministers aware of public opinion that would exact and sustain war."21 Blackwood's Magazine maintained that "there are times when it is

18 Mr. Russell's ideas stated here are found in The Edinburgh Review, CII, 572, ff.
19 Fraser's Magazine, for January, 1855, 119.
20 Living Age, XLIV, 208, for January, 1855.
21 Ibid., 46.
the duty of every man, and of every organ of public opinion, to speak out their sentiments, and without reservation. Our criticism must be hostile to the present Ministry. We have never reposed faith in them; we now repose less than ever—and being thoroughly of the opinion that they are unfit for the station they occupy, and that their continued occupation of it is dangerous for the welfare of Britain, we shall not conceal our sentiments. The Cabinet was divided against itself. They did not believe in the reality of war, even after it was declared. They thought it might be tided over. . . It is a shameful, almost an incredible fact, that the militia acts for Scotland and Ireland were not passed until the 11th of August, 1854.''

On Thursday, January 4, 1855, William II. Channing wrote a letter from Liverpool to the Living Age regarding the feeling in England:

"In regard to general feeling of all classes, I should say there was a wonderful unanimity in favor of it [that is, the war] . . . Old England, proud, enterprising, colonizing, commercial old England—conscious of her superior civilization, enthusiastic for her free institutions, vigorous in her hope to weave all continents and islands into one grand confederation of industry and exchange—does not feel ready to be swallowed at a mouthful by this Ogre (Russia). There is a solemn expectation that this war will become a means to diffuse a purer form of religion. 'We are in for it, now let us go through with it', is the only tone I hear.

"No; not the only tone—this brings me to the minority—a very small one now—who are opposed to the war. . . A few fear that the result of the war will be to strengthen Russia, not to cripple her. And their view is that Russia must and will hold out and make a long war of it. Some say—'Suppose Russia should absorb Turkey, Christian Russians are vastly better than Mussulman Turks.'

"Then came a very, very few, who say like Mr. Bright of Manchester that Russia has the best of the controversy—that she was right, and France and England wrong—that England is intruding in what conceives her not—that it is a wicked, presumptuous, heaven-defying war, and that its sure end will be England's humiliation and remorse.

"Finally, are those who really at heart would be pained by the downfall of the Czar—these dread letting loose the People of Europe, now awed into stillness. Such, briefly described, are the Peace party . . . who oppose
all war without regarding its animus and aim.

"Still, my judgment is, that the war party will keep control of the Government. Great Britain will come out of the war the leader of free governments in Europe—she has looked at home for her strength and weakness—a self-study."²²

When Palmerston became Premier in January, 1855, there was much rejoicing. But by March we found that he was being hampered, as Aberdeen had been. The Westminster Review commented upon this situation: "Palmerston’s position depended always on success in war. We have great confidence in Palmerston and are sorry to find him hampered by so many colleagues from among Conservative Whigs."

In the spring of 1855 prospects of peace began to appear. The Examiner of March 17 declared: "Chances of satisfactory and honorable peace were never so unpromising as at this time . . . they have been diminished by the death of Nicholas. The common and accredited rumor is that the English Government is inclined to grant more favorable terms to Alexander II than France is willing to concede. . . . If peace be concluded the war will have ended . . . with enormous disadvantage on our side. In such circumstances such a peace is not possible . . . it would be nothing more than a truce. Of course every exertion will be made by the so-called Peace Party to bring about at least an armistice pending the conference, for it is quite in the interest of Russia that the operations in the Crimea should now be arrested. . . . Mr. Bright argued upon Lord John Russell that his first duty was to stop the further effusion of blood by consenting to suspend operations."²³ This was also the view of an editorial in The Morning Chronicle of March 27, which stated that "the British nation would recoil, notwithstanding its pacific instincts, at a peace which would possess no lasting elements, and would merely defer to some other day the final struggle between the North and the West. For our own part, we should be guilty alike of weakness and treason were we to countenance the suicidal act of concluding a peace with Russia which would not have for a definite object the total dismantlement of Sebastopol. . . . We are impressed with the serious conviction that the conclusion of a peace not guaranteed

²² Living Age, XLIV, 646, ff.
²³ Ibid., XLV, 298, ff., for April, 1855.
by the destruction of Sebastopol would be a calamitous event, not alone to this country, but to Europe. The course of civilization, and, perchance, the grandeur of the British Empire are at stake; and therefore, we protest against a peace which would affect the rational dignity, without affording restraint to the ambitious projects of Russia.' In an article, entitled "Peace or War?" which appeared in The Living Age for May, 1855, the alternatives of immediate peace or the continuation of the war were considered: "If peace is to be accepted such as our diplomatists can negotiate, it should be with the firm intention and the resolute determination to employ the leisure thus obtained in remodeling and over-hauling our entire military system; . . . in a word, in so profiting both by the experience of the war, and the opportunities of the peace as to secure ourselves against the possibility of the recurrence of such calamities and humiliations as those which have attended our Crimean expedition. If, on the contrary, we should resolve to prosecute the war to a really glorious and successful termination, then it behooves us courageously and dispassionately to look our prospects in the face, and see what course of action it would be wise to pursue, and what results it would be reasonable to expect and wise to be prepared for."

