THE WIDER IMPLICATIONS
OF THE REPUBLICAN REVOLUTION IN YEMEN

1962 - 1966

A Thesis

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Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts

by

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During the last years of the Imamate, the Sayyids, those Yemenis in addition to the royal family who provided the leadership and bureaucracy of Yemen, proved themselves incapable of dealing with the problems of a country slowly entering the modern world. Also, they were unwilling to tap the one source which might have helped them -- the few youth who were educated. Over the years, only relatively few Yemenis were permitted to leave Yemen for advanced military or other study abroad. Further, the Sayyids, who traced their lineage back to the Prophet through his grandson, Hussein, ignored the spread of foreign revolutionary ideas within the small Yemeni army that had destroyed army acceptance of old ideas which until then had insured the loyalty of the armed forces. ¹

Between 1954 and 1961, Yemeni army officers were exposed to outside influences. Egyptian officers came to train Yemenis as part of military missions, and a few Yemeni officers were trained in Egypt or Iraq. Also, beginning in 1957, Soviet military technicians began arriving in Yemen to provide maintenance and training for equipment which Crown Prince al-Badr had bought from the Soviet Union. By 1961, there were three to four hundred Yemenis studying in Egyptian secondary schools and over one hundred in Cairo

University, seventy to eighty in European and American schools, about three hundred in Communist bloc countries, and over five hundred in Aden. The new ideas which these people brought with them increasingly helped them to see the ineptness of Sayyid rule. As these young men returned, they expected to find governmental positions in which they could use their newly acquired skills or education. However, the ruling Sayyid oligarchy felt threatened because virtually none of them had any real understanding of modern administrative techniques or were themselves foreign educated. The Sayyids also feared that if old practices were replaced with modern ones, this might lead to their replacement by the foreign-educated youths. In the short range, it is doubtful if these youths could have done a more effective job of governing Yemen than the Sayyids, but they were emotionally prepared for change in Yemen, which they could help to effect. Among those who had received foreign military training, the officers who were trained in Egypt especially favored the complete replacement of the Imamate by a republic like Egypt.²

Twice between World War II and September, 1962, unsuccessful coups occurred in Yemen. In 1948, the assassination of Imam Yehya preceded a coup by business and propertied men desiring more freedom and modernity in Yemen. It failed because the Arab League followed Saudi Arabian King Ibn Saud’s

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² Ibid., p. 354.
view that Crown Prince Ahmed should be recognized as the new Imam. Imam Ahmed, since he owed his throne to conservative support, did little to satisfy the desires of the reformers. Again, in 1955, dissatisfied reformers and military men joined forces to replace Imam Ahmed with one of his brothers, Abdullah, who displayed liberal tendencies. However, due to the efforts of Ahmed's son, Crown Prince Muhammed al-Badr, the Imam was restored to his throne. Shortly after regaining control of Yemen, Imam Ahmed announced the start of a modernization program for the country under al-Badr's direction.3

From 1955 until the Republican Revolution, some changes had come to Yemen. However, they were only a very small beginning. At the time of the revolution, the government was not able to meet common needs satisfactorily. For example, when supplies were needed for the palace or for hospitals, the government commissioned a prominent merchant who imported the necessary goods and extended short-term, high interest credit to the government. In 1961, the government had to call upon a merchant to establish a new Yemeni legation in Aman, Jordan.4 No ministry was capable of providing any public service functions to the people. For instance, four fire engines rotted in Hodeida in the royal warehouse as there were no fire fighting organizations in any towns throughout Yemen.5

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4. Brown, loc. cit., p. 358
5. Ibid.
A further indication of the regimes character could be seen in the economic picture in Yemen. There was just one bank which provided only foreign exchange and limited short term business credit. Yemen was one of the few countries which had no official currency; exchange was by barter or by the old Maria Theresa thaler. To escape the reach of the regime, Yemeni merchants generally kept their money reserves in Aden and conducted their affairs in Britain through the business facilities there.\textsuperscript{6} Commerce generally was more of a drain than a stimulant to the Yemeni economy as the following example should indicate. After the 1955 attempted coup, work was begun on a $1,000,000 textile plant which would have an annual capacity of four million yards. Although completed in 1957, it was never used because exporters feared the loss of personal income if locally produced cotton was processed domestically instead of exported, because they would lose their export business.\textsuperscript{7}

Like wise, agriculture was on the decline at the time of the Republican Revolution, partly because irrigation facilities were diverted from coffee to qat, a narcotic plant, which was immediately profitable because unlike most coffee it was consumed locally and, therefore, it was not subject to export taxation as was coffee. Also, Yemen experienced various

\textsuperscript{6} Ibid., p. 357.\\textsuperscript{7} Ibid.
degrees of drought. And oppressive government administration discouraged agriculture with excessive agriculture taxes, many internal transport taxes, and pier taxes.

Local industry was likewise on the decline. Few wealthy Yemenis were willing to risk money on the primitive handicraft-type industries which were increasingly incapable of competing with foreign products.⁸

To complete the picture of Yemen at the time of the 1962 Revolution, the condition of Yemeni society should be considered. The Sayyids were basically a large secondary branch of the royal Imamic line. They were the fountain of most social values and relationships. The September Revolution would destroy the Sayyids as an important segment of Yemeni society with no other group readily able to take their place. Further, there was a long standing conflict between orthodox Shafi Muslims and Zeidi Muslims, both of whom claimed to have 60% of the population among its membership. The Shafis were located primarily in the southern part of Yemen and the Zeidis in the northern part. The Shafis handled most of Yemen's economic life while the majority of tribal leadership came from the Zeidis. Although many Zeidis were connected with the Sayyid oligarchy, neither they nor the Shafis thought of them as being an actual part of the Sayyid oligarchy. At the time of the revolution, religiously,

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⁸ Ibid., p. 356.
socially, politically, and economically there were potential problems to be encountered when dealing with the total population--Shafi and Zeidi.  

The actual revolution or coup was short in duration, but probably long in plotting, much of which was most certainly done in Aden and in Cairo. The opportunity for the coup was provided when Iman Ahmed died of natural causes and was succeeded by Crown Prince al-Badr, who was considered to be either a liberal, a question mark, or a continuation of the past. In an attempt to win favor with all, al-Badr had promoted a revolutionary of long standing, Abdalla as-Sallal, as Chief of Staff on the day he took the throne. Sallal seemed to be the most likely leader of any revolutionary activities.  

In the "quiet" little revolution in Sanaa, the capital, September 26-27, 1962, the only signs of violence after about ten hours of random rifle and tank fire were some shell holes in the upper stories of the Iman's palace and in the nearby palace of Hussan, his uncle. Reports given out by the Republicans said that the Imam had been killed in the shelling of the palace. However, by the end of October, it was learned that Imam al-Badr had walked out

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of the palace, though wounded, in a guard's uniform and had escaped to the north where he had received help and had begun to rally support.\footnote{13}

Perhaps the most important implication of the revolution for Yemen was the destruction of the Sayyid oligarchy which was composed of about three hundred thousand out of the approximately four and one-half million people in Yemen. Except for the Imam's officials, few were engaged in any gainful activities, and, therefore, lived on doles from the Imam. Their authority rested on their claim of being descendents of the Prophet and from their position as members of the privileged class of the Imamate, which based its right to rule on the sovereignty of God. The army was perhaps the only part of society before the revolution in which Sayyid control did not directly show itself. However, the regular army, the majority of which was stationed in Sanaa, was so small that it was not a significant power in Yemen. Instead, in time of conflict, the Imam relied upon tribal forces almost totally drawn from levies upon his fellow Zeidis of northern Yemen. To keep the Shafis of the south under control and for personal gains, the Zeidi troops generally were ready to follow the Sayyids' bidding.\footnote{14}

Within a few days after the revolution, the Republican government made known its objectives. The Republicans also issued a manifesto in which they explained their reasons for revolution.

Of course, the Republican Revolution did not occur without reaction from the outside world. Particularly those views to be considered here are those of her fellow members of the Muslim-Arab world, especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Federation of South Arabia. Commenting upon the Republican Revolution, the Egyptian magazine, Arab World, echoed the view of the Nasser government when it said:

"That the liberation revolution in the Arab world is inevitable is simple truth. The seeds of freedom have now taken root in the Arabian Peninsula, from here they are bound to sprout in the very stronghold of backwardness in other parts of the Arab World."

15. (1) to end monarchical government and foreign influence; (2) to apply social justice by declaring a republic; (3) to revive Islamic legislative rules; (4) to abolish tribal differences; (5) to organize people and to qualify them to govern their country; (6) to reorganize and modernize the army so that it could prevent any collapse of the country; (7) to introduce social justice in Yemen; (8) to encourage capitalism, but to discourage monopolies; (9) to encourage the return of emigrants to Yemen.

16. "For hundreds of years, Yemenis had been living in abjection under one-man rule, devoid of pity or mercy. "Every Imam whom the people would elevate to the throne would begin by acting as a benevolent prince until he was firmly seated on the throne. Once this was achieved, he would become a tyrant to satisfy his personal will and desires. "Citizens were subjected to terror and had no rights. The Imam and his colleagues lived in modern luxury, while the rest of the Yemenis lived in primitive poverty." London Times. September 29, 1962, p. 8.

Interestingly, Egypt's Information Minister said, "The UAR opposes any interference in Yemen's affairs." 18

Prince Talal, rebel half-brother of King Saud of Saudi Arabia, said, "The success of the revolution in Yemen will have wide repercussions in the whole Arab peninsula, especially in our country." 19 King Saud, on the other hand, denounced the revolution and closed the Yemeni legation in Saudi Arabia to show his antagonism to the Republic. 20

In the South Arabian Federation reactions were opposing. In Aden, political groups like the Peoples' Socialist Party and the Aden Trade Union Congress showed their feelings by supporting a pro-Republican demonstration, September 28, 1962, which called for union of the entire Arab South. 21 Defense Minister of the Federation, the Sultan of Lahej, said, "Our frontiers in the past have been subjected to subversive activities, and we fear once the current regime has been organized, these activities will be increased." 22

With the numerous problems and potential unrest, as discussed above, it probably was inevitable that revolutionary change would come to Yemen. However, the Republican Coup of September 26-27, 1962 did not settle the question of who would direct the modernization and reformation of Yemen. Within two weeks, after the coup, it was clear that the question of leadership of Yemen would be settled by civil war.

