THE PLAY OF DIALOGUE: ON TURN-TAKING IN CONVERSATIONS

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by

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Chapter I

Introduction

The question which this paper attempts to answer is 'How does one experience turn-taking in conversations?'. Alternatively, this research question may be phrased, 'What is the essence of turn-taking?'. Based on the latter question, the thesis advanced in this paper will be that essence of turn-taking is dialogue. It will be argued that the fundamental structure of turn-taking is the to and fro movement of the dialectic. This will allow for the claim that turn-taking behaviors may be indicators of the breakdown of dialogue into monologue. Conversely, turn-taking behaviors may be indicative of the creation and maintenance of dialogue in conversations. Furthermore, it will be argued that turn-taking may also be an indicator of the interaction involvement of the participants in a conversation.

One of the assumptions of the paper is that dialogical communication occurs in conversations in and through which mutual understanding is achieved. Monological communication, it will be assumed, represents a truncation of the communication achieved in and through
dialogue. Furthermore, it will be assumed that the object of the conversation governs the turn-taking behaviors of those engaged in dialogue. In contrast, when the process of turn-taking is determined solely by the will of the interlocutors, then we may say that the conversation is monological. The intersubjectivity sustained during a monological conversation is not one of creating mutual understanding (although it may presuppose and/or maintain such understanding), but is one that serves some other instrumental or expressive purpose.

The preceding statements require some explication in order to understand their significance with regard to recent research of turn-taking in conversations. Most researchers of turn-taking have followed a linguistic paradigm. This paradigm assumes that turn-taking in conversations may be explained in terms of how the subjects engaged in the conversation manage to exchange turns. Hence, research in turn-taking has concentrated on what the subjects do in the conversation, assuming that it is the will of one and/or the other interlocutor which determines the exchange of turns in a conversation. Thus turn-taking has been viewed as an interaction between two or more subjects, i.e., what has been investigated is the subject-
subject relationship in the conversation. However, such an approach ignores the influence of the object of the conversation, that which is talked about. It is the thesis of this paper that turn-taking can be best understood as a subject-topic-subject relationship. When both interlocutors are familiar and interested with the object of the conversation, then the topic can be seen as determining the exchange of turns in a conversation. However, in order for this object of the conversation to be the basis for intersubjectivity, a certain process must come into play. This is the process of mutual understanding in and through dialogue. When a conversation is dialectical, the language used in the conversation accomplishes presentational thinking. As opposed to this, in monological conversations, language represents preconstituted or sedimented thoughts and meanings; these preconstituted meanings are the result of the presentational thinking engaged in during dialogue. In this sense, mutual understanding is presupposed in monological conversations and it may be said that this communication is a truncation of the communication that occurs during dialogue. 4

The difference between dialogue and monologue may be illustrated by analogy to jazz music. Both dialogic communication and good jazz music share a commonality:
the freedom of spontaneous turn-taking. When a group of jazz musicians are making music together two important things occur. First, each note produced emerges spontaneously and forms a structure or framework in time. The same may be said of dialogue since each turn spoken is spontaneous while also constituting a structure of question and answer. Second, each note produced interpenetrates and intertwines with the notes that precede it and/or occur simultaneously, i.e., each note produces or makes a 'common' music. Each musician is not simply performing for him/herself but is performing for an audience and is oriented toward producing a 'common' sound. For example, during a performance when a musician plays a solo, if that music is an interpretation of the theme(s) that were presented by the entire group (offering a different emphasis and opening a new horizon of meaning), then we view the 'solo' as being 'together': there is a commonality between the solo and the preceding music which furthers our understanding of the entire group's musical statement. A similar sort of thing happens in dialogue: through the intertwining and interpenetration of our interpretations of each others' statements, my partner and I achieve a common language in dialogue, a mutual understanding.

A peculiar thing happens in both of the above situa-
tions; the process of turn-taking becomes transparent to that presented in and through the turn. The musicians performing before us recede in favor of the music being presented to us, their individuality being transparent and illuminating the music being made. Similarly, during a dialogue, what is said becomes thematic and the individual doing the speaking becomes transparent.

However, just as a musical performance may be inconsistent, with the group being 'together' for only a few sets of the performance, so too may a conversation achieve dialogical being only for a few, interspersed moments. How is it then that we know when a conversation is dialogical or a group of jazz musicians are 'together'? We recognize this difference in the very way in which turns are exchanged in the conversation or by the way notes are traded in the musical performance. In monological conversations or solo musical performances, the speaker or musician determines when an exchange will occur. Conversely, when making music together or when engaging in dialogue, the spirit of the music or conversation, that is, its theme or object, determines the exchange of notes or turns.

Bill Evans has pointed out that the spirit of improvisation, of creating spontaneous music together, re-
quires "sympathy from all members to bend for the common result." Thus, a common spirit or mode of being directs the efforts of jazz musicians when playing music together. In dialogical conversations this bending for a 'common result' occurs when at least the following four conditions are achieved in and through my own and my partner's speech. It should be noted that these conditions for dialogue are derived from the works of Hans-Georg Gadamer and Jurgen Habermas. Furthermore, these conditions are mutually interdependent and the lack of any one condition will result in a monological conversation.

What then are necessary requirements for dialogue? Gadamer tells us, in the following passage, the basic demands of a fundamental or dialogical conversation:

To conduct a conversation requires first of all that the partners to it do not talk at cross purposes. Hence its necessary structure is that of question and answer. The first condition of the art of conversation is to ensure that the other person is with us. We know this only too well from the reiterated yesses of the interlocutors in the Platonic dialogues. The positive side of this monotony is the inner logic with which the development of the topic proceeds in the conversation. To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the object which the partners in the conversation are directed. It requires that one does not try to out-argue the other person, but that one really considers the
weight of the other's opinion. Hence it is an art of testing. But the art of testing is the art of questioning. For we have seen that to question means to lay open, to place in the open. As against the solidity of opinions, questioning makes the object and all its possibilities fluid. A person who possesses the 'art' of questioning is a person who is able to prevent the suppression of questions by the dominant opinion. A person who possesses this art will himself seek for everything in favor of an opinion. Dialectic consists not in trying to discover the weakness of what is said, but in bringing out its real strength. It is not the art of arguing that is able to make a strong case out of a weak one, but the art of thinking that is able to strengthen what is said by referring to the object.\(^8\)

We may derive from this passage and our prior discussion a number of requirements that are necessary for a conversation to be considered a dialogue. First, dialogical conversations require that we make sure that our partner is with us and understands what we are saying. Second, our utterances should be appropriate and fit the context of the conversation, i.e., not directing the talk, but allowing the object of the conversation to lead us. Third, we must be sincere and veracious in our utterances, attempting to strengthen what our partner says by referring to the object of discussion. This last requirement conceals perhaps the over-riding condition of the dialogical conversation: that we should seek in and through our utterances to discover the truth about the object of
of our discussion. What is of concern with the last condition of dialogue is not the logical truth of a proposition, but that we should seek the truth about that which is the topic of discussion. When my partner and I are in agreement about some statement concerning the object of discussion, when we are in consensus, then the statement is seen as true.

The notion that the above conditions necessary for dialogue are mutually interdependent can be explicated as follows: each utterance in a dialogical conversation creates a common language in and through the act of understanding. Thus it can be said that the requirements for dialogue are mutually related and dependent since each condition seeks to further mutual understanding. For example, the requirement that our partner follow us in the conversation and understand what we have said means that we must expect to be misunderstood and seek assurance that such is not the case by asking our partner questions. Gadamer has pointed out that all questions imply a certain understanding of the answer that the questions seek, an orientation that underlies the significance of the questions. This point should temper any misunderstanding of our last statement: if the questions we ask are condescending they would not be appropriate, i.e., seeking mutual
understanding. This caveat takes on added significance when we realize that the requirement that we be assured that our partner is with us entails a variety of possible actions on both my own and my partner's part. Certainly, we must be open to questions from our partners that seek to clarify their understanding. However, this means that I do not parrot back to my partner simply the words he/she has just said but, rather, relate what is said to my own horizon of meaning and express my understanding of what was said, i.e., my interpretation. In this manner the conversation unfolds upon itself: my interpretation inter-penetrates and intermingles with my partner's interpretation and so on.

This last matter also demonstrates the interrelatedness of appropriateness and the third condition of dialogue, that the speakers be sincere and veracious in their utterances. Only if I can assume that you are sincere in your utterances and other indications to me, can I act appropriately in the conversation and vice versa. What is in question in these cases is not the logical truth of what is said, but the sincerity with which an utterance is made. Moreover, our utterances must also be sincere in relation to the goal of dialogue, that of mutual understanding about some thing which is the object of our talk.
This means that a sincere utterance fulfills the fourth condition of dialogue, that the propositional contention of the conversation be truth. What is sincere about our utterances is that they have the common aim of seeking the essence or truth about the object of our talk. It is this condition that demands that my partner and I actually share a common language in our conversation that is not pre-constituted but is created in our talk. In order to know the truth about something I must be able to express this truth in a manner that includes both myself and my partner. In this sense, all my utterances are interpretations that go beyond myself and present what I know to my partner: this process necessitates that our speech should constitute a common language.

In order to advance the thesis discussed in the previous pages, this paper will be presented in a format that mirrors the process of experimentation and reflection that underlay its development. The second chapter of the paper consists of a report of an experiment, based on a grammatical model of turn-taking, that attempted to answer partially the question: 'How does one experience turn-taking in conversations?'. Specifically, this experiment tested three hypotheses concerning the turn-taking behaviors of familiar versus
stranger dyads. The hypotheses assumed that familiar subjects would be more comfortable with most turn-taking behaviors than would subjects not familiar with each other. Also, it was assumed that familiar subjects would be more likely to violate the 'rules' of turn-taking, i.e., they would be less formal than would strangers meeting for the first time.

It should be noted that the grammatical model of turn-taking is based on a monological model of communication. This model assumes that turn-taking is a form of meta-communication through which the conversation is regulated and communicators exchange speaking turns. Although the grammatical model does account for the conscious management of the conversation by the communicators, it does not account for the effortlessness and freedom of turn-taking during a dialogue. The third chapter of the paper articulates this critique while discussing the results of the experiment.

The fourth chapter of the paper advances the thesis that the essence of turn-taking is dialogue. Since much has been written and said about dialogue, it will be necessary to review what is meant by the term. For the purposes of this paper, a review of John Stewart's article, "Foundations of Dialogic Communication," will establish what is generally meant by dialogue in the field of com-
munication. It will then be necessary to differentiate this meaning from the meaning of dialogue vis-a-vis turn-taking in conversations. In so doing, it will be argued that dialogue can be understood as dialectic and play. In addition, the notion of presentational thinking will be explicated through this discussion of dialogue.

