PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN THE AMERICAN RED CROSS
DURING WORLD WAR II

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the
Graduate School of the Ohio State
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By

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The Ohio State University
1949

Approved by:

[Signature]
Advisor 4/29/49
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PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION IN THE AMERICAN RED CROSS
DURING WORLD WAR II

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: VOLUNTEERS IN RED CROSS

BACKGROUND OF RED CROSS AS A VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATION

This study is devoted to a consideration of personnel administration in the American Red Cross during World War II as it affected paid workers. Yet, as a matter of proper perspective, it should be remembered that from its origin in 1881 to the present day the Red Cross has been characterized as a "volunteer organization." Paid personnel, even in World War II, have constituted only a fraction of the total number of persons who have given service to Red Cross. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to indicate in brief compass something of the numbers, influence and significance of the volunteer in Red Cross. Indirectly the place of the paid worker in the organization is made clearer.

Clara Barton, as president from 1881 to 1904, led bands of volunteers into the field at home and abroad to relieve suffering caused by war and natural disaster. The Congressional Charter of 1905, which imposed definite obligations upon the Red Cross and gave it quasi-governmental status, spoke of its duties in terms of "volunteer aid to the sick and wounded of armies in time of war...[and action] in matters of voluntary relief...." In the period of Mabel Boardman's greatest influence, the American National Red Cross Congressional Charter, approved January 5, 1905. Since the adoption of the Charter, the national governing body of Red Cross, the Central Committee, has been composed of volunteers. The Chairman (the executive head of Red Cross) has more often than not been a volunteer, though paid executives have also been appointed. Volunteers have made up the governing bodies of the local chapters, and have given time as chapter workers.
1905-17, her philosophy of volunteer effort was deeply felt in the organization. Although these years also marked the beginning of paid professional work, as late as 1914 there were only 25 paid workers on the staff of the national organization.  

In the first World War, the general management of Red Cross was turned over to the direction of a War Council of volunteers under the chairmanship of Henry P. Davison, a Morgan partner. Harvey Gibson, then the young President of the Liberty National Bank of New York, acted as General Manager. Under him the important positions in the departments and bureaus both at home and abroad were held by volunteers from business and the professions. Many full-time workers in the field were volunteers. The direction of the chapters remained with local volunteers, and the work of the chapters was largely done by volunteers.  

At the end of the war volunteers began to leave Red Cross. The War Council and the Central Committee realized that as volunteers withdrew, they must be replaced by a paid group. Appropriate action toward that end was taken by the Central Committee.  

New persons were added to the paid staff and many wartime volunteers remained in Red Cross as paid members.  

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1. Data from Reports and Analysis Division, Office of Reference, Statistics and Publications, ARC, September 30, 1948, HFD.  
2. For a more detailed discussion of the war period see the monographs by Gustave R. Caedder in the Historical Division, ARC.  
Livingston Farrand, appointed in 1919 as the first paid Chairman, placed marked emphasis upon building a national staff of paid and professional workers as the organization expanded its functions to include matters of health and social welfare in addition to its traditional work of war and disaster relief. Although Farrand resigned in 1921, "professionalization" continued in the Red Cross, bringing with it a factionalism sometimes described in terms of paid professional worker versus amateur volunteer. Yet that was not a wholly correct description for some of the paid workers were not professional social workers, and some of the volunteers had had professional training. Perhaps the most significant distinction was to be made in terms of amateur versus professional service. There remained, however, a subsidiary distinction between paid and volunteer personnel. Progressively the general executive and managerial functions of the national organization (national headquarters and area offices) centered in a paid career civil service. Gradually larger chapters acquired paid (and professional) workers.

Despite this long-term trend toward a paid professional staff, the bulk of the work of the chapters through the twenties and thirties was performed by volunteers. Most of these volunteers had no professional training in health or social welfare work; they often received, and in some instances were required to have, Red Cross instruction in specialized tasks.

Divided into two groups, volunteers were classified as "unorganized" and "organized." The larger group of unorganized volunteers served chapters in such capacities as officers and committee members, instructors in courses such as first aid, water safety, home nursing, and
nutrition, fund workers, disasters workers, Junior Red Cross sponsors, Home Service workers, and public information representatives. Both men and women were to be found among the unorganized volunteers, though women were predominant in numbers.

The smaller group of organized volunteers was Miss Boardman's special concern. From 1923 until 1940 she threw her energies into the creation and furtherance of this group, collectively known as the Volunteer Special Services. She hoped to stem the tide of professionalization through trained, disciplined, and uniformed corps of volunteer women ready to perform many services, especially those in connection with war and disaster relief. By the early 1920's Volunteer Special Services was composed of the following corps: Administration, Staff Assistants, Production, Braille, Canteen, Motor, Health Aides, Home Service, and Hospital Service. Each corps had a distinctive program, most had established training and service requirements, and each furnished recognition in the form of special status, uniforms, certificates, pins or veils.

Miss Boardman appealed to the higher social and economic classes—particularly the Junior League set—for volunteers for these corps. And in general, the appeal of all Red Cross volunteer work, organized and unorganized, was to the leisure class. Recognition was partially, 1

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1. Eighteen hours per year was the usual minimum standard for personal service set by national headquarters until World War II. During World War II some corps, such as Dietitian's Aides, Nurse's Aides, and Home Service, required 150 hours service per year.
if not largely, in terms of social distinction. "It was done" in the best circles of the metropolitan centers, including those of Mrs. E. H. Harriman and Mrs. Whitelaw Reid in New York City, Mrs. George Drexel in Philadelphia, Mrs. Henry Rea in Pittsburgh, and Mrs. Joseph Cudahy in Chicago, to name only a few.\(^1\) In the smaller communities, social leaders followed the lead of their big-city contemporaries.

However, the Volunteer Special Services did not fare as well as Miss Boardman had hoped; in fact, she considered her work a failure. In 1939 there were only 53,115 members in the organized corps. But this is not to say that volunteer work as such was a failure, for in the same year chapters had an estimated number of 456,482 unorganized volunteers.\(^2\)

The importance of this group in carrying on the day to day work of the Red Cross can hardly be over-emphasized:

Beyond the few thousand volunteers who chalked up so many hours of work a month in any corps activity were the many more thousands who kept the work of the Red Cross going in the 3700 chapters and whose record of service is hard to discover in any Red Cross record or in any precise set of figures. Yet without their help, the work of the Red Cross would not have been done.

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1. Constance McL. Green, "Volunteer Special Services, 1919-39," p. 21, MDF.
2. American Red Cross, Annual Report, 1939, p. 20. A record was kept of the number of organized volunteers; the number of unorganized volunteers was an estimated figure.
VOLUNTEER SERVICES IN WORLD WAR II

In World War I, volunteers were brought in to run the Red Cross. This was not the case in World War II. Norman Davis, the Chairman of the Red Cross for most of the war, had the itinerant assistance of businessmen from time to time at national headquarters. Most of them were not, however, given definite and continuing responsibilities for the duration of the war, though at various times volunteers planned fund raising, performed important administrative functions, or served on the Chairman's advisory "Administrative Committee." In the overseas theaters, the top administrative heads were often volunteers. However, they reported to a paid member of the national headquarters staff, the Vice Chairman in Charge of Insular and Foreign Operations. Thus it appears fair to conclude, without minimizing the importance of top volunteer assistance in Red Cross, that the executive function at national headquarters was largely a responsibility of the paid staff. This was a significant contrast to World War I experience.

Also significant was the fact that in the second World War, as contrasted with the first, a larger share of the work of the whole organization was done by paid workers. Paid personnel of the national organization (headquarters, area offices, and overseas) increased from 935 in 1940 to 24,378 in 1945.\(^1\) Chapter paid workers increased from 2,547 in 1940 to

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1. ARC, Red Cross Service Record, Accomplishments of Seven Years, July 1, 1939—June 30, 1946 (ARC 541), p. 11. Hereafter referred to as "Seven-Year Report."
Table 1

VOLUNTEER PERSONNEL — TOTAL, MEMBERS OF ORGANIZED SPECIAL CORPS, AND OTHERS PARTICIPATING IN RED CROSS ACTIVITIES
FISCAL YEARS, 1939-40 THROUGH 1945-46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total (a)</th>
<th>Organized Special Corps</th>
<th>Other (a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939-40</td>
<td>1,120,000</td>
<td>540,000</td>
<td>580,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940-41</td>
<td>2,000,000</td>
<td>1,215,000</td>
<td>785,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941-42</td>
<td>3,000,000</td>
<td>2,719,000</td>
<td>281,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942-43</td>
<td>6,500,000</td>
<td>3,838,000</td>
<td>2,662,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943-44</td>
<td>6,000,000</td>
<td>3,199,000</td>
<td>1,801,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944-45</td>
<td>7,500,000</td>
<td>2,633,000</td>
<td>4,867,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945-46</td>
<td>4,600,000(b)</td>
<td>820,000</td>
<td>3,780,000(b)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average per year</td>
<td>4,246,000</td>
<td>2,138,000</td>
<td>2,108,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

PERSONNEL — VOLUNTEER AND PAID, FISCAL YEARS ENDING JUNE 30, 1940-46

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Paid Personnel</th>
<th>Volunteer Personnel</th>
<th>Number Volunteers to Each Paid Worker</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Chapter</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,547</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>3,482</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>3,046</td>
<td>2,068</td>
<td>5,114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>5,420</td>
<td>6,243</td>
<td>11,663</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>10,001</td>
<td>13,772</td>
<td>23,773</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>13,848</td>
<td>20,338</td>
<td>34,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>14,654</td>
<td>24,378</td>
<td>39,032</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>13,956</td>
<td>14,368</td>
<td>28,324</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(a) The number of volunteers other than members of organized corps is estimated.
(b) Based on preliminary data.

14,654 in 1945. Of the 3,754 chapters, those manned entirely by volunteers decreased from 72 percent in 1940 to 37 percent in 1945. Yet, until as late as 1944 a majority of the chapters were operated only by volunteers.  

This evidence of increasing reliance on paid work in both the national and chapter organizations should not obscure the record of volunteer effort. Recorded participants in the organized corps numbered 540,000 in 1940, increased to 3,838,000 in 1943, and dropped to 2,633,000 in 1945. The unorganized volunteers were estimated at 580,000 in 1940, 2,662,000 in 1943, and 4,867,000 in 1945, though the latter figure, especially, must be taken with several grains of salt.

Over one billion recorded hours were contributed by the organized corps during the eight fiscal years 1939-47. This was a quantity of work over three times the amount given in the same period by all paid workers (based on 250 eight-hour days per paid worker per year). To the work of the organized corps should be added that of the unorganized volunteers, but no systematic records were kept of the latter group. If

1. Ibid., p. 13. The figures for chapters include part-time personnel; 82 percent of the 1940 figure and 86 percent of the 1945 figure were full-time employees.
2. The number of chapters varied slightly during these years. The number in 1940 was 3,721; 1943, 3,757; 1945, 3,754. Ibid., p. 15.
3. Ibid., Table 9, p. 13
4. "Seven Year Report," p. 2. These data are for fiscal years ending June 30 of the years cited.
5. The number of unorganized volunteers are estimates only, and probably highly inflated. One investigator believes the peak year enrollment of 1945 was closer to 1,500,000 than to 4,867,000. See M. R. Huteson, "Volunteer Special Services in World War II, 1939-1947," p. 5, f. 1.
6. Ibid., p. 2.
one estimates, as does one investigator, that the unorganized group contributed an amount of time over half that of the organized, it may be assumed that for every hour of paid work there were roughly something like five hours of volunteer work (organized and unorganized), or that volunteers accounted for over 80 percent of all wartime Red Cross work-hours.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 2-3}

Such comparisons as these, however, do not measure the relative efficiency of volunteer and paid work performed per hour, nor do these suggest the amount of professional staff supervision necessitated by volunteer work. It should also be remembered that each corps member gave only an average of 65.4 hours of service per year,\footnote{"Seven Year Report," p. 7. This average applies to the years 1939-1946.} in contrast to the full-time service of the paid staff.

As to the work performed by the volunteers, a few statistics are impressive. Among the organized corps, between 1939 and 1946 volunteers in Arts and Skills (organized in 1943) worked with convalescent men and women in 105 hospitals. The Canteen Corps served over 120 million meals to servicemen. Volunteers in the Home Service Corps (as well as Home Service paid workers and Home Service volunteers who were not members of the organized corps) gave welfare service to millions of ex-servicemen, members of the armed forces, and their families. Transportation amounting to over 60 million miles was furnished by the Motor Corps to Red Cross and to military officials. "Gray Ladies" of the hospital and Recreation Corps provided service and recreation for convalescents in
1,044 federal and civilian hospitals. The volunteer Dietitian's Aide Corps assisted in 263 hospitals; the Nurses Aide Corps gave essential service in 2,493, certifying 215,495 aides. Over 63 million garments were made or repaired by the Production Corps; more than 31 million kit bags and miscellaneous articles were produced. Out of Production Corps work rooms came almost two and one-half billion surgical dressings.¹

The Blood Donor Service, operated with assistance from several corps, saved the lives of thousands upon thousands, collecting over 13 million pints of blood for the armed forces between February 1941 and September 1945.²

The efforts of the unorganized volunteer group have not been recorded as impressively in figures, though we have noted earlier the varied types of work executed by these workers. Suggestive is the fact that one activity alone--first aid instruction--resulted in the certification of almost 9 million persons (1939-46).³ This instruction was given almost entirely by volunteers.

Some notion of the effort put forth at the chapter level by the unorganized workers may be conjectured from the following estimates of

¹ "Seven Year Report," p. 10. There was also a Staff Assistance Corps, an organized group of general office workers. The Braille Corps was terminated in late 1942 when its services were no longer needed.
² "Seven Year Report," p. 49.
³ Ibid., p. 87.
their numbers for 1944-45:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Home Service</td>
<td>18,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Executive Committees</td>
<td>18,716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disaster and Civilian War Aid</td>
<td>17,285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Red Cross</td>
<td>16,935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nursing Enrollment</td>
<td>10,471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Aid</td>
<td>9,835</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home Nursing</td>
<td>9,180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Safety</td>
<td>6,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>5,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Health Nursing</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>114,112</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One of the best testing grounds not only of volunteer effort but of the collaboration of professional and non-professional workers was to be found in chapter Home Service. This service, staffed with paid workers, unorganized volunteers, and organized volunteers, handled 17,980,230 cases between 1939 and 1946. Its workers often dealt with serious human problems—problems confounded by the entanglement of emotional, physical, and financial aspects. They gave consultation and guidance in personal and family problems, assisted with communications between servicemen and their families, furnished information about government regulations and legislation, and assisted in presenting claims for pensions and other government benefits. They furnished military authorities with reports needed in medical and psychiatric treatment or in deciding questions of discharge and furlough, and provided financial assistance on the basis of need.

In the small chapter this work was usually performed by a volunteer,

3. Ibid., p. 55.
with some advice and instruction from the area office. What this meant in terms of human activity was graphically and humorously described by two workers in Huron, South Dakota. The work they did, if concentrated, was not untypical:

...we dashed all over the county and meddled into people's lives and histories, past and future, bought the baby's shoes, got the boys furloughs, helped the old folks with their allotments, had marriages annulled where a fellow has forgotten he has a wife and three babies, looked at the dead to make sure they were really dead, comforted the tearful, reported the AMOS's and talked them into going back and being a good boy, loaned money and turned the loan into a grant, used up our husbands' can coupons, ran up the electric bill, kept the household awake pounding on this typewriter, borrowed a four drawer steel file, let the house co, stopped cooking and washing dishes, stay /sic/ home nights because some farmer is coming in to try to get his boy out of the Army, and answer the telephone every time it rings, which is on the average of every ten minutes by actual count, AND HAVE BEEN HAPPY AND GLAD TO DO IT...¹

In the larger chapters, where both professional (largely paid) and non-professional (largely volunteer) personnel worked together, serious problems were sometimes posed in securing cooperation between the two groups. During the first year of the war the Home Service women of Volunteer Special Services felt that the professional workers gave only lip service to the idea of using volunteers intelligently and extensively.² Gradually, however, this tendency to give Home Service volunteers insignificant and confining jobs was at least partially broken down.

Chapters learned what might have been expected: "that the more they demanded of their volunteers, the more they received from them. When

². Green, "Home Service Corps," pp. 50-51, HDF.
given only 'busy' work to do, volunteers became restless and unreliable, but when given definite assignments and real responsibility, their interest grew and they usually increased their hours of work.\(^1\)

In some places, New York, Chicago, Detroit, Los Angeles, Washington, no distinction was made between paid staff and volunteers: ability constituted the criterion in assignment. Rochester, New York, worked out a chart showing exactly what service could be handled by professional staff, what might be delegated to volunteers. Los Angeles judged the work of volunteers on the same basis as professionals, evaluating both at six-month intervals.\(^2\) That volunteers had proved themselves in professional work by 1945-46 was revealed in a comparison of assignments of volunteer and paid chapter workers:\(^3\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Assignment</th>
<th>Paid (in percent of total)</th>
<th>Volunteers (in percent of total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workers dealing with cases</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretarial and clerical</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative and supervisory</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The lesson of the war for Home Service, as apparently for other services in which volunteers participated, was that intelligent volunteers, with basic training and reasonable supervision, could gradually be led to increasingly responsible work. The chief incentive was the

desire to be of genuine service. The chief reward: a feeling of having done one's part. The usual media of publicity kept the public aware of needs, and it responded to the call to do useful war work. Volunteers were drawn from classes to which Red Cross had not traditionally appealed; the organization became more representative of the public at large. In the Nurse's Aide Corps, for example, there were not only women of leisure, but women with children who did all of their own housework, shop and factory girls, typists and bookkeepers, teachers and business executives. Volunteers in other Red Cross work represented a comparable range of social classes, occupations, and interests.

The numerous problems involved in securing the highest efficiency from the volunteer—problems of selection, training, supervision, and the like—are beyond the scope of this brief account. War experience suggested, however, that if volunteers were to be utilized to best advantage, an efficient, continuing, paid national staff was essential to supervise and coordinate the volunteer and paid work conducted in the chapters. Also requisite was a large, paid staff at the work level to give efficient day-to-day service to the various Red Cross publics in camps, hospitals, and clubs. The management of these paid workers during World War II is the major concern of the following chapters.

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SECTION I

PREPARING FOR A WAR EMERGENCY
CHAPTER II

NATURE AND ADEQUACY OF ADVANCE PLANNING

A. OVERALL PLANNING FOR PERSONNEL

"The Red Cross organization arose as a result of war and the relief of war conditions has always remained its prime objective."\(^1\) Thus, during years of uncertain peace between two world wars one aspect of its work, like that of the armed forces, was preparation for war. In executing this responsibility the American Red Cross appointed a committee on preparation for war in July 1934\(^2\) known as the Military Relief Committee.

1. Major General Robert U. Patterson, The Surgeon General, to J. B. Payne, Chairman, Central Committee, American Red Cross, December 1, 1931, National Archives, War Department, No. 080 (ARC)T, SGO. Reproduced in "War Department Documents, 1898-1933, From National Archives", in Historical Division Files; hereafter cited as "WD Documents, 1898-1933, HDF."

2. H. R. Hutcheson, "Preparation for a War Emergency. First Phase: July 1934 to March 1938", p. 1, HDF, hereafter cited as Hutcheson, "First Phase." This monograph was based largely on previous accounts by Marian B. Clausen and G. R. Gaedert, but is used in this paper as a convenient single source of reference.

3. While this was the first definite step taken by the Red Cross in preparation for World War II, at least one branch of the military had been aware for some years of the importance of Red Cross war preparation through the medium of continuous training in peacetime services to the armed forces. As early as 1928 the Surgeon General of the Army had expressed the belief that any curtailment of peacetime Red Cross work with and for the Army hospitals would be ill-advised. "We cannot hope," he said, "to expand efficiently the vast organization to be needed by the Red Cross in time of war without a small peacetime cadre thoroughly trained in the intricacies of military relief" (Major General /Irland/?, The Surgeon General, to Director of War Service, American Red Cross, March 21, 1928, WD Documents, 1898-1933, HDF).

In the depression year of 1931 the Army Surgeon General, R. U. Patterson, who was also a member of the central Committee of the American Red Cross expressed his concern with the state of preparedness of the Red Cross to meet its obligations to the armed forces in the event
This Committee met and worked in extreme secrecy for four years, preparing on March 31, 1938 its "Confidential Preliminary Report: Preparedness for War," a numbered document with copies assigned to a select list of persons. This Report was never intended to set down in final form what the Red Cross would do in case or war. It was to serve as a basis for a more elaborate and complete plan of war work.

From the point of view of planning for personnel administration in war, this Report, even as a preliminary statement, is of interest chiefly because of its slight treatment of the whole subject. The personnel "problem" as envisaged in the Report was one merely of recruitment. With reference to the number and classifications of people to be needed in time of war, the Report only reproduced World War I figures on the number of paid and volunteer personnel in this country and abroad, without suggesting the more pertinent information as to the number of persons in the various types of jobs established in World War I, or the qualifications needed to perform such jobs.

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1. Hutcheson, "First Phase," p. 1, HDF.
2. Ibid., pp. 10, 15.
3. As assigned to the main organizational units.
4. "Confidential Preliminary Report: Preparedness for War," p. 16, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HDF. The Report also quoted Army and Navy regulations dealing with personnel to be furnished the armed forces by the Red Cross, including nurses, dietitians, pharmacists, cooks and other hospital personnel, and physicians. But apparently these regulations on recruitment, with the exception of those pertaining to nurses and dietitians, had not been seriously considered by the Red Cross in the inter-war years. One of the purposes of the conferences with representatives of the Army and Navy then being undertaken was
Of the general problem of recruitment in wartime, the Report took a rosy view. Reference was made to the ability of the Red Cross during the 1937 Ohio-Mississippi Valley flood to recruit and utilize personnel "approximating in number and equaling in variety of professional technical requirements" the persons used during World War I. Some 10,000 paid workers and 45,000 volunteers had been secured in 1937. On the basis of this experience the Committee concluded, apparently without thought of any prospective competition for workers in wartime, that "largely as a result of actual experience in recruiting such staffs it may be assumed that the Red Cross could speedily recruit the necessary personnel for its own wartime activities."

Other aspects of large-scale personnel administration were ignored in the Report. This is surprising since the Report was to take into account the experience and problems of World War I, during which employee training, for example, had been a matter of concern. But it is understandable in the light of the lack of attention to the general development of personnel administration by the Red Cross during the inter-war years. However, on the positive side, the Report pointed out a basic problem: that planning for personnel and organization was dependent upon an understanding with the military as to the services to be rendered to the armed forces by the Red Cross. "Until the scope of the activities is ... determined at least in a general way," stated the Report, "the Red

to determine the extent to which the Red Cross would actually be called upon to supply the types of personnel listed (ibid., pp. 17-19).
1. Ibid., p. 16
2. Annual Report, Department of Personnel, July 1, 1918--June 30, 1919, Gaedert Collection, MDF.
Cross cannot complete detailed plans for organization and personnel.\textsuperscript{1}

The Report recommended strengthening of liaison with the armed forces, continuation of planning for war, and preparation of a list of all services which the Red Cross might be called upon to perform for the armed forces and for civilian populations in a future war. Following such a tabulation, "simple, flexible plans for organization and personnel [should] be formulated and thereafter kept up to date to facilitate the ready transition of the American Red Cross from a peacetime to a wartime status at any time."\textsuperscript{2} Had these general recommendations been carried out in some detail, an adequate plan for wartime personnel administration could have been developed.

The assumption behind the Confidential Preliminary Report was further detailed planning. This was done in an informal, continuing, yet "deliberate and organized" study, known as the "Report on Preparedness for War,"\textsuperscript{3} most of which probably was written in the summer and fall of 1939 according to the reasonable guess of a student of this period.\textsuperscript{4} An outline of this Report on Preparedness for War suggests that further personnel planning was contemplated, for it lists the following headings for elaboration:

2. Ibid., p. 21.
3. No report of this further planning was published; the subjects under discussion were developed in meetings of the Committee and presented to the Central Committee of the Red Cross for discussion from time to time (DeWitt Smith, Domestic Operations, to I. Denison, Nov. 27, 1946, telephone conversation, HRF).
1. National Organization Personnel  
   a. Kinds  
      1. Paid  
      2. Volunteer  
   b. Sources, recruiting  
   c. Qualifications  
   d. Compensation  
   e. Maintenance and Transportation  
   f. Training  
   g. Titles, Uniforms, etc.  
   h. Insurance, claims, etc.  

2. Chapter Personnel  
   a. Kinds  
      1. Paid  
      2. Volunteer  
   b. Sources, recruiting  
   c. Qualifications  
   d. Compensation  
   e. Training  
   f. Uniforms, etc.  

This outline, however, was not developed in the full Report.

The section on personnel in the "Report on Preparedness for War" merely reproduced a portion of the earlier statement on personnel appearing in the 1938 "Preliminary Report: Preparedness for War." Although the "Report on Preparedness for War" dealt in some detail with war plans in areas other than personnel, formal, overall planning in this vital field was for some reason not carried beyond the preliminary 1938 stage. As a result Red Cross proceeded into the national defense period of 1940-41, and to the outbreak of the second World War itself, without an overall

2. See Section X, "Report on Preparedness for War," DeWitt Smith Preparedness Binder, HFD. At another point in the Report it is recommended that in event of war a new bureau of Civilian Training be set up and that the regular personnel department be expanded to carry out recruitment and enrollment functions. These suggestions hardly constituted an overall personnel plan, however.
personnel plan.  

1. Later statements of December 1940 and March 1941 on "The American Red Cross and National Defense" contain no suggestion of an overall personnel plan (DeWitt Smith, at Midwestern Area Field Staff Conference, December 2, 1940, "The ARC and National Defense," pp. 15-16, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HDF; ARC, "The ARC and National Defense," March 1, 1941, (mimeograph), Atkinson Binder No. 9, HDF). A release to chapter chairman in October 1940 in connection with the annual Roll Call contained a copy of the "Revised National Defense Outline," which suggested under "Personnel" that the Red Cross intended to improve training "all along the line," to strengthen personnel by enlarging the Red Cross staff and the Red Cross personnel staff, and to develop assistant managers and understudies in the areas. These items were intended as suggestive of what the Red Cross was thinking about, and were not part of a definite program (Fieser to Chapter Chairman, October 31, 1940, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HDF).
B. PIECMEAL PLANNING FOR PERSONNEL

1. ORGANIZATION-WIDE PLANNING

Though it had no overall plan for personnel to meet a war emergency, the Red Cross did a certain amount of piecemeal planning between the years 1939 and 1941. It was, as the term "piecemeal" suggests, not designed to meet a total war situation. The relatively small amount of this planning was in accord with the general temper of conservatism and hesitation regarding the expansion of Red Cross activities which existed until at least June 1941 on the part of the Chairman and the Central Committee of the Red Cross.\(^1\) While there was apparently a strong feeling on the part of some service heads that the need for expanding activities was urgent during 1940-41,\(^2\) the planning for personnel did not, and probably could not, follow this feeling to any large degree in view of top management conservatism.

A few examples of piecemeal planning before the war may be mentioned:

When the Red Cross began thinking specifically, in August 1939, of what work it would do in a European war in which the United States was not engaged, a special Committee Concerning Necessary Additional Personnel was appointed.\(^3\) The Committee was handicapped in its planning because of the lack of any basic policy governing the participation of the Red Cross

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1. R. R. Hutcherson, "Services to the Armed Forces Before Pearl Harbor," p. 23, HRF.
2. Ibid.
3. DeWitt Smith to Chairman Norman Davis, September 5, 1939, HRF.
in such an emergency, and it accepted the usual Red Cross view of the
case with which workers could be added to the staff. It did, however,
list the types of personnel it thought would be required in such an emer-
gency, making very brief suggestions as to their recruitment. The Report
of the Committee also recommended a quiet strengthening of certain ser-
1 vices and offices, one of the most important of which was War Service.
In practice, this strengthening was conservative, the Director of War
Service stating that "only definitely weak spots should be strengthened
by adding new personnel." 2

Somewhat later, in 1940, a special Committee on Foreign Personnel
listed again the categories of persons likely to be required in a war
in which the United States was not engaged, and set up some general
standards for their recruitment. For immediate action the Committee
suggested (1) a listing of domestic Red Cross staff qualified and
available for foreign service, and (2) a survey of potential foreign
service personnel outside the organization. 3 These suggestions were
approved, and some service heads and area managers were asked to
carry them out. 4 This plan was merely to assure some advance prepara-
tion, for the Red Cross did not then know how many workers, if any,
would be needed for foreign service. As events transpired, no appreciable
numbers of Red Cross workers were sent overseas until the United States

1. Ibid., p. 6.
2. Don Smith, Director of War Service, to DeWitt Smith, September 15,
1939, No. 340.1; quoted in Hutcheson, "SAF Before Pearl Harbor,"
pp. 13-14.
3. J. Blaine Gwin, Director of Personnel, to Fieser, April 18, 1940,
4. Fieser to Area Manager, May 11, 1940, No. FW.3; Fieser to Nicholson,
Don Smith, et al, May 18, 1940, No. 300.02.
entered the war. Red Cross participation in European relief activities was not direct, but through foreign Red Cross societies and through the International Red Cross Committee and the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva. 1

Other than such efforts as these there is little in the way of plans to prepare the entire Red Cross organization for an emergency, especially for a war in which the United States should be involved. In September 1939 the Director of Personnel asked higher management what Red Cross policy should be toward the use of World War I workers in another emergency 2 and later suggested some possible uses of experienced workers in the event of need; 3 at another time he suggested that the Red Cross establish employment qualifications similar to Civil Service standards for the specific types of workers likely to be required; 4 someone suggested the creation of a file index of the qualifications of all Red Cross personnel to aid in filling vacancies within the organization in time of emergency; 5 there was some thought that the National Headquarters office should exercise more control over chapters, insisting on certain standards in the selection of chapter workers; a comprehensive training program both within the Red Cross and through universities was

1. William Breese, Special Assistant, to Mr. Downe, October 17, 1941, WD: William M. Baxter, Jr., Manager, Midwestern Branch, to J. C. Arnold, Austin, Texas, April 3, 1940, No. FW.3, WD.
2. Gwin to DeWitt Smith, October 2, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, WD.
3. Gwin to DeWitt Smith, October 29, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 8, WD.
4. Gwin to DeWitt Smith, September 29, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, WD: Gwin to DeWitt Smith, October 2, 1939, No. 320.2.
5. H. B. Atkinson, to Fieser, August 6, 1940, No. 320.2.
6. Fieser to Schaefer, Baxter, Allen, August 29, 1939, with attachment, Gwin, "Meeting of Special Committee Regarding Organization and Responsibilities of Personnel Service," Atkinson Binder No. 9, WD.
briefly outlined;\(^1\) at one time some thirty-one pertinent questions of policy concerning personnel in the event of war were raised.\(^2\) Such suggestions as these were hardly plans, however; they were ideas in the discussion stage, and there is little evidence of any concerted planning springing from them.

2. SERVICE-WIDE PLANNING

Within the services themselves varying degrees of attention were given to preparation for war, examples of which follow. After the President's declaration of a limited emergency in the fall of 1939, the Director of Domestic Operations surveyed his male staff who would be subject to military duty with the intention of recruiting and training substitutes for workers definitely committed to military service. He also suggested general qualifications and conditions of employment for new male personnel (e.g., field directors and assistant field directors) for use in the limited emergency and in possible event of war, but no formal Red Cross training for these workers was contemplated.\(^3\)

In the spring of 1940 the Director of War Service, recognizing that the daily routine permitted practically no time for the development of additional personnel or the preparation of training plans and material, suggested the appointment of an additional Assistant Director of War

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1. Mr. Sanderson to Robert E. Bondy, SAF Administrator, June 13, 1941, HDF; Fieser to W. W. Pettit, New York School of Social Worker, September 11, 1939, No. PW.3.
Service. With this administrative assistance the Director and Assistant Director could devote more time to such matters as training programs for Home Service workers in chapters and for field directors and assistant field directors. Additional administrative assistance was provided during 1941, but a formal training program for field directors was not established until after Pearl Harbor.

Within Hospital Service, Margaret Hagan, then field director at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, had noted in 1941 the shortage of trained psychiatric social workers for Red Cross service in war. She suggested a plan to teach the principles of basic psychiatry to non-psychiatric social workers and to specified volunteers of the Red Cross, recommending the appointment of a consultant in psychiatric social work at National Headquarters to carry out such a program. No one was appointed to the position by the time of Pearl Harbor.

Such personnel programs and attempted programs as these, while suggestive of service activity in war preparation, and valuable insofar as they went, did not constitute a complete, well organized or coordinated plan for the total participation of the Red Cross in a war emergency.

1. This same recommendation included an addition of 10 field directors and 5 hospital workers (Don Smith to DeWitt Smith, May 22, 1940, No. 140.11).
C. SOME RED CROSS CONCEPTS AFFECTING PERSONNEL PLANNING FOR WAR

Lack of a personnel plan for war is in part explained by some basic concepts regarding war work expressed by the Red Cross policy-makers during the years 1938-41. Concepts which vitally affected Red Cross preparation for wartime personnel administration included:

1. That wartime services of the Red Cross to the armed forces would be fundamentally an elaboration and extension of peacetime services to the armed forces, conducted through a well-established, trained, and highly flexible Red Cross organization which could be adapted to wartime use speedily and smoothly.2

Emphasis was placed on the fact that the Red Cross, through its daily operations for the military, and backed by the organization and financial machinery of the large number of chapters and of the national headquarters, was well prepared to meet a war emergency. "Throughout the peacetime period of twenty years following the World War," wrote Don Smith, Director of War Service, in May 1939, "a high degree of effectiveness, efficiency and of standards has been developed through the daily employment of the Red Cross by the military...a high degree of preparedness has been attained..."3 This and other references to the "thorough state of preparation" secured by the Red Cross through

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1. While there was some distinction between planning for national defense activities and for war, after December 2, 1940 Red Cross planners "had quite ceased thinking of United States involvement in war as a 'possibility'. It 'had become a virtual certainty" (Hutcheson, "Second Phase," p. 39).
2. DeWitt Smith to Cornelius N. Bliss, Chairman, Advisory Committee on War Relief, July 12, 1940, Atkinson Binder No. 9, MDF; DeWitt Smith to Mabel Boardman, November 12, 1940, No. 112.04; ARC, "The ARC and National Defense," (mimeograph), March 1, 1941, p. 8, Atkinson Binder No. 9, MDF; Fieser to Staff Members, July 24, 1940.
3. Don Smith to DeWitt Smith, May 1, 1931, No. 102.02.
4. DeWitt Smith to Bliss, July 12, 1940, Atkinson Binder No. 9, MDF.
its peacetime experience suggest that the top policy-makers may have over-emphasized the ease with which a going, but small organization, could adapt itself to a war emergency. In terms of personnel administration there was no basic Red Cross personnel plan or system which could be adapted.

2. That expansion of the Red Cross staff to meet an emergency situation could be accomplished speedily, easily, and effectively.¹

This widely-held belief in the ease with which workers could be added to the staff in event of war had its chief basis in the success of the Red Cross in recruiting 10,000 paid and 45,000 volunteer workers for flood relief activities in 1937. Another correlative belief, expressed as late as March 1941, was that a continuing state of unemployment would provide a large reservoir of persons from which to draw at any time.² There seemed to be a continuing acceptance of the myth, expressed in 1939 by the Committee on Additional Personnel, that in case of emergency, "the principal problem would not be to recruit the necessary personnel," but "diplomatically to handle the inquiries which will doubtless be received from the large number of persons who...may seek employment."³ While this belief appears untenable in retrospect, at the time it appeared sensible, and was borne out by the substantial and increasing number of application for Red Cross employment received in

1. DeWitt Smith to Davis, September 5, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, UDF; DeWitt Smith, "The ARC and National Defense," December 2, 1940, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HOF; ARC, "The ARC and National Defense," (mimeograph), March 1, 1941, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HOF.
3. DeWitt Smith to Davis, September 5, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, UDF.
3. That Red Cross, in preparing for a war emergency, should profit from the experience of World War I, but should also be prepared to meet new conditions. To meet new conditions, in terms of planning, meant a close understanding with the armed forces as to the services to be furnished by the Red Cross, as well as to the prospective number and distribution of troops.1

As early as the "Confidential Preliminary Report of 1938," the Red Cross recognized that services to the armed forces must be defined before any detailed plans for organization and personnel might be effected. In the report on "Preparedness for War," most of which was written in 1939, concern was again expressed as to the liaison problem.2 Earlier in that year the Director of War Service had emphasized the inadequacy of liaison with the Army in commenting on the difficulty of obtaining official information on expanding air fields in the Midwest. "One officer," he wrote, "says one thing and another officer contradicts him. The trouble is we have no place to go where the officer will feel responsibility for the information he gives us..."3 "Nothing is clearer in the history of the pre-Pearl Harbor period," concludes one study, "than the utter inadequacy of liaison between the Red Cross and the Army and Navy."4

This relationship was not improved, in a formal way,5 until

3. Don Smith to DeWitt Smith, April 8, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HCF.
4. Hutcheson, "SAF Before Pearl Harbor," p. 44.
5. This is not to say that progressive understandings with the Army and Navy were not reached, for by the middle of 1940 the Army and Navy had issued Mobilization Regulations which provided that the Red Cross.
June 30, 1943, when AR 850-75 was revised to include provision that the Assistant Chief of Staff for Personnel, G-I, would be responsible for all policy decisions regarding Red Cross. This implemented an amended Act of 1912 by officially broadening Red Cross liaison to include the Army as a whole rather than the Medical Corps alone, as previously. \(^1\)

But the establishment of this channel did not automatically solve the liaison problem. Obtaining sufficiently close liaison with the armed forces to secure definition of Red Cross services and knowledge of numbers and locations of troops to be served was a major problem, not only between 1938-1941, but in the war period itself. \(^2\) It was a problem

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1. Hutcheson, "Adaptation to Continued Military Expansion (1943)," p. 62, HDP. A revision of Navy Regulations, January 24, 1944, provided in Article 1272 for the appointment of a liaison officer by the Chief of Naval Personnel "to act as the Navy's representative in all policy matters except those relating to the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery" (ibid., p. 66).

2. This problem of liaison was an old one, dating back to the beginnings of the American Red Cross. See Marian B. Clausen, "Planning for a War Emergency: Part II," HDP.
for which the Red Cross cannot be held solely responsible, for the Red Cross was continually seeking improved liaison.¹

This lack of liaison may have been one of the very important reasons behind the failure of the Red Cross to prepare effective personnel plans for war. Even if the Red Cross policy-makers had been inclined toward personnel planning, the Red Cross had to wait for the Army and Navy to act before it could take action. The Red Cross felt it could not recruit personnel without knowing the number and disposition of troops; throughout the preparedness period the Director of War Service was hampered by a lack of such information.² The indecision of the military during this period, seemingly not clear as to their own needs, plus the lack of military information, made difficult any intelligent planning by the Red Cross to meet the needs of expanding military forces. As a consequence, steps taken to strengthen personnel in a service such as Camp Service followed increases in military forces rather than being a part of a staffing plan anticipating these increases.³

This method of meeting the needs of armed forces in training before Pearl Harbor amounted to what has been called an "opportunistic adjustment to a changing environment."⁴ Such events as the proclamation by the President of a limited emergency on September 8, 1939; the authorization of an additional 100,000 men for the armed forces by June of 1940;

3. Ibid., p. 18.
4. Ibid., p. 17.
and the federalization of the National Guard, enactment of Selective Service legislation, and the calling up of Navy and Marine Corps reserves in 1940 all were followed by Red Cross action to meet the demonstrated need on the basis of a conservative expansion to meet the growth of the armed forces. ¹

This "conservative expansion" was in part the result of a lack of information from the military, but perhaps as important was the underlying conservatism of the Red Cross, rooted in an attachment to the concept of the flexibility of the organization and particularly in the longstanding belief that persons competent to perform Red Cross services could be acquired on short notice. It was this attitude probably (plus what she considered a lack of definite progress) that led Mabel Boardman to be "absolutely discouraged" about the Red Cross by May 1941. "It won't be long before the best people will be enlisted in...other organizations that are alive, while we, it seems to me, are sleeping." ²

The net result was a lag in services to the armed forces even before the war broke out. In Camp Service, for example, by the time of Pearl Harbor the initial caution in recruiting personnel, the developing manpower shortage, and the loss of experienced field personnel to administrative positions resulted in inadequate field coverage. ³ The number of men in the armed forces rose during the fiscal year 1940-41 from 425,000 to about 1,750,000—an increase of slightly over 300 percent.

¹ Ibid., pp. 17-20.
² Boardman to Davis, May 22, 1941, Gaeddert Collection, HAP.
During the same period Red Cross paid employees on duty with these forces increased from 251 to 635—an increase of roughly 150 percent.¹

¹ Hutcherson, "SAD Before Pearl Harbor," p. 27. The field staff as such increased from 100 in November 1940 to 241 in September 1941 (Bykofsky, "Camp Service—1938—Pearl Harbor," p. 42). Even this expansion proved a great boon once war broke out for it furnished an enlarged staff of trained personnel facilitating wartime expansion.
CHAPTER III

THE PERSONNEL PROGRAM BY 1941

A. PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION AND THE RED CROSS

One way to prepare for war is to make paper plans for a personnel program to meet war needs. Another, and complementary, method of preparing for war is the establishment in peacetime of a well-balanced personnel program, supported by a trained staff, to serve as a foundation for an expanded wartime personnel work, and to facilitate the transition to wartime operations. Having examined the extent of formal personnel planning for war, we may turn to a brief examination of the status of personnel administration in the Red Cross at the outbreak of the war.

Little attention was given by Red Cross management to personnel administration during the inter-war years. Although personnel administration was still in a relatively early stage of development, during the 1930's substantial progress had been made in defining concepts and policies. This was true, not only by private business organizations, but (more closely related to Red Cross experience) by public and quasi-public agencies. It was during these years that the Tennessee Valley Authority produced one of the best conceived and executed programs in the public service. In Washington, D. C., in physical proximity to Red Cross headquarters, organizations such as the Department of Agriculture and the Social Security Board were making notable progress. The Civil Service Commission in Washington was responsible for two personnel functions which the Red Cross was later to find essential: efficiency
rating and position classification. In the early thirties the Federal Personnel Council [then known as the Council of Personnel Agencies] was established as the overall coordinating body for personnel administration in the Federal service. One of its purposes was to serve as a center and clearing-house of information regarding federal personnel administration. Closer contact with it and with governmental agency personnel directors might well have been to the advantage of the Red Cross in keeping abreast of significant developments in the personnel field which had application to the Red Cross.

Actually, however, personnel administration within the Red Cross existed as a thing apart from this main stream. It did not feel the impact of programs developing outside the Red Cross. The crucial importance of personnel administration, especially in preparation for war, was not appreciated by Red Cross top management in the inter-war years. Perhaps as a consequence of this attitude, no persons trained in personnel administration were added to the permanent staff in positions of responsibility. This was hardly surprising when one considers that the Red Cross was an organization numbering only 700 at the outbreak of the European war.¹ Deficiencies in personnel management techniques and practices did not make themselves unduly felt; the well-known (if largely informal) means for handling personnel matters sufficed for the day, and seemed adequate for the future.

¹. Harry A. Wann, Personnel Director, to L. F. Hackemann, Historical Division, August 28, 1946, HDF.
B. RED CROSS PERSONNEL POLICIES

Red Cross personnel administration had its origins in a personnel office established in June of 1917 to recruit, enroll, and dispatch persons for overseas service. By June 1918 it was recruiting persons for National Headquarters and domestic camps also. After the close of the war, the headquarters personnel staff shrank from 32 persons to a director and an associate director in the 1930's, selected from within the organization, each of whom gave only part-time service to the work.

As to the personnel policies actually in effect during the thirties, the records show that leave and travel regulations were published, that only American citizens might be employed on the permanent staff, and that a retirement system had been in effect since May 1936. In filling vacancies consideration was to be given to persons within the organization. There were not, however, specific overall policies regarding such

1. Margaret Clapp, "Organization of the Red Cross National Personnel Office, 1947-45," p. 1, "PDF. (Hereafter cited as Clapp, "Personnel Office"). Interestingly enough, in 1918 the Personnel Bureau, as it was termed, was unable to perform the recruiting function satisfactorily from headquarters, and decentralized the operation on October 1, 1918 to Personnel Bureaus in each of the 13 Divisional Headquarters then in existence. Because of the end of the war, this new plan was not adequately tested, yet the experience foreshadowed that of World War II. In 1941 for a second time the Red Cross attempted to operate a centralized recruiting and placement function in Washington, only to see it fail, and to be forced to decentralize to the five area offices in May 1943. This decentralized recruitment continues into the post-war period, and apparently it is the established pattern for the future.