19. Ibid., p. 3.
21. Ibid.
Perhaps the one aspect of the Republican Revolution about which the most has been speculated is the actual civil war which the revolution unleashed. Virtually all military actions are claimed or charged with little or no impartial reporting or observation. This war could best be described as guerilla warefare of limited, separate actions. There have been no campaigns or mass battles. The civil war has been primarily composed of claims of success by one side or the other, or charges of one side against the other.

Basically, the Republican-Egyptian forces occupy the main cities and the lowland coastal area, and the Royalists control the highlands. In all of Yemen's history, no opponent has successfully driven the Yemenis out of the mountains. Most of the Royalists' forces and supplies are in caves. It is doubtful if Egypt has enough bombs to reduce the mountains to rubble. As long as they can secure supplies, the Royalists should be able to hold their positions.23

A major factor in the Yemeni civil war has been the participation of Egypt on the side of the Republicans. Egyptian intervention began very soon after the revolution, if not before, when within a week of the coup, three to five thousand troops were on route to Yemen via the Red Sea. On November 10, 1962, formal sanction was given to the presence of Egyptian troops in Yemen by a mutual defense treaty between the two governments.24


The magazine, New Outlook, properly evaluated the situation of the Republicans in the early weeks of the civil war, as well as later, when it stated that the revolutionary junta stood no chance against the Royalists and their tribal armies and outside support without Egyptian help. Cairo certainly must regard its intervention as an investment toward overthrowing the rulers of Saudi Arabia, the Gulf Principalities and the South Arabian Federation sheikhdoms.

However, the reason which Sallal and the other Republicans gave for Egyptian assistance was, "If Saud and Hussein are enlisting British and American support, aren't we entitled to seek support from our biggest sister, the UAR?" Also as early as October, Sallal's long range plans for Yemen were reported by Cairo as being a "union of Egypt and Yemen which is inevitable since Yemen cannot face foreign and domestic problems alone if we are to get rid of effects of centuries of underdevelopment and raise standards in all fields."

November 16, 1962, Husainan Haykal, editor of the semi-official newspaper of the Nasser government, Al-Ahram, explained what Egypt was doing in Yemen:

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First, Egypt went to Yemen not to fight but to prevent a war. Secondly, it is the duty of all those who believe in Arab national revival and in the rights of the Arabs to revolt, to help the Yemenites to regain their victory. Thirdly, the victory of the revolution in Yemen is the high road towards Palestine, indeed, victories of revolution in Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, and in other countries where reaction dominates, will be high signs on the road to victory in Palestine.27

In 1965, Egypt introduced a new military strategy in Yemen, perhaps in hopes of hastening the conclusion of the civil war. While visiting the troops in northern Yemen during August, Field Marshal Abd al-Hakin Amer, explained the new strategy. He said that Egyptian troops were being concentrated in strategic positions so each battle area can be completely self-reliant and capable of carrying out operations against the enemy. This would mean that Egyptian troops would be safe against surprise attack from any attempt by the Royalists to induce tribesmen to attack the Egyptians by offering arms and money. Yemeni troops and tribesmen would protect the remaining Republican territory.28

Several times during 1963-1966, President Nasser spoke out on reasons for the Egyptian part in the war in Yemen. On April 22, 1963, he said, "The heroic and victorious battle which the UAR forces waged in Yemen side by side with revolutionary Yemeni Republicans was a decisive turning point in the fierce war of the whole Arab nation against imperialism and reaction."29

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To the first troops returning from Yemen, May, 1963,

Nasser said,

For the first time, an entire army goes to a
distant land not as a conqueror or invader or colonist.
For the first time, the army of a small nation goes
thousands of miles away from its homeland to an area
surrounded on all sides by the influence and vital
interests of imperialist forces. The Yemeni revolution
was bloodless, followed by complete calm, showing
its popularity and the fact that it was the realization
of the will of the Yemeni people. Ten days later,
firing began on the northeast frontier and mercenary
armies led by remnants of the Hamidul Din Family pounced
on the revolution aiming not only to destroy the
revolution, but also any chance for life in Yemeni
territory.30

Before the Palestine National Congress, May 31, 1965,

Nasser said of the civil war,

There were contradictions, problems, and lack
of confidence between Arab forces. There is a war
between Arab states in Yemen. There is a conflict
between Yemen and the United Arab Republic, on the one
hand, and Saudi Arabia and the British on the other....
The UAR went to Yemen not to colonize Yemen. They
said Nasser wants to dominate Arabia and take its oil.
But is there oil in Yemen? Yemen has no oil or water....
Is it conceivable that I should attack Israel while
there are 50,000 (UAR) troops in Yemen? When we sent
our forces to Yemen, we had to build up modern forces
in order to defend borders.31

Part of Nasser's speech at a mass rally to celebrate
the thirteenth anniversary of the Egyptian Revolution in
Cairo, July 22, 1965, touched on the Yemeni situation:

The Yemeni revolution, when it happened, was a
turning point. Naturally it faced problems from the
first day because it met with external aggression,
both British and Saudi. The Saudis supported the

30. Mideast Mirror, "Abdel-Nasser Condemns Deviation".
31. Mideast Mirror, "Nasser Speaks About Arab Dissension".
June 5, 1965, pp. 3-5.
Royalists and that is why we sent forces....We have problems--two problems. The first is mercenaries. There are documents which show that the British have taken part. Today there are talks with Saudi Arabia to have peace with Saudi Arabia. The second problem is among the Republicans, themselves. I have told them there must be national unity in Yemen. There is no national unity and if they do not appreciate the responsibility fully, the republic cannot be strong. Concerning the war, we want peace. If they want peace, we can all have it; otherwise we cannot remain patient, and we will liquidate the bases of aggression. The situation would then develop into a clash with Saudi Arabia. We extend our hand for peace, and we have a plan to withdraw from Yemen in six months or even less if we achieve peace there. It is unfortunate that Egyptians and Saudi Arabians face each other to kill one another. We have been patient for two and a half years, but we cannot be patient any longer.32

Before a mass rally at Suez after the opening of industrial projects in 1966, Nasser spoke about Egyptian commitments to the Republicans and of the 1965 Jeddah Agreement with Saudi Arabia on the Yemeni civil war. He again made it clear that Egypt would stay in Yemen until the Republican government was strong enough to defend itself. On the Jeddah agreement, he said that he had not been much in favor of it. The Saudis had fancied that Egyptian forces would be withdrawn leaving Yemen on its own, and then the Saudis would be free to do whatever they wanted in Yemen. However, Egypt had and would stand by her commitment to the Yemeni Revolution. He restated old threats of retaliation upon Saudi Arabia if she interfered in Yemen.33


The chief outside supporter of the Royalists is Saudi Arabia. However, her support has not been of the size and type which Egypt has given to the Republicans. At a press conference in Beirut shortly after the coup, Prince Feisal, acting prime minister, expressed his country's views on the Yemeni situation. He said that he hoped that all Arabs would not interfere in Yemen, but let the Yemenis settle their own problems. He said that as far as he knew, Saudi Arabia was not supplying the Imam with arms or men. To substantiate this statement in part, the London Times reported in November, 1962, that Saudi Arabia was unwilling or unable to give the Royalists the men and help they needed.

A part of the Yemeni conflict, and at times more active than the Royalist-Republican clashes, has been the troubles on Yemen's borders with her neighbors—the Federation of South Arabia and with Saudi Arabia. Border troubles with the Federation are not a new experience for Yemen. Depending upon the viewpoint of the Yemeni government, of the western protectorate states, and, especially Aden, were either virtually integral parts of Yemen or hostile neighbors. Since the September coup, there has been a continuation of incidents and charges along this large ill-defined border. The border situation is complicated because of the presence of Britain in the role of administrator of the Protectorate. Britain never has recognized

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the Republican government. The Yemeni-Saudi border by comparison has been much more quiet both before and since the coup, although not totally without incidents.36 Even before 1962 ended, there were some efforts to bring the war to a close. However, more serious, concentrated efforts began during 1964 and continued into 1966. In these years, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and other countries made attempts to settle the problem.

In hopes of scoring a psychological advantage before the scheduled Arab Summit Conference in September, 1964, Nasser tried to end the Yemeni civil war but was unsuccessful in working out a settlement with Saudi Arabia.37 About a year later, August, 1965, Egypt again tried to pave the way for peace efforts, this time because of a belief that the situation with Israel was becoming more serious, and, therefore, the main focus of Arab attention should be toward that area.38 A third evidence of Egypt's apparent desire for peace came in a brief statement by Nasser late in 1965 of

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37. Mideast Mirror, "Egyptian Leaders on 4-Day Visit to Yemen". August 29, 1964, p.4.
of support for the persistent Republican efforts to find a peaceful solution to their difficulties and of threatened Egyptian retaliation toward the Royalists if they resumed the fighting. 39

Saudi Arabia also made separate efforts to find a solution to the Yemeni conflict. On November 13, 1962, the Saudi government used Mecca Radio to introduce a three-point proposal for settling the Yemeni civil war. First, it proposed evacuation of all foreign forces, arms, and equipment from Yemen as soon as possible. Second, it suggested withdrawal of foreign troops to be carried out under unbiased, neutral supervision. Third, it recommended that after these troops were withdrawn, there would be no direct or indirect intervention from any source. 40 Again, in January, 1963, the Saudi government proposed, this time through the Arab League, that a peaceful settlement be reached in the Yemeni conflict to avoid widening Arab differences and to stop bloodshed. A settlement should be reached and implemented through international supervision but not by interference with the Yemenis themselves. 41 On the anniversary of his ascension to the

the throne, November 12, 1963, King Saud reasserted his country's position on peace efforts in the Yemeni civil war:

Last year we sought to stop bloodshed between brothers in Yemen. We avoided interference in Yemeni affairs and insisted on the need to stop all outside interference. Parts of our country were subjected to aggression because of our attitude. Further, we had followed a disengagement agreement with Egypt which was not respected by the other side. 42 Whatever the true facts of the role of Saudi Arabia in Yemen since the coup, there was considerable belief that Saudi help was a major factor in the continued existence of the Royalists' forces, and that this help was designed to increase the Saudi role in Yemeni affairs. To clearly state the position of his government, the Saudi Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sayed Oman al-Sagqaf, said on March 30, 1964, "We consider it as one of our most sacred duties to protect Yemen against maneuvers of imperialism. The Saudi government has no ambitions in Yemen whatsoever. All we want is to give the Yemeni people the opportunity to realize self-determination of their own free will." 43 During 1965-1966, much of King Feisal's efforts in foreign affairs were directed toward ending the "tragedy in Yemen" as he termed the situation there. 44 On June 20, 1965, Feisal said that he was ready to receive a