The fifth and final chapter of the paper will develop some of the implications of the thesis that the essence of turn-taking is dialogue. These implications will be developed from both specific and general applications of the thesis. A specific application of the thesis to the experiment reported in the second chapter of the paper will result in a number of suggestions for operationally testing the thesis. On a more general level, the thesis will be applied to some of the more recent research concerning turn-taking in order to exhibit its explanatory power. Lastly, a number of questions about turn-taking will be offered to direct future research.
Chapter II

A Study of Turn-Taking and Familiarity

In the last two decades there has been increased interest and research concerning conversational management in the fields of anthropology, communication, social psychology, and sociology.\textsuperscript{10} Turn-taking behaviors have been identified and various syntactical rules to govern conversational management have been suggested in the literature.\textsuperscript{11} The paradigm that has been assumed by most of this research is that conversational management is a form of meta-communication. That is, during conversations it is assumed that people communicate about who will be the next speaker. This is usually thought to be accomplished via nonverbal (but not, necessarily non-vocal) channels.\textsuperscript{12} Furthermore, investigators of conversational management may be said to have utilized the notion that turn-taking may be studied as if it were a language.\textsuperscript{13} As Charles Morris noted, we may study the syntax, semantics, or pragmatics of any language.\textsuperscript{14} For the most part, researchers have concentrated on the semantics and syntax of turn-taking and have ignored its pragmatics.\textsuperscript{15}

In order to summarize this research, a grammatical
model of turn-taking will be presented in this section of the chapter. This model combines the research of investigators from a number of fields, from ethnomethodologists to social psychologists. It should be noted that this model is based, to a large extent, on a similar model of turn-taking proposed by Starkey Duncan, Jr.  

As mentioned above, turn-taking has often been studied in order to determine its grammar, i.e., its syntax and vocabulary. Generally, two approaches have been taken by researchers of turn-taking. On the one hand, they have tried to discover the syntax or system of rules for generating speaking turns. On the other hand, they have tried to determine the vocabulary or set of signals used to meta-communicate about turn-taking during conversations. Of course a number of researchers such as Duncan have combined these two approaches.

Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson have deduced, based on six years of studying recordings of natural conversations, what may be called a set of syntactic rules that govern turn-taking. The foundation of their set of rules relies on the definition of a turn as consisting of either a single word, a phrase, a clause, or a sentence. Utterances of more than one sentence are therefore comprised of more than one turn, i.e., a lengthy utterance is the result of rule option 3 (below) being followed at every
transition-relevance place, according to the syntactic rules of turn-taking. These rules state that every transition-relevance place in the conversation offers four possibilities:

(1) The current speaker may designate or allocate his/her turn to someone else. If this option is not initiated before the transition-relevance place, then:

(2) One of the listeners may select themselves as the next speaker, in which case the first person to speak acquires the 'right' to the turn. If this option is not taken, then:

(3) The current speaker may continue to talk. If the original speaker does not speak, then either the rules will be reiterated or:

(4) the conversation ends.18

It should be noted that the four rules are applied in an ordered, optional and consecutive manner. In addition, the rules are applied cyclically, i.e., at the end of each speaker's turn or every possible transition relevance place the rules are reapplied. Thus if rule option 1 is fulfilled by the speaker designating another speaker, then rule options 2, 3, and 4 are not applied. At the end of the new speaker's first turn, at the transition-relevance place, the set of optional rules are reapplied. It should be stressed that, in order for rule option 1
to be assured of use, it needs to be employed before the transition-relevance place or end of the speaker's turn.

What is a transition-relevance place and how do we know that it is a possible turning point in the conversation? According to Sacks, et al., syntactical and paralinguistic cues enable the speaker/listener to predict when a possible transition place will occur in a conversation. In other words, a speaker and listener both encode and decode a turn as a single unit of thought which may vary in length from a word to a simple sentence. It should be noted that Donald S. Boomer and Allen T. Dittmann have pointed out that such units of thought are not equivalent to a grammatical sentence (as written) but, in speech, are equivalent to what they call a phonemic clause. In fact, they propose that both speakers and listeners view the beginnings/ endings of such clauses as natural openings or transition-relevance places in the conversation. The concept of the phonemic clause will be central to later arguments for integrating the work of various researchers of turn-taking and will be explicated at that point.

Other researchers have been primarily concerned with the behaviors that accompany turn-taking in conversations. These researchers think that certain behaviors of the speaker and/or listener act as signals and are used to
meta-communicate about turn-taking. In other words, while Sacks, et al., attempted to determine the natural openings in a conversation where speakers may exchange turns, other researchers have tried to determine the signals used by the speaker and/or listener in order for an exchange of turns to occur. Four categories of signals are mentioned by Argyle, Duncan, Knapp, and Wiemann, however, the terms used for these categories varies. 21

For the purposes of this paper the four categories are listed as follows:

(1) turn-requesting signals
(2) turn-yielding signals
(3) turn-maintaining signals
(4) back-channel signals

Turn-requesting signals are used by the listener to indicate a desire to take the speaking floor. One or more of the following verbal and nonverbal signals may be displayed by the auditor:

Verbal signals
   a. interrupting the speaker
   b. use of buffers
   c. use of reinforcers
   d. asking a question
   e. stuttering a start of an utterance

Nonverbal signals
   a. triple head nods
b. gazing at the speaker

Turn-yielding signals are used by the speaker to relinquish the speaking floor. One or more of the following verbal and nonverbal cues may be displayed by the speaker:

Verbal signals
a. sentence completion
b. directing a question to a listener
c. use of a buffer after completing a sentence

Nonverbal signals
a. gazing at a listener
b. ending gesticulations that accompanied one's speech
c. drawling the final syllable of an utterance
d. ending a sentence on a prolonged rising or falling pitch
e. leaning back from a forward position

Turn-maintaining signals are also used by the speaker, but in this case their function is to keep the floor for the speaker. Again, one or more of the following signals may be displayed by the speaker:

a. raising the volume of one's speech (thus talking louder than any person attempting to speak)
b. continuing a gesticulation started before
the end of an utterance

Back-channel signals are used by the listener to indicate that he/she does not wish to take a speaking turn, given that the speaker has exhibited a turn-yielding signal. Otherwise, these signals are used to provide feedback to the speaker and to allow the listener to participate during a conversation without 'interrupting' the speaker. These are often called listener responses and may be used to allow the speaker to ascertain that 'uptake' or understanding by the listener has occurred. These signals may also include the function of regulating the tempo or rhythm of the conversation. Albert Scheflen has pointed out that such signals may also be used to sanction the behavior of other persons in the conversation.22

One or more of the following verbal and nonverbal signals may be displayed by the auditor as a back-channel cue:

Verbal signals
   a. complete the speaker's sentence
   b. briefly request clarification
   c. briefly restate what the speaker has said
   d. use of reinforcers

Nonverbal signals
   a. nodding or shaking the head
   b. avoiding eye contact with the speaker

It should be noted that the above list of signals
are not inclusive and that there are probably many other
cues that fit one or more of the turn-taking signal cate-
gories. In addition, although there seem to be general
rules that govern how the turn-taking signals may be used
in conversations, it is likely that the use of some speci-
fic signals may vary from these general rules, e.g., eye
gaze.\textsuperscript{23}

At this point these general rules governing turn-
taking signals need to be made explicit. Duncan offers
a grammatical model of turn-taking that encompasses all
of the above set of signals except turn-requesting sig-
nals.\textsuperscript{24} However, his model differs in many respects from
the system of rules for turn-taking posited by Sacks, et
al. The major difference between the two approaches cen-
ters on the definition of the turn. For Sacks, et al.,
any utterance equivalent to a sentence or less in length
is considered a turn. Duncan, however, excludes cer-
tain verbal utterances or back-channel signals such as
reinforcers and buffers from turn status. In addition,
he allows for a turn to vary in length: a turn may be
an utterance of many sentences or it may be an utterance
of a single word. His set of rules assumes that in order
for a turn to be taken, without disruption, a turn-yield-
ing signal must first be emitted by the speaker. Needless
to say, a turn-yielding signal does not obligate the lis-
tener(s) to take the turn since the listener(s) may re-
fuse the turn by using a back-channel signal. Moreover, in some cases the speaker will emit a turn-yielding signal while still desiring to keep the floor, e.g., at the end of a sentence. Turn-maintaining signals simultaneously emitted with the turn-yielding signal will indicate to the listener that the speaker has more to say.

How may the rules for turn-taking posited by Duncan and by Sacks, et al., be integrated and applied to the four categories of turn-taking signals discussed above? By explicating what is meant by the phonemic clause and by reviewing some of the behavioral research dealing with this fundamental unit of speech, a grammatical model of turn-taking will be proposed that shows that the rules posited by Duncan and by Sacks, et al., are complementary. As mentioned above, the greatest difference between the rules proposed by Duncan and those advanced by Sacks, et al., resides in their respective definitions of a turn. One of the contentions of this paper is that the phonemic clause may be viewed as the smallest turn unit: it will be argued that this unit is compatible with both the rules proposed by Duncan and those advanced by Sacks, et al.

According to Boomer, "speech is formulated in phonemic clauses, each of which is planned and executed as an organized speech act. This view is contrasted with other
prevailing views that the production units are (1) sentences, or (2) individual words, serially chained together by some associative process." To support this contention, Boomer presents evidence from a number of studies, some cross-cultural, dealing with pause production and perception, tongue slips, and listener responses. Before discussing the research on listener responses, it would be helpful to explain what is meant by the term 'phonemic clause'. What follows is a very condensed explication of the term, based on Boomer's summarizing article, "The Phonemic Clause: Speech Unit in Human Communication".

Boomer tells us, in the following extended passage, that:

In spontaneous speech there are discernible "chunks," sequences of a few syllables, usually from one to seven or eight, that seem to be spoken as a unit, a single speech act. This unit is the phonemic clause... Sustained speech is made up of such chunks, one after another. If you listen carefully to someone talking spontaneously--thinking on his feet--you will be able to hear these repeating units... The physical features that mark off phonemic clauses are patterns of voice pitch, rhythm, and loudness... Consider the following sentence:

The man who called me yesterday just telephoned again.

In print this is a single sentence. As spoken, however, it would probably
come out in two phonemic clauses:

the man who called me yesterday/just telephoned again/

If you say this aloud in a natural conversational way, or ask someone else to say it to you, you will probably hear the break where the first slash has been inserted. Let us consider how pitch, rhythm, and loudness divide this utterance into two phonemic clauses.

1. Pitch. The "tune" accompanying this utterance will have certain regular pitch characteristics. In the first chunk 'the man who called me' will be said with only minor pitch variation. During the 'yes-' in 'yesterday' the speaker's voice will move abruptly to a higher pitch and will glide back down to the opening level during '-terday'. The second chunk will show a similar, though not identical, pitch pattern. The initial level pitch will extend over 'just telephoned a-'. The pitch movement over '-gain' is likely to be a rapidly executed rise-fall. If the speaker does not intend to say anything further, the final pitch will drop to a point slightly lower than the opening level. . . .