3. In connection with the retirement system, physical examinations and birth certificates were required for permanent employees appointed after May 1, 1936. For a full discussion of the retirement plan, see a monograph by Margaret Clapp, "Provisions for Retirement," "PDF.

essentials of personnel administration as classification of positions, pay schedules, periodic personnel evaluations, employee relations, and in-service training. "All in all," wrote an administrator, "the policies are so inadequate in their coverage and specifically limiting in their treatment of the subject as to prevent the establishment of a unified plan of personnel administration." 

1. As of 1941, some health and welfare activities were conducted by one nurse at national headquarters. Before the reorganization of July 1941 she reported to the Chief Clerk; with the reorganization of July 1941 he was made an assistant director of personnel and the welfare nurse became a part of Personnel Service.

2. This is not to say that the value of additional services was not recognized by the Director of Personnel. From time to time he suggested increased services. For example, in January 1938 he called attention to such needs as those for periodic reviews of the staff, of health and welfare activities, and of service on employee problems including transfer and personality difficulties, as well as other matters. He asked for an additional personnel worker and stenographic help, but these were denied on budget grounds (I. Denison, "Personnel and Training Before and Apart from SAF, Policies, Organization," p. 21, HDF).

C. NATURE OF RED CROSS PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION: LINE AND STAFF FUNCTIONS

In the 1930's Red Cross policy made line officers, heading up to the three Vice-Chairmen each in charge of a group of services, responsible for personnel matters within their respective jurisdictions.¹ Under this arrangement operating officials, such as managers of areas² and directors of services in headquarters, were responsible for training and welfare activities in their own sectors of the organization; for administering the rules regarding leave regulations, time reports, and office hours; and for executing personnel functions such as appointments, transfers, and separations when approved by the particular Vice Chairman to whom they reported.³

Personnel Service as such had no line responsibility for the execution of general personnel policies; the Director of Personnel served as an advisory staff aid to line officers "with respect to the more important phases of recruiting, placement, and training of Red Cross workers for the entire organization."⁴ He reported not to the Chairman of the Red Cross but to the Vice-Chairman in charge of Domestic Operations. Thus, he had a position in the hierarchy lower than that ordinarily desired for personnel administrators, and moreover he reported to an officer responsible for one group of Red Cross services.

¹. General Instruction letter No. 20, June 2, 1936 is the basic policy reference for this period.
². Originally the three "areas" were known as "branches"; they are referred to in the text as areas inasmuch as that term came to be the accepted designation. The number was increased to 4 in 1942, and to 5 in 1943.
³. CI 20, p. 3.
⁴. CI 20, p. 2.
rather than for all services.

The "staff" duties of Personnel Service at headquarters were to interview some applicants for employment and to perform the clerical routines in connection with putting persons on the payroll; to answer inquiries regarding present or former employees; to aid areas and services in training; and to aid chapters in recruiting, placement, and training of professional workers. As "soon as practicable" after June 1936, when this policy was issued, Personnel Service was to develop facilities to classify workers, to suggest salary ratings and changes, and to handle individual personnel problems as they might arise. 2

In practice, these latter functions were not developed by 1941. Recruitment and placement were, for all practical purposes, a line responsibility. The specific training duties of Personnel Service were not clear from the policy statement, 3 nor was there any specially trained or designated training staff to perform them.

Until July 1941 the Director and Assistant Director of Personnel were both part-time workers. On that date the directorship was made a full-time position, and two full-time assistant directors were appointed. This so-called "reorganization of 1941" also provided that all personnel matters having to do with recruiting, training, and employment of

1. These included "answering inquiries concerning employment opportunities, obtaining necessary references, and classifying and recording such information so that it may be readily available to the heads of all services and activities and others concerned" (GI 20, p. 2)
2. GI 20, pp. 2-3.
3. GI 20, p. 2.
personnel be coordinated and centralized in Personnel Service.\(^1\) Actually, however, neither coordination nor centralization had been achieved by the date of Pearl Harbor, and the relationships and duties of Personnel Service remained much as they had been before.

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\(^1\) Fieser to National Headquarters and Area Office Staffs, July 1, 1941, No. 140.11.
D. HEADQUARTERS — AREA — CHAPTER RELATIONSHIPS

The national Director of Personnel had no representatives in the area offices until 1941. Before that time such contact as there was between the Director of Personnel and the managers of the areas was chiefly through correspondence. In July 1941 area directors of personnel were appointed; each was a person of long and meritorious Red Cross experience, but without specific training in personnel management. These area directors were under the technical guidance of the national Director of Personnel, but they were responsible to the area managers, who, as line officers, were directly responsible for personnel matters within their jurisdictions. The managers were instructed to conduct their personnel administration in accordance with national policies and procedures. In practice, area personnel administration developed without much guidance from Washington.

This relationship between headquarters and area offices in personnel matters was a loose one, as was that between headquarters and chapters, through the areas. Personnel Service located some disaster personnel and prospective paid workers for chapters, suggested some field representatives for the areas, and was supposed to help develop and "supervise" training of chapter workers. Headquarters followed the policy of letting chapters select their own workers, but attempted to guide the selection through visits, by correspondence, and through the

2. GI 20, p. 2.
3. Ibid.
4. Fieser to McClintock, et al., August 23, 1939, RDF.
publication of statements of desired minimum qualifications for chapter executives\(^1\) and workers.\(^2\) By the late thirties it was believed that, with the exception of a few of the larger chapters, all had shown increasing willingness to accept the advice of the national organization in securing personnel. By 1939 it was said that the quality of field representatives and of chapter personnel had shown "marked improvement".\(^3\)

Thus, basic Red Cross policy regarding personnel administration in the years before the war separated the line and staff aspects of the work. In a way, the Red Cross unconsciously anticipated a general development in personnel administration: by the 1940's there was renewed emphasis in personnel thinking that line officers should assume responsibility for all personnel work within their units (in conformance with established policies and often subject to review). Personnel workers as such were primarily to be kept "on tap" for advice, aid, and consultation to line management.

However, under the conditions that existed in the Red Cross during the pre-war years, the dissociation of line and staff responsibilities was not a completely happy device because (1) in many personnel matters there were no overall policies to govern line officials, and (2) there was no professionally trained personnel staff to serve as effective advisors to line officers. Had these two basic deficiencies been recog-

1. CI 29, May 23, 1939, with ARC 812, n.d., attached.
2. ARC 816, June 1939, and changes.
3. Fieser to Schafer, Baxter, Allen, August 29, 1939, Atkinson Binder No. 9, HDF.
nized and met, the Red Cross would have been much better prepared to meet the conditions of 1940-41 and of the war.
SECTION II

PERFORMING PERSONNEL FUNCTIONS DURING THE WAR
CHAPTER III

ORGANIZATION FOR PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

Personnel Service was not able to meet the increasing work load of the early months of the war. Assistants were hired as rapidly as possible—(the personnel staff numbered 33 officers by March 1942)—yet the operating services found Personnel Service slow in recruiting workers. Therefore, they continued and expanded their pre-war practice of recruiting and hiring employees directly to meet their own needs.¹

A final blow to any hope of creating an effective central personnel agency occurred when Services to the Armed Forces² set up independent units of Personnel Management and of Personnel Training in January 1942.³ Whether or not Services to the Armed Forces created these units because of the demonstrated failure of Personnel Service to function efficiently in these fields, or because the Administrator of SAF, in any case, wanted these functions under his direct control, is not entirely clear.⁴ At any rate, the demonstrated failure of Personnel Service to serve even as an effective recruiting agency made the new arrangement plausible at the time, however faulty it might appear to the expert in organization. Services other than SAF, less immediately affected by the war, added to the confusion by establishing their own personnel units or entrusting

² Services to the Armed Forces (SAF) was organized in July 1941 as the single unit responsible for all services to the men in the Army and Navy and to their families (Hutcheson, "Services to the Armed Forces Before Pearl Harbor," p. 12).
³ Annual Report, ARC, 1941-42, pp. 18, 19.
⁴ Joseph Leverenz, Assistant Director of Personnel, ARC, interview with S. D. Hoslett, March 23, 1948, HDP.
such matters, as in the past, to one or two members of their staffs who also had other responsibilities.¹

Personnel Service, as such, during the early months of the war continued to be primarily concerned with the routines of recruiting and employment, while power to select employees and to perform the other personnel functions remained in the individual services. Each service established its own policies and procedures as to qualifications for employment, salaries, promotions, and the like, producing variations among the services and areas.² "The ensuing confusion," states one writer, "of a national personnel office existing side by side with service personnel units of varying degrees of organization and effectiveness characterized the entire war period."³

General dissatisfaction with personnel management, and in particular with the recruitment of employees, led the Chairman to ask John D. Rockefeller III, then serving as a special assistant, to survey Personnel Service and to recommend changes. A study was made in March–April 1942 by a personnel official from the Standard Oil Company, whose report stated that many of the difficulties encountered in Red Cross personnel management stemmed from the "failure to key in responsibility for personnel relations at the top of the organization as an integrated function requiring specialized executive attention..."⁴ The Report

2. Ibid., p. 9.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
recommended that the Director of Personnel report not to the head of one group of services, Domestic Operations, but to the Chairman. His activities were to be subject, however, to a personnel policy committee of three or four top executives. To assist and advise the Director in proposing overall policies to this group, a second committee composed of officers handling personnel matters in each service was recommended. Also, by means not stated in the Report, area personnel officers were to be brought into closer contact with the national director. Finally, a separate Office of Employment was to be established to handle the mechanical details of recruiting and employment to free the Director of Personnel for other work.  

Following the issuance of the report, on July 1, 1942, the longtime Director of Personnel became Director of Employment Service, with duties much as they had been formerly, and a new Director of what was now termed "Personnel Relations" was appointed. The two major committees proposed in the Rockefeller report were inaugurated, the high policy control group, however, being replaced shortly thereafter by the regular Administrative Committee of the Red Cross, with whose personnel it had overlapped.

Following the resignation of the first Director of Personnel Relations, another administrative change was made. In May 1943 the

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1. Ibid., passim.
2. He reported to Domestic Operations, yet was also to be under the supervision of the new Director of Personnel Relations.
4. Ibid., pp. 11-14.
Vice-Chairman in charge of Junior Red Cross, James T. Nicholson, was made responsible for personnel matters, and the new Director of Personnel Relations reported to him. This further subordinated the Director of Personnel in the hierarchy, but at the same time it gave personnel a champion before the Administrative Committee in the person of Vice-Chairman Nicholson. The Administrative Committee continued to have authority to accept or reject proposed personnel policies.

By the winter of 1943-44 the structure of the Personnel Relations Office included an employee relations unit and a technical analysis unit, under assistant directors. The employee relations unit was concerned with:

1. Counseling, interpreting policies to employees, guiding employee activities.
2. Handling government regulations affecting personnel.

Technical analysis included:

1. Occupational and salary analysis -- concerned with job and salary classification, development of organizational charts and of a personnel evaluation system.
2. Procedure analysis which involved analysis of existing procedures, development and revision of forms and routines, etc.

A third unit was to deal with in-service training, but was never

1. A National Personnel Committee composed of top management officials was also established to assist the Vice-Chairman in formulating policies he presented to the Administrative Committee.
3. Ibid., p. 18.
organized. 1 This organization remained substantially the same for the rest of the war with the exception of the addition of another assistant director in charge of personnel policies and procedures. 2

Presumably Personnel Relations could have functioned as the central personnel office had the Administrative Committee allowed such development. But proposals looking toward this end were not approved. The only significant organizational change was one re-uniting the Employment Service with Personnel Relations in November 1944, the combined unit using the old organizational title of Personnel Service under a Director of Personnel reporting to Vice-Chairman Nicholson. 3

Thus, by the end of the war, Personnel Service, as a central personnel office, had made some advances, but it was still not in a very strong position either organizationally or in practice. Services continued until the end to perform many personnel functions, training being one of the most important. In overall personnel matters the Administrative Committee, often slow to act, retained control, never giving the Vice-Chairman in charge of personnel a general grant of authority. 4

Four reorganizations in as many years during the war, as employees increased from fewer than one thousand to more than 25 thousand, indicated some demand for improved personnel management within the Red Cross.

1. Ibid., pp. 17-18.
2. Ibid., p. 23.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid. While the Administrative Committee approved some proposals, the most important matters had to be referred for final approval to the Chairman, and perhaps by him to the Central Committee.
However, the reorganizations were inadequate; there were four different Directors of Personnel during the war; overall policies and procedures were never clarified; and personnel functions were never centralized in control or standardized in practice. These facts suggest the consequence of operating within a pattern which included a non-personnel-conscious management, meeting a war situation without the advantages of prior planning or a well-organized personnel program, and allowing each of the constituent services within the organization to take to itself a considerable part of the personnel function.
CHAPTER V
RECRUITMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

With the outbreak of the war the Red Cross was faced with the prospect of an expansion in war services requiring the development of an extensive recruitment organization, plan, and procedure. In terms of numbers the extent of the recruitment job is indicated in part by the following figures of paid personnel in the national organization during the years 1940-1945:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1940</td>
<td>935</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1941</td>
<td>2,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1942</td>
<td>6,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1943</td>
<td>13,709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1944</td>
<td>20,262</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 30, 1945</td>
<td>24,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Because of turnover, however, the number of persons actually employed was much larger than the yearly increments indicate. In 1944 the annual rate of separations was 76.8 percent of the average total number of persons employed in headquarters and areas. In 1945 the rate was 78 percent.\(^2\)

The needs for the different types of workers\(^3\) employed by the Red Cross fluctuated during the war years in direct relationship to the expansion of the various Red Cross services to meet changing conditions and to the increasing scarcity of personnel to man these services. At one time the need for personnel to man Red Cross clubs overseas was

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1. Source: ARC, Annual Reports. The total number of persons actually employed during these years is not obtainable.
2. On turnover, see below, p. 52.
3. For a listing of the major job titles used by Red Cross see below, "Course Description", appendix III.
pre-eminent among Red Cross personnel needs, at another time the greatest demand was for social workers for Hospital Service or for assistant field directors for Camp Service. Because of these changing requirements, which are discussed in detail in appendix II, special recruitment drives or campaigns were used from time to time in an attempt to meet the needs, followed by periods of little or no recruitment for particular categories of personnel.

At no time during the war years were all of the personnel needs completely met, though at different times major requirements were fulfilled. However, there was always a shortage of clerical-stenographic personnel and social workers.
A. FACTORS INFLUENCING RECRUITMENT

1. TURNOVER

One of the most important factors in producing a heavy recruitment load throughout the war period was the high rate of worker turnover. This problem reached serious proportions as early as 1943, with the increasing competition of government and business for personnel. In the Pacific Area, where turnover was highest, the Red Cross had to compete with war industry, in the North Atlantic with government and business, in the Midwestern with industry and a "migratory condition" of labor, in the Eastern with national headquarters and government.

There are no complete records of turnover prior to 1944, but average monthly turnover rates\(^2\) for Red Cross (headquarters and areas) during 1944 and 1945 may be compared with turnover rates in manufacturing industries in the United States and in civilian establishments of the Federal government:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Red Cross(^3) (HQs. and Areas)</th>
<th>Federal Govt.(^4) (United States)</th>
<th>Mfg. Industries(^4) (United States)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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1. SAF, Report on Management Conference, January 6-8, 1943, No. 140.04 C-G.
2. Turnover is here defined as the ratio of monthly separations to the average monthly total of employment. Figures for the Federal government include inter-agency transfers; figures for the Red Cross exclude all transfers.
3. Source: ARC, "Personnel Turnover" monthly reports, 1944-45, Buchanan's office file. The figures given above are as accurate as can be obtained. While the writer can not vouch for the accuracy of the original figures, he has re-calculated the monthly turnover rates to assure that they are uniformly calculated on the proper bases. No area turnover figures are in file for the months of April and May 1944; the turnover rates of March and June are counted twice in figuring the monthly average turnover for 1944.
When monthly turnover rates for the Red Cross (areas and headquarters) are translated into annual rates, they amount to 76.8 percent per annum in 1944 and 78 percent in 1945.\(^1\) It is difficult, however, to analyze the meaning of gross turnover rates in terms of the factors which produce them. These factors varied from month to month and differed both among areas\(^2\) and among types of work. For example, at certain periods Selective Service was responsible for large numbers of separations; at others, opportunities for more remunerative employment elsewhere were important; and at times in 1944 and 1945, feeling on the part of many persons that they had "done their part" in a war effort soon to cease accounted for many voluntary separations: feelings of insecurity as to future employment with the Red Cross were also present at times in these years.

As to the relationship of different types of work to turnover rates, a study of domestic Hospital Service is informative. The resignation rate for professional workers (based on the period November 30, 1944 through March 31, 1945) averaged 24 percent a year, while among

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1. The annual rate is the sum of the monthly rates, following the practice of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
2. For example, area turnover rates (including inter-area transfers) in 1945 were calculated by the Red Cross as follows (monthly average rate):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>1944</th>
<th>1945</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Area</td>
<td>9.03</td>
<td>10.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midwestern</td>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southeastern</td>
<td>8.06</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Atlantic</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eastern</td>
<td>6.16</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Headquarters</td>
<td>2.66</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: "Personnel Turnover" Monthly Reports).
clerical hospital employees the rate was almost 100 percent a year.\textsuperscript{1}

Turnover of clerical personnel was high in all services during the war.

One important factor, especially in domestic camps and hospitals, was the short-term employment of wives of men temporarily stationed at these installations.\textsuperscript{2}

The tables above also indicate that the Red Cross had a somewhat higher turnover rate than the Federal government over the period 1944-1945. In accounting for this, it may be noted that the Federal government had a much higher percentage of permanent employees in its work group during the war years than the Red Cross, presumably making for a somewhat lower turnover rate. (The ratio of civilian employees as of June 30, 1940 to those of June 30, 1945 was, in the Federal Government, approximately 1 to 2.9; in Red Cross, it was 1 to 27.)\textsuperscript{3} A counter-balancing factor is found in the fact that the Red Cross was a very small organization compared with the Federal government. As of June 30, 1945, the comparative number of paid employees was 24,300 in the Red Cross\textsuperscript{5} and 2,915,476 in the Federal government.\textsuperscript{6} This meant that the Red Cross because of size alone, with its smaller work groups, was in a much better position than the Federal government to control the management factors which influence turnover rates.

\textsuperscript{1} Progress Reporting Unit, SAF, "Study of Domestic Hospital Resignations...", June 9, 1945, in "Personnel Studies Binder," HDF.

\textsuperscript{2} Norman Durfee, National Administrator, Personnel Service, interview with Hoslett, July 25, 1948, HDF.

\textsuperscript{3} The World Almanac, 1947, p. 775.


\textsuperscript{5} ARC, Annual Report, 1944-45, p. 182.

\textsuperscript{6} The World Almanac, op. cit.
This suggests that in the Red Cross, as in any hastily-expanded war organization, turnover rates could have been somewhat reduced through general improvement in administrative practices such as better placement, more equitable salary rates,\(^1\) improved supervision, more opportunities for promotion and transfer, and improved employee counseling. A careful study of turnover made in the Southeastern Area in the fall of 1944, covering 200 professional and non-professional employees,\(^2\) indicated some reasons for resignations which improved management practices might have affected. These included: dissatisfied employees, 6 percent; no reason given, 2 percent; discharged for "failure to adjust", 3 percent; and "ill health", 15 percent (a review of the leave records suggested that approximately one-half of these employees had not been noticeably ill; they probably used the term "ill health" in place of the real reason for resignation).\(^3\) Another study, made of 268 persons in domestic hospital service in early 1945, suggested that 20 percent of the resignations were due to conditions which improved management practices could alleviate, such as "dissatisfied with assignment", "supervision inadequate," or "wanted greater use of skills." Three-fourths of these persons had been considered satisfactory employees.\(^4\)

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1. Salary rates, as such, are discussed in the next section.
2. This survey included 152 persons in SAF; the remainder were divided among such services as Nursing, Chapter, Public Information, Accounting, Supplies, Volunteer Special Services, and First Aid, Water Safety and Accident Prevention.
3. Clyde E. Buckingham to J. Stanley Lewis, Acting Director, Personnel Service, Southeastern Area, November 2, 1944, PDF.
4. M. Moss, Chief, Progress Reporting Unit, to E. A. Golway, Assistant Administrator, SAF, March 24, 1945, in "Personnel Studies Binder", PDF.
These analyses suggest the interdependence of general administrative practices and particular problems such as turnover or recruitment, and the influence of one upon the other. The Red Cross, like other organizations, required a balanced effectiveness in all major aspects of administration if individual functions were to be well performed.
2. SALARIES PAID

Salary Comparisons. Throughout the war recruitment efforts were hampered because Red Cross salaries were lower than those offered by competing employers. The Administrator of SAF in the North Atlantic Area believed in 1943 that Red Cross was not recruiting "top notchers" in social work because of low salary scales. To Vice-Chairman Nicholson, writing in 1945, there was no question but that the salaries offered to assistant field directors did not attract many high calibre men.

Without special studies comparing Red Cross salaries with those offered by other employers for positions of similar qualifications, it is impossible to do more than generalize as to the adequacy of Red Cross salaries in a competitive market. One such study was reported in 1945 for certain social work positions. Red Cross salaries as of December 1944 were compared (1) with those in New York City during the last three months of 1943 as reported by the Russell Sage Foundation, and

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1. This section is not concerned with specific salaries paid in all positions but with the competitive position of Red Cross, in terms of salaries, in relation to other organizations. Salaries were, of course, raised during the war period, but the changes were not organization-wide. For the domestic field positions under discussion here the salaries in 1941 were: field directors, $175-275 per month; assistant field directors, $115-225, with an allowance of $25 per month to single men unable to secure living quarters on the post. Married men received a $50 allowance. In April 1942 the salary was raised to $200-275 ($250-350 at large and strategic centers) for field directors, and to $175-225 for assistant field directors, plus allowances. In August 1945 the range for field directors was adjusted to $255-300 (special stations $275-350), and for assistant field directors to $175-250 (Eykowski, "Camp Service, Pearl Harbor Through 1943", p. 15, HDF; McGlintock to Dewitt Smith, et al, August 18, 1945, No. 340.1 SAF).

2. As early as 1940 Red Cross was having difficulty in procuring and retaining personnel because of low salary rates.

3. Sherrard Ewing to Don Smith, July 12, 1943, No. 320.01.

(2) with a suggested salary standard guide prepared by the Personnel Committee of the Council of Social Agencies of Detroit, Michigan.

Because of the great variation in job titles, functions, and qualifications described in the three reports, the comparison was only a rough one.¹

This particular study revealed that salaries for social workers who lacked recognized professional training (Staff Assistants, Hospital Workers, Junior Correspondents) were as high or higher than those workers with equivalent qualifications in New York and Detroit. Red Cross personnel with recognized professional training in social work (Psychiatric Social workers: Medical Social workers: Correspondents) had lower minimum salaries² than similar workers in New York and Detroit, but the maximum salaries were approximately the same or higher.³ Red Cross supervisors generally had lower salary ranges than those for Detroit and New York. The minimums were higher, but the maximums much lower; the salaries of recreation supervisors and case work supervisors were especially low. While the bases of the comparisons are not very adequate, the general conclusion drawn from the study is that there was a tendency for non-professional personnel to be paid more than the going rate, for

¹ Progress Reporting Unit, SAP, "A Comparison of Salaries and Qualifications of Professional Red Cross Personnel with Those of Other Agencies," June 18, 1945, HUD. Cited hereafter as PRU "Comparison of Salaries..."
² However, correspondents and junior correspondents at national headquarters had higher salary ranges than personnel in Detroit or New York with equivalent qualifications, (ibid).
³ However, generic social workers, also classified as professionally trained, were poorly paid in comparison with the Detroit and New York standards. In the field of recreation Red Cross salaries ranged from $1620-$2400, as compared with the suggested Detroit range of $1700-$2700 (ibid).
professional personnel to be paid the going rate, or somewhat more in certain cases, and for supervisory personnel to be paid less than the going rate.¹

The study did not include comparisons with the federal government, in which salaries were higher than in either local social welfare agencies or the Red Cross, and with which the Red Cross was in active competition. It has been estimated that during the war period Red Cross salaries for professional and clerical personnel ranged from 6 to 10 percent below government rates,² but specific examples suggest much greater differences in some positions. It was reported in 1945, for example, that the qualifications for Red Cross hospital case supervisors with a salary range of $2200-3000 were as high as those for consultant positions in the federal government with a beginning salary of $3200 or more.³ In the Veterans Administration, by June 1945, the lowest grade social work position was said to pay $2600;⁴ in the Red Cross the lowest paid social work position paid $1620.⁵ In 1945 when Home Service in headquarters needed professional supervisory personnel badly, it was reported that professional people in government agencies were paid "a

¹. In the field of Medical Social Work a late 1943 survey of membership of the AAMSW showed that Red Cross top level salaries were $1,000 to $1,500 less than "accepted top salaries" in the field (Report of Joint Session with Advisory Committee, Function of Staff Aides in Hospital Service Program, op. 6-7, December 3, 1943, No. 140.14 Hospital Service).
². Benjamin Cliff, Personnel Service, NHQ, interview with Roslett, April 22, 1948, HDF.
³. Verna Mueller, Assistant Chief in Charge, Domestic Hospital Program, MTWS, to W. E. Dugan, Assistant Director Personnel Service, June 18, 1945, HDF.
⁴. Ibid.
⁵. Ibid, "Comparison of Salaries...."
much higher salary" than the Red Cross could offer.\(^1\) In the spring of 1946 some workers in Home Service and Claims Service had been offered as much as 40 to 50 percent more than their Red Cross salaries by W NBCRA and the Veterans Administration. In a "number of important instances" employees had resigned or indicated their intention to resign.\(^2\) In Claims Service an estimated 90 percent of the separations between September 1, 1945 and March 31, 1946 were attributed to low salaries.\(^3\) This suggests that the Red Cross could recruit some professional or semi-professional workers at relatively low salaries but after a period of experience in Red Cross, during which their skills were developed, could not retain all of them. It pointed to the need for a greater salary range, if employees were to be retained. Initial recruitment from higher paying agencies was obviously impossible, except in isolated instances.

**Salary Inequalities.** Not only were initial salary levels important in recruitment and retention of workers, but salary inequalities had an important effect on turnover, and hence on recruitment needs. A classification and pay plan was finally adopted in November 1945, but until that time there was no standard pay schedule.

Not only did salaries for the same position title vary as among headquarters, area, and chapter offices, but within the same organizational unit as well.\(^4\) A late 1944 study of domestic hospital service

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1. Marve E. Voight, Chief, Clerical Placement Unit, PA, SAF, to Ruth Hill, September 13, 1945, No. 320.01.
2. DeWitt Smith to John C. Wilson, Manager, Southeastern Area, April 11, 1946, No. 360.3.
3. Frank V. Grayson, National Director, Claims Service, to Colonel H. F. Thompson, April 10, 1946, No. 360.3.
4. In 1942 assistant field directors in Eastern Area were paid $200 per month and those in Midwestern, $175 (W. S. Walden, Director, MNS,
revealed wide variances in pay among areas: professionally trained workers (e.g., social workers) being paid the same as untrained workers (e.g., staff aides), and higher salaries authorized for new employees than for older incumbents.\(^1\) There were also pay discrepancies reported for positions of equal responsibility, but of different title, between services.\(^2\)

Added to this was the lack of a standard promotion policy, resulting in salary discrepancies sometimes described as "shocking."\(^3\) In Pacific Area Hospital Service in 1944 some workers with good training and experience learned the same or less than workers with less training and experience merely because the former had not asked for raises.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) M. Moss, Progress Report, Unit, SAF, to Colmun, November 2, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) Ibid.

\(^4\) Ibid.
In 1942 there was a feeling among some Camp Service field personnel, who had been in service a year or year and a half without salary increases, that "unless one has a friend in court, either at area or national, consideration for advancement is withheld."¹

The effect of salary inequities on recruitment needs was nicely demonstrated in a September 1943 survey (covering the war period to June 30, 1943) of turnover among Red Cross personnel attached to army divisions stationed in the United States three months or more. There were 191 Red Cross jobs to be filled in the 48 divisions studied. Of the original 191 persons employed to fill the jobs, 65 left; to fill these 65 vacancies, 114 men were eventually required, because of turnover among the replacements. Altogether 305 men were assigned to 191 jobs. High among the reasons for this excessive turnover was the inconsistency among areas concerning salaries and maintenance allowances. Of six proposals made to improve the situation, four had reference to providing uniform bases for remuneration.²

Salary only one reason for resignations. Caution must be used, however, in any general discussion of the number of resignations due to salary reasons. Frequently salary is only one reason among several causing resignation. Had other incentives been strong, such as job security or a high sense of attachment to the organization, some resignations presumably made for salary reasons would not have occurred.

¹. Wakeman to Bondy, November 2, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
². Wm. S. Hepner, Director, Military and Naval Welfare Service, to Don Smith, Deputy Administrator, SAF and Bondy, September 8, 1943, with attachment, September 8, 1943, No. 340.1 MWS.
Pacific Area Hospital Service paid the highest salaries and had the lowest turnover; Southeastern Area paid the lowest salaries and had next to the highest turnover; but North Atlantic Area paid next to the lowest salaries and had a turnover approximately the same as Pacific.¹

**General importance of non-economic incentives.** In spite of salary inequities and the tendency of Red Cross salaries to fall below those of competing employers, the Red Cross turnover rates were only 10.2 percent higher per year (average of 1944-45) than those for civilian employees of the federal government. In terms of economic incentives alone one might possibly expect a greater difference. What is the explanation? Part of the answer lies in the genuine appeal of Red Cross to patriotic, humanitarian, and ego-satisfying motivations. The belief in the importance of Red Cross services to the morale and well-being of men in the armed forces and to their families; the opportunity for day-to-day participation in the conduct of these services; the chance for many workers to assume a high degree of personal responsibility for the success of their work; the sense of urgency and of pressure to meet the demands made upon Red Cross by its clientele—all of these were morale factors not to be underestimated in influence.² There can be little doubt that such intangible factors as these led many persons to remain with the organization during the war in spite of opportunities for more

¹ "Study of... Hospital Workers as of December 1944," in "Personnel Studies Binder," HDF.
² These influences were less felt by clerical workers than by professional and semi-professional workers. The turnover among clerical workers was also much higher than among the other workers.
remunerative employment elsewhere.¹

¹ The point was sometimes made among Red Cross personnel during the war that they made financial sacrifices to work for the Red Cross. (Hutcheson, interview with Hoslett, April 1, 1948.) This sacrifice, if such it were, was only in terms of what the person could possibly have earned in non-Red Cross war employment, rather than in terms of what he earned before joining the Red Cross. The Southeastern study which is a good but small cross section of Red Cross personnel, particularly SAP, indicated the following: When employed by Red Cross 70 percent of the group were paid salaries equal or superior to those previously earned in civilian life. At time of resignation, averaging 16 months later, the percentage was 90 percent, though of course the cost of living had risen. (Buckingham to Lewis, November 2, 1944.)
3. SELECTIVE SERVICE

As early as April 1940 the Red Cross had decided that it would not request exemption from military service for any of its employees in event of war.¹ However, when war came exceptions were made to this rule for a small number of key positions in headquarters and area offices, and for positions known as the field director group. Positions in this group (field director, club director, club program director, regional director, field supervisor)² were listed by the War Manpower Commission as essential to the support of war, and local boards were so informed.³ Therefore, the Red Cross could request the deferment of persons in these positions as essential to the war effort. The extent to which such deferments were requested was a Red Cross policy determination. This policy was important in its effect on recruitment, for the stricter the Red Cross was in approving applications for deferment, the greater was the recruitment job to be attempted in a constantly tightening labor market.⁴

As far as single, able-bodied persons without dependents were concerned, the Red Cross followed a policy of neither recruiting nor requesting deferment of such persons within the age limits subject to call by Selective Service.⁵ Deferments for employees in certain age groups, with dependents, were requested.

¹. Fieser to Area Manager, April 1, 1940, No. 302.
². GI 81, April 5, 1943; GI 91, March 13, 1944.
³. GI 81, April 5, 1943.
⁴. Figures on the total number of Red Cross employees who entered the armed forces are not yet available. These separations are included as part of the overall turnover rates cited earlier, however.
⁵. GI 82, May 26, 1943.
Fixation of the age levels at which deferment would be asked was influenced in part by Selective Service regulations regarding the ages of men subject to military service; in large part by an attempt (reflected especially in the regulations of 1943) to be conservative in asking deferment to avoid public criticism; and finally, in 1944, by the fact that a somewhat more liberal policy was essential if the Red Cross was to maintain its male-operated services to the armed forces.

In the early days of the war the Red Cross took no able-bodied men under 35 unless they had dependents who would make them eligible for deferment. Between 1941 and June of 1942 these age limits moved down to 28 and back to 35, in conformance with Selective Service policies regarding the ages below which deferments would not be given. From August 1942 through April 1943 the policy remained rather liberal, deferments being provided for the field director group unless they were "under 36 and single, and even then if their draft classification were under 38 and they had heavy responsibility for dependents..."2

Policy became much stricter as of April, 1943 -

Deferment was to be requested for a field director only if he was over 38, unless he furnished the major support for at least one dependent. The reduction of the age limit to 38 toward the end of May involved no liberalization of the deferment policy, but merely an adjustment to the Army's announced intention of avoiding the induction of men over 38. The tendency, indeed, was toward still greater strictness, for in July an age limit of 28 was set below which no deferment would be requested under any circumstances, while a field director between 28 and 37

1. Austin Thompson, PA, SAF, to Don C. Smith, June 11, 1942, No. 320.01.
must furnish major support to at least one dependent other than his wife to be eligible for a deferment request. A week later an amendment to this new directive provided that there would be no requests for deferment even for this limited group beginning January 1, 1944, and that meanwhile no field directors should be employed who seemed liable to induction.

If the Red Cross was counting on a reduction in domestic camp activities, or the new availability of men over 38 whom the Army was discharging, to make this stringent non-deferment policy feasible by reducing the need for male field directors and increasing the supply, it was mistaken...Before the end of the year, the Red Cross relaxed its policy to the extent of asking deferments for pre-Pearl Harbor field directors aged 20-37 if they supported at least one dependent other than a wife. This adjustment, however, was wholly inadequate. The SAF reports for January, February, and March, 1944, show increasing alarm at the inroads of Selective Service into the supply of field directors. A greatly liberalized deferment policy went into effect, accordingly, in March, 1944. Thereafter the Red Cross would ask deferment for any married field director 31 years or over who was at that time employed by the Red Cross and who when deferment was considered had been in the Red Cross at least six months.1

This policy continued until September 1945 when registrants 26 years of age and older were no longer considered available for military service by Selective Service. Thereafter men in that age group could be retained or employed by Red Cross without reference to Selective Service.2 Fortunately, this change came at a time when the Red Cross badly needed additional staff, particularly field directors, assistant field directors, staff assistants and social workers.

Red Cross policy regarding Selective Service may thus roughly be summarized as passing through periods of moderate liberality in 1942,

1. Ibid., 40-43.
2. NHQ 72, September 24, 1945.
changing to high conservatism by the end of 1943, followed by a modified liberal policy in 1944-45. The results of these differing policies in terms of losses to Selective Service are not yet available.

The basic question affecting recruitment in another emergency is: How far should the Red Cross go in requesting deferment for its personnel recognized by Government as essential to the conduct of the war? On the one hand there is the necessity to avoid criticism by public and servicemen that the Red Cross is a haven for draft-dodgers; on the other, there is the need to maintain and expand its services to the armed forces in the face of decreasing manpower sources. There seems little question that during World War II the Red Cross leaned to the side of conservatism to avoid public criticism.
B. THE "CENTRALIZED" AND "DECENTRALIZED" SYSTEMS OF RECRUITMENT AND EMPLOYMENT

1. "CENTRALIZATION", 1942-43

Under the practice in effect at the outbreak of the war, area offices employed persons for assignment within the area including, by July 1942, personnel expected to move overseas with military units originating in the area.\(^1\) Other applicants for overseas service were interviewed by Area Personnel Services. If area interviewers were favorably impressed, they endorsed these applicants to Personnel Service in headquarters for consideration. Final interviews and decisions regarding employment were made in Washington.\(^2\) At the same time, Personnel Service\(^3\) in Washington also recruited for overseas workers and for headquarters staff. Recruitment of overseas workers was thus a responsibility divided between areas and headquarters.

During 1942 representatives of headquarters Personnel Service made visits to the field and interviewed persons for employment,\(^4\) some of whom

1. "In the early months of the war National Headquarters did all the recruiting and training of task force personnel. But the program expanded so rapidly that the recruitment of staff to serve with triangular divisions was decentralized to the areas. In its first policy letter on staffing of divisions issued in July 1942 the SAF administration gave the areas the job of recruiting, assigning, and administering Red Cross personnel serving triangular divisions. National Headquarters retained the right to approve all appointments, provide formal and field training, and, through a representative of the Insular and Foreign Section of SAF, cleared the teams for overseas service" (Bykofsky, "Camp Service, Pearl Harbor Through 1943", p. 90, HFD).

2. J. K. McClintock, Vice Chairman, to the Chairman, October 28, 1942, with attachment, No. 320.01; GI (General Information Letter) 78, November 11, 1942.

3. As noted earlier between July 1942 and November 1942, recruitment and employment facilities were handled by "Employment Service", a separate organization from Personnel Service.

were also interviewed by area offices. However, by August 1942 these efforts were not providing sufficient staff, and a special personnel field staff was established in national Personnel Service to secure personnel. Under this plan, specialization of function was introduced: one person recruited recreation workers, another visited educational institutions, a third visited schools of social work, public welfare and other social agencies, etc. These persons, who from time to time worked out of area offices, again duplicated some of the recruiting efforts of the areas themselves. This fact was acknowledged, but the great need for certain types of workers was given as the explanation for the duplication. 1

This so-called "centralized" plan of recruitment and employment 2 did not prove very workable. One of its defects, which soon became glaring, was in the referral of candidates for overseas employment to Washington for final interview and approval. The cost of these trips, paid by the Red Cross, was high, especially for persons called in from the Pacific Area. Moreover, in some instances, this practice had an unfortunate public relations effect. The Manager of a chapter in Duluth, Minnesota, for example, complained that two teachers had been called to Washington, expenses paid, to discuss possible employment. At the time of writing one had returned to the community after an expense-paid trip, having refused to accept employment. The teachers of the

1. DeWitt Smith, Vice Chairman in Charge of Domestic Operations, to Wm. Carl Hunt, Manager, Eastern Area, August 19, 1942, HDF.
2. Obviously, this was a "centralized" plan only in part. Decision as to employment of overseas workers was "centralized" but recruitment was partially "decentralized" to the areas.
community, consistent Red Cross contributors, did not receive these reports of Red Cross expenditures with favor.¹

Other unfortunate incidents occurred when persons called to Washington for final interviews, assuming they would be appointed for overseas work, made such personal arrangements before leaving home as for the care of their families and for leave from employment. Some were the recipients of elaborate "going-away" parties. When such persons were turned down for employment in Washington, the Red Cross was subject to criticism upon their return home.²

During this period administrative difficulties arose when the national headquarters did not keep area offices informed of all of the sources of personnel it was consulting directly.³ At times both area and headquarters, in active competition with each other, attempted to employ the same workers.⁴ The Director of Personnel for the Midwestern Area complained in mid-1942 that social agencies and schools of social work in Chicago had been overworked by national and area efforts to recruit personnel. He objected to representatives from headquarters coming out to visit these agencies.⁵

¹. Clinton A. Denison, Manager, Minnesota Arrowhead Chapter, to Arthur Morehead, Director of Personnel, Midwestern Area, December 29, 1942, No. 320.01.
². Joseph Leverenz, Assistant Director of Personnel, interview with S. D. Hoslett, March 16, 1943, HFD.
³. Dorothy V. Hall, Director of Personnel, North Atlantic Area, to E. G. Schine, Director of Personnel Relations, ARC, January 19, 1943, No. 320.01.
⁴. Morehead to Gwin, July 21, 1942, No. 320.01.
⁵. Ibid.
Some problems of the period, however, were not directly related to the "centralized" recruiting scheme. For example, there was competition offered by chapters to induce members of the national organization to join their staffs, and interservice proselytizing of staff members in headquarters and area offices, with which the Chairman expressed some concern as early as January 1942.¹ There was also complaint that areas were not kept as well informed regarding the needs and qualifications for overseas personnel as they should have been.² The national Director of Employment stated that a "great deal" had been done to keep areas informed, but that areas had been so engrossed in their own staffing that national needs for foreign personnel had not been "well understood."³

¹ DeWitt Smith, Director, Domestic Operations, to Guin, January 5, 1942, No. 340.4.
² H. F. Keisker, Assistant Manager, Midwestern Area, to DeWitt Smith, August 7, 1942, No. 320.01.
³ Guin to DeWitt Smith, September 5, 1942, No. 320.01.
2. "DECENTRALIZATION" 1943-45

As early as August 1942 the Manager of the Midwestern Area suggested that the time had come to decentralize major recruitment and employment activities to the areas in the interest of greater efficiency.\(^1\) In early 1943 additional pressure for such a change was furnished by the fact that personnel needs were not being met.\(^2\) R. E. Bondy, Administrator of SAF, complained that the Red Cross had not done a satisfactory job of recruiting the qualified personnel available; he attributed the slowness in recruitment in part to the delay that occurred in having the applicants report to Washington for interviews.\(^3\)

In an effort to improve performance, a new plan for decentralized recruitment and employment by area offices was announced May 27, 1943.\(^4\) Area Personnel Services were given authority to recruit for both domestic and overseas positions. Approval of employment was delegated to representatives of the operating services in the areas, with the exception of overseas club directors, assistant club directors, accountants and certain other personnel\(^5\) whose employment had to be approved by operating service in headquarters.

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1. Winfrey to DeWitt Smith, August 7, 1942, No. 320.01.
2. Wann to Bondy, January 26, 1944, No. 320.01.
3. Memo of SAF Conference, May 18, 1943, No. 320.01.
4. AM 379, May 27, 1943.
5. Ibid.; "History of North Atlantic Area, 1942-45, 'Where We Start', p. 2, HDF. For example, employment of civilian war relief workers was not decentralized until July 1944. Recruitment of colored personnel was not decentralized to the areas until January 1944. Employment of colored persons was not decentralized until December 1944 (Waters to Leverenz, July 10, 1944, No. 300.1; Waters to Leverenz, et al., January 29, 1944, No. 320.02; AM 641, December 19, 1944). For a discussion of Negro participation in Red Cross activities during the war, see Kathryn R. Tyler, "American Red Cross Negro Personnel in World War II, 1942-46," HDF.
Under this plan, on the first of each month headquarters furnished a quota of persons in each job classification to be employed by the area during the month. Later, an estimated quota for the ensuing five months was also published.\(^1\) By late June 1943 a "Recruiting Manual" of general information regarding positions in SAF was furnished by national Employment Service to the areas. "Employment Guides" for each position were also revised or developed. These were general statements of the duties of the position and of the age, sex, education, training, experience and personal qualifications necessary for employment.

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\(^1\) SAF Monthly Report, November 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
C. RECRUITMENT METHODS UNDER THE "DECENTRALIZED" PLAN

1. RECRUITMENT METHODS

The Area Team - Chapter Committee Device. The basic methods of recruitment and employment outlined in the new plan, and not fully developed until 1945, involved the use of area recruiting teams and chapter recruitment committees. During 1943 and 1944 each area set up a number of field teams typically composed of a representative of Personnel Service and of the other services, such as Hospital or Camp, for which recruitment was being carried on at the time. These teams made periodic visits to cities within the area to recruit, coordinating their activities with the local chapters in locating sources of applicants. Generally these teams had authority to reject applicants and to hire persons on the spot provisionally (subject to their passing a physical examination, producing satisfactory references and draft status, etc.). Persons were hired for one of the general position titles such as assistant field director or staff aide. Placement on a specific job in a specific location was made after training.