42. Mideast Mirror, "Decline in Inter-Arab Relations". November 15, 1963, p. 17.
43. Mideast Mirror, "Feisal Not Keen to Become a King". April 4, 1964, p. 4.
"popular Yemeni delegation representing all factions" to discuss the Yemeni situation.\footnote{45} He asserted, June 28, 1965, that Saudi Arabia's role was that of a mediator in the Yemeni conflict and that any settlement must have the approval of the Yemeni people. "It is not our right to dictate settlements not acceptable to the Yemeni people. But as mediators we are entitled to present solutions and the Yemeni people are free to present solutions and the Yemeni people are free to accept or reject these solutions."\footnote{46} At a press conference, September 1, 1965, Feisal said that his country never would have interfered in Yemen if it had not been forced "to defend itself against foreign threats" and Sallal's threats to overthrow the Saudi monarchy. Even so, Saudi aid to the Royalists had been restricted to military equipment and money in relatively small amounts when compared to the vast amount of Egyptian aid to the Republicans.\footnote{47} At the time of Kuwaiti mediation efforts, 1966, Feisal told a Kuwaiti interviewer, November 2, 1966:

We have often asked the Royalists in Yemen to restrain themselves. At the same time, we ourselves did not answer provocations in order to create a favorable atmosphere for mediation by our brothers in Kuwait in the hope that it would succeed. But Royalists in Yemen might not be able to restrain themselves much longer. We can pacify those who live amongst us for some time, but we cannot restrain the Royalists who are living in their own country.\footnote{48}

\footnote{46. Mideast Mirror. "King Feisal on Yemen Peace Moves". July 3, 1965, p. 11.}
\footnote{47. Mideast Mirror. "Feisal Not in Favor of Imam's Return". September 4, 1965, p. 14.}
\footnote{48. Mideast Mirror, "Yemeni Problem Seen As Threat to Arab Understanding". November 5, 1966, p. 5.}
For most of the time since the civil war began, the Republicans and the Royalists have seemed to concentrate more upon resolving their conflicts by fighting instead of by talking. However, during 1964, they did make some efforts to get together for a peace conference even though the meeting never took place. In February, both sides quite accurately expressed their appraisal of the situation. Sallal said that the purpose of the revolution had been to "settle accounts" with remnants of the old regime, that the revolution had come about in order to protect the Yemeni society and the individual, and that the Republicans "must settle accounts with the minority and inflict severe punishment on them". The Royalists' views were expressed during a February 20 London press conference by Prince Salif al-Islam Abdel-Rahman Ibn Yahya, an uncle of the Imam, when he said that the Royalists would "never accept compromise until the last Egyptian soldiers leave Yemen." Republican Deputy Prime Minister, Muhammed Mahmoud Zukiri, replied to this Royalist condition in November, "They will not leave unless the people ask them to and until a proper Yemen army has been built to defend the country." By October, there were definite plans to have a Royalist-Republic conference as soon as the place and the choice of delegates could be agreed upon. The difficulties among the Yemenis were not

Page 21 does not exist
solely between Republicans and Royalists but also among the Republicans. While on their way to Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a group of sixty dissident Republicans, including top officials and tribal leaders, stopped in Aden and expressed their views on the proposed conference, December 8. It was their view that the conference could not achieve any desired result unless the people were properly represented, because most of the Yemenis scheduled to be at the conference were not really aware of the conditions in Yemen. This was the situation primarily because the leaders of Yemen "deserted the people, considering it a mere flock of sheep." Further, these Republicans said that those who were given the responsibility of conducting the war for the Republic had exploited the situation in Yemen from the very beginning and were misdirecting the revolution and the war. Though some sources, especially non-Yemeni ones, spoke confidently about the proposed conference, Republicans and Royalists continued to raise doubts about the conference. The Royalists insisted upon being represented by members of the Hamid al-Din family, but the Republicans and their backers, the Egyptians, said that they would not sit at the conference table with any of the Imam's relative. Although the Royalists appeared willing to be a party to some form of coalition govern-

52. Mideast Mirror, "Greenwood Ends His Visit to Aden". December 12, 1964, p. 5.
ment, the Republicans insisted upon a republican form of
government from which all Royalists would be excluded.
With unyielding views, there was little chance for the
proposed conference to come into existence, at least
in 1964.

Even though the two leading protagonists were unable
to settle their problems peacefully, various outside
countries—Syria, the United States, Jordan, Algeria,
Kuwait, and Sudan—beginning soon after the coup, tried
to mediate the problem.

The Baath Party of Syria (an opponent of Nasser) on
October 23, 1962, proposed that Egyptian and Saudi forces
should stay out of the Yemeni conflict so they would not
be drawn away from Palestine.  

In December, 1962, the United States proposed that to
make talks possible Saudi Arabia should withdraw her troops
from the Yemeni border and her support from the Imam,
while the United Arab Republic should declare that she
had no aggressive intentions toward her neighbors and that
she would leave Yemen as soon as she was sure that the Yemeni
frontiers were secured.  

While Jordan initially supplied a degree of material
support to the Royalists, she soon abandoned this course.

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54. *Mideast Mirror*, "Jordanian Support for Yemeni
55. *Mideast Mirror*, "Sallal Claims Opposition Wiped
Out in Yemen". December 8, 1962, p. 5.
However, she did make several efforts to bring about mediation of the conflict. In September, 1964, while at the Alexandria Conference of heads of state of the Arab League countries, King Hussein tried to improve relations between Egypt and Saudi Arabia by bringing about private talks between Nasser and Feisal as a preliminary step toward ending the civil war.\footnote{MidEast Mirror, "No Solution Found to Yemen Issue". September 12, 1964, p. 4.} Hussein continued his efforts which bore fruit in a peace plan that was submitted to those involved in June, 1965. The Jordanian plan included the following suggestions "to start an effective dialogue leading to a partial agreement... their dialogue can be resumed to achieve a basis for conciliation, putting an end to the entire dispute." At the present time Zionism "is much more dangerous and more pressing a threat than fighting between brothers in Yemen." The dialogue should attempt to preserve the dignity of all parties concerned, to avoid sacrifices in Yemen having been in vain, and to ensure Yemeni progress and development with collective Arab protection and financing. A small pan-Arabic force should be formed by the Arab League to preserve peace in Yemen. When it was formed, all other non-Yemeni forces should withdraw from Yemen, and aid to either side should stop. The development of Yemen should be undertaken by an administration which contained Royalist and Republican representatives and was headed by a neutralist acceptable to both sides. After an undefined period of time, the Yemenis
would decide for themselves what form of government they would want to have. 57

In June, 1965, a special Algerian envoy visited such Arab capitals as Cairo, Baghdad, and Kuwait in hopes of promoting Algeria as a mediator in the Yemeni conflict. Nothing concrete for Yemen developed from these efforts. 58

During 1965 and 1966, Kuwait expended considerable effort on attempted mediation of the Yemeni conflict because, as a source close to the Amir said, Kuwait had good relations with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia. 59 Kuwait's mediation efforts began with a high-level visit of a delegation headed by Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Sheikh Sabbah al-Salem al-Sabbah, to Riyadh during June, 1965. 60 As a result of this visit, Feisal agreed to receive a Yemeni delegation representing popular groups to discuss various viewpoints on Yemen. 61 In November, the Crown Prince became the Amir and, as such, continued to follow his father's policy of attempting to mediate the Yemeni conflict. 62 After visits by the Amir to Saudi Arabia and Egypt in April, 1966, word circulated that a

Kuwaiti mediation proposal yet to be announced was satisfactory to both the Egyptians and the Saudis. By August, progress had been made to the point that Nasser agreed to accept the idea of calling the transistional Yemeni government "The State of Yemen" instead of the present name of "The Republic of Yemen". In September, the specifics of the Kuwaiti proposal became public. Egyptian troops would leave in nine months to be replaced by a force of neutral troops—one thousand each from Kuwait, Libya, and the Sudan. Then would follow a transitional period of unspecified length. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would withdraw their recognition of the Royalist and the Republican governments. A Yemeni ruling body during this period would be composed of two fifths Republicans, two fifths Royalists, one fifth neutrals. The Republican government was very much opposed to Kuwait's plan and made every effort to convince Egypt that it was doomed to failure. Deputy Premier, Abdullah Guzelian, was dispatched to Cairo to try to get a full mandate from Egypt affirming that the Republican government was the only side which would be represented in mediation efforts. Further, he attempted to secure adequate guarantees that Egypt would not abandon the Republican government in talks or that Egyptian troops would not leave Yemen. With such conditions, Kuwait's efforts at mediation did not bring success.

64. Mideast Mirror, "UAR and Saudi Officials to Meet in Kuwait Soon". August 6, 1966, p. 10.
66. Ibid.
The final attempted mediator of the Yemen conflict was the Sudan, later in December, 1966. A Saudi delegation was persuaded to go to Khartoum to meet with the Egyptians at some undetermined time. The plan was practically the same as the Kuwaiti plan except that it called for the exclusion of members of the royal family from Yemen and for the Yemenis to decide by plebiscite what the form of their future government would be.

While most efforts to bring about peace in the Yemeni conflict did not get out of the planning stage, there were several peace attempts which got as far as the conference and agreement stages.

Republicans, Royalists, and "Third Force" delegates met at Taef, Saudi Arabia, during August, 1965, to try to solve their country's problems. They called for the establishment of an "Islamic" state and a transitional period at the end of which the Yemenis would decide their permanent form of government by plebiscite. One immediate objective of the delegates was to form a national united front to oppose the "Egyptian-supported puppet government in Sanaa", and to get the Egyptians out of Yemen by whatever means would be necessary. In the line of positive accomplishments, a presidency council was formed which would elect a consultative council that in turn would run Yemen during the transitional

period. The official Republican reaction to the conference fairly well doomed it to failure. In a statement broadcast by Sanaa Radio, August 15, the Republican government said that the Taef meeting showed Saudi Arabia's persistent aggression and subversion against the Yemeni revolution, and accused the "so-called dissident Republicans" of treachery by contacting Royalists and going over to the "fold of colonialism and Saudi Arabia."

