Urban Revitalization, Urban Regimes, and Contemporary Gentrification Processes

Dissertation

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Abstract

The urban scene has undergone significant changes in the past twenty years, as gentrification and similar patterns of upward neighborhood change, once rare and unique, have become increasingly prevalent. Meanwhile, there exists an increasing recognition within academia that the processes underlying upward neighborhood change have been in transition over the past decades (Lees, 2000). This dissertation investigates the formal and informal arrangements undergirding contemporary processes of upward neighborhood change, which I term urban revitalization. It argues that revitalization occurs at the nexus of coalition (or regime)-style governance and ‘classic’ gentrification where change is driven by neighborhood regimes, largely informal coalitions that bring together representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors. Revitalization does not occur within a vacuum, however, and the dissertation situates contemporary neighborhood change dynamics within a conceptual framework that moves from broad economic-social-political organization to on-the-ground realities, where higher, more abstract tiers set limits and possibilities on subjacent levels. The research grounds itself in three Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods, two of which have witnessed the emergence of neighborhood regimes: Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, and Olde Towne East. Methods include exploratory quantitative data and GIS analyses, archival research, and key informant interviews. Results indicate that the rise of the cognitive-cultural economy and consumer cities, along with demographic and cultural transitions, have fomented a new vitality for the CBD and surrounding areas. Coupled with ongoing shifts toward entrepreneurial governance, this has led to the current era of revitalization. Further, trends in community development (strategic geographic targeting) and foundation giving (smart philanthropy), combined with greater institutional involvement in surrounding neighborhoods, have encouraged a more placed-based approach from the public and civic spheres, which has, in turn, engendered the rise of neighborhood regimes.

Key words: cognitive-cultural capitalism; gentrification; revitalization; urban regime theory; growth machines; Columbus, Ohio
Dedication

Dedicated to my family, who believed in me through all of it.
Acknowledgments

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The urban scene has undergone significant changes in the past twenty years. From blight, vacancy, abandonment, crime, homelessness, and myriad other social problems, cities today are being transformed by real estate developers, foundations, city governments, and institutions like universities and hospitals. As a result, gentrification and superficially-similar patterns of upward neighborhood change, once rare and unique, have become increasingly prevalent. Recent Census data confirm the changing demographic nature of central cities: across numerous large urban areas, the population overall, especially that of the well-to-do, is increasing (Krupa, 2011; Morello & Keating, 2011).

Meanwhile, there exists an increasing recognition that the processes underlying upward neighborhood change have been in transition over the past decades (Lees, 2000). Accounts of early gentrification emphasized individual property owners investing their sweat equity into dilapidated houses that they would eventually occupy (Clay, 1979; Laska & Spain, 1980). By the 1980’s, real estate interests with access to larger capital pools and limited liability were injecting themselves into the gentrification process (Smith, 1996). The 1990’s witnessed increased support for central-city rehabilitation from the local state through use of eminent domain, selective tax incentives, and creation of special business districts and other neighborhood promotion efforts (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Slater, 2004, 2006). Over the past decade, it appears that the role of larger actors in upward urban neighborhood change – the state, private firms, and institutions – has continued to increase, with entities operating under some sort of organizational aegis (Betancur, 2002; Davidson & Lees, 2010; Gaffikin & Perry, 2012; Newman & Ashton, 2004; Rose, 2010).

This dissertation investigates the formal and informal arrangements undergirding contemporary processes of upward neighborhood change, which I term urban revitalization. It argues that revitalization occurs at the nexus of coalition (or regime)-style governance and ‘classic’ gentrification. Change is driven by largely informal neighborhood regimes, which bring together
representatives from the public (municipal governments and quasi-government entities like housing authorities and community development corporations), private (real estate developers), and civic (place-based institutions like universities and hospitals, foundations and philanthropies, neighborhood associations, and cause-driven non-profits) sectors.

Revitalization does not occur within a vacuum, however, and the dissertation situates contemporary neighborhood change dynamics within the broad social-political-economic context. It constructs a conceptual framework that incorporates both the abstract (broad economic organization) and on-the-ground realities, including urban governance and neighborhood revitalization. The research argues that the current economic environment is best understood as a synthesis of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, which, together, have afforded the CBD and surrounding neighborhoods a comparative advantage in attracting businesses and residents (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Scott, 2011). In turn, national and state policies have adapted to meet the demands of the cognitive-cultural economy, and frequently seek to mitigate the opportunity costs of central city development. These policies shape municipalities’ actions, which in turn effect processes of neighborhood revitalization.

The research grounds itself empirically in three Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods, two of which have witnessed the emergence of neighborhood regimes: Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, and Olde Towne East. A remarkably broad and well-funded coalition, anchored perhaps most visibly by The Ohio State University, has promoted revitalization in Weinland Park. In contrast, while King-Lincoln has received substantial inward investments to stem disinvestment since the late 1970’s, a regime has only recently emerged there, largely due to the leadership of Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman. Finally, despite ongoing gentrification since the 1970’s, a neighborhood regime has failed to emerge in Olde Towne East.

The dissertation is organized as follows (Figure 1.1). Chapter 2, Review of Relevant Literature, summarizes pertinent research on urban politics and neighborhood change. It highlights early political geography inquiry that documented municipal fragmentation and the fiscal disparities problem before reviewing two contemporary perspectives on urban politics, growth machines and urban regime theory. While treated separately in the literature, the research argues that these perspectives are instead complementary, and together understand urban politics as a division of labor between public, private, and civic sector interests. The chapter continues with a review of gentrification and neighborhood change literatures, similarly summarizing early inquiry before
moving to more contemporary research. It chronicles ongoing debates between use of ‘gentrification’ versus ‘reurbanisation,’ noting that the latter has typically been utilized by European researchers focusing on demographic shifts. The research proposes urban revitalization as a way to break this logjam, noting that contemporary change is substantially different from the processes underlying gentrification, but often does not include the demographic transformations envisioned by reurbanisation, and nevertheless is an effort coordinated by neighborhood regimes – a characteristic not proposed by either gentrification or reurbanisation literatures.

Chapter 3, Conceptual Framework and Research Design, presents the theoretical approach to the dissertation. It constructs a layered framework that moves from the abstract to on-the-ground realities, where higher tiers set both limits and possibilities for subjacent levels. Beginning with the most abstract, these layers include (i) the mode of production, (ii) its expression at particular times (i.e., the accumulation regime), (iii) federal and state policies, (iv) urban governance, and (v) neighborhood revitalization. Drawing on recent work of Scott, Glaeser, and colleagues, it argues that the contemporary social-political-economic environment is best understood as a synthesis of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, in which dense urban areas enjoy a comparative advantage in attracting economic activity and residents (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2000; Scott, 2011). As a result, demand for central city housing has risen, and the importance of the knowledge industries and civic sector is heightened, thus leading to the current era of urban revitalization. Regarding the cognitive-cultural economy, Columbus is noteworthy for its long-standing base in service and knowledge-based sectors, with major local employers including Nationwide Insurance, Bank One/JP Morgan Chase, Limited Brands, Abercrombie & Fitch, Cardinal Health, Executive Jet/NetJets, Battelle Memorial Institute, and The Ohio State University. The research utilizes a mixed-methods approach that incorporates exploratory quantitative data and GIS analyses, archival research, and key informant interviews.

The following two empirical chapters relate the emergence of neighborhood regimes and revitalization in Weinland Park and King-Lincoln; the former is the subject of Chapter 4. In response to the neighborhood’s blighting influences, Ohio State incorporated a community development corporation, Campus Partners, to pursue economic and community development throughout the University District, through most of its efforts have focused on Weinland Park. One such effort, the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan, proved a catalytic event that led to the
formation of the Weinland Park Collaborative (WPC), the area’s neighborhood regime. WPC brings together representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors, and has primarily focused its efforts on housing and infrastructure improvements.

Chapter 5, King-Lincoln, relates the history and current revitalization efforts in Columbus’ African-American cultural hearth. Located immediately east of the CBD, King-Lincoln was developed in the late Nineteenth century as an enclave for the city’s black community, and reached its economic and social apogee during the Harlem Renaissance of the 1910’s and 20’s. Decline and blight characterized the neighborhood’s postwar period, and numerous attempts to stem disinvestment were unsuccessful, though a nascent, first-wave gentrification process did begin in the early 2000’s. Under the leadership of Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman, though, the area has recently witnessed the emergence of Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT), a more formal neighborhood regime that builds upon previous investments and includes representatives from the public and civic (but not private) sectors.

The final empirical chapter, concerning Olde Towne East, chronicles a neighborhood where a regime has failed to emerge despite forty years of ongoing redevelopment and gentrification. The area developed as the home for Columbus’ *nouveau riche* in the late Nineteenth century, and stately mansions characterize the area’s built environment. Like King-Lincoln, Olde Towne East was affected by blight in the postwar era, and attempts to stem disinvestments were similarly ineffective. However, a gentrification movement began in the 1970’s, driven by the usual suspects – artists, progressives, and homosexuals. While these early in-movers worked to preserve the area’s affordable housing stock and mitigate gentrification-related displacement, later arrivals did not share their concerns, and utilized aggressive tactics to transform the neighborhood, leading to racial tensions documented in the 2003 film *Flag Wars*. Today, Olde Towne East is characterized by a bifurcated population, split between largely Caucasian and middle-class in-movers (represented by the Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association) and predominantly African-American, low-income residents. While the latter cohort has historically been unorganized, the Columbus Compact has recently made several social service investments along Main Street, at the neighborhood’s southern margin.

Chapter 7, Summary, Analysis, and Concluding Observations, reviews the dissertation, places the case studies within the conceptual framework, chronicles the major thrusts of the research, and identifies avenues of future inquiry. Concerning the theoretical grounding, the conclusions
highlight the (i) expansionary nature of capitalism and the increased role of the civic and public sector in property markets, (ii) importance of the cognitive-cultural economy and entrepreneurial policies in driving regime formation and actions, and (iii) heightened role of the knowledge industries and civic sector, including place-based institutions, foundations, and neighborhood associations, in supporting revitalization. The chapter further situates neighborhood regimes within urban regime theory, identifying their (i) capacity to govern, as reflected in their ability to effect revitalization, (ii) set of actors, which represent the public, private, and civic sectors, and (iii) relationship, both in terms of organizational capacity and degree of formality/informality in codifying the coalition. The dissertation concludes with the significant contributions of the research, which include (i) chronicling a new form of neighborhood change, urban revitalization, (ii) situating this within the broader economic-political environment, and (iii) identifying the crucial role of civic sector actors in supporting regimes. Future research should build upon these insights, and should document how regimes adapt – in terms of membership and actions – to changes in economic and political organization.

Figure 1.1: Plan of the dissertation.
Chapter 2: Review of Relevant Literature

I. Introduction

As noted in the introduction, the dissertation examines the formal and informal arrangements that shape urban revitalization processes. Such research invokes a number of topics across many disciplines that have long been objects of scientific inquiry. This chapter reviews four of these: (i) early political geography, (ii) growth machines, (iii) urban regime theory, and (iv) gentrification and similar forms of upward neighborhood change.

Revitalization is fundamentally about the distribution of scarce resources, and conflict over where these resources are applied is ever-present. The early political geography literature investigated how debates over the spatial distribution of resources are resolved (or not). In doing so, it seeks to understand the landscape of power in the postwar American city, partly from a social justice perspective. Pertinent topics include externalities from facility siting, territorial fragmentation of American metropolitan areas, and the resultant fiscal disparities problem.

Investigating power within cities bring to the fore questions of ‘who governs’ and ‘how do they govern.’ Research investigating these questions is broadly recognized as urban political theory, which argues that elected officials do not govern as isolated actors; instead, private firms and special interests are integrated into the governing process. Why these actors come together, how these coalitions form, and what allows these relationships to maintain themselves (or not) are points of debate within the literature.

The review concludes by going on-the-ground, investigating perspectives on urban neighborhood change. This is largely empirical and multi-disciplinary, applying insights developed in geography, sociology, economics, and political science. Among the various forms of neighborhood change, gentrification is a particular concern. Broadly, gentrification represents the process of change that transforms urban, frequently poor neighborhoods into
middle- and upper-class central-city districts. It contradicts popular narratives of urban decay and white flight, and its uniqueness, including associated social issues, has made it a popular topic of academic inquiry. Hence, gentrification research has investigated what attracts certain individuals to these neighborhoods, what negative consequences have resulted from change, and how the process has changed over time.

Overall, the urban focus of this research is not accidental. While issues of spatial political conflict, development policy, and neighborhood change occur in a plethora of contexts – cities, suburbs, rural areas and places in between – the urban provides a unique perspective. Cities feature a multitude of entrenched political, economic, and social interests. The mass of humanity located in such close proximity increases the possibility of spatial externalities, spillover effects, and conflict. Admittedly, rural areas also hold these characteristics and are unique in their own ways, and the evolution of disciplines like rural sociology and agricultural economics confirms the singular nature of rurality. But, at the same time, urban areas also have been given special attention in disciplines such as geography, sociology, economics, and planning.

The chapter is organized as follows. It first considers early political geography on urban matters and locational conflict. Attention then turns to the development of urban political theory; in particular, to two contemporary frameworks – growth machines and urban regimes. Critiques are elaborated that (i) situate growth machines and urban regimes within the broader arc of urban political theory and (ii) provide a synthesis of the two perspectives. The chapter concludes with an investigation of the neighborhood change literature, with particular emphasis on gentrification and related processes.

II. Early Political Geography

Within urban areas, political discord over space and spatial allocation of resources is manifold. These conflicts and their resolution formed the initial focus of the early political geography literature, and the territorial organization of cities animated much debate. The postwar period saw extensive shifts in population away from central cities and toward the suburbs. A burgeoning population allowed suburban jurisdictions to thrive, largely because they could insulate themselves from the social and fiscal issues affecting central cities. Further, suburban jurisdictions could maintain exclusivity through land-use zoning. Such efforts included
regulations that *de facto* mandated middle- and upper-class housing, such as minimum lot sizes and prohibitions on rental housing (Cox, 1979).

The increasing number, population, and power of suburban municipalities gave rise to *metropolitan fragmentation*, as metro areas became a hodge-podge of isolated jurisdictions. In turn, this led to the *fiscal disparities problem*, as central cities faced financial crises as upper-income residents fled for the suburbs (Cox, 1979, 2009). Central cities fought to tax these households, as suburbanites utilized central city infrastructure (for, e.g., commuting, downtown employment, cultural institutions, parks and recreation) but did not contribute to municipal coffers through tax payments. Further exacerbating fiscal disparities were policies and planning initiatives (e.g., exclusionary zoning, lack of social services, inadequate public transit) that made suburbs unattractive to the poor and elderly.

Emblematic of this political geography was locational conflict research which represented a response to spatial allocation models. These models ignored the political contingencies of facility siting – i.e., a functionalist, conflict-free world where locating noxious land uses was viewed as a quantitative matter in that they *should* be sited where net social costs were minimized (Ley & Mercer, 1980; Wolpert, 1970). That political conflict might (and did) arise from optimal spatial decisions was outside the purview of locational theorists.

The alternative perspective, most closely associated with the work of Wolpert, centered on how actual siting decisions deviated from the emotionless reality envisioned by allocation models (Wolpert, 1970). Instead of asking where activities *should* be cited, locational conflict engaged questions of where these facilities *were* located – and when the two differ, *why* and *how* that variance arose. At various scales of analysis, certain districts can avoid noxious facility siting within their jurisdictions through financial wherewithal, political connections, or expertise in the legal system. Meanwhile, poorer neighborhoods predominantly attract the unwanted land uses that wealthier neighborhoods successfully steer away: toxic waste dumps, interstate freeways, and bus depots, to name a few commonly-cited examples.

Another salient characteristic of the early political geography was a growing concern for *social justice*. Researchers began to question explicitly the impact of policies and phenomena on marginalized and less well-to-do populations – “that principles of social justice had some relevance for the application of spatial and geographical principles” (Harvey, 1973, p. xi).
This thrust of inquiry stood in sharp contrast to the dominant paradigm of Geography (and the rest of the social sciences), which prized dispassionate, quantitative, scientific inquiry. Harvey’s *Social Justice and the City* is undoubtedly the most influential work in steering urban and political geography toward a greater concern for the poor and marginalized.

III. Urban Political Theory: Growth Machines and Urban Regimes

III.a Some Introductory Notes

In understanding how locational and other forms of intra-metropolitan conflict are resolved, questions of *who governs?* and *how do they govern?* rise to the fore. These questions are pertinent to the development of urban political theory, itself an inter-disciplinary effort. Early inquiry into urban political theory is characterized by two strongly divergent threads – elitism and pluralism. The tensions surrounding these oppositional perspectives later forged a synthesis around *possibilist* perspectives that embraced a stronger appreciation of the structure/agency debate across the social sciences. This section provides a brief history as the basis for a more extensive review of two contemporary frameworks – growth machines and urban regime theory.

Pluralist approaches – largely emanating from the political science literature – granted significant efficacy to both elected officials and special interests irrespective of their economic strength. Most closely associated with Dahl, pluralism argues that public officials mediate among various special interests, and are just as likely to favor marginalized groups as those with significant economic resources (Dahl, 1961). Preferences for particular interests are not shaped solely by their financial wherewithal. While these interests undoubtedly over-represent elites (leading to a form of polyarchy), they can additionally include marginalized groups, such as community-based non-profits.

In contrast, elitist approaches minimize and, at their most ideological, eliminate the ability of the public sector to craft and implement policy. Also known as *instrumentalism*, elitism argues that economic and social structure determines policy outcomes. Elitism enjoyed a long history in institutional economic approaches to political economy, and is most closely associated with Marxist thinking in that discipline (cf. Sweezy, 1942). From the latter approach, instrumentalism views the state as a tool of the bourgeoisie, and its manipulation is unfettered by popular demands. The state exists simply as an instrument to maintain and
promote the accumulation process, and it is subservient to the larger economic structure of state capitalism.

Criticisms of both pluralist and elitist approaches arose in the 1980’s as social scientists developed increasingly nuanced perspectives on the relationship between structure (the broad social, economic, and political context) and agency (the ability of individuals or organizations to act of their own volition). Regarding these perspectives, perhaps the most cited work is Giddens’ structuration theory, which conceptualized a mutually-dependent relationship between structure and agency (Giddens, 1979, 1984). In contrast, pluralism and elitism adopt separatist, more orthodox approaches, at the expense of an improved understanding of the pragmatics and contingencies of governing. Pluralism prizes agency over structure: public officials can pursue policies and interests unfettered by a larger economic, political, and social super-structure. Instrumentalism emphasizes the primacy of structure, as elected officials are merely automatons reflecting bourgeoisie interests.

New and more nuanced theories of urban politics arose in response to both structuration and similar theories. In part, these responded to lacunae in the literature, but they also reflected the growing sophistication of social science. Marxist structuralism was reformulated, most notably by Harvey who discussed limits placed on elected officials by the capitalist mode of production (Harvey, 1982, 1985). Importantly, these limits do not foreclose particular courses of action that inhibit the accumulation process, especially in the short run.

Other responses to the pluralist/elitist dualism emphasize coalition-building among elected officials, private business interests, and the non-profit (“third”) sector. Growth machine coalitions arise within metropolitan areas as private-sector interests band together to lobby for and pursue development-friendly policies; inevitably, public officials and institutional actors are also drawn into their orbit (Molotch, 1976). As the state and private interests work together, a division of labor may form – elected officials provide the regulatory power needed to enact policies, while business interests contribute the financial wherewithal to fund campaigns and donate to particular causes (Elkin, 1987). To the extent that cooperation among business interests, elected officials, and neighborhood interests is maintained over time, an urban regime forms (Stone, 1989).

Broadly, these more nuanced perspectives have been termed the New Urban Politics (NUP) (Cox,
Not only do they adopt greater sophistication toward urban governance, but they allow the contextualization of local actions within broader processes. As some have argued,

Cox noted that one of the defining characteristics of NUP scholarship has been a tendency to situate urban political actors and institutions – or what political scientists such as Stone (1989) have referred to as urban regimes – in relation to wider process of globalization and capital mobility . . . Therefore cities must compete with each other to attract capital … gearing up the local economy for inward investment … increasing the market for local firms (Jonas, Gibbs, & While, 2011, pp. 2539–40).

The NUP makes explicit the linkages between cities (at the local level) and broader characteristics of the macro space-economy. As the result of increasing mobility of capital – colloquially known as globalization – municipalities increasingly see themselves in competition with one another. Further, and separate from globalization, the NUP envisions urban governance as not only a response to local issues, but as distilling directives from higher scales. NUP also highlights the role of inter-jurisdictional competition, both between and within metropolitan areas. In doing so – particularly at the intra-metropolitan scale – it invokes the jurisdictional fragmentation literature of the early political geography.

III.b Growth Machines

III.b.1 Formulation, Membership, and Operation

Growth machines provide two penetrating insights into understanding contemporary urban governance. First, they assume that growth is the goal of urban politics and “is not … merely one among a number of equally important concerns” (Molotch, 1976, p. 313). The pursuit of growth drives the creation of much urban policy; virtually all new regulations must be judged by their ability to attract and create jobs and/or spur economic activity. Second, growth machines highlight the cooperative arrangements that arise to facilitate expansion of the local economic base. Growth is viewed as such a high priority that its realization cannot be left to politicians and bureaucrats (as a pluralist perspective would suggest); instead, the desire for economic expansion compels private interests to come together to ensure that development-friendly policies are implemented.

At its most specific, growth machines contextualize why and how land-based private interests within a particular location form alliances to attract inward investment (Molotch & Logan,
Compelling this action is their economic interest in rent; i.e., income earned from putting land to productive uses. The ability of rent-based capitals to accumulate is contingent on demand for the particular tract(s) of land they own or have the option to purchase. While landowners have a number of strategies at their disposal to stimulate demand, such as creating ‘shovel-ready sites’ replete with utilities and infrastructure, they lack access to local government and its attendant powers, namely the ability to determine economic and land use (viz. zoning) policy.\(^1\) To address this shortcoming, land interests organize to lobby for favorable development policies within their particular locality.

The growth machine framework recognizes the contradictory economic position, simultaneously powerful and vulnerable, inhabited by real estate elites. Their power derives from the monopoly of place: they enjoy near complete control over their particular landholdings. Conversely, the ability to develop landholdings successfully is highly contingent on exogenous factors. A buyer (or renter) is needed to occupy the property, and successfully renting the land is dependent on local development conditions. A healthy business climate that encourages inward investment augments demand for land.

Coalition membership extends to other (i.e., non-property based) businesses, institutions, and elected officials. The local media, most notably newspapers, typically have little-to-no economic interests in land prices but are hallmarks of any growth coalition (Elkin, 1985). Their involvement in setting development policy stems from the ability to sell more papers and thus increase rates charged to advertisers. Similarly, banks have only a tangential interest in land itself, but are significantly concerned about whether borrowers can repay mortgages.

Elected officials are also invariably drawn into the growth machine, and motivations here are twofold. First, the continued ability to win elections is highly dependent on their track record of creating jobs and growing the local economic base. Secondly, enacting development-friendly policies maintains alliances between elected officials and the business community. Politicians are highly dependent on businesses for campaign contributions and positive endorsements. Newspapers’ leading role in growth machines further necessitates elected

\(^1\) The word “landowner” is understood to include that person and any other “who otherwise has some interest in the prospective use of a given piece of land” and either “has in mind a certain future use for that parcel which is linked somehow with his or her own well-being” (Molotch, 1976, p. 310).
officials to implement pro-growth policies that appease the growth machine agenda.

Growth machines undertake a variety of actions to encourage inward investment. Most notably, they lobby elected officials to pursue development-friendly policies. These include lowering tax rates, providing financial incentives, improving local infrastructure, and maintaining adequate service delivery. The growth machine will likely financially endorse pro-business candidates, and in some cases may select one of its own members to run for elected office (Elkin, 1987; Vojnovic, 2003).

In many contexts, members of the growth machine organize to create a formal apparatus to attract economic development. Within the US, most notable of these organizations is the Chamber of Commerce, which has numerous local branches and a national chapter. In general, local chapters exercise significant autonomy but are largely ideologically aligned in favor of low taxes and fewer regulations. In addition to lobbying elected officials, the Chamber of Commerce works to market a locality to outside firms. It assumes a crucial role in ‘selling’ the metropolitan area to outside investors; highlighting the favorable business climate, coordinating the provision of utilities and infrastructure, and marshaling other businessmen to offer testimonials about the benefits of doing commerce in the particular city (Cox & Mair, 1988, 1989). Other state-sponsored organizations, such as Departments of Development and Convention and Visitors Bureaus, also work to ‘sell’ a city and marshal public-private cooperation in place marketing.

Despite its control of significant financial resources, coordinated lobbying presence, and its ability to engrain itself into the bureaucracy, a growth machine’s success is not predetermined. Voters must be convinced to elect politicians who are amenable to the growth machine’s goals. Thus, within a democratic context, crucial to the growth coalition’s success is its ability to promote development-friendly policies to the general public. In doing so, the ideology of value-free development is promulgated through pro-growth discourses (Molotch & Logan, 1984; Troutman, 2004). The ideology of value-free development attempts to diffuse opposition to pro-growth politics and other forms of locational conflict through discourses that all development is good; that economic growth benefits all (a rising tide raises all boats); and that those opposed to investment are selfishly placing their parochial interests over the common good.
Part and parcel of the growth machine ideology and pro-growth discourses are efforts to market a city as desirable for inward investment; that is, to ‘sell’ the city to businesses located elsewhere. Such urban boosterism characterizes growth machine action and discourse across numerous contexts – an indelible feature of the urban economic development landscape. Commonality of purpose is reflected in the numerous terms employed to describe its urban promotion projects: ‘civic jingoism,’ ‘local boosterism,’ ‘flagship projects,’ ‘urban spectacle,’ ‘hallmark events,’ and ‘place promotion’,” among others (Boyle, 1999, p. 55). Studies also highlight a number of recurring themes in such efforts (Short & Kim, 1998). A pro-business environment is common to nearly campaign messages: low taxes, lack of obtrusive regulations, and financial incentives for firms that relocate. Other salutary economic characteristics also garner mentions, including friendly labor relations, a well-educated workforce, and efficacious governance.

Concomitant with touting a municipality or metropolitan area’s attractiveness to business, the growth machine also must minimize characteristics that may repel potential investors. Short identifies this as a contrast of light and shadow: the growth machine seeks to highlight advantageous aspects while concurrently obscuring less-desirable characteristics (Short, 1999). Promotional materials frequently highlight ample open space, green-field sites, and desirable neighborhoods. What will never be mentioned, however, are high-crime areas, disinvested neighborhoods, or the quality of the inner-city school district. Tensions within the metropolitan area – racial, labor-management, or class-based – will similarly be omitted.

In both promulgating the ideology of value-free development and conducting place marketing, it is crucial that the growth machine marshal the support and involvement of local media. Newspapers are of critical importance and are almost always active members of a successful growth coalition. Their importance derives from the ability to communicate the pro-growth discourses and the ideology of value free development is of crucial importance to growth machine success. While they lack the economic interest in land-rent that compels other members, newspaper revenue streams are invariably linked to readership and the proportional effect on advertising rates. It is not surprising that, in countless accounts of growth machine operation, newspapers nearly always assume a central role (Elkin, 1985, 1987; J. Logan, Whaley, & Crowder, 1997; Stone, 1989).
III.b.2 Critiques

From its introduction in 1976, the growth machine framework has fundamentally changed how scholars understand urban politics (cf. Cox & Mair, 1989). It advanced urban political theory beyond the community power studies that either conceptualized governance as an interest group free-for-all (pluralism) or a function of bourgeoisie interests (Marxist instrumentalism). As with any nascent theory, growth machines were tested in a variety of empirical settings, including Dallas, Los Angeles, Columbus, and San Diego, among many others (Calavita, 1992; Elkin, 1987; Jonas, 1991; Purcell, 2000; Troutman, 2004). While the majority of these follow-up studies found significant empirical support for the basic growth machine tenets, they also raised a number of theoretical and empirical critiques.

The most widely voiced critique of growth machines has drawn attention to the disconnect between the narrow economic rationale that compels land-based interests to coalesce and the much broader growth machine membership. To better situate growth machines within a broader economic, social, and spatial framework, local dependence emphasizes the rootedness of interests in a particular place (Cox & Mair, 1988, 1989). Unlike the common understanding of modern economic thinking – that contemporary capitalism is predominantly footloose – local dependence highlights the numerous private and public actors that cannot relocate – either due to regulatory controls, cost, or personal preference. Certain industries, like utilities and (previously) banks, operate in highly regulated industries with defined service areas. Their expansion is either barred by law, or only possible at significant cost and effort.

More importantly, though, local dependence argues that many industries are characterized by less formal, though equally (if not more) important, ties to a particular place. Certain businesses, including developers, real estate agents, and financial institutions, have highly specialized knowledge of a certain municipality, metropolitan area, or local market. This knowledge is developed over time and provides a comparative advantage vis-à-vis younger firms and economic actors headquartered elsewhere. Relocation entails economic costs beyond merely moving, as it forces a firm to forfeit the economic advantage of deep, experiential knowledge of a local market.

In addition to specific local knowledges, trust relationships are created and fostered through consistent face-to-face interaction. While these ties might be more formal, such as contract-
based business relationships (e.g., a developer and his preferred lender), they often encapsulate more informal relationships (Granovetter, 1973). Informal ties are constructed over consistent yet largely unplanned interactions over time among actors in interconnected firms and industries. Sociologists, most notably Granovetter, have propounded informal ties as crucial to firm success within a local area. Building on the work of Granovetter, economic geographers have propounded the benefits of agglomeration economies within a metropolitan area (Scott & Storper, 2003).

Both elected officials and institutional actors are also subject to local dependence. Political careers are forged over time, and positive reputations cannot be easily transferred between locales. Further, residency requirements prohibit footloose politicians from relocating easily. Large institutions – hospitals, universities, and neighborhood interests – are especially embedded in a particular place. They may have high sunk costs (hospitals and universities with significant investments in the built environment), or their entire existence may be a product of a certain location (e.g., neighborhood groups and homeowners associations).

Another critique of growth machines has highlighted its relatively ahistorical understanding of urban politics. Growth machines are seen as divorced from history – they occur, but Molotch’s framework does not discuss how they form and how they endure (or change, or disintegrate). Researchers have proposed examining the historical factors and contingencies – related in many ways to Massey’s geomorphological metaphor – that motivate the formation, character, changes, and dissolution of machines (Fleischmann & Feagin, 1987; Massey, 1984). For example, in San Diego, the growth machine supported attempts to restrict suburban development while promoting downtown reinvestment (Calavita, 1992). However, a growth-control referendum divided the machine between downtown and suburban interests, leading to its fracturing and the creation of two competing coalitions.

III.b.3 Example Study

In a 1991 article, Jonas employs a case study of annexation policy in Columbus, Ohio, to illustrate the close relationships between business interests – embodied in the growth machine – and elected officials. In the postwar period, the City of Columbus exploited its monopoly on sewer and water provision in Central Ohio to annex surrounding unincorporated areas aggressively (Jonas, 1991). Certain major local employers banded together with organized
labor and institutional leaders to form the Metropolitan Committee for Jobs and Progress, an organization that promoted the passage of bond issues for infrastructure improvements. It hoped that, through these improvements, inward investment in Columbus would be stimulated. Concurrently, other local firms organized into the Development Committee for Greater Columbus (DCGC), a separate growth machine-type coalition that lobbied for the establishment of a metro-wide water and sewer authority. The DCGC vigorously supported the city’s annexation policy, as it allowed for lower sewer and water rates through increasing economies of scale. The growth machine worked with city officials to diffuse conflict surrounding the annexation policy, most importantly by lobbying State officials to allow the decoupling of municipal and school-district annexation. This decoupling allowed residents of unincorporated land to be annexed into the city but remain in (more desirable) suburban school districts (a so-called ‘win-win’ strategy).

The Metropolitan Committee and DCGC are both paradigmatic of growth machines. The former was spearheaded by local business interests, but brought together labor and institutional leaders to support a slate of priorities that would stimulate inward investment – namely, the issuing of bonds to fund infrastructure improvements. The DCGC also typifies growth machines, through its membership was exclusively limited to private firms. Its promotion of a metro-wide water and sewer authority was motivated by a desire to ensure favorable rates, which would, in turn, attract outside firms to Columbus.

While Jonas’ research echoes many growth machine tenets, it also highlights issues not covered in previous research. The success of Columbus’ annexation policy, both for the city (in terms of spatial expansion) and private firms (lower water and sewer rates) is attributed to the growth machine’s ability to co-opt opposition, especially from suburban jurisdictions and residents. In contrast to growth machine orthodoxy, he identifies multiple growth machines within the metropolitan area, each supporting its own development lobbying organization. The existence of numerous growth machines suggests that, while private firms might share certain interests, they are not in total agreement regarding all development-related issues.

III. c Urban Regime Theory

III. c.1 Formulation, Membership, Operations

In comparison to growth machines, urban regime theory provides a more sophisticated and
historical perspective regarding governing coalitions’ membership and dynamics. Urban governance is conceptualized as both a coalition and a division of labor among private interests, elected officials, and other actors, including institutions, non-profits, neighborhoods, and other special interests (Rast, 2006a; Stone, 1989). Their cooperation is based not strictly on shared goals, but on the need to cooperate in achieving each side's respective aims. Elected officials enjoy nominal control over the formal mechanisms of power, viz. the ability to pass and enforce laws. Business interests have access to financial resources, but require a regulatory environment that offers favorable investment conditions. Neighborhood groups can marshal significant electoral support, particularly for local issues, but lack the financial or formal wherewithal to effect change. While not formally building on growth machines, urban regime theory incorporates some of its insights – namely, the notion that governance is a cooperative matter among public, private, and institutional interests.

In contrast to largely ahistorical growth machines, regimes are characterized by both continuity and change in their membership and policy aims. Membership continuity is provided by place-based actors who are both economically and socially wedded to the municipality. In particular, business interests with significant investments in the local economy – that is, those with strong local dependence – will frequently be long-term members of the governing coalition (Elkin, 1987; Vojnovic, 2003). They provide a stable counterweight to the vicissitudes of the electorate and the politicians who rely on it.

Yet regimes are not ossified, and they hold the ability to modify their ideology and membership. Elections shuffle candidates in and out of elected positions. Industrial restructuring alters the economic base of a locality, minimizing the role of certain firms while increasing the prominence of others. Even within the same firm, a change in leadership can drastically alter the direction of the entire urban regime. In Atlanta, for example, the death of a long-time, civic-minded Coca-Cola executive left the urban regime rudderless for a number of years (Stone, 1989). Similarly, the arrival of new firms in Dallas upset the balance of regime politics, bringing new actors to the table with significant financial wherewithal (Elkin, 1987).

A regime’s flexibility is further evidenced by the changing role of non-profit and neighborhood-based groups in a city’s governance. Technocratic, pro-development regimes characterized many (but not all) US cities following the Second World War (Kilburn, 2004;
These governing coalitions involved tight cooperation between private business interests and public officials, with business leaders driving an agenda of downtown redevelopment utilizing urban renewal dollars (Groberg, 1965; Rast, 2009; Stone, 1989). Their policy goals targeted inward investment through low taxation, urban boosterism, and infrastructure investments. Neighborhood groups were typically excluded from the planning process, despite efforts to insert themselves into decision-making channels. While they were unable to lobby against proposed developments successfully, neighborhood-based organizations and other non-profits (e.g., historic preservation) were later able to leverage their voting power to elect pro-neighborhood mayors in several cities (Ackerman, 1999; Purcell, 2000; Rast, 2006a). They also effected a shift in municipal planning paradigms away from an exclusive, technocratic model and toward an inclusive, participatory process (Stone, 1989).

Shifts in demographic composition and economic base can also usher in regime change, albeit often in a more gradual fashion. White flight and concomitant increases in African-American population in many American cities demanded that regimes become more inclusive. In Atlanta, these changes were the impetus behind creating mentorship opportunities for minority businesses (Stone, 1989), while in New Orleans, mayors utilized patronage politics to woo a newly-empowered black-majority electorate (Whelan, Young, & Lauria, 1984). To a similar extent, changes in the local economic base, and the rise and fall of particular industries, impacts the composition of the governing coalition. In Seattle, the shuttering of the downtown department store and the departure of Boeing's corporate headquarters shifted the coalition away from manufacturing- and retail-based interests and toward a regime more closely associated with attracting technology firms and well-educated in-movers (T. A. Gibson, 2003).

Urban regime analysis further differentiates itself through attention to understanding how coalitions negotiate the dynamics of continuity and change, and how they maintain cooperation through these shifts. Change in regime membership is a given – to paraphrase Keynes, in the long run, we're all dead – and shifts in regime policy and aims are also rather common. For example, the election of a progressive mayor may reorient the regime away from downtown development and toward public housing construction (Nguyen, 2009; Rast, 2006a; Stone, 1989). Despite these changes, regimes endure.

Empirical examples of regimes and their continuity and change are manifold. In a qualitative
overview of regime research, Kilburn relates studies of regimes in Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, Ft. Lauderdale, Houston, Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pittsburgh, Portland, San Francisco, Seattle, St. Louis, and Tampa (Kilburn, 2004). Regarding regime dynamics, the coalition governing Dallas has been remarkable stable, and this continuity has allowed the city to pursue a remarkably pro-development agenda driven by low taxation and efforts to attract inward investment (Elkin, 1987). Atlanta has been dominated by a regime that promoted downtown development – corporate offices and upper-income residential – at the expense of public and low-income housing. However, within this continuity, Atlanta experienced a brief, progressive interlude under the mayoralty of Maynard Jackson, who favored neighborhood-based interests and expanded social services (Stone, 1989).

III.c.2 Critiques of Urban Regime Theory

A number of critiques have arisen to challenge the theoretical assumptions and execution of urban regimes. The most salient and enduring of these critiques concerns the relative isolation of regime theory. It seems to apply very well at a particular level of abstraction, at a particular scale, and in a particular context. However, it often fails to make connections to broader theories and loses much explanatory power at alternative scales.

In terms of scale and levels of abstraction, it appears that urban regimes’ ability to explain urban governance at different scales, and to contextualize governing coalitions within broader social and economic theory, is limited. Regime theory is best utilized to understand the development politics of a large municipality or metropolitan area divorced from broader, structural forces – what Lauria terms middle-level abstractions (Lauria, 1997). It appears that Lauria employs ‘abstractions’ to mean both theory and object: the urban regime framework fails to concern itself with broader social theory and with larger scales of analysis.

Regarding scale, urban regime theory explains how constellations of forces – public, private, neighborhood, and institutional – come together to give coherence and continuity to a particular jurisdiction’s (typically a large city) governance. When one escapes this arguably mesoscalar analysis, however, regime theory loses much of its explanatory power. At a finer, more micro-level of analysis, regime theory often ignores the often fractious nature of relationships between jurisdictions located in the same metro area. These cities compete with one another for jobs, housing, and other forms of private investment. The caustic relationships
among intra-metropolitan jurisdictions are well known to private interests, who can play these cities off one other in exchange for various incentives (Cox, 1979). For example, a suburban municipality might extend incentives for a corporation to leave its downtown office tower for a suburban office park. Suburban residents may mobilize to oppose annexation into the metro area’s primary city and the higher taxes that it brings, and the politics of public school districts, particularly surrounding racial and busing, have long been a source of tension.

At the macroscale, the urban regime framework disregards many of the larger structural forces that compel various interests to come together. At the most broad, these have been linked to the mode of production, viz. state capitalism (Lauria, 1997). Capitalism compels private interests to ensure that the accumulation process operates unfettered. Capitals organize to lobby the state for pro-development policies that reduce the burdens on businesses and facilitate commerce, such as lower taxes, reduced workers’ compensation contributions, restrictions on unionization, and infrastructure improvements.

The most serious attempt to integrate regime theory into broader thinking about social theory and political economy has come via regulation theory. As an extension of Marxist political economy, regulation theory argues that capital organizes itself temporally into so-called accumulation regimes that entail a particular set of relations – production, consumption, distribution, and circulation. Accumulation regimes are themselves part of a mode of regulation – the policy environment in which they reside. Regulation theory is related to similar perspectives in political economy (e.g., social structures of accumulation) that periodize development on the basis of industrial and institutional organization and arrangements (Lobao, Rulli, & Brown, 1999).

The potential for regulation theory to enrich our understanding of urban regimes is readily apparent, though synthesis of the theory has rarely proceeded smoothly. Like urban regimes, accumulation regimes are characterized by continuity and change. Production, consumption, distribution, and circulation relationships are relatively stable within an accumulation regime. Further stability is contributed by the mode of regulation, as policy is unlikely to shift dramatically over a short time.

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2 Recall that metropolitan fragmentation and its attendant politics was a major concern for the early political geography.
Where regulation theory can improve understandings of urban regimes is through the former's more explicit attention to formal political economy. Regulation theory builds on Marxist political economy by hypothesizing accumulation regimes that govern and provide coherence to capitalism in a particular time period. As an example, the Fordist regime witnessed state involvement in the economy through a strong social safety net, while extensive unionization ensured relatively high wages and stable employment. The shift to a Post-Fordist regime is generally associated with the erosion of the social safety net, government austerity programs, and a reduction in union rolls as employment becomes more unstable.³

Imbuing regime analysis with a more sophisticated understanding of political economy allows it to better contextualize relationships among private, public, and non-profit actors. Under a Fordist accumulation regime, the state ensures demand for mass production through income transfers, mandatory collective bargaining, and Keynesian economic policies that stimulate demand during recessions (Lauria, 1997). The shift to post-Fordism mandated its own changes in governance. The rise of footloose capital meant that cities were more in competition with one another for inward investment, leading to calls to improve the local business climate (by reducing taxes and the social safety net) while increasing the provision of business-ready infrastructure.

III.c.3 Example Study

One attempt to integrate a more nuanced understanding of social theory and political economy into urban regime analysis is Hackworth’s analysis of development policy in New Brunswick, New Jersey (Hackworth, 2000). New Brunswick found itself in an unenviable economic position by the mid-1970’s, as various obstacles – race riots, extensive regulation, elevated tax rates, and deindustrialization – made the city unattractive to investment. As neither the local state nor private firms held all the necessary tools to ameliorate these barriers, they came together in a public-private partnership (The New Brunswick Development Corporation [DevCo]) to manage a division of labor among them. Hackworth’s research situates the efforts of DevCo toward attracting inward investment to New Brunswick from 1975 through 2000. The research methodology is qualitative and largely historical, drawing on local news

³ One should note, however, that quantitative investigations of the Fordist/Post-Fordist divide have yielded a much more nuanced perspective of these shifts (Lobao et al., 1999).
sources to chronicle regime activity.

New Brunswick’s urban regime operated as a coalition and division of labor among private interests and elected officials, especially long-time Mayor John Lynch. While the New Brunswick economy is dominated by the headquarters of Johnson & Johnson, Hackworth’s portrayal of regime dynamics emphasizes the role of (relatively) smaller real estate firms in driving the policy agenda. Real estate firms pressured the public sector to remove barriers to outside investment, including rent controls and a sizeable public housing inventory adjacent to the CBD. Concurrently, elected officials required certain actions by private interests, namely the financing of growth projects, to maintain a favorable economic climate. The regime’s major achievement throughout the study period was the demolition of the Memorial Homes Complex, a large public housing project near the CBD. While the local state had to grant approval, the actual demolition was financed by private firms (2000: 454-455).

The New Brunswick study utilizes a more sophisticated understanding of scale and social theory to contextualize regime formation. The imperative to establish the New Brunswick regime was motivated by efforts to attenuate extensive deindustrialization and its concomitant effects on the local space economy – specifically, the abandonment by capital of the American Northeast for Sun Belt metropolises. Hackworth’s discussion of the capitalist space economy is grounded in an understanding of the dialectic between expansion and exclusion – or, put another way, mobility and fixity. Capitalist firms require the ability to relocate in order to exploit differential profit rates – for example, consider the relocation of manufacturing away from high-wage cities of the American Midwest and Northeast (e.g., New Brunswick) toward low-wage rural areas in the American South. Concurrently, firms must make investments of a long-life (fixity) and require spatial differentiation – that is, the differential profit rates that undergird mobility. The New Brunswick regime was an attempt to negotiate the contradiction between fixity and mobility by (i) making the city more attractive to outside capital while (ii) differentiating space within New Brunswick, e.g. the relocation of public housing away from the CBD to facilitate corporate expansion.