This recruitment team device was said to have been effective in recruiting not only non-professional personnel, but professional as well, through the contacts it made with such groups as councils of social agencies, public relief agencies, settlement houses, park departments, schools and universities, and with the chairmen of local branches of

1. AM 379, p. 3.
2. Lena R. Waters, Assistant Director of Employment, "General Recommendations", August 9, 1943, No. 320.01; Durfee, Dillard, interview with Hoslet, March 16, 1948, HDF.
such associations as American Association of Social Workers, American 
Association of Medical Social Workers and American Association of 
Psychiatric Social Workers.¹

In 1944 and 1945 the areas also sponsored the establishment of local 
chapter recruitment committees² in the type I, II, and larger type III 
chapters.³ These committees, usually composed of both voluntary and 
paid chapter workers stirred up interest in Red Cross employment through 
local publicity, received applications for employment and screened out 
the obviously unqualified. Applications of seeming worth were held for 
the next visit of the area field team or submitted directly to the area 
office if the chapter were too small or isolated to warrant visitation

¹ Waters, "General Recommendations", August 9, 1943, No. 320.01.
² The proposal to use chapter committees for recruitment had been made 
as early as October 1942, and in early 1943 an experimental program 
was developed with the Hartford, Syracuse and Buffalo chapters which 
proved the value of the suggestion. Experience with the small type 
IV and V chapters did not produce very good results (Landon K. Thorne, 
Pearson Winslow, to Lloyd Wilson, Executive Vice-Chairman, October 27, 
1942; Sabine to Administrative Committee, February 22, 1943; Winfrey 
to Harriman, et al, May 19, 1945, No. 320.01.).
³ "Types" or "groups" of chapters are defined as follows by CI 58, 
July 31, 1941:

   I - Chapters having jurisdiction over cities of 500,000 
       population or more.

   II - Chapters having jurisdiction over a territory with one or 
        more cities of 100,000 to 500,000 population.

   III - Chapters having jurisdiction over a territory with one or 
        more cities of 25,000 to 100,000 population.

   IV - Chapters having jurisdiction over a territory with one or 
        more cities of 10,000 to 25,000 population.

   V - All other Chapters.
by the recruiting teams. In 1945 the need for personnel, and the tightness of the labor market, stimulated the development of chapter committees in all areas.¹

The procedures described above may be termed the basic methods for recruiting and employing personnel for the Red Cross during 1945 and 1946, though many persons applied at the area and headquarters offices as well. The combined use of recruitment teams and chapter committees had the great advantage of utilizing the facilities of several hundred of the stronger and better staffed chapters throughout the country in recruiting, without burdening chapters with responsibility for actual employment. Such responsibility most certainly could not have been discharged efficiently; it was difficult enough for full-time area staff to make intelligent selection and initial placement; it would have been impossible for the committees of the local chapters.

These chapter committees were especially useful in securing semi- and non-professional staff such as field directors, assistant field

While chapters aided areas in recruitment, at the same time area offices assisted chapters in recruiting and selecting professional chapter personnel. In the Pacific Area, for example, there was a chapter Placement Unit with specific responsibility for the recruiting, interviewing and processing of files of persons interested in chapter positions and the referral of applicants to chapters. ("History of North Atlantic Area, 'When We Start',' p. 4, HDF: Pacific Area History, p. 133, HDF; Helaine Todd, speech to Red Cross Trainees, undated, attached to letter, Todd to Denison, May 31, 1945, HDF).
directors, staff aides, and staff assistants for overseas clubs. In securing the more highly trained and professionally experienced social workers and recreation workers direct contact with sources by headquarters on a national level, and by areas and area recruiting teams on a state and local level, was more effective. Often, however, the local chapter or chapter recruitment committee could direct area officials to important local sources of professional workers.¹

Although there were some administrative problems involved in the use of chapter recruiting committees, such as a failure at times to screen out undesirable applicants because of local community pressures, or occasional half-hearted commitments of jobs to important local figures, the presence of chapter organizations, when combined with the recruitment team device, provided the Red Cross with an excellent instrument for recruitment, when properly directed.²

Direction and coordination by headquarters. The special campaign for hospital workers in mid-1945 provides an example of effective direction and coordination of this machinery. At national headquarters a temporary National Recruitment Committee was organized, composed of representatives of Personnel, Public Information and Hospital Service. The function of the Committee was to develop plans for a nation-wide recruiting drive, to recommend action to areas, and to direct efforts to accomplish the recruitment objective of 3,000 workers. Recommendations of the Committee to the areas regarding the recruitment of hospital

¹. Ibid.
workers suggest a pattern of action for future use which can be adapted to the procurement of other professional and semi-professional personnel:

1. Recruiting teams should be kept in the field continuously.

2. It is imperative to recruit for specific jobs in this instance (such as medical social worker, case supervisor, generic social worker etc.).

3. Areas should interpret to key professional leaders within the area the objective of the drive and enlist their sponsorship. This might be done by inviting key professional persons into area headquarters for a one-day meeting. This was done at the national level by the National Committee.

4. The area field recruiting staff and the operating staff (capital Service in this case) should be called together for conferences in area offices to interpret the recruiting plan and to stimulate concerted and coordinated effort.

5. Quotas should be assumed, in relationship to size and ability, to the type I, II, and III chapters.

6. An aggressive and continuous publicity campaign should be inaugurated, using Speakers Bureau, motion pictures, newspaper articles, editorials, posters, window displays and radio spots of material were furnished in this instance by Public Information at headquarters to areas for distribution to chapters.

This plan made full use of the area-recruitment-team chapter-recruitment-committee device, inteerated publicity efforts, and stimulated cooperation of appropriate professional groups. It provided a procedure by which centralized guidance and coordination of recruiting was combined with decentralized execution, yet it assured a considerable degree of independent planning and initiative at the area and chapter levels. It illustrated a means of utilizing fully the flexible decentralized recruitment machine which the Red Cross developed during the war and which, in another emergency

could be put into effect at a much earlier date. The Red Cross might well avoid the two "false starts" of attempted centralized recruitment which both World Wars I and II proved unworkable.
2. MAJOR SOURCES OF PERSONNEL

Catalog of sources. The major sources of personnel utilized by area
and headquarters offices included:

1. Professional social work organizations such as the American
   Association of Social Workers, the American Association of
   Medical Social Workers, and the American Association of
   Psychiatric Social Workers;

2. Other professional or semi-professional organizations in such
   fields as accounting, hotel management (club personnel), edu-
   cation, and recreation;

3. Schools of social work;

4. Students completing social work training on Red Cross scholar-
   ships;

5. Universities, colleges and special schools, their placement
   bureaus and alumni associations;

6. Councils of social agencies, and social welfare agencies at city,
   county and state levels;

7. Federal and State departments and agencies, especially when
   reducing forces, (e.g., WPA, CCC, and state departments of
   education);

8. Professional employment agencies (e.g., teachers agencies and
   the Social Work Vocational Bureau, New York City);

9. The National Roster of Scientific and Professional Personnel;

10. Advertising and publicity in professional and semi-professional
    journals;

11. Persons of means to serve as volunteer personnel;

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1. Data derived from review of recruitment files No. 320.01, General
   Plans, Rules and Regulations.

2. Volunteer personnel, persons of means who were entirely unpaid or
   reimbursed for living expenses, were employed primarily for high
   administrative positions such as Commissioners or Delegates. Quali-
   fied persons who wished to give their services in any subordinate
   positions, such as field director or club director for example, were
   welcomed provided they accepted the regular duties and discipline of
   the organization. There seemed to be some feeling, reflected from
12. Non-professional organizations such as Junior Leagues and patriotic, business, and service clubs, (e.g., American Legion, Chambers of Commerce, Lions Clubs) and their publications;

13. Advertising and publicity in newspapers, and to a lesser extent, on the radio;

14. United States Employment Service;

15. High schools, secretarial schools, and private employment agencies;

16. Domestic Red Cross personnel available for overseas service;

17. Discharged servicemen (especially 1944-45);

18. Red Cross personnel returning from overseas, especially 1944-45 (over the period January 1942 through November 1946, 10.3 percent of these "returnees" were reassigned to overseas or domestic positions);

19. Names suggested by Red Cross employees, including trainees.

time to time in the Central Committee, that Red Cross employment staff did not encourage volunteer full-time services, resulting in instruction from the Administrator of SAF to areas to encourage volunteer service. However, no special recruitment campaign for volunteers was ever conducted, nor were more than a few hundred utilized, the number never approaching the World War I figure of 1,921 as of February 28, 1919. (ARC, The Work of the ARC During the War, October 1919, p. 47). Of course, at the chapter level (and in some areas overseas) thousands of part-time volunteers provided the backbone of many Red Cross services in World War II. The fact that there were these opportunities for service in the chapters probably accounts in part for the smaller number of full-time volunteers in the national organization.

1. Although the Red Cross is a quasi-government agency, it did not attempt to utilize the services of the U.S. Civil Service Commission in recruiting in any large degree. Neither did federal war agencies after early trials.

2. Another related source of recruitment in late 1944 and in 1945 was found in men over 38 who could be released from the armed forces on their own initiative if they had an offer of outside employment essential to the war effort. The Red Cross hired such acceptable applicants who voluntarily applied, but did not recruit among members of the armed forces (Nicholson to McClintock, September 27, 1944, No. 329.2; Nicholson to Mitchell, October 2, 1944, No. 329.1; Domey to Area Directors of Personnel, January 31, 1945, EM 115, No. 320.01).

Source effectiveness. There are not sufficient data to evaluate the relative efficiency of the various sources in terms of acceptable applicants produced by each. North Atlantic Area employment officers averred that most applicants could not attribute the motivation for their applications to any single source of information — they were said to learn of Red Cross opportunities through several sources.\(^1\) However, an analysis of three training classes at headquarters in 1942 suggested that the most effective recruiting medium for this group (a cross-section of professional and non-professional personnel, excluding clerical) was referral by a Red Cross employee. These referrals accounted for the employment of 41 percent of the group. Referrals by a friend other than a Red Cross employee accounted for an additional 27 percent, making a total of 68 percent who applied because of direct personal contacts. A low rate of recruiting resulted from newspaper and magazine articles, contact through professional organizations, radio, and other sources.\(^2\)

It should be noted that these last-named resources were not being used as effectively in 1942 as later. It was later demonstrated that use of professional associations and publicity produced many applicants in the 1945 hospital recruitment campaign.\(^3\) For clerical jobs in Washington, a large number of usable applicants came from sources such as the United States Employment Service and newspaper advertisements, as well as from

contact with friends who knew of Red Cross opportunities. Moreover, source-effectiveness fluctuated from period to period: advertisements for clerical workers in Washington newspapers produced 75 applicants in February 1941; three months later, only 5. Vocational fields represented. There are no overall figures on the vocational fields from which employees came. The 1942 survey of training classes revealed that 36 percent of the group came from the social work field, 21 percent from business, 15 percent from teaching, 12 percent from physical education and recreation, and the remainder from miscellaneous vocations. An analysis of SAF field personnel of December 1942 showed that 43 percent came from public agencies, such as WPA, WPA, CCC and state social welfare organizations, while only 6 percent came from private agencies.

The scholarship program as a special recruitment source. The scholarship program (initiated in July 1942 and terminated June 30, 1947) provided a means during the war years of helping to meet Red Cross needs for trained social workers through the employment of new persons trained

1. See appendix I, "Recruitment of Clerical Personnel".
2. Yoder to Waters, May 15, 1944, No. 320.1.
5. For the academic years 1945-47, the scholarship program was used as in-service training or staff development for currently employed Red Cross staff members. This training feature of the program, as well as the administration of the program, are discussed in the section of this study devoted to the post-war period. For a fuller discussion of the scholarship programs in Home Service and Hospital Service during the war years, see forthcoming monographs by Ruth Walrad and Sarah Becker.
in schools of social work under scholarships granted by the Red Cross.¹

Scholarship holders received tuition and a stipend, amounting to $100 monthly by July 1945, for one academic year's work (either first or second year study) in an approved school of social work. They committed themselves to a minimum of one year's employment with the Red Cross following completion of their training.²

As a source of recruitment for trained, or partially trained, family case workers, medical social workers, and psychiatric social workers for the Home and Hospital services, the scholarship program produced 382 scholarship students during the academic years 1942-45.³ The program was expanded greatly in 1945-46, so that in the entire period 1942-47 a total of 968 students matriculated in schools of social work on Red Cross scholarships, of whom 355 were already Red Cross staff members.⁴ Of the total, 813 completed their scholarship study and accepted Red Cross job assignments.⁵

The scholarship plan was never expected to meet all the Red Cross needs for trained social workers. It did provide 458 trained or partially trained new social workers for the organization (813 persons trained and assigned to Red Cross, minus the 355 Red Cross staff members also trained). Some of these persons would not have completed this social work training,

¹. Mary B. Calvert, Chief, Scholarship Office, to F. T. Schaeffer, Assistant to the Vice Chairman, November 19, 1946, attached to Schaeffer to DeWitt Smith, November 20, 1946, No. 390404.
². ARC, Scholarship Program, 1942-47. Mary B. Calvert, author. J. Mower, 85541 F-1047, pp. 1-3. At first, the promise of two years employment was requested (ibid).
³. Ibid.
⁴. Ibid., pp. 42, 7.
⁵. Ibid., p. 29.
and would not have been available to Red Cross employment, had it not been for the scholarship program. The number of 458 persons\(^1\) may not appear large, but should be considered in relation to the number of trained workers and to the demand for these workers. On July 1, 1944, the membership of the American Association of Social Workers, which required professional training and experience for membership, was 10,207.\(^2\) The total number of "adequately" trained medical and psychiatric social workers was said to be only 3,500 in 1946.\(^3\) As of late 1944, approximately 5,000 social workers were needed by both public and private agencies, according to the AASW.\(^4\)

As a recruitment source it now appears, in hindsight, that the scholarship program might advantageously have been expanded more rapidly in the early stages of the war, in view of known shortages of trained workers. Also, the program might have been applied to other Red Cross services concerned with health and welfare matters. By late 1946 consideration was given to possible participation of Disaster Service, Nursing Service,

1. The specializations of second year scholarship students during the entire period 1942-47 were as follows: family case work, 93; medical social work, 164; psychiatric social work, 143; community organization, 2; group work, 2 (ibid., p. 15).
2. Social Work Year Book, 1945 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1945), p. 452. This is not to imply that there were only 10,207 social workers in the country. The census of 1940 showed a total of 92,000 persons engaged in social work (ibid., p. 4/8). The membership in AASW more nearly suggests the number of fully qualified workers in the country, though some workers qualified for membership do not belong to this organization.
4. Colvert to Schaeffer, November 19, 1946.
Chapter Service, and Camp Service in the program.1

Advertising and publicity. By the summer of 1943 the Administrative Committee had authorized $1,600 for advertisements for professional workers in such magazines as the Hospitals' Magazine, Survey Graphic, and The Family.2 Occasionally thereafter advertisements appeared in professional journals as well as in some newspapers.

The use of releases to magazines regarding personnel needs began in the fall of 1942.3 These early releases apparently were prepared by the personnel staff in headquarters, but by mid-1943 Public Information, in the Eastern Area at least, began to assist in publicity and advertisement matters.4 In the Eastern Area, the publicity department prepared material for use and release by chapters which included stories for local newspaper release, letters for special interest groups, outlines of talks, display material, and a general leaflet on job opportunities.5

In the campaign for assistant field directors in the fall of 1944 Public Information at headquarters planned a publicity campaign which included articles in magazines of such national organizations as the Rotary and Lions clubs. Material for release through Area Public Information Directors to chapters included stories for state educational publications, localized news and feature stories, localized radio spots.

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1. Calvert to Schaeffer, November 19, 1946. A limited number of scholarships for Camp Service personnel, and for recreation workers for Hospital Service, were approved in 1945-46 (ibid).
3. Guin to DeWitt Smith, September 9, 1942, No. 320.01.
4. Harold C. Anthony, Public Information, to Mr. Powers, et al, with attachments, August 6, 1943, No. 320.01.
5. Ibid.
announcements, and speeches for selected audiences. As noted above, coordinated publicity through area and chapter outlets for the 1945 hospital worker campaign was also provided by Public Information, working closely with the National Recruitment Committee. In addition to materials supplied by headquarters, area and chapter public relations offices devised publicity material to meet their own special requirements in recruiting.

Perhaps the chief problem in the release of publicity material was to keep it sufficiently discriminating in its appeal to attract desired applicants rather than wholesale applications by unqualified persons. Experience in the 1945 hospital recruitment campaign demonstrated that recruitment publicity should be very specific in stating the qualifications required for the jobs. Mr. Nicholson reported, "We are having a great many apply as the result of newspaper publicity who are unemployable. A number of them have been very wrathful because, despite our need for workers we have had to decline to give assignment."

Another problem was the coordination of publicity releases with changing needs for personnel. According to one source, not infrequently magazine articles or even speeches by members of the national staff

1. Bonham to Romine, October 20, 1944, No. 320.01.
3. Romine, Assistant Director of Publicity, interview with Hoslett, April 19, 1945, HDF.
4. Era James, Personnel Service, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948, HDP; Winfrey to Harriman, et al, with attachments, May 19, 1945, No. 320.01.
5. Lewis H. Bow, Directory of Publicity, to Service Heads, Publicity Department, August 3, 1945, No. 320.01, quoting Nicholson to Bonham, July 19, 1945.
would report great needs when quotas had already been closed. Such a
situation, it was said, was difficult to interpret to the public and
ill will was engendered as a result.¹

¹ "History of the North Atlantic Area, 1942-45, 'Where We Start',"
  p. 5. For further comment on the general problem of coordination
  of personnel needs and recruitment machinery, see p. 105.
D. SELECTION METHODS UNDER THE "DECENTRALIZATION" PLAN

1. INTERVIEWS

Interview Procedure. Before applicants could be added to the staff they were required to submit a formal application, pass several interviews and a physical examination, and furnish satisfactory references and proof of citizenship. The most important single step in this process was the interview. There were two basic steps in the interviewing process: (1) the recruitment interview conducted by a member of Employment Service in national headquarters, or Personnel Service in the areas, and (2) the employment interview or interviews conducted by members of the operating service, or someone in the personnel staff authorized to act for the using service. The recruitment interview determined the eligibility of the individual for consideration for

1. Under War Manpower rulings, most applicants had to furnish releases from former employment. In addition, draft status also had to be checked; workers going overseas had to secure permission from their draft boards to leave the country (E. I. West, Assistant Director, Employment Service to Virginia M. Dunbar, Nursing Service, December 29, 1944, No. 140.11; "History of North Atlantic Area," op. cit., p. 1).

2. A variation in this general pattern existed in the North Atlantic Area from May 1943 to August 1945. In this area a hiring committee, consisting of a representative from management, Personnel, and the service concerned, had final authority for employment. The Chief of Personnel Administration SAF, reported that some of the persons hired by this committee were good and some "quite bad." The committee was discontinued in August 1945 and responsibility for employment placed on selected members of the interviewing staff serving as employment officers. These interviewers were assigned particular services or types of positions for which they were responsible ("History of North Atlantic Area, 1942-45, 'Where We Start'", pp. 1-2, EDF; E. A. Thompson, to Bondy, August 14, 1944, No. 330.9).
employment by a using service, and the position or positions for which he appeared qualified. Actual commitment as to employment was made in the employment interview or interviews. In general, the operating services retained the right to conduct the employment interview.

In SAF at headquarters the applicant was usually interviewed at the employment stage by two persons from the operating staff, and in case of doubt, by a third. The consensus of the three decided the applicant's fate. When an applicant was rejected, the reasons therefore were given to Employment Service, where the person returned for a final interview in the course of which he might be found qualified for another position.

The degree of screening in the recruitment and employment interviews varied with the standards of the interviewers in interpreting employment qualifications, with the changing standards of the qualifications themselves, and with the degree of labor scarcity at the particular time. In a period of relatively ample manpower supply, July 1942, the ratio of persons employed to persons interviewed in the North Atlantic Area was 1 to 10 for all positions. In national headquarters during the "tight" labor supply period of fiscal year 1944-45, the ratio was 1 to 3.1; over a period of three and one-half years the average in North Atlantic Area was

1. As noted above, area recruiting teams performed both the recruitment and employment interviews.
3. E. G. Sabine, Director, Personnel Relations, to Heads of Departments and Services, November 6, 1942, HDF.
about 1 to 6.5 for all positions.  

In 1945 it was estimated to cost $30 to process each application through the recruitment interview stage. Estimates of the "replacement" cost of personnel in the Eastern Area, which took into consideration the cost of inefficient performance during first weeks on the job as well as estimated initial recruitment and employment costs, placed the amount at $150 for clerical personnel and as high as $2200 for assistant field directors.  

In passing on applicants, interviewers determined whether the individual had the minimum qualifications for a job or jobs, in terms of age, education, sex, and experience as outlined in the "Employment Guides." Drawn up by the service concerned and published by Personnel Service, these guides usually stated a few required qualifications plus a number of "desired" qualifications. But interviewers were not to consider the stated qualifications as a substitute for "considered evaluation and good judgment" in recruiting and employing personnel.

2. The source is not explicit, but apparently this figure includes the cost of processing all applications through the recruitment interview phase. It is hardly likely that this estimate could have included cost of transportation to place of interview (Nicholson to Bonham, Director of Publicity, July 19, 1945, No. 320.1). At one time it was attempted to compare Red Cross recruitment costs with Civil Service, but the bases of the two comparisons were quite different and no valid comparison could be made. The Civil Service Commission estimated it cost approximately $16 each to recruit clerical staff, and $100 for persons in higher administrative brackets, based only on salaries paid to Civil Service staff and not including travel expenses of applicants (Waters, "Notes on Visit to Mr. Guster's Office," attached to Mitchell to Nichols, October 22, 1943, No. 320.01).
3. Harold Buchanan, Director of Personnel, NHQ, interview with Hoslett, April 19, 1948, HDF.
The guides were to indicate the area in which the evaluator's "considered judgment" was to operate. In general, states the present Director of Personnel, guides were rather loosely drawn and subject to wide variations in interpretation. In another emergency he believes all of them should state the irreducible minimum of qualifications, as well as the desired qualifications, thus in effect limiting somewhat the area of personal interpretation by interviewers.

In addition to the applicant's meeting, or approaching, the formal qualifications required for a position, the Red Cross put increasing stress upon desirable personality characteristics for employment. "Evaluations" of each applicant made by the interviewer often centered around the "personality" intangibles. The following examples of evaluations made during the recruitment interview for overseas club workers, while not typical, show the degree of emphasis sometimes placed on these factors:

Age 24. Charming personality, wholesome looking girl, splendid poise, mature for age, appears very capable but is modest about her ability. I would rate her an excellent No. 1 prospect.

27 years of age. Very attractive girl, has open face and wonderful smile and dimples. She impressed me as being the wholesome type of American girl that will fit into the work overseas splendidly.

No standardized Red Cross evaluation forms were ever developed either for the recruitment or for the employment interview. The evaluations furnished a general impression of the person but did not always state the basis on which applicant was selected or analyze the significance of the applicant's work experience or avocational interests for Red Cross employment. Also, there was no national policy as to the relative weights to be given to education, experience, or "personality." This kind of comparative evaluation was highly subjective.

The subjective element is bound to play a large part in any selection process, but perhaps a standard interviewers' rating form, with opportunity for narrative comment on specific points, would have made for greater uniformity in selection decisions. Moreover, better evaluations, in the opinion of a former Chief of Personnel Administration, SAF, would have served a useful purpose in the placement of persons by overseas personnel departments. As it was, information supplied to overseas theatres as to the field of service for which the individual seemed best fitted was derived chiefly from evaluations made during the training period.

1. The Midwestern Area, however, developed an evaluation form.
2. Avocational interests were not indicated on the application form.
The most notable defect in the procedure, however, was the lack of provision for testing. The use of mental ability tests, aptitude tests, attitude tests, or general "personality" inventories would have been useful in screening persons. For positions in which highly developed professional qualifications were not requisite (e.g., assistant field directors, staff aides and staff assistants) but in which agreeable personality characteristics were very important, attitude tests and "personality" inventories might have been of considerable aid in ascertaining desired qualities. The majority of applicants no doubt had a sincere desire to be of service to their country, yet some entered Red Cross or other war service to escape situations they had not handled successfully at home. Under these circumstances it became important to screen out persons with a demonstrated inability to adjust to the kinds of social situations they would meet in this country or overseas.

With so much of the interviewing process of a subjective nature, it is obvious that the success of the interviewing was largely dependent upon the education, experience, and abilities of the interviewers. The Red Cross established no qualification guides for the employment of its own interviewers. Performance of interviewers varied from area to area; the Midwestern Area had a reputation for being especially well staffed.  

No instructions regarding interview technique were issued, nor was a training course held for interviewers. This would have been helpful

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1. Durfee, interview with Hoslett, March 3, 1948, HDF.
in view of the fact that it seemed to take months of experience to produce good interviewers and that the interviewing staffs were "constantly changing."¹ In another emergency an intensive training program in techniques of interviewing, information to be supplied the applicant, evaluation of applicant's qualifications, and the recording of evaluations might help to standardize and improve selection methods and procedures and cut the time required for the development of good interviewers. In the hands of trained persons, the "non-directive" interviewing technique would be especially useful in revealing maladjustments which might affect job performance after employment.²

Criticism of Interviewing Methods. There is no conclusive evidence upon which to evaluate Red Cross interviewing methods objectively.³ The present Administrator of Personnel Service has stated that while in general the employment interviewing was considered good, it could have been materially strengthened by the selection of qualified interviewers and through an in-service training program for interviewers.⁴ Referring to overseas personnel, an experienced official concluded in 1945 that hospital staffs were carefully selected with due consideration to training, experience and temperament; that the selection and recruiting

¹ Thompson to Bondy, August 14, 1944, No. 330.9.
³ There have been no studies made of the correlation between the interviewers' pre-employment evaluations and the performance of the person on the job.
⁴ Durfee, interview with Hoslett, July 26, 1948.
of club workers had been well handled, securing recreational workers "of reasonably good standard." But that with reference to men in Camp Service, there was "considerable evidence that we missed the boat in the selection of many of our men who have been returned [from overseas] for cause, health, or emergencies real or imaginary. Our men have not stood up as well as our women."¹

However, throughout the war period there were serious criticisms of the selection methods for both men and women. The Chairman, in approving the decentralized recruiting plan in March 1943 declared that the failure of the plan under which the Red Cross had been operating had "been largely due to bad judgment in passing upon some of the applicants."² James T. Nicholson, Vice Chairman in charge of personnel, in reviewing cases of overseas workers returned in 1943 because of irrational behavior, expressed the belief that interviewers were not very searching in their attempts to evaluate the applicant.³ There were also complaints from Personnel Administration, Personnel Training, and the several using services that persons were not carefully interviewed in the areas before being hired. It was often reported that trainees came to Washington with little understanding

¹ Walter Wesselius, Assistant to the Vice Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations, to Allen, July 3, 1945, attached to Allen to Bondy, July 11, 1945, No. 140.08.
² Davis to L. B. Wilson, Executive Vice Chairman, March 26, 1943, No. 320.01.
³ Nicholson to Waters, August 27, 1943, HDF.
of the duties of the job for which they were hired, job location or salary. It was said that applicants were sometimes given information only about the specific openings in the area or the particular position about which they inquired, rather than information about jobs for which they may have been better qualified; that the several service interviewers in the area offices often attempted to "sell" their own services without much regard for the interests of the applicant; that applicants were "talked at" too much with little opportunity to ask questions in return; that interviewers could not always discuss professional jobs to the satisfaction of the professional applicant; that inadequate and inaccurate information was given regarding Washington training (what to bring, where to go, whom to see, etc.). One of the most serious

1. R. C. Raymond, Personnel Administration, SAF to Wann, Chief, Personnel Administration, SAF, December 8, 1942, No. 140.18; T. O. Campbell, Personnel Administration, to J. J. Waters, Employment Service, October 20, 1944, No. 330.9; Austin Thompson, Personnel Administration, Monthly Report, January 1944, No. 140.18 SAF; Mary Gold, Associate Chief, Personnel Training Unit, to Grayson, April 23, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF, May 3, 1945, No. 340.18; Ruth H. Lewis, Assistant Chief, Personnel Administration, to Campbell, May 1, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF; Dorothy Dessau, Assistant Chief, Personnel Administration to Lewis, November 2, 1945, No. 340.18; Martha B. Smith, Minutes of Chiefs' Meeting, April 18, 1945, HDF.

2. Mary B. Lawson, Assistant to Director, MNWS, to Eleanor Vincent, Assistant National Director, MNWS, August 13, 1942, No. 320.01; Mazie Rapport, PTU, to Grayson, submitting "Recommendation of a Committee of Personnel Training Class No. 60," April 13, 1942, No. 330.9; Waters to Leverenz, et al, September 1, 1943, No. 330.9.

3. Vincent to Hepner, January 25, 1944, No. 320.01.

4. Austin Thompson, Chief, Personnel Administration, to Golway, March 14, 1944, No. 330.9 [see North Atlantic Area practices].


criticisms was that few area interviewers understood just what kind of people were needed for the different jobs, a condition due in part at least to rapid staff turnover among interviewers\(^1\) and in part to lack of up-to-date information at all times on the preferred qualifications.\(^2\)

Such specific criticisms, while perhaps suggestive of weaknesses in the interviewing program, are not overall evaluations and do not take into consideration the pressure of work under which the interviewers often worked, requiring interviews to be very brief at times. They do, however, suggest the need for a staff large enough to have ample time for interviewing under ordinary circumstances, and the need for some of the other improvements in the selection process suggested above.

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1. G. Ott Romney, Director, Recreation and Club Service, to Don Smith, May 14, 1945, No. 330.001.
2. See, e.g., Campbell to Waters, October 20, 1944, No. 330.9 regarding lack of information supplied to areas on secretarial jobs. Settle to Grayson, September 27, 1944, No. 330.001, suggested that a team from the Club training staff in headquarters be sent to areas to train employment interviewers "on the type of people needed in the various job categories and the changing trends in club operation which would affect the selection of personnel."
2. REFERENCE LETTERS

Applicants for Red Cross employment listed five references on the application form, preferably employers rather than relatives, who had knowledge of their character, experience, and ability.\textsuperscript{1} Different types of letters to references were used by national headquarters and areas. The form letter used in headquarters inquired about —

ability, integrity, loyalty, habits, personableness. Do you consider the applicant qualified for the position /a statement of qualifications and responsibilities was inclosed/? If so, why? What are the applicant's outstanding qualifications? State your relationship to applicant. If employer, what position did the applicant hold? Was work record satisfactory? Would you re-employ? \textsuperscript{2}

The North Atlantic Area sent a blank to be filled out in narrative form, asking a somewhat different set of questions.\textsuperscript{3} While it is difficult to generalize about these procedures because of the lack of standard practice throughout the organization, apparently no specific questions were asked references about the physical and emotional history of the applicant, data which Mr. Nicholson believed would have been helpful in early rejection of unsatisfactory persons.\textsuperscript{4} Until 1945 no specific questions were raised about excessive drinking on the part of applicants. By that time the increase in the number of trainees who drank to excess, and in the number of persons returned overseas for that reason, brought forth instructions from headquarters that areas include a question to

\textsuperscript{1} ARC Form 615A, "Application for Employment."
\textsuperscript{2} ARC Form 1836 and 1836-A.
\textsuperscript{3} Form 5-FS, "Personnel Evaluation."
\textsuperscript{4} Nicholson to Waters, August 27, 1943, No. 320.01.
references regarding excessive drinking habits of the applicant.  

While the procedure varied in areas, in the Eastern Area when three replies of satisfactory nature had been received, the person might be employed, provided he met all other requirements. A good deal of attention was paid to these reference letters in finally approving applicants for employment, and delays of as much as a month or two in the receipt of reference letters sometimes slowed up the employment process.

But the Red Cross found, as have other organizations, that references cited by the applicant were usually fulsome in their praise of the applicant, and that the judgments expressed were of little value in making a decision as to employment. To improve information received, the suggestion was made, but apparently not fully carried out, that the Red Cross secure references from at least two persons other than those suggested by the applicant. Another recommendation, which was partially affected, was that the chapter chairman be asked to furnish a letter on persons under consideration from his community. In smaller communities, especially, this kind of reference might uncover useful information, and its use has been recommended for another emergency.

2. Buchanan, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948, HDF. 
3. Mitchell to Waters, November 10, 1943, No. 320.01. 
4. H. Buchanan, F. Rooney, L. Micas, T. James, Members of Personnel Service, NHQ, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948, HDF. 
5. Nicholson to Waters, August 27, 1943, No. 320.01. 
6. Mitchell to Bondy, Sabine, February 4, 1943, No. 320.01; Fieser to Sabine, March 5, 1943, No. 320.2. 
7. James, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948, HDF.
One problem in connection with reference letters and the recruitment interview system generally, was the fact that the information furnished by the applicant on the information form sometimes indicated long intervals between jobs which were not explained by the applicant, the interviewer, or the reference letter. Attempts were made in 1945 to have interviewers check on these gaps. Also some applicants did not list their present employer as a reference. Interviewers were instructed to make sure this was not a method of covering up unsatisfactory job performance.¹

World War II experience with reference letters indicates that in another emergency less attention should be paid to the comments of references cited by the applicant as a factor influencing the decision to employ.² Inquiries to previous employers can serve a useful purpose to verify such specific matters as periods of employment, whether service was satisfactory, and whether applicant was known to have serious medical or mental illness or excessive drinking habits. Employers' replies can be made on a simple form supplied by the Red Cross requiring a minimum of narrative comment. Such a standard form for the entire Red Cross is recommended because of ease in review by employment officers, because of the greater uniformity of the information supplied, and because of ease in completion by employers. It will be more quickly returned than the narrative type of report.

¹ Downey to Area Directors of Personnel Service, March 19, 1945, (EM 129), No. 320.01.
² Durfee, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948.
3. PHYSICAL EXAMINATIONS

Physical examinations were required for all regular permanent employees appointed on or after May 1, 1936.\(^1\) For a time persons employed as temporary workers (6 months or less) could secure waivers of physical examination, but after November 1942 all workers were required to have physical examinations\(^2\) with the exception, from October 1944 on, of war service clerical, maintenance and custodial personnel.\(^3\) Employment Service could waive the physical examination for temporary or emergency employment of this nature if the applicant signed a waiver which provided that a physical examination might be required at any time and that further employment would be contingent upon its results.\(^4\)

During the war period the requirement of a physical examination might be satisfied by (1) a physical examination by the applicant's own physician, or (2) examination by area or national medical personnel.\(^5\) Most examinations were performed by the applicant's own physician, who filled out forms for this purpose supplied by the Red Cross. This procedure made for lack of uniformity in enforcement of standards, and probably resulted in many persons being employed who were physically unqualified. Moreover, in headquarters at least, the regulations allowed up to 15 days after actual employment for compliance with the physical examination requirement. Frequently, it was said,

\(^{1}\) GI 20, June 2, 1936.
\(^{2}\) James, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948.
\(^{3}\) Special Medical and Health Survey Report, June 1945, HDF.
\(^{4}\) Amos Christie, M.D., Assistant Director Medical and Health Service, to Albert McCown, M.D.D., April 16, 1943, No. 320.2.
\(^{5}\) James, interview with Hoslett, March 26, 1948.
the examination was not made until after employment, and rejection of a person at that time caused "difficult personnel problems."¹ The employee might have given up other employment, and in the case of overseas workers, made arrangements for his family, purchase of equipment, etc.

Until mid-1942 Medical and Health Service at Headquarters had not developed satisfactory standards for physical examinations, and one Red Cross doctor reported that the Red Cross would "reap the whirlwind for this laxity." From mid-1942 on standards were tightened to become more comparable to those of the United States armed forces.² By 1945 the standard physical examination form consisted of a personal medical history signed by the applicant and the physician's record of his examination of the applicant. Physical standards required average good health and permitted the placement of applicants with non-handicapping defects in domestic service. For overseas personnel, the standards were derived from the Army Regulations for Selective Service and for enlistment in the Women's Army Corps. These were modified in several respects to be comparable to the requirements for "limited military service."³

Of the 8,000 Red Cross employees sent abroad between January 1, 1940 and October 1, 1944, approximately 400 were returned for reasons of

¹ Special Medical and Health Survey Report, June, 1945, HDF.
² Amos Christie, M.D., Assistant Director Medical and Health Service, to Albert McCown, MDD, April 16, 1943, No. 320.2.
³ Special Medical and Health Survey Report, June 1945, HDF.
health, or about 5 percent of the number sent overseas.\textsuperscript{1} Reports from some overseas theaters, especially ETO,\textsuperscript{2} called attention to poor employment physical examinations. A recommendation from CBI asked for a more strict physical and mental examination and referred to the examinations as of mid-1944 as "lamentably incomplete."\textsuperscript{3} World War II experience seems to suggest that in another emergency the Red Cross should take earlier action to establish physical examination standards, especially for overseas personnel, and to enforce these standards through pre-employment examinations administered by Red Cross medical personnel at point of employment (areas or headquarters).

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Ibid.} There are no accurate figures on persons separated from domestic service for health reasons.

\textsuperscript{2} R. H. Bremner, Associate Historian, ARC, interview with Hoslett, April 16, 1948, HDF. R. D. Jameson, Red Cross Consulting Historian for the FOA, SPA, SWPA, and PTO, reports no complaints from these theaters, however (Jameson, interview with Hoslett, April 1, 1948, HDF).

\textsuperscript{3} "Mr. Fesler's Recommendations to Major John Nixon for presentation to ARC Headquarters in Washington," attached to memo, Don Smith to Dinsmore, \textit{et al.}, June 19, 1944, No. 099.08 CBI.
E. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS OF THE "DECENTRALIZATION" PERIOD

1. MAJOR PROBLEMS RELATED TO THE DECENTRALIZATION PLAN

Probably the most difficult administrative problem in recruiting under the decentralization plan was that of gearing the recruitment machinery to the changing needs for personnel. The areas worked on the basis of quotas for all overseas positions as assigned by national headquarters. These quotas were subject to abrupt expansion and contraction, with resulting problems in the areas of attempting to relate recruiting efforts, personnel staff, and publicity to an ever-changing situation.¹ For example, during the latter part of November-December 1943 recruitment for overseas service was suspended. The areas generally believed that the peak of recruitment had passed, and proceeded to disband their recruiting staffs. But in January 1944 larger requisitions for personnel were authorised, and areas found themselves short-staffed and unable to meet the new demands promptly. In this case it required a period of nearly five months to gain momentum sufficient to procure personnel again in the quantities needed.²

In another instance, areas were in the midst of a campaign for assistant field directors and staff assistants for overseas when SAF determined that sufficient numbers of these persons had been recruited

¹ "History of North Atlantic Area, 1942-45, 'Where We Start'," p. 2.
² H. A. Wann, Chief, Personnel Administration, SAF, Annual Report for 1943-44, Personnel Administration and Personnel Training Units, June 20, 1944, No. 140.8.
for the time being. This meant that many persons whose applications
were in the process of being developed had to be told that they would
not be needed, at least not immediately. The Director of Employment at
headquarters suggested that it would have been better to close off
recruitment gradually, for as he said,

organization machinery for recruiting and employing
personnel cannot be turned off and on like a switch.
It takes time to work up momentum, and once we get
underway, there is a carryover. Assuming that we
will efficiently deal with this situation, there will
nevertheless be applicants throughout the country
who complain to Chapter Chairmen, Central Committee,
members, and friends in key positions in Red Cross.

This problem of coordination of personnel needs and recruitment
machinery apparently existed in its more severe form until December 1944.
At this time agreement was reached that area quotas, which had been
projected for a six months' period as early as November 1943 \(^2\) would be
made sufficiently definite that areas could plan their recruiting pro-
grams accordingly and obtain all workers required for the period as
rapidly as possible. Previous to this time areas could recruit only
for the current month with any certainty. \(^3\) However, after the new
"definite" quotas were assigned some changes were made because of cancel-
lations and additions necessitated by changing conditions overseas. In
another emergency in which area and chapter recruitment devices are used,
this problem of recruitment quotas will require early attention. It is

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1. J. J. Waters, Director of Employment, to DeWitt C. Smith, V-C, Do-
mestic Operations, July 10, 1943, No. 320.01.
2. SAF Monthly Report for November 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
not a problem admitting of easy solution when military plans for future expansion or contraction are indefinite or unknown to Red Cross administrators.

Another administrative problem of importance arising under the decentralization plan was that of dealing with persons rejected by areas who applied for employment at headquarters, or vice versa. There were cases like that of Miss M, who was rejected for employment in the North Atlantic Area, but who came to Washington and impressed the members of SAF personnel staff so favorably that she was hired.¹ These cases, incidentally, are of interest, also, because they indicate differences in interviewing standards from place to place. To avoid embarrassment and friction it was finally agreed that persons rejected for employment by the areas would not thereafter be accepted for employment by national headquarters or by an area until after proper clearance with the agency which had rejected the applicant in the first place. "Proper clearance" apparently meant an explanation of the reasons for hiring the person.²

Administrative inefficiency also resulted from the fact that areas did not always suggest the possibility of employment in other areas to

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2. Mitchell to Waters, November 27, 1943, No. 320.01. Another problem, easy of solution, arose in connection with the procedure which required the approval of certain personnel by national headquarters before employment. Apparently in 1943 at least, headquarters was lax in informing areas of the disposition of the applications referred to them. It was complained that in many instances two months elapsed after the referral of the applicants before any word as to action taken was released to the area (Mitchell to Waters, November 10, 1943, No. 320.01).
applicants for whom there were no vacancies within the area. Thus, in the case of hospital workers, there might be a shortage in the Southeastern and Pacific areas at a time when North Atlantic area had no vacancies in these positions.\(^1\) A procedure for the referral of this type of application to other areas had been suggested in June of 1944, and was reiterated in November 1944 with the comment that the earlier procedure was not being followed completely. Under the suggested procedure areas were to exchange information on vacancies within the areas. Areas with surplus applicants were to refer the files of the applicants to the areas in need of workers for direct handling.\(^2\) This plan did not work very well, however. The Chief of SAF Personnel Administration reported in 1945: "... the pressures on each area of meeting its own needs has pushed out of its mind the necessity of helping other areas ...."\(^3\)

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1. Virginia Megowan, Assistant Director, Hospital Service, to Hamilton Eames, October 16, 1944, No. 320.08.
2. H. E. Downey, Acting Director, Employment Service, to Area Directors of Personnel Service, November 24, 1944, (EM 93), No. 320.01.
2. MAJOR PROBLEMS NOT DIRECTLY RELATED TO THE DECENTRALIZATION PLAN

A problem, not related to the decentralization plan as such, but rather to the lack of a strong central personnel agency, was the duplication in recruitment efforts. According to plan, Employment Service in headquarters and Personnel Service in the areas, had the responsibility for recruitment of personnel. Personnel Administration of SAF was to keep Employment Service informed of estimated SAF needs and to see that adequate steps were taken to secure the applicants it desired. Two results followed from this arrangement: (1) an additional administrative unit (Personnel Administration, SAF) was placed between Employment Service and the major bloc of services for which it recruited; (2) Personnel Administration, SAF, did some recruiting in addition to that done by Employment Service. From the standpoint of administrative efficiency in another emergency, consideration might be given to the advantages of eliminating these duplications in favor of an expanded recruitment unit of the overall personnel agency operating in direct contact with the services concerned, thus being in closer touch with their needs and in a better position to service them effectively.

Another aspect of this same problem of duplication in recruitment, was the duplication that came from the services themselves. In the North Atlantic area, for example, in the early stages of recruitment, the operating services were almost as active in direct recruiting and

employing as Personnel Service was in their behalf. Eventually all employment and recruitment in this area was channeled through Personnel.¹

Throughout the war, all the services did a certain amount of their own recruitment;² many times this was a net advantage, tapping sources Employment Service was not aware of. At other times some inefficiencies and poor public relations resulted when both an operating service and Employment Service sought workers from the same organizations. Highlighting the service autonomy which was characteristic of Red Cross organization, though modified by wartime operating conditions, was the recruitment practice of the Nursing Service. At least until 1943 it performed all of its own recruiting, in violation of Red Cross policy.³ The Hospital and Home Services also recruited for their scholarship programs independently, and to some extent competitively, in both the headquarters and area offices, without reference to Personnel Service. In 1945 it was suggested that these agencies utilize Personnel Service rather than continue to duplicate the contacts between Red Cross and the schools and colleges.⁴

Perhaps a workable rule for the future is that the services make such informal referrals and suggestions to Personnel Service as they see fit, but that all concerted efforts to recruit from associations, schools, and the like, be channeled through the personnel organization.

². Imogene S. Young, Assistant to Director M&NWS, to Ruth Emerson, January 2, 1945, No. 320.01.
³. Arthur Morehead, Director of Personnel, Midwestern Area, to Waters, April 1, 1943; Waters to Morehead, April 12, 1943, No. 320.01.
⁴. Nicholson to DeWitt Smith, June 16, 1945, No. 320.01.
Another criticism, explained largely by lack of staff, was that made by Hospital Service in 1943. It reported that applicants sometimes waited many weeks or months for acknowledgment of job inquiries and for action on applications. As a result applicants were said often to accept other employment, believing that the Red Cross was not interested in them. However, J. L. Fieser, Vice Chairman at Large, who complained in 1945 of dilatory action in connection with a young woman whose application had not been acted upon for six or eight months, concluded that these "problem situations" were not unduly numerous. In general, he said, "recruitment had been an amazingly good job in face of almost insuperable difficulties."

