RATIONALIZATION AND REFORM:
THE COLUMBUS URBAN LEAGUE
1942—1962

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by
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DEDICATION

This time to the Black Charadrians, Next Time...

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Miss Andrea Durham: Each of us has his own calling.

The Movement: It is very difficult to find the correct answers until one has discovered the correct questions.
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Introduction

"The Columbus Urban League Believes in Santa Clause!"
Legend to Public Relations Poster, circa 1942

American society is an organized society and the American people are an organized people. As technologies expand and multiply, new specialized and highly complex skills emerge as necessities. As urbanization increases the policy makers of urban areas must increasingly organize to meet the massive challenges of the city and its environs. Government, perceiving a mandate to enter positively into the maintenance of the social welfare of its citizens, has felt the need as well to expand its allocations of money, time and manpower to the alleviation of social problems. This effort too has required centralization, concentration, and control. In fact, no segment of society has escaped this organizational rationalization process. Ultimately the complete professionalization, bureaucratization, and rationalization of American society will be an accomplished fact, if indeed such is already not the case. Many writers have argued persuasively that this process is so clear, so blatantly obvious, and so pervasive, that the "impulse to rationalization" is a
completely irreversible historical fact of life. Recent historians, particularly, while differing on the reasons for the development of the process, have generally agreed upon the importance of rationalizing society, with its attendant professionalism, bureaucratization, and necessity for co-ordinated planning. The processes hit primarily in the field of economic behavior, enveloped governmental operations, and belatedly, though early in this century, became the predominant thrust in social welfare and uplift endeavors. By the 1960's, American society, in general, became oriented so strongly to this organizational ideology that even its cultural and psychological base was imbued not only with the ethic but its utility and necessity as a positive value in a "good" society.

This paper will not attempt to challenge the notion of the "organizational society" as one of the important, if not one of the dominant, ideas, ethics, ideologies, or blueprints of our century. What it will question is the pace, influence, and development of that ethic and its attendant practices within a limited area of American society. That area is social welfare and uplift. The focus will be on the American Negro and his efforts to find a meaningful place in American society.

The particular reference will be to the Columbus, Ohio chapter of the National Urban League and its efforts in the city to assist and expedite the inclusion of the urban Negro into American Society.

The central proposition is that the pace of organ-
izational rationalization, both of the League itself as an institution and of the problems it attempted to solve, was considerably slower than has been the case with other attempts at resolution of social problems, and with the society as a whole. More than a few historians have either asserted or alleged by implication that the thrust to organizational rationalization by Negro groups has approximated the pace set by the primary social service and welfare organizations in the central Midwest, and some which relate to the problems of Negro inclusion in the society in general.

But if indeed the Columbus Urban League did move more slowly in its bureaucratization of reform and rationalization of its program, was it a unique exception to an otherwise general tendency? This writer thinks not. While certain conditions in the development of the League were undoubtedly peculiar to the area in which it was located, the tendency seems characteristic of other Leagues in other cities, of the Negro uplift movement in general, and to some extent, of large segments of the social service and reform movement in general.

Why concentrate on Columbus? Urban Leagues operate in metropolitan areas to be sure, but some of these areas are megalopolis like New York or Philadelphia, while others are small or medium sized cities like Canton, Ohio. But many of the Leagues operate in what could be characterized as large cities, like Columbus, Ohio. Urban Leagues have been most active in cities which have or are undergoing the change, often rapidly, from a city to a metropolis.
with cultural, economic, political, and social connections to a whole region.

Further, the Urban League in Columbus is a well-established one. Begun in 1917, it was one of the first chapters affiliated with the National Urban League. More important, it had the same executive secretary for thirty-four years, Nimrod B. Allen. Other Urban Leagues with such continuous leadership have been located in other major cities, New York and Detroit, for example. A study of Columbus offers the opportunity to see the effects of continuous leadership of a less large urban area and to compare that leadership with other Urban Leagues.

Until July 21, 1969, Columbus, Ohio was one of the few major cities in the country which had managed to avoid ghetto rebellion or other major civil disorder. Since, as will be shown, the Urban League has been instrumental in the development of the race relations pattern of the city, a study of the League is extremely fruitful to further an understanding of the nature and causes of city disorders.

Finally, the Columbus Urban League has some impressive innovations to its credit. These include the first organized program of crime prevention by a police department; the development of a broad public relations program to further its objectives; the development of a service fraternity for potential Negro leadership. Most important,
the Columbus Urban League was one of the first Urban Leagues, if not the first, to promote interracial goodwill and cooperation as the ultimate program of the League. This programmatic orientation was later picked up by the National Urban League and ultimately has become the orientation of all Urban League chapters in the United States.

So if the Columbus Urban League is, indeed, unique, this uniqueness is of positive value to the historian.

The unique aspects cited above are of great assistance to the student wishing to analyze whether the developmental pattern of the Columbus League is an isolated phenomenon or part of a broader evolutionary scheme. Of course, there are aspects to Columbus which are intrinsically unique to that city. For example, it is a state capital. Most cities are not, these anomalies are more than counterbalanced by the parallel patterns of development of Urban Leagues in other cities.

This paper will of necessity have to treat elements of the League's entire history, but its focus will be on the period 1942-1962. During this period the League in Columbus underwent major changes including, most prominently a re-organization and a change of executive directors, for the first time in thirty-four years. More important, the League was in this period belatedly to come fully to grips with the question of to what extent should it bureaucratize and professionalize. In this period at least a tentative answer emerged to that query, very strongly, during the
administration of Mr. Allen's successor, Mr. Andrew Freeman. Within a year of Mr. Freeman's departure in 1962, the Urban Leagues across the United States executed a decisive shift not only in programmatic approach but in basic philosophy which rendered much of the earlier work of the National Urban League either obsolete or irrelevant. This shift, of course, was the change from a policy of advocacy of "integration" to a policy of "self-determination." This shift was picked up rapidly by the Columbus League as well as most of the other chapters.

A complete understanding of the reasons for this shift is not yet possible. We still stand very close in time to these events. But it is clear that by 1967, a sizeable proportion of the Black community no longer identified their life style with the "integration ethic" which the League had advocated and fought to implement for decades. Further, this alienation was finding expression in a plethora of militant movements, especially among the young. The Urban League found itself in the unenviable position of retaining its white support while losing its Black constituency. To counter this trend, the League moved to a more militant stance and renounced many of its old, by now almost sacrosanct, doctrines. In so doing, it lost some of its conservative white support, but regained the allegiance of at least a portion of the Negro establishment and the previously alienated white intellectual community. But by no means, is the Urban League as pervasively supported by either Blacks or Whites to the extent it was even eight to
ten years ago. In this struggle to regain the confidence of the Black community, the Urban League has entered a decisive new phase in its history and it is much too early yet to assess with a historical judgment the extent to which the League is a new organization and how much of its link with the past remains. This is not to say that the League has never shifted its position before. It has. But the recent shift is a significant breach with the past in many respects. For that reason, above all others, the writer has determined to end his analysis of the League with the departure of Andrew Freeman.

But by no means should the reader assume that the previous history of the League is now in a vault and only of antiquarian interest. Nothing would be further from the truth. The Urban League today, despite its changes in policy, is still the present end-product of more than a half-century of group effort on behalf of the Negro. This writer proposes no predictions or prognostications. On the contrary, he argues that the "inexorable progress of an historically 'inevitable' process" -- organizational rationalization -- was far less impressive with regard to at least one aspect of our society than has been commonly argued or assumed. The format of this paper will be to present a short discussion on the theory and practice of organizational rationalization with its often attendant but not dependent process of professionalization. It will then consider the development of the Columbus Black Commun-
ity and the rise of the Columbus Urban League. From this story, the paper moves to a discussion of the League in Columbus from 1942 to 1962, with special emphasis on the nature of the League's response to Negro problems and the impulse to bureaucratization. It will conclude with a comparison of the Columbus League's experience to that of Leagues in other cities and what general conclusions may be derived from the analysis.
Chapter I

The Study of Organizational Rationalization

"The development of the modern form of the organization of corporate groups in all fields is nothing less than identical with the development and continual spread of bureaucratic administration. Its development is, to take the striking case, the most crucial phenomenon of the modern Western state."

- Max Weber

The terms bureaucratization, professionalization, and rationalization, as used in administrative and organizational analysis, deal with specific behavioral approaches to human interaction. These terms have numerous definitions and interpretations; but these can be determined for this analysis.

Bureaucracy and bureaucratization, the two most commonly used terms, appeared in modern scholarship with Max Weber's study of administration. Other writers had considered the topic, but Weber's compendious and thorough examination of the nature of societal organizations established him as the father of modern administrative science.

Weber, a sociologist, was a speculative theorist. His works reflect his attempts at all-inclusiveness and generalization. His analysis also reflected his biases, both personal and environmental. His main examples come from emphasis on certain aspects of organization as being essential is reflective of their necessity in the systems
he studied. Many of the more specialized bits of his "essentials" have been subsequently disproven or modified, but as a whole, most of his analysis has withstood scholarly scrutiny.¹

To Weber, the crucial question in the study of the organization was the location of authority. He traced the development of authority in society and he concluded that Western man's societal organizational structure has passed through distinct phases. Each phase was dependent on the type of authority which legitimized the structure. He further argued that these authority "types" were universal to mankind and that they had co-existed contiguously, with one of the "type" forms dominant in the society. But the development of type forms was a process and ultimately would result in the total arrangement of all society. This ultimate "pure type", he called "bureaucracy." He postulated that man in a tribal society, or even earlier, had asserted leadership over his fellows by the sheer force of personal merit, skill, or physical endowments. This was the charismatic "type" form. It persisted down to the present day in any organizational form which adhered to a personalized leader. Over time these leaders developed dynasties based on their own charisma and the transfer of that charisma by ritual to a chosen heir, by a designated process. In other words, the organization's authority was based on the legitimation of charisma over time. This type he called traditional, and stated it was
characterized by institutions like feudalism and the divine right monarchy. But with the 19th Century a new form of organizational authority for social legitimation evolved, one based on legalized authority, accepted by the whole society, and dependent neither on charisma nor traditionalism for its legitimation. This "pure type" was called the "bureaucratic form", and was destined to become the ultimate organizational scheme for Western society.\(^2\) Weber was confining his analysis to organizational systems which needed subordination to accomplish tasks. Subordination was only legitimized by the recognition of that subordination on some abstract basis of authority. He noted that organizational forms based on fraternal, ethnic, or collegial (equal partners ties were not within the realm of his discussion. But he did assert that the authority based organizations he was discussing were the dominant ones in Western society, and had been for centuries.\(^3\)

Next, Weber analyzed the components of each system of authority and arrived at an empirical set of characteristics which specified a particular form as a "pure type." To Max Weber, the fulfillment of all the characteristics was necessary to qualification as a "pure type."

A system embracing all of the characteristics would be termed a "pure model." Weber never found one, and neither has anyone since, but that did not discredit his theory. For each of the characteristics were broad enough to warrant
inclusion in a given class even if only a few of them were fulfilled. Furthermore, Weber characterized some conditions as being more crucial than others. Basically, his criteria were: (1) the existence of a legitimized, routinized, and systemized order of authority, usually legal; (2) a division of responsibility into identifiable and separate areas of jurisdiction; (3) development of a separate skill called office management; (4) beginning of systematic and accurate files; (5) a divorcement of office and private life; and (6) the development of separate systems of specialized and generalized values on the part of the official.

The upshot of these characteristics was the existence of an occupational type known as the official who is both authority and subordinate. He conducts his affairs from an office. He deals with the specialized matters under his jurisdiction, utilizing his files, and pervaded with his specialized values during his time in his official capacity.

Weber went on to note that this system of organization was being increasingly applied to large-scale governmental and economic organizations in the late 19th Century, and that the most efficient form of social organization. His theory stressed the development, because of the system's characteristics, of bureaucratic tendencies of routinization, impersonality, and rationalization. But crucial to the estimation of the comparative extent and efficiency of any bureaucracy, were the concepts of specialization and legitimation of authority. Specialization to Weber meant efficient specialization which would avoid duplication and over-production.
Authority to him implied clear and distinct legal authority which was indisputable. Inherent within the system was the concept of the full-time official who was career oriented in his duties.  

Weber did not elaborate on what modifications, if any, his system would undergo if his system was, or ever could be, applied to other types of social endeavor than governmental or economic administration. Robert Michels, in his *Political Parties*, provided such an elaboration, following Weber, in his discussion of political party units in post-1900 Germany. His conclusion was that Weber's analysis was pre-dominantly correct, and that an "Iron Law of Oligarchy" governed political party behavior. Authority was established under conditions of conflict and compromise in the political system, inevitably emerging in the establishment of political elites.  

His departure set the stage for other classical theorists to apply Weber directly to other types of social organization. By the 1950's, it had become obvious to the classicists that Weber's principles were applicable in some degree to any organization in a modern technological society, even the ones Weber eschewed. The questions was the extent of that bureaucracy.  

A qualitative difference between bureaucracy and bureaucratization recurs in the writings. One is a system, the other a process. Definitions have varied extensively since Weber in each case. This paper follows very closely
the Weberian viewpoint, as modified by Parsons and Merton, when discussing bureaucratization in a classical context. This view implies emphasis on the elements of authority and specialization as characteristics of bureaucratization and discounts the necessity of impersonalization as a characteristic. Further, this approach stresses the functional rather than the formal characteristics, and dwells less on what men should do, than on what they actually do in approximating the "pure type."9

The study of organizational systematization has been characterized as basically being of two types. One is the Weberian, or classical, approach, discussed above. The other is the rationalization or managerial efficiency approach. This viewpoint was pioneered by F.W. Taylor in his studies of worker efficiency. It theorizes that by scientific techniques, the maximum efficiency for each task in an industrial enterprise could be ascertained and men then conditioned or trained to perform at that efficiency level. Taylorism emphasized the impartiality of the scientific approach and the inevitability of management-labor cooperation since each task was scientifically computed as to its completion probability. Hence, bargaining units like unions were unnecessary. Needless to say, management embraced the system rapidly.

Since Taylor, the direct efficiency approach has gone through numerous variations and modifications. Notable among these are Elton Mayo's "Hawthorne" School which emphasizes the human relations element in efficient production.
and the Warner-University of Chicago School which emphasizes problems and conditions outside the work situation as having a definite bearing on work performance. The writer has chosen to use the Taylorian criteria of: (1) efficient person; (2) efficient plan; (3) efficient task; and (4) efficiency as an ideology, as developed by Samuel Haber; and to supplement them with observations from the Hawthorne and Chicago schools.  

The major problem encountered in studies of organizational rationale is the disparity in interpretation. Weber and the classicists approach the subject from an abstract theoretical point of view useful in cross-cultural comparisons. The efficiency schools approach the topic from the concrete, practical level of human problems in a social situation. Both approaches have strengths and weaknesses. Classicists have valuable theoretical orientation; the rationalists have provided useful behavioral insights. But the classicists lack concrete verifiable empirical justification for their theory, and the rationalists have few frameworks but those grounded in human behavioral science. What is more, the two approaches do not really complement each other and serious contradictions are present not only within each system, but especially when the two approaches are compared.

What is extraordinarily needed in organizational research is a unified theoretical and behavioral approach which will withstand scholarly criticism from both schools of thought over time, with the further accumulation of
theoretical and behavioral knowledge. At the present time no such system exists. But the one which has received the widest acceptance as a useful prototype for such a synthesis is the general theory of formal organization developed by Talcott Parsons. Because of its critical acclaim, and also because it offers a useful format for understanding the organizational rationalization of the Columbus Urban League, that model has provided the main approach to a consideration of the League's bureaucratization and rationalization.11

Parsons has essentially attempted to derive a functional model for all organizational activity. He postulates that all organizational units within a given system are motivated and act with regard to four functions: (1) adaptation - the procurement of needed resources; (2) goal achievement - the bringing about of desired ends through action; (3) integration - the meshing of the organization with its other constituent organizations within a system; and (4) latency - the maintenance of solidified, unified, and unswerving dedication of all parts of the given organization to the socially viable goal of the organization within the system.12

Each organizational unit in a system performs all of these functions. But, given the nature, composition, and goals of a given unit, one of those functions will dominate the unit's relationship with other units in the system. And one or more of the same functions, though not necessarily the same one as its external function, will dominate
each of the component subordinate sections of the unit. The strength of the theory is that any organizational unit can be defined as overall system: The United States, the Black community, the Columbus Black community, the Columbus Negro uplift groups, the Columbus Urban League. The same functional relationships will apply to a system no matter how large or how small it may be. But it is crucial to note that each unit must be studied as a unit and each system studied as a system. Simply because a given organization plays an adaptive function in one system does not mean that it will play the same function in an expanded system. For example, it will be argued below that the Public Relations Department of the Columbus Urban League played primarily an integrative function in its relationship to the League itself. But the same department played a goal-achievement function with regard to the city of Columbus as a system. Such designations must of course be backed by illustrative evidence and argument. These will be presented below. 13

Parson's approach to the problem of behavioral efficiency in his famous pattern variables. These postulate that any actor, when confronted with a given social situation, will react with either one mode or the other to five basic behavioral variables. They are: (1) affectivity versus affective neutrality; (2) specificity versus diffuseness; (3) universalism versus particularism; (4) quality versus performance; and (5) self-orientation versus collectivity-
orientation. None of the variables is an absolute. A person may be neutral and affective in the same situation. But one mode or the other will be dominant. By interplaying the functional variables with the pattern variables in a given unit-system, and with regard to a given social situation, one ascertain and predict response and probable future behavior -ceteris paribus.