Hackworth also locates the New Brunswick regime in the context of federal devolution and a reduction in social welfare programs, both indelible aspects of Postfordism. The demolition of Memorial Homes was impeded for years by HUD’s requirement that demolished public housing units be replaced at a 1:1 ratio – that is, for every unit removed from the public...
housing inventory, another unit must be added within the same metro area. The repeal of this regulation in the early 1990’s, coupled with HUD’s increasing reliance on Section 8 housing vouchers (the disbursement of which is handled at the local level), removed the primary barrier to demolishing Memorial Homes – namely, the cost and logistics of relocating hundreds of public housing tenants. Also symptomatic of devolution was HUD’s requirement that local firms, instead of federal funds, finance the demolition of Memorial Homes.

III.d Toward a Synthesis and Some Concluding Comments

The relationship between growth machine and urban regime frameworks has not been thoroughly developed, and in fact, the two have been treated rather separately in the academic literature. This is surprising given their similarities, most notably, the hypothesis of governance as a division of labor, in contrast to earlier pluralist and elitist perspectives.

Further, applying insights from human-environment interactions and cultural geography, both represent a shift to possibilism and the concomitant rejection of both pluralist and determinist approaches. Indeed, within the possibilist tradition of urban political analysis, growth machines and urban regime theory have enjoyed considerable popularity across disciplines. They reject the straitjacket of elitist/instrumentalist approaches but also the free-for-all of pluralist thinking. They conceptualize urban actors as operating within a context of both limits and possibilities that guide, but do not determine, behavior. Nevertheless, while these frameworks share numerous similarities, they have received separate treatments in the literature. This might be a result of silo thinking that has characterized much of academia. Of particular relevance are disciplinary divides, as the growth machine framework was pioneered by a sociologist (Molotch) while the urban regime framework was developed by a political scientist (Stone). Thus, while it is appropriate to consider these separately in a literature review, it is also important to recognize their complementariness.

Growth coalitions provide an economic rationale for why place-based businesses form

Possibilist thinking arose in human geography as a more nuanced approach to human-environment interactions, highlighting both the limits and possibilities accorded by the natural world. In doing so, it discards the environmental determinism that characterizes much early cultural geography, most (in)famously the work of Semple but also reflected in the research of her contemporaries. It also critiques pluralist approaches that ignore the limits to human action posed by the natural environment.
alliances to attract inward investment. As the result of such alliances, private interests enter into various arrangements with the public sector, both formal (sundry committees and task forces) and informal (lobbying and campaign contributions).

While growth machines most closely focus on the cooperative relationships within the private sector, urban regimes investigate how cooperation is forged among the private, public, and civic spheres. It conceptualizes a division of labor among the various sectors, as participants are brought together in search of particular resources they lack. Private firms have access to capital but lack regulatory power. Elected officials control the levers of regulation but lack financial wherewithal. Neighborhood groups can bring voters to the polls but lack financial resources and access to levers of power. The distinction here is not perfect, and growth machines invariably draw in elected officials and those from the institutional sector. But its strongest explanatory power remains with private firms.

Accordingly, while emphases and foci differ, there exists considerable overlap between the actors and processes emphasized by growth machine and urban regime frameworks. Both hypothesize that coalition-building is a crucial component of effective governance, between and within public, private, and institutional/non-profit sectors.

Returning to the topic at hand – contemporary processes of upward neighborhood change – I believe that growth coalition and urban regime frameworks, considered jointly, provide a powerful tool for understanding the contemporary urban scene. The politics of neighborhood redevelopment and change are inherently messy, drawing in a variety of actors with significant differences in motivation, tactics, and wherewithal. Regime theory and growth machines provide a worthwhile perspective to understand the multitudinous actors that involve themselves in urban redevelopment, and allow research to contextualize how scarce resources are committed to neighborhood-based (re-) development efforts.

IV. Gentrification and Neighborhood Change

IV.a Gentrification: Formulation and History

While the previous sections relate academic thinking regarding the political arrangements that guide urban redevelopment efforts, here the chapter turns to the empirical particulars of upward neighborhood change. Gentrification has received the lion’s share of attention within
the literature (and is thus the primarily topic of this review); however it is important to note that (i) gentrification is not monolithic and (ii) gentrification is only one type of neighborhood change, whether upward or downward. Further, while the problem at hand relates to contemporary processes of urban neighborhood change, it is worthwhile to note that such processes – both upward and downward – have long been an object of academic inquiry. Ghettofication and the formation of ethnic enclaves, the expansion of immigrant neighborhoods, and residential-to-industrial land conversion were prominent topics to the urban sociologists and geographers of the Chicago school (Harris & Ullman, 1945; Hoyt, 1933; Park & Burgess, 1925). Hoover and Vernon recounted processes of upgrading and downgrading in various New York City environs in their stage framework of neighborhood change and expansion of the suburbs (Hoover & Vernon, 1962).

Nevertheless, gentrification per se was not a development imagined by any of these scholars, and indeed, after a half century of research, little consensus has emerged about what, exactly, constitutes gentrification. The term was first coined by British sociologist Ruth Glass, writing that “the working-class quarters of London have been invaded by the middle classes . . . Shabby, modest mews and cottages . . . have been taken over” (Glass, 1964, p. xvii). Similar urban change was also witnessed, at an earlier date, in New York City, and modern-day scholars have argued that gentrification (or gentrification-like processes) may date back to 19th-century Paris, if not earlier (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Hoover & Vernon, 1962; Smith, 1996).

Contributing to semantic controversies is an increasing recognition that gentrification has, or is, changed/changing in numerous facets. One locus of change is the gentrification process itself. Early gentrification was largely the product of individual homeowners transforming “modest mews” and rundown houses into higher quality residences through their own sweat equity. Writing in the late 1970’s, Clay posited a stage model of gentrification that highlighted bohemians and less well-to-do artists purchasing low-value residences and renovating them (Clay, 1979). Gentrification through the 1980’s followed the sweat equity paradigm, with perhaps some intrusion from local real estate interests and urban boosters, all working under minimal government involvement (Smith, 1996). However, following the real estate recession of the early 1990’s – what Hackworth and Smith term third-wave gentrification – larger real estate interests, developers, and local governments assumed a larger and crucial role in revitalization projects (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Lees, 2000; Smith, 2002). Research has explained the
increased involvement of the state as the product of (i) fear of ‘de-gentrification’ as inner-city property values declined and (ii) the continued erosion of the Keynesian welfare state. Regarding the latter, they highlight reduced public housing inventory, the demolition of large, inner-city projects, and the shift to scattered-site Section 8 voucher programs. The deconcentration and removal of public housing – long considered a barrier to gentrification – reduced the inherent riskiness of inner-city development, making it more amenable to larger real estate interests. Operating with much larger capital bases and political support, these actors have engendered much larger (in both scale and scope) redevelopment projects.

Another facet of change is the expanded geographic scope of inner-city revitalization. Writing in the mid-1980’s and summarizing research over the previous decade, Brian Berry concluded that gentrification was confined to certain neighborhoods in certain cities (my italics) (Berry, 1985). The title of his paper similarly reinforces the unique and rare quality of gentrification – “Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay.” His observations stand in contrast to the contemporary urban scene, where gentrification has, in some instances, transformed entire central cities, leading Wyly and Hammel to title a 1999 article “Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal” (Wyly & Hammel, 1999a).

Some scholars, largely operating within the European context, have argued that recent inner-city change processes are not, actually, gentrification; instead, the phenomenon is labeled ‘reurbanisation’ (Boddy, 2007; Haase et al., 2010). Their distinction between reurbanisation and gentrification is made on three grounds. First, and less importantly, reurbanisation is aesthetically more similar to suburban development than the urban built environment. New construction is characterized by gated buildings and communities, modern architecture with ample on-site parking, and building siting away from the sidewalk – what Boddy calls ‘designer neighborhoods’ and Smith and Cowen label ‘suburbs with pizazz’ (Boddy, 2007, p. 86; Smith & Cowen, 2007, p. 34). Second, reurbanisation, unlike gentrification, does not engender displacement. Given that construction occurs on vacant land, no existing population exists to be displaced. Development of abandoned and derelict industrial, warehouse, and seaport districts conveniently avoids the property battles that characterize neoclassical gentrification processes (cf. Smith, 1996, for a discussion of the Tompkins Square Park riot).

Third, ‘reurbanisation’ is utilized to break free of the political connotations of ‘gentrification.’ As Davidson and Lees – both strong critics of gentrification – argue (pp. 1167) “‘gentrification’ is
perhaps the most politically loaded word in urban geography or urban studies and indeed in the politics of cities” (Davidson & Lees, 2010). From theirs and similar perspectives, continued usage of gentrification to describe a variety of urban real estate phenomena represents an embrace of an activist research agenda centered on class confrontation (Boddy, 2007; Smith, 1996, 2002). Such tactics were earlier employed by Smith, who broadened the scope of gentrification to entail “the class remake of the central urban landscape” (1996, p. 39). Such a definition not only expands gentrification to include a wide variety of inner-city real estate processes, but also reifies the political struggle inherent to property markets. This expansive definition of gentrification has gained currency among a number of scholars (Davidson & Lees, 2010; Hackworth, 2002; Lees, 2000; Newman & Wyly, 2006).

Researchers, largely operating within a Marxist perspective, have refuted the distinction between reurbanisation and gentrification. New-build development along the Thames River, far from the gentrified London city center, has spawned spillover gentrification and transformed previously low-income and working class communities (Davidson & Lees, 2010). These developments have included rehabilitation and privatization of public housing towers in addition to the loft conversion and new construction that typifies reurbanisation. In addition to the loss of public housing, reurbanisation has engendered cultural displacement of the quintessentially British working-class ethos that typifies these areas. For example, Davidson and Lees relate the closing of neighborhood pubs and stores in favor of gourmet restaurants and trendy night-life establishments.

What underlies much of the debate between gentrification vs. reurbanisation is displacement, more specifically its prevalence and relevance to third-wave (and especially new-build) gentrification. Displacement has been viewed by some as the sine qua non of gentrification (Davidson & Lees, 2010; Slater, 2006; Smith, 2002). Arguments surrounding the extent of gentrification-induced displacement are not new, but few quantitative displacement measures exist, making rigorous statistical analysis difficult (Newman & Wyly, 2006; Sumka, 1979). To the extent that displacement has been quantified, results have generally shown that it is not as significant an issue as critics would make it out to be (Freeman & Braconi, 2004).

Much like gentrification, ‘displacement’ is subject to definitional controversy. Numerous authors have distinguished between involuntary displacement, when residents are (more or less) forced to leave, and voluntary displacement as residents choose to out-migrate from a gentrifying
neighborhood (Freeman, 2005). Important to the former are landlord actions, sometimes described as ‘winkling,’ where tenants are harassed into leaving through deferred maintenance, eviction notices, and spurious legal complaints (Atkinson, 2003; Slater, 2006). Marcuse augments the voluntary/involuntary debate with two additional forms of displacement: exclusionary displacement, where potential residents are unable to afford gentrified housing, and displacement pressure, where changes (of varying sorts) make an area less desirable for its existing residents (Marcuse, 1986)

**IV.b Breaking the Logjam: Urban Revitalization?**

Both long-standing and contemporary debates surrounding nomenclature and displacement prevent the gentrification literature from engaging with larger themes. Researchers have failed to connect inner-city rehabilitation to broader urban, economic, and real estate processes, instead viewing gentrification as a largely idiosyncratic, unique, and political phenomenon. Gentrification scholarship has consistently engaged with the political implications of inner-city change, especially those endangered by displacement or the threat of it (Beauregard, 1986; Davidson & Lees, 2010; Newman & Wyly, 2006; Smith, 1996).

Research on third-wave gentrification has also engendered a global focus, as inner-city revitalization is no longer seen as restricted to the First World (if it were ever so geographically confined) (Smith, 2002). Municipalities around the world increasingly view downtown vitality as an economic barometer, and gentrification-supporting policies are utilized to assure a city’s place in the global hierarchy, a demand made more acute through the pressures of globalization (Taylor, 2004). One can also attribute the spread of gentrification-favoring policies to widespread shifts away from social governance and towards a development state, changes some have related to neoliberalism (Klein, 2007).

Globalization provides an entrée for connecting contemporary processes of neighborhood change – of which gentrification is one – to broader political, urban, and economic processes. Recently, gentrification has been connected to the political struggles created by globalization, most notably competition at numerous geographic scales. Montreal, for example, has invested in downtown improvements to attract residents from the suburbs, as the city’s budget is heavily dependent on residential property tax receipts (Rose, 2010).
Indeed, increased competition between municipalities at various scales engendered by globalization has fomented the spatial extent of gentrification to new contexts and locations. Shanghai has promoted urban development to solidify its place in the global and regional urban hierarchy, seeking to compete with Asia’s other global cities – Hong Kong, Singapore, Tokyo, Beijing – for footloose, global capital (He, 2010). Interurban competition is more acute in Montreal, where the central city must compete with suburban jurisdictions (e.g., Laval) for inward investment and high-income residents (Rose, 2010). Competition here is about more than the vagaries of international finance capital; as US and Canadian municipalities are highly dependent on the local residential tax base, attracting high-income residents is of paramount importance.

The spread of gentrification to increasingly far-flung locales, its rise to be seen as an admirable goal of urban policy, and its utilization by policy-makers to attract footloose capital, are all indicative of the rise of world or global cities (Taylor, 2004). Policy-makers view urban areas as gems in their own right, and work toward making these large metropolitan areas attractive to the newly-global elite (Rofe, 2003). Importantly, since this elite coterie is truly global in nature, the policies aimed at attracting them are remarkably similar across contexts. Examples here are numerous, and include highly-visible public transit improvements targeted toward increasing middle-class ridership (namely urban rail), construction of parks (particularly along a river), eliminating urban freeways and generally slowing automobile traffic, incentivizing downtown retail, construction of parking garages, and expanding policing services (including empowering private security agencies). Geographers have recently embarked to study how such initiatives are transferred among municipalities, a phenomenon termed policy mobilities (McCann, 2008, 2011).

Urban scholars have connected contemporary processes of upward neighborhood change in urban areas with broad policy efforts to (i) deconcentrate poverty, (ii) create mixed-income neighborhoods, and (iii) expand homeownership opportunities in low-income neighborhoods (Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Newman & Ashton, 2004; Wyly & Hammel, 2000). While such policies have been enacted and funded at the federal level, their implementation is consigned to municipal-level actors. So, for example, cities have utilized Section 8 vouchers to spread...

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5 The research on world cities is voluminous – cf. http://www.lboro.ac.uk/gawc/publicat.html for a list of publications.
public housing recipients throughout the city (instead of concentrating them downtown), HOPE VI to demolish and redevelop public housing projects as mixed-income neighborhoods, and HOME to build and rehabilitate single-family residences that are sold below cost to new homeowners.

Together, municipalities have utilized these funds to effect neighborhood change in previously dilapidated areas. They leverage public funds to improve urban livability in a way that encourages private investment. Cities may also be motivated by the ‘generalization of gentrification,’ as municipalities seek to improve their position in the geographic division of consumption through attracting higher-income homeowners to urban neighborhoods (Newman & Ashton, 2004, p. 1154; Smith, 2002). Implicated in this is the shift from progressive to neoliberal urban governance. For example, as support for public housing has eroded in the US, its redevelopment (e.g., HOPE VI) has been uncoupled from 1:1 replacement – that is, more units can be removed from the stock than are rebuilt (Hackworth, 2000). Wyly and Hammel argue that gentrification is the goal of efforts to utilized HOPE VI funds (Wyly & Hammel, 2000).

In response to reduced budgets and resource cutbacks, a number of cities have begun allocating funds disproportionately to certain neighborhoods, a strategy known as strategic geographic targeting (Thomson, 2008). While targeting particular areas for reinvestment is not a new phenomenon and dates back to at least the urban renewal of the 1950’s, the level of targeting and the desirability of funds (vis-à-vis the relatively undesirable nature of urban renewal) set these efforts apart. Neighborhoods lobby for economic and community development funds, and their allocation – the selection of winners and losers – is often made in response to political concerns, despite attempts to impose rationality on the distribution process (Thomson, 2011). Of particular importance is the perception that elected officials spread the wealth around, being careful not to favor certain areas or certain types of areas (e.g., poor or African-American) exclusively for fear of electoral backlash from those neighborhoods that have not received such attention.

While the increased role of public-sector actors in neighborhood change processes is acknowledged, the literature has not seriously considered how governance interfaces with shifts in area composition. Given the increased role of geographic targeting, particularly in an environment of federal devolution, local governments have increased powers to effect
dramatic change in particular neighborhoods (at the relative expense of others). Thus, it is crucial for the literature to better integrate theories of urban governance into how these funds are allocated. In particular, researchers must seek to understand not only which neighborhoods win and what areas lose, but why this is so and how these allocational decisions are reached.

Given the significant changes in contemporary urban neighborhoods – and the concomitant stagnation in the gentrification literature – it appears that new terminology is vital. As discussed previously, ‘reurbanisation’ has been proposed by some academics, though it (at its most specific) refers to contexts where the urban population is increasing (Haase et al., 2010). Scott terms contemporary shifts as ‘redevelopment’ (or, alternatively, ‘urban redevelopment’); his primary motivation for the new term is the upgrading of both residential and commercial properties, the latter of which, he claims, is outside the gentrification framework (Scott, 2011). While I agree that a new term is needed, the suggestions by both Haase and Scott are lacking. ‘Reurbanisation’ is arguably too specific to the European context, while ‘redevelopment’ is rather broad and unspecific – consider, for instance, the ‘redevelopment’ of a suburban shopping mall into a contemporary lifestyle center.

I propose the expression urban revitalization to describe the neighborhood change processes under investigation. Revitalization connects with the broader policy goals of urban livability and improving inner-city quality of life. It also invokes efforts by the public sector, private firms, and institutional actors to create vibrant downtowns and urban neighborhoods that attract both in-movers and inward investment. Finally, while not completely disposing of the conflict surrounding gentrification, it allows the literature to contemplate more seriously the causes, rather than the effects, of change.

IV.c Some Concluding Thoughts

Gentrification has proven to be an enduring research topic in urban-centered disciplines, though significant shifts in topics and methods have occurred over this time period. Early gentrification research was primarily descriptive and case-study driven, and focused on the results of neighborhood change. Later, two theories emerged to explain why gentrification

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6 Note that ‘vita’ is the Latin term for ‘life.’
was occurring, with one focusing on demand-side explanations while another emphasized the supply-side. The former highlighted the role of a gentrifying class that prefers urban living (Ley, 1986, 1996), while the latter stresses the role of depressed urban property values and the potential for successful investment (Smith, 1996). Despite the strong periodization of gentrification research, a number of enduring themes and debates have emerged. Chief among those is (i) an ongoing debate regarding the social costs and benefits of gentrification and (ii) the extent of displacement. Regarding the former, gentrification is perhaps unique among urban phenomena in terms of the divergent opinions held by scholars. To a large extent, these differences are disciplinary in nature: planners frequently emphasize its benefits, or at least downplay the costs (Freeman, 2004; 2005) while geographers (and sociologists) consistently emphasize its negative effects and applaud any evidence of its demise (Lees, 2009; Slater, 2006; Smith, 2002).

In addition, seemingly all gentrification research conducted over the past decade has made light of displacement, which has long been identified as the negative effect of the process super alia. Displacement is seen not only in its traditional sense (that is, an involuntary decision of the less well-to-do to leave an up-and-coming neighborhood), but has been extended to cultural aspects of certain areas (Davidson & Lees, 2010). The debate over the extent of displacement and its negative effects is nothing new, but it seems that recent perspectives have increased their discussion of its extent and effects (Sumka, 1979). Indicative of the displacement fixation, but drawing significantly different conclusions, is the work of Freeman. The results of his quantitative methodology cast doubt on the extent of displacement (Freeman & Braconi, 2004; Freeman, 2005, 2006). Given the focus on displacement, one can see how recent gentrification scholarship has a strong focus on the effects, or consequences, of neighborhood change. Displacement of residents and culture is seen as the result of rising property values and in-moving of a wealthier, whiter population.

This research seeks to reorient the neighborhood change literature by considering the causes of the process. I operate from the perspective that the gentrification literature has devoted too many resources to displacement, and in doing so has failed to investigate contemporary

\footnote{This might be a product of Slater’s (2006) call for a return of critical perspectives to gentrification research.}
processes of neighborhood change. The term ‘gentrification,’ with its considerable political baggage and connotations of sweat equity, is (at best) anachronistic and (at worst) a retardant to the development of new perspectives. Going forward, this research attempts to understand the formal and informal arrangements that shape contemporary neighborhood change – a process that stands in stark contrast to the dominant gentrification paradigm.
Chapter 3: Conceptual Framework and Research Design

As stated in the introduction, the urban scene has undergone significant changes in the past twenty years. From blight, vacancy, abandonment, high crime, homelessness, and myriad other social problems, today’s cities are being transformed by those with access to capital: real estate developers, middle-class households, foundations, city governments, and institutions like universities and hospitals.

From the previous chapter, regime theory and growth machines have arisen as two complementary approaches to understanding contemporary urban politics and political geography. The growth machine framework provides a rationale for private interests to coalesce in promoting the economic development of a locality. Urban regime theory focuses on governance as a set of formal and informal relationships between the public sector (elected officials and bureaucrats), private interests (e.g., business), neighborhood constituencies (e.g., community groups, churches, other social entities), and institutional actors (universities, hospitals, philanthropies, and cause-driven organizations).

One salient critique of both growth machines and urban regimes is their lack of connection to broader, macro forces. Both perspectives are depicted as examining the local in isolation, failing to consider not only state and national policies, but also broader capitalist forces, and how the expression of these vary over time, e.g. the manufacturing-dominated economy of the 1950’s, or the ‘creative class’ industries of today. Indeed, I would argue that one of most important contribution of the New Urban Politics (NUP) is connecting local actions to macro forces, echoing the assertion that

[O]ne of the defining characteristics of NUP scholarship has been a tendency to situate urban political actors and institutions – or what political scientists such as Stone (1989) have referred to as urban regimes – in relation to wider process of globalization and capital mobility. Therefore cities must compete with each other to attract capital … gearing up the local economy for inward investment … increasing the market for local firms (Jonas et al., 2011, pp. 2539–40).
To address this lacuna, and in the spirit of the new urban politics, the conceptual framework adopts a layered analysis that incorporates both broad social theory and on-the-ground realities (Figure 3.1). Moving from the most abstract to the most concrete, these layers include (i) broad economic organization (e.g., capitalism), (ii) its expression at particular times, (iii) national and state policies, (iv) municipal governance, and (v) neighborhood-based revitalization. I argue that higher, more abstract tiers set both limits and possibilities for subjacent levels. For example, the most abstract tier, capitalism mandates the exploitation of labor, continued economic expansion, and accumulation. However, within those bounds, its expressions at particular times and places varies widely; consider the shift from cottage industries to assembly-line production, or the economic structure of Silicon Valley versus Detroit. Similarly, numerous cities have enacted policies concerning property (re)development, but its forms vary from city to city and neighborhood to neighborhood with respect to architecture, land use, and the like.

This chapter, then, sets forth a conceptual framework that moves from the abstract to the concrete and proceeds as follows. The most theoretical tier concerns broad organization of the capitalist economy. Drawing on regulation theory, I then evaluate previous eras of capitalist development – Fordism and Post-Fordism – and present two perspectives on contemporary economic organization: Allen Scott’s cognitive-cultural capitalism and the consumer cities thesis of Edward Glaeser and colleagues, both of which address the demographic and economic resurgence of central city neighborhoods and urban areas more broadly. Discussion then turns to on-the-ground reality of urban revitalization, first providing a foundation through a historical appraisal of gentrification, followed by a summary of urban regime theory at both the metropolitan and neighborhood scales. It further articulates a dramatis personae of regime actors and appraises urban regimes across different historical periods, highlighting how these operate within a broader context and postulating that the contemporary political-economic-social condition has led to the emergence of coalition-style governance at the neighborhood scale. The chapter concludes with the study area and research design.
I. The Conceptual Context of Today’s Metropolis

I.a The Capitalist Space Economy and the State

At the most theoretical level, contemporary revitalization processes can be related to the mode of production, viz. capitalism. Per Marx, what distinguishes capitalism is the commodification of labor power (cf. Harvey, 1982). Following a process known as primitive accumulation, workers are successively divorced from the means of production, and must sell their labor power in return for a wage. This exchange, occurring within the realm of production, is exploitative, and often referred to as the M-C-M’ relation, wherein capitals lay out money for production (M), which results in a commodity (C), followed by a return for selling the commodity (M’) that (hopefully) exceeds the original outlay (M). Marx argued that M’ can only exceed M through the exploitation of labor – i.e., that the increase from M to M’ reflects value extracted from workers. Further, the M-C-M’ relationship mandates that capitalism is an inherently expansionist economic system. The desire not only to profit but to continually expand those profits (M’’ must exceed M’, M’’’ must exceed M’’, etc.) drives capitals to penetrate new markets and draw previously non-capitalist actors into relations of production and exchange.
While the demands of capitalism (e.g., the drive for profit, need to expand markets, increasing exploitation of workers and the like) are a constant, their expression in the everyday environment has varied over time – for instance, consider the upheaval in social relations brought about by the industrial revolution, as society shifted from a largely agrarian base to one centered on manufacturing (Lauria, 1997). Such changes in the capitalist space-economy are accounted for by regulation theory, which seeks to understand, broadly, “the temporal and spatial variability of capitalism” (Goodwin & Painter, 1997, p. 15). Regulation theory proposes that capitalism develops as a series of *accumulation regimes*, which encompass

the broad relationships between production, consumption, savings and investment, and the geographical extent and degree of autonomy of the capital circuits. But the particular forms of these relationships have changed over time and across space because of adjustments to inherent contradictions and resultant crises (Lauria, 1997, p. 6).

Capitalism endures, therefore, because such relationships provide a certain level of stability within a sea of contradiction, and, over time, as the nature of contradictions shifts, the institutional arrangements (i.e., the regime of accumulation) adapt as well. As such, regulation theorists view capitalism as a series of historical epochs, “each defining a different set of relationships between production, consumption, saving, and investment” (Painter, 1997, p. 123). In this way, while accepting the broad principles of Marxism, regulation theory moves beyond more abstract *necessary conditions* of capitalism (accumulation, exploitation, etc.) to examine the economic, social, and political conditions of particular periods.

The past century has witnessed two such epochs – Fordism and Post-Fordism – each casting a unique imprint on economic organization and urban form. Based on manufacturing, the Fordist city replaced earlier monocentric forms, with each reflecting the nature of transportation, transaction costs, and importance of proximity among the factors of production (land-labor-capital). The monocentric city is reflected by the urban models of Burgess and Hoyt (Hoyt, 1933; Park & Burgess, 1925). Rail, the dominant transport mode of the era, is inherently nodal, leading

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8 Marx wrote extensively about contradictions in capitalism, which he felt would eventually lead to the overthrow of the system. For example, one such contradiction is the relationship between owners and workers concerning wages. Owners have a rational self-interest to compensate workers as little as possible – so as to maximize profits – but they also have an interest in selling as many products as possible to those very workers, which can be abetted by paying a higher salary.
to concentrated commercial and production activity at and surrounding the core. Downtowns were largely consumption-oriented, and manufacturing districts were proximate to the city center. Factory workers often lived within walking distance to their employment, while middle-class residents located further from the city center along streetcar lines.

However, as the Fordist economy became ascendant, innovations in transportation and manufacturing processes undercut the economic rationale of monocentrism. With expanded assembly line techniques, for example, the multi-story factory proved to be less efficient than one-story but more spatially expansive plant layouts. Further, the advent of the automobile and an increasingly dense road network opened up previously inaccessible urban space. Hence, by the middle of the Twentieth century cities were becoming increasingly polycentric, production facilities migrated to the farther reaches of urban areas, suburbanization took place, and commercial activities shifted to address the needs of a dispersed population.

Post-World War II, furthermore, US manufacturing found itself in expanded competition, from newer, more efficient plants, lower labor costs and less onerous union restrictions in the South and West, and an invasion of foreign firms that, generally, offered more contemporary and/or less expensive products (New York Times, 2006). Additionally, the perhaps-inexorable expansion of automobile ownership, supported by government policies and infrastructure provision, further weakened and often ruptured the spatial ties between the city center and manufacturing, consumption, and residents – the monocentric city was becoming, for all practical purposes, an historical relic (Jackson, 1985).

The continuation and, frequently, intensification of these trends – innovations in manufacturing processes, expanded competition from abroad, and decentralization of industrial, commercial, and residential land uses – characterize the Post-Fordist era. Greatly reduced transportation and communication costs, in addition to increasingly routinized production processes, further reduce ties to the city center, leaving behind acres of underused, dilapidated, and abandoned structures – houses, businesses, warehouses, factories, and the like. Concurrently, previously independent municipalities – so-called *Edge Cities*, such as Schaumburg, Illinois – attracted significant investment, becoming new nodes within the metropolitan network (Garreau, 1991). Polycentrism comes to define urban form, as dispersal of residential, office, commercial, and industrial land uses expanded into ever far-flung suburbs and exurbs. Those unable to afford the residential opportunities engendered by suburbanization and sprawl were left behind in decaying urban
neighborhoods where quality of life declined dramatically. Government-funded attempts to stem disinvestment, such as urban renewal, Model Cities, and Enterprise Zones, were largely unsuccessful (Groberg, 1965).

In this unfolding scenario, a small number of households begin to purchase central-city residences for rehabilitation, resurrecting their former elegance and livability, and forming communities of individuals who sought their own occupancy, a process known as gentrification. Given broader urban decline, gentrified neighborhoods were the exception rather than the norm. Alternatively, however, gentrification proved to be a pioneer model, a viable phenomenon, and not a passing trend (Smith, 1996). Accordingly, more institutionalized forms of redevelopment were attracted – thus forming the base of today’s urban revitalization, the focus of this dissertation. An example, reported by Davis (1991), is downtown Los Angeles, which brought suburban-style amenities to the central city.

With the development of each epoch or accumulation regime, government policies across numerous arenas were critical. Earlier, they animated decentralization and suburbanization during both late Fordism and Post-Fordism. Examples include but are not limited to construction of the interstate highway system; subsidized FHA loans which, combined with relaxed lending practices, favored suburban locations; and the mortgage interest tax deduction, which provided homeowners with an incentive for home purchase (Jackson, 1985). Busing for racial balance, which primarily affected central cities, further abetted the movement of predominantly white, middle-class households to independent suburbs. Concurrently, other federal efforts were directed to the less fortunate, including Model Cities, need-related subsidies (e.g., Food Stamps and Medicaid), new public housing projects, and demolition of dilapidated central-city housing (urban renewal, slum clearance). Following the end of Johnson’s War on Poverty, urban policies shifted to mitigate the opportunity costs of central city development. Such programs include Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), subsidies toward environmental reclamation of contaminated parcels, asbestos (and other noxious material) removal assistance, increasingly relaxed mortgage qualifications, Enterprise Zones and Neighborhood Commercial District designations, and well-enforced anti-discrimination regulations.

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9 Hence Brian Berry’s 1985 chapter titled “Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay” (Berry, 1985).
Urban policies in the 1990’s and onward have largely continued the shift to entrepreneurial and neoliberal governance. In part driven by city governments’ need to recapture the tax base and to stimulate the economy overall, these policies have encouraged businesses and institutions to realize the importance, and profits, of having healthy neighborhoods, businesses, production enterprises, and the like at the urban core. For example, HOPE VI has replaced deteriorated and/or crime-filled public housing complexes in many cities with more aesthetically-pleasing and safer mixed-income developments, and the Moving to Opportunity program has attempted to deconcentrate public housing tenants in many central city neighborhoods. More ad hoc efforts, like the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP), have provided funding to purchase and demolish or rehabilitate foreclosed properties in heavily vacant neighborhoods, most of which are located near the CBD (Joice, 2011; Reid, 2011). Certain states, including Ohio, provide matching funds to rehabilitate brownfield sites, and provide property tax deferments in certain central city neighborhoods (State of Ohio, 2013a). While many of these programs ultimately were to the benefit of business interests, probably more than those of the disadvantaged, they nevertheless altered urban fortunes to increase the social, political, and demographic vitality of the central city. It is to this transformation that I now turn.

I.b Contemporary Forces in Urban Formation: Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism

The rise of the internet and new communication technologies, coupled with changes in production processes and the importance of various economic sectors relative to one another, has led to shifts both in economic composition and metropolitan form. Indeed, many scholars argue that the Post-Fordist era is undergoing a nascent transition to a new epoch of capitalist development. One such scholar, Allen Scott, identifies the current economic, social, and urban scene as cognitive-cultural capitalism, saying that the phrase

[u]nlike the term ‘postfordism’ … carries a clear and positive message to the effect that so much production today is posited on the far-reaching mobilization of the mental and behavioral powers of critical segments of the labor force … [which] involve skills such as logical thinking, inductive judgment, analytical perception, technical insight, and creativity as well as workers’ capacities for empathy, self-presentation, leadership communication, and social interaction (Scott, 2008, p. 848).

To Scott, this represents a rupture from previous eras, where production was largely grounded in manual labor, as in, e.g., automobile assembly. However, despite the emergence of this new
worker in the knowledge economy, continuity in economic organization is reflected in the continued relevance of location theory, accumulation, path dependency, and place-specific competitive advantages. Scott argues that agglomeration

involves an insistent search for cost-reducing proximities and increasing-returns effects in complex production systems; on the other [hand], it is expressed in path-dependent processes of innovation, horizontal and vertical spin-off, entrepreneurship, and the collective accumulation of place-specific competitive advantages, all of which are highly characteristic of the cognitive-cultural economy (Scott, 2011, p. 853) (my italics).

Thus, urban growth occurs as a process of circular and cumulative causation, wherein

(a) increasing-returns effects in the production system attract specific kinds of new capital; (b) employment opportunities expand as a consequence, thus encouraging in-migration; (c) the local availability of labor . . . attracts further capital investment directed at export production as well as satisfying local consumption (Markusen and Schrock, 2009); (d) with the intensification of increasing-returns effects in the production system, a new phase of capital investment is then initiated in round after round of path-dependent urban expansion (Scott, 2011, p. 854).

As such, cognitive-cultural capitalism does not represent a break from the logics of production that motivated both Fordism and Post-Fordism. Instead, Scott argues (contra the ‘creative class’ theory of Richard Florida) that production remains dominant in understanding contemporary economic growth (cf. Florida, 2003). In fact, Scott argues that agglomeration and path dependency have only become more important – that is, they “have been forcefully re-asserted” (2011:855).

Where cognitive-culture capitalism represents a shift from previous epochs, however, is in its division of labor – including the rise of knowledge workers – and corresponding urban form. Digitization and new information technologies have eliminated swaths of employees through new forms of routinization, while concurrently expanding demand for a new class of highly-educated and skilled workers with knowledge of finance, research, data mining, programming, design, and use of modern technology. Further, the emergence of this cohort has created a need for lower-skilled service-sector workers that support the expansion of the cognitive-cultural economy. Such positions include traditional low-skill employment, such as domestic help and food service, and marginally more skilled positions such as database maintenance, data entry, and back office functions. The emergence of this new division of labor has replaced the traditional white/blue
collar distinctions and, Scott argues, exacerbated the income gap between skilled and unskilled workers, and led to “urban neighborhoods . . . diverging markedly from one another in terms of socioeconomic status” (2011: 855).

Cognitive-cultural capitalism also reflects and reinforces processes of globalization and the emergence of ‘world cities’ and the global cities hypothesis (Sassen, 1991; Taylor, 2004). Improvements in information and communication technologies (ICT) and transportation systems, coupled with liberalization of trade laws promoted through the WTO and other bilateral and multilateral treaties (NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, etc.) have allowed manufacturing to become increasingly footloose. Far-flung production facilities demand command-and-control functions that agglomerate in the world’s major cities, as the geographic dispersion of production requires enhanced and expanded coordination. With these command-and-control positions come demands for harmonious urban environments. Thus, cities have witnessed the development of “spectacular architectural set-pieces” and other “iconic gestures” which represent “the ambitions of particular cities to function as cynosures of the world system” (Scott, 2011, pp. 856–7). These are, therefore, also a mainstay of the new urban revitalization.

I.c Contemporary Forces in Urban Formation: The Consumer City

An alternative interpretation of the contemporary economic and urban condition highlights the rise of the ‘creative class’ and the emergence of consumer cities (Florida, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000). In contrast to Scott, the consumer city hypothesis argues that the increasing economic relevance of central cities is related to changes in both consumption and production, arguing that

[T]he remarkable resurgence of a number of big cities in the 1990’s is quite remarkable … There are two main explanations for this turnaround. First, over the past 20 years, there has been a remarkable increase in the importance of knowledge in the economy and the biggest, densest cities appear to have a comparative advantage in facilitating the flow of knowledge. Secondly, over the past 20 years, the desire of consumer to live in these cities has increased enormously as a result of changes in style of government, improvement in law enforcement technology and rising incomes that have raised demand for high-end urban amenities (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006, p. 1275) (my italics).

Thus, the increased vitality of central cities is a product not only of shifts in the economy (as Scott argues), but also changes in consumer preferences and/or changes in urban amenities to suit those preferences – and that these shifts are mutually-reinforcing. The rise of knowledge industries and the emergence of a so-called ‘creative class’ has led to attendant increases in
footloose employment opportunities (Florida, 2003; Glaeser et al., 2000). Unconstrained (or, at least, less constrained) by geography and proximity to a specific work site, workers are increasingly able to signal their residential preferences over a greater space – and these preferences increasingly favor large, dense cities. Thus, consumer city adherents argue that “the key [to metropolitan growth] is to educate and attract high human capital individuals. This means providing strong basic services” in addition to place-based, or local, amenities like “restaurants, theaters, and an attractive mix of social partners” (Glaeser et al., 2000, pp. 2–3).

Given the sovereignty of the urban consumer facilitated by the rise of knowledge industries, cities must provide these services and amenities to attract new high-talent residents. With increased numbers of highly-educated and skilled workers and attendant rises in incomes,

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\text{[A]s human beings continue to get richer, quality of life will get increasingly critical in determining the attractiveness of particular areas. After all, choosing a pleasant place to live is among the most natural ways to spend one’s money . . . This increase [in household and transportation expenditures] can be seen as spending to get a desirable place to live. If these trends persist, then we must think that the future of cities depends on the ability of particular urban areas to provide attractive places for increasingly rich workers, who are less and less fettered by constraints on employment location (Glaeser et al., 2000, p. 2).}
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The consumer city hypothesis utilizes spatial and temporal shifts in real incomes to explain the role of consumption in the contemporary central city resurgence, arguing that

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\text{If dense US cities were becoming more productive . . . then wages in those cities should be rising relative to the US as a whole. If dense cities were becoming more pleasant and attractive places to live, then real wages . . . should be declining in those cities relative to the US as a whole (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006, p. 1281).}
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Thus, the consumer city thesis justifies itself empirically in declining real wages in urban areas, itself driven by rising property values. Since the 1980’s, urban incomes have increased only modestly – which consumer city proponents argue suggests slight gains in productivity. Concurrently, property values have risen, indicating a strong increase in the desire for urban

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10 Of course, this says little about less-skilled, lower-earning workers inhabiting subjacent rungs of the economic ladder, whose employment is often less-footloose and who, regardless, lack the financial wherewithal to afford residences in desirable urban neighborhoods. Evidence suggests that these workers are increasingly locating in suburban locations where they can afford housing, but where, nevertheless, they suffer spatial mismatch with CBD-centered employment opportunities (Kneebone & Garr, 2010).
living vis-à-vis other areas. Thus, urban real wages have declined as the desirability of a place increases (represented by property values) increases faster than productivity (that is, incomes).

Glaeser et al. attribute these shifts in real wages to increases in amenities and concurrent decreases in disamenities (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Glaeser et al., 2000). Examples of the former include the construction of new cultural and lifestyle assets such as museums, art galleries, theaters, restaurants, and shopping, while the latter encompasses the mitigation of crime, concentrated poverty, and vacant structures. Obsolescence, combined with shifts in HUD funding, have led many municipalities to demolish large-scale public housing projects, thus eliminating their blighting influence, and the move to Section 8 vouchers has led to a dispersal of low-income populations beyond central-city neighborhoods. Cities have also increasingly sited homeless shelters and related social service provision away from revitalizing neighborhoods (Cox & Mair, 1988; T. A. Gibson, 2003).

I.d Contemporary Forces in Urban Formation: Reconciliation and Impact on Urban Form

While cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities are often viewed as oppositional explanations of urban form and growth, I argue that they instead are complementary and that each contributes to a conceptual framework of contemporary urbanism. Both highlight the role of urban amenities in driving economic growth. The consumer cities hypothesis views parks, museums, mass transit, walkable streets, and other assets as a strategy to retain and/or attract urban populations. Relatedly, cognitive-cultural capitalism sees amenities not as a means to attract footloose creative class workers (e.g., from elsewhere), but as a way to continue and expand local patterns of growth. In other words, amenities are important for both theories, but with consumer cities they are aimed at attracting new residents, while cognitive-cultural capitalism views them from the production side: improving quality-of-life for existing workers which will, in turn, attract new industries (and workers). Further, both cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities stress the role of proximity in economic growth. Scott approaches agglomeration from the perspective of firms, as they seek “cost-reducing proximities and increasing-returns effects” within a context of “path-dependent processes . . . [and] accumulation of place-specific competitive advantages” (pp. 853). Consumer cities emphasizes the benefits of proximity from the perspective of individuals; with the increasing economic importance of knowledge industries, “[g]lobalization and new technologies have increased the returns from
being smart . . . we get smart by being around other smart people in cities” (Florida, 2013; Glaeser, 2011).

The contemporary economic condition, whether termed cognitive-cultural capitalism or consumer cities, leads to a unique metropolitan form centered on expanded revitalization of central city neighborhoods. The continued shift in economic composition toward tertiary and quaternary sector industries has greatly increased employment opportunities in city and its environs. Concurrently, demand for central city housing has expanded apace, and revitalization and other forms of central city redevelopment have become the norm, rather than the exception, among urban neighborhoods.\textsuperscript{11} Abetting revitalization is the relocation of manufacturing to rural and foreign locations, and the outward movement of low-income households to the urban fringe or suburbs, both of which have unlocked opportunities for property upgrading and redevelopment (Frey, 2001, 2012). As cities increasingly see themselves in competition for firms and workers as part of a global urban hierarchy, they also are driven to create new urban spectacles, rework entire districts, and construct new cultural amenities. Ultimately, then, the cognitive-cultural city features

a sort of continuity or harmony . . . over selected segments of urban space where employment, shopping, leisure, and residential activities interpenetrate with one another in relatively smooth mutual interdependencies (Scott, 2011, p. 857).

A caveat: when considering each period discussed previously, one should note that they do not occur in a vacuum; instead, they incrementally build (literally and figuratively) on previous epochs of urban growth. The stock of historic central city structures, repurposed today for middle-class living or technology offices, is largely a product of Fordist urbanization. For example, Chicago’s Merchandise Mart, the largest building in the world when constructed in 1930 as a wholesale goods center, has been renovated as offices for technology firms, such as Motorola Mobility, Groupon, and several smaller, internet-based startups (Ding, 2012). Similarly, the Post-Fordist city is associated with urban sprawl, leaving behind a central city that became home for the poor, deprived, and criminal elements, as well as marginal enterprises. This dramatically lessened land prices, gave energy to gentrification efforts, encouraged the State to take remedial actions, and thus led to the current epoch of cognitive-cultural capitalism and

\textsuperscript{11} As illustrated by Wyly and Hammel’s (1999) “Islands of Decay in Seas of Renewal”. See also Berry, 1999.
consumer cities. The latter, then, does not represent a rupture from previous eras, so much as continuity of change in the urban landscape. Further, urban dispersal has continued in the contemporary period, leading to the creation of exurbs, previously independent, agriculture-oriented small towns at the urban fringe that are drawn into the broader metropolitan orbit (Clark, McChesney, Munroe, & Irwin, 2009).

Beyond the influence of cognitive-cultural consumer capitalism on urban organization, demographic and cultural changes have also impacted today’s city (Ehrenhalt, 2012). Over time, for example, personal tastes have changed such that a suburban residence has lost its attraction for many, while walkable, urban locations have witnessed an uptick in popularity. Marriage is later, thus increasing the population of singles, not to mention the increase of “empty nesters,” divorcees, and the like. The result is a population that forms a sizable market, with tastes that favor choices in restaurants, cultural events, shopping opportunities, and entertainment of all sorts typically found in central city neighborhoods.

II. Metropolitan Renaissance, Urban Regimes, and Contemporary Actors

Prior to the contemporary period, central city renewal was largely the province of three actors: (i) a small cohort of individual gentrifiers purchasing and renovating properties for their own residence, (ii) specialized developers skilled in the often-complicated process of urban redevelopment and who could, by accessing investor capital, redevelop whole districts into walkable, mixed-use developments, and (iii) the State which created conditions favorable for investment, including renovation tax credits, favorable re-zoning decisions, and use of eminent domain. However, under what I term urban revitalization, the dramatis personae of contemporary urban change both expands and becomes more institutionalized. This section grounds such change. It first provides a historical backdrop for gentrification and revitalization. Second, discussion turns to urban regime theory, which has typically been applied at the metrowide scale. The third topic is neighborhood regimes, which I argue are an understudied and under-recognized component in today’s urban revitalization.