A continuing administrative problem of some importance under both the "centralized" and "decentralized" systems, and mentioned earlier, was the competition for personnel among areas and between areas and national headquarters. In 1944 a representative of the American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers noted as one of the defects of Red Cross personnel work the bidding between areas for the services of a given applicant, and the apparent differences in salaries paid by areas for similar assignments and responsibilities. That there were wide variances in pay for hospital personnel among areas was verified in a

1. Catherine Hough, Assistant to Director MENWS, to Vincent, Fallon, June 24, 1943, No. 320.2.
2. Fieser to Nicholson, May 2, 1945, No. 320.01.
3. Durfee, Dillard, interview with Hoslett, March 23, 1948, HDF.
4. Vincent to Hepner, January 24, 1944, No. 320.01.
study reported by the Progress Reporting Unit of SAF in March 1945,\(^1\) and this condition was true for other services as well. Competition among administrative units of the Red Cross in terms of different salaries for the same position was a problem directly related to the lack of a position classification and pay plan, discussed later.

\(^1\) Moss to Golway, March 24, 1945, in "Personnel Studies Binder," HDF.
CHAPTER VI

TRAINING IN SERVICES TO THE ARMED FORCES

A. ORIENTATION TRAINING AT NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

At the time of Pearl Harbor the national headquarters of Red Cross was not equipped with a training staff or with plans for a formal training program. Shortly after the outbreak of war, in January 1942, the Military and Naval Welfare Service began to provide orientation training for its newly employed personnel. This was followed in May 1942 by the appointment of a Director of Training for all of the SAF organization.

The initial training venture of January 1942 was informal in nature. At the first class, several newly employed assistant field directors met around a conference table, were given some information orally, provided with material to read, and sent to the various services for further information. But as the number of new employees increased, it became necessary to formalise the orientation program and to provide for classroom methods of instruction.

This was done by the unit designated as the Personnel Training Unit,

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1. Since there was no training program which encompassed all of Red Cross, specific attention is given here to the largest segment of training during the war, SAF training. Later, at pages 189-90, the general problem of the coordination of all Red Cross training is discussed.


3. SAF, Three Year Report of Services to the Armed Forces, June 1941-June 1944, p. 32; interview, Wm. S. Hopner, Assistant Administrator, MNWS, with Marjorie Lyman, HD, May 27, 1946, HDF.
SAF. By the summer of 1942 organized instruction was being given for Camp Service, Hospital Service, Club and Recreation Service, and Home Service. In July 1943, a special Recreation Course was established, becoming a separate unit from the Club Recreation Unit in August 1945. Finally in October 1945 a Claims Service Training Unit was established.¹

As finally developed in 1945, a major purpose of the training program was to orient the trainee to the American Red Cross as an integrated agency with numerous specific services; to the SAF organization in particular; to the organization, courtesies, and procedures of the armed forces of the United States; and to the special functions, policies and procedures of the particular job and service for which the trainee had been employed. For trainees with special professional skills (as in social case work) another object was to review the application of these skills to the particular job. For trainees without previous professional education or experience some courses attempted to impart a basic understanding of the job and how to perform it. Such courses as the Hospital Staff Aide Course and the Recreation Course were specifically designed for untrained and/or inexperienced workers, while certain other courses, such as the Camp Service Course, often included appreciable numbers of non-professional personnel. Thus the objectives of these so-called

¹ Overall Administrative Report of SAF-SV Training, pp. 1-4. The special Claims Service training course was established to train technical advisors to work with chapters on claims matters. Since this unit was established at the end of the war period for a special purpose and was not a part of the wartime training function, it is not discussed here. The Camp, Hospital, and Home Service training units all gave instruction in Claims Service matters affecting their work, in addition to a presentation of Claims Service given in the basic orientation course.
"orientation" courses (the term is misleading) were double-barreled; for all, a basic orientation; for many, instruction in specific skills.

These objectives were to be accomplished through a common "basic orientation" course for everyone, lasting less than a week; so-called "job function" courses to prepare workers for their specific jobs, varying from a little over one to five weeks in length; and two weeks of "extension training" (supervised practice on-the-job) in field installations, given primarily for overseas workers.¹

Between January 5, 1942 and April 26, 1946, 23,323 trainees were registered in the SAF Training Unit. The smallest class to register was the first: on January 5, 1942, two assistant field directors entered training. The largest class, 371, registered on April 2, 1945. During the peak month of July 1945 over 1,000 persons entered training. From VJ Day until December 1945 registration gradually declined, and the program was terminated on April 26, 1946.²

¹ For a detailed breakdown of time and sequence of the several parts of each training course, see appendix III, "Course Descriptions."
² Overall Administrative Report of SAF-SV Training, p. 5.
1. COURSE DESCRIPTIONS

Basic Orientation. All new employees of SAF took the basic orientation course during their first week at the Red Cross training school in Washington. Finally reduced to a period of three and one-half days, it provided something of the history, philosophy, organization, and function of the American National Red Cross and of the Red Cross chapters, sketched the functions of the various services within SAF (i.e., Home, Claims, Camp Hospital and Club services), and imparted information regarding military organization, health on the job, ARC personnel practices, and the "responsibility of the ARC worker."  

The basic orientation course was largely a lecture series; the speakers were furnished by the several services. In the beginning there was apt to be considerable repetition of material, but gradually the duplication of content was reduced, attempts were made to effect better correlation of the orientation with the job function courses that followed it, and emphasis was placed upon visual aids as they became more accessible. Orientation films such as the "Battle of Britain," "Japanese Life and Customs," "War Comes to America," and the latest "Combat Bulletin" were borrowed from the Army, Navy and OWI.  

The Waves, Canadian WACS, and the Army loaned films about health protection and the prevention of venereal disease which were shown in connection with health talks given by a representative of the Red Cross Medical and Health Service.  

1. SAF Personnel Training Unit, Schedule, Basic Orientation Course, effective January 29, 1945, No. 330.01.  
3. Grayson to Wann, June 5, 1944, Monthly Report, No. 140.18 SAF.
Recreation Training. Providing recreation service for the armed forces was one of the basic functions of Camp, Hospital, and Club Service during the war. When the shortage of qualified recreation workers became especially acute, the Red Cross established a special recreation training course of four weeks' duration. Established in the summer of 1943, it was designed to provide persons untrained in recreation with an understanding of recreation philosophy and with a groundwork of recreation skills and techniques to be used on the job. Because these recreation trainees were to serve in both the hospital and able-bodied programs, foreign and domestic, the training program concentrated on common denominators in recreation which were found in all assignments, rather than the adaptation of recreation to any specific setting. Workers trained in this program included women recreation workers and assistant field directors, recreation, for Camp Service; hospital recreation workers for Hospital Service; and program directors, assistant program directors, and staff assistants for Club Service.¹

Until January 1945 such workers for Camp, Hospital or Club services took a week of basic orientation, a week of job function training in the service to which assigned, and the special four-week recreation course. When this arrangement did not prove entirely satisfactory, a new five-week course in recreation was inaugurated in January 1945 to follow basic orientation. Here job function and recreation skills were combined in one course, part of the instructing being supplied by the

¹ Mary B. Settle, Associate Chief, Personnel Training Unit (PTU), SAF, to Wann, June 4, 1943, No. 330.001.
particular service to which the trainee was assigned. As this recreation training course was finally given, it included the following topics for all trainees (with most time given to the topics marked): Analysis of Groups, Interpretation of Recreation, Recreational Leadership, Use of Volunteers, Recreation Program Planning, Facility Planning, *Crafts,* Dramatics and Music, *Hobbies and Special Interests, Dancing,* Games,* Tours and Outings, Parties and Special Events, and Discussion Techniques.

Training in recreation was difficult because of the newness of the field. The total field of recreation, as well as Red Cross recreation, was "hampered by lack of professional standards, lack of an accrediting body, lack of unity in the field, and lack of adequate total training for recreation on the graduate level."  

**Camp Service Training.** The main objective of Camp Service training was stated as "the preparation of a person to become an assistant field director whose work essentially would involve the rendering of social service to able-bodied servicemen and servicewomen at military*

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1. Mariana Bing, formerly in Hospital Service Training, telephone interview with Hoslett, June 17, 1946, HDF.
2. In addition to material on specific job functions for each service.
3. See Barbara Pheyn, former Chief of Club Training Unit, "Induction Training, for Red Cross Overseas Club Workers in World War II," (A thesis submitted to George Washington University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, November, 1947), p. 38, Fig. 2. (Hereafter cited as Pheyn, "Induction Training.")
4. Conference on Training Resources for Hospital Recreation Workers, September 12-14, 1945, afternoon session, September 12, 1945, M. K. Taylor, Chairman; attached to Hepner to Area Administrators SAF, October 9, 1945, No. 330.001.
installations.\textsuperscript{1}

At first the emphasis of the course was placed on the mechanics of the job — policies, procedures, accounting and office administration. This emphasis was based on the supposition that it was possible at the time to recruit persons with training or experience in the welfare field. As a result of criticism and of a study which revealed that the majority of the new workers did not have such a background, the emphasis in both class and field training was shifted by August 1943 to the basic attitudes, principles, and techniques involved in the case work approach to servicemen's problems.\textsuperscript{2} Policies and procedures were treated broadly and generally; specific applications were left to people in the areas and in foreign theaters. Subjects taught by the staff in April 1945 included: Approach to Servicemen's Problems (counseling and interviewing; field director services); Job Organization and Administration (office administration, bookkeeping, communications and recordings); Establishing and Maintaining Effective Professional Relationships; Understanding and Using Related Red Cross Services; Information and

\textsuperscript{1} Final Administrative Report, Camp Service Training Unit, no sig., no date. Of the 6,078 persons who took the Camp Service Course, approximately 5,800 were assistant field directors. Other workers trained included assistant field directors for recreation, able-bodied recreation workers for foreign service, and staff assistants for domestic service.

\textsuperscript{2} Final Administrative Report, Camp Service Training; Reverend William R. Johnson, "The American National Red Cross Camp Service Training Program" (a dissertation submitted to the National Catholic School of Social Service in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Social Work), June, 1949, p. 31. (Hereafter cited as Johnson, "Camp Service Training."
Services to Trainees.  

Hospital Service Training. The Hospital Service Training Unit trained social workers, hospital workers (staff aides), hospital recreation workers, and overseas secretaries. The primary objective of the training was said to be to relate orientation to general policy and practice, without placing undue emphasis upon details of practice, inasmuch as these varied with the particular installation. Thus in mid-1944 the course for experienced social workers proposed to give (1) the structure, purpose, and charter obligations of Red Cross, (2) an understanding of the limits of the worker as defined by the structure and purpose of the agency, and (3) the use of social work as a process which enables a serviceman to attain his rights and to retain his own sense of responsibility.

As of February 1945, Hospital Service was giving separate one week courses for experienced social workers (domestic and overseas), and for domestic recreation workers. Both supplied information about the military hospital and the military setting in which Red Cross work was done and about the administrative aspects of the job, including supervision and staff development. Social workers participated in case discussions centered upon the problems of social and emotional aspects of illness and upon the practice of case work in a military hospital setting.

1. For an excellent detailed statement of the topics discussed under each of the major headings cited above see Hepner to Area Administrators, SAF, April 30, 1945, No. 330.001. See also, Johnson "Camp Service Training."
2. Final Administrative Report of the Hospital Service Training Unit, no sig., no date, HDF.
3. Mary Gold, Associate Chief, Personnel Training Unit, to Mrs. Maida Solomonson, July 19, 1944, No. 330.001.
Recreation workers considered the philosophy and principles of recreation programs in military hospitals, adaptation of recreation techniques to a medical setting and the reaction of the ill person. Both courses included sessions on the relationship of Hospital Service to other SAF services, "personal adjustment" information, and one or more field trips.  

In training hospital recreation workers the Hospital Unit made use of the facilities of the Recreation Unit for part of the training, and provided part of the training itself. In 1945 the Hospital and Recreation staffs cooperated in the five week course, most of the content of which was provided by the recreation staff: Administration, 10 percent of time; Working with People, 20 percent; Program Planning, 20 percent; Recreation Skills, 35 percent; and Work Projects and Field Trips, 15 percent.  

When it became impossible to secure or train sufficient professional social workers and recreation workers for hospitals, a new sub-professional classification of worker called staff aide (later called

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1. Final Administrative Report, Hospital Training, HDF. For allocation of time to the specific subjects see, "Description of Courses," appendix III.  
2. This course also served during 1945 as an in-service training course for area personnel. A substantial number of area domestic hospital workers' staff aides, of 6 to 20 months' experience, attended this course, after which they were re-classified to hospital recreation workers (Bing, interview with Hoslett, July 30, 1948).  
3. Conference on Training Resources for Hospital Recreation Workers, September 12-15, 1945, Morning Session, September 12, 1945, William S. Hepner, Chairman; attached to Hepner to Area Administrators, SAF, October 9, 1945, No. 330.001. The specific content of this course was outlined by Miss Mariana Bing, Training Assistant, at the Conference cited.
hospital worker) was established in 1943. These trainees, varying widely in age, education, and experience, were trained in a four-week course to work in hospitals under the direction of qualified professional workers. Their course of study was more than merely orientation; it emphasized the fundamentals of working with people. Included\(^1\) were sessions on interviewing, intended to teach basic principles regarding attitudes and behavior, sessions on "job function" including specific information regarding the services included in the case work program, and sessions on recreation in hospitals.\(^2\)

Secretaries destined for overseas were trained by the Hospital Service Training Unit, because in the beginning many of them were expected to work in hospitals. Later when the majority of the secretaries were sent to work in other services, Hospital Service continued to train the whole group. In addition special courses were scheduled for individual workers, administrative assistant field directors, and assistant field directors not falling within the usual classifications.\(^3\)

**Club Training.** When, in June 1942, Club Service became a separate training unit, little was known about the job to be done. As stated in the

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1. In addition there were movies and a lecture at St. Elizabeth's Hospital on psychiatric information, a lecture on medical information essential for social work and periods for reading and fulfilling written assignments (Verval Mueller, Chief, Hospital Service, Domestic Section, MNWS, to Area Directors of Hospital Service, September 7, 1945, No. 330.9). For a comprehensive study of hospital worker training, see attachment to Mary K. Taylor, Chief, Staff Development Section, Hospital Service, to Area Directors, December 17, 1945, Eastern Area file No. 330.9.

2. By January 1945 the work of domestic hospital staff aides was limited to case work, while overseas staff aides continued to perform recreation work as well as case work. As a result of this development, course content for each group was modified to meet its needs (Bing, interview with Hoslett, July 30, 1948).

3. Final Administrative Report, Hospital Training.
Final Administrative Report of the Club Unit, "In the early months of training emphasis was put primarily on general orientation ... and ... very little training in job function was given, primarily because no information was available and there was not enough of a pattern of organization established overseas so that any general principles or impressions could be drawn."\(^1\) As in the early Camp Service training courses, a large proportion of time was given to detailed training in bookkeeping and other Red Cross standard business procedures in addition to general orientation.\(^2\)

It soon became apparent that there was need for more concentration on the particular functions of club operation. A week's training in "job function" was set up which concentrated primarily on recreation skills for staff assistants, assistant program directors and program directors, and on hotel operation and food and housekeeping services for club directors and assistant club directors.\(^3\)

About August 1943, ... a complete study was made of the program and a completely new program was inaugurated. At this time it was determined, among other things, that (1) it was impossible to train for specific theatres, (2) it was futile to attempt in one week to impart recreation skills such as games, square dancing, etc. and that the program must of necessity be one which attempted to give general principles and point general directions rather than train in specifics, and (3) that it was important for everyone, regardless of classification, to be given some material on all phases of club operation.\(^4\)

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2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
This development reflected the need for flexibility in job assignments overseas, and was similar to Camp Service experience in that it followed a pattern of training moving away from the detailed and specific to the general.

As the course finally developed, one week of job function training was set up primarily for club directors and assistant club directors, who, in most instances, were responsible for the administration of overseas clubs, and for staff assistants, who had to be prepared for almost any kind of job which did not require special administrative ability and technical skill. About 30 percent of the week's training for club directors and assistant club directors was devoted to administrative and supervisory phases of the job. While they were so occupied, staff assistants received instruction in the simpler aspects of club administration and of recreation, with which most of them would be concerned on the job.

A different type of course was organized for program directors and assistant program directors whose major responsibility was to plan and execute recreation programs in clubs overseas. Those workers attended the five week recreation course mentioned earlier and were also given instruction by the Club Unit in some of the administrative aspects of club work, namely, foods and food service, housekeeping, business management, public relations, hotel desk operation, and supervision, as

1. See below, page 138.
2. The objectives of the program are elaborated in detail in Phinney, "Induction Training," pp. 33-36.
well as background information on the purpose of the club program and the types of installations.\footnote{1} This was in keeping with the conclusion that all trainees should get some training in all aspects of club operation.\footnote{2}

\textbf{Home Service Training.} Home Service training at National Headquarters differed from most of the other training programs discussed in that it was not orientation for new workers of divergent backgrounds but rather a kind of leadership development course for newly employed Home Service staff presumably with a background in social work training and experience.\footnote{3} The training course, which began in July 1942, consisted of three weeks' instruction covering the background and scope of Home Service, Home Service Administration, and the constituent functions of Home Service, namely, Information Service, Reporting

\footnote{1. Under this arrangement, however, program directors taking the five week course, received more hours of instruction in administrative aspects of club operation than did the club directors responsible for overall club management who took the one week course.}

\footnote{2. The specific content of the one week job function training was as follows:}

\textbf{Part I:} Interpretation of Recreation, Location and Types of Clubs, Clubmobile Program, Policies Affecting Club, Administrative Club Set-up;
\textbf{Part II:} Housekeeping, Business Management, Recreation Planning, Staff Relations;
\textbf{Part III:} Snack Bar Operation, Information Desk Operations, Recreation on Transports, Personal Adjustment Overseas;
\textbf{Part IV:} Housekeeping (advanced), Business Management (adv.), Hotel Desk Operation, Food Service (adv.), Public Relations, Supervision.

Of the above units, the various classifications of workers received the following: CD and ACD: Parts I, II, and IV; PD and AFD, Parts I and III, plus recreation training; SA, Parts I, II, and III (Phimney, "Induction Training," pp. 38-42).\footnote{3. See SAF 63, June 18, 1942.}
Service, Financial Assistance and Claims.\textsuperscript{1}

To the course were admitted qualified administrative personnel at National Headquarters and in area offices, Home Service field representatives, Home Service correspondents, and chapter Home Service workers.\textsuperscript{2} The objective of this training was "to equip personnel new to Red Cross, having leadership positions, for prompt assumption of job responsibility, and a quickly gained familiarity with the full scope of the Home Service Program."\textsuperscript{3} In short, this was training for administrative leadership in Home Service.

1. A special week's course to orient correspondents for work in the national headquarters office of Home Service was also given (see Helen F. Moore, Assistant to the Director, Home Service, to Helaine Todd, November 13, 1944, No. 330.001).

2. SAF, Three Year Report of SAF, June 1941-June 1944, No. 140.18 SAF.

2. TEACHING METHODS

Like personnel training units in other organizations, the Personnel Training Unit of SAF was faced with the problem of developing effective teaching methods. This is a much-discussed subject in the field of training. In industrial training, investigators have not yet scientifically determined the relative efficacy of such methods as lecture, lecture-discussion, case study, or role-playing (psychodrama) for a particular training purpose. There is, however, substantial experimental evidence that learning occurs much more readily in situations in which the learner is active and participant rather than merely listening or reading.\(^1\) Hence, the general disapproval of the straight lecture method.

Within the Personnel Training Unit, SAF, there is evidence that the staff was acutely aware of the need for analyzing and improving teaching methods, and that it gradually introduced a number of variations to the traditional lecture method used at the beginning.\(^2\) Attempts were made, especially in the later years, to provide opportunities for student participation through discussions, field trips, field assignments, and individual consultation. Important devices for gaining participation were stimulated situations such as giving students in recreation training in empty gymnasium with the requirement to set up a typical club lounge;

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1. For a review and evaluation of this evidence, see Schuyler Hoslett, "Training in Human Relations," Personnel (American Management Association), July, 1946.

2. Throughout the period the Basic Orientation Training Unit relied heavily upon lectures given by representatives of the various services (Final Administrative Report, Basic Orientation Training).
"laboratories" such as those in which trainees could learn craft skills under group and individual instruction; workshops in which groups of trainees shared their knowledge of games suitable for GI recreation and staged dramatic productions for practice purposes;¹ "laboratory sessions" which, as interpreted by Camp Service, might mean the completion of all sample forms used in a field director's office by a trainee or the setting up of a role-playing situation in which instructors acted as servicemen in need of help, with trainees playing the part of Field Directors and auditors. Hospital Service found that discussion lent itself more readily as a method in those classes where philosophy rather than specific information was the subject. Discussions might follow a test, accompany an exercise in letter writing and reports, or follow the presentation of illustrative cases.³

Other teaching methods included demonstrations to teach such subjects as manual skills, ballroom and square dancing, or the preparation of dehydrated foods.⁴ Lecturers, especially on medical subjects, were sometimes brought to the classes from other agencies.⁵ Tests were occasionally used, but tests were not developed as criteria of the learning or teaching processes.⁶ Course outlines were supplied students, and

² Mary Settle, Chief, Personnel Training Unit, SAf, to Hill, Monthly Report, October 28, 1945; Grayson to Hill, Monthly Report, May 28, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
⁵ Final Administrative Report, Hospital Service Training.
⁶ Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, August 12, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
materials cited for reference and classroom discussion included appropriate Red Cross and SAF publications, reports and letters, some especially prepared material for trainees, and technical literature in book or periodical form. In Hospital and Home Service training some specific assignments were made for class discussion, and in Home Service practice assignments consisted of having the new employee analyze a particular case history and answer questions about it.1 While outside reading was not much used in Club training, in the five-week recreation course more use could be made of outside reading and research. In general, in the short courses for overseas trainees there was not sufficient leisure time for much outside reading because of personal preparations for movement overseas such as uniform fittings, shopping and packing.2

The staff attempted to make some use of such audio-visual aids as blown-up photographs and charts, sound film, cartoons, and film strips. In general, however, the use of visual aids was very limited. Some films were borrowed from other agencies, one or two film strips were made on Hospital and Club subjects, but the lack of appropriations, technical assistance, and equipment prevented any general use of visual aids.3

2. See Phinney, "Induction Training," pp. 54-64.

In 1945 the Coca-Cola Company was interested in making a gift to the Red Cross up to $100,000 to cover the expense of a series of American
This was a real deficiency in the training program.\footnote{1}

The above suggests some of the teaching methods used and not used in personnel training at its fullest development in 1944 and 1945. While lectures and limited classroom discussion necessarily constituted the backbone of the training given, trainees themselves were eager for more individual and class participation in training. Many trainees wanted a longer training period with more opportunity for role-playing situations, field trips, class room projects, informal discussion groups, discussion of cases, and the like. As one trainee said, "The emphasis should be more on actual practice than theory."\footnote{2} That there was not a greater utilization of methods which allowed a maximum of student

Red Cross personnel training films to be produced by a commercial company, but the Administrative Committee rejected the proposal as contrary to Red Cross policy. It was reported that while the Administrative Committee was prepared to consider the possibility of Red Cross financing its own films, certain members of the Committee were not convinced of the values to be derived from training films (Nicholson to Poteat, May 23, 1945, No. 330.001; Nicholson to R. O. Purves, North Atlantic Area, June 5, 1945, No. 300.001).

1. "One of our greatest lacks was a technical department which could give help to all five units of the Training Section in the preperations of audio-visual aids. In doing another training program of this scope we would recommend the establishment of a technical service within the Training Section which would include experts in the making of charts and the preparation of films, recordings, exhibits, and printed materials" (Phinney, p. 5).

2. Unsigned, "Tell it to Washington Inquiry, Trainee Remarks," June 30, 1944, No. 330.90. This is not the only type of criticism of the training course made by trainees, but it is a major theme running through many of the comments made in response to a questionnaire which trainees completed in the fall of 1944.\footnote{Note: the date of June 30, 1944 given above is incorrect, as the questionnaire was not designed until October 1944.}

For a similar criticism from overseas, see Katherine Blake, Staff Assistant in Middle East to Wessellus, attached to Don Smith to Bondy, Wann, Romney, December 30, 1943, No. 330.008.
participation may be attributed to the inexorable facts of life which the Training Unit faced. These included: (1) the large number of students to be "trained" in short periods of time ("job function" classes ranged up to 80 persons, and many of the students received only one week of job training plus one week of orientation in Washington); (2) the diverse backgrounds of many of the student groups (assistant field directors, for example, came from almost every walk of life; lawyers, doctors, teachers, social workers, businessmen, were all represented); (3) the lack of sufficient teaching staff during most of the period, which meant lack of time for the staff to improve its methods; (4) the constant turnover in staff, complicated by individual differences in professional preparation and teaching experience or ability. Carrying on any systematic training program at all was difficult in the face of these conditions, and of unpredictable and widely fluctuating weekly registrations; lack of adequate classroom space and equipment until June 1943\(^1\) (and thereafter inadequate to meet peak loads); lack of visual aids; and training for jobs which were not always clearly defined, or regarding which there was not sufficient information, especially from overseas installations.\(^2\) As an observer noted, "training for jobs that have not been defined is precarious work."\(^3\) One concludes that within the

1. In June 1943 the school removed from the Printcraft Building in downtown Washington to the campus of American University.
2. Committee of Personnel Training Unit Staff, to Planning Committee, February 16, 1943, No. 330.001.
administrative limits circumscribing the Training Unit, every effort was made to vary teaching methods and to provide for student participation. There were, however, no training specialists as such employed to evaluate and improve training methods.
3. COURSE CRITICISM AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT

Improvement of Courses. There were both favorable and unfavorable criticisms of the training courses by trainees, domestic and overseas administrators, training staff, and outside auditors.¹ Some of the unfavorable criticisms made during the later years of the war by former trainees were based on a course as the trainee had known it in 1942 or 1943, and oftentimes the deficiency mentioned had been corrected or ameliorated by the time the comment was received in Washington. But there was some truth in an overseas worker's description of training as of 1943:

We hadn't been trained — just exposed... Two weeks of orientation where we found out how many different things Red Cross did, plus accounting. We knew who else was on the team and how to keep track of a revolving fund and some of us had copies of the SAF Handbook, that is, those who were lucky enough to be sitting in the front of the room the day they were given out. Then a week of 'task' training for those of us who were going overseas.²

Some of the criticisms of the training courses in 1943 not only suggest reactions of the trainees at the time but also some of the problems with which the Training Unit had to cope. A common impression was

1. For examples of some favorable comments, see Louise N. Mumm, Director, Home Service, North Atlantic Area, to Charlotte Johnson, National Home Service Director, August 4, 1942, No. 330.01; Eunice Robinson, Home Service Secretary, Denver Chapter, to Todd, November 1, 1942, No. 330.9 Home Service; Ralph A. Brandt, Club Supervisor, Middle East to Ralph Bain, Director, Middle East Operations, August 3, 1943, attached to Bain to L. M. Mitchell, Director, Insular and Foreign Operations, August 9, 1943, No. 330.9; Milo F. Christensen, Superintendent of Recreation, D. C. Recreation Department, to Bondy, March 14, 1944, No. 330.001; Eleanor Vincent, Director, Hospital Service, to Mary K. Taylor, June 19, 1945, No. 330.9.

of the tremendous pressure of so much training concentrated in a few weeks -- the attempt, as a trainee said, "to explain everything that the Red Cross had ever done or intended to do"\(^1\) -- and of the confused welter of information resulting in the trainees's mind. As might be expected, administrative relationships and functions were particularly hard to get across to the mind virgin to Red Cross work. "The parts of the job which still seem confusing are the relations of Home Service to Military and Naval Welfare Service," wrote a former Home Service trainee. "The type of work that SAP also does is completely vague."\(^2\)

Another trainee summarized his reactions as follows:

> After attending the several lectures on various subjects all day and day after day it is rather difficult for one, after a personal review, to convince himself that he had learned anything very thoroughly. The reason, of course, is that so many subjects must be covered in a short space of time, that the result is a smattering of knowledge of all and without complete information on any. The advantage of the course is that without it, the new workers would not even have a theoretical knowledge. After taking the course the more efficient will continue the study of the printed instructions and when meeting problems will know better whether to refer for policy decisions, - either through the now familiar booklets or through the organization channels.\(^3\)

Criticisms by members of a hospital training class in 1943, which probably had validity for the other courses also, included the

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1. Mazie Rappaport, Personnel Training Unit, to Grayson, April 15, 1943, No. 330.2.
repetition and contradiction of material presented,¹ the generalized and vague discussion of military life, and the confusion of class scheduling under which trainees never knew in what room they would be for any given period.² Another criticism, applying to courses for overseas workers, concerned the lack of information as to type of clothes to purchase, climatic and living conditions overseas, native customs, and the like.³

Attempts were made to improve the conditions cited. The training staff seemed to have a healthy attitude of receptiveness toward criticism, and an eagerness to profit by it. While there were substantial deficiencies in the training, recognized by the staff, improvements were progressively made in course conduct, content, organization, and sequence within the limits of action imposed by the administrative pattern within which the Training Unit functioned.⁴

The Training Unit frequently evaluated and altered its curriculum. For example, one overall evaluation of March 1943 revised the length of time of some of the courses, reclassified all of the material into ten courses, improved the sequence of presentation, and added and modified

¹. Regarding overlapping material, the head of Home Service training reported in March 1944: "There is an irreducible limit to overlapping material. This is due to (a) the division of instruction in general orientation with numerous speakers who inevitably develop a certain amount of repetitious information, and (b) persons who come to the Home Service class with a previous experience in Red Cross are already familiar with much that is organization and policy... It is not possible to alter these elements of duplication (Helaine Todd, Assistant Director, Home Service, to Johnson, March 17, 1944, No. 330.001.

². Rappoport to Grayson, April 15, 1943, No. 330.2.


⁴. See below, p. 145.
course content. Again in June, 1943, the courses were "streamlined." Another major curriculum study on the part of the combined staffs of Hospital, Camp, Club, and Basic Orientation, was that which resulted in setting up the four-week recreation course of 1943, and the development of the five week course of January 1945 which combined both job function and recreation instruction.

Individual services scrutinized their own courses from time to time, and the content of the basic orientation course, and its interrelationship with the job function courses, was several times the subject of special study. Basic orientation was also the subject of a

1. Harry A. Wann, Assistant Administrator, SAF, to Area Administrators, SAF, March 18, 1943, No. 330.001; see also Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, March 31, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
2. SAF Monthly Report, June 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
3. Hill to C. E. Vrooman, Results Analysis Unit, Monthly Report, February 5, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
4. E.g., Home Service reported in November 1944 that each class member participated in a classroom evaluation of the training at the close of the course, and that from these successive evaluations there had been a continuous process of change and development in training. During the same month a special evaluation of the last twelve classes was being conducted and Home Service directors in the areas were asked to make evaluations of the class to be discussed at a staff meeting that month. This kind of self-analysis was typical of the other services as well (Charlotte Johnson, National Director, Home Service, to Ruth Hill, Assistant Administrator, PA, SAF, November 6, 1944, attached to Hill to Johnson, November 9, 1944, No. 330.001; Johnson to Munn, NA Area, et al, November 6, 1944, No. 330.001). See also Grayson to Wann, Monthly Report, February 5, 1944 (re revision of hospital staff aide course), No. 140.18 SAF.
5. For example, in November 1943, as the result of an evaluation, the basic orientation course was shortened one-half day to provide more time for instruction in job function subjects. SAF Monthly Report, October 1943, No. 140.18 SAF; ibid., November 1943. In October, 1945 it was further shortened to three and one-half days, and the content modified (Settle to Hill, Monthly Report, October 28, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF).
questionnaire devised in 1944 to determine orientation training needs, especially for overseas personnel. As a consequence of its findings, some subjects of value only for certain classifications of workers were removed from the common orientation and inserted in the specialized job function training. Unfortunately, this was the only questionnaire ever devised for curriculum evaluation.

There is no doubt that training could have been improved, had the Red Cross made available the necessary money, facilities, and the expertise so to do. The Red Cross training hardly can be compared in quality with some of the specialized training programs of the Army or Navy. Yet advances were reported: between October 1943 and March 1944 Vice Chairman Allen of Insular and Foreign Operations found that "many good reports...and no bad reports" had come to his attention. It seemed to him that the course had "boiled down to a very satisfactory short preparatory affair which is of great value to the people going overseas." When, in early 1945, Harvey Gibson, Commissioner to Great Britain and Western Europe, offered a "spontaneous and enthusiastic comment" to the effect that persons arriving in his theater during the past year seemed to be of a higher grade insofar as their ability to do the job was concerned, the Director of Recreation and Club Service

1. The questionnaire was not distributed as widely as desired, not being completed overseas, but it was filled out by members of the faculty, one class of trainees, and a few "returnees" from foreign theaters.
2. Pinney, "Induction Training," p. 29; Carey A. Maupin, Associate Chief, PTU, to Assistant Chiefs, Returnee Unit, December 18, 1944, No. 330.001, with attachments; Grayson to Members of Faculty, January 9, 1945, No. 330.008.
3. See Francis M. Taylor, Regional Supervisor, Region III, CBI, to Robert C. Lewis, Director, CBI, November 5, 1945, No. 900.08 CBI.
4. Allen to Don Smith, March 24, 1944, No. 330.001.
(G. Ott Romney) attributed this improvement chiefly to the training program.\textsuperscript{1} Earlier in 1944 Mr. Romney had written:

My own reaction from close association with the training program and my experience with large numbers of our people in one of our overseas theatres [he had been Director of Club Operations in Great Britain], as well as a very wide opportunity to operate, analyze and design pre-service and in-service training programs over the nation through a great many years, leads me to say unqualifiedly that the training is essential and that it is paying a rich dividend... The American Red Cross is fortunate to have outstanding personnel caring for the training all the way from its administration to the actual teaching and guidance.\textsuperscript{2}

The demand for "general" and for "specific" training. Yet a training program to teach large numbers of persons, some with and some without professional backgrounds, could not be all things to all people. Individual criticisms of the training courses reflected this dichotomy of the group between the inexperienced who needed training to learn what to do on-the-job and the professional worker who needed it primarily as a general orientation.

There was a widespread demand for more specific training to do a designated job.\textsuperscript{3} A worker once placed in a job — whether program director of a club in Great Britain, hospital recreation worker in primitive New Guinea, or assistant field director at Camp Browder, U.S.A. — seemed to believe that the training course should be revised

\textsuperscript{1} Romney to Don Smith, May 14, 1945, No. 330.001.
\textsuperscript{2} Romney to Don Smith, February 3, 1944, attached to Smith to Bondy, February 9, 1944, No. 330.001.
\textsuperscript{3} Allen to Bondy, May 26, 1943, No. 330.01, (re training for overseas personnel); "Comment of Trainee at Ft. Meade," attached to Bondy to Harold Houle, Chief of PTU, August 19, 1942 (re Camp Service training); "Comment of Trainee" attached to Jeanne Barnes, Assistant to Director, MNWS, to Eileen McBrier, Training Section, May 10, 1943 (re hospital recreation training); Mary Eren Lawson, Assistant to Director, MNWS to Vincent, date omitted, No. 330.9 (re hospital worker training).
to include training which would have prepared him for his job, in his particular location, executing the specific functions assigned to him at the moment. A list of needs for new or additional training noted by Red Cross employees in the Middle East in 1944 reflected these demands, encompassing a range of subjects from accounting, Army regulations, Army-Red Cross inter-policies and psychiatric case training to posters and lettering, French Arabic, interior decoration, and jitterbugging.¹

On the other hand active proponents of as much general training as possible were some overseas administrators who also wanted trainees psychologically prepared in Washington to accept any job assignment overseas necessitated by the circumstances, whether or not the person had been specifically trained for it. "Service in the Red Cross means more than doing the job for which one is classified," wrote a supervisor in Hawaii where girls sent over as club workers in 1945 had to give service for a time in communications and in mail and files departments. "That point is emphasized in Washington training and in the hiring areas. It would help us if it could be hit even harder."²

What was asked for was essentially indoctrination in an attitude of flexibility. One staff assistant overseas reported the training

¹. Some club staff assistants in this same group found no opportunity overseas to display their skill, acquired in Washington, in playing tonettes and sweet potatoes! Another apparently recommended to the training staff the leveling of king-size staff assistants, for she suggested, "Don't be too tall if you are a staff assistant, you can't dance with the fellows" ("Comments on Training at National Headquarters from ARC Workers in the Middle East," June 20, 1944, No. 330.008).

effective in this respect: "I got nothing from my Washington training that I use or that applies except an attitude: be ready to do anything."\(^1\)

Finally, a survey of faculty members and one class of trainees in 1944 revealed a mixed emphasis. Faculty members rated certain subjects of general information and adjustment of greatest importance in the training curriculum (e.g., "Understanding Basic Principles of Helping People"), while trainees rated highest subjects of more specific application to their jobs (e.g., "Understanding Claims and Benefits Service").\(^2\)

These divergent views as to the content of training were reflected in the courses. There was some emphasis on the purveyance of specific factual information for a particular job (as in the Home Service correspondents' course); some emphasis on learning situations in which students participated in simulated, but specific, job situations (as in the Camp Service Course); some emphasis on providing at least a smattering of general information on all jobs within a service (as in Club Service training).

This balance between the specific and the general within a course or within a service was not easy to maintain, and the proportions never satisfied everyone. As late as July 1945 it was observed overseas that to secure flexibility in club functioning, all workers assigned to club duties should be given more general training in business methods since

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1. "Comments on Training...from ARC Workers in the Middle East," June 20, 1944, No. 330.008.

2. The specific subjects rated as most important by trainees varied of course, with the particular job classification to which the trainee was assigned ("Summary of Curriculum Study," attached to Grayson to Members of Faculty, January 9, 1945, No. 330.008).
they were frequently called upon to assume management responsibilities in the absence of the appropriate staff member.¹

**Suggested Training Needs.** One part of the training did not seem to some to be sufficiently developed. It pertained to special orientation for overseas workers in addition to the regular instruction in overseas job function. There was some preparation for life overseas given in the regular courses, but Grayson was of the opinion that a basic overseas orientation should have been developed covering such subjects as an appreciation of people in different countries, an understanding of variations in theatres of operation overseas, and the varieties of responsibilities overseas workers may encounter, including a kind of psychological preparation of the trainee for the "realities of life" overseas. Other suggestions included physical conditioning,² especially of male field personnel, and more information on basic personal equipment needed in a particular theater.³

Some of the topics which might have been covered in such a course were suggested "returnees"⁴ in the fall of 1944. They stated that the

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1. Walter Wesseli us, Assistant to the Vice-Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations, to Allen, July 3, 1945, attached to Allen to Bondy, July 11, 1945, No. 140.08 Personnel Service.

2. The person who handled "problem returnees" in Washington stated that "it would have paid dividends if men trainees had all been put through Army Basic. It would have helped eliminate the unfit who later broke down, and the others would have been in better shape for their assignments" (Interview of Marjorie Lyman with Carey Maupin, former Associate Chief, Personnel Administration, May 2, 1946 ADF).

3. In late 1944 returnees complained there was not sufficient information given on this subject ("Common Denominators in Preparing Red Cross Personnel for War Service," pp. 4-5, attached to Maupin to Associate Chiefs, Returnee Unit, December 18, 1944, No. 330.001).

4. "Returnees" were persons who came home for a month's vacation after extensive foreign service, persons who resigned overseas, and persons dismissed overseas.
following subjects, if covered in the training course, were insufficiently stressed: personal conduct in the Red Cross uniform; working harmoniously, following channels and accepting authority; freedom from serious personal problems;\(^1\) willingness to accept different assignment if necessary; approaching soldier or officer with a "friendly impartiality;" refusing to play favorites or become "rank happy."\(^2\)

Club girls going out from Washington in 1945 under the impression they were going to rugged locations in the Pacific were "disillusioned" at finding themselves detained for six months in Hawaii, assigned as one girl phrased it, to a "silver fox-hole" where they carried on other than club duties for a time.\(^3\) Six months living in the silver fox-hole, which was both a staging and leave area, where women not only received attentions from a great many men, but from those who had not seen or talked with a white woman for many, many months, called for an emotional stability which the Commissioner to the Pacific Ocean Areas hoped Washington training might help to inculcate.\(^4\)

Administrators in the Middle East were not so much concerned with emotional instability as with social snobbery and lack of responsibility, a part of which was reflected in the "rank-happy" feeling mentioned above.

\(^1\) By including this topic, "returnees" meant that people having "serious personal problems" could be discouraged in training from continuing in Red Cross, from using it as an "escape." This could not be done, of course, without more extensive evaluation, interviewing, and counseling than was possible with the limited staff the training unit had at its disposal during most of the period (Ibid).
\(^2\) Ibid.
\(^3\) Nicholson to Hill, February 5, 1945, No. 330.9; Stanton Griffis, Commissioner, FOA, to Nicholson, January 20, 1945, No. 330.001.
\(^4\) Griffis to Nicholson, January 20, 1945, No. 330.001.
They asked for more emphasis in training on "job responsibility to the enlisted man," thinking of those on their staff who felt they were on a Cook's tour or who were primarily interested in social relations. They found a tendency among women staff members, especially, to think of their jobs in terms of a "social and relationship" matter rather than as a work assignment.¹

Essentially what these constructive critics of Red Cross training were asking was training to change basic attitudes of workers, attitudes which, translated into action, sometimes reflected unfavorably upon the Red Cross in terms of administrative efficiency, impartial service, and personal morality as representatives of the organization. Yet training which attempts to change basic attitudes or personality traits of individuals has been, for the most part, notably unsuccessful.²

Basically, the problem under discussion was probably more a condition to be ameliorated through improved selection of workers than through training endeavors. Nonetheless, a fuller description of the conditions likely to be faced by trainees overseas, plus explanation of proper conduct, might have been of considerable service, especially when

2. Recent experiments with role-playing, and other participant devices, suggest that they may be the most effective measures yet found to alter attitudes. They have been used, for example, to alter a supervisor's "authoritarian" attitude toward his employees to one involving more respect for the individual. There is not yet sufficient validation of these experiments, however, to warrant a conclusive statement as to their effectiveness. The fact that advances have been and are being made in research in human relations, as well as in the more mechanical aspects of training procedure, suggests the necessity for training specialists in such a program as Red Cross war-time training. This was lacking in the World War II program of the Red Cross.
buttressed with a supervisory and disciplinary system overseas exerting a definite control over personnel. Even a nominal instruction program such as this, however, would have required up-to-date information on the types of situations encountered by Red Cross employees in the various theatres. During World War II such information was not available in a constant flow to the Training Unit,¹ though of course it was within the range of administrative feasibility through a system of reports from overseas and visits to theatres for information and inspection.

¹. On the problems of "securing information," see below pp. 149-151.
4. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS AND CONSIDERATIONS

Staffing problems. Probably the most troublesome problem facing the Training Unit was inadequate staffing. Until December 1945 there was a constant shortage in staff resulting in part from the qualifications established for instructors, limited recruitment sources available, and a high rate of turnover. The size of the staff increased from five instructors in early 1942\(^1\) to 80 professional and clerical persons in the summer of 1945, declining in numbers from December 1945 to two when the Unit closed April 26, 1946.\(^2\)

For the most part, statements of qualifications for teaching staff emphasized not only professional educational preparation but Red Cross experience as well, usually with the statement that "teaching experience is desirable," or "preferably with some type of teaching experience."\(^3\)

There is no conclusive evidence as to the consequence of this policy in terms of teaching effectiveness, but the Recreation, Club and Hospital training units all concluded that professional knowledge and Red Cross experience, without special teaching skill, were not enough. In practice the primary requisite for instructors was the ability to teach effectively and with sustained enthusiasm. Many of the best operational people in the

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1. SAF Monthly Report for March, April, and May, 1942, No. 140.18 SAF.
2. Overall Administrative Report, SAF-SV Training, November 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
3. See e.g., teletype, Don Smith to Area Administrators, SAF, May 26, 1943, No. 330.02; Hepner to Wann, September 22, 1943, No. 330.001; Bondy to Hospital Field Staff, September 6, 1943, No. 330.02; Hepner to Wann, September 22, 1943, No. 330.02; Wilson to Area Administrators, SAF, August 29, 1945, No. 330.02.
field were the worst failures in the classroom.\textsuperscript{1} Former teachers, on the other hand, usually used more varied skillful teaching techniques and had more ease in the classroom.\textsuperscript{2}

In view of the qualification requirements for instructors, the main recruitment source was the Red Cross itself. From time to time urgent appeals were sent to the areas for instructors,\textsuperscript{3} most of whom were loaned for short periods, but it was said that no uniform procedure was ever devised to inform area workers of teaching opportunities in Washington\textsuperscript{4} or to assure a certain supply of instructors by areas.\textsuperscript{5} A number of instructors from professional social work schools were employed,\textsuperscript{6} and consideration was given to recruiting other outside teachers.\textsuperscript{7} By 1944 overseas workers were employed as instructors also.