That is the general theory in brief. A full-scale Parsonian analysis of the rationalization of the League in a multi-dimensional system set of the Columbus Black community, Columbus, Ohio, and the United States, it should easily be seen, is far and away beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, this writer has greatly abridged the scope of Parsonian application and will apply the principles in a more generalized way as an informational and structural format for the consideration of the role of the League in the city. Reference to terms like "integrative role" and "goal achievement" role should be, unless otherwise indicated, meant to imply the given relationship between the Columbus League and the general system being discussed in context. In most cases, unless otherwise indicated, this system will be either the general Columbus community or the Columbus Black community. The Parsonian theory was designed to be applicable to broad theoretical as well as specific behavioral studies. The writer has attempted to use the theory to envelop elements of both approaches.

The difficulty with the Parsonian system is not only
its generalization but the relative lack of both empirical and deductive research which has utilized; it as a format. To the best knowledge of the writer, the system has never been used on a voluntary social service organization. Hence, the theoretical implications of the discussion below should not be extrapolated broadly until ether research using the model is undertaken in this field. The writer has not undertaken to use the Parsonian model for his analysis because of his faith in the ultimate correlation of his findings. Such a result would be gratifying, but is not the reason for its utilization. Rather, it is a useful, and comprehensive informational theory structure which seems to place the patterns represented by the rationalization process of the League over time in an understandable and useful perspective with the patterns shown by other social service groups, Black and White, as well as the base society, both locally and nationally. Where the framework's relevancy is less clear, the writer has supplemented this presentation with Weberian or Taylorian interpretation.
CHAPTER II

"No Man's Land"

"The work of the League in this city, especially in the early days, was work in No Man's Land."

- Nimrod B. Allen

A. Columbus.

In many ways, Columbus, Ohio, was industrially underdeveloped immediately preceding World War I. For that matter, it still is. Possessing relatively strong potential in terms of water and power resources, these resources had not been utilized fully by the city. Columbus was primarily the state capital and much of its sustenance was due to this fact. In other words, other Ohio cities of comparable size felt the need much earlier to widen their economic base and modernize their governmental system in order to prosper. Columbus had less pressing need to do so because of the capital with its attendant bureaucracy, personnel, and impact. But this was not all. Situated almost squarely in the middle of the state, Columbus favorably connected with all major rail lines. This strategic position gave a natural impetus to the development of the city as a clearing house, railhead, and commercial transfer point. Hence, much capital which under more limited alternatives might have been allo-
cated to industry, was allotted to wholesaling and commercial brokerage enterprises.\textsuperscript{3} Further, Columbus had no other city of even comparable size or importance in its immediate vicinity to offer a challenge to its economic suzerainty over central Ohio. This lack of local urban competition naturally retarded the growth of the city, to some extent, since no compelling necessity was felt to meet a propinquant economic challenge.\textsuperscript{4}

Finally, the city was small. The state of Ohio was a Republican stronghold well into the twentieth century and remedying the over-representation of rural constituencies was not really undertaken with any vigor until the 1960's. This rural parochial orientation was reflected strongly in the state government. And the great shadow cast by that government on the city was reflected in the essentially conservative nature of the power groups within the city.\textsuperscript{5}

This intrinsic conservatism was reflected in many ways. In terms of the city's economic development, the local financial institutions were undercapitalized, given the size and structure of the city. The available capital, therefore, was extremely limited in its applicability. Funds were allocated to either established firms or types of firms that had had economic success in the area. This of course included commercial agriculture, due to the proximity of the agricultural college of the Ohio State University. Hence the economic structure of the city was oriented toward a productive capacity far below the potential of the economic and social resources available.\textsuperscript{6}
Politically, the city was more in step with the times in that it too had been swept along in the wave of municipal reform which characterized one aspect of the Progressive movement. The city had converted to a commission-council form of government during the decade following 1900, but while aiding city administration, this shift had other less positive social results. Strongly backed by a vocal but small liberal or Progressive community, whose vanguard was composed of many university personnel, the transition had effectively negated the influence of certain minority groups by cancelling their ward representation. The city government became totally caucasian and economically affluent in its composition. The patterns of city change were markedly affected. Further, the influence of state government on local politics was not sidestepped by the reforms and, if anything, the commission, in its actions, reflected even more the predilections of the dominant social groups within the city. 

It is pre-requisite to note the influence of these social groups within the city. Because Columbus had no industrial giants in its midst, the social leadership of the city was pre-empted by other groups. The city had a definite middle class and a small upper class, but these groups were composed in a somewhat different way than in many other cities. Even as a pre-Civil War agricultural state capital, Columbus had had its leading families. Certain of these families retained leadership long after
more powerful economic and social interests had made their appearance. But more important was the emergence of a high status group whose economic interests were oriented to finance, retailing, wholesaling, real estate, and commercial agriculture. In most urban societies, industry's lords and their lackeys usually eventually overshadow the above mentioned groups in status level. The previous elite is correspondingly reduced in status ranking. This did not happen in Columbus, Ohio. For a variety of reasons, some of which have been mentioned above, large industry simply did not come to Columbus. And without this new economic base, the social elite remained primarily composed of financiers, merchants, light industry owners, and the remnants of an agricultural elite.

This is not to say that there were not exceptions to this general tendency. Some light industries became quite large in their distribution and production. The University community, too very definitely entered the ranks of the socially influential. But this community, with rare exceptions, was held in middle-class status position for a number of reasons: income, outlook and direction by the state governmental institutions. This picture should not be taken too literally, however. Oversimplification must be minimally indulged in since a full-scale analysis of the development of the total economic social, and political base and to reform the nature of local government. But it is indisputable that Columbus lagged far behind Ohio
cities of comparable size in its adaptation to modern urban industrial society.

Attempts at economic and political modernization were often spearheaded by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce. In its efforts to lure business and industry to the city. The Chamber noted that sound city administration and adequate economic resource facilities were crucial in the persuasion of businesses considering re-location. Public facilities were also essential since the new firms desired their working forces to be as efficient as possible. Although some progress was made along these lines, the Black population was usually excluded from policy formulations since it figured so minimally in the economic life of the city. 11

But despite the enlistment of university personnel like Dr. C. C. North, the noted sociologist, in the effort to modernize the city, progress was extremely slow. The city's population was reluctant to change its approach to urban life. The nationally-based heavy industries and manufacturing firms, whose coming would have necessitated many changes, failed to relocate in Columbus, because of the conditions present. Although progress was made in city administration, due to local political pressures, little progress was made before World War II in alleviating economic deficiencies. 12

Dayton, Ohio, on the other hand had a much different experience. Comparable to size, population, available
resources, and geographical location to Columbus, Dayton moved much more rapidly in terms of economic modernization. Much of the credit for the advancement must go to John H. Patterson, founder, manager, and principal owner of the National Cash Register Company. Patterson lured General Motors, Delco, and Western Electric to the city. He illustrated the phenomenal growth of his own firm in the area, from a minuscule operation to the largest producer of cash registers in the country. He then was instrumental in organizing the combined economic power of his own firm and the new arrivals into a coalition of economic interest. This coterie acted as a spur in the rump of a traditionally oriented citizenry, to bring about modernization of the city's governmental facilities and economic resources.  

B. Black Columbus and the Rise of the Urban League

There had been black people in Columbus since the colonial period. During the frontier era, Blacks, both free and slave, were present in the early settlements, and even after the passage of the Northwest Ordinance, slaves who had been freed or had run away were in the area. The Black community increased before the Civil War while the city was a station along the Underground Railroad. In fact, there were enough able-bodied Blacks in the city at the outbreak of the war to form an infantry company whose services were rejected by the military. Later in the war, however, Blacks did serve in other units.
Following the war, the population grew slowly by natural increase and by minor addition from small groups fleeing the ever-harder Black Codes which characterized the later post-war South. By 1917, there were approximately 5000 Blacks in the Columbus area. These Blacks were hidden from general view. Small in numbers, these Blacks made their presence known in few ways. One of these was representation on the city council. Three black persons managed to be elected in the late 19th century, but with the transition of city government in the early Twentieth Century, this practice ceased abruptly. Most of these people were in unskilled or laboring professions or in small subsistence agriculture. Segregation was absolute and to the casual tourist, the way of chancing upon Blacks in any numbers would have been to stroll down Long St. in the immediate downtown area. There, a small cluster of tightly housed Blacks were residing. But even this was not blatant, as most of the housing was in alleys or in the back of white commercial establishments.

The social and economic condition of these people was not as bad as it might have been. Underemployed, ill-fed, ill-housed, and under-educated, the Blacks were living on the fringe of society. But the group was more or less stable in its composition and was growing slowly enough to be predictable. Also, since the group was very small vis-a-vis the rest of the population, efforts to gain help from the base society in terms of charity were usually met with
widespread approval and support.\textsuperscript{20} In short, the black population was a submerged society and offered no direct challenge to the reigning political, social, and economic power groups or the general societal mores.\textsuperscript{21}

Within a few short years, this had all changed. "The Great Migration" began. Affecting the largest cities of the nation first, Columbus felt the impact of the migration only moderately in the years immediately before the outbreak of World War I. But the results of this small migration were profound enough to cause sufficient public concern to expedite greater assistance to the social service agencies already in existence within the city. This assistance was aimed not only at public charities but at private religious and secular social service agencies as well. One of the most visible manifestations of this new interest was the erection of a new black YMCA on Spring St. and the staffing of it with a young, new director.\textsuperscript{22} The year was 1915 and the man was Nimrod B. Allen. For the next four decades, the history of black people in Columbus, as well as the rise of the Urban League, would be inextricably linked to the study of this man. And in many ways, the growth of the entire city is reflected in his career. While not wishing to turn this paper into a biography any more than is necessary, it still seems manifestly important to the writer to discuss, at least at minimal length, on the activities of this individual.

Nimrod B. Allen was graduated from Wilberforce
University in 1910, and after a brief time went East. While studying for the ministry at Yale, he heard of the program and approach of the newly formed National Urban League. He became acquainted with its first director, Eugene Kinckle Jones. Upon receiving his S.T.B. degree in 1915, Allen heard through the Urban League of New York that a position was available in the town of Columbus, Ohio, for a director for a new YMCA. Furthermore, Columbus had no Urban League and its NAACP chapter was essentially dormant. Allen decided to take the position. He arrived in Columbus shortly after his graduation and attempted to make up in enthusiasm what he lacked in experience. Generally, his directorship was adequate. He received a great deal of assistance from citizens, black and white, who were concerned in seeing that YMCA continued its service to black youth. The main advantage of the position, however, was the access it gave the young social worker to the powerful political and social forces within the city. He also had an opportunity to meet frequently with other charitable agencies and their leadership. These connections proved to be invaluable when the "Great Migration" hit Columbus most directly in early 1917.

With American entry into the First World War, northern industry boomed to meet the demands imposed by war mobilization. The lure of the North as a "promised land", which had been tempting previously, now became overpowering. More than 500,000 Blacks migrated north between 1915 and 1920.
Even Columbus was affected. Between the beginning of 1917 and the Armistice, the black population of Columbus doubled. Daily the trains from the South brought in new large groups of southern Blacks, who had no idea what they were going to do when they arrived in Columbus, and indeed, more than a few who stepped off the platform, did so because there was no more money to take them any further. The attempts to accommodate and absorb this black population as well as an increasing southern white population (driven north for the same reasons) taxed the established agencies to the breaking point and beyond. Uneducated and unaccustomed to urban life, these poor Blacks were crammed into already crowded housing in the black pockets in the center of the city. The combination of poor housing, rural patterns of living unadapted to the urban environment, and poverty sent the crime rate, disease rate and incidences of fire spiraling upward. The black pockets quickly became black sections and ghettoization seemed inevitable. It was manifestly clear that action was needed to assist the overburdened social agencies in order to restore some measure of stability to the city.

Consistent with the movements toward centralization and bureaucratization which characterized so much of the intellectual and social action of the Progressive period, there had been a movement for some years across the country to rationalize the activities of social work and the charitable agencies. This was concurrent with the emergence of
tools of rational analysis and social organization to its sister profession—social work. The younger generation of social workers in the pre-Great War years were imbued with these doctrines in their training and these lessons had made an extraordinary impact on their approach to social problems.27 There had been devotees of the "new" approach in Columbus before the War, especially at the University, and in the younger ranks of the charitable and social service organizations. But traditional patterns of organization and leadership prevailed because of personal influence and the seeming efficacy of older approaches. In some cities, persuasive advocates of the new order were able to establish their position with their loquacity or personal connections. But there were no such figures in Columbus. A crisis was needed to engender change. A crisis came. And change came with it.

Nimrod Allen was an adherent to the new school of social work. When it was proposed early in 1917 that a co-ordinating agency be established, to prevent duplication of effort and utilize resources more efficiently with regard to social welfare, Allen was very active in advocating its adoption. Elements of church leadership, school representatives, NAACP, YMCA and YWCA, and other high civic and governmental officials met in March, 1917, to form the Federated Social and Industrial Welfare Movement for the Negro. The meeting place of the group was the Spring St. YMCA, of which Allen was director. Within a month he had been elected general secretary and with Elsie Mountain, a female social
worker, was the staff of the new group. To illustrate the immediacy of the problems, within a few days of organizing the staff, Mrs. Mountain was in the train station daily as a full-time traveler's aid worker to assist the arriving immigrants. Allen helped her when he could but his primary job was co-ordination of the efforts of the new group and establishing liaison with all other existent social service agencies. He also enlisted the aid of all interested persons in selling the idea of the group to gain financial and public support. The case was not ultimately hard to sell in that the potential consequences of inaction were apparent to any person traveling by the train station, night or day, throughout the week. Realizing that public support might not be so willingly forthcoming once the crisis was past, elements of the Federated, spearheaded by Allen, began to move rapidly to consolidate the position of the group, while laying the foundation for a permanent organization.

Forming such an organization proved to be no easy task in a society which had always been extremely reluctant to welcome innovative change. But Nimrod Allen had many factors in his favor. The Federation of which he was General Secretary had made important strides in bringing order to black immigration in the city. The organization had gained the support of many prominent non-professional leaders within the city. And the experience of other larger cities showed that these problems would not cease once major
immigration had slowed. The population balance had changed and the political and socioeconomic structure had changed. Society would have to adapt to these changes with as little friction as possible. And it was widely hoped that these adjustments could be made in such a way as to preserve and assure the retention and adoption by society of those elements of behavior, attitude, and action which the dominant power and status groups of society accepted and which the rest of society had generally emulated. 33

Because of previous association, Allen and others felt that the Urban League would be the most advantageous organization for black advancement for the city. Other than personal reference, the choice had other factors persuading its adoption. First was the philosophy. The National Urban League was avowedly and unequivocally a social and economic uplift agency; it had no political program as did the often disliked NAACP. Further, its membership was bi-racial, and it had fostered a vigorous policy of racial conciliation and co-operation. Also, it had openly shunned any attempts to change the basic fabric of society. Rather it advocated the gradual but persistent entry of black people into the larger social and economic community, and the prevention of hunger, disease, and violence among its own people. 34.

Secondly, the National Urban League was established. It had been functioning for several years in the larger cities of the United States and had shown that it basically
practiced what it preached. It had not indulged in politics, harassment or arch-militance. It was aimed at the correction of fundamental social abuses, asked no special favors, and advocated equality of access to American life. This was reflected in the fact that its journal was called *Opportunity*, while that of the NAACP was entitled *The Crisis*. And the National had gained the trust and support of some of the most wealthy, powerful and socially prominent people in the country. Any doubts as to the respectability of the organization were dispelled by examining its membership list.

Finally, there was a great degree of local autonomy. While the research, publicity, and executive staffs were at the disposal of the local leagues, and while each branch had to subscribe to the cardinal tenets of the League, nevertheless there was an extraordinary flexibility possible to local leagues to accomplish local objectives with specialized techniques. Added to all of these general reasons was the fact that the League as proposed by its Columbus supporters would accomplish the goals of the Federated in much the same manner as the latter, but with all the advantages of Urban League affiliation. After one year of presenting the case along these lines and others, and meeting relatively little concerted resistance since a crisis was still at hand, the Federated affiliated with the National Urban League in mid-1918.

Nimrod Allen remained very active with the League through the next few years, in his capacity of general
secretary. But since neither he nor any of its other founders could spend full-time with it after 1918, the League established the full-time position of executive secretary. The list of this series of directors is not worthy of note because they came and went with extreme rapidity in the period following the War. With the end of the War, the economic boom, triggered by mobilization, deflated and many of the gains of the War years were lost. The "Red Scare" of 1919 also was a major setback since its extreme nativism cast the Blacks into even greater disrepute. Finally, in 1921, with the situation continually deteriorating and the League about to crumble, The Board of Directors asked Allen to assume the position of full-time Director. He accepted.

During his long term of continued directorship, Nimrod Allen developed the core of the organization and approach of the Columbus Urban League. Even today, fifteen years after his retirement, his mark is still visible on the League in more ways than might be immediately suspected. Since Allen held office for such a long period of time and so much of the League's history involves him, it would be easy to identify the League with Allen and vice-versa. Such analysis is far too simplistic. While Nimrod Allen was certainly the single most important individual in the Columbus League's history, many other persons were also intimately involved for many years in its programs, and offered leadership and direction which has left a decided impression on the orientation of the League. As many as
possible of these other persons will be cited below.

The Urban League in Columbus began as a co-ordinating agency and liason group for other established social agencies. But it rapidly became much more. By 1921, Nimrod Allen was a trained social worker with five years of Columbus experience behind him. He saw many areas being essentially overlooked by established social service organizations. He attempted early, to begin to fill the gap. As soon as the organization was founded, volunteers, black and white, began to work in the train stations with new arrivals. On a broader basis, Allen and the Board of the League, saw quickly that certain crucial problems would not be eradicated by helpful hints in the train station. The two biggest of these were health and race relations. The black immigrant health was deteriorating rapidly in the urban North. The League began a series of health education meetings for Blacks and instituted similar programs in schools and churches. Also, the League talked with city health authorities and the Columbus medical profession concerning the establishment of emergency free clinics, which could hopefully one day be made permanent. Instrumental in this effort was the President of the League, Dr. William J. Woodlin, who left his own practice to co-ordinate, for some time, the management of these problems.  

