STRUCTURALISM/HUMANISM: JANUSZ SŁAWIŃSKI
AND POLISH LITERARY Methodology

DISSERTATION

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* * * * *

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1981
Dedicated to the memory of Jurand Banach (1950-1980), a humanist scholar in the best sense of the word. Without his help, encouragement and guidance this study could never have been written. May some of his intelligence and wit live on in the words of the study it helped to produce as it does in the memory of those who knew him.

Tales sunt hominum mentes, quali pater ipse Juppiter auctiferas lustravit lumine terras.
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INTRODUCTION

This study is designed to introduce the American reader to the literary scholarship of a Polish theoretician and methodologist, Janusz Sławiński. Since the background of Sławiński's work is described in Part I, Chapters III and IV and his general view of literature and literary scholarship in Part III, Chapters IV and V and in the Conclusion, I will not describe them here. Instead, I will address the question of why his work has remained virtually unknown in the United States in spite of the fact that a volume of his articles has been published in Germany¹ and that he is generally recognized within Poland as probably the leading literary theoretician in the country.

The most obvious answer would be that American scholarship simply does not concern itself with theoretical developments within Polish literary scholarship. This is probably a true statement. It does not, however, explain why Polish scholars such as Stefan Żółkiewski, Maria Renata Mayenowa and Michał Głowiński, who works in the same workshop with Sławiński, are, at least among American Slavists,² relatively well-known. There are, in my opinion, two reasons why the value of Sławiński's work has not been appreciated: 1) He has never gathered all of his thoughts

¹

²
on literature into the type of synthetic work which would make his name known in the West; and 2) He is perhaps a more original and uniquely Polish theoretical thinker than the scholars mentioned above.

This statement is not meant to degrade the value of the research of Żółkiewski, Mayenowa and Głowiński but rather to suggest that they become known in the West because they fit into the well-established paradigms of Western, particularly of American, literary scholarship. ³ Żółkiewski and Mayenowa are affiliated with what I have called Slavic linguistic structuralism. (The term is explained on p. 58.) Głowiński speaks fluent French and, before he lost his right to travel overseas because of his affiliation with the underground university, ⁴ spent some time in France. He, therefore, writes in a style and deals with problems which are easily understood by an audience familiar with French structuralism.

Janusz Sławiński's literary scholarship on the other hand has been shaped by three unavoidable realities of the intellectual life of his generation. The first of these is what I have euphemistically called the "Stalinist episode" and somewhat more polemically the Stalinist logos. For a scholar like Sławiński, who began his career in the mid-1950's, Stalinist Marxism was a reality of everyday life. He, therefore, has concerned himself with problems which may on first glance seem Marxist to the Westerner.
I have described his sociology of literature in Part III, Chapter IV. In Part II, Chapter II I have, in order to prepare the reader for that discussion, argued for the general usefulness of a social history or sociology of literature to any contemporary literary scholarship. I have done so because it is my impression that most American Slavists, reject on principle the very idea of a sociology of literature. Those scholars should be advised that Sławiński's sociology does not represent the type of literary scholarship which the term "sociology" suggests to the American reader.

The second pervasive influence on Polish literary scholarship is the phenomenology of literature developed by Roman Ingarden in the 1930's. Ingarden's work is discussed in Chapter II of Part III. Every Polish scholar has at least some familiarity with Ingarden's general terminology, and he has probably influenced even those who have outwardly rejected his larger philosophy of literature. The artistic philosopher Witold Gombrowicz has had an equally pervasive influence within Poland. Gombrowicz introduced into Polish intellectual life a jocular tone and a self-irony which have proven useful in weathering the earlier Stalinist and continuing party domination of the mass institutions and media. Western scholars would call Gombrowicz's view of life existentialist.
Marxism, phenomenology and a joking, ironic existentialism have provided the methods, sets of problems, and vocabularies which Janusz Sławiński has combined with the general terminology and concerns of structuralist literary scholarship to produce a body of thought which is both original and hard to understand for the American reader. For that reason, I came to the conclusion while preparing this study that a simple exposition and further development of Sławiński's views would both seem unnecessarily abstruse and prove incomprehensible to the American reader. The necessary terminology would probably seem superfluous. I have, therefore, in addition to describing the general historical background of his scholarship, spent some time in the study showing why the scholarly paradigms on whose basis we have ignored Sławiński's thought are not as stable as we might think. I have devoted the end of the first part, most of the second part, and the beginning of the third part of the study to an analysis, regrettably superficial, of some of the limitations of the projective method which is at the basis of those paradigms. This discussion will provide the reader with some of the background necessary to understand Sławiński's own point of view. Most of the seeming complexity of his thought is caused by his direct treatment of the role which consciousness plays both in literature and in literary scholarship. This
emphasis on consciousness is a result of his attempt to overcome what he sees as the limitations inherent in the use of the projective method in literary scholarship.

In keeping with Sławiński's belief that scholarship should be a dialogue rather than a recording of facts observed in external reality, I have from time to time asked the reader to think along with me, particularly when I reached a problem to which we, or at least I, do not know the answer. I have tried to indicate both what in this study is personal opinion and where I have my own doubts about the ultimate validity of the position which I have taken. It seems to me that this procedure is necessary when discussing a scholarly movement like structuralism, which, although it may now call itself post-structuralism in France, is still in the process of developing. (This is certainly the case in the Slavic countries and probably in France as well.)

One of the underlying themes of this study is the relationship between the humanist and the scientist, particularly in contemporary society. In order to raise that issue at the start of the study, I should like to begin with two passages which concern both the value of the humanities, the arts and old books and our relations with the traditions of our past. I should also like to pose at the start of the study a deceptively simple question: How
absolute is the difference between the "common man" and the intellectual, the poet and the scholar, the humanist and the scientist?

For those who write learnedly to be criticized by a few scholars, not even ruling out a Persius or a Laelius as a judge, seem to be more pitiable than happy to me, simply because they are continuously torturing themselves. They add, they alter, they cross something out, they reinsert it, they recopy their work, they rearrange it, they show it to friends, and they keep it for nine years; yet they still are not satisfied with it. At such a price, they buy an empty reward, namely praise—and the praise of only a handful, at that. They buy this at the great expense of long hours, no sleep, so much sweat, and so many vexations. Add also the loss of health, the deterioration of their physical appearance, the possibility of blindness or partial loss of their sight, poverty, malice, premature old age, an early death, and if you can think of more, add them to this list. The scholar feels that the has been compensated for such ills when he wins the sanction of one or two other weak-eyed scholars.

Erasmus, *The Praise of Folly* 6

In short, he so buried himself in his books that he spent the nights reading from twilight till daybreak and the days from dawn till dark; and so from little sleep and much reading, his brain dried up and he lost his wits. He filled his mind with all that he read in them, with enchantments, quarrels, battles, challenges, wounds, wooings, loves, torments and other impossible nonsense, and so deeply did he steep his imagination in the belief that all the fanciful stuff he read was true that to his mind no history in the world was more authentic...
In fact, now that he had utterly wrecked his reason he fell into the strangest fancy that ever a madman had in the whole world. He thought it fit and proper, both in order to increase his renown and to serve the state, to turn knight errant and travel through the world with horse and armour in search of adventures...and so, carried away by the strange pleasure he derived from these agreeable thoughts, he hastened to translate his desires into action.

The first thing that he did was to clean some armour which had belonged to his ancestors...

Miguel de Cervantes, *Don Quixote*
NOTES: INTRODUCTION

1

2
The work of Stefan Żółkiewski and Maria Renata Mayenowa is discussed in Part I, Chapter II. Michał Głowinski's work is described in general terms in Part I, Chapter III.

3
The concept of a scholarly paradigm is described in Part I, pp.

4
Michał Głowinski is one of the original signatories of the declaration of the society of scholarly courses (Towarzystwo Kursów Naukowych) which was formed by Polish intellectuals to discuss subjects which cannot be discussed in the official media and institutions. The declaration was dated January 22, 1978.

5
Structuralism has always had some association with avant-garde movements in the arts and with romanticism. Perhaps we should not be misled by the avant-garde's habit of renaming itself every year. Many of the basic concerns and methods remain the same.

6

7
PART I

THE BASIC PRINCIPLES AND SUBJECT OF THE STUDY

When a man has finally reached the point where he does not think he knows it better than others, that is when he has become indifferent to what they have done badly and he is interested only in what they have done right, then peace and affirmation have come to him.

Hegel\(^1\)
CHAPTER I

POLISH COMPLEX

The report of Professor Jerzy Kmita has expressively documented the present situation of the methodology of scholarship. It has become a separate discipline. It enjoys almost complete autonomy. It develops "autotelically". It does not supply the individual scholarships with either theoretical principles or with instruments which could be put to practical use; it supplies them only to itself.

Roman Zimand, Polish Literary Historian, speaking at a conference on literary methodology held from November 18-22, 1974.

Colleague Mencwel has caught the deep structure of my report. That's just what I am concerned with—with leading the his historian of literature into a state of regained innocence.

Janusz Sławinski, Polish literary theoretician and methodologist, at the same conference.

"Why should members of the American reading public, be they average citizens, literary critics or even Slavists, concern themselves with a dispute over the usefulness of methodology in literary scholarship, especially when that dispute took place among virtually unknown scholars at a
conference which few have ever heard of and in an Eastern European country which, due to historical circumstances, lacks the freedom of speech and enormous resources which American scholarship possesses? There is in our Departments of English and Comparative Literature a fully developed literary criticism which has followed an uninterrupted line of development from the days of the Greeks and is now able to look back with pride at the accumulated knowledge and methods of centuries of Western thought. There has been some controversy over methods recently and enrollments have been declining in the humanities, but history will show these to have been ephemeral events. Feminism, Marxism, Structuralism, post-structuralism and deconstructionism will also soon go away and the tradition will be able to continue with its slightly delayed but uninterrupted development.

"Eastern European literature, philosophy and culture are the result of peculiarly Eastern European circumstances and, with the exception of the Russian authors Turgenev, Dostoevsky, Tolstoy and Chekhov, who were under Western influence, there is little which is directly applicable to Western reality. The same is true of Eastern European scholarship, with the exception of the work of the Russian Formalists, who sketched out some of the ideas later independently and more fully developed by Anglo-American New
Criticism,\textsuperscript{8} and of the linguistic and literary research of the Prague Circle which latered flowered into French Structuralism.\textsuperscript{9} This same scholarship has also reappeared in the Soviet Union itself in the form of the semiotic scholarship practiced by Jurij Lotman, Boris Uspenskij and others in Tartu and in Moscow.\textsuperscript{10} What remains is an example largely of how men and women working under an oppressive system managed nevertheless to assert the dignity and freedom of man and art. It is to be read for inspiration and with a kind of secret delight in the superiority of our own society.\textsuperscript{11}

I may have overstated the case somewhat, but it seems to me that this is likely to be the reaction of an American reader when first confronted by this study. He might continue, "One more methodology? One more --ism? And now a Polish one? Why should I read about it when it is probably drawn from Western or other Slavic sources and will necessarily reflect the limitations of research in a Soviet-dominated state?" It is an awareness of the likelihood of such a reaction which is beneath what Tadeusz Knowicki, in the novel which gave this section its title, has called the "polish complex".\textsuperscript{12}

In \textit{Polish Complex} Konwicki's narrator expresses his feelings about the Western attitude in a number of places. I will quote three of them. In the first he expresses his
resentment at being treated as a symbol of a liberty he
does not have.

It's true that in brief instants of nobility you lifted us up on your hands as symbols of liberty (swoboda) but on the day after you expelled us from your satiated (well-fed) countries which honor freedom (wolność) in word and print. ...Give us a chance, dammit, to get a whiff of that freedom.13

In the second he wonders how he has been turned from a cosmopolitan citizen of the world into an angry provincial.

How has it happened that I am an author of Polish books, bad or good but Polish? Why have I accepted the role which I had refused ages ago? Who (has turned) me, an Esperantist, a cosmopolitan, an agent of the alien kingdom of the Universality of Fates, who has turned me, as in an evil fairy tale into a contentious, dark, furious Polak?14

In the third his resentment and wonder burst into a threat.

Therefore, a citizen of the familiar, stable, sleepy societies which have fallen into a stupor from lazy grazing is not in a position to understand my everyday realities, my normal morning thoughts and my evening despairs, the chemistry of my brain and the physical structures of my soul. And for that reason he says that I am incomprehensible...and I become embarrassed, I explain (myself), I excuse (myself) until that instant when exasperated I shall say, Thank God that you do not understand me, and pray daily that you will not understand me for as long as possible because in the end you will have to understand me...when (the time) comes for you to share my fate...15
CHAPTER II

THE GENERAL HISTORY AND BREADTH OF CONTEMPORARY
POLISH LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP

The "fate" which Konwicki is talking about is, among others, the virtual destruction of the material and economic base of Polish culture and society during the Second World War and the resulting reoccupation of the country by the Russian, now Soviet, state. The entire issue of German, Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian and Russian relations is not only extremely complex but highly emotional as well. Since this is a study of literary scholarship, I am only going to concern myself with the effect which this "fate" had on literary scholarship.

In 1935 in Lwów a scholarly congress ostensibly devoted to the work of the eighteenth century Polish poet Ignacy Krasicki broke out into a lively methodological discussion. A variety of approaches were represented. Juliusz Kleiner defended the version of Geisteswissenschaft which he had been practicing for some time. Manfred Kridl argued the case for Formalism as he understood it. Julian Krzyżanowski argued for the importance of studying the relationship between folklore and literature.
Ingarden asserted that literary scholarship could not begin until the question of how and whether the literary work can be known was resolved and then proposed a phenomenology which was designed to establish the possibility of such knowledge. 20 Konrad Górski insisted on the importance which the philosophy of a work has in shaping its form. 21 Stefania Skwarczyńska presented an early version of her theory of geneology. 22

A full discussion of the details of these arguments would exceed the scope of this study. This is unfortunate because there is a real need for a comprehensive history of Twentieth and also Nineteenth century Slavic and Baltic literary scholarship if we are to remove some of the distortions caused by attempting to find in the nineteenth century the causes and in the twentieth century the results of the Formalist-Marxist dispute which took place in Russian scholarship in the 1920's. 23 In this study I am going to deal with some of these distortions on a methodological level. However, my study is only a beginning and is not a substitute for the extensive historical research which is required if that dispute is finally going to be placed in its proper historical perspective so that we can gain a fuller awareness of the true variety of Slavic and Eastern European scholarship during the last two hundred years. 24
The importance of the 1935 conference lies in the fact that it reveals the variety of approaches and awareness of Western European research which were present in Polish literary scholarship during the years between the two World Wars.25 The Polish scholarship which emerged after the death of Stalin did not simply import foreign methods. It was based on a fully established scholarly tradition and on a literary culture which date back to the Renaissance.26 The same is true to varying degrees of other Eastern European cultures. This is something which Western scholarship often forgets when it views Eastern Europe as a monolithic culture dominated by Soviet thought.

Konrad Górski has asserted that Polish scholarship in 1939 was indeed marked by disagreement over methods but that there was a general consensus that the literary work as an artistic creation was the proper object of study, that form and content must be studied in relation to each other and that both biographical and historical study are useful as long as they are based on an awareness of the nature of the artistic work. Furthermore, the evaluation and propagation of works was possible but should be done outside of the boundaries of scholarship.27

This "traditional" literary scholarship was destroyed physically by the Second World War and the ensuing Soviet occupation.28 Czesław Miłosz has described some of the
effects of these changes on Polish intellectuals in his essay *The Captive Mind*. The results for literary scholarship were probably inevitable, especially after the installation of a Stalinist regime in 1949. At a conference of Polonists (the Polish equivalent of English teachers and scholars in the United States) held from May 8-12, 1950 a new Soviet Marxist literary scholarship was forcibly introduced by those who were in control of the political and social institutions of the country. The tone and achievements of that conference were summarized by its organizers in the following passage:

The congress of Polonists has brought about important ideological and scholarly (naukowy may mean 'scientific' here) gains. In accordance with the tasks established by the work before the congress it carried out a detailed evaluation of Polish writings on literature and history. It defined the ideological (ideowe), methodological and organizational foundations of future research. It sketched out their concrete plan.

The congress enriched and deepened the ideological battle which has been in progress for five years on the terrain of our Polonistics and ended its first stage. Today we already know what from the tradition of Polish literary scholarship must be thrown out and what must be undertaken; we have a (fully) outlined conception of future investigations. The congress was the terrain for ideological clashes on theoretical and historical subjects. It laid bare the ideological composition of our Polonistics. It revealed two distinct camps: the idealist and the Marxist. It revealed how idealism is connected with social reactionism and how materialist scholarship serves life, serves the construction of socialism.
The ideological struggle at the congress demonstrated (unaozníta, the Polish word has a sense of "confrontation" rather than a simple demonstration) to all participants the revolutionary role of the Marxist-Leninist method in the development of literary scholarship. The congress convinced the majority of the participants about the superiority of the Marxist method. The position of the opponents of Marxism was on the other hand defensive and eclectic. They endeavored to suggest that in literary research the use of many methods is possible. They sought a compromise between the idealist method and the Marxist method.

The discussion at the conference clearly revealed that in scholarship there are no compromises. The reports and the discussion, struggling with all forms of the vulgarization and confinement of Marxist research, revealed the broad range of the problematics of Marxist literary scholarship. Within the circle of this problematics every honest researcher will find a terrain of work for his individual concerns, aesthetic, historical, psychological, etc.31

As this passage suggests, an attempt was made to bring all literary research under the control of a single, centrally controlled and socially approved methodology. Stefan Żółkiewski, as institutional and intellectual spokesman for Marxism, was actively involved in this attempt.32 The Marxist purpose was not only to change the methodology of literary scholarship but also to organize Polonistics in a manner which would allow all of its resources to be devoted to the social transformation of the country. It was to accelerate this transformation that the institute of Literary Research had been founded in Warsaw in 1948 to provide an institutional alternative to the more
traditional "idealistic-eclectic" scholarship of the universities. Žółkiewski summarized the assumptions of the new scholarship in two publications, The Old and the New Literary Scholarship which appeared in December of 1950 and Researches on Polish Literature, subtitled "On the occasion of the First (italics mine) Congress of Polish Scholarship," which appeared in 1951. These works are more indicative of their time than of the current position of Žółkiewski, who has since outlined a more limited area of research which he calls "literary culture" and has provided institutional support within his "Workshop of Literary Culture" for much important work.

It is important to remember that even during this period Polish scholarship was not as monolithic as it might appear from a distance. Henryk Markiewicz, for example, embraced Marxism with a great deal more restraint than Žółkiewski and insisted both on its contradictions and on the limitations of its current methodology. In 1954 Stefania Skwarczynska published the first two volumes (a third was added in 1965) of her Introduction to Literary Scholarship in which she develops her genealogical theory of literature. Maria Renata Mayenowa and Maria Dłuska continued the work of Franciszek Siedlecki on problems of versification and artistic language viewed from a perspective similar to that of the Russian Formalists and
structuralists. Kazimierz Budzyk, also under the influence of Siedlecki, made a serious attempt to reconcile a Marxist emphasis on literary history and large processes with structuralist techniques for the description of the language and style of the work itself. The efforts of these scholars along with the continuing work of scholars such as Julian Krzyżanowski, Konrad Górski, Czesław Zgorzelski, Kazimierz Wyka and others too numerous to mention resulted in the presence within Poland of both a substantial body of research and a group of well-trained younger scholars who were ready with the help of their mentors to re-establish a more traditional literary scholarship once the institutional pressures were removed.

The pressures were removed with the death of Stalin, the riots of Polish workers in Poznan in 1956 and the subsequent return to power of Władysław Gomułka. In 1958 from December 10-13 there was another national congress of Polonists at which Polish teachers and scholars of literature heaved a collective sigh of relief. This conference was marked both by the addition of the word "scholarly" to the title and by the absence of Stefan Żeromski, then Minister of Higher Education, who, because of illness, sent Eugenia Krassowska to take his place. Krassowska in a sense set the tone for the conference by openly admitting the excesses committed in the name of Marxist scholarship
during the last few years and appealing for a moderate response which would emphasize the good which had been done rather than dwelling on the mistakes.46

The scholars who had Marxist affiliations were clearly on the defensive. Kazimierz Wyka continued Krassowska's appeal not to overreact by going too far in the other direction and stressed the important organizational gains and the publication of basic sources which had occurred from 1950-1958.47 Maria Janion, in a long article defended the use of genetic explanation against what she called the anti-geneticism of structuralism.48 Kazimierz Budzyk asserted that there were two extreme positions in literary scholarship, a vulgar sociologism which gave the determining role to content and a vulgar formalism which did the same thing with form.49 There seems to have been both a general consensus that the Marxist-Leninist episode in Polish scholarship had been a terrible mistake and a concerted effort to avoid a return to the polemical tone of the 1950 conference.50 As a result, Polish literary scholarship moved out of its Stalinist phase rather quickly and established an atmosphere of tolerance for conflicting points of view which, with a few exceptions (see pp. 34-36), has persisted until today.

In that atmosphere a number of groups of scholars have emerged at different universities in Poland. Each
group works on its own set of problems, and each is worthy of serious consideration. In Wrocław, a city in southwestern Poland, a group of scholars associated with Czesław Hernas has continued and expanded the research of Julian Krzyżanowski into the relationship between folklore and literature. Working at the branch of the Institute of Literary Research in Wrocław Mieczysław Klimowicz has investigated and written a history of the Polish Enlightenment.

In Kraków (Cracow), a city in southeastern Poland and former capital, Henryk Markiewicz, both in his own general works and in two anthologies of Western and one of Polish research, has not only continued to re-appraise the value of Marxist research but has also summarized and evaluated a great deal of Western research. It is also in Kraków that Jan Błoński has produced some stimulating and always entertaining scholarly literary criticism.

In Gdańsk, a city in northern Poland, Maria Janion with the collaboration of Maria Żmigrodzka has developed her interest in the history of ideas into a series of works on the romantic conception of history. She has also recently written about the limitations of her own methodology and the potential distortions which it can cause in the study of individual works.

In Poznań, a city in western Poland, Jerzy Ziomek has worked on the Renaissance and on the theory of literary
history, and Edward Balcerzan has used methods drawn loosely from French structuralism to study the principles of literary biography.\textsuperscript{59}

At the university in Warsaw Ryszard Handke has produced some interesting studies of science fiction.\textsuperscript{60}

As I have said on p. 18, the Institute of Literary Research was founded in 1948 to provide an institutional alternative to the "traditional" scholarship of the universities. This brief survey has shown that after de-Stalinization the universities have reestablished themselves as leading research centers engaged in the study of all the traditional problems of literary scholarship. It is important to realize that Janusz Sławiński does not work in isolation. The tension between the universities and the institute, which was caused by the institutional implementation of Marxist literary methods during the Stalinist period, has largely disappeared. Sławiński does not see himself as creating a "new" literary scholarship but rather as contributing to the continuing health of an "old" one.\textsuperscript{61}

There has also been extensive Polish research into general and literary semiotics. Semiotics as a discipline has expanded so rapidly in the last two decades that it now includes what may be irreconcilable contradictions and methodologies.\textsuperscript{62} This is also the case in Poland where there is both a linguistic and a logical semiotics.
Linguistic semiotics was established in Poland largely through the personal intervention of Roman Jakobson. He gave a three-day seminar on linguistic poetics in the fall of 1958 in the Polish town of Krynica, near Kraków, when he was on his way back from an international conference in Moscow. He also played an important role in arranging and attended the International Conference of Work in Progress devoted to Problems of Poetics which met in Warsaw August 18-27, 1960. Furthermore, he helped arrange both the 1966 international conference on semiotics held in Kazimierz nad Wisłą and the 1968 conference held in Warsaw. As a result of these efforts, Polish scholarship was fully exposed to semiotics at a time when semiotics was at the height of its expansion.

Linguistic semiotics and structuralism have developed in Poland itself largely due to the personal efforts of Maria Renata Mayenowa. She has not only published anthologies containing the important articles in Polish translation but has also offered other Polish scholars the use of her considerable personal contacts and extensive personal library. The importance of the latter should never be underestimated in a country where books are sometimes hard to obtain. She has also published a textbook for university students which is not only a summary but a further development of the basic semiotic concepts involved
in the study of poetic language and texts. The work of the Soviet semioticians has also been studied by Jerzy Faryno. Soviet work on the semiotics of culture has been critically appraised by Stefan Żółkiewski in the introduction to an anthology of their work prepared by Mayenowa. The decision not to consider Mayenowa's work in detail within my study was made with great reluctance and is based on the subjective judgement that it represents a further development of concepts which are well-known to the Western reader.

Polish research into logical semiotics is another matter. It rests on a philosophical tradition stretching back to the teaching and research activities of Kazimierz Twardowski and including the work of Alfred Tarski whose definition of truth in formalized languages is still the starting place for most discussions of logical semantics and the indexical logic of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz which is related in some ways to the Montague grammar now being employed in an attempt to resolve some of the problems of a logically based linguistic semantics. Jerzy Pelc, Barbara Stanosz, Ryszard Wójcicki and the other Polish logicians and methodologists have produced work which is of real importance for any discussion of the general possibilities of semiotic research. However, the inclusion of this work in its present form would require a general discussion
of semiotic concepts which could only be applied to literary scholarship after a long and involved discussion which would expand this study beyond any reasonable limits.\textsuperscript{75}

The same is true about a full discussion of the work on the logical foundations of research in the humanities, the methodology of science and artistic culture which has been done at the Institute for Cultural Studies (\textit{Kulturoznawstwo}) in Poznań under the direction of Jerzy Kmita. Kmita's group has combined elements of Neo-positivism, Marxism and semiotics into a theory of humanist interpretation and artistic culture which, when and if all of its implications are fully explored, may prove to be one of the outstanding Polish contributions to contemporary thought.\textsuperscript{76} The same is also true of the related work of Leszek Nowak on Marxist dialectics\textsuperscript{77} and of Jerzy Topolski on the methodology of historical study.\textsuperscript{78} I have had to exclude them in order to confine this study within reasonable limits. Their work employs a terminology of its own and really cannot be understood without an extended discussion. However, the work of Jerzy Kmita has had such a deep influence on my own understanding of literary scholarship that I have found it impossible to write this study without employing a few of his concepts in a simplified form (see the discussion on pp. 75-90 of Part I).
It has been necessary to provide a brief survey of the history and breadth of contemporary Polish literary scholarship for three reasons: 1) to explain my reasons for not discussing a great deal of interesting material, 2) to dispel the objections of the imaginary Western reader who began the study by doubting the existence of anything worth studying in Polish literary scholarship and most importantly 3) to show that the work on literary theory and methodology which is at the basis of this study is not that of a small group of scholars working alone in a hostile environment. Janusz Sławiński and his co-workers are very much aware that they are members of a larger scholarly community which both existed before their work began and contains more than just that work. This awareness has had a large effect on the tone of their scholarship.79
CHAPTER III

A GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE WORK OF
MICHał GŁOwIŃSKI, JANUSZ LALEWICZ,
ALEKSANDRA OKOPIEN-SŁAWiŃSKA AND JANUSZ SŁAWiNski

The research which I am going to discuss in this study has been done largely by Michał Głowinski, Aleksandra Okopien-Sławińska and Janusz Sławiński who are members of the Department (Pracownia)\(^80\) of Historical Poetics of the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw.\(^81\) The three of them are former students of Kazimierz Budzyk, who was, as I have said, influenced by the work of Franciszek Siedlecki on metrics (see p. 20). They work together with the Department of Theoretical Poetics and Artistic Language which is headed by Maria Renata Mayenowa and in a sense continues Siedlecki's work today. These two groups together comprise the Department of Poetics and Contemporary Literature.\(^82\)

This relationship is important because it means that the workshop, despite its name, is involved not only with the study of literary history but with all aspects of literary scholarship as they apply to contemporary literary life. It is important to emphasize that, although the Institute is divided up into departments and workshops,
these departments for the most part share the same facilities (many of the offices are in the same hallway), and there is a great deal of cooperation between them. The work of Sławiński, Głowinski and Okopień-Sławińska is not theirs alone but rather draws on the results of the research done by the other members of the institute. Much of their attitude toward the usefulness and limitations of the formation of theories about literature stems from the fact that they work on a daily basis with scholars who are using differing methods in order to solve the problems associated with different aspects of literary scholarship. The same is also true of their relationship to the research done by the scholars working at the universities who were mentioned on pp.21-23. It is even more true of the work of Kazimierz Bartoszyński, a former student of Roman Ingarden, who works with them in the same workshop and has written a number of clear analyses of closely-related problems (see the bibliography for a list of some of his more important articles).

Głowński, Okopień-Sławińska and Sławiński have acknowledged their debt to Kazimierz Budzyk in a number of places. He seems, perhaps due to the influence of Siedlecki, to have insisted on precise theoretical formulations and precise descriptions of the problems of study. He also, due to his awareness of Marxist scholarship,
insisted on the importance of studying literature in its social and historical context. However, perhaps the most important thing which he did was to assign them the task when they were in their early twenties of writing a general textbook on literary scholarship. As a result, at the start of their careers they had to gain an awareness of the complexity of literary scholarship. Furthermore, they wrote the textbook at a time when Polish scholarship was trying to reestablish a mood of tolerance after the Stalinist episode. It was published in 1957 in an edition of 16,000 copies with the approval of the Ministry of Education (Oświata) for use in teachers' colleges.\textsuperscript{85} It is easy to imagine, given the social atmosphere of the time, the pressures felt by a group of young scholars, even though they were working under the auspices of Budzyk, while trying to formulate the general principles for the teaching of literature in the public schools.\textsuperscript{86}

As a result of this experience and of their close relationship with other scholars at the Institute and the universities (with the exception of the University of Warsaw, see pp. 34-36), they have a broad understanding of literary scholarship. In their opinion it includes not only the theory and history of literature but criticism, didactics, the editing of manuscripts and administrative functions as well (see Chapter I of the Conclusion).\textsuperscript{87}
In this role they, along with other scholars, have edited the series *From the History of Artistic Forms in Polish Literature* which has about 60 volumes today. Janusz Sławinski is the general editor of *Vademecum Polonisty*, a series of reference volumes designed to provide the teacher of Polish with the standard terminology and methods of literary scholarship. The two volumes most concerned with general theoretical issues are Maria Renata Maynowa's volume on *Theoretical Poetics* (see p. 24) and the *Dictionary of Literary Terms* written by Głowński, Sławinski, Okopien-Slawinska and Teresa Kostkiewiczowa with Sławinski as the primary editor.

The Department is also the office for the bi-monthly journal *Texts (Teksty)* although the journal is in fact a cooperative venture, and both Jan Błoński from the Jagiellonian University in Kraków and Czesław Hernas from the University of Wrocław have served as the chief editors. It is hard to describe the tone of this journal since American scholarship, at least American Slavic studies, has nothing like it. *Pamiętnik Literacki*, now published by the Department of the History of Polish Literature of the Institute of Literary Research, contains serious studies and analyses of issues in Polish literary history. *Teksty* seems to be the place where Polish scholars publish when they want to have a little fun with current issues in
literary scholarship. It contains a number of serious studies, including translations of important foreign works. However, it also includes such pieces as Jan Błoński's account of his travels in Italy, Stefan Treugutt's musings on how American society can have heroes when it names its streets after numbers, Ryszard Handke's study of the semiotics of mushroom picking and Stanisław Lem's "Confessions of an Anti-Semiotic". It also contains often humorous comments made in the margins by the editors, and every issue opens with a satirical statement which is meant to make a serious point in an amusing fashion.

It is easy to underestimate the importance of such a publication until we compare its tone with that of the passage written by the editors of the 1950 conference (see pp.17-18). Perhaps, literary scholarship is in less danger when Jan Błoński openly wonders why he should continue publishing his journal and then decides to go on writing even as Hamlet went on living than it was when the Marxist-Leninists knew exactly why and what not only they but everyone should publish.

In a society with a system of government like Poland's such a tone can sometimes get one in trouble, and that has occasionally happened to Teksty, especially when scholars address social as well as strictly literary issues. In
"We Want a Goal! We Want a Goal!" Stanisław Barańczak, a leading Polish poet and literary scholar, analyzed the increasingly violent nature of Polish soccer chants as an indication of the country's deteriorating social situation. Articles on this and other current topics can cause a great deal of trouble with "the powers that be", and there have been occasional fears the journal might be closed down. Fortunately, it has not been.

The dangers of doing scholarly research in Poland should be kept in their proper perspective. Janusz Sławiński, Michał Głowinski and Aleksandra Okopię-Sławińska are political figures only to the extent to which anyone who tries to do any job properly in a country in which an inefficient political system has defined every action as a political action must undertake actions which can be construed as political protests, either by the system, by outside observers or by professional rivals seeking to discredit their opponents. This is how, as Sławomir Mrożek has shown in his play The Police and Witold Gombrowicz in all of his writings, an inflexible political system continually generates its own opponents by the very fact of its existence.

In attempting to preserve the integrity of their discipline as they see it Sławiński, Głowinski and Okopię-Sławińska have become involved in open controversy at least
two times. In 1968 there were student riots at the University of Warsaw, partially inspired by the staging of Mickiewicz's play Dziady 'Forefathers' Eve' which contains, among other provocative references, the lines, "I'm to be free--so! I don't know where the news came from,/But I know what it means to be free at the mercy of a Muscovite." (The lines are stronger in Polish since Polish has two verbs (wiedzieć and znać) expressing the English concept 'know'. In these lines the first English 'know' is the Polish wiedzieć, a more abstract knowledge, whereas the second is znać, which describes a knowledge based on a more direct, personal experience.) The performance of this play with an exaggeratedly dramatic recitation of these lines reportedly sent crowds of excited students marching through the streets. The play was closed down. It has, however, since been performed several times in different stagings and in a different social atmosphere.

As a result of these events Sławiński, Głowíński and Okopień-Sławińska, who had nothing to do with the riots, were, through a series of administrative maneuvers, deprived of their right to lecture at the University of Warsaw. Since then they have been able to work only at the Institute of Literary Research where they can only supervise doctoral dissertations. As a result Polish students have been deprived of direct contact with three of the best
literary minds in the country. This event is past history now, and there is no need to go into all of the details. The point which I am trying to make is that it was not so much a conflict between Marxists and non-Marxists (the work of Sławiński, Głowinski and Okopień-Sławińska is compatible with Marxism) as a professional conflict in which Marxist phraseology was used as a weapon by the attacking faction.104

The tensions caused by this event are still present in Polish scholarship today. After the appearance of the Dictionary of Literary Terms, a group of reviews was published in The Humanist Review which marked a return to the tone and terminology associated with the Stanist episode described earlier in this chapter. The Dictionary was assaulted for its "false conception and harmful results"105 which stemmed from its anti-Marxism, anti-socialism and over-reliance on Western sources.106 Michał Głowinski responded with an unusually angry article in which he classified scholars, according to their relationship to their predecessors, as haters (nienawiściści), pedants107 (belfrzy) and manipulators (manipulatorzy). He then used the work of the critics of the Dictionary, led by Eugeniusz Czapelekewicz (see footnote 98), as examples of manipulators. Manipulators are, according to the obviously angry Głowinski, the worst of the three because they distort the past
completely, using it only as a source of respected names
to bolster the authority of their own incoherent work.

It seems to me that in this case Głowinski is
right. However, the dangers posed by the situation are
more important than the details of the debate. The Stalin-
ist tone is always present at least in potential in the
vocabulary of Eastern European Marxism. In their attempt
to prevent a return of that tone Polish literary scholars
have been forced to research a number of problems which
American literary scholarship has on the whole been able
to ignore. Polish research may not provide us with a final
solution to these problems for some time, but it does offer
a different perspective on them.

An example of one such problem is the relationship
between literature and extra-literary reality. One attempt
to investigate that relationship led Michał Głowinski and
Janusz Sławiński into another controversy with the publica-
tion of the volume Literature in the Face of War and
Occupation, containing studies devoted to the effects which
the Second World War and the German occupation of the
country had on Polish literature. Sławiński introduced
the volume with a theoretical article outlining the ways in
which war can change literature.

The controversy, however, was a result of the content
of the articles he was introducing. The present government
of Poland has, for political reasons which are obvious, surrounded the war with myths of heroism and the victory of the united Polish and Soviet armies over the Germans. The problem for the scholar of literature becomes one of how the literature which actually resulted from the war can be studied without either accepting or openly challenging the official version. If the official version is accepted, then much of the best Polish literature, for example Miron Białoszewski's *Memoir of the Warsaw Uprising*, is a result of the cowardice and personal weaknesses of its author. If it were to be openly challenged, however, Sławinski would not only be engaging in open political protest but, what would be worse for a scholar as careful and as theoretically aware as he is, he would also be entering into areas of discussion which exceed his professional competence as a literary scholar. Therefore, Sławinski, as a critic and historian of literature, has to have a theory of literature which is capable of providing an alternative literary explanation for the appearance of Białoszewski's work.

In Russian Formalist and structuralist literary scholarship the solution to this problem has usually been to assert the existence of what amounts to a transcendental literary realm (see Part III, Chapter I). In Poland, however, partly because the doctrinaire Marxism of the
Stalinist period never really became a part of the scholarly tradition (see p. 23), literary scholarship has been able to draw on the perspective and some of the methods provided by Marxism and combine them with other methods to create an alternative version of how literature can both be under the influence of and play an active role in historical and social events (see Part III, Chapter IV). The volume on literature and war was intended to do that for an important part of Polish social life and history.

This example reveals a great deal about the manner in which Sławiński and Głowinski work. They are often simultaneously critics, historians and theoreticians of literature. Białoszewski's work is identified as both an important event in contemporary literary life and in the history of Polish literature, and then a group of theoretical concepts is developed in order to study it. This raises further theoretical questions, and the entire complex matter of the relationship between literature and war is addressed. Finally, the new group of theoretical concepts has to be integrated into the concepts which already exist in their overall view of literature. The point is that they are much closer to their material than many of the linguistic structuralists and Soviet semioticians who are consciously constructing a universal theory of literature from a few basic assumptions about reality.
This closeness to their material can cause problems when the material is as controversial as the Warsaw Uprising and the Polish and Soviet role in the Second World War. Sławiński, Głowiński and Okopień-Sławińska are scholars of literature and are primarily interested in the literary aspects of their material. But the very act of discussing the relationship between literature and history can easily become, or be viewed as, a political act given the realities of Eastern European life. In this case the matter was too controversial, and the volume was reviewed, often angrily, in numerous places. I have been told, although I have not been able to find them, that there were also letters from retired soldiers and responses in the Soviet and East German press. Given the importance which the war plays in the Polish and Soviet governments' explanations of their recurring economic problems, it may well have been the simple suggestion that the war should now be treated as an event in the past and subjected to historical analysis which was unacceptable.\textsuperscript{118}

Because they are engaged in so many different activities and because they focus their attention so closely on individual problems, no member of the group has ever produced a synthetic, theoretical work which would compare with Jurij Lotman's \textit{The Structure of the Artistic Text} in Soviet semiotics\textsuperscript{119} or Roman Ingarden's two volumes on the
phenomenology of literature. Their writings are largely composed of articles written for conferences devoted to a given topic and later gathered into a group for publication as a book. In some cases there are even contradictions between two articles re-published in the same volume. There may also be another reason for the lack of a synthetic work. It is possible that Janusz Sławiński, who is the most theoretically inclined of the three, feels that such a synthetic work on literary theory is either impossible or could actually have a harmful effect on Polish literary scholarship by bringing about a return to the atmosphere of the 1950 conference when a small group of scholars attempted to force their views on the others.

Whatever the cause may be, the lack of a synthetic work creates problems for anyone who wishes to extract a unified theory from their work. I have attempted to do so for the reasons which I will describe in the next chapter. In this chapter I will only say that their research is in five general areas of literary scholarship as they understand it:

1) linguistic poetics or the morphology of the literary text;

2) historical poetics or the theoretical study of literary history;
3) the sociology of literature or the study of literary communication;

4) the theory of literary criticism or the art of interpretation;

5) the general methodology of literary scholarship.\textsuperscript{121}

The classification is only to show the breadth of their interests and is not intended to give the impression that these are separate activities. In fact, the importance of their work, particularly that of Sławinski, lies in showing that none of these activities can be performed in isolation from the other ones. This is why it is possible to speak of them, as Henryk Markiewicz has done, as structuralists even though, as Markiewicz also notes, they themselves insist that they are not structuralists.\textsuperscript{122} I will address the complex issue of their relationship to structuralism in the chapter (see pp. 57-59).

Because of the breadth of their interests it has proven impossible to discuss in depth all of their work within the limits of a single study. I have chosen, therefore, to emphasize the bottom four topics as representing their most interesting contribution. Their work on the morphology of the text is interesting in its own right, but most of its original features are a result of the different perspective on the literary work introduced by their study of history, communication and interpretation.
Even within the study of those topics, I have been forced to choose between an historical approach which would describe the evolution of their thought and the influence which other scholars have had upon it and a methodological analysis of their thought which would place it within the context of some of the other existing literary methodologies. I have, for reasons which I will explain in the next section, chosen the latter alternative. It seems to me to be the most appropriate way of responding to a body of thought which is still in the process of being formed today. I have, however, in order to give the study a boundary, considered only those works which were published by 1978.

I have chosen 1978 because it was in that year that I had the opportunity of studying with them in Warsaw and discussing their ideas in some detail. Janusz Sławiński in particular not only explained many aspects of his thought which he has not put into print but stopped me from turning him and the other members of the group into semioticians or linguistic structuralists. As a result, some sections of the study, particularly the conclusion, are the result of verbal suggestions which he made and which I have further developed in my own manner. I have tried to give him credit whenever I have done so. It is necessary to acknowledge his input in order to avoid becoming one of the manipulators described by Głowinski in his response to the critics of the Dictionary of Literary Terms (see P. 35).
It seems to me that in order to understand the full importance of their study of literary communication it is necessary to consider it in connection with that of Janusz Lalewicz. Lalewicz was a student of the Polish philosopher Adam Schaff until Schaff's group was broken up as a result of the administrative changes after the student riots of 1968 (see p. 34). Lalewicz earned his living for a while by doing translations from French into Polish, including an excellent translation of Jean Paul Sartre's *Qu'est-ce que la littérature*. He eventually managed to acquire a position at Stefan Żółkiewski's Workshop of Literary Culture. There he wrote his dissertation under Żółkiewski with Janusz Sławiński as one of his readers. Lalewicz's research centers around the role which the existing communicative situation and the technology available in a given society have on its literature. He has provided an alternative explanation for some of the characteristics of the literary text which have been explained by linguistic structuralism as a result of the peculiar linguistic structure of the text. This alone would make his work worthy of attention. However, his research also serves as a bridge between the literary sociology of Janusz Sławiński and Stefan Żółkiewski's study of literary culture. When examined together the work of these four scholars provides us with a reasonably coherent theory of
literature which rests on a different set of assumptions from those of the linguistic or semiotic structuralism associated with the work of Roman Jakobson and Jurij Lotman. I have called this approach structuralist humanism, or theoretical eclecticism. In the next chapter I will explain my reasons for using these terms and the manner in which I will present the research covered by them.
CHAPTER IV

METHOD OF PRESENTATION - STRUCTURALIST HUMANISM

In Chapter I I quoted three examples of the manner in which Konwicki's narrator responded to Western treatments of his writings (see p. 13). I would now like to return to those quotations in order to explain the reasons for the manner in which I have decided to present the research of the four scholars described in the preceding chapter. In those quotations Konwicki's narrator expressed his resentment at being an abstract symbol of the struggle for a liberty he was not allowed to have, wondered how he had been changed from a citizen of the world into an angry provincial and, exasperated by Western inability to understand him, threatened that the West, too, would share his fate.

It seems to me that these are the three available alternatives when presenting Polish research in a study which will (one hopes) be read by American readers. It can be presented as an example of how the Polish scholars have resisted Soviet oppression in their struggle for liberty. The problem is that this not only turns them more into abstract symbols than real scholars but also gives their
work more of a political coloring than it actually has. As I have said in the last chapter (see p. 33), the workshop's activities are political only to the extent to which any professional group which seeks to do its job properly in Polish society must undertake actions which have political implications. To present their work in this manner would, it seems to me, mark a return to the tendency represented in the 1950 conference manifesto (see pp. 17-18) of viewing the world as locked in an endless struggle between two warring camps. Such a presentation would therefore undermine the very foundation of Sławiński's approach to literary scholarship. It is also an approach which, as I have suggested on p. 15, has led to some distortion in the history of nineteenth and twentieth century Eastern European scholarship.

The second alternative would be to present Janusz Sławiński's theoretical writings as a phenomenon of largely Polish significance. Konwicki's narrator was undoubtedly referring to the isolation caused by the Russian and Soviet occupations of his country when he asked who had turned him into an angry provincial. However, it seems to me that he was also referring to a Western tendency to view everything which happens in Eastern Europe as a particular manifestation, with some bizarre characteristics due to the Soviet presence, of a general European phenomenon. It is in this
manner that Witold Gombrowicz is spoken of as an early existentialist although his work preceded Sartre's and is in some ways opposed to it. In a similar manner Sławomir Mrożek is spoken of as a more political variant of the theater of the Absurd.

In the case of the research which I am studying it would mean classifying it, given its characteristics, as either Marxist, structuralist, phenomenological or eclectic literary scholarship. The problem is that it is both none and all of the above. Viktor Šklovskij once said, when defending himself against the attacks of Soviet Marxists, "It goes without saying that I am not declaring myself a Marxist because one does not adhere to scientific methods. One masters them and one creates them." The realization that this is true of authors has led to much greater sophistication in literary history. It seems to me that it is true of leading literary scholars as well.

Sławiński, Głowinski, Okopień-Sławińska and Lalewicz work within the structuralist tradition in the broadest sense of the term. However, they have not so much "adhered to" as "mastered" and "created" structuralist methods. They have also similarly "mastered" the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden and some of the major concerns of Marxist scholarship. Sławiński in particular is highly sensitive to theoretical problems, but he does not hesitate to draw
from different traditions of thought to explain individual problems. In this sense he is an eclectic. But one could say the same thing about Roman Jakobson or Jurij Lotman (especially if we could identify some of the sources for Lotman's semiotic distinctions). 132

It is for the above reasons that I have decided to choose the third alternative: to present the Polish research as a separate methodological position in the ongoing debate about the nature of literary scholarship. It is a position which, because of its different characteristics, can provide us with a different perspective on the issues involved in the debate. Janusz Sławiński's literary scholarship represents a coherent methodological alternative which can be used by any scholars, including those outside of Poland as well as those within Poland. If we regard it as such rather than as merely a product of its environment, then Sławiński acquires the cosmopolitan status which Konwicki's narrator desired. There is a clear danger, however, of presenting as completely unique a scholarship which shares characteristics with other existing Slavic scholarships.

The best solution is a compromise position which both situates Sławiński's work within the existing tradition and at the same time emphasizes its individual characteristics as a body of thought which is every bit as valid as the
ones of which Western scholarship is already aware. It is for this reason that I have chosen the terms "structuralist humanism" and "theoretical eclecticism" to describe his work. "Theoretical eclecticism" is meant to describe a body of thought which draws on different approaches and methods to explain what it sees as the complexities of reality but at the same time insists that each of these methods be given a coherent and fully conscious theoretical status. This statement will become clearer after I describe non-theoretical eclecticism in a general manner in the next chapter.

"Structuralist humanism" also requires further explanation. In deciding to introduce a new term into the scholarly vocabulary I have been guided by the principles outlined by Charles Sanders Peirce in his brief essay "The Ethics of Terminology".\textsuperscript{133} Peirce gives four reasons for the importance of precise thought: 1) language is not only important but of the essence of good thought, 2) there is an increasing value placed on precision as thought advances, 3) there can be no progress in science without collaboration, as Peirce says, "no mind can take one step without the aid of other minds",\textsuperscript{134} and 4) "the health of the scientific commune requires the most absolute academic freedom".\textsuperscript{135} There is, therefore, a tension in any body of thought between the need for collaboration which requires a
common, precise language and the need for absolute academic freedom which requires the ability to create new terminol-
ogy. 136

Peirce reasons that the only way to solve, or rather learn to live with, these twin needs of thought is to avoid "arbitrary dictation" and rely on "the power of rational principles over the conduct of men." 137

Peirce concludes that new terminology must be intro-
duced only with the greatest trepidation 138 and then makes
in the course of his essay three comments which have
guided me in the preparation of this study:

1) Before proposing a term, notation or other symbol, to consider maturely whether it perfectly suits the conception and will lend itself to every occasion, whether it interferes with any existing term, and whether it may not create an inconvenience by interfering with the expression of some conception that may hereafter be introduced into philosophy; 139
2) Whoever deliberately uses a word or symbol in any other sense than that which was conferred upon it by its sole rightful creator commits a shameful offence against the inventor of the symbol and against science and it becomes the duty of others to treat the act with contempt and indignation; 140
3) The first rule of good taste in writing is to use words whose meanings will not be misunderstood; and if a reader does not know the meaning of the words, it is in-
finitely better that he should know he does not know it. 141

Peirce's language may be a little bit harsh (occas-
sional misunderstandings are unavoidable), 142 and he may be
overly confident in the power of rational thought to control human conduct. However, his position offers the best chance of becoming aware of both the differences and similarities between the different literary methodologies existing today. In the case of the term "structuralism" it seems inappropriate to simply redefine the term so that it applies to the work of Janusz Sławinski and his co-workers. This would not only be unfair to the original creators of the term "structuralism" but also lead the reader to assume that he understands something which he does not understand.

It is for these reasons that I have decided to introduce the term "structuralist humanism" in an attempt to identify the existence of a body of thought of whose existence we have not been aware and which has both similarities and differences with other bodies of thought about literature. The term is designed to make possible within the context of this study a coherent discussion of two variants of structuralism and may someday be abandoned if further research shows that it is no longer necessary. However, it also necessitates certain changes in existing terminology such as the addition of adjectives to describe the other types of structuralism (see p. 58). It seems to me that this, too, is a step forward representing a movement toward a "greater precision of thought" which may
eventually lead to a fuller understanding of the history and the possibilities of structuralism as a body of thought. In keeping with Peirce's "ethics" it is necessary for me to explain in detail my reasons for choosing the term.

I have chosen the term "humanism" from four sources, all of which seem appropriate to the historical context of the research under discussion.143

1) The first source of the term is Renaissance humanism. This is the period which has given the term its commonly accepted meaning. It is defined by such a standard general source as Webster's Collegiate Dictionary as "a doctrine, attitude, or way of life centered on human interests or values; esp: a philosophy that asserts the dignity and worth of man and his capacity for self-realization through reason and that often rejects supernaturalism."

There are many implications involved in applying this term to a type of structuralist thought, some of which will only be clear at the end of this study. It will prove necessary to replace the term "reason" with "conscious activity." Man, or at least man's awareness of man, has changed since the time of the Renaissance and "humanism" and "the humanist" have changed with him and her. (The linguistic difficulties encountered in writing the previous sentence are a clear example of the changes which have
occurred.)

The limited point which I am trying to make here is that there is a parallel between the role of the Second World War and the Stalinist period in Eastern European letters and the general role of the Medieval period in the history of Western letters. Both the Renaissance and the post-Stalinist period are times when scholars were trying to replace a system of thought which saw man as determined by forces which were beyond human control with one which placed human concerns and activities at the center of human reality. It did not in either case necessarily mean the total rejection of those forces but only that they should be approached from the point of view of human concerns.

As the general discussion in the previous chapter has shown, scholars such as Michał Głowinski, Janusz Lalewicz, Aleksandra Okopień-Sliwińska and Janusz Sliwiński reached their intellectual maturity in such a period of cultural Renaissance and were able to draw on a well-established tradition of both Polish and foreign scholarship. However, they reshaped that tradition in order to confront the realities of their own historical situation.

2) The second source of the term "humanism" is in the writings of the Polish author and philosopher Witold Gombrowicz. I am using it in a sense which is similar
to his use of the term "human" when he speaks of the "inter-human church." There is some disagreement over the nature and value of Gombrowicz's writings. Czesław Miłosz in his History of Polish Literature speaks of him as a destructive talent. The fact remains that Gombrowicz's writings have played a large role in shaping the thought of the generation of scholars described in this study.

Michał Głowinski has described Gombrowicz's technique as one of "constructive parody" rather than of destruction. It is a technique and a philosophy of life which views the forms of social life as created by other men (the inter-human church) and then provides the individual through "constructive parody" with a means of inhabiting those forms in search of his own personal identity. It was attractive to Polish intellectuals in the fifties, and remains so today, because it provided and still provides a means of resisting the Stalinist rhetoric still present in Eastern European society. I will return to this view of life in Chapter II of Part III because it has played a crucial role in determining Sławiński's attitude toward linguistic structuralism.

3) The third source of the term is in the writings of Leszek Kołakowski, a Polish philosopher, who titled a collection of his early writings, Toward a Marxist
Humanism. Kołakowski has had a considerable influence on Polish intellectual life both as a philosopher and as a spokesman for the political opposition. He has played a crucial role in the de-Stalinization of Polish Marxism. He has, in a sense which I will describe shortly, done the same thing to Marxism as a social philosophy which Sławiński and Głowinski have done to structuralism as a literary philosophy. This is why I have chosen to apply his term to their writings.

4) The fourth source for the term is Soviet literary scholarship where it has sometimes been used to describe the Soviet literature which developed as a result of de-Stalinization and is more concerned with the individual feelings and emotions of the central character than with his role in the building of socialism. There seems to be general agreement that this change has occurred. The argument is over whether to view it as a further stage in the development of socialist realism made possible by the successes of Soviet society or as a return to critical realism made possible by the failure of socialist realism. In relating Polish research to this process I am suggesting that it is part of a general movement toward de-Stalinization which has persisted in different forms in all of Eastern European thought since the middle of the 1950s.
It is the combination of these four factors which has led me to choose the term "humanism" over the alternatives of structuralist existentialism, phenomenology, Marxism or personalism which could have been used in its place. Existentialism is a Western European philosophy which developed after Gombrowicz had already written Ferdydurke. The Polish scholars, with the possible exception of Głowiński,¹⁵⁵ were probably more influenced by Gombrowicz than by Sartre. This is definitely true of Sławiński. Phenomenology is a complex phenomenon, and the term has often come to be used as a value judgement.¹⁵⁶ Polish scholars have drawn on Roman Ingarden's phenomenology but more as a source of specific ideas about literature than as a total philosophy. This point is discussed in more detail in Part III, Chapter II.

Marxism exists in Poland more as political rhetoric than as a literary scholarship. Henryk Markiewicz (see Part I, footnote 115) has played a major role in establishing the fact that it is a social philosophy and, therefore, compatible with different types of literary scholarship.

Finally, there is little doubt that Catholic personalism has had some influence on the thought of Sławiński and Głowiński.¹⁵⁷ I have been unable to pursue this line of research both because of my own lack of knowledge of the material involved and because it would involve, as Marxism
would, matters of belief which, although they may in fact shape a scholar's approach to his material, are beyond the range of his professional competence as a scholar of literature. The significance of what I have called the humanism of Sławinski is that it is a theoretical approach to literature which allows the individual scholar to practice his discipline whether he is an eclectic, existentialist, phenomenologist, Marxist, Catholic or structuralist.

I have explained my reasons for using the term "humanism." But are these scholars still, or have they ever been, structuralists? It seems to me that this is similar to asking whether Leszek Kołakowski is still a Marxist. He began as a Marxist and has continued to work on problems which seem Marxist, but whether he is still a Marxist is a matter of definition. Such definitions tend to become value judgements. I have called the Polish scholars structuralists because they started as structuralists and have continued to work on problems which we have grown accustomed to thinking of as structuralist. The term "humanism" is intended to show that they are no longer structuralists in the sense in which we normally use the term "structuralist".

One of the purposes of this study is to suggest that we no longer know, if we ever did, what a Slavic structuralist is. There seem, given our present knowledge, to
be at least the following Slavic structuralisms, each with a different terminology and understanding of literature:
1) the linguistic semiotic structuralism of Roman Jakobson;
2) the cultural semiotic structuralism of Jurij Lotman and the Moscow-Tartu group (for the differences between the two see Part III, Chapter I);
3) the Czech literary semiotic structuralism of Jan Mukařovský, Felix Vodička and Miroslav Červenka (see Part III, footnote 99);
4) the dialogical-semiotic structuralism of the Baxtin-Medvedev group (see Part III, footnote 28); and
5) the Polish tradition which I have called structuralist humanism.160

It has not been possible within this study to explore all of the similarities and differences within and between these five structuralisms. There has not been enough research done on the individual scholars involved to provide me with the information necessary for such a large-scale classification.

For this reason I have decided to contrast structuralist humanism only with the tradition with which it most differs, the linguistic semiotic structuralism of Roman Jakobson and Jurij Lotman. It seems to me that once this contrast has been clearly established, then further research can determine the complicated relationships which
exist and have existed between the different groups. Such research will have to pay particular attention to the considerable influence which Roman Ingarden's phenomenology has had on Polish and Czech scholarship. The important point is that structuralism and semiotics have sometimes presented themselves as the first and only scientific literary scholarships. If we can someday show that there is more than one structuralism and then place them within their larger cultural, historical and philosophical contexts, then we can finally begin to discuss their limitations and possibilities in the same manner as those of any other literary scholarship.

In order to take the first tentative steps in that direction and argue for the usefulness of a structuralist humanist literary scholarship I have divided the remainder of the study into two additional parts. Part II is an involved analysis of the literary scholarship of the Russian scholar Aleksandr Nikolaevič Veselovskij designed to provide the conceptual framework for the part which follows. Veselovskij's work is analyzed as an example of the methodology of positivist literary scholarship. The analysis is intended to demonstrate that linguistic structuralism was not the first scientific literary scholarship and to determine the possibilities and limitations of the projective method on which linguistic structuralism relies.
The other purposes of Part II are to explore in an impressionistic manner the origins of the "crisis in the humanities," describe the limitations of "non-theoretical eclectic literary scholarship" and assert the need for methodological discussion and social history in literary scholarship. (Both of the terms in quotation marks will be explained in the next chapter.)

Once the foundations have been laid in the second part, the discussion proceeds in a simpler and less detailed manner. The third part begins with a general methodological analysis of the development of Slavic linguistic-semiotic structuralism out of Russian Formalism.

The rest of Part III describes the methodological assumptions of structuralist humanism, contrasting them with those of the linguistic structuralism described in Chapter I. Chapter II summarizes the ideas of Roman Ingarden and shows how his ideas combined with Polish humanism to produce a view of the nature and purpose of literature which is radically different from that at the basis of Russian Formalism. Chapter IV presents in a general form the basic ideas of structuralist humanism, regarding the historical and social position of literature. (What they would call the study of literary communication.) Chapter V explores the implications and results of those ideas when they are applied to the reading and interpretation of individual
literary texts and to the general methodology of literary scholarship.

In the Conclusion I will develop two suggestions which Janusz Sławinski has made in conversation into an answer to the questions: what is literary scholarship and why the humanities? The answers to these questions will serve as arguments for the usefulness of a structuralist humanist scholarship.

This method of presentation can meet with an obvious objection which must be addressed before the study can proceed. In order to establish the contrast between these two structuralisms I have had, in a sense, to redefine the scholarships under discussion by employing a terminology which is my own, although drawn from other sources as indicated. This problem is particularly acute in regard to the work of Veselovskij and structuralist humanism because they have not formulated their most basic assumptions as consistently and have not been studied as extensively as linguistic structuralism has. There is a real possibility that I have pushed Veselovskij's scholarship further in the direction of an evolutionary view of literature than he would have gone. It seems to me that this is a reasonable step to take in a methodological analysis as long as we are aware that it is meant to be an exploration of the possibilities inherent in his method and not an historical
description of his position.

The situation in regard to structuralist humanism is complicated by the fact that I have worked so closely with Michał Głowiński, Janusz Łalewicz, Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska and Janusz Sławiński both through personal contact (see p. 42) and through the constant rereading and rethinking of their works that I am no longer always capable of separating their ideas from my own. Every researcher encounters a serious problem of perspective when he studies the work of any scholar other than himself. The closer he gets to it, the more its possibilities open up for him and the less he is capable of distinguishing between the other man or woman's thoughts and those which are his own. From a more distant perspective the differences can be seen more clearly, but they usually appear as limitations in the other scholar's work. This is why the word "jargon" should probably be permanently expelled from the scholarly vocabulary. It was only by merging my thoughts with those of the Polish scholars that I was able to overcome the prejudices against structuralist humanism which resulted from my training as a linguistic semiotician. The first versions of this study were critical of the structuralist humanist position. If I were to do another study of the same material from another perspective, the possibilities of linguistic structuralism, which is still a developing
body of thought, might emerge more clearly.

This particular study has, however, been primarily inspired by and is for the most part devoted to the thought of Janusz Sławiński. In writing it I have not "adhered to" but "mastered" and "extended" his method. It seems to me that this is the only way to do justice to the work of a man and of a group of scholars whose thoughts about literature are still developing.\textsuperscript{162}

Jurij Oleša expressed this feeling well in his speech to the First Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934. Oleša was speaking about the relationship between an artist and his characters, but his passage can apply to that between two scholars of literature as well. This is especially true if we understand scholarship in the manner in which Janusz Sławiński does. Oleša writes,

\textit{...Every man may suddenly feel in himself the appearance of some double. This phenomenon is particularly acute in an artist; one of the most amazing things about him is his capacity to experience other people's passions. ... It is impossible to describe a third person without becoming, if only for one minute, that third person. Often people ask (the artist), "How could you know? Did you make it up yourself?"
Yes, the artist makes everything up himself, although obviously it is impossible to make up anything that doesn't exist in nature.}\textsuperscript{163}

In order to formulate Janusz Sławiński's thought into a doctrine capable of entering into a discussion with linguistic structuralism about the proper methodology for
literary scholarship I have been forced to extract from the inner coherence of his thought a terminology and a perspective whose ultimate usefulness and validity will be determined only by future research. If the study convinces the reader that such research is necessary, then I have achieved my purpose.

Sławiński has expressed similar feelings about the tentative nature of some of the terminology and classifications in his own research. He closed the introduction to the only collection of his writings which he has compiled with the following words:

But the world of research is not composed exclusively of problems which have already been well-solved, given a firm footing, made precise in a manner which is as clear as it is careful; its citizens (it's true that they are often only second-class citizens) are equally problems whose justifiability has still not been established, problems which have been posed only in a provisional fashion, as an experiment, sometimes only to set the imagination into motion. Or am I nevertheless grabbing for too easy a consolation?164

Janusz Sławiński is probably the leading literary theoretician in Poland today. If the tone of this passage is compared with that of the manifesto by the directors of the 1950 conference (see pp.17-18), the contrast gives a hint of what structuralist humanism has to say about the study of literature. It involves questions which have bothered literary scholars since the rise of positivism in
the nineteenth century: Is literary scholarship an activity by which we acquire a perspective from which we can observe the order present in external reality, or is it a means for individual consciousnesses to communicate with each other and with whatever else may exist in external reality? What about literature?

The last chapter of this part addresses the issue of why we might want to have an answer to those questions.
CHAPTER V

IS THERE A CRISIS IN THE HUMANITIES?
CAN STRUCTURALIST HUMANISM HELP?

In the third of the Konwicki quotations given on p. 13 the narrator suggested that Western society should be glad that it cannot understand him now because the day will come when it will have to understand him. The question facing the humanities today is whether that day has already come.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that American society has undergone anything as severe as the trauma of war and occupation experienced by Polish society in the years after 1939. On the other hand, as I tried to suggest in the first section of this part of my study, there is something annoying in the way in which Western scholarship assumes that Eastern European thought is applicable only to Eastern European reality. If I may refer back once again to the 1950 manifesto, it seems to me that it has at least some similarity in tone to some of the recent debates in Western literary scholarship. Edith Kurzweil in the preface to her book The Age of Structuralism made the following statement, "In fact, at a recent conference at Boston
University on 'The State of Literary Criticism,' participants were in pro-structuralist and anti-structuralist camps: their vehement arguments appeared to replace the former conflict between Marxists and their opponents.\textsuperscript{165} If we add Feminist and Black scholars arguing for the inclusion of their perspectives and administrators arguing for fiscal responsibility to the list of combatants, then the picture is complete. The humanities in Western society find themselves for different reasons in the same sort of crisis state in which Polish literary scholarship was in the early 1950's. Eastern European thought survived, and has continued to survive, in such a state for decades. Perhaps, if Western scholarship was more willing to examine that thought on its own merits rather than as a victim of Soviet oppression, we could gain some insights into how to survive our own crisis.

That crisis can be viewed from both an internal and an external perspective. Kristin R. Woolever, writing in \textit{The Chronicle of Higher Education} on July 21, 1981, described the external aspect of the crisis in the following manner:

It's not news that the humanities are in a state of crisis. In 1972 in an article in the \textit{Virginia Quarterly}, Henry Nash Smith noted that most humanists were on the defensive and had "a disturbing suspicion that what we are doing is not worth doing." More than any other area in the humanities, the teaching of composition illustrates our defensive—almost apologetic—attitude as
humanists in an increasingly hostile environment. ...

In Michigan, the heart of the American automobil industry, students demand that we provide them with highly specialized skills so that they can graduate well trained to tackle the problem of the Japanese imports --their most discernible economic enemy. What chance has Shakespeare or Sartre against Lee Iacocca and the K-car? Our enrollments in literature and philosophy courses are predictably small....

The primary external cause of the crisis in the humanities is the commitment to mass education made by American society in the early 1960's. This commitment has brought into the universities large numbers of students from differing backgrounds who demanded "relevance" in the decades of the Feminists, Marxists and Black activists and are now demanding economic usefulness in the eighties. Denis Donoghue in his highly critical review of Geoffrey Hartman's most recent book Criticism in the Wilderness (the title is indicative of Hartman's feelings about his position as a humanist in contemporary society) put the question succinctly, "The problem is: What good is literary criticism in a time of mass education?" I will return to this review shortly because it provides a clear example of two of the opposing traditions in literary scholarship today.

First, I would like to stress the fact that the crisis has affected more than just literary criticism. It has also affected literature itself. For a forceful example of
this we may turn to the popular newspapers. A nationally syndicated cartoon which appeared on July 23, 1980 opened with a picture of a man (he was actually a bird) deep in sleep with an enormous tome on his chest. The following dialogue ensued (the man's part will be easy to identify):

"What's your uncle reading there, Skyler?"
"One of the classics, I guess..."  
"ZZZZ"
"What's a classic?"
"That's a book no one can read but one wishes he had."  
"ZZZZ"168

There is in the uncertainties about the humanities expressed by Woolever, Smith and Hartman more than just a fear that students may not be willing to take courses in the humanities. There is a deeper fear that literature, philosophy and the humanities themselves may not be viable activities in a technological society. This fear has been compounded by the appearance within the humanities of a linguistic structuralist scholarship which has presented itself as the first scientific literary scholarship and thereby provoked an internal crisis which is perhaps more intense than the external one.169

In order to comprehend the full ramifications of what structuralism has done to the humanities, it is necessary to understand the distinction which Thomas Kuhn has made in his study of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions between normal and crisis science.170 Normal science is a
time when the members of a given discipline are governed by a general consensus as to what problems are to be addressed, what sources are authoritative, what methods can be used and what language the results should be reported in. It is, as Kuhn has put it, a time when most scholars are engaged in "puzzle solving," the working out of the details of problems whose general outlines have already been established by the general consensus. Kuhn calls the combination of problems, sources, methods and language a paradigm.

Crisis science is a time when the consensus becomes threatened. There may appear not only one but several additional paradigms within the same discipline. The crisis becomes acute and leads to a scientific revolution only when the users of the older paradigm become aware that there are a number of problems or puzzles which the paradigm cannot solve. This awareness is, of course, heavily influenced by social factors such as the tasks which society has assigned the given discipline. This is what led Kuhn into an argument with Karl Popper, who has always asserted that good science is not influenced by social factors. Popper maintained that Kuhn's "normal scientist" was only a poorly trained scientist.

In a time of mass education within a technological society the scholarly paradigm which has governed literary
scholarship for some time has been faced with a number of social tasks which it is seemingly incapable of solving. The traditional paradigm, which has been described nicely by Denis Donoghue in a passage which will be quoted shortly, was designed to preserve, and to develop in the students it trained the ethical and aesthetic values of Western civilization has produced.\textsuperscript{175} The problem is that with the appearance of Feminist, Marxist and Black activist scholarship it is those values themselves which seem to be under attack.\textsuperscript{176} Literary scholarship has been given the task not only of preserving traditional values but also of proving their relevance to contemporary needs. The traditional methodology did not seem to be capable of solving the new set of problems. This resulted in the debates and arguments over curriculum and methods in the sixties and seventies.

Economic usefulness, which has apparently replaced relevance as the primary social task, has not proven any more congenial to the traditional view of literary scholarship. This is true whether usefulness is viewed from the perspective of the student seeking an employable skill or of the administrator seeking to "maximize" credit hours.

Linguistic structuralism has added an entire additional set of demands by requiring that literary scholarship become scientific in order to respond to the technological orientation of modern society.\textsuperscript{177} It is this last set of
demands, resulting from the requirement that literary scholarship become scientific, which has ultimately led to a seemingly permanent state of crisis scholarship.

Denis Donoghue's review of Geoffrey Hartman's book *Criticism in the Wilderness* provides a clear example of what has happened. Donoghue responds to his own question, already quoted on p. 68, "What good is literary criticism in a time of mass education?" with the following passage, a passage with he develops into a criticism of Hartman's position.

The normal answer is that a critic can show what it means to read well; to read a poem or a novel, for instance, in such a spirit as to make the reading a valid experience, valid in intellectual, emotional and moral terms. When we read a work of art, we study the human imagination as the mind in the aspect of its freedom. If the literary critic is employed to teach in a classroom, he regards teaching as the civic from of his skill: In teaching, he speaks, argues, persuades and practices the decency of communication. That is roughly the rationale of criticism.

Mr. Hartman is not content with such a program; he finds it constructing. He represents the convention by which criticism is deemed to be a secondary activity, subservient to the poems and novels we read, the primary texts.178

Denis Donoghue's sarcasm is obvious. The key words in the passage are "read well," valid experience," "the human imagination as a form of freedom," "decency of communication" (to which Donoghue later in the same review adds "neo-classic notions of decorum") and "subservient to the
primary texts." These are fine sentiments, and, as the reader will see in the conclusion to this study, I agree with them all.

The problem facing literary scholarship, however, is that Geoffrey Hartman has based his poetic criticism on the deconstructionist aftermath of a linguistic structuralist scholarship which has first denied the existence of "the human imagination as a form of freedom" and then on that basis denied the existence of "the primary text" as something to which one could be "subservient".

Whatever we may think of what Donoghue has justly argued is Geoffrey Hartman's romantic embrace of criticism as a form of literary creativity, Jacques Derrida's deconstruction of the literary text into a set of pure relations which the reader has helped to set into motion by the very act of attempting perception remains in effect. As long as this is the case, the notions of "valid experience," "decency" and "decorum" are highly problematic. How can one assert that "decorum" and "decency" demand "subservience" to a "primary text" whose existence can no longer be assumed?

If the reader feels that an abyss has opened up before him as a result of this debate, it is because such an abyss has opened up before literary scholarship as a result of the role which structuralism has played in the humanities.
There are really three positions in the debate with structuralism as the missing fourth. Denis Donoghue's position represents a mixture of neo-classic decorum and nineteenth century liberalism. 182 Geoffrey Hartman, as a scholar steeped in romanticism and alarmed at the prospect of literature classes becoming exercises in grammar and composition, has used Derrida's position to assert the value of reading and criticism as creative literary activities. 183 Jacques Derrida, as a member of the Parisian avant-garde and humanist philosopher, has used his considerable powers of reasoning and formidable rhetorical skills to free thought from the confines of the structuralist science which has become known as "logocentrism" in his writings. 184 By linking literary scholarship to science, structuralism set into motion a chain of events which enabled Derrida to complete the crisis which the other scholarships had only begun. The social tasks which Feminism, Marxism, Black activism and fiscal responsibility have assigned to literary scholarship may be resolved. But once the existence of the literary text has been called into question, literary scholarship, as it existed before structuralism, has been thrown into a permanent state of crisis. It is no accident that Stanley Fish has titled his most recent book on literary scholarship *Is There a Text in This Class?* 185
The crisis in the humanities, as it appears in literary scholarship, involves four questions:

1) Will there be literature classes and students to fill them?

2) Will there be a literary text to study in the classes?

3) Will there be a single literary scholarship with which to study the hypothetical text in the hypothetical classes with the hypothetical students?

4) What will they all be like?

The importance of structuralist humanism lies in the fact that it provides answers, albeit tentative ones, to these questions. In order to give the reader some idea early in the study of what shape these answers will take it is necessary to consider in slightly more detail the options which linguistic structuralism in its post-structuralist phase has left for literary scholarship. The Polish methodologist Jerzy Kmita has provided a clear analysis of the situation while arguing for the validity of his own theories of humanist interpretation and the development of science.

Kmita's analysis is connected with his rejection of what he calls the "anti-naturalist" approach to the humanities. In Kmita's terminology an anti-naturalist approach is one which relies on the activity of human consciousness as a means of acquiring knowledge about reality, for
example German hermeneutics with its method of "understanding" (Verstehen) or any form of phenomenology. Kmita rejects these types of explanation because, due to the influence of neo-positivist philosophy on his writings, he believes that there is only one reliable source of knowledge, theoretical science. Theoretical science is understood by Kmita as a rational body of thought gathered into a formal, logical system capable of explaining all the individual phenomena within its range of application. Kmita calls his scholarship "naturalist" because it asserts that this theoretical science can and should be applied to all disciplines. As the term suggests, Kmita's writings represent an argument, and one must add that it is a particularly coherent and well-reasoned one, for the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the humanities.

Kmita has supported this argument with an analysis of humanist interpretation which denies the validity of any "non-scientific" forms of interpretation and a general study of the development of scientific thought which presents it as an inevitable progression from pre-science to pre-theoretical science to theoretical science. In his study of humanist interpretation Kmita analyzes traditional literary scholarship as a pre-scientific activity devoted to the interpretation of individual literary texts. These texts are treated as products of human cultural activity,
products which were designed to be interpreted by other men. Traditional literary scholarship obtains its interpretations by applying to the texts some combination of techniques involving "understanding," ad hoc explanation and a loose form of historical narration which Kmita calls "developmental-genetic explanation." Kmita denies scientific validity to all three types of explanation on the grounds that they have not created what he calls "a theory systematizing humanist interpretation."

Such a theory, according to Kmita, must be composed of a set of general laws which are both held to be universally valid and capable of producing, in combination with more individual statements within the theory, explanations of all the individual phenomena within the given discipline. In literary scholarship this would mean the creation of a precisely defined set of universal literary laws and the designation of an equally precise means of applying those laws to the interpretation of any individual literary text. It is, in Kmita's analysis, the lack of such a theory which is the defining characteristic of a pre-scientific activity. The appearance of a "theory systematizing interpretation" signals the transition to pre-theoretical science.

What Kmita's analysis has contributed to this study is an awareness that "the structuralist controversy" (see
footnote 5) was caused by linguistic structuralism's insistence that a scientific literary scholarship, or poetics as it was often called, had to be based on a universally applicable formal theory of literature. The creation of the theory was justified by the assertion that all human consciousness and, therefore, all literary phenomena were fully determined by linguistic laws. Linguistic structuralism thus marked the first concerted effort to make the transition from pre-science to science in literary scholarship.

Because of this effort, structuralists became involved in heated controversies not only with phenomenologists and Marxists protesting the grounds on which the theory had been created but even more so with traditional literary scholars resisting the creation of any universal theory. It seems to me, although it would take a separate study to prove it, that this is why lovers of romanticism have greeted the work of Jacques Derrida with such enthusiasm (see footnote 180). He seems to have proven conclusively the impossibility of any scientific literary scholarship. As a result, it is with some relief that the different post-structuralisms and deconstructionism have been welcomed into American and French literary scholarship. But, as the discussion of Denis Donoghue's review of Geoffrey Hartman's book showed, when Jacques Derrida deconstructed
the formal theories which linguistic structuralism had erected, he also deconstructed the individual literary text which had provided the methodological justification for the activities of traditional literary scholarship. As a result, the internal crisis of traditional literary scholarship has not been lessened by the change. Because Denis Donoghue is a perceptive scholar of literature, he has realized that when Geoffrey Hartman draws on Jacques Derrida to assert that literary criticism must become a poetic activity it is not only the possibility of science but the possibility of all scholarship as we have traditionally understood it which has been denied.

Jerzy Kmita's analysis of humanist interpretation proposes a solution to this dilemma which is hardly likely to appeal to traditional literary scholarship. What Kmita calls the "Marxist" elements in his thought provide two criticisms of linguistic structuralism: 1) linguistic structuralism is not a form of humanist interpretation because it treats structures as independent of, rather than created by, men and 2) structuralism is not a theoretical science because it has not yet realized that its "theory systematizing interpretation" has also been created by scholars who are men and women and, therefore, are under the influence of their social environment. This realization is what marks the transition to a theoretical science
or, as Kmita also puts it, from a positivist to an anti-positivist naturalism.¹⁹⁹

Kmita calls the type of non-humanist explanation used by structuralism "functional explanation" because it explains the features of texts solely as a result of their function within the larger linguistic or cultural system. He distinguishes it from the functional-genetic explanation of his own "Marxist" approach. Functional-genetic explanation is Marxist and theoretical because its genetic element explains how structures, including theoretical structures, are created by men and women acting in their social environment.

If we accept Kmita's analysis, then the linguistic structuralist-deconstructionist dilemma can be explained in the following manner. In attempting to create a scientific literary scholarship linguistic structuralism employed a linguistically based functional explanation which was not suited to the study of the products of human activity. It also failed to realize the role which the linguistic structuralists were playing in creating their own theories. It, therefore, tied the existence of a science of literature and of literature itself to the existence in external reality of linguistic laws which had in fact been created by the linguists themselves. Because the existence of the literary text had been tied to the existence of linguistic
entities, Derrida's deconstructionism could, by proving the relativity of the theories which had created those entities, seemingly demonstrate both the impossibility of any science of literature and the insubstantiality of the literary text which had been the basis of traditional literary interpretation. It is this step which has provided the basis for Hartman's poetic criticism.

Jerzy Kmita's analysis, therefore, offers two solutions to the internal crisis which structuralism has caused in the humanities. The first is to abandon the functional explanation of linguistic structuralism and adopt a functional-genetic explanation which views men and women as both creating structures and determined by the structures they create. This type of explanation can be applied both to literary texts and to the theories which have been created to interpret those texts. It is this aspect of Kmita's thought which is in agreement with the basic assumptions of structuralist humanism. In structuralist humanism it marks a return to the more traditional belief that literary texts are written and interpreted by men and women and not by a transcendental linguistic or semiotic system.

Functional-genetic explanation is put to a different use in Jerzy Kmita's own work. In accordance with the basic pattern of development which he sees at the basis of every
scientific discipline, Kmita has called for the creation of a theoretical science of literature by combining functional-genetic explanation with logical models based on a combination of the logic of decision and the generative linguistics of Noam Chomsky. This is the second possible solution which Kmita's analysis offers to the problems caused by Derrida's deconstruction of linguistic structuralism. Traditional literary scholarship was a pre-scientific activity. Linguistic structuralism was an improvement, but, by insisting that linguistic structures have an existence which is independent of the men who create and use them, it never moved beyond pre-theoretical science. The proper path of development for literary scholarship and all the disciplines of the humanities is to take the next step and develop a fully theoretical science. Kmita is not alone in reaching this conclusion. It is also at the basis of the work of Siegfried Schmidt, Teun van Dijk and other scholars working on the development of formal grammars of literary texts and of a formal literary pragmatics. This entire area of research is just beginning, and there is really no justification for denying the possibility of the eventual creation of a fully-developed formal theory of literature.

The importance of structuralist humanist research rests on the fact that it has been able to abandon the
functional explanation of linguistic structuralism without becoming a theoretical science of literature. Because of this it has been able to reassert, or rather to continue to perform, the broad range of activities traditionally associated with literary scholarship even while incorporating some structuralist methodology. It, therefore, seems to offer a compromise solution to the internal crisis of literary scholarship, a middle ground somewhere between the traditional but now shaky position of Denis Donoghue, the poetic criticism of Geoffrey Hartman, the now highly questionable linguistic structures of linguistic structuralism and the formal logic of Jerzy Kmita.

In order to explore fully the possibility that structuralist humanism may in fact have found such a middle ground it has proven necessary to discuss some of the other existing alternatives. In order to keep this study within reasonable boundaries I have had to limit that discussion to a consideration in a superficial manner of the methodology of traditional literary scholarship, positivist literary scholarship and linguistic structuralism. (See pp. 59-60 for a description of how that discussion has been distributed among the remaining parts of the study.) Although Jerzy Kmita's analysis has been crucial in shaping my understanding of traditional literary scholarship and of linguistic structuralism, I have had to abandon most of his
terminology in the course of preparing this study.

The replacement of his terminology has been made necessary by Kmita's assumption that a theoretical science of literature is not only possible but the inevitable culmination of a literary scholarship which wishes to have reliable results. One of the assumptions underlying my study is that such an assertion is something which would have to be proven in the course of discussion and should, therefore, not be built into our terminology at the start. As will be obvious at the end of this study, it is, in fact, my belief that it is something which cannot be either proven or disproven. There are also other reasons for my abandonment of Kmita's terminology. Although Kmita has provided strong arguments for the possibility of a theoretical science, he has in the process created a terminology which rejects well-established literary methodologies. These methodologies have provided us with some of our most important literary scholarship and, before literary scholars agree to reject them, we should first explore not only the possibility of their continuing usefulness but also the possible limitations of the theoretical science of literature in whose name Kmita has rejected them.

Although a detailed analysis of Kmita's work is not possible within the scope of this study, certain reservations about his theoretical science of literature
immediately present themselves. Kmita's logical theories are, despite his Marxist elements, obviously drawn from neo-positivist sources. In fact, his anti-positivist naturalism is either very close to the type of empirical science which Ryszard Wójcicki has described at length in his study *Formal Methodology of the Empirical Sciences: Basic Concepts and Problems* or else marks a return to linguistic structuralist modes of explanation. The change from pre-theoretical to theoretical science which Kmita has called anti-positivist is most likely the same as the change from "verifiable truths" to "falsifiable hypotheses" which Karl Popper introduced into neo-positivist thought in the 1930's. All of these similarities lead me to suspect that, although Kmita's recent work marks an improvement over a linguistic structuralist science of literature because of his greater theoretical sophistication, he will in all likelihood encounter on a higher level of explanation the same difficulties which linguistic structuralism has already encountered, in part because of its own positivist elements. Both because of these reservations and because the structuralist humanism I am describing has developed in part as an attempt to overcome the positivist elements in linguistic structuralism, I have been unable to use Jerzy Kmita's terminology.
In attempting to replace that terminology I have turned to a relatively unknown Russian philosopher and methodologist Boris Engel'gardt. Engel'gardt's terminology has proven useful because he used it to study both the methodology of Aleksandr Nikolaevič Veselovskij whose positivist-inspired literary scholarship preceded Russian Formalism and the methodology of the Russian Formalists themselves.²⁰⁵ Engel'gardt was both a contemporary and a sympathizer of the Formalist movement.²⁰⁶ His terminology and his analyses, therefore, represent an attempt by someone who was present at the start of the development of Slavic linguistic semiotic structuralism to understand the implications of what was going on. As I have suggested in Part III, Chapter I, he was, in fact, able to foresee some of the dangers inherent in the "formalist method" even as he defended it.

It is this combination of sympathy and detachment which has made his terminology a relatively neutral alternative. This neutrality is further enhanced by the fact that Boris Engel'gardt is not well enough known to have become associated with any well-defined movement in philosophy or literary scholarship. If I were to write of the phenomenological reduction, the existentialist choice, the semiotic system, "the theory systematizing humanist interpretation" or the ideological superstructure at the basis
of all literary scholarship, then I would already have linked my line of reasoning with one of the debating positions among which structuralist humanism is seeking to mediate.

Engelgardt's work has provided me with three terms, "method," "the cognitive transformation," and "the projective method." Engelgardt's own definitions of "method" and "the cognitive transformation" are given on p. 153, while his definition of "the projective method" is given on p. 164. In this study I am using the term "method" to describe any systematic procedure for bringing about a cognitive transformation in the object of study. A cognitive transformation is understood as a process of selecting among the infinite features which an object manifests as it first appears in consciousness in the phenomenologists' sense of the term or which a phenomenon in experience has before the perceiving mind acts on it in the Kantian sense of the term. Methodology is, therefore, the study of how different scholarships produce cognitive transformations in their objects of study, and a methodological scholarship is one with a well-articulated methodology.

Engelgardt has described any method which studies cultural objects as objects existing outside of and beyond the control of human consciousness as a projective method. Structuralist humanism is a methodological scholarship
which has developed, at least in part, in opposition to the projective methods of determinist Marxism and linguistic structuralism. The concept of the projective method has proven essential to this study both because of the role which it has played in the development of linguistic structuralism and because of the manner in which traditional literary scholarship has employed an inductive projective method, often only implicit, in order to avoid methodological discussion. I have discussed the issues involved in more detail in Parts II and III of the study.

The projective method also is involved in my definition of "theory." I have accepted Jerzy Kmita's understanding of a theory as a universally valid set of general statements combined with a set of particular statements capable of interpreting all the phenomena within a given discipline.\textsuperscript{210} I have also accepted his assertion that the presence of such a theory is the distinguishing characteristic of a scientific discipline. Finally, I have also adopted the distinction between a pre-theoretical science which views its statements as verifiable and its results as verified truths and a theoretical science which views its statements as falsifiable hypotheses and its results as not-yet-falsified rather than verified.\textsuperscript{211}

The projective method is important here because the generally accepted demand that any science meet standards of "inter-subjective falsifiability"\textsuperscript{212} requires the
scientist to view his research activities as under the control of the theory itself rather than of his own consciousness. It is this claim which has given empirical science its high social status as the best source of reliable knowledge of external reality. But, it also means that any science of literature must function within the possibilities offered by the projective method. It cannot appeal directly to the intuitive or creative powers, if they exist, of human consciousness. The second part and the first chapter of the third part of this study are a preliminary exploration of the role which this limitation has played in the development of positivist literary scholarship and linguistic structuralism. Structuralist humanism represents, as I have explained in Part III, an attempt to remove these limitations by changing the status of the structures which linguistic structuralism has created.

In this study, therefore, although Jerzy Kmita's naturalist view that there is only one science and that it can be applied to all disciplines has been accepted, I have not accepted his further assertion that all scholarship and all knowledge must be scientific. I have instead made the more limited assertion that all scholarship must be methodological in the sense explained above of basing its activities on a conscious cognitive transformation of
the material of study. It is this sense of the term methodology which is at the basis of Janusz Ślawinski's structuralist humanism. It is important to emphasize at the start of the study that he has no intentions of creating a fully scientific literary scholarship.

In order to convey Ślawinski's position I have replaced the term "pre-science" with the term "non-theoretical eclecticism" as a description of traditional literary scholarship. The term "non-theoretical eclecticism" is meant to be a description and not a criticism of the methodology which in my opinion governs the working consciousness of most American scholars of literature today. That consciousness is "non-theoretical" in that it openly resists the formation of the kind of universal "theory systematizing humanist interpretation" which Jerzy Kmita has justly argued a science of literature would require (see p. 77). It is "eclectic" because it insists that every text, author and movement should be explained with the methods and terminology which their individual characteristics require. It is in an attempt to keep my terminology neutral that I have replaced "pre-scientific" with "non-theoretical and what Kmita would call "ad hoc explanation" with "eclecticism." For the same reason I have replaced "developmental-genetic explanation" with "historical-genetic explanation."
When I speak of "non-theoretical eclecticism," I mean an approach to literary scholarship which is based on the following assumptions: 1) the literary text exists in external reality as an individual object capable of determining our perceptions of it; 2) the literary text exists in the form in which it was created by a particular person at a particular time in a particular place; 3) the only proper form of explanation in literary scholarship is an historical-genetic interpretation which employs the point of view and terminology of the person, place and time by whom and at which the text was created. This scholarship, as it is practiced in American literary scholarship today, employs a projective method.²¹⁵

I have discussed in some detail in Part II the question of whether this type of literary scholarship can avoid methodological discussion by denying the presence within itself of a cognitive transformation of its material. It can assert that the text has not been transformed because it has controlled our perceptions of itself. This discussion, because it is part of a study of structuralist humanism, could only concern itself with the objections which non-theoretical eclecticism would have to structuralist humanist methodology. I have, therefore, been able to consider only in passing a problem which a thorough investigation of contemporary literary scholarship would have
to explore in greater detail.

This problem involves the assumption that there is, or ever was, such a thing as traditional literary scholarship. German hermeneutic literary scholarship with its method of "understanding," Anglo-American New Criticism and Russian Formalism could be considered non-theoretical eclecticism given my definition of the term. They all, in their different manners, view the literary text as a particular object which must be interpreted in its own terms. However, they all have highly developed methodologies for the interpretation of literary texts. This leads me to believe that non-theoretical eclecticism has both methodological and non-methodological variants.

The presence of these two variants leads me to believe that if we were to abandon the perspective of structuralism and the other scientific literary scholarships, historical research would show that every age has had its non-methodological literary scholars. In other words, methodological literary scholarship is not something which began suddenly at the start of this century. In all likelihood, historical research will someday show that the very idea of an undifferentiated traditional literary scholarship, a notion which is still reflected in my own Formalist and structuralist terminology, was created at the start of this century in the disputes between a
Bohemian avant-garde which had to have something to attack and an academic scholarship which had to have something to defend.  

This is why structuralist humanism can provide an important perspective on the internal and external crisis in the humanities which I have described in this chapter. That crisis has been caused largely by the belief that science has somehow created a new social reality in which the humanities can no longer fulfill their traditional social function. Linguistic structuralism drew much of its early literary inspiration from the futurist atmosphere which accompanied the turn of the century industrial transformation of European society. Structuralist humanism, however, was developed by Polish scholars who had first-hand experience in the war of what that industrialization could lead to and had an equally intense experience in the Stalinist period of what a self-proclaimed, "new", scientific literary scholarship could lead to. The methodology which they employ is designed to provide a means for the tasks which have traditionally been associated with literary scholarship to be continued rather than to redefine some tasks and replace the others with more modern, scientific ones. It is this mixture of theory and eclecticism, of traditional literary scholarship and structuralism which has allowed Janusz Sławiński to pose, and,
thereby, to take the first steps toward solving, some of the most serious questions facing the humanities today.
NOTES: PART I

1 Hegel made this comment in one of the casual notes preserved in his own hand at Widener. The translation is that of Carl J. Friedrich, who used it as an epigraph to his anthology of Hegel's writings. Carl J. Friedrich, ed., The Philosophy of Hegel (New York, 1954). I have used it as an epigraph to my study because it reflects my attitude toward the scholars whose methodologies I have analyzed in the body of the study.

2 There is a problem with translating the Polish word nauka into English. It may often mean either 'science' or 'scholarship'. I have used the term 'scholarship' here because Roman Zimand is speaking of literary scholarship in the sense in which German scholars speak of Literaturwissenschaft. Jerzy Kmita himself, however, has been trained as a formal logician as well as a literary scholar and has close ties with the methodology of the natural sciences. Kmita's work is described in Chapter V of Part I. In this study, in order to avoid a priori value judgements, I am using the term "scholarship" to refer to any reasonably coherent intellectual activity. In Janusz Sławiński's terminology and in my own, "literary criticism" is only one part of literary scholarship (See Conclusion Chapter I).

3 Henryk Markiewicz and Janusz Sławiński, ed., Problemy metodologiczne współczesnego literaturoznawstwa (Kraków, 1976), 509. All of the translations in this study are my own unless otherwise indicated.

4 Markiewicz and Sławiński, Problemy, 528.

5 This is the word which Eugenio Donato and Richard Macksey used to describe the situation in the title of a volume of the papers presented at a conference held at the Johns Hopkins Humanities Center on October 18-21, 1966, to discuss, among other things, the role of structuralism in the humanities. Eugenio Donato and Richard Macksey, ed., The Structuralist Controversy: The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man (Baltimore, 1970).
6 Even a scholar of the stature of Eric Auerbach in his extensive study of Western European literature treats Russian literature as a result of Russia's belated attempt to come to terms with European realities. Eric Auerbach, *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature*, trans. by Willard R. Trask (Princeton, 1953), 520-24.


8 Ewa Thompson has provided a lucid account of the real differences which existed between the two groups. Ewa M. Thompson, *Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New Criticism* (The Hague, 1971).


11 These two paragraphs have been written in satirical style. One need only remember, however, the Parisian and American reactions when Mickiewicz and Solzhenitsyn moved from a criticism of Russian society to a criticism of Western society. The literary scholarship of Janusz Sławiński and Jerzy Kmita, although it arguably began as a reaction to Stalinism, has similarly developed ideas
which are direct or indirect criticisms of some of the methodological assumptions of American literary scholarship.


13 Konwicki, Komplex, 93.

14 Konwicki, Komplex, 78.

15 Konwicki, Komplex, 22.

16 The proceedings of this conference were published in Księga referatów--Zjazd naukowy im. Ignacego Krasickiego, (Lwów, 1936), and in Pamiętnik Literacki, Rocznik XXXIII, z. 1-3 (Lwów, 1936). A satirical account of the proceedings appeared in the popular press; see Karol Irzykowski, "Monachomachia literacka," Pion, 1935, nr. 27, 2.

17 Juliusz Kleiner's understanding of the work of Wilhelm Dilthey was heavily influenced by Kleiner's own literary culture. See on this point Michał Głowśni, "Studium lektury: Słowacki czytany przez Kleineru" in Michał Głowśni, Style Odbioru (Kraków, 1977).

18 Manfred Kridl described his view of literary scholarship, which he called "the integral method," in his synthetic work, Manfred Kridl, Wstęp do badań nad dziełem literackim, Z zagadnień poetyki, nr 1, Wilno, 1936. The closer one examines the issue of who is, or was, a Formalist scholar, the more complicated a question it becomes. Victor Erlich (Erlich, Russian Formalism, 164-66) describes Kridl as having made the transition from Russian Formalism to Czech structuralism. Maria Rzeuska, in a somewhat angry comment at the conference which officially de-Stalinized Polish literary scholarship, insisted that Kridl had nothing to do with Russian Formalism and was instead under the influence of English and German scholarship. She continued her comment to assert that the only true Formalists in Poland before the Second World War had been Marxists (see Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów 10-13 grudnia, 1958 (Wrocław, 1960 , 283). Rzeuska's comments obviously reflect her anger at the Russian role in her country's
history. The reason I have mentioned them here is to emphasize once more the need for a comprehensive historical study of the entire period in Eastern European literary scholarship. Formalism and Marxism could be combined in Polish thought because they were both seen as challenges to the prevailing romanticism of the official culture of the time.

Another Polish scholar from between the wars who might reasonably be called a Formalist was Kazimierz Wóycicki. Henryk Markiewicz has included some of his articles in the two-volume anthology; Henryk Markiewicz, ed., *Teoria badań literackich w Polsce, Wypisy, Biblioteka Studiów Literackich* (Kraków, 1960). Franciszek Siedlecki, a specialist in the study of metrics who was in personal contact with Roman Jakobson and the Prague Circle, was involved in the formation of a literary circle at Warsaw University which included David Hopensztand, author of a study of indirect speech (David Hopensztand, "Mowa pozniesie zależna w kontekście Czarnych skrzydł Kadena-Bandrowskiego," *Prace ofiarowane Kazimierzowi Wóycickiemu, z zagadnień poetyki, VI* (Wilno, 1937), and two scholars who will be discussed later in this study, Kazimierz Budzik and Stefan Żółkiewski. As Siedlecki's letter to Jakobson indicates (R. Jakobson, "List", Jankowski, ed., *Literatura. Komparyst. Folklor. Księga poświęcona Julianowi Krzyżanowskiemu* (Warszawa, 1968), 664-74.), the entire group was interested in the possibility of combining Formalist-structuralist techniques with Marxism to provide a larger, synthetic theory of literature. The entire question of who is a Formalist and who is a structuralist has been so confused by the tendency to view a Formalist as inherently better than a non-formalist and a structuralist as better than a Formalist that I have found it impossible to unravel the situation in this study.

19 Julian Krzyżanowski demonstrated the value of that research in a work which was originally published in 1935 and is still the standard source on the relationship between Polish literature and folklore. See Julian Krzyżanowski, *Paralele. Studia porównawcze z pogranicza literatury i folkloru*, Wydanie IV (Warszawa, 1977). Krzyżanowski was a comparativist, folklorist and literary historian of broad interests. His other standard work on the history of Polish literature has been recently published in English translation and contains an extensive bibliography of reference works on and English translations of Polish literature. It is necessary to inform the English-speaking reader that Krzyżanowski's style in Polish is far better than that of the English translation. The value of the

20 Roman Ingarden's work has finally begun to receive the credit it deserves. His two volumes on the phenomenology of literature have recently been published in English. See Roman Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art. An Investigation on the Borderlines of Ontology, Logic and Theory of Literature, trans. George G. Grabowicz (Evanston, 1973) and Roman Ingarden. The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art, trans. by Ruth Ann Crowley and Kenneth R. Olson (Evanston, 1973). Both volumes contain good introductions written by the translators. The other study in English of Ingarden's work of which I am aware is the Chapter on Ingarden in R. Magliola, Phenomenology and Literature. An Introduction (West Lafayette, 1977). A volume of Polish studies of Ingarden's work has also been published in English translation by the Polish Academy of Sciences; see Piotr Graff and Sław Krezmień-Ojak, ed., Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics (Warsaw, 1975).

21 Konrad Górska also summarized the proceedings of the 1935 conference in a paper which he presented at the 1958 conference. Konrad Górska, "Przegląd stanowisk metodologicznych w polskiej historii literatury do r. 1939", Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów, 89-123.

22 Stefania Skwarczyńska's "genealogical theory" remains virtually unknown outside of Poland. Skwarczyńska has developed a terminology and style of writing which is different not only from that of any established American literary scholarships but also from that of other Polish literary scholarships as well. Stanisław Dąbrowski has revised and critically appraised her theory in his study Teoria Geneologiczna Stefani Skwarczyńskiej (Próba analizy i krytyki), Gdanskie Towarzystwo Naukowe Wydział I Nauk Społecznych i Humanistycznych, Seria Monografii Nr 47 (Gdańsk, 1974).

In the course of preparing this study I have been unable to give her writings the attention they deserve. It is to be hoped that someone will undertake the task of presenting her theory in a form which the American reader can understand.
23 There have already been some impressive steps taken in this direction. Victor Terras has written an appreciative study of the organic aesthetics of the nineteenth century Russian literary scholar Vissarion Belinskij. Viktor Terras, Belinskij and Russian Literary Criticism. The Heritage of Organic Aesthetics (Madison, 1974). Richard Sheldon has attempted to rehabilitate Viktor Šklovskij both through the translation of his works into English and in an appreciative introduction; Richard Sheldon, "Viktor Šklovsky and the Device of Ostensible Surrender", in Third Factory, ed. and trans. Richard Sheldon (Ann Arbor, 1977), vii–xxxi. The standard account and one with which Sheldon is in open disagreement is that of Viktor Erlich (Erlich, Russian Formalism, 118–39). Ewa Thompson's account of the growth and decline of Russian Formalism is closer to that of Sheldon (see on this point Sheldon, "Šklovsky", xxviii).

24 Jurij Striedter, also in a polemic with Erlich, has made a similar point in his introduction to the German edition of the writings of the Czech literary historian Felix Vodička. Striedter describes the role which the work of Otokar Hostinsky and Otokar Zich played in the development of what has been called Czech structuralism. Felix Vodička, Die Struktur des literarischen Entwicklung, Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen Künste, trans. and intro. by Jurij Striedter (München, 1976), ix–xv.

25 The variety of approaches present at the conference is especially striking if we compare it with the relative uniformity of the approaches represented at the conference held to discuss the work of Jan Kochanowski in 1884. The papers, most notable among which were those of Piotr Chmielewski and Stanisław Tarnowski, were published as "Pamiętnik zjazdu historyczno-literackiego imienia Jana Kochanowskiego" in Archiwum do dziejów literatury i oświaty w Polsce, t. V (Kraków, 1886). The differences show the rapid improvements which Polish scholarship had made since the country regained its independence.

26 In order to emphasize the existence of this tradition Walter Kroll began a German collection of contemporary Polish articles on literary scholarship with a discussion of the rhetorical scholarship of Maciej Kazimierz Sarbiewski

27
Górski, Przegląd, 119-20.

28
One of the worst losses was the death of a scholar who has not been mentioned in this survey, the Polish scholar of German literature Zygmunt Łęmpicki. Łęmpicki had a broad knowledge of European literary history, theory and aesthetics and died in the prime of his career in a German concentration camp. His major writings have been collected in a two-volume edition by Henryk Markiewicz with appreciative introductions by Roman Ingarden and Bogdan Suchodolski. Zygmunt Łęmpicki, Wybór Pism, t. I: Studia z teorii literatury, t. II: Renesans, Oświecenie, Romantyzm (Warszawa, 1966).

29

30
The proceedings of this conference have been published in the volume O sytuacji w historii literatury polskiej, ed. by Jan Baculewski (Kraków, 1951). There were truly Marxist scholars before the war such as Ignacy Fik, but they appear to have had little influence. His article "Charakter społeczny literatury" has been re-published by Markiewicz (Markiewicz, Teoria, v. II, 292-314).

31
Baculewski, O sytuacji, 5.

32
The development of Stefan Żółkiewski's thought provides an interesting example of the role of Marxism in Polish scholarship. He began as a student of Franciszek Siedlecki (see footnote 18) and in 1938 he argued in an inflammatory style that linguistics was going to solve all the problems of literary scholarship. Stefan Żółkiewski, "Powrót do Itaki", in Teoria badań literackich w Polsce, t. II, ed. by Henryk Markiewicz (Kraków, 1960), 251-55. In the Stalinist period he embraced Marxism as the only scientific approach and supervised its institutional
implementation. He continued to defend Marxism by combining it with semiotics at the 1960 conference on semiotics. See Stefan Żółkiewski, "De l'integration des Études littéraires", in Poetics. Poetika. Poëtika (Warszawa, 1961), 763-94. His position has continued to represent a combination of Marxism and semiotics. However, he is now applying it to a more limited area of study, literary culture, and is once again in opposition to the official culture. He closes his largest study of literary culture by urging that perhaps someday Poland should adopt a rational cultural policy based on a semiotics of culture (Stefan Żółkiewski, Kultura literacka 1918-1932 (Wrocław, 1973), 463-69).

The distinguishing characteristics of his work are probably his enthusiastic maximalism and a tendency, which may stem from his neo-positivism of the mid-1930's (see on this point H. Markiewicz, Teoria badań literackich w Polsce, t. II, 350), to view scholarship as the determination of the large structural patterns governing human thought. The important thing for Polish scholarship is that his Marxist literary culture co-exists peacefully with the structuralist humanism of Janusz Slawiński and its sociology of literary forms (see Part III, Chapter IV).

33

Mieczysław Klimowicz has provided a general account of the Institute's origins and present activities. Mieczysław Klimiowicz, "The Institute of Literary Studies--Its Present Day and Prospects" in Sociology of Literature in Poland. Sociologie de la Littérature en Pologne, ed. by Hanna Dziechcińska (Wrocław, 1978), 7-14. In that article Klimowicz quotes Żółkiewski's description of the feelings of the young people who founded the Institute, "To these young people the renewal of literary study was to stem from the criticism of Positivism, from Marxism, and the scientific sociology of literature based on precise theoretical results of linguistically understood poetics, or morphology of the literary work, free from critical impressionism."

The passage is indicative of Żółkiewski's understanding of linguistic semiotics and Marxism as two compatible scientific views of literature.

34

Stefan Żółkiewski, Stare i nowe literaturoznawstwo. Szkice Krytyczno-naukowe (Wrocław, 1950).

35

Stefan Żółkiewski, Badania nad literaturą polską. Dorobek, stan i potrzeby (Kraków, 1951).
36 He has gathered much of this work into a recent publication. Stefan Żółkiewski, *Kultura, Socjologia, Semiotyka literacka. Studia* (Warszawa, 1979).

37 See, for example, Henryk Markiewicz, *O Marksistowskiej teorii literatury. Szkice*, Wydanie drugie (Wrocław, 1953), 89, footnote 3 where he outlines three different understandings of the term 'reflection' (odbiecie) in Marxist-Leninist scholarship.


41 Kazimierz Budzyk's writings were published by his widow and by his former student, Janusz Sławiński, in the posthumous volume, *K. Budzyk, Stylistyka--Poetyka--Teoria literatury*, ed. by H. Budzykowa, J. Sławiński (Wrocław, 1966).

42 Czeslaw Zgorzelski has played a major role in establishing a high quality Catholic literary scholarship in Poland both through his work as a researcher and teacher since 1950 at the Catholic University in Lublin and through his collaboration since 1956 with the Catholic journal *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

43 Kazimierz Wyka was one of those talented literary figures who was able to work comfortably in both scholarly forms of writing and in the essay style which borders on
literature itself. He had institutional affiliations with Marxism but always remained a predominantly literary figure. For an appreciative, but brief, summary of his role in Polish letters see Czesław Miłosz, The History of Polish Literature (New York, 1969), 515-16.

44
The proceedings of the congress were published in Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów.

45
Tadeusz Kotarbiński, the president of the Polish Academy of Sciences noted this in one of the several ceremonial speeches which opened the congress, Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów, 9-14.

46
Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów, 9-14.

47

48
M. Janion "O perspektywach badan genetycznych w historii literatury", Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów, 149-246.

49

50
There is, of course, the potential for distortion in the fact that the volume is a censored version of the proceedings. There are also occasional signs of real resentment and anger in the comments (see footnote 18). However, the desire to avoid a return to a confrontational situation appears to have been real.

51
Hernas' major articles on folklore have appeared in the journal Literatura Ludowa of which he is the editor. He described the general situation of the study of folklore in Poland in the article "Miejsce badań nad folklorem literackim", Markiewicz and Sławiński, Problemy, 467-481. Hernas has also written history of the Polish Baroque. Czesław Hernas, Barok (Warszawa, 1976).
52
Mieczysław Klimowicz, Oświecenie (Warszawa, 1975).

53
See his general survey of literary scholarship in
Henryk Markiewicz, Główne problemy wiedzy o literaturze
(Kraków, 1965) and the recent collection of his articles,
Henryk Markiewicz, Przekroje i zbiżenia dawne i nowe.
Rozprawy i szkice z wiedzy o literaturze (Warszawa, 1976).

54
Markiewicz, Teoria badań literackich w Polsce,
Henryk Markiewicz, ed., Współczesna teoria badań literackich
Henryk Markiewicz, Sztuka interpretacji, t. I-II

55
Jan Błoński has worked as a historian of literature
as well as a critic. Jan Błoński, Mikołaj Sep Szarzyński
a początki polskiego baroku (Kraków, 1967). For some of his
early criticism see Jan Błoński, Zmiana Warty (Warszawa,
1961).

56
This research has culminated in their joint publica-
tion, Maria Janion and Maria Żmigrodzka, Romantyzm i
Historia (Warszawa, 1978).

57
Maria Janion, "Historia literatury a historia idei
(Propozycja nowej problematyzacji)", Markiewicz, Sławiński,
ed., Problemy metodologiczne, 64-67. Also published in
French translation as Maria Janion, "Histoire de la
littérature et histoire des idées (Proposition d'une nou-
velle problematisation)" in Theory of Literature in Poland.
Theorie de la litterature en Pologne, ed. by Hanna
Dziechcińska (Wrocław, 1978).

58
This work has culminated in his history of the

59
Balcerzan has written a work on the problems of
translation, Styl i poetyka twórczości dwujęzycznej Brunona
Jasieńskiego, Z zagadnień teorii przekładu (Wrocław, 1968).
He is not only a theoretician of literature but a poet and
critic as well. For his poetry see Edward Balcerzan,

60


61

I have, of course, not been able to describe all of the literary research which is being done in Poland. Much good historical research is also being done by scholars associated with the Institute of Literary Research of the Polish Academy of Sciences. For a general account of their activities the reader may turn to the Klimowicz article cited in footnote 33. See also my comments in footnote 81 on how the Institute has changed since its founding as a center of Marxist literary scholarship. The point of this discussion was to show how quickly the universities re-established themselves as leading research centers after the Stalinist period and to describe the overall atmosphere in which Janusz Sławinski works.

62

For a general survey of the development of semiotics the reader may turn to two articles published in Studia z historii semiotyki. Semiotic Historical Studies, ed. by Jan Sułkowski (Wrocław, 1976): Roman Jakobson, "Coup d'oeil sur le development de la semiotique", 9-26 and Thomas Sebeok, "'Semiotics' and Its Cogeners", 27-38. As will become apparent in the course of this study, there are serious reasons to doubt the validity of a new universal 'discipline' or 'philosophy', as semiotics sometimes calls itself, which has incorporated without comment contradictory definitions of its most basic terminology. The reader of this study need only compare the work of Jerzy Kmita, Roman Jakobson and Jurij Lotman, all of whom may with good reason be called literary semioticians.

63

Maria Renata Mayenowa was kind enough to meet with me when I was in Poland and explain not only the personal role of Roman Jakobson but also many other aspects of Polish literary scholarship. Jakobson's seminars are described briefly by the planners of the 1960 semiotics conference whose papers were published in the volume Poetics. Poetyka. Poëtika, v.
Poetics.


Maria Renata Mayenowa, Poetyka teoretyczna. Zagadnienia języka (Wrocław, 1974). For a study by a Polish scholar who works with Mayenowa and is close to her position see Teresa Dobczyńska, Delimitacja tekstu literackiego (Wrocław, 1969).

Jerzy Faryno has summarized some of the results of his study in the textbook Vvedenie v literaturovedenie čast' I (Wstęp do literaturoznawstwa, Część I) (Katowice, 1978). The test is in Russian. Faryno has also discussed their work in Polish; Jerzy Faryno, "Propozycje semiotykow radzieckich", Teksty, 1, 1972, 158-73.


Jerzy Pelc has credited Twardowski with founding semiotic study in Poland and published several of his articles in the anthology Semiotics in Poland 1894-1969, ed. by Jerzy Pelc (Warszawa, 1979). The reaction of this philosophical tradition to Marxism-Leninism has been described in Z. A. Jordan, Philosophy and Ideology. The Development of Philosophy and Marxism-Leninism in Poland Since the Second World War, Sovietica Monographs of the
Institute of East-European Studies University of Fribourg/Switzerland, ed. by J. M. Bochenski (Dordrecht, 1963).

71
This article is now available in Alfred Tarski, Metamathematics (Oxford, 1956), 152-277. It was originally read to the Warsaw scientific society on March 21, 1931 (Tarski, Metamathematics, 152).

72
Some of Ajdukiewicz's work has been republished recently in the volume Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, Logika pragmatyczna (Warszawa, 1975).

73

74
Jerzy Pelc has published some of the important articles in English translation; Pelc, Semiotics. The logical semioticians have published their work in the series Studia semiotyczne edited by Pelc and in the companion series Studia z historii semiotyki. Semiotic Historical Studies. The articles in both of these series are often published in Western European languages in order for foreign readers to have access to Polish research. Their views on language have been clearly expressed in Adam Nowaczyk, Barbara Stanosz, Logiczne podstawy języka (Wrocław, 1976), a publication of the Polish Semiotic Society.

75
In my opinion the future of semiotic literary scholarship will be decided by the success or failure of the attempt to develop a logical theory of literature. Sławiński's structuralism has moved away from semiotics as a scientific discipline. Jan Mukařovský was also doing so at the end of his scholarly career. See Janusz Sławiński "Jan Mukařovský: Program estetyki strukturalnej", in Dzieło, Język, Tradycja (Warszawa, 1974), 223-241.

76
I have discussed Kmita's work in a general manner on pp. 75-90. Anna Zeidler has summarized the group's early activities. Anna Zeidler, "Zwiazki logiki z estetyką. Koncepcje metodologów poznańskich", Studia o współczesnej estetyce polskiej (Warszawa, 1977), 125-43.
See, for example, Leszek Nowak, *U podstaw dialektyki marksowskiej. Próba interpretacji kategorialnej* (Warszawa, 1977).


There has also been a considerable body of Polish research in philosophy. Two good studies available in English translation are Stefan Morawski, *Inquiries into the Fundamentals of Aesthetics* (Cambridge, MA, 1974) and Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought From the Enlightenment to Marxism*, trans. by Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, 1979).

The Polish word *pracownia* literally means 'Workshop'. I have translated it as "department" because "workshop" is not commonly used in English to describe a scholarly unit.

The circumstances and attitudes surrounding the founding of the Institute were described in footnote 33. It is one of the ironies of Polish intellectual life that the institute which was founded to introduce Marxism-Leninism into Polish literary scholarship has now become the home not only for those who were driven out of or left the University of Warsaw as a result of the student riots of 1968 but also for just plain scholarly research which has little or nothing to do with Marxism as it was conceived in 1948. This does not mean that the Institute is anti-Marxist. It has simply become a scientific and scholarly institution which uses whatever methods are appropriate to the given material of study and protects with its institutional support sound scholarship whenever it is threatened. The study of how this transformation has occurred would make an interesting chapter in the sociology of Polish scholarship.
Klimowicz, "Institute", 11.

The reader may check the Klimowicz article cited in footnote 33 for a general summary of those activities.


For an example of the tense atmosphere of the time the interested reader may turn to the discussion of the care with which the 1958 conference was prepared (Zjazd Naukowy Polonistów, ix-xxi). Kazimierz Wyka's report was read and discussed by all the members of the committee before it was presented (p. xx). The textbook was rewritten in 1967 and is now in its fourth edition under the title Zarys teorii literatury. The authors are currently working on a new edition to reflect the changes in their understanding of literary scholarship.

Both Michał Głowinski and Janusz Sławiński worked as practicing literary critics for the journal Twórczość during the mid-fifties. Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska still works on institutional and pedagogical matters concerned with the teaching of literature in the schools. Janusz Sławiński has also published a recent article on the subject; Janusz Sławiński, "Literatura w szkole: dziś i jutro", Teksty, 5-6, 1977, 1-19.

The title of the series was chosen by Kazimierz Budzyk who published the first volume in 1963. K. Budzyk, ed., Z teorii i historii literatury. Prace poświęcone V międzynarodowemu kongresowi slawistów w Sofii (Wrocław,
1963). Janusz Sławiński has been the general editor of the series since the seventeenth volume which appeared in 1969.

89 Teresa Kostkiewiczowa is a specialist in Eighteenth Century literature. She has written an important study of the three major literary movements of that period. Teresa Kostkiewiczowa, Klasycyzm, Sentymentalizm, Rokoko, Szkice o pradach literackich polskiego Oświecenia. (Warszawa, 1975).


91 See Klimowicz, "Institute", 8-11.


93 Jan Błoński, "Miasta", Teksty, 1, 1972, 80-89.

94 Stefan Treugutt, "Orientacja wedle nazwisk", Teksty, 1, 1972, 53-61.


97 Jan Błoński, for example, opened one issue by saying that he was bored with the whole enterprise, that the articles had become monotonous and overly predictable and then finally decided to go on publishing the journal anyway. Jan Błoński, "Po co Teksty?" ('What good are Texts?'), Teksty, 1, 1976, 1-6.
Janusz Sławiński, in "Literatura w szkole: dziś i jutro", suggested half-seriously that public school teachers should no longer be allowed to contaminate great literature by using it in their classrooms. There is a serious point hidden in Sławiński's humor. Are mature adults more or less likely to read great literature if they have been forced, when they were still too young to appreciate its value, not only to read it, but also to memorize facts about authors' lives and authoritative interpretations provided by school teachers? In the Polish schools the situation was made worse by the fact that the correct interpretations were often recitations of Stalinist cant.


98
Błoński, "Po co Teksty?"

99
Stanisław Barańczak, "Nasza Wola--Polska Gola", Teksty, 1, 1972, 98-113. The Polish title literally means 'Our Will is that Poland Scores'. I have translated it in the body of the study with an American equivalent to the Polish chant.

100
Some articles on Russian literature have also reportedly caused a great deal of trouble for the editors.

101
This is why Michał Głowiński has, as a scholar interested in the intellectual health of his country, supported the courses and brochures of the underground university (see Introduction, footnote 4).

102

103
In 1978, for example, it was staged in a full version which ran for two nights in Wrocław. In Warsaw both Part IV and Part III were performed in separate productions.

104
The scholars who ousted Sławiński, Głowiński and Okopień-Sławińska have since created what they call a new "pragmatic poetics". Pragmatic poetics is based on the
assumption that Plato, Marx and Baxtin are examples of dialogical and therefore also of dialectical and Marxist thinkers. The principles of their poetics have been described in the volumes Problemy poetyki pragmatycznej, ed. by Eugeniusz Czaplęwicz (Warszawa, 1978) and Dialog w literaturze, ed. by Eugeniusz Czaplęwicz and Edward Kasperski (Warszawa, 1978). I have not been able to examine this dialogical thought in detail in this study. One immediately has doubts about any attempt to equate Plato, Marx and Baxtin without any indication of the differences between the work of three men who surely are as different as they are similar. In particular, there seems to be a great deal of difference between Baxtin's dialogical thought which asserts that a carnival atmosphere can temporarily negate all social forms and Marxist dialectics which predicts and analyzes the inevitable historical progression of those forms. Baxtin's Marxism was most likely a pose. One suspects the same about that of "pragmatic poetics." Although I have not been able to discuss it in this study, the article by Wincenty Grajewski seems to be a more restrained treatment of the subject than the other articles published in the two volumes. Wincenty Grajewski, "Maszyny dialogowe", in Czaplęwicz, Dialog, 219-36.


106 Eugeniusz Czaplęwicz, "Co to za Vademecum?" (What kind of a Come with me is it?), Przegląd, 197-204.


108 I have discussed the reasons for this in a general manner in footnote 104.


110 Janusz Sławiński, "Zaproszenie do tematu", in Literatura wobec, ed. by Głowiński and Sławiński, 7-16.
This, of course, does not mean that there was not real heroism during the war. There was. One of the things which, at first, surprises a foreigner in Poland is the anger which many young Polish intellectuals feel when government-sponsored folk dancers come on television. To the foreigner it is pure entertainment and a fine preservation of the national heritage. To the young Poles it is often seen as something which is being used by the government to block the channels of mass communication so that there can be no communication of real information about the country's situation. The same thing may be said about the official heroism of the war.

Białoszewski's work has been recently published in English translation. Miron Białoszewski, A Memoir of the Warsaw Uprising, trans. by Madeline Levine (Ann Arbor, 1977). The Polish text was first published in 1970.

Maria Janion has provided one such explanation in her article "Wojna i forma", in Głowiński and Sławiński, Literatura wobec, 187-268, by contrasting Białoszewski's realistic portrayal of the war on a personal level with the "Western" (in the sense of "cowboy") style of earlier writers such as Henryk Sienkiewicz.

Jurii Striedter has made a similar point in regard to the possibilities of a rational discussion of Marxism in Czechoslovakia and the positive effect it had on the development of Czech structuralism (Striedter, "Introduction", xv).

Henryk Markiewicz had described the relationship between Marxism and literary scholarship in the following manner: "At the same time it should be remembered that the theory of literature or the methodology of literary studies do not constitute an integral part of Marxism; in this respect literary studies are in a different situation than, e.g., economics. In particular, Marxism does not include statements on the specific laws of its development or specific criteria of its value", Henryk Markiewicz, "The Past and Present Day of Polish Literary Studies," Theory of Literature in Poland, 17-18. It is the presence of an attitude such as this on the part of Marxist scholars in Poland which has made possible a rational study of the sociology of literature.
At this point in the study I am only interested in the manner in which the different scholarships work. One need only compare two studies. In his work on how literary texts have been and are being read Michał Głowinski, obviously drawing on his work as a literary historian, came up with a list of six reading styles. He then, at the suggestion of Karlheinz Stierle, added a seventh reading style. Michał Głowinski, Style Odbioru. Szkice o komunikacji literackiej (Kraków, 1977), 131, footnote 17. Jurij Lotman, on the other hand, deduces from the internal structure of the communicative situation the three ways in which the literary text may be read. No additions to the list would be possible; see Jurij Lotman, "K probleme tipologii tekstov" in Stat'i po tipologii kul'tury. Materialy k kursu teorii literatury, 1, Tartu, 1970, 78-85.

See for example reviews by M. Milewski in Nowe książki 11, 1976, 19-20; M. Soltysiale in Wrocławski Tygodnik Katolików 26, 1976, 5; L. Mentze in Polityka, nr 2, 1977, 10; and D. Schol in Zeitschrift für Slawistik, nr 3, 1977, 426-30. A well-balanced account which is sympathetic to Sławiński's point of view is the review by Ryszard Nycz in Pamiętnik literacki, Nr 4, 1976, 393-401.

Sławiński, in fact, says that it is time for a young scholar, too enthusiastic and naive to know what he is undertaking, to make an historical study of the material involved. Sławiński, "Zaproszenie do tematu".


Ingarden, Cognition and Ingarden, Work.

Janusz Sławiński has described his work as centering around the first three problems. Janusz Sławiński, Dzieło, Język, Tradycja (Warszawa, 1974), 10. I have added the last two to cover studies not devoted to the first three problems.

The question of influence is a complex one. Many scholars in Eastern and Western Europe have been working on the same problems at the same time. They have, therefore, often come to similar conclusions. It is extremely hard to tell when it is a case of influence and when it is a case of two scholars having reached the same conclusion independently. Because this study is devoted to a methodological analysis of the different structuralisms, I have for the most part ignored questions of influence. However, it should be emphasized that the Polish scholars have drawn on the work of other Slavic and Western scholars. Michal Głowiński has been influenced by the work of the French structuralists and by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre. Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska has been influenced by Jurij Tynjanov. Janusz Sławiński is thoroughly familiar with the writings of Jan Mukařovský. He has, in fact, edited and written an introduction to the Polish edition of Mukařovský's writings. Jan Mukařovský, Wśród znaków i struktur, Wybór szkiców, wybór, redakcja i słowo wstępne J. Sławiński, Biblioteka Krytyki Współczesnej (Warszawa, 1970).

Adam Schaff has written a number of works in philosophy which have been published in English. The two most related the topic of this study are Adam Schaff, Language and Cognition, intro. by Noam Chomsky (New York, 1973) and Adam Schaff, Structuralism and Marxism (Oxford, 1978).


For a summary of the department's activities see Klimowicz, "Institute", 12.

Since published as a monograph, Janusz Lalewicz, Komunikacja językowa i literatura (Wrocław, 1975).

Gombrowicz insisted that Sartre had become a part of the problem by developing the theory of "engaged writing". In Gombrowicz's view of life, which might be called a theory of disengagement, man should strive to attain a distance from the forms of social life rather than become engaged. One interesting implication of the differences
between the views of Gombrowicz and Sartre is that Michał Głowiński's involvement with the underground university may be a result of his acceptance of Sartre's theory of engagement. Janusz Sławiński who has probably been more influenced by Gombrowicz has chosen a policy of disengagement, preferring to concern himself with the "purity" of institutional literary scholarship. It seems to me that the existence of a healthy intellectual community within Poland requires both types of activity. For Gombrowicz's comments on Sartre see Witold Gombrowicz, "J'étais structuraliste avant tout le monde", in Gombrowicz, ed. by Constantin Jelenski and Dominique de Roux, (Paris, 1971), 228-32. For Sartre's theory of engaged writing see Jean-Paul Sartre, Literature and Existentialism (Secaucus, 1972). Literature and Existentialism is Sartre's What is literature? under a new title.

129

130
Quoted and translated by Richard Sheldon, "Shklovsky", xxiv.

131

132
For example, in the article "Semantika čisla i tip kul'tury" (Lotman, Stat'ı, 58-63) Jurij Lotman makes a distinction between historical and mythical societies which is very similar to the one made by Mircea Eliade in Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, trans. by Willard R. Trask. Harper Torchbook, The Bollingen Library (New York, 1959). Since Lotman does not describe his differences with, or acknowledge his possible debt to, Eliade, his work may seem less eclectic than it really is.

133
Peirce, "Ethics", 129.

Peirce, "Ethics".

The introduction of the term "structuralist humanism" and the decision to add adjectives to describe the other Slavic structuralisms amounts to a tentative revision of the generally held view that Slavic structuralism is a unified scholarly tradition which developed as the inevitable culmination of Russian Formalist thought about literature. This view has been caused for the most part by the role which the writings and personal involvement of Roman Jakobson have played in unifying the entire movement. Victor Erlich first presented Slavic structuralism in this manner when he published his history of Russian Formalism in 1955. His 1980 preface reflects the same attitude and even questions the usefulness of a structuralist aesthetics because of the questionable status of Jakobson's linguistic analyses of poetry. Victor Erlich, "Preface", in Erlich, Russian Formalism.

In studying the work of Janusz Sławiński I have found it inappropriate to accept this view for three reasons: 1) Sławiński himself has insisted, in open polemic with the earlier edition of Erlich's book, that Jan Mukařovský's structuralism has as many differences as similarities with Russian Formalism and that Mukařovský's important work on a "structural" aesthetics marks a departure from his earlier work on poetics which was done in collaboration with Roman Jakobson. (Sławiński, "Mukařovský", in Sławiński, Dzieło, 223-241, especially 226-229); 2) Although Sławiński's own writings on literary scholarship sometimes use a Jakobsonian terminology, they are based on a combination of Mukarovsky's later writings with the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden and the concerns of post-Stalinist Polish literary culture; 3) Given the above facts, any definition of structuralism which was restrictive enough to maintain the concept of a unified development would have to be based on a normative decision to exclude either Sławiński, Mukařovský or Jakobson, or at least some aspects of their work, from literary structuralism.

Such a procedure would be pre-mature given the present lack of historical research in the structuralist tradition. I have chosen Peirce's "ethics" because he has been recognized as an authority by the linguistic semiotic structuralism whose standard view is being, at least temporarily, revised.
Peirce, "Ethics".

Peirce's "trepidation" is reminiscent of Janusz Sławiński's assertion that literary scholarship suffers from an overabundance of terminology. As Sławiński has noted, the language of literary scholarship often seems to be governed by the same principles as the literary tradition itself. Once a term has been invented it never disappears, but rather continues to be reused in new and creative contexts. A given term's survival is more a result of its rhetorical effectiveness at a given moment in time than of its theoretical status. Sławiński concludes that literary scholarship has no theoretical language with the possible exception of a few well-established Greek and Latin terms for describing versification and basic genre distinctions. The remaining terms acquire their theoretical meaning only within the confines of an individual scholarly tradition. Janusz Sławiński, "Problemy literaturoznawczej terminologii", Sławiński, Dzieło, 203-222.

It seems to me that Sławiński is right about the overabundance of terminology in contemporary literary scholarship. Probably because of the influence of romanticism and of twentieth century avant-garde literary movements, the writing of a scholarly study has seemingly been equated with either the creation and rhetorical justification of a new terminology or the redefinition of an already existing terminology. Sławiński has argued, both in the article cited above and in the brief sketch "Methodological Remains" (Janusz Sławiński, "Zwłoki metodologiczne", Teksty, 5, 1978, 1-9.), that this endless terminological creativity threatens to replace both historical research and the testing and discussion of the merits of existing terminologies as the primary purpose of literary scholarship.

In this study I find myself in the paradoxical position of having accepted Sławiński's point of view and yet still finding it necessary to introduce a new term in order to discuss his scholarship. The discussion which follows in the body of the study is designed to fix that term within a particular historical and theoretical context. The term itself is intended only to make possible further historical and methodological research into two topics: 1) How many Slavic structuralisms are there and what are the relations between them?; and 2) Has there been a general phenomenon in post-Stalinist Polish literary and intellectual culture which might justifiably be called "humanism" and how has it affected Polish literary scholarship?
I have been unable to provide definitive answers to those questions within this study. Once future research has provided such answers the term may be either permanently accepted with a well-defined range of application or be abandoned. In my opinion the term should not be applied indiscriminately to other non-Polish research and most definitely, should not be used rhetorically to imply that linguistic structuralism represents a "structuralist inhumanism." I have not used the term "humanist structuralism" because I am more convinced that Janusz Slawinski is a "humanist" than that he is a "structuralist". As the discussion in the body of the paper suggests, the entire issue of the nature of Slavic structuralism will be completely understood only when someone determines the full extent of the influence which Roman Ingarden has had on Polish and Czech structuralism. The same may be true of existentialism as well.

139
Peirce, "Ethics", 133.

140
Peirce, "Ethics", 132.

141

142
It is possible that he is polemicizing with William James who had, in Peirce's opinion, stolen and popularized Peirce's own terminology.

143
Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary (Springfield, MA, 1967), 404.

144
I am trying to draw a very limited parallel here and am, therefore, treating as unified whole a Medieval period which had a great deal of variety to it. For a good discussion of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in France and the Netherlands in their own terms, not as a pre-Renaissance, see J. Huizinga, The Waning of the Middle Ages (Garden City, NY, 1954).

145
They were not beyond the control of all men. Both societies had their established "priesthoods" who were capable of interpreting and also of influencing the forces
which were beyond the control of the average citizen.

146

In each case, however, it did mean a rejection of the established "priesthoods" in favor of a more personal contact with the forces governing human life and history. In the Renaissance this ultimately led to the growth of Protestantism. In the Post-Stalinist period it led to the rise of what I am calling "humanist" views of life.

147

For a recent study of Gombrowicz see Ewa M. Thompson, Witold Gombrowicz, Twayne's World Authors Series, A Survey of the World's Literature, ed. by Irene Nagurski, TWAS 510: Poland (Boston, 1979).

148


149

Miłosz, History, 432-37.

150


151


152

See, for example, the discussion of the prose of the 1950's and 1960's in the Soviet textbook, Istorija russkoj sovetskoj literatury, ed. by P. S. Vygodceva (Moskva, 1974), 521-522.

153

Edward Swiderski has shown that, within certain limits, such a change has also occurred in Soviet philosophy. Edward M. Swiderski, The Philosophical Foundations of Soviet Aesthetics. Theories and Controversies in the Post-War Years, Sovietica, v. 42, (Dordrecht, Holland, 1979).

The possible influence of Sartre on Głowinski has been discussed briefly in Part I, footnote 128.

Robert Magliola, for example, employs a definition of phenomenology which makes a phenomenologist someone who perceives objects which really exist outside of consciousness and a non-phenomenologist someone who does not. This allows him to exclude from the phenomenological movement those literary philosophers, for example Sartre, with whose interpretations of literary texts he does not agree, while retaining within phenomenology those, such as Heidegger, with whom he does agree. Magliola may be right. I am only trying to point out the value judgement at the bottom of the definition (Magliola, Phenomenology, 3-18).

When I speak of Catholic personalism, I mean the tradition which Władysław Tatarkiewicz has called the "philosophy of faith". Tatarkiewicz traces its origins from the opposing views of Newman and Kierkegaard in the nineteenth century back to Augustinian thought in the Medieval period. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Historia filozofii, vol. 3: Filozofia XIX wieku i współczesna (Warszawa, 1978), 58-69. There is also some similarity between the thought of Slawinski and that of Catholic existentialist philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel.

At the end of his three volume study of Marxism Kolakowski concludes that Marxism as a body of philosophical thought has virtually ceased to exist and been replaced by a "repertoire of slogans serving to organize various interests, most of them completely remote from those with which Marxism originally identified itself." Leszek Kolakowski, Main Currents of Marxism, vol. 3: The Breakdown, trans. by P. S. Falla (Oxford, 1981), 530.
One of the clearest accounts of the problems and possibilities offered by a structuralist approach to literature is that of Jonathan Culler. Culler analyzes the method of the French version of what I have called linguistic structuralism. Jonathan Culler, *Structuralist Poetics*, *Structuralism, Linguistics and the Study of Literature* (Ithaca, 1975). Detailed research is required to determine whether Jurij Lotman, Jan Mukařovský and Janusz Sławiński have, because of their differences with French linguistic structuralism, overcome the problems described by Culler.

There is a strong possibility that there is a sixth Slavic structuralism studying the problems of literary communication in Czechoslovakia. Janusz Sławiński participated in a seminar held in Nitra in Slovakia in September of 1970 on the topic of literary communication. Anton Popović seems to be the leading figure, along with Frantisek Miko, among the Slovak scholars. The papers from the seminar were published in the volume *Literarna Komunika- cia*, ed. by Anton Popović (Martin, 1973). I have been unable, partly because of my inability to read Slovak, to pursue the connections between the two groups. It is one more topic which deserves to be studied further.

This use of the term "positivist" may seem unusual to the Western reader. In Polish and some other Slavic scholarship "positivism" has a much broader applicability than in American terminology. Władysław Tatarkiewicz in his *History of Philosophy* uses it to cover most of nineteenth century philosophy, especially from 1860-1880. Władysław Tatarkiewicz, *Historia filozofii*, vol. 3, 69-132. I have discussed the use of the term in relation to Veselovskij in Chapter II of Part II.

Jonathan Culler has taken a similar approach to the work of the French structuralists. He writes, "To anyone who objects to my placing critical works in a perspective which their authors might reject, I can only say that I have done so in an attempt to increase their value rather than to denigrate them and that, in any case, the kind of restructuring or reinterpretation in which I am engaged is amply justified by the theories propounded by the works that I may distort." Culler, *Structuralist*, x.
163
Yuri Olesha, *Envy and Other Works*, trans. by Andrew R. MacAndrew (Garden City, 1967), 213. Oleśa's comment and mine in the preceding discussion are similar to Janusz Sławiński's assertion that we can evaluate literary works only on the basis of an evaluative language which is not our own. See the discussion of interpretation and evaluation in Part III, Chapter V.

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Sławiński, *Dzieło*, 10.

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In his review of Henryk Markiewicz's anthologies of foreign literary scholarship Michał Głowiński, citing Elder Olson, spoke of contemporary literary scholarship as a "Tower of Babel." After stating that Olson thinks this "Babel" offers greater chances for future development and that Rene Wellek thinks it represents a stage of crisis, Głowiński sides with Olson. Michał Głowiński, "Wieża Babel? (Wokół antologii Henryka Markiewicza)", *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 1976, z. 3 reprinted in Style Odbioru, 223-50. In the passage cited by Głowiński, Wellek associates the "Tower of Babel" in literary scholarship with a larger social fragmentation (p. 223). In the remainder of this chapter I will argue that "The Tower of Babel" is also a symptom of a deeper internal crisis produced by the role which structuralism has played in literary scholarship.

170
Thomas Kuhn's study of the manner in which changes take place in the methodology of the sciences has become a

The implications of Kuhn's research were debated at a colloquium on the philosophy of science held in London in July, 1955. The papers from that discussion were published in *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge*, Imre Lakatos, Alan Musgrave, ed. (Cambridge, 1970).

171 Kuhn, *Structure*, 35-42.


175 This view of the purpose of literary criticism, scholarship in the sense in which I am using the term "scholarship", has been best expressed by Matthew Arnold. Arnold writes that the purpose of criticism "is to keep man from a self-satisfaction which is retarding and vulgarizing, to lead him towards perfection, by making his mind dwell upon what is excellent in itself, and the absolute beauty and fitness of things." Matthew Arnold, "The Function of Criticism at the Present Time", *Essays by Matthew Arnold* (London, 1925), 22. He defines criticism as "a disinterested endeavour to learn and propagate the best that is known and thought in the world" (p. 34). Arnold's essay was originally published in 1865.

176 This is quite clearly the case with Feminist literary scholarship. See the articles in Cheryl L. Brown, Karen Olson, ed., *Feminist Criticism: Essays on Theory, Poetry and Prose* (Metuchen, NJ, 1978). I have examined the
issues involved from the point of view of Janusz Ślawiński's literary scholarship in my unpublished manuscript, "On the Need for and Limitations of a Feminist Literary Scholarship," which was read at a Woman's Studies conference at The Ohio State University in the fall of 1980.

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This requirement was expressed by Jurij Lotman and Boris Uspenskij in the introduction to the Italian translation of their linguistic semiotic studies of literature and culture. J.M. Lotman, B.A. Uspenskij, "Introduzione", Richerche semiotiche: Nuove tendenze delle scienze umane nell' URSS, ed. by J. M. Lotman and B. A. Uspenskij (Turin, 1973), xi-xviii. Daniel Lucid in the introduction to his anthology of Soviet semiotics described and supported the position which Lotman and Uspenskij took in the Italian publication. Lucid writes, "semiotics both arises from a particular scientific movement and expresses characteristics of contemporary cultures." Daniel Peri Lucid, "Introduction", Soviet Semiotics. An Anthology, ed. by Daniel P. Lucid (Baltimore, 1977), I.

178

Donoghue, "Reading", 11.

179

Jan Broekman has described structuralism, referring to the work of Michel Foucault, as having both destroyed the "I" as a source of identity and as having denied the possibility of philosophy as a viable activity. Jan Broekman, Structuralism: Moscow, Prague, Paris (Dordrecht, Holland, 1974). See especially Chapter I: "The Structuralist Endeavour" and Chapter V: "What is Structuralist Philosophizing?"

180

For an indication of Hartman's romanticism see his preface to a recent volume of deconstructionist studies. Harold Bloom, Paul de Mann, Jacques Derrida, Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, Deconstructionism and Criticism (New York, 1979), vii-ix.

181


Jacques Derrida's thought is unfortunately both essential to an understanding of what linguistic structuralism has done to the humanities, unless we choose to ignore all of his work, and too complex to be considered in detail within a study of Slavic literary scholarship. Derrida has expressed, in discussion with French phenomenological philosophers, some of his feelings about the implications of his writings:

Since you mentioned intentionality, I simply try to see those who are founding the movement of intentionality—which cannot be conceived in the term intentionality. As to perception, I should say that once I recognized it as a necessary conservation. I was extremely conservative. Now I don't know what perception is and I don't believe that anything like perception exists. Perception is precisely a concept, a concept of an intuition or of a given originating from the thing itself, present itself in its meaning, independently from language, from the system of reference. And I believe that perception is interdependent with the concept of origin and of center and consequently whatever strikes at the metaphysics of which I have spoken strikes also at the very concept of perception. I don't believe that there is any perception.


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It is no accident that his criticism of Geoffrey Hartman's bohemian threat to good taste was published in The New York Times. The belief that "decorum" is at the basis of literature and literary criticism was fully developed in the well-known treatises of Horace and Longinus. Horace, "On the Art of Poetry", Longinus, "On the Sublime", in Classical Literary Criticism, ed. by T.S. Dorsch, (Baltimore, 1965), 77-95, 97-158.

183

It is Hartman's romanticism which has led him to assert the very same creative abilities of the poetic self which linguistic structuralism had originally denied (see footnotes 179 and 195 in this part).
Jacques Derrida's deconstructionism places rhetorical skills, understood as the ability to manipulate linguistic forms and relations, at the core of thought and "perception", if the term is still valid in relation to deconstructionism and grammatology (see footnote 181). Derrida's own rhetorical playfulness is obviously present in his essay-poem-philosophical treatise Glas. Jacques Derrida, Glas (Paris, 1974).

Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, MA, 1980).


Kmita, Z metodologicznych, 84-103.

The term naturalism is explained clearly in the conference paper to which Roman Zimand reacted in the quotation cited on p. 1, Jerzy Kmita, "O marksistowskich dyrektywach metodologicznych badań humanistycznych", Problemy metodologiczne, 7-32.

Kmita, Z metodologicznych, 182.


Kmita, Z metodologicznych, 110-23.

Kmita, Z metodologicznych, 84-103.

The term poetics was used in many structuralist works, for example, Roman Jakobson, "Linguistics and Poetics", Style in Language, ed. by Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge, MA, 1960); Tzvetan Todorov, The Poetics of Prose, trans. by Richard Howard (Ithaca, NY, 1977), the French title is Poétique de la Prose.
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It is important to remember that Geoffrey Hartman was never a structuralist. See his comments on Northrop Frye described in footnote 9. In fact, there is something similar between the bohemianism of Viktor Šklovskij and that of Jacques Derrida. Hartman has endorsed both positions.

196

This, of course, is only true of those scholars who both understood and were apprehensive about the scientific purposes of structuralism. Geoffrey Hartman is such a scholar.

A good collection of post-structuralist studies has been published recently by Josué V. Harari. Josué V. Harari, ed., Textual Strategies. Perspectives in Post-structuralist Criticism (Ithaca, 1979). The epigraph to the preface of that study provides a summary of the problems which those articles are addressing, "The great danger to avoid is the self-isolating nature of critical discourse." Jean Starobinski, Harari, Strategies, 9. The structuralist humanist research which will be described in Part III has attempted to avoid that same danger and in a manner which is similar to some of the developments in post-structuralism.

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Kmita, Z metodologicznych, 124-37.

198

Kmita, Szkice, 113.

199

Kmita, Szkice, 182.

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This program of research has been proposed in the volume Zagadnienie przełomu antypozytwistycznego w humanistyce, ed. by Jerzy Kmita (Warszawa, 1978).

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Many of the studies of these scholars have been published in the journal Poetics. International Review for the Theory of Literature. Three works which can provide
the reader with an overview of their activities are Siegfried Schmidt, *Texttheorie. Probleme einer Linguistik der sprachlichen Kommunikation* (München, 1973); Siegfried Schmidt, *Literaturwissenschaft als argumentierende Wissenschaft. Zur grundlegung einer rationalen Literaturwissenschaft* (München, 1975); Teun A. Van Dijk, *Text and Context. Explorations in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Discourse* (London, 1977). As far as I have been able to tell, the work of Jerzy Kmita and that of the scholars just cited are independent developments resulting from their familiarity with the same philosophical, logical and linguistic tradition.

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Popper, *Logic*.

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For an account of the neo-positivist elements at the basis of Roman Jakobson's thought see Ewa M. Thompson, *Russian Formalism*.

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206

Erlich, *Russian Formalism*, 186.

207

In phenomenology what Engel'gurd called "the cognitive transformation" is spoken of as "the phenomenological reductions" or as an "intentional act of consciousness." For a general survey of how phenomenology views the "reductions" and "intentionaligy" see the articles in Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Phenomenology. The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation* (Garden City, 1967).

208

My understanding of Kant's philosophy is based on my own reading of his *Critique of Pure Reason* and on

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The term "methodology" is used in two senses in this study. "Methodology" is both a set of research procedures present within a given literary scholarship and the study of those procedures.

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I am assuming here that Kmita's theoretical science is the same as the view expressed in Popper's *Logic of Discovery*. Jerzy Kmita's disagreement with Karl Popper is over the way in which science actually develops rather than over how a scientific theory should operate. See Kmita, *Szkice*, 147-50. When Jerzy Kmita studies the history of science, his position is different from Karl Popper's, but it seems to me that as soon as Kmita attempts to apply his logical models to the description of artistic culture, he will have to accept Popper's understanding of a scientific theory.

212


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The difference between Kuhn's "normal scientist" and Popper's theoretically aware scientist (see p. 70) may, perhaps, best be understood as that between one who accepts without question the fact that his theories are in touch with reality and one who is somewhat uncertain about their status. This is the difference which Jerzy Kmita has tried to convey in the distinction between pre-theoretical and theoretical science. This distinction is essential when considering the differences between linguistic structuralism and structuralist humanism.

214

A full explanation of why this change is necessary would require a discussion which is beyond the scope of this study. I must ask the reader who is not familiar with Kmita's work to accept on faith the assertion that "developmental" is a term designed to undermine the validity of the type of explanation it describes.
The examination of a large body of scholarly material to prove that this is the case would, as many other legitimate lines of research which I have been to pursue, have taken a longer portion of my text than is warranted by the role which it plays in my justification of structuralist humanism. I have only been able to explain my understanding of non-theoretical eclecticism. I have to leave it for the reader to decide if it is the methodology which most scholars of literature employ.

This may be exactly how Boris Eijxenbaum understood the Formalist movement. See the English translation of his 1927 Russian article "Teorija formal'nogo metoda." Boris Eichenbaum, "The Theory of the 'Formal Method'", Russian Formalist Criticism. Four Essays, Lee T. Lemon and Marlon J. Reis, ed. (Lincoln, 1965), 99-139. It was Roman Jakobson and the later semioticians who turned Russian Formalism into a pre-theoretical science.

They are, it seems to me, the humanities' equivalent of Kuhn's normal scientists. The paradox of science as it has been described by Kuhn is that, although it views itself as a theoretical discipline, it cannot exist without normal scientists. The same is true of literary scholarship. Can one imagine a literary scholarship which consisted only of methodological debate and theory formation?

This attitude was reflected in the Formalist-structuralist use of the term "academic eclecticism" to refer to Viktor Žirmunskij, who was, if I were to develop the distinction mentioned above, a methodological eclectic. See Ju. Tynjanov and R. Jakobson, "Problemy izučenija literatury i jazyka", Texte der Russischen Formalisten, Band II, Texte zur Theorie des Verses und der poetischen Sprache, Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen Künste, Texte und Abhandlungen, Max Imdahl et al., ed., Band 6, 2. Halbband (München, 1972), 386.

PART II

POSITIVIST LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP, A. N.
VESELOVSKIJ AND THE NEED FOR METHODOLOGY
AND SOCIAL HISTORY

Now, I am living out my life in my corner, taunting myself with the spiteful and useless consolation that an intelligent man cannot become something. Yes, an intelligent man in the nineteenth century must and morally ought to be a characterless creature; a man of character, an active man, is preeminently a limited creature.

Fyodor Dostoevsky, Notes From Underground. Translated by Ralph Matlaw.
CHAPTER I

ROMANTIC VS. POSITIVIST AND THE CRISIS
IN THE HUMANITIES

GUSTAV
So there are no spirits?
(with irony)
This world is without soul?
It lives, but it lives only as a bare skeleton,
Which a doctor animates with a mysterious spring;
Or is it something like a great clock,
Which is driven round by the force (impulse) of the weight?

(with a laugh)
Only you don't know who has hung the weights!
About the wheels, about the springs reason teaches you;
But you don't see the hand and the key!
If the earthly covering fell from your eyes,
You would see around yourselves more than one life,
Driving the dead mass of the world into motion.

Adam Mickiewicz, Forefathers'
Eye, pt. IV, 1823. (rhymed in
the original)\(^1\)

The globe was slowly turning, revealing
ever new regions. Here was the Asiatic land
mass with the small European peninsula; here
was Africa, both Americas...
Looking more closely, I made out on the
inhabited land masses the very same splotches,
dull gray, light gray, green, yellow and
russet, as on the stone. They were made up of
large numbers of barely perceptible small
points, apparently immobile but in reality moving very lazily...

The points joined together, separated, vanished, appeared on the surface of the globe, but none of these occurrences were worthy of any particular attention. Only the movements of entire splotches had an important character. They shrank, or grew, appeared in new places, permeated or dislodged each other from occupied positions.

Meanwhile, the globe was continuously turning, and it seemed to me that it completed hundreds of thousands of revolutions.

"Is that supposed to be the history of mankind?" I asked the botanist who was standing by me.

He nodded his head as a sign of confirmation. "Good, but where are the arts, knowledge?..."
He smiled sadly.
"Where are consciousness, love, hate, desires?..."
"Ha! ha! ha!" he laughed quietly.
"In a word, where are human hearts and souls?..."
"Ha! ha! ha!..."

Bolesław Prus, The Mold of The World. 1888.²

Consider the above passages from Polish literature. In the first a young romantic poet turns against a priest, who represents a combination of rationalist philosophy and common sense propriety, and demands the return of the folk ceremony for talking with the souls of the dead. In the second a positivist narrator recounts in anecdotal form his encounter with a devil who appears as a botanist and presents the world as a stone covered with mold.

Even in these translations, which admittedly lack some of the force of the originals, the reader should be able to notice a significant change in the status of the
artist. In the first passage the depicted poet is aggressive, employing an animated verse to force a vision of the world upon the priest and, through him, on the reader as well. The demand and the presentation are immediate in both senses of the word and personal. Neither abstract thought nor organized religion are of use. Only intense, creative, personal involvement will reveal the forces which govern the world and human existence. By providing such revelations the poet himself becomes a driving force in human history. This was the origin of the poet-seer or wieszczy whose poetic work was to help free Poland from the domination of the Empires.

In the second passage the vision is impersonal and distant. It comes not from the poet (who must now be called "the writer") but from the botanist. As a natural scientist, the botanist provides a perspective from which the spirits and the individual experiences which Romanticism had created are seen as insignificant, or even non-existent, in natural and human history.

What brought about the change? Why did the mantle pass from the poets to the natural scientists? Why did the poet-seer of the first half of the century become the writer-journalist of the second? And, more importantly for us, what kind of literary scholarship resulted from the new view of literature and history?
Full answers to the first two questions would require a separate study. However, I should like to mention one aspect of the change which helps to explain both the nature of positivist scholarship and its later influence on the Formalist-Structuralist tradition and the origin of what I have called the crisis in the humanities.

Romanticism became associated with a number of speculative philosophic systems. If Kant's "Copernican revolution", with its emphasis on the active role of the mind in perception, had disturbed the common sense belief that objects fully control and correspond to our perceptions of them, it had also placed limits on the mind's activity in the form of the a priori categories and the unattainability of metaphysics.\textsuperscript{5} The authors of the speculative systems of the early 1800's attempted to extend the mind's activity by overcoming these limits through the use of a combination of logical deduction, aesthetic intuition and religious faith to grasp the essence of objects and history. An emphasis was placed on the active role of the individual or group in creating or embodying the forces which motivate human history. Art and the poet were given an important creative role in that process. The Mickiewicz passage cited above is characteristic of the romantic attitude toward life and art.\textsuperscript{6}
By the time when Prus wrote his story the speculative systems had collapsed, taking faith in poetic intuition and creative human activity with them. Because of the discoveries of Darwin, Mendel, Mendeleev and others science seemed to provide a proven means of acquiring knowledge about the world. This knowledge combined with the improved technology in whose development it assisted, and the accompanying industrial revolution provided tangible proof of the viability of a physical rather than a spiritual transformation of the world. Furthermore, the end of the Napoleonic period and of its legend and the failure of subsequent romantically inspired revolts seemed to deny the romantic view of history. This denial was bolstered by the spread of education to larger parts of society, by the growth of archaeology and by the greater awareness of non-European culture provided by colonial expansion and the growing fields of comparative linguistics and ethnology. All of these served to undermine the supposed universality of the Greek and Latin basis of European culture and to question the general applicability of any large synthetic systems based upon it.7

The relative peace and prosperity provided by the great European empires suggested a view of history as governed not by revolution but by tradition, evolution and, for the beneficiaries if not the victims of empire,
progress. There was a general feeling that science was restoring the contact with reality which the Romantic visions had lost. Even the revolutionaries and victims of that reality had come to feel that it could only be changed by coming to know it and, for the most part, only by hard work and gradual change.  

The passage from Prus has been chosen as representative of one of the victims of the reality whose existence positivism was accepting. Mickiewicz had denied the import, if not the existence, of that reality ("the dead mass of the world") by asserting the primacy of the soul which animates it. Since the poet was seen as most capable of perceiving the workings of the soul, his work assumed a central place in the universe.  

In visionary Romantic works the poetic consciousness finds, or places itself, at a time and place where the laws of being are actively manifesting themselves and then intuits outward to a total view of reality. This view was behind what Stefan Sawicki has called the first historical literary syntheses in Polish scholarship, the first attempts to provide a coherent account of the laws and meaning of history. In the early studies of "the national soul" and in Mickiewicz's Parisian lectures Polish literature and Poland's suffering under the partitions were presented as central to the redemption of mankind. Her
superficial status as victim was poetically elevated to her essence as "the Christ of nations."\textsuperscript{11}

By the time of Prus science and the new reality it perceived had displaced both Poland and the poet from the central position which they had occupied in the visionary reality of the romantics. Prus' narrator is located not at the center but outside of human history. From this distant position he has a different perspective of both space and time. Spatially, Europe itself appears as only a small peninsula. Temporally, the lives and deaths of entire generations are seen as insignificant events. It was the latter perspective, that of time, which was probably the crucial one supplied by nineteenth century science. The theory of evolution provided a means by which observation could reveal the laws according to which groups had changed over time. There was a reversal of roles. It was no longer the centrally located poets and the literary scholars they inspired revealing the soul of a higher reality but the scientists and the literary scholars who had adopted their methods observing the laws of this reality. Subjective involvement and creativity were replaced by detachment and objectivity as the criteria for scholarship.

I have chosen to discuss these passages in some detail because they provide a dramatic illustration of the
cultural change which both produced positivist scholarship and is in my opinion the root cause of the crisis in the humanities described in Part I. Prus' position on the periphery of nineteenth century European society is in many ways similar to that of the intellectual and especially of the humanist in modern technological society. Positivism as a philosophy may have lost its authority, but what Władysław Tatarkiewicz has called scientism seems, except for occasional outbursts from wartime generations and religious and minority groups, to have gained the ascendancy over the public, if not the private, life of most educated Americans. What Tatarkiewicz means by "scientism" is a loosely held faith in natural science, an acceptance of the objective validity of the survival of the fittest as a result of the free competition of ideas, individuals and institutions and a reliance on the results of that competition and science as a source of progress through technological miracles. Its supremacy is probably due to the technological orientation of post-industrial society.

As a result of this supremacy, the issues posed by the conflict between romantic and positivist are still basic to any discussion of the role of the humanities in contemporary society. This is not the place to discuss the implications for science of viewing it more as a source of technological miracles than of knowledge about reality,
but there is little doubt that the emphasis on technological science has driven the humanities to the periphery of society. From this position on the periphery we are like Prus' narrator or even his scientist, sadly aware that our history of "splotches" contains little of the values and creativity we once felt to be central to our discipline. Yet we are also unwilling to accept the romantic visions of a poet as scientific knowledge. It may be the case that once we have eaten of the apple of science, neither the assertion that literature represents a special, higher form of knowledge nor the attempt to become as scientific as the scientists will return us to the Garden of Eden. The nature of the relationship between science and the humanities is one of the central themes of this study. I will return to it from time to time throughout the discussion and will present my final thoughts on the matter in the conclusion.
CHAPTER II

A. N. VESELOVSKIJ, POSITIVISM AND LITERARY EVOLUTION

In this brief section I want to establish the fact that it is appropriate to discuss the scholarship of the Russian literary historian Aleksandr Nikolaevič Veselovskij within the context of positivist literary scholarship. This is necessary because Victor Erlich, under the influence of the Russian Formalists he was studying, has accepted and promulgated the view that Veselovskij made the transition from the cultural history of his early work to a search for the specifics of literature which was similar in some ways to the approach of the Formalists themselves. It is true that Veselovskij's later work had a strong influence on the Formalists. However, it seems to me that Erlich's position represents a minor misunderstanding, caused by a failure to distinguish between the methodology associated with the Geistesgeschichte school of Dilthey and that of positivist scholarship. This failure was further compounded by a lack of awareness of the influence which positivism, partly through Veselovskij, exerted on Russian Formalism itself. Both Veselovskij's "anti-psychologism" and his search for the specifics of
literature are the result of a positivist anti-romanticism which is older than the anti-symbolism of the Formalists. Boris Engel'gardt and Viktor Žirmunskij are, therefore, justified in asserting that Veselovskij's research remained within the boundaries of positivist methodology. An examination of why it is possible to do so and still develop what can be called a specifically literary scholarship can provide us with a counterargument to the belief that a specifically literary scholarship must concern itself only with the immanent laws of literature and with *sui generis* texts.

As I have suggested in the previous chapter, positivist scholarship attempted to develop, as the name suggests, criteria for a positive knowledge, one which was free of the subjectivity and deductive reasoning characteristic of romanticism. The result was an attempt to remove individual perceptions from scholarship by emphasizing careful observation and comparison of details and to replace deductive philosophic systems with specific scientific disciplines. Władysław Tatarkiewicz has called this process "the parcelling out of philosophy" (*parcelacja filozofii*). Thus, it is as a positivist that Veselovskij in 1893 complains:

The history of literature is reminiscent of a geographic zone which international law has sanctified as *res nullius* where the historian
of culture and the aesthetcian, the erudite and the investigator of social ideas come to hunt. Each carries away from it that which he can according to his abilities and views with the same label on goods or booty which are far from similar in content.  

In order to end the pillage and firmly establish the borders of a scientific literary scholarship Veselovskij proposed both a method (the inductive or comparative method which will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV) and a specific subject matter for literary scholarship. Three definitions of literary scholarship taken from different times in his life may provide a basis for the discussion of his understanding of the subject matter specific to literary scholarship:

The history of literature in the broad sense of this word is the history of social thought to the extent that it was expressed in philosophic, religious and poetic movement and fixed in word (zakleplena slovom). If, as it seems to me, it is appropriate in the history of literature to pay particular attention to poetry, then the comparative method reveals to it within this more narrow sphere a completely new task—to follow by what means the new content of life, this element of freedom rushing in with each new generation, penetrates the old images, those forms of necessity, into which all previous development has inevitably been cast.

(On the Method and Tasks of the History of Literature as a Science, 1870)
The history of literature is the history of social thought in its figurative poetic experience (obraznopoëtičeskom pereživanii) and in the forms which express it [the experience]. The history of thought is a broader concept, literature is its partial particular manifestation; its [literary history's] isolation presupposes a clear understanding of what poetry is and of what the evolution of poetic consciousness and of its forms is. Otherwise, we would not begin to speak about history.

...my lectures were intended to gather material for a methodics of the history of literature, for an inductive poetics which would eliminate its speculative constructions, for an elucidation of the essence of poetry based on its history.

(From an introduction to Historical Poetics, 1893)\textsuperscript{27}

The task of historical poetics, as I imagine it, is to define the role and limits of tradition in the process of individual creative work.

(Poetics of Plots, 1897-1906)\textsuperscript{28}

It is the last definition which seems to indicate a change in Veselovskij's approach. This change, however, is more a matter of vocabulary than substance. As the following discussion will show, it is a question of what Veselovskij meant by "tradition" and "individual creative work."

The central unifying factor is that Veselovskij conceives of literary scholarship as the study of literary history and of history as an evolutionary process. The essence of poetry can be determined only by studying its evolution, that is, by the discovery of its origin in an
earlier stage of social consciousness and by tracing the changes which it has undergone while interacting with its changing social environment. Although it is not apparent from these quotations, Veselovskij (obviously influenced by Spencer, Taylor, Lange and others) views evolution itself as a process of differentiation in which the members of a loosely unified, homogeneous group acquire specialized functions and differing characteristics in response to the demands of their environment. The now differentiated group then becomes the immediate environment within which the new entities, now too specialized to survive on their own, must function. This is why Spencer believed that differentiation also led to greater interconnectedness and a subordination (hierarchization) of parts. Progress in history was seen as a result of the movement from simple, undifferentiated and loosely organized groupings to more complex, differentiated, tightly organized groups whose members were more dependent on each other but less dependent on the larger environment for survival due to the efficiency and complex behavior of the new group. The specialization of cells within the body, the division of labor within industrialized society and the development of positivist philosophy itself were held to be examples of the process.29
It is such a view of social evolution which is behind Veselovskij's assertion that literature can only be understood in relation to the social thought out of which it has evolved and of which it is a part. Furthermore, literary history has evolved from and is a part of the history of thought in general, and, in a similar fashion, individual creative work must be studied in relation to the literary tradition out of which it has evolved and within which it functions. This is why the third definition does not represent a significant departure from the first two. This insistence on the relation between literature or work and environment has led to the view that positivist scholarship placed more emphasis on the social environment than on the specifically literary features of literature. It is, however, important to be aware that it denies only the absolute, self-sufficient nature of that specificity, not its existence. The evolutionary view of reality led the positivist to believe that literature's specific characteristics appeared at a certain point in history and have continued to evolve as a result of changes in man's social consciousness. If literature is a specific form of that consciousness, it seems not only reasonable but necessary to study them in relation to each other.

As a matter of fact, it is social and environmental determinism which allow positivism to provide alternative
versions of both Kant's *a priori* categories and Hegel's evolutionary idealism. Specifically, the older forms of necessity were *a priori* limits on thought for any member of the group in which they were in effect. However, the outside observer could see them as not *a priori* but rather a product of earlier evolution which would change with time. In this manner Kant's universal categories were made historical. History itself was given an evolutionary mechanism which did not rely on the pre-determined development of a deductive system, in other words, a mechanism which did not depend on the workings of a spirit, whether human or absolute, and, therefore, did not require either Hegel's or some other form of romantic idealism. For this reason social determinism was an integral part of Veselovskij's attempt to develop a non-speculative definition of the essence of literature. In order to reject that attempt solely on the basis that it is a non-literary scholarship we would have either to disprove the theory of social evolution or to prove that literature is not a part of society.

Once we have accepted this, we may formulate an answer to any assertion that a socially-based scholarship is not a specifically literary scholarship. I have couched this answer in general terms so that it can be seen as a defense of any scholarship which views literature as part
of a larger entity, system or process. If literature is determined by forces in the external environment (extra-literary forces), and we cannot prove that it is not, then the only way to understand and thereby to overcome or lessen that dependence is to study its laws, not to deny its existence. We are always controlled by that which we do not understand and even more by that of which we are not aware. If we do not explore the determining forces in our environment, we will never know which, if any, are a priori limits on thought and which are in fact only environmental in nature.
CHAPTER III

THE COGNITIVE TRANSFORMATION, NON-THEORETICAL ECLECTICISM AND THE NEED FOR METHODOLOGY

In the first part I spoke in a general manner about the distinction between a projective method which views its object of study as something external in relation to consciousness and a method which views its object of study as a phenomenon in consciousness or experience. I also said that I had taken my definition of the distinction from Boris Engel'gardt, a Russian philosopher who had written incisive studies of both Veselovskij and Russian Formalism.

In the next two chapters I am going to develop this distinction in more detail by first analyzing Engel'gardt's criticism of Veselovskij's methodological naivete and then demonstrating by a similar analysis of Veselovskij's method that that method was not naive but rather based on the evolutionary theory described in general terms in the previous chapter. Although both of these analyses are interesting in their own right, their importance for this study lies in the fact that Engel'gardt's criticism can be developed into a strong argument for the need for conscious
methodological decisions at the basis of any scholarship and that the analysis of Veselovskij's method provides me with a conceptual framework necessary for the discussion of both linguistic structuralism and structuralist humanism. The discussion of Engel'gardt's criticism will take up all of this chapter. The discussion of Veselovskij's method will comprise the entire next chapter.

Boris Engel'gardt has criticized Veselovskij's definitions of literary scholarship cited on page for their "naive-realistic identification of the phenomenon given in experience with the object of science." Engel'gardt maintains that in order to define a scientific discipline we must not only single out a particular subject matter, a "phenomenon given in experience," but also select a specific method which will transform this phenomenon into a scientific object. Engel'gardt further argues that because Veselovskij was unaware of this he was unable to provide criteria for a specifically literary scholarship.

Engel'gardt's criticism reflects a disagreement over the nature of science. It is a disagreement which must play a part in any discussion of structuralist methodology. Veselovskij saw science and the comparative method, which was general and not limited to any specific discipline, as a means of bringing about an identification between thought and individual objects or groups of objects
observed in external reality. If a discrepancy appeared in the observation of a given object or group, it was seen as something to be overcome by a careful comparison of the results of further observations. The role of the scientist in this process is to be a passive observer of reality (see the discussion in Chapter IV for a more detailed presentation of his position). Engel'gardt, on the other hand, viewed science as a means of actively transforming the phenomena of experience into scientific (conceptual) objects. Both views can produce avowedly objective laws, but they are laws of different types, depending on the status of the objects from which and the procedure by which they are derived. A failure to distinguish between these two avowedly scientific approaches has led to a great deal of confusion in the discussion of the possibility and usefulness of a scientific literary scholarship.

For this reason I would like to explore in some detail the nature of the cognitive transformation which Engel'gardt's criticism posits as the basis of scientific thought. Engel'gardt describes it in the following passage:

The thing is that every phenomenon which is given in external and internal experience possesses an infinite multiformity, i.e., has an infinite quantity of the most diverse features. As a result of this, it cannot in and of itself in the form in which it appears (vozzritel'noj formoj) become the direct
object of a specialized scientific cognition. Before it can become one, it must undergo a special cognitive reworking and make the transition from a condition of appearance (vozzrenija) to a condition whose cognitive form is that of the concept, i.e., be thought as a closed series of features which have been abstracted for a definite purpose from its representation in appearance (vozzritel'nogo predstavlenija).

The basis for the transformation is then the change over from a phenomenon which has "an infinite quantity of diverse features" to an object which has "a closed series of features which have been abstracted for a definite purpose."

We may assume, although Engel'gardt is not specific on this point, that the phenomenon in experience has an infinity of features for at least three reasons: 1) it is open to the flow of time and may change with this flow, 2) it may interact with different phenomena or contexts acquiring or revealing different features in the process and 3) it is open to changes in the perceiving consciousness. If this is true, then the purpose which governs a given science must, in order to close off this infinity, be specific as to 1) how the phenomenon is to be removed from the flow of time, 2) how it is to be freed from the distorting influence of other phenomena or contexts, and 3) the mental attitude or type of consciousness which is necessary for its scientific apprehension. This attitude must, of course, exclude unnecessary features. This means
that the object which results from the transformation is abstract, atemporal, non-contextual, removed from non-scientific consciousness and specific to the given science. As a result, a single phenomenon can give rise to several scientific objects. Literature, for example, can be described as a sociological, philosophic, psychological or literary object depending on the method with which it is studied. In the following diagram I have attempted to depict the way in which this approach would transform a phenomenon such as Romanticism (see Figure 1: The Cognitive Transformation).

I should like to stress the inadequacies of this diagram. Since it is on a flat surface, it does not reproduce the multidimensionality of the phenomenon in experience. Furthermore, the fact that I have given all the objects the same number of features is purely a matter of convenience, and I have not attempted to reproduce the more complicated situation in which two scientific objects overlap, that is, both contain the same number of features. However, it does portray graphically what I have just described verbally. This gives me two chances to present and the reader two chances to grasp an issue which is central to an understanding of Twentieth-Century literary scholarship, particularly Slavic literary scholarship.
Figure 1. The Cognitive Transformation

* Purpose (method) produces a cognitive transformation by selecting some features and excluding others.
The issue is that of the relationship between consciousness and external reality. It is closely related to the question of the relationship between the seemingly infinite variety of experience, the structures, if any, which are beneath it, and the scientific abstractions if we are to have them, which describe it.

This raises the question of how we can be sure that the numerous impressions which we have acquired in an informal manner while reading or hearing from others about a book, author or movement, are, in fact, reliable? What procedures, if any, should we adopt in order to refine these impressions and guarantee their correspondence with something in external reality? All modern movements in literary scholarship have offered answers, be they implicit or explicit, to these questions. The important thing to remember is that they differ not because some of them are interested in reality and others are not, but because they have different views of reality and of the part of it which is accessible to and of relevance for the humanist.

In the cognitive transformation described by Engelgardt the process starts when we become conscious of a phenomenon in experience. To continue with our example of romanticism, the scholar who becomes aware of romanticism as a topic for investigation has experienced, and will continue to experience, it in innumerable ways. To give the
most obvious example, as Andre Lefevere has argued, we encounter the most famous works in various ways. They appear in comic books, popular films, translations, parodies, the literary manifestos of those who rebel against or revive them, handouts we receive while students, summaries in literary histories, as material for our lectures, as potential examples for our theoretical discussion and occasionally as something we actually read in the comfort of our home. This list could be extended almost indefinitely.

As I have said above, Engelgardt would control this inchoate mass of experience by having science define a conceptual object composed of a limited number of features. In so doing, he gives the mind an active role in excluding extraneous data and in organizing the data which remain.

If we accept the transformation's existence, it therefore becomes a powerful argument for the necessity of methodological awareness in research. Many literature scholars who find methodological discussion distasteful do so because it leads them away from the texts which they see as their proper subject matter and their source of objectivity. However, if we accept the necessity of this transformation, then the text as a source of objectivity is not a particular object which exists in external reality and which always appears in the same form but a general
object which we create or co-create as a result of a methodological decision. It is not the trees in the forest but "the tree" within, abstracted from or projected upon the trees we encounter in experience. The decision not to create a general object also becomes a methodological one and must be based on the conscious or unconscious assertion that the complexity of experience, not the unity which may be beneath it, is the true subject matter of the humanities. As a result, if we accept the reality of this transformation, any scholar must constantly not only make his own methodological decisions but also come into contact with those of others whenever he uses secondary sources. The material in those sources has already been shaped by the decisions of those who wrote them, and even the mere quotation of the sources is a passing on of the methodological decisions of others.

The citation of sources without a full awareness of the methodological issues involved is similar to what Thomas Kuhn has called normal science in that it avoids discussion of fundamental issues by relying on examples of successful past research both to identify problems for investigation and to provide the methods necessary for their solution. Kuhn has called a shared group of such examples a paradigm (see Part I, p. 70). What is unusual about the paradigm governing literary scholarship today is
its extraordinary eclecticism. In Part I, Chapter V, I have suggested that our working consciousness is governed by a non-theoretical eclecticism. It seems to me that most scholars of literature still see themselves as critics of literature, or even as poets,\footnote{40} and, therefore, continue to read methodological statements either as a new literary genre to be interpreted and judged for insights into life as any other genre would be or as a source of potentially rich new interpretations of already existing literary genres. Any methodology is accepted into our working consciousness as long as it enriches our understanding of a given work, but no methodology is taken seriously as a proposal of the general requirements which must be met by any study of any work.

As a result of the strength of this non-theoretical eclecticism, the methodological crisis in the humanities, about which I spoke in Part I, Chapter V, has remained for most scholars a generally annoying uncertainty about what to say when asked about general principles and a series of intermittent shocks when confronted with scholarly studies written in what are virtually alien tongues rather than something which interferes with their daily research on individual topics. Murray Krieger, who is a shrewd practitioner and theoretician of criticism, has nicely expressed the working consciousness of many scholars when,
even while writing a theoretical article, he said of the
tendency to engage in growing methodological discussion;
"And I confess myself too much Hayden White's 'Normal'
critic not to counteract that tendency—to see it as a	tendency to usurpation. Indeed, it is with some comfort
that, as a 'Normal' critic, I contemplate the return here,
with the next issue, of properly literary objects of crit-
ical concern."41

It is with the desire expressed in Murray Krieger's
statement in mind, that I would like to turn to a more
intensive discussion of Veselovskij's inductive projective
method. It is a method which tries to avoid the cognitive
transformation just described and, if proven reliable,
could provide us with a means of avoiding the methodologi-
cal discussion necessitated by the acceptance of that
transformation's unavoidability.
CHAPTER IV

VESELOVSKIJ'S USE OF THE INDUCTIVE PROJECTIVE METHOD AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-THEORETICAL ECLECTICISM

I will begin the discussion of Veselovskij's method with a brief review of Engel'gardt's criticism. Engel'gardt asserted that any science must define the method by which it constructs a scientific object from the multiformity of the phenomenon in experience. If we are to speak of objectivity, it must be based on such a general object produced by an act of scientific cognition. For this reason, one phenomenon can yield several scientific objects, be the source of several kinds of objectivity. It was this potential relativity which provided the basis for the argument for greater methodological awareness.

A scholar who used the same method as Veselovskij could reject both Engel'gardt's position and the need for methodological discussion on grounds which, although it is hard to find an admitted practicing positivist, are still at the basis of much anti-methodological sentiment today. The argument could take the following form. The creation of a scientific object as the basis of research must necessarily involve a return to romantic speculation and a priori reasoning. By taking the phenomenon in
experience as the start, if not the goal, of investigation, Engel'gardt's approach and your conscious methodological decisions introduce subjective factors which destroy the objectivity of results. In order to attain reliable results the investigator must keep his definitions to a minimum, observe facts, as they exist in external reality (not in consciousness or experience, as in Engel'gardt's presentation) and compare them to produce generalizations about the phenomenon under observation. When Veselovskij spoke of scientific laws, he meant generalizations achieved through such a process of observation and comparison. In speaking of this process he used the terms "inductive poetics" and "the comparative method." We may, on the basis of this argument, formulate four objections to the creation of a conceptual object as the result of a conscious methodological decision:

1) the investigator who would achieve scientific results should assume a passive, not an active, stance toward the object of investigation;

2) the source of objectivity should be facts (particular real objects or features of particular real objects), not general conceptual (be they ideal or real) objects;

3) these particular real objects should be observed in the external environment, not studied as phenomena in experience;
4) by avoiding the construction of atemporal conceptual objects the investigator can observe the changes which have occurred (in real objects) in history. (This is the other name which Veselovskij uses for a section of his work, "historical poetics.")

These arguments are all standard features of a positivist epistemology and of the belief in science as a source of verifiable truth described in Chapter I. They are also associated with an inductive version of what Boris Engel'gardt has called the projective method. This method studies cultural objects as artifacts, that is, as objects outside of consciousness. It is worth quoting Engel'gardt's definition in full because, as he has shown, the method played an important role in Russian Formalism and, as history has shown, continues to play an important role in attempts to develop a scientific literary scholarship today.

The thing is that, as an object of scientific investigation, every monument of spiritual culture, every product of human creative work can be examined at the very least on two levels: it can be thought, in the first place, as a process in creative and apprehending consciousness (such, for example, is the point of view of Steinthal and Poteb'nja) and, in the second place, as something external (vnepoložnoe) to that consciousness. In the latter case it is somehow torn off from living consciousness, objectified (projected) somewhere externally and then endowed with all those features which in their essence belong to the creative consciousness itself: a capability of internally
based development, suggestiveness and others. They speak of the history of "ideas"; the historian of philosophy constructs an entire historical schema of the development of some philosophical concept without considering for a minute its creator; they speak about "the evolution of speech," "the transition from one sound to another," about the evolution of the pediment, of the bronze ax, of the hammer of a gun and so on, and so on. In all these cases we are concerned with the projection of the processes of creative work, with that which, speaking of the legal sciences, prof. B. Kistjakovskij called the projective or "naive-projective" method. 48

The use of the adjective naive deserves some explanation. Engel'gardt takes it for granted that literature and its texts exist in consciousness, but he also asserts that the projective method has proven itself to be extremely useful in humanistic research. 49 He seems, however, to distinguish between its conscious use as a method to produce the cognitive transformation described in Figure 1 and an unconscious or "naive" use which is unaware that it is producing such a transformation.

Veselovskij's inductive use of the projective method which Engel'gardt called "naive" 50 can be described as define your subject as loosely as possible, make as many observations as possible and then generalize on the basis of those observations. In Figure 2: The Inductive Projective Method, I have attempted to depict for the sake of comparison with the cognitive transformation depicted in Figure 1 how a scholar using such a method would study
romanticism (see Figure 2).

The comparison of these two figures reveals the differences between the two scientific methods. In the cognitive transformation the scientific object is produced from the phenomenon in experience or perceived within the phenomenon in experience only by an active process of selection in which the mental activity of the scholar plays an active role. In the inductive projective method objectivity is provided not by a constructed scientific object but by the texts themselves which, in their status as observable individual objects in external reality, provide all the information necessary to select the appropriate features (characteristics). The scholar plays only a passive role in this process. This is why the inductive projective method provides an argument against the conscious creation of scientific objects.

Veselovskij would call the generalizations resulting from the process depicted in Figure 2 objective and verifiable because they are derived from real objects in external reality (the texts) and because the process of observation and comparison can be duplicated by anyone. A number of objections are obvious. Does not the whole procedure depend on our knowing in advance what romanticism is in order to determine what texts to read? Do we not quickly run into problems of statistical significance?
Figure 2. The Inductive Projective Method

Comparison of these results yields the following generalization:

Observation (reading) of these texts reveals the following characteristics:

Romanticism as a phenomenon in the social environment is composed of the following number of texts:

Text A
Text B
Text C
Text D
Text E

x
y
z
x

x
Must $y$, a given characteristic, appear 20%, 50%, 75% of the time? Why should we accept the fact that what is most common is the most significant? Does this not predispose us toward an acceptance of mass art? What happens if two observers ascribe different characteristics to the same text? Do we let statistics decide here as well? If these objections are valid, then anyone using the inductive projective method as a means of avoiding a conscious methodological decision has a problem. The only way to limit the number of texts, avoid the acceptance of mass art as the most characteristic art or to establish the superiority of one observer over another is to appeal to some external authority as a means of creating the appropriate conceptual object. If, as I suggested in the introduction, the inductive projective method is the basis of non-theoretical eclecticism, then this eclecticism itself must be based on implicit methodological decisions (ad hoc or otherwise). This point will become clearer as I consider in some detail what happens when Veselovskij moves from these general statements about phenomena to what he himself calls a higher level of generalization: the establishment of general laws. The discussion of this transition will also allow me to explore the connections between the inductive projective method and determinism.
Veselovskij describes the transition in the following passage as a search for the repetition of a particular relationship in a manner similar to the search for the repetition of a particular characteristic described above.

Studying series of facts, we notice their sequentia1ity, a relationship between them of consequent and antecedent; if this relationship is repeated, we begin to suspect in it a certain lawfulness; if it is repeated often, we cease speaking about antecedent and consequent, replacing them with the expression cause and effect. We are even inclined to go further and willingly transfer this narrow concept of causality to the closest of the contiguous facts: they either called forth the cause or are an echo of the effect. We take for verification a parallel series of similar facts: here the relationship of a given antecedent and a given consequent may not be repeated, or if it is represented, then members which are contiguous with them will be different or a similarity will appear on more distant levels of series. In accordance with this we narrow or extend our concept of causality; every new parallel series can introduce a new change in the concept; the more such verificatory repetitions there are, the greater the probability that the obtained generalization will approach the exactness of a law. 52

Although Veselovskij is not clear on this point, we may assume that he is talking about the comparison both of individual texts and of the general statements about groups of texts achieved by the inductive procedure pictured below. He calls them both indiscriminately facts (fakty).

In order to understand positivist literary scholarship more clearly it is useful to consider the possible
explanations for the recurrence of certain facts in our observation of a given phenomenon. Let us assume that in reading the works of a certain author, time period or genre (it makes no difference for our discussion) we have continually noticed the presence of a certain characteristic. This means for Veselovskij that it is there that it is objectively present in the texts. The question then becomes: why is it present in these texts?

It seems to me that there are the following possible explanations: 1) the recurrence of this characteristic is a random event, a result of the presence of chance in the universe. I do not think it is necessary to say why a positivist would have to reject this. It is, however, one way in which to understand the assertion that the literary text is a sui generis object. I also mention it to point out the need for much more precise statistical methods than are usually employed by literary scholars using an inductive approach; 2) the regularity is caused by the activity of some active, subjective, conscious force, the creative ability of the author, the national soul, a divine consciousness or even the observer himself. Veselovskij rejects this possibility since his projective method causes him to view all observed data as external to and beyond the influence of consciousness. It would be the explanation favored by romantic scholarship and much phenomenological
scholarship when combined with the third explanation; 3) the regularity is caused by the persistence of a single object which manifests itself in different forms in space and time (as, for example, in the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden) or, alternatively, by the impersonal workings of a universal system which creates literary objects. This is the type of explanation favored by Slavic structuralists such as Jakobson and Lotman. Positivists reject it because they admit the existence neither of general objects nor of a transcendental system capable of creating particular objects; 4) the regularity is the result of the interaction of particular objects themselves. This is the only type of explanation accepted by Veselovskij. (The difference between three and four is that four views the regularities either as caused by the properties of the objects themselves or as causing those properties while three views the laws of the system as creating the objects and, therefore, their essential characteristics.)

In order to establish the relationship between Veselovskij's method and his determinism, I would like to repeat the above discussion, replacing the term "particular object" with the term "literary form" to make the general discussion of the inductive projective method more directly applicable to Veselovskij's literary scholarship.
In studying the literature of a given people we notice the recurrence of a particular characteristic and/or a particular literary form. How can we explain this? We are not willing to call it an accident. The projective method rules out the creative efforts of any individual or collective consciousness, as does Veselovskij's anti-romanticism. Furthermore, since we admit the existence only of individual texts, we cannot appeal to any universal literary system. Our only solution, if we are to be consistent, is to assert that the recurrence of this characteristic or form must be a result of the interaction of the literary forms themselves.

Veselovskij does this, as I have said above, by choosing the fourth alternative. This provides him with two possible explanations: 1) the recurring literary forms have all come from the same earlier proto-literary form (This was the theory of the mythological school.\textsuperscript{55} It was modeled on the great success attained by linguists in reconstructing proto-languages from recurrences found in related but separate languages.); 2) the recurrences are a result of the influence of a single literary form, that is to say, one form, or characteristic, has migrated from text to text or from people to people. (This was the theory of migratory plots.)\textsuperscript{56}
The problem is that the projective method is not especially well-suited to the study of influence and cannot provide a particularly satisfying explanation of where the proto-texts or the texts which are doing the influencing came from. Let us assume that literary from C was a result of the disintegration of literary form A combined with the influence of literary form B. Then a reasonable description of the process would be as follows:

![Diagram of the Infinite Regression]

Figure 3. The Infinite Regression
Because the projective method views literature as a process external to consciousness, it cannot, without recourse to ad hoc explanation (which is, of course, what most people do), admit the author's consciousness as a creative force. As a result, the search for proto-literary forms becomes an infinite regression (any given proto-form can only be explained by finding an older one), and the influence of one form on another becomes a random event which either makes historical change possible or at the very least decides its direction. We may assume that without these random contacts with other literary forms the proto-form would either last forever or slowly disintegrate in accordance with some general tendency toward decomposition.

This is a very important conclusion because it raises some serious questions about the implications of constructing a reliable literary scholarship solely on the basis of the reading and comparison of individual texts. The most common form of such a scholarship, which I have called non-theoretical eclecticism, employs a loose version of the projective method to exclude creative acts of consciousness. This is not entirely true of Russian Formalism and even less so of Anglo-American New Criticism whose close readings really require an active involvement of the scholar in the sui generis structuring of the text. However, all three scholarships rely on the status of the texts as particular
objects in external reality to determine our perception of them. The question is, does such a procedure force us, if we are to avoid ad hoc explanation, to choose between the following alternatives?

1) We can assert that each literary text is unique (sui generis) and, therefore, that no general statements about groups of texts or determinations of general historical laws are possible. Furthermore, there is really no such thing as literary history since there is no continuity or change, only a series of unique objects. We also cannot explain where the texts came from. They are just here to be interpreted. This alternative perhaps explains why scholars associated with early Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New Criticism have always had the most difficulty accounting for, and sometimes even denied the existence of, literary movements, national literatures and literary history; or

2) We can compare the results of our individual readings, but then we must explain any similarities as: a) traceable to an infinite series of proto-texts, b) the result of the random influencing of one text by another, or c) the result of the presence of some other force which is also beyond our conscious control (if we are to assert that the text is fully controlling our perceptions) and capable of both creating the original proto-text and controlling the
interaction of individual texts (if we are to assert the presence of patterns in literary history).

Russian Formalism after the development of the concept of the dominant\textsuperscript{59} and Anglo-American New Criticism both demand a considerable amount of methodological sophistication from their adherents and are therefore capable of producing coherent interpretations of the unique objects mentioned under the first alternative. The problem which interests me now is once more that of non-theoretical eclecticism. In the last section I suggested that if the necessity of the cognitive transformation is accepted, then there is no possibility for avoiding the necessity of conscious methodological decisions. I then further suggested that Veselovskij's inductive projective method seemed to offer a means of avoiding that discomforting situation. It now seems to offer a somewhat less than satisfactory alternative. Structuralism and New Criticism are able to produce descriptions and interpretations of individual texts because their developed methodologies enable them to produce a cognitive transformation in the object of study. The "dominant" of Russian Formalism and the "fallacies" of New Criticism are designed to produce the type of scientific object described in Figure 1 by excluding from consideration "non-literary" factors and in effect placing the text in the type of atemporal scientific
realm described on page 154. This is why they have gained a general ascendancy in the interpretation of individual texts.

As a result, non-theoretical eclectic scholarship has been left with the alternatives listed as 2a, b, and c. Since it is still the prevailing type of literary scholarship, it is probably correct to assert that historical genetic explanation is still the most common mode of explanation in literary scholarship today. Historical genetic explanation as it is practiced by non-theoretical eclectic scholarship provides two sources for the external force capable of controlling our observations, the life of the author and history. However, if it uses the inductive projective method, it must break both the life of the author and history down into an infinite regression of, and a random set of correlations between, individual texts. The analysis of Veselovskij's method suggests that non-theoretical eclectic scholarship, in order to achieve some unity of results, will have to rely on some other force which is also accepted as beyond conscious control. It seems to me that this force is what Thomas Kuhn has called a paradigm (see the discussion on p. 70) and the Russian Futurists have called "common sense" and "good taste." They provide non-theoretical eclectic scholarship with an established and often hierarchically arranged body of authoritative texts which can
be used to end the regression and establish the necessary correlations. Because of its eclecticism this scholarship can draw on any generally accepted authority from any field and can therefore potentially offer explanations for any aspect of literary texts, tradition and life. However, non-theoretical eclecticism has not avoided the cognitive transformation described in Figure 1 but has only installed an often unacknowledged "common sense" and "public taste," usually closely tied to the literary tastes of the moment, as the scientific purpose or method required to produce the necessary transformation. This is perhaps why its greatest challenge within Slavic scholarship has come from the Formalist and Structuralist tradition which grew out of the Futurist atmosphere.

As a positivist scholar Veselovskij did not have to appeal to "public taste" because his evolutionary theory contained a mechanism for controlling both it and the literary forms it uses. Veselovskij could simply assert, since this was what had caused him to select the inductive projective method in the first place, that even as matter determines thought, the evolving conditions of material existence determine the literary forms in use among a given people.

This procedure provides him with a third explanation for the similarity of two literary forms: independent
development under the same social conditions. His study of "The Poetics of Plot" is meant largely to bring some moderation to the search for influences and proto-forms by showing how two peoples whose social and material conditions were the same would have developed the same literary forms. By so doing it also provides him with a source for the original proto-form (thereby avoiding an infinite regression), a means of controlling possible influences and a mechanism for continued historical development. This is accomplished by asserting that literary forms, or the simpler forms of which they are composed, were originally a part of the social environment. This in turn allows Veselovskij to use his inductive method to search for a third group of recurrences, the presence of the same characteristics in social and literary forms. When such recurrences are found, Veselovskij assumes that the social form has caused the literary one.

Veselovskij's method, therefore, is not "naive" in the sense described on p.165 but a conscious linking of the specifics of literary history and forms to a universal theory of evolution. However, as the argument on p. 173 suggested, there is, because of Veselovskij's positivist use of the inductive projective method, no force capable of creating objects other than the relationships between objects themselves. As a result, a full explanation of the
patterns observed in literary reality would result not only in an infinite regression but in an infinite expansion as well. In other words, it would force us to establish a nexus of connections stretching not only far back into history but across the different spheres of reality until we traced the determining relations among matter back to the Big Bang which, according to modern astronomy, set that matter into motion. I am, of course, not suggesting that every positivist study of literature has to include an account of the entire evolution of matter. The point I am insisting on is that Veselovskij's social environmental and evolutionary determinism is not an early aspect of his thought which he later overcame (see the discussion in Chapter II) but the methodological justification for his use of the comparative or inductive projective method. As I will show in Part III, Chapter I, the attempt by the early Russian Formalists to use that method without its evolutionary determinism led to serious theoretical problems which were solved only when linguistic structuralism replaced Veselovskij's evolutionary determinism with what might be called a semiotic or linguistic determinism of its own.

We cannot reject this methodology, as I said at the conclusion of Chapter II, without either disproving the theory of social evolution or proving that literature is
not a part of society. In Chapter V I will explore the possibilities offered literary history by the theory of social evolution as Veselovskij conceived it. This will allow me to explore the issue of whether a positivist social history of literature is theoretically possible. In Chapter VI I will explore the potential usefulness of such a theory in addressing the social problems described at the start of this chapter.

In concluding this chapter it is necessary to return to the opposition between the cognitive transformation and the inductive projective method in order to emphasize a point which has been made informally in the preceding discussion. I have discussed the inductive projective method in such detail because it seemed to provide a means for the humanities to avoid the kind of methodological discussion which becomes necessary if we accept the presence of a cognitive transformation at the start of all scholarly research. I provided some of the arguments for the use of the inductive projective method and arranged them into the four objections to the cognitive transformation expressed on p. 163. Those objections can be summarized in the assertion that scientific results (verified truths) can be obtained only by the passive observation and comparison of the particular objects which exist and have existed in the past in the external environment. This assertion is at
the basis of both Veselovskij's positivist methodology and non-theoretical eclecticism. However, as this discussion has shown, the former rests on a universal theory of evolution and the latter on the existence of a universally (however narrowly defined that universe may be) accepted public taste. I do not believe that it is possible to prove that either the theory of evolution or public taste are invalid. But it can be shown that they have produced the same kind of cognitive transformation they may be seen as trying to avoid.

The argument for a conscious cognitive transformation is based on the assertion that since a phenomenon in experience has an infinite number of features, any scientific study has to employ some method which is designed to select among and arrange the selected features. On p.154 I suggested that such a method must 1) remove the phenomenon from the flow of time, 2) free it from the distorting influence of other phenomena and 3) specify the mental attitude or type of consciousness which is necessary for a scientific cognition of the phenomenon. This discussion has suggested that both Veselovskij's method and non-theoretical eclecticism do the same thing, although in a somewhat different manner, with their use of the inductive projective method. This is why I have called it a method and have discussed the two approaches together. Their
inductive projective method removes the phenomenon from the flow of time and projects it into the past where it is seen as composed of a group of individual objects. These objects are then fixed into an unchanging set of relations by the evolutionary theory of Veselovskij's work 67 or by the authoritative sources of the non-theoretical eclectic paradigm. As a result, it may be asserted that both scholarships have in fact created their own scientific objects by means of a cognitive transformation produced by their sometimes unexamined acceptance of the reliability of the observational powers of the members of their respective groups, the scientific community of the Positivists, and the literary community of the non-theoretical eclectics. In this manner, I have returned to the question of the relationship between science and literary scholarship, a question which was raised in an impressionistic manner in the discussion of Mickiewicz and Prus. It seems to me that I have also established the presence of a cognitive transformation at the basis of any literary scholarship and, therefore, of the necessity for a methodological clarification of some of the positions literary scholarship has taken. This clarification will provide us with the perspective we require in order to understand the development of what I have called structuralist humanism and theoretical eclecticism.
CHAPTER V

IS A POSITIVIST SOCIAL HISTORY OF LITERATURE POSSIBLE?

In the previous chapters I have has used the term "environmental or evolutionary determinism" in place of "mechanistic" in order to emphasize the flexibility of a positivist literary scholarship based on the theory of evolution. In its simplest form such an evolutionary theory may be summarized as: the literary forms of a given literary tradition at a given time in its history are a result of the past and present state of the social and material environment in which that tradition has developed. Any unusual features are the result of outside influences which have been assimilated into the tradition and have proven useful, or insignificant, in its survival in that environment. In Veselovskij's own work this determinism is made stronger by the universal assumption, based on the ethnology of his day, that all societies have undergone the same line of development. It is this stronger assumption which now seems invalid if we are to believe the results of more recent anthropology. If we abandon it, we can provide a social history of literature which seems capable of providing us with useful information about literature.
In order to show how this is possible I will have to discuss the way in which Veselovskij allows the social environment to determine literary forms. This discussion will also provide us with the framework for the later discussion of what happened when Formalism adopted a similar view of the environment and when Czech and Polish structuralism attempted to re-establish a social history of literature. On p. 145 I quoted a passage in which Veselovskij made a distinction between the freedom offered by the new content of life flowing in with each new generation and the older forms of necessity into which earlier development had inevitably congealed. It is now possible, given the discussion of his method in the previous section, to understand what he meant. When Veselovskij speaks of content, he means the new forms of social thought which are in contact with the new conditions of material existence. When he speaks of the forms of necessity, he means the literary tradition composed of the literary forms derived from older forms of social thought. This is why one can speak of his literary history as based on the way in which literary forms adapt to new social content. 70

It is important to remember that for Veselovskij social content meant all the philosophy, religious beliefs, law, science, general knowledge and public opinion and customs of the day, not the more narrowly conceived class
ideology with which we might associate it today. Veselovskij called it social thought in order to emphasize the fact that literature did not represent a special realm of knowledge but rather incorporated the general knowledge of its day. The study of this social thought was a laborious process which required the reading of all the documents an age had produced in order to understand the "ideas" present in its poetic works. Veselovskij wrote with approval that Edward Gibbons had spent twenty years and H.T. Buckle an entire life writing their major works. The enormous amount of reading which would be required for a discussion, based on his evolutionary approach, of modern literature may be one of the reasons Veselovskij broke off his study at the start of the modern age.

In the preceding section I suggested that Veselovskij's method, if applied consistently, would result in an infinite regression and expansion leading back to some action which set the particular objects it explains into motion. In Veselovskij's article on the larger literary genres, dramatic, lyric and epic he posits the existence of an undifferentiated, syncretic, pre-literary, social activity which contained in embryonic form all the future genres. As society differentiated to accommodate itself to the increasingly complex conditions of material existence, the syncretic activity also broke up into separate
different genres capable both of expressing the now-different forms of social thought and of individual development. The process was complete when the development of the concept of individuality allowed for the development of lyric poetry as a separate activity.\textsuperscript{76}

This argument is closely related to the acceptance of a single path of development for all cultures. Regardless of what we may now see as its lack of empirical validity (see Part II, footnote 69) several aspects of it are important because of the light they throw on the possibilities of the inductive projective method:

1) The social activity which originally contained prototypes of the future genres is meant to end the infinite regression of which I spoke on p. 173. But, as Žirmunskij has noted,\textsuperscript{77} Veselovskij strongly desired to avoid any romantic notions of the creative power of national consciousness. Furthermore, as we have seen, the projective method excludes it. As a result, the original syncretic social activity is presented as an undifferentiated state set in motion by a change or event in the environment. Such a state seems to be characteristic of evolutionary theories. One might compare it with the role of primitive society in positivist and Marxist social theory, the chemical soup of modern biology or the Big Bang of modern astronomy. Perhaps, theories which are based on the
interaction of or relations between objects need both an undifferentiated state and a disturbing force in order to avoid infinite regression and get the interactions started. Veselovskij's differentiation of genres is, therefore, a kind of literary "big bang".  

2) The "big bang" is a means of setting into motion the particles whose interaction led to the development of life on earth. The layman hesitates to speak on these matters, but it seems safe to say that there is still some contention among evolutionary scientists as to whether life is a statistical inevitability or a statistical quirk, whether there is only one or several paths to its development and whether, having once appeared, it will continue to exist. A positivist literary theory would allow us to ask questions about literature, culture and society. Is there only one line of development? Once they have developed may they disappear? We might even reverse the last question: may they survive or are they programmed for self-destruction? These questions in a different form are at the basis of the discussion in Chapter VI of the potential usefulness of such a theory.  

3) This proto-activity is a theoretical reconstruction produced by comparing existing literary genres and then positing the existence of an original state containing in an undifferentiated form all of the features necessary to
produce, by acting in history under the transformative power of the evolving conditions of material existence, the variety of literary forms we have today. As a result of our discussion in Chapter IV of the cognitive transformation at the basis of his theory we are justified in asking whether Veselovskij has turned history into the reverse of his own inductive projective method, that is, into a deductive system capable of transforming without the intervention of any conscious force the proto-form into the various, complex forms of today. As long as this possibility exists, how can we be sure, without finding independent empirical verification of the existence of this proto-form, that it has not been created by his scientific consciousness acting to create regular connections among the objects he is studying? In other words, what has created the recurrences: history or the observer projecting them into his material? Any answer to these questions must concern itself with the implications of defining science as a search for recurrences inherent in the material of study. These questions must form the basis of any discussion of the role of invariants, deep structures or universal forms in the structuralist use of the projective method.

This same issue of the transformation of a simple form into more complex ones is also crucial in Veselovskij's explanation of how the social and material environment can
produce a multiplicity of complex literary forms by injecting simple social forms into literature as time progresses. This is a different type of explanation from that described above. The proto-form (or syncretic activity) contains within itself a program for future development. The simple forms described here combine themselves into complex forms under the random influence of other literary forms, simple and complex, and the determining influence of the environment. This is an important difference because, whereas the proto-activity was complex, although undifferentiated, before history began, the simple forms acquire their complexity in history. In other words, the first type of explanation requires the existence in potential of the future literary system before it manifests itself in history (a full-scale determinism) while the second type of explanation offers a mechanism by which any history, be it predetermined, conditioned or random, could have produced the complex literary forms which we have today. This is another way of saying that the second type of explanation may still be used, even by a scholar who rejects the positivist assumption that all societies must develop in the same manner under the influence of the pre-determined evolution of the conditions of material existence. This is true even though Veselovskij himself seems to accept the animism, totemism, matriarchy, patriarchy scheme of
development which was favored by the ethnologists of his day (Frazer, Lange, Morgan).

Veselovskij's introduction of this second type of explanation may be seen as a result of the difficulties encountered in the transferal of the theory of evolution from the explanation of forms of life to the explanation of forms of thought (in this case literary forms). I have discussed some of these problems in a general sense in the section on the projective method. Now I can show the specific problems they cause in any attempt to explain the origin and development of literary forms.

The theory of evolution rests on the assumption that life forms are capable of reproducing themselves by their own activity. It is possible, given this minimal activity, to explain how the environment inhibits, or prevents, the reproduction of some forms and allows, or promotes, the reproduction of others. Change occurs both because the environment changes and because the reproduction is itself imperfect. Random mutations result in innumerable differences which may prove significant in a given environment. The problem is that the direct transferal of these assumptions to the history of literary forms would contradict two of the most fundamental positivist assumptions about the nature of human thought. The assertion that literary forms reproduce themselves by their own activity would necessitate
the acceptance of an ideal realm of thought in which that reproduction takes place. (It would mark a return to the position of Kant or more likely, given the positivists' emphasis on historical change, to the evolutionary idealism of Hegel.) If, on the other hand, we assert that literary forms can be reproduced only within the human mind, then we must either abandon the possibility of imperfect reproduction as a source of change or run the risk of undermining the assumption that the mind passively reproduces external reality and with it the inductive method on which positivist scholarship rests. (It would mark a return to romanticism.) The only solution is to find a means of locating the process of reproduction inside the human mind while at the same time demonstrating that the environment both produces and controls the imperfections (mutations) which occur in that process. This is what Veselovskij does in his study of psychological parallelism.  

At the basis of this study is an implicit evolutionary assumption: only those organisms and societies whose thoughts are in contact with (an accurate reflection of) the conditions of material existence will survive. This results in a natural selection for forms of thought which are in contact with material reality. Positivist science with its inductive method is the culmination of this evolutionary process. But what of poetry? Veselovskij
finds the origin of poetic language in an early stage of human existence when man was living in close, everyday, physical contact with nature. The result of this contact was the establishment of parallels or juxtapositions between the phenomena of nature and human life based on the presence of activity and motion in them both.82

Veselovskij describes how these early parallels accumulated around one object, giving birth to symbols, myths and, with the development of the concept of individuality, divinities.83 Thus, animism and religion were early means of maintaining contact with material reality by bringing about an identification between human actions and those of the natural forces at work in external reality. However, as social life developed, man's self-consciousness increased. As a result, he became more aware of the differences between himself and his surroundings, and this identification collapsed.84

Veselovskij calls the type of thinking which preceded this collapse "animistic" and the language it used "figurative" (the Russian root obraz also means 'image') language. After the sense of identification was lost, the original symbols became mere comparisons. And as the conditions of material existence continued to change, they lost their figurative quality entirely (their contact with material reality) and became algebraic signs.85 Poetry gives new
meaning to these algebraic signs by establishing new connections between them and external reality. This is how the parallels of an earlier stage of development have become the metaphors of our poetic language. (The reader who is familiar with the concept of *ostranenie* will notice an obvious similarity here.)

The romantic would make an obvious objection to this argument. If poetry developed out of the figurative language, animism and religion which were pre-scientific man's way of maintaining contact with external reality (this is close to Levi-Strauss's presentation of *The Savage Mind*) why have they not all disappeared with the advent of positivist science which is a more effective means of establishing and maintaining such contact? In other words, why should poetry exist in a society with science? It seems to me that this is a crucial question for any theory which asserts that literature is a source of knowledge about external reality.

Veselovskij's work provides two answers to this question, both based on assumptions about human psychology which are drawn loosely from his evolutionary theory and directly from his anti-romanticism. The first assumption is based on the continued existence and recurrence of a more primitive form of thought. The second is based on the need to maintain contact with evolving forms of thought.
The assumptions are: 1) man has a recurring need not only for contact with external reality but also for the presence within that reality of a power which is sympathetic to his needs. Therefore, he continually, especially in times of social unrest, finds in nature parallels or consonances (sozvučija) for his own activities and feelings. Veselovskij uses this assumption to explain romanticism and symbolism as a return to animism in a time of social exhaustion. He also uses it to explain why new parallels, new metaphors, are continually being formed in reaction to such social changes as the appearance of steamships or trains in the nineteenth century; 2) man has a need for full awareness of the forms of social thought which he has just developed. This is why Veselovskij speaks of the poet as filling the old forms with our new understanding as revealing the suggestivity (podskazyvanie, suggestivnost') of the old forms.

If Veselovskij associated the first assumption with the romantic art of which he was critical, he associated the second with the art of the Renaissance, an art which made men aware of the new possibilities inherent in a changing social atmosphere. The first type of artist projects his own feelings into reality; the second type bases his art on a thorough study of existing modes of thought.
By combining these three assumptions we can formulate a positivist literary history in the following manner: 1) Something changes in the conditions of material existence; 2) The members of society attempt to develop new forms of social thought to account for the change; 3) Poets and writers either a) revert to animism and anthropomorphize the new material conditions or b) employ some combination of old literary forms and/or borrowed literary forms and new social forms to become fully aware of the change which has just occurred.

There are passages in Veselovskij\textsuperscript{92} which suggest that 1, 2, 3b is the way in which a healthy, self-confident society functions and is the only way to produce great literature, while a tired society fails to produce new forms of thought (fails in step 2) and, therefore, has an animistic literature (3a). Veselovskij believed that European society and literature were in such a period in the late 1800's.\textsuperscript{93} Perhaps, therefore, we can present his account of literary history in the following manner:
It is hard to tell whether Veselovskij meant the argument which I have just abstracted from his writings as a serious hypothesis about literary history or was just venting the traditional spleen of the classical scholar in the face of the young, self-proclaimed, avant-garde of his day. Whatever the case may be, if we accept these assumptions about the need for society to maintain both contact with reality and an awareness of the forms of thought which are providing that contact, then an evolutionary model of literary history is possible. Furthermore, it will be one which meets the theoretical needs of positivist literary scholarship. Human minds driven by these constant needs will reproduce the literary forms, changing them only by adding material provided by the changing environment. In
the following diagram I have tried to show how a complex form could be produced by such a process— even in a rather brief time and without the addition of all the complicating factors listed on page 200. In order to simplify matters further I have started with the appearance of a form of social thought, not depicting the similar process by which the social form was produced by the conditions of material existence.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Literary Forms</th>
<th>Social Thought</th>
<th>Conditions of Material Existence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i</td>
<td>$r \leftarrow \text{adds and selects for } r$</td>
<td>form $r \leftarrow \text{appears } R$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii</td>
<td>$r+s \leftarrow \text{adds and selects for } s$</td>
<td>form $s \leftarrow \text{appears } S$</td>
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<tr>
<td>iii</td>
<td>$r+s+t \leftarrow \text{adds and selects for } t$</td>
<td>form $t \leftarrow \text{appears } T$</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>iv</td>
<td>$r+s+t+u \leftarrow \text{adds and selects for } u$</td>
<td>form $u \leftarrow \text{appears } U$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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</table>

Figure 5. A Simple Scheme of Literary Evolution

This conceptual system is capable of producing within a very short time a complex literary form composed of at least four social forms. If we were to take an example from Veselovskij's work on plot, the social forms might be seen
as simple motifs, understood by him as the simplest narrative units responding figuratively to our need for understanding reality (for example, the sun is an eye, the sun and moon are brother and sister, a bride is abducted by a bridegroom, the brother of the bride mourns, it rains on some days, trains are appearing in the Russian countryside, etc.) Simply by causing the combination of these simple motifs without need for poets to create anything out of their imagination the social environment could create a fairly complex plot.

We accept this type of study when it is done on an older folk tradition.95 We are much less willing to consider the possibility that the same factors may be at work when a modern artist such as Tolstoy incorporates a train into his work at a time when industrialization is changing the existing fabric of Russian society. By comparing Tolstoy to a folk artist Veselovskij's work would not denigrate the former but rather emphasize the value of them both to their respective societies as a means of gaining an awareness of what was going on in their surroundings. Furthermore, as I have said above, Veselovskij's theory provides the artist with some freedom in his choice of literary form. This is accomplished by adding the following complicating circumstances to the simplistic diagram presented in Figure 5.
1) The forms of social thought are not simple forms but complex ones which combine in a manner similar to literary ones only under the influence of material conditions. In fact, they are more than just thought and include rituals and other complex activities (see p. 185). Veselovskij leaves unconsidered how much variety there might be in social thought itself. In a complex modern society the amount of choice would be considerable. He never discusses the possibility of class divisions which would add even more choice to the system.

2) Veselovskij allows for the possibility that an individual "event" in real life (he calls it a sobytie) might, although it would eventually be broken down into the existing motifs and plots of its day, produce a variant form which could survive for some time. He said that the modern novel was unusual in that it had abandoned the traditional plot schemes for the depiction of the typical characters of its day.

3) Veselovskij also allows for the possibility that an individual author, presumably due to the unusual circumstances of his life or under the influence of a foreign source, might create variant forms which could also survive for some time. Only the perspective of the distant future will show that it was a random event not characteristic of its time. One might add that it could probably be
explained adequately by a more precise breakdown of society into its different groups.

4) The primary source of variation is the influence of other texts. This provides the author with a choice of exotic forms and is especially significant in the development of literatures other than Greek. Veselovskij found it particularly important during the Renaissance. At time iv, for example, any foreign form which could incorporate u could be used.

5) Literary forms not only combine with each other but also come apart. Furthermore, they do not perish but continue to exist apparently on the periphery of the tradition or as unread written texts. This means that the author who had to incorporate u into his work might be able to combine it with r, r+s, or r+t. In fact, Veselovskij argues that there is often a return to older forms because the forms of the preceding generation have become so identified with the ideas of the most recent social stage as to be unusable in the current one.

I have described these circumstances to emphasize the fact that Veselovskij's determinism is neither as absolute nor as simple as it may seem to be. In fact, many of its vices and virtues stem from the projective method which many of us, seeking to avoid methodological discussion or embracing structuralism, use today. In its weakest form
Veselovskij's social determinism represents the assertion that the literary forms of a given people are a result of the forms of social thought which they have had in the past and are developing at the present. These forms of social thought are in turn a result of their past and present conditions of material existence. He never says that an author's consciousness is determined by his social condition. In fact, the projective method excludes the study of consciousness.

Instead, Veselovskij presents a picture of the author as forced to work with the forms of thought available to him at a given time and place. (As Victor Erlich has said, this is what the Russian Formalists found so attractive in his work.\textsuperscript{102}) As a result of society's and his own constant need to maintain an awareness of the forms which society is developing to maintain contact with material reality, the author must choose some combination of the existing literary and social forms, a combination which will provide the necessary awareness. He is denied the possibility of creating his work out of his own imagination or of drawing on the resources of some ideal literary realm. But, if he is a modern writer, even his choice is not determined by the social conditions. What is determined is the survival of his choice. From the perspective of the historian it becomes apparent as a result of their survival which choices
were appropriate. However, the use of survival or even of popularity as a mark of which works are characteristic of an age raises all the problems of statistics and mass art which were mentioned briefly on p. 168. Veselovskij was aware of this and was consciously rethinking the romantic theory of the creative personality. He argued that the tone of an age was best discovered in the numerous books for everyday reading, not in a few masterpieces. Moreover, he argued the specific form and content of a masterpiece are a result of what the masses had prepared for the genius, not his actions alone.104

It is this combination of anti-romanticism and the projective method which makes an understanding of Veselovskij's scientific methodology crucial to an understanding of the structuralist attempt to develop a scientific literary scholarship and of the ensuing development of structuralist humanism out of that attempt. It is essential to realize that because of Veselovskij's combination of the projective method and the theory of evolution, the literary forms and the forms of social thought have no immanent laws. Their shape and their development are the result of the evolving conditions of material existence on the one hand and Veselovskij's assumptions about constant human needs on the other. William Bascom, in his comments on the functions of folklore suggests that human needs are, in fact, more
complex than Veselovskij assumes. We may need not only contact with but also a means of transcending or escaping from material reality and not only awareness of but also release from our forms of social thought. Veselovskij himself moved in this direction with his comments on the need for animistic thought but then placed a negative value on the art it produced. If we make his assumed constant need a variable one, we can both allow the environment to produce a greater variety of forms and add the potential for even more choice to the system.

The same can be said about his assumption that the path of development of conditions of material existence is also a constant. There is good reason to believe that this, too, should be a variable. If so, then two seemingly necessary changes can turn a determinist system into one in which the history of a given people, or individual, is a result of the choices they have had to make, made, or failed to make about their internal needs and the needs forced upon them by their environment (I will call them external needs). If this procedure is followed, then I may formulate my new more limited social determinism in the following way. The state of a given people's literature will depend on their internal and external needs at a given point in history and on the path of development which they have followed in the past. It seems to me that this is a reasonable statement.
and that there is no theoretical reason, other than a prior commitment to an ideal literary system or a complete denial of history, to reject the possibility of a social history of literature based on this assumption. It may not prove to be valid, and consciousness may have to be introduced as a creative force, but there is no basis for its a priori rejection.

We can, however, state that such a history has and will continue to have some limitations. The reader will remember the simple diagram (Figure 5: A Simple Scheme of Literary Evolution) which produced the literary form \( r+st+u \). A social history based on my revised version of Veselovskij's method would break that form down into its constituent parts and then trace their origin back to a given set of social forms and material conditions. It seems to me that this is a result of the historical use of the projective method. Because it ignores consciousness, it turns history into a mechanism for generating texts from historical base forms. One doubts whether this is all we should like to be able to say about a given literary text or even about its history. At the very least, we can note the danger that a historical, projective method will project everything into history. The problem is that, as Engel'gardt\textsuperscript{109} has noted, we may want to know more about a text than the distant perspective provided by the historical
projective method can offer. Engel'gardt asks whether one of the purposes of history should not be to recapture the sense of the historical time as well as to arrange it in an order provided by our more distant perspective. We can scarcely argue that the authors and readers of a given time are aware of the full history of all the forms which they are using. Our perspective as social historians would provide this knowledge, but it would not be able to recapture the original meaning of the text nor to re-interpret it in light of contemporary needs. A more complete discussion of this question will be provided in relation to the work of Janusz Sławinski on the sociology of literature, literary history and the literary text (see p. 330). His work introduces a third variable into the system by requiring the scholar to abandon his fixed position as an external observer of texts.110

In this chapter I have argued for the theoretical possibility of a social history of literature based on the positivist scholarship of Veselovskij. In so doing, however, I have also repeated the path by which what I have called structuralist humanism arose out of determinist Marxism and linguistic structuralism. For this reason, it is worthwhile reviewing the process once again. Veselovskij's theory provided the simple determinist system presented in Figure 5. It was a rather stable system
controlled in Veselovskij's own work by the pre-determined evolution of the conditions of material existence on the one hand and two assumptions about constant human needs on the other. The observability of the process was ensured by the stable position of the scientific observer. It seems to me that if I replaced the positivist scientific observer with a practitioner of a determinist Marxism, replaced the forms of social thought with social classes and allowed the social classes to determine the author's consciousness instead of the survivability of forms, then it would also be a reasonable model for a Soviet Marxist social history. It also resembles some of the transformational models associated with linguistic structuralism.

The point which interests me here is the procedure by which I have complicated this simple system, thereby reducing its determinism to a minimal level. The procedure had four steps:

1) I introduced a series of mediating factors which increased the number of available choices within the system;
2) I replaced constant human needs with variable ones thereby, although I did not develop the point, allowing the members of society to enter into different relations with the alternatives made available by the first procedure;
3) I replaced the predetermined evolution of the conditions of material existence with variable paths of evolution,
thereby allowing different groups to have different histories; and finally

4) I suggested that the fixed external position of the positivist observer also has its limitations and said that Janusz Ślawinski has abandoned that, adding the observational position of the scholar as one more variable in the system.

The scholarship which results from this procedure is what I have called structuralist humanism or, if we were to develop further its theoretical models, theoretical eclecticism. It is, as I will argue in Part III, capable of producing not only a social history of literature but much more as well. In order to place Part III in the proper perspective I would first like to argue in an impressionistic manner why I feel we need a social history of literature. This will also allow the last chapter of this part to form a complement to the first one.
CHAPTER VI

DO WE NEED A SOCIAL HISTORY OR SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE?

I am going to answer this question by a circuitous argument which will eventually take me back to the social situation I described in Chapter I in relation to the passages from Mickiewicz and Prus. The reader will probably have noticed that I started out talking about determinism and wound up talking about choice. Veselovskij was a scholar and devotee of Italian Humanism. He was fond of comparing it with romanticism or symbolism as a contrast between great literature and animism. The emphasis was on laborious study as the source of an awareness of the existence of a choice between alternative forms of thought. He argued that because Italian Humanism was based on a thorough study of classic models it offered freedom of choice, while romanticism, in asserting creative freedom, was trapped by the forms in its environment of which it was unaware. A similar point is made in his article on plot where he says that, "not all peoples have achieved a schematization of fairy tale plottedness, that is, a most simple composition which has opened the path to further already non-mechanistic creative work."
The comparison with Veselovskij's own scholarly work is obvious. If we do not study our surroundings, they determine our thoughts and activities. If we study them, we may attain a level of abstraction where we can choose among the existing alternatives. In this approach the alternatives cannot be avoided, only understood and accepted. It seems to me that there is in what I have called Veselovskij's determinism something of the stoic acceptance of fate which the Renaissance took from Cicero, among others. This is, perhaps, what most distinguishes the choice which Veselovskij offers an author from the creativity the romantics desired. There are in the existing order of the universe a number of roles to be played. If we study that order carefully, we gain the knowledge necessary to choose among them or, if the choice has already been made for us, to accept our fate willingly and with full knowledge of what we are doing. If we assert our total freedom, we are the blind victims of fate. This was the basis of Veselovskij's criticism of the symbolists.

We can, on the basis of our analysis of the cognitive transformation at the bottom of his thought (see pp.178-79), turn this criticism back against Veselovskij himself. He criticized the romantics and symbolists for their relapse into animism, saying:
Such a mood is understandable in an epoch of waverings and doubts, when the dislocation between the existing and the desired has come to a head, when faith in the durability of the social and religious order has weakened, and the thirst (desire) for something different and better is felt more strongly. Scientific thought sets out on new paths, trying to establish an equilibrium between faith and knowledge, but the old parallelism which seeks in nature and in her images an answer to the insufficiencies of spiritual life and consonances with her also plays a role. In poetry this leads to a renewal of figurativeness (obraznost'), the landscape—the scenery fill up with human content. This is the same psychological process which answered once the first modest needs of thought, the same attempt to get on intimate terms with nature, to project oneself into her mysteries, to re-settle her into one's own consciousness; and often the same result: not knowledge, but poetry.115

The same question can be asked about Veselovskij's positivist scholarship especially in its most determinist form. Has his scientific consciousness projected into reality the consonances it needed to find there? Are his determinist history and fate as necessary to his sense of stability in a time of change as the divinities were to primitive man and the symbolists? In other words, can the scientist free himself of animistic thinking in order to discover the laws determining external reality, or has his own scientific animism placed them there?

These questions might be treated as verbal games or intellectual speculation were it not for the fact that they concern the status of the science and technology which have
created, directly or indirectly, much of contemporary society and have now, in the form of structuralism, moved into the humanities with an impact equal to or greater than that which positivism had on the romanticism which preceded it. As I have shown in the preceding sections, Veselovskij's scholarship was based on the relationship between social and literary forms of thought. In the following passage he expressed his concern about the way in which the social changes of his time were affecting literature:

We are all more or less open to the suggestivity of images and impressions; the poet is more sensitive to their small nuances and combinations, he perceives them more fully; thus, he amplifies, reveals to us the realms renewing the old plots with our understanding enriching the familiar words and images with a new intensity, enticing us for a time into the same unity with ourselves in which the undifferentiated (bezličnyj) poet of the unconscious poetic epoch lived. But we have lived through too much separately, our demands for suggestivity have grown and become more personal (ličnyj, referring to bezličnyj above), more diverse; moments of unification arise only in epochs of a peaceful, vital synthesis which has accumulated in the general consciousness. If great poets (bol'sye poetry) are becoming rarer; have we not with this answered one of the questions which we have addressed to ourselves more than once: why?

This passage is in line with Veselovskij's theory as discussed in Chapter V. The lack of a vital synthesis in social thought makes it impossible for poets on the grand scale, ones capable of incorporating the thought of an
entire society in their work, to appear. Veselovskij is addressing a problem which occupied a central position in nineteenth century thought: Was the increasing specialization brought about by industrialization good for society, as Spencer's evolutionary optimism maintained, or would it cause general disunity and the collapse of existing institutions? In light of Veselovskij's original theory, the question would be: as society splits up into specialized occupational groups and individual family units, will its members still share material conditions similar enough to produce the capacious forms of social thought which are the basis of great literature? In light of the direction in which I moved his theory the question would become: has modern society added so much choice and so many variables into social life that there is no longer the possibility of a unified literature or, for that matter, of a unified literary scholarship?

There is a value judgement inherent in Veselovskij's position based on his assumption that great literature must deal with the public questions of its day. (Here once again we see the positivist and lover of Renaissance art in him.) However, if I replace the term "great art" with "public art" in the sense of art dealing with the large Social issues involving the fate of a people. I can use his comments to consider in an informal manner the usefulness and limitations of a positivist social history of literature.
Before doing that, however, it is necessary for me to introduce a factor of which Veselovskij may not have been aware, the role which positivist science, its evolutionary social history and the systems of economic thought to which they were related were playing in the social transformation which disturbed him. One may suggest that it is the belief in industry, technology and science as a means of changing man's environment until his dependence on it can be ended that is at the basis of both capitalism and communism as systems of social thought.

The Polish author Kazimierz Brandys in his novel Nierzeczywistość 'Unreality' has expressed this in the following manner:

Despite all the differences, certain unexpected associations with the problems of mass societies in your part of the world suggest themselves. Don't you suspect that the present crises and reevaluations equally in communism as in capitalism are derived from the utopian flaw of their philosophical assumptions? If we were to reflect on the essence of both great conceptions of social organization formed by the last centuries, perhaps we would admit that they are utopian. Not only that one which regulates the division of goods according to work and needs but also that one which is based on the free play of the interests of individuals. So I sometimes suppose that both of them, Smith's and Marx's, with their faith in progress and in the creative abilities of human nature did not foresee its self-destructive power.

...
So perhaps we both, you and I, are sons of Utopia. It's true that they are greatly different, yes, but our anxiety (niepokoј) is similar. 119

The presence of a cognitive transformation at the basis of positivist science (see Chapter IV) and the theory of social evolution discussed in Chapter V raise two questions: what if science has projected its own image into the environment more quickly than we can adjust the forms of thought necessary to our survival? It is one thing when a primitive peoples his external world with divinities or when a positivist scholar projects order into his subject matter (if that is what Veselovskij has done); it is another when an entire society devotes itself to making its physical environment over into the image of its faith. This is why industrialization and the transformation of reality play such a large role in early Soviet literature. 120

It is also why Eastern European intellectuals have an innate sense of the real dangers inherent in any structures of thought. It may also be why we err if we read their work as applicable only to Eastern Europe. Perhaps they have a more acute awareness than we do of why the humanities are necessary to a modern society.

What I mean by this will become apparent if I consider the manner in which a positivist social history would describe the crisis in the humanities described in Part I,
Chapter V.

It seems to me that it would analyze the situation in the following manner. I have phrased this analysis in the form of predictions in order to relate it to the positivist motto introduced by August Comte (Savoir pour prévoir 'know in order to predict').

If literature is the result of a people's need to maintain both contact with the material conditions of their existence and an awareness of the forms of thought used in maintaining that contact, then we can make the following predictions about a mass society whose members perform specialized tasks and, therefore, live under different material conditions according to their age, sex, level of education, race, type of employment and innumerable other factors:

1) Literature will virtually disappear as a public art in the sense just given the term except when some unusual event such as a war, revolution, massive civil disturbances, natural or economic disaster or the presence of an external enemy create a shared experience capable of producing shared forms of thought;

2) Literature's place in public life will be taken by a mass art which exists within the institutions of mass communication any such society requires. We would expect this mass art to have two characteristics: i) it would
have to draw on a very limited number of shared older forms of social thought and would employ these forms in a superficial manner in order to appeal to the largest number of people (in other words, it would be an art of stereotypes and cliches drawn from older literary forms produced before the society divided up); ii) because it would exist within the institutions of mass communication, it would have to adapt itself to the needs of those institutions. (They are its immediate environment and would apply the most direct pressure on its artistic forms. In a society where the institutions were commercially owned and operated the artistic forms would have to incorporate a commercial content within themselves. In a society where the institutions were politically controlled the artistic forms would have to acquire a political content. One might expect them to attempt to generate a false sense of public life and art perhaps based on the presence of an external enemy, disaster, etc. which has to be faced by a unified society. In either case, these institutional environments would select against what Veselovskij called "great artists." Because the institutions of mass education would face similar environmental pressures and because the student body would be composed of the consumers of this mass art, we might expect teachers of literature to feel a significant, perhaps overwhelming, pressure to adopt, or at the very
least adapt to, its aesthetics.)

3) We might also expect a number of specialized art forms to develop, for example: a) the artists, writers and critics who were deprived of a role in public life might be expected to produce an art which, since it was based on their shared artistic environment, would be concerned largely with the status of art and the artist. This art might alternate between frustration at its limited social audience and exultation in the intense experiences it provided its users. It could employ extremely complex forms because of the expertise of its audience but would probably be incomprehensible to the masses and, perhaps, even to other artists who worked in different genres; b) as machines play an ever larger role in the material existence of large segments of society and, therefore, shape their thoughts, one might expect the development of artistic forms produced either by machines or by men using machines (electronic music, computer art and film might become dominant art forms). This is why Scholes and Kellog\textsuperscript{121} have argued that literature may diminish in importance as electronic media replace books; c) workers and businessmen whose conditions of material existence were dominated by the struggle for existence might transfer their need for an awareness of their forms of social thought to a professional sports capable of expressing competition in its
purest form. (Roland Barthes for example, has analyzed the aesthetics of professional wrestling in *Mythologies*.)

4) When public life does not exist, one would expect the primary forms of thought to be concerned with private life. Poetry and prose which were concerned with individual emotions and insecurities might become dominant literary forms in such a society. This is what Veselovskij called animism (see p. 195).

For the purposes of my discussion it is not important whether these predictions accurately reflect the details of contemporary social life. For one thing, they are a result of the assumption that contact with reality is the primary human need. Furthermore, I am not sure that the difference between modern society and all but the most simple societies is really that absolute. Is the difference between mass art and high art today more extreme than the difference between folk art and aristocratic art in the eighteenth century? It is, perhaps, more a matter of perception. We are much less secure about the superiority of our art today. In addition, there is some disorientation because raising of public taste did not occur simultaneously with the transfer of power from the aristocracy to whomever has it today.

The point which concerns me here is that these predictions do concern forces which were at work in Poland
when Polish structuralists were making their methodological decisions and which are at work in some form in any contemporary society. When a student enters or decides not to enter a literature classroom, he is under their influence, as are we when we teach him. If works of literature are to be read, they must survive in competition for a student's free time with television, film, sports, mass art, electronic music and other forms of "entertainment" in today's society. The prestige of science has pushed literature out of whatever public life there is today. If the humanities are to reenter or to help recreate public life by creating the necessary shared experience more effectively than the mass media can, then we will need a theoretical means of asking questions about the existence and possibility of controlling such forces. In other words, my theoretical argument for the possibility of a social history of literature has just been joined by a practical one for its necessity.

In order to understand the limitations of a positivist social history and, perhaps, of any literary history based on the inductive projective method (including non-theoretical eclecticism) we may turn back to the novelist Kazimierz Brandys who, in the novel quoted above, said the following of the dilemma of the contemporary humanist and intellectual:
What was he thinking about then? About the same things about which he had reflected while writing his school-boy diary. What is man, does God exist, does death signify the end and how to behave in life. Those are truely juvenile questions, the fear (of looking) ridiculous is truly justified: Is it possible to pose them at all in a civiliza-
tion in which specialized investigations have taken the place of philosophy? Our world is occupied with technology, genetics and linguistic structures, it has become submissive in regard to universal problems, it has marked out for itself more narrow, more tightly defined purposes. In such a world to plumb the mysteries of existence itself without electron microscopes, without labora-
tories and accelerators; well after all that's the craziness of provincial thinkers seeking proofs for the existence of God.124

And yet Brandys, as a contemporary intellectual and author, has written an entire novel devoted both to the exploration of those problems and to an understanding of the social situation in which he lives. He has done this by employing a narrative structure in which the narrator tapes his responses to a sociologist's questionnaire. (The written book as we read it is the transcript of a taped conversation.) By so doing Brandys is able to incorporate the existing social content into his new literary form and question its authority over him.

Readers of Slavic literature have seen this narrative structure many times before. It appeared at the start of Chapter I in the dialogue between the romantic poet and the rational, or common sense, priest in Mickiewicz, and
in the conversation between the writer and the botanist in Prus. It also appears in the dialogue between the Underground Man and the missing Černyševskij in Dostoevsky and in the exchanges between Kavaleroş and Babičev in Jurij Oleša's novel Envy. There are numerous other examples.

What the remainder of this study will suggest, and what we have not always been fully aware of, is that many structuralist scholars have done the same thing with the scientific descriptions of linguistic and social structures which they have incorporated into their literary scholarship. If "Know in order to predict" was the motto of positivist scholarship, then "Know in order to resist" might become the motto of a structuralist humanism. It seems reasonable to conclude that such a scholarship would require a fully developed sociology of literature. In Polish and Czechoslovakian scholarship such a sociology has developed under the name of the study of literary communication. It will be discussed in Chapter IV of Part III. First, however, I have to describe the linguistic structuralism which developed out of Russian Formalism. This will be the subject of Chapter I of the next part.
NOTES: PART II

1 Adam Mickiewicz, Dzieła poetyckie, t. 3, Utwory Dramatyczne (Warszawa, 1973), 92.

2 Bolesław Prus, Nowele i Opowiadania, wybór Ireny Orlewiczowej (Warszawa, 1979), 308-09.

3 In the brief discussion which takes up all of this chapter I am trying, in an impressionistic manner which is all the space allotted to the event in this study will allow me, to describe a change in the atmosphere of Western society which took place in the nineteenth century and has had far-reaching effects which are still with us today. Because of the necessary brevity of the discussion, I have been forced to run the risk of oversimplifying a very complex process. My understanding of the romantics and of their attitude toward history is taken form a recent, but already authoritative, Polish discussion of the matter. Maria Janion, Maria Żmigrodzka, Romantyzm i historia (Warszawa, 1978). My understanding of the positivist period is drawn from standard Polish sources, particularly Władysław Tatarkiewicz, Historia Filozofii, t. III, Filozofia XIX wieku i współczesną (Warszawa, 1978) and Julian Krzyżanowski, A History of Polish Literature, trans. Doris Ronowicz (Warszawa, 1978), 354-450. Krzyżanowski (or his English translator) has titled the section of his history devoted to the use of positivist literary scholarship in Poland, "Scientific Literary Criticism," Krzyżanowski, History, 439-43. It is the appearance of that adjective before literary scholarship or criticism which is at the heart of the following discussion.

Because of the unavoidable simplifications involved, I have tried in some of the footnotes to qualify the main thrust of the discussion. It is not the case, for example, that all Romantic visions were intense. In some writers, such as the Russian poet Afanasij Fet, the vision is less intense, more personal and sometimes seems to come so effortlessly that the poet and the reader wonder whether it was real. See, for example, his poem "Fantaziya", Afanasij Afanasievič Fet, Stixotvorenija (Moskva, 1970), 129-30.
The actual process was more complex than this. The development of Mickiewicz from the early romantic poet depicted in this passage to a religious mystic and, finally, into an active revolutionary soldier has been described in great detail by Alina Witkowska. Alina Witkowska, Mickiewicz. Słowo i czyn (Warszawa, 1975).


This statement needs to be clarified by saying that there quickly developed among Romantic authors a tendency to parody each other's visions. The tendency toward parody is at its strongest in writers such as the Byron of Don Juan in English literature and Pushkin in Russian literature. The visionary abilities of the poet became a part of what Janusz Sławiński has called "the key tradition" (tradycja kluczowa) of a given literary period. Sławiński understand the key tradition as the set of problems and techniques in relation to which nearly all the writers and movements of a given time have to define their position. Janusz Sławiński, "Synchronia i diachronia w procesie historyczno-literackim," Dzieło, Język, Tradycja. (Warszawa, 1974), 28.

This, too, was a complex process. The romantics were the first to turn the attention of European society away from aristocratic culture and toward folk cultures. The romantics, however, seem from our perspective to have used the folk mainly as a confirmation of their belief in an alternative non-aristocratic (natural) culture. It seems to us that it was only the positivists and the later scholars who could take advantage of the results of positivist research, who began to study non-European cultures as cultures in their own right. There is a danger, though, of allowing historical perspective either to make any of these contributions seem less important than it was or of assuming that we are the first to study non-European cultures in their own right. For an impartial account of one of the early debates over how to study folk culture see Richard M. Dorson, "The Eclipse of Solar Mythology", The Study of Folklore, ed. Alan Dundes (Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1965, 57-83.)
In Poland this change was a direct result of the failure of the romantically inspired uprisings. Positivist culture was based on the assumption that only a gradual rebuilding of the economic and cultural structure could lead to eventual independence. As Julian Krzyżanowski has said, this even caused some Polish positivist historians to suggest that Poland's past errors may have been the cause of her present situation. This was a reversal of the Romantic messianism, described below, which saw Poland's sufferings as a sign that God had chosen her to play a central role in human history. Krzyżanowski, *History*, 363.

9

10

11
In a neat political move Mickiewicz also offered the French a role as partners in this transformation. Mickiewicz lost his position as a lecturer as a result of the revolutionary tone of his lectures. Sawicki, *Początki*, 216-242.

12
This statement is explained in greater detail at the end of this part of the study (see pp.

13
Tatarkiewicz, *Historia*, 80-84.

14
What I mean by "supremacy" is a general faith in science and an equation of the part of the general public of scholarship with detached objectivity. The mood of society changes quickly, but this general faith seems to remain.

15
There is a latent tension between the view that science is a source of knowledge about reality and the view that science is a source of technology, devices capable of manipulating that reality.
There has been no room within this study for a general account of Veselovskij's scholarly activities. For such an account the reader may turn to V.M. Žirmunskij, "A. N. Veselovskij (1838-1906)", in A.N. Veselovskij, Izbrannye State'i (Leningrad, 1939), v-xxiv.


The methodology of a positivist literary scholarship based on the theory of social evolution developed by Spencer will be the subject of this part of the study. For an extensive discussion of the methodology of Geistesgeschichte see Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago, 1978).

Ewa Thompson has based her entire study on the conflicting idealist and positivist tendencies in Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New Criticism (The Hague, 1971). She assumes without comment that Veselovskij was a positivist (p. 93).

Boris Engel'gardt, A.N. Veselovskij (Petrograd, 1924), 13-14.

Viktor Žirmunskij, "Istoričeskaja poëtika A.N. Veselovskogo", in A.N. Veselovskij, Istoričeskaja poëtika, ed. by V. M. Žirmunskij (Leningrad, 1940), 3-37. Žirmunskij refutes the formalist view of Veselovskij's development in a section describing "the cultural-historical principle" governing Veselovskij's research (p. 8). This "cultural-historical principle" is what I will be calling a theory of social evolution.

This belief is a heritage of the Formalist origins of our research. See Erlich, Russian Formalism, 30, for a criticism of Veselovskij's literary history which is based on this assumption.

From the point of view of positivist philosophy both subjective and deductive reasoning about the nature of
reality can be seen as the same attempt, for example in Hegel, to impose the workings of one's own mind on reality. It is this belief which is at the basis of the inductive projective method of positivist scholarship (see p.  ).

24 Tatarkiewicz, Historia, 84.

25 A. N. Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija v istoričeskju poètiku" (1893), Istoričeskaja poètika, 53.

26 A. N. Veselovskij, "O metode i zadačax istorii literatury kak nauki" (1870), in Istoričeskaja poetika, 52.

27 Veselovskij, "O metode", 53-54.

28 A. N. Veselovskij, "Poètika sjužetov" (1897-1906), in Istoričeskaja poetika, 493.

29 Herbert Spencer developed his views of social evolution under the influence of Charles Darwin's theory of evolution. The account of his work which I have just provided agrees with that of Tatarkiewicz, Historia, 72-80.

30 Erlich, Russian Formalism, 30.

31 This is why it is possible to accept Victor Erlich's general view that Veselovskij came to focus more closely on the specific characteristics of literature while still insisting that Veselovskij's methodology remained that of a positivist scholar.

32 I am only summarizing here a distinction which I present as part of my basic vocabulary on p. and will discuss in more detail shortly.

33 Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, also Boris Engel'gardt, Formalnyj metod v historii literatury, Voprosy poètiki, XI, ed. V. Zirmunskij (Leningrad, 1927).
Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 37.

Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 37-42.


Among Slavic scholars, Dmitrij Lixačev has explored this problem in great detail in his study of time in Medieval and other literature. Dmitrij Lixačev, Poëtika drevnerusskoj literatury (Leningrad, 1967), 212-353.


This was the position of the deconstructionist scholars described at some length in Part I, Chapter V.


Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 54.

Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 47.


This is why Jerzy Kmita is justified in speaking of his combination of Neo-positivism and Marxism as anti- positivist. This is especially true when his work emphasizes
its status as a theoretical science in the sense in which he uses the term (see Part I, p. 77).

46

It is important to remember that Veselovskij's use of the inductive projective method was based on its successful use by Darwin in biology, the Indo-European linguists in philology and the English ethnologists in the study of "primitive" cultures. All of these disciplines were concerned with the study of artifacts from the past. This is true of ethnology as well because at the time "primitive" cultures were seen as keys to the understanding of the history and development of European culture. This comment is not meant to belittle the considerable achievements of the men who laid the groundwork for our, perhaps overconfident, study of "primitive" cultures as cultures in their own right. I am only suggesting that, since they were studying animals, languages and cultural "stages" which were for the Europeans of the time already dead, it was only natural for the positivist scholars to study these artifacts as objects no longer in use by an active consciousness.

47

Boris Engel'gardt, Formal'nyj metod.

48

Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 47.

49

This is the purpose behind his description of the methodology of the formalists as a "formal method" in Engel'gardt, Formal'ny metod.

50

Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 37.

51

This is why in a general treatment of the possibilities offered by inductive logic Henry E. Kyburg combined it with a general theory of probability. Henry E. Kyburg, Jr., Probability and Inductive Logic (London, 1970).

52

Veselovskij, "O metode", 47.

53

Veselovskij himself uses a statistical argument to distinguish between borrowing and independent development.
Veselovskij, "Poētika", 495. It is, probably, because Ewa Thompson is aware of the danger of randomness that she has joined the concept of the sui generis text with Roman Ingarden's metaphysical qualities. These qualities provide a means of controlling the potential randomness in the concept. Thompson, *Formalism*, 149.

54

It is interesting that Victor Erlich provides in his criticism of Veselovskij four terms which seem to be similar to the four alternatives just described: "creative genius" (2), "inner dynamics of the literary forms" (4), "extra-literary determinants" (4) and "sui generis text" (1). Instead, however, of discussing the possibilities offered by the different alternatives he assumes without explanation that Veselovskij should have chosen 1. Because of his use of the inductive projective method and his desire for history, Veselovskij had to choose the fourth alternative. Erlich, *Russian Formalism*, 30.

55


56

Veselovskij, "Poētika", 504-12.

57

Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 202-06.

58

In footnote 53 I said that Ewa Thompson had linked the sui generis text with Roman Ingarden's metaphysical qualities. It is important to remember that Ingarden insists that the person reading the literary text must "co-create" those values (see Part III, Chapter II).

59

The "dominant", or dominanta, was developed largely by Jurij Tynjanov. See Erlich, *Russian Formalism*, 199.

60

It is in some ways similar to the intersubjective realm of Roman Ingarden but without the extra sophistication of Ingarden's distinction between the text and its concretizations (see Part III, Chapter II).

61

I have no statistical proof for this assertion. There have been no in depth studies of how most scholars of literature really work. It seems to me that most American
scholars who make interpretations of individual texts are using some combination of Russian Formalism and New criticism. This is not the case in German scholarship where hermeneutic interpretation is widely practiced; see Siegfried Schmidt, *Literaturwissenschaft als argumentierende Wissenschaft zur Grundlegung einer rationalen Literaturwissenschaft* (München, 1975), 191-208.

62 I have taken the term from Jerzy Kmita's developmental-genetic explanation. Its meaning is explained on p. 91, Part I.


64 I am suggesting that non-theoretical eclecticism relies on the literary tradition of its day in order to achieve its uniformity of results. This point is described in more detail in Part III, Chapter VII.

65 Much of the following discussion is based loosely on Veselovskij's "Poetics of Plots" (*Poētika sjužetov*), a study to which I have already referred several times in this discussion. Veselovskij's "Poetics" consists of both sections which were written out and sections which remained mere listings of problems and topics to be considered. It was published in this incomplete form after Veselovskij's death. In the version published by Žirmunskij it runs to slightly over 100 pages. Veselovskij, "Poētika", 493-597.

66 These proofs would require disproving most of modern science on the one hand and the creative sensitivity of our most talented and experienced readers of literature on the other.

67 Victor Erlich has rightly noted both that Veselovskij's own research emphasized the fixed place of the literary forms in the traditions and that this is the aspect of his work which most appealed to the Formalists. Erlich, *Russian Formalism*, 28-30.
It seems to me that the term "mechanistic" both has negative connotations and is not reflective of the historical orientation of Veselovskij's thought.

It seems safe to assert that no anthropologist outside of the Soviet Union would accept it today.

I have throughout this discussion used the term "social forms" instead of "social content". It seems important in an exploration of the possibilities offered by a positivist social history to emphasize the fact that "social content" is not consciousness but "forms of social thought" if the inductive projective method is consistently applied. As Viktor Žirmunskij has noted, Veselovskij was highly critical of Hippolyte Taine's version of positivist literary scholarship. Žirmunskij, "Istoričeskaja", 3.

It is true, however, (see p. 145) that Veselovskij in his general statement tended to speak as if social content was an undifferentiated mass.

This was part of his general anti-romanticism. The reasons why an anti-romantic would reject the notion of a special realm of literary knowledge were discussed in relation to the passages from Mickiewicz and Prus which began this part of the study.

Veselovskij, "O methode", 45.

It is important to remember that positivist scholars and most nineteenth century scholars were normally fluent in several languages. There are few scholars today with the linguistic ability necessary to undertake the type of massive comparative study which Veselovskij had started and left unfinished at his death.


Žirmunskij, "Istoričeskaja", 17, 23-25.

This is the type of explanation which is at the basis of the study which most appealed to the Formalists; Veselovskij, "Poëtika".

Veselovskij, "Poëtika", 515-86.

Their work was critically appraised by Veselovskij in the text of his study, "Poëtika".


Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 125-36.

Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 12, 147 and elsewhere.


Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 132.

Claude Levi-Strauss, The Savage Mind (Chicago, 1962). This is one of the reasons why this entire discussion is important to a full understanding of linguistic structuralism. Levi-Strauss and Veselovskij employ a similar method in attempting to describe the invariant structures of primitive thought. Veselovskij, however, sees these structures as a past stage in human development whereas Levi-Strauss sees them as proof of the universal nature of human thought. Levi-Strauss is partly using this universal structure to question the status of French middle-class culture as a superior stage of human development.
For a discussion of all of these aspects of Levi-Strauss' thought the reader may turn to E. Nelson & Tanya Hayes, 

87 Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 133.


89 Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 129.

90 Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 71-72.

91 Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 60-67.

92 Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 64; also, Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 197-99.

93 Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 67, 72; also Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 199.

94 For Veselovskij's definitions of motif (motif) and plot (sjužet) see "Poëtika", 494-95, 500.

95 The most widely accepted study of this kind and one which was clearly influenced by Veselovskij's research is 
Vladimir I. Propp, _Morfologia skazki, Voprosy poëtiki, XII_ (Leningrad, 1928). A second edition has recently been published (Moskva, 1969). It is indicative of the way in which the Formalist-structuralist tradition has assimilated Veselovskij's method that Propp's other study tracing the folk tale, as Veselovskij would have done, back to its historical origins has received far less attention. Vladimir Propp, _Istoričeskije kornji volšebnoj skazki_ (Leningrad, 1946).

96 Veselovskij, "Poëtika", 496.

97 Veselovski, "Poëtika", 500-01.
Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 69.

Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija". This raises all the problems of statistics mentioned on p.168.

Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 56.

It is interesting that Žirmunskij, who was the most familiar with Veselovskij's work also produced one of the best studies of influence to come out of the early 1920's. Viktor Žirmunskij, Bajron i Puškin: Iz istorii romantičeskoi poèmy (Leningrad, 1924).

Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 67-68.

Erlich, Russian Formalism, 30.

Veselovskij, "O metode", 44, 49.


Bascom ends his article with the statement, "Here, indeed, is the basic paradox of folklore, that while it plays a vital role in transmitting and maintaining the institutions of a culture and in forcing the individual to conform to them, at the same time it provides socially approved outlets for the repressions which these same institutions impose upon him." Bascom, "Functions", 298.

William Bascom's passage cited in footnote 106 could, in fact, be used to explain the need a society has for artistic movements like symbolism. It would be an explanation which would be more likely to appeal to Veselovskij than to the symbolists.

It was this aspect of the theory of cultural evolution which led to the proto-object at the basis of the
theory of the ritual origin of folklore (see the discussion on p. 190). William Bascom has harshly criticized that theory as "a lively fossil which refuses to die." William Bascom, "Folklore and Anthropology", The Study of Folklore, 25-33.

109
   Engel'gardt, Veselovskij, 202-06.

110
   It is only by gaining an awareness of his role as participant in the text he is reading that the scholar can "regain his innocence", the goal which Sławiński expressed in the quotation on p.10 of Part I.

111
   Veselovskij probably saw his positivism, as the following discussion will show, as having the same position in regard to Romanticism as the Renaissance had had in relation to the Middle Ages. The Futurists and Formalists, especially in their manifestos, often had the same attitude toward the Symbolists.

112
   Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 56, 60.

113
   Veselovskij, "Poëtika", 497.

114
   This rational stoicism is perhaps most clearly expressed in Cicero's famous essay on death, De Senectute 'On Old Age', in which he presents a series of arguments on why approaching death should not be lamented.

115
   Veselovskij, "Psixologičeskij", 199.

116
   Veselovskij, "Iz vvedenija", 72.

117
   Melvin Defleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach have devoted the entire sixth chapter of their study of mass communication to this problem and concluded their study by saying that the mass media are the only means for a diverse, modern society to maintain some common experience and unity. Melvin L. DeFleur and Sandra Ball-Rokeach, Theories of Mass Communication, 3rd edition (New York, 1975).
This is another way of looking at the crisis in the humanities described in Part I, Chapter V.

Kazimierz Brandys, Nierzeczywistość (Paryż, 1978) 95-96.

The peripheral role of the artist in a rapidly industrializing society is clearly present in the novels, plays and short stories of Jurij Oleša, to give just one example.


I am accepting Veselovskij's contention (see pp. ) that that of which we are unaware (I would add, whether it is inside or outside of us), will inevitably control us.

Brandys, Nierzeczywistość, 83.

Prus was in all probability employing an ironic mode in the story from which the passage was taken. In fact, some of his stories are almost sentimental with their good will among poverty-stricken students, for example, the four students in the story "Pojednani". Prus was a broad talent capable of writing in more than one mode.

There is a bibliography available of Polish work on literary communication; Aleksander Bereza, Polskie Badania Nad Komunikacją Literacką 1960-1975, Sprawozdania Wrocławskiego Towarzystwa Naukowego 30 (1975), Seria A--Dodatek 2 (Wrocław, 1976). Aleksander Bereza was the leader of a group of young students working on problems of literary communication at the University of Wrocław. The group appear to have broken up because of the tragic deaths
of Bereza himself and of one of the young scholars, Jurand Banach, to whom this study is dedicated. Wojciech Soliński, who has contacts with the Slovak scholars mentioned in footnote 139 of Part I, has continued to work on these matters. His speciality is the study of translation.
PART III

THE CASE FOR STRUCTURALIST HUMANISM

Voice out of stone out of sleep
deep here where the world darkens,
memory of toil rooted in a rhythm
that beat on the earth with feet
forgotten.
Bodies sunken in the foundations
of the other time, naked. Eyes
riveted, riveted on a spot
which you cannot discern however you try;
the soul
that struggles to become your soul.

Even the silence is no longer yours
here where the millstones stopped.

George Seferis, "Gymnopaedia"\(^1\)

239
CHAPTER I

THE METHODOLOGY OF SLAVIC LINGUISTIC STRUCTURALISM

Our time should be defined by two opposing traits: it is a time of the most extreme materialism and along with that of the most passionate idealistic outbursts of the soul.

In essence the entire generation of the end of the 19th century carries in its soul the same rebellious, indignation (vosmuščenie) against the suffocating deathly positivism which lies like a stone on our heart.


Benz: But aren't I happier than you, Basil - you people who are too intelligent not to see that spark of awareness at the bottom of your religion which tells you that your only disciples are inferior creatures terrified of the moral darkness of the universe who are searching for a way out of that darkness, even at the expense of reason just so they can be assured that morally the world is not an absurdity. But it's not an absurdity, despite all your doubts - which tell me more about your ignorance than your religion does - and the reason why it isn't is because logic is possible. There's your proof. The sense of an ideal world whose miserable function is nothing but a limited (and not absolute) rationality is far more important than whether some little boob can endure life or not...
Prince Basil: Oh, that's the last straw! And you call that a proof?! I can't take any more of this. A time will come when you and your kind will wake up in some horrible void. With the help of your mental somersaults maybe you'll find a system that'll satisfy you in the realm of pure signs, but even with such a system you won't have anything to construct: it'll always be a deserted building without any life or tenants, and that's where you'll die, in a sterile void.

Benz kept silent. He had been prone to such thoughts himself whenever something went amiss with his system of signs. What would come of a system free of contradictions, a system derived from a single axiom and wallowing in the perfection of some ideal existence? Boredom and emptiness born of the demise of a thoroughly mechanized mind. What magnificent systems there would be, but, alas, what purpose would they serve if there was nothing left to construct? [. . .]

Benz tried to be witty: One day I'll logicize your Catholic dogma, then you'll see what's left of it, Father Basil — nothing but a bunch of signs. He broke out in a cynical laugh, but the echo reverberated from his own depths with a hollow sound. . .

Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, Insatiability (1927).

In the first part of this study I summarized the historical background of structuralist humanism, explained my reasons for the choice of the term and suggested that the literary scholarship of Janusz Sławiński can provide a literary methodology which is capable of lessening the tensions generated by the crisis which literary scholarship, as a part of the humanities, is experiencing today. I also described both the external, caused by social factors, and
the internal, caused primarily by the conflict between scientific and traditional literary scholarship, aspects of that crisis. In the second part of the study I attempted to place the crisis in an historical perspective by showing its origin in the positivist culture of the nineteenth century. The analysis of one example of positivist literary scholarship allowed me to establish three things which are important to the further development of my discussion: 1) Non-theoretical eclectic literary scholarship cannot avoid methodological discussion by denying that it produces a cognitive transformation in its object of study because the inductive projective method it employs to justify that denial produces the very same type of cognitive transformation it is attempting to avoid; 2) Linguistic structuralism was not the first and is therefore not the only possible scientific literary scholarship; and 3) There are certain limitations imposed on literary research by any consistent use of the projective method. This implies that there are also limitations on any attempt to create a scientific literary scholarship (see Part I, p. 88 for my definition of science). These points are at the basis of my argument for the usefulness of structuralist humanist research. In the first chapter of the part of my study devoted to the justification of the structuralist humanist perspective it is necessary to provide a brief description of the
methodology of Slavic linguistic structuralism.

As the passages which began this chapter suggest, the conflict between poet and scientist, which I described at the beginning of Part II, did not end at the turn of the century. It has rather continued with equal or greater intensity throughout the twentieth century. The romantic poet has been replaced by the symbolist, phenomenologist, and existentialist in insisting on the importance of human consciousness in shaping human reality. The positivist natural scientist, with his inductive projective method and observational (pre-theoretical) science, has been replaced by the neo-positivist logician, with his deductive projective method and the falsifiable hypotheses of his empirical (theoretical) science. But, the opposition and the not infrequent hostility remain the same. In this chapter I am going to touch on some aspects of the effect which it has had on the development of Russian Formalism into Russian and Soviet linguistic semiotics. The discussion will help me to explain in the following chapter why Polish structuralism has developed in another direction.

In Russian literature and literary scholarship at the turn of the century the poets had once again gained the ascendancy over the scientists. This was a result of the literary success of the movement known in Russian literature as symbolism or, sometimes, as Neo-Romanticism.
Symbolism asserted once again that literature was a higher form of knowledge capable of transcending the limits of both material reality and rational thought. It was the artistic symbol, defined by the early Russian symbolist Dmitrij Mereškovskij in the following passage, which made this possible:

"A spoken thought is a lie!" In poetry that which is not said and shimmers through the beauty of the symbol acts more strongly on the heart than that which has been expressed in words. Symbolism makes the very style, the very artistic substance (veščestvo) of poetry spiritual (oduševlennym) transparent, translucent throughout like the thin walls of an alabaster amphora in which a flame has been lit.

It is easy to see why this view of art would cause the rejection of positivist literary scholarship. As the discussion in Part II, Chapters IV and V showed, Veselovskij's scholarship rested on the assumption that the literary text was a particular object existing outside of consciousness and, therefore, as open to observation as any other cultural artifact would be. Mereškovskij's symbol, however, turns the text's artistic substance, its "thingness" (i.e. its status as an observable object in external reality), into a transparent vehicle for a "fire" which acts not on our rational powers of observation but on our poetic consciousness, our "heart". Art is no longer, as it was for Veselovskij, a means of becoming aware of the forms
of social thought. It is rather a means for consciousness to permeate those forms and free us both from their limits and from the material reality which had produced them. When in the same article Merežkovskij speaks of the three characteristics of the "new art" as "mystical content, symbols and the broadening of artistic impressionability," it is important to remember that he is speaking of the ability of the poet's consciousness to create artistic forms which will expand the reader's consciousness and thereby reveal to that consciousness the deeper mystical current or flow (теечение) of reality.\textsuperscript{10}

In Russian symbolism the mystical content had two forms. In the earliest symbolism it was related to the momentary truthfulness of even the most fleeting states of the poet's consciousness and therefore revealed the "eternal freedom" which was the essence of all reality.\textsuperscript{11} However, the mystical content very quickly became connected with the religious philosophy of Vladimir Solov'ev and with the manifestation in reality through art of a divine consciousness. This resulted in the writings of Andrej Belyj and particularly in those of Vjačeslav Ivanov, in a fully developed religious philosophy of art:\textsuperscript{12} In that philosophy art was, through the creation of the universal myth, to bring about the spiritual transformation of material reality and the spiritual redemption of mankind by facilitating the
manifestation of the absolute divine consciousness in this world.

The importance of the symbolist view of art for this discussion lies in the fact that the literary movements which followed symbolism retained many of its characteristics including a belief in the power of artistic language and in the creative abilities of the artist. This is true even though the nature of that language and of those abilities were understood in different manners. As a result, when one of the founders of Russian formalism, Viktor Šklovskij, defined the concept of ostranenie ('defamiliarization', or 'making it strange'), he incorporated into his definition both the symbolist idea that art was a means of acquiring knowledge of external reality and the futurist view that words were 'things' (vesč), objects in external reality. Šklovskij also accepted the view, common to both schools of thought, that the artist and artistic language were not subject either to the laws of everyday language or to the laws of material reality. Because his futurist view of the word caused him to use a projective method, Šklovskij's methodology represents, in this sense only, a symbolism without the controlling activity of a divine consciousness combined with a positivism without the controlling force of the laws of evolution. Viktor Šklovskij took from early symbolism the idea that art was a means for man to
experience his creative freedom and from positivism the
forms whose resistance made that experience possible.15

It is worth examining a passage in which Šklovskij
describes the process of ostranenie:

Thus life falls away, changing into noth-
ing. Automatization consumes things, a dress,
furniture, a wife and the fear of war.

"If the entire complex life of many people
passes by unconsciously, then this life is as
if it had never been."

And this is why, in order to return the
sensation of life, to feel things, in order
to make the stone stony that that which is
called art exists. The purpose of art is to
give a sensation of the thing as a vision and
not as a recognition; the technique [priëm
'device'] of art is the technique of making
things strange [ostranenie 'defamiliariza-
tion'] and the technique of making form dif-
ficult [zatrudnenie 'defacilitation'], (of)
increasing the difficulty and length of
perception since the process of perception is
an end in itself in art and should be pro-
longed. Art is a means of experiencing the
making of a thing, what has been made in art
is not important.16

If I may refer back to Figure 1, then
art as a type of cognition is for Šklovskij a means of
overcoming the cognitive transformation('automatization')
which everyday language has brought about in reality by
arranging things into categories. It is a means of once
again 'seeing', or 'experiencing,' the full complexity,
the infinity of characteristics, which the objects in ex-
ternal reality possessed before that classification
occurred. But, as Jurij Striedter has pointed out, this is
only one aspect of Šklovskij's definition. The definition also includes the assertion that what is really important is the making of the artistic object itself, the perception of the text's own coming into being.

Jurij Striedter states, as do Ewa Thompson and Richard Sheldon, that it was this second aspect of the definition which really interested Šklovskij. Viktor Šklovskij never created a synthetic literary theory because he preferred to emphasize the artist's creative play with his material, the open-ended arrangement and rearrangement of devices, rather than any object or perception of external reality which might be the end result of such a process. The first half of Šklovskij's passage may therefore be misleading because he was on the whole interested not so much in art as a means of knowing external reality as in external reality as material for making art.

In Šklovskij's own writings the cognitive value of art was downplayed and the constant play with devices was held together by the force of his own creative personality. However, he was not the only formalist, and Ewa Thompson has some justification for treating the entire movement as an interplay of "idealistic" tendencies asserting the value of art as a higher form of knowledge, a knowledge which is non-rational in the sense of not being bound either by the laws of rational thought or by the forms of practical language, and "positivistic" tendencies seeing art as a system of
The attempt to reconcile these two tendencies provided the internal impetus for the evolution of formalist thought. The external stimulus was provided by Soviet Marxism which forced the Formalists to attempt to develop a theory of the relationship between art and external reality.22

The discussion of positivism in Part II and of symbolism earlier in this chapter can help explain the difficulties caused for formalism by the assertion that art is a form of knowledge. The type of experiential knowledge described by Šklovskij in the passage just quoted requires the establishment of a correlation between the perceiving consciousness and an object in external reality. The second half of Šklovskij's definition can then be seen as asserting that art is a means of prolonging that experience and thereby of enriching that knowledge. This is a reasonable definition of art but, as Ewa Thompson's analysis suggests, it is very similar to the symbolist understanding of the symbol.23

The symbolist definition of the cognitive value of art, however, relied on the creative ability of human consciousness and on the presence within relaity of a deeper level of consciousness, either eternal freedom or an absolute divine consciousness, which was capable of ensuring the validity of the perception. Šklovskij's futurist belief that words exist as things outside of consciousness excluded the workings of any such consciousness.
There was, therefore, no external conscious force capable of ensuring the validity of the experiences which art provided. For Šklovskij himself this validity was probably not important. He was more interested in the possibility of the experience than in its validity. There is in all of his writings something of the "ready-made", and his critical articles are perhaps best read as futurist parodies of the works he was studying.

As the basis for an entire literary scholarship, however, the concept had its limitations. The open-endedness of the play with the devices meant that there was no means of producing a complete interpretation of an individual literary text. Such an interpretation requires some integrating cognitive transformation of the text being studied (see Part II, p. 176). Furthermore, this same open-endedness meant that literary history could be studied only as a series of destructive parodies. By employing the projective method without the controlling force of the laws of matter Viktor Šklovskij had accomplished just what he wanted to do. He had returned the devices and form of which artistic language was composed back into a state where the only organizing power was the creative activity of the artist (see Part II, p. He had also, since the projective method excludes consciousness, defined that creative activity as the rearrangement of existing forms rather than as the creation of new ones. Šklovskij has, in fact, produced a disintegrating cognitive
transformation of the literary text into its formal elements. Since this is a transformation which is very similar to Cubist techniques in painting,\textsuperscript{25} it seems reasonable to call Šklovskij's writings a Cubo-Futurist literary scholarship.\textsuperscript{26}

The methodological problems, the lack of an external force capable of confirming the validity of the experience provided by literature, the lack of a means of producing a complete interpretation or description of an individual work and the lack of a means of explaining literary history as anything but a series of destructive parodies, were amplified by the Marxist attacks on formalism in the 1920's. These attacks and the methodological problems culminated in the dissolution of formalism as a unified scholarly movement by the end of the decade.\textsuperscript{27} For the purposes of this discussion it is important to note the existence both in the defense against Marxism and within the Russian and Soviet structuralism which grew out of Russian formalism of three separate methodological alternatives. These three alternatives all use a projective method to produce an integrating cognitive transformation of their object of study. They also all have problems with the first part of Šklovskij's definition because of that method.\textsuperscript{28}

On p. 170 I described the possible explanations for the recurrence of certain characteristics in the reading of a group of literary texts. I also suggested that Veselovskij's positivism caused him to choose the fourth alternative, that
the recurrence was the result of the interaction of those particular objects or, as I said on p. 172 of the literary forms themselves. The reason why Veselovskij's work had an influence on Šklovskij and the formalists is that Šklovskij's Cubo-Futurist emphasis on the open-endedness of the arrangement and rearrangement of devices caused him to employ the same type of explanation, i.e., the characteristics of a given literary text or group of literary texts are the result of the interaction of the devices used within the texts. It was this open-endedness which formalist structuralist methodology attempted to control in its further development. ²⁹

The discussion of Veselovskij's methodology suggests that any further development of Šklovskij's methodology which wished to end that open-endedness would have to choose among the following alternatives:

1) It could abandon the projective method and, thereby, reintroduce human consciousness as a force in the organization of the individual text and in literary history; or

2) it could retain the projective method and choose one of the alternatives given on p.175: a) each literary text is unique; b) existing literary texts are traceable to an infinite series of proto-texts; c) existing literary texts are the result of the random influencing of one text by another; d) the whole process is controlled by some unconscious external force which is also beyond our conscious
control. The development of Slavic formalism structuralism has taken place within the scope of these alternatives. Formalist eclecticism (see below) and structuralist humanism have chosen the first alternative. Linguistic structuralism has chosen the second. 30

The first methodological position to appear was the compromise position advocated by Boris Ejxenbaum and by the formalist sympathizers Boris Engel'gardt and Viktor Žirmunskij. 31 The compromise was based on the assertion that the formalist emphasis on form and the resulting use of the projective method was only a methodological decision to emphasize the specifically literary aspects of the literary text and of literary history. Both human consciousness and extraliterary forces could be reintroduced into literary history if they were treated in their specifically literary aspects. 32

This approach was called "academic eclecticism" by the linguistic, or to use Ewa Thompson's term, the "positivistic", structuralists Roman Jakobson and Jurij Tynjanov (see Part III, p. 248). In the terminology which I suggested at the end of Part I it would be called "methodological non-theoretical eclecticism" because it draws on more than one aspect of reality, resists or at least does not emphasize the formation of general formal theories of literature and has a coherent scholarly methodology.

The methodology of formalist eclecticism, if I may call it that, was best described by Boris Engel'gardt in his
study *The Formal Method in the History of Literature.*³³ Engel'gardt wrote the study partly as a warning against some of the dangers inherent in the method. He describes formalism as one in a series of attempts to define the specific object of aesthetic investigation. Its basic terminology results from the need to bring about a cognitive transformation in the literary text in order that it can be studied as an aesthetic object. (See Figure 1 for Engel'-gardt's understanding of a cognitive transformation).

As I said on p.249, the concept of ostranenie required the establishment of a correlation between the perceiving consciousness and an object in external relaity. In accordance with Engel'gardt's view of formalism, such a transformation can be produced by using the basic formalist concepts to select among the infinite features exhibited by the author's and reader's consciousnesses, the text itself and the objects in external reality which are depicted in the work only those features which are important to the creation of the aesthetic object. The author's consciousness has been replaced by the concept of the dominant, the literary text has been replaced by the devices, the reader's consciousness by ostranienie, and external reality by the formalist concept of artistic material. The aesthetic object is, then, the intersection of these four concepts. (See Figure 6.)

The purpose of Figure 6 is to show that formalist eclecticism was a viable literary methodology. In fact,
Figure 6: The Cognitive Transformation of Formalist Eclecticism
structuralist humanism can be seen as continuing on a different basis formalist eclecticism's basic approach to literary scholarship. The historical fact that formalist eclecticism failed to develop further was probably a result of the difficulties caused for any eclectic study of consciousness, external reality and literary life by the atmosphere of Soviet intellectual life in the late twenties and thirties.  

In his study of the formal method Engel'gardt warned that there were four dangers associated with the manner in which the formalists were using it: 1) an equation of artistic material with linguistic material; 2) a confusion of the tasks of aesthetics, or poetics, with the tasks of literary history; 3) a failure to distinguish between a critical interpretation and a scientific description of a literary work; and 4) a failure to realize that the aesthetic object and the concepts which created it were methodological abstractions of the type used by natural science and not absolute statements about literary reality. One senses in these warnings a defense of the position of Viktor Žirmunskij under whose auspices Engel'gardt's study was published.  

The linguistic structuralists saw Žirmunskij's eclecticism and Ejxenbaum's compromise position as faults and saw the dangers about which Engel'gardt had warned as the true goals of a scientific literary scholarship. The most consistent advocate of this approach has unquestionably been Roman Jakobson. The limitations inherent in Jakobson's
linguistic poetics have been described so many times and in such detail that there is no need for me to repeat the discussion. 36

I will, therefore, describe Jakobson's work only as a coherent methodological alternative within the formalist structuralist tradition. This discussion is in a sense a response to Jakobson's critics because it suggests that his work rests on an assumption about the limitations of human thought which, although it need not be accepted, is extremely hard, or even impossible, to disprove.

Roman Jakobson's linguistic semiotics may be interpreted in different manners. He has been linked, often with his own approval, to positivism, neo-positivism, Husserl's phenomenology, Russian futurism, Russian formalism, structuralism and semiotics, including that of Peirce as well as that of Saussure. 37 This is a group of thinkers whose views are seemingly irreconcilable until one examines what it is which connects Jakobson with each tradition. He is linked with positivist linguistics and literary scholarship by his belief in the direct observability of linguistic and literary data and by his use of a projective method to determine the invariant patterns within the phenomena he is observing. He shares with neo-positivism both the assumption, usually only implicit in Jakobson's own thought, that complex philosophical problems can be resolved by their exact linguistic, logical or semiotic formulation and the accompanying belief that
logical structures are the basis for human thought. His method does not contain, however, either the positivist restriction of direct observability to particular objects or the later neo-positivist concern with the falsifiability of scientific hypotheses.

From Husserl Roman Jakobson has taken the assertion that the essence of an object lies in its invariant logical structure and the use of the phenomenological reductions to perceive that essence. He also shares both the belief in the intersubjective nature of human thought and, ultimately, the transcendental idealism of the later Husserl. Jakobson has, however, not drawn either on that part of the phenomenological tradition which emphasizes the role of human consciousness in creating, or co-creating, the objects we perceive or on Roman Ingarden's related attempt to overcome Husserl's transcendental idealism. (See Chapter II of Part III for a discussion of Ingarden's work.)

Within the semiotic tradition, which his own research has helped establish, Roman Jakobson has employed Charles Sanders Peirce's iconic sign, the only sign which will retain its characteristics if it has no referent, to describe the self-referential nature of an utterance which is dominated by the poetic function. He also has used Peirce's indexical signs to describe a particular group of linguistic categories. Jakobson has made less use of Peirce's third sign, the symbol, and none of the two other trichotomies of signs.
In fact, of Peirce's three divisions of semiotics, pure grammar, logic proper and pure rhetoric, Jakobson's work has remained almost exclusively within the realm of pure grammar, the study of what must be true of any sign if it is to be used by every scientific intelligence to embody any meanings. Jakobson has not investigated either logic proper, what is necessary for the signs of a scientific intelligence to refer to an external object, to be true in Peirce's sense of the term, or pure rhetoric, "the laws by which in every scientific intelligence one sign gives birth to another, and especially one thought brings forth another."\textsuperscript{40}

It is, therefore, not surprising that Jakobson's linguistics and his linguistic poetics rest more on Saussure's binary definition of the sign as a relationship between signifier and signified\textsuperscript{41} than on Peirce's triadic one of "something which stands to somebody for something in some respect or capacity."\textsuperscript{42} In terms of Peirce's definition Jakobson equates the first "something" with the "signifier" and the "respect or capacity" with the "signified" of Saussure's definition. As a result of this definition both logic proper, the study of how signs refer to objects in external reality, and pure rhetoric, the study of how signs affect people, are excluded from a methodology based on Jakobson's understanding of Saussure. It is probably for this reason that the major change which Jakobson made in Saussure's linguistics was to reject Saussure's view that the history of language was a
series of readjustments by the linguistic system to accidental changes, caused largely by the intrusion of extra-linguistic factors, for a view which asserts that the history of language is governed by immanent linguistic laws. 43

It seems to me that the constant thread running through Roman Jakobson's relationship with the different philosophical traditions is that he has drawn upon only those aspects which support the existence and direct perceivability of the futurist samovitoe slovo, an untranslatable term described by Victor Erlich as "a primary fact, a self-sufficient and self-valuable entity." 44 Roman Jakobson's linguistics and his linguistic poetics, therefore, represent what might be called a pure grammar, or to use Charles Morris' later reformulation of Peirce's terminology, a syntax of human experience. 45 The fact that this syntax is described with terminology and methods borrowed from linguistics has led me to call the methodological alternative which Roman Jakobson's work represents linguistic structuralism.

The discussion of Aleksandr Veselovskij's use of the projective method in Part II, Chapters IV and V, has suggested what the results of an attempt to base a literary scholarship on the existence of a directly observable, "self-sufficient and self-valuable" word (linguistic entity) will be. If such a scholarship wishes to avoid randomness, provide complete interpretations of individual literary
texts, and still make general statements about groups of literary texts, it will have to replace the materialist determinism of Veselovskij's scholarship with a linguistic determinism of its own. Because Roman Jakobson believes in the direct perceivability of the invariant structure of the text or of the linguistic system itself and not just of its individual characteristics, his own use of the projective method is deductive, not inductive, as Veselovskij's was. This deductive projective method allows him, in the article "Linguistics and Poetics", to deduce the essential nature of any poetic message from the six necessary and only possible factors of any communicative situation.46

Elmar Holenstein, in a study which Jakobson has approved, has justified the use of this deductive projective method on the basis of the phenomenological doctrine of intersubjectivity.47 In Jakobson's work it seems to be the same as functional analysis since in Jakobsonian semiotics both techniques rest on the assertion that any object which is to be communicable or to be, for example, a poetic text must possess certain structural characteristics. This acceptance of the intersubjective nature of human experience culminates in the assertion that the existence of external referents for linguistic categories is not only not a matter for linguistic or semiotic study but also not a part of human experience.48 Peter and Wendy Steiner in a review of
Holenstein's book have shown that this assertion has important consequences for Slavic structuralism because it removes the basis both for the cognition of external reality and for any but an ideal history of semiotic systems. The studies cited in footnote 36 have criticized its application to the description of literary texts.

This discussion does not disagree either with the Steiner's conclusions or with the criticisms of Jakobson's method contained in those studies. I am only stressing the fact that Jakobson's is a consistent methodological approach based on the acceptance of the samovitoe slovo as the basis for human experience. The argument for such a position could be phrased in the following manner. All of reality which exists for human experience is perceivable. All that is perceivable is communicable. All that is communicable is semiotic. All that is semiotic is linguistic. All that is linguistic is describable by the techniques of structuralist linguistics. It therefore follows that linguistic structuralism is capable of describing all of human experience. If all of these assumptions are accepted, linguistic structuralism is a perfectly consistent methodological position.

It is, however, one which has had certain consequences in French structuralism. Those consequences were described by Robert Magliola, paraphrasing Serge Doubrovsky, in the following manner, "the structuralists had been cooked in their own stew. They had without justification negated the
origins of meaning, namely, self and world, and then, with curious blindness, lamented the very loss of meaning they had occasioned. By asserting that all human experience and perception are under the control of a linguistic system and not of human consciousness or non-linguistic reality, linguistic structuralism has made possible Jacques Derrida's assertion that no perception is possible. Linguistic structuralism has, therefore, left literary scholarship and the humanities with the choice of accepting the linguistic absolute as the reliable origin of all human meaning, history and experience or of denying the possibility of any human meaning, history or experience at all.

The possibility of this happening was seen by Boris Engel'gardt when he warned of the four dangers present within Russian formalism. It is worth considering how those dangers have been realized within linguistic structuralism. It is important to remember that if the line of reasoning presented above is accepted, these dangers are not the faults but the virtues of a linguistic semiotic poetics. I will follow the same order of presentation as on p.256. The four consequences are: 1) the artistic material of the text, its contact with external reality, has been replaced with purely linguistic material; 2) the determination of the universal characteristics of all aesthetic objects has replaced the study of literary history; 3) the critical interpretation and evaluation of texts in relation to contemporary reality
has been replaced by their scientific description; and 4) the
dominant as a methodological assumption designed to facilitate
the search for the specifically aesthetic characteristics of
a text has been replaced by an ontological statement about
the essence and even the value, of the text itself. In other
words, literary criticism, history and aesthetics have all
been placed under the control of a transcendental linguistic
or semiotic system.

If I may refer the reader back to Figure 6, the rea-
sons for the disagreements between the linguistic structural-
ists and the formalist eclectics are obvious. It is not only
the critical and historical aspects of literary scholarship
but also all the characteristics and activities of the author,
the reader, the text and external reality which have been
brought under the control of the linguistic system. It is in
all likelihood the similarities between the linguistic deter-
minism of linguistic structuralism and the social determinism
of Soviet Marxism which have led to its relative lack of in-
fluence among the Polish structuralist humanists.

The problem which linguistic semiotics poses for the
formalist structuralist tradition is that the more precisely
its concepts are developed, the more it seems to deny the
possibility of the aesthetic experiencing of reality and/or
human creativity which Viktor Šklovskij has called ostranenie.
By restricting human experience to linguistic experience it
makes the Bergsonian seeing of objects described by Šklovskij
impossible. By placing the dominant under the control of the linguistic system and by insisting that the description of the linguistic product, the invariant linguistic structure of the text, is the proper object of scientific investigation, it denies the open-endedness both of the literary text and of human activity itself. It thereby makes the _delarnoe_ 'that which has been made' more important than the _delanie_ 'the process of making'.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the other Slavic structuralisms have been largely concerned with establishing either the open-endedness of the literary text or the possibility that the special characteristics of the literary text provide us with a special perception of non-linguistic reality. The work of the Baxtin-Medvedev-Vološinov group has removed the linguistic dominant and destroyed the objective nature of the text by throwing it into the dialogical activity of human social consciousness. The work of Jurij Tynjanov and of the Czech scholars Jan Mukařovský and Felix Vodička has similarly opened up the text by relating it to the literary and social conventions which make its perception possible and by demonstrating the historical changeability of those conventions. It has also developed the idea that those conventions allow the aesthetic function to neutralize the associations of everyday language, replace them with new ones and create a new aesthetic perception of reality. Polish structuralist humanism, and especially Janusz Sławiński, was
heavily under the influence of the Czech tradition. However, at first tentatively and then more consistently, it has placed more emphasis on the role of human activity in making both those conventions and that perception possible. That emphasis has been the result of the influence which the writings of Roman Ingarden and Witold Gombrowicz have had on Polish scholarly and literary life and of a dogged determination on the part of Polish scholars of literature to resist the social and linguistic determinism of the Marxist thought and rhetoric of the Stalinist "cult of personality".

The discussion of those influences will be the subject of the next chapter. Before closing this chapter, however, I would like to make a few brief comments about what I am afraid, given my terminology, I have to call the linguistic-cultural-semiotic structuralism of Jurij Lotman. In an era of post-structuralism it seems to many scholars that structuralism should now be considered a brief episode in the past history of humanist scholarship. This belief is based on the assumption that the techniques of a narrowly defined linguistic structuralism encompass all structuralist research. It seems to me that even this cursory discussion of the Slavic formalist-structuralist tradition has shown that this is not in fact the case. In these brief closing comments on Jurij Lotman's semiotic scholarship I want to suggest that the possibilities of linguistic structuralism itself have not been exhausted.
Jurij Lotman has made at least three significant changes in the linguistic semiotics of Roman Jakobson, if that is the source of Lotman's work. 55 1) He has replaced the idea that the poetic function is a special function of ordinary language and the structure of a poetic text a linguistic structure with the idea that literature and all artistic languages are secondary modeling systems built on the basis of ordinary language (the primary modeling system) but with their own structures and purposes; 56 2) He has, by removing the linguistic dominant, created a self-estranging literary text capable of producing an infinite series of trans-codings (perekodirovka); 57 and 3) He has reestablished the cognitive value of art by linking it to the presence of other secondary modeling (i.e., non-linguistic) systems in any culture 58 and reintroducing the notion of the asymmetric duality of the sign. 59 There is not space in this study to discuss all of the issues raised by these changes.

It is obvious, however, that it is a far less extreme position to say that human experience and history are a result of the continuing discrepancy between our cultural patterns of thought and behavior and the external reality which surrounds us than it is to say that human experience is entirely linguistic in nature. 60 It must also be emphasized that Jurij Lotman was an established scholar of romantic and symbolist poetry before he began his work in semiotics and that his self-estranging text and universal human culture are very
similar to the symbolist view of art as a source of awareness of the eternal freedom and absolute consciousness at the essence of reality. At any rate his changes in linguistic structuralism do make it possible to speak of ostranenie as an open-ended aesthetic experiencing of non-artistic reality and human creativity once again.

The entire Moscow-Tartu endeavor, however, has to develop within the possibilities offered by its projective method and the linguistic terminology which it has borrowed from Jakobson and Saussure. This means that it is essentially engaged in developing a pure grammar or syntax of human reality. The limitations inherent in any such approach are a result of the difficulties encountered in creating a set of cultural universals. As Ruth Kempson's discussion of semantic universals and Phillip Pettit's study of the possibilities of French structuralism have suggested, such cultural universals either represent a small group of terms which are so abstractly defined as to be meaningless or comprehensive lists of everything which has ever been found. In the latter case the assertion of universality is vacuously true. In the case of Soviet linguistic semiotics we have usually seen the creation of a small group of abstractly defined cultural universals from which all existing cultural phenomena can, at least in potential, be derived. It seems to me that this is very close to what David Lewis has called "Markerese" and described in a passage which can also be
seen as a comment on the limits of Jerzy Kmita's recent work on the logic of culture:

The Markerese method is attractive in part just because it deals with nothing but symbols: finite combinations of entities of a familiar sort out of a finite set of elements by finitely many applications of finitely many rules. There is no risk of alarming the ontologically parsimonious. But it is just this pleasing finitude that prevents Markerese semantics from dealing with the relations between symbols and non-symbols—that is, with genuinely semantic relations. Accordingly, we should be prepared to find that in a more adequate method, meanings may turn out to be complicated, infinite entities built up out of elements belonging to various ontological categories. 64

If we accept Lewis' point of view, and he is one of the leading representatives of a logical semantics built on the work of Tarski, Ajdukiewicz, and Montague, then any linguistic or semiotic theory of literature or culture must have at its basis, no matter how precise its theoretical models are, an eclectic ontology. A linguistic syntax of reality will not be enough. A full discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this study. I have included the Lewis passage both to suggest that a formal theory of language, and therefore of literature, can be eclectic and to show that a leading theoretical scientist of language 65 has come to conclusions about the usefulness of a pure grammar of language which are similar to the attitudes expressed in the scholarly activities and writings of the structuralist humanists.

It is important to remember, however, when evaluating the research of the Soviet semioticians both that it may not
be possible to prove the existence of an eclectic ontology and that they are working within the context of Soviet society. As Dell Hymes said in his restrained criticism of their typological activities, "It seems likely that these proposals have a resonance in the Soviet context that is missing to one outside it. It seems likely that the underlying opposition between "sign" and "background" needs to be invoked and that much of the point of these proposals is precisely that they address cultures and persons without discussing mode of production or treating social class as a factor in change." 66 It may be the case that within Soviet society the only means for a literary scholar to assert what is essentially a symbolist or futurist aesthetics of art is to couch his research in the technological terminology that society needs for its survival in the modern world. 67 Western scholars do not live in Soviet society and they need not accept Jurij Lotman's methods, but they should be appreciative of the importance his work has within the Soviet context.
CHAPTER II

TWO POLISH SOURCES FOR A LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP BASED ON CONSCIOUSNESS

SECTION A : ROMAN INGARDEN'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE LITERARY WORK OF ART

This long explored but still exhaustless mine of contemplation . . .

Byron

The situation savours of paradox: there are no followers of the Ingardenian system among the students of literature, yet we can hardly imagine a theory of literature that neglects the problems formulated by Ingarden, or dispenses with the categories introduced by him. The magnificent architectonics of the system may be admired as we admire a work of art, whereas, in practice, we employ merely its elements—often regardless even of the place they occupy within the whole. This fact seems fundamental for the reception of Ingarden's aesthetic theory.

Michał Głowiński, "On Concretization"

It is a "nothing" and yet a wonderful world in itself even though it comes into being and exists only by our grace.

Roman Ingarden, speaking of the literary work of art.

In a recent study of Juliusz Słowacki, Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz expressed his impatience with the general level
and technical nature of much structuralist discussion of literature. It is worth quoting Rymkiewicz at length because he has forcefully expressed sentiments which have been shared at varying levels of intensity by most scholars of literature since the beginning of "the structuralist adventure."

While enlarging our knowledge about the character of the literary text, we have introduced between the text and the man who wrote it and who manifested himself in it various constructions of our intellect. After which we have decided that those constructions were prepared by the one who wrote the text. And, having arranged those structures, we have begun to occupy ourselves only with them and to speak only about them. Why this has happened is easy to explain. [. . .]

The psyche is singular and concrete, and so, incomprehensible and incognizable. The spirit is transitory and may not exist in general. How can one speak about something which may not exist? Therefore, we have given up on the reconstruction of the psyche of the poet. Therefore, we have decided that the spirit of the poet is not reflected in his poetry. But, in giving up on conversing with the reflected soul, we have short changed ourselves. For we have ceased talking with Great Spirits. And we have started a conversation with signs, structures, lyric subjects. Lyric subjects do speak, of course, and very curious things. Structures also speak, although for the most part they're boring. Subjects and structures speak as subjects and structures have been formed in a certain epoch. It even interests me sometimes; but from year to year it interests me less and less.71
It seems to me that Jarosław Rymkiewicz's position is the Polish equivalent of that of Denis Donoghue which was described in Part I, Chapter V. They are both resisting the general tendency among structuralist and post-structuralist critics, historians, and theoreticians of literature to replace the traditional discourse of literary scholarship and the individual discourses of different literary periods and authors with a new universal discourse composed of abstractly defined "signs, structures and lyric subjects" or of the equally abstract concepts of post-structuralist philosophy. In both cases, the criticism is perhaps more directly applicable to the endless rephrasings of traditional interpretations into semiotic terminology and the constant proposals of new terminology for what are essentially the same concepts found among non-theoretical eclectic scholarship which employs semiotic and structuralist terminology than it is to the structuralists themselves. Denis Donoghue emphasized this point at the end of his review when he said that he did not mind Geoffrey Hartman's poetic criticism in itself but rather shuddered at the thought of Hartman's techniques in the hands of scholars of less acute critical sensibilities.72 The differences between Donoghue's criticism and that of Rymkiewicz can best be explained by the fact that, whereas American scholarship exhibits a pervasive positivism and eighteenth century rationalism, Polish literary scholarship is still
characterized by a pervasive romanticism, probably due to
the fact that except for Jan Kochanowski, Ignacy Krasicki,
Eliza Orzeszkowa, Bolesław Prus and perhaps Henryk Sienkie-
wicki most of the leading Polish authors and poets before
the twentieth century were romantic writers.

The interesting thing about contemporary Polish
literary scholarship is that the very structuralists whom
Rymkiewicz was criticizing have in their theoretical writ-
ings on literary scholarship reintroduced the activities of
human consciousness into literary history, criticism and
theory. The reason Rymkiewicz may be unaware that this has
happened is that they have had to employ a terminology
which is different from that of the Geisteswissenschaft
which Rymkiewicz is defending. 73

There are at least four reasons why Geisteswissen-
schaft is no longer popular in Polish literary scholarship:
1) its basic premises were subjected to an extensive crit-
icism in the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden, 2) the phi-
losophy of Witold Gombrowicz, the existentialism of Jean
Paul Sartre and the existential phenomenology of Martin
Heidegger have seriously questioned the indivisibility of
the psyche or spirit on which it was based, 3) the literary
writings of Gombrowicz, Sławomir Mrożek, Tadeusz Rożewicz
and others have effectively ended the romantic literary
culture on which Polish Geistesgeschichte rested, 4) and
perhaps most importantly, the official romanticism of
Soviet ideology and political rhetoric under Stalin has made romanticism an unacceptable view of life for members of the generation of Michał Głowinski, Janusz Lalewicz and Janusz Sławiński. (The last point will be discussed in Section B of this chapter.) The same four factors have made linguistic structuralism equally unacceptable and led to the creation of the scholarship which I have called structuralist humanism. In this chapter I am going to discuss briefly why this is so. As an introduction to that discussion I will describe two satirical articles in which Janusz Sławiński addresses the issues raised by Rymkiewicz. In the first article Sławiński subjects the point of view represented in Rymkiewicz's passage to a biting criticism. In the second he agrees with it.

In the article "And what next 'common man'?" Janusz Sławiński responded to those who criticize the complexity and seeming incomprehensibility of much of the language now used in the humanities. The title of the article plays a pivotal role in this response and therefore needs to be explained. The Polish phrase is "szary człowiek" which literally means "gray man" and is sometimes used to express the idea of a common man-off-the-street whose opinions are somehow universally valid because of their anonymity. Some American equivalents have been "John Q Public", "Mr. Smith" and recently "The American people" as in, "The American people want the budget cut", or "If the American people want
ballets and foreign films on television and courses on exotic literatures in the universities, then they will pay for them". *Szary Człowiek* is, then, a term for an anonymous and unidentified public opinion.

In the article under discussion Sławiński complains that certain unidentified scholars have been using the "man-off-the-street" to criticize theoretical terminology by saying that the common man cannot understand it. Sławiński responds by arguing that the "common man" does not exist, except in the objections of scholars who cannot understand the new developments in their discipline. Furthermore, even if the "common man" did exist, he would have no interest in literary terminology and no right to expect to understand it without effort anymore than he can expect to understand without effort the terminologies developed by the biological and physical sciences. Sławiński concludes that a complex terminology is necessary if scholars are both to control their thought and reveal the complexity of their subject of study. The point which Sławiński has raised is an important one. How can literary terminology be simple in a century in which the psyche, spirit or self of the individuals who write and read literary texts, the texts themselves and the objects depicted in them have been broken down into sets of relations by the various contemporary philosophies and literary scholarships? Sławiński and his co-workers employ a complex terminology not for its own
sake but in an attempt to reveal and control those relations. This is why a structuralist humanist would disagree with Rymkiewicz's description of their research. The complex terminology may in fact be the only means of re-establishing a dialogue with the great spirits of the past.

Janusz Sławiński, however, agrees with Jarosław Rymkiewicz when the latter writes of the tendency to replace discussion of literary history and its variety with an endless series of methodological and theoretical articles. Sławiński entitled another article devoted to a discussion of the problem "Methodological Remains." The title of this article is also important. I have translated with "remains" the Polish word zwłoki which may mean either "delays, postponements, deferments" or "what is left after the death of a living organism, mortal remains, bodies, carcasses." Sławiński's pun is both obvious and to the point. He begins his article by asserting that only "common-men-off-the-street" still need to be told why methodological studies are now as necessary as theoretical and historical studies. But enough is enough, and Sławiński wonders if there is any way of putting a stop to the infinite progression of theoretical, metatheoretical, meta-metatheoretical, metametametatheoretical . . . ad infinitum studies which seem to have taken over the professional work of scholars of literature.
At this point in the discussion it is important to emphasize the fact that the leading theoretician and methodologist of structuralist humanism is a man who believes both that complex, precise theories are necessary to discover the complexity of reality and that they should not be allowed to become either the sole function of literary scholarship or the sole source of knowledge about literary reality. The central position which this belief, which is also shared by his co-workers, occupies in Sławiński's thought explains his limited acceptance and later abandonment of the projective method of linguistic structuralism. Both the belief and his skepticism about the projective method are probably the result of the presence within Polish letters of two approaches to literature which place a great deal of emphasis on the role of human consciousness in the creation and perception of literary texts. In the remainder of this section I will discuss the role of consciousness in the phenomenology of Roman Ingarden. In the next section I will discuss in a cursory fashion the view of human consciousness and of consciousness' relation to form and language which is found in the writings of Witold Gombrowicz and Miron Białoszewski.

In order to understand the importance which Roman Ingarden's work has played in the development of structuralist humanism, it is necessary to understand both the relationship between the thought of Edmund Husserl and
Roman Ingarden and the differences between the semiotic philosophy, if it may be called that, of Charles Sanders Peirce and the linguistic semiotics of Roman Jakobson. It was Ingarden's attempt to overcome the transcendental idealism of Edmund Husserl which made his work a source of useful ideas for those structuralists who were seeking to avoid the idealist determinism of linguistic semiotics. 76

Robert Magliola has explained the early Husserl's thought as an attempt to overcome the division between an idealist epistemology which asserts that thought creates the objects it perceives and an empiricist epistemology which believes that external objects create and control thought. 77 The same opposition appeared in Part II of this study as the difference between romanticism and positivism. The positivist use of the projective method was based on the assumption that external objects and the laws of matter which control them do in fact control thought. The evolutionary version of positivist scholarship which I presented in Part II, Chapter V, explained this further by adding the assertion that forms of thought which were not in contact with external reality would have perished in the struggle for survival along with the organisms which had developed them. I also said that structuralist humanism wished to resist such an evolutionary social determinism. The reasons for this will become obvious in the next section of this chapter.
Magliola continues his discussion to assert that
Husserl's contribution to philosophy was neo-realism, an
epistemology based on the linking of the conscious atti-
tudes of a real subject and the appropriate aspects of a
real external object by the structural and structuring
properties of an intentional act of mutual implicature. The
Husserl's early phenomenology rests on the assumption of a
real connection between the intentional acts of an individ-
ual consciousness and the real objects which it is intend-
ing. The phenomenological reductions are designed to pro-
vide a means of examining within consciousness the essential
structure of an object. The problem for phenomenology
seems to have been, at least to an outside observer, that
the existence and full reliability of such a connection is
notoriously hard, if not impossible, to prove. If
Husserl's neo-realism is to be maintained, it requires the
existence of an external object which is capable of con-
trolling the acts of perception which are directed at it,
but not of fully determining the consciousness which is
doing the perceiving. If the consciousness were fully
determined, it would mark a return to what Husserl called
the "constructionism" of Hegel's Absolute Mind since the
very possibility of an intentional act requires the exist-
ence of a consciousness capable of doing the intending. The
problem is that such an intentional, or rather an in-
tending consciousness is, as it did in the history of
phenomenology, likely to detach itself, at least temporarily, from its fellows and perhaps from the objects as well and become the isolated existential consciousness of the early Jean Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger.

It was partly to avoid such a development of his thought that Husserl himself moved to a position of transcendental idealism and introduced the concept of intersubjectivity. In Husserl's later writings the world is presented as an ideal intersubjective realm composed of objects created by the combined acts of individual consciousness. Because of the existence of this realm, the self is not isolated and its perceptions of external objects are reliable. It was in defense of this type of phenomenology that Elmar Holenstein, whose book on Roman Jakobson was discussed in the last chapter, turned to Jakobson's linguistic structuralism for an example of a successful phenomenological linguistics. The importance of Roman Ingarden's work on literature for the development of structuralist humanism was a result of the fact that he undertook his entire study of the literary work of art as the first part of an attempt to prove the real existence of the world, disprove Husserl's transcendental idealism and return to the neo-realism of the original phenomenology. In so doing he provided Polish literary scholars, all of whom have at least some awareness of his work, with a fully developed alternative to the methodology of linguistic
structuralism. This alternative is based on an exploration of the relationship between individual human consciousness and the objects it creates and co-creates through its intentional acts.

The full importance which Ingarden's phenomenology played in the scepticism with which linguistic structuralism has been received in Polish scholarship was a result of the manner in which linguistic structuralism combined the use of a projective method with the phenomenology of Husserl. This can best be explained by a brief comparison of the methodology of linguistic semiotics with the semiotic philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edward C. Moore has argued convincingly that Peirce's thought represents an attempt to overcome the problems posed for the process of scientific inquiry by the fact that objects in the material world are particular objects while the concepts with which we perceive and think about them are universal concept. The central question for scientific thought is, according to Moore's presentation of Peirce, whether there are any analogues in the real world for our universal concepts. Peirce solved this problem by positing the potential existence of general objects and by devoting the major portion of his writings to the development of a procedure for testing their existence and bringing about a correspondence between the universal concepts of thought and the potential general objects in external reality. Moore relates this
aspect of Peirce's thought to modern science asserting that it is compatible with the theory of relativity and with modern biology. Moore concludes by saying that, because we can never be sure that our future experiences will match our past ones, the world itself is a general concept, a potentiality derived from particular observations.86

What emerges from a comparison of Peirce's semiotics with that of Roman Jakobson is that Jakobson, because of his acceptance of the direct perceivability of the samovitoe slovo (see Part III, Chapter I), is able to combine Peirce's particular objects with Husserl's intentional objects and assert the direct perceivability of both by means of the projective method.87 Jakobson's phenomenological linguistics is not based on the introspective examination of the essence of an object as it appears in consciousness, but on a direct observation in external reality of its linguistic features. This is why a Polish trained scholar such as Ewa Thompson views him as a positivist.88 Because of the projective method, however, linguistic semiotics is forced (see Part II, Chapter IV, and Part III, Chapter I) to employ a linguistic determinism (a linguistic absolute) to assert the reliability of its results. Holenstein may therefore be wrong to call Jakobson a Husserlian, because there may be more of Hegel than of Husserl in Jakobson's idealism especially in his view of linguistic and semiotic history.89 The important point for this study is that,
whatever a detailed examination might show Jakobson's true position to be, the similarities with the methodologies of Husserl's idealism, Hegel's idealism, Stalinist social determinism (see Section B of this chapter) and positivist determinism were close enough for linguistic semiotics to be perceived by the Polish structuralist humanists as a deterministic linguistic idealism which was not useful in creating the contact with external reality and the possibility of creative acts of consciousness which they see as the goal of literary scholarship.\textsuperscript{90} This is why they have turned to Polish sources such as Roman Ingarden and Witold Gombrowicz.

In attempting to disprove Husserl's transcendental idealism Roman Ingarden set out to demonstrate two things which were to prove crucial in the structuralist humanist understanding of literature: 1) the literary work of art is an intersubjective object created by intentional human acts\textsuperscript{91} and 2) once created, it continues to exist until it is either changed or destroyed by another intentional act.\textsuperscript{92} Ingarden believed that, if he could prove that man has the ability to create such an object and that the object has an existence which is neither real nor ideal, he could use his discussion of the literary text to prove that the world had more than just an ideal existence.\textsuperscript{93} The questionable success of his larger endeavor was not important to the development of structuralist humanism
because in the process of making the attempt he conclusively demonstrated that consciousness plays an important role in the perception of the literary text and that, therefore, any attempt to base a literary scholarship solely on the basis of the projective method is fraught with danger. As my previous discussion of Veselovskij and linguistic structuralism has shown, it leads to some form, however mild, of determinism.

In trying to disprove Husserl's transcendental idealism, Ingarden wished to demonstrate the existence of an intentional object which had been created by man and continued to exist independently of him in a form which was capable of controlling but not of fully determining the acts of consciousness directed at it. In describing the literary work of art as such an object Ingarden employed the phenomenological method of eidetic reduction. He bracketed out or excluded from consciousness all the inessential features of the literary work of art in order to determine those features which were essential to its existence as a literary work of art. In Ingarden's opinion this meant those features which were essential to the work's ability to produce an aesthetic experience in interaction with the consciousnesses which use it. Ingarden distinguished within this experience two intentional objects: the literary work of art itself whose artistic properties make the aesthetic experience possible and the
concretization of the work whose constitution as an object makes the realization of the aesthetic values of the work possible. The literary work of art once created exists in an intersubjective realm independently of the men who created it but still subject to their additional intentional acts; while the concretizations, for the most part, exist within the consciousness of those who have produced them. It is this dual existence which allows the literary work of art to control but not to determine fully the intentional acts which are directed at it. It also allows Ingarden to criticize Juliusz Kleiner's psychologism for making the work only a part of the psyche which created it. In Ingarden's terminology the work comes-into-being in and as a result of human consciousness, but it has its existence in an intersubjective realm which is independent of human consciousness. The crucial difference between Ingarden's intersubjectivity and that of Roman Jakobson and linguistic structuralism is that objects in the intersubjective realm have no life or independent development due to their own laws. They can change only when additional human actions change them. This point led to the disputes between Ingarden and the Czech structuralists. As I will point out at the end of this section, it has probably also led to the reception of his work described by Michał Głowiński in the passage quoted at the start of the section.
As George Grabowicz has noted, Ingarden bases the ability of the literary work of art to both exist in its intersubjective realm and come-into-being in human consciousness on the presence of three factors: 1) the existence of creative acts of human consciousness, 2) the foundation of the work in some physical material (print, tape recording, handwriting, etc.) which ensures its physical preservability, and 3) the existence of an ideal realm in which sentence meanings and, presumably, aesthetic values exist in an unchanging form. By drawing on these three realms an author can produce a literary text which will exist in an unchanged form until it is reproduced by a reader who has assumed an aesthetic attitude toward the text. Although the reproduction will differ in some aspects because the reader's consciousness is different from that of the author's, its essential features and aesthetic value will remain the same.

It is possible for Ingarden to take this position because of the manner in which he has distinguished the literary work of art from its concretizations. The literary work of art is for Ingarden a many-layered, schematic formation created for the purpose of making possible the creation of an aesthetic object (aesthetic concretization) and the ensuing aesthetic experience. As I have said above, it has its physical existence today in the printed material on the page. In its intersubjective realm,
however, it is an indeterminate formation consisting of four layers defined by Ingarden himself as:

(a) the stratum of verbal sounds and phonetic formations and phenomena of a higher order, (b) the stratum of semantic units: of sentence meanings and the meanings of whole groups of sentences; (c) the stratum of schematized aspects, in which objects of various kinds portrayed in the work come to appearance; and (d) the stratum of the objectivities portrayed in the intentional states of affairs projected by the sentences. 103

The other characteristics of the literary work of art which are important for my discussion are: 1) it has in its structure, particularly on the two non-linguistic strata, numerous "places of indeterminacy." 104 These "places of indeterminacy" are an inevitable result of the fact that, according to Ingarden, it is impossible for any linguistic or intentional act to describe all the features or aspects of an object as it exists in external reality or as it appears and will appear in the consciousness of different readers; 105 2) the statements which are present within the work are only quasi-judgements, marked as and reacted to as portrayals of aspects of objects or states of affairs in external reality rather than as statements about genuine objects or states; 106 3) the literary work of art has, if it has positive value, both artistic values and aesthetic values present in a potential state throughout and between all the levels of the work. 107 The most important of these aesthetic values are for Ingarden
metaphysical qualities described by him as "the sublime, the tragic, the dreadful, the shocking, the inexplicable, the demonic, the holy, the sinful, the sorrowful, the indescribable brightness of good fortune, as well as the grotesque, the charming, the light, the peaceful, etc."\textsuperscript{108} These qualities are neither rationally describable nor determinable and can be experienced in their essence, without our being overwhelmed by their intensity, only within the literary work of art and, more specifically, within its concretization. The metaphysical qualities appear only as a result of the constitution of the upper strata of the work since they must be attached to objects and states of affairs. This is why, according to Ingarden, the work has to be composed of quasi-judgements. If the objects and states of affairs were constituted in our consciousness as genuine objects and states of affairs, they would overwhelm the aesthetic response. This does not mean that the work cannot be constituted as referring to reality but only that it cannot be constituted as reality itself.\textsuperscript{109}

Because these metaphysical qualities are states of consciousness, they can exist in the literary work of art itself only as potential qualities. They can manifest themselves only in the concretization of the work by an individual reader. In producing the aesthetic concretization, the reader starts with the physical foundation, assumes a passively receptive attitude toward the work and
then moves up the strata intending the appropriate linguistic entities, sentence meanings, objects, and states of affairs until, as he or she proceeds with the concretizing of the work, the aesthetic concretization or aesthetic object is created. The aesthetic qualities are manifested on all levels of the work and also in the harmony between the levels. This harmony gives rise to a polyphony of aesthetic values in the final concretization.\textsuperscript{110} Because the reader must fill in the places-of-indeterminacy, or at least some of them, in the process of concretizing the work, the concretization is more determined than the work itself. Since this determination requires a certain perspectival foreshortening due to the limitations involved in any act of consciousness, any concretization is both more than and less than the work itself.\textsuperscript{111} The quasi-judgemental character of the statements in the work is an essential factor in the concretizing of the work because, as I have said in the preceding paragraph, some of the aesthetic qualities can appear only because of that quasi-judgemental status and because without the presence of those aesthetic qualities some of the connections between the different strata cannot be perceived. Since these qualities are not rational entities, the work as an aesthetic object can, in Ingarden's phenomenology, exist only in an individual consciousness.\textsuperscript{112}
There are several reasons why a scholar who is aware of Ingarden's work is unlikely to accept the projective method of linguistic structuralism in its entirety. Ingarden's phenomenology represents a view in which the artistic work as an aesthetic object cannot exist without the activity of human consciousness. Furthermore, of the four levels only the lower two can be called linguistic unless we adopt, as the linguistic structuralists must (see Chapter I), an extremely narrow definition of human consciousness. In Ingarden's view the metaphysical qualities which are the essence of the aesthetic experience can manifest themselves only when the non-linguistic levels of the work have been concretized. For a scholar who is familiar with Ingarden's work the linguistic descriptions of Roman Jakobson, who analyzes largely the first stratum of the work, are likely to appear inadequate.

Ingarden's work on the possibility of knowing or cognizing the literary work of art makes it even more difficult for a Polish scholar to accept the projective method. The application of the projective method to the aesthetic experience described by Ingarden could be justified either as a means of describing the literary work of art in its existence as an intersubjective object outside of consciousness, or as a methodological tool for the description of the aesthetic object in the form in which it appears in consciousness. However, as Ingarden has shown, the intersubjective
object, as he understands it, can be perceived only by an act of pre-aesthetic cognition; one which intentionally prevents the process of concretizing the aesthetic object from beginning. This means that the scholar who applies a purely projective method to the description of the intersubjective object will, perhaps unknowingly, produce in the text he is studying a cognitive transformation which will exclude from study the aesthetic, as opposed to the artistic, features of the text and will, therefore, never be able to produce a complete aesthetic object. Although the detailed discussion of this point is too extensive to be included in this study, it seems to me that Jurij Lotman's self-estranging literary text, which was discussed in passing in the last chapter, may have been produced by such a process.

The application of the projective method to the description of a complete aesthetic object runs into another problem. As Ingarden has shown, since the aesthetic object exists only in an aesthetic experience, any scientific description of the aesthetic object must rely on memory to reproduce the details of the object which appeared during the aesthetic experience. The scientific description can be produced only by a consciousness which is no longer in an aesthetic attitude. The linguistic descriptions of Roman Jakobson may perhaps best be described on the basis of Ingarden's analysis as a pre-aesthetic linguistic
description of the lower levels of the text with additional interpretative details supplied by Jakobson's memory of an aesthetic concretization over which his strictly linguistic methodology has no control. This would explain the certain capriciousness which Victor Erlich, Michael Riffaterre and Jonathan Culler have all noted in Jakobson's interpretative activities. The linguistic aesthetic object he is describing may really exist in the aesthetic experience of Roman Jakobson if not in that of his critics. The possibility that two different aesthetic objects with different aesthetic values may be produced from the same text, however, explains not only why Polish scholars were not likely to accept the projective method of linguistic structuralism, but also why they have not accepted Ingarden's entire phenomenology of literature.

The central issue is the nature of the intersubjective realm. In linguistic structuralism the intersubjective realm is an ideal realm of thought under the direct control of an absolute linguistic or semiotic system whose laws both create the intersubjective objects within the system and also control the activities of any consciousness which enters it. In Roman Jakobson's work at least the absolute also directs the historical evolution of the entire semiotic system. In Ingarden's phenomenology the intersubjective realm is not an ideal realm of thought and contains only schematic formations which have been created
by individual acts of consciousness. There is no ideal system capable of evolution or of creating its own objects. Ingarden, however, in order to ensure the stability of the intersubjective object, accepts, or at least seems to accept, the existence of ideal meanings and metaphysical qualities in an unchanging form which will ensure a correspondence between the essential characteristics of the aesthetic concretizations of the author and the reader. 119

It is the existence of an ideal realm of thought beyond human control which structuralist humanism has been unwilling to accept. In structuralist humanist research the literary system, the aesthetic values and the literary texts themselves are all the products of historical human activity. The intersubjective realm is therefore an historical and social realm in which men and women interact with the creations of other men and women and with any other forces which may manifest themselves in the human environment. Since it is a literary scholarship, structuralist humanism has studied those forces only as they appear in literary history and only in an attempt to maintain a minimal human freedom from their control. 120 In so studying the relationships between literature and its historical and social environment the Polish structuralists under discussion have created a body of thought about literature which is compatible with any but the most determinist
sociologies of literature and, therefore, with Marxism as well.121

The differences between the different literary scholarships which have been discussed at this point in the study are therefore a result of the explicit or implicit assumptions at the basis of their scholarly activities. The earlier discussions in this study have shown that non-theoretical eclecticicism, positivism, and linguistic structuralism all rest on the assumed existence of some absolute force which is beyond individual human control and capable of controlling both our research activities and our perception of the texts we are studying. Charles Sanders Peirce's semiotics accepted, as a potentiality which made science possible, the existence of general objects and of the external world. Roman Ingarden, in order to ensure the reliability of our aesthetic experiences, assumed the existence of ideal metaphysical qualities. Structuralist humanism has accepted, as a potentiality without which literature and scholarship would not be possible, the existence of a certain minimum human creative freedom. The purpose of scholarship and of scholarly methodology in particular is, for Janusz Sławiński, to ensure that this activity will never be closed off, that the ongoing scholarly dialogue with reality will continue. The high value which the structuralist humanists have placed on this continuing process and on the existence of certain minimal human
creativity is almost certainly a result of their personal and scholarly experience with what we might call the Stalinist logos or the samovitoe slovo of the Stalinist cult of personality. This point will be discussed in the second half of this chapter.
SECTION B: THE CULT OF PERSONALITY,
WITOLD GOMBROWICZ AND HUMANISM

The world and life are too fragmentary!
I want to give myself over to a German professor
Who knows how to put life back together again.
And he makes of it a comprehensible system;
With his nightcap and the rags of his nightgown
He plugs the holes in the world's structure.

Heinrich Heine, 1824

The Formalist school represents an abortive
idealism applied to the questions of art. The
Formalists show a fast ripening religiousness.
They are followers of St. John. They believe
that "In the beginning was the Word." But we
believe that in the beginning was the deed.
The word followed, as its phonetic shadow.

Leon Trotsky,
Literature and Revolution
(1924)

Good Good
it's good when it's not too good
it's even good
not too smart
not making it better doesn't hurt
if we can just hold out
in our own foolish fashion

Miron Białoszewski, 1961

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In this brief section of my study of structuralist humanism I am going to try to convey my sense of the effect which the Stalinist episode in Polish literary scholarship and the continuing presence of Stalinist political rhetoric in Polish social life has had on the "spirit," in the meaning in which Rymkiewicz used the word, of contemporary Polish literary scholarship. It is very difficult to write about such things with any certainty since it is a matter of moods, feelings and attitudes expressed in various places both in and out of print. I have given some of the historical background of the situation in Part I. In this section, which is written more in the form of an essay than of a scholarly treatise in order to reflect the personal opinion on which it is based, I will suggest that the need to overcome the Stalinist logos has played an important role in shaping the tone of contemporary Polish scholarship.

Whatever Leon Trotsky may have thought (and he used words to think it), the Russian revolution, which was later to purge him for his advocacy of eternal revolution, had its conceptual origin in the philosophy of Hegel. This is true both because of the influence which Hegel had on Marx and because of the influence which Hegel's philosophy had on the nineteenth century Russian nationalism and Slavophile philosophy which were soon to overwhelm the international elements in Marx's philosophy. By the time
of Stalin's death, the Hegelian word had become the self-referential and self-valuable logos of Stalinist political rhetoric. My reasons for using this term will become obvious at the end of this essay. First, however, I would like to sketch out the conceptual logic which appears to have governed the historical developments. It is a logic which would perhaps have made Hegel himself happy and should make those who think that abstract methodological disputes have no implications for real life reconsider their position.

The logic of the situation begins with Marx's attempt to combine Hegel's idealism with Feuerbach's materialism in an attempt to create a revolutionary philosophy which was designed to change the world rather than just study it. This philosophy had built into it at the very start an Hegelian faith in the rationality of human history, a positivist (to use the term in the general sense of Part II) belief that the conditions of material existence and forms of social thought found in the surrounding environment determine human consciousness and a romantic faith in man's ability to change those conditions.¹²⁸ There was also a faith in the perfectibility of human nature which is reminiscent either of the eighteenth century belief in man's rationality or of early romanticism's faith in his natural goodness.¹²⁹
In Marx's own thought these elements were combined in the belief that the intellectuals who made up the communist party could, by educating the working classes, release the creative forces of their natural goodness and bring about a revolutionary change in the social and material conditions of human existence. This change was not only inevitable (the positivist belief in a single pattern of social evolution was mentioned in Part I), but also beneficial since it would lead to the full realization of man's natural goodness and creative nature when the full potential of the industrial revolution removed all environmental limits on that activity.

As James Miller has noted, this belief was based on the historical optimism of a time when industrialization was just beginning and the working classes were just emerging as a force in European history. It represented a synthesis of several philosophical positions. The problem was that as history progressed, and particularly when Lenin employed an activist version of the theory as the basis for the Russian revolution, the synthesis fell apart under the weight of the historical reality that there had been no international revolution and no transformation of material reality. It seems reasonable to assert that contemporary Marxism has divided into sometimes competing groups of those who emphasize the positivist assertion that matter controls human thought and consciousness and those
who emphasize, as the romantics had done, the creative ability of human praxis.\textsuperscript{131}

This same division is usually found within the thought of any Marxist thinker in one form or another as the opposition between the subjective and the objective context of human action. The subjective context represents the individual's own sense of what he or she is doing, while the objective context represents the social meaning of a given action.\textsuperscript{132} This distinction played a crucial part in Stalinist Marxism because the party in its role as positivist observer of social reality was the only group given the ability to observe the true social meanings of an individual's actions. Subjective consciousness was considered invalid. Moreover, because of its role as a romantic force transforming reality, the party also assumed the responsibility for changing the reality it had perceived. Individuals were treated as objects by the party members who were exempted from the limitations of class consciousness which the reflective theory of cognition had imposed on the other members of society.\textsuperscript{133}

It seems natural to me that men and women with this view of reality would eventually start removing the subjects-now-objects which were delaying the transformation. Furthermore, once the process had begun, it had to be continued. The more resistance they encountered from external reality and other subjects, the greater the extent to which
the subjects comprising the party would have to go to project their own subjective consciousness into external reality. The purges and concentration camps were from the methodological perspective a result of the party's refusal to consider how its own subjective context was affecting its view of external reality. As a result, in order to avoid an awareness of the existence of what Jean Paul Sartre called "the other," another subjective context from which the objective view of their actions could be perceived by them and by the other members of society, communist party members have had to cling desperately to the original terminology of the Stalinist era. The fear of losing control if the existence of more than one position from which truth can be observed were admitted may not be the only reason for the slow pace of de-Stalinization. An awareness of the existence of more than one subjective context might be too great a psychological burden for the party members who were involved in the Stalinist era to bear. At any rate, it would be a threat to party unity.

There are then, it seems to me, both internal and external reasons, both generated in true Marxist fashion by the social position of the party members, for the existence of artistic censorship and a tight control over the flow of information. Socialist Realism, which is, it seems to me, a perfectly valid theory of art if we accept
the party's status as observers of reality, is a natural result of the party's need to prevent the appearance and dissemination of other subjective contexts within social reality. As Abram Tertz has noted, the revolutionary romanticism and artistic exuberance of early Soviet art solidified, or was codified from above, into what I would call a romantic classicism under Stalin. Tertz also noted that for members of Soviet society there was always the romance of the revolution on which to base one's sense of social identity. The members of Soviet society are for the most part still Russian and Soviet and can look back on the revolution as a shared experience, a common subjective context, in their past. Therefore, the party has been able to make use of the slogans and feelings of traditional Russian nationalism to create a sense of social unity.

But what of the Polish communist party? If they appeal to traditional Polish nationalism they are going to activate over one hundred years of struggle against Russian occupation and even more years than that of Catholic faith. The Second World War and the subsequent rebuilding of the country can be talked about for only so long without raising embarrassing issues surrounding the Russian involvement in that conflict. The result during the Stalinist era and until recently, when the
party seems to have changed, was the development of an
official language which the anonymous Polish author of the
report "The Language of Propaganda" has called "newspeak"
(nowo-mowa), taking the term from George Orwell. This
report is an insightful analysis of the role which Stalin-
ist rhetoric has had, or at least could have had, in Polish
intellectual life. The fact that the effects of this
language on literary scholarship were more limited than
they might have been is a testimony to the strength of
Polish intellectual traditions and also to a certain tol-
erance, or at least to a sense of the limited power it has
within Polish society, on the part of the party itself.
Some of the major characteristics of Janusz Ślawiński's
scholarship are a result of the fact that he began his
career at a time when "newspeak" was just being removed
from the dominance it had over literary scholarship and
all aspects of social life during the Stalinist era.

"Newspeak" is based on the ability of the party, and
during the Stalinist era of the Marxist literary scholars
as well, to observe the objective conditions present in
the surrounding intellectual life, society and world and
to assign a value to everything they see. The subjective
contexts of all other members of society are invalid when
seen from this perspective. This is a result of the posi-
tivist elements in "newspeak." The romantic elements give
its speakers the power to change the reality they are
observing. As the anonymous author has observed, its four characteristics are: 1) to give a single value to every phenomenon by dividing the world into dichotomies, one member of which has a positive and the other a negative value; 2) a tendency toward the complete ritualization of every speech situation so that the same words are always spoken in the same situation; 3) a belief in the magical power of its own utterances, either to cause a desired state to exist, for example "the youth is always with the party," or to cause a thing or a person to cease to exist by refusing to allow its name to be spoken; 4) an arbitrariness which allows the permissibility and referents of utterances to be changed according to changing political needs.\(^{142}\)

These characteristics are all derivable from the combination of romantic and positivist elements described above. The assigning of a definite value to every phenomenon and the ritualization of all speech situations stem from the positivist determinism. The magical powers and the ability to adjust to the changing historical situation are a result of the Stalinist party's and scholar's visionary abilities. The anonymous author calls it "arbitrariness" because his subjective context has interfered with his ability to perceive the party's visionary truths. His is therefore an external criticism of the Stalinist methodology. For the speakers of "newspeak" both the magical
creation and destruction of people and objects and the changing historical situation are real events. In order to prove their arbitrariness the author would have to disprove the status of the observer. This is hard or impossible to do since the Stalinist can always assert that history is only in a holding pattern and that he will be proven right in the end.

There is no way of denying, however, that "newspeak" has a universal axiology designed to give a value to every object and subject in the world, institutionalize all speech figures, eliminate all linguistic choice from intellectual life and replace all other existing languages. By creating such a universal, self enclosed, axiological language the speakers of "newspeak" can prevent the discussion of serious topics and the appearance of other subjective contexts within their society in two manners: 1) Within the domain of "newspeak" no such discussion is possible because there is no terminology with which to discuss forbidden topics or persons; 2) More perniciously, as the author notes, they can remove the possibility of such discussion from the natural language as well. Since the speakers of "newspeak" control the educational institutions, they can, whether intentionally or unintentionally is unimportant, prevent the creation of the highly developed intellectual language which every society needs to discuss its serious problems. If the
Stalinist period in Polish intellectual life had been more prolonged, it might have meant that large numbers of Polish students would have been trained only in "newspeak."

The author of the article "The Language of Propaganda" fears that this may still be the case in Poland today because "newspeak" still controls the mass media and the mass educational institutions. He concludes his study by saying that, although parody and a joking cynicism enable young Poles to protect themselves from "newspeak," a healthy social life requires more than that:

The role of parody should not be over-estimated. It teaches mistrust and suspicion of "newspeak." It sometimes reveals "newspeak's" mechanisms. It seems, however, that parody as a form of behavior in relation to "newspeak" is not enough; that what is needed is a rebuilding of a trust in language--beyond "newspeak." In the social consciousness a mistrust of "newspeak" is often transformed into a mistrust of language in general. The building of a trust in language, in a language which is not "newspeak," would depend, among other things, on the delineation of a clear border between the two phenomena. In "newspeak" one can say nothing real. In the Polish language one can now make parodies and scoff at things. The point is to make it possible to speak in a manner which is both authentic and serious about serious matters.

Janusz Sławiński did not write this passage but it is indicative of his attitude toward the creation of theories of literature as expressed in the two satirical articles discussed at the beginning of this chapter. On the one hand, theories are necessary if we are "to speak in a manner which is both authentic and serious about
serious matters." On the other, if we are not to substitute one "newspeak" for another one, we must have a certain looseness, a certain scepticism about our own intellectual creations. The presence of this attitude in his work is probably a result of the influence of Witold Gombrowicz and in a different manner of the poetry of Miron Białoszewski.

The two writers offer two solutions, or rather two aspects of the same solution, to the social determinism and the "newspeak" of Stalinist society. The Stalinist cult of personality was based on the assumption that one man in his position of romantic visionary cum positivist scientist was capable of perceiving and controlling the laws governing the development of human history and the universe. The official science, scholarship and public policy which were backed by his authority were seen not as the creation of men and women but as the objective determination of the structure of social and material reality. It was, to use Heine's words, a structure with all "the gaps plugged up." It was also a structure in which no subjective context could exist, perhaps, if we are to believe Solzhenitsyn, not even that of the man who ran it. The acceptance of "newspeak" meant a denial of one's own conscious activity (the young Marx would have said praxis) in favor of a hierarchical structure which would one day lead to salvation. Within Soviet society this belief was buttressed
both by the romance of the revolution in the past and by
the hope of its future realization in the communist utopia.
For most of the members of Polish society, however, the
revolution and the Stalinist system had never been Polish
and could offer no sense of shared national or personal
identity. What the author of the article discussed above
probably means when he speaks of "newspeak's arbitrariness"
and of what he elsewhere in the same article calls its
"immanent axiology," 150 is that, unable to make contact
with either the subjective contexts or the objective con-
text of Polish society, "newspeak" became a pure political
grammar, a transcendental political syntax whose only pur-
pose was to sustain its own existence. 151

Janusz Śliawński began his career at a time when,
through what appears to have been a united effort of the
scholarly community, "newspeak" was expelled from Polish
literary scholarship. 152 As a literary scholar, he is more
fortunate than his counterparts in history, philosophy or
sociology since, at least in Poland, his discipline is not
considered an integral part of "newspeak." However, his
scholarly activity can probably best be understood as an
attempt to ensure the continued existence of literary
scholarship as a creative intellectual activity but on the
one hand keeping the Stalinist "newspeak" outside of lit-
erary scholarship and on the other making sure that he
himself and his fellow scholars have not simply replaced
the Stalinist "newspeak" with one of their own. His satirical articles and his humanism are a result of his belief that, if the gaps are ever filled in, literary scholarship will become a sterile, self-referential form unable to fulfill its functions as a humanist discipline.\textsuperscript{153}

Janusz Sławiński's understanding of "form" and of its dangers has been influenced by the writings of the Polish author and artistic philosopher Witold Gombrowicz.\textsuperscript{154} The following passage is indicative of Gombrowicz's attitude toward form.

\begin{quote}
Man is made in such a way that he continually has to define himself and continually escape his own definitions. Reality is not about to let itself be completely enclosed in form. Form for its part does not agree with the essence of life. Yet all thought that tries to define the inadequacy of form becomes form in its turn and thus only confirms our tendency towards form.\textsuperscript{155}
\end{quote}

Gombrowicz's passage is a statement of the paradox facing any avant-garde movement, whether it is political or artistic. The insistence on originality and revolutionary activity ultimately creates new forms which, if accepted, mean an end to the revolutionary activity. This is what had happened to Soviet Marxism during the Stalinist era. The importance of Gombrowicz's writings for Polish intellectual life in the 1950s was that his philosophy of inter-human form presented a clear refutation both of the objectivity of the Stalinist logos and of its denial of the validity of the subjective human context.
Gombrowicz's philosophy rests on the opposition between the self (the "I") and form, and between immaturity and maturity. He believed that as the human self matures it creates in search of its own identity and takes on in interaction with other people a number of forms. These forms cause the "I" to lose its own authenticity and sense of self-identity. The more mature the self becomes, the less authentic it is and the more it suffers. For this reason "immaturity," a lack of a well-defined form, becomes a positive value in Gombrowicz's writings. It is also an unattainable goal, a "potentiality" in the sense in which I used the term on p. 282, since any interaction with other people will inevitably form the self. The only solution presented by Gombrowicz is to inhabit the forms already existing in social and artistic life and, by parodying them, use them to establish your own identity, your own immaturity.\(^{156}\) Michał Głowiński has termed this process "constructive parody.\(^{157}\)

Gombrowicz presented human history as an endless dance of forms in which individuals destroy each other in the name of the very forms which are depriving them of the authenticity and self-identity they seek.\(^{158}\) The major character of his play *The Marriage* (1953), which is a parody of the Shakespearean tragedy, describes the effect of this interhuman dance of forms in the following passage:
This raises a simple question: If in the course of several years a person fulfills the function of a madman, is he not then really a madman? And what does it matter that I am healthy if my actions are sick—eh, Johnny? But those who forced me to commit those insanities were also healthy
And sensible
And balanced....Friends, companions, brothers--

Health
And such sick behavior? So much sanity
And yet so much madness? So much humanity
And yet so much inhumanity? And what does it matter if taken separately, each of us is lucid, sensible, balanced when altogether we are nothing but a gigantic madman who furiously Writhe about, screams, bellows and blindly Rushes forward, overstepping his own bounds Tearing himself out of himself....Our madness Is outside ourselves, out there....There, there, out there

Where I myself end, there begins
My wantonness....159

In Gombrowicz's writings the value system of the Stalinist logos or "newspeak" is reversed. The individual "I" should no longer sacrifice its individual subjective context in order to receive its identity from the objective context of the Stalinist visionary observer. That context itself is no longer seen as objective but rather as the interhuman form, the mature residue, of the immature subjectivities which have produced it. Gombrowicz's thought denies the possibility of the position of external observation on which Stalinist thought depended. Furthermore, since the existence of any interhuman form and not the content of any particular form is what has deprived the self of its identity, the only way to end the mad dance
is to replace "newspeak" with an immature form, one which has in its structure gaps or holes in which the human self can create, to the limited extent to which that is possible, its own identity. It is most likely this line of reasoning which is beneath Sławinski's ambivalent attitude both toward literary theorizing and toward the structuralist terminology he has used in his own scholarship.

It is an attitude which Witold Gombrowicz himself expressed when a French interviewer asked him about his relationship to structuralism:

I am rather an artist and, therefore, a dilettante. I do not claim to usurp the domain of science nor of philosophy. Nevertheless, the necessities of an epoch, its deepest tendencies, can be realized by different voices: by those of reason as well as by those of artistic vision. I believe that structuralism and I, we are in the same current... my man is apparent in theirs... I will therefore allow myself to present him. Here he is. He speaks a different language than yours, messieurs les professeurs. Agreed. Despite everything he has a few things to say to you: 1) Search your oppositions: in speaking of the universal, of the abstract, of humanity, of culture do not forget the human form in the concrete, immediate aspect in which it appears when produced by the individual. 2) The "I" has a tenacious existence (vie dure). 3) Be on your guard against suffering--it is the tiger which threatens you. 4) Be on your guard against the immaturity which lies in secret at the heart of your maturity.160

As the author of the article on the "Language of Propaganda" said, however, this endless parody of forms, although it does prolong the immaturity of the self,
cannot replace the scholarly language which intellectual
thought requires for its existence. Kazimierz Brandys, in
the novel Nierzeczywistosc which was also discussed in
Part II, said of the Stalinist years:

Between my attitude toward reality and
reality itself there were no connections.
Everything took place beyond the range of
my opinions, independently of my interests,
desires or convictions. And in the end I
came to the conclusion that precisely such
a state of affairs had become the new social
principle of coexistence, in place of the one
for which we had waited. And so it was not
I who broke with reality. If I were to say
that it was reality which broke away from me,
then I would be closer to the truth.161

The discussion of "newspeak" and of "interhuman form"
in this section has suggested, as Brandys also suggests at
other points in his novel, that it was not the case that
physical reality itself had broken away from Polish intel-
lectuals, but rather that the Stalinist logos had inter-
jected itself between the traditional language and insti-
tutions of thought and both the reality which they were
designed to describe and the social and artistic life
which they had traditionally maintained.162 Brandys con-
cluded that in such a situation the only recourse for an
intelligent man or woman with a sense of social responsi-
bility is to "carry out his profession" with whatever tools
and institutional facilities the logos has left him.163
As a literary scholar, Janusz Sławiński had at his dis-
posal most of the structuralist terminology of Roman
Jakobson, Jurij Tynjanov and Jan Mukařovský. However, due to the influence of Roman Ingarden and Witold Gombrowicz, he used that terminology for a purpose other than the construction of a scientific theory of literature.

In order to explain that purpose more fully I will briefly describe one poem by Miron Białoszewski, a poet and author of whose work Sławiński has been a consistent supporter. Structuralist humanism is, like the positivism of Veselovskij, the formalism of Šklovskij and the structuralism of Jakobson and Lotman, consistent with the literary tastes of the scholars who have produced it. I have given Białoszewski's poem in both Polish and English because verbal play is crucial in the poem's aesthetic effect.

"ACH, GDYBY, GDYBY NAWET PIEC ZABRALI..."
MOJA NIEWYCZERPANA ODA DO RADOŚCI

Mam piec
podobny do Bramy triumfalnej!

Zabieraja mi piec
podobny do Bramy triumfalnej'!

Oddajcie mi piec
podobny do Bramy triumfalnej'!!

Zabrali.

Zostala po nim tylko
szara
naga
jama
szara naga jama.
I to mi wystarczy:

szara naga jama
szara naga jama
sza-ra-na-ga-ja-ma
szaranagajama.165

"OH, IF, IF THEY EVEN TOOK AWAY MY STOVE..."
MY INEXHAUSTIBLE ODE TO JOY

I have a stove
which is like a triumphal arch!

They are taking away my stove
which is like a triumphal arch!!

Give me back my stove
which is like a triumphal arch!!!

They took it.

There remained after it only
a gray
naked
hole
a gray naked hole.

And that is enough for me:

a gray naked hole
a gray naked hole
a-gr-ay-na-ked-ho-le
agraynakedhole.

This poem is best understood in light of the relationship between the conscious activity of the tenacious "I" of Gombrowicz and the linguistic and physical reality of the German and Russian occupations of Poland and the ensuing Stalinist logos. In such a context the individual poetic consciousness found itself cut off not only from the objects in external reality but also from the words and the language with which those objects had been discussed.
The question for a poet such as Białoszewski was whether art and conscious existence itself were possible under such conditions. Is the artistic self tenacious enough to exist in isolation on the periphery of society and with only the most minimal elements of linguistic and material reality at its disposal?

Under these conditions Białoszewski's poetic self not only manages to exist but to create an "inexhaustible ode to joy." This is accomplished by imagining a worst case scenario in which even the solitary physical object is removed. Punctuation is used to convey the poetic consciousness' changing emotional state as the scenario unfolds. In the first sentence the self has turned the solitary physical object in the poem into a triumphal arch, a source of joy and, one may assume, of psychic stasis. In the second sentence the consciousness is agitated as the object is being removed from its world. This agitation culminates in the exclamation, "Give me back...!!" In the finality of the simple statement "Zabrali," both the self and the object are gone. Even linguistically the logos is triumphant. This closes the first movement of the poem.

The second movement is one of transition in which the self, now alone with "a gray naked hole," examines the hole's characteristics and then arranges them into a simple statement. In the third movement, however, the joy returns, even if only in an understated form, as the
linguistic elements of which the "gray naked hole" is composed are first broken into parts and then combined into a single undifferentiated word which with its -a- in every syllable is almost like a religious chant (almost but not literally!). This minimal play with linguistic elements is a demonstration that conscious activity and artistic creativity can continue under the most limited conditions possible. It is not a political statement and not a grand pronouncement of the value of art. It is simply the making of art by a consciousness which inhabits "the holes in the world's structure."

Janusz Sławiński wrote the introduction to the selection of Białoszewski's poetry which was published in 1976. In it he praised Białoszewski for his successful withdrawal into self (the Polish word is wycofanie się). Białoszewski's poetry is, in Sławiński's opinion), that of a man who keeps the creative process going by refusing to allow either himself or the reader to settle into an established pattern. He is always a little aloof from his own work, leaving it behind himself as soon as it is written and moving on to open up a new set of artistic problems. The distinguishing characteristic of Sławiński's scholarship is that he has always worked in the same manner. He views scholarship as a creative intellectual activity which must be both sustained and controlled. He opens up one set of problems and then moves on to another
set, often without fully resolving the first group. His work therefore remains a set of suggestions for future investigation rather than a completed universal theory of literature. It is perhaps this attitude toward literary scholarship which may be one of the most important contributions which he has made to structuralist thought about literature. In the remaining chapters I will describe some of his suggested areas for investigation before returning to the value of his general attitude in the conclusion.
CHAPTER III

THE HINGE [La Brisure]

The title of this short chapter is taken from the writings of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida. In Derrida's grammatology "the hinge" is the place within any body of thought on which the relations of which the thought is composed rest. Because those relations rest on a hinge rather than on some firm, absolute foundation, any thought or any literary text can be deconstructed, even turned into its own opposite, by revolving the relations around the hinge. It is this possibility which causes Derrida to question the reliability of any perception and thereby deny the possibility of science. It also allows, as I suggested in Part I, Geoffrey Hartman and the deconstructionists to deny the possibility of traditional literary scholarship and assert the necessity for a poetic criticism.

The importance of structuralist humanist research is that, without disproving the existence of the hinge (such a proof is in all likelihood impossible), it has managed to create a methodological scholarship by
incorporating both the hinge and the revolving relations within a larger social and human context. Although the relativity within Derrida's thought has not been denied, it has been made the subject matter for scholarly investigation.

In this manner the study of structuralist humanism has provided me with a perspective from which the problems caused by the internal crisis in the humanities described in Part I, Chapter V, appear to be resolvable or, at the very least, endurable in their inevitability. However, in so doing it has also demonstrated the role which any scholar's own individual consciousness and social environment play in shaping the results of his or her research. It is necessary for me, therefore, before moving to a discussion of structuralist humanism to reveal the hinge present at the center or, as Derrida's work suggests, the absent center of my own thought. 169

The relations of which my own perception of structuralist humanism is composed revolve around my sense of the position of the humanist in contemporary society. It seems to me (see the discussion in Part I, Chapter V) that mass society and the technology and science which are essential to its existence have pushed the humanities to the periphery of contemporary culture. The mass culture which this society has produced tolerates, by blissfully ignoring or employing in an identical, content-blind
manner, all the conflicting products (both past and present) of intellectual thought. It is this very tolerance which makes the humanities seem irrelevant.

The danger is that this belief has caused me to understand the work of Janusz Ślawiński, Michał Głowiński, Aleksandra Okopień-Ślawińska, Janusz Lalewicz and Jerzy Kmita in the manner in which I have understood it. Perhaps the presence in the world of a group of scholars preserving the traditional role of the humanities in the face of an intolerant utopian ideology is as necessary to my sense of purposeful activity as the evolutionary laws of thought were to Aleksandr Veselovskij or the universal semiotic laws are to Roman Jakobson and Jurij Lotman. This is a relativity with which scholarship will have to learn to live. Only further research and history itself will reveal what other perspectives structuralist humanist research has revealed. Perhaps, if the humanities return to a central position in society, it will prove necessary to revolve this study on its hinge and argue for the necessity of a fully scientific literary scholarship whose formal structures would prevent us from forcing our ideas on others. For now, however, the structuralist humanist perspective seems to me to be the most attractive one available.

There is, of course, a great deal of room for debate on this subject. I can, within the scope of this study,
only reveal my own hinge by quoting the ironic lines of Robinson Jeffers:

"We must adjust our economics to the new abundance..."
Of what? Toys: motors, music boxes,
Paper, fine clothes, leisure, diversion.

I honestly believe (but really an alien here: trust me not)
Blind war, compared to this kind of life,
Has nobility, famine has dignity.

Be happy, adjust your economics to the new abundance;
One is neither saint nor devil, to wish
The intolerable nobler alternative.

Robinson Jeffers, The Trap 171
CHAPTER IV

STRUCTURALIST HUMANIST HISTORY AND
SOCIOLOGY OF LITERATURE

The knowledge Zipcio had acquired in school and which lay at the bottom of his memory like an inert mass began to surface and cluster around newly posed questions, not as intellectual problems but as a cry of horror before the omni-mystery contained in the infinity of time and space, as well as in the ostensibly simple fact that everything was arranged precisely so and not otherwise.172

Hardonne kept silent and smiled ironically. He was constantly subject to the same feeling. Except that he knew how to convert (he had no other choice, really) all this (this metaphysical insatiability) into sounds, or rather into sound patterns which usually appeared to him initially in the form of vague spatial [italics Witkiewicz's] potentials and then fanned out into time sequences, weighed down like branches of berry clusters with preposterous dissonances [ . . . ]173

In the course of this study I have described four literary scholarships which based the objective validity of their descriptions or interpretations of individual literary texts or groups of literary texts on the existence both of some absolute determining force and of some position from which the laws of that force can be observed. In the case of non-theoretical eclecticism that force was

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the established but often unacknowledged tradition for reading texts or, as it is often called, "decorum," "common sense" or "public taste." In the case of positivist literary scholarship it was the evolutionary laws of matter and social development. Linguistic structuralism replaced the positivist laws of matter with the laws of an absolute linguistic or semiotic system. The Stalinist logos was justified by a combination of visionary laws of matter and the social determination of consciousness. A fifth scholarship which was discussed only in passing in relation to the passage from Jarosław Rymkiewicz's article on Słowacki relies on the presence of a "Great Soul" within the literary text. As I have tried to indicate in relation to those scholarships which I did discuss, these are all assumptions which are extremely difficult, if not impossible, to disprove. However, as I indicated in the first part of the study, they are also assumptions which have led literary scholarship into an internal methodological crisis which is further aggravated by the external social crisis which has afflicted all of the humanities in contemporary society.

In the final two chapters I am going to describe some of the terminology and concepts which Janusz Sławiński and his co-workers have developed in an attempt, one which has been relatively successful, to deal with a similar situation in their own country. In the last chapter I
discussed two Polish philosophers, one academic, the other artistic, who had provided a perspective from which the aesthetic or artistic experience can be seen as a result of an interaction between the creative abilities, however limited, of human consciousness and the intersubjective objects or interhuman forms which it has created.\textsuperscript{180} I also conveyed my impression that this dialogue between form and consciousness had provided Polish intellectuals with a technique for resisting the Stalinist logos or "newspeak," as the anonymous author called it. At the end of the chapter I gave an example of how Miron Bialo-szewski, a poet whose work Janusz Sławiński has always actively supported, could use the most minimal linguistic elements and the smallest physical fragments of reality to demonstrate, even with his poetic "I" ironically withdrawn, the creative potentiality and resilience of human consciousness. The reason Janusz Sławiński's work has never received the approval and recognition it deserves from the other Slavic structuralisms is that he has done the same thing with their linguistic terminology.

It is necessary to remember when considering the value of Sławiński's theoretical formulations that he is talking about states and formations which exist inside human consciousness, whether individual or social, and not about observable external objects and structures. He has combined Gombrowicz's belief that the "tenacious I" is the
only "absolute" (if the word can still be used) reality with the ironic withdrawal of Białoszewski's poetry. For Sławinski the projective method is either only a means of holding states of consciousness in memory, with all the potential for distortion that entails, or else a sterile formalism which will imprison the consciousness and thought it once made possible. Sławinski wrote in 1972 of the linguistic semiotics of the Moscow-Tartu group and of the French scholars, Roland Barthes, A. J. Greimas (actually Lithuanian), Tsvetan Todorov (actually Bulgarian) and Julia Kristeva, that it had become a fashionable machine which was now beyond human control.¹⁸¹ He warned, "Once the machine has been set into motion there is no longer any means of stopping it: it will not cease functioning until everything has been ground into a text."¹⁸² Sławinski continued to call linguistic semiotics "a mechanical and barren effort" (wysięk mechaniczny i jałowy)¹⁸³ and expressed his amazement at the peculiar human perversity which equates authenticity with a universal text whose rules we do not know.

The above comments were made in one of Sławinski's satirical articles and are, perhaps, not fully accurate descriptions of Soviet and French research (see the discussion of Jurij Lotman at the end of Chapter II). They are, nevertheless, accurate reflections of Sławinski's view of the purpose and nature of scholarly activity.
Concepts, semiotic models, logical diagrams, or whatever we may choose to call them, should not be allowed to acquire a life of their own and develop independently of the scholarly dialogue and perception of reality which they make possible. Literary scholarship itself is for Sławiński, although like Białoszewski's ironic "I" he never says so openly, a group consciousness which must never be allowed to fall under the control of any absolute force, whether internally generated or externally imposed. For this reason the satirical sketches and the jocular tone of Texts are as important to him as his theoretical and methodological studies are. The purpose of both is to maintain the dialogue between scholars and literary reality. The dialogue must be carefully maintained since, if literature and literary scholarship exist primarily in consciousness, they are activities which may be forgotten and thereby, either temporarily or permanently, cease to exist. The potential for this happening must have become clear to Sławiński during the years of the Stalinist logos. The problems faced by a scholarly consciousness emerging from that era are therefore a good starting point for a discussion of his sociology of literature.

The central problem facing a scholarly consciousness in those years was, as I have said in the last chapter, that the Stalinist "newspeak" had not only deprived scholarship of the terminology which it needed for its
existence, but also replaced that terminology with the terminology of an inflexible social determinism. Because of the relative autonomy of literary scholarship within Polish society, Sławiński has been able to draw on a number of existing methodologies in order to expand the possibilities of study. In each case, however, he employs the new terminology and the aspect of reality it describes not as a source of objective validity but as a set of possibilities for further conscious activity. In much the same way I added choice to Veselovskij's positivist determinism at the end of Part II, Sławiński balances one aspect of reality and one set of scholarly procedures against another in order to create the maximum relativity and, therefore, the maximum possible conscious creative activity on the part of authors, readers and scholars. If there is no one and no set of laws which are free from the play of form and consciousness, then there is no one capable of ending the play. However, and this is what separates Sławiński from Derrida and Heidegger, if the play of consciousness is to be controlled and understood, it must be placed within a larger social and historical context. In Sławiński's own work this context has acquired the name of literary communication.\textsuperscript{184} In developing, along with his co-workers, this area of study Sławiński has shown that the "Great Soul" of Rymkiewicz, the public taste of traditional literary scholarship, the linguistic structures
of linguistic structuralism and the social structures of vulgar Marxism can only be understood when studied in relation to each other. Since he tries to bring those different aspects of reality under the control of a single terminology, it is possible to speak of his work as a theoretical eclecticism.

The background for Sławiński's understanding of literary communication is found in the articles "Synchrony and Diachrony in the Historical Literary Process" and "The Sociology of Literature and Historical Poetics." I will begin with a discussion of literary sociology since it provides a framework for his understanding of history.

Sławiński calls his sociology of literature "the sociology of literary forms." It should be obvious from the earlier parts of my study why a young scholar of Sławiński's generation would have wanted to develop a "sociology of literary forms." He begins his study with a discussion of the three methodological alternatives which he has not chosen because they were not capable of providing a literary sociology. The first of these is a sociology of literary life (życie literackie). Sławinski describes its subject matter as,

The social role of creative artists, the social position of the writer and the status of his occupation; the layering of the public and the levels of readers' literary culture which correspond to it, the social motivations for reading tastes and selections, the types of reading activity and the reception of
creative work in different environments of receivers; the forms of access to books and the course of their circulation in society; the dissemination of the products of writer's work, editorial politics and its connection with the conditions of the reading market; the functioning of the institutions of social control of creative work. 188

Sławiński considers this a legitimate area of study and gives two examples of how it affects literature: literature will not flourish in a society without free time and censorship may actually help literature by causing it to focus on more universal problems and find elaborate means for communicating forbidden topics. 189 This can in turn have a harmful effect because literature may become so rarefied as to be accessible only to an intellectual elite capable of deciphering its content. The presence of censorship may also cause readers to read works of all ages as containing the same hidden content. This leads Sławiński to conclude that literary history cannot understand the manner in which literary forms and conventions change without studying the social life in which those changes occur. This means that the sociology of literary life and the sociology of literary forms share, as Sławiński phrases it, "a commonality (but not an identity!) of the material of research" but not the same "object of research." 190 He is speaking of the cognitive transformation described in Figure 1. The cognitive transformation which his sociology produces in the literary subdivision
of social life is based on the following assumptions:
1) literary life is a "set of possibilities (and also impossibilities) for definite manners, means, and bases of literary communication," and 2) the method of literary communication can be treated as "a particular type of program for the circumstances of literary life." The purpose of the sociology of literary forms is, then, to study the interaction between literature and social life and the possibilities and limitations which this interaction places on artistic creativity.

The above assumption provides Sławiński with a criticism of the liabilities of "social-genetic explanation" as a sociology of literature. Sławiński uses Taine's positivism and crude Marxism as examples. His criticism is based on the assertion that "literariness" (Polish: literackość) is a social category and that, therefore, any literary sociology which is both literary and social must be capable of explaining "literariness." As a result, he can make criticisms of four different types of "social-genetic explanation": 1) One type of social-genetic explanation breaks the work down into two sets of elements, social and aesthetic. However, since it contains no means of studying non-social entities, it can never explain the aesthetic character of literary works. The non-social elements must, therefore, be treated as aesthetically neutral. This in turn deprives literary
sociology of the subject matter it is trying to explain. (Sławiński does not say so in this article but from his position the same criticism also applies to linguistic semiotics as a literary theory); 2) Another type of social-genetic explanation views the author's consciousness as representative of the consciousness of a particular social group and, therefore, the "depicted reality" of the literary work as the manifestation of a subgroup of social consciousness. Sławiński reasons that this is also an inadequate literary sociology because it cannot study the author as a social individual fulfilling the social role of author. In other words, the author's consciousness, to the extent to which it is a social consciousness, is, at least partially, a literary consciousness; 3) The study of the literary work as an image (obraz) of the social conditions which spawned it neglects the fact that mimesis is only a particular, historically and socially determined, function of literature; and 4) Social-genetic explanation which is based on the theory of reflection (Polish: odbicie) removes the layers of mediation which make literature a social activity. Sławiński concludes that a truly social and literary literary sociology must study the literary conventions which, because they are social in nature, provide the social shape for the activity they govern. 193
These social conventions also provide the basis for Sławiński's rejection of sociologies of literature which study only the reception of the literary work. Such theories will, according to Sławiński, ultimately lead to the view that the reader is the only source of meaning in a work which exists only as a material artifact until the reader gives it shape. Sławiński asserts that, although these theories have clearly demonstrated that the work is an entity in the historical literary process and that it is an open formation whose internal/external border is hard to define, they are capable of accounting only for one side of the work's social nature.  

In order to find a means of explaining the social and historical relations between authors, readers, literary conventions and the social groups which have produced and define literary works, literary sociology should, according to Sławiński, study the "deep-rooted social foundation (społeczne zakorzenienie) of the possibilities, rules, means and manners of literary communication." He continues, "It can never be brought to mind enough, that 'literariness' itself, and thus the set of characteristics allowing literary notifications (powiadomienia) to be distinguished from transmissions (przekazy) of other types, is a category which demands relativization to a definite state of social consciousness."  

It is therefore natural that literary scholarship should be based on a sociology and social
history of literature.

Before describing that sociology I would like to review briefly what Świąński has done in justifying its existence. His argument for a literary sociology began in the context of theories arguing for the social determination of literature and consciousness. In a series of arguments based on the assumption that a literary sociology must be literary, Świąński accepted the idea that literature is socially determined but, in the course of doing so, he redefined that determination to mean only that literature is determined by a state of social consciousness. In other articles, some of which will be described below, he has done the same thing with literary language, the literary tradition, the literary work, the "Great Soul" of Rymkiewicz and literary scholarship itself. When Świąński's theoretical writings are examined as a group, there is beneath the ironic surface of his terminology what he himself calls a "comprehensive strategy of activity" or "personality" turning the world outside itself into the intersubjective forms of past and present consciousness and thereby increasing the possibilities for further conscious activity for both itself and others. This is no small achievement. In the rest of the chapter I will summarize the view of the historical and social situation of literature and the writer which it has produced.
In Sławiński's theory of literature literary communication consists of the following elements: society, literary life, the literary public, literary culture, the literary tradition, literary works and the individuals who are part of and communicate through the above system of social relations. The content and the exact state of the relations between the various elements change across history, but the general framework within which the relations occur remains the same. In the following discussion I will start at the level of society and work down level by level until I come to the individuals. I have, however, left the discussion of the communicative levels of the literary work for the next chapter. First I will describe each level separately, then I will discuss some of their interrelations. The reader who wishes to have an overview of the levels involved before the discussion begins may turn to Figure 7.

The highest level of the system is society. It is presumably divided into the social institutions and corresponding social roles which are the basis for social life. Sławiński describes social life only as a series of roles into which the individual must enter while living out his social existence. Social life is a process of continual interaction in which society defines the individual and the individual, by his behavior, proposes a potential role model for the other members of society. Sławiński
has not defined the process more fully than this because he believes that, since it exceeds the area of the literary scholar's professional competence, any decision about the exact nature of social and material reality would be an ideological decision for a scholar of literature. 204

Literary scholarship should, therefore, attempt to base its methodology and theory on as neutral a definition as possible. Sławiński's definition of society and social existence seems relatively neutral to me. It is compatible with Marxism, Catholicism, existentialism, phenomenology and structuralism in most variants. The central issue is the definition of the interaction. The normative element (the ideological decision?) in Sławiński's definition is that he gives human consciousness some interactive role in the process in line with his general belief in the possibility of conscious human activity.

The next level after society is that of literary life, composed of the broader social institutions which are directly concerned with literature. Sławiński feels that a study of literary life can provide insights into the development of literary history. He views literary life as a superstructure which is a sui generis result of the need for some means of connecting social groups with the literary public. Some of the elements of literary life were described in the passage on page 330. The sociology of literary forms is interested mainly in the study of
that aspect of literary life which relates to the formation of the literary public and not to its relations with the larger social structures. 205

The relations between literary life and those larger social structures have been studied extensively in Poland by Stefan Żółkiewski under the name of "literary culture." 206 Żółkiewski's use of the term should not be confused with that of Sławiński (see Part III, Footnote 216). Żółkiewski applies linguistic semiotic terminology to describe literary culture as composed of different "circulations" (obiegi), each with its own institutions and purposes. 207 The literature within these circulations is shaped by the social aspirations of the classes which control the circulation. In his study of the literary culture of interwar Poland, Żółkiewski analyzes the syntax, semantics and pragmatics of each social circulation. The pragmatics of a given circulation is a result of the class aspirations it represents and shapes the literary forms within it. Żółkiewski has on this basis criticized the study of culture in Soviet semiotics for its lack of pragmatics. 208

It is important for a Westerner to understand that Żółkiewski's work and that of his workshop of literary culture has added a great deal of sophistication to some of the original Soviet Marxist ideas of social determination. By loosening the connection between genetic
determinants and literary forms and by tolerating Janusz Sławiński's work, which is compatible with his own, Zójkiewski, given the authority which his former institutional affiliations gave him, has helped make the sociology of literary forms possible. Furthermore, Janusz Lalewicz has, while working within Zójkiewski's group, shown how the technology available in a given society places one more limitation on the manner in which the underlying social structure and class divisions within a society determine the shape of its literature.209

It is, however, when we move from the level of literary life, or Zójkiewski's "literary culture," to that of the literary public which forms on its border that Sławiński's own literary sociology begins.210 The literary public is made up of individuals who are actually engaged in the writing and reading of literary texts.211 They are joined together into groups not by their non-literary social connections but by their shared literary culture. This common literary culture preserves the mutual literary convention, or zero state, which the member of a given group within the literary public must have in order to be considered a member of that group. Each member of the group is also an individual for whom, as Sławiński says, the "literary actions (of transmission or reception) are only sections (odcinki) in the entire stream of his productive, consumptive and communicative activity."212
As a result, the entire spectrum of an individual's social and cultural consciousness can potentially enter into his relationship with literary texts. This real life experience, although it is filtered through the literary culture and tradition on the lower levels of the system, allows both for continual change within the literary tradition and for the presence of meaning within the work.²¹³

There are in Sławiński's description three literary roles for these individuals to perform: author, reader and critic. Sławiński notes, not without some irony, that the critic plays a derivative, mediating role, "picking his way" back and forth between the two essential components of the literary public.²¹⁴ This ambivalence will become important in the next chapter.

In order to orient itself in relation to the literary tradition any group within the literary public has to develop what Sławiński calls a literary culture.²¹⁵ A literary culture is a set of writing and reading habits designed to ensure that authors will write and readers will read books in an appropriate manner. It maintains communication within the group by making certain that an author finds "his own" (swoich) readers and that readers find "their own" authors within the literary tradition. The literary culture therefore contains the following elements: 1) Knowledge (wiedza) of the proper understanding and evaluation of the individual communications which the given
group has accepted as "classics"; 2) Taste (gust), a group of predilections for works of a particular type; 3) Literary competence, a group of abilities to use the literary experience which the members of the group already have in order to accept or reject a communicative possibility which the group has not yet encountered. Sławiński calls these the particular, statistical and structural elements of literary culture. It is here, as elsewhere in Sławiński's work, the structural element of the culture which makes further development possible. The three together make up what Sławiński calls, taking the term from Hans Robert Jauss, the "horizon of expectations" of the given group. Any work which exceeds that horizon will not be accepted by the group and may even break the group up if some members do accept it. This is an important point because it reveals one more aspect of the potential for change within Sławiński's system. One creative action, one innovative work, can potentially cause a good portion of the literary public to re-group itself by de-stabilizing its literary culture.

This same potential for development appears more clearly within the literary tradition itself. Sławiński writes that the dynamics of the tradition are a result of three oppositions: "between the supply of works and the inventory of norms, between the partial systems of norms co-existing in the tradition; and finally between the
various layers of the past which live together in its space."\textsuperscript{218} These oppositions are explained below. They make possible the continual renewal of the tradition and its continued historical development through the undertaking of individual acts of writing. Every such act is a "unity of supraindividual systems and individual utterances," which projects the "new performances" (dokonania) into an "order of simultaneity with all previous experiences" and at the same time returns to the tradition its "dimension of temporal sequentiality."\textsuperscript{219} Sławiński calls this process the union of synchrony and diachrony. Both the tradition and the individual (writer, critic or reader) require this union for their existence.

Although the terms have been taken from Roman Jakobson, it is important to emphasize the differences in perspective.\textsuperscript{220} Sławiński, who is apparently aware of the danger of confusion, insists that the system exists only in any moment of writing and that "the system of norms, which we can reconstruct, does not exist above a given group of works, as an ideal order, but between (italics Sławiński's) the works creating the zone of their commonality, a field on which they are comparable."\textsuperscript{221} It is within such zones of relations which are not yet occupied by any existing work that new creative initiatives are possible.
The first of the oppositions mentioned above is between a supply of works which occupy spaces in the tradition making certain creative actions impossible and the potential relations which have been introduced into the tradition by those same works and make further creativity possible. Sławiński calls such a class of potential relations a literary norm. The dynamics of the tradition are a result of the fact that even as a work actualizes an existing norm it also reveals new relations between existing works and thereby creates a new norm. The same dynamics also apply to the partial systems (genres or groups of norms) in the tradition. The individual works and the partial systems are for Sławiński "thickenings" (gęstości) in the tradition, "dynamic equilibriums," which can be easily disturbed. By disturbing these "thickenings" in order to create a new one of its own, each act of creativity rearranges both the partial systems and the works from the past. To a modern poet a work from the Baroque may seem more contemporary, more of a source of creative possibilities, than a work of nineteenth century positivism. This was the third of Sławiński's oppositions. The works from the past which are not valued at a given time do not disappear from the tradition forever but rather sink into the "large memory" of the tradition from where they can be recalled, provided their physical existence is maintained, if the need should arise. A discussion
of how this can happen requires a consideration of the relations between the levels of literary communication which have been discussed so far.

Literary culture is an "orientational system" designed to pick out the works within the literary tradition which are suitable for the members of the literary public which shares the given literary culture. Sławiński writes that its three elements (knowledge, taste and competence) pick out within the literary tradition, respectively: individual works, classes of privileged works and possibilities for further performances. Such a grouping of elements of the tradition is for Sławiński a literary convention.

The conventions which are in use by the different levels of literary culture at a given time in history are the "operational memory" of the literary tradition. At any moment (one wonders whether Sławiński should say at most times) there is within the literary tradition a "key tradition" (tradycja kluczowa) which dominates the "operational memory" of the tradition. Every level of the literary culture must react to it. The "key tradition" both ensures the unity of the tradition and blocks further development because of its "extra-temporal matter-of-factness" (ponadczasowa oczywistość). This is where the relations of which Sławiński's system is composed assure continued historical development. As I have said
above, the literary tradition, even the key tradition, exists only when someone is actually using it. However, each use reveals new relations between works and introduces at least a minimal change in the tradition. Even the most stable "thickenings" in the tradition will eventually rearrange themselves. This process is accelerated by the fact that writers and readers sometimes bypass the operational memory and draw on the resources of the large memory. As a result, the relativity of the key tradition is eventually revealed and its place taken by another one. At the pole of his literary sociology which is occupied by the literary tradition Sławiński has installed a permanent artistic avant-garde mechanism, thereby ensuring continual artistic creativity. 230

The same is true of the other pole of his system. The literary culture and literary life serve to join together social individuals and literary works. There is a one-to-one correspondence between levels of the literary public and the groups of literary conventions created by literary culture. However, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between social groups and the levels of the literary public. Since it is here that the transition from social to literary behavior is made, different members of the same social group may join different literary publics. 231 For literary purposes, 21-year-old male carpenters may have more in common with 21-year-old female
college students than with 50-year-old male carpenters. This flexibility seems to accurately reflect social reality. It also leaves the artistic process open at the other end as well. There is no social determinant capable of closing it off. In Figure 7 I have summarized the preceding discussion into a schematic form. The reader should note the number of factors which would have to be the same for two acts of reading or writing to coincide. Change is inevitable given such a view of the historical and social situation of literature. (See Figure 7 on the next page.)

In Sławiński's sociology and history of literature the source of the creativity which causes that change is individual human activity. The open tradition and the open social determinants only offer the possibility for the actions which individuals must undertake if the literary tradition is to continue to exist. There are in Sławiński's account three roles for the individuals to perform: author, critic and reader. I will discuss the role of the critic briefly along with that of the scholar in the next chapter. First, however, I would like to discuss how Michał Głowiański's work on the reception of literary works and Janusz Sławiński's study of the role of the author as an entity in the historical literary process reveal the creative possibilities offered by the presence of the various levels in the social and historical situation of literature.
Figure 7: The Horizontal Relations of Literary Sociology.
Michał Głowiński has studied the role of the reader in literary history and communication in his book *Styles of Reception*.233 Głowiński defines the literary work as a "sphere of tensions" in which the literary conventions which the author built into the work conflict with those of the reader who is trying to understand it. Głowiński shows how, since the presuppositions and connotations of the author and the reader must inevitably disagree, there will always be some conflict.234 This conflict is, although Głowiński does not say so, a new definition of what Roman Jakobson once called the poetic function. Głowiński both sketches out the places where one could go to look for evidence of how literary works have been read and also lists the seven styles of which he is aware: 1) a mythical style which reads the work as a source of religious faith; 2) an allegorical style which reads the work as a two-layer construction whose lower level always contains the true, "deeper" meaning; 3) a symbolic style which is somewhat similar to the allegorical except that it believes the meanings are always fluid, ill-defined and open; 4) an instrumental style which reads the work as a source of guidelines for practical activity; 5) a mimetic style which relates the work not to a "world-view" but to "reality"; 6) an expressive style which reads the work as an expression of its author's personality and 7) an autotelic, aestheticizing style which reads the work only as a source
of beauty, form or recreation.\textsuperscript{235}

Głowiński may have collapsed several styles into his seventh style, but his studies have outlined an important source of change within the literary situation. Every time the dominant reading style changes, all of the conventions, norms and works within the literary tradition will have to be regrouped. Furthermore, since the styles which Głowiński has outlined are quite obviously related to the larger social needs of the readers, any social or historical change has the potential for bringing about a change in the reading styles and thereby, ultimately, in the literary tradition as well. In addition, the individual reader has, depending on the number of styles in his literary culture, considerable choice and creative potential in the use which he or she will make of the tradition as it exists at a given time. Each such creative use changes the tradition at least minimally. If authors wish to be read, they will have to adjust their writing habits to the new state of the tradition. Moreover, since each author is also a reader, he acquires much of his knowledge of the existing literary conventions as a result of his own reading styles. The role which the author plays in the literary tradition and his motivations for doing so have been studied by Janusz Sławiński.

Sławiński considers the role of the author in the article "Thoughts on the Topic: The Biography of the
Writer as an Entity in the Historical Literary Process."236 Sławiński describes the writer as the artistic self which takes advantage of and thereby continuously produces the regroupings of the elements of the literary tradition. In this article as in many others Sławiński takes a new position in relation to one of the traditional problems of literary scholarship and in so doing reestablishes a traditional methodology on a new basis. In this case he is considering the question of the role of the author as a personality in literary history and to a lesser extent in the work as well.237 The procedure is similar to that used in Sławiński's work on sociology. The two extreme approaches, that the author as a "Great Soul" has no place in literary scholarship and that the "soul" of the author is the controlling force in the work and in literary history, are reconciled by asserting that the artistic self, the work and literary history must be studied in relation to each other.

In this article more clearly than in his other studies, Sławiński presents his view of the importance of the tenacious "I" in literary history. Sławiński justifies the study of literary biography by asserting that for the author there is little or no distinction between literature and personal biography. Everything which happens to the writer is potentially material for his writing and his texts are structured fragments of the flow of his life.
In fact, the author's existence is largely determined by the twin realities of his historical social situation. In order to write he must continually interact with the literary tradition, and in order to fulfill the social role of author he must continuously interact with literary life. These are the aspects of the author's "life space," as Sławiński calls it, which are the proper subject matter for literary biography. They are the "bottleneck" (wąskie gardło) through which all the details of the author's life and psychology must pass before becoming a part of literary scholarship.238

The most important part of the article for an overall understanding of Sławiński's literary scholarship is, however, the section in which he describes the relationship between biography and history. This section of the study is a sketch for a theory of human consciousness.239 I will discuss it in more detail in the conclusion. At this point in my discussion it is necessary to describe only one aspect of Sławiński's view of consciousness.

Sławiński summarizes his discussion of biography in the following paragraph:

It is easy to notice that the list of oppositions composed above reveals a certain regularity. On one side we have the series: individuality, eventfulness, the small time of history, documentariness, distinctivity; on the other such (a series): typicality, a comprehensive strategy of life activity (personality), the large time of history,
legendariness, instrumentality. In the commonality of the elements making up the first series mostly variable moments are decisive, like singularity, concreteness, particularity, diachronicity. In the second an analogous role falls to factors of wholeness, systemicity and potentiality. We will say then that the second series represents various dimensions of the biographic langue; while the first represents diverse dimensions of the biographic paroles.240

In the above passage Sławiński has described the oppositions underlying both his own work and his own understanding of structure. The first series is human consciousness itself: singular, concrete, particular and historical in nature, awash in the small events of its own existence. The second series is the forms or structures that consciousness projects and creates in interaction with others. Those forms and structures provide the wholeness and potential for longer duration which the self needs for its existence. The artistic consciousness also requires them if it is to create. However, as the discussion of the key tradition has shown, if those forms congeal into a logos, they make creativity, in Sławiński's sense of the term,241 impossible. His sociology of literary communication is designed to provide the artistic self with the levels it needs in order to have the combination of space, choice, structure and material which artistic creativity, in Sławiński's opinion at least, requires. In his article on literary biography Sławiński brings the "Great Soul" of Rymkiewicz's passage under the control of the changing
relations of the literary tradition in order to give the artistic self of other times the necessary space in which to operate. It is a space which is necessary for writers, critics and readers. In the continuous process of artistic creativity there is a certain immortality for all. This process makes the aesthetic openendedness of Ślawiński's literary sociology somewhat like the ostranenie of Viktor Šklovskij. The external world becomes aesthetic material for the activities of the artistic self. The inclusion of authors, readers, texts and non-literary reality makes his methodology similar to that of the formalist eclectics.

In the following figure I have summarized the levels of Ślawiński's literary sociology and history from the perspective of the self which uses them. The dotted lines indicate the fluidity of the borders. The artistic self can make its way up through the levels to work with the material of external reality or some force from external reality can work its way down to define the self. The levels and constant regroupings in Ślawiński's system are designed to keep the process in motion by preventing either the artistic self or the structures of the various levels from ever assuming a final form. It is the constant moving back and forth which is the basis for literary history. It is the presence of both consciousness and social and historical structures which make both art and scholarship possible. In any act of creativity the self
projects itself into all the levels of the system; while the levels simultaneously acquire a real historical existence. This act moves the entire system along the diachronic axis. The implication of Sławiński's literary sociology and history is that at the center of each act of literary communication there is an artistic self saying, "I'm here. This is my creative consciousness," and then pulling back to hide in its layers of form (see Figure 8).

By introducing individual acts of human consciousness into structuralist literary history and setting that history in a social context, Janusz Sławiński's theoretical writings provide a general outline for the type of social history of literature whose desirability was described at the end of Part II of this study. Sławiński's solution allows literature and the individual authors, readers and critics who create it to use their social situation as material for their aesthetic activity. In this manner it also provides an alternative both to the determinism of any use of the projective method and to the total relativism of Derrida's deconstructionism. Sławiński's alternative is based on an eclectic ontology which allows for the existence both of acts of consciousness and of the external framework whose general position at a given moment in history controls the relations set into motion by those acts. In the next chapter I will describe some
Figure 8: The Levels of Literary Communication, Social or Individual Literary Consciousness, and Literary History.
of the possibilities which this situational theory of literature provides for and some of the limitations it places on the reading and interpretation of individual literary texts.
CHAPTER V

THE INTERPRETATION AND COMMUNICATIVE LEVELS OF THE LITERARY TEXT

When I heard the learn'd astronomer,
When the proofs, the figures, were ranged in columns before me,
When I sitting heard the astronomer
when he lectured with much applause in the lecture room,
How soon unaccountable I became tired and sick,
Till rising and gliding out I wandered off by myself,
In the mystical moist night-air, and from time to time,
Look'd up in perfect silence at the stars.

Walt Whitman\textsuperscript{243}

In the preceding chapter I have shown how, partly to overcome the sterilizing effects of the Stalinist logos, Janusz Sławiński created a sociology of literature which, due to its communicative levels, allowed for the maximum expression of creativity on the part of the artistic self. It did this both by providing the artistic self with material from various levels of social reality and by so defining that material as to make choice and therefore conscious creativity possible. Sławiński spoke of these choices as structural possibilities. They were provided both by the social situation and by the historical development of literature. The central motivating forces
in both cases were the individual personalities fulfilling their roles as either writers or readers of literature. At the end of the chapter I described an article in which Sławiński seemed to suggest that the self which was making these choices was human consciousness itself. In conclusion, I presented a figure which was designed to show the levels of consciousness or communication in Sławiński's overall system.

The problem caused by this emphasis on human activity is that any literary scholarship which builds that much choice into its overall view of literature and introduces that many factors into literary reality is bound to run the risk of total relativism. This is not necessarily a problem. A controlled relativism may be the purpose of Sławiński's scholarship since it would offer the greatest possibility for different types of study and tolerance of competing methodologies. The problem is how to bring that tolerance under the control of some general conceptual framework. In Sławiński's work the greatest potential problem, or opportunity for future development if one wishes to view it optimistically, is the nature of the literary text.

All of the literary scholarships which I described in the earlier parts of the study relied, if they wished to interpret literary texts, on some cognitive transformation to produce a coherent interpretation of the
literary text. Such interpretations required some means of selecting among the infinite features which the text presents as it appears in consciousness. In analyzing the literary public, however, Sławiński placed the critic, the one most likely to produce such a transformation in the middle of the literary process. In this chapter I am going to describe the studies in which Sławiński denies the literary scholar the fixed observational position which he would require in order to replace the critic as a source of interpretations. We are therefore left with the levels of social consciousness. The logical question is: what will become of the study and interpretation of the literary text if it is seen as an object, fact or entity in social consciousness?

Janusz Sławiński himself provided the answer to that question when he wrote in the introduction to Work, Language, Tradition.

... the sociology of literature [italics Sławiński] is now the discipline which, endeavouring to explain the mechanisms of literary communication, is transforming by stages - often unknowingly - our ideas on the theme of "the ontological status" of the work. It is getting us accustomed to the thought that the work as a creation which functions socially - is not only an object (semiotic) with a fixed internal order, but in equal measure a situation, not only a structure, but to no less a degree a field.
One of the hazards facing any theory linking form or structures and consciousness is it that it may lose the connection and move to one extreme or the other. When Sławiński writes of the openness of the literary text his emphasis on structural relations could lead him in the direction of Jacques Derrida's deconstructionism. The role of consciousness, or the "tenacious I," as the motivating force in literary history and social relations could become the intersubjective consciousness of Martin Heidegger. As I suggested at the end of the last chapter, Janusz Sławiński's eclecticism has allowed him to avoid either extreme position.

The primary reason is that his notion of intersubjectivity and of the relationship between form and consciousness has been shaped by the writings of Roman Ingarden and Witold Gombrowicz. In the philosophy of both men a literary form or work of art was both the product of and had a separate existence from the actions of an individual human consciousness. Such intersubjective forms both shape and are shaped by consciousness. As a result, there is no need for Sławiński to reduce the majority of structures in his world to either linguistic structures or to consciousness. His "thickenings" can acquire a separate existence and characteristics as sui generis systems produced by the requirements of their own social and historical situation. Sławiński's work, therefore,
involves only the exclusion or perhaps more exactly the abstraction\textsuperscript{248} of any force capable of determining the behavior of all types of structures, objects and subjects within the literary universe. Because his work contains structures and activities of different kinds he is able to place the relativity inherent in his view of literature within a larger social context. In this chapter I will examine his view of the role which critics and historians of literature play in the interpretation of individual literary texts and then briefly describe the communicative levels which the communicative situation creates in the literary text itself.

One of the traditional sources of interpretations of literary texts is literary criticism. Sławiński presents literary criticism as a \textit{sui generis} social activity arising out of the need for a social institution which is capable of maintaining contact between authors, works and readers.\textsuperscript{249} He derives four functions for literary criticism from the elements of its social situation:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Element of the Social Situation</th>
<th>Corresponding Function</th>
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<tr>
<td>a definite literary fact (works, group of works, creative work of an author)</td>
<td>cognitive-evaluational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a group of postulates which make a &quot;projection&quot; for a literary fact (a literary program directed at the author)</td>
<td>postulative</td>
</tr>
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the public and institutions of literary life (proposals and techniques for the reading of books) operational

the means, tasks and institutions of criticism itself (self-analysis) metacritical

Sławiński asserts that each function occurs simultaneously in every critical statement. It is the combination of functions and not the dominance of any particular function which is characteristic of literary criticism as a specific scholarly activity. Each of the components is necessary if one accepts the analysis of literary sociology and history presented in the last chapter. The cognitive-evaluative function serves to identify and place a value on any new groupings which have appeared in the literary tradition. The postulative program provides the author with an understanding of what literary norms his works must embody if he wishes to be understood. The operational function enables the public to identify and understand works. The metacritical function enables literary criticism to ensure that its own methods are working properly.

The fact that criticism is necessary does not mean that all criticism is useful. Sławiński describes the properly functioning critical statement as an "excess of information," the "redundancy" which is necessary if the
individual work is to make it through the "noise" of the social realm of uncertainty and be properly received by readers. However, a postulative institutional criticism can prevent literary communication by juxtaposing itself between authors and readers and drowning out the literary signal. 252 This is a particularly harmful occurrence in Ślawiński's system because, as the discussion in the last chapter showed, works continue to exist within the "operational memory" of the tradition only as long as they are within the "horizon of expectations" of the literary public. Scholarly literary criticism is, at least partially, a creative act which re-creates or renders (odtworczość) the existing, or potentially existing, works within the tradition, thereby making them accessible to the members of the literary public. 253 Ślawiński does not mention teaching in his article on literary criticism but his article "Literature in the School: Today and Tomorrow" suggests that he feels the same way about teaching. 254 The only difference between such critical interpretation and the historical interpretation which many people see as the only true scholarly criticism is that historical interpretation evaluates the work within its "maternal context" (macierzysty kontekst) while critical interpretation often relates the work to another context, either that of the critic or that of the literary public.
These two factors, the creative element at the basis of critical and historical interpretation and the relating of a work to its historical context, reappear in a more developed form in Janusz Sławiński's most extensive study of literary interpretation, "The Analysis, Interpretation and Evaluation of the Literary Work." I will discuss this article in some detail because it shows how Sławiński has been able to accept and provide a methodological account of the presence of relativity at the core of his discipline. It is this tolerant distance toward relativity which makes his work an alternative to the Denis Donoghue - Geoffrey Hartman dispute or the linguistic structuralism - deconstructionism logjam described in Part I of this study. It is also a position which, in the conclusion of this study, will allow me to propose possible answers from the perspective of Sławiński's work to the internal and external crises of literary scholarship.

Sławiński's study is devoted to a methodological analysis of the role of the individual literary work in the scholarly activity of the historian of literature. There are, according to Sławiński, two basic problems facing the literary historian: 1) He is unable to create a history which is not based on his own historical existence; and 2) The historical categories and the large scale classifications which are the goal of literary
history lead the historian away from the very individual works which they have been developed to describe. These are for Sławiński the irresolvable paradoxes at the core of literary history. 257

These paradoxes originate in the social situation of the literary historian. He is, after all, both a reader and a scholar of literature. As a reader, he is bound by the norms and conventions of the literary culture of which he is a member. 258 There is no way for him to escape from the most basic classification of works into readable and unreadable which is at the basis of any literary culture. 259 As a scholar, he is forced to form rational structures of thought which assign works their place in literary history. However, this rational historical position is equivalent neither to his own reading of the work nor to that of any other reader. Sławiński concludes that the theories which speak of scholarly reading or interpretation of works as simply an "intensified reception" (wzmocżony odbiór) 260 have failed to take into account the fact that reading and scholarship are different activities, each with its own procedures and goals.

The purpose of the literary historian is to break the work down into the historical series of which it is composed, literary movements, genres, the development of a particular stylistic device, the history of a particular type of character, etc. The reader, on the other hand,
views the work as a totality, not as a "bunch of 'aspects'" but as "integrated complexes of sense." As a result, Sławiński concludes, individual literary works are the "black holes" of the historical literary process. The literary historian must take them into account if he is to describe the literary universe, but he can never enter into direct communication with them. This definition of the literary work is similar to the presence of the "thickenings, densities" (gęstości) in the literary tradition itself, which were described in the last chapter. The individual literary work has become for Sławiński a field of centrifugal forces from within whose interiority the rest of the universe and other aspects of history fade from view.

One can assume that the creative impulse (pierwio- stek twórczy) at the basis of all literary interpretation is the force which the reader of a work or the original author must supply in order to set those forces into motion. Within the literary tradition a work or genre, or other group or norms, remains in motion as long as it is part of the 'operational memory' of the tradition. If it is not renewed by the creative impulses of authors, critics or readers, it will dissipate into the 'large memory' of the tradition. This view of the literary work and the literary tradition is the reason for Sławiński's insistence that literary criticism and didactics are
integral parts of literary scholarship. It is on the basis of this understanding of the literary text that Sławiński discusses the problems encountered in the analysis, interpretation and evaluation of the literary work. He begins with a description of analysis, the procedure which breaks the text as an integral whole down into its component parts so that it can then be related to an interpretative context or a group of interpretative contexts. Analysis itself consists of a description of the levels of the text and, usually, of the type of organization which joins those levels. There are now, according to Sławiński, four competing conceptions of the structure of the literary work:

1. a conception - the most traditional-operating with the distinction between content and form;
2. a tectonic conception which has two influential and principally different embodiments: Ingarden's idea of the work as a four layered formation and the theory of the work which has been formed on the basis of structural poetics (it is, moreover, far from uniform) and whose model is the linguistic manner of viewing the structure of the utterance (text);
3. The phenotype/genotype conception which treats the work as a whole which is dualistic in essence: concealing behind the individual combination of "visual" traits and elements a combination of norms and rules through which the work is connected with the historical literary process;
4. a conception which treats the work as a particular type of communicative situation describing its system in terms of "point of view," sender and receiver, "dialogical nature," personal relations, etc.265
The last two conceptions are the ones on which Sławiński has based his own work. He is therefore indicating that both his own method and those of which he is aware are unable to solve the paradoxes of the literary historian. On the level of analysis there are two particular problems: 1) If we only describe the levels of the text, then the text has no unity, but if we describe the transition from level to level, then the characteristics of the individual levels disappear from consciousness; and 2) There is no convincing solution of the "bilingualism" of the text (it has in Sławiński's opinion both linguistic and non-linguistic levels) and, therefore, no satisfactory treatment of the meaning of a work. Sławiński insists that we still have not been able to decide where in a work, if anywhere, the meaning is located.

The purpose of analysis is to break the text down into levels and elements which can be related to the interpretative contexts of literary history. This is why implicit ontological decisions such as the assumption that all the elements of the work are linguistic, semiotic or social can lead to the unconscious exclusion of entire sets of interpretative contexts. The work which has been placed within the interpretative contexts of literary history exists for Sławiński in a peculiar state of presence
and non-presentation as a place for the intersection of interpretative contexts and not as a totality. Sławiński calls this state the "reality of interpretation." 270

Since the literary historian is rarely satisfied with this present/non-present work, the most common step is to attempt a return to "the lost first reading of the work." 271 However, whenever this is attempted, all the "problematic nature of meaning, newness and surprise" which are characteristic of the work itself return. 272 For Sławiński this new historical interpretation is based on the same creative element as any other critical interpretation and therefore has no more claim to universality than any other act of reading. He reasons that if there were a "proper non-relational and indivisible sense of the work" it would be a "mystery, riddle or secret" which could only be experienced in silence. 273 Any attempt to communicate that secret becomes a poetic act which must inevitably substitute another utterance for the text itself and can represent only an infinite process if it is not to displace the text. Sławiński concludes that such an act,

... feeds not on the primal opaqueness of the text but on a text which has been stripped into pieces, illuminated and categorized (rozebranym, rozjaśnionym; skategoryzowanym). Although it has its point of departure in a text which is already subdued (zawładnięty), it endeavours to re-cognize (odpoznać) a sense which offers resistance to understanding and is thus independent (niepodległy).
In undertaking such a task it leaves in a rather definitive manner the territory of the history of literature. 274

The prefix "re-" (Polish od-) which appeared in the verb 'recognize' (odpoznać) recurs throughout Sławiński's description of the reader's relationship with the literary text. Critical interpretation is a recreation (odtwórczość) of the text. 275 The sophisticated reading of the scholar is a re-playing (odgrywanie) of the lost innocence of the unsophisticated reading of the literary text. 276 The article under discussion was justified at the conference where it was originally read as an attempt to lead the historian of literature into "a state of regained innocence" (odzyskanej niewinności). 277 The same prefix also is used both to describe evaluation as a response (odpowiedź) to the values which an evaluating language has made "audible" for the individual reader of the work and to assert that a work can acquire different values as it goes through the "rereadings" (odczytania) of which its history is composed. 278 The presence of these "rereadings" leads Sławiński to conclude that any final evaluation of a literary work must be as flawed as any attempt at a final interpretation. 279 We may conclude based on Sławiński's general position in this and his other articles that the same is true about the life work of another man or woman and of entire literary, critical and scholarly traditions.
They can be judged negatively, as the passage quoted below indicates, only to the extent to which they have projected their own subjective contexts into an external form which is used to deny the validity of other subjective contexts.

The effect which such a procedure had (or could have had if it were not for the existence of the humanities and other social institutions) on Polish society during the time of the Stalinist logos was described in Chapter II. It is not surprising, given this experience, that a scholar such as Sławiński makes the following statement, "One could risk the following thesis: in the case of historical literary evaluations, it is less important, whether they refer back to the maternal language of values of the work, than whether they actualize a language of values which is in some measure foreign (obcy) to the literary culture of the scholarly subject." Since such "foreign" languages of values are in effect evaluative contexts with the same status as the interpretative contexts described above, Sławiński believes that a "final" evaluation is appropriate only within literary criticism, even as a "final" interpretation of the text is possible only in our private reading, that is, as activities within the historical social context of our own literary culture. The literary historian, in his role as historian, can provide neither "final" interpretations nor "final" evaluations.
Scholarly languages must exist, however, in order to make possible whatever dialogue is possible between different literary cultures. Since such cultures are composed of various historical, social and individual contexts, a scholarly language cannot be based solely on the scholar's individual subjective context. If the scholarly interpretation and evaluation of literary texts ultimately depend on the scholarly language which makes them possible, which makes the text "readable" and "analyzable" and the values "audible," then that language must be based on the input of as many subjective contexts as possible. It is only this intersection of subjective contexts which allows literary scholarship to increase, rather than to decrease, the amount of choice and the possibilities for creative activity present within society. Sławiński's argument that literary historians should "regain their innocence" is, we may conclude, based on the following assumptions:

1) Methodological analysis and the creation of literary theories can never provide us with absolute criteria for or with absolute knowledge of literature; but, the former can make us aware of our own social-historical situation and the latter can allow us to talk about it;

2) Neither of the above activities can have any meaning unless it is based on the literary history,
literary criticism and private aesthetic experiences which make us aware of the "black holes" and larger patterns present in the literary universe.

This is the methodological argument for the eclectic nature of literary scholarship. Janusz Sławiński's literary scholarship is, in the terms I used earlier in this study, a methodological theoretical eclecticism. From this eclectic perspective the theoretical and methodological dispute described in Part I as the internal crisis in the humanities is a conflict between extreme positions: those which assert the absolute existence of the structures on which scholarly thought is based (Donoghue, linguistic structuralism) and those which assert the absolute relativity of all thought (Derrida, Hartman). Sławinski could argue that both those structures and relativity itself have only a relative social and historical existence.

A line of reasoning which justifies his position may be phrased as follows: Scholars are conscious. Through their creative and rational activity "thickenings or densities" (gęstości) appear in their consciousness. Some of the gęstości arrange themselves into patterns, and, when a creative element is applied become "dark holes" of "readable" and "audible" centrifugal forces. Since no one can prove that these patterns and forces do not exist, any scholar is entitled to accept their existence within the span of his or her own social and historical existence.
The development and communication of the patterns is the basis for literary history and theory. The centrifugal forces are the result of the creative interpretation and private reading of literary texts. The creation and communication of their presence is the purpose of literary criticism. In order to prevent scholars from forcing their individual consciousnesses on each other, and to protect literary scholarship against the intrusions of other disciplines, it is necessary to have a fully developed literary methodology. Because there is no way of determining where these patterns and presences come from other than by an ideological decision or an act of faith, it is best for literary scholarship to remain as eclectic as possible. The only social purpose of literary scholarship is to see that the play of patterns and forces is continued. This requires not only all of the activities described above but also an acceptance of our own limitations.

Sławiński has expressed this controlled relativity in the following manner, "it is not enough to state the impurity of all research procedures. It is, in addition, necessary to distinguish between them. The fact that certain procedures are selected and then realized provides no refuge at all from the subjectivity of the researcher."\textsuperscript{283} It follows, therefore, that, in a healthy
literary scholarship, the members of the scholarly community must understand both the limitations of their own activities and the usefulness of those of the other members of the scholarly community. This is the practical justification for eclecticism which I will make in the first part of the conclusion.

As the discussion in Chapter IV showed, it is not only literary scholarship but literature as well which appears in Sławiński's writings as a play with forms taking place between different human consciousnesses. This play, as it is manifested in social interaction, results in the formation of different structures and levels in human social and historical reality. Within Polish scholarship the literary text has been analyzed as composed of communicative levels on which this play or dialogue can take place. The original formulation of the problem was by Aleksandra Okopień - Sławińska.284

Aleksandra Okopień - Sławińska derived the personal relations within the literary text from the three basic personal roles available within any communicative situation: 1) the role of sender, the one who is speaking; 2) the role of receiver, the one who is being spoken to; and 3) the role of hero, the one who is being spoken about.285 The complexity of literary communication is a result of the fact that it takes place on two levels, extratextual and intratextual. On the extratextual level a real author
is sending a message to a real reader. Within the text a narrative persona, depicted characters and depicted and imaginary readers engage in intratextual communication. Within these levels the author and reader may assume different roles.

Okopień-Sławińska distinguishes the following extratextual roles: 1) The transmitter of the message is both a real author and a sender with the knowledge of literary conventions necessary to have created this particular text; 2) The receiver of the message is both a real reader and a member of the literary public with the literary conventions necessary to understand the given work. On the intratextual level there are three roles for senders: 1) the subject of the work, seen as the subjectivity whose presence holds the work together, (Rymkiewicz's "Great Soul"); 2) the major narrator or lyric subject; 3) a speaking character. There are equivalent roles for receivers of messages: 1) the subjectivity to whom the work is addressed; 2) the addressee of the narration or addressee of the lyric monologic, often actually referred to as 'you' in the work by the narrator; and 3) a character who is not speaking. 286

Aleksandra Okopień - Sławińska has done further work on the manner in which changes in these relationships help shape the semantic structure of the literary work. 287
For the purposes of a discussion of the methodological possibilities offered literary scholarship by structuralist humanism, the importance of her work rests on the fact that each of these roles has a different ontological status and can therefore enter into relations with and introduce into the literary text material from different levels of social reality. It is for this reason that the literary text can be presented as a field of relations which is both controllable and analyzable through the assumption of different observational positions within and in relation to the literary text. From each position a different set of relations emerges. I have summarized the available positions in the following diagram (see Figure 9). I have added to Okopień-Sławińska's roles the role of the scholar of literature as described by Sławiński in the articles discussed above.288

The problem for someone trying to understand Sławiński's methodology is that his theoretical eclecticism has also remained "theoretical" in the sense that, to the best of my knowledge, no Polish scholar has ever applied it in a complete, or nearly complete, description or interpretation of a literary text. The methodological possibilities have been opened up, but it remains to be seen whether any scholars will take advantage of them.289
The major reason why Sławiński's theoretical writings have not been applied in practice may well be that he places rather stringent limitations on the activities of the individual literary scholar. It is true, as I have said above, that his work reintroduces into the formalist-structuralist tradition many of the traditional problems of literary scholarship, including history, sociology, biography, criticism and evaluation. These are all areas of study which were either excluded from literary scholarship or at least de-emphasized by linguistic structuralism.  

However, in outlining a particular area for study Sławiński always places certain methodological restrictions on the manner in which a literary study of the problem can be conducted. These restrictions are not likely to appeal to those who have practiced the given activities beyond the range of structuralist scholarship. Even in the brief discussion of his work which I have presented in these two chapters it has become obvious that he has denied the historian not only the right to a final interpretation or evaluation of the literary work but also access to the work itself as a totality. He also denied the biographer the possibility of discussing an author's life and works in isolation from each other and removed the methodological justification from the direct application of psychoanalytic techniques to the study of either an individual work or a writer's life work. Both simple
Holds the entire work together in his consciousness. He contains all the historical-social levels described in Figure 8. His scholarly language is designed to control his own history, allow him to assume positions in the text and communicate what he has seen to others.

Author: a real person who for some reason decided to assume some combination of the positions described below. His decision may be studied as that of a real person under the direct influence of both non-literary forces and literary life.

Concrete reader: A real person who for some reason has decided to read the book. He may be studied as a real person under the influence of both non-literary forces and literary life.

Sender of the work: The space which the author occupies within the literary tradition. Knows the literary conventions with which the work was written. Member of a certain literary culture.

Receiver of the Work: Ordinarily a member of the literary culture whose conventions and reading styles decide how and whether the work will be read. If he is a literary historian, censor, publisher, school teacher or student, he may perform some other operation with it.

Subject of the work: The subjectivity or artistic self whose presence or ironic absence holds the work together (the "Great Soul").

Address of the Work: The subjectivity whose creative impulse is necessary to keep the work together. He has to assemble the impressions of the lower levels into a coherent whole. (May be normal reader or a literary critic?)

Main Narrator: Actual speaker of the narration. He may be an omniscient third person or a lyric self.

Address of the Narration: The reader who is often given a status in the work when the narrator asks him rhetorical questions. Forced to make decisions about what he encounters in the course of the work.

Speaking Character: Someone who is both depicted and assumes a speaking role. He may change places with the main narrator. Changes in the hierarchy of narrators keep the work in motion.

Non-speaking character: A position in which one is the object of another subjective context. Characters and narrators often move in and out of this position. The shape of the world within the work changes each time.

Figure 9: The Personal Roles or Observational Positions Within and in Relation to the Literary Work.
biography and psychoanalysis must first be passed through
the "bottleneck" of the literary life and culture of a
given historical and social situation. The same is true
of sociological study and also of the philosophical ideas
and linguistic structures present in a given work. 

Śląawinski's eclecticism is easy to misunderstand if
one does not realize that for him the literary work is a
verbal construction which allows us to create and recreate
within our consciousness an eclectic universe. There
is at the bottom of his theoretical writings on literature
a sense of wonder and even surprise at the simple fact that
the process continually works, that an individual con-
sciousness is able not only to create a universe out of
verbal material and experience but also to communicate it,
however imperfectly, to another consciousness. In
Śląawinski's writings the concept of structure is always
linked with notions of possibility and potentiality, while
literary convention, knowledge and taste are related to
the limitations which a social group places on creativity in
order to ensure its continued existence as a group. His
eclecticism is designed to maintain the creative potential
of the individual text and literary tradition and not to
allow the individual social groups of readers to use
texts for their own purposes. In other words, Śląawinski
does not suggest that scholars may study literary works
in any manner in which they choose but rather that a variety of clearly defined approaches are necessary to reveal the true complexity of a literary work.

Sławiński, therefore, insists that the literary work must be studied as a verbal structure. In his study "The Semantics of the Narrative Utterance" he wrote the following:

The soundness of interpretative endeavours can be evaluated according to various criteria. However, it is always appropriate to ask what kind of reality the object of interpretation is. In observing the research practices which are appearing, particularly within the theory and history of narrative genres, one can come to the conclusion that a departure (ucieczka 'flight') from the basic reality which is created by the fact of "existence in word" (istnienie w słowie) is a rather widespread phenomenon. Wholes whose existence (byt) has been somehow extricated from the maternal matter of the narrative transmission, wholes which have arisen as a result of some prior facticity of the utterance, are all too willingly made the object of interpretation. This procedure allows one to speak at length, for example, about the narrator as if he had a substantial existence beyond the narration and about his position in relation to the represented world as a cognitive or moralistic relationship without examining the circumstance that it is most of all a set of relations between definite entities of the narrative utterance.295

Sławiński continues to say that the term "fiction" is a much overused excuse for speaking about verbal constructs as if they were real people and objects in external reality and concludes that it is a term which
is as dangerous as it is ill-defined. He writes,

It indicates some immeasurably difficult to identify quasi-reality which is situated halfway between that which happens among the words and sentences of the narrative utterance and that which is the result of a translation, (a translation) which arranges the structure of the text (to correspond with) the terms of the cognitive, social, psychological and ethical experiences of the reader.

In fact, a great number of the conceptions which are espoused in the area of the theory of the novel are distinguished precisely by the fact that they deal with a work which has been summarized (streszczenia) (italics Sławiński's), that means reduced to a situation in which its single, continuous "being in word" (jednorazowe "bycie w słowie") becomes something neutral, interchangeable with other manners of existence which are equally extralinguistic (for example with film signs, theatrical signs, comics). Research procedures are carried out on a novel which is apprehended as an object of possible translations, which is reduced to a state in which it can be "told" (opowiedziana) in one way or another since it is no longer told (opowiedziana) in any concrete manner.296

The passages which I have just quoted were first published in 1967. They show that even then Sławiński had made the distinction between what he was later to call the text as a "dark hole" (here jednorazowe "bycie w słowie) and the text as related to its interpretative contexts (here "summarized" text). They also reveal the strong structuralist influence on his theoretical writings. In emphasizing the features which make his work different from that of the linguistic structuralists I have paid less attention to what connects him with the formalist-structuralist
tradition in Slavic literary scholarship. He shares with that tradition an emphasis on the literary aspects of literature, the assumption that literature has a verbal foundation (although in Sławiński's work it is capable of communicating nonverbal information as well) and the attempt to develop a single language for the description of all literary phenomena. Sławiński began his work under the influence of Jan Mukařovský and, although he has replaced Mukařovský's emphasis on social conventions with his own emphasis on the creative role of individual consciousness in literary communication, he has retained much of Mukařovský's general terminology and many of his concerns.

It is important, therefore, to realize that if Sławiński's research represents a return to the traditional eclecticism of literary scholarship, it is a post-structuralist tradition and a post-structuralist eclecticism. Sławiński has not so much rejected the methods of structuralism as assumed their validity and then moved on to a broader range of problems. His criticism of linguistic structuralism is based on a claim that it is not capable, or rather no longer capable, of accounting for the specifically literary features, the totality and the meaning of the literary work. This is a criticism which can be seen as coming from the structuralist tradition itself. One of the most interesting aspects
of his research is that by adding a traditional Polish emphasis on the role of consciousness in literature to the structuralist tradition he has, as his own theory would predict, rearranged the existing tradition and opened up possibilities for further research which once seemed closed.

These possibilities have appeared not only in the area of future theoretical research but also in the history of the formalist-structuralist tradition itself. From the perspective provided by Sławiński's writings linguistic structuralism does not seem to be either the only scientific literary scholarship or the only structuralism. By rejecting the projective method Sławiński has shown it to be only one of the possible methods which literary scholarship may choose. In combining an emphasis on the verbal nature of the literary work with an insistence that the verbal material is historical and social in nature and owes its existence to individual acts of human consciousness, Sławiński has shown that interpretative and evaluative activities must take into account the historical and social context of the men and women who are doing the interpreting and evaluating. However, in so doing, he has both denied the possibility of a final interpretation or evaluation of the literary work and of any cognitive transformation (see Figure 1) capable of accounting for the work in its jednorazowe "bycie w słowie."
In the study of interpretation described above Sławiński explained this limitation as a result of the historical social situation of the literary historian. He has also explained it as a result of the structure of the literary work itself. In order to link the "summarized" work with the work as it exists in word Sławiński introduced the category of "large semantic figures," large unities within the work such as an individual character, time, place, space, objects in external reality, narrative persona, etc. These large semantic figures have their existence only in the narrative flow (i.e., verbal material) of the text, but they are not linguistic categories. They are a superorganization or excess of organizing (nadorganizacja, nadmiar zorganizowania) which is, one may conclude, created or re-created within the narrative flow by any individual consciousness which actualizes the norms, classifications and roles of its literary tradition and social historical situation. Sławiński calls this "interference of the large semantic figures" in the narrative flow the autotelic or poetic function of the narrative utterance. The semantic figures are realized simultaneously, overlapping and conflicting with each other as the flow continues. Sławiński asserts that because of this "the sequence of sentences mobilizes a many-planed semantic action," which is marked by a constant
interaction between two primary planes of semantic units: those which create the narrated world and those which form the narrative situation. In other words, between the objects, space, time and subjects depicted in the work and the personal roles (described in Figure 9) which are creating them.

The true complexity of the literary work's structure, in Sławiński's understanding of it, becomes apparent only when we realize that each of the roles described in Figure 9 also contains within itself, at least in potential, all of the levels depicted in Figure 8. Sławiński's version of the dialogical nature of the literary work is an oscillation in consciousness between the different worlds and narrative situations projected on the narrative flow by the different selves, intra- and extra-textual, who are trying to actualize within the work their own individual historical social situations.302 If the work is to take shape, to be re-created, then the reader must introduce his own consciousness into the dialogue. This is what Sławinski called the "creative impulse" at the bottom of every literary interpretation. The author had to do the same when he created the text. The text, therefore, becomes a field or a situation within which a dialogue between consciousnesses can take place (see Sławinski's statement on p. 359).
For a scholar who accepts Sławiński's point of view, the situational status of the literary work makes the use of the projective method as the basis for literary scholarship impossible. The following line of reasoning reveals why this is so. We may assume from Sławinski's comments on the literary tradition that the literary work has only a potential existence outside of, i.e. when it is not in use by, an individual human consciousness (see p. 342). Since, however, every such use changes the tradition and the work, at least minimally (see Figure 8), no two readings of the work will ever actualize exactly the same structure. It is also the case that no two states of consciousness, even of the same consciousness, will ever be exactly the same. Therefore, no final interpretation or evaluation is possible. Any interpretative or evaluative operation can only be conducted on the basis of historical social relations between traditions, selves and works which have been in different states in the past and will be in different states in the future. Furthermore, if I may refer the reader back once more, if only in memory, to Figure 1, no cognitive transformation can achieve anything but a description of the analytic level or levels of the work which its own ontological assumptions have isolated. It can never perceive the work-in-itself (to use Kant's term) since that work as a totality exists
only as a "dark hole" of centrifugal forces in the infinite
flow of an individual human consciousness. Sławiński's
eccentricity may be the only thing which prevents his
scholarship from becoming trapped in a world consisting
only of consciousness itself. One might even (as Sławiński
often says) "risk the hypothesis" that in Sławiński's view
of literature and human existence the self, or individual
human consciousness, can become conscious of its own exist-
ence as more than a potentiality only by discovering with-
in consciousness and creatively rearranging objects,
structures and forces which are not, or do not seem to be, its
own creation. In the first chapter of the conclusion
I will consider one perspective which Sławiński's work
provides on the nature of literary scholarship. In the
second I will consider its implications for the external
"crisis" of the humanities.
NOTES: PART III


3 Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, Insatiability, trans. Louis Iribarne (Urbana, 1977), 64. In the body of the text I have given the year in which the novel was written, 1927. It was first published in 1930. Louis Iribarne, "Translator's Introduction", Witkiewicz, Insatiability, xxii.

4 Witkiewicz, Insatiability, 68-69.

5 Here, as elsewhere in the study, I am using the term scholarship in a broad sense which includes scholarly criticism as well as literary history and theory. In this sense of the term the writings of men such as Andrej Belyj and Vjačeslav Ivanov may be considered a part of Russian literary scholarship.

6 The existence of the term Neo-romanticism as a description of the general literary trends known as symbolism in Russian literature is important to this study because it shows that literary historians have often viewed the entire movement as a return to the techniques and preoccupations associated with romanticism. For just two examples see Julian Krzyžanowski, A History of Polish Literature, trans. by Doris Ronowicz (Warsaw, 1978), 451-560 and Dmitrij Čiževskij, Comparative History of the Slavic Literatures, trans. Richard Noel Porter, Martin P. Rice (Baltimore, 1971), 176-97.

7 The attempt to prove that rational thought was unable to perceive the essence of external reality was often
buttressed by the authority of Immanuel Kant, who was seen by Dmitrij Merežkovskij, for example, as the founder of positivism (Merežkovskij, "O pričinax", 9). As the discussion in the last chapter showed, positivism believed that it was perceiving the laws of reality by using the inductive projective method. It did not accept Kant's view. As Ewa Thompson has shown, Kant's work on aesthetics was interpreted by the symbolists, and by both Ernst Cassirer and herself, as a proof that art could provide a perception of certain ideal qualities not accessible to rational thought; Ewa Thompson, Russian Formalism and Anglo-American New Criticism: A Comparative Study (The Hague, 1971), 11-13. For a discussion of Kant's own position see Ralph C. S. Walker, Kant, The Arguments of the Philosophers (London, 1978), 136-75.

8 Merežkovskij, "O pričinax", 24. The line of poetry which begins the passage is from Fêdor Tjutčev's poem "Silentium". It's use by Merežkovskij emphasizes the return of the romantic vision of poetry in symbolism. The assertion that some aspects of literature can only be experienced in silence has returned in the writings of Janusz Slawiński (see p. 369).

9 The means for broadening the artistic impressionability was to "surprise" the reader by making connections in the artistic text which would strike the reader as "unexpected or rare". Merežkovskij, "O pričinax", 16.

10 Merežkovskij, "O pričinax", 10.


12 The leading theoretical writers of the second wave of Russian symbolism were Andrej Belyj (Simvolizm Moscow, 1910) and Vjaceslav Ivanov (Borozdy i Meţi; Opvty estetičeskie i kritičeskie Moskva, 1916). The aesthetic philosophy of the movement and the influence of Vladimir Solov'ëv on it is discussed in James West, Russian Symbolism: A Study of Vjačeslav Ivanov and the Russian Symbolist Aesthetic (London, 1970).
13 The influence of symbolism on futurism and formalism is mentioned in most accounts of the development of the latter two. For the influence of symbolism on futurism see Vahan D. Barooshian, Russian Cubo-Futurism 1911-1930; A Study in Avant-Gardism (The Hague, 1974), particularly the chapters on Velimir Xlebnikov (19-37) and David Burljuk (67-78). For the influence of symbolism on the formalists see Victor Erlich, Russian Formalism: History--Doctrine (New Haven, 1965), 33-42 and Thompson, Formalism, 15-16. Krystyna Pomorska shows how symbolist poetry used techniques similar to the formalist devices, Russian Formalist Theory and its Poetic Ambiance (The Hague, 1968), 51-76.

14 See his cryptic statement "The word is a thing" (Slovo -- več.) in the introduction to his collection of articles on prose, Viktor Šklovskij, O teorii prozy (Moskva, 1929), 5.

15 Barooshian has noted the influence of Valerij Brjusov's emphasis on the creative freedom of the artist on the futurist David Burljuk. (Cubo-Futurism, 67-78). Boris Engel'gardt has shown that the concept of the device cannot be justified without some material to offer resistance to the artistic devices; Engel'gardt, Formal'nyj metod v istorii literatury (Leningrad, 1927), 83-84.

16 Šklovskij, O teorii, 13.


19 It was natural for Šklovskij to become a theoretician and practitioner of the literature of the fact, a literature which attempted to use material taken directly from external reality as its subject matter; Viktor Šklovskij, "Literatura vne sjužeta", O teorii, 226-45.
This aspect of Šklovskij's professional activity was satirized by the Russian novelist Veniamin Kaverin; see Sheldon, "Introduction", xxii.

Thompson, Formalism.

Erlich, Russian Formalism, 99-117. As Erlich has shown, the Marxist criticisms which originally contributed to the further development of Formalist thought eventually became a rigid dogma which led to its destruction, at least temporarily, within Soviet scholarship.

Thompson, Formalism, 26-28, 75-76. It is also similar to Henri Bergson's theory of art as a means of "seeing" the essence of things. Thompson, Formalism, 66-67. Thompson correctly notes that Bergson's was a non-linguistic seeing. Henri Bergson, "Laughter" in Comedy (Garden City, 1956), 61-190.


The best indication of Šklovskij's futurism is probably his early article, "The Resurrection of the Word". Viktor Šklovskij, "Voskrešenie slova", in Texte der Russischen Formalisten, II, Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen Kunste, 6; 2 (München, 1972), 2-16.

Erlich, Russian Formalism, 118-39.

I have discussed only three methodological alternatives in the text. The situation is perhaps somewhat more
complex that that. Richard Sheldon, "Introduction", in describing Viktor Šklovskij's "device of ostensible surrender", has provided a convincing set of arguments for his position that Šklovskij never abandoned his original understanding of art. Jurij Tynjanov presents a special problem. Ewa Thompson groups him with Roman Jakobson (Thompson, Formalism, 97-103). However, his emphasis on the literary as opposed to the linguistic system makes his position closer to that of Jurij Lotman. The Medvedev-Baxtin-Vološinov group which has been claimed as a part of linguistic structuralism was never really a part of it; Krystyna Pomorska, "Mikhail Bakhtin and His Verbal Universe", PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature, 3 (1978) 379-86. For them the literary text was always a dialogue between the voices of individual and social consciousness. It was never a linguistic or a semiotic object. The differences are most clearly expressed in the books V. N. Vološinov, Marxism and The Philosophy of Language, trans. by Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik, Studies in Language, I (New York, 1973) and P. N. Medvedev, M. M. Bakhtin, The Formal Method in Literary Scholarship: A Critical Introduction to Sociological Poetics, trans. by Albert J. Wehrle, The Goucher College Series (Baltimore, 1978).

29

It is worth emphasizing one more time that Viktor Sklovskij's "failure" to close off the open-endedness was not a result of his intellectual weaknesses but rather a result of his belief that artistic freedom should not be controlled; Sheldon,"Introduction".

30

I have not been able to provide a detailed analysis of Slavic linguistic structuralism within in this study. It seems to me that many, if not all, of the major theoretical developments can be explained as choices among these alternatives. In American Slavistics linguistic structuralism has tended to combine with Anglo-American New Criticism to produce a series of linguistic and semiotic interpretations of literary texts studied in isolation as sui generis objects (alternative 2a). Alternative 2b has been chosen by the Soviet semioticians who have attempted to reconstruct the proto-texts of Slavic folklore. 2c has become the theory of the subtext as exemplified in the writings of Kiril Taranovsky. 2d is the literary system of Jurij Tynjanov, the cultural system of Jurij Lotman and the linguistic system of Roman Jakobson.
31
There is, perhaps, some distortion in Victor Erlich's account of the relationship between Viktor Žirmunskij and Russian Formalism. The real attack against his "academic eclecticism" came in the manifesto of what Ewa Thompson has called the neo-positivist trend in Russian Formalism (Thompson, Formalism, 87-110). This is the trend which later developed into the linguistic structuralism which the formalist eclectics were trying to resist. The dispute between the two groups was described by Erlich in his history of the movement, Russian Formalism, 94-96. Boris Engel'gardt published his study of the formal method in a series which was under the general editorship of Žirmunskij. The series, published by the Gosudarstvennyj Instytut istorii iskusstv, was called Voprosy poètiki.

32
The most coherent defense of the formal method is in Engel'gardt's study. Boris Eijzenbaum, however, reflected a similar point of view in his defense of formalism as a method and in his later studies of Tolstoy and literary mores. See Erlich, Russian Formalism, 125-29. Eijzenbaum's defense of the formal method is available in English as "The Theory of the 'Formal Method'" in Russian Formalist Criticism, Four Essays, trans. and intro. by Lee T. Lemon and Marion J. Reis, Regents Critics Series (Lincoln, 1965), 99-140.

33
Engel'gardt, Formal'nyj.

34
It is instructive that Jan Mukařovský and Janusz Sławiński, who can be seen as most continuing the tradition represented by formalist eclecticism, both work or worked in countries where Marxism was not an inflexible doctrine. In a sense, linguistic structuralism is a negative image of the positivist and even the Hegelian tendencies in Soviet Marxist thought. Positivism and Hegelianism can be joined in Soviet thought since they both represent an evolutionary determinism (see also Part III, Chapter II, Section B).

35
I have abstracted these warnings from the summary at the end of Engel'gardt's study (Formal'nyj, 105-114).

36
The foundation for Roman Jakobson's linguistic poetics was already present in his early statement that
"Poetry is language in its aesthetic function". Roman Jakobson, "Modern Russian Poetry: Velimir Khlebnikov (excerpts)" in Edward J. Brown, ed., Major Soviet Writers, Essays in Criticism (London, 1973), 58-82. The translation is of Jakobson's Новейшая русская поэзия (Nabrosok pervyj). Viktor Xlebnikov (Prague, 1921). The emphasis on art as a type of language was criticized at the start of the formalist movement by Viktor Žirmunskij in the article "Задачи поэтики", Научал, 1921, No. 1, 51-81 and by Boris Ejxenbaum in "Melodika stixa", Letopis' Doma Literaturor, 1921, No. 4 (reprinted in 1922 under the title Melodika russkogo liriceskogo stixa). Boris Engel'gardt, as I have just said above in the body of the text, also cautioned against the dangers inherent in such an approach.

Roman Jakobson has consistently defended his original position, most notably in "Linguistics and Poetics" in Style in Language, ed. Thomas A. Sebeok (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), 350-77 and "Поэзия грамматики и грамматика поэзии" in Poetics. Poëtyka. Poëtika. (Warszawa, 1961), 397-417. At the conference where the latter paper was read Roman Ingarden, in line with his consistent opposition to linguistic formalism and structuralism, insisted that artistic and aesthetic phenomena could not be explained solely on the basis of linguistic analysis; Roman Ingarden, "Poetik und Sprachwissenschaft", in Poetics, 3-9.

Within Anglo-American scholarship Victor Erlich has openly wondered about the aesthetic significance of all of the linguistic structures which Jakobson has detected in his analyses of individual poems (Victor Erlich, "Preface", in Russian Formalism, 14-15). The linguist Paul Werth has used an analysis of what he feels is the arbitrariness with which Jakobson locates linguistic structures within poetry as the basis for a criticism of Jakobson's linguistic methodology in general; Paul Werth, "Roman Jakobson's Verbal Analysis of Poetry", Journal of Linguistics, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1976 (Cambridge, Eng., 1976), 21-73. Jonathan Culler, by showing that the same linguistic features can be found in any piece of writing, including a newspaper clipping, has questioned both their objectivity and their status as the distinguishing characteristic of artistic texts; Jonathan Culler, "Jakobson and the linguistic analysis of literary texts", Language and Style 5:1 (1971), 53-66, and "Jakobson's Poetic Analyses" (Part I, Chapter III) in Jonathan Culler, Structuralist Poetics: Structuralism, Linguistics, and the Study of Literature (Ithaca, 1975), 55-74.

There have been numerous criticisms within French scholarship as well. As Robert R. Magliola has noted, Tsvetan Todorov (among others) has modified the linguistic basis of French structuralism, including an abandonment of
Michael Riffaterre ("Describing poetic structures: Two Approaches to Baudelaire's les Chats", in Structuralism, ed. by Jacques Ehrman Anchor Books Garden City, NY., 1970 , 188-229.) has proposed an alternative to Jakobson's analysis of Baudelaire's poem "Les Chats". Jacques Derrida's criticism of logosentrism is most applicable to Roman Jakobson's version of linguistic structuralism. He has devoted a study to a rebuttal of Husserl's theory of meaning which seems to be beneath Jakobson's linguistic structuralism (see Part III, footnote 84); Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena and Other Essays on Husserl's Theory of Signs, trans. and intro. by David B. Allison, Northwestern University Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (Evanston, 1973).

In German scholarship the centrality of the Jakobson position within the formalist-structuralist tradition has been deemphasized by both Jurij Striedter ("Einleitung" and "Zur formalistischen") and Wolf-Dieter Stempel ("Zur formalistischen Theorie der poetischen sprache", in Texte der Russischen Formalisten, II, 1972, ix-liii) in their introductions to German translations of formalist and structuralist articles. This is in line with their general advocacy of an aesthetics of reception.

More detailed criticisms have been developed by Siegfried Schmidt and Jens Ihwe who wish to develop a scientific theory of literature based on the analysis of textual and not linguistic structure. S. Schmidt, Texttheorie. Probleme einer Linguistik der sprachlichen Kommunikation (München, 1973); Jens Ihwe, Linguistik in der Literaturwissenschaft, zur Entwicklung einer modernen Theorie der Literaturwissenschaft, Grundfragender Literaturwissenschaft 4 (München, 1972).

In Polish scholarship Janusz Laliewicz has reasoned that Jakobson's derivation of the universal functions of speech from the communicative situation is a content-blind definition which ignores the existence of many other possible classifications based on the purposes for which people actually communicate. Janusz Laliewicz, "Krytyka teorii funkcji mowy Bühlera--Jakobsona", Teksty 6(12), 1973, 16-33. In an important study Laliewicz has shown how an examination of the non-linguistic structures of communication can lead to a different understanding of the communicative situation of literature, Janusz Laliewicz, Komunikacja językowa i literatura (Wrocław, 1975).

Janusz Sławiński, however, perhaps because he takes the validity of Ingarden's criticism for granted, has followed the Slavic practice of redefining Jakobson's terminology without an open acknowledgement that its meaning has been
changed. Jurij Lotman has done the same thing (see p. 267). Peter and Wendy Steiner in their restrained and well-reasoned discussion of Jakobson's position ("Structure and Phenomena: Elmar Holenstein, Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism", PTL: A Journal for Descriptive Poetics and Theory of Literature 3 (1978), 357-70) and in their attempt to link his work with that of Jan Mukařovský have followed more or less the same procedure (Peter Steiner and Wendy Steiner, "Postscript: The Relational Axes of Poetic Language" in Jan Mukařovský, On Poetic Language, trans. and ed. by John Burbank and Peter Steiner (Lisse, 1976), 71-86).

The problem with this procedure is that it allows non-Slavists such as Mary Louise Pratt to reject the entire tradition of Slavic structuralism by repeating once again the well-known criticisms of Jakobson's position (Pratt, Toward a Speech Act Theory of Literary Discourse (Bloomington, 1977), 3-37). If Slavists would be more open about the methodological differences within Slavic structuralism and within Slavic scholarship as a whole, then such a wholesale rejection on the part of those not familiar with the tradition would not be possible.

37

The only connections which may be controversial are those to positivism and neo-positivism and those to Husserl. The others all appear in standard summaries of Jakobson's work. See, for example, Linda R. Waugh, Roman Jakobson's Science of Language (Lisse, 1976). The connection between Jakobson and positivism and neo-positivism has been shown, to my satisfaction at least, by Ewa Thompson, Formalism, 87-110. The relationship between Jakobson's linguistic structuralism and Husserl's phenomenology has been explored at length by Elmar Holenstein in "Jakobson and Husserl: A Contribution to the Genealogy of Structuralism", The Human Context, vol. VII, No. 1, Spring, 1975 (London), 61-83 and in his book Roman Jakobson's Approach to Language: Phenomenological Structuralism, trans. by Catherine and Tarcisius Schelbert (Bloomington, 1976). Holenstein writes with Jakobson's approval.

38

Jakobson's general understanding of "iconicity" is described by Waugh, Jakobson's, 47-48.

39


Erlich, *Russian Formalism*, 44.


Holenstein, *Jakobson's Approach*, 61-64.

Holenstein, *Jakobson's Approach*, Section 3.2.4: The Referential Function.

Steiner and Steiner, "Postscript". They have rightly noted that it removes the system's contact with external reality by abandoning the asymmetric duality of the sign which Jakobson had accepted in his earlier writings. On the asymmetric duality of the sign see Serge Karcevki, "Du dualisme asymetrique du signe linguistique", *TCLD*, 1, 1929, 88-93.
Magliola, *Phenomenology*, 84.

See footnote 28.

Jurij Striedter surveys the development of literary history in the work of those scholars in his introduction to the German translation of Vodička's studies of literary history. Striedter, "Einleitung".

A good description of this theory which relates it to the semiotic tradition is Peter Steiner's "Jan Mukarovsky and Charles W. Morris: Two Pioneers of the Semiotics of Art" in *Semiotica* 19:3/4, 1977, 321-333. See also Peter Steiner, "Jan Mukarovsky's Structural Aesthetics" in *Structure, Sign, and Function, Selected Essays by Jan Mukarovsky*, trans. and ed. by John Burbank and Peter Steiner, (Yale Russian and East European Studies, 14 (New Haven, 1978), ix-xxxix.


The possible sources and Lotman's ambiguity about them have been discussed by Ann Shukman (*Literature and Semiotics A Study of the Writings of Yu. M. Lotman* (Amsterdam, 1977). Lotman gathered his ideas on the artistic text, many of which originally appeared in separate articles, in the book *Struktura khudozhestvennogo teksta*, Brown University Slavic Reprint IX (Providence, 1971). His studies of culture have been gathered into the volumes *Stat'ii po tipologii kul'tury. Materialy k kursu teorii literatury*, I (Tartu, 1970) and II (Tartu, 1973).

Lotman, *Struktura*, 16. Lotman further states that the existence of an artistic language requires the existence within the natural language of a certain level of redundancy, a certain number of synonymous words. The artistic language establishes new connections between these words, thereby investing them with a new
non-synonomous meaning. Lotman reasons that, because this process and the potential discrepancies between the codes of the author and reader reduce redundancy to an absolute minimum, the artistic text can communicate a higher level of information than any other text; Lotman, Struktura, 36-43.

Although he has couched his argument in the language of information theory, Lotman's position amounts to asserting that artistic language is another means of thought which, because of its unique organization, is superior to rational thought as a means of acquiring knowledge about reality. It is indicative that he has always insisted that art is a means of cognition and that, unlike play whose purpose is a reenactment of activity, art is a reenactment of life whose purpose is truth; Lotman, Struktura, 91.

It seems to me that this marks a return within the linguistic structuralist tradition to a romantic or symbolist view of art. Lotman's higher information and minimal redundancy, produced by an infinite series of connections unattainable in natural language, are very similar to the mystical content and broadening of impressionability, produced by surprising the reader with new symbolic connections, which Merežkovskij had held to be the basis of the "new art". See also the discussion of Merežkovskij at the start of this chapter and footnotes 59 and 65.

57 The artistic text is, in Lotman's view, characterized by its ability to create within itself multiple internal trans- or re-codings. The Russian pere- may have either meaning. Internal perekodirovka is defined by Lotman on p. 49 of Struktura.

58 The other secondary modeling systems provide the artistic text with the possibility of multiple external trans- or re-codings and, therefore, enable it to become a model of all the information available within a given culture. External perekodirovka is defined by Lotman on p. 50 of Struktura. It is important to remember that both internal and external perekodirovka were already present in the concepts of syn- and auto-function developed by Jurij Tynjanov. Shukman, Literature, 6.

59 In Lotman's work the asymmetric duality of the sign appears as the distinction between culture and non-culture. Culture cannot exist without non-culture, but, because there is always a discrepancy, an asymmetry, between the
two, the semiotic system which is culture is in a constant state of flux. The dialectic between culture and non-
culture is the basis for the history of a culture. Ju. M.
Lotman, A. M. Pjatigorskij, V. N. Toporov, B. A. Uspenskij,
"Theses on the Semiotic Study of Cultures (As Applied to
Slavic Texts)", in Structure of Texts and Semiotics of
Culture, ed. by J. van der Eng and M. Grygar (The Hague,

60

There are, however, problems with Lotman's theory. As
Renate Lachman has noted, the attempt to combine internal
and external perekodirovka results in two contradictory
theories of the artistic text. One Views it as an iconic
sign; the other as an intersection of different cultural
systems. Renate Lachman, "Zwei Konzepte der Textbedeutung
bei Jurij Lotman"); in Russian Literature, I (January, 1977),
1-36. In a sense, the two aspects of Sklovskij's concept of
ostranenie have reappeared in Lotman's work. External
perekodirovka is necessary to have an external non-literary
source capable of ensuring the validity of the cognition
provided by art. Internal perekodirovka emphasizes the
process, the making of the text. It is important to note
that Lotman places a much greater emphasis on the cognitive
value of art than Sklovskij did. Sklovskij was closer to
the view of art as playful activity which Lotman rejects
(see also footnotes 56 and 67).

61

There are several passages in Struktura in which
Lotman appears to be a romantic or symbolist theoretician
of art. This is particularly true in the introduction and
the conclusion where he describes and justifies his study
in more general terms. He equates art with a special
language, life and truth. The following two passages are
the most indicative:

"I seek an idea in you"

and

"I study your dark language"

were semantic equivalents: to understand life is to master
its dark language. And in all these, and in many other,
cases it is not a matter of poetic metaphors but of a deep
understanding of the process by which truth and, more
broadly, life are mastered.

For classicism poetry is the language of the gods, for
romanticism the language of the heart. The epoch of realism
changes the content of the metaphor but retains its charac-
ter: art is the language of life; with its help reality
tells us about itself; Lotman, Struktura, 11.
The comparison of art with life has been circulating for some time. But it is becoming clear only now how much exact truth there is in this comparison which once sounded like a metaphor. One can say with certainty that of all that has been created by human hands the artistic text to the greatest extent reveals those qualities which draw cybernetics into the structure of living tissue; Lotman, Struktura, 365.

The infinite trans- or re-codings of the text are close to the eternal freedom of Brjusov, but the universal cultural myths which are at the basis of Soviet cultural semiotics are analogous to the universal myths of Vjaceslav Ivanov's symbolism. Because Lotman, except for his study of Pasternak (Yury Lotman, "Language and Reality in the Early Pasternak", in Pasternak, A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. by Victor Erlich, Englewood Cliffs, NJ., 1978, 21-31), does not give a role to the poet's consciousness, it is the text, artistic language and culture themselves which are treated as living systems.

62

The issue of what the exact nature of that non-artistic reality and artistic creativity may be raises an extremely interesting possibility for future research. Although I have not been able to explore the issue in this study, it seems to me that what is really at the basis of both Jurij Lotman's cultural semiotics and Roman Jakobson's linguistic semiotics is the Hegelian absolute. In both theories we are presented with an ideal system with its own immanent laws of evolution and the ability to constitute itself by controlling the actions of the individuals who use it. In fact, both external reality and human consciousness are necessary only for the constitution of the system. They introduce the dialectical tensions which make the evolution of the system possible. The binary opposition itself may have its origin as much in Hegel's thesisantithesis as in information theory. A Jakobsonian such as Linda Waugh asserts that creativity is possible within the linguistic system because it is not a material entity (Waugh, Jakobson's, 22) and because its invariant structures make creative variance possible. This is true only within certain limits; "the variants (contextual and stylistic) are also linguistically determined--variation is not unbounded or completely free because ultimately the invariant (no matter how different it might appear to be) must be present in all the variations.... Creativity is, of course, possible, but creativity is associated with a specific linguistic system." (Waugh, Jakobson's, 74).
If further research shows that it is some version of the Hegelian absolute which is beneath the universal system of linguistic and semiotic structuralism, it would explain a great deal about the historical development of the Slavic formalist-structuralist tradition. Hegelian thought has always been influential in Russian philosophy where it was at the basis of Slavophile thought in the nineteenth century and has, arguably, reemerged in Soviet Marxism, especially in its Stalinist variant. The combination of romantic visionary and positivist determinism which I have described in Chapter II of this part could also be seen as a partial return to the Hegelian elements in Marx's thought brought about by the influence of Russian nationalism. At any rate, much of Russian thought has shared the belief that individual freedom and true knowledge can be had only by freely submitting to the control of some absolute source of authority and justice.

There is some possibility that the entire idea of an absolute linguistic or semiotic system is a Russian development. In discussing Alexandr Veselovskij's positivism I showed how, by emphasizing the Darwinian elements and deemphasizing the belief in a universal path of development for all cultures, the determinism could be removed from his theory of literary evolution and be replaced with a view of history as a result of the individual choices which a people has made. To the best of my knowledge, no Russian semiotician has moved in this direction. Instead, in response to Marxist determinism the social absolute has been replaced with a linguistic or semiotic one.

It is important to remember that Aleksander Veselovskij was a "man of the sixties", the time when Western rationalism was at its strongest in Russian thought. He also spent a great deal of time overseas and was under the influence of English ethnology. The Darwinian evolutionary tendencies in his thought have been realized in Poland in the Neo-positivist-Marxism of Jerzy Kmita where the individual's subjective context is determined gradually by the success or failure of the various actions which he undertakes in relation to the surrounding social environment, the objective context. The formalist eclectics were admirers of Veselovskij and were all familiar with the German aesthetics of their day. Jan Mukařovský was also familiar with Neo-Kantist German and Czech aesthetics and probably with Roman Ingarden's work as well.

It may have been the "Hegelian elements" in linguistic structuralism which made it popular with Stefan Žólikiewski and Maria Renata Mayenowa, the older generation of Polish structuralists. The same elements made it unpopular with the structuralist humanists who are, especially Michał
Głowiński and Janusz Sławiński, thoroughly familiar with the works of Roman Ingarden and Witold Gombrowicz. In Ingarden they found an example of a fully developed Husserlian, not Hegelian, phenomenology of art and in Gombrowicz of an "existentialist" theory of life and art. From such a perspective the linguistic absolute of linguistic structuralism probably seemed overly similar to the other "Russian" absolute they were trying to overcome. It may have appeared to mark a return to an older way of thought about man and history. However, because this has not been an historical study, these comments must remain only suggestions whose validity will have to be checked by further historical research. Methodological analysis can only point out the similarities. It will take a comprehensive historical study to determine their origin and significance.

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65

David Lewis is a theoretical scientist in the sense of the term which I have taken from Jerzy Kmita. Lewis writes, "I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associated with aspects of the world; and second, the description of the psychological and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract systems is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these two topics." Lewis, "Semantics", 170. Lewis has described the process by which an individual speaker can acquire an abstract grammar in his study of convention; David K. Lewis, Convention. A Philosophical Study (Cambridge, MA., 1969). His approach is, in fact, quite similar to Jerzy Kmita's treatment of the interaction between subjective and objective context (see footnote 60) and is compatible with the definition of convention found in structuralist humanism (see p. 344).

66

It is not always possible to distinguish, especially if, as Lotman may be doing, a scholar is trying to conceal his sources, whether it is a symbolist or futurist view of language and art. Because of his emphasis on the cognitive and communicative value of art, Jurij Lotman seems to me to be a romantic or a symbolist. The comments of Dmitry Čiževskij, who treats symbolism and futurism together under the heading of "Neo-romanticism (Modernism)", are instructive.

Čiževskij has written the following about the two movements (the italics in the passage are Čiževskij's):

The term "neoromanticism" which literary historians more and more frequently use is not quite applicable. Slavic modernism was, first of all, much less philosophically oriented than romanticism and considered the aesthetic value of literature in particular. (...).

2. The chief problem that moved the modernists was the limiting in realism of the word's functions to the purely communicative one. The "realization" of the word's other functions was the task set for themselves by the representatives of Młoda Polska and Russian symbolism, without, however, always consciously formulating this task. Realism's resulting weakening of the metaphorical function of the word, the neglect of its tonal side, of its emotional efficacy, led to the somewhat distorted conception of realism as a "making rational" of literature. Čiževskij, Comparative, 178.

Already there were modernists in Russia who before the First World War had considered themselves opponents of symbolism and who gave to their closed groups names such as "acmeists", and especially "futurists". In the last years when individual writers were dedicating works to the futurists—the two most important among them, V. Majakovskij and V. Xlebnikov, and recently B. Pasternak too, are mostly treated without any connection with the entire movement which they created or from which they proceeded—often came to the realization that they indeed presented a certain uniformity with symbolism. The tasks they had set themselves were frequently the same, as for example, the realization of the literary word; and the
methods with which they solved these problems were also partly the same, even if they did lead to ostensibly different appearing results. (...) It is thoroughly possible too that in a more distant perspective of the future all the modernistic "unrealistic" movements in Russian literature between 1895 and 1925 will be conceived of as one great--though differentiated--unity. Čičevskij, *Comparative*, 196-97.

Slavic linguistic structuralism, as a literary scholarship, had its origins in and has continued to draw much of its inspiration from the literature of that period. Hegelian patterns of thought about art and history had a pervasive influence on Russian symbolism both through Hegel's own writings and through the writings of the nineteenth century Slavophile philosophers. The symbolist view of art and language had a large influence on Klebnikov. For an account of the similarities and differences between Klebnikov and the symbolists see Barooshian, *Cubo-Futurism*, 19-37. Hegelian patterns were equally present in the Marxism which influenced Majakovskij. He had largely a romantic poet's visionary view of the revolution; Barooshian, *Cubo-Futurism*, 38-66, and Abram Tertz, "On Socialist Realism", in *The Trial Begins and On Socialist Realism* (New York, 1960), 211.

There is a strong possibility that history will one day show Slavic linguistic structuralism, as it has been applied to literary scholarship, to be the scholarly criticism and theory of literature of the Russian modernist art movement, more specifically of those writers within it who most believed that artistic language is the highest form of cognition which man has. Because linguistic semiotics employs a projective method, it has granted that language the qualities of consciousness which are characteristic of the Hegelian absolute (see Engel'gardt's comments on why this is necessary in the passage quoted on p. 164.) Viktor Šklovskij's ambiguous status within the movement was probably a result of the fact that his bohemian attitude caused him to question the transcendental status of the absolute; Sheldon, "Introduction".

The linguistic semiotic absolute has also entered its post-Hegelian stage. There have been attempts to explain it as the result of three types of material laws, the laws of human neuropsychology (E. C. Barksdale, *Daggers of the Mind: Structuralism and Neuropsychology in an Exploration of The Russian Literary Imagination* (Lawrence, KS, 1979), the social structure of society (Stefan Žółkiewski, see
Part I, footnote 32) and the characteristics of the technology it consumes for its existence (Lalewicz, Kommunikacja). Lalewicz, in particular, has undercut the romantic status of the absolute by suggesting that art is a form of play which relies on creative betrayal and owes its existence to the fact that society does not consider it one of the practical activities subject to all the controls of other social relations (see for example Janusz Lalewicz, "Mechanizmy komunikacyjne 'twórczej zdrady!'", in Teksty, 6, 1974 and Janusz Lalewicz, "Literatura w epoce masowej komunikacji", in Kultura—Komunikacja Literaturą, ed. by S. Żółkiewski, M. Hopfinger (Wrocław, 1976). He has also analyzed some of the themes of modernist art as a result of the isolation between artist and reader produced by the changing social and technological structure of modern society. Janusz Lalewicz, "Racja bytu powieści", O Współczesnej Kulturze literackiej, ed. by Stefan Żółkiewski and Maryla Hopfinger, vol. I, (Wrocław, 1973), 235–60. When judging Lalewicz's attitude toward the romantic absolute, it is important to remember that he is among other things' one of the Polish translators of Jean Paul Sartre.

68
Lord Byron, Childe Harold's Pilgrimage, Canto the Fourth, Stanza CXXVII, 1818.

69
Michał Głowiński, "On Concretization", in Roman Ingarden and Contemporary Polish Aesthetics, ed. by Piotr Graff and Slaw Krzemien-Ojak (Warsaw, 1975), 33.

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71
Jarosław Marek Rymkiewicz, "Juliusz Słowacki pyta o godzinę", in Twórczość XXXV, 10 (411) październik, 1979, p. 53. I wish to thank Professor Jerzy Krzyżanowski of The Ohio State University for bringing this passage to my attention.

72

73
In Polish scholarship, because of the work of Julusz Kleiner, Geisteswissenschaft has had a strong romantic
coloration (see Part I, footnote  ). For an account of Wilhelm Dilthey's Geisteswissenschaft which argues persuasively that Dilthey himself did not have a romantic faith in intuition but was trying to resolve the problems of positivist epistemology, see Michael Ermarth, Wilhelm Dilthey: The Critique of Historical Reason (Chicago, 1978).


76 George Grabowicz has stressed the point that this was the purpose of Roman Ingarden's work on the literary work of art. George Grabowicz, "Translator's Introduction", in Ingarden, Work, xlv-lxxxiii.

77 Magliola, Phenomenology, 3-4.

78 Magliola, Phenomenology.

79 For a general account of the phenomenological reductions see the articles in Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation, ed. by Joseph Kockelmanns (Garden City, 1967), 24-118. They are also described in relation to Roman Jakobson's linguistics by Elmar Holenstein, Jakobson's Approach.

80 Magliola, Phenomenology, 3.


82 Holenstein, Jakobson's Approach. One wonders whether Holenstein is really justified in calling Roman Jakobson's linguistics Husserlian since Jakobson's view of intersubjectivity seems more like the Hegelian absolute than Husserl's transcendental subject.
This statement is equally or even more true if we interpret Jakobson's work as Hegelian rather than Husserlian. Ingarden insists that intersubjective objects are created by acts of individual consciousnesses and only by acts of consciousness. They cannot come into being or change of their own accord.

It seems to me that Slavic linguistic structuralism can perhaps best be understood as a combination of the positivist belief in the direct observability of the literary text as an object outside of consciousness with a Husserlian semantics and a Hegelian history. They are all held together by a belief in the samovitoe slovo. I hope someday to be able to devote a separate study to this topic. I have mentioned it within this study because Janusz Sławiński's use of some linguistic structuralist terminology conceals from the casual reader the fact that he has rejected all three assumptions. In this study I have been able to deal only with the projective method and the role of consciousness.

Edward C. Moore, "Introduction", in Charles Sanders Peirce: The Essential Writings, ed. by Edward C. Moore (New York, 1972), 1-42. If Moore's account of Peirce's work is correct, it should be remembered that Charles Morris and later Roman Jakobson have interpreted Peirce in their own manner in using his iconic sign to define artistic phenomena. Charles Morris, "Esthetics and the Theory of Signs" in Morris, Writings, 415-33. Peirce's own work could easily be interpreted to mean that artistic texts may be any one of the three types of signs. It is only the samovitoe slovo which is iconic. Ewa Thompson has discussed J. C. Ransom's objections to the theory of the artistic text as an iconic sign; Thompson, Formalism, 80-82.

This point will be crucial in my discussion of the relationship between science and literary scholarship in the conclusion.

See footnotes 62, 67 and 84 for my view of what is really at the basis of Jakobson's thought.

Thompson, Formalism, 87-97.
This point is developed in more detail in footnotes 62, 67 and 84.

Janusz Laléwicz is the Polish structuralist, except for Stefan Żółkiewski and Maria Renata Mayenowa, who can most justifiably be called a linguist structuralist. He has, however, criticized Jakobson's position. Laléwicz, "Krytyka". His own understanding of structuralist linguistics comes from the French linguists Emile Benveniste and Andre Martinet. See Emile Benveniste, Problèmes de linguistique générale (Paris, 1966) and Andre Martinet, Podstawy lingwistyki funkcjonalnej, trans. by L. Zawadowski (Warsaw, 1970).

Ingarden, *Work*. Ingarden outlines his reasons why the work can be seen as neither an entirely real nor an entirely ideal object on pp. 9-19. He then develops the intentional nature of the work throughout his entire study. See especially pp. 356-68.


This attempt was made in the study Roman Ingarden, Spór o istnienie świata, 2 vols. (Kraków, 1947-48) and in an expanded version as Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt, 3 vols. (Tübingen, 1964-65).


See on this point David Michael Levin, "Foreword", in Ingarden, *Work*, xvi-xxi.

Michał Głowński has noted that there is some confusion on this point because scholars of literature who use Ingarden's distinction often speak of the concretization as a process, "concretizing" in Ingarden, rather than as an object. Głowński, "Concretization", 34-35.

98 Ingarden, Work, 365-68.

99 This dispute has been described by Jurij Striedter who provides a fair account of both positions. Striedter, "Einleitung", lix-lxxiv. The Czech scholars employ a distinction between the artifact which is a linguistic construct and the aesthetic object which is produced by the conventions of the given society in Jan Mukařovský's writings and of the individual as a member of society in Felix Vodička's work on literary history. Mukařovský was himself, at the end of his career, reintroducing the individual into literary history. Jan Mukařovský, Aesthetic Function, Norm and Value As Social Facts, trans. by Mark E. Suiño, Michigan Slavic Contributions No. 3 (Ann Arbor, 1970); Jan Mukařovský, "The Individual and Literary Development" in The Word and Verbal Art, trans. and ed. by John Burbauk and Peter Steiner (New Haven, 1977), 161-179. Vodička, Struktur. The linguistic structure of the linguistic artifact has been studied by Miroslav Červenka. Miroslav Červenka, Der Bedeutungsaufbau des literarischen Werks, Theorie und Geschichte der Literatur und der schönen Kunste, 36 (München, 1978).

Roman Ingarden's real dispute was with the description of his work by Austin Warren and Rene Wellek in their study Theory of Literature, new revised third edition, A Harvest Book (New York, 1956). Ingarden apparently felt that they had employed a modified version of the basic tenants of his position as the basis for their theory and then criticized a distorted version of his work within the text of their study. Ingarden, "Preface to the Third German Edition Edition", Work, lxxviii-lxxxii.

The disagreement concerns issues of crucial importance to aesthetic theory, Ingarden wanted to establish the unchanging intersubjective existence of the schematic formation of the text and the universality of aesthetic values. Ingarden, Cognition, 366-96. Without this universality to insure the reconstitutibility of the original aesthetic values and intersubjective object, his proof of the intersubjective nature, as he understood it, of the literary work of art would be invalid and with it his argument against Husserl's transcendental idealism.

The Czech scholars were interested in literary history and in the way in which social conventions reconstitute the literary text. By placing the aesthetic object and the aesthetic values under the control of history and society they established, within the framework of their writings, the historical and social nature of them both. This,
however, makes the universal values of which Ingarden spoke impossible. All aesthetic values are placed under the control of historically variable conventions. This is also true, it seems to me, of the literary text (the artifact) as well.

In Polish structuralist humanism, the universal aesthetic values, if they were to be discussed, would probably appear as examples of "long duration" versus the "short duration" of the concretizations (see p. 352). Janusz Sławiński's position is actually a combination of the two. Like the Czechs he places the text in the historical and social tradition. Like Ingarden he views the systems as changing only as a result of individual creative acts and not according to their own laws.

The disagreement over whether the aesthetic object (concretization) is under the control of a linguistic system (Jakobson), a cultural semiotic system (Lotman), a set of social conventions (Mukařovský and Vodička, the latter places those conventions in the individual) or the social interaction of individual consciousnesses (Sławiński) is, it seems to me, the root cause of the differences between the different Slavic structuralisms.

Roman Ingarden's own position, including the opportunities it offers for historical study, has been defended by Rolf Fieguth, "Rezeption contra falsches und richtiges Lesen? Oder Missverständnisse mit Ingarden", Sprache im technischen Zeitalter, 38, (Berlin, 1971), 142-159. He has also defended Ingarden's position in the article "Pierwaśtek historyczny w literaturoznawczych koncepcjach Romana Ingardena", Teksty, 1, 1978, 37-62.

100 Grabowicz, "Introduction", lviii-lix.

101 Since he was trying to disprove Husserl's idealism, Ingarden accepted the existence of ideal entities only with reluctance. As Ruth Crowley and Kenneth Olson have pointed out, he abandoned the ideal nature of sentence meanings in The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art; Ruth Ann Crowley, Kenneth R. Olson, "Translator's Introduction", in Ingarden, Cognition, xix. However, he seems to define the aesthetic values or metaphysical qualities which are the basis of universal aesthetic value in such a manner as to require their ideal existence in his sense of the term; Ingarden, Cognition, 376-83.

102 The best summary of Ingarden's first study, The Literary Work of Art, has been provided by Ingarden himself
in his second study, The Cognition of the Literary Work of Art. Ingarden, Cognition, 12-14. The following account is in agreement with his own summary of his work.

103
Ingarden, Cognition, 12.

104
Ingarden, Cognition, 13.

105
Ingarden, Work, 246-54.

106
Ingarden, Work, 160-81.

107
Ingarden, Cognition, 392.

108
Ingarden, Work, 291.

109
Ingarden, Work, 288-304.

110
Ingarden, Work, 369-73.

111
Ingarden, Cognition, 94-145.

112
The fact that the aesthetic qualities and the connections they produce are necessary for the formation of the aesthetic concretization, the aesthetic object, leads Ingarden to make the important conclusion that the aesthetic value of a literary work can be judged only by someone who has had an aesthetic experience of the work. Ingarden, Cognition, 323. This is something which critics of literature often forget when studying other literary traditions.

113
Ingarden, Cognition, 233-300.

114
Ingarden, Cognition, 300-331.

115
See their critical appraisals of Jakobson's linguistic poetics in footnote 36 (Part III).
See the passage from Michał Głowiński's study of Ingarden cited at the start of this chapter.

See Part III, footnote 64.

See p. 260.

See the discussion on p. 287 and following.

What Janusz Sławiński has done with the role of consciousness in literature is quite similar to what I did with the role of choice in Veselovskij's evolutionary determinism (see Part II, Chapter V). The concept of choice, or possibility, and creative conscious activity are closely related in Sławiński's work.

This compatibility has led the German scholars who have studied their work to overemphasize its Marxist elements. Sławiński's work is compatible with Marxism since Marxism is a social theory of another type and on another level. Not all conscious human activity is praxis. See Rölf Fieguth, "Semantik und literarische Tradition. Ein strukturalistisches Gesamtkonzept der Literaturwissenschaft", in Janusz Sławiński, Literatur als System und Prozess (München, 1975), 11-39.

I have used the term logos in order to relate Stalinist thought to the logocentrism which Jacques Derrida has deconstructed (Part I, Chapter V) and to convey the religious atmosphere surrounding the cult of personality. The term samovitoe slovo, which I will not use in the next section of the chapter, is intended to provide a transition to the term "newspeak" which I will take from a Polish writer in the next section. I have used samovitoe slovo to emphasize the fact that for a Polish scholar like Janusz Sławiński the self-referentiality of the universal linguistic system and the self-referentiality of Stalinist rhetoric are similar in their abstract structure. This is probably because they both have a Hegelian basis. It is important to emphasize my absolute conviction that there is a vast difference between a system of scholarly thought which has been created to deal with a subject matter and a system of
political thought which has been designed for entirely
different purposes. The parallel has been drawn only to
explain the direction in which Janusz Sławiński's struc-
turalism has developed. It is not meant to discredit what
is a perfectly justifiable and consistent methodological
position. See Part III, Chapter I and Chapter III.

123
Heinrich Heine, *Heines Werke in Fünf Bänden, erster
Band, Gedichte* (Weimar, 1978), 78.

124
Leon Trotsky, *Literature and Revolution*, trans. by
Rose Strunsky, Ann Arbor Paperbacks for the Study of
Communism and Marxism (Ann Arbor, 1971).

125

126
Adam Ulam *The Bolsheviks* (Toronto, 1969, 247-48)
has noted that, although Trotsky's theory of permanent
revolutions was not accepted by most Bolsheviks, their 1917
revolution was, in fact, a reenactment of it because, if
they had waited for the material conditions outlined by
Marx to develop, there would have been no revolution in
1917.

127
Frederich Bender has called this process "the
betrayal of Marx". Frederich L. Bender, ed., *The Betrayal
of Mark* (New York, 1975). His title is unfair to the
Soviet position because it is probably impossible to tell
who is a "real Marxist". Such a definition would be as
much of a value judgement as defining the real existential-
ist, the real phenomenologist or the real structuralist.
The situation is especially complicated because of the
universally acknowledged fact that Engels edited some of
Marx's writings. For the influence of Hegel on Lenin's
thought, see Russian Philosophy Vol. III: Pre-Revolutionary
Philosophy and Theology, *Philosophers in Exile, Marxists
and Communists*, ed. by James M. Edie, James P. Scanlan, &
Mary-Barbara Zeldin: with the collaboration of George L.
Kline, Quadrangle (New York, 1965), 405-09. The "betrayer"
of Marx for Bender was not Lenin but Stalin.

128
This account of the origin of Marxist thought is
taken from James Miller, *History and Human Existence, From
For a comparison see the account of Nikolaj Ščerne-

Miller, *History*.


This distinction is described by Jerzy Kmita, *Szkice z teorii poznania naukowego* (Warszawa, 1976).


For a Marxist account of Sartre's concept of "the other" see Jameson, *Marxism*, 240-44, 300-04.

One remembers the heavy hands, almost too heavy for his knees to bear, of the Well-Doer in Zamjatin's *We*. Eugene Zamiatin, *We*, trans. by Gregory Zilboorg (New York, 1952), 44.

Victor Terras is probably correct in asserting that socialist realism has remained within the scope of the Hegelian "organic aesthetics" of Belinskij; Victor Terras, *Belinskij and Russian Literary Criticism, The Heritage of*
Organic Aesthetics (Madison, 1974), 271-85. The party has assumed the position of an observer capable of deciding which artistic intuitions of reality are valid and which are not. In order to disprove the possibility of socialist realism, one would have to disprove the status of the party.

137

Abram Tertz, "On Socialist". What Tertz has called classicism is the codified rhetoric of revolutionary romanticism. In calling it classicism he is in fact writing a manifesto for an avant-garde artistic movement, a new romanticism in opposition to the classicism of the official art. See his comments on pp. 218-19 and also his novel The Trial Begins, trans. by Max Hayward, in The Trial Begins and On Socialist Realism.

138

Tertz, "On Socialist", 202-06.

139

Czeslaw Milosz has covered some of those issues in his The History of Polish Literature (New York, 1969), 441-44. It is one of those cases when the truth of what happened, if there is doubt about it, is not as important as the public perception of what happened. It is the public perception which is important to my discussion.

140


141

See the discussion in Part I, Chapter II.

142

Język, 4-6.

143

Język, 13.

144

Język, 15.

145


146

See his description of Stalin in The First Circle.

This process of self-renunciation was graphically portrayed by Witold Gombrowicz in the figure of a bourgeois intellectual turned revolutionary who tries to "puke" his own self out in the play Operetta.

A transcendent political syntax is as potentially harmful to itself as to the society in which it functions. Since it has no pragmatics, it cannot adjust to or accommodate the needs of those who use its language. Since it has no semantics, it cannot maintain contact with external reality. It will, therefore, eventually make its existence known as much by the absence of certain normal social functions as by its presence in the social life of the country. It will empty both itself and the institutions it inhabits of all content and innovation. Of course, other institutions will take its place.

See Part I, Chapter II.

This is the manner in which he has described linguistic semiotics (see pp. 326-27).

For a description of Gombrowicz's artistic work and philosophy see Ewa M. Thompson, Witold Gombrowicz, Twayne's World Authors Series, A Survey of the World's Literature, ed. by Irene Nagurski, TWAS 510: Poland (Boston, 1979).


Gombrowicz explained and exemplified his philosophy in all of his creative work, including his novels, plays

157

Michał Głowinski, "Parodia Konstruktywna (O Pornografii Gombrowicza)", Gry powiesciowe, Szkice z teorii i historii form narracyjnych (Warszawa, 1973), 279-303. Głowinski analyzes the novel Pornography, but the element of parody is just as strong in Trans-Atlantytyk and Ferdydurke as well.

158

In the play Operetta he presents the history of twentieth-century Europe in the form of a parody of the Viennese Operetta whose tone is set by the conflict between the aristocrats and their master of fashion on one hand and the political forms of the revolutionaries on the other. The hope of an end to the endless dance comes in the image of "nakedness", a momentary innocence and freedom from both clothes and form. Witold Gombrowicz, Operetka, in Dziena zebrane, vol. 5, Teatr.

159


160

Gombrowicz, "J'étai", 232.

161

Kazimierz Brandys, Nierzeczywistość (Paryż, 1978), 94.

162

The "beyond" where everything takes place in Brandys' passage is the domain of the Stalinist logos. It can be seen as similar to the "interhuman form" or the "out there where I myself end" of Gombrowicz. This connection is why Sławiński is suspicious of the forms of thought he has created. We never know what may become of them if we allow them to leave the control of consciousness. Brandys himself may be seen as repudiating his earlier involvement with institutional Stalinist Marxism.

163

Brandys, Nierzeczywistość, 88.

Białożewski, Wiersze, 71.

In the poem "Autoportret odczuwany" 'Self-portrait sensed' Białoszewski questions his own existence, Wiersze, 66-67, and then concludes that because he can imagine certain absences if he were not there, he must be.

Sławiński, "Wycofania".


Derrida, Grammatology, 30-64.


Witkiewicz, Insatiability, 38.

Witkiewicz, Insatiability, 45.

See Part II, Chapter IV.

See Part II, Chapter V.
176
See Part III, Chapter I.

177
See Part III, Chapter II, Section B.

178
See Part III, Chapter IV.

179
See Part I, Chapters IV and V.

180
There is, of course, a large difference between the intersubjective object of Roman Ingarden and the interhuman form of Witold Gombrowicz. Ingarden's object manifests itself in both a schematic formation and an aesthetic object and ensures the validity and stability of our perceptions of the literary work of art. Gombrowicz's interhuman form is an endless play of forms which threatens the integrity of the self. Janusz Sławiński's attempt to maintain both relativity and control is in a sense a combination of the two.

181

182

183
Sławiński, "Teksty", 7.

184

185
Janusz Sławiński, "Synchronia i diachronia w procesie historycznonoliterackim", in Dzieło, 11-38.

186
Janusz Sławiński, "Socjologia literatury i poetyka historyczna", in Dzieło, 39-77.

187
Sławiński, "Socjologia", 41.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 45-47.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 44.


Sławiński, "Socjologia", 56-59. Interest in problems of reception was sparked in Polish literary scholarship by Stanisław Lem's expansive essay (if an essay can be two volumes long) on how little control an author has over the manner in which his books will be read. Lem titled his book 'The Philosophy of Chance'. Stanisław Lem, Filozofia przypadku, 2 vols. (Krakow, 1968). Lem's book produced a reaction from Polish scholars which appeared in Pamiętnik Literacki, 2.1, 1971. Sławiński is criticizing Lem's position in this part of the article.


Janusz Sławiński, "Wokół teorii języka poetyckiego", in Dzieło, 91-119. Sławiński's understanding of poetic speech (it is important to note that he views it as parole (mowa) and not as langue (język)) has not been discussed in this study. It is similar to his understanding of literature and of the literary text. Sławiński concludes his article by making the following statement about the attempt to provide a linguistic definition of poetic speech, "endeavoring to describe that which opposes poetry to other regions of linguistic communication, that which is in it (poetry) the most 'egotistical' it leads, as if in spite of its own but nevertheless unavoidably, to the understanding of poetry as a social situation (italics Sławinski's)."

Sławinski, "Wokół", 119.

Sławiński, "Synchronia".
Janusz Sławiński, "Semantyka wypowiedzi narracyjnej", in Dzieło, 120-57. Also Janusz Sławiński, "Analiza, interpretacja, i wartościanie dzieła literackiego", in Problemy metodologiczne współczesnego literaturoznawstwa, ed. by Henryk Markiewicz and Janusz Sławiński (Kraków, 1976), 100-130.


Sławiński has not only analyzed the limits of any literary history (Sławiński, "Analiza") but also warned that institutional affiliations and requirements can, if allowed to become more important than the scholarly activity they are supposed to support, lead to its demise. This danger exists because those scholars who control the scholarly institutions tend to adapt the ethics of the economic and political institutions with which they deal on a daily basis rather than those of the scholarship which is their "maternal context". Sławiński concludes that any criticism of the behavior and output of a scholarly discipline is, therefore, also a criticism of the values and structures of the society in which it functions. Janusz Sławiński, "Zapowiedź nie dokonanego referatu", in Teksty, 1, 1978, 215-18. The text is an abstract of a conference report which Sławiński was unable to give because of illness: Sławiński, "Zapowiedź", 215.


In footnotes 62 and 67 of this part I suggested that the universal semiotic system of Slavic linguistic structuralism may be related to the general dominance of Hegelian patterns of thought over Russian intellectual life. I also said that in my opinion it was a promising direction for the historical study which I have been unable to pursue within my own research.

In this footnote I would like to suggest another direction in which such research might proceed. Janusz Sławiński's literary scholarship may also have its origins in the historical patterns of thought of the country in which it was formed. Polish thought has been dominated for two centuries by the historical need to resist foreign
occupation. In the first half of the nineteenth century that resistance received its intellectual support from the romantics' attempt to use the spiritual resources of the national consciousness to transcend, either artistically or through overt revolutionary activity, the occupation of their country. In the second half of the century resistance continued in the form of positivist acceptance of the occupation as an historical fact and a resulting emphasis on the maintainance and improvement of the material basis of national culture until that historical situation either changed or could be changed. (See Part I, pp. 134-141). When the country regained its political independence after the First World War, both approaches received their historical vindication.

After the Second World War the situation was different. Too much had changed for the romantic and positivist traditions of the nineteenth century simply to be maintained or reused in their original form. In addition, as I said in Part III, Chapter II, Section B, the Stalinist logos and its official group culture had appropriated essential elements of both types of thought. The intriguing aspect of the literary scholarship of a man like Sławiński is that, like many Polish authors, he seems to have both accepted the historical inevitability of his situation and yet reasserted the ability of the individual consciousness (as opposed to the collective absolute or national consciousness of Hegelian and much romantic thought) to transcend that situation internally.

In the body of the study I discuss Sławiński's concept of the "large memory" of the literary or cultural tradition (see p. 345). It seems to me that through the medium of Witold Gombrowicz's writings the "large romantic memory" of Polish culture has reappeared in contemporary Polish thought (it never really left). Under the conditions of modern life that romanticism appears as a faith in the conscious self's ability to endure and even to achieve a minimum freedom from the determining powers of its historical situation.

Gombrowicz's thought may seem existentialist to Western readers but within the Polish context it continues an artistic tradition of analyzing the relationship between the individual's visionary or creative power and its historical and social environment which runs back from Gombrowicz through Witkiewicz and Wyspiański to the romantics themselves. An existentialist may in fact be described as a romantic who has become overly aware of or underconfident in the role which his consciousness has in shaping his perceptions of external reality. If he is overly aware, the external world disappears. If he is underconfident, the
self disappears. This makes the existentialist the opposite of the overly confident romantic visionary who creates a logos.

The cure for overconfidence is irony, and the cure for underconfidence is creative success. In the literary scholarship of Janusz Ślawiński, in the poetry of Miron Białoszewski and also in the fullness of Gombrowicz's writings there is an ironic exterior which seemingly denies its own ability to create the text which is being read. But one always suspects that the "withdrawn self" is delighting both in its own creative abilities and in the possibilities for conscious activity which have been found in the outside world. I would call a writer who has taken such a stance toward the world an existentialist eiron, taking the latter term from Northrop Frye (see below).

Such a writer is existentialist because his irony consists of a hidden awareness that within his own internal conscious activity the logos has, by the very fact of its external acceptance, been made irrelevant. Conscious individual and social activity will continue without and in spite of the logos until such time as a combination of history and that self-same activity make it go away.

It should be remembered that in Frye's terminology the creator of a logos would be the alazon, or miles gloriosus, who is the hero of tragedy and the blocking figure of comedy (Northrop Frye, Anatomy of Criticism, Four Essays, third printing Princeton, NJ., 1957, 365). Frye defines the eiron as "A self-deprecating or unobtrusively treated character in fiction, usually an agent of the happy ending in comedy and of the catastrophe in tragedy." (Frye, Anatomy, 365).

Detailed historical research is needed to determine whether the differences between the various Slavic structuralisms of the twentieth century are in fact a result of their different historical-social situations. I am personally convinced further research will show that the individual Slavic and other Eastern European cultures, including the Russian or Soviet one, have drawn on their respective "large memories" to overcome or mute the influence within literary scholarship of the Stalinist logos. The result of these endeavors may not be a universally valid scientific theory of literature, but it may be something more important than that for the cultures within which it has developed.

Ślawiński, "Socjologia", 52-53. Ślawiński's understanding of the social roles which an individual may and must play is taken from the work of the Polish sociologist Florian Znaniecki and the American sociologists Parsons,
Linton and Newcomb. In their sociology an individual is integrated into society by the social roles he has learned to assume. The difference in Sławiński's writings is that the individual seems to be given an inner space, a flow of consciousness, or a "tenacious I", to use Gombrowicz's term which is his own.

The importance of this social psychology is that it allows Sławiński to assert that individual consciousness is not determined by group consciousness. The theory of social roles would, if made the basis of historical analysis, lead to results similar to the evolutionary theory I described in Part III. As I said then, structuralist humanism is concerned with resisting more than with predicting that evolution or history. Sławiński wants not just choice, but conscious choice, and the possibility of creative aesthetic activity.

Sławiński has made such a point in private conversation with me more than once. The reader might interpret this as an excuse to avoid conflict with official thought. It is not. If Sławiński is going to be consistent, he must accompany the assertion that a true literary sociology must be literary and, therefore, a part of literary scholarship with the admission that the resolution of questions about the nature of society and non-literary reality is beyond the competence of the literary scholar. By accepting their own limits the individual disciplines gain a certain autonomy. The price of this autonomy is that certain questions about literature can be answered only by cooperation with the other disciplines of the humanities. The alternative to that cooperation is the assertion that literature has its own immanent laws. Sławiński places too much emphasis on the historical and social situation and the role of the individual to accept that alternative. He is left, therefore, with a set of relations produced by individual actions within the overall framework of a given historical-social situation.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 47-48. Sławiński suggests in a footnote that a simplistic, but useful, way of defining literary life is "a set of institutions whose activity transforms the basic stratification of society into the secondary and specific stratification of the literary public"; Sławiński, "Socjologia", 70.


See, for example, Janusz Lalewicz's articles "Proces i aparat komunikacji literackiej", in *Teksty*, 1, 1978 and "Społeczny kontekst faktu literackiego i funkcje lektury", in *Pamiętnik Literacki*, 4, 1978.


In his study of the literary tradition Sławiński states that the tradition only exists when someone is actually using it. Sławiński, "Synchronia", 32.


Although he never defines his position on the nature of meaning exactly except to say that we do not know where in the work it is present, it is likely, given his position on the nature of the interpretation of individual literary texts, that it is for Sławiński a state of consciousness. In making the statement that meaning depends on a relation between the text and real life experience I am assuming that we do not possess in consciousness a separate realm of specifically literary meanings.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 63.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 65-68.

Sławiński, "Socjologia", 66-67. This description of literary culture clearly reveals the difference between
the sociology of Sławiński and that of Żółkiewski. Żółkiewski's literary culture is composed largely of broader social institutions which social classes are using for literary purposes. He studies the relationships between literary life and larger social groups. Sławiński's sociology of literary forms, on the other hand, studies the relationships between literary life, the specifically literary roles it makes available to individuals and the literary tradition. His literary culture, therefore, is a system for bringing about literary relationships between authors, readers and works. The two sociologies are concerned with the study of different social levels.

217
Sławiński, "Socjologia", 67. Jauss' term has been studied by Ryszard Handke in "Kategoria horyzonta oczekiwań odbiorcy a wartościanie dzieła literackiego", in Problemy odbioru i odbiorcy, ed. by T. Bujnicki and J. Sławiński (Wrocław, 1977), 93-104.

218
Sławiński, "Synchronia", 32.

219
Sławiński, "Synchronia", 38.

220
Sławiński's view of the relationship between synchrony and diachrony is different from that of both Jakobson and Saussure. In Jakobson's work diachrony is governed by its own immanent laws. In Saussure's it is a series of accidents to which the system adjusts itself (see Part III, footnote 43). For Sławiński the performance of an individual intentional act both materializes the synchrony and moves the diachrony forward. This view of the intersubjective realm of the tradition is similar to the intersubjective object of Roman Ingarden, from whom Sławiński may have taken it. There is one important difference, however, Sławiński has in his theory of literature no ideal entities capable of assuring the validity of individual perceptions of the text. The other possible source for Sławiński's view is in the writings of Jan Mukařovský (see Part III, footnote 99).

221
Sławiński, "Synchronia", 23.

222
Sławiński, "Synchronia", 21-22. The norm is actually the border of the class of potential relations brought
into existence by the class of properties which have actually been realized in the work. The properties are the "occupied spaces". The potential relations are the possibilities for future realizations, each of which will in turn introduce a new class of potential relations.

223

224

225
Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 71.

226
Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 65.

227
Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 67, 72.

228
Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 71.

229

230
It is indicative that Śląwiński's first and only monographic study was on the Kraków avant-garde. He introduced the term "key tradition" in that study to describe the romanticism against which, he asserted, the Kraków avant-garde were rebelling. In the first study the "key tradition" was quite similar to the "dominant" of Russian formalism. Janusz Śląwiński, Koncepcja języka poetyckiego awangardy krakowskiej (Wrocław, 1965), 188-89. In his later article it appears more as a center of attention capable of activating the other elements of the tradition by its presence than as a hierarchical element in the tradition. It also reminds one of the Stalinist logos discussed in Chapter II, Section B of Part III.

231
Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 68-70.

232
This figure is a revised version of the ones which Ślawinski included in his study; Śląwiński, "Socjologia", 69, 72.
Michał Głowinski, Style Odbioru (Kraków, 1977).


Michał Głowinski, "Swiadectwa i style odbioru", in Style, 116-126 and 126-132.

Slawinski, "Mysli".

Slawinski first considered the role of the author's personality in the literary work in the article "O kategorii podmiotu lirycznego", in Dzienio, 78-90.


For Slawinski creativity always involves some minimal change in the existing tradition. He does not accept the possibility of either perfect reproduction of existing forms or the creation of new forms out of one's own consciousness. All writing is an at least minimally creative combination and rearrangement of existing forms and structural possibilities.

There are three types of time in Slawinski's theoretical writings: the undifferentiated flow of consciousness and history, the short duration of the operational memory of the literary tradition and the long duration of the large memory of the tradition. Any act of writing unites the first two. One would assume only some, particularly significant, acts of creativity or re-creativity unite all three.

See Chapter IV of Part III.

Sławiński, *Dzielo*, 7-8.

See Part I, Chapter V.

Robert Magliola has provided a convincing case for the usefulness of a Heidegger-based semantics of literature. Magliola, *Phenomenology*, 174-191. It would, however, have its limitations unless it could find a way of introducing structuring forces other than consciousness into its methodology. Magliola has suggested (pp. 81-93) that phenomenology and structuralism may be two sides of the same problem. The point is well taken, and the scholarship of Janusz Sławiński can be seen as trying to combine the two.

If the determining force is defined abstractly enough, then it becomes vacuously present within what is essentially an eclectic universe.


Sławiński, "Funkcje", 174-75.

Sławiński has obtained the functions of literary criticism by a procedure which is similar to that which Roman Jakobson used in deriving the function of literature. The difference is, however, a crucial one. Sławiński establishes no hierarchy among his functions. For him the specific characteristic of a phenomenon is defined by all aspects of its social situation, not by one particular one.

Sławiński, "Funkcje", 190-191.
Sławiński, "Funkcje", 198.

Janusz Sławiński, "Literatura w szkole: dziś i jutro", in Teksty, 5-6, 1977, 1-19.

Sławiński, "Funkcje", 188.

Sławiński, "Analiza".

Sławiński, "Analiza", 100-07.

Sławiński has analyzed the literary norms governing the reading habits of his colleagues in his article "O dzisiejszych normach czytania (znawców)", in Teksty, 3, 1974, 9-32.


Sławiński, "Analiza", 103.

Sławiński, "Analiza", 103.


See the Conclusion, Chapter I.

Sławiński, "Analiza", 110.

The first is represented in his view of literary history (Sławiński, "Synchronia"). The second in his understanding of the social situation of literature, Sławiński, "Socjologia".
Janusz Sławiński outlined his understanding of the purpose and nature of scholarly terminology in the article "Problemy literaturoznawczej terminologii", in Dzieło, 203-222.
Markiewicz and Sławiński, *Problemty*, 528.


Okopień-Sławińska, "Relacje", 30.

Okopień-Sławińska, "Relacje", 31-43.

Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska, "Jak formy osobowe grają w teatrze mowy?" in *Teksty*, 5-6, 1977, 42-77. Also Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska, "O semantycie form osobowych", in *Roczniki Humanistyczne (KUL)*, vol. XXIV, 1976, z. 1, 39-49.

The basic format of the diagram follows that of Aleksandra Okopień-Sławińska's own. Sławińska, "Relacje", 43. I have supplied the scholar and the descriptions of the individual levels on the basis of my understanding of Janusz Sławiński's work.

I have attempted to do so in a study of Isaak Babel's short story "Pan Apolek". The study remains unfinished. The problem with the approach, and perhaps with any approach which tries to account for the full complexities of literature is that the distinctions become so fine and the terminology so complex that they are almost incommunicable. The study of an eight page short story can run to several hundred pages in length.

It must be emphasized once again that Sławiński has drawn on the earlier research of Jan Mukařovský and Felix Vodička on the same problems. The influence of Roman Ingarden on all three makes it hard to tell what is original and what is a parallel development. Sławiński has always placed more emphasis on the activities of the individual consciousness.
Sławiński has remarked in private conversation with me that his study of the possibilities of literary biography drew a more heated response than any he has ever written. This is probably because he was venturing into the area where non-theoretical eclecticism remains the strongest and where structuralism has had the least effect (see Part II, p. 177).

In his article "The Semantics of the Narrative Utterance" Sławiński insists that the norms of the literary tradition shape all of the semantic levels of the work and especially those which are above the most minimal linguistic units; Sławiński, "Semantyka", 149.

This is perhaps a result of the work of Roman Ingarden who discussed the work as a many-layered formation whose verbal levels insure its communicability. Ingarden's work was discussed in Section A of Chapter II of this part of the study.

Sławiński's view of literature is, as I have said in Part III, Chapter II, Section B, similar to that represented by the poetry of Miron Białoszewski. See, among many other examples, the poems "Niedopisanie", "mironczarnia", "o sobie rosnąco", "Głowienie", "Nie swój" in Wiersze by Białoszewski, 133, 147, 148, 158, 161.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 139.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 140.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 151.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 152.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 150.

Sławiński, "Semantyka", 152-54.

The dialogical nature of the literary work has been developed within Slavic structuralism by the Medvedev--Baxtin--Vološinov group. It is significant that they, too, insist that the text exists within consciousness (see Part III, footnote 28). Sławiński is aware of their work; Sławiński, "Semantyka", 131-34, 153-54. His own concept of the situational work is probably a combination of the cocreativity of Ingarden's concretization and the inter-human form of Gombrowica (see Part III, Chapter II).
CONCLUSION

THE STRUCTURALIST HUMANIST PERSPECTIVE

... as long as he could even allow himself words, then why did he want to say necessarily that which he was thinking, as long as he was free to think "I think," then why did he have to add that conclusion "therefore I am" as long as no one even prevented him from being, couldn't he just simply have been

Stanisław Barańczak, "It's His Own Fault"
CHAPTER I: WHAT IS LITERARY SCHOLARSHIP?

The world thought to pieces. And space and time
And what wove and weighed mankind,
Only a function of eternities,
The myth lied.

Where to? Where from? not night, not morning,
No Ehoe, no requiem,
What you would like is to borrow a slogan —,
But from whom?

Gottfried Benn, The Lost I

The perspective provided by Janusz Ślawiński's writings on literary scholarship has in the course of this study caused me to question some of the absolutes which have sometimes been used to justify the existence of literary scholarship. There seems to be no way of proving that a unified public taste, literary text or set of universal laws both exist and control our perceptions of literary texts. Janusz Ślawiński clearly believes that this is the case, and yet he has continued to practice what is in some ways a traditionally eclectic literary scholarship. In this brief chapter I am, in order to suggest a practical solution to the internal crisis in literary scholarship, going to show how Ślawiński's work implies that traditional eclectic literary scholarship may be a sui generis social activity resulting from the social situation of literature.
In his study of the sociology of literature Janusz Sławiński suggested that the literary tradition may be seen as having both an operational memory consisting of the literary conventions which are in use at a given time and a large memory consisting of works and norms which are not in use at the present time but can be reactivated if someone uses them in an appropriate manner. It seems to me that literary scholarship may be profitably examined as a mechanism, or a social activity, whose purpose is both to maintain the large memory of the tradition and to ensure that as much of it as possible is made a part of the operational memory of every generation. If this is the case, then it is obvious that literary scholarship is going to have to perform a variety of functions. A brief examination of that variety reveals that it will probably always be an eclectic activity. If I may refer back to Figure 7, each activity will cause the scholar performing it to perceive different aspects of the literary tradition. The first function which literary scholarship will have to perform is to insure the physical survival of the literary texts of which the literary tradition is composed. This means that it will have to contain a group of scholars devoted to textual preparation, preservation and publishing. In order to ensure the institutional survival of the scholars, books and physical plant of which it is composed
literary scholarship will also require a group of literary administrators. These two groups of scholars will tend to see the literary tradition in terms of its economic viability and to come into contact with society's economic institutions.

The next group of scholarly activities is related to the creation within the literary public of a literary culture capable of making maximum possible use of the full range of the literary tradition. It should include translators whose function is to expand the tradition by making foreign works accessible to monolingual readers, the majority of the reading public. There should also be scholars devoted to the problems involved in making the older texts accessible to the younger generations who have grown up in a new historical context and, if they are not given the proper literary culture, will be unable to recreate the existing literary tradition. There will therefore be scholars whose primary function is teaching. A similar function in regard to the general reading public is performed by literary critics.

This brings me to the actual study of the literary tradition. It contains both historians concerned with the past and present states of the tradition and theoreticians attempting to make generalizations about the universal characteristics of literature. In order to test the
reliability of these procedures and to mediate between the scholars engaged in such different activities, literary methodology has developed within literary scholarship. Methodology is a meta-scholarly activity devoted not to the study of or interaction with external reality but to the analysis of the consciousness and work habits of literary scholars themselves. It is therefore in the paradoxical position of seeming to be in the center of literary scholarship and yet in reality being the scholarly activity with the least direct contact with the external reality beyond literary scholarship. It is probably an awareness of this situation which has lead Janusz Sławinski to adopt a jocular or ironic tone in many of his methodological articles. I have summarized the social situation of literary scholarship in Figure 10.

The view of literary scholarship presented in Figure 10 is Sławinski's own. It is obvious from the figure why he never attempted to develop a scientific literary scholarship. Given his view of literary criticism as a creative activity and, probably, therefore of teaching as well, he could accept a science of literature as applicable only to, at most, the theory and history of literature. He views the entire idea of a scientific theory of literature as the result of a broader social obsession with texts, technology and science. In a sense
direction in which the individual social activity pulls the scholar

Figure 10: The Social Situation of the Literary Scholar and of Literary Scholarship
structuralist humanism may be seen as the "large memory" of literary scholarship reasserting itself and overcoming the "operational memory" of the linguistic structuralism which grew out of a twentieth century tendency to equate the human mind with that of a machine or simple mechanism. Sławiński's work marks a return within the Slavic tradition to the aesthetic attitude of Viktor Šklovskij and the scholarly practice of the formalist eclectics.

The answer which Sławiński's work offers in the debate over whether literary scholarship should be linguistic, Marxist, feminist, structuralist, deconstructionist or any other-ist is so simple as to appear banal. Literary scholarship should be literary scholarship. Any adjective which is placed before the term will, in order to perform the range of activities demanded of literary scholarship, have to become so abstractly defined as to be meaningless.

The appearance of such a literary scholarship within Polish society may be explained by the need for Polish culture to maintain itself over a two hundred year period when it had full control of its public institutions for only about twenty years. Under such conditions, particularly after Hitler and Stalin, the mere fact of human existence, the simple possibility of creative conscious activity and the very process of rational discussion have become
absolute values in themselves. For a slogan which justifies such an approach to life and philosophy we may turn to the writings of the Polish philosopher Leszek Kołakowski:

Both the priest and the jester violate the mind: the former by strangling it with catechism, the latter by harassing it with mockery. At a royal palace there are more priests than jesters - just as in a king's realm there are more policemen than artists. The preponderance of the believers in mythology over the critics seems inevitable and natural . . . In the intellectual life of societies, wherever the machinery of traditional beliefs has gone rusty, new myths flock into being, created en masse from technological progress and scientific achievements . . . Perhaps the desire for the absolute, the striving to equalize tensions, must embrace a disproportionately larger number of units in the system than the increase of tensions, if the whole is not to blow up. If this is so, then the existence of priests is justified, although this is no reason for joining their ranks.

. . . .

We declare ourselves in favor of the philosophy of the jester, that is, for an attitude of negative vigilance in the face of any absolute. This we do not because we want to argue; in these matters, a choice is an appraisal. We declare ourselves in favor of the non-intellectual [italics mine!] values inherent in an attitude the perils and absurdities of which we know.]

In arguing for both the impossibility of complete knowledge of the literary work and the necessity of literary scholarship in the face of that realization, Janusz Sławinski has continued the tradition of Quixotic folly which has throughout the ages been one of the
distinguishing characteristics of the humanist. The last chapter of this study considers the question of why that folly may be useful.
CHAPTER II: WHY THE HUMANITIES?

Stone cutters fighting time with marble, you foredefeated
Challengers of oblivion (. . .)
The poet as well
Builds his monument mockingly;
For man will be blotted out; the blithe earth
die, the brave sun
Die blind and blacker to the heart:
Yet stones have stodc for a thousand years
(and pained thoughts)
found
The honey of peace in old poems.

Robinson Jeffers

An answer, which is only one of the many answers, to the question which is the title of this chapter may be found in the answer to two other questions. The first of those questions is: Why is it that every generation of humanists and perhaps every individual humanist feels compelled to find an answer to the above question? Scientists, as Thomas Kuhn has shown (see p. 69), feel no such compulsion. The development of science except in rare times of crisis is marked by a steady accumulation of knowledge in which each generation of scientists adds to the edifice erected by the preceding generation. It is only the humanities which represent a "Tower of Babel" (Part I, footnote 169) or rather a series of towers of
babble whose structures continually collapse in upon themselves only to be just as continuously rebuilt. The history of philosophy or of literary scholarship does seem to consist of the constant interplay of forces and regrouping of forms which structuralist humanism sees as the basis for literary history.

The second question was asked by the Polish humanist Zbigniew Jarosiński; "Why is it that in a normally functioning society the work of intellectuals is either ignored or derided, and yet, whenever any group wants to seize control of a society, the intellectuals and their seemingly useless work are always the first to be destroyed? Hitler did it, Stalin did it, everyone who wants to make a society conform to his vision of the world does it." Jarosiński's question and the continuing collapse and reformation of philosophies and literary scholarships suggest to me that the humanities are somehow inextricably involved with the human historical and social situation. The humanities seem both to change with and to offer resistance to any change in that situation. This is very close to Janusz Sławiński's view of the literary text as described in Chapter V and of the literary tradition as described in Chapter IV.

It is also very similar to his view of the relationship between an individual human biography and history. Sławiński describes the individual biography as a zone of
pomiędzy (between, in the midst of) linking the events of
the flow of history with the texts and structures of human
social and cultural life. The three major structuring
influences on that flow are the behavioral strategy of the
individual, the typifying classifications of society and,
if the individual's biography passes into the cultural
zone of "large historical time" or "long duration" after
his death, the restructuring of his or her biography by
the cultural tradition.  

Sławiński describes the transferal of a biography
to "long duration" in the following passage:

. . . it's well known that the entire pro-
cess can not be removed (odjęty) from the
biography of a famous entity. It is its
further continuation: somehow variations on
its theme. The performing (dokonywanie się)
of a biography in small historical time is
a step by step narrowing of the field of
possibilities, which spread itself out be-
fore the individual in the different phases
of its life. [. . .] While in large histor-
ical time we observe the opposite movement:
as a pushing aside of that which has been per-
formed, is closed, somehow a return to the
region of possibilities; the form of the
biography which was realized once upon a
time (zrealizowany ongīś Kształt biografii)
is transformed into a multiform (wielokształt)
- into the set of its most various versions.  

In this passage Sławiński has applied to the biography of
the individual the same method he used in analyzing the
social situation of literature and the literary text.
History and form both "take away" and "recreate."
In concluding this study, I may summarize his work in terms of the oppositions between odląć and odtworzyć, 'to take away, remove' and 'to re-create' and niedokonanie, dokonywanie się, and dokonanie, 'non-performance to completion,' the process of performing, and performance-to-completion. It is the first opposition which places his work in the context of the formalist-structuralist theory of ostrazenie, of automatization and deautomatization. In Sławiński's own work, however, it is quite clear that the 'taking away' of possibilities is a result of the overwhelming presence of a logos in the "small time" of a concrete historical situation or in the literary conventions of the "operational memory" of a given literary culture. With the flow of history, given the presence of the creative activity of authors, critics and readers working in the tradition, the "large memory" of the tradition and the "large time" of history will reassert themselves. The purpose of literary scholarship and of literature itself is for Sławiński a continual recreation which allows the "process of performing" to continue.

In order for something to be re-created it has to have been created in the first place. Sławiński grants no transcendental status either to the logos or to the forms which are created and recreated to replace it. The tradition exists only when someone even to the most limited
extent, is using it. This is why Ślawiński places such an emphasis on the "process of performing." His study of criticism implies that a criticism which has linked itself to an institutional logos interferes with the creative impulse which makes re-creation possible and, therefore, makes it impossible, or at least extremely difficult, for the artistic process to continue. It blocks the contact between authors and readers which that process requires. However, it is to be remembered that both those institutions and the logos which sustains them have been created by men and women endeavoring to make their own thought possible. The paradox of art and scholarship is that the very same institutions and forms which they require for their existence tend to threaten that existence.

Yet writing and reading must continue if the tradition is to be maintained. All writing and probably all thought are for Ślawiński based on an acceptance of the above paradox as the unavoidable result of the human historical and social situation. Absolute faith and absolute relativity are luxuries which the humanist cannot afford. Therefore, in the opposition between non-performance-to-completion (niedokonanie), the process of performing (dokonywanie się) and performance-to-completion (dokonanie) it is the middle term, the incomplete process itself which is the positive value. The noncompletion of the logos
is a benefit for art and scholarship, while the non-performance of the re-creation of the individual literary work, of a man or a woman's life work or of the tradition means the destruction, or at least the temporary loss, of a set of creative possibilities. Without a creative impulse they will sink into the chaos and inert shapelessness (bezwład) of the play of social forces. Sławiński writes, while describing the effect of an institutional logos on the work of an individual, "And thus non-performance-to-completion drowns out performance-to-completion." The values are reversed in regard to dokonanie 'performance-to-completion.'

It is obvious both that such a system of values is related to Gombrowicz's "tenacious I" and the other sources listed in my explanation of the term "structuralist humanism" and that it is going to take consciousness as the location of all experience and thought. The pomiędzy 'the between or in the midst of' of the individual biography is human conciousness itself. In justifying the methodology of the formalist eclectics Boris Engellgardt asserted that it was based on the assumption that literary scholarship must concern itself primarily with the study of the specific characteristics of Literature. In evaluating the methodological theoretical eclecticism of Janusz Sławiński it is necessary to understand that he bases his writings
on the belief that the social function of literary scholarship is to provide the members of society with the maximum possible opportunities for exercising the aesthetic creative potential of human consciousness. The specific characteristics of literary scholarship and of literature itself are for him a result of their status as social activities serving to help the individuals of whom society is composed realize their individual creative potentials.

In order to make this possible he has scattered around his articles on individual topics the rudiments of a philosophy of literature. Although it has not been possible within the scope of this study to discuss in detail the influence of Roman Ingarden on Janusz Sławiński's work, there is no doubt that Ingarden's writings have provided Sławiński with an example of the complex problems any fully developed literary scholarship must solve. Sławiński has addressed many of those problems. His epistemology is based on the primacy of human consciousness. Within that consciousness there are patterns which can be known and communicated by rational thought. These patterns are the historical and social structures of literary communication. There are, however, also states, or "black holes" (the literary texts, and individual personality), which can only be experienced aesthetically. The only way to communicate them is both indirect and incomplete. The
scholar must engage in a creative act of critical writing which attempts with the aid of the original literary text or texts to re-create the same experience in the mind of the reader.¹⁹

The primacy accorded human consciousness also leads Sławiński to adopt an eclectic ontology. If the scholar can never escape from his own 'historicity,' his own consciousness, how can he make a final judgement as to what exists in the external universe? Sławiński assumes that anything can exist and that the literary scholar should therefore study the interplay and not the origin of the patterns which appear in the literary universe. This eclectic ontology is closely linked to what seems to be an avant-garde aesthetics based on the assumption that it is the aesthetic experience itself and not its content, the forms and objects it uses, which is the essence of art.²⁰ It does not matter to Sławiński whether the content of the aesthetic experience is linguistic, philosophical, social or religious as long as it is there.

This emphasis on the value of the ongoing aesthetic experience itself leads to what might be called the ethics of his literary scholarship. His assertion that no individual scholar can, on the basis of his or her own subjective context, provide a final interpretation or evaluation of a text or of another individual's life work²¹ is
related to his belief that both the individual and the tradition have the right to the maximum realization of their aesthetic experience. In making a final negative judgement on a text or life work the individual scholar denies it a place in either the "large" or the "operational" memory of the tradition. In so doing he deprives not only the individual biography and work but also the literary tradition itself of an entire range of re-creative possibilities. Literary scholarship has not often discussed the ethical issues which Sławiński has raised, but perhaps it would be useful to do so, particularly in regard to teaching.

This same ethical decision has combined in Sławiński's thought with the belief that the aesthetic experience is a value in itself to produce his distrust of abstract theorizing. He believes that, since abstract theories usually result from the cooperation of a group of men and women working within one subjective context, they almost always become a logos, judging the texts and life works of which the literary tradition is composed rather than contributing to its further development. He believes that literary scholarship should remain an open dialogue designed to create within an individual consciousness the presence of "an other or a foreign language" (obcy) on which such judgments can be based. This belief is one more source of his theoretical eclecticism or structuralist humanism. The structures must be the result of
interactions between consciousneses if they are going to be used to judge consciousneses.

It should be obvious from the above discussion that what Janusz Sławiński has done is to pull structuralism and literary scholarship down into the mire of unanswerable questions with which practical and professional philosophy have been concerned since men and women first started thinking about their relationship with each other and with the outside world. How can I know anything? How can I judge my own actions and those of others? What exists outside of my own consciousness? These are truly unanswerable questions. What the structuralist humanist perspective on literary scholarship suggests is that they are also the inevitable questions of human existence. Perhaps they are, in addition, questions which have to be reposed (re-created) by every scholarly and social generation and tradition in order to prevent a logos from taking their place in the "operational" memory of society.

If this is in fact the case, then the continual formation and reformation of bodies of thought and the crisis state of the humanities in today's society is more a result of their status as a sui generis social activity than of some modern disease. Sławiński's distinction between "large" and "operational" memory suggests that the humanities are a means for a society both to maintain a sense of historical continuity and to readjust to changing
historical conditions. If this is indeed the case, then it explains why any attempt to bring about a drastic change in a society has to destroy the humanities if the logos is to survive. Janusz Sławiński's own writing and much of contemporary Polish literary scholarship sometimes has the tone of an inside joke whose humor is derived from the pleasure of its own existence. It is perhaps this pleasure more than anything else which has led to the belief that aesthetic and intellectual activity are values in themselves. They are activities which must be maintained for their own sake even though we cannot prove their absolute validity. In the parlance of contemporary literary scholarship one might call the humanities a sui generis set of norms for projecting diachrony into synchrony or a grammar for transforming the flow of individual experience into "tradition," "biography" and "long duration." One might call them other things as well, but those names would, as Janusz Sławiński has justly said, "leave behind in a rather decided manner the territory of the history of literature."24

If we accept the terms of Janusz Sławiński's literary scholarship, then the answer to the question which began this chapter is another question: The rest is silence?
NOTES: CONCLUSION


2 The Penguin Book of German Verse, ed. by Leonard Foster (Baltimore, 1969), 426. In the body of the text I have rearranged Foster's prose translation into verse lines and changed a few words.

3 See Figure 7.

4 It is based on the comments on the divisions of literary scholarship found in the textbook Zarys teorii literatury by Michał Gowinśki, Aleksandra Okopień-Slawińska, Janusz Sławiński (Warszawa, 1975), 5-15, and on comments he has made in private conversation with me.

5 This attitude was expressed in his article "Teksty i teksty" discussed on p. 327.

6 Sławiński made the same remark about his conclusion that literary criticism is literary criticism; Janusz Sławiński, "Funkcje krytyki literackiej", in Dzieło, Język, Tradycja by Janusz Sławiński (Warszawa, 1974), 202.


8 Robinson Jeffers, The Selected Poetry of Robinson Jeffers (New York, 1959), 84.

9 Jarosiński's comment was made in private conversation with me and has not appeared in print. I have paraphrased
his comment, but the sense remains the same. Jarosziński has written an interesting survey of the Polish and Russian futurism discussed in Antologia polskiego futuryzmu i Nowej Sztuki, ed. by Helena Żaworska, Biblioteka Narodowa, Seria I, Nr 230 (Wrocław, 1978), iii-cxxiii.

10

11

12

13
Janusz Sławiński, "Synchronia i diachronia w procesie historycznoliterackim", in Dzieło, 32.

14
Sławiński, "Funkcje", 183.

15
See Part III, footnote 200.

16
Sławiński, "Funkcje", 194.

17
Sławiński, "Funkcje", 191.

18
Sławiński, "Funkcje", 199.

19
Janusz Sławiński, "Analiza, interpretacja i wartościowanie dzieła literackiego", in Problemy metodologiczne współczesnego literaturoznawstwa, ed. by Henryk Markiewicz and Janusz Sławiński (Kraków, 1976), 121.

20
See the discussion of the Białoszewski poem in Part III, Chapter II, Section B.

21
22 Sławiński, "Analiza", 126.

23 Leszek Kołakowski, "Priest".

24 Sławiński, "Analiza", 123.
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