Reliance on areas for instructors often resulted in a "transient" staff for much of the training school, especially when coupled with other conditions promotive of high turnover such as: a tendency at times for the

\textsuperscript{1} Phinney, Final Administrative Report, Club Unit, February 1, 1946, p. 2; also see Final Administrative Report, Recreation Training Unit, pp. 7-8; Mary Gold, "The Residual of Hospital Service Training," HDF.
\textsuperscript{2} Phinney, "Induction Training," p. 17.
\textsuperscript{3} An example of the sources of instructors for hospital training; between July 15, 1943 and April 1, 1944 the staff of twenty consisted of a few persons from professional schools, several Hospital Service Educational Consultants loaned by areas, one former trainee, and the remainder staff workers from the field (Tate to Vincent, March 31, 1943, No. 330.02).
\textsuperscript{4} Interview, Gold and Lyman, March 8, 1946, HDF.
\textsuperscript{5} See Committee Recommendation, "Meeting of SAF Personnel Committee," September 8, 1945, No. 330.9.
\textsuperscript{6} Mildred C. Tate, Associate Chief, PTU, to Vincent, March 31, 1944, No. 330.02.
\textsuperscript{7} Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, April 13, 1943, No. 140.18.
staff to use teaching jobs as stopgaps while finding better jobs, the monotony and hard work of heavy teaching loads, salaries thought not to be commensurate with duties performed, and uncertainties about the continuation of training. Very few men could be obtained as teachers, even for short periods. Turnover was especially acute in the Hospital Training Unit where in November 1943, for example, the entire staff, with the exception of the head, was on temporary loan from areas or outside sources. For the period July 15, 1943-April 1, 1944, the average tenure of Hospital instructors was 3.2 months, with several of only one month's duration. Thereafter the Hospital staff stabilized considerably, but during much of the period such conditions handicapped sustained program planning and uniform teaching practices.

Obtaining instructors with overseas experience. One of the most insistent complaints about instruction was the lack of instructors with

1. Phinney, Final Administrative Report, Club Unit, p. 6. Home Service and Camp Service with small staffs, did not have a serious turnover problem.

2. From time to time it was reported that recruitment needs would soon be met, ending the training program (See e.g., SAF Meeting on Training, August 14, 1943, No. 330.9).

3. "Salaries for all training assistants were so low that we were not always able to command the best possible staff for our program and it was veritably impossible to get men instructors" (Phinney, Final Administrative Report, Club Unit, p. 6).

4. SAF Monthly Report, November 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.

5. Tate to Vincent, March 31, 1944, No. 330.02.


overseas experience. In the first months of training, before any substantial overseas experience had been accumulated, it was obviously impossible to supply instructors with overseas experience. In the later stages of the program as returnees from the theaters appeared in Washington it became possible to recruit some of them for teaching jobs, so that by 1944 every service had at least one instructor with overseas experience; Club Service at the close of the program had a representative of every theater except China-Burma-India.

But it was difficult to recruit returnees for teaching: teaching salaries were low and the job drab in comparison with overseas work, and most of the workers were mentally and physically fatigued. "So it was that with thousands of prospects, it was not easy to find persons with creditable records, sound experience, teaching ability, and the desire to do a training job."

There were two proposals made to solve the problem: provide foreign experience for Washington instructors or for the withdrawal of qualified

1. For complaints regarding non-use of overseas workers as instructors see Mitchell to Bondy, January 25, 1943, attached to Bondy to Mitchell, January 28, 1943, No. 330.001; Ralph Bain, Director, Middle East Operations, to L. M. Mitchell, Director, Insular and Foreign Operations, August 9, 1943, No. 330.9; Jacob B. Zack, former Club Supervisor, ETC, to L. L. F. Hackemann, HD, June 12, 1946, HDF; Don Smith to Bondy, Wann, Romney, with attachments, December 30, 1943, No. 330.006; Wann to Don Smith, with attachment, March 21, 1944, No. 330.001; Rachel Armour, Assistant Director, MNWS, SE Area, to Emerson, with attachment, June 3, 1944, No. 330.9. "Comments on Training at National Headquarters from ARC Workers in the Middle East," June 20, 1944, No. 330.008.


persons from the theaters for assignment in Washington. Unfortunately, no administrative machinery for such purposes was established.

Securing Information. Securing information upon which to base the content of training is a major problem in any training program encompassing a wide scope of operations. Red Cross, like other organizations, was faced with this problem, and in an acute form.

Considering the entire war period, and making allowances for specific exceptions, from the training point of view certain aspects of Red Cross administrative communications adversely affected training. The Training Unit was not closely enough associated with the line administrators in Washington to be aware of changing policies and plans; the staff rarely was able to attend meetings of administrators.

1. This kind of arrangement was proposed by Ralph Bain, Director, Middle East Operations to L. M. Mitchell, Director of Insular and Foreign Operations, August 9, 1943, No. 330.9. See also Wann to Don Smith, March 21, 1944, No. 330.001.

2. There was, however, a problem in the use of overseas workers as teachers in that their experience was likely to be limited to one theater. "It is our feeling," wrote the head of hospital training, "that any returnee is somewhat provincial in that she is prone to answer questions in terms of the theatre, climate, hospital unit, etc., with which she had contact. As yet we have had no one with an overall picture or experience in more than one theater" (Gold to Ryan, January 12, 1945, No. 330.9).

3. "We were not closely enough tied up with operations so that we could keep abreast of developments sufficiently to keep our material current... And we were seldom included in meetings in which future plans and current developments were discussed" (Phinney, Final Administrative Report, Club Training, p. 5). Several suggestions were made that instructors be allowed to sit in on policy and planning meetings (Melvin A. Glasser, Associate Chief, Personnel Training Unit, to Hepner, August 24, 1943, No. 330.001; Settle to Grayson, September 27, 1944, No. 330.001). In February 1945 it became possible for members of the Camp Service staff to attend the weekly Camp Service Operations meetings (Frank E. Rooney, Associate Chief, Personnel Training Unit, to Grayson, Monthly Report, February 28, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF).
did not receive a sufficient number of up-to-date reports from areas or overseas on field practices, practices which should have been reflected in course content.¹ There was not time for as many staff visits to areas as desired, and as mentioned earlier, no opportunity for overseas visits.² Few formal reporting means were devised for ascertaining reactions to training by former trainees and administrators or for gaining their suggestions for changes in training.³ Such obstructions to communication affected not only the accuracy, scope, and freshness of training in Washington, but, since communication is a two-way process, they also tended to keep the area and overseas organization in the dark as to the Washington training program at any particular time.⁴ The

¹. See L. Lloyd Baird, Chief, Recreation Unit, SAF, to Wann, November 10, 1942, No. 140.18 SAF, and Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, April 30, 1943, No. 140.18, noting the need for information on overseas operations; Gold to Helen Armstrong, Director, Hospital Service, Midwestern Area, September 3, 1945, No. 330.9, noting that by the time the monthly reports were received they were usually three to four months old; Settle to Grayson, September 27, 1944, No. 330.001, suggesting the need for a constant flow of fresh material other than the limited reports then being received.

². There were some visits of training staff members to the field especially Camp and Hospital Staff in 1944 and 1945 (See Johnson, "Camp Service Training," pp. 25-26; Final Administrative Report, Camp Service Training, p. 1; Settle to Grayson, September 27, 1944, No. 330.001; Grayson to Hill, December 2, 1944, No. 140.18 SAF; Grayson to Hill, Monthly Report, July 3, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF; Settle to Hill, Monthly Report, October 28, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF; Grayson to Walden, August 30, 1944, No. 330.9; Hill to Bondy, February 28, 1945, No. 330.001.)

³. The only formal questionnaire to the field on training needs was the so-called "Tell it to Washington Inquiry," of 1944, which was circulated only to the faculty, one graduating class and a few returnees. There were occasional referrals of prospective or current training programs to the field for comment and Hospital Service made at least some study of the daily activities of social workers for use in planning course content (Grayson to Hill, December 21, 1944, No. 330.9; Baird to Harvey Gibson, May 11, 1943, No. 330.9; Bondy to Wann, February 17, 1943, No. 330.9; McBrien to Area Assistant Directors of MNWS, October 20, 1942, No. 330.2).

⁴. See Grayson to Harry Walden, August 30, 1944, No. 330.9.
The shortcomings suggested obvious administrative remedies at the time and for the future. "It would be our hope," wrote the head of Club Training,

that in any future training situation the training staff, by administrative order, would be brought into close working contact with those responsible for policies and operations in the field and that operations would consider it their obligation...to make possible a continual flow of information necessary to the training program. In turn, the training section should be encouraged to pass on suggestions to operation departments which they might have as a result of their study of the situation from the training angle.  

These deficiencies, though substantial, were counteracted in part by the ability of instructors to ferret out information through such means as personal contacts, perusal of available reports, discussions at service and SAF general conferences, and talks with overseas and domestic workers and administrators. Conferences with returnees, of which Club Training Unit had more than 300, were especially valuable as sources of information.

**Screening and evaluation of trainees.** It was not the responsibility of the Training Unit to screen out unsatisfactory trainees. Rather this was a function of its companion unit, Personnel Administration, SAF.

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2. Such difficulties were not, of course, unique to the Red Cross. The Training Center of UNRRA, for example, "felt it did not get adequate information from the field, that it was not kept informed by pertinent material from Headquarters, and that it did not have a chance to see the cables necessary for intelligent planning" (Marian B. Clausen, "Personnel Policies and Problems: The Training Program" UNRRA, pp. 51-52, HFD. Hereafter cited as Clausen, "UNRRA Training").
3. Regarding interviews with overseas personnel, see Allen to Don Smith, with attachments, March 24, 1944, No. 330.001; Hill to Results Analysis, Monthly Report, May 3, 1945, No. 140.16 SAF.
Overseas personnel were presumably told upon employment that their fitness and aptitude for overseas work would be observed during the training period with the right reserved by SAF to release unsatisfactory trainees or transfer them to domestic duties for which they seemed qualified.¹

It was the responsibility of the Training Unit to observe the trainees and to report such observations to Personnel Administration, including recommendations that a person should not go overseas. The final decision, however, rested with Personnel Administration² which might itself have to consult with various services at headquarters before rejecting a trainee. It was reported that the training staff found difficulty in persuading Personnel Administration of the undesirability of some trainees, and in other cases Personnel Administration was not able to follow a strong recommendation to release a trainee when the service concerned objected.³

Since areas were responsible for employment, Personnel Administration limited itself to rejecting obvious misfits, normally rejecting persons manifestly unqualified in terms of the employment guide of qualifications or who showed a definite lack of ability while in training.⁴ The numbers rejected for poor work amounted to 24 or 25 persons per month at the most, or about 2.5 percent of peak enrollment, although others were

¹. Settle to Wann, June 4, 1943, No. 330.001.
³. Interviews, Roy Johnson and Lyman, April 10, 1946; Hackesmann and Phinney, March 22, 1946.
⁴. E. A. Thompson, Chief, PA, SAF, to Golway, March 14, 1944, No. 330.9.
also found unsuitable for overseas work because of health or "personal" reasons. These figures are suggestive of the total numbers disqualified for all reasons during the peak period of training: January, 1945, 35; February, 65; May, 64; June, 36. During some of these months the enrollment approached 1,000. Trainees for service in the United States were also rejected by Personnel Administration, though the members probably were never very large.

Written observation or evaluations of trainees made by the Training Unit were used not only by SAF Personnel Administration in rejecting trainees, but also by areas in making training assignments, and by areas and overseas offices in making job placements. The observations themselves took the form of such short narrative comments as these:

Miss X was one of the most active members of the group. She has a good mind and her written assignments covering reading were particularly well done. She inclines to be too "theoretical" and should benefit greatly from experience in working with people.

Miss Y has shown excellent potentialities. She is adjustable, flexible and interested.

Miss Z: Extremely shy - very nice person; tries hard; has something. She is doing very well now; only 23 years of age. From North Atlantic Area. Came out a lot; when she gets to know what it is all about, she will be a good worker. Needs a lot of help but will grow on the job. Will wear well.

1. Bondy to Winfrey, March 28, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
2. Ibid.; Campbell to Hill, July 5, 1945, No. 140.8 SAF; Lois Johnson to R. H. Lewis, June 9, 1945, No. 330.9.
5. Ibid.
6. Unsigned Report of Recreational Trainees, August 1944, No. 330.9. Combined with these narrative comments, was an objective rating scale used in Recreation and Club training in 1944 and 1945 (Phinney, interview with Hoslett, July 30, 1948).
There were mixed reactions as to the value of such comments for these purposes.\(^1\) Within the training staff itself serious doubts were expressed that worthwhile evaluations could be prepared on such large numbers of students under observation for short periods.\(^2\) Instructors had definite reactions to only a small percentage of the class.\(^3\) Moreover, it was felt that the observations probably had little positive correlation to on-the-job performance, and thus might do the trainee an injustice.\(^4\) The head of Home Service training was convinced that any evaluation attempting to measure ability to perform specific jobs was impossible. Classroom association was so limited, she said, that it was unfair to judge a person beyond the superficials of appearance, indicated interest, degree of participation, and ease and clarity of speech -- qualities which should have been evaluated at the point of employment.\(^5\)

Nonetheless, more attention was given to the problem of evaluation and it appears as time went on more importance was attached to its usefulness. By early 1945, however, the size of the classes and the pressure of work made it impossible to prepare evaluations except for the outstandingly good or the very weak trainees.\(^6\)

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1. SAF Conference, MNWS Section, January 21–23, 1943, No.140.14 MNWS; Gold to Mary Taylor, Chief, Staff Development Section, Hospital Service, August 29, 1945, No. 330.9; Gold to Helen Armstrong, Director, Hospital Service, Midwestern Area, with attachment, January 29, 1945, No. 330.08.
4. Ibid.
The locale of training. Apparently there was no real opposition to the orientation training of workers in Washington rather than in the areas, though occasionally the question was raised: shouldn't domestic employees be trained in the areas? This possibility was explored at various times, but was found impracticable because of the excessive cost of such a program, which would have required a staff in each area headquarters, idle at times, handling small classes, and in a less favorable position than trainers at headquarters as far as instructional materials and instructors were concerned. It was felt, too, that there were values in having trainees see national headquarters, meet and hear administrative officers, obtain uniform training, and "getting the feel of the urgency of the whole situation.”

There was a question, however, as to the relative amounts of orientation training that should have been given in Washington and overseas. The Club Training Unit felt that the orientation training in Washington was too short, but Richard F. Allen, Vice Chairman in Charge of Insular and Foreign Operations, was convinced at one time that a shorter course

1. Pacific Area protested early in 1942 at the cost of sending trainees to Washington, and wanted to continue its week-long orientation training program in the area, which was not allowed (A. L. Schafer, Manager, Pacific Area to James L. Fieser, Vice Chairman, February 4, 1942; Fieser to Schafer, February 18, 1942, No. 330.9). There was evidence also in Home Service that area management preferred to have all training of domestic staff members done in the areas (Minutes of Meeting of Home Service Directors, SAF Conference, November 28-December 2, 1944, No. 140.14).
3. Fieser to Schafer, February 18, 1942, No. 330.9. For similar comments, see "Minutes of Meeting Held to Discuss SAF Training Plans," November 17, 1944, No. 330.001.
of training in Washington with supplementary training overseas would have been more effective.\(^1\) Ralph Bain, Director of Middle East Operations, made the same recommendation,\(^2\) as did W. H. G. Giblin, Director of Civilian War Relief in the ETO. If a worker were trained for the specific operation after arrival in the field, said Giblin, "I am sure much of the confusion and misunderstanding which has resulted from other Red Cross training programs for foreign service would be avoided."\(^3\)

In practice, however, no uniform orientation training was established overseas, though it existed in some theaters for some categories of personnel.\(^4\) The Training Unit thought this lack of follow-up training overseas brought unwarranted criticism upon the training in Washington which was expected to be the beginning and end of training given our personnel. Consequently, not only were we a target for constant criticism because of all we did not accomplish, but much of the effectiveness of what we did was lost because it was not followed up by any well-ordered training program overseas. No national program given in Washington... could possibly have met all the training needs, and the induction program should have been recognized as just that and nothing more.\(^5\)

The suggested solution was a training staff in each theater of operations working in cooperation with the training staff in Washington.\(^6\)

**Class size and advance notice of registration.** Most of the training classes for much of the war period experienced the annoyance and incon-

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1. Allen to DeWitt Smith, Don Smith, Dinsmore, Wesselius, July 9, 1943, No. 330.01.
3. Giblin to Allen, September 4, 1944, No. 900.62/33 ETO.
4. See below, p. 240.
6. Ibid. For further consideration of this question, see below p. 243.
venience of large fluctuations in class size from week to week ordinarily without advance notice of the number to be trained. In Club training enrollment in any one week might be 20 or 70; in Camp Service, 2 or 88; the desiradatum of 25 seldom was achieved. Registration in the hospital workers class was sometimes well over 100. In peak periods the staff was seriously overworked — so much so in March 1945 that the head of hospital training remarked that she could not find time to get her hair washed.

A system was finally worked out whereby Area Directors of Personnal in their regular reports on recruitment gave an estimate, on a weekly basis, of the number of trainees who were expected to report to Washington from training during the following month. This was of obvious assistance in setting up class schedules, planning housing, and in making other preparations for the reception of new trainees, though the estimates of the number of students varied from 88 to 210 percent of actuality. Area quotas of trainees for each class, though suggested, were never established.

1. Home Service was an exception. Its classes seldom ran over 25 members, and there was advance notice of registration.
2. Settle to Grayson, September 27, 1944, No. 330.001.
4. Gold to Grayson, Monthly Report, March 9, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
5. Ibid.
Facilities and costs. Facilities until June 1943 were inadequate: Classes were held in various buildings, including the Printcraft office building in downtown Washington. From June 1943 until the closing of the school, facilities occupied on the campus of the American University were generally considered very adequate except at the peak period of training, when the Unit had to seek additional classroom space off-campus.

The cost of operating the training school for one year was estimated in 1943 at $282,255, and included the following items:

Rent - American University for one year .......... $110,000.00
Equipment, maintenance, and operation .......... 23,000.00
Maintenance salaries .......... 20,000.00
Salaries - professional and clerical staff ...... 129,255.00

Total ........................................... $282,255.00

1. Provision was made for classroom space and for housing 311 trainees. A gymnasium, an auditorium and a cafeteria were available for the use of the trainees and staff. A reference room, and a lounge-snack bar were also set up on the premises (Johnson, "Camp Service Training," pp. 20-21).

2. Hill to Bondy, Mat 2, 17, 1945, No. 140.18, SAF. The American University campus was several miles from the main Red Cross buildings. It has been suggested that this interfered in some degree with liaison with the rest of the personnel organization.


4. Costs of training cannot be ascertained exactly because salaries of teaching staff were not itemized separately from staff members of Personnel Administration, SAF. Moreover, salaries of some instructors were carried on payrolls of their own services.

5. Rental of the University facilities included two dormitories which housed 311 trainees. Before these were available, trainees were housed in hotels at an average per diem rate at one time of $2.50. Subtracting the housing cost for 311 trainees in hotels ($246,487) from the total cost of operating the school ($282,255) reduced the net cost of operating the school to only $35,668, based on 311 trainees. Of course, as enrollment increased, other housing than American University dormitories was used (See Bondy to Wann, with attachment, December 17, 1943, No. 330.001).
In addition to these costs were the expenditures for food,\(^1\) for housing for students not housed at American University,\(^2\) for transportation to Washington,\(^3\) and for salaries paid while in training. In December 1943 it was stated that the average total cost for each trainee for the training period varying from 2 to 6 weeks was $350, of which instruction itself was a very small part.\(^4\) Thus, it was relatively inexpensive training.

1. Cost per day for food was estimated in May 1944 at $2.50 per person (Wann to Walden, May 8, 1944, No. 330.9).
2. Housing costs varied from an average of $3.42 in September 1942, to $2.50 in January 1943, to $1.43 in September 1943 to an estimated $1.85 in May 1944 (Wann to Bondy, with attachment, March 2, 1943, No. 330.9; Wann to Golway, September 5, 1943, No. 330.001; Wann to Walden, May 8, 1944, No. 330.9).
3. Cost per trainee for travel was estimated at $75.00 (Wann to Walden, May 8, 1944, No. 330.9).
B. EXTENSION TRAINING

1. DESCRIPTION

Extension training, which formally began in June 1942, was part of the training program for Club, Camp and Hospital overseas workers, occupying the time period between the completion of formal training in Washington and the date when transportation overseas was provided by the Army. This training gave some practical on-the-job observation and experience in selected camps, hospitals, or non-Red Cross agencies such as USO (for club personnel), bridging the gap between classroom theory and field practice.

Such training might well have been an integral part of the whole training program, but the fact that it applied chiefly to overseas personnel suggests that the main raison d'être was to occupy the time until overseas transportation was ready. In fact, the whole extension training program was geared to availability of transportation. Theoretically, each overseas worker was to receive at least two weeks of extension training, but some received none, some a few days, and some up to 10 weeks or more, depending on the transportation factor.

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1. See SAF 66, June 24, 1942.
2. Extension Training did not apply to Home Service. Home Service Trainees returned to the jobs on which they had been employed prior to training.
3. Domestic Camp Service personnel had extension training, and at times some domestic employees in Hospital Service.
Small groups of trainees\textsuperscript{1} were sent to field stations for extension training under the direction of Training Supervisors. The latter supposedly had some prior instruction in their duties in Washington,\textsuperscript{2} and some written instruction from Washington on the conduct of their work.\textsuperscript{3} Ideally, extension training included not only further formal instruction given by the Training Supervisor, and opportunity for observation, group discussion, and individual conferences, but in particular an opportunity for participation in the day to day tasks. "If the continuation (extension) program is to have real value," stated the Chief of the Personnel Training Unit, "it should be based on the idea that the trainee will learn by actual doing."\textsuperscript{4} "The emphasis," said another trainer, "should be on participation rather than on observation since the orientation program itself serves every purpose observation might offer."\textsuperscript{5}

Among the benefits to be derived from this kind of program were: first-hand experience of the military environment in which the new

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} SAF 66, June 24, 1942, proposed to limit the maximum number of trainees to five, but this was not always possible.
\item \textsuperscript{2} SAF 66, June 24, 1942.
\item \textsuperscript{3} For written directives on Camp Service instruction to Supervisors see SAF 66, June 24, 1942; AR 1228, section 12.4.4, January 1945; Hepner to Area Administrators, April 30, 1945, No. 330.001. For Hospital Service: SAF 66; SAF 294, February 19, 1944; "Suggested Guide for Extension Training in Hospitals for Social Workers," January 11, 1944, No. 3399; Evadne M. Laptad, Assistant to National Director, MNWS, to Tate, January 22, 1944, No. 330.001; Gold to Minnie Willner, Assistant Director, MNWS, North Atlantic Area, June 6, 1944, with attachment, No. 3309. For Club Supervisors: Settle to Grayson, March 22, 1945, No. 330.001.
\item \textsuperscript{4} Grayson to Wann, Assistant Administrator, S.A., January 18, 1943, No. 330.001.
\item \textsuperscript{5} This statement referred to the training of hospital social workers and hospital recreation workers specifically. Tate to Ruth Coon, Eastern Area, February 8, 1944, No. 330.2.
\end{itemize}
employee was to work; opportunity for the trainee to try himself out in direct contact with the GI (for it was surprising how few trainees had ever had actual association with military personnel); better understanding of Red Cross objectives and methods by contact with practice. Hospital staff sides, for example, needed experience in adjusting to the regimen of the hospital, the physical appearance and the disabilities of patients, and in meeting the fears of hospitalized men regarding the future. Through working side by side with Red Cross staffs and medical officers who are serving patients having physical and mental illnesses, these newcomers to Hospital Service will have the best opportunity to gain confidence and further understanding of the job they have chosen and of themselves in relation to it.3

To the organization it provided an opportunity to observe a worker under controlled conditions on the job, in which such factors as health, adaptability, flexibility, and personal and work relationships could be observed much more realistically than in Washington.4 Strengths and special abilities, as well as weaknesses, could be ascertained and reported5 in the extension training period.6 These observations, together with information in the individual’s personnel file,

4. Ibid.
5. Reports on trainees by Training Supervisors were to include narrative statements as to (a) attitude, industry and manner of applying self to work, (b) receptiveness to supervision and suggestions, (c) ability to grasp objectives of Red Cross work, (d) relationship with military personnel, (e) relationships with fellow workers, (f) professional performance, (g) ability to interpret opportunities for service to chapters, individuals, and groups, (h) mastery of office routines, (i) additional comments (SAF 66, June 24, 1942).
and the evaluation of the trainee made while he was in training in Washington, were available to Personnel Administration, SAF, which had responsibility for determining whether a trainee was finally suitable for overseas assignment. In another emergency these kinds of information should be developed and used to a higher degree.

2. ADMINISTRATIVE PROBLEMS

Facilities for Club Extension Training. The main problems in conducting the extension training program were in securing supervision of the training in the field and in adjusting training programs to the unknown factor of Army transportation. In addition to these general problems Club training had the special problem of finding facilities for extension training. In contrast to Hospital and Camp Service, with their established units at domestic installations, the newer Club program, preparing workers for overseas service only, had no staffs at domestic military installations upon which to call. As a result, various expedients were tried such as making arrangements for trainees to work at USO centers, or at canteens and service clubs on military posts near Washington. Some were given experience in the "Loft," the combination snack bar and lounge at American University, and at other special training centers established by Red Cross. One of the latter was Midtown House in New York City, where between October 1942 and December 31,

1943, Club personnel were housed awaiting overseas transportation, and given extension field work at locations around New York City as well as lectures on subjects relating to club work.\(^1\) Other such centers were the old Russian Embassy and the Wesley Heights Club in Washington.\(^2\) Neither these Washington centers nor Midston House was very satisfactory, however, in providing extension training useful overseas.\(^3\) It was said, for example, that at Midston House many of the work assignments were impractical\(^4\) or too prolonged, causing trainee unrest and "disintegration of serious proportions."\(^5\) It was useful as a place to hold trainees until transportation was ready, sometimes up to five months.\(^6\)

By 1945 it became clear that military camp assignments and some service clubs were of the greatest value for extension work in lieu of actual R. C. Clubs, which could not be set up in our country. Arrangements were made to assign larger numbers to these installations, five of

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2. Between June 1943 and January 1944 Red Cross used the old Russian Embassy in Washington where, under supervision, Club extension trainees lived and operated the facility as a combination cooperative house and Club for Red Cross personnel. Toward the end of the war another club, the Wesley Heights Club, was operated by women extension trainees as a model club (Final Administrative Report, Club Training Unit).


4. Interviews of Marjorie Lyman with Leonard Block and L. F. Hackemann (both of whom had been Red Cross club directors overseas), November 6, 1947, HDF.


6. Ibid.
which were put under the supervision of resident Club Extension Training Supervisors.\textsuperscript{1} A program was set up to give training experience to club personnel in recreation leadership, recreation program planning, functional arrangement of facilities, military orientation, snack bar operation and service, public relations, staff relations, and personal adjustment on the job.\textsuperscript{2}

The Problem of Supervision. Defined, systematic, and controlled supervision of trainees on extension assignments was never completely achieved. One obstacle seemed to be administrative responsibility for extension training. With the exception of Club training,\textsuperscript{3} areas were responsible for (1) placement opportunities for trainees, (2) appointment of extension training supervisors, and (3) preparation of evaluations of trainees.\textsuperscript{4} The Personnel Training Unit neither enforced uniform standards in the areas for the supervision of extension training, nor had it direct communication with supervisors of extension training in the field. All matters of mutual concern to the Personnel Training Unit and field supervisors of extension training passed through the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Final Administrative Report, Club Training, p. 3. Other training centers were supervised on an itinerant basis by one supervisor (Phinney, interview with Hoslett, July 30, 1948).
\item \textsuperscript{2} Settle to Grayson, March 22, 1945, No. 330.001.
\item \textsuperscript{3} Since there was no area organization for Club Service, training supervisors for Club work were responsible to the Club Training Unit. However, the appointment of Club Extension Training Supervisors was not approved by the Administrator of SAF until a late date, April 1945 (Hill to Harry Walden, Robert Wilson, April 11, 1945, attached to Wilson to John Donovan, Eastern Area, July 5, 1945, No. 330.9).
\item \textsuperscript{4} Grayson to Coon, April 13, 1944, No. 330.001. In Hospital Service, Area "Educational Consultants" were responsible for "planning with area personnel for field work training of overseas hospital service personnel" (SAF 246 - MNWS 52, August 24, 1943).
\end{itemize}
regularly established service channels of administration and technical control.

The round-aboutness in administrative direction that this system involved might have been mitigated had the Personnel Training Unit had a specifically designated person or staff in charge of developing and coordinating the extension training program in the areas. Until January 1945, however, when one person began to devote three-fourths of her time to visiting training units, there was not enough staff available for this purpose.\(^1\) In the meantime the Training Unit could only wish it might be more helpful to areas in their supervision of trainees in extension training.\(^2\) In any event, more than one person was needed to do the job.

This is not to say that no measures were taken to coordinate headquarters - field relationships by the services concerned. Camp Service held two conferences (July 1942; July 1944) in Washington at which field training supervisors and the staff of the Camp Service Training Unit discussed training problems and the coordination of class training with training in the field. When possible, trips were made by members of the Camp Service training staff to area offices and field training stations.\(^3\) Though conferences for training supervisors were not held by the Hospital Service,\(^4\) by early January 1945 the Hospital Service

\(^1\) Mill to Vrooman, Results Analysis, Monthly Report, February 5, 1945, No. 140.18, SAF.
\(^2\) Grayson to Coon, April 13, 1944, No. 330.001.
\(^4\) Gold to Vincent, June 9, 1944, No. 330.9.
reported that it was providing for field visits to all hospitals used for extension training and for more direct contact with those hospitals with respect to planning of activities, supervision and evaluation of trainees.\footnote{1}

In Club extension training five extension supervisors under direct Washington control were appointed in April 1945, when the emphasis in club extension training had turned from training centers such as Midston House to military camps.\footnote{2} The need for better control of extension training was apparent in club training as in the other programs. "In another such program," wrote the former head of club training, "we should advise additional staff members to be responsible for the club extension training and to be located not only in all field assignments but also at the training center itself."\footnote{3}

Hospital Service problems with extension training. Throughout the program Hospital Service seemed to have special difficulty with extension training, or at least its difficulties are better recorded. It had trouble in obtaining from areas up-to-date descriptive lists of hospitals to be used for training; good selections of hospitals for training; sufficient extension training placements for trainees; and

\footnote{1}{Gold to Mary Rose Ryan, MNS, January 12, 1945, attached to Gold to Vincent, February 2, 1945, No. 330.9.}
\footnote{2}{Romney to Settle, October 28, 1943, No. 330.0; Hill to Walden, Wilson, April 11, 1945, attached to Wilson to John Donovan, Eastern Area, July 5, 1945, No. 330.9; Settle to Grayson, March 3, 1945.}
\footnote{3}{Finney, Final Administrative Report, Club Training, p. 9.}
good supervision of extension training.\footnote{Gold to Vincent, September 26, 1944, No. 330.9; Report of Meeting on Extension Training in Domestic Hospitals, March 15, 1944, No. 330.001; Gold to Vincent, February 22, 1945, No. 330.9. See also Coon, Eastern Area, to Millner, October 13, 1942, No. 330.001; Tate to Laptad, October 18, 1942, No. 330.9; McBrien to Wann, October 31, 1942, No. 330.001; McBrien to Wann, October 31, 1942, No. 330.2; McBrien to House, November 9, 1942, No. 140.18 SAF.} "We have little control over how extension training is done in the hospitals," reported the head of the Hospital Service Training Unit in August 1944. "We are still laboring with the areas to get some uniformity in planning and method but with scant success."\footnote{Ruth Emerson, Assistant Chief in Charge, Domestic Hospital Program, MNHS, to Area Directors of Hospital Service, January 8, 1945, No. 330.001. Hospital Service wanted staff aides in extension training to have experience in assisting in an administrative capacity, participating in both the casework and recreational aspects of the hospital program (Gold to Vincent, July 21, 1944, No. 330.012).} As late as January 1945 it was noted that staff aide trainees returned to Washington having had experience in only one aspect of the hospital program and frequently were assigned to mere "routine tasks" while in extension training.\footnote{Gold to Grayson, August 18, 1944, No. 330.001.}

Coordination of Training and Transportation. Inasmuch as training was geared to the availability of transportation, rather than transportation to training, some persons were held for long periods of time at extension centers such as Midston House, while others were cleared for overseas with very little, if any, extension training. There even were instances of trainees being pulled out of class in Washington for immediate assignment overseas. The actual numbers involved in these violations of standard practice have not been recorded, but the problem of withdrawal of students from extension training was present from the beginning. It was the subject of special concern in the last half of
1944, becoming critical during the first half of 1945, reaching a point in March 1945 when clearances for overseas were being made at such a rapid rate that there was little opportunity for any extension training.

Holding persons over-long in training awaiting transportation seriously affected their morale, but the consequences of assignment without extension training were even more serious: persons were sent overseas unfamiliar with the fundamentals of the work situation into which they were going, unconditioned for their assignments. This was of especial concern, for as the Area Administrator for SAF in the

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2. Hill to Vrooman, Monthly Report, April 5, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF. Illustrative of the range in training period, which applied to all the services carrying on extension training, was the report compiled by Club Service for the months of August and September 1944, showing the number of days spent on extension training assignments by 626 trainees, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Days in Extension Training</th>
<th>Number of Trainees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 day but less than 1 week</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 week but less than 2 weeks</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 weeks but less than 3 weeks</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 weeks but less than 4 weeks</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 weeks but less than 5 weeks</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 weeks and over</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>626</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It will be seen that of the total number about 25 percent (155) received the desired extension training program of two weeks (Grayson to Hill, Monthly Report, October 4, 1944 No. 140.18 SAF).
North Atlantic Area stated, "We believe no man is competent to represent Red Cross overseas without...intensive camp experience" in extension training. A second effect was confusion in trainees' minds because of sudden change of plans, coupled with the impression that extension training was used merely to put in time waiting for transportation. Administratively, it was difficult to maintain an extension training program in the light of the uncertainty as to the numbers which would be available for the standard two week period. Some of the agencies to which trainees were customarily assigned had expanded their supervisory staff for the benefit of the training program, only to find trainees recalled after a few days of experience, disrupting not only training plans but in some instances also the services rendered by the agencies. In addition to the expense involved in sending people into the field for brief periods, the continuous withdrawal of trainees resulted in constant questioning in military camps as to the basis for such confusion, which in many instances jeopardized relationships with the military.

2. Ibid.
3. Phinney to Settle, August 28, 1945, No. 140.18, Personal Service.
4. Grayson to Hill, Monthly Report, October 4, 1944, No. 140.18 SAF.
5. Settle to Grayson, attached to Grayson to Settle, May 28, 1945, No. 330.001. The availability of transportation had the same effects on classroom training in Washington as on extension training in the field, but to a lesser degree. The number of complaints on withdrawals from classroom training suggests that over the entire period it was a relatively infrequent occurrence in comparison with withdrawals from extension training (e.g., see Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, April 30, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF; Grayson to Hill, June 15, 1945, No. 330.9). Yet G. Ott Romney, Chief of Recreation and Club Service, stated in February 1944 that it had "become necessary too frequently to take substantial numbers" of workers out of training (Romney to Don Smith, February 3, 1944 No. 330.001).
There were really three aspects to the transportation problem. One was, of course, the fact that transportation was not always available at the time trainees completed their extension training. A second was that frequently transportation, which Red Cross felt it must utilize, became available on short notice requiring the withdrawal of trainees from various stages of training. A third was the frequent and insistent demands for certain categories of personnel by overseas theatres, resulting in the withdrawal of such categories of workers from training as soon as ships were ready.

Regarding the last factor, by February 1944 the Deputy Administrator of SAF believed that overseas theaters had sufficient personnel so that if they were "organized and administered at all adequately" there was no longer any need for their calling loudly to Washington for the dispatch of a large number of workers on the first available boat.\(^1\) He was hopeful that henceforth there would be uninterrupted completion of schooling of each trainee, with the problems of recruiting, training, assignments, and transportation met in proper sequence without dislocations in training.\(^2\)

This hope was never fulfilled, especially with respect to extension training. When overseas theaters indicated urgent need for personnel, trainees were withdrawn as transportation became available.\(^3\)

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1. Don Smith to Boncy, February 9, 1944.
2. Ibid.
Even apart from these extraordinary overseas demands, everyone was considered available for overseas assignment the day he graduated from the training school and transportation was requested for that date. The majority, of course, received some extension training because of the lack of adequate coordination of transportation with the date of completion of training.¹ The date of availability of students for overseas assignment might have been set administratively at the point when trainees completed their extension training, but in view of the continuing demands for personnel overseas, this was not done. While at times transportation was made available slowly, the major problem, as reflected by the frequency with which trainees were withdrawn from training, was an excess of transportation at particular moments.²

The general problem of having transportation ready at the proper time was one, of course, over which the Training Unit had no control.³ Whether or not administrative action to improve transportation dates through top Red Cross liaison with the Army was feasible is a question beyond the scope of this study. In any logistic operation other factors have to be adjusted to the least controllable. Since transport was the least controllable in this situation, Red Cross had either to

¹ Travis O. Campbell, Acting Chief, Personnel Administration, SAF, to Ruth Hand Lewis, May 12, 1945, No. 340.18.
² According to an interview of Marjorie Lyman with the Military Liaison Officer, June 27, 1946, (HDF) only for a period of two months did that officer find it impossible to secure adequate transportation overseas. His trouble was in assembling personnel quickly enough to use shipping space when it was available.
³ Personnel Administration, SAF, made the arrangements for overseas transportation through the office of the Military Liaison Officer, Colonel John A. Prosser.
get people overseas regardless of training, or insist that no one sail without a stated period of training. The latter practice appeared infeasible because of overseas demands and because Army-Red Cross relationships would have been strained had Red Cross not made use of transportation as it was assigned. Another wartime agency, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, faced with the same problem of coordinating transportation and training, also withdrew students from training when passage was ready.\(^1\) Red Cross policy until the end was that transportation took precedence over training.

\(^1\) Clausen, "UNRRA Training," pp. 7, 16, 39.
C. IN-SERVICE TRAINING

1. NEED AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR IN-SERVICE TRAINING

Induction or orientation training was obviously only one part of a general training program. In-service training, with especial emphasis on training in supervisory skills, was a need which soon became apparent in Red Cross, and which assumed increasing importance as the qualifications and quality of personnel were progressively lowered during the course of the war. While there was ample appreciation of the need for in-service training by general SAF and service administrators, in-service training did not blossom forth as a part of any overall training program as had orientation training at the outbreak of the war. The need for orientation training was apparent from the start, and it was relatively easy of accomplishment in a centralized unit, but discovering in-service needs was more difficult, slower to be appreciated, and not as obviously demanding of attention as induction training. Then, too, once persons were on the job there was an understandable hesitancy, in view of work loads and manpower shortages, to take them off the job for in-service training.

While a part of in-service training is concerned with further instruction to improve on-the-job performance of workers, much of it is normally concerned with improving supervisory techniques. In Red Cross experience, one is impressed with the number of complaints of supervisory practices which either directly or indirectly could have been
corrected by formal and informal in-service training.\textsuperscript{1} Looking at the domestic field services of Camp and Hospital staffs as early as July 1943, the Assistant to the Administrator of SAF reported that the program of supervision was in general far from adequate, and much below the level at which it should be in order to maintain field stations at an optimum level of efficiency and service. He found that in training, experience, and personality many of the supervisors were "very limited." They seemed to render good service in checking the routine aspects of office procedure, but fell down on problems of policy, staff morale and training, and general relationships with the military. Supervision was especially important since field personnel, even at that date, was not "of the quality that it should be to carry out the Red Cross program effectively and efficiently." He was also concerned at what he considered the low level of staff morale, noting the direct relationship between morale and effective performance, and the lack of attention SAF had given to this problem, especially as compared with the Army and Navy.\textsuperscript{2}

An SAF Conference of late 1944 also called attention to the human relations aspect of the morale problem and decided, inconclusively, that a stronger effort should be made "to regard new personnel as human beings." Seth Wakeman, SAF Consultant, pointed to the inadequacy of field supervision in dealing with the problems of individual workers as

\textsuperscript{1} Formal training would include special courses and institutes; informal meetings and conferences and individual supervision.
\textsuperscript{2} Everett A. Golway to Don Smith, July 7, 1943, No. 140.18 SAF.
distinct from the mechanics of operations.¹ To the Chief of the Training Unit, what seemed to be needed was emphasis on the supervisor-worker relationship on the day by day job.²

The Training Unit itself, though without responsibility for in-service training,³ was well aware of the need, and from time to time between 1944 and 1946 drew attention to it.⁴ At the same time the Office of Personnel Relations was planning an overall in-service training program under its auspices. Some consideration was given by Personnel Relations to adapting the basic Training Within Industry supervisory courses of Job Instructor Training, Job Relations Training, and Job Methods Training, widely used by government and industry.⁵ While such short, streamlined courses were far from adequate, they had some beneficial effect in improving supervision in government and industry, including its human relations aspects. But no like program of instruction in the elements of supervision basic to any Red Cross job was ever attempted for all supervisors.

¹ Minutes, SAF Conference, November 28-December 2, 1944, No. 140.14. There are many service indications of the need for improved supervision.
² Grayson, Annual Report, 1943-44, SAF PTU, June 15, 1944, p. 5, HDF No. 140.18 SAF; Grayson to Hill, February 26, 1945, No. 330.01.
³ Except that the staff of the Hospital Service Refresher Seminar was administratively responsible to the Chief of the Personnel Training Unit (see SAF-SV Organization Chart, April, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF).
⁵ Rudolf F. Vogeler, Director, Personnel Relations, to Assistant Area Managers in Charge of In-Service Training of Personnel, January 7, 1944, No. 330.9; Vogeler to Nicholson, December 31, 1943, No. 140.1 Personnel Relations.
In practice, the development of in-service training was a Red Cross service story, primary responsibility for execution resting with the area offices of the services,\(^1\) who looked to their respective offices in national headquarters for leadership.\(^2\) By early 1945 this work was headed up in headquarters by "Staff Development" sections in Hospital Service, Home Service, and Claims Service.\(^3\)

2. NATIONAL IN-SERVICE TRAINING PROGRAMS

**Hospital Service.** Such formal courses as were devised in national headquarters for in-service training may be briefly described. In the field of training for improved worker performance Hospital Service in 1945 and 1946 sponsored several training courses to prepare staff members for work with neuropsychiatric patients. Hospital workers (staff aides) and generic social workers were given four weeks' specialized training at St. Elizabeth Hospital in Washington and a total of 37 generic social workers were trained in a six weeks' course at the Army Air Forces Convalescent Hospital, Fort Logan, Colorado, which was

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1. SAF Meeting on Training, August 14, 1943, No. 330.9.
2. The implementation of in-service training in the areas is discussed in the forthcoming historical monographs on the Camp, Home, and Hospital services.
3. The Staff Development Section of Hospital Service reported directly to the Director of Hospital Service and was technically responsible for the work of both the hospital orientation and refresher seminar training units. The staff of Home Service Staff Development directly executed both orientation and in-service training (SAF-SV Organization Chart, April, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF; Phinney, interview with Hoslettt, July 29, 1948).
closed before the third group of workers completed its training.¹

The most ambitious training program conducted by Hospital Service consisted of 12 "refresher seminars" given in Washington for a total of 351 supervisors in 1944-45. Primarily these seminars were to prepare social case work and recreation supervisory staffs to direct work with neuropsychiatric and special disability patients. These seminars, conducted by Mrs. Elizabeth de Schweinitz and Louise Stolz, were of high quality and were of real assistance to the staff taking them.²

The great need for hospital supervisors, especially those to supervise untrained hospital workers, led to the use of several outside training facilities during the summer of 1945. About 25 beginning supervisors or staff members ready to undertake supervision attended institutes on supervision held at the New York School of Social Work, the University of Chicago, and the University of Southern California. In addition, under the auspices of the Smith College School of Social Work, a special two-week institute for 49 Red Cross workers was held.³

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1. Leila Dickinson, "Hospital Service, Midwestern Area," Part IV of the History of Midwestern Area, p. 160, HUF. Hospital Service also sponsored a 3-day seminar at the University of Pittsburgh in September 1944 on "Integration of Social Case Work and Recreation" which was apparently attended by nineteen persons from the areas (Emerson to Eleanor Cockerill, University of Pittsburgh, with attachments, August 30, 1944, No. 330.001).


