In Service of God and King: Conflicts between Bourbon Reformers and the Missionaries of Santa Rosa de Ocopa in Peru, 1709-1824

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Cameron David Jones

Graduate Program in History

The Ohio State University

2013

Dissertation Committee:

Stephanie J. Smith, Advisor
Kenneth J. Andrien, Co-advisor
Donna J. Guy
Abstract

This dissertation examines the evolving political, economic, and philosophical conflicts between the Franciscan missionaries based out of the College of Santa Rosa de Ocopa in Peru and the Spanish State between 1709 and 1824. The conflicts facing Ocopa were representative of a major pattern of clerical reform influenced by a new philosophy of regalism, which, inspired by the European Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason over tradition, aimed to centralize political power in the monarchical state. The Ocopa missionaries were not completely subservient agents of the government sent to exploit local labor forces to extract resources for Spain. Rather, they sought to create a spiritual utopia, as they imagined it, using State funds but being free from the Crown’s political agenda. Although Spanish regalists were pious Catholics, they sought to create a more national Church under Crown control, which involved curtailing the autonomy of religious orders like the Franciscans. The resulting tensions allowed Amerindian communities concentrated in the Ocopa missions to resist the missionaries’ cultural, political, and commercial impositions. What occurred in the missions, therefore, was a result of interactions among Franciscan missionaries, Crown officials, and indigenous peoples—each with its own discrete agenda. Untangling these competing agendas will help to reveal the dynamics of Spanish colonial aspirations along this crucial frontier zone in Peru during the Bourbon period (1700-1824).
To Carrie, Claire, and Suzy
Acknowledgments

First I would like to acknowledge and thank all the various organizations who during the seven years I have worked on this project have helped to fund my research. The U.S. Department of Education (through the Fulbright-Hays Doctoral Dissertation Research Abroad Program), the Academy of American Franciscan History, the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Tinker Foundation, the Office of International Affairs (OIA) at the Ohio State University (OSU), and the OSU Department of History all helped me arrive at the various far-flung archives I had to visit as well as not letting me starve in the process. I would especially like to thank Joanna Kikielka-Blaser at the OIA who guided me through perils of the Fulbright-Hays experience.

During my time abroad I encounter many scholars who advised and help me get around Spain and Peru. In Spain Luis Miguel Glave and José Hernández Palomo served as my guides and gave me invaluable advice. In Peru I would have been lost without the help of professors Claudia Rosas, Margarita Suárez, and José de la Puente. I am particularly grateful to Father Jorge Cajo, O.F.M., who as the current guardian of Ocopa gave me unprecedented access to the monastery and its records. Two institutions so graciously allowed me to affiliate with them, the Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos in Seville, Spain and the Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú in Lima.
Also I would like to thank my fellow traveling graduate students Elizabeth Montañez and Javier Puente, who helped me to navigate the intricacies of academia abroad.

At OSU several graduate students have given me invaluable feedback and moral support during this project: Danielle Anthony, Spencer Tyce, Beau Brammer, James Weeks, Jessica Wallace, Melissah Pawlikowski, Daniel Watkins, Joseph Wachtel, Daniel Vandersommers, and Frank Blazich. I would especially like to thank Steven Hyland, my academic big brother and sounding board for all my crazy ideas, as well as James Bach, the graduate studies coordinator and the other person who listened to my insanities.

Many professors during my graduate program have helped to make this dissertation a reality. Alan Gallay not only served on my doctoral candidacy committee but was an outside voice of reason in the formation of this project. Joseph Miller who during his short time here and throughout our correspondences has helped me to shape this project in ways that I did not think possible. Geoffrey Parker not only has served as my teacher of both the science and art of writing history, but has been a consummate mentor and friend. Donna Guy provided sage advice and gentle prodding that pushed this project and me to strive to always be better. Stephanie Smith, who has guided me throughout my graduate career, but especially this last, difficult year, has made me be a more careful and conscientious teacher and scholar. Finally, I am grateful to Kenneth Andrien, who advised me during these seven long years. I cannot thank him enough for his wisdom and reassurance during my entire graduate experience. This dissertation is as much a product of his skillful advising as it is my own hard work.
Last, I owe a deep debt of gratitude to my family. My parents Ernest and Julie Jones provided a loving home where learning and the thirst for knowledge were always highly prized. I am grateful to my siblings Alison Sweetnam, Matthew Jones, Timothy Jones, Melinda Kunz, and Christian Jones, who put up with their annoying little brother. Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Carrie, and my two beautiful daughters, Claire and Suzy. My daughters with their joy and love for life inspire me every day. And Carrie who stood by side during the long ordeal of graduate school, learned a new language, and lived (and even had a baby) in foreign lands. I cannot begin to thank her. This doctorate is as much hers as it is mine.
Vita

June 2000 .............................................. San Luis Obispo High School

2006 ..................................................... B.A. History, Brigham Young University

2009 ..................................................... M.A. History, The Ohio State University

2006 to present ......................................... Graduate Teaching Associate, Department of History, The Ohio State University

Fields of Study

Major Field:  History
## Table of Contents

Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii  

Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ iv  

Vita .................................................................................................................................. vii  

List of Tables .................................................................................................................... ix  

List of Figures .................................................................................................................. x  

Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 1  

Chapter 1: The Birth of Ocopa ....................................................................................... 16  

Chapter 2: Rebellion, Religion, and Regalism ............................................................... 70  

Chapter 3: In the Aftermath of Rebellion ..................................................................... 125  

Chapter 4: “In Service of Both Majesties” ................................................................. 169  

Chapter 5: From Apogee to Collapse ......................................................................... 230  

Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 276  

Bibliography ................................................................................................................... 282
List of Tables

Table 1 - Payment of annual stipend to the Ocopa missionaries 1724-1745 ..................54
Table 2 – Payments to the Ocopa missionaries during Manso de Velasco’s term ..........144
Table 3 - “Plan de los contribuciones anuales, y limosnas… en este Reino del Perú”. ..174
Table 4 - Royal Treasure Payments to Ocopa 1762-1787 .....................................176
Table 5 - Peninsular missionaries who travelled to Ocopa, 1761-1787 .......................181
List of Figures

Figure 1 – “Descripción Geografía de las Montaña de los Andes”. .......................... 22
Figure 2 - Population Change in Four Tarma Missions, 1722-1739 .......................... 63
Figure 3 - Baptisms and Burials in Eneno, 1732-1742 ........................................... 64
Figure 4 - Baptisms in Pozuzu, 1736-1786. ............................................................. 64
Figure 5 - Map of the Ocopa Missions ................................................................. 83
Figure 6 - Lima con sus contornos ........................................................................ 115
Figure 7 - “Mapa de los Mártires de Santa Rosa de Ocopa” ................................. 136
Figure 8 - Finances after the Earthquake/Tsunami of 1746. ................................. 147
Figure 9 - Government Expenditures for the Rebuilding of Lima ......................... 149
Figure 10 - The College of Santa Rosa de Ocopa, 2011 ........................................ 179
Figure 11 - Ocopa’s missionary zones in Peru ...................................................... 187
Figure 12 - The Archipelago of Chiloé in respects to Lima and Ocopa ................. 194
Figure 13 – Ocopa’s Seals ..................................................................................... 219
Figure 14 - Plan del Curso de los Ríos Huallaga y Vcayali ............................... 240
Figure 15 - Viceroyalty of Peru in 1810 ............................................................... 256
Figure 16 - Selection Results for the Cámara de Indies ..................................... 259
Introduction

Frontier missions were a critical component of Spain’s imperial enterprise in the eighteenth-century Atlantic World. These missions mediated between the Crown’s desire to exploit the wealth of the indigenous peoples and the Amerindians’ desire for autonomy. In previous centuries, these frontier areas had served principally as buffer zones between areas of Hispanic cultural diffusion and hegemony and the sparsely populated hinterland beyond. They were a stage for conflicts between semi-sedentary Amerindian groups and the Catholic missionaries who attempted to convert them and control them in networks of mission villages. By the seventeenth century many areas in the borderlands had reached an equilibrium because religious institutions lacked the resources to force more resistant ethnic groups onto their missions. The absence of a large, exploitable pool of laborers or substantial mineral deposits made Crown officials and merchants unwilling to invest in further expansions into the hinterland. By the eighteenth century this paradigm began to shift as other European powers exerted their influence in the Atlantic World. Spanish officials became more interested in developing the frontier not just commercially, but as a buffer zone against foreign intrusion into territory which they claimed, bringing them into contact with Amerindian groups who had been spared the initial burdens of Spanish colonization.
Into this new milieu came the missionaries of Santa Rosa de Ocopa. In 1709 a reform movement within the Franciscan Order, called the Apostolic Institute, sent half a dozen missionaries to Peru to strengthen and expand evangelization into the eastern tropical forestlands. The Institute had been founded two decades earlier in reaction to the perceived stagnation in the frontiers of Spanish America during the seventeenth century. They argued that the lack of momentum in evangelizing Spanish frontiers in America was due to a dearth of missionary zeal, not just a shortage of resources. In part they were right. Many large religious institutions, colleges, convents, and monasteries, were focused on local concerns, drawing most of their recruits and funding from the communities in the surrounding area and in turn serving the local populous and their interests. The Apostolic Institute therefore used Crown funds and attempted to draw the most zealous recruits directly from Spain to go out into the borderlands. The Institute indeed met with modest success in northern Mexico, Central America, northern South America, as well as Peru. The Franciscans’ program for the revitalization of their missionary enterprise, however, paralleled a series of reforms undertaken by the Crown that attempted to better fulfill their aspirations for dominance in the Americas. These have become known as the Bourbon Reforms, and though seemingly in harmony with the Apostolic Institute’s own desires, worked in many ways to thwart them.

*The Bourbon Reforms and Ocopa*

With the ascension of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne at the beginning of the eighteenth century, royal ministers looked for ways to renovate the ailing Spanish
economy and regain Spain’s predominate position in world politics. Inspired by the emerging European Enlightenment, particularly its emphasis on reason over tradition, these ministers attempted to move away from the inefficiencies of the consensus-driven, composite monarchy of their predecessors, the Habsburgs. Instead they adopted a new philosophy of regalism that championed the supreme authority of the monarch in all matters of state. These ministers, therefore, believed that political power in the Spanish empire should be centered in the monarchy rather than shared with other traditionally powerful institutions, such as the nobility or the Church.¹

In order to implement this regalist vision, royal ministers attempted to wrest power away from any institution that rivaled Crown authority. Of particular interest to

¹ Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 57 – 58. There has been much debate about when exactly the Bourbon Reforms start in Spanish America. John Fisher uses 1750 as the starting point to his masterful work, Bourbon Peru. He argues inconsistencies of early reform made any real impact on Peru impossible during the first half of the eighteenth century. John Elliott in Empires of the Atlantic World: Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830 contends that the Americas were largely unaffected by the Bourbon Reforms until after the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763). He posits that despite the creation of the new viceroyalty of New Granada in 1717 and then permanently in 1739, that commitments in Europe made it impossible to impose reform in their American possessions. While this argument allows Elliott to make a more direct connection between reforms in Spanish and British America after the Seven Years’ War, it belies the fact that reforms began after the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1713). More recent scholarship has begun to discuss the extent to which the Bourbon State began to enact reform in Americas prior to the Seven Years’ War. In Shaky Colonialism: The 1746 Earthquake-Tsunami in Lima, Peru, and Its Long Aftermath, Charles Walker argues that to Bourbon reformist ministers the 1746 Lima Earthquake/Tsunami exposed the baroque backwardness of the city. This realization inspired Bourbon officials both in Spain and Peru to enact a series of reforms to create a more modern enlightened city. Walker, however, stops shorts at calling this the beginning of the Bourbon reforms. He instead argues that while these policies foreshadowed later reform, that they in themselves had little lasting effect on Peru. Probably the most promising work on the Early Bourbon reforms to date is Adrian Pearce’s 1998 dissertation, “Early Bourbon government in the viceroyalty of Peru, 1700-1759.” Pearce argues that the early Bourbon period is the foundation of the later reforms in the Americas. He notes that all the major administrative structures necessary for later reform were created during the early Bourbon period such as the Secretariat of the Indies and that the Crown attempted financial, mining, military, and ecclesiastical reforms with the colonies themselves. While like Walker, Pearce believes that early Bourbon reforms were intermittent, he argues that they “followed a consistent, enlightened agenda” (Abstract). Like Pearce’s work suggests, this dissertation will start with the initial ascent of the Bourbon dynasty in Spain in 1700 in evaluating the entire scope of the reforms. It will argue that aspects of both the early and late reform periods followed the same inconsistent pattern with implementation dependent on the efforts of individuals and interested parties at given specific moments.
Bourbon reformers was the regular clergy. Regular clergy are men and women who follow a particular religious rule or *regula*. In the Americas these were mostly Franciscans, Mercedarians, Augustinians, Dominicans, and Jesuits. As early as the reign of Philip II (1556-1598) in the late sixteenth century, the influence of the regular clergy had impeded Crown efforts to extend royal power over the Church in the Americas. The *Patronato Real*, or Royal Patronage, allowed the Catholic Kings of Spain to nominate candidates for bishops within its territories and to control the tithe. This gave the Crown great influence over secular (meaning non-regular) clerics. As Spain began the “spiritual conquest” of the Americas, however, large numbers of regular clerics traveled to the Americas. Regular orders, with their zeal, internal organization, and discipline contributed much to early colonization efforts. Consequently, the Crown allowed the regular clergy to fulfill many of the duties normally reserved for the secular clergy, such as operating rural Amerindian parishes. While the regular clergy brought many to the faith, their presence created a particular dilemma for the monarchy. Except in pastoral matters, regular religious orders were supranational organizations, whose members answered not to local bishops but to their own leaders in Rome. These leaders, in turn, were ultimately accountable to the Pope. Furthermore, for those clergy who ministered in far-away Spanish America, even Rome’s authority was limited. Long distances made effective coordination difficult and left local provincial leaders with considerable autonomy. As Bourbon government ministers began to advance regalist policies in the

---

eighteenth century, the conflict over the king’s inability to control the regular clergy in the Americas escalated. One of the more extreme regalist minister quipped in 1765, “from the moment they [took] vows, [regular clergy] should be looked upon as foreigners.”

Regular clergy were not just a threat to royal authority, reformers argued, but were detrimental to the economy of the Spanish empire. Over the centuries, devout Catholics had donated money and large tracts of land to clergy in both Spain and the Americas. Convents and monasteries used these resources to maintain themselves. During the eighteenth century, however, royal officials began to believe that the Church’s hold on these vast resources adversely affected commerce throughout the empire. They argued that if Church property could be put in the hands of commercial interests, it would be used more efficiently and create tax revenue. Though the Spanish Crown already received a percentage of Church tithes, many in the royal government saw greater potential revenue in the sale of Church property. Some ministers even began to argue that monastic life removed too many individuals from the workforce, thereby damaging the economy. While convents and monasteries labored to worship god, they did not, ministers argued, help to further industry within the empire. Moreover, because of their vows of celibacy, regular clergy had no children, and thus reduced the workforce of the next generation.

---

5 Marchese Grimaldi in a 1765 letter to Benardo Tanucci as cited in Paquette, Enlightenment, Governance, and Reform, 74.
6 Ibid., 67 – 70.
7 Ibid., 64.
While these reforms were intended to weaken the political power of the Church, most reformers did not see their actions as anti-clerical or anti-religious. They understood that the clergy was an integral part of the Spanish empire. As the influential Italian regalist Ludovico Antonio Muratori stated in 1749, the state would be strong if “perfect and constant harmony [existed] between the Sacerdocio (clergy) and the Imperio (state)” and if “both [strove] together to deliver the people spiritual and temporal happiness.”

Many royal ministers engaged in reform therefore believed that by removing clerics from political power, they would allowing the clergy to focus on their principal duty, saving people’s souls.

Ocopa therefore presented a difficult case to those in government trying to enact reform. On the one hand, for reformers they were ideal clerics. They were disciplined peninsulars who did not try to stunt productivity or soak up capital by maintaining large urban monasteries. Instead they went out into the frontier to expand Spanish dominance through evangelization and potentially opening up new lucrative markets. On the other hand, they became a powerful institution with influence locally, regionally, and across the Atlantic. Reformers therefore struggled to decide how to approach the Ocopa missionaries, whether to curtail their rising influence or aid them in their endeavors. Not surprisingly over its 115-year colonial history, Ocopa experienced often ambivalent treatment from reformist royal ministers.

These shifting and contradictory stances toward Ocopa demonstrate the importance of individuals and small groups both within and without the Spanish

---

8 Ibid., 57.
bureaucracy in creating the changes experienced in Spanish territories throughout the Bourbon period (1700-1824). Their interactions with the Crown exposed many of the fissures between interested groups within the Spanish bureaucracy. Ocopa’s history demonstrates how both the terms and implementation of the so-called Bourbon Reforms were negotiated at all levels of society among the Amerindians and enslaved Africans in the missions, the missionaries themselves, local government officials in and around the College of Ocopa and its missions, the viceregal seat in Lima, and the court in Madrid. Indeed while these historical actors were indelibly influenced by ideas circulating around the Atlantic World, such as the Enlightenment, it was individuals’ interpretations of those ideas which drove the various interested parties that ultimately decided how events in the missions and throughout the Spanish Atlantic would unfold.

**Historiography and Theoretical Framework**

Even during the colonial period, the Ocopa missionaries obsessely wrote their own history. In most cases these histories were persuasive devices designed to extract concessions of funds and land from the Crown. Foremost among these was a chronicle written in the 1770’s by José Amich, entitled *Compendio Histórico de las conversiones de estas montañas de Perú* (Historical compendium of the conversions of these jungles of Peru). As would be expected, *Compendio Histórico* painted the missionaries of Ocopa as pious emissaries sent to bring the word of God to the “infidels” of the eastern Peruvian jungle. The work downplayed any deleterious effects of any actual reforms emanating from Madrid, but was critical of several colonial officials’ actions regarding the
missionaries, particularly the failure of Peruvian viceroy to provide money and material promised to Ocopa by the Crown. Amich’s account became the basis for most of the later works on the College by Franciscan historians. It was expanded in the early twentieth century by Ocopa missionaries Fernando Pallarés and Vicente Calvo to include a narrative the history of the institution up until 1907. Even until the 1920’s historians relied almost completely on Amich’s account. Bernardino Izaguirre’s 1929 *Historia de las misiones franciscanas* (History of the Franciscan Missions) quotes Amich extensively. Izaguirre, however, was the first historian to take into consideration important regional events, particularly the 1746 Lima Earthquake/Tsunami when evaluating Crown officials’ relationship with Ocopa.

A significant change occurred in the historiography of Ocopa with the rise of *Indigenismo*, a revisionist movement in the 1920’s and 1930’s that attempted to glorify Peru’s indigenous past. With this movement most works began to focus not on missionaries’ pious works as the Franciscan histories had, but the struggles of the Amerindians who lived in the missions. In particular historians turned to the most remarkable event of Ocopa’s history, the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion. In 1942 José Loayza published a collection of documents relating to the rebellion entitled *Juan Santos, el invincible*. In the introduction and footnotes to the volume Loayza characterized the Ocopa Missionaries as simply appendages of the State, who blindly adhered to the Spanish colonial project. This conflation of all Spaniards into one homogeneous group

---

9 The chronicle in its entirety written by Amich, Pallarés and Calvo is found in a volume edited by Julián Héras, O.F.M. entitled *Historia de las misiones del convento de Santa Rosa de Ocopa* published in 1988.
11 Loayza, ed. *Juan Santos*, (abbreviated throughout the text as JSEI).
was important to his overall nationalist commentary of the documents, since Loayza contended that the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion was a “precursor” to the Creole-led independence movement of the 1820’s. Steve Stern’s 1987 article, “The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742 – 1782: a Reprisal” more correctly places Juan Santos in its larger context of Amerindian-led, anti-colonial revolts of the late Bourbon period, but his attempt to construct a Marxist dialectic between oppressors and the oppressed still tends to ignore the nuances in the missionaries’ position within the colonial regime.\(^\text{12}\)

Probably the most comprehensive work on the Ocopa missions to date, Jay Lehnertz’s 1974 dissertation “Lands of the Infidels: The Franciscans in the Central Montaña of Peru, 1709 – 1824,” again tends to ignore the larger trans-Atlantic implication of Ocopa’s missionary enterprise. Instead as an ethnohistory it attempts to uncover the history of the jungle Amerindian nations with whom the missionaries interacted. While Lehnertz’s last chapter is devoted to the missionaries themselves, the narrative is mostly limited to internal or regional matters.\(^\text{13}\)

Like Lehnertz, the field of Mission History over the last few decades has tended toward the ethnohistorical approach. These scholars reacted against earlier mission histories like those of Pallarés, Calvo, and Izaquirre, which were generally triumphal Euro-centric accounts authored principally by the clergy themselves, by emphasizing the indigenous inhabitants’ reactions to Spanish attempts at domination. Emerging in the 1990’s the so-called ‘New Mission History’ produced scholars who provided invaluable

---


\(^{13}\) Lehnertz’s “Lands of the Infidels” was a Ph.D. dissertation at University of Wisconsin-Madison completed in 1974 under John Leddy Phelan.
ethno-historical information about the Amerindians in the frontiers of the Spanish empire. In their difficult quest to uncover information on previously unstudied, undocumented ethnic groups, however, they often have given insufficient attention to the missionaries who interacted with them.\textsuperscript{14}

This dissertation seeks to place the Ocopa missions in an Atlantic context using a conceptualization pioneered by African historian Joseph C. Miller. Miller argues that the Atlantic World should not be conceived as a few discrete hierarchical empires managed effectively by European monarchies even in the context of central, semi-peripheral, or peripheral regions. Instead, the Atlantic World should be seen as numerous smaller autonomous communities engaged in multiple, mutually reconstituting encounters, which allowed them to find new places in emerging cultural contexts of their own creation. Therefore, while no one group could completely drive the course of events, every group held enough political, economic and cultural influence to inhibit autonomous initiatives of the others, while pursuing its own discreet agenda.\textsuperscript{15}

The missionaries of Ocopa, therefore, were one of many groups in the crucible of the Atlantic World vying for political and economic power and autonomy. Though most were peninsular Spaniards, they did not function simply as agents of the government sent

\textsuperscript{14} For probably the best examples of “New Mission History” see Cynthia Radding’s \textit{Wandering peoples: colonialism, ethnic spaces, and ecological frontiers in northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850} and Susan Deeds’ \textit{Defiance and deference in Mexico’s colonial north: Indians under Spanish rule in Nueva Vizcaya}. One of the few exceptions to recent mission histories’ narrow focus on the Amerindian inhabitants of the missions rather than the missionaries in larger global context is Erick Langer’s 2009 monograph \textit{Expecting Pearls from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830-1949}. In it he demonstrates how political shifts between liberal and conservative governments in nineteenth-century Bolivia shaped the cultural, political, and commercial interactions between missionaries and Amerindians.

\textsuperscript{15} Miller, “Retention, Re-Invention, and Remembering” and \textit{Way of Death}. 

10
to extract local resources or manpower for Spain, but had their own spiritual and temporal objectives. They wanted to create a spiritual utopia, as they envisioned it, sustained with State funds but free from Crown interference. Crown officials, however, had other objectives. In the eighteenth century, these included the consolidation of royal authority and an increase in revenue. This vision was made even more complicated by fissures within Ocopa and the Spanish bureaucracy, as smaller factions of ministers and missionaries alike acted upon and enacted policies differently, according to their individual interpretations of regalism and the Enlightenment. In addition, indigenous ethnic groups and enslaved Africans residing in the missions reacted diversely to the historical processes happening around them and exerted their own influence on events. What happened in the missions was the result of the interactions between the different participants, each with its own discrete agenda. This complex negotiation of political power and cultural space dominated all interactions in the Atlantic world. The narrative of the Atlantic World, therefore, cannot be summarized in terms of European interests in conflict with indigenous peoples, or competition between different European empires, but in a complex series of compromises among various and sometimes mixed groups of Africans, Europeans, and Amerindians.

Chapters

This dissertation is divided in the five principal chapters. Chapter one examines the first three decades of the Apostolic Institute’s presence in Peru. In addition to looking at the establishment of the missionaries’ permanent base at Ocopa, it tracks the rapid
instillation of two dozen mission stations in the Jauja, Tarma, Huánuco frontiers. As part of this narrative, chapter one will delve briefly into ethnohistory to illuminate missionaries’ difficulties with “converting” the local populous. It will explore the friars’ initial attempts to culturally assimilate the Amerindians into mission life and how and why these ethnic groups resisted their efforts, sometimes violently. At the same time it will look at Ocopa’s emerging relationship with the Spanish colonial bureaucracy at its various levels. While Ocopa initially received promises of funding from the Crown, as the chapter discusses, a series of increasingly regalist viceroys refused to fund them consistently. The ultimate goal of the chapter is to show how these early failures to aid Ocopa’s evangelization effort, combined with indigenous resistance to the missionaries’ political, economic, and cultural impositions, led to instability in the missions, which was easily exploited by Juan Santos Atahualpa leading up to the rebellion in 1742.

Chapter two focuses on the events surrounding the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion. Specifically, it examines how the viceregal government ultimately failed to support Ocopa against the rebels. The first part of the chapter looks at why different and sometimes competing groups of jungle Amerindians chose to join Juan Santos, a mestizo from the Andean highlands, against the missionaries. It narrates the initial expulsion and murder of the Ocopa friars and the unsuccessful attempt by local militia to end the rebellion quickly. The chapter then looks at the larger geopolitical context of the rebellion examining how the earthquake/tsunami of Lima ultimately shaped the viceroy’s decision to abandon attempts to dislodge Juan Santos from Ocopa’s missions. At the same time chapter two uncovers the role that Ocopa’s support for one their former missionaries,
Friar Calixto, played in kindling the viceroy’s animosity toward the College. It ultimately argues that viceroy ordered advances against Juan Santos abandoned, not just because of strategic concerns, but also to limit the regional and trans-Atlantic influence of Ocopa, which he saw as a threat to royal authority.

Chapter three is in many respects a continuation of Chapter two as it examines the aftermath of the viceroy’s decision to cede most of Ocopa’s missions to the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebels. The first part of the chapter looks at Ocopa’s lobbying campaign in Madrid to force the viceregal government to commit enough supplies and manpower to expel Juan Santos. The missionaries’ reputation for piety and obedience convinced Crown officials to grant Ocopa essentially all its demands. As this chapter explains the viceroy refused to honor the Crown’s decree, remaining intransigent on the Juan Santos question, and instead halved the missionaries’ stipend. This in part was motivated by the missionaries continued support for Friar Calixto, whom the viceroy had arrested and forcibly removed to Spain for his alleged complicity in fomenting indigenous unrest against the government. Ultimately the viceregal government relented on the issue of the College’s annual stipend, but continued to hold Spanish forces in a defensive position along the frontier. As the chapter concludes, it examines how the rebellion affected the missionaries’ stance toward the viceregal government and Crown officials in general. Instead of remaining obstinate to viceregal efforts to curtail their autonomy, in reaction to these events, Ocopa began the process of gradually ceding control of their operations to Crown authorities, and particularly the viceroy, in exchange for increased material support.
Chapter four explores the resurgence of Ocopa after the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion. The relatively more pro-Franciscan atmosphere, caused in part by the ascension of Charles III to the throne, gave Ocopa enough money and resources from the Crown to restart in earnest their evangelization efforts in the Peruvian Amazon. As the chapter narrates, they were aided even more when after the expulsion of the Jesuits, Ocopa received territory and property formally controlled by the Society. This increased largess from the Crown came at a cost, as royal ministers pressed for greater control over Ocopa’s missionary enterprise. The extent to which the Crown, and in particular viceregal authorities, had control over Ocopa became intensely debated among the friars themselves. The chapter ends with the violent takeover of the College by the viceregal government in coordination with a faction in Ocopa known as the Aragonese party.

Chapter five explores Ocopa’s history during the last three and half decades of Spanish colonial rule in Peru. In many ways this period can be seen as the apogee of Ocopa’s missionary enterprise under the control of the Aragonese faction. It narrates how Ocopa’s new leadership purged any dissenters who opposed the leaders’ more regalist stance. These new leaders also more fervently began to incorporate many of the economic and political principles behind the Bourbon reforms in their evangelization efforts. This new emphasis was in part an outcome of the new leaders’ philosophical beliefs but was also obviously to please Crown officials, who exercised more and more authority over the College. The new propaganda worked and Ocopa was granted its largest concession from the Crown to date, almost complete pastoral control over the newly created diocese of Maynas. Their success, however, was hollow, as
miscommunication and incompetence in the Spanish bureaucracy led to confusion and
dissention in the new diocese. The French invasion of Spain and the wars of
independence ultimately sealed Ocopa’s fate. As the Chapter argues, Ocopa’s close
identification with the Spanish Crown and the large number of peninsular missionaries
made it impossible for the community to survive the process of independence. After
chapter five a short conclusion will explore the nature of clerical Bourbon reforms during
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The goal of this section will be to suggest
further implications for Ocopa’s history in understanding the processes that shaped the
Atlantic world as a whole.
Chapter 1: The Birth of Ocopa

The Apostolic Missionaries (later based out of Santa Rosa de Ocopa) who came to Peru in 1709 struggled to carve out a series of mission stations in the Peruvian high jungle. Part of a reform movement within the Franciscan order started in Mexico just a few decades earlier, the reformers aimed to refocus the efforts of the Order on the evangelization of the vast frontiers of Spain’s overseas possessions. Entering the high jungle east of the highland provincial capital of Tarma, they overcame deep canyons, fast flowing rivers, and near impassable terrain to penetrate a region that had yet to sustain permanent missionary operations. Filled with pious zeal, the missionaries employed every method, both persuasive and coercive, to attract a reluctant native population to their missions. These included attempts to control not just commerce but agricultural production as well. These impositions combined with disease led to demographic decline throughout the missionary enterprise which thwarted Ocopa’s efforts to build religious communities.

Such a large undertaking required money, which the mendicant Franciscans could not gather from alms alone, and instead turned to the Crown for funding. While the Crown, impressed by the discipline and dedication of the missionaries as well as their Peninsular status, generously granted concessions of both money and resources, viceregal authorities, influenced by the rising regalist sentiment in the empire, ignored Crown
mandates to support the missionaries. This viceregal neglect provided a space for indigenous resistance. Under cultural and commercial pressures created by the missionaries and the diseases that came with them, the jungle Amerindians took advantage of the weakness created by viceregal government’s lack of support and ultimately rebelled against the missionaries.

*The Rise of the Apostolic Institute in Mexico and its arrival in Peru*

While the Catholic Church had a long tradition of missionary work, two events that occurred within a few decades of each other created new urgency for more effective evangelization: the discovery of the Americas in 1492 and the Protestant Reformation starting in 1517. In Europe, the Council of Trent (1545-1563) attempted to reform the church from within in order to counter the spread of Protestantism, but conflicts among and between Protestant and Catholic nations as well as the conflict between the Catholic secular and regular clergies led to more than a century of losing adherents to “heretical” faiths. To counter these losses in 1622 Pope Gregory XV created the *Sacra Congregatio de Propaganda Fide* (Sacred Congregation of the Propagation of the Faith) to help coordinate Catholic missionary efforts throughout the world. The *Congregatio* was influential in helping reconvert large populations throughout the Europe, particularly Eastern Europe, but it dealt also with missionary efforts in Africa and Asia. Almost immediately after its conception the *Congregatio* began to establish Colleges *de Propaganda Fide*, the first being established in Rome in 1628, in order to train missionaries more effectively. In the Iberian Peninsula the burden of erecting such
institutions was taken up mostly by Franciscans and in Spain the Order built nine colleges before 1700.16

In the Americas, while evangelization had been an essential tool in Spanish colonization, royal patronage had prevented the Congregatio from taking control of missionary efforts after 1622 as it had done virtually everywhere else on the globe.17 While the regular religious orders, which were at least in theory directed from Rome, remained at the core of missionary ranks in the New World, the Crown jealously blocked the Congregatio for fear that it would weaken the power of the Royal Patronage by letting a foreign institution make decisions about American affairs without Spain’s approval. By the late seventeenth century, however, stagnation in missionary efforts throughout the Spanish empire caused a growing concern among many in the Spanish church to believe that resources of the Congregatio could help to revitalize missionary efforts in the peripheries of the Spanish empire. These concerns came to a head in 1682 when Friar Antonio Llinas, a native of Mallorca with more than twenty years of missionary experience in Mexico, presented to the Crown the idea of founding a series of colleges de Propaganda Fide in Spanish overseas territories under the auspices of the Franciscan order. This new “Apostolic Institute” would function in conjunction with the Congregatio in Rome but be under the Orders’ general leadership within the Spanish empire. They would also be manned by Peninsular Spanish Friars. The council and the king approved the measure. On the 7th of April 1682 Pope Innocent XI issued a papal bull forming the

16 Saiz, Los Colegios de Propaganda Fide, 27-38.
17 The Royal Patronage (Patronato Real) was a series of concessions made by Papacy to the Spanish Crown starting in late fifteenth century granting the monarchy sweeping powers over the Spanish Church, particularly in the New World. Under the patronage for example the Crown collected tithes and had control over major clerical appointments such as Bishops.
Apostolic Institute, and on August 15th of the next year, the monastery of Querétero in Mexico became the first College *de Propaganda Fide* in the Americas. Before 1700 the Institute established three more Colleges in Mexico.18

Colleges *de Propaganda Fide* in America functioned in many ways outside of the normal Franciscan leadership structure. Once a monastery received the status *de Propaganda Fide*, they were no longer accountable to the local Franciscan province in which they resided. Only the Commissary-General of the Indies who resided in Spain had complete jurisdiction over the Colleges.19 Even before the Apostolic Institute could establish a College in particular region, the Commissary-General selected a special “Commissary of the Missions” to direct missionary endeavors. These Commissaries of Missions rarely sought the direction of provincial leadership, and at least in Peru, a general animosity festered between the provinces and the Apostolic Institute.20 The make-up of the Institute also caused conflicts. While the Franciscan province in Peru, for example, consisted of almost 80% creoles by the eighteen century, the Institute recruited almost exclusively from the colleges *de Propaganda Fide* already established or founded for this purpose in Spain. From 1709 to 1823 74% of the missionaries that served in Ocopa were peninsulares. These friars had studied theology at the colleges in Spain for at least two years before they were deemed worthy for American missionary service.21

19 The Commissary-generals in New Spain and Peru also could intervene in the affairs of the colleges, but these offices were abolished in 1768: Saiz, *Los Colegios de Propaganda Fide*, 39-53, 176.
20 This is evident in the conflicts over the elevation of Ocopa to a College in Peru: Rodríguez Tena, *Crónica de la Misiones Franciscanas*, 220-223.
Funding the missions also presented the Institute with particular challenges. As mendicants, Franciscans depended on the alms of the faithful to maintain their ministry. These at times included rents from property and businesses donated to the friars by local adherents. In establishing a brand new religious community dedicated to preaching to regions not yet or nominally converted to Catholicism meant that the Institute could not depend solely on these traditional sources of income. Most Colleges depended on some form of state funding, not just for the transport of Peninsular missionaries from Spain to the Americas but for their day-to-day maintenance. The colleges, therefore, despite their relationship with the Congregatio in Rome, were extremely reliant on the Spanish Crown.22

In 1708 Friar Francisco de San Joseph brought the Apostolic Institute to Peru. Francisco de San Joseph, born Melchor Francisco Jiménez in 1654 in the Spanish village of Mondéjar near Toledo, served six years as a soldier in the Spanish Army in Flanders as a young man. While it unknown whether he saw action, Spain’s involvement in the Franco-Dutch War (1672-1678) during roughly the same time period that he was in Flanders, suggests the possibility. Upon returning to Spain young Melchior found his vocation, taking the habit as a Franciscan in the monastery of San Julián near Burgos and renaming himself Francisco de San Joseph. In 1692 at the age of 38, San Joseph sailed to Mexico in the service of the Apostolic Institute. He stayed two years at Querétaro before leaving for Guatemala City, where he aided in establishing of a community of missionaries that later became a College de Propaganda Fide. San Joseph only stayed in

22 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 12-ii-1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808. A similar pattern of funding developed for the College of Chillán in Chile.
Guatemala City a few months before he left to proselytize among the ‘infidel’ nations of
the Urinamas, Chaguenes, and Terrabas in modern day Costa Rica. In 1708 Friar
Francisco Esteves, Commissary of *Proganda Fide* missions in the Americas, made San
Joseph vice-Commissary of missions and sent him to Lima with six other missionaries to
extend the Apostolic Institute into Peru. Once in Peru the missionaries traveled in the
central sierra near Huamanga (modern-day Ayacucho) for a year, preaching to the local
population. It was during these travels that the missionaries learned about several
abandoned missions in the high jungle east of Tarma. In 1709 the intrepid group entered
the high jungle through Chachamayo river valley and established two small mission
reductions at Quimiri and Cerro de la Sal (see Figure 1, 1 and 3). 23

*The Challenges of the First Mission Stations*

The region in which Francisco de San Joseph and his companions entered
was considered at the time one the most inhospitable region of the Americas. A viceroy
in the mid-eighteenth century described the region as a “vegetated hell.”24 The eastern
arm of the Andes mountain range made access to the region extremely difficult. Only
where relatively large rivers transected this rocky curtain wall could the missionaries
enter. These river valleys were commonly referred to as “*entradas,*” or entrances, and
were generally named for the closest provincial capital. As time went on these *entradas*

---

23 This was taken from a biography by Friars Fernando Pallares and Vicente Calvo that was included in
1870 version of José Amich’s writings entitled *Noticias históricas de las misiones de fieles e infieles del*
*Colegio de Propaganda Fide de Santa Rosa de Ocopa.* It was also included in the most recent edition of
Amich’s work edited by Julián Heras, *Historia de Misiones,* 27-35. While the source of the information is
unknown, many of the details coincide with Amich’s own account as well as letters from Francisco de San
Joseph himself found in the AGI, Lima 536 and 537.
24 José de Armendariz, Relación que hizo de su Gobierno, BNE, mss. 3109, 77r.
22

became synonymous with the missionary zones that were accessed through them and consequently many colonial writers alternatively refer to them by the name of the most important mission in the region. Though both in the modern and colonial vernacular, Peruvians (as well Spanish officials) used the word “montaña” or mountain to describe the eastern jungle region of Peru, where plains of dense tropical forest dominate the landscape. Only the regions closest to the Andes are marked by a mountainous terrain. This ceja de selva, or eyebrow of the jungle, as it is commonly known, is probably one the most impassable geographic areas in South America, since not only did its verticality make its rivers unnavigable but the high jungle supported extensive plant ground cover which caused it to be nearly impassable. Its proximity to the highlands, however, made it the site for the most missionary work in the jungle during the eighteenth century.

If the terrain of the region was not enough to dissuade the missionaries from entering the montaña, the oppressively hot climate and hazardous animal life presented more difficult challenges. Day-time temperatures in the region hover around 90˚F with an almost constant humidity of 90%. Because of its proximity to the equator, daily temperatures vary little throughout the year giving its habitants no seasonal reprieve as in higher latitudes. Seasons are marked by the yearly rains that begin in November and continue through March. During the rainy season the jungle receives more than 100 inches of rain, making any sort of travel during this season virtually impossible.

25 For example the Tarma entraña became commonly known as the Missions of Cerro de la Sal, but the terms were still virtual interchangeable and at times the old term was still used. For clarity in this text, only the provincial capital names will be used.
26 Amich gives an excellent description of the Montaña in the first chapter of his Historia de las Misiones, 53-56; Rodríguez Tena dedicated an entire volume to the flora and fauna of Peru and in particular the jungle in Crónica de la Misiones Franciscanas, Book 1; Also see Lehnertz, “Land of the Infidels”, 1-15.
Therefore missionaries in distant mission stations could expect to be isolated from the outside world for nearly half the year. The hot, wet conditions also were a breeding ground for mosquitoes. José Amich, Ocopa’s chronicler who experienced the Montaña first hand complained “The infestation of the mosquitos is a very great torment; because … they do not permit a moment of rest, especially in the swamplier valleys. It is necessary to cover yourself completely… [and with] luck the heat will not suffocate you.” Other fauna of the Montaña also proved difficult to manage. In several missives the missionaries complained about the “wild beasts” of the jungle, including poisonous ants and snakes. In the burial records of one their mission stations, the friars even recorded that one their converts had been killed by a “tiger,” probably a jaguar.

From even before the arrival of the Spanish, however, the border between the highland and the jungle had been extremely porous. Goods, in particular, coca, used in both in highland Andean rituals as well as to fortify workers for daily labor in high altitudes, formed the basis of commerce between the regions. Even after the Spanish invasion, while the Crown did not have an official presence in much of the Montaña, networks of commercial and cultural exchanges persisted. The Crown’s mediated relationship with the jungle nations through the highland Andeans was even evident in their vocabulary to describe the people of the Montaña. Colonial correspondence, for

---

28 Amich, Historia de las Misiones, 54.
29 A good example of these types of complaints are found in Friar Joseph de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, Madrid, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-19, Caja No. 95.
30 This was found in the burial records for the mission of Eneno, AGN, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libro 567.
example, frequently used the word *Chuncho* which was Quechua for “monkey” to describe particularly aggressive jungle nations.\(^{32}\)

It was these so called “Chunchos” who caused the Franciscans first attempts to evangelize the area later adopted by the Apostolic Institute to fail during the seventeenth century. In 1635 a lay Friar named Jerónimo Jiménez, most likely following existing trade networks, entered the high jungle through the Tarma *entrada* and founded a small chapel in village of Quimirí (Figure 1, 1) along the banks the Chanchmayo river. Two years later members of the Campa Amerindian nation killed Friar Jeróninmo as he tried to penetrate farther into the jungle. Four years later two other Franciscans attempting to enter the Jungle through the Tarma *entrada* met the same fate. In 1673 the Franciscans made a second attempt to establish a mission at Quimirí, but were forced to retreat a year later when a local Cacique named Mangoré attacked the missionaries. Mangoré also destroyed a burgeoning Franciscan mission at Sonomoro (Figure 1, 18) in the Jauja *entrada* established that same year by Friar Manuel Biedma. In 1681 Biedma returned to Sonomoro, but was killed six years later by members of the Conibo nation, leading to the Franciscans eventual withdraw from Sonomoro. In 1689 Franciscan Friar Blas Valera attempted once again to establish a mission in the Tarma *entrada* at the Cerro de la Sal, but this mission disappeared by 1694.\(^{33}\) All in all by 1716 the friars claimed missionary

\(^{32}\) Both missionaries and colonial officials alike use this term: San Antonio, Account of the rebellion of Juan Santos, 8 May 1747, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 541; Villagarcia, Report the Crown, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 415; Friar Bernardino de Mathias, Letter to San Antonio, 15 November 1756, Lima, AGI, Lima 808.

\(^{33}\) Accounts of these expeditions are found in several locations: Amich, *Historia de las Misiones*, 57-129; and Iziquirre, *Historia de las Misiones en el Perú*, book 1; There is also a brief summery in Royal Decree, 12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591.
work in the region had created fifty-five martyrs. While these patterns of missionary
expansion, native unrest, and retreat foreshowed events in the eighteenth century; in 1709
the Franciscans hoped that the Apostolic Institute’s political connections and singular
focus on missionary work could have a more lasting impact on the region.

The Franciscans were not the only regular order to attempt to evangelize the
region. The Dominicans had long standing ties to the Chanchamayo river valley (which
formed part of the Tarma entrada) since they maintained a sugar plantation along the
upper part of the valley. In 1699 the Dominicans attempted to take up where the
Franciscans had left off establishing missions in Quimiri, Cerro de la Sal, and farther
down the river at Eneno. They hoped that these reductions would serve as a barrier to
raids on their plantation. Just as had occurred to the Franciscans, however, the
Dominicans were forced to retreat. Though even as late as 1717 the Dominicans had not
given up on their designs for the region, requesting funds from the Crown to recommence
missionary work in the Chanchamayo river valley.

Within four years the Franciscan Apostolic Missionaries were well entrenched in
the region. In a letter to the Crown in 1713 requesting funds for his new enterprise, San
Joseph claimed that in the Tarma entrada they had 585 Amerindians living “under the
bell” at Quimiri, 112 of who were already baptized, not counting those who had died of

---

35 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 May 1758, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
36 Royal Decree, 12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591.
37 “Manifiesto que hace la provincial del Perú de el Orden de Predicadores, sobre la justificacion con que
procedio de Rmo. P. M. Fr. Antonio Cloche su General, en la expedicion, y providencia de prorrogar el
Capitulo Provincial futuro, que se avia de celebrar en 24 de Julio de 1718 hasta dicho Julio de 1720 en la
Persona del M.R.P.M.Fr Juan Moreno Doctor en la Real Universidad de los Reyes, Prothonotario de la
Camara Apostolica, y actual Prior Provincial de dicha Provincia” December 1717, AGI, Lima 537. I am
grateful to Luis Miguel Glave for bringing this reference to my attention.
smallpox. They also had a permanent settlement at Cerro de la Sal and another with 600 inhabitants at Eneno, though they had temporarily abandoned Eneno because of rumors of native unrest. They had re-entered the Jauja entrada as well, establishing mission stations at Sonomoro, Savini, and El Carmen (Figure 1, 18, 19, unknown location). The missionaries also had begun missions farther north in the Montaña, pushing into an entrada north of the highland city of Huánuco. San Joseph claimed that previous missionaries had baptized in excess of 30,000 Amerindians in the Huánuco entrada, but that they currently only had 300 in one mission station at Pozuzu (Figure 1, H), and only 47 of those were baptized.\(^{38}\) The expansion of the Apostolic Institute’s missions was enough to convince the Archbishop in 1716 to grant the Ocopa missionaries the faculties of a parish priest, allowing them to administer the sacraments of the Eucharist and marriage within their mission congregations.\(^{39}\)

Despite several studies on the subject, the exact ethnographic makeup of the region during the eighteenth century is difficult to discern. This is due principally to a failure of the missionaries themselves to categorize the indigenous nations that they encountered in any standardized manner. Missionaries and other external colonial observers alternatively differentiated groups using ethnic, linguistic, and geographic denominations. One Amerindian nation could have three separate names used interchangeably throughout the documents, though in all fairness to the missionaries, modern academics still debate just how to categorize some jungle nations. Frequently

\(^{38}\) San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 8 July 1713, Lima, AGI, Lima 536.

\(^{39}\) San Joseph, Letter to Antonio de Soloaga, Archbishop of Lima, 1716, CVU, Papeles Varios Mss. Tomo 20 no. 4; response 6 April 1716.
missionaries used names which ethnographers cannot match to known ethnic groups, due perhaps to a misunderstanding of the ethnic composition of the group, or because that particular ethnicity was subsequently completely wiped out by disease or war, or simply a mistranslation or alternate spelling of a given ethnic denomination. Though at times missionaries tried to identify the ethnicity of the Amerindians they encountered, more often they categorized the Amerindians by their status within the Catholic faith rather than by any ethnic affiliation. Missionaries referred to Amerindians either as “converts or Christians,” for those who had accepted the missionaries teachings, or as “infidels” or “chunchos” for those who resisted reduction into the missions.

According to Friar José Palos the provincial minister in Lima who visited the newly formed Apostolic missions in 1716, in the region lived “Amages, Campas, Autes, Siminche, Callisecas, Coñinos, Citipos, Carapachos, and Mochonos Indians.” Census records, however, demonstrate that the early mission stations were inhabited almost completely by two jungle nations, the Campa or Andean nation (known commonly today by their largest subgroup the Asháninka) and the Amuesha, Amage, or Mage nation. Both Campa and Amuesha spoke dialects of the Arawak language family, which had penetrated the Amazon basin from the Caribbean in about the first millennium B.C.E. It seems that at least in some cases Campa and Amuesha co-habited the same mission. In a census taken in the mission of Eneno probably around 1737 by the Cacique Mateo

---

40 Both Varese (Salt of the Mountains, 1-6) and Lehnertz (“Land of the Infidels”, 21-29) discuss these problems at length.
41 Examples of this categorization of Amerindians by their status within the Catholic faith are ubiquitous, but probably the best is Amich, Historia de las Misiones.
42 Friar José Palos, Report to the Crown, 16 November 1716, Lima, AGI, Lima 537.
Quillmoch Asia, of the 151 inhabitants of the mission, sixty-two are identified as Amuesha and fifty-one as Campa. The remaining thirty-eight inhabitants’ ethnicity was not declared. Cacique Asia, an Amuesha, listed his wife as Campa, whom he may have chosen to better lead the bi-ethnic community. As the missionaries began to expand deeper into the Jauja and Tarma entradas, however, they encountered other jungle Amerindian nations, such as the Piros (another Arawak speaking group). In the Huánuco entrada most of the inhabitants were Amuesha, but as the missionaries neared the flood plain of the Ucayali River, they began to encounter Casibos, Sipibos, Conibos, which spoke dialects of the Panoan language family.

The missionaries recorded very little about the appearance, social interactions, or culture of the jungle Amerindians. According to what scarce records exist on the subject, jungle Amerindians were short by European standards with dark skin and black hair. They commonly painted their faces and wore a cushma, a type cotton tunic usually dyed with achote. In describing their culture, the missionaries tended to emphasis their “sinful” behavior, stating that Amerindians practiced incest, excessive drinking, and devil worship, among other “pernicious” acts. Many times these enumerations of the Amerindians cultural poverty were discursive tools to draw contrasts between Christianized and non-Christianized natives and to demonstrate the superiority of Hispanic Catholic culture. Even among the converted some “vices” were difficult to root out, in particular polygamy. Jungle Amerindian nations also tended to have dispersed

---

44 Census of Eneno, AGN, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libro 567.
46 Ibid., 32.
populations. Poor jungle soil made it difficult for large numbers of natives to live one centralized village, so most of the year jungle Amerindians lived in small family groups, and came together with others only for trade or mutual protection. This way of life was quite anathema to the town-dwelling Spaniards, and in particular the missionaries who feared that if converts lived too far from the church they would slip back into their previous “idolatries.”

Methods of Conversion

In 1718, the Franciscan Procurator-General over the Indies, Friar Francisco Seco, marveled at the rapid growth of the Institute’s missionary enterprise:

[The missionaries have] baptized one thousand and seventy-seven people between adults and infants. They have two hundred and sixty-five catechumens, which consist of two hundred and nine families. They penetrated and opened more than eighty leagues of land into [the jungle]. They have made three large bridges one with two spans. They fabricated nine churches and three hermitages or chapels. To sustain their dependents, they have two hundred and forty six sheep; also birds (probably chickens), and lesser cattle, as well as planted fields: almost fifty thousand feet of bananas, whose fruit serves as bread.

Such an impressive growth within only ten years raises the question: how did missionaries draw so many people into their missions?

First, the missionaries maintained strategic control of the salt deposits at the aptly named Cerro de la Sal (Mountain of Salt) (Figure 1, 3). Salt was a vital resource for Amerindians throughout the entire jungle. Since the rainy season made fishing in the

47 Varese, Salt of the Mountains, 6-31.
49 Friar Francisco Seco, Report to the Crown, without date, AGI, Lima 537. A note from 10 October 1719 at the end of the copy of the Royal Decree (12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591) dates this document sometime between when the decree was issued and when the copy was made, probably 1718.
swollen rivers impossible six months out of the year, jungle inhabitants needed to preserve and stockpile fish during dry the season to maintain a supply of protein year round. The only preservative to which they had access was salt, and without it they suffered from severe starvation. Salt was so important that some ethnographers have dubbed it the currency of the jungle.  

Though many, including the first Franciscans to the region, knew of the Cerro de la Sal’s existence and importance, it was not until 1645 that a military expedition led by Captain Francisco Bohorquez was sent in an attempt to control it. While they were able for a short time to subdue the indigenous population around the Cerro de la Sal, Amerindians eventually forced them out. In 1685, Manuel Biedma wrote extensively on the importance of controlling the salt depots militarily. He advocated that the Crown donate the deposits as an *encomienda* to a wealthy Spaniard, who would manage and protect the deposits while only selling the salt to Amerindians who had obtained licenses from the missionaries. The jungle Amerindians were not ignorant of either the strategic importance of this resource or the missionaries’ plans for cornering the market. According to San Joseph, when the Apostolic Institute first arrived in the Tarma *entrada* in 1709 their initial efforts to find the salt deposits were thwarted by local Caciques who instructed their followers not to reveal its location. As San Joseph writes, however, “After two years, in which we suffered immense labors, exploring various regions, evangelizing numerous nations, we fortunately discovered this desired mountain, and reduced, with our Catholic doctrine, its inhabitants, so that we could communicate with the rest of the gentile nations, which appear in copious troops and

---

50 Stefano Varese, however, argues that such a comparison is inappropriate (*Salt of the Mountain*, 34 – 35).
51 Varese. *Salt of the Mountain*, 56, 70, 83.
many fleets of rafts to carry the salt down the river.” After the mountain’s discovery, San Joseph moved quickly to secure the deposits and constructed two forts at Quimirí and Cerro de la Sal. Indeed, it was no coincidence that the first three missions the Institute established in the region were at Quimirí, located along an access road from the salt deposits to the highlands; Cerro de la Sal, the actual site of the deposits; and Eneno, the river port closest to the deposits where most Amerindians moored their boats. With the construction of these three missions, in theory, jungle Amerindians coming up to extract salt or trade had to at least speak with the missionaries. Some Crown officials, however, doubted that the missionaries did or could ever effectively control the deposits due to large area over which they were spread. Certainly not every nation in the area was forced to receive the missionaries in order to gain access to the salt, but their presence was probably enough to disrupt indigenous commercial networks.