During the summer of 1855 the feeling of the country grew more warlike. The failure of the negotiations at Vienna had touched the national pride. England, in spite of the preachers of peace at any price, determined to continue the Crimean War as a "duel with Russia." In July Fraser's Magazine pointed out that everybody was agreed upon the war, which was popular, but that the Government would now have made peace gladly "had they not been deterred by the fear of public opinion." This was the beginning of attacks upon the Palmerston Ministry, led by Blackwood's Magazine.

After Sebastopol had fallen, the periodical press took sides on the question of peace or war. The Spectator for September 15 declared: "now that Sebastopol has fallen, some of our contemporaries are rushing into the discussion of terms for the conclusion of peace. Such a discussion is obviously premature. It is far too early, therefore, to discuss terms of peace; Russia does not offer, and no offer can be made by any but Russia. . . . We believe that it will be

24 Living Age, XLV, 383, for April, 1855.
practically impossible at the next settlement to repeat the fatal errors of 1815.’’ The Economist for October 6 stated that a termination of hostilities and not a cessation of them was desired. ‘‘We agree with Mr. Gladstone and the Press that we ought to consent to peace as soon as the purpose of war has been accomplished. . . . What was our object? . . . Was it not the rescue of Turkey, to secure the ‘independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire?’ Was not the possession of Sepastopol and the Crimea the special instrument which Russia owned?’’28 Another statement declared: ‘‘we do not say that, because the nation is morally justified in declining what it believes to be a hollow treaty, it is justified in carrying on war without. It is the duty of those who hold the struggle to be one of self-preservation, as well as those who hold it to be diplomatic, to fix their aim, and to fix it within the bounds of possibility.’’27

By November, 1855, public opinion was inclined to look upon Palmerston as an ‘‘instrument rather than a leader, the country’s servant rather than its chief, to have adopted rather than to have dictated, a policy.’’

On December 8, 1855, The Saturday Review thought that it was impossible ‘‘to dispute the unanimous willingness of the English nation to persevere in the war. The confidence of future advantages renders the English nation at this moment lukewarm for peace. Strong in the present, stronger in the future, the English Government can afford to be moderate.’’28 The Quarterly Review held a similar opinion: ‘‘Having been once convinced of the justice and necessity of the contest into which the people were called upon to enter, they have persevered in their determination not to flinch from it until its real objects have been attained. Notwithstanding the assertions and predictions of those who would arrogate to themselves the direction of the working classes, the great mass of our population is still earnest in the prosecution of the war.’’29

The thinking classes expressed grave satisfaction when tidings of peace came, but there was no popular exultation. The Saturday Review of March 22,

28 Living Age, XLVII, for 1855 contains excerpts from The Spectator and the Economist.
27 The Saturday Review, I, for November 24, 1855.
28 Ibid.
29 The Quarterly Review, XCVIII, 252.
1856, summarized the matter by saying, "The conclusion of the war is like the week after a large dinner party—there are accounts to settle." Blackwood's Magazine was delighted with the peace: "We candidly say that we do not think it was possible to procure for England any better terms... But Turkey is still the 'sick man', and Europe will soon be fighting again over its dead body."

Peace had come once more to Europe, bringing with it problems to be considered for the welfare of humanity, together with the realization that the war was not "the gratification of any sectional vanity, but the practical determination of the political position and of the comparative forces of the States of Europe; that the best security for the continuance of peace consists in the knowledge that no single Power can commit encroachments with impunity... It has been proved that Russia is not irresistible, that Austria no longer clings to the Holy Alliance, that England is, on occasion, not averse to war and has learned to regard any interruption of peace as an unwelcome episode in her career."\[54\]

20 Twenty years later this prophecy came true.
21 The Saturday Review, I, for March 8, 1836.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. ORIGINAL SOURCES

*Annual Register*, 1853-1856. London.


B. SECONDARY WORKS


*Cambridge Modern History*, XI.


Latimer, Elizabeth W., *Russia and Turkey in the Nineteenth Century*. Chicago, 1897.