The most significant meeting between Egypt and Saudi Arabia concerning Yemen was in August, 1965, at the Saudi Red Sea port city of Jeddah. A preliminary meeting took place in Alexandria, Egypt, between Sallal and Nasser, August 18. Virtually up to the opening of the Jeddah meeting, August 23, there were only high hopes that it would occur. Although Egyptian-Saudi relations were at "an all-time low", the Jeddah meeting produced a signed agreement on Yemen, August 24.

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74. Ibid.
An immediate ceasefire went into effect that day. Four days later, the Egyptian paper, Al-Ahram, reported that the Jeddah

76. Text of the Jeddah Agreement: (1) Giving to the Yemeni people the right to decide and affirm their view to the kind of government they want in a popular plebiscite at the date not later than November 23, 1966.
(2) Considering the period up to the date of the plebiscite a transitional period in which to prepare for the plebiscite.
(3) Saudi Arabia and the UAR will cooperate in forming a transitional conference of 50 members representing all of the national forces and people of authority in Yemen, after consultation with the various Yemeni groups in accordance with the agreement to be reached. The conference will meet at Haradh on November 23, 1965.
(a) Determination of the system of government during the transitional period and until the popular plebiscite is held.
(b) Formation of a provisional cabinet to be in charge of the government during the transitional period.
(c) Determination of the form and kind of the plebiscite which will be held by November 23, 1966, at the latest.
(4) The two governments adopt the resolutions of the above-mentioned transitional Yemeni conference, support them, and cooperate to ensure their successful implementation. They declare from now on their acceptance of a joint neutral follow-up committee of both, to be in charge of the plebiscite should the conference decide on the need of the presence of such a neutral committee.
(5) Saudi Arabia will immediately stop military aid of all kinds and the use of Saudi Arabian territory for operations against Yemen.
(6) The UAR will withdraw all of its military forces from Yemen within 10 months beginning on November 23, 1965.
(7) Fighting in Yemen will be stopped immediately and a joint peace commission from both sides will be formed to: (a) Supervise the ceasefire through a special supervisory commission. 
(b) Supervise the frontier and ports and stop all kinds of military aid. The said supervisory commission will be entitled to use all the necessary travel facilities within Yemeni territory as well as to use Saudi Arabian territory, if necessary.
(8) Saudi Arabia and Egypt will cooperate and act positively to ensure the carrying out of this agreement and impose stability in Yemen until the proclamation of the result of the plebiscite, by forming a force of the two countries to be used by the commission when necessary to prevent any departure from this agreement or any action to obstruct it or provoke disorder against its success.
(9) In order to promote cooperation between the UAR and Saudi Arabia and enable the cooperation to continue beyond the present phase to the normal phase which should prevail in relations between two countries, there will be direct contact between President Abdel-Nasser and King Feisal to avoid any difficulties in the way of carrying out this agreement.

Agreement was signed just in time to stop an assault of sixty thousand to seventy thousand Egyptian troops on Yemen on September 7, 1965. 77

Of the ceasefire, Prince Abdel Rahman, uncle of the Iman, said, "If Egyptian troops observe the ceasefire, there is real hope that this is the beginning of peace in Yemen." 78

As the Yemen civil war was one of the biggest events occurring in the Arab world in the first half of the 1960's, there was widespread interest expressed in the Jeddah Agreement. The Royalists, who remained discreetly in the background during the meeting, regarded the proposed Haradh Conference as a test of good faith. They planned to insist upon equal representation at that conference and upon places in the transitional government for members of the royal family, but not for Imam Muhammed. Some Royalists expressed surprise that the period of withdrawal of Egyptian troops would be ten months and not a maximum of six which Nasser had said in a July 29, 1965, speech was all the time that would be necessary for evacuation of the troops. (The extra four months were added to give the Egyptians time to recover all their arms and equipment from the battle areas.) 79 The Republican government said the people favored the agreement except that many called for preservation of the republican form of government at all costs. The dissident Republicans favored withdrawal

79. Ibid.
of the Egyptian troops as well as elimination of all of the royal family and of the Sallal government from the future new Yemeni government.

Characteristically, Cairo hailed Nasser as "the hero of peace". The Egyptian press said the ceasefire gave the United Arab Republic a chance to get on with opposing "the common enemy, Israel." Mecca Radio hailed the agreement as a "historic moment in the history of the Arabs." The semi-official Syrian paper, Al-Thawra, attacked Nasser, accusing him of "liquidating the Arab revolution, particularly the Yemeni Revolution." Al-Baath, the official paper of the Baath Party which at this time was in control of the Syrian government, said of the Jeddah Agreement:

The most prominent feature of the Jeddah meeting and agreement was the absence of the real representatives of the Yemeni people, and the planning, outside Yemen, of the future of the revolution of the Yemeni republic in a vague manner surrounded by queries and threats.

The Jordanians praised the part of the agreement "which aimed at respecting the wishes of the Yemeni people" and added that "while we consider it a great gain for the Arab nation, the agreement is an even greater one for our brother Yemeni people." "An historic omen for the Arab nation which

82. Mideast Mirror, August 28, 1965, p. 4.
which has known its course and followed it, leaving behind all disagreements and relapses", was the response to the agreement by Iraq. Sudan Radio said, "The aim of President Nasser and King Feisal is to enable the free will of the Yemeni people to serve their great aspiration." The London Economist expressed the general British view that the agreement appeared to be the result of compromise on both sides.  

84. Ibid.
85. Middle East Mirror, August 28, 1965, pp. 3-4
Page 33 does not exist
By September, repatriation of prisoners was under way with the assistance of the International Red Cross. Because of the great distances to be covered with the primitive communications and roads, repatriation was expected to take at least until the end of the year. 86

The first meeting of the Joint Peace Committee, under Saudi-Egyptian leadership, began in Sanaa, September 11. The functions of the committee included (1) to observe the application of the ceasefire; (2) to stop further military aid coming into Yemen; (3) to "enforce" stability in Yemen; (4) to secure total implementation of the military aspects of the agreement; (5) to protect the fifty-man national Yemeni conference of Republicans and Royalists scheduled to meet in Haradh (northwest Yemen), November 23; (6) to distribute food supplies throughout Yemen. 87 The committee members had jurisdiction to enter all parts of Yemen and to cross into Saudi territory, if necessary. 88 The first report of the joint committee, October 3, stated that the Jeddah Agreement was being implemented to the letter, including no exchange of fire, at least in the eight sectors under observation. 89 A further, and last, report on October 31, stated that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia were in agreement on measures to convene the Haradh Conference, November 23. 90

86. Mideast Mirror, "8 Commands Created in Yemen". September 25, 1965, p. 16.
88. Ibid.
90. Mideast Mirror, "74 Die in Cairo Bus Tragedy" November 6, 1965, p. 16.
Early in September, work began on selecting delegates for the proposed November Haradh Conference. The Royalists met late in the month at Jauf (eastern Yemen) to select their twenty-five delegates. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Said al-Islam al-Hassan, the delegates chosen included two royal princes, senior army officers, members of the Imam's government, tribal sheikhs, and religious leaders. During a meeting called by Ahmad Muhammed Noman at Janad (15 miles from Taiz), October 20 and 21, a committee of nine Republicans was chosen to select the twenty-five Republican delegates to the Haradh Conference. A resolution was passed which emphasized that the Republicans were opposed to the return of the royal family to Yemen. Ibrahim al-Wazir, president of the United Popular Forces of Yemen, appealed to Royalists and Republicans to make no "provocative" statements before the conference. Up until a week before the conference, the Royalists had not decided whether any of the royal family would be in Haradh. However, Royalist Information Minister, Hasham al-Hashem, said that if none of the royal family attended the conference, "it will be due to political reasons and concerns of the Royalists themselves."

91. Mideast Mirror, "Yemeni Royalists Name Haradh Delegates". October 2, 1965, p. 11.
Perhaps, surprisingly, the conference began somewhat optimistically and on time. By November 26, delegates reported that they were half way to success. As one delegate put it, "a broth is being cooked and a delicious dish will be presented." 95 However, as the conference progressed, the delegates could reach no common ground on the main points of discussion including formation of the transitional government and interpretation of the Jeddah Agreement. The only thing which the delegates were able to agree upon was the formation of a twenty-man subcommittee representing both sides. However it never got into the functioning stage. On December 24, the conference became deadlocked and was indefinitely postponed. 96

Over Mecca Radio that day, the Royalists said that they were forced to quit the conference "in view of the departure of most of the members of the Republican delegation". They accused the Republicans of putting up obstacles in the path of a successful conference. 97 On the day of the postponement, both sides gave their views

on when the conference would reconvene. Qadhi Abdel-Rahman al-Iryani, head of the Republican delegation, said that talks should resume on or before February 20, 1966. The Royalists said that talks would begin only after they had gotten further interpretations of the Jeddah Agreement from both Saudi Arabia and Egypt. There was some speculation that if the meeting reconvened, it might be in a neutral country, probably the Sudan or Ethiopia.98

At a press conference in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, January 2, 1966, Ahmen Mohammed al-Shami, foreign minister and head of the Royalists' Haradh Conference delegation; Muhammed al-Wazir, information minister and conference delegate, and Prince Abdel-Rahman Ben Yehia, deputy prime minister, discussed the Yemeni situation. Shami, in answer to Republican charges made, December 29, 1965, by Iryani said that instead of interfering at Haradh, Saudi Arabia always championed the right of Yemeni self-determination. The Royalists turned down Republican offers to have a part in the transitional government because, "They offered us a share in a regime they did

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not own." The Royalists also turned down the Republican offers for an immediate plebiscite since there seemed no point in holding one while Egyptian troops remained in Yemen. Shami claimed that a Republican delegation had gone to Peking to ask the Chinese for help if Egyptians left Yemen. Wazir said that he had evidence proving the secret landing of six thousand Egyptian troops on a beach north of Haradh (Turba) during the conference as well as the arrival in Yemen of two shipments of Russian arms and one of Chinese arms. Further he charged that if Nasser had insisted upon a settlement, the Republicans would have produced one"...because they have nothing to say. They are just employees. 100

In signing the Jeddah Agreement, Nasser had gotten only time. Royalists, Wazir said, were generally of the opinion that if Nasser withdrew from Yemen, the leading role in the Middle East would fall to Feisal. Yehia, in his remarks, said that the proof that the Royalists had come to Haradh in good faith was that no member of the royal family attended the conference. The Royalists’ interpretation of the Jeddah Agreement on the transitional government had been that it would be neither Royalist or Republican. However, the Republicans began to insist

that the transitional government had to be Republican. Yehia said that there was evidence that the Republican delegates had been threatened with death if they did not follow Sanaa's orders for insistence upon a Republican government for the transitional period. 101