12 An example of mixed-use development pursued by private developers is the DUMBO (Down Under the Manhattan Bridge Overpass) neighborhood of Brooklyn, where developer David Walentas, who, with access to finance capital and favorable treatment from city government, was able to purchase nearly all of the area’s abandoned warehouses and refurbish them into loft condominiums, in addition to bringing art galleries and high-priced restaurants into the neighborhood (Hackworth, 2002).
II.a Revitalization and Gentrification: Historical Context

Unlike contemporary revitalization, gentrification is primarily the product of investment decisions by individual households, real estate developers, and the State, inclusive. Early gentrification efforts, such as the transformation of “modest mews” in London’s Islington neighborhood, demonstrated that a certain middle-income cohort values urban living (Glass, 1964). Compared to current revitalization efforts, what distinguishes early gentrification is the tepid support from the state, private capital, and institutions; in most cases, few (if any) incentives were used and/or available, real estate interests were largely absent, and in many US cases, early gentrifiers had to campaign against urban renewal schemes that sought to demolish the historic neighborhoods they valued (Fusch, 1980).

Early gentrification proved to be a slow-going transformation of the central city (Berry, 1985; Smith, 2002). The number of households with the construction, financial, and intellectual wherewithal to purchase and renovate a dilapidated structure was small, leading to a thin market for these properties. Real estate developers were hesitant to involve themselves in urban (re)development, which had failed to prove itself as a viable phenomenon, and which nonetheless entails tremendous risks and opportunity costs. Land acquisition, neighborhood politics, planning bureaucracy, environmental contamination, and other hurdles not only created burdensome costs in an absolute sense, but especially relative to alternative development.

Nevertheless, the history of gentrification is linked with broader urban transformation which has involved larger and more complex actors, described by Hackworth and Smith (2001) with a three-stage model. First-wave gentrification, occurring before the early 1970’s, is rare and confined to only a few urban areas in the largest cities. It was driven by individual households, commonly childless, purchasing individual properties and renovating them for their own occupancy, as described in the preceding paragraph. Second-wave gentrification, from the late 1970’s through the late 1980’s, witnessed the arrival of real estate developers, drawn by the success of individual gentrifiers and profit potential of redevelopment. Finally, following the early 1990’s recession, the pace of gentrification increased markedly. In this ‘third wave,’ the State, typically working in
concert with large developers, emerges as a crucial lubricant for inner-city gentrification, or as I term it, revitalization.\(^\text{13}\)

The State’s involvement in promoting neighborhood revitalization is related to increasing tax revenues through increased property values, attraction of economic development, political pressure to create a business- and investment-friendly climate, and expansion of commercial activity. Further, the influx of middle-income residents not only increases tax receipts, but it also reduces expenditures by eliminating the need for social services, education, and the like. Hence, States create a policy environment that promotes investment in central city neighborhoods. These efforts are multifaceted and primarily entail (i) the ability to acquire land through eminent domain, (ii) infrastructure provision, (iii) subsidies for new construction such as Low Income Housing Tax Credits, HOPE VI, Enterprise Zones, and environmental reclamation grants for brownfield sites, and (iv) a host of local regulations including zoning.

Eminent domain supports inward investment by facilitating property acquisition. A significant barrier to large-scale urban redevelopment is the fragmented nature of land ownership. Unlike rural development, where one owner might control hundreds (or thousands) of acres, urban tracts are typically one-quarter acre or smaller. To achieve economies of scale, developers must assemble numerous parcels from many owners. Eminent domain acts to eliminate incentives for individual landowners to refuse to sell their property, thus easing the burden of land assembly. However, given the political opposition to most uses of eminent domain, it is primarily used as a threat against obstructionist landowners, and rarely executed to assemble property.

States also promote favorable development conditions through infrastructure provision. In many contemporary cases, this involves constructing costly investments, like tree-lined streets, wide sidewalks, brick and other special paving, traffic circles, decorative streetlights, and safety improvements like closed-circuit cameras and police substations. These often complement other significant, bread-and-butter infrastructure, e.g. water and sewer lines, electricity, new road systems, and drainage.

\(^{13}\) Promoting urban revitalization involves many public entities such as counties, cities, townships, US states, federal governments, and quasi-state actors like regional commissions and Metropolitan Planning Organizations. In general these are referred to in the abstract as the ‘State.’
Additionally, the State provides direct subsidies to private developers. The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) provides funding for cities to purchase foreclosed and vacant properties and partner with developers to redevelop these (Joice, 2011). Another example is Ohio’s Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund (CORF) program, which provides up to $3 million in matching funds for the environmental reclamation of former industrial sites (State of Ohio, 2013b). These subsidies support the emergence of a real estate developer cohort practicing in central-city development.

These developers, by virtue of specialization, are tied into a broader circuit of planners, consultants, and other real estate professionals who provide the supportive services necessary for center city revitalization – elements of the urban regime, discussed below. Given the highly bureaucratic nature of urban development, planners are vital; many US states and localities mandate that any redevelopment be consistent with a master plan and zoning regulations. Environmental consultants are frequently required to evaluate any redevelopment site – such as a brownfield – for potential contamination and, if found, propose a mitigation strategy that meets Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approval. Legal advisors often have expertise in title issues that frequently occur with older properties, community engagement consultants are frequently called upon to placate neighborhood concerns, and marketing specialists are hired to promote new developments.

**II.b Urban Regime Theory**

Given the expanded roster of actors promoting central city redevelopment and the formal and informal arrangements guiding revitalization, I argue that urban regime theory (URT) best explains the formation and maintenance of these coalitions. Urban regimes are defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together to make and carry out governing decisions” (Stone, 1989, p. 179). URT envisions power as fragmented, with no actor possessing all the resources necessary to achieve his aims. Thus, urban governance requires a division of labor between the public, private, and civic sectors (Mossberger & Stoker, 2001, p. 812). Each member of a regime brings a certain asset or skill-set from which other actors benefit, thus creating reciprocal relationships. As noted in Chapter 2, their cooperation is not solely grounded on shared goals, but on the necessity of collaboration to achieve each actor’s respective aims. URT highlights the values that drive these coalitions, specifically (i) why actors
become involved in the coalition and (ii) why actors cooperate – that is, the benefits they receive from cooperation, and the resources they contribute to the coalition’s aims.

Three elements define regimes. First, they have a capacity to govern (Stone, 1989, pp. 178–9). URT holds that neither the public (or electoral) sector (elected officials and bureaucrats), nor the private (business interests) or civic (neighborhood groups, institutions, non-profits) can effectively formulate and execute policy by themselves. As such, they enter into formal and/or informal relationships with one another.

Second, regimes are constituted by a set of actors who, in cooperation with one another, provide the capacity to govern. While specific actors vary across regimes, they have traditionally been conceived as representing the public (government officials) and private (business) sectors. However, with the rise of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, contemporary regimes almost invariably include participation from the civic sector, including neighborhood groups, philanthropies, and institutions. As stated in Chapter 2, regime membership is characterized by both continuity and change; the former is provided by place-based actors and interests, while the latter results from transitions in elected leadership and local industrial restructuring. Change in regime membership can also result from changes in broad economic composition and organization – e.g., the rise of cognitive-cultural capitalism – which has increased the participation of knowledge industries and civic sector actors in governing coalitions.

Third, regimes embody a relationship among these actors, varying along a continuum between informal and formal. Most regimes are constituted by largely informal arrangements among the public and private sector, and a lack of formal control makes regimes dynamic over time (P. Burns, 2002; Trettter, 2008). Further, power relationships within the coalition vary across cities; for example, Chicago’s postwar regime was defined by a strong mayor supported through a political machine, while Houston’s governance is led by a coterie of business elites (Rast, 2009; Vojnovic, 2003).

Nearly all empirical regime analysis has examined cities or metropolitan areas (De Socio, 2012; Elkin, 1987; Hamilton, 2004; Mossberger & Stoker, 2001; Rast, 2006a; Stone, 1989). At this scale, regimes bring together government and business elites, as noted above – but also, more recently, the civic sector, including neighborhood interests, non-profits, place-based institutions,
foundations, and cause-driven organizations. Regimes at this scale operate under broad demands placed by the capitalist space economy and its manifestation during particular epochs – e.g., coalitions under Fordism responded to and were influenced by different pressures than during Post-Fordism. Additionally, regimes function within a state and national policy environment. The relationship is not unidirectional though, as regimes frequently engage in lobbying at the state and federal levels.

Houston’s postwar governing coalition reflects the three elements defining urban regimes (Vojnovic, 2003). First, by bringing together elected officials and the local business community – itself organized as the Greater Houston Partnership – the regime has a capacity to govern. For example, the regime has obtained federal funding for improvements to the city’s port, securing over $60 million for dredging and channel widening. Second, the set of actors represents both the public and private sectors. Third, the regime embodies a relationship between these sectors. This coalition was largely informal, but especially notable – in comparison to a machine-style coalition in, e.g., Chicago – is the dominance of local business interests in setting urban policy, and the relatively subservient role played by public officials.

Houston’s regime also evinces how municipality-based coalitions reflect both a particular economic context and a broader policy environment. In the 1930’s it received New Deal infrastructure public works investments, and further obtained federal monies for defense-related manufacturing in the 1940’s. In the postwar era, as suburbanization and expanded automobile ownership whetted the country’s appetite for petroleum, the regime sought to ensure Houston’s continued relevance to the oil and gas industry. For example, it lobbied the Texas Railroad Commission (TRC), which regulated the oil and gas industry, for aggressive price controls (Vojnovic, 2003, p. 607). Similar efforts at the federal level resulted in import quotas that also protected the local oil industry, and further abetted economic growth. More recently, given expanded concern about environmental degradation and shifts in regime membership that reflect a more diversified local economy, the coalition cooperated with the state Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to introduce far-reaching pollution controls.

II.c Dramatis Personae

Regimes coalesce as largely informal governing coalitions that bring together disparate interests in pursuit of setting urban policy and promoting economic growth. As noted above, regime
actors are generally classified as the public (or electoral) sector – those with control over the formal apparatus of government; business interests constituting the private sector. Given recent economic shifts labeled, alternatively, cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, regimes have increasingly seen greater participation from the civic sector.

For each actor, certain topics are addressed. These include:

- The values driving regime participation: Why does each actor cooperate?
- Their value to others in the coalition: What do they bring to the table?
- Finally, stepping back, the chapter evaluates mechanisms by which regimes maintain themselves – that is, the basis for cooperation (Stone, 1989, p. 180).

The public sector – such as elected representatives, bureaucrats, and quasi-governmental entities like Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPO’s), transit providers, and public housing authorities – enjoy access to the formal mechanisms of power, but lack the financial resources to capably execute policy. As such, members of the public sector form largely informal relationships with the private sector to underwrite growth policies and provide an additional source of legitimacy beyond electoral support. Business support appears particularly crucial for economic matters, as private interests are considered particularly knowledgeable and, through investment decisions, can ensure that policies within this arena are successful.

The private sector is favorably endowed with financial resources, but lacks control of the formal mechanisms of governance, and participates in urban regimes as a way to gain access to policy levers. Their financial wherewithal makes the private sector doubly important to other regime members. First, through their own investment decisions, businesses are partially responsible for the success or failure of particular policies. For example, growth-based policies – like tax incentives for business expansion – depend on businesses’ decisions whether or not to invest in the community. Second, private interests control the resources – viz., contributions to political campaigns and non-profits – necessary for funding the public and civic sectors (Stone, 1989, p. 7). Further, by virtue of experience, private interests bring expertise in matters of economics and business.

Finally, the civic sector connects regime governance to the community at large. While the civic sector has traditionally been defined as neighborhood groups, non-profits, and cause-driven
organizations engaged in social advocacy, more contemporary interpretations have included place-based institutions like universities and hospitals (so called ‘eds and meds’), foundations, and philanthropies (Ferman, 1996; Gaffikin & Perry, 2012; Hamilton, 2004). Regime participation of the civic sector is both contingent and yet essential; they have not typically been the object of regime analysis, but they undoubtedly increase the coalition’s governing capacity, especially in recent years (Hamilton, 2004). For example, neighborhood groups unite residents behind redevelopment, place-based institutions have an enlightened self-interest in their surroundings, and foundations and philanthropies can provide the financial wherewithal to effect revitalization.

II.d Historic and Geographic Variability in Regime Membership

Given changes in social relations over time – the procession from economic epoch to epoch – regime membership is dynamic and reflects how “the kinds of resources attributed to business community leaders . . . are contingent upon the particular mix of corporations . . . and the general economic health of both its firm and the wider economic sectors to which they belong” (De Socio, 2012, p. 51). In the Fordist era, private sector regime membership would certainly include, and perhaps be dominated by, large manufacturing interests; today it might encompass finance and technology firms. Likewise, hospitals and universities, representing the civic sector, today are significant regime participants, but likely would not have been included in governing coalitions earlier. Change also defines the public sector, as political attitudes shift and politicians are voted in and out of office. With the emergence of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, the civic sector has become more important to regimes, with expanded contributions from knowledge-based institutions (universities, hospitals, and research centers), philanthropies, cause-driven organizations, and neighborhoods groups becoming essential members of a governing coalition.

With this dynamism, regimes endure despite changes in economic organization and coalition membership – that is, they continually must (re-)construct a basis for cooperation among the dramatis personae (Stone, 1989, pp. 9, 180). One such basis is a continuity of interests around the broad goal of effecting economic development; most regime analysis echoes Molotch’s assertion that growth is the goal of urban politics (Molotch, 1976). Cooperation may also emanate from enlightened self-interest: the public sector benefits from the appearance of more efficacious governance, while the private sector requires effective economic development policy.
to expand. Among civic sector actors, neighborhood groups have a rational basis in property value increases, place-based institutions benefit from safe, desirable surrounding neighborhoods, and foundations are charged with affecting positive social change in their communities. Regimes may also employ selective incentives to both reward participation and castigate contraventions of coalition policy – e.g., businesses may lobby for favorable tax treatment from the public sector, which, in turn, leads to campaign contributions to supportive elective officials.

Beyond this historical variability, regimes exist within a place-based (often discordant) convergence of economic and social relations – a condition termed *local dependence* and discussed in Chapter 2 – that contextualizes coalitions’ actions and membership (Cox & Mair, 1988). Many private sector actors, such as utilities and banks, are either banned from relocation by statutes or find moving unfeasible due to specialized local knowledges, relationships, or cost. Institutions like universities and hospitals find relocation similarly unfeasible, given their significant investments in the built environment. Political officials have built both formal and informal trust relationships with the public in addition to the private and civic sectors that are locally-specific and not transferable to other cities.

II.e Urban Regimes across Different Historical Eras

How do regimes interface with higher-level abstractions – the layers described earlier, including capitalism, its manifestations over time (regimes of accumulation), and the broader state and national policy environment? Regimes are inherently pragmatic and atheoretical, and they operate within a particular political-economic-social environment that varies according to time and space. This historical and geographic context provides both limits and possibilities to a particular regime’s actions; though note that coalitions of the same period may exhibit variability in organization and strategy. For example, contrast the postwar activist urban regimes of Atlanta and Houston, heavily influenced by downtown business interests, with Chicago, a classic machine dominated by political interests, and Milwaukee, where a regime failed to materialize (Rast, 2006a, 2009; Stone, 1989; Vojnovic, 2003).

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14 *Local dependence* refers to the rootedness of interests in a particular place. It contravenes common understanding of globalization and footloose capitalism by highlighting the formal and informal relationships between public, private, and civic sectors actors within (and to) a particular place.
Consider regimes during the postwar era. Moving from the most abstract to on-the-ground realities, they operated within capitalist economic system wherein economic growth was heavily oriented toward the suburbs, and federal and state policies favored growth in outlying areas while attempting to arrest urban decline. For example, Columbus’ urban regime pursued an aggressive growth policy during the mayoralty of Jack Sensenbrenner (1954-1960, 1964-1972), when

During [Sensenbrenner’s] tenure, the airport was expanded, the area’s freeway system got started, and the first urban renewal project called Market-Mohawk got under way. He thought big and acted big, and was convinced Columbus would stagnate if it did nothing to expand. Thus, Sensenbrenner in his first term launched an aggressive annexation policy that would make the city the largest in the state geographically . . . The exodus of manufacturing, retail and people from downtown that began during and following World War II made Sensenbrenner determined not to make the same mistakes Cincinnati and Cleveland did in their attempts with annexation. He believed by capitalizing as much as possible on the exodus to the suburbs, Columbus would strengthen itself and broaden its shores (Lovelace, 2012).

Columbus’ postwar urban regime reflects contemporary economic and political conditions. Faced with suburbanization of industry, commerce, and residences typical of the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, the city adopted an aggressive annexation policy that brought unincorporated land within municipal bounds and restricted the growth of independent suburbs. The regime pursued federal highway funding, which would eventually lead to the construction of a well-articulated local interstate system, featuring both north-south and east-west arteries in addition to an outer- and inner-belt. Concurrently, the regime engaged in urban renewal that saw much of downtown and many central city neighborhoods razed for new office, commercial, and residential development (Citizens Research, 1974; Lentz, 2003; Shorter Smith, 2010). As such, Columbus’ regime was not ideologically pro-urban or pro-suburban, but instead pragmatically engaged in activist (re)development grounded in the economic and political realities of the era.

How do regimes operate under the contemporary era of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities? They continue to operate within the capitalist system, but economic shifts toward the tertiary and quaternary sectors have led to an expanded economic relevance for knowledge- and technology-based industries. Further, relaxed banking regulations, including bans on interstate banking and the repeal of various New Deal-era restrictions, have led to considerable growth in the financial industry. In turn, investments in the CBD and central city neighborhoods have increased apace (De Socio, 2012). Abetting this new urban vitality are
federal and state policies promoting central city redevelopment including the Neighborhood
Stabilization Plan (NSP), Low-Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), HOPE VI, brownfield
revitalization funding, urban homesteading, historic preservation tax credits, Enterprise Zones,
and a myriad of other programs.

As a result of changes in economic composition and government policy, regime membership has
also shifted. Contemporary regimes feature greater contribution from the civic sector, including
knowledge-based institutions like universities, research centers, and hospitals, foundations and
philanthropies, non-profits, advocacy and cause-driven organizations, and neighborhood groups
whose jurisdictions are frequently the target of urban revitalization. Further, membership from
the private sector is likely to include representative from the industries ascendant in cognitive-
cultural capitalism, including research, technology, and financial firms.

Hence, regime policy in cognitive-cultural capitalism frequently targets central city
neighborhoods, as demand for housing in these districts has risen and federal and state policies
increasingly promote urban revitalization (Gaffikin & Perry, 2012; Purcell, 1997). For example,
governing coalitions build and promote various urban amenities and infrastructure, such as
restaurants, boutiques, specialty stores, galleries, museums, theaters, parks, expanded public
transit options (light rail, streetcars), stadiums, festivals and social events, and other entertainment
options that will attract new central city residents and satisfy the needs of existing ones. While
many of these amenities were constructed in previous eras, their relevance has increased given
the expanded vitality of the CBD and surrounding areas, and many cities have expanded previous
investments into larger arts, entertainment, or sports districts. This engagement with central city
neighborhoods, Scott argues, is an attempt to create “a sort of continuity or harmony … over
selected segment of urban space where employment, shopping, leisure, and residential activities
interpenetrate … in relatively smooth mutual interdependencies” (Scott, 2011, p. 857).

Given their expanded economic, demographic, cultural, and social vitality, central city
neighborhoods are not only a major focus, but also the locus of regime-style governance. These
neighborhood-scale regimes bring together many of the same actors as metro-wide urban
regimes, but their focus lies on a particular neighborhood within a city, rather than the entire
municipality or metropolitan area. They have received less attention in the literature, though
empirical observations suggest that their prevalence is increasing. Accordingly, I utilize the term
neighborhood regimes to describe neighborhood-level coalitions pursuing urban revitalization.
Like all metro-wide governing coalitions, neighborhood regimes respond to the limits and possibilities set by higher-level abstractions and governance scales. They must operate within the mandates of capitalism, the current economic epoch, and the federal, state, and local policy environment. Like urban regimes, this relationship is not unidirectional, and neighborhood regimes may exert considerable influence on city, state, and federal policies.

With the emergence of regime-style governance at the neighborhood scale, the increasing economic relevance of knowledge-based industries and institutions and the increased targeting of central city areas in development efforts, the importance of the civic sector to both neighborhood and municipal-wide urban regimes has increased apace. In previous epochs, participation of these actors within a regime was largely contingent on the whims of the public and private sectors. For example, Atlanta’s regime only engaged with neighborhood groups after federal grants programs like Model Cities mandated community participation (Stone, 1989, pp. 71–2). As these funding opportunities dried up, though, neighborhoods’ power within the regime faltered in the early 1980’s. Currently, however, neighborhoods’ expanded importance and targeting as objects of urban policy drives the formation of neighborhood regimes in particular areas. Membership in neighborhood regimes both overlaps with that of metropolitan-wide urban coalitions – such as in officials elected to represent the entire city – and is specific to particular areas, such as place-based institutions, smaller, locally-based businesses, and civic leadership.

III. The Setting: Columbus, Post-Fordism, and Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism

The remainder of the dissertation examines the emergence of neighborhood regimes in two central city Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods (Weinland Park and King-Lincoln), and contrasts these case studies with another (Olde Towne East) where an effective regime has failed to emerge. While each empirical chapter may appear myopic on its own, largely relating events unfolding in each neighborhood chronologically, I return to the conceptual model in the concluding chapter, where the actions of neighborhood regimes are contextualized within cognitive-cultural capitalism and the federal and state policy environment. First, in order to place these events in a broader frame of reference, consider the evolution of Columbus Ohio over the past four decades, with selected locations shown on Figure 3.2.

At the dawn of the Fordist/Post-Fordist transition, a visitor to Columbus’ CBD would feel they were in a town, albeit a large town, rather than a major metropolis. Unlike Cleveland and
Cincinnati, Fordist economic activity played a relatively lesser role in Columbus, whose economic base was largely in tertiary and quaternary activities, those at the center of Post-Fordism. Examples include numerous insurance companies (e.g., Nationwide, Motorists, Safe Auto), banking (e.g., Bank One, which was among the most innovative in the US); retailing (Lazarus and the home of the Federated Department Store chain); and as the capital city, Ohio’s major governing agencies.

Further, Columbus organizations also prospered in the Post-Fordist arena. Examples include Wendy’s, Bob Evans, and White Castle in fast food; Compuserve, the first major on-line service in the US; OCLC which was and remains a pioneer in the digitization of library catalogues, Executive Jet, the first private business in the chartering and management of aircraft; Limited Brands, which pioneered contemporary approaches to marketing, becoming a nationwide presence; Worthington Industries, a pioneer in the custom processing of steel; innovative malls such as Polaris Fashion Place and Easton Town Center, both of which combined shopping, office, professional, and residential functions in a form that simulated a classic American town’s main street; and Honda, which initiated its manufacturing function with an innovative, Post-Fordist approach.

Largely beginning in the 1970s, then, Columbus’ downtown sprouted many new towers for government and businesses such as Nationwide, American Electric Power, Huntington Bank, and upscale hotels. Older, decaying theatres were also refurbished, their offerings upgraded, and professional sports were introduced (e.g., in hockey and soccer). One outcome was an area known as Capitol Square, at the center of downtown Columbus, and the Arena District at the CBD’s northern edge. Another outgrowth was the Short North, a collection of restaurants, art galleries, boutique shops, specialty foods, and the like which transformed a formerly derelict area.

Included in the urban regime that oversaw, initiated, or stimulated these changes would be the state’s governor and city’s mayor; CEOs of Nationwide, Bank One, Lazarus, and the Columbus Dispatch newspaper; and from the civic sector, the Columbus Association for the Performing Arts (CAPA) and President of The Ohio State University. Overall, however, the business sector was the major player, followed by government.

In terms of neighborhoods, to the CBD’s south was German Village, the outcome of a traditional, or ‘first wave,’ gentrification (Figure 3.2) (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). North of the CBD was
Victorian Village, followed by Italian Village and Harrison West. These would be ‘second-wave’ renewals that involved real estate professionals, construction and development firms, and a significant financial input from the Battelle Memorial Institute, a non-profit research institution that, via legal proceedings, divested itself of a considerable number of properties located in Victorian Village and south of Ohio State.

More recently, with the aforementioned base established and strong, the civic sector has taken on a considerably more important role, as will be seen in the three neighborhood case studies that follow. Further, the mood of Columbus metropolitan area, now the 32nd largest in the nation, has shifted such as to typify the mold of cultural-cognitive-consumer capitalism. Aside from the economic advances and milieu of innovation described above, since the 1990’s Ohio State has carried out a tremendous transformation in its academic breadth and excellence, accompanied by new facilities that more than doubled the earlier stock; individual hospitals have consolidated into three major consortiums with accompanying expansion of services, sophistication, and new or updated buildings; Columbus State Community College has become a major educational institution; and Battelle remains a strong presence. Columbus also has become a major center of operations for JP Morgan Chase, which absorbed Bank One, and home office of companies such as American Electric Power, Abercrombie & Fitch, Cardinal Health, and NetJets (the former Executive Jets). Finally, Columbus’s government, under the leadership of Michael Coleman, has moved to re-populate the downtown with a number of new green spaces, incentives for construction of new apartment and condominium complexes, and throughout the city, a maze of bicycle paths and bicycle rights-of-way on city streets. To illustrate, the Columbus Downtown Development Commission reports the addition of 2,343 living units since 2002, another 785 under construction, and 652 proposed (Columbus Downtown Development Commission, 2013). Truly, then, Columbus well represents cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities.

IV. Research Design

Within this context, the empirical research grounds itself in three Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods, two of which have witnessed the emergence of neighborhood regimes: Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, and Olde Towne East (Figure 3.3). King-Lincoln has seen significant investment as part of a broad push to publicize the neighborhood’s historic character, especially with respect to the African-American community. In contrast, redevelopment activity in Weinland Park has been realized as a partnership between various actors, including (but not
limited to) the City of Columbus, private developers, foundations, and The Ohio State University. Finally, Olde Towne East provides a contrasting example of change (or lack thereof) where a neighborhood regime has failed to emerge, despite ongoing gentrification since the 1970’s.

The research utilizes a mixed-method approach to understand the formal and informal relationships that guide contemporary neighborhood change – the nexus of which I have termed urban revitalization. First, exploratory data analysis identifies socioeconomic, employment, housing, and land use changes in each neighborhood since 1970. Characteristics will be mapped to understand temporal-spatial dynamics of change, including how the study area neighborhoods have evolved (both in-and-of themselves and vis-à-vis Columbus as a whole). Second, archival data analysis articulates historical processes of change that provides additional context to the perspectives gleaned through quantitative and GIS analyses. Third, key informant interviews provide an on-the-ground understanding of the formation and maintenance of neighborhood regimes. Different informants are interviewed for each study neighborhood, but I have also contacted individuals with a broader knowledge of revitalization activity throughout Columbus, as well as ones with exceptional local knowledge of the city. Interviews probe the sense of the various coalitions relevant to each neighborhood’s evolution; its process of change over time; and current outcomes.

In addition to assembling facts regarding the evolution of each neighborhood, a major objective of the interviews is to gain an impression of (i) why a particular neighborhood has evolved as it has (or has not); (ii) why neighborhoods (among the three) have evolved differently; and (iii) the forces or individuals who are seen as being responsible for, or underlying, these changes and differences.

The sampling frame consists of individuals in the public, private, institutional, and community-based sectors with knowledge of redevelopment processes in Columbus (broadly) and/or the three study neighborhoods. Public-sector actors include development professionals who can speak broadly about the city’s philosophy concerning revitalization and actions in the three study neighborhoods.

Beyond individuals identified through archival research and the author’s personal contacts, interviews proceed according to a snowball sampling technique. While snowball sampling has drawbacks, it is the most appropriate method given the research questions and sampling frame.
Potential interviewees constitute a broad range of individuals who are not easily identified, given that the membership of a governing coalition, especially at the margins, is constantly in flux. In addition, the leadership of some institutions and non-profits undergoes frequent turnover. This is especially true of neighborhood groups and those that depend on volunteer labor. Thus, merely surveying those currently in leadership positions does not provide the research with a full perspective of regime dynamics, in that many who were instrumental in decision-making may have moved on to other opportunities. In addition, it is hoped that those outside the coalition are more candid in their conversations, as they do not have to fear from reprisals, or negative selective incentives.

Archival research and the author’s personal contacts and experience also inform the initial interview list. Regarding the latter, previous research in Weinland Park included numerous key informant interviews with real estate developers, Ohio State officials, planners from the City of Columbus and State of Ohio, and leaders of various neighborhood organizations. Many of these interviews were spurred through a snowball method, as certain individuals proved invaluable in suggesting well-informed contacts. In addition, this research demonstrated the importance of interviewing individuals who are more widely knowledgeable about neighborhood development dynamics in Central Ohio – and perhaps less attuned to events within a particular area.
Figure 3.2: Columbus CBD and surrounding neighborhoods.
Figure 3.3: Study area neighborhoods, landmarks, and surrounding environs.
Chapter 4: Weinland Park

I. Introduction

Having articulated the conceptual framework, the dissertation now turns to analyzing the formal and informal relationships underlying urban revitalization in three Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods: Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, and Olde Towne East (Figure 3.2). This first empirical chapter concerns Weinland Park, whose neighborhood regime – the **Weinland Park Collaborative (WPC)** – brings together representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors to promote urban revitalization.

Located on the Near North Side of Columbus, Ohio, and immediately southeast of The Ohio State University campus, Weinland Park is a historically blue-collar neighborhood; one defined by relative socioeconomic stability until the 1980’s, and an area that has undergone substantial social and economic changes within the past thirty years. The neighborhood is compact (approximately ½ square mile) and somewhat rhombus-shaped, bounded by Chittenden Avenue to the north, the Big Four Railroad to the East, Fifth Avenue to the south, and High Street to the west.\(^{15}\) To the neighborhood’s north and west are boarding houses and apartments catering to Ohio State students, to the east is an area of warehousing and light manufacturing, and to the south are gentrified Italian Village and the bustling Short North commercial corridor.\(^{16}\)

Demographic and socioeconomic data suggest a racially-mixed, socioeconomically-challenged neighborhood. Census 2010 data indicate a population of 4,386, with 52% identifying as

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\(^{15}\) These are the boundaries of the Weinland Park Community Civic Association and the study area of the *Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan*. The Weinland Park Collaborative’s service area largely conforms to these bounds, but includes the block north of Chittenden Avenue between Summit and Fourth Streets – the site of a new student housing development named East Village.

\(^{16}\) Both Italian Village and the Short North are typical of ‘second-wave’ gentrification, where revitalization and reinvestment are led by real estate interests, in the former’s case by local realtor Joe Armeni (Hackworth & Smith, 2001).
Caucasian and 37% as African-American. However, within those aggregated figures, differences exist between the neighborhood’s two Census tracts (Figure 4-1). Census tract 16, located primarily east of Summit Street, is 28% Caucasian and 60% Black, while tract 17, located west of Summit Street, is 62% White and 28% African-American. Twelve percent of the population is Hispanic of any race and is relatively evenly distributed between the two Census tracts. According to 2007-2011 American Community Survey estimates, average household income is $22,995, compared to $55,522 in the City of Columbus. The poverty rate in Weinland Park’s two Census tracts are 62% (tract 16) and 55% (tract 17), respectively, while the same rate for Columbus is 16.6%.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Having reviewed the geographic, demographic, and socioeconomic situation of Weinland Park, discussion now turns to the history of the neighborhood until the founding of Campus Partners, Ohio State’s community development arm, in 1994—a relatively stable period that ended with the arrival of urban blight in the 1980’s. The entrance of OSU into neighborhood politics is discussed, including Campus Partners’ two sizeable interventions in the period between 1998 and 2001—the construction of the South Campus Gateway and the transition and subsequent rehabilitation of the area’s project-based Section 8 portfolio. The chapter then turns to the formation of a neighborhood regime—the Weinland Park Collaborative—beginning with the catalytic Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan, attracted a number of actors—Wagenbrenner Development, the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, the Columbus Foundation, and United Way of Central Ohio—to promote urban revitalization. The formation, organization, and efforts of the Collaborative are then discussed, highlighting investments in housing, social services, and infrastructure by both the Collaborative and other actors. The chapter concludes by elucidating a number of salient points about the formation and maintenance of the Weinland Park’ neighborhood regime, including the organizational capacity provided by a place-based institution (Ohio State), the cooperation between outside funders and local leadership, and the role of the civic sector in supporting urban revitalization.

II. Neighborhood History until 1994

17 The Section 8 program contains two components. Project-based Section 8 provides HUD-backed financing for affordable housing units; in turn, these must be let to Section 8 tenants. Housing Choice Vouchers (so-called Tenant-based Section 8) offers subsidies to individual households who rent from private landlords.
Weinland Park was developed in the early 1900’s as a blue-collar neighborhood catering to workers in nearby factories including Columbus Coated Fabrics, Jeffrey Mining Manufacturing, and DL Auld metal finishings (later 3M) – though, despite the area’s proximity to Ohio State, few of its early residents were university employees. Historic Census data indicate that the neighborhood has long featured a racially-mixed though highly-segregated population, with African-American residents primarily located east of 4th Street and Caucasians living west of Summit Street, nearer to High Street (Table 4.1).

Urban blight arrived in Weinland Park relatively late, but with its usual effects. In the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, local developer David Houze assembled approximately 550 apartment and townhouse units into the newly-created Section 8 program, which subsidized private landlords to provide housing for low-income tenants. Many of these Section 8 tenants arrived in Weinland Park from Columbus’ Westside, where a large public housing complex was shuttered at roughly the same time. These newcomers represented a significant influx of poverty and its attendant pathologies into the neighborhood, and in-movers lacked social ties to other area residents. Violence increased as competing, Westside gang members were now living alongside their Northside rivals.

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<td>4%</td>
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<td>50%</td>
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<td>48%</td>
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<td>Homeownership rate</td>
<td>16%</td>
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1 Data from 2007-2011 ACS estimates.

Table 4.1: Weinland Park historic Census data. Sources: Geolytics, 2003; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.

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18 This information was gleaned from key informant interviews and OSU archival records pertaining to Campus Partners’ efforts to transition the portfolio to non-profit ownership.
Figure 4.1: Weinland Park Reference Map
Municipal initiatives in Weinland Park during the 1980’s and 1990’s were primarily focused on stemming blight through reducing crime.¹⁹ By the late 1980’s, Weinland Park had the city’s highest crime rate; the intersection of 8th Avenue and Hamlet Street was known as the most dangerous in the city; and the local gang, the Short North Posse (commonly referred to as the SNP), carried the reputation as Columbus’ most violent group. Following a lengthy investigation, the Columbus Police Department executed a series of warrants the SNP in early 1995, indicting 46 gang members with 200 felony charges (Columbus Monthly, 2011). However, the success of this operation was short-lived, as by 1997, a second-generation SNP was operational, reportedly featuring younger relations of those previously indicted.

One early attempt to revitalize Weinland Park was led by a group of in-movers hoping to spark gentrification. In the early 1990’s, a group of friends, all of whom met while students at OSU, began purchasing and renovating houses along Hamlet Street (between 7th and 8th Avenues) and East 7th Avenue (between Summit and 4th Streets). These residents hoped to spark a neighborhood renaissance similar to what had earlier happened in Columbus’ Victorian, Italian, and German Villages, where renovation of historic properties had fomented a broader gentrification process.

While these in-movers were initially optimistic about fomenting broad neighborhood change, their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful. Stonewall Columbus, a local gay rights and advocacy organization, warned that gentrification could lead to displacement of existing residents, and many abandoned their cause due to these ethical concerns.²⁰ Those who remained found themselves targeted by existing neighborhood residents, and interviews with these in-movers reveal that they believe homophobia and racism motivated many of the attacks. One in-mover was killed in his home, prompting many others to sell and leave. The few who stayed isolated themselves social and politically; rarely venturing within the neighborhood beyond Hamlet Street,

¹⁹ This stands in sharp contrast to today’s revitalization efforts, which have adopted a much broader, more holistic perspective.

²⁰ The importance of Stonewall was related to the demographic composition of the in-movers, many of whom were homosexuals. Further, interviews with members of this cohort indicated that they were cognizant of the role that homosexuals had played in engendering change in other Columbus neighborhoods – namely German Village, Olde Towne East (see Chapter 6), and Victorian Village – and felt like the presence of gays in Weinland Park would do the same.
and forming their own civic association, the Weinland Park Community Collaborative, membership in which was restricted to homeowners.21

III. Neighborhood History, 1994-2004: Enter OSU

III.a Campus Partners and Neighborhood Planning22

Given the social pathologies occurring in the area to its immediate southeast, it is not surprising that OSU chose to involve itself in community and economic redevelopment – and in fact, it’s perhaps more shocking that the university largely ignored off-campus issues until the early- to mid-1990s. However, the arrival of E. Gordon Gee as University President in 1990 brought a new focus on the neighborhoods surrounding campus.23

OSU’s involvement in off-campus neighborhoods results from a perfect storm of geography and history. First, Gee’s wanted the University to adopt a more public and activist stance in both its surrounding neighborhoods and also the broader Columbus community.24 Second, processes of blight in the Weinland Park community were spilling over to neighborhoods to the north and west, and students were increasingly concerned about both violent and property crime. As a result, many chose to live further from the university and commute to campus, prompting fears among university administrators of a decline in ‘student culture’ in the neighborhoods surrounding OSU.25 Third, OSU was in the process of improving its academic reputation – having only recently shifted away from an open enrollment policy – and administrators feared

21 Note that the Weinland Park Community Collaborative is the now-defunct civic association representing the neighborhood. The Weinland Park Collaborative is the area’s neighborhood regime.

22 Information in this section was largely culled from OSU archives.

23 His interest in off-campus neighborhoods is explained through the (possibly apocryphal) story that, with his driver ill, Gee drove himself from the President’s mansion in Bexley to campus and became lost, eventually passing through Weinland Park. Gee was reportedly shocked by housing conditions along 11th Avenue and/or 4th Street (accounts of his route to campus vary).

24 The previous administration, led by Edward Jennings, had devoted much of its attention to OSU’s pressing budget issues.

25 A February 1994 report from Bill Hall, then OSU’s Director of Housing, identified a “Red Zone” – south of 13th Avenue and east of High – where the student population had declined 13% since the mid-1980’s. Hall attributed this drop to the area’s very high violent crime rate.
that perceptions of safety (or lack thereof) hampered the university’s ability to attract high-quality students.

Within this emerging scenario, in January 1994 Gee commissioned the University Area Improvement Task Force to identify how OSU could promote development and improve quality of life in the neighborhoods surrounding campus, including Weinland Park. In a press release announcing the Task Force’s creation, Gee stated that the University’s motivation lay “with the problems of crime, trash and deteriorating housing in the University Area . . . this neighborhood is the front door to the Columbus campus. Its problems are, therefore, our problems.” Gee designated University Treasurer Jim Nichols to lead the Task Force, assisted by Janet Pichette (Vice President of Business and Finance) and David Williams (Vice President of Student Affairs). The Task Force’s efforts included site visits to other urban universities and conducting focus groups and community meetings with stakeholders – students, faculty, and staff, along with neighborhood residents not affiliated with OSU.

The Task Force’s efforts took on a new urgency with the March 1994 rape and murder of Ohio State student Stephanie Hummer, who was abducted from the south campus bar district – a derelict series of basement-level drinking establishments where, on Friday and Saturday nights, Columbus police felt compelled to string ropes along High Street to prevent intoxicated students from falling into traffic. Hummer’s murder attracted a tremendous amount of attention to the problems plaguing the University District, and interviews with former Task Force members and archival data suggest that it directly led to the incorporation of Campus Partners for Community Urban Redevelopment (Campus Partners) in September 1994 as a 501(c)3 non-profit and Ohio 1728 Community Urban Redevelopment Corporation. Campus Partners was charged with promoting community and economic development throughout the University District, and was initially funded by $25 million from the OSU endowment.26

Campus Partners’ first initiative was to engage international planning firm EDAW (now part of AECOM) to conduct a comprehensive plan for the entire University District. A year-long

26 The University District is bounded by the Glen Echo Ravine (Arcadia Avenue) to the north, the Big 4 Railroad to the east, Fifth Avenue to the south, and the Olentangy River to the west. While primarily associated with off-campus student housing, its southeastern quadrant encompasses Weinland Park, and several neighborhoods to campus’ southwest are largely non-student as well (e.g., NECKO, the Circles).
planning process throughout 1995 was overseen by a 90-member Community Advisory Council and was guided through input collected by six public task forces, five public meetings, a five-hour open house, and interviews with neighborhood residents. These efforts culminated with the July 1996 adoption of the *University Neighborhoods Revitalization Plan: A Concept Document*. The plan is a comprehensive urban neighborhood evaluation, covering such issues as parking, crime, health, residential and commercial revitalization, and transportation. Beyond these topics, the *Concept Document* is organized around six core values guiding future community and economic development of the University District: (i) Model for University-Community Relationships, (ii) A Place of Pride, (iii) Cultural and Economic Diversity, (iv) A Neighborhood of Choice, (v) Demonstrate New Leadership, and (vi) Active Participation of Individuals and Agencies.

The most salient recommendation from the *Concept Document* was the creation of three revitalization zones along High Street. Moving south to north, these include a ‘Urban Retail and Entertainment’ District at High Street and 11th Avenue, an ‘Arts Gateway’ at High and 15th Avenue, and an ‘International Village’ at High and Lane Avenue. Each revitalization zone features greater density than the existing land uses, mixed-use structures with first-floor retail and either residential or office above, and structured parking facilities.

With the momentum generated through the *Concept Document*, Campus Partners initiated another planning process in 1997 that limited its geographic focus to High Street. Adopted in 2000 following several revisions, *A Plan for High Street: Creating a 21st Century Main Street* is organized around a four-point mission statement that seeks to

(i) Restore High Street as the symbolic heart of the district, providing a variety of public places for people from all walks of life together, (ii) Re-establish High Street as a vital Main Street for the district, providing a dynamic mix of retail, entertainment, and services, (iii) Create a place for new economic opportunities, providing jobs and other public benefits to adjacent neighborhoods, and (iv) Reinforce High Street as an environment that supports learning, providing settings and activities that draw Ohio State students, faculty, and staff to the district (Campus Partners, 2000, p. 5).

From this mission statement, the plan reinforces Campus Partners’ commitment to High Street redevelopment first seen in the *Concept Document*, providing a detailed inventory of building stock and advocating redevelopment along New Urbanist lines – mixed use including apartments or offices over retail, historic preservation where applicable, increased density, structures built to
the sidewalk, and structured parking facilities to the rear. The plan also reiterates the call for strategic redevelopment of the three revitalization zones identified in the Concept Document, and prioritizes the construction of a University Gateway Center at High Street and 11th Avenue.

Following adoption of the Plan for High Street, Campus Partners received authorization from the OSU Board of Trustees to issue a national RFP (Request for Proposals) to construct the University Gateway Center, later renamed the South Campus Gateway. Given the market tone struck by the plan, Campus Partners was initially optimistic about the RFP process, but their enthusiasm was met with lukewarm responses by developers owing to changed retail market conditions and the numerous demands of OSU. First, since commencing the High Street plan’s retail analysis, Columbus’ commercial market had shifted. The University Gateway Center would now compete with the Lennox Town Center, a commercial brownfield redevelopment located southwest of and adjacent to OSU and anchored by the city’s only urban Target, several national clothing retailers, a book store, and a 24-screen multiplex. Second, many developers shied away from the logistical hurdles of building a large, mixed-use development that must achieve certain public goals. The challenges of such development are daunting: site assembly is complex and incentivizes landowners to hold-out, the displacement of long-term tenants is politically unpalatable, and public (University) demands can add complexity and unpredictability to the project.

Ultimately, Campus Partners served as lead contractor for the Gateway project, and hired planners and developers to meet its vision. Land assembly was accomplished through the threat, but not use, of eminent domain by the City. Support from the City also included infrastructure improvements to the area. The Gateway features 184 apartments above retail establishments, various OSU offices, art galleries whose presence is subsidized by Campus Partners, a 1,200-space parking garage, and a movie theater that shows both new-run and art-house films (Campus Partners, 2013). Interviews indicate that the parking, apartments, and office components of the Gateway have exceeded expectations (the latter two likely due to a ready-made market from Ohio State), while the retail and movie theater have lagged revenue expectations – likely from increased competition from the Lennox Town Center.