2. Rhythm. If you listen carefully to someone saying this sample utterance, you may also hear a change in the syllabic rhythm, coinciding with the pitch changes. That is, 'the man who called me' and 'just telephoned a-' will be said relatively evenly and rapidly. 'Yesterday' and '-gain' will be heard as slightly longer, or stretched--not quite drawled, but tending in that direction. This is a subtle difference and difficult to hear. . . .

3. Loudness. This difference is even more difficult to hear, but the 'yes-' in the first chunk and the '-gain' in the second are likely to be somewhat louder than the rest of the utterance.

Notice that 'yes-' and '-gain' are the points in the two chunks where the change begins in all three features. These syl-
ables stand out from the rest of the utterance because of the simultaneous changes in pitch, rhythm, and loudness. This quality of standing out, or prominence, is called primary stress. The primary stress typically occurs at or near the end of the phonemic clause, as it does in both the clauses in our sample utterance. The patterned change in pitch, rhythm, and loudness that begins on the primary stress continues to the end of the clause. The span over which the changes occur may be a single syllable (-gain) or two, three, or more syllables (yesterday). During this period the pitch movement and the stretching continue, and the increase in loudness may also persist. The end of the phonemic clause is signaled at the point of discontinuity where the change in all of these features ends and their value level off again in the beginning of the next phonemic clause, i.e., back to relatively level pitch, more rapid enunciation, and reduced volume. This abrupt leveling off is the other identifying feature [aside from primary stress] of the phonemic clause. Trager and Smith have termed this feature terminal juncture, the point of joining of one clause to the next. The phonemic clause, then, is marked by one, and only one, primary stress and a terminal juncture.27

It is a contention of the paper that what Sacks, et al., call 'transition-relevance places' are the terminal juncture points of phonemic clauses. Indeed, Sacks, et al., note that "Our characterization in the rules, and in the subsequent discussion, leaves open the matter of how projection [of transition-relevance places] is done."28 It is interesting to note that the reasoning behind calling points or spaces of turn transition, 'places', impli-
cibly acknowledges the validity of claiming that transition-relevance places occur at terminal junctures of phonemic clauses. Sacks, et al., state that:

There are aspects of transition coordination which seem to require the notion of a 'space' for transitions, e.g., inter-turn silences which are not treated by participants as gaps or pauses. And there are aspects of transitions for which the notion of a transition 'point' seems correct; e.g., the end of a question which selects a next speaker seems often to constitute a transition point—a new turn starts there whether or not talk by another is immediately begun. . . . The concerns of this paper seem to us not to turn on this order of detail, and we avoid prejudicing the issue by the use of 'place', of which both 'space' and 'point' are possible specifications. 29

Interestingly, a series of studies conducted by Dittmann and Llewellyn, have dealt with the phenomenon of intra-turn silences or hesitation pauses. These are pauses that occur within a phonemic clause rather than at a terminal juncture. They found that listener responses were much more likely to occur at juncture pauses (inter-turn silences) than at hesitation pauses (intra-turn silences). This is congruent with the statement made by Sacks, et al., that 'inter-turn silences. . . are not treated by participants as gaps or pauses'. 30

It would also seem that that the phonemic clause, as a
fundamental turn unit, allows for Duncan's explanation of why he excludes verbal back-channel signals from turn status. This exclusion is motivated by the fact that the use of such signals by listeners is not viewed as an interruption by the person speaking. Dittmann and Llewellyn, in the same series of studies reported above, found that such "listener responses \( \text{(back-channel signals) as} \) brief interjections and nods, prove to be very strongly associated with terminal junctures."\(^{31}\)

Before concluding our discussion of phonemic clauses as turn units, it is necessary to explicate how such units may be combined into longer turn units of sentential length. In order to accomplish this, two additional points about the terminal juncture of the phonemic clause need to be made:

1. The pitch rise that begins on the primary stress may continue to rise until the juncture. This rise occurs, for example, in a question that calls for a yes-no answer, and is termed rising juncture. Alternatively, there may be a shorter rise followed by a quick return to the base level. This pattern, termed sustained juncture, typically occurs when the speaker intends to continue with at least one more clause. Because of the terminal fall to base level, there is no perceptible pitch discontinuity across the juncture. There is a third possible terminal pattern: the contour may fall to a level markedly lower than the baseline. This pattern is termed falling juncture. This is a final-sounding intonation contour, which, in a dialogue, constitutes one of the signals
that the speaker is prepared to yield the floor. In our sample utterance, the pitch movement over 'yesterday' corresponds to a sustained juncture; that over 'again' to a falling juncture.

2. The juncture may be accompanied by a pause, an actual brief silence before the next phonemic clause begins. This is known as a juncture pause. Its occurrence is another cue for identifying a juncture, but like the other cues it isn't always present. . . . Furthermore, the likelihood of a pause occurring is differentially associated with the kind of juncture. The sustained juncture is much less likely than either of the others to be followed by a pause.32

One may argue that phonemic clauses that end with sustained junctures allow for the construction of sentential length turns. The fact that sustained junctures usually are not followed by a pause, presents the listener with little opportunity to take a turn without interrupting the speaker. Such junctures also provide an accounting for 'honest' interruptions that do occur in conversations. Their similarity to rising junctures easily allow for the listener to anticipate a pause and thus interrupt the speaker. The concept of rising juncture as markers for questions also fits in with our earlier remarks concerning the use of transition 'points'.

Following the above analysis, it seems reasonable to suggest that the rules posited by Sacks, et al., are followed at rising and falling terminal junctures in a conversation. Furthermore, it may be argued that the
turn-requesting, turn-yielding, and back-channel signals, particularly the verbal signals, are exhibited at rising and falling junctures, while turn-maintaining signals are exhibited at sustaining junctures. This would be consistent with Duncan's system of rules.

Nevertheless, there are some questions about turn-taking that arise from this line of reasoning. How does the speaker differentiate between verbal back-channel signals and verbal turn-requesting signals? Wiemann and Knapp suggest that the use of multiple, simultaneous turn-requesting cues may enable the speaker to correctly interpret the auditor's signal. "For example, a head nod by the auditor is interpreted as a back channel cue or reinforcer if displayed alone, but when the nod is accompanied by 'yeah, but,' it becomes a request for the floor."33

To summarize the discussion of turn-taking thus far, a grammatical model of turn-taking has been presented that is comprised of a set of syntactical rules which govern the use of four different categories of turn-taking signals. The fundamental turn unit is the phonemic clause, which, depending on the terminal juncture used, may vary from a sentence to a word in length. An implicit contention of this model is that the exchange of turns may be consciously negotiated by the members of a conversation.
However, the successful exchange of turns in a conversation depends on all members tacitly agreeing on the style of phonemic clause(s) used to signal the possible transition places in a conversation. Unless both my partner and myself recognize a certain length pause, a certain rhythm of speech, a certain melody of pitch and loudness, i.e., a certain way of making phonemic clauses, successful turn-taking, without lengthy pauses or simultaneous talking, will not occur. Hence, it may be that the 'definition' of the phonemic clause, underlying the syntactical rules of turn-taking advanced by Duncan and Sacks, et al., is also negotiated and established during a conversation. This seems reasonable to assume since, as Wiemann and Knapp note, communicators who are familiar with one another seem to establish a rhythm of turn-taking that is maintained during future conversations. Additionally, Argyle assumes that this interactional synchrony is established via the exchange of nonverbal messages/cues.

However, as was noted previously, turn-taking may be accomplished both by verbal and nonverbal signals. Watzlawick, Beavin, and Jackson suggest that nonverbal signals tend to be less obvious and more ambiguous than verbal signals. Thus, it may be that people who are unfamiliar with each other tend to use more verbal turn-taking signals, while people who are familiar with each
other tend to use nonverbal turn-taking signals.

Furthermore, it seems likely that the grammatical model of turn-taking presented in this paper may be particularly true for polite conversations, i.e., those held by strangers who wish to manage their impressions of each other. Certainly, when we first meet someone we are usually quite concerned with making a good impression and with being polite to the other person. Part of being polite to others is being aware and responsive to their desire to speak (or stop speaking). Thus, we are generally aware of the turn-taking behaviors of others (as well as our own behaviors) when we are not on familiar terms with them. On these occasions we may say that the conversation is managed and, perhaps, one of the major concerns of the communicators is the management of the conversation.

However, as Gadamer points out:

... the more fundamental a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner. Thus a fundamental conversation is never one that we want to conduct. Rather, it is generally more correct to say that we fall into conversation, or even that we become involved in it. The way in which one word follows another, with the conversation taking its own turnings and reaching its own conclusion, may well be conducted in some way, but the people conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led.
What Gadamer points to is the transparency of the means of conversation to the content of conversation. We might assume that this transparency of turn-taking during a conversation is more likely to occur between familiar people than strangers. In addition, it would seem that as the concern of the communicators was directed toward the subject matter of the conversation, the concern with politeness and the following of the grammatical model of turn-taking would decrease, at least on a conscious level. Hence, one might expect that communicators who are familiar with each other would more readily interrupt each other (and feel comfortable doing so) and would also be more likely to maintain the speaking floor (given the presence of turn-requesting signals from their partner) than would strangers. Indeed, Mark Knapp has noted that:

Turn-taking behavior is not just an interesting curiosity of human behavior. We seem to make important judgments about others on the basis of how smoothly exchanges are accomplished. Effective turn-taking may elicit the perception that you and your partner 'really hit it off well' or that your partner is a very competent communicator; ineffective turn-taking may prompt evaluations of 'rude.' (Too many interruptions) or 'dominating' (not enough turn-yielding) or 'frustrating' (unable to make an important point). 38

The above reasoning led to the formulation of the
following three hypotheses:

\( H_1 \) Non-familiar dyads will more likely use turn-yielding signals, such as directing questions to the listener, at a greater rate and with greater comfort than will familiar dyads.

\( H_2 \) Familiar dyads will more likely self-start by interrupting the speaker and will be more comfortable with these behaviors than will non-familiar dyads.

\( H_3 \) Familiar dyads will more likely use turn-maintaining signals and will feel more comfortable with these behaviors than will non-familiar dyads.

**Subjects**

Eight female and ten male subjects, affiliated with The Ohio State University, participated in the study. Subjects ranged in age from 20 to 30 years and in education from undergraduate with no degree to graduate with a Master's degree. It should be noted that all of the subjects were acquaintances of the experimenter. Given the nature of the study, recruitment of both familiar and non-familiar dyads was facilitated by the use of acquaintances. Various preliminary analyses are included in this study to assess any experimental bias that may
have occurred due to the use of such subjects.

There were 8 subjects (3 F & 5 M) in the non-familiar condition and 10 subjects (5 F & 5 M) in the familiar condition. Three of the dyads in both conditions had male and female members and each had one dyad with male members. The familiar condition also had one dyad with female members.