In Cairo, on March 11, 1966, Iryani expressed Republican views on the conference. "We are prepared to attend a second conference at any time" and to discuss a coordination plan to confront "imperialist, reactionary conspiracies. These conspiracies aim at undermining the Yemeni revolution." Yemen, he said, stood by the Republican government and a boycott of the family of the Imam. 102

In February, 1966, both Feisal and Nasser also expressed their views on the condition of the peace agreement. Feisal expressed the belief that Egypt would not wish renewal of the war in Yemen. He said that he would not get into specifics on the agreement until he received replies on Egypt's interpretation of the agreement. "We stopped aid to the Royalists and Cairo should have started withdrawing its forces from the beginning of the Farah Conference, according to provisions of the agreement. The differences which have developed between Royalists and Republicans do not justify Cairo's maintenance of its

forces there. Because of the possibility that it might cause the resumption of fighting in Yemen, Feisal said he would not say that the Haradh Conference had failed. Although the conference had not reconvened on February 20 as had been speculated, private, informal talks were continuing which would require only a brief, formal, public meeting to bring fruitful results. The Saudi government was trying to convince the Royalists to avoid resorting to arms even if provoked. The following day, February 21, Nasser replied to Feisal. He charged that Feisal had overlooked a provision in the Jeddah Agreement which stipulated that Egyptian troops would leave Yemen only when a provisional government had been formed. Until that condition was met, the troops would remain even if it took years.

Early in April, it looked perhaps as if there was a chance for resumption of the Haradh Conference. The Saudi and Egyptian governments asked the Joint Peace Commission to make preparations for a second round of Haradh talks to begin as soon as possible. These talks had not begun by the end of 1966.

104. Ibid. p. 8.
105. Ibid.
The causes and events of the Republican Revolution, the resulting fighting, and the prime peace efforts, 1962–1966, have been examined. However, to be able to evaluate properly the implications of the revolution, closer consideration should be given to the four principal countries involved—Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and the South Arabian Federation—within the context of the revolution. Internal factors, as well as external relations, of all four which are of possible importance to the Republican Revolution should be examined.

There are several important basic internal factors which are useful in accessing Saudi Arabia's capacity to continue involvement in the Yemeni conflict. Saudi Arabia's estimated four to seven million people (sixty-six per cent bedouin nomads, twelve per cent farmers, twenty-two per cent city dwellers) live in a country of about one million four hundred ninty-six thousand six hundred ninty square miles, most of which is desert. The Saudi budgets, 1962–1966, while indicating an overall increase, do not show increasingly large defense budgets.

108. Saudi Budgets—1962: $446,000,000 total, with no defense allocation but $55,733,000 for the privy purse and the private treasury. 1963: $545,000,000 total, with $291,200,000 for defense. 1964: total—$597,000,000; defense—$480,000,000. 1965: total—$692,000,000; defense—$231,100,000. 1966: total—$1,100,000,000; defense—$252,000,000.
Internal politics have been as much of a threat to the Saudi monarchy's role in the Yemeni conflict as have external troubles with countries such as Egypt. Late in December, 1963, reports coming out of Saudi Arabia alleged a rift between King Saud and his most prominent half-brother, the prime minister, Feisal.\textsuperscript{109} In March, 1964, the rift became more open when Saud sent a letter to Feisal asking him to resign as Prime Minister. Saud said that he felt his health was at its best and wanted to handle the functions of prime minister as well as those of sovereign. Feisal was able to rally sufficient princely and religious support to keep the status quo, with his position perhaps becoming stronger than before.\textsuperscript{110} On March 30, Feisal was made solely responsible for all internal and external affairs of Saudi Arabia. Further, he was made regent. Then, November 2, the Council of Ministers and the Consulative Assembly, acting upon a letter from the royal family and the Ulema, decided to depose Saud and to elevate Feisal to his position as sovereign.\textsuperscript{111} This action seems to have brought more progressive leadership to Saudi Arabia without the necessity of a revolution.

For Saudi Arabia, relations with Egypt in this decade are perhaps as crucial as any of her foreign relations. With Nasser determined to replace all Arab monarchies with

\textsuperscript{110} Mideast Mirror, "Feisal Regent in Saudi Arabia". April 4, 1964, pp. 2-3.
\textsuperscript{111} Mideast Mirror, "New King Proclaimed in Saudi Arabia." November 7, 1964, pp. 2-3.
republics, Saudi Arabia has had a difficult course to follow. However, trouble between these two countries is not new. For example, as a result of the Egyptian government's refusal to recognize Ibn Saud after his conquest of the Hijaz, conflict resulted in 1926, with some Egyptian pilgrims. Later, in 1955, trouble threatened until a plot by Egyptian trained officers to overthrow the Saudi regime was stopped. 112

Relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt hit a new low in November, 1962. Two Saudi villages near the Yemeni border were bombed by Egyptian planes and coastal areas were shelled from the sea by Egyptian destroyers. As a result, Saudi Arabia announced on November 6 that it was breaking relations with the United Arab Republic. The Crown Prince, Feisal, said that Saudis long had been subject to verbal attacks, but by these air attacks, "Egypt violated all principles and conventions and basic principles by killing innocent children, women, and old people....These acts have abolished all hope and understanding and this has caused the Saudi Arabian government to sever diplomatic relations with the Cairo government. 113 Egypt's reaction to the break with Saudi Arabia was to label it a "nervous act" taken to "cover up defects inflicted

112. Lipsky, George A., Saudi Arabia. New Haven, Conn., P. 142
on the mercenaries of King Saud." Further, the Saudi break in relations was labeled an expression of a grudge against Egypt. To break relations would not solve the Saudis' difficulties, or "convert defeats into victories" by broadcasting word of "imaginary battles and imaginary victories which were so completely unfounded that they didn't need any answer.  

Also, to protect herself from what she said were continuing attacks by the United Arab Republic, Saudi Arabia declared a general mobilization against Egypt, January 3, 1963. Feisal, who ordered the mobilization, said that it was necessary to maintain Saudi Arabia's internal and external security. Even though no Egyptian invasion of Saudi soil occurred, it is not inconceivable that Nasser would engage in such an activity if the situation seemed favorable for its success.

Although tension between the Saudis and the Egyptians continued at a high level, relations were resumed, February 4, 1964, and ambassadors were exchanged in June.  

The Saudis said that they resumed relations with Egypt because they had no ambitions in Yemen and were ready to solve all their outstanding problems with the United Arab Republic in the spirit of Arab brotherhood.  

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114. Ibid. p. 4.  
of diplomatic relations, Saudi Arabia and Egypt began to work on one of their problems—Yemen. In private talks during the September, 1964, Arab Summit Conference in Alexandria, Feisal and Nasser agreed to cooperate to try to settle the civil war even though Saudi Arabia still did not recognize the Yemeni Republic.118

Whether real or imaginary, Saudi Arabia continued to charge from time to time that she was in danger of attack by Egypt. In August, 1965, the Saudi government warned the United Arab Republic against attacking any part of Saudi soil. The fact that large numbers of tanks and artillery recently had been delivered to the area near the Saudi-Yemeni border was given as proof of its allegations.119 At the same time, efforts toward Saudi-Egyptian cooperation on Yemen continued. The Saudi ambassador to Egypt, who was shuttling back and forth between Riyadh and Cairo trying to better relations, said, August 18". We have been using a different approach. Our idea is to rebuild relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt and put them on a more frank and solid basis which ultimately will reflect on subsidiary problems (Yemen).120 A sign of the Egyptians" efforts to cooperate could be seen in the lifting of the sequestration which had been placed on Saudi properties in Egypt when relations deteriorated in 1962.121

121. Mideast Mirror, "Vice President Ends East German Tour". September 4, 1965, p. 19.
On his way to the Arab Summit Conference in Casablanca in September, 1965, Feisal accepted an invitation to stop in Cairo where he was wined and dined. The two leaders reemphasized their adherence to the Jeddah Agreement,¹²² but nothing constructive for Yemen really developed from this visit.

Relations between the two countries continued on their somewhat erratic character. Late in 1965, while on a state visit to Iran, Feisal called for a meeting of the Islamic heads of state which he said was not an attempt to form an alliance against Arab revolutionary states, namely Egypt.¹²³ Although Nasser continuously criticized the proposed conference as being against the revolutionary Arab leadership, there seems to be no indication that Feisal had any hidden motive for recommending this conference that would relate to the Republican Revolution or to Egypt. He appears to have felt that there was a religious need in Islamic countries for such a conference to consider the effects of challenges of the modern world to Islam. However, if Feisal were successful with this conference, Nasser could be correct in believing that his position of leadership in the Muslim world would be challenged or taken over by Feisal. To the end of 1966, there was no concrete progress made to actually

having such a conference. Further, on June 1, 1966, the Saudi government began arresting and expelling Egyptians who were working in Saudi Arabia with no prior notification to the Egyptian Embassy in Jeddah. Then, in July, 1966, Nasser accused Saudi Arabia of spending large sums of money for anti-Egyptian propaganda, although he gave no specifics. If this was not bad enough, Nasser charged, not a word of anti-Israeli propaganda came out of Saudi Arabia at this same time.

While Saudi Arabia's relations with Egypt definitely were colored by the Yemeni conflict, her relations with some of her other fellow Arab countries, such as Jordan, Kuwait, the Federation, and Pakistan, were not governed particularly by that conflict. Most countries, it seems, generally want to have good relations with neighbors on their borders and certainly a developing country like Saudi Arabia, could use technical help, especially from potentially friendly brother Muslim nations such as Pakistan.

Only in the case of the Taef Agreement with Jordan in 1962, is there any direct indication of the Yemeni revolution having a directly traceable effect upon Saudi actions in that conflict. Saud and Hussein met at Taef (Saudi summer vacation town about one hundred miles southeast of Mecca) in August to discuss formulation of a friendship treaty of broad scope. At this time, relations between Jordan and Egypt were at a low ebb. In October, high-ranking Jordanian and Saudi delegates assembled and quickly began preparing the agreement.
especially the military part of it, probably because of the conflict which had begun in Yemen. The rest of the agreement, interestingly, was allowed more or less to slide until Feisal visited Hussein early in 1966, when the rest of the agreement—full cooperation in economic, cultural, and political areas—was implemented.

