Chaos, Coercion, and Organized Resistance; An Organizational Analysis of the Nazi Concentration Camps

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By
Thomas Vernon Maher
Graduate Program in Sociology

The Ohio State University
2013

Dissertation Committee:
Dr. J. Craig Jenkins, Co-Advisor
Dr. Vincent Roscigno, Co-Advisor
Dr. Andrew W. Martin
Abstract

Research on organizations and bureaucracy has focused extensively on issues of efficiency and economic production, but has had surprisingly little to say about power and chaos (see Perrow 1985; Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006), particularly in regard to decoupling, bureaucracy, or organized resistance. This dissertation adds to our understanding of power and resistance in coercive organizations by conducting an analysis of the Nazi concentration camp system and nineteen concentration camps within it. The concentration camps were highly repressive organizations, but, the fact that they behaved in familiar bureaucratic ways (Bauman 1989; Hilberg 2001) raises several questions; what were the bureaucratic rules and regulations of the camps, and why did they descend into chaos? How did power and coercion vary across camps? Finally, how did varying organizational, cultural and demographic factors link together to enable or deter resistance in the camps?

In order address these questions, I draw on data collected from several sources including the Nuremberg trials, published and unpublished prisoner diaries, memoirs, and testimonies, as well as secondary material on the structure of the camp system, individual camp histories, and the resistance organizations within them. My primary sources of data are 249 Holocaust testimonies collected from three archives and content coded based on eight broad categories [arrival, labor, structure, guards, rules, abuse, culture, and resistance]. These testimonies produced 440 “prisoner-camp” events for the analysis of nineteen camps including death camps (Birkenau, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka), labor camps (Auschwitz, Buchenwald, Buna, Dachau, Flossenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Plaszów, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, and Stutthof), and transit camps (Bergen-Belsen, Drancy, Theresienstadt, and Westerbork).

In the first chapter, I show that the camp system was formed with a clearly defined set of draconian rules and punishments designed to control political prisoners. Yet, as the war progressed, broad institutional changes (including the introduction of competing economic and ideological goals), shifting organizational conditions (particularly the rapidly expanding size of the camps), and ideological beliefs (including a racial-ethnic hierarchy that encouraged dehumanization and division) coalesced to create a context where guard behavior could decouple from the formal structure of the camp. The decoupled conditions created an ambiguous and often chaotic environment for prisoners.

In the second chapter, I focus to how power and coercion varied across the camps. Drawing on Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1989; 2001), I locate the organizational characteristics and methods of control associated with high and low mortality in the camps. I find that camps with chaotic and bureaucratic control or chaotic conditions and surveillance were associated with high mortality. Conversely, camps with bureaucratic control and structural violence (but without chaotic control) as
well as labor camps with absent or negligent bureaucratic and chaotic controls were associated with low mortality. I draw on these set conditions to theorize four broad coercive organizational forms – coercive, negligent, chaotic, and tyrannical, and how they relate to power.

Finally, my third chapter investigates the organizational and demographic camp characteristics associated with the emergence of organized resistance groups. I find that camps with chaotic organizational conditions and a high proportion of Jewish prisoners were more likely to hold organized resistance groups. Conversely, camps with cruel low level elites and low proportion of Jews were more likely to have no organized resistance. Collectively, these findings show that prisoners’ assessments of threat were exacerbated by the chaotic conditions of the camps but that resistance groups needed sympathetic, or at least agnostic, low level elites in order to have space to resist.

The rules and regulations of the camps provided a brutal basis for control, but as demographic, economic, and ideological pressures expanded, camp conditions became more chaotic. However, these conditions were not evenly distributed across camps. The camps where prisoners were most likely to describe chaotic conditions – in conjunction with bureaucratic controls or surveillance – were most likely to have high mortality rates. Chaotic conditions also motivated resistance as some groups of prisoners, seeing fewer opportunities for survival and more severe threats to their lives, were motivated to organize resistance groups. These findings hint at the possibility that the characteristics that made the camps monoliths of terror, also offered the means and motivation for resistance.
Dedicated to
Thom and Elaine Maher
Acknowledgments

I would like to start by thanking my excellent committee, Craig Jenkins, Vinnie Roscigno, and Andrew Martin. I cannot conceive of how I would have finished this project without their helpful support and advice. Craig has supported me, and this project, from the moment that I arrived in Columbus. He gave me the space and time to think through issues, especially at crucial stages after generals, and provided insightful and timely feedback throughout the process. More broadly, Craig taught me how to recognize and practice good research and I will be forever grateful. I thank Vinnie for being an optimistic and realistic voice throughout my time in graduate school, and for being willing to take me on as an advisee even though he was about to take a sabbatical. Vinnie taught me how to do historical research that values cases and people without losing sight of the big picture. He also came through with absolutely critical practical and big picture advice about how to collect, code, and analyze historical data. So critical that I would probably still be coding testimonies if it were not for him. I thank Andrew for his steadfast support for the project, and for his patience for my erratic updates. He offered insightful comments on early aspects of the project, and, more broadly, has helped to teach me to write professionally with an eye toward publication.

I would also like to thank Rachel Einwohner for her willingness to mentor me into graduate school, her friendship, and the invaluable advice and support that could only come from someone with similar experience dealing with such sensitive subject matter. I thank Randy Hodson for his thoughtful insights on coding and aggregating qualitative material for analysis, and for pointing out that ambiguity, chaos, and Franz Kafka can be considering in more sociological ways. I am also indebted to Kay Meyer, Eitan Alimi, Greg Maney, and Steve Boutcher for their support and encouragement at multiple stages in the process.

I benefited from the research assistance and guidance of Michlean Amir, Vincent Slatt, and Megan Lewis during my visits to the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum. Their willingness to help me locate sources and references was invaluable. Colin Odden helped with web scraping, data retrieval, and numerous conversations about the project. I am also indebted to Lindsay McCord who conducting reliability coding for the project. I also thank Ohio State University for provided early support for traveling to the archives through an AGGRS grant, and a Presidential Fellowship that gave me a year of uninterrupted focus on data collection and analysis. I cannot thank Julia Miller-Cantzler, Alexa Trumpy, Anne McDaniel, Lisa Neilson, Tate Steidley, and especially Carrie Smith-Keller enough for helping me think through the project at all of its stages.

I am lucky to have met, lived with, and gotten to know so many amazing people during my time in graduate school. Marc Auerbach, Kevin Snorteland, Nick Crane, Paul Malackany, and especially Brookes Hammock were great roommates who were always willing to share food, time, beer, and laughs. Graduate school would have been significantly less fun if it were not for Josh Taylor, Lauri McCloud, Jamie Lynch, Alexa Trumpy, Lindsey Peterson, Carrie Smith-Keller, Pat Keller, Salvatore Restifo, Julie Restifo, Casey Knutson (you are missed), Colin Odden, Rachel Durso, Amanda Miller, Lauren Pinkus, James Davis, and Yolanda Gelo. I am lucky to have had the opportunity to meet, and get to know such a great group of brilliant, funny, hard-working, and inspiring people. This is particularly true of Dan and Jen Carlson without whom I doubt I
would have survived graduate school, and, simultaneously, because of whom I almost did not survive graduate school. I am also thankful to have friends like Aidan, Trisha, and Sidney Heinzerling, Ryan and Sarah Recker, Dan Olejko, Cheyenne Hohmann, Brad Thomson, and Josh Kuntz who have been nothing but supportive, encouraging, and inspiring.

Lastly, I could not have done this without my family. My grandparents, Thom, Rose, Bill, Barb, and Vern, for their pride and encouragement. My parents, to whom this is dedicated, you have been supportive and encouraging the entire time, even though I am sure there were points where it seemed like I would never finish. I could not have done it without you. My siblings, Emily (and Steve & Charlie), Sam, Barb, and Maggie, you have been supported me, distracted me, and never let me forget that I cannot take things too seriously. You’re seven of my favorite people in the world. Finally, I am grateful to Godspeed you! black emperor, Mogwai, John K Samson, Jason Molina, Tom Waits, Radiohead, Neutral Milk Hotel and Botch for providing the soundtrack to which parts of this were written, and coffee for keeping me awake to write it.
Vita

2000................................Bishop Luers High School

2004................................B.A. Sociology & History, Purdue University

2007.............................M.A. Sociology, Ohio State University

2005 – 2013.................Graduate Assistant, Ohio State University

Publications

*Mobilization* 16(2):127-146.


Fields of Study

Major Field: Sociology
Table of Contents

Abstract ........................................................................................................................................... ii

Dedicated to ........................................................................................................................................ iv

Acknowledgments........................................................................................................................................ v

Vita........................................................................................................................................................ vii

Publications ........................................................................................................................................ vii

Fields of Study ...................................................................................................................................... vii

Table of Contents ................................................................................................................................... viii

List of Tables ........................................................................................................................................... x

List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... xi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ............................................................. 1

CHAPTER 2: THEORY ............................................................................................................................... 7

Explaining Chaotic Decoupling in Bureaucratic Organizations ......................................................... 8

Power and Coercion in Organizations ................................................................................................. 12

Methods of Control in Coercive Organizations .................................................................................. 17

Organized Resistance in Coercive Organizations ............................................................................... 21

CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY .......................................................... 27

The Sociology of the Holocaust ........................................................................................................... 28

Holocaust Testimony As Data .............................................................................................................. 30

Aggregating Testimonies .................................................................................................................... 34

Analytic Strategy .................................................................................................................................. 37

CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING CHAOTIC DECOUPLING ........................................................................ 41

Rules and Bureaucracy within the Camps ............................................................................................ 42

The Evolution of the Nazi Concentration Camp System ..................................................................... 50

Expanding Goals and Expectations ..................................................................................................... 57

Mounting Demographic Pressure ....................................................................................................... 63

Ethnic Hierarchy in the Camp System ................................................................................................. 66

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 70

CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COERCION IN THE CAMPS ...................................... 72
List of Tables

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Interview Page Length, by Archive.................................33
Table 2: Demographic and Organizational Measures for Coercion Analysis.............................77
Table 3: Camp Organizational and Demographic Characteristics by Type................................85
Table 4: Reduced Configurations for Organizational Features and Processes Associated with Mortality in the Camps ........................................................................................................87
Table 5: Reduced Configurations for Bureaucracy, Chaos, and Surveillance with Mortality in the Camps ..................................................................................................................................109
Table 6: Logit Regression of Reduced QCA Configurations on Mortality Rates .........................113
Table 7: Structural and Organizational Measures for Resistance Analysis ..................................119
Table 8: Reduced Configurations for Structural and Organizational Characteristics with Organized Resistance ...........................................................................................................127
Table 9: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance .........................134
Table 10: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance .......................135
Table 11: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance .......................137
List of Figures

Figure 1: Institutional and Organizational Hierarchy ................................................................. 46
Figure 2: Evolution of the Camp System, 1935-1945 ................................................................. 53
Figure 3: Camp Mortality Rates and Death Counts ................................................................. 75
Figure 4: Mortality Rate in Relationship to Camp Size ........................................................... 110
Figure 5: Mortality Rate in Relationship to Time Open ........................................................... 112
Figure 6: Average Prisoner-Functionary Behavior Score ......................................................... 122
Figure 7: Average Proportion of Jewish Prisoners, By Camp .................................................. 124
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION & THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

“But the ambiance, and the work that is not work, and the food that isn’t food, and the constant roll calls, and the threats if you don’t show on roll call everybody else gets killed and all this, this has another dimension. And this is when, I mean, you see, I have already learned to live with fear as part of – fear that could at least be used to motivate me to look out and to watch out, to see that I don’t become a burden to my sisters and to see that I can maneuver somehow through.” – Regina Laks Gelb (USHMM, RG-50.030*0041)

Regina Gelb’s description of her experience in the Auschwitz concentration camp is broadly reflective of thousands of other prisoners who struggled and suffered to survive from day to day. Regardless of a prisoner’s status, demographics, or personal history, the camps were terrible and dehumanizing places focused on demoralizing and eventually destroying everyone who passed through their gates. Prisoners were fed too small portions of often moldy, stale, or inedible soup and bread. They were shuffled through roll calls that were intended to keep track of the population while providing a venue for psychological and physical abuse. They were put to work at jobs, such as moving rocks or doing construction, that were meant to destroy their strength and will to survive while being overseen by fellow prisoners who often abused them out of fear that they would lose their “privileged” positions if they did not. If a prisoner survived until they end of the day, they were sent to horribly overcrowded bunks where they fought for a few hours of sleep before they had to wake up and do it all again the next day. These conditions tried prisoners physically and mentally, often forcing them to focus solely on their
immediate survival. But, in spite of these barriers, prisoners still found the time and will to share food, participate in cultural activities like reading, sharing stories, and playing music, and, in some cases, organizing resistance. All of these experiences – the work, rations, day to day struggles, and the space to share, talk, or resist -were embedded in the organizational characteristics of individual camps and the broader Nazi concentration camp system, and differences across camps and broad institutional shifts certainly influenced prisoners daily lives and chances for survival. As a result, it is not only important to recognize and attempt to understand prisoner life in the camps, but also the broader social context that made things worse and, in some cases, motivated resistance.

There has been a long history of sociological and organizational research on how institutional and organizational contexts influence the day to day lives of prisoners, customers, and employees (Gouldner 1955; Morrill and Fine 1997; Hodson 1999; Hallett and Ventresca 2006), and an equally long history of research on resistance in organizations (Zald and Berger 1978; Lammers 1969; Morrill, Rao, and Zald 2003). Yet this research has often had little to say about issues of power (Roscigno 2011), stratification (Perrow 2000), chaos, and ambiguity (Hodson, Martin, Lopez, and Roscigno 2012; Warner 2007) in organizations. Weber warned of an iron cage of bureaucracy as a painful, yet unavoidable, outcome of increased rationalization (1947), but, organizations have also been shown to exhibit highly ambiguous bureaucratic practices including overly complicated or contradictory rules, multiple chains of command, and patrimonialism. The ambiguous side of organizational behavior (Griffin, O’Leary-Kelly, and Collins 1998; Hodson, et al. 2012) is particularly relevant for the employees, prisoners, and citizens who are a part of them. The ambiguity of
organizational practices is relevant to potential resistance groups within them as well. Previous work has shown that institutional breakdowns (Skocpol 1979; Useem 1998), assessments of threat (Almeida 2008; Einwohner and Maher), and organizational infrastructure (Slater 2009; Almeida 2008; Jenkins 1983) influence the emergence of resistance groups, and the clarity of information about each of these factors (institutional change, threat, and infrastructure) is crucial for mobilization.

In this dissertation, I focus on the emergence, variation, and effects of bureaucracy, chaos, and power in the concentration camps. In order to do so, I draw on a combination of primary and secondary data on the organizational rules and functions of the concentration camp system, including written rules, internal memos, and discussion between principle figures, as well as secondary work on individual camps, the concentration camp system, and work on specific economic and ideological practices within the camps. I also look more specifically at organizational life within nineteen Nazi concentration camps by collecting 249 Holocaust testimonies from three archives, and content coding them based on eight theoretically driven categories. Collectively, the 440 “prisoner-camp” events offer insight into how the rules and regulations of individual camps were lived and experienced, especially in light of other camps. These prisoner testimonies offer grounded insights into the organizational conditions of the camps and shed light on variations between camps (Hallett and Ventresca 2006). In sum, these disparate sources of data are useful for answering several questions about the camps, including; what were the rules and regulations of the camps, and why did hierarchically minded soldiers stop abiding by them? how did organizational conditions and methods of control vary across the camps, and how did these variations influence coerciveness?
Finally, how did organizational, cultural, and demographic factors link together to enable or deter resistance?

*The Chapters that Follow*

In this dissertation I examine the relationship between organizational conditions, coercion, and resistance. I build upon prior work on decoupling; power and coercion in organizations; methods of control; and resistance in non-democratic environments to identify how broad institutional, organizational, and demographic conditions lead to chaotic organizational conditions, and how these chaotic conditions influenced coercion and motivated resistance. Identifying the institutional origins of organizational chaos and tracing its effects offers insight into the complex structure of power in organizations and the numerous obstacles groups must overcome in order to resist.

In the next chapter (Chapter 2), I trace the role of bureaucracy and chaos in research on power and organizations. I begin by discussing neo-institutional theories of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977), but with an eye toward identifying how institutional and demographic pressures may lead organizational decoupling to become chaotic and abusive. I then discuss broader comparative research on power in organizations (Adler and Borys 1996; Hodson et al 2012; Goffman 1961) in order to understand how bureaucratic and chaotic conditions are related to power, as well as how varying methods of control such as structural violence (Galtung 1969) and surveillance (Sewell 1998; Foucault 1995) may make conditions worse. Finally, I trace how these organizational conditions may in turn provoke the formation of organized resistance rather than quiescence. Organizations are not always functioning bureaucratic
hierarchies, and understanding how organizational chaos overlaps with power and coercion, and motivates resistance is something that needs to be fully considered.

In the third chapter I begin by briefly summarizing the history of sociological research on the Holocaust. Although unprecedented, the Holocaust is not unique, and the analysis of it has produced insights into social behavior generally (Bauer 2002). I then discuss the data collection and data cleaning process for the analysis of the Holocaust testimonies, outlining the archives the testimonies emerged from, how the sample of camps was selected, the coding process, and the process of data aggregation. I end this chapter with a discussion of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the method of analysis used in chapters five and six. The data collection and analysis process for this project was conducted in order to attempt to understand the organizational characteristics of the camps from the prisoner’s perspective—treating the camps as “inhabited institutions”—while recognizing the limits of the medium and memory on the process (Hallett and Ventresca 2006; Hodson 1999).

The following three chapters (Chapters Four, Five, and Six), are the empirical core of the project. Chapter Four first identifies the organizational rules and regulations for the camps, known as the “Dachau Model,” and specifically outlines its core themes and components. I then trace the institutional pressures that led to guard behavior decoupling from these rules and regulations. I specifically outline how expanding organizational goals, notably the extermination of the Jews and the exploitation of slave labor; mounting demographic pressures; and the ideological belief in a racial-ethnic hierarchy combined to produce chaotic decoupling. The chaotic conditions undermined
the Nazi’s ability to fulfill economic and ideological goals, and made prisoner’s lives even more miserable.

The next two substantive chapters (Five and Six) draw on QCA to identify the social and organizational conditions associated with high mortality rates (which I treat as a proxy for coercion) and organized resistance in the camps. Chapter Five specifically looks at the relationship between bureaucratic control, chaotic control, surveillance, structural violence, and institutional roles to identify comparative similarities and differences across nineteen camps. The QCA set conditions highlight the omnipresence of starvation and surveillance, and focus our attention on four forms of coercion in organizations; coercive, negligent, chaotic, tyrannical. The final substantive chapter turns its attention to how these institutional and demographic factors influence where organized resistance emerged. The analysis focuses particularly on guard behavior, low level elites, the proportion of Jews, and chaotic organizational conditions to show the importance of threatening conditions and the presence of low level elites for mobilization.

I conclude by highlighting the usefulness of integrating organizational chaos and the deliberate abuse of bureaucratic control into our understanding of organizations and collective action. I specifically describe my contribution to these literatures, particularly in regards to neo-institutional decoupling, comparative organizations, and collective action in coercive organizations. The findings from such extreme cases are useful for understanding more contemporary issues for organizations and collective action, and I conclude with a brief discussion of their broader applicability.
CHAPTER 2: THEORY

Early explanations for the Holocaust simply stated that the Nazis committed such atrocities because they were monsters. But work by Hannah Arendt (2002) and Raul Hilberg (2001) countered this claim, showing that the Nazis were more banal bureaucrats than crazed psychopaths.\footnote{This is not to say that they did not believe in what they were doing; a point I will return to later.} Indeed, the bureaucratic structure of the Nazi camp system was one of the central features that provided the logistical capabilities and justification that made the scale of the Holocaust possible (Bauman 1989; Browning 2001). The concentration camp system was, in spite of its unprecedented nature, bureaucratic, and sociological theories of organizations and power are applicable.

This chapter outlines several lines of theoretical work related to power, organizations, and resistance related to the concentration camps. These works are all tied together by a broad theoretical question of how does organizational chaos emerge, and what are its effects? I draw on a number of different theories, primarily neo-institutional decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1987), to understand its emergence; theories of bureaucracies and power in the work place and total institutions to make sense of how it varied (Goffman 1961; Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006; Gouldner 1955); and
theories of revolutions and resistance in non-democratic environments to understand its effects on organized resistance (Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Slater 2009; Einwohner 2003). While these touch on different aspects of the social world, they connect to help explain control and contention in a seemingly inexplicable context.

**Explaining Chaotic Decoupling in Bureaucratic Organizations**

Bureaucracy is a core post-industrial organizational form, and a foundational aspect of organizational theory. Dating back to Weber (1947) and Blau (1957; Blau and Meyer 1971), the major elements of bureaucratic organizations – hierarchy, impersonality, written rules of conduct, promotion based on achievement, specialized division of labor, and efficiency – have received considerable attention (see Perrow 1986 for an overview). Formal rules draw worker’s attention to managerial expectations, help explain desired tasks, shape employer/employee relations, and legitimate punishments (Gouldner 1955). How rules are implemented and whose interests they serve influence their effectiveness and efficiency. Yet, their role shaping the behavior of superiors and subordinates is widely accepted and understood.

According to neo-institutionalism, bureaucracies and organizational rules are embedded in social and cultural conditions, and influenced by shifts in social norms and expectations (Zucker 1987). Within this framework, organizational actors match their formal structures with social values and practices for several reasons; to gain legitimacy, internal power dynamics, to avoid implementing opposing beliefs, in response to external networks, coercive pressure, distrust for new practices, or in response to heterogeneous fields among many others (Ruef and Scott 1998; Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008).

“Because attempts to control and coordinate activities in institutionalized organizations
lead to conflicts and loss of legitimacy, elements of structure are decoupled from activities and from each other” (Meyer and Rowan 1977:357).

The process of decoupling has become a central component of neo-institutionalism, and the decoupling of claims and behavior has been identified in several contexts. However, because they are a part of formal structure, decoupling creates a split between rules and behavior too. Meyer and Rowan see the process of decoupling—particularly activities being performed outside of the manager’s view, goals being rendered ambiguous, avoiding integration, and a reliance on informally sorting out issues— as clear advantages; because “the assumption that formal structures are really working is buffered from the inconsistencies and anomalies involved in technical activities” (1977:357). In some workplaces, where employees identify with the goals and value the products they are producing, decoupling is beneficial for efficiency and production.

However, hierarchical decisions like decoupling are power-laden (Roscigno 2011; Clegg 2010; Westphal and Zajac 2001), and it is not hard to imagine that the conditions created by a break between the formal structure of an organization and the actual behavior has the potential to create coercion for workers; what I call chaotic decoupling. Chaotic decoupling occurs when workers decouple their behavior from institutional expectations, and use the lack of oversight to coerce and abuse subordinates.

As these critiques imply, decoupling may be more perilous than theorized.

Begging the question, what makes the decoupling process chaotic? Like much of the

---

2 Workers are a part of this process. Resistance to decoupling, either through adherence to broader environmental claims or rejection of informal rules, can prevent decoupling from being effective (Turco 2012).

3 Chaotic decoupling is not the same as organizational deviance. With organizational deviance, events occur that do not conform to an organizations goals or expectations (Fox and Harding 2005; Vaughn 1999). With chaotic decoupling, the outcomes match the goals of the organization, just in an inefficient and incomplete way that is coercive for subordinates.
work on bureaucracy, decoupling often presumes that organizations are “oriented towards a specific goal” (Perrow 1986:133, see also Ethiraj and Levinthal 2009, Pache and Santos 2010) when, in reality, they are oriented toward multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals (Cyert and March 1963; Perrow 1961). As a result, *broad institutional changes* may provoke decoupling by introducing new institutional rules with the expectation that organizations adhere to both. Integrating new rules while abiding by prior institutional expectations and interests (especially when prior goals are rooted in deeply held beliefs), can create chaotic decoupling by forcing workers to strive for two sets of goals simultaneously. For example, prisons that are expected to rehabilitate and punish may struggle to do both effectively. Indeed, this is particularly relevant for total institutions like the military, mental hospitals, and work camps where goals are drawn from broader society to act as a “language of explanation” for their existence, and as an impediment to the blind pursuit of control and punishment (Goffman 1961:83).

The other two explanations - changing organizational conditions and shifting ideological positions – focus on more intra-organizational factors that may produce chaos decoupling. Decoupling may be a proactive or reactive response to changing *organizational conditions* as legal, social, or bureaucratic shifts alter the landscape in a way that either remove prior hindrances to behavior; creating an environment where chaos and ambiguity flourish (i.e. it is an intentional choice held back by rules and regulations). Alternately, the increasing speed, demand, or volume of social pressures leads workers to cut corners and shirk bureaucratic rules in order to fulfill expectations. Social pressures may include negotiating rapid population growth, increased demand for

---

4 Meyer and Rowan recognize the potential for rules arising from different parts of the environment conflicting with one another (1977:355). However, this caveat has not been widely acknowledged.
goods and services, or the expectation that workers “do more with less.” Organizational theorists (particularly population ecologists) have long argued that the size and complexity of organizations influence their structure and efficiency (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg 1994). Such ecological shifts influence the potential for chaotic decoupling as well.

Finally, chaotic decoupling may simply be a product of shifting ideological positions. With internally driven ideological shifts (i.e. not influenced by broader socio-cultural shifts), organizations make an ideological decision to undermine bureaucratic rules because they believe that it is the quickest way to achieve their desired ends. Discrimination and dehumanization influence the establishment of goals (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Goffman 1986), and one would expect that they can and do influence the adherence to bureaucratic expectations. On the other hand, either intentionally or unintentionally, a lack of oversight for bureaucratic rules may leave people to their own devices. As Ethiraj and Levinthal explain, managers who are bounded rationally cannot integrate across a diverse set of goals, and the imposition of multiple goals just leads to behavior that prioritizes the status quo (2009:6).

Each of these factors that produce chaotic decoupling are imbued with power. The decision to adopt multiple conflicting goals, or increase the speed, volume, or demand for products and services, or shift ideological goals are top down decisions that benefit those at the top while making organizational conditions more chaotic for subordinates. In some cases, employees may evade these shifts by quitting (Hirschmann 1970), but those in total or coercive institutions (Goffman 1961) or in situations where economic and demographic conditions make quitting untenable are particularly susceptible. For Lukes
power is most engrained when the powerless do not even acknowledge their
position, but that may pale in comparison to conditions where conditions are blatantly
unequal and the oppressed, regardless of will, have no recourse.

One of the most iconic examples of organizational power and coercion is the Nazi
concentration camp system. Within weeks of coming to power, the Nazis had established
the beginnings of a system that would cover Europe, and kill millions of people (Hilberg
2003). In the beginning, guards abided by a strict set of rules and regulations that valued
hierarchy and ideological superiority. By the end of the war, the Nazi elites influence
over the day to day command in the camps was diminished, attempts to extract labor and
arms production from the camps was inefficient at best (Allen 2002), and prisoner
experience in many camps was highly chaotic. Yet, by design or by behavior, all
concentration camps were not created equal, and certainly all of the camps were not
evenly chaotic. Which leads to questions regarding how the forms of power and coercion
varied across camps, and the different methods of control that were associated with these
organizations.

**Power and Coercion in Organizations**
Power and coercion have been understudied aspects of organizations (Roscigno 2011;
Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2006). The literature that does exist tends to centralize
bureaucracy and bureaucratic authority as core components of power, arguing that control
stems from direct supervision or through rules, regulations, and personal expertise (see
Blau 1964, 1971; Gouldner 1955; Clegg 2009; Meyer 1968). More recent research has
taken a different perspective, identifying inconsistent rules and chaos as organizational
opportunities for the abuse of power (Sofsky 1996; Hodson, Martin, Lopez, and Roscigno
Yet these works often treat bureaucracy and chaos as two sides of the same coin when they are interrelated, but not diametric, processes. Further, chaos may be an intentional, rather than negligent, decision by power-holders.

The most prominent approach to power and coercion in organizations posits that, in coercive organizations, power flows through bureaucratic means in understandable ways. Bureaucracy can act as a tool, enabling innovation and efficiency within organizations (Adler 1993; 1999). Over time, these characteristics may be supplanted as it becomes an end in itself (Michels 2010; Weber 1947), but the expressed intention of a bureaucracy is to achieve organizational goals efficiently. Organizations may act coercively when rules are insufficient for fulfilling organizational goals (Gouldner 1955; Adler and Borys 1996), but, more specific to these cases, the organizational goals themselves can be coercive or exploitative. In cases where organizational goals are cruel, there is nothing to prevent bureaucracies from being applied to efficiently bring about destructive ends (Bauman 1989). This process of coercion and power via bureaucracy is common in the literature. For instance, Gouldner (1955) points out that bureaucracies become punishment-centered when workers’ and employers’ goals clash; a condition that may be more malignant when power dynamics are more asymmetric.

Although less discussed in the organizational literature (Clegg 2006), Goffman’s work on total institutions is useful for thinking about bureaucracy control (McEwen 1980). In total institutions “the handling of many human needs by bureaucratic organization of whole blocks of people – whether or not this is a necessary or effective means of social organization in the circumstances – is key fact” (1961:6). These organizations maintain control through a combination of surveillance, house rules,
punishments for breaking the rules, and privileges which are “merely the absence of deprivations” (1961:51). Bureaucratic controls in total institutions are reified by technologies of power – particularly the appeal to expert knowledge, the mobilization of identity, dehumanization of inmates, and efficiently designed systems (Clegg 2009) – that tie power and efficiency into reinforcing constructs. As Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips explain, “[Power and efficiency] are fundamentally tangled up in the social fabric of power as a concept and a set of practices” (2006:17). Yet, coercion and power are not solely products of efficiency; the absence of bureaucratic rules and regulations can produce inequities as well.

In his original typology, Gouldner’s conceptualization of “mock bureaucracy” focuses on the non-enforcement of, and non-compliance with, bureaucratic practices (1955). While the original conceptualization offers the possibility for mutual mocking by workers and employers, it is not a stretch to argue that the ability to neglect bureaucratic rules is more pronounced– and more coercive– in unequal organizations. Such negligent organizations – structured power-laden organizations where bureaucratic rules exist, but enforcement is ambivalent and beneficial for those in power– are not uncommon. These are the seemingly Kafkaesque organizations that we encounter when we are routed between call centers, when workplace complaints and concerns are ignored or half-heartedly addressed, or when attempts to protest one’s house being wrongly foreclosed on lead down a rabbit hole of complaints and paperwork. Like previous conceptualizations of power in organizations (Blau 1964), this approach highlights the inherently asymmetrical nature of power. Alongside the ability of a person to withhold rewards from
and apply punishments to others, power offers the ability to withhold bureaucratic enforcement; mocking expectations of uniform compliance.

Along with relational powerlessness and incoherent organizational environments, prior work has pointed to negligent organizational conditions to explain bullying in the workplace (Hodson, Roscigno, and Lopez 2006). This work specifically argues that chaotic organizations “constitute a failure of management to fulfill one of its principle functions – the provision of an effective and smoothly functioning system of production,” and defines chaotic conditions as the neglect of principle functions (Roscigno, Lopez, and Hodson 2009:1566). More recent work, fleshes out these aspects of organizational efficiency and neglect by identifying divergent goals, patrimonialism, unwritten rules, and chaos as “normal regularly recurring aspects of bureaucracy” (Hodson, et al. 2012:3). The Kafkaesque conditions described by Gouldner and Hodson & company present a different conceptualization of control, one where bureaucratic structures that seem to care little for consistently enforcing rules or preventing others from taking advantage hold prisoners and workers. Granted, these conditions can become more odious as the neglect of bureaucratic rules extends into neglecting to provide the means of survival.

In many cases, organizational ambiguity is an inadvertent product of bureaucracies’ inability to efficiently attain stated goals (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). However, there are organizational contexts where the conditions that Hodson et al. describe are not only more pronounced, but deliberately implemented and “weaponized” in order to oppress, abuse, and solidify power. In such chaotic organizations, power flows through the force and will of an individual or group which wields control in a manner that is unpredictable and driven by individual concerns. Instead of chaos arising
from “contradictory formalized rules” (Hodson, et al. 2012), chaos is the product of administrators and guards who deliberately ignore existing rules or excessively punish prisoners for violating arbitrary rules. Administrators in these organizations act as petty tyrants, as Ashforth (1994) points out, often exhibiting arbitrariness and self-aggrandizement, belittling subordinates, lacking consideration for workers, demanding to get their own way, discouraging initiative, and non-contingent punishments. Petty tyrants emerge and thrive in environments where administrative beliefs about the righteousness of the organization and the subordinate nature of workers combine with conducive societal and institutional values and norms. Indeed, it is not difficult to recognize these conditions in the emergence and development of the Nazi concentration camps.

In chaotic organizations, rulers operate in a manner that is closer to Weber’s traditional coercion, which revolves around a “double sphere” of legitimation, “on the one hand, of action which is bound to specific tradition; on the other hand, of that which is free of any specific rules” (1947:342). Such an approach is less commonly discussed by organizational theorists, but it is often applied to authoritarian and totalitarian states where “traditional rule of more or less patrimonial or feudal character still enjoys considerable legitimacy, even though its future is in doubt. Those traditional elements are even more important at a regional and local level in many countries in the Maghreb, Southeast Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa” (Linz 2000:143). In addition, Mann identifies despotic power as a type of state power, describing it as “the range of actions which the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with civil society groups,” and pointing out that the despotic powers of many historical states have been “virtually unlimited” (1984:188).
The final organizational form is *tyrannical organizations*, which are the combination of bureaucratic abuse and chaotic individual rule that creates a sort of controlled chaos that ensures the domination of those in power. In other words, it is the combination of the top down rule of a bureaucratic organization with the ability of guards and rulers to act without the restrain of rules or fear of punishment; combining the methods of control described by Goffman (1961) with the intentional application of the forms of organizational ambiguity described by Hodson et al (2012). In *Asylums*, Goffman expresses that “every institution must not only make some effort to realize its official aims, but must also be protected, somehow, from the tyranny of a diffuse pursuit of them, lest the exercise of authority be turned into a witch hunt” (1961:84). Tyrannical organizations are this diffuse pursuit unleashed. As Sofsky describes, the “personalized organization [of the camps] unleashed the impulse of arbitrariness on which terror is predicted. The SS issued an impenetrable thicket of rules and regulations that no inmate could ever follow in their entirety, and which could be employed by the guard personnel arbitrarily. The formal rules did not limit power, hedging it in, but rather provided the freedom of terror with an institutional underpinning” (1996:18-19). The organizational characteristics associated with coercion vary in important ways depending on the use, or absence of bureaucratic enforcement and chaos. When combined with different methods of control, the presence of bureaucratic and chaotic organizational conditions help explain variations in coercion experienced by prisoners and workers.

**Methods of Control in Coercive Organizations**
The interrelationship between bureaucracy and chaos only partially explains how organizations retain power. Organizations also draw on a variety of methods of control
including surveillance (Sewell 1998; Foucault 1995), structural violence (Galtung 1969), and informal reward systems (Blau 1964; Sykes 1957; and Hepburn 1985). Each of the organizational forms described above have the potential to combine with these methods of control in order to further reify power and stability. However, in the camps, surveillance and structural violence were much more common, and my discussion will focus on these characteristics.

Although the subject has its own journal and set of scholars, surveillance has been an under-discussed aspect of organizational control. Historically, organizational scholars have treated surveillance as a “top-down” process of control where managers and guards look for rule violations, or, as Goffman explains, “[surveillance is] a seeing to it that everyone does what he has been clearly told is required of him, under conditions where one person’s infraction is likely to stand out in relief against the visible, constantly examined compliance of others.” (1961:7). The surveillance process extends beyond total institutions as states and organizations design physical conditions including cities, prisons, and the environment to ensure visibility and “legibility” (Scott 1998).

Surveillance is distinct from, but not unrelated to, bureaucracy. In the gypsum mines of Gouldner’s analysis, “close supervision” (i.e. surveillance) was viewed as a punishment by workers, and often created a vicious cycle of distrust between supervisors and workers (1955). Gouldner argued that bureaucratic rules did not eliminate the need for close supervision, but, they had the potential to reduce some of the tensions created by it. However, in some organizations, like the camps, the combination of strictly

---

5 Much of the recent surveillance studies research on “top-down” surveillance focuses on electronic surveillance through CCTV, the internet, and technological change (Hier and Greenberg 2007). Since the concentration camps did not have these means at their disposal, I focus on the literature on more direct forms of top-down surveillance.
enforced bureaucratic rules and direct personal supervision can increase tension by making prisoners much more concerned about breaking rules and supervisors more focused on finding infractions (Edwards 1992; Jacoby 2004). Indeed, close supervision from higher ups can organize subordinates in a way that makes following bureaucratic rules more stressful, and chaotic conditions more confusing and terrifying.

Yet, as much of the recent discussion of surveillance has argued, the authoritative power of close supervision is “spatially bound,” and thus limited, by the physical presence of superiors (Clegg, Courpasson, & Phillips 2004:204). Indeed, direct supervision is insufficient compared to the disciplining power of the self-management of “the gaze” (Foucault 1980, 1995) or the pressure of team-based control systems (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992; Sewell 1998). The pressure of panoptic control combines the external pressure of punishment with some combination of the internalization of norms and values and the recognition of the need to externally portray particular traits. The combination of “vertical” and “horizontal” control, referred to as “chimerical control” (Sewell 1998), has a strong ordering influence within organizations to the coexistence of nominal autonomy and a high degree of control through a complex interaction of rationalizing surveillance and disciplinary forces internal to teams.

Sewell specifies that workplace control must direct work tasks, assess task completion, and incorporation sanctions and rewards (1998), but this may not necessarily be true for coercive organizations which may employ chimerical control for the sake of control in and of itself. Further, while much of the discussion of the coercive power of self-managing teams has focused on the internalization of organizational norms and values (Sewell and Wilkinson 1992; Barker 1993; Vallas 2006), this internalization is not
a requirement; peer pressure and expectations or the threat of being informed upon (Goffman, 2009) can yield similar corrective behavior, especially in conditions where punishments for violations are collective.

In addition to surveillance, there has been a long discussion of more economic forms of control. Extending as far back as Marx, scholars have discussed how control over productive property (2004) and the labor process (Braverman 1974) have allowed owners some power over worker’s lives. Economic forms of control such as wage slavery, deskillling, threats of outsourcing, and piece rate production are all mechanisms of control utilized to control workers and extract maximum surplus value (Cowie 2001; Muehlberger 2007). Yet organizations often have control over, or influence on, much more than just the economic lives of workers. Organizations may influence health (through safety and the amount of hours scheduled), social relations (through the number of scheduled hours), and mental health (through stress and expectations). This is even more the case in more coercive and total institutions where worker and prisoner reliance on the organization for basic needs becomes a point of control that organizations use to reify power.

The control over human needs is a departure from the discussion of economic control in organizations, but it is very similar to the concept of structural violence discussed in political science and peace studies (Galtung 1969; Farmer 2004). With structural violence, individuals may be injured, but “there may not be any person who directly harms another person in the structure. The violence is built into the structure and shows up as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. . . . Above all the power to decide over the distribution of resources is unevenly distributed” (Galtung
Galtung continues on to say that “if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation” (1969:171). In the same manner that organizations may use economic means of control against workers, total and coercive institutions can use structural violence in the form of deprivation of food, water, adequate shelter, or mobility as a method of control. In a sense, this acts to prevent any sense of relative deprivation (Rule 1988), and thus any potential resistance. Methods of control such as surveillance and structural violence act to order coerced populations in ways that both prevent resistance and ensure that they cannot evade or ignore organizational conditions.

Coercion and control were an ever-present aspect of the Nazi concentration camps, and methods of control like surveillance and structural violence ensured that the prisoners were wary of who was watching them, and worried about where their next meal would come from. These conditions made day to day survival hard, but prisoners found ways to not only survive, but to resist as well. Organized resistance groups formed in several camps across the camp system. In some camps, prisoners found ways to stage armed uprisings, while in others resistance was limited to small individual acts of mutual aid and symbolic resistance. This raises a question regarding why organized resistance groups emerged in some camps, but were deterred in others.

**Organized Resistance in Coercive Organizations**
States and organizations actively work to prevent or tamp down dissent. As Gaventa (1982) points out, states and organizations actively draw on a range of approaches to

---

6 Although the concept of structural violence shares similarities with more structural theories of inequality and development (see Tilly 1998; Sen 2000), I am using it in the original sense of intentional starvation and deprivation, rather than the constriction of opportunities and access.
deterring collective action, from direct repression and violence (Moore 1998; Earl 2010) to bureaucratic rules and channeling (McCarthy, Britt, and Wolfson 1991; Goffman 1961) to preventing issues from ever emerging (Foucault 1977; Clegg, Courpasson, and Phillips 2004). Yet resistance can and does occur; ranging from everyday resistance (Morrill, Zald, and Rao 2003; Johnston 2005, 2006; Scott 1985, 1990) to organized resistance and rebellion (Goodwin 2001; Slater 2009; O’Hearn 2009; Einwohner 2003; Maher 2010). The question emerges, where and how do organized resistance groups form in contexts where organizations are actively trying to prevent them?

One relevant explanation, drawn from research on revolutions, contends that the formation of organized resistance is a product of broad institutional shifts. State-centered theory argues that revolutions are a product of broad institutional forces combining with internal pressures on the state as elites prevent the state from addressing these pressures (Skocpol 1979). The state breakdowns produced by the inability to address these pressures produce revolutions, and, extrapolating from this, one would expect that in repressive environments institutional and internal pressures would open space for organized resistance groups to form as well. Indeed, with some success, scholars have applied the structural focus on state and organizational breakdown –through leadership turnover or institutional change –to several cases including prison riots (Goldstone and Useem 1999; Useem and Goldstone 2002), revolutions in developing countries (Goodwin 2001), and the breakdown of social norms and values (Snow, Cress, Downey, and Jones 1998; see also Useem 1998). While these studies encourage sharper integration of repression and popular grievances, their focus on broad conditions misses more meso-level factors that influence where organized resistance is able to flourish.
More recent work on revolutions and social movements in non-democratic environments have directed attention toward more local or organizational factors for collective action. In his analysis of revolution and quiescence in Southeast Asia, Slater highlights the crucial role low level elites play in revolutions, arguing “authoritarian regimes and democratic oppositionists are each bolstered by an advantage in symbolic power; the political positioning of communal elites is the key to this balance…” (2009:223-224). Communal elites may be just as important for their suppressive power considering their localized knowledge and influence provides leverage and ability to impact daily lives more thoroughly and effectively than any government elite.

The role of low level elites is crucial in a number of contexts. Resource mobilization theorists (Jenkins 1983; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Cress and Snow 2000) have demonstrated how elites provide crucial aid and support for movement mobilization. Although they most often act as targets of resistance (Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Fantasia 1988), the presence of sympathetic or ambivalent management (i.e. low level elites) can create an environment that is conducive to organized resistance (Courpasson 2011). While organizational allies, organizational history, and organizational capacity are certainly important for the emergence of organized resistance, it is important to recognize that characteristics of the organization itself may provide the means for mobilization and collective action as well. Indeed, workers may utilize specific organizational characteristics as strategic resources for resistance (Vallas 2003). In Vallas’ case, team-based production systems fostered patterns of solidarity that were difficult to control, but this may also include using
knowledge of bureaucratic rules and routines to evade detection, bring members into contact, or spread information.

Coupled with the focus on the role of institutional and organizational characteristics for organized resistance in repressive environments, some research has focused on more micro level characteristics including networks (Gould 1993; Loveman 1996), identity (Goldstone 2001), and, more recently, threat (Alimi 2007; Almeida 2003, 2008). While social movement scholars have historically paired threat with opportunity (Tilly 1978; McAdam 1999), more recent work has treated them as separate processes (McAdam et al. 2010; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Einwohner and Maher 2011). Goldstone and Tilly (2001) identify two different forms of threat, current threat – harms that are currently experienced or anticipated – and repressive threat – the costs of repression if protest is undertaken, and argue that the state has a monopoly on both types. Collective action occurs in repressive environments when current threats are perceived to be credible, temporally immediate, applicable to the threatened group, unmalleable, and more severe than repressive threats (Maher 2010; Einwohner and Maher 2011; Einwohner 2009).

Collective resistance does not spring forth from the ether. Groups have to organize prior to collective action, and escalating perceptions of threat provide motivation. This may particularly be the case in organizationally chaotic environments. Conditions where elites are able to apply and break from bureaucratic rules at a whim (Hodson, et al. 2012) amplify many of the components of threat assessment identified by Einwohner and Maher. They produce uncertainty for subordinates, are seen as potentially more severe, credible, and, by their nature, disrupt the ability to recognize the temporal
nature (i.e. the immediacy) of the threat. More simply, chaotic conditions make already threatening conditions even more threatening.

Coupled with chaotic organizational conditions, the presence of a stigmatized and repressed population may increase the likelihood of organized resistance through several means. The threatened groups may band together to mobilize in response. The presence of stigmatized groups may signal that conditions are threatening for proximate populations as well, provoking mobilization (this is particularly the case in total institutions and highly repressive countries where there is no “exit” or “voice” (Hirschmann 1970)).

Disentangling institutional, organizational, and conditional factors may be theoretically useful, but it is often not reflective of conditions where these factors interact with one another in order to create the conditions for organized resistance. Further, there may not be a single explanation for resistance in highly repressive environments as groups mobilize under different conditions and for different reasons. The Nazi concentration camps provide an excellent set of cases for such an analysis considering that there was significant variation in institutional conditions, organizational characteristics, threatening conditions, and outcomes across the camps. Understanding where resistance emerged in the concentration camps not only expands our understanding of collective agency in highly repressive conditions, it forces us to rethink how varying methods of control may become motivations and conditions for organized resistance.

Tying the development, variation, and effects of organizational chaos together offers insights into the dark side of organizational behavior, and the potential of human agency to find ways, despite all odds, to resist. An institutional and comparative analysis
of the Nazi concentration camps offers an exemplary set of cases for exploring how these processes unfold. The Nazi concentration camps were a part of a broader institutional system primarily run by the SS Economic Administration (WVHA) and the Reich Security Main Office (RSHA) producing systematic characteristics across camps. Yet the camps varied considerably in regards to the forms of control and the presence and activities of resistance groups. Exploring these similarities will offer a number of insights into the relationship between chaos, power, organizations, and resistance.
CHAPTER 3: DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYTIC STRATEGY

Extant organizational research has tended to focus on the character and function of businesses (Perrow 1985), hospitals (Ruef and Scott 1998), and cultural organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1982), and has had surprisingly little to say about more coercive environments (Clegg 2007; Cooke 2003). Coercive organizations are potentially more likely to have chaotic organizational conditions and provoke organized resistance, and this makes them particularly relevant as subjects of analysis. Conducting research on coercive organizations is difficult. Access to subordinate populations is often limited, and the lived experience of the organization often differs from the established institutional rules.

This is particularly true for research on the Holocaust where recognized gaps in the historical record make analysis difficult. The victims of the Holocaust died a “double death” in the sense that they were physically killed by the Nazis, and then the records of their existence and murder were destroyed in an attempt to cover up the crimes. However, resources and data are available for studying the organizational characteristics of the camps. Further, some argue that the Holocaust was a unique event, and should not be the subject of a broader analysis. While unique, the Holocaust was not unprecedented, and there has been a long history of sociological research on the subject. In this chapter I begin by briefly summarizing this literature before turning my attention to describing the

---

7 See Bauer 2002, chapter 2 for a detailed discussion for the distinction between unprecedentedness and uniqueness.
data collection and analysis process I used to collect, code, aggregate, and analyze Holocaust survivor testimony. I conclude by discussing the comparative historical and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) methods (Ragin 1989; Mahoney 2004) that I use for analysis in the following chapters.

The Sociology of the Holocaust

The Holocaust is one of the most analyzed historical events of the past century. Work on the subject has crossed disciplinary, linguistic, and geographic boundaries, and generated its own journal (*Holocaust and Genocide Studies*). While historians have been responsible for the lion’s share of this work, sociologists had an early role, publishing pieces on the concentration camps in the *American Journal of Sociology* and *Social Forces* shortly after the end of the war (Bloch 1947; Abel 1951; Adler 1958). Since then, Sociologists has taken a broad interest in the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, producing work on a broad array of subjects and areas.

Scholars have investigated voting in Nazi Germany (Hamilton 1982; Brustein 1997), the use of population statistics (Seltzer 1998), shown how quotidian events and processes produced a genocidal environment (Berger 1993; Melson 1996), investigated the motivations of participants (Mann 2000), assessed the camp’s spatial characteristics (Giaccaria and Minca 2011), explored its theoretical implications (Arendt 1976; Baehr 2002), used it to theorize about total institutions (Goffman 1961), tied genocide and Jewish victimization together (Fein 1979), and applied social movement theory to resistance in the camps, ghettos, and cities of occupied Europe (Epstein 2008; Einwohner 2003; Einwohner 2007; and Bastholm-Jensen 2007). Notable work like Zygmunt Bauman’s *Modernity and the Holocaust* (1989) has argued that societies’ broader
adherence to rationality and bureaucracy in society was necessary and responsible for the genocide that occurred. That is, the Holocaust was less of an abnormality that needs to be explained, and more of a reflection of the normal state of society. In spite of this history (with some exceptions) sociologists have left Holocaust research to historians and area specialists.

But, as these studies show, quality research on the Holocaust is not only possible, it has been done. Further, there is theoretical and empirical room for work on the concentration camps. As the prior chapter argued, research on power and organizations has been fairly limited, particularly in a comparative context. Indeed, the concentration camps act as a deviant case for analysis; highlighting social processes pushed to their limits and shedding light on difficult to reach concepts and areas (Ragin and Becker 1992). Understanding how – when combined – seemingly common social conditions and pressures can produce a horror of its magnitude should be a core aspect of social science research (Bauman 1989) and organizational theory (Clegg 2002, 2006).

The process of theorizing about Holocaust events is particularly timely considering recent critiques of Holocaust studies. In the introduction to their recent edited volume on the concentration camps, Caplan and Wachsmann’s argue that, “the new histories of the Nazi camps have been far more encyclopedic than analytic, far more empirical than critical. As a result, scholarship has become highly fragmented: for all the mass of details, it has become increasingly difficult to discern broader themes, developments and debates” (2010:6). The call for analytic work on the Holocaust, and the concentration camps in particular, opens the door for more systematic sociological work. Social science methods are well suited for drawing together fragmented information, and
identifying broader themes and theoretically relevant revelations. This is particularly true for organizational control, demographic inequality, and resistance; three areas that are well developed within sociological research, but not in regard to more repressive or total institutions such as the concentration camps.

**Holocaust Testimony As Data**

In order to develop an understanding of how organizational conditions varied across camps I draw on several sources of data including Nuremberg documents, published diaries and memoirs, interviews with perpetrators, and secondary sources on individual camps and the camp system. My primary data for analysis was collected from Holocaust testimonies content coded for specific theoretically informed subjects. Holocaust testimony are particularly useful because they offer an opportunity to treat the camps as “inhabited institutions,” and recognize that “institutions are not inert cultural logics or representations; they are populated by people whose social interactions suffuse institutions with force and local meaning” (Hallett and Ventresca 2006:226). Indeed, the use of ethnographic and qualitative methods for organizational analysis (Hodson 1999; Morrill and Fine 1997) is particularly suited for recognizing the often fuzzy connection between the camp rules and how they were experienced by prisoners.

I collected testimonies from three separate archives, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum [USHMM], the Voice/Vision Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive [VVA], and the Voices of the Holocaust project [VotH]. Testimonies from the USHMM were collected through their website and two visits to the archive library in Washington DC. VVA and VotH testimonies were downloaded from their websites and

---

8 The VVA archive is available here: http://holocaust.umd.umich.edu/
9 The VotH archive can be found at: http://voices.iit.edu
saved as individual files. The testimonies from each archive have particular characteristics. The USHMM testimonies were collected by several interviewers who followed a single set of guidelines to collect the testimony, and then transcribed separately (United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, 2001). The majority of VVA testimonies were collected by one historian, Sidney Bolkosky, and they tend to follow a similar format of questions. The VotH testimonies vary slightly. The testimonies were collected by David Boder, a clinical psychologist who visited displaced persons camps during the summer of 1946 to collect interviews. Dr. Boder asked some questions, but the interviews were almost entirely unguided; a method used by psychologists. These testimonies were shorter, and often more raw as prisoners were still coming to grips with their experiences.

The sum original sample from all three archives was 607 testimonies. I skinned or, when available, used archive specified tags to identify each of the camps the respondent discussed in the testimony. Respondents regularly described multiple camps. Prisoners in my final sample described an average of 2.14 camps per testimony. I counted every camp reference, and included every camp that was discussed in more than ten testimonies. The camps identified through this process include Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Birkenau, Buchenwald, Buna, Dachau, Gross-Rosen, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Plaszów, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof, and Theresienstadt. I included six additional camps -Drancy, Flössenburg, Gurs\(^{10}\), Sobibór, Treblinka, and Westerbork – because they were close to the ten testimony cut off (Flössenburg and Gurs), important positive cases for the analysis (i.e. they were known to have organized resistance;

\(^{10}\) I coded testimonies for Gurs, but dropped it from the final analysis because only three survivors discussed it in detail, and structural & demographic information was extremely limited.
Sobibór and Treblinka), or useful negative cases (Drancy and Westerbork). At this point, my sample was reduced to 230 testimonies (with an expectation of 409 prisoner-camp entries). After omitting eight false positives, and strategically collecting and adding twenty-seven additional testimonies to improve representativeness, my sample at the time of writing is 249 testimonies and 440 prisoner-camp entries for nineteen camps.

I coded each testimony using an established coding scheme (see Appendix B for blank coding sheets). The coding scheme was created in order to capture several theoretically or substantively informed categories including arrival, labor, structure, guards, rules and abuse, culture, and resistance. I also coded each testimony for pre-war demographic information (i.e. birth date, hometown, country, education, resistance experience, prior ghettos, etc.). The coding sheet was revised several times in the course of exploratory coding in order to improve its ability to capture organizational characteristics, and to incorporate emergent issues and subjects (such as “organizing” (i.e. thefts), roll calls, the arrival process, more specific cultural activities, suicides, and specific forms of abuse directed toward women). After the coding sheet was finalized, I coded (or re-coded) each testimony based on the respondents discussion of their experiences. Reliability coding of the testimonies with a trained undergraduate coder is in progress, and face reliability is positive. Future reliability analysis using Krippendorf’s alpha will help provide a more thorough assessment (Krippendorf 2004, 2011).

Testimonies tended to follow a similar pattern; an introduction with biographical information, a discussion of family and community life before the war, and then the Nazis arrive/come to power. When recounting their experiences, the respondents always recognize radical change, and then explain their life story under the Nazis. These stories
can focus on the ghettos, the camps, or attempts at evasion. They often conclude by
discussing their post-war life (which, for many, included emigration to the United States),
and occasionally the philosophical, spiritual, and personal beliefs they hold as a result of
their experiences. Some prisoners justify their testimonies; explaining that they are
speaking out as a counter to Holocaust deniers, to bear witness for future generations, or
so their children and grandchildren knew what they endured. Overall, testimonies
averaged 32.79 pages (st.dev.= 22.84) (Table 1). More than half of the testimonies did
not report a time (132 of 249), but, for those that did, the average length was an hour and
a half (89.9 minutes).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Median</th>
<th>St. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
<th>Earliest</th>
<th>Latest</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USHMM</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>32.79</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>22.84</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>10/26/1981</td>
<td>9/9/2003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOTH</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>17.52</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>9.65</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>7/29/1946</td>
<td>9/25/1946</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VVA</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>34.07</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>16.26</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>5/26/1981</td>
<td>5/21/2008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The testimonies are broadly representative of individual experiences within the
camps. There are testimonies from 104 women, 143 men, and two couples. The
testimonies capture individuals from all across Europe, with respondents reporting
birthplaces in Poland (115 testimonies), Czechoslovakia (36), Germany (25), Romania
(12), and Hungary (12) among others. Prisoners were often moved between multiple
camps, and, on average, prisoners in my analysis were in 2.14 camps (32% were in three
or more camps) producing a final dataset of 440 prisoner-camp “events”.
Aggregating Testimonies
Survivor testimony is extremely useful because it offers the perceptions and experiences of those who were in each of the camps, and particularly the respondent’s most salient recollections. While the content of the discussion was somewhat guided by the interviewers, survivors were able to focus and elaborate on the subject matter of central importance. However, prisoner experience varied within the camps too. A prisoner’s experience was influenced by a number of unpredictable factors including their age, occupation, friends and contacts, when they arrived, and, most importantly, chance.

By their very nature, testimonies are conditioned by the experiences of those who are telling them. We are limited to the answers they provide, and, therefore, by the respondents willingness and ability to negotiate the “ruins of memory” (Langer 1991) to convey their experiences. We are also limited by a prisoners’ willingness to admit to or describe behavior that, in another context, may be morally questionable. Finally, and most importantly, we are limited by the absence of prisoners who died in the camps. The Nazis desire to “murder the murder” (Bauer 2002:25) ensures that we will never have the full story. The testimonies present a grim existence for everyone in any of the camps. Yet, as David Boder explains, these are not the grimmest stories that could be told – “I did not interview the dead” (1949:xix).

---

11 There are multiple examples, from each archive, of the interviewer asking a question, and the respondent either ignoring them and continuing to bear witness, or briefly answering the question and returning to the prior subject.
12 Related to this point, I include the full name of the survivor whenever they are quoted in my analysis, and in the list of testimonies in Appendix A. Prior work has chosen to use only the first name and last initial (Langer 1991; Greenspan and Bolkosky 2006). I include their full name in order give testament to what they endured, to avoid inadvertently participating in the destruction of memory, and because the publicly available sources I acquired the testimonies from use the survivor’s full names (see Einwohner 2011 for further discussion of this issue).
In order to simultaneously draw on the knowledge and experiences of survivors while recognizing that they cannot be expected to speak for all who experienced the camps, I aggregate the coded information regarding the camps into a set of camp scores that are based on the experiences described by survivors. Aggregation provides a camp level measure that may be paired with structural and demographic information, while recognizing, and allowing for, variability in camp experience.

The process of aggregating prisoner testimony is reflective of leading historians’ regarding testimonies; they are “extremely useful and reliable when cross-checked with and borne out by many other testimonies,” (Bauer 2002:25) “especially when the number of survivor testimonies is sufficient, the vantage point of the survivor is apt, and surviving contemporary documentary is scant” (Browning 2010:9) (see also Rudof 2006). There are some who question the use of testimony (Hilberg 1996), but there is simply too little contemporary data on prisoner life in the camps and Nazi documents come with their own set concerns.

In order to construct organizational characteristics for each camp, I condensed data collected from testimonies to produce camp level measures for characteristics described by the prisoners. I constructed camp measures from individual testimonies by dividing the number of prisoners who discussed a particular topic by the number of times that broader subject [arrival, labor, structure, guards, rules, abuse, culture, and resistance] was discussed in the camp. For example, prisoners who discussed ration sizes were divided by prisoners who discussed the structure of the camps [bunks, food, mobility, and demography]. These camp level conditions can be interpreted to show that “of the
survivors who discussed X (ex: structure) in their testimony, more than half\textsuperscript{13} described Y (ex: receiving small rations).”

The process of aggregation I used recognizes that these measures are an indication of the prisoner’s perception of the presence of a characteristic;\textsuperscript{14} they are not an indication of the absence of a characteristic. In many cases, camps coded as zero had prisoners who discussed some of these issues, but there was not a critical mass of respondents who discussed the issue. In addition, this approach takes into account the fact that not every prisoner discusses every aspect of their time in the camps in their interviews, and it puts their discussion in a context with other similar aspects of the camp experience. Although imperfect, it also allows for a broad spectrum of experiences within a single camp rather than ranking camps on a continuum from “bureaucratic” to “chaotic.”

I combined the organizational information collected from prisoner testimonies with structural data collected from several secondary sources including the Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos (Megargee 2009), Benz and Distel’s Der Ort Des Terrors, and several secondary works on broad institutional histories of the camp system (Hilberg 2003; Megargee 2009; Krausnick and Broszat 1970; Bauer 1982), specific aspects of the camp system (Allen 2005; Orth 2009a), and individual camps (Gutman and Berenbaum 1994; Stein 2004; Marszalek 1986; Boas 1985, Schelvis 2007, etc.).

\textsuperscript{13} I reduced the cut point for Auschwitz and Birkenau to 33% due to the sheer number of respondents who went through the two camps (90 testimonies discuss Auschwitz, and 62 describe Birkenau). Considering that both of these camps were processing and transit camps, many were only in the camps for less than a week. This approach accounts for the quantity of Auschwitz/Birkenau responses without lowering the bar for other camps with fewer respondents.

\textsuperscript{14} In this analysis I am most interested in understanding how prisoners broadly perceived the camps. Focusing on what survivors chose to discuss and how they combine helps to identify broader differences across camps by drawing attention to the issues that were most salient for survivors.
These sources provide contextual and structural information on the history, demographics, and control structure of the camps. Structural variables include, but are not limited to, average size, length of time open, ratio of prisoners to guards, mortality rate, and the proportion of Jews in the camp (see Table 3 below). While some may question the use of secondary documents, I contend that they complement the information collected from bureaucratic documents, elite memos, and prisoner testimonies, while reinforcing particularly important points (see also Skocpol 1984).

Finally, in addition to the testimonies and structural data, I collected a number of primary documents including written rules and regulations, internal memos between senior officials and commandants, correspondence, and elite memoirs are collected from the proceedings of the Nuremberg trials and its supplementary documents (United States et. al. 1946, International Military Tribunal 1946), document anthologies (Arad, Gutman, and Margaloit 1999), and individual memoirs (Höss 1961; Sereny 2011). Collectively, these documents help identify the core bureaucratic components of the camps, and illuminate the motivations and methods of their evolution.

**Analytic Strategy**

In order to identify similarities and differences across the camps and understand how they influenced the degree of violence and coerciveness in the camps, this analysis draws on comparative-historical methods -particularly process analysis -(Mahoney 2004) and Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin 1989, 2000). Process analysis –“the analysis of sequences of events that occur within cases” (Mahoney 2004:88) –is a particularly useful approach for identifying the effect of particular factors on outcomes (George and Bennett 2005). The use of these two distinct, but interlocking, parts helps
identify the temporal factors that increased chaotic and coercive conditions over time, as well as the comparative factors that were crucial for where these conditions were worst and where resistance was most likely to emerge.

Process analysis is useful for identifying interceding events, and, although it is typically used to analyze the effect of one condition, I draw on it to understand the myriad of factors that led guard behavior to decouple from formal rules and regulations. There is a long history of the use of comparative-historical methods and descriptive inference to classify groups and organizations and formulate conceptual distinctions (Mahoney 2004; Gerring 2001), and this process of conceptual development “can lead to new conceptual understandings and perhaps the formation of entirely new concepts” (Mahoney 2004:93).

In addition, QCA is particularly useful for understanding how structural and bureaucratic characteristics link together to influence coercion and resistance in the camps because it identifies each set of conditions associated with the outcome, allowing for several paths to the outcome of interest. QCA is a useful approach to comparative case analysis that has been used by a variety of researchers to look at a diverse set of topics including environmental inequality (Grant, Trautner, Downey, and Thiebaud 2010), worker resistance (Roscigno and Hodson 2004), homeless mobilization (Cress and Snow 2000), eating disorders (Haworth-Hoeppner 2000), and trade union growth (Griffin, Botko, Wahl, and Isaac 1991).

Crisp-set QCA (used here) requires researchers to create a dataset of dependent and independent variables coded “1” or “0” indicating presence or absence. The program uses Boolean algebra to create logical tests and generate configurations, or sets, of
variables that are either necessary or sufficient for the dependent variable to occur (Ragin 1989, 2000). The program engages in a process of reduction where it identifies the real and potential sets of events (ex: aBc = 1 or aBC = 1) and then reduces them to the lowest possible configuration (aB=1) with conditions in all capital letters symbolizing presence, and conditions in all lower case letters symbolizing the absence of presence.  

QCA is useful for case analyses because it is not a linear program, and so it can identify several different paths that a case may take to get to the identified outcome. In other words, it takes the existing patterns that the data form, and groups these patterns into condition sets. The QCA framework uses the term “set” instead of “variable” to stress the notion that each variable has been constructed to represent a case’s status in a condition. Sets may include a combination of present conditions (indicated by all capital letters) and absence (indicated by all lower case letters). For this analysis, I include positive, negative, and contradictory cases in order to maximize variation and fully incorporate the negative cases into the analysis (Mahoney and Goertz 2004). The small number of cases virtually ensures some degree of limited diversity for the QCA analyses. In order to minimize the probability of randomly generated findings, I kept the number of conditions in my analysis to five or fewer for the analysis of mortality in the camps (Chapter 5) and four or fewer for the analysis of organized resistance (Chapter 6) (Marx and Dusa 2011; see also Schneider and Wagemann 2010).

QCA is not simply a method for quantifying qualitative data. QCA requires that researchers have a strong understanding of their cases in order to recognize the validity of...
the condition sets produced by the program, as well as the relative importance of the conditions that are added into the equations (Ragin 1989). In addition, QCA allows for a qualitative re-immersion into the testimonies that constitute the figures for analysis. The qualitative data and the QCA analysis are both integral to the process of data analysis because they allow the researcher to move between testimonies and QCA results. This oscillation provides a qualitative understanding of the variation in prisoner’s experiences across the concentration camps without losing sight of the broader organizational processes the organizational processes identified while simultaneously (see Roscigno and Hodson 2004, and Crowley 2012 for additional examples of this process).

Finally, the analysis of the concentration camps presents a number of theoretical (Baehr 2002), methodological (Abell 2001; Bauer 2002), and ethical (Einwohner 2011; Kushner 2006) pitfalls for researchers to negotiate. QCA is particularly useful in this regard because it does not treat high and low mortality as subject to the same structural processes and causal patterns, it allows for the identification of multiple pathways to a single outcome, and its focus on cases rather than variables provides a bridge between the quantitative analysis with the rich underlying qualitative data in a way that respects the sensitive nature of the testimonies. Further, QCA is especially well suited for analyses where quantitative counts and measurements are less concrete. Much of the structural data on the camps is pieced together from Nazi records, and scholars will never be able to say for certain how many prisoners passed through Stutthof, Dachau, or Bergen-Belsen. Crisp-set QCA’s binary “yes/no” approach offers an opportunity to place camps in broad, theoretically and empirically informed, categories while still allowing for some error in the exact figures.
CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING CHAOTIC DECOUPLING

Eugen Kogon famously described the Nazi concentration camps as a system, and the research that has followed has continually shown that to be the case (Kogon 2006; Orth 2009b). The camps were constructed in order to punish political enemies of the state and solidify power, and were swiftly re-appropriated for additional uses. The Nazis who developed the camp system, and ran the camps were devoted members of the SS and the Nazi cause, and many proved to be committed bureaucrats as well (Sydnor 1990). The camps originated with a strict and brutal set of rules and regulations for guards and prisoners with responsibilities concentrated at the top with the commandant. Yet, by the end of the war, the camps were highly chaotic. Prisoners were killed for no reason, and with no recourse. SS guards regularly misreported information about mortality in the camps. The sharp contrast between the strict brutality at the beginning of the war, and the violent chaos at the end raises the question of how a hierarchical total institution run by one of the most bureaucratic states ever (Bauman 1989; Arendt 2006) became a quintessential example of chaos and terror.

This chapter begins by identifying the bureaucratic rules and regulations of the camp system. I then move on to try and answer the question, how and why did the camps evolve from brutal bureaucratic organizations to chaotic, and even more brutal, organizations in such a hierarchically oriented context? Or, more theoretically, how and
why did guard behavior decouple from the bureaucratic rules and regulations of the camp?

**Rules and Bureaucracy within the Camps**
The common perception of the Nazi concentration camps was that they were chaotic and tyrannical places where abuse and death were commonplace, and, especially in later years, this was broadly true. Yet, this does not mean that the camps had no rules. Camp rules formed the basis for and motivation of punishment, and the social and ideological elements underpinning early rules had an impact on later adaptation. Camps’ rules, regulations, and structure can be traced back to what is not referred to as the “Dachau Model” (Berben 1975; Krausnick and Broszat 1970). Shortly after being appointed commandant of Dachau, Theodor Eicke wrote a set of service regulations for guards (10/1/1933). These rules were inspired by the prior commandant (Wäckerle), but offered more structure, and infused the camps with Eicke’s beliefs about the SS, and enemies of the Nazi State. The Dachau Model can be divided into three related parts: service regulations for guard behavior (NMT IV, PS-1216), the “Disciplinary and Punitive Regulations for the Internment Camp” (PS-778, Orderlagerung), and the organizational division (Sofsky 1996: 106-108; Krausnick and Broszat 1970:182-184). Through these parts, the Dachau Model outlined a series of rules and regulations for guarding prisoners, established organizational characteristics, and promoted a set of ideological beliefs about the superiority of the SS and how prisoners should be viewed.

---

16 Theodor Eicke later became the first head of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps (IKL). The IKL was the early organizing institution for all of the concentration camps.

17 Unless otherwise noted, quotes in the section below will be taken from one of these three documents.
Responsibilities

The disciplinary regulations provided a detailed list of violations and the punishments they warranted. Punishments were specified for a wide range of behavior. From small acts of insolence such as ironic or jeering remarks to the SS, intentionally failing to salute, or “by [one’s] conduct, showing that [one] does not want to submit to order and discipline” (PS-778) earned eight days of close confinement and 25 thrashings.

Exchanging bunks without permission, smuggling goods out in the laundry, and smoking in inappropriate places earned two weeks confinement. The maximum punishments were reserved for political “crimes,” forming cliques or loitering with intent could get someone hung as a subversive, agitators and people working to spread the word about the camp were hung, and mutineers were shot on the spot (PS-778).

Along with specifications for what prisoners could not do, the Dachau Model established a set of duties and responsibilities expected of guards. Roll calls and work assignments were to be conducted daily, a fact reflected by prisoner testimonies. Guards were also expected to hold prisoners to a specific march discipline and saluting protocol; before SS leaders from Sturmführer (2nd Lieutenant) up, the command, while standing was “Attention! Caps Off!,” or, while marching “Caps Off, Eyes Right – or – Eyes Left!” Additionally, guards were only responsible for watching the prisoner, “[i]t is not [the guard’s] task, to supervise the work; he must leave that to the deputies of the [construction] department, resp. the foremen of the work-shops . . . The duty of the escort consists only in watching the prisoners” (PS-1216). Indeed, the strict division of labor, and focus on its own role policing enemies of the state influenced how the camps adapted to additional expectations and treated prisoners. Finally, the guards were not allowed to
talk to prisoners in the line of duty, and were expected to never set their arms down. Guards were to be perpetually ready to prevent escapes, kill revolting prisoners, or kill individual attackers. Escapes on a guard’s watch were punishable by imprisonment, whereas shooting an escapee “will not be punished” and “warning shots [were] forbidden as a matter of principle” (PS-1216). Later in the life the camps, guards were rewarded with a week’s vacation for shooting escaping prisoners which led to guards creating situations where it would appear that prisoners were trying to escape so that they could be shot (Kogon 1960:100). Under the Dachau Model, prisoners earned maximum punishments for minimal crimes, with collective action receiving swift and brutal treatment. As a result, these rules “produced an enormous distance between the SS men and the inmates. Because of this distance, many members of the camp personnel lost their perspective and fell into patterns of behavior that could no longer be reconciled with the conduct desired or proscribed by Nazi policy” (Hilberg 2003:969).

Hierarchy

The Dachau Model established a very specific hierarchy within the camps as well. Camp commandants were at the apex of the hierarchy, “[a]uthority for ordering punishments lies in the hands of the camp commander, who is personally responsible to the police commander18 for the execution of the issued camp regulations” (PS-778). Indeed, the majority of authority was the centralized of the commandant, including working hours, punishments, and interrogation. Below the commandant, the regulations identified lesser SS, unit leaders, and prisoner escorts. The service regulations also explained that unit

18 Heinrich Himmler was the police commander of Munich at the time (Krausnick and Broszat 1970).
leaders were responsible for assigning escort leaders and control work unit sizes. All exceptions and releases had to be verified in writing by higher ups reinforcing the centrality of commandants, and, finally, higher ups were expected to inspect labor detachments for “all defects and faults of the guard system” (PS-1216).
Organization of a typical concentration camp

SS offices and personnel are in Roman type; prisoner offices and functionaries are in italics.

Figure 1: Camp Hierarchical Structure
The camp hierarchy was solidified during the 1936 reorganization. Camps were divided between five components – administration, political, labor, concentration camps, and medical – that were all responsible to the camp commandant (Figure 1). These were independent components with their own hierarchies, and responsibilities. The Political Administration was responsible for keeping track of prisoners and punishing enemies of the state, the labor division extracted labor (and grew in importance over time), and the medical division was – in name – responsible for the well-being of the prisoners. One of the more insidious aspects of the concentration camps was that these hierarchies incorporated prisoners at the lower levels. Effectively requiring prisoners to act as jailors and prisoners simultaneously; surveilling and punishing fellow prisoners with the knowledge that they would be assaulted if they ever fell out of favor with camp guards.\textsuperscript{19} Prisoners acted as \textit{lagerälteste} (camp elders) and \textit{blockälteste} (block elders) in the camp hierarchy, and as capos (work party leaders) in the labor division. These positions were filled by German criminals in the early camps, but, as populations grew and camps diversified, political prisoners and Jews were found in these roles.

\textbf{Ideology}

The final component of the Dachau Model imparted a set of ideological beliefs onto SS guards. The Dachau Model reflected Eicke’s – and, by extension, the Nazi parties’ – view of enemies of the state, and their broader ideology of superiority and strength. The disciplinary regulations directly state that “[t]olerance means weakness. In light of this conception, punishments will be mercilessly handed out whenever the interests of the

\textsuperscript{19} There are multiple examples of kapos and blockälteste being killed by fellow prisoners after being stripped of their responsibilities.
fatherland warrant it” (551). The disciplinary regulations reiterate this point: “[the] guard is the prisoner’s superior,” “the SS man must be a leading example to the prisoners, if prisoners are to respect the SS-guard.” Guards were forbidden from taking shelter during sentry duty (it “is ridiculous and unsoldierly”), or using the familiarity “Du” in conversation with prisoners. These regulations were intended to bolster the superiority of the SS as a collective rather than as individuals. Clearly reinforcing these collective notions, the regulations stating that “self-aid means lack of discipline,” and that “[not] words but only the example of deeds have effect on [Communists and Plutocrats]. A SS man who does not want to accept that obligation of self-education, should leave the camp.” This approach reflected Eicke’s own belief that the SS were the elite of the elite in the Nazi party (Sydnor 1990:26), and that blind obedience to the party and “fanatical hatred for enemies” was central to the SS code of conduct (Sydnor 1990:11). Multiple SS reiterated the Dachau Model’s prohibition of pity for enemies of the state (see Höss 1961; Berben 1975; Segev 1990).

The Diffusion of the Dachau Model

The bureaucratic and ideological beliefs embedded in the service regulations, disciplinary regulations, and camp divisions formed a normative basis for SS and guard behavior. The culture of the camp SS valued order, recognized their own superiority, and admonished tolerance and empathy for the enemy. Although the rules originally only applied to Dachau, they became standard practice at other camps (Sofsky 1996:32; Krausnick and
Broszat 1970:179; Sydnor 1990). The Dachau Model spread formally and informally through Dachau’s early role as a prison and a school for SS soldiers (Berben 1975). SS commandants and guards at Sachsenhausen (Baranowski), Flössenburg (Weissenborn), Hertogenbosch (Grunewald), Ravensbrück (Kogel), Mauthausen (Ziereis), Auschwitz (Höss), Stutthof (Pauly), and Bergen-Belsen (Kramer) all served apprenticeships at Dachau (or, later, Sachsenhausen) (Segev 1987; Berben 1975; Sydnor 1990; Hilberg 2003).

Not all camps were subject to the Dachau Model. Camps that were not directly run by the SS were not subject to the Dachau Model (Browning 2010), and the impact of the rules on the death camps was likely limited. The Dachau Model did have an indirect influence on these camps though. There is evidence that the camp guards, as well as guards in Drancy (Poznanski 2001) and the death camps (Arad 1987), adhered to some of the same expectations and behaviors. Namely, the use of roll calls, prisoner hierarchies, the triangle system, and punishments seen in Dachau Model camps.

The rules and regulations laid out in the Dachau Model were used throughout the war. In testimonies, prisoners from a multitude of camps described roll calls, the presence of prisoner-functionaries, hierarchical divisions within the camps, and harsh punishments for minor rule violations. Many described public hangings for attempted escapes and sabotage, and prisoners receiving 25 lashes for rule violations. Clearly, even as the camps

---

20 Some question the persuasiveness of the “Dachau Model,” and argue that its features were quickly disregarded for something more brutal (Caplan 2010). These critiques hold some validity as the Dachau Model was not perfectly adhered to, especially as the camps evolved. However, the spirit of the laws and rules certainly proliferated across camps. Further, the focus of this paper is on understanding how and why guard behavior decoupled from these clearly defined organizational rules.

21 The commandants of the Reinhard death camps – Sobibor, Treblinka, and Belżec – were drawn from a different organizational population, and answered to a separate SS head. The commandants largely came from the 14f13 euthanasia program, and were responsible to Reinhard Heydrich (and, later, Klatenbrunner (Hilberg 2003)).
became increasingly chaotic, the normative and organizational structure of the Dachau Model was an identifiable undercurrent in the behavior of the SS and guards of the camps. It is just that the ability of these rules to constrain and direct behavior diminished as additional goals and expectations emerged, which raises the question of how and why behavior decoupled from such strict rules.

**The Evolution of the Nazi Concentration Camp System**  
*1933-1939: Formation, Organization, and Expansion*

The Nazi camp system was a sprawling behemoth that included more than 42,500 concentration camps, sub-camps, labor camps, POW camps, and ghettos between 1933 and 1945, but its origins were fairly banal (Megargee 2009; Lichtblau 2013). Dachau, the first concentration camp, was established on March 20, 1933; just two months after Hitler became chancellor, and days before the passage of the Enabling Act (the “legal” framework for totalitarianism in Germany)\(^\text{22}\). The early concentration camps were created to provide “protective custody” for political opposition figures and stabilize the power of the regime, and between 150,000 and 200,000 prisoners had been temporarily detained by the end of the year (Berben 1975). Prisoners, almost entirely political enemies of the state (around 80% of the camp prisoners were communists, 10% social democrats, and the rest were from other political parties or trade unions), were held in a variety of makeshift “camps” including abandoned factories, schools, ships, and castles throughout Germany (Wachsmann 2010). However, these conditions were short lived. Most of the incarcerated prisoners were released within a couple weeks of confinement, and, after

\(^{22}\) The Enabling Act gave Hitler’s cabinet exclusive legislative power for four years (Shirer 1960).
taking control of the political police (the Gestapo) in 1934, Himmler started to change the camp structure.

Himmler saw the camps as a potent political weapon. He swiftly consolidated authority (as a part of the Night of the Long Knives in July of 1934); reorganizing camp structure to streamline the system of detention, and establishing the Death’s Head units (*Totenkopfverbaende*) to act as guards. As a part of this process, Himmler named Theodor Eicke, the former head of Dachau, the head of the newly created Inspection of the Concentration Camps (IKL) in Berlin (Sydnor 1990). As the head of the IKL, Eicke oversaw the development and expansion of the camp system. Corporal punishment in the early camps was rare because they were still subject to judicial oversight. However, in February of 1936, the Prussian Law on the State Secret Police ruled that the orders and affairs of the secret police (i.e. the operators of the camps) were no longer liable to investigation; in effect, creating a sort of “dual state” of responsibilities and rules; Nazi Germany and the SS camp system (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:170).

With the new organizational structure and no legislative oversight, the camp system underwent a process of rapid expansion that did not abate until the end of the war and the collapse of the Nazi empire. In 1937 there were only four functional camps, Dachau and Lichtenburg, the only early camps left, and two new “model” camps, Sachsenhausen (established in September of 1936 near Berlin) and Buchenwald (established in July of 1937 near Weimar). A 1937 decree expanded the view of who could be subjected to preventative detention (*Polizeiliche Vorbeugungshaft*) to include “professional and habitual criminals,” others guilty of “asocial behavior” (such as asocials, vagrants, beggars, and pimps), and Jews, vastly expanded the size of the camps.
The prisoner population rose from 24,000 prisoners at the end of June to more than 50,000 at the end of the year (Figure 2). Less than half of these were Jewish. Nationwide arrests of Jews associated with the Kristallnacht pogroms sent 26,000 Jewish men to Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen and Dachau, but these arrests were intended to terrorize the Jews into emigration and many of the incarcerated Jews were released. The camp system continued to expand, adding three new camps – Flössenburg (established in May of 1938), Mauthausen (August, 1938), and Ravensbrück (May, 1939), and the number of SS increased from 4833 men (the end of 1937) to 22,033 men (summer of 1939).

1939-1944: Shifting Targets and Multiple Goals

In 1939, “the war came, and with it the great turning point in the history of the concentration camps” (Höss 1961:89). The German invasion of Poland brought a number of changes for Europe, and the camps. The Reich Security Main Office (RSHA), run by Reinhard Heyrich, was founded on September 27, 1939 in order to consolidate control over much of the concentration camp system. The camp system continued to grow. The prisoner population had reached an estimated 53,000 by the end of 1940, and a number of new camps including Neuengamme (1940), Auschwitz, (June 1940), Gross-Rosen (May 1941), Natzweiler (May 1941), Birkenau (March 1941), Majdanek (October 1941), and Stutthof in Northern Poland (January 1942) were incorporated. By the beginning of 1942, there were thirteen camps and tens of thousands of prisoners in the system.
One motivation for camp expansion was economic interests, particularly the exploitation of political prisoners for labor. The camps constructed in the late 1930’s were built near newly constructed quarries or brickworks for the new, SS owned, German Earth and Stone Works ("Deutsche Erd- Und Steinwerke GmbH", DEST), DAW ("Deutsche Ausrüstungwerke"), and OSTI East ("Ostindustrie"). These companies managed quarries and manufactured construction and road building materials (DEST), lumber products and recycled military equipment (DAW), made textiles (Texled) and capitalized on Jewish labor in the Generalgouvernement (OSTI) (Guterman 2008:23).

In May 1942, Himmler consolidated the economic interests and general control over the camps, under the Economic Administration Main Office ("Wirtschafts Verwaltungshauptamt", WVHA) (Krausnick and Broszat 1970). Headed by Oswald Pohl,

---

23 Camp system population data was collected from Caplan and Wachsmann 2010:33.
the WVHA subsumed the IKL and control over the camps, and became the organizational hub for the economic interests of the SS Empire. The WVHA solidified economic gain as an organizational goal. Camps were no longer just to hold political enemies of the state, they needed to exploit their labor too. In a letter for Pohl, the new head of the WVHA, to Himmler succinctly lays out the transition:

“The war has [brought] about a marked change in the structure of the concentration camps and has changed their duties with regard to the employment of the prisoners. The custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work, for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more.” (R-129)

Originally, the camps were to be integrated into the war effort by building armaments complexes inside the camps, but this proved problematic. Instead, prisoners were moved to the factories as sub-camps – still organizationally tied to the main camps – emerged around factories. By 1943, two thirds of the continually growing population of prisoners was deployed for labor in the war economy, and by 1944 there were more prisoners in sub-camps, and the main camps tended to function like transit hubs where prisoners were processed and contracted out to sub-camps (Wachsmann 2010). In fact, much of the work the WVHA did was negotiate with companies regarding the availability of prisoners, and the condition of prisoners after arrival.

Concurrent to the economic integration of the camps, the Nazis were decided that dealing with the “Jewish problem” through forced emigration was no longer an option (Browning 2007). They began to see the camps as not only a punishment for enemies of the state and a source of cheap labor, but also as the potential means to achieve their ideological goals of exterminating the European Jews. The rising number of Jews and
Russians – both at the very bottom of the Nazis’ ethnic hierarchy – imprisoned in the camps, and the “success” of the 14f13 and 14f14 euthanasia programs that killed 38,000 people made the potential even greater. Widespread mass murder of the Jews began sometime between summer of 1941 and the summer of 1942, and the Nazi bureaucracy fully invested itself after the Wannsee Conference in January 1942 (Bauer 1982). As the Nazi bureaucracy got involved, murder increasingly moved from mass shootings conducted by the Einsatzgruppen to gas chambers inside new death camps in occupied Poland (Arad 1987; Browning 2001). The dual economic and ideological purpose of camps like Birkenau and Majdanek is a tangible example of the expanded, and often competing, goals of the Nazis.

Because of the expanded role of the concentration camps, the population began to grow even more rapidly, particularly the Auschwitz complex. By September of 1942, more than a third of the 110,000 prisoners in the camp system were in Auschwitz (39,000). Within a year, the camp system had doubled in size (224,000 prisoners), and Auschwitz had grown to 74,000 prisoners. In November 1943, Auschwitz was finally split into three camps; Auschwitz I (the concentration camp), Auschwitz II (Birkenau, the death camp), and Auschwitz III (Monowitz-Buna, a labor camp). Overall, between May and July of 1944, 470,000 Jews were deported to the camps; just as many had arrived in all of 1942 and 1943 combined. The rapidly expanding size of the camps put increasing amounts of pressure on guards and commandants.

---

24 The death camps were Belżec, Birkenau, Chelmno, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka.
25 It is important to note that the Nazis saw their economic and ideological goals as two fronts in the same war, that is, complimentary – not competing – goals. For the Nazis there was an external front against the Allies and an internal front fought against enemies of the state (and primarily the Jews).
Collapse, 1944-1945

Even as losses on the Soviet front began to mount, the size of the camps swelled at an ever increasing rate. The population of the camps doubled between August 1943 (224,000) and August 1944 (524,286). On January 15, 1945, the day the Auschwitz death marches started, the SS reported 714,211 prisoners in the camp system. The Nazis did close four of their death camps during this period (Bełżec, Chelmno, Sobibór, and Treblinka), largely due to the fact that they had succeeded in murdering the majority of the Jews in the Generalgovernment.26 Military losses and economic demand altered the camp landscape in other ways. In a major reversal, Himmler rescinded the policy making Germany free of Jews (Judenrein) in order to fulfill an ever growing demand for labor in German war factories. Prisoners from Majdanek, Warsaw, Plaszów, and the Baltic camps were sent west in the spring and autumn of 1944, and the population of the core pre-war camps (Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen) went from 104,500 prisoners in August of 1943 to 373,646 prisoners by the end of 1944 (Hilberg 2003; Wachsmann 2010). In early 1945, another 100,000 prisoners from Auschwitz, Gross-Rosen, and Stutthof were sent to Ravensbrück, Bergen-Belsen, and Dachau, swelling their ranks even further beyond capacity.

Increased economic demand did not mean improved conditions for prisoners. Even without the extermination camps, death dominated the later era camps. Mauthausen’s mortality rate was 12.5% between January and April of 1945. Bergen-Belsen, originally a transit camp with no nearby factories, was used as a dumping ground for prisoners. In March 1945 alone, 18,000 prisoners died there. Overall, “it is likely that

26 The Generalgovernment is the area of central and southern Poland occupied by the Nazis during World War II, and designated as a specific administrative area.
one-third to one-half of the over 700,000 prisoners still alive in early 1945 perished before the end of the war.” (Wachsmann 2010:35). Many of these deaths were a product of overwork and a lack of provisions, but harsh treatment certainly played a role too. The end of the war and the liberation of the camps did not bring an immediate end to the pain and suffering. Prisoners continued to die from disease and exhaustion, and, sadly, many died from overconsumption or consuming rich and fatty foods they could not digest.

The Nazi concentration camps were not designed to be the weapons of mass destruction that they became. Instead, the camps, originally a tool for controlling political opposition, were repurposed to meet an expanding, and often conflicting, set of economic, political, and ideological policies. As the camp system expanded, the RSHA and WVHA’s expectations for it to fulfill political, economic, and ideological goals simultaneously created conflict and ambiguity within the camps, particularly in light of the early training, rules, and expectations established for guards and commandants.

Expanding Goals and Expectations
In his treatise on the camps, Wolfgang Sofsky argued that the Dachau model curtailed arbitrary commandant decisions, but set few limits on guard cruelty, thus “established terror as a principle” and created a paradigm for behavior (1996:32). By the end of the war guards were certainly able to act capriciously toward the prisoners, but, as others have pointed out, these were not static attributes of the camps (see Lammers 1995; Pingel 2010). Guard behavior and the role of the camps evolved over time, and behavior varied across camps. What Sofsky’s argument leaves unexplained is how a group trained and socialized toward total obedience can suddenly act as they wish. In the following section, I outline how Nazi ideological beliefs and economic interests clashed in ways that
simultaneously increased violence and chaos, and increased the value of prisoners’ lives producing opaque rules and expectations.

The concentration camps changed dramatically over their life course, and one of the central reasons for these changes was the continual expansion of the goals and expectations for the camps. The camps originated as prison camps for political enemies, but added economic and ideological responsibilities as the Nazi’s interests and concerns evolved. The addition of new, and, in many ways competing, goals provoked chaotic decoupling by expanding the expectations of the camps without rectifying conflicts among goals, thus allowing guards free reign to act independently. The guard’s decoupling had a deleterious effect on the ideological and economic goals of the camps, but especially for the prisoners in the camps.

The evolution and functions of the camps shaped the administrative structure of the camps (Hilberg 2003:960). In the early period, the camps were political institutions used to neutralize political opponents and scare Jews into emigrating. By 1938, the camps were being utilized to exploit prisoner labor, spurring the expansion of the camp system (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:201, 229). Indeed, early identification of a camp as a “concentration camp” was politicized and heavily influenced by the proximity of economically beneficial structures (factories, quarries, etc.). As the war approached, the Nazis anticipated an increase in prisoners, and constructed camps in order to exploit prisoner labor (Hilberg 2003:939).

Nearly simultaneously, the Nazis were negotiating how to address “the Jewish question.” Options such as forced emigration, and deportation to Madagascar were progressively less likely as war became more certain. Memos from Reinhard Heydrich to
the chiefs of the secret police (the Gestapo) indicate that secret plans were agreed upon in 1939 which involved ghettoizing the Jews in the occupied territories under the watch of a “Council of Elders” (PS-3363), and the removal of Jews from Germany. The methods of the final solution were likely not agreed upon until the Wannsee Conference in 1942, but mass murders by specially commissioned soldiers (Einsatzgruppen), and ghettoization were already well underway by this point. The RSHA began building specially constructed extermination camps – Chelmno and the Operation Reinhard camps – in order to handle the large number of Jews and lighten the psychological burden on Nazi soldiers, and expanded established camps to incorporate ideological aims. Auschwitz, for example, originally held Poles for economic exploitation, but, by September 1941, had evolved to begin gassing prisoners, and, by spring of 1943, had expanded into a full-fledged extermination camp (Gutman and Berenbaum 1998).

After the winter of 1941, the availability of labor was increasingly more important. The incorporation of the Inspectorate of the Concentration Camps (IKL) into the WVHA under Pohl signaled that economic goals had become the dominant factor determining the demographic and administrative development of the camps. The expanded economic role changed expectations of the commandants and the camps. In a memo to Himmler, Pohl states that he informed camp commandants that “[t]he custody of prisoners for the sole reasons of security, education, or prevention is no longer the main consideration. The mobilization of all prisoners who are fit for work, for purposes of the war now, and for purposes of construction in the forthcoming peace, come to the foreground more and more” (R-129), and new commandants were installed in several

27 A Germany free of Jews (Judenrein) was one of the Nazi’s primary goals.
camps in order to bureaucratize the camps (Allen 2005; Megargee 2009). Increasingly, camp commanders were responsible for allocating labor to surrounding factories and businesses (NO-2167) turning many of the concentration camps into hubs of slave labor. The use of prisoner labor had the effect of “relaxing” the rules of camp management, reducing corporal punishments, and, for non-Jews, incorporating “prizes” and rewards for good work (Krausnick and Broszat 1970).

Complicated Adherence

Institutional elites continued to expect that guards adhere to rules and regulations event though the rules had not expanded to meet the new demands pressed on the camps. In July 1943, Glücks, the Inspector of the Concentration Camps, issued a memo of “instructions in the duties and obligations of guards which in content and tone agreed largely with Eicke’s old directions” (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:180). The head of the WVHA sent an additional memo to camp commandants (7/6/1943, NO-1245) observing that “guards are adhering to their duties and obligations very imperfectly.” He specifically admonished guards for engaging in conversations with, and failure to remain aloof from, prisoners. He faults the commandants’ lack of oversight and makes them responsible for instruction of the guards by lessons given out once a week (both, talking to prisoners and commandant oversight were a part of the service regulations).

In spite of expectations for adherence, the simultaneous demands between two different authorities (WHVA & RSHA) with two conflicting aims (economic & ideological) complicated the responsibilities of the guards in the camps. WVHA administrators pushed commandants to keep prisoners alive to work. In a memo to the
commandants, Glücks stated that “every means must be used to lower the death rates in the camps,” and held the commandants “personally responsible for exhausting of every possibility of maintaining the physical strength of the prisoners” (NO-1523). In a later memo to Himmler, Pohl described improved hygiene, food, clothing, and shortened roll call in the camps, and provided tables showing a visible drop in the mortality of the camps (PS-1469). However, these numbers were misleading. Commandants increasingly hid the total number of deaths from administrators. Camps stopped numbering deaths and death certificates with consecutive numbers, stopped returning the bodies of Polish, Jewish, and Russian prisoners to their families, and simplified the documentation of Jewish deaths to a single list (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:244-45; NO-1246).

Additionally, prisoners who died in transit or in the gas chambers were not counted in the mortality rates, and so commandants, particularly in labor camps like Buna, shipped sick or exhausted prisoners to extermination camps knowing that they would be selected (and removing the death from their books in the process).

Hiding, or failing to report, death counts were not the only ways to evade the WVHA’s half-hearted appeals to reduce mortality in the camps. While Himmler, Pohl, and Glücks were telling commandants to reduce death rates, they were instructing SS doctors to kill sick inmates and prisoners too weak to work again, “[h]ygiene and killings were used as interchangeable means to make the camps ‘fit for action’ and to free them from all ballast” (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:246). Murders by injection were often recorded as ‘illness causing death’ on camp records and death certificates. Prisoners actively avoided visiting the hospitals, and stating that a person only went there if they
wanted to die. Indeed, many described an environment where medicine was non-existent, and selections regularly removed prisoners from hospital beds (Ritvo and Plotkin 1998). The attempt to address both ideological and economic goals only highlighted the competition between them. Extermination through work (*Vernichtung durch Arbeit*) attempted to meld the camps multiple functions, but only blurred the responsibility of the camps. Prisoners were viewed as a valuable source of labor that guards were expected to keep alive for as long as possible, but they were not valuable enough to keep alive for good. As a result, prisoners were worked long hours in trying conditions while being fed poorly, in inadequate housing, and with little regard in the way of hygiene. The ever expanding size of the camps devolved into a waste, and the intentional destruction of prisoners (extermination through labor) (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:225).

Even in camps that were only under the jurisdiction of the WVHA, conditions were chaotic. Pohl, the head of the WVHA, specifically pointed to the decoupling of guard behavior and the rules of the camp; specifically arguing that camp conditions could be partially attributed to the socialization of SS guards in the early camps and the organizational norm of “labor as torture” established by Eicke (and later Höss) (Weiss 1984; Allen 2005). In a letter to Himmler in May of 1942, Pohl lamented that “many commandants and Schutzhaftlager – Rapport – and Blockführer employed in the camps continued to treat their charges as enemies of the State who required terrorizing, that they showed little interest in a rational use of labor and thereby defeating his efforts” (Krausnick and Broszat 1970:242). Clearly, as the functions of the camps blurred, the

---

28 Roughly a quarter of the testimonies that I coded specifically stated that they hospitals were to be avoided if one wanted to survive. They were a frequent site of selections for extermination, or deportation to death camps. See testimonies from Nechama Epstein-Kozlowski (Boder and Epstein-Kozlowski 1946), Lilly Malnik (RG-50.030*0146), Solomon Radasky (RG-50.030*0305) for particularly insightful examples.
Nazi elites were unable to control\textsuperscript{29} the violence of the guards and the SS, nor their corruption and personal enrichment. “Maltreatment and chicanery, violence and death; these were still the defining feature of incarceration. Nor did corruption and personal enrichment wane, but remained a key symptom of the system and even increased.” (Wachsmann and Caplan 2010:53). Indeed, as the war progressed, the WVHA and the RSHA began to demand of the camps “feats of production and of human destruction that were almost intrinsically self-contradictory. It’s not surprising that chaos and degradation ensued beyond anything previously imaginable” (Koehl 1983:169).

**Mounting Demographic Pressure**

Coupled with expanding organizational goals, the camps faced rapidly mounting demographic pressures. The increasingly inclusive definition of who deserved to be sent to the camps and the ever growing demand for labor swelled the ranks of prisoners well beyond capacity. The sheer volume of prisoners put pressure on guards to cut corners with bureaucratic rules and to treat prisoners as an inexhaustible resource. As a result, prisoners were treated in increasingly chaotic ways, and their usefulness as an economic force was significantly diminished.

As depicted in Figure 2 above, after a couple years with a small number of prisoners, the population of the camps expanded rapidly. The population of the camps doubled several times over the course of their existence. The camps swelled from 7,750

\textsuperscript{29} In this context, I mean control in the sense of harnessing, focusing, and limiting violence, but not necessarily preventing it. It is important to be clear that Nazi elites were not concerned with prisoner deaths per se. Rather, they wanted to extract as much labor from them as possible. This is evident in a letter from Himmler to Pohl regarding the use of Jewish laborers, “reduce most of these Jewish concentration camp factories, to a few large Jewish concentration camp factories if possible, in the East of the General Government (i.e. Poland). Of course, there too, the Jews shall some day disappear, in accordance with the Fuhrer’s wishes” (NO-1611). More broadly, I am not arguing that Nazi bureaucrats were not responsible for the Holocaust or the chaos of the camps. They were. I am arguing that the camp commandants and guards were not simple bureaucrats who were “just following orders.” For more on this point, see Allen 2002.
prisoners to more than 50,000 prisoners between January 1938 and the state-sanctioned Kristallnacht pogroms in November 1938. Then, after releasing many of these prisoners with the expectation that they would emigrate, doubled again between September 1939 (21,400) and December 1940 (53,000). The population continued to double annually until the end of the war. Between July 1943 and January 15, 1945 the Nazis reported that the camps added an incredible 490,211 prisoners.

As more and more arrived, prisoner’s lives were worth less and less, allowing the SS and the guards to believe that they could achieve both economic and ideological goals by working prisoners to death. Thus, prisoners in labor camps were worked heavily, fed little, and treated poorly with the knowledge that more were available to take their place. In Auschwitz, the epitome of both economic and ideological goals, Jews not selected for extermination after arrival were considered “working Jews,” a special category of prisoners likely to be worked to death or to become “muselmen” (Levi 1988). Further, rapid population growth made oversight more difficult, conditions more dire, and the SS more reliant on prisoner-functionaries who – in the gray zone of authority within the camps – behaved in a manner that they believed was best suited for helping them to survive (violently) (Levi 1988; Krausnick and Broszat 1970:235).

Prisoner testimonies clearly show how demographic pressures influenced guard behavior. Guards treated prisoners without regard or order, clearly reflecting the fact that, even as labor, they were replaceable. Yet they went to incredible lengths to retain control over them. For example, Larry Wayne described the sense that the SS were completely overwhelmed as the war came to an end, “[after January 15th, 1945] they were completely disorganized, taking us from one place to another. Then finally took us on a train ride ‘til
we got to Gross-Rosen, they said they can’t take us, they’re too overcrowded. Went to Mauthausen, they didn’t take us, they were too overcrowded. And finally we wound up in Sachsenhausen near Berlin.” (Voice/Vision Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive (hereafter, VVA). Wayne, 2005). In this quote, Wayne was transported at least 1000 kilometers, and he was later transported to Flössenburg and Buchenwald before being liberated.

Treatment for prisoners after they arrived in overcrowded camps was equally poor, and created conditions that made even simple daily activities stressful. As Stefan Czyzewski explains, “So Mauthausen became greatly overcrowded. So, like my barrack, instead of having 120 people, had 700. Half of the people slept inside, sitting on again-against he other, for half a night and then they would get out of a window and the people who are standing outdoors, would get in at 12 o’clock and sit on the floor to be warm and to sleep until morning.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0387). The experiences described by Larry Wayne and Stefan Czyzewski are representative of the experiences of prisoners who survived through the end of the war. Constant transports from overcrowded camp to overcrowded camp, and living conditions that made simple activities like sleeping and eating problematic.

The best, and worst, example of the effects of the rapid population growth had on prisoner experience was Bergen-Belsen. Founded in 1943 to hold “Exchange Jews” that Himmler hoped to trade for prisoners of war (Kolb 1984), Bergen-Belsen swiftly devolved into a dumping ground for prisoners transported from the East as camps closed. Irene Hasenberg Butter arrived from Westerbork in February of 1944, and describes the deterioration of the camp,
Things got worse all the time. The um, the life in the camp deteriorated. Less food uh, more harassment, more cruelty, and more people coming because some point in '44, the Russians um, advanced to the extent that they, they transferred people from, from Auschwitz. And people came from Auschwitz to Bergen-Belsen, which meant that, um... And many other transports came, people from out of Albania, people from Greece, people from Hungary, so that we constantly had to live with more people and less... and more beds were crammed in. And the conditions, of course, became worse and worse because we were so crowded. The end, I remember, that they had the bunk beds, there were three beds on top of one another and two beds next to each other so, and two people in each bed. So you had six beds, twelve people shared six beds and six beds were very close together. And there was almost no space to put anything. . . The bathrooms were very inadequate for that many people and a lot, of course, as time went on, more and more people had typhoid fever and dysentery, and bathroom conditions were uh, just uh, unbelievable. (VVA, Butter, 1986)

The declining organizational conditions described by Irene Butter paint a picture where the rapidly expanding population of the camps made conditions even worse. Guards relied on violence and cruelty more regularly while day to day life became increasingly difficult.

**Ethnic Hierarchy in the Camp System**

The final factor in the decoupling of behavior and rules was the Nazi’s beliefs regarding ethnic hierarchy. According to Nazi beliefs, the German aryans were genetic elites followed by Poles, Czechs, and Slavs (with a wide gap in between), and then Russians and Jews at the very bottom. The SS and guards used ethnicity as a marker for the distribution of power and privilege among inmates in the camps (Hilberg 2003:978). The presence of a despised enemy of the state justified decoupled behavior directly toward those who were essentially marked for abuse. The combination of the order, “tolerance is weakness” (PS-778) with ethnic prejudice created a motivation –and justification –for decoupling.
The camp system was originally designed for neutralizing and punishing political “enemies of the state (Krausnick and Broszat 1970), and early Jewish detainees were often imprisoned and released with the intention of terrorizing Jews into forced migration. After the war began, the racial hierarchy of the camps had increasingly dire consequences for prisoners, as Nina Kaleska, a prisoner in Birkenau, explains,

“Yes, there were many other people in Auschwitz, Christians, political prisoners, uh prostitutes, homosexuals, uh murderers, but I want people to understand one very important thing – it was primarily an extermination camp of the Jews of Europe. Because the Christian inmates were not subjected to the same treatment. They were not subjected to uh to crematoria. If they “sinned” (quote, unquote) according to them, they were hanged. I don’t know that there were any selections for the Christians. They were there were any selections for Christians. They were there as criminals and treated as such as though it was a prison. A terrible prison for them. But Auschwitz and the concentration camps of Europe were made for one reason and one reason alone and that is to – I don’t want to use exterminate – it was, you exterminate cock roaches – for the murder of Jews. And six million died, not just in Auschwitz – in others, I think that’s very important to understand (USHMM, RG-50.030*0101).

The introduction of dehumanized and stigmatized populations in large numbers exacerbated the hatred and animus of the guards, and treatment for all prisoners, not just Jews, grew increasingly worse. “Right away, we could notice that we are treated already different, practically. We didn’t care. We [knew] this: that if you are gentile, you didn’t survive; if you are Jewish, you less survive.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0116). Mr. Kornberg’s statement succinctly explains how the brutality of the camps applied to all prisoners, just to varying degrees. Indeed, this hierarchy could not be broken by inmates, and was one of the most rigid aspects of the camp bureaucracy (Hilberg 2003).

Prisoner’s uniforms, particularly the use of a triangle system of identification, symbolized the Nazi’s adherence to ethnic hierarchy. The triangle system was employed by the Political Administration in the camps to quickly identify the reasons that prisoners
were incarcerated. The worst treated groups changed as the definition of “enemy of the state” expanded from political prisoners to asocials to homosexuals to Jews (Stein 2004). Political prisoners, and most of the Poles, wore red triangles\(^{30}\), criminals, who were mostly Germans, wore green, emigrants wore blue, Jehovah’s Witnesses wore purple, homosexuals wore pink, and “asocials” and work-shy wore black triangles, and Jews wore inverted yellow triangles behind one of these other colors. Additional badges and identifiers were included for recidivists, assignment to penal companies, race defilers, escape risks, POWs, and non-German nationalities (ex: a “P” for Pole would be in the middle of the triangle).

The stratifying logic of the triangle system embedded itself in the camp structure, and influenced how prisoners identified and interacted with one another. Prisoners integrated the colors of the triangles into camp slang, criminals were referred to as “greens” and political prisoners were “reds,” and Jews were simply Jews. Almost from the beginning, the camp hierarchy that utilized prisoner-functionaries tapped into this racial hierarchy, making “greens” capos and lagerälteste in many of the early camps. Indeed, particularly brutal labor camps such as Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, and Stutthof had greens dominate prisoner-functionary positions throughout the war, while camps such as Auschwitz and Buchenwald saw pitched battles between greens and reds over these positions during the lifespan of the camps (Megargee 2009; Pike 2004; Garliński 1975; Stein 2004). The use and stigmatization even extended to camps like Drancy where, in spite of holding only Jews, prisoners were required to wear yellow triangles (Poznanski 2001).

\(^{30}\) “Political prisoner” in the Nazi lexicon meant “enemy of the state.” The indication did not necessarily entail socialists, communists, or trade unionists, although these groups were certainly included.
Most importantly, the ethnic hierarchy of the Nazi’s influenced how guards treated prisoners in the camps. The disparities in treatment are most apparent when considered through the eyes of Jews who were – through mislabeling or their own actions – considered to be non-Jewish political prisoners. After surviving Drancy and Auschwitz-Birkenau, Bernard Nissenbaum describes his arrival and treatment in Dachau:

“In this camp – by far the best I have been interned in – exemplary order and cleanliness reigned. In contrast to us newcomers, the prisoners there looked healthy and not weak . . . Dachau had been designated for all people, except for Jews, though among the political prisoners some were Jews who had not disclosed their origin.” (USHMM, RG-02.005*01)

In the extermination camps, Jewish prisoners were much more likely to be targeted for selection. Walter Peltz, a prisoner in Auschwitz at the time, describes risking his life to pass as a political prisoner:

“Being a tailor, I used to sew on a lot of those numbers, the triangles, and the Star of David for the Jews and non-Jews, . . . and 1944, late’43, ’44 when there were a lot of Selections, I took off my Star of David and I put on a red triangle, I didn’t wear a Star of David. . . . [others in the barracks knew,] and, I was told, ‘What are trying to do? They’re going to kill you.’ I said, ‘They’re going to kill me anyway.’ But it saved me at the Selection, I want you to know. I did, I did save [myself] at the Selection.” (USHMM, RG-50.165*0087).

The guards also utilized the distinctions created by the ethnic hierarchy system to “divide and conquer” prisoners (Kogon 1960:46). As the regulations and disciplinary rules showed, the Nazis were particularly concerned about collective resistance31, and ethnic divisions were not only effective at helping guards to identify prisoner characteristics; they sowed distrust and competition amongst prisoners struggling to survive. Strife and competition was sown between different color groups, as well as across prisoners of

31 See Glücks letter to the commandants encouraging prisoner-spies to avoid “being surprised by major unpleasant events” (NO-1554).
varying nationalities. In sum, the racial hierarchy of the camps dehumanized the prisoners within the camps, and provided a rationalization for abusing the prisoners by stigmatizing them as both enemies of the state and inferior. It also created confusion and chaos among prisoners providing an even deeper sense of control.

Conclusion
The concentration camp system of Nazi Germany originated as a set of camps for the punishment and neutralization of political enemies of the state. After falling under the control of Heinrich Himmler, the camp system swiftly expanded taking on new economic and ideological demands as the interests and concerns of the Nazi elite changed. Rules and regulations, specifically the service regulations, disciplinary regulations, and institutional hierarchy established by Theodor Eicke early in the life course of the camps influenced the norms and behavior of the SS guards and commandants that came to run the camps. These rules ensured maximum punishment for minimal violations, while reinforcing the strict hierarchy of the SS, and its ideological interests (for example, the maxim: “tolerance is weakness”). However, these same ideological interests undermined attempts to integrate new and expanded organizational goals as the war unfolded.

The combination of an ever expanding set of political, economic, and ideological goals and expectations for the camps, a rapidly expanding camp population, and an ethnic hierarchy that dehumanized prisoners – particularly Jews and Russians – created an environment where guard behavior chaotically decoupled from the rules and expectations established by the Dachau Model. The shifting institutional and organization conditions tapped into and complicated the guards’ socialization into a set of beliefs that include a strong regard for hierarchy, a belief that insubordination warrants maximum penalties,
and violent ideological hatred of one’s enemies. As a result prisoners struggled to make sense of their organizational surroundings and find ways to survive the camps, and the Nazi’s struggled to fully tap into the economic potential of its available labor force.
CHAPTER 5: COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF COERCION IN THE CAMPS

The concentration camps within the broader concentration camp system certainly shared a number of similarities. Either by design or behavior, “each of the concentration camps was well prepared to carry out all the functions, from ‘educational’ to exterminational, although each to a different extent” (Muzeum Stutthof, 1980:4). However, they were not all alike. These differences in behavior extended beyond the assigned purpose of individual camps as death, labor, concentration, and transit camps, although they were certainly influenced by these distinctions. Some argue against comparative analyses of the camps, rightly pointing out there was starvation, abuse, and death in every ghetto and concentration camp. However, the assertion that “the distinction among the types of camps is purely academic” (Guterman 2008:4) ignores important distinctions in how prisoners experienced the camps, and the lack of comparative perspective “makes it difficult to develop a theoretical framework for understanding camp life and finding answers to more general questions” (Pingel 2010:59). Indeed, much of the historical research on the camps has focused on either individual camps (Langbein 2004; Berben 1975; Morrison 2000, etc.) or a small set of camps that share similarities (Arad 1987).

Additionally, sociological research has been lacking a thorough comparative analysis of the camps. Although Adler (1958) theorized a sociology of the concentration camps more than a half century ago, much of the sociological literature has treated the concentration camps as an ideal type (Goffman 1961; Sofsky 1996; Bauman 1989; Clegg...
2009). Rather, as Lammers points out in his review of Sofsky’s book, the concentration camps were a constellation of organizations that varied in regards to internal behavior and institutional purpose (1995). Considering the long history of comparative organizational analyses (Blau 1955, 1971; Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg 1994, etc.), sociological methods offer a useful approach for exploring the concentration camps and developing a theoretical framework for understanding camp life. This chapter addresses these issues by drawing on the data collected from Holocaust testimonies described above to address two separate, yet related questions: What are the organizational similarities and differences across concentration camps? Further, what aspects of these organizations make them particularly coercive? In order to answer these questions I conduct a QCA analysis of the relationship between camp organizational and structural conditions and coercion –as measured by mortality rates. This analysis is informed by, and connects back to, prior research on power and coercion in organizations as well as varying methods of control. I begin by identifying the specific outcomes and conditions under analysis before drawing on the QCA results to discuss the qualitative and historical data drawn from the testimonies and secondary sources on the camps.

**Outcome and Conditions**

*Camp Mortality Rate:* Mortality rates varied considerably across Nazi concentration camps. Historians have done an exceptional amount of work to overcome the destruction of important documents and estimate the total number of dead in the Holocaust and in individual camps (see Hilberg 2003; Weiss 1984; and Dawidowicz 1975 for varying estimates). Death, either directly or through deportations, was the greatest threat for prisoners, and mortality rates serve as an acceptable proxy for coerciveness in the camps.
Further, the use of mortality as an outcome provides an opportunity to explore how particular sets of broad organizational conditions and methods of control (as described by survivors) extended beyond the functional intention of the camp, and combined to form sufficient conditions for high mortality.

In order to produce mortality rates for each camp, I took the proportion of deaths to the total population who had passed through the camps (not including those who were executed or gassed on arrival). The use of a rate of mortality (in contrast to a raw count) helps to account for variations in size and time in existence, as well as holes in the demographic data for the camps. Mortality rates were highest in death camps such as Sobibór and Treblinka and lowest in transit camps such as Drancy and Westerbork, but there is considerable variation between these two extremes (see Figure 3). I means-clustered the mortality rates in order to identify a natural binary division of 43% mortality (mean=.479) (Hermann and Cronqvist 2006). Camps above this mark, including death camps (Birkenau, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka), labor camps (Auschwitz, Buna, Mauthausen, and Stutthof), and concentration camps (Bergen-Belsen), represent a diversity of camp types indicating that coercion was a broad phenomena.

32 The great majority of the deaths in the Holocaust occurred immediately after arrival (either by execution or gassing), and I do not intend to minimize this massive loss of life. But, in order to understand how prisoner experiences varied after arrival, I chose to focus on those who survived the initial selections. The process of selection and mass murder certainly influenced prisoner experiences within the camps, and I discuss this influence later in the paper.

33 The mortality rate for Auschwitz, Birkenau, and Buna were derived from the same figure. I applied the mortality rate to all three camps because I do not have enough information to establish a quantitative distinction between the three camps. Demographic information is available for all three camps, but mortality information is only available for the Auschwitz-Birkenau complex as a whole. It is likely that the mortality rate for Buna is much smaller than Auschwitz or Birkenau because the injured and dying were transferred to Birkenau to be killed (Piper 1996; Gutman and Berenbaum 1994).
Figure 3: Camp Mortality Rates and Death Counts

Structural and Organizational Measures

Not all concentration camps were created equal, and prisoners’ experiences in the camps varied significantly as a result. The disparate experiences are readily apparent in the oral testimonies that survivors have provided to historians and museums over the past half century. I draw on these testimonies in order to identify how different bureaucratic and organizational characteristics of the camps linked together with surveillance techniques and the degree of deprivation in high and low mortality camps.

In order to understand how organizational characteristics varied across camps, I condensed data collected from testimonies to produce camp level measures of characteristics described by the prisoners. I constructed camp measures from individual
testimonies by dividing the number of prisoners who discussed a particular topic by the number of times that broader subject [arrival, labor, structure, guards, rules, abuse, culture, and resistance] was discussed in the camp. For example, prisoners who discussed ration sizes were divided by prisoners who discussed the structure of the camps [bunks, food, mobility, and demography]. These camp level conditions can be interpreted to show that “of the survivors who discussed X (ex: structure) in their testimony, more than half\textsuperscript{34} described Y (ex: receiving small rations).”

One important element of my coding scheme is the recognition that these measures are an indication of the prisoner’s perception of the presence of a characteristic;\textsuperscript{35} they are not an indication of the absence of a characteristic. In many cases, camps coded as zero had prisoners who discussed some of these issues, but there was not a critical mass of respondents who discussed the issue. While imperfect, this approach takes into account the fact that not every prisoner discusses every aspect of their time in the camps in their interviews, and it puts their discussion in a context with other similar aspects of the camp experience. It also allows for a broad spectrum of experiences within a single camp rather than ranking camps on a continuum from “bureaucratic” to “chaotic.”

\textsuperscript{34} I reduced the cut point for Auschwitz and Birkenau to 33% due to the sheer number of respondents who went through the two camps (90 testimonies discuss Auschwitz, and 62 describe Birkenau). Considering that both of these camps were processing and transit camps, many were only in the camps for less than a week. This approach accounts for the quantity of Auschwitz/Birkenau responses without lowering the bar for other camps with fewer respondents.

\textsuperscript{35} In this analysis I am most interested in understanding how prisoners broadly perceived the camps. Focusing on what survivors chose to discuss and how they combine helps to identify broader differences across camps by drawing attention to the issues that were most salient for survivors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mortality Rate (MORTALITY)</td>
<td>Deaths as a proportion of the total population who had passed through the camp.</td>
<td>1- Mortality rate was 43% or above 0- Mortality rate was below 43%</td>
<td>0.473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bureaucratic Rules and Punishments (BUREAU)</td>
<td>SS, guards, or prisoner functionaries enforced bureaucratically defined camp rules and punishments</td>
<td>1- Guards enforced bureaucratic rules 0- Guards did not enforce bureaucratic rules</td>
<td>0.421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaotic Organizational Rules and Punishments (CHAOS)</td>
<td>SS, guards, or prisoner functionaries enforced rules with no &quot;correct&quot; behavior or impossible expectations and punished prisoners without reason</td>
<td>1- Guards enforced ambiguous rules 0- Guards did not regularly enforce ambiguous rules</td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surveillance (SURVEIL)</td>
<td>Survivors describe surveillance in the form of roll calls in the camp</td>
<td>1- Survivors described surveillance 0- Survivors did not describe surveillance</td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunger (HUNGER)</td>
<td>Survivors describe receiving small or inadequate rations (ex: limited portions of food, being forced to share their portion, or only receiving food once a day)</td>
<td>1- Prisoners describe starvation conditions 0- Prisoners did not describe starvation conditions</td>
<td>0.789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labor Camp (LABOR)</td>
<td>The camp was primarily a labor camp.</td>
<td>1- Camp was a Labor Camp 0- Camp was not a Labor Camp</td>
<td>0.579</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bureaucracy: In his treatise on the subject, Weber stated that, in bureaucracies, rules and duties are official, regularly fulfilled, and that “the authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means, physical, sacerdotal, or otherwise, which may be placed at the disposal of officials” (1978:956). Following this logic, rules should limit coercion in organizations, but, as others have shown, rules may also act as methods of coercion (Gouldner 1955; Roscigno, Lopez, and Hodson 2009). Bureaucratic rules limit and channel individual behavior, and, when callously written, justify punishment for minimal violations and missteps. Organizations with such constraining and restrictive conditions may be associated with highly coercive conditions. In order to assess the relationship between this condition and high mortality rates, I include a measure of camps where more than fifty percent of prisoners who discuss rules and abuse discuss known rules or punishments for violating known rules.36

Prisoners identified a number of different rules including talking limits, areas that were off limits, and behavioral expectations. Rules in the concentration camps were occasionally specific, but there were serious consequences for lapses in behavior. As Solomon Radasky, a prisoner in Auschwitz explains:

“If I am not shaved until 12:00 I get no soup. I have to be shaved, my face has to be shaved until 12:00 and 12:00 they’re bringing out the soup. Any man not shaved cannot get it. You have to be shaved to get a little bit of soup. If not I’d have to wait until Monday 12:00. Sunday evening if you’re working you get Sunday evening a little piece of bread. If you’re not working you get nothing, just 12:00 the soup.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0305).

Prisoners also describe being punished for violating rules and expectations, and, often, the significance of the rule did not fit the severity of the punishment. Punishments were

---

36 Again, the cut off for Auschwitz and Birkenau is 33% (see footnote 10 above)
not always death though. Cecile Klein-Pollack explains that her sister was punished for breaking a clear rule in Birkenau while trying to care for her while she was sick,

“So she went over – an SS was eating an apple. So she went over and she said, ‘Please give, give my sister a piece of apple. She’s very sick.’ But he gave her such a slap in the face that she fell all the way to, to where I was lying. And I just begged her, ‘Please, don’t, don’t ever, you….’ Because nobody was allowed to approach an SS. In fact, if this would have happened in, in Auschwitz, she would have been automatically killed.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0107)

Chaos: Recent research has argued that bureaucratic rules, particularly rules in coercive organizations, are not always so straightforward (Sofsky 1996; Hodson, et al. 2012). Instead, rules may be enforced poorly or inconsistently exacerbating tensions and further reifying power relations. Such instances, where guards “mock” bureaucratic rules over subordinates, demonstrate an expansive power in organizations. In order to integrate more ambiguous rules and power relations, I include a measure for chaos, or intentionally chaotic organizational conditions in the camp. The measure represents camps where more than fifty percent of prisoners who discuss rules and abuse discuss impossible rules, ambiguous rules, “sport” (a form of abuse that is largely for the amusement of the guards (Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982)), beatings at the whim of the guards, or beatings for unknown reasons. Ambiguous rules are instances where there is no “right” answer, the wrong answer may get you punished, or, rules are left undefined by those in power (a contrast with Goffman (1961)). In his Voices of the Holocaust testimony Alexander Gertner describes the absence of known rules in Auschwitz:

“David Boder [Interviewer]: And who explained to you what was permitted and what was not permitted?
Alexander Gertner: It was not explained. We saw that for this one gets beaten, so we knew that this was not permitted. They… they did not explain, ‘this you can’t
do.’ If one did something, even [if] it was right, one [the capo] also gave him a blow with a club.” (Voices of the Holocaust (hereafter, VotH), Gertner, 1946).

Similarly, Gilda Schild Haas describes how everything was seemingly forbidden in Theresienstadt:

“Well, contraband – another new expression – was for us anything they didn’t allow for Jews to possess – lipstick, money, cigarettes, chocolate, even female napkins – anything like that was called contraband. As a matter of fact, anything that belonged to a Jew was not allowed to belong to him, so most everything was contraband.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0334)

Chaos was not limited to impossible or ambiguous rules; guards beat and abused prisoners for no clear reason, relying on the ambiguity of these beatings to keep prisoners under control. Saul Ingber describes an incident in Mauthausen where a guard attacks him simply for being Jewish,

“When he lift up my chin, he said to me in uh his voice in German ___ because I speak Yiddish I understand the German… he says where’s your God, and I raised my right hand… I remember it exactly… I raised my right hand and trace it to the sky. As soon as I lift my hand to the sky, he punched me in to my stomach.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0099)

Ingber got the SS to stop beating him by saying to the SS man “when you don’t beat me, you’re my God,” further abusing him by making him go against his religious principles, another sadly common method of control in the camps.

_Surveillance:_ Worker surveillance is a significant aspect of research on shop floor culture (Vallas 2003), and total institutions (Goffman 1961), and that was certainly the case in the concentration camps. Policies of surveillance in the camps, including daily roll calls (known as appells) ensured that camp guards maintained a degree of control through top down direct observation (Gouldner 1955) that accounted for the dead and the living. As Nathan Roth, a prisoner in Birkenau explains,
“…there were deaths and when we were in the Appellplatz [roll call area], counted, we had to be lined up front of you, the dead and the living. Everybody had to be accounted for in the morning, then the dead were carried off. That was a common occurrence. That was, that was, that was a common occurrence every morning. And in Jaworzno [a subcamp of Auschwitz] too” (VVA, Roth, 1983).

Yet more recent research on surveillance has revealed a more chimerical nature, as peer and self-policing are as controlling as bureaucratic control, if not more (Sewell 1998).

This was certainly the case in the camps as rules such as collective responsibility (where ten prisoners were shot for every prisoner who escaped) were instituted in some camps, and roll calls, that were as much a form of punishment as they were a method of ensuring legibility (Scott 1998), lasted until every last prisoner was accounted for by the guards. As Luba Elbaum explains,

“We standing in the line for hours they count us. They count us for hours. More counting like [if] somebody was missing you stay and stay and stay.” (VVA, Elbaum, 1982)

The roll calls acted as a form of surveillance and as coercive tool to ensure that prisoners kept an eye on one another, furthering the reach of camp surveillance and, for some, poisoning the well of prisoner solidarity in the process (Marszalek 1986:99). Roll calls were regularly discussed in the concentration camps (mean=.789), and fifteen of the nineteen camps had more than half of the prisoners who discussed rules describe roll calls, only Drancy, Flössenburg, Theresienstadt, and Westerbork did not.

Structural Violence: In addition to roll calls, food was one of the most commonly discussed aspects of the camps, in particular, the lack of it. In some cases, camp commandants denied prisoners food for a day as a form of punishment (see Reilly, Cesarani, Kushner, and Richmond 1997), but, on a day to day basis, prisoners regularly
received only a small bowl of watery soup, a piece of stale bread, and a small cup of “coffee.” In some cases, prisoners would be required to share a slightly larger portion with several other prisoners, carefully watching to make sure that no one took more than their share. Starvation was so bad that the prisoners had a name (Muselmann) for individuals so malnourished that they were like the walking dead (Levi 1988; Kogon 2006). The lack of food only helped guards maintain control in the camps, and acted as a method of physiological “structural violence” (Galtung 1969) to use against the prisoners.

Judith Meisel, describes food distribution in Stutthof during her time in the camp:

“In the afternoon, they would open up the water faucet and I can remember all I wanted to do was just a drink of water. I was always so thirsty. And I… uh… then I… uh… then we got little loaf of bread, and the Lagerältester [block elder, a prisoner functionary], the person who was in charge of our group, said she wanted to teach us how to share. So instead of getting your own piece of bread that was made out of sawdust, she would give us one little loaf of bread and like 10 people had to share that so someone… person given that bread would run off, and we would get nothing. And… uh… then we would get a potato, a soup made of potato peelings and that was our ration.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0157)

Food was not solely a source of physical nourishment, it held deeper cultural and psychological meaning for prisoners as well. How food was distributed and consumed was significant, especially in an environment where it was so central to daily life. As Hana Bruml, a prisoner in Auschwitz, explains:

“And then you were given one big pot; and this is like the last bit of humanity was taken away. Because in the pot they gave five scoops of soup, and the pot was circulated among people. And everybody slurped like an animal. You were being… being made to an animal by slurping the food. So at one point, I saw somebody dragging a bag… bag of spoons, and one was hanging out. So I pulled it out; so I was already more civilized. I had a spoon. I kept the spoon throughout.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0043)

Fifteen of the nineteen concentration camps had a significant portion of prisoners who described structural conditions discuss receiving limited portions of food (mean=.789),
being forced to share their portion, or only receiving food once a day. Of the camps that did not, Drancy, Gross-Rosen, Sachsenhausen, and Treblinka, one (Gross-Rosen) had an extensive black market bartering system (Guterman 2008), the second, Treblinka, had opportunities for prisoners to steal (known as “organizing” in camp slang) enough to survive from the clothes of murdered Jews (Donat 1977), the third, Drancy, was a transit camp, and the fourth, Sachsenhausen, was a political prisoner camp.

Labor: The final condition in the analysis is an indicator of the institutional purpose of the camp. The Nazi concentration camps were not individual entities that developed independently. Rather, they were a part of a broad camp system where each camp was established in order to fulfill a specific role (Kogon 2006). While these roles did change over time, they did not vary significantly from their original purposes; often adding responsibilities and expectations rather than changing completely. I include a condition for camps where the primary institutional purpose was to provide labor and contribute economically to the Nazi machine (in contrast to death camps and transit camps) (mean=.579). The organization purpose of the camps likely shaped the institutional logics of the guards in the camps and the methods of coercion they employed to control prisoners (Friedland and Alford 1991). However, these institutional purposes are more guiding lights than predictive paths, since “not all organizations of the same title use the same control means with the same results” (Etzioni 1975:73-74). Indeed, this was the case for the camps as well. In the following section I draw on these conditions to identify

---

37 Birkenau and Majdanek were the only two hybrid labor/death camps in the Nazi system. I code them both as death camps because, for Jewish prisoners, the primary demographic group in my sample, this was their primary purpose.
different forms of control in coercive organizations, and explore the empirical validity of these types drawing on primary and secondary information about the camps that fit into each type. I then draw on a QCA analysis of these conditions to understand how they link together in camps with high mortality rates.
Table 3: Camp Organizational and Demographic Characteristics by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>S</th>
<th>SV</th>
<th>Camp Type</th>
<th>Avg. Size</th>
<th>% Jewish</th>
<th>SS Owned Factory</th>
<th>Mortality Rate</th>
<th>Prisoner Functionary Group</th>
<th>Pris. Per Guard</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coercive</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>French</td>
<td>68.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drancy</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>3,718</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>109.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Negligent</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transit</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bergen-Belsen</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Concentration</td>
<td>28,110</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>59.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buchenwald</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>Reds</td>
<td>15.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dachau</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>30,000</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>Reds</td>
<td>17.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flössenburg</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>5,250</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>11.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ravensbrück</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>20,503</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>51.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sachsenhausen</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>25,350</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>13.41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Chaotic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Transit/Labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross-Rosen</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>26,700</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.14</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>18.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauthausen</td>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>21,000</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.43</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>8.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plaszów</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>16,000</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>26.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stutthof</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>11,333</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.70</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>21.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theresienstadt</td>
<td>Czechoslovakia</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Transit</td>
<td>35,000</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>35.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tyrannical</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Labor/Labor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auschwitz</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Reds</td>
<td>14.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birkenau</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Death/Labor</td>
<td>49,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>33.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buna</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Labor</td>
<td>5,594</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>Reds</td>
<td>3.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majdanek</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Death/Labor</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>Greens</td>
<td>12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sobibór</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Treblinka</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Death</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>Jews</td>
<td>4.23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

38 B = Bureaucracy, C = Chaos, S = Surveillance, and SV = Structural Violence
39 The mortality rates for Westerbork, Sobibór, and Treblinka are informed estimates based on the incomplete information available about the population and number of deaths in the camps. Even with this limited information, we can safely say that the binary mortality rates are coded properly. See the discussion of mortality rates above for information on the Auschwitz complex.
QCA Results
None of the Nazi concentration camps were enjoyable or productive places to live or work. Prisoners in each of these camps were starved, overworked, physically and mentally abused, and, in many cases, murdered. Yet, the camps were not all the same. They varied in regard to how coercion was experienced within the camps, and they varied in how many prisoners were able to survive. There are a multitude of methods of power and abuse that produce highly coercive environments, and, arguably, each of the coercive organization forms theorized in Chapter 2 has such a potential. In order to explore these organizational characteristics, I turn my attention to the question of, what aspects of the camps were associated with high mortality rates? Was it strictly tyrannical camps, or was mortality more broadly distributed? In order to do so, I draw on findings from a series of QCA analyses of the sets of conditions which produce both high and low mortality.
Table 4: Reduced Configurations for Organizational Features and Processes Associated with Mortality in the Camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th># of Ones</th>
<th># of Zeros</th>
<th>High Mort. in Configuration (%)</th>
<th>Mean Ratio (Configuration to Non-Configuration)</th>
<th>Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER<em>SURVEIL</em>CHAOS* BUREAU</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.50**</td>
<td>Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buna, Majdanek, Sobibór</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVEIL<em>CHAOS</em>BUREAU* labor</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>3.00**</td>
<td>Birkenau, Majdanek, Sobibór, Treblinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER<em>SURVEIL</em>CHAOS* LABOR</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>2.24*</td>
<td>Auschwitz, Buna, Majdanek, Sobibór, Treblinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER<em>surveil</em>CHAOS<em>bureau</em>labor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>Theresienstadt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER<em>SURVEIL</em>chaos*bureau</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>.667</td>
<td>Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Ravensbrück</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SURVEIL<em>bureau</em>LABOR</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.393+</td>
<td>Buchenwald, Dachau, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Plaszów, Stutthof</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER <em>surveil</em>chaos<em>BUreau</em> labor</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>Drancy, Westerbork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGER<em>chaos</em>bureau*LABOR</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>Buchenwald, Flössenburg, Ravensbrück</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution Coverage: 1.00

The findings from the QCA analysis (Table 4) identifies a number of relational conditions associated with both high and low mortality camps. The significant findings

---

$mortalityrate = f(smration, rollcall, bureaucracy, chaos, labor)$
associated with high mortality show two central sets of conditions; the connection between bureaucracy and chaos, and the connection between chaos and surveillance. Conversely, the significant findings associated with low mortality in the camps show two central relationships, the presence of bureaucracy and structural violence and designated labor camps where prisoners did not discuss bureaucratic power were associated with low mortality.

*Bureaucracy & Chaos*

The combination of bureaucratic and chaotic conditions the basis for tyrannical organizations is present in two configurations in the analysis, Configuration 1 (3.50**) and Configuration 2 (3.00**). The combination of bureaucracy and chaos may seem illogical and problematic, but it was the everyday experience of prisoners in some camps. The two organizational aspects were mutually reinforcing, enabling the abuse and murder present in high mortality rate camps. Bureaucratic enforcement justified the punishments meted out to the prisoners, and provided the order and focus needed for the guards to commit genocide. Simultaneously, organizational chaos and ambiguity paralyzed prisoners with fear and paranoia while absolving guards of any oversights that may have tampered their behavior. The mixed messages were sometimes applied seemingly without reason or logic, as Hana Bruml, an Auschwitz prisoner, explains, “I mean, this cleanliness business! You couldn’t wash. You couldn’t clean. But you had to wash the floor everyday in the barrack” (RG-50.030*0043). More insidiously, the guards used the mixed messages for their own benefit. In many of the camps, prisoner functionaries and
SS were rewarded for killing prisoners who were trying to escape (Kogon 2006), and guards would set up impossible scenarios to take advantage of these rewards.

[David Boder: And so why didn't [SS and prisoner functionaries] beat someone to death every day?]
[They] had to have a reason for it. [They] had to have certain grounds. So [they] connived with the capo... At work we had a fence of...from the sand heap... up to here we could go. Whoever crosses this border gets shot. Then the SS man made it up with the capo so that the capo receives a package of tobacco... so that the capo should send him out, Jew or a... Then the capo saw...took.... I myself witnessed it. I saw it myself from a distance of five meters. He called over a Jew...and older man... and he took off his cap... and threw it over...over the fence. There was no fence yet. There were only a few markers [?] on the ground... and said, 'Go fetch the cap.' And he said, 'How can I fetch the cap? When I cross the border I'll get shot.' So he says, 'Nobody is there. Go and fetch it.' He didn't want to. Then he said, 'If you don't go, I'll kill you. And he began to beat him. Then he went. The SS man was hidden behind a tree... and when he crossed the 'fence'...he immediately shot him. (VotH, Hamburger, 1946)

The combination of bureaucracy and chaos also worked because it instilled fear and paranoia in prisoners that likely made management and control easier for the guards. The bureaucracy and brutality of the camps made it so that, “[y]ou were afraid to talk. You were afraid to say anything” (Rose Szywic Warner, USHMM, RG-50.030*0270) while providing their own perverse logic, Joseph Bukiet explains:

“I was one of the lucky people in that I lived with my father from the beginning of the camps to the end. I never told them he was my father or they would have killed him. In the end I was in the schiess commando. I took out the shit. Someone had to do it in Birkenau. There were thousands of people. And every day, on this commando, ten got killed and ten lived. I saw that those who lagged behind got killed, so I didn’t lag behind” (USHMM RG-50.165*0011).

The Nazi’s motivations for killing Bukiet’s father were never explained. The combination of conditions where guards may kill a person simply because they were related to another prisoner, and where the ostensibly bureaucratic logic of “those who lagged behind will be killed” created an environment rife with coercion for prisoners while enabling their mass murder by the guards. Indeed, the presence of bureaucratic rules gave the impression of
accountability, but, for the guards and the SS, it was simply a façade, “they could, whatever they did, nobody dared take no account of it. The Frenzel [an SS in Sobibór], if [he] want to shoot something, somebody, that’s what he did, he had not to give account up to anybody why he did it and what he did, so the power was so strong, that they, it was some, think it was the people took, did it, because they had the power” (Chaim Engel, USHMM, RG-50.042*0009).

These set conditions are representative of the structural and organizational conditions of the camps as well (see Table 3 above). These camps were both coercively bureaucratic and intentionally chaotic. Prisoners described the guards punishing prisoners through known bureaucratic means, and, ignoring these same rules to beat, punish, and murder prisoners for ambiguous and unknown reasons. Organizations that adopted tyrannical control were the epitome of Sofsky’s concept of “absolute power” (1996), and likely some of the most terrible to endure. They varied in when they opened (Buna, Sobibór, and Treblinka opened after 1942), and in size (Birkenau was massive, Auschwitz, Buna, and Majdanek were moderately sized, and Sobibór and Treblinka were very small), but it should come as no surprise then that all the camps that fit into this type – Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buna, Majdanek, Sobibór, and Treblinka – were Jewish death camps (or associated with death camps) located in Poland. Labor within the death camps was tied to the extermination process, but Auschwitz, Buna, and Majdanek were partially or entirely forced labor camps with armaments, rubber, and construction factories in or near the camps.

Organizationally, these camps were run by some of the more notorious commandants. Auschwitz, Birkenau, Treblinka, and Sobibór were run by brutal but
bureaucratically minded operators, including Rudolf Höss, Franz Stangl, and Karl Frenzel (Arad 1987; Gutman and Berenbaum 1994; Schelvis 2007; Sereny 1983). In Majdanek, the leaders “fostered corruption and sadism among the staff and guards. The first three managers were “old school” managers from the pre-war camp system” (Megargee 2009:877). In spite of the revolving door of commandants, all were notoriously brutal figures from camps in the German Reich, including Koch and Florstedt (from Buchenwald), Koegel (from Ravensbrück), and Weiss (from Dachau) (Stein 2004; Marszalek 1986; Berben 1975)\(^{41}\). Further, low level elites were equally sadistic. Figures such as Fritsch (Auschwitz and Birkenau), Thurmann (of Gross-Rosen fame, in Majdanek), Wagner (Sobibór), Franz and Miete (Treblinka) were widely feared by prisoners. In contrast to other camps, the prisoner-functionaries in the tyrannical camps were primarily Jewish; largely due to the proportion of Jewish prisoners in the camps. The Nazis attempted to sew seeds of dissention even here by placing Jews of different nationalities in charge of one another. In all, the camp organization in the tyrannical camps brought the bureaucratic interests of the Nazis to bear on the ideological goal of extermination with minimal concern for the economic factors that influenced other camps. Simultaneously, the presence of a hated enemy justified the use of ambiguous or personally motivated violence against prisoners. Thus, all organizational means were applied to terrorizing prisoners.

\(^{41}\) Koch and Florstedt were convicted of corruption by the SS prior to the end of the war. Koch was executed, but Florstedt was able to escape and go into hiding (Stein 2004; Marszalek 1986).
Surveillance and Chaos

Each of the configurations significantly associated with high mortality included the presence of surveillance and chaos (Configuration 1 (3.50**), Configuration 2 (3.00**), and Configuration 3 (2.24*)). Through surveillance, here in the form of roll calls (or “appells”), prisoners were subject to selections, physical punishment, and psychological abuse (i.e. singing demeaning songs, insults from guards, and watching public executions, etc.). But surveillance also ordered prisoners and ensured that they were unable to evade punishment or observation (Scott 1998). When combined with chaotic organizational conditions, surveillance provided conditions where coercion could be applied broadly, and, in the case of the concentration camps, the number of prisoners who died as a result would be greatest. The most blunt combination was cases where, for example, Göth, the commandant of Płaszów, would randomly open fire on prisoners while they were lined up for roll calls (VVA, Nothman, 1982; Graf 1989). More often, as Samuel Gruber, a prisoner in Majdanek, explains, the guards would combine psychological and physical punishment while simultaneously taking advantage of the opportunity to take out their own frustrations on prisoners in order to abuse prisoners.

“If somebody run away, they caught him. Usually they caught. They caught two of them and they took out the whole camp there one night and they were hanging him publicly like everybody else to see. They woke us up in the middle of the night and everybody came out naked almost and it wasn’t even – they told them to take off. Everybody was half naked outside and was February, I think – they beginning of March cold. Terribly. And a lot of us got pneumonia. We caught cold. And on top of this when they told us to go back to the barrack, they was standing in the door and whoever walked in they beat them how much they could. Everyone one of us, we all got beating. I was just behind a man who started crying, ‘Don’t hit me. I have – I have home children, a wife. Don’t hit me.’ The Germans said, ‘Yes, I have a child – wife and children too, and I have to say here with you and watch you, you stinking Jew.’ And he hit him more even” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0082).
The combination of long periods of standing, exposure to brutal guards and SS, and often adverse weather conditions made the methods of surveillance in the camps one of the most cruel and enduring aspects. The roll calls were also cruel because they were a means to encourage prisoners to police one another. In instances where the count was incorrect or prisoners were missing, prisoners would be forced to remain at roll call for extended periods, randomly selected for manual labor, or simply killed.

“And the many times they made mistakes, and again count. And we stood out on that terrible... I mean, was cold in the early morning. Very, very, uh, tight to each other; and finally when the SS woman came and recount us, some of us, they fell down or sit down because they couldn’t stay. She start to beat that... that person in the face. And was.. was a... was a terrible way to... stay at the appel.” (Barbara Marton Farkas, USHMM, RG-50.030*0070)

For the prisoners, the constant dangers of the roll calls, and the fact that they could be called at any point in time, day or night, made them a constant danger, and this was especially true in camps where the SS and guards were free to use ambiguous rules or unaccountable discretion to abuse prisoners. As one prisoner from Buna explained: “But outside the sun just started to rise. They would make you say in line being in, in sixes. We—the counting started. We stayed in line every morning from then on and every night. The counting never ceased. If they didn’t like your looks, that was the end” (VVA, Eisenberg, 1982).

The camps that combined chaotic forms of control with surveillance were broadly similar structurally and organizationally. These camps had bureaucratic rules, but, based on the descriptions provided by prisoners, they were weak or applied in limited settings, and were run by fiat. Commandants and guards used ambiguous rules, violence, and terror to keep prisoners in line. In combination with the tyrannical camps described
above, chaotic camps could include the labor camps at Mauthausen, Płaszów, and Stutthof.

The camps with chaotic organizational conditions shared a number of important similarities. Each of the camps were, on average, medium sized (Mauthausen, Płaszów, and Stutthof) camps that were largely populated by high proportions of groups that were at the bottom of the Nazis’ race-ethnic hierarchy; namely, Poles, Soviets, and Jews. The presence of enemies of the state were certainly motivating factors for the chaotic conditions within these camps. Mauthausen, and, based on some reports (Megargee 2009), Gross-Rosen were the only “Category Three” camps, a categorization reserved for camps with prisoners who had “hardly any chance at rehabilitation”. Treatment of Soviets, and particularly Jews, in these camps was especially brutal. Płaszów and Stutthof were forced labor camps for Jews and Polish enemies of the state, and, by 1944, Stutthof acted as a de facto extermination camp for prisoners receiving overflow Hungarian prisoners from Auschwitz (Megargee 2009; Muzeum Stutthof, 1980; Drywa 2004). In comparison with less coercive camps, the presence of ideological enemies elicited more brutal and chaotic conditions within the camps.

The camps shared a number of economic similarities. They were connected with the SS economic institutions and the WVHA; Mauthausen, and Stutthof had DESt quarries. Płaszów and Stutthof had DAW plants. Yet these camps were only minimally associated with war production. Armaments factories were located near the camps, but much to the labor (especially the Jewish labor) was devoted to mining and resource

---

42 Some dispute the worth of the camp categorization system utilized by the Nazis, especially considering its in ability to explain mortality rates and ranking Auschwitz as a Category II camp (Orth 2009b). These are valid critiques of the overall categorization system, but Mauthausen and Gross-Rosen’s status as the only Category III camps and the organizational conditions that pervaded those camps is worth noting.
extraction. In Mauthausen, workers labored at the infamous quarry and at excavating tunnels for hiding factories rather than producing material goods (Le Chêne 1971). Stutthof had a quarry and a nearby armaments factory, but prisoners were more likely to be employed in construction or felling trees, clearing stumps, and river regulation (Megargee 2009; Muzeum Stutthof 1980). As the demand for cheap labor increased in 1943, conditions in the camps improved somewhat, however “the difference was marginal, and the working hours and tempo actually increased (Megargee 2009:696; Muzeum Stutthof 1980; Le Chêne 1971). Clearly, labor played an important role in these camps, but less as a means of increasing war production, and more for annihilation through work (Vernichtung durch Arbeit); the most common cause of death in these camps.

The organizational hierarchy of the camps influenced the chaotic conditions that prisoners experienced, but in two different ways. The first was through a despotic commandant. Mauthausen and Płaszów were run by commandants (Franz Ziereis and Amon Göth) who held their positions for extended periods of time, and were largely considered to be despotic and abusive towards prisoners (Graf 1989; Pike 2000; Megargee 2009). In Płaszów, Göth ruled absolutely, “there were no rules to obey – everything and everybody was subject to Göth’s whims. He was the absolute ruler and knew how to take advantage of this, in dealing with both Jews and his own subordinates” (Graf 1989:94). These conditions only changed slightly after Płaszów became an official concentration camp. Six hundred Nazi SS replaced Jewish prisoner functionaries and Ukrainian guards, prisoners were assigned numbers, and Göth was placed under some restrictions. Göth ignored them. “These new regulations, along with better food, should
have resulted in better conditions for prisoners but Göth ignored the new orders and used the same drastic measures he always had. We saw no noticeable improvement” (Graf 1989:112).

Random violence was rampant in the camps, and beating by guards as punishment or a spontaneous act were a daily occurrence (Megargee 2009). Ziereis’s control over Mauthausen was similar. The commandant was described as sadistic and violent (Le Chêne 1971; Pike 2000). Daily life in Mauthausen was “characterized by continuous brutality at the hands of the SS guards and capos and the deliberate lack of the most fundamental elements of human existence” (Megargee 2009:901). Indeed, Ziereis regularly allowed, and even encouraged, prisoner functionaries to strike and abuse prisoners (Pike 2000:57). The prisoner functionaries in Mauthausen were almost entirely German “greens.” Many of them shipped from “red” camps such as Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen to the “‘green’ haven” Mauthausen where they, “quite as sadistic and bestial as their SS masters,” knew they would be immune from punishment (Le Chêne 1971:41).

In Stutthof, the commandants took a more laissez-faire approach to management. In 1942, due to the new WVHA authority, camps like Gross-Rosen and Stutthof were assigned new commandants. The new figure, Paul Werner Hoppe, was more bureaucratically minded figures expected to maintain economic production in the former and control over the influx of Jews in the latter (Guterman 2008; Sydnor 1990). Hoppe was, based on all accounts, a “company man” who helped Eicke plan the organization of the Totenkopfdivision (Death’s Head Units) (Segev 1987; Sydnor 1990). He was described as “simultaneously both submissive and stern and felt completely obligated by
the SS’s ideology and values” (Segev 1987:170). Under Hoppe, chaotic conditions flourished as German greens held prisoner-functionary positions and terrorized the heavily Jewish population, and the camp implemented the final solution through small-scale gassings (Drywa 2004; Feig 1981) and the aforementioned extermination through work. Gross-Rosen, another highly chaotic camp, albeit with comparatively lower mortality rates, was organizationally very similar to Stutthof with a commandant, Johan Hassebroek, who “did not trouble himself with running the prisoners’ camp; he left this to a subordinate,” an exceptionally cruel Hauptsturmführer named Anton Thurmann (Gutterman 2008:75). Indicating that this organizational form was present in camps where mortality may have been lower, but conditions were still brutal.

Bureaucracy and Structural Violence

Condition set 7 shows that the camps where structural violence and bureaucratic controls were present, but surveillance, chaos, and labor responsibilities were relatively absent were associated with low mortality rates (.000*). These camps had established hierarchies and known rules that are often extreme but understood by the prisoners or employees. While not identical, such structures resemble organizations that rely on bureaucratic rules to enforce behavior described by prior organizational theorists (i.e. coercive bureaucracy (Adler and Borys 1996) & punishment-centered bureaucracy (Gouldner 1955)). Like coercive bureaucracies, these camps had clear organizational goals adhered to by elites, and clear punishments for violating organizational rules.

Of the cases under analysis, Drancy and Westerbork fit these conditions. These camps share a number of structural and demographic similarities, primarily the fact that
they were both transit camps located outside of the Reich and the general government. Transit camps, located all over Europe during the war, acted as staging grounds where Jewish and political prisoners were held before being shipped to labor and death camps. The majority of prisoners were shipped to Auschwitz (57% of prisoners from Westerbork were sent there), but many others were sent to Sobibór, Treblinka, and Majdanek.

Drancy and Westerbork were formed after the start of the war, and were comparatively small, holding an average of 5,000 or fewer predominantly Jewish prisoners. Prisoners worked at menial, camp related, jobs as neither camp was attached to any factories. Westerbork put prisoners to work farming vegetables, in workshops sewing and making shoes, and in scrap yards dismantling machines (Mulder 1990). William Lowenberg was employed in the metal shops doing “anything to do with metal shops, repairing things . . .and [his] sister became a runner for the offices there in the camp. And [his] father worked in -- it was a farm, the camp had a farm. That farm was there. They had cows, where my uncles since they were cattle dealers, took care of the cows so that the commandant would have milk and fresh eggs, fresh chickens, and that’s what they did. They had that farm there for the benefit of the guards and the commandant” (USHMM RG-50.030*0139). Work in Drancy was less structured. Prisoners were often assigned to keeping their room’s clean (VotH, Bondy, 1946) or work around the camp engaging in activities like peeling potatoes (VotH, Frydman, 1946).

Organizationally, coercive camps were more reliant on non-SS guards and the compliance of prisoners than other camps. Although the camps were run by SS officers (Danneker and then SS-*Hauptsturmführer* Aloïs Brunner in Drancy, and SS-*Obersturmführer* Konrad Gemmeker in Westerbork), the majority of responsibilities fell
to lower level elites in the camps. Drancy was under the authority of the French for the majority of its existence (Poznanski 2001), and a Jewish Council and Jewish police force were responsible for constructing the transport lists and enforcing the rules in Westerbork (Boas 1985). Unsurprisingly, the ratio of prisoners to guards was high in both camps. Prisoners were more willing to do the work because “they knew that life in a camp was more pleasant if one took care of things oneself instead of leaving it to the Nazis” (Mulder 1990:10). Yet, this compromise created a stratification system between elite and non-elite prisoners in the camps, and implicated the elites in the deportation process.

Indeed, the biggest similarities between Drancy and Westerbork – and the factors that distinguish them from other camps – revolve around the transports. In both camps, the transports were scheduled for specific days, and required the deportation of a predetermined group of prisoners. By early 1943, every Tuesday a train left Westerbork with an average of 1000 prisoners on board (Mulder 1990), and, in Drancy, there were three trains to Auschwitz per week, every week from July 1942 through October 1942. The transports shaped the organization of the camp. Camp elites were those who were exempt from transports, or, in Westerbork, those who created the list. But the status of elites was tenuously tied to the availability of prisoners for filling transports. “Those internees who had escaped deportation due to one exemption or another would sometimes become deeply anxious at seeing the camp being emptied. They knew that the necessity of filling the trains took precedent over everything else, and they would be in danger if there were not enough “deportable” internees on hand” (Poznanski 2001:287).

The centralizing coercive force in the transit camps was the threat of deportation. In both camps, deportation was the punishment for even minor rule infractions. “Here we
were not kicked or beaten,” stated a former inmate of Westerbork, “but the punishment was much more subtler. Because for every mild transgression you were sent to transport, and that meant death. . . . More than the countless regulations that streamed from the commandants office, it was his personal threat of transport that maintained the camp’s astonishing order” (Boas 1985:29). In sum, there were clearly defined bureaucratic rules and regulations in the camps that organized and influenced prisoner’s behavior within the camps. However, adherence was due to the excessive punishment allotted to prisoners who broke the rules.

Westerbork and Drancy were not identical. Prisoners described Drancy as more harsh, especially after the arrival of Brunner. This was likely influenced by the Jewish Council and the hands off nature of Gemmeker in Westerbork too. Prisoners in Drancy had greater access to, and communication with, the outside world, and organizations who worked to help them (the UGIF and the Amelot Committee). They received packages with clothes, food, and correspondence from friends and family on the outside, and they were able to write (heavily censored) postcards on a semi-regular basis. Overall, Drancy and Westerbork reflect coercive organizations in that they were highly bureaucratic with a clear internal hierarchy, and known, harsh, punishments for rule infractions. Yet, if these rules were maintained, prisoners could identify ways to evade punishment.

Absence of Bureaucracy and the Presence of Labor camps

The final set of configurations highlights the combination of the absence of bureaucracy and the presence of labor camps. The configurations that were significantly associated

---

43 Prisoners had to be careful who they wrote to, and what they wrote because the Nazis often used the addresses on postcards to round up Jews and enemies of the state (Poznanski 2001).
with low mortality rates broadly indicate that camps with a combination of the lack of bureaucratic rules and the presence of labor camps tended to have lower mortality rates. Of the three significant configurations, this set of conditions is present in two, Configuration 6 (.458*) and Configuration 8 (.000*), and the third, Configuration 7 (.000*) represents the two coercive camps (Drancy and Westerbork). The relationship between labor, bureaucracy, and low mortality rates indicates that labor and bureaucracy played a complex role for prisoners in the camps. Bureaucratic rules and punishments made the organizational landscape clearer, but they were often tied to specific demands in relation to the extermination process. Similarly, labor was a method of extermination used in many camps, but it also offered a way for prisoners to survive one more day or one more week. The combination of the two indicates that camps with low mortality rates were associated with camps where labor offered an opportunity to survive and where organizational conditions were ambiguous but not necessarily chaotic. David Bergman, a prisoner in Płaszów, explains what work meant for prisoners in the camps, and how it helped he, and other prisoners, survive,

“[O]ne of the things I was told is survival means the ability to work. If you could work, there was hope for survival. If you couldn’t work, you were done. So mentally I had to psyche myself out that I’m adult and I could do the work; and I wanted to survive. [Describes guards asking for occupations]. I raised my hand. ‘I’m a bricklayer.’ I never laid a brick or a stone in my life. I never even touched one. But as I was in the camp, I saw how people laid the bricks and the stones, how they mixed the cement. And so I figured, ‘well, I could do that.’ They said, ‘Okay. Fall in line.’ And they put me in the work group; and I… in their eyes, I was a professional bricklayer. (laughing) And I would mix cement and carrying the wheelbarrow. And we had to go to a mine where they mined stones, and then we had to carry each stone to a certain area and build a little wall underneath the barracks. It was useless work, for all practical purposes; but it kept us busy. In their eyes, we were doing something.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0020).
The notion that the ability to work was necessary for survival was a common theme in many of the testimonies. Work made prisoners less expendable, offered opportunities to “organize” (i.e. steal) food, and kept prisoners from sticking out. Many prisoners felt the SS treated them as “just as a mechanical instrument, moved here and there” (Father Francis Cegielka, USHMM, RG-50.030*0052), and camps where prisoners were able to give the perception of usefulness was crucial for survival. Yet, use was relative. Work was often vague and aimless. For example, Antoni Golba worked in Buchenwald doing “something not very, nothing specific. There were all kinds of jobs like cleaning, sweeping, light jobs, because there was already a disorganization. The camp commander didn’t know what to do…” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0081). Although work helped prisoners survive, productivity at work was only moderately tied to survival (Allen 2005), as a prisoner from Ravensbrück explains,

“Pepi and I were brought, worked in that factory and she was working there testing. You have to test if [the airplane parts] are good or bad, and most of the were bad, really, but we had to, we had to produce something because the foreman tried to be nice to us, not to beat us or anything, and we all tried to back him up and he had some quota to fulfill. If there is so and so much bad output, then he would be punished, so I remember Pepi was telling me that she was checking and she was saying, “make good ones, make bad ones, whatever.” And we worked there 12 hours a day.” (Doris Fuchs Greenberg, USHMM, RG-50.030*0082).

The combination of factories and less strict bureaucratic rules and punishments offered opportunities for prisoners to evade abuse, and the ire of the guards in the camps for long enough to survive the war. Although certainly ambiguous, these organizational conditions were less coercive than those in camps with higher incidents of chaotic organizational conditions. These findings show that while all organizational types have the potential to
be highly coercive, coercion is much more likely in organizations where guards are free to use bureaucratic rules in ambiguous and malicious ways.

The organizational and structural characteristics of the camps that fit these conditions are broadly similar as well. The majority of these camps had some form of bureaucratic rules, but they were ambiguously applied compared to other camps. Simultaneously, the ambiguously applied punishments did not reach the levels of violence in other camps. In a sense, these organizations are akin to Kafkaesque bureaucratic structures where there are rules and punishments, but they are vaguely defined and enforced (Hodson, et al. 2012). Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen all fit this form the closest, and share a number of structural and demographic similarities. They were all labor camps; all formed prior to the start of the war, and all were located inside the German Reich. Camps such as Mauthausen, Płaszów, and Stutthof overlapped considerably, but it is possible that their organizational and structural conditions were what separated them in regards to mortality rate.

The dates of origin and location inside the German Reich help explain why these camps adopted negligent organizational control. The early camps were constructed to hold enemies of the Nazi state, and, with the exception of Bergen-Belsen, German and Polish political prisoners were the dominant demographic groups within the camps. This was solidified in spring of 1942 when Himmler ordered that Germany was to be Judenrein (“free of Jews”), and shipped almost all Jewish prisoners in the concentration camps to Auschwitz. These orders held until 1944 when the approaching Soviet front and the need for labor forced the Nazis to allow Jews to return to work in German labor
camps (Hilberg 2003). Although the camps were still horrible, the diminished presence of Jews in the camps reduced the degree of violence and coercion, especially compared to other camps. Each of the camps were finally closed in April of 1945 meaning that many of the prisoners who had passed through the camp, especially the Jewish prisoners, had been transported from concentration camps in the East, certainly influencing their perspective on the conditions in the camps.

Each of the negligent camps were well integrated into the economic plans of the SS State, especially after the WVHA took over control. Prior to the war, although camps such as Buchenwald, Flössenburg, Mauthausen, and Sachsenhausen were constructed near quarries, economic gains were a minimal concern and labor was largely a means of torture for prisoners (Allen 1997; Stein 2004). But as the war progressed, with the guidance of Oswald Pohl and the WVHA, the Nazi’s worked to take full advantage of their cheap labor source (Allen 2005).

The negligent plants, and prisoner’s experiences within them are evidence of this shift. Buchenwald (DAW, DEST), Dachau (DAW), Flössenburg (DEST), Ravensbrück (Texled), and Sachsenhausen (DEST) were all connected to SS owned enterprises of varying productivity. After the start of the war and the integration under the WVHA, many of these camps concentrated more and more on arms for the war effort. In Flössenburg, the SS billed Messerschmitt (the producer of the ME 109 fighter plane) more than 3.3 million Reichmarks for prisoner labor in 1944 (Heigl 1994:24). By the end of 1942, Sachsenhausen was already heavily involved in war production, and prisoners were being moved from producing construction materials to producing shells and

---

44 Deutsche Ausrüstungwerke (DAW) produced equipment for the SS, Deutsche Erd und Steinwerks (DEST) produced construction materials such as brick and granite, and Texled was the SS owned textile company.
salvaging military wreckage (Megargee 2009:1258). Indeed, the combination labor demands and the relative absence of Jewish prisoners likely kept mortality rates low in these camps.

Organizationally, each of the camps had leadership turnover. The change in commandants is not surprising considering that these camps preceded the beginning of the war and the founding of the WVHA. Despite the turnover, with the exception of Bergen-Belsen, each of the camps had a commandant that was around for at least two years after the WVHA took control. Pister ran Buchenwald from January 1942 through the end of the war, Eduard Weiter ran Dachau from November 1943 through April 1945, Max Koegel ran Flössenburg from May 1943 through April 1945, Fritz Suhren ran Ravensbrück from August 1942 through April 1945, and Anton Kaindl ran Sachsenhausen from August 1942 through April 1945 (Megargee 2009). The combination of economic demands and relatively stable organizational leadership likely reduced some of the actively chaotic conditions that were common-place in other camps.

These camps were only comparatively kind. Prisoners were still poorly fed, beaten, and overworked by camp guards. In spite of growing economic interests and occasional pressure to reduce mortality rates in the camps (Allen 2005), the WVHA collected minimal–if any–information about economic production. As George Salton, a prisoner in Sachsenhausen, explains, “four hundred and fifty of us were assigned to work in a warehouse where iron devices like axles for trucks and so on were being stored and we were caused to moved it and required to move it and assemble it and pile it and so on. I don’t know that there was really any sense to it. It was hardness of the work… the same thing again. Beating, hunger, and rejection again” (USHMM RG-50.030#0200).
Theresienstadt & Bergen-Belsen

Two camps that do not fit particularly well with any of the other camps, or into any significant configuration sets were Theresienstadt and Bergen-Belsen, and it is worthwhile to briefly discuss the atypical nature of these camps. Theresienstadt was a large camp/transit center outside of the German Reich. Unlike the other camps, it was a “model camp” that was kept in relatively acceptable conditions to be modeled for the Red Cross as evidence that the mostly Jewish population were being treated acceptably. As a result, the camp walked a fine line between endurable and chaotic. Prisoners were able to socialize and engage in cultural activities such as orchestras, dances and religious ceremonies (Bor 1963; Troller 1991), but struggled for adequate rations. Further, the Jews were granted a degree of autonomy and space through the role of the Council of Elders running the camp and the use of indigenous Jewish police. Yet, this came at a cost. From January, 1942 through October, 1944 the Council of Elders was expected to submit lists of Jews to be shipped eastward to Auschwitz embedding the camp with an omnipresent sense of fear (Lederer 1983).

Unlike other camps, Theresienstadt’s administration “embraced elements of both a municipal bureaucracy and a labor camp” (Bondy 1984:304). Like the labor camps, a commandant held absolute power as lower level prisoner functionaries enforced stringent rules. Yet, simultaneously, a Jewish Council of Elders existed that was tasked with maintaining the camp and organizing prisoners for deportation (Lederer 1983). The amalgamated organizational structure crated a number of contradictory features that characterized the administration of the camp. The Jewish administration had to negotiate
German orders for multiple unnecessary administrative departments (that complicated prisoners’ lives) with a desire to improve conditions for prisoners (primarily through the distribution of food and improving structural conditions). The primary point of contention was the demand for lists of prisoners for deportation. “This external pressure affected the relations of the inhabitants to the Jewish camp administration, which became the target of their dissatisfaction” (Lederer 1983:16). Dissatisfaction was primarily driven by the opaque nature of the selections. “There was no criterion [for who would be assigned to the next transport] . . . Things used to change according to changes in instructions from Berlin or according to the instructions of the [SS in the camp], or the particular [SS] commander who would issue the orders” (VotH, Schlaefrig, 1946). In sum, the ambiguous rules surrounding deportations and the conflicts between the SS and the Council of Elders created a chaotic organizational environment, yet, in this case, the chaos was intended to instill fear in the population rather than violently terrorize.

Bergen-Belsen was founded in 1943 as a transit camp for “exchange Jews.” The camp was to hold German, Dutch, and “passport” Jews in hopes of exchanging them for Germans interned in Western countries (Kolb 1985). Tragically, only 358 prisoners were ever genuinely “exchanged” (Lattek 1997:46). The rest of the prisoners were left to suffer in a camp that became a proverbial dumping ground for Jewish prisoners moved from camps in the East. In the camps described above where bureaucratic and chaotic controls were absent, prisoners were allocated to various labor groups and subjected to Kafkaesque, but not always deliberately chaotic, organizational conditions. The absence of Jews and the demands for labor likely kept conditions slightly less deadly than other concentration camps; however, this was not the case in Bergen-Belsen.
Unlike camps like Auschwitz, Sobibór, and Mauthausen where terror was brutal and direct, Bergen-Belsen was terrorized by indifference. Between February 1944 and spring 1945, the camp expanded from 2,000 prisoners to more than 20,000 prisoners, but added no wash rooms or toilets. Typhus, dysentery, and lice were rampant, and the rapid population growth only served to damage the distribution of rations in the camp leading to massive starvation. These conditions were only partially due to the chaos of the end of the war, “they were mostly and decisively due to specific actions and omissions in the WVHA and of the camp administration” (Kolb 1984:341). Overall, Bergen-Belsen reflects the dark side of organizational negligence hinted at in Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen. Yet, where the latter camps were buoyed by the presence of factories and the comparative absence of Jews, Bergen-Belsen was damned by its contrast.

**Robustness Checks**

The findings from the QCA analyses are supported by the underlying prisoner testimonies and match with the historical understanding of the camps. In order to check the robustness of their relationship with the outcome of interest I ran a series of logit regression analyses of the conditions sets on the likelihood of high mortality. Prior work has used a similar approach for checking QCA results and found affirmative results (see Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Grant et al. 2010). Prior to the logit regression, I reran my QCA analysis with a more limited set of conditions; chaos, bureaucracy, and surveillance (Table 5). I reran my QCA analysis because structural violence (Hunger) was nearly ubiquitous, appearing in six of eight set conditions (Table 4), and labor acted as an institutional control. By reducing the number of conditions, I focus more specifically on
the organizational conditions most associated with mortality in the camps. Further, the set conditions produced by the first QCA analysis would only produce interpretable logit regression results for two of the six significant configurations due to the lack of variation in the dependent variable (Long and Freese 2006). By limiting the conditions in the configurations, I am able to produce findings that provide a more thorough robustness check.

Table 5: Reduced Configurations for Bureaucracy, Chaos, and Surveillance with Mortality in the Camps.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th># of Ones</th>
<th># of Zeros</th>
<th>High Mort. in Configuration (%)</th>
<th>Mean Ratio (Configuration to Non-Configuration)</th>
<th>Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SURVEIL*CHAOS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>.80</td>
<td>7.20***</td>
<td>Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buna, Gross-Rosen, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Stutthof, Sobibór, Treblinka Flössenburg, Drancy, Westerbork Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof, Theresienstadt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>surveil*chaos</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.000*</td>
<td>Flössenburg, Drancy, Westerbork Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof, Theresienstadt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bureau</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>.27</td>
<td>.364*</td>
<td>Bergen-Belsen, Buchenwald, Dachau, Flössenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen, Stutthof, Theresienstadt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution Coverage: 1.00
The set conditions from the more limited QCA analysis broadly fit with the conditions identified in the analysis above, particularly chaotic control and surveillance and the absence of bureaucracy (and labor). For the logit regression, I include dummy variables for cases where all configuration conditions are present. The first set of models (Table 6, Models 1-3) regresses the set conditions on mortality without any additional variables. The second set of models (Table 6, Models 4-6) includes two control measures, average camp size (Figure 4) and length of time open (Figure 5).

Figure 4: Mortality Rate in Relation to Camp Size

For example, the measure for bureaucracy is coded in the affirmative when bureaucracy is absent.
Camp size and length of time open are standard measures in quantitative research on organizational behavior (Hannan and Freeman 1977), and have been found to bear relation to the function of, and methods of control within, organizations (Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg 1994). Size may be understood as a structural property of an organization, or as a contextual indicator of the level of demand for an organization’s activities (be it labor, transit, or extermination). Additionally, the length of time open may influence the number of prisoners through the camp as well as the number of prisoners killed in the camp, both components of the dependent variable.

As Figures 4 and 5 show, there is a slight negative relationship between mortality and size, and mortality and time open. Treblinka and Sobibór are clear outliers in both figures, but, the negative relationship holds when they are omitted. This is likely due to two factors; the death camps of Poland and did not begin operation until 1941, well after German political camps, and camps with larger prisoner populations were likely to be labor camps, not high mortality camps.
The findings from the logit regression analysis (Table 6) show that the sets of configurations identified by the QCA analysis are robust in their relationship with the mortality rate, and are all pointing in the correct direction. Granted, the number of cases necessitates caution in the interpretation of the coefficients (Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2006), but taking the quantitative and qualitative findings together it is safe to say that the overall relationship between bureaucracy, chaos, surveillance, and mortality is robust.\textsuperscript{46}

\textsuperscript{46} I ran a supplemental OLS regression using the full mortality rate as an outcome (not shown), and found similar results to the logit regressions presented above. These OLS regressions further support the robustness of my findings.
Table 6: Logit Regression of Reduced QCA Configurations on Mortality Rates

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bureau</td>
<td>-2.079*</td>
<td>-1.891</td>
<td>('-1.96)</td>
<td>('-1.35)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chaos*surveil (omitted)</td>
<td>3.466**</td>
<td>3.166*</td>
<td>('2.62)</td>
<td>('2.34)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAOS*SURVEIL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Open</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-0.001</td>
<td>-.001</td>
<td>('-0.81)</td>
<td>('-1.57)</td>
<td>('-0.77)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Camp Size</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>.000</td>
<td>('0.64)</td>
<td>('-0.69)</td>
<td>('0.20)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.099</td>
<td>.251</td>
<td>-2.079*</td>
<td>1.304</td>
<td>2.909</td>
<td>-1.023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>('1.35)</td>
<td>('0.50)</td>
<td>('-1.96)</td>
<td>('1.10)</td>
<td>('1.70)</td>
<td>('-0.55)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

Conclusion
The QCA analysis identified four core set conditions associated with high and low mortality rates; chaos and bureaucracy, chaos and surveillance, bureaucracy and structural violence, and the absence of bureaucracy and labor. These set conditions can be theorized as four broad, yet overlapping, coercive forms: tyrannical, chaotic, negligent, and coercive. These camp forms match with prior theoretical work on coercive organizations, and show that particular organizational conditions are more associated with coercion than others. Without a doubt, each organizational type was terrible in its own right; possessing the potential to be highly coercive. Yet comparative differences across them influenced prisoner experience. This is particularly true for the presence of chaotic control. As Graf explains, “[c]learly the Holocaust was a systematic, centrally determined social policy, systematically and bureaucratically implemented. At the same time it created a situation in which individuals were free to act out their own pathological
impulses” (Graf 1989:xi). Recognizing this mix of system and impulse, bureaucracy and chaos, helps explain how and why terror varied across camps.
CHAPTER 6: FIGHTING BACK

“In prisons, of course, inmate organization has sometimes been strong enough to run strikes and short-lived insurrections; in prisoner-of-war camps, it has sometimes been possible to organize sections of the prisoners to operate escape channels; in concentration camps there have been periods of thoroughgoing underground organization; and on ships there have been mutinies; but these concerted actions seem to be the exception, not the rule.” –Erving Goffman

Erving Goffman, in his seminal work on total institutions, pauses briefly to identify several examples of concerted acts of resistance in total institutions before dismissing them as “the exception rather than the rule” (1961:61). While the occurrence of resistance in highly repressive environments is not common, it is not as rare as Goffman leads us to believe. Historical and contemporary society provide numerous examples of such resistance including slave rebellions on plantations in the antebellum South (Kolchin 1987), the gulags of Soviet Russia (Applebaum 2002), prison riots (Goldstone and Useem 1999), and worker strikes in shops and factories in the global South (Louie 2001). Indeed, there has been a growing amount of research on movements in non-democratic environments and organizations (Almeida 2003, 2008; Slater 2009; Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Davenport 2007; Maher 2010). These studies expand point to several factors, including institutional breakdowns, perceptions of threat, organizational infrastructure, networks, and culture as explanations for where and how organized resistance groups emerge and respond in repressive environments. Yet, such variation in our theoretical understanding raises questions regarding our theories of power, coercive organizations, and resistance in coercive environments. Particularly, which coercive
environments foster organized resistance, and which deter it? Further, why do some groups act, but not others? In order to address these questions I conduct a QCA analysis of the relationship between organizational and structural conditions in the camps and the presence of organized resistance within the camps. I begin by describing the outcome and conditions under analysis before drawing on the QCA results to discuss the qualitative and historical data drawn from the testimonies and secondary sources on the camps.

Outcomes and Conditions
Organized Resistance: The primary organizational goal of the concentration camp system was the destruction of enemies of the Nazi state, primarily Jews. With this in mind, any pro-social act that helped save the lives of fellow prisoners could be considered an act of individual resistance, and these acts were remarkably common (Bauer 2002). Organized resistance, or a group of prisoners working together to plan and prepare for armed revolt or mass escape, was more rare, but not uncommon. Most, if not all, of these groups were also engaged in providing mutual aid, help prisoners escape, and sabotaging production too. Indeed, many of these acts occurred in camps where organized resistance groups did not form (Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982; Langbein 1994). For this analysis, I am focusing on organized resistance groups working specifically toward revolt or mass escape. The formation of these organized resistance groups, as reported by secondary sources, is the primary outcome of interest for this analysis. In all, twelve camps of the nineteen camps in my sample had organized resistance groups form and operate; Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buchenwald, Buna, Dachau, Drancy, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Sobibór, Stutthof, and Treblinka.
I focus on the formation of organized resistance because it is a broader measure of resistance than direct armed revolt, and it recognizes that rebellions were highly situational in their origins. Organized resistance encompasses material and symbolic forms of dissent (Morrill, Zald, and Rao 2003), and it gives testament to the incredible risks that prisoners took in order to engage in sabotage, collect weapons, help prisoners escape, organize food, and generally improve the changes for some prisoners to survive (Bauer 2002; Langbein 1994). In addition, the formation of organized resistance groups is an important stage in the process of transitioning from “organizing” (i.e. theft) and everyday resistance to direct armed revolt (Johnston 2005), and it should not be taken for granted as a part of the process of mobilization, especially in highly repressive environments. Armed revolts occurred in response to perceptions of total threat (Maher 2010), but it is crucial to understand how they organizationally put themselves in a position to respond.

The formation of organized resistance groups in the concentration camps was a supremely risky endeavor. Guard service regulations ordered escapees and mutineers to be killed without hesitation, and that “warning shots are forbidden as a matter of principal” (NMT IV, PS-1216). Guards relied on informers to sow seeds of distrust among prisoners, and to find out about plans for a revolt before they were able to occur (Langbein 1994). As a result, resistance groups were supremely clandestine affairs, and only members or those close to members were aware they existed. In some instances, prisoners in camps that had prisoner revolts denied any knowledge of clandestine activity. Resistance groups members were often ethnically, nationally, and ideologically homophilous. So called “international” resistance groups were established in Auschwitz,
Buchenwald, and Mauthausen, but they were amalgamations of previously existing groups (Langbein 1994; Garliński 1975).

In order to negotiate these factors, and capture as many resistance groups as possible, I focused on organized resistance groups identified by secondary sources. This approach captures the full sample of resistance groups, provides a baseline of information to check prisoner testimonies against, and includes resistance groups that prisoners may not have noticed during their time in the camps. That said, of the camps where organized resistance groups formed, prisoners in my sample of testimonies at least mentioned the presence of organized resistance in ten of the twelve camps. In sum, 63% of cases in the analysis had organized resistance groups, and, of these, five – Birkenau, Buchenwald, Mauthausen, Sobibór, and Treblinka – had armed revolts, and nearly every camp in the analysis had testimonies that described some form of escape, escape attempt, theft, black market activity, or everyday resistance.
Table 7: Structural and Organizational Measures for Resistance Analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Coding</th>
<th>Mean</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Organized Resistance (ORGRESIST)      | Organized resistance group formed in the camp, as reported by a secondary source. | 1- Organized resistance group in the camp  
0- No organized resistance group in the camp | 0.631 |
| Sympathetic Low Level Elites (LOWELITE) | Prisoner-Functionaries in the camps were predominantly political prisoners ("Reds") | 1- Prisoner Functionaries were predominantly political prisoners  
0- Prisoner functionaries were not political prisoners | 0.21  |
| Guard Behavior (GUARDBEH)            | Prisoners describe prisoner functionary behavior as particularly harsh or abusive. | 1- Prisoners describe prisoner functionary behavior as harsh and abusive  
0- Prisoners did not describe prisoner functionary behavior as harsh and abusive | 0.421 |
| Proportion of Jews in the Camp (PERCENTJEW) | The proportion of the camp population that was Jewish | 1- More than 47% of the camp was Jewish  
0- Less than 47% of the camp was Jewish | 0.631 |
| Chaotic Organizational Rules and Punishments (CHAOS) | SS, guards, or prisoner Functionaries enforced rules with no "correct" behavior or impossible expectations and punished prisoners without reason | 1- Guards enforced ambiguous rules  
0- Guards did not regularly enforce ambiguous rules | 0.579 |

Low Level Elites: One of the most troubling parts of the Nazi concentration camp’s organizational hierarchy was the inclusion of prisoners as capos (supervisors for work details), blockälteste (barracks elders), and lagerälteste (camp elders), and schreibstube (administrative support). These prisoner functionaries acted as low level elites within the camps; separated from fellow prisoners by their position, and bound to the SS because of it (Megargee 2009; Levi 1988). The SS tended to select prisoners based on their ethnicity.
and the reason they were in the camp, preferring “greens” (criminals) over “reds” (political prisoners) and Jews. Greens tended to be German and to behave in ways that were not far removed from the SS. As the camps progressed, small wars were waged between the greens and reds in order to secure control over prisoner functionary positions (Langbein 1994). This condition is an indicator of camps where reds held control over prisoner functionary positions (mean = .210). Reds in low level elite positions had the ability to aid resistance groups or turn a blind eye to their activities providing a valuable elite resource for the formation of organized resistance groups (Slater 2009; Jenkins 1983), and many often did. Ludwig Hamburger, a Jewish prisoner, describes arriving in Buchenwald toward the end of the war:

“In Buchenwald we arrived in the evening, hungry. We received nothing, not even bread, only one bread [during] six days travel on the railroad and we came to Buchenwald. It was like every other concentration camp, but one thing was better. There were comrades. There we had only one enemy, the SS. In Auschwitz we had the capos and the block elders, the greens. The professional criminals. In Buchenwald there were political prisoners. The political said that we were all brothers. There were no exceptions. Between Jews and Aryans, between negro and white. They were all the same. They made the same victims. We had one enemy, the SS. And against them we had to fight. So that was a great relief for us. In Buchenwald, the fact that we live today, the majority of the youth – we are to be grateful to the lager elder.” (VotH, Hamburger, 1946).

The presence of political prisoners in sympathetic low level elite positions should be expected to aid in the formation of organized resistance groups.

Guard Behavior: Group presence should not be mistaken for supportive behavior, and that is certainly the case in the concentration camps. The designation as a political prisoner simply implied that a prisoner was an enemy of the state, it did not imply a political persuasion or preclude them from anti-Semitism. In order to address this, I
include a condition for guard behavior, specifically low level elites, within the camps. In many cases, prisoners described prisoner functionaries as incredibly cruel:

“And the whole camp was counted with the main prisoner, who was called the Lagerältester, the Lager elder, who in most cases was either a, a German criminal or came from Poland. I also want to make one thing very strong, very clear. The people in charge of the barracks in most cases, and I would say 90% or better, were Germans or Poles, Germans or Poles. . . . These were the murderers, the murderers among us. They were prisoners, but these are the killers. And during roll calls they would kill many of us. Kill us for the simple reason that someone did it in their pants. They, uh, soiled their pants, soiled their uniform. Poor guy couldn’t hold it. Dysentery was, was something very, very common.” (Michael Vogel USHMM RG-50.030*0240).

In spite of their ability to act cruelly, prisoner functionaries could also be incredibly beneficial for prisoners working to survive or organize resistance. They acted as the eyes and ears of the camp organization, and they not only had the autonomy to act murderously but to act virtuously as well. As Stefan Czyzewski explains:

If they were Polish, they could be of great help to us. Also, to- they were not killers. Some capos were killers. Capos were people who led groups of people to work and toe exercise and to kill at will. But people who – who had functions like block leader, if he didn’t kill, he was alright and block secretary, most of them did not kill, they were alright. And there was a secretary over the first quarantine, there was a chief secretary of the whole camp (Führerschrieber). They had positions. The camp inside, ran itself. . (USHMM RG-50.030*0387)

In order to construct a measure of the behavior of prisoner-functionaries, I content coded how survivors described the behavior of capos and blockälteste. I coded behavior of each prisoner-functionary a prisoner discussed in their testimony on a scale of 1 to 5, with one being “actively helping in resistance or survival” and 5 being “exceptionally cruel and abusive.” For example, the quote provided by above by Michael Vogel for blockälteste in Auschwitz would be coded as a 5, and quote provided by Stefan Czyzewski for blockälteste in Gross-Rosen would be coded as a 3 (neither actively helping nor activity
harming prisoners, but possessing the capacity to do either. I averaged the scores across the camps, and used k-means clustering (Stata 11) to identify a natural break in the behavior of 3.6 (this is in contrast to a mean of 3.19 and a median of 3.5, see Figure 6 below).

Camps in the sample with harsh and abusive prisoner functionaries (mean=.421) include Buna, Flossenburg, Gross-Rosen, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Plaszów, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen. In spite of the Nazis reliance on a strict racial hierarchy, camps varied in regards to the primary demographics of prisoner functionaries, and the formation of organized resistance groups was influenced by, but not limited to the distribution of these demographics. By focusing on the behavior of prisoner functionaries, I highlight how the immediate actions of prisoner functionaries helped or hindered organized resistance.
Percent Jewish: The Nazi concentration camps were threatening to everyone imprisoned in them, but they were particularly dangerous for Jewish prisoners. In order to incorporate the effects of these beliefs on the likelihood of organized resistance, I included a condition for the proportion of Jews within a camp. Camps where more than 47% of the population was Jewish were treated as 1’s, and those below as zeros (see Figure 7 for the distribution). Again, I used k-means clustering in order to identify the natural clustering within the camps. In this case, there were three clusters, above 77%, below 25%, in between the two. I combined the two highest clusters in order to construct a more inclusive measure (mean=.631). The high proportion of Jewish prisoners represents the threatening conditions for Jewish prisoners, as well as a signal to other groups interested in resisting of the threat posed by the camps. Camps coded as ones include Auschwitz, Bergen-Belsen, Birkenau, Buna, Drancy, Majdanek, Płaszów, Sobibór, Stutthof, Theresienstadt, Treblinka, and Westerbork.
Chaos: The final condition in the analysis is a measure of organizational chaos. The measure represents camps where more than fifty percent of prisoners who discuss rules and abuse discuss impossible rules, ambiguous rules (i.e. rules with no correct answer), “sport” (a form of abuse that is largely for the amusement of the guards (Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982), beatings at the whim of the guards, or beatings for unknown reasons (mean=.579). Chaotic bureaucratic camps include Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buna, Gross-Rosen, Majdanek, Mauthausen, Płaszów, Sobibór, Stutthof, Treblinka, and Theresienstadt. Chaotic organizational conditions amplify assessments of threat for prisoners, and one would expect that camps where these conditions are rampant that these conditions would motivate the formation of organized resistance groups. The use and
willful disregard for rules is a sign of the absolute power held by the guards in the camp (Sofsky 1996), and its presence in a significant number of prisoner testimonies is a way of identifying conditions where threat assessments would be more likely. As Alexander Gertner explains, chaotic organizational conditions can create a Kafkaesque experience for prisoners in the camps:

“David Boder [Interviewer]: And who explained to you what was permitted and what was not permitted?
Alexander Gertner: It was not explained. We saw that for this one gets beaten, so we knew that this was not permitted. They… they did not explain, ‘this you can’t do.’ If one did something, even [if] it was right, one [the capo] also gave him a blow with a club.” (VotH, Gertner, 1946).

Considering the ambiguity of these conditions, the desire to resist has to be significant in order to willfully tempt such uncertain conditions. Such an approach fits with prior work on threat assessment and collective action, particularly the fact that threats have to be assessed as credible, severe, and unmalleable (Maher 2010; Einwohner and Maher 2011). The presence of decidedly chaotic and oppressive behavior on the part of guards and prisoner functionaries acts as an identifiable form of threat for prisoners and may encourage them to form organized resistance groups in order to prepare to resist as well as organize methods for surviving and enduring such treatment. In his camp diary, Sasha Pechersky, one of the leaders of the Sobibór revolt sharply conveys how this sense of chaotic helplessness motivated resistance,

“I was paralyzed with fear. But this wasn’t a fear of death. I was terrified by the awareness of my complete helplessness in the face of these monstrous facts. There must be some way out of this horrible situation! Something must be done!” (Nirenstein 1959:312)

Hodson, Martin, Lopez, and Roscigno (2012) and Sofsky (1996) describe a darker side of bureaucracy where ambiguous rules, patrimonialism, and chaos in bureaucratic
organizations create such a sense of helplessness, but it may also be the case that a malevolently ambiguous organizational environment can spur individuals to organize ways to resist.

**QCA Results**
The findings from the QCA analysis identify two sets of conditions associated with organized resistance in the camps. The first configuration shows that the combination of the presence of chaotic organizational conditions (CHAOS) and the proportion of Jews in the camp (PERCJEW) is significantly associated with the presence of organized resistance (2.222*). Conversely, the combination of the presence of abusive prisoner-functionary behavior (GUARDBEH), a lower proportion of Jews (percjew), and the absence of sympathetic low level elites (lowelite) is significantly associated with the absence of organized resistance in the camps (.255**). QCA presents a unique opportunity to reassess the validity of findings by engaging in a process of qualitative re-immersion (Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Crowley 2012).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Configuration</th>
<th># of Ones</th>
<th># of Zeros</th>
<th>High Mort. in Configuration (%)</th>
<th>Mean Ratio (Configuration to Non-Configuration)</th>
<th>Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAOS*PERCJEW</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>2.222*</td>
<td>Auschwitz, Birkenau, Buna, Majdanek, Płaszów, Sobibór, Stutthof, Theresienstadt, Treblinka</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWELITE<em>guardbeh</em>chaos*percjew</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>Buchenwald, Dachau</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCJEW<em>guardbeh</em>lowelite</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.982</td>
<td>Bergen-Belsen, Birkenau, Drancy, Sobibór, Stutthof, Theresienstadt, Treblinka, and Westerbork</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUARDBEH<em>percjew</em>lowelite</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.255**</td>
<td>Flossenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, Sachsenhausen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solution Coverage: 1.00

**Chaos & the Proportion of Jewish Prisoners**

The combination of chaotic organizational conditions and a high proportion of Jewish prisoners is significantly associated with the presence of organized resistance in the camps. These findings indicate that assessment of threat played a particularly important role for the motivation of resistance in the camps. Camps with chaotic organizational
conditions and high proportions of Jews tended to have high mortality rates, regardless of their camp status, and guards were unhindered by the even minor organizational rules and regulations present in other camps as they terrorized prisoners. In response, and in spite of the grave threats that collective action posed, Jewish and political prisoners worked to organized resistance groups in order to provide mutual assistance to other prisoners, aid in escapes, and plan for an eventual revolt. Of the camps that fit this set of conditions, five held organized resistance groups mobilized by Jewish prisoners: Birkenau, Buna, Płaszów, Sobibór, and Treblinka. Of the remaining four camps, one did not have organized resistance, Theresienstadt, and three had resistance groups: Auschwitz, Majdanek, and Stutthof.

The Jewish resistance groups formed in response to the threatening conditions of the camps, and as the results of this analysis show, the chaotic organizational conditions present within those camps. Richard Glazar, a survivor of Treblinka, explains how the murderous nature of the camp, and the absence of other means of redress pushed prisoners to start thinking about resistance,

“After one of the leading SS. SS-Untersturmführer Franz, Kurt Franz executed a whole Kommando. So we came to the conclusion that it, and told us that for anyone who was going to escape in the future, ten would be executed. So then these individuals escapes stopped and we thought on common action, on a revolt. And really it took ever since December 1942 until August 1943 before we, before we succeeded. There were, We had different concepts, different ideas and we always had some or other reason to postpone it.” (USHMM, RG-02.003*01)

The decision to organize in response to the chaotic and threatening conditions of the camps was evident for resistance group members in other camps too. Edith Serras, a Birkenau survivor explains the motivation to find ways to resist,

---

47 Dunin-Wasowicz references a Jewish resistance organization forming from a group of Communist youth from the Lodz ghetto (1982). Unfortunately, I cannot find any additional information on the group.
“The conditions for us were very bad. At every instant they told us that we have come here to die. When one would forget herself, and break out in laughter during the work, the SS women would tell us, 'Don't laugh'. You have come here to die—to croak. You will never get out of here. You won't see liberty.' We noticed that the lager was an extermination lager, and that we shall not come out of there alive. So we started to organize ourselves around the BUND [a Jewish political organization]. Only political women who have come to the lager and who knew that they live to fight against Fascism and Hitlerism. So we started to organize resistance in the lager. We could not accomplish much with our work, because we had nothing in our hands. . . . When one would get sick, and we did not want her to die, so we gave a little piece of bread. Everyone had to give a little piece of her own in order to help to support her health. And thanks to such an organization in which we have committed ourselves to help one another, we saw that we would be able to save ourselves. And we also knew that they would exterminate us, so we started to organize ourselves and to make propaganda that we should defend ourselves... We should not permit them to 'gas' us.” (VotH, Serras 1946)

Resistance groups in Płaszów and Buna, motivated by similar conditions, focused on gathering guns and explosives with the intention of staging an uprising in the case of liquidation, but, unlike Sobibór, Treblinka, and Birkenau, they chose not to resist in the end, (Kowalski 1984; Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982).

The Polish resistance groups that formed in Auschwitz (the ZOW/CMC), Stutthof (a joint Polish/Russian group), and Majdanek (Eagle Union) were equally motivated by the chaotic and threatening conditions of the camps (Garliński 1975; Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982; Marszalek 1986). These groups encouraged mutual aid amongst prisoners, helped orchestrate escapes (with the exception of Stutthof), and collected weapons with the intention of revolting and liberating the camps. Like the Jewish organizations, the threatening conditions of the camps pushed prisoners to act; even when the actions were directed toward other groups. In Majdanek, “[d]ue to the constant danger, ideological differences had to recede to the background and be replaced by common action in favour of the prisoner community. The November murder of 18,000 Jews [Erntefest, Operation “Harvest Festival”] activated the group and contributed to its further development”
(Marszalek 1986:164). Indeed, the liquidation of the Majdanek Jews, even in 1943, came as a grave shock to non-Jewish prisoners. As Janina Mahlberg, a non-prisoner who had access to the camp, and worked to smuggle food in for prisoners explains,

“Dr. Perzanowska came out to meet us. Usually controlled and dignified, a person others looked to for support, her face today was ghastly pale, red eyes staring out in horror. "I'm surprised they let you in," she said. "We are going through torture. Yesterday and the day before. If they'd just finish us off, like the Jews, if they would only make it quick. It's the end anyway for all of us." She spoke as in a trance” (USHMM, RG-02.053).

Although the violence directed toward the Jews was seen as threatening and upsetting for Polish organizations too, in the end, it did not spur them to revolt in solidarity. In October 1944, the Sonderkommando in Birkenau revolted destroying a crematoria, killing three SS, and wounding twelve more (Garliński 1975; Gutman and Berenbaum 1998). Yet, As Erich Kulka, a resistance member in Auschwitz explains, the Polish resistance group chose not to resist alongside them,

“So the crematoria, this one crematorium was put out of operations on the 7th of October 1944, from sonderkommando. They proved that it was possible to destroy, with own hands and force, the killing facilities. But only the The Fighting Group of Auschwitz [ZOW]. They promise [the Sonderkommando] help, and they never get help. In the last moment they are refused, [by] the Polish. And they told later, it was in a document, they told that [the ZOW] will dare to make an uprising only in the moment when we are in the such stage, endangered as the Jews. . . they didn’t keep their vow, they didn’t help.” (USHMM, RG-50.030*0119).

The resistance group in Stutthof chose not to resistance for similar reasons, concluding that chances of success were too small and the number of prisoners killed in the revolt would be too large to justify a revolt (Dunin-Wąsowicz 1982). Although none of these camps initiated a revolt, they can point to considerable achievements in filling prisoner-functionary positions with empathetic guards, helping escapes (which spread the word about the camps), and raising hopes amongst prisoners.
The prisoners in each of these camps felt that liquidation and extermination were real and terrible possibilities, and they organized resistance groups in order to provide mutual aid to one another and to prepare for these eventualities. The violent chaotic organizations conditions of the camp increased fears and made an imminent liquidation a credible and real threat. The presence of a large proportion of a hated and dehumanized minority only enhanced these fears, even for non-Jewish resistance fighters.

_Cruel Low Level Elites_

The second significant configuration shows that camps where non-political prisoner functionaries (lowelit) were exceptionally cruel (GUARDBEH) and there were few Jewish prisoners (percjew) were significantly associated with the absence of organized resistance groups (.255**). The camps identified by this configuration included Flossenburg, Gross-Rosen, Mauthausen, Ravensbrück, and Sachsenhausen, and only one (Mauthausen) had an organized resistance group. Indeed, all five of these camps were dominated by “green” (i.e. criminal) prisoner-functionaries. The greens were renowned for their ill treatment of fellow prisoners (Langbein 1994). As George Salton, a Jewish prisoner who was in Flossenburg, explains, and the presence of cruel low level elites limited prisoners space and ability to even survive, let alone resist,

“We were for the first time really exposed to German capos. Kapos were trustees. They were prisoners, frequently prisoners from criminal institutions, from criminal prisons where people who were come… who were there for committing some violent crimes like murder, something like this, and they were made trustees in concentration camps and we were for the first time exposed to capos who were also brutal and miserable and who I believe tried to outdo the German guards in order to retain their privileged position. It was just one of those difficult nightmares that went on from day to day and one had to survive. One had to avoid again being somehow singled out or beaten or injured or fractured” (RG-50.030*0200).
The presence of harsh prisoner-functionaries made it incredibly difficult to survive. Hermann Langbein, a prominent scholar of resistance during the Holocaust, described Gross-Rosen as “the only camp where the prisoners could not possibility do a thing to improve their living conditions or organize resistance” (quoted in Guterman 2008:2). In addition, as camps like Buchenwald and Dachau were increasingly exploited for labor, many of the green capos – who tended to be cruel, violent, and inept at bureaucratic practices – were shipped to camps like Mauthausen (Le Chene 1971). Camps with cruel low level elites were able to stamp out organized resistance because they were present as capos watching work details, and, as lagerälteste and blockälteste, keeping track of prisoners in the bunks. The constant presence likely closed down the space and ability for prisoners to meet and discuss methods and plans for collective action. As Jürgen Bassfreund states,

“There was an immense crowd of people. One couldn’t sleep nights. We were simply all sitting up and leaning against each other, and when one just barely moved or made an attempt to walk around, there appeared immediately a BVer [a criminal capo] with a big club and began to strike indiscriminately into the crowd. It was terrible. And then the second day we were told that a transport is getting ready. I quickly volunteered for it because I through it can’t be worse than in this lager. We were getting very little food, a very thin watery soup, and even the customary turnips were often missing, and a piece of bread.” (VotH, Bassfreund, 1946)

Bassfreund, like George Salton, clearly conveys the seeming omnipresence and brutality of the green prisoner functionaries. Considering such oversight, it is likely that any attempts at organizing was difficult in these camps. The greens had a reason to be concerned about the formation of resistance groups in the camps. Established resistance
groups would displace greens from prisoner functionary positions and the greens would be killed, either within the camp or in the next camp.

“When you change the camps, people involved, interested who remember that you did something wrong in a previous camp, there is you have a freedom fro a day or so to take care of this guy, to kill him, to simply kill him or damage something, warn him. That’s what happened to this kapo. People who were in this group decided to fix him and they killed him there. It was about two days after arriving to the camp in Buchenwald. [Q: Had you know him before? In Gross-Rosen?] Yes. [So other prisoners killed him?] Yes.” (Antoni Golba, USHMM, RG-50.030*0081).

The greens own fears and prejudices acted as a buffer against the formation of organized resistance in the camps, and a motivation for continued vigilance against collective action. Although they too were prisoners within the camps, their positions as prisoner functionaries tied them –willingly or unwillingly –to the Nazis, and, in many cases, made them the face of deprivation and a potential target of retribution.

Robustness Checks
In order to check the robustness of the QCA results, I conducted a logit regression analysis of the findings with a series of theoretically minded control variables. Prior QCA analyses have followed a similar approach to check for robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness as a check on the relationship between the set conditions and the outcome (Roscigno and Hodson 2004; Grant, et al 2010). The limited number of cases in my analysis (19) necessitates a degree of caution in interpretation (Vittinghoff and McCulloch 2006), and so I do not discuss the coefficients beyond their direction and significance. I conducted three logit regression tests. The first (Table 9) tests the QCA sets individually. The second tests the QCA sets with two theoretically informed control variables – commandant stability and the number of prisoners per guard (Table 10). The
final logit regression combines the QCA sets with two organizational controls, average size of the camp and the length of time open (Table 11). I do not combine all of these together in the same model in order to ensure that the degrees of freedom per variable remains manageable. Finally, the second QCA set (LOWELITE*guardbeh*chaos*percjew) is not in the models because the variable perfectly correlates with the outcome in the analysis and omits the cases from the model. This is a known characteristic of logit regression (Long and Freese 2006).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 9: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAOS*PERCJEW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCJEW<em>guardbeh</em>lowelite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUARDBEH<em>percjew</em>lowelite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

The logit regression results presented in Table 9 show that the significant QCA set conditions from the prior table (Table 8) are significantly related with the organized resistance in the regression. Each of the conditions is pointed in the correct direction. The second set of models include measures of *commandant stability* and *prisoners per guard* as controls for institutional change (Skocpol 1979; Useem 1998; Goldstone and Useem 1999) and control (Earl 2010). There was considerable turnover in almost every Nazi concentration camp, particularly in 1942 when the SS Economic Administration
(WVHA) took over control of the camps. I include a dummy variable for camps that retained the same commandant for more than two years (Bergen-Belsen, Birkenau, Drancy, Gross-Rosen, Majdanek, Plaszów, Sobibór, and Theresienstadt) with the expectation that it will have a negative effect on the likelihood of organized resistance by providing stable organizational control and awareness. Prisoners per guard \(^{48}\) - the average size of the camp divided by the average number of SS guards in the camp acts as a proxy measure for control in the camps, and should have a negative effect on organized resistance in the camps.

| Table 10: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance |
|----------------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
|                                   | 1     | 2     | 3     |
| CHAOS*PERCJEW                     | 2.335+|       |       |
|                                  | (1.70)|       |       |
| PERCJEW*guardbeh*red             | 1.51  |       |       |
|                                  | (1.16)|       |       |
| GUARDBEH*percjew*red             |       | -5.702***|       |
|                                  |       | (3.40)|       |
| Established Commandant           | 0.577 | -0.013| 1.888 |
|                                  | (0.46)| (0.01)| (1.26)|
| Prisoners Per Guard              | -0.025| -0.058*| -0.073*|
|                                  | (1.06)| (2.24)| (2.35)|
| Constant                         | 0.01  | 1.612 | 3.829*|
|                                  | (0.01)| (1.33)| (2.57)|
| N                                | 19    | 19    | 19    |

+ p<0.1; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001

The second robustness check (Table 10) continues to show a significant relationship between the QCA results and the likelihood of organized resistance. Chaotic

\(^{48}\) The figures for prisoners per guard in each camp are available in Table 3.
highly Jewish camps were significantly associated with organized resistance, and camps with cruel low level elites had a very significant and negative relationship with resistance. The number of prisoners per guard had a significant and negative effect on resistance in the models (Model 2 and 3). This is an interesting finding considering that, in theory, camps with fewer prisoners per guard should have less resistance, but, in this case, the camps with the fewest prisoners per guard -Buna, Sobibór, Treblinka, and Mauthausen—all had resistance groups in spite of the fact that they were some of the most dangerous for prisoners.

The final robustness check tests the QCA results with two organizational measures of control, average camp size and the length of time open (Table 11). These controls are common in organizational analysis (Hannan and Freeman 1977), and have been associated with organizational control (Marsden, Cook, and Kalleberg 1994). One would expect that average camp size would have a positive effect on organized resistance as the more prisoners there are, the easier it is to blend in or become “illegible” (Scott 1998), and that time open would have a positive effect as older camps were more likely to be populated with political prisoners (and prisoners had more time to organize). The final set of robustness checks show that the QCA sets continue to have significant relationships in the correct directions.
Table 11: Logit Regression of Reduced Configurations on Organized Resistance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CHAOS*PERCJEW</td>
<td>4.310**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(2.95)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCJEW<em>guardbeh</em>red</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.055</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.05)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUARDBEH<em>percjew</em>red</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-4.147*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(2.19)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avg. Camp Size</td>
<td>-0.000+</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.79)</td>
<td>(0.72)</td>
<td>(1.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Open</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
<td>0.00</td>
<td>0.001+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
<td>(0.00)</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>-1.636</td>
<td>1.171</td>
<td>0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.94</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001

The control variable show some effect in the hypothesized direction, but their effects are not as strong as the QCA sets. In sum, the robustness checks show that the conditions identified by the QCA analysis are significantly associated with organized resistance and provide further support that the findings from this analysis are robust.

**Conclusion**

Organized resistance groups formed in several different camps, and were able to mobilize in ways that helped them, and their fellow prisoners, survive the horrors therein. The findings from my analysis show that organized resistance groups were more likely to form in camps that were highly threatening, specifically in camps with chaotic organizational conditions and a high proportion of Jewish prisoners. Chaotic organizational conditions made every decision more dangerous for prisoners, and the future more bleak and ambiguous. The presence of a large proportion of Jewish prisoners only exacerbated these conditions by either demonstrating that brutality of the guards, or,
because the resistance group was Jewish, making the applicability of the threat that much more apparent.

Conversely, organized resistance groups were largely missing from camps with cruel low level elites. The presence of non-sympathetic prisoner functionaries –largely criminal “greens” –who prisoners described as cruel and brutal in camps where there was a low proportion of Jewish prisoners made the conditions for organizing more difficult, and lowered the broader motivations for resistance. Green prisoner-functionaries undermined organization efforts knowing that any attempt to organize resistance would include an attempt to get allies into elite positions; specifically their positions. Further, the social distance from the gas chambers and the mass murder of the Jews likely gave the impression that the camps were survivable so long as the prisoner kept their head down and demonstrated their value as a laborer.

Regardless of the outcome, every act of resistance was important, especially symbolically. It is important to remember that “every manifestation of resistance, even though reprisals (and guilt by association) threatened those who took part in it, cracked the structure of terror, proved to those who had lost hope that hope existed, showed that there were indeed ways out of a dead-end situation, and they were various. Every method of opposition -no matter whether it increased the survival odds for a group of prisoners or a particular person, or was the immediate cause of death for the resister –expressed a protest against violence” (Pawelczynska 1979:121-22).
CHAPTER 7: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In conclusion, I find that shifting economic, demographic, and ideological factors produced chaotic conditions by providing a context where guards were able to decouple their already brutal behavior from organizational rules and regulations. Yet chaotic conditions were not evenly distributed across camps. Indeed, camp variation, particularly in regard to chaotic organizational conditions, was strongly associated with high mortality rates (a proxy for coercion), and the formation of organized resistance groups. The formation, variation, and effects of chaotic conditions had a profound effect on the day to day lives of prisoners within the camps.

The Nazi concentration camp system was established with a clear set of rules and guidelines known as the “Dachau Model” that emphasized harsh punishments for the prisoners, a specific set of responsibilities for the guards, a set of ideological beliefs that the prisoners were inferior in every way, and an organizational hierarchy that centralized power with the commandants. These rules remained in place throughout the war, but expanding economic goals, mounting demographic pressures, and ideological beliefs regarding the inferiority of prisoners –particularly Jews –produced a chaotic decoupling between guard behavior and the institutional goals and organizational rules of the camps.

The conditions produced by the chaotic decoupling of guard behavior were not evenly distributed across camps. Although camps shared a number of similarities, including crushing labor, structural violence, surveillance, and dehumanization, there were important distinctions between camps. The combination of organizational and
structural conditions created four broad and somewhat overlapping camp forms – coercive, negligent, chaotic, and tyrannical. These camp forms, most notably distinguished by the relative presence or absence of bureaucratic controls and chaotic controls, were significantly related with mortality. Camps with bureaucratic controls and chaotic controls or chaotic controls and surveillance were strongly associated with high mortality in the camps. In contrast, camps with just bureaucratic controls and no chaotic control, and negligent camps with neither bureaucratic nor chaotic controls were associated with low mortality. As I demonstrated above, these conditions match with the experience of prisoners within the camps, and the secondary description of life in the camps. However, it is important to note that all of the camps were coercive in their own way, and the distinctions drawn are between nineteen centers of terror.

Finally, organized resistance groups found ways to mobilize, and, in some cases, revolt, in twelve of the nineteen concentration camps in my analysis. Drawing on a QCA analysis of camp conditions to understand why camps emerged in some cases, but not others. I find that camps with highly chaotic conditions and a high proportion of Jewish prisoners were strongly associated with the presence of organized resistance groups. These conditions made day to day life in the camps much more dangerous, and increased the likelihood that groups would mobilize to protect themselves against the threat of the camp. Conversely, organized resistance was significantly less likely in camps with a low proportion of Jewish prisoners and cruel low level elites. The absence of Jewish prisoners likely gave prisoners in the camps the impression that they were less at risk of extermination; feeding the notion that they may survive if they put their heads down and demonstrate their value as a labor force. Simultaneously, the constant presence of a cruel
low level elites reduced the space prisoners needed to discuss and plan, and likely lead to the deaths of prisoners who expressed an interest in defiance.

These findings make several contributions to the sociological literature on organizations, power, collective violence, and social movements. First, the chaotic decoupling of behavior from rules and regulations seen in the camp system (discussed in Chapter Four) is particularly relevant to organizational theory because it is a reminder that organizations not only decouple from what they claim, they decouple from formal rules and regulations too. Although such “mock bureaucratic” practices may be functional and efficient in some contexts (Gouldner 1955), they are rife with potential for abuse and exploitation. The addition of ideological animosity, dehumanization, and organizational pressures such as rapid demographic expansion may render even the most rigid hierarchies chaotic.

These findings support Yehouda Shenhav’s work on hybrid bureaucracies which integrates Weber’s traditional forms of dominance (i.e. patrimonial and personal forms of coercion) into legal bureaucracies justified by racial hierarchies rather than citizenship, and reinforced by formal and informal means (unpublished). The theoretical similarities between work on imperial colonies by Shenhav (as well as Steinmetz (2003, 2008)) and the concentration camps is interesting for thinking further about the intersection between power, race, and organizations. Race, discrimination, and dehumanization (Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008; Melson 1996; Fein 1993) may play exceptionally important roles in explaining how and when organizations become especially violent and coercive.

Chaotic decoupling may also add to the discussion of power in organizations. Recent work has shown that the process of recoupling can create turmoil and anxiety
within organizations (Hallett 2010), and the findings from this analysis opens the possibility that, in some contexts, decoupling can have a similar effect on workers. Indeed, one of these conditions (rapidly expanding size) is a subject of particular importance to population ecologists, offering a potential bridge between two seemingly disparate parts of organizational theory. Further research is certainly required though.

The findings from this analysis also contribute to sociological understanding of bureaucracy and power, particularly in a comparative context. Distinguishing between bureaucratic and chaotic organizational conditions as independent, yet related, concepts is useful for thinking about power and coercion broadly. Indeed, the four organizational forms – coercive, negligent, chaotic, and tyrannical – identified through the intersection of bureaucratic and chaotic organizational conditions are born out by the camp conditions identified by prisoners and the QCA analysis as well as secondary work on the camps. Without a doubt, each organizational form was terrible in its own right; possessing the potential to be highly coercive. Yet comparative differences across them influenced the form of control and coercion prisoner’s experienced.

The comparative distinction between bureaucratic and chaotic control contributes to broader sociological work by broadening the focus of Etzioni’s work on comparative organizations to focus on how organizations are coercive, and the various forms organizational coercion may take, such as coercive, negligent, chaotic, or tyrannical. By including chaotic organizational conditions, this paper building on previous research on the inherent ambiguities and inconsistencies of bureaucracy (Gouldner 1955; Hodson, Martin, Lopez, and Roscigno 2012) to show that in these conditions are not necessarily the antithesis of bureaucracy, but rather a “Janus-faced” version that can be utilized for
coercion in the same way that bureaucratic rules and regulations may be used to justify abuse and bullying. More broadly, these findings also build on organizational theory by applying an “inhabited institutions” (Hallett and Ventresca 2006; Morrill 2008) perspective to more coercive organizations, and by reintroducing the issue of total institutions and coercive organizations into organizational research (Clegg 2006).

Drawing a distinction between bureaucratic and chaotic control is useful for expanding our understanding of resistance in non-democratic environments as well. The findings provide further support for the role of threat assessment in non-democratic environments (Maher 2010; Einwohner and Maher 2011) by showing that threat is helpful for distinguishing between where resistance groups emerged and where they did not. All of the camps were threatening and dangerous for prisoners, but the emergence of resistance groups was concentrated in the most organizationally and demographically threatening camps. It is indisputable that the camps were a severe threat to Jewish prisoners, but the formation of non-Jewish resistance groups in camps with a high proportion of Jews indicates that it also made the camps a greater proximate threat to others as well. Repression and coercion are often erratic and indiscriminate (Hafez and Wictorowicz 2005; Khawaja 1993), and non-Jewish resistance groups were mobilized by the potential for spillover.

These findings also highlight the role of low level elites for mobilization in highly repressive environments. In camps where “greens” dominated prisoner-functionary positions, it was much more difficult for organized resistance groups to form, providing support for prior arguments regarding the importance of low level elites for revolutions (Slater 2009), and, more broadly, the importance of mid-level figures like managers for...
the maintenance of an organizational environment that is conducive to collective action (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Jenkins 1983) or inequality (Castilla 2011; Stainback and Tomaskovic-Devey 2012). Although it did not appear in the significant QCA results, the presence of supportive low level elites was important for the mobilization of resistance in many camps, and capos and blockälteste were active members of the resistance playing active roles in several camp revolts (Langbein 1994). More broadly, these findings add to the chorus of research advocating for greater attention to non-mobilization (McAdam et al. 2010; Wright and Shaffer Boudet 2012; Shriver, Cable, Norris, and Hastings 2000; Gaventa 1982). Integrating non-mobilization expands the theoretical bounds by diversifying scope of the analysis to include non-action (alongside mobilization and collective action), and the methodological scope by selecting (and theorizing) on more than affirmative cases.

In addition to the immediate theoretical impacts, there are several broader implications to this analysis. Although the concentration camps are extreme cases, coercive organizations are not an unfamiliar part of modern life. The organizational conditions described by scholars of colonial states (Steinmetz 2008; Shenhav, unpublished; Lammers 2003), slave labor in the south and in Soviet Russia (Kolchin 1987), and prisons (Hepburn 1985; Liebling 2000), as well as more contemporary instances of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan (Mestrovic 2007), allegations of abuse at Guantanamo Bay (Murphy et. al., 2012), police behavior (Garland 2001; Maguire 2003), and “the new slavery” and sex trafficking (Bales 1998; Goldhammer, Weber, and Gilman 2011) certainly fit with the theoretical descriptions of tyrannical and chaotic organizations described here. Indeed, Bales
specifically cites the combination of economic interests, expanding demographic availability (re: demographic pressures), and dehumanization driving the proliferation of “new slavery” (Bales 1998). Unlike the concentration camps, genocide may not be the goal of these organizations, but the presence of a dehumanized prisoner/labor population and ever expanding organizational demands may produce more tragedies and, potentially, atrocities.

Theoretical links may be extended all the way to more banal organizational experiences as well. The long lines and uncaring, unreceptive employees at institutions such as the Department of Motor Vehicles, telemarketing call centers, and airport help desks have been despised for years. Employees at these institutions see a never ending flow of people and can benefit from using bureaucratic red tape and ambiguous conditions to make their jobs easier by transferring customers from contact to contact. Indeed, the push toward neoliberal economic policies (Harvey 2005), and the expectation that organizations “do more with less” creates an incentive for such organizational behavior, particularly at the points of contact between the institution and the public or, in some cases, its employees. What separates the more coercive experiences of the camps from more banal experiences with Kafkaesque bureaucracies may simply be the presence of dehumanization, as well as political and demographic pressures (Melson 1996; Hagan and Rymond-Richmond 2008).

Research on coercion, power, and resistance would benefit from further exploration of the validity and applicability of the organizational forms and process of decoupling identified here. Particularly exploring the operationalization of chaotic control in less repressive contexts. It is simple to point to chaos in coercive organizations like the
concentration camps, but identifying and measuring chaos in more banal contexts will likely require a more nuanced approach that treats organizations as inhabited institutions rather than as efficient bureaucracies (Hallett and Ventresca 2006).

Future research on resistance in the concentration camps would benefit from an even broader focus on contention, incorporating forms of everyday resistance into the discussion of how individuals fought back against the camp regime. Everyday resistance was still dangerous, but the risk of guilt by association was diminished. Identifying the role that this form of protest played in the camps, and how it influenced individual prisoners may be a fruitful avenue for exploration. Additionally, more deliberate analysis of the organized resistance groups in the twelve camps identified may identify different methods and motivation for collective action that will provide insight into how groups negotiated immediate concerns and long term interests in organizations that required hour to hour, minute to minute vigilance. Finally, a more specific analysis within a single camp – such as Buchenwald or Auschwitz – of the perceptions and experiences of Jewish and non-Jewish prisoners, and their motivations for resistance may offer a deeper understanding of life in the camps.
REFERENCES


Poznanski, Renée. 2001. Jews in France during World War II. UPNE.


Reilly, Jo, David Cesarani, Tony Kushner, and Colin Richmond, eds. 1997. *Belsen in History and Memory.* Taylor & Francis US.


APPENDIX A: PRIMARY SOURCE DOCUMENTS AND SURVIVOR TESTIMONIES

Institutional Documents

Survivor Testimonies
Voices of the Holocaust

Voice/Vision Holocaust Survivor Oral History Archive


Larry Wayne interview with Sidney Bolkosky [unknown]. The VVA. The University of Michigan-Dearborn, Dearborn, MI, 1982.


United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

United States Holocaust Memorial Museum (hereafter, USHMM), Record Group 50.042, Oral History, interview with, Abe Malnik, February 27, 1992, RG-50.042*0019

USHMM, Survivor Testimonies, "Janina's Story" by Janina Mehlberg, 2003.333

USHMM, Record Group 02.003, Survivor Testimonies, interview with, Richard Glazar, October 26, 1981, RG-02.003*01; Acc. 1991.A.094

USHMM, Record Group 02.005, Survivor Testimonies, "My Deportation" by Bernard Nissenbaum, RG-02.005*01

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Esthy Adler, May 16, 1994, RG-50.030*0004

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Meyer Adler, April 24, 1991, RG-50.030*0005

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Francis Akos, June 18, 1990, RG-50.030*0006

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Erwin Baum, July 6, 1994, RG-50.030*0016

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Icek Baum, July 5, 1994, RG-50.030*0017

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Rita Kerner Hilton, August 12, 1994, RG-50.030*002

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, David Bergman, July 18, 1990, RG-50.030*0020

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Michael Bernath, March 22, 1990, RG-50.030*0022

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Kate Bernath, March 22, 1990, RG-50.030*0023

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Thomas Blatt, September 6, 1990, RG-50.030*0028

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Bela Blau, June 11, 1990, RG-50.030*0029

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Magda Blau, June 11, 1990, RG-50.030*0030

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Avraham Bomba, August 28, 1990, RG-50.030*0033

USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Ruth Borsos, July 3, 1990, RG-50.030*0035
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Margaret Jastrow Klug, March 13, 1990, RG-50.030*0108
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Solomon Klug, March 13, 1990, RG-50.030*0109
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Ernest Koenig, July 1, 1991, RG-50.030*0112
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Abraham Kolski, March 29, 1990, RG-50.030*0113
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, John Komski, June 7, 1990, RG-50.030*0115
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Morris Kornberg, March 15, 1990, RG-50.030*0116
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Erich Kulka, June 8, 1990, RG-50.030*0119
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Doriane Kurz, July 10, 1990, RG-50.030*0120
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Abraham Lewent, October 20, 1989, RG-50.030*0130
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, David Lieberman, July 10, 1990, RG-50.030*0132
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Johanne Hirsch Liebmann, January 19, 1990, RG-50.030*0133
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Max Liebmann, January 19, 1990, RG-50.030*0134
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, William Luksenber, April 14, 1991, RG-50.030*0140
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Sol (Shaya) Lurie, July 8, 1994, RG-50.030*0141
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Abraham Malach, March 20, 1990, RG-50.030*0144
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Abraham Malnik, May 10, 1990, RG-50.030*0145
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Lilly Malnik, May 10, 1990, RG-50.030*0146
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Lily Margules, January 3, 1990, RG-50.030*0150
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Judith Meisel, January 25, 1990, RG-50.030*0157
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Ruth Krautwirth Meyerowitz, February 20, 1990, RG-50.030*0161
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Frieda Greinegger Noga, December 11, 1990, RG-50.030*0172

173
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Murray Pantirer, April 23, 1990, RG-50.030*0174
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Beatrice Pappenheimer, June 6, 1990, RG-50.030*0175
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Bella Simon Pasternak, April 21, 1994, RG-50.030*0176
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Bernard Pasternak, April 20, 1994, RG-50.030*0177
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Chiel Rajchman, December 7, 1988, RG-50.030*0185
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Frank Reiss, June 18, 1991, RG-50.030*0187
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Dora Goldstein Roth, June 8, 1989, RG-50.030*0197
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Norman Salsitz, May 12, 1990, RG-50.030*0199
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, George Salton, October 10, 1990, RG-50.030*0200
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Leo Schneiderman, May 23, 1990, RG-50.030*0205
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Walter Schnell, June 28, 1989, RG-50.030*0206
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Martin Spett, November 7, 1989, RG-50.030*0218
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Steven Springfield, March 30, 1990, RG-50.030*0220
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Eva Rozencwajig Stock, July 26, 1989, RG-50.030*0225
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Chana Tencer, September 30, 1991, RG-50.030*0232
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Bella Jakubowicz Tovey, February 15, 1990, RG-50.030*0236
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Michael Vogel, July 14, 1989, RG-50.030*0240
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Helen Waterford, November 14, 1989, RG-50.030*0246
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Ernst Weihs, May 30, 1989, RG-50.030*0248
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Guta Blass Weintraub, January 4, 1990, RG-50.030*0250
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Sonja Gottlieb Ludsins, July 13, 1994, RG-50.030*0262
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Rose Szywie Warner, September 12, 1994, RG-50.030*0270
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Leonard Zawacki, September 21, 1994, RG-50.030*0271
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Chana Mehler, December 13, 1993, RG-50.030*0275
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Blanka Rothschild, September 27, 1994, RG-50.030*0281
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, William Schneiderman, September 21, 1994, RG-50.030*0288
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Henny Fletcher Aronson, September 23, 1994, RG-50.030*0290
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Fela Warschau, February 9, 1995, RG-50.030*0303
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Sam Spiegel, May 3, 1995, RG-50.030*0324
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Susan Eisdorfer Beer, May 16, 1995, RG-50.030*0326
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Gerda Schild Haas, June 12, 1995, RG-50.030*0334
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Bert Fleming, May 16, 1996, RG-50.030*0365
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Irene Salomonawicz Fleming, May 16, 1996, RG-50.030*0366
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Carola Steinhardt, June 3, 1996, RG-50.030*0368
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Walter Meyer, August 2, 1996, RG-50.030*0371
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, George Havas, August 26, 1996, RG-50.030*0378
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Stefan Czyzewski, April 8, 1998, RG-50.030*0387
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Tadeusz Marchaj, September 21, 1998, RG-50.030*0393
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Rosalie (Chris) Laks Lerman, December 1, 1998, RG-50.030*0396
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Regina Laks Gelb, February 20, 2001, RG-50.030*0410
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Anna Laks Wilson, February 21, 2001, RG-50.030*0411
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Jack Baum, December 16, 1995, RG-50.030*0424
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Charles Siegman, July 24, 2003, RG-50.030*0477
USHMM, Record Group 50.030, Oral History, interview with, Edgar Krasa, September 9, 2003, RG-50.030*0478
APPENDIX B: CODING SHEETS

Prisoner Pre-Camp Coding Sheet

Name: _____________________  Source: _______  Citation:__________

Interviewer:_________________  Interview Date: __/___/___

Intv. Date 2:___/____/____

Pages: ______  Time (in min.): ________

Birth Date: ___/___/____  Sex: ______  Religion: _____________

Born in:  City: __________________  Country:  __________________

Raised in (if different) City: __________________  Country:  __________________

Background:
Were they aware that a genocide was taking place? Y  N
Did they hear rumors about genocide? Y  N

Were they politically active (military, resistance, Judenrat, etc.) before the war? Y  N

How So?

Did they practice their religious faith (remain kosher, practice Sabbath/Shabbat, etc)? Y  N

How So?

Did they attend a religious school, or Cheder? Y  N
Did they graduate from high (secondary) school? Y  N

What languages did they speak? ___________________________

What was the first ghetto they were in? ________________

What was the second ghetto they were in? ________________

Did they talk about, hear about, or participate in resistance in the ghetto? ________________

When were they transported to the first camp? __________

Is there anything else you’d like to make note of about this person’s life before the war?
**Prisoner Camp Coding Sheet**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name: __________________</th>
<th>Camp: ____________</th>
<th>Source: ________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Train Arrival: Y N</td>
<td>Arrival Date: <em><strong>/</strong></em>/___</td>
<td>Departure Date:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>/</strong><em>/</em>__</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td># of Prior Camps: ______</td>
<td>Time In Camp: ___</td>
<td>Arrive Death March? __</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Why Leave? ______________</td>
<td>Next Camp: __________</td>
<td>Comparison: Y N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Camp: Y N</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Arrival

| Describe Arrival: Y N       | Walk to Camp: Y N |
| Chaotic Arrival: Y N        | Selection: Y N |
| Gender Separation: Y N      | Possessions Taken Y N |
| Received Advice Y N         | Disinfected/Showered Y N |
| Shaved Y N                 | Tattooed Y N |
| Registered Y N              | Quarantine Length: ______ |
| Uniform Y N                 | __ Family Members Survived Selection |
| Quarantine Y N              | __ Family Members Survived Camp |
| Arrive with ____ Family Members |                   |

### Labor

| Describes Work Y N         | Work Steady Y N |
| Had Job Y N                |                 |

#### Occupation #1:

| War Factory Y N              | Apparatus Job Y N |
| Punishment Job Y N           | Beaten at Work Y N |
| Able to Sabotage Y N         | Able to Organize Y N |
| Status Job Y N               | Productive Job Y N |
| Sisyphean Job Y N            | Guard Oversight Y N |
| Known Rules Y N              | Guard Impeded Work Y N |

#### Occupation #2:

| War Factory Y N              | Apparatus Job Y N |
| Punishment Job Y N           | Beaten at Work Y N |
| Able to Sabotage Y N         | Able to Organize Y N |
| Status Job Y N               | Productive Job Y N |
| Sisyphean Job Y N            | Guard Oversight Y N |
| Known Rules Y N              | Guard Impeded Work Y N |

#### Occupation #3:

| War Factory Y N              | Apparatus Job Y N |
| Punishment Job Y N           | Beaten at Work Y N |
| Able to Sabotage Y N         | Able to Organize Y N |
| Status Job Y N               | Productive Job Y N |
| Sisyphean Job Y N            | Guard Oversight Y N |
| Known Rules Y N              | Guard Impeded Work Y N |

Anything else interesting/relevant about labor in the camp?

______________________________________________
### Structure

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe Structure</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crematoria?</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Death Camp | Y | N |

| Bunk #1: | Y | N |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bunk Organized:</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe Bunk Organization (Gender, Nationality, etc):</th>
<th>_______________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID Bunk Blockalteste:</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bunk #2: | Y | N |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bunk Organized:</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe Bunk Organization (Gender, Nationality, etc):</th>
<th>_______________________</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ID Bunk Blockalteste:</td>
<td>Y</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Contact Other Parts of Camp: | Y | N |

| S received no food (as punishment or other): | Y | N |
| S received a small ration | Y | N |
| S complained about quality/amount of food: | Y | N |
| S stated they received poisoned/rotten food: | Y | N |
| S stated they received contaminated/unhealthy water: | Y | N |
| S stated they lived in a clean camp/bunk: | Y | N |
| S stated they had lice: | Y | N |
| S stated they had typhus: | Y | N |
| S stated lice was bad in the camp: | Y | N |
| S stated typhus was bad in the camp: | Y | N |

| S mentions the presence of a hospital (Krakenbau, Revier, or Lazarett): | Y | N |
| S worked in hospital: | Y | N |
| S visited the hospital: | Y | N |
| S feared going to the hospital: | Y | N |
| S stated the hospital was helpful: | Y | N |

| Other Hospital Information: | _______________________ |

| Able to move between parts of the camp: | Y | N |

| Describe reasons for mobility: | _______________________ |

| Incidences of hiding from/changing identities in the camp (S or others): | Y | N |

| Describe hiding changing identities: | _______________________ |
| Multiple examples of hiding/changing identities: | Y | N |

| Size or demography of camp discussed: | Y | N |

| Describe size of camp: | _______________________ |
| Describe demography of camp: | _______________________ |

| Demographic conflict or animosity? | Y | N |
| Camp was overcrowded: | Y | N |

| Other Relevant/Interesting Structural Information? | _______________________ |
**Guards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>S discussed guards in the camp?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Kommandant:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kommandant’s Name:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified SS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Names:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Multiple SS:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SS Behavior: (&lt;#1&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#2&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#3&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#4&gt; 1/2/3/4/5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=showed kindness/helped pris., 3=ambivalent/mixed behavior, 5=sadistic/exceptional cruel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Non-SS Guard:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Demography:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Multiple Guards:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guard Behavior: (&lt;#1&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#2&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#3&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#4&gt; 1/2/3/4/5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=showed kindness/helped pris., 3=ambivalent/mixed behavior, 5=sadistic/exceptional cruel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Kapo:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapo Demography:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Multiple Kapos:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kapo Behavior: (&lt;#1&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#2&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#3&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#4&gt; 1/2/3/4/5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=showed kindness/helped pris., 3=ambivalent/mixed behavior, 5=sadistic/exceptional cruel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Blockalteste:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockalteste Demography:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Multiple Blktste:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Change Blockalteste:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blockalteste Behavior: (&lt;#1&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#2&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#3&gt; 1/2/3/4/5) (&lt;#4&gt; 1/2/3/4/5)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(1=showed kindness/helped pris., 3=ambivalent/mixed behavior, 5=sadistic/exceptional cruel)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identified Administrator:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrator’s Demog:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describes Interaction Amongst Guards:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe Interaction (help, harm, argue, etc):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other relevant/interesting information about the guards?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Rules**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Describes rules/expectations in the camp:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known Rules/Expectations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limits to Talking:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rules/Expectations that were Impossible to Fulfill:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orders/Expectations with no obvious correct behavior:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No rules in the camp:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Set camp schedule:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collective Responsibility Enforced:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roll Calls/Appells:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

180
Multiple Roll Calls/Appells per day:  
Other methods for keeping track of prisoners: 

Other relevant/interesting information about rules in the camps?

*Abuse*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dehumanizing treatment:</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cultural Abuse:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Learn Rules Through Abuse:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isolation from other prisoners:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Able to avoid beatings:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaten for unknown reasons:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Psychological Abuse:  
Moral Abuse:  
Sport (abuse for guard amusement):  
Beaten on a regular basis:  
Beaten for violating rules:  
Beaten for individual reasons:  

Other relevant/interesting information about abuse in the camps?

*Culture*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Describe culture in the camps:</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifies stratification in the camp:</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Describe Stratification (status, religion, nationality, etc):</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S identified cultural practices in the camps:  
Describe Cultural practices:  

Prisoners practiced religion:  
Prisoners told stories/sang songs:  
Guards were aware of cultural practices:  

Love/Dating among other prisoners:  
Other prisoners shared with one another:  
Other prisoners helped S survive:  
Other prisoners stole from one another:  
Other prisoners described as selfish:  
Non-guard prisoner-to-prisoner abuse:  

S trusted other prisoners:  
S had contact with elite prisoners:  
S engaged in love/dating in camp:  
S shared with other prisoners:  
S felt responsible for someone’s death:  
Black Market Activity in camp:  

S was culturally active:  
S had friends in the camp:  
S stole from other prisoners:  
S helped other prisoners:  
S engaged in taboo acts:  
Suicides in camp:  

Other relevant/interesting information about culture in the camp?

*Resistance*

“Organizing” described in the camp:  
Organized:  

Resistance in the camp:  

181
**Survivor engaged in:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contentious Speech:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping Others Escape:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance Group Membership:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday Resistance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaping/Escape Attempts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Resistance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Survivor knew of other prisoners engaged in:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contentious Speech:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helping Others Escape:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resistance Group Membership:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Everyday Resistance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Escaping/Escape Attempts:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organized Resistance:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Other relevant/interesting information about resistance in the camp:

______________________________