**Experimental Procedures**

Subjects were initially contacted by the experimenter, either in person or by phone, and asked to participate in a study of conversational communication. Upon request, they were told that the study consisted of their participation in a video taped conversation with another person. After the conversation they would be asked to fill out three questionnaires and then view the video taped conversation and fill out one more questionnaire.

The experiment was conducted in an audience response laboratory in the Department of Communication at The Ohio State University. The laboratory is divided into three rooms: (1) a foyer entered from the hallway of the building; (2) an equipment monitoring room to the left of the foyer; and (3) the main room behind both the foyer and the monitoring room. The main room may be viewed from
the monitoring room through a one way window/mirror.

The main room was equipped with two video cameras placed behind two upholstered chairs in which the subjects would sit while conversing. The chairs faced each other near the middle of the left hand side of the room, as one enters, and were separated by approximately 3½ feet. In the center of the main room, two desks with wooden chairs were placed against opposite walls; in this location the questionnaires were answered by the subjects. On the right hand side of the main room two TV monitors were placed in the corners; in front of them were upholstered chairs for the subjects to sit in while viewing the video tapes of their conversation. Headphones were provided so that the subjects could listen to the conversation without interference from the other TV monitor. A number of pictures hung on the left hand wall and long drapes covered the two windows facing the street. It should be noted that the main room was filled with extra furniture that was placed along the walls during the experiment.

Subjects in the non-familiar dyad condition met for the first time in the audience response laboratory where they were introduced by name to each other by the experimenter. The following set of procedures were adhered to for subjects in both conditions. Subjects were ushered into the main room and asked to engage in a 10 minute
conversation on a topic(s) of their own choosing. Subjects were then directed to the chairs on the left hand side of the room and asked to attach microphones to their lapels and start their conversation in 30 seconds. The experimenter then left the main room and turned on the recording equipment in the monitoring room. After approximately 10 minutes the experimenter stepped into the main room and asked the subjects to end their conversation and to remove the microphones from their lapels. The experimenter then returned to the monitoring room and turned off the equipment.

Returning to the main room, the experimenter asked the subjects to sit at the desks and fill out three questionnaires that had been previously placed there. Subjects were instructed to read the directions on the first questionnaire (the turn-taking instrument); those directions were as follows:

Please read the questions that follow carefully and write down your immediate response to each item. Please do not spend time trying to recall exactly your conversation; again, it is your immediate response to the items that is desired.

Subjects were also instructed to mark any question which they thought was unclear, ambiguous and/or intelligible with an X. This instruction was repeated for each
questionnaire that was administered. In addition, subjects were told that even if they did not recall the occurrence of a behavior described in any of the 7 questions, they should respond to the comfort scales as if that behavior had occurred during their conversation. The experimenter observed the subjects from the monitoring room and, after they had completed each questionnaire, provided them with instructions for responding to the next questionnaire.

Subjects were told to circle those answers that best described their own behavior during the conversation they had just had in responding to the second questionnaire (the interaction involvement instrument measuring the subject's involvement). In responding to the third questionnaire (the interaction involvement instrument measuring the subject's perception of the involvement of the his/her partner), subjects were told to read the directions and circle those answers that best described the behavior of their partner.

After the third questionnaire was completed, subjects were asked to view the video tapes of their conversation. This required that the subjects view their conversation twice: once, in order to view their partner and the other time in order to view themselves. Hence, the experimenter asked the subjects to change their seats af-
ter the first viewing of the tapes. After viewing each tape, the subjects were asked to fill out the turn-taking instrument a second time, following the same procedures as mentioned above.

Subjects were told at the end of the experiment about the hypotheses that were being tested and the rationale for the hypotheses. Generally, the entire experiment took between 45 minutes to an hour to complete.

**Instruments**

Three paper and pencil tests were used in the study to measure (1) selected turn-taking behaviors of the subjects and their partners; (2) the interaction involvement of the subjects; and (3) the subjects' perception of the interaction involvement of their partners.

The tests to measure interaction involvement were developed by Donald Cegala and have been shown to be internally reliable and valid. In addition, there is some tentative support for the external validity of the interaction involvement tests.\(^39\)

The theoretical basis of the turn-taking instrument was the grammatical model of turn-taking. It was developed to test the three hypotheses listed above. The Appendix to this paper contains copies of the instruments
used in this study. The turn-taking instrument has seven questions that ask the subject how frequently certain turn-taking behaviors occurred during the 10 minute conversation they had with their partner. The first 3 questions are designed to test $H_1$, with questions 4 and 5 testing $H_2$ and questions 6 and 7 testing $H_3$. Each of the questions are followed by two 7 point bi-polar scales that measure (a) the subjects' degree of comfort with the turn-taking behavior mentioned in the question and (b) the subjects' perception of their partners' degree of comfort with the described turn-taking behavior.

Two judges were asked to read the turn-taking questionnaire with regard to the adequacy of the instrument for testing the above mentioned hypotheses and its degree of ambiguity in the wording of the questions. Some minor word changes in question 2 and 3 were suggested by one judge, while the other judge felt that the instrument was unambiguous and adequate for its purpose. Given pragmatic concerns of time, the original instrument was used in this study.

The internal reliability of the turn-taking instrument was determined by using three statistical tests. Since the turn-taking instrument was administered twice (once, after the conversation and, again, after viewing the video tapes of the conversation), six correlation
tests were made. A split half (odd-even) Pearson product-moment correlation was used to assess the internal reliability of the initial 7 questions of the turn-taking instrument. The coefficient of correlation was corrected by using the Spearman-Brown Prophecy formula. The obtained reliabilities were $r = .88$ after the conversation and $r = .81$ after viewing the video tapes. A Kuder-Richardson formula 8 test was used to assess the internal reliability of the turn-taking instrument scales that measured both the subject's degree of comfort and the subject's perception of his/her partner's degree of comfort. The coefficient of correlation for the scale that measured the subject's comfort was $r = .75$ after the conversation and $r = .90$ after viewing the video tapes. The coefficient of correlation for the scale that measured the subject's perception of his/her partner's comfort was $r = .80$ after the conversation and $r = .94$ after viewing the video tapes.

The reliabilities reported above indicate that the internal consistency of the turn-taking instrument was well within acceptable bounds. However, there are some questions concerning the accuracy of the instrument. First, there is a problem with asking people to write down the number of times that they recall observing a certain turn-taking behavior. As one of the subjects suggested, perhaps a 5 or 7 point scale from very often to seldom
or never would make more sense to the subject when replying. This problem is linked with another problem: how valid are the answers to the comfort scales when the subject reports none of the behaviors being rated for comfort?

Do these questions concerning validity warrant the rejection of any reported results? Even though the frequencies and comfort scores reported by the subjects are estimates, being second hand reports, it should be kept in mind that the subjects received some training via viewing the video tapes of the conversations after having completed the turn-taking instrument for the first time. One would expect that the turn-taking instrument would orient the subjects and direct their observations of the behaviors measured in the instrument administered after viewing video tapes, making their judgements more accurate. One might also expect that the reports of comfort with the turn-taking behaviors measured by the instrument administered after viewing the video tapes would be less likely to be based on speculation. In viewing the tapes, the subjects would probably encounter the turn-taking behaviors measured by the questionnaire.

Based on the above reasoning, one may contend that high correlations between the two administrations of the turn-taking instrument would be indicative of an acceptable degree of accuracy in the scores reported, especi-
ally for the first administration of the instrument. Interestingly, the correlation between the first and second administrations of the scale measuring the subject's degree of comfort with the turn-taking behaviors was $r = .74$, while the equivalent correlation for the scale measuring the subject's perception of his/her partner's degree of comfort was $r = .88$. However, the correlation between the first and second administrations for the scale measuring the reported frequency of turn-taking behaviors was $r = .43$. These correlations indicate that one may assume the validity of the comfort scales but should question the accuracy of at least the first administration of the frequency scale for the turn-taking instrument.

Since the correlation for the frequency scale of the turn-taking instrument is only marginally acceptable, results are reported for the three hypotheses based on separate analyses of both the first and second administrations of the instrument. Both the preliminary and main results of the experiment are reported and discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter III

Discussion of Results: A Switch in Paradigm

Preliminary Results

Four sets of preliminary analyses were made in order to determine if there was any systematic error variance in the study caused by the following extraneous variables: (1) the degree of familiarity of the subjects in the familiar condition; (2) the sexual composition of the dyads in both conditions; (3) the educational level of the subjects in both conditions; and (4) the pre-exposure to the questionnaire and/or to the objectives of the experiment by subjects in both conditions.

A series of 18 t-tests were made in order to measure any effects of pre-exposure upon the three hypotheses of the study. Each hypothesis required 3 t-tests: (1) a t-test to assess the difference between conditions for the reported number of turn-taking behaviors; (2) a t-test to assess the difference in the subjects' reported comfort with the turn-taking behaviors; and (3) a t-test to assess the difference in the subjects' perception of their partners' comfort with the turn-taking behaviors.
Since the turn-taking instrument was administered twice (after the conversation and after viewing the video tapes), the series of 9 t-tests for the three hypotheses were repeated for a total of 18 t-tests. The only significant difference occurred in the frequency of turn-maintaining signals reported on the turn-taking instrument administered after the conversation. The pre-exposed subjects (N=8) reported more turn-maintaining signals than did the non-exposed subjects (N=10). The mean score for the exposed group was 2.9, while the mean score for the non-exposed group was 0.8, (p<.0259, two-tailed). Thus, a portion of the third hypothesis may have been somewhat biased by the result of subject pre-exposure to the questionnaire and/or to the objectives of the experiment. However, this bias seems to have disappeared for the results from the turn-taking instrument administered after viewing the video tapes. Therefore, the main results reported in the next section do not seem to be inaccurate with regard to the third hypothesis.

In order to assess the effect of education upon the three hypotheses of the experiment, 18 separate single-factor analyses of variance were run. As in the t-tests reported above, three analyses of variance were required for each hypothesis and the resulting series of 9 analyses of variance were repeated for the second administra-
tion of the turn-taking instrument. The subjects were partitioned into three groups: (1) those without an undergraduate degree (N=7); (2) those with just a Bachelor's degree (N=7); and (3) those with a Master's degree (N=4). There were no significant differences in the reported means for any of the groups. Hence, education did not seem to affect the results of the experiment.

A similar set of single-factor analyses of variance were run in order to measure the effects of the sexual composition of the dyads on the three hypotheses tested in the experiment. The groups consisted of (1) two male dyads; (2) one female dyad; and (3) six mixed sex dyads. One significant difference in the group scores was found for both the first and third hypotheses.