However, it is questionable if the two events which mark Saudi-Kuwaiti relations have a direct connection with the Yemeni conflict. One event occurred during January, 1963, when Saudi peacekeeping troops were withdrawn from Kuwait. They had gone to Kuwait under the auspices of the Arab League. There could be speculation that this move was made, at least partly, to return these troops to Saudi soil where they could more easily be used if the nature of the Yemeni conflict should make such a defensive measure necessary. Then, in late 1965, these two countries signed a cultural agreement which especially concentrated upon education.

In November, 1966, Saudi talks with the Federation of South Arabia which aimed at strengthening "brotherly relations and cooperation in all fields" called specifically for Saudi aid to build roads in the Federation and to

provide one hundred fifty scholarships so that students from the Federation could study in Saudi Arabia.\textsuperscript{130}

Relations with Pakistan during these years were clearly of a separate nature. As a result of the visit of a Pakistani trade delegation to Saudi Arabia in June, 1966, an agreement was concluded whereby Pakistan would provide technical assistance to Saudi Arabia, and there would be regular trading between the two countries.\textsuperscript{131}

Of her non-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia's relations with Britain are perhaps most pertinent for this inquiry. Although relations, which were broken during the 1956 Suez Crisis, were resumed in January, 1963, denials were made by both countries that this action was in any way connected with the Yemeni revolution. The British Foreign Office said that steps had been taken toward resumption of relations after the September, 1962, talks between Feisal and Foreign Secretary Lord Home. However, it certainly would not be a hindrance to either country if the two prime countries which did not recognize the Republican regime enjoyed good relations. Resumption of relations previously had been tied by King Saud to settlement of the question of who—Saudi Arabia, the

\textsuperscript{130} Mideast Mirror, "Aid from Saudi Arabia". December 3, 1966, p. 10.
\textsuperscript{131} Mideast Mirror, "Strengthening Relations with Pakistan". July 2, 1966, pp. 18-19.
Trucial States, Abu Dahbi, or Muscat—should control the important Buraimi Oasis. (The Buraimi Oasis is located in an area where the vaguely defined borders of these four states meet and is the best source of water in that area.) Because the Buraimi Oasis question was not settled when relations were resumed, Egypt charged that the Yemeni revolution caused Saudi Arabia to be willing to compromise and "sacrifice a piece of Arab homeland" in order to achieve a speedy resumption of relations with Britain. 132

To help update and expand Saudi military capabilities and probably to prepare for possible conflict with Egypt, Feisal turned to Britain and the United States. In November, 1965, an arms agreement was concluded which called for both countries to cooperate in supplying the up-to-date air defense system which Saudi Arabia had wanted for over two years. The Saudi government would buy most of the system from Britain on generous, long-term credit. 133 In May, 1966, Feisal gave as his reasons for arms agreements with Britain and America,"...so they (the Saudis) could carry out their responsibilities toward the Arab and Muslim worlds, toward the Saudi motherland, and the Arab Unified Command. 134

As with Saudi Arabia, some basic internal factors relating to Egypt's capacity to participate in the Yemeni conflict should be considered. Egypt, the power behind the Republican government, is three hundred eighty-six thousand two hundred square miles, but like Saudi Arabia much of the land is too arid for permanent settlement. In 1962, Egypt's population was about twenty-seven million fifty-nine thousand people with about a one million increase annually. Approximately ninety per cent of the population is Muslim, and most of them like the Saudis are Sunni Muslim. 135

While the Saudi economy has been fairly stable, the Egyptian economy has faltered. 136 Although the cost of backing the Republican regime in its revolution was a drain on the Egyptian economy beginning in 1963 (about $100,000,000 had been expended by then), it was not heavy enough to undermine seriously the operation of the Nasser government. 137 By 1965, $13,800,000 more had been spent on the Yemenis of which $6,440,000 had gone directly to keep the Republican government functioning. In addition, about $34,500,000 was spent each year to

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135. The Middle East, "Egypt". 1962, pp. 413-442.
136. Egyptian Budgets---1962: Total Expenditures---$5,410,000; Defense---not shown. 1963: Total Expenditures---$2,481,700; Defense---$359,490,000 1964: Total Expenditures---$987,000,000; Defense---$395,600,000. 1965: Total expenditures---$1,100,000,000; Defense---no increase of a specific amount was shown, perhaps because of a new $69,000,000 deficit. 1966: Total Expenditure---$1,707,000,000; Defense---$408,160,000.
137. Amnon Kapelink, loc. cit., p. 46.
maintain the Egyptian troops in Yemen. Beginning in early 1963, the Egyptian populace expressed a desire for more domestic effort toward building and development, and less effort toward enlarging the military machine for risky military ventures. Thus far, however, even though not much attention has been given toward satisfying their desires, the Egyptian people have not become so aroused or disenchanted with Nasser and his government really to pressure the government for much more attention to domestic concerns. When, in 1964, the economy was in a weakening condition, significantly, every ministry, but defense, was ordered to cut all expenses to the minimum. After a year's breathing space, a new call for a "tightening of the belt" came in March, 1966, allegedly to permit further industrialization. In addition to a very large expenditure for military concerns, the fact should be mentioned again that the Egyptian economy suffers from a yearly population increase of about one million which is a large drain upon the nation's resources.

Between 1963 and 1966, internal needs caused Egypt to conclude various agreements for foreign loans and aid,

140. Mideast Mirror, "Red Cross Representative Visits South Arabian Detention Centre". March 22, 1966, p. 5.
which, though perhaps considered necessary for the development of the country, only added to the precarious nature of the Egyptians' economy. This added financial drain upon the Egyptian economy certainly should have repercussions upon Egyptian aid to the Republican cause, especially when the time of repayment occurs.

The effects of the Republican Revolution could be seen as more of an important factor in some of Egypt's foreign relations than in Saudi Arabia's foreign relations than in Saudi Arabia's foreign relations. In February, 1963, for example, Egypt promised to help Iraq with the Kurds in exchange for Iraqi backing of Egyptian efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the Yemeni question.

From time to time, Egypt acted as a type of policeman to detain Yemenis whom the Republican government wanted kept out of Yemen. In September, 1963, for example, one of the early revolutionary government leaders, Abdel-Rahman

143. (1) Soviet Union loans of $69,000,000 for industrial projects, June, 1963; (2) Canadian loans of $3,800,000 for purchase of Canadian broadcast equipment, June, 1965; (3) Japanese credits for $50,000,000 to purchase maritime and fertilizer products, February, 1966; (4) Grain agreements with the Soviet Union, Australia, Mexico, America, and Communist China to secure a total of 1,320,000 tons on credit for undisclosed terms in 1965; (5) Kuwait guaranteed credit up to $34,500,000 to Egyptian central banks, December, 1966. These agreements put Egypt into debt at least $199,300,000 more than she was before they were concluded.

144. Mideast Mirror, "Ties with Other Arabs Important For Yemen, Says Sallal". September 21, 1963, p. 11.
al-Bayandi, was planning to take a delegation of his fellow Shafi Yemenis to Nasser to submit the case for Shafic equality with Zeidi Yemenis. As it had been rumored that Shafic leaders had convinced Bayandi that he should lead the Shafis in establishing a Shafic government for Yemen, Bayandi was considered to be a threat to the Republican government which was almost totally Zeidi. Just before the delegation was to leave for Cairo, Bayandi got a cable insisting he go alone. Since he was given assurances of his safety, Bayandi went to Cairo, was arrested, and was put into a military prison. 145 In 1965, Premier Ahmed Muhammed Noman resigned over internal problems with President Sallal. Among those Yemenis who came under Egyptian detention over this affair were Noman's son, Muhammed Ahmed Noman, ex-royal ambassador; Mohsin Ahmed al-Aini, ex-foreign minister; and Hassan al-Amri, another ex-premier. 146 In 1966, however, when Sallal and his underlings were on another "witch hunt" and wanted the Egyptian detainees returned so that they could be executed, Egypt seemed more ready to listen to the urgings of other Arab states for her not to release the detainees to the Republicans. 147

146. Mideast Mirror, "Differing Views on Kuwaiti Mediation Over Yemen". November 12, 1966, p. 15.
The fate of the Yemeni Republic has not been the most important concern of Egyptian foreign relations. To Nasser and his government after "Occupied Palestine", the greatest enemy of Egypt and the Arab world is Britain. This view can be seen in the following statements:

Our first mission is to oust Britain from every inch of Arab land. Britain, the intruder, is sucking the blood of the Arabs. The Yemeni revolution will naturally ask for evacuation of Aden by Britain. Our Troops are in Yemen to establish a democratic, free government...Britain is shamelessly fighting the Yemeni revolution....Egypt is in Yemen at the request of the Yemeni people. Britain is the intruder. (Nasser, May 1, 1964)148

It has been proved beyond a doubt that there is a political and military organization working against the Yemeni revolution. This organization is functioning under British leadership, probably from the secret service. (Editor Heykal, May 1, 1964)149

Answering these charges, May 6, 1964, British Ambassador, Sir Harold Beeley, restated the British policy of non-hostility toward Egypt and of non-involvement toward Yemen.150 Then the following May at the United Nations, Egypt demanded the removal of the British base in Aden, charging that it was only used for aggressive purposes.151 It appears reasonable to suggest that a prime Egyptian reason for wanting Britain out of the whole Federation area is so that she can take it over before or after successful completion of the Yemeni civil war.

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148. Ibid. p. 6.
150. Mideast Mirror, "Yemeni Ministers Appointed". May 9, 1964, pp. 3-5.
To further clarify the picture of the implications of the Republican revolution, consideration should be given to conditions within Yemen itself. Even if all outside forces were removed from the conflict, stability probably would still be lacking in this corner of the Arabian Peninsula because of the problems existing in Yemen, which will be examined now.

One of the first concerns of the Republicans after the coup was the secure foreign recognition. Within two days, Egypt gave her official recognition to the Sallal government.152 American recognition came December 19, 1962, based upon acceptance of a statement by Egypt and rejection of a plea by Saudi Arabia. On December 18, Egypt had said that she would withdraw troops when Saudi and Jordanian border activities stopped or when the Republican government asked her to leave.153 During an October visit with President Kennedy, Feisal, as Saudi Foreign Minister, argued against recognition of the Sallal government for the reason that nothing should block the chance of the return to power of the Royalist government.154 Saudi Arabia never has recognized the Republican government.