Concurrent with planning the South Campus Gateway project, in 1998 Campus Partners initiated a homeownership incentive program for OSU faculty and staff that provided up to $3,000 of forgivable down payment assistance through a $500,000 grant from the OSU Board of Trustees.
While grants were available throughout the University District, Campus Partners bifurcated the neighborhood into two areas – ‘A’ and ‘B,’ with ‘A’ including homes immediately proximate to campus and in Weinland Park (i.e., less desirable houses) and ‘B’ areas lying north of Lane Avenue and largely non-student neighborhoods southwest of campus (i.e., likely more desirable homes). While many faculty members took advantage of the program in the ‘B’ neighborhoods, few utilized the grants in the ‘A’ designation – and in fact, 15 years following the program’s inception, funds are still available for Area A.\(^{27}\)

### III.b Section 8

As part of negotiations with Columbus officials concerning the use of eminent domain to acquire property for the South Campus Gateway, City Councilor Charleta Tavarese publicly called for OSU to address quality-of-life issues in the adjoining Weinland Park neighborhood. Her concern was twofold: first, that the Gateway might foment a gentrification process that would displace existing, low-income residents, and second, that the Gateway might represent a symbolic way for the university to wall itself off from Weinland Park. In response, Campus Partners hired Boston-based consultant Peter Roche to investigate how the organization could address blight in Weinland Park. Mr. Roche’s report highlighted the extensive nature of Section 8 throughout the neighborhood, and how upcoming shifts in HUD Section 8 disbursements would exacerbate the already-deteriorated condition of these properties.

As discussed previously, through the late 1970’s and early 1980’s, Columbus-based developer David Houze assembled a portfolio of apartments and townhouses through HUD-insured mortgages, which provided that Houze only rent those units to Section 8 tenants. This portfolio came to encompass approximately 1,900 housing units, about 1,350 of which were located in Columbus’ Weinland Park (~550) and Near East (~800) neighborhoods, with the remainder in Louisville, Kentucky, Portsmouth, Ohio, and Athens, Georgia. Houze created Broad Street Management, Inc. (BSMI) to manage the Section 8 units, which became known as the Broad Street Portfolio. Despite the portfolio’s significant size and scattered-site nature, ownership was

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27 Despite the recent development attention in Weinland Park, the emergence of a neighborhood regime, and the general uptick in demand for urban living inherent to cognitive-cultural capitalism, Campus Partners staff reported that they have not witnessed an increase in usage of the Homeownership Incentive Program, and in fact, they are working to retool the effort.
relatively straightforward, and was comprised of single general partner and seventeen limited partnerships. Additionally, portfolio properties were relatively uniform, and primarily consisted of two- or three-bedroom townhouses of brick construction.

As the initial mortgages had carried a 20-year term, by the late 1990’s these loans were coming due for refinancing. Concurrently, HUD was embarking on a program known as Mark-to-Market. Administered by the Office of Multifamily Housing Assistance Restructuring (OMHAR), Mark-to-Market entailed lowering rents paid to Section 8 owners while providing federal funds for property rehabilitation and refinancing the HUD-insured loans into a 30-year note.28

Mr. Roche argued that the need to refinance (thus entering the Mark-to-Market program) and the resulting reduced rents would have significant and deleterious effect on BSMI’s finances and, thus, property quality. Even before Mark-to-Market, Weinland Park residents considered BSMI’s properties an eyesore at best and a blight at worst. Section 8 payments are contingent upon occupancy, so BSMI had no incentives to ensure tenant quality – or, considering the tight Section 8 market, to ensure the properties’ desirability. In a memo to Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman and OSU President Brit Kirwan dated 21 August 2000, Campus Partners President Terry Foegler wrote that “The potential implications of this restructuring activity . . . are ominous. Reduced rents virtually insure that the quality of management and maintenance will deteriorate . . . In the worst case, HUD’s adoption of ‘street rents’ . . . . could lead to conditions of poverty and neighborhood disinvestment which will take decades to reverse,” given that post-Mark-to-Market mortgages carried a 30-year note.

While the specific details of the Broad Street restructuring are beyond the scope of this dissertation, a few notes are pertinent. The entire process was incredibly bureaucratic and complex, and only accomplished by the close cooperation of Campus Partners, the Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing (an affordable housing agency), HUD officials, and two elected representatives, Rep. Deborah Pryce and Senator Mike Dewine. While Campus Partners

28 In the early years of Section 8, HUD incentivized landlords to enroll in the new program by paying above-market rate rents. As these were pegged to metro-wide housing inflation and most subsidized units were in deteriorating neighborhoods (i.e., where inflation was much lower, if present at all), by 2000 HUD was paying substantially above market rate for these units. Mark-to-Market attempted to bring rents down to actual, or “street,” levels.
orchestrated the restructuring, it recruited the Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing (OCCH) to own the portfolio. In turn, OCCH created Community Properties of Ohio (CPO) to manage the portfolio and provide social services to tenants. CPO has adopted a number of innovative programs, including Eliminate the Elements, where specially-trained Columbus police officers patrol units and build relationships with tenants. In addition, CPO has instituted strict tenant controls, in stark contrast to BSMI. With the restructuring came a renovation of the entire portfolio, funded by a $100 million ‘earmark’ secured by Representative Pryce and Senator Dewine.

IV. The Formation of a Neighborhood Regime, 2004-2006

By the early 2000’s, Campus Partners, with support from the City of Columbus, was the only actor driving revitalization efforts in Weinland Park. Despite their mandate to support community and economic development throughout the University District, Campus Partners’ two significant investments in the built environment – the South Campus Gateway and the Section 8 sale and rehabilitation – had been within Weinland Park, the district’s southeastern quadrant. Given these efforts, coupled with other planned investments, Campus Partners and the City engaged a neighborhood planning process for Weinland Park. This planning process would ultimately prove to be a transformational event that brought a number of new actors into the orbit of Weinland Park’s redevelopment and ultimately led to the creation of a neighborhood regime – the Weinland Park Collaborative – encompassing representatives from the public (City of Columbus), private (Wagenbrenner, Cardinal Health), and civic (Campus Partners/OSU, Weinland Park Community Civic Association, JP Morgan Chase Foundation, Columbus Foundation, and United Way) sectors. The Collaborative would adopt a largely informal structure, where potential initiatives would be discussed openly, but individual funders could select which projects to support.

IV.a Weinland Park Neighborhood Planning Process

Following two years of lobbying by Campus Partners, in early 2004 the City of Columbus initiated a neighborhood planning process for Weinland Park. In his successful 2000 campaign, Mayor Michael Coleman emphasized the role of neighborhoods in local economic development; following his election, the City shifted its planning focus from larger area plans to smaller, more focused neighborhood plans. Area plans had typically studied a geographically larger expanse
that had little or no connection to cohesive social units, had been largely technical in nature, and had not emphasized community participation. In contrast, neighborhood plans place community engagement at the center, study socially-relevant units that are typically much smaller than those examined under area plans, and are more expansive in scope, approaching planning through a holistic perspective that often includes safety, education, alternative transportation, youth engagement, and civic engagement.29

While Columbus’ Planning Department typically organized and managed the planning process, in addition to writing and formatting the plan itself, Campus Partners contracted with Goody Clancy to assist city staff. A Massachusetts-based consulting firm, Goody Clancy has become Campus Partners’ and the University’s planner of choice, having previously been hired to complete the University Neighborhoods Revitalization Plan (1995) and A Plan for High Street (2000). The addition of Goody Clancy augmented the scale and scope of the planning process, especially related to community engagement.

The process itself was guided by a working committee and five sub-committees – community involvement and public safety, housing, human services, infrastructure, and land use, economic development, and aesthetics – each composed of neighborhood residents and staff from the City and Goody Clancy. Given the frequently acerbic nature of neighborhood politics, particularly between newer and longer-term residents, and also between homeowners and renters (e.g., the latter could not join the Weinland Park Community Collaborative), the plan emphasized community engagement to build consensus.

The Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan advocates a future for the neighborhood based on what it terms ‘revitalization,’ instead of gentrification, that encompasses

the creation of an exciting, attractive, diverse, mixed-income area where residents, business, institutions, and other stakeholders in the community work together to address and fulfill their mutual interests, dreams, and aspirations (Department of Development, 2006, p. 2).  

The majority of the plan’s recommendations – discussed across twelve pages – concern housing revitalization and development. The plan identifies six locations as ripe for redevelopment, with

29 To compare the differences between area and neighborhood plans, see http://development.columbus.gov/planningareas.aspx and http://development.columbus.gov/neighborhoodplanning.aspx.
three serving as neighborhood gateways and five offering new, mixed-income residential opportunities. Potential neighborhood gateways include the 5th and 11th Avenue corridors and the intersection of High Street and 7th Avenue, while opportunities for new investments include the aforementioned corridors in addition to the former Auld/3M site along 5th Avenue and the Columbus Coated Fabrics property at the eastern margin of the neighborhood (See Figure 4.2). Topics addressed less thoroughly include community involvement, economic and workforce development, public safety, infrastructure, and human and social services – the latter a subject typically not addressed in such documents, and whose inclusion was advocated by neighborhood residents and aided by the expertise of Goody Clancy. Also regarding the latter, the plan advocates for promotion of financial literacy, programming for youth and families including parenting education and engagement of young people, and celebrating neighborhood diversity through life-cycle housing and mentoring of previously-incarcerated residents.

IV.b Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan Impacts I: Development and Leadership

While a cursory glance of the planning document reveals few unanticipated elements, the impact of the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan goes beyond the printed page, and in numerous ways, it serves as the founding document of the Weinland Park Collaborative. First, it traced a path for urban revitalization, integrating existing (South Campus Gateway, Section 8 rehabilitation) and planned (11th Avenue police substation, Ohio State’s Early Childhood Education Laboratory School, Weinland Park Elementary reconstruction) projects with proposals for future housing revitalization and economic development. Second, it reorganized neighborhood leadership, replacing an exclusive organization limited only to homeowners (the Weinland Park Community Collaborative) with a more inclusive group open to all residents (the Weinland Park Community Civic Association). Third, building on the plan’s recommendation to rehabilitate the former Columbus Coated Fabrics site, Campus Partners and city planning staff engaged the Wagenbrenner Development Company to involve itself in Weinland Park’s redevelopment. The relevance of these impacts is now discussed.

First, the planning process occurred at a time when many city officials and neighborhood residents felt the area was primed for transformation – and when many existing and planned investments were targeted for the neighborhood. The Plan’s Executive Summary echoes this sentiment, stating that
Much is happening, including Campus Partners’ new South Campus Gateway in the northwest corner of the neighborhood, rehabilitation of hundreds of subsidized housing units by Community Properties of Ohio, streetscape and park improvement by the City of Columbus, and a new Early Childhood Development Center and modern Weinland Park Elementary School being developed by OSU and the Columbus Public Schools, respectively (Department of Development, 2006, p. 2).

With these existing and planned investments, the Plan could articulate a vision of development that leveraged newly-constructed and planned assets toward future development. For example, the South Campus Gateway could anchor a revitalized 11th Avenue corridor, with a corresponding gateway at the eastern boundary of the neighborhood. The new Northside Library, located just outside the neighborhood on the west side of High Street at McMillen Avenue, could lead to housing development along Eighth and Ninth Avenues. The reconstruction of the Kroger at 7th Avenue could be integrated into a larger gateway project that linked the neighborhood to High Street. Development pressure from a transformed Italian Village to the south would encourage the rehabilitation of the adjacent Columbus Coated Fabrics and 3M sites.

Second, given the neighborhood’s fractious politics and the exclusiveness and aloofness of the existing neighborhood association, an early thrust of the planning process was identifying new civic leadership. City officials and Campus Partners felt that the existing neighborhood organization, the Weinland Park Community Collaborative, could not serve as the area’s voice in the planning process; membership in it was limited to homeowners, and virtually all of its members were middle-class and Caucasian and thus hardly representative of the neighborhood’s socioeconomic profile. To that end, planning officials sought to replace the Community Collaborative with a more inclusive and representative organization, and engaged Robert Caldwell and Catherine Girves, two experienced community organizers, to establish the Weinland Park Community Civic Association (WPCCA). Unlike the Community Collaborative, the WPCCA was open to all Weinland Park residents—not just homeowners—and became the designated voice of the neighborhood for the duration of the planning process. Caldwell served

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30 These properties were part of the BSMI Section 8 portfolio, and were slated to be demolished due to structural deterioration. However, following objections by preservationists (the properties are part of a historic district), the Collaborative decided to retain the apartments. As of June 2013, construction is beginning on the former Community Properties of Ohio apartments along 11th Avenue at this eastern gateway, between 4th Street and Grant Avenue. Wagenbrenner Development is renovating these units with funding from historic preservation tax credits (discussed later in the chapter).
as the Chair of the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan Working Committee – effectively serving as a liaison between the planners and WPCCA – and also chaired the community involvement subcommittee.

IV.c Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan Impacts II: Columbus Coated Fabrics

The plan’s most ambitious project was the purchase, environmental rehabilitation, and redevelopment of the Columbus Coated Fabrics (CCF) site. Originally constructed by the Columbus Oil Cloth Company in 1902, the CCF site eventually came to occupy 17.6 acres along the neighborhood’s eastern margin, extending from 5th to 9th Streets between Grant Avenue and the Big 4 railroad tracks (Ball, 2004; Franklin County Auditor, 2013). The Coated Fabrics site had sat vacant since 2001, when its then-owner, Decorative Surfaces International, declared bankruptcy. The attraction of the site to Campus Partners and the City was obvious: it occupies a large parcel in a neighborhood that appeared ripe for redevelopment and sits adjacent to a transformed Italian Village. However, given the site’s lengthy history of manufacturing and the nature of what it had produced (vinyl wallpaper and cloth), environmental contamination was expected.
Knowing that financial and logistical hurdles likely placed redevelopment of the CCF site beyond the scope of either the City or Campus Partners, both organizations began conversations with Columbus-based Wagenbrenner Development Company in 2005. They envisioned a public-private partnership where Wagenbrenner, with support from the City, would apply for Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund (CORF) monies to offset costs associated with environmental reclamation. In return, the City would sign an Economic Development Agreement that promised infrastructure improvements to serve the revitalized CCF site. Originally passed by voters in 2000 and reauthorized in 2008, the Clean Ohio Fund competitively disburses matching grants of up to $3 million toward environmentally reclaiming contaminated, formerly industrial properties. CORF judges redevelopment proposals based on a multitude of factors, including feasibility, job creation, and amount of matching funds (State of Ohio, 2013a).

To the City and Campus Partners, Wagenbrenner was the obvious choice to redevelop the CCF site. The developer had previously submitted two successful CORF applications, including one for a primarily residential redevelopment, Harrison Park, on the site of a former margarine factory in the Harrison West neighborhood (see Figure 3.1). Further, the recent failure of a Clean Ohio-funded redevelopment just south of Weinland Park, Jeffrey Place in Italian Village, was attributed to have resulted from the inexperience of its developer, Joe Recchie, in navigating the logistical and bureaucratic hurdles associated with infill development of contaminated sites (Ferenchik, 2011b). In 2007, Wagenbrenner learned that their application was accepted by Clean Ohio, and they would be receiving $3 million to redevelop the CCF site (Ohio Development Services Agency, 2013).

IV.d JP Morgan Chase Foundation

Separately, in 2002, university benefactor Betty Schoenbaum gifted $2.5 million to construct a new facility for OSU’s Early Childhood Laboratory School that would replace existing on-campus facilities in Campbell Hall. The school provides preschool facilities for children of both

31 Campus Partners had negotiated a purchase option on the site in 2004, but elected not to pursue the property after determining that the environmental reclamation work was beyond the scope and expertise of their organization.

32 The Clean Ohio Fund contains two components – the brownfields matching grants discussed here (the Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund), and the Agricultural Easement Purchase Program, which functions to preserve farmland by purchasing development rights from interested farmers (State of Ohio, 2013a).
OSU staff and, on a lottery basis, those not affiliated with the university. As a condition of her gift, Ms. Schoenbaum stipulated that the new facility be built east of High Street – that is, off-campus – likely in the Weinland Park neighborhood. Despite Ms. Schoenbaum’s insistence, the existing neighborhood leadership, then organized as the Weinland Park Community Collaborative, opposed the preschool. However, with the founding of Weinland Park Community Civic Association, new civic leaders were more amenable to locating the school within the neighborhood. Further, with the planned demolition and reconstruction of the Weinland Park Elementary School at 7th Avenue and 4th Street, Ohio State saw an opportunity to co-locate the preschool and pursue strategic partnerships with the Columbus Public Schools.

While OSU was planning for the facility – and negotiating with neighborhood leaders about siting – the Columbus office of the **JP Morgan Chase Foundation (JPMCF)** was surveying its options to become involved in local community and economic development. JP Morgan Chase had come to Columbus in 2004, when it purchased locally-owned Bank One (A. Burns, 2007). Bank One had enjoyed a longstanding relationship with the university, had supported other developments, and had previously agreed to invest, along with Cincinnati-based Proctor and Gamble, in the Schoenbaum Family Center.33

Concurrent with the change in ownership from Bank One to JP Morgan Chase came new priorities in corporate philanthropy. Inspired by the experience of the General Mills Foundation’s efforts to promote holistic community development in Minneapolis’ Hawthorne neighborhood, JPMCF’s local foundation officer, Jeff Lyttle, decided to commit resources to a low-income Columbus neighborhood. In Hawthorne, the General Mills Foundation had committed to improving neighborhood quality-of-life, specifically by bringing together stakeholders (at monthly meetings known as the ‘Hawthorne Huddle’) and funding various projects related to housing, safety, and education (Barrett & McCarthy Leddy, 2003). What distinguished the Hawthorne Huddle from previous giving by the General Mills Foundation was its geographic

33 More generally, Bank One contributed considerably to the entire city and was a key member of the Columbus urban regime until its merger with First Chicago (and subsequent headquarters relocation) and later JP Morgan Chase.
targeting and broad perspective: concentrating resources to address numerous sources of blight within a distressed, central city neighborhood.\(^{34}\)

Having decided to emulate the Hawthorne Huddle, Lyttle began an assessment of six distressed, central-city Columbus neighborhoods where JPMCF might make a similar commitment.\(^{35}\) In this assessment, Lyttle evaluated these neighborhoods in terms of potential partners and existing “momentum” for development. He selected these criteria because, first, JPMCF did not want “to go it alone,” as (i) it had not engaged in direct service provision previously (instead making grants to non-profit service providers) and (ii) it hoped to leverage its giving with financial, organizational, and logistical commitments from others. Second, Lyttle believed that previous investments in these neighborhoods that would give them “momentum,” thus increasing the likelihood that JPMCF’s investments would be successful in supporting positive community development and improving quality of life.

Ultimately, Lyttle and JPMCF chose to invest in Weinland Park – as one foundation officer remarked, the decision was “obvious.” In terms of partners, Ohio State and the City of Columbus had both made significant investments in the built environment (infrastructure improvements, South Campus Gateway), and the recent turnover of Section 8 from BSMI to OCCH, orchestrated by Campus Partners, further evinced the University’s commitment to the neighborhood. Further, Lyttle believed that the WPCCA would be an honest partner and was a group that would work with the JPMCF toward revitalizing the neighborhood. Lyttle also saw momentum in the neighborhood with the rehabilitation of Section 8 units, the adoption of the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan, potential spillover effects from the gentrifying Italian Village to the south, and the construction of the South Campus Gateway, 11\(^{th}\) Avenue police substation, a new Weinland Park Elementary School, and the Schoenbaum Family Center, in addition to Campus Partners’ commitment to revitalize the High Street commercial corridor.

\(^{34}\) This emphasis on geographic targeting and a holistic approach to neighborhood development is a part of a broader trend in giving known as strategic philanthropy or place-based philanthropy and is discussed in the conclusions.

\(^{35}\) While key informant interviews did not indicate what these six neighborhoods are, one can reasonably expect that they included Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, Franklinton, Linden, and the South Side.
Separate from the JPMCF’s shift to a more targeted giving strategy focused on Weinland Park, changes were also afoot at two other large local philanthropies, the Columbus Foundation and the United Way of Central Ohio (UWCO). As the largest community-based philanthropy in Central Ohio (and one of the largest in the country), the Columbus Foundation annually disburses over $100 million per year to various non-profits. However, despite its substantial financial wherewithal, staff has little say over funding priorities: $92 million of its annual disbursements are determined by donors, who establish their own accounts for the Foundation to manage. This leaves only $8 million in annual discretionary funds to distribute throughout Central Ohio.

In the early 2000’s, however, the Foundation underwent a leadership change that resulted in a shift in operations and funding priorities. Douglas Kridler, previously head of the Columbus Association for the Performing Arts, was hired as President and CEO in 2002, and Dr. Lisa Courtice joined as Executive Vice President for Community Research and Grants Management in 2003. Courtice in particular was hired to revolutionize the Foundation’s grant-making process; their Board of Trustees wanted to make a long-term impact on a particular issue, believing that previous giving had been reactive instead of proactive. Kridler and Courtice both shared this concern and hoped that “putting a stake in the ground” on a particular issue would inspire other donors, including national funders and local institutions, to join in supporting a particular cause.

The first priority in this new strategy was selecting an issue to which the Foundation would commit itself. Staff conducted a meta-analysis of needs in the Columbus area to identify an arena where investments could effect the greatest change. Topics evaluated included women and children, neighborhoods and place-based giving, early childhood education, and workforce development. Encouraged by place-based grant-making done by the Hewlett Foundation in California and the Annie E. Casey Foundation in various cities, most notably Baltimore and Atlanta, the Columbus Foundation decided to target its resources toward broad community and economic change in a particular Columbus neighborhood.

Concurrent with shifts in funding priorities at the Columbus Foundation, the United Way of Central Ohio (UWCO) was similarly adopting a strategy of focusing resources in particular neighborhoods. Its Volunteer Impact Councils – comprised of residents who identify funding priorities – believed that, by targeting giving in a few areas, the impact of grants would be much
greater. Michael Wilkos, Senior Impact Director at UWCO, shared the vision of the Volunteer Impact Councils, and further believed that adopting a more targeted and higher profile approach would leverage resources and inspire giving from large, place-based institutions like Nationwide Children’s (South Side) and Mount Carmel (Franklinton) Hospitals.

With both entities pursuing a place-based grant-making strategy, the Columbus Foundation and UWCO jointly commissioned a study by OSU’s Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicity to evaluate distressed central-city Columbus neighborhoods for potential investment. The funders charged Kirwan to report neighborhood indicators and the likelihood that investments would successfully promote revitalization, given the presence of anchor institutions, potential funding partners, cohesiveness of neighborhood leadership, and ability to improve quality of life in a timely manner. The neighborhoods studied included Franklinton, the South Side, King-Lincoln, Linden, and Weinland Park.

Kirwan recommended that investments in Weinland Park had the greatest likelihood of success, given that (i) the neighborhood is a relatively small and coherent area (½ square mile with a population <5,000), (ii) has a large anchor institution (Ohio State), (iii) has only one civic association (the Weinland Park Community Civic Association) that, as one foundation officer said, “gets along well,” (iv) had received infrastructure investments from the City, and (v) had recently been selected as a target neighborhood by the JP Morgan Chase Foundation.

Ultimately, the Foundation decided to target its giving in Weinland Park, partially as a result from the Kirwan study, but also by lobbying from neighborhood residents, including WPCCA President Robert Caldwell. UWCO also selected Weinland Park, but to appease its many constituents also adopted a broader approach that identified five ‘Priority Neighborhoods,’ one each from the north (Weinland Park), south (South Side), east (King-Lincoln), and west (Franklinton) of the central city, and another, more suburban-style area (North Linden). Similar to the Columbus Foundation, UWCO was also lobbied heavily from neighborhood leaders, including Catherine Girves and Caldwell – who also sat on United Way’s Housing Committee – to select Weinland Park as a Priority Neighborhood.
V. Neighborhood Regime: the Weinland Park Collaborative

V.a Formation and Weinland Wednesdays

By 2009, urban revitalization in Weinland Park was being pursued by three foundations (Columbus Foundation, United Way, and the JPMorgan Chase Foundation), a community development corporation (Campus Partners) funded by a place-based institution (Ohio State), and a developer specializing in central city development (Wagenbrenner). In addition, the City of Columbus had also committed resources toward that goal. This represented a significant shift from only five years prior, when Campus Partners, with assistance from the City, had initiated the Weinland Park neighborhood planning process, and the only momentum toward revitalization was the construction of the South Campus Gateway and the ongoing renovation of the former BSMI Section 8 portfolio.

Given the interest of so many actors in the neighborhood, representatives from these organizations began meeting informally at the Schoenbaum Family Center in early 2009, thus beginning the process of forming a neighborhood regime. Credit for convening these early meetings varies, but interviews suggest that an early impetus came from Jeff Lyttle, JPMCF foundation officer, and David Andrews, then Dean of the College of Education and Human Ecology and a driving force behind the construction of the Schoenbaum Family Center. Campus Partners President Doug Aschenbach was also instrumental in bringing organizations to the table and discussing funding priorities. Soon, they adopted an organized schedule – the first Wednesday of the month at 7:30 am in the Schoenbaum Center’s 2nd floor classroom – and became known as Weinland Wednesdays.36 The Columbus Foundation agreed to fund a part-time consultant – former Campus Partners community relations director Steve Sterrett – to coordinate meetings, write minutes, and handle communication among group members.

As the Weinland Wednesday group began to formalize itself with regular monthly meetings, members discussed possible organizational forms. An early proposal was to pool resources into a single account, possibly administered by a separate 501(c)3 community development corporation, that would distribute funds to various revitalization projects. There were, however, logistical and

36 Recall that the inspiration for JPMCF’s targeting of Weinland Park was the similarly alliterative Hawthorne Huddle in Minneapolis.
bureaucratic hurdles in that all five organizations have separate Boards of Directors to which each is accountable. Further, deciding which projects to fund would likely prove contentious – what if the some funders disagreed with a particular effort? – and would necessitate a more bureaucratic structure to ameliorate disputes. Such an organization would undoubtedly attract outside attention, especially if incorporated as a non-profit, whose tax returns would be public information. Ultimately, the five funders discarded the 501(c)3 approach and elected to keep their finances separate, collaboratively deciding which initiatives merited attention but allowing each organization to fund its own projects, pooling funds when appropriate.

While Weinland Wednesdays were a private sounding board for the organizations looking to transform the neighborhood, the secretive, backroom nature of the meetings drew the ire of neighborhood residents, including the WPCCA. Residents complained that the group was not sharing its plans, was failing to solicit public input, and appeared aloof to neighborhood concerns. Fearing a widespread backlash, the Weinland Wednesday group decided to, as one representative stated, “blow itself up” and invite the WPCCA and other community groups, including the Godman Guild (the local settlement house), other advocacy organizations (Local Matters, Neighborhood Services Inc.), churches (7th Avenue Baptist, St. Sophia), OSU researchers (Kirwan Institute, Knowlton School of Architecture, OSU Urban Extension) to the table. The organization rebranded itself as the Weinland Park Collaborative (WPC), cleaved its membership into the ‘funders’ (Campus Partners/Ohio State, Columbus Foundation, UWCO, JPMCF, and Wagenbrenner) and neighborhood representatives (Godman Guild, WPCCA, Community Properties of Ohio, advocacy organizations), with the City of Columbus and Cardinal Health, a Columbus-based health care services company, also invited to participate in discussions. Figure 4.3 represents what the Collaborative refers to as its ‘family tree’ – the various organizations and individuals supporting and guiding urban revitalization in Weinland Park. The WPC’s leadership consisted of two co-chairs – one representing the funders and another representing the neighborhood. WPC’s efforts would be organized around seven subcommittees: housing, workforce development, education, civic engagement, public safety, youth engagement, and health. Each subcommittee was tasked with identifying a transformational idea that would achieve broad change in an expeditious manner.
Figure 4.3: Weinland Park Collaborative ‘Family Tree.’
The Collaborative hosted a kick-off event, which doubled as the first (and now annual) Weinland Park Neighborhood Festival, on August 28, 2010. The event featured a community picnic, booths representing various social service agencies, promotion of the Weinland Park Dawgs youth football team—funded by the United Way and coached by former Short North Posse member Derek Russell, and speeches from various residents (Ferenchik, 2010a).37

Thus, by the middle of 2009, a neighborhood regime had been forged in Weinland Park. Its membership included representatives from the electoral (City of Columbus), private (Wagenbrenner, Cardinal Health), and civic (JP Morgan Chase Foundation, United Way, Columbus Foundation, Ohio State and Campus Partners, WPCCA, and Godman Guild) sectors. It had settled on a largely informal structure, without incorporating into a separate organization, where initiatives would be discussed collaboratively while individual funders would have autonomy in deciding which projects to support. The WPC would support urban revitalization in Weinland Park centered on the seven subcommittees and their transformational ideas.

V.b Weinland Park Business Plan

One of the Collaborative’s first efforts was commissioning Boston-based consultant Peter Roche, who had previously worked with Campus Partners on the Section 8 portfolio transition, to author a business plan that would guide the WPC’s efforts.38 The need for a plan was two-fold. Many of the funders, including the Columbus Foundation, UWCO, and JPMCF, had not engaged before in direct service provision, had never supported such a broad community and economic development initiative, and had never targeted their resources to one neighborhood. For them, the business plan would articulate a strategy for future involvement.

37 Interestingly, all of the speakers at the event were neighborhood residents, and no representatives from the Collaborative not living in Weinland Park spoke. Michael Wilkos, formerly of the United Way and now employed by the Columbus Foundation, spoke on behalf of the Collaborative. He is also a Weinland Park resident, having moved to the area after becoming inspired by the revitalization that UWCO and the Foundation were pursuing.

38 The business plan was funded by the Columbus Foundation, and concerned broad urban revitalization (that is, the business of the Collaborative), not just business development.
Another reason for a business plan was the rapidly-deteriorating condition of Weinland Park’s real estate market. Few (if any) of the funders had anticipated the upheaval that would emanate from the Great Recession that began in 2007. Given perceptions among developers and real estate investors that Weinland Park was poised for transformation, many had purchased houses with subprime and other risky mortgages. For example, local landlord Richard Resatka, operating as Sales One Realty, had used aggressive property appraisals, (non-existent) equity, and creative mortgage instruments to assemble a portfolio of low-income rental units. In 2009, Resatka’s scheme collapsed, and Sales One’s portfolio of dozens of rental properties was liquidated in foreclosure.

Within this environment, Wagenbrenner began a broad analysis of Weinland Park’s real estate market. Their initial results were highly troubling: given declines in appraised values, most of the neighborhood’s mortgages were ‘underwater’ – that is, the house was worth less than the remaining value of the loan. With the foreclosure of the Sales One portfolio, vacancy rates were skyrocketing, driving fears of spillover effects and further decreases in property values. Other funders feared that Wagenbrenner was contemplating withdrawing from the Economic Development Agreement and its planned redevelopment of the CCF site. Lobbying from other Collaborative members, especially Campus Partners, allayed Wagenbrenner’s fears, though the Collaborative realized that it would have to adopt a more strategic approach to housing investments – one that relied heavily on federal subsidies – and a longer-term view to achieving urban revitalization.

While the Weinland Park Business Plan has not been released to the public (or, despite repeated requests, to the author), interviews with Collaborative members provide a cursory picture of its recommendations. Roche recommended that the Collaborative “go big” and invest substantial resources into rehabilitating Weinland Park’s housing market. He argued that present real estate disruptions and the Sales One liquidation provided a singular opportunity to purchase a large number of vacant properties at prices that would likely never be so low again. Further, the neighborhood’s high vacancy rate allowed the Collaborative to take control of many houses without having to displace existing residents, as they had already been evicted by foreclosure.

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39 More than one key informant referred to Mr. Resatka as a ‘slumlord.’
Roche’s *Weinland Park Business Plan* identified a revitalization strategy centered on renovation and construction of new housing. As a result, housing has attracted the majority of the WPC’s attention and resources. The Collaborative broadly adopted the recommendations in Roche’s plan, and charged Wagenbrenner to begin acquiring properties with funding from other WPC members. Wagenbrenner demonstrated its expertise in urban real estate markets, forming several shell companies to acquire houses surreptitiously. In doing so, it masked the Collaborative’s efforts, preventing an escalation of housing prices; certainly, if existing landowners knew of the WPC’s plans, they would begin demanding higher prices, and so much buying activity (and the likelihood of redevelopment) would attract competition from other developers. All properties acquired by Wagenbrenner were vacant, and as such, these efforts did not directly displace any existing residents.

While Wagenbrenner was acquiring properties with Collaborative financing, a new funding source emerged to purchase and renovate foreclosed and vacant housing. The federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has allocated funds to municipalities to purchase and dispose of vacant, previously-foreclosed, or abandoned properties in neighborhoods where such houses are concentrated. Property disposal can include either demolition or rehabilitation and resale, though NSP imposes certain income and affordability requirements on the latter – specifically, households purchasing a NSP home must earn less than 120% of the area median income (AMI).

Funding restrictions limit use of NSP funds to low-income neighborhoods, of which Weinland Park was one.\(^{40}\) Neighborhood leaders in eligible areas lobbied the City to direct funding their way, and many complained that Weinland Park had already received a disproportionate amount of municipal attention and monies. Nevertheless, the City believed that, among eligible neighborhoods, Weinland Park had the best organizational capacity due to the presence of its neighborhood regime (the Weinland Park Collaborative), and awarded the WPC (through Wagenbrenner) a portion of the City’s NSP funding.

\(^{40}\) Location guidelines were similar to those used with the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program.
Wagenbrenner has augmented Collaborative monies with NSP funds to renovate 14 homes and construct 6 new residences, mostly along 5th and 6th Streets (Figure 4-4). Initial demand was so strong that the developer instituted a lottery to organize and rank potential buyers; this also gave existing residents a better chance of acquiring an NSP property, as drawings alternated between households currently living in Weinland Park and those outside the neighborhood. As of June 2013, all NSP homes have been sold and occupied, and Wagenbrenner is currently recycling the proceeds from sale of the initial NSP properties to construct and rehabilitate additional housing. Some recycled NSP money is going toward construction of new houses at the corner of 4th Street and 8th Avenue, long considered one of the more dangerous intersections in the neighborhood. These homes will replace two derelict apartment buildings, which the Collaborative gained control of through cooperation with Franklin County, which agreed to forgive tax arrears on the property (Carmen, 2010). Franklin County then gifted the property to Campus Partners, which funded demolition of the structures. In turn, Wagenbrenner is currently constructing six single-family houses using NSP and funding from the Affordable Housing Trust for Columbus and Franklin County.

While NSP funding was unexpected, and the houses renovated by Wagenbrenner have elicited strong demand from both existing residents and in-movers, developers and buyers have expressed numerous frustrations with the program’s bureaucracy. Representatives from the real estate community, while admitting that NSP has resulted in increased property values throughout Weinland Park, remarked that developers are currently trying to extricate themselves from the program, believing it slow, expensive, and unwieldy. Buyers of NSP homes expressed similar frustrations, remarking that the “process was arduous … we had to fill out lots of paperwork … the loan had to first be approved by the bank, and then by the city, and any changes to the loan had to be re-approved by the city.” Regardless of the difficulty in obtaining the mortgage, though, this household would go through the process again, because they are committed to the neighborhood and understand the financial benefits of purchasing a subsidized house.41

Aside from WPC and NSP funding, Wagenbrenner has secured both federal and state historic preservation tax credits to redevelop 90 multifamily units across 25 buildings along East 11th

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41 One should note, though, that this household had unique resources to draw upon – one member worked for a bank as a teller, and could speak with others at the firm for advice.
Avenue between North 4th and Grant Streets, a project recently named Commons on Grant (Figure 4.4). These units were once a part of the BSMI portfolio, and slated for demolition and redevelopment by Community Properties of Ohio (Ferenchik, 2008b). However, when preservation activists balked – the properties lie within the New Indianola Historic District – WPC applied for federal and state historic tax credits, and sold the properties to Wagenbrenner for redevelopment. Interviews with Collaborative representatives indicate that WPC was able to obtain these tax credits because of the “political firepower” of its members, especially OSU, and because of infrastructure commitments from the City. The project has an estimated cost of $12 million; construction is slated to begin in fall 2013 and scheduled to be completed in 2014.

Another housing investment by the Collaborative (administered by the Mid Ohio Regional Planning Commission [MORPC]) is an exterior home repair program for homeowners in Weinland Park. This has committed $600,000 for renovations to 30 houses, with homeowners eligible to receive up to $20,000 each. Its goal is to improve the physical appearance of the neighborhood, and especially to assist more elderly homeowners with the cost of exterior repairs.

Spurred by the Collaborative’s housing efforts, outside organizations have also invested in in Weinland Park’s housing stock. Cleveland-based NRP Group utilized Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and NSP-2 funding to construct 40 new homes along 6th Avenue, in proximity to properties Wagenbrenner has renovated utilizing NSP-1 funds. NRP was drawn to Weinland Park by Wagenbrenner, having met serendipitously at a national affordable housing conference and being inspired by the work of the Collaborative. NRP’s properties operate on a lease-purchase agreement, where buyers sign a 15-year rental agreement during which they accrue equity on the house, and have the option to purchase following the lease period – but are not obligated to buy.

Other private housing developments have targeted the neighborhood’s northern margin – an area where many residents are Ohio State students – and the High Street corridor (Figure 4-4). East Village, an 82-unit apartment building catering to students, opened in 2012 along Chittenden

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42 Recall that Community Properties of Ohio is the property manager for the project-based Section 8 portfolio in Weinland Park.

43 Similar programs exist in other central city Columbus neighborhoods, including the Hilltop and South Side.
Avenue at the northern border of the WPC service area. An infill development at Euclid Avenue and High Street expanded an existing commercial building to include three new apartments and three additional retail spaces. In 2008, a private developer renovated the York Masonic Temple at 6th and High into 25 condominiums. Immediately south of the York redevelopment, at 1288 North High Street, a new mixed use (12 apartments over a micro-brewery) building has opened. Locally-owned Brothers Drake Meadery moved from a suburban location to a previously-vacant structure one block east of High Street, at Courtland and Fifth Avenues.

While the aforementioned housing investments were generally greeted positively by neighborhood residents, Habitat for Humanity’s efforts to construct seven new homes utilizing NSP funds was met with resistance. Members of the WPCCA housing subcommittee felt that Weinland Park already had too much low-income housing, and were concerned about the utilitarian and unattractive design of the proposed buildings. Residents were also concerned about perceptions of the neighborhood, feeling that Habitat is associated with a more low-income population and not indicative of an area “on the upswing,” as one WPC representative stated.

The eventual acceptance of Habitat’s plans demonstrates the versatility of the WPC structure, the close cooperation fostered by the Collaborative, and the complementary expertise of its members – all hallmarks of neighborhood regimes. To alleviate concerns about the homes’ design, Wagenbrenner engaged in pro bono architectural work that produced a more aesthetically-pleasing structure. The Columbus Foundation funded a grant to have blueprints made of these designs. Finally, the WPCCA was able to convince residents of the benefits of Habitat’s plans, and successfully diffused the simmering controversy. One WPC representative stated that the experience of Habitat demonstrates that “it goes back to having good neighborhood leaders . . . If someone’s going to come in, we want [homes] that are in character with the rest of the neighborhood, but we’re willing to work with people.”

As of June 2013, a number of additional housing investments are in the planning stages. Homeport, a city-wide Community Development Corporation (CDC) specializing in low-income rental properties and affordable homeownership, has secured row houses along the north side of 5th Avenue, at the southern border of Weinland Park. These properties are slated to be rehabilitated using Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and will be rented to qualified (low-income) tenants. Wagenbrenner has submitted an application to the City for construction of a 70-unit senior apartment complex along 5th Avenue at the southern edge of the Columbus
Coated Fabrics site. This building will also be constructed utilizing LIHTC funding and will represent the first construction on the CCF site. Additionally, through strategic property acquisition, Campus Partners has assembled South of Gateway, a nearly 7-acre development site along 8th and 9th Avenues; while the area has been subject of numerous development rumors and an aborted RFP process, it remains largely vacant as of July 2013. A developer has proposed replacing a dollar store and Laundromat at the northeast corner of High Street and 7th Avenue – immediately north of the redeveloped Kroger site – into a mixed-use retail and apartment building.\textsuperscript{44} Wagenbrenner recently received another $3,000,000 Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund grant to perform environmental clean-up on the Auld/3M site, and potential uses for the property are being evaluated through an $868,000 HUD Community Challenge grant, administered by OSU Landscape Architecture Professor Kay Bea Jones, to address food insecurity issues in the neighborhood.

Despite these many investments in housing, though, the first residential project proposed for the neighborhood – the Columbus Coated Fabrics property – remains undeveloped. Interviews with those affiliated with the development indicate that Campus Partners, the City, and Wagenbrenner were all overly optimistic about the potential for market-rate housing in Weinland Park. In particular, they did not foresee the 2007-8 foreclosure crisis and its numerous impacts on the neighborhood, with decreases in property values, a notable uptick in vacancy rate, and a general ossification (not limited to Weinland Park) in the housing finance market. Beyond these impacts, though, interviews indicated that the three entities also did not fully understand the effort required to realize urban revitalization – that the neighborhood’s real estate market was not yet robust enough to support market-rate homeownership, and would require preceding investments in (subsidized) housing, social services, and infrastructure to reach a point where unsubsidized development was feasible.

Concurrent with housing improvements have been other investments in the built environment. In 2007, the Columbus Public Schools and Ohio State’s Early Childhood Education Lab opened a co-located facility, housing both the Weinland Park Elementary School and Schoenbaum Family Center. The Columbus Police Department constructed a new substation along 11th Avenue that

\textsuperscript{44} As of July 2013, this project appears likely to have been shelved on account of opposition from residents, who feared losing two businesses catering to the area’s low-income population, as well as a parking lot used by a nearby church.
also houses the Northside Pride Center in 2008. The Pride Center serves as a liaison between city government and the community, and provides various services to residents, including code enforcement and public health outreach. As part of a larger corporate strategy refreshing aging stores, Kroger completed a $10 million project to raze and reconstruct their grocery at High Street and 7th Avenue in 2011. The project nearly doubled Kroger’s size, reoriented the building to front High Street and provide outparcels for future development, and refreshed the store’s offerings to appeal to a wealthier clientele (Turner, 2011). Further south, at 5th Avenue and High Street, the AIDS Healthcare Foundation is developing a long-vacant site into a thrift store and pharmacy.

V.d   Social Service Investments

While Roche’s Weinland Park Business Plan articulated a revitalization strategy centered on housing (re)development, WPC has also made investments in social service and workforce development programming. While receiving less attention (and funding) than housing efforts, this programming was instrumental to the Collaborative’s approach to neighborhood revitalization; of the seven WPC subcommittees, six concern social service improvements (workforce development, education, resident leadership, public safety, health and youth engagement). These efforts have largely been spearheaded and administered by the WPCCA and the Godman Guild and funded by the Columbus Foundation and United Way.

However, despite the relative success of investments in Weinland Park, social service programming has a mixed record of bringing about positive change. An early workforce development initiative, funded by the Columbus Foundation, established a position within Ohio State’s Human Resources office for an individual to find employment opportunities for Weinland Park residents at the University.45 In the one year the position was funded, the program failed to secure employment for any neighborhood residents.

45 The individual hired to administer this program was Gina Thorpe, formerly of the United Way.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project</th>
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<th>Public/Private</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
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<td>2009</td>
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<td>7th and High</td>
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<td>Proposed</td>
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</tr>
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<td>1288 N. High</td>
<td>Private developer</td>
<td>Private</td>
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</tr>
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<td>York on High</td>
<td>Private developer</td>
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<tr>
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<td>AIDS Healthcare Foundation</td>
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<td>City of Columbus, Campus Partners</td>
<td>Public/Private</td>
<td>2005</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Public housing investments</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>$26,030,000+</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total housing and built environment investments (including Gateway)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$234,698,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Figures are adapted from literature provided by the Weinland Park Collaborative.
2 Figure only includes Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund ($3 million) and property acquisition and demolition costs ($2.4 million) paid for by the City.
3 Amount includes both construction and infrastructure costs.

Table 4.2: Housing and built environment investments in Weinland Park.
Interviews with WPC representatives suggest that failure of this program relates to a lack of job-ready skills among Weinland Park residents. Accordingly, it caused the Collaborative to shift its emphasis to education and skills training instead of locating employment opportunities. This lack of skills is illustrated by an opening at OSU for landscapers and groundskeepers. Three hundred individuals applied, and the University employed a ranking program to evaluate each applicant. No Weinland Park resident scored higher than 250th in the rankings – that is, all were in the 17th percentile or below. To WPC, this was a clear signal that most employment opportunities – including relatively low-skilled jobs, like groundskeepers – were not attainable for many in the neighborhood – hence, the shift in focus.

Other workforce development initiatives have similarly failed to meet expectations. A construction training program, funded by the WPC and administered by former WPCCA President Robert Caldwell, enrolled 30 neighborhood residents in a trades program at Columbus State Community College. Enrollment was enticed by the potential for employment; Wagenbrenner had promised to hire many of these individuals on housing projects in the neighborhood. Participants were required to attend 7:30 AM classes for an entire month; three tardies resulted in expulsion from the program. Despite strict attendance standards, however, 27 individuals graduate, but most failed to find employment. One reason for this was that NSP funding required Wagenbrenner to use a competitive bidding process, which was not anticipated when the program was initiated. Hence, Wagenbrenner could not select its preferred contractor, and was unable to pressure the one it hired to employ training program graduates. The situation was exacerbated, furthermore, by the worst construction market since the Great Depression.

Improving neighborhood safety has been the focus of other social service programming. Prior to the formation of the WPC, Community Properties of Ohio introduced the ‘Eliminate the Elements’ program in 2003 to hire specially-trained police officers to patrol Section 8 properties and build relationships with tenants. Interviews indicate that this program, along with CPO’s rigorous tenant controls, have reduced crime. A more recent effort that incorporates many ‘lessons learned’ from Eliminate the Elements is Neighborhood Options for Youth, a program initiated in Spring 2013 and funded by the Columbus Foundation and United Way, and operated in partnership with the Godman Guild, Columbus Police, and Franklin County Juvenile Court (Ferenchik, 2013d). The program has two thrusts. First, it offers young people the option to obtain free counseling, and those charged with a crime can be diverted into the program in lieu of
entering the criminal justice system. Second, similar to Eliminate the Elements, Neighborhood Options also hires specially-trained police officers to engage with area youth in places they gather, e.g. the corner of 4th Street and 8th Avenue, and Kelly’s Carryout at 4th Street and 11th Avenue. Given the program’s recent inception, it is too early to pass judgment on the program’s success.

One recent development that may bring about transformational social change is the addition of the Annie E. Casey Foundation to WPC. The Casey Foundation is a nationwide entity that specializes in promoting family-centered two-generational change, primarily through education and workforce development. It targets funding in a number of distressed central city neighborhoods of major metropolitan areas, and has demonstration sites in Baltimore and Atlanta. In late 2012, the WPC received a $150,000 Family-Centered Community Change (FCCC) readiness grant to “design, pilot and plan for the broader implementation of programs and strategies geared toward families with young children” (Annie E. Casey Foundation, 2012). While the FCCC grant process is only in its planning stages, preliminary meetings between Casey Foundation staff and WPC suggest that points of emphasis will be engagement of parents and residents, increasing literacy in both children and adults, and developing a new workforce development intervention. Importantly, the Casey Foundation has expertise in direct social service provision, something that most other Collaborative members lack, and will bring a more experienced perspective to programs designed to improve education, safety, and workforce development.

V.e Infrastructure Investments

Perhaps the most substantial initiatives in Weinland Park have been improvements to the area’s infrastructure. Largely financed by the City of Columbus, these include planned corridor improvements along 11th and 5th Avenues (Weinland Park’s northern and southern boundaries, respectively), upgrades to Indianola and Weinland Parks, a reconstruction and realignment of Grant Avenue between 5th and 11th Avenues, new sidewalks and repaving of 7th Avenue, and street and alley improvements along 6th Street. Many of these improvements were part of the City’s Economic Development Agreement with Wagenbrenner signed for the rehabilitation of the CCF site. Prior to the WPC’s formation, the City conducted extensive infrastructure improvements in and around the South Campus Gateway.
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 summarize recent public and private investments in housing and infrastructure within the Weinland Park neighborhood and indicate the substantial public and private monies devoted to effecting urban revitalization in Weinland Park. Total housing investments amount to $46,430,000, of which $26,030,000 (56%) comes from public funds while $20,400,000 (44%) is contributed by private developers. Note that the latter figure only includes known investments, thus omitting (for example) the Euclid and High, 1288 North High, and York on High projects, as well as planned developments at 7th and High, the Columbus Coated Fabrics site, and Homeport’s renovation to apartments along 5th Avenue. Investments to the built environment aside from housing, e.g. the Neighborhood Pride Center, Weinland Park Elementary School, Schoenbaum Family Center, Kroger reconstruction, and 3M site reclamation, sum to $34,268,000, leading to a total housing and built environment investment of $80,698,000 (Table 4.2). When combined with the $154,000,000 cost of the South Campus Gateway Project, total built environment investments climb to $234,698,000. Infrastructure improvements by the City of Columbus amount to $18,580,000, bringing the total amount of recent investments to the Weinland Park neighborhood to $99,278,000 excluding the Gateway project, and $253,278,000 when the Gateway is included.

<table>
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<th>Date</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>2013-2014¹</td>
<td>$6,200,000</td>
</tr>
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<td>Indianola Park improvements</td>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<td>City of Columbus</td>
<td>2007</td>
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<td>6th St improvements</td>
<td>City of Columbus</td>
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<td>City of Columbus</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total built environment investment (excl Gateway)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total built environment investment (incl Gateway)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>$253,278,000</strong></td>
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¹ As of July 2013, this project is now postponed until 2015.

Table 4.3: Infrastructure investments in Weinland Park.
Figure 4.4: Map of recent and proposed investments in Weinland Park.
VI. Conclusions

This chapter has related the history of Weinland Park, initial attempts at revitalization, growing interest in the neighborhood from a private real estate developer and three locally-based foundations which culminated in the formation of a neighborhood regime, and recent housing, social service, and infrastructure investments within the neighborhood. In doing so, it has traced Weinland Park’s origins as a blue-collar neighborhood, built in the early Twentieth century for workers of nearby factories, and one characterized by a racially-mixed though segregated population and general neighborhood stability until the 1980’s. Then, efforts of a local developer to assemble a portfolio of Section 8 housing brought a lower-income population to the area, created a blighting influence, and led to increases in crime and other social pathologies. Responding to spillover effects of blight within student neighborhoods to the north and west of Weinland Park, OSU created Campus Partners, a university-funded Community Development Corporation. Following an initial planning period, Campus Partners began focusing its efforts in the Weinland Park community, first through construction of the South Campus Gateway, and later through the turnover of the Section 8 portfolio from private to non-profit management, coupled with extensive rehabilitation of its units.

Within this unfolding scenario, the City of Columbus, Campus Partners, and Goody Clancy conducted a neighborhood planning process that articulated a vision of neighborhood revitalization and replaced existing ineffective neighborhood leadership with a more inclusive organization, the Weinland Park Community Civic Association. As part of the plan’s recommendations, the City and Campus Partners recruited Wagenbrenner Development to redevelop the Columbus Coated Fabrics site with financial assistance from the Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund. Concurrently, the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, United Way, and Columbus Foundation all independently decided to target their resources in bringing about community and economic development in a central-city Columbus neighborhood, and each concluded that investments in Weinland Park were the most likely to achieve success. This group, along with representatives from the City of Columbus, began meeting informally as ‘Weinland Wednesdays’ in early 2009 and, following pressure from the WPCCA, invited neighborhood partners to the table and rebranded the organization as the Weinland Park Collaborative. Since its founding in August 2010, the Collaborative has made contributions toward housing, social services, and infrastructure, and has spurred additional investments from
outside organizations, including national groups like Habitat for Humanity and the Annie E. Casey Foundation.

In discussing the history of Weinland Park, the founding of the Weinland Park Collaborative, and the neighborhood regime’s efforts to achieve urban revitalization, a number of salient points emerge. First, one notes the organizational role played by Campus Partners and, by extension, the role of place-based institutions in fomenting urban revitalization and guiding the formation of neighborhood regimes. From 1994 through roughly 2005, Campus Partners, with support from the City, was the only entity supporting revitalization in Weinland Park. The catalytic Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan (i) articulated a feasible course of development that leveraged existing assets against new investments, (ii) incorporated a new, more inclusive neighborhood organization, and (iii) recruited Wagenbrenner to redevelop the Columbus Coated Fabrics site. This momentum and the presence of a place-based institution and partner inspired the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, Columbus Foundation, and United Way to select Weinland Park for their targeted giving. When these organizations began holding their ‘Weinland Wednesdays’ informal meetings, Campus Partners played an important organizational role in getting the partners together and organizing their efforts.

Second, the civic sector plays an essential role in promoting urban revitalization. Campus Partners, and by extension Ohio State, was the first organization to promote revitalization in Weinland Park. OSU was motivated by an enlightened self-interest – it believed that spillover effects of blight would inhibit the university’s ability to attract high-quality students and professors, and was contributing to a loss of ‘student culture’ in the neighborhoods surrounding campus. Foundations and philanthropies, including the Columbus Foundation, United Way, and JP Morgan Chase Foundation, have also played a crucial role in funding urban revitalization, contributing $1 million to property acquisition, funding the Exterior Home Repair program, hiring the WPC’s only staff member, and supporting social service programming. As the area’s civic leadership, WPCCA was instrumental in attracting these foundations to Weinland Park; foundation representatives stated that the WPCCA is “undoubtedly an asset” to the neighborhood and “has been an honest partner.” Much of the Collaborative’s social service programming,
including Neighborhood Options for Youth, is administered either by WPCCA members or by the Godman Guild, a Weinland Park-based settlement house and WPC member.\textsuperscript{46}

Within the civic sector, the Weinland Park Community Civic Association has played a crucial role in both attracting outside funders and working with other Collaborative members to effect urban revitalization. In separate evaluations of which distressed, central city Columbus neighborhood in which to invest, the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, Columbus Foundation, and United Way considered the cohesiveness of neighborhood leadership, and its willingness to work with outside funders – that is, to be a respectful, and dependable, partner. Both concluded that the WPCCA would be such an entity, particularly in contrast with King-Lincoln, a similar neighborhood (and the subject of the following chapter) where (i) neighborhood leadership is highly fragmented, with 11 separate organization operating with frequently overlapping boundaries and (ii) area leaders are often combative with and distrustful of outside funders and the city government.

Representatives from the Collaborative were unanimous in their praise of the WPCCA, its two most recent presidents, Joyce Hughes and Robert Caldwell, and other civic leaders in Weinland Park. One WPC representative remarked that these individuals were “one of the early instigators to get folks involved in Weinland Park . . . positive civic leaders like Catherine Girves, Robert Caldwell, Joyce Hughes, and Steve Sterrett . . . the [WPCCA] is undoubtedly an asset for the Collaborative. It’s crucial.” The attraction of the WPCCA to outside funders is that “the leadership is forward-looking . . . there’s a willingness to try new things.” Another WPC member commented that “resident engagement is a breakthrough . . . attendance [at WPCCA meetings] is way up . . . that has resulted in more support for [the WPCCA] as the voice of the neighborhood.” The same individual remarked how the relationship between the WPC and the WPCCA is mutually reinforcing, with support from the former also aiding the latter: “I think that the Collaborative has increased attendance at [WPCCA] meetings by reinforcing the commitment of the funders to Weinland Park.”

Third, the Collaborative’s relatively successful strategy, especially in housing, has led to a virtuous cycle of revitalization, where previous investments generate momentum and ‘buzz’ in a

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\textsuperscript{46} As of early 2013, Godman Guild CEO Ellen Moss-Williams is one of the co-chairs of the Weinland Park Collaborative.
neighborhood and lead to outside involvement. From 1994 through roughly 2005, revitalization in Weinland Park was solely driven by two actors – Campus Partners and the City of Columbus, with the latter largely playing a supporting role. However, the transition of the Section 8 housing stock from private to non-profit ownership (as well as its rehabilitation and the imposition of much stricter tenant control) eliminated what one WPC representative described as “the greatest barrier to fixing up the neighborhood . . . the Section 8 was the worst of the worst housing.” With this barrier removed, the perception of the neighborhood shifted to one ‘on the upswing’ and primed for a turnaround.47 Further, the demolition of the derelict, and dangerous, south campus bar district and the construction of the South Campus Gateway replaced a blighting influence with a reasonably successful mixed-use development, and have arguably led to several private investments along High Street, including the reconstruction of the 7th Avenue Kroger and several new residential and mixed-use projects. NRP was attracted to Weinland Park when it learned of the WPC’s vision for urban revitalization at a national affordable housing conference. The recent announcement of the Annie E. Casey Foundation to partner with the WPC further evinces the power of previous investments, and a well-organized and competent neighborhood regime, to attract outside funders.

Within this revitalization strategy, though, one notes the disproportionate amount of funds and energy devoted to housing in comparison to other investments. Housing was always a crucial element of the WPC’s revitalization strategy – for instance, the housing committee has typically reported first at WPC meetings, and many key informants referred to research that has stressed the role of housing in creating a stable neighborhood foundation. However, interviews suggest that a series of unforeseen events pushed housing to the forefront of the WPC’s efforts. First, Roche’s business plan identified the distressed nature of Weinland Park’s mortgage market, and the coming “tsunami” of foreclosures that would soon afflict the neighborhood. This presented an opportunity for the WPC to secure a large number of vacant properties – thus avoiding displacement and the specter of gentrification – at tremendously discounted prices. Second, the

47 I can personally testify to this perception of the neighborhood based on research conducted in 2007 (Webb, 2007). At that time, the Section 8 renovations were nearly complete, the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan had recently been published, the Schoenbaum Family Center would soon open, and Wagenbrenner was finalizing its CORF application for the Columbus Coated Fabrics site. Interviews with neighborhood residents, city officials, Campus Partners staff, and other stakeholders all echoed the assertion that the neighborhood was undoubtedly primed for a turnaround (which many feared would result in gentrification) in the near future.
WPC could not have anticipated the sudden availability of NSP funding, which provided $5 million to purchase and either demolish (and reconstruct) or renovate foreclosed and vacant properties. While developers and the purchasers of NSP homes may complain about the bureaucracy inherent to the program, it has undoubtedly improved the neighborhood’s housing stock, and WPC members believe that it has influenced nascent property value increases in Weinland Park.

One may attribute the emphasis on housing to the informal structure of the Collaborative, which has allowed it to remain flexible in its investments and overall revitalization strategy. The WPC initially formed as a series of organic meetings amongst the funders, which eventually – with organizational help from Campus Partners – coalesced as the Weinland Wednesdays group, later becoming the Weinland Park Collaborative. While the funders initially discussed pooling their money into a single account, they soon dismissed the idea because of logistical complications – for example, each organization has its own Board of Directors to which it is held accountable. Instead, the WPC has remained lean and flexible by not incorporating as a 501(c)3, not having any bylaws, only having one staff member (Steve Sterrett) who is nevertheless a contractor paid for by the Columbus Foundation, and only maintaining a minimal web presence (http://columbusfoundation.org/central-ohio/transformative-grants/weinland-park-collaborative).

The future of the WPC and urban revitalization in Weinland Park will likely build upon their existing investments in housing while attempting to devise transformational projects in social services, including workforce development, education, safety, civic leadership, youth engagement, and health. When initially conceived, each WPC sub-committee was tasked with developing one ‘transformational project’ – a large initiative that could bring about immediate change. However, one WPC representative commented that, outside of housing and safety, the committees have “bogged down” as “the challenges are so great.” Part of this is because these issues lie outside the WPC’s control – for instance, education in the neighborhood is the province of the Columbus Public Schools and Ohio State (through the Schoenbaum Family Center), while workforce development efforts have fizzled given the lackluster economic recovery, deficiency of job-ready skills in the neighborhood’s population, and lack of expertise in program design and delivery among WPC funders.

Interviews with WPC members, neighborhood leaders, and other stakeholders indicate a guardedly optimistic view of the future for both the Collaborative and Weinland Park. Many
representatives from the development community indicated that they are most excited about the future of the Columbus Coated Fabrics site, which will likely be the first market-rate housing built by the Collaborative. As all housing has, thus far, been constructed with subsidies, the ability to construct and sell market rate housing, as one WPC representative stated, “will demonstrate the healthiness of Weinland Park . . . and will represent a tremendous transformation from what it was.”48 Others were optimistic that future workforce development and social service programming, bolstered by the expertise of the Annie E. Casey Foundation, would be more successful in supporting Weinland Park’s revitalization.

48 One should note that the environmental reclamation of the CCF site was accomplished through a $3 million matching grant from the Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund, and that proposed senior housing at the southern edge of the site will be constructed with LIHTC funds, though it is not anticipated other development on the site will receive any additional subsidies.
Chapter 5: King-Lincoln

I. Introduction

Having chronicled the history of Weinland Park and the emergence of its neighborhood regime, the Weinland Park Collaborative, the dissertation now turns to King-Lincoln, a district on Columbus’ Near East Side. A neighborhood regime has recently emerged in King-Lincoln – Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT) – that brings together representatives from the public (City of Columbus, Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority) and civic (Ohio State University) sectors – though note that, in contrast to the Weinland Park Collaborative, PACT lacks private sector participation.

Located immediately east of downtown Columbus, King-Lincoln has served as Columbus’ African-American cultural hearth since the late 19th century. From its origins as a collection of ramshackle dwellings colloquially known as the Blackberry Patch, the neighborhood rose to cultural and artistic prominence contemporary with the Harlem Renaissance of the 1910’s and 1920’s. Like many urban neighborhoods, it experienced blight in the postwar period, and various federal and local attempts to stem disinvestment largely proved unsuccessful. However, PACT represents arguably the most holistic and coordinated attempt to spur reinvestment in King-Lincoln.

For the purposes of this study, I define King-Lincoln as bounded by Interstate 670 to the north, Interstate 71 to the west, Broad Street to the south, and the Norfolk and Western Railroad tracks to the east. To the west of the neighborhood is the Columbus CBD, to the south lies Olde Towne East (itself the topic of Chapter 6), to the east is the middle- to upper-income, independent municipality of Bexley, and to the north is Milo-Grogan, an area of warehousing, light
manufacturing, and working-class residential.\textsuperscript{49} In terms of city administration, King-Lincoln is the northern half of the Near East Area Commission (NEAC), which extends to Interstate 70 to the south and includes Olde Towne East.\textsuperscript{50}

While the chapter refers to this neighborhood as King-Lincoln, the nomenclature of the area is subject to sometimes contentious debate. The King-Lincoln moniker itself is a product of the City’s Planning Division as part of the 2002 King-Lincoln District Plan (Department of Development, 2002). In key informant interviews, some residents (particularly long-term individuals not associated with Olde Towne East’s neighborhood association) referred to the area as the Near East Side, grouping it with the area located south of Broad Street. Certain community groups, most publicly the OSU African-American Community Extension Center and the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association, prefer the term Bronzeville as an homage to the area’s African-American heritage (Vitale, 2009, 2010c).\textsuperscript{51}

In comparison to Weinland Park, King-Lincoln features significantly greater levels of civic fragmentation. Research by an undergraduate Geography service class in 2010, Cartography in the Community, found that 11 different civic, business, and planning organizations lie within King-Lincoln (Table 5.1, Figure 5.2) (Department of Geography, 2010). These include 8 civic organizations, 7 of which lie wholly within the neighborhood, with a portion of another (the Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association) extending into King-Lincoln but primarily located south of Broad Street. In addition, King-Lincoln is home to two business improvement districts, the Long Street Businessmen’s Association and the Mount Vernon Avenue District Improvement Association. The Near East Area Commission (NEAC) is an elected body that makes recommendations to the city regarding planning and zoning issues within the neighborhood; its

\textsuperscript{49} This definition is somewhat larger than the city’s Planning Division definition of the King-Lincoln District; the southern and western boundaries are the same, but the city’s eastern border is 20th Street and its northern extent ends at Atcheson Street.

\textsuperscript{50} Area commissions are 17 neighborhood-based, elected bodies that review zoning variances and “act as a liaison between neighborhood groups, property owners, residents, developers, and city officials” (Department of Development, 2013). These bodies were created as a way for city government to respond to neighborhood concerns, given that Columbus has an at-large city council.

\textsuperscript{51} ‘Bronzeville’ was a popular name for African-American neighborhoods in the immediate prewar era and derived from the darker skin of an area’s African-American denizens. The name is most closely associated with a neighborhood on the south side of Chicago, but Milwaukee and Los Angeles, among other cities, also had Bronzevilles (Boyd, 2000).
service area includes King-Lincoln and Olde Towne East (see Chapter 6). The boundaries of these civic and business organizations frequently overlap; for example, the intersection of Spring and 20th Streets (denoted on Figure 5.2 as a red circle) lies within the North of Broad Residents Association, the Bronzeville Neighborhood Association, the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association, and the Mount Vernon Avenue District Improvement Association.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Having chronicled the geographic and political context of King-Lincoln, the opening section discusses the pre-World War II history of Columbus’ black community, highlighting the city as a destination for fugitive slaves, the emergence of King-Lincoln as the city’s African-American cultural hearth, and the neighborhood’s apogee during the New Negro Movement and Harlem Renaissance of the 1910’s and 1920’s. Discussion then turns to decline and blight in the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, tying this process to the ‘usual suspects’ that afflicted other urban neighborhoods, and then elucidates numerous, largely unsuccessful efforts to stem disinvestment, including urban renewal, Model Cities, business development initiatives, and cultural investments. The chapter reviews an incipient gentrification movement in the early 2000’s – that is, when the transition to a cognitive-cultural economy was underway – first led by individual homeowners and later spurred by investments from Homeport, a city-wide Community Development Corporation. The formation of a neighborhood regime, Partners Achieving Community Transformation, is then discussed; this penultimate section provides a *dramatis personae* of actors, their investments in the neighborhood prior to the coalition’s formation, and current and planned efforts. The chapter concludes by highlighting a number of salient points about the formation and maintenance of PACT, offering comparisons to the Weinland Park Collaborative when appropriate.
Figure 5.1: King-Lincoln reference map.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Civic organizations</th>
<th>Business Improvement Organizations</th>
<th>Planning and Zoning organizations</th>
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<tr>
<td>Bronzeville Neighborhood Association</td>
<td>Long Street Businessmen’s Association</td>
<td>Near East Area Commission</td>
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<td>East Central Neighborhood Association</td>
<td>Mount Vernon Avenue District Improvement Association</td>
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<td>King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association</td>
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<td>Miami Avenue Residents Association</td>
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<td>NOBO Residents Association</td>
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<tr>
<td>Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association (partial)</td>
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<td>Saunders Park Property Owners Civic Association</td>
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<td>Woodland Park Neighborhood Association</td>
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Table 5.1: Civic, business, and planning organizations serving King-Lincoln. Source: Department of Geography, 2010.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Black Population</th>
<th>Columbus Population</th>
<th>% Black Population</th>
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<tr>
<td>1840</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>6,048</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1850</td>
<td>1,277</td>
<td>17,882</td>
<td>7.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
<td>997</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1870</td>
<td>1,847</td>
<td>31,274</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1880</td>
<td>3,010</td>
<td>51,647</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1890</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>88,150</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>8,201</td>
<td>125,560</td>
<td>6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>12,739</td>
<td>181,511</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>22,181</td>
<td>237,031</td>
<td>9.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>31,774</td>
<td>290,564</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>32,774</td>
<td>306,087</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 5.2: Overall and African-American population of Columbus, 1840-1940. Partially adapted from James, 1979, p.3 (until 1910) and data from the US decennial Census (C. Gibson & Jung, 2005).
Figure 5.2: Map of King-Lincoln’s civic, business, and planning organization service areas. Source: Department of Geography, 2010.
II. Neighborhood History until 1945

II.a Columbus’ early African-American Community

The history of Columbus’ African-American community dates to the city’s origins in the early nineteenth century as Ohio’s capital (Lentz, 2003). Prior to the Civil War, Columbus had a population of free blacks and fugitive slaves that, while small, outpaced any other Northern city (see Table 5.2) (Collins-Warfield, 2010; James, 1979, p. 2). The city’s popularity with escaped slaves was a function of geography; unlike Cincinnati and other towns bordering slave-holding states, as well as Canadian gateways like Toledo, Sandusky, and Cleveland, it was not vigilantly patrolled by US marshals. Thus, fugitive slaves considered Columbus, located in the center of the state with no direct access to either the South or Canada, a safer haven for settlement or stopover en route to Canada (James, 1979).

Postbellum Columbus, like most Northern cities, witnessed a dramatic expansion of African-American settlement as part of the Great Migration. These new arrivals were pulled by the promise of higher-paying jobs from industrial development and pushed by de jure Jim Crow laws, in addition to a lack of economic opportunities in the South’s largely agriculture-oriented economy. Compared to other major Northern cities, however, Columbus was not as popular destination for these migrants given its lack of industrial development. Still, from 1870 to 1910, Columbus’ African-American population increased nearly six-fold, and its share of the (also growing) city population rose from 5.8% to 7.0% (Table 5.2). Growth of the African-American population continued to the beginning of World War II; from 1910 until 1940, Columbus’ black population grew nearly 157% in absolute terms and from 7.0% to 11.7% of the city’s total population.

II.b Emergence as a self-contained community

At the turn of the twentieth century, Columbus’ African-American community primarily located in areas adjacent to the CBD, including (i) the Near Northside in the Flytown neighborhood and (ii) the near Southside known as “Nigger Hollow” (James, 1979, p. 17). While these communities remained in the post-Civil War period, they were augmented by a newly-developed black commercial and residential district near the intersections of High Street (the city’s main north-south thoroughfare) and Broad Street (the primary east-west corridor) and High and Long...
(Collins-Warfield, 2010; Lentz, 2003). By the 1880’s, commercial development began to push out this population from its prime location, and displaced residents, combined with new arrivals, moved farther east and settled along Long Street and Mount Vernon Avenue between St. Clair and Taylor Avenues.

The economic upswing of the 1920’s and the emergence of the New Negro Movement and Harlem Renaissance reverberated among Columbus’ black community, and a thriving commercial corridor arose along both Mount Vernon Avenue and Long Street. Racial discrimination mandated that the African-American community be self-sufficient, since it was difficult (if not illegal) for them to patronize businesses in other parts of the city. Further, discriminatory commercial lending practices meant that, unless a business was self-financed, it could not be owned by blacks. As a result, a number of stores along Mount Vernon Avenue that employed African-Americans were owned by others, Jews especially (WOSU, 2011a).

Thus, by the 1920’s and extending into the immediate postwar period, King-Lincoln was a self-contained, largely African-American community. Businesses along Mount Vernon Avenue and Long Street catered to the various needs of the population, from groceries (most notably Carl Brown’s Market), healthcare (St. Clair Hospital), churches (St. Dominic’s, Shiloh Baptist, Second Baptist, St. Paul’s AME, among many others), entertainment (e.g., Pythian, Lincoln, Orpheum, Dunbar, and Empress Theaters, in addition to nightclubs and drinking establishments), education (Garfield Elementary, East High School), clothiers and tailors (High Style Shop), home goods (Spicer Furniture), barber shops, bowling alleys, and the like. Photos of the area from this period indicate a hustle and bustle along Mount Vernon Avenue that indicates a vibrant commercial district (WOSU, 2011a).

Concurrent with King-Lincoln’s cultural and economic apogee was the construction of the 414-unit Poindexter Village. Opened in 1939, it was the city’s first public housing complex and represented an upgrade to the area’s housing stock (Winter, 2009). At the time, it was the largest public housing complex of its kind in the nation, and its opening was attended by both the President and Eleanor Roosevelt. Poindexter Village replaced an area known as the Blackberry Patch, a collection of shacks that had served as marginal housing for the new arrivals of the Great Migration, with housing that was well-built and included modern amenities like indoor plumbing. By all accounts, the African-American community took a tremendous amount of pride in Poindexter Village; it provided a significant upgrade in the quality of housing stock, became
home to a number of working class families, and many of King-Lincoln’s most successful former residents were raised in the complex (Bishop, 1983; Robinson, 1997).

III. Urban Decline and Attempts at Renewal, 1945–2010

By 1945, King-Lincoln was a self-contained and self-sufficient community that served as Columbus’ African-American cultural hearth. Businesses along Mount Vernon Avenue and Long Street met all the physical and social needs of the area’s population – from pharmacies, grocery stores, clothing outlets, theaters and jazz halls, and even a bowling alley. A number of largely segregated educational institutions served the area’s youth, including East High School. However, the social bonds within this close-knit neighborhood would soon be severed by shifts in policy and development associated with the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, including the construction of the interstate highway system, a decline in practices enforcing segregation, and the expansion of suburban development.

III.a Urban Decline and Blight

The reasons for King-Lincoln’s decline in the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras are those that fomented urban dilapidation and disinvestment across older cities throughout the US (Jackson, 1985). First, expanded automobile ownership greatly increased mobility and fueled suburban development of housing, industry, and shopping, leading to the decentralization of the population and land uses more broadly, including African-Americans. Despite its many cultural institutions and status among the African-American community, King-Lincoln’s older housing stock lacked modern amenities of new construction, such as air conditioning, indoor plumbing, and modern electrical systems, and households that afford to move were typically eager to leave the neighborhood for more outlying areas.

Second, decreases in discriminatory residential and commercial practices opened new housing and shopping opportunities to African-Americans. Restrictive covenants had prevented blacks from moving into many areas beyond King-Lincoln; these were declared illegal in the 1948 Supreme Court decision in Shelley v. Kraemer (James, 1979). Irrespective of these restrictive

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52 This nostalgia for the “good old days” of Poindexter Village, in addition to its historic status, would later fuel an opposition movement to the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority’s plan to raze the site, discussed later in the chapter.
covenants, a lack of educational and employment opportunities meant that new African-Americans could have afforded dwellings outside the neighborhood. Easing of employment discrimination allowed blacks to relocate to the newly-built, working class communities, especially Berwick to the southeast of the city (WOSU, 2011a).

Third, siting of the interstate highway system severed physical linkages between King-Lincoln and the CBD. In Columbus, Interstate 71 – the city’s north-south freeway – isolated King-Lincoln from downtown, which represented a needed source of employment outside of the neighborhood. In a 2013 speech, Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman said that I-71 was like the Berlin Wall in that it “separated and segregated the King-Lincoln District from the rest of the community . . . it contributed to the decline of the community” (Rouan, 2013). Later, the construction of I-670, Columbus’ inner-belt, separated King-Lincoln from the light manufacturing and warehousing firms located north of the neighborhood in Milo-Grogan.

Fourth, tumult during the civil rights era led to unrest, destroyed many local businesses, further driving out-migration and blight. While Columbus did not witness the widespread turmoil of cities such as Washington or Detroit, the violence that did occur was concentrated in King-Lincoln, with a number of large-scale disturbances focused on Mount Vernon Avenue. Rioters specifically targeted Jewish-owned businesses, such as the High Style Shop, and the local chapter of the Council on Racial Equality (CORE) demanded that non-African American-owned shops close (WOSU, 2011a).

Overall, the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras witnessed a vicious cycle of decline and blight affect King-Lincoln. As those who could afford to do so migrated to other neighborhoods, the remaining population was increasingly destitute, leading to social pathologies of crime, drug use, and the like. Many commercial establishments decamped for other locations, closed for lack of business, or were destroyed in the riots. Thus, by the late 1960’s, the once-vibrant and self-contained community was no more, having been replaced by a largely dilapidated neighborhood afflicted by the various effects of concentrated poverty.

III.b Attempts at renewal, 1950’s-2000

The history of King-Lincoln from the 1950’s until the turn of twenty-first century is one of various attempts, largely unsuccessful, to stem the tide of disinvestment. While nearly all of Columbus’ central city neighborhoods experienced decline (with the exception of German
Village, which underwent a first-wave gentrification process), attempts to reverse this were far greater in King-Lincoln than elsewhere.\(^{53}\) Broadly, these efforts involved (i) attempts to improve the housing stock, (ii) business incentive programs, (iii) cultural investments, and (iv) improving social service provision.

The first attempts to revitalize King-Lincoln dramatically altered the *built environment*. Using federal urban renewal funds, the City razed most of the Mount Vernon Avenue corridor in the 1950’s and 1960’s, and while some cleared property was redeveloped as the high-rise Poindexter Tower, much stood vacant for over two decades – until the construction of the Mount Vernon Plaza in 1978 (Figure 5.1) (Carter, 1978). Separately, Columbus received a Model Cities grant in 1968 that provided funding over four years (Citizens Research, 1974).\(^{54}\) The Model Cities law mandated that all funds be spent within the city-designated Model Neighborhood, which was selected as the Near East Side.\(^{55}\) One result was the construction of much of King-Lincoln’s public housing stock, including the high-rise Sawyer Tower and low-rise Sawyer Manors.

The City also promoted *business improvement* and economic development in King-Lincoln, designating the neighborhood as a *Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization District* in the late 1970’s and as an *Empowerment Zone* in the 1990’s (Hilltop Business Association, 2013). Both programs utilize tax incentives and Community Develop Block Grant (CDBG) funds to support business development and subsidize exterior home repairs. In King-Lincoln, the most visible symbol of the Empowerment Zone is a Wendy’s along Broad Street, which added fifty jobs to the neighborhood (Columbus Compact, 2013). Further, Mount Vernon Plaza also brought some commercial space to the neighborhood, with a strip mall-style retail development adjacent to the high-rise housing tower.

\(^{53}\) Interviews with neighborhood residents suggest that this attention is a result of King-Lincoln’s status within the African-American community and the political connections of its residents.

\(^{54}\) Authorized in 1966 as an integral part of Lyndon Johnson’s War on Poverty, Model Cities sought to ameliorate urban decline by addressing economic development, education, health, housing, and social services.

\(^{55}\) The Model Neighborhood boundaries extended south to Interstate 70 and included Olde Towne East (the subject of Chapter 6) in addition to King-Lincoln.
King-Lincoln was also the recipient of various cultural investments in the 1980’s geared toward improving quality-of-life for existing residents and attracting new ones. Ohio State’s Department of African American and African Studies moved its Community Extension Center (AAASCEC) to the neighborhood from another location south of Broad Street (Figure 5.1). This new facility, built in 1985 on Mount Vernon Avenue, aims to “enhance community access to the University . . . and improve the relationship between the University and Columbus’ African American and African Community” (Department of African American and African Studies, 2013). The AAASCEC offers both university and continuing education courses for the community while also supporting youth and celebrating black history. The King Arts Complex opened in 1987, and is also located on Mount Vernon Avenue in the former Pythian Theater and adjacent Garfield School. This provides community meeting space and features exhibitions highlighting African culture and Columbus’ African-American community.

Further, the Urban League contributed to revitalizing King-Lincoln with a new headquarters that greatly expanded social service provision. Opened in 1990 across Mount Vernon Avenue from the King Arts Complex, this new building increased the capacity of the Urban League and the community space it provides. While the League’s original mission centered on adjustment of recent arrivals during the Great Migration, and providing social and economic aid to Columbus’ African-American community, today it offers programming on education, housing support, and workforce development (Columbus Urban League, 2012; Murphy, 1970).

Thus, by 2000, King-Lincoln’s postwar history was defined by numerous, uncoordinated, and largely unsuccessful efforts to revitalize the neighborhood and stem the process of blight. Model Cities and urban renewal demolished a vibrant, though admittedly declining, commercial corridor along Mount Vernon Avenue, leaving many parcels vacant for decades, while replacing other razed structures with new public housing that concentrated poverty and its associated social pathologies. Business improvement efforts faltered, and more recent initiatives, such as the Empowerment Zone, can only claim attracting a fast-food restaurant to the neighborhood. Cultural investments and expanded social service provision also failed to spur broad improvements in the neighborhood in their time.

56 This stands in contrast to Weinland Park, where previous revitalization efforts were undertaken by a single entity – Campus Partners – and were more recent, having only begun in the early 2000’s.
Demographic, socioeconomic, and housing data from the decennial Census support the narrative of King-Lincoln’s decline (see Table 5.3). From 1970 through 2000, the neighborhood lost almost one-third (31.3%) of its population while remaining relatively stable in terms of racial mix, with approximately 90% of the population identifying as African-American and 9% as Caucasian. The homeownership rate declined from 29.8% to 23.3% between 1970 and 1980, likely due to Model Cities’ razing of many aging structures and their replacement with new public housing, but has remained relatively stable since. In the 1970’s, the vacancy rate more than doubled, from 8.3% to 17.2%, but stayed at roughly the same levels through 2000.

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<td>Population</td>
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<tr>
<td>% White</td>
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<td>8.7%</td>
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<td>4.4%</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
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<td>% in White-collar occupations</td>
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<td>19.1%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
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<td>% in Poverty</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>36.0%</td>
<td>47.7%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
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<td>8.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
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<td>15.6%</td>
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<td>% Owner-occupied</td>
<td>29.8%</td>
<td>23.3%</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
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<td>% Renter-occupied</td>
<td>61.8%</td>
<td>59.5%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>60.4%</td>
<td>51.2%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>$212</td>
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<td>$462</td>
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* Data from 2005-2009 American Community Survey estimates.

Table 5.3: Historic Census data for King-Lincoln. Data adapted from Geolytics, 2003; U.S. Census Bureau, 2010.

**III.c Incipient Gentrification and NOBO, 2000-2010**

Despite the apparent failures of postwar efforts to engender revitalization in their time, in the early 2000’s King-Lincoln began a nascent gentrification process. A number of younger households began purchasing dilapidated houses and renovate them for their own occupancy (Turnbull, 2001). Many of these in-movers were young African-Americans, more middle-class in outlook than in income, and were drawn by the area’s history and arts offerings. The neighborhood’s changing character was reflected in the emergence of new social events, including the BRUSH Experience (Black Renaissance Urban Sophisticated Hip), conceived as a
African-American-centric alternative to Gallery Hop (Joy, 2009). In addition, several new businesses opened in the neighborhood catering to a younger, more cosmopolitan population, including Zanzibar Brews Coffee House, Gene Walker’s Café, and Urban Spirit Coffee Shop (Chronister, 2008).

Given this incipient interest in the neighborhood, Homeport, formerly the Columbus Housing Partnership, began to target its homeownership program toward King-Lincoln. Founded in 1988 as the Columbus Neighborhood Partnership, Homeport is a city-wide Community Development Corporation focused on construction of both affordable (i.e., subsidized) and market-rate apartments and houses (Homeport, 2012). Homeport funds its activities through individual and corporate donations (from, e.g., the Columbus Foundation, Chase Bank, and NeighborWorks), partnerships with banks and construction companies, and grants and municipal bond proceeds from the City. Homeport-funded projects have typically been scattered throughout Columbus, including some rental communities located beyond the Outerbelt.

However, beginning in 2004, Homeport began to concentrate its homeownership initiatives not only in one neighborhood – King-Lincoln – but along two blocks in that area (Figure 5.3) (Pramik, 2004). As of early 2013, its NOBO (North of Broad) development has renovated 35 houses along 20th, 21st, and 22nd Streets in addition to a 9-condo rehabilitation project of a multi-family building at the corner of Long and 21st Streets. To minimize displacement of existing residents, Homeport only purchases vacant properties for renovation – similar to the strategy that Wagenbrenner and the Weinland Park Collaborative have utilized in acquiring houses. True to Homeport’s other initiatives, NOBO has been funded by cobbling together various funding sources, including Community Development Block Grants (CDBG), Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) monies, and proceeds from the same of municipal bonds. Those purchasing houses renovated with funds from the former two sources must meet certain income requirements; these are <80% area median income (AMI) for CDBG and <120% AMI for NSP. City bond money does not place any income restrictions on buyers.

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57 The Gallery Hop is a monthly art event held in Columbus’ revitalized Short North neighborhood.

58 As of 2013, Columbus’ area median income is $67,900; thus, CDBG limits households to incomes under $54,320 while NSP buyers must earn less than $81,480 (Department of Housing and Urban Development, 2013).
In contrast to other previous public and institutional attempts to spur revitalization, Homeport has achieved a certain level of success and has arguably provided a foundation for the later formation of a neighborhood regime. NOBO has proven popular with buyers, and of the 44 renovated homes and condominiums, only one single-family residence and five condos are on the market as of May 2013 (Homeport, 2013). Interviews with Homeport representatives indicate that NOBO residents represent a variety of demographics and socioeconomic statuses; according to a Homeport official, properties have been purchased by families with children moving from elsewhere in King-Lincoln, singles, seniors, and homosexuals.

Socioeconomic and demographic data suggest a neighborhood undergoing nascent revitalization between 2000 and 2010, though one tempered by an expanding vacancy rate and declining population (Table 5.3). From 2000-2010, the percentage of Caucasians expanded from 8.4 to 14.6%; in absolute terms, this represents an increase of 371 individuals, from 952 to 1,323. This gain was offset, though, by a decrease of 2,289 African-Americans, whose population fell from 10,081 to 7,792. Average rents rose 37% between the 2000 Census and 2005-9 American Community Survey estimates, and the percentage holding a bachelor’s degree or higher more than doubled in the same time period. However, despite these apparent gains in socioeconomic standing, King-Lincoln’s poverty rate increased slightly, and the number of vacant structures jumped dramatically, perhaps as a result of the 2007-8 Great Recession.

IV. Neighborhood Regime: Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT)

By 2010, King-Lincoln was undergoing a hybrid of first-wave and third-wave gentrification, with incipient revitalizations spurred by individual households purchasing and renovating residences for their own occupancy, and public funding used by Homeport to develop the NOBO community. Within this environment, three organizations began to make significant investments in King-Lincoln – the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, City of Columbus, and Ohio State University. Their efforts would ultimately culminate with the formation of a neighborhood regime, Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT), a more

\[59\] Its success might be a product of the type of investment Homeport is making. Housing is very concrete and quantifiable – a home is either sold or unsold, property values increase and decrease. The benefits of cultural anchors and social services are much harder to discern; how can one measure how an art gallery improves neighborhood quality-of-life? And improvements related to social service provision may be lost through residential mobility; a resident connected to a job may choose to leave the neighborhood.
formal organization than the Weinland Park Collaborative that includes representatives from the public and civic (but not private) sectors.

IV.a  PACT Membership and Formation

Prior to the 2011 formation of PACT, its three funders had engaged in several programmatic investments in King-Lincoln. These included the demolition and planned redevelopment of the Poindexter Village site by CMHA and the sale of Sawyer Towers; the City’s financing of the Whitney Young Condominium development and oversight of the Lincoln Theater renovation; and OSU’s purchase of the Park Medical Center and VA Outpatient Clinic, later renamed OSU East Hospital and CarePoint East, respectively (Figure 5.3). The following section relates the history of each of these actors to King-Lincoln, and discusses investments by each prior to PACT’s formation.

IV.a.1  Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority

As the largest landowner in King-Lincoln, the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority (CMHA) has long played an important role in the neighborhood’s trajectory. King-Lincoln features the greatest number of public housing units in Columbus, with approximately 800 CMHA-owned units in Jenkins Terrace (100 units), Sawyer Manor (116), Trevitt Heights (137), and the now-closed Poindexter Village (414) (Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, 2012). In addition, the neighborhood contains nearly 1,000 units of Section 8 housing, with 216 located in the Mount Vernon Plaza and the remainder scattered-site, largely project-based, and managed by Community Properties of Ohio.60

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60 The latter units were part of the Broad Street Management (BSMI) portfolio that Campus Partners transitioned to OCCH ownership in the early 2000’s (see Chapter 4). In fact, the portfolio contained nearly twice as many units in King-Lincoln (~800) than in Weinland Park (~500), though given the latter neighborhood’s smaller size, the concentration of subsidized apartments in Weinland Park is greater.
Figure 5.3: Map of recent and proposed investments in King-Lincoln.
Since the 1970’s, CMHA has shifted how it delivers public housing, from ownership and management of project-style developments toward providing Section 8 vouchers for individual households to rent in the private market. This strategy is partly social and altruistic – research has shown that large-scale public housing concentrates poverty and creates more problems than it solves – and largely financial – since the Nixon administration, HUD has curtailed construction of new projects and reduced funding to manage these aging, often poorly-constructed buildings. CMHA is not alone in selling off or demolishing its portfolio; for example, Chicago’s housing authority has recently demolished the high-rise Robert Taylor Homes and Cabrini-Green developments.

Following continued HUD funding reductions, CMHA conducted an internal assessment of its portfolio in 2008; as a result, it elected to sell Sawyer Towers to a private developer (but retain low-rise Sawyer Village) and demolish Poindexter Village. The report categorized Poindexter as functionally obsolescent, with renovation not only cost-prohibitive but nearly impossible to fund, given that HUD has largely moved away from project-style housing and does not provide special grants for historic preservation.

While HUD approved CMHA’s demolition application, the Authority’s intent to raze Poindexter Village was met with criticism from a number of individuals and community groups. While most existing Poindexter residents were happy to leave their deteriorating, crime-filled complex, many expressed displeasure with the hassle of moving and feared that the promised Section 8 vouchers would not be forthcoming (Ferenchik, 2012a; Heagney, 2012). However, the strongest criticism came from two groups of non-residents, including (i) individuals who had grown up in the complex but were not currently living there, as well as historic preservationists and other community groups, and (ii) radical student housing activists.