3. "Presentation of the Present Situation Regarding Training for Recreation Work in Hospitals," by Mary K. Taylor, Chief, Staff Development Section, Hospital Service, attachment to Hepner to Area Administrators, SAF, October 9, 1945, No. 330.201. For details of these programs, see forthcoming monograph of Sarah Becker.
Home Service, in addition to its training course in Washington for positions of leadership, and its scholarship program,\(^1\) provided for some training at both the area and chapter level. As of early 1944, two of the area offices of Home Service trained chapter executive secretaries from the smaller chapters in Home Service functions for a two or three week period.\(^2\)

As for the training of volunteer chapter workers, chapters with instructors considered qualified by the area trained their own Home Service Corps members, and chapters without qualified instructors called upon the Home Service field representative to serve as instructor.\(^3\) This latter practice took too much time from the normal duties of Home Service field representatives. After long delay, in February 1945 a new plan to furnish Home Service training for the small chapter was evolved.\(^4\) One person in each chapter was selected, who, after

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1. Scholarships for staff members to attend schools of social work were not much utilized during the war period. In 1944-45 Home Service granted 27 scholarships to its staff members. Hospital Service granted no scholarships to its staff members until 1945-46. In December 1945 it was decided that all remaining scholarship grants for both services would be made to staff members, reflecting the change in emphasis from recruiting personnel to staff development. Between 1944 and 1947 a total of 355 staff members were granted scholarships ("Scholarship Program, 1942-47," Mimeo 85541P-1047, p. 7; also see above, p. 48).

2. Todd to Walden, May 31, 1944, No. 330.001. All areas except Southeastern provided orientation of executive secretaries of medium and small chapters. This training was under Chapter Service, Home Service providing instruction for the period of study devoted to Home Service. Also, Chapter Service sometimes requested Home Service to develop classes for newly employed general field representatives (ibid).

3. Ibid.

4. This plan applied to chapters manned entirely by volunteers, or with an executive secretary who devoted part time to Home Service work, or which had a part time paid Home Service worker (about 3,000 chapters, generally of the type IV and V).
group training by an area instructor, became responsible for instructing and supervising the chapter Home Service workers. As a follow-up device, Area Home Service was to provide prompt and continuous guidance to these chapters upon completion of this so-called "Home Service Basic Training," instruction in which was not completed by the close of 1945.

**Camp Service and Other.** In Camp Service a great deal of attention was given to planning for the development of in-service supervisory training for field supervisors and regional supervisors, and for the appointment of area "training consultants," but the program did not get under way during the war period. Other suggested in-service programs which were not established included a re-orientation course for personnel returning from overseas for domestic assignment, and a refresher course for club personnel returning to this country on rotation leave.

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1. Area instructors were given a course at NHQ designed to standardize Home Service instruction for chapter workers.
2. AM 669, February 2, 1945.
3. For a more detailed account of the development of HS Training see forthcoming monograph by Ruth Walrad.
5. Minutes of Meeting Held to Discuss SAF Training Plans, November 17, 1944, No. 330.001.
D. ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATION AND RELATIONSHIPS

Organization and Prestige Status. The Personnel Training Unit with its companion agency, Personnel Administration, made up the organizational unit known as Personnel Administration and Training.\(^1\) Organizationally, the latter was on the same level as other major units within SAF such as Military and Naval Welfare Service, Home Service and Insular and Foreign SAF.\(^2\) Its chief reported to a Deputy Administrator of SAF (Don C. Smith), who in turn reported to the Administrator of SAF (Robert E. Bondy).\(^3\)

Although the Personnel Training Unit was not unduly depressed in the formal administrative hierarchy within SAF, there is evidence that the informal prestige status of personnel training was not very high. This influence of the "informal" as against the "formal" is a well-known

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1. For most of the war period the PTU was under the direction of Ferdinand V. Grayson; Personnel Administration and Training, under Dr. Harry A. Wann. Grayson was a graduate of Syracuse University and had taken work at the New York School of Social Work. He had experience as a case worker, an area supervisor, and an assistant professor in social work at Louisiana State University. His recommendations stressed his competence in routine matters and his academic record was average (Grayson, Personnel File No. 301).

Dr. Wann had been connected with the USO before coming to the Red Cross in June 1942. Earlier he had been Superintendent of Schools, Madison, New York, and Co-Superintendent State Board of Education, Trenton, New Jersey, as well as instructor at New York University and Rutgers. He had an A.B. from DePauw and an M.A. and Ed. D. from Columbia (Wann, Personnel File No. 301).

2. SAF-SV Organization Chart, April 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.

3. Bondy in turn reported to the Vice Chairman in charge of Domestic Operations and to the Vice Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations, who reported to the Chairman.
phenomenon in administration which sometimes makes a seemingly good organizational arrangement unworkable in practice or produces an efficient organization in spite of an apparently senseless formal organization pattern.

Symptomatic of the prestige position of training was Mr. Romney's comment that training received far too little attention from those in the higher administrative brackets:

It seems to be set off on an island apart from the mainland of operations instead of being recognized as an integral part of the total. Some credence is given the occasional impression in some circles that it is more taken for granted and tolerated than considered an essential and highly important part of our total scheme of service . . . Its quality and efficient functioning are constantly jeopardized because it is subconsciously, possibly, regarded merely incidental to those parts of our structure that are looked upon as important.  

The head of club training also emphasized the lack of appropriate attention given to training in SAF when she concluded that "the concept and vision behind the project were too small to meet the gigantic demands and possibilities of the program." To that fault she attributed many of the administrative problems discussed earlier in this study. "Most of the problems would have been solved," stated Romney after the conclusion of the war, "and can be solved in another emergency only by a proper conception of the necessity, the possibilities, the nature and the importance of training, and its inclusion

1. Romney to Don Smith, February 3, 1944, No. 330.001. See also the note of Romney to Smith, May 14, 1945, same file, in which he commented favorably on the Training Unit "because the training unit received so little comment ... regarding the good work it is doing in the face of the difficult circumstances, and might well use a pat on the back."

from the very beginning in full dignity, under appropriate administra-
tive control and with logical and effective administrative relation-
ships, in the scheme of services and in all planning.\textsuperscript{1}

Top administrators in SAF manifested some interest in training from
time to time, but the files reveal no evidence of especially strong top
management support. Such support is essential for the success of staff
functions such as this. Moreover, the Vice Chairman in Charge of
Foreign and Insular Operations, in overall charge of overseas personnel,
referred in 1943 to the training given in Washington as of "problematical
value,"\textsuperscript{2} though later his opinion was more favorable. No doubt within
Red Cross there was some of that same division of opinion regarding the
importance of training which was manifested in UNRRA, and which is
typical of organizations in which there is no background of successful
training experience or in which training has failed. As in UNRRA,
"fundamentally the disagreement represented the difference between those
who regarded training as an 'indispensable function of good management'
...and those who could see little point to training but accepted it as
a necessary evil."\textsuperscript{3}

\textbf{Headquarters Relationships of the Personnel Training Unit. While}
the Training Unit was reasonably well placed in the administrative
structure, its responsibility, authority and lines of communication at

\begin{enumerate}
\item Romney to Don Smith, April 29, 1946, HDF.
\item Richard F. Allen to DeWitt Smith, Don Smith, \textit{et al}, July 9, 1943,
No. 330.01.
\item Clausen, "UNRRA Training," p. 54. See also Durfee to Hoslett,
August 10, 1948, HDF.
\end{enumerate}
headquarters were never very clearly defined. The most obvious problem in its internal administration was the relationship of the Associate Chiefs of the Unit to the Chief. An Associate Chief, who was the head of training for one of the services, was said to be "administratively responsible" to the Chief of the Training Unit, although "technically or professionally" responsible to the head of his service.\(^1\) He was carried on the payroll of the service and as a member of the service staff bore a separate title such as "Assistant Chief in Charge of Training."\(^2\) Thus, these heads of training for the various services were responsible to at least two persons in two different organizations — a problem common to all auxiliary units.

Interestingly enough, even the relationship of the head of training for a service to her own service was not always clear. In early 1944 it was said that the relationship of the Assistant Chief in charge of training to the Director of Hospital Service and to the head of the Domestic Hospital Program was undefined and unknown. The latter thought it desirable that "we have written down to whom and for what in Hospital Service is the Assistant Chief responsible."\(^3\)

1. Grayson to Wann, May 21, 1943, attached to Settle to Hill, February 21, 1944, No. 330.008. Even this relationship was not always defined as clearly as this, for in one place it was stated that the Associate Chief of the Personnel Training Unit in charge of Camp Service training was "responsible administratively to the Chief of Camp Service in collaboration with the Chief of Personnel Training," while in another place it was stated that he was "administratively responsible to the Chief of the Personnel Training Section" (Whiting to Hepner, September 25, 1944, No. 330.001; Final Administrative Report, Camp Service Training, p. 5).

2. Settle to Hill, August 1, 1945, No. 330.008.

3. Emerson to Vincent, March 6, 1944, No. 330.001.
For practical purposes the Associate Chiefs seemed to be more the representatives of their own services than of the Training Unit, leading the Chief of the Unit to feel that he had responsibility for training without authority. He felt his position reduced, in effect, to that of housekeeper for the constituent services.\(^1\) Under these conditions unresolved questions were continually raised as to the relative degree of responsibility of services and the Personnel Training Unit for course content,\(^2\) time periods, teaching methods and control of teaching personnel.

One example illustrates the point:

The head of Hospital Service requested Miss M of the Hospital Service teaching staff of Personnel Training Unit to attend a conference in St. Louis and another in Cleveland. Miss M cleared with the Chief of the Personnel Training Unit on both occasions, and with respect to the latter meeting the Training Unit Chief felt it inadvisable for Miss M to be absent at that particular time. Query: "To whom was Miss M responsible at that point?"\(^3\)

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2. It was generally understood that the services themselves assumed basic responsibility for the content of training courses. This caused difficulties, however, when a service refused to alter content to meet the criticism of the majority of the staff of the Personnel Training Unit (See SAF Conference, Minutes of Meeting of Camp Service Directors, November 28-December 2, 1944, No. 140.14 SAF; John to Mumm, Tyler, et al, draft copy June 1943, No. 330.9; Romney to Don Smith, April 29, 1946, HDF; Grayson to Wann, May 21, 1943).

3. Paraphrased from Grayson to Wann, May 21, 1943, attached to Settle to Hill, February 21, 1946, No. 330.008. This report is of special interest in that a later chief of Personnel Training, Mary Settle, in commenting on it in February 1946, stated that the Unit was still struggling with some of the problems discussed by Grayson in May 1943, namely, "a clear definition of the function, responsibility, authority, and lines of connection for the Training Section."
Home Service solved this problem of dual administrative responsibility by making itself entirely independent of control by the Personnel Training Unit, though it continued to use the facilities of American University. "All I know about this training," said Grayson, "is what I read in memos and hear about incidentally." Hospital Service also considered making its training independent of the Training Unit, as a means of eliminating some of the administrative difficulties, but it remained in the fold.

In practice there was too little coordination between the Personnel Training Unit as such and the SAF services at headquarters in ascertaining training needs and in planning courses to meet them. The Chief of Personnel Training was out of touch with service planning, changes, and practices and therefore was not in a position to give leadership to the Training Unit staff. For information he had to depend upon comments by the Associate Chiefs, the Assistant Administrator for Personnel Administration and Training, or published releases, which obviously were not always sufficient:

1. Grayson to Hill, February 26, 1945, No. 330.001. It was also stated that the Basic Recreation School was not administratively responsible to the Chief of the Training Unit, but it was not absolutely independent in the sense that Home Service was (Grayson to Golway, Monthly Report, June 30, 1943, No. 140.17 SAF).
2. Teletype, Vincent to Emerson, April 7, 1944, No. 330.2; see also Emerson to Vincent, April 15, 1944, No. 143.16 MNWS; Vincent to Hepner, April 17, 1944, No. 330.001.
5. This state of affairs could be attributed only in part to administrative shortcomings, of course, and in part to the persons filling the leadership positions in Personnel Administration and Training.
For example, one Monday morning, along with other trainees, a number of "clubmobile" girls registered for training. No one in the Training Unit knew that this new classification was organized, nor what they were supposed to do. Any intelligent planning of a training program for them was impossible. The impression these trainees had of Red Cross could not be anything but one of confusion and bewilderment.¹

Relationship of Personnel Training Unit to Area Training. If administrative relationships within the Personnel Training Unit and to services in headquarters were unclear and confusing, the relationship of the Personnel Training Unit to area offices was even less satisfactory. Basically this may have been due to the fact that at the national level the Unit had a known function to perform for the services — the provision of orientation classes — but in relationship to area training, it had no stated or known function. The areas desired national leadership and assistance in developing area training programs,² but the Personnel Training Unit never had the authority or the staff to provide such leadership, though it was eager to do so and was cognizant of the need. "During the last six months," reported Grayson in May 1944, "persons from Southeastern and North Atlantic areas...in charge of 'overall' training for their respective areas have visited SAF Personnel Training Unit national headquarters... They leave the impression that it would be helpful to them in their work if

2. Wann to Golway, with attachment, April 7, 1944, No. 330.001; Statement of L. Spellman, Hospital Training Unit, June 30, 1944, No. 330.001; Todd to Grayson, Wann, December 22, 1942, No. 330.001; John N. Zydenman, Assistant Director MNWS, Pacific Area, to J. F. O'Brien, Assistant National Director, MNWS, March 6, 1943, No. 330.9; Florence Parker, NA Area to Emerson, December 18, 1943, No. 330.9.
there were some guides and standards of training programs emanating from national headquarters.¹ Fred Winfrey, Vice Chairman in Charge of Area Offices and Chapter Services, also recognized that the areas had no one to look to at national headquarters for leadership in training.²

Training in the areas was given in part by Personnel Service,³ an organizational entity separate and apart from SAF, which often gave orientation and other general courses to employees.⁴ Other training was given by the area offices of the respective services: in 1943 the North Atlantic Area had a "Chief of SAF Personnel Training," the Eastern Area had a person in Camp Service primarily responsible for training, the Pacific Area was planning to set up SAF area training, Home Service had authorized areas to employ "Area Supervisors of Training" for Home Service, and in Hospital Service "Educational Consultants" had largely training duties.⁵ Such guidance as these

1. Grayson to Wann, May 18, 1944, No. 330.001.
3. The Assistant Director of Personnel in charge of training in the North Atlantic Area reported the same kind of dual responsibility that existed in the national Personnel Training Unit. "It is one of those complex organization problems," she said, "because we follow the national edict that training is a function of personnel — hence this title and a desk in Personnel — and yet responsible to the Assistant Manager in charge of programs!" (Mildred S. Hitch to Carl Hunt, December 1, 1945, No. 330.008).
4. Helen B. Cobel, Director Personnel Service, MW Area, to Wann, March 12, 1945, No. 330.01; Mildred S. Hitch, Assistant Director of Personnel in Charge of Training, North Atlantic Area, to Carl Hunt, December 1, 1945, No. 330.008. For a description of courses given by Personnel Service in North Atlantic Area, see Hunt to Eaton, Keisker, Simmons, September 25, 1944, No. 330.001.
5. Grayson to Wann, attached to Settle to Hill, February 21, 1945, No. 330.008.
persons received regarding orientation training in areas, supervision of extension training, and in-service training was from the service offices in headquarters, rather than from the Personnel Training Unit. Indeed, the Training Unit had no direct channel of communication with area personnel concerned with training.\textsuperscript{1} Areas, in turn, needed to be informed of changes in the training curriculum at Washington in order to coordinate their training with the national program.\textsuperscript{2}

**The Basic Need.** These difficulties suggested the fundamental need for long range plans to integrate all Red Cross training,\textsuperscript{3} coordinated at the top by a well-qualified National Director of Training of sufficient organizational position, salary, and prestige, with responsibility well defined at national and area levels. Other obvious essentials were top management support and an adequate staff for training.

Coordination of training under a strong National Director of Training at a higher level than SAF was especially needed, for even if the Training Unit in SAF had been able to direct SAF training as it desired, including overseas training, there remained other services outside of SAF not touched by the SAF organization. Throughout the war such services as Disaster Relief, Junior Red Cross, First Aid, Water Safety and Accident Prevention, Nutrition, Nursing, Fund Raising, Volunteer

\textsuperscript{1} "Mr. Bondy asks specifically 'What are the Areas doing on Training? I do not know, and the SAF, Personnel Training Unit has no direct channels to the Areas to keep us informed'" (Grayson to Hill, February 26, 1945, No. 330.01).

\textsuperscript{2} SAF Conference, Minutes of Camp Service Directors, November 29-December 2, 1944, No. 140.14.

\textsuperscript{3} Elizabeth deSchweinitz, in charge of Hospital In-Service Training, to Vincent, December 26, 1944, No. 330.008.
Special Services, and Civilian Relief carried on their own departmental training programs which were of varying extent and quality.

As the war closed, in addition to the Personnel Training Unit, organizations responsible for training at headquarters, with their counterparts in the areas, included the non-SAF services mentioned immediately above, three service "Staff Development" sections primarily responsible for in-service training, and a projected training division under the guidance of Personnel Service. All of these training units had a function to perform but they badly needed overall direction and coordination to avoid wasted effort and to provide needed training services, especially in the largely unplowed field of supervisory practices. "Coordination" of training was the prime requisite: the war experience of the Red Cross, as well as war experience generally, demonstrated again "that coordination is the central dynamic principle of effective action, the hallmark of sterling administration."  

1. Home Service, Hospital Service, Services to Veterans.  
CHAPTER VII

DEVELOPMENT OF POSITION CLASSIFICATION AND SALARY SCHEDULES

A. SALARY PRACTICES UNTIL OCTOBER 1942

Before World War II salary rates in the American Red Cross were the result of individual agreements mutually agreeable to the hiring official and the worker. They were strongly influenced by Red Cross consciousness that the public was the sole financing agent and the humanitarian impulse which led people to seek job-satisfaction through service to Red Cross rather than in substantial monetary return. There was no attempt to meet business salaries. Red Cross remuneration was admittedly low throughout the twenties and thirties, in many instances precluding the employment of desirable people. "To give you some idea of how distinguished men feel about the salaries we pay," wrote the Chairman of the Red Cross in 1928,

Mr. Hoover, as Chairman of the President's Committee, serving through the Mississippi flood operations of 1927, told the Central Committee at its meeting in October that the Red Cross was not paying adequate salaries and he made a motion then and there that the salaries of all paid workers serving in the Mississippi flood operations be doubled. I pointed out to him that that was quite impossible; that the Red Cross did not aim to compete with business salaries and that the workers of the Red Cross took pride in the fact that they were, in a large sense, volunteers...

Yet the surplus manpower prevalent throughout the decade before the war, combined with the small staff of the American Red Cross, the low rate of

1. Margaret Clapp, "Development of Policies on Position Classification and Salary Schedules, 1941-1945," p. 1, HDF. This chapter is largely a condensed and paraphrased version of this excellent study.
turnover, and the devotion of long-time employees minimized the problem of remuneration.\footnote{Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 2.}

In 1940, however, the labor market tightened, and Red Cross, forced to compete with government agencies for employees, found procurement and retention of personnel difficult. The Central Committee voted $25,000 for salary adjustments during 1941,\footnote{Minutes of Central Committee, November 15, 1940, p. 3525, HDF.} but the amount was not sufficient to meet the competition of the federal government, especially for clerical and stenographic help.\footnote{J. A. Logan Sayer to DeWitt Smith, Director of Domestic Operations, memorandum, December 24, 1940, No. 360.3. Many of the documents referred to in this section are to be found in a separately bound copy of this section filed in the Historical Division, American Red Cross.}

No immediate steps were taken to give a blanket raise to all employees or any single group of employees, such as clerical-stenographic. The Chairman and the Central Committee recognized the problem, but, as the Chairman wrote in June 1941: "Thus far, we have felt that the best we could do would be to act on an individual basis in what seemed the most important situations without undertaking the general raising of salary scales."\footnote{Norman Davis to Mrs. Henry P. Davison, member of the Central Committee, June 19, 1941, No. 360.3.}

Throughout 1941 the regular Red Cross policy of individualized salary adjustments was followed.\footnote{See Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 3.} Until June 1941 authorized administrative officers approved increases for salaries up to $3,000; after that date up to $5000. Salaries over $5000 were passed upon by the
Central Committee, following World War I practice.\textsuperscript{1}

Two results flowed from this decision. On the one hand,

It freed the Central Committee and the Chairman from consideration of relatively unimportant salary changes yet it retained a central place where the total needs of the organization could be reviewed in determining the salaries of higher officials. On the other hand, salaries below $3000 were largely determined by heads of services or offices with the result that starting salaries, job analysis, job classification, and consequent salary and promotion policies affecting the vast majority of employees were frequently handled haphazardly or by personnel officials of an individual Service with little awareness of what other branches of Red Cross were doing.\textsuperscript{2}

Meanwhile competition in Washington increased, especially for clerical workers. A small committee discussed possible solutions, but no agreement was reached as to the proper limit of salaries.\textsuperscript{3} The Committee did develop a draft of a classification plan for lower-salaried positions, but it was never completed or put into operation.\textsuperscript{4}

The situation grew more serious. In January 1942 the Chairman requested that steps be taken to cease practices whereby chapters recruited workers from the national staff at higher salaries than national head-

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{1} Minutes of Central Committee, June 24, 1941, HRF. In March 1942 it was decided that salaries up to $3600 a year should be approved by the Vice Chairman concerned; salaries between $3600 and $5000 by the Chairman upon Administrative Committee recommendation—thus increasing the number of salaries which would be set with over-all needs in mind. Higher salaries were to be approved by the Chairman and submitted to the Central Committee. In June 1943 this was amended to permit salary adjustments in the $3600-5000 bracket upon recommendation of the Vice Chairman concerned and Administrative Committee approval, and in the over $5000 bracket upon recommendation of the Vice Chairman concerned being submitted to the Chairman of the Central Committee (Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 4). \textsuperscript{5}
  \item \textsuperscript{2} Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 5.
  \item \textsuperscript{3} See DeWitt Smith to Mary Beard, director of Nursing Service, October 4, 1941, No. 340.06; same to same, October 6, 1941, No. 340.1 Nursing.
  \item \textsuperscript{4} Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 1.
\end{itemize}
quarters paid, and whereby one service within the national organization offered positions to members of other services at a higher compensation.\textsuperscript{1} However, as late as the spring of 1942 Red Cross had not centralized responsibility for its salary policies.\textsuperscript{2}

The result was inequity in remuneration among areas, services, and personnel carrying the same or similar responsibilities. John D. Rockefeller, III, asked by the Chairman to examine Red Cross personnel administration, presented the results of an investigation made under his direction on April 23, 1942.\textsuperscript{3} One of the seven problems which he believed should be handled by a director of Personnel Relations responsible solely to the Chairman rather than to any one Service head was: "Assisting in setting up and maintaining a salary policy and means for its administration." Among the "pressing problems...to which attention should be first directed...", he listed a "systematized salary administration based upon job description and classification..." This was one of the problems "which will reach their most critical point within the near future and which, therefore, must be met during the peak of operations activity rather than postponed until normal times."\textsuperscript{4}

The Administrative Committee and the Chairman approved in principle the report submitted by Mr. Rockefeller.\textsuperscript{5} On June 1, 1942 a new office of Personnel Relations was established. "But a centralized, uniform and

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] Dewitt Smith to Givin, January 5, 1942, No. 340.04 Transfers General.
\item[3.] Rockefeller to Chairman, "Personnel Relations Administration in the National Organization of the American Red Cross, April 23, 1942, HFD.
\item[4.] Ibid., pp. 11-12.
\item[5.] Norman Davis to S. Sloan Colt, Chairman of the Administrative Committee, June 10, 1942, No. 140.11 Personnel.
\end{itemize}
equitable policy on salaries was only one problem facing...its director, Edward G. Sabine, who assumed control on July 1, 1942. Until outside pressure forced action, little or no progress was made in resolving the conflicting views on salary policies within the Red Cross organization.¹

B. EFFECT OF THE SALARY STABILIZATION ACT

The Federal Salary Stabilization Act became effective on October 3, 1942. The purpose was to hold wages and salaries in the United States at current levels. (Salaries of people employed for overseas service were not affected.) The method was to place salaries under $5000 paid to employees not in executive, administrative, or professional classifications under the jurisdiction of the National War Labor Board and other salaries under the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. According to the law, no salaries could be raised without prior approval of the Board or Commissioner unless they were in accord with a salary agreement or salary rate schedule in existence when the Act took effect or unless they were the result of individual promotions or reclassifications or merit increases within an already established salary rate range.

The Act set no standards of equity for salary schedules. It demanded no revisions of policy in effect in October 1942. Yet it was to play a peculiarly important role in the development of Red Cross personnel practices. It was to force Red Cross, which had no satisfactory position-classification schedule and no established salary ranges, to review its actual practices and formally to establish what its rates and ranges were in October 1942. The organization could of course seek individual approval of every salary change and every salary proposed for a new employee and so avoid establishing an over-all schedule. But the

1. This section is a slightly altered version of the discussion presented by Clapp, "Position Classification," pp. 11-13.
difficulties and delays inherent in such a course would be administratively intolerable and disastrous to the procurement and retention of personnel. So the Act put an end to the old method of determining salaries on an individual basis, for once a schedule was made, salaries of new employees would have to conform to it. It made less tenable the argument of some Red Cross officials that they should concentrate upon program rather than divert any more of their attention to personnel practices. By requiring a composite picture of salaries paid at a specific time, it made officers inescapably aware that glaring inequities existed.

Moreover, it placed a potent argument in the hands of officials who had long urged job analysis, job classification, equitable salary ranges uniformly applied, clearly defined policy on salary increments, promotions, etc. Since current practices would have to be reviewed and in the future justifications would have to be prepared for any contemplated changes, why not undertake complete, scientific revision of position-classification and salary policies? Such action would comply with Government rulings, would aid recruiting and employment officers who were handicapped by vague job-descriptions and the lack of information on salary policies, and should improve morale especially among new employees brought in for the emergency, which would, presumably, have some bearing on public relations.

This conscious effort to combine long-range reform of the organization's salary policies with two immediate needs—complying with Government regulations and procuring workers—characterized the ensuing months. Yet over a year passed before there was much progress. It was the summer
of 1944 before a complete statement of the Red Cross salary schedule as of October 1942 was presented to Government officials, and the war was over before position-classifications were established for the entire organization, based upon technical analysis and accompanied by salary schedules.

Many factors contributed to the delay, among them (1) the Personnel office did not have strong leadership continuously, (2) many of the staff members who first worked on position-classification were unfamiliar with essential techniques, (3) long-standing conflicts in procedures and attitudes among different services had to be resolved. Yet had none of those obstacles existed, the task would have been time-consuming, for there were repeated interruptions in the long-range objective caused by immediate problems connected with government rulings.


Upon entering his new position in July 1942, Edward G. Sabine, Director of Personnel Relations, began work on immediate and long-range salary objectives. He asked the Accounting Office to prepare a statement of all titles and salaries on the payroll as of October 1, 1942, "...to serve the dual purpose of controlling salaries in accordance with the stabilization regulations and of providing a working basis for examination and revision of titles and salaries."¹

This study was followed in November 1942 by a formal request to Mr. Sabine from the Administrative Committee to study and submit a

¹. E. G. Sabine to Norman Davis, June 4, 1943, No. 360.
schedule of salary rates for national headquarters.\textsuperscript{1}

At the same time Mr. Sabine appealed to the National War Labor Board for exemption from control over salaries of clerical and custodial employees.\textsuperscript{2} But the General Counsel of the NWLB had ruled on November 24, 1942 that the Red Cross could not be granted exemption, writing:

The quasi-Federal character of the American Red Cross organization is well recognized. In these respects it is essentially similar to many other charitable and educational organizations, which, while performing what is undoubtedly a public service, and while administered by persons designated by heads of state and other government officials, have nevertheless not been exempted from the provisions of Executive Order No. 9250. In fact, the only exemption specifically made is contained in Section 4001.13 of the Regulations of the Director of Economic Stabilization in favor of wages and salaries fixed by statute. Under the circumstances, adjustments in the wages and salaries of the American National Red Cross which are subject to the jurisdiction of the National War Labor Board may not be made without the approval of the National War Labor Board.\textsuperscript{3}

At this point Sabine hastened to complete that part of his study of October salary scales at headquarters which related to typists, stenographers, secretaries, clerks, and auditors, those being the five groups subject to the NWLB in which the shortage of personnel was most critical. He established some ranges actually in use prior to passage of the Salary Stabilization Act, which could, therefore, be applied by employment officers without further approval of the War Labor Board. His findings and recommendations were issued to heads of services and offices at headquarters and to the Eastern Area. The memorandum pointed out that the schedule of salaries for the five classifications related

\textsuperscript{1} Minutes of Administrative Committee, November 4, 1942.
\textsuperscript{2} Sabine to L. Metcalf Walling, Administrator, United States Department of Labor, November 13, 1942, HDF.
\textsuperscript{3} Lloyd K. Garrison, General Counsel, NWLB, to Sabine, November 24, 1942, No. 118.9 Administrative Committee.
only to positions "in which the urgency is greatest" for which salary increases of not more than $20 a month could be made...on an individual basis in recognition of efficiency and loyal service and to curtail losses of capable employees" and promised shortly "a revised salary schedule for all employees". It emphasized that the intention of the pay-raises was not "to cause far-reaching salary changes, but only to place the Red Cross in a somewhat more favorable position to recruit and retain competent employees."1

All of the foregoing was, to use Mr. Sabine's words, "...expedient action taken to meet, in some measure, emergencies and Federal regulations, and much remains to be done to complete satisfactory schedules of classifications and salaries."2 The schedule he had prepared in December covering lower-salaried personnel was at best a stop-gap. It stated the salary ranges allowable for each of five large classifications, but it gave no indication of what types of responsibility and what degree of proficiency were to determine the individual's place within the range. Yet except for that schedule and an outmoded SAF schedule prepared the preceding spring when the vast expansion of its staff and duties had only begun, Red Cross had no stated salary policies in January, 1943.3

At that point, faced with a gigantic recruiting task, SAF decided that it could no longer wait for a general salary schedule and proceeded to work independently on its own plan. This plan, however, was not based on job analysis but on discussions of administrators. The

1. Sabine to Heads of Services and Departments, Dec. 28, 1942, No. 360.3.
2. Sabine to Davis, June 4, 1943, No. 360.3.
Administrative Committee failed to approve it. Recipients of salary increases under it were warned that "they do not, of course, represent a commitment as to the salaries which may be paid to them after the present emergency."  

While SAF officials were working separately on their schedule, officials in Personnel Relations and Domestic Operations realized the impossibility of developing an equitable over-all salary-rate schedule under the old Red Cross system of position-titles. For many years the organization had adhered to thirty-two categories of job-titles, but they grew increasingly meaningless as Red Cross programs expanded and they were a definite handicap in attempting to apply government rulings. Employees were being assigned without much attention to one or another of the thirty-two outmoded categories. As a result, in some cases it was impossible to determine from titles indicated on the payroll the classification to which a worker belonged.

The apparent need for a comprehensive list of position classifications was further emphasized by a request from the Bureau of Internal Revenue in March 1943 to submit a complete schedule of position classifications plus other data in order to obtain approval of an over-all salary schedule.

Unfortunately the Director of Personnel Relations was frequently

1. Wann to Bondy, April 1, 1943; Minutes of Conference of Area Administrators on Proposed SAF Revision of Salary Classifications, April 11, 1943, No. 360.3.
2. DeWitt Smith to Bondy, October 30, 1943, No. 360.3.
4. The Bureau controlled executive, administrative, and professional salaries and all salaries of $5,000 or over.
absent in April 1943, resigned from the Red Cross in June of that year, and was not immediately replaced. Prior to his departure, however, he completed with the assistance of the Accounting office a schedule for headquarters and for each area showing existing titles and salaries arranged in four general groups: supervisory, professional, and technical, clerical and fiscal, and custodial, and indicating the number of employees in each title. The schedule was intended only as a statement of fact to be used for clearance with the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the NWLB, and as a starting point for revision. Mr. Sabine considered it merely a first step:

It will be noted that there are some rather nondescript titles; many superfluous ones, and a number which have no range of salaries to provide for increases or higher recruiting rates. A few have such wide ranges that important differences in duties and responsibilities are indicated and probably different titles should be used to recognize those differences. For example, the title 'Assistant Director' carries a salary range of from $2100 to $9000 a year.¹

The Administrative Committee, with the approval of the Chairman, made some use of Mr. Sabine’s work by ruling in June that thereafter no salary changes were to be permitted unless they could be made within the budget of the office concerned and unless they conformed to the general salary schedules recently compiled by Personnel Relations and Accounting Service.² This "hold the line" order, based only on hasty summaries of current practice, was simply another expedient to comply with government regulations. Even as a temporary measure, however, it

¹. Sabine to Davis, June 4, 1943, No. 360.3.
². Minutes of Administrative Committee, June 2, 1943.
did not prove wholly satisfactory for the reason already pointed out by Mr. Sabine; the relations between salaries and titles was too variable to provide much guidance.

D. THIRD ATTEMPT: JULY 1943 - JANUARY 1944

The first concerted effort to establish position-classification came in July 1943 after James T. Nicholson became Vice Chairman in charge of Personnel Relations. Heads of services and offices were asked to prepare schedule sheets for every position under their supervision, making separate schedules for each variation within a general classification, as, for example, differentiating between mail clerks, file clerks, stock clerks, etc. After schedules were completed for areas and headquarters, the newly created National Personnel Committee composed of representatives of various services under the chairmanship of Mr. Nicholson intended to review and revise them and recommend a standard list of position-classifications for the entire organization.¹

By July 26 schedules for most positions below the level of assistant administrator were completed, and higher officials were engaged in summarizing their duties.²

However, a position-classification plan following the method prescribed in July 1943 was never achieved. It was at best a difficult

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² Moore to B. Lefevre, July 12, 1943, No. 340.06.
undertaking in an organization which had grown so rapidly, and it was complicated by changes in the staff working on classification and by the attitude of some officials toward what they apparently considered usurpation.¹ Most serious, however, were the weaknesses in the technique adopted. The job was tackled too hastily. Supervisors were not given adequate instructions on how to make analyses. The result was omission, inaccuracy, and vague generalization that defeated the project.²

E. PROGRESS IN CLASSIFICATION. FEBRUARY-OCTOBER, 1944

With the advent of a new director of Personnel Relations in November 1943, a new effort was made to establish organization-wide position classification and salary schedule. Emphasis was placed on schedules for clerical and custodial positions because in those classifications were the largest numbers of employees, the fewest technical problems in analysis, the most usable of the data compiled during the summer, and the least administrative opposition to the project. By February

¹ For example, see Mary Beard, Director of Nursing Service, to F. A. Winfrey, memorandum, July 29, 1943, No. 340.06 Nursing, in which she stated that it was "essential" for her office to review position-classifications of Nursing Service as they came in from the Areas, in order to maintain "certain uniformity and standards" in her service. That uniformity was desirable throughout the organization as well as within a particular Service apparently did not occur to her. In reply, Mr. Nicholson wrote on August 6, 1943 that service reviews such as she proposed would delay completion of the task, that service heads could rest assured that they would be consulted prior to any classification changes.
5, 1944, the first scientific classification and compensation schedules ever developed by Red Cross were completed. They were a mere beginning; only fifteen classes of positions at headquarters were covered -- eight in maintenance and custodial work, and seven in clerical work; yet they had significance as the first fruits of scientific techniques in that the schedules were based on desk audits by trained analysts and on-the-job descriptions made by supervisors during the preceding summer.

On February 10, 1944, the Administrative Committee recommended to the Chairman adoption of these schedules which the National War Labor Board stood ready to approve and which constituted the first adequate step taken to meet the request made by the Central Committee in April 1943 "... that a general salary schedule for all personnel in the National Organization be prepared and submitted for the consideration of the Sub-Committee on the Budget."¹

But the Budget Committee of the Central Committee hesitated to confirm the schedules lest, as the Vice Chairman in charge of Area Offices and Chapter Service summarized it, "... the moment we establish uniform schedules everyone will be immediately advanced to the top salary permissible in the schedule."² Not until late April did the Budget Committee approve the schedules, plus fifteen others for clerical and custodial positions prepared in the meantime by Personnel Relations.³

¹ Vogeler to Nicholson, No. 340.032 Job Classification, February 8, 1944.
² Winfrey to Verne Simons, manager, Pacific Area, April 1, 1944, HDF.
³ Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 35.
NHQ-33 "Job Classification and Salary Schedules Effective May 1, 1944" described the schedules in detail and explained their operation.\(^1\) NHQ-33 was a landmark in the development of position-classification and salary-schedules in Red Cross, for it contained not only the first acceptance by the organization of the principle of job classification, but also provided interim procedures governing new employment, salary adjustments, and individual reclassifications, and promised "a realistic and systematic job classification and salary rate plan" for the entire organization. With this support the Personnel Relations and the Classification Committee worked with renewed vigor. Job analyses of professional positions were begun, though no final classifications in such groups were anticipated until a sufficiently large number of descriptions could be collected to permit comparisons between services.\(^2\)

Positions in the clerical and custodial groups were analyzed, schedules were prepared, cleared with heads of services and offices concerned, and Administrative Committee approval won. The work continued until in October 1944 the entire clerical and custodial staffs in the national organization were working under uniform salary ranges. In the lower-salaried brackets, then, the triple goal of 1942 — complying with Government regulations, improving morale by equitable and open salary policies, and simplifying recruitment and employment by providing adequate job specifications\(^3\) — was achieved.\(^4\)

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1. Dewitt Smith to Heads of Services and Offices, National Headquarters, NHQ-33, April 27, 1944.
Compliance with the Salary Stabilization Act. Technical analysts in Personnel Relations gave only part of their time to long-range objectives concerning clerical and custodial positions during the summer of 1944. Immediate problems connected with administrative and professional personnel and arising from Red Cross relations with the Bureau of Internal Revenue were more pressing. On May 13 and again on June 9, after the Vice Chairman in charge of Personnel Relations had returned to Washington, Willis Dugan, head of the classification unit, renewed an earlier plea that Red Cross comply with the Salary Stabilization Act.¹

On June 21 the Administrative Committee froze all salaries over $200 a month paid to administrative and professional workers. The freeze was to last until the organization filed with and had accepted by the Bureau of Internal Revenue its salary scales of October 1942 and justifications of all later deviations.²

The entire burden now fell on Personnel Relations. Two separate tasks confronted it. The first was to compile and file with the Bureau lists of positions and salaries as of October 3, 1942 both in headquarters and areas. The more difficult task was to arrange clearances of salaries for positions throughout the national organization which did not exist in October 1942 and of salaries which were higher than the

¹. Minutes of Administrative Committee, May 3, 10, 24, June 21, 1944.
range in effect in 1942. Third, a justification had to be prepared for each of these salaries, which entailed a precise listing of duties and comparisons with salaries for similar positions. In like manner, positions created after 1942 — and there were many in Red Cross consequent to its expanded program — had to be analyzed, classified, and provided with salary ranges for the approval of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

The cumulative burden of seeking approval at one time of all the changes made in period of a year and a half was indeed onerous. Fortunately, officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue did their utmost to assist Red Cross in this crisis and throughout the war viewed with sympathetic understanding the difficulties the Red Cross had experienced due to the vast and rapid expansion of its force and its lack of established salary schedules at the time that Government controls took effect.

By August 30 the salary stabilization analysis for all areas and headquarters was completed. It had been an enormous task. In October 1942 when the Salary Stabilization Act became effective, Red Cross had 8,234 paid national employees. By July 1944 it had 20,987 people on its payroll. How much simpler it would have been to clear salary schedules in October 1942 and arrange procedures for later clearances appear off-hand to be self-evident. But in October 1942 Red Cross was incapable

2. Unsigned, "Notes on Meeting with Mr. Nicholson, August 16, 1944, Subject: Job Classification Schedule and Salary Stabilization," No. 340.132 SAF.
of complying. Its staff had multiplied almost six times in the preceding 22 months, its personnel records had not been maintained in available, orderly fashion, its Personnel office was poorly staffed, it had neither position-classification nor a general salary schedule which would have made compliance possible. The result was a protracted and unavailing effort to win exemption or to side-step the issue, with the corollary that each passing month enlarged the task.

The reports submitted to the Bureau of Internal Revenue at the end of August showed that of the 20,987 positions, 10,643 were subject to the NWLB and had been cleared satisfactorily with them, 6,350 were overseas positions not subject to government regulations, and 3,994 positions were subject to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Of the last group, 2,057 positions were covered by the SAF schedule of April 1942 and would not require clearance provided individual salaries were within the ranges then established. That left 1,336 area positions and 601 headquarters positions to be considered. By arrangements made with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, however, only 749 cases required individual clearance and by the end of August justifications for those cases had been presented to the Bureau. It was now up to the Bureau to act.¹ On October 20 the Bureau accepted the Red Cross reports and approved retroactively all its salary adjustments since October 1942.² At last Red Cross was in good standing with the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

¹. Dugan to Wann, August 30, 1944, No. 360.3: Wann to J. F. Addor, Head, Washington Regional Office, Salary Stabilization Unit, Bureau of Internal Revenue, August 30, 1944, HDF.
². Addor to American Red Cross, October 20, 1944, HDF.
Revenue and had procedures which would ensure continuance of satisfactory relations.¹

E. CLASSIFICATION COMPLETED: OCTOBER 1944 – OCTOBER 1945.

Clerical and custodial personnel were adequately classified by October 1944, but administrative and professional personnel were not. Classification of the latter positions could not proceed until the existing pattern of administrative organization in Red Cross was clarified. Though each service had a table of organization indicating position titles and relationships within the service, there was little uniformity among the various tables so that the same title indicated different position levels in different services. Nor were there any common definitions of the core groups of Red Cross – of service, office, unit, and so forth.²

Therefore, it was necessary for the Classification Committee to chart the existing administrative structure showing lines of administrative relationships as preparation for defining and allocating position titles. It drafted precise definitions of "service", "office", "staff office". It identified nine distinct administrative position-titles based upon scope of responsibility, immediate superior and immediate subordinates, and began to develop definitions for the wide range of professional positions.

All of this was to establish a foundation upon which classification could be built. The next step would be to secure from each service and office an up-to-date organization-chart listing the name of each adminis-

² Ibid., p. 44.
trative and professional employee with the title selected from the standard list which most adequately identified his position. Once all charts were collated by the Classification Committee, it would then be necessary to analyze and evaluate in terms of duties, responsibilities, and requirements each class of position (as administrator, director, chief) and to allocate each person to a class, preparatory to attaching salary ranges to position levels.¹

On January 18, 1945, the Classification Committee presented for the approval of the Administrative Committee the proposed definitions and procedures outlined above.² These were accepted on January 31 "subject to necessary changes in detail which were discussed in the Committee."³

Thereafter progress was rapid. Almost simultaneously three distinct phases of the work were commenced: area classification officers were appointed and trained, position descriptions and job analyses were secured, and salary increment and promotion policies were developed.