152. Mideast Mirror, "Yemen Central Figure in Arab Dispute". October 6, 1962, p. 4.
Another country which never has recognized the Sallal government is Britain. Recognition posed a problem for Britain. Arab countries with whom Britain was closely linked, especially Jordan, supported the Royalists. So to recognize the Republican government would risk offending friends, while not to recognize the Republicans would leave Britain open to charges of aligning with counter-revolutionary forces of the Arab world. An answer to the dilemma seemed to be to remain consistent and follow the stated policy of granting recognition to a government which seemed to be in effective control of its country. The British said it was questionable if the Sallal government possessed that type of control of Yemen.\footnote{Middle East Forum. XXXVIII, No. 9 (December, 1962) p. 10} Events in Yemen would tend to provide a strong argument in support of the British position. Also, Britain felt that she could not recognize a republican government which pledged to reunite "The Occupied South" with Yemen, when the Federation government had a British pledge of protection against any type of outside aggression.\footnote{H.A.R. Philby, "From the Yemen" Mideast Mirror, "Aden Offers of British Colonial Secretary". December 8, 1962, p. 15.} When Britain continued to hold firm to non-recognition by February 16,
1963, the Sallal government closed the British legation. 157 Jordanian recognition came in July, 1964, after relations with Egypt, which had been bad since before the Republican Revolution, were improved. 158 World Acceptance came to the Republican regime in December, 1962, when the UN voted to accept the Republican delegate in place of the Royalist delegate. 159

From its inception in September, 1962, until 1966, the Republican government has demonstrated its lack of stability by the frequent changes of constitutions it has undergone during these years. The constitutions also show how supreme power was shifted from a revolutionary committee into the hands of the president. The first, announced by Sallal, October 31, 1962, was a provisional document for a five-year transitional period. It set up the basic agencies of government like the Revolutionary Command Council which had supreme powers. 160 In April, 1963, the "first interim constitution" was put into effect. Supposedly it was to last until a permanent document was approved by the people. With a preamble

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patterned after Egypt's, the constitution replaced the Revolutionary Council with the Presidency Council which assumed all of the powers of its predecessor.\textsuperscript{161} It was time again for a new constitution in April-May, 1964. Significantly, this new document was declared after a surprise six-day visit by Nasser to Ye-en. Replacing the Presidency Council was a president, prime minister, consulative council, and a national defense council with most of the power resting with the president.\textsuperscript{162} This constitution lasted about a year when it is believed to have been replaced by a new document, May 8, 1965. The reason for the above speculation is that the 1964 constitution was supposed to be the permanent constitution. The main point of the 1965 constitution seemed to be to take power away from the president and give it to the people through their elected representatives in the Consulative Assembly, but this is open to question. Also, beginning May 2, 1965, a new transitional period of unspecified length began, to be ended by a referendum whereby the voters would approve a constitution prepared by the Consulative Assembly.\textsuperscript{163}

Further, the lack of Republican stability also may be seen in the six major cabinet changes which occurred during those years. Among the more important ones were

\textsuperscript{162} MidEast Mirror, "Yemen Gets a New Constitution". May 2, 1964, p. 15.  
\textsuperscript{163} MidEast Mirror, "Yemen Appeals for Aid in Bringing Peace". May 15, 1965, pp. 6-8.
(1) February, 1963, a ministry of "Southern Yemen" (the Federation) was added to the cabinet, allegedly because of the failure of Britain to recognize the Republican government, and more Shafis were added to the predominately Zeidi government;164  

(2) May, 1964, Shafis and Zeidis apparently were given equal representation in the government.165

Another sign of the lack of stability for Yemen under the Republican government were the purges and executions which occurred in 1964-1966, after the Republicans had had control of the government for about one and a half years. Hundreds were arrested or expelled, the government was purged twice, and fifteen were executed from October to December, 1966. Also, there were two alleged plots against Sallal, one to kill him in August, 1965, and one to oust him from leadership in October, 1966.166

A further indication of unrest within Yemen was the formation of the Union of Yemeni Popular Forces, the "Third Force", in November, 1964. This occurred after a split in Republican ranks when attempts to hold peace talks with the Royalists that same month failed.167  The Third Force appealed to both Egypt and

165. Mideast Mirror, "Yemeni Minister Appointed". May 9, 1964, p. 5.  
Saudi Arabia in 1965 and 1966 to help Yemen solve her problems either by devoting their efforts to Yemen's good or by keeping "hands off" if they could not do the first.\textsuperscript{168}

The direction of Yemeni foreign policy, while it is under the Republicans at least regarding the Arab World, has been indicated in numerous statements made by Sallal. Included among these are the following:

We do not believe in artificial frontiers which were created by imperialism and were not known before the Saudi leaders came to power. Our land is one, our religion is one. We, therefore, have only a single way to follow to get rid of Saudi tyranny over our land. (November 13, 1962, when announcing the creation of the Republic of the Arabian Peninsula).\textsuperscript{169}

The Yemen revolution would liberate South Arabia and Britain would have no choice but to leave the area. The revolution was going ahead to purge 'Occupied South Yemen'. (September 26, 1966, on the fourth anniversary of the revolution).\textsuperscript{170}

The revolution in which the people would take over Saudi Arabia was imminent. Yemen, the 'cradle of Arabism', had pledged itself to march forward toward the aims of 'Arabism's leader', Nasser. (February 25, 1963)\textsuperscript{171}

Consideration of Republican Yemen only presents half of the internal picture of Yemen. The Iman and the Royalists, while their government and area of control

\textsuperscript{168} Mideast Mirror, "A Plea for 'Hands Off Yemen'. January 29, 1966, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{169} Mideast Mirror, "Republicans Warn Jordan and Saudi Arabia". November 17, 1962, p. 2.

\textsuperscript{170} Ibid., p. 7.

\textsuperscript{171} Mideast Mirror, "Sallal in Step with 'Arabism's Leader". March 2, 1963, p. 6.
during the civil war has been outside of the cities, have been a key factor in the whole Yemeni question. There is speculation that if it had not been for the revolution, Imam Muhammed might have brought as drastic changes to Yemen as the revolution did. Because he wanted to modernize Yemen by relying heavily upon foreign educated young men in running Yemen's affairs, the Sayyids did not like him even before he became the Imam. Also, he seemed to favor the possibilities of constitutional monarchy in Yemen. For example, one of al-Badr's first official acts as Imam was to announce the creation of a consultative assembly. Although he visited Egypt while Crown Prince and was exposed to Nasser's line of thinking, al-Badr seemed only to accept some of Nasser's ideas for reform without becoming an actual disciple. He seemed to be more receptive to aid from the Soviet Union and the Communist Chinese. After the revolution, Imam Muhammed held a press conference in northern Yemen. He gave a credible description of Nasser as a man with a love for domination and expansion, whom he formerly had considered a friend, but time had shown otherwise.

173. Middle East Mirror, September 29, 1962, p. 3.
Of course, in the area of foreign relations, Yemeni relations with Egypt have been of prime importance. However, those who charge that Egypt has designs upon Yemen for her own purposes are not talking about a new phenomena. Egyptian interest in Yemen goes back at least to 1173 when a brother of Salah al-Din, Muran Shoth, claimed Yemen and ruled it for fifty-five years. Again in 1514 and in 1818, Egyptians secured footholds in Yemen.  

In the 1960's Cairo's desire seemed to be to dominate all Arab lands, especially those which are fertile like Yemen or those which have vast oil resources. To many Yemenis and others, the biggest question in Yemeni-Egyptian relations was when would the Egyptians' troops leave Yemen. The Egyptian answer was given several times in forms including the following:

(1) not until Yemen has an army which is able to undermine the Saudi Arabian monarchy and expell imperialism from the "Occupied South";  
(2) not to leave until forty thousand Yemeni soldiers were trained well enough to be able to defend Yemen when all Egyptian troops were withdrawn;  
(3) not "as long as the Yemen revolution required consolidating."

175. Brown, loc. cit., p. 349  
178. Mideast Mirror, Egyptian Troops Will Stay in Yemen". February 27, 1965, p. 19  
In addition to aiding the Republicans by sending troops, the Egyptians helped to train and organize the government personnel; provided technical aid in all fields, arms and munitions, and military training; and aided and staffed the Yemeni schools.

The necessity of Egyptian aid to the very existence of the Republican regime was clearly stated by Sallal at a mass rally, "If it were not for the help of the United Arab Republic, we never would have established a foothold in Yemen.

Soon after the revolution, it was clear by his statements that Sallal was under Nasser's control and was his puppet. Sallal frequently said that union with Egypt was inevitable. Yet, it is questionable if any element of society except the military favored closer

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ties with Egypt. Although by 1964, the people of Yemen, according to Sallal, were demanding that their government secure union with Egypt. 188

Beginning soon after the coup in 1962, the closer ties between the two governments were indicated by the numerous visits between Republican Yemeni and Egyptian officials and delegations. 189

In addition to the call of Nasser's puppet, Sallal, for unity with Egypt, there also, in 1963, was talk and planning of Yemen joining the proposed federal union of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Algeria. In a speech on the fifteenth anniversary of the 1958 Egyptian-Syrian merger, Sallal called for the formation of the aforementioned Arab union. 190 In June, 1963, Iraq and Egypt welcomed Yemen into their proposed federation formed by the Cairo Pact in April, 1963. 191 Through the end of 1966, the basic Egypt-Iraq-Syria Cairo Pact never was implemented.

189. 1962: One Yemeni delegation visited Egypt. 1963: Two visits to Egypt by Sallal. 1964: Two visits to Yemen by Egyptians, including the first one by Nasser. 1965: Two Egyptian visits to Yemen, and five Yemeni visits to Egypt, including two by Sallal. 1966: Three Yemeni Visits to Cairo, and the return to Sallal after a year in Egypt; one surprise visit to Yemen of a high rank Egyptian team.
190. Arab Observer, "Concept is Realised". March 4, 1963, p. 23
Yemeni relations with the Federation of South Arabia were much more complex than her relations with Egypt. One of the questions complicating relations was that of union of the two. Yemen based her claim to the entire Arabian southwest upon the fact that the Imams ruled all of it from 1630-1730. However, the tribes and their rulers in the Federation disputed this claim. The present basis of relations between Yemen and the Federation is the 1934 "Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Cooperation", which is due to expire in 1974. The treaty is designed to facilitate establishment of a definite Yemeni-Federation border which never has been accomplished. For many in Aden, union with a Nasser-type republic is attractive, while union with Imamic Yemen had not been so. However, for most in the Federation as a whole, good neighborly relations with any Yemeni government was and is, the only desired goal.

