THE COLUMBUS CALL & POST: THE FOUNDING
OF A
LOCAL BLACK COMMUNITY NEWSPAPER, 1962-1966

A Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Master of Arts
by
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Approved by

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Adviser
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The author would like to thank the interviewees who shared their recollections about the part they played in the shaping of this historical analysis of the local Black community.

Special thanks are due Dottie, Rose, Bridgett, Gene, and "Tiger" for their clerical assistance, criticisms, and patience.
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Introduction

This study was undertaken in part as a result of work the author completed about the first Black newspaper in Ohio, the Columbus Palladium of Liberty (1843). The content of the Palladium bore a remarkable resemblance to contemporary Black newspapers. The similarity in rhetorical style, the emphasis on equal rights, the inclusion of religious themes, and most of all the emphasis on issues concerning race linked the Palladium to its modern day counterparts. These similarities were intriguing enough to encourage further investigation into some current aspects of the present Black press.

The Columbus Call & Post (hereafter the Columbus paper) was a logical selection for study, since it happened to be the only Black newspaper to which the author had been exposed to any degree. Moreover, the writer wanted to investigate a local or community-based newspaper which dealt with local politics and social movements. Finally, the Columbus paper would also be a suitable topic because historians generally have ignored the Black press in central Ohio. In his research, the author could find no scholarly secondary sources concerning the local Black press. It was for these reasons the author selected the Columbus paper for study.

A more general but nonetheless significant reason for selecting the Columbus paper conceals itself here. The
paper concerns Black people who in general lack a scientifically documented history. Not until the late 1890s did Black scholars like W. E. B. Du Bois begin to scientifically explore and record the heritage of the Black race, and not until Carter G. Woodson formed the Association for the Study of Negro Life and History in 1915 with its organ, the Journal of Negro History, did Black historians have a means of telling their story to the people.

Selection of the Columbus paper as a topic proved to be simpler than determining which aspect of the paper to study. The socio-political circumstances surrounding the beginning of the paper were finally chosen. The Columbus paper began in 1962 during the decade (1955-1965) which James Sundquist refers to as the era of "nonviolent Negro revolution."

It was the local politics and social movements of this particular decade which appealed to the author. From the outset, the author suspected that these forces must have had a significant effect on the establishment and development of this Black community newspaper. Indeed, the study describes the forces which helped to shape the way the paper began and subsequently helped determine its content during its formative years.

Chapter one is concerned with the methodology used in the study. Its purpose is to explain the type of study conducted as well as to describe the instruments used to gather and to
measure information. This chapter includes definitions of terms used as well as a discussion of the limitations of the study.

Chapters two and three describe the rationale for the existence of a local Black community newspaper. Chapter two gives some background information about the local Black and white communities to show why a need existed for a Black community newspaper. Chapter three describes how the increase in socio-political awareness within the Black community from 1955 through 1965 further demonstrated the need for a Black community newspaper.

Chapter four presents background information about the Cleveland Call & Post (hereafter the Cleveland paper). This includes a brief account of the editor-publisher William O. Walker along with a description of his Cleveland and Cincinnati editions all of which influenced the development of the Columbus paper.

Chapters five and six trace the development of the Columbus paper explaining how it gained then retained the confidence and support of the local Black community, thus becoming one of its main vehicles of collective expression.

Chapter seven summarizes and states the conclusions.

In this study the author had endeavored to contribute to Black history especially as it relates to the local Black
press. Perhaps this small contribution will help fill some of the void and stimulate others to do the same.
1
Chapter 1
Methodology

This is an historical analysis of a Black community newspaper. The work is not intended to be a sociological or political science study, though it may resemble studies in these disciplines. It identifies and describes the socio-political forces within the community and how these influenced the formative years of the Columbus Ohio Call & Post newspaper. The term socio-political denotes a social force intertwined with a political force to form one socio-political force. When investigating the Black "sub-community," the author found that many significant social movements had political overtones, and conversely. By "sub-community" the author is referring to the "functional community within the larger community...[that] sets the prevailing standards and values of society."  

In this analysis the author will be addressing two broad questions: (1) why was the paper begun and (2) why did it succeed in its formative years when many Black newspapers failed? While answering these two basic questions, the study will show that the Columbus paper succeeded in becoming an accepted voice of the local Black community. The local Black community needed its own newspaper to help it to interpret the news and reflect its views. The Black community, as Maxwell R. Brooks states, "wants to know about the story
behind the news, to see what really happened'...[because the Black community] may be affected by something that has taken place, or is likely to take place.'" 4

This organ also had to be sensitive, as well as sympathetic, to racial issues stemming from the increase in Black awareness which began in the mid-1950s. Before it could serve community needs, the Columbus paper first had to be accepted by the Black community and win its trust. This meant the Columbus paper then had to become a "community-oriented" paper before the community would support it through subscriptions and advertisements.

Before proceeding further, other terms used in the study require definition. The terms "accepted voice," "organ," and "vehicle" are used interchangeably to refer to any means of collective expression. In this sense the terms could just as well apply to the spoken word from the pulpit, since each, in order to survive, must be supported by the community for which it claims to speak. The term "formative years" or "early developmental years" is also used herein to mean the years 1962 through 1966, when the paper was still in the process of gaining and retaining the support of the Black community for which it spoke, as opposed to retaining this support.

In several places the term "Black awareness" is used. It is meant to denote the realization by Blacks of their social and political strengths and weaknesses. Therefore, when the
study refers to an increase in Black awareness, it is referring to an increase in realization of the race's social and political strengths as well as of its weaknesses. In this study Black awareness is measured by Black socio-political activity.

The local Black press has been ignored by students of history which mean secondary sources were almost non-existent. The investigator therefore had to rely upon interview analysis as his main instrument to gathering information about the social and political movements of the decade. Seventeen personal interviews were conducted within a two-month period. The interviews were primarily with some of the "Black leaders" of central Ohio. These social and civic leaders were selected on the advice of others who were resident in the Black community during the Columbus paper's early years. For example, the general manager of the Columbus paper, Amos Lynch, mentioned the Rev. Russell M. Jones as being one of the most influential Black men in the community at this time. Several others agreed with Lynch's selection, so Jones was interviewed. In this way, the principal investigator played a minimal role in the selection process.

These local leaders supplied considerable information for the study, but most was subjective since it relied heavily on the recall of the interviewee and upon the relevance of the interview questions. Nonetheless, most interviewees were
extremely helpful in providing background information about the socio-political forces within the local community. For example, Al Hawkins, Democratic Ward Committeeman for the Seventh Ward, was very helpful in supplying information about the awareness of the Black community in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Details extracted from these interviews helped the investigator determine the change in Black awareness.

To check some of the subjective information obtained from the interviews, quantitative analyses were conducted. Voting behavior, for example, was one means of re-examining one interviewee's comment about local Blacks not becoming politically active until the late 1950s. To examine voter behavior, the author performed a voter analysis for one predominately Black ward for the decade 1955 through 1965 (see Appendix A). To determine the validity of statements concerning the responsiveness of the local white press to the Black community, a content analysis was also conducted wherein random samples of the three major white dailies for the years 1955, 1957, and 1959 were read and coded (see Appendix B). Another content analysis was conducted wherein randomly selected issues of the 1962, 1964, and 1966 Columbus Call & Post were read and coded. This was done to determine the political content of the Columbus paper during these years (see Appendix D). For example, in several instances it was necessary to conduct two or more interviews in order to obtain additional information needed
to help clarify inconsistencies between interviewee statements and quantitative measurements. Furthermore, a good deal of the information obtained from the interviews was of little consequence. Only about one of every ten minutes of tape was of some use to the study. Some interviews were of negligible use in this study.

Analyzing the content analysis data was not quite as tedious, but it was just as time consuming as analyzing interview information. Here, selecting the proper analytical tool was a major problem. The Janis and Fadner "coefficient of imbalance" was finally selected as the tool to use in analyzing political content, though several tools were considered.\(^5\) In this instance, Berelson was correct when he stated that "By and large...the numerical results of content analysis are presented in the simplest forms...[since] the problems for which the studies are designed seem to require no more elaborate forms of presentation."\(^6\)

This chapter on methodology must necessarily include observations about the limitations of the study. As suggested earlier, the interview technique, while a very useful tool for gathering certain kinds of information, can yield unsatisfactory results when left on its own. Few have the minds with which to readily and adequately recall events which occurred twenty years ago let alone to piece together these events in order to answer questions about them. More-
over, even the most diligent researcher cannot verify every relevant detail imparted to him by the interviewee. About the best the investigator can do is ask as succinct and relevant questions as possible without turning the interview into a structured one-way interview which might restrict information flow.

The use of quantitative data has its limitations also. A serious problem arises if one depends upon another's data in formulating one's own data. On many occasions errors were found when the data was rechecked. Just as frustrating was the attempt to retain reliability or consistency in recording data in the content analyses. Holsti's reliability formula helped when coders performed the political content analysis, but no such formula exists for determining the reliability for calculating the population of a particular ward which was necessary when the investigator analyzed voter turnout.\textsuperscript{7} Sampling too proved difficult, for again no realistic formula exists to help determine sample size. Dornbusch and Schmid suggest as a rule sampling twenty percent of the universe, but this is unrealistic when the universe amounts to almost 3100 newspapers as was the case in the racial content analysis in this study. Lastly, content analysis is not foolproof. As Dornbusch and Schmid go on to explain, "Statistical inference is concerned with deriving broad, inclusive generalizations," and since inferences are a result of content analyses, it must be made clear that "statistical inference never produces certainty."\textsuperscript{8}
Historical knowledge is never complete, thus the author decided to verify information gathered from the interviews with the data obtained from the quantitative analyses in order to produce a study of some historical significance. Detailed information about the local Black community and its press were sparse. It was necessary therefore to supplement information obtained from the interviews then re-check the supplemental information. The "makers" of local Black history failed to leave sufficient and well documented sources for students of history to peruse. The attempt in gathering, analyzing, and presenting this study was not to complete historical analyses but rather to contribute to whatever information exists on the local Black community and its press. The author is sure however that in the process he did not answer all of the pertinent questions. This unintentional negligence will perhaps stimulate future students of the local Black community.
END NOTES

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In his "Negro Newspapers: Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," Journalism Quarterly, XXVIII, (Spring, 1951), pp. 179-188, Armistead S. Pride says the "average life span of a Negro newspaper is nine years." Though no current studies have been attempted to update this figure, it is highly probable that this figure remains a fairly good indicator of the life span of the average Black newspaper today. H. G. LaBrie, III, states that of "the 203 papers listed (in his most current guide), 123 have been founded since 1950.... 86 have been founded since 1960 and 21 since 1970." In other words, 80 of his existing total were in existence before 1950, 166 before 1960, and only 192 before 1970. See page 4 of his The Black Press in America: A Guide, 2nd ed., (Coralville, Iowa: Mercer House Press, 1972).

4  

5  
For one alternative method, see S. B. Huff's "A Method for the Quantitative Measurement of Bias in News Coverage," M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1966. However, the racial content analysis of the local white press leant itself to simpler forms of analyses such as percentage breakdowns.

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Chapter II
The Need for a Black Community Newspaper: Rationalization Part I

I think the [Columbus] Call & Post has made a strong effort to try to be responsive to the Black community's needs. We've tried to do a job with the people...showing them how to effectively use the newspaper. We've kept the doors of the newspaper open.

- Amos Lynch, 9/18/75

The socio-political forces encouraging the founding of the Columbus paper in May, 1962, were of long standing and involved the relationship of the dominant white community and the coterminous Black community. The Black community was then and remains today a "sub-community," which, though retaining many of its cultural distinctions, permits the dominant white community to set many of the day-to-day standards for Blacks. Perhaps the term "permits" is inaccurate, for the Black community in all too many cases has had no alternative but to accept these standards. Economically deprived, socially ostracized, and politically weak, the local Black community was less willing in the 1950s than it later would be to resort to short-term militant tactics to effect social and political change.

The economic, social, and political restrictions characterized the local Black community up through the early 1950s. Economic
deprivation had it effects on the community and needs little expansion, but social ostracism (or racial segregation) had a greater effect and needs to be explained. Geographically, racial segregation was most conspicuous in the community's residential pattern. An average of approximately 70% of the Black community resided in six voting wards in the inner city from 1955 through 1965. Increasing the number of wards from six to seven causes the 70% figure to increase to an average of over 80%. Until the early 1940s, Blacks could not be served in downtown restaurants; neither could they attend downtown theatres, or attain access to the hotel accommodations in the downtown area. Even when many of these restrictions were lifted, mainly through the efforts of the Vanguard League, a local Black activist group of the 1940s, Blacks still felt compelled to frequent the establishments in their own community. The Black community reacted naturally to this racism by wanting to integrate, but at a moderate pace. Only as a last resort did Black use litigation to achieve this end. The main tactic used through the early 1950s was persuasion. Barbee Durham, Executive Secretary of the Columbus Branch of the N.A.A.C.P., stated that as a last resort to alleviate housing discrimination on the local level "we [the NAACP] used the legal approach.... we filed action against the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority...,[but] where employment [discrimination] was concerned we used conferences [and] persuasion." Nimrod Allen, Executive Director of the Columbus Urban League from 1921
until 1954, said that the major method of getting white
support for the various social efforts in the Black community
was through "persuasion" and through educational efforts. 4
"We [the Urban League]," Allen continued, "tried to educate
the public and tried to educate the Negro" in order to effect
social change. Thus it was moral suasion that the Black
community endeavored to use in order to effect socio-political
change. The militancy of the Vanguard League and the Congress on
Racial Equality (hereafter CORE), which flourished locally
during World War II, was substantially reduced since the or-
ganizations were thought of as communist inspired.

About the only avenue for socio-political change left open to
the Black community was the political process, but even this
avenue for change was blocked. According to the Rev. Russell
Jones, social and political activist in the community beginning
in the mid-1950s, the politics of the Black community basically
consisted of "ward heeling" wherein after the "white" candi-
dates had influenced the Black vote, the Black community was
disregarded and considered inconsequential until the next
election campaign. The promises made by these politicians
were seldom kept. 5  Al Hawkins, present Democratic Committeeman
for Ward Seven, commented that the Black community was "left
out of the scheme of things....They [the local white politicians]
came out...asked us for our vote, but gave us nothing." 6
To make matters worse, the Black community had been so gerry-
mandered that they could not use their vote effectively to
intimidate a political candidate. Even at the local level, no Black had been elected to city council since before 1914 when Wilbur King was elected by the ward system. 7

The Black community faced a white power structure in the 1950s which permeated the entire community. Each time the Black community desired change, as in its attempt to strike at "restrictive covenants," which allowed for segregated housing, it had to reckon with this structure. The power structure did not overtly attempt to control the Black community, but rather took implicit action in an attempt to influence the thinking of the dominant community of which the Black community is a part. For example, the Wolfe family was one of the families that was believed to wield tremendous influence in the community. It stands to reason then that any forces for change coming from within the Black community such as open housing, would necessarily affect the influence this family had on the greater community. The Wolfes for example are thought to have a controlling interest in the Ohio National Bank which extends mortgage loans throughout the community. In effect the Wolfe family is a significant part of the dominant white community which sets many of the day-to-day standards for the greater community. 8 One article describes the Wolfe power in these terms: "But more than any other Wolfe power is the death-tight vice the Wolfes apply on the media of Columbus. Through the media the Wolfes keep a mental control over the Columbus
The author of the article is referring to the substantial control the Wolfes are thought to have over the local communication's media which in the 1950s included ownership of one of the four local television stations, one of the major radio stations, and one of the two evening newspapers, the Columbus Dispatch. In the 1950s there was some competition in the local newspaper industry with the Columbus Citizen, a Scripps-Howard paper, and the Ohio State Journal, a Dispatch subsidiary. The Journal and the Citizen were merged in December, 1959, to form the Columbus Citizen-Journal, which became the community's only morning paper. The Citizen Journal is still basically a Scripps-Howard paper, but its printing, advertising, and circulation are controlled by the Dispatch.

The white press in general, which spoke for the power structure, limited the news concerning the Blacks and the Black community. These newspapers were politically conservative, which meant the Black community was constantly being exposed to if not influenced by the power structure's political ideology. Politically this ideology took the form of the conservatism of the Republican party. When the Dispatch and the rest of the local white press did mention news of interest to the Black community, this news tended to be politically biased. According to Al Hawkins, the Dispatch gave qualified endorsement to only three Black candidates up through 1970 and all three of these were Republican.

Another way in which the local white press limited the news
concerning the Black community was in the amount and type of the news it printed. William Savoy, a contributor of historical articles to the Columbus Ohio Sentinel, a Black newspaper published in Columbus during the 1950s, stated that Black news was "curtailed" and was mostly limited to society and religious news. He stated, "If we did anything worthwhile it was hard to get it in the [white] paper. You couldn't get your [Black] news in any particular part of the paper except in the editorial during Negro history week."

Mr. Savoy went on to mention Attorney Howard Gillard's column in the Dispatch, which was the column for Black community news. According to Savoy, the Black community sent its news to Gillard, who in turn would screen it and then place it in his column. The late Blanche Van Hook had a similar column in the Citizen. Much of the news about the Black community then was of the society and religious type and appeared in the Sunday editions of these local white dailies.

The local white press did not give adequate coverage to news concerning the Black community. The Black community was aware of its limited exposure and the distorted view of the coverage it received from the white press and therefore turned to its own press for what it considered to be "the facts." An example of the lack of coverage of news of concern to Blacks is shown in the results of a racial content analysis of the local white press for the late 1950s. Table 1.1 is the result of a racial content analysis which shows a breakdown of the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Space Devoted to Black Articles</th>
<th>Percentage of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Space Available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Dispatch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Citizen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 Journal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Dispatch</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Citizen</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 Journal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>1959 Dispatch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 Citizen</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 Journal</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand Totals</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*C/I Denotes estimated column inches.

Four issues of each newspaper sampled each year; one per month for three separate years; total sampled 36.

Percentage of "Total News Space Available" was computed as follows using the 1955 Dispatch results:

- Dispatch with average of 200 news columns per issue X 30 C/I per column=approx. 6000 C/I per issue X 4 copies read=24,000 C/I for year ÷ 128 C/I devoted Black articles=0.00533x100=0.53%.
"classifications" of "Black articles," the types of "categories" into which these articles fall, and the amount of "space devoted to Black articles," i.e., those articles specifically mentioning Blacks or articles concerning the Black community. According to samples read, in 1955 less than one percent of the total news space available was devoted to news about the Blacks or of concern to the Black community. Of the twelve newspapers sampled (one per month) for 1955, only twelve articles about Blacks were found. Of these twelve issues, five had no articles mentioning Blacks or any articles with news concerning Blacks at all (as indicated in Table 1.2). The major category for Black articles in 1955 was "sports" with 56 column inches (C/I) of news, or about 40% of the total "space devoted to Black articles."
Next was "religion and society" with three articles and 53 column inches, for about 37.5% of the devoted space.

In 1957, 28 articles were found relating to Blacks and the Black community, an increase of 16 articles, of which four were classified as "unfavorable." The number of articles per category was more evenly distributed for this year. The sports category had the most articles but had fewer column inches of news; whereas, "general and miscellaneous" (which included crime, accidents, human interest, and any other category not easily associated with the other categories) had 126 column inches for approximately 46% of the total space devoted to Black articles making it the most conspicuous
### Table 1.2

**Issues Containing No Distinguishable Black Articles**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1957</th>
<th>1959</th>
<th>TOTALS</th>
<th>TOTAL PAPERS READ</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispatch</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journal</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>5</strong></td>
<td><strong>1</strong></td>
<td><strong>2</strong></td>
<td><strong>8</strong></td>
<td><strong>36</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 1.3

**Results of Racial Content Analysis of Three Local White Dailies of Columbus, Ohio for 1955, 1957, and 1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Classification</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>T</th>
<th>Gov't</th>
<th>Politics</th>
<th>Entert.</th>
<th>Sports</th>
<th>Relig.</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>Space Devoted to Black Articles in Column</th>
<th>Percentage of Total Space Available</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dispatch</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>5 101 6 89</td>
<td>311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizen</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>3 31 4 70</td>
<td>208</td>
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<tr>
<td>Journal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1 7 2 13</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>9 i39 10 172</td>
<td>585</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
category for 1957. A rather surprising increase was in the "government and politics" category. The column inches for this category increased almost three-fold from 15 to 44. Another marked increase was in the space devoted to Black articles, which increased almost 100%, but the percentage of Black articles for the total news space available increased only 0.13 percentage points. Thus news space relating to Blacks remained at less than one percent.

The 1959 results for some reason did not increase as had the results for 1957. The 1959 results more closely resembled those of 1955. In the 1959 figures, the column inches for Black articles decreased from 276 to 168; shown as a percent of the total news space available, the figure was almost the same as that for 1955. Sports again was the principal category with seven articles and 38 column inches for approximately 23% of the space devoted to Black articles in the samples read. Of the twelve 1959 sample issues read and coded, two had no articles mentioning Blacks or news concerning the Black community (see Table 1.2).

As for the papers individually, Table 1.3 provides part of this breakdown. In the classification columns, the Citizen contained a total of 20 articles of which two were coded "unfavorable" and 16 were coded "neutral." It would appear the Citizen led the Dispatch in printing Black articles, but this is true if one looks only at the number of articles.
A glance at the space columns, however, reveals that the Citizen fell behind the Dispatch both in column inches and in Black articles as a percent of the total news space available. Then again, in the percentage of total space devoted to Black articles, the Citizen once again becomes the leader with 0.50% compared to the Dispatch's 0.43%. Even this column fails to give the complete picture. Table 1.4 gives the percentage breakdown of the categories by newspaper for all three years in the sample. It can be discerned here which newspaper contained the greatest percent of news by category. For example, the Citizen contained 55% of the "politics and government" category. This is significant considering that only approximately 23.30% of all the categories was devoted to the "politics and government" category. In the entertainment category, the Citizen once again has 55% of this category while this category comprised only 0.15% of the total categories. It will be recalled the Dispatch led the Citizen in both column inches and in Black articles as a percent of news space available. Table 1.4 shows the Dispatch having printed some 68% of the sports category which comprised only about 23% of the total categories. Similarly, the Dispatch printed 73% of the Black articles relating to religion and society. The religion and society category made up only about 24% of the total number of categories. In the general and miscellaneous category the Dispatch printed 52% of the Black articles; the category comprised about 29% of the total number of categories. The Journal turned out to be an almost negligible factor here,
### TABLE 1.4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>DISPATCH</th>
<th>CITIZEN</th>
<th>JOURNAL</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
<th>Percentage of Category for All Categories Combined</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics &amp; Government</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entertainment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>22.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion &amp; Society</td>
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<td>22%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. &amp; Miscellaneous*</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>29.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>98.61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*This category is composed of news pertaining to crime, accidents, human interest, or other subjects not readily associated with the listed categories.

### TABLE 1.5
PERCENTAGE OF CATEGORIES OF DISTINGUISHABLE BLACK ARTICLES APPEARING IN THE LOCAL WHITE PRESS IN COLUMBUS, OHIO, 1955, 1957, AND 1959 (PER PAPER)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORIES</th>
<th>DISPATCH</th>
<th>CITIZEN</th>
<th>JOURNAL</th>
<th>TOTAL %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Politics &amp; Government</td>
<td>9.65%</td>
<td>34.63%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
<td>2.40%</td>
<td>6.06%</td>
<td>0.15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sports</td>
<td>29.26%</td>
<td>14.42%</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>22.91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion &amp; Society</td>
<td>32.47%</td>
<td>14.90%</td>
<td>10.61%</td>
<td>23.76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gen. &amp; Miscellaneous*</td>
<td>28.62%</td>
<td>33.65%</td>
<td>19.70%</td>
<td>29.40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>98.61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
except in the entertainment category where it printed 45% of Black articles. In terms of total percentages of categories printed by newspaper, the Dispatch again leads. This fact makes the 25% for the Citizen and 22% for the Journal all the more significant, for even though the Citizen accounted for only 25% of all Black news coverage, it represented the majority in both the "politics and government" and entertainment categories.

Another way of looking at which newspaper contained the greatest amount of news per category is to compare the breakdown of each category within each newspaper for balance. Table 1.5 gives such a breakdown. In the Dispatch, for example, over 60% of its Black articles were in sports and "religion and society" categories, while less than 10% was devoted to the "politics and government" category. The Citizen's categories were more evenly balanced. Almost 35% of its Black articles were in the "politics and government" category with a little less than 15% each for the sports and "religion and society" categories. The revealing statistics are found in Journal's Black articles. Almost 44% of its Black articles fell in the "political government" category. Even though the Journal was highest in this category, it should be recalled that (see Table 1.1) it contained such content only for the 1957 sample issues read. In terms of overall balance, the Citizen appears to be the leader.
With such a limited sample with which to work, it is difficult to determine which newspaper printed the most articles which could be considered more or less favorable to Blacks or to the Black community. One might infer from Table 1.2, however, that since four of the twelve Journal newspapers read and coded contained no mention of Blacks, and since three of the twelve articles it did print were "unfavorable" (see Table 1.6) that the Journal was less inclined to print news articles of a favorable nature about Blacks or about the Black community. The only obstacle to making this an inference stems from the fact that the Journal contained the least amount of news column space. As for the classifications of the papers for the years under study, it can be inferred that the white press during this time period in general did not print an unusual number of "unfavorable" articles about Blacks or about the Black community. Another inference to be drawn from this analysis is that there was an apparent lack of concern by the white press for news about Blacks and for the news affecting the Black community. However, the Citizen appears to have proportioned its coverage of Black news a little better than the other papers. It must be concluded that the only Black news of concern to the white press appeared to be that of a religious, society, or athletic nature, which had to be edited by one select individual. Moreover, the amount of Black news, as measured in the number of articles and in column inches for the three years, was a very small portion of the total news space.
## TABLE 1.6

CLASSIFICATIONS OF DISTINGUISHABLE BLACK ARTICLES BY PAPER AND YEAR

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Dispatch</th>
<th>Citizen</th>
<th>Journal</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A "favorable" article was one which denoted a qualified and unqualified group of statements of support about a Black person or about the local Black community. A supportive could be one concerning the athletic accomplishment of a local Black youth. In this respect all religious articles could be construed as supportive and thus favorable.

An "unfavorable" article was one which denoted a qualified or unqualified group of statements of nonsupport about a Black person or about the local Black community. An unfavorable statement could be construed as a story concerning a Black caught committing a crime.

A "neutral" article is one not fitting either category, or one having an equal amount of both traits.
available. The socio-political implications of this racial content analysis and the aforementioned introductory statements preceding it are related to the development of the Black Columbus paper only in an indirect manner. That is, the local power structure which set the standards for the greater community, and to a lesser yet significant extent set the standards for the Black community, produced the need for a Black newspaper. The Black community needed a Black community newspaper to help it interpret these standards. The organ would help the Black community decide in which direction it should go: to the "left" or to the "right," towards the Republican or towards the Democrat, and towards persuasion or towards militancy in order to effect socio-political change. Al Hawkins commented upon discussing the individuals and families who "control Columbus" then and now: "They control your banks, they control your mortgage companies, they control your insurance companies, they control your newspapers, your media....so they control your thinking... they are most powerful individuals." The Black community newspaper had to function as a communications link between itself and the dominant white community which was influenced by these powerful families.

Another implication is that Blacks could not expect the local white press to be sensitive to the issues facing the Black community. The coverage of news concerning Blacks in the
white press was simply insufficient in terms of the amount of space devoted to Blacks and in terms of thoroughness in coverage. The Black community needed a paper to which it could relate. In sum, a Black "community-oriented" press was needed to interpret the news for the Black community, not for the greater community.
END NOTES


2 Al Hawkins interview, September 27, 1975, Columbus, Ohio and the Barbee Durham interview, September 15, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

3 Barbee Durham interview, September 15, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

4 Nimrod Allen interview, September 20, 1975, Columbus, Ohio. The persuasion strategy to effect change through the early 1950s was the consensus of interviewees. Some of the comments regarding the use of the persuasion tactic were unsolicited.

5 Rev. Russell M. Jones interview, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio. Also Allen interview.

6 Hawkins interview.

7 John Combs interview, September 13, 1975, Columbus, Ohio. Mr. Combs revealed that the revised city charter of 1914 provided for the election of council members "at large" thus virtually eliminating any chance for a Black candidate to be elected.

8 The Galbreaths were mentioned along with the Lazaruses, Millers, and Reeses by several interviewees as having significant power within the community.

Caldwell, p. 4.

Hawkins interview.

William Savoy interview, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

It should be mentioned again that the study was based upon a small sample. R. K. Kerckhoff reached similar conclusions about the white press in his earlier and more extensive study. See "Negro News in Columbus, Ohio Newspapers," (M.A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1949). For more detail about the racial content analysis, see Appendix B.

Hawkins interview.
Chapter III
The Need for a Local Black Press: Rationalization Part 2

They needed to step aside. Their strategies...their analgies were outdated....Either change or step aside...that was my attitude.

- Rev. Arthur A. Zebbs commenting on the local Black leaders he encountered in Columbus during the early and mid-1960s. 9/25/75

Chapter two described the need for a Black press in the local community. It discussed the community "power structure" and the influence the dominant white community had over the Black sub-community. This chapter will describe the increase in political awareness within the Black community beginning in the mid-1950s and extending into the early 1960s. This increase can be measured in increased organizational activity and was accompanied by an increased desire within the Black community to make its wants and needs known to the greater community. In effect, a Black newspaper was needed to express its collective views, its emotions, its goals, and subsequently its demands.

The local Black community has not lacked leadership. Most assuredly the term leader has meant different things to different people. Certainly, however, Attorney Frank Shearer of Columbus, who in 1948 successfully argued and won a favorable
decision against the restrictive covenant before the United States Supreme Court, would most certainly qualify as a local Black leader during the 1955-1965 time period. Shearer also ran unsuccessfully for the State Legislature many times not so much to win but "to prove a point that Blacks could run and that they could and should become a part of the political process."¹ Shearer was also one of the founders of the Vanguard League mentioned in chapter two. Another activist was Barbee Durham, Executive Secretary of the NAACP from 1951 to 1966, who worked in concert with Shearer in the Vanguard League on many activities. As "Mr. Urban League" in Columbus from 1921 through 1954, Nimrod Allen had long been recognized as a Black leader.² Blacks in Columbus had their share of political leaders too. The first Black State Representative from Franklin County was the Rev. Sandy F. Ray in 1941. The second representative to be elected was the Rev. Jacob Ashburn, Sr., in 1945. Both were Republican, as had been all Black State Representatives until 1962 when Carl Stokes of Cleveland became the first Black Democrat to be elected to the State House of Representatives.³

These Black leaders reflected the "conservative" attitudes of their constituency. The Black populace, having been exposed to conservative views of the local power structure, no doubt were influenced by it. The local Black community leadership simply espoused the "grassroots" conservatism of the Black
community. Al Hawkins commented that in the 1950s just as now "Blacks are just as conservative as whites."⁴ John Combs, of the Columbus paper, stated that politically "Columbus was a...conservative town...and you'll find that Blacks are conserv-ative just like...white people here."⁵ According to William Savoy, former contributor of historical articles to the Columbus, Ohio Sentinel, "...we [the local Black community] wanted...more rights....For instance, we wanted to use the picnic grounds...[etc.] so we would meet with certain persons to see if we could do that....that's where we used our polit-ical efforts."⁶ In other words, Savoy was saying the conservation in the local Black community took the form of "integration-by-persuasion" in the 1950s. This seems wholly logical, since the nation, after the landmark 1954 Supreme Court public school desegregation decision, was imbued with integrationist-desegregationist activities. Russell Jones said, "We [the local Black community] were involved as a people in what has been called the 'integrationist movement'... [which] emphasized the matter of Blacks going to white churches, going to white schools, moving into white neighborhoods, and these kinds of things." Jones went on to comment on the relationship between the Black "grassroots" and the leadership:

There were those movements which called for the support of the grassroots....All the grassroots people want to see is leadership...and...they will follow leadership.... Whenever we've called on them, they've sup-port ed us. Whenever they could see that there was...a movement afoot, they would follow.

The Rev. Arthur Zebbs, who was active both socially and
politically as the local Director of CORE in the early and mid-1960s, affirmed that he believed he "read" the Black community pretty well. "I think they gave me the cues," he states, "it was implicit in whatever they said....I just felt this is what we've got to do and went ahead." 8

The Black conservatism in the Black community slowly began to give way to a new ideology that preceded Black separatism of the mid and late 1960s. Perhaps instead of the civil rights era, those years should be termed the era of rapid integration, since even though strategies of persuasion were no longer swift enough to satisfy the new mood of the local Black community, the fact remained that integration was still the goal. Slow or swift, persuasion or militancy, the years from 1958 through the mid-1960s brought with them a change in the integrationist ideology in Columbus. The Black community began to see the short comings of the phrase "with all due speed" in regards to integration as well as the weaknesses in the 1957 Civil Rights Bill in regards to voting. The Rev. Russell Jones commented that the "change on the local level corresponded somewhat with the national situation."

"Sit-ins" and marches soon took the place of persuasion across the conference table in many cities across the country. Locally, the Black community, which had maintained its conservative "integration-by-persuasion" posture, began to change its tactics. "During this period [the late 1950s and early 1960s]," Jones
later commented, "we were fighting the whole business of segregated education....there were marches....we objected to the building of Monroe Junior High School, because we felt it was going to be what it is, a segregated...school."9

Measuring the change in the integrationist ideology is as difficult as defining it. Black organizations reflected the change. The Urban League, for example, became more active. E. R. Lentz states in his thesis that the new Urban League Executive Director Andrew Freeman had a different approach to solving social problems than his predecessor had.

Within a month of assuming his post, Andrew Freeman had scrapped most of Allen's organizational structure substituting his own.10

Freeman...stressed the complex and inter-connected nature of urban problems. Allen's approach had been fundamentally to attack a new problem with a new committee or a new program while striving to create an 'atmosphere...'; Freeman saw the need for concerted, coordinated planning by the League...He maintained planning should be the priority program of the agency.11

Freeman staffed the League with professionals. The effect was to lessen the volunteer aspect of the agency, since many of the volunteer functions were now being performed by paid staff. Moreover, there seemed to be less "closeness" between the staff and the membership. According to Ila Bowser, Urban League member and activist, around 1960 whites became disinterested in the agency. This is not to say that the agency
was any less effective, but to say it was responding to a new integrationist ideology. The League was assuming a more general role than the specific one it had previously performed in community functions. It was a role it continued to retain under the subsequent leadership of Chester Jones, who became executive director in 1962, and under Robert Brown, who assumed that position in 1965. Community groups such as the Near Eastside Area Council (NESAC) and "similar organizations arose in the late 1950s in response to a need felt by the residents of given areas to take a direct hand in the planning and developing of their own community."  

Though it did not change its structure or philosophy, the local branch of the NAACP felt the surge of the new ideology too. "Better organization on the part of the branches," relates Barbee Durham who was Executive Secretary of the NAACP during this time, resulted in "the highest membership" in the local branch's history. Table 2.1 shows the membership of the local branch from 1955 through 1965. Community support as measured in terms of adult membership does show the NAACP held its own, peaking in 1964. Community support for the group's efforts was also evident during the late 1950s and early 1960s. Durham states that in 1961 and 1962 the NAACP "had very successful Freedom Fund dinners and the Freedom Fund dinner has to have support from the community in general."  

33
### Table 2.1

Yearly Memberships for the Columbus Branch of the NAACP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>3511</td>
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<td>3682</td>
<td>3554</td>
<td>3888</td>
<td>4538</td>
<td>3581</td>
<td>3255</td>
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<tr>
<td>% of Total Adult Black Population</td>
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<td>8.16</td>
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<td>7.96</td>
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<td>7.92</td>
<td>8.97</td>
<td>6.87</td>
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<td>#</td>
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<td>#</td>
<td>#</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3859</td>
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<td>3554</td>
<td>3888</td>
<td>5189</td>
<td>4114</td>
<td>3299</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

# Denotes figures unavailable at time of writing

* Figures supplied by Ms. Muriel Outlaw at NAACP Headquarters in New York City via telephone conversation on October 1, 1975. Figures for 1958 were unavailable at time of this writing.
The decline in membership in the NAACP beginning in 1964 and the decline in the voluntary activities of the League after 1960 reflect the increasing militancy of the younger members of these rather formal bodies. Dr. John Rosemond who has been active in the NAACP recalls that younger members in the organization "became more progressive" and the older members permitted them to vocalize their feelings. The net effect of the changes was that Blacks of the rapid integrationist ideology were becoming more assertive. The "Young Turks" became the youthful element in the local chapter of the NAACP, and they were recognized by the older members. The NAACP was virtually thrust into greater activity under the leadership of the Rev. Phale D. Hale partly to "buffer" between CORE and the establishments it demonstrated against. Hale, pastor of Union Grove Baptist Church, was not of this youthful activist bent but nonetheless symbolized this increased activity in the NAACP.

The revitalization of CORE in the early 1960s was the most conspicuous element of the increase in socio-political activity. Many other groups such as the "Assembly" and the "Committee" came into being at this time, but it was CORE which best exemplified the new ideology. CORE had been locally active during World War II, then ceased to function in the early 1950s due to its alleged "leftist" activities. According to Lentz, CORE was re-established in Columbus in 1955 "with a social
branch." However, it was not until a young Black Methodist minister from Oberlin, Ohio came to assume the pastoral duties of Aldersgate Methodist Church did CORE really become revitalized. The Rev. Arthur Zebbs assumed pastorship in 1961 and found the inhabitants of the Black community around his parish "restive." He commented that he had to shift his "middle class approach to the ministry" to one that was more responsive to the needs of the Black community. He began his community activity by working alone in an effort to help his parishners provide for themselves. Through his efforts to aid the community, he soon gained sufficient recognition to be asked to join CORE in mid-1962. That same year he began to change the organization's image. 

Zebbs changed CORE's image by making it more militant and by challenging the power structure. He recalls that CORE increased its militant activities such as "marching, open confrontation, sit-ins, being jailed [and] arrested, [being] beaten." As a result of these activities, people began to see us [CORE]...in a different light rather than [as] some sort of elite white, intellectually-controlled organization...[they began to see] that we were for real...we were out there." To get an idea how far "out there" Zebbs had put CORE, one need only look at his confrontation with the Ohio National Bank, a Wolfe-controlled institution, in September
of 1963. With only fifty to sixty "fairly active" members, Zebbs led an effective demonstration against the bank. One week after the demonstrations began at the Mt. Vernon Avenue branch of the Ohio National Bank, the president of the bank capitulated to demands to put Black tellers in the bank, which was situated in an all-Black neighborhood. In effect, CORE had done in a few weeks via demonstrations what the NAACP had been trying to do via persuasion over the conference table for years. Perhaps the NAACP would have eventually succeeded, but CORE simply showed the quick results of the new rapid integrationist ideology. As alluded to earlier, the NAACP acted as intermediary between the CORE group and the establishments against which CORE demonstrated. Zebbs commented, "Everything we [CORE] got involved in whether it was the Columbus Board of Education, Krogers, Ohio National [Bank], the Union [Department Store], Lazarus [Department Store], the NAACP was called in to be the mediator between the radical CORE members and the more staid...reasonable, logical members of the NAACP." 19 This is simply to say the power structure still recognized the NAACP as the integration-by-persuasion element of the Black community. Indeed, the NAACP thought of itself as instrumental in bringing about the integration of the Mt. Vernon Avenue branch of the Ohio National Bank. 20 However valid the NAACP claim may be, it must be concluded that Zebbs and CORE highlighted the rapid integrationist movements of the early and mid-1960s. On speaking about his role in local socio-poli-
tical activities, Zebbs stated that his major accomplishment was "the break from the old ideologies." He then went on to describe the difference between the old ideology of integration-by-persuasion and the new rapid integration. The old ideology was typified by strategies of "accommodation," "long term negotiation," "moral suasion," and "Christian gentleness across the table." The new ideology was typified by "open direct kinds of confrontation." These confrontations placed Zebbs and CORE "up front" as leading the socio-political activity of the period. Al Hawkins, a Black political activist, said that "two of the most vocal persons this town has ever known [were attorney] Frank Shearer...[and] the Rev. Arthur Zebbs." Fugate Page, former ward committeeman and activist in local Black Republican politics, agreed that "Rev. Zebbs was [the] most outstanding Civil Rights leader...."

The increase in socio-political activity revealed itself in another form in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Just as this increase in Black awareness showed itself in the Urban League, the NAACP, and in CORE, so did it show itself on the political level. The racial segregation which characterized the local community into the 1940s resulted in the Black community becoming politically organized. The advent of these political organizations showed that the Black community was increasing its socio-political awareness.

The first Black political groups to organize in the 1950s was
the Franklin County Republican Club (FCRC) in 1953. The organization came about because of the Franklin County Republican organization's unwillingness to integrate. One of FCRC's goals was to get more Blacks hired by elected Republican officials. Their method of accomplishing this goal was "persuasion." As far as the success of this goal was concerned, the Council Secretary Fugate Page related that the Council was instrumental in increasing the number of Black employees "from nine to forty-six over a period of four years."²⁴ He continued, "...but in every elected office starting with the governor on down...the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer's office, the County Auditor's office, and at that time...many offices on the county level we were able to employ many, many Blacks."²⁵ The FCRC on several occasions approached even the governor in an effort to secure appointments for Blacks on the local level. Two such appointments were those of Robert Duncan to the municipal court in 1966 and of James Pearson to municipal court in 1968. According to Page, the FCRC had been "successful in getting practically every Black...endorsed by the FCRC [to be subsequently] endorsed by the Franklin County Republican organization." The FCRC endorsed attorney Ragland Reid for city council in 1959; the Franklin County Republican Organization followed suit.

The remnants of racial segregation within the local community
which led to the formation of the FCRC also led to the formation of its Democratic counterpart, the Interward Democratic Council (IDC). R. F. Hopkins characterized the Franklin County Democratic Organization in his study of the politics of the Black community in 1962 as being "politically bankrupt," or unable to meet the needs of the local Democrats, and attributed this characteristic as part of the reason for political ineffectiveness of the Black community.

...the weakness of the Democratic party has reinforced the muffling effect of the conservative political culture, resulting in relatively powerless Negro political leadership.

Of the Interward Democratic Council Hopkins observed:

Prior to 1958 there was little formal Negro leadership in Columbus. In that year, the Ohio AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education provided funds and guidance in helping a group of local Negro leaders establish an Interward Democratic Council.

Al Hawkins, who worked for the IDC, remembered Warren Pate, Warren Jennings, and Sam Stokes as being three of the key labor community activists in the AFL-CIO who were instrumental in organizing IDC. The IDC coordinated a massive voter registration drive within the Black community in 1958 in an attempt to muster local Black support against the local anti-labor union "right to work" movement. About this same time the Franklin County Democratic Council, a chapter of the larger Federated County Democrats of Ohio was organized by John Kinser and Abiahia Gregory. In 1961 Mary Durham, wife of
Barbee Durham, organized the Eleanor Roosevelt Club, a woman's political activist group. 29

Aside from the development of Black political organizations, the increase in local Black political activity is difficult to measure. For example, the author examined the results of voter turnout for the Seventh Ward, one of the most representative Black voting wards in the community, and found no discernible change in voter turnout over the period 1955 through 1965. Table 2.2 shows the results of the study. It must be pointed out, however, that the study relied upon estimated-not actual-data. Therefore, it can only be inferred that the increase in Black socio-political awareness cannot be measured in terms of voter turnout (see Appendix A).

Just as Arthur Zebbs became the focal point of increased socio-political activity representing the more socially-oriented groups beginning in the early 1960s, Russell Jones became the focal point of increased socio-political activity representing the more politically-oriented groups beginning in the late 1950s. Jones was appointed to city council in 1959 by the outgoing Democratic Mayor M. E. Sensenbrenner to fill out a two-year term. Jones had run fifth out of a four-seat race in the city council election that year, just barely missing out on a council seat. For the first time in over half a century, the Black community had a Black representative on city council. Al Hawkins referred to Jones as the "first
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<th>Total Black Population of the City as a Percentage of the Total Black Population of the City</th>
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<th>Adjusted Black Voter Turnout For Ward*</th>
<th>Black Voter Turnout as a Percentage of the Estimated Black Pop.</th>
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<td>3061</td>
<td>2908</td>
<td>39</td>
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<td>7583</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>3157</td>
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<td>7811</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>3167</td>
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<td>1964</td>
<td>8045</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>4636</td>
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<td>1965</td>
<td>12834</td>
<td>14.35</td>
<td>3873</td>
<td>3679</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The adjusted Black voter turnout reflects the voter turnout less the number of all eligible white voters in the ward.
modern day Black councilman" in that Jones showed what Frank Shearer had been trying to prove for years: Blacks could run for public office and make a showing. Jones ran without the support of the Democratic party in 1959, but his strong showing caused the party to support him in the 1961 and 1963 council races. In each instance Jones failed to win a seat, but what is more important, the Black community began to realize that the Black vote made a difference. Also in 1959, the Black attorney Ragland Reid, a Republican, ran for council. In 1963 former police inspector Harvey Alston, another Republican who was also Black, ran for a council seat. None of these Black candidates was elected to a council seat; however, in December of 1963 Alston was appointed to council by Mayor Sensenbrenner. More satisfying to the Black community was the election of Dr. Watson Walker to the Columbus Board of Education in 1961. These candidates showed that Blacks could be prominent in both parties and that race was not always a barrier to winning elections.

Among his many other posts, Jones, the first Black ever appointed to Columbus City Council, was also the first "moderator" of the Columbus Leadership Conference. The Conference which began around 1960, was conceived by the Urban League's Andy Freeman and Jones. The Conference, which is still in existence, was "the" organization at the turn of the decade. Its purpose was to broaden the base of Black leadership. According to Jones, its plan of operation was to call together a group of
Black business and professional men "for the purpose of helping them to do their homework on the community—to know what was going on in the community." The Conference cannot be labeled activist. Its role was to pool the thoughts of local Black leadership in order to form a uniform Black strategy on how to confront the power structure. The Conference was an attempt to prevent the power structure from utilizing the Black leadership of the older ideology of integration-by-persuasion. According to Jones, before the Conference was formed, the power structure could focus on key individual Blacks and find out the strategies Blacks were considering to effect social change.

An added impetus to the increase in socio-political activity in the Black community was the new apportionment plan for electing state legislators as required by the United States Supreme Court's "one man, one vote" decision in 1962 to give equal weight, as near as possible, to each vote. Hawkins stated the re-apportionment plan "brought...[a] guarantee that we would be able on the district level to send Black legislators to the legislature."

The liberal policies of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations also contributed to the increase in Black political activity. During their administrations several Blacks were appointed to high administrative positions. The 1964 Civil Rights Bill and the 1966 Voting Rights Bill were also products of these
administrations. In general, these activities produced a climate conducive to greater Black political participation. Locally, several Blacks sought public office. For example, Jeanne Woodward, State Representative candidate for an Ohio House in 1964 was moved to run for election because she felt the "youthful and vibrant" administration of John F. Kennedy had to go on after his assassination. \(^{35}\) Dr. John Rosemond who was later to become the first Black man to be elected to city council in fifty years, ran for the County Coroner's post in 1964 for two reasons. One reason was the local Democratic Organization felt a Black candidate had a good chance of winning, while the candidate, himself, felt his "involvement in civic affairs" had qualified him to a great extent to serve the people. \(^ {36}\) A total of six Blacks were running for local offices in 1966 including one John W. E. Bowen who defeated Robert O'Shaunessy, a popular white incumbent Democrat. Attorney Bowen felt that because of re-districting he had an "outside chance to win." Bowen commented that "there was a mood and a feeling among many people to show that they were willing to support a Black candidate." \(^ {37}\) Similarly, local political organizations had begun to make overtures to Black candidates, something they dared not do in the 1950s. Black political appointments also increased in the 1960s. In the 1950s, only two significant political appointments of Blacks were made on the local level. \(^ {38}\) The first was the appointment of Harvey Alston to Inspector of the Columbus Police department.
by Mayor Sensenbrenner in November, 1954. This post made him the second ranking officer on the force, a position he held until February, 1963 when he retired.\textsuperscript{39} The second appointment was that of Russell Jones to city council in 1959 also by Mayor Sensenbrenner as mentioned earlier in this chapter. Attorney John Francis was appointed by Sensenbrenner to the Columbus Civil Service Commission in 1962. In 1963 Governor Michael DiSalle appointed Attorney William H. Brooks to the Franklin County Municipal Court. As mentioned earlier, Robert Duncan was appointed to the Franklin County Municipal Court by Governor James Rhodes in 1966. Gov. Rhodes also appointed William O. Walker to his cabinet in 1963 as the Director of the Department of Industrial Relations in 1966.\textsuperscript{40} Though much of this political activity can be attributed to "tokenism," the overriding fact remains that national times encouraged many Blacks to venture into the field of politics and other social movements, where they were welcomed. Jones, Zebbs, Rosemond, and Hawkins all agreed on the existence and influence of this national climate.

According to Hawkins, the national climate affected local party politics in another rather significant way. It helped Black Democrats more than it helped Black Republicans. The Franklin County Democratic party began to recognize the strength of the Black vote. The aforementioned voter registration drive of 1958 showed the party that it was amiss in not making use of this potential bloc of voters. As Hawkins states, "Prior to...1958 the Franklin County Democratic party
did not recognize Blacks....Coming out of the 'right to work campaign...' into the early '60s...under the leadership of...John F. Kennedy there was a...turnabout....the party structure began to reckon with the Blacks because they found out...we were one of the strongest and most potent blocs of votes." By "reckon with," Hawkins meant that the Franklin County Democratic Party began to endorse Black candidates for the office of committeeman in the predominately Black wards, they also began to put Blacks on the Central and Executive Committee of the party, and even have Blacks as vice-chairmen. Hawkins, himself, became the first Black First Vice Chairman in 1965. It appears the local Democratic Party organization was receptive to the new ideology of rapid integration.

This increase in socio-political activity within the Black community had certain implications for the local Black press. In the first place, the local Black community changed its views regarding the pace at which it sought integration. If the Black community newspaper did not keep pace with the community's views concerning rapid integration, the paper would soon lose local Black community support. Secondly, the Black community needed a newspaper to help it express its changing attitudes. When Zebbs marched on the State Capitol in mid-1963, he and his CORE followers expected the support of the local Black community newspaper even though CORE
represented a newer and different kind of ideology than that which had been expressed by the Black community just a few years before. Lastly, the local Black press had to adjust to the recent increase in Black political activity.

The local Black community had changed during the decade 1955 through 1965 from a fairly conservative community desiring gradual integration through persuasion to a community demanding integration as rapidly as possible through more militant means. The Black community needed a newspaper which could not only help it interpret the standards set by the greater local community, but also help it formulate its own desires and express these to the greater community. Similarly, in order for a new Black newspaper, like the Columbus Call & Post, to become accepted into the local Black community, it had to be able to help this community interpret the information coming into it and to express opinions going out from it.
END NOTES

1 Hawkins interview.


3 Combs interview.

4 Hawkins interview.

5 Combs interview.

6 Savoy interview.

7 Rev. Russell Jones interview, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.


9 Jones interview.

10 Lentz, p. 82.

11 Lentz, p. 84.

12 Ila Bowser interview, September 22, 1975, and October 10, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

13 Lentz, p. 97.

14 Durham interview.
Dr. John Rosemond interview, September 16, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Lentz, p. 95.

Zebbs interview.

Zebbs interview.

Zebbs interview.

Durham interview.

Zebbs interview.

Hawkins interview.

Fugate Page interview, September 21, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

This occurred in the State Treasurer's office in the mid-1960s. Page interview.

Page interview.

Hopkins, pp. 75-76.

Hopkins, p. 76.

Hopkins, p. 44.

All of these organizations remain active today with the exception of the IDC which ceased to function about 1965 when Russell Jones, who helped to found IDC, left the city to accept another position. The majority of the above information was derived from the Al Hawkins interview; however, some had to be pieced together from the Page, Durham, and Zebbs interviews.
Jones recalls the Conference as beginning around 1956; however, other sources, viz., Hawkins, Rosemond, and Page say the Conference began in the early 1960s.

Hawkins interview. Also Amos Lynch interview, September 18, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Jones interview.

See "Voters Face Fewer Names" (Columbus Dispatch, April 14, 1966), p. 16B.

Hawkins interview.

Jeanne Woodward interview, September 15, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Rosemond interview.

John W. E. Bowen interview, September 25, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Attorney John Francis was appointed as public defender in 1958 by Mayor Sensenbrenner, but the author does not consider this position to be politically significant.

Alston interview.

See "Rhodes Names Call & Post Publisher to Cabinet Post," (Columbus Call & Post, January 5, 1963), p. 1.
We don't let our politics interfere with what we think is the best hope for the Negro. Our theory is that Negroes have to be prominent in both parties in order to have some clout.

- William O. Walker, 8/22/75

An analysis of the Columbus paper can hardly be undertaken without first taking into account the background of its parent edition, the Cleveland Call & Post, and its editor-publisher, William O. Walker. In effect, when one speaks of the Cleveland paper, he speaks about Walker, who has been managing editor of the paper since October of 1932.

To refer to William Walker as the "Dean of Black Journalists" may sound somewhat exaggerated, but the fact remains that he has managed the Call & Post newspaper chain for fifty-five years with only a few setbacks. Some of his business ability no doubt is a result of his family background. His father operated the successful Walker's Restaurant for many years in Selma, Alabama, where Walker was born on September 19, 1896. According to Christopher Wyes, who interviewed Walker a few years ago, Alexander Walker had emphasized not only good business but good Black business as a way of life. It was no doubt from his family that William Walker acquired his
basic business skills. It can also be assumed that Walker acquired his Republican party sympathies here since the party still was thought of in Walker's childhood as the party of Lincoln, the Great Emancipator.

After attending Wilberforce University and then graduating from Oberlin Business College in 1918, Walker became Executive Director of the Pittsburgh Urban League. Shortly after this experience, he began his newspaper career with the Pittsburgh Courier under the tutelage of its editor, Ira Lewis. In 1920 he moved to Norfolk, Virginia, to take a job with the Norfolk Journal & Guide. Finally, in 1921 he got the chance to manage his own paper, the Washington Tribune in Washington, D.C. The Tribune, published until 1931, was an outspoken critique of racial discrimination in the Capital. When the death of one of his business associates resulted in a stockholders' disagreement, Walker relinquished his connections with the Washington newspaper and took a job with Fair Department Store in downtown Washington, D.C. Soon afterwards he was named manager of the firm's Baltimore store. The lure of newspaper work, however, was too much for him. As Walker explained, "I wanted to get back into the newspaper business...and a friend I had who was connected with the Call & Post...induced me to come out here" to assume editorship of the financially ailing Call & Post. The friend was Norman McGhee, a Black attorney from Cleveland. Thus Walker launched his career with the Call & Post.
Upon arriving in Cleveland in October of 1932, Walker found the badly edited, poorly managed, and inefficiently circulated remnants of two unsuccessful newspapers, the Cleveland Call and the Cleveland Post. These two rivals had merged in order to survive in 1927, but internal friction and financial distress plagued this often-described "marriage of misery." Within a few months of Walker's employment, the corporation defaulted on Walker's $35.00 per week salary, causing the young editor to "dip into his own modest savings to keep the paper alive...." This was only one of Walker's troubles, for in the beginning he had no trained staff. This meant he either had to hire a new staff or train his inexperienced staff. With the paper's finances the way they were, he set out to train his own staff. Along with these problems Walker had to rely upon an outside printer whom he could then barely afford to pay. It was this last problem most of all which led him to set a goal of some day publishing a "self-contained" paper starting with the story and ending with the printed page.

In attempting to make the Cleveland paper self-sufficient, Walker was showing his business acumen. He knew that during these economically depressed times a strike or sudden walkout could destroy the paper. Moreover, obtaining capital for a newspaper plant in the midst of the Depression would be an almost impossible task for a Black newspaper with a poor financial history. Walker saw that the way out of this
dilemma was through politics. Historical articles in the Cleveland paper explain how Walker saved the newspaper:

Fortunately, the rising tide of political activity in Cleveland's black community threw Walker into contact with a rising young lawyer-politician, Lawrence O. Payne, who had gained popularity as a black Republican leader. Working with Payne and Leroy Bundy, both of whom were [Black and] members of Cleveland City Council, Walker threw the weight of his newspaper into the political battle...between the incumbent mayor, Ray T. Miller, a Democrat and Harry L. Davis, Republican [in 1932].

Walker mentioned that one of his 'white' political friends subsequently opened up credit for him at the Cleveland Trust. 7

Lining up with the Republicans, Walker's hard hitting editorials and practical approach to the black voters, won him sorely needed financial backing from his new friends. With this money he purchased the mechanical equipment used by the Call & Post in its struggling years....

Meanwhile, the former stockholders had reneged on their promise to make up operating deficits or to guarantee the editor's salary. Despairing of ever collecting his accumulating back salary, or his personal investment in the paper, Walker took over the Call & Post [in 1940]....

In 1940 the partnership [between Payne and Walker] was incorporated under the name of P. W. Publishing Company. 8

Between the time Walker came to Cleveland and the time the
paper became a successful business venture in the late 1930s, the Call & Post had to rely almost solely on subscriptions and advertising from the Black community. Without community support through subscriptions and advertisements, the Cleveland paper would certainly have failed as a business enterprise. After all, "Negro publishers and editors are first of all businessmen with a commodity for sale--the news. Their primary motivation is not uplift but profit." Walker, being aware of this fact, had kept the paper active in the affairs of the Black community. For example, he backed in the Cleveland paper's columns the "don't spend your money where you can't work" campaign conducted by the Future Outlook League (hereafter FOL) in 1935. Wyes writes that "the FOL would not have gotten beyond the initial stage of obtaining a few jobs in small neighborhood stores without the strong support from the Call & Post, a militant black newspaper...." According to Wyes the Cleveland paper was "revived following a period of decline in 1934." Walker states that the Call & Post became the "community bulletin board." By supporting the Black community, Walker had gained its confidence. Members of the Black community in turn subscribed to the paper and thus made it a fairly stable business.

The success of the Call & Post did not end here. In 1951 Walker started the Five-Star edition in Cincinnati. In order to help gain acceptance into this community, Walker selected
Ted Berry, a prominent Black Cincinnati Democrat, to manage the paper. This enabled the new Cincinnati paper to retain some identity with the Cincinnati Black community even though it was owned in Cleveland. Just as important, the paper was considered less of a political threat to the Black Democrats in Cincinnati. One can safely assume that the Black Democrats in Cincinnati were aware of Walker's Republican sympathies. As pointed out before, Walker is a shrewd businessman who has always known that he had to have the support of the local Black community to make his satellite edition a success. Commenting on the local or community aspect of the Call & Post, Roland Wolseley says the following:

Editorially it [the Call & Post] has kept an eye on the local scene more than some of the other medium-sized papers; these often are elaborate and far more thorough than the usual opinion writing in...weeklies. Local columnists are featured as well as national writers.12

The significance of "bread and butter coverage," as Armistead S. Pride refers to the type news contained in the Call & Post, is not lost to its editor-publisher. Walker states that he and his staff made it a policy at the very beginning to "serve the state of Ohio and...not try to become a national newspaper." "Ohio was big enough for us," he continued [but] "naturally we would develop these cities [Cleveland, Cincinnati, Columbus, and Dayton]." This policy paid off in the thriving
Call & Post enterprise. One setback, however, occurred when Walker purchased the shortlived Columbus Advocate in 1937. Later in 1955 Walker attempted to put an office in Dayton, but it too was unsuccessful. The same failure subsequently occurred in Akron and Toledo.

The relationship Walker has with his satellite editions is one apparently based on an "understanding" between himself and the individual editors. He stated that the editors "have all the independence they need to operate....Mr. Lynch [Amos Lynch, editor of the Columbus paper] runs the paper in Columbus...; he has certain guidelines and naturally he has to confer with us [the staff] on some things....but so far as deciding what goes into the paper and who he's going to support...he does most of that." It would appear then the satellite editions are somewhat independent though not wholly autonomous operations.

This conclusion was supported by Mr. Lynch's statement concerning the editorial freedom of the Columbus paper: "on... politics...we have a direct responsibility to....Cleveland, and they embrace only two levels of politics, state and federal.... When [we] have statewide elections the endorsements [and] the political positions on issues are controlled in Cleveland by the publisher, Mr. Walker. On local, municipal, and county politics the dictates are centered right here." The Cleveland paper then plays a "watch dog" role in relationship
to its satellite editions. Walker exercises firm control over all but the papers' political content, but he limits his control to the state and federal levels. Lynch, and it is assumed, James Ben Fair, the managing editor of the Cincinnati paper, probably enjoy as much editorial freedom as many editors of the larger white dailies, if not more.

Several facts must be recognized in order to understand Walker's relationship with his satellite editions. One obvious fact is Walker's firm, yet not stifling control over the satellite editions. Regarding the content of the papers, he has final authority. Lynch recalls having had only one major disagreement with Walker. It concerned the endorsement of candidates in a state legislative race wherein Walker had his way, supporting a white Republican incumbent over a Black Democrat candidate. Another fact which should be recognized is directly related to this incident. Walker is a Republican, though he qualifies this by declaring he is an "independent Republican." Walker states, "I am a member of the Republican party [and] to a limited extent I will support Republican candidates, but I [will] support any other candidate [who] represents the best hope of the Negro for advancement."16 The Call & Post editor-publisher is simply saying that he is a Republican and a Black man. He goes on to say that the paper always supported "all Black candidates whether they were Republicans or Democrats." Of course as his disagreement with Lynch shows, this is not always true, but Walker will
probably support a Black Republican candidate when the opposing
candidate is a Black Democrat. If the Democrat is white and
the Republican is Black, Walker will probably support the
Republican. But should any candidate regardless of race or
party not "represent the best hope of the Negro for advance-
ment," the Call & Post will not endorse that candidate.

These conclusions, if correct, have socio-political implica-
tions. Walker is a Black man operating a Black business in
a basically Black community. Whether or not a given Black
community supports his paper determines the paper's survival
as a profit-making enterprise. Walker knows and understands
this fact. In his entire working career, he has spent only
a few years working for whites, and even then it was in a
racially integrated environment. The social and political
news in the Call & Post is carefully weighed for its potential
effect on the Black community for which it speaks. During the
critically important formative years of a new community edition,
community support is of utmost importance to the satellite
general managers and to Walker. The Black community is aware
of this vulnerable spot in a Black newspaper too. The news-
paper needs community support to survive; the Black community
needs a vehicle of expression to help it interpret the news
and to reflect the Black community's views. The burden is
upon the new Black newspaper to gain then retain the con-
fidence and respect of the community. The Black newspaper
must become "community-conscious."

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END NOTES


5. Much of this information and that below was supplied by Mr. Walker himself in my August 22, 1975, interview with him in Cleveland, Ohio. However, a good deal more had to be pieced together from subsequent telephone conversations with Walker as well as from the 1974 and 1975 promotional issues of the *Call & Post*. For a more detailed version of the Walker-McGhee relationship see "Cleveland's Call & Post," *Crisis* XLV (Dec. 1938), pp. 391, 404.


7. Walker interview.


Walker interview.


Quotes from William O. Walker interview, August 22, 1975, Cleveland, Ohio. Emphasis added.

Lynch interview.

The Lynch recollection is from the September 18, 1975 interview; the Walker statement is from the August 22, 1975, interview. The Ayers Guide lists the Cleveland paper as "Independent Republican," p. 693.

Chapter V
The Local Black Community Newspaper, 1962-1964: The Columbus Call & Post Gains Community Support

We started out with more advantages than disadvantages.

- Amos Lynch, 9/18/75

Chapters two and three attempted to establish the rationale for the existence of a local Black press in Columbus. Chapter two developed the theme that a local Black press was needed to help the Black community interpret the news affecting the Black community. Chapter three developed the related theme that a local Black newspaper was needed to help the Black community express itself collectively. Chapter four provided background information about the parent paper the Cleveland Call & Post and its editor-publisher, William O. Walker. This chapter describes how the contents of the Columbus paper were affected by the socio-political forces within the Black community. This chapter will also describe how the paper gained the support of the Black community resulting in its becoming a vehicle for community expression.

Amos Lynch, the general manager of the Columbus paper, began his professional newspaper career in the early 1930s as a newsboy for the Columbus Advocate, a new Black newspaper originally published by Dr. Lloyd L. Jones.¹ In order to help him sell the papers, Lynch's mother began writing a
column for the paper about her local neighborhood. A few years later when she became ill, Lynch began writing the column for her. He wrote the "News and Views from the Southside" column for an entire year until the publication ended around 1938.²

This episode with the Advocate was just the beginning of Lynch's professional career in journalism. When the Advocate ceased publication in 1938, he went to work for a former editor of the paper, Jack Coles, who had since earned his degree in journalism and had begun his own newspaper, The Ohio State News.³ The influence of Coles and the News caused Lynch to become deeply interested in the newspaper business. Lynch soon went beyond the neighborhood column, expanding his reporting to amateur sports and to community activities in which he was involved. Lynch continued working for the News after he entered Ohio State University in 1943. Later that year he was drafted into the Navy. Even there it was difficult for the hospital Corpsman to "keep his fingers out the ink" of the newspaper business. Not only did he periodically submit articles about local servicemen to the News, but even during hospital corpsman training, he edited a "little magazine called the 'Hypo'" which was put together by members of the hospital corps training program. "Somehow or another," he remembered, "I always had a finger close to the pulse of anything in the communications field."⁴

After Lynch was discharged from the Navy in 1946, he went
back to the News. At the same time he re-entered Ohio State University to continue training for a medical career. After two quarters Lynch decided to forego medicine for a chance in journalism. Again Coles and the News seem to have been major influences. The News had grown in circulation during the war years to become "the" Black community newspaper. Coles prided himself on the fact that his Black newspaper was to Columbus what the Cleveland paper was to Cleveland. Moreover, the News had published the writings of several young men who would become highly respected newspapermen. Dale Wright who went on to the New York Times, began with the News. Carl Rowan, columnist and news commentator, who went on to become Director of the U.S. Information Agency under President Johnson, submitted his first column to the News during the war. One can hardly wonder then why Lynch was attracted back to the News.

Coles and the News influenced Lynch in several ways. The News was a protest journal. Coles started it because he "saw a need for it in the Black community," The Advocate's publisher, according to Coles, was evidently becoming "tired" of the responsibility. The News then became a "community-oriented" newspaper which protested on behalf of the Black community. It "opposed racial segregation and discrimination in housing, in education, in the military, and in employment." In several issues the editor supported the militant Vanguard League and its leader, the aforementioned Attorney Frank
Shearer. In some quarters mere association with the League was considered tantamount to being a communist. Coles not only associated with the League but was a member of the organization and demonstrated with it.10 He stated that he "got quite a bit of flak from the white community because we [the Vanguard League and the News] were pretty severe as far as racial angles were concerned."11 It was this attempt to be responsive to the Black community which Coles and the News passed on to young Lynch.

Coles and the News also influenced Lynch politically as far as the newspaper business was concerned. Though Coles was a Republican (similar to the "independent Republican" William Walker considers himself to be), the News was "Democratic in its political affiliation...."12 Coles states, "I was a registered Republican and I've always...been, but I tried to treat both parties as equally as possible."13 Coles' sense of "equality to party" is shown in his support of the Republican Mayor James Rhodes while at the same time supporting President Franklin Roosevelt in 1944. An example of Coles' "equality to party" can be seen in his printing the poor civil rights voting records of both vice presidential hopefuls in 1952, Democratic Senator John Sparkman of Alabama and Republican Representative Richard Nixon of California.15 This political fair play was good for the newspaper, since the market for Black newspaper advertising was limited. Coles recognized this, but failed to take full advantage of politics as had
Walker in Cleveland, to help sustain the News. Coles stated that because he was a trained newspaperman, the News was a "better" newspaper than the Cleveland paper; however, he admits that Walker was a "better businessman." Coles' sense of "equality to party" was to follow Lynch through his newspaper career.

Coles' neglect of the business led to the demise of the News. He admits he "never wanted the business end of the newspaper," but would much rather devote his time to the editorial and the news part of the paper. When confronted by the business aspects of running the paper, he found that he was uncomfortable. Moreover, he had created adversaries both "Black and white" who would just as soon see the paper go out of business. Subscriptions from the Black community could hardly keep the paper going. At that time it also took white advertising to keep a Black paper in business. Coles recalls that because of his stand on "civil rights it was almost impossible for him to get white advertising." The same was true of national advertising. The News, which had struggled through the Depression, then prospered during the war years, had begun to decline just three years after the end of the war. When the News ended in late 1952, its publisher secured a position as assistant to his friend and fellow classmate, James Rhodes, who had left the Mayor's office to become State Auditor. Other factors contributed to the fall of the News. Coles
had neglected the business end of the paper to the point where it was causing internal problems. Finally, in the spring of 1949, a "dispute with management" caused a group of eight staff members--including Lynch--to walk out on Coles and the News. This "resulted in the death" of the News, for this core of "disenchanted workers" began to publish the Columbus Ohio Sentinel in June that same year. The News had gone from 24 full size pages in mid-1944 to six tabloid pages by August of 1952, the year it ceased publication.

Because of its many advantages, it was almost certain the Sentinel would become a successful newspaper. Unlike the early Cleveland newspaper, the Sentinel had a trained staff. After the Sentinel partnership was incorporated, it received a major financial contribution from an unidentified "financial angel in the community." Attorney Edmund Paxton, who became president of the Sentinel Publishing Company, was the intermediary between the financial contributor and the Sentinel management. Lastly, the Sentinel had a good relationship with the local Black community, since it was basically the same relationship that had made the News successful during and after World War II. The Sentinel protested like the News, even though its staff did not participate as actively as did Coles. The Sentinel's activity was its news. Since the Vanguard League was dysfunctional by the early 1950s, the Sentinel supported the activities of the NAACP. Discrimination in housing, education, and police brutality influenced the paper's
The Urban League was also given considerable coverage in the Sentinel. Many of the League's new programs were first mentioned in the Sentinel. The Sentinel was also successful because of its sense of fairness in party politics. This quality, which had also characterized the News, was perhaps the result of the Sentinel's hiring John Combs in 1951 who was William O. Walker's state legislative correspondent. With Combs, the Republican, and Lynch, the Democrat, the paper had a political balance which helped its relationship to the Black community. Combs states that the Sentinel "had a stronger principle" than any Black paper he had ever known because it did not endorse political candidates. The content of the Sentinel was similar to that of the News.

The reason for the decline of the Sentinel was financial just as with the News, but there was a difference. The News was self-contained, having the facilities to print its own paper. The Sentinel thus had no control over the cost of printing its own newspaper. The Sentinel could not profit from depreciation on the machinery needed to publish a newspaper. The rising cost of labor was simply passed on from the printer to the Sentinel. The paper was in a sense a victim of rising costs, whereas such was not the case with the News. Lynch remembers that in 1961 finances had sunk to the point that he considered leaving the paper. He describes the financial
situation of the Sentinel: "...the bulk of the money we were working with and the cash in-flow from the Black community was going right through our hands into the hands of a white printer." After an unsuccessful attempt to convince management to contract printing with Walker in Cleveland, Lynch finally decided to leave the Sentinel. "Our people [the Sentinel management]," Lynch said, "were Democrats, Walker was a Republican, and our people simply weren't going to have anything to do with a Republican...." Just as the "disenchanted eight" left the News to form the Sentinel, so did Lynch leave the Sentinel to form the Columbus paper. Its core consisted of Lynch and John Combs, who could also be considered a part of the original core. Though Combs never worked for the News, he had worked with the Sentinel staff many of whom had previously worked for the News.

This two man team approached Walker in 1961 in an attempt to persuade him to establish a Columbus edition of the Call & Post. "I decided that Columbus needed a newspaper and was going to be without one, if we stayed with the Sentinel.... There had been a continuing loss of money over...about a twenty-four to thirty-month period of time." This was the point that Lynch and Combs used to try to convince Walker to establish a Columbus edition of the Call & Post. Walker had not forgotten his bad experience with the Advocate in the late 1930s. Lynch recalls that it took Combs and him nine months
to convince Walker to start a Columbus edition. Walker felt that the Black community in Columbus was too conservative even for his newspaper; furthermore, he cited to Lynch and Combs the lack of full support given Black newspapers by the local Black community. Lynch argued that he and Combs knew the local market and could guarantee that the paper would have a circulation of 5,000 and a given dollar amount of advertising within six months. Finally, in April of 1962, Walker accepted the challenge.

Lynch and Combs might have pointed out to Walker that the local Black community was losing some of its conservativism. Columbus Blacks were changing and increasing their socio-political activity. This new awareness could not be adequately expressed in the columns of the financially depressed Sentinel. It may be that Walker was already aware of this and beyond the potential monetary gains of marketing a new Black newspaper, he could foresee a chance to influence the direction of socio-political activity in the Black community.

If the new newspaper was going to succeed, it would have to convince the local Black community of its intentions to be responsive to the Black community. The Columbus paper had to gain community support, and this was a challenge, since the Sentinel was still in existence in May of 1962 when the Columbus paper began. Lynch and Combs had both Walker's Republican
politics and the fact that he was an outsider going against them. To counterbalance these factors, Lynch and Combs had a few things going for them. First, even though the Sentinel was still being published, unless it received some new capital soon, it was destined to fail. Secondly, Walker had undertaken this type of venture before and had valuable experience in this area which he could lend, not to mention the capital he could invest in such a project. Thirdly, John Combs, as has been mentioned, previously worked for the Cleveland paper. It can be assumed that Combs who had worked for Walker for eight years were of similar political persuasion. This being the case, Walker could maintain some political control over the paper and thus indirectly affect the increase in socio-political awareness within the Black community. Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Lynch was a Black "community-oriented" newspaperman.

Not only was Lynch an asset to the new paper because of his journalism skills and business sense, but he was a part of the community. The Lynch name meant something to Columbus Blacks. At one time or another, the majority of residents in the Black community had come in contact with the Lynch family. Lynch had been active in the southend of Columbus as a youth and was well known throughout the entire Black community by the time he began his career with the News in 1946. The content of the Sentinel reflected what he had
learned while with the News: to be an outspoken voice for the Black community and to be fair in terms of party politics. Moreover, Lynch declared after his experience with the Sentinel that he was not going to work for any paper that was "controlled or printed by whites....[He] wanted complete Black control of the operation." 34 This latter sentiment must have appealed to Walker, for even though Lynch was a Democrat, and the only one in the Call & Post's management, he would, support a Republican who "spoke for Blacks." With all of these factors in their favor, the Columbus paper still had a difficult time gaining full acceptance by the Black community.

In order to be accepted by the local Black community, Lynch, whom Walker had named general manager of the Columbus paper, had to convince the community of the paper's intentions to be politically fair and responsive to its needs. Lynch was well aware that he and Combs had developed special rapport with the Black community. He remarked that they had been recognized by the "Black leadership" as having given "prior service to the community" and therefore would not encounter the "same kinds of resistance" that might face outsiders. 35 Some in the community, however, required more convincing.

Lynch recalled that there was an "overt effort" to impede the establishment of the Columbus paper. 36 This effort had political implications, for the two key individuals opposing a new paper were the Rev. Phale Hale and the Rev. Russell Jones,
both Democrats. Lynch termed their attempt to impede the development of the Columbus paper as "anti-Walker Democratic-oriented" politics. According to Lynch, a group led by these two Democrats along with an unidentified Black labor leader put out rumors that the Columbus paper would only be published long enough to promote State Auditor James Rhodes' candidacy for governor.\(^37\) Even after the Columbus paper had begun, attempts were made to persuade Lynch to discontinue his efforts with the Columbus paper.\(^38\) At one point Walker had to come down from Cleveland to address this group of Democrats to convince them, as John Combs put it, that the staff of the Columbus paper "didn't give a damn about a Democrat or a Republican."\(^39\) It took some time for the Columbus paper to win these Democrats over, and it was the "equality to party" legacy from the old News which helped Lynch to do this.

Lynch's strategy to gain the confidence of the Black community was to win over the local Black leadership.\(^40\) To do this, he relied upon his experience and skills as advertising director and upon his knowledge of the community. He began working for the Call & Post on April 1, 1962, but did not publish the first issue of the Columbus paper until May 10, 1962. During the month of April, Lynch and Combs were engaged in a public relations campaign to win community support for the Columbus paper. The campaign consisted of contacting the civic, social, and religious leaders of the community (see
Appendix C). Over 500 persons were reached by mail or in person, so that anyone who might have some influence on the "future prospects" of the paper was contacted. Lynch and Combs told these leaders that the Columbus paper would be the community's paper. The intent of the campaign also was to allay the fears of Black Democrats who believed the paper would become a political organ for Walker.\footnote{41}

The first edition of the Columbus paper would be critical for Lynch. The month before the Columbus paper was begun was also the period for the new three-person staff to gather material to place in the first edition.\footnote{42} During this time Lynch decided to distribute the first issue free of charge. This idea was not new, but it was novel for a Black weekly, and it required considerable effort, for Lynch wanted to distribute some 20,000 copies on a door-to-door basis to selected Black neighborhoods.\footnote{43} This first edition, according to Lynch, was a "well packaged news piece on Columbus."\footnote{44} Its purpose was to counter the prejudice many Columbus Blacks felt against an out-of-town newspaper.

A major selling point of the Columbus paper was its physical appearance. The first copy contained many photographs of Blacks. These photographs reproduced much better on the "cold-type" (offset) press being used by the \textit{Call \\& Post} than on the "hot-type" (rotary) press used by the \textit{Sentinel}. Realizing this fact, Lynch ran an abundance of Black pictures
in his first issue. Concerning the quality of these pictures, he comments: "Pictures in the [Columbus] Call & Post...[looked] like portraits when...compared to...the...Sentinel...and to the daily newspapers as well."\textsuperscript{45}

Lynch recalls that the Columbus paper was initially received "very well" by the Black community.\textsuperscript{46} In general this is perhaps true, but the advertising campaign apparently did not convince all of the Black community leaders to believe the announced intentions of the Columbus paper to be politically fair and community-oriented. According to Al Hawkins, the Democrats and organized labor were concerned about having a Black Republican newspaper in the Black community.\textsuperscript{47} The militant Rev. Arthur Zebbs of CORE recalls that he had some doubts about the paper's intention at first to reflect the views of the community. He terms the community's acceptance of the Columbus paper as a "gradual reception." Zebbs goes on to say:

\begin{quote}
I think there was a general acceptance of it. As the [Columbus] Call & Post became more and more issue-minded--and it had to--because it was born in that era, I think people accepted it more and more.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

Reverends Russell Jones and Phale Hale were still trying to convince Lynch to give up and quit the Columbus paper. Lynch, however, was not about to give in at that point.\textsuperscript{49} Lynch felt, moreover, that he had begun a potentially successful newspaper; he believed he had a "go situation inside of the
first year of operation." The main reason for this optimism was that he had successfully gained the confidence of the Black religious leadership during this period. He describes the importance of this relationship:

We [the Columbus paper staff] viewed them... the Black church community [as being]...the only free community in the city of Columbus.... It's the only politically free structure that Blacks control....[Therefore] if the Black minister wants to...provide leadership... he can do it without fearing any threat of recrimination from the white community, because he answers to his congregation.

We felt we had...to develop a good, working rapport with the church community.50

To this end, Combs interfaced with the church community a good deal of the first six months of the paper's existence. Workshops were set up to teach church and social clubs how to correspond with the new newspaper and to "teach them to effectively use a Black newspaper."51 There were over one hundred churches with which the understaffed newspaper had to deal. As Lynch pointed out, however, each of these churches represented a "bloc of potential subscribers and supporters" of the Columbus paper. In order for these people to become actively interested in the newspaper, they had to have an "active piece" of the newspaper. This active piece of the newspaper came in the form of the views they contributed to the paper. By the fall of the year, the Columbus paper did not have to go out to the churches, as the churches came to the newspaper. The acceptance of the Columbus paper by the Black churches was a clear indication that the new newspaper
was being favorably received at least by this segment of the community.

Though they can hardly be considered part of Lynch's overall strategy to convince the Black community of the Columbus paper's value, the thoroughness of its news coverage and the limited but evident use of "sensationalism" were used to attract subscribers to the newspaper.\textsuperscript{52} The Columbus paper was thorough in that it was able and willing to follow a news story and cover it more completely than the daily paper. An incident involving a Black might receive scant coverage in the daily newspaper, but the weekly would go into the details of the incident.\textsuperscript{53} It would appear that the thoroughness of coverage was a factor in helping the Columbus paper gain the support of the local Black community.\textsuperscript{54} Another way in which the Columbus paper was thorough was in its ability to cover news on the national level. Lynch agrees that the \textit{Sentinel} could not compete with national news coverage provided by the Cleveland paper's staff. This staff consisted of professional "photo-journalist" who could be flown to the spot where news was taking place and direct feature articles about these happenings to Cleveland for dissemination to the Columbus \textit{Call \\& Post}. In regards to "sensationalism," the Columbus paper used this tactic to a limited degree, but nonetheless, it did use it. For example, the following headlines appeared in early issues of the paper: "Find 8 Infant Bodies Piled Up in Mortuary;" "Nine Babies Buried: Police Search Laws to Charge Undertaker."\textsuperscript{55}
It is difficult to determine exactly what effect the use of such headlines had on subscriptions; however, there can be little doubt as to their purpose.

The Black community found the paper valuable because it supported Black social and political aspirations. The Columbus paper was doing what the *News* and the *Sentinel* had done before it. The paper was helping the Black community to understand itself and to disseminate its feelings, moods, and opinions outside the community. In essence the new newspaper served as a communication link between the Black community and the greater white community. For example, in its second issue the Columbus paper supported a group of local businessmen who were protesting the city's redevelopment plan as it pertained to the predominately Black section of Mt. Vernon Avenue. A more specific example of the paper's support of the community can be seen in its willingness to protest in favor of the Black community. "Since his appointment to the Municipal Civil Service Commission more than a year ago," one article reads, "G. B. Newton has followed a course of action which bears the earmarks of a person whose racial prejudices have been etched to the bone." Still proving itself, the Columbus paper revealed a stroy about housing segregation in the nearby community of Newark, Ohio. The headlines read, "Arrival of Negro Technicians Arouses Lily-White Community." Being thorough and following up on this story, the
Columbus paper gave front-page coverage to an investigation of a home construction firm located in Newark which allegedly discriminated against one of the Black technicians. When a group of concerned citizens marched "in protest to the operation" of a segregated swimming pool in the near westside community of Valleyview, the Columbus paper gave the marchers front page coverage. When the Olentangy Inn, a local restaurant, refused a Black membership to its "Dinner of the Month Club," the Columbus paper protested to the point that the Ohio Civil Rights Council threatened to intercede. When Dr. Watson Walker, the only Black member on the Columbus Board of Education, protested against the appointment of an all-white education investigation committee by the Columbus Chamber of Commerce, his action was commended by the paper. The Columbus paper supported CORE in its final action against the discriminatory hiring policies of the Kroger Company which resulted in the grocery chain's hiring its first Black trainee.

In his attempt to make the Columbus paper responsive to the Black community, Lynch often lent front page space to events which might not make the pages of the white dailies. When a group of irate mothers marched in protest against a local grocer's beating of a boy, the Columbus paper gave it front-page coverage. When the mother of seven children was killed in an auto crash, the incident made front-page headlines. When CORE offered leadership training for non-violent programs, this too was given front-page coverage. Lynch also tried
to make the news personal in his attempt to make the Columbus paper "community-oriented." Quite often the scholastic achievements as well as the sports accomplishments of high school and junior school students were printed in the newspaper. The opportunity of seeing their names in print gave these younger members of the community a "piece of the paper" too. Lynch was instrumental in getting several of the local high schools to submit articles to the newspaper. Adults were not left out of this personalization either. When Jack Gibbs and Walter Randolph were promoted to vice-principal and principal, respectively, the Columbus paper gave these items front-page priority with pictures.

It would appear that the Columbus paper's gradual, as opposed to rapid, acceptance by the Black community was more the result of Walker's Republican sympathies than of anything else. Lynch had made significant strides in winning the support of the religious segment of the Black community. The Democratic political segment of the Black community was reluctant to accept the new paper, and this was a major factor in causing the gradual acceptance of the Columbus paper. The fears of Democrats like Hawkins, Jones, and Hale seemed justified when one looks at politics on the national and state levels. In one of Walker's first editorials, he criticized the racial policies of President John Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy. One can imagine the effect an article like this would have on Democrats like Al Hawkins who considered the
Kennedys "heroes." 70 Another article denounced President Kennedy for refusing to meet with a group of over 100 clergy-men to "discuss the racial situation" in racially troubled Albany, Georgia. 71 On the state level, there seemed to be a Walker-Rhodes relationship. When State Auditor James Rhodes proposed "a program to develop a plan to provide 200,000 new jobs in Ohio," the headline to the editorial read, "Jim Rhodes Steals [Democratic Gov.] DiSalle's Thunder." 72 Another article on Rhodes described his "good" relationship with Blacks. 73 The Columbus paper also printed a column written by Rhodes which appeared on the editorial page entitled "Little Lessons on Negro History." This column appeared until Rhodes became governor-elect in November of 1962. The incumbent Gov. Michael DiSalle had been given considerable coverage in the Columbus paper most of which was unfavorable. In a front-page editorial, the paper denounced DiSalle's decision to extradite Mrs. Mae Mallory to North Carolina to face "uncertain justice" in a kidnapping charge stemming from a racial disturbance. 74

To counterbalance these Republican political influences, which apparently came from Cleveland, Lynch and Combs endeavored to maintain their "equality to party politics." One article criticized Republican Representative Samuel Devine for "deserting his own delegation" and voting against outlawing poll taxes. 75 On local politics the Columbus paper gave an un-qualified endorsement to former Democratic Mayor M. E. Sensen-
brenner for his bid to regain his mayoral seat in an election which was more than a year away.76 In another attempt to remain "fair" to the political parties, the Columbus paper printed political information articles for the Black community, most of which avoided party politics.77

The Columbus paper's political endorsements also embraced both political parties; however, to determine the degree to which the paper supported one party or the other, a political-party content analysis was performed. Table 5.1 gives the results of the analysis for 1962. Of the 293 statements coded, 51% were coded "favorable," 13% "neutral," and 36% "unfavorable." The Democrats received the overwhelming majority of "neutral" and "unfavorable" statements, while the Republicans received a relatively large portion of the "favorable" statements. The "coefficient of imbalance" (see Appendix C for explanation) is greater for Republicans than for Democrats for this year. One interesting observation is the classification of statements for the important campaign months of October and November. For that period there is a total of five "unfavorable" statements for Republicans compared to a total of 27 for Democrats. Moreover, there is a total of 49 favorable for Republicans compared to a total of only 15 for the Democrats. The conclusion is that regardless of the Lynch-Combs attempt to be politically fair, the Columbus paper supported the Republican party to a greater degree than it did the Democratic party. One possible explanation for this im-
### TABLE 5.1

POLITICAL PARTY CONTENT ANALYSIS OF THE COLUMBUS CALL & POST NEWSPAPER FOR 1962*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>29</td>
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<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fav.</td>
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<td>3</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fav.</td>
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<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
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<tr>
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<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
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<td>5</td>
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<tr>
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<td>13</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>25</td>
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<th></th>
<th>REPUBLICAN</th>
<th>DEMOCRAT</th>
<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>(100%) 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>35%</td>
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<td>(100%) 13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>(100%) 51</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\[ C_{f,u} = 0.329 - 0.083 \quad 100\% \]

* The Columbus Call & Post was not published until May 1962.
balance in support for the Republican party might very well be the exploitation of the apparent "Walker-Rhodes" relationship in the Columbus paper. However, this analysis did not attempt to discern this kind of information. The analysis for 1962 would tend to confirm the suspicion of the local Black Democrats that the paper was being influenced by Walker and his "Republicanism." The only qualification which must be added is that these influences, if indeed they did emanate from Cleveland, were limited to state and national politics.\(^78\)

The initial concerns of Black Democrats eventually subsided. Hawkins comments about these initial concerns and the eventual change in the attitude of Black Democrats:

We [the Black Democrats] had our reservations, and we were very pessimistic... to how much support they would give Black Democrats. The reason being that... [the paper was] owned and operated by William Walker.... We figured he would be dictating... the editorial policy and... lean toward the Republican party. This has not been true, because on the state level... perhaps Mr. Walker controls the editorial policy, but on the local level, Mr. Amos Lynch and Mr. John Combs control the political policy....

I have been able to go to the [Columbus] Call & Post and get a lot of support for the Democratic cause....\(^79\)

Aside from its editorial policy on politics, there was another reason why local Democrats began to give the Columbus paper greater support. They found that though Walker was a Republican, he too was Black. More will be said about this later.\(^80\)
The Black community's initial acceptance of the Columbus paper was gradual, but nonetheless successful. Lynch's securing community support resulted from his convincing the local Black community that the Columbus paper was "community-oriented."
The support given the smaller, lesser known groups helped to convince many others in the community about the sincerity of the Columbus paper. As mentioned earlier, the local Black Democrats, and organized labor to some extent, had yet to realize that Lynch and Combs were attempting to be as fair to political parties as they had been when they worked on the Sentinel. The more formally organized groups such as the NAACP and CORE too were yet to be fully won over by the paper.

As socio-political activity increased in the Black community, the Call & Post's support for the established organizations and for some of the informal groups like the "Columbus Coordinating Committee" and the "Assembly" also increased. As Lynch in 1962 had gone out to convince the Black church community that the Columbus paper was sincere, in 1963 he concentrated on placing more emphasis on these socio-political groups. Early in 1963 the Columbus paper mentioned an informal group called the Ohio Committee for Civil Rights Legislation. Then the paper turned its attention to the NAACP and publicized the internal problems caused by the organization's December 1962 elections. In a later article the paper commented that the dispute might be good for the organization. Part of the later article read: "...during

86
the past several years the local branch has been plagued with a chronic ailment brought about by petty bickering, personality clashes, and dogmatism." A third article about the NAACP predicted that the organization would be more democratic in the future. By printing these articles the paper may have stimulated the organization to greater activity, for during the balance of the year, the local NAACP became more active. After the lull and internal friction had subsided, the NAACP held a meeting on the State House lawn in sympathy for the civil rights workers in the riot-struck city of Birmingham. In response to an article printed in the Columbus Dispatch on crime statistics, the organization issued a release, part of which was printed in the Columbus paper: "The story in [the Dispatch] left the impression that in nine out of 11 homicides, Negroes did the killing...." In effect, the level of activism in the local NAACP increased, though it did not approach that of CORE.

In mid-1963 the Columbus paper began to give more coverage to CORE. This was no doubt due to increased socio-political activity of the organization and to the militancy of its local leader, the Rev. Arthur Zebbs. Up until this time, the Columbus paper had given limited coverage of CORE, but coverage of the organization became more frequent and was given front-page coverage beginning around September of 1963. In one article the Columbus paper described the confrontation between CORE and the Mt. Vernon Avenue branch of the Ohio National Bank...
described in chapter three. In a subsequent article about the local Black press, Zebbs "blasted what he called a 'press blackout' of his group's activities." This is what Zebbs was alluding to when he said the Columbus paper became "more and more issue-minded." Zebbs or CORE was mentioned in at least nine separate articles in the Columbus paper from July through December. While Zebbs may have been correct in saying the Columbus paper had been ignoring him and CORE, this was not the case after mid-1963.

The greater coverage of CORE and the NAACP carried over into 1964. With the ever-increasing socio-political activity occurring within the Black community, the Columbus paper had to report how the Black community felt to the greater community. The housing discrimination theme was carried over into 1964, especially the incident surrounding the Northwest Gardens housing development run by the Leo Yassenoff's Buckeye Property Management. CORE had staged "sit-in" demonstrations and marches against the management, protesting its alleged refusal to consider Blacks as potential tenants. The massive civil rights rally held in late January 1964 was given considerable coverage by the Columbus paper. Several of the leading groups active in the civil rights movement were given space in the paper. Both the NAACP's and CORE's activities involving de facto school segregation were front-page material throughout 1964. On one occasion the NAACP's Rev. Phale Hale and CORE's Rev. Arthur Zebbs were pictured leaving the Columbus
Board of Education building together. All manner of protests against this type of segregation helped to form the content of the Columbus paper. In each of these articles either Hale, Zebbs, the NAACP, or CORE was mentioned. It took some doing on Lynch's and Combs' part, but this extensive coverage was needed to help convince these leaders and their organizations that the Columbus paper was sincere. At one point Zebbs went so far as to give qualified support to the Columbus paper, when he "stated his opposition to a resolution adopted at a statewide meeting of CORE...critical of the Call & Post."

In its usual role of supporting the community, the Columbus paper continued observing the greater community for information of potential interest to Blacks. For example, it reported that local cab companies were to begin hiring Blacks. Due to greater thoroughness of coverage, the Columbus paper continued to bring in news of national interest to the Black community. For example, the Birmingham disturbances, the shooting of NAACP leader Medgar Evers, and the "March on Washington" were covered in depth in the Columbus paper.

It was probably the political policy of the Columbus paper during the years 1963 and 1964 that finally convinced the local Black Democrats that the Columbus paper was indeed attempting to be "fair" as far as local party politics were concerned. Early in the year the paper highlighted outgoing Democratic Gov. DiSalle's appointment of William H. Brooks
to the Columbus Municipal Court, which made Brooks the "first Negro judge of a Columbus court." In the same issue came the report which was no surprise to local Black Democrats--William Walker's appointment to Governor-elect Rhodes' cabinet as Director of the Department of Industrial Relations. This event appeared to confirm their suspicions about the Columbus paper being a political organ for the Rhodes campaign, although apparently Rhodes did not initially have Walker in mind for the positon. The effect of Walker's appointment to Rhodes' cabinet was neutralized by the Lynch's and Combs' endorsement of local Democrats. The Rev. Russell Jones, for example, who was running for a council seat, was given considerable coverage in the paper. Democrat Norma Jones, wife of Urban League director Chet Jones, also received publicity for her candidacy for a seat on the Columbus Board of Education. Another article mentioned the opening of an eastside branch office of the Franklin County Democratic party to be run by Al Hawkins.

During 1963, the Columbus paper not only supported Black Democrats but withdrew support from the incumbent Republican Mayoral candidate Ralston Westlake. The articles denouncing Westlake were emphatic. In one issue, the Rev. Russell Jones claimed Westlake had only a "sudden interest" in the Black community because of the upcoming election." Another article reported that the mayor was "bombarded" with letters of protest from the Black community. One pre-election issue con-
tained two articles against him. One read in part: "Throughout his public career Westlake has never been very popular among Negroes, and during his more than three years as Mayor, he has made no effort to improve the relationship." The article went on to list particulars against him. The other article, a front-page editorial on Westlake, reads as follows:

Westlake, in our estimation, has flunked miserably in every human relations test he faced during his four years in office....

...one of his first official acts was to discontinue the position of executive of the Community Relations Commission. Without a director the commission became ineffective and died.108

When Westlake was defeated in the election, the Columbus paper headlines read, "Big Negro Vote Sinks Westlake."109

Another factor in 1964 helped to convince Black Democrats that the Columbus paper was doing its best to be fair to both parties. This was the paper's support of the Democratic presidential candidate, Lyndon Johnson, and simultaneous denunciation of the Republican candidate, Barry Goldwater. Beginning in 1963, the Columbus paper began to look unfavorably on Goldwater.110 In 1964, the Columbus paper started its campaign against Goldwater's candidacy. In an attempt to retain some semblance of Republicanism, the first article against Goldwater read as follows:

Unlike [the late U.S. Senator Robert] Taft, Goldwater's relations with the Negro couldn't be worse. For the average Negro sees no difference between Goldwater's civil rights philosophy and the preaching of Govs. Wallace, Barnett, and other of their ilk.111
The headlines of a later article read, "Goldwater and Wallace Belong Together." After the primaries and the Republican convention, anti-Goldwater articles became frequent on the editorial pages. Pointing out the lack of Blacks at a local Goldwater rally, Combs writes "our nose count of the Negroes may not be absolutely correct, but, by count, we [the Columbus paper reporters] spotted only 15...among the whole crowd." An article by Combs attacked the last-minute efforts of Goldwater to win back some of the Black Republican votes. In one final article against Goldwater, written just before the election, a reporter again warned against last-minute Goldwater moves to win Black votes:

In the Negro communities, material depicting Goldwater as a friend of the Negro and champion of civil rights went into circulation last week... the literature goes into great detail in explaining his vote against the civil rights bill of 1964.

The Columbus paper was just as much in favor of re-electing President Johnson as it was in favor of defeating Goldwater. Almost every issue from mid-summer through the election time mentioned some favorable aspect about the Johnson-Humphrey team. This support of Johnson did not go unnoticed, for Johnson subsequently named Walker to the National Committee for U.S. Community Relations in July of 1964.

Local Black Democratic candidates were given substantial coverage also. As mentioned in chapter three, Dr. Rosemond ran for County Coroner and Jeanne Woodward ran for State
Representative. Each candidate was given front page coverage on several occasions.\textsuperscript{117}

This overall support for local and national Democrats and partial abandonment of the Republican party can be seen in Table 5.2 which gives the results of a 1964 political party content analysis. Of the 193 "unfavorable" coded statements, 74\% were about Republicans, a significant increase from the 27\% in 1962 (see Table 5.1). Another change was that the Democrats took the lead in "favorable" statements going from 43\% in 1962 to 60\% in 1964. The coefficient of imbalance reflects this change too with the Republican figure going from 0.329 to 0.038 while the Democrat figure went from 0.083 to 0.162. One other fact worth noting is that during the critically important campaign months of September, October, and November, the Republicans received 42 "unfavorable" statements while the Democrats received only 13. For these same months, however, the Democrats still received fewer "favorable" statements. Judging from the results of this analysis and the preceding comments, it would appear "Goldwaterism" helped to change the direction of political party support as far as the content of the Columbus paper is concerned. The Columbus paper made a concerted effort to publicize any party member who did not support the civil rights package or the state's fair housing bill. For example, one article suggested the Republican party "drop" Congressman John Ashbrook for being the "lone Ohio Congressman to vote against the civil rights bill."\textsuperscript{118}
### Table 5.2

**Political Party Content Analysis of the Columbus Call & Post Newspaper for 1964**

**Summary 1964**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>JAN</th>
<th>FEB</th>
<th>MAR</th>
<th>APRIL</th>
<th>MAY</th>
<th>JUNE</th>
<th>JULY</th>
<th>AUG</th>
<th>SEPT</th>
<th>OCT</th>
<th>NOV</th>
<th>DEC</th>
<th><strong>TOTALS</strong></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Republican</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Democrat</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>51</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>103</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unfav.</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>11</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fav.</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>655</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Classification/Party Percentages**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Republican</th>
<th>Democrat</th>
<th>% of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>(100%) 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>(100%) 27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>(100%) 43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cf,u</strong></td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>0.162</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Columbus paper was born during that part of the "non-violent Negro revolution" wherein, locally, an increase in socio-political activity was taking place within the Black community. An older ideology of passive integration was giving way to a newer ideology of active integration. The older ideology used persuasion as its main strategy; the new ideology used intimidation through demonstrations to shorten the process toward a more rapid integration. The Columbus paper could not afford to be out of touch with the Black community's change in philosophy towards integration. With Combs' and Lynch's combined 50 years newspaper experience they could well appreciate the necessity of the Columbus paper having to be "community-oriented." The new paper had to be responsive to the Black community's needs and it had to change as the community changed. The team of Combs and Lynch set out to do this by retaining their "equality to party politics" and by maintaining their level of involvement in the Black community. Their tactic was to first gain the support of the church community. A good deal of effort was spent in 1962 to gain the confidence of this vital segment of the Black community. Convincing the more formal socio-political groups such as CORE, NAACP, and the Black Democrats that the paper was going to be "fair" regarding party politics, was more difficult. Not until 1963 and into 1964 did these more skeptical segments of the community begin to believe that the Columbus paper was indeed a "community-oriented" newspaper.
For the first two and one half years of its existence, the Columbus paper was involved in gaining the support of the Black community. From mid-1962 through 1964 the Black community tested the sincerity of the out-of-town, Republican-oriented newspaper. Though the acceptance of the paper was perhaps gradual, the fact remained that by the end of 1964, it had established itself as a spokesman for the Black community. The Black community was now coming to the paper with news not only of the churches but of socio-political groups as well. The staff of the paper had grown from three to six in order to be more responsive to the Black community. Lynch had guaranteed Walker a 5,000 circulation within the first six months of operation, and they surpassed the guarantee. According to Combs it was a rare occasion when the Sentinel reached 5,000. The Black community had accepted the new Columbus paper, and the Columbus paper had gained the confidence of the Black community.
END NOTES

1. Walker did not assume ownership of the paper until about 1935 according to Lynch; however, Walker puts the date later at around 1937.

2. Lynch interview.

3. Llewellyn Coles interview, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

4. Lynch interview.

5. Lynch's father was a dentist and his uncle was a doctor.

6. In several editions, the News advertised this fact.

7. Coles interview.

8. The author could find only sparse records of the Advocate. It could be too that the Advocate had competition, for Maxwell R. Brooks mentions not only the Advocate but a Columbus Voice as being active in the Black community during this same time. See M. R. Brooks, "A Sociological Interpretation of the Negro Newspaper" (M. A. Thesis, Ohio State University, 1937), p. 90.

9. See "Note to Researchers" preceding microfilm copy of the News at the Ohio Historical Center Library.

10. On one occasion he recalls having been taken to jail for holding up a line at the box office of one of the segregated downtown theaters.

11. Coles interview.


13. Coles interview.
Vishnu V. Oak characterized the News as "pro-Roosevelt" when dividing up the anti- and pro-Roosevelt Black newspapers. See V. V. Oak, The Negro Newspaper (Westport, Conn.: Negro University Press, 1948), pp. 61-62.


Coles interview.

Coles interview.

Coles interview.

Lynch recalls that Coles fired him on at least two occasions. Lynch interview.

Combs interview.

Lynch interview.

Paxton served as president of the Sentinel Publishing Corp. from its inception until its final publication in 1963.

Combs interview.

Bowser interview.

Lynch interview.

Combs relates an incident in which gave him a "great sense of pride." A lobbyist from the Ohio Chamber of Commerce attempted to buy space from the Sentinel to endorse a particular issue which if passed by the Ohio Assembly would prove beneficial to the Chamber. He recounts that he told the lobbyist that he could "buy everything but the front page, the back page, and the editorial" of the Sentinel. Combs interview.
27  Combs interview.
28  Lynch interview.
29  This is probably accurate because Lynch had been the advertising director and promotions manager for the Sentinel. Lynch interview.
30  Combs, originally from Toledo, did not come to Columbus until 1943, but he had become well known in the community. Combs interview.
31  Lynch interview.
32  Walker, in his reluctance to start the Columbus paper, even offered Lynch the managership of the Cincinnati paper.
33  In his many attempts to begin new editions in local communities, only the Cincinnati Five Star edition established in 1951 proved to be a successful venture.
34  Lynch interview.
35  Lynch and Combs interviews.
36  Lynch interview.
37  Lynch interview.
38  Lynch remembers having been invited to a meeting to discuss starting a local edition of the Democratic-oriented Chicago Defender that he would supposedly manage.
39  Combs interview.
40  Lynch interview.
41  Lynch interview.
A secretary had been hired in April.

The first edition is lost; neither Cleveland nor Columbus has a copy of this issue.

Hawkins interview.

Zebbs interview.

Walker defines sensationalism as using the Black press to fight discrimination. He says it is a "relative term" by which he meant that "any Black newspaper is sensational to a white man." In the context of this paper sensationalism refers to the use of bizarre crimes or incidents placed in headlines to attract attention.

Combs humorously quips that the Columbus paper will "follow someone to the cemetery."

One column in the Columbus paper is borderline sensational. "Good Morning Judge" is a column which gives the names and offenses of the local law offenders for the previous week. Because the column is often humorously written, it can hardly be construed as sensational. The majority of the offenses are minor, e.g., "drunk and disorderly," "vagrancy," and "illegal gambling."

See Columbus Call & Post, June 9 and 16, 1962, respectively, p. 1.


See "Dinner Club Hedges on Negro Applicant," and "Rights Unit May Act in Dinner Club Case" (Columbus Call & Post, December 8, 1962 and December 15, 1962, respectively), p. 1.

"All White Group Hit by Walker" (Columbus Call & Post, December 22, 1962), p. 1.

"Kroger Answers CORE on Fair Hiring Policy," and "Kroger Hires Negro Trainee" in the September 22, 1962 and October 6, 1962 issues of the Columbus Call & Post, respectively.

"Gorcer Pistol-Whips Boy: Mothers March" (Columbus Call & Post, August 18, 1962), p. 1.

"Mother of Seven Dies in Ohio Freeway Crash" (Columbus Call & Post, September 29, 1962), p. 1.

"CORE Opens Training Programs" (Columbus Call & Post, July 14, 1962), p. 1.

"East High Students Named First C+P School Writers" (Columbus Call & Post, September 29, 1962), p. 3.

See "Jack and Bob Keep Negroes Agog" (Columbus Call & Post, May 19, 1962), p. 10.

Hawkins interview.

"JFK Refuses to See Albany Delegation: (Columbus Call & Post, August 11, 1962), p. 1.

See Columbus Call & Post, August 18, 1962, p. 11.

"Jim Rhodes Knows How to Win Negroes Favor" (Columbus Call & Post, October 6, 1962), p. 11.


"Gag Rule Alibi Used by Devine in Tax Vote" (Columbus Call & Post, July 7, 1962), p. 11.

See "Capital City is Scene of Political Caucuses" (Columbus Call & Post, July 7, 1962), p. 11.

See "Voter Registration Planning Session Thursday" (Columbus Call & Post, September 1, 1962), p. 1.

See Lynch quote regarding the relationship between Walker and the Columbus paper on page 58.

Hawkins interview.

Lynch interview.

"Fair Housing Law Drive Launched by Ohio Group" (Columbus Call & Post, January 19, 1963), p. 2.

"Bitter Dispute Rocks Local NAACP Branch" (Columbus Call & Post, January 19, 1963), p. 1.

"NAACP Dispute May Be Good for What Ails It" (Columbus Call & Post, January 26, 1963), p. 1.

"Columbus NAACP Sets 'Sympathy' Meeting for State House Yard" (Columbus Call & Post, May 18, 1963), p. 1.


See for example "Rights Groups Split on Ohio National Bank Picket" (Columbus Call & Post, September 21, 1963), p. 1.

"NAACP Sees Victory: Others March" (Columbus Call & Post, September 28, 1963), p. 1.


Zebbs interview. See page 76 for statement in fuller context.

See for example the November 14 and 23, 1963, issues of the Columbus Call & Post for extensive "CORE-Zebbs" coverage.

See "Jail More Sit-Inners at Downtown Office Building," and "CORE Leader Beats Cases, Followers Keep Marching" (Columbus Call & Post, November 23, 1963 and January 4, 1964, respectively), pp. 1.

See "Signers of Rally Call," "8,000 Jam Vets Hall for Rights Rally," and "Rev. Zebbs' Talk Electrifies Rights Rally" (Columbus Call & Post, January 11 and 25, 1963, respectively), pp. 2A, 1, and 2A, respectively.

See "CORE's Dynamic Rev. Zebbs Backs Call & Post," and "Rev. Zebbs Clarifies Position on the Call & Post" (Columbus Call & Post, March 28 and April 4, 1964, respectively), pp. 1 and 3A, respectively.

The role of the paper also increased when the Sentinel ceased publication in February, 1963. See "Ohio Sentinel Quits Business" (Columbus Call & Post, February 2, 1963), p. 1. In October 1963 the Columbus Challenger, an inconsistently published monthly newspaper, was begun. This Black newspaper lasted until 1968, but was never real competition for the Columbus paper.

"Green-Yellow Cabs to Hire Negroes" (Columbus Call & Post, February 16, 1963), p. 1.

See the May 11 and 15, 1963 issues for the Birmingham march information. See "Mississippi NAACP Leader Shot in Back" (Columbus Call & Post, June 15, 1963), p. 1. for information on the Evers slaying. Also see "Freedom Marchers Pour into Capital" (Columbus Call & Post, August 31, 1963), p. 1.


Refer to footnote 40 on page 51.

Coles interview. Coles mentioned that Rhodes considered him for the position.

See "Jones Fires First Shot in Battle for Council," and "Jones Calls for End of Civil Service Farce" (Columbus Call & Post, January 12 and May 4, 1963, respectively), pp. 1.

"Norma W. Jones Circulates Petitions to Throw Har into Capital Political Ring" (Columbus Call & Post, July 27, 1963), p. 1.

"Columbus Democrats Open Eastside Branch Office: Al Hawkins is Director" (Columbus Call & Post, December 14, 1963), p. 1.
"Westlake Ignores Interest of Near Eastside, Jones Charges" (Columbus Call & Post, April 27, 1963), p. 1.

"Westlake Under Fire [by NAACP and Jones] on Race Issue" (Columbus Call & Post, June 29, 1963), p. 1.

"Mayor in Serious Trouble With Negro Voters; Piled Up Disfavor Over Years" (Columbus Call & Post, November 2, 1963), p. 1. It appears that in close local elections, the Black vote is crucial. See Hopkins pp. 72-73.

"Why Westlake Should Be Defeated" (Columbus Call & Post, November 2, 1963), pp. 1-2.

See Columbus Call & Post, November 9, 1963, p. 1.

"Goldwater Speaks With Racist Tongue?" (Columbus Call & Post, August 17, 1963), p. 11.

"Goldwater Defeat Predicted" (Columbus Call & Post, January 18, 1964), p. 9.

See Columbus Call & Post, June 27, 1964, p. 2.

"Throws Goldwater on Au H2O Rally" (Columbus Call & Post, October 10, 1964), p. 3B.

"Exposes Goldwater Campaign Gimmick" (Columbus Call & Post, October 24, 1964), p. 3B.

"Negro Vote to be Decisive in Crucial Election" (Columbus Call & Post, October 31, 1964), p. 1.

"President Johnson Names Walker to U.S. Community Relations Body" (Columbus Call & Post, July 11, 1964), p. 1.

See "Jeanne Woodward Unveils Her Campaign Platform" (Columbus Call & Post, April 11, 1964), p. 1. Also see "Call-Post Endorsed Primary Candidates" (Columbus Call & Post, May 2, 1964), p. 1.
"GOP Should Drop Ashbrook" (Columbus Call & Post, February 1, 1964), p. 3B.

Lynch and Combs interviews. According to Combs, the Sentinel rarely reached 5,000 circulation.
Chapter VI
The Local Black Community Newspaper, 1965-1966:
The Columbus Call & Post Retains Community Support

Chapter five traced the development of the Columbus paper through its first two and one-half years. Basically, these first two and one-half years were used to gain the support of the Black community. Chapter six attempts to describe how the paper retained this support during the two ensuing years.

As stated in chapter five, the Columbus paper only gradually received the support of the Black community. This resulted from the inability of certain segments of the Black community to readily accept an "out-of-town," Republican-influenced newspaper. By the end of 1964, however, even these elements had begun to accept the paper. The two years that followed revealed that not only had the Black community accepted the Columbus paper, but that certain elements of the greater community seemed to recognize its influence as well. For example, the paid political advertising infrequent in the Columbus paper during its first two years increased after mid-1964. Moreover, white readership had increased. Though there is no definite way to measure this, Combs realtes that in the mid-sixties papers placed in news stands patronized predominately by whites began to sell.

There were other signs that the greater community had begun
to accept the Columbus paper. On one occasion in the summer of 1965 it was rumored that an impending racial disturbance threatened the downtown area. An executive of a large department store called the Columbus paper office to find out whether or not this was the case. Perhaps the executive called because he recognized that Lynch and the Columbus paper spoke for the local Black community. Lynch recalls having been invited to take part in several meetings during 1965 with the local Black leadership arranged by Trent Sickles, an executive assistant to the chairman of the Lazarus Department store. It was evident then that one of the major business concerns considered Lynch's influence of some significance. In another more select group Lynch was called upon to take a leadership role. This rather clandestine assemblage called the "32 Group" consisted of 16 whites and 16 "Black leaders." Their function was to discuss and propose alternative solutions to problems facing the greater community. It must be assumed, therefore, that Lynch and the Columbus paper were being recognized by members of the greater community as possessing leadership roles within the Black community.

Politicians, heads of formal and informal groups, as well as members of the church community, had all come to expect a certain amount of support from the Columbus paper. The paper in turn had come to expect a certain amount of support from the community. The community got what it wanted in terms of content, while the paper got what it wanted in terms of cir-
The circulation of the Columbus paper must have surpassed Walker's expectations (see Table 6.1). The first year circulation growth was such as to cause staff to seek a larger facility at 721 East Long Street. Not only did the Columbus paper increase its circulation for each year from 1962 through 1966, but it surpassed the already established Cincinnati paper. This is significant in that Cincinnati had more Black households than did Columbus. The Cincinnati paper had a net increase of 163 for this period, while the Columbus paper had had a net increase of 4,144 for the period.

**TABLE 6.1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cincinnati &quot;Five Star&quot; Edition</th>
<th>Columbus Edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>N/W Occupied Housing Units</td>
<td>Circulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>36,422</td>
<td>4,232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>4,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>5,527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>5,063</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>&quot;</td>
<td>4,069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>23,191</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Circulation figures from Audit Bureau Circulations' Audit Report-Newspaper (Chicago: 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, and 1967). Figures are those reported the first quarter of the ensuing year, e.g., 1962 figures are for the 12 months ending March 1963, etc.

#Designates Non-white housing units as shown in the ABC sheets.
The Columbus paper retained its Black community support by maintaining the policies that helped it to become accepted by the Black community during its first two and one half years of existence. These were the "responsiveness to the community" and the "equality to party politics." The Columbus paper had committed itself to the continuing task of convincing the Black community that it was "community-oriented."

Being responsive to the community meant the Columbus paper had to maintain its thorough and comprehensive coverage of news events concerning Blacks. On the national level in 1965, the paper covered such events as the Selma, Alabama racial disturbances. The paper went into depth about the police brutality, the "inhuman" conditions of the jails, the march itself, and about President Johnson's decision to send federal troops into the state to quell the violence. On the local level, the Columbus paper continued to protest on behalf of the Black community, exposing racism where it found it. One article described the effects of a bomb scare on the members of the Northwest Council on Human Relations, who were conducting an open-housing meeting. Another article criticized the inaction of the Columbus police department concerning the "right wing involvement" of one of its officers.

Not all of the articles, however, were protest; some were in support of efforts of whites in the greater community to prevent racism. For example, one article lauds the efforts
made by whites in one neighborhood to protect the neighborhood from the "block busting" tactics of realtors who take advantage of neighborhoods that have the potential of becoming integrated.\(^{10}\) Headlines from another article read, "Columbus Beginning to Justify Selection As 'All American' City," and referred to the city's opening of its "third fully integrated swimming pool."\(^{11}\) Also on the local level, the Columbus paper maintained thorough coverage of minor events involving racial flare ups and social welfare. It was perhaps this effort that signaled an attempt by the Columbus paper to become the Black community's "conscience" or "moral gatekeeper." For example, one front-page article asked for support of a family whose home had burned. A subsequent article told how well the community had responded to this plea.\(^{12}\) A similar article relating a family's distress was printed just before Christmas, 1965, and a similar response came from the community.\(^{13}\)

Along with these activities, the Columbus paper also continued its policy of supporting informal and formal groups which supported Black interests. One issue which drew the attention of the paper was the alleged striking of a teenage girl by her school principal. Meetings and ad hoc committees were formed to help resolve the situation.\(^{14}\) However, it was the issue surrounding de facto segregation in the local school system which drew the greatest proportion of the paper's attention.\(^{15}\)
The NAACP and CORE, the more formally organized groups, were again, as in 1964 and part of 1963, heavily involved in school desegregation movement. The groups attempted to integrate not only the student body but the school staff as well. Beginning about mid-September of 1964 when school began, both Zebbs and Hale resumed the fight they had been waging for the past year and a half against the School Board. It was CORE that demanded that the principal be fired in the aforementioned incident in which the principal allegedly struck the teenage girl.\textsuperscript{16} In response to this harassment, the School Board established an Intercultural Education Council (IEC). With his usual flare, Zebbs denounced the council. Even more significant is the fact that the paper too denounced IEC, thereby asserting itself. The paper, which had been following the events all along, became critical of Zebbs' and Hale's inability to make any real gains towards integrating the schools.\textsuperscript{17} "Dr. Harold Eibling and the Columbus School Board," one article read, "successfully foiled the socks off floundering civil rights leaders this week when they presented the anxiously awaited board resolution to establish the 'stooge' IEC."\textsuperscript{18} This kind of language shows how the paper had changed along with the community. In 1963 Zebbs had accused the Columbus paper of not fully supporting social movements. Now the paper was accusing these same leaders of not acting fast enough. These Black leaders responded to the paper's accusation, but it is important to note that the Columbus
paper thought itself strong enough to print words which might offend local Black leadership. It had gained that much support in the Black community.19

The paper reflected its new assertiveness by increasing its coverage of the Rev. Zebbs, the militant CORE leader. The paper had even gone so far as to print an article that he submitted.20 In fact, the paper and Zebbs appeared to be working in concert against school segregation. This relationship carried over into 1966. In one instance, Zebbs had "threatened to enjoin the city schools from receiving federal assistance until Jim Crow concept of neighborhood schools" was corrected.21 In a later article, Zebbs' CORE group ridiculed the IEC saying it had "no power."22 The Columbus paper evidently felt it could support the more vocal CORE due to its increased support in the Black community.

As the Black community became increasingly militant in the mid-1960s, the paper became more militant. A good example of this is the fact that Zebbs was asked to contribute articles about the civil rights movements on the local level. The first article in his column, which was called "The Civil Rights Movement," appeared September 24, 1966. From reading the articles, one would imagine he was reading two different newspapers. Zebbs' style was critical. Commenting on the race riots, he wrote, "the riots are really a preview of a major attack upon our political organizations and upon the belief in the free enterprise system."23 The Combs' and
Zebbs' articles reflected the more militant local community views, while the Walker-Loeb articles were more conservative and Cleveland-influenced.24 Walker and Charles Loeb, his managing editor, would denounce irresponsible demonstrators while the Columbus columnists would either encourage or remain neutral regarding militancy as an approach to integration. The Loeb and Walker columns appeared on the left hand side of the two editorial pages while the Zebbs' and Combs' columns appeared on the right hand side. A good example of this division can be seen in a Loeb article in which he attempts to denounce Stokely Carmichael:

Leading candidate for this dubious honor [of being a civil rights amateur] is a loud-mouthed young Negro named Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, who...is most typical of the crop of Johnny-come-lately [sic]... so-called militants who seem intent upon driving the hard core dedicated white supporters out of the civil rights movement.25

In contrast, Zebbs decried the seven Black leaders who had publicly denounced Black power in the New York Times call the organizations they represented as being too much involved in integration. "That's not where it is today," Zebbs acclaimed and went on to write up a special article on the "Black power denouncers" in his column.26

Another example of how the paper's attitude towards militancy changed on the local level can be seen in how the Columbus paper received "Black Power" advocate Stokely Carmichael during his rally held in Columbus in September of 1966.
Carmichael received front-page coverage complete with photos. The headlines read, "Hurricane Stokely Appears; Brings Only Truth, No Riots." The article went on to expound Carmichael's "new integration" philosophy of attaining "real power" through votes, not that of the "black man moving into the white community."  

Of course the Columbus paper maintained as thorough and comprehensive coverage on the state and local levels in 1966 as it had in 1965. On the state level, open housing had always been a major concern to Blacks in Columbus. The Columbus paper, however, did not mention this concern to any degree during 1962 or 1963, but from 1964 onward the interest in open housing increased within the Black community, and this was reflected in the paper. This is no doubt due to the state and federal fair housing laws being considered during these years. Combs, in following the state fair housing bill in 1965, wrote eight articles pertaining to the status of this bill. On the local level, job discrimination appeared to have been a major issue in 1966. The local NAACP challenged the hiring practices of the Ohio Youth Commission.  

It then proceeded to accuse the Ohio Civil Rights Commission of being inactive in this area.  

Later in the year, the NAACP picketed construction sites at the Ohio State University, protesting job discrimination on the construction crews. Then in September, the organization confronted the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority accusing them of dealing with contractors.
who discriminated against Blacks. 31

Politically, the Columbus paper tried to maintain its policy of being fair to both parties while endorsing Black candidates. It did not have much opportunity to do this in 1965, since this was an off-election year. The Columbus paper did manage to carry on its policy to some extent. One article looked disfavorably on Republican State Senator Charles Whalen of Dayton who, according to the article, was "being looked upon with suspicion by rank supporters" of the state's fair housing bill. 32 Most of the Republican content for the year centered upon Governor Rhodes and his "good" relationship with the Black community. One article, for example, praised his appointment of three Black judges to municipal court vacancies, while another mentioned his interest in ending job discrimination in the aforementioned Ohio State University construction project. 33 Rhodes, along with other notable state Republicans, was also given considerable support for his efforts in getting the state legislative reapportionment plan approved. 34 As far as the Democrats were concerned, the paper's favorable coverage of 1964 seemed to be decreasing. President Johnson was acclaimed for his sending federal troops into riot-torn Selma, Alabama, but beyond this the paper was fairly quiet as far as Johnson and Humphrey were concerned. 35 The only other Democrats to receive support by way of content in the Columbus paper were a few Black Democrats. The most notable was State Representative, Carl Stokes who was endorsed for
mayor of Cleveland by the Call & Post. In sum, the Columbus paper did not have many candidates to endorse that year on the local or state level. The political content in the paper was almost inconsequential, except for the previously mentioned state fair housing bill which was about evenly supported by both parties.

The year 1966 was a politically active year for local Blacks. The U.S. Federal Court had approved the reapportionment plan, which encouraged more Blacks to run for state legislative office than ever before. Locally, there were six Blacks on the ballot, four for legislative seats. This could have turned out to be a real test case for the Columbus paper to see who really controlled the political content of the paper. Fortunately or unfortunately, only two of these candidates opposed each other. Attorney James Pearson, a Republican, ran against and was defeated by the Rev. Phale Hale, a Democrat, for the 63rd Ohio House seat. The paper was noncommittal on this race. In another race, Attorney John Francis, Democrat, was running against incumbent Republican Robert MacNamara. This was the case mentioned in chapter four wherein Walker endorsed MacNamara, a white Republican, over Francis, a Black Democrat. Lynch recalls that he and Walker had a "war" about the endorsement.

The increased political activity had another effect on the Columbus paper. A prominent Black attorney, John Bowen, was running for the State Senate. He had been approached by Jack
Coles, assistant to Gov. Rhodes, to seek office. It was felt that a Black with Bowen's excellent credentials stood a good chance of winning a seat. Coles, it will be recalled, was a personal friend of Gov. Rhodes, and Rhodes apparently had a working relationship with Walker. This meant that beyond his credentials, Bowen had party backing and the power of the Black press all on his side with one additional benefit: Rhodes was running for re-election. In sum, the picture looked good for local Republicans.

The Columbus paper had given Rhodes considerable coverage over the months preceding the election. One of the pro-Rhodes headlines read as follows: "Governor Rhodes Does It Again," which referred to his appointment of Black Attorney Lillian Burke to his cabinet. Another read, "A Big Thanks to Gov. Rhodes," which referred to his role in helping get the reapportionment plan approved. There were others, along with a lengthy five-page advertisement detailing the accomplishments of the Rhodes administration.

The results of the 1966 political party content analysis are shown in Table 6.1. It reveals the change from the abandonment of the Republicans in 1964 to the support of Republicans again in 1966. This is not to say that the Columbus paper gave no support to Democrats; it merely states that the paper was influenced sufficiently by the Walker-Rhodes relationship to offset the local support given to Black Democrats. A total
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<td>REPUBLICAN</td>
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<td>52%</td>
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<td>53</td>
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<tr>
<td>% OF TOTAL</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>24%</td>
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<td>38</td>
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<td>C_f,u</td>
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of 79% of the "unfavorable statements were Democratic, whereas 76% of the "favorable" statements were Republican. Once more, a look at the pre-election months of October and November shows the Republican party receiving forty-one "favorable" statements as opposed to only four for the Democrats. The "coefficient of imbalance" for the Republicans went from 0.038 in 1964 to 0.454 in 1966. On the Democratic side, the figures went from 0.162 down to 0.024. Even with the Republicans receiving more "favorable" content, the Black Democratic segment of the community was apparently content with receiving endorsements for some of its local candidates and knowing that the paper was attempting to be fair to both parties on the local level.

It would appear that Black Democrats did not receive "fair" treatment from the Columbus paper. Evidently the Cleveland paper exercised some political control over the political content of the Columbus paper, but this control on the local level was covert. It should be recalled that Combs was basically of the same political persuasion as Walker. Table 6.2 shows the summary of the 1962, 1964, and 1966 results presented in chapters five and six (see Fig. A for graphic representation). In total, the Republicans received 54% of the "unfavorable" statements and 63% of the "favorable" statements. The Democrats, though not far behind in "unfavorable" statements lag far behind in "favorable" statements. And had it not been for the "Goldwaterism" of the 1964 campaign, the "favorable" figures would probably have been even more in favor of the
<table>
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**CLASSIFICATION/PARTY PERCENTAGES**

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<th>% OF TOTAL</th>
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<tr>
<td>Unfavorable</td>
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<td>46%</td>
<td>(100%) 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>59%</td>
<td>(100%) 30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Favorable</td>
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<tr>
<td>$C_{f,u}$</td>
<td>0.167</td>
<td>0.058</td>
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* The Columbus Call & Post was not published until May 1962.


Figure A
Republicans (see Figures B and C).

After the Columbus paper had gained the support of the Black community around the end of 1964, the greater community (including some elements within the power structure) began to realize the power of the Columbus paper as a spokesman for the Black community. Amos Lynch, the general manager, was soon recognized as having substantial influence within the Black community. Having gained the support of the community, the paper then had to retain this support by remaining a "community-oriented" newspaper. The means by which the paper gained the support of the Black community in the first place had to be continued. Furthermore, the paper had to maintain, as best it could, the policy of "equality to party." Finally, the Columbus paper had to become flexible to meet the change in the community ideology. The influence of Walker and the Cleveland paper placed quite a burden on Lynch, during these years, to maintain this policy.

**Republican**

**Democrat**

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* Columbus Call & Post did not begin publishing until mid-May of 1962.

* Indicates coders found no favorable statements for issue read in this month.

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Figure B
THE NUMBER OF "UNFAVORABLE" STATEMENTS
CONCERNING THE TWO MAJOR POLITICAL
PARTIES AS CODED FROM SAMPLES OF THE
COLUMBUS CALL & POST NEWSPAPER
1962, 1964, AND 1966

NO. OF UNFAVORABLE STATEMENTS

* COLUMBUS CALL & POST DID NOT BEGIN PUBLISHING UNTIL MID-MAY OF 1962.
* INDICATES CODERS FOUND NO UNFAVORABLE STATEMENTS FOR THE ISSUE READ FOR THIS MONTH.
END NOTES

1. Except for the advertisement on the 1962 Rhodes campaign, the author found scant paid political advertisement for the white candidates, both Democrat and Republican. It must also be noted that these were off-election years.

2. Combs relates that today the Columbus paper has a "tremendous" circulation among whites. Again, however, this is difficult to measure.

3. Combs interview.

4. Lynch interview. Trent Sickles interview, September 22, 1975, Columbus, Ohio. Sickles did not recall the specific meetings in which Lynch took part, but he does recall Lynch as being active in these meetings.

5. Lynch, Jones, Woodward, and Rosemond interviews. The most the author could gather from all these interviews was that the meetings were productive, clandestine, and lasted for about three years from 1966 through 1969. At least these four Blacks were members of the "32 Group."

6. The financial support data on advertising were not made available to the author.


"White Home Owners Organize to Off-Set Panic Selling Tactics" (Columbus Call & Post, July 10, 1965), p. 1.


See "Burned Out Eastside Family in Dire Need of Assistance," and "Community Responds Generously to Needs of Burned Out Family" (Columbus Call & Post, February 27 and March 6, 1965, respectively), p. 1.

See "Bleak Christmas Faces Slain Father's Six Helpless Infants," and "Residents Open Hearts to Widowed Mom of 6" (Columbus Call & Post, December 18 and 25, 1965 respectively), p. 1.

"Principal's Clash With Girl, 15, Draws Ire of Community" (Columbus Call & Post, October 2, 1965), p. 1.

The Columbus Call & Post, of course, gave support through content to other issues. See for example the following articles. "Zebbs Levels Blast at [Federal] Poverty Project Plans" (Columbus Call & Post, September 4, 1965), p. 1; "NAACP Picks Auto Dealers As No. 1 Selective Buying Target," (Columbus Call & Post, November 6, 1965), p. 1; and "Baptist Ministers Back Selective Buying Drive" (Columbus Call & Post, November 13, 1965), p. 1.

See both "Rights Leaders Prod Education Board on De Facto Race Issue," and "Demand Firing of Principal" (Columbus Call & Post, September 25, and October 9, 1965, respectively), pp. 1.


"School Board Foiled Rights Leaders; Creates Powerless Advisory Council" (Columbus Call & Post, December 11, 1965), p. 1.

See "NAACP President Flags Call & Post Editorial" (Columbus Call & Post, December 11, 1965), p. 1.

"CORE Set to Block Federal Aid" (Columbus Call & Post, January 8, 1966), p. 1.

"CORE Thumbs Nose at IEC Appointments" (Columbus Call & Post, February 26, 1966), p. 1.

"Where Do We Go from Here" (Columbus Call & Post, September 24, 1966), p. 5B.

The August and September 1966 issues are perhaps the best examples of this difference in the local versus the Cleveland aspects of the paper.

"LBJ Rebukes Irresponsible Marchers" (Columbus Call & Post, August 27, 1966), 4B.

See the following Columbus Call & Post articles. "& Leaders Denounce Black Power," October 22, 1966, p. 1; "NAACP President Challenges Zebbs to Count Black Power Advocates," October 29, 1966, p. 3A; and "Black Power Denouncers Have Nothing to Say," November 5, 1966, p. 5B.


"NAACP Orders YOC Probe, Job Bias Charged" (Columbus Call & Post, March 26, 1966), p. 1.

"NAACP Answers Critic; Renews Attack on OCRC" (Columbus Call & Post, May 7, 1966), p. 1.


32 "Eye Senator's Act with Skepticism" (Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, March 13, 1965), 5B.

33 See "Rhodes Adds 3 Negroes to Ohio Courts," and "Rhodes Orders Negro Job Count on OSU Project" (Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, January 16, and August 28, 1965, respectively), pp. 1.

34 See "The Apportionment Bombshell," and "Reapportionment Plan Upheld" (Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, October 30, and November 6, 1965, respectively), p. 4B.

35 "LBJ-All the Way" (Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, March 20, 1965), p. 1.

36 However, it should be remembered that Stokes ran as an independent for the mayoral post the first time. See "Carl Stokes for Mayor" (Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, October 2, 1965), p. 4B.

37 Lynch interview.

38 Bowen interview.

39 See Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, April 9, 1966, p. 4B.

40 See Columbus \textit{Call \& Post}, p. 6.

41 The author could not tell whether the advertisement was paid or not.
Chapter VII
Conclusions

The author's original contention was that the Columbus paper was begun to serve the needs produced by the increase in the social and political activity within the local Black community beginning in the late 1950s. Until this time, the local Black community had been reluctant to exert any sustained militant pressure against the greater white community for social integration. This conservatism took the form of integration-by-persuasion. However, beginning in the late 1950s, local Blacks began to become more active in the greater community in order to effect social integration. Blacks became more vocal and impatient in expressing their opinions about issues affecting their well being. They began to organize and participate in local party politics as never before. This mood was further enhanced by the liberal policies of the Kennedy-Johnson administrations and by the demonstrations which were occurring in other cities across the country. With this increase in activity came the younger, more militant, leaders who challenged the older method of integrating the community. Local whites too were caught up in this activity, and responded supporting Blacks for political office.

Columbus Blacks needed a responsive newspaper. The Black
community's newspaper could neither adequately help its community interpret information coming into the community, nor could it adequately help the community formulate opinions coming out of the community. The Black community needed a stronger paper during these times of new and emerging ideologies.

The Sentinel's Amos Lynch recognized the need for an effective Black community newspaper. The only practical solution was to establish a local edition of the Cleveland paper. Certain segments of the Black community, however, were reluctant to accept the "out of town" and Republican-oriented newspaper. To make matters more complex, William Walker, the editor-publisher of the Cleveland Call & Post, was just as reluctant to begin another newspaper venture in Columbus, having done so previously without success. Eventually, however, Lynch and co-newspaperman John Combs convinced Walker to start the Columbus edition.

Had Lynch not taken the initiative, the local Black community would probably not have a community newspaper today. The author's original contention as stated at the start of this chapter, was true, but insufficient. Whereas increased social and political activity may have been the impetus for beginning the Columbus paper, the practical reason for the paper's beginning was that Lynch saw the need for it.

The author's basic assumption was that the Columbus paper
gained the support of the Black community because it supported both major parties. The reason proved more complex than that. Lynch and Combs made the Columbus paper the community's paper not only attempting to be fair in supporting both parties but also to be responsive to the community. This meant that the news had to be thorough and comprehensive as well as relevant to the issues facing the Black community. This also meant the paper had to flexible enough to meet the changes from integration to Black nationalism. Once the paper had gained the support of the local Black community, it then had to retain this support by remaining thorough, comprehensive, and responsive to issues facing Blacks in Columbus. It was this responsiveness to the community as much as the paper's attempt to be fair to both political parties which caused the paper to become accepted by local Blacks. Furthermore, even though the paper attempted to be equal to both parties, in reality the Columbus paper gave more support, as measured by "favorable" content, to the Republican party than to the Democrats for the years under study.

As far as control of the Columbus paper is concerned, it appears Walker's policy was final; however, he did give his general managers limited but sufficient managerial responsibilities. He seldom interceded in their running of their papers. The only times he did intercede were when the apparent Walker-Rhodes relationship was concerned as
in the 1962 and 1966 election years. It was this relationship which accounted for much of Walker's Republican sympathies as expressed in the editorials. The author contends that control of the Columbus paper rested ultimately in Cleveland, but that the paper's community-oriented content allows the community share some of this control with Cleveland.
Appendix A

The voter turnout analysis was undertaken to determine whether or not the increase in socio-political activity within the local Black community could be measured in terms of voter turnout for the period under study, viz., 1955 through 1965. Comments from interviews indicated that turnout should show a definite increase especially after 1958.¹

The author originally planned to sample eight of the predominately Black voting wards for this period: Wards 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13, 17, and 30. However, certain obstacles were encountered. First, the ward boundaries changed three times over this period, which meant that comparing individual wards would not be meaningful.² Secondly, population shifts over the period away from the inner city made it impossible to measure Black voter turnout in a fairly stable geographical area. Thirdly, the 1960 census tracts for Columbus, Ohio were incongruent with the voting ward boundaries, which required the author to estimate ward population, and finally have to estimate turnout as a percentage of the total ward population. Turnout had to be estimated because the voting abstracts at the Franklin County Board of Elections are not broken down by race.

For these reasons, the author decided to analyze one of the predominately Black wards in order to determine whether
or not to expand the analysis to include the original eight wards. Ward seven was selected. It had limited boundary change, less population shift, and contained a greater concentration of Blacks when compared to the other seven wards. Moreover, Al Hawkins, Democratic Ward Committeeman for this ward, was a readily reliable resource.

Upon comparing voter turnout data for ward seven with the Black population of voting age within the ward, the author found no significant trend. The "sub-hypothesis" was that voter turnout would increase due to the increase in socio-political activity within the local Black community. Even when controlling for "on" and "off" year elections, the figures reveal no appreciable trend. As a matter of fact, the 5½% average increase in turnout for the 1955 through 1959 period approximates that for the 1960 through 1965 period when it was assumed an increase in voter turnout would occur. Because of these inconclusive results and the apparent lack of a trend, the analysis was not further pursued.

Given the fact that the Seventh Ward averaged better than 9% of the total Black population of Columbus for the period under study, it was considered unlikely that inclusion of all wards for this period would substantially change the above results. The author concluded then that the increase
in socio-political activity as it occurred within the local Black community could not be measured in terms of voter turnout—at least not for the eleven-year span with which this study was concerned. Perhaps expanding the period of analysis from eleven to, say, twenty years and including the remaining predominately Black wards might produce different results. The expansion of the period to be studied would allow for greater political maturation on the part of the ward inhabitants along with allowing for greater numbers and for newer voters to be included in the wards. Expansion of the analysis to include the other predominately Black wards would allow for greater representation of the total Black population of Columbus. This could take the analysis away from its original intent of measuring a geographically stable community to more of an inclusive, conglomerate community. This shift would tend to reduce the local community biases which could influence the results. For example, the low level of change in the present study might be attributed to Ward seven's community feeling of political alienation. At any rate, the analysis was an interesting attempt at quantitatively measuring a difficult concept.
END NOTES

1 See for example Hawkins interview.

2 See attached maps.
Appendix B

Before discussing the actual racial content analysis, a few comments about the technique of content analysis is in order.

Content analysis is a technique for the "objective, systematic, and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication." The process does, however, involve human judgement and therefore may fall short of this definition. That is, because of the human factor, the technique may not be as objective as the researcher may desire. The human factor of subjective perception is present at each stage of the development. The researcher cannot eliminate subjectivity, he can only hope to minimize it.

Budd outlines five "stages of development" in the content analysis technique. As he sees it, the first stage is the formulation of the "research question," or the hypothesis to be tested. The second stage is twofold. The researcher must first select the sample, then define the categories to be used in the analysis. Selecting the sample is clear enough, but defining the categories is not so clear. Categories are "compartments with explicitly defined boundaries into which material [from the communications source] is grouped for analysis." Each category should
be precise and relate to the research question. In the racial analysis, for example, the author's research question was basically how did the local white press treat news about Blacks in the late 1950s. One assumption made was that sports would be treated as a major part of their coverage, so sports became one of the categories to be considered in the analysis (see attached worksheet). Unlike the "general-miscellaneous" category, the sports category was self-explanatory and required no definition. This is not to say that category definitions do not change, for often they do. As a matter fact, definitions are often refined as they are being "coded."  

The third stage in Budd's five stages of content analysis is the coding process. Coding involves discriminating and recording communications content according to selected "units of classification." The unit of classification may be a word, a sentence, a paragraph, or even an article, as in the racial analysis. Here, the coders discriminated between the various articles in the newspapers they read in an effort to determine which articles fit the defined categories. The coders then determined whether each article was "favorable," "neutral," or "unfavorable" according to definitions established for these terms. Finally, the coders had to estimate the number of "column inches" of space taken up by each article. This last step
involving the estimating of column inches is not actually considered a part of the content analysis technique.

The fourth stage in the process is arriving at some score for the information recorded. This is necessary only when a researcher "weights" some aspect of the collected data. For example, if the author had given a value of plus one to favorable articles and a value of minus one to unfavorable articles, some method of scaling these weighted scores would have been necessary. The author chose to give each article in the racial and political party analysis an absolute value of one in order to avoid this step.

Budd's fifth and final stage is interpreting findings according to appropriate concepts and theories. In his research for an analytical tool, the author relied mostly upon simple percentage breakdowns. One tool, however, which proved valuable was the Janis and Fadner "coefficient of imbalance" ($C_{f,u}$). This is simply one numerical representation of the "overall estimate of the degree of imbalance...." The imbalance is simple to compute and takes into account favorable, neutral, and unfavorable statements which made it a useful analytical tool for both the racial and political party analyses. Many of the other tools with which the author came into contact did not consider the neutral statement, or went beyond to consider
more than the three classifications the author was using for his analyses.

The process ends here; however, there are other points which should be mentioned. The first is that consistency should be maintained. Berelson states that coders should "produce the same results when they apply the same set of categories to the same content" even over time. This may be somewhat ambitious, but well-defined categories and precise coding instructions tend to increase consistency. The second point concerns validity. Berelson claims that "in most cases validity does not seem to be a major problem in content analysis....[since] careful definition of categories ...will take care of the matter." The author's categories were, for the most part, self-explanatory; however, the political party analysis did require some explanatory notes (see attachment to Appendix D). Similarly, reliability, or the "repeatability with consistency of results," proved to be a fairly simple matter. The author applied Ole Holsti's formula for reliability to initial data gathered by the coders. Holsti considered a score of 0.75 "too low" for his particular study; the racial analysis score was 0.78.

The third point which should be mentioned is that content analysis does not in itself make for conclusions, but simply aids in reaching conclusions by helping the researcher make inferences about communications data. In sum, "because
each research project is unique, the analyst must adapt, revise, or combine techniques to fit his individual problems."

***

The racial content analysis was performed to determine the amount and the type (by favorable, neutral, and unfavorable classifications) of Black news in the local white press during the late 1950s. One of its objectives was to test the statements made by some interviewees concerning the local white press. The years 1955, 1957, and 1959 were selected because in 1955 and 1959 Columbus had mayoral races. This meant that the newspapers during these years had the potential for containing more politically relevant news in their "news hole" than, say, 1956 or 1958. For this particular analysis, the author held constant obituaries, comics, and paid advertisements.

Randomly selected issues of the Columbus Citizen, the Columbus Dispatch, and the Ohio State Journal were coded according to type or classification, i.e., "favorable," "neutral," and "unfavorable," according to news category, and according to space measured in column inches. The unit used was the "article" rather than the "statement" or "symbol." It was felt mere mention of the word Negro, Black, or "colored" was an insufficient measure, especially since race labeling had been virtually eliminated from the local...
white papers by this time.

Two coders were used to code the newspapers in the sample issues. The author coded approximately 65% of the newspapers, while the other coder coded the remainder. The second coder was a graduate student in education and works as a personnel administrator for a local training center. He is well read and being a native of the city, is quite familiar with the local Black community.

The Holsti formula was used to measure reliability. A score of 0.78 was obtained using the formula below:

$$R = \frac{n \ (C_1 , 2)}{C_1 + C_2}$$

where

- $R$ = reliability
- $C = \text{no. of category assignments agreed upon}$
- $n = \text{no. of coders}$
- $C + C = \text{total no. of category assignments}$

The categories used here were all explicit except for the "general-miscellaneous" which was a composite category for articles concerning crime, accidents, human interes, or other articles not easily associated with the other four categories.

Much consideration was given to what constituted an article. In this analysis an article was condered to be the written statements (including a photo with caption) appearing in the news hole which directly or indirectly concerned Blacks as individuals, groups, or members of the Black community. For
example, a sports article about Roy Campanella, the famous Brooklyn Dodger baseball player, would be coded. According to this definition, articles about school integration would also be coded (see copy of worksheet attached).

The analysis was not without its limitations. For example, not all Blacks were famous; therefore, the coders did not always have a clear-cut method of determining whether a given article was about a Black or not. In such cases, the articles was not coded. Another limitation was the fact that race labeling had stopped by this time for the most part, thus it was even more difficult to determine which articles dealt with Blacks. Again, if there was any doubt, the article was not coded. The only measure to be taken in such instances was for the the coders to be familiar with the local Black community and its influential personalities. The newspapers too on occasion attempted to camouflage their race labeling with substitutes such as "near east side boy" or "Long Street Man." The use of such labeling implies the Black race, but the coders did no code articles on this basis alone. The term Black, Negro, or "colored" was a coding prerequisite.

One final limitation concerns the sample size as referred to in the Introduction. Two coders sampled 36 issues of the Columbus newspapers out of a universe of some 3,100 issues. The author reasoned that since the purpose of the analysis
was to verify statements made by fairly reliable sources, the sample size could be smaller than it would normally be were the analysis simply testing the racial content of the papers alone without any support of knowledgeable interviewees.
END NOTES


3 Budd, p. 39.

4 Berelson, p. 150.

5 Berelson, p. 172.

6 See Berelson, p. 172 for complete definition.

7 Budd, pp. 66-68.

8 Berelson, p. 172.

9 Budd, p. ix.

10 According to Budd, the news hole content is that space in the paper solely committed to news. Budd and Thorpe define it merely as the "part of the newspaper...devoted to news as opposed to advertising." See Budd, p. 37.
Appendix C

GUIDE TO BETTER

CHURCH, CLUB AND SCHOOL NEWS

REPORTING

Ohio's Fastest Growing Weekly

721 EAST LONG STREET

COLUMBUS 3, OHIO

PHONE: 224-8123
What happens when your club meets? Book reports, election of officers, forums, presentation of awards or honors, entertainment, discussion of new projects, passing of resolutions: All these and perhaps more, because a club session can be very boring if members simply "meet."

If those outside your group are to catch the true significance and spirit of meetings, news stories must be full of action, as vivid and alive as the session itself. What is done, not simply the fact you met, is important.

Choose an interesting event to play up in the lead. Whatever happened at the meeting that seldom or never happened before is far more interesting than repeated action. News of society, church and school is intended to appeal to everybody.

Stories appearing before the meeting that tell what is going to happen should follow a similar pattern.

Too little thought and preparation went into this one:

Women's Society of North St. Church will have its regular meeting Thursday, April 10, in the church. Mrs. John Jones will conduct an executive meeting at noon.

Luncheon will be served at 1 p.m. At the 2:30 program, Mrs. James Taylor will review "People in Quandaries." Devotions will be led by Mrs. Kenneth Long. Mrs. Leslie Cole and Mrs. Alvin Streator will be hostesses.

Such a dull and unattractive story does little to stir interest of members or non-members, either. Indeed, with such a commonplace beginning, small wonder it's read at all.

For more punch and interest, why not:

A review of "People in Quandaries," will be given by Mrs. James Taylor when Women's Society of North St. Church meets Thursday, April 10.

--OR--

Hostesses for the Women's Society meeting of North St. Church Thursday, April 10, will be Mrs. Leslie Cole and Mrs. Alvin Streator.

--OR--

Mrs. Kenneth Long, program chairman, will lead devotions when, etc, etc.

To save space, do not list names of members attending club meetings. Give names of visitors and those participating in programs, the presiding officer and hostess(es).
For a special program or other type social gathering, the host and hostess, guests, especially the most prominent ones and those from out of town; members of committees making arrangements, those pouring tea or coffee, those in receiving lines, musicians, entertainers or other acts might be named.

* * * *

Before submitting, check your story for the five W's -- the who, what, why, when and where. Make sure it contains as many of these elements as are present.

The following guides should help you write more readable stories:

1. Give the main facts in the first paragraph. Don't be vague.
2. Tell the essential things and eliminate unnecessary details.
3. Check facts carefully--names, dates, addresses, places. Give correctly first names, middle initials and last names and titles.
4. Direct quotations often add interest to stories but be sure you quote accurately.
5. If at all possible, type copy, triple spaced and number pages. If it must be in longhand, write neatly and legibly in ink, leaving space between lines.

Often, your story will not appear as submitted. Stories must always conform to the individual style of a paper. Often, they must be cut to fit available space. Whatever the reason, basic ideas and most important facts will be preserved.

If your story misses the paper altogether, don't stop sending news. Perhaps it missed the deadline (Monday 12 noon). Or maybe there was an unusual amount of club and social news that week and not enough space for it all. Nevertheless, we would appreciate hearing from all of you and will do our best to publicize events of your group.

Don't forget the news value of good pictures.

Some stories are told most easily and effectively through a good news picture. Try to have subjects doing something. Attention should be focused on a "center of attention" but not the camera. Arrange subjects in such an order as to make identification easy. Be sure to list them in the proper order. As a final precaution, count the names and then the subjects to assure a like number of each.
Glossy prints reproduce best. Deadline is Monday noon but we appreciate having them earlier if possible.

There is NO CHARGE for publishing pictures in the COLUMBUS CALL & POST. Simply call the photographer of your choice, have your picture taken and bring the one(s) you like best to our offices at 721 E. Long St., Columbus, Ohio.

If you are unable to reach a photographer at any time please feel free to call our office and we will refer you to one who is available.

Offices of the COLUMBUS CALL & POST are open daily, Monday through Saturday from 9 a.m. till 5:30 p.m.
Appendix D

The political analysis of the Columbus Call & Post newspaper was performed to determine the political sympathies of the paper for the 1962 through 1966 period. If for example, more "themes" or "statements" were coded in favor of the Republican party, then it could be inferred that the paper was Republican-oriented. The analysis would also show to what degree the newspaper was supportive of either party.

As with the racial content analysis of the local white press, the political content analysis was not as simple as expected. The units to be coded, for example, were sentences rather than articles. It was felt that sentences (statements or themes) would be less time consuming and less tedious. Moreover, it seems as if political writers start an article in one direction, shift to another midway through, then end the article going in another direction. Therefore, the investigator decided to code the sentence as opposed to the article or some other unit.

Defining the parameters for the sentence for this analysis was as much a problem as was defining the article in the racial content analysis. The investigator was mainly concerned with what the paper had to say rather than with what the syndicated columnists or news service writers had to say. The editor can at his discretion elect not to incorporate such items into the paper. Therefore, the analysis included
syndicated and wire service statements, but each was coded "neutral" as opposed to being discarded completely (see attached worksheet).

The sentence had other restrictions. For example, it had to be "in the paper's own words." This means direct quotations in the articles were not coded, but statements interpreted by the Columbus paper were coded. Most statements that were coded were noun clauses.

The actual classification of statements as "favorable," "neutral," or "unfavorable" was perhaps the most perplexing problem in this analysis. With the exception of coding symbols, it is next to impossible to code without subjectivity. The coder can only be consistent; human error can be reduced but not eradicated. When instructing the two coders on how to code sentences, the investigator realized the built-in biases in this second analysis. One of the coders was the same coder used in the racial content analysis. He would probably carry over the biases he learned from the previous racial content analysis. The new coder was a white female undergraduate student from a middle income rural family. No doubt she had her own ideas about classification of statements as "favorable" or "unfavorable." The investigator had sacrificed reliability for objectivity in coding the statements. The reliability score dropped from 0.78 in the racial analysis to 0.71 in the political analysis, which was barely tolerable.
Though not actually a limitation, choosing an analytical tool for the political analysis was a problem. The investigator, being unaware of many statistical tools at his disposal, groped for a tool before deciding upon the Janis and Fadner "coefficient of imbalance." As explained by Budd, the coefficient of imbalance "pertains to the extent of differences in the ratios of 'favorable,' 'neutral,' and 'unfavorable' material accorded to the topic or symbol under analysis...."¹

The coefficient of imbalance has several characteristics according to Budd and Berelson. The investigator has listed those characteristics Budd considers most important: The coefficient of imbalance will always:

...increase in the positive direction when the frequency of units (statements, articles, etc.) of favorable content increases.

...increase in the negative direction when the frequency of units of unfavorable content increases.

...[be] equal to zero if the number of units of favorable content are equal to the number of units of unfavorable content.

The formula is simple to compute:

\[ C_f = \frac{f^2 - fu}{rt} \], when \( f \) (favorable) > \( u \) (unfavorable)

\[ Cu = \frac{fu - u^2}{rt} \], when \( f < u \)

\( r \) is relative content, = total "\( f \)" plus total "\( u \)"

\( t \) is total content, = total "\( f \)" plus total "\( u \)" plus total "neutral."

157
Berelson discusses the coefficient of imbalance formula, but seems to adhere to the simpler analytical tools of content analysis.

1 Budd, p. 55.
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<th>Newspaper</th>
<th>Unit of Classification</th>
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| Issue_____ Special Yes___ No___ |
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**Code Reference Notes:**

Favorable content denotes qualified and unqualified supportive statements:

1. Use of proper party name in a positive or supportive nature.
2. Use of party nickname, e.g., GOP, or symbols in a positive or supportive nature.
4. Endorsement of a party candidate or incumbent for (re-) election.
5. Approval or support of a party platform.
6. Support for a known personality affiliated with either party.

Unfavorable content denotes qualified and unqualified nonsupportive statements:

1. Use of party name in a negative or nonsupportive nature.
2. Use of party nickname or symbol in a negative or nonsupportive nature.
3. Not supporting party office holder on an issue.
4. Not endorsing a party candidate or incumbent for (re-) election.
5. Not approving or supporting a party platform.
6. Not supporting a known personality affiliated with either party.

Neutral content is that statement is neither favorable or unfavorable, or which contains an equal proportion of both categories.
Essay on Sources

As mentioned in the introduction, there is little secondary information on the local Black press. The history of such bygone Black newspapers as the Columbus Record, the Columbus Torch, and the Columbus Voice, and the Ohio State Monitor is fragmentary where existent at all. The sources for the more recent Black press are the minds of the individuals who published and edited the Columbus, Ohio Sentinel, the Ohio State News, and the Columbus Advocate. Lacking this printed information the author had to seek out these individuals and record from interviews with them information about the local Black press and the Columbus community.

Though there is a dearth of sources on the Black press and an even worse situation regarding sources on the local Black press, some information about the Black press in general is available. The researcher must identify what he needs to know and who possesses this information, then interview that person. This is in fact what the author had to do. From all of the sundry sources about the Black press available to him, he had to formulate questions and identify who might have the answers to these questions. Oftentimes the author had to ask one interviewee to refer him to another person who would possibly have answers to other questions. In this way the author was able to re-construct (as best he could) the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Columbus paper.
Of the seventeen interviews conducted by the author, the ones which were most informative regarding the local Black press and the local Black community were conducted with Amos Lynch, John Combs, the Reverend Russell Jones and Arthur Zebbs, Al Hawkins, Fugate Page, and Llewellyn Coles. The other interviewees were informative but served mostly to clarify points of a more specific nature. For example, the Dr. John Rosemond and Jeanne Woodward interviews were conducted to find out why Blacks began to seek political office in greater numbers in 1964 than they had previously. Each gave his specific reasons, but it was the Hawkins and Page interviews which gave more comprehensive reasons as to why this occurred. The Jones and Zebbs interviews gave the author insight into the local socio-political movements of which these two ministers were so much a part in the early 1960s. The Coles interview gave the author background information about not only the local Black press but about the "conservatism" of the Black and white segments of Columbus. By far the most informative interviews were those with Lynch and Combs. Combs possesses a wealth of knowledge about state politics especially as it relates to Blacks. It was he and Page who helped to give balance to the overwhelming Democratic-oriented information which the author was being given. Lynch possessed extensive knowledge of the local Black press and its relationship to Columbus. From the information obtained from Lynch, Combs, and Coles, the author could draw a fair picture of the local Black press and its relationship
to Columbus. From information obtained from these men and the
other interviewees, the author was able to piece together an
account of the social and political circumstances surrounding
the establishment of the Columbus paper.

Reading the newspapers of the period proved to be helpful in
supplementing information drawn from the interviews. The
author read each issue of the Columbus paper for the years
1962 through 1966. The author and another reader perused the
1962, 1964, and 1966 issues in order to analyze their political
content. The author also read selected issues of the local
dailies over the 1955-1961 period; however, this provided little
information about Blacks beyond that which was found in the
racial content analysis of the late 1950s. Certain issues
of the Columbus Challenger, which was the only other Black
newspaper besides the Columbus paper published in Columbus
between 1963 and 1968, were read but were of limited value
to the author. Its content, according to this author, did
not concern itself with the social or political issues of the
era in an objective manner.

Because of the lack of secondary source material, the author
had to rely upon whatever materials about the Black press
available. This explains why there are so many older sources
listed in the bibliography. The author was endeavoring to
piece together from these works sufficient information with
which to form questions and identify potential interviewees.
Most of these covered both the history and contemporary condition of Black journalism. However, except for H. G. LaBries' reference work, *The Black Press in America* and Dr. H. A. Ploski's reference work the *Reference Library of Black America; Book III*, there is no mention of the Columbus paper and only a few books mention the Cleveland paper (see bibliography). Roland Wolseley's *The Black Press USA* (see bibliography) goes into about as much detail on the Cleveland paper as is available in any of the other works on the subject.

There are several excellent sources on the Black press in general. I. Garland Penn's *The Afro-American Press and Its Editors* (see bibliography) is of course a standard for information on the 19th century Black press. This can be supplemented with Martin E. Dann's *The Black Press, 1827-1890* (see bibliography), another good source. Dann in one instance compares political necessity of the Black press of the 19th century to the political necessity of the Black press of today:

> From the very beginning, black people saw politics as the mechanism by which they might achieve equality. No other subject raised such controversies among black editors....

> The heritage of the black political experiences as reflected in the press may be seen as a dichotomy between the failure of the political institutions to include black people....

Frederick Deitweiler's *The Negro Press in the United States* is a standard work for the 1920s. The author could not locate any published works on the Black press during the 1930s. Another
standard is Vishnu V. Oak's *The Negro Newspaper* (see bibliography). Oak's work is one of the best sources for the Black press during the 1940s. Going into the 1950s, Brook's *The Negro Press Re-Examined* (see bibliography) is one of the best sources. Its content analysis of five Black newspapers is both thorough and comprehensive. Researchers would do well to consult his bibliography when beginning studies on the Black press for this period. The author could find no comprehensive study on the Black press during the 1960s. Jack Lyle's *The Black American and the Press* contains several notable articles (see bibliography). For the 1970s, Wolseley's *The Black Press, USA* has already been mentioned. Henry LaBrie's *The Black Press in America: A Guide*, 2nd ed., is a good reference book for Black newspapers as is Armistead S. Pride's *The Black Press: a Bibliography*, a slightly older work (see bibliography).

There are several good unpublished sources dealing with the Black press. To fill the void in published works about the Black press in the 1930s, a researcher might want to read Rhoda Irving's "Advertising in Negro Newspapers" and Maxwell Brook's "A Sociological Interpretation of the Negro Newspaper" (see bibliography). Two excellent studies are Richard Kerckhoff's "Negro News in the Daily Press" and Alexander Washington's "Growth and Influence of the Negro Press in the United States with Emphasis on the Period Since 1921" (see bibliography).
It was Kerckhoff's work which encouraged the author to pursue his racial content analysis of the local dailies in this study.

With the exception of the Crisis article, "Cleveland's Call & Post" and Armistead Pride's "The Negro Newspaper in the United State," the articles read were of insufficient detail to be of any historical consequence (see bibliography). However, most of the articles read dealt with the content analyses portions of this study. These articles were read to see if they would help the author in his own content analysis. Both the John Windhauser article, "Content Pattern of Editorials in Ohio Metropolitan Dailies," and the Granville Price article, "A Method of Analyzing Newspaper Campaign Coverage," were helpful in this respect (see bibliography).

The book most helpful in the content analysis portions of the paper was Budd's Content Analysis of Communications (see bibliography). Berelson's Content Analysis did not go far enough in explaining the details of such an analysis, while the North book, Content Analysis, A Handbook with Application for the Study of International Crisis, presented more of an overview and failed to elaborate on many points (see bibliography).

In helping the author to analyze his data, Dornbusch's A Primer of Social Statistics proved to be invaluable, even though it is somewhat dated.

END NOTES

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Books


Books (cont.)


Oak, V. V. The Negro Newspaper. Westport, Conn.: Negro University Press, 1948.


Articles, Addresses, and Essays


Articles, Addresses, and Essays (cont.)

"Cleveland's Call and Post," Crisis, XLV, (Dec., 1938), pp. 391, 404.


Articles, Addresses, and Essays (cont.)


Unpublished Theses and Dissertations


Personal Interviews Conducted

Nimrod Allen, Former Exec. Dir. of the Columbus Urban League, September 20, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Harvey Alston, Former Police Inspector and City Councilman, September 22, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Attorney John Bowen, Former State Senator, September 25, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Ila Bowser, Active member of the Columbus Urban League Guild, September 22, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

John Combs, Political Editor for the Columbus Call & Post, September 13, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Llewellyn Coles, Administrative Asst. to the Governor James Rhodes of Ohio, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Barbee Durham, Former Exec. Secretary of the Columbus Branch NAACP, September 15, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Albert Hawkins, Democratic Ward Committeeman for the Seventh Ward and past Vice-chairman of the Franklin County Democratic Party, September 27, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Rev. Russell M. Jones, Former Columbus City Councilman, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Amos Lynch, General Manager of the Columbus Call & Post, September 18, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Fugate Page, Former Ward Committeeman for the Seventh Ward, September 21, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Dr. John Rosemond, Member Columbus City Council, September 16, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

William Savoy, Former Dean of the West Va. State College and local businessman, September 24, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Trent Sickles, Former Assistant to the Chairman of the F. & R. Lazarus Company, September 22, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

William O. Walker, Editor-Publisher for the Call & Post newspapers, August 22, 1975, Cleveland, Ohio.

Jeannine Woodward, Former candidate for State Representative, September 16, 1975, Columbus, Ohio.

Rev. Arthur Zebbs, Former Director of the Columbus Chapter of CORE and present Director of Black Studies at Dennison University, September 25, 1975, Granville, Ohio.
Select and Random Content from the Following Newspapers

The Columbus Call & Post.
The Columbus Challenger.
The Columbus Citizen-Journal, including the former Columbus Citizen.
The Columbus Dispatch.
The Cleveland Call & Post.
The Ohio State Journal, (merged with the Columbus Citizen in December of 1959 to form the Columbus Citizen-Journal).