Just as important and pressing was the problem of race relations. Most of the base population was sceptical, to say the least, of the benefits to be derived from the Black influx. And to complicate matters, the extremist
opposition to black immigration had organized itself better than it ever had in the past, in the form of the resurrected, but in many ways novel Ku Klux Klan. Sacrificing its purely southern base and limited program, the Klan had expanded its itinerary of panacea of bigotry to include Catholics, Jews, and immigrants, as well as Blacks. The "White Hoods" had done surprisingly well since the resurgence of the movement, especially in the urban Midwest. Marches in the early 20's in Columbus were turning out 2,000 individuals at a time to burn crosses and indulge in other frivolities. Second only to Indiana in strength, the Ohio Klan vigorously denounced the black immigration in highly militant presses and lecture tours. The League responded to this challenge by joining forces with the NAACP, the Ministerial Alliance, ethnic group representatives, and the Liberal community in launching a counter-fusillade at the Klan. More important than this battle in printer's ink, however, was again an education program. Although the Klan was powerful, it had by no means won over the entire society. Therefore, the most strenuous efforts of the League were aimed at convincing the uncommitted that Blacks were not the holy terror which the Klan had made them out to be. Generally they were successful: because of the variety of public officials who openly denounced the Klan; because the Klan overextended itself and shocked the sensibilities of even some of its more fervent earlier supporters; and most importantly, because the frustrations following World War I, which had induced its success, had
abated somewhat in the relative ensuing stability of the 1920's. By 1925, the Klan had declined as a powerful force in central Ohio, although its remnants never faded away. But the problem of race relations remained. Many persons who were appalled by the extremities of segregation which had been in existence for generations. Since this problem was more subtle, the battle became much more complicated and specialized. And it lasted much longer. In fact, it is still going on.

Simultaneous with the establishment of the Race Relations and Health Committees, the League formed a Committee on Industry. The simple fact was that immigrant Blacks could not find work. Part of the problem was lack of education and lack of adaptability. But equally important was white discrimination. White employers were extremely reluctant to hire Blacks, either for reasons of personal prejudice or from fear of losing able white help. The problem was compounded in that local labor unions were practicing a "hands-off" policy toward Blacks. The committee determined to get Blacks jobs, any jobs, in any way possible. In order to remedy the immediate economic problems. There were plans for the future, but the future seemed far away.

Enlisting the aid of local employers, who were either members of or sympathetic to the Urban League, the committee managed to place many Blacks in unskilled and semi-skilled positions. There were always more applicants than jobs, but minimal advances were made.
By the mid 1920's, the programs cited above were proceeding with varying success. But new problems had emerged which required action: One was growing crime and the other was youth. Columbus had relatively few black policemen, but its most prominent was Sgt. Leslie M. Shaw. The highest ranking Black on the force and the first black sergeant in its history, Shaw was very concerned over the rising crime rate, a significant portion of which was directly related to the recently arrived black population. He believed that this crime could not only be reduced, it could be prevented by education, counseling, and assistance from the police dept. itself. He therefore established The Friendly Service Bureau of the Columbus Police Department in 1925 with Urban League help, using the facilities of the police to work positively for crime prevention. Initially he managed the Bureau alone. But the idea was exciting, and many others offered support, including N.B. Allen. By 1927, the Bureau had become an "affiliate" of the Urban League. Affiliation meant utilization of the League's staff and resources, which, while meager, were helpful. The Bureau had become so effective by 1929 that it was incorporated directly into the Department as the Police Welfare Bureau, while maintaining its status as an affiliate of the League. The organization's approach and techniques were widely studied and copied. The development of the Juvenile Bureau of the Police Department from the "Friendly" was emulated in several other cities.
Buy young crime was only one aspect of the problems of youth in the city. Many black parents were forced to work long and relentlessly to maintain a bare subsistence, and since black public education was lacking in funds, staff, and content, many black youths were becoming increasingly alienated. Several black women formed a group to deter and hopefully remove this problem in 1925. The group called itself the Colored Big Sisters and Mrs. Kittie Green was its indefatigueable head. The intention of the group was to provide person to person counseling and guidance to black girls in the role of a "Big Sister." The program was successful to the extent that it was joined by a companion "Colored Big Brother" movement in the following year. Both groups became affiliates of the League in 1928.

During the period, The League was attempting to prove itself useful and necessary to the community, as well as attempting to accomplish the goals it had set for itself in its programs. Although the League was receiving some funding from the Community Fund, its resources were extremely overtaxed. Added to the problem was the support of the affiliates. Therefore in 1929, the League formed the Joint Welfare Fund for Organizations outside the Community Fund. (J.W.F.) It was a great assist to the League until the 1930's when the League and its applicants became dominantly funded by the Community Fund.

Just as the League was beginning to feel its way out of its first decade, the Great Depression began. The League
with its exclusive policy of social and economic uplift, was called upon to undertake an extremely heavy responsibility in this period. Previously the staff of the League had been quite small and had acted primarily as a co-ordinating group for day-to-day operations. Much of the actual work of the League was handled directly by the Directors or members by utilizing contacts and influence and by giving part-time service. With the crisis of the Depression, this was no longer possible. The Board of the League simply did not have themselves to and felt an obligation to carry out. Therefore the staff was expanded. 50

Columbus had had community centers for many years. But it was not until 1928 that the Alexandrian Civic Center was established exclusively for black people. Other centers had grown up rapidly in the wake of the Alexandrian. By 1934, a committee of the Board had been established to co-ordinate their affiliated efforts. 51

Finally, there was Nimrod Allen's special project - The Public Relations Department. The League had had a Publicity Committee of the Board for some time to handle general publicity in co-operation with the other committees. But Nimrod Allen, since the early 1920's, had been looking for a means to obtain the largest possible public support for the League. He called his ultimate blueprint "The Columbus Plan." After a number of years of continual advocacy of its merits, he had been gaining, with the passage of time, a quite favorable response. The Plan called for a comprehensive approach to
dealing with the problems of the Black community and with the organization of the Departments mentioned above, the Plan was well on its way to implementation. This was, of course contingent on the continuing development of Organization, centralized planning, and close contact with the main agency - The Urban League. But the Plan was also innovative in a number of ways. The first was to launch a virtual blizzard of publicity. This was to be combined with a professional public relations approach to public education with regard to the League.\textsuperscript{52} Secondly, he boldly decided to change the constituent base of membership in a drastic fashion. This was a major departure from the policies of the National or the other branches, in that the others, while pressing for public support made actual membership possible only by action of the Board. Nimrod Allen proposed to sell memberships for a dollar apiece. He was not interested in the funds \textit{per se}, helpful as they would be. Rather he was saying that by having thousands of members of the League and having a "stake" in its success, public support would be enhanced extraordinarily. Also a yearly membership drive would offer an excellent opportunity for a concentrated public relations campaign concerning the League.\textsuperscript{53} John Dancy, longtime Director of the Detroit League, has written that he forebore such an approach because he disliked asking the public twice for funds - once for the League and another time for the Community Chest which helped support the League in Detroit.\textsuperscript{54} Nimrod Allen was not moved by such reasoning.
He felt that if people could be moved to give twice, they should have an opportunity to do so. As Mr. Allen was often quoted as saying, "If anyone ever wants to do a favor for you, let him. Don't discourage him. It deflates his ego."

The other major innovation of the Plan was with regard to black leadership. Allen felt strongly and with reason, that there was a dearth of trained black leadership. The colleges were turning out few potential black social service leaders and the prospects for improvement looked dim. He therefore proposed the formation of leadership training facilities on the local level and a service organization whose members would be trained to be social service personnel. The idea was realized in 1936 in the Frontiers of America, the first national black men's social service organization. 56

Meanwhile the Industry Department was coming into its own. Not only concerned with finding any available employment, the Department began to move to break new ground. The League in conjunction with the NAACP, began to negotiate with previously unapproached industries and businesses. When employers were reluctant, persistent persuasion was usually used to wear down the opposition. 57 Occasionally, though, the League assisted in more direct action, as the case in the Kroger Co. boycott of 1937. It is significant to note that although the entire black community was enraged over the Kroger discrimination, that the League did not take the lead in the boycott as such, although most of its membership was quite active in it. And the League as a body
did approve of the goals of the boycott, as expressed by its co-ordinators, The Independent Voter's League.

Stores affiliated with the Kroger food chain, expanding into the Near East Side of Columbus, refused to employ Negroes at any level higher than carry-out boy. Black groups of all types believed this to be a particularly antagonistic form of discrimination since almost all of the business in the stores were transacted with Negroes. The Independent Voters League, with the support of the NAACP and the Urban League, began a boycott, which ultimately succeeded in integrating the store's management. But progress only came after picketing, altercations, and negotiations had dragged on for months. The turning point came when the state NAACP moved from a position of support to action. It threatened a state-wide Kroger boycott. When the Urban League supported the proposal, first in Columbus and then in other cities, opposition from the Kroger Company began to deteriorate rapidly. But adverse criticism of League support of the boycott from the League's own membership as well as the white community, caused the staff to severely restrict its direct-action involvement in future activities of this sort.

The Industry Department had also begun to seek a reapproachement with organized labor. With the rise of the CIO in Columbus, the League moved rapidly to open negotiations concerning black unionism. The AFL, to meet the challenge of the CIO, also softened its earlier stance of grudging acceptance of co-operation with the League. But blatant racism and
discrimination was still the basic order of the day once
the "romantic" period of the CIO had ended by the late
1930's. It was not until World War II that the Unions and
the League finally reached a meeting of the minds. The
ultimate change is best illustrated by noting that during
the War, the name of the Department was changed from Indus-
try to Industrial Relations and that labor representatives
were actively recruited to sit on the Board of Directors.

As the League moved on in the 1930's, it became
increasingly clear that it had overextended itself danger-
ously. More projects had been launched in its twenty year
history that had been the case by any other Black uplift
group in the city of any type. The need was present and
the League responded. Somehow the need was never extin-
guished, only alleviated. Although the volunteer base of
the League expanded constantly and rapidly, co-ordination
among the plethora of projects undertaken by the League
was desperately needed. But to the staff and Board, organ-
izational problems were inconsequential compared with the
necessity of continued assistance to the Black poor and
unemployed. Criticism of the League's increasingly unwildly
structure were ignored by pointing to the progress the
League had made in behalf of the Negro. Few other groups
addressed themselves to these problems. Consequentially,
The Leagues efforts did look more important than the means
of achieving its aims.

Not until the nation had passed out of the Depression,
would the League be viably confronted with criticism of its own inefficiencies. In the wake of one national crisis, and in foreseeable advance of another, criticism was not only conceivable but inevitable.
Chapter III

"The New Epoch"
1942-1954

"The Columbus Urban League is gearing its strategy to meet the New Day. We are entering upon a New Epoch in our methods and techniques. Our goal of seeking for the Negro a normal participation in the American way of Life will be pursued vigorously. We are looking forward to the future with enthusiasm."

Twenty-Fifth Annual Report
1942

When the Columbus Urban League celebrated its twentieth anniversary in 1937, its leaders looked back proudly on the record of the agency. The League had initiated efforts in health, housing, crime prevention, employment, community services, and education. In some cases, its efforts were trailblazers in the field, and in others they were improvements on practices from other locations. This effort had been undertaken by what was essentially a group of influential private citizens who gave freely of their time and effort, whenever possible, to the goals of the League. A relatively small staff of full-time social workers gave continuity and leadership to the private effort. Affiliation with the Community Fund in 1922, when that agency began in Columbus, alleviated the League's financial
problems to a great extent.¹

Beginning as a co-ordination agency for other agencies, the League rapidly moved to begin its own varied projects encompassing, in one way or another, most of the social problems of the Black community. Over the course of its first twenty years, the League persistently expanded its social service offerings. When a new problem emerged, a new committee was founded to tackle it. Staffed with members of the Board of the League, the committee analyzed the problem, proposed the programs to alleviate it, initiated the programs, and kept them moving. When possible, the League relied on private part-time assistance. When such help was not possible, as in the case of the Northwest Community Center, it hired full-time workers to staff the project.² Often these workers were not professional social workers when they began their work. Rather, they learned social work by doing it. The same was true of the more actively involved members of the Board. Mr. Allen was the professional social worker.

Even using this system, the League did not manifestly increase its staff. As late as 1942, there were only five full-time workers on the staff, excluding secretaries. These were the heads of Big Brothers and Sisters, the Friendly Service Bureau, and the two workers at the Northwest Community Center. Of these, the Northwest Community Center was essentially a domain unto itself which relied on the League for administrative and financial help. The
Friendly Service Bureau was an "affiliate" whose main connection with the League was financial. 3

Overall, as the League entered the 1940's, it was still very much a voluntary organization of concerned private citizens who participated in various fields of social endeavor for Negroes, with the assistance, guidance and counsel of Mr. Allen and his practically-trained assistants.

But still another dimension to the League's program was of crucial import. Integral to Nimrod Allen's Columbus Plan was the skillful, pervasive, and consistent use of publicity to create an "atmosphere" for change within the city. Seen to its logical conclusion, this emphasis on pervasive public relations provided much of the impulse to change within the Urban League itself since the 1930's. 4 The League eschewed "politics" per se, and throughout its history attempted to work apolitically for the full integration of the Negro into American society. It aimed most of its programs, up to the 1940's, not primarily at agitation or at protest for social change, but rather toward working on a person-to-person basis to effect the uplift of the Negro community.

Originally, the League had attempted to meet an emerging crisis -- the Great Migration. With its efforts to assist the Migrants' assimilation into a Northern, urban society, the League realized at an early stage that it had an obligation to "assist in the improvement of urban conditions among Negroes in general. 5 The techniques used to assist in this process were still basically those
of benevolent person-to-person assistance. But elements of opposition and complacency so impeded this "normal implementation," that Mr. Allen concluded early in the 1920's, that public relations was essential in order to enlist the support of the White community. Liberal-minded men who could see and understand the problems of the Negro in Columbus would as rational human beings assist in the process of assimilation. More important, if the entire community was made aware not only of the Negro's physical problems, but also of his desire to enter White society openly and without detriment to that society, then Whites would be more receptive to the assimilation process. Men fear what they do not understand, Allen asserted. If Whites saw that the Negro's integration into their society boded no ill to the White community, and was in its best interest, then the difficulties attendant in uplifting the culturally and physically deprived Black community would be greatly eased. As Mr. Allen put it,

The long-run objective is to achieve a normal life for the Negro group in the city. That is, the aim is to reduce these problems to the point where they are not excessive and to achieve a normal integration of the Negro group into the life of the city. This would mean a situation wherein no special attention to Negro Welfare would be necessary because Negroes no longer present special problems. As we like to say, we're trying to work the Urban League out of existence.

Now as a matter of fact the character of problem with which the agency is now concerned is not profoundly different from those which engaged its attention at the time of organization. Their acuteness, novelty, and immediacy are not now present and the solutions now sought are of the permanent and long-run character.
What Mr. Allen apparently did not foresee was that his emphasis on public relations, enlisted in the course of apolitical "ordinary integration," had political overtones in the broadest sense of the word. The "normal integration" strategy is logically keyed to a passive value structure. That is, American society exists de facto; we wish to fit the Negro into that society without conflict and without peculiar advantages to him because of his race. But if one then attempts to change attitudes in order to assist in that integration, one is no longer dealing with the same society. A complacent or oppressive society is not the same as a concerned society. The structure may be the same, but assuredly its component members are not. The point is subtle, in that the League, while eschewing "politics," still entered positively into the realm of political action in advocating its public relations program. Its politics was not partisan in the usual sense; the League promoted Negro assimilation and or integration as an interest group. The full significance and implication of this public relations syndrome did not become apparent until much later in the League's history, although Allen formulated the concept in the late 1920's. The obscurity was primarily due to the tardiness in full implementation of the program until the 1940's. The reasons for that lag will be discussed below with regard to the general tardiness of the League in rationalizing its program. But it is crucial to keep in mind that while most of the programs of the League, up to
the end of the 1930's, emphasized integration into a White society, the publicity syndrome was essentially changing the normative base of the local city.

By the late 1930's, the Urban League's program was thorough, broad-ranging, and was yielding significant returns within its scope of operations. But these returns minimized in the next few years. Although the League engaged in activities it considered valuable, a body of opinion had emerged by the early 1940's which stated that the League could do more with the sources at its disposal.

The need for change was not only being felt on the local level, but on the national level as well. A growing number of scholars, officials, and private citizens concluded in the closing years of the Great Depression that while social welfare programs under the New Deal had made extraordinary strides towards rationalization and efficiency, the Negro had been largely excluded from these benefits. Because of government intervention and support, as well as a general societal concern with social problems which was induced by the Depression, the tasks and problems of social work became increasingly important not only to the officials, but to society in general. But it became increasingly clear that the Negro was not being included in this concern. Awareness of this problem spurred groups and individuals involved with Negro uplift to redouble their efforts in behalf of the Blacks. Part of this was a series of reassessments of the current programs aimed at furthering Black uplift.
The most famous of these studies was Gunnar Myrdal's classic work, *An American Dilemma*. Part of the preparation for it included a Carnegie Commission grant, supervised by Ralph Bunche, to study the operations, role, and efficiency of the Urban League as a Negro uplift organization. The results were not too impressive, at least to Mr. Bunche:

As an interracial, dependent organization it can never develop a program which will spur the Negro masses and win their confidence. It has not exerted, nor can it, any great influence upon the thinking of Negroes nor upon their course of action. It operates strictly on the periphery of the Negro problem and never comes to grips with the fundamentals in American racial conflict.

The National Urban League leadership undertook immediate efforts to remedy deficiencies, spurred on as well by the advent of World War II.

The experience of the First World War gave Negro uplift groups a pattern from which to work. The job market in the North encouraged a migration of Black laborers. While they found jobs, these transplanted migrants experienced relocation problems. These difficulties added to the already existent dilemmas of the Northern Whites concerning the proper place of the Negro in their society. With the contraction of the job market at the end of the War, the economic gains were cancelled out while the social problems multiplied. These were aggravated by the Depression, which eradicated many of the social and economic advances made by the Black uplift and welfare agencies since the 1920's.
Advocates for change now argued that the Negro community should take full advantage of the economic and social possibilities offered by the war, and follow up on these gains after the war ended. They envisioned the difficulties of a second displaced migratory wave being added to the problems of the still not assimilated first wave, and postulated that the results could be catastrophically explosive.

Given this analysis, it was clear to the National Urban League's leadership that decisive action would have to be taken during the war not only to assist in the war effort, but also to exploit and guarantee the preservation of gains made during the hostilities. A new militancy entered into the problems involved with the "Negro mobilization" on the part of elements of the Black community advocating protest techniques to gain their ends. The "March on Washington Movement" epitomized this new activism. Led by A. Philip Randolph, it resulted in President Roosevelt's executive order instituting the Fair Employment Practices Commission. Men like Randolph and Bayard Rustin were mobilizing this growing activism by an ever growing minority. Assisting them were a plethora of radical and militant reform groups both in the white and in the Black community.

The President turned to me and asked, "Walter, how many people will really march?"

I told him no less than one hundred thousand.

The National Urban League and the NAACP acutely felt this challenge to their acknowledged leadership of the Negro
uplift movement. Such activism would either have to be brought under the aegis of the two national groups or efforts would have to be made to render the challenge impotent. The situation provided yet another reason to renew efforts and increase activity on behalf of Negro uplift by the League.

At the same time, a professional challenge to the League's leadership in economic and social uplift emerged from the ever stronger and more numerous cadres of trained social workers who decried the League's reliance on voluntarism. They persisted in arguing that the League needed a more professionalized social work approach in order to make efficient use of its available resources. The arguments presented persuaded: -- Volunteers only participated provisionally, on a part-time basis, by definition; although the freely given labor of volunteers was appreciated and needed, more professionalized activity was prerequisite, given the expanding complexity of social adaptation, in general, to an urban environment. The perverse effects of this complexity were more strongly in evidence in Black areas of a given community than in any other, due to the cultural and physical history of deprivation of that group as a whole. Negro problems per se required a co-ordinated, professional, full-time effort. And this was especially true given the pressing nature of wartime conditions and the expectations of potential gain which the League hoped to reap from its full involvement and activity during the
hostilities. 13

The arguments made positive sense to the National, whose professional leadership came from that self-same social work profession. What was not as clear in the arguments presented was the implicit assumption of the social worker, that he was better qualified than the volunteer to understand the problems of the Negro community. The social workers also insisted that if funds were not available to implement the program, they should be discovered and tapped. On the national level, the funds were available from the Rockefeller Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, and other private and institutional donors. The National Urban League, reflecting its own aims, wished to make the best use possible of its links to local chapters. Hence the program which finally emerged. It was called the "New Day." 14

The "New Day" consisted of a call by the National to each of its local chapters to re-examine its programs, priorities, and aims, eliminate duplication of effort, increase professional help and a professional approach wherever possible, and generally re-consolidate its organizational structure to approximate that of the National. The most striking structural aspect of this pattern was the departmentalization of tasks, with a trained professional handling the duties of each department on a full-time basis. Volunteers would provide advisory and supplemental help.

In other words, the League never relinquished for a moment its aim of utilizing influential members of the White
community to achieve their ends through the exercise of power. But the National, over its thirty year history, had become well enough established, financially and organizationally, no longer to see the need for utilizing influential white persons in the day-to-day functioning of most of the League's programs.\footnote{15}

Nimrod B. Allen and the Columbus Urban League were intrigued by the theory of the "New Day," but skeptical of its efficiency in practice. In fact, there were grave doubts within the League as to the efficacy and desirability of all of the theory itself. The doubters noted that the National Urban League was a co-ordinating agency above all else. The Columbus League was committed to specific projects as well as the co-ordination of diverse activities. It had taken twenty years of effort to build up many of these projects - projects which no one else had undertaken effectively. Now the National was suggesting that the League in Columbus drop projects which were either no longer relevant or whose services were being, or could be, minimally provided by other agencies particularly designed to deal with the specific problems. It seemed to Mr. Allen that many years of experience and painstaking progress would be sacrificed if the agencies assuming these responsibilities were unable or unwilling to profit fully from previously obtained knowledge.\footnote{16}

More important, Mr. Allen had serious doubts about the desirable extent of professionalization. He had no
qualms about professional assistance. He never made it a secret that he was desirous of all the help he could get. But the League in Columbus had co-ordinated its publicity campaigns for many years with the recruitment of volunteer help. This situation developed not only because of a lack of manpower and funds, but also because an influential person, working in the League's day-to-day programs, acquired a much stronger interest and stake in them, than would be the case of an individual in simply an advisory position. The success of Mr. Allen's "Roll-Call" idea (in which memberships in the League were procurable by the general public, for one dollar) was in great measure due to the public knowledge that influential Columbusites were not only supporting, but working actively and diligently with the League. This impression would suffer if the private volunteer aspect of the League's work was reduced. 17

Mr. Allen prided himself in the fact that he was making part-time social workers out of busy lawyers, doctors, businessmen, and other private citizens. It seemed to mesh with an old American myth of every man a bit of his brother's keeper, when the need arose. The argument that professionals, as a class, could better establish priorities and allocations of resources seemed to negate this concept. 18

Centralization of departments and adherence to a national pattern formed other problems. The local chapters had always been relatively autonomous. The imposition of national guidelines struck an individualistically non-
responsive chord in many members of the League, both volunteer and Staff. The advantage of Mr. Allen's "involvement" process lay in getting as many important persons as possible to participate actively in a committee area which interested them. Consolidation of functions and dropping of activities signalled the end to many committee positions and potential work areas. These persons were accustomed to the exercise of authority, and often were reluctant to work in a non-decision-making role.

Partially as a consequence of this reluctance of the Columbus Urban League enthusiastically support all aspects of the "New Day," and partially as a matter of course, The National Urban League sent a study team to Columbus in 1942 to analyze the League's programs and advise if substantive change was necessary. The team made its analysis and presented its report. A reorganization of the Columbus League called "The New Epoch" emerged. It was something of a compromise between many of the conflict interesting interests described above. The National had been urging for some time that the Columbus League departmentalize its structure. It had done this by 1939, by changing the name of most of its project groups from "committees" to "departments," while retaining the same organizational pattern. The "New Epoch" was a change of a more fundamental nature.

The League dropped its affiliation with the Friendly Service Bureau. The responsibility for that agency's
functions was given completely to the Columbus Police Department under the title of the Police Welfare Board. It subsumed the Big Brothers and Big Sisters organizations under a new Youth Department, with a professional at its head, who supervised these activities as all others related to youth problems. The Industry Department became the Industrial Department with a professional director. The various community centers, health, and housing programs of the League became the Community and Neighborhood Department. A separate department was established for the newly-founded Brush Lake Youth and Family Camp. Separate committees were retained for the Roll Call and personnel functions of the League. The Extension Committee was dropped.

(The passing of the Extension Committee and The Friendly Service Bureau meant that the League lost the services of Dr. C.C. North, Professor of Sociology at the Ohio State University, who for many years had served both on the League's Board and as Chairman of those two committees.)

On the surface, the transformation of the League seemed total. Such was not the case. Each of the separate departments cited above had a committee of volunteers complementing it. The chairmen were organizationally responsible for the Department as well as the Committees. The chairmen were all volunteers. They, with the officers of the Board, the Executive Director, and the Directors of the departments composed an Executive Committee, whose task was described as "constitutional responsibilities."
A pattern seemed established in which the League had become much more professionalized while the utilization of volunteer help was kept at a maximum. The most striking innovation of the whole reorganization scheme was the Public Relations Department, in which all interpretative, research, and social harmony matters rested under one office. The first full-fledged Public Relations Department anywhere in the League, the Department was the organizational culmination of Nimrod Allen's long drive to make the promotion of inter-racial harmony through the media a dominant goal of the League in Columbus. Now the League had an organizational tool to not only use public relations to institute the Columbus Plan, but also to push the Plan itself as the most efficacious means of bringing about inter-racial harmony.

The war years were not easy ones for the Columbus League or for the Black community in general. Wartime rationing of necessary commodities inflicted great hardship on the lower economic levels of the community, and the scarcity of building materials only expedited what was an already critical housing shortage. The prognosticators were more or less correct. The coming of World War II had induced a second migration, not as proportionally massive as the first, but larger in terms of absolute number of migrants. The problem intensified with a concurrent White migration of equal proportions, which had many of the same types of problems: poor education, previous rural environment, low
available skills, and a deteriorating family structure. The resources of many social agencies were bent to the breaking point by the combined onslaught of both White and Black migrants, as well as the problems of the base population. As a result, The Columbus League was forced to work even harder for the Black community.

The Black community was not wholeheartedly behind the League, however. One of the most important manifestations of that lack of confidence, in both the Urban League and the NAACP, was the Vanguard League. Founded in 1940 as an offshoot of the NAACP, by a high school student named Frank Shearer, the Vanguard League decried the tactics and progress of both older groups and boldly announced programs of social protest and agitation in line with the example of A. Philip Randolph. From a very inauspicious start, it rapidly gained support, and soon was one of the more significant Black advancement groups in the city.

Throughout its entire history, the Vanguard League was a mixed blessing to the Urban League in Columbus. For now the liberal-to-leftist Black elements of the protest persuasion had a viable and growing organization to press their demands and to chide the League and NAACP for their slowness to act. Combined with a residuum of dislike for the League by the Right (for being "too progressive"), and the problems engendered by the War itself, the League felt compelled to work more diligently than ever to answer its
critics and to meet the physical problems at hand. The Vanguard League made an impact on the Urban League but was less effective in mobilizing the Black community to its persuasion. It was never successful as a mass movement. When it pressed its demands forcefully, even during the War, it struck the community, Black and White, as being more than a little unpatriotic. The movement toned down its attacks as its leaders grew older, until its policies regarding protest were only slightly more militant than the NAACP, from which it had originally bolted in discust. 28

During the War, the Urban League did its best either to counter the charges of the Vanguard League or simply ignore the group. Its Brush Lake camp was extremely successful. Few camping facilities were available to Negro youth and Brush Lake offered its resources to families as well as youth. It filled a pressing need satisfied by no other agency. It was the oldest tradition of the Columbus League to meet such needs; during the 1940\'s. No one argued about its utility or merit. 29 The community centers and block units were kept running by volunteers to enable Negro mothers to work in the War industries. Health programs increased, often with governmental assistance. 30

The Public Relations Department conducted surveys, took polls, and produced reams of illustrative and descriptive material about the League and the Negro in Columbus. It also distributed the materials sent on by the National Urban League and other groups interested in Black advancement. The Department also held many types of lectures,
meetings, and conferences on the problems of race relations in wartime, usually ending up with an appeal to forget "minor" differences and co-operate to win the war.31

These efforts were most closely co-ordinated with regard to the activities of the Industrial Department, which throughout the war period, constantly sought new employment opportunities for Negroes, ran adult education courses in vocational training, and sponsored vocational counseling for Negro youth.32 More significant than any of these specific programs was the direction the League was beginning to take with regard to organized Labor. For decades the League and Labor had not been the best of friends. The League's earliest employment contacts, locally and nationally, had been with representatives of the larger manufacturing and service businesses of a given area. Many, if not most of these men expressed hostility to organized labor. The situation had thawed somewhat by the 1930's, but the new militancy represented by the CIO caused many employers to reconfirm old suppositions and condemn labor in general. From the beginning, there was no doubt as to which side of the controversy the League and its constituency gravitate - business.33

The League was founded nationally by industrial representatives as well as scholars and social workers. Before the turn of the century, Labor had accused Management, more than once, of using Negroes as strike-breakers. The League and similar organizations usually denied these
charges. If their validity was occasionally admitted, the League vigorously asserted that such action was individual in nature, discouraged by the League, and certainly not in accordance with the League's policy of eschewing politics in its attempts to fit the Negro into a normal place in American Life. The Columbus League made this argument even stronger with its early policy of inter-racial harmony as its prime goal. "Scabbing" was certainly not conductive to inter-racial harmony. Although at least one writer has alleged documentary evidence to the contrary with regard to the League on the national level, no contradictory evidence has presented itself to counter the claim by the Columbus League that it has never indulged in such activity.

As the 1930's progressed, however, a decided shift occurred in the League's relations with Labor. The policy of avoiding all comment on the Labor movement was replaced by a cautious reapproachment. The Director of the Industrial Department changed his title to that of Industrial Relations Director in the early 1940's. By 1945, the Department had become the Industrial Relations Department. By virtually ignoring or terming irrelevant the manifest bigotry of many union members, the League aimed its program of inter-racial goodwill and industrial relations at the key labor leaders in the city. The approach was summarized by Nimrod Allen:
In essence the lot of the Negro people in any community is tied inextricably to that of the working class of that community and of the nation. Techniques, programs and strategies designed to make closer this bond of oneness and to improve the stature of the working class as a whole is relevant to the Negro problem. 38

This technique was successful in that, despite the presence of some die-hard businessmen on the Board, Labor representatives were being asked to become Board members by the late 1940's. The League still had miles to go in winning over local union members, but at least a partial realignment was accomplished.

As the United States emerged from World War II, the gloomy predictions of some economists that the economy would undoubtedly take a downward turn with the coming of demobilization, seemed to have a solid basis in fact. Columbus, Ohio proved to be no exception. The city experienced an increase in the manufacturing employment index of 225% between 1938 and 1945 (on a base of 1935 as 100%), but dropped precipitously back to 150% of the 1935 levels in the 1944-45 fiscal year, and then stabilized at that level. This drop was not as dramatic as those experienced in some other cities; and to be sure the total employment index dropped less severely from a smaller peak percentage. But the addition of approximately 15,000 persons to the Black community in this period, of whom 10,000 were classed as some kind of worker, led to a severe dislocation when the Negro employment syndrome of "last hired, first fired" began to take its toll in late 1945 and early 1946. 39 Once
again Columbus was faced with a population of relatively unskilled, unemployed Negro migrants. These Black newcomers were jammed into the East Side of the city due to a wartime lag in housing and the general reluctance of contractors to build for Blacks in any case.

The League attempted to meet these problems in several ways. It undertook several housing studies attempting to show the untapped Black housing market, and tried to persuade the public to forego restrictive covenants. It intensified its Industrial Relations program with regard to both Labor and Business, and made vigorous efforts to stem the drop in Negro employment. It was not wholly successful in this effort until the 1950's.

This entire period proved in the long run to be less of a challenge in terms of immediate action than the migration of World War I had been. There were several reasons for this: not only did the League have thirty years' experience, but other agencies were in existence after World War II which had not been in a position to help after World War I. The two most important were the Community Chest, formed in Columbus in 1922, and the Council of Social Agencies, which though in existence after the First War, was mainly co-ordinating the advisory agency of miniscule influence.

By the end of World War II, a three-pronged civic approach to welfare co-ordination and maintenance was
operating with relatively smooth efficiency: the United Appeal to raise money, the Community Chest to administer it, and the Council of Social Agencies to advise on programs. These civic welfare groups primarily co-ordinated fund raising and expenditure. The existence of the civic social service nexus greatly alleviated the problems engendered by the migration and made the task of the Urban League part of a co-ordinated, rather than a single, effort.

Probably the most important factor in the easing of migratory settlement was the nature of the migrants themselves. The first migration had been composed primarily of rural Negroes from the deep South whose exposure to a Northern urban environment was, in many cases, literally traumatic. The second migration had elements of the deep South rural population within it, but to a large extent it consisted of second generation migrants. Their parents, or they themselves, had migrated to the border states during the First War; and they now moved further North during World War II because of a more favorable job climate above the Ohio River. Indeed, many of the migrants were simply southern Ohio Blacks who were moving North to escape the new influx of Negroes crowding into the southern Ohio metropolii. This second migration had therefore already been partially acculturated before arriving in Columbus, so the local problems of total acculturation were less severe. Also, the second migration did not proportionally increase the local Black community to the same extent as did the
earlier migration. 41

As the League moved into the late 1940's and early 1950's, it was evident that the pre-war mobilization had had many positive benefits. The increased co-ordination within the League and with the other agencies had made for notable gains in employment and acceptability during the war. While the demobilization cancelled out some of these, the situation by no means returned to status quo ante bellum.

So it was something of a surprise to the League when its next major struggle arose not over economic or social policies but over its "politics." Given its strenuous efforts to avoid politics, the League was especially shocked to be labelled "Communist" as well as "political." But such was the case during the late 1940's and early 1950's as McCarthyism swept through central Ohio.

During this period every organization to the left of the Chamber of Commerce was not above being suspected of being a "Communist front." The Vanguard League never really recovered from this societal witch hunt, and eventually dissolved in the early 1950's. Its members either went into other more established groups like the NAACP or simply disaffiliated with organized activity for a time. Many of them re-emerged in the middle 1950's when CORE organized a chapter in the city.

The Negro groups came under especial suspicion in this period because of the widespread belief that Communists
worked most actively among exploited or low-status minority groups -- and in Columbus, that meant the Negro. As the most respected Negro service group in the city, the Urban League had an especially important role in this controversy. Utilizing all of its influential members, and any other personal or group connection available having any standing in the community, the League worked to clear itself of the charges made by rumor and innuendo. It tried to show that allegations made against the loyalty of the Black community were without basis of fact. It was generally successful. But the extent of suspicion was reflected in the fact that Nimrod Allen felt compelled to appear before the Ohio Legislative Committee on Unamerican Activities to defend not only the League but his whole race. He closed his lengthy remarks by saying:

The implication has been given that the Communists draw strength in Columbus from the Negro; but this is not, to my thinking, true. I do not personally know a single Negro Communist in our community... If we could get our state legislators aroused to action against racial discrimination and other minority injustices, an active power would be let loose that would be the moral equivalent to the vigor which wins wars. And this, in my humble opinion, is the best antidote for Communism. 42

The community, in general, seemed to accept Mr. Allen's viewpoint. The Columbus papers, with which the League had conducted a running engagement for twenty-five years to render unbiased coverage of Negro news, generally supported Allen, the League, and the Negro community editorially. 43 Further, the media unanimously
tried during this period to report news concerning the Negro community fairly. 44

As the League entered the 1950’s and saw the return of the Republicans to Washington and the war in Korea drag on, it became apparent that the national climate of political opinion had changed for the time being. Americans, generally, weary of wars, depressions, and not fully convinced of the necessity and efficacy of governmental intervention, were less willing than in the past two decades to promote social reforms. After the indecisive split over civil rights within the Democratic party in 1948, American society seemed to be ready to pause in its social advancement. 45 The pause was only temporary, however. In 1954, the Supreme Court moved where Congress had not, and ushered in a whole new period in the history of race relations.

The Columbus Urban League had more than its share of trouble all its own in this first half of the 1950’s. Nimrod Allen reached the age of 65 in 1952 and was beginning to feel the effects of nearly forty years of effort in Columbus. Even more crucial was that the League itself was undergoing a strain. It had reorganized in 1942, but that reorganization was a compromise, thanks mainly to the efforts of the League’s Old Guard. These men and women agreed sincerely with Nimrod Allen that volunteer effort still had a strong and viable place in Negro social work, and that person-to-person effort was in the highest tradi-
tion of American social service. They felt strongly that only local citizens could fully understand local problems; the role of the National was solely advisory. This group included L.M. Shaw, head of the Youth Department; James A. Maddox and Richard Lynch, Chairman and Director of Public Relations respectively; Velma Davis and Ellen Sandridge, Chairman and Director of the Community and Neighborhood Department; and Frank Throop, Chairman of the Industrial Relations Department; as well as numerous longtime administrative aides and several longtime members of the board. It strongly felt that the League knew far better than other civic agencies what were the hopes, aspirations, and goals of the Black community. It wanted to keep the League programs which filled a need in the Black community even if that meant partial duplication of services and occasional co-ordinating inefficiencies.

And there were inefficiencies. Brush Lake Camp, for example, had been founded because no real camping facilities, within easy travelling distance of the city, were available for Negro youth. Since 1942, changes in policy and expanded facilities by organizations like the Boy Scouts, Y.M.C.A., and various church groups had remedied that deficit to a large degree. The Colored Big Brothers and Sisters had been founded because of the recalcitrance of the companion White organizations to enter the Black community. Expansion of these organizations, largely under religious leadership, as well as the expansion of
services by the Police Welfare Board (formerly the Friendly Service Bureau) had rendered these programs, too, somewhat duplicatory. Federal and state F.E.P.C. legislation, though belated, had rendered superfluous to at least some degree many of the activities undertaken by the Industrial Relations division. For example, the League had conducted an "on-the-spot adjustment campaign" yearly since the late 1940's which attempted, through all media, and within the economic units themselves, to push for adjustment of occupational racial friction "on the spot." When recourse to the F.E.P.C. became available by the middle 1950's, this direct need no longer seemed as crucial, although few persons denied the efficacy of the good-will generated by the program. Moreover, the efficacy of the Public Relations approach to "create an atmosphere" of "interracial harmony" as the pure goal of the League was placed in question. Some critics either failed to see the full implications of the program or doubted that it could possible be all that it was represented to be.

The Public Relations program did achieve one of its goals. It startled the community, Black and White, out of its complacency. Amplifying the program in the late 1940's with at first one and then two radio programs a week, the League, after being in Columbus for thirty years, began to become well-known for what it was attempting to do. One radio show, "The Tenth Man," was dramatic in design; the
other, "The Lighthouse," narrated by Nimrod Allen, was oriented toward civic affairs and social commentary. Combined with regular and relatively favorable coverage in the press as well as a never-ending stream of brochures, studies, reports, conferences, lectures, movies, and slide projections, the League consolidated its position as a voice for the Black community in Columbus. With the advent of popular recognition also came condemnation from the rising radical right. Hate literature flooded the city in this period; much of it was directed against the League. The quiet left, on the other hand, voiced the occasional opinion that the League was becoming the mouthpiece of the Establishment. But more important was the emergence of three additional situations. The League was losing the confidence of an ever-growing though silent minority of Blacks who were dissatisfied with previous approaches to Negro uplift. This sentiment had risen with the Vanguard League in the 1940's. But the subsequent decline of that organization did not spell the end of that sentiment in the Black community. This segment of Negroes felt the League especially was out of date.

Furthermore, opposition to the League as constituted was developing in somewhat unusual but not completely unexpected quarters -- the Council of Social Agencies. The Council and the Community Chest, upon which the League depended for much of its funds, had felt for some time that
the duplications and inefficiencies of the League were an inexcusable waste of donors' money in the long run. This was not to deny the efficacy of many of the League programs and their value in absolute terms. But relatively speaking, especially to the money allotters at the Community Chest, many programs of the League were being continued either out of habit, routine, or selfish maintenance of control prerogatives. From the point of view of the Council of Social Agencies, many of the problems attacked by the League either were already, or could be, approached by other specialized agencies consisting primarily of professionals who could handle the problems more efficiently and thoroughly.

Finally, there was a growing body of sentiment within the League itself that perhaps the old approaches needed revamping. This feeling was present on the Board and among some of the younger staff. These persons felt most strongly that if the League was going to survive as a viable institution in the 1950's, it must change with the times and meet the criticisms of both the civic social service agencies and the black community. If this meant dropping programs and changing the aims of the League, so be it.

Nobody knew better than Nimrod Allen that an agency must change with the times in order to retain its viability. But much of what was advocated by the critics was unacceptable to his personal value structure. The lines were drawn; it was inevitable that sooner or later the battle
would be joined. The crisis came over a dismissal. Late in 1953, the League hired Prather J. Hauser as an associate executive in charge of Industrial Relations. On February 12, 1954, Allen dismissed him. Incidents like this had happened before in the League's history, but on this occasion there was a new twist. Hauser fought back, demanding a hearing before the full board to air his case. Not receiving a suitable reply, Hauser then went to board members privately to plead his case. One of these men agreed with him and so informed the Ohio State Sentinel. On March 10, the Executive Committee met in special session to discuss the case and to hear the report of a three-man evaluative committee which had interrogated the staff regarding the Hauser incident. The Committee could not agree on (1) whether Hauser should have had a hearing and (2) whether the investigatory committee was properly authorized to conduct an investigation. One week later, Ninrod Allen resigned. He recommended that the National office be consulted concerning a successor, and promised to assist in the transfer. Allen remarked that he had been wanting to resign for some time because of age, and that this seemed an appropriate time. The Board lauded him for his labors and asked him to sit in on meetings indefinitely. Shortly thereafter, it appointed L.H. Shaw as interim director. Within a few weeks, the Board learned that the Community Chest would shortly release a none-too-laudatory
study of the League's activities. The Board reacted with dispatch in special session and prepared to present a united front, meet the criticisms of the Chest, and forestall an attempt by the National to bring the Columbus chapter "into line," meaning under more direct control of the National headquarters. 59

These attempts were moderately successful in that both Allen and the National approved his successor in a short time. But the criticisms of the Chest were in many cases impossible to avoid. Major changes in the League's structure and format were undertaken with the advent of the new director, Andrew Freeman. The story of those changes and the development of the League under its first new executive since 1921, is the subject of the next chapter.

But before we leave Nimrod Allen and the League in early 1954, a few summary comments about the patterns of bureaucratization, rationalization, and professionalization are in order.

The thrust of the League during the 1940's and early 1950's was still primarily that of a volunteer organization with the skillful direction, guidance, and maintenance of Allen and the Old Guard. But the New Epoch laid the groundwork for what became, after Allen's passing, the dominance of the professionals within the League.

Through these years a steady decline occurred in the importance and positive reinforcement of person-to-
person activities by the League. Once again, however, the full shift to more community planning and community organizing as the League's dominant thrust, with person-to-person projects in a secondary position, had to wait for new leadership and the passing of the Old Guard.

The development of the Public Relations Department and Allen's emphasis on "creating an atmosphere" was of crucial impact. Using the Parsonian construct of (1) goal achievement, (2) adaptation, (3) integration and (4) pattern maintenance, as possibilities of multiple action for any organization, clearly the dominant goal orientation of the League's programs in Columbus was integrative — i.e., "to achieve a normal participation of the Negro in American life." But to implement this function, Allen seized secondarily on the technique of public relations to implement this goal by creating the proper "atmosphere." Such a norm change from complacency to interest, from hostility to achievement, of course implied a "goal achievement" function for the organization. What Allen perhaps did not clearly perceive was the cultural feedback element this program brought into play.

Theoretically speaking, to work for the "integrative function" implied a relatively static norm base for that integration. At the same time, the attempt to create an "atmosphere" led inevitably to a change in the norm base of personal responses. A contradictory process came into play when any organization attempted to integrate a population
segment into a society which had a shifting set of norms. This contradiction would not matter if the norm shifts were relatively small. But in the case of Columbus, Ohio the shift was significant. Not only did the norm base of the White population shift, but the norm base of the Blacks shifted as well. By the middle 1950's the Columbus Urban League found itself attempting to integrate a Black population into a society many persons, both Black and White, no longer found acceptable.

The Columbus Urban League did not necessarily contain the seeds of its own failure. Factors other than its Public Relations Department were contributory in the norm shift of significant elements in the Black and White communities. These included urbanization, increased education, expectation gaps, and the rise of militancy in the Black community. But the League, by using complementary functional orientations in a contradictory pattern, hastened that shift. 60 It continually told the Black that he was equal to the White man; that Blacks should strive with all their effort to reach their appointed place in a stable, well-ordered society of free men. This drive led eventually to Black dissatisfaction when such integration, despite his efforts, did not take place.
Chapter IV

American Teamwork Works!

1954-1962

"The Columbus Urban League is a volunteer organization for social service among Negroes"

Nimrod E. Allen

"The Columbus Urban League is a community planning agency.

Andrew Freeman

Andrew Freeman is a quiet man. He moves with a quiet style. Not a showman, he presents an image of efficient competence and calm appraisal. He is also a professional. Not only in style, but in analysis as well, his method is to find the best possible subordinates and delegate much of the responsibilities for specific tasks to them without strict supervision. He is presently director of the Philadelphia Urban League. From 1954 to 1961, he was the Executive Director of the Columbus Urban League.

"I Think he (Andy Freeman) at that particular point had the most difficult job of the three (directors) that I was acquainted with, because he had to take an institution that was basically in fairly poor shape in terms of public relations and in terms of community acceptance, and I think he did a pretty good job of rebuilding."

Andrew Freeman came to Columbus from Dayton, Ohio, where he was president of the local Urban League. He had
no previous experience as an Urban League executive, but his prior work experience made that point irrelevant. He had been National Youth Administration counselor during the Depression both in Columbus and at Wilberforce College. He took his Master's in Social Science at the Ohio State University, concentrating on youth counseling problems for his thesis. During and after World War II, he served as employee counsellor at Wright Field in Dayton. From 1947 to 1954 he was the personnel manager of the Dayton Malleable Iron Company.

In 1947 he was among the small group, Black and White who banded together to form the Dayton Urban League. He was President of that League for three terms. He arrived in Columbus in 1954 at the age of forty.

When Andy Freeman reported for work, the Columbus League was still nursing its wounds from the Community Chest critique. Without Himrod Allen, the organization was rapidly losing headway and drifting. Mr. Allen, for all practical purposes, was still "Mr. Urban League" in Columbus. It required tact as well as skill to attempt to fill his shoes. Andrew Freeman, aware of the situation, made a command decision. He would run his own program, with his own style, retaining only those elements of previous organization and orientation that fit with his own idea of what the League should be. In the long run his decision was easier to state than to implement.
Even Freeman’s appointment had involved some controversy, although it had met with approval by both Nimrod Allen and the National office. The disagreement evolved not over Freeman himself, but over the role of the National in local affairs. In May, Lester Granger, the Executive Director of the National, came to Columbus to confer over possible successors to Allen. In offering the assistance of his office during the transition, he noted that the National as well as the local Board would have to approve Allen’s successor. As the Columbus chapter had had the same executive for thirty-four years, the Board was unaware of the stipulation. The enforcement of this stipulation emphasized the National’s desire to assert its supremacy over the Columbus chapter. It had not felt ready to attempt a change until at least some of the Old Guard, who viewed the National as simply an advisory agency, left the local organization. Nimrod Allen’s departure signalled a reassertion of the National’s position. The new director, it was thought, would be more amenable to change. Perhaps his leadership would bring the Columbus League to its proper place in the Urban League family.

Andrew Freeman was definitely more inclined to implement change. He set about making those changes immediately upon his arrival. Within a month of being on the job he had analyzed the role of the League in the city and had prepared a report not on what the Urban League in Columbus should be, but what it was:
"Its program, basically, is one of community organization in the fields of employment, vocational guidance, housing, community services, and welfare services."  

Freeman went on to explain that the League believed that:

1. Interracial cooperation is the best approach to the problems of the Negro community.
2. The Urban League's job is one of community planning and community organization.
3. It is a waste of time, effort, and finances for the Urban League to duplicate those services offered by other agencies."

He emphasized in the preface to his statement that

The ideas contained herein represent an area of agreement which typifies the Urban League movement across the country. The philosophy and program objectives were determined after conferences with members of the staff of the National Urban League and after attending the National Conference in Pittsburgh. 10

Within a month of assuming his post, Andrew Freeman had scrapped most of Allen's organizational structure, substituting one of his own. He took the Dayton League as his model, a model he had helped construct. He modified his original schemata to retain integral elements of the old structure, such as the Public Relations Department. But he drew heavily on the Community Chest report and the National's guidelines, as well as upon his own previous experience, in solidifying his organizational plan. 11

The plan itself called for the gradual phasing out of the Big Brothers and Sisters organizations, and the "determination" of the status of Brush Lake. He proposed to de-emphasize the finding of jobs per se by the Industrial Relations Department, concentrating on higher
status and higher pay skills as well as previously untapped resources. He played down and ultimately phased out most actual community center social work on a person-to-person basis, directing efforts to the organization and coordination of self-run community organizations for Black people. He planned the decentralization of public relations' affairs, to allow each department to handle its own publicity, with special projects co-ordinated through the executive. An Urban League Guild, a Ladies' Auxiliary to the League, established itself under his guidance. He abolished the Roll Call campaign completely.\textsuperscript{12}

Freeman added some new ideas, structural and programmatic. He proposed the creation of a Department of Housing to handle what he believed was the most crucial problem in the Black community next to jobs. He placed most of the previous race relations work into his Community Services Department. He replaced the Youth Department with a guidance services program for Negro youth, which was not specifically related to career planning or community problems.\textsuperscript{13}

It took Freeman a little over a year and a half fully to legitimize this program. A rewriting of the Constitution of the League to fit the specifications of his plan marked the culmination of his planning.\textsuperscript{14}

These changes did not proceed smoothly. When it became clear that Andrew Freeman was going to de-emphasize the Public Relations Department, most old members and staff who had worked so hard and so long to implement this aspect
of the Columbus Plan immediately raised a hue and cry. Freeman replied that he was not negating the Plan, but merely making it more effective. By having each department responsible for its own public relations, he was making the staff more publicity-conscious as a whole, thereby enhancing the Plan. Richard B. Lynch, the Publications Director, withstood this direct assault as long as possible and finally resigned in late 1956. The Department dissolved shortly thereafter.

Freeman conceived of the League in a fundamentally different way than did Allen or the Old Guard. To Freeman, the crucial problems in modern society would not be solved by "creating an atmosphere" alone. The "atmosphere" concept was an important necessity, but it alone could not solve the problems of the Negro in urban society. There was a distinct generation gap between Allen and Freeman. While both men agreed on the fundamental goals of the League, their philosophies as well as their approaches differed on the adaptation of the Negro to urban life.

Freeman was educated in the post-New Deal school of social work which stressed the complex and interconnected nature of urban problems. Allen's approach had been fundamentally to attack a new problem with a new committee or a new program while striving to create an "atmosphere." By attacking all conceivable problems, the field would be covered. By working these programs through one agency,
the League, a united approach to Black uplift would be achieved. Freeman saw the utility in that approach, but he also stressed the need for concerted, co-ordinated planning by the League with respect to all of its problems. He maintained that planning should be the priority program of the agency.

There was also a subtle difference in what the two men hoped to ultimately achieve. Allen's program was primarily integrative, with a secondary emphasis on "atmosphere," which became the dominant ideological thrust of the League's integrative attempt. Freeman's conception was of a community planning agency coordinating interracial efforts for better community living, in the areas of: employment, vocational guidance, housing, and community services." In other words, to Freeman the problem was not one of fitting the Blacks into a White society but one of adjusting the total community so that the two races could live harmoniously together.16

In terms of value orientations, Freeman's approach was still primarily integrative. He wished to help Black and White work harmoniously together. But his approach was far more politically oriented than Allen's was. Freeman fully realized the ever-increasing complexity of urban society and its problems, and wished to undertake a coordinated effort to eliminate the obstacles to racial harmony. This idea implied a close cooperation not only within the League but with the other social service agencies in the city --
notably the Council of Social Agencies, which in 1957 became the United Community Council. The problems were so massive that maximum efficiency was prerequisite to the whole social service establishment. Duplication of services was a luxury which could not be afforded. 17

Coordination and co-operation had other consequences as well. By reducing duplicated services the League could devote more time and energy to activities which were being neglected, and could co-ordinate and plan an operational assault on those trouble spots. Housing was extremely important in this respect. Housing had always been a concern of the League, but the priority had been the provision of decent housing for Blacks, first, and integrated housing, second. Freeman gave these aspects equal priority and created a department to co-ordinate efforts in this regard. But by doing so, he was moving the League into an area it had early avoided -- "open housing." 18

It was difficult to push for low-cost public housing in the city, given the opposition from everyone to the right of the Chamber of Commerce. But to advocate "open housing" meant an attack right at the heart of the social nexus of racial discrimination. To accomplish such a goal would require the League to undertake a "goal achievement" or political function with regard to individual and institutional discrimination in housing sales. 19 The full implications of such an expansion of the goal achievement function of the League would not become apparent until after Freeman
had left. But the changed emphasis of the League from community service to community planning left the door open for a change-over within the League to a value system stressing political action, or goal achievement. Many facets of Freeman's operation of the League suggested the former approach. The staff at the Dayton League was even smaller than Columbus' had been before the New Epoch. Freeman, like Allen, relied on volunteers for support in the endeavors of the League both in Columbus and Dayton. He had been a volunteer himself in all his previous Urban League experience. Therefore, he knew the value of volunteer help and fully agreed to its necessity as an integral part of the League program.

"The heart of our program is in volunteer services; our volunteers represent community support at its best."\textsuperscript{20}

But his utilization of volunteer help varied considerably from Allen's, especially with regard to the Board.

Allen had considered the Board an authority concurrent with, if not superior, to the staff. Although he pretty much ran the League after his own manner, he relied extensively on the Board not only for advice and influence but also for actual help in solving vexing problems. In Freeman's mind, the Board was an advisory group of influential citizens whose support and interest were a valuable adjunct to League work. If they could be induced to assist in League projects, all well and good, but the role of the Board was more advisory than participatory. As the revised consti-
"These Directors shall be persons actively concerned about interracial efforts for a better community." 21

The League became a more professionalized organization under Freeman's leadership. Planning and coordination were the work of fulltime experts. As the main aim of the League, it followed naturally that greater and greater reliance was placed on a competent professional staff to handle more of the League's work. Keeping volunteers' interest high and their activity solidified thus became something of a problem, especially on the Board level. As one previous president of the League remarked when asked if the League's Board's role was primarily advisory:

"It is. And it's a frustrating thing. And it's one thing I worked on when I was President. To try and get more participation by the Board members. I feel that a purely advisory Board is bad for an organization, that you have to get more involved than that, and feel more responsible than just an advisor... If we could learn how to channel the work of the volunteers, we could vastly increase our potential. Except in rare instances, this has not been done... It takes real commitment on the part of a volunteer to overcome the natural lethargy that seems to come from the staff on these things." 22

But even though the Board was to decline in importance during the Freeman directorship, he never lost sight of the fact that public support, especially by influential citizens, was crucial to the success of the League.

If as a result of Mr. Freeman's structural and program innovations, the League was becoming a professionalized organization at a more rapid rate than previously,
the same was not true of the League's bureaucratization process:

"And No! If this is the way you think of bureaucracy, as an organization chart, where, and, a series of committees and subcommittees and so forth, where things must move in a prescribed manner, I don't think the League represents this at all. In fact, I think the League is quite informal."

The League had never really been a full-fledged "bureaucracy" in Max Weber's sense of the term. It was manifestly neither a political nor an economic organization. Nor was it a mammoth organization. The appearance of those two pre-conditions was present in most of Weber's examples. But this is not to discount Weber completely. Although the "Marx for Managers" was prone to human error, few scholars have ever seriously contended with Weber's argument that his was a general theory applicable to all forms of organization derived from legalistic authority. Therefore, at least a partial analysis of the Freeman League from a Weberian standpoint is relevant to this paper.

Weber postulated several important features to the "ideal type," bureaucracy. Among them were a legitimization of authority and a specialization of task orientation that would be thorough, pervasive and explicit. He also postulated a routinization of labor; no given individual would ever be indispensable; the organization would function effectively no matter what personnel were changed.

Certain characteristics in the League's construc-
tion and function made a full implementation of this model unfeasible. In the first place, the League desired volunteer help to assist in the staffing and carrying out of its projects. It needed volunteer assistance from influential citizens to maintain its hard-won acceptability in the community. The League in Columbus had established itself over time to the extent that forceful and organized opposition to its programs was kept at a minimum. But it was still a social uplift organization. Although social service, uplift, and welfare services rendered by organized groups, either public or private, had been a relatively acceptable community activity for some time, there still was latent opposition to its goals. The American middle-class White public retained an individualistic ideology in its view of the world, never completely eradicable. This view distrusted group activity in the behalf of the disadvantaged. Government action, however, acquired over time, after initial opposition, a certain high degree of respectability and acceptability, allowing the legitimization of its authority. 27

The Columbus Urban League had built up quite a solid basis of respectability and acceptability in its long history in the city. But it was still a private organization, a social uplift group. The result for the League, was an overall level of acceptability less pervasive than that enjoyed by White or governmental social uplift groups in the city. 28
The influential volunteers on its Board were extremely important to League acceptability. Andrew Freeman faced a dilemma. Realizing that "creating an atmosphere" was not enough, he still needed that atmosphere and the volunteers who were the strongest element in its maintenance. Freeman attempted to solve this problem by keeping the volunteers while making their position more advisory than before. This approach solved many of the previous problems of the League related to inefficiency and non-professionalism, but it still left the major problem of full legitimization of authority. As long as the professionals had to rely on volunteers to achieve social acceptability, the League's full-time workers basically had two masters — Freeman, who like all previous directors had been given a mandate without condition; and the Board, which legitimizes that mandate. As long as the League retained volunteer advisory assistance as well as generalized support the full routinization of tasks was impossible to achieve, in that much more was expected in terms of compliance and control from a professional than from a volunteer.\textsuperscript{29} Hence, although the League had moved more in the direction of Weber's authority legitimization, by the disengagement of volunteers from most actual projects, it still had by no means fully legitimiz its authority as a "pure type" bureaucracy.

Further, the nature of the professional staff militated against the full implementation of a bureaucratic work system. The staff was small; several staff members from separate departments simultaneously handled much of
the work. Also, the types of problems being undertaken by the league under freeman required only social workers with minimum training. Thus, while the problems became specialized, the staff could effectively operate without commensurate specialization on its own part. The staff could interchange positions rapidly if need be, lessening the indispensability of a given individual but also lessening the necessity of full job specialization. 30

Finally, the nature of the activities being undertaken by the league was conducive to full bureaucratization. When dealing in direct person-to-person services, routines can be built up over time in the service to clients. Especially, for example, in health and unemployment matters, a given individual can find maximally efficient techniques and use them consistently and repeatedly to achieve his ends. Such is not the case with "planning" as an occupational process. Needs change, and if a planning agency is to meet those needs it must see them before most of the rest of the community. Otherwise a planning agency has no utility. Planning requires a flexibility which is relatively impermeable to full bureaucratic routinization. Assuredly, community planning calls for a certain professionalism in the analysis of social conditions. However, the league was employed in many projects which could not be called planning by any stretch of the term. But the very fact that the league had adopted community planning as one of its goals acted as a check on further expansion of the routinization of person-
Also, it was obvious to the League that it could not afford the luxury of impersonality attendant in full routinization of endeavor. The League was a social service agency and its reasons for existence was predicated on service to the Negro and the community at large. It needed the confidence and faith of the public to accomplish its task. Bureaucratic impersonality negated that goal. Hence it was not only avoided per se. Rather, informality and personal approach were stressed in order to gain a greater show of faity and acceptability from the community.

The League, in addition, had competition from other Black groups within the city. It needed the personal approach as well as its comprehensive organization and long-standing reputation to assist in the continuing process of assuring the Black community that it was the best agency to co-ordinate Black uplift attempts in the city. The League had always had competition in Columbus, but this competition had not challenged its essentially predominant position in the city as the Black uplift organization. In the early 1920's, the Universal Negro Improvement Association of Marcus Garvey had attracted advocates in the city. With its program of Black nationalism and re-patriation, it stood diametrically opposed to the aims of the League. But the Garveyites were never able to capture the White support the League enjoyed. Also, many Columbus Negroes, while intrigued, were extremely cautious of the rather flamboyant nature of the
movement. When Garvey himself began to suffer legal and political difficulties on the national level, the movement in Columbus as elsewhere rapidly disintegrated.\textsuperscript{32}

In the 1930's, the radical left made a stormy bid for the support of the Black community and, in many cases, made decisive inroads into the League's community support. But the rather theoretical perambulations of the movement caused most Negroes in the city to react once again with distrust. Moreover, the press coverage of the Radicals in the White community was even more negatively oriented than the usual biases given Negro News. Furthermore, the League itself did not sit still in the 1930's. It, too, took a moderate swing to the left and for a time at the end of the decade lent its support, but not its organized participation, to more than one protest course. The League's role in the Kroger Boycott, mentioned earlier, was illustrative of the group's extent of protest involvement.\textsuperscript{33}

In the 1940's, as has been discussed, the Vanguard League offered more than a passing challenge to the organization's usually unquestioned leadership in Black affairs in the city. But despite a temporary loss of status, the League was not seriously challenged by this movement either.\textsuperscript{34}

The situation had changed markedly by the mid-1950's. In the wake of the 1954 desegregation decision came the sit-in movement in North Carolina. With the support of the liberal White community and an ever-increasing number of government officials, a new period of activism in the field of Negro advancement began. Whether one called this protest
upheaval a "revolution," a "movement," or an "exercise in organized chaos," it became manifestly clear by the middle 1950's that a decisive change in the pattern of American race relations was taking place. E. Franklin Frazier's "Black Bourgeoisie" was as committed to this attempt at changing American society, as were the poor and working-class Negroes who suffered most from racial exploitation.\textsuperscript{35}

Columbus, Ohio was no exception to the rest of the nation in feeling the impact of non-violent civil rights protest on a new growing scale. The Vanguard League, an early affiliate of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), had declined in the early 1950's. But by 1955, CORE was back in the city with a social branch. This second CORE chapter drew in many of the earlier adherents of the Vanguard League as well as many new converts, who were seeking a means to exhibit their distaste for American society more dramatically than the alternatives provided by either the NAACP or the Urban League.\textsuperscript{36}

Although much, if not most, of the League's change in this period seemingly was a step in the transition from a primarily volunteer organization to a predominantly professionalized agency, the League did exhibit a reaction to the Civil Rights movement. Intrinsically, the Civil Rights movement offered a challenge to the traditional approaches and action styles of the League. No longer was slow, patient uplift culminating in ultimate integration acceptable to growing numbers of Negroes and their White allies.
Clearly, too, this unacceptability was no longer confined
to rhetoric. The League, therefore, felt constrained to
justify its approach and modify its tactics when necessary
in order to retain its viability and leadership.

The League stepped up its public relations efforts,
not only in the Black community but among Whites as well,
especially in those areas where White support of the "Move-
ment" was most heavily concentrated. But the League leader-
ship, and, especially Andrew Freeman, knew that the trad-
tional public relations approach would be insufficient in
itself to counteract the support being mustered for the
Civil Rights activists. 37

First, the League stressed in its public relations
that it, too, was a changing organization, self-evident to
any person who chose to look. The League, so the argu-
ment went, realized that White society could not be consid-
ered a passive complex into which the Negró must integrate,
by hard and diligent labor. Rather the nature of the prob-
lems confronting the Black community were but reflections
of those of the total community. Unified effort must be
made on a co-ordinated basis to allay them. Further, these
efforts required more than personal uplift, although that
was still the League's hallmark. Where the need for legis-
lation appeared, the League supported it. More signifi-
cantly, the League applauded the non-violent orientation of
the movement, but cautioned against crossing the line from
protest to causing a public disorder or nuisance. 38 Such
arguments eased the minds of some Negroes and were greeted
with mixed emotions by others. But there was a residuum of the young, both Black and White, upon whom such arguments made little impact.

The League searched for a means to bridge the gap between the traditional values of the older organization and the new groups which characterized the movement, and utilized the community organization. It tied in the best of the past's values with the aspirations of the young, at least on paper.

One of the main vehicles to this rapprochement was the Near East Side Area Council. NESAC was a voluntary community organization made up of community leaders, private citizens, and civic leaders who were concerned about the conditions in their own general neighborhood area — the congested, under-developed, Negro-Populated Near East Side of Columbus. It and similar organizations arose in the late 1950's in response to a need felt by the residents of given areas to take a direct hand in the planning and development of their own community area.39

A number of elements were involved in the emergence of such an organization. With its volunteer emphasis, the League had attempted to answer the needs of such community-minded residents within the structure of its own organization. This answer proved to be unfeasible in the long run. Since the 1940's, the League had slowly but surely been relinquishing its direct control over a variety of community centers devolved upon either local groups of private citizens,
community-center-oriented social agencies, or the Department of Recreation of the City of Columbus. Mostly, the latter two alternatives played the predominant role. Nimrod Allen had foreseen problems years before in this approach. Limited by available resources, the city government and the Council of Social Agencies were unable to supply the centers with all of the services which were required by the expanding Negro community. The agencies simply could not fully meet demands for necessary services on the direct community level. The entire population felt these inadequacies, but the impulse to remedial action emerged most strikingly within the Negro community, primarily because of the Civil Rights movement and Urban Renewal.

The Civil Rights movement in general had reawakened the social consciousness of most Negro communities across the country, even though the most decisive efforts for full and equal opportunity were being undertaken in the South. In the city of Columbus, winning the franchise was not a problem, nor was the desegregation of public facilities. Both goals had been achieved or acceptable in the city for years. Therefore the major activities encompassed by the Southern movement were not of direct importance to the members of the Columbus Black community. But the use of direct action still aroused feelings of identification. More and more Negro citizens felt the need to participate directly in the betterment of their own institutions.

The city's program of urban renewal and slum clear-
ance provided the direction for such action. It had created an urban renewal office in 1952, the Slum Clearance and Urban Redevelopment Commission (SCUR), to plan and initiate projects of urban physical redevelopment within the core city. By 1956, city redevelopment was out of the planning stage, and a five million dollar bond issue was floated to begin these project changes. The city had established a Development Office in 1953, which worked with the Franklin County Regional Planning Commission to co-ordinate the general redevelopment of the city with the physical projects. The primary activity of these departments in the 1950's was urban renewal.43

The Columbus Urban Renewal program involved eradica-
tion of the city's most blighted areas. These areas were invariably occupied by Blacks; and thus the program imposed itself most strongly on the Negro community. The wholesale removal of Black neighborhoods, combined with a heightened urge to "do something," led to a reawakening of community spirit and involvement in the Negro community. This was a policy the League had failed to fully implement by itself.

Thus, the citizens of the Near East Side, the most densely congested Negro population center in the city, reacted with dismay as the Goodale Redevelopment Project leveled a whole neighborhood and relocated its Black population. To make matters worse, plans had already been formulated for a more extensive project in the Near East Side itself.44

The response by citizens in the affected areas was
an appeal to the city government, the League, and other social service agencies within the city, to impede this wholesale destruction of communities and to alleviate the relocation problems of displaced persons. The League was sympathetic to these pleas. It observed that the city's approach was to eliminate those areas beyond repair and those which seemed to be deteriorating rapidly. Planning for urban redevelopment was undertaken with those specific areas in mind. Hence the response called for seemed to be the rehabilitation and conservation of neglected neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{45}

But more was needed. The city, in co-operation with the state and federal government, planned an extensive expressway system which would pass through the core city. Many neighborhoods would have to be eliminated in these projects regardless of their condition. To channel an expressway away from a given neighborhood required political action and extensive planning on the part of the local residents.\textsuperscript{46} With the decline of the old community centers, it became clear that specific neighborhoods would have to organize their own. They did.

The League realized that local community indignation and organized response were inevitable. It was therefore essential to establish as close a liaison as possible with the organizations, predicted on the League's established function as a community organization and coordination agency. In this way, the League tried to preserve
its hegemony in the face of the rising influence of more militant civil rights groups. 47

The League established early contacts with NEAC, offered it the services and staff assistance of the League, and channeled much of its co-ordinated community planning through the group. This approach had many advantages. First, NESAC as an all-Black group could undertake programs and proposals regardless of possible disagreement by White members of the Urban League. Many White Board members, in any case, could not afford to be affiliated with the local group. Further, the problems of community conservation and relocation were complex, requiring extensive planning over time. They were not as conducive to efficacious resolution by direct action as were political problems. By channeling interested and concerned Negro citizens into such organizations, direct political or economic protest activity would necessarily be lessened. In addition, the spirit of local citizen involvement in the solution of common problems was as old as the frontier custom of barn raising. It had few potentially ideological or revolutionary overtones, and fit well within the established format of the League. 48

This approach of community organization on the local level tied in directly with Andrew Freeman's reorganization scheme. The nexus of difficulties concerned with inadequate housing was directly related to the urban renewal problem. The League sponsored numerous studies of the local housing market in the late 1950's, attempting to show
that property values did not decline with the integration of developments, and that a massive untapped housing market was available in the city. Further, the relocation problems implicit in urban renewal were cramming more and more people into the already congested Near East Side, creating a potentially ugly situation. Remedial measures to open the housing market to Negroes were not only beneficial to the city's economy, but were a positive necessity, crucial to the maintenance of some semblance of order in the city. 49

During the late 1950's, the League proceeded with a multi-pronged attack on the problems engendered by urban renewal and an ever growing Black population. On the one hand, it vigorously endorsed and supported community councils like NEASAC and the Mount Vernon District Improvement Association, participated actively in their programs, and assisted in their policy making. On the other hand, it utilized those groups to heighten public awareness of the potentially destructive aspects of non-integrated housing construction. It further solidified the impact of the community councils by extending their pattern of organization to the individual neighborhood level, organizing "Block Units" to pursue the activities of conservation, rehabilitation, and community involvement. The concept was not new. It had been used in the 1920's and 1930's by the Extension Committee of the League, under the direction of Professor C.C. North. But these old Block Units had long since passed away, having fulfilled their function of helping residents organize to combat
the problems of migration, depression, or war. Planned as ongoing units, the former organizations had been founded to meet a particular identifiable crisis. When the crisis passed, they lost vitality. The new approach of installing the units as parts of a broad pattern of community advisory organizations destined them to have a longer life span and vitality. The Block Units were integrated into the community advisory councils, which themselves were then integrated into a system of community planning and coordination. The Urban League was the pre-eminent Negro coordinating group.