Since the Republican Revolution began, an increased number of Federation citizens reportedly have gone to Yemen, which is a reversal of the pre-revolutionary pattern of immigration. Some private citizens and some Federal guards and regular army members defected to Yemen during the first year of the civil war to fight the Royalists. Others have used Republican Yemen as

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a safe base from which to agitate and direct anti-Federation and anti-British activities, which have done nothing to better Yemeni-Federation relations. 197 While on the one hand most of the citizens of the Federation who went to Yemen did so after the revolution, a considerable number of Yemenis had lived and worked in Aden for years before September, 1962. There were more opportunities to make money in Aden than in their native Imamic Yemen. Others lived in Aden because they had political difficulties with their government. Not all of the Yemenis who went to live and work in Aden were able to avoid trouble there. In May, 1963, approximately several hundred Yemeni workers were expelled from Aden for engaging in violent agitation against the government and the British. 198 Because of continuing outbreaks of violence in Aden which the Federation government felt were largely traceable to Yemenis living there, about one hundred thousand Aden-born Yemenis were deported in July, 1964. 199

199. Lipsky, p. 142.
Yemen's relations with her other neighbor, Saudi Arabia, generally have been much more peaceful in recent times than her relations with the Federation. From clashes in 1934 until the Republican Revolution, the Yemeni-Saudi border was quiet as the result of a treaty settlement at that time. Further, as stated earlier, there are no formal diplomatic relations between the Saudi and Republican governments. However, potential trouble loomed between Yemen and Saudi Arabia, in May, 1966, when the Republican government announced its attention to make formal claim to Saudi Arabian border territory which is said had belonged to Yemen before the 1936 treaty settlement. To the end of the year, nothing concrete had come of this Republican claim.

The other prime country in addition to Saudi Arabia with which the Yemeni Republic has no diplomatic relations is Britain. However, as the foreign relations of the Federation are under Britain's control, Yemen's indirect relationship with Britain has importance for the Republican regime. The basis of these relations stems from the Treaty of Sanaa of 1934, which said that the frontier would be maintained according to the situation

existing on the day the treaty was signed. Both parties were pledged to maintain this status quo and to be bound by its maintenance. However, since the Imam interpreted status quo to mean the total border situation including displacement of men and guns, and the British interpreted status quo to apply only to the frontier line itself, there has been trouble and so-called violations of the treaty since its formulation, making Federation-Yemeni border troubles since the 1962 coup just part of a continuing situation. 202

In addition to relations with her Arab neighbors, Republican Yemen has continued a pattern established by al-Badr of seeking aid and assistance from Communist countries. Since December, 1962, technical, military, economic and medical aid, equipment; personnel; and food-stuffs have continued to arrive in Yemen from the Soviet Union. 203 Relations with Communist China were begun in 1958 by a Treaty of Friendship and Commerce and by the opening of a Chinese legation in Taiz later that year, largely through the efforts of Crown Prince al-Badr. 204 In May, 1965, a cultural agreement was signed between the two governments. 205 The presence of other Communist countries was added to Yemen when the Republicans and

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Yugoslavians signed agreements, February 17, 1963, whereby Yugoslavia would provide loans to Yemen to pay for trade, navigation, and technical assistance.\textsuperscript{206}

To complete any consideration of the principal countries affected by the Republican Revolution in Yemen, the situation in the Federation of South Arabia should be examined within this same context. Beginning with Aden in 1839, the Federation area has been under British control. Aden was important to Britain first as a coal bunking port, and after 1960, as the world's largest oil bunking station. In the Federation there are approximately one million Arab Muslims living on about one hundred eleven thousand area square miles. Most of the people are Shafis, like the Yemenis in southern Yemen.\textsuperscript{207}

At the time of the Republican Revolution, plans were close to completion for the merger of Aden colony and the states of the Western Protectorate into a federation. With the revolution, some people favored an indefinite postponement of merger plans because of the general unrest caused by the revolution.\textsuperscript{208} While there had been considerable enthusiasm for the Republican Revolution in Aden, by November, 1962, it was fading because there seemed to be little place for patriots from Aden to do anything

\textsuperscript{206} Reilly, pp. 1-3.
in Yemen to help with the civil war. Therefore, speculation and planning for the merger continued. In December, political circles in Aden were said to expect the merger before Ramadan, January 26, 1963. They proved to be correct as the merger treaty was signed, January 16, 1963, at al-Ittiḥad. The treaty maintained British sovereignty over Aden colony, provided friendship and protection to all states of the Federation by allowing for stationing and free movement of British troops in the Federation, for continued British management of Federation foreign affairs and defense, and for continued British financial assistance.

Before and after the merger treaty was signed, there were those in the Federation area who desired independence from Britain in one form or another. Many in Aden, before the Republican Revolution, had wanted to unite with Yemen, but they did not want to give up their higher standard of living and small rights for the total backwardness of Imamic Yemen. So these people generally favored working for independence within the British

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framework or to unite with Yemen, many, as a result of the continuous border incidents and the suspected part of Republican Yemen in internal unrest and terrorism, began in 1963, to desire total independence from everyone. However, through 1966, no constructive steps had been taken. To Adenese politicians, however, good news came in the cause of independence, February 22, 1966, when the British government announced that it was planning to terminate its use of Aden as a naval base in 1968.\textsuperscript{212}

To look into the future, if the British do leave the Aden base in 1968, there definitely will be repercussions for the Yemenis whatever the civil war situation is, as there will be nothing to stop either the aggressive desires of either Nasser or many Republicans for control of the federation. It is doubtful if most Arabs in the federation will concur with such aggressive plans.

The most vocal parts of the population of the Federation for independence from Britain were the political groups which were supported by the United Arab Republic and who used Yemen, with support and approval of the Republican regime, as a base for terroristic activities in the Federation. This indirect interference by the Republicans through such parties as the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen and the Organization for the Liberation of the Occupied

South Yemen, is a strong indication of the Republican regime’s plans for the whole Federation.

No consideration of the Republican Revolution in Yemen could be complete without an assessment of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Yemen, and the Federation within the context of the revolution. The success of the revolution, which is a creation of the Nasser philosophy, is important to revolutionary, republican ideas in the Arab world. Probably, the leading proponent of progressive monarchy in the Arab world is Saudi Arabia. By supporting the Republicans and the Royalists, respectively, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have provided themselves with a battleground for possible settlement of their rivalry. Certainly, a clear victory for one country’s side would demonstrate to other Arabs the worth of following the victor’s ideas. While Nasser would seem to have designs on Yemen, and, eventually, perhaps on Saudi Arabia, and the whole Arabian Peninsula, the reverse does not appear to be true for Feisal. Also, in terms of ability to assist their respective sides in the Yemeni conflict, Egypt is suffering the bigger drain on an already more faltering economy than is Saudi Arabia. Of course, Egypt’s total commitment to the Republicans is much greater than Saudi Arabis's to the Royalists.
The outcome of the Yemeni civil war certainly will influence the course which the Arabs of the Federation will take about their country's future--complete independence, independence in a commonwealth-type relationship with Britain, or union with Yemen. Likewise, the scheduled 1968 evacuation of British forces from Aden probably will open the way for Nasser's entrance into that territory as well as for forcible Republican efforts to annex the entire area, that is if the Republicans still are in power in Yemen. Certainly, a problem for the future to settle will be that of the relationship between Yemen and the Federation.

CONCLUSION

The Republican Revolution in Yemen basically appears to be an Egyptian creation designed to promote Egyptian ambitions on the Arabian Peninsula. The death of Imam Ahmed in September, 1962, was almost certain to herald great changes for Yemen whether a coup occurred or not. Yemen could no longer keep out the modern, progressive world. However, even though the majority of the Yemenis desired to reform their country, Yemenis generally have been quite hostile to the presence of foreign conquerors in Yemen. No conqueror has stayed in the Yemeni mountains
for long, even if his treatment of the natives was better than that which they received from the Imams. Further, Yemen is the only state in the Muslim-Arab world which was never under direct Western protection so that it missed both the benefits of direct exposure to Western civilization and any evils inherent in such exposure.

Yemen seems to have become a testing ground for the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian rivalry for leadership in the Arab world. The Saudis' commitment seems to have remained fairly close to their announced policy of keeping hands off the Yemeni conflict, while at the same time recognizing, and, obviously, diplomatically supporting the Imam and the Royalists. The Egyptians' commitment to the Revolution and to the Republicans is far more extensive than the Saudis's to the Royalists in men, material, and ideology. However, Egyptian military might has not been able to end successfully the civil war even though extensive resources and personnel have been expended for that purpose. This failure certainly has implications in the future for Egypt both internally and externally in such endeavors of the "liberation of occupied Palestine".

Before any solution to the Yemeni conflict itself can be achieved, it would seem necessary that outside influences be removed so that the Yemenis can solve their own problems. There actually are two levels of conflict in Yemen--Egyptians and Republicans versus
the Imam and the Royalists, and the Yemenis against each other. The crucial problems which the Yemenis must successfully solve if they are to regain their stability are to resolve the Shafi-Zaidi conflict, to fill the leadership and power base vacuum left by the destruction of the Sayyids, which is so evident in the fumblings of the Republican government, and to resolve the question of the future of the Imamate and the conflict between the medieval Yemeni civilization and the modern contemporary world. To solve these problems, all foreign influences must be eliminated or else the basic issues will cause the Republican-Royalist conflict in one form or another to drag on for years with no real lasting conclusion.

The Republican regime has been more active in trying to bring about the independence of "South Yemen", the Federation, from Britain and its union with Yemen than was Imamic Yemen. Virtually all of the border incidents, the activities in the Federation of Yemeni based political groups, and the terrorism in the Federation can be traced to Republican backing or encouragement. Even though many in Aden especially want union with Republican Yemen, it is questionable if most of the population shares this goal. One of the problems holding up any merger is the basic antagonism between Shafi and Zaidi Muslims. The inhabitants of the Federation are Shafis.
Before stability can come to the Arabian Peninsula, especially to this southeast entrance to the Red Sea, and to the Arab world in general, the problems thrust forward by the Republican Revolution which involve Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Federation of South Arabia, and Yemen must be ameliorated.
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