The former cohort entails two disparate organizations that are supported by local civic associations. These include the Coalition for Responsible and Sustainable Development of the Near Eastside, led by Community Extension Center Director Judson Jeffries, and the Poindexter

61 CMHA had previously sold Poindexter Tower as condominiums to existing residents; however the project was not able to attract new buyers and was soon largely abandoned. Poindexter Tower sat vacant since 2003 and was demolished in mid-2012 (Ferenchik, 2012c).
Village History Advisory Group (Coalition for Responsible and Sustainable Development, 2013; Jeffries, Brooks, & Farmer, 2013). The most vocal critic of CMHA’s plans, though, has been Willis Brown, president of the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association and a regular fixture at city council meetings who has advocated for historic preservation and enhanced city services for King-Lincoln. These groups share a primary concern for preserving the history and character of Poindexter Village. To a lesser extent, they support the preservation of affordable housing, although this is a more minor concern.

The latter cohort was organized as the short-lived Columbus Housing Justice (CHJ), a self-described ‘radical’ and ‘non-hierarchical’ organization that formed in mid-2009 and has been dormant since August, 2010 (Columbus Housing Justice, 2010). CHJ primarily consisted of Ohio State students and allied activists, and unlike those described previously, their primary concern was the preservation of affordable housing, not history. CHJ’s tactics primarily included attending neighborhood civic association meetings, protesting CMHA headquarters, and community organizing existing Poindexter residents, often carpooling from the OSU dormitories to do so.

Preservation proponents received some solace in a November 2012 report from Columbus’ Historic Preservation Office that advocated preserving ten Poindexter buildings (Ferenchik, 2012e, 2012f). Given that the Poindexter complex is on the National Register of Historic Places and federal funds will be used for its demolition, CMHA was obligated to review alternatives for the site (Ferenchik, 2013a). Despite these recommendations, CMHA has shown no interest in preserving any of the Poindexter site, given funding concerns. However, the Authority has offered to mark the site’s historical significance in some way.

IV.a.2 City of Columbus

In the postwar era, Columbus was governed by a series of Caucasian, pro-business, fiscally-conservative mayors (Lentz, 2003). In the character of the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, Columbus’ urban regimes pursued an activist economic development agenda focused on suburban annexation and downtown commercial development (see Chapter 3). However, in 2000, voters elected Michael Coleman as Columbus’ first Democratic mayor in decades. In contrast to previous administrations, and in the spirit of the ascendant cognitive-cultural
economy, Coleman had run on a neighborhood-focused agenda, where economic development investments would not only focus on downtown, but also on revitalization of central city areas.

Given his neighborhood-based platform, personal connections to the area (the mayor himself is African-American), choice of development director (Boyce Safford is not only African-American but also grew up on the Near East Side), and source of pride that King-Lincoln holds for Columbus’ black community, it is not surprising that Coleman quickly turned his attention to the neighborhood. King-Lincoln was one of the first areas to undergo a neighborhood planning process, and the 2002 *King-Lincoln District Plan* advocated for (i) increased homeownership rates through in-fill construction and (ii) promotion of King-Lincoln’s history, arts, and culture through rehabilitation of the Lincoln Theater (Department of Development, 2002).

Following the plan’s recommendations, the City began to promote infill development with the 2005 demolition of the HUD-owned, derelict Whitney Young Estates at the corner of Mount Vernon and St. Clair Avenues (Figure 5.3) (Gebolys, 2005a). A Request for Proposals (RFP) was then offered for the site’s development, and while any developer could respond to the RFP, interviews with several city officials indicated that the Mayor strongly favored granting it to a minority-owned firm. In August 2006, the City selected the *Whitney Young Collaborative*, a consortium funded by the African-American Alpha Phi Alpha fraternity and three neighborhood-based black churches, to develop the site with 29 townhouses, each valued around $200,000 (Ferenchik, 2006b).

From the outset, the Whitney Young Collaborative faced challenges that exceeded those typically encountered during in-fill development. Neighborhood leaders questioned whether a market existed for such high-value properties, given the site’s proximity to numerous public housing complexes and that most homes in the neighborhood were selling for well under $100,000 (Ferenchik, 2007). Slow pre-sales appeared to confirm these suspicions – as of 2010, the developers had not sold a single unit (Ferenchik, 2010d). The Collaborative itself had little expertise with development, and struggled to obtain financing even after a $364,000 gap loan

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62 The transition from *area* plans to *neighborhood* plans, and the differences between the two processes, are discussed in Chapter 4.

63 Some of these challenges are discussed in Chapter 4 with Campus Partners’ development of the South Campus Gateway.
from the City in 2008 (Ferenchik, 2008a). Given these difficulties, the scale and scope of the project became a moving target, with the planned number of units falling to ten and the cost of each declining to $160,000. Even after receiving a $3 million loan in 2008 from the non-profit Ohio Community Development Finance Fund, the Collaborative halted construction in August 2010 for lack of funds.

Given other municipal investments in the neighborhood, including the renovation of the Lincoln Theater (discussed later in this chapter) and various infrastructure improvements, the City offered to ‘bail out’ the Whitney Young Collaborative in August 2011 with a loan that would allow the Collaborative to refinance its funding from the Ohio Community Development Finance Fund (Ferenchik, 2010d). Such a move was not without controversy; several council members worried that the project had become a money pit, and longtime community activist Willis Brown added that “[w]e have no guarantee that more money is going to make it better” (Ferenchik, 2010e). Brown also wondered “what we could do with $3.4 million for this neighborhood” (Ferenchik, 2011c). The city’s investment was funded through bonds and proceeds from a recently-passed income tax increase.

The bail out not only exacerbated the controversy surrounding the Whitney project, but also failed to convince buyers of its worthiness. After completing only two units and still with no buyers committed, in December 2011 the City decided to forgive its loan to the Collaborative – merely four months after it had been disbursed – if the developer would cede control of the project to CMHA, which in turn promised to finish construction with its own funds (Caruso, 2011; Ferenchik & Caruso, 2011; Ferenchik, 2012d). Further, a December 2011 report by the Columbus Dispatch revealed that City and Affordable Housing Trust officials knew the bailout would fail to put the Whitney project on sound financial footing, and in fact had misgivings about the project from the beginning, but continued to provide financial assistance (Caruso & Ferenchik, 2011). As of May 2013, the Whitney Young project remains unfinished, with CMHA working to complete interior construction on the units.

Another municipal thrust toward revitalizing was the Lincoln Theater renovation, first proposed in the King-Lincoln District Plan and later promoted in Mayor Coleman’s 2004 State of the City address (Figure 5.3) (Carmen, 2004; Department of Development, 2002; Hoholik, 2004). During the neighborhood’s acme in the prewar era, the Lincoln was one of numerous theaters serving the community’s African-American population. In the intervening years, most of the area’s theaters
were demolished (including the Regal, Macon, and Cameo), the Lincoln sat vacant since the 1970’s, and the Pythian was converted into the King Arts Complex (Vitale, 2008; WOSU, 2011a). Thus, by the early 2000’s, the Lincoln was the only standing theater in a condition where renovations were reasonably financially feasible.

To offset the initial rehabilitation estimate of $8 million, the City leveraged its initial investment, largely funded through municipal bond proceeds, with contributions from other public and institutional actors.64 Franklin County matched the City’s investment with monies from its general fund, continuing a recent trend of city-county cooperation that also included airport consolidation and construction of a new downtown minor league baseball park (Columbus Dispatch, 2006; Ferenchik, 2006c). The City also convinced several local corporate foundations, such as those of Nationwide Insurance, Dispatch printing, and JPMorgan Chase, in addition to the Columbus Foundation, to contribute toward the theater’s renovation (Lincoln Theatre Association, 2013).

Like any investment in King-Lincoln, the city’s decision to renovate the theater was met with both praise and vocal opposition. Understandably, arts groups and neighborhood boosters applauded the decision to further cultural investments in distressed center city neighborhoods. And as one would expect, criticism arose from individuals and civic groups typically opposed to the mayor’s plans, including Willis Brown and the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association in addition to Near East Area Commission President Kathleen Bailey, who claimed that the rehabilitation was a waste of taxpayer money (Ferenchik, 2006a).

Completion of the Lincoln Theater rehabilitation did little to allay criticism. Interviews with King-Lincoln residents indicate a frustration with the theater’s programming, with many claiming that it is not geared toward neighborhood residents, but instead to middle-class, largely Caucasian households who “drive their kids in from the suburbs.” Further, the Capital City Community Urban Redevelopment Corporation, from whom Columbus purchased the theater in 2002, is currently litigating against the City for violating a restrictive covenant (“Capital City Community Urban Redevelopment Corp. v. Columbus,” 2012). As part of the purchase agreement, Capital City placed a deed covenant that required the theater’s operator to screen children’s movies on

64 While the initial estimate was $8 million, the project’s final cost was $13.5 million (Joy, 2009).
Saturday afternoons. However, since its opening in 2008, the theater’s manager, the Lincoln Theatre Association, has failed to show any of these films, and area reconnaissance indicates that the theater holds dance classes on some Saturdays, with most participants driven to the theater.

IV.a.3 OSU

The final actor to support contemporary efforts to revitalize King-Lincoln is The Ohio State University, whose involvement stems from (i) purchase of two medical facilities in the neighborhood and (ii) conditions attached to a tax abatement for the University’s Medical Center expansion. OSU purchased the former Park Medical Center in 1999 at Taylor and Hawthorne Avenues, bringing stability to a hospital that had undergone numerous ownership changes in the past decade, renaming it OSU Hospital East (see Figure 5.3) (OSU Medical Center, 2013). Further, in the late 2000’s, OSU gained control of the former VA clinic, renaming this outpatient facility Carepoint East. With these acquisitions came investments to improve the level of care. Through purchase of these two distressed medical assets, the University became the largest employer in King-Lincoln.

In 2010, OSU announced a $1 billion investment in its medical center, partially funded by a $100 million donation from former Limited Brands CEO and OSU alumnus Les Wexner, that would centralize the its scattered-site facilities into a new complex on its main campus (Ghose, 2013). Given the economic development resulting from the project, OSU approached the City concerning an income tax abatement. Such a request was not unprecedented: when Nationwide Children’s Hospital announced a significant expansion several years prior, it received a tax abatement contingent on the hospital renovating houses in the surrounding Near Southside neighborhood. Following lengthy negotiations with the City, OSU agreed to commit a portion of the tax abatement proceeds toward the revitalization of King-Lincoln.

The particulars of the agreement between the City and OSU are as follows. In exchange for investing $1 billion into its main campus medical center, estimated to create 6,000 hospital-related and 5,000 construction jobs, OSU would recoup 30% of these newly-created positions’ income taxes, up to $35 million over 15 years (Vitale, 2010a). The City would receive the

65 Recall that OSU had previously supported King-Lincoln’s revitalization through its Community Extension Center.
remaining 70% of income taxes, which officials expected to be $77 million over the same time period. In return for the tax abatement, OSU would contribute $10 million toward revitalizing King-Lincoln, with $9 million devoted toward housing (e.g., down payment assistance and purchase and rehabilitation of existing properties) and $1 million toward community health programs administered by neighborhood churches.66

IV.b  PACT Formation and Planning

Thus, by early 2011, three entities – CMHA, OSU, and the City of Columbus – shared a commonality of interests in promoting the revitalization of King-Lincoln. CMHA is the largest landowner in the neighborhood, and would soon vacate 414 units of public housing and raze the 27 acres on which it stands. OSU owns two large medical centers in King-Lincoln, is the area’s largest employer, and was mandated by its tax abatement agreement to invest $10 million in improving neighborhood housing and health. Finally, the City had a long-standing interest in King-Lincoln; having made infrastructure, housing, and cultural investments of $20 million dollars over the past decade.

A neighborhood regime, Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT), emerged from this commonality of interests and the leadership of both OSU President E. Gordon Gee and especially Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman. Interviews with PACT, OSU, and City officials indicate that Coleman was instrumental in convincing OSU to commit a portion of its tax abatement proceeds toward revitalizing King-Lincoln instead of Weinland Park, where the university already had significant investments in housing and community development (see Chapter 4). Convinced of the value in supporting King-Lincoln’s revitalization, Gee then advocated for the plan to the skeptical OSU Board of Trustees, who approved the deal. Coleman also convinced Columbus City Council to approve the tax abatement. Concurrently, Coleman was able to persuade CMHA President Charles Hillman to join a collaborative venture with OSU, no small feat given the bureaucratic and often-insular nature of the housing authority.

66 The mandate for supporting health was two-fold. First, King-Lincoln leads the city in number of residents with a number of serious health problems, especially diabetes (Vitale, 2010a). Second, such an investment will likely bail out the Gateway Health and Wellness Center, a neighborhood-based clinic of St. Paul’s AME Church that received and subsequently defaulted on a $5 million loan from the City’s Finance Fund (Gebolys, 2005a).
In contrast to the Weinland Park Collaborative, PACT was envisioned as a much more formal organization. While not initially incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit, its funders believed that it would eventually become one following an initial planning process. As such, PACT would pool contributions from its three funders to support neighborhood revitalization, either by carrying out these projects themselves, or by funding a developer(s) to revitalize the neighborhood. PACT would have a dedicated staff that included an Executive Director, program director, and administrative assistant. PACT’s offices would be located in a former house adjacent to and owned by OSU East Hospital.

Coupled with a more formalized structure is PACT’s hierarchical organizational chart. The organization is headed by the three partners – the City, CMHA, and OSU – who fund PACT’s staff and provided its office space. PACT’s oversight committee contains high-ranking representatives from the three funding organizations, and sets the organization’s overall agenda. The advisory committee includes members of the oversight committee in addition to neighborhood representatives, including individuals affiliated with various civic associations, the Urban League, the United Way of Central Ohio, Columbus City Council, and local churches. PACT organized its initial planning efforts around five-subcommittees, which entailed jobs and economic impact, safe neighborhoods, health and wellness, education, and housing.

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67 As of July 2013, PACT has announced that it will soon incorporate as a 501(c)3 non-profit (Ghose, 2013).

68 PACT’s initial Executive Director was Dawn Tyler Lee, who had previously served as OSU’s Vice President for Government Relations. Following Ms. Tyler Lee’s move to the United Way of Central Ohio, PACT appointed Trudy Bartley as Interim Executive Director. Ms. Bartley had also previously served as OSU’s Vice President for Government Relations, having succeeded Dawn Tyler Lee in that position as well.

69 Membership of the oversight and advisory committees is included in the Blueprint for Community Investment (PACT, 2013b).
Following its formation in 2011 and a public kick-off event in January 2012, PACT set about organizing a series of community meetings to gather resident input regarding neighborhood revitalization strategies.\textsuperscript{70} It organized the five subcommittees and identified two or three volunteer co-chairs for each, typically community representatives or other neighborhood stakeholders. Each subcommittee was charged with holding ten monthly public meetings beginning in April, 2011. Final subcommittee recommendations were published in June, 2012.

Attendance at public meetings was mixed, with housing sub-committee meetings attracting the largest crowds though even the less-attended events often devolved into contentious debate. However, given conflict surrounding previous investments in King-Lincoln, one would expect vocal disagreement. Interviews with sub-committee chairs indicate that meetings were often

\textsuperscript{70} In contrast to the Weinland Park Collaborative’s kick-off event, PACT’s was held in the East High School auditorium (instead of a park), was not paired with a larger community event, and featured a number of speakers from outside the neighborhood, including OSU President E. Gordon Gee, Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman, and CMHA President Charles Hillman.
disorganized, and that they received little guidance from PACT concerning their purpose or agenda.

Concerning neighborhood tension, subcommittee chairs suggested that meeting attendees were largely split into two largely oppositional cohorts. One group, relatively wealthier homeowners and primarily living on the east side of King-Lincoln, advocated for increased homeownership and encouraging in-migration of middle-class households. They believe that market-rate development will provide a bulwark against further blight and will spur outside investments. A second cohort, consisting primarily of low-income homeowners and renters, champions greater provision of affordable housing and stronger controls against tenant evictions. This group fears gentrification-related displacement through higher property taxes or evictions, and views affordable housing as a tactic to prevent housing price increases.

 Concurrent with these community meetings, PACT, through CMHA, applied for and received a $300,000 HUD Choice Neighborhoods planning grant. Choice Neighborhoods is a relatively recent federal program (initially funded in 2010) that “supports locally driven strategies to address struggling neighborhoods with distressed public or HUD-assisted housing through a comprehensive approach to neighborhood transformation” (HUD, 2013). In many ways, Choice Neighborhoods is the successor to HOPE VI, but whereas HOPE VI constructs government-owned mixed-income housing, Choice Neighborhoods has housing authorities partner with developers to build privately-owned communities, where affordable housing is provided through Section 8 vouchers. Choice Neighborhoods is a two-stage process, with applicants first receiving a planning grant to develop a ‘Transformation Plan’ and, pending HUD approval, then receiving much more significant implementation funding to achieve the plan.

As community meetings began to wind down in early 2012, PACT announced that it had hired Goody Clancy to develop its Transformation Plan, called the *Blueprint for Community Investment*. In spite of a competitive process to hire a planning firm, one notes that Goody Clancy has a long-term relationship with both the City and OSU, and served as the principal

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71 This is reminiscent of the broader trend in public housing provision, discussed earlier, that has shifted ownership of affordable units from the public to the private sector. In many ways, HOPE VI was an outlier, and was one of the only programs to support new-construction public housing in decades (with the exception of senior housing) (HUD, 1999).
planner for both *A Plan for High Street* and the *Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan* (Campus Partners, 2000; Department of Development, 2006). PACT provided Goody Clancy with subcommittee recommendations, and both PACT and Goody Clancy organized a series of community planning workshops and open houses in March, July, October, and November 2012 to gather additional community input (PACT, 2013b). A draft version of Goody Clancy’s *Blueprint for Community Investment* was presented on March 5, 2013 at the King Arts Complex. At this meeting, community members were presented with a number of recommendations organized under the rubric of the five original PACT subcommittees, with attendees asked to rank the importance of each suggestion.72

**IV.c Beyond Planning and Future Efforts**

As the public component of the planning process ended in early 2013, OSU announced plans to transition PACT from a planning organization into a Community Development Corporation (CDC), incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit and funded through donations from the university, the City of Columbus, and CMHA (Ghose, 2013). OSU and the City will each contribute $200,000 annually, with CMHA providing half that amount (Ferenchik, 2013b). Unlike Campus Partners, OSU announced that PACT would not be a developer itself, but instead would offer subsidies to private real estate interests to achieve the *Blueprint’s* vision.

Though the *Blueprint* remains unreleased as of May 2013, PACT has signaled its funding priorities through several community meetings and the presentation of the draft plan in March 2013. First among these, and one that PACT has advocated for since its inception, is the redevelopment of the Taylor Avenue corridor that connects OSU’s two facilities in the neighborhood, OSU Hospitals East and CarePoint East outpatient facility (see Figure 5.3) (Ghose, 2013; Heagney, 2012; Kerkhoff, 2012). PACT envisions transforming Taylor into a neighborhood commercial center anchored by a grocery store and shopping center. The future of Poindexter Village is somewhat less clear, but CMHA has signaled its intent to construct senior housing with Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), with mixed-income housing later coming to the site – though the amount of housing is still under debate, with various groups supporting either 400, 500, or 600 units (Ferenchik, 2013a, 2013c). Other likely investments by

72 Goody Clancy released the final *Blueprint* at a community meeting on July 10, 2013.
PACT include business improvement along the Mount Vernon Avenue corridor, and scattered-site housing investments, perhaps similar to the exterior home repair program funded by the Weinland Park Collaborative (see Chapter 4).

Who will implement PACT’s vision, though, is unsettled. In announcing the transition from a planning group to a development organization and incorporation as a 501(c)3 non-profit, PACT’s leaders stated that it will not serve as a developer, but will instead contract with real estate professionals. In doing so, they specifically differentiated themselves from Campus Partners, which developed the South Campus Gateway project (Ferenchik, 2013b; Ghose, 2013). However, one should note that Campus Partners, like PACT, originally intended to contract with a developer on the Gateway project through a nationwide RFP, but found responses tepid, given the bureaucratic complexities of central city redevelopment and the need to fulfill institutional (OSU) goals. One must assume that PACT will experience the same difficulties in locating a willing developer, and that the real estate industry may be even less willing to work in King-Lincoln, given both neighborhood fragmentation and a greater bureaucratic presence: instead of only having to satisfy the University, PACT’s developer will have to meet the goals of OSU, the City, and CMHA.

V. PACT and the Weinland Park Collaborative as Agents of Revitalization

In discussing the history of King-Lincoln and PACT, a number of salient points emerge, both in and of themselves and in comparison to the Weinland Park Collaborative. First, the organizational role for PACT was largely played by the City of Columbus. The City has long supported the revitalization of King-Lincoln, dating back to the Model Cities initiative, with more recent efforts including infrastructure improvements throughout the area, the renovation of the Lincoln Theater, and financial support of the Whitney Young condominiums. The City orchestrated the tax abatement agreement that resulted in OSU pledging $10 million to King-Lincoln’s revitalization, and later convinced CMHA to join PACT. The city’s organization role is similar to that of Campus Partners and the Weinland Park Collaborative, where Ohio State’s community development arm was instrumental in assembling a neighborhood regime.

The City’s capacity to organize a coalition promoting redevelopment was also evinced in the Lincoln Theater redevelopment. While a number of actors representing the public, private, and institutional sectors contributed to its renovation, their actions never reached the level of cohesion
or geographic extent to represent a neighborhood regime. As discussed in Chapter 3, neighborhood regimes are coalitions representing the public, private, and civic sectors that fund multiple investments within a particular area – for example, the Weinland Park Collaborative has engaged in various housing, social service, and infrastructure projects throughout the neighborhood. With the renovation of the Lincoln Theater, civic and private sector actors merely served as donors, not as members of a coalition. In addition, their efforts were solely focused on renovation of a particular building, not a broader neighborhood. While the Lincoln renovation might have represented an opportunity for the City, as the initial investor, to cobble together a regime pursuing wider revitalization in King-Lincoln, such a coalition did not materialize at that time.73

Second, PACT lacks a private sector representative, and in comparison to the Weinland Park Collaborative, the role of the public sector is greater in setting the revitalization agenda. Nearly all revitalization activities in King-Lincoln have been undertaken by the public or civic sectors, including Model Cities, urban renewal, the Community Extension Center, King Arts Complex, Lincoln Theater renovation, and NOBO. The one privately-funded investment in the neighborhood, the Whitney Young condominiums, was a fiasco that demonstrated that its developer, the Whitney Young Collaborative, was not a suitable partner for development. Since its inception, PACT has sought a private developer with whom to partner in effecting revitalization, but as of July 2013, these efforts have proven unsuccessful. In addition, while WPC features broad civic sector participation (especially from philanthropies), including OSU/Campus Partners, the Columbus Foundation, United Way, JP Morgan Chase Foundation, and the Weinland Park Community Civic Association, PACT is primarily led by the public sector (CMHA and the City), and the only civic sector representative is OSU.74

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73 This isn’t to criticize the City’s actions or lack thereof. This model of project-based redevelopment, led by government and supported from corporate donations, has been de rigueur since at least the urban renewal programs of the 1950’s (Groberg, 1965). Further, the level of philanthropic participation demonstrated in the neighborhood regimes is a relatively recent phenomenon, with place-based philanthropy – where foundations support a broad project of urban revitalization throughout a targeted neighborhood, only becoming popular in the early- to mid-2000’s (Backer et al., 2004; Murdoch et al., 2007).

74 Several neighborhood residents affiliated with different civic organizations served on PACT’s advisory committee, but it appears that they primarily participated as individuals, not as representatives of their respective organizations.
In addition to lacking a private sector presence, PACT is a more formal organization than the WPC, as evidenced by current plans to incorporate as a 501(c)3 Community Development Corporation. In comparison, while WPC initially debated establishing itself as a non-profit, it ultimately discarded those plans in favor of individual funders retaining autonomy over their investments. With PACT’s more formalized structure has come a more hierarchical organizational chart, led by the three funders, with neighborhood residents and stakeholders playing an advisory role.  

Third, much like WPC, PACT’s revitalization strategy is centered on housing. Given the presence of CMHA and its planned redevelopment of the Poindexter Village site, this is not entirely surprising, though note $9 million of OSU’s funding is dedicated to housing as well. Much like the WPC, PACT representatives frequently mentioned existing research that emphasizes housing’s role as a foundation for further community development. PACT will utilize OSU’s funding to purchase and renovate housing throughout King-Lincoln, in addition to a Choice Neighborhoods Implementation grant and Low Income Housing Tax Credits to develop senior housing on the Poindexter Village site.

Unlike WPC, though, PACT has thus far been unable to harness its investments toward a virtuous cycle of neighborhood revitalization, nor has it been able to expand its coalition. Despite financial commitments from its three funders, PACT has yet to enlist a developer to implement the Blueprint for Community Investment, and no significant outside investments have recently occurred in the neighborhood. PACT has yet to reach out to neighborhood-based civic sector actors, including the Columbus Foundation (whose offices are located on Broad Street in the former Governor’s Mansion) and Homeport, itself headquartered on Long Street. The later

75 Admittedly, this is not so different from the Weinland Park Collaborative, where the five funders (Campus Partners/OSU, Columbus Foundation, United Way, JP Morgan Chase Foundation, and Wagenbrenner) retain autonomy over their own investments. However, I believe the organizational structures (and the names for each) published by each organization are telling of differences between the groups (cf. Figure 4.3 and 5.4). The WPC’s “family tree” is a networked diagram with no clear hierarchy that includes a number of community groups and emphasizes connections between all actors. In contrast, PACT’s “organizational chart” is an explicitly hierarchical diagram that fails to mention community groups and actors.

76 Choice Neighborhoods Implementation funding is contingent upon HUD’s acceptance of the Blueprint for Community Investment. Interviews with PACT’s representatives indicate a largely optimistic view that the organization will receive implementation funding.
omission is even more surprising given Homeport’s ongoing investments in the NOBO community. Also unlike the WPC, PACT’s planned investments have not spurred interest by outside groups like Habitat for Humanity and the Annie E. Casey Foundation.

Finally, the often acrimonious relationship between PACT, its funders, and neighborhood leadership defines revitalization efforts in King-Lincoln. In contrast to Weinland Park, where a single civic association represents the entire neighborhood, 8 different civic associations and 2 business improvement associations lie within PACT’s bounds. Many of these have overlapping boundaries, and virtually all have a different vision of community revitalization. Interviews with residents and PACT representatives have indicated that, with so many organizations, groups see themselves in competition with one another for attention. In turn, this has incentivized confrontation with outside groups, including the City, CMHA, and PACT.

However, despite civic dysfunction, King-Lincoln continues to receive substantial investments from the public and civic sectors, a testament to both (i) the political connections of both existing institutions (e.g., churches) and former residents and (ii) the continued relevance of the neighborhood to Columbus’ African-American community. Neighborhood churches have shown tremendous efficacy in steering investments their way, such as the selection of the Whitney Young Collaborative to develop condominiums. Many of the City’s political leaders, including former Development Director Boyce Safford, grew up in the neighborhood. Interviews with black leaders indicated that they view the neighborhood as Columbus’ version of Harlem, a place of pride that should be returned to its cultural and economic apogee.

In addition to civic fragmentation, driving much of the opposition to PACT’s redevelopment efforts is widespread nostalgia both among current and former neighborhood residents. One of the loudest critical voices has come from neighborhood churches, most of whose congregants grew up in the neighborhood but have subsequently moved elsewhere. Opposition to the proposed Poindexter Village demolition is being driven not by recently-displaced complex residents, but by those who were raised there, such as noted King-Lincoln artist Aminah Robinson (Columbus Dispatch, 2012). And some neighborhood groups and residents, most notably (i) the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association and its leader, Willis Brown and (ii) Near East Area Commission President Kathleen Bailey, have long criticized the City and CMHA for not adequately investing in the neighborhood that serves as the city’s African-American cultural hearth (Caruso, 2010; Ferenchik, 2006c, 2012b; Vitale, 2010b).
The past also motivates the skepticism and cynicism that many King-Lincoln residents have shown toward PACT, especially in regards to the Poindexter Village redevelopment. Over the past sixty years, a number of actors have promised neighborhood revitalization, but failed to deliver on these guarantees. Urban renewal was promoted as clearing a deteriorating commercial corridor in favor of new housing; instead, many of the sites it razed sat vacant for decades. Model Cities offered housing reinvestment and job training, the Empowerment Zone would bring new businesses into the community, and cultural investments would improve quality-of-life and celebrate the neighborhood’s history. Given that all of these projects failed to meet the (admittedly lofty) expectations that they promoted to King-Lincoln, shouldn’t one expect that residents would be skeptical of another outside group promising a broad renaissance? What makes PACT different from these previous efforts?

VI. Conclusions

This chapter has related the history of King-Lincoln from its origins as a self-contained African-American neighborhood, blight in the postwar era, numerous and largely unsuccessful attempts at revitalization, and recent investments that culminated in the formation of a neighborhood regime, Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT). As such, it has elucidated King-Lincoln’s origins as Columbus’ African-American community, one that emerged concurrent with the Harlem Renaissance as a cultural hearth for the area’s black population. Due to widespread de facto segregation, neighborhood businesses catered to every need of the city’s African-American population, including food, clothing, and entertainment. Thus, from roughly 1920 through 1950, Mount Vernon Avenue and Long Street were bustling commercial districts.

However, King-Lincoln, like urban neighborhoods throughout the United States, entered a period of disinvestment during the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras. The construction of the interstate highway system severed social and physical linkages between the neighborhood and downtown. The decline of discriminatory real estate and commercial practices meant that African-Americans were no longer confined to particular neighborhoods. Increased automobile ownership and invasion-succession processes offered new, affordable housing opportunities in safer communities. As a result, most residents of means left, leading to a vicious cycle of decline and blight.
Blight in King-Lincoln was not met idly, though, and the neighborhood was the recipient of numerous efforts to stem disinvestment in the postwar era. These included attempts to improve the built environment (urban renewal, Model Cities), to encourage business development (Neighborhood Commercial Revitalization Districts, Empowerment Zones), social service provision (Urban League), and cultural investments (OSU Community Extension Center, King Arts Complex). Despite this attention, these efforts were largely unsuccessful in their time. However, they arguably laid the groundwork for an incipient, first-wave gentrification movement, begun around the turn of the Twenty-first century, which was later complemented by the purchase and renovation of houses along 21st Street as part of Homeport’s NOBO community.

Within this environment, three organizations – the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority, the City of Columbus, and the Ohio State University – began to undertake investments to revitalize King-Lincoln. CMHA planned the demolition of the dilapidated, though historic, Poindexter Village site, sold Sawyer Towers to a private developer, and converted (and later demolished) Poindexter Tower into condominiums. The City supported the development of the Whitney Young condominiums, and funded the renovation of the Lincoln Theater. OSU purchased two health care facilities in the neighborhood, and through a tax abatement agreement with the City, dedicated $10 million to revitalize King-Lincoln.

With this commonality of interests, these entities came together under the leadership of Mayor Coleman to form Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT), a neighborhood regime that would oversee investments in King-Lincoln. PACT is a more formal organization than the Weinland Park Collaborative, an independent entity that pools contributions from the three funders and has a dedicated staff and office space. PACT’s initial efforts focused on planning, including (i) numerous public meetings, (ii) applying for and receiving a HUD Choice Neighborhoods planning grant for the Poindexter Village site, and (iii) the publication of the Blueprint for Community Investment. The latter outlines a revitalization strategy centered on housing development and the rejuvenation of the Taylor Avenue corridor.
Chapter 6: Olde Towne East

I. Introduction

Having chronicled the history, formation, and maintenance of two neighborhood regimes – the Weinland Park Collaborative (WPC) and Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT) – the dissertation now turns to analyzing an area where a similar coalition has failed to emerge despite redevelopment since the 1970’s – Olde Towne East.

Located immediately south of King-Lincoln and east of the CBD, the history of the area now known as Olde Towne East largely reflects the neighborhood life cycle framework of Hoover and Vernon (1962). Originally constructed as an enclave for Columbus’ nouveau riche in the late nineteenth century, the neighborhood began a process of blight and disinvestment in the postwar era. However, beginning in the 1970’s, a ‘classic,’ or first-wave, gentrification began in the neighborhood – one that continues today (Ferenchik, 2011d; Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Despite four decades of ongoing redevelopment, though, Olde Towne East still features a socioeconomically diverse population divided between largely white, middle-class in-movers and less well-to-do, African-American long-term residents. While the former cohort has organized into a relatively active neighborhood association, the latter group has only recently been galvanized by the Columbus Compact – an institution founded to administer Columbus’ Empowerment Zone and which has pursued quality-of-life improvements for the area’s low-income population.

For the purposes of this study, I define Olde Towne East as bounded by Broad Street to the north, Miller Avenue to the east, Interstate 70 to the south, and Interstate 71 to the west (Figure 6.1).77

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77 These largely comport to that of the Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association (OTENA), though that organization’s formal service area extends north of Broad Street to Long Street, and its eastern delineation is rather irregular and not as extensive as the study area, encompassing Wilson Avenue, Kendall Place, and Latta Avenue.
To the north of Olde Towne lies King-Lincoln (Chapter 5), to the east is Franklin Park and the South of Main neighborhood, south of Interstate 70 is Nationwide Children’s Hospital and the neighborhoods of Southern Orchards, Old Oaks, and Driving Park, and to the west is downtown Columbus (Figure 3.2). Important landmarks include the Columbus Public Health headquarters at Main Street and Parsons Avenue, the Jerry Hammond Building housing city offices at Broad Street and Ohio Avenue, the Blackburn Recreation Center on 18th Street, the Central Community House and East Central Health Clinic at Main Street and Oakwood Avenue, and the Model Cities Neighborhood Facility and Near East Side Pride Center at Broad Street and Latta Avenue.

Demographic and socioeconomic data indicate a neighborhood undergoing slow redevelopment within a context of urban blight (see Table 6.1). Olde Towne East’s population fell 61.1% from 1970 to 2010, a decrease of 7,784 residents. The percent of the population identifying as Caucasian shrank slightly between 1970 and 1990 – from 23.8% to 21.9% – but has increased to 32.8% in 2010, a pattern that is a testament to the continued in-moving of gentrifiers. Concurrent with a period of first-wave gentrification, the neighborhood’s homeownership rate has increased nearly 50% since 1970, rising from 20.3% to 30.8% in 2010 (having slightly fallen from 2000 to 2010, possibly as a result of the Great Recession). Like King-Lincoln, Olde Towne East’s vacancy rate increased dramatically from 1970-1980, from 15.1% to 28.3%, but has remained relatively stable since then, falling to 21.2% in 1990 before rising to 23.1% in 2000 and 27.7% in 2010.

The chapter proceeds as follows. Having reviewed the geographic, socioeconomic, and demographic character of Olde Towne East, discussion now turns to the neighborhood’s history until 1945, highlighting its development as a streetcar suburb defined by architecturally-significant mansions. Urban blight is then chronicled, identifying the culprits – some unique to Olde Towne East, and some applicable to neighborhoods throughout the U.S. – and attempts to stem disinvestment, most notably Model Cities. The chapter discusses an incipient gentrification movement, as a number of former Model Cities volunteers, artists, educators, and younger households, began to purchase and renovate historic properties for their own occupancy. This section highlights formation of the Olde Towne East Development Association and its efforts to revitalize without displacing existing residents. The penultimate section reviews the neighborhood’s recent history, including the 2003 Flag Wars documentary, continuing property renovation, and recent in-moving of several commercial establishments catering to a more well-
to-do population. Throughout this entire history, though, Olde Towne East is marked by tremendous socioeconomic diversity, and recently an organization has been formed – the Columbus Compact – that is attempting to revitalize the area by improving quality-of-life for low-income residents. The chapter concludes by elucidating comparisons to Weinland Park and King-Lincoln, offering potential explanations for why neighborhood regimes have emerged in those areas but not in Olde Towne East.

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II. Neighborhood History Until 1945

The neighborhood now known as Olde Towne East was annexed into Columbus in 1870, and platted soon after as an enclave for the city’s elite (Ferenchik, 2011d). The area had previously been farmland owned by one of Columbus’ prominent early families, the Parsons.78 As noted by Columbus historian Ed Lentz, the East Side “was the logical place for the extension of relatively fashionable communities in Columbus,” as the city’s northern neighborhoods were separated from downtown by Union Station and its corresponding railroad lines, the west side community of Franklinton was subject to almost-annual flooding, and south of downtown was largely the province of heavy industry (WOSU, 2011b). Further, the East Side was unique in that most deeds did not place any religious or racial restrictions on residents, in contrast to other areas (Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association, 2013a).

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78 The street leading to the Parsons farm is now known as Parsons Avenue.
Figure 6.1: Olde Towne East reference map.
The development and expansion of Columbus’ streetcar lines facilitated the growth of the East Side, including Olde Towne East. The first streetcar through the neighborhood, along Oak Street, was built in 1882, and other early transit lines ran along important east-west arteries such as Main and Livingston Streets (Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association, 2013a). Further, the local elite promoted Broad Street as a gateway to the city, and its boulevard featured landscaping, tree islands, and residential monuments to their success, including the Governor’s Mansion (Lentz, 2003). A number of Columbus’ new institutions, including the School for the Blind (now the Columbus Health Department) and the old Ohio State Fairgrounds (now the Franklin Park Conservatory), were located within the neighborhood and surrounding environs. Importantly, these institutions not only gave the area an imprimatur of wealth and importance, but also positively contributed to quality-of-life through their grounds.

Given the wealth of those moving into Olde Towne East, most homes were architecturally significant and reflect the tastes of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. The neighborhood is said to feature over 50 different architectural styles, with Italianate, Queen Anne, and Victorian being arguably the most common (WOSU, 2011b). The sizeable mansions along Broad Street and Bryden Road reflect a European influence, as the nouveau riche from America’s Industrial Revolution looked to the old world for inspiration. The area’s wealthy population would give it the nickname of the “Silk Stocking District” (Johnson, 2007). This architectural significance would later prove crucial to the neighborhood’s appeal to in-movers in the 1970’s.79

III. Urban Blight and Attempts to Stem Decline, 1945 – 1975

By 1945, Olde Towne East was tenuously maintaining its position as Columbus’ premier residential community. In both the prewar and postwar years, the neighborhood faced challenges from continued out-migration and invasion-succession, as wealthier households chose to relocate further from the city center, with many moving to more outlying communities and the independent suburbs of Bexley and Upper Arlington. The late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, however, would see tremendous social, political, and economic changes affect Olde Towne East –

79 However, Olde Towne East was never an exclusively wealthy neighborhood, and interspersed throughout the area are more modest dwellings catering to a lower-income population. Many of these units were built for domestic employees of the area’s wealthy. The intermixing of both grand mansions and smaller houses has long given the neighborhood a significant amount of diversity, both socioeconomic and architectural, which further laid the groundwork for its eventual redevelopment.
first as community transitioning to middle-income African-American homeownership, and then as one afflicted by disinvestment and blight – a process described by Hoover and Vernon as a neighborhood life cycle (1962).

III.a Urban Blight

The initial post-World War II period saw Olde Towne East become a more diverse neighborhood racially, as declining central city house prices and, eventually, the reduction in discriminatory lending practices opened up new residential opportunities for minorities. As a result, a classic invasion-success process commenced, as houses within the neighborhood came within reach for middle-class black families, many of whom already lived on the Near East Side (especially in King-Lincoln) as renters (WOSU, 2011b).\textsuperscript{80}

However, this new diversity only proved to be a transitory period, as Olde Towne East soon entered a period of decline and disinvestment typical of urban neighborhoods in the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras. Much like King-Lincoln, the reasons for Olde Towne East’s decline included increases in automobile ownership, development of car-related infrastructure including the interstate highway system, the growth of residential sub-divisions (both within and beyond the city), outlying commercial centers, and the decentralization of the population more broadly.

Interstate highways severed Olde Towne East from the CBD and surrounding areas, and roadway changes and realignments greatly increased automobile traffic through the neighborhood. North-south Interstate 71 separated Olde Towne East from downtown, while east-west Interstate 70 divided the neighborhood from areas to the south. In a 2013 speech, Columbus Mayor Michael Coleman referred to Columbus’ interstate highways as a “Berlin Wall” that “contributed to the decline of the community” (Rouan, 2013). Additionally, traffic through Olde Towne East increased as Broad Street’s boulevard was removed for additional travel lanes, Main Street was widened and connected to the interstate system, and Ohio and Champion Avenues were converted to one-way traffic (Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association, 2013a).

\textsuperscript{80} One witnesses similar processes of decline and blight in King-Lincoln and Olde Towne East (collectively known as the Near East Side). Key informant interviews with long-term residents of both neighborhoods suggest that disinvestment in King-Lincoln began earlier, with residents first initially moving to Olde Towne East (due to the latter’s superior housing stock) before decamping for more outlying areas.
Changes in cultural tastes also fomented blight in Olde Towne East, as residential preferences increasingly favored newer subdivision housing with modern amenities like central air conditioning, modern electrical systems that could support household appliances, attached garages, and large yards on sizeable lots. Commercial preferences shifted as well, with consumers favoring larger, new stores and enclosed malls with sizeable parking lots that promised greater convenience.81

Much like King-Lincoln, this decentralization of population and commercial activity led to a vicious cycle of disinvestment throughout Olde Towne East. Post-World War II, many of its large residences were subdivided into boarding houses and apartments, converted to nursing homes or churches, or abandoned altogether (WOSU, 2011b). The latter soon attracted a homeless population, and arsons – whether by squatters or property owners seeking to cash in an insurance policy – plagued the neighborhood. While Olde Towne East was not as affected by unrest during the civil rights era as King-Lincoln, increased crime nevertheless further fueled out-migration and blight. With a less-affluent customer base, neighborhood businesses moved out, and to the extent they were replaced, these new firms catered to a lower-income population: bail bondsmen, tattoo parlors, corner stores, and the like. Given a declining homeownership rate, greater prevalence of crime, and increasing traffic through the neighborhood, prostitutes soon plied their trade along Olde Towne East’s east-west thoroughfares – namely Bryden Road and Main Street.

III.b Model Cities

While Olde Towne East did not receive as much postwar redevelopment attention as King-Lincoln, it was the focus (along with areas to the north of Broad Street) of Columbus’ Model Cities initiative. As discussed in Chapter 5, Columbus received Model Cities funding from 1968-1972, and identified the Near East Side as its ‘Model Neighborhood’ where funds would be spent. Unlike King-Lincoln, though, Olde Towne East did not witness the construction of a substantial

81 As mentioned in Chapter 3, Columbus has long been a pioneer in suburban shopping development. Town and Country, built in 1948 just outside the city in Whitehall, was arguably the first (or one of the first) suburban shopping center in the US (Lentz, 2003, p. 122). Three regional malls opened in the 1950’s and 1960’s – Northland, Westland, and Eastland, a portion of downtown was leveled to build City Center Mall in the late 1980’s, and three newer regional shopping centers were constructed in the 1990’s and 2000’s: Tuttle Crossing, Polaris Fashion Place, and Easton Town Center, the latter two considered “lifestyle centers” that combine shopping, office space, and residential.

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public housing stock. However, much like in King-Lincoln, Model Cities demolished a number of vacant properties throughout the neighborhood, and also failed to foment a broad revitalization movement in its time.\textsuperscript{82}

IV. Olde Towne East, 1975-Present

By the mid-1970’s, Olde Towne East had suffered a fate similar to many urban neighborhoods throughout the US. Its postwar history was defined by disinvestment and blight, as shifts in housing preferences, the construction of the interstate highway system, and increases in crime led many residents and business to decamp for more outlying communities. The one significant attempt to revitalize the area – Model Cities – did little to improve quality of life. However, much like in King-Lincoln, this initiative arguably laid the foundation for a ‘first-wave’ gentrification process beginning in the mid-1970’s, though in a decidedly different way.\textsuperscript{83}

IV.a Beginnings of Gentrification, early to mid-1970’s

While Model Cities failed to spur redevelopment, many of its former volunteers and staff had become socially invested in the Near East Side – including Olde Towne East. In the years following Model Cities’ demise, many of these volunteers began to purchase and renovate houses in the neighborhood for their own occupancy – a classic first-wave gentrification process (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Many of these in-movers were aided by the City of Columbus offering 3% interest on rehabilitation loans throughout the neighborhood; according to one early in-mover, “the City was thrilled because Model Cities funding had dried up, but they had done investments with it all over the East Side.” Interviews further suggest that these initial in-movers were a diverse cohort, including not only Model Cities volunteers but also professionals who valued the area’s architecture, Ohio State professors, and homosexuals.

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{82} One relic of this time period is the Model Cities Neighborhood Center, which housed the program’s offices, at Broad Street and Latta Avenue. The center remains open, and houses the Near East Side Neighborhood Pride Center.
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\textsuperscript{83} Recall that King-Lincoln’s incipient gentrification began in the early 2000’s, and was arguably built upon several waves of previous investment, including the King Arts Complex, OSU Community Extension Center, Model Cities, and the like.
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Another impetus for early renovators was the Cultural Arts Center, then located in a restored firehouse at the corner of Oak Street and Parsons Avenue. The Center was a hub of the local arts community, attracting would-be painters, sculptors, designers, and the like. Importantly, it exposed its participants to a neighborhood with ample available real estate—both houses and potential gallery spaces—at affordable prices. A number of galleries opened along Parsons Avenue, and many artists purchased and renovated properties throughout the neighborhood. Despite undergoing turnover over the ensuing four decades, Parsons Avenue remains an important node of Columbus’ arts community.

These initial in-movers were largely disparate actors, though, until a shooting brought the community together into a broader redevelopment movement. Dick and Dee Johnson had opened the Dell as a restaurant and music club along Parsons Avenue in the mid-1970’s (Figure 6.1). The incident at the Dell inspired recent in-movers to begin organizing about improving the neighborhood and preserving its historic housing stock. These meetings culminated with founding the Olde Towne East Development Association (OTEDA) in 1975. Unique to most neighborhood associations, OTEDA was incorporated as a 501(c)4 non-profit, which allowed it to engage in political lobbying.84 In its early years, prior to the formation of the Near East Area Commission, OTEDA lobbied the City for Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funding to purchase and renovate houses, and worked with municipal officials to preserve as much of the area’s housing stock as possible.

Interviews with early OTEDA members indicate that, while the organization was initially socioeconomically and racially diverse, schisms soon appeared and many long-term African-American residents disassociated from the group. Many feared the loss of affordable housing, and worried that the actions of OTEDA would eventually lead to their displacement. Debates about protections for existing residents and the siting of affordable housing in the community were particularly vocal, and these disagreements have arguably animated neighborhood politics for nearly four decades.

84 More commonly, neighborhood groups incorporate as 501(c)3 non-profits, under which political activities are forbidden.
IV.b  OTEDA/OTENA and Neighborhood Struggles, late 1970’s–2000

OTEDA’s early years were primarily focused on historic preservation. Residents worked with code enforcement officers in their ‘drive-throughs’ of the neighborhood, identifying which abandoned properties were salvageable and which should be demolished. OTEDA partnered with the City on a neighborhood plan that advocated for pods of commercial activity, rather than corridors, believing that the former would prevent widespread redevelopment of the area. Area leaders succeeded in getting most of Olde Towne East placed on the National Register of Historic Places, and in 1989, Bryden Road was recognized on the Columbus Register of Historic Places (Edwards & Smith, 1987; Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association, 2013a). Placement on the National Register allows for renovators to apply for historic preservation tax credits, and any demolition within the district using federal funds must undergo project review. In contrast, any building or demolition permit within Columbus’ historic districts must be reviewed by the Historic Review Commission, which can comment on (but not reject) plans.\(^{85}\)

Compared to other neighborhoods undergoing revitalization, OTEDA was particularly conscious of displacement, and undertook a number of actions to preserve affordable housing – perhaps motivated by previous disagreements within the group between long-term residents and in-movers. First, in the early years of the Section 8 program – the late 1970’s – OTEDA partnered with Sandifer Development to locate a sizeable number of project-based subsidized rentals within the neighborhood.\(^{86}\) One early OTEDA leader believed that these were “a tool … by having it scattered throughout the community, we could keep it mixed-income,” as project-based Section 8 would ensure that these units would remain affordable for at least 20 years. Additionally, OTEDA sponsored a homeless shelter on Main Street, which would not only provide housing for

\(^{85}\) In addition to historic district designations throughout the city, three Columbus neighborhoods – German, Victorian, and Italian Villages – have their own, independent historic designations that includes architectural review of all building and demolition permits (Edwards & Smith, 1987). Each district’s architectural review commission wields the authority to reject any proposed permit if it does not meet adopted standards.

\(^{86}\) As mentioned in Chapter 4, the Section 8 program consists of two components. Project-based Section 8 provides HUD financing for affordable housing units; in turn, these are let to eligible tenants. Housing Choice Vouchers (so-called tenant-based Section 8) offers subsidies to individual households who rent from private landlords. Project-based units, like those in Olde Towne East, must be let to Section 8 tenants, and are thus guaranteed affordable housing.
the area’s most destitute population, but would also reduce squatting in abandoned residences and would arguably reduce revitalization pressure.

Second, OTEDA adopted a by-law that asked in-movers to avert displacing existing residents whenever possible, and, when displacement was unavoidable, to locate housing within the neighborhood for affected individuals.\(^{87}\) The resolution, along with Section 8 and the Main Street homeless shelter, were tactics to prevent the wholesale transformation of the neighborhood by ensuring that low-income residents remained in the area; seeing as these new residents valued the neighborhood’s socioeconomic diversity, one former OTEDA President commented that “we didn’t want it to become like German Village.”\(^{88}\)

Beyond mitigating displacement, OTEDA worked to improve quality-of-life by eliminating drugs and prostitution. The crack epidemic of the 1980’s strongly affected Olde Towne East, and many of the its abandoned properties became ‘crack houses’ and sources of other criminal activity. Open-air drug dealing became frequent on residential streets, and property crime grew rampant, as burglaries and car thefts became an increasingly common way for addicts to acquire cash to fuel their habit. In response, OTEDA adopted a multi-faceted strategy to combat rising levels of drug use and violence (Lovell, 1989). It partnered with Columbus police to identify crack houses, and encouraged residents to report these dwellings to city officials.\(^{89}\) It organized a number of public anti-drug events that pushed much of the drug activity indoors and off neighborhood streets. Finally, OTEDA sponsored the creation of block watches throughout the neighborhood; many of these are still operational today.

Another ongoing struggle of OTEDA has been prostitution, and residents have employed a number of conventional and unconventional strategies targeting the activity. The area became a hotbed of prostitution in the 1970’s and 80’s, especially on Bryden Road and Main Street.

\(^{87}\) Both current and former members of OTEDA/OTENA mentioned that, while this resolution is likely still on the OTEDA’s records, it is not enforced.

\(^{88}\) German Village is a neighborhood immediately south of Columbus’ CBD that began a first-wave gentrification process in the late 1950’s (Fusch, 1980). Over time, it has become almost completely transformed, shifting from a working-class ethnic Caucasian enclave to a middle-class neighborhood.

\(^{89}\) Long-term African-American residents commented that they had previously attempted to work with Columbus Police to fight drugs, but their efforts fell on deaf ears. However, once a cohort of renovators began moving into the area, police became much more receptive to neighborhood concerns.
OTEDA lobbied City Council for tougher enforcement of anti-loitering laws, and more stringent punishments for those convicted (Carmen, 1992, 1993). Less conventionally, residents began hanging posters with photos of convicted prostitutes, and identified ‘Johns’ (by culling Criminal Initiation reports) through hanging posters both in Olde Towne East and in areas where the Johns lived. More recently, the Columbus Compact installed six cameras along the roof of its headquarters on Main Street in 2009; these were broadcast in real time on the organization’s website (Knox, 2009).\(^9\) Designed to provide surveillance against a variety of crimes – including prostitution – the cameras allowed anyone with an internet connection to watch activity along Main Street, and to alert authorities when appropriate.

In the 1980’s, OTEDA transitioned from being a development organization to a more traditional neighborhood group, renaming itself the Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association (OTENA) and reincorporating as a 501(c)3 non-profit. This shift occurred as (i) newer residents were more interested in building community and promoting social events, and less interested in promoting development, (ii) funds for renovating properties declined, and (iii) Olde Towne East gained more formal representation in planning and zoning issues through the Near East Area Commission, which serves as a liaison between the neighborhood and city government.

To promote community and the neighborhood’s diversity, OTENA began holding Hot Times in Olde Towne, as a flea market and block party in 1976 along 18th Street between Main Street and Bryden Road, where residents could trade and barter pieces from houses under renovation. When Hot Times outgrew the site along 18th Street, it moved to the parking lot of the Jerry Hammond Building on Broad Street, and later relocated to the Columbus Public Health building at Main Street and Parsons Avenue. Over time, Hot Times in Olde Towne evolved from a flea market to include other community events, such as musical performances, arts and crafts merchants, and food vendors, and its name was eventually shortened to Hot Times.

Additionally, and in accordance with OTEDA’s mission to spur redevelopment and historic preservation within the neighborhood, it began holding an annual “rehab tour” in 1982. This event served as a showcase for OTEDA’s work and the neighborhood as a whole, and was designed to (i) display houses available for renovation and (ii) previously-rehabbed properties

\(^9\) Some camera footage was recorded by viewers and posted to Youtube.
that could serve as inspiration. Further, by encouraging property renovation the tour could reduce demolitions within the neighborhood. An early rehab tour brochure touted that

[the Near East Side has many fine, historic homes and buildings... Too many in our city lack the creativity and vision to see a revitalized Near East; many more fail to see the importance that the historic fabric of this nearly-downtown urban neighborhood will play in its resurgence. . . . We cannot rebuild the history that we have around us. Please work with us to see that it is not destroyed by a simple lack of vision and creativity.

The rehab tour continues today, but has been renamed the Olde Towne East Tour of Homes, and no longer features available properties. Instead, it showcases restored residences and churches, highlighting home décor and landscaping. This is largely reflective of shifts in the Tour of Homes’ sponsor – first OTEDA, then OTENA – that began as a development organization, but later transitioned to a neighborhood group focused on building community. The Tour of Homes has also shifted in purpose, as the event is now OTENA’s largest fundraiser, and supports the organization’s various community events.

IV.c Flag Wars (2003)

As redevelopment continued apace throughout the 1980’s and 1990’s, new residents brought a social and economic perspective that strongly differed from the initial core of in-movers. While many of the early in-movers valued Olde Towne East’s racial and economic diversity – and had worked to preserve the neighborhood’s character, e.g. through Section 8 housing – newer arrivals desired a more traditional gentrified neighborhood, and undertook steps to, as one new in-mover commented, “clean up the community.” Many of the latter group had come to Olde Towne East after being priced out of more mature gentrified neighborhoods, like German, Victorian, and Italian Villages, and were drawn by the area’s relatively affordable housing stock, historic character, proximity to the CBD, and existing cohort of middle-class households.

Tensions soon arose, though, between recent arrivals and (i) the original in-movers and (ii) low-income residents. Members of the initial cohort of renovators bristled at new residents’ heavy-handed tactics to improve the appearance of the neighborhood, namely through code enforcement. Interviews with these new residents indicated that they would coordinate “phone trees,” where numerous residents would bombard code enforcement offices with complaints about a particular property. Others complained that new residents were tone deaf to low-income
residents’ concerns and condescending in dealings with them, often pursuing underhanded or ‘back-room’ strategies.

This tension between new arrivals and existing residents – both middle-class whites and low-income households, largely African-American – was chronicled in the 2003 documentary Flag Wars, directed by Linda Goode Bryant and Laura Poitras (Bryant & Poitras, 2003). The title refers to the rainbow flags that began to appear in Olde Towne East throughout the 1990’s as an increasing number of homosexuals moved into the neighborhood, and the African flag flown by local artist Chief Baba Shango. The filmmakers use these flags as a metaphor for social, racial, and economic divides within the community – viz, between white, affluent, socially liberal gentrifiers and African-American, poor, socially conservative long-term residents. It highlights the use of code enforcement by new arrivals to ‘clean up’ the neighborhood, the inability of existing low-income homeowners on fixed income to meet increased property taxes, and the homophobia espoused by low-income, primarily African-American residents (Bryant, 2006).

IV.d Recent investments, 2000-present

The history of Olde Towne East since the turn of the twentieth century – that is, as the cognitive-cultural economy has become ascendant – is a tale of not only two neighborhoods, but of two streets. Along (and in the vicinity of) Oak Street, a number of new, independent businesses have opened that cater to a more affluent, middle-class clientele. Concurrently, the Columbus Compact, with support from the City, has made a number of investments along Main Street, opening a police substation, a neighborhood health clinic, and new headquarters for both a settlement house and the Salvation Army.

Beginning in the mid- to late-2000’s, several new restaurants, coffee shops, bars, and other establishments opened along Oak Street. The earliest of these concentrated at the intersection of Oak Street and Parsons Avenue, including Black Creek Bistro, an upscale and locally-focused

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91 Ms. Goode-Bryant has family that lives in Olde Towne East.

92 All conversations with Olde Towne East residents – both newer- and long-term, Caucasian and African-American – discussed Flag Wars, and most interviewees (especially Caucasians) expressed a negative opinion of the film. Many said that they felt ‘used’ by the filmmakers, and in a 2003 Columbus Dispatch article, real estate agent Nina Masseria (who figures prominently in the film) commented that “[t]he film gives the gay community a bad rap” (Latta, 2003).
restaurant, Carabar, which opened in the former Dell Restaurant space, Portico sandwich shop (now closed), CS Gallery, and Core Fitness Studio (Ferenchik, 2011d). Business development along the Parsons corridor builds upon previous investments in the area, primarily in terms of art-related ventures (e.g., Black Art Plus, which remains open, and several galleries that have come and gone) and restaurants and nightlife, such as the shuttered Dell Restaurant and Columbus Music Hall.

More recently, new businesses have opened farther east along Oak Street, and include the Angry Baker, Yellow Brick Pizza, Olde Towne East Tavern – all located at the corner of Oak and 18th Street – and L’Appat Patisserie. Interviews with owners of these establishments indicate that the area’s restaurant market was sorely underserved previously – as the owner of Yellow Brick Pizza commented “we were overwhelmed with the response and how excited the neighborhood was that we were open” (Trowbridge, 2010). Their decision to locate in Olde Towne East was influenced not only by the area’s continued revitalization, but also by the growth of downtown’s residential population. Further, restaurant owners indicated that they often source their ingredients from one another, and that they cooperate in attempting to attract patrons to Oak Street.

Concurrently, the Main Street corridor has also witnessed numerous investments that provide services to a less well-to-do population; these have been primarily been coordinated by the Columbus Compact Corporation, itself headquartered on Main Street. The Compact was founded in the mid-1990’s to administer Columbus’ Empowerment Zone, a 13.96 square mile district eligible for various forms of federal assistance (Columbus Compact Corporation, 1999).93 While the Compact has a large service area, a number of its investments have been targeted to the Near East Side broadly, and Olde Towne East specifically. To that end, the Compact represents the first attempt to organize Olde Towne East’s sizeable low-income population, and in many ways, might represent a competing organization to OTENA in charting the neighborhood’s future.

93 Columbus’ Empowerment Zone includes Weinland Park, King-Lincoln, and Olde Towne East, as well as the neighborhoods of Italian Village, University District, South Linden, Milo-Grogan, Franklinton, Driving Park, and East Columbus. A map of the Empowerment Zone may be found at http://www.colscompact.com/images/ez_and_commission_overlay.jpg.
Since the turn of the Twentieth century, the Compact, with City and federal funding, has coordinated the construction and relocation of several social service groups, in addition to other investments, along Main Street. It organized the construction of a new police substation in the early 2000’s that also provides community space and hosts monthly meetings of the Near East Area Commission (Figure 6.1). The Compact and the City also worked together to construct the new East Central Community Health Center and a new headquarters for the Central Community House in adjacent buildings at Main and Oakwood Avenue. The former facility offers healthcare services to the area’s low-income population, while the latter provides a plethora of social services to the community, including preschool, after-school care, job placement, and technology education. The Compact also assisted the Salvation Army in establishing its new headquarters on Main Street, adjacent to the police substation. More recently, the Compact used Empowerment Zone incentives to recruit a Save-a-Lot grocery to Main Street, and has used Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) funds to renovate houses in the South of Main neighborhood (Ferenchik, 2006d, 2009). Separate from the Compact’s efforts, the Columbus Health Department renovated the former Ohio School for the Blind at Main Street and Parsons Avenue, turning the historic structure into a modern headquarters and health clinic.

The distinction between Oak and Main Streets reflects the broader history of the neighborhood, which echoes Brian Berry’s 1985 chapter titled “Islands of Renewal in Seas of Decay” (Berry, 1985). In contrast to Columbus’ other gentrified neighborhoods – German, Victorian, and Italian Villages – Olde Towne East never completely transformed from low-income to high-rent. The pocket of higher-end commercial establishments along Parsons Avenue and Oak Street is, in many ways, isolated from the broader Near East Side, and interviews suggest that African-Americans frequently avoid white-owned businesses. These same residents feel that OTENA, while claiming to be a civic association representing the entire neighborhood, does not represent their interests, and frequently engages in subterfuge to mask its intent to displace the neighborhood of its remaining low-income residents.

94 The Weinland Park Collaborative has also utilized NSP to purchase and renovate vacant and previously foreclosed properties. Details of the program are discussed in Chapter 4.
However, the recent opening of the Near East Side Cooperative Market, located at the corner of Oak Street and Champion Avenue, might represent a weakening of the Oak Street/Main Street divide (Figure 6.1). The market operates on the cooperative model – where buyers can become members and participate in the store’s management – and thus may serve as a community-building tool. Further, the market offers reduced-price membership for low-income households, thus encouraging participation from individuals of various socioeconomic strata. While some of its offerings cater to both more affluent households, such as organic and locally-grown produce, the market also sells more affordable canned goods and bulk items. The co-op accepts food stamps, and is the only area grocery where low-income residents can use government benefits to purchase fresh produce.

Separate from recent development along Oak and Main Streets, contemporary issues in Olde Towne East reflect many of the same topics that have animated neighborhood politics since the 1970’s. Much like the Broad Street portfolio in Weinland Park, Olde Towne East’s stock of Section 8 housing was also due for refinancing in the late 1990’s. Many recent arrivals to the neighborhood, hoping for a faster neighborhood transformation, hoped that these units would transition out of the program, making them eligible for renovation. However, fearing that this would only exacerbate existing redevelopment pressures, other residents, especially many of the early in-movers who had fought for affordable housing in the 1970’s, organized to preserve the affordable housing stock. This group approached the Ohio Capital Corporation for Housing (OCCH) – an affordable housing financial intermediary – about purchasing some or the entire Section 8 portfolio. OCCH President Hal Keller elected to purchase most (but not all) of these properties, and they remain affordable today. Many of the units not purchased by OCCH, including a number of properties along Oak Street, are currently vacant.

Historic preservation has long been a hallmark issue for OTENA, and debates about which structures are worth preserving continue to the present. In the early 2000’s, OTENA was locked in a lengthy battle with Pilgrim Baptist Church about a planned demolition of a Frank Packard-designed mansion that the church owned; despite OTENA’s disapproval, the church proceeded to raze the structure (Gebolys, 2005b). The construction of a Wendy’s along Broad Street in the

95 Recall that OCCH worked with Campus Partners to restructure the Broad Street Portfolio, and currently owns Weinland Park’s project-based Section 8 as well.
same period elicited a similar response, with a two-year battle pitting OTENA against the Columbus Compact. As discussed in Chapter 5, the Columbus Empowerment Zone, itself administered by the Columbus Compact, had attracted a Wendy’s franchisee to open a new location at Broad and 21st Streets. OTENA objected to its construction, though, as the Wendy’s required a zoning variance (Broad Street is zoned exclusively for residential and offices) and, regardless, did not fit the area’s historic character. The Compact countered, though, arguing that the restaurant would employ 46 neighborhood residents, providing a sorely-needed source of jobs for the community. Within both debates is the tension that has animated so much of the neighborhood politics within Olde Towne East, with more affluent and Caucasian residents on one side and less well-to-do African-Americans on the other.

V. Neighborhood Regimes, Organizational Capacity, and Neighborhood Politics

In discussing the history of Olde Towne East, the founding and growth of OTEDA/OTENA, and its actions over the past forty years, a number of salient points emerge both in and of themselves and in comparison to Weinland Park and King-Lincoln. First, and most notably, a neighborhood regime has failed to emerge in Olde Towne East. In discussing the Weinland Park Collaborative and PACT, each had an actor serve an organizational role in forming the coalition. For Weinland Park, this was Campus Partners, which had promoted revitalization for a decade prior to recruiting Wagenbrenner, JP Morgan Chase Foundation, the Columbus Foundation, and the United Way. In King-Lincoln, Mayor Coleman and the City were instrumental in convincing Ohio State and the Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority to promote the area’s revival, and previous investments by the City (Whitney condos, Lincoln Theater renovation) laid much of the groundwork for the formation of PACT.

In contrast, Olde Towne East appears to lack the organizational capacity of either Weinland Park or King-Lincoln. With the exception of the Columbus Compact, no significant place-based institution, like a university or hospital, exists within the neighborhood. The area does not hold the political importance of King-Lincoln, and racial tensions (such as those described in Flag Wars) have likely caused outside actors to avoid investing in the neighborhood. Regarding the latter, in their separate evaluations of central-city Columbus neighborhoods, the JP Morgan Chase
The two entities that could serve a regime’s organizational role – OTENA and the Columbus Compact – either (i) do not have access to a significant capital base (OTENA) or (ii) do not see themselves as champions of Olde Towne East (Columbus Compact). As seen in Weinland Park, a strong civic association can have an important supporting role in a neighborhood regime, but such groups typically lack the financial wherewithal to effect revitalization. Further, OTENA does not have the broad mandate of the Weinland Park Community Civic Association; while the latter has a varied membership that reflects the neighborhood’s socioeconomic diversity, the former is a much more exclusive group whose representatives are primarily homeowners. The Columbus Compact could also organize a coalition, and its recent commercial, social service, and residential investments along Main Street could lay the groundwork for future revitalization. However, interviews with Main Street stakeholders indicate that they do not see themselves as a part of Olde Towne East, and their efforts are more focused on the southern and eastern margins of the area.

Time of revitalization may also be a factor in why Olde Towne East lacks a neighborhood regime. Its redevelopment began in the mid-1970’s, prior to the current era of cognitive-cultural capitalism and urban revitalization. It also predates the interest of philanthropies and place-based institutions in affecting urban development, as one witnesses in Weinland Park and King-Lincoln today. Further, ongoing gentrification over the past four decades has left Olde Towne East with a mixed-income, if largely segregated, population that does not reflect the widespread poverty seen in other central-city neighborhoods. The latter point is likely why Olde Towne East was not included in the foundations’ neighborhood evaluations; they most likely believed that the area had already undergone too much change for investments to effect a broad revitalization.

Note that the Columbus Foundation and United Way jointly commissioned their evaluation, which was conducted by the Kirwan Foundation at OSU. Each evaluation compared six central-city Columbus neighborhoods, believed to include Weinland Park (where each decided to invest), Franklinton, King-Lincoln, the South Side, and Linden.

Note, though, that OTENA membership is not restricted to homeowners; however most participants in the group are middle-income, Caucasian homeowners. In practice, then, OTENA is somewhat reminiscent of the Weinland Park Community Collaborative, whose by-laws restricted membership to homeowners (see Chapter 4).
Interviews with residents – both Caucasian in-movers and lower-income, long-term African-Americans – suggest yet another reason why a neighborhood regime has failed to coalesce: that the area does not want outside involvement. Nearly all in-movers expressed how Olde Towne East’s diversity drew them to the neighborhood, and feared that it would be lost if investments were made in the area. In fact, many in-movers – both early and those who arrived more recently – expressed satisfaction with the status quo, arguing that “we really like the diversity,” and “there’s such a sense of community.” Some in-movers worried that even continued gentrification would negatively affect the neighborhood, stating that “this neighborhood is becoming a yuppie haven . . . we hope it doesn’t become to yuppified.” Low-income residents fear that investments would spur increased gentrification and displacement, with some mentioning changes in King-Lincoln, particularly the Poindexter Village demolition, as being indicative of how outside involvement can negatively affect a community.98

Second, Olde Towne East demonstrates that, while gentrification may appear an outdated concept within a context of urban revitalization, it endures under cognitive-cultural capitalism. In comparison with urban revitalization, gentrification is a much slower and more ad hoc process. It relies on the investment and locational decisions of individual households, without the broader planning perspective provided by a neighborhood regime. It also lacks the larger capital base of the private and civic sectors, from actors such as developers, place-based institutions, and philanthropies. Without this organizational capacity and financial backing, gentrification may remain an incomplete process for decades – especially in a case like Olde Towne East, where early in-movers and long-term residents have actively worked to ensure the area’s racial and socioeconomic diversity.

Third, much like King-Lincoln, the residents of Olde Towne East, while largely united n opposing outside investments, are bifurcated on how they would like their neighborhood to evolve. On the one hand, the initial in-movers, as well as remaining low-income residents, want the neighborhood to remain a mixed-income community that is not a “ghetto of the rich” – as one key informant, one of the early in-movers, articulated, “I think my neighborhood is pretty damn near perfect as it is.” To the extent that this cohort champions new housing, they would like to see as many units remain affordable as possible, perhaps through the use of Low Income Housing

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98 Such outside involvement is a hallmark of neighborhood regimes.
Tax Credits or Section 8 vouchers. They appreciate diversity, and would welcome more families to the area.

However, a second group, largely consisting of more recent arrivals, hopes that Olde Towne East will undergo a transformation similar to what has occurred in Columbus’ German, Victorian, and Italian Villages. This cohort champions (i) quality-of-life improvements, like eliminating prostitution and drug-dealing, (ii) beautification measures, such as enhanced code enforcement, and (iii) preservation by blocking demolition of historic structures. Many neighborhood residents have opposed the Columbus Compact’s attempts to promote economic development within the neighborhood, as these efforts are typically aimed at attracting businesses catering to a more low-income population. Such efforts include attempts to block the construction of a Wendy’s along Broad Street, and to stymie the opening of a Save-a-Lot grocery store on Main Street (Ferenchik, 2006d; Harden, 2006).

These distinctions – between largely African-American long-term residents, first-wave gentrifiers, and more recent arrivals – contribute to a general sense of racial and socioeconomic tension within the neighborhood, perhaps best captured in Flag Wars (Bryant & Poitras, 2003). Both black and white residents commented that, while they appreciate the diversity of Olde Towne East, the neighborhood lacks integration between races. For example, while a number of social events exist within the neighborhood – e.g., OTENA meetings, progressive dinner parties that move from house-to-house, the African Village Art Festival – they appear to be largely segregated. Long-term black residents remarked that OTENA is not receptive to their needs, and feel like they are constantly under surveillance for code violations. Further, they believe that efforts to showcase the area’s diversity – such as WOSU’s 2011 Columbus Neighborhoods documentary or the annual Hot Times festival – mask the true lack of integration within the neighborhood (WOSU, 2011b).

Recent debates on alcohol sales reflect this divide, and how many less well-to-do and African-American residents feel that OTENA is not responsive to their concerns. Following an extended campaign led by OTENA volunteers, voters in Olde Towne East turned down six liquor options within the neighborhood, all held by ‘corner stores’ that cater to a lower-income population (Ferenchik, 2010b). Following the vote, then-OTENA President Mike Moore commented to the Columbus Dispatch that “[this] is just the start of positive changes, and [helps] us as residents to start to clean up the neighborhood” (Ferenchik, 2010c) (my emphasis). However, at the same
time, OTENA leaders celebrated business development along Parsons Avenue and Oak Street, including Black Creek Bistro, Yellow Brick Pizza, the Olde Towne East Tavern, and Carabar, all of which hold alcohol licenses, and Corner Stone Craft Beer and Wine, a ‘high-end’ corner store that offers “200 varieties of beer and 400 varieties of wine” (Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association, 2013b). Commenting on the seemingly contradictory opinions of OTENA members on alcohol sales, one long-term African-American resident remarked that “what did they mean by ‘clean up?’ . . . [I]f you want an accepting community you have to be accepting too,” while another added that “it all illustrates how un-integrated the community is . . . it comes down to who gets their way, and how they get it.”

These schisms within Olde Towne East – between Caucasian, largely middle-class in-movers and lower-income, African-American long-term residents – are reminiscent of Weinland Park in the 1990’s, where a small group of homeowners along Hamlet Street formed their own civic association (the Weinland Park Community Collaborative [WPCC]), membership in which was restricted to property owners (Chapter 4). In contrast, OTENA is much more inclusive – it does not restrict membership – though in practice, it is a predominantly Caucasian organization. In Weinland Park, the City replaced WPCC with the Weinland Park Community Civic Association, an organization open to all residents that has proved a champion in marketing the neighborhood to outside funders. One could envision a similar future for Olde Towne East – where OTENA and the Columbus Compact merge their efforts – but it does not appear that there is any momentum behind such an initiative.

VI. Conclusions

This chapter has related the history of Olde Towne East, its decline in the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras, initial revitalization in the 1970’s, and neighborhood politics until the present. In doing so, it has traced its origins as an enclave for Columbus’ wealthy, who built stately mansions along the area’s main thoroughfares, including Broad Street and Bryden Road. However, like many urban neighborhoods, Olde Towne East entered a transitional period in the immediate postwar era, first becoming home to middle-class African-Americans relocating from King-Lincoln from the north, but then entering a period of blight and disinvestment. The construction of the interstate highway system, decentralization of land use, and increasing levels of violence fomented blight in Olde Towne East, and attempts to stem decline – namely Model Cities – failed to spur revitalization in their time.
However, beginning in the early-to-mid 1970’s, a cohort of in-movers began to purchase and renovate the area’s historic residences for their own occupancy. These early residents were typical of a first-wave gentrification process – artists, homosexuals, and progressives, including OSU professors and former Model Cities volunteers. Like many other early gentrifiers, they were drawn by the area’s housing stock, proximity to downtown, and emerging arts community. While initially a disparate group, a shooting at the Dell Restaurant brought in-movers together, and their efforts led to incorporating the Olde Towne East Development Association (OTEDA), a 501(c)4 non-profit that lobbied City Council for redevelopment funds.

Early OTEDA efforts centered on historic preservation and improving neighborhood quality-of-life while preventing displacement of existing residents. OTEDA representatives partnered with City officials to decide which properties should be spared from demolition, and cooperated with Columbus police to combat drug dealing, prostitution, and arsons. OTEDA founded two community events – the Olde Towne East Redevelopment Tour (later renamed the Tour of Homes) and Hot Times in Olde Towne (later just ‘Hot Times’) that continue to this day. Concurrently, OTEDA attempted to mitigate displacement by siting a substantial number of Section 8 subsidized apartments within the neighborhood, supporting a homeless shelter on Main Street, and establishing by-laws that asked in-movers to locate new housing for evicted residents.

Olde Towne East’s history in 1980’s and beyond is defined by continuity of renovation and change in the outlook of in-movers. As the neighborhood’s redevelopment stabilized and became a viable phenomenon, OTEDA renamed itself the Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association (OTENA), reincorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit, and shifted its focus from promoting redevelopment to building community among residents. Due to ongoing gentrification in certain areas through the 1990’s, many found themselves priced-out of other transforming neighborhoods and chose to locate in Olde Towne East. This new cohort did not share existing residents’ concerns with displacement, and sought to ‘clean up’ the neighborhood through aggressive code enforcement. Racial and socioeconomic tensions increased, and were eventually chronicled in the 2003 documentary Flag Wars.

Regarding the neighborhood’s future, interviews with residents indicate many believe that Olde Towne East will continue to experience redevelopment, and that the pace of change will only increase. Several remarked that property redevelopment has risen in recent years, with buyers purchasing some of the more challenging properties to renovate. Regarding a house across the
street from their Franklin Park residence, one in-mover remarked that “you should have seen [it] . . . we thought it was unfixable” after the structure was purchased and rehabbed by an empty nester household. The recent development of the Oak Street corridor confirms this heightened pace of change by indicating that a market exists to support neighborhood-based businesses like bakeries, restaurants (both casual and formal, e.g. Yellow Brick Pizza and Black Creek Bistro), and drinking establishments. Further, many believed that forces outside the neighborhood, including (i) increased residential population downtown, (ii) expansion of area colleges (Columbus College of Art and Design [CCAD], Columbus State Community College [CSCC], and Franklin University), and (iii) planned revitalization of King-Lincoln (Chapter 5) will only encourage further residential and commercial development within Olde Towne East.

However, some feared that continued change will eliminate what many residents value most in the neighborhood – its diversity. One long-term resident feared that gentrification – especially the in-moving of empty nester households – would result in a loss of families in the neighborhood, who would be unable to afford higher house prices. Others fear that Olde Towne East will go the way of German and Victorian Villages, where gentrification has been a more complete process that has resulted in the displacement of nearly all low-income residents. Regarding business development along Oak Street, one of the early in-movers worries that a higher profile for Olde Towne East will attract even more restaurants and drinking establishments, thus transforming the neighborhood into an entertainment district and ruining its residential character. Regardless, though, nearly all residents anticipate that Olde Towne East will not experience the civic and private sector investments that characterize revitalization in Weinland Park and King-Lincoln, for many of the reasons outlined above – lack of a neighborhood ‘champion,’ racial and socioeconomic tensions, and satisfaction with the status quo.
This dissertation has examined the formal and informal relationships guiding contemporary processes of upward neighborhood change. It argues that these are best understood as urban revitalization, which occurs at the nexus of coalition-style governance and ‘classic’ understandings of central city neighborhood change, viz. gentrification. Within urban revitalization, change results from top-down and bottom-up forces working together in largely-informal neighborhood regimes that bring together representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors. Three case studies document the emergence of regimes in two Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods, and a final area – Olde Towne East – where a coalition has failed to coalesce, despite nearly four decades of ‘classic,’ or first-wave, gentrification (Hackworth & Smith, 2001).

This concluding chapter presents an overall review, situates the three case studies within the conceptual model articulated in Chapter 3, and offers concluding comments. The following section provides a chapter-by-chapter summary of the dissertation, moving from the introduction and literature review through the theoretical grounding, research design, and three empirical case studies. The chapter then addresses the conceptual framework specifically, contextualizing the research within the layered approach presented in Chapter 3. The most localized tier, neighborhood governance and revitalization, is addressed at length, highlighting the three salient characteristics of neighborhood regimes: (i) their capacity to govern, (ii) membership, and (iii) relationship among actors. The dissertation concludes with a commentary on the research’s contributions to the literature, identifies planning implications for municipalities and civic associations, questions the continued utility of ‘gentrification’ as a research focus, and offers directions for future research.

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99 As in Chapter 3, I use the terms ‘tier,’ ‘layer,’ and ‘level’ interchangeably.
I. Summary

The introductory chapter presents the problem at hand and research questions. Noting that the scale and scope of urban neighborhood change have increased over the past decades, it argues that the processes underlying these transformations have shifted as well. To that end, it briefly recounts the history of gentrification research, including early efforts that emphasized the sweat equity of individual homeowners, the entrance of real estate developers in the 1980’s, and, more recently, the increasing involvement of municipal governments in fomenting change (Fusch, 1980; Hackworth & Smith, 2001; Smith, 1996). The dissertation advances the literature by investigating the formal and informal arrangements undergirding contemporary processes of upward urban neighborhood change, arguing that it is best understood as urban revitalization, a process where public (or electoral), private, and – perhaps most importantly – civic sector representatives work together in largely informal coalitions known as neighborhood regimes.

Chapter 2, Review of Relevant Literature, inventories a broad swath of research concerning urban politics and neighborhood change. It begins with a summary of urban political geography, highlighting early efforts that documented municipal fragmentation, the fiscal disparities problem, spatial allocation models, and social justice. The chapter then reviews two perspectives on urban politics, growth machines and urban regime theory, both formulated in response to more ideological approaches – viz., elitism and pluralism. Growth machines are closely associated with the work of Molotch and Logan, and argues that (i) growth is the goal of urban politics and (ii) because of its importance, coalitions of public and private interests coalesce to ensure economic expansion (J. R. Logan & Molotch, 1987; Molotch & Logan, 1984; Molotch, 1976). Regime theory similarly views urban politics as a collaborative effort, but sees these cooperative arrangements in a more historical context. Regimes are defined by a division of labor among the public, private, and civic sectors, and are characterized by continuity and change relative to the prevailing economic and political climate. The chapter concludes its review of urban politics with a synthesis of the growth machine and regime theory approaches, arguing that the former provides a strong rationale for public-private cooperation, while the latter incorporates the civic sphere into governing coalitions, and places these coalitions within a historic and spatial context.

The literature review continues by surveying gentrification and neighborhood change research. It summarizes early inquiry – including the Chicago School and the neighborhood life cycle of Hoover and Vernon – before discussing more recent forms of change, and, most poignantly, if
these continue to represent gentrification or whether ‘reurbanisation’ is a more apt descriptor. Usage of the latter term, largely by European researchers focusing on demographic transformation, is motivated by both empirical observations that the processes underlying upward change have shifted, and also by considerations to move past the political and theoretical logjam of arguments concerning displacement (Criekingen, 2010; Haase et al., 2010; Kern, 2010). The chapter concludes with an attempt to break the gentrification/reurbanisation impasse, arguing that contemporary neighborhood change is best understood as urban revitalization.

The third chapter presents the conceptual framework and research design. The research utilizes a layered approach, where higher, more abstract levels set both limits and possibilities for subjacent tiers. Moving from the most theoretical to the most concrete, these include (i) the mode of production (capitalism), (ii) its expression at various times, as understood through regulation theory, (iii) federal and state policies, (iv) municipal governance, and (v) neighborhood revitalization. After reviewing two previous eras of economic organization (Fordism and Post-Fordism) and their impact on urban form, the chapter argues that the contemporary urban-political-social environment is best conceived as a fusion of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities. This synthesis asserts that the rise of the knowledge economy, coupled with shifts in residential preferences, have afforded the CBD and surrounding neighborhoods comparative advantages in attracting development. Concurrently, federal and state policies have shifted to more entrepreneurial, or neoliberal, governance in that they primarily address the opportunity costs of central city development through subsidies to private developers, while minimizing direct government provision of services (e.g., the shift of public housing provision from HUD-owned ‘projects’ to Section 8 and Low Income Housing Tax Credits).

The conceptual model argues that the following tier, urban governance, is best understood through regime theory, as the roster of actors promoting central city revitalization has greatly expanded over time (Hackworth & Smith, 2001). Regimes encompass largely informal relationships among the public, private, and civic sectors that form a division of labor to effectively govern. Over time, regime membership and actions have varied according to the prevailing economic climate and changes in social relations; within the cognitive-cultural economy, coalitions are more likely to include representatives from the knowledge industries and civic sector, and are typically more inclined to target investments in central city neighborhoods. Given their expanded vitality, these neighborhoods are not only a focus, but also a locus of
regime-style governance. Thus, at the neighborhood level, redevelopment is also best understood through regime theory, where coalitions’ efforts are confined to a particular area or district. Chapter 3 concludes by reviewing the empirical setting and research agenda, highlighting Columbus’ cognitive-cultural economy, the three case study areas, and the dissertation’s mixed-method approach.

The following three chapters document the emergence of neighborhood regimes in two Columbus, Ohio, neighborhoods, and one area where a coalition has failed to emerge. Chapter 4 chronicles Weinland Park, beginning with its history as a blue collar community developed in the early Twentieth century, one marked by relative stability until the conversion of a sizeable number of rental properties into project-based Section 8 housing. In response to blight, Ohio State formed a community development corporation, Campus Partners, whose initial revitalization attempts included the South Campus Gateway and turnover of the Section 8 portfolio to non-profit ownership and management. Campus Partners also successfully lobbied the City to bring its neighborhood planning process to Weinland Park, which proved a catalytic event for organizing a neighborhood regime. In response to the plan, (i) ineffective neighborhood leadership was replaced with a more inclusive organization, (ii) Wagenbrenner Development was recruited to redevelop the Columbus Coated Fabrics site, and (iii) momentum in the area convinced the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, Columbus Foundation, and United Way to target investments in Weinland Park. A neighborhood regime emerges from this commonality of interests – the Weinland Park Collaborative, a relatively informal organization that allows individual funders to retain autonomy over their investments. To date, WPC has largely focused its investments on housing stock improvements and infrastructure enhancement, with other initiatives – namely social service programming and workforce development – receiving comparatively less attention.

King-Lincoln is the subject of Chapter 5, which similarly documents the area’s history and the emergence of its neighborhood regime, Partners Achieving Community Transformation (PACT). The neighborhood grew up in the late Nineteenth century as Columbus’ African-American cultural hearth, reaching its cultural zenith during the Harlem Renaissance. The area entered a period of disinvestment in the post-World War II era; numerous attempts to stem blight were largely unsuccessful; but arguably laid the groundwork for a nascent gentrification movement in the early 2000’s. Concurrently, three organizations – Columbus Metropolitan Housing Authority
(CMHA), the City of Columbus, and The Ohio State University – began to invest in King-Lincoln, and through the leadership of Mayor Michael Coleman, formed PACT (Ball, 2013; Kerkhoff, 2012). Initially conceived as a planning organization, PACT is a more formal coalition than the WPC, having recently incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit that will pool contributions from its three funders (Ghose, 2013). With the release of the *Blueprint for Community Transformation*, PACT announced it funding priorities as the redevelopment of Poindexter Village from public housing into affordable senior apartments, revitalization of the Taylor Avenue corridor connecting OSU’s two facilities in the neighborhood (OSU Hospital East and Carepoint East), and other investments to improve the health of King-Lincoln residents and quality of the neighborhood’s housing stock.

The final empirical chapter relates the history and ongoing transformation of Olde Towne East, where a neighborhood regime has failed to emerge despite nearly 40 years of ongoing gentrification. Olde Towne East was developed in the latter part of the Nineteenth century as an enclave for Columbus’ *nouveau riche*. While a brief invasion-succession process began in the post-World War II era, this soon gave way to disinvestment and blight, as freeways severed the neighborhood from the CBD and residential preferences shifted to newer, suburban dwellings. Model Cities failed to engender revitalization, but a ‘classic,’ or first-wave gentrification process began soon after, spearheaded by artists, progressives, and homosexuals. This coalesced into the Olde Towne East Development Association, whose efforts centered on sparing historic structures from demolition, neighborhood promotion, mitigating displacement through siting of affordable housing, and combating crime and prostitution. However, as gentrification continued into the 1980’s and 1990’s, new arrivals did not share the progressive outlook of the original renovators, and utilized aggressive code enforcement to evict many long-time residents, leading to the racial and socioeconomic tensions documented in *Flag Wars*. These tensions continue to the present, as witnessed in the differences between the Oak and Main Street corridors: while the former has recently developed as a node of locally-owned restaurants catering to a middle-class clientele, the Columbus Compact, which administers Columbus’ Empowerment Zone, has attracted a number of social service providers to the latter, including a settlement house, neighborhood policing center, health clinic, and the local headquarters of the Salvation Army.
II. Returning to the Conceptual Model

Chapter 3 sets forth a conceptual framework that utilizes a layered analysis incorporating both broad social theory and on-the-ground realities. Moving from the most abstract to the most concrete, these tiers include (i) broad economic organization at the macro-scale, (ii) the expression of this at particular times, (iii) national- and state-level policies, (iv) municipal governance, and (v) neighborhood-based revitalization (Figure 7.1). It then identifies these layers at the present time as (i) capitalism, (ii) cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities, (iii) entrepreneurial and neoliberal efforts to encourage development of the urban core and surrounding areas, (iv) regime theory, and (v) neighborhood regimes.

Insights gleaned from the three studies areas allow for the illustration and further development of each layer. At the most abstract, capitalism is an expansionary system that requires enlistment of new actors into relations of production and exchange. Thus, one witnesses the deeper involvement of the public (City of Columbus, CMHA) and civic (Ohio State, Columbus Foundation, United Way, JP Morgan Chase Foundation) spheres in real estate markets through, e.g., redevelopment of Poindexter Village and support of Wagenbrenner Development’s property acquisition efforts. Concerning Poindexter Village, note that while CMHA has long constructed public housing, changes in federal funding formulae have made public ownership of such facilities unfeasible. Further, new HUD grants – including Choice Neighborhoods – require that the Authority now subsidize private construction (and eventual private ownership) of affordable housing. Further, civic sector WPC members have provided funding for Wagenbrenner’s development efforts. All told, then, the expansionary nature of capitalism is reflected in both WPC’s and PACT’s initiatives.

While capitalism remains the mode of production, its articulation has varied over time and space. In Chapter 3, I argue that the contemporary era is best understood as a reconciliation of Scott’s cognitive-cultural capitalism and the consumer cities thesis of Glaeser and colleagues (Glaeser & Gottlieb, 2006; Scott, 2011). Both argue that, today, urban areas enjoy a comparative advantage in attracting economic activity and residents, due to (i) the growth of the knowledge industries and quaternary sector, which benefit from “cost-reducing proximities and increasing-return effects” afforded by density and (ii) quality-of-life improvements in central city neighborhoods, including decreases in crime, deconcentration of poverty and demolition of public housing.
complexes, and construction of cultural and lifestyle facilities, often weaving the latter into whole arts, entertainment, or leisure districts (Scott, 2011, p. 853).

The impact of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities is seen across the three neighborhoods. Continued expansion of OSU – including a recent $1 billion investment in its medical facilities – is representative of knowledge industries’ increasing prosperity, which has led to attendant development of surrounding central city neighborhoods. Further, the heightened relevance of other civic sector actors, such as foundations and philanthropies, has also engendered revitalization through an infusion of funds to redevelopment efforts. The growth of the CBD – both in terms of economic activity and population – has fomented spillover effects into other central city neighborhoods – for example, interviews suggest that the development of Olde Towne East’s Oak Street commercial corridor is, at least partially, due to an expanded market from downtown residents (Ferenchik & Pyle, 2013; Ferenchik, 2013f).

Federal and state policies under cognitive-cultural capitalism largely reflect an ongoing shift toward entrepreneurial and neoliberal governance that has encouraged the private and civic sectors to invest in central city neighborhoods through subsidies that minimize opportunity costs. Thus, the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) has provided federal monies for the purchase and renovation of vacant, previously-foreclosed properties in neighborhoods where they are concentrated – typically at or near the urban core. Disbursed by local governments, these funds are utilized by private developers and Community Development Corporations, who are guaranteed a certain profit on the sale of these properties. Wagenbrenner and the Columbus Compact have employed NSP funds in Weinland Park and Olde Towne East, respectively, the latter in cooperation with local developers.

Another example of entrepreneurial governance typical of cognitive-cultural capitalism is HUD’s Choice Neighborhoods Program, which “supports locally driven strategies to address struggling neighborhoods with distressed public . . . housing through a comprehensive approach to neighborhood transformation” (HUD, 2013). Enacted in 2010, Choice Neighborhoods replaced an earlier program, HOPE VI, which replaced projects with mixed-income housing. However, while HOPE VI housing was government-owned, Choice Neighborhoods provides subsidies to build privately-owned developments. As covered in Chapter 5, CMHA applied for and received a planning grant to guide the redevelopment of Poindexter Village, which is currently slated for
senior housing constructed via Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), itself a program designed to subsidize private construction of affordable residences.

At the state level, the Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund (CORF) provides matching funds for the environmental reclamation and redevelopment of previously-industrial sites (State of Ohio, 2013a). Development of these sites is complex as the extent of environmental contamination is frequently unknown, and, regardless, central city development entails tremendous opportunity costs relative to ‘greenfield’ sites. In Weinland Park, Wagenbrenner, with support from the City and Campus Partners, successfully applied for and received a $3 million CORF grant to conduct environmental reclamation and construct market-rate housing on the Columbus Coated Fabrics site.

The penultimate layer, municipal governance, is best understood through urban regime theory (URT). This envisions power as fragmented, and as a result, representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors come together in coalitions, defined as “the informal arrangements by which public bodies and private interests function together to make and carry out governing coalitions” (Stone, 1989, p. 179). As discussed in Chapter 3, most empirical regime analysis has focused on the municipal or metropolitan scales. While Columbus’ regime has not been a primary focus of this dissertation, it has nonetheless guided policies affecting all three study areas. Beginning with the election of Mayor Michael Coleman in 2000, the City adopted a neighborhood-focused development agenda, as evidenced by the switch from broad area plans to more focused and engagement-based neighborhood plans (Chapter 4). An example of the latter, the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan was an important catalyst for that area’s revitalization, as it (i) leveraged existing and scheduled projects with proposals for future development, (ii) replaced an existing, ineffective, and exclusive civic association with a more inclusive organization, and (iii) advocated for the redevelopment of the Columbus Coated Fabrics site, which brought Wagenbrenner Development into the area’s neighborhood regime, the Weinland Park Collaborative (Department of Development, 2006).
Figure 7.1: Expanded conceptual model.
Regime policies have also been crucial in fomenting revitalization in King-Lincoln, where the City has arguably served as the organizing force behind PACT (Partners Achieving Community Transformation). Like Weinland Park, King-Lincoln has also been the subject of a neighborhood planning process, which articulated a vision of redevelopment that advocated for (i) promoting homeownership through new construction and (ii) preserving the area’s cultural assets. From that plan, the City facilitated and funded the construction of the Whitney Young condominiums, and rehabilitated the Lincoln Theater through marshaling financial contributions from representatives of the urban regime – including American Electric Power, Battelle Memorial Institute, Cardinal Health, Dispatch Printing, Huntington Bank, JP Morgan Chase, Limited Brands, Nationwide Insurance, and State Auto Insurance (Ferenchik, 2007, 2011c; Lincoln Theatre Association, 2013).

Columbus’ urban regime is further responsible, more broadly, for efforts to revitalize the CBD, which has engendered spillover effects in central city neighborhoods, including the three study areas. To that end, in 2010 the City adopted a Downtown Plan that advocated for a number of “catalytic ideas,” including the establishment of a creative campus around downtown’s three colleges, substantial infill housing, demolition of a vacant shopping mall and its replacement with an urban park, and numerous riverfront improvements including a new greenway and redevelopment of the Scioto Peninsula (Department of Development, 2010). Concerning these catalytic ideas – and the necessity of regime cooperation to achieve them – Columbus Downtown Development Corporation COO Amy Taylor remarked that “Business Leadership and political leadership all got engaged . . . [they] are intended to inspire Columbus to think big and to bring people together around commons goals and projects” (Ferenchik, 2013e). The success of these efforts is evinced by downtown’s recent housing boom; as of September 2013, 785 units are under construction, and 652 have been proposed, with one developer commenting that

This whole downtown area is working because of a partnership between private enterprise, the City, commercial industry, a lot of groups that come together to make all this possible. And if any one of these groups tried to do it on their own, it wouldn’t be successful (Ferenchik, 2013f).

III. Neighborhood Regimes: Formation, Membership, and Operations

The final layer of the conceptual model is neighborhood governance and redevelopment, which I argue is today the product of neighborhood regimes pursuing urban revitalization. Like urban

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regimes, their neighborhood-based counterpart brings together representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors in largely-informal coalitions. While urban regimes typically focus on the economic affairs of a large metropolitan area or municipality, neighborhood coalitions have a much finer focus. As such, their actors may not have the financial wherewithal or political clout to serve as members of the broader urban regime, but nevertheless they have the capacity to influence development trajectories of certain neighborhoods.

Like their metro-wide counterpart, three elements define neighborhood regimes (Stone, 1989, pp. 178–9). First, they have a *capacity to govern*, as defined by the ability to carry out revitalization activities. Second, neighborhood regimes contain a *set of actors* that represent the public, private, and civic sectors. Third, these actors are bound to the coalition by a *relationship* that varies along a continuum between formal and informal. The relevance of these characteristics is discussed in the following sections.

**III.a Capacity to Govern**

Given that regime theory views governance in terms of social production – that is, the “power to, not [the] power over,” a neighborhood regime’s *capacity to govern* is reflected in its ability to effect urban revitalization (Stone, 1989, p. 229). As such, WPC and PACT’s actions to foment revitalization – that is, their *capacity to govern* – have largely been trifurcated to promote (i) housing, (ii) infrastructure, and (iii) social service provision.

Regarding housing, WPC and PACT have directed a disproportionate amount of resources toward property acquisition and rehabilitation. Interviews with representatives from both regimes suggest that this emphasis was partly purposeful – research has shown that housing is important as the base for revitalization efforts – but largely contingent on outside events. For one, the Great Recession resulted in a highly discounted real estate market; as WPC and PACT were charting strategy, house prices were at historic lows. As noted by WPC consultant Peter Roche, this presented an unprecedented opportunity to stretch limited resources toward acquiring vacant properties. Further, NSP monies – not anticipated when either regime coalesced – offered an additional funding source to purchase previously-foreclosed and vacant houses.

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100 The fact that these properties were vacant was crucial to WPC, as they did not want their actions to displace existing residents.
Another thrust of neighborhood revitalization is infrastructure investments, typically funded by the public sector. As part of its Economic Development Agreement with Wagenbrenner to redevelop the Columbus Coated Fabrics site, the City agreed to street, alleyway, and sidewalk improvements surrounding the property, including reconstructing Grant Avenue with attractive pavers and roundabouts. To support investments in King-Lincoln, Columbus similarly upgraded the neighborhood’s infrastructure, with roadway improvements, improved signage, and installing one of the city’s hallmark arches bearing the neighborhood’s name. Additionally, the City and neighborhood officials successfully lobbied the Ohio Department of Transportation (ODOT) to construct freeway ‘caps’ as part of its Interstate 70/71 reconstruction project.\(^\text{101}\)

In contrast, the final facet of urban revitalization – social service provision and programming – has received comparatively less attention (and dollars) from WPC and PACT, and efforts within this arena have arguably been less successful. As part of its tax abatement agreement with the City, OSU has committed $9 million to improving King-Lincoln’s housing stock, but only $1 million toward health programming – with no firm commitments to other social service efforts. While WPC has invested substantial dollars toward social services, its efforts have primarily proven unsuccessful. Graduates of Wagenbrenner’s construction training program largely failed to secure long-term positions, and a job placement program at OSU similarly floundered, failing to provide employment for any neighborhood residents. Another WPC effort, Neighborhood Options for Youth, addresses safety by partnering with local cause-driven organizations; unfortunately, this program is too new for any evaluation. In interviews, WPC officials admitted to the failure of the construction training and OSU job placement programs – largely due to unfamiliarity with operating them – and mentioned that the addition of the Annie E. Casey Foundation would increase the coalition’s expertise in these efforts.

**III.b Set of Actors**

Like urban regimes, neighborhood-based coalitions include representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors. In WPC and PACT, membership both overlaps with that of Columbus’ municipal-wide governing coalition – such as the City bureaucracy – and is unique to each area,

\(^{101}\) Caps are upgraded bridges over below-grade freeways that allow for construction on one or both sides of the roadway. These allow for a sort of continuity when traversing across the bridge, and have previously been used in Columbus’ Short North neighborhood.
such as place-based institutions and civic associations. This section presents a *dramatis personae* for neighborhood regimes, highlighting contributions from the public, private, and civic sectors, with the latter divided into (i) place-based institutions, (ii) foundations and philanthropies, and (iii) neighborhood leadership and cause-driven organizations. Similar to the roster of urban regime actors presented in Chapter 3, it addresses:

- The values driving promotion of revitalization: *Why do they care?*
- The values motivating coalition participation: *Why do they cooperate?*
- Their value to others in the coalition: *What do they bring to the table?*

### III.b.1 Public Sector

Neighborhood regime membership from the *public (or electoral) sector* includes municipal governments and quasi-government entities – such as public housing authorities and community development corporations. The public sector promotes development to improve quality of life, create a sense of progress, extend political largesse, and stimulate inward investments from the private market – all with the goal of self-preservation of elected officials. Cities bring a unique toolkit to promoting urban revitalization, including eminent domain, neighborhood planning, and access to government funding opportunities including infrastructure spending. However, they face unique pressures on their actions, as elected officials are the only regime actor that requires regular demonstrations of public support.

While municipal governments have long involved themselves in community and economic development, one element that separates current efforts is the increased targeting of resources, a phenomenon known as *strategic geographic targeting* (SGT). SGT “[concentrates] significant resources in a limited number of geographically delimited areas based on criteria that increase the potential for maximizing attainment of program goals” (Thomson, 2011: 566). It “deliberately channels resources to a specifically defined geographic location that is larger than an individual project but smaller than the geographic area over which the entity providing the resources has jurisdiction” (Thomson, 2008: 633). For cities, SGT provides many potential benefits. It can engender cost-savings by achieving economies of scale in a particular neighborhood, and can lead to multiplier effects where efforts spur investments from other actors, such as the private and civic sectors. Finally, a comprehensive SGT program that includes investments in multiple
arenas, e.g. housing and safety, can achieve interaction effects where improvements are greater than the sum of their individual parts.

III.b.2 Private Sector

Within the private sector, real estate interests are often crucial regime members. Developers’ interest in central city neighborhoods follows a lengthy period in the late Fordist and Post-Fordist eras when the real estate industry favored investments in the more outlying, undeveloped areas. This was motivated by incentives favoring suburban development such as construction of the interstate highway system, subsidized FHA loans, and the mortgage interest deduction. The increasing participation of real estate interests in central city districts corresponds with the emergence of the cognitive-cultural economy and consumer cities. As the economy continues to shift toward the knowledge industries and municipalities invest in quality-of-life improvements, demand for central city housing has similarly risen. This increase is abetted by entrepreneurial policies that subsidize such development, including Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC), brownfield reclamation funding, historic preservation tax credits, and Enterprise Zones.

The primary contribution of developers to regimes is their expertise in property markets. Revitalization involves the acquisition and development of property, activities which other actors typically have no experience. Seasoned real estate professionals can apply a deft touch to the often-controversial issue of property assembly. For example, Wagenbrenner was able to surreptitiously acquire a number of houses by establishing shell companies to mask WPC’s actions. In a related vein, developers join regimes to create more favorable conditions for investment. By supporting a regime’s social service investments, they can increase a neighborhood’s desirability for in-movers. Further, partnering with municipal governments provides developers access to public monies; Wagenbrenner Development was able to utilize Neighborhood Stabilization Program funds to purchase and renovate vacant, foreclosed properties in Weinland Park. Collaboration with Columbus officials and other public sector actors yielded

102 Recall that, in the growth machine framework, land-based private interests form alliances to attract inward investment (Molotch, 1976). Their importance is similarly emphasized in regime theory.

103 Cities have some experience in property acquisition, but their efforts are typically clumsy and politically unpopular (e.g., eminent domain).
the Whitney Young Collaborative access to low-cost financing for its condominium development in King-Lincoln.

III.b.3 Civic Sector I: Place-based institutions

One salient aspect of regimes in the cognitive-cultural economy, and one of the major contributions of this dissertation, is the increased participation of the civic sector, including place-based (or anchor) institutions, foundations and philanthropies, cause-driven organizations and other non-profits, and civic associations whose jurisdictions are frequently the target of urban revitalization. Within the civic sector, place-based institutions, such as universities, research institutes, and hospitals, are often the first (or among the first) to support revitalization. Institutions’ involvement in redevelopment reflects the fixity of their investments: hospitals and universities are embedded (or ‘stuck’) in particular locations, as their operations involve tremendous sunk costs – such as buildings and laboratories – and highly specialized and calibrated equipment. This fixity gives institutions an ‘enlightened self-interest’ toward involving themselves in their surrounding neighborhoods, as they will benefit (both financially and in terms of reputation) from being located in safe, healthy neighborhoods. For example, in deciding to form Campus Partners, Ohio State frequently cited how the loss of students in off-campus neighborhoods was contributing to a decline of ‘campus culture,’ and how perceptions of safety (or lack thereof) placed the university at a competitive disadvantage in attracting high-quality students. Further, interviews with PACT stakeholders indicate that OSU East feels that its support of revitalization will not only contribute to a more positive work environment, but will allow the hospital to better attract and retain employees.

Because they are often the first to pursue revitalization, anchor institutions frequently serve an organizational role in forming a neighborhood regime. Unlike philanthropies and the public sector, these entities are typically not surveying different neighborhoods in which to invest, and therefore are not looking for “momentum” against which to leverage their efforts. The

104 Institutions – especially universities – have a long history of involvement in surrounding neighborhoods, through the nature of their engagement appears to have shifted in recent years. Universities were closely involved with urban renewal projects of the 1950’s, 60’s, and early 70’s, and they opportunistically utilized federal funds to demolish and acquire properties in surrounding neighborhoods (Marcuse & Potter, 2005; Strom, 2005). Today, as seen in Weinland Park, they are more likely to be members of a broader coalition with representatives from the public, private, and civic sectors (Cummings, Rosentraub, Domahidy, & Coffin, 2005; Webber, 2005).
importance of place-based institutions was discussed in a number of interviews; one high-ranking City official remarked that “big institutions are important,” while a representative of one funder argued that “[place-based institutions] are an economic engine, they have a lot of money, and they really care.”

Like all other regime members, place-based institutions benefit from participation by leveraging their resources against other investments and from the expertise and unique toolkits of other members, such as real estate developers’ experience in property acquisition and municipal governments’ access to certain funding opportunities (e.g., Community Development Block Grants, Neighborhood Stabilization Program, and the like). Concurrently, institutions bring a number of resources to regimes, including financial resources, university endowments and limited tax liability. Further, by virtue of being important economic engines, institutions often have invaluable political connections.\(^{105}\)

**III.b.4 Civic Sector II: Foundations and Philanthropies**

While foundations and philanthropies have not historically supported broad neighborhood revitalization, recent shifts in foundation giving, encapsulated in the trends of *smart (or strategic) philanthropy* and *place-based philanthropy*, have altered the behavior of foundations and other grant-making non-profits. Broadly,

> [s]trategic philanthropy . . . is generally understood to mean that the donations of the philanthropist are consistent with some understood intention or ‘strategy.’ The idea is that the philanthropy is directed by a desire to satisfy or maximize a specific objective. This, of course, implies that the foundation must adopt a strategy before it can pursue strategic philanthropy and that it is willing to evaluate its effectiveness in light of this strategy (Murdoch et al., 2007, p. 1).

An offshoot of the smart philanthropy movement is place-based philanthropy, which combines geographic targeting with the strategy-setting and rigorous evaluation. Place-based giving often involves a multidimensional approach, e.g. investing in housing, education, and safety programming in supporting neighborhood revitalization (Murdoch et al., 2007). The motivations underlying a place-based approach include increased visibility, expanded impact of foundation

\(^{105}\) In interviews with WPC representatives, several commented that OSU’s political connections were crucial to receiving many state monies, including historic tax credits for the Commons on Grant project.
dollars, and the ability to engage with residents in “priority-setting and decision-making processes” (Backer et al., 2004: 1).\textsuperscript{106}

Strategic and place-based philanthropy were developed in response to frustrations within the philanthropic community that often-sizeable donations were not engendering transformational change. Mission statements to the contrary, foundations have frequently not worked toward broad social change, especially in the arena of community and economic development; instead, they have typically invested in smaller, scattered-site projects that often fail to meet expectations. Thus, by the late 1990’s, a new generation of foundation employees was advocating for a new direction in giving – which would eventually coalesce in strategic/place-based philanthropy – that called for strategy-setting, rigorous evaluation, and targeting of resources. For example, the Columbus Foundation hired Douglas Kridler and Lisa Courtice in the early 2000’s to revolutionize its grant-making process along strategic philanthropic lines.

The entry of the JP Morgan Chase Foundation, United Way, and Columbus Foundation in revitalization efforts reflects the strategic/place-based philanthropic model. First, each established a giving strategy: to invest heavily in central city neighborhood(s) to affect holistic change. Second, each adopted a place-based giving approach, evaluating several neighborhoods where they believed their investments could have the greatest impact. While JPMCF and the Columbus Foundation decided to target their resources solely to Weinland Park, the United Way directed investments to the five Priority Neighborhoods (two of which are Weinland Park and King-Lincoln).

Interviews with employees at several foundations indicate that they were motivated to adopt a strategic/place-based approach because of the ability to leverage foundation dollars, inspire further giving, and increase their organization’s visibility. One employee commented that a strategic approach would allow her organization to “put a stake into the ground” that would inspire donors and lead to a higher public profile for the foundation. Another believed that a neighborhood-centric approach could “leverage the influence of the brand to make a big

\textsuperscript{106}There are a number of similarities between strategic/place-based philanthropy and strategic geographic targeting – namely, the imperative to concentrate resources within a geographically-delimited area. Strategic/place-based philanthropy has traditionally been applied to foundations’ actions, while SGT is used to describe municipalities’ initiatives.
difference in an area,” while another said that “there’s a broad movement toward focusing resources . . . we thought that this would be a way to leverage resources and inspire institutional giving.”

Foundations may benefit from joining neighborhood regimes more than any other actor, as (by their own admission) they lack much knowledge or any significant experience in pursuing revitalization. Thus, philanthropies benefit from the expertise that the public and private sectors bring to the coalition. For instance, the Columbus Foundation provided $1 million to WPC’s renovation efforts, which were carried out by Wagenbrenner Development, who utilized in a deft touch in acquiring properties. Participation in a regime also allows foundations to leverage their investments against funds from other members.

Like place-based institutions, institutions and philanthropies bring substantial financial wherewithal to regimes. Typically, place-based projects have a special designation within the foundation itself, and access to funding is less bureaucratic than smaller grants. This allows for ‘on-demand’ funding for immediate needs. For example, when the Weinland Park Community Civic Association objected to Habitat for Humanity’s plans to build six houses – believing that the proposed houses were aesthetically unpleasing – the Columbus Foundation funded Wagenbrenner to develop blueprints for a structure more palatable to residents.

III.b.5 Civic Sector III: Neighborhood Associations and Non-Profits

The final major component of neighborhood regimes, civic associations and cause-driven organizations, is crucial to coalition operations yet brings virtually no economic resources to the table. Because they contribute little in terms of financial wherewithal, civic associations may appear to only have a contingent relationship with the regime – that is, they may only participate at the whim of other coalition members. However, in numerous interviews, regime members frequently cited the importance of active neighborhood participation in shaping policy, and expressed exasperation when civic leaders failed to support coalition goals.

Civic associations and non-profits make a significant non-financial contribution to neighborhood regimes, primarily in terms of legitimacy and expertise. Coalitions are susceptible to charges of carpet-bagging, given that some (if not most) members are located outside the area and all are typically large, politically-connected organizations; support from area leaders can dull these charges (cf. Ferenchik, 2011). Further, existing residents are experts about neighborhood
conditions, and have ‘on-the-ground’ knowledge and connections that outsiders lack. Cause-driven organizations bring years of experience in social service provision, an arena in which many regime members frequently lack expertise, and often have a relationship with neighborhood residents.107

Neighborhood leadership may either join or oppose the neighborhood regime, but in both cases, their goals lie in shaping coalition policy and directing investments toward (or away) from their jurisdictions.108 The relationship between neighborhood leadership and the regime varies along a continuum between cooperative and oppositional. At one end, a more collaborative association – such as in the WPC – provides civic leadership with a seat at the table, and allows neighborhood residents an opportunity to shape regime policies. Conversely, a more adversarial relationship – as witnessed between PACT and various groups in King-Lincoln – can allow neighborhood leadership to modify coalition actions through open confrontation.

III.c Formation and Relationship

The third element defining regimes is a relationship among actors – that is, how the coalition is formed and codified. In forming this relationship, it appears that a neighborhood’s organizational capacity is crucial, in that an entity must serve as a champion in bringing the coalition together. In Weinland Park, this role was largely played by Campus Partners, which had promoted revitalization for several years prior to WPC’s formation. Campus Partners, with support from the City, worked to eliminate several of the neighborhood’s most blighting characteristics – namely, the south campus bar district (replaced with the South Campus Gateway) and the BSMI Section 8 portfolio (now managed by Community Properties of Ohio). Additionally, Campus Partners convinced the City to conduct a neighborhood planning process, and hired Goody

107 For example, consider the United Way’s job placement program at Ohio State – the one where the program failed to locate employment for any Weinland Park residents in its one year of existence. Interviews with several social service providers indicated that they knew the program would fail, and expressed disappointment that WPC failed to solicit their input in designing the effort. To their credit, WPC members mentioned that they learned numerous lessons from the program, would rely more on cause-drive organizations in planning investments and that future programming will focus on job training, not placement.

108 An example of civic leadership working to drive investments away is the actions of the King-Lincoln Bronzeville Neighborhood Association (among others) in opposing CMHA’s plans to demolish Poindexter Village and construct senior housing on the site.
Clancy to augment the capacity of the plan. The resulting *Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan* led to the recruitment of Wagenbrenner Development to redevelop the CCF property, and the momentum generated by the plan led to three foundations selecting Weinland Park for their place-based giving.

In King-Lincoln, Mayor Michael Coleman and the City of Columbus, which had long supported the neighborhood’s revitalization, served a similar organizational role. Its efforts date back to urban renewal, Model Cities, and the construction of the King Arts Center, but more contemporary efforts include financial support for Homeport and its North of Broad (NOBO) project, Whitney Young Condominiums, and Lincoln Theater renovation. In negotiating with Ohio State concerning a tax abatement for its medical center expansion, the City convinced OSU to commit $10 million toward King-Lincoln’s revitalization – and Mayor Coleman successfully lobbied City Council to approve the agreement. Similarly, the Mayor was instrumental in persuading CMHA to join PACT, no small feat given the housing authority’s bureaucratic and insular culture.

Olde Towne East presents an example where a regime has failed to emerge, likely because the neighborhood lacks the organizational capacity of either Weinland Park or King-Lincoln. No place-based institution exists within the neighborhood, and the area does not hold the political importance of King-Lincoln, and racial tensions – a deterrent to outside investments – continue to animate local politics. The two entities that could serve an organizational role, Olde Towne East Neighborhood Association (OTENA) and the Columbus Compact, either (i) lack the financial wherewithal and broad mandate to effect revitalization or (ii) have a service area that extends well beyond the neighborhood (Compact). While the Compact has recently championed investments along Main Street, in its role as administrator of Columbus’ Empowerment Zone, it is responsible for development across a 13.96 square mile swath of the central city – boundaries that extend well beyond Olde Towne East.

In codifying each regime, WPC and PACT illustrate how such coalitions can either adopt a more informal or formal structure. WPC is a relatively informal coalition – it has not incorporated as a 501(c)3 non-profit, has no by-laws, no formal office space, no significant web presence, and only one part-time employee – who, regardless, is a contractor for the Columbus Foundation. Since it is not an independent entity, each funder retains autonomy over its investments, though members often collaborate in supporting particular programs. For instance, both the Columbus Foundation
and United Way have funded various safety initiatives, and the Columbus Foundation, Wagenbrenner Development, and JP Morgan Chase Foundation have cooperated in various housing investments.

In contrast, PACT has adopted a more formal structure. From the beginning, it had a three-person staff, a significant internet presence, and its own office space adjacent to OSU East Hospital. Following publication of the *Blueprint for Community Change*, PACT announced its intention to incorporate as a 501(c)3 Community Development Corporation. This entity will pool money from its three funders – Ohio State, CMHA, and the City – in pursuing urban revitalization, likely by supporting a private developer.

These differences are reflected in each group’s organizational chart. WPC’s “family tree” is a non-hierarchical, highly networked diagram that includes both funders and supporting entities, like the Godman Guild, Weinland Park Community Civic Association, and other social service organizations (Figure 4.3). In contrast, PACT’s organizational chart is noticeably more hierarchical, headed by the three funders (“The Partners”) and their designated representatives (“The Oversight Committee”) (Figure 5.4). Civic associations, social service organizations, local churches, and other neighborhood stakeholders occupy a subjacent tier – the Advisory Committee.\(^\text{109}\)

**IV. Concluding Observations and Future Research**

The dissertation’s final section considers the future of urban revitalization. First, it identifies the significant contributions of the research and interrogates the planning implications of cognitive-cultural capitalism and revitalization for both municipalities and civic associations, with suggestions for how these entities can court and support central city investments from the civic and private sectors. Second, it questions the continued utility of ‘gentrification’ as both a descriptor and a research topic, and highlights how both WPC and PACT are attempting to mitigate revitalization-related displacement. The dissertation concludes by suggesting avenues

\(^{109}\) Differences in organizational charts might obscure that each regime operates in a largely similar fashion with respect to civic leadership. In both cases, however, the funders set the revitalization agenda, and neighborhood associations largely serve an advisory role. However, WPC appears to be a much more inclusive group, and has actively worked to fund projects supported and carried out by neighborhood residents. For example, the regime funded a youth outreach program conducted by local resident Julie Orban, which provided summer field trips for neighborhood children.
for future inquiry, including better articulating the link between the city as it evolved under Fordism and neighborhood revitalization; i.e., the Post-Industrial city whereby developments outlined in Chapter 3 provide a foundation for, and link to, neighborhood regimes.

IV.a  Cognitive-Cultural Capitalism, Revitalization, and the Civic Sector

This research examines the formal and informal arrangements undergirding contemporary neighborhood change, and in doing so, makes a number of important contributions to a diverse swath of literature. It identifies a new process of change – *urban revitalization* – that occurs as the result of largely informal arrangements among the public, private, and civic sectors. The research assembles a conceptual framework for current urban dynamics that (i) draws on regulation theory and thoughts on the contemporary economy by Scott (2011), Glaeser, and colleagues, (ii) situates national, state, and local policies within this environment, and (iii) applies urban regime concepts in understanding neighborhood governance. It tests this framework, drawing on Columbus, Ohio, and particular neighborhood developments therein, arguing that these have established the case for revitalization as a distinct change process from ‘gentrification’ or ‘reurbanisation.’

The research does not investigate revitalization in a vacuum, though, instead situating contemporary neighborhood change within a broader social-political-economic context. Within this environment – which I argue is best understood as a synthesis of cognitive-cultural capitalism and consumer cities – dense urban areas enjoy a comparative advantage in attracting economic activity, and spillover effects have fomented housing demand in surrounding central city neighborhoods. In terms of urban governance, the importance of knowledge-based industries to regimes is heightened, and the role of the civic sector has expanded, as witnessed by the participation of Ohio State, the Columbus Foundation, JP Morgan Chase Foundation, and United Way in revitalization efforts. In both WPC and PACT, the role of Ohio State—the University itself and its medical center— is crucial for funding revitalization and serving an organizational role in galvanizing a neighborhood regime.

Additionally, recent trends in resource provision have led to the public and civic sectors concentrating development initiatives within geographically-delimited areas, further driving revitalization. Thus, municipalities have employed *strategic geographic targeting (SGT)* in pursuing revitalization, selecting particular neighborhoods in which to direct investments. While
cities have long engaged in such activities, what separates contemporary efforts is the scale of targeting and the strategic approach in allocating resources – for instance, by evaluating different neighborhoods in which to direct investments. Separately, *strategic/place-based philanthropy* has motivated foundations’ efforts to effect change in particular neighborhoods.

The public and civic sector’s increased reliance on targeting resources has afforded an expanded role for another civic sector actor, neighborhood leadership. The rise of both SGT and strategic/place-based philanthropy has led to both cities and foundations evaluating several neighborhoods in which to invest. As discussed earlier in the chapter (in addition to Chapters 4 and 5), a crucial aspect in such evaluations is the (perceived) complaisance of local leadership in working with outside funders. However, more confrontational neighborhood associations can also affect an area’s development trajectory through actions that pressure a regime to modify its efforts.

*IV.b Planning Implications*

From a planning perspective, the emergence of urban revitalization and neighborhood regimes presents a number of unique opportunities for policy-makers, especially at the local level. The expanded economic relevance of place-based institutions, and their continuing involvement in surrounding neighborhoods, offers a source of institutional support and investment dollars. In partnering with anchor institutions, municipalities and the public sector more generally also bring assets such as access to federal and state resources (e.g., Community Development Block Grants [CDBG] and the Clean Ohio Revitalization Fund), infrastructure provision, and, if needed, eminent domain authority.110

Similarly, the emergence of strategic and place-based philanthropy provides another possibility for policy-makers to leverage limited resources by partnering with foundations. In particular, because philanthropies are often less ‘stuck’ in a particular neighborhood, they are likely to be more flexible (relative to place-based institutions) concerning where to target investments. In attracting philanthropies, furthermore, it appears that municipalities should work to build

110 While eminent domain was not utilized in any of the three case study neighborhoods, the City did threaten to use it against holdout landowners during Campus Partners’ development of the South Campus Gateway, which undoubtedly had the desired effect.
'momentum' in a particular area through (i) supporting investments, such as infrastructure, (ii) cultivating a healthy, inclusive, and accessible neighborhood organization, and (iii) providing access to federal and state funding sources.

However, interviews with foundation officers indicate that extensive municipal involvement with a regime also may discourage their participation. In discussing selection of neighborhoods in which to target investments, for examples, representatives mentioned that the City’s outsized role in King-Lincoln’s redevelopment was a deterrent to their involvement; one mentioned that PACT was “too highly motivated by the Mayor . . . Politicians want that short-term gain, [there are] bureaucratic hurdles working with them, and they want to promote endlessly. It’s more attractive for [us] to work with other non-profits and institutional partners, because they have much different M.O.’s than the City.” Foundations were also deterred by CMHA’s involvement, noting that the housing authority is almost universally loathed by the neighborhood. In contrast, foundations believe that WPC’s informal nature and lack of extensive public sector involvement allows their organizations to keep a lower profile. To that end, one WPC representative commented that “since there’s no need for anyone to stand for election, they don’t need to take credit individually . . . in fact, we don’t promote a lot of projects until we’re sure of success.”

The expansion of the cognitive-cultural economy, and ongoing shifts in residential preferences toward walkable, urban neighborhoods, presents another opportunity for municipalities to leverage investments with the private sector. Entrepreneurial urban policies, including long-standing programs like LIHTC and Section 8, as well as more recent efforts like NSP and brownfield reclamation funding, have reduced many of the opportunity costs associated with central city development. This, combined with continued municipal investments in urban amenities and broad cultural, social, and demographic shifts, have made central city living attractive to a wider swath of the population, and provides new opportunities for profitable real estate development.

Urban revitalization also has implications for civic associations and cause-driven organizations. Because philanthropies and developers are often surveying several central city neighborhoods –

111 This sentiment was echoed in interviews with a number of neighborhood residents in King-Lincoln, who almost unanimously opposed efforts to redevelop Poindexter Village and were upset by CMHA’s heavy-handed tactics.
evaluating them in terms of potential for successful investments – it is in the best interest of civic leadership to “play nice” (as one WPC representative stated) with outside funders. Granted, this does not mean that neighborhood associations should merely acquiesce to the regime’s plans, and even the Weinland Park Community Civic Association has objected to some of WPC’s efforts (Ferenchik, 2011a). Moreover, PACT’s actions illustrate how neighborhood leadership can inhibit a regime’s actions. Specifically, the area’s civic fragmentation and a toxic relationship between neighborhood organizations and outside funders motivated philanthropies to make their investments elsewhere; as one foundation officer commented, “we didn’t want to get involved with those people.”

IV.c Wither Gentrification?

In laying out the research questions, Chapters 1 and 2 argued that the processes underlying gentrification have changed over the past few decades, to the point where contemporary upward urban change hardly resembles efforts from the 1960’s and 70’s. In doing so, it questioned the continued utility of ‘gentrification,’ not only in terms of process, but also in terms of its ability to continually push the frontiers of research, given that so much contemporary inquiry on the topic is highly focused on displacement.

In documenting processes of change, this research has argued that urban revitalization is substantially different from gentrification, and worthy of being a unique topic of inquiry. In contrast to gentrification, revitalization is the product of neighborhood regimes, coalitions of public, private, and civic sector actors working together under largely-informal arrangements. While gentrification was a geographically-limited phenomenon, revitalization is transforming neighborhoods throughout the central city, to the point where redevelopment is no longer the exception, but the norm.

Another salient characteristic of revitalization is that its practitioners – members of the neighborhood regime – strongly argue that they are not promoting a gentrification process per se, and further believe they are taking active steps to avoid displacement. As one WPC funder stated, “we didn’t want to be part of a gentrification process . . . We don’t view gentrification as a success . . . Diversity is part of a healthy neighborhood.” Numerous interviewees across the study

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112 It appeared that most, if not all, of interviewees equated gentrification with displacement.
areas commented that each neighborhood features a sizeable portion of public housing, and that much of the project-based Section 8 housing stock is in contract well into the 2020’s. Further, coalition representatives believe that the presence of so much affordable housing will tamp down redevelopment pressures, preventing the wholesale transformation of each neighborhood – an outcome traditionally associated with gentrification. The WPC has further avoided displacement through a purposeful property acquisition strategy that only purchased vacant houses for redevelopment.\textsuperscript{113}

However, Olde Towne East indicates that ‘classic’ gentrification is not an outdated concept; that it continues to the present – although, in scale and scope, it is overshadowed by urban revitalization. Redevelopment there has occurred since the mid-1970’s, and while the pace of change appears to have accelerated in recent years, no outside actor (much less a coalition of entities) has emerged to promote revitalization. Olde Towne East serves as a noteworthy contrast of gentrification vs. revitalization; while the former is typically disorganized and an \textit{ad hoc} process dependent on the investment decisions of homeowners, revitalization is more planned and brings a larger capital base to support redevelopment.\textsuperscript{114} Without the organizational capacity and financial commitments afforded by a regime, gentrification may remain an incomplete process for decades – as it has in Olde Towne East.\textsuperscript{115}

\textit{IV.d Future Research}

While the dissertation has investigated the formal and informal arrangements undergirding contemporary neighborhood change, it is documenting these at a fairly nascent stage, and future efforts should be more expansive in scope and geographic and historical grounding. This study has examined revitalization in three neighborhoods, and it has done so within a limited

\textsuperscript{113} Homeport has pursued a similar strategy in its North of Broad (NOBO) development.

\textsuperscript{114} Driving through Olde Towne East, one notes the unevenness of redevelopment: on some streets (e.g., Franklin Avenue), rehabilitated housing is the norm, while on others (e.g., Ohio and Champion Avenues), virtually no homes have been renovated.

\textsuperscript{115} Olde Towne East residents were nearly unanimous in rejecting that their neighborhood’s trajectory represents a gentrification process – one long-term resident argued that “I hate thinking about this as a gentrification project.” While this might reflect prevailing notions of gentrification as a dirty word – more than one interviewee referred to it as the ‘g-word’ – many commented that the neighborhood has consistently supported subsidized housing (through Section 8) and that the area still features a substantial affordable housing stock.
geographic context – Columbus, Ohio. Future research should expand this scope to include not only other areas within Columbus, but neighborhoods in other cities. On Columbus’ Near South Side, for example, Nationwide Children’s Hospital has forged a coalition – named Healthy Neighborhoods, Healthy Families (HNHF) – promoting revitalization with the City and Community Development for All People, a local 501(c)3 community development corporation. Similarly, the City has recently partnered with Donato’s Pizza, whose founder was born on the South Side, on the Southern Gateway initiative. Beyond Columbus, the Hawthorne Huddle, a partnership between General Mills Foundation, the City of Minneapolis, and local non-profits, has worked to redevelop a low-income neighborhood through housing improvements, safety enhancements, and social service programming (Barrett & McCarthy Leddy, 2003). A number of churches have worked with the City of New Orleans in promoting revitalization in the Tremé neighborhood, with a notable focus on social service investments and economic development (Lacho, Parker, & Carter, 2005).

Beyond this, future research should investigate the connection between revitalization and central city redevelopment more broadly, which constitutes a “missing link” to understanding the contemporary urban scene. Research on the post-industrial city has chronicled shifts in attitudes, particularly among members of the urban professional classes, that favor a “livable city” over technocratic, rational planning (Ley, 1980). In Vancouver, such a cohort organized as TEAM (The Electors Action Movement) that, within a context of sectoral economic shifts that favored the services industries, assumed the reins of power in the mid-1970’s. TEAM advocated for a neighborhood-based planning agenda that emphasized “people over automobiles” and favored “people over property” (Ley, 1980, p. 250). More broadly, TEAM represented a shift in the ideology of urban revitalization; one embodied in its redevelopment of the derelict industrial zone of False Creek: lower densities, mixed-income housing, and ample green space that was “a microcosm of the livable city vision” (Ley, 1980, p. 254).

The shifts in redevelopment ideology described in the post-industrial thesis may form the “missing link” between urban and neighborhood revitalization. In Columbus, this is perhaps best embodied in the 2000 election of Mayor Michael Coleman, whose platform emphasized the role

116 The Hawthorne Huddle was an inspiration for JP Morgan Chase Foundation to concentrate its investments in one Columbus neighborhood, and to work with other funders to affect revitalization.
of neighborhoods in supporting urban revitalization. However, the seeds of Columbus’ central city rebirth date back even further, with the transformation of the CBD through skyscraper construction in the 1970’s and 80’s and, more recently, the redevelopment of the Arena District in the late 1990’s. The latter represents a mixed-use development, constructed on the former site of the Ohio Penitentiary, that combines residential, office, and commercial uses, in addition to being the home of the local National Hockey League franchise and (more recently) the city’s AAA-affiliated baseball club (Schwirian, Curry, & Woldoff, 2001; Wartenberg, 2013).

One of the major contributions of urban regime theory lies in its historical approach to urban governance, seeking to understand both continuity and change in coalition actors and policy aims. Continuity in regime membership is provided by placed-based individuals, corporations, and institutions – that is, those with strong local dependence to a particular neighborhood or municipality. For example, certain major local corporations—such as Dispatch Printing, Bank One/JP Morgan Chase, Nationwide Insurance, Limited Brands, and Huntington Bank—have long been active members of Columbus’ urban regime (Paprocki, 2010).

To that end, another shortcoming of this research is that it examines a rather compressed time frame – both WPC and PACT have only formally organized themselves within the past five years. Thus, chronicling change has proven difficult, and future research should continue to document membership and actions of both regimes, with particular attention paid to regimes’ ability to attract new members and sources of funding. WPC has proven adept at expanding its coalition – formally inviting the Annie E. Casey Foundation to join the regime, and successfully courting investments from NRP Group, Habitat for Humanity, and numerous private real estate interests. In contrast, PACT has not expanded their coalition, despite a number of place-based actors within or near their service area (e.g., Columbus Foundation, Community Properties of Ohio, and Homeport) and concerted efforts to recruit a private developer to implement their vision.

Note that Coleman shifted the city’s area plans to neighborhood plans, which focused on smaller, more socially-relevant units. To that end, the Weinland Park Neighborhood Plan was instrumental in organizing the Weinland Park Collaborative (see Chapter 4).

Interviews with PACT representatives indicate that the coalition has lobbied the Annie E. Casey Foundation to support their revitalization efforts, with some believing that the Foundation will eventually join their coalition. However, as discussed in Chapter 5 and earlier in this chapter, conversations with
Relatedly, documenting change in regime actions would also be a fruitful topic of future inquiry. As discussed in Chapter 3, regimes are a product of their times – both in terms of membership and actions. Thus, contemporary neighborhood regimes have responded to prevailing economic conditions and policy environment, and have largely focused their efforts on housing stock improvements. Thus, WPC targeted much of its early efforts on property acquisition, given that the Great Recession greatly depressed prices and allowed the coalition to stretch limited resources in purchasing (admittedly numerous) vacant housing. Similarly, PACT utilized a new funding source – HUD’s Choice Neighborhood Program – to prepare the Blueprint for Community Investment, which not only guided the redevelopment of the Poindexter Village site, but also charted a revitalization course for King-Lincoln as a whole. Both WPC and the Columbus Compact have utilized NSP monies to acquire vacant and foreclosed properties.

Future regime actions will similarly respond to political and economic alignments, and while predicting the future is admittedly fraught, one would likely assume that ongoing trends will continue into the short- and mid-term. The ascendance of the cognitive-cultural economy is ongoing, and is likely to only intensify as a form of economic organization – thus improving the economic condition of the CBD and surrounding areas. Similarly, ongoing changes in demographics and cultural preferences – such as increases in singles and childless households (including empty-nesters), and heightened demand for ‘walkable’ communities – will only continue, further driving revitalization in central city neighborhoods. The shift to entrepreneurial governance shows no signs of abating, and future urban policies will likely continue to address the opportunity costs of redevelopment through subsidies to private interests. Interviews with foundation officers indicate that they are unanimously pleased (even “thrilled”) with their decision to concentrate resources in specific neighborhoods, and will continue this work – in fact, some indicated that they hope to develop a model of revitalization that can be replicated in other neighborhoods. All told, then, it appears that economic, social, political, demographic, and cultural trends favoring redevelopment will endure, and the involvement (and cooperation) of public, private, and civic sector actors will continue to effect urban revitalization into the near future.

foundation officers participating in WPC indicate that they were all hesitant to support PACT given the outsized municipal role in the coalition, and one would assume that a philanthropy as experienced and savvy as Annie E. Casey would likely share the same concerns.
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Appendix A: Key Informants

This appendix presents an inventory of key informants organized by affiliation and neighborhood.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: municipal governments</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public sector: quasi-government entities</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private sector: developers</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic sector: place-based institutions</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic sector: foundations</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic sector: cause-driven organizations</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic sector: neighborhood leadership†</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighborhood residents</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

† Neighborhood leadership includes individuals who are currently, or have previously, served in leadership positions in a local civic association. Neighborhood residents have not been in such positions.  
Table A.1: Key informants by affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Neighborhood</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Weinland Park</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>King-Lincoln</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olde Towne East</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multiple neighborhoods</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>41</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table A.2: Key informants by neighborhood of expertise.