Second, in order to attract Amerindians to live in their missions, the Peruvian Apostolic Institute distributed steel farming implements to mission Amerindians. As one friar stated the missionaries had found a “docile people, easily impressed with the Catholic faith,” but that their conversion was aided “with the assistance of giving them tools for the cultivation of their fields.” Steel tools, particularly machetes, axes, and knives were invaluable for the type slash-and-burn agriculture prevalent in the jungle. The poor jungle soil made farming in one field year after year impossible. Jungle Amerindian had to clear new fields every few years, cutting down the trees and

---

54 Probably the best example of this is Viceroy José Antonio Manso de Velasco, “Relación que hizo de su gobierno,” BN-3108, 118v.
55 Fr. Lucas de Quenca, Procurador de Indias, Petition to the Crown, without date, Madrid, AGI, Lima 536.
underbrush and burning them to fertilize the soil. Steel implements greatly increased the speed of preparing field and the size of fields that could be cultivated allowing for a greater abundance of food. Missionary control over the supply of these implements helped attract Amerindians by offering them the use of the tools for several weeks during this planting season. The missionaries were careful to assure that Amerindians only borrowed the tools, and that these were not outright gifts. This was for two reasons. First the constitution of the Franciscan province of the Twelve Apostles of Lima, to which the missions belonged, prohibited friars from giving gifts to potential or recent Amerindian converts. The Franciscan leadership feared that this type of *quid pro quo* relationship would lead to false conversions. The second reason, which contradicted the first, was that missionaries wanted the Amerindians to remain dependent on missionaries and stay in the mission communities. The missionaries’ policy of lending tools, of course, did not always work. Several missionaries complained that Amerindians would come to the missions and give obedience to the missionaries, perhaps even be baptized, in order to obtain tools and then simply leave. They cited the Amerindians great “greed” for the tools as one of the reasons why seemingly docile mission Indians rose up in rebellion against the missionaries. Missionaries claimed that rebel leaders incited the Amerindians against the missionaries so that they could steal their tools. Certainly the value of these tools in providing food for their families was a powerful incentive to obtain them by

---

56 This process is described in San Joseph, Letter to Friar José Sanz, Commissary-general, 24 March 1721, Tarma, AGI, 538. A copy of this letter is also found in a volume of San Joseph’s letters edited by Julián Heras (*Cartas e Informes*, 55-60), which was taken from the Propaganda Fide Archive in Rome.

57 Provincial Minister of the Province had to reissue this order in 1717, which indicates that it was not being followed. Friar Joseph de Palos, Order, 5 May 1717, ASFL, r6, n.1, doc. 231, ff. 501v-502v.

whatever means necessary. Despite these concerns, however, the Apostolic Institute continued this method of attracting Amerindians to their missions throughout the colonial era both in the Tarma, Jauja, and Huánuco entradas among other places.

One of the other ways in which the missions augmented the number of people they reported to have baptized was the compulsory baptism of dying Amerindians. Baptism in artículo motis or at the moment of death was a common practice among Catholics throughout the early modern world. They believed that without baptism cleansing the soul from sin (in the case of children the original sin of Adam and Eve), the soon-to-be departed would most certainly go to hell. Though the missionaries were trying to build spiritual utopias on earth, they believed that such deathbed conversions were, in the eternal perspective, just as important as the salvation of those destined to live on. These “numerous” imminent-death conversions were certainly a factor in missionaries’ arithmetic that claimed they had converted 10,000 to 12,000 souls, though this still was most certainly an exaggeration. These supposed conversions, did little to build up the mission communities. The missionaries tried, however, to use these conversions as a discursive tool to convince government officials to fund the missions. The missionaries then claimed that not only had they brought hundreds into the “Christian life” in the missions in a short amount of time, but also that they had saved thousands from the fires

60 Gil Muñoz, Vice-commissary of the Franciscan province of San Antonio de Charcas, Petition to the Crown, 12 May 1752, Cuzco, AGI, Lima 541.
61 This particular number was mentioned numerous times, so much so it found its way into a royal decree, 13 March 1751, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, AGI, Lima 542.
of hell, fulfilling the empire’s goal of converting its inhabitants to the “true faith” dead or alive. While this argument was probably lost on many Spanish officials, claiming that they had baptized tens of thousands was much more impressive than the several hundred converts that actually lived in the missions.62

Delineating the missionaries’ coercive methods, however, begs the question of whether any of the Jungle Amerindians were convinced by the friars and converted to the Catholic faith by their own volition. The missionaries certainly thought so. To prove it in 1713 San Joseph sent a letter to the Crown recounting several stories of the Amerindians miraculous conversion and stalwart devotion. He claimed that when he arrived in the Montaña he encountered a group of Christians who had been baptized in previous expeditions who had hidden themselves in the remote village of Potocuatros because of fear of the “tyrannies” of the other Amerindians. There they had a church and continued to practice baptism on each other. In another village he recounted that when the small chapel that the missionaries had built caught fire in their absence (though he does not say how the fire started), the village women, at great risk to their own life, saved the altar and all the images of the saints. Then he told the story of a Cacique, who having broken his leg, asked for his men to find a missionary so he could be baptized, presumably so that if he died his soul would not go to hell.63

---

62 To this type of discourse is obvious in: San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 8 July 1713, Lima, AGI, Lima 536; Friar Juan Higinio de Ibarra, Visitor-General of the missions, Report, 30 March 1715, Lima, ASFL R6, N.1, 223, ff. 490v-491r; Friar Fernando de San José, Report to Crown, 20 March 1716, Lima, AGI, Lima 537.

63 San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 8 December 1713, Lima, AGI, Lima 536; These same stories were repeated in the royal decree that resulted from this petition (12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591).
Demonstrating that any jungle Amerindian completely and honestly converted to Catholicism because they were convinced by the friars’ message, however, is of course impossible. No personal writings of any jungle Amerindian from the period survived (and probably never existed). Certainly even the most devout converts did not understand Catholic Christianity in the Hispanicized manner that the missionaries would have wanted, but retained a hybridized belief based on their own previous beliefs and cultural environment. What can be demonstrated, nonetheless, was a preference among some Amerindians in the Montaña for the missionaries. Many missionaries spent months or years alone in isolated villages, where in many cases the Amerindians fed and maintained them, even through several famines. According to the missionaries some Amerindians died for their beliefs, claiming that between 1634 and 1737, 233 Christianized Amerindians were “martyred”.64 Certainly at least some these could have joined rebels, but chose to die with the missionaries. In several rebellions between 1709 -1742 (Figure 1, 4), after groups of discontented converts attacked the mission, other mission Amerindians formed war parties to go after the rebels.65 Even during the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion (1742-1752) Christianized Amerindians died in defense of the missions and all of the inhabitants of the Sonomoro mission relocated to the highlands so that, according to Amich, they did not have to abandon their Catholic faith.66 Whether these actions were completely free any sort of coercion is, of course, unknowable. Social

---

64 “Mapa de los Mártires,” 1737, AGI, Mapas y Planos.
65 Friar Lorenzo Nuñés de Mendoza, Commissary-general of the Ocopa missions, Letters to the viceroy, 13 May 1736 and 14 April 1737, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 539; Friar Alonso Lopez de Casas, Commissary-general of the Franciscan Order in Peru, Report, 19 May1737, Lima, AGI, Lima 539; Real Acuerdo, Act, 16 Abril1737, Lima, AGI Lima 539.
pressure within each village from Christianized Caciques, or some type of dependency on the missionaries certainly informed their decisions. In difficult, life-threatening moments, however, some Amerindians chose to stay with the missionaries and be identified as Christians.

Life on the Missions

Life on the missions was rigidly controlled by the missionaries and centered on religious activities. The municipal laws of the Amuesha mission of Pozuzu, written probably in 1760’s but most likely in effect much earlier, laid out a rigid schedule of church attendance and devotion. Every morning the community gathered and the missionary designated as the mission’s priest led them in the rosary. On Sundays, Wednesdays, Fridays, and Saturdays every Amerindian in the community was required to attend mass in the afternoon. The procession of the Capac Eterno (probably another name for Jesus Christ, capac means powerful or prince in Quechua, and eterno eternal in Spanish) preceded each mass and ended with a sermon. The missionaries took attendance at each ceremony and whipped those who failed to attend without permission, three lashes for the first offence, six for the second, and twelve for the third. If the truancy continued, the offending Amerindian would be placed in the stocks. The mission

---

67 Varese argues that mission of Sonomoro did not back Juan Santos Atahualpa because the influence of its Cacique (Salt of the Mountains, 87-96). In one of the few baptismal records that exist for the missions, the Cacique of Eneno, Mateo Assia, engaged in the traditional Catholic patron-clientele relationship of becoming the godfather to many of the children in the village. Mateo Assia, however, was one the principal commanders against the missionaries during Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, casting serious doubts on whether his previous devotion to Catholic ritual persuaded Amerindians to support the friars.

68 Borrow words from Quechua, considered the common tongue in Peru, were embedded throughout Catholic rhetoric in the Andeans. It is unclear whether the term was brought to Pozuzu by the missionaries or adopted independently by the Amuesha. For more information on Quechua in Catholic rhetoric see Alan Durston, Pastoral Quechua: The History of Christian Translation in Colonial Peru, 1550-1650.
Amerindians were also charged with the care and maintenance of the church and main square. Every Saturday the married men and widowers brought firewood to the church and, those who did not were whipped. The married women cleaned the plaza and the widows the church, while the young women set out flowers on the sacristy and crosses. In Pozuzu there were three principal feast days, the mission’s patron saint, St Anthony of Padua (13 June), Corpus Christi (sometime between May and June), and the Assumption of the Virgin Mary (15 August). The singing of hymns, mass, and other religious festivities celebrated these feasts. Other holy days such as Christmas, Ash Wednesday, Good Friday, and Easter were also observed with religious ritual. While temporal aspects of the Community were in theory run by the community leaders, at least according to the laws of Pozuzu, the missionaries chose these leaders. How closely the community adhered to these guidelines remains uncertain. Detailed explanations of what punishments the Amerindians would receive for each omission, however, suggest that punishments were meted out regularly and that even Amerindian converts resisted the rigid mission lifestyle.

The sole surviving confession manual from the missions, written in Pozuzu in 1764, also reveals the missionaries’ concerns for their flock. The Amuesha of Pozuzu, encouraged to confess their sins once a week on Sundays, probably did so in their own Amuesha tongue, since the manual, written in both Spanish and Amuesha, was devised to help the missionary learn the questions in Amuesha. Though the manual was written in

---

69 Friar Domingo de la Cruz, Municipal Laws of the Mission of San Antonio de Pozuzu, without date (probably 1760’s), AL-MRREE, LEB 12-4, Caja 94, ff177r-122v. A special thanks to Joan Manuel Morales Cama for helping me obtain a copy of this document, which includes the registry of baptisms, marriages, and burials for Pozuzu from 1734-1787, as well as a confessional manual from 1764.
1764, the author claimed that it was an update of an older version that had contained Amuesha terms that had fallen out of use (perhaps as the friars learned more about the Amuesha language and culture). Many of the questions in the manual were rather standard for confession: “Do you lie?” “Do you steal?” “Do you desire to kill your spouse?” The missionaries, however, were particularly concerned with sexual sins. These questions certainly reflected the vast gulf between Catholic and jungle Amerindian sexual mores, which it seems the Amuesha of Pozuzu struggled to bridge. The manual instructed the priest to ask whether the women stared at men at church or made signals to them with their tongues, eyes, or mouths. One question even asked women: “have you ever uncovered your breasts to appear good (more attractive) to a man?” Confessants were asked if they had committed adultery and to detail with whom and the number of times. The manual’s author seemed particularly preoccupied with sexual relations between family members, which missionaries believed to be prevalent in jungle Amerindian cultures.

The confession manual also attempted to confront potentially destructive beliefs and behaviors. Some of these threatening elements included “heretical” beliefs that resulted either from the persistence of Amuesha culture or hybridization with Catholicism. Mission priests asked confessants whether they believed in dreams; if they heard a bird cry did they think someone was going to die, or if they spat on their hand to know the truth of something, or whether they worshiped the moon. Most importantly,

---

70 While the author of the confession manual remains unknown it was probably written by Friar Domingo de la Cruz who arrived in 1764 and whose handwriting matches with the entries he made in the mission’s registry of baptisms, marriages, and burials. Confession Manual, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-4, Caja 94, ff 33v-35r; Registry of Baptisms, Marriages, and Burials for the Pueblo of Nuestra Señora de la Asumpcion de Yanahuanqui (known commonly as Pozuzu), AL-MRREE, LEB 12-4, Caja 94, 1r-105v.
however, the priests were instructed to press the villagers about their relationships with the *Cimarrones*, the rebellious Amerindians outside the missions. This was particularly important in Pozuzu since the missionaries moved many of the most faithful converts to establish another mission at Cuchero in 1753, leaving those whom they feared would “escape” into the jungle. The mission priest was also to ask the confessant whether he or she had considered joining the rebels or communicated with them or even gave them “axes, knives, or machetes.” Not only were farm implements important to the friars’ strategy of keeping the Amerindians in the mission communities, but the missionaries knew all too well that these tools could be easily used against them as weapons of war.

The missionaries themselves, of course, did not see their actions as being malevolent or oppressive. Indeed, as in so many other instances in the colonial world, the Spanish missionaries saw themselves as benevolent “fathers” to their Amerindian “children”. Missionary leaders instructed them that they should not treat the mission Amerindians as “children of the whip,” but treat them with “affection.” Of course, corporal punishment for children in the eighteenth century was not uncommon either and when carried out “in moderation,” they believed, were simply an extension of this paternalistic relationship. In many ways the order that the missionaries attempted to impose in the missions paralleled the monastic life that they themselves had embraced. In the monastery they attended mass multiple times a day, and did not see it as unreasonable.

---

71 *Cimarrón* is a general term in Spanish for any group of Amerindian or Africans that have escaped Spanish society to form their own communities. It is from this word that the English term “maroon” was derived.

72 Confession Manual, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-4, Caja 94, ff. 33v-55r.

73 Friar Domingo de la Cruz, Municipal Laws of the Mission of San Antonio de Pozuzu, without date (probably 1760’s), AL-MRREE, LEB 12-4, Caja 94, ff177r-122v.
that the Amerindians do so four times a week. Discipline, obedience, order, and even martyrdom were integral parts of the missionaries’ lives, and while it could be unpleasant in the short-term physical sense, in the eternal perspective they believed these things were beneficial for Amerindians souls. For example, in a petition to the Crown describing an epidemic in Eneno in 1713, San Joseph, instead of lamenting the actual deaths of the Amerindians, exclaimed “how many children have died without baptism...?”74 Similar sentiments were shared by several Ocopa friars over the next hundred years.75 While Amerindians dying of disease or starvation was lamentable, the real tragedy was that so many died without the sacrament of baptism.

One of the unintended consequences of the missionaries’ presence in the Montaña was virgin-soil epidemics. Due to their relative isolation from Europeans, jungle nations had been spared the great pandemics that killed much of the inhabitants of the Americas. This isolation, however, meant that they lacked any sort immunity to the European diseases that had ravaged indigenous populations elsewhere. In the Tarma missions, epidemics of smallpox killed large numbers of converts in 1711, 1713, and 1715, in some cases reducing the mission stations’ populations by more than half. Other outbreaks of unknown diseases hit the Ocopa mission stations in 1721, 1724, and 1736-37.76

Anthropologist Fernando Santos Granero argues that there was a distinct correlation

74 San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 25 November 1713, Lima, AGI, Lima 539, italics added (also found in Herás, Cartas e informes sobre Ocopa y sus misiones, 33). San Joseph express a similar sentiment almost 20 years later in another petition to the Crown (12 July 1732, Lima, AGI, Lima 539).
76 Santos Granero, “Epidemias y sublevaciones en el desarrollo demográfico de las misiones Amuesha,” 33 – 35.
between these epidemics and violent uprisings among mission populations. The outbreaks particularly infuriated mission Amerindi
ans, he argues, because they disproportionately affected children (under 14). Indeed uprisings in 1712, 1719, 1724, and 1737 occurred in mission villages recently decimated by disease.\textsuperscript{77} While disease undoubtedly was a spark for unrest, it was not the only factor in stirring up the natives’ enmity toward the missionaries. Even the epidemics themselves, while seemingly an act of nature, the unintended consequence of two previously isolated groups meeting, the severity of these outbreaks was exacerbated by the cultural impositions of the missionaries. As a matter of cultural tradition during times of disease, jungle Amerindians scattered into smaller family groups, even leaving infected individuals alone in the jungle with supplies until hopefully the sickness passed. This practice most certainly would have retarded if not stopped the spread of disease among the population.

The missionaries believed this practice to be an example of the jungle Amerindians barbaric, pitiless nature and argued that scattering would actually lead to more deaths since these small family groups had less people available to care for the sick. They consequently exhorted the Amerindians to stay in the mission communities during outbreaks.\textsuperscript{78} The missionaries also feared that if Amerindians were out of the mission too long they would return to their “idolatries”.\textsuperscript{79} Maintaining mission communities concentrated during times of disease most likely accelerated the rate of infection turning outbreaks into epidemics.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 36-52. While Santos Granero proves this correlation through a thorough examination of the missions’ censuses, the missionaries themselves reported these connections: San Joseph, Report of the missions \textit{de Propaganda Fide}, 12 June 1732, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 539.

\textsuperscript{78} Amich, \textit{Historia de las Misiones}, 76.

\textsuperscript{79} See Causa contra Fray Domingo Garcia, 8 October 1745, JSEI, 106 – 109.
Other Settlers in the Missions

The missionaries and the jungle Amerindians were not the only inhabitants of the mission stations. To build up the missions’ infrastructure and maintain order, the friars incorporated other ethnic groups and Spanish institutions into their missionizing project. Enslaved and free Blacks became an integral part of the missionary enterprise. The missionaries employed the Africans generally in two ways: firstly, they used them to supplement indigenous labor to produce food for the missions. Secondly, they were a disciplinary force. In the Hispanic world using Blacks in a martial capacity was less taboo than in British North America. Blacks, including slaves, were taught to fight and armed to be used principally as personal security for elites. Because of a lack of a military or police presence in the missions, the friars turned to their enslaved Africans to mete out punishments. San Joseph commented in 1719 that “the Indians already have much fear [of the Blacks]: because they are the ones that whip [the Amerindians] when they do not attend mass or catechism.” Three years later San Joseph again commented that they Amerindians thought the Blacks to be “children of hell.” The missionaries even entrusted blacks to stay in the missions while they were absent. It is possible that missionaries were attempting to create divisions between the Africans and the Amerindians as part of a strategy to control mission Amerindians. The missionaries perhaps hoped that when rebellion broke out, the ire of the Amerindians would fall upon

80 San Joseph, Letter to José Sanz, Commissary-General of Missions, 19 September 1718, Tarma, AGI, Lima 537. 
81 San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 23 March 1721, Tarma, AGI, Lima 538.
the Blacks just as much as the friars, forcing Blacks to join in the protection of the missionaries. During the multiple uprisings in the Ocopa missions, most Blacks sided with Spanish forces. Pitting Blacks against Amerindians, however, did not always guarantee loyalty. One exceptional example was African Antonio Gatica, who became one of the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion’s principal commanders against missionaries. Gatica was a free black from Mina (Southeastern coast of Africa), whom the missionaries brought to the Montaña, perhaps at first as slave, to serve as a laborer in the Tarma Entrada.\textsuperscript{82} Over time Gatica was able to integrate himself into the local jungle Amerindian culture. He married the sister of an important local leader, Mateo de Assia, the cacique of Metráro and Eneno. Gatica, who lived in Eneno, became the godfather of many of the converts in that mission.\textsuperscript{83} According to Viceroy Villagarcia, this cultural duality gave Gatica, as well his bi-ethnic children, “great authority.”\textsuperscript{84} When the rebellion broke out seven other Blacks followed Gatica against the missionaries, possibly suggesting more cultural integration of Africans into jungle Amerindian communities.\textsuperscript{85}

Other groups of highland Andeans and Europeans had also settled in the region. The fragile but persistent commercial ties between the highland and the jungle, as well as a small trickle of Spaniards, Mestizos, and highland Andeans escaping justice, had

\textsuperscript{82} Baptismal Record for the mission of Eneno, AGN, Sección Republicana, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libro 5, ff. 1-22; Villagracia, Letter to Manso de Velasco, 1745, Lima, RAH 9-9-3 1699, 190v.
\textsuperscript{83} \textit{Ibid.}
\textsuperscript{84} Joseph Antonio Mendoza, “Relación de Marques de Villagarcia,” Mss. 3108, BNE, 22r; Joseph Antonio Manso de Velasco, “Relación que hizo de su Gobierno” Mss. 3107, BNE, 114r.
\textsuperscript{85} Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 169.
brought with it at least a few immigrants. One missionary was even surprised by the number of “Europeans” who had come to the region in search of the legendary lost Incan city of gold, Paititi. The missionaries were not necessarily opposed to the presence of such settlers since, while many were far from being ideal Catholics, they could help to acculturate the “barbarous” jungle nations. In 1718 San Joseph even requested that the Crown create a program for poor Amerindian and Spanish families to settle in the jungle alongside the missionaries’ new converts. The missionaries also used highland Andean labor to help build up the roads, bridges, and structures necessary for their endeavor. In 1717 the Crown gave the missionaries Mita rights (a corvee labor tax to which all Amerindians in the Viceroyalty of Peru gave service) for 100 men in frontier villages of Chinchao and Pillao. These villages dutifully fulfilled this labor every year, probably because the alternative was either a fine of seventy pesos (a sum much higher than most Amerindians’ annual earnings) or service in the mercury mines of Huancavelica.

Over time Spanish troops began to protect the missions. In reaction to small rebellions in the Tarma entrada, as early as 1718 the missionaries began petitioning the state for soldiers. These most often took the form of a handful of regular army troops out of Tarma or Jauja, supplemented by militia during times of rebellion. Most of the troops were concentrated in the forts that the Crown constructed at Quimiri, Cerro de la Sal, and

86 There are accounts of several non-Jungle Amerindians entering the Montaña, including Juan Santos, but others include: Royal Decree, 12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591; Friar Fernando de San José, Letter to Fr. Joaquin, Tarma, June 1730, AGI, Lima 541.
87 Ibid.
88 San Joseph, Letter to José Sanz, Commissary-general of Missions, 19 September 1718, Tarma, AGI, Lima 537.
89 Real Acuerdo, Act, 13 September 1756, Lima, AGI, Lima 808.
90 Sebastian de Mendizabel, Captain of military forces in Tarma, Petition to the Viceroy, 24 March 1721, Tarma, AGI, Lima 538.
later Sonomoro, but later they began to accompany the missionaries on their expeditions deeper into the Montaña. A viceroy at the time defended the missionaries’ militaristic strategy to the King: “His Excellency should not reprimand [the missionaries] for building a fort against the attacks of the barbarians, because this does not oppose, according to all modern writings on this point, the freedom [of the Amerindians] to accept the Gospel. It does not constrain their free will, but repels cruelty.” While the presence of troops in the missions in these early years was less pronounced than it would later become, it set a dangerous precedence for state intervention in the affairs of the missions.

*Acquiring State Funding and Conflicts with Early Bourbon Reformers*

In order to maintain the expansion of their newly formed missions, the Peruvian Apostolic Institute needed a steady source of income. Building up this new network of mission stations required a large investment in material not available in the Montaña. The missionaries needed steel tools to attract Amerindians to the missions as well as the various vestments, ornaments, and objects to adorn the new chapels and perform Catholic rites such as images of Christ, Mary and the saints, sacramental chalices, and fine linens for the alters. The missionaries’ transport to the missions from their base of operation in the highland Mantaro valley, including expenditures for food and portage, was also costly. 91 Furthermore, maintaining Amerindians concentrated in one location accelerated soil depletion in the immediate vicinities of some of the mission stations, forcing the

91 San Joseph, Letter to José Sanz, Commissary-general of Missions, 19 September 1718, Tarma, AGI, Lima 537; San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 23 March 1721, Tarma, AGI, Lima 538.
missionaries to import food at great cost in order to stave off starvation.  
As with other Apostolic Institute operations, the Ocopa missionaries at first could not rely on local alms around their base of operations for support. While the newly converted jungle Amerindians did sustain the missionaries in many locations with food and labor, they could not provide the type of hard currency necessary to import European goods. Even in their base operations in the Christianized highland Mantaro valley, their status as newcomers made the wealthy local elite reluctant to donate alms to the Institute. Perhaps they wanted to wait until the Institute had a permanent presence in the region before they exchanged their worldly wealth for prayers to release their souls from purgatory. No notary records exist for mortmain donations during the first two decades of their operations in the region. The first such donation in 1729 demonstrates the local elite’s reluctance to “invest” in missionaries. Don Sebastian Nieto left the missionaries (at that point based at monastery of Santa Rosa de Ocopa near Jauja) an annual payment of twenty-five pesos from his estate in exchange for friars saying two masses per year for his soul. He stipulated, however, that if the missionaries failed to do so the money would be given to the parish church of Jauja for the same service. The only substantial donation that was recorded during this period came in the form of 500 pesos from the Archbishop of Lima. There are also some indications that some institutions in the local

---

92 Friar Christorial de Molina, Procurator for the Dominican province of San Juan Baptista del Perú, Letter of Support for the apostolic missions, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 536.  
93 Will of Don Sebastian Nieto, ARJ, Protocolos Notoriales, Tomo 18, Scribe Juan de Mesa Valera, 327vr.  
Franciscan province gave the missionaries money, but these donations do not appear to be significant.\textsuperscript{95} Crown funding, therefore, was vital to the missions’ ability to grow.

In 1713, just five years after founding the first missions in the Tarma \textit{entrada}, Friar Francisco de San Joseph petitioned the Crown for funds. San Joseph requested that the Crown provide 6,000 pesos per year, 2,000 pesos for each of their three \textit{entradas} at Jauja, Tarma, and Huánuco, as well as paying for the transport of twelve new missionaries from Spain. He argued that he needed this money to pay for “tools and wages, the transport of provisions, and guards.” In his attempt to persuade the Crown to fund the missions San Joseph recounted several stories of the miraculous conversion of several of the jungle Amerindian Caciques and their followers, while at the same time warning that if not provided with the funds, many hundreds of Amerindian children would die in the \textit{Montaña} without baptism. He, of course, mentioned the numerous missionaries that had paid with their lives to bring about this great conversion.\textsuperscript{96} Three years later, however, San Joseph’s companion Fernando de San Joseph amended the Institute’s reasons for missions receiving funding to appeal more to Spain’s imperial designs of expanding their influence into their frontiers. He added that with the funding the missionaries could “clear trails a distance of 100 leagues and build bridges over the large, fast flowing rivers, which serve as a barrier to the barbarians,” and that such work would lead to the “expansion of new dominions” for the king.\textsuperscript{97} Consequently, on March 12\textsuperscript{th} 1718 King Philip V issued a royal decree confirming previous promises to send more

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{95} Rodriguez Tena, “Crónica de la Misiones Franciscanas,” 220-234.
\textsuperscript{96} San Joseph, Petition to the King, 25 November 1713, Lima, AGI 539. There is also a copy of this letter in Heras, \textit{Cartas e Informes}, 31-33.
\textsuperscript{97} Friar Fernando de San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 20 March 1716, Lima, AGI, Lima 537.
\end{flushright}
missionaries and granted the Peruvian Apostolic Institute the 6,000 pesos per year that San Joseph had requested. The decree was written in a pious tone and recounted most of the miraculous stories of San Joseph’s initial petition, while omitting the more worldly arguments of Fernando de San Joseph. Unfortunately for the missionaries, the decree did not resolve how the Crown would pay for these concessions and simply shifted responsibility for payment of both the stipend and the travel expenses to the treasury in Lima.98

Getting viceregal officials to release the 6,000 pesos of the annual stipend to the missionaries proved more difficult. While the advancement of regalism in the New World during the first twenty-five years of the eighteenth century was limited, the Crown made significant gestures toward religious and particularly anti-clerical reform. Probably the most significant reform during this period for the regular clergy was the Crown’s attempts to eliminate small convents (conventillos). The regular orders used these conventillos as bases of operations for their rural indigenous parishes, from which the orders notoriously stripped funds to pay for their large urban convents instead of reinvesting the tithes back into the parish. By officially listing these friars as part of the convent, they were putting them under the control of their own order’s hierarchy, rather than secular church authority. In 1703 King Philip V issued a decree that all convents have at least eight friars in permanent residence to be considered an official convent. The decree was most likely ignored, since it was reissued in 1708, 1727, 1731, and 1739.99

---

98 Royal Decree, 12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas 591.
99 Andrien, “The Coming of Enlightened Reform,” 188.
Nonetheless the elimination of *conventillos* demonstrated a burgeoning desire for anti-clerical reform in the Americans almost from the beginning of the Bourbon dynasty.

The inability of the Institute to convince viceregal authorities to pay their stipend, at least until 1724, had less to do with reform and more to do with political instability in the Viceroyalty of Peru. Between 1705 and 1724 Peru had eight viceregal administrations. Only two of these administrations were these individuals actually given the title of viceroy, the other six were considered interim appoints. Three of these interim appointments were held by clerics, but they were little suited for the office, and their administrations were plagued by corruption and incompetence. The last such viceroy during this period of uncertainty was the Trinitarian friar and Archbishop of Charcas, Diego Morcillo Rubio de Auñón who was 74 when he became viceroy in 1720. During his four years as viceroy, Archbishop Morcillo became so rich from corruption and contraband that he was able to endow a church in Rome (where a monument to him still stands) with 200,000 pesos.  

Other factors also delayed the missionaries receiving their payment. In 1720 funds destined for the mission were diverted to bolster the viceregal capital’s port of Callao against the English privateer John Clipperton. Clipperton had taken the president of the Audiencia of Panama captive, inspiring a rush to rebuild the port’s aging fortifications. The result was that though the decree giving the missionaries their stipend was ratified in 1718 they did not receive their first payment until 1726.

---

After 1724 viceregal officials’ regalist attitudes became more of a barrier to missionaries receiving their stipend. The new viceroy, José de Armendáriz y Perurena, Marqués of Castelfuerte (1724-1736), was an ardent regalist with a “highly aggressive” approach toward the church. As historian Adrian Pierce summarizes:

The language he used to justify his actions was that of an extreme form of regalism and it was this view which informed his attitude toward the exercise of the Real Patronato (the royal patronage). It is quite clear, however, that his aggression exceeded that of a dispassionate servant of the Crown: his criticism of the clergy was expressed in violent and even crude language, and he was deliberately confrontational in his dealings with them.\(^{103}\)

Castelfuerte exerted the full authority of the Royal Patronage, which generally went unutilized under the Hapsburg viceroys, by exercising his privilege to veto ecclesiastic elections and to remove summarily priests from their parishes. His relationship with the Franciscans in particular became so embittered that the Commissary-General of the Indies attempted to have him excommunicated. Though at times these attacks were obviously personal in nature, officials in Madrid rarely challenged Viceroy Castelfuerte’s reforms and his actions in many cases formed the basis for changes in colonial policy toward the church.\(^{104}\)

In regards to the Apostolic Institute, Castelfuerte seemed less antagonistic but still attempted quietly to erode the largess that the Crown had awarded the missionaries. Like many of his successors, the viceroy openly praised the missionaries, and ostensibly agreed to pay the 6,000 pesos they had been granted, sending them a full payment just a

\(^{103}\) Pierce, “Early Bourbon Government,” 197.
\(^{104}\) Ibid., 197-199.
year and a half after taking office.\textsuperscript{105} Castelfuerte, however, eventually exploited the vagaries of two clauses of the March 12\textsuperscript{th}, 1718 decree that granted the missionaries their stipend to allow him not comply fully. First the decree charged the viceroy with finding funds within his own jurisdiction to pay the missionaries. Castelfuerte interpreted this responsibility as giving him arbitrary authority to decide whether the missionaries needed the funds whether such need was a priority to the viceroyalty’s limited financial resources. As Castelfuerte described:

\begin{quote}
I ordered that several payments be made to [the missionaries], such as the one of 6,000 pesos they received at the beginning of the year 1726… and the one of 2,000 that was designated for them in the year 1729, because it seemed that the amount [was] proportional to the needs of them that received it and to the state of the royal treasury which gave it to them, being sufficient for the maintenance and advancement of the missions.\textsuperscript{106}
\end{quote}

Secondly, the decree specified that the funds come from the royal treasury in Lima. So instead of transferring the payment to the closest treasury to the missionaries base of operations (which after 1725 was only 18 miles away in Jauja), the viceroy required that at least one missionary make the rugged overland journey from Ocopa to Lima (174 miles away) to appear in person and collect the funds. This essentially meant that every time the missionaries wanted payment at least one (usually two) had to travel for several weeks from their highland base to Lima to justify to the viceroy the necessity for more money. Then, if the viceroy agreed to pay the stipend, they had had to send one or more friars back to Lima several months later to collect the funds.\textsuperscript{107} Early on this was particularly disruptive to missionary work because the missionaries lacked sufficient

\textsuperscript{105} Castelfuerte, Report to the King, 8 November 1734, Lima, AGI, Lima 539.
\textsuperscript{106} Castelfuerte, “Relación que hizo de su Gobierno”, BNE, mss. 3109, 79r.
\textsuperscript{107} Joseph de Salazar y Monatoneo, Syndic-General of the Franciscan missions, Petition to the Crown, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 539.
manpower to spare even one friar. Before 1734, the number of active missionaries, those who were not too infirm or old, rarely exceeded a dozen.\textsuperscript{108} It seems that some years the Institute simply did not try to collect the funds.

Castelfuerte’s successor, José Antonio de Mendoza Caamaño y Sotomayor, Marques of Villagarcía, maintained the same policies. Villagarcía personally proved less ardent than Castelfuerte in attacking the clergy, perhaps due to the fact that he was nearly 70 years old when he took office.\textsuperscript{109} Regarding the Apostolic Institute, however, he was equally neglectful and maintained the same policy of forcing the missions in person come to Lima and justify, then later collect their stipend. Consequently payments to missions between 1724 and 1745 were few and almost always incomplete.\textsuperscript{110} During this period, the royal treasury only registered eight payments and only one, the first in 1726, was for the full amount (see Table 1).

The missionaries, of course, strongly disagreed with the manner in which both Castelfuerte and Villagarcía handled their annual stipend and the missionaries and their representatives flooded the Council of the Indies with petitions to force viceregal officials to pay the money promptly and in full. The missionaries also demanded that the funds be distributed from the royal treasury at Jauja rather than Lima to avoid having to travel to Lima every time they needed to collect the funds.\textsuperscript{111} Crown officials in Madrid agreed

\textsuperscript{108} In 1734 they only had six: Castelfuerte, Report to the King, 8 November 1734, Lima, AGI, Lima 539.
\textsuperscript{110} Fiscal’s comments in regards to a petition to the Crown from Friar Diego Joseph de la Fuente, Franciscan Procurator-general for the Indies, 14 June 1738, Madrid, AGI, Lima 539.
\textsuperscript{111} There are multiple petitions from multiple sources some include: Joseph de Salazar y Monatoneo, Syndic-general of the Franciscan missions, Petition to the Crown, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 539; San Joseph, Petition to the Crown, 6 June 1726, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 539; Friar Diego Joseph de la Fuente,
and the royal decree of March 12th 1718 was reissued twice, 1729 and 1734. By 1734 pressure from Madrid made ignoring the missionaries request more difficult, and in response Viceroy Castelfuerte further complicated the process by requiring that local governors in the region report on the state of the missions before issuing payments.\textsuperscript{112} Even this tactic, however, could not delay payment indefinitely and Villagarcia, though he still made the missionaries come to Lima to collect, issued steady payments to the missionaries from 1736 to 1739 but at the reduced amount of 4,000 pesos per year (see Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>1726</th>
<th>1729</th>
<th>1731</th>
<th>1732</th>
<th>1736</th>
<th>1737</th>
<th>1738</th>
<th>1739</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amount in Pesos</td>
<td>6,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1 - Payment of annual stipend to the Ocopa missionaries 1724-1745. Source: Lehnertz, “Lands of the Infidels,” 316.

The viceregal government was not the only institution that impeded the growth of the Apostolic Institutes’ missions in Peru. The leaders of the Franciscan Province of the Twelve Apostles, which oversaw the Order in most of the Audiencia of Lima including the Institute’s three missionary zones, saw the rise of the Institute as threat to their own power. Once the missionaries could establish a collage de Propaganda Fide, according to

\textsuperscript{112} Audiencia of Lima, Writ, 27 August 1736, Lima, AGI, Lima 539.
the 1686 Innocence Bulls, they would be virtually independent of Provincial Leadership. Therefore the Province attempted to delay the establishment of a permanent base of operations for the Institute as long as possible. The Innocence Bulls stipulated that the Province was obligated to surrender to the Institute two religious houses to be converted into seminaries and eventually colleges of missionaries. Almost immediately upon his arrival in Peru in 1709 San Joseph petitioned the Province to release two such localities. Francisco specifically requested the monastery at Huánuco, which was relatively large facility and was situated at the trailhead of one the Institutes’ *entradas* and was easily accessible to the other two.\(^{113}\) The Province, however, rejected this proposal and after several years of petitioning tried to grant the missionaries a monastery in Huaraz, nearly 180 miles from Huánuco (320 and 350 miles from Tarma and Jauja respectively). The site was impractical as it would take weeks for the missionaries to travel to and from this location and their missions (including a climb over 15,000 ft. pass) and San Joseph refused to take possession of it. San Joseph continued to insist, and began petitioning directly to Madrid and Rome. Finally in 1724 the Province was forced to compromise and ceded to the missionaries the small *Hospicio* of Santa Rosa de Santa Maria de Ocopa.\(^{114}\) Ocopa was located in a remote corner of Mantaro Valley at altitude of 11,108ft. The physical facilities included only two small cells for living quarters and a small chapel dedicated to Saint Rose of Lima.\(^{115}\) Though Ocopa lay relatively high in the mountains and its small facilities were less than ideal, its proximity to Jauja (only 18

\(^{113}\) San Joseph, Letter to the provincial minister of Lima, 12 August 1709, Lima, AGI, Lima 541, copy.  
\(^{114}\) This negotiation is detailed in Rodríguez Tena, *Crónica de las misiones Franciscanas*, 220-237.  
\(^{115}\) Ocopa literally means “corner” in Quechua.
miles away) and Tarma (46 miles) meant that it had ready access to the Institute’s missions. For the next twenty-five years Ocopa was the Peruvian Apostolic Institute’s only base of operations in the viceroyalty, and the name Ocopa became virtually synonymous with the Institute’s until it began to expand into other areas of operation in the 1750’s. The provincial leaders’ delay in establishing of a permanent base of operations for the Institute even earned them the reproach of Pope Benedict XIII who emphasized that “we [the Pope] order, desire, and command, that [the Province] indubitably and inviolably observe…” the command to aid in building colleges de Propaganda Fide in Peru. Subsequently relations between the Ocopa missionaries and the Province began to improve.

Outside groups were not the only factor in delaying aid to the growing Ocopa missions. Though the 12 March 1718 decree granted the Apostolic Institute funds to transport twelve new Peninsular missionaries to Peru, these missionaries did not arrive until 1730. The delay was actually at the request of the Ocopa missionaries who required that one of their own travel to Spain to escort the new missionaries to Peru. The missionaries took this extreme measure because of problems associated with the policy called the Alternativa. The Alternativa was a system devised in late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries and used by several religious orders in the Americas to maintain peace between Peninsular Spaniards and Creoles within religious communities. As early religious communities began to grow in the New World, Creole and Mestizo clerics

116 Amich, Historia de las Misiones, 140.
117 Pope Benedict XIII, Edict to Franciscan provincial ministers in Peru, 17 June 1728, Rome, AGI, Lima 541.
118 Francisco Díaz de Román, Report, 29 November 1729, Madrid, AGI, Arribadas 538.
began to numerically dominate religious houses causing resentment among the small but still powerful Peninsular contingents. This discord tended to flash into open hostility during the election of new community leaders roughly every three to four years leading to several notable schisms. To avoid conflicts, religious communities began to devise a system whereby leadership positions alternated between Peninsulars and Creoles. The Crown later codified the practice into colonial law. By the eighteenth century, the small number of Peninsular regular clerics in the New World forced religious communities to recruit Peninsulars in order to meet the demands of the *Alternativa*. This meant that if any regular Peninsular cleric could afford passage to the New World, they would almost certainly be rewarded with a leadership position which could lead to opportunities back in Spain.\(^{119}\) The Ocopa missionaries so feared that the large monasteries in Lima would snatch up their new missionaries that, in addition to the new missionaries being escorted, they demanded that the 1730 group completely avoid the viceregal capital by landing at the port of Paita and proceed directly to Ocopa.\(^{120}\) In some ways the delay in the arrival of new missionaries was more damaging to the expansion of the missions than viceregal interference in the dissemination of the Ocopa missionaries’ annual stipend. While the missionaries went deeper into the Montaña to encounter new groups purportedly willing to be evangelized, they lacked the manpower to exploit these opportunities.


\(^{120}\) San Joseph, Letter to José Sanz, Commissary-general of Missions, 19 September 1718, Tarma, AGI, Lima 537.
**Expansion of the Missionary Work and Demographic Collapse**

The desperate need for manpower was created by a seemingly rapid expansion of the Ocopa missionary enterprise. From 1709 to 1727 in the Tarma *entrada* the missionaries built six mission stations along the Sal and Perené rivers. Farther below at the confluence of the Perené, Ene Rivers, the Tarma *entrada* effectively merged with the Jauja *entrada*, which by 1727 also had three missions (see Figure 1). Just north of the confluence of these two rivers, the missionaries encountered an elevated, temperate zone called the Gran Pajonal. The region, according to the missionaries was heavily populated, and the more temperate climate seemed to have a greater potential for more permanent missions. In 1727 Friar Juan de la Marca entered the Pajonal, establishing the first mission at Catalipango in 1729. La Marca was aided his journey by the Cacique of Eneno, Mateo de Assia and his brother-in-law the missionaries’ African servant Antonio Gatica. Assia seemed to have been the missionary’s greatest asset in the journey using his “great authority” to “persuade the Ande [Campa] habitants of the Pajonal to receive the law of God.” The missionaries continued to return to the region and by 1739 had at least officially established ten missions in the Pajonal.\(^{121}\)

In Huánuco the missionaries had less success. By 1739 they had only established two missions, which later merged into a single station. These small advances were not for a lack of potential converts nor effort. Starting in 1726 the missionaries sent several expeditions farther east into the jungle with little success. In 1731 their Amuesha converts from Pozuzu guided missionaries to Mayro river valley where the Amuesha

\(^{121}\) Amich, *Historia de las Misiones*, 151-154 (quote on 152); Marquez de Soto Hermoso, Governor of Tarma, Report on the missions, 4 July 1736, AGI, Lima 536.
fished during the summer, which the friars named the Pampas de Sacramento (since they arrived on Corpus Christi). In 1732 an expedition to the Pampas under Friar Simon Jara encountered an Amerindian nation that his Amuesha guides called Carapachos, and while their encounter was peaceful, nobody in the party could communicate with them. Carapachos, a group which ethnographers have been unable to identify, probably spoke a Panoan dialect, distinct from the Arawak language family speakers that the missionaries had previously encountered. Language became a significant barrier to evangelization in the Pampas as several expeditions over the next decade failed to establish any sort of permanent missionary presence in the region. Language, however, was not their only impediment as disease and famines in the Huánuco missions as well as a lack of manpower made expeditions to the Pampas more difficult.\textsuperscript{122}

These rapid expansions in territory in which the missionaries operated, of course, strained Ocopa’s human resources. By the time the ten new missionaries arrived at Ocopa in 1730 (two of the original twelve died in transit), they could do little more than replace the aging friars who manned the existing mission stations. According to the Viceroy Castelfuerte, in 1734 death and abandonment had whittled the number of active full Ocopa friars down to only six.\textsuperscript{123} After 1734 missionaries from other monasteries in Peru helped to bolster their numbers so that by 1736 the missionaries claimed sixteen full friars, two lay friars, twenty-three oblates, and six alms-gathers. As the missionaries began to establish mission station after mission station, however, they still did not have

\textsuperscript{122} Amich, \textit{Historia de las Misiones}, 145-150.
\textsuperscript{123} Castelfuerte, Report to the King, 8 November 1734, Lima, AGI, Lima 539.
enough missionaries to service them. Ideally at least one full friar (meaning he was also an ordained priest) and a companion (a lay friar or oblate) resided in and ministered to each mission community. Additionally at least a handful of friars needed to reside at Ocopa both to administrate the missionary enterprise, and to train new field missionaries. As the missionaries expanded their enterprise in the mid-1730’s, only one friar (sometimes just a lay friar) serviced two or more demographically disparate mission stations. Between 1736 and 1737, the missions of Eneno, Cerro de la Sal, and Metraro only had one friar among them. Also missionaries did not always stay in their designated missions, but upon hearing rumors of new population centers they left their posts to explore surrounding territories.

The problem of manning the missions was further exacerbated by the exhausted jungle soil finally forcing mission communities to spread out over a larger area. Despite the missionaries’ efforts, over time mission communities could no longer live “under the bell,” but had to divide into small family groups called Ayllos that radiated out from a central mission station hub, where the missionaries and other outside settlers lived. One of Eneno’s Ayllos, Epillo, was some thirty miles from the mission church. In response to this lack of manpower, the Ocopa once again petitioned the Crown for more missionaries, this time thirty, which the Crown agreed to support in 1734. Unfortunately

---

124 “Mapa de los Mártires de Santa Rosa de Ocopa,” orginal 1736, copied 1746, AGI, Mapas y Planos, Perú y Chile 32; Four those sixteen full friars came from the monastery of Pisco, Amich, Historia de las Misiones, 141.
126 These types of impromptu expeditions by mission friars were prevalent in the expeditions to the Pampas de Sacramento, Amich, Historia de las Misiones, 145-150.
127 Tibesar, “San Antonio de Eneno,” 27. Ayllo is most likely a Hispanicization of the Quechua word Ayllu or kin group.

60
eleven died in transit and even the remaining nineteen that arrived in Peru 1737 were still insufficient to man all of Ocopa’s supposed mission stations.  

Viceregal officials, however, became suspicious of this rapid proliferation of Ocopa’s mission stations. If Ocopa had so few missionaries, how could they possibly claim mission stations in so many locations? Were these viable, substantial religious communities or simply places where missionaries had at one time visited and possibly baptized some of the population? In 1736 the missionaries presented a census of the missions that claimed that the Jauja, Tarma, and Huánuco entradas contained twenty-four mission stations populated by 4,835 inhabitants. Only three years later a census conducted by Franciscan Commissary Friar Lorenzo de Nuñéz during an official inspection of the missions (Visita), recorded only nine mission stations, San Fermín de Parua, Sonomoro, Quirimí, Nijandaris, Cerro de la Sal, Metraro, Eneno, Pichana, and Los Autes (San Tadeo), with 851 inhabitants. Nuñez seems to have omitted the missions of the Huánuco entrada, Pozuzu and Trilligo, though the 1736 census claimed that these villages only had a combined total of 437. Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa, explorers and reformers who were gathering information for confidential report on the state of Peru for the Crown, estimated that the Ocopa missions had roughly 2,000 inhabitants, based on information they gathered in Lima during the late 1730’s, still less

---

129 “Mapa de los Mártires,” 1736, AGI, Mapas y Planos (Image 3.1). For all the mission stations names also see Map 1.1.  
131 “Mapa de los Mártires,” 1736, AGI, Mapas y Planos.
than half of what the friars claimed. 132 Therefore while Ocopa presented their missions to the Crown as a continually expanding enterprise that flourished miraculously despite problems with manpower and funding, independent census numbers and even their own statistics indicate a less positive outlook.

The change in population in the few mission stations where the missionaries were able to take multiple censuses demonstrated stagnation and even decline in mission populations over time. Between 1722 and 1739 censuses of four mission stations, Quimiri, Cerro de la Sal, Eneno, San Tadeo (los Autes), indicated modest but steady declines in populations (Figure 2). Only in two instances, in Eneno between 1732 and 1735 and in Quimiri between 1735 and 1739, were there actual increases in mission populations, and only one was significant (Eneno’s population nearly doubled during that period). Therefore while Ocopa touted to the Crown the expansion of the number of its mission stations, individual mission station populations were in decline. Indeed the two existent baptismal registries from the Ocopa mission stations of Eneno and Pozuzu demonstrate a similarly steady decline in demographics. In Eneno (Figure 3), while the number of baptisms, which included both adults and children, (blue line) fluctuated wildly during the ten years the missionaries recorded them, the overall trend was negative (black trend line). The mission of Pozuzu perhaps better demonstrates the long term outlook for Ocopa mission populations. Since Pozuzu did not fall to the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebels in 1742, Ocopa missionaries maintained a community there until the end of the colonial period. Its surviving Baptismal Registry from 1736-1787, though it

only included infants and children, shows a similar trend to Eneno. Baptisms (Figure 4 blue line) steadily declined over fifty-one years going from average of 21.6 baptisms during the first five years to an average of 2.6 during the last five (see also yellow trend line). This negative trend was probably exacerbated by the missionaries removing over hundred converts in 1753 to found another mission nearby. While both the census data and the baptismal records indicate a decline in mission populations, they do not explain why these communities were shrinking. Disease and famine certainly took their toll: the burial records that accompanied the baptismal registries for Eneno and Pozuzu suggest periods of high mortality (see the red lines in Figure 3 between 1736 and 1738 and Figure 4 1744), corresponding to known epidemics. The overall trend of burials, however, suggests that disease was not the only factor. Though mortality rates over time were

![Population Change in Four Tarma Missions, 1722-1739](chart.png)

Figure 2 - Source: Heras, *Comienzos de las misiones de Ocopa* (published version of BNP, C 342)
Figure 3 - Source: AGN, Sección Republicana, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libro 567.

Figure 4 - Source: AL-MRREE, LEB-12-4, Caja 94.
slightly higher than baptismal rates, the rate of depopulation tended to be much higher. In Eneno (Figure 3), for example, while baptismal rates from 1732 to 1742 declined slightly from a yearly average of 9 to an average of 11 (see black trendline) and burial rates remained virtually flat, if not slightly elevated (see green line). During the same period, however, the population of the mission community was almost halved, going from 287 to 153. As anecdotal evidence from the Pozuzo’s confession manual suggests, converts must have simply chosen not to live in the mission communities and either left or escaped. Despite both the missionaries’ coercive methods and zeal, the missions apparently could not hold onto their converts. Some converts, rather than leaving their homes, attempted to make the missionaries disappear instead.

Rebellions

Between 1709 and 1742 the Ocopa missions experienced four rebellions in 1712, 1719, 1724, and 1737. Most of these rebellions were small affairs where jungle Amerindians rose up against the local missionaries. All the rebellions involved some contingent of disaffected converts, usually led by the local Cacique, but according the missionaries, they were also always aided by some group of “gentiles” from outside the missions. These rebellions usually consisted of a brief flash of popular anger, resulting in the massacre of the local missionaries and other colonists, followed by the rebels retreating into the jungle to avoid recriminations. These resulted in the deaths of eleven missionaries (between full friars, lay friars, and oblates), and several dozen non-jungle
Amerindian colonists, enslaved Blacks, highland Andeans, and Spanish soldiers. The
death, of course, proved excellent material for their subsequent petitions to the Crown
which detailed the missionaries’ holy sacrifice. One example was the death of Friar
Fernando de San Joseph, one of the original Apostolic missionaries in Peru. After the
Campa Amerindians of the village of Choquizoqui tossed the missionary into a large
bonfire, the friar miraculously emerged holding his crucifix aloft preaching the word of
God before he succumbed to his burns. All of these rebellions were suppressed locally,
usually by a force of mission Amerindian who remained loyal to friars, later joined by a
contingent of regular Spanish troops and militia from Tarma. Generally, however, by the
time outside forces arrived there was little left to suppress, since rebels usually had
already escaped into the jungle.133

The last and largest of these four rebellions, the Torote Rebellion in 1737, closely
followed this model, but demonstrates an escalation in the size and scope of these anti-
missionary rebellions. Ignacio Torote was the Cacique of the village of Catalipango, and
also the son of Fernando Torote who had led a rebellion against the missionaries in 1724.
In early March 1737 he gather twenty-one warriors, seventeen “bad Christians” and four
“infidels” in his home village of Catalipango. There they murdered anybody connected to
the missionaries, an oblate that had been stationed there in the absence of a friar, an
African who presumably worked for the missionaries, his Indian wife, two orphans being
raised by the missionaries, and the wife of Cacique of Sonomoro who must have had

133 Miguel de Rementeria, Lieutenant General of Tarma, Report on the rebellion at Metraro, 2 September
1720, Tarma, AGI, Lima 538; Royal Decree, 12 March 1718, San Lorenzo de el Escorial, AGI, Arribadas
591; Santos Granero, “Epidemias y sublevaciones en el desarroll demográfico de las misiones Amuesha,”
26-52. The story about Friar Fernando is found in Francisco de San Joseph, Report to the Crown, 12 June
1732, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 539.
some connection to the village. After destroying and burning the church they made a rapid march to the mission station of Sonomoro, normally a four-day journey which they made in two and half. On March 20 they surprised the three missionaries at Sonomoro peppering them with arrows. According to Amich, when the dying missionary Manuel Bajo asked Torote why he was killing them, the cacique revealingly responded “Because you and yours are killing us every day with your sermons and doctrines, taking away our liberty. Preach then Father, for we are the Fathers now,” after which they bludgeoned Bajo to death with clubs. The rebels razed the church and stayed in the village until April 1\(^{st}\) when a contingent of eighty highland Andeans from Comas, led by their parish priest and Ocopa missionary Cayetano Rodriguez, arrived in the village and forced the rebels to retreat. Friar Cayetano could do little but bury the dead.\(^{134}\)

The Ocopa missionaries could not let such open and violent defiance stand, since not only had Torote massacred their brothers but had turned a local dispute into a regional one. They begged viceregal authorities for more resources to help capture rebels and completely quash resistance. They petitioned the viceroy through Friar Cayetano himself, who went to Lima bearing not only the tale of possible general insurrection but the arrows pulled from the corpses of the martyred friars. This symbolic gesture worked, and the Viceroy Villagarcía released four thousand pesos for expedition of 150 men lead by the frontier governors, Pedro Milla y Campoy and Benito Trocoso Lira. The force,

\(^{134}\) Much of this account is taken from Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 155-163, but is collaborated by Friar Lorenzo Nuñes de Mendoza, Commissary-general of the Ocopa missions, Letters to the viceroy, 13 May 1736 and 14 April 1737, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 539; Friar Alonso Lopez de Casas, Commissary-general of the Franciscan Order in Peru, Report, 19 May1737, Lima, AGI, Lima 539; Real Acuardo, Act, 16 Abril1737, Lima, AGI Lima 539. See also Santos Granero, “Epidemias y sublevaciones en el desarrollo demográfico de las misiones Amuesha,” 41-42; Lehnertz, “Lands of the Infidels,” 112-113.
however, did not leave the highlands until the middle of October 1737 and by the time they arrived in Catalipango, Torote had retreated deeper into the jungle. The expedition only encountered three suspected members of the Torote’s raiding party, whom they executed two days before Christmas 1737 in Eneno. They placed the heads and hands of the rebels along the paths between the mission stations as warning to future rebels.\textsuperscript{135}

* * *

The Torote Rebellion demonstrates the systemic problems within the missions that fueled indigenous desires for resistance. Torote’s supposed words to the dying Friar Manuel Bajo were indeed true. The reduction of jungle Amerindians into the missions, the desired result of those “sermons and doctrines,” was killing the native population. Attempts to create permanent concentrated population centers along with disease slowly reduced mission populations. Catalipango, where the rebellion had begun, had just suffered from an outbreak of an unknown bleeding disease, which had increased the mortality rate of the neighboring mission station of Eneno by a factor of five (see Figure 3).

Furthermore, the missionaries’ zealous overextension of their manpower had created a space for resistance. Only one oblate and one African servant manned Catalipango at the time the rebellion broke out. Perhaps a more substantial presence in the area could have at least warned the missionaries of the brewing discontent of the village’s Cacique. Viceregal avoidance of supplying the missionaries with their annual stipend, however, undoubtedly was a factor in the fragile state of the missions at the end

\textsuperscript{135} Ibid.
of the 1730’s. A lack of funds meant a slower development of mission facilities, fewer resources to attract Amerindians to the missions, and less protection for missions and expeditions. Though these effects were only secondary to a flawed missionary model, they were a portent for viceregal involvement during the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion.
Chapter 2: Rebellion, Religion, and Regalism

In June 1742 the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion erupted from the small jungle village of Quisopango, eventually leading to the destruction of all but two of the twenty-three mission stations under the control of the Franciscan monastery of Santa Rosa de Ocopa. Despite a recurring pattern of violent resistance in the high jungle mission stations serviced by the friars, the rebellion took the missionaries almost completely by surprise. Whispers of indigenous unrest (and actual uprisings) were a common facet of missionary service in the high jungles of Peru, but the size and scope of the rebellion was previously unmatched. Heretofore, uprisings in the missions had been limited to a single village or group, while the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion spread over a large swath of the Peruvian high jungle and involved multiple ethnic groups. Furthermore, the rebellion was led not by a local Cacique, but by a highland Andean interloper, Juan Santos, suggesting that it had the potential to spread beyond the remote jungle missions. One of the few successful anticolonial revolts during the entire colonial period, Spanish officials never captured Juan Santos, and the Spanish Crown never again controlled the region in which the rebellion took place.

For centuries, missionaries and scholars alike have focused on the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion when discussing the history of the missions of Santa Rosa de Ocopa. The Ocopa missionaries used the rebellion, particularly the stories of the martyrs it
produced, as a tool of propaganda to acquire more support for their missionary enterprise. Later nationalist Peruvian historians, particularly during the Indigenista movement of the 1920’s-40’s, erroneously linked the rebellion to the Creole-led independence movement some eighty years later. More recent scholarship has focused on characterizing the rebellion as the beginning of a series of indigenous-led, anticolonial uprisings that culminated in what historians have dubbed the Great Age of Andean Insurrections (1780-1782). While such a direct link to these later uprisings is tenuous at best, the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion was of sufficient size to warrant the attention

136 As early as the 1770’s, Ocopa’s official chronicler, Friar José Amich, in Historia de las misiones del convento de Santa Rosa de Ocopa wrote extensively on the rebellion and its effects on the missionaries. Amich complained about how the lack of Crown support for missionaries had allowed the rebellion to flourish. This not so subtle condemnation was strategically aimed at convincing the Crown to maintain, if not increase, its financial and military support of the missionaries with the hope of retaking the lost missions even twenty years later. Amich’s writings also attempted to deflect the blame for the rebellion, which Crown officials had placed squarely on the Franciscan missionaries at Ocopa. Amich’s sentiments were echoed, albeit less pointedly, by his contemporary Franciscan chronicler, Friar Fernando Rodrigo Tena (Crónica de las misiones franciscanas del Perú, siglos XVII y XVIII, vol 2, also completed sometime in the 1770’s). The emphasis of Franciscan historians on Juan Santos continued even until the 1920’s, when Friar Bernardino Izaguirre dedicated several chapters of his multi-volume work on Franciscan missions in eastern Peru to the rebellion (Historia de las misiones franciscanas y narración de los progresos de la geografía en el oriente del Perú; relatos originales y producciones en lenguas indígenas de varios misioneros... 1619-1921, vol. 2).

137 In the notes and introduction of historian José Loayza’s 1942 document collection, Juan Santos, el Invencible, he argued that the rebellion was a “precursor” to the Peruvian Independence movement of the 1820’s. Indigenista intellectuals, such as Loayza, attempted to reconcile the Creole-led Independence movement with earlier attempts at indigenous autonomy, such as the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, to create a unifying national identity in a republic where a creole elite ruled over the indigenous majority. Although most scholars reject this interpretation of Juan Santos as a proto-nationalist figure, the idea has remained popular in Peru and was reflected in journalist Mario Castro Arenas’ 1973 La rebelión de Juan Santos.

138 The Great Andean Revolts is a term used by historians to describe three nearly simultaneous uprisings: Tupac Amaru Rebellion in the Cusco region of modern-day Peru (1780-1782), and Tomás Catari in Chayanta (1780-1781), and Tupac Katari Rebellion near La Paz (1780-1782) in modern-day Bolivia. While these rebellions shared similar causes, principally a reaction to economic pressures created by the Bourbon reforms, and the rebels were aware of each other, and after the death of Tupac Amaru his followers fought alongside the Tupac Katari rebels. Steve J. Stern in “The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742-1782: a Reappraisal” argues that Great Andean Revolts were part of larger consciousness of resistance that started with the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion. While certainly all these rebellions were caused in some part by the impositions of colonialism, historical records do not seemed to support the type of direct relationship between the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion and the later revolts that Stern insinuates.
and concern of high-ranking royal ministers in Lima and Madrid, including the Viceroy and the Minister of the Indies. Indeed, royal officials attempted to connect Juan Santos to conspiracies and civil disturbances throughout the viceroyalty of Peru.\textsuperscript{139}

While the previous historiography identifies the local political implications of the rebellion, they tended to ignore its larger ramifications, as the uprising signaled a dramatic shift in Spanish policy away from the regular clergy’s involvement in the empire’s frontiers. Though Viceroy Villagarcía and later his successor José Antonio Manso de Velasco initially sent a series of small, undermanned expeditions in an attempt to crush the rebels and retake control of the missions, they did so more out of a desire to be seen defending Spain’s frontiers rather than to protect Franciscan evangelization efforts. Manso de Velasco in particular was a dedicated regalist reformer who after the Lima Earthquake/Tsunami in 1746 strove to limit the wealth and power of the regular clergy. Therefore, in 1750 after Manso de Velasco implicated two of Ocopa’s former missionaries in a conspiracy to overthrow the viceregal government and citing nearly eight years of failed expeditions, the viceroy ended his support for retaking the lost Ocopa missions. He instead ceded the mission territory to the rebels, and reinforced the highland entrances to the jungle with an increased military presence.

Manso de Velasco’s decision to replace missionaries with a military zone in the frontier represents one of the earliest examples of a shift in Crown policy toward Spain’s colonial frontiers that came to characterize Bourbon border policy. After the initial invasion of America, the Crown hoped that missionary enterprises in the empire’s

\textsuperscript{139} These rebellions include: Lima Conspiracy of 1750 and the Huarochirí Rebellion which are discussed later in the chapter.
frontiers could extend colonial hegemony through the peaceful conversion of marginalized, mainly semi-nomadic peoples. Starting as early as the late 1740’s, however, colonial administrators began to replace religious institutions in the frontier with military units. Increasingly regalist Crown authorities not only disliked their inability to directly control the regular clergy on the frontier, but they argued that a missionary led frontier policy had proved to be ineffective. In theory, missions were only supposed to be temporary institutions, quickly transformed into full-fledged parishes once missionaries had sufficiently Hispanicized the native populations. Reformers argued that instead of building stable communities, the missionaries had created virtual fiefdoms with the financial aid of the state, greedily extracting labor and resources from the natives for their Orders resulting in economic stagnation and even rebellion in frontier zones.\footnote{140 Weber, \textit{Bárbaros: Spaniards and their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment}, 91-137.}

Ironically, while corruption in missions was rampant throughout the Americas, Franciscan leadership, as well as court officials in Madrid, saw Ocopa as one the best examples of missionaries dedicated to evangelization of the non-catholicized populations of the Americas. To Manso de Velasco, however, the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion demonstrated the Ocopa missionaries were no different than their corrupt Franciscan brothers elsewhere.

\textit{Juan Santos Atahualpa}

Little is known about Juan Santos before the outbreak of the rebellion in June 1742. The Franciscan chronicler José Amich described him as a Mestizo ladino from
Cuzco who was taller than average with pale skin, muscular limbs, a beard, and his hair cut short like “the Indians of Quito” but that he dressed in the traditional *cushma* of the jungle Amerindians. Another source contended that Juan Santos was about thirty years old when the rebellion broke out. He spoke or had knowledge of at least four languages, including Spanish, Latin, Quechua, and the local Campa language. Juan Santos claimed to have been the servant of a Jesuit priest, whom he had accompanied to Europe and Africa. Sometime during this journey, Juan Santos maintained that he had met with “the English,” who had agreed to support by sea his rebellion against Spain. According to Amich’s account, written several decades later, Juan Santos then entered the Ocopa missions in May 1742 in an attempt to flee justice after he had killed a man in Huamanga (modern-day Ayacucho). According to this account, while wandering through the high jungle he encountered the Cacique of Quisopango, Mateo Santabangori, who guided him to his village where he began his rebel movement. A more contemporary account written by royal officials in 1744, however, refutes Amich’s version, instead saying that between 1729 and 1730 Santos traveled along the Peruvian Andes “from Cusco to Cajamarca” claiming to be the legitimate descendant of the Incas, who was attempting to “restore his Kingdom from the power of the Spanish and free his vassals from the tyrannies that they suffer.” After this attempt to rally support in the highlands, perhaps

---

141 Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 167
142 Friars Manuel Santos and Domingo García, Report to Commissary Father Friar José Gil Muñoz, Pichana, 2 June 1742, JSEI 1-7. In the notes of his document collection of the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, Loayza attempts to connect the activities of British privateers in the Pacific with the rebellion. Since Spain and Britain were still opposing combatants in the War of Jenkins Ear (subsumed into the War of Austrian Succession on the continent) until 1748, his evidence is circumstantial at best.
143 Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 167. While Amich’s account is deeply flawed, containing an extreme bias toward the missionaries and having been written several decades after the rebellion (1770’s), his access to missionaries who had been around during the rebellion signifies that at the very least his account reflects the missionaries’ general consensus about Juan Santos which shaped their reaction to him.
some ten years before the outbreak of the rebellion, Santos made his way to the missions. 144 Considering Santos’ fluency in the local dialect and his widespread local support, it is more likely that he had spent considerable time among the jungle Amerindians before the outbreak of hostilities in 1742. Several years before the rebellion, according to another Franciscan historian, Francisco Rodríguez Tena, a lay friar from Cusco named José Vela prophesized that “in seventeen forty-two an abominable monster will rise up in this kingdom who will attempt, filled with arrogance, to Crown himself king of all this kingdom and new world of Peru,” suggesting that rumors of a rebellion in the Montaña may have already reached the highlands. 145 What is certain, however, is that a year before the rebellion, Commissary of the Missions in Peru, Friar Joseph Gil Muñoz, noted that “infidels” were meeting with converts in “secret conferences,” which made the converts “vacillate in their fidelity” so as to want to “insult the father missionaries and take away their lives.” 146 By June 1742, missionaries in both the Tarma and Jauja entradas as far out as the Gran Pajonal started reporting that people, mostly young men, were fleeing their missions, headed, according to those who remained, to Quispango to see the “Apu-Inca” or Lord Inca Juan Santos Atahualpa.

Santos created the fervor that fueled his rebellion by combining Catholic theology with highland Andean and jungle Amerindian millenarianism. For example when the first Ocopa missionary, Friar Santiago Vázquez de Caicedo, arrived in Quispango from the neighboring mission of Autes, he found people gathered in the center of village. As he

144 José Patricio de Arbeiza y Elizonda and Manuel de Barrenechea, Officers of the Royal Treasury, Report to the Crown, Pasco, 14 March 1744, JSEI 50-53.
145 Rodríguez Tena, Crónica de las misiones franciscanas, 337.
146 Joseph Gil Muñoz, Commissar of the Missions of Peru, Petition to the Crown, Lima, 8 March 1741, AGI, Lima 808.
approached he called out “hail Mary” to the crowd, who responded with the perfunctory “without sin conceived.” After Santos appeared wearing a silver cross, Friar Santiago asked him questions about Christian doctrine, to which Santos responded in Spanish in a satisfactory manner to the friar, and then he recited the Creed in Latin. According to most accounts, Santos claimed that God had told him to reconquer Peru from Spain. Amich went so far as to state that Santos claimed he was the Son of God.\textsuperscript{147} Juan Santos also seems to have borrowed ideas from the Mosaic Law, learned probably from his years serving a Jesuit priest, ordering that the villagers slaughter all the pigs, deeming them to be unclean.\textsuperscript{148}

While Juan Santos outwardly practiced Christian rites, he incorporated rhetoric that appealed particularly to highland Andean cultural sensibilities. According to the few existing descriptions of Santos’ ideology, all of them secondhand, Santos continued to rail against the abuses of the Spanish colonizers, as he had reportedly done in the Highlands between 1729 and 1730. For example, he ordered an end to obrajes and the mita, neither of which existed in the missions. He also invoked Andean millenarian rhetoric. He conceived the world as only having three kingdoms: Spain, the Congo, and his kingdom, which he should rightfully rule as the last Inca Atahualpa’s direct descendant.\textsuperscript{149} He took the name Atahualpa in order to emphasize his claim to royal Incan lineage. One scholar has argued that his choice of this name was an attempt to invoke the Andean myth of Incarri, a messianic tradition that held that the Inca would return from

\textsuperscript{147} Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 167-168.
\textsuperscript{148} Friars Manuel Santos and Domingo Garcia, Report to Commissar Father Friar José Gil Muñoz, 2 June 1742, Pichana, JSEI; 5-6.
\textsuperscript{149} \textit{Ibid.}, 4.
the dead to retake control of Peru. According to Amich, Santos promised that he would expand his rebellion into the heavily populated highlands, and even sent a “spy” to try to convince the highland Andeans to join his cause. From all accounts, his goal was not simply local control but to march on Lima where he would, aided by the British navy, force the viceroy to surrender Peru to him. Both the Ocopa missionaries and viceregal officials used fears that Santos’ rebellion would somehow spread to the highlands to urge the Crown to support their plan for action against his followers. In both sets of correspondences to the Crown there are vague references to highland Andeans going down to the jungle; however, there no examples of such a movement happening en masse. Although some highland Andeans did join Santos and perhaps many others were sympathetic to his cause, neither his anticolonial nor his millenarian rhetoric seemed to have been enough to convince large numbers to join him in the jungle.

Juan Santos’ military force actually was composed almost entirely of indigenous nations from the Montaña, although he made no reference to them in his statements recorded by contemporaries. Anthropologist Stefano Varese argues that Santos was able to command jungle Amerindian forces because of key alliances he had forged with the local caciques in the Tarma entrada. Santos maintained a close relationship with

---

150 Santos Graneros, “Anticolonialismo, mesianismo, utopía en la sublevación de Juan Santos Atahualpa,” 37.
151 Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 167-170; Friars Manuel Santos and Domingo Gracia, Report to Commissary Father Friar José Gil Muñoz, 2 June 1742, Pichana, JSEI, 5-6.
152 While many Highland Andeans sympathized with Santos, they seem to not recognize his leadership. As part of the long process of colonization in Peru, the Spanish had divided most of the Andeans along kinship groups. Andeans usually only recognized the leadership of their immediate Kuraka. Larger indigenous hierarchies for the most part had been long since dismantled. Consequently most rebel groups in the colonial period were extended kinship communities such as in the Tupac Amaru Rebellion (see Ward Stavig, *The World of Tupac Amaru*).
Mateo de Assia, the cacique of Metraro and Eneno, who served as one his principal
generals.\textsuperscript{154} Varese, however, also argues that the community of Sonomoro did not join
the rebellion because of its cacique’s positive disposition toward the missionaries, though
he ignores the fact that the Torote rebellion had razed the village only five years earlier,
perhaps making them apprehensive to join another rebel group.\textsuperscript{155} Certainly, while the
support of local caciques was vital in initiating the rebellion, the size, duration, and multi-
ethnic composition of the rebellion suggest that Santos’ appeal to the Jungle Amerindian
cultural and economic interests was more important in mobilizing supporters than any
traditional ethnic or familial alliances. Santos possibly invoked similar anti-colonial
and/or religious themes among the jungle Amerindians as he did with the highland
Andeans, but no known record of this remains. For example, Montaña cultures contained
similar millenarian traditions to the highland Incarrí that Santos certainly exploited. The
Campa (Asháninka) had the Kesha, a cultural hero with messianic characteristics, while
the Amuesha had the Yompor Ror, a messianic figure who was supposed to return to give
the people the gift of immortality, a belief possibly derived from the hybrid mixture of
local beliefs with Christianity.\textsuperscript{156} After Santos’ arrival, the Amuesha alternatively began
to call the Yompor Ror the Yompor Santo, giving credence to Santos utilizing a deeper

\textsuperscript{154} Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 169
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., 155-160.
\textsuperscript{156} While messianic millenarianism is a common theme in most belief systems, given the area’s recent
Catholic evangelization, the idea that the Yompor Ror gave immortality, a less common messianic
tradition, suggests that at least that aspect of this belief could have come from Christianity; Santos
socio-religious connection to the jungle cultures. Similar beliefs were shared by all the other jungle nations who purportedly participated in the rebellion.\textsuperscript{157}

The jungle Amerindians had other socio-economic reasons for rebelling against the missionaries. Well before Juan Santos Atahualpa arrived in the missions, jungle Amerindians had rebelled violently against the missionaries. They rose up for the same reasons they had before: the rigid missionary lifestyle, the increased intrusion of commercial interests, and most importantly, the demographic collapse caused by successive waves of epidemics, which the jungle Amerindians blamed on the missionaries. This time, however, Juan Santos coordinated their efforts more effectively. The missionaries for their part attributed Juan Santos’ popularity to his promises of steel tools which the Amerindians “search[ed] for with great covetousness,”\textsuperscript{158} a gross over simplification of complex resistance to missionaries’ cultural and commercial impositions.

Juan Santos also drew a third group into the rebellion, the Africans who served the missionaries. Enslaved and free Blacks had become an integral part of the missionary enterprise. Ironically Juan Santos had specifically vilified Africans as functionaries of their Spanish masters in accounts of his speeches. In Quisopango, as the forces of Juan Santos took control of the mission, villagers attacked three Blacks left behind by the Ocopa friars. At the same time, Santos claimed to oppose slavery, prohibiting it in his new kingdom, though his rhetoric also suggested that Africans would be driven out of

\textsuperscript{157} These nations included the Machiguenga, Piro, Shipibo, Conibo, and Cashibo; \textit{Ibid.}

\textsuperscript{158} Lay Friar Juan de San Antonio, Report to the Crown, Lima, 28 February 1757, Lima 808, AGI; Joseph Antonio Manso de Velasco, “Relación que hizo de su Gobierno,” BNE, Mss. 3108, 120r.
Peru with the Spaniards.\footnote{Friars Manuel Santos and Domingo Gracia, Report to Commissar Father Friar José Gil Muñoz, 2 June 1742, Pichana, JSEI, 5-7.} Despite these contradictions, some Blacks joined and even served in leadership positions in Juan Santos’ forces. African Antonio Gatica was one of Juan Santos’ principal commanders alongside his brother-in-law Cacique Mateo de Assia. He was joined by at least seven other Blacks. Since some Africans had worked in the capacity as soldiers for the missionaries, they proved invaluable to the rebellion, most likely wielding and perhaps training jungle Amerindians to use European weapons that Santos’ forces acquired.

Juan Santos’ rhetoric also aimed at pitting the Catholic regular orders against each other, particularly Jesuits against Franciscans, as well the regular clergy against regalist Crown officials. Santos stated that once in power, he would send the Franciscan friars back to Spain and obtain permission from Rome to ordain Indians to be priests. He then stipulated that the only priests allowed in his kingdom would be Jesuits. While Santos’ preference for Jesuits certainly stemmed from his relationship with his former master, the Society of Jesus was the only regular order at this time that frequently allowed non-Europeans into their ranks. According to Santos’ own alleged statements, he had witnessed an African be ordained a priest by the Jesuits while accompanying his former Jesuit master in Angola and wanted only Amerindian priests in his new kingdom.\footnote{Ibid., 4-7.} Santos may have been using this rhetoric to exploit existing animosities between Franciscans and Jesuits, who had been vying for missionary territories in frontiers of Peru since the late sixteenth century. At the time of Juan Santos’ rebellion, King Philip V

\footnote{Friars Manuel Santos and Domingo Gracia, Report to Commissar Father Friar José Gil Muñoz, 2 June 1742, Pichana, JSEI, 5-7.}

\footnote{Ibid., 4-7.}
favored the Jesuits, even selecting one as his confessor, leading to their ascendancy in Spanish imperial politics during the early eighteenth century and causing anxiety among Franciscans.\textsuperscript{161} Furthermore, the idea of ordaining Amerindians to the priesthood was hotly debated during this time period both within the Franciscan order and amongst regalist ministers, who opposed such deviations from orthodox social hierarchies. The Ocopa missionaries themselves favored the ordination of native clergy. Perhaps Santos hoped this declaration would spark conflicts both within and among the orders and the Bourbon government that would give him time to establish himself in the central Montaña.

Santos did not wait passively for his rhetoric to inflame imperial rivalries or incite a general insurrection. By the time Friar Santiago arrived in Quisopango, Santos’ band had already overpowered the Blacks, stole their weapons and constructed a crude fort. Over the next few months, Santos’ forces, commanded by Assia and Gatica, expelled converts and missionaries alike from most of the missions in the Tarma \textit{entrada}. By September 1742, most of the missionaries had gathered in the last reduction left in the \textit{entrada}, Quimiri. Meanwhile, word of the rebellion had reached Lima, where Villagarcía and the \textit{Audiencia} voted to provide 6,000 pesos and 100 muskets to the frontier governors of Tarma and Jauja, with orders to subdue the rebellion.\textsuperscript{162} Governors Benito Troncoso and Pedro de Milla met in a war council early in September and devised a plan to take Juan Santos in a pincer movement. Troncoso would lead his troops through the Jauja \textit{entrada} to the rear of where they believed Juan Santos to be encamped at Metraro or

\textsuperscript{161} Lynch, \textit{Bourbon Spain}, 158-160.
\textsuperscript{162} The correspondence regarding the funding and allocation of weapons is found in JSEI 13-19.
Eneno. Meanwhile, Milla would make a more direct advance through the Tarma *entrada* down the Chanchamayo river valley (see Figure 5). They hoped to trap Juan Santos so that he could not retreat into the jungle, as Ignacio Torote had done a few years before. To prepare for the arrival of troops from Tarma, the presiding missionary at Quimirí ordered one of their oblates to go with several local converts to clear a path for the soldiers. He returned without success, reporting the presence of many Amerindian “infidels” blocking the path. Two missionaries, who had fled to Quimirí from their assigned missions, Domingo García and José Cabanes, volunteered to lead another expedition to clear the paths. As their party attempted to repair the bridge over La Sal River, they were ambushed and killed along with one oblate.163

By mid-September of 1742, Troncoso and Milla began to prepare for their advances toward Juan Santos’ encampment. On the 17th Troncoso gathered his forces at Sonomoro, the first mission in the Jauja *entrada*, but with no word from Milla, he waited ten days before departing. The two commanders never successfully coordinated their attacks. On the 27th Troncoso began his march and with the aid of sixty local Amerindiands, they arrived at the birth place of the rebellion, Quisopango, two weeks later. Troncoso attacked the makeshift fortress Juan Santos had erected and killed the local cacique with no losses to his own troops. As he suspected, the bulk of Juan Santos’ forces had moved on and were now at the reductions of Eneno and Nijándaris. Unable to communicate with Milla, he probably realized he could not face such a large host so far

---

163 Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 168-169; a record of the war council formed by Milla and Troncoso is located in ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 19, 204r-206r, Santa Ana de Pampas, 7-August-1742, scribe Juan de Mesa Valera.
from his line of supplies in the harsh conditions of the high jungle and decided to retreat in good order back to Sonomoro. Milla on the other hand was delayed because of a lack of supplies, and he did not leave Tarma until October 1st. In mid-October Milla arrived at Cerro de la Sal, but there delayed his advance for two more weeks to wait for reinforcements from Tarma. Fearing that disease would ravage his troops, on the 1st of November he decided to attack Nijándaris before help from Tarma could arrive. At Nijándaris, however, fierce resistance and the fear that the Juan Santos’ rebels would cut off his retreat forced Milla to withdraw under the cover of darkness back to Cerro de la Sal and ultimately Tarma. By the summer of 1743, with the exception of Sonomoro, the missionaries abandoned all the missions in the entradas of Tarma and Jauja for the shelter of the highlands.164

Once word reached Lima of Troncoso’s and Milla’s failure to crush Juan Santos’ rebellion, Viceroy Villagarcía ordered the construction of a new fortress at Quimiri in order to “subjugate the apostates and infidels, hinder the transit of Indians from the sierra to the jungle, and also to serve as a staging area for the formal expedition which he considered launching to capture the rebel.”165 To assure success, he sent two companies of soldiers from Callao, under Captains Pedro Alamora and Fabricio Bartuli, along with four four-pound cannons and four swivel guns. In mid-October 1743 the expedition left Tarma under the command of the governor of the province, Alfonso Santa, and accompanied by three Ocopa missionaries, including Friar Lorenzo Núñez. Fortunately

164 Amich, Historia de las misiones, 168-169; Villagarcía, Report to the King, 16 August 1744, Lima, JSEI, 55-69; A daily log of the Milla expedition is found in JSEI, 19-48.
165 Amich, Historia de las misiones, 174.
for the expedition, their departure coincided with Juan Santos’ attack on Huancabamba farther to the north, and they arrived in Quimiri without incident on the 27th. There they built a fort and garrisoned it with seventy men under the command of Captain Bartuli, with Friar Lorenzo attending to the soldiers’ spiritual needs, before marching back to Tarma on November 11th. While Santa armed the fort with the weapons and munitions from Callao, he left only a small amount of food provisions, with the promise to resupply them later. Two days after the expedition returned to Tarma, a party was sent to resupply the fortress. Because the initial expedition to build the fort had not encountered any resistance, in all likelihood because of the absence of rebel forces in the area, the resupplying party was lightly armed. When the party reached the Chanchamayo River, rebels ambushed them, killing seventeen men and taking possession of the supplies so desperately needed at the fort. As the lack of supplies became desperate in the fort, the commander sent Friar Lorenzo Núñez back to Tarma to beg for relief. Despite the real threat of capture and death, Núñez and another missionary made their way to Tarma, but he found Santa unwilling to help relieve the fortress, probably because of the fate of the re-supplying party. Santa’s intransigence forced the friars to travel to Lima for aid.166

Upon meeting with Núñez, Viceroy Villagarcía ordered the governors of Jauja and Tarma to relieve the fort “with the promptness that [this] urgency required.”167 By the 28th of December 300 men left Tarma under the command of Frontier Governor Benito Troncoso. Sometime before the beginning of January, however, the rebels had breached the fort and massacred the garrison. As a result, when Troncoso’s expedition arrived at

166 Ibid., 174-175.
167 Ibid., 175.
the Chanchamayo River on the 3rd, they were met with artillery fire from the cannon and swivel guns left at the fort as well as a display of the bloody shirts taken from its fallen defenders. Seeing no way to cross the river under fire and no purpose in relieving the now dead garrison, Troncoso withdrew his men back to Tarma, marking the last armed expedition to attempt to end the rebellion under Viceroy Villagarcía.\footnote{168}

After the fall of Quimíri, Friar Lorenzo Núñez began negotiations with the rebels through intermediaries to allow missionaries to reenter the Jauja and Tarma entradas. According to Amich, however, this negotiation failed because Villagarcía prohibited Núñez from personally entering the Montaña to conclude the peace agreement. Seemly unconvinced of the Franciscans’ ability to deal with Juan Santos, Villagarcía turned to the Jesuits to mediate an end to the rebellion. The Jesuits had petitioned the viceroy to allow one of their Order, a Father Irusta, to enter the Montaña and negotiate a cessation of hostilities. Almost certainly, these Jesuits believed that since Juan Santos favored the Society over the Franciscans, they would have success and quite possibly take over the missions from Ocopa. In the summer of 1745, Irusta, who seemed to have had some experience in the central Montaña, met with several principal Caciques, claiming that Cacique Mateo de Assia had agreed to help royal troops to capture Juan Santos. But news of this possible break in Juan Santos’ alliance did not reach Lima before Villagarcía had left office in 1745.\footnote{169}

\footnote{169} Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 176-177.
Viceroy Villagarcía’s inability to crush the rebellion, however, did not make him reluctant to blame the Ocopa missionaries for instigating the rebellion. Villagarcía traced the outbreak of the rebellion to the heavy handed behavior of one of the Ocopa missionaries, the then-deceased Friar Domingo García. García had ordered Mateo de Assia, an important Cacique and one of Juan Santos’ principal generals, whipped for interfering with the punishment of his brother Bartolomé, who had been accused of adultery. Villagarcía judged this action to be of “indiscrete immoderation” which made Assia feel “notable insult,” causing him to lead his people “to rise up against the obedience” of the friars.\(^{170}\) To counter the Viceroy’s attacks, the Ocopa missionaries appeared before the frontier governor of Jauja, Benito Troncoso, to present testimony on the matter. They probably hoped to present this evidence to the Crown to exonerate themselves from any rumors of malfeasance that might have reached Madrid. They selected Troncoso because he had significant personal and economic ties to Ocopa and was thus a sympathetic mediator.\(^{171}\) From the testimony, Troncoso concluded that Bartolomé de Assia had indeed committed adultery and that in trying to interfere with his brother’s punishment, Mateo de Assia had broken the law and therefore García had every legal right to whip both brothers in an attempt to teach Catholic sexual morality to the “infidels” under Mateo’s leadership. Governor Troncoso was further persuaded in his ruling by the discovery of Friar Domingo’s decapitated head, which, despite being buried almost a month in moist jungle soil, was apparently “fresh, without corruption or bad

\(^{170}\) Villagarcía, Relación de su gobierno, Mss, BNE, 3107, 21v; also found in Real Biblioteca, Real Palacio de Madrid, II/1349, 25v; and JSEI, 86.

\(^{171}\) Troncoso donated the entirety of his deceased wife’s estate to the Ocopa missionaries in 1750 totaling more than 16,000 silver pesos; see ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 21, ff. 639-641, 8-vi-1750, Santa Rosa de Ocopa, scribe Juan de Mesa Valera.

87
odor,” a well-known sign of sainthood. Whether these testimonies ever even reached Villagarcía or other government official is unclear.

Villagarcía’s overall assessment of the missionaries was divided between his private opinion and his official statements. In a private letter of advice to his successor, he admitted that “experience will manifest to his excellency that nature [in the Montaña] has placed an impenetrable bar to arms and that this is a conquest of hearts (ánimos) that the wisdom of the missionaries will make [against] the backwardness of the Barbarians.” Even publically, Villagarcía did not place complete blame on the missionaries for the rebellion, recognizing that obviously the “Indios Chunchos” (non-mission Amerindians) who had supported the “pretend Inca” and actually rebelled, had ruined the missionaries’ work. His official report to the Crown on the rebellion, however, was bitingly critical. He considered the restoration of the missions to be “very difficult,” and while he said he could not deny the zeal of the missionaries, he questioned their ability to administer their missions. He complained that though his government had given the Franciscan missionaries 16,000 pesos, they had little to show for it, and questioned whether it would be “convenient if those missions remained under the power of these friars.” Perhaps the viceroy’s attack against Ocopa to the Crown was an attempt to create a scapegoat for his administration’s inability to deal with Santos. A later viceroy, Manuel de Amat, hinted that the king removed Villagarcía as viceroy because of his inability to deal with the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion, although he was 79 years old.

172 Causa contra Fray Domingo Garcia, 8 October 1745, found in Ibid., 106 – 109.
173 Villagarcía, Correspondence with Manso de Velasco, 1745, RAH, 9-9-3 1699.
175 Ibid. During the Villagarcía’s administration, the Ocopa friars should have been paid 60,000 pesos.
of age and due for relief. In many ways, however, Viceroy Villagarcía’s attacks of ineptitude against the Ocopa friars echoed previous criticisms, which would be repeated in later years as Bourbon reformers made their case against Ocopa.

King Philip V replaced Villagarcía with José Antonio Manso de Velasco y Sánchez de Samaniego, then president of the Audiencia of Chile. Manso de Velasco was a dedicated regalist and an up-and-coming figure in the Spanish bureaucracy. Born in the northern Spanish province of La Rioja in the city of Torrecilla in 1689, José Antonio Manso de Velasco had risen through the ranks of the Spanish government through a combination of military success and political skill. In 1705, he joined the Spanish royal guards and saw combat in the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1713). In 1736, he was named Captain General of the Philippines, but the assignment was later changed to Chile, where he served from 1737 to 1745. In Chile, Manso de Velasco gained invaluable experience when he oversaw the reconstruction of Valdivia after an earthquake destroyed the city in November 1737. But Manso de Velasco’s 1744 appointment as viceroy of Peru was not based on his experience alone. Manso was closely aligned in court with his fellow riojano, Zenón de Somodevilla y Bengoechea, the first Marques de la Ensenada. Somodevilla, like Manso, was not of noble birth. Having started as a clerk he advancing his way through the Spanish civil administration. After helping to orchestrate the coronation of King Philip V’s youngest two sons as kings of Naples and Sicily, and Parma, respectively, Somodevilla received the Neapolitan title of Marques de la Ensenada. In 1743, because of his adept administrative skills, King Philip appointed

---

176 Amat, Relación que hizo de su gobierno, BNE, Mss. 3112, 188v.
Ensenada minister of finance, war, navy, and the Indies as well as secretary of State and superintendent of revenues, or in the words of one historian, “secretary of everything.” Ensenada’s correspondences with Manso de Velasco were peppered with flowery odes of brotherhood, such as referring to each other as “countryman of my soul,” and demonstrate a close friendship and political alliance. Along with whatever personal relationship they may have had, Ensenada and Manso de Velasco shared an intense dedication to the goals of regalism. Having the patronage of Ensenada, who by 1745 had become the most powerful man in Spain, therefore, gave Manso de Velasco, unprecedented latitude in reforming the viceroyalty, or at least so the new viceroy believed.

Ensenada ordered that Manso de Velasco’s first task be to “assure the pacification” of the rebellious provinces in the east. Ensenada suggested that Manso de Velasco could even bring in troops from Chile to quell the Juan Santos rebellion. Ensenada’s concern in quashing the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion had more to do with assuring the viceroyalty’s security rather than helping Ocopa. Also in July, just as Manso de Velasco became viceroy, Father Irusta arrived in Lima with word of Mateo Assia’s defection to the royalist cause. Manso de Velasco acted quickly, ordering troops from Callao to Tarma, placing them under the command of General José de Llamas. Llamas arrived in Tarma in February with orders from the viceroy to immediately enter the Montaña with the aid of frontier governor Benito Troncoso. Troncoso warned against an

---

179 For a good example of this type language see: Ensenda, Correspondence with Manso de Velasco, 30 November 1748, Madrid, AGI, Lima 643.
180 Ensenada, Instructions to Viceroy Manso de Velasco, 21 December 1744, Madrid, JSEI, 74 - 76.
expedition during the rainy season that made the Montaña roads impassable and fostered disease. Not wanting to contradict his orders from the viceroy, however, Llamas pressed on, and in March his troops left Tarma in two separate parties, with 200 men-at-arms and 300 baggage carriers commanded by Llamas himself, and 150 men-at-arms with 200 baggage carriers under Troncoso, the largest expedition ever launched against the Juan Santos rebels.

The expedition, however, was an utter failure. Troncoso’s warning about mounting an expedition in the rainy season proved prophetic. Damp conditions rotted their provisions, and the troops to suffered from disease and fatigue, while the pack animals slipped and stuck in soft mud and most had to be abandoned. Both parties had small skirmishes near Nijándaris, but neither achieved victory, as the rains saturated their powder supplies to the point that they were unusable. The alliance with Mateo de Assia that the Jesuits claimed to have forged never materialized, and after a few weeks, both parties returned to Tarma. In his official correspondence with the Crown on June 21, 1746, Manso de Velasco claimed victory for the Llamas expedition, asserting that despite their losses, they had at least pushed Juan Santos deeper into the jungle, thereby securing their borders.\footnote{Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 176-177; Ensenada, Report to the Crown, 17 March 1747, Madrid, AGI, Lima 983; The beginning of this report, which was started in December 1744, is found in JSEI, 72-75. Whether the expedition actually accomplished this or whether Juan Santos simply retreated of his own accord is unknown. In all of Manso de Velasco’s correspondences about the expedition, there was no mention of attempting to reclaim the lost Ocopa missions. For the viceroy, fighting Juan Santos was about security, not 181}
religion. In October 1746, however, events in the viceregal capital temporarily diverted the viceroy’s attention from the eastern jungles of Peru.

The Lima Earthquake and Reforms

On 28 October 1746 at 10:30 in the evening, a massive 8.4 magnitude earthquake rocked Lima, instantly killing about 1,500 in the viceregal capital. However, the worst disaster came at 11:00 PM when the sea around Lima’s port, Callao, began to retreat. Suddenly, an approximately fifty-foot wall of water bulldozed the bustling port town, killing all but a few hundred of its approximately 6,000 inhabitants. Many ships belonging to the large merchant fleet in the harbor survived the initial wave, but were subsequently destroyed by the backrush of debris-filled water from the leveled port city. Most of the viceregal government buildings had collapsed. Both towers of the Cathedral had fallen, and parts of the viceregal palace were uninhabitable. Lima lay in ruins while Callao essentially no longer existed. ¹⁸²

Manso de Velasco, however, saw an opportunity in the ruins of the viceregal capital. Along with his allies, both in Lima and Madrid, Manso de Velasco planned to rebuild Lima, both physically and spiritually, on an enlightened regalist model. Of particular importance to this project was divesting the regular clergy of their influence within the city and in the viceroyalty as whole. Starting in December 1746, just two months after the earthquake, Manso de Velasco wrote a series of letters to the Crown regarding the state of regular clergy in Lima. While numbers of clergy in the city were

comparable to most Spanish cities during this time, the earthquake’s destruction of the convents and monasteries had exposed just how many regular clergy there really were. The viceroy criticized severe overcrowding of the major convents and monasteries, which he believed caused laxity in the regular orders’ religious piety. The viceroy even posited that “Divine Providence” had sent the earthquake to facilitate the reformation of Lima convents. Manso de Velasco also targeted the regular clergy’s control of the rural Indian Parishes. These parishes had become a significant source of income for the regular orders in the viceroyalty. Manso de Velasco lamented that rather than reinvesting tithes back into the parishes, the regulars stripped these parishes of all their funds to pay for their large urban convents.183

In the intervening weeks and months after the Earthquake, Manso de Velasco began enacting reforms aimed specifically at reducing the power of the clergy. For example, the viceroy targeted the city’s censos. Censos were liens and loans that monasteries and convents made to private citizens, other religious institutions, and even the state. The interest charged on the censos was set below market rate to avoid the appearance of engaging in usury, which was considered a sin by the Catholic Church. These loans usually were couched in terms of “contracts of purchase and sale in which the [religious houses] purchased the right to collect an annuity.”184 By the eighteenth century, however, this distinction began to fade as the use of terms such as principal (principal) and interest (rédito) came into normal parlance. In order to facilitate the

rebuilding of the city, in January 1747 the viceroy froze all *censo* payments for two years, cut the principal of all *censos* in half, and reduced the rates of interest from the standard 5% to 2% or 1% depending on the type of *censo*. Manso de Velasco argued that by so doing, he would allow Lima residents to rebuild their homes more quickly, since many Limeños still owed money to the church for their old residences that now lay in ruins. While this was helpful for most Limeños, more importantly it was helpful to the Crown, also in debt to the religious houses. Manso de Velasco even froze all payments to religious orders from the Crown during the months immediately following the earthquake. The reduction of censo interest rates, of course, impaired the orders’ ability to rebuild their religious convents and monasteries, which Manso de Velasco hoped to reduce in number and size in his enlightened regalist Lima.

While Manso de Velasco surrounded himself with likeminded Limeños, not everyone in the viceregal capital agreed with his reforms, particularly his anticlerical policies. Many of his supporters were prominent citizens of the city, including members of the Audiencia, shared his regalist vision for the Spanish empire. But the viceroy’s critics, including many members of the clergy, saw this group as a “pandilla” or street gang devoted more to making themselves rich than to restoring the wellbeing of Lima. The Archbishop of Lima, Pedro Antonio Barroeta, a particularly vocal critic, claimed that Manso de Velasco’s men were immoral, prone to gambling, promiscuous, and one was even a homosexual. He even went so far as to accuse one of the viceroy’s closest contributors.

associates, Judge Juan Marin de Poveda, of having leprosy. Some sources indicate that the archbishop also considered excommunicating the viceroy. In stark contrast, royal officials in Madrid praised Manso de Velasco as an efficient administrator. The court ministers were particularly impressed with his continual remittances of silver back to Spain, even immediately following the disaster. In 1748, his efforts earned him the title of Conde de Superunda, or “Count over the waves.”

Consequently, when Superunda’s reports on the fallen state of the regular orders after the earthquake reached Madrid, the powerful Marqués de la Ensenada worked quickly to back his recommendations. In 1748, Ensenada along and then secretary of State José de Carvajal y Lancaster met at the Escorial Palace with the Archbishops-elect of Lima and Mexico as well as the heads of all the religious orders. Ensenada and Carvajal reached an agreement with the prelates to reduce the number of regular clergy. Ensenada convinced the king to form a Junta Particular de Ministros (special council of ministers) with the archbishops elect of Lima, Bogotá, and Mexico City; four members of the council of Castile; and three members of the council of the Indies to expedite the reform process. Between 29 November 1748 and March 1749, Carvajal along with the king’s confessor, Jesuit Father Francisco de Rávago convened the Junta on Carvajal’s estate. Based on the reports of several government observers, including Manso de Velasco, the junta agreed that the Crown should allow only licensed convents and monasteries to rebuild, and that every order in the city should be limited to one religious house for each gender.

Disagreements within the government on the exact details of the recommendations delayed action. In the end, the Crown produced a vaguely worded royal decree in 1751, almost five years after Superunda’s initial complaint. When the decrees reached Lima, it was too little and too late. The vagueness of the official guidelines allowed the religious orders to contest or ignore them, and in the end, most convents were rebuilt. In part, the recommendations for rebuilding the convents were so mismanaged because the junta had spent most of their time discussing the removal of the regular orders from their rural Indian parishes. These parishes had been a concern well before the earthquake, and the junta was eager for decisive action. Upon the junta’s recommendation, on 4 October 1749 the Crown ordered the gradual removal of the regulars from the rural parishes in the Archdiocese of Lima. The guidelines in the decree stipulated that when a regular cleric vacated an Indian parish, a secular priest would fill the position. While at first this rule pertained only to the Archdioceses of Lima, Mexico City, and Bogotá, a later decree in 1753 extended it to include all of Spanish America. Ironically, one of the reasons the Crown wanted to remove regulars from their parishes was so that the orders could concentrate on missionary work in the frontiers of the Spanish empire rather than in their large urban convents and monasteries. In many ways, the Ocopa missionaries were fulfilling the express will of the Bourbon reforms, though some reformers remained suspicious of their power.

189 Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 120 - 121
190 Andrien, “The Coming of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru,” 190 – 191; Royal decree, 1 May 1747, ASFL, Registro 2, I-2, N.1, document 38, ff.202r – 204r.
191 Royal decree, 1 May 1747, Registro 2, I-2, N.1, document 38, ff.202r – 204r, Archivo de San Francisco de Lima.
Even before the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion broke out, a current of distrust and hostility against Ocopia existed within reformist circles in the viceroyalty of Peru. These negative sentiments were evident in the famous report on the state of the viceroyalty commonly known as *Noticias Secretas de América*, written by two young Spanish naval officers and dedicated regalists, Jorge Juan y Santacilia and Antonio de Ulloa. In 1735, Juan and Ulloa accompanied an officially sanctioned French scientific expedition to measure one degree on the equator. They stayed in the Andean region for eleven years, taking notes on both its natural wonders and its political intrigues. Upon their return to Spain in 1749, Ensenada commissioned a report of their observations on the general state of the colonies. Only intended for a small group of Crown officials, their report was damning, citing gross abuses by both government officials and the regular orders.  

Except for the Jesuits, Juan and Ulloa painted the regular clergy as an undisciplined, greedy rabble who “rival[ed] the corregidores in extracting wealth from the blood and sweat of the people.”  

Juan and Ulloa accused the friars in the frontier missions of colluding with local Spaniards to exploit the Amerindians’ labor, which in turn incited the natives to revolt. As a prime example of missionary abuses causing revolts, the young reformers cited the Ocopia missionary involvement in the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion.  

---

192 Kenneth J. Andrien, “The Noticias Secretas de América,” 175; The original title of the report written for the Spanish court was *Discurso y reflexiones políticas sobre el estado presente de los reinos del Perú; su gobierno, régimen particular de aquellos habitadores y abusos que se han introducido en uno y otro; Dase individual noticia de las causales de su origen y se proponen algunos medios para evitarlas*. In 1826, however, an Englishmen named David Barry published the report as *Noticias Secretas de América* by which it is more commonly known.  

193 Juan and Ulloa, *Discourse and Political Reflections on the Kingdoms of Peru*, 102.  

194 Andrien, “The Coming of Enlightened Reform in Bourbon Peru,” 185-186.
To clarify the basis for our opinion, one can simply turn to the latest revolt of the newly converted Indians in the provinces of Jauja and Tarma. Here forty years have been wasted reducing a group of only 2,000 Indians. When the revolt began, the Indians’ principal aim was to flee the abuses and excesses of the clergy, since they still did not have to pay tribute. To gain adherents, the rebel leader preached that he was going to free the Indians from Spanish oppression. If the Indians were rebellious by nature, could any Indian from any village – since they are treated so cruelly and contemptuously – have failed to take sides against such tyrannical abuse? Certainly not.  

While these words seem to justify the Amerindians’ actions, they were written out of political expediency rather than sympathy for the rebels. In truth Juan and Ulloa never even traveled to the Ocopa missions, or to most of the other places of which they claimed to have intimate knowledge. Most likely these reflections on the Ocopa missionaries were based on reports that they had received from other like-minded regalists during their stay in Lima. The report, therefore, demonstrated that, at least among some of Lima’s political elite, a sentiment existed that Ocopa’s missionary efforts were not only unproductive, but detrimental to the advancement of royal authority in Peru.

The Lima Conspiracy, the Huarochiri Rebellion, and Friar Calixto

In 1750, the atmosphere of crisis in the city of Lima deepened when on June 21st, a priest came to the Viceroy with the news that during confession, he had learned of a conspiracy to overthrow the government by the city’s indigenous population. The next morning, another priest came forward with a similar story from a confessant. According to the informants, on September 20, St. Michael’s day, a group of the city’s Indians would use the day’s celebration as a cover to burn the thatched roofs of the temporary

houses in the outskirts of the city. A later account claimed that conspirators even had plans to dam the Rimac River so that the fires could not be extinguished. While the citizenry was distracted by the fires, other conspirators would simultaneously storm the viceregal palace and take control of the armory. As soon as the city was taken, all important Spanish officials would be executed, save a few members of the regular orders, to celebrate Catholic rituals in the city. According to Manso de Velasco, the Indians were fulfilling a prophecy given by Santa Rosa of Lima that in 1750 Peru would be returned to its original rulers. Some rebels even wanted to summon Juan Santos and crown him as king, although the viceroy himself seriously doubted whether they had actually communicated with the distant rebel leader. After a brief investigation confirmed the priests’ story, Manso de Velasco acted quickly to arrest most of the people involved in the conspiracy. Ultimately, he executed six of the principal conspirators in the main square of Lima, while others received lesser punishment, and issued a general pardon for the rest of the populous.  

These executions did not stop the conspiracy from spreading outside the city. While Manso de Velasco arrested suspects in Lima, one of the conspirators, Francisco Jiménez Inca, attended his daughter’s wedding in the adjacent highland province of Huarochirí. During the wedding festivities, Jiménez Inca recruited several more people to the conspiracy. So when word of his impending arrest arrived in Huarochirí, he was able to secure the protection of two local kuracas, Juan Pedro de Puipuilibia and Andres de

197 Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 172 – 173; Nicolas de Salazar, Account of the Lima Conspiracy, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 988; Manso de Velasco, Report to the Crown, 24 September 1750, Lima, JSEI, 161-178 (originally AGI, Lima 988); a similar, more strongly worded version of this letter is found in the AGI, Lima 417.
Borja Puipuilibia. Spanish officials were initially unconcerned, believing that when royal troops arrived to arrest Jiménez Inca, the locals would simply hand him over. The Spaniards’ feeling of security was confirmed when Borja Puipuilibia agreed to deliver Jiménez Inca. Unfortunately for the Spanish forces, it was a trap. On July 19th as they waited in the village of Huarochirí for Borja Puipuilibia to arrive with Jiménez Inca, Andeans attacked the Spanish forces by surprise, killing several in the initial assault. Some, including the Spanish commander, José Antonio Salazar y Ugarte, barricaded themselves in the town hall but were killed when they tried to escape the next morning. The rebel’s successes, however, did not last long. Within a few weeks, Superunda dispatched more than 400 regular army troops and more than 150 militiamen to Huarochirí. The force out of Lima was joined by conscripted indigenous workers out of the nearby mining region, and the uprising was eventually crushed.198

In his report to the King dated 24 September 1750, Manso de Velasco blamed the Lima Conspiracy and the Huarochirí rebellion on two causes. First, the viceroy noted that the conspirators denounced the abuses of corrupt corregidores (local Spanish governors), judges, and priests, complaints common throughout colonial Spanish America.199 Principally, however, Manso de Velasco claimed that the Lima conspirators were “exasperated” over the exclusion of Amerindians from the priesthood. The viceroy attributed the “patronage [of] this sentiment [to] two friars of the order of San Francisco”

199 Manso de Velasco, 24 September 1750, Lima, JSEI, 163. The issue of corrupt corregidores especially would haunt the Spanish colonial authorities as one of the major catalysts in the Túpac Amaru Rebellion in Cuzco from 1780 to 1782.
who he described as possessing “indiscrete piety and poorly allocated zeal.” While he did not mention them by name in the document, the viceroy was referring to two former Ocopa missionaries, who at time were in residence in Madrid, Brother Calixto de San José Túpac Inka and lay Friar Isidoro de Cala y Ortega.

Brother Calixto was born in Tarma in 1710 to Pedro Montes, a Spaniard, and Dominga Estefania Tupac Inca, an Amerindian of noble Incan descent. According to records procured by the missionaries of Ocopa, he was the eleventh descendant of Inca Túpac Yupanqui. In 1727 Calixto entered the Franciscan Order in Lima as a donado or oblate. In colonial Latin America, donados were usually Amerindians, Mestizos, or in some cases illegitimate Spaniards, who lived in Franciscan communities but worked essentially as servants. They generally could not hold offices or lead liturgical or evangelizing activities. A lack of skilled manpower within the Order, however, particularly in regards to speaking native languages, forced many Franciscan institutions to allow donados to act in capacities normally reserved for friars. Calixto, therefore, spend almost two decades in Lima working for various Franciscan institutions principally as a procurador, a clergyman charged with soliciting funds from private donors or the Crown as well the management of said funds for a particular community. During some point, he also spent a few years working as a missionary for Ocopa. In 1744 Calixto accompanied Friar Joseph Gil Muñoz, the commissar of missions in Peru, to Guatemala

200 Manso de Velasco, 24 September 1750, Lima, JSEI, 163.
201 Bernales Ballersteros, “Fray Calixto Tupac Inca,” 6; Fr. Isdoro Cala y Ortega, Petición to the Crown, 7 May 1751, Cádiz, Lima 988, AGI; Walker, Shaky Colonialism, 164-166; Calixto, Petition to the Crown, CVU, Papeles Varios, Mss. Tomo 18, No. 25.
202 When and for how long is unknown, but according to Joseph de San Antonio he spent at least a few years working in the Ocopa missions, Joseph de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
on their way to Spain to advocate for the Apostolic Institute. The Cabildo de Indios (indigenous municipal council) of Lima also gave them license to appear before the Pope on their behalf to ask him to allow Amerindians full membership in religious orders and to be able to take vows as priests.²⁰³ While waiting to sail, however, Calixto received orders from Friar Mathías de Velasco, Commissar General of the Order over all Spanish territories and a former Ocopa missionary, to return to the viceroyalty Peru to serve in the missions being started by the Apostolic Institute in the Audiencia of Charcas (modern-day Bolivia). At the same time, the Procurador of Ocopa in Lima, Friar Juan de San Antonio, began the process of securing documents to prove Calixto’s status as a member of Indigenous nobility so that he could be elevated from a donado to a lay friar. While by law Amerindians were not allowed to become friars, a royal decree in 1691, later ratified in Peru by Viceroy Castelfuerte in 1725, granted Amerindians of noble birth the privilege of becoming full members of religious orders.²⁰⁴ Calixto’s baptismal records from Tarma, however, had been lost some time after his birth, which forced Friar Juan de San Antonio to meet with many of his relatives, many of who had been “elevated” to positions of “Sergeants, Captains, and Maestros de Campo (acting field commanders)”, in order to verify he was of Incan royal descent, which the viceroy later ratified.²⁰⁵ This dispensation for noble Amerindians, however, even in the 1740’s was rarely granted and according to Commissar General Friar Mathías, the Franciscan Order as a general rule banned people of “infidel ancestry” to rise above the level of a donado. Nonetheless, but he believed the

²⁰³ Cabildo de Indios of Lima, License for Fray Calixto, 30 October 1756, Lima, AGI, Lima 988.
²⁰⁴ O’Phelan Godoy, “Ascender a al estado eclesiástico,” 312.
Order should make an exception for “brother Calixto Túpac [because] he had served in
the missions, and the college of Ocopa, with much edification and example to the
missionaries.” After returning to Peru, Calixto travelled to Charcas as Friar Mathías
Velasco had ordered. On his way there Calixto passed by Quillabamba (on the frontier of
Cusco) where, according to Juan de San Antonio, his indigenous nobility, combined with
his language ability enabled him to build relationships with local caciques allowing the
missionaries to have great success.

Despite Calixto’s success as a missionary, he continued his work in advocating
for the creation of an indigenous clergy. Historian Jorge Bernales Ballesteros has
suggested that after 1744 Calixto began to meet with “discontented Indians” who were
upset by Amerindians not being allowed to “embrace the priestly state,” though the
Cabido de Indios of Lima’s license in 1744 for Calixto and Muñoz to discuss the matter
with the Pope suggests that Calixto’s involvement with this issue began much earlier.

Sometime before 1748, Calixto returned to Lima where he illegally printed a polemic
treatise against the established colonial order known as the Representación Verdadera.
While Calixto’s name appears on the cover letter, the actual author of the Representación
is unknown, though Manso de Velasco identified him as Franciscan Friar Antonio

---

206 Mathías de Velasco, Summary of Joseph de San Antonio’s petition to the Crown, 28 June 1751, Madrid,
AGI, Lima 541.
207 Joseph de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
209 The full name is Representación Verdadera y exclamación rendida y lamentable que toda la nación
Indiana hace a la Majestad de Rey de las Españas y Emperador de la Indias El Señor Don Fernando VI
pediendo los atienda y remedie, sacándolos del afrentoso viperio y oprobio en que están más de doscientos
años.
As historian Charles Walker points out, while the *Representación* ostensibly was about allowing Amerindians to become full members of religious orders at its core it was a pointed criticism of the Spanish colonial system. The author of the *Representación* dwelled at length on the vast gulf between the theory of Spanish colonial rule and the actual practice. He condemned in particular local viceregal ministers for failing to implement Crown policies. He even criticized the colonial policy of not allowing Amerindians to hold government offices. Though the *Representación* contained a condemnation of the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, the author argued that the uprising was caused by a lack of indigenous clergy in the missions as well as “the same Spaniards, soldiers and corregidores (local Spanish governors), with their exorbitant harassments and lack of modest charity in their treatment of the uncivilized barbarians and the recently converted.” The *Representación* utilized the rhetoric of the Laminations of Jeremiah, which tells the story of the destruction of Jerusalem by the Babylonians, to intone an apocalyptic vision typical of late baroque thinking. The invocation of Lamentations in the *Representación* was a clear message from the author to the reader (the king) that failure to implement its demands would result in the destruction of the Viceroyalty.

The *Representación* was not well received by many Spanish regalists as the campaign to allow Amerindians into the higher ranks of the clergy would have occasioned a fundamental change in Amerindians status within the Spanish colonial

---

211 Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 164-165
212 *Representación Verdadera*, 16-17; Walker also paraphrases this in *Shaky Colonialism*, 165.
system. As historian Juan Carlos Estenssoro argues, early on during the colonial period, the Spanish had deemed Indians to be Neophytes, New Christians, too inchoate in their understanding of Catholic doctrine to be allowed to teach, give mass, or even be culpable of heresy before the inquisition. While this division between European and Amerindian was synonymous with race, legally, Amerindians spiritual inferiority served to justify Spain’s colonial hierarchy. Spaniards needed to rule since Amerindians could not understand the true religion and therefore could not be trusted to hold high spiritual or government office. Most Bourbon reformers feared that if the distinction between Old and New Christians were erased by allowing these men to have equal rank with Spaniards in religious communities, it would lead to the breakdown of social boundaries, which undermined the orderly regalist social hierarchy. At the same time Crown officials had to deal with the reality that most Spanish clergy, whether peninsular or creole, lacked the language skills necessary to teach the native people of Peru where Quechua, along with other local languages were still predominated. Therefore, government ministers allowed for certain exceptions, such as the 1725 edict in Peru that ratified the Royal Decree of 1691 allowing the indigenous nobility to take religious vows. Manso de Velasco, of course, lambasted the Representation stating that giving universal permission for Amerindians to take such vows was against “the nature and condition of the Indians.” He blamed the document for stirring up anti-colonial sentiment that led to the Lima Conspiracy and the Huarochiri rebellion:

215 O’Phalen Godoy, *La gran rebelión*, 47-63
The indiscrete expressions with which the [Representación] is filled reflect on, more than is just, the pain that [the Amerindians feel at] seeing their own lands possessed and governed by foreigners. [This] has influenced, not a little, [the Amerindian’s ability] to avoid disloyal thoughts which they conceive during the drunkenness, to which their meetings are reduced, [and] has produced the effect of their reckless machinations.216

For this reason, even before the Lima Conspiracy was discovered, the viceroy had refused to give license to Calixto to let the Representación be published or give permission for Calixto to travel to Spain to present it before the king.217

Calixto persisted in his cause, despite Manso de Velasco’s disapproval. After illegally printing the Representación, he began sending copies to kurakas throughout the viceroyalty in order to solicit funds for his journey to Spain, where he hoped to present the document before the King. After Manso de Velasco rejected his request for a license to travel to Spain, Calixto decided to take the cheaper, illegal route to Europe though Portuguese Brazil. In September 1749, Calixto left Lima for the overland journey to Buenos Aires. He was accompanied by a lay friar and fellow Ocopa missionary Isidoro Cala y Ortega. Friar Isidoro carried with him a document in Latin which he himself most likely wrote entitled Planctus Indorum. Like the Representación, the Planctus Indorum advocated for an Amerindian clergy and condemned the abuses of the Spanish colonial system. Friar Isidoro planned on presenting the document directly to the Pope. From Buenos Aires the two Franciscans crossed into Brazil where they later sailed to Lisbon. In Lisbon they initially decided to go first to Rome, but when other Franciscans told them that the journey was too expensive, they entrusted the Planctus Indorum to a banker

217 Ibid.
bound for Rome, and continued their journey on to Madrid. On 22 August 1750, they arrived in the capital and that night immediately made their way to the palace, where they were told that they could not present their petition without it being first sent to the Council of the Indies. Fearing perhaps that the Council might not send the Representación to the king, the next morning they waited outside the King’s rural estate for his carriage to emerge. As the carriage went by them, they passed the Representación to the King through the open carriage window, without, according to Calixto, it even stopping. The following day, they received word that the King had read the petition with great interest and was passing it on to the Council of the Indies for further consideration.\(^{218}\) The sudden appearance of the Representación seems to have caught some ministers by surprise, particularly Ensenada who sent a series of frantic letters to various people looking for a copy of the manifesto.\(^{219}\) Over the next several weeks Isidoro and Calixto met with several members of the Council of the Indies, thanks to Commissar General Friar Mathías Velasco’s connections at court. Friar Mathías had encouraged the clerics to travel to Spain, despite having to do so illegally. The King, for his part, seems to have received the representation favorably.\(^{220}\)

In January of 1751 the King even sent a royal decree to Manso de Velasco instructing him to not block petitioners, particularly kurakas and noble Amerindians, from coming to Madrid if they

---

\(^{218}\) A narration of this journey is found in Bernales Ballersteros, “Fray Calixto Tupac Inca,” 6–8; as well as Calixto, Letter to the Cabildo de Indios of Lima, 14 November 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 983; Joseph de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.

\(^{219}\) This frantic search is evident in the Ensenada’s letters to the Council of the Indies, 7, 8, 9, 10 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 988.

\(^{220}\) Bernales Ballersteros, “Fray Calixto Tupac Inca,” 8; about Commissary-general Velasco’s support see Velasco, petition to the Crown, 3 March 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
had the correct recommendations, and should even help them financially with the journey if necessary.\textsuperscript{221}

One of Calixto most ardent advocates before the Crown was Ocopa’s representative in Madrid, Friar Joseph de San Antonio. In a long petition to the Crown San Antonio touted Calixto’s service in the Ocopa missions saying he had served with “fidelity” and was a “good example to all”. He stated that he and Calixto were there on the same mission, to advocate for the grave necessity to save the missions of Ocopa, which would ultimately save Peru from the unrest of the Amerindians who, without recourse to the King, were oppressed by local governors. He hoped that not only would the King allow Calixto to be made a lay friar but that he could take those vows at Ocopa and continue on there as a missionary. He believed that allowing noble Amerindians like Calixto to take vows as friars would give Amerindians hope that someday their children “could obtain the same benefit” and would calm the unrest. San Antonio also argued that the ordination of indigenous clergy would provide the missionaries with sufficient manpower to complete their missions of saving the souls of the “infidels” as well as the faithful, and thus avoid the total destruction of the viceroyalty that the \textit{Representación} implied. San Antonio’s lobbying, along with others, must have been persuasive since on 17 May 1751 Calixto was made a lay Friar in Valencia. Though Calixto was not ordained at Ocopa, San Antonio still hoped he would return to work there. In contrast to regalist plans for rigid social hierarchies, the Ocopa missionaries had a more permissive attitude.

\textsuperscript{221} Royal Decree, Madrid, 19 January 1751, AGI, Lima 988.
about allowing *donados* with non-white, non-Christian ancestry to take vows as friars.\footnote{Joseph de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541; see also Mathías de Velasco’s reponse to San Antonio’s petition, 28 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.}

In 1755, the Guardian of Ocopa allowed Manuel Maria from Tangiers to wear the habit of a lay friar despite being of Muslim decent. Friar Manuel argued to the Archbishop of Lima that that guardian allowed him to do this because it been many generations since his ancestors had been Muslims.\footnote{Manuel Maria, Petition to the Archbishop of Lima, Lima, 9 September 1755, AAL, Sección San Francisco VIII – 44, ff. 1v-2v.} For Ocopa the passing of generations erased the “stain” of heretical descent, a radical suggestion in colonial Peru where more than 200 years had passed since Catholicism had first arrived.

Ocopa’s position in favor of indigenous clergy and their support of Friar Calixto further strained their relationship with Viceroy Manso de Velasco. Though Manso de Velasco had always been an ardent critic of the regular clergy, in 1747 he at least officially praised the missionaries as having “endeavored with such determination” so as to “reform the customs, vices, and abuses in all of the cities, villages, and places they have been” and “continue to be a benefit for the public cause, for religion, and for the royal service of his majesty.”\footnote{Manso de Velasco, License for Friar Joseph de San Antonio to travel to Spain, 8 January 1747, Lima, AGI, Lima 541.}

After the Lima Conspiracy, however, the Viceroy’s support for the missionaries completely eroded. While Manso de Velasco never admitted to this acrimony publically, his actions displayed not only a personal distrust of Ocopa, but a complete disregard for their work in the eastern frontier.
Final Retreat from the Jauja and Tarma Entradas

While the commotion created by the Lima Earthquake/Tsunami diverted the Viceroy’s attention away from the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion for a time, the missionaries of Ocopa continued their efforts to reoccupy their lost missions. In early 1747, Friar Lorenzo Núñez, newly elected commissar of missions over Ocopa, decided to send an expedition of missionaries to once again negotiate a peaceful end to the rebellion. Manso de Velasco granted the missionaries permission to reenter the Tarma entrada and in May four missionaries led by Friars Francisco Otazuo and Salvador Pando left for Quimiri. According to Amich, there they found Juan Santos who received them “with great respect.” Santos also allowed the missionaries to celebrate mass, but he would not speak of peace. He responded with “ambiguous words” saying that he would not end of the hostilities until the kurakas of the highlands came down and promised him their obedience. Amich also commented that Santos enjoyed discussing a range of topics with the missionary. 225 Whether this incident of the missioners meeting with Santos in 1747 actually took place or Amich invented the story is unclear. Only one other source collaborates that missionaries entered the central Montaña in 1747. 226 If this incident actually occurred, however, Santos’ reasons for refusing to talk peace demonstrated a keen understanding of his situation. While the Montaña provided a physical obstacle for colonial forces, if he hoped to have any dramatic influence on Spanish colonial policy, he had to have the support of the highlands, where most of the population of the viceroyalty

226 The only other reference of this expedition by these four missionaries is from a letter written by Alonso Santa de Ortega to a Friar Juan de Jecla Santa, 30 May 1747, Lima, JSEI, 122-123.
resided. Without it, the rebellion would simply remain a local uprising in a marginal corner of the Spanish empire. According to Amich, after eight days the missionaries left Quimirí with the exception of Otazuo who stayed with a donado to try to reconvert the Amerindians. The missionaries could not convince the Amerindians to rejoin the Catholic flock, however, because the Amerindians feared Santos’ wrath. Santos finally had them arrested and the donado tortured. They were only freed when Núñez entered the Montaña to plea for their release, though Santos refused to meet personally with Núñez to talk peace.\textsuperscript{227}

Within a few years, however, the viceroy began once again to take an interest in ending the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion. In 1748 he ordered José de Llamas to form an expedition to enter the Montaña. Llamas, however, was not opposed to finding a peaceful solution to the uprising. Before his expedition left, an Amerindian claiming to be Santos’ emissary met with Llamas to negotiate a general pardon for Juan Santos and his forces. He stated that the rebellion had been caused by internal problems in the Montaña, and they did not want to continue fighting the Crown. Wanting to save himself from the possible losses and probable failure of another expedition, Llamas halted preparations to enter the high jungle. Though Llamas was suspicious of Santos’ intentions, with the viceroy’s permission, he sent a delegation to Santos’ camp to try to finalize a peace that would return the entire central Montaña to Spanish rule. Despite waiting for almost two years, the delegation never returned and their fate is unknown, though presumably they were killed. In the meantime in anticipation of the coming peace,

\textsuperscript{227} Amich, \textit{Historia de las misiones}, 180-181.
highland Andeans began to enter the Montaña to sow coca fields. Sometime before 1750, however, a jungle Amerindian raiding party, assumed to be under Santos, surprised a group of Coca farmers killing as many as thirty. This event, along with the failure of his delegation to return, convinced Llamas that Santos was acting “in bad faith” and in the summer 1750 he went forward with his expedition. The expedition like those before was it an utter failure. Llamas attempted the same tactic that Troncoso had employed with limited success in the first expedition against Santos dividing his troops into two groups, one entering through the Tarma entrada and the other through Jauja. Santos withdrew to Eneno allowing for the jungle and small raiding parties to defeat his enemy. The hot humid conditions, difficult terrain, and lack of supplies, combined with jungle Amerindian archers harassing the soldiers as they marched eventually caused the expedition to retreat back to the highlands. The 1750 expedition was the viceregal government’s last attempt to quash the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion.

Not coincidentally, the cessation of expeditions against Juan Santos’ rebels corresponds with the discovery of Lima Conspiracy and the outbreak of the Huarochiri rebellion, which Manso de Velasco blamed in large part on Friars Calixto and Isidoro. In his 24 September 1750 report on the two disturbances in which he accused the two friars of treason, Manso de Velasco worried that since the viceroyalty had no ability to produce arms and all its weapons had been committed to the frontiers of Jauja and Tarma, that he had limited resources to combat rebellions closer to Lima. While he was concerned that

---

229 Amich, Historia de las misiones, 182-183.
rebels in Huarochirí could join forces with Santos, he downplayed the rebel’s capabilities. The viceroy instead emphasized that potential unrest in the highlands was a greater threat to the security of the Viceroyalty than an actual rebellion in the Montaña. Indeed, the Sierra was in terms of its large population and mineral wealth the economic engine of Spain’s South American possessions. While Manso de Velasco claimed victory in crushing the Huarochirí rebellion, he expressed fear that further unrest was fomenting among the Indigenous population of Peru. Huarochirí in particular was as Manso de Velasco called it the vital “throat” of Peru as it not only was a major source of grain for the barren coastal capital but a crossroads for commercial trade throughout the region. To emphasize the threat Huarochirí posed to Lima, the viceroy also included a map of the areas affected by rebellion (Figure 6). Like the letter, the map was intended to convince Crown officials unfamiliar with Peru’s geography that the viceroy was justified in ending expeditions to the jungle in order to take a more defensive posture to protect the capital. The map depicts the Andes as small bumps frequently trespassed by large valleys. Roads flowed easily from each rebellious region into the viceregal capital. Even the name of the map, “Lima and its outskirts” conveyed this false sense of proximity. While the map accurately depicted the distances between regions, however, it ignored the physical realities of Peruvian geography. Though Huarochirí is only approximately 50 miles away from Lima, travel to Lima could take several weeks. The small bumps on the map which evoke an image of rolling hills are actually part of the second largest mountain range in the world. Most roads, especially in the sierra, were little more than small trails that

---

hugged sheer cliffs over deep gorges. In sending this “stylized” map, Manso de Velasco tried to create a sense of urgency of the potential threat that rebellion in the Sierra posed to Lima.

After the Lima Conspiracy/Huarochiri Rebellion in August 1750, Manso de Velasco unofficially closed the Jauja and Tarma *entradas*. The viceroy never again ordered a new expedition against Juan Santos, nor did he issue any more licenses for missionaries to reenter the territory. Instead Manso de Velasco opted for a policy of containment. He ordered three regular companies, two infantry and one cavalry (approx. 50 men each), that José de Llamas had brought to Tarma and Jauja in 1745 to remain there indefinitely, acting as a barrier to further assaults by Juan Santos’ rebels. The cost maintaining these troops on the border was in excess of 51,000 pesos a year. The financial burden bankrupted the royal treasury at Jauja requiring that the viceroy transfer funds from elsewhere. Indeed, the Jauja treasury remained insolvent until its disolusion in 1788.  

Several royal ministers complained about the excess cost of maintaining the troops. In 1757 the Fiscal of the Council of the Indies lamented this large expenditure and opined that the Crown should send more missionaries to the region in the hope that they would be able to secure the frontier and thus cut costs. Manso de Velasco’s successor, Manuel de Amat, also believed it to be a waste of money and considered pulling the troops out. He ultimately did not because

---

231 For a breakdown of the number of troops in Tarma and Jauja see AGI, Contaduría 1870 and 1873 for the corresponding years 1745 to 1755. For evidence after those dates see RAH 9-3-3 1680, ff. 48v – 49r.
232 Fiscal’s report on the petition from Joseph de San Antonio, 28 February 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
Figure 6 - Lima con sus contornos, 1750. Source: AGI, Mapas y Planos, Peru-Chile 33.
he feared that if the rebellion was somehow rekindled, he would be removed from office as Villagarcía had.\footnote{Amat, Relación que hizo de su gobierno, 188v, mss. 3112, BNE.}

While Manso de Velasco had decided to end offensive military actions against the rebels in the Montaña, Juan Santos had not ceased his hostilities toward the Ocopa missions. As Amich so aptly stated, “the pretend Inca [Santos] seeing himself free of the whirlwind that threaten him with the entrance of the Spanish decided to take… Sonomoro.”\footnote{Amich, Historia de las misiones, 183.} Sonomoro was the Ocopa missionaries’ last mission in the Jauja \textit{entrada} and was one only indigenous community in the Jauja and Tarma \textit{entradas} that had refused to join Juan Santos. Its fortress had been built several decades earlier under Viceroy Castelfuerte, and had been the model for the then defunct fortress of Quimiri. Despite having access to 150 Spanish regulars as well as local militia, the local governor, perhaps under the viceroy’s order, had only garrisoned the fortress with fourteen soldiers. The fortress was also poorly maintained and supplied. One missionary lamented of “the little care that the subjects, in whom the Superior Government had entrusted [Sonomoro], had for this enterprise”\footnote{While Amich, of course, decried the decrepit state of the Sonomoro’s fortress (Historia de las misiones, 183), there are strong indications from AGI, Contaduría 1870 and 1873 that the fortress was indeed in disrepair. The quote is from a report of the journey of the 27 missionaries, without date, AGI, Lima 541.} In September, at the outset of the rainy season Juan Santos began to cut off Sonomoro’s lines of communications to and from the Sierra. When the governor of Jauja became aware these actions he ordered an immediate withdraw from the fortress. Before the order even arrived the missionaries and soldiers had come to the same conclusion as Juan Santos’ troops had begun to occupy the farms around the mission, forcing converts into the fortress itself. Juan Santos laid siege for eighteen days.
Finally on the 28th of September, fearing they would be massacred just as Spanish troops had been in Quimiri eight years earlier, seventy-seven people including twenty-three soldiers, three missionaries, and fifty-one converts slipped out the fortress under the cover of darkness taking a less known path to Andamarca, the closest frontier village. Several converts, however, stayed behind to fight a rearguard action to cover their retreat. The converts who escaped were eventually taken to Ocopa, where they suffered severely from the high altitude and cold weather. Within a few years all of them died from diseases that they had not been previously exposed to in the jungle.236 Manso de Velasco justified to the Crown the loss of Sonomoro by claiming that the fortress was poorly situated and that he only maintained it “because of the discomfort that it caused the missionaries to be without this shelter.” He argued ultimately that maintaining a fort in this location was unadvisable as any fortification would “remain vulnerable to same risks.” The loss of Sonomoro, therefore he argued, was strategically neutral if not beneficial as he no longer had to waste resources on an indefensible position.237

Despite Manso de Velasco’s insistence that the loss of Sonomoro posed no strategic threat to the viceroyalty, in 1752 Juan Santos used the former mission as staging ground for his most bold raid to date: the attack on the highland city of Andamarca. In late July 1752, Santos along with 500 Jungle Amerindians archers left Sonomoro to make the arduous journey up eastern slope of the Andes. In early August they entered the

236 Ocopa lies at 11,102 ft. and temperatures range from 20 °F to 65° F. The narrative of the fall of Sonomoro was constructed from accounts in four sources: Amich, Historia de las misiones, 183; Manso de Velasco, Report to the Crown regarding the fall of Sonomoro, 20 November1751, Lima, AGI, Lima 643; Juan de San Antonio, Report to the Crown, 12 July 1752, Lima, AGI, Lima 541; Report of the Journey of the 27 missionaries, without date, AGI, Lima 541.

237 Manso de Velasco, Report to the Crown regarding the fall of Sonomoro, 20 November1751, Lima, AGI, Lima 643.
Andamarca, incarcerating the three missionaries present in the village.  

According to many accounts, however, the inhabitants of Andamarca received Juan Santos with a hero’s welcome. Historian Luis Miguel Glave argues that century old commercial and cultural ties between Andamarca and the Montaña contributed to Santos popularity among the people of Andamarca. Juan Santos, nonetheless, only stayed few days probably because his jungle archers refused to stay in the cold highlands for long. As Santos left, his men burned key buildings in the village including the prison. Locals saved the three missionaries from being incinerated in their jail cell, implying that at least some contingent of the city was still loyal to the missionaries.

In many ways Santos’ raid on Andamarca was his movement’s crowning triumph. Though Ocopa essentially controlled Andamarca (the Crown had granted the missionaries the village’s mita labor and Ocopa friars manned its parish), it was a fully incorporated part of the viceroyalty, not a loosely held frontier mission. It also was both physically and culturally clearly in the highlands at an altitude above 10,000 ft. with Quechua speaking inhabitants. Santos had effectively extended his rebellion out of the jungle into the highlands, the economic and demographic heart of Spanish Peru. Santos’ inability to hold Andamarca, however, demonstrated the limitations of his rebellion.

239 Luis Miguel Glave, “El Apu Inca Camina de Nuevo,” 28-68. Whereas Glave seems to localize pro-Santos sentiment to the region immediately around Andamarca and perhaps within the province of Jauja, Steve Stern in “The Age of Andean Insurrection, 1742 – 1782: a Reprisal” (published in his larger edited volume *Resistance, Rebellion, and Consciousness in the Andean Peasant World, 18th to 20th Centuries*, Ch. 2) argues that the willingness of the people of Andamarca to join the rebellion demonstrated an anticolonial consciousness throughout the viceroyalty, that periodically manifested itself in rebellions.
240 Amich, *Historia de las misiones*, 184; “Causa seguida contra Julián Auqui, Blas Ibarra y Casimiro Lamberto…por traidores a la Corona,” 1752, AGN, Sección Real Audiencia, Causas Criminales, Leg 15, C. 159; also found in AGI, Lima 988, Escribanía 527.
Though Santos dreamed of a larger insurrection, he could never marshal widespread Serrano support.

While Santos could not hold highland territory, the raid shocked provincial leaders, provoking them to extreme actions to counter the perceived danger of the rebellion spreading to the Sierra. The Governor of Jauja, Laureano José de Torres y Ayala, Marques of Casatorres, was so paranoid about the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion spreading to his province that he had three highland Andeans hanged as “spies” after they were caught praising the exploits of Juan Santos. The executions were so summarily carried out that the Audience later fined Casatorres 6,000 pesos for not consulting with them before applying capital sentences. Manso de Velasco, however, again downplayed the threat that Juan Santos posed to the viceroyalty in his correspondence to the Crown. He argued that while Santos would continue to raid along the frontier in order to steal tools to maintain his popularity, that he would not pose any permanent threat to the highlands. Certainly this argument favored Manso de Velasco who had to prove his effectiveness in keeping the peace to Crown officials in Madrid, though Santos’ inability to occupy Andamarca for any length of time certainly supports this argument. At the same time, the viceroy also used the continued threat of raids to justify his policy of containment, arguing the Crown needed to retain military forces on the frontier to protect against any future raids. While he was confident that in a pitched battle that the Spanish forces could easily defeat the rebels, any new campaign, he argued, would be fruitless since the jungle Amerindians would simply withdraw into the interior and wait until Spanish forces left as they had continually done before. Manso de
Velasco told the Crown that the “sagest method” to conquer Juan Santos was “to introduce the missionaries into their old reductions… [and] restore the Indians to the faith,” though he seemed unwilling to provide them with military protection to do so.\footnote{Manso de Velasco, Report to the Crown, 4 January 1755, Lima, AGI, Lima 988; Manso de Velasco, Relación que hizo de su Gobierno, BNE, Mss. 3108, 113r-120v.}

Juan Santos’ withdrawal from Andamarca marked the effective end to the Rebellion. According the various reports, Santos died sometime after the Andamarca campaign, though exactly when is unknown. Manso de Velasco in his official report of his government described a gradual decline for the rebel leader. Frustrated by his inability to expand his rebellion outside of the Montaña, Santos became increasing embittered and paranoid. Fearing that Gatica and his other principal generals would betray him, he eventually had them executed. The missionaries of Ocopa, on the other hand, claimed that two Amerindians from Manoa in 1776 told them that Santos had died in the former mission of Metraro. When pressed for details about his death, they said they had witnessed him being swallowed by Hell in cloud of smoke and fire.\footnote{Lehnertz, “Land of the Infidels,” 147-149; A draft of a royal decree dated 19 May 1767 written at Aranjuez (AGI, Lima 834, c. 65) has Santos being poisoned by his own people.} Internal strife among the rebels or divine retribution did not, however, end the rebellion. While Juan Santos never again attempted a raid of the size and ambition of Andamarca, it was Manso de Velasco’s decision to cordon off the Montaña central that ended hostilities. Even before Andamarca the viceroy had begun to build series of fortification in the passes leading to the central Montaña to completely seal the region.\footnote{Lehnertz, “Land of the Infidels,” 150.}

Ironically maintaining troops on the frontier was far more costly to the royal treasury than the missionaries’ annual stipend had ever been. For the cost of maintaining
two of infantry and one of cavalry companies, approximately 150 men, the royal treasury
meted out 51,326 pesos annually, significantly more than the 6,000 pesos annually the
viceregal officials had been ordered to pay Ocopa.\textsuperscript{244} Over time the cost of these troops
began to add up and in 1776 Manso de Velasco’s successor Manual de Amat complained
that during his term of office he had wasted almost 1,000,000 pesos on this unnecessary
garrison of troops.\textsuperscript{245} The missionaries, of course, also complained about the defensive
(the would say idle) nature of this force, whom they believed should be attempting to
retake their lost missions. They “have not restored even one handful of dirt” of the
territory lost to Juan Santos, lamented the Guardian of Ocopa. The missionaries
maintained that these troops lived in “notorious slothfulness” and that some were so inept
that they did not even know how to fire their muskets. The missionaries were particularly
bitter about the inactivity of these troops because Manso de Velasco had “not even given
one real (a coin worth one eighth of a peso)” to protect their remaining missions in
Huánuco.\textsuperscript{246} Despite the comparatively enormous cost, Manso de Velasco decided that
the eastern frontier of Peru would be better protected by military arms rather than
religious communities.

Over the next decade, the missionaries and viceregal government continually
blamed each other for the loss of the missions. Manso de Velasco felt that if the
missionaries had done their job in converting the jungle Amerindians and placing their
missions in more defensible locations, a military intervention would have been

\textsuperscript{244} BNE-3113, 24v-25r; RAH 9 -3 -3 1680, 48v-49r; AGI, Contaduria 1870, 1873.
\textsuperscript{245} Amat, Relación de Gobierno que dejó el Exmo. Señor Don Manuel de Amat, 1776, BNE-3112, 188r
(also found in RAH 9-9-3 1704).
\textsuperscript{246} Friar Joseph Ampuero, Guardian of Ocopa, Report, 5 January 1757, AGI, Lima 808.
unnecessary. In 1753 the viceroy chided Ocopa’s leadership regarding their new missions in Huánuco stating, “This work has to come from the zeal of the missionaries and from their wisdom to locate the Indians in a place where they are less willing to return to the infidelity that they once professed, which decision will be in your hands.”247 The missionaries, on the other hand, vehemently blamed the viceroy in particular for failing to defeat Juan Santos. As one missionary accused, “any man with average intelligence and average zeal could have in two or three years, at the most, destroyed the rebel but [only if he] listened to the missionaries (Religiosos), who are the ones that can speak [with authority] on this subject.”248

* * *

It is unclear whether or not a decisive victory over Juan Santos was even possible. As the five expeditions proved, while Spanish forces had superior arms and training, they could not overcome the climate and terrain of the high jungle. Partial control, however, perhaps of selected enclaves such as Sonomoro, may have not been out of the question. This could have been achieved through a negotiated peace that would allow the missionaries to return. Especially after Juan Santos’ alliance disintegrated, there may have been room to coopt the caciques that remained.

Manso de Velasco used the rebellion of Juan Santos Atahualpa as a pretext to curtail the influence of the Ocopa missionaries. As chapter one demonstrates, relations never had been warm between the viceregal government and the Ocopa missionaries. As

---

247 Manso de Velasco, Letter to Friar Juan de Antonio, 5 May1753, Lima, AGI Lima 808.
248 Frair Bernardino de San Antonio, Correspondence with Frair Mathias Velasco, 15 November 1756, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 808.
members of a regular order their independence from local Crown authority threatened the
efforts of regalist ministers to concentrate ever greater political power in the hands of the
Bourbon state. Nonetheless, the King strongly supported the missionary efforts of the
Franciscans, making it difficult for the viceregal government to ignore them completely.
The Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion provided an opportunity for viceregal authorities to
limit the extension of Franciscan influence both in their Ocopa missions and at court in
Madrid. The threat to state security posed by the rebellion of Juan Santos, along with
Ocopa’s political influence in Madrid, made it difficult for Viceroy Villagarcía and later
Manso de Velasco to ignore the uprising. Therefore, they had to at least make periodic
military efforts to quash this ever allusive enemy. The discovery of the Lima Conspiracy
and the outbreak of the Huarochirí Rebellion, however, provided Manso de Velasco with
sufficient political cover to end military campaigns against the Juan Santos rebels. The
viceroy could end offensive expeditions into the high jungle under the guise that these
troops were needed in the highlands to put down any rebellion that could adversely affect
the economic engine of the colony, the highlands, or in the viceregal capital. Manso de
Velasco was particularly motivated to curtail Ocopa’s activities after Friar Calixto, a
former member of the community that Ocopa still actively supported, was implicated in
the Lima Conspiracy.

Furthermore, Manso de Velasco’s cordonning off of the missions marked the
beginning of a movement by Bourbon administrators to remove religious orders at the
frontiers of Spain’s colonial possessions in favor of military units. While the viceroy did
not (or perhaps could not) fully articulate his reasons for this action, he clearly no longer
trusted the Ocopa missionaries to hold let alone expand the frontier even with significant state assistance. Though Manso de Velasco in the coming years would have to continually defend his decision against the missionaries’ powerful political influence in Madrid, the opinions of Juan and Ulloa demonstrate the existence of a growing contingent within the Spanish Bureaucracy that wholehearted supported his decision.
Chapter 3: In the Aftermath of Rebellion

While the Andamarca campaign in 1752 marked the end of hostilities between Juan Santos and Spanish forces in the Montaña, Manso de Velasco’s refusal to continue to pursue the rebels ignited debates between the viceroy and the Ocopa missionaries that raged over the next decade. The Ocopa missionaries not only wanted the viceregal government to continue their campaigns against Juan Santos until the missionaries were restored to Jauja/Tarma entradas, but an increase in both financial and military aid. Viceroy Manso de Velasco, however, sought at every occasion to block the Ocopa missionaries’ requests, delaying or simply refusing to follow orders from Madrid to aid them. This conflict between the viceroy and the missionaries provides a window into fissures during the 1750’s not only between regular clergy and the Spanish government but within the Crown bureaucracy itself. In 1714 King Philip V created the Ministry of the Indies (headed by the Minister of State for the Indies), which handled many of the executive functions the Council of the Indies had previously exercised. The new ministry, in theory, allowed the king and his ministers to enact reform more rapidly and efficiently. The move severely weakened the power of the Council, though it still retained its judicial authority and remained an important advisory body for the king on matter regarding Spain’s overseas possessions.249 The Council also tended to be more conservative than

249 Burkholder, Biographical dictionary of the Councilors of the Indies, xi.
the Ministry, particularly on matters of the church, and it attempted to retain the Habsburg model of administering the empire in partnership with the clergy. This traditional approach, of course, clashed with regalists’ attempts to consolidate royal authority.

For this reason in 1753 Ensenada convinced the king to form a Junta Particular de Ministros in order to circumvent the Council and force more radical anti-clerical reforms. As a result these meetings the Crown received the Concordat of 1753 which gave it the Patronato Universal (universal patronage) over all the Spanish church. This meant that for almost all secular church offices within its empire, the Crown had the right of presentation, a process by which Crown officials created a short list of possible candidates from which the Church could select one to fill a particular office. Previously the Crown only had this privilege for selecting bishops. While in practice the Concordat of 1753 changed little of the character of the Spanish secular clergy, it demonstrated the advance of regalist ministers within the court of Ferdinand VI.²⁵⁰

Within this context Ocopa presents an important case study. To some reformers the Ocopa missionaries were ideal clerics. They performed missionary service which helped to expand Spanish hegemony to a previously unincorporated hinterland and according the design of the Apostolic Institute, they were dependent on the Crown for funding and manpower. To conservatives, they fulfilled the godly mission to convert the ‘infidels’ which the pope had charged the Crown in its donation of the Americas to Spain. Even the King who up until early 1750’s had supported the more anti-clerical factions

²⁵⁰ Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 187-188.
within his government seemed to see the missionaries as fulfilling his own moral commitments to God. For this reason, Ocopa had received generous concessions from Madrid, including their annual stipend and reimbursement for the travel costs of new missionaries. To Manso de Velasco, however, Ocopa seemed to pose a threat to royal authority. As members of the regular clergy, the Crown still had little direct authority over the actions of the Franciscan missionaries. Furthermore the missionaries of Ocopa had proven their subversive tendencies by supporting of the now discredited Friar Calixto. From the perspective of Madrid, Ocopa appeared under authority of the state since the Franciscans remained dependent on the financial largess of the Crown, but the vast distances between Ocopa and Spain meant that the friars enjoyed relative autonomy within Peru. This left Manso de Velasco with a powerful, well-funded institution that he could not easily control.

Therefore, in the aftermath of the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, the viceroy continued his attempts to neutralize the missionaries, even ignoring royal decrees supporting the missionaries when they impeded his efforts. While Crown officials in Madrid, even reformers, seemed convinced that Ocopa was aiding reform and renovation of the empire in Peru, Manso de Velasco apparently judged the missionaries a threat to the regalist cause. The resulting tensions created by Ocopa between imperial and local interests, as well as conservative and radical forces, exemplify the complex political process that shaped the Bourbon Reforms in Peru. What happened to Ocopa in the wake of the rebellion was a negotiation between the Franciscans and the numerous political factions at various levels within the Spanish bureaucracy. While clashes over Ocopa were
certainly rooted in competing philosophical beliefs, the geographic perspective of each minister also shaped his decisions regarding the missionaries. While Ensenada did not openly oppose Crown concessions to Ocopa, his handpicked viceroy did so vigorously.\textsuperscript{251} Therefore in order for Ocopa to receive aid from the Crown, the missionaries needed not only to conform to the sometimes contested views of regalist ministers in Madrid, and also to the regalist visions of the viceregal government in Peru.

\textit{Ocopa’s Attempts to Regain Crown Support}

In 1747, to counter the increasing intransigence of the viceregal government, the Ocopa missionaries decided to send one of their own to Madrid to solicit aid for their missionary efforts directly from the Crown. The missionaries selected Friar Joseph de San Antonio, a native of Extremadura with seventeen years of missionary experience in both the Tarma and Jauja \textit{entradas}.\textsuperscript{252} Sometime between 1748 and 1750, San Antonio traveled to Spain armed with the necessary recommendations and licenses for such an undertaking, including a license to travel from Manso de Velasco that praised the missionaries’ exploits in the Montaña. Though the viceroy mistrusted Ocopa, as he did most regular clergy, he understood that their popularity at court made it difficult from him to criticize them openly. The viceroy also possibly wanted to avoid drawing attention to his negligence in providing them with Crown mandated money and support.\textsuperscript{253} On the 11\textsuperscript{th} of July 1750, San Antonio wrote the first of a string of petitions to the Crown. These

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{251} Whether this dissonance within the regalist ranks was planned remains unknown, though such a conscious collusion on this particular issue seems unlikely.
\textsuperscript{252} Heras, \textit{Libro de Incoporaciones}, 35.
\textsuperscript{253} Manso de Velasco, License for Friar Joseph de San Antonio to travel to Spain, 8 January 1747, Lima, AGI, Lima 541.
\end{footnotes}
petitions, of which San Antonio would submit more than a dozen over the next decade, laid out the missionaries’ plan for expansion throughout most of the eastern jungle of modern-day Peru. He hoped that the Crown would not only help the missionaries to grow their enterprise, but also increase their autonomy from local viceregal officials, which he argued were ignorant of how to govern the Montaña. To emphasize this point, he began his first petition, dated 11 July 1750, as well as most subsequent petitions, by recounting the history of the Ocopa missions, taking great pains to emphasize both the concessions in funds and manpower that the Crown had promised as well as the failure of successive viceregal governments to fulfill them. He particularly emphasized that the viceregal government rarely paid the promised annual stipend of 6,000 pesos lamenting that “all of these mentioned promises, sir, have not had effect for the most part, for they have delivered few payments, [and] have not satisfied them in total,” although he did concede, perhaps to avoid a direct attack on the viceroy, that these failures were “without doubt due to the occurrences of wars and the increased costs associated with them.”

Therefore “to remedy of the damages” caused by this neglect, San Antonio pleaded that the Crown grant four dispensations.

The first two dispensations continued Crown patronage supporting the order San Antonio first requested that the Crown pay for a group of sixty peninsular friars to travel to Ocopa at a cost of nearly 4500 pesos. Ocopa had not received new missionaries from Spain for more than sixteen years and only twelve missionaries remained in the

---

254 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 142.
255 Ibid. 143-144.
256 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 144. The total cost is listed in a royal decree, Buen Retiro, 26 March 1751, AGI, Arribadas, 591.
community. Later he asked for an additional twelve to fourteen lay friars trained in medicine, blacksmithing, and other useful trades to serve in the distant missions; he later reduced that number to eight. Secondly, San Antonio asked for the restoration of the annual stipend of 6,000 pesos. Under Manso de Velasco the mission had only received three payments, each less than the mandated 6,000 pesos (see table 3.1). As before, San Antonio requested not just that annual payments resume but that the government give them the unpaid balance for every year since the decree was originally issued in 1718. By 1750 this amounted to 153,000 pesos. Both of these requests had been repeated in multiple petitions over the last four decades (as detailed in Chapter 1), and while the Crown had funded two groups of missionaries to travel from the peninsula to Ocopa in 1730 and 1737, the viceregal government had consistently refused to pay their annual stipend. Ocopa hoped that somehow the Council of the Indies could force the viceregal government to comply with what they believed was the king’s will.

The third request asked the king to make a further investment in Franciscan missionary work in the viceroyalty of Peru. In the original text of the letter San Antonio only requested that Santa Rosa de Ocopa be elevated to a College *de Propaganda Fide*. Again this was a request that the Apostolic Institute had been making since they

---

258 Mathías de Velasco, Report regarding Fr. Joseph de San Antonio’s petition to Crown, 29 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541. The reduction to eight lay friars is noted in a royal degree dated 26 October 1751, AGI Arribadas 538 where the missionaries had been given six but were granted two more for a total of eight.
259 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 144-146. A list of payments showing Manso de Velasco refusal to pay missionaries before 1752 is located in AGI, Lima 1607. A royal decree mandating that viceroy distribute the back-pay was finally issued 20 February 1761 at the palace of Bien Retiro (AGI, Lima 1606). The amount that Crown should have paid is located in Diego de Chaves, Mayor of Lima, Testimony in support of Ocopa, 19 December 1748, Lima, AGI, Lima 541.
260 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 145-146.
had acquired Ocopa in 1725. Viceregal officials and the provincial Franciscan leadership in Lima blocked this request by failing to provide the necessary recommendations for the petitions to go forward in the Council of the Indies. By obtaining the status of a College *de Propaganda Fide*, Ocopa would become independent of Franciscan provincial leadership in Lima and be only directly subject within the Church to the Franciscan commissary-general in Spain. Such independence in theory would free Ocopa from the types of local political intrigues and pressures that afflicted most Franciscan institutions in Peru, particularly in Lima, and allow the missionaries to focus on the work of evangelization. The separation would also make Ocopa more difficult for viceregal officials criticize, since it completely disassociated Ocopa from the Order in Lima which many saw as corrupt. In a note added to the back of the petition, however, San Antonio went beyond just calling for Ocopa’s elevation, and requested that the King approve and fund the erection of two such colleges in every one of the seven Franciscans provinces in the Viceroyalty of Peru. The establishment of two Colleges *de Propaganda Fide* in each Franciscan province had been one of the principal stipulations of the papal bulls that created the Apostolic Institute in 1686. By 1750, several of these Colleges dotted the viceroyalties of New Spain and New Granada, but no such institution existed in the viceroyalty of Peru. Such an expansion would allow the Franciscans to extend their influence into most of the frontiers of the viceroyalty as well as cement the state’s patronage of their evangelization efforts.\(^{261}\) To show the widespread support for such colleges, San Antonio also included in the petition letters from many of the major officials.

\(^{261}\) This note is left out of published version of this letter in JSEI, 131-159, but can be found in San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, Lima 541 and 1607.
spiritual and political institutions in the viceroyalty, including the Audiencia of La Plata, the Cabildo of Lima, and several archbishops, all supporting proposed expansion of Colleges de Propaganda Fide in Peru.\textsuperscript{262} The Fiscal of the Council of Indies for Peru, Manuel Pablo de Salcedo, who represented the interests of the Crown to the Council, agreed that the construction of these colleges along with the elevation of Ocopa was essential to teach missionaries from Spain the necessary languages to preach to the “infidels” along the frontier. He even implied that such colleges would allow Franciscans to engage fully in missionary work in New World instead of “amusing themselves to other ends.”\textsuperscript{263} Fiscal Salcedo’s remarks demonstrate that many royal officials, particularly the more conservative ones, saw the Colleges de Propaganda Fide as a means to curtail any excesses of the regular clergy. This opinion made it difficult for more hardline regalists such as Manso de Velasco and Ensenada openly to oppose these expansions, even though such policies would extend Franciscan influence in Peru.

San Antonio’s fourth request asked that the Crown redouble its efforts at retaking the missions lost to Juan Santos Atahualpa. While the viceroy had not yet ordered an end to expeditions against the rebels when San Antonio had left Peru in 1748, by the late 1740’s the missionaries must have suspected that Manso de Velasco was not interested in restoring them to their former territories. Therefore San Antonio, on behalf of the missionaries, presented the Crown with their own plan for retaking the area lost to Juan Santos. This plan centered on controlling the salt deposits of the Cerro de la Sal. San

\textsuperscript{262} The original letters are found in AGI, Lima 541, but they were also later published and a copy resides in RBPM, II3327.
\textsuperscript{263} Fiscal’s report regarding San Antonio’s 11 July 1750 petition, 11 September 1750, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
Antonio argued that if they had a fort of fifty to sixty soldiers, along with several Spanish and/or Mestizo settlers to support them, they could completely control this vital resource. This would give the missionaries the opportunity to evangelize the jungle Amerindians, who were constantly traveling to the mountain to collect the salt. It would also deter any “gentile nations” from attacking the missionaries “for fear of Catholic arms prohibiting them from taking the fruit (the salt) that they so crave.”\footnote{San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 146-147.} Since Cerro de la Sal was so deep into the jungle, however, he also suggested that the Crown build two forts to protect the roads to the new fortification at La Sal. He wrote that these, should be placed at the passes leading to down to La Sal in the Oxabamba and Chanchamayo river valleys (see map 2.1) with bridges to allow for the easy passage of soldiers in case of a rebellion. The Chanchamayo river valley in particular, he reasoned, was already under coca cultivation by Spaniards, Mestizos, and highland Amerindians and would be an ideal location for the first fort to serve as a staging ground for either spiritual or military expeditions into the Montaña.\footnote{Ibid., 147. The plan also called for a reinforcement of the fortress at Sonomoro, which had already fallen to Juan Santos in 1749. It seems word of its capture had not arrived in Madrid.} Convincing the government to go forward with the Chanchamayo plan, as it became known, remained an obsession for the Ocopa missionaries over the next few decades. Though some of the details changed, it would be included in almost every petition to the Crown well into the 1770’s, and became the source of constant friction between Ocopa and viceregal authorities. Even Fiscal Salcedo, who had readily supported San Antonio’s other three proposals, equivocated with this fourth request.

While he recognized that the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion had shown that the...
missions were vulnerable and in need of military defense and had “no doubt of the certain zeal and truthfulness of this missionary [religioso], with his great practice, experience, and knowledge of those missions’ locations, rivers, entrances and exits…”; he did not believe he could recommend to the Council such a large expenditure of money and manpower without first consulting the viceroy. 266

At the end of his petitions San Antonio reminded the king of the numerous martyrs who had died in the establishment of the missions as further evidence of the need to retake the missions. He enumerated the forty-five Friars, ten oblates, three tertiaries, and 254 Christians that had been martyred since missionary work had begun in region in 1634 (even before the arrival of the Apostolic Institute) and proclaimed that there were surely countless others that would “only be known on the day of Judgment.” To make these deaths more real to the reader, San Antonio included a copy of what he called a map (mapa) originally created in 1737 that had been on display in the viceroy’s offices (Figure 7). Ostensibly the map was a census of the Ocopa missions at their greatest extent, demonstrating the sheer magnitude of their accomplishment, but it also conveyed something more. The census data for each mission was placed around tableaus depicting the death of each martyr, along with his name, killed in that particular mission. Though the pictures were small, even a casual observer would note that most of the friars died from arrow wounds. Although the bow and arrow was the most common weapon of the jungle, this might also have been an allusion to the iconography of St. Sebastian, who was similarly martyred by arrows. The invocation of martyrdom was a common literary

266 Fiscal’s report regarding San Antonio’s 11 July 1750 petition, 11 September 1750, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
trope throughout the history of Christianity, particularly in the baroque artwork of the seventeenth century. As the wars of religion during this period ravaged Europe, descriptions and depictions of martyrs were used to motivate faithful Catholics (and Protestants) to action. As historian Brad Gregory states “martyrs were the living embodiment of what they believed and practiced as members of religious communities.” They personified the communities’ commitment to their beliefs and “infused religious dispute with human urgency. Any compromise could unfold only ‘over their dead bodies’” 267 In sending the martyrs’ map, Fray San Antonio was attempting to convince Crown officials that retaking of the missions was not just beneficial to expansion of the empire, but fulfilled the moral imperative by not letting those Franciscan martyrs die in vain.

The Martyrs’ Map’s stylistically Baroque sentiment in many ways demonstrated Ocopa’s philosophical rift with the regalists at court. Baroque art emerged from Catholic counter-reformation of the seventeenth century to combat the austerity of Protestant religious reformers and demonstrated the power and majesty of the church. Through sensual displays of the divine, Baroque religious devotion attempted to create an atmosphere that was radically different from daily life. Church authorities encouraged individual devotees to concern themselves with the plight of their eternal soul rather than the state of the secular world. Spiritual purity, therefore, should be achieved through emotional displays of devotion...”268 Historian Charles Walker, in his work on the Lima

267 Gregory, Salvation at Stake, 6-7.
268 Walker, Shaky Colonialism, 15.
Figure 7. “Mapa de los Mártires de Santa Rosa de Ocopa,” orginal 1737, copied 1746. Source: AGI, Mapas y Planos, Perú y Chile 32
earthquake/tsunami, argues that chaotic baroque sentimentality displayed in the processions and religious devotions after the earthquake deeply offended “enlightened” bourbon ministers’ logical, orderly sensibilities. Regalists, and Manso de Velasco in particular, believed that these great ostentatious displays of emotive religious fervor were disorderly and wasteful. They drained economic resources that could be used to promote commerce and the economic renewal of the city. Religious devotions should, according to “enlightened” regalists, be simple, private, and logical.\(^{269}\) The Martyrs’ Map was not intended to be logical. In fact logic might dictate that so many missionaries’ deaths proved that the Ocopa missions were not viable, as Manso de Velasco apparently believed. The Map was intended to appeal to personal devotion and even outrage over the deaths of these saintly friars.

Regardless of whether or not the pathos of the Martyrs’ Map gnawed at the consciences of the Council of the Indies, they agreed with most of San Antonio’s propositions. On the 5\(^{th}\) of November, 1750, the council deliberated on San Antonio’s petition. In its summary of the decision, the council lambasted previous viceroys for their failure to give the Ocopa missionaries the promised financial aid, and the manpower mandated by the king since the establishment of the Apostolic Institute in Peru in 1709. The Council recommended that the king accede to all of San Antonio’s requests, but they recommended that the creation of Colleges de Proganda Fide in other Franciscan provinces be decided on a case by case basis. Most importantly, however, the Council asked the king to “personally charge” the viceroy with the task of retaking the lost

\(^{269}\) Walker, *Shaky Colonialism*, 14-18, though the concept is a reoccurring theme throughout the book.
missions utilizing San Antonio’s Chanchamayo plan. They argued that it was the viceroy’s duty to “correct with greatest severity the abuses” of the rebels with the “efficiency and promptness that is expected in such an important work.” They even recommended that the viceroy offer freedom to criminals in exchange for colonizing Cerro de la Sal.

On the March 13th, 1751, the king issued a royal decree that closely followed the Council’s recommendations. He even chided the viceroy for the “omission and lack of zeal with which until now you had treated this material” warning that he will “from this moment forward take the corresponding [actions] to remedy it” and he will “punish whomever is involved in such culpable neglect prejudicial to the service of god and myself.”

The wording of the decree regarding exactly how it was going to be implemented, however, was vague and easily ignored. While the decree clearly backed San Antonio’s Chanchamayo Plan, for example, it left details of how to launch and finance the plan up to the viceroy. Details regarding Crown’s exact responsibilities in sending sixty new missionaries to Ocopa were left to subsequent royal decrees. A decree issued on 26 October 1751 detailed the exact amount of money that the Crown would pay for each missionary’s travel expenses to Ocopa and where Crown officials would draw these monies. Nonetheless, the Crown issued no decree specifying how the government would execute the Chanchamayo plan until late 1770’s. Royal decrees (Real

270 Consulta regarding petition San Antonio’s 11 July 1750 petition, 5 November 1750, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
271 Royal Decree regarding the missionaries of Ocopa, 11 March 1751, Buen Retiro, AGI, Lima 542.
272 Ibid.
273 Royal Decree regarding the transportation of 60 missionaries to Ocopa, 26 October 1751, San Lorenzo de El Escorial, AGI, Lima 542.
Cédulas had a long tradition in colonial law of being negotiable, known as the arbitrio judicial. Kings, worried about being poorly advised, allowed colonial administrators, particularly at the highest levels (viceroys and audiencias), to delay implementation or even send the decrees back for further review. Ironically, regalist royal ministers over the course of the eighteenth century, as a way of strengthening royal power, created new forms of legal instruments, more binding than Cédulas, which attempted to end this type of non-compliance. This legal flexibility along with the decree’s vagueness allowed Manso de Velasco to delay its execution almost indefinitely. For the next three decades the 13 March 1751 decree would be a point of conflict between Ocopa and the viceroys of Peru.

In the meantime, encouraged by his success with the Council of the Indies, San Antonio continued to petition the Crown. One month later, San Antonio presented the Crown with a second, longer list of requests. These included small increases in the number of lay friars allowed to travel to Ocopa as well as a heartfelt plea for mestizo brother Fray Calixto de San José Tupac Inca to receive orders as a friar (discussed in Chapter 2). Three of these new requests aimed to maintain or even increase Ocopa’s independence, particularly from the viceroy. The first was a request to prohibit any friar who had served in Ocopa from joining any other Franciscan convent in Peru after their ten-year term as a missionary had ended, forcing them to return home to Spain at the Crown’s expense. This request reflected a serious problem for Ocopa that was only intensifying as they began to bring ever larger numbers of peninsular friars to Peru. The

---

274 San Antonio, petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
275 Ibid.; Matthías Velasco, comments on San Antonio’s petitions, 28 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
missionaries had always insisted on sending an experienced missionary to escort each new group of new missionaries so they could not take advantage of leadership opportunities created by the *Alternativa* as they passed through New World cities before arriving at Ocopa. They could not, however, stop any missionaries from taking up these posts after they had completed their ten-year term of service. San Antonio, and other members of Ocopa’s leadership, feared that this potential for almost certain eventual leadership opportunities would attract the wrong type of friars to the missions, ones that were more concerned with advancing their careers than preaching the word of God in the far reaches of the jungle. San Antonio hoped to “close this door of even the remote hope that they could be motivated to pass to the Indies where they would serve for ten years in the missions and ascend with more ease to positions within the Order than in the province from which they came.” The Council of the Indies, however, did not agree. They pointed out that nowhere in Pope Innocence’s bulls of 1686 that created the Apostolic Institute did it stipulate that missionaries had to return after their term had ended. Furthermore, they were probably not interested in shouldering the extra cost of transporting the missionaries back to Spain. The problem of ambitious friars, nonetheless, uninterested in doing actual missionary work continued to plague Ocopa until the end of the colonial period. Not only did these missionaries refuse to actually serve in jungle missions, spending their entire term of service at Ocopa, but they tended to be more interested in the political intrigues of the viceroyalty. The ambitions of some

276 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
277 Fiscal’s comments on San Antonio’s petition, 29 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
278 Ibid; see note on the back of the Fiscal’s comments.
friars beyond missionary work at Ocopa later in the century gave viceregal officials leverage to interfere with the college’s affairs in exchange for recommendations to higher offices.

The second new request was that the king ordered the Archbishop of Lima to grant one of the older missionaries certain ecclesiastical privileges that were normally only reserved for a bishop. These included the ability to preside over confirmations and give dispensations for marriages where the couple was too closely related. This practice was common among frontier missions as a simple matter of convenience. Bishops would never travel so far from their episcopal seats and such dispensations allowed the faithful in the margins of the Catholic world to receive the rites they believed necessary for their salvation. Practically, however, this gave missionaries almost complete pastoral control over their missions and thus eliminated one of the few areas in which the secular clergy had power over Ocopa. San Antonio argued that this prefect, as they were called, should be from Ocopa to avoid any unforeseen conflicts. The Council of the Indies agreed though it reserved the right in the future to select a non-Ocopino to the position. Later the archbishop created the position of prefect of the missions and endowed it with the episcopal power requested by San Antonio, which an Ocopa missionary held continuously for the rest of the colonial period.

Thirdly San Antonio requested that the King put the Ocopa missions under his personal protection and create a “Conservator Judge” to serve as his witness to ensure that the “royal ministers in those kingdoms (the viceroyalty of Peru) foment and protect

---

279 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541; Fiscal’s comments on San Antonio’s petition, 29 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
the missionaries and employ themselves in such a holy work and give aid for the happy achievement of said undertaking.”280 San Antonio hoped that by having some sort of outside arbitrator charged with ensuring that the viceroy fulfill with the royal decrees issued on Ocopa’s behalf, they could avoid the “gravest inconveniences” previous neglect had created.281 The request for a Conservator Judge demonstrates one of the core problems Ocopa faced in their relationship with the Crown. While they could get Madrid to promise aid, particularly with the help of a more conservative Council of the Indies, they could not convince viceregal ministers to honor those promises in the manner which they wanted. The Council, perhaps in a tacit admission of its own limitations, rejected this request, stating that the king has already issued all the decrees which “the Council has deemed necessary.”282

Indeed, what actually happened to the Ocopa missionaries was dependent less on what the king and council hoped for the Ocopa missions and more what the viceroy in Peru judged to be feasible and necessary. While supporting missionaries fulfilled the Crown’s obligations to the Church (and God) to Christianize the New World, their ability to realistically carry out their intentions was limited by resources and manpower in a territory on the other side of the globe. Though pro-Ocopa ministers in Madrid could try to cajole the viceroy, unless they could convince the king (and Ensenada) to remove Manso de Velasco from office, there was little they could do to force the viceroy to help the missionaries. Though as a dedicated regalist Manso de Velasco was obligated to

280 Mathias Velasco, Comments on San Antonio’s petitions, 28 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
281 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
282 Fiscal’s comments on San Antonio’s petition, 29 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
obey the King’s commands, both the vagueness and personal discretion given him in the 13 March 1751 royal decree, gave him room to ignore or delay its implementation. Since Manso de Velasco believed that the regular clergy, and it seems Ocopa in particular, was ultimately detrimental to royal authority, the viceroy attempted everything within their power to renegotiate terms of the Crown’s largess toward the missionaries.

*Manso de Velasco’s continued resistance against the Ocopa missionaries*

A few months before the raid on Andamarca, on the 9th of May, 1752, a royal decree arrived in Lima on the 13 March 1751. At least for the moment, two of the clauses, the elevation of Ocopa to a College *de Propaganda Fide* and the transportation of sixty new missionaries to Ocopa, did not affect Manso de Velasco since arrangements for those concessions were still being handled in Spain. As for the order to retake the Ocopa missions from Juan Santos, the viceroy had already decided, as he had indicated in his report to the Crown on 24th of September 1750, on a policy of containment.

Nevertheless, Manso de Velasco could not completely ignore the decree’s insistence to pay 6,000 pesos annually to Ocopa, “without the officers of the royal treasury or any other minister pretending to know how to distribute it, claiming it was [the king’s] will, [and] that the decision (on how to spend it) should be left to the missionaries or their leaders.” The viceroy, however, only partially obeyed the decree’s provision to pay the stipend. While he ordered that the royal treasury in Jauja to pay the missionaries, he

---

283 The arrival was noted in ledger notes for the royal treasure of Jauja, AGN, Caja Real, Jauja, 627, Libro de Cuentas, Contador, 1751-1752.
285 Royal Decree regarding the missionaries of Ocopa, 11 March 1751, Buen Retiro, AGI, Lima 542.
reduced the payment by half to 3,000 pesos. He reasoned that since the missionaries had only one *entrada* (Huánuco) of the three for which they had originally been given the funding (they had lost Tarma and Jauja) the 3,000 pesos was more than adequate for their needs (see Table 2).\(^{286}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (in pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>2000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1756</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1757</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1758</td>
<td>3000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1759</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1760</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1761</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 – Payments to the Ocopa missionaries during Manso de Velasco’s term of office as Viceroy. Sources: AGN, Caja Real, Jauja, 627-629; AGN, Ministero de Hacienda, Libros 794, 817; Francisco Davila y Thores, Petition in the name of the three conversions, 9 November 1748, Lima, AGI, Lima 541; Lehnertz, “Land of the Infidels,” 316.

\(^{286}\) Manso de Velasco, Relacion que hizo de su Gobierno, BNE, mss. 3108, 70.
The reduction of Ocopa’s stipend may have not just been a matter of reducing clerical power, but also concerned another aspect of the Bourbon reforms, streamlining the colonial budget. Over its 300 year history, Spain’s American colonies provided the Crown with an immense source of revenue. Over time, however, a larger colonial bureaucracy, local corruption, tax evasion, and failing mineral production had all led to a decline in remittances to Spain. Reformers hoped that by cutting colonial budgets, more closely enforcing taxation, and promoting colonial industry and commerce, the Crown could recover and even augment colonial revenues. Therefore, colonial ministers were under extreme pressure to increase their remittances to Spain.

Pressure to remit money back to Spain was so intense that despite the devastation of the Earthquake in Lima, Manso de Velasco had devised a method of keeping the funds flowing to the metropolis. As early as 1748, only two years after the Lima earthquake/tsunami, Ensenada pressured Manso de Velasco to resume remittances from Lima to help Spain conclude the War of Austrian Succession. Even before Ensenada’s letter had arrived, the viceroy had already remitted 115,000 pesos and hoped to send 300,000 more within the following few months. This was difficult since, taxable commerce on the sale of luxury goods in Lima, had almost completely disappeared in the years immediately after the Earthquake. Nevertheless, according to Spanish royal treasury records, during the nine years after the earthquake Manso de Velasco balanced Lima’s budget. As Figure 8 details, between 1746 and 1755 Manso de Velasco matched

---

287 Ensenada included the demand for more money in most of his letters to Manso de Velasco, but the letters dated 17 August 1748 and 30 November 1748 are exemplary (AGI, Lima 643).
income (dark blue line) to expenditures (pink line) almost exactly, with the exception of 1750. Balancing the ledger, even in times of decreased revenues was not an unusual practice for colonial treasuries. Though when in deficit, the account ledgers generally indicated this imbalance by showing income that came from ramos (account entries) for borrowed money. After the earthquake, however, viceregal treasure officials in Lima resorted to a more subtle method to balance their ledgers. While total expenditures were increasing (to rebuild the city), so was income from the ramo extraordinario de Real Hacienda (red line), a ramo that normally contained miscellaneous entries. In fact, the increases and decreases in these two accounts match up closely. Both total expenditures and extraordinario saw increases in 1746, 1747, 1748, 1751, and 1752, and decreases in 1749, 1750, 1753, and 1754. The two accounts increased and decreased in similar intervals, as the two year moving averages for total expenditures (black line) and extraordinario (green line) indicate. The Viceroy drew upon tax revenues from neighboring treasury districts and placing them in Lima’s multipurpose ramo, extraordinario de real hacienda, in order to pay for the reconstruction of Lima. In a letter to Ensenada dated shortly after the earthquake, Manso de Velasco admitted using profits from the taxes on mercury production in Huancavelica to rebuild Lima’s most vital government buildings, such as the viceregal palace, the chambers of the Audiencia, and the fortress at Callao. In later letters, Manso de Velasco indicated that in 1747, he had diverted 176,911 pesos from neighboring areas, using this and other sources of

---

289 Cuentas de caja de Lima, 1748-53, Contaduría 1771, AGI.
### Table 1: Finances after the Earthquake/Tsunami of 1746

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Income</th>
<th>Total Expenditures</th>
<th>Extraordinario de Real Hacienda</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1745</td>
<td>1539120</td>
<td>1539090</td>
<td>551753</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1746</td>
<td>1473000</td>
<td>1473001</td>
<td>672256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1747</td>
<td>1808619</td>
<td>1808623</td>
<td>676643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1748</td>
<td>2123001</td>
<td>2123007</td>
<td>1131508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1749</td>
<td>2101586</td>
<td>2101597</td>
<td>683875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1750</td>
<td>1683400</td>
<td>1983397</td>
<td>364945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751</td>
<td>1897842</td>
<td>1897846</td>
<td>707724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>2385934</td>
<td>2385933</td>
<td>755257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1753</td>
<td>1759254</td>
<td>1759253</td>
<td>191778</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1754</td>
<td>1434990</td>
<td>1434989</td>
<td>102144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1755</td>
<td>1473165</td>
<td>1473165</td>
<td>104265</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 8 - Finances after the Earthquake/Tsunami of 1746. Source:** John Jay TePaske, Herbert S. Klein, and Kendall W. Brown, eds. *The Royal Treasuries of the Spanish Empire in America.* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1982), 362 – 367.
income to rebuild public buildings in the capital. In truth, the viceroy probably used these sources of income more than he was willing to admit publicly. From before the earthquake in 1745 to its highest point in 1748, *extraordinario* saw a 105% increase. In 1748, the *extraordinario* ramo held 1,131,508 pesos, comprising 53% of the city of Lima’s total income. While Manso de Velasco sought sources of income from within the city, the destruction in Lima forced him to look outside the affected area to satiate the Crown’s desire for remittances to Spain.

By 1751, however, when Manso de Velasco decided to end campaigns against Juan Santos and reduce the friars’ funding, the city’s financial income greatly improved. Manso de Velasco depended less on outside sources of income as his city began to recover. As the table on Figure 8 indicates, in 1751 *extraordinario* accounted for only 37% of the city’s total income—down from 53% in 1748—and in 1752 it comprised only 32%, which was less than pre-earthquake levels (in 1745 *extraordinario* made up 36% of the budget).

At the same time that the city’s tax income rose, the viceroy completed most of the government’s major rebuilding projects. By 1750, as Figure 9 demonstrates, most of the work for rebuilding the viceregal palace, the royal mint, and the fortress at Callao had been completed. The final large reconstruction project for the Crown, the rebuilding of the Lima Cathedral, did not start in earnest until after 1754, because the viceroy had been reluctant to assume responsibility for this task, believing that it should fall to the *vecinos*

---

(prominent citizens) of the city and the Church. In fact, except for the reconstruction of government buildings, the Crown felt little obligation to rebuild any part of the city. Likewise, the care of the thousands of Limeños injured in the Earthquake was left completely to the Church. Traditionally, the Catholic Church had been colonial Latin America’s principal healthcare provider, but in the wake of the tremendously destructive earthquake/tsunami, the ecclesiastical hospitals struggled to cope. During the

Figure 9 - Government Expenditures for the Rebuilding of Lima. Source: Pérez-Mallaina Bueno, Retrato de una ciudad en crisis, 123.

---

reconstruction of Lima, the viceroy only allocated 27,998 pesos for maintenance of hospitals in the city, as compared to the approximately 1.3 million pesos he spent on the reconstruction of government buildings. Even the burying of the dead was left to a secular religious brotherhood, the *Hermandad de la Caridad*. As historian Pablo Pérez-Mallaina Bueno so aptly stated, in the minds of Bourbon officials, “Charity [was] not a matter of State.”

Crown officials felt it was their duty only to rebuild the apparatus of government and to maintain law and order within the city. Therefore, by 1751 when the Viceroy cut funding to the Ocopa missions, the government had already completed most of its major rebuilding projects.

During Manso de Velasco’s administration (1745 to 1761), he sent approximately 3.5 million pesos back to Spain in the form of remittances. In the fifteen years before his tenure in Lima, previous viceroys had sent a little less than 1.5 million pesos combined. Of the 3.5 million pesos Manso de Velasco remitted to the metropolis, 2.5 million were sent between 1748 and 1752—the years during which he decided to limit funding to Ocopa. Had the viceroy continued to fund fully the Ocopa missionaries’ 6,000 pesos per year stipend during his last ten years as viceroy, remittances to Spain would have been reduced by less than 1%. Ensenada, however, believed that even the rebuilding the city of Lima was less important than increasing remittances to Spain. In letter dated 24 April 1748, Ensenada chastised Manso de Velasco for spending too much on the rebuilding of the viceregal capital. He instructed the viceroy to use only the 176,911 pesos that he had admitted taking from outside sources in 1747 on the reconstruction of government.

---

buildings.\textsuperscript{293} Manso de Velasco was reluctant to admit using outside money to fund rebuilding projects, and he omitted this from the official account of his tenure of office.\textsuperscript{294} Mounting pressure from Spain to streamline the colonial system made it difficult for Manso de Velasco to justify giving funds to support the rebel-torn Ocopa missions in the east.

While Manso de Velasco worked to streamline royal treasury expenditures so that he could remit more money to Spain, he was also filling his own pockets. Like many others before him, Manso de Velasco hoped to profit financially from his government post in the Americas. On his initial voyage to South America to become governor of Chile in 1737, his personal baggage contained boxes of clothing, jewels, and other valuables listed for “personal use,” including 150 pounds of tobacco. Manso de Velasco hoped to sell these luxury goods for an inflated price in Chile. To pay for these goods, the new governor had borrowed nearly 15,000 pesos, clearly confident of a profit. By the time Manso de Velasco left his office as Governor of Chile in 1745, he had done little more than pay off his initial debts.\textsuperscript{295} But as viceroy of Peru, he had access to wealth much greater than anything found in Chile. Manso de Velasco’s annual salary as viceroy was 30,000 silver escudos (approximately 31,000 silver pesos). Exactly how much of the money went to maintain his household remains unstudied. But upon arriving in Lima, Manso de Velasco worked quickly to set up a web of subordinates in key government positions in Lima, such as corregidores and treasury officials, to help advance his other

\textsuperscript{293} Ibid., 120 – 121.
\textsuperscript{294} This is omitted from both known versions of his official account: Relacion que Escribe el Conde de Superunda Virrey del Peru de los Principios sucesos de su Gobierno, RAH, 9-9-3 1703; and Manso de Velasco, Relación que hizo de su Gobierno, BNE, mss. 3108.
\textsuperscript{295} Pilar Latasa Vassallo, “Negociar en red,” 470 – 473.
Manso de Velasco also maintained close ties with *consulado* members both in Lima and Cádiz. Through this network of associates, in 1750, the year before the viceroy reduced the Ocopa missionaries’ annual allotment from 6,000 to 3,000 pesos per year, Manso de Velasco sent 80,000 pesos of his own personal earnings back to Spain. He would ultimately send back the enormous total of 490,500 pesos.

Shortly after Manso de Velasco’s decision to reduce funding to the Ocopa missionaries by half (in defiance of the edict of 13 March 1751) the missionaries appealed to the viceroy to reconsider his decision. Perhaps to assuage the politically powerful friars and to garner support for his controversial decision, on May 10th, one day after his initial decision, the viceroy agreed to take the matter before the *Audiencia*. By 1752, however, after seven years as viceroy, Manso de Velasco had surrounded himself with many likeminded government officials, several of whom were members of the *Audiencia*. This inner-circle of powerful civic leaders was fiercely loyal to Manso de Velasco and his regalist vision for the viceroyalty, including clerical reform. Not surprisingly, on the 24th of April the *Audiencia* confirmed Manso de Velasco’s decision to cut Ocopa’s funding. That same day Ocopa’s representative in Lima, Juan de San Antonio, lamented that Viceroy and the *Audiencia* were “determined to ignore” his demands for full payment, but took comfort in the fact that “his royal highness

---

296 While it is unclear whether these practices were actually illegal, his remittance back to Spain through his merchant connections were, *Ibid.*, 490 – 492.
300 *Real Acuerdo*, 24 April 1752, Lima AGI, Lima 808; *Tribunal de Cuentas*, 22 September 1751, Lima, AGI, Lima
commanded the reverend father missionaries to inform him yearly on the state of the missions, and the use of said 6,000 pesos.”

Once word of the reduction in funding reached Madrid several months later, Joseph de San Antonio heeded his spiritual brother’s suggestion and informed the king of the viceroy’s decision. On the 23rd of September San Antonio begged the king to order the viceroy (once again) to pay the full payment of 6,000 pesos annually. In response on the 7th of October the King wrote to the Manso de Velasco, “I command you that you give attention to this subject (the missions of Ocopa), commendable as it is, and of great interest to the service of God and myself.” The king ordered him to pay the full 6,000 pesos “without delay” writing “I want to have proper and prompt fulfillment of what has been ordered in these decrees (the 13 and 26 March 1751 decrees) so that the missions receive the necessary aid. This is my will.” This type of language was uncharacteristically direct when compared to the officious and flowery rhetoric that dominated eighteenth-century bureaucratic correspondence. The personal attention that Ferdinand VI, who generally maintained aloof from most, matters of State, leaving the day-to-day affairs to Ensenada, is also noteworthy. Perhaps Ferdinand, despite Ensenada’s attempts to reduce power of the regular clergy, felt that in the case of Ocopa delaying or preventing their work would imperil his immortal soul. While the king perhaps could accept attacks on the more corrupt regular houses of Lima or Quito, he could not oppose such a notable pious work. Despite the king’s demands, however,

---

301 Juan de San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 24 April 1752, Lima, AGI, Lima 542.
303 Ferdinand VI, Letter to Manso de Velasco, 7 October 1752, Buen Retiro, AGI, Lima 1607.
Manso de Velasco continued to ignore calls to restore full funding to Ocopa. As a result, in 1757 San Antonio once again attempted to get Ocopa’s funding restored. He accused Manso de Velasco and the rest of the viceregal ministers of “disobedience” because they “pretend to have knowledge” of “his majesty’s royal will.”

Fiscal Salcedo agreed stating that the viceroy’s logic for not funding the missionaries was “twisted” and “not creditable,” but also said, perhaps in recognition of the Council’s weakness, that they had tried to force Manso de Velasco several times to obey, but since he still refused to restore the funding there was nothing more they could do. Despite a reissuing of the royal decree in 1755, Manso de Velasco did not restore Ocopa’s full funding until 1759, after his political position had been severely weakened by the downfall of his patron, Ensenada.

Manso de Velasco further thwarted the Ocopa missionaries from receiving funds promised in the 13 March 1751 royal decree by failing to pay the travel costs for new missionaries coming to Peru. On March 23rd, 1751, a few days after the initial decree, the Crown specified that they would provide 21,900 pesos to transport sixty-seven missionaries (sixty full friars, including San Antonio himself and six lay friars), but stipulated that the money be paid upon their arrival in Lima from the cities’ own mesadas eclesiasticas account (a tax levied ecclesiastics upon taking office). This stipulation

---

304 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 14 September 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 542.
305 Fiscal’s report regarding San Antonio’s 14 September 1757 petition, 1 October 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 542.
306 The 1755 decree is noted in petition to the Crown from San Antonio, 14 September 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 542.
307 Previously the missionaries had collected the funds at every city with a royal treasury they passed though on their way to Peru. Royal decree about funding travel for the missionaries of Ocopa, 26-i-1751, Buen Retiro, AGI, Lima 808.
that money must come from Lima worried San Antonio. He complained to the Crown that, “experience has taught the supplicant and his companions that in thirty-two years the treasury of Lima has not paid the balance of the stipend (limosna) designated by his majesty for the missions to the infidels, which I fear will now happen, if the corresponding expenses are not paid in every port and royal treasury until [they] arrive at Santa Rosa de Ocopa.”

Both Fiscal Salcedo and the Council of the Indies agreed with San Antonio but the resulting royal decree on the 16th of October did nothing to rectify the problem. Because the number of missionaries headed for Ocopa was so large San Antonio decided have them travel in two groups, one by way of Cartagena and the other through Buenos Aires. In 1752 the first group of twenty-seven missionaries left Cádiz passing from Cartagena to Lima. When they arrived in Lima, the Viceroy honored the royal decree and paid the first half of the promised funds, 15,684 pesos. The second group left a year later numbering forty-four missionaries. Unfortunately as their ship entered the Rio de la Plata estuary it ran aground and though none of the missionaries were killed they lost all of their supplies and documents. The group’s bad fortune continued to fail them when they arrived in Lima absolutely penniless and the viceroy refused to pay them the rest of the promised funds, arguing that the first group of missionaries had completely emptied the mesadas eclesiasticas account. The missionaries, of course, complained to the Crown. In an attempt to silence the missionaries, the viceroy made a token payment of 2,350 pesos quite short of the 14,937

308 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 9 May 1951, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
309 Note at the end of San Antonio’s petition to the Crown, 9 May 1951, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541; Royal decree, 16 October 1751, AGI, Lima 808.
pesos his government owed. The missionaries did not receive the balance of their compensation until after Manso de Velasco left office.\textsuperscript{310}

Manso de Velasco also renewed his attacks against Friar Calixto. In 1753 after his elevation to lay friar in Valencia, Friar Calixto petitioned the king to allow him to return to Peru and serve in the missions that the Apostolic Institute were creating in the high jungle region north of Cusco.\textsuperscript{311} With the help of Commissary-general Friar Matthías Velasco, Calixto not only secured license from the Crown to return to Peru, but the council agreed to fund the voyage as well.\textsuperscript{312} Calixto, however, feared that viceroy would try to arrest him when he arrived in Lima since he had made the journey to Spain illegally. To assuage his fears the Crown ordered the viceroy and the archbishop of Lima to let Calixto pass unmolested through the viceregal capital.\textsuperscript{313}

Upon returning to Peru, Calixto may have gone to Cuzco for a time as he had told the Crown, but by 1756 he was in Lima in residence at the city’s principal monastery, San Francisco de Jesus. There, according to Manso de Velasco, Calixto enjoyed a significant following among the brothers of the monastery and in October of 1756 began hosting secret meetings in his cell, sometimes lasting all day, with a small group of prominent indigenous leaders and businessmen. On 15 January 1757 the viceroy dispatched a blistering report to the Crown, drawing parallels between these meetings and the Lima Conspiracy that had occurred seven years earlier. He still blamed Calixto and

\textsuperscript{310} Petition of Syndic-general of Ocopa, without date, AGI, Lima 808; Friar Julian de Arriaga, Secretary of the Indies, letter to the Manso de Velasco, 19 March 1758, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
\textsuperscript{311} Calixto, Petition to the Crown, 27 June 1753, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
\textsuperscript{312} Summary of the Council’s decision, 12 July 1753, Madrid, AGI, Lima 988; Matthías Velasco, Petition to the Crown, 15 January 1753, Madrid, AGI, Lima 988.
\textsuperscript{313} Royal decree, 10 July 1753, AGI, Lima 988.
his companion Friar Isidoro de Cala for inciting the unrest in 1750 by disseminating the
*Representación Verdadera*, which advocated allowing Amerindians to receive holy
orders as well as serve in government offices.\(^{314}\) The viceroy complained that Calixto did
not understand “the inconveniences nor the consequences of this universal permission
which the nature and condition of the Indians will not allow.” Manso de Velasco claimed
that this secret cabal espoused exactly the same ideals, which taught the Indians “to hate
the Spanish Nation” and desire to “throw off their yoke of domination.”\(^{315}\) The viceroy
even complained that the group believed he had been too harsh in executing the traitorous
Lima conspirators for their crimes. To stem the potential threat that the viceroy believed
that these meetings posed, he ordered Audiencia Judge Pedro Bravo de Rivero to
incarcerate Calixto while they searched his cell for condemning evidence. While the
viceroy admitted that the search turned up no new evidence, it produced two letters that,
according Manso de Velasco, demonstrated Calixto’s animosity toward the Spanish as
well his evil intentions. One letter was from the *Cabildo de Indios* of Lima, complaining
about Amerindians inability to receive priestly orders, and another from one Felipe
Tancuri detailing the suffering of the Amerindians in Mexico. Nonetheless, the search did
not produce enough evidence to convict Calixto of treason. Manso de Velasco therefore
condemned Calixto for illegally meeting with a group of Amerindians, which according
to colonial law had to be attended by a Crown representative, though no other suspected
member of this supposed cabal was ever arrested or even investigated.\(^{316}\)

\(^{314}\) This account is based off two reports Manso de Velasco wrote on 15 January 1757, Lima, AGI, Lima
988. Both basically narrate the same events and probably one was an earlier draft of the other.
\(^{315}\) *Ibid.*
\(^{316}\) *Ibid.*
The viceroy’s condemnation of Calisto’s activities was enough to cause concern among Crown officials in Madrid. Therefore, when the viceroy asked the Crown for permission to deport Calixto back to Spain, both Crown and Franciscan officials in Madrid agreed. While Calixto waited for his deportation from Peru, the viceroy placed him under house arrest and banned him from any communication with any Amerindians.

In January 1759 Calixto sailed from Callao. The viceroy insisted that he be placed on a ship bound for Cádiz by way of Cape Horn, probably to minimize any risk of him escaping during a land journey through the Andes to Cartagena or Buenos Aires. The ship, however, was waylaid in Chile for almost a year until the viceroy personally ordered it to set sail, warning that under no circumstance could Calixto stay in the Americas. Manso de Velasco also requested that upon arrival in Spain, Calixto would be sent to an “austere” monastery in Castile (not Valencia where he received orders), remain prohibited from any communication with Amerindians back in Peru or elsewhere, and be banned from living in any community in a port city to ensure that the lay friar could never return to Peru. 317 Both the Crown and the Order again acceded to the Viceroy’s request and when Calixto arrived on the 16th of September, 1760 in Cádiz, he was escorted in “secure custody” from the port to the remote monastery of San Francisco del Monte near the landlocked Andalusian village of Adamuz where he resided until 1765 when he disappeared from the historical record. 318

318 Friar Antonio Juan de Molina, Franciscan commissary-general of the Indies (replaced Matthías de Velasco), Order, 12 December 1760, Madrid, AGI, Lima 988; Bernales Ballersteros, “Fray Calixto Tupac Inca,” 158
Calixto’s second run-in with the viceroy certainly only reinforced to Manso de Velasco the danger that the regular orders, and perhaps specifically Ocopa, posed to the monarchy. Calixto was certainly a provocateur whose activities even in early times may have seemed to colonial officials as subversive. Manso de Velasco’s determination in pursuing the friar, however, demonstrated not only a personal concern on the part of the viceroy for Calixto’s growing influence, but a symptom of a growing uneasiness among regalist Crown officials as they began to suspect that the church was no longer a partner in the maintenance of a harmonious social and racial colonial hierarchy. Ocopa’s association with Calixto helped to keep the missions at the center of these debates.

In almost every occasion between 1750 and 1761, Manso de Velasco attempted to use the full power of his office to block or retard the expansion of the Ocopa missions as well as other projects of the Apostolic Institute. In 1756 Manso de Velasco denied a request that would give the Ocopa missionaries access to labor from the *mita* of twenty-three Indians from frontier villages of Panao and Acomayo. In 1717 the Crown had given the missionaries *mita* rights to the labor of 100 men in frontier villages of Chinchao and Pillao. The missionaries used these men mainly as soldiers to protect their expanding missions in the only *entrada* they had left, Huánuco. Not only did the viceroy reject their proposal but insisted that they report yearly on how they were using these *mitayos.*

The viceroy further attenuated Ocopa’s missionary activity by ignoring their request to exempt the highland parish which Ocopa controlled that servicing the villages of Comas Inca,” 12-13. Mostly likely Calixto died in or around 1765 since his last correspondence complained about his failing health, unfortunately the San Francisco de Monte Monastery was destroyed in the Spain Civil War.

319 Order of the *Real Acuerdo*, 13 September 1756, Lima, AGI, Lima 808.
and Andamarca from secularization. Andamarca in particular was not only the site of Juan Santos last raid but an important staging ground for any future attempt to reenter the *entrada* of Jauja. The viceroy argued that only the king could grant such an exemption, but he never passed the request on to Madrid. The parish passed into the hands of a secular priest in November 1755. 320 The viceroy also personally blocked the Apostolic Institute from expanding missions into Tarifa (in modern-day Bolivia), even though local Audiencia of Charcas had already approved the Franciscan takeover of the region. Instead he gave the area over to the Jesuits. 321

The most divisive issue between the Ocopa missionaries and the viceroy was his intransigence over the continuation of campaigns against Juan Santos. Manso de Velasco followed a policy of containment until the end of his term of office. In an attempt to force Manso de Velasco’s hand, however, the missionaries devised other ways to reach the missions of the Tarma *entrada*. In 1753 the missionaries asked the viceregal government for more troops to protect their remaining missions in the Huánuco *entrada*. The missionaries were using these men, mostly militia, to launch expeditions to explore areas near their old Tarma missions in the Pampas de Sacramento. They justified reentering the former missions by claiming that “the motive for said enterprise is the continuous pleading of those apostates in repeated messages that they have been sending to the College (Ocopa) offering to restore their villages (the mission reductions) if they were

321 Matthías de Velasco, Petition to the Crown, 6 September 1759, Madrid, Lima 808, Cuaderno 34.
given missionaries to govern them and solders to defend them.” The viceroy tried to limit the number of troops he sent to the Huánuco entrada so that the missionaries would not have enough to expand into the Pampas. Possibly he feared that if the missionaries once again got into armed conflict with Juan Santos that he would have to respond with force to avoid criticism from Madrid that he could not protect the Peruvian frontier. In order to stop the missionaries from inciting further violence, on the 2nd of June 1755, the viceroy issued an order that barred the Ocopa missionaries from entering “infidel lands” with the caveat that it was just “for now.” The Ocopa missionaries, of course, vehemently objected, pointing out that the Crown had paid for the transport of peninsular friars to come to Peru just for this purpose. The newly elected Guardian of Ocopa, Friar Joseph Ampuero, personally travelled to Lima with a petition signed by the community to press the viceroy to rescind his order. Even before Ampuero arrived in Lima, however, Manso de Velasco reversed his decision. Perhaps he realized that barring the missionaries not only from their Juan Santos-occupied missions but from sending any new expeditions elsewhere in the jungle was politically untenable.

In rescinding the order, however, the viceroy added a clause that deeply offended the missionaries; by stating that in any future expeditions they should “use convenient precautions and not disrupt the peace of those providences with the insults experienced

322 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 6 September 1759, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
nearby [in the Tarma and Jauja missions].” Ampuero again lashed out at the viceroy saying that such a clause, which essentially blamed the missionaries for the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, impinged on “the honor of the sacred religion [the Franciscan Order] and its children [the friars] who have striven to conserve the holy desire to convert.”

Like Juan and Ulloa, Manso de Velasco saw Ocopa’s frontier missions as a liability to the stability of the empire. Unable to get satisfaction for the accusation to force the viceroy to launch new campaigns against Juan Santos, the missionaries pressed the Council of the Indies through their representative, Joseph de San Antonio, who had just returned to Madrid from escorting the new missionaries to Ocopa. Once again San Antonio pleaded that the Council force Manso de Velasco to launch new campaigns to recuperate Ocopa’s lost missions, calling the viceroy’s efforts up to this point “useless.” While the Council heartily agreed and sent the order, they were impotent to make the viceroy comply. Even in reissuing this order just as in the royal decree of 13 March 1751, they left implementation to the discretion of the viceroy. The missionaries fumed about their treatment, so much so that the fiscal of the Council of the Indies noted that “these friars demonstrate little satisfaction in the conduct of the Viceroy regarding these missions.”

By the late 1750’s Manso de Velasco’s political position in the Spanish bureaucracy had begun to weaken with the fall of his patron, the Marques de la Ensenada in 1754. Ensenada’s radical reform agenda, not just in religious matters, deeply upset the more conservative factions in the Spanish government. Ensenada’s fall began with the

---

326 Ampuero, Letter to Manso de Velasco, 30 November 1756, Lima, AGI, Lima 808
327 Ibid.
328 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 12 February 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808; a note of the Council’s decision and action are at the end of the copy of the petition.
329 Fiscal’s report on San Antonio’s petition, 28 February 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
death of his partner, José de Carvajal y Lancaster in April of 1754. Many ministers within the regalist faction did not trust Ensenada’s ambitions and without Carvajal to check his power, they began to abandon him. Eventually two pro-British ministers, Fernando de Silva Mendoza y Toledo, Duke of Huéscar, and Ricardo Wall, convinced the king that Ensenada had been secretly trying to start another war with Britain over the cutting of logwood in Central America. On July 21st, 1754, Ensenada was placed under house arrest and eventually exiled to Granada. The king replaced Ensenada as minister of the Indies with the conservative president of the Council of the Indies, Julián de Arriaga.  

Though Ensenada’s removal did not mean the end of Manso de Velasco’s tenure as viceroy, it certainly limited his freedom in ignoring direct requests from Madrid. The viceroy still continued to try to undermine Ocopa, but could not ignore all demands from Madrid to aid them. On 24 June 1758 the viceroy finally relented and restored Ocopa’s funding of 6,000 pesos annually, but in most other issues, including the retaking of the lost missions, he remained unmoved.

The State of the Missions in the Wake of Juan Santos and Viceroy Manso de Velasco

The 1750’s were not a complete disaster for the Ocopa missions. The missionaries began expanding into the Huánuco entrada as well as opening a new one at Cajamarquilla. Most significantly, the 13 March 1751 royal decree also elevated Ocopa to status of Collage de Propaganda Fide.  

330 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 182-190.  
331 Treasurer’s report, 24-iv-1759, Cuentas de Caja 1758-1759, Jauja, AGN, Caja Real 629.  
332 Royal decree, 13 March 1751, Buen Retiro, AGI, Lima 542.
was delayed because the royal decree was lost in the shipwreck in the Rio de la Plata estuary in 1754, few challenged Ocopa’s new status. In reality the day-to-day function of the College of Ocopa changed very little with its elevation. Experienced missionaries still instructed new missionaries in indigenous language to prepare them to man the college’s new *entradas*. Though control of the Ocopa missions passed from the temporary position of commissary of the missions to the guardian (superior) of Ocopa, this change meant very little in practice. In theory this new status allowed Ocopa to be completely autonomous of Franciscan leadership in Lima, but Ocopa had long since ignored its provincial leadership. Formally at least, between the elevation and the creation of the position of prefect, the college was almost completely independent of any sort of church leadership in Peru.

With the arrival of sixty-six new missionaries from Spain the college also had the manpower to capitalize on its most recent territorial expansions. Just as San Antonio had feared, however, many of these friars sought missionary service in the New World in the hope that once there, they could obtain leadership positions created by the *Alternativa*. According to San Antonio, these ambitions made many of the new missionaries “incompatible” with the type of evangelization that they would need to do in the jungle. Both Manso de Velasco and his successor Amat complained about these missionaries, whom the Crown had paid Peru to preach to the ‘infidels’ and not to fulfill

---

333 This was due in part because the minister-general of the Franciscan Order instructed the Provincial in Lima to treat Ocopa as College de Propaganda Fide 31-iii-1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 542; Ampuero, Report to the Crown, 5 January 1757, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 808.
334 Ampuero, Report to the Crown, 5 January 1757, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 808.
335 San Antonio, petition to the Crown, 2 May 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541; Matthías Velasco, comments on San Antonio’s petitions, 28 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
336 *Fiscal’s* report on San Antonio’s petition, 8 May 1764, Madrid, AGI, Lima 634.
their ambitions for advancement. In order to force these office-seeking missionaries to go out to the Jungle, as early as 1751 San Antonio tried to ban them from preaching locally around Ocopa in order to allow them no excuse to stay in the Sierra. Unfortunately for the Ocopa leadership, many missionaries continued staying at the college for as much of their ten-year term as possible, leaving only after they had completed their service, and taking up posts throughout the viceroyalty.

Therefore by the end of the 1750’s the proximal mass exodus of all the missionaries who had come earlier in the decade had caused Ocopa to confront another shortage in manpower. Not all the friars were being wooed away by Alternativa opportunities. The Ocopa leadership had sent eighteen missionaries to found a new College de Propaganda Fide in Tarifa. Though the viceroy later blocked this project, the missionaries did not return to Ocopa. Others, who actually had ventured out into the missions, died of diseases. In 1757 San Antonio once again asked the Crown to send over new missionaries. Perhaps in a fit of zeal he requested four groups of fifty to sixty friars, two groups for Ocopa, one for the new missions in Huánuco and Cajamarquilla entradas, and another for the “reconquest” of the Tarma and Jauja entradas. Another group would be sent to Tarifa (news had not yet arrived in Madrid of the Viceroy ending the endeavor) and another to start a new College in Chile. Confused by such a large request the Council of the Indies asked Commissary-general, Friar Matthias Velasco, to clarify the

337 Manso de Velasco, Relación que hizo de su Gobierno, BNE, mss. 3108, 52v; Amat, Relación que hizo de su Gobierno, RAH 9-9-3 1704, 85.
338 Matthias de Velasco, Commentary on San Antonio’s petition, 28 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, 541. The request was rejected by the Council as the Innocence Bulls commanded the Apostolic Institute to preach both to the faithful and ‘infidels’ see Fiscal’s Report, 29 June 1751, Madrid, AGI, Lima 541.
339 San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 12 February 1757, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
Order’s request. Velasco reduced the request to just one group of 50 to 60 missionaries for Ocopa, with perhaps a smaller group for Chile in a separate request. 340 The Council, however, ultimately rejected even the commissary-general’s more moderate proposal stating “for now there are not sufficient motives for His Majesty to concede the request of this friar.” 341 This rejection left the Ocopa leadership in a difficult position. By 1762 when first the group of new missionaries’ ten-year term expired, thirty-seven left or had already left Ocopa and twelve had died. Of those who remained one had gone insane while another suffered from what the missionaries labeled “hypochondria.” Many missionaries that were left were old and infirm and within two years four more died. 342

In 1761 the newly crowned King Charles III ordered a report on all the religious institutions in that Archdiocese of Lima. Friar Joseph de San Antonio responded on Ocopa’s behalf in 1764. The friar began his report with a lamentation on the fallen state of the Ocopa missions. He complained that only ten missionaries remained, and two of those were too sick to work.343 He argued that they at least needed 60 new missionaries, as well as the support of arms and soldiers to protect them, just to occupy the missions they currently had. He still bemoaned the loss of the Tarma and Jauja entradas, whose continued abandonment he, of course, blamed on the “indifference of His Majesty’s ministers.” Though most throughout the viceroyalty believed Juan Santos to no longer be a threat, he warned that “the lack of corresponding punishment,” would allow Santos to

340 Matthías de Velasco, Petition to the Crown, 6 September 1759, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
341 Fiscal’s comments on San Antonio’s petition, 20 April 1760, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808; Council’s decision, 18 August 1760, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
342 Heras, ed. Libro de Incorporaciones, 31-42. The missionary with “hypochondria” died a year later.
343 It is unclear whether this is just in Ocopa or throughout all of their mission stations. San Antonio, Report on Ocopa, 7 April 1764, Madrid, AGI, Lima 834.

166
gain more supporters and arms.\textsuperscript{344} To support San Antonio’s dire assessment of the state of the Ocopa missions, Friar Joseph Gil, commissary-general for the Order in Peru, stated that “there are few [missionaries in Ocopa] who are capable of work in the Montaña, some due to their old age, others because they are too ill” and that Ocopa and its missions would be in complete ruin “without anybody who can replace those members of the Collage who have died.”\textsuperscript{345} San Antonio, however, attempted to look to the future. In addition to the missionaries needed for the territory the friars already controlled, he pleaded, for an additional 60 missionaries to implement their planned expansion into Pampas de Sacramento, an area just adjacent to the old Tarma \textit{entreda}.

While San Antonio’s 1764 report lambasted Peru’s regalist ministers, it demonstrates a subtle shift in the Ocopa missionaries’ rhetoric to accommodate the regalist ministers surrounding King Charles. In describing the Pampas de Sacramento, for example, an Antonio claimed that it was a “very rich region, with abundant gold, which we know from the many Indians already baptized…. We have seen them pull out of the rivers’ sand banks large nuggets and flakes of gold, but the gold of greatest quality, in which the missionaries are most interested, is the souls redeemed with the blood of Jesus.”\textsuperscript{346} This appeal to the Peruvian jungle’s commercial potential for the empire was aimed at convincing regalists, particularly at the local level, of the importance having the missionaries expand Spanish hegemony into this fertile hinterland. While the missionaries had used such rhetoric in a limited fashion before Manso de Velasco’s

\textsuperscript{344} \textit{Ibid.}\textsuperscript{345} Friar Manuel Gil, Commissary-general of Peru, Report the state of the Franciscan missions in Peru, 7 September 1764, Madrid, AGI, Lima 834.\textsuperscript{346} San Antonio, Report on Ocopa, 7 April 1764, Madrid, AGI, Lima 834.
tenure of office, after the 1750’s appeals to use the missions to strengthen colonial commerce became the centerpiece of Ocopa’s lobbying to the government. These promises helped to improve relations between the missionaries and the more radical viceregal officials but at a cost to the college’s independence. While the increasing closeness with the local officials provided increased benefits, including most importantly compliance to King’s concessions of money and manpower, viceregal officials began to demand more and more control over the missions. The conflicts with Manso de Velasco had begun to change the way Ocopa functioned as an institution. The Ocopa missionaries had started to realize that in order to survive in the political climate of regalism, they needed to align their spiritual goals more closely with the temporal goals of the state, particularly with the viceregal officials’ more radical vision of reform. To show the union of their will with the states, the guardian of Ocopa told Manso de Velasco in 1756, ”The main object of our [the missionaries’] coming from the Kingdom of Spain... [is] to serve both majesties, the divine in the conversion of the souls of the infidels and the human in the greatest increase of his vassals and domains.”


168
Chapter 4: “In Service of Both Majesties”

The ascension of Charles III (1759-1788) to the throne represented a significant change in Ocopa’s fortunes. With the fall of the Jesuit Party and Charles’ more pro-Franciscan sentiments, the Order began to eclipse the Society and become predominant among the regular clergy. While regalists at all levels of the Spanish bureaucracy continued to push for a stronger centralized government, the Ocopa friars were able to avoid the most crippling anti-clerical reforms. This was due in part to their status as peninsulars, whom reformers believed were more loyal to the Crown, but also a willingness among some of the missionaries to cede at first oversight and then control of their missionary enterprise to Crown authorities. This change in Ocopa’s relationship with the State and in particular viceregal authorities led to a rapid growth of missionary opportunities and funding for Ocopa. The College was able to cut its losses in the Jauja and Tarma Frontier and shift its attention to other fields, which promised a rich spiritual harvest of indigenous converts. Predictably the Amerindians in some areas resisted the missionaries’ cultural impositions, but Ocopa’s stronger relationship with the viceregal government made the missionaries more resilient than before.

This closer working relationship with government officials, however, came at a price. Bourbon desires for state centralization meant that, as missionaries received more benefits, they gave up more autonomy. Nevertheless just as before the overall trend
toward Bourbon state supremacy could not negate the influence of individuals and groups in the events that unfolded around the missionaries of Ocopa. The exact level to which viceregal colonial authorities desired or could control the missionaries varied throughout Charles’ three-decade reign. The Crown’s ability to control Ocopa depended not just on material or geographic realities, but also on individual interpretations of regalism. While this had been true during the previous half century of Ocopa’s existence, unlike before some of the missionaries themselves began to share regalist attitudes with bureaucrats in Madrid and Lima. The philosophical differences among the missionaries led to a division within the community, which viceregal authorities were able to exploit and ultimately to gain virtual control over the College and its missions.

*Charles III and the Rebirth of Ocopa*

On August 27th 1758, Queen Barbara of Spain died, leaving King Ferdinand VI in a deep, crippling depression. Like his father, Ferdinand suffered from mental instability almost his entire life and consequently never recovered from the grief of his wife’s passing. He spent the next year secluded in the Castle Villaviciosa de Odén wandering unshaven, unwashed, refusing to change his clothes. This caused a crisis within the government and for an entire year it was completely paralyzed, unable to made decisions without the king’s authorization. Mercifully Ferdinand joined his wife just a year later on 10 August 1759.

Ferdinand was succeeded by his half-brother Charles, the Duke of Parma and King of Sicily. Influenced by the propaganda perpetuated by his own ministers, many
historians have succumbed to the temptation to characterize King Charles III as Spain’s greatest “Enlightened Monarch,” who over his almost three decade reign guided the Spanish bureaucracy to a more efficient, regalist state. While Charles was certainly interested in reform, he himself seemed to have little personal interest in enlightenment philosophies, directing much of his energies toward his greatest passion, hunting, which he did twice daily. Instead Charles brought something to the institution of the Crown which it had lacked for several years: stability. Already experienced as an administrator, Charles was able to focus the energies of talented reform-minded ministers. These ministers attempted to neutralize traditionalist factions in Spain and its empire, emphasizing their “rational”, “enlightened” form of governance. More than anything, however, Charles was a royal absolutist, believing in the supremacy of the Crown in all state matters. Once he had made a decision he was not easily swayed, even by his own ministers. 348 Charles, however, was also a deeply religious man with a particular fondness for the Franciscan order. He was a member of the Franciscan Third Order and selected a Franciscan, Friar Joaquín de Eleta, as his confessor. Therefore while he worked to bring the regular clergy under the power of the State, the Franciscan Order enjoyed a privileged position in the eyes of the Monarch, who attempted not to destroy it but to coopt and control it.

Two years after coming to the throne in 1761, Charles recalled Manso de Velasco who by then was 73 years old and had served as viceroy for sixteen years. He replaced him with Manuel de Amat y Junyent Planella Aymerich y Santa Pau, the fourth son of a

348 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 194-195, 247-268. Probably the greatest example of one these exceptions was the Esquilache riot of 1766, see below.
Catalonian aristocrat. Amat, like Manso de Velasco, was a soldier by training and had seen combat in Europe. His previous post had been Governor of Chile, meaning that he was also a seasoned colonial administrator. Amat was not particularly religious, and he was deeply committed to regalist concepts. He called the royal patronage “one of the most precious and resplendent stones that adorns [the] Crown and that every day [we] discover a deeper appreciation [for it].” The beginning of Amat’s term of office, however, signaled a reprieve for Ocopa from the neglect of the previous administrations. This was possibly for two reasons: Amat, especially at first, lacked the personal animosities that Castelfuerte or Manso de Velasco had harbored against the clergy. While Amat would enact reforms with a soldiers’ obedience, he seemed to at least publically maintain good relations with higher clerical offices, particularly with the Archbishop of Lima. Second, in religious matters Amat seems to have submitted himself to Charles’ inclination toward the Franciscans and followed more closely than his predecessor decrees emanating from Madrid regarding Ocopa.

Shortly after taking office Amat met with Ocopa’s leadership. Amat seemed impressed with their missionary zeal and promised that he would retake the territory lost in the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion, so that “not one handful of dirt” would remain in rebel hands. He informed them, however, that Spain’s recent entry into war (the Seven Years’ War, 1756-1763), made it impossible for him to undertake another military expedition at that time. As a consolation to the missionaries, he finally paid 14,986 pesos

---

349 Rodríguez Casado and Perez Embid, “Estudio Preliminar” in Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, xxiii – xxxvi.
350 Amat, Memoria de Gobierno, 21.
promised by royal decree 1751 for the travel costs of the group of missionaries that came to Ocopa in 1752 that Manso de Velasco had refused to pay (see Chapter 3).\(^{352}\)

In this more pro-Franciscan climate the missionaries were finally able to secure a steady source of income from the Crown. By 1759 Manso de Velasco, sensing an impending shift in power, had already restored Ocopa’s annual stipend of 6,000 pesos. Furthermore San Antonio’s constant petitioning for the restoration of not just the annual stipend, but all the money they should have received since they were initially granted the stipend back in 1718, finally bore fruit. On the 2\(^{nd}\) of February, 1761 the king issued a decree granting the missionaries an additional 4,000 pesos per year for the unpaid balance, for a total of 10,000 pesos per year.\(^{353}\) Unlike his predecessors, Amat immediately ordered the extra money be paid as soon as the decree arrived in Lima in December 1763.\(^{354}\) By 1773, the College of Ocopa was receiving the largest annual contribution from the Crown made to any Franciscan institution in the viceroyalty. According to Table 4.1 this was almost six times greater than the next largest recipient. Without even counting the extra 4,000 pesos for back payments, Ocopa’s 6,000-peso stipend constituted nearly half of all Crown contribution to the Franciscans in the viceroyalty.

Furthermore payments during Amat’s administration proved to be more consistent than ever before. Over nearly his entire administration (1761-1776), the funds for Ocopa were paid from the Royal Treasure at Jauja without fail each 31\(^{st}\) of December (Table 3).

\(^{352}\) Amat, Report to the Crown, 16 August 1763, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.
\(^{353}\) Royal decree, 20 February 1762, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1606.
\(^{354}\) Amat’s acceptance of the decree was noted in the treasury’s ledger notes, AGN, Sección Rebulicano, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libro 840.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Annual payment (in Pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>College of Ocopa</td>
<td>6,000*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Huánuco</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Huancavelica</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Huamanga</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of Cusco</td>
<td>690</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollect Monastery of Cusco</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Urquillos</td>
<td>207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollect Monastery of Urubamba</td>
<td>543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of Arequipa</td>
<td>168</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollect Monastery of Arequipa</td>
<td>115.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of Arica</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of La Paz</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Oruro</td>
<td>178.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>College of Tarifa</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of Cochabamba</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollect Monastery of Cochabamba</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of La Plata</td>
<td>1,005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recollect Monastery of La Plata</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observant Monastery of Potosi</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of Mizque</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monastery of San Francisco Puqsi</td>
<td>54.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>12,996.5</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 - “Plan de los contribuciones anuales, y limosnas que se deven hacer a los conventos de San Francisco en este Reino del Perú” 8 July 1773, Lima, RAH 9-9-3 1680, 55rv. * This number does not reflect the additional 4,000 pesos given to Ocopa every year for the royal treasury’s unpaid balance.
After Amat left office payments were less consistent, but usually the Franciscans always received some amount of money each year from the Crown. These inconsistencies in payments were largely due to a lack of funds in account from which the money were drawn, “vacantes ecclesiásticas” (an account funded by the salaries of church offices that had no current occupant), rather than the viceroy deliberately withholding funds as Castelfuerte, Villagarcía, and Manso de Velasco had done.\(^{355}\) The exception was between 1784 and 1786 when money was withheld from Ocopa for the Elizarde expedition (see Table 4).

By the 1760’s Ocopa began to have other significant sources of income. After several decades in the Mantaro Valley, local elites in the regions around Ocopa began to donate the College. Many of these donations came in the form of bequests from the wills of local elites, generally in exchange for prayers for the departed’s soul in purgatory. As the College’s reputation for spiritual devotion began to spread, these mortmain donations became a significant source of wealth for Ocopa.\(^{356}\) Notary records from Jauja indicate that the missionaries owned at least one large farm (the Estancia of Runatullo near Comas) which boasted 188 cows, 2,455 sheep, a large, fully-furnished house, a chapel, and several other minor buildings. Notary entries also record other land holdings and livestock throughout the Mantaro Valley, all the result of the “alms” received by the College from private donors. In 1770, for example, they rented no less than 10,000 sheep

\(^{355}\) The source of the funds: “Plan de los contribuciones anuales, y limosnas que se deven hacer a los conventos de San Francisco en este Reino del Perú” 8 July 1773, Lima, RAH 9-9-3 1680, 55v-56r; Failure to make a full payment from 1776-1779 due to a lack of funds in vacantes ecclesiásticas: AGN, Sección Colonial, Caja Real, Jauja, 632-635.

\(^{356}\) Records of some of these donations are in ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 18, 327rv; Tomo 19, 8rv, 57v-58v; Tomo 20, 626r-627v; Tomo 21, 636r-641r; Tomo 25, 167rv, 671r.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount (in Pesos)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1762</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>no data*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1768</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1771</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1772</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1774</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td>5,109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>7,836</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>7,054</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>8,270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>6,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>13,913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>no data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>7,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>2,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1786</td>
<td>8,847</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1787</td>
<td>10,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4 - Royal Treasure Payments to Ocopa 1762-1787. Source: AGN, Sección Republicano, Ministerio de Hacienda, Libros 817, 840, 845, 866 (for years 1762-1766); AGN, Sección Colonial, Caja Real, Jauja 629-638 (for years 1767-1784 and Pasco 1182,1184 (for years 1785-1787). *though the treasury records for 1763 are missing, it seems likely that the full amount was paid.
to Coronel Bonifacio de Torres y Esquibel for period of nine years. Such vast material wealth, however, did not come without strings attached. Many these properties had liens on them which the missionaries were forced to pay before the properties could be sold. The *Estancia* of Runatullo, for example, had 659 pesos in debt, compelling the missionaries rent out the property.\(^\text{357}\)

The bequest of Teresa Apolaya typifies the difficulty of accessing the value of these mortmain donations. Before her death in 1729 Apolaya, wife of Benito Troncoso, one of the local governors who had fought Juan Santos, donated the entirety of her dowry of 10,000 pesos to the missionaries on Ocopa for the “construction of the church of the College of Santa Rosa de Ocopa” and for the maintenance of the missions. While husbands in Colonial Spanish America managed their wives’ dowries, the money remained theirs, and the wives was free to donate it to whomever they liked upon their deaths or retain it if their husbands died before them. Payment of Apolaya’s bequest, however, did not begin until 1750, twenty-one years after her death. Although with interest the dowry was then worth 16,542 pesos, her husband had invested it in livestock as well as loaned it out to other people, requiring that the bequest to Ocopa be paid in small annual sums.\(^\text{358}\)

---

\(^\text{357}\) Regarding the *Estancia* of Runatullo: Torres (agent for Ocopa), Rental Agreement to Francisco Lazo, 31 January 1750, Concepción, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 21, 537r-540r (Scribe, Juan de Mesa Valera); Other properties: Torres (agent for Ocopa), Sale of fields in Ayllo Yavios, Atique, Maraguata to Joseph Gabriel Astocuri, 4-iii-1756, Huancayo, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 25, 700r -704r (Scribe, Manuel de Marticorena Gutierrez); Renting 10,000 sheep to Torres, 4 April1770, Jauja, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 25, 249r-253r (Scribe, Manuel de Marticorena Gutierrez).

\(^\text{358}\) Troncoso acting on behalf of Teresa Apolaya, Donation of 10,000 pesos, 7 August 1741, Huancayo, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 19, 8rv (Scribe, Juan de Mesa Valera); and 8 June 1750, Ocopa, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 21, 639-641. (Scribe, Juan de Mesa Valera).
The missionaries, however, did not completely shy away from these types of business transactions, despite their mendicant vows of poverty. While certainly a lump sum of hard currency would be ideal, guarantees of long term rental income and loan payments provided a level of financial security that the missionaries had lacked in the early years of Ocopa. Therefore like many monastic institutions in the Hispanic world, they actively engaged in lending money. The notary records for Jauja contain contracts for several loans, some for thousands pesos. Generally the interests on these loans were low, at about a 5% annual interest rate, typical of ecclesiastic loans. Such loans had relatively low interests rates to avoid the sin of usury, as opposed to merchant loans that could be as much as 20%-30%. Missionaries themselves did not directly handle the day-to-day business of their properties and loans, instead relying on a designated agent (sindico), generally a prominent member of the local elite. From all available records it appears these agents were not paid but received preferential treatment when renting property or taking out loans from the missionaries. Both Benito Troncoso and Bonifacio de Torres served as agents for Ocopa.359 Since the crown specified that its annual stipend went only to funding missionary work in the field, it seems most of Ocopa’s income from private donors went to building the college itself. By the late eighteenth century the College boasted a large church, a library, and three separate cloisters where the missionaries lived and trained for work in the field.

359 Such loan agreements are found in ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 23, 13v-14v; Tomo 24, 131v-133r; Tomo 25, 231r, 311r-312v, 442rv. Preferential treatment for agents noted in a loan to Torres for 3880 pesos 6 reales, ARJ, Protocolos Notariales, Tomo 25, 231r (Scribe, Manuel de Marticorena Gutierrez).
While support for Ocopa was growing regionally, Ocopa also became better represented in Madrid. Previously they either had to send a missionary at great cost or rely on an agent in Spain. In 1762 Ocopa established a permanent “apoderado” or representative at court in Spain. This friar, though resident at court, remained a member of the community and was empowered to petition on Ocopa’s behalf before the Crown. The *apoderado* generally was a missionary with many years of service in the jungle that
had demonstrated his loyalty to College. Naturally the first missionary to hold this office was Friar Joseph de San Antonio, who for the last two decades had advocated for Ocopa as well as supervising the ferrying missionaries to Peru from Spain. By order of Viceroy Amat in 1763, 500 pesos was set aside from the Ocopa’s 10,000-pesos stipend for the apoderado’s maintenance and use in Madrid. \(^{360}\) The *apoderado* used these funds to produce printed tracts to recruit new missionaries for Ocopa from colleges *de propaganda fide* in Spain as well as for his own food and lodging.\(^{361}\)

In 1764, after a thirteen-year gap, the Crown finally granted Ocopa funds for the transport of new missionaries to Peru. While San Antonio requested seventy missionaries, he was granted forty-eight and initially was only able to recruit thirty-seven. Two years later, when he presented the list that was supposed to contain the names of remaining eleven friars, it had twenty-eight names. After an intercession by the Franciscan commissary-general of the Indies, the Crown eventually relented and gave him funds and passports for the additional missionaries. In general the reign of Charles III (1759-1788) saw proportionately the largest influx of missionaries to Ocopa from Spain. Of the 302 missionaries to come over during its 115 year history (1709-1824), 128 came during this thirty-seven year period. Furthermore more missionaries during this period completed their ten-year term (*decenio*) at Ocopa, 83\% as opposed to only 38\% before 1761 and 57\% after 1788 (for total of 60\% during the entire 115 year-period) \(^{(1)}\) (see Table 5). The groups also came in closer intervals with four groups arriving during the

\(^{360}\) Friar Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva, Petition to the Crown, Madrid, without date, AGI, Lima 1607; Amat, Report to the Crown, 1 July 1763, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Joined</th>
<th>Arrived</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>Decentio</th>
<th>Died</th>
<th>Left</th>
<th>Percent completed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1730</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1737</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1751</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11*</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1752</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>25*</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1730-1761</strong></td>
<td><strong>129</strong></td>
<td><strong>109</strong></td>
<td><strong>49</strong></td>
<td><strong>19</strong></td>
<td><strong>45</strong></td>
<td><strong>38%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1769</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1761-1788</strong></td>
<td><strong>132</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
<td><strong>110</strong></td>
<td><strong>12</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>83%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1796</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1802-1804</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1818</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1820</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>no data</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1788-1820</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>65</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>6</strong></td>
<td><strong>17</strong></td>
<td><strong>57%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total 1730-1820</strong></td>
<td><strong>329</strong></td>
<td><strong>302</strong></td>
<td><strong>198</strong></td>
<td><strong>37</strong></td>
<td><strong>68</strong></td>
<td><strong>60%</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 - Peninsular missionaries who travelled to Ocopa, 1761-1787. Sources: Lehnertz, “Lands of the Infidels,” 399; Heras, ed., *Libro de Incoporaciones*, 19-85; AGI, Arribadas 538,591. *30 missionaries from these groups were sent to found other Colleges de Proganda Fide, most to Tarifa (Bolivia). When Manso de Velasco blocked the Franciscans from building a college at Tarifa, however, the missionaries did not return to Ocopa and incorporated into the local province.

1761-1788 period an average of less than one group per every ten years, thereby assuring a steady source of manpower for Ocopa’s missions. Both the increase in numbers of missionaries and percentage of completion was most likely due to the presence of a permanent *apoderado* in Spain. San Antonio and his successors, apart from their duties petitioning at court, could take time to visit colleges and monasteries throughout Spain to...
find more and better quality candidates for missionary service. Therefore, secure in both financial and human resources, the missionaries began the process of rebuilding their missionary program to its former glory before the rebellion.

The missionaries also benefited from the leadership of a new, active guardian. This new prelate shared the same vocational name as Ocopa’s founder, friar Francisco de San Joseph. Born Francisco Antonio Josef de Mora Fernández in 1721 in the Castilian village of Manzanares, La Mancha, San Joseph’s family was most likely part of local hidalgo class. At age sixteen he took the habit of a Franciscan at a college near Cartagena, and was later ordained a priest in the diocese of Cuenca. In 1751 San Antonio recruited San Joseph. After arriving in Peru in 1752, San Joseph distinguished himself as an able missionary, and was part of the first expedition to the Manoa region. His biographer claimed that was known as “el Apóstol de las Montañas del Perú” (the Apostle of the Peruvian Jungle), but admits that he was “vulgarly” known as “el quatro ojos” (four eyes) probably because he wore spectacles.362

After his election to guardian in 1767, San Joseph enacted a series of reforms aimed at more effectively controlling missionaries under his charge as well as improving the College’s reputation for diligence and obedience that was perhaps tarnished during the turbulent 1740’s and 50’s. San Joseph stated that though he found the missionaries to be “very able and zealous… there has occurred very grave scandals and disturbances [that have] discredited them and [been] a detriment to the conversions.” San Joseph’s

---

362 Friar Martin de Martín, “Vida Exemplar del Siervo del señor y venerable Padre Francisco de San Joseph, llamado vulgarmente el quatro ojos, Predicador Apostólico Guardián y Vice Comissario de la conversiones del Colegio de Santa Rosa de Ocopa en el Reyno del Peru” AL-MRREE, LEB-12-14, caja 94. Martin never completed the manuscript which literally ends mid-sentence.
reforms ostensibly attempted to improve the relationship between the missionaries and the Amerindians living within the mission stations. He extolled the missionaries to treat the Jungle Amerindians “with love and pity, and never with opprobrium.” They should never “cane or whip” the converts but let local leaders mete out punishments, for this has caused “very grave scandals,” perhaps in reference to the whipping of Mateo Assia, which some viceregal officials cited as the cause of the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion (see chapter 2). Other reforms included not borrowing money from the Amerindians or trying to collect debts personally, not changing community rules established by previous missionaries, as well as prohibiting the missionaries from letting women serve them directly. Most importantly San Joseph ordered an end to unauthorized expeditions. Previously missionaries periodically had left their stations, guided by their mission’s converts, to find other nearby (and sometimes not so nearby) Amerindian populations. The practice led to the chaotic expansion of the College’s missions before the rebellion. San Joseph, therefore, prohibited missionaries from leaving their assigned stations without permission from the guardian. Expeditions farther into the jungle thereafter would be organized centrally by the Ocopa leadership. 363 What effect these reforms had on the Ocopa missionary effort is debatable. While Ocopa continued to enjoy an excellent reputation particularly in Spain, the expansion of their missions after 1767 cannot be characterized as orderly. With this reform, however, San Joseph established the preeminence of the guardian of Ocopa over not just the communal life of the College but the pastoral affairs of all of its dependent missions. Over the next few decades, San

363 Instructions from Friar Francisco de San Joseph to all the missionaries of Ocopa, 3 December 1768, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-4, caja 94, ff110r-111r. Chapter Proceeding 1767, AO, Libro de Elecciones, 11r - 20v.
Joseph was frequently cited as an exemplary missionary and guardian, and his reforms as
the ideal for mission life sometimes by both sides in disagreement over a particular
policy. And as Ocopa saw a renewed expansion starting in the 1760’s, such
disagreements proliferated.

One of those conflicts came from within the Order itself. In 1765 the Franciscan
commissary-general for Peru, Friar Bernardo de Peon y Valdes began, as one Ocopa
missionary described it, “[to] lead missionaries to blood and fire, recklessly trampling on
powers of the colleges.”\textsuperscript{364} Though technically over all Franciscan institutions in Peru, he
was trying to micromanage Ocopa, overriding the guardian’s decisions and controlling
which missionaries could leave Ocopa for expeditions into the jungle. This infuriated
Ocopa’s leaders, who complained to the commissary-general of the Indies that their
status as a college de propaganda fide made them immune to such interference. As a
result, the superior prelate agreed and Peon was forced to lessen his involvement.\textsuperscript{365}

\textsuperscript{364} Friar Manuel Gil Múñoz, Letter to the Commissary-general of the Indies, 2 April 1765, Ocopa, AGI,
Lima 834.
\textsuperscript{365} Friar Placido de Pinedo, Commissary-general of the Indies, Report to the Crown, 8 March 1767,
Madrid, Lima 834. Peon was, however, successful in forcing the missionaries to allow architect and
cartographer Friar José Amich not only to accompany an expedition out of Pozuzu in 1765, but to lead it.
Amich was originally from Barcelona, where it appears he studied mathematics. Before taking vows as a
Franciscan in 1750, he seems to have been some kind of military fortifications expert having been involved
in the initial planning for the rebuilding of Real Felipe Fortress in Callao after the 1746 earthquake.\textsuperscript{365} Two
separate royal decrees from 1747 and 1761 demanded that the missionaries bring a cartographer with them
on any new expeditions. The friars of course balked at his assignment to lead the expedition, but Peon
persisted. Perhaps because the other missionaries saw him as an interloper, Amich only spend a few years
as a member of the college.\textsuperscript{365} After returning Lima in 1769 he drew some of the most detailed maps of the
Ocopa missions (for an example see map 1.1) and wrote a detailed chronicle of their history (most recently
republished in 1988). Ironically, Amich is one the names most closely associated with Ocopa. (See Heras.,
intro to Amich, Historia de las misiones, 14-16 and Heras, ed., Libro de Incorpaciones, 44).
The Missionaries Advance and Retreat

In the wake of the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion (1742-1752), the missionaries of the Ocopa were only left with two small missions in the Huánuco "entrada," Pozuzo and Tillingo. The missionaries had hoped that these could be a staging point for expansion east into the Pampas de Sacramento, but after several failed attempts, by the 1750’s this appeared increasingly unlikely. For example, one expedition in 1757 failed after five Amuesha escorts died at hands of a group of unseen archers. Ultimately fears that the Amuesha converts would join the Juan Santos rebels motivated an almost complete abandonment of the two communities. In 1753 the frontier governor of Huánuco moved 300 inhabitants from the Pozuzo and Tillingo farther north to a mission station abandoned in the seventeen century called Cuche. The governor left only 100 inhabitants, those at risk of fleeing the missions (presumably to join Juan Santos) in Pozuzo. Tillingo was completely abandoned. Unfortunately the journey took the jungle-born Amuesha over the high mountain pass of Tambonuevo resulting in many deaths. More died once they arrived at Cuchero. The valley was not large enough to support agricultural production sufficient to feed the population, nor could it support growing Coca to trade for food. The Amuesha were forced to work in nearby haciendas to survive. Within a few years “all but a few died,” and of those who survived, most made their way back to Pozuzo. The missionaries also constructed a new village in the highlands above Pozuzo named Santa Cruz de Muña, which they populated with highland Amerindians, where they could escape if Pozuzo were ever attacked.366

By the 1750’s, however, the focus of Ocopa’s missionary activity had shifted much farther north. As the Juan Santos rebels blocked the missionaries from Tarma and Jauja frontiers, the missionaries needed to look elsewhere to expand their evangelization efforts. In 1752, the guardian of Ocopa persuaded Franciscan provincial leaders in Lima to cede the Ocopa missionaries the high jungle region known as Cajamarquilla. The Cajamarquilla missions lay more than 120 miles (200km) linear distance from their northern most entrada of Huánuco and along the most likely path from Ocopa the journey was more than 500 miles (850km) and took several weeks. To facilitate working in the far off region the missionaries established a base of operations in a hospice in the highland village of Huailillas in the sierra of Ancash. Previously friars from the Province had evangelized Cajamarquilla and it already boasted of at least four mission communities each with several hundred inhabitants from the Cholón and Hibito nations. The Cajamarquilla missions proved to be the most stable missionary zone which Ocopa would administer during the colonial period. From 1753 to 1823 little changed in the Amerindian population. The missions had already suffered a wave of epidemics in the 1690’s and the region regularly saw immigration from the highlands. Additionally the missions had been established for almost seventy years, and the Amerindians already had adjusted to mission life.367

Ultimately Cajamarquilla was just a launching point for expeditions farther into the jungle. Almost as soon as Ocopa took control of Cajamarquilla, the friars began organizing expeditions deeper into the Amazon basin, utilizing large numbers of Cholón

and Hibito Amerindians as guides and porters. The missionaries’ goal lay some 150 miles east of Cajamarquilla along the banks of the Ucayali River. The Ucayali is one the largest rivers in the Amazon basin and at its confluence with Marañón River forms the great river itself. At 994 miles (1601km) in length and at places more than three-quarters of a mile (1200m) width, it was home to one the largest human populations in the Amazon. The right to evangelize in the region had been hotly contested by the Franciscans and the Jesuits during the seventeenth century as each attempted to send expeditions to evangelize the nations along its banks. Neither group, however, was able
to build stable, permanent missions. During the 1750’s the Ocopa missionaries had similar luck. Between 1753 and 1760 they sent four expeditions, three of which ended without encountering any significant population centers. The exception was in 1757 when an unusually large expedition composed of nearly 300 Amerindians from Cajamarquilla and five friars encountered a village of Setebos along the Manoa River, one the Ucayali’s many tributaries. Unfortunately somebody in their retinue set fire to some of the Setebos’ huts resulting in a violent skirmish. One friar and thirteen Amerindians died, but the expedition was able to take three children captive. The oldest child was baptized with the name Ana Rosa and became the missionaries’ guide and translator for future expeditions.368

In May of 1760 the missionaries reentered the Ucayali flood plain. Guided by Ana Rosa they encountered a local Setebo cacique, Rungato, who took the missionaries to his village where they built the first chapel in the region. They renamed the settlement San Francisco de Manoa. Manoa (which became synonymous with the missionary zone in the upper Ucayali) served as a base of operation for missionaries along the Ucayali. By 1764 the missionaries had begun to evangelize the more populous neighboring nation of the Sibipos. The Setebos and Sibipos had been in conflict with each other, probably over scarce resources, since the seventeenth century. But despite the conflict by 1765 the missionaries built three ethnically disparate mission stations populated by approximately 800 individuals. The missionaries had even begun to venture farther up river (south)

368 Ibid., 246-248; Amich, Historia de las misiones, 192-200. Friar Juan Perez de Santa Rosa, Letter to Friar Juan de San Antonio, 28 September 1757, San Buenaventura de Pizano, Cajamarquilla, AGI, Lima 808.
where they commenced evangelization efforts with the Conibo nation and had plans to begin preaching to the Piro nation as well. In 1765 these expeditions nearly stretched Ocopa’s manpower to its breaking point as many of the friars who had come to missions in 1751-2 had completed their ten-year term service (decenio). So Ocopa asked for and received fifteen new missionaries, eight from the College of Chillán in Chile as well as seven from the Franciscan province in Lima, including Ocopa’s future chronicler José Amich. By the time the new friars arrived, however, the Manoa (Ucayali) missions were in full rebellion against Ocopa.\footnote{Lehnertz, “Lands of the Infidels,” 248-249; Amich, Historia de las misiones, 200-219.}

Sometime before October 1766, Cacique Runcato, who had helped the missionaries to establish a presence in the Ucayali basin, withdrew with a large group of his supporters from the Manoa mission station. On the 8\textsuperscript{th} of October two missionaries along with Amerindians from Cajamarquilla left from Manoa to attempt to re-establish relations with Runcato and his band. Though they were initially greeted with gifts of food, as dusk fell Runcato’s men attacked them with clubs killing both missionaries and sixteen Amerindians. Surprisingly Runcato, who was a Setebo, had convinced the Sipibos, their rivals, to eliminate the remaining missionaries in the other mission stations. In all the Setebos and Sipibos massacred sixteen missionaries (seven full friars, four lay friars, and five oblates), five Spaniards (including the frontier governor Antonio Thomati), and as many as twenty-seven Amerindians from Cajamarquilla.

In August 1767 a relief party from Ocopa came down the Ucayali from Pozuzo led by the current guardian, San Joseph. The party was harried by archers along the banks
of the river and was almost massacred when they encountered a group of Conibos who threaten to kill them unless the missionaries gave them steel tools, which friars quickly conceded. Once the party reached the Manoa mission, they found Runcato had retreated and through their translator Ana Rosa discovered the fate of their Franciscan brothers. Still under constant attack and fearing for their safety they retreated back up the river to Pozuzo. The missionaries did not return to the Ucayali flood plain for another two and a half decades.\footnote{Lehnertz, “Lands of the Infidels,” 249; Amich, Historia de las misiones, 215-227; Friar Gil Muñoz, Commissary of Missions, Report to the Crown, without date, Lima, AGI, Lima 882.}

None of the existing sources indicate precisely what caused the rebellion. Ocopa’s chronicler, Amich, who was part of Ocopa’s failed relief party, uncharacteristically admitted ignorance, save to blame the Setebos for “severe ingratitude.” Almost certainly the Manoa rebellion shared at least some the same causes as those in the Tarma and Jauja entradas: the rigid lifestyle in the missions, commercial impositions, pandemics, famines, personal conflicts with the local leadership. The fact that the rebellion spread so easily to other nations, however, suggests that the rebellion could not have been caused exclusively by an interpersonal conflict between Runcato and the missionaries. Though the missionaries recorded no outbreak of diseases or food shortages, it is unlikely that in six years they could have completely imposed a rigid mission life or commercial restrictions; therefore the widespread support of the rebellion indicates some sort of larger systemic problem.

Ironically, though more missionaries died in the Manoa rebellion than in the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion (16 as compared to only 7), the Ocopa missionaries made less
of a public outcry than they had in the 1750’s. This was probably due to several factors. Ocopa had only been in the region for a short period of time and such setbacks had been common in the early expansion of their other *entradas*. They also had other missions to focus their energies on, unlike after the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, when twenty-one of twenty three missions were destroyed. So they simply redirected their efforts elsewhere. Furthermore, the Ucayali flood plain had less strategic importance to the Crown. It was quite distant from colonial strongholds in the highlands and none of the combatants were highland Andeans, so making the case to the Crown for a military intervention was more difficult. Finally, the missionaries could not complain to the Crown that they had not received the aid they had been promised. By the late 1760’s funds were flooding into the college. Therefore, now that missionaries could not lay guilt on viceregal government, they had to be careful that burden of blame would not be placed on themselves. With the loss of Manoa, Ocopa needed to find new fields of labor from which to harvest souls for conversion, if for anything to justify the massive expenditures that Crown had invested in their institution. Fortunately for the missionaries, events in Madrid and elsewhere were helping them to realize their mandate.

*The Fall of the Jesuits*

In January 1767 the Crown sent sealed orders to all magistrates in the Spanish empire with instructions that they be opened at midnight on April 2\textsuperscript{nd}. When colonial officials unsealed the documents, they discovered orders to round up and expel all Jesuits from Spanish territories immediately. Just a decade earlier the Society of Jesus (Jesuits)
had been the most powerful and favored regular clerics in the Spanish empire. Ferdinand
VI’s partiality for the society combined with the advocacy of the King’s confessor,
Francisco de Rávago, a Jesuit priest, as well as Ensenada and Carvajal, meant that the
Society had enjoyed a privileged position at court and in the empire. In fact, many at
court referred to these three men as the Jesuit Party. The Society was not opposed
outright to regalist reform. Through the Jesuit Party, the Society spearheaded policies that
limited the power of the regular clergy, though many of these policies, such as the
secularization of indigenous parishes, negatively affected other regular institutions more
than the Jesuits. After the death of Carvajal and the fall of Ensenada, however, the Jesuit
star began to dim. With the ascent of Charles III this decline became more rapid. Charles
loathed the Jesuits, whose special devotion to the papacy clashed with the king’s royal
absolutism. The king was not alone in his criticisms. Jesuit power in almost every corner
of the Spanish empire had spawned local jealousies and conflicts. The king’s distaste for
the Society allowed these attacks to grow. Therefore when riots broke out in Madrid on
March 23, 1766, official inquiries almost immediately focused on the complicity of the
Jesuits. Though high bread prices and new anti-vagrancy laws were most likely the
catalyst for the Madrileños taking to the streets, Crown officials blamed the Society for
inciting the populous. The event steeled the Crown’s resolve; the Jesuits had to go.371

While the Crown hoped the expulsion would be a warning to the regular clergy
not to flout royal authority, the distribution of Jesuit wealth afterwards greatly benefited
the regular orders. The Franciscans were one of the largest recipients of Jesuit holdings.

Almost immediately Ocopa received two new missionary zones previously under Jesuit care. Only four months after the expulsion of the Jesuits at the insistence of the Bishop of Trujillo, the viceroy ceded Ocopa their missions of Lamas, which lay in the high jungle 135 miles (216km) north of Cajamarquilla. Lamas was located only a few miles outside the traditional boundary of Spanish colonial hegemony and its proximity to more established cities meant that, while the region had a native population, it also contained large numbers of Spanish and Mestizo migrants from the highlands. The native inhabitants of the region lived in three communities around Lamas while the colonists dominated the city proper. Within a few days the local citizens (vecinos), probably all immigrants, asked the Ocopa friar to leave, stating that region was no longer a missionary zone but a parish that required a secular priest, not missionaries. Amich strongly insinuated that the reason for the request was so that the local citizens could continue in their “vice”, against which the missionaries had begun to preach. He implicated in particular the local governor who he claimed openly cohabitated with a woman not his wife. A few months later the local citizens repeated their request, this time it seems more forcefully. According to Amich, the Spanish and Mestizo immigrants feared being reduced into the strict mission life and becoming “subjects (of the missionaries) like converted Indians.” With the memory of the massacre in Manoa fresh in the missionaries’ minds, they acceded to their request and the town was handed over to the secular clergy.\footnote{Amich, \textit{Historia de las Misiones}, 231-233; Francisco Javier, Bishop of Trujillo, Letter to Viceroy Amat with Fiscal’s comments, 15 July 1768 and 22-vii-1768, Trujillo, AGN, Superior Gobierno, GO-B14, Leg 123, Cua. 92.}
The other territory ceded to Ocopa after the expulsion of the Jesuits was the Isles of Chiloé, dominated by the Isle of Gran Chiloé, located in southern Chile nearly 2,100 miles (3,300km) from Lima. Though the assignment of Ocopa to this region seems illogical since Chile boasted numerous regular institutions much closer to the island, including a Franciscan college *de propaganda fide* in Chillán only 420 miles (670km) away (see Figure 12), the pairing was consistent with shipping patterns in eighteenth-century South America. Most ships leaving ports in Chile went north to the viceregal capital, while only vessels en route to Europe via Cape Horne passed by the islands.

![Figure 12 - The Archipelago of Chiloé in respects to Lima and Ocopa, Map by author.](image-url)
and most of these ships originated from Lima’s port, Callao. Indeed, the College of Chillán had attempted to establish a missionary presence on the islands even before the expulsion, but found it difficult to find transport in Chile, and had forced to travel to Lima in order to find passage. Therefore shortly after the Jesuits left in 1770, the Crown decided to turn the island over to Ocopa. Despite the relative ease of finding transport, the great distance between Ocopa and Chiloé was a burden on the College. Manning and supplying their religious activities on the islands was expensive, difficult to coordinate, and generally took years to execute. Chiloé was also a different experience for the missionaries. Most of its pueblos were not burgeoning mission stations but essentially full-fledge parishes, inhabited mostly by Creoles and Mestizos. While over the decades the College would send expeditions to the native Chono and Huiliche nations, they met with little success. Compared to their *entradas* in the jungles of Peru, however, which had small, unstable populations, Chiloé was a much larger affair. In a census reported in 1788, Chiloé had eighty-one pueblos with a combined population 23,216 spread mainly on Gran Chiloé itself but also over twenty-four others islands in the archipelago. To tend to such a vast population the Crown stipulated that the College sent fifteen ordained friars. Ocopa was obligated to pay for the maintenance of these friars out its own coffers until 1784 when the crown granted Ocopa the same stipend that the Jesuits had received, 250 pesos per full friar, totaling 3750 pesos, per year. There was ambiguity, however, regarding whether the treasury in Lima or Chile would pay the missionaries’ stipend, and it is unclear when or how much the missionaries were

373 Amich, Pallares, Calvo, *Historia de las Misiones*, 234-238. Amich’s chronicle abruptly stops in 1770 and it is finished by two nineteenth-century Ocopa missionaries Friars Fernando Pallares and Vicente Calvo.
compensated for their services in Chiloé.\textsuperscript{374} Though the Chiloé enterprise provided great prestige to the College, anecdotal evidence suggests that missionaries found service on the cold southern islands even less desirable than in the sweltering Peruvian Jungles. There was even one suggestion that service in Chiloé was a punishment for unruly missionaries.\textsuperscript{375} Perhaps some missionaries saw routine labors of a parish priest less romantic than forging out into the jungle to find new nations of “infidels” to convert.

The largess of the Crown in doling out former Jesuit possessions to Ocopa had its limits. Less than a year after the expulsion, Friar Manuel Gil Muñoz, Commissary of Missions in Peru, on Ocopa’s behalf petitioned the Crown to move the community of Ocopa with its title of College \textit{de Proganda Fide} to the former Jesuit College in Lima. Gil argued that the cold climate of the sierras was bad for the College’s novices, newcomers, and old and sick missionaries. Lima, he reasoned, would also be more convenient for newcomers because after their long journey from Spain they would not have to climb immediately into the Andes. They would be more comfortable and willing to receive instruction. He also suggested that perhaps they keep Ocopa as a way station to their missions in Huánuco, subject to the guardian of the new college in Lima. If the Jesuit College was unavailable, he added, perhaps they could just build a new college in Lima with the “numerous alms” they were receiving from private donors. The commissary-general of the Order in Spain, Friar Manuel de la Vega, who ultimately


\textsuperscript{375} Friar Christobal Gomez, Letter to the Bishop of Trujillo, 5 December 1788, Hualillas, AL-MRREE, LEB-11-39, 21r-22r.
presented the petition before the crown, also added that the missionaries could, as part of their training, preach to the vice-ridden people of Lima.  

As was standard practice, the Council of the Indies asked for opinions of religious and government officials in Lima regarding the move. The Archbishop of Lima, Diego de Parada, disagreed. He rejected Gil’s argument that Ocopa was a cold, unhealthy region, arguing that the locale had “good air” and the Mantaro Valley provided ample foodstuffs for their needs. Other communities, he chided, lived in similar climes without complaint. He added that Ocopa also was receiving financial support for local elites in the Mantaro Valley and that such a move would put these sources of revenue into jeopardy. Parada, however, was most concerned about having yet another regular community in Lima. The Franciscans already had three religious houses and he feared that the alms a fourth institution required would bankrupt the faithful. Viceroy Amat echoed the Archbishop’s opinion about having a forth Franciscan institution in Lima pointing out that the King was trying to limit the number of regular houses in the city, not increase them. He scathingly added:

I am amazed that in a time when the Jesuits have been removed from their missions or conversions of infidels, [that] these friars (religiosos) who aspire to take their place and cultivate those fields for the church, try to retreat from the frontiers and take shelter and rest in this Capital, from where many [regular clergy] who inhabit it should leave to initiate that sacred conquest, especially when the Institute of Apostolic Missionaries profess that they are principally for active missions (misiones vivas).

---

Amat further complained the Crown did not pay Ocopa 10,000 pesos a year to be in Lima, but for the propagation of the faith in far reaches of the empire. Instead of focusing their energies on building a new college, they should use their vast wealth to reclaim the territory lost to Juan Santos. Amat’s and Parada’s negative view of the missionaries’ proposed move to Lima had the predictable consequence of the Crown denying the missionaries request on 6 July 1773.

In 1774 the missionaries tried again to move to Lima, with the same consequences. Again the archbishop disagreed with the move, which almost guaranteed that the request would be denied by the council. Between March and May of 1774, however, the missionaries apparently reformulated their plan. In this new plan, instead of taking over the Jesuit collage or building a new facility, they would move into the Guadalupe Seminary that the Franciscan province maintained in the outskirts of the city. The current faculty and students at Guadalupe would then move to the Order’s large monastery, Francisco de Jesus, in the city center. With this new adjustment to the plan, Viceroy Amat reversed his opinion, and threw his support behind the missionaries. While he admitted that the city had a “superfluity of regular houses,” since the missionaries would be constructing no new buildings, they would not be in breach of Crown policy. Guadalupe, he contended, was supposed to be a seminary but was essentially a siphon for the cities alms, and the students would be better supervised in the large monastery.

379 Royal order, 6 July 1773, AGI, Lima 882.
Amat’s only stipulation was to restrict missionaries from collecting alms in the city, saying that they should be forced to support themselves on the Crown’s stipend.  

Ultimately the community decided not to move to Lima. When the new proposal to move from Ocopa to Guadalupe arrived in Madrid in March 1776, Commissary-general Vega expressed reservations about the transfer, even though he had supported the initial plan which did not involve taking Guadalupe away from the Province. One of the Ocopa missionaries insinuated that the Order’s reversal of position, though he did not mention Vega specifically, was due to the influence of provincial leaders in Lima, who did not want to lose control of Guadalupe. Vega instead argued that a college de Propaganda in the viceregal capital would inevitably rob the college of its independence. These colleges by design were chartered to be free of regional influence so as to maximize their ability to carry out missions to the borderlands. He feared that if the community was so close to viceregal authorities and Franciscan provincial leaders, it would struggle to maintain its autonomy. He cited similar problems with colleges de Propaganda Fide in Cali and Popayán. Despite possible political motivations for Vega’s change of heart, he raised a concern that would come to plague Ocopa over the next decade. While the state increased its largess toward Ocopa, this generosity created a pretext for government intervention in the college’s affairs.

---

382 Vega, Petition to the Crown, 4 March 1776, Madrid, AGI, Lima 882; Friar Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva, Petition to the Crown, 28 March 1781, Madrid, AGI, Lima 808.
Ocopa versus the “New Method”

Church reform under Charles III did not end with the expulsion of the Jesuits, and increasingly the Crown turned its attention towards securing the imperial frontiers. Particularly with the rise of the British as the dominate Atlantic power after the Seven Years’ War, the Spanish Crown looked to strengthen their borders against the incursions of completing imperial interests. The slow progress of missionary work frustrated colonial officials who had poured tens of thousands of pesos into frontier missionary enterprises, such as Ocopa. At the heart of their criticism was the method the missionaries used to convert the frontier Amerindian populations. Reformers heavily criticized the missionaries’ creation of separate communal societies dependent on the missionaries culturally, politically, and economically. This dependency was certainly at odds with the tenants of emerging liberal philosophy such as personal liberty, private property, and rewards for individual labor. From these debates regarding the frontier during the early eighteenth century, colonial administrators and political theorists alike developed “the new method of spiritual government,” which sought to incorporate more fully frontier indigenous populations into colonial society.\textsuperscript{383} The key aspect of this method was Hispanicization through trade. As Amerindians interacted economically with colonial populations, proponents argued, they would begin to adopt Hispanic cultural values including Christianity. The appeal of this system to the Crown was obvious, because it

\textsuperscript{383} This idea seems to have emerged from a series of reforms both in Mexico and Spain see note 95 in Weber, Bárbaros, 309.
would no longer have to invest in frontier missions while reaping the taxes the new commerce would produce.\textsuperscript{384}

The Crown first tested the “new method” in the Mexican frontier of Nueva Santander in 1749. The viceroy of Mexico selected José de Escandón, a soldier and successful businessman to the lead expedition. Between 1749 and 1753, Escandón oversaw the settlement of 6,000 colonists in twenty towns. While he allowed Franciscans to accompany the settlers, he stripped them of any jurisdiction over the Amerindians and forced the friars to build their missions next to the new Spanish towns rather than in isolated stations as they had traditional operated. The Friars also served as parish priests to the towns in addition to their duties to convert the native populations. Escandón also obligated colonist and friar alike to pay the Amerindians wages, and prohibited natives from living on Franciscan lands. From the State’s perspective, the plan was an astounding success, the more sedentary nations submitted to the new regime, while other groups fled. Though the native population was significantly reduced, 13,000 in 1749 to around 2,000 in 1821, the area had been effectively Hispanicized.\textsuperscript{385}

In other more remote areas of the northern Mexican hinterland, particularly where there were already established missions, reformers struggled to enact the “new method.” Apart from having to contend with the political and economic power of the missionaries already in the region, the biggest barrier to using the “new method” was simply a lack of settlers. Nuevo Santander had been adjacent to large Hispanicized population centers that had been more or less eager to expand. Therefore when the new inspector general of

\textsuperscript{384} Ibid., 102-104.  
\textsuperscript{385} Ibid., 105-107.
Mexico, José Bernardo de Gálvez y Gallardo, attempted to revitalize the missions in northern Mexico, he abandoned the idea of settlers. Instead he pushed to enact the other aspects of the “new method” through a surrogate, Friar Antonio de los Reyes. Reyes, for example, proposed the creation of a new archdiocese in the northern Mexico to take away control of pastoral affairs from Franciscan prefects. This would have meant that though the friars would have still manned missions, they would have had to receive a license from a secular Archbishop. The new archdiocese never was created, but the plan to create one along with the use of religious surrogates would later be resurrected in the Peruvian jungle. In general neither Gálvez nor Reyes had much success in curbing the control of the Franciscans over the missions of northern Mexico. Soon after Gálvez left Mexico to become Minister of the Indies in 1776, he organized the northern regions of the viceroyalty of Mexico into the Comandancia General of the Interior Provinces of New Spain. Gálvez urged the creation of this semiautonomous entity, in part, as a continued attempt to wrest control of Mexico’s northern frontier from the regular clergy. Its first commander, Teodoro Francisco de Croix Heuchin, even ordered that the “new method” be implemented in two settlements along the lower Colorado as well as one in Alta California near Santa Barbara. All three ended in disaster.386

The Ocopa missionaries also took part in one “new method” expedition in the Vitoc valley during the 1780’s. Before the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, Vitoc had been the site of intense coca cultivation but was abandoned when rebels raided several of the plantations. Though just south Quimirí, however, the valley had never been under

386 Ibid., 122-123.
Ocopa’s control and Crown officials made it clear that the expedition was not an attempt to reoccupy the lost Ocopa missions. Like in Nueva Santander, the expedition relied on colonists to build commercial enterprises, in this case coca plantations, aimed at integrating the local Amerindians into Hispanic society. The Crown also built three forts to assure pacification and hoped that these could be launching point for a reoccupation of the Chanchamayo river valley. One Ocopa missionary accompanied the eighty colonists, but it seems that the expedition facilitated few conversions. The Vitoc valley was not been inhabited by any significant jungle Amerindian population and its previous inhabitants had been settlers from the highland as well. In fact, the move was more a re-occupation of a buffer zone lost during the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion rather than a test of the “new method.”

Indeed, at almost the same time as the Ocopa missionaries were involved in the repopulation of Vitoc, they were also using the “old method” farther south in the high jungle near Huanta (in the modern-day Peruvian department of Ayacucho) to evangelize the Simarivas nation. In 1781 two Ocopa missionaries entered the region baptizing ninety individuals and founded a mission along the Apurimac River. A royal decree dated 25 June 1783 even seems to have granted Ocopa extra funding for the Huanta missions, but viceregal officials ignored the request. According to the missionaries, the Huanta

388 Ibid.
missions eventually floundered because of a lack of state funding, though the expeditions remained under the control of Ocopa.\textsuperscript{392}

The “new method” was a manifestation of the reformist ideas that permeated discourses on government in the Spanish Atlantic during the late eighteenth century. Though the method as executed by Escandón was not viable in the distant outposts of most of Spain’s vast border regions, the ideas behind it, such as the emphasis on the commerce rather than evangelization, the use of colonists as a mode of Hispanicizing frontier populations, and the overall ceding of administrative control over these regions from regular orders to the government and military, lived on. As the Bourbon reforms began to intensify, even the regular clergy, whether out of true belief in the new philosophy or because of political expediency, began to adopt them as well. Predictably these ideas created divisions within religious communities as some members tried to ride the wave of reform, while others resisted it. Ocopa was no exception.

\textit{Divisions in Ocopa}

The fissures among some of the missionaries began to show during the late 1770’s as the College considered its next expeditions into the jungle and ultimately the direction of their missionary efforts. The members of the College divided over two plans. The first was the Chanchamayo plan. The plan originated with Joseph de San Antonio in the 1750’s and successive generations of Ocopa missionaries had argued for its

\textsuperscript{392} A “\textit{Diario}” of an expedition to the region in 1782 is found in AGI, Lima 808 (dated 18-vi-1782); On the missions floundering see Deliberations of the Council of the Indies (\textit{Consulta}), 13 February 1788, Madrid, AGI Lima 1607.
implementation, modifying it only slightly over the years. The plan required the Crown to build a fortress along the Chanchamayo River as a launching point for expeditions into the old Tarma entrada. Ultimately the goal was to retake control of the salt deposits at the Cerro de la Sal. The hope was that by controlling this vital resource local Amerindian nations would not dare attack the new missions for fear of losing access to the salt. The plan’s supporters also argued that Chanchamayo fulfilled the royal decree of 13 March 1751, which called for the recapture of the territory lost to Juan Santos Atahualpa. The plan incorporated at least one idea from the “new method.” The missionaries hoped to attract colonists to the area with offers of reduced taxes and free land, and argued that these new settlements could produce up to 150,000 pesos a year in agricultural production. Clearly, however, the missionaries believed that the main purpose of the colonists and the control of the salt mines was not commerce, but to solidify their hold on the region.\(^3\) The plan’s supporters included most of Ocopa’s future leadership, including Friar Pedro González Agueros, who became Guardian in 1780, and Mauricio Gallardo, elected Guardian in 1783.\(^4\) Detractors, however, saw this plan as a repeat of the failures of the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion rather than a vindication. As one Franciscan leader so concisely stated, retaking the lost missions “by [way of] Tarma is almost impossible, as was experienced during the governments of the Marques of

\(^3\) Former guardian Francisco de San Joseph described the Chanchamayo plan in a treatise written probably in 1770’s found in RAH 9-9-1731, 434r-440r. The originally elaboration of the plan by Joseph de San Antonio is found in San Antonio, Petition to the Crown, 11 June 1750, Madrid, JSEI, 146-147.

\(^4\) The division between factions can be seen in letter to the Franciscan Provincial Minister from Gonzales and the discretorio dated sometime between 1782 and 1784, ASFL, r.42, n.12a & b, ff. 273r-276v. Also see Libro de Elecciones de Santa Rosa de Ocopa, AO, 43v-45v.
Villagarcia and Count of Superunda (Manso de Velasco), whose attempts we saw frustrated.”

The other faction that emerged during this dispute, later called the Aragonese faction, was in fact led by a Castilian, Friar Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva. Álvarez, from the perspective of Ocopa’s leadership, had been a problematic missionary since his recruitment in Spain. Álvarez had been enlisted in Spain for duty in Ocopa by its former guardian, Joseph Amparo, in 1768. As he passed through Chile en route to Ocopa, however, Álvarez was retained by an army captain to be his chaplain. Álvarez later claimed that he did so under the direction of Amparo. Nevertheless Álvarez’s securing of the post as chaplain was the type of move that Ocopa’s leadership had been railing against for decades: missionaries who used the funds granted to the College as free passage to the Americas only to abandoned the community for better, less rigorous positions elsewhere in the Americas. Within the year, Álvarez moved to Lima with his patron, where the captain died, and he finally incorporated into Ocopa in 1770. Despite Álvarez’s early decision to stay in Chile, or perhaps because of it, he was able to ingratiate himself with several important Ocopa leaders during the early 1770’s, including ex-guardian Friar Francisco de San Joseph and acting Guardian Friar Antonio

---

395 Josef de Garmendia, Commissary-general of Peru, petition to Real Acuerdo, 4 March 1774, Lima, AGI, Lima 1612.
396 Riva-Agüero, “Los Franciscanos en el Perú y las Misiones de Ocopa,” 15.
Within a month, Álvarez returned to Lima as Ocopa’s procurator. Álvarez was probably an ideal candidate to advocate for the College, having most likely made many contacts during his time as a chaplain in the viceregal capital. In 1775 Álvarez returned to Spain as the apoderado for Ocopa in order to collect a new group of missionaries. According to Gonzales, Álvarez did so without any official permission from Ocopa’s leadership. Álvarez later produced a license to go to Spain, but it only empowered him to collect new missionaries, not represent the College at court as other apoderados had done. Either faction, however, could do little to stop or support Álvarez from continuing his work, since war with Britain between 1779 and 1783 made sending a new representative to Spain impossible.

Álvarez, however, did more than just collect new missionaries. He began to bombard the Crown with proposals. He sent so many that the Franciscan commissary-general of the Indies griped that the Council “suffered the annoyance of his quarrelsome ideas, reproving him [for] a few projects, which were judged [to be] impossible.” One proposal that received attention from the Council of the Indies requested that the entire College move from Ocopa to the Franciscan monastery of Huánuco. Álvarez argued that as most of Ocopa’s missions were now far to the north, Huánuco was a more logical base of operations for the community. Also the more temperate climate in Huánuco would

---

399 Ampuero, Letter to Commissary-general of the Indies, 13 June 1778, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 1612; González, Report from the guardian and discreetorio of Ocopa to the provincial of the 12 apostles about Fr. Caballero, 1782, Lima, ASFL, r.42, n.12a & b, ff. 273r-276v.
prepare new missionaries better for the heat of the jungle. González countered these arguments by pointing out that Álvarez did not have the authority to negotiate relocation. He added that the monastery at Huánuco was too small for the large community, and that Ocopa’s cold climate was the most effective motivation for new missionaries to leave the College for evangelization in the torrid jungle. While the Council ultimately did not approve the move and the proposal eventually died, Álvarez’s push to focus northward toward the missions of Huánuco, Cajamarquilla, and ultimately Manoa did not.\textsuperscript{402}

In 1777 Álvarez suggested an alternative to the Chanchamayo plan. He felt that the Crown would waste its resources helping the missionaries regain a region that had already rejected them. Instead he proposed that the Crown invest in building a road from the mission of Pozuzu to the port of Mayro, along the Pozuzu River. From Mayro boats could navigate all way to the Ucayali connecting the Huánuco missions to then-defunct Manoa missions (which had also rejected the missionaries) and ultimately the rest of the Amazon basin. In contrast to advocates of the Chanchamayo plan, Álvarez went to great lengths to emphasize the commercial benefit of the enterprise as well. The new port, he claimed, would be an entrepot for Amazonian products, listing no less than twenty-one potential trade goods including, “gold, sugar, chocolate, cinnamon, Jesuit’s bark (for making quinine), rice, beans, yucca, [and] yams.”\textsuperscript{403} Not only would the port help commerce but also would solidify Spain’s claims over upper amazon basin against the Portuguese. Overall command of the expedition would be given to the Governor of

\textsuperscript{402} The entire exchange of letters detailing this proposal, the counter arguments, and the council decision are found in ASFL, R.41, n.44, ff. 534 – 574.

\textsuperscript{403} Álvarez, Petition to the Crown, 5 September 1777, San Ildefonso, AGI, Lima 994.
Tarma, Jose Josef Abella Fuertes, with missionaries accompanying them to establish a mission once the port was built. The expedition would use the troops guarding the Tarma and Jauja frontier, committed to the Chanchamayo plan, and supplemented by “delinquents,” who would forge a path and construct two bridges. Just as in the Chanchamayo plan, colonists would also be required to help secure the area. According to Álvarez, in 1768, Manual Gil, Commissary of the missions of Peru, had suggested a similar plan, which viceregal officials had approved, but it did not come to fruition due to a lack of funding. The Mayro plan apparently gained wide support in Madrid and Peru with the Governor of Tarma as a particularly vocal advocate. On 30 April 1779 Viceroy Manuel de Guirior and the Audiencia of Lima considered both plans, but decided initially to fund the Chanchamayo plan since its goal, the retaking of the missions lost to Juan Santos Atahualpa, was more in keeping with the 13 March 1751 royal decree and therefore more in line with the will of the king.

On 13 July 1779 a small expedition left the frontier fortress of Palca for the Chanchamayo river valley. The expedition consisted of eighty soldiers and a small contingent of Ocopa friars led by the ex-guardian, Francisco de San Joseph. Overall command of the expedition was Francisco de Robles, but his second-in-command, Josef Patricio Barrantes, led this initial foray. It took them three weeks until 3 September to cut a path 36.4 miles (58.8 km) through the high jungle to the confluence of the

---

404 Ibid. Though I found no evidence of Gil’s 1768 petition or its viceregal approve, it seems quite plausible that it did occur.
405 Writ of the Real Acuerdo, Regarding the reconquest of the missions of the Cerro la Sal, 30 April 1779, Lima, AGI, Lima 1606.
Chanchamayo and Ocsabamba rivers. On the 14 September San Joseph sent a letter to the Viceroy stating that they had built a chapel with a large wooden cross in front of it and were preparing to build fortifications, but that they had had little contact with the Amerindians.

Only seven days later, however, the Governor of Tarma, Abella Fuertes, whom Álvarez had suggested as commander of the Mayro expedition, drafted an alarming missive to the viceroy regarding the status of the expedition. According to his sources, on the 17th a “numerous” contingent of Amerindians had erected a cross on island in the middle of the Chanchamayo and had declared that they already had a cross and did not need another, and promised that if the expedition did not leave that they would take Spanish soldiers captive and “slit the priests’ throats.” Abella Fuertes continued by saying that jungle Amerindians blew horns and sang songs at night to intimate the soldiers, and by day brandished European firearms, including the cannon the Juan Santos rebels had captured from Quimiri three decades earlier. To emphasize the Amerindians capacity to use these weapons he added that many of the Amerindians spoke Spanish, suggesting perhaps that Europeans and Mestizos escaping colonial justice had “gone native” and were now aiding the jungle nations. Without more men and arms, which the governor contended he did not have, the expedition would soon be overrun. Abella Fuertes concluded that expedition must withdraw from Chanchamayo. To add more weight to his opinion, and because the commander of the expedition refused to do so, the

---

406 San Joseph, Letter to the Viceroy Guirior, 14 September 1779, Santa Cruz de Chanchamayo, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94), 0r-1v.
407 Avella Fuertes, Report to Viceroy Guirior, 21 September 1779, Tarma, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94), 1v-2v.
governor formed a council of war, which consisted of his own coterie of clientele. The
council, of course, came to the same conclusions, adding that there were no Amerindians
in the area left to convert except “apostates” who mixed in with the “Mestizos, Blacks,
and even Spaniards [still there since] the time of the uprising (Juan Santos Atahualpa
Rebellion) whose anger is principally against the missionaries whom they murder.”408
The Fiscal of the Audiencia of Lima, concurred completely with Abella Fuertes and
urged the viceregal government to order the troops withdrawn.409

It was not until three weeks later that Francisco de San Joseph and the rest of the
expedition realized Abella Fuertes was trying to undermine their efforts. San Joseph fired
back with a letter to overall commander of the expedition Francisco de Robles who it
seems was still back in Tarma. The missionary included with missive the testimony of
acting field commander, Barrantes, his second command along with the company
engineer, Alejandro de Arana, and the company sergeant, Sivestre Carvajal. All three
men’s account refuted the dire picture of the expedition that Abella Fuertes had painted.
Indeed for the most part the missionaries had little contact with Amerindians, either
peaceful or violent. On September 17th a group of Amerindians had been spotted on the
other side of the river but communication was impossible, according to ex-guardian San
Joseph, over the din of the rushing water. For some reason the Amerindians fired one
arrow at the leading friar, but it fell short. Weeks later the Amerindians reappeared on the
other bank brandishing machetes and axes, chopping down a few trees to show that they

408 Declaration of the war council, 26 October 1779, Tarma, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94), 7r-12v.
409 Fiscal’s report of the council of war in Tarma, 29-ix-1779, Lima, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94),
ff.13v-14r.
were real, and even erected a wood cross, but made no other verbal threat to kill the
priests. The Amerindians clearly did not have firearms or cannon. In fact the only injury
sustained was on the night of the 18th of October, when Amerindians tried to shoot
arrows over the river. The Amerindians again missed but when the Spanish picket tried to
return fire with a volley in the darkness, they accidently aimed toward their own
encampment injuring one man in the leg. Furthermore, Sergeant Carvajal, who had
considerable experience along the frontier, confirmed that the group across the river
indeed consisted only of Andes and Amueshas, and was not mixed with Europeans,
Mestizos, and Africans as Abella Fuertes had claimed.  

Even before San Joseph penned his letter, and over the urgings of the fiscal, the Viceroy and Audiencia had already decided to leave the question of whether the expedition should withdraw from its position along the Chanchamayo up to the commander in the field, Barrantes.

It was not, ultimately, the possibility of violence against the Chanchamayo expedition that most concerned the viceregal government, but its lack of results. Despite the occasional sighting, it seems the Ande’s and Amuesha’s strategy for dealing with the missionaries was simply to ignore them. As Viceroy Guirior’s successor, Augustin Jaurequi wrote in frustration:

> The fort was constructed in an incorrect manner, and since my entrance into this viceroyalty I have only seen these reports: that there has been no advancement of conversions, despite the immense expense on Tarma and Jauja companies; that the solders… lack discipline; that the Chanchamayo expedition has produce no useful advancement, and the pathways that the father missionaries have opened up are very defective.

---

410 San Joseph, Report to Francisco de Robles, with attached reports from Barrantes, Arana, and Carvajal, 12-x-1779, Santa Cruz de Chanchamayo, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94), 14r-21v.
411 Writ of the Real Acuerdo, 24 September 1779, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-17 (Caja 94), 21v-23r.
Jaurequi quickly concluded that indeed the Mayro plan seemed more “useful” for the “advancement of conversions” and attempted to convince the Guardian of Ocopa, then González, to support it, “but the Guardian and his faction were determined to impede this enterprise.” González not only refused to help pay for the expedition but also to release troops from Chanchamayo to help with Mayro. In response to Gonzáles’ intransigence in 1783 the viceroy sent his own expedition to Mayro. Led by a young captain, named Francisco Elizalde, the expedition’s goal was simply to gauge whether construction of a road from Pozuzu to Mayro was even possible. After a two-month expedition Elizalde concluded that it was, and Jaurequi began construction. The Elizalde expedition enraged Ocopa’s leadership especially since the viceroy, unable to get funding from Ocopa directly, simply discounted the 4099-peso cost of the expedition from their annual stipend. In 1784 the Mayro plan, however, floundered with Jaurequi’s recall and subsequent death. The Chanchamayo mission did not survive either. That year the newly created Intendant of Tarma, Juan Maria de Gálvez, ordered the site demolished and burned, presumably under the orders of the new viceroy of Peru, Teodoro de Croix.

Though the Chanchamayo/Mayro conflict ended in stalemate, it was only the first battle in larger war between Ocopa’s then leadership (González and Gallardo) and the Argonese faction headed by Álvarez. In many ways the conflict underlined the

---

413 Ibid., 25v.
414 Ibid., 26v-28v; Friar Mauricio Gallardo, Letter to Jose de Gálvez, 28 October 1785, Madrid, AGI 1609.
415 Both Jorge Escobedo (superintendent of the treasury) and Teodoro de Croix (viceroy) refuse to pay it, 7 September 1787, Lima, AGI, Lima 1609.

213
ideological divide between the two factions. The more traditionalist faction wanted to reclaim former glories with minimal state involvement, while the other tried forging into a new region under the auspices of the Crown and employing its commercial and political goals. The conflict also demonstrated the tension between the choices and personal interactions of the historical actors in reaction to the larger ideological changes taking place within the Spanish empire. Many leaders within the Order and the Church blamed the discord solely on Álvarez. One commissary-general of the Indies stated, “Frankly hell has not spit out an equal monster, nor instrument perfectly suited (to the destruction of the College) as Friar Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva.”417 Even the archbishop of Lima faulted Álvarez: “It is inexplicable the pain that the ruin of the College of Ocopa causes me; most of the missionaries (Religiosos) are not only seduced but have been miserably penetrated by the venom of this very unhappy Álvarez.”418 During the Gálvez period, however, Peru endured a radical and often violent transformation. These changes undoubtedly influenced Álvarez and subsequent viceregal officials with whom he interacted, as different factions with the Spanish empire vied for predominance, interpreting and reinventing regalism to their own ends.

Building Tensions

The ascension of Gálvez to the post of minister of the Indies in 1776 marked the start of a period sweeping reform throughout Spanish empire. Peru became a particular

---

417 Friar Josef Felix Palacin, Minister general of the province of the Twelve Apostles of Peru, Report to Friar Manuel Maria Trujillo, Commissary-general of the Indies, 16 August 1787, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.
418 Friar Manuel de Trujillo, Commissary-general, quotes the Archbishop for a letter he wrote to the friar 20 abril 1789 (Report to Crown, 16 November 1790, AGI, Lima 1610).
focus for reformers. Up until the seventeenth century the viceroyalty had been the jewel of the Spanish empire, but its failing mining sector had long since left it in decline. Bourbon reformers hoped to invigorate the region and thus increase its remittances back to Spain. To do this Gálvez dispatched one of his former aides, Antonio de Areche, to Peru as inspector general. Areche oversaw a series of aggressive reforms aimed at increasing government revenue and centralizing authority to the crown. He set up mechanisms to increase both tax rates and collection enforcement. In 1778 the viceroyalty was divided in half, creating the new viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata with its capital in Buenos Aires. Areche also attempted to remove as many American-born creoles from political offices as possible. Creoles, reformers reasoned, had less of a vested interest in the overall goals of the Spanish Crown, wanting instead to grow rich off local corruption, and therefore denying the Crown of central control and vital revenue. In his previous post as inspector general of Mexico, Gálvez had struggled to work with Creole leaders, and he had created policies to replace them with peninsular Spaniards. The naturally doctrinaire Areche pursued this policy doggedly. He even had the viceroy of Peru, Guirior, removed from office in part for being too friendly with the Creole elite of Lima. Areche’s hardliner reformist stance and brusque leadership style won him few friends, however, and soon as a crisis befell Peru, he too was removed from office.419

The crisis that precipitated Areche’s downfall was the largest anti-colonial revolt in the Americas to date, the Tupac Amaru Rebellion (1780-1782). The rebellion was largely fueled by indigenous resentment over local government corruption, exacerbated

---

by increased taxation and changing commercial policies created by the formation of the viceroyalty of Rio de la Plata. Spawning one additional rebellion near La Paz and coinciding with another in the mining region near Potosí, the Great Andean Revolts, lasted three years and involved hundreds of thousands of combatants. Despite the gruesome execution of the uprising’s leader José Gabriel Condorcanqui (who had taken the name of his supposed ancestor, the last Inca, Tupac Amaru), many Crown officials blamed Areche’s heavy handedness and administrative incompetence both for inciting the rebellion and delaying its suppression. Gálvez recalled him to Spain in September 1781.\textsuperscript{420}

Gálvez charged Areche’s replacement as inspector general, Jorge Escobedo, to rectify one of the other main causes of the Tupac Amaru rebellion, the “tyrannies” of the \textit{corregidores de Indios}. \textit{Corregidores} were local governors with direct jurisdiction over Indigenous peoples of the Americas. Low pay, poor supervision, and opportunity had encouraged endemic corruption among these magistrates. By the eighteenth century \textit{corregidores} were criticized by almost all levels of colonial society. Escobedo supervised the installation of a system of intendants thought to be less corrupt since they were better paid, better supervised, and for the most part, peninsular Spaniards. The increased political authority of the office of the intendant, however, threatened the power and prestige of the viceroy. Into this milieu of change and conflict came Teodoro de Croix as the new viceroy of Peru in April 1784, fresh off his tenure as commander of Interior Provinces of New Spain. Croix spent most of his appointment as viceroy quietly struggling with

\textsuperscript{420} \textit{Ibid.}
Escobedo, who after his inspection ended in 1785 remained as the superintendente subdelegado de la real hacienda (superintendent sub-delegate of the royal treasure) essentially the senor intendant and chief officer of the viceroyalty’s finances. Escobedo not only represented the other intendants, but was answerable not to the viceroy but directly to the minister of the Indies. Though the powers of superintendent were eventually restored to the viceroy after Gálvez’s death in 1787, during entirety of his term of office (1784-1790) Croix remained concerned about maintaining viceregal authority.\footnote{Fisher, \textit{Bourbon Peru}, 33-34, 150, 163-164.}

When it came to frontier missions in Peru, in addition to his obsession with the prestige of his office, Croix’s time in Mexico, it seems, deeply affected his decisions. He had seen that in remote areas of the frontier, the “new method” was an utter failure. The Crown could not attract enough willing (or even unwilling) colonists for it to work. “The old method,” however, was not effective either. While over centuries the missionaries had “pacified” many frontier areas, disease and the act of forcing of the native populations into missions had led, for the most part, to economic and demographic stagnation. More importantly for dedicated reformers such as Croix, the “old method” gave the regular clergy who manned these missions far too much power in peripheral regions that in the late eighteenth century were becoming hotspots for political and military conflicts with other European powers. Therefore when it came to Ocopa, which after the exit of the Jesuits had become the most important religious institutions in the frontier of the Audiencia of Lima, Croix seems to have adopted a similar tactic to what
Gálvez had done to try to control the regular clergy in Mexico. He found a surrogate that would allow him to control Ocopa from within – Friar Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva.

*Viceregal Takeover of Ocopa*

The viceregal takeover of Ocopa began with the arrival of Álvarez from Spain in 1785. Álvarez had spent nearly a decade in Spain collecting new missionaries for Ocopa. He clearly saw this as an opportunity to pack Ocopa with likeminded missionaries. Almost from the start Álvarez attempted to circumvent his enemies in the Ocopa leadership to ensure that these new missionaries would be accepted into service at the College. To do this Álvarez created his own seal of the College and began affixing them to new missionaries’ patents. Though it was standard practice for collectors of missionaries to issue such documents, conditionally incorporating new recruits into the College, once they arrived in Ocopa their patents had to be ratified by the Guardian and affixed with the College’s seal. By creating his own seal, Álvarez was attempting to circumvent the guardian’s right to approve new missionaries. Even the design of Álvarez’s new seal revealed his own regalist attitudes (see Figure 13). While the false seal nearly duplicated Ocopa’s official seal by portraying a standing Virgin with Child holding roses, Álvarez added two royal seals flanking the central figures, suggesting visually the College’s subservience to the Crown. Though González, then Guardian, still accepted the first group of twenty-two missionaries that Álvarez dispatched to Ocopa in 1779 with the false seal, he appealed Álvarez’s usurpation of his powers to the
Figure 13 - On the left the counterfeit seal created by Álvarez to issue patents to new missionaries bound for Ocopa. This patent was the later famous missionary Narciso Girbal (28 November 1783, Cádiz, AGI, Arribadas 538). On the right is the true seal of Ocopa used on many documents throughout eighteenth century. This example was taken from Álvarez’s own patent issued by the collector of missionaries Fr. Joseph Amparo on but sealed by the then Guardian of Ocopa, Friar Antonio López (13 June 1768, Ocopa, AGI, Arribadas 538).
commissary-general in Spain, who later confiscated and destroyed the counterfeit seals.\footnote{González, Petition to Friar Manuel de la Vega, Commissary-general, 30 January 1781, Santa Rosa de Ocopa, AGI, Lima 1609 (with rescript from Vega 20 January 1783, Madrid); Friar Manuel de Trujillo, Commissary-general, Report, 16 November 1790, AGI, Lima 1610.}

Álvarez had been scheduled to follow this first group with a second of forty-four missionaries a few months later, but the war with Britain (nominally related to the American Revolution) caused them to be delayed four years.\footnote{Spain was drawn into global conflicts related to the American Revolution because of their Family Pact treaty with France. Spain, however, never officially allied with the Americans. Álvarez describes the delay in a defense of his actions dated 27 June 1785 from the Convento grande de Jesús de Lima, AGI, Lima 1610.} The delay may have served to reinforce the philosophical bonds that many in this group seemed to share with Álvarez. The 1784 group were also different from previous groups sent from Spain in the regional origins of the missionaries. Previous groups had consisted mostly of missionaries from the kingdom of Castile. Only seven of the sixty-three missionaries sent in 1768-9 and only four of the twenty-two Álvarez sent in 1779 were non-Castilians. The 1784 group, however, was evenly split with half of the missionaries (twenty-two of forty-two) coming from the kingdom of Aragon (sixteen Aragonese, five Catalans, and one Valenciano).\footnote{Heras, ed., Libro de Incorporaciones, 48-75.} What effect the regional identity of these missionaries had on their philosophical leanings and later actions remains unclear. The regions that made up the kingdom of Aragon had backed the Habsburg claimant in the War of Spanish Succession (1700-1713) that brought the Bourbons to the throne in Spain. Therefore in the wake of the war regional autonomy suffered greatly as successive Bourbon monarchs attempted to erase the legal distinctions between the two major medieval kingdoms that formed
Spain. Unsurprisingly, this process produced few ardent regalists among the Aragonese, Catalans, and Valencianos (the three regions that form the kingdom of Aragon). Perhaps, however, it was simply old animosities between the two principal kingdoms of Spain that allowed Álvarez to turn Aragonese against the mainly Castilian leadership of Ocopa. Over the previous three centuries since the unification of the crowns animosity between the smaller, commercially vibrant Aragon and the larger, politically-dominate Castile had festered. Most certainly the Aragonese friars (which in the nomenclature of the documents refers to both Catalans and Valencianos as well) spoke Catalan among themselves, further alienating them socially from their Castilian brothers. What is certain is that of the fifteen missionaries considered to be Álvarez’s principal “conspirators”, nine were from the kingdom of Aragon. Among them the Aragonse Friar Manuel de Sobreviela was widely considered to be Álvarez’s co-leader in the faction.

In April 1785, Álvarez and the new group of missionaries arrived in Lima. Álvarez, however, delayed his own departure from the city to meet with Criox. According the Franciscan commissary-general of the Indies, Álvarez “seduced the viceroy.” In their meeting, Álvarez proposed that the viceroy, as the king’s representative in Peru and vice-patron of the royal patronage of the Church, should be the person to decide, in consultation, of course, with the guardian of Ocopa, where the new missionaries would be posted. Álvarez then presented a tentative plan for the distribution of the new missionaries to Ocopa’s various posts throughout the viceroyalty. He

426 A list of these “conspirators” can be found in AGI, Lima 1609; Friar Manuel de Trujillo, Commissary-general, Report, 16 November 1790, AGI, Lima 1610.
explained that since he had gotten to know the personalities and abilities of each missionary during their long wait in Spain and their journey to Peru that he might be better suited than the guardian to advise the viceroy on this matter, adding that in September 1783 the commissary-general of the Indies had given him permission to do so in order to “repair the concept of the college that was close to expiring.” Álvarez’s proposal must have struck a chord with the viceroy. Not only was he arguing for the supremacy of the Crown even in internal religious matters, but was offering himself as an agent for extending viceregal control to one of the most powerful Franciscan institutions in Peru.

Shortly after his meeting with Álvarez, the viceroy remitted the new plan to the guardian of Ocopa for commentary. Before the guardian could respond, however, he allowed the missionaries bound for Chiloé to embark, since they had so far to travel. The guardian of Ocopa, Friar Mauricio Gallardo, was an experienced missionary and devoted ally of González, the former guardian who had initial opposed Álvarez over the Mayro expedition. Gallardo had first incorporated into Ocopa in 1745 and had been one of the missionaries expelled from Sonomoro by Juan Santos. Gallardo later returned to Lima where he taught novices at Lima’s principal monastery for many decades. In 1782 he reincorporated back into Ocopa, where he served for several months in the Huanta missions before being elected Guardian in 1783. When Álvarez’s plan for the disposition of missionaries arrived at Ocopa, Gallardo rejected the plan outright, refusing to

---

428 Croix, Report to the Crown, 16 August 1788, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611; Consult of the Council of the Indies, 2 November 1793, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607; Álvarez, “Primeros Antecedentes al Capítulo,” without date or location (but probably after February 1787 from Ocopa), AGI, Lima 1609.
recognize the authority of Álvarez or the viceroy to assign the new missionaries to their posts. Croix, disgusted by Gallardo’s “discords and dissentions,” and in consultation with the Audiencia, approved Álvarez’s proposal in its entirety within the month.\footnote{Ibid; Writ of the Real Acuerdo, 11 June 1785, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611.} At first, Gallardo refused to follow the new plan, attempting to hold off on its implementation but eventually capitulated on October 19\textsuperscript{th} 1785. Victorious Álvarez began an inspection tour of Ocopa’s missionary outposts including Cajamarquilla. He even attempted, though it is unclear whether he was successful, to make it as far as Mayro. Such inspections were not uncommon, but generally they were commissioned by the commissary-general or Guardian of Ocopa, and Álvarez seems to have had no such license.\footnote{Álvarez, “Primeros Antecedentes al Capítulo”, AGI, Lima 1609; González, Cargos contra Fr. Francisco Álvarez Villanueva, 28-viii-1787, San Ildefonso, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.} Meanwhile, even in Álvarez’s absence his allies in Ocopa purportedly continued to cause disruptions. On October 11\textsuperscript{th}, 1785, just eight days before Gallardo released the missionaries to their new posts, members of the Aragonese faction attempted to forcefully enter the guardian’s cell to steal the seal of the College, which would have effectively made it impossible for Gallardo to issue orders to Ocopa’s geographically dispersed missions. The guardian had to call up soldiers from Jauja to calm tensions in the College.\footnote{González, Cargos contra Fr. Francisco Álvarez Villanueva, 28-viii-1787, San Ildefonso, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.} Four months later on morning of 16 January 1786 Guardian Gallardo woke up violently ill, vomiting, with fever, and pustules on his face. Almost immediately, Gallardo blamed Álvarez’s allies for poisoning him, claiming it could not have been someone from outside the College since the door had been sealed all night. As one of Gallardo’s supporters stated “even though I did not see the poison poured, it is public
knowledge” that he was poisoned. Further “proof” that the guardian was indeed poisoned was provided by Ocopa’s doctor, who claimed that in addition to his other symptoms Gallardo had a red nose. According to Álvarez, the guardian simply had cholera, a common ailment in the early modern world.432

On 16 June 1786 Álvarez finally returned to Ocopa. That same day Álvarez confronted Gallardo to again demand the seal of Ocopa.433 Álvarez later argued that Gallardo’s and his predecessor’s elections as Guardian were invalid, since instead of letting the entire community elect someone to preside over new elections, the out-going guardian and decretorio had simply selected one of their political allies, Friar Philip Sanchez, provincial minister of Lima, to do so. In addition, he contended, Gallardo had not spent the requisite year in residence at Ocopa before his election.434 Gallardo, of course, refused to give up the seal. Unsuccessful, Álvarez attempted to call for a new election immediately. Ringing the bell of the College, he gathered the missionaries to the library. Gallardo tried to stop these new elections by threatening to expel all the missionaries who assembled with Álvarez. Some heeded the guardian’s warning, but the resulting rump assembly went ahead and picked a date for new elections and selected a new president to preside over them, Friar Antonio Cavallero y Nieto, one of Álvarez’s most staunch supporters. Knowing that without the seal of Ocopa Franciscan leadership in Madrid would not recognize the authority of the new president, Álvarez and several of

434 Álvarez, “Primeros Antecedentes al Capítulo”, AGI, Lima 1609; Croix, “Antecedentes mas Próximos al Capítulo celebración de este, y sus resultas,” without date or place but probably from Lima sometime after February 1787, AGI, Lima 1609.
his closest supporters traveled to Lima to get the blessing from the Viceroy and Audiencia for a new election.435

When he arrived in Lima Álvarez not only pleaded with the Viceroy and the Audiencia to approve the election, but argued that they should allow him to hold a “clandestine election” so that people “opposed to his ideas” could not vote. The viceroy, however, equivocated when it came to removing Gallardo in this manner. Perhaps he feared the public scandal that it might cause. The bad blood between Álvarez and Gallardo had become “public and notorious,” and therefore openly taking sides on the election may have cost him political capital elsewhere. Even Álvarez noted that the viceroy’s support for him cooled after reports of the guardian’s alleged poisoning reached Lima.436 Croix instead decided to wait for the commissary-general of the Indies, Friar Manuel de Trujillo, to choose a new president for the elections. Trujillo selected Friar Andrés Carbajal. Though at first Carbajal’s exact alliances in the matter were unclear, he was member of the community at the San Francisco de Jesus monastery in Lima where Gallardo had been in residence for many years. In addition to presiding over the election, Trujillo also gave Carbajal judicial powers, in the hope that he could somehow end the schism at Ocopa.437

Shortly after the patent giving Carbajal his new powers arrived in Lima, he set date for Ocopa’s election for 19 April 1787 and ordered Álvarez and his colleagues back

437 Consult of the Council of the Indies, 2 November 1793, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607; Carbajal, Report to Manuel Maria Trujillo, Commissary-general of the Indies, without date or place but between April 1786 and February 1787 from Lima, AGI, Lima 1609.
to Ocopa. Álvarez and his colleagues, however, refused to leave until Carbajal changed the date of the election. They complained that since Gallardo’s term of office ended January 29th, 1787 that the election should be held earlier than April. For their disobedience, Carbajal put them “under censure,” prohibiting them from voting in the upcoming election. Álvarez again complained to the viceroy, but this time Croix listened. On December 4, 1786 the viceroy and Audiencia ordered that the election should take place before February 20, 1787 and removed the censure on Álvarez and his companions. In addition the viceroy also ordered that the intendant of Tarma, Juan María Gálvez, should also be present at the election “with an eye to end any discord or dissension that may occur.” With the date set for February 12th, Carbajal, Álvarez, and company left Lima for Ocopa.438

Álvarez and his companions arrived the day of the election in the company of the intendant and a detachment of Spanish regulars out of Jauja. As the voting began Carbajal remained firm on the censure the he had placed on Álvarez and the other fifteen members of the Aragonese faction and announced that they would not be allowed to vote. As the voting began troops filled the room “causing great terror” among the friars.439 Intendant Gálvez ordered the troops to present arms. He then read to the assembly the December 4th ruling of the viceroy and Audiencia and demanded that Álvarez and the other censured missionaries be allowed to vote. Carbajal refused. Gálvez repeated the order in the name of the king, but Carbajal again refused. After Gálvez gave his

438 Croix, Report to the Crown, 16 August 1788, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611; Writ of the Real Acuerdo, 4 December 1786, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611.
439 Friar Juan de Marimon, Letter to Commissary-general of the Indies, 4 June 1787, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.
ultimatum for a third time, Carbajal’s only response was to make silently “a reverent representation,” most likely the sign of the cross. Frustrated, Gálvez commanded the troops to remove Carvajal forcefully. Confined to his cell and prohibited from communicating with the other friars, he died there ten days later of an unknown illness. With Carbajal gone, Gálvez instructed the missionaries to select a new president and proceed with the election. According to one eye witness, Gálvez also “ordered his troops to contain the friars even at the risk of death, that [if] they tried to leave the election room, or in case [they] resisted, there was no other reply than the bullet and the bayonet.”

The missionaries clearly understood the intendant’s message. After a complex process typical to Franciscan prelate elections, they selected Friar Manuel de Sobreviela as guardian with three other members of the Aragonese faction as the discretorio. Álvarez himself, though he served as secretary of the election, was not elected to office. He instead stayed for three years to help Sobreviela solidify control of College then chose to return to Spain to collect new missionaries.

The 1787 guardian election established almost complete regalist control in Ocopa. For the rest of the colonial period the Aragonese faction dominated the College’s leadership. More importantly after the election the viceroy became a central figure in the College’s decision making process. From that point on, the posting of missionaries to any of Ocopa’s numerous stations had to be approved by the viceroy. In addition the office of

\[440\] Ibid.
\[441\] Ibid.
\[442\] The facts of Marimon’s story are confirmed by reports on both sides of the schism: González, Cargos contra Fr. Francisco Álvarez Villanueva, 28 August 1787, San Ildefonso, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607; and Croix, Report to the Crown, 16 August 1788, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611; Consult of the Council of the Indies, 2 November 1793, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
the viceroy increasingly exercised more subtle forms of control. While the Ocopa still retained its apoderado at court in Spain, they more often turned to viceroy to advocate on their behalf and to adjudicate even internal conflicts.

* * *

The reign of Charles III was an important turning point in the history of the College of Ocopa. Though this period has often been cited as the height of royal authority and reform, the Ocopa missionaries were able to expand their evangelization efforts into new areas largely under their own leadership. This was despite widespread use of the “new method” throughout Spain’s border regions. The method stripped missionaries of any direct control over colonization efforts in the borderlands, relegating them to simple appendages of state-run expeditions. The missionaries were able to maintain this type of independence, at least until the election of 1787, because of combination of factors: Charles III’s personal disposition toward the Franciscan Order created in certain circumstances a more favorable climate for its institutions; the expulsion of the Jesuits left open frontier regions that the Crown lacked the resources to effectively control without help from the remaining regular clergy; the College’s new apoderado at court allowed them to lobby the Crown more effectively and capitalize on their reputation for piety; and finally, but as Manso de Velasco proved perhaps most importantly, a general ambivalence toward Ocopa among three succeeding viceroys, Amat, Guirior, Jauregui. Even the onslaught of the Manoa rebellion, which in terms of missionaries’ lives was more costly to Ocopa than the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion, could not stop the growth of the College’s missionary enterprise. This equilibrium that allowed Ocopa to grow
during most of the reign of Charles III while maintaining some semblance of autonomy seems to have been predicated on one important factor: Ocopa’s united front both at court in Madrid and in Peru. The presence of a more regalist faction in the community seems to have tipped the balance of power in favor of the Crown.

The guardian election of 1787 at Ocopa, and the events leading up to it, are probably one of the starkest examples of the importance of individuals in the way in which reformist ideas unfolded on the ground in the Americas. The extension of royal control over Ocopa, came not by way of a mandate from Madrid, but from Croix’s exploitation in the divisions within the College, created by the adoption of regalist ideas by a few of its members. Criox had succeeded where Manso de Velasco had failed, not by an overwhelming of Crown authority, but through the exploitation of Álvarez’s and the Aragonese faction’s beliefs and ambitions. Certainly ideas of Regalism drawn from the Enlightenment provide the context for the divisions at Ocopa, but the implementation of those ideas was the result of individuals’ interpretations and actions.
Chapter 5: From Apogee to Collapse

After the 1787 election Ocopa was a different institution. Though the results would continue to be challenged over the next decade, the shift in the mentality of Ocopa’s leadership meant that the individual missionaries became more closely aligned with the philosophical and political trends of the colonial government. In this new Ocopa, the missionaries strove not just to evangelize, but to spread commerce, spur scientific exploration, and occupy and protect Spain’s vast eastern frontier in South America against Portuguese encroachment. This shift toward a more “enlightened” focus gave the College both notoriety among intellectuals in the empire and more importantly ever increasing financial and material support from the Crown. At its height, at least on paper, Ocopa was the largest missionary operation in the Americas, serving more than seventy parishes and missions over a vast swath of South America that encompassed approximately 500,000 sq. miles (1.3 million km²).

Just as before, however, state largess came at a cost to Ocopa’s autonomy. With increased state funds and support came expanded Crown control over Ocopa’s missionary enterprise. Just as one of the main factors in the disputes surrounding the 1787 election was the ability for the viceroy to approve the placement of new missionaries to Ocopa, as the crown gave Ocopa more resources, it expected a greater hand in the day-to-day governance in the missions. Later expansions of State control
would be even more devastating to Ocopa’s autonomy, particularly the creation of the Diocese of Maynas in 1802, brought into question the College’s pastoral control over its own missions. This meant that while Ocopa leaders retained control over the College itself, authority over teaching and liturgy in the missions fell upon a Crown-selected bishop. Ironically, it was this close association with the Crown that led to Ocopa’s ultimate demise as independence came to Peru.

Consolidating Power

In the wake of the 1787 election, many of the most ardent supporters of the old leadership of Ocopa began to flee the College. Some of Gallardo’s backers, particularly those who had completed their ten-year term, simply unincorporated from the community, including the former guardian himself. Those who had not completed their ten-year commitment to Ocopa, however, would either have to serve out their remaining years or somehow escape their “obedience” to the new leaders. Friar Prudencia de Echevarria, for example, assumed a new identity to flee the country. Two days before Carvajal died, Echevarria met with the deposed president of the election, where he claimed Carvajal gave him permission to leave the College. So Echevarria waited until he was given his new post. Ordered to Trujillo, presumably en route to Cajamarquilla, Echevarria instead went to Payta embarking on a ship bound for Spain. To avoid the “many spies” that he claimed Alvarez had in the port, Echevarria assumed the name Friar

---

443 Heras, ed., Libro de Incorporaciones, 63.
Antonio de Arostequia and forged a license from the guardian of Ocopa stating that he had completed his ten-year term at the College in order to board the ship.\textsuperscript{444}

Ocopa’s new leadership also simply forced out friars who had been allied with the old regime. For example, the leadership simply ordered Friar Vincente de la Torre to leave. He later complained bitterly to the Franciscan Commissary-general of Indies that neither the prelate nor even the king could “remove from that throne (the guardianship of Ocopa), the idol of Satan (meaning Sobreviela), that the pride of [Alvarez de] Villanueva placed there.”\textsuperscript{445} With other Gallardo supporters, the new leaders were more heavy-handed, especially with those who attempted to defame them or undermined their authority. Friar Jimenez de Bejarano, like Echevarria had met with Carvajal just before his death. Carvajal had entrusted Bejarano with all his papers and ordered him to get word to Spain regarding the events surrounding the election of 1787. Bejarano therefore travelled to Guayaquil, where he sent the papers and a report to the Commissary-general in Spain. While waiting for a response he left the coast for Quito, effectively fleeing the Audiencia of Lima, where it seems he believed his enemies had more influence. He stayed eleven months in the Audiencia of Quito, during which time he accompanied several missionary expeditions into the jungle. Sometime during 1788 he received instructions from the Commissary-general to return to the Ocopa missions outside of Huanta. In late September, while making his way to Huanta, he stopped for few days to

\textsuperscript{445} Friar Vincente de la Torre, Letter to Trujillo, without date or location (but probably from Lima), AGI, Lima 1609.
rest in Huancayo, just 16 miles (27km) from Ocopa. On the night of the 29th at around 10:00pm, he was summoned to give spiritual aid to soul in need. When he exited the house where he was staying, however, three Ocopa missionaries and a contingent of militia led by Coronel Pedro Elizalde “too large for the arrest of a friar (Religioso)” confronted him, ordering him arrested “in the name of the king.” The soldiers beat him, seemingly severely, shackled him, and temporarily confined him at Ocopa. The arrest caused a scandal among the locals of Huancayo who it seems had sympathy for the Gallardo faction. After the arrest, one of the residents reportedly yelled, “nobody speak with Don Pedro Ilzarbe (sic), he is excommunicated because he beat Father Bejarano.” Eventually Bejarano was transferred to Lima along with a group of prisoners from the Tupac Amaru Rebellion in Cusco, where he was imprisoned in la Casas Matas dungeon at the Real Felipe Fortress in Callao. His imprisonment in Callao was of course illegal, since as member of the clergy he should have been held apart from the general population, usually in one of his Order’s religious houses. Viceroy Croix stated that he ordered Bejarano’s arrest for “disobedience to his superiors.” Croix held Bejarano in Callao for about a year before eventually exiling him to Spain.

Even two decades after the election, many accused the Aragonese faction of expelling or at least distancing friars from Ocopa who did not agree with their policies. In

446 González, Report to the Crown regarding the Bejarano affair, without date (probably mid-1789), Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609; Bejarano, Report, without date (after 1790), Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609.
447 Etraciano Jose de Thorrez (probably a vecino of Huancayo), Letter to Fray Prudencio, 30 November 1789, Huancayo, AGI, Lima 1609.
448 Friar Francisco Arandaz, Letter to Gallardo, without date or location, AGI, Lima 1609.
449 González, Report to the Crown regarding the Bejarano affair, without date (probably mid-1789), Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609.
450 Croix, Report to the Crown, 13 February 1790, Lima, AGI Lima 1609.
1806, the guardian of Ocopa ordered Friar Francisco Campal from his mission in Chaglla to a posting farther north for being a “notorious merchant” of Jesuit bark (from which quinine is extracted). The friar was allegedly forcing the Amerindians to harvest the bark against their will. The intendant of Tarma, who most likely was benefiting financially from the trade, mocked this reasoning as a “frivolous excuse.” He claimed that the guardian’s “efforts on this subject are not the impetus of a justified zeal, but are the necessary recourses that are brought into consideration by the next election (of the new guardian), in which they try to send away critics that are not addicts to supporting the faction controlled by the Argonese that established rule over the College since the year 1786, and whose duration [illegible] is the origin of the distraction of so many.” The viceroy agreed and Campal stayed in Chaglla. The “frivolous excuse” was even more suspicious considering the new leadership’s push for commercial development in the missions.

_Evangelization through Science and Commerce_

With their hold on the College now firm and the support of the viceregal government at least in the short term unwavering, Ocopa’s new leadership set about to remake the missions. Shortly after the election, Sobreviela and Alvarez set off on a grand tour of all of Ocopa’s missionary zones (Carmarquilla, Huánuco, Huanta) save the distant

---

451 Friar Miguel Andiviela, Letter to Geronimo Zurita, Guardians of Ocopa, 21 June 1806, Huánuco, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-25, Caja 95, 6rv.
452 Ramon de Urrutia y las Casas, Intendant of Tarma, Letter to the viceroy, 9 May 1806, Tarma, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-25, Caja 95, 3r-5r.
453 Urrutia, Letter to the viceroy, 18 October 1806, Tarma, AL-MRREE, LEB-12-25, Caja 95, 8rv.
454 Viceroy to the guardian of Ocopa, Lima, 17 November 1806 AL-MRREE, LEB-12-25, Caja 95, 7v.
Isles of Chiloé. The tour was not merely an inspection. Sobreviela supervised new efforts
to improve the physical condition and accessibility of the missions. The most important
project forged a trail from Huánuco to the river port of Playagrande on the Huallaga
River. From Playagrande the river was navigable to Cajamarquilla, and, as Sobreviela
added in a later report to the viceroy, all the way to the Atlantic. Again according to the
guardian, the route reduced the time it took for missionaries to travel from Ocopa to
Cajamarquilla from three or more months to only eighteen days.455

After the tour, Sobreviela prepared a report for the viceroy, in which he pushed
for continued and even increased Crown assistance for the missions. The report clearly
appealed to the pro-commercial, reformist sentiments of the Galvez-era Spanish
American bureaucracy. While the guardian attempted to balance the missionaries’
spiritual goals and the Crown’s political and economic aims, emphasizing both “the
spiritual and temporal” advantages of Ocopa’s enterprise, his rhetoric seemed more tilted
toward material interests.456 He suggested many products that the region could export for
sale including “cacao, coffee, cinnamon, cotton, tobacco, almonds, pepper, sugar cane,
and rice.” He added that many of the plants had undiscovered medicinal values, and the
region was filled with animal-life in all forms both “bipedal and quadrupedal.” He even
cited a lecture given on the 17th of January 1787 in Madrid by the royal botanist Josef
Martínez Toledano that advocated for the further expansion of evangelization efforts into
the Huallaga river valley and on to the Ucayali, where Ocopa’s defunct Manoa missions
lay. Sobreviela concluded that for the Crown it would be “undoubtedly [a] great

455 Sobreviela, Report to the Viceroy, 20 June 1789, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 686 (also found in Lima 1610).
advantage to facilitate the extension of Catholicism to all the spring-like valleys of the Ucayali,” warning if they did not, the Portuguese would soon claim the area.\textsuperscript{457}

Sobreviela also included part of the Cacao plant, to further convince the viceroy of the economic viability of the missions, as well as a map of the locations of Ocopa’s mission stations. Croix was impressed and sent the report along to Spain with his own missive in which he praised Sobreviela. Echoing the guardian’s own emphasis on trade, he concluded: “so that those missions increase and do not remain in the same state, as they have until now, there is no other means than to facilitate importation and commerce in those populations.”\textsuperscript{458}

As with any such work, it is unclear how much Sobreviela (or Álvarez) believed the persuasive rhetoric used in the report. Just as their predecessors had done, the leaders presented a picture that would appeal to their commercial-minded patrons. Had the report not mentioned the economic and security benefits of Ocopa’s enterprise, its calls for increased state assistance would have received little attention. Indeed Sobreviela needed as much political support as he could muster to accomplish his ambitious goals. Just a few months before he issued the report, for example, he asked the Crown to consider extending Ocopa’s missions to all of the eastern jungle from the equator to Cusco, an idea that would later gain support.\textsuperscript{459} The report also demonstrated a subtle yet significant change in the rhetoric the missionaries used in their petitions. Whereas before such documents described the commercial and security benefits of the missions as the

\textsuperscript{457} Sobreviela, Report to the Viceroy, 20 June 1789, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 686 (also found in Lima 1610).
\textsuperscript{458} Croix, Report to the Crown, 5 May 1788, Lima, AGI, Lima 1607.
\textsuperscript{459} Sobreviela, Petition to the Crown, 17 March 1789, Ocopa, AGI, Lima 686.
collateral benefits of evangelization, Sobreviela’s report seems to reverse this paradigm of causation. Like in the “new method,” the report suggested that saving peoples’ souls was the natural outcome of commercial advancement and Hispanicization, not the obverse.

Sobreviela further touted not only the Ocopa missions’ commercial value, but its scientific importance in a series of articles published in the journal *Mercurio Peruano*. The *Mercurio Peruano* was the product of the intellectual society, *La Sociedad Académica de Amantes del País* (the Academic Society of Lovers of the Country), which was modeled on the salons of Paris. Like their French counterparts, the Society consisted of elite members of the Limeño citizenry who met in private homes to discuss enlightenment-inspired philosophy and the scientific advancements of the day. In 1790 the Society began to produce articles in journal-form under the title the *Mercurio Peruano*. Society members published under their own names or pseudonyms on topics ranging from geography and economics, to natural and moral philosophy. Over the five years of its existence the Society produced twelve volumes of the journal consisting of 3,568 pages of text. Many historians have argued that these articles provided the seed for Peruvian Creole (if not national) identity. Though initially sanctioned by the viceroy in 1792 and royal decree in 1793, in 1795 the society disbanded and publications ceased after several of its volumes were banned. With the specter of the French revolution gripping Europe many of the members of the Society feared arrest.\(^{460}\)

Sobreviela’s involvement in the Society and the *Mercurio Peruano* seems to have begun sometime around early 1791. Encouragement for the Guardian to publish on the natural geography, flora, and fauna of the Ocopa missions, along with its commercial benefits, came in part from Viceroy Croix himself. In June 1791 the first history of the Ocopa missions to appear in the *Mercurio*, published under the name Aristio, the *nom de plume* for one of Society’s central figures, Hipólito Unanue, entitled “*Historia de las Missiones de Caxamarquilla: Origin and pérdida de las de Manao*” (History of the missions of Cajamarquilla: origin and loss of those of Manoa). The article, however, promised more to come. A month later Aristio again produced an article on the missions this time in collaboration with Sobreviela. The article, entitled “*Peregrinación por el río Huallaga hasta la Laguna de la Gran Cocama, hecha por el padre predicador apostólico fray Manuel Sobreviela en el año pasado de 1790*” (Peregrination along the Huallaga river until the Gran Cocama lagoon, done by the apostolic preacher father friar Manuel Sobreviela this last year of 1790) was the edited version of a diary Sobreviela had written on his last inspection of the Ocopa missions from Huánuco to Cajamarquilla. While Sobreviela’s original diary was saturated with religious rhetoric and musing on the evangelical potential of the region, Aristio’s version focused almost exclusively on scientific considerations: the geography, animal and plant life, as well as the ethnography of the native peoples. In September another account of an expedition by an Ocopa missionary, Narciso Girbal y Barceló, appeared in the *Mercurio*, again edited by Aristio, entitled “*Peregrinación por los ríos Marañón y Ucayali a los pueblos de Manoa, hecha por el padre predicador apostólico fray Narciso Girbal y Barceló en el año pasado de*
1790” (Peregrination along the Marañón and Ucayali rivers to the village of Manoa, done
by the apostolic preacher father friar Narciso Girbal y Barceló this last year of 1790) with
the same basic scope and focus as the previous piece. Again in October Arisitio published
another piece on Ocopa this time focusing almost exclusively on ethnography entitled
“Noticia de los trajes, supersticiones, y exercicios de los indios de la Pampa del
Sacramento, y Montañas de los Andes de Perú” (Information on the dress, superstitions,
and exercises of the Indians of the Pampa del Sacramento and the jungle of the Andes of
Peru). Sobreviela’s participation in the Mercurio culminated in late October with the
publication of a map which represented the bulk of the territory serviced by Ocopa.
Entitled Plan del Curso de los Ríos Huallaga y Ucayali, y las Pampas del Sacramento
(Plan of the course of the Huallaga and Ucayali rivers, and the Pampas of Sacramento –
see Figure 14) the map was intended to demonstrate the grand scope of the Ocopa
missionaries’ efforts in Peru. Included with the map was a table that listed their missions
and the number of inhabitants in each one. According to the table as of the 12th of
October, 1791 the missions of Ocopa had 31,671 people living within their confines. 461
This impressive piece of propaganda, along with other subsequent articles in the
Mercurio, had profound consequences for Ocopa. The names of Sobreviela and Narciso
Girbal became well known not just in Lima but in Madrid as well. The articles, map, and
tables seems to have transformed Ocopa from an institution that appeared to many
reformers as a liability to border security and a lag on frontier commercial development,
to a model of how a regular institution can be adapted to meet regalist objectives.

461 Morales Cama, “Fray Manuel, guardián del Colegio de Ocopa, en el Mercurio Peruano,” found in
Morales Cama, ed., Diario de visita de fray Manuel Sobreviela, 5-21.
Figure 14 - Plan del Curso de los Ríos Huallaga y Vcayali, y las Pampas del Sacramento. Originally printed in Mercurio Peruano in October, 1791. This image is a reproduction of the original printed by Amadeo Chaumette des Fossés in 1830 that now resides in the BNE.
Ocopa’s advancements were not just propagandist fiction. As one of the titles of the articles in the *Mercurio* suggested, in 1790 the missionaries reentered Manoa under the leadership of Friar Narciso Girbal. Upon arriving at the site of one of their old missions they found a community of eighty individuals still attempting to practice Catholicism under the direction of the missionaries’ old ally and guide Ana Rosa. With this community as a base, they continued to evangelize, but this time to the Cunibo and Pano (Paño or Pino) nations, instead of the Shipibos and Setebos as before. Within a few years the missionaries had built up four mission stations. The area, however, remained volatile and Girbal made several requests for soldiers and arms. This brought him into direct contact with the local governor of the province (Maynas), Francisco Requena, an up-and-coming Spanish bureaucrat, who later advocated for both for Girbal and Ocopa.

**Mounting Opposition**

Praise of Ocopa’s new regime was not universal. As Sobreviela began to exercise authority as guardian, opposition mounted not just against the manner in which he took power, but also for the way that he ran the Ocopa’s various enterprises. In the wake of the 1787 election, reports of Sobreviela’s overreaching use of power and inappropriate conduct by Ocopa missionaries begin to proliferate. Whether accurate or not, these

---


463 Friars Buenaventura Marques, Manuel Haza, and Pedro Pablo Gracia, Petition to the Viceroy, 10 July 1803, Sarayacu, MRREE-AL, LEB 12-5, 1r-2r; Friar Luis Colomer, Petition to the Viceroy, without date or place, MRREE-AL, LEB 12-5, 2r-6v; Fr. Manuel Gil, Letter to the Bishop of Quito, 7 October 1795, Lima, CVU, Mss. Tomo 11 No.20.
complaints clearly cast dispersions on Ocopa’s new leaders. One notable example was the rancor surrounding the new missionaries assigned to Cajamarquilla. As soon as the missionaries arrived at their highland staging point, the *hospicio* of Huayllillas, prominent citizens, including a local priest, complained to Bishop of Trujillo about the missionaries’ “affinity for gambling, drink, and sensuality.” Several witnesses even reported that one the missionaries, Friar Francisco Obiol, had brought a mistress from Cajamarca.  

When the missionaries finally descended to Cajamarquilla, the missionaries already stationed there also began to gripe bitterly about their new companions. They claimed that not only did the converts view these missionaries with “less veneration and respect,” but that the new missionaries were inciting the mission Amerindians into rebellion against the old ones. The new missionaries, the old missionaries affirmed, go without their habits and dance “all hours of the night,” and sell European goods to the local population. At some point it seems one of new missionaries and one the old even had some sort of physical alteration. The old missionaries, therefore, left heading to the *hospicio* of Huayllillas to protest their new brother’s behavior and the lack of material support for the Cajamarquilla missions from Ocopa, but the president of the *hospicio*, Friar Valentin Lopez, newly appointed by Sobreviela, barred them from entering, even though one of them was ill. Even after Sobreviela personally visited the missions, according the old missionaries, he defended the new missionaries’ actions. Without any other recourse,

---


465 Cristobal Gonzales, Letter to the Bishop of Trujillo, 19 July 1788, MRREE-AL, LEB-11-39
they claimed, the old missionaries simply left Ocopa’s service without the guardian’s permission.\footnote{Ibid.; Licenciado Padre Martín Prieto, Parrish Priest of Challas, Before the Bishop of Trujillo, 19 August 1788, Trujillo, MRREE-AL, LEB-11-39, 6r-7v.}

Another example of the mounting criticisms against Sobreviela’s leadership of Ocopa came from closer to home, in the parishes surrounding Ocopa. Although the main focus of the Apostolic Institute was to preach to the “infidels,” the missionaries also had a commission to spiritually fortify the faithful as well. Highland Andeans congregated regularly in the College church and other parishes controlled by Ocopa. Those with the inclination and sufficient wealth joined the Franciscan Third Order that the College operated out of these churches. Members of the Franciscan Third Order were lay, generally married, congregants who did not take vows as friars or nuns, but participated in the good works and civic ceremonies of the Order. Membership brought social status, and perhaps some were even emulating the late King Charles III, who was also a Franciscan tertiary. Members must have been relatively wealthy since the price for entry was three pesos a year, much too high for a common laborer. Sometime after coming to office, Sobreviela charged Friar Antonio Romero Colas to extend the Ocopa missionaries’ preaching along with their Third Order outside their own houses of worship to the surrounding parishes. Romero began to give sermons at local festivals, small devotionary chapels dedicated to local patron saints, and even the parish churches themselves. These gatherings caused Ocopa’s Third Order to surge in popularity, as Romero began leading members in what witnesses called “spiritual exercises,” perhaps akin to those practiced by the then-extinguish Jesuits. Local parish priests protested what
they saw as a blatant overreach of Ocopa’s mission. They claimed the Third Order bore “little fruit” and worried that such an organization “separated the Indians from their immediate pastors.” The Third Order also seems to have encouraged its members to travel to Ocopa to confess, hear mass, and, though its critics never openly stated it, give alms. The Archbishop agreed and in 1791 ordered Ocopa’s Third Order suppressed in all secular parishes.467

Ocopa’s new leadership’s most virulent and dangerous opponent, however, was the Commissary-general of the Indies, Friar Manuel Maria Trujillo. In truth the election of 1787 was more a threat to Trujillo’s power than any other friar in the Franciscan Order. By both Church and Crown law elections in the Order had to be authorize by the commissary-general in order to be valid. By the intendant, with the consent of the viceroy, dismissing Carvajal, the commissary-general’s hand-picked president for the election, the viceregal government was indeed usurping Trujillo’s power. Once he learned of the election the commissary-general appeared livid. He immediately voided the election of Sobreviela and called for a new election. He asked the Crown to confirm his decision and order the arrest of Sobreviela, Alvarez, and Luis Colomer, who served as president of the election after Cajaval’s dismissal. He stipulated that they be confined in separate monasteries and be tried for sedition and that the Intendant of Tarma, Juan María Gálvez, be investigated as well.468 Trujillo stopped short, however, of accusing Viceroy

467 Father Dr. Jose Antonio de la Via Orcasitas, Parrish priest of Jauja, Petition to the Archbishop, 20-October-1790, Jauja, AAL, San Francisco, X-1,1rv; La Via y Orcasitas, Declaration, 19 October 1790, Jauja, AAL, San Francisco, X-1, 3r-5r; Father Buenaventura de Tagle Ysasaga, Parish priest of Huancayo, Petition to the Archbishop, 16 January 1791, Huancayo, AAL, San Francisco, X-1, 6rv; La Via Orcasitas, Decree, 22 February 1791, AAL, San Francisco, X-1, 7r.
468 Trujillo, Petition to the Council, 10 September 1788, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609.
Croix directly, stating in separate letter that Alvarez made a “bad use of his natural goodness.” The Council of the Indies and the king agreed and on the 6th of July, 1788 ordered the viceroy to carry out the annulment and arrests.

News of the annulment did not go over well at Ocopa. In rather a melodramatic letter to Intendant Gálvez, the missionaries describe the shock that they experienced upon receiving the order of annulment in late April 1788, including crying and fainting. They seemed most disturbed by the implication that some of the missionaries tried to poison the former guardian. The intendant for his part was more resolute, simply stating that such an order would only disrupt the good works that the missionaries had recently accomplished. Viceroy Croix immediately ordered the annulment’s implementation delayed and by 18th of May had convinced the rest of the audiencia of Lima to revert the case back to the Council of the Indies, despite suggestion by González, one of Gallardo’s most staunch allies, that the majority of its members favored its implementation. To defend his own position, within two months Croix had gathered an impressive eight volumes of documents, organized and indexed, filled with correspondence, testimonies, and decrees regarding the 1787 election, which he dispatched to Spain ahead of the hearing before the Council. As a preamble to these documents, Croix included his own account of the election which explained the reasons for his actions. Not surprisingly,

---

469 Trujillo, Report, 6 October 1790, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
470 Fiscal’s report, 6 July 1788, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607 (Fiscal notes the king’s ascent to the consulta that same day at the end of the document).
471 Missionaries of Ocopa, Letter to the Juan María Gávez, Intendant of the Tarma, 19 April 1788, Ocopa, AGI, 1609.
472 Gálvez, Letter to the viceroy, 24 April 1788, Tarma, AGI, 1609.
Croix attacked Gallardo, stating that the former guardian demanded “obedience in a gross and disrespectful manner.” At the same time he did not completely spare Alvarez either, admitting that the missionary had a reputation for “little religiosity” even before arriving in Peru. Croix’s explained that despite these rumors he decided to support Alvarez’s plan because he carried a royal order issued by the minister of the Indies, José de Gálvez, which authorized the viceroy, as vice-patron of the Royal Patronage, to decide, in consultation with the guardian of Ocopa, where the new missionaries who accompanied Alvarez should be posted. He argued that it was Guardian Gallardo’s initial resistance to this order that made him suspicious of his motives and lead him to instruct the Intendant to intervene in the election if the guardian or any of his allies caused “dissentions.” These suspicions, he reasoned, were justified when Carvajal prohibited some of missionaries from voting in defiance of his own viceregal decree. While certainly Carvajal defied the viceroy, the royal order that Alvarez presented to Croix giving him power to place the new missionaries seems to have never existed. Alvarez did carry an order from the minister, which Croix cited and included in the eight volumes that he sent to the Council, but the document in question said nothing about the power of the viceroy to distribute missionaries. It was simply a license for Alvarez to escort missionaries to Peru. Croix’s tactic worked, however, delaying a final decision on the annulment for another five years.

474 Croix, Letter to His Majesty through the Council of the Indies, 16 August 1788, Lima, AGI, Lima 1611. (The whole eight volumes comprise the entirety of AGI, Lima 1611 and 1612.)
475 Croix cites 1st and 2nd documents of the 2nd cuaderno as these royal orders. They are royal orders, signed by the minister of the Indies, José de Gálvez at San Lorenzo, 16 October 1778, and two at San Ildefonso, 7 October 1783, AGI, Lima 1611.
Both sides used the long delay to get representatives back to Spain to help strengthen their position with the Council. In many ways, the traditionalist faction already had the upper hand. Sobreviela’s expulsion of Gallardo’s supporters meant that several of them were already in Spain or were making their way there. Friar Prudencia de Echevarria, who had used an assumed identity to board a ship in Payta, arrived in early 1788. Shortly thereafter Friar Bernardo Bejarano joined him after being freed from his imprisonment in Callao. Perhaps foreseeing the coming political imbroglio, Gallardo had already sent González as Ocopa’s new apoderado at court in 1785, two years before the election had even taken place. It was these missionaries who had first reported the election to the commissary-general, and their opinion appeared to have weighed heavily on the prelate’s initial decision to annul the election. Sobreviela, however, had powerful advocates as well. In 1790, when dispatched Álvarez himself, who not coincidentally traveled to Spain on the same ship as the recently recalled Viceroy Croix.

The arrival of Álvarez, however, created a new problem: there were now two apoderados for Ocopa at court. González obviously had the advantage. He had already had been representing Ocopa for five years at court and had the backing of the commissary-general who had nullified the election of the Guardian that had selected Álvarez. Even though Álvarez arrived in the entourage of the former viceroy, he received a cold reception from Commissary-general Trujillo, who balked at the missionary’s

---

476 Echavarria, Report to the commissary-general, 25 January 1788, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607
477 Council of the Indies, Consult, 20 June 1795, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607
478 Trujillo mentions the testimony of these men in several correspondence and petitions such as: Trujillo, Petition to the Council, 10 September 1788, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609; Trujillo, Report, 6 October 1790, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
“audacity” in appearing before him. Trujillo complained that allowing Álvarez to come to Spain “does not have precedent” and demonstrated “a positive contempt for the most sacred rights of the sovereign, of his ministers, and of religious subordination.” Trujillo therefore immediately stripped Álvarez of his title and had him confined to a monastery in Guadalajara. Unfortunately for González, this did not settle the question. When González had arrived in Spain, he had lacked the proper license to act as apoderado for Ocopa from the viceroy. This was because when he attempted to leave Peru in 1784, Juan Maria Gálvez, the future intendant of Tarma and then secretary to Viceroy Croix, denied González’s request to travel to Madrid in an official capacity for Ocopa. Gálvez only allow González to travel to Spain if he unincorporated from the College and thereby abdicated any authority to act in Ocopa’s name once he returned to the peninsula. When he got to Spain González must have thought that his lack of a license from the viceroy would not be an impediment since he enjoyed the support of the commissary-general. He was so confident that, at Trujillo’s insistence, he published two missionary tracts with the promise that the printing costs, amounting to more than 2600 pesos, would be paid for from the 500-peso annual stipend that Ocopa’s apoderado received at court. Without the proper license, however, González found it difficult to draw the money. The lack of a license also gave ammunition to Álvarez’s criticisms of González, calling

479 Trujillo, Report, without date (but sometime between 1790 and 1795), Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609.
480 González, Petition to the Crown, 7 January 1794, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
481 Council of the Indies, Consult, 20 June 1795, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607; González, Petition to the Crown, 28 October 1785, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607. Of the two missionary tracts, one focused on the Franciscan missionary activity in Chiloé, advocating for the construction of a new college de Propaganda Fide on the island to directly manage its mission parishes. The second, entitled Calamores Apostólicos, was a tract intended to recruit new missionaries in Spain for service in the Apostolic Institute in the Americas and Philippines. A special thanks to the library at Ohio Dominican University for providing me an electronic copy of this tract.
him a “pretend apoderado,” and painting him as simply a disgruntled former missionary, who was able essentially to trick the commissary-general of the Indies into nullifying the 1787 election, with his “machinations” and “secret reports.”

The fiscal of the Council of the Indies seemed unconvinced by Álvarez’s characterizations, but he concluded that this matter could not be decided until the Council ruled on the election itself.

On 2 September 1793 the Council finally sat to decide the fate of the increasingly notorious 1787 election at Ocopa. Ostensibly the council upheld the commissary-general’s nullification and ordered that a new election be conducted by the proper authority. Sobreviela was ordered to be removed from Ocopa and Álvarez banned from ever returning to the Americas or engaging in any business in Spain on the College’s behalf. The Council asked that the King censure Viceroy Croix, the audiencia of Lima, and in particular the Intendant of Tarma, Juan María Gálvez, whom they agreed had overstepped his authority. The Council additionally ruled that González and Bejarano could return to Americas and later recommended that the latter be selected to head the new college de Propaganda Fide in Tarata (in modern-day Bolivia). To avoid further conflicts, however, they also forbade González from returning to Ocopa and stripped him of his title as apoderado. Gallardo was similarly barred, although he had already comfortably reincorporated into the Franciscan province of Los Doce Apóstoles in Lima. King Charles IV not only agreed with the Council’s recommendation, but was apparently

---

482 Álvarez, Report to the Crown, 4 December 1790, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1609.
483 This note from the fiscal appears at the end of petition from Álvarez, 29 October 1790, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
“very content” with the way the Council handled the case “in restoring tranquility to the College.”

On the surface, the ruling was seemingly a victory for the traditionalists at Ocopa. While Gallardo or González could not return to the College, their faction had been proven correct and their enemies punished. Over the next year, however, the Council began to equivocate and this victory became less one-sided. After the initial ruling González pressed the Council for the funds reserved for the apoderado of Ocopa to pay his debts. On 20 June 1795 the Council finally agreed to pay the costs of printing the two tracts, despite González’s lack of proper license, but also it stipulated that the balance of the money left over, some 2,995 pesos, be given to Álvarez for services rendered as apoderado, who despite the controversy, did have a proper license. Nine days later the council agreed to allow Sobreviela to remain at Ocopa. It seems that the council had been swayed by a report from the friar presiding over the new guardian election convened at Ocopa a year earlier. The friar, who was presumably handpicked by Commissary-general Trujillo, had refused to expel Sobreviela. He argued to Council that Sobreviela was simply an innocent bystander during the contentious election of 1787 and that as Guardian he had spearheaded a massive expansion of the Ocopa’s missionary program. Additionally, the president noted the great “tranquility” in the College (aided no doubt by the expulsion of all of Sobreviela’s enemies). Álvarez, the principal provocateur of

484 Council of the Indies, Consult (with a note from the King’s secretary attached), 2 September 1793, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607. Bejarano’s positing to Tarata is noted in Council of the Indies, Consult, 17 December 1794, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.


486 Ibid.
these events, was never allowed to return to Ocopa. Even before the Council upheld the election nullification, however, he seems to have made inroads with Trujillo. The commissary-general told the Council that Álvarez had “humbled himself” and the Council eventually agreed to allow him to remain as a “collector” of new missionaries for the College in Spain.487 In 1797 Álvarez dispatched a new group of missionaries to Ocopa.488 Even as late as 1812 Álvarez was described as “the commissary and procurator general of Ocopa.” At the time he was working for the French occupation government in Seville at the Archive of the Indies where he certified a death warrant for a man condemned to die by firing squad for aiding Spanish forces after the battle of Talavera.489

Ocopa and the creation of the Comandancia and Diocese of Maynas

As the disputes settled from the Council’s ruling regarding the election of 1787, Ocopa continued to push their evangelization efforts northward to the Ucayali river valley. These efforts led them farther and farther into the Provence of Maynas. Maynas was an amorphous territory created in the early seventeenth century to govern Jesuit missions in the tropical forests in what is now eastern Ecuador. As missionizing efforts expanded during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, spearheaded mostly by the Jesuits, its borders expanded to encompass most of the upper Amazon basin including parts of modern-day Ecuador, Columbia, and Peru (see Figure 15), though its exact borders, particularly to the east, were ill-defined. With the expulsion of the Society in

487 Council of the Indies, Consult, 2 September 1793, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1607.
488 List of missionaries collected by Villanueva in 1797 is found in AGI, Arribadas, 241.
489 Death warrant for Don Manuel Antonio Perez, 16 November 1812, Madrid, AGI, Indiferente 962.
1767, other regular orders were given charge of their missions, including Ocopa, who took over Cajamarquilla after the Jesuits left. Most of these abandoned missions, however, were turned over to the Franciscan province based in Quito, since Maynas was under the jurisdiction of that Audiencia. The Quiteño Franciscans were not only notoriously undisciplined, but many friars were sent to Maynas as a form of punishment. As a result the province swelled with some of the most indolent and recalcitrant friars in the Americas. The Quiteño Friars did no evangelization and little pastoral work, preforming mass irregularly and rarely hearing confession. They essentially just tried to live off the mission converts. Unsurprisingly, one by one these friars were forced to abandon the Jesuits’ former missions as their Amerindian converts fled rather than suffer the missionaries’ malfeasance and neglect.490

Ironically, at the same time this was happening the Spanish state became more interested in developing Maynas as a buffer zone between the Portuguese and their more valuable highland possessions in the Andes. As the missionaries themselves had reported, Portuguese traders and slavers had begun making their way farther up the Amazon basin and were encroaching on territory traditionally seen as Spanish. While several treaties between the Spanish and the Portuguese delineated the borders between two the European powers in South America from the Treaty of Tortesillas in 1494 to the Treaty of Madrid in 1750, the exact line of demarcation in this relatively unexplored corner of the continent remained unclear. Alarmed Spain scrambled to negotiate a new treaty. In

1777 they signed the Treaty of San Ildefonso with Portugal, finally solidifying the colonial boundary between Portuguese Brazil and Spanish South America.491

To assure the treaty was honored by the Portuguese, the Spanish Crown sent military engineer Francisco Requena y Herrera as a border commissary (comisario de limites), later naming him governor of Maynas. Requena, who boasted more than two decades of experience in the New World, began to study Maynas to understand better how it could be further develop both commercially and militarily to be a more effective source of revenue for the Crown and a buffer against the Portuguese. Requena noted with disgust the undisciplined, corrupt manner that the Franciscans out of Quito comported themselves. He was, however, impressed with the missionaries of Ocopa, in particular the expeditions of Friar Narciso Girbal into the Ucayali river valley. It became clear to Requena that the missionaries of Ocopa were the only religious institution expanding in Maynas, and the governor aided these expeditions with supplies and troops.

When Requena finally returned to Spain in 1799, he submitted a report on the state of Maynas, along with recommendations on how to develop the region and improve its utility to the Crown. He recommended the creation of a military district, the Comandancia General de Maynas to streamline multiple political, military, and religious jurisdictions that had existed in the province of Maynas into one clearly defined politico-religious entity. If created the comandancia would have several important implications for Ocopa. The first was that Requena strongly urged that Ocopa be given exclusive pastoral rights to all of Maynas’ missions and parishes and that all other religious

491 Espinoza, Amazonía del Perú, 326-327.
institutions, particularly the friars out of Quito, be expelled. To help Ocopa control the region’s missions better, he recommended that they be granted two additional frontier parishes as well as two small highland monasteries to serve as staging points for missionaries going into the jungle. These included the monastery of Huánuco, which Friar Álvarez had fought so hard to annex a decade earlier. For their services Ocopa would be paid 6,000 pesos per year from the Crown, the same amount that the Jesuits had received previously, in addition to their current 6,000-peso stipend. Requena also added that they should be granted more new missionaries as well. To simplify further Ocopa’s problems working in multiple political and religious jurisdictions, Requena made two suggestions. Firstly, he argued that all of Ocopa’s missionary zones in Peru be annexed into the new district (see Map 4.2) and secondly, that within this district the Church create a new diocese. The erection of a new episcopate was meant to simplify issues of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. Even Ocopa’s existing missions fell within two Catholic dioceses, Lima and Trujillo. The additional territory they would be working in fell under two more, Quito and Cuenca. This meant that in order to receive licenses to function in pastoral matters, they would have had to appeal to four different bishops. The missionaries had gotten around these complications previously with the creation of a prefect, who in certain cases could act in behest of a bishop, but such dispensations would have to be sought for each jurisdiction. Requena reasoned that having Maynas fall under one local bishop would be more convenient. The bishop, he argued, should have no cathedral and would travel around the district as needed. Of course, for this plan to work,
he cautioned, the bishop would have to be from Ocopa, and suggested giving the new
mitre to Friar Narciso Girbal. 492

The recommendation with the longest lasting impact on the region, however, was
that Maynas should be transferred from the Audiencia of Quito to that of Lima. It seems
that the idea for the shift in territorial jurisdiction originally came from Girbal and
Sobreviela, who argued that since Ocopa’s headquarters lay in the Peruvian highlands,
having all of its missions under the same jurisdiction would be more convenient for the
College. Requena cited two additional reasons for the switch. First, the shift from Quito
to Lima recognized a change in transportation patterns into the Province of Maynas.
During the seventeenth century and early eighteenth centuries under the Jesuits,
missionaries tended to enter via Quito or Cuenca through the Napo river valley. As
missions along the Napo fell apart during the transfer of the region to the Franciscans,
however, the main access to the tropical lowlands of Maynas came through Moyabamba
or Jaen in the Audiencia of Lima. The second was that Lima, as the viceregal capital and
major trading hub, had a larger military garrison than Quito and could more easily
provide assistance in the case of a rebellion. 493

After several years of debate the Crown codified most of Requena suggestions in
a royal decree dated 15 July 1802. The decree created the Comandancia General de
Maynas incorporating almost all the upper Amazon basin including the Ucayali, Napo,
Putumayo, Marañon, Huallaga river valleys and many of their tributaries up to the edge

492 Ibid., 352-358; Francisco Requena, Report the Crown, 29 March 1799, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1580.
493 Ibid. The Crown’s later implementation of this suggestion led to no less than six wars between Peru and
Ecuador after their respective independences over ownership of Maynas.
Figure 15 - Viceroyalty of Peru in 1810, Raúl Porres Barrenechea, 1936.
Andean highlands in the west and to the line of the Treaty of San Ildefonso in the east into one political-military entity (Figure 15). Save for a few regions in its northern most reaches of the *Comandancia*, the Crown granted Ocopa exclusive rights over all the missions and parishes in Maynas, including the various small convents and parishes in the highlands suggested by Requena. Any cleric who wanted to continue their service in the region had to incorporate into Ocopa. The decree also called for the creation of a diocese under the Archbishop of Lima, pending papal approval.494

Ocopa’s missionaries rejoiced as they began to make preparation to take charge of the new territories. The Franciscans from Quito, upon learning of the decree, began abandoning their posts, however, and Ocopa’s leaders began to realize the massive scope of their new responsibilities. At the same time other institutions, even Franciscan ones, jealous of the College’s massive acquisition, began squabbling over the implementation of the decree.495 The local Franciscan province, for example, agreed to forfeit the monastery at Huánuco, but they demanded to retain the religious adornments and images as well as any incomes from mortmain donations. With the religious cohesiveness of the *Comandancia* at stake, much of the ability of Ocopa to manage the territory and defend it against outside institutions depended on the selection of the new bishop of Maynas.496

On the September 19th, 1803 a select committee within the Council of the Indies charged with recommending royal appointments, the *Cámara* of the Indies, met to consider the selection of the new bishop. The Royal Patronage, conferred upon the

495 Diego Calvo, Governor of Maynas, Petition to the Crown, 12 January 1803, AL-MRREE, LEB 3-26, Caja 88.
496 Casimiro de Sotomayor e Yparraquirre, Summary, Lima, 21 January 1806, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-9, Caja 94, 2r-7v.
Spanish monarch in stages over the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, gave the Crown virtual control over selecting new bishops. In its advisory capacity the Cámara considered worthy candidates and created a list of three in ranked order for the monarch’s consideration. The Cámara weighed several options, including former Franciscan provincial minister of Lima, Friar Juan Marimon, but they ultimately agreed with Requena’s assessment of the new diocese, that the new bishop had to come from Ocopa, and unanimously selected as their top choice Friar Narciso Girbal (see Figure 16, top). When the decision came back to the Cámara, however, the king had selected Juan Antonio Mantilla, chaplain of San Felipe Neri in Valladolid. Mantilla had not been on the list of candidates. He had no connection to Maynas or Ocopa and was not even a Franciscan.\textsuperscript{497} No rationale accompanied the decision. Mantilla, however, declined the post, citing health problems.\textsuperscript{498} Certainly the rigors of taking over a new, unorganized diocese in the fetid tropical forests of the Amazon would have seemed less desirable than a comfortable sinecure back in Spain. Therefore the Cámara once again convened on May 14\textsuperscript{th}, 1804 to present a slate of names for the king’s consideration, and again unanimously selected Girbal in first place (see Figure 16, bottom). Charles (or perhaps his favorite, Manuel Godoy) again selected a person who was not on the list nor was affiliated with Ocopa. The choice, Friar Hipólito Sánchez Rangel, was a Franciscan and his current posting in the notoriously undesirable tropical port of Havana made him more

\textsuperscript{497} Cámara of the Indies, Consult, 19 September 1803, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1580.
\textsuperscript{498} Juan Antonio Mantilla, Letter to the Crown, 14 April 1804, Valladolid, AGI, Lima 1580.
Figure 16 - Selection Results for the Cámara de Indies regarding the new bishop of Maynas, 19 September 1803 and 14 May 1804 respectively. Source: AGI, Lima 1580.
likely to accept, which he did. A Papal decree confirmed his appointment 10 September 1805.

Problems with Maynas

As Requena’s report had implied, not selecting a bishop from Ocopa had disastrous consequences. In 1807 Rangel arrived in Quito, where he was anointed by that city’s bishop, and on February 20th, 1808 he finally entered Maynas. Despite Rangel’s previous experience with tropical regions, he complained bitterly about the climate, stating in a letter just a year later that he was sick and covered with sores. He seemed surprised at the disorder that reigned in the region and begged the Crown to be released from his new see. By far one of his most pressing problems was Ocopa’s lack of cooperation. The royal decree that had created Maynas required that Ocopa provide most of the manpower for the diocese, but the College refused to recognize the authority of the new bishop in most matters. Rangel, on the king’s recommendation, had selected Girbal as one of his principal assistants, perhaps in an attempt to ease the College’s resentment of the new bishop. Girbal had initially reported for duty at the new diocesan seat at Concepción de Jeberos, but after a short time had abandoned his post in the words of Rangel “like a fugitive.”

At the heart of the conflict was an uncertainty over who had pastoral oversight of the missions and parishes in Maynas. Both the papal bulls creating the Apostolic Institute and colonial law had allowed missionaries to have pastoral control of their own missions.

499 Rangel, Letter to José Fernando Abascal y Sousa, Viceroy of Peru, 2 January 1809, AGI, Lima 1580; Espinoza, Amazonia del Perú, 405-406.
This was because missions usually lay so far from the episcopal seat that expecting a bishop to oversee such enterprises was impractical. Instead the Church followed the practice of creating prefects, generally older missionaries, who would tend to all the duties of a bishop in their stead, such as performing confirmations, giving dispensations to couples with too close of an affinity to get married, and most importantly licensing and supervising mission and parish priests. The Crown and the archbishop of Lima had granted Ocopa a prefecture almost fifty years earlier. Previously the prefects in Ocopa’s missions worked closely with its guardians and were effectively subordinate to them. The 15 July 1802 and subsequent decrees did not seem to clarify the issue. Perhaps it was assumed that since the bishop would be from Ocopa that delineating such ecclesiastical jurisdictions would be unnecessary. Rangel, however, argued that whole purpose of creating the diocese was to have a bishop present to see to all the duties formally performed by the prefect and attempted to dissolve the office. This effectively meant that all missionaries leaving Ocopa for their respective missions or parishes should receive license from Rangel. According to Rangel, it also signified that he could inspect and remove friars from their missions, and even punish them if he deemed it necessary. Rangel argued that the Ocopa missionaries should engage in “the conquest of the Gentiles, under the authority of the bishop, nothing more.”

Friar Luis Colomer, former guardian and current prefect of Ocopa, countered Rangel’s arguments with a nuanced response. Colomer agreed that in regards to the

---

\(^{500} \text{Fiscal’s summary of three letters from Rangel dated 10 May 1808, 23 September 1808, and 8 April 1809, AGI, Lima 1580; Rangel, Letter to the Guardian of Ocopa, 14 December 1810, Jeberos, AGI, Lima 1580.}\)
parishes of Maynas the bishop was correct in asserting pastoral oversight, but that according to both cannon and colonial law the missions still fell under the control of Ocopa. In making this argument, he also ceded that those same laws recommended that after ten years all missions should be converted into parishes, but he was quick to point out that this clause had largely been ignored because of the slow development of most frontier zones and the lack of secular clergy to staff them. Certainly in this case, he argued, the missions in question were not strong enough in the faith to make such a change. Colomer also strongly disagreed with Rangel regarding his ability to restrict the movements, punish, or remove Ocopa’s missionaries without the guardian’s permission. While the bishop had the right to inspect parishes and even missions, he had no power over the missionaries since “the regular [clergy] are exempt and independent from the lord bishops in their persons and their monastery.”

Two additional factors weakened the bishop’s authority. The first was funding. Rather than giving the pay for Maynas’ missions and parishes to the bishop to disperse, as was typically done in other dioceses, the 15 July 1802 royal decree directly granted the funds to the Ocopa missionaries. In 1807, perhaps to force the two parties to work together, Requena suggested that missionaries be forced to submit a budget to the bishop for his approval. This idea, however, never came to fruition. While the Viceroy of Peru, José Fernando de Abascal y Sousa, refused to disseminate the funds until the new

---

501 Colomer, Letter to Viceroy Abascal, 1 December 1809, Ocopa, MRREE, LEB 3-30, Caja 88, 18r-21r.
bishop arrived, it appears he did so after 1808. Rangel complained bitterly about this
discrepancy, but it seems that he never saw any of the funds marked for his diocese. 503

The other factor weakening Rangel’s authority regarded viceregal control over
the placement of missionaries. While the guardian of Ocopa claimed authority to decide
in which missions and parishes his missionaries should be placed, after the 1787 election,
he had to submit his plan to viceroy for approval. This meant that in order to get the
viceroy to side with him over pastoral authority and funding, Rangel would also have to
submit a plan to the viceroy as well. Ocopa had the advantage of a head start, and two
years before the bishop had even arrived in Maynas, they submitted their list, and
Abascal allowed the missionaries to begin making preparations for the new expansion. 504
When Rangel arrived in 1808, he submitted his own plan, but instead of waiting for
approval expected the missionaries to implement it immediately. Abascal seems to have
largely ignored the bishop’s request. 505

The ultimate effect of Rangel’s weakened authority was that the missionaries of
Ocopa simply ignored him. Only one missionary, Girbal, ever even met with him
personally. Ocopa maintained the missionary zone that they already occupied, but it
never sent friars to service the new missions granted them by the 15 June 1802 royal
degree. 506 Ocopa’s inaction, was not, however, motivated solely by their disregard for

503 Junta Superior de Real Hacienda (which was headed by the Viceroy), Edict, 28 March 1806, Lima, AL-
MRREE, LEB 3-25, Caja 88; Rangel, Letter to Colomer, 5 May 1808, Jeberos, AL-MRREE, LEB 3-30,
Caja 88, 11r-16v; Rangel, Letter to Abascal, 3 March 1810, Jeberos, AL-MRREE, Caja 88, 52r-54v.
504 Several letter regarding the submission of this plan and the negotiation between the viceroy, the
intendant of Tarma, and Ocopa are located in AL-MRREE, LEB 12-2 (Caja 94) and LEB 12-25 (Caja 95).
505 Rangel, Letter to Abascal, date illegible, copied 21 May1810, AL-MRREE, LEB 3-29, Caja 88.
506 Rangel, Letter to Abascal, 2 January 1809, AGI, Lima 1580; Rangel, Petition to the Crown, 15 April
1814, Jeberos, AGI, Lima 1580.
Rangel’s episcopal authority. Nor indeed was Abascal’s indifference to the bishop’s pleas. By 1808, events in Spain and throughout its American possessions conspired to turn the attention of colonial administrators elsewhere, relegating the problems in Maynas to something to be dealt with later.

**The Crisis of 1808**

The outbreak of the French Revolution in 1789 deprived Spain of its most important ally in Europe. Since the French Bourbon dynasty came to rule Spain in 1700, the two countries, bound by blood, had worked out a series of treaties that tightly bound the nations both militarily and politically. With the abdication and later execution of his cousin French King Louis XVI, Charles IV’s government attempted to respond militarily to the growing revolutionary threat in France. Political corruption caused in part by a weak-willed Charles IV and only exacerbated by his incompetent royal favorite, Manuel de Godoy, led to a series of humiliating Spanish defeats. Quickly Spain found its self on the losing end of a war with France and sued for peace. The resulting treaties forced Spain to not only recognize the new government of France, but made it a virtual puppet of French foreign policy. Spain’s vulnerability only intensified after the British routed a combined French and Spanish Fleet at Trafalgar (off the southwest Spanish coast) in 1805. The defeat prompted Napoleon Bonaparte, now emperor of France, to establish the Continental System, which attempted to bar British merchants from trading with Continental Europe. One of the lone holdouts of the system was long-time British ally, Portugal. Without a navy, which was crippled at Trafalgar, the only route available for
France to conquer Portugal was through Spain. In 1807 Godoy negotiated an agreement that would allow French troops to pass through the country. Napoleon, however, saw an opportunity in the political chaos caused by the rivalry between Godoy and Charles’ heir, Ferdinand. Instead of merely passing through Spain, French forces invaded it. After luring both Charles and Ferdinand to France, Napoleon forced them to abdicate in May of 1808. Within a few months French forces controlled most of Spain, except for a few pockets of fierce local resistance. Napoleon had his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, crowned king of Spain. A small rump of Spanish government officials, however, fled to Cádiz where the city’s location on a peninsula and the British navy kept the French forces at bay. There they established a government in exile, first forming a ruling council (Junta Supremo) and later a national assembly (Cortes).  

The French invasion and subsequent abduction of the king of Spain caused a crisis of legitimacy in Spain’s American possessions. The debates that followed centered on the question of, in the absence of the king, who had sovereignty? Political elites in the Americas almost universally rejected Joseph Bonaparte’s claim, but without a legitimate king in power some began to question the authority of their own colonial administrators. Without a king how could a viceroy (quite literally a vice-king) or audiencia claim authority? The town councils of several viceregal and provincial capitals such as Quito and Buenos Aires, instead of letting colonial officials continue in office, set up their own ruling councils (juntas) to govern in the name of King Ferdinand VII, el deseadó (the desired one). While these cities did not fully accept the authority of the government in

---

507 Lynch, Bourbon Spain, 375-421.
Cádiz either, they did send representatives to newly formed Cortes. Peru as a bastion of colonial conservatives, however, experienced no such shift in governance. Some credit for this intransigence has to be given to Abascal’s ironfisted rule of the viceroyalty. During the six years of the crisis, he put down numerous rebellions and attempts at autonomous government including the brutal suppression of the Junta of Quito, many of whose members were massacred. He prevented Upper Peru (now Bolivia) from falling under the influence of the Buenos Aires government by having it annexed to viceroyalty of Peru.  

While Abascal completely ignored the liberal ministers in Cádiz, the government in exile did eventually try to intervene in the conflict between Ocopa and the bishop of Maynas. At first, as in most matters of government regarding Peru, officials in Cádiz left the decision of who ultimately should have pastoral control of the diocese to the viceroy. It seems, however, that one or both of the factions pushed for Cádiz to adjudicate the matter, perhaps because the viceroy seemed to ignore the issue. After the formation of the Cortes in 1812, the new government attempted to resolve conflict by siding completely with Ocopa. Citing the 15 July 1802 royal decree the Cortes argued that the whole purpose of creating the diocese was to aid Ocopa’s evangelization efforts. Following Friar Colomer’s logic, they proclaimed that “all governors, bishops and other superiors in the Indies…should not interfere but leave [evangelization] completely to the discretion of the missionaries, or the College can in no way progress in the missions.”

509 Junta Supremo de Cádiz, 23 December 1810, Cádiz, AGI, Lima 1580.
510 Manuel Plaza, Letter to the Asesor General, 13 Abril 1814, Lima, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-11 – Caja 94,1r-4v.
This, of course, did little to fix the problem, since the Cádiz government could not enforce their decision across the Atlantic.

The issue was taken up once again after the restoration of the monarchy in March of 1814. Ferdinand VII, hoping to renew the type of royal absolutist government of his grandfather, Charles III, within a few months ordered the Cortes in Cádiz disbanded and annulled the extremely liberal 1812 constitution they had promulgated.\textsuperscript{511} Rangel, who for several years had been residing outside of his diocese in the highlands, wrote to the king lamenting the poor state of missions in Maynas and begged the Crown to transfer him to a new episcopate. He blamed these conditions in his dioceses on the Ocopa missionaries’ lack of deference and inability to man all the Maynas missions.\textsuperscript{512} In 1816 the Council of the Indies began to collect reports to make recommendations to the king on how to definitively solve the matter. As the guardian of Ocopa admitted, “I believe only our sovereign will be able to redeem such great evils.”\textsuperscript{513} The fiscal, in his report to the council, suggested a simple solution: just let Bishop Rangel transfer to another diocese, as he had requested multiple times, and choose someone from Ocopa to replace him.\textsuperscript{514} The Council’s recommendations, which the king later approved, failed to heed the fiscal’s opinion, and instead produced a vaguely worded, partial reversal of the decision made by the Cortes of Cádiz. They confirmed the bishop’s right to inspect the missions

\textsuperscript{511} The Constitution of 1812 was remarkably radical legal framework for its time. Among other things it granted almost universal male suffrage throughout Spain and its colonies.
\textsuperscript{512} Rangel, Petition to the Crown, 15 June 1814, AGI, Lima 1580; The Guardian of Ocopa, Friar Geronimo Zurita, revealed Rangel absence in a letter to Friar Pablo de Moya, Commissary-general of Indies, 14 August 1816, Ocopa, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-15, Caja 94.
\textsuperscript{513} Friar Geronimo Zurita, Letter to Friar Pablo de Moya, Commissary-general of Indies, 14 August 1816, Ocopa, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-15, Caja 94.
\textsuperscript{514} Fiscal’s report, 13 August 1816, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1580.
and parishes in Maynas, but did not clarify completely the question of pastoral control. To confuse the matter further, they instructed the bishop and the governor to defer to the expertise of Friars Girbal and Colomer on all military matters in Maynas.  

The overall effect of war in Spain, civil strife in Peru, and more specifically the conflict between the missionaries and the bishop was the “complete abandonment of the missions.” As one missionary described Maynas: “there are many abuses and superstitions; sins and scandals of all unspeakable types and ignorance of the mysteries [of God].” He hoped that another Saint Francis or Saint Dominic would come teach in the New World, but concluded that it appeared that the earth was preparing itself for “god’s last wrath.” In 1816 the guardian of Ocopa reported that the missionary zones of Huánuco, Cajamarquilla, and Maynas were all “forsaken” and without missionaries save two because of the “differences” between the bishop of Maynas and Ocopa. Even if these “differences” had not existed, however, and Ocopa had wanted to man all the missions and parishes of Maynas, it would have been impossible.

The crisis of 1808 not only disrupted the Crown’s supervision of the Maynas project, but cutoff the literal life-blood of Ocopa: the flow of missionaries from Spain. Even before Ocopa was granted the responsibility of servicing Maynas, the size of the groups of missionaries coming from Spain had been in decline. In 1797 only nine missionaries made the journey to replace those who had completed their 10-year term

---

516 Friar Geronimo Zurita, Letter to Friar Pablo de Moya, Commissary-general of Indies, 14 August 1816, Ocopa, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-15, Caja 94.
517 Friar Francisco Andiviela, Letter to the Archbishop of Lima, 1 November 1816, Ocopa, AAL, San Francisco, XI-24, 1r-2r.
518 Ibid.
from the previous group in 1784. After the 15 July 1802 royal decree the Crown made promises that a significant number of missionaries would be provided for Ocopa but the three groups that came between 1802 and 1805 only totaled forty friars. 519 This was not nearly enough to service the fifty-seven missions and parishes of Maynas, which according to papal decree had to be staffed by at least two missionaries each. 520 By 1816 the manpower situation had become desperate: of the nine missionaries who came in 1797 only two remained, and of the forty from the 1802-1804 groups only fifteen. 521 The College was in fact forced to abandon the monastery at Huánuco because neither had the manpower to maintain the physical facilities nor enough staff to meet the liturgical needs of community. 522 The Cádiz government had recognized the problem too few missionaries at Ocopa, but because of the exigencies of war had few resources to help. In 1813 they asked for the bishops of the Audiencia to give money to Cádiz so that they could send back missionaries, but nothing came of the idea. 523 After the restoration of the monarchy the Crown optimistically promised 100 new missionaries for Ocopa but admitted that it had few funds to pay their journey. 524 The bigger problem, however, was recruitment. It seemed that few friars in war-torn Spain were willing to make the journey to the Americas. The last group to leave in 1818 only consisted of fourteen missionaries, two of which had already served in Ocopa, with one lay friar, who was considered too old

520 Espinoza, Amazonia del Peru, 422-423.
521 Heras, ed., Libro de Incorporaciones, 75-85.
522 Council of the Indies, Letter to the Viceroy of Peru, 28 February 1820, Madrid, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-8, Caja 94, 2rv.
523 Cortes of Cádiz, Royal Order, 2 June 1813, Cádiz, CVU, Papeles Varios Mss. Tomo 24 no 32.
524 Royal decree, 20 July 1816, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1606.
for service.\textsuperscript{525} In 1819 Ocopa’s collector of missionaries in Spain, Friar Joseph Lasala attempted to send another group of sixteen missionaries but complained that he could not find a “national ship” bound for Callao, and that he was force to look for a “neutral” vessel.\textsuperscript{526} The missionaries, however, never left Cádiz. In 1822 Crown officials in Cádiz ordered Lasala to stop collecting missionaries “due to occurrences overseas,” but added in the margin “[only] for now.”\textsuperscript{527}

\textit{The End of Ocopa}

The “occurrences overseas” that had ended the collection of new missionaries was nothing less than the collapse of the Spanish colonial government in most of the Americas. After the restoration of the monarchy, the autonomous governments who had survived the last six years were unwilling to accept Crown rule once again. Their defiance was only solidified by Ferdinand’s attempt to move the colonial government back to a strictly regalist model. While they had never fully accepted the legitimacy of the Cortes of Cádiz, the king’s annulment of the 1812 constitution demonstrated his unwillingness to negotiate a power sharing agreement with Creole elites. In South America, independence movements continued in the viceroyalties of New Granada and Rio de la Plata. As these regions began to win their independence, their leaders begin to

\textsuperscript{525} Fiscal’s Report, 18 April 1818, Madrid, AGI, Lima 1608; List of Missionaries embarking for Peru, 17 March 1818, Cádiz, AGI, Lima 1808.
\textsuperscript{526} Friar José Lasala and Friar Antonio Boria, Letter to Juan Buenventa Bestard, Commissary-general of Indies, 1 April 1819, Cádiz, AGI, Lima 1608.
\textsuperscript{527} Accountant General of Cádiz, Report, 27 November 1822, Cádiz, AGI, Indiferente 2979A.
understand there would be no permanent peace in the continent without removing the royalists from their stronghold in Peru.  

Independence leaders in Buenos Aires were the first to realize the threat Peru posed and as early as 1811 had begun campaigns in Upper Peru (now Bolivia) to dislodge royalist forces. These expeditions, however, met with disaster. Further plans to invade Peru floundered as the independence movement in the Rio de la Plata region fractured. In 1814 one of the movement’s most gifted military generals, José Francisco de San Martín y Matorras, made plans to attack Peru once again. San Martín concluded that the best route to royalist heartland of South America was not through Upper Peru, but Chile. In 1817 he gathered an army of 5,000 men in Mendoza (in what is now Argentina) and from there marched in several columns across the high mountain passes of the Andes Mountains (with the highest almost 12,000 ft.) to surprise, along with their Chilean allies, the royalist army near Santiago. From Chile they launched an expedition to Peru landing in Pisco in September 1820. By July 1821 San Martín captured Lima declaring independence on the 28th of that month.

In an attempt to gain local support, however, San Martín had prolonged his march toward Lima and the delay allowed most of the royalist army to escape to the highlands. Trapped on the coast with arduous task of dislodging a numerically superior force from the Andes, San Martín’s expedition stalled. The general’s problems were further exacerbated by the conservative local elite who remained unconvinced by the

529 Ibid., 137-140.
530 Ibid., 171-173.
cause of independence. Many Creole elites, particularly in the wake of the Tupac Amaru rebellion of the 1780’s, feared that independence could lead to a race war that the indigenous majority of Peru would invariably win. The fact that San Martín’s army consisted mostly of freed blacks and Amerindians did little to calm their anxieties. San Martín’s only hope lie in the other great rebel army in South America led by General Simón Bolívar. Bolívar, over the previous half decade, had liberated all of the Viceroyalty of New Granada (the modern-day nations of Venezuela, Colombia, and Ecuador) from royalist forces. Bolivar and San Martin met in Guayaquil in July 1822. What transpired between the two liberators is unknown, but Bolivar’s victory at Pichincha just a few months before gave him the negotiating advantage. Also, his control of the Ecuadorian Highlands meant that his army was not penned in against the sea and was free to march south and face the Spanish on even terrain. It seems San Martin understood the weakness of his position and agreed (perhaps at Bolivar’s insistence) to leave Peru entirely and give Bolivar command of his army. After almost a year spent gathering strength, in 1824 Bolivar’s army made the arduous journey down the Andean cordillera. On August 6th the liberation army faced royalist forces on the plateau of Junín, only 85 miles (135km) from Ocopa, where they inflicted a major defeat on the royalists, sending the Spanish army into full flight. On December 8th they completed their victory at the battle of Ayacucho, capturing the last viceroy of Peru, José de la Serna y Martínez de Hinojosa.

531 Ibid., 175-187.
532 Ibid., 271-272.
As Bolívar’s army passed through the Mantaro Valley from Junín to Ayacucho, they came upon the College of Ocopa. On 1 November, Bolivar ordered the community suppressed, their goods confiscated, and the missionaries to Lima placed under arrest.\(^{533}\) The Liberator’s heavy-handedness with the friars was probably due to two factors. First, though Ocopa was center of spiritual reflection and learning, the College was also headquarters to a large missionary operation that by the early nineteenth century had a recognizable military component. As late as 1817 the viceregal government had provided the College with arms, 2 canons, 39 rifles, and 6876 Cartridges, to be distributed to their missionary outposts.\(^{534}\) The second, and probably most important, factor was that missionaries were peninsular Spaniards, who would not join the independentist cause. Among the goods confiscated from the College were also 100 ounces of gold and 275 silver pesos, hard currency that was certainly useful to the Liberator’s Army.\(^{535}\)

As a consequence of the suppression, Ocopa’s network of missions completely collapsed. Not all the friars were caught up by Bolivar’s forces. The missionaries along the Ucayali were somehow able to slip away and made their way back to Spain. Those in Huanta followed the Spanish army into Upper Peru and ultimately returned to Europe. One missionary, Manuel Plaza, simply stayed in his mission for twenty years reappearing in Lima in 1844. For such dedicated service, Plaza was made the bishop of Cuenca (in Ecuador). The missionaries caught by the Liberation Army, however, had a humiliating

\(^{534}\) Josef Gomala de Prado, Letter to Friar Timoteo Delgado, Guardian of Ocopa, 21 April 1817, Huánuco, AL-MRREE, LEB 12-16, Caja 94, 17r.
\(^{535}\) Padre Rafael Castro, A list of the goods from Ocopa, signed by Felix Balega, 9 March 1822, AGN, Sección republicana, Ministerio de Hacienda, OL – 57-2; Delgado, Letter to the Minister of Hacienda, 24 June 1825, Jauja, Ministerio de Hacienda, OL – 131-425.
fate. Once they arrived in Lima, they were forced to try to rejoin their fellow Spaniards in the still besieged Real Felipe Fortress in Callao. As the friars crossed the no-man’s-land between the two forces, the starving defenders in the fort began to fire at the missionaries to prevent them from entering. Peruvian officials eventually had pity on friars and allowed them to incorporate into the Franciscan province in Lima instead.  

* * *  

While the College of Ocopa would be reconstituted in 1836, it would never recapture the power and grandeur of its colonial past. During the early nineteenth century Ocopa reached an apogee of territory and resources unparalleled among the religious institutions in the New World. It oversaw, at least in theory, most all of the missions and parishes in the Spanish Amazon and received a staggering stipend from the Crown of nearly 12,000 pesos per year. This was in addition to vast property holding in the Mantaro Valley, and a separate missionary enterprise in Chiloé. This power was, of course, built upon the close relationship that Ocopa had fostered with the State during the latter half of the eighteenth century, and solidified with the election of 1787. Despite challenges to the election, these new leaders of Ocopa became the darling of Bourbon reformers and other “enlightened” thinkers, through their focus on scientific exploration, and, at least outwardly, their emphasis on commerce. These leaders could seemingly do no wrong and persecuted their enemies with impunity.  

This relationship, however, created a dependency which tied Ocopa not just to the fate of Spanish crown, but its whims as well. Had the king selected one of the College’s

---

own as bishop of Maynas, the College may have been able to maintain some autonomy and perhaps some semblance of a missionary program during the Crisis of 1808. As it was, Ocopa was forced to rely on the adjudication of the viceroy who was too busy to care and a Crown bureaucracy in Spain that no longer existed. Therefore even before Bolivar arrived and suppressed the community, Ocopa and its missions were in shambles. As Ocopa pushed the Crown for more resources, it was forced to reconstitute itself in a way that lacked the flexibility necessary to deal with the great changes surging through the Atlantic World during the early nineteenth century and under such pressure ceased to function.
Conclusion

Almost from the initial establishment of the Apostolic Institute in Peru, conditions in the missions allowed more zealous reformers to realize their aspirations for suppressing the regular clergy. For many regalist ministers in Peru anti-clerical policies emanating from Madrid were developing too slowly. The traditional partnership with the Church was deeply entrenched in Spanish law and political culture and since the monarch derived his rule from divine right, he was obligated to support clearly pious endeavors, such as the Ocopa missions. Ministers more hostile to the power of the Church in Peru, like the Marques of Castelfuerte, however, used their distance from the metropolis to curtail the influence of religious institutions. In the case of Ocopa this was made easier by the remote location of the missions themselves as well as their utter dependence on Crown funding. Viceregal ministers in Peru simply ignored demands from Spain to fund the missionaries’ enterprise consistently, only doing so when political pressure from Madrid made it impossible for them to continue their neglect without political ramifications. Problems in the missions were also exacerbated by conditions on the ground. As Ocopa attempted to expand rapidly their missionizing program into the Jauja, Tarma, and Huánuco frontiers, disease and poor soil made establishing permanent missions difficult. In addition, jungle Amerindians resisted the economic, political, and cultural impositions of the friars both by violent rebellions and by simply abandoning
mission towns. These local difficulties further weakened the missionaries’ influence both regionally and at court as they struggled to prove their successes to their patron, the Crown. Thus regalist ministers interested in clerical reform were able to attenuate Ocopa’s political and economic power without attacking them directly, by neglecting their obligations to fund the missions and suppress indigenous unrest.

This trend of regalist ministers using problems on the ground in the missions as political cover to weaken Ocopa reached its peak during the Juan Santos Atahualpa Rebellion. Viceroy Villagarcía continued the example of Castlefuerte by generally trying to neglect Ocopa whenever possible. He let the local militia, for example, handle the initial outbreak of the rebellion rather than sending Spanish regulars out of Lima. Viceroy Manso de Velasco, however, took this neglect a step further, because he eventually began to see Ocopa not only as a rival to royal authority, but possibly treasonous as well. At first, he attempted to recapture the missions as a matter of border security, but after Ocopa began to support the elevation of Friar Calixto Tupac Inca to a full member of the Franciscan Order, his strategic assessment of the situation changed. Manso de Velasco believed that the friar had taken part in the Lima Conspiracy to overthrow his government in 1751 and that in general an ordination of a member of the indigenous elite to the upper echelons of the clergy would be destabilizing to the viceroyalty. Therefore, the viceroy changed his tactics against Juan Santos and simply cordoned off the Jauja and Tarma entradas rather than continue campaigns into the high jungle. He even forbade the friars from entering the region, thereby cutting them off from most of their missions, and severely weakening them politically.
The debate over Manso de Velasco’s actions regarding the rebellion raged for over a decade (most of the 1750’s) as political alliances shifted throughout the Spanish bureaucracy. In Madrid, the rise of Marques of Ensenada, who was Manso de Velasco’s political patron, led to a period of anti-clerical reform as this faction attempted to curtail the power of the regular orders. This atmosphere of anti-clericalism, directed especially against the Franciscans, allowed Manso de Velasco to weaken Ocopa’s enterprise further. Despite renewed promises from the Crown to fund the missions fully and consistently, the viceroy cut their annual stipend in half. Manso de Velasco continued this stance toward the College until after the fall of his patron Ensenada, only returning the funding when it became clear the king’s Franciscan leaning half-brother would soon succeed him to the throne. Thus, the jockeying among various factions within the Bourbon government and in the missions had by the beginning of the 1760’s left Ocopa’s missionary enterprise nearly in ruins.

With the ascension of Charles III, regalist reformers changed the way in which they attempted to curtail the influence of Ocopa. While Charles favored Franciscans, he was a royal absolutist, who demanded the centralization of the political power into the hands of the monarchy, thereby necessitating that outside groups, such as the Franciscans, be stripped of even local control. Given these contradictions and the reality of governing such a vast territory, regalist reformers developed a means of controlling the Franciscans without simply dismantling them as they did with the Jesuits. Through trial and error particularly in northern Mexico but in a sense coming to fruition in Ocopa, reformers were able to weaken the friars’ political influence not through neglect as
before, but through co-optation. On the surface, this meant a boon for Ocopa, especially after the expulsion of the Jesuits as Society land passed to the College. Crown support of men and material increased and payments became more regular. As a result, Ocopa’s missionary enterprise once again flourished. The Amerindians whom the missionaries attempted to draw into their mission stations still resisted, as the case of the Manoa rebellion (1766) demonstrates, but with the College and viceregal government now more unified, such resistance had less of an impact on Ocopa’s enterprise than the Juan Santos Atahualpa rebellion. This largess from the Crown, however, came at a cost. While Ocopa