Before the end of February, area classification officers were in Washington undergoing a month's intensive training to ensure uniform classification throughout the organization.⁴

While the Classification Unit of Personnel Service conducted the training course and guided the area officers after they returned home, it

¹ Dugan to Wann, January 3, 1945, No. 340.032 Job Classification
² Nicholson to Vice Chairman, January 18, 1945. No. 340.032 Job Classification.
³ Minutes of Administrative Committee, January 31, 1945. For example of types of changes considered necessary, see Mitchell to Cavin, January 29, 1945, No. 340.032 Job Classification.
⁴ Dugan to Wann, January 24, 1945, No. 340.032 Job Classification, outlining procedures for Area classification.
also assisted services at headquarters in another phase of the project-charting organizational relationships and position-titles with a view to uniformity.\footnote{1} In May the lower administrative and professional staffs of SAF prepared job analyses and position qualifications. In June other services and the areas did likewise.\footnote{2} Thereupon the Classification Committee faced the laborious, involved task of studying hundreds of positions, classifying them, and attaching salary ranges. This work went on pace through the summer of 1945.\footnote{3}

On August 14 active hostilities with Japan ceased and shortly thereafter the government salary stabilization program was discontinued. Nevertheless, Red Cross pressed on to complete its position-classifications and salary schedules. By September 1 the technical work was finished. On September 10 the Central Committee approved the final classifications for clerical and custodial positions. On October 8 it approved the position-classifications and pay plan proposed for administrative and professional positions.\footnote{4}

At last Red Cross had provisions for allocating new positions to clearly defined classifications, procedures to enable both re-allocation of positions and amendment of the existing list of classifications when

\footnote{1} Clapp, "Position Classification," p. 47.
\footnote{2} Dugan to Golway, May 4, 1945, No. 340.132 SAF; Winfrey to Area Managers, June 18, 1945, No. 340.032 Job Classification.
\footnote{4} Wann to the Vice Chairman, "Position Classification and Salary Policies," PR-15, October 18, 1945; Winfrey to Area managers, Am-750, October 20, 1945; Dewitt Smith to Heads of Services and Offices, National Headquarters, NHQ-73, October 23, 1945.
necessary, and means whereby uniformity between services at headquarters and in the areas could be maintained. To minimize future difficulties, a Classification Review Committee was established to rule on any case in which the allocation given by the Classification Unit was disapproved by service authorities.1 Commencing in mid-November, this representative Committee began its work, settling conflicts after a study of written and oral testimony from the service or office concerned and from the Classification Unit.2

Scientific classification had been accomplished, equitable salary scales had been adopted, and by November 1945 they had in fact become part of Red Cross practices. On July 1, 1948 the classification and salary plans were extended to overseas positions as well, and the whole system had become an accepted feature of Red Cross administration. Such acceptance was important. The difficulties which Red Cross faced during the war due to the absence of over-all policies, due to the initial lack of trained personnel handling classification matters and due to the ignorance among many administrative officers as to the values and methodology of position classification and salary schedules, suggest the utility of maintaining such classification and schedules on a permanent basis. Obviously they must be constantly adjusted where necessary and improved where possible not only to facilitate equitable salary administration in a peacetime organization numbering 7,221 paid national personnel,3 but as

1. See NHQ 73, October 23, 1945.
3. As of June 30, 1948 (ARC, "Report of Paid Personnel", June 30, 1948). This number does not include paid chapter workers, who were not subject to this program.
basic preparation for a war emergency as well. Had Red Cross been equipped at the outset of the war with the classification tools devised just after hostilities ceased, its personnel difficulties would have been far less serious. Immediate compliance with the Salary Stabilization Act would have been possible, vast numbers of man-hours would have been conserved in an era of critical manpower shortage, and the employment, transfer, promotion, and training of personnel would have been facilitated.
CHAPTER VIII

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION OVERSEAS:

AN IDENTIFICATION OF SOME MAJOR PROBLEMS

A. ORGANIZATION AND POLICY FOR PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

In the course of development each of the major overseas theaters created a personnel department. That in Great Britain, for example, was set up in January 1943, four months after the establishment of the ARC Commission to Great Britain. The functions of these overseas departments expanded during the course of the war and varied from theater to theater.

Most typically, as in the European Theater, the personnel department was accountable for handling new arrivals, registration, housing, security, recruitment of workers overseas, personnel records, and assignment.\(^{2}\)

In its most comprehensive form, as in the South West Pacific, the work of a personnel department came to include requisitioning personnel, arranging orientation courses, arranging transportation, supervising billets, maintaining central personnel records, procuring uniforms, approving classification and salary changes, taking final action on resignations, home leave, and emergency furloughs, cooperating with line officers in making personnel adjustments, supervising employment of local civilians,

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1. This section attempts to identify some of the major personnel problems overseas. It does not deal exhaustively with each subject. The material presented supplements that found in the histories of overseas theaters, and the reader is referred to these for further comment on such matters related to personnel as living and working conditions, personal conduct, health, morale, supervision, and administrative policies.

2. H. E. Bedford, Personnel Director, ARC in Great Britain, to Harvey Gibson, Commissioner, February 3, 1943, No. 900.08 ETO.
and publishing house organs.\textsuperscript{1}

National headquarters frequently expressed dissatisfaction with personnel work overseas.\textsuperscript{2} In part this condition may have been due to lack of early attention on the part of national headquarters to the problem of organizing and staffing personnel departments overseas.\textsuperscript{3} For the most part personnel work overseas seems to have developed primarily as a response to the desires, beliefs, prejudices, and knowledge regarding personnel administration of individual theater administrators. In practice this meant that personnel organization sometimes was of such low priority that qualified personnel workers were not always sought out, that typically the functions assigned to such departments were routine, and that the general performance was often mediocre.\textsuperscript{4} A high Red Cross administrator stated in July 1945:

\begin{itemize}
\item[1.] N. I. Christenson, Director of Operations, SWP, to all Administrative and Supervisory Personnel, May 4, 1945, No. 900.101.
\item[2.] See, e.g., Wesselius to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 954.3 I-P.
\item[3.] It may be noted that in the summer of 1943 national headquarters took action to send persons to some theaters, such as Great Britain and North Africa, to head personnel departments, and suggested to others the necessity for a sound development of their personnel departments (Richard Allen, Vice Chairman, Insular and Foreign Operations, to Ralph Bain, Director, MEO, July 15, 1943, No. 900.34 MEO; W. Wesselius, Assistant to the Vice Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations to William E. Stevenson, Delegate, MTO, attached to letter, Stirling Tomkins, Assistant Delegate, MTO, to Allen, December 31, 1943 No. 900.3 MTO).
\item[4.] This is not to say that every theater management was not conscious of the need for improved personnel work, especially as the war wore on (See, e.g., MTO Personnel Department Monthly Report for June 1944, January 1945, No. 900.108 MTO). Commissioner Gamble, an experienced Standard Oil executive, made this comment in February 1944 in connection with increasing the personnel staff in the South and Southwest Pacific: "We have been more than ever impressed lately with the need for strengthening our Personnel Department so that it can deal not only with routine or statistical matters...but also so that it can work out and put into effect policies to meet the increasing number of
\end{itemize}
Generally speaking the personnel departments in the theaters of operations are little more than record keeping units of the over-all organization. A good personnel relationship program has not been done and from my observation this has been due to the youthfulness and comparative inexperience of the majority of our personnel directors.¹

Others noted this same condition. An administrator in Great Britain stated in the spring of 1944 that the personnel department there was "strictly an employment agency for British staff," by no means meeting the standards of a functional department.² Don C. Smith, Deputy Administrator of SAF, in commenting on the personnel difficulties in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations and in the Pacific areas, suggested it was "absolutely essential to have excellent top personnel administrators in these big theaters..."³ This suggestion was prompted in part by a report from the MTO that the theater Director of Personnel was being assigned non-personnel reporting work within the Theater as "something new and important" for him to do, since the work of the personnel department was largely "routine, maintaining personnel records, evaluation sheets, etc., and in reporting on these matters to Washington."⁴ At the

¹ Human relationship problems which are coming to light as our staff increases and as more and more of them are working in the forward areas where living conditions are primitive and frequently unhealthful. We are convinced that we must create a department sufficiently equipped with experienced personnel to care for the welfare of our staff..." (Gamble to Allen, February 26, 1944, p. 1, No. 900.08 FETO).

² P. K. Betts, Assistant to the Vice Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations, to Allen, July 2, 1945, attached to Allen to Bondy, July 11, 1945, No. 140.08.

³ Paul B. Edwards to Seth Wakeman, SAF, April 11, 1944, No. 900.08 ETO.

⁴ Smith to Ruth Hill, Assistant Administrator, Personnel Administration and Training, SAF, October 16, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.

⁵ Wesselius to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.
same time that this assignment was made, Washington was complaining that resignations in the MTO had been high, that personnel had not been intelligently upgraded, counseled, or assigned.¹

There was, however, no consensus in Washington as to the responsibilities of overseas personnel departments. For example, the head of Personnel Administration, SAF, believed that the theater departments should have responsibility for making assignments, transfers, and other placements. The chief of Hospital Service believed these were duties of the operating units. The Recreation Unit head thought that personnel departments should make placements only with the concurrence and recommendations of the operating units.² A definition of personnel responsibilities overseas was never reached in national headquarters, but was left to the determination of individual theaters.

A fundamental defect in overseas personnel administration appears to have lain in a lack of basic personnel policy issuing from Washington yet reflecting the experience of the organization overseas. Such policy should have related not only to the organization, functions and staffing of personnel departments overseas, but should have furnished performance standards for guidance in the execution of the work. Had there been such policy it is reasonable to assume that some of the troublesome day-to-day problems of overseas personnel administration would have been modified in character and severity. There is reason to believe that some problems

¹. Wesselius to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 954.3 I-P.
². Smith to Horace A. Brown, Assistant to Administrator, SAF, August 30, 1944, attached to Wesselius to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.
overseas arose out of a lack of a knowledge of sound personnel practice on the part of the overseas general administrators and of the overseas personnel workers themselves. A policy statement would have provided some guidance to them.

B. **MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OVERSEAS PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION**

**Shortages of personnel.** The problem of recruiting adequate numbers of persons for overseas positions has been discussed in an earlier part of this study. It remains to be noted, however, as a matter of emphasis, that throughout most of the war the overseas theaters complained of serious shortages of workers to carry out their programs. While these complaints were frequent from the Atlantic theaters, the most constant and intensive pleas for personnel came from the Pacific theaters. This might be expected in view of over-all war planning which placed first priority on winning the war in the West and which directly affected Red Cross in terms of numbers of troops to be served in each Theater and in transport available for Red Cross workers.

Until the middle of 1945, activities in the European Theater of Operations (ETO) were always short of personnel. By May 1945 the Middle East (MEO) reported it was well staffed. In the China-Burma-India Theater (CBI) staff shortages did not disappear during 1944.

1. As late as October 1945 Club Service, which had been faced with a heavier workload after VE day, contended that it was inadequately staffed on the continent (William H. Nethery, "General Administration, ARC, ETO, World War II," p. 155, HDF; Sophie E. Fisher, "Narrative Report of the Club Department," October 1945, p. 1, attached to Don S. Monand, Acting Commissioner, GB and Western Europe, to James T. Nicholson, Vice Chairman, Insular and Foreign Operations, November 13, 1945, No. 900.08 ETO).

2. Raymond R. Fisher, Director, MEO, to Allen, May 11, 1945, No. 900.08 MEO.

January 1945 found the installations in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) not fully manned. Shortages in the Pacific continued right up to December 1945, with complaint during that year of acute shortages in both the South West Pacific (SWP) and the Pacific Ocean Areas (POA).

Continuing shortages were due to the inability of national headquarters to fill all quotas promptly and to delays because of lack of Army transportation. Usually several months were required to fill overseas quotas, by which time new demands created additional unfilled quotas.

Need for executive personnel. Part of the demand for more personnel was a demand for more and better executive personnel. Again, this demand was made most forcefully by the Pacific theaters. In May 1943 Commissioner Gamble in Australia wrote to national headquarters that they were ill advised in not choosing several first-rate executives and sending them to Australia a year ago in anticipation of the need to lay here the framework for a strong, efficient business organization.

He complained that with one exception, headquarters had not sent a single first-rate Red Cross executive. A little later he suggested that if the men in your organization who are prepared to make the sacrifice and go abroad

3. Gamble to Allen, May 26, 1943, No. 900.346 FETO.
4. Ibid.
will be given preference after the war over the tailsitters, it might have a salutary effect on some of the gentlemen in your ranks who seem to be so loath to give up the comforts of home."¹ By March 1944 national headquarters had sent five persons to strengthen management in the South Pacific and South West Pacific.² However, these and other additions were far from a complete solution to the problem in the Pacific. In the POA, Commissioner Heckman complained of the same condition in June 1944.³

National headquarters found that it was unable to release any considerable number of executives from the permanent Red Cross staff for overseas duty. The only solution seemed to be for overseas theaters to develop executives from their own staffs.⁴ This, in the view of the Pacific theaters, was feasible only when there was an adequate total staff, so that persons could be selected for executive posts from the ranks without curtailing necessary services.⁵ As we have seen, this condition was never fully realized during the course of the war.

**Volunteers vs. paid workers as executives.** A source of executive personnel, in addition to persons who could be persuaded to leave national headquarters and those springing up out of the ranks overseas, was the volunteer executive. At one time or another the Commissioners or Delegates to Great Britain and Western Europe, to Australia and the South

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¹ Gamble to Allen, August 27, 1943, attached to Allen to Gamble, October 5, 1943, No. 900.08 FET0.
² Myles I. Christensen, Director of Operations, to Allen, March 11, 1944, p. 1, No. 900.08 FET0.
³ J. H. Heckman to Allen, 28 June 1944, No. 900.08 POA.
⁴ Allen to Heckman, July 18, 1944, No. 900.101 POA.
⁵ Christensen to Allen, May 19, 1945, No. 900.3 FET0.
and South West Pacific, to the Pacific Ocean Areas, and to the Mediterranean Theater, were all volunteers. Some of their subordinates were also volunteers, with an especially high percentage in the European Theater.¹ In national headquarters, in contrast to World War I, administration remained essentially in the hands of a paid staff.²

The relative advantages and disadvantages of superimposing volunteer top management over middle management and rank-and-file of paid workers are a source of controversy. As might be expected, some of the paid workers resented the introduction of volunteers into high positions. Yet the Red Cross did not have a sufficient corps of well-trained paid persons in the national organization to man top wartime jobs abroad, if important Washington jobs were also to be covered by paid executives. It was also said that the Red Cross could not attract many paid executives of the same level of experience as those who volunteered, though this allegation has not been proved. Finally, there was the tradition of the Red Cross as a volunteer organization. This volunteer aspect was demonstrated continually at the chapter level, and had been well-established for overseas service in World War I.

It is only possible to identify the problem here. A thorough study of the use of volunteer executive personnel in World War II is required.

¹. As of April 1945 of the 9 administrative assistants to the European Commissioner, 6 were volunteers, 1 was a temporary wartime paid worker, and 2 were of the permanent Red Cross staff (Draft of letter, Allen to F. A. Carroll, April 28, 1945, No. 900.08 ETO).
². Marian B. Clausen, Consulting Historian, ARC, to S. D. Hoslett, December 3, 1948, HDF.
for any sound conclusions regarding the usefulness of this administrative
device in another emergency. Here we may point to several views of the
practice. One is the opinion of Mr. Bolles Rogers, a World War II Red
Cross volunteer who became head of the Club Department in the European
Theater. In his view, the top administration of Red Cross during the
war, both at home and abroad, was "a very loose affair;" it lacked many
of the features of organization and control exemplified in good business
management practice. This situation, in his opinion, might have been
improved substantially if the Red Cross had more actively sought out
successful middle-aged business men for volunteer Red Cross war service
in administration. Many such persons, he believed, would have been
willing and eager to give their services, had the appeal been made to
them. They would have supplied the kind and quality of leadership un-
available through paid workers at a time when industry and government
could pay higher salaries than the Red Cross.1

Another view is represented by Mr. Arthur Mayer, operator of the
Rialto Theater in New York City, who served as a volunteer special
assistant to the Chairman of the Red Cross, and who had also served as
Deputy Commissioner in the Pacific Ocean Areas. Visiting Italy shortly
after V-E Day, Mayer declared that the operation there was the finest he
had seen (he had made an inspection in the European Theater as well as
having served in the Pacific Ocean Areas). This he accounted for in
part by the limited size of the theater, and in part by the policy of

1. Interview of Bolles Rogers with S. D. Hoslett, Minneapolis, Minn.,
September 5, 1948, HDP.
filling top Red Cross jobs by promotion from the ranks, including, at that time, the position of Delegate. "These executives," wrote Mayer, "are not chosen from the ranks of eminent men of affairs who, in spite of their unusual abilities, must learn Red Cross from the wrong side, namely the top, rather than from the right side, the bottom."  

Louis F. Hackemann, a former paid Director of Club Operations, U. S. Occupied Territory, ETO, agreed with Mr. Mayer. Hackemann also believed that Red Cross could have secured many more successful middle-aged business men on a paid basis than it did. Moreover, he said,

There were many good executive people who were not volunteers who served as club directors, field directors, etc., and never got into key positions because the volunteers held the key positions. I doubt seriously if they were too much interested in the paid people under them to use them in top administrative positions. The volunteer was very "cocky" in thinking that he was the ablest of the able and the volunteer often got the glory, the paid worker did the work. There is a lot of talk about the high calibre of volunteers. Certainly there is no discussion on whether or not Harvey Gibson, commissioner to ETO, for example, was an outstanding person in Red Cross overseas service. He was. I can assure you that there were other volunteers who were called high type people but who were, in my judgment, utterly useless. I had a man, a volunteer, in Verdun, who was a top Standard Oil administrator and as far as service in the Red Cross was concerned, he was hopeless. We had to send him home...

I think that if Harvey Gibson, for instance,... had had stronger paid executives (and many of them were in the ETO) instead of being surrounded by a lot of volunteers, the net result would have been a stronger organization.  

2. L. H. Hackemann, Director, Historical Division, ARC, to S. D. Hoslett, December 3, 1948, HDFS.
Assignment and transfer. National headquarters selected the individual worker for a service (such as Hospital) and for a job classification (such as hospital worker) in the states. In the theater it was ordinarily a responsibility of the line department to make assignment to a specific job.  

In Great Britain, however, during the "golden age" of Commissioner Gibson, the Commissioner himself assigned new workers to one of the principal departments of the theater. Because of needs of the moment Gibson made many assignments and re-assignments which did not correspond with the service or job classification made in Washington. This was a source of dissatisfaction to workers recruited and trained for jobs different from those to which they were assigned. By mid-1945 Robert E. Bondy, Administrator of SAF, reported that the European Theater had agreed upon the importance of assignments corresponding to service and

1. When workers were cleared for overseas, national headquarters sent summaries of their personnel folders to the theater concerned for assistance in placement. These summaries included education, work experience, skills, and a brief note regarding their work experience related to the job in which they were classified. Overseas administrators reported, however, that often the summaries did not arrive until long after the employee had been assigned to a job (Ruth Hill to Bondy, March 31, 1945, No. 900.346 ETO; Moody to Lewis, "Personnel Department Report (CBI) for July," August 22, 1944, No. 900.108 CBI; Hackemann, interview with Hoslett, July 30, 1948). They complained, too, that personnel records sent from Washington were very indefinite in indicating the special skills of the workers (Report of A. H. Sulzberger on ARC Operations in POA, attached to Wessellius to Nicholson, December 21, 1944, No. 900.09 POA).


4. For example, a member of a class of 54 girls trained as hospital staff aides in Washington reported that most of the class was assigned to club work in Great Britain; about 7 were assigned to hospital work (Ruth Fallon to Mary R. Ryan, attached to Ryan, Assistant to National Director, MNWS, to Don Smith, SAF, April 7, 1944, No. 900.3 ETO).
job classifications made in Washington.\footnote{Bondy to Allen, June 20, 1945, attached to Allen to Carroll, June 24, 1945, No. 900.08 ETO.}

Other theaters, especially in times of particular need for certain types of workers, also assigned personnel to meet the needs they found urgent. In the early stages of the North African campaign, Delegate Stevenson explained that operations could not be rigidly divided between club, field, and clubmobile services. The best service to the troops, he said, would be rendered by "using all our personnel indiscriminately to do whatever job is required in a particular place."\footnote{Stevenson to Gibson, December 9, 1942, cited in Bremner, Adams, Greenberg, "ARC Services in the War Against Germany, Part I, From Pearl Harbor to D Day, Chapter IV, North Africa, November 1942-May 1943," p. 10, HDF.}

National headquarters realized the necessity for flexibility in assignment of personnel under special circumstances, but it "assumed, of course, that insofar as possible classified personnel recruited (in the United States) will be employed as planned."\footnote{L. M. Mitchell, Director, Insular and Foreign Operations to Gibson, February 6, 1943, ETO No. 2955, HDF.}

As noted earlier, theater managements generally wanted persons who would be willing to do any kind of work, to be "flexible" rather than insist on doing the work for which they were classified. In addition there was sometimes an expression of opinion that classifications made by Washington were not correct in terms of the employees' ability and experience. In Australia, for example, it was said that "assignments had to be made within these Washington classifications even though it became increasingly clear that Washington's decisions as to what these people
could do and what they were worth were made by worried men has-ridden
by the need to do something to meet an emergency."1

Eventually in the GBI and MTO the personnel departments developed
into an advisory service to line departments in the placement of personnel.
In early 1945 the personnel department of the MTO reported that there was
an increasing number of requests by regional supervisors and department
heads for aid in placement.2 In the GBI after February 1944 the person-
nel department assisted in placement, at least as far as Club Service
personnel was concerned. Members of the personnel staff conferred with
department heads, with the head of the orientation course, and with the
workers in an attempt to make proper placements. Recommendations for
assignment went forth as suggestions to the regional offices for confir-
mation or alteration.3

Transfers between departments were, as a general rule, made directly
by the supervisors and employees concerned. However, in the MTO by late
1944 it was ordered that transfers were not to be made on the basis of
direct negotiations, but arranged by the personnel department. Line
officials were to inform the personnel department of needs which could
not be filled through regular channels and the personnel department was
to seek suitable persons for transfer.4

1. R. D. Jameson, "Brief History of Red Cross Services in the War Against
Japan," p. 93, HDF.
2. Becker, "Personnel Department Report, February 1945," dated March 6,
1945, No. 900.108 MTO.
Lewis, March 20, 1944, No. 900.08.
1944, No. 900.108 MTO.
Classification and pay. The kinds of salary inconsistencies mentioned at length in an earlier section of this study applied to overseas as well as to domestic positions.

Overseas, final administrative approval for changes in classification and salary up to and including $300 per month was the responsibility of the ranking theater official.\(^1\)

Salary changes had to be reported to Washington, however, to effect payroll changes, and for much of the period it was said that delays of several months in completing this transaction were common, partly because of use of slow mails and partly because of delay in the Washington offices.\(^2\)

But much more dissatisfaction arose out of dilatory action on reclassifications overseas by line officers. Throughout the war there were numerous complaints that persons were given increased responsibilities without being reclassified to the corresponding position, as when a staff assistant executed the functions of a club director for a period of several months. Bondy, on a tour through SWP, noted that this failure to classify people properly after reassignment in the theater had resulted "in a good bit of ill feeling".\(^3\) In the PQA, Commissioner Heckman reported this same condition, noting that many had carried higher responsibilities for six or eight months without getting a corresponding increase in

\(^{1.}\) The files examined indicate that this responsibility was given to Mr. Gibson in Europe and to Mr. Gamble in Australia but it is assumed that it was also given to the heads of other theaters as they were created (Allen to Gibson, November 7, 1942, No. 900.36 ETO; LeFevre to Mitchell, April 5, 1943, No. 900.36 ETO).
\(^{2.}\) As of November 1944 it was stated that cables were being used to report salary changes and that much of the previous confusion had been eliminated (Allen to Wesselius, November 13, 1944, No. 900.3 ETO).
\(^{3.}\) Bondy to Allen, November 20, 1944, No. 900.68 ETO.
salary. He also noted the feeling of many that promotions were on a personal basis rather than on a record of accomplishment. ¹

Another source of friction arose out of the slowness of theater headquarters in acting upon recommendations from line officers regarding reclassifications. An area administrator in the MEO wrote: "In many, many cases, people have assumed increased duties as of a certain date only to receive the salary of said position months later, and then not retroactively... It has caused a definite lowering of morale in many instances. The amount of the salary increase is often unimportant but the morale value of the salary increase is inestimable."²

By 1945 national headquarters allowed overseas theaters, in emergencies, to appoint persons to positions of higher responsibility on a temporary basis not to exceed 90 days, without increase in salary or change in designation. In contrast to these temporary appointments, headquarters drew attention to the desired use of probationary assignments to determine whether a worker should be permanently upgraded to a position of higher responsibility. These probationary periods were not to exceed 60 days, and salary and classification changes were to be made effective as of the date it was decided that the person had demonstrated a capacity for the job. These provisions were intended to force overseas theaters into curtailing long assignments at classifications and rates of pay lower than those for which the job called.³

¹ Heckman to Allen, July 27, 1944, Jameson's files (no file number cited).
² T. M. Simpson, Area Administrator, MEO, to R. R. Fisher, Director, MEO, October 27, 1945, p. 6, attached to Fisher to Simpson, October 31, 1945, No. 900.08 MEO.
³ Allen to Christensen, April 4, 1945, No. 900.343 FETO.
Another difficulty in the classification of overseas jobs was that the domestic system of titles for jobs was transferred in toto to the foreign theaters, without adaptation to the changed conditions. Washington insisted upon the use of the standard classification titles and pay rates. In many cases, new positions and new types of positions were created overseas which did not fit into the established system. As a result, overseas theaters created a host of "working titles" for their own use, while carrying the persons on the official records under the standard titles authorized by national headquarters.¹

In the Red Cross this was an unfortunate development because it furnished a device whereby merited salary increases could be avoided. Thus, the head of a Home Service Communications Unit overseas was officially classified and paid as an Assistant Program Director;² staff assistants might serve for long periods of time at their old rate of pay with the working title "Acting Club Director," etc.³ By 1948 it was said the use of special titles was discontinued, and overseas theaters conformed to a new set of titles authorized by national headquarters under its position classification plan.⁴

¹ This is not an unusual development. In the federal service persons who often have "working" or "organizational" titles in addition to their civil service designation, (e.g. an associate historian, P-4, may also carry the organizational title, "Chief of Historical Division").
² E. A. Thompson, Chief, Personnel Administration, SAF, to Bondy, August 14, 1944, No. 330.9.
³ It was also reported that merited decreases in salary did not always occur when persons were demoted to less important jobs (Clausen to Hoslett, December 3, 1948, HDF).
⁴ Lindeman, former Director of Personnel, ETO, interview with Hoslett, July 15, 1945.
Supervision. One of the most insistent and basic personnel complaints recorded in Red Cross files concerns the quality of supervision overseas.\(^1\) Poor supervision was recorded in every theater.\(^2\) Its effects were seen not only in work performance but also in worker morale.

Some of the factors which contributed to this problem included:

1. Shortage of staff to carry out the program often made it difficult to obtain enough supervisors. Administrators reasoned that they could not afford to take persons away from their jobs serving the men to provide for supervision.\(^3\)

2. In the early stages of a campaign chaotic conditions and lack of staff made supervision impossible or difficult.\(^4\) In later stages, when the operation was stabilized, supervision usually improved as a result of setting up regional offices which could supervise workers. But at every stage the dispersion of workers over large areas often handicapped supervision. At the same time this condition made the need for supervision that much more acute.

The Director of Hospital Service in the POA reported, "Because of the distances involved, we have found in many instances by the time

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1. A common complaint reported by returnees in 1945 was that administrative heads in a supervisory capacity were too far from the field to really know what was going on (F. Gates, Acting Chief, Returnee Unit, to C. A. Maupin, October 2, 1945, No. 140.12 SAF).

2. W. E. Stearns, Assistant to National Director, MNWS, to H. A. Brown, February 2, 1945, attached to Brown to Don Smith, February 20, 1945, No. 900.08; Bondy to Allen, June 20, 1945, attached to Allen to Carroll, June 25, 1945, No. 900.08 ETO; Tomkins to Allen, attached to Wessellus to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.


4. Brenner, Adams, Greenberg, "ARC Services in the War Against Germany," Part I, Chapter 5, p. 34, HDF; Christensen to Allen, March 11, 1944, p. 1, No. 900.08 ETO.
problems get to our attention they are of an acute nature, whereas if someone were there whom the workers could consult, many such instances could be averted.\textsuperscript{1}

3. Most of the supervisors had to be developed from the overseas staff, and many of them had not supervised people before. Moreover, they had not had any training during the Washington training course in what might loosely be termed "principles of supervision."

The problem of supervision was thus a very real one for overseas administrators, and in times of stress there was little time for much attention to either proper selection or training, especially the latter. In July 1945 P. K. Betts suggested that a more careful selection of supervisory personnel and a more intensive training of supervisory staffs in the theaters would go far to correct some of the deficiencies of the

\textsuperscript{1} Rose Corey to E. C. Bryant, August 8, 1944, p. 2, attached to Bryant, "Monthly Report from Pacific Ocean Area," August 1944, No. 900.08.

This dispersion of workers was especially marked, of course, in the Pacific areas. The extent of supervisory coverage in the SWP in mid-1943 is suggested by the comment it was "imperative" to work out a plan whereby every hospital could be visited by a supervisor "at least once in three months" (Jane Betterly, Hospital Service, SWP to T. H. Dinsmore, MNWS, attached to R. C. Fallon, MNWS, to Betterly, June 28, 1943, No. 900.08 PETO).

Where better supervision was provided, improvements were noted. Reported an administrator of the Central Pacific Area in late 1944: "Problems that were formerly carried into the POA headquarters by the field staff of Zone A, CPA, are now for the most part being settled by the supervisors in the field. The supervisors are likewise finding an opportunity to discuss general policies with the field which has aided a great deal in clearing up the thinking of the actual field staff" (H. E. Allen to Stanton Griffis, "Monthly Report, CPA Operations, November," December 4, 1944, No. 900.08 POA).
field service.  

Evaluations of overseas work. One indication on the quality of supervision overseas is provided by the experience of national headquarters with written evaluations of workers returning from overseas employment. These evaluations were made by overseas supervisors in response to a request of the Vice Chairman in charge of Insular and Foreign Operations for brief evaluations of each staff member at the end of the first six months of employment, and annually thereafter, or at the end of a foreign assignment.  
Eventually most of the evaluations were received in the form of check sheets which provided space for narrative comment.  

The Returnee Unit in headquarters "processed" thousands of returnees from overseas theaters during 1944-46. In its view, the overseas evaluations showed that many supervisors did not know workers well enough to make accurate or useful evaluations.  

"We seldom know when we can place credence on the evaluation," noted the Chief of Personnel Administration, SAF, "and when we should consider the evaluation a reflection on the theater of operation."  

Another administrator reported

1. Betts to Allen, July 2, 1945, attached to Allen to Bondy, July 11, 1945, No. 140.08 SAF.  
2. Allen to Gamble, August 6, 1942, No. 900.346 FETO.  
3. In August 1944 national headquarters suggested the use of a Personnel Service Rating (Form 1859) for overseas theaters, a form which had been introduced domestically on June 1, 1944 (Allen to Gibson, August 24, 1944, No. 900.346). In practice theaters developed different types of rating forms after a substantial time lag. The ETO, CBI, and SWF developed a check sheet; others sometimes used a narrative comment (Gates to Maupin, October 2, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF).  
4. Gates to Maupin, February 5, 1946, No. 140.18 SAF.  
the evaluations as "terse, loosely stated, or completely inadequate..."\(^1\)

It was also said, with particular reference to ETO and MTO, that the evaluations often covered only a small percentage of the time spent overseas by the employee.\(^2\)

The most common complaints coming out of the Returnee Unit, however, concerned the lack of discussion of evaluations with workers overseas by their supervisors or in theater headquarters prior to the departure of returnees for the United States:

Returnees have stated that they were not given...an opportunity to discuss their overseas work evaluation and theater recommendations with the theater headquarters before coming to the United States. Many of them have felt that they have worked hard and have rendered excellent service. It is often a shock to them upon arrival at NHQ to learn that their overseas work evaluations do not bear out the impression they had been led to believe...

Another complaint is that the theater headquarters do not give the returnees time enough to discuss their problems with them. Many returnees have told the interviewers that they have had to wait for three or four days before they could get even a ten minute interview. More understanding and sympathy on the part of theater headquarters would avoid disillusionment and disappointment.\(^3\)

Additional instructions were given to overseas theaters on this matter and some improvement in evaluations was noted.\(^4\) But many workers continued to return unaware that their work evaluations indicated poor job performance, personality difficulties, or other negative

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1. Louis S. Johnson, Assistant Administrator, Personnel Administration and Training, SAF, to Hill, March 6, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
2. Gates to Maupin, February 5, 1946, No. 140.18 SAF.
3. Ruth Hill, Chief, Personnel Administration and Training, SAF, to Bondy, March 31, 1945, No. 900.346 ETO.
4. Golway to Hill, May 8, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
Supervision and morale. Overseas reports emphasized the effect of supervision on morale. I have found that many of our people," wrote the Director of Operations of the South Pacific Area, "are quite cognizant of the lack of supervision and have developed an attitude that no one in particular is interested in their work accomplishments, and because of all of this, they are disappointed in Red Cross. This all adds up to poor staff morale..." Robert Bondy reported "constant indications that personnel feel they have been disregarded or forgotten." The Returnee Unit in headquarters reported that many returnees said they had no one to turn to when faced with a job or personal problem. "Their supervisors did not seem to be interested in listening to their difficulties nor in objectively reviewing the situation."

Supervision and personal conduct. Where close supervision and discipline of workers were lacking, improper personal conduct was more likely to appear. There were always problem cases brought about by over-attention to drink, social life, and romance. In one instance, Commissioner Heckman established a curfew in the South Pacific as some

1. Allen to Gibson, March 26, 1945, No. 900.308 ETO; Clara C. Arthur, Chief, Returnee Unit, to Maupin, August 2, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF. In the ETO there was resistance to the idea of discussing evaluations with workers, though ETO finally accepted the instructions of national headquarters of March 1945 requiring such discussion (See Allen to Gibson, March 26, 1945, No. 900.308 ETO; Albert H. Gregg, Deputy Commissioner, ETO, to Allen, April 23, 1945, No. 900.347 ETO).
2. Wesselius to Allen, November 7, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.
4. Bondy to Edith Miller, December 29, 1944, No. 900.346 FETO.
5. Thompson to Bondy, August 14, 1944, No. 330.9.
protection to "the women who wanted to be decent" after he had noticed women leaving their posts at closing time and returning only in time to freshen up in the morning.\(^1\) There were also the occasional instances of homosexuality, psychosis, drug-addiction, and pregnancy to be dealt with.

Violations of Red Cross rules provided difficult disciplinary problems for supervisors. One example was the fairly widespread use of unauthorized air travel by women workers.\(^2\) Such travel was usually obtained through personal friendships with officers and was sometimes used to attend officers' parties at distant points. In Australia, Gamble and Christensen tried to stop this practice, in one instance refusing to allow an Admiral to take a worker with him to New Caledonia on his personal plane, a rebuff which the sea dog did not take in very good part.\(^3\) Many such trips were made without detection, or without severe disciplinary action upon discovery. There were a few instances of workers being returned to the States upon detection.\(^4\) In general there was no consistent discipline applied to violators of this rule.

Dating of officers by Red Cross women, while not in violation of

1. R. C. Jameson, "Brief History of Red Cross Services in the War against Japan," p. 251, HDF; Beckman to Allen, June 10, 1944, attached to same, June 27, 1944, No. 900.08 POA.
2. Men also made unauthorized trips, though probably not as extensively as women since the latter were in greater demand as social companions. It was also reported that authorized air travel was very loosely regulated (Clausen to Hoslett, December 3, 1948, HDF).
3. R. D. Jameson, "Brief History of Red Cross Services in the War Against Japan," p. 235, HDF. The seriousness of unauthorized air travel was brought forcefully to the attention of national headquarters when seven Red Cross workers lost their lives in an unauthorized air trip from Italy to Corsica (Bondy to Wesselius, August 8, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO).
4. See Beiterly to Ryan, May 17, 1945, No. 900.346 FETO.
Red Cross rules, affected supervision and discipline. For the most part this dating practice was by choice, but there was also said to be an element of informal coercion present. Some of the girls were resentful of being on call to attend officers' parties (so-called "command performances"), yet were unwilling to decline party invitations for fear of reprisals. These reprisals could be serious, for in some instances what was done for the Red Cross by the Army in the way of supplies, equipment and cooperation came about in part through the good relationships established by the female elements of the organization.

Women enjoying the favor of officers, and especially of high officers, were thus not as amenable to supervision and discipline. Commissioner Heckman found "too many" women in the South Pacific played up to high rank and thus had no need to follow Red Cross channels, receiving personal favors and supplies which their superiors in Red Cross were unable to obtain. National headquarters took no definite stand on the dating question. Both the heads of SAF and of Insular and Foreign Operations agreed that it was "a very delicate subject and there is very little that we can do about it."  

This brief discussion of the personal conduct-supervisory relationship is not intended, of course, to cast reflection upon the thousands of Red Cross workers whose conduct and performance were exemplary, but to

1. Margaret C. Humberger, Personnel Interviewer, Personnel Relations, SAF, to D. G. McCallister, July 12, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.
2. Heckman to Allen, June 10, 1944, attached to same to same, June 27, 1944, No. 900.06 POA.
3. Bondy to Wessellius, August 8, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO.
4. For more detailed discussions of the personal conduct of Red Cross workers, readers should consult the Red Cross histories of overseas theaters.
illuminate a few conditions which affected that relationship. Some administrators felt that the Red Cross supervisors were not severe enough in their discipline. "Many times," wrote an Area Administrator in the MEO, "personnel do things knowing there is little if any penalty that will accrue even if they are caught." If, as appears likely, the Red Cross was more lax in discipline than it should have been, the condition may be attributed to war conditions, lack of supervision, lack of a well known and understood Red Cross disciplinary policy, shortage of workers which tended to make supervisors shut their eyes to infractions, and the well known effect of Army-Red Cross worker relationships upon Army cooperation and assistance to Red Cross. In preparation for another emergency the question of a more definite and stringent Red Cross disciplinary policy overseas seems to merit attention.

Staff welfare. One means to supplement supervision, especially as it concerns personal services and the personal problems of workers, is to provide a separate staff of workers who devote their entire time to such matters. The organization, training, responsibilities, and methods of such staffs are important conditions of their success.

In American industry and government there are several types of programs. Some companies, such as the Western Electric Company, provide counselors whose chief function is to listen to workers. The nature of the complaints they hear is made known to management, but the counselors do not attempt to solve individual problems. A more common type of program makes provision for the counselor to bring specific problems and

1. T. M. Simpson to Fisher, October 26, 1945, p. 7 attached to Fisher to Simpson, October 31, 1945, No. 900.08 MEO.
individuals to the attention of line supervisors for corrective action.

In the Red Cross, national headquarters had established staff welfare departments in overseas theaters by mid-1944.¹ The writer is not aware, however, of any explicit directive from national headquarters regarding the exact nature of staff welfare functions or the relationship of the staff to line supervisors. The programs varied considerably from theater to theater. In the MEO the staff welfare department was concerned with "health, annual and sick leave, billeting, uniforms, job performance and factors affecting it, and assignments."² Staff welfare workers in the SWP made monthly reports concerning "billeting, messing arrangements, group morale, depotment, and movement of personnel."³

The Commissioner to Great Britain reported in 1943 that the director of this department

makes frequent visits to all of our operations throughout Great Britain to be assured that the welfare of our staff

1. Allen to Gibson, April 12, 1944, No. 900.3 ETO; Allen to Bailey attached to Bailey to Allen, August 3, 1944, No. 900.341 MEO; Nicholson to Poteat, September 11, 1945, No. 900.3 MTO.

The European Theater had set up such a department as early as October 1943 (M. Wilson, ARC in GB to Mitchell, October 2, 1942, No. 900.08 ETO) and Australia had asked for "personal counselors" for its female staff earlier in the year 1944 (G. M. Lusty to Wesselius June 30, 1944, No. 900.32 FETO). It appears that the initiative for a staff welfare director in the POA also originated overseas. The PCA Commissioner wrote in June 1944: "Staff welfare, morale and conduct, particularly amongst the women is a problem...I need a woman of about 45 to 50 who is friendly, kindly and understanding, but who can be a real leader. She must not be a top sergeant nor a mother superior, but she must not be weak. I want a woman who is not a sin smeller but who knows what sin is" (Heckman to Allen, June 28, 1944 attached to same, July 18, 1944, No. 900.101 POA).

2. Vivian Brower, Director of Staff Welfare, MEO, to Raymond Fisher, Director, MEO, February 9, 1945, No. 900.108 MEO.

3. Stuart Miller, "Report of Director of Personnel, October, 1945", p. 6, attached to Nicholson to Christensen, December 26, 1945, No. 900.08 FETO.
is being properly taken care of. The conduct and control of our staff, insofar as it is not covered by the regulations of the various departments and divisions, as well as regulations as to uniforms, is in a general way supervised by this department. Facilities for hospitalization, nursing and first-aid, day and night, for all of our staff at all of our clubs and at headquarters are under this department's control.

The variations in the programs, lack of information on the qualifications of the staff workers and the results obtained, and the absence of policy on this function from national headquarters make it impossible to draw any conclusions as to the value of the services rendered. A well defined staff welfare policy, including provision for some training in counseling methods for staff welfare workers (such as offered by the USO to its volunteer workers\(^2\)), appears an obvious requirement for the successful operation of staff welfare services in another emergency.

Training. In training workers and supervisors overseas, the theaters were largely their own guides and masters. There was relatively little aid, assistance, or suggestion from Washington. Indeed, knowledge in Washington of overseas training was often incomplete, as noted earlier in this study.

There seems to have been an impression, particularly noticeable in the early years of the war, that training in Washington would largely solve the "training problem" — i.e., that very little further training should be required in the field. This impression was modified as experience demonstrated that Washington training was not sufficient to

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1. Gibson to Davis, January 25, 1943, p. 17, attached to Mitchell to DeWitt Smith, February 24, 1943, No. 900.08 ETO.
prepare workers for jobs that varied substantially from theater to theater. Geographical and climatic conditions (let alone such factors as differences in native resources, differences in equipment with which workers had to work, and differences in the number of workers available to service troops) were enough to call for special training for special areas. As these local, area, or regional needs were recognized, and as personnel became available, training courses to meet these special needs were instituted in each theater. Some of these training aids sprang up in 1942, more in 1943, but not until 1944 or 1945 were sufficient personnel and resources available to do extensive training overseas.

The kinds of training that were developed overseas during the course of war may roughly be classified as (1) orientation training, (2) skills training, (3) training for special groups, and (4) in-service supervisory training. Of the types mentioned, the last-named was least commented upon in the files. The impression is that overseas (as well as domestically) the improvement of supervision through staff meetings, in-service courses and institutes, publications and the like received less attention than other types of training.

All of the theaters developed some kind of orientation training for new workers. These courses were generally two or three day affairs during which various theater and perhaps Army officials spoke to the new employees. Conditions and problems peculiar to the theater were discussed. These programs were ordinarily conducted by the personnel department.¹ After

this introduction, the department to whom the individual was assigned usually held meetings regarding the work of the department.

Training in job skills was introduced, usually by the departments concerned, as workers were found unprepared to enter into or continue on the jobs for which they had been selected and trained in Washington. Such training was instituted in Hawaii, for example, when the Club Supervisor found that some of the girls did not know how to play cards and others could not dance. In the Pacific, especially, further skill training was required to train club girls in the use of available native materials such as bamboo and palm fronds. The training periods varied, a course in the PCA consisting of as much as six weeks instruction.

From time to time special groups had to be trained in the theaters. In CBI, a group of white persons employed locally as club and hospital recreation workers was given a special training course. Another CBI training course provided instruction for Indian and Anglo-Indian canteen managers and cooks. In the ETO a special program was devised in 1945 to train Assistants to Field Directors employed overseas from among discharged servicemen. Numerous other examples of training could be cited, but these indicate the wide range of needs which occurred.

1. Gladys Andrews, Supervisor, Club Program and In-Service Training (Hawaii) to Mary Settle, Associate Chief, SAF Personnel Training, January 31, 1945, No. 330.001.
2. R. D. Jameson, "Brief History of Red Cross Services in the War Against Japan (Pacific)," pp. 279-280, HDF.
4. R. C. Hisgen, "ARC in the China-Burma-India, Theater, 1944," pp. 16-17 HDF.
5. W. L. Prince, "Narrative Report, Field Service Department, October 1945," December 1, 1945, attached to Nicholson to Stephens, February 7, 1946, No. 900.08 ETO.
The war experience of the Red Cross in training suggests that the basic question of "where should training take place" has to be thought through in preparation for another emergency. Consideration might be given to a training plan which would include a kind of basic or overall training in Washington, together with explicit training in the theater for the job and for orientation to the peculiar local conditions surrounding the job. Such a plan would have to provide for a high degree of administrative flexibility to meet overseas conditions. An implicit assumption of such a plan is that overseas training is an integral and planned part of the total training program. Thus, provision would have to be made for creating and staffing training units overseas as part of the authorized organization plan of overseas theaters.