But these coordination and housing pursuits were by no means the League's only major activities in this period. One of the major aims of the National Urban League had always been to secure job opportunities for Negroes. The pursuit of economic equality had been a priority in League planning in Columbus as well as the National. But by the end of the 1950's the activities of the Industrial Relations Department had changed markedly. While there were certain occupational classifications in which the Negro had either token or no representation, most fields of occupational endeavor had Black people working within them by the late 1950's. While the League continued its task of opening up new job classifications to Negroes, it changed its orientation to take best advantage of the relatively open job markets available since the beginning of the decade. Essentially, the League found itself in the
situation in which jobs were available but no qualified person could be found to fill them. This implied the necessity of occupational education and vocational counseling, not only of adults but of youth as well. With regard to youth, the orientation of the League changed from the establishment of physical social opportunities for youth, to a more generalized guidance approach, dealing with the social and psychological problems peculiar to Negro youth.

The Industrial Relations problem was approached through conferences, work-shops, and seminars for the Black and White community, which were concerned with vocational training possibilities and opportunities. Adult education classes were established, aimed primarily at vocational assistance, but also dealing with general educational matters where necessary. A variety of vocational opportunity and training clubs were established, with the League in an advisory position. And special vocational counseling services for individual cases were established in the Department. The League furthered its association with organized labor by utilizing its Board members from the labor leadership, and urged freer Negro admission to union membership.

In terms of youth guidance, the League served as a clearing-house, referring Negro young people to other social service agencies in the city. It used its guidance secretary to deal with special guidance problems which were not being undertaken by other agencies. As much as possible, the League tried to utilize the services of established agencies and to
create youth counseling procedures in the local community advisory councils, while always leaving itself as the counselor of last resort. 52

This process of vocational counseling and job preparation picked up momentum rapidly after 1961, with the establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Since the beginning of the present decade, the League has received numerous grants to expedite its programs in job placement and training. These monies have been especially utilized in the field of apprenticeship programs to increase the number of Negro entrants into the skilled craft unions. The League, Government, Business and Labor finance these programs cooperatively. 53

By the early 1960's, the program changes which had been institutionalized by Freeman in 1954 were operative in fact as well as theory. The final development in this transitional process from the social service approach to that of community organization and planning, was the creation of the Columbus Leadership Conference. Negro leaders, in the late 1950's, began to see the essential necessity of cooperative and coordinated effort to accomplish their collective goals. Frontiers of America, Inc. had been operating in the city since 1936 to offer a fraternal service outlet for the development of Black leadership in Columbus. But given the complexity of programs and the necessity of a unified Approach to community problems was expedited in terms of inter-agency cooperation and personal contact
between the various executives of the represented organizations.  

The technique worked very well, in the opinion of its founders. It allowed mutual problems to be discussed in an informal and confidential atmosphere. It also permitted potential conflicts over approach and tactics to be resolved by interested third parties within the Conference. This format resulted in a more coordinated rationalization of combined program objectives. The possibility of organizations with the same goals but different tactics coming into open conflict was also minimized. This conflict minimization gave White opponents of Black uplift fewer opportunities to exploit differences within the Black community, and thus to retard common advancement toward avowedly common goals.  

In mid-1961, Andrew Freeman announced to the Board of Directors of the League that he had accepted to offer to become the Director of the Philadelphia Urban League. On the surface the League looked much different than it had when he had accepted the Directorship in 1954. The League in Columbus had become much more professionalized in composition and outlook, had solidified its approach to problems in the community, and had taken on a much more generalized community function. The League had developed several organizational innovations during his term in office, including the Urban League Guild and numerous vocational counseling organizations for youth and adults. It had helped in the development of community area councils to assist in the reso-
lution of particular social or economic difficulties on an advisory basis to local, state, and federal government, and to provide self-help within the community. 56

In spite of these changes in structure and orientation, much had not changed. For reasons of utility as well as philosophy, the League retained volunteer assistance from the White community, although it lessened the actual use of volunteers in ongoing programs. The Community Chest and United Appeal still were the primary funding agencies for the League. Policy decisions still necessarily had to take into account the social philosophy of those organizations. Both the Board and Andrew Freeman still considered the ultimate aims of the League to be integration into American society. It was true that they realized this was not going to be as easy as some had thought, and that the problems of the entire community were tied in with that integration. But they still saw integration as the dominant goal. 57

Organizationally, the League had become more professionalized, both in its approach and in the quality of its trained full-time personnel. But these professionals even by the early 1960's, were still working in a relatively informal environment. Reasons of economy as well as professionalism militated against their full bureaucratization. The staff was still too small and the problems attacked too generalized to permit the growth of fully independent departmentalization. The only exception to this general trend
had been the Public Relations Department, which had emerged as a full-fledged independent operation by the middle 1950's. This approach was repugnant to Freeman. With its elimination, the pattern of bureaucratization was restored to its relatively slow pace. But if the full specialization of tasks and demarcation of jurisdictions had not come about in Freeman's years with the League, a certain routinization and depersonalization had. When Freeman left, the transition to the new director, Chester Jones, was accomplished with little fundamental change in the organizational pattern of the League. Even today, the League under Jones' successor, Robert Brown, is still basically following the same general organizational format as that established by Freeman. Thus, if the League is still informal in approach, it by no means is still as personalized as it was under Himrod Allen. New personnel will institute new programs and drop old ones; but it is a testament either to Freeman's insight or his rehabilitation efforts that the basic organizational format has remained the same through three directors.  

If the League has reached at least a modicum of organizational stability the same is by no means true of its programmatic and philosophical pattern. For all of its organizational similarity, the League simply is not fundamentally the same today as it was under Freeman. Its primary goal orientation is no longer integration, but self-determination. This is a decisive shift in orientation from the earlier history of the League. Although this change may on
the surface seem to have come overnight in the wake of the militant Black Power advocacy and earlier disorders which have characterized the late 1960's, such was not the case. The League, of course, had to adjust to the new arch-militants of the middle and late 1960's in order to retain its viability; but by no means was the new approach of the League without roots in the past.

Nimrod Allen's public relations program contained the seeds of such a shift because of its emphasis on changing the attitudes of the White community as well as the Black. There was no guarantee present in Allen's plan that once it began to achieve results, the attitude changes would not surpass the expectations of social reality prognosticated by the League. Such was the case. Integration into a base society which did not reflect the aspirations of its Black as well as its White citizens began to seem an invalid concept. Negro protest groups outside the League began to advocate far more than a "normal" participation in American life; rather, they wished for an "equal representation in American society. Slowly over time, the League staff began to embrace this viewpoint.\(^5^9\)

But the fallacy of "equality" is that its definition differs given the nature and background of the observer; and a verifiable gap began to emerge by the late 1940's between what the Negro and White considered to be equal participation and treatment. The League had always been committed to the concept that this gap could be narrowed and ultimately elimin-
ated by instillation of a spirit of "inter-racial goodwill." It had attempted to bring the Negro up to the economic, social, and political status levels of Whites. Andrew Freeman retained that dream, as did most of the League, if not most of the Black community. But the realization of that dream would require a coordinated community effort involving all segments of the community. 60

In this context a decided pattern change was instituted during the Freeman years which would not fully develop until the late 1960's. Integral to the total community approach to social problems was at least some small factor of community organization on the lowest levels. NE5AC and groups like it provided that organization. As long as such groups were controlled and composed of persons dedicated to the integration ethic, no fundamental shift in programmatic expression of philosophic values was undertaken. But the expectation gap between the Black and White communities continued to exist, and in fact, to grow wider in the early 1960's, as the gains made by the Civil Rights movement were found to be either temporary or illusory. 61

As young black intellectuals and members of the Negro middle class who had had their baptism under fire in the Neshoba Counties of the South reflected on their experiences, they began to see that problems concerning segregation, discrimination, and degradation were just as present in the North as in the South. The only difference was subtlety. In many places that subtlety was not even present.
These former Civil Rights workers became more militant in their approach and began to organize in the North as they had in the South. They struck a responsive chord in Black communities across the country. What followed in the late 1960's was civil disorder, "Black Power," and a general negation of the integration ethic by several young cultural and political Black nationalist groups.

In some areas the "Black Power" critique gained overwhelming Negro support. In most areas it did not. Rather, the Black community split between the older generation while advocating, though more skeptically, the integration ethic, and the younger generation which aligned more closely with Black nationalism. But in all cases, the integration ideal was questioned, reassessed, and tempered. In the entire Black community the notion that personal integration was no longer a fully acceptable ethic began to grow.

A strong body of sentiment began to emerge that perhaps some of the basic institutions in white society would have to be changed drastically if full Black integration was to become a reality. In some cases, the beneficility of full integration itself was questioned. The community councils provided an organizational framework for this attitude shift. The shift is illustrated in the changing titles of the dominant community participation organizations on the Near East Side. NESAC, an area council, became overshadowed after 1965 by the East Central Citizens' Organization (ECCO), which itself was displaced in 1967 by the federally-sponsored
League itself changed to meet these changes in the black community by adopting the ethic of self-determination instead of integration after 1965. Even though the organizational structure and many of the League's programs have remained the same over time, it has made a fundamental change in philosophical approach in the last few years. This change is the admission, with the term "self-determination," that the integration that it had worked nearly fifty years to accomplish in this city might not be the only desirable alternative for given members of the black community. For, while most of the board and professionals in the League still cling to the integration ethic as the desirable alternative, it is manifestly clear that a sizeable number of the black community does not. This shift has been expedited even more by the recent 1969 conference of the National Urban League. The League seems to be moving even more strongly away from its previous integrational policies and into a direct assault on the controlling institutions of society.

"The National Urban League last week accelerated its "departure" from a traditional course, which over most of the organizations 59-year history has been to provide "direct services" to aid the poor...But the emphasis of this year's conference appeared to have shifted slightly from attempts to build power in ghettos to changing controlling institutions."64

How much of this shift will continue is impossible to predict. It does, however, have roots in the past.

Clearly the organizational rationalization and professionalization of the League was well on its way to accom-
accomplishment by the time Andrew Freeman left office in 1961. That organizational structure has retained its vitality through three directors over the last fifteen years. If the decisive change in the philosophy and ideology of the League had not changed drastically in response to the needs of the Black community, the unified rationalization pattern of the League could most probably have continued apace. Such has not been the case, and it is manifestly clear that this full systematic rationalization will not be possible until the League's shift in philosophy and approach has reached minimal stabilization.

The full bureaucratization of the League will not take place on a scale comparable to that of government and industry until the full acceptability of the League's goals is reached in the White community as well as the Black. Given the contemporary fundamental splits in these communities over the legitimate role of the Negro in American society, such bureaucratization seems a distant prospect indeed.
Chapter V

Conclusion

"There's still time but I have moved from cautious optimism to cautious pessimism."

This paper has been concerned with the extent of rationalization, bureaucratization, and professionalization, and with the development of these phenomena in the League over time. It has also been concerned with the relevance of these developments in the League's history as they bear on the role which the League has come to occupy in the Black community and in the total society.

Elements of professionalization, bureaucratization, and rationalization have played a relevant and important role in the development of the League in Columbus. Although the League has become progressively more oriented in these directions, the process is far from complete. Certain societal factors inherent in the League's structure, composition and goals, as well as external factors in the environment in which it operated, worked to impair the full development of bureaucratization, professionalization, and rationalization within the League. Certain of these factors have already been discussed and illustrated. The following pages will undertake a recapitulation of the rationalization process of the League and related examples of the same process in
in American society.

The basic premise of organization theory, whether abstract or behavioral, is that rationalization is the dominant pattern of Twentieth Century social interaction and that this process is inevitable, pervasive, and ultimately irreversible. If one accepts this premise, one must not only examine the nature of the general impediments challenging that realization, but must also examine which aspects of a given society have most fully realized the organizational imperative. For such studies not only are indicative of the nature of organizational rationalization but also of the entire structure, values, composition, and goals of that society. Studying society in an analytical fashion over time and developing interpretations of that development so that a man may better understand his world is a legitimate function of the study of history. It is in the spirit of that function of history that the following analysis will be given. 1

Organization theory rests on the twin pillars of authority and specialization. The more legitimate the authority, and the easier the task of specialization, the more rapidly will the rationalization process ensue. When authority is split or in conflict, and when the tasks at hand to accomplish a socially viable goal are not fully adaptable to routinization and specialization, that rationalization process will inherently be slower.

The legitimation of authority has a direct relation-
ship to the nature of the socially viable goal. If society, its members as well as its leadership, are convinced of the desirability and necessity of a particular goal, authority will be much more easily achieved.  

The goal of the Columbus Urban League is the rationalization of the place of the Negro in American society. It is common knowledge that the means to implement that goal are not universally agreed upon by any segment of the society, even the Negro community. In fact, the controversy and divided opinion existent over the nature of those means is one of the most, if not the most, single divisive characteristics of modern American society.

Because the rationalization of the Negro's place in American society involves tasks of social interplay and action, the techniques used to bring about that implementation are not as readily subject to complete technological specialization as are those of a physical process - for example, assembling a machine. Hence, it would be expected that the process of rationalization would lag in human affairs vis-a-vis the speed of implementation in a purely technological system. Such has been the case in the American experience.

As in the European experience, the United States first developed recognizable patterns of rationalization in its economic and governmentally administrative pursuits. Historical analysis of the development of the United States as an industrial, urbanized nation tends universally to agree that the first important manifestations of bureau-
cratic specialization and authority derivation were seen in the economic system of the post-Civil War United States. This rationalization process next appeared most strikingly in the administration of governmental concerns, and political organizations; and ultimately by the turn of the century and especially after World War I, it was even observable in the approach of society to its social problems. These historical trends have logical corroboration in organization theory. Economic concerns organized first because authority was legitimized fully in the modern corporations (a post-Civil War economic development which legitimized authority in the manager and his subordinates), and specialization of industrial production was much simpler than human behavioral rationalization. The trend next appeared in government since the authority criterion was constitutionally established and the tasks at hand, while more difficult to specialize, were still reducible in many cases to printed rationalization and interpretation. The techniques of social problem rationalization were the last to be incorporated since its given were much more difficult to specialize and by tradition, authority over such matters was not within the realm of either the economic or governmental system.

On a less theoretical level of argument, recent historians have generally agreed that the laissez-faire ethic which dominated 19th Century American ideology had begun to decline rapidly in practice shortly after the Civil
War, although its rhetoric remained well into the Twentieth Century. Competition was a non-desirable value in terms of full efficiency and profit maximization, and the economic history of the late nineteenth Century is the history of the decline of competition in the major industries and economic concerns of the United States. With the rationalization of authority developing from merger, trust, and other devices to reduce competition, also came a high degree of technological specialization as the result of coordination and scientific innovation. The result was an Industrial Revolution which caused severe dislocations of the established patterns of American society and the development of new patterns.

Combined with the Industrial Revolution was a major revolution in the demographic and ethnographic composition of American society, due to immigration, urbanization and population growth. These combined "revolutions" led to serious problems of social disorganization which could not be alleviated by traditional orientations. Thus the role of government changed in the late 19th Century from one of "minimal interference" to one of "minimal intervention." The intervention was largely postulated upon the general societal acceptability of such intervention, as well as upon the exhortation of the dominant economic and status groups in the society.

Social concerns which had no powerful status or economic groups advocating their alleviation or which
had alternative systems of social control available, were not subsumed under the governmental umbrella. The history of governmental concern with social problems in American society is one of continuing extension into areas whose needs have become, over time, socially acceptable to the society which the government represents.

But certain social problems which had not merited governmental or economic intervention in the early 20th Century were still considered to be so pressing that some form of rationalization was undertaken. This was the social organizational impulse of the Progressive Era from which the Urban League movement sprang. The impulse offered a goal as well as a method. During this period, many citizens both Black and White became convinced that the traditional approaches to social service among Negroes were inadequate and that some effort must be made to alleviate the problems. This concern with group and individual social problems not being alleviated by other agencies, public or private, was generalized in the Progressive Era; and the League and the NAACP were the only Negro uplift versions of that concern. 4

But here the similarity ends. There was an interlocking interest in all aspects of the general social service organizational movement, but progress in the full rationalization of approach to the problems lagged considerably behind the progress toward rationalization made in the economic and political spheres.

This lag was due primarily to a less fundamental
agreement by the society in general and specifically by its
more important status and economic groups about the utility,
necessity, and beneficiary of such efforts. Since most
of these social service and uplift groups — child labor,
women’s rights, prohibition, immigrant assimilation, Negro
uplift — were limited in resources and manpower due to
their lack of acceptability, volunteer effort was encouraged
and promoted. A professionalized approach was also stressed
to maximize the use of available resources. ⑤

But if the progress toward full rationalization was
limited in the social service groups per se, there were
also gradations of progress with regard to each specific
group, depending on the social acceptability of its goal.

The progress of the Columbus Urban League in the
rationalization, professionalization, and bureaucratization
of its function was extremely slow vis-à-vis the society as
a whole and the non-Negro-oriented social service groups
in particular.

As numerous scholars have shown, the full rational-
ization of many of the social service reforms organizationally
advocated during the Progressive Era came more slowly than
economic or political realization, but were realized by
the New Deal governmental intervention in behalf of the
goals advocated. These included child labor, female labor,
health protection and social security. ⑥

These reforms were themselves fully rationalized
between 1900 and 1930, and their organizations became
increasingly more efficient, professionalized, and bureau-
cratized as the given reform or service gained support
and approached realization.

The data and argumentation presented concerning
the Columbus Urban League indicate that the process of
bureaucratization, rationalization, and professionaliza-
tion was much slower with regard to that specific group,
not really being noticeably comparable to the other insti-
tutions cited, until well into the 1940’s (in many respects,
not until the 1950’s and 1960’s). If this trend was not
isolated locally but was a function of Black uplift groups
in general, it has much to offer in a better understanding
of the nature of the reform impulse per se. While elements
impeding the rationalization process are unique to the
environment of the group-Columbus Ohio, patterns of general
similarity in the League’s history seem apparent in the
development of Black uplift groups in general.

In a well-written memoir concerning his three decades
as Director of the Detroit Urban League, John Dancy recounted
many of the same problems encountered by the Columbus League.
He noted the necessity of gaining influential White support
to reinforce the movement, the problems encountered in
obtaining financial resources, and the inability to exer-
cize full control by the professionals given the dual nature
of the organization’s compositions. 7

The same general problems and level of their inten-
sity with regard to raising public support and funds, insti-
tuting programs, and developing a fulltime professional
orientation appear in an examination of the development of the National Urban League, as well as the League in other cities. Progress in a given area of social service and uplift may vary with given locales, but the general pattern of slower rationalization seems endemic to the League movement vis-à-vis the other attempts at social rationalization, cited above. 8

The question which comes to mind is, why? There are undoubtedly many reasons. But the level of acceptability seems to be of crucial import. Certain types of reforms and social service have indubitably gained public and private acceptance before others. Tied intimately with their level of acceptability would seem to be the nature of the group receiving its benefits. Numerous sociological studies have indicated that the American Negro is one of the most unassimilated ethnic groups in American society. In fact, such studies seem to indicate that the acceptability of a given ethnic group is largely dependent on its racial composition. American society has had difficulty assimilating all groups which enter its midst. But the levels of acceptability and ease of assimilation are directly related to the type of difference exhibited. 9

Gordon, in his assimilation paradigms shows that groups with only a cultural difference, due to their nation of origin, have assimilated fastest, followed by religious differentiation depending on the difficulty of integrating that religious life-style into the American norm, and finally,
most difficult, differentiation as to race. Groups less acceptable than the Negro to the norm society in terms of assimilation progress seem to be those racial groups which have arrived later than the Negro — for example, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans. 10

If bureaucratization and rationalization are seen as a function of societal acceptability, it would seem to follow that the Negro would rationalize his social uplift attempts more slowly. The data provided concerning the Columbus League seem to corroborate that hypothesis.

Compared with the efficacy of advancement of the League in Detroit, the Columbus League seems to have been slower in its rationalization of response. This was despite the fact that both cities had the same urban League Directors for three decades and that both cities are located in the Midwest. The most important factors of difference appear to be the comparative size of the two cities, the comparative size of the Black communities, and the extent of traditional societal views influencing political conduct. In both size of city and Black population, Detroit is larger by far than Columbus. In extent of traditional patterns of political response, Detroit seems to have a more innovative aspect to its governmental history.

On the other hand, both Detroit and Columbus lag behind New York in their rationalization of operation. This lag is undoubtedly due not only to larger Negro population and the existence of the League in a city charac-
characterized as much by its radicals as its reactionaries, but also because the National Headquarters of the League is in that city.

The last factor is of great import because the National Urban League professionalized and bureaucratized much faster than any of its local branches. Partly, this was due to the fact that the National rapidly absorbed the innovations of all of its local chapters, and drew on the influence of the most powerful supporters of the League for national concerns. But also, it is undoubtedly due to the fact that the National is primarily a co-ordinating and planning group. As has been discussed above, (Chapter IV), the League's impulse to rationalization was expedited rapidly by the shift in its approach from person-to-person service to community planning and coordination. 11

Finally, the history of the League itself in a given city is an element in the slowness of bureaucratization and rationalization. The League in cities like New York, Columbus, and Detroit was established more than fifty years ago, and the abandonment of traditional techniques and functions painstakingly acquired over time hindered the full efficiency of rationalization and professionalization. For example, the Urban League in Dayton was organized in 1947, and wishing not only to render maximum service but to justify its own existence, it moved rapidly to the position of a community planning agency. Such was not the case in Columbus or Detroit. Old techniques linger and sometimes
The similarities between the various Leagues revolve around the two problems of voluntarism and professionalism. All of the Leagues considered by the writer in his survey of comparative operational efficiency tended to indicate that volunteers were still, as late as the 1950's being used in policy making as well as advisory positions. In other words, the volunteers were being utilized out of necessity as well as desirability. Such has not been the case in Columbus, for example, with the Catholic and Jewish charities; nor has the history of religious charitable organization on a national scale shown the same emphasis on voluntarism as an integral part of the group's existence and program. Such a heavy reliance on volunteers creates two levels of authority within the agency - one professional, one volunteer - which decreases the probability of full rationalization. Unified authority is prerequisite to the development of full efficiency. This problem is exacerbated by the reliance on inter-racial good will which has characterized the League locally and nationally for years, lessening even more the control probability of the professionals over the volunteers, and vice-versa. The Columbus League is especially fruitful for examination of the latter policy, since it was one of the first Leagues to instigate such an approach.

In terms of professional efficiency per se, the League has also lagged behind other social service agencies because of limited funds as well as the lack of available
talent. The necessity of limiting full professionalism was due to demands of professional-volunteer interaction.

But if the League has lagged behind social service groups, its process or rationalization has been much more expeditious than other Negro social service agencies in the society. Much of this also has to do with levels of acceptability.

The League, nationally and in Columbus, eschews political activity, *per se*, and relies on a social and economic uplift approach to its problems. It not only accepts influential White assistance, it courts it assiduously. Furthermore, its program for many years stressed inter-racial goodwill and the integration of the Negro into the predominant American society. These views rested much more easily with the White community, and especially its economic and social status elites, than did some of the more direct challenges made to the system by the NAACP or other militant groups.

Hence economic, political, and social support was often given the League, as opposed to other Black groups, to pursue its socially defined goals. With more support came more acceptability. With more acceptability came more rationalization.

This differential support is illustrated in Columbus by the fact that the NAACP until quite recently, had no full-time staff whatsoever, and no formal headquarters. Some more militant organizations for Black uplift in this city are even less well organized. The NAACP, despite its lack of formal facilities and staff, does have a highly structured
and useful system of volunteer assistance. Groups like CORE, SNCC, and the Black Panthers rely basically on a small cadre of faithful volunteers, supplemented by appeal on the basis of specific issues. CMAAO and Model Cities, on the other hand, both federally financed programs, have extensive offices, staff, and operational facilities.  

This differentiation of acceptability has been heightened in recent years by the emergence of a recognizable Black middle class.

Compounding the problems of the League as well as those of all Black uplift groups is the existence of multiple status and value levels within the Black community, which at times transcend racial identification. Sociologists have known that rudimentary social status differentiations have become more complex over time. Until recently, however, they believed that the elements of discrimination and disrespect produced a racially oriented value identification instead of a status one, as the dominant role identification in the individual's criteria for social action. This assumption can no longer be universally applied, as studies have indicated that the Black upper and middle class adult Negro tends to identify with the program of the League and NAACP, while lower class and young Negroes tend to identify with more direct-action-oriented groups. This phenomenon did not have important implications until the Negro middle class became large enough to precipitate noticeable divisions within the bulk of the Black community. Such has been the case.
within the last ten years. The problem has become intensified by the late 1960's with the emergence of a "militant" middle class, whose conception of "militancy" is derived from the direct-action involvements of the 1950's. But this non-violent direct approach seems unacceptable to the more actively militant black power school. The problems of relating a Black community which is divided over goals and tactics but which has a general direct-action approach, with a White community, split over the same goals but eschewing direct action, is one of the basic problems facing the Urban League movement. 17

But probably the key problem facing the League, both locally and nationally, is that its decades-old philosophy of integration has been rejected by increasing numbers of both the White and Black communities. This has been the result of powerful and persistent divergencies developing within both communities. The League has attempted to hold its inter-racial coalition together, while adapting to meet the criticisms of dissidents, as well as expressing the needs and aspirations of the entire community. This attempted philosophical re-orientation is not yet complete, and it is impossible to predict when it will stabilize.

What has come about, however, is a general societal questioning of the relationship between egalitarianism and cultural pluralism. The League, reflecting a "consensus" school of sociology and history, has repeatedly asserted for decades that the two elements are complementary and
reconcilable.

Sociologists, for just as many years, on the other hand, have known that the two elements are ultimately contradictory, but that this ultimate contradiction is irrelevant since society is basically consensus-oriented. Levels of the two elements will stabilize in harmony with each other. In other words, the ultimate contradiction is unlikely given the consensus nature of society.

Since the end of World War II, however, a growing number of sociologists have concluded that society is not "consensus," but rather "conflict" oriented. Since the late 1950's, a younger generation of historians have also begun to ascribe to that view. This change has resurrected the whole debate once again as to the desirable levels of pluralism and egalitarianism. These scholars argue that the two concepts are never completely reconcilable, or even marginally so, but that societal conditioning will instill levels of both value systems in any given individual, and the extent of conflict will be dependent on the given individual's environment and ethnic origins.

The major problem in all assimilation studies is the reconciliation of an egalitarian positive value system with a culturally pluralistic positive value system in the society.

This problem relates directly to the Urban League as a social service and reform institution as well as to a
consideration of the nature of the reform process in general. If the triumph of any reform movement, including its full attendant rationalization, is dependent on acceptability levels of the society, then mutually strong positive but contradictory value systems will impede that reform. These depend on the nature or the relationship of that given reform to the contradictory value system. (The more resistant a given group is to the egalitarian ethic, either from pressures imposed internally or externally, the less likely will that group's reform attempts be met by positive reinforcement from the norm society, which defines egalitarianism in terms of its cultural biases).

In pure definition, egalitarianism and cultural pluralism have no cultural connotations. Egalitarianism, taken to its logical extent, implies psychological and social, as well as economic and political, similarity. But it is well known that no system of sociological differentiation exists in a bias-free state. The terms "egalitarian" and "pluralistic" will be defined given the cultural biases of the norm society, largely in terms of the views or the dominant status groups in that society. And each ethnic sub-group -- social, religious, national or cultural -- will define the two terms in light of its own ethnic values.

The goal of a unified society would then be the development of similarity between the values of the norm society and those of the particular ethnic group involved. This may be accomplished by instilling the norm society's
values in the group, by instillation of the group's values on the society, or by a combination of the two.

The Urban League movement has used both approaches but has emphasized the former. It has not succeeded in instilling those values for two reasons. On the one hand, the White norm society has preached egalitarianism but has practiced prejudice. In practice, its own conception of an integrated society is not an egalitarian one. On the other hand, the League has stressed cultural pluralism on its own terms when the cultural practices retained are either politically harmless or morally inoffensive to the norm society's tastes.

Within the last few years manifest concern within the Black community has been expressed over a general question of the norm society's egalitarian inconsistencies and of the universal verity of that norm society's cultural judgement as well. This has resulted in an ever-greater expectation gap between the Black and White communities, as to what definition of a "normal participation" in American life should be valid. The upshot has been for the American Negro to question not only the White society but himself, and to find the American dream lacking not only in terms of physical privatisation but also in intellectual justification, as practiced in contemporary society.

The frustration which has resulted from these questions over the last fifteen years and the seeming inability
to grasp the "dream deferred" has often vented itself in violence involving the Negro middle class as well as its lower class and its youth. Violence is the last resort of rational man. And the growth of violence as a last resort to implement viable social change indicates not only the frustration of the Negro but also the recalcitrance of the White. 20

How long this recalcitrance can retain its viability in the wake of increasing levels of frustration and violent expression, despite serious societal repression of disorder, is impossible to say. But it seems to be clear that the traditional approaches to the problems of Negro participation, exemplified in the style, technique, and philosophy of the Columbus Urban League, will have to be drastically modified to meet the legitimate aspirations of the black population and a growing segment of the white as well.

To test fully the hypothesis of the dependency of the realization of reform on its acceptability in an ethno-cultural spectrum, with the study of the development of organizational rationalization as the methodological center of research, one would have to examine the history of groups advocating reform by return to a former societal system as well as those advocating a new societal pattern of cultural interaction. Further, analysis of the acceptability and utility of reforms of minimal impact on the traditional norm base of society would have to be undertaken. None of these groups or reforms have been within the scope of this paper. As such, they have
not been dealt with.

The Urban League in Columbus, Ohio, and nationally, has made important contributions to easing the burdens of the Negro race, and in many ways has hastened the day when men will be able to live with their differences as well as their similarities. If progress has been slow, it is not because the League has not exerted efforts on multiple fronts to achieve full Negro participation in American life. That progress even by the most accepted Negro uplift group in White America has been so slow testifies to the reluctance of the White society to live according to its ideals, even at a minimal level.
The NEW EPOCH
of
The COLUMBUS URBAN LEAGUE
CORPORATION...3000 MEMBERS
BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Personnel Committee
Personnel Standards, Practices
Policies, Functions and Responsibilities

Executive Committee
Constitutional Responsibilities

Koll Call Committee
To provide the Urban League's constituency who support the philosophy carried out in the League's program.

DEPARTMENTS

Youth
A. Guidance—Wholesome Leadership and Opportunity for Creative Expression
B. Big Brothers
C. Big Sisters
D. Coordinating Recreation

Brush Lake
A. Family Center for Social, Recreational and Educational Activities
B. Youth Summer Camp
C. Vacations, Retreats and Chalets

Industrial
A. Seek new job opportunities for Negroes and work with labor and management for the thorough integration of Negroes in Industry.
B. Conduct a long range program of workers education and encourage Negroes in the efficient use and extension of their skills.
C. Conduct a Free Placement Service.

Community & Neighborhood
A. Monroe Ave. Social Center
B. Resident Activities
C. Neighborhood Social Work
D. Youth Activities
E. American Adoption—Urban, etc.

Public Relations
A. General Research Activities Re Negroes
B. Carrying on an Educational Program Concerning Industry—Health—Housing and Minority Group Problems
C. Interpretation of Negro Life
D. Public Contacts
THE COLUMBUS URBAN LEAGUE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

RECEPTIONIST
  ↓
  BOOKKEEPER
  ↓
  TYPIST (Part Time)

OFFICE MANAGER

HOUSING SECRETARY

COMMUNITY SERVICES SECRETARY

GUIDANCE SERVICES SECRETARY

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS SECRETARY
FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

1 For Background on Max Weber:
   Talcott Parsons, "Introduction," in Max Weber, 
The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, 
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63 See "Annual Reports" of NESAC, ECCO, and CMACAC, (Ohio Hist. Soc.-MD, Col. Urban League) (Columbus, Reference File.)

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Chapter V

1. On the "bureaucratic imperative," see Chapter II of this paper and Weber as cited in Note 6 of Chapter II.

2. See: Chapter II of this paper and Weber, Theory, pp. 324-330.

3. For historical development of the process of organization:
   Presthus, Organizational Society, pp. 59-93.

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16 Frazier, Bourgeoisie, passim.

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20 Graham and Gurr, Violence, passim., especially pp. 377-441.
NOTES ON SOURCES

The Ohio Historical Society:

The Archives and Manuscripts Division of the Society contains two valuable primary sources for research concerning the Columbus Urban League - The Papers of The Columbus Urban League and an Oral History Series in Progress on the Columbus Urban League. The papers are in very good condition and occupy approximately forty-three archives boxes. The period covered is 1917-1962. The files will be supplemented periodically from the current files of the Columbus League. The general arrangement is: Boxes 1-11, executive and administrative files; Boxes 12-22, Departmental files; Boxes 23-28 files of Affiliates and related organizations; Boxes 29-38 Financial records, and Boxes 39-43, Research Files and Miscellany. Liasian has been established with the Columbus Urban League to allow access of scholars to the current files of the Columbus League, under the auspices of the Society. The collections manuscripts, Research, and financial records files are especially solid and useful to the student of organizational history. It was made available for scholarly research on June 30, 1969.

The Oral History Department of the Archives and Manuscripts Division is presently completing a series of interviews with persons significantly involved in the History of The Columbus Urban League. The writer is co-
ordinating the project and therefore had advance access to the interviews cited in this paper. The Series will ultimately consist of 15-20 interviews, with transcripts filed in the Library of the Ohio Historical Society. Access for scholarly use is planned for on or about November 1, 1969, at the latest. Earlier accessibility is anticipated and pre-access use requests can be referred to the Society. Inquiries concerning the Oral History Project should be referred to Mr. David Larson, Chief Archives and Manuscripts Division, The Ohio Historical Society. Inquiries concerning the Papers of the Columbus Urban League should be referred to Miss Andrea Durham, Curator of Manuscripts, Archives and Manuscripts Division, The Ohio Historical Society.

Personal Interviews:

The writer conducted personal interviews to supplement his research in this paper with: Mr. Nimrod B. Allen, Director of the Columbus Urban League, 1921-1954; Mr. Barbee Durham, Director of the Columbus NAACP, 1952-1966, and Mr. Robert Lazarus, Jr., President of the Columbus Urban League, 1962-64. The writer's notes as to general questions and replies are available upon request, c/o Dept. of History, The Ohio State University.
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