For the first hypothesis, there was a significant difference in the frequencies of turn-yielding signals reported by the three groups on the instrument administered after viewing the video tapes (F=8.31, df=2/10, p < .0075). The male dyads reported more questions as turn-yielding signals in their conversations than did the other two groups. The mean score for the male dyads was 9.8, while the scores for the female and mixed sex dyads were 3.5 and 3.3, respectively. However, it is doubtful whether this result had any effect on the outcomes reported in the next section since one of the male dyads was in
the familiar condition while the other was in the non-
familiar condition. Moreover, a t-test of the differences
in mean scores for the male dyads in the two conditions
was non-significant (p ≤ .20, two-tailed).

The male dyads seem to have been more comfortable
with the turn-maintaining signals that occurred during
their conversation than were the other dyads, as reported
in the instrument administered after their conversation.
Their mean score was 7.5, while the mean scores for the
female and mixed sex dyads were 13.0 and 12.6, respective-
ly (F = 5.44, df = 2/15, p ≤ .0168). Again, it is questionable
whether this effect made any difference in the results
reported for the third hypothesis since the male dyads
were equally represented in both experimental conditions
and the difference in the mean scores for the male dyads
in the two conditions was non-significant (p ≤ .80, for
a two-tailed t-test).

An assessment of the effect of familiarity on the
three hypotheses tested in the experiment was accomplished
by running a set of 18 separate single-factor analyses
of variance similar to those reported above. The analyses
were made of three groups of subjects: the first group
had 4 subjects who had known each other for 3 months;
the second group had 2 subjects who had known each other
for 6 months; and the third group had 4 subjects who had
known each other on an intimate basis for at least one year. Two significant differences were discovered, one dealing with the first hypothesis and the other with the second hypothesis.

For the first hypothesis, tested by the instrument administered after the conversation, there was a significant difference among the scores reporting the subject's comfort with questions as turn-yielding signals ($F=4.46$, $df=2/7$, $p<.0563$). A clear trend can be reported since the mean scores for the three groups (from least to most familiar) were 15.00, 22.00, and 12.75.

Similar results occurred with the second hypothesis, again, tested by the instrument administered after the conversation. In this case, there was a significant difference in the group scores reporting the number interruptions as turn-requesting signals ($F=6.73$, $df=2/6$, $p<.0294$). A clear trend appeared since the mean scores for the three groups were 1.0, 4.5, 1.0, in order of increasing familiarity.

The results concerning familiarity reported above may present clear trends but their interpretation is not as clear. On the one hand, it would be expected, based on the rationale for the first hypothesis, that a negative linear relationship would exist between familiarity and comfort with questions as turn-yielding signals.
On the other hand, based on the rationale for the second hypothesis, one would expect a positive linear relationship between familiarity and the number of interruptions as turn-requesting signals. Since the results reported meet neither one of these expectations, the third section of this chapter will discuss these results and offer an interpretation.

**Main Results**

In order to assess the degree of support for the three hypotheses tested in this study, a total of 18 t-tests were made which compared the summed scores of the turn-taking instrument for subjects in the familiar and non-familiar conditions. Each hypothesis required 3 t-tests: (1) a t-test to assess the difference between conditions for the reported number of turn-taking behaviors; (2) a t-test to assess the difference in the subjects' reported comfort with the turn-taking behaviors; and (3) a t-test to assess the difference in the subjects' perception of their partners' comfort with the turn-taking behaviors. This series of 9 t-tests were then repeated since the turn-taking instrument was administered on two occasions.

Overall, the three hypotheses received limited sup-
port. The first and second hypotheses had two significant differences in the predicted direction, while the third hypothesis had only one significant difference in the predicted direction. However, the first hypothesis also had a significant difference in a direction opposite from that predicted. These results are reported in Table 1.

The only significant difference in the turn-taking instrument that was administered after the conversation occurred in the turn-taking behaviors reported for the first hypothesis. Subjects in the non-familiar condition were more likely to report the use of questions as turn-yielding signals during their conversations than were subjects in the familiar condition. Not surprisingly, this result was repeated in the turn-taking instrument administered after viewing the video tapes. These results are not surprising since the first portion of $H_1$ is fairly trivial: one would naturally expect strangers to ask more questions than familiar subjects. That is, there would be a natural tendency because the dyad does not know each other to find out more about each other, hence, more questions would be asked. However, the second part of $H_1$ that predicted that familiar dyads would be less comfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals was not trivial and was not supported by the results of the
** Significant difference in direction opposite from that predicted **

(A) higher score = greater comfort

(C) subjects' reported perception of their partners' comfort with above behaviors

(2) reported comfort with above behaviors (lower score = greater comfort)

N = the reported frequency of a turn-taking behavior

* All results reported are the probability levels for a one-tailed t-test

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After Conversation

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Mean group scores and t-test probability levels for the three hypotheses

Table 1
experiment. The instrument administered after viewing the video tapes measured a significant difference in the subjects' perception of their partners' comfort with the use of questions as turn-yielding signals in a direction opposite from that which was predicted by the first hypothesis. Familiar subjects were more comfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals than were non-familiar subjects.

Interestingly, as predicted by the second hypothesis, subjects in the familiar condition were more comfortable with interruptions as turn-requesting signals than were non-familiar subjects as measured in the instrument administered after viewing the video tapes. This result held true for both the subjects' comfort and the subjects' perception of their partners' comfort with interruptions. However, there was no significant difference in the frequency of turn-requesting interruptions between the familiar and non-familiar conditions.

The only support for the third hypothesis was reported in the instrument administered after viewing the video tapes. There was a significant difference between the familiar and non-familiar conditions in the subjects' perception of their partners' comfort with turn-maintaining signals. As predicted, familiar subjects were more comfortable than were non-familiar sub-
jects with turn-maintaining signals.

In general, it seems as if non-familiar subjects were more uncomfortable than familiar subjects with turn-taking behaviors. The only significant difference in the frequency of turn-taking behaviors between the two conditions was found for questions as turn-yielding signals: non-familiar subjects were much more likely than familiar subjects to use questions as turn-yielding signals. However, as mentioned previously, this is a trivial result. Hence, it is easy to conclude that there was only very limited support for the hypotheses tested in this experiment based on a grammatical model of turn-taking.

Discussion of Results

If the main results of the experiment provide only limited support for the hypotheses tested, one is immediately faced with the problem of interpretation. What do the results tell us? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to consider those aspects of both the preliminary and main results that were not expected or predicted. As the reader recalls, the preliminary analyses of familiarity found two perplexing trends. First, all but one dyad of the familiar subjects were fairly comfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals.
Second, the same familiar dyad also exhibited a greater number of interruptions as turn-requesting signals than did the other familiar dyads. It is the contention of this section of the paper that an explanation of the above two preliminary results will shed light on the unexpected main result that familiar subjects were more comfortable than non-familiar subjects with questions as turn-yielding signals.

Clearly, something occurred in the conversation of the familiar dyad mentioned above that did not occur in the conversations of the other familiar dyads. The question that needs to be answered is how was this conversation different from the conversations of the other familiar subjects? A possible answer to this question, based on extensive viewing of the video tapes, is that the subjects were not engaging in dialogue for a large portion of their conversation. That is, the conversation between the familiar subjects 'A' and 'B' was not one in which they were preoccupied with understanding themselves in relation to each other and the topic of the conversation. In other words, subjects A and B were preoccupied with perhaps their own thoughts and/or were not interested in the object of their conversation.

Evidence for this claim is provided by two characterizations of the behaviors exhibited by the subjects.
First, both subjects engaged in a high number of what Erving Goffman calls side involvements. Both subjects A and B were involved with touching and 'preening' their clothes and/or body while talking and also manipulated such objects as coffee cups and the microphones on their lapels. These behaviors indicate that subjects A and B were involved more with themselves as objects than with either their partner or the object of their conversation. Second, the 'feedback' exhibited by the subjects seemed to be inappropriate for furthering dialogue and mutual understanding. That is, the feedback in the conversation between A and B often did not present an interpretation of what was said. Either A or B would simply parrot what the other had said. An example of this inappropriate feedback is the transcribed portion from the conversation held by subjects A and B:

A: It's a very constant, not necessarily work in the sense that like you talk about an art thing working it's a sense of..after I've written say, a section, like that's what I was working on last night like the introduction getting the broad, you know
B: Hm hmm
A: the narrowing it down to a thing..going back and seeing which, which of those is really precise enough, well, uh uh I I guess in that sense you could say it works but its more than simply an aesthetic feeling that that's the right word, you know, it's kinda, it's more, it's more hum a precisional kind of thing
B: Organizational
A: than, huh
B: precise..organization
A: Hm hmm
In the transcribed conversation, the exchange of talk seems to be one-sided or monological; in this portion A dominates the conversation. B's speaking turns are limited to either reinforcing 'hm hmm's' or the repeating of key words from A's talk, e.g., 'precise'. This characterization, along with the side involvements of the subjects, leads to the claim that the conversation held by A and B was largely monological rather than dialogical.

Interestingly, an alternative but complementary interpretation of the results also indicates that the conversation between A and B was predominately monological. As the reader will recall, immediately following the first administration of the turn-taking instrument, two interaction involvement instruments were completed by the subjects in both conditions. The first of these instruments provided a measure of the subjects' preoccupation and understanding of themselves in relation to their partner and the topic of the conversation (i.e., self involvement). The second instrument measured the subjects' perception of their partners' preoccupation and understanding of themselves in relation to the subjects and the topic of the conversation (i.e., other involvement). It should be noted that statistical tests of the internal con-
sistencies of these two instruments were equivalent to previous reliabilities for the instruments reported by Cegala. In addition, it should be pointed out that the interaction involvement instruments are measures of what Goffman calls socially focused dominant main involvements, i.e., those involvements occurring in face-to-face interactions. Hence, on a theoretical level, the interaction involvement instruments should complement the findings concerning side involvements in the conversation between subjects A and B. That is, the greater the side involvements of the subjects in a conversation, the more likely the interaction or main involvement of the subjects will be lessened. It will be argued that such seems to be the case in the conversation between A and B and that this characterization of the conversations may be extended to differentiate, overall, the conversations between the familiar and non-familiar subjects.

Of additional interest for this discussion is the fact that the interaction involvement instruments may provide an indexical measure of the amount of dialogical communication occurring in a conversation. It may be argued that highly involved interlocutors would be more likely to engage in dialogue than would interlocutors who were less involved. The less involved communicator would
be more content to sit back and allow their partner(s) to monologue, not holding up their side of the conversa-
tion, as it were, than would the more highly involved communicator. On the basis of the above reasoning, the summed interaction involvement scores were correlated with the scores reported by each subject for each item and sub-item of the turn-taking instrument. Correlations were made for both administrations of the turn-taking instrument with the two interaction involvement instruments. In the proceeding discussion, the interaction involvement instruments are differentiated by the labels self interaction involvement and other interaction involvement.

The above analyses shed meaningful light on the three unexpected findings that are mentioned in the beginning of this section. First, these analyses indicate that discomfort with questions as turn-yielding signals (mea-
sured by items 1b, 2b, and 3b of the turn-taking instru-
ment) is negatively correlated with both self and other interaction involvement. Items 1b and 2b of the turn-
taking instrument yielded the following correlations with self and other interaction involvement:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Self Involvement</th>
<th>Other Involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1b</td>
<td>r = -0.63, df = 14, p &lt; 0.01</td>
<td>r = -0.56, df = 14, p &lt; 0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2b</td>
<td>r = -0.44, df = 14, p &lt; 0.10</td>
<td>r = -0.46, df = 14, p &lt; 0.10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Second, the same analyses also indicate that discomfort with interruptions as turn-requesting signals (measured
by items 4b and 5b of the turn-taking instrument) is negatively correlated with self interaction involvement. The coefficient of correlation for item 4b and self involvement was $r = -.50$, $df = 14$, $p \leq .05$.

Based on these findings, it may be argued that the conversation between A and B was predominately monological. This inference is supported by the fact that A and B reported (1) greater discomfort with questions as turn-yielding signals than other familiar dyads and (2) greater discomfort with interruptions as turn-requesting signals than did other familiar dyads. As evidenced by the correlations reported above, these reported discomforts with turn-taking signals are negatively correlated with interaction involvement and, hence, dialogue.

This argument may be extended to differentiate between the conversations held by the familiar and non-familiar subjects. Non-familiar subjects, as the reader recalls, reported greater discomfort with questions as turn-yielding signals than did familiar subjects. This unexpected result may be explained by the claim that non-familiar subjects were less involved in their conversations and, hence, engaged in less dialogue than did familiar subjects.

Furthermore, this interpretation of the results follows from a dialogical model of communication that was
implicitly a part of the theoretical reasoning assumed in the hypotheses of the experiment. The implications of the above interpretation are many, but two will be stressed at this time. First, the grammatical model of turn-taking, it will be argued, is based on a monological model of communication and does not adequately explain the turn-taking that occurs during dialogue. From this it will be argued that the essence of turn-taking is dialogue, which may be understood as the play of the dialectic. The latter argument will be articulated in Chapter Four, while the former argument will be explicated in the concluding section of this chapter. However, before preceding to these matters, it is necessary to first review the theoretical reasoning, based on an implicit model of dialogical communication, that was involved in the formulation of the experimental hypotheses.

As the reader may recall, it was assumed in the hypotheses that familiar subjects would be more comfortable with 'rude' turn-requesting and turn-maintaining signals than would non-familiar subjects. This assumption was based on the following reasoning: one, the turn-taking behaviors of the familiar subjects would be likely to be transparent to them and, hence, two, the familiar subjects would be less likely to follow the grammatical model of turn-taking thus feeling less discomfort with 'rude' (i.e., non-grammatical) turn-taking. The first premise
of the above argument was based on the claim by Gadamer that in fundamental conversations the people conversing do not manage the conversation, i.e., consciously manipulate the exchange of turns, but are led by the conversation. This last claim is based on an implicit model of dialogical communication since, for Gadamer the more fundamental a conversation is, the more its process follows the dialectical structure leading to mutual understanding.

It should be noted that this dialogical model of communication allows for a more basic explanation of the comfort with turn-taking reported by the familiar subjects. According to Gadamer, the necessary structure of dialectic is the play of question and answer. When people fall into a fundamental conversation, their turn-taking is spontaneous, i.e., it is effortless. It may be argued that a conversation that is comfortable is one that is effortless. Gadamer in the following passage, shows how the effortlessness of a fundamental conversation can be understood through analogy to play:

Play obviously represents an order in which the to-and-fro motion of play follows of itself. It is part of play that the movement is not only without goal or purpose but also without effort. It happens, as it were, by itself. The ease of play, which naturally does not mean that there is any real absence of effort, but phenomenologically refers only to
the absence of strain, is experienced subjectively as relaxation. The structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus takes from him the burden of initiative, which constitutes the actual strain of existence. This is seen also in the spontaneous tendency to repetition that emerges in the player and in the constant self-renewal of play, which influences its form (e.g., the refrain). 44

This quote suggests that the reason the familiar subjects felt comfortable (relaxed) with the turn-taking signals was a by-product of their being caught up in the play of dialogue.

The understanding of comfort as the absence of strain will be helpful in arguing that the grammatical model of turn-taking is monological and does not adequately explain turn-taking in conversations. The reasoning underlying the prediction that non-familiar subjects would be more comfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals than would familiar subjects was that questions are the least ambiguous turn-yielding signals during first encounters. In other words, the use of questions as turn-yielding signals would allow both my partner and myself to have greater certainty in our predictions of transition places in the conversation. Needless to say, familiar subjects would find the other turn-yielding signals not as ambiguous as the non-familiar subjects, having, it is assumed, tacitly agreed upon the style of phonemic clauses
that signal transition places in the conversation. The main point for our discussion is that comfort is assumed to be associated with the degree of certainty we have concerning our prediction of transition places in a conversation.

Yet, this reasoning, based on the grammatical model of turn-taking does not explain the results that familiar subjects were more comfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals than were non-familiar subjects. However, as we have seen, the dialogical model of communication does explain this result. This, in turn, allows us to consider the grounds for arguing that the grammatical model of turn-taking is a monological model of communication. The fundamental turn unit of the grammatical model is the phonemic clause. According to the grammatical model, it is assumed that in order for successful turn-taking to occur, both partners in a conversation must tacitly agree upon the style of phonemic clauses that comprise a turn unit. This tacit agreement is based on the linguistic competence of the individuals engaged in conversation. Their mastery of a language allows for the successful exchange of turns by furnishing each individual with identical knowledge of phonemic clauses, i.e., the syntactical and paralinguistic cues that comprise a turn. Jurgen Habermas points out that:
"Linguistic competence" is Chomsky's name for the mastery of an abstract system of rules based on an innate language apparatus regardless of how the latter is in fact used in actual speech. This competence is a monological capability. It is founded in the species specific equipment of the solitary human organism. If that capability is to be a sufficient linguistic basis for speech, one would have to be able to reconstruct the communication process itself as being monologic. The information model of communication is suitable for this purpose. I consider this information model of communication to be monologic, because it consequently attributes the intersubjectivity of meaning, that is the mutual sharing of identical meanings to the fact that sender and receiver--each an entity for itself--are previously equipped with the same program. This preestablished code is supposed to make communication possible.45

The above quote draws out some obvious parallels between the grammatical model of turn-taking and a monological model of communication. Both models are based on the idea of linguistic competence. In addition, it should be noted that by basing the exchange of turns on the ability to predict transition places, the grammatical model assumes an information model of communication. Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude that the grammatical model of turn-taking is a monological model of communication.
Chapter IV

Dialogue as Dialectic and Play

This chapter will establish what is generally meant by dialogical communication. John Stewart asserts that, while there are four distinguishing characteristics of a dialogic perspective, these characteristics are dependent on a view of language as presentational rather than representational. In other words, it may be argued that dialogue describes the ideal speech situation which actualizes mutual understanding through presentational thinking. Although Stewart recognizes the importance of this 'possible fifth characterization of a dialogic perspective', he does not fully develop the concept of presentational thinking. This chapter, therefore, will extend Stewart's thesis and present, based on Gadamer's writings, a more explicit description of the way in which mutual understanding is achieved in and through dialogue.

According to Stewart, the first characteristic of the dialogic perspective is that the primary object of study is the communicative relationship or meaning that emerges and develops when two or more people talk with one another. The second characteristic is an emphasis
on 'experientialism' as a way of knowing or learning, i.e., first hand experiences are substituted for lectures or readings (second hand experiences) as a means of learning. A third characteristic is an emphasis on subjectivity and on assuming the viewpoint of the actor rather than that of the spectator. A fourth characteristic of dialogical communication is the concern with studying a phenomenon holistically, that is with regard to the living relations underlying the existence of any phenomenon.

The above paragraph very briefly summarizes Stewart's thesis concerning the foci of a dialogical communication perspective. It should be noted that Stewart devotes a great deal of space to tracing the foundations for the four characteristics of a dialogical perspective in the works of phenomenologists, existentialists and philosophical anthropologists. However, what is of interest to our discussion is Stewart's thinking concerning a view of language as presentational rather than representational. According to Stewart, "no dialogical treatment of communication has adopted, explained, or developed the implication of this view of language. In my judgment this is currently the most pressing challenge facing scholars in this area."48

Stewart traces the foundations of the presentational view of language to Heidegger's argument "that one's 'world'
comes into existence as one relates to this or that entity that is ready-at-hand. That relating act is at root a linguistic act, a speaking."49 Furthermore, Stewart tells us, as a "mode of being or activity, language cannot be reduced to a thing. Moreover, it is a constituting kind of activity and, therefore, cannot accurately be described as representational. In (not simply through) being spoken in language, things come-to-be."50 Stewart draws upon Gadamer's distinction between 'world' and 'surround' to clarify the relation between language and the world:

The animal lives not in a 'world' but in a 'surround,' 'habitat,' or 'Umwelt.' The difference between its environment and the human's is that the human experiences both a 'surround' and an attitude toward it. The animal does not consider, for example, why it was born and raised here instead of elsewhere, whether its species suffers from overpopulation, or what might improve the conditions it experiences. The human does consider those things—and countless others—and the distinction between having an Umwelt and having a world (Welt) is the presence of an attitude toward one's habitat or surround which grows out of those considerations. That attitude is possible only through and is realized only in the constitutive action of language. Moreover, according to Gadamer, that language act is nothing like the abstract 'social fact' that Saussure called langue. "As against this," Gadamer wrote, "it must be emphasised that language has its true being only in conversation, in the exchange of understanding between people."51

The next part of this chapter will explicate what
Gadamer means by conversation in the above quotation. As we have already noted, a fundamental conversation is a dialogue. In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer compares dialogue to play and dialectic. Dialogical conversations are like play in that their structure is the to-and-fro movement of question/answer. This structure gives to dialogue an effortlessness and repetition which may be understood as purpose-without-purpose. Dialogic conversations are dialectical in that they involve an attempt to discover the truth about some object of discussion. The understanding of dialogue as play and dialectic reveals the idealization of speech that occurs in fundamental conversations. For play involves, when it is more than mere self-representation, the presentation of something for someone. Gadamer notes that in theater, the play

... is experienced properly by, and presents itself as what is 'meant' to, one who is not acting in the play, but is watching... When a play activity becomes a play in the theatre a total switch takes place. It puts the spectator in the place of the player. He--and not the player--is the person for and in whom the play takes place.\(^{52}\)

In dialogue each person's speech is not presented for the speaker but for the listener. The fact that dialogue
is dialectic further imposes the requirement that each person's speech fulfills the process of mutual understanding. Thus we may say that dialogue achieves both intersubjectivity (via its playful structure) and mutual understanding (via its dialectical process) thereby realizing an idealized form of communication.

Let us now return to our discussion of presentational thinking and explicate how dialogue as the process of achieving mutual understanding necessarily involves the view of language as creating and accomplishing thought. Gadamer notes that engaging in conversation "does not automatically mean that understanding is achieved in a conversation." There are some necessary pre-conditions to reaching an understanding:

Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes that both partners are ready for it and are trying to recognize the full value of what is alien and opposed to them. If this happens mutually, and each of the partners, while simultaneously holding on to his own arguments, weighs the counter-arguments, it is finally possible to achieve in an imperceptible but not arbitrary reciprocal translation of the other's position (we call this exchange of views), a common language and a common statement. 53

This common language is not a tool that is brought into use for the purpose of understanding but, "rather, coincides with the very act of understanding and reaching agreement." 54 The process of translation by which a com-
mon language is achieved, is a series of acts of interpretation that involve a fusing of both my own and my partner's horizons of meaning. Thus it is appropriate that Gadamer describes what occurs during the process of achieving a common language in a conversation in terms of an interpreter understanding a text:

... the interpreter's own thoughts have also gone into the re-awakening of the meaning of the text. In this the interpreter's own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that one holds on to or enforces, but more as a meaning and possibility that one brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one's own what is said in the text. I have described this above as a 'fusion of horizons'. We can now see that this is the full realisation of conversation, in which some thing is expressed that is not only mine or my author's but common.55

It comes to no surprise then that Gadamer elevates language to "the universal medium in which understanding itself is realised. The mode of realisation of understanding is interpretation. ... All understanding is interpretation and all interpretation takes place in the medium of a language which would allow the object to come into words yet is at the same time the interpreter's own language."56 According to Gadamer, interpretation or hermeneutics is "a special case of the general relationship between thinking and speaking, the mysterious intimacy of which is bound up in the way in which speech is
contained, in a hidden way, in thinking." Thus, we are finally led to the view of language as creating and accomplishing thought, i.e., presentational thinking.

It should now be quite apparent that the turn-taking that occurs during dialogue is determined more by the object of the conversation—that toward which the interpretations of my partner and myself are aimed—than by my own or my partner's will, i.e., following of rules. Furthermore, the four conditions of dialogue presented in Chapter I must all be fulfilled if dialogue (and presentational thinking) is to be achieved. These four conditions or prerequisites may also be viewed as particular conditions that are lacking and allow a conversation to fall into a monologue. The next chapter will attempt to show how two of these conditions, sincerity and appropriateness, may be operationally defined so as to indicate that a conversation is monological or dialogical. Of course it should be kept in mind that, as our previous discussion pointed out, all of the prerequisites for dialogue are mutually interdependent and at times it may prove difficult to differentiate one condition from another.
Chapter V

Further Considerations

In this final chapter three matters will be discussed. First, a partial operationalization of the thesis will be suggested for testing the interpretation of the results presented in Chapter III. From there, our discussion will be extended and the thesis will be employed to interpret the results of an experimental study and an ethnographic study of turn-taking. The concluding section of the chapter will raise a number of questions about turn-taking, using a dialogical model of communication, in order to direct future research.

In Chapter III it was argued that the non-familiar subjects were more uncomfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals than familiar subjects because the non-familiar subjects engaged in conversations that were more likely to be monological. However, it was also noted that the conversation between subjects A and B was similar to the non-familiar subjects' conversations since they were uncomfortable with questions as turn-yielding signals. The conversation between A and B was characterized by two types of behaviors: (1) both A and B exhibited a large number of side involvements or self-directed
gestures such as preening of their hair and clothes and/or manipulation of coffee cups and the microphones on their lapels and (2) both A and B exhibited what may be called inappropriate feedback that encouraged the other partner to engage in monologue. This feedback generally took the form of reinforcers such as 'hm hmm' being emitted after some sort of 'uptake' check by the speaker, i.e., after the speaker said 'you know'.

It seems that one way to operationalize the thesis of this paper, that the essence of turn-taking is dialogue, may be to examine each conversation in the experiment for the two types of behaviors described above. This should, through content analyses of the frequencies of such behaviors, provide an index of both the degree of involvement and the amount of monologue that occurred in the conversations. It should be noted that the first type of behavior provides the observer with an estimate of the degree to which a subject was involved in objects other than the conversation; this is not to say that side involvements per se indicate a lack of involvement in the conversation or that the conversation is monological. To determine involvement in the conversation, the observer must always rely on the object of the conversation and use this as a referencing point. In this sense, the appropriateness of the feedback or listener response emitted by the audi-
tor is also determined by the object of the conversation.

In addition, when back channel signals are used as listener responses, they may be either sincere or insincere. A puzzled look may tell my partner that 'uptake' has not occurred enabling my partner to restate what was said and furthering mutual understanding. However, I may also be insincere in my use of listener responses, falsely indicating that I follow what is said. Of course, when this occurs, my future utterances in the conversation are likely to be inappropriate, revealing my lack of understanding and perhaps prompting discomfort in my partner.

In everyday conversations we seem to be able to differentiate between behaviors that show attentiveness and a desire to understand and behaviors that simply go along with what is said, i.e., sincere and insincere listener responses. One way that these two types of responses might be differentiated operationally would be that one would expect insincere listening responses to be exhibited only after some sort of elicitation from the speaker, e.g., as in the conversation between subjects A and B. Sincere listening responses would be expected to be exhibited at places in the conversation where the speaker was not eliciting such responses. This last point requires some clarification; certainly some sincere listening responses would occur as a result of some sort of elicita-
tion from the speaker, especially responses affirming understanding. However, one would expect that non-comprehension would prompt the listener to emit a listener response seeking clarification at points in the conversation where the speaker did not request feedback. Hence, a content analysis of the experimental conversations may reveal that non-familiar dyads exhibited a higher percentage of insincere listening responses than did the familiar dyads.

This last point offers an interesting interpretation of a recent experiment in turn-taking that attempted to identify social patterns of turn-taking behaviors. Robbins, Devoe, and Weiner hypothesized that turn-taking behaviors and their patterns of usage may differ for members of different social groups. In their experiment they compared selected turn-taking behaviors of working and middle-class adolescents. They found significant differences in the type and number of turn-yielding signals used by the two groups. Based on the results of their experiment, Robbins, et al., conclude that:

It appears that the regulator or turn-taking behaviors used by the two groups studied were rarely equivalent. The most interesting data seem to indicate that the patterns used by each group are quite distinct in terms of "permitting" listener options for participation. For example, if one looks at unfilled pauses as a place where a lis-
tener might enter the conversation, working-class speakers show twice as many instances on the average, and in a shorter speaking time than do middle-class speakers.

For middle-class speakers, the sequence of use of filled pauses during speaking, with downward inflection and eye focus on the other at the end of speaking, leaves little ambiguity about who is speaking when. Correspondingly, there is little discretion left to the listener about when he/she may speak; unless the listener "interrupts," the speaker determines the listener's behavior, even indicating at what point the listener may interject a "decoding" response. For working-class speakers, the communication seems to include more opportunity for concomitant and intermittent verbal responding by a listener, with intervention left to the discretion of the listener.58

What is of interest in this study is the remarkable difference in the manner in which feedback is allowed for and/or elicited by the two social classes. Does this indicate that dialogue would be more difficult to achieve in one of the social classes or the other, given our remarks concerning appropriateness and sincerity in feedback? An answer to this question might be a qualified no: each pattern still allows for dialogue, albeit, in the middle-class pattern, one that relies heavily on the speaker's discretion concerning possible misunderstandings and upon absolute sincerity in listener responses. The working-class pattern seems to rely more on listener discretion concerning misunderstanding and allows for more
leeway in the appropriateness of the listener's responses. More over, our brief analysis makes more believable the implication, suggested by Robbins, et al., that "such differences in turn-taking behaviors might well be a source of disruption in cross-group communication instances." In these cross-group encounters, dialogue might be difficult to achieve since the patterns of turn-taking for the groups might allow for the misinterpretation of appropriate and sincere utterances as being insincere and vice versa. For example, a middle-class person listening to a working class speaker might not realize the significance of what is being said due to the expectation that the speaker will direct questions to the listener when areas of potential misunderstanding are touched upon in the speaker's talk. The working-class person might be equally baffled by the middle-class person's subsequent utterance which exhibits misunderstanding while not allowing for the emittance of a listener response to correct the problem. In this situation one would suspect the sincerity of the other party in the conversation since their turn-taking behaviors are not furthering mutual understanding. In other words, high interaction involvement may involve the 'encoding' and 'decoding' of a different set of behavioral signals for the achievement of dialogue.
Another interpretation of the results reported by Robbins, et al., is also possible. This interpretation would suggest that the turn-taking behaviors of either the middle-class or the working-class adolescents may be more or less oriented toward dialogue than toward monologue. (Or vice versa: this interpretation is offered to generate discussion, not to make any empirical claims.) The basis for such speculation is found in the report of an ethnographic study of 'making noise' in the West Indian island of Antigua. Karl Reisman tells us that on this island there is a particular form of communication, quite wide spread, of engaging in contrapuntal conversation or 'making noise'.\textsuperscript{60} The form that this conversation takes is not that of an orderly exchange of speaking turns but of simultaneous talking and repetition of of statement. Arguments that occur while 'making noise' have the "essential feature of... non-complementar[y]... repetition. Each person takes a point of view or position and repeats it endlessly, either one after the other, or both at once, or several at once depending on the number of people participating."\textsuperscript{61}

Reisman demonstrates that the form or structure of 'making noise' is integrated throughout the culture of Antigua. Curses, boasts, wedding celebrations, ordering at restaurants and ordinary conversations are all
patterned after the structure of contrapuntal noise. He argues that underlying this structure of communication is the notion that in any setting one should spontaneously express one's feelings. However, one should not conclude that 'making noise' simply means that everyone talks and nobody listens. Reisman notes that 'one must not assume in the remarks one makes that one has not been heard the first time or one will be rebuked. One is listened to." In fact, one usually walks away from such conversations filled with the information that others asserted while 'making noise'.

All of the above suggests that the structure of 'making noise' may be understood as a monological form of communication which establishes a form of intersubjectivity, bringing into play a certain kind of relationship, but not achieving mutual understanding. This is not to say that 'making noise' does not achieve a pre-constituted form of mutual understanding, only that the process of presentational thinking does not occur while 'making noise'. Furthermore, 'making noise' seems to be based on an informational model of communication in which repetition ensures that the message will be received. Needless to say, it tells us very little of how the message is understood. What is of importance from this
discussion is that dialogue and its structure of turn-taking is not equally valued from culture to culture. In other words, the primary form of interaction involvement may be modeled after dialogue in some cultures (as, one may speculate, in most of the Western world) or it may, as in the Antiguan case, be modeled after a form of monological communication. It should be stressed that the above remarks should not be interpreted as implying that in Antigua dialogue does not occur; certainly, it must if the creole language is to remain viable. However, this does imply that when dialogue does occur, its form is likely to be stylistically similar to that of 'making noise'. This also suggests that the dialectic of mutual understanding is not tied to just the face-to-face encounter but emerges whenever the play of dialectic (i.e., interpretation) is achieved; here, Gadamer would be in agreement.

In concluding this chapter some suggestions for future research of turn-taking will be proffered. However, these suggestions depend on an assessment of the questions asked and answered in this paper. The thesis of this paper presented a possible answer to the question 'What is the essence of turn-taking?'. It has been argued that the meaning of turn-taking, its essential feature, is that it occurs whenever the play of dialectic is achieved.
Furthermore, it was stressed that dialogue depends not on the will of the interlocutors but on the object of discussion to determine the exchange of turns in a conversation. If we accept these arguments, what now does this suggest?

Implicitly, the concern of this paper has been communicator competence. As the study by Robbins, et al., suggests, interaction involvement may vary form sub-culture to sub-culture and may allow for various forms of dialogical turn-taking. In addition, the study by Reisman suggests that dialogue as a desired form of interaction involvement may be variously valued by different cultures. This raises the question of how people from different sub-cultures and cultures indicate to one another their desire for dialogue and how they actually manage to engage in dialogue. How is this dialogue initiated? How is it terminated? What role do turn-taking behaviors play in the above process?

However, before asking these general questions, some more specific and fundamental questions need to be answered. In order for a communicator to engage in dialogue, the communicator must be involved in the interaction. What then is the relationship between turn-taking and interaction involvement? How does turn-taking indicate that one is involved in a dialectic interaction? The results reported in this paper offer some clues but this
last question is perhaps the one that is most pressing for current turn-taking research. What is suggested by the thesis of this paper is that this and other questions cannot be answered by examining only the structure of a conversation: the object of the conversation must be accounted for in any analysis of turn-taking. This suggests that an aspect of turn-taking that needs to be explored in the future is the influence of the object of discussion on the interaction involvement of the communicators. It is hoped that such future research will enable cross-cultural communication to be understood and participated in as a lived process of interpretation.
APPENDIX I

TURN-TAKING INSTRUMENT

Instructions:

Please read the questions that follow carefully and write down your immediate response to each item. Please do not spend time trying to recall exactly your conversation; again, it is your immediate response to the items that is desired.

1. As a speaker how often did you feel obligated to continue talking during your conversation, even though you felt you had said your fill? ____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable __ __ __ __ __ Very uncomfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable __ __ __ __ __ Very comfortable

2. As a listener how often were you aware of being asked questions such that you thought that the intent of the speaker was to get you to take over the conversation? ____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable __ __ __ __ __ Very uncomfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable __ __ __ __ __ Very comfortable

3. As a speaker how often did you consciously use questions as a ploy to get the other person to talk? ____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable __ __ __ __ __ Very comfortable
How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable _______ Very uncomfortable

4. As a listener how often were you aware of interrupting the person speaking? _____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable _______ Very uncomfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable _______ Very comfortable

5. As a speaker how often were you aware of being interrupted by the listener? _____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable _______ Very comfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable _______ Very comfortable

6. As a speaker how often were you aware of signaling to the listener that you wished to continue speaking? _____# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable _______ Very uncomfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable _______ Very comfortable

Please describe the sort of signal you used during these occasions.
7. As a listener how often were you aware of the speaker signaling to you that he/she wished to continue speaking? 
___# of times

How comfortable did you feel during these occasions? (check one)
Very comfortable ___ ___ ___ ___ Very uncomfortable

How comfortable did you think the person you were conversing with felt during these occasions? (check one)
Very uncomfortable ___ ___ ___ ___ Very comfortable

Please describe the sort of signal used during these occasions.
APPENDIX II

SELF INTERACTION INVOLVEMENT INSTRUMENT

In responding to this questionnaire please follow the directions as given by the administrator.

1. I was keenly aware of how the other(s) perceived me during the conversation.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)*

2. My mind wandered during the conversation and I often missed parts of what was going on.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

3. Often in the conversation I wasn't sure what to say, I couldn't seem to find the appropriate lines.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

4. I carefully observed how the other(s) responded to me during the conversation.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

5. Often I pretended to be listening to my partner(s) when in fact I was thinking about something else.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

6. Often during the conversation I wasn't sure of my role; that is, I wasn't sure how I was expected to relate to the other(s).
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

7. I listened carefully to the other(s) during the conversation.
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

8. Often I was preoccupied in the conversation and did not pay complete attention to the other(s).
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
9. Often in the conversation I wasn't sure what the other(s) was really saying.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

10. Often in the conversation I was not sure what the other's needs were (e.g., reassurance, a compliment, etc.) until it was too late to respond appropriately.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

11. During the conversation I was sensitive to the other's subtle or hidden meanings.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

12. I was very observant during the conversation.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

13. In the conversation I paid close attention to what the other(s) said and did and tried to obtain as much information as I could.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

14. Often I felt sort of "unplugged" from the situation; that is, I was uncertain of my role, the other's motives, and what was happening.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

15. I really knew what was going on in the conversation; that is, I had a "handle on the situation."

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

16. In the conversation I accurately perceived the other's intentions quite well.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

17. Often in the conversation I was not sure how I was expected to respond.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
18. In the conversation I was responsive to the meaning of the other's behavior in relation to myself and the situation.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

*In the instrument administered to the subjects, each of the numbers that follow each item was accompanied by the following statements:

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Somewhat Disagree
(4) Not Sure
(5) Somewhat Agree
(6) Agree
(7) Strongly Agree

Subjects were asked to circle the statement that was the most appropriate response to each item.
Appendix III

Other Interaction Involvement Instrument

Directions: Please respond to each item by indicating the extent to which you agree that your partner behaved as indicated.

1. My partner was keenly aware of how I perceived him/her during the conversation.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)*

2. My partner's mind wandered during the conversation and he/she often missed parts of what was going on.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

3. Often in the conversation my partner wasn't sure what to say, he/she couldn't seem to find the appropriate line.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

4. My partner carefully observed how I responded to him/her during the conversation.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

5. Often my partner pretended to be listening to me when in fact he/she was thinking about something else.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

6. Often during the conversation my partner wasn't sure of his/her role; that is, he/she wasn't sure how he/she was expected to relate to me.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

7. My partner listened carefully to me during the conversation.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

8. Often my partner was preoccupied in the conversation and did not pay complete attention to me.
   
   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
9. Often in the conversation my partner wasn't sure what I was really saying.

   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

10. Often in the conversation my partner was not sure what my needs were until it was too late to respond appropriately.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

11. During the conversation my partner was sensitive to my subtle or hidden meanings.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

12. My partner was very observant during the conversation.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

13. In the conversation my partner paid close attention to what I said and did and he/she tried to obtain as much information as he/she could.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

14. Often my partner was sort of "unplugged" from the situation; that is, he/she was uncertain of his/her role, my motives, and what was happening.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

15. My partner really knew what was going on in the conversation; that is, he/she had a "handle on the situation."

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

16. In the conversation my partner accurately perceived my intentions quite well.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

17. Often in the conversation my partner was not sure how he/she was expected to respond.

    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
18. In the conversation my partner was responsive to the meaning of my behavior in relation to himself/herself and the situation.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)

* In the instrument administered to the subjects, each of the numbers that follow each item was accompanied by the following statements:

(1) Strongly Disagree
(2) Disagree
(3) Somewhat Disagree
(4) Not Sure
(5) Somewhat Agree
(6) Agree
(7) Strongly Agree

Subjects were asked to circle the statement that was the most appropriate response to each item.
Notes

1 These questions indicate that this paper is phenomenologically oriented; a rationale for this orientation in the social sciences is proffered in: Michael Philipson, "Phenomenological Philosophy and Sociology," in New Directions in Sociological Theory, Paul Filmer, Michael Philipson, David Silverman, and David Walsh (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1972).

2 Understanding as used here and throughout the paper refers to the process of interpretation and should not be confused with intuition or psychological understanding.


6 Bill Evans, "Improvisation in Jazz," in Kind of Blue, by Miles Davis, with Julian Adderly, John Coltrane Wyn Kelly, Bill Evans, Paul Chambers, and James Cobb, Columbia, CS 8163, n.d.


13 See Knapp, *Nonverbal Communication in Human Interaction*.


16 See Duncan, footnote 10.

17 Sacks, et al., p. 698; all references in this paper are to the article in *Language*, see footnote 10.

18 The rules for turn-taking are derived from Sacks, et al., pp. 700-705.

19 Sacks, et al., cite many examples that lead to the conclusions stated in the paper but are not as definitive in their discussion as this paper.


21 See Argyle, pp. 165, 166; Duncan, pp. 283-292; Knapp, pp. 213-217; and Wiemann and Knapp, pp. 75-92; also see footnote 11.

23 See Argyle and Cook and Wiemann and Knapp regarding the role of eye gaze in turn-taking.

24 See Duncan, footnote 10; it should also be noted that the statements concerning turn-taking signals on pp. 17-20 of the text are based on the references cited in footnote 21.


26 See Boomer, "The Phonemic Clause" in footnote 20.

27 Boomer, pp. 246-248.

28 Sacks, et al., p. 703, footnote 12.

29 Sacks, et al., p. 706, footnote 15.

30 The studies by Dittmann and Llewellyn are reported in Boomer, pp. 255, 256.

31 Boomer, p. 256.

32 Boomer, pp. 248, 249.


34 Wiemann and Knapp, in Small Group Communication, p. 41.

35 Argyle, Bodily Communication, p. 165.


38 Knapp, p. 214.

The objectives of the experiment and preliminary questions used in the turn-taking instrument were discussed in a number of seminars which were attended by the subjects in the pre-exposed condition. The exposure to the questionnaire and/or objectives was not, therefore, controlled by the experimenter and analyses to account for such pre-exposure were felt to be needed in order to assess the validity of the results.


The interaction involvement instruments were tested for internal reliability using a Kuder-Richardson formula 8 test. The coefficient of correlation for the self involvement instrument was r = .95, while coefficient of correlation for the other involvement instrument was r = .93. Cegala (see footnote 39) reports, using the same statistical test, that the coefficient of correlation for the self involvement instrument was r = .90.

Goffman, pp. 43, 44.

Gadamer, Truth and Method, p. 94.

Habermas, p. 131, see footnote 7.

Stewart, see footnote 9.


Stewart, p. 200; it should be noted that Pilotta (footnote 47) has substantially developed the implications of the presentational view of language.
49 Stewart, p. 200.
50 Stewart, p. 201.
51 Stewart, p. 201.
58 Robbins, et al., pp. 43-45; see footnote 10.
59 Robbins, et al., p. 47.
60 Reisman, see footnote 10.
61 Reisman, p. 121.
62 Reisman, p. 115.
Bibliography