Marriage policy overseas. In August 1943 national headquarters issued a directive to the effect that all ARC personnel who married while abroad would be returned to the United States or transferred to a station remote from spouse. This policy was based on the assumption that married persons could not give undivided attention to their tasks. It was also supposedly in accord with Army policy.¹

This policy met with opposition overseas. ETO attempted to enforce the policy but provided, with the concurrence of Washington, that persons marrying might continue in Red Cross service on a volunteer basis.² However, it was reported in Washington that some girls who married were

¹ Gibson to All American Personnel, C. O. 71, August 23, 1943 No. 900.08 ETO; Cable, ARC, Washington to ARC, London, August 13, 1943, No. 900.341 ETO.
² Cable, ARC, Washington, to ARC, London, April 19, 1944.
not put on volunteer status in the ETO. This inconsistency in policy execution caused "considerable dissatisfaction."¹

In North Africa and the MTO the policy was considerably modified. Here the strict enforcement of the policy would have been especially difficult because of the well-publicized fact that the Delegate, Mr. Stevenson, was accompanied by his wife, "Bumpy."² Mr. Stevenson's own observation was that in a great majority of cases a Red Cross worker who married was "apt to settle down and become a more effective worker than she was before her marriage."³

Moreover, the Assistant Delegate of the Theater reported that the headquarters policy was not in conformity with theater military policy which permitted marriage and allowed the husband and wife to live together. The Red Cross in MTO adopted a policy as early as the summer of 1943 in conformity with the theater military policy.⁴ Under MTO policy a Red Cross worker who married was not required to live away from her spouse or to return to the United States. Each person, however, signed an agreement that she would not allow the marriage to interfere with her work, would accept any assignments given to her, and would not request assignments to place her with or near her spouse. According to the policy, whether or not married persons lived together depended

1. Hill to Bondy, March 31, 1945, No. 900.346 ETO.
2. Roy E. Johnson, SAF, to Thomas M. Dinsmore, September 30, 1943, No. 900.3 MTO.
3. Stevenson to Allen, June 4, 1945, attached to letter, Allen to Stirling Tompkins, Asst. Delegate, MTO, July 20, 1944, No. 900.341 MTO.
4. The MTO action was reportedly taken with the concurrence of Mr. Norman Davis, Chairman of the Red Cross (Tompkins to Allen, May 3, 1945, No. 900.341 MTO).
entirely on the chance assignment of both husband and wife. The alternative of volunteer status as used in Great Britain was not considered fair by the MTO because it made marriage available only for those who could afford it.¹

SWP policy also modified headquarters policy. Persons could marry with the permission of the Director of Operations, but married personnel were subject to assignment and transfer or return to the United States as deemed necessary in the interest of Red Cross.² (Of the 36 who had married by September 29, 1944, 18 were returned to the states.)³ In all but a few cases married persons were required to live remote from spouse, but the guide Christensen preferred to follow in assignment was "the ability of the worker to perform effectively his, or her, Red Cross responsibility."⁴

The marriage policy of national headquarters, opposed and modified in the theaters, was rescinded May 18, 1945. This action followed the issuance of War Department Circular No. 125 (1945) which stated that assignments of personnel under military control to duty overseas, and authorization for others to proceed overseas, would be made solely on the basis of military necessity and without regard to personal relationships involved. Since Red Cross workers were under military control, national headquarters policy was made to conform with military policy. Thereafter, the status of Red Cross personnel marrying in the theaters

1. Tompkins to Allen, May 3, 1945, No. 900.341 MTO.
2. Christensen to All American Personnel, August 18, 1943, No. 900.346 FETO.
4. Ibid.
was not affected because of presence of spouse. Headquarters continued to emphasize the fact, however, that assignments of personnel would continue to be for the convenience of the Red Cross and not to meet the convenience of individuals.¹

**Leave policy and problems.** By 1944 it became apparent to national headquarters that a "home leave" policy for overseas workers of long service would prove beneficial to morale and job performance. As of June 1944 national headquarters issued a directive authorizing a month's vacation in the United States for Red Cross personnel who had served overseas two years.²

The requirement of two years' service was not uniformly enforced by the theaters. In the MEO the period was 18 months; in the ETO the period was 24 months but the plan was not put into operation until December 1944 and was limited to 20 persons per month;³ in CBI, the period was 18 months;⁴ in the MEO, 22 months.⁵

In the Pacific the period appears to have been 2 years until mid-1945 when it was reduced to 18 months.⁶ By this time it was apparent

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¹. Cable, ARC, Washington, to ARC, London, May 18, 1945, No. 900.341 ETO.
². Allen to Charles Bailey, Director MEO, June 16, 1944, No. 900.345 MEO. Refinements of the policy are contained in letters in the same file as follows: signed by Nicholson, December 7, 1944; signed by Allen, May 15, 1945; signed by Nicholson, July 20, 1945 and August 29, 1945.
³. Bremer, Adams, Greenberg, "ARC Services in the War Against Germany, Part II: Chapter 3, Administrative Services," pp. 15-16, HDF.
⁴. R. C. Hisgen, "The ARC in the CBI Theater, 1944," p. 20, HDF.
⁵. Bailey to Harry Truman, Asst. Dir., SAF, June 3, 1944; No. 140.18 SAF; Nicholson to Raymond R. Fisher, Director of Operations, MEO, January 19, 1945, p. 1, No. 900.08 MEO.
⁶. R. L. Kelsey, Director, Hospital Service, Forward Area, POA, to All Hospital AFD's, April 26, 1945, Jameson's file, no file no. cited; Cable, ARC, Manila, to ARC, Washington, June 13, 1945, No. 900.37 FETO; Stanton Griffin, Commissioner, POA, to Allen, July 5, 1945, p. 2, No. 900.08 POA.
that the extended service in the tropics was seriously impairing the health of an increasing number of workers.

The major general limitations on the full execution of the leave policy overseas were inability to relieve some key persons overseas without adversely affecting operations; lack of transportation to the states; and shortage of new staff to replace persons on home leave. These limitations affecting the execution of the home leave policy had to be met by the theaters as best they could.

In addition to home leave, theaters attempted to provide rest leave (annual leave) within the theater at rest centers and rest homes. In the MTO and ETO adequate arrangements were made in 1944 and 1945 for rest leave within the theaters. ¹ To assist the MEB, which had very limited leave facilities, arrangements were made in the winter of 1944-45 for a limited number of the staff to take leave in Italy.² By August of 1945 the MTO was granting out-of-theater leaves to Switzerland, Cairo, and the French Riviera as well as a number of places within Italy.³

In respect to rest leave the Pacific was in a worse position than the other theaters, with the possible exception of the MEB. In fact, Christensen stated that the inability to provide adequate rest and leave areas in temperate climate was one reason for reducing the home leave service period to 18 months.⁴ Note the contrast between MTO and P0A:

¹ Bremner, Adams, Greenbert, "ARC Services in the War Against Germany, Part II Chapter 3, Admin. Services," p. 18, HDF.
² Allen to O'Connor, June 15, 1945, No. 900.346 MTO.
³ Wm. L. McGill, Director of Personnel, "Report for August, 1945, Personnel Department," No. 900.108 MTO.
⁴ Cable, ARC, Manila, to ARC, Washington, June 13, 1945, No. 900.37 FETO.
In the MTO in 1945 leave was extensively and beneficially used, personnel being allowed one out-of-theater leave each six months. In the PQA a hospital supervisor wrote to her superior in May 1945: "I realize that you are thoroughly aware of the need for planning rest leave for those workers who have been in this area for more than eight months—however, I feel that at this point immediate action is indicated...the workers who have been in this area since September 193 months are tired to the point of exhaustion."2

Reassignment of overseas personnel by national headquarters.

The practice of reassigning overseas workers by headquarters was criticized by all theaters. The problem had two aspects: (1) complaints from theaters that some of the persons on home leave were not returned after leave to the theaters from whence they came, and (2) complaints that some of the persons who resigned or were dismissed overseas were, contrary to theater recommendations, reassigned by headquarters either to the theater from which they came, to a different theater, or to a domestic position.

The number of such reassignments has not been fully recorded.3

Regardless of the number, overseas administrators expressed strong

1. James F. Nields, Jr., Commissioner to Italy, to Dept. Heads, etc. August 6, 1945, No. 900.345 MTO.
2. L. E. McLeod, APO 244, to R. Kelsey, Director, Hospital Service, Forward Area, PQA, May 23, 1945, Jameson's file, no file no. cited.
3. Between May 1943 and January 19, 1944, of 217 persons returned from overseas 40 percent resigned, 14 percent were reassigned to overseas areas, 36 percent were assigned to domestic duty, and 10 were on leave or in reserve awaiting for the disposition as of January 19, 1944 (Don Smith to Wann, February 4, 1944, No. 340.18 SAF).
feeling on the subject. From the South Pacific Area it was reported:

One of the most distressing things to our personnel has been the rehiring of men who have resigned in this area. These men have resigned because they didn't like working where they were or could not get the job they wanted, or where they wanted it; they then have returned to the United States and been rehired and in some cases sent back to this theater.  

The Director of the MEO complained: "Those of our staff who have done a continuing good job in the Middle East are still eating sand and swatting flies, and they cannot help but wonder at the justice of these undeserved reassignments."  

Commissioner Heckman wrote to Vice Chairman Allen that if anyone he released was retained on the Red Cross staff, he would consider it "a definite breach of confidence that must exist between us if I am to do a job."  His successor, Stanton Griffis, was so much concerned about the matter in the spring of 1945 that Chairman O'Connor agreed that no person returning from the P0A should be reassigned by the Red Cross in violation of theater recommendation unless the Chairman had personally written to Mr. Griffis that he was not prepared to accept the theater recommendation.  

Red Cross policy in headquarters was to consider the requests of personnel for change of theater assignment when they had completed a satisfactory tour of duty abroad, but not to encourage such requests. It was also national policy to investigate, "in limited instances,"  

2. Beasley to Robert Curran, SAF, August 4, 1944, No. 900.345 MEO.  
the cases of persons who returned to the United States to resign. In these cases it was determined in headquarters whether the interests of the organization would be served by continuing the person in service.¹

Reassignments of persons who resigned or were dismissed overseas were made by national headquarters for a number of reasons. There was an ever-present need for personnel which, combined with the difficulty of recruitment, prompted headquarters to "salvage" as many workers as it believed might prove satisfactory in another work situation. There was the belief that in many instances overseas theaters had not made a real attempt to get the worker adjusted to his work, and that he should have another chance to adjust in a new environment. Sometimes, also, negative overseas evaluations were not received until after the worker had returned to Washington and had been reassigned. Some negative overseas evaluations were so inconclusive that they did not seem sufficient to bar the worker from another trial. Finally, national headquarters, on the basis of its own judgment, at times took action contrary to the specific recommendations of the theater regarding reassignment.²

Several considerations regarding this problem of reassignments may be mentioned. In the long run, the assignment of "good" workers to new theaters after home leave was not as harmful as might have been expected because every theater received some new persons who had previously served

¹. Nicholson to Christensen, Gibson, et al., December 29, 1944, No. 900.343 FETO, ETO, etc.
². See Allen to Tomkins, July 19, 1944, No. 900.3 MTO; Nicholson to Allen, May 12, 1945, No. 109.1 Personnel.
in other theaters. As to reassignment of persons dismissed overseas, the chief corrective was in convincing national headquarters that overseas theaters were doing a reasonably good job in preventing and handling these "problem cases." During World War II national headquarters was not so convinced. In another emergency, once reasonable personnel standards are established overseas, it would seem to follow that except in very special cases overseas personnel recommendations should be followed by national headquarters or changes made in responsible overseas personnel whose recommendations cannot be allowed.

**Turnover and resignations.** Turnover was a constant concern of overseas administrators. Actually the turnover rates overseas were relatively low. Official Red Cross figures placed them at .84 percent monthly in 1944 and 1.48 percent monthly in 1945. This may be compared with domestic Red Cross monthly turnover rates of 6.4 percent in 1944 and 6.5 percent in 1945.\(^1\) Yet to overseas administrators faced with serious personnel shortages, turnover loomed exceedingly large.

Poor health and voluntary resignations for other causes were major factors contributing to turnover.\(^2\) Regarding the former, the theaters

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1. While these figures may not be absolutely accurate, other scattered figures on turnover found in the files tend to verify their approximate accuracy.

2. Of the 8,436 Red Cross personnel sent overseas between January 1, 1942 and October 31, 1944, 1,178 returned; of the latter, 27.7 percent returned for medical reasons. Of the persons returning from overseas between May 1943 and Jan. 19, 1944, 40 percent resigned (Progress Reporting Unit, "Survey of the types of Medical Problems Presented by Returnees from Overseas Theaters...", December 12, 1944, HDF; Don Smith to Wann, February 4, 1944, No. 340.18 SAF).
did what they could in cooperation with medical services of the armed forces to protect the health of workers, but in many instances combinations of overwork and bad climatic conditions (and in some cases personal over-indulgence) tended to undermine health in spite of any theater concern.

Many factors contributed to resignations, some real, some imaginary or psychological: family difficulties at home, inability to adjust to living and working conditions, desire to get back to old jobs (especially as the war came to a close and after it ended), discouragement because of long periods of service before rotation was obtainable (especially in the Pacific), long periods on the same job, unsatisfactory personal relations with colleagues and supervisors, homesickness, mental fatigue, psychological problems peculiar to the individual, and general disillusionment with the job.¹

Resignations could be controlled overseas only by persuasion to remain on the job, for Red Cross workers did not sign a contract binding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Domestic</th>
<th>Overseas</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>2,732</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1943</td>
<td>5,503</td>
<td>2,568</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>9,254</td>
<td>5,933</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>9,299</td>
<td>9,407</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>5,794</td>
<td>3,589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The total number of domestic and overseas personnel by years is as follows:

(ARC, Red Cross Service Record, Accomplishments of Seven Years, 1939-1946, November, 1946, p. 29, HDF).

¹ See Betterly to Fallon, MMWS, September 16, 1943, No. 900.346 FET0; Heckman to Nicholson, September 27, 1944, No. 900.08 POA; E. C. Bryant, Director of Operations, Forward Area, POA, "Narrative Report, May 1945," June 11, 1945, Jameson's file, no file no. cited; Bondy to Heckman, September 17, 1944, Jameson's file, no file no. cited.
them to work for a specified period of time.\footnote{1} Though it was made plain at time of employment that employees were expected to serve for the duration of the emergency, there was no legal agreement to that effect.\footnote{2} Even if one had been made it could not have been enforced.

**Conclusion.** From this description of Red Cross personnel problems overseas it should not be concluded that generally speaking Red Cross administration overseas was poor or that most workers returned from their overseas assignments disgruntled. In late 1945 the Chief of the Returnee Unit reported that most of the returnees felt that their military and Red Cross personnel relationships had been good. Most of them felt that the overall Red Cross operations where they served were excellent. Most of them expressed loyalty to the ideals for which Red Cross stood. The criticisms that many of them made were in the hope that "something could be done about it."\footnote{3}

It is in this same spirit that the overseas personnel problems of

\begin{itemize}
\item [1.] The POA took action to curtail resignations in 1945 by terminating immediately overseas the salary of persons who resigned with less than one year's service (rather than paying the person until he was "declared" in Washington as was usual). It appeared that this action, which included marking the personal record "resigned with prejudice," was taken regardless of the reason for resignation. Moreover, in many instances the employee was not informed of the action until he reached the Returnee Unit in the United States (McCoy to Nicholson, August 20, 1945, No. 900.347 POA; Hill to Nicholson, September 4, 1945, No. 900.347 POA).
\item [3.] Gates to Maupin, October 2, 1945, No. 140.18 SAF.
\end{itemize}
the Red Cross have been identified here. The discussion of some of them, such as marriage policy, carry their own clear-cut suggestions as to preferred action in another emergency. Others, such as shortages of personnel, are problems for which there is no complete solution in time of war. Certain factors, such as the use of volunteer executives, arise out of the basic features of Red Cross organization, rooted in its history. The consideration of other matters, such as supervision and training, suggest problems common to any organization (but accentuated in Red Cross war experience) regarding which better plans can be made for another emergency on the basis of the record of World War II.
CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSION

The kind and quality of personnel administration in the American Red Cross during World War II resulted from a complex of factors. One of the factors was the inadequate planning of the Red Cross for wartime personnel management. Since aid and assistance to the men in the armed forces in time of war has always been a major purpose of the Red Cross, it, like the armed forces, has a responsibility in time of peace to prepare for war. Although some general planning for war was done in the years 1934-1941, practically no attention was given to the problem of personnel management in another emergency. Some of the individual services within the organization laid plans to prepare themselves for war service, but their plans proved to be spotty in execution. Moreover, they were not coordinated with any overall plan for the entire Red Cross.

Lack of exact information from the Army and Navy regarding the type and extent of services Red Cross was to perform in event of war made precise personnel planning difficult. However, omitting this factor from consideration, top Red Cross management evidenced no recognition of the need to plan, if only on the basis of available information or even on the basis of World War I experience.

Part of the explanation for this inattention to planning personnel management for war no doubt lay in the fact that as a small, peacetime organization the place and function of personnel administration in the general management of the Red Cross had not been appreciated by top management. Most so-called "personnel matters" were handled informally, without
policy decisions, on a day-to-day basis by the line officers of the services. There were very few organization-wide personnel policies attuned to the purposes and needs of the Red Cross. True, the development and execution of an organization-wide retirement policy had been accomplished by 1936, but the individual services determined their own practices in such matters as recruitment, promotion, training, classification, and pay.

The Red Cross conception of the nature of personnel administration was sound: a 1936 policy statement suggested that personnel work was in the nature of staff assistance to line operators. However, the personnel staff was small (consisting of only two part-time persons until July 1941), professionally untrained, seemingly unaware of developments in the general field of personnel administration, and of relatively low prestige status in top Red Cross councils. This meant that the personnel staff as such was effective neither in convincing top management of the need for planning and for expanding the personnel organization nor in laying any plans for present or future operations on its own initiative. As a consequence the Red Cross entered World War II without plans, policies, or a personnel department adequate to serve as a substantial foundation in meeting wartime problems.

Even after United States participation in World War II thrust a widening range and increasing volume of activities upon the Red Cross, its top management failed to appreciate the need for personnel policies and personnel organization in war. The approach to developing a personnel program was purely day-to-day, experimental, and reasonably pragmatic,
dictated by immediate needs and pressures to execute obvious tasks, ordinarily using such personnel as were conveniently available, and influenced in the location of the function in the organization by power drives of certain officers and the seeming inability of the personnel office to meet new needs.

In this situation recruitment and selection became the major jobs of the office known as Personnel Service which, after a period of attempted centralized recruitment in Washington, developed a satisfactory system of decentralized recruitment by 1945, reaching the public through a coordinated field program utilizing the resources of hundreds of local chapters in conjunction with supervision from the five area offices. Selection methods, however, were in need of refinement throughout the war period. Personnel training was centered, though not entirely, in another part of the organization: Services to the Armed Forces. Its staffing and leadership were never entirely adequate, nor were its teaching methods developed to the highest point of effectiveness. However, by 1944 and 1945 the staff was making a progressive adaptation of the training program to the purposes and needs of the Red Cross and its individual services. The employee relations function never came to be centered in any one coordinating unit for the whole organization, though on paper the office of Personnel Relations was responsible for it. The most serious deficiency, however, was the lack of a uniform position classification and a salary plan. The development of such a plan was the responsibility of Personnel Relations for much of the period, but success was not achieved until after the war. During the war, salary inequities of many types characterized Red Cross administration.
Nothing was demonstrated more conclusively in the war experience of the Red Cross than the consequences of lack of basic personnel policy in impairing organizational efficiency, creating dissension, reducing morale, and promoting disgruntled employee groups. Also demonstrated was a relatively slow rate of adaptation of personnel methods and techniques to the war needs of the organization. This probably was due to lack of understanding and appreciation of personnel problems by top management, a long tradition of service autonomy, an emphasis among old-timers on providing "services" rather than developing temporary machinery through which to provide them, (the combination of these factors led several directors of personnel appointed from outside the organization to resign after relatively brief stints), below-par leadership at the operating level of personnel management in several instances, and the fact that the "staff aid approach" to personnel administration was not fully understood and used by all of the wartime personnel staff.

The war experience of the Red Cross also underlined the high degree of interdependence and inter-relationship among the personnel functions, and the necessity for their coordination. Deficiencies in the selection process, which were often substantial, were immediately reflected in increased problems in training and in ineffective performance on the job. Training which did not fully prepare the student for participation in a real-life work situation produced repercussions not only in performance, but also in job adjustment, job satisfaction, and general well-being. Most clearly seen, however, was the effect of an inadequate classification and pay plan upon the whole organization: employees were apt to
become disgruntled when an informal comparison of salaries revealed discrepancies in pay for persons doing the same work in different positions within a service, as well as among comparable positions in the different services. A well-designed classification and pay plan could also have been of assistance in recruitment, transfer, training and promotion of personnel, as well as in facilitating compliance with the federal Salary Stabilization Act.

That the Red Cross carried out a generally successful operation in spite of serious deficiencies in its formal organization and methods of personnel administration may be attributed in large part to the underlying strength of the organization in another area: the workers' belief in the importance of Red Cross services to the men in the armed forces and to their families, and a genuine sense of participation in what was considered a great work. There were those who reduced the "morale-content" of this atmosphere—potential draft-dodgers, husband-seekers, domestic problem-escapers, and the like—but among the mass of the workers the appeal of patriotism, the sense of urgency, and the feeling of personal importance in a vital work produced a high level of morale in the face of conditions which might well have been conducive to the opposite. This was probably the saving grace of the organization in war and is indeed one of the great human resources of the Red Cross in any emergency.

Some of the defects in the formal organization and administration of Red Cross personnel work during the war were recognized by the fall of 1946 when a central Personnel Services unit was created in national headquarters with subordinate personnel offices in each of the five areas.
As of late 1948 the new organization was staffed with a small number of technicians who were gradually developing a well-rounded personnel program to meet the current needs of an organization of about 7,000 persons. ¹

Thus, by 1948, the personnel department of Red Cross had developed to about the point it should have reached by the time of Pearl Harbor.

In the event of another war, the Red Cross now is considerably better prepared in terms of personnel staff, personnel policies, and management recognition of the importance of the personnel function than it was at the outbreak of World War II. Moreover, the personnel staff is increasingly aware of World War II deficiencies in personnel administration and of the necessity for preparation and planning for another possible emergency, a task that remains to be done. It is hoped that the present study may provide a number of specific guides whereby some of the pitfalls of the earlier experience may be avoided.

¹. Its classification, retirement, employee relations policies have been reasonably well developed, through much remains to be done in the field of training, and particularly in supervisory training.
APPENDICES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY
APPENDIX I

RECRUITMENT OF CLERICAL-STENOGRAPHIC PERSONNEL FOR NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

As indicated in the text, recruitment of adequate clerical personnel, especially stenographers, for the headquarters office was a special problem throughout the war. Both before and after the decentralization plan was put into effect, representatives from national headquarters recruited clerical workers in territory adjacent to Washington. In May of 1943 a special plan was approved which did not involve any increase in salary, but provided for reimbursement for transportation to Washington and a guarantee of acceptable lodgings at a rate of $30, or less per month, provided the employee promised to remain with Red Cross at least 90 days. Headquarters recruiters worked in the Eastern and North Atlantic areas on this program, the particular selling point of which was the guaranteed low-cost quarters. These efforts by Employment Service were not completely successful and in July the Eastern

1. Yoder to Waters, February 6, 1943, No. 320.01; Waters to DeWitt Smith, July 12, 1943, No. 320.01.
2. During 1941 headquarters offices lost some of their staff to the Federal Government because of salary differences. In 1942 the Red Cross met the government salary scale for clerical-stenographic work, but by this time it was said that "many" had left its employ. During most of the war period the Red Cross rates were roughly comparable to (but slightly below) government rates. By the summer of 1944 clerical and stenographic positions carried several entrance salaries as follows, based on experience and skill: Typists: $110, $120, or $130; Stenographers: $120, $135, $140, or $150. These are approximately the ranges paid in 1943 and 1944, also (George Smith to Mitchell, April 29, 1941, No. 300.1; John Griffith, Assistant Office Manager, to I. Denison, telephone conversation, June 1, 1941, HDF. Benjamin Cliff, Personnel Service, interview with Hoslett, April 21, 1948, HDF).
3. DeWitt Smith to Waters, May 29, 1943, No. 320.01.
and North Atlantic areas were asked to utilize their newly developed field recruiting units to recruit.¹

By the end of June 1944 SAF was short 200 clerical workers, and some efforts were made to use night shifts, part-time workers, and re-assignment of workers to use highest skills.² Home Service, in addition to two full-time shifts of 8:30 to 5, 2 to 10, had a night force of 10 part-time Government workers employed from 6 to 10. More use of clerks, where possible, in place of stenographers was urged at this time, plus a greater use of Negroes³ and part-time night workers who could be secured from the government.⁴ It must be noted that the work week, which affected need for recruitment, remained at 42 hours until May 1, 1945 when the 48 hour week was put into effect at the insistence of the War Manpower Commission. This was required in order to obtain a higher priority on referrals from the United States Employment Service, the main source of clerical and stenographic personnel in Washington.⁵

¹ Waters to DeWitt Smith, July 12, 1943, No. 320.01.
² Wann, "Annual Report for FY 1943-44, Personnel Administration and Training Units", SAF, June 20, 1944, No. 140.18.
³ Mitchell, to DeWitt Smith, Winfrey, June 26, 1944, No. 320.01; Voight to Hill, September 13, 1945, No. 320.01.
⁴ Yoder to Waters, May 15, 1944, No. 320.1.

By 1943 the Red Cross could hire no one who applied for employment without the approval of the local WMC office, unless the individual had been residing in Washington for thirty days, had not been employed for 60 days or had a certificate of availability from his employer. This practically limited selection to those referred by U.S.E.S. (a unit of WMC), the very few unemployed and the many unemployable. From July 1944 until May 1, 1945 headquarter's status with the USES for referrals had been lowered until it reached a No. 8 priority and a ceiling limitation which prevented clearance of many workers to ARC. When the new work week was adopted, priority rating was set at 5 and a resumption of referrals made (Yoder to Waters, May 15, 1944, No. 320.1; Personnel Service, "Annual Report, FY 1944-45", No. 108.1).
In May 1944 the areas (except Pacific) had been given a total quota of 100 stenographers for Washington, and in early August an additional 50 was added. However, the results were poor; only 9 of the 150 had reported by August 14. Results from recruiting by the areas continued to be unsatisfactory. In Washington, classified advertisements, appeals to Red Cross employees to suggest names of applicants, and streetcar and bus advertising were used, but there was often a shortage of several hundred persons during the war years. Not until the summer of 1946 could stenographic demands be filled with relative ease compared with the war period.

1. Winfrey to Area, May 24, 1944, AM 567.
2. Waters to Winfrey, August 14, 1944, No. 320.01.
3. Ibid.
4. Romone S. Eaton, Manager Eastern Area, to Chapter Chairmen, June 22, 1945, ECS 527-0-56; Buchanan, Director Personnel Service, Eastern Area, to Wann, July 2, 1945, No. 320.08.
5. Mitchell to Heads of Services..., April 28, 1944, No. 320.01; Frances Karl, Assistant to Director of Employment, to Wann, January 19, 1945, No. 320.01; Voight to Hill, September 13, 1945, No. 320.01, Personnel Service, Employment Section, "Report for FY 1945-46", May 7, 1946, No. 140.18.
APPENDIX II

MAJOR NEEDS IN PERSONNEL, 1942-45

From the beginning of the war there was a pronounced need for medical and psychiatric social workers for Hospital Service, a need which continued throughout the war, and which was particularly hard to meet because of the professional qualifications required for the job and the relatively small supply of trained workers.¹ Other especially pressing needs during 1942 existed for field directors and assistant field directors in Camp Service, social workers for both Hospital and Home Service, club workers for the overseas clubs, and staff assistants.²

During 1943 the rapid expansion in the hospital program required the addition of many recreation workers and the establishment of the position of hospital staff aide.³ Staff aides were sub-professional assistants who performed the simpler social work tasks in hospitals to relieve the burden on the trained staff. Field staff for Camp Service, assistant field directors for recreation, hospital recreation workers and social workers (including medical social workers, psychiatric social workers, staff social workers) continued to be in demand, the social work group probably being the most difficult to recruit.⁴

1. Telegram, Vincent to Perle Dow, Pacific Area, February 6, 1942, No. 320.01.
4. Waters, Assistant Director of Employment, to D. V. Hall, Director of Personnel, North Atlantic Area, June 11, 1943, No. 320.01.
At times in 1943 the requests for overseas hospital needs for social workers and recreation workers simply were not filled. As of July 1, for example, 169 social workers and 198 recreation workers were needed to meet overseas requests. Yet on July 9 only 26 social workers and 45 hospital recreation workers had been committed to Red Cross employment, some of whom were not immediately available for assignment.¹

By November 1943 sufficient recruiting had been accomplished to warrant temporarily discontinuing recruitment of overseas personnel.² In domestic Camp Service, a new and more restrictive Table of Organization had resulted in a technical surplus of domestic field personnel warranting temporary discontinuance of recruitment in November in most areas.³ By early 1944, however, areas again began to search for domestic Camp Service workers, but recruitment was slow and camps remained understaffed during 1944 and part of 1945.⁴

Early in 1944 overseas requests indicated special need for assistant field directors, staff assistants for clubs and other club personnel, and hospital staffs including social workers, recreation workers, secretaries and staff aides.⁵ Recruiting for overseas, which had come to a standstill November 1, 1943, steadily gained momentum after January 1944,⁶ and by June immediate requirements for staff assistants,

¹ Don Smith, Deputy Administrator, SAF, to Waters, July 9, 1943, No. 320.12, SAF.
² Harry Boyte, Assistant Chief, PA, SAF, to Perry Walsh, November 6, 1943, No. 320.01.
³ Teletype, Bondy to Areas, November 23, 1943, No. 320.01.
⁴ Dykofsky, "Camp Service, Stabilization, Specialization and Redeployment - January 1944 - VJ Day", pp. 24-29, HDF.
⁶ Mitchell to Winfrey, Vice Chairman, May 18, 1944, No. 320.01.
staff aides and overseas secretaries had been met.¹ But the total needs in other classifications remained unfilled.

By October 1944 an especially serious need in Camp Service for field directors, assistant field directors and field supervisors overseas had developed. Immediate and projected six months' needs in these categories totaled 500 men.² The need for assistant field directors was described as the most critical employment problem since the outbreak of the war.³ In November an intensive campaign for assistant field directors was launched in the areas,⁴ which included reassignment of some domestic staff to overseas positions.⁵ Within seven weeks almost 40 percent of the total requirements through May 1945 had been engaged, with the prospect of the entire quota being met within two or three weeks.⁶

Another crisis occurred in November-December 1944 regarding overseas social workers, recreational workers, and stenographers. Estimates of needed personnel made six months or more before had proved too small, and by November 25 national headquarters had failed to produce 972 persons needed in all classifications overseas. Instructions went forward to areas to recruit every "qualified" person that could be located without regard to quotas or budget limitations, or strict adherence to qualification requirements.⁷ Areas were also assigned quotas to be filled from

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¹ Mitchell to Dewitt Smith, Winfrey, June 26, 1944, No. 320.01.
² Winfrey to Furves, et al, October 20, 1944, No. 320.01.
³ Howard Bonham, Director of Public Relations, to Romine, October 20, 1944, No. 320.01.
⁴ Nicholson to Chairman, December 16, 1944, No. 320.1 Overseas.
⁶ Wann to Nicholson, January 25, 1945, No. 320.1 Overseas.
⁷ Nicholson to Chairman, Dec. 16, 1944, with attachments, No. 320.1 Overseas.
domestic staff. Apparently in December and January the areas responded well to this stimulus but lost momentum by March 1945, so that total needs were not met.

Throughout 1943, 1944 and 1945 Home Service was in serious need of personnel. In May 1944 a maximum recruiting effort was called for to increase the staff from 502 to 1,102 persons as the load of Home Service correspondence became heavier. The Service remained understaffed through- out 1945, however, in both its professional, and especially in its clerical personnel. Indeed, all headquarters offices considered themselves short of clerical-stenographic personnel during the war years, particularly 1943-45. Special recruitment efforts were carried on during these years, but the need was not satisfied until the summer of 1946.

During 1945 personnel needs increased rapidly as activities continued to expand, and with deployment begun in June 1945 the Red Cross was engaged in an all-out recruiting campaign for overseas personnel. It was said that 1500 positions in clubs overseas were unfilled, including 1000 staff assistant positions for women. More than a thousand persons were needed to serve as field directors and assistant field directors in Camp Service in this country and overseas. Because the bottom of the manpower barrel had been reached, domestically there was some emphasis on the recruitment

1. Ibid.; Winfrey to Areas, Dec. 20, 1944, AM (Area Management Letters) 643, "Personnel Book III", HDF.
2. Nicholson to Winfrey, March 14, 1945, No. 320.08.
4. Margie E. Voight, Chief Clerical Placement Unit, PA, SAF, to Ruth Hill, September 13, 1945, No. 320.01.
5. "Fact Sheet, no. sig., June 1945, No. 320.01. These needs, stated for recruitment purposes, were probably in excess of actual requirements.
of women assistant field directors and in July the semi-professional classification of Field Assistant was created to assist in base stations and separation centers.1

The shortage in Hospital Service personnel, which had existed since the beginning of the war, reached such a critical point with increased casualties in the armed forces that concerted action was necessary to relieve it. A temporary National Recruitment Committee was appointed in Headquarters in late May to direct a nationwide recruiting drive for 3,000 hospital workers (750 social workers, 600 recreation workers, and 1650 staff aides.).2 By late October more than 1,100 workers had been recruited, current needs appeared to have been met, and recruitment publicity was discontinued.3 In November the campaign was officially terminated,4 though social workers were still accepted for employment.5

A final drive for field directors and assistant field directors for overseas was launched in September 1945, ending in November, 1945,6 after the peak of demobilization had been reached (October-November). From this time through June 1947 no extensive outside recruiting was carried on. Though overseas personnel needs remained high in 1946 - e.g., 807 persons were needed in September 1946 - most requests were met through reassignment of returnees from overseas, from a roster of reserve

1. Bykofsky, op. cit., p. 28.
3. Lewis A. Bowen, Publicity Department, to Section Heads, October 29, 1945, No. 320.01.
5. Margie E. Voight, Chief, Clerical Placement Unit, QA, SAF, to Ruth Hill, September 13, 1945, No. 320.01.
6. Nicholson to Wann, Sept. 1, 1945, No. 320.01; "History of North Atlantic Area, 'Where We Start'", p. 3.
personnel of former employees, or from domestic staffs made surplus through closure of military installations.\textsuperscript{1} Occasionally there was some outside recruitment of selected categories of personnel such as overseas social workers and secretaries.\textsuperscript{2}

One concludes that the needs for particular categories of personnel fluctuated widely during the war period as the Red Cross adapted and expanded its program to meet changing war needs. Because of these changing requirements, special recruitment drives or campaigns were used from time to time in an attempt to meet the needs, followed by periods of low recruitment or non-recruitment. However, recruitment of social workers and headquarters clerical-stenographic workers was never discontinued and the needs were never fully met during the war period.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item \textit{Ibid.}; Thomas M. Dinsmore, Dir., Insular and Foreign Div., SAF, to Don Smith, August 16, 1946, No. 320.01.
\item Leverenz, Assistant Director, Personnel Service, to Harold Buchanan, Director of Personnel, Eastern Area, Sept. 20, 1946, No. 320.01.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
APPENDIX III

DESCRIPTION OF COURSES
(as of 2/12/45)

I  BASIC ORIENTATION
   1. Introduction to ARC
      (History, Organization, Survey of SAF, the ARC Chapter, etc.)  8 hours
   2. Military Instruction
      (Army, Navy, Special Services, Chaplain Services, etc.)         5 hours
   3. Factors affecting Personal Adjustment
      (Health, Uniform & Equipment, ARC Personnel Practices, Responsibility of ARC Worker, Packing, etc.)  6½ hours
   4. Miscellaneous
      (Welcome, Vouchers, Instructions on Training Program, Graduation, "Get Acquainted")  4½ hours

NOTE: Time for "shots", photos, uniforming, shopping, health consultation, etc., not included.

II  HOME SERVICE - Area and Chapter Class  94 hours
   1. Basic Orientation                  24 hours
   2. Job Function                      70 hours
      Includes following subjects:
      a. Background & scope of Home Service
      b. Information Service
      c. Communication Service
      d. Reporting Service
      e. Financial Assistance
      f. Claims
      g. Administration

III HOME SERVICE - National Correspondence  35 hours
   1. Basic Orientation (selected hours)  18 hours (approx.)
   2. Job Function                      17 hours
      a. Organization & Functions of Home Service
      b. Administrative Detail (esp. files)
      c. Communications, censorship especially stressed

NOTE: Course one week all together
IV CAMP SERVICE - AFD (Domestic & Overseas)

1. Basic Orientation 24 hours
2. Job Function
   a. Administration & Job Organization 12 hours
   b. Related Services 4 hours
   c. Approach to People 13 hours
   d. Factors Affecting Pers. Adjustment 2 hours

NOTE: Extension Training follows for 2 weeks.

V CAMP SERVICE - AFDR & ABRW

1. Basic Orientation 24 hours
2. Interpretation of Recreation 11\frac{1}{2} hours
3. Recreation Leadership 10\frac{3}{4} hours
   Skills, techniques, projects
4. Job Function
   a. Administration & Job Organization 18 hours
   b. Understanding People 18 hours
   c. Related Services 12 hours

NOTE: Extension Training for 2 weeks follows.

VI CLUB SERVICE - CD & ACD

1. Basic Orientation 24 hours
2. Job Function 35 hours

The detail of this course is heavily weighted on the side of administration, housekeeping, fiscal control, food management, relationships with Quartermaster, care of equipment, etc. Course also includes history, location & types of clubs; interpretation of recreation, organization of clubs, etc.

NOTE: Because of small numbers of trainees, much individual instruction possible, with field trips included. Extension training arranged if transportation is not available.

VII CLUB SERVICE - Staff Assistants (overseas)

1. Basic Orientation 24 hours
2. Job Function
   a. Org., history, adm. of clubs 7 hours
   b. Programs in the club, interpretation of Rec., etc. 10 hours
   c. Related Services 10 hours
   d. Personal Adjustment 2 hours
   e. Field Work (extension training preparation)
VIII CLUB SERVICE - PD & APD  188 hours
1. Basic Orientation  24 hours
2. Interpretation of Recreation  11½ hours
3. Recreation Leadership  100½ hours
   Skills, techniques, projects, etc.
4. Job Function
   a. Adm. & Job Organization  35 hours
   b. Public Relations  5 hours
   c. Related Services  3 hours

NOTE: Placed in extension training if transportation not available.

IX CLUB SERVICE - Staff Assistants (domestic)  188 hours
1. Basic Orientation  24 hours

NOTE: The rest of the course is at present undergoing revision. This group takes the course similar to PD's & APD's - a total of 6 weeks and 188 hours. There are very few in this category; perhaps 4 every 4 weeks at the most.

X HOSPITAL SERVICE - Social Workers (Dom. & Overs.)  59 hours
1. Basic Orientation  24 hours
2. Job Function
   a. Application of skills  7 hours
   b. Administration & Organization  10 hours
   c. Related Services  12 hours
   d. Personal Adjustment  2 hours
   e. Field Trip  4 hours

XI HOSPITAL SERVICE - Rec. Workers (all overseas - some domestics)  188 hours
1. Basic Orientation  24 hours
2. Interpretation of Rec.  11½ hours
3. Recreation Leadership  110½ hours
   Skills, techniques, etc.
4. Job Function
   a. Adm. & Job Org.  15½ hours
   b. Understanding People  18 hours
   c. Related Services  8½ hours

NOTE: This is the combination Recreation & Job Function Training Course - all overseas Hosp. Rec. Workers must take the course. Area, domestic Hosp.
Rec. Workers take it only at Area request.
Overseas workers placed in 2 weeks extension training upon completion Domestic workers returned to Areas for job assignment.

XII  HOSPITAL DOMESTIC RECREATION WORKERS
1. Basic Orientation 24 hours 58 hours
2. Job Function
   a. Adaptation of Rec. to Mil. Hosp. 14 hours
   b. Hospital Service Setting 6 hours
   c. Administration 3 hours
   d. Related Services 5 hours
   e. Field Trips 4 hours
   f. Personal Adjustment 2 hours

NOTE: Return to Areas upon completion.

XIII  HOSPITAL SERVICE - Secretaries
1. Basic Orientation 24 hours 59 hours
2. Job Function
   a. Org., Administration, bookkeeping 16 hours
   b. Relation to other services 13 hours
   c. Field Trip 4 hours
   d. Personal Adjustment 2 hours

XIV  HOSPITAL WORKERS - Staff Aides (domestic & overseas) 97 hours
1. Basic Orientation 24 hours
2. Job Function
   The overseas Aides get more recreation. The domestic Aides get more case work.
   3. Interviewing & Understanding People 24 hours
   4. Field Trips 8 hours
   5. Personal Adjustment 2 hours
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Central Files

The primary source materials used in the preparation of this study consisted of several thousand pounds of correspondence and reports filed in the Central Records Section of the American National Red Cross in Washington, D.C. The Red Cross classification system, roughly comparable in design to that of the army, uses a numerical breakdown to identify major topics (e.g., Personnel) and a series of sub-topics (e.g., Training; Training, Induction; etc.). Because much personnel material appeared as a part of reports and correspondence classified under headings other than personnel, it was necessary to examine not only personnel files but other more general files as well. Files with the heaviest concentrations of useful material are listed below:

No. 340.08 Reports, general

No. 140.08 Personnel, reports of
  140.1 Personnel Relations
  140.18 Reports, SAF
  140.18 Reports, Personnel Service
  118.9 SAF Personnel Committee

No. 320.01 Recruitment, general plans, rules and regulations
  330.001 Training, general plans
  330.01——
  330.9 Training, for specific classes of workers

Interviews

Interviews were held by the writer with persons qualified by position or knowledge to discuss Red Cross personnel administration during World War II. Members of the personnel staff now on duty who served during the war were interviewed, as well as a number of line officials. These interviews, and others conducted by former members of the Historical Division staff, are indicated in appropriate footnotes.

Red Cross Monographs

The following monographs, prepared during 1945-48 by members of the Red Cross Historical Division, were especially useful:

Joseph Bykofsky, "Camp Service: 1938-Pearl Harbor."

——, "Camp Service: Expansion to Meet War Needs (Pearl Harbor Through 1943)."

——, "Camp Service: Stabilization, Specialization and Redeployment, January 1944-VJ Day."
Marian B. Clausen, "Planning for a War Emergency."
Margaret Clepp, "Organization of the Red Cross National Personnel Office."
_____ "Provisions for Retirement."
Isabel Denison, "Personnel and Training Before and Apart from SAF: Policies, Organization."
H. R. Hutcheson, "Preparation for a War Emergency. First Phase: July 1934 to March 1938."
_____ "Preparation for a War Emergency. Second Phase: April 1938 to June 1941."
_____ "Service to the Armed Forces Before Pearl Harbor."
_____ "Adaptation to Continued Military Expansion (1943)."
Kathryn R. Tyler, "American Red Cross Negro Personnel in World War II, 1942-46."

_Collections of Documents and Special Reports (filed in the Historical Division)_

"The Atkinson Binders." A collection of correspondence and reports pertaining to Red Cross preparation for World War II, compiled in 9 numbered binders by the former Secretary of the Military Relief Committee.

"DeWitt Smith Preparedness Binder." Another collection of documents pertaining to preparations for World War II, collected by the former Director of War Service.

"The Gaeddert Collection." A large collection of indexed materials on general administration of the Red Cross covering the period through World War I.

"Personnel Studies Binder." A collection of studies of particular classes of workers, in particular services, concerning such matters as absenteeism, turnover, salary inequities, etc. The studies were prepared by the Progress Reporting Unit, Services to the Armed Forces.


Barbara Phimney, "Induction Training for Red Cross Overseas Club Workers in World War II." A master's thesis prepared by the former chief of the Club Training Unit, SAF, and submitted to George Washington University, November, 1947.

ABBREVIATIONS USED IN FOOTNOTES

HD  Historical Division, American National Red Cross
HDF  Historical Division Files. Indicates that the document referred to is filed in the Historical Division.
MRWS  Military and Naval Welfare Service
PA  Pacific Area Office, American National Red Cross
AASW  American Association of Social Workers
AAMSW  American Association of Medical Social Workers
AAPSW  American Association of Psychiatric Social Workers
ARC  American National Red Cross. When followed by a number (e.g., ARC 616) refers to one of the statements of qualifications for employment for a particular position in the Red Cross.
SAF  Services to the Armed Forces. When followed by a number (e.g., SAF 116) refers to one in a series of numbered letters of information and instruction distributed by the headquarters SAF office to the area SAF offices.
GI  General Information Letters. These are numbered letters of general instruction to Red Cross management personnel.
NHQ  National Headquarters Letters. Informational letters addressed to national headquarters management by the chairman or Vice-Chairman.
AM  Area Manager Letters. A numbered series of general policy letters distributed to area managers by national headquarters.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY

I, Schuyler Dean Hoslett, was born in Sturgeon Bay, Wisconsin, June 3, 1918. I received my secondary school education in the public schools of that city. My undergraduate training was obtained at Park College, Missouri, from which I was graduated as valedictorian with the degree Bachelor of Arts in 1940. I also attended the University of Cambridge (summer, 1938) and the University of Virginia (summer, 1939). I received the degree Master of Arts from Ohio State University in 1942, where I was a University Scholar, and the degree of Master of Public Administration from Harvard University in 1946, where I was a Littauer Fellow. I was also a University Fellow in Political Science at Ohio State University while completing the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy.