Time is on their Side?
The Dynamics of Congressional Party Voting and Constituent Support

Dissertation

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy
in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

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2013

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ABSTRACT

The divisive political climate in Congress in recent decades has been the subject of much scholarship in political science and commentary in the political media. Given the polarized nature of Congress, it is important to advance our understanding of both variation in trends in congressional party voting and constituents’ reactions to party voting over the course of a congressional member’s (MC’s) career. The goal of this dissertation is to explore the dynamic relationship between representatives and their constituents through three investigations of party voting. My specific focus is on temporal dynamics, that is, the role that various conceptualizations of “time” play in shaping congressional party voting and constituents’ reactions to loyal party voting.

The dissertation consists of three empirical investigations. The first explores the question, “Do legislators significantly alter their party voting habits throughout their careers?” Here, I consider time as the MC’s tenure in office, and so I model how party voting changes over the course of legislative careers. A second research question emerges: “How does faithful party voting influence constituent support over the span of a legislator’s career?” While the first section of my research analyzes congressional voting behavior, the second part focuses on constituents and how they are influenced by MC’s
party voting. In order to address the second research question, I consider time in two ways. The first is by exploring the extent to which seniority – whether a MC is newly elected or if he or she has spent several terms in office – has an impact on constituents’ reactions to party voting information. The second is by observing the formation of impressions of representatives in real time.

The dissertation research methodology consists of a triangulation of experimental, survey, and congressional data analyses. First, congressional party voting data over a period of twenty-eight years are analyzed using fixed-effects regression analyses in Study 1. Second, survey data from the American National Election Studies are merged with congressional data to assess the influence of party voting and congressional seniority on constituents’ opinions in Study 2. Finally, impression formation is carefully monitored in two longitudinal experiments in Study 3.

I find that seniority influences party voting for all House members, with MCs engaging in more party voting as their tenure in the House lengthens. The results of the impact of congressional party voting on constituent evaluations are mixed. The survey data show that party voting has an overall negative effect on evaluations of MCs, but that effect is stronger for more senior MCs and weaker for junior MCs. However, some of the experimental results indicate that in-partisans react more positively to loyal party voting than moderate party voting. A consistent finding in the dissertation is that out-partisans dislike loyal party voting more than in-partisans favor it. The experimental results yield mixed support for the hypothesis that party voting information will have a greater impact on evaluations when that information is received at the beginning of the impression
formation process. The dissertation has implications for our understanding of congressional careers and how constituent impressions of MCs are formed. More broadly, the dissertation enriches our general understanding of representation and the representative-constituent relationship.
DEDICATION

To Brian, my husband and best friend
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The completion of my dissertation is in large part due to the support I received from numerous people throughout my time at The Ohio State University.

First, I feel privileged to have an excellent political science dissertation committee. Ever since my first year in graduate school, Professor Kathleen McGraw has always been a supportive advisor, and I am so grateful that I could always count on her to provide prompt, honest, and helpful feedback. I developed a strong interest in political psychology during Professor McGraw’s political psychology and public opinion classes and while working on a research project with her. My dissertation research about legislative politics was largely inspired by Professor Jack Wright’s Legislative Studies class, and I thank him for his excellent guidance on research about Congress. I gained firsthand experience on every aspect of conducting experiments by collaborating with Professor Tom Nelson on his research projects, so I thank him for inviting me to join his research group during my first year at Ohio State. I appreciate all of the support from my committee throughout my time at Ohio State. I would also like to thank Professor R. Kelly Garrett who is not on my committee but I have learned so much about the research process while collaborating with him on several projects.

Secondly, I must thank several graduate students for their friendship and support. Thanks to my running (and yoga) partners Michelle Cook, Erin Graham, Josh Kertzer,
and Katy Powers. I will always remember the fun times we had running – it was the perfect way to relieve stress after spending those long days in Derby Hall. To my fellow Americanists Sarah Bryner, Dustin Carnahan, and Nyron Crawford, you are great friends and are already excellent scholars. Also, I appreciate the support from Ohio friends Carolyn Morgan and Melissa Kleis.

Next, I would like to extend my thanks to the Graduate School at Ohio State for research support through the Alumni Grants for Graduate Research and Scholarship, which allowed me to pay adult participants to complete my experiment through Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Furthermore, I appreciate the help from the Graduate School for selecting me for the Distinguished University Fellowship that provided me with first and fifth year support. This Fellowship was a major reason why I was able to complete my dissertation in a timely manner. Thank you to the Department of Political Science for selecting me to receive a research grant so I could complete my experiment by paying adult participants through MTurk.

I would like to thank my parents, Mark and Diane Anderson, for their constant support and guidance throughout my life. My siblings and their spouses have also offered their support throughout my time at OSU. My dear blessing - Anderson John - motivated me with his tiny kicks while pregnant, and later with his smiles, to finish the dissertation. Finally, I would like to thank my husband Brian for his love, strength, and support for over thirteen years - beginning in high school and throughout our time at Ohio State. Brian has been my biggest motivator and inspiration as I worked on my dissertation, and I can’t thank him enough.
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Primary Areas of Interest: American Politics, Congress, Political Psychology, Political Communication, Public Opinion, Political Parties.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

The Research Problem

Over the past few decades, Congress has become increasingly conflict-ridden as Republicans and Democrats have shown little desire for bipartisanship (Rohde, 1991, Theriault, 2006). During the 110th Congress, Members of Congress (MCs) voted on average over 90% of the time with their own party on divisive roll calls (see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). Because of this increase in partisan polarization, I believe it is important to improve our understanding of both variation in trends in congressional party voting and constituents’ reactions to party voting over the course of a MC’s career. Specifically, the goal of this dissertation is to explore the dynamic relationship between representatives and their constituents through three investigations of party voting. My specific focus is on temporal dynamics, that is, the role that various conceptualizations of “time” play in influencing congressional party voting and constituents’ reactions to loyal party voting.

The first empirical study in this dissertation is designed to answer the question, “Do legislators significantly alter their party voting habits throughout their careers?” Previous research has yielded mixed evidence about stability in congressional voting. Here, I consider time as the MC’s tenure in office, so I can observe how party voting changes over the course of legislative careers.
Once variation in congressional party voting trends is considered, a second question emerges: “How does faithful party voting influence constituent support over the span of a legislator’s career?” While the first section of my research examines congressional voting behavior, the second part focuses on constituents and how they are influenced by MC’s party voting. In order to address the second research question, I consider time in two ways. The first is by exploring the extent to which seniority – whether a MC is newly elected or if he or she has spent several terms in office – has an impact on constituents’ reactions to party voting information. The second is by observing the formation of impressions of representatives in real time, through experimental methods. Previous research has neglected to consider how constituents’ impressions of elected representatives are formed and updated over the span of a legislator's time in office.

The dissertation research methodology consists of a triangulation of experimental, survey, and congressional data analyses. First, congressional party voting data over a period of twenty-eight years are analyzed using fixed-effects regression analyses in Study 1. Second, survey data from the American National Election Studies are merged with congressional data to assess the influence of party voting and congressional seniority on constituents’ opinions in Study 2. Finally, impression formation is carefully monitored in two longitudinal experiments in Study 3. I gain more leverage in understanding the significance of party voting for legislators and constituents by examining party voting from multiple methodological perspectives.
Understanding the dynamics of party voting is important because of the potential consequences of voting instability on party government in Congress. The existing literature assumes members of Congress are concerned about creating a party brand. Furthermore, previous literature suggests that party leaders have the power to persuade members to vote along party lines throughout their careers, but I argue that if MCs are less partisan at the beginning of their careers, then party leaders may not have as much control over their members’ party voting as was once thought.

My study will contribute to previous research by examining how constituent support develops over time. This has implications for how we understand the development of evaluations of elected representatives. In particular, scholars have failed to consider whether the impact of party voting on constituent support varies throughout a legislator’s tenure. Finally, it is my hope that my research will provide political scientists and citizens alike with a more thorough understanding of the factors and processes that shape evaluations of legislators, so that citizens might be better able to hold their representatives accountable for their actions.

The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. First, I briefly consider the relationship between loyalty and party voting, and their importance. Second, I review the existing party voting literature from two perspectives: (1) the voting behavior of MCs and (2) the reactions of constituents. In each relevant section of the literature review, I also I elaborate on why I believe it is important to take into account different approaches to time when studying party voting. By taking into account three related yet still distinct conceptualizations of time, I will be able to provide a holistic view of how tenure
influences party voting and in turn how tenure and party voting will influence constituent opinion. Finally, I provide a brief overview of the three sets of empirical studies in the dissertation.

Loyalty and Party Voting

The concept of loyalty is central to this research. While philosophers disagree about the range of things to which people can be loyal, many agree that it is fundamentally an interpersonal or intergroup phenomenon. So, for example, loyalty has been broadly defined as “perseverance in an association to which a person has become intrinsically committed as a matter of his or her identity” (Kleinig, 2013). Kleinig argues that loyalty is generated by associations with individuals, groups, or collectives with which individuals identify strongly, such as friendships, organizations, and countries. Similarly, social psychologists also classify loyalty as an intergroup phenomenon, produced by an identification with a group (Levine & Moreland, 2002). In the political context, parties are a critical group with which individuals – both public officials and the mass public – identify. In this research, I investigate MCs’ loyalty to their party over the course of their careers and how this party loyalty influences constituents’ evaluations.

I conceptualize party loyalty as a House member’s overall allegiance to his or her party on contentious issues. I operationalize party loyalty with party voting records - the percentage of times a legislator votes with his or her party on divisive roll call votes each term. Party loyalty is operationalized as the aggregate party voting record because of its importance to legislators and constituents. MCs are concerned how their vote decisions will resonate with their constituents (e.g. Mayhew, 1974), especially since voting records
can be a prominent part of the election landscape that provides information about a MC to his or her constituents. First, a MC’s party voting record can signal to constituents the legislator’s strength of attachment to the party. In addition, the party voting record can be a cue to constituents about the MC’s future behavior in office. For example, if a MC votes with his party ninety-five percent of the time, then a constituent may infer that he will continue to be a strong partisan in the next term. Moreover, constituents treat party voting records as a signal about shared issue agreement (or disagreement). If a Republican constituent who greatly disapproves of government regulation of business learns that her Republican representative voted with the party 95% of the time, then she might assume that they share views on a broad range of issues. In sum, a MC’s party voting record serves as a signal to constituents about strength of partisanship, issue agreement, and future voting behavior.

Although research on ideological voting contributes to our understanding of ideological consistency (e.g., Poole, 2007) and research on voting on specific issues provides insight about voting patterns on certain topics (e.g., Meinke, 2005), I believe it is necessary to consider party voting trends. Focusing on specific issues only provides a small percentage of a legislator’s voting habits that otherwise could look much different if party votes on all issues are aggregated into an overall party voting record. Furthermore, partisan measures tend to have a stronger influence on constituents’ evaluations of legislators than do ideological measures.

Voters have a better understanding of partisanship than ideology (Converse, 1964). A legislator's Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) score may be reported by
the media, but it is doubtful that constituents evaluate their legislator's ideological score in the same way they do as a party voting score (see Carson et al., 2010 for a discussion). Newspapers often report party voting scores to depict a legislator’s level of loyalty to his or her party. A challenger in a primary election may use an incumbent's voting record to charge that the incumbent is not loyal to the party, or opponents in a general election may emphasize inconsistencies in party voting or cast an incumbent’s partisan strength in an unfavorable light. Legislators may realize their party voting scores can be used strategically by supporters and opponents, and that they can serve as a cue to constituents about their level of party allegiance. In short, party voting records provide a realistic and succinct measure of party loyalty. Throughout the rest of the dissertation, party voting records are used as the indicator of party loyalty.

Polarization in Congress

Over the past several decades, party polarization in Congress has increased considerably. Parties in the House have become more homogenous, with polarization increasing from the 1970s to the 2000s by over 45% (Theriault, 2006). One plausible explanation for this rise in polarization is that redistricting has lead to more partisan districts so that MCs feel less compelled to act in a moderate fashion. Indeed, some evidence suggests that legislative redistricting is related to an increased polarization (Grainger, 2010). After the 1990 redistricting, Republicans gained 17 open seats that were previously evenly split districts (Swain, Borrelli, and Reed, 1998), suggesting that redistricting does lead to more partisan districts. However, others argue that redistricting
does not lead to polarization, and that it is a rise in income inequality that is the cause of increased polarization (e.g. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal, 2006).

Institutional changes in the late 1970s have also been linked to increased polarization in Congress. Rohde (1991) and Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2002) suggest that the party structure in Congress has become stronger over the past several decades. One of the first explanations for this surge in party loyalty was offered in Rohde’s (1991) seminal work on conditional party government. Rohde’s central argument was that Democratic majority party leaders enacted institutional changes that are considered the driving force behind growing party support. Since these reforms, majority party members have experienced more pressure to vote with their party. Leaders and committee chairs risk losing their coveted seats, and rank-and-file members are threatened to be appointed to an undesirable committee if their votes are out-of-step with their party. Republicans in the 1980s responded to Democratic Party reforms by improving their own organizational structure. By the end of the 1980’s, both parties had bolstered their strength as a result of these reforms that restricted intraparty disagreement.

Yet another explanation for polarization in Congress is generational replacement, in which incoming members are more liberal or conservative than those they are replacing (Rohde, 1991; Stonecash, Brewer, & Mariani, 2003). Finally, Theriault (2006) argues that polarization is partially a result of adaptation, such that MCs become more conservative or liberal over the course of their careers. The first study in the dissertation explores whether there is support for Theriault’s argument that MCs change their voting behavior over the course of their careers. I elaborate on this theme below.
The Effect of Seniority on Party Voting

The first important focus on time in the dissertation focuses on seniority (that is, the amount of time that a representative has served in office), and in particular examines the extent to which party voting changes, if at all, over the course of the average MC’s career. Meinke (2005) argues time is an essential factor when studying congressional voting, and he finds legislators systematically reverse votes on the specific issue of minimum wages. As noted earlier, the congressional behavior literature provides a mixed portrait of legislative voting trends over time. There are a number of approaches to measuring changes in voting over time. Nye (1994) outlines three sources of potential catalysts for change in congressional votes: generational replacement (changes attributable to the characteristics of newly elected members); member conversion (changes in the behavior of continuing members due to events from a specific time period); and life cycle effects (changes in behavior due to the tenure of a congressional member). Although I acknowledge that temporal trends in party voting may vary due to generational effects or member conversion my goal is to assess the existence of a life cycle effect, which will be referred to as a seniority effect. I define a seniority effect as the influence of the length of a legislator’s career on his or her voting behavior. I focus on a seniority effect because my primary interest is in investigating how party voting evolves throughout a legislator’s career and whether constituents’ evaluations of a legislator’s party voting record vary at different points in his or her career. In Chapter 2, I investigate whether there is a seniority effect by analyzing a congressional panel data set that spans 28 years.
Three competing expectations about stability in Congressional party voting can be outlined. First, party voting may remain consistent throughout a MC’s career with no significant adjustments as a MC becomes more senior. Evidence of stability in party voting would suggest that that MCs remain consistently loyal to their party, as the average party voting record over the past few decades is extremely high (about 88%, see Chapter 2, Figure 2.1). Second, a seniority effect may exist, such that junior members are most partisan at the beginning of their careers and senior MCs less so. The final expectation is that there is a seniority effect, but in the opposite direction, with junior MCs exhibiting less partisanship and senior MCs the highest levels of party voting of their careers. These expectations are derived from previous literature on party voting and legislative careers.

**Expectation #1: Stability in Party Voting**

Previous studies support the argument that legislators vote consistently throughout their careers, while others suggest that voting is not very stable. In Asher and Weisberg’s (1978) seminal piece, voting is described as “evolutionary” in that any systematic change in congressional voting is at best incremental in domains such as public debt, foreign aid, school construction, and civil rights votes. Another study using party unity votes finds that voting remains stable for most legislators unless a significant incident occurs during their time in office (Nye, 1994). Nye argues that specific events (e.g., changes in party leadership, shifts in constituent opinion, modifications in the President’s behavior) can serve as the catalyst for change in a legislator’s level of support for his or her party but that no clear systematic changes can be attributed to seniority per
As for ideological voting, Poole (2007) concludes that MCs vote consistently, and these fixed ideological positions are due to a legislator’s intense beliefs and ideological constraint.

One reason why party loyalty might remain stable throughout a MC’s career is that he or she believes there is an electoral benefit to party cohesiveness because party allegiance will lead to a strong party brand. The idea of a party brand, that political parties can act as a brand name for voters, has a long history (Aldrich & Rohde, 1997; Cox & McCubbins, 1993; Downs, 1957; James M. Snyder & Ting, 2002). The argument is that parties create a strong “brand name” by ensuring that politicians in their party are united in their goal to vote on behalf of the party to signal to voters the party’s preferences and priorities. According to Cox and McCubbins (1993, 2002), an incumbent’s reelection probability is a function not only of individual characteristics, but also party characteristics. In this way, the party confers electoral advantages to its incumbent members. “The political party performs this function by acting as a surety, or a third-party guarantor, on behalf of its candidates, similar to the way that a firm might enter into a brand licensing agreement when it introduces a new product” (Grynaviski, 2010, p. 9). Thus, according to this line of reasoning MCs should consistently adhere to the party line when voting in order to help develop a credible party brand.

However, the party brand literature provides little empirical evidence about party voting trends among MCs striving to create a party brand. It seems reasonable to assume that members elected after the 1970s (when most of the institutional changes in Congress occurred) should be more likely to vote with their party than members elected earlier. If
the party brand argument is correct, generational replacement should have occurred after the 1980s in which older members are replaced by younger members who are more highly partisan. These young members, in a conscious effort to help promote a brand name, should consistently vote with their respective party. Because they enter office with the goal of promoting the party through party loyalty, there should be no distinct movement toward or away from the party throughout their careers. Thus, levels of party voting should not be related to seniority.

To summarize, the studies reviewed above present an image of an elected official who rarely strays from the voting record established during the first term in office. If this is indeed the case, then the results from the data panel analyses reported in Chapter 2 should confirm the first expectation, that party voting is unrelated to seniority.

Changes in Party Voting during a MC’s Career

When House members vote in roll calls during their first term as representatives they are setting a precedent for their future votes in Congress. These votes send signals to their party, potential opponents, the electorate, and interest groups that may give insight into how these members will vote for the rest of their legislative careers. Unfortunately, little is known about how legislators are socialized into this elite group of representatives and why they initially decide to vote the way they do at the beginning of their careers. During their first term, freshman members are – many for the first time - exposed to the group dynamics of their party and Congress as a whole. Members must learn how to deal with a wide array of external pressures, such as party leaders, interest
groups, and the electorate, as well as internal demands such as personal ideology and social identity. Because MCs are faced with these pressures at the beginning of their careers, their voting patterns may change over time as they become more accustomed to congressional life. That change may be of two sorts, namely increased party voting over time or decreased party voting over time.

Expectation #2: MCs are most partisan at the beginning of their careers and become less so over time

A legislator’s voting behavior may vary during his or her tenure in Congress. Uncertainty about constituent preferences may lead to inconsistencies in voting (Grose & Yoshinaka, 2006). An aging effect, in which politicians vote contrary to voter preferences as they become older, is conditional upon the speed that “sorting” occurs, which is defined as the ability for constituents to become aware of whether their preferences are aligned with their representatives’ preferences (Lott & Reed, 1989). These studies suggest that changes in voting habits occur throughout a MC’s career, but the direction of the movement is not specified.

Higher allegiance to the party among newer MCs may occur only under particular conditions. For example, some evidence suggests freshman members of the President’s party supported the President more than senior members (Weinbaum & Judd, 1970). Additional evidence suggests that freshman members will vote more in line with their party than senior members when the party recently wins the presidency or gains House
seats (Hurley & Kerr, 2000). These studies predict a noticeable difference between newer and more senior MCs’ voting behavior only under certain circumstances.

Other research more clearly shows that congressional voting moves from more partisan to less partisan during a MC’s time in office. Elling (1982) demonstrated that the ideological positions of Senate members become more moderate during their careers. Freshmen may support their parties more than veteran members because, as party leaders attempt to cultivate freshman party members, freshmen must deal with unique electoral constraints, and freshmen follow party officials if they are interested in moving ahead within their party (Cohen, 1981). A similar conclusion was reached by Stratmann (2000), who argued that junior legislators may rely more heavily on the advice from their senior colleagues and are more likely to succumb to party pressure at the beginning of their careers (Stratmann, 2000). Thus, the second expectation, that party voting is strongest at the beginning of a MC’s career, is consistent with the results from this set of studies.

**Expectation #3: MCs are less partisan at the beginning of their careers and become more so over time**

Finally, there is only one prominent study that offers some support for the claim that MCs will become more partisan the longer they sit in office.¹ As part of his argument for member adaptation, Theriault (2006) used DW-NOMINATE and ADA voting scores and suggested that adaptation is one mechanism that produces party

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¹ Some research indicates that MCs, regardless of partisanship, become more liberal or conservative over time. For example, legislators’ ideology tends to move in a more conservative direction over time (e.g., Hibbing, 1991). However, while this move toward conservatism was apparent in the aggregate, it was not necessarily the case for all issues in another study, where legislators grew more liberal on fiscal issues at the same time overall ideology became more conservative (Lopez & Ramirez, 2008).
polarization in Congress. To explain adaptation, Theriault provided the example of Malcolm Wallop, a Wyoming Republican Senator who began his career as a moderate Republican, but ended up retiring as the second most conservative Senate member, primarily because of his conservative military and foreign policy views. This argument suggests that MCs are strategically aware of the optimal times to vote with the party. So it is possible that legislators will vote more moderately at the beginning of their careers, and then become more increasingly partisan over time. One potential reason for this more moderate voting behavior at the beginning of the legislator’s career is to win the support of the majority of their constituency. The third expectation, namely that MCs are less partisan at the beginning of their careers in the House, is consistent with these arguments.

**Majority vs. Minority Members**

Having outlined existing research and theoretical arguments associated with different possibilities in trends in party voting over the course of legislators’ careers, it is important to recognize that there may also be differences in party voting as a function of majority versus minority status. Cox and McCubbins (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2002) highlight the many advances of parties during the reform era, most notably the power of agenda setting. These scholars diverge from Rohde’s work because they make a key distinction between majority and minority party loyalty. In their model, parties are conceptualized as cartels in which majority party leadership controls the agenda. Agenda setting is the key to Cox and McCubbins’ cartel theory because the majority has the power to determine which bills will be voted upon, meaning they have the power to block
controversial bills from coming to the floor that may otherwise split their party, especially coalitions within the party. Minority legislators lack this power, and thereby have less control over how their members vote. Therefore, majority members should exhibit higher levels of party voting than minority members.

Cox and McCubbins argue that majority members will secure a higher electoral payoff for party loyalty than minority members will for a number of reasons, such as the leadership positions they receive as well as benefits that simply derive from the majority status, such as money from PACS. Given these findings, it is expected that legislators gain electoral benefits from majority party status, especially when voting with their party on divisive issues. Cox and McCubbins also suggest that party reputations are important, so that House majority members have an incentive to claim credit for legislative accomplishments. Lipinski (2004), who finds that majority legislators make greater use of partisanship in their communications to gain voter support, confirms the argument that party reputation matters. Based on the aforementioned research, it seems clear that when minority members become majority members, a stronger electoral incentive to vote with their parties exists. Following the logic of the cartel theory, there should be differences in majority and minority members' party voting scores, such that party unity scores will increase when minority members become majority members. If this speculation is confirmed, it would suggest that party voting is motivated in part by institutional structures, specifically that party voting is influenced by majority and minority membership status.
Constituent Evaluations of House Members

As I have noted, my goal is to examine both the extent to which MCs’ party voting practices change during their careers and how constituents are influenced by MCs’ party voting records. Unfortunately, much of the political science research fails to study both sides in conjunction with one another, so "how citizens think about politicians and the strategic attempts by politicians to influence those perceptions - occupy separate shelves in our offices and separate chapters in scholarly treatments" (McGraw, 2003, p. 395). The previous section outlined the literature on congressional party voting along with a set of different expectations about party voting behavior throughout a MC’s tenure that can be derived from these literatures. Here I turn to the relevant literatures and theories for the second part of the dissertation. I expect that the influence of party voting on constituent evaluations is a dynamic process where party voting matters most at the beginning of the impression formation process. I begin by providing a brief overview of research examining legislative actions that are associated with evaluations of House members, and then I elaborate on how party voting can also influence constituent evaluations.

Legislative Actions and Constituent Support

A congressional member’s personal appeal and legislative actions have not always been considered important determinants of constituent evaluations or vote choice. The Michigan model (W. E. Miller & Stokes, 1963), a social-psychological model determining that presidential vote choice is largely explained by party identification, was
largely thought to be applicable to congressional races so party identification was also thought to be the primary explanatory factor of the congressional vote. Under the Michigan model, a voter’s views of issues and the candidates had little direct influence on vote choice and were secondary to party identification. However, research on congressional elections soon began to reveal that party identification was not the sole determinant of vote choice. The “incumbency effect” became popularized in the 1970s, where familiarity and recognition of the incumbent’s legislative actions (most notably district service) served as the primary voting factor in congressional elections (Ferejohn, 1977). Since then, scholars have recognized the power of incumbency and the importance of establishing a strong reputation with constituents (e.g. Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1990; Mann & Wolfinger, 1980). Furthermore, national factors like the economy and presidential popularity became less important factors in explaining outcomes of congressional elections, although other research suggests that both national forces and local forces have an impact on candidate evaluations (Brown & Woods, 1991).

Recent public opinion research suggests that incumbent evaluations are based on a variety of legislative actions and personal characteristics (e.g. Jacobson, 2004; Serra & Moon, 1994). Several personal attributes, such as incumbent reputation, and legislative actions, like district staff presence, casework, bill sponsorship, and pork barrel have been related to constituent support for a congressional member. Legislative activities affecting re-election chances have been categorized into three areas: advertising, credit claiming, and position taking (Mayhew, 1974). Fenno (1978) emphasized a “home style” where
explanation of Washington activity, presentation of self, and allocation of resources in the district are important in gaining support from constituents.

In one of the most detailed reviews of this literature, Gary Jacobson (2004) revealed several determinants of candidate evaluations in his *Politics of Congressional Elections*. Jacobson outlined how congressional incumbents often are judged by a diverse set of criteria, including job performance, experience, and district and individual services. All candidates, including non-incumbents and open seat candidates, are evaluated on their personal characteristics. There are other important characteristics as well, including party, policy, and ideology. Constituents respond to three main actions of candidates: (1) advertising (since familiarity is important), (2) credit claiming of personal and district services; and (3) general and specific agreement with members’ votes and issue stances. In sum, when voters are asked to mention things they like and dislike about House candidates, Jacobson noted that several categories emerge, including personal characteristics, performance and experience, district service and attention, party, ideology and policy, and group associations.

Representatives attempt to cultivate support from their constituents through numerous types of district service (Cain, Ferejohn, & Fiorina, 1987; G. R. Parker & Parker, 1985). For example, casework for constituents has been shown to influence support. When a representative’s office provides services to constituents to resolve problems with things like social security benefits, veterans’ benefits, civil service pensions, Medicare, immigration, IRS, and issues with other federal bureaucracies, constituent support for a legislator is enhanced (Serra & Cover, 1992). Constituent
support also increases when: (1) the total number of sponsored bills increases, (2) the percentage of local bills sponsored increases and (3) congressional members sit on committees that address constituents’ interests (Box-Steffensmeier, Kimball, Meinke, & Tate, 2003). Furthermore, resource allocations, measured by bills sponsored or co-sponsored, total number of staff, and the number of district offices, influence vote choice (Romero, 2006). Based on these studies, it seems clear that legislative actions that directly affect the district will be influential when constituents judge their representative.

While some scholars suggest that legislative actions matter for an incumbent’s reputation (e.g., S. Parker & Parker, 1993), others are less convinced (e.g., Ragsdale & Cook, 1987). For instance, pork, defined as federal spending on construction of things such as roads and office buildings, and civilian employment (e.g., social security employees) in a district, have been shown to negatively influence vote share for the incumbent (Feldman & Jondrow, 1984). Some scholars argue that an endogeneity problem exists, where incumbent feeling thermometer scores affect whether an individual recalled that an incumbent did something for the district, met the incumbent, talked with a staff member, and received mail about the incumbent (McAdams & Johannes, 1988). This is partially resolved when an individual’s rationalization of a legislator’s actions is accounted for in statistical analyses, which indicate that support for incumbents is influenced by contact with constituents, both direct contact and indirect, such as receiving information about the incumbent through mail, television, or radio (Romero, 1996).

Constituent evaluations may be dependent on different types of information depending on the electoral context. For example, campaign intensity influences the type
of criteria individuals use when they evaluate Senate candidates (Kahn & Kenney, 1997). Kahn and Kenney find that when an intense campaign ensues, evaluations are more dependent on policy, ideology, partisanship, and retrospective evaluations of the President and the economy. However, those who are less politically sophisticated are more likely to be affected by the intensity of the campaign than are political experts. In another study, the incumbency advantage was found to be most effective when the short-term forces of an election, such as the condition of the economy, are most salient (Petrocik & Desposato, 2004). Furthermore, the determinants of support can depend on whether the congressional race is for the House or Senate. Senate and House candidates are judged by different criteria, with issues, competence, and integrity being more important for Senators and personal character, personal appeal, and responsiveness more important for House members (A. H. Miller, 1990). These studies offer a more complex view of how legislative actions influence constituent evaluations and vote choice.

*Party Voting and Constituent Evaluations*

As described in the previous section, there are many legislative activities that can enhance a legislator’s reputation in the district. Many of these actions provide direct benefits to constituents and are designed to advertise and promote the incumbent’s name and personality. In contrast to activities in the district, a “beltway” activity that only recently has been considered to have a potential impact on constituent support is the level of party loyalty a legislator exhibits, as evidenced by party voting scores. Whereas scholars like Fenno (1978) emphasize “home style,” where explanation of Washington activity, presentation of self, and allocation of resources in the district are important for
impression management, politicians must also realistically consider the effect of roll call votes on voters’ evaluations. Deviation from the party and ‘toeing the party line’ may affect constituent opinion. MCs may not be able to easily explain their voting record throughout an entire term or career. House members may not be able to obfuscate their overall voting records with pandering, ambiguity, and explanations, making it difficult to distance themselves from their voting records. And while legislators may refrain from advertising their own voting records, opponents and the media may eagerly include party voting scores in their campaign commercials or websites if they feel it will help defeat the opposition.

In contrast to the literature on ideological extremism and constituent support (e.g., Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder, & Charles Stewart, 2001; Canes-Wrone, Brady, & Cogan, 2002), there are only a handful of studies that specifically focus on the direct impact of congressional party voting on citizens’ attitudes. While accounting for measurement and simultaneity issues, Ansolabehere and Jones (2010) find that perceived agreement with an incumbent’s roll call voting record predicts job approval for the incumbent. This study confirms that citizens are aware of congressional roll-calls and that they are responsive to them.

Ansolabehere and Jones’ (2010) considered several specific key roll-calls on a variety of topics. While this portrayal of constituent responsiveness to specific issues is important, overall party voting records also warrant attention. Furthermore, their study fails to examine whether party loyalty on these roll-calls is associated with constituent
support. To the best of my knowledge, only two recent studies have examined the impact of party voting records on incumbent evaluations.

The first study examines the impact of party voting using complementary methodologies. Carson et al. (2010) conclude that individuals tend to punish incumbents who have strong party loyalty. Evidence from their experiment underscores the importance of studying partisan voting records instead of ideological voting records as they find no significant relationship between ideological voting and constituent opinion. Participants read about a mock legislator’s ten policy positions and the information included whether the legislator voted with or against his party. The number of times he voted with the party varied between six and ten times. A legislator with a 6/10 was considered more moderate, whereas a legislator with a score of 10/10 had the highest party loyalty score. The results show that high party loyalty negatively influences the level of support for the incumbent for reelection. The second part of Carson et al.’s analyses made use of congressional data to assess how party unity scores are related to incumbents two-party vote share. Both the experimental and congressional data analyses confirm the authors’ expectations that strong party loyalty negatively influences constituent support. As noted earlier, party polarization is prominent in Congress, but this level of extreme party loyalty is not evident in the mass public (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006). If constituents are distressed by high levels of partisan polarization, then high levels of party loyalty, as reflected by party unity scores, will be viewed negatively. According to this logic, and Carson et al.’s findings, I expect that individuals
will be less supportive of a House member with a loyal party voting record (LPV) than one with a moderate party voting record (MPV).

Party Voting, Evaluations, and Shared Partisanship

The Carson et al. (2010) study, and the prediction that derives from it, fails to take into account the importance of shared partisanship. However, I expect that there should be systematic differences in how in-partisans and out-partisans view congressional party loyalty.

Social psychologists refer to humans as “cognitive misers” who are unable to retain enough information to form a purely rational assessment (for a review, see Taber, 2003). Party voting may serve as a simple cue to constituents that an incumbent is clearly exhibiting loyalty to his or her party. How constituents respond to that cue should depend on whether they share a loyalty to the same party. Constituents who share the same party affiliation should evaluate a MC with party loyalty more positively than those with a different party affiliation. In-partisans (i.e., those who share the same partisan affiliation with the House member) will be more supportive of a House member with a LPV than a member with a MPV (Hypothesis 1a). Conversely, out-partisans (that is, those who have a different partisan affiliation from the House member) should be concerned that their MC’s party loyalty is not in their best political interest, so that evaluations may be negatively affected by party loyalty. Out-partisans will be less supportive of a House member with a LPV than a member with a MPV (Hypothesis 1b).
In addition to whether the constituent shares or holds a different partisan affiliation as his or her House member, the effect of party loyalty on constituent evaluations may be dependent on strength of partisanship. In the second study on the impact of party voting records referred to above, Harbridge & Malhotra (2011) demonstrated that strong partisans are more supportive of incumbents with loyal party voting records that are weak-partisans. In their survey experiment, which considered only in-partisans, Democrats (Republicans) were asked to evaluate an actual Democratic (Republican) incumbent. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first condition, the representative’s voting history on key issues recognized by the Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) was described as having “almost always voted the Democratic [Republican] position.” In the second condition, the legislator “took the Democratic [Republican] position on about half the votes and the Republican [Democratic] position on about half the votes.” Strong in-partisans were more approving legislators with higher party loyalty than legislators described as showing bipartisan behavior. For weak partisans, the results were reversed, with weak partisans’ approval ratings being higher for legislators in the bipartisan condition than legislators in the higher party loyalty condition. Based on the results of this study, I would expect to find systematic differences in how in how weak and strong partisans are influenced by party loyalty. *Differences in evaluations of MCs with loyal and moderate party voting will be more evident among strong partisans than weak partisans.*
**Majority and Minority Members and Constituent Support**

Membership in the majority party is an additional characteristic of House incumbents that potentially could influence constituent evaluations. Fenno (1978) argues that it is more beneficial for MCs to gain constituent approval through individualized actions that separates them from the party rather than to “run with Congress.” Recent studies have examined whether majority members are punished for their party loyalty. The most important predictor of the type of messages sent to constituents about Congress is majority or minority membership (Lipinski, 2004). In his study, Lipinski finds that majority members send campaign messages that indicate they are “running with Congress,” and messages from minority members address how they are “running against Congress.” The consequences of running with the party can have a negative impact when the majority party’s reputation is weak. For example, Lipinski finds Democrats that sent out campaign messages supporting Congress during the 103rd Congress were more likely to be defeated in the 1994 election. Yet, during the 1998 election when constituents were more approving of the majority party, institutional loyalty did not have a significant impact on vote choice (Lipinski, Bianco, & Work, 2003). A pair of related studies corroborate these results; constituents hold majority members accountable when they disapprove of Congress (Jones & McDermott, 2004; McDermott & Jones, 2003). Based on this research about the influence of majority membership, it appears that individuals take into account the performance of the majority party when they assess legislators.

In Chapters 3, 4, and 5 of the dissertation, I explore how constituents react to the label of majority and minority membership. Majority membership may serve as a
heuristic that influences constituent evaluations. Previous analyses would suggest that majority members are viewed the most critically. Analyzing the impact of minority and majority membership status on constituent evaluations will serve as an exploratory exercise; no formal hypotheses will be presented.

Newer and More Senior Members

In addition to considering majority and minority membership status, I take into account differences between newer and more senior members. This is the second approach to time, which is similar to seniority as discussed above. However, here the emphasis is on a more focused comparison of newer and more senior MCs, by comparing (in Chapter 3) how party voting affects constituent opinion for newer and more senior MCs. There has been relatively little systematic consideration of how legislative activities change throughout the course of a congressional career (see Hibbing, 1991 for a review). To maintain a strong reputation, incumbents may change some behaviors throughout their congressional careers in order to preserve constituent approval. In perhaps the most important treatment, Fenno (1978) was the first to describe a legislator’s career as a series of stages - the expansionist and protectionist stages. In the expansionist stage, the incumbent attempts to build a strong base and a reelection constituency, whereas in the protectionist stage the incumbent is primarily concerned with maintaining the constituency support he or she has already cultivated. Scholars have also argued that it takes time for both legislators and constituents to recognize each other’s preferences (Grose & Yoshinaka, 2006; Lott & Reed, 1989). These previous studies propose that constituents will evaluate newer and more senior MCs differently. In Chapter 3, I test
whether party voting differentially influences on constituents’ opinions depending on the MC’s seniority.

Political science scholars have long thought that partisanship has an enduring impact on constituent evaluations and vote choice (e.g., Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960). If this is true, then we would expect that in-partisans would always view loyal party voting as a positive attribute, and out-partisans would be forever unforgiving of their loyal party voting legislator. An alternate view holds would be that once an impression is formed, additional information, such as party voting, becomes less influential.

I believe there will be differences in how constituents are affected by party voting information as a function of whether the MC is a new or more senior representative. When comparing American National Election Survey respondents’ lists of likes and dislikes of incumbent and open seat candidates, Jacobson (2004) found that more emphasis was placed on the party of open seat candidates (Jacobson, 2004). This pattern suggests that voters think more about party with regard to new candidates than incumbents, suggesting the greater importance of party for evaluations at the beginning of a legislator’s career. This implies that party voting information should be a more significant determinant of evaluations of MCs earlier in their career. A legislator's initial actions in office are most important for impression formation, and once constituents have developed support toward their legislator, additional actions, including party voting, become less influential. This prediction follows from a large body of psychological research (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Asch, 1946; Park, 1986) that demonstrates that initial
information has a much stronger impact on impressions than information that is learned later. Therefore, I expect that evaluations of junior House members will be influenced by party voting information (the specifics are detailed below) whereas evaluations of senior House members will not be significantly affected by LPV or MPV regardless of the partisanship of the constituent (Hypothesis 2a).

As noted above, political science research has suggested that overall, individuals react negatively to party voting (Carson et al., 2010), and that polarization does not exist in the mass public (e.g., Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006). However, taking into account the partisanship of constituents may qualify these conclusions. An in-partisan should approve of a junior legislator with a LPV, while out-partisans should be less enthusiastic. Following this logic, individuals will hold more favorable impressions of their newly elected representative who engages in LPV when they share the same party identification as the representative (in-partisans) whereas out-partisans will evaluate the same representative negatively. That is, I predict that in-partisans will be more supportive of a junior House member with a LPV than a junior House member with a MPV (Hypothesis 2b). Out-partisans will be less supportive of a junior House member with LPV than a junior House member with a MPV (Hypothesis 2c). Hypotheses 2a through 2c are tested using the survey analysis in Chapter 3.

The Temporal Dynamics of Impressions

The final treatment of time in the dissertation is the point in time in the information stream when party voting is learned. Previous research on party loyalty has neglected to consider how impressions of elected representatives are formed and updated
over the span of an incumbent’s career. Impressions are simply the “collected knowledge one person possesses about another,” and they consist of a variety of information about a person, such as behaviors, demographics, and traits (Park, 1986, p.907). An important social psychological study examining the dynamics of impression formation in real time finds that actions become less important over time while traits become the most important component of evaluations (Park, 1986). The impact of legislative actions on evaluations may be conditional on when the information about those actions is learned. If legislative behavior like party voting affects constituent impressions, it becomes necessary to investigate how and when that impact occurs.

The few studies about the temporal dynamics of incumbent evaluations focus on how evaluations change throughout the duration of a campaign. Although my research is focused on understanding how constituent evaluations of an incumbent change through a political career, campaign studies provide some insight into how evaluations change over time.

Mitchell (2012) examines the impact of campaign information over time in a study that utilized a similar experimental design to my experiments in the dissertation. Based on results from a panel experiment that lasted twelve weeks, Mitchell discovers that old information is rapidly displaced by new information, especially for information about a candidate’s stance on issues. Note that this result contradicts my expectation of strong primacy effects in impression formation. In Mitchell’s study, the legislator’s partisanship was included in each of the articles they read each week. She concluded that persistent information like partisanship also had a strong effect on candidate evaluations.
No manipulation of party loyalty was included in her study, and the legislator in her treatments was described as “mainstream” who voted with his party on 75% of the issues described in the articles.

When competing information about a single policy issue is given to individuals at separate times, individuals are most influenced by the most recent information, since the effect of the initial information has decayed over time (Chong & Druckman, 2010). Previous opinion formation research describes similar results, where information effects become less influential as time passes (Tewsksbury, Jones, Peske, Raymond, & Vig, 2000). The difference between this body of literature and my dissertation is that I examine an alternate version of the temporal dynamics of information. In particular, I am most interested in comparing how the same information given at different times during impression formation will influence attitudes. I turn now to a brief consideration of the importance of traits in the representative-constituent relationship, and how constituents at the beginning of impression formation should be more affected by party loyalty than individuals who have already established impressions of the incumbent.

There are a number of processes involved in impression formation. One way that constituents form impressions of their respective representative in Congress is to evaluate the MC’s character. In fact, “traits are the central components of ordinary and political impressions” (McGraw, 2003, p.398). Trait inferences are not only influential for judging political candidates, but traits like competence are also related to political behaviors, such as vote choice for presidential candidates (Funk, 1999). In addition, strategic party candidates may claim “ownership” over particular attributes where
respondents view Republican candidates as moral and Democratic candidates are compassionate (Hayes, 2005).

There are several common traits that have been shown to influence constituent evaluations. The traits most often used by individuals to judge presidential candidates are: competence, leadership, integrity, and empathy (Kinder, 1986). More recent studies highlight the importance of these traits. For example, traits like competence and integrity (Mondak, 1995) and leadership and empathy (Fridkin & Kenney, 2011; Hayes, 2010) may directly affect individuals' evaluations of politicians. The influence of three trait dimensions - leadership effectiveness (including intelligence), integrity, and empathy - on candidate evaluations fluctuate depending on election year and Presidential candidate (Funk, 1999). I explore the impact of loyal party voting on trait inferences in the final experimental study in Chapter 5.

Finally, I expect to see differences in the impact of party voting information, depending on the when that information is learned in the impression formation process. As noted above in my discussion of evaluations of junior and senior MCs, a large body of psychological research points to a primacy effect in impression formation, with information received earlier having a greater impact than information that is received later (e.g., Anderson, 1981; Asch, 1946; Park, 1986). I expect to see party voting records to have the greatest impact at the beginning of impression formation, rather than later when impressions are more solidified. The expected direction of the influence of party voting on incumbent evaluations at the early stages follows the predictions described earlier. In short, I expect that a congressional member’s party voting record is more
influential at the beginning of impression formation than later in the impression formation process (Hypothesis 3). I test this prediction in Chapters 4 and 5, as described in the next section.

Preview of Empirical Studies

I conclude this chapter by outlining the purpose and expected contributions of each of the empirical studies.

Study 1: Panel analysis of party loyalty and seniority

I begin examining the dynamics of party loyalty by first conducting a longitudinal analysis of congressional party voting in Chapter 2. Data were gathered from a variety of sources, including prominent political scientists’ websites (Keith Poole’s Voteview website, Charles Stewart’s Congressional Data Page, and E. Scott Adler’s Congressional District Data), the U.S. Census Bureau website, U.S. Election Atlas.org, and The Federal Election Commission website. Part of the data were retrieved from a data set compiled by Jack Wright (100th-108th Congress), while I added data for several more Congresses (97th-99th, 109th, and 110th Congress). The entire time period included in the data set spans from the 97th until the 110th Congress (1980-2009). This unique dataset allows me assess whether levels of party voting change throughout the average MC’s career, while controlling for a number of important factors.

The main objective in Chapter 2 is to examine whether MC’s party voting habits change as a legislator becomes more senior. The results from this study will contribute to our general understanding of party loyalty, and the extent to which it is stable over time. If party loyalty changes over time, then scholars should be concerned with the follow-up
question: why does party loyalty change throughout a MC’s career? Furthermore, finding that a MC’s party voting is indeed dynamic would underscore the importance for understanding how party voting influences constituents’ opinions at different points in time and depending on the MC’s level of seniority.

Study 2: Survey analysis of party loyalty and constituent evaluations

The next three chapters focus on whether congressional party voting influences constituents’ opinions by examining constituent support of MCs using surveys and experiments. In Chapter 3, I analyze public opinion survey data merged with congressional data. Congressional election data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) between 1984-2008 are pooled and combined with congressional data from the previous chapter. The ANES is one of the few national surveys containing opinion questions about congressional incumbents, and these surveys are conducted during midterm elections for most of the years included in the analysis.2 Because the ANES does not ask specific questions about respondents’ opinions on their incumbent’s party voting records, matching the party unity score to each incumbent will serve as a proxy to assess whether there is a significant relationship between level of party loyalty and constituent opinions. The strength of this study is that it combines three decades of data from a nationally representative survey with actual congressional data to assess how party voting, seniority, and evaluations are related. In this analysis, I compare the impact of party voting for newer and more senior MCs.

---

2 Unfortunately, the ANES stopped conducting midterm election surveys after 2002.
The first objective in Chapter 3 is to assess whether party unity influences constituents’ opinions without accounting for seniority. The second objective is to investigate whether seniority interacts with party unity and if the effect of this interaction differs among in-partisans and out-partisans. I argue that in-partisans will view party loyalty as a positive attribute whereas out-partisans will be negatively affected by party loyalty. Additionally, I propose that party loyalty should have little effect on evaluations of senior members since they have already developed a reputation with their constituents. Overall, the findings from Study 2 will reveal whether party voting and seniority influence evaluations of Congressional incumbents with a nationally representative sample, and the extent to which those effects are shaped by shared partisanship.

**Study 3: Experimental analyses of party loyalty and individual evaluations**

In addition to the survey analysis reported in Chapter 3, I conducted experiments to investigate the relationship between party voting and evaluations. In Chapters 4 and 5, I present results from my original longitudinal experiment that will supplement the survey and congressional data by investigating the individual-level processes through which constituents form impressions and develop support for politicians. Although the ANES survey results indicate that party voting and evaluations are related, I am unable to make any strong causal claims using these data. The survey results are only suggestive as to how evaluations are affected by party voting since I cannot verify whether the respondents actually know their MCs’ party voting records. Even for those who do know the party voting record, I cannot capture the point in time in which the respondents learned this information. Finally, I am unable to assess how the same respondents’
evaluations change over time because different respondents were chosen in each election survey.

My experiments address these shortcomings of the survey study. Chapters 4 and 5 report the results of my longitudinal experiments that examine how constituent support changes over time depending on a House member’s level of party loyalty and the point in time in which participants learn about that party loyalty. In the experiments I manipulate partisanship and party voting, as well as other variables, and I manipulate the time at which individuals are exposed to party voting. Also, I track individuals’ evaluations over time to examine the process of impression formation.

The experiment in Chapter 4 consists of four stages so individual evaluations are measured from their first initial impression of a House member until their final impression after reading the last of three news releases about the legislator’s actions. Results from two different samples – undergraduates at Ohio State and adult participants on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website – are reported in this chapter.

The four stages of the experiment reported in Chapter 4 took place over a thirty-minute time period. Chapter 5 reports the results of another unique experiment designed to uncover the effect of party loyalty on individuals’ evaluations. The main difference between this experiment and the one in Chapter 4 is that participants complete one stage of the experiment each week for a period of four weeks. This provides a more realistic view of how evaluations of MCs change over time, and whether there is a difference in evaluations when a participant reads about a party voting score near the beginning of
impression formation or at a later time. Student participants from a number of undergraduate political science courses served as the sample.

The main objectives of both experiments are to assess: (1) how evaluations change over time as a function of shared partisanship and party voting records and (2) how the impact of party voting information depends upon when it is learned. If the experimental results support my hypotheses, it would offer convincing evidence that time is an important factor of how party voting influences constituent opinions. I expect the results from these experiments to contribute more generally to our general understanding of how political evaluations form over time.

Chapter 6

The dissertation concludes with a summary and discussion of my findings from the four empirical chapters. This chapter highlights the importance of studying the dynamics of party voting from both the constituent perspective using survey and experimental analyses, and the representative perspective by investigating trends in congressional data analyses. I also discuss how my dissertation contributes to the fields of legislative politics and political psychology, and the implications these results for political scientists' understanding of party loyalty. Future directions for research on the dynamics of party voting are discussed as well.

The conventional wisdom on trends in congressional party voting in the aggregate is mixed. Some scholars contend that each party is becoming more unified, creating a polarized Congress (e.g., Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2002). Others are less concerned about this rise in polarization since long-term patterns in congressional voting show that congressional parties are moving in the direction of a national consensus (Poole and Rosenthal, 1991). Because of this lack of agreement in the political science literature, it is important to assess recent patterns in congressional party voting.

Over the past few decades, there has been a noticeable shift toward loyal party voting in Congress. During the 97th Congress, the average MC voted with his or her party less than 80% of the time (see Figure 2.1). Twenty-seven years later, the average party voting record was 93%. While the aggregate increase in congressional party voting is obvious, the individual level dynamics that might account for the linear trend are not clear. Do legislators alter their party voting habits throughout their careers? One possibility is that more moderate MCs are replaced by more partisan legislators who are more likely to exhibit consistently high party voting records. An alternative explanation is a seniority effect, where MCs become more loyal to their party over the course of their
career. Other individual-level dynamics are possible. In this chapter, I examine
individual-level party voting patterns, and their sources, to determine if loyal party voting
remains stable or if it increases or decreases over time for MCs.

Previous scholarship has been inconclusive on the question of whether MCs
exhibit stable party voting records throughout their careers. Stable party voting occurs
when MCs vote consistently with their party on divisive roll calls each term without
deviating from their voting record in previous terms. Instability in party voting record

Figure 2.1. Average Party Unity Scores for House Members Elected after 1980.
occurs when a representative deviates from his or her prior record, by voting more or less with the party over time.

Some research supports the conclusion of stability in voting on particular issues (e.g., Asher and Weisberg, 1978) and on measures of ideology (e.g., Poole, 2007), while alternative studies have suggested otherwise (Elling, 1982; Meinke, 2005). When it comes to party voting in the aggregate, conclusions about the stability of legislative behavior are just as uncertain. Nye (1994) dismissed any effects of seniority on party voting, yet over the past three decades, several studies have concluded that legislators vote less often with their parties as their legislative careers advance (Cohen 1981; Hibbing 1991; Stratmann 2000). One of the most recent analyses on party loyalty suggest that MCs become more conservative or liberal as they spend more time in office (Theriault, 2006). The lack of consensus in the congressional literature over party voting trends is worth reconsidering.

My purpose in this chapter is to examine the relationship between legislative seniority and party voting using data with a longer and more recent time series than previous studies. My study generates a central finding based on fourteen Congresses during the period of 1980 until 2009. Using a fixed-effects regression analysis, I find that seniority influences party voting for all House members, with MCs engaging in more party voting as their tenure in the House lengthens. House members do not simply follow their leaders’ voting habits and are not whipped by their party leaders to toe the party line. On important and divisive votes, younger members on occasion do choose to vote with the other side. Party voting is not stable throughout a legislator's career, and there
are noticeable differences in voting patterns depending on whether the legislator has just begun his or her career or is a veteran of Congress. These results have implications for how political scientists think about legislative behavior, specifically in the realms of party loyalty and the stability of party voting.

The chapter begins with a series of alternate expectations that are derived from previous empirical work. In the second section, the data, measurement, and model specification are discussed. A panel analysis is used to assess whether party unity scores change over time and to explore which factors may contribute to these changes. The final section assesses the results from these findings and discusses the implications they may have on prior theories of party loyalty in Congress.

Expectations

Three alternate possibilities for the impact of seniority on party voting exist: first, that MCs exhibit higher levels of party voting at the beginning of their career; second, that MCs exhibit higher levels of voting later in their career; and third, that MCs exhibit stable levels of party voting throughout their career. There is support for each of these expectations in the existing literature, which I reviewed in detail in Chapter 1. In addition to the impact of seniority, I consider how party voting changes when there is a change the majority party in the House. I expect to find that party unity scores will increase when minority members become majority members.
Assessing the Influence of Seniority

Methods

A panel data analysis is conducted to examine variability in House of Representative members’ party unity scores over time. A fixed effects regression is the appropriate method since it allows the researcher to use the changes in individual observations over time to estimate the effects of the independent variables on the dependent variable. In other words, fixed effects regressions estimate separate regressions for each member to assess overall trends. The model includes fourteen Congresses, specifically, the 97th to the 110th Congress (1980-2009), and the data set is unbalanced, meaning that all of the MCs elected after 1980 are included in the data set. A total of 888 legislators are included in the data set, providing a total of 4,162 observations. The average number of terms for each MC is 4.7, with a minimum of one term and a maximum of fourteen terms. The data sample is almost perfectly split between Democratic and Republican control; Democrats were in the majority from the 97th Congress until Republicans won the majority in the 104th Congress, and Democrats regained control in the 110th Congress. There is little variation in the number of members in the majority and minority party for each Congress. When the Democrats were the majority party, the number of majority members ranged from 244 to 270, and for the Republicans, the number was between 221 and 229. Since these ranges are relatively

---

3 Between-effects regression is not necessary because I have no theoretical reason to consider whether there are differences across members. I conducted Hausman tests to see if the random-effects regression should be used instead of the fixed effects regression and I find that the fixed-effects regressions are most appropriate.
small, there is no reason to believe that changes in the size of the party should affect how
the members vote.\textsuperscript{4}

In order to measure the partisan behavior of each member, I examine party vote
scores because it is the most straightforward assessment of party loyalty in Congress.
The dependent variable is \textit{party unity}, which is defined as the proportion of times that a
congressional member votes with his or her party when the roll call is a party vote (a
majority of Republicans are pitted against a majority of Republicans).\textsuperscript{5} The data for the
mean, standard deviation, and range for each variable in the model is located in Table
2.1.

\textit{Seniority} is the main independent variable of interest.\textsuperscript{6} \textit{Seniority} is the number of
years that a legislator has served in Congress. The dummy variable \textit{Majority} indicates
whether a legislator is within the majority party in a given term. \textit{Seniority} is interacted
with \textit{majority} to assess whether majority party legislators vote differently from minority
legislators as the number of years in office increases.

Several control variables are included in the analysis to determine whether
\textit{seniority} has an influence on party unity scores even when these other explanatory
variables are included in the model. \textit{Committee chair} is a dichotomous variable

\textsuperscript{4} For an alternative view, see Patty (2008).
\textsuperscript{5} Party unity scores are available on Keith Poole’s website (http://voteview.ucsd.edu).
\textsuperscript{6} Seniority was derived from a number of sources, including ICPSR Study #7803 and Charles Stewart’s
committee data.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unity</td>
<td>4291</td>
<td>88.21</td>
<td>11.52</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>4289</td>
<td>7.63</td>
<td>5.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>8035</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority X Majority</td>
<td>4289</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>5.42</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>14876</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DW-Nominate (Abs)</td>
<td>4272</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Urban Population</td>
<td>4254</td>
<td>12.80</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>5.96</td>
<td>13.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>8035</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log UrbanXParty</td>
<td>4254</td>
<td>6.37</td>
<td>6.38</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>13.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote</td>
<td>4254</td>
<td>48.40</td>
<td>13.62</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>95.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>4233</td>
<td>17.36</td>
<td>13.56</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Campaign Receipts</td>
<td>4233</td>
<td>764320.10</td>
<td>589964.70</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8123186</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Restricted to members elected after 1979.

Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics for Party Voting
indicating whether the legislator is a chair of a standing committee.\textsuperscript{7} DW-NOMINATE is the first dimension score for each legislator; this is a measure of ideology based on roll call votes using a dynamic weighted nominal three-step estimation. The \textit{DW-Nominate} measure in the analysis is derived by calculating the absolute value of the scores, and so is an indicator of ideological strength not direction (i.e., whether the legislator is a conservative or liberal). \textit{Presidential Vote} is the share of votes for the president in the legislator’s district in the most recent election.\textsuperscript{8} Prior studies have used this as a measure for district level partisan preferences.\textsuperscript{9} \textit{Marginality} is a measure of the legislator’s electoral security in the last election. Some scholars have suggested that party voting fluctuations are a result of a legislator's margin of victory in the last election (Carson et al. 2010).\textsuperscript{10} Marginality is derived from taking the absolute value of the difference between the legislator’s vote percentage in the last election and fifty.

\textit{Urban} is the population of a legislator’s district.\textsuperscript{11} Because the population total is quite large for some districts, urban is logged to normalize the data. \textit{Party} is the legislator’s party affiliation (0= Democrat, 1=Republican). To account for urban districts with Republican legislators, an interaction variable between \textit{urban and party} is included in the model. I control for the \textit{urbanXparty} interaction due to the possibility that as the

\textsuperscript{7} Committee chair data was retrieved from Charles Stewart’s Congressional Data Page (http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html).
\textsuperscript{8} Data retrieved from USElectionAtlas.org.
\textsuperscript{9} District characteristics, such as demographic and political makeup, are important for party voting in competitive districts (Griffin, 2006). Legislators may act strategically by taking positions that are congruent with the median voter’s preferences in order to increase the chances of re-election (Downs, 1957).
\textsuperscript{10} Other scholars have considered the relationship between party loyalty and margin of victory. There are mixed findings: while Dye (1961) finds that a legislator’s party loyalty decreases in competitive districts others discover the opposite result where party loyalty decreases as marginality becomes wider (Brady, 1978; Deckard, 1976).
\textsuperscript{11} Population data was retrieved from the U.S. Census Bureau website.
level of population increases, Republicans are more apt to vote moderately. However, a growing suburb in the south may actually create the opposite reaction, where Republicans vote more with their party, so this relationship may not be apparent with this data.

*Total receipts* represent the total amount of funds reported by candidates and the committees authorized for the particular campaign.\(^\text{12}\) These total receipts are added to the model to account for the possibility that contributions are related to party unity scores. Although incumbents receive very little from PACs and direct contributions from their party, congressional PACs are strategic so "despite some bias toward incumbents, the parties do support candidates according to how close the election is anticipated to be" (Jacobson & Kernell, 1983, p. 37).\(^\text{13}\) In other words, congressional PACs target competitive elections to send the most money (La Raja, 2008). Since the campaign finance literature has not yet linked party voting over time to total campaign contributions, it is important to consider whether total receipts will be an important explanatory variable.

*Results*

I begin examining whether there is overall stability in party voting for legislators over time by first reporting simple bivariate correlation statistics (see Table 2.2).

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\(^{12}\) According to the FEC website, total receipts do not include receipts of office-account committees or joint fundraising committees.  
\(^{13}\) For Republicans between 1986 and 2008, the percent of funding from PACSs ranged from 36-43%, and for Democrats, the percent of funding from PACS was between 41-52%. These statistics were retrieved from the Campaign Finance Institute (www.cfinst.org/data.aspx).
Seniority and party unity scores are positively and significantly related for all cohorts except for in 1982, 1994, 2000, and 2002. A closer look at the breakdown between Republicans and Democrats for these non-significant cohorts indicates a few party differences, especially in some of the most recent elections in the dataset.

Table 2.2. Party Unity Scores and Seniority: All congressional members by Cohort, Democrats, and Republicans, 97th to 108th Congress, Pearson r.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Elected</th>
<th>All House Members</th>
<th>Democrats</th>
<th>Republicans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R</td>
<td>sig.</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>0.13</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For instance, the correlation between seniority and party unity for Democrats in 2000 and 2002 were 0.35 and 0.30, respectively (p<.05 for each year). For Republicans, the correlations were negative in 2000 (-0.24; p=0.02) and 2002 (-0.33; p=00). When the sample is restricted to Democrats, the pattern is similar to the overall results, where the relationship between party unity scores and seniority is positive for all cohorts except for those elected in 1984. An overall weaker relationship between party unity scores and seniority is observed among Republicans, as the relationships in five of the last six Congresses in the data set are negative.

If an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is estimated instead, with each Congress also included in the model as dummies, a significant negative relationship between seniority and party unity emerges (β= -0.08, p<.01), indicating that junior legislators are more loyal to their party than more senior members during this time period. However, although the OLS regression provides insight into the relationship between seniority and party unity scores, it cannot account for the change in each individual MC’s voting behavior as they become more senior. A fixed effects regression is necessary to examine how seniority influences party unity throughout each MC’s career.

In the fixed effects regressions, I control for a number of potential explanatory variables (described above) and explore an interactive effect between seniority and the
majority party in Congress.\textsuperscript{14} A number of variables are significant, including seniority, which is evidence that party unity scores are unstable (see Table 2.3).\textsuperscript{15} Supporting the expectation that MCs will be less partisan at the beginning of their careers, the effect of seniority is highly significant and positive, indicating that party unity scores increase as seniority increases over time. Figure 2.2 illustrates the predicted values of party unity as seniority increases when all other variables are held at their mean. As seen in Figure 2.2, party unity scores are relatively high regardless of seniority, as the average member tends to vote with their party 85-95\% of the time throughout their careers. Although the shift is small, there is nonetheless a significant increase in party unity scores the longer a House member is in office.

Because this data set extends from the 97\textsuperscript{th} to the 110\textsuperscript{th} Congress, MCs elected into office as a majority or minority member switched roles in the 104\textsuperscript{th} and 110\textsuperscript{th} Congresses. This change allows me to determine whether party unity scores change when majority membership changes. The results suggest that when a minority member becomes a majority member, loyal party voting will increase significantly over time (see Table 2.3). This result supports the prediction of cartel theory (Cox & McCubbins, 1993, 2002) that majority party members should vote with their party more than minority party

\textsuperscript{14} I exclude a lagged dependent variable; although the results are fairly comparable if I do include the lagged party unity score. I am hesitant to explore the lagged models more fully because a lagged dependent variable can mask the importance of other explanatory variables (Achen 2000).

\textsuperscript{15} The results provided in Table 2.3 are based on a two-tailed test, which is a conservative assessment of the significance of these variables.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seniority</td>
<td>0.08***</td>
<td>0.06*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majority</td>
<td>5.03***</td>
<td>4.70 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.23)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seniority X Majority</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>---</td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Committee Chair</td>
<td>1.37 *</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.67)</td>
<td>(0.68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abs (DW-Nominate)</td>
<td>36.36 ***</td>
<td>36.38 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
<td>(1.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (logged)</td>
<td>2.87 ***</td>
<td>2.90 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
<td>(0.39)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party</td>
<td>70.57 ***</td>
<td>71.07 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(7.19)</td>
<td>(7.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban (logged)x Party</td>
<td>-5.01***</td>
<td>-5.07 ***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
<td>(0.54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presidential Vote</td>
<td>-0.02*</td>
<td>-0.01*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
<td>(0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Campaign Receipts</td>
<td>-0.0000005*</td>
<td>-0.0000005*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>31.12***</td>
<td>30.99***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-5.02</td>
<td>-5.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R² within/between/all</td>
<td>0.25/0.40/0.37</td>
<td>0.26/0.41/0.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>0.71</td>
<td>0.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Observations</td>
<td>4162</td>
<td>4162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Groups</td>
<td>888</td>
<td>888</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Observations/Group, min/avg/max 1/4.7/14  1/4.7/14

*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 two-tailed tests; House legislators elected after 1980; Entries represent unstandardized beta coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2.3. Determinants of Party Voting, 97-110th Congress
members. Thus, when Republicans became the majority in the 104th Congress, the Republican incumbents’ party unity scores increased on average by about 5 points.

Among the other control variables reported in Table 2.3, the role of Committee Chair is positively and significantly related to party voting, indicating that on average, committee chairs have higher party unity scores than non-committee chairs. This supports Rohde's (1991) argument that committee chairs will be more loyal to their party than other legislators. Ideology, as measured by DW-NOMINATE, is also highly
significant and positive, indicating that as ideology becomes more extreme, party loyalty also increases. The coefficient for Urban X Party is statistically significant and positive, which indicates that as the population of urban residents in a district increases for legislators in the Republican Party, there is a decrease in the party unity scores. This finding is consistent with the argument that legislators mirror their constituents' interests, since these results suggest that Republican MCs will vote less with their party when their district consists of more liberal city dwellers. Similarly, Democrats are more likely to vote with their party when the population of urban residents in a district increases over time. The variable Marginality is not significant, suggesting that there is no relationship between the legislator's vote margin in the last election and party unity score over time. Finally, Total Receipts are negatively related to party unity scores. For each dollar of funding for the legislator, the party unity score decreases by 0.0000005 units. Although the change in party unity is relatively small, this nonetheless supports the notion that legislators receiving the most contributions are the least likely to be party supporters and may possibly need the most help in their re-election campaigns.

Even though institutional forces have played a role in strengthening overall party loyalty in Congress over the past few decades (e.g. Rohde, 1991; Cox and McCubbins, 1993, 2002), this does not necessarily mean that each legislator will follow the same voting pattern throughout their careers. Party government theories do not account for the possibility that party voting may change during a legislator’s career. If majority members have higher party voting scores than minority members, than how does party voting
change over time for each group? Will there be a difference in party voting as majority and minority members become more senior?

The interaction variable necessary to answer this question, Seniority X Majority, is not included in the Model 1 equation (see Table 2.3). As an exploratory exercise, I include a Seniority X Majority interaction term in Model 2, also located in Table 2.3. When Seniority X Majority is added to the model, the main effects for seniority and majority remain statistically significant, but the interaction does not reach significance. Thus, I find no discernible differences in party unity between majority and minority members as seniority increases.¹⁶

Although ideological and partisan voting offer divergent views of legislative behavior, there is an obvious overlap with DW-NOMINATE scores and party unity, partly because both measures are derived from House roll calls. In order to assess how party unity is influenced by seniority without accounting for the relationship between party voting and ideological voting, I re-estimated Model 1, excluding DW-NOMINATE. In this new model, the coefficient for seniority becomes three times the size of the coefficient from Model 1 (β= 0.24, p<.001). As seniority increases by one year, party unity will increase by 0.24, all else equal. This observation further underscores the significant relationship between seniority and party voting.

¹⁶ This finding is not a result of the possibility that because there are more majority members in Congress, there will be more variance. In fact, minority member party unity scores have a larger variance than majority member party unity scores for the entire data set and when the party unity scores are compared if the data set is divided into the 97-103rd Congress and 104th-110th Congress.
One concern about this panel analysis is that the data set is unbalanced. The results are based on data that included legislators who served two terms and others who served all fourteen terms. Three additional models (analyses not shown) were estimated using a balanced data set for legislators elected in 1980, 1988, and 1996. Although the number of observations and groups dropped substantially, the results confirm the original model. MCs elected during the 97th Congress voted more with their party over time (seniority $\beta = .25; p<.001$), and the same pattern emerged for MCs elected for the 100th Congress (seniority $\beta = .42; p<.001$), and 105th Congress (seniority $\beta = .53; p<.001$). Note that the coefficient for seniority more than doubled from the 1980 cohort to the 1996 cohort, suggesting that the relationship between seniority and party voting has become more robust in more recent years.

Discussion

The evidence presented in this chapter confirms that party loyalty in Congress is dynamic, with systematic changes in party voting observed throughout a House Representative’s career. Newly elected majority party members may maintain favorable evaluations from a broad consortium of constituents by occasionally voting against their party at the beginning of their careers on some divisive issues, but party voting becomes more important as they continue in office. Even though there is only a modest increase in party voting each year, it is important to keep in mind the definition of party voting in this chapter. I use party unity scores, which are the percentage of times when a legislator votes with his or her party on divisive votes that split the parties. These should be
effortless votes for the party, yet new legislators occasionally vote against their party on a handful of important issues at the beginning of their careers.

Another important finding is the divergent patterns of correlations between party voting and seniority for Democrats and Republicans presented in Table 2.2. Since 1994, Republicans have voted less with their party the longer they sit in office (although these correlations were only significant for the 2000 and 2002 cohort, and the correlation was positive for the 2004 cohort). The party voting trends for Democrats were opposite as they tended to vote more with the party as tenure increased. This finding suggests that in recent years, Democrats and Republicans may have different party voting strategies. Future research should consider potential reasons why the two parties may have dissimilar views of party voting throughout their careers.

These results also have implications for party discipline in Congress. According to my findings, MCs tend to have the lowest party voting scores at the beginning of their careers, which is a time when members are inexperienced and the most vulnerable to party pressures from their leaders. Understanding when and why party leaders are best able to exert their persuasive power over their membership is a promising avenue for future research.

These data and analyses are incapable of providing leverage on the question of why loyal party voting changes over time. Several possibilities exist. One possibility is that MCs vote more moderately at the beginning of their careers to appeal to a wider range of constituents. Once MCs develop electoral security by establishing more
moderate records at the beginning of their careers, they have more flexibility to vote as they please. For instance, more senior MCs could focus their attention on voting with their party to promote party-building in Congress and to advance a party brand. This explanation assumes that MCs become focused on developing a party brand later in their careers. They may also exhibit more loyalty to the party to further their own political goals and interests.

Another potential reason for the increase in party voting as MCs become more senior is the possibility that the party agenda is changing over time. In other words, legislators may vote more or less consistently with their party because the party is becoming more or less conservative or liberal. Rohde (1991) discussed how party voting levels may be affected by inconsistencies in the party agenda. The proportion of votes on any issue may fluctuate each year, which may affect party voting patterns. In some of Rohde’s earlier work (1989a, 1989b, 1990), the variance of issues did affect party voting but it was not the sole factor of variations in party voting. While this critique is more relevant to studies examining changes in party voting scores of Congresses over time, not party unity scores of individual legislators, investigation of the impact of changing legislative agendas on party voting is important. As an initial step in this direction, I examined the number of bills in over twenty categories (agriculture and nutrition, federal budget policy, transportation, etc.) in Congressional Quarterly. There appeared to be only slight variation each year in the proportions of each of these categories to the entire

17 In studies of changes in overall party voting in Congress, the total number of party votes is divided by the overall number of floor votes. This means that if there was a low level of partisan issues in one year, it may look like party voting is quite low. Party unity scores are derived from the number of times a legislator voted with his party on party votes over the total number of party votes. Regardless of whether the agenda shifted over the years, the only votes considered in this equation are divisive party votes.
roll-call votes. Roll-call votes seem quite stable when comparing the 100th, 104th, and 108th Congresses.\textsuperscript{18}

Finally, processes of learning partisan norms and culture may also be implicated. It may take incumbents time to learn the new direction in which the party is heading as parties become more polarized. As Fiorina et al. (2006) and other scholars suggest, the parties in Congress have become quite polarized throughout the past few decades. New MCs may be voting out-of-step with a party that has developed an agenda that is more extreme than the one on which they campaigned.

The results of this study suggest that political scientists should reconsider the importance of legislative careers, particularly how seniority has implications for legislative behaviors. The most recent comprehensive analysis of legislative careers was published over two decades ago (see Hibbing, 1991). A re-invigoration of the literature on legislative careers should assess how and why party unity and other manifestations of party loyalty (i.e. sponsorship of bills, mentioning the party in floor appearances or news releases) change throughout a legislator’s time in office. In addition, the evolving nature of other types of loyalty, such as district loyalty, during a MC’s career should be analyzed.

The purpose of this dissertation is to gain a holistic view of the significance of party voting from both the congressional members’ and constituents’ perspectives. I gain more leverage in understanding the significance of party voting for legislators and

\textsuperscript{18} In the future, I plan to analyze each individual legislator’s party votes for each issue category to see if there are any substantial changes in the composition of party votes over time.
constituents by examining party voting from multiple methodological perspectives. Now that I have demonstrated that party voting in Congress is dynamic, the next step is to assess the influence of congressional party voting on constituent support over time. Are constituents affected by party loyalty in Congress? The subsequent chapters will address this question.
CHAPTER 3: A SURVEY ANALYSIS OF CONGRESSIONAL PARTY VOTING AND CONSTITUENT EVALUATIONS

How do members of the House of Representatives gain support from their constituents throughout their careers? As noted in Chapter 1, partisanship, contact, and recognition are often listed as critical influences of evaluations of incumbents (Jacobson 2004). Absent from much of the previous research is consideration of how a legislator’s level of party loyalty, measured by party unity scores, may influence constituent evaluations, particularly as a function of the seniority of the legislator.

The relevant existing literature has yielded conflicting evidence about the consequences of partisan loyalty in roll-call voting. By voting loyally with his or her party, a legislator may connect to a “party brand” as an effective way to gain constituent support (Cox and McCubbins 1993). However, some scholars disagree that party loyalty has positive consequences. Carson et al. (2010) found that party voting led to more negative evaluations of legislators, whereas Harbridge and Malhotra (2011) discovered that it was only strong partisans who were more approving of legislators with strong party loyalty. A central tenet of this dissertation is that the seniority of a legislator matters, which was neglected in these previous studies. The goal of this chapter is to examine how seniority and party unity interact to influence constituent evaluations.
In this chapter I examine the relationship between party voting and seniority using 1984-2008 election data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) combined with congressional data from the previous chapter. The previous chapter provided evidence that members of Congress tend to vote more with their party later in their careers. One method to assess whether party voting influences constituent support for MCs at different times in their careers is analyze survey data on constituent opinions. Using pooled ANES and congressional data, I examine whether party loyalty influences evaluations of House members throughout their careers. I find that the party loyalty and seniority combine to have an interactive impact on constituent opinions, even while controlling for various incumbency effect variables.

This chapter will proceed as follows. First, the hypotheses tested in this chapter will be reviewed briefly. Next, the data and measures are described in the methods section. The results section consists of five sub-sections that report the results of several analyses of party loyalty and constituent evaluations. Finally, the discussion section summarizes the main results from the data analyses.

Hypotheses

In the subsequent analyses, I will assess how seniority and party loyalty influence support for incumbents. There are two main objectives of these survey data analyses.

The first objective is to determine whether party loyalty influences constituent evaluations, regardless of seniority. Partisanship will be considered in these first set of analyses in three different ways: (1) respondent partisanship will be controlled for to assess the overall influence of party loyalty on evaluations, (2) the effect of party loyalty
on evaluations for in-partisans and out-partisans will be compared, and (3) the moderating influence of partisan strength will be examined. I expect that when in-partisans and out-partisans are compared, there will be differences in how they react to party voting, where in-partisans will react positively to loyal party voting, and out-partisans’ evaluations will be negatively affected. When the model is restricted to strong and weak partisans, I anticipate that party loyalty will influence strong partisans more than weak partisans (Harbridge and Malhotra, 2011). In short, the following hypotheses will be tested in this chapter:¹⁹

**H1a:** In-partisans will be more supportive of an in-partisan House member with a LPV than an in-partisan member with a MPV.

**H1b:** Out-partisans will be less supportive of an out-partisan House member with a LPV than an out-partisan member with a MPV.

The second objective is to examine how the interaction between party voting records and tenure influences evaluations. I expect to see that party voting has a larger impact on citizens’ evaluations earlier in a MC’s career due to the primacy effect in impression formation (Anderson, 1981; Asch, 1946). Out-partisans will appreciate a moderate junior MC more than a loyal junior MC while in-partisans will view loyal party voting among junior legislators positively. Party loyalty may not matter for senior legislators since once MCs establish electoral security in their districts, their Washington activities, such as party voting, are less consequential.

¹⁹ For a more detailed overview of the hypotheses, please refer to Chapter 1.
H2a. Evaluations of senior House members will not be significantly affected by LPV or MPV regardless of the partisanship of the constituent.

H2b. In-partisans will be more supportive of a junior House member with a LPV than a junior House member with a MPV.

H2c. Out-partisans will be less supportive of a junior House member with LPV than a junior House member with a MPV.

Methods

Data

Data from the American National Election Studies (ANES) Time Series Cumulative Data File is used to examine the impact of party voting on constituents’ evaluations of incumbents. ANES surveys from the 1984 to 2008 elections (corresponding to the 98th-110th Congresses) are pooled in the analyses. Unfortunately, the ANES eliminated the midterm election surveys after 2004, so data from the 2006 midterm election are unavailable.20 This time period was analyzed for a number of reasons. It is logical to begin assessing the relationship between party loyalty and constituent opinions near the beginning of the 1980s because this was a time when there was a noticeable increase in party unity in Congress (Rhode, 1991). In addition, I chose this period in order to include several Congresses when each party was in the majority.21 Moreover, this data consists of the same Congresses as the congressional data analyses in

20 Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) introduced their own midterm and general election surveys in 2006, but this study fails to include the main dependent variable of interest (feeling thermometer scores), so the 2006 CCES data could not be merged together with the NES survey data.

21 Democrats held the majority during the 98th through the 103rd Congress, and again in the 110th Congress, and the majority switched to the Republicans for the 104th through the 109th Congress.
the previous chapters except for the 1982 election (97th Congress) and the 2006 mid-term election (109th Congress).

The ANES cumulative file consists of all of the ANES time series studies merged into one file, and questions are only included if they were asked in at least three or more ANES surveys. Every question I chose to include in my study was asked in each of the election surveys in my analyses, except for the incumbency effect variables (these questions were asked only during the 1984-1994 elections). A cross-sectional and equal probability sample served as the study design for each ANES study. Participants completed the survey through a face-to-face interview or through a telephone interview using random digit dialing (RDD). Five of the ANES studies in my selected pooled sample were randomly assigned to be interviewed face-to-face or through the telephone (1984, 1992, 1996, 1998, and 2000 ANES surveys). In 2002, telephones were the only means by which respondents were interviewed. For the 1986-1990, 1994, 2004, and 2008 ANES surveys, the interviews were completed exclusively face-to-face. The interview was completed either right before or just after the election. All interviews during presidential years consisted of a pre-election and post-election survey, and during off-presidential years, only post-election surveys were administered.22 Pre-surveys were given to respondents in September until the day before the election, and post-surveys were conducted immediately after the elections and were completed by the end of January.23 Most surveys lasted about an hour and fifteen minutes.

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22 One drawback to using the ANES data is that the incumbent evaluation questions in this chapter’s analyses were asked after the mid-term elections. The only mid-term election that included pre- and post-election interviews was in 2002.
23 The closing dates of the interviews ranged from December 6 to February 7.
The ANES is the most appropriate dataset to assess the opinions of the mass public because it incorporates a rich set of questions about congressional evaluations for most mid-term and presidential elections. I have yet to find another national political study that provides constituent evaluations at the congressional level for the elections I am interested in studying. However, an important drawback of the ANES survey is that very few respondents from each district are sampled. In many cases, there are only one or two respondents from a district. Nevertheless, because the data are pooled, I am able to investigate whether there are systematic patterns of support attributable to MCs’ voting records and seniority.

The ANES data from the 1984 to 2008 elections were merged with congressional data from the 98th to the 110th Congress. Three decades of congressional data were obtained using several resources.\textsuperscript{24} In order to merge the data, I matched each Congress with the corresponding election survey data. For example, ANES data from the 2000 election, which was conducted right before the 106th Congress ended, were merged with the 106th Congress data to match evaluations to the legislator’s current party voting record. One problem with this method is that roll call votes conducted after election day until the end of the legislative session are included in each legislators’ party unity scores. Since the number of House votes occurring during the months of November and December after an election are usually quite small,\textsuperscript{25} using the party unity scores for the entire duration of each Congress should not be a problem.

\textsuperscript{24} For more information about how I gathered this data, please refer back to the data section in Chapter 2. 
\textsuperscript{25} For the 112th Congress, 5% of the total amount of roll calls took place after the November 6 election until the end of the Congressional session. This percentage was calculated from roll call data found on the CQ Press Congress Collection website (http://library.cqpress.com/).
Measures

In this chapter, I examine whether party voting influences constituent evaluations, and whether that influence varies with the seniority of the legislator. It has already been established that party voting on specific roll-call votes is associated with approval for the incumbent (Ansolabehere et al. 2010). In contrast, Carson et al. (2010) demonstrated that between the period of 1956-2004, House members’ share of the two-party vote decreased significantly as party unity scores increase. While vote share is an important way to gauge overall constituent voting behavior, this measure does not explain how individual attitudes may change over time.

The process of forming an evaluation of a politician is distinct from the process of deciding whether to vote for that politician. The main difference is that in decision-making an individual chooses among multiple candidates while judgments are made of each candidate independently. Although judgments often lead to vote choice, there are many times when this does not occur, such as when individuals vote strategically or they vote for a less favorable candidate due to outside pressures like family (for a review, see Lau & Redlawsk, 2006). Individuals are also constrained by their choices when they vote, so they may not care for any of the candidates. While vote decisions and judgments are distinct, Carson et al.’s (2010) study uses judgment measures in their experiments and electoral success measures in the party unity data analyses. Linking the two data analyses together is problematic given the different processes they examine. Instead, I focus on the impact of party voting on constituents’ evaluations of their representatives.
Several models are estimated in this chapter using OLS regression to examine whether evaluations (measured by feeling thermometer scores) are influenced by party loyalty (measured by party unity in roll call votes) for newer and more senior members while accounting for each of the Congresses and controlling for other factors.

The times series ANES include a measure for overall evaluations of Congressional incumbents, namely feeling thermometer scores. The feeling thermometer score, ranging from 0 (unfavorable feelings toward the incumbent) to 100 (favorable feelings toward the incumbent), was the primary measure of respondents’ attitudes towards the incumbent. 66.25% of the entire sample (15,900 respondents) provided a feeling thermometer score rating for the incumbent. For 10% of the respondents, the incumbent was not running. Another 10% did not recognize the incumbent’s name. Finally, about 14% of the sample either did not know how to rate the incumbent, could not judge the incumbent, or refused to answer. Only the respondents who provided a feeling thermometer score were included in the analyses, and the rest of the respondents were coded as missing. The wording of the feeling thermometer question is listed in the Appendix. Means and standard deviations are displayed for all variables in Table 3.1.

Because my objective is to assess how party loyalty and seniority influence constituent evaluations, the main variables of interest are Seniority, Party Unity, and the interaction between these two variables. If seniority is used as a continuous variable (as it was in Chapter 2), and it is interacted with party unity, another continuous variable, there may be issues with multicollinearity rendering the results difficult to interpret.
Table 3.1. Descriptive Statistics

(Aiken & West, 1991). Because of this, seniority is operationalized as a dichotomous variable in three distinct ways. First, freshman House members are included as a dichotomous variable, with Freshmen coded as “1” and all other legislators as “0.” The second seniority variable, Two Terms, consists of two groups, House members who have served up to two terms in Congress (coded “1”) terms and all others (coded “0”). The final seniority dichotomous variable, Junior Members, contains two separate groups: members who have served up to four terms (juniors as “1”) and members who have served five or more terms (seniors as “0”). Multiple operationalizations of junior members are considered in this chapter as an exploratory exercise.

26 Nevertheless, I estimated a regression using seniority as a continuous variable, and seniority is positively and significantly related to the feeling thermometer score (β=0.08, p<.001). This corroborates the findings in this chapter that as seniority increases, evaluations will become more positive. The main focus in this chapter is to examine how seniority interacts with party unity, so that is why the dichotomous seniority variables are created.
Party identification and partisan strength are measured by two separate variables. First, *same political identification* was controlled by matching the partisanship of the incumbent with the survey respondent. *In-partisans*, those who share the same political identification as their legislator, including Independent leaners, receive a “1” and *out-partisans*, individuals with different party identifications than their House member (including pure Independents), are marked with a “0.” Strength of partisanship is coded as “1” for strong Republicans and Democrats and “0” for weak Republicans and Democrats and Independent leaners.

Standard control variables are also included in the models (i.e. education, political interest, gender, and age). *Education* is based on four categories, from grade school or less, high school, some college, to college or advanced degree. *Political interest* is based on the amount of interest respondents had in the elections, with higher values indicating more interest. *Gender* (male coded “1”, female “0”) and *age* are also included in the model. Dummy variables were also included to account for election year differences, although there is some concern in the literature that it is unnecessary to do so (see Markus, 1988).

**Results**

I first report the correlations between party unity and incumbent feeling thermometer scores as a function of seniority. Those correlations suggest that overall party unity is weakly but negatively related to evaluations, such that as party loyalty increases evaluations become more negative (see Table 3.2). For each series of

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27 The partisanship measure was the standard 7-point scale. Independent-Republicans and Independent-Democrats were created when respondents answered the following follow-up question after they described themselves as Independent: “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?”
correlations, evaluations of junior House members are less strongly related to party unity scores, with the correlation for freshmen failing to reach significance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seniority</th>
<th>R</th>
<th>sig</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two terms</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All others</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Members (5 terms or more)</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.2. Correlation between Feeling Thermometer Scores and Party Unity, by Seniority

**Party Unity and Constituent Evaluations**

The next set of analyses consist of ordinary least squares regressions that assess the hypotheses laid out in Chapter 1. In these regressions, the effect of party loyalty on constituents’ attitudes is estimated, specifically estimating the impact of party unity on evaluations of incumbents while holding other relevant variables constant. Four models were estimated and are included in Table 3.3. In Model 1, which considers the independent impact of party voting and shared partisanship, Carson et al.’s findings are confirmed. The variable party unity is statistically significant (p<0.001), and the
### Table 3.3. The Effect of Partisanship and Party Unity on Incumbent Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 2 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 3a Strong Partisans Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 3b Weak Partisans Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.10*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.18*** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.16*** (0.04)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpartisans</td>
<td>11.12*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.20 (2.56)</td>
<td>6.17 (3.85)</td>
<td>-2.50 (3.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inpartisans X Party Unity</td>
<td>--- (---)</td>
<td>0.14*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.16** (0.06)</td>
<td>0.12*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.92*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.96*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-1.22** (0.39)</td>
<td>-0.56* (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>1.41*** (0.28)</td>
<td>1.40*** (0.28)</td>
<td>0.91+ (0.53)</td>
<td>1.37*** (0.36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.17*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.51*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.50*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.89** (0.70)</td>
<td>-1.04* (0.48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>59.66*** (1.64)</td>
<td>66.15*** (2.11)</td>
<td>63.64*** (3.33)</td>
<td>65.74*** (2.76)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R² 0.10  0.10  0.18  0.08  Adjusted R² 0.10  0.10  0.18  0.08  MSE 20.97  20.96  21.95  19.92  F-Test 78.57***  75.81***  46.47***  31.81***  N 12561  12561  4053  7184

Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests. Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score. Model 3a is restricted to strong partisans; Model 3b is restricted to weak partisans. Each Congress (98th-110th, excluding 109th) was included as controls in the model.
coefficient (β = -0.10) is negative. For every one point increase in party unity scores, the incumbent feeling thermometer scores decrease by a tenth when holding all controls constant. To put this in perspective, consider Legislator A with a party unity score of 99 and Legislator B with a party unity score of 60. The average change in the feeling thermometer score for Legislator A will be about a 10-point drop, and the change in feeling thermometer score for Legislator B will decrease by 6 points, holding all other variables constant.

As for the other results from Model 1, not surprisingly in-partisans evaluate their representatives more positively than out-partisans. (The interaction of party unity and partisanship will be further elaborated in Models 2, 3a, and 3b). The results for political sophistication are mixed. When measured as Political Interest, the results indicate a positive relationship between interest and evaluations. For Education, however, there is a negative effect, with the more educated holding more negative attitudes towards their representative. Older respondents evaluated their representatives more positively than younger respondents, and men held more negative attitudes than women. The results from these control variables essentially remain the same for Models 2, 3a, and 3b, and so will not be discussed further.

Turning our attention to how partisanship and party unity interact, the results in Model 2 show that the differences between in-partisans and out-partisans are evident (see Table 3.3). For in-partisans, a loyal party voting record results in more positive evaluations than a moderate party voting record. Although party unity scores have a positive effect on the feeling thermometer score for in-partisans, the conditional effect of
party unity is not enough to overcome the negative main effect of party unity ($\beta = -0.18$, $p<.001$). Therefore, the overall effect of party unity for in-partisans is slightly negative ($-0.18 + 0.14 \times 1 = -0.04$), disconfirming Hypothesis 1a.

Figure 3.1. The Effect of Partisanship and Party Unity on Incumbent Feeling Thermometer Scores
The coefficient for \textit{party unity}, which represents the impact of party unity on the feeling thermometer scores for out-partisans, is negative and significant, confirming Hypothesis 1b. As a legislator becomes more loyal to his or her respective party, out-partisan constituents’ evaluations decrease significantly. These findings demonstrate that partisanship serves as an important lens in determining the influence of party unity scores on constituent evaluations of House members.

Figure 3.1 depicts the difference in feeling thermometer scores between in-partisans and out-partisans as party unity scores increase. Holding all other variables constant, the in-partisan line remains at around 70 on the feeling thermometer scale, regardless of the party unity score. Note the slightly negative slope for the in-partisan line in Figure 3.1 due to the negative influence of the main effect of party unity for in-partisans. These results suggest that party voting does not matter much for in-partisans. For out-partisans, there is a steady drop in feeling thermometer scores, dropping from about 73 when party unity scores are 0 to 55 when feeling thermometer scores are 100. Feeling thermometer scores are about the same for in-partisans and out-partisans only when party unity scores are at their possible lowest (below 10).

The next set of models takes into account differences between strong and weak partisans. The prediction was derived from the results of the experiments conducted by Harbridge and Malhotra (2011), where strong partisans were positively influenced by party loyalty, but weak partisans were not. The results from Models 3a and 3b are inconsistent with Harbridge and Malhotra’s results. The results in Model 3a (restricted to strong partisans) indicate that the relationship between partisanship and party unity is
essentially the same as the results in Model 3b (weak partisans). A chow test reveals no significant difference between the In-Partisans X Party Unity interaction coefficients for strong and weak partisans ($\chi^2=0.22$, $p=0.64$). Similarly, the effect of party unity on strong out-partisans is not significantly different from the effect of party unity on weak out-partisans ($\chi^2=0.18$, $p=0.67$). In sum, the impact of party voting on constituent evaluations is essentially the same for strong and weak partisans in these analyses.

*Party Unity, Seniority, and Constituent Evaluations*

The results from the first set of analyses revealed that party unity influences constituent opinions of incumbents, but the direction of this relationship is dependent on whether the constituent shares the legislator’s party identification. I now move on to an analysis of how the seniority of the MC interacts with party unity scores to influence evaluations. Models 4 through 6 in Table 3.4 examine the influence of seniority using the three different operationalizations of junior status. In the first column of Table 3.4, junior status is defined as only freshmen incumbents, and a dummy variable for that status is interacted with party unity scores to assess how freshman legislators’ party loyalty is evaluated. For Model 5, second term members are added to the freshmen to account for a potential sophomore effect. Finally, in Model 6, incumbents are divided into relatively more “junior” and “senior” members, with junior members defined as those who have spent four terms or less in office, while the senior members are those who have spent over five terms in office.

The results in Table 3.4 demonstrate that individuals’ evaluations are negatively affected by loyal party voting for both newer and more senior members of Congress. In
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 4 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 5 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 6 Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.11*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.12*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.15*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>-9.30* (3.18)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshman X Party Unity</td>
<td>0.09+ (0.05)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st or 2nd Term</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-7.17* (3.01)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1st or 2nd Term X Party Unity</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.07* (0.03)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-7.79** (2.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members X Party Unity</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.08** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Party ID</td>
<td>11.12*** (0.38)</td>
<td>11.12*** (0.38)</td>
<td>11.11*** (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.91*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.92*** (0.22)</td>
<td>-0.91*** (0.22)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>1.39*** (0.28)</td>
<td>1.41*** (0.28)</td>
<td>1.41*** (0.28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.49*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.50*** (0.38)</td>
<td>-1.50*** (0.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>60.73*** (1.70)</td>
<td>61.48*** (1.80)</td>
<td>63.10*** (2.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>20.97</td>
<td>20.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Test</td>
<td>71.38***</td>
<td>71.19***</td>
<td>71.45***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>12561</td>
<td>12561</td>
<td>12561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests. Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score.

Table 3.4. The Effect of Party Unity and Seniority on Incumbent Evaluations
the first column, Model 4 shows that *Freshman X Party Unity* is positive and approaches significance \( (p<.10) \). Once again, however, this positive interaction effect is not large enough to overcome the negative main effect of party unity. When party unity increases by one point, incumbent feeling thermometer scores actually *decreases* by 0.02 points \( \beta = -0.11 + 0.09 \times 1 = -0.02 \), holding all other variables constant. For more senior members, greater party unity leads to a significant and negative change in evaluations.

Model 5 in the second column displays a similar pattern as Model 4. For first or second term members, there is a significant and positive relationship between party unity scores and evaluations, but the positive coefficient \( \beta = 0.07 \) is not large enough to overcome the main effect of party unity \( \beta = -0.12 \). The results from Model 5 indicate that this effect of party unity and seniority on evaluations is not restricted to just freshmen, but the effect is similar for second term members. House members serving at least three terms or more are significantly and negatively affected by loyal party unity scores.

In the final model in Table 3.4, *Junior Members X Party Unity* is again significant and positively related to evaluations. The same pattern emerges in this model as it appeared in Models 4 and 5, with higher levels of party loyalty benefitting more junior MCs but the overall effect is negative. The interaction variable reaches a higher significance than the similar variables in Models 4 and 5, but the overall negative effect is greater for junior members \( \beta = -0.15 + 0.08 \times 1 = -0.07 \) than two termers or freshmen. In Model 6, *Junior Members X Party Unity* is significant at \( p<0.01 \). One potential reason
for the increase in the level of the p-value in Models 5 and 6 compared to Model 4 could be the increase in the sample size of “junior” members, from freshman members (9.6% of sample) to two term members (19.5% of sample) to junior members (37.3% of sample). In all instances for senior members, however, higher levels of party voting are associated with more negative evaluations.

The interaction between seniority and party unity is represented in Figure 3.2. Senior members are evaluated more positively than junior members despite their party unity score until party unity scores become very high (at about 90) and then both junior and senior members are evaluated about the same. Based on the line for junior members, it is unclear whether junior members would benefit at all from voting loyally, since the feeling thermometer scores remain within the 64-68 range no matter the party unity score. The positive effect party unity scores have on evaluations for junior members is not large enough to overcome the overall negative influence of party unity scores. For senior members, the range for the feeling thermometer scores is much wider, from about 76 when the party unity score is 0 to about 64 when party unity scores are at 100. According to this results displayed in this figure, it appears that senior members would be advantaged to be less loyal to their parties in roll call voting; in contrast, there is little impact of party loyalty on constituent evaluations of junior members.
Model 6 indicates that House members who have served up to four terms are more positively evaluated when they have higher party unity scores. This finding is a bit surprising, especially since four terms is equivalent to eight years in Congress. To test whether this trend continues for members who have served up to five terms, I estimate an additional model with party unity interacted with a dummy variable separating members who have served five terms or less and those who have served six or more terms. The negative coefficient for the interaction (\(\beta = -0.08\)) is statistically significant (p<0.01).
This suggests that there is a cutoff point at five terms (the average length of service in Congress; see Manning, 2011) when party voting is viewed negatively. It is unclear why there would be such a change in evaluations from four to five terms, especially since it is unlikely that constituents would even be aware of their legislator’s length of service at that late point in his or her career. For those legislators who spend at least five terms in Congress, constituent evaluations drop, perhaps because constituents respond negatively when senior members (potentially in leadership positions) toe the party line.

In addition, *same party identification* is controlled for in each of the models in Table 3.4. The *same party identification* coefficients for Models 4 through 6 indicate that in-partisans are viewed more favorably than out-partisans. However, even while controlling for partisanship, seniority and party unity influence incumbent evaluations. The next section compares the effect of seniority and party unity for in-partisans and out-partisans.

*Party Unity, Seniority, Partisanship, and Constituent Evaluations*

The above analyses demonstrate that seniority of an incumbent is important when considering the relationship between party unity scores and constituent evaluations, even when controlling for party identification. However, this relationship may be more nuanced due to differences based on whether the constituent shares the same party identification of the legislator. In-partisans may value party loyalty at the beginning of a legislator’s career, whereas out-partisans may be less enthusiastic of a newer incumbent’s party loyalty. Hypothesis 2b, which predicts that in-partisans will have more favorable impressions of a junior House member with a loyal party voting record than a junior
### Table 3.5. The Effect of Partisanship, Party Unity and Seniority on Incumbent Evaluations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>In-Partisans Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Out-Partisans Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.09** (0.03)</td>
<td>-0.21*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>-7.40* (3.42)</td>
<td>-7.82* (3.92)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members X Party Unity</td>
<td>0.08* (0.04)</td>
<td>0.07 (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.42 (0.28)</td>
<td>-1.53*** (0.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>3.30*** (0.36)</td>
<td>-0.75+ (0.43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.20*** (0.01)</td>
<td>0.13*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.56 (0.49)</td>
<td>-2.67*** (0.59)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>63.71*** (2.85)</td>
<td>76.99*** (3.31)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R²: 0.06 (Model 7); 0.04 (Model 8)
Adjusted R²: 0.06 (Model 7); 0.04 (Model 8)
MSE: 19.77 (Model 7); 22.05 (Model 8)
F-Test: 21.84*** (Model 7); 13.05*** (Model 8)
N: 6771 (Model 7); 5790 (Model 8)

Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests.
Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score. Model 7 is restricted to in-partisans; Model 8 is restricted to out-partisans.
House member with a moderate party voting record, and Hypothesis 2c, which predicts that out-partisans will have less favorable impressions of a junior House member with a loyal party voting record than a junior House member with moderate party voting record, are tested in Table 3.5. In regards to Hypothesis 2a, there should be no systematic relationship between party unity and constituent evaluations for senior members if party unity is less meaningful for evaluations at the latter end of a House career.

The model in Table 3.5, estimated separately for in-partisan and out-partisan respondents, is the same as the models reported in Table 3.4, but the only seniority variable included in Table 3.5 is the “junior members” variable (junior members, 1; senior members, 0).\(^{28}\) The models are restricted to junior/senior membership since the p-value for this characterization of seniority was stronger than the analyses using other operationalizations of junior status (i.e., freshman or two termers in Table 3.4). *Junior Members X Party Unity* is positive and significant (*p*<0.05) for in-partisans, but the overall effect is still negative (*β* = -0.09 +0.08*1= -0.01), disconfirming Hypothesis 2b. This result indicates that in-partisans are negatively affected by loyal party voting among more junior representatives, although the magnitude of the negative effect is quite small. Figure 3.3 shows how feeling thermometer scores hover at 70 for in-partisan junior members no matter their party unity score while holding all other variables at their mean. For senior members, feeling thermometer scores significantly drop as party unity scores

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\(^{28}\) The analyses in Table 3.5 were replicated using the freshman and two-term variables in the place of junior members, and the results were similar with some discrepancies. For both the *Freshman X Party Unity* variable and *First or Second Term X Party Unity* interaction variables, there was no significant effect on in-partisan constituent evaluations for freshmen or second termers. Just as Table 3.5 shows, the effect of party unity on in-partisan evaluations for more senior members was significant and negative. For out-partisans, evaluations were significantly and negatively affected by party unity for all groups - freshmen, two-termers, and the corresponding more senior counterparts.
become larger, disconfirming Hypothesis 2a. Junior and senior members are evaluated about the same when party unity scores reach 85, and senior members are evaluated slightly more negatively than junior members when the party unity score is over 85.

Figure 3.3. The Effect of Party Unity on Incumbent Feeling Thermometer Scores by Seniority for In-Partisans
For out-partisans, the coefficient of the Junior Members X Party Unity interaction variable is insignificant, although the p-value is close to significance (p=0.134). Therefore, party unity among junior members has no significant impact on out-partisan evaluations, disconfirming Hypothesis 2c. Just as for in-partisans, out-partisans evaluate loyal party unity scores negatively for senior members (p<0.001), which disconfirms Hypothesis 2a. The coefficient for the interaction between senior members and party unity (β= -0.21) for out-partisans is double the size of the coefficient for in-partisans (β= -0.09). In Figure 3.4, it is apparent that out-partisans negatively evaluate both junior and senior members as party loyalty increases. If senior members vote with their party nearly every time, then feeling thermometer scores drop to about 55. However, as party unity scores increase, the rate of decline in evaluations is much larger for out-partisans than in-partisans.

Pure Independents are included in the out-partisan variable. Yet, these Independents may respond differently than the rest of the out-partisan group who have a different party identification as their MC. Because of this, another set of models are estimated that restricts the analysis to only Independents (11.5% of the sample). Three separate models examined the influence of seniority (freshmen, two terms, and four terms) and party unity. None of the main interaction variables of interest are significant, so these results will not be discussed further. The insignificant results suggest that Independents are not affected by party unity scores like their partisan counterparts.
Several respondent demographic and individual characteristics are controlled for the previous analyses. These controls do not account for an important factor in evaluations of elected officials, namely the incumbency effect. The incumbency effect can be defined as the positive advantages elected officials have over those who first seek office, because of familiarity, name recognition, and constituency service (see Jacobson,
I add two additional controls to Models 4, 5, and 6 to assess whether party unity scores are important to incumbent evaluations even when controlling for familiarity with the candidate. Unfortunately, these questions were only asked in six of the elections included in previous models, so the analysis is restricted to the 98th-103rd Congresses.

The first variable, *incumbent recognition*, is a dichotomous variable measuring respondents’ knowledge of whether a House candidate was already serving in the House (Correct, 1; Incorrect, 0). Most respondents knew which House candidate was an incumbent (91.7% answered correctly). The next variable, *incumbent contact*, measures whether respondents were ever contacted by their representative. Several examples of contact were presented to the respondents, and respondents answered whether they came into contact or learned anything about the incumbent candidate through a variety of ways (see the Appendix). The incumbent contact variable was coded as “1” if the respondent indicated “yes” to any of the options and “0” if the respondent had no contact at all with the respondent. Over three-fourths of the respondents had some sort of contact with the incumbent (78.09% of the sample).

It is clear that the incumbency effect variables have a positive and significant influence on feeling thermometer scores (see Table 3.6). When an individual recognized that one of the House candidates was an incumbent, the incumbent’s feeling thermometer score increased by about 7 points in Models 9-11, holding all other variables constant. Similarly, when a respondent had some sort of contact with the incumbent, the feeling

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29 Respondents were given the names of the two major party candidates, and if they answered they knew one of the candidates was already in the House before the election, they were asked the follow-up question of which candidate was already in the House. The response was coded “incorrect” if the participant gave the incorrect incumbency status or the incorrect candidate.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 9 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 10 Coefficient (SE)</th>
<th>Model 11 Coefficient (SE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.12*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.14*** (0.02)</td>
<td>-0.19*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshmen</td>
<td>-17.89** (5.75)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freshman X Party Unity</td>
<td>0.19** (0.07)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) or 2(^{nd}) Term</td>
<td>--- (---)</td>
<td>-13.94*** (3.87)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1(^{st}) or 2(^{nd}) Term X Party Unity</td>
<td>--- (---)</td>
<td>0.16*** (0.05)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>--- (---)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>-12.88*** (3.38)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members X Party Unity</td>
<td>--- (---)</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.04)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Recognition</td>
<td>6.92*** (1.55)</td>
<td>6.95*** (1.55)</td>
<td>6.94*** (1.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Contact</td>
<td>9.52*** (1.03)</td>
<td>9.56*** (1.03)</td>
<td>9.69*** (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Same Party ID</td>
<td>11.08*** (0.53)</td>
<td>11.08*** (0.53)</td>
<td>11.08*** (0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-2.06*** (0.30)</td>
<td>-2.09*** (0.30)</td>
<td>-2.07*** (0.30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
<td>0.15*** (0.02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-1.48** (0.53)</td>
<td>-1.52** (0.53)</td>
<td>-1.52** (0.53)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>52.66*** (2.75)</td>
<td>53.37*** (2.86)</td>
<td>57.95*** (3.28)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests. Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score. Each Congress (98th-103rd) was included as a control in the model.

Table 3.6. The Effect of Party Unity and Seniority on Incumbent Evaluations
thermometer score increased by about 10 points in each of the models in Table 3.6, holding all other variables constant.

Importantly, the influence of seniority and party unity remain significant even after controlling for these incumbency effect variables. In Models 9-11, the coefficients for the interaction variables *Freshmen X Party Unity*, *Two Terms X Party Unity*, and *Junior Members X Party Unity* were about double the size of the coefficients from Models 4-6. Moreover, the significance levels were at a higher level when comparing the models from Table 3.4 to Table 3.6. Although young members of Congress are on average viewed more negatively than senior members of Congress, a higher party unity score will contribute positively to evaluations of junior MCs. For example, while holding other variables constant, a respondent will evaluate a freshman incumbent about 4 points higher on the feeling thermometer scale if their party unity score increased by 20 points. The important point is to note that a 20 point increase in the feeling thermometer score is not enough to counteract the more negative attitudes individuals have toward freshman members, but at least it would ameliorate the negative freshmen effect ($\beta= -17.89$) by about one-fourth.

Figure 3.5 is a graphical representation of the effect of party unity and seniority on evaluations when accounting for the incumbency effect. Evaluations of junior members remain at about 70 on the feeling thermometer scale despite the party unity score, while senior members are viewed more negatively as party unity scores increase. When party unity scores are over 80, junior members are actually viewed more positively than senior members, although the difference in evaluations is quite small.
Two additional models were estimated to examine how party unity and seniority interact for in-partisans and out-partisans when the incumbency effect variables are included in the models. Table 3.7 shows positive and significant coefficients for the interaction variable, *Junior Members X Party Unity*, in Models 12 and 13.\(^{30}\) For in-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 12 Coefficient</th>
<th>Model 13 Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.10**</td>
<td>-0.27***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.04)</td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>-8.41+</td>
<td>-16.84**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.31)</td>
<td>(5.34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members X Party Unity</td>
<td>0.10*</td>
<td>0.18**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td>(0.06)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Recognition</td>
<td>7.84***</td>
<td>6.20**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.00)</td>
<td>(2.41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent Contact</td>
<td>10.68***</td>
<td>8.35***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.31)</td>
<td>(1.65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-1.66***</td>
<td>-2.54***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.37)</td>
<td>(0.50)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>2.11***</td>
<td>-1.38*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.48)</td>
<td>(0.63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.18***</td>
<td>0.11***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.02)</td>
<td>(0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.27</td>
<td>-3.02***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.65)</td>
<td>(0.87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>53.50***</td>
<td>74.07***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.17)</td>
<td>(5.16)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>19.48</td>
<td>22.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Test</td>
<td>19.31***</td>
<td>11.10***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3653</td>
<td>2864</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: *p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests. Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score; Each Congress (98th-103rd) was included as a control in the model. Model 4a is restricted to in-partisans; Model 4b is restricted to out-partisans.

Table 3.7. The Effect of Partisanship, Party Unity, and Seniority on Incumbent Evaluations
partisans, evaluations remain about the same for junior members ($\beta = -0.10 + 0.10*(1) = 0$, $p<.05$), but they decrease by about 0.10 for more senior members ($p<.01$). Consistent with the other models estimated in this chapter, these results indicate that for in-partisans, party unity scores seem to have little influence on feeling thermometer scores when House members are more junior, but a loyal party voting record may negatively affect senior members’ evaluations. Despite the positive coefficient of Junior Members X Party Unity for out-partisans, the estimated overall effect is negative for junior members as party unity increases ($\beta = -0.27 + (0.18)*(1) = -0.09$, $p<.01$). The estimated effect is also negative for senior members who are out-partisans ($\beta = -0.27$, $p<0.001$). Both junior and senior members’ evaluations are negatively affected when party loyalty increases for out-partisans, although the effect of party loyalty is more damaging to their reputations when they are senior members.

*Majority Membership, Party Unity, Seniority, and Constituent Evaluations*

In the analyses reported in Chapter 2, party loyalty significantly increased when minority members became majority members. There are two reasons why majority members’ party loyalty is higher than minority members: (1) institutional norms could make it easier for majority members to vote with the party and (2) majority members could be attempting to gain recognition from constituents through loyal party voting. Models 14 and 15 in Table 3.8 test whether there is a differential impact of loyal party voting on constituent evaluations for majority junior and senior members. I limit these
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 14 In-Partisans Coefficient</th>
<th>Model 15 Out-Partisans Coefficient</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party Unity</td>
<td>-0.16** (0.05)</td>
<td>-0.30*** (0.07)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members (4 terms or less)</td>
<td>-15.58*** (6.03)</td>
<td>-13.40* (7.18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior Members X Party Unity</td>
<td>0.19** (0.07)</td>
<td>0.16* (0.08)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.54 (0.48)</td>
<td>-1.71** (0.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest</td>
<td>2.72*** (0.62)</td>
<td>-1.46+ (0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.18*** (0.03)</td>
<td>0.11*** (0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>-0.67 (0.82)</td>
<td>-1.90+ (1.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>72.96*** (5.13)</td>
<td>83.10*** (6.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R²</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSE</td>
<td>19.61</td>
<td>22.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Test</td>
<td>7.81***</td>
<td>5.28***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>2347</td>
<td>2033</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001, two-tailed tests. Dependent Variable - Feeling Thermometer Score for Majority House Members; Each Congress (98th-110th, excluding 109th) was included as a control in the model. Only respondents who could accurately name the party that held the majority in the House before the election were included in these models. Model 14 is restricted to in-partisans; Model 15 is restricted to out-partisans.

Table 3.8. The Effect of Partisanship, Party Unity, and Seniority on Incumbent Evaluations of Majority Members (when Respondents know which Party is the House Majority)
analyses to ANES respondents who accurately named the party that held the House majority before the election.

Models 14 and 15 display only the results of regressions when the incumbent is in the majority. When the models are restricted to minority members, there are no significant results for the seniority and party unity interaction. Because seniority and party unity were not important factors for respondents’ evaluations of minority members but they were significant for majority members, this indicates that constituents may consider different qualities and actions when evaluating majority and minority members. For in-partisans, the interaction between seniority and party unity for majority members is significantly related to constituent evaluations (see Model 14). A one-point increase in party unity scores for junior members leads to a 0.03 increase in feeling thermometer scores ($-0.16 + 0.19*(1) = 0.03$) for in-partisans. Although this is positive, the total effect is near to 0, indicating that junior incumbents benefit very little from party loyalty. More senior majority members are actually punished by in-partisans if they vote loyally with the party. As party unity scores increase by one point for more senior members, feeling thermometer scores will drop by 0.16 for in-partisans.

Out-partisans dislike all incumbents who vote with their party regardless of seniority, although the negative impact on evaluations is less substantial for junior members. The results in Model 15 display how evaluations of junior members decrease by 0.14 when party unity scores increase by one point. For senior members, the negative change in evaluations doubles in size – feeling thermometer scores will decrease by 0.30 when party unity scores increase by one point. The results from Table 3.8 mirror the
results from previous analyses in this chapter comparing in-partisans to out-partisans (see Tables 3.5 and 3.7) where in-partisans’ evaluations of junior members remain about the same as party loyalty increases and out-partisans’ evaluations of members of any level of seniority become more negative as party loyalty increases.

Discussion

When constituents evaluate their House representatives, they are affected by the incumbent’s level of party loyalty. Yet there are two caveats to this finding: the direction and magnitude of this effect is dependent on the incumbent’s time spent in office and whether the respondent shares the same partisanship as his or her legislator.

The results provide a mix of support and disconfirmation of my previously stated hypotheses. It is clear that overall support declines as party unity scores increase, regardless of partisanship. This confirms the conclusion reached by Carson et al. (2010), where party loyalty was damaging to House members. However, the negative impact of loyal party voting is much weaker for in-partisans than out-partisans. Strength of partisanship did not moderate the impact of party loyalty on evaluations, contrary to Harbridge and Malhotra (2011), where strong in-partisans viewed party loyalty positively. Here, my findings show that both weak and strong in-partisans are affected by party loyalty to the same degree.

One of the main implications of these results is the difference in how in-partisans and out-partisans are affected by loyal party voting and seniority of a MC (see Table 3.9 for a summary of the results). Out-partisans dislike loyal party voting more than in-partisans value it. Party loyalty does not enhance in-partisan support but rather it sustains
support for junior members, even when controlling for incumbent recognition and contact (see Table 3.9, Column B) and for majority MCs (see Table 3.9, Column C). Both in-partisans and out-partisans punish senior MCs if the level of party loyalty increases. For out-partisans, the effect is about double the size for senior members as it is for junior members. Overall, the results of these analyses show that when partisanship and seniority are taken into account, the impact of party unity on evaluations differs based on partisanship and by seniority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Seniority</th>
<th>Partisanship</th>
<th>Overall Effect</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior MC</td>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior MC</td>
<td>In-Partisan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior MC</td>
<td>Out-Partisan</td>
<td>ns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior MC</td>
<td>Out-Partisan</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column A: See models 7 & 8; Column B: Overall effect when controlling for incumbency effect, see Models 12 & 13; Column C: Overall effect for majority MCs, see Models 14 & 15. (−) denotes negative overall effect; (0) denotes zero overall effect (rounding overall effects of (B)-0.01 and (C) 0.03 to 0); (ns) denotes no significance.

Table 3.9 The Effect of Party Voting on Evaluations
While I predicted that senior members would not be affected by party loyalty due to the positive reputation they have built with their constituents over the years, this was not reflected in the findings. It appears that senior House members are unable to secure the freedom to vote more loyally without any repercussions since they are most negatively affected by voting loyally. Even in-partisans seem to prefer senior members who vote moderately. Perhaps constituents are more forgiving or care less about party loyalty at the beginning of a legislators’ career, but they grow more resentful of party loyalty the longer a legislator sits in office.

This chapter explored how the mass public is influenced by party loyalty and seniority. In the next two chapters, I will take an experimental approach to assess whether these dynamics are replicated when examining the impression formation process. By manipulating key variables, such as level of party loyalty, seniority, and partisanship, the experiments should provide a complementary view of how individuals evaluate legislators. Furthermore, these experiments will be conducted over a series of four stages, so the formation of evaluations over time can be assessed.
CHAPTER 4: STUDY 3: LONGITUDINAL EXPERIMENT, SHORT VERSIONS

In the previous chapters, aggregate data were analyzed to assess the trends in congressional party voting over time and the impact of party voting on evaluations of the mass public. In this chapter, I focus on the individual level by using experiments to assess the causal mechanism of evaluations when party loyalty is learned. The purpose of the following study is to examine how party loyalty influences evaluations of a legislator, and how impressions of legislators are formed and updated throughout a specific time period. The overarching research question is: How does faithful congressional party voting influence individuals’ support for a House member over time?

The chapter will begin with a review of the hypotheses tested in the analyses that follow. Next, the participants, experimental design, stimulus materials, and measures are discussed. The results of Experiment A and B are summarized in the subsequent section. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the findings.

Hypotheses

There are several hypotheses developed in Chapter 1 that will be tested in the experiments to assess the influence of party voting on support for MCs.
The first two hypotheses predict differences in evaluations of party voting for in-partisans and out-partisans. In-partisan constituents share the same party identification of the MC so they may be more sensitive to the member’s party actions, and in turn they will evaluate the MC positively when the MC loyally votes with his or her party. Constituents who share the same party affiliation should give less support to the MC if the representative is a moderate party voter. So, individuals will have more favorable impressions of an in-partisan House member with a loyal party voting record (LPV) than an in-partisan House member with a moderate party voting record (MPV). For out-partisans, the predicted relationship is reversed; individuals will have less favorable impressions of an out-partisan House member with LPV than an out-partisan House member with MPV. Constituent evaluations should be negatively affected when MCs vote loyally since out-partisans should be concerned that their MC’s party loyalty is not in their best interest. The effect of party loyalty on constituent evaluations may be dependent on constituents’ strength of partisanship. Therefore, I also explore differences between strong and weak partisans.

**H1a: In-partisans will be more supportive of an in-partisan House member with a LPV than an in-partisan member with a MPV.**

**H1b: Out-partisans will be less supportive of an out-partisan House member with a LPV than an out-partisan member with a MPV.**

The next hypothesis tested in this chapter takes into consideration the role of time in evaluations. I argue that constituent impressions are dynamic, and that the impact of information about the MC, such as party voting, depends on when the information is
received. I predict that a legislator’s initial actions in office are most important for impression formation, and once constituents have developed support toward their legislator, subsequent information becomes less influential. The impact of timing is tested in Hypothesis 3 by examining how encountering party voting records early versus viewing party voting at a later stage influences evaluations. Hypothesis 3 asserts that a congressional member’s party voting record is more influential at the beginning of impression formation than once an impression has been formed.

H3. A congressional member’s party voting record is more influential at the beginning of impression formation than later in the impression formation process.

In addition, I explore whether leadership, defined as majority membership, plays a role in influencing individual’s evaluations of a MC, although there are no formal hypotheses about the influence of majority membership and constituent evaluations. Since majority members may attempt to use their position of power to solidify a party brand with their constituents (e.g. Cox and McCubbins, 1993; Lipinski 2004), perhaps majority membership will lead to more positive evaluations for in-partisans. However, it is likely that being labeled a member of the majority or minority party may not change constituent evaluations since this leadership position may serve as only a weak cue about the MC’s potential party voting habits.

Methods

Survey analyses, like those reported in analyses in Chapter 3, are effective in establishing relationships between variables in a representative sample. However, those analyses can provide only weak tests of causal mechanisms involving party voting and
evaluations. It is here where experiments are the optimal method because variables can be manipulated and controlled. In order to assess how impressions of incumbents are formed over time, I conducted two types of longitudinal experiments. The first experiment is a thirty-minute study involving four stages and the results are discussed in this chapter. This experiment was conducted with two different samples – college students and adult participants solicited from Mechanical Turk. In the subsequent chapter, I discuss the second longitudinal experiment that was conducted over a period of four weeks. The purpose of these experiments is to examine how loyal party voting influences evaluations while taking into account the point in time at which an individual receives information about party voting, the shared partisanship between the MC and participant, whether the MC is a freshman or an incumbent, and the MC’s majority or minority status.

Participants

Three hundred fifty-five Ohio State undergraduates participated in the first version of this experiment, which I will refer to as Experiment A. Participants from four political science courses were recruited via email to participate in the experiment in exchange for extra credit from February through May 2012.31 Most participants were young adults with the mean age of 22, ranging from 17 to 54 (see Table 4.1 for a summary of demographic characteristics for Experiment A and Experiment B). About the same number of participants identified as Democrats and Republicans, and nearly 20% declared themselves Independent (140 Democrats, 146 Republicans, and 65

31 The majority of students were enrolled in introductory political science courses, but 43 students were enrolled in upper level courses. 9.4% of the students were political science majors, and 71% were either enrolled in their first course in political science or had taken only one other political science class.
Independents). There were slightly more females than males. Student participants were emailed a link to complete the 30 minute study on Qualtrics. Qualtrics is a private research software company that provides tools for users to build and distribute online surveys.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experiment A</th>
<th>Experiment B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Mean Age</strong></td>
<td>Students</td>
<td>MTurk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender (Female)</strong></td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>53.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Race</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Party Identification</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>21.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1. Demographic characteristics.

Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) was used to recruit adult participants during April and May 2012 for Experiment B. MTurk is an Internet platform that researchers, including political scientists, have recently begun to use to recruit and pay subjects to participate in their studies (see Berinsky, Quek, & Sances, 2012, for an overview of research using MTurk for online experiments). The MTurk homepage advertises for individuals to become “workers” to participate in human intelligence tasks (HITs) where
workers find an interesting task, complete the task, and then are compensated (money is
deposited into their Amazon payments account). Even though anybody can sign up to
become an MTurk worker, researchers who post tasks onto MTurk can set up
qualifications for the type of worker they would like to complete the task. In order to
recruit participants through MTurk, I posted a job listing (see MTurk recruitment
document in the Appendix) that provided a short description of the experiment and the
amount of compensation ($3.00). I set a small number of qualifications so only certain
individuals were allowed to participate. Specifically, participants were required to be
U.S. residents who were at least 18 years old. In addition, participants had to have
acquired at least a 95% approval rating on MTurk, which is the percent of previous tasks
accomplished that were considered acceptable by other researchers. The purpose of the
last requirement was to include only participants who had taken previous surveys
seriously to avoid the risk of including fraudulent participants in the sample. Although
MTurk research participants are less representative than national probability samples,
there is evidence suggesting that MTurk participants are more representative than student
experimental populations (Berinsky, Huber, & Lenz, 2012). For the purposes of my
study, the MTurk population was used for convenience and cost-effectiveness.

A total of 1,215 participants completed the experiment through MTurk (see Table
4.1 for a summary of demographic characteristics). Unfortunately, the population was
heavily composed of Democrats (59%, compared to 22% Republican), which is common
for MTurk samples (see Berinsky, Huber, and Lenz, 2012). The mean age was 34
(ranging from 18 to 80). About half of the participants made at least $39,000 and had attended at least some college.

**Experimental Design**

A mixed experimental design was used in these two studies. See Figure 4.1 for a summary of the design. During Stage 1, the experiment was set up as a between-subjects 2x2x2 factorial design. The manipulated factors were majority status (majority or minority), seniority (freshman or incumbent), and partisanship (Republican or Democrat) of the mock member of the House of Representatives in the first news article. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight Stage 1 conditions (Republican majority freshman, Republican majority senior, Republican minority freshman, Republican minority senior, Democratic majority freshman, Democratic majority senior, Democratic minority freshman, and Democratic minority senior).

The first stage was followed by three more stages, resulting in a total of four stages for this repeated measures design. Stages 2 through 4 were varied so that the legislator’s party voting record was presented during one of these three stages. The level of party voting was varied (operationalized as loyal party voting at 95% or moderate at 55%), which added six more distinct stage treatments (three levels for the stage at which the party voting information was received and two levels of party voting). The remaining two stages consisted of neutral information about the legislator that was kept constant.
Figure 4.1. Experimental Design.

*News releases were randomized for stages 2-4.
(described below). To ensure there would be no systematic ordering effects, the order of the final three news releases was randomized.32

**Stimulus Materials**

After the participants completed the informed consent document, they were given instructions which stated that this was a study of news coverage of politicians and that the purpose of the study was to examine how political opinions develop. Participants were told they would be asked the same questions after each article and that they should answer them based on their thoughts and feelings about the representative at that moment.

After answering several questions about their demographic characteristics, participants read the first article consisting of biographical information about a member of the House of Representatives from Iowa, “John Sunderland.” While made up for the purposes of this study, Sunderland’s biography resembled actual biographies of House members that are often published in newspapers and in the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress. The stimulus materials are provided in the Appendix.

Membership in the majority party was manipulated in the biography to evaluate the impact of majority and minority status on individuals’ impressions. Since time spent in office may also have an impact on individuals’ evaluations of the mock legislator, seniority was manipulated through information stating “Sunderland’s first term representing Iowa’s 5th district in the House of Representatives” for the junior MC, while the information for the senior MC stated “Sunderland has represented Iowa’s 5th district

32 All treatments in this study were randomized with balancing to ensure a comparable amount of participants received each condition.
in the House of Representatives for over 8 years.” Finally, Sunderland’s partisanship was manipulated to account for in-partisan and out-partisan dynamics. After reading the biographical information, participants answered a series of opinion questions about Representative Sunderland which served as the dependent variables in the study (described below).

Before moving on to the next article, the participants were required to complete a visual distraction task involving finding the differences between two similar pictures (see Appendix for example of distraction task). The purpose of the task was to temporarily take the participants thoughts away from the information they just read about Representative Sunderland, and to simulate the passage of time. Participants spent one minute on a page viewing two pictures spotting the differences between two pictures that look almost identical. The same distraction task has been used in other unrelated experiments to divert participants’ attention (e.g. Garrett & Weeks, 2011; Tang & Bernholtz, 2010). Furthermore, this distraction task is similar to others used in information processing experiments that were meant to gauge how distraction tasks affected memory (Barden and Petty, 2008; Petty, Wells & Brock, 1976).

The next three articles were mock news releases from the Les Mars Daily Sentinel. One of the articles explained that the latest statistics on roll-call voting in the House were recently released and Representative Sunderland had voted with his party “close to 55% [95%] of the time” during his current term in the House. The other two articles, which were held constant, were based on actual news releases of congressional

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33 Local and national newspapers and news websites often publish congressional party voting records (e.g. Washington Post’s U.S. Congress Votes Database).
members posted in newspapers or on members’ personal websites. These news releases consisted of neutral-positive information about Representative Sunderland. The first described how he had cosponsored a bill to help keep unused and expired prescription drugs off the streets whereas the second reported that Representative Sunderland was holding a job fair in his district. After participants read each news article, they answered the same set of opinion questions and then completed the same distraction task with new pictures. After reading the final article, the participants answered additional questions about Representative Sunderland and American government, individual differences questions, and political knowledge questions. At the end of the study, participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study (that is, the impact of party voting records on individuals’ evaluations of elected representatives and how impressions of representatives are formed and updated over time). A few website links were provided in case participants wanted to view information about their own member of Congress.

Measures

Three variables were used to measure evaluations of Sunderland. The first was a feeling thermometer score. Immediately after reading each news article, participants responded to the same question,

“Please give your overall opinion of John Sunderland, the candidate for U.S. House of Representatives in Iowa's fifth district. Please rate him on a thermometer scale. This scale ranges from 0 – 100 degrees: ratings above 50 mean that you have a positive opinion of Sunderland – the higher the rating, the more “warmly” you feel about him. Ratings below 50 mean that you have a negative opinion about Sunderland – the lower the rating, the more “coldly” you feel about him. So, on the thermometer scale of 0-100 degrees, what is your overall opinion of John Sunderland?”
In addition to answering the feeling thermometer question, respondents also gave an approval rating for Sunderland (a 5-point Likert scale anchored by “strongly approve” and “strongly disapprove”) and a vote likelihood measure (If you had the opportunity, how likely is it that you would vote to re-elect John Sunderland” with a response scale from 1-7, very unlikely to very likely). A new variable, overall support, was created by averaging the feeling thermometer score, approval rating, and likelihood to vote measure. Because overall support consists of three alternate measures of the individual’s impression of Representative Sunderland, it provides the most accurate measurement of overall impressions, thus making it a reasonable choice for the dependent variable.

The main independent variable of interest is the party voting record, that is, whether the participant received the loyal or moderate congressional party voting treatment. I will be using LPV and MPV respectively to refer to these conditions throughout the chapter. Partisanship is a second independent variable in this study. A participant is an in-partisan when he or she shares the same party identification (including strong partisans, partisans, and independent leaning partisans) with Representative Sunderland (N = 136 student participants; N = 484 MTurk participants). A participant is an out-partisan when he or she has a different party identification which

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34 To form the average support variable, each of the three measures was normalized (feeling thermometer score/100; approval rating/5; likelihood to vote/7) and then averaged. Each of the overall support scales was checked for reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, and they are reliable (Student Sample - Stage 1: 0.69; Stage 2: 0.83; Stage 3: 0.83; Stage 4: 0.81. MTurk Sample - Stage 1: 0.84; Stage 2: 0.87; Stage 3: 0.87; Stage 4: 0.89.). Cronbach’s alpha becomes lower if any one of these items is deleted from the scale.

35 Several variables measuring other types of support for Representative Sunderland could have served as the dependent variable, such as traits (trustworthiness, leadership, intelligence, etc.). These traits will be considered in a section in Chapter 5 and will be considered in future analyses, but the main focus of the dissertation is on constituent support.
includes all Independents (N = 215 student participants; N = 726 MTurk participants).

Time is included as a variable and is defined as the stage at which the measures were collected, with a total of four stages in this experiment. The variable time is useful when using repeated measures analyses to assess how time interacts with other independent variables to affect overall support. Other variables of interest include the manipulations made during the first stage. Leadership (majority or minority party membership) and seniority (first or fourth term in office) are accounted for in the first set of analyses.

**Overview of Data Analysis**

The purpose of the experiments is to examine how the level of party voting influences impressions of legislators and how impressions change over time. The first analyses will assess whether manipulations of incumbent characteristics affect overall support for Representative Sunderland. The second set of analyses will focus on the impact of time and party voting on overall support for the Representative.

**Partisanship, Leadership, Seniority, and Party Voting**

**Experiment A Results**

A 2 (Partisanship: In-partisan v. Out-partisan) X 2 (Leadership: Majority v. Minority) X 2 (Seniority: First term v. Fourth term) ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the impact of the first stage’s manipulations, using the overall support measure taken after Stage 1 as the dependent variable. There were no main effects of leadership and seniority on overall support in the student sample. Not surprisingly, the main effect for partisanship was highly significant ($F(1, 349) = 27.99, p<.001$). In-partisans gave Sunderland an average support rating of 0.67 whereas out-partisans gave an overall
support rating of 0.59. There were no significant interaction effects involving partisanship and the other two variables manipulated at Stage 1. Because being a member of the majority or minority party had no effect on a participant’s level of support for Representative Sunderland, even when it is interacted with partisanship, it was not included in the remaining analyses of the student participant data. Similarly, being a senior member of Congress did not influence a participant’s initial level of support for Representative Sunderland any more than if Representative Sunderland was in his first term in office. Accordingly, seniority is also ignored in the remaining Experiment A analyses.36

To assess the importance of partisanship and party voting, a 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) ANOVA was estimated, using the overall support variable provided after the party voting stage as the dependent variable. There was a significant main effect for partisanship, $F(1, 347) = 36.01, p<.001$, and a non-significant main effect for party voting. The important result is the significant interaction effect between partisanship and party voting, $F(1, 347) = 15.05, p<.001$. As seen in Figure 4.2, in-partisans have more favorable impressions of Sunderland when he had a loyal party voting record than when he was moderate, supporting Hypothesis 1a. In contrast, out-partisans viewed Sunderland more favorably when he had a moderate party voting record as compared to loyal party voting, supporting Hypothesis 1b.

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36 A 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Leadership: Majority v. Minority) X 2 (Seniority: First term v. Fourth term) ANOVA was conducted to see if party voting and partisanship interacted with leadership and seniority, but there were no significant main effects or interaction effects involving leadership and seniority.
Figure 4.2. Mean Levels of Support for Moderate and Loyal Party Voting by Partisanship.

The differences in the impact of MPV and LPV for in-partisans and out-partisans are comparable. The difference between MPV and LPV for in-partisans is 6 points, which is comparable to the difference between MPV and LPV for out-partisans (7 points). I estimated additional ANOVAs by splitting the sample by partisanship and comparing evaluations of MPV and LPV. For in-partisans, the difference between evaluations for MPV and LPV was significant ($F(1, 135) = 7.43$, $p<.01$), and the effect size of party voting, that is, the partial eta-squared statistic, was 0.053. For out-partisans,
the difference between evaluations for MPV and LPV was also significant ($F(1, 214) = 8.68, p < .01$), with an effect size of 0.039. The difference between the partial eta-squared for in-partisans and out-partisans is only 0.014. Thus, difference in mean evaluations for MPV and LPV is about the same for in-partisans and out-partisans.

I examine the difference between strong and weak partisans’ evaluations of party loyalty through a 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Partisan Strength: Strong v. Weak) ANOVA. Once again, the main effect for partisanship is significant, $F(1, 285) = 54.66, p < .001$. Two-way interactions between partisanship and party voting ($F(1, 285) = 28.08, p < .001$) and partisanship and partisan strength ($F(1, 285) = 17.33, p < .001$) are significant below the 0.001 p-level. Even though the two-way interaction between partisan strength and party voting is not significant, the three-way interaction among partisan strength, party voting, and partisanship is significant ($F(1, 285) = 10.41, p < .001$). This is an important result. For ease of interpretation, Figure 4.3 provides the means of each group. The largest difference between strong and weak partisans exists in evaluations among out-partisans when Sunderland engaged in LPV ($M = 0.28$ for strong out-partisans; $M = 0.57$ for weak out-partisans). The other difference between strong and weak partisans that emerged is in evaluations among in-partisans when Sunderland engaged in LPV ($M = 0.83$ for strong in-partisans; $M = 0.72$ for weak in-partisans). In contrast, strong and weak partisans did not react differently to moderate party voting records. These results are consistent with Harbridge and Malhotra’s findings (2011).
Figure 4.3. Experiment A: Mean Levels of Support for Moderate and Loyal Party Voting by Partisanship and Partisan Strength

*Experiment B Results*

Mirroring the student sample results, the manipulation of leadership status and seniority had no significant impact on level of support expressed by the MTurk participants in the 2 (Partisanship: In-partisan v. Out-partisan) X 2 (Leadership: Majority v. Minority) X 2 (Seniority: First term v. Fourth term) ANOVA with the dependent variable of overall support (measured after the first stage). There was no difference in overall support for members described as being in his first or fourth term in office or as a member of the majority or minority. Partisanship’s main effect was the only significant
result, \( F(1, 1202) = 297.31, p < .001 \), which indicates that the in-partisans’ level of overall support (M=0.71) was much higher than the level of support expressed by the out-partisans (M=0.57). As with the student sample, the interaction effects among seniority, leadership, and partisanship were insignificant. Since majority membership and seniority labels were not significant, they were omitted from the remaining analyses.\(^{37}\)

In the 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v Out-Partisans) ANOVA, with support at the stage in which the party voting information was provided as the dependent variable, there are main effects for both partisanship \( F(1, 1206) = 159.41, p < .001 \) and party voting \( F(1,1206) = 10.46, p < .001 \) and a significant interaction between these two variables, \( F(1,1206) = 90.03, p < .001 \). Hypotheses 1a and 1b are supported in the MTurk participants’ results, as evidenced by this significant interaction between partisanship and party voting. The mean level of support for Representative Sunderland for the MTurk sample is summarized in Figure 4.2. As expected, there are overall differences between in-partisans and out-partisans, but there are also differences in overall support as a function of loyal and moderate party voting for in-partisans and out-partisans. For in-partisan participants, overall support was higher when Sunderland was described as having a loyal party voting record in comparison to a moderate party voting record, supporting Hypothesis 1a. For out-partisans, the outcome

\(^{37}\) A 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Leadership: Majority v. Minority) X 2 (Seniority: First term v. Fourth term) ANOVA was conducted to see if party voting and partisanship interacted with leadership and seniority, but just as in Study 1 there were no significant main effects or interaction effects involving leadership and seniority that met the standard p-value of 0.05 or less.
was reversed – moderate party voting was favored over loyal party voting (Hypothesis 1b).

The difference in the impact of MPV and LPV for in-partisans was less than half the size of the difference for out-partisans (6 points and 13 points, respectively). This suggests that at least for the MTurk participants, there is an asymmetry in how in- and out-partisans react to party loyalty. Additional ANOVAs split by partisanship show a significant difference between MPV and LPV for in-partisans ($F(1, 483) = 18.61$, $p<.001$) and a significant difference between MPV and LPV for out-partisans ($F(1, 725) = 93.47$, $p<.001$). Contrary to the results in Experiment A, there is a sizable difference in the impact of party voting for in- and out-partisans. For out-partisans, the partial eta-squared (0.114) is about three times the size of the partial eta-squared for in-partisans (0.037), indicating that the impact of party voting records on evaluations was stronger for the out-partisans.

As in Experiment A, the results from Experiment B indicate that the interactive effect between party voting and partisanship is be more evident for strong partisans than weak partisans. In a 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Partisan Strength: Strong v. Weak) ANOVA, each of the main effects of party voting ($F(1, 975) = 5.07$, $p<.05$), partisanship ($F(1, 975) = 184.50$, $p<.001$), and partisan strength ($F(1, 975) = 32.80$, $p<.001$) are significant. Two-way interactions between partisanship and party voting ($F(1, 975) = 96.21$, $p<.001$) and partisanship and partisan strength $F(1, 975) = 23.60$, $p<.001$) are significant. These two
way interactions are qualified by the significant three-way interaction among partisan strength, party voting, and partisanship ($F (1, 975) = 9.06, p<.01$).

The results of that three-way interaction are displayed in Figure 4.4, and those results are similar to those displayed in Experiment A’s Figure 4.3. Once again, the largest difference in evaluations as a function of strength of partisanship is among out-partisans reacting to a loyal Sunderland ($M = 0.35$ for strong out-partisans; $M = 0.52$ for weak out-partisans). The difference, however, between strong and weak in-partisans
reacting to LPV (M = 0.79 for strong in-partisans; M = 0.73 for weak in-partisans) is not as sizeable as in Experiment A. In sum, LPV has a greater effect on strong partisans than weak partisans, albeit the effect is largest for strong out-partisans.

The Temporal Dynamics of Party Voting and Overall Support

Experiment A Results

While the first set of analyses provide information about the impact of party voting on support for a House member, they do not take into account potential differences in impressions as a function of the time at which an individual learns about the legislator’s voting record. From this point forward, another variable, time, is included in the analyses.

I begin by presenting descriptive statistics. The average means from Experiment A appear to show little systematic patterns in the impact of moderate and loyal party voting for in-partisans over time (see Figures 4.5 through 4.7 below). When party voting is learned at Stage 2 for in-partisans, support for Representative Sunderland increases slightly for MPV and barely decreases for LPV, which is contrary to evidence in the previous section where MPV is detrimental to support. For out-partisans who viewed party voting at Stage 2, support remains nearly the same as in Stage 1 for MPV, and, as expected, support decreases by for LPV. For in-partisans and out-partisans encountering party voting at Stage 3, support decreases for MPV and LPV. For party voting at Stage 4, the reduction in support for MPV and LPV is about the same for in-partisans and out-partisans.
In sum, these descriptive results suggest that information about party voting has a somewhat negative impact, regardless if it is MPV or LPV, for in-partisans and out-partisans. In-partisans who read about a legislator with LPV are slightly less negatively affected by the information than if the legislator had a MPV (except for when party voting is viewed at Stage 2). At each stage out-partisans are more negatively affected by LPV than MPV. It appears that the later a participant encountered LPV or MPV, the more negatively it influenced impressions for in-partisans. However, these results should be viewed cautiously, as the cell sizes for the stage-based analyses in Experiment A are quite small (ranging from 17 to 26). The MTurk results include four times as many participants as the student sample, so a clearer pattern may be evident exist in the Experiment B results.

One way to assess changes in participants’ impressions over the four stages is to estimate a two-way repeated measures ANOVA. In this analysis, two manipulations – party voting and partisanship – are included to examine how the level of support changes throughout the four stages. Overall constituent support at all four stages is the repeated measure and the analysis was conducted separately for each of the three stages in which the party voting information was provided (see Tables 4.2 through 4.4). The first important result is the highly significant main effect of “time” in all three analyses, which
Figure 4.5. Experiment A: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

Figure 4.6. Experiment A: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.
Figure 4.7. Experiment A: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.
captures changes in overall support across the four stages. The nature of this effect is that as time passes, support for Sunderland becomes stronger (see Figures 4.5 through 4.7 for a visual representation of the increase in overall support over time). This is consistent with research on person positivity and familiarity (e.g., Sears, 1983). Moreover, the information in the two news releases that were not manipulated at Stages 2 through 4 was relatively positive. Note that the increase in support over the four stages was not qualified by partisanship (with none of the Time X Partisanship within-subject terms reaching significance); individuals who did not share the same party identification as the MC still developed a more positive impression of him over time.

The between-subjects variance results (see the right panels of Tables 4.2-4.4) indicate that partisanship plays a major role in overall support without accounting for time. Overall support is about five points higher for in-partisans than out-partisans (see Figures 4.5 through 4.7). The between-subjects variance results show a significant interaction effect for partisanship and party voting ($p<.10$) when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 (see right panel of Table 4.2). This interaction is not significant when party voting is displayed at Stages 3 or 4. These results indicate that Partisanship X Party Voting significantly influences in-partisans and out-partisans evaluations early on in the information stream (i.e. at Stage 2), providing some support for Hypothesis 3.

In the within-subject variance results, the repeated measures analyses provide only marginal evidence that the impact of party voting varies with the time in which the support variable was measured (see the left panels of Tables 4.2 through 4.4). The interaction between party voting and time is significant when party voting is displayed at
Stages 3 and 4, although these findings are significant at p<.05 and p<.10 levels, respectively. When party voting is displayed during Stage 2, there are no significant effects of party voting, either as a main effect or in interaction with the other variables, invalidating Hypothesis 3. The only significant triple interaction between partisanship, party voting, and time is when party voting is displayed at Stage 3. It is most noticeable in Figure 4.6 when party voting is displayed at Stage 3. Even though overall support decreases when LPV occurs at Stage 3 for both in-partisans and out-partisans, support increases greatly in the next stage. However, when MPV occurs at Stage 3 for in-partisans and out-partisans, overall support remains about the same at Stage 4. This suggests that the effects of MPV may continue in the stages after party voting has been learned.

In summary, based on the Experiment A results, there is mixed support for the hypothesis that the timing of party voting information matters for impressions. On the one hand, Experiment A results disconfirm Hypothesis 3, as party voting records only had a significant impact when that information was encountered at Stage 3 in the within subjects variance results. On the other hand, the between-subjects variance results show that party voting records and partisanship influence overall support when the party voting news release is displayed at Stage 2. However, these results are considered preliminary because of the small cell sizes in Experiment A. The next section will provide a better overview of the impact of party voting and partisanship on impressions over time.
Table 4.2. Experiment A: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>0.68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>0.013</td>
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<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>3.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.

Table 4.3. Experiment A: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<td>Time</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>2.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Table 4.4. Experiment A: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
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<th>Between subjects variance</th>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>20.50***</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>163.42</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>163.42</td>
<td>3509.60***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>0.004</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.26</td>
<td>5.55*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>2.53</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.23+</td>
<td>Party Voting</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>1.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2.57</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>1.49</td>
<td>Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Error                     | 2.39     | 218.67   | 0.01     |          | Error                     | 3.96     | 85       | 0.05     |          |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Experiment B Results

In the MTurk study, support over time varies based on when party voting is encountered and as a function of partisanship. Figures 4.8 through 4.10 provide a graphical representation of the results. When in-partisans receive party voting information at Stage 2, overall support decreases with MPV and stays about the same with LPV (see Figure 4.8). Impressions bounce back, however, for the moderate party voting condition, since two stages later overall support jumps back up. For out-partisans, overall support rises for MPV and decreases substantially for LPV. Once out-partisans hear new information about the MC in the third and fourth stages, the level of support increases no matter which party voting condition they viewed at Stage 2.

When party voting is encountered at Stage 3 for in-partisans, there is a slight decrease in support for LPV and a larger decrease in support for MPV (see Figure 4.9). For out-partisans, party voting increases slightly for MPV and greatly decreases for LPV. For both in-partisans and out-partisans, overall levels of support increase in the final stage when new information – either cosponsorship of a bill or district service – is encountered.

When the party voting manipulation occurs at Stage 4 (see Figure 4.10), the change in evaluations is similar to when party voting is viewed at Stages 2 or 3. For in-partisans, support for Representative Sunderland stays about the same in the LPV condition and decreases when MPV is encountered. For out-partisans, the overall level of support slightly increases in the MPV condition and decreases considerably for LPV.
Figure 4.8. Experiment B: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

Figure 4.9. Experiment B: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.
Figure 4.10. Experiment B: Overall Support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.
The clear trend here is that for in-partisans, loyal party voting is viewed more favorably than moderate party voting. At each stage MPV is encountered, support among in-partisans decreases. It is not the case, however, that LPV has a strongly positive impact on support among in-partisans, as support remains essentially the same or even drops a couple points when LPV information is received.

Among out-partisans, a MPV record is viewed more favorably than a LPV record. MPV slightly increases constituent support at any stage, whereas LPV greatly reduces overall support. Interestingly, this decline is almost completely reversed if new positive information about the representative is revealed in the following stage.

To summarize, it is evident from each graph in Figures 4.8 through 4.10 that LPV is favored over MPV for in-partisans, and MPV is favored over LPV for out-partisans, consistent with the results from the first set of analyses. For in-partisans, there is always a decline in overall support when MPV is learned, and their level of support remains about the same with LPV. For out-partisans, support levels consistently drop with LPV and support slightly increases with MPV. The results from the repeated measures analyses will provide more clarity about the magnitude of these trends.

As with the Experiment A sample, I estimated two-way repeated measures ANOVAs, separately for each stage in which the party voting information was provided (see Table 4.5.-4.7). The between-subject variance results, which do not take into account temporal dynamics, indicate that partisanship is always an important independent determinant for overall support (p<.001) (see right panel of Tables 4.5-4.7). Levels of party voting did not have a significant independent impact on support. However, the
interaction between party voting and partisanship is significant when party voting is displayed at each stage (Stage 2, $p<.001$; Stage 3, $p<.10$; Stage 4, $p<.05$). These effects in essence break down the aggregated Partisanship X Party Voting interaction effects described above and displayed in Figures 4.8-4.10 at each stage. These results suggest the different reactions of in-partisans and out-partisans to LPV and MPV persist over time, but are particularly strong earlier in the information stream.

The within-subjects results indicate that the main effect for time (which, again, is the stage at which the support level was measured) is highly significant ($p<.001$), consistent with the Experiment A results. As time passes, overall support for Representative Sunderland tends to become stronger. The positive effects of time are not simply qualified by partisanship (note the non-significant Time X Partisanship interactions in Tables 4.5 – 4.7), meaning that the passage of time similarly influences both in-partisans and out-partisans (while, of course, their starting point is much different). While the Time X Party Voting two-way interactions are significant, they are qualified by the highly significant three-way interactions among Time, Partisanship, and levels of Party Voting. These triple interactions indicate that the trends displayed in Figures 4.8-4.10 are not random fluctuations but rather significantly shaped by the joint impact of partisanship, party voting, and time.
Table 4.5. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
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<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
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<td>Time</td>
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<td>1.40</td>
<td>163.47***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
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<td>Partisanship</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>2.54</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>3.34*</td>
<td>Party Voting</td>
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<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
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<td>2.54</td>
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<td>43.10***</td>
<td>Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
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<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Error</td>
<td>54.37</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>0.09</td>
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***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.

Table 4.6. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
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<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
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<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>56.81***</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
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<td>2.68</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Partisanship</td>
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<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
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<td>6.10***</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
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<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
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<td>Error</td>
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<td>0.01</td>
<td>Error</td>
<td>24.05</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>0.08</td>
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***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Table 4.7. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.
Unlike with the Experiment A sample, the Experiment B MTurk sample is large enough to incorporate strength of partisanship in the repeated measures tests. Strength of partisanship is a dichotomous measure created from the 7-point partisanship measure by characterizing strong partisans (Strong Republicans and Strong Democrats) as “1” and weak partisans (Republicans, Independent leaning Republicans, Independents, Independent leaning Democrats, Democrats) as the “0” category. 174 participants considered themselves strong partisans, and it should be noted that a majority of these strong partisans are Democrats.\footnote{Only 26 out of 175 strong partisans are Republican.} Figures 4.11 through 4.13 provide a visual representation of overall support when strength of partisanship is taken into account. Strong in-partisans are more strongly affected by LPV and MPV than are weak in-partisans. For weak in-partisans, the overall support for Representative Sunderland remains fairly consistent regardless of his party voting record. The strong in-partisan graphs show a completely different story, with strong in-partisans responding much more positively to LPV, as compared to MPV, regardless of the stage at which the voting record information was provided.

For out-partisans, the difference between strong and weak partisans is much smaller. Both strong and weak out-partisans are negatively affected by LPV, at approximately the same magnitude, and regardless of when the party voting information was received. Tables 4.8–4.10 report the results of the repeated measures analyses. My focus in interpreting these results is on how consideration of strength of partisanship
Figure 4.11. Experiment B: Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.
Figure 4.12. Experiment B: Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.
Figure 4.13. Experiment B: Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.
changes the conclusions reached from the results reported in Tables 4.5-4.7. The between-subjects results suggest one minor qualification, namely the significant Partisanship X Partisan Strength interactions, which indicate, as would be expected, that the main effect of partisanship is greater among strong partisans (means not shown). Importantly, the significant Partisanship X Party Voting interactions (described in Figures 4.8-4.10 at the outset of this section as well as Tables 4.5-4.7) are not qualified by strength of partisanship (all three triple interaction are non-significant), meaning that the differences in the reactions of in-partisans and out-partisans to LPV and MPV records holds regardless of strength of partisanship. This result is inconsistent with Harbridge and Malhotra’s (2011) conclusions that the effect of party voting is conditional on strength of partisanship, although strength of partisanship is important when time is not taken into account in the results presented earlier.

The results for the within-subject effects, once strength of partisanship is taken into account, are somewhat inconsistent over the three stages of the experiment. Again, my focus in interpreting these results is in how they modify the conclusions reached from the earlier models when strength of partisanship was not considered. One unexpected pattern to note is that the two-way interaction between Time and Partisanship is now significant in these models. The four-way interaction among time, partisanship, party voting, and partisan strength is significant at the second and fourth stages, but not the third, a pattern that is difficult to interpret. As Figures 4.11-4.13 show, partisan strength seems to play a role in determining whether party voting influences overall support for Representative Sunderland, but this finding is not consistent in all analyses over time.
Table 4.8. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

<table>
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<tr>
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</table>

Error: 10.35 1229.05 0.01

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.

Table 4.9. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.

<table>
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Error: 5.69 649.68 0.01

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Table 4.10. Experiment B: Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.

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Error: 4.68 702 0.01

Error: 37.47 483 0.08

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geisser F-Tests are reported.
Discussion

Party loyalty, operationalized as party voting, in conjunction with partisanship, influences evaluations of a House incumbent. This finding was consistent for both samples when the timing of receipt of party voting information was not taken into account. When time was included in the analyses, only the MTurk sample (Experiment B) exhibited evidence that the timing of party voting information mattered. The low number of student participants assigned to each condition may have contributed to the non-significant conclusion in Experiment A.

As expected, in-partisans reacted more favorably to LPV than to MPV whereas out-partisans evaluated Representative Sunderland more positively when he was described as having a MPV rather than a LPV, regardless of what stage party voting was encountered. In both samples, there was a larger difference between MPV and LPV for out-partisans, indicating that out-partisans dislike LPV more than in-partisans like it. This evidence suggests that in-partisans are less concerned about LPV than out-partisans, and that voting loyally does not lead to extremely positive evaluations. Overall, in these experiments party voting had a generally negative impact (compared to the other largely positive information about the MC that was provided), regardless of whether the party voting was loyal or moderate. People seem to dislike information about party voting – either they care little about it or think less of the member no matter the party voting record or partisanship.

When time was accounted for, the effect of LPV and MPV on evaluations for the most part mirrored the initial results that did not incorporate time. The results in
Experiment B provides some preliminary evidence that party voting records will have a greater impact on impressions when viewed earlier. Not only did it appear that party voting plays a larger role at Stage 2 for all individuals, the second stage was the only time when loyal party voting lead to slightly positive evaluations for in-partisans. When loyal party voting was learned during the third or fourth stages, in-partisans’ evaluations actually decreased slightly. Loyal party voting had the largest negative impact for out-partisans, and this large negative change in evaluations occurred regardless of when information about party voting was received. Once again, it appears that out-partisans’ negative reactions to loyal party voting are much stronger than in-partisans’ positive reaction to loyal party voting.

The findings indicate that strength of partisanship may moderate the relationship between partisanship and party voting. In the first set of analyses when time was not included, the differences in evaluations between the LPV and MPV conditions were larger for strong partisans than for weak partisans. The ANOVA results show the interaction among partisanship, party voting, and strength of partisanship was significant in both studies. Also, it is important to remember that most of the strong partisans in the samples were strong Democrats, so these results are not generalizable to the behavior of both Republicans and Democrats. In the repeated measures ANOVA for Experiment B, the interaction of these three variables along with time was significant when party voting was viewed at the second and fourth stages. However, the three-way interaction among partisanship, party voting, and time remained significant at each stage. Party voting and partisanship influenced evaluations over time even while accounting for strength of
partisanship, which suggests that strength of partisanship may not be an important factor of how evaluations change over time. The mixed results in these analyses offer an uncertain view of the role of partisan strength in evaluations of party voting.

Because one focus of this dissertation is on how the length of time an individual has known a MC influences evaluations, Chapter 5 will extend the time span of the experiment to several weeks. Individuals participate in the same experiment described in this chapter except that one stage is completed each week for four consecutive weeks.
CHAPTER 5: STUDY 3: LONGITUDINAL EXPERIMENT, LONG VERSION

This chapter provides a different approach to examining the impact of party voting, partisanship, and time on evaluations. The main difference between this chapter and the previous one is that the experiment in this chapter consists of a multi-stage experiment that was conducted over a four week period, whereas participants finished the experiment in Chapter 4 within thirty minutes. The advantage of extending the length of time for this study is that it provides a more realistic view of how evaluations of a MC will change over time. Participants are inundated with information unrelated to the experiment throughout the week before they view the next stimulus news article. This simulates reality since individuals may encounter a news story about their representative and a considerable amount of time may pass until they hear any new information about the MC and update their evaluations. This longitudinal study allows me to assess how party voting influences a participant’s evaluations of a MC from the early weeks when they just formed an impression of the member and how these evaluations differ when they encounter party voting in later weeks when their impression is more developed.

The first section of this chapter summarizes the hypotheses that are tested in the empirical analyses. Next, I provide a brief description of the participants, experimental
design, stimulus materials, and measures in the methods section. As with Chapter 4, the results are divided into two sections. The first results section discusses the influence of the experimental manipulations on evaluations without considering time, and the second section reviews the findings from the analyses that focus on the temporal dynamics of party voting and evaluations. The chapter ends with a short discussion of the results from the experiment.

Hypotheses

The same hypotheses from Chapter 4 will be tested in this chapter. These hypotheses have already been outlined in detail in previous chapters (see Chapter 1 for a complete discussion of each hypothesis). To give a brief overview, the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter are outlined below:

- **H1a**: In-partisans will be more supportive of an in-partisan House member with a LPV than an in-partisan member with a MPV.

- **H1b**: Out-partisans will be less supportive of an out-partisan House member with a LPV than an out-partisan member with a MPV.

- **H3**: A congressional member’s party voting record is more influential at the beginning of impression formation than later in the impression formation process.

Methods

Participants

Undergraduates from several political science classes volunteered to participate in the four week study in exchange for extra credit. A total of four hundred seventy-three
Ohio State undergraduates participated in the study. Participants came from four political science courses; three of the four were online Introduction to American Politics courses and the fourth was an online Introduction to International Relations course. Participants were recruited via email to participate in the experiment in exchange for extra credit from April through November 2012. Most participants were young adults with the mean age of 22 (ranging from 18 to 61). There were slightly more males than females in the sample (53% males). The racial composition of the sample consisted of a majority of white students (75%), a small percentage of black students (10%), and the rest of the students were members of other racial groups (Asian, Hispanic, Native American, Arab, and other). There were more Democrats than Republicans (included in these numbers are Independents that lean Republican or Democrat), and 14% of the total participant population declared themselves Independent (217 Democrats, 184 Republicans, 65 Independents).

*Experimental Design*

The mixed experimental design is the same as the experimental design from Chapter 4 (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4 for a summary of the design). The first stage of the experiment was a between-subjects 2x2x2 factorial design, including majority leadership

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39 There was an 81% retention rate in this study. A total of 384 students completed all four stages of the experiment.
40 33.2% of the participants completed the study during the 2012 Spring Quarter, 20.3% completed the study in 2012 Summer Quarter, and 46% completed the study during the 2012 Fall Semester. 87% were either enrolled in their first political science course or had taken only one other political science course. 4% of the participants were political science majors.
41 Independents that lean Republican or Democrat were included in the total number of Republicans and Democrats.
(majority or minority), seniority (first term or fourth term), and party identification (Republican or Democrat). Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight Stage 1 conditions (Republican majority first term, Republican majority fourth term, Republican minority first term, Republican minority fourth term, Democratic majority first term, Democratic majority fourth term, Democratic minority first term, and Democratic minority fourth term).

There were a total of four stages for this repeated measures design. Stages 2 through 4 were varied, with the legislator’s party voting record randomly presented during one of these three stages, and the level of party voting varied (operationalized as loyal at 95% or moderate at 55%). This added six more distinct stage treatments (the stage at which party voting was learned (Stage 2, Stage 3, or Stage 4) and the level of party voting (moderate or loyal). The remaining two stages consisted of neutral information about the legislator that was kept constant. To ensure there would be no systematic ordering effects, the order of the three news releases was randomized for most of the participants.42

Stimulus Materials

The stimulus materials were the same as in the two experiments from Chapter 4 (see Chapter 4 for a detailed review of the materials), but the experimental procedure

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42 All treatments in this study were randomized with balancing to ensure a comparable number of participants received each condition. An exception was made for the experiments conducted in Fall 2012, in which the second and third stages were randomized among the two neutral news releases, and all participants received the party voting news article last. Several descriptive and ANOVA analyses were conducted to compare the two groups of participants (Spring/Summer 2012 and Fall 2012). The descriptive characteristics and ANOVA analyses of the participants in Fall group are comparable to the Spring/Summer participants.
differed slightly from Chapter 4’s experiments due to the length of time between each stage. Participants were given two days to complete each stage, and then participants were emailed a link to the next stage five days later. For example, I emailed participants a link to the first stage on Monday morning at 7am during the first week of the study. The first stage of the study closed on Tuesday night at 11:59PM. On the following Monday morning, the second stage was emailed to participants.

The first step in the experimental procedure was for participants to agree to the consent statement. Next, participants answered a short questionnaire consisting of demographics questions and questions about their political background (e.g. political interest and party identification). Then they read the first article about the legislator’s biography. After responding to a short series of questions about their impressions of the legislator, the participants were informed that the first stage was complete and that they would receive another email with a link to the second stage in a week. The following week, a link to the second stage was emailed to all participants who completed the first stage. In the second stage, participants read the next news article and answered the evaluation questions. This process continued until the final stage during the fourth week when participants read the final news article, answered evaluation questions and then answered a battery of questions about American government, individual differences questions, and political knowledge questions. At the end of the study, participants were debriefed about the true purpose of the study.

Measures
The variable, overall support, is used as the main dependent variable in the following analyses. Overall support consists of the average of three evaluations measures: feeling thermometer scores, approval ratings, and likelihood to vote measure.\footnote{The overall support variable was formed by normalizing feeling thermometer scores, approval ratings, and likelihood to vote (feeling thermometer score/100; approval rating/5; likelihood to vote/7) and then averaged.} There were a total of four overall support variables – one for each stage of the experiment.\footnote{Each of the overall support scales was checked for reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, and they are reliable (Stage 1: 0.77; Stage 2: 0.81; Stage 3: 0.78; Stage 4: 0.86). Cronbach’s alpha becomes lower if any one of these items is deleted from the scale.} In addition, the feeling thermometer score is used by itself as a dependent variable in some of the analyses that follow. In addition to answering the above questions about general evaluations of the legislator, participants were also asked to provide trait assessments of Representative Sunderland after each stage. Participants evaluated several traits based on how much each phrase fit with their impression of John Sunderland (the response options were: A great deal, Somewhat, A little, and Not at all). The following traits were measured: leader, caring, intelligent, trustworthy, honest, and experienced. The final set of analyses reported in this chapter explores these character traits as dependent variables.

The primary independent variable of interest is the party voting record, that is, whether the participant received the loyal or moderate congressional party voting treatment. I will use LPV and MPV respectively to refer to these conditions throughout the chapter. Partisanship is another critical independent variable. In-partisans share the same party identification with Representative Sunderland (including Independent leaners), and out-partisans have a different party identification; the out-partisan category includes
pure Independents (N= 189 in-partisans; N= 219 out-partisans). In some of the analyses I use an alternate version of partisanship where I exclude pure Independents from out-partisans (N= 65 Independents excluded). *Time* is defined as the four stages in this experiment. The variable *time* is useful when using repeated measures analyses to assess how time interacts with other independent variables like partisanship and party voting to affect overall support, feeling thermometer scores, and traits). Other variables of interest include the manipulations made during the first stage. *Leadership* (majority or minority party membership) and *seniority* (first or fourth term in office) are accounted for in the first analysis.

**Overview of Data Analysis**

The purpose of the experiment is to examine how partisanship and the level of party voting influence constituent evaluations of MCs and how these evaluations change over time. The majority of the analyses replicate the tests from Chapter 4 with the exception of a few new analyses using feeling thermometer scores and traits as dependent variables. The first set of analyses assess whether manipulations of incumbent characteristics affect overall support for Representative Sunderland without accounting for the time at which party voting was learned. The final set of analyses focus on the impact of the timing of receipt of party voting information on evaluations of the Representative.

**Partisanship, Leadership, Seniority, and Party Voting**

The impact of the first set of manipulations from Stage 1 (i.e., partisanship, leadership, and seniority) are assessed in a 2 (Partisanship: In-partisan v. Out-partisan) X 2
(Leadership: Majority v. Minority) X 2 (Seniority: First term v. Fourth term) ANOVA, using overall support after Stage 1 as the dependent variable. As with the experiments reported in Chapter 4, there were no main effects of leadership and seniority. Not surprisingly, the main effect for partisanship was significant (F (1, 457) = 59.46, p<.001). Participants categorized as in-partisans gave Sunderland an average of a 0.68 overall support rating, whereas out-partisans gave an average overall support rating of 0.60.

The interaction between majority and partisanship was significant, F (1, 457) = 4.60, p<.05 (see Figure 5.1). As evidenced by the main effect for partisanship, in-partisans were more supportive of Sunderland when he was in the majority (M = 0.70) and minority (M = 0.67) whereas out-partisans had lower levels of support (Sunderland as a majority and minority member, M = 0.59 and M = 0.61, respectively). In-partisans evaluated Sunderland slightly more positively when he was in the majority than in the minority, whereas the reverse was true for out-partisans. For both in- and out-partisans, the slight difference in mean evaluations between majority and minority members is the same (three points).

The interaction effects between partisanship and seniority, seniority and leadership, and the three-way interaction between partisanship, leadership, and seniority were insignificant. Because being labeled a fourth term member of Congress does not influence a participant’s initial level of support for Representative Sunderland any more than if Representative Sunderland was in his first term in office, the seniority variable was excluded from the remaining analyses.
Figure 5.1. Mean Levels of Support for Majority and Minority Party Voting by Partisanship.

Since there was a significant finding with the interaction between partisanship and majority/minority status, a second ANOVA including both of these variables along with party voting was estimated. Overall support after the party voting stages, based on the overall support variable measured after the party voting record was learned, was the dependent variable in this 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Status: Majority v. Minority) ANOVA. Partisanship was
the only variable with a significant main effect, F (1, 391) = 3.88, p<.05. Also, a significant interaction effect between partisanship and leadership emerged, F (1,391) = 5.51, p<.05, paralleling the Figure 5.1 results. Party voting did not have a significant impact in this analysis, as a main effect or in interaction with the other two variables. Because there was no difference between the impact of LPV and MPV on evaluations of in-partisans or out-partisans, Hypotheses 1a and 1b are rejected in this study.

Additional tests further confirm the lack of significance in party voting when simply assessing the relationship between party voting, partisanship, and support for the legislator. The dependent variable was altered in a subsequent 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) ANOVA. The dependent variable change in average support, calculated by subtracting overall support at the party voting stage from overall support at the first stage, provides similar results. The main effect for partisanship is significant F (1, 395) = 6.33, p<.05, but there are no effects attributable to party voting, as a main effect or in interaction with partisanship. In addition, because overall support is an average of three measures (feeling thermometer scores, approval ratings, and likelihood of voting), each of these measures were used as dependent variables. Those three analyses also did not yield significant effects attributable to party voting.

The final test considered the possible impact of party voting as a function of strength of partisanship. Results from a 2 (Party Voting: Loyal v. Moderate) X 2 (Partisanship: In-Partisans v. Out-Partisans) X 2 (Partisan Strength: Strong v. Weak)
ANOVA show that there is no difference between strong and weak partisans’ evaluations of a legislator as a function of party voting record. Partisanship had a significant main effect (F (1,339) = 12.84, p<.001), and there was a significant interaction effect between partisan strength and partisanship (F (1,339) = 7.25, p<.01). However, there were no significant main or interaction effects for party voting. In short, the results from these analyses provide no support for H1a and H1b.

The Temporal Dynamics of Party Voting and Evaluations

Overall Support Results

In the previous section, the analyses considered the impact of several manipulations (party voting, seniority, leadership, and partisanship) on support for a House member without taking into account possible changes in support over time. The following set of analyses assess how support for a House member changes throughout the four stages of the experiment. Time is the major variable of concern in these analyses, especially how time interacts with party voting and partisanship.

The first set of results considers the means of overall support at each stage. The graphs display how overall support changes over time when party voting is encountered at Stages 2, 3, or 4 (see Figures 5.2 through 5.4) for in-partisans and out-partisans. The means for overall support for Representative Sunderland show a slight pattern of change over time due to his party voting record, although there seems to be little systematic difference in the impact of moderate and loyal party voting for in-partisans and out-partisans.
When in-partisans learn about a LPV record at Stage 2, their evaluations remain about the same as in the first stage when they read the biographical information (see Figure 5.2). For MPV, in-partisans’ support for Representative Sunderland decreases slightly. For out-partisans, the difference in overall support between MPV and LPV at Stage 2 is more pronounced. Out-partisans view MPV as a positive piece of information and overall support increases. In contrast, overall support slightly declines for LPV. When in-partisans and out-partisans view party voting at Stages 3 or 4, there is a negative change in evaluations, regardless of party voting level (see Figures 5.3 and 5.4). In-partisan support decreases by about the same amount for MPV and LPV when party voting is presented at Stages 3 or 4. For out-partisans, the negative change in overall support from Stage 2 to 3 is larger for MPV than LPV. On the flip side, the negative change in overall support from Stage 3 to 4 is larger for LPV than MPV for out-partisans.

In sum, these descriptive results show that the only time when in-partisans and out-partisans react differently to LPV and MPV is at Stage 2. At Stage 2, in-partisan evaluations remain the same for LPV and decrease for MPV, and out-partisan evaluations increase in the MPV condition and decrease in the LPV condition. When the party voting condition is encountered at Stages 3 or 4, evaluations always decrease, no matter the level of party voting or partisanship.

To gain a better perspective of whether there are any significant changes in support for Representative Sunderland over time due to partisanship and party voting, a series of
Figure 5.2. Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

Figure 5.3. Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.
Figure 5.4. Overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.
two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted. As with the analyses reported in Chapter 4, these repeated measures analyses estimate how two manipulations – party voting and partisanship - affect overall support throughout the four stages. The repeated measures ANOVA was conducted three times, for each of the three stages when party voting was presented.

Based on the between-subjects variance results (see right side of Tables 5.1 through 5.3), partisanship is only significant when party voting is displayed at Stage 4, $F(1, 214) = 15.70, p<.001$. Taking a look at the average means for in-partisans when party voting is displayed at Stage 4, I find that overall support stays in the .70-.80 range, whereas out-partisan support is in the .60-.75 range. When party voting is displayed at Stages 2 or 3, support for in-partisans and out-partisans are not significantly distinct. This could be a function of the randomization issue, where participants from Fall 2012 were automatically assigned to the Stage 4 party voting condition, thus increasing the N to twice the amount of participants that viewed party voting at Stage 2 or 3. The party voting and Party voting X Partisanship effects are not significant in the between-subjects results.

In the within-subjects variance results, as with the studies reported in Chapter 4, I find that time has a main effect on support for Representative Sunderland regardless of when party voting was encountered (see left side of Tables 5.1 through 5.3). As time passed, the level of support for Representative Sunderland increased significantly. It appears that individuals, regardless of partisanship, often develop more positive impressions of legislators over time.
In contrast to the results reported in Chapter 4, there is no indication of a significant triple interaction among partisanship, party voting, and time when the experiment is spread throughout a four-week period. Only the partial effect between time and partisanship is significant when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 (p<.05, see Table 5.1). The partial effect of time and party voting is inconsequential. One potential reason for these null effects is that the cell sizes for the stage-based analyses are very low. For example, for in-partisans receiving the MPV condition at Stage 3, there were only 11 participants. However, there were a sufficient number of participants in each condition when party voting was displayed at Stage 4 (n>39 for each condition), but there were no significant interaction effects for this repeated measures ANOVA either (see Table 5.3). These non-significant results could also be the product of the length of the experiment – where four weeks was too long for participants to remember the partisanship of the mock legislator.

Two other possibilities may account for these null results. First, out-partisans consist of partisans who support the opposite party and Independents. If Independents are excluded from the analyses, partisanship and party voting may have a stronger effect than when Independents are included. Secondly, overall support may be too weak of a dependent variable. If feeling thermometer scores, the most variable of the three support measures, are used instead there may be some indication that partisanship and party voting play a role in constituent evaluations of the legislator. The next section will replicate the previous analyses with feeling thermometer scores serving as the dependent variable and partisanship defined as in- or out-partisans excluding Independents.
Table 5.1. Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2.

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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
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<td>272.03</td>
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***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geisser F-Tests are reported.

Table 5.2. Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3.

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<td>df</td>
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<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
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<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>2.55</td>
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<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>2.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>160.77</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geisser F-Tests are reported.
Table 5.3. Repeated measures ANOVA on overall support for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>MS</td>
<td>F</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
<td>MS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>1.81</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>45.28***</td>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>432.15</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>432.15</td>
<td>9981.15***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>2.11</td>
<td>Partisanship</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>15.70***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Party Voting</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.002</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>0.001</td>
<td>0.06</td>
<td>Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.01</td>
<td>0.32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Error                  | 8.58 | 599.91 | 0.01 | Error     |                      | 9.27 | 214 | 0.043 |                      |

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Before moving to the next set of analyses, I explored whether partisan strength influences evaluations in a repeated measures ANOVA in interaction with partisanship and party voting. However, because of the low number of strong partisans in the sample (N = 40), I am unable to test for that triple interaction effect. Thus, strength of partisanship is excluded from the rest of the analyses in this chapter.

*Feeling Thermometer Results*

Overall support was created by averaging the responses of three separate measures of attitudes toward Representative Sunderland: feeling thermometer scores, approval ratings, and likelihood of voting for Representative Sunderland. There is less variation in the responses of approval ratings and likelihood of voting than in the responses for feeling thermometer scores because measures of approval ratings and likelihood of voting are based on 5-point and 7-point Likert scale. Feeling thermometer scores range from 0-100, so variability in participant responses to this measure may show a stronger relationship between a participant’s feelings for Representative Sunderland and partisanship and party voting records. Furthermore, feeling thermometer score was the first question asked after participants read each news article. Most importantly, a feeling thermometer score is a common measure of overall evaluations of individuals in political psychology experiments. The next set of analyses will use feeling thermometer scores as the dependent variable.

Moreover, in the following analyses, the partisanship variable will include only partisans (i.e. Independents will be excluded). Since the previous analyses suggest that there is little partisan effect on overall support for Representative Sunderland when
Independents are included in the measure, there might be a stronger relationship when Independents are left out of the analyses. In-partisans will be defined in the same way as in the previous analyses – they are individuals who share the same party identification as Representative Sunderland. Out-partisans are individuals who have the opposite party identification as Representative Sunderland.

Figures 5.5 through 5.7 show the relationship among partisanship, party voting, and time when party voting is presented at Stages 2, 3, and 4. Based on the descriptive evidence from Figure 5.5, a distinct interaction effect is clear when party voting is encountered at Stage 2. For in-partisans, feeling thermometer scores increase slightly when they are learn about Sunderland’s LPV. However, the in-partisans’ feeling thermometer scores decrease by about 9 points from Stage 1 to Stage 2 when they learn about his MPV. For out-partisans at Stage 2, feeling thermometer scores for the LPV condition decrease by about the same amount as the feeling thermometer scores increase in the MPV condition.

When party voting is encountered at Stage 3, in-partisans reveal an unexpected opposite pattern (see Figure 5.6). Feeling thermometer scores decrease when in-partisans learn about the LPV, and they become more positive with MPV. For out-partisans at Stage 3, feeling thermometer scores decrease for both MPV and LPV, but the negative change in feeling thermometer scores is more pronounced for LPV.

The difference in mean overall support as a function of party voting record is trivial when party voting is displayed in the fourth and final stage (see Figure 5.7). When
LPV or MPV is viewed at Stage 4, feeling thermometer scores decrease for in-partisans, although the drop is more substantial for LPV. For out-partisans, there is only a slight decline in feeling thermometer scores for both LPV and MPV.

To evaluate the statistical significance of these descriptive findings, three two-way repeated measures ANOVAs are reported in Tables 5.4 through 5.6. The between-subjects variance results show that partisanship is an important factor for feeling thermometer scores at Stages 2 and 4 (F(1, 79) = 4.12, p<.05, and F(1, 175) = 9.77, p<.01, respectively).

As with all of the previously reported analyses involving time, the within-subjects variance results indicate that the feeling thermometer scores become significantly more positive as time passes from Stages 1 through 4 (see Figures 5.5 through 5.7).

When party voting is provided at Stage 2, there is a significant within-subjects effect for the triple interaction of time, partisanship, and party voting (p<.05; see Table 5.4). Among in-partisans, feeling thermometer scores decreased in the MPV condition and remained about the same when LPV was encountered (see Figure 5.5). Among out-partisans at Stage 2, feeling thermometer scores increased in the MPV condition and decreased in the LPV condition. This significant effect indicates that the variations in evaluations at Stage 2 that were described above are not random but rather are systematically a function of the combination of partisanship, party voting, and time.
Figure 5.5. Feeling thermometer scores for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 for partisans.

Figure 5.6. Feeling thermometer scores for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3 for partisans.
Figure 5.7. Feeling thermometer scores for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4 for partisans.
Table 5.4. Repeated measures ANOVA on feeling thermometer score for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 for partisans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>9424.12</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>465.56</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>90.28</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>1243.69</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>30524.44</td>
<td>213.94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.

Table 5.5. Repeated measures ANOVA on feeling thermometer score for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3 for partisans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>3073.51</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>2013.06</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>1471.64</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>109.04</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>43454.99</td>
<td>138.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, +p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Table 5.6. Repeated measures ANOVA on feeling thermometer score for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4 for partisans.
As suggested by the descriptive analyses, the three-way interaction among party voting, partisanship, and time fails to reach significance when party voting was learned at Stages 3 or 4 (see Tables 5.5 and 5.6). This suggests that the interaction effect of party voting and partisanship is most important at the initial stages and less influential when party voting is introduced at a later time when attitudes have already been established for over two weeks, supporting Hypothesis 3.

*Intelligence Trait Results*

According to the previous findings, the joint impact of party voting and partisanship has little effect on participant’s attitudes unless party voting is encountered early on. As discussed in Chapter 1, individuals evaluate politicians based on their perceived traits, which is a more specific form of evaluations than general measures like feeling thermometer scores and approval ratings that I have used in the analyses in this dissertation. In this section, I will explore how party voting, partisanship, and time influences trait evaluations.

The five trait measures of traits were provided directly after participants answered the support questions. As discussed in the measures section, the question asked “how much would you say each phrase below fits with your impression of John Sunderland?” and was followed by the following traits: leader, caring, intelligent, trustworthy, honest, and experienced.

While the main trait of interest is trustworthiness because of the a priori assumption that party voting and partisanship should influence the development of trust
over time, other traits are also considered as an exploratory exercise. Because of this, a repeated measure ANOVA was estimated using each of these traits as the dependent variable. Just as in the previous section, I limited my sample to partisans – Independents were excluded from these analyses.

Contrary to what I expected, the interaction among time, partisanship, and party voting was not significant for perceived trustworthiness. There was a significant three-way interaction effect of time, partisanship, and party voting for perceived caring and perceived honesty when party voting was presented at Stage 2. No other interaction effects were significant for caring or honesty when party voting was displayed at Stages 3 or 4. These results parallel the results from the previous section where feeling thermometer scores served as the dependent variable. Another interesting result emerged when the intelligence trait served as the dependent variable. The intelligence trait findings will be discussed in detail here.

Figures 5.8 through 5.10 display how evaluations of intelligence change over time. When in-partisans learn about Sunderland’s party voting record at Stage 2 for in-partisans, both MPV and LPV lead to drops in perceived intelligence, but the negative change is greater for MPV. For out-partisans at Stage 2, there is a dramatic drop in intelligence for LPV, and a slight uptick in intelligence ratings for MPV.

When party voting is exposed at Stage 3, there is a slight increase in intelligence ratings from Stage 2 to 3 for LPV (see Figure 5.9) for in-partisans. For MPV, there is a large decrease in intelligence ratings, dropping from “Somewhat” to “A little.” For out-
Figure 5.8. Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 for partisans.

Figure 5.9. Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3 for partisans.
Figure 5.10. Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4 for partisans.
partisans, LPV leads to a slight decrease in intelligence ratings, and MPV leads to a slight increase.

When party voting is introduced in the final stage for in-partisans, there is a slight decrease in intelligence ratings for LPV and a slight increase in intelligence ratings for MPV, but this movement is quite small, which may indicate there is little difference between the two conditions to warrant a significant finding (see Figure 5.10). For out-partisans, the results are similar where intelligence ratings barely move from Stage 3 to 4 for both MPV and LPV. It appears that party voting does not affect intelligence ratings at the final stage.

In the two-way repeated measures ANOVA, the between-subjects variance results indicate that party voting and partisanship separately may shape individuals’ evaluations of Representative Sunderland’s intelligence regardless of time. However, this is only apparent when party voting is encountered at Stage 2 or 3 (see right-hand side of Tables 5.7 through 5.9). When party voting is viewed at Stage 2, partisanship is significant, $F(1, 83) = 4.64, p<.05$. On average, in-partisans evaluated Representative Sunderland about 0.20 points higher on the intelligence rating scale than out-partisans when party voting is viewed at Stage 2. Partisanship is not significant in the between-subjects results when party voting is encountered at Stages 3 or 4. Party voting is highly significant when party voting is viewed at Stage 3, $F(1, 52) = 7.05, P<.001$. The mean intelligence rating is about 0.40 points higher for the MPV condition than the LPV condition. This suggests that regardless of time or partisanship, moderate party voting is favored over loyal party voting when party voting is viewed at Stage 3. Although this finding is not
Table 5.7. Repeated measures ANOVA on Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 2 for partisans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>2.39</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>0.12</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>1.06</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>2.41</td>
<td>2.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>78.43</td>
<td>215.57</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.

Table 5.8. Repeated measures ANOVA on Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 3 for partisans.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Within subjects variance</th>
<th>Between subjects variance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SS</td>
<td>df</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Party Voting</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time X Partisanship X Party Voting</td>
<td>2.16</td>
<td>2.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Error</td>
<td>52.84</td>
<td>153.58</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05, + p<.10; Greenhouse-Geiser F-Tests are reported.
Table 5.9. Repeated measures ANOVA on Intelligence Trait Rating for Representative Sunderland when party voting is displayed at Stage 4 for partisans.
consistent with the results when party voting was encountered at Stages 2 or 4, this may suggest that party voting on its own will influence intelligence ratings, and that being more moderate will lead individuals to perceive a legislator as being more intelligent. The interaction effect for Partisanship X Party voting was not significant in any of the models for the between-subjects results.

In the within-subjects variance results, there is a significant interaction effect between time and partisanship when party voting is displayed at Stage 4 (p<.10). More importantly, the within-subjects results show promise for the triple interaction effect of the Time X Partisanship X Party voting variable. When party voting is viewed at Stages 2 and 3, the three-way interaction among time, partisanship, and party voting is significant (p<.10). As seen in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, MPV leads to a lower intelligence rating than LPV for in-partisans and LPV leads to a lower intelligence rating than MPV for out-partisans. This finding does not hold when party voting is displayed at Stage 4. The significant triple interaction at Stages 2 and 3 and nonsignificant finding at Stage 4 confirms Hypothesis 3, that party voting is most influential at earlier stages than later stages.

I expected trustworthiness to be related to party voting and included additional trait ratings as an exploratory exercise. Surprisingly, trustworthiness was not significantly related to party voting in my analyses. Three other traits – caring, honesty, and intelligence – were significantly influenced by the triple interaction of time, partisanship, and party voting when party voting was displayed at Stage 2. Additionally, a significant triple interaction was revealed when party voting was displayed at Stage 3.
for the intelligence trait. It is unclear why these particular traits are affected by party voting only at the beginning of impression formation. Future research should seek to further explore the relationship between traits and party voting.

**Discussion**

The experimental design was altered in this chapter so participants received one stage each week over the course of four weeks. Because there was more time between each stage, the findings differ somewhat from Chapter 4. The major glaring discrepancy between these two chapters is that party voting has less of an impact on evaluations when the experimental time period was extended. Party voting did not significantly interact with partisanship to influence overall support – in the univariate ANOVA and in the repeated measures ANOVA. Because of this, I considered alternate versions of the dependent variable and partisanship. I substituted feeling thermometer scores and trait ratings in the place of overall support in some of the analyses. I also limited my sample to partisans and excluded Independents. After these changes were made to the models, party voting emerged as a more influential variable in the analyses.

Based on the results from the feeling thermometer analysis, party voting is most influential at the beginning stages of impression formation. The triple interaction among party voting, partisanship, and time is only significant when party voting is encountered at Stage 2. The only time in-partisans were positively affected by LPV is when party voting was encountered at Stage 2 (albeit there is only a slight increase in evaluations). This finding matches the results from previous chapters where the evaluations of in-
partisans barely respond to a loyal party voting record. The feeling thermometer scores of in-partisans declined when LPV was encountered at Stages 3 and 4. Thus, it is not the case that in-partisans are strong supporters of loyal party voting as might be expected under the party brand theory.

Not only did party voting influence general evaluations like feeling thermometer scores, but party voting also influenced evaluations of specific trait characteristics. Traits were used in this chapter as dependent variables to examine how party voting and partisanship affect specific evaluations over time. The results show that party voting and partisanship influenced the intelligence ratings. It was surprising the intelligence trait was most affected by partisanship and party voting instead of other traits like trustworthiness or leadership. Party voting records, defined as an accumulation of decisions made by a legislator in office, may be connected to an individual’s perception of how competent a legislator is in office. Both in-partisans and out-partisans think less of the MC’s intelligence when they encounter LPV at Stage 2, although the negative change in evaluations is much larger for out-partisans. Perhaps the reason for this negative intelligence evaluation is that the general public views party loyalty as an unpopular behavior, so they would consider it to be foolish for a MC to have a loyal party voting record.

Generally speaking, the evidence from this study suggests that party voting and partisanship influence feeling thermometer scores and intelligence ratings the most when party voting is displayed early on. However, there are several limitations in this experiment. The predicted triple interaction of party voting, partisanship, and time is
only significant for limited dependent measures – feeling thermometer scores and trait ratings – are used. More importantly, a large number of participants were not randomly assigned to each of the party voting stages. All participants in Fall 2012 received the party voting news article at Stage 4 to make up for the lack of participants who were randomly assigned to this condition in Summer 2012. If all participants had been randomly assigned to each party voting stage, the cell sizes would be more comparable and the outcomes may have been different. Nonetheless, even with a large number of participants viewing party voting at Stage 4, party voting was not an important factor, further confirming that party voting does not influence evaluations later in the impression formation process. In the future, additional data should be collected that replicates Summer 2012’s experimental design where participants are randomly assigned to each party voting stage.
CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION

The primary purpose of this dissertation was to examine party voting with an emphasis on temporal dynamics. In particular, I considered two important political processes: (1) a MC’s party voting behavior and (2) constituent evaluations of the party voting behavior of a MC. Previous research has not considered the dynamic nature of MCs’ voting habits and constituent evaluations. I considered the impact of time using three separate approaches. In Study 1, I examine whether length of time in office influences a MC’s party voting record. I compare the impact of party voting on citizens’ evaluations of newer and more senior MCs in Study 2. Finally, Study 3 consists of experiments that track the impact of party voting over the course of the impression formation process. The dissertation highlights the importance of studying the dynamics of party voting from both the constituent perspective using survey and experimental analyses and from the representative perspective by investigating behavioral voting trends in congressional data analyses.

It is clear that this investigation is only a beginning to understanding the temporal dynamics of party voting. Some contradictory findings emerged from the empirical results. Key among these is the finding that MCs tend to become more loyal to their
party the longer they sit in office, while constituents either respond negatively to loyal party voting or at best reward it only negligibly, depending on their partisanship and the MCs’ seniority. Furthermore, even though some of my findings show that party voting information has a weaker impact on evaluations later in the impression formation process, it appears that more senior members will be punished more than their junior counterparts who vote loyally. Taken together, these findings suggest a political landscape where the loyal party voting behavior of more senior MCs is at odds with the public’s negative reaction to that behavior. Another surprising result from the empirical chapters is that out-partisans dislike loyal party voting more than in-partisans approve of it. In short, while some of the results partially clarify our understanding of party voting, new research puzzles emerge and future research should seek to understand how robust these conclusions are and identify their underlying causes.

Studying party loyalty throughout a legislator’s career and examining the effect of party loyalty on constituents’ evaluations are important for several reasons. First, the results are relevant to debates as to whether there is polarization in the electorate (e.g. Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope, 2006; Levendusky, 2010). For the most part, individuals do not respond positively to a MC with a strong party voting record, even when they share the same partisanship, suggesting that constituents have not become more polarized. Second, it is important to understand party voting habits because loyal party voting has contributed to the recent rise of party government in the United States. Third, party voting directly affects legislative outcomes. Consider, for example, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (otherwise known as Obamacare) and how the votes were
nearly split evenly between the parties. Obviously gridlock is another concern when there is strong party loyalty in Congress. Finally, the average length of service in the House is five terms (Manning, 2011). Because MCs are spending long periods of time in office, it is important to understand if and why their voting records change throughout their careers.

Furthermore, the dissertation explores how constituent opinion evolves over time. As political scientists develop a better understanding of how constituent evaluations are formed and updated, we will have a more clear view of the legislative behaviors that are consequential for those evaluations. In regards to party loyalty, we can begin to understand whether a MC’s party voting is a reflection of what the electorate values in a representative. As we advance our understanding of legislative voting habits and how those actions affect constituent impressions, we will develop stronger insights into how constituents hold legislators accountable for their actions, an essential component of democracy.

In the remainder of this chapter, I review the key results from Chapters 2 through 5. After summarizing the findings, I discuss the theoretical implications of these results. In the final section, limitations of the dissertation and future directions for research on the dynamics of party voting are discussed.

Review of Empirical Results

The three studies explored several aspects of the temporal dynamics of MCs’ party voting trends and the impact of party voting on constituent evaluations. The goal of
the analyses reported in Chapter 2 was to examine the stability in congressional party voting because the previous literature presents mixed evidence on the consistency of party voting. Three outcomes are possible: (1) consistent voting records, (2) greater party loyalty at the beginning of MCs’ careers, and (3) greater party loyalty at the end of their careers. After gathering congressional data spanning three decades, I use a fixed-effects regression to test whether MCs’ party voting records at the beginning of their careers differ from their party voting records later in their careers. The empirical findings indicate that party voting increases over time, suggesting that MCs develop greater party loyalty over the course of their careers. It is important to note that this result does not mean MCs are extremely moderate at the beginning of their careers. The point here is that legislators begin their careers in Congress a bit less partisan than when they finish their careers.

There are several possible reasons for finding that MCs exhibit greater party loyalty as their careers develop. One possible explanation is that MCs become focused on developing a party brand later in their careers. In this case, a senior MC may anticipate an increase in constituent approval of the MC’s party as the MC establishes a public image as an experienced statesman with strong party ties. Or, personal goals and incentives may also be implicated, as greater party loyalty may be used to secure a leadership position within the party. Another potential reason for the observed increase in party voting as MCs become more senior is the possibility that the parties themselves have become more partisan over time. If parties are becoming more partisan over time, then a larger number of partisan bills may be brought to the floor each year by the
majority party through agenda setting. Also, it may take time for incumbents to learn the new direction in which the party is heading as parties become more polarized.

A final explanation is that MCs may exhibit lower levels of party loyalty at the beginning of their careers to gain support from a broad range of constituents. The results from the other analyses in the dissertation provide little support for this explanation. The results in Chapter 3 indicate that constituents respond more favorably to moderate party voting and the experimental results generally indicate that out-partisans reward moderate party voting to a greater extent than in-partisans reward loyal party voting.

My second objective was to consider how party voting influences constituent opinion over time. First, I compared how representative samples from the ANES evaluate junior and senior MCs based on their party voting records and partisanship. I expected to find party voting records to be more influential in evaluations of junior members and to have little impact on evaluations of senior members, because I expected that more senior MCs have already developed a positive reputation with their constituents. However, this hypothesis was not supported in Chapter 3. The results indicate that it was the evaluations of more senior members that were most affected by party voting records. The ANES data utilized in Chapter 3 are not suitable for investigating why this outcome occurred. Perhaps constituents give junior MCs more leeway as they begin their careers and so are more willing to excuse strong or even excessive party loyalty early on. As MCs become more senior and are expected to understand and respect constituents’ wishes, loyal party voting may have more negative consequences.
When I analyzed the ANES data in Study 2, I assumed that participants are aware of the length of time their MC has been in office or at a minimum that they know that their representative is a newer or more senior member. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine whether the survey respondents in fact have this knowledge. Surveys could incorporate questions gauging citizens’ knowledge about their representatives and their records, which would give researchers the opportunity to understand how this knowledge matters for evaluations. In Study 3, the simple cue of stating whether the MC is in his first term or has served for eight years did not affect evaluations of the MC. A second suitable methodological approach would be to observe how evaluations evolve as an individual becomes more familiar with a MC by tracking how levels of support develop over time, as more information about the MC is encountered.

The Study 3 experiments took this second approach. The key difference between the experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 5 was the amount of time that passed between each stage of the experiment. The student and adult participants (Experiments A and B, respectively) in Chapter 4 completed the four stages of the experiment in about thirty minutes, whereas the student participants in Chapter 5 completed the four stages in four weeks. In both sets of experiments, overall impressions became more positive over time, regardless of partisanship and the MC’s party voting record. This result is consistent with previous research on familiarity and positivity bias (see Sears, 1983).

Counter to predictions, the results from Experiment A in Chapter 4 revealed no significant difference in evaluations of a MC as a function of when the party voting record was encountered. However, given the small number of student participants in
each of the conditions in that experiment, it is probable that study lacked sufficient statistical power. However, the number of MTurk participants in Experiment B was much larger, and those results indicated that the joint impact of party voting information and partisanship had a greater impact on evaluations when party voting was introduced at an earlier time (Stage 2) instead of at a later time (Stages 3 or 4). The results reported in Chapter 5 also corroborate the conclusions that party voting has a greater impact earlier in the impression formation process, although qualified by the types of dependent variables (feeling thermometer scores and intelligence ratings) and excluding Independents from the analyses. Taken together, Experiment B and the four-week study results suggest that party voting is most influential when it is learned earlier rather than later supporting Hypothesis 3. This conclusion appears to be inconsistent with the results obtained in Study 2, where the voting records of more senior MCs, rather than more junior MCs, had a greater impact on citizens’ evaluations. In reconciling these conflicting conclusions, it is important to keep in mind that “time” was treated differently in each study. In the Study 3 experiments, I can observe the time at which an individual learns about a party voting record, but I am unable to control for when respondents encounter party voting records in the survey analyses reported in Chapter 2. Rather, the temporal focus there was on seniority per se.

I also predicted that in-partisans would favor LPV over MPV, and that out-partisans would react more positively to MPV than LPV (Hypotheses 1a and 1b). As expected, the experimental results in Chapter 4 supported these hypotheses (see Figures 4.2 and 4.4). However, these results were not replicated in the Chapter 5 experiment.
The nonsignificant finding in Chapter 5 might be attributed to the randomization issue where more participants received the party voting record stimulus at Stage 4 than at the earlier stages. The length of time is greatest between learning the MC’s partisanship at Stage 1 and Stage 4, and party voting may have less of an effect on individuals if they are not reminded of the MC’s partisanship when they learn about party voting record. However, even if the non-randomized participants who learned about party voting in Stage 4 are omitted from the analyses, party voting is not a significant factor. The Chapter 3 survey results are also in contrast to the Chapter 4 experimental results. In Chapter 3, the results indicated that both in-partisan and out-partisan evaluations were negatively affected by LPV, although the negative effect of party voting on evaluations for out-partisans was about four times the size of the negative effect of party voting for in-partisans (see Table 3.3, Model 2). Because of the inconsistencies across the different studies, among these findings, Hypothesis 1a – that in-partisans favor LPV over MPV – cannot be confirmed. Hypothesis 1b, that out-partisans favor MPV over LPV, is supported by the results in Chapters 3 and 4.

A consistent pattern that emerged in Chapters 3 through 5 is that out-partisans dislike LPV more than in-partisans value it. As just noted, Chapter 3’s survey results illustrate that out-partisans react more negatively to LPV than do in-partisans. The experimental results in Chapters 4 and 5 show a similar pattern where the difference in the impact of MPV and LPV on evaluations was more pronounced for out-partisans than in-partisans, with out-partisans punishing LPV more than in-partisans rewarded it (see Figures 4.2, 4.5-4.10, and 5.5-5.10). There are a couple potential explanations for this.
consistent asymmetry in the findings. One possibility is that the asymmetry is the result of a negativity bias, where negative information carries more weight than positive information when forming an impression (e.g. Baumeister, Bratslavisky, Finkenauer, and Vohs, 2001; Kanouse and Hanson, 1972). According to the argument, the negative implications associated with LPV for out-partisans are more influential than positive implications associated with LPV for in-partisans. Another potential explanation for the asymmetry is that out-partisans may view MPV more favorably because it is unexpected that a MC would be willing to vote with the other side on a regular basis. Social psychologists have long understood (Jones and Davis, 1965) that unexpected behaviors elicit deeper levels of information processing and so have a greater impact on judgments. From this perspective, the unexpected MPV would be more consequential for out-partisans than the expected LPV would be for in-partisans. Whether or not this individual-level asymmetry has macro-level implications is an open question. It does suggest that a MC from a split district who engages in high levels of party voting is at a greater risk of losing his or her seat since LPV has a greater effect on out-partisans than in-partisans.

Despite the asymmetry noted above, overall, I find that constituents – even in-partisans – tend to dislike MCs with high levels of party voting. Perhaps the current record-low levels of confidence in Congress (Mendes & Wilke, 2013) are testament to constituents’ disappointment with highly partisan voting records contributing to partisan gridlock. If MCs were solely concerned with citizens’ negative reactions to loyal party voting, an optimal strategy for MCs would be to act in a more bipartisan manner. This
poses an interesting paradox, because it is clear from the results in Study 1 that the average MC has a very loyal party voting record and that MCs tend vote even more loyally as their tenure increases. There are a few potential reasons why MCs vote loyally even though their constituents disapprove of it. Personal and professional goals may play a role. Many MCs are ambitious and would like to attain a committee chair or party leadership position, and loyal party voting may be instrumental in reaching those goals. For others, loyalty to a party’s political ideology may trump other considerations. It is also possible that MCs misperceive the negative effect of party voting. MCs may believe they will gain support from in-partisans by voting loyally without realizing that loyal party voting does little to positively influence in-partisans’ opinions and, if anything, can lead to more negative evaluations in the aggregate.

MCs have available to them strategies to mitigate the negative effect of party voting. For example, MCs may strategically appear more moderate in their communication to the district but vote with the party at high levels. Another strategy would be to engage in high levels of district service so loyal party voting may have less of an effect on constituent opinion. Future research should consider how legislative actions in and out of Congress influence constituents in conjunction with party voting records.

The dissertation results extend the findings from two recent related studies about partisanship and party voting. My results from Chapter 3 confirm the results from Carson et al. (2010) where party voting negatively influences constituents’ opinions while controlling for partisanship. I extend those findings by demonstrating the negative
impact is more or less likely to occur under certain conditions. For example, this	negative effect is weaker for junior MCs than senior MCs (see Study 2), and there is
some evidence that in-partisans favor loyal party voting over moderate party voting (see
Study 3).

I also explored the moderating role of partisan strength, as Harbridge and
Malhotra (2011) found that only strong in-partisans responded favorably to loyal party
voting over moderate party voting. My results provide mixed support for this result. I
found no difference in evaluations of MCs when strong and weak partisans were
compared in Chapter 3’s survey analysis. Perhaps one reason for this null result is that
my measure for strength of partisanship is slightly different than the measure used in
Harbridge and Malhotra’s study. I included Independent leaning Republicans and
Democrats as weak partisans but Harbridge and Malhotra excluded these participants
from their analyses.

In Chapter 4, there was some evidence of differences between strong and weak
partisans in their reactions to MPV and LPV. Over time, however, strength of
partisanship did not moderate the triple interaction among party voting, partisanship, and
time. Given the fact that my experiments relied either on student samples, who are less
likely to have yet developed strong partisan attachments, or MTurk workers who are
disproportionately Democrats, my conclusions regarding the impact of partisan strength
on reactions to party voting should be viewed as tentative. Future research utilizing more
representative samples will be necessary to understand if and why strength of
partisanship influences evaluations of party voting.
Finally, a common theme within the dissertation was to consider how majority membership influenced MC’s voting habits and the joint impact of majority membership and party voting on constituents’ opinions. There is some evidence that majority membership influences party voting. When minority members become majority members, their party voting levels increase (see Chapter 2). However, there was no evidence that seniority and majority membership interacted to influence party voting trends in that study. In Chapter 3, the interaction of party voting and seniority had no effect on evaluations of minority members, but it did have a significant impact on majority members. However, the experimental results provided little evidence that majority membership is consequential for individuals’ opinions. The chapter 5 analyses yielded an unexpected finding suggesting that majority membership interacted with partisanship to influence evaluations, but majority membership did not interact with party voting. In sum, more research is needed to fully explore how majority membership influences constituent evaluations and whether constituent reactions to party voting differ based on majority membership.

**Implications**

These results have methodological and theoretical implications for studies in legislative behavior and political psychology. Previous research has failed to consider when and why party voting may change over time. The results I present in Chapter 2 should lead us to reconsider the utility of a simple party brand theory, as my findings indicate MCs vary in their levels of party loyalty over time. Party brand theory does not provide any theoretical basis for the observed instability in party voting. Moreover, in
both the survey and the experimental analyses, in-partisans’ evaluations of their MCs rarely become more favorable when loyal party voting occurred. Rather, most of the results show that in-partisans’ evaluations decreased or remained about the same when they encountered loyal party voting. Party brand theory also provides no theoretical mechanisms to account for this negligible or even negative impact of loyal party voting among in-partisans.

Furthermore, political scientists and political psychologists should work harder to incorporate temporal dynamics into research on constituent impression formation. I follow the lead of two innovative longitudinal experiments (see Miller, 2010 and Mitchell, 2012) by conducting a longitudinal experimental analysis of individuals’ evaluations that points to important methodological and theoretical innovations. It is possible to investigate the development of impressions over time, and to develop stronger theoretical principles for when and why information may matter at one point in the information stream and not at another. For example, my study shows that certain information such as party voting can have a strong effect on evaluations when impressions of a legislator are just beginning to develop, whereas later on the same information has less of an impact. Further methodological and theoretical developments along these lines will enrich our understanding of how constituents evaluate their elected representatives.

Most importantly, these findings suggest that the effect of time, conceptualized in various ways, should be more carefully incorporated in research on congressional voting behavior and on constituent impression formation. Doing so will enhance our existing
theories and broaden our general understanding of several key democratic processes such as representation and the representative-constituent relationship.

Prospects for Future Research

Limitations of dissertation

While this dissertation provides suggestive evidence that time plays a role in how MCs vote and when constituents react to party voting, it must be acknowledged that there are several limitations to the empirical tests I report. First, I can only speculate as to the reasons that MCs vote somewhat less with their party at the beginning of their careers. One way to address this shortcoming would be to interview junior and senior MCs in order to understand the goals and ends they hope to achieve with different levels of party voting. Another limitation of this dissertation is that all party votes are weighted equally in my analyses. Certainly there are some party votes that will be more consequential than others. For example, a vote on a highly publicized topic like immigration will have a stronger impact on constituent opinion and a party’s decision to fund a MC’s campaign than an insignificant procedural vote. While the aggregated party voting record used in this dissertation may serve as a signal to constituents of how MCs will vote on important issues, it would be useful to examine how party voting on salient issues affects constituent evaluations in future studies.

It also important to acknowledge that the confounding influence of agenda control makes it difficult to compare party voting over time. Through agenda control, majority leaders can select the bills that have the most party support and bring them to a vote.
Majority leaders try to avoid controversial bills that may splinter party unity, especially since several coalitions exist within the parties. For example, oftentimes fiscal conservatives do not agree with social conservatives’ positions. Or Blue Dog Democrats will not see eye to eye with other Democrats. Because of agenda control, there may be a stronger appearance of overall party unity than actually exists, which makes it especially difficult to compare party voting over time. One way to address this issue would be to examine the proportion of party votes by policy over time, which I plan to do in future research.

Another limitation of this dissertation involves the hypothetical experimental design in Chapters 4 and 5. In Chapter 5, I extend the duration of the experiment to four weeks to gain a more realistic perspective of how individuals’ evaluations change over time. Despite the advantages to view change in evaluations over several weeks, I am most interested in how actual evaluations change throughout an incumbent’s career, which lasts for years. Only a study that follows the impressions of constituents for several years could address this limitation. Unfortunately, this would be an extremely difficult endeavor due to the resources needed to fund this type of research.

In Chapter 3, I examined the relationship between party voting, seniority, and constituent opinion when congressional data was merged with opinion data. However, this is at best an indirect measure of how constituents are affected by party voting. A more direct measure would be to ask participants if they know the legislator’s party voting record in a survey. It is likely that most individuals would not know the specific party voting score, but perhaps they could estimate where their MC fits on a party loyalty
scale (e.g. very loyal, loyal, moderate, disloyal, very disloyal). In addition, it would be useful to control for the length of time the constituent has lived in the district, in order to better disentangle the amount of time the constituent has known an MC from the amount of time that MC has been in office.

Future research objectives

The results reported in this dissertation raise a plethora of additional research questions about party loyalty trends in Congress and the evolving nature of constituent opinion. I plan to address these questions in my future research. In this final section, I will discuss several of these future research objectives.

While my dissertation focuses solely on party voting in Congress, future extensions of this work will examine other forms of party loyalty. Are the dissertation results specific to party voting, or would I find similar outcomes with other perceived loyal or moderate congressional behavior? For example, I would like to compare the influence of moderate and loyal party voting on constituent opinion with other congressional actions like co-sponsorship of a bipartisan and partisan bill. I am interested in studying other manifestations of party loyalty such as the number of times a MC makes a floor appearance for a partisan bill, the amount of times the MC mentions support for the party in news releases, and the number of times the MC attends a partisan function.

I conceptualize loyalty as party allegiance based on the percentage of party votes during a term, but certainly there are other types of loyalty that are important in politics. Some MCs are loyal party voters yet they are loyal to district interests as well. For
example, John Dingell, the longest-serving MC, is considered a loyal Democrat, but he is also loyal to his working-class constituents who work in the automotive industry. His district loyalty may conflict with party loyalty, such as when there is environmental legislation on car emissions. In the future, I would like to examine how individuals react to different types of loyalties, especially when these loyalties may conflict with each other.

In Chapter 5, I find evidence that intelligence trait ratings are affected by party voting and partisanship. Why was intelligence and not the other traits influenced by party loyalty? Is it the result of using an aggregated party voting score? Would party votes on specific issues have different consequences for different trait perceptions? For example, a Democrat’s party vote on a pro-immigration bill may lead to enhanced perceptions of empathy, whereas a Republican’s vote on a defense bill may influence perceptions of strength.

In order to keep the dissertation a manageable length, I ignored the possibility that individual differences, other than partisanship, may moderate how individuals react to loyal party voting. In-group loyalty is a moral foundation (see Graham, Haidt, and Nosek, 2009, for a review) that may influence how people react to loyal party voting. Measures of in-group loyalty were included in my experiment, so it would be interesting to see whether people with high and low levels of in-group loyalty react to loyal and moderate party voting records differently.

More broadly, I would like to study how MCs are socialized into Congress throughout their careers. How does each party attempt to mold representatives into
faithful party members? To what extent do partisan caucuses like the Republican Study Committee and Congressional Progressive Caucus influence party cohesion in Congress? Do patterns in the policy content of the legislative agenda give members the flexibility to vote with or against their party without losing constituent support? Does a quick turnover of the majority in Congress lead to legislation that is less moderate than when a party maintains the majority for a longer period of time? Studying both sides of the constituent-representative relationship will offer a more comprehensive analysis of party loyalty which has important consequences for representation and accountability in a democracy.
REFERENCES


APPENDIX: ANES VARIABLES, MTURK RECRUITING MATERIALS, STIMULUS MATERIALS, AND DISTRACTION TASK

CHAPTER 3

Variables from ANES Cumulative File:

VCF0301 7-pt Scale Party ID

VCF0110 Respondent Education

VCF0310 Respondent Interest in the Elections

VCF0101 Respondent Age

VCF0104 Respondent Gender

VCF0978 Was Respondent Response Correct: Was a House Candidate an Incumbent

VCF0910 Did Respondent Have Contact with House Running Incumbent

The contact list included: respondent met incumbent personally, respondent attended a meeting or gathering where incumbent spoke, respondent talked to a member of incumbent’s staff or someone in the incumbent’s office, respondent received something in mail from incumbent, respondent read about incumbent in a newspaper or magazine, respondent heard incumbent on the radio, and respondent saw incumbent on TV.

VCF0977 Does Respondent Know If One House Candidate Was Already in the House

VCF0908 Thermometer: Incumbent House Candidate

Question wording for feeling thermometer score: “I’d like to get your feelings toward some of our political leaders and other people who are in the news these days. I will use something we call the feeling thermometer and here is how it
works: I’ll read the name of a person and I’d like you to rate that person using the feeling thermometer. Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 and 50 degrees mean that you don’t feel favorable toward the person and that you don’t care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50 degree mark if you don’t feel particularly warm or cold toward the person. If we come to a person whose name you don’t recognize, you don’t need to rate that person. Just tell me and we’ll move on to the next one. Our first person is Ronald Reagan. How would you rate him using the thermometer?”
MTurk recruitment document:

Answer a Political Attitudes survey

We invite all individuals who are U.S. residents and are 18 years of age or older to earn $3.00 by participating in a study about congressional campaigns. Your participation only requires completion of a 30 minute survey where you read a few short news articles and then answer questions. We hope you will agree to participate in this study, as it will contribute importantly to the work of Ohio State researchers while also earning you money. Remember, this survey will be taken online, so email security cannot be guaranteed.

If you would like more information, please respond to Emily Lynch lynch.379@osu.edu.

We thank you very much for your time and interest.

Respectfully,

Professor Kathleen McGraw
Emily Lynch, Ph.D. Candidate

*This HIT is periodically re-posted. If you’ve already completed this HIT previously, please do not complete it a second time. YOU WILL NOT BE COMPENSATED A SECOND TIME.* Thanks!

SURVEY:

Please copy and paste the survey link below into a new window/tab.

https://osucomms.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_00Psb5fawokQKYk

At the end of the survey, you must create a code (5-digit number plus the initials of your first and last name). The code you entered on the survey must match the code you enter below:

Thank you for participating in our study!
[Biography]

LE MARS Daily Sentinel

Politics - B3

John Sunderland, U.S. Representative, 5th district

Party: Republican/Democrat
Birth Date: Nov. 30, 1965
Occupation: Attorney
Religion: Methodist
Education: University of Iowa, BA; University of Iowa College of Law, J.D.

John Patrick Sunderland was born in Le Mars, IA. He grew up and attended high school in Sioux City, where he still lives. Sunderland and his wife, Carolyn, have two children, Matthew (8) and Angela (6).

Sunderland enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1983 and he served until 1986. During these years, he was stationed in Bolivia and Panama. After his Army service, he enrolled at the University of Iowa. He graduated with degrees in both English and Political Science, in 1990.

Upon graduating, he enrolled in the College of Law at the University of Iowa, graduating from there in 1993.

Sunderland has worked as an attorney in private practice at the law firm of Hayek, Brown, & Sunderland since 1993. In 1996, he was elected to the Iowa General Assembly.

[Sunderland has represented Iowa's 5th district in the House of Representatives for over 8 years./ This is Sunderland's first term representing Iowa's 5th district in the House of Representatives]. Sunderland's party, the Republicans/Democrats, are currently the [majority/minority] party in the House. He sits on the House Committee on Veterans' Affairs and is assigned to the Subcommittee on Health and Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity.
How Representative Sunderland voted this term
Review of Representative Sunderland’s current term in Congress

WASHINGTON, DC - The latest statistics on roll-call voting in the House of Representatives have been released. We now know which members of the Iowa delegation vote primarily with their party and which members sometimes vote with the other party.

Historically, it has been the case that some members of Congress vote with members of their own party almost all of the time on controversial issues. Other members choose to vote with their party on some contentious issues and vote with the opposing party on others. According to the U.S. Congress Votes Database, in his first term in the House, John Sunderland has voted with his party [close to 95% of the time/close to 55% of the time].

This percentage was calculated by taking the number of times a member votes with his or her party divided by the total number of roll-call votes that result in a majority of the Republicans voting against a majority of Democrats. For example, if a legislator voted with his party 10 times out of 100 total votes, then his party voting record would be 10%. The U.S. Congress Votes Database documents every vote and member of the House and Senate since 1991. Data is pulled from several sources, including the House clerk, the U.S. Senate and the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.
LE MARS Daily Sentinel

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This percentage was calculated by taking the number of times a member votes with his or her party divided by the total number of roll-call votes that result in a majority of the Republicans voting against a majority of Democrats. For example, if a legislator voted with his party 10 times out of 100 total votes, then his party voting record would be 10%. The U.S. Congress Votes Database documents every vote and member of the House and Senate since 1991. Data is pulled from several sources, including the House clerk, the U.S. Senate and the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.
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This percentage was calculated by taking the number of times a member votes with his or her party divided by the total number of roll-call votes that result in a majority of the Republicans voting against a majority of Democrats. For example, if a legislator voted with his party 10 times out of 100 total votes, then his party voting record would be 10%. The U.S. Congress Votes Database documents every vote and member of the House and Senate since 1991. Data is pulled from several sources, including the House clerk, the U.S. Senate and the Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress.
[News Article B.]

LE MARS Daily Sentinel

Local U.S. Representatives in Action
Sunderland Cosponsors Bill on Prescription Drugs

WASHINGTON, DC – U.S. Representative John Sunderland (IA-5) is cosponsoring the Prescription Drug Reuse and Disposal (PDRD) Act, a bill to help keep unused and expired prescription drugs off the streets and out of the environment.

The bill will allow the redistribution of medical supplies among health providers, require the proper disposal of drugs, and enact other steps to ensure medical supplies have been safely transported and stored. One provision of the bill will create a mail-in program in which pre-paid envelopes will be made available to the public so unused prescription drugs can be mailed to an approved location in each state.

Sunderland said “we are fortunate to have many concerned parents and local leaders working together to raise awareness of the dangers of prescription drug misuse. Our goal in Congress is to provide more tools for them to help protect our kids and our environment.”
Sunderland To Hold Job Fair  
More than Sixty Companies Taking Part  

WASHINGTON, DC - Congressman John Sunderland of Sioux City today announced he will be holding a Western Iowa Job Fair on September 8. The event is open to the public and those seeking employment are invited to attend the fair. The job fair will take place from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. at the Bellevue University 4-H Center.

“Our country is facing a number of challenges – first and foremost is the need for job creation and growth so more people can return to work,” Sunderland said. “From my many local visits and meetings throughout Cass, Buena Vista, and Fremont counties, it is clear that while our economy is slowly making progress toward recovery, there is still much work to be done in this area. That is why I am hosting the job fair.”

Local companies and businesses looking to hire will be on hand to meet with job seekers. In addition, there will also be breakout sessions on resume writing and interview skills. There will be more than sixty companies participating in the job fair, offering more than 1,000 jobs.
Example of Distraction task:

[First page of distraction task]

As part of this study, we would like to better understand how you process images.

Please take **one minute** to compare the two pictures shown on the next page, counting how many differences you can see. After the minute is up, the images will be removed and you will be asked to enter the number of **differences you spotted**.

[Next page]

Count how many differences you see. **You have one minute.**

[Next page]

How many differences between the two pictures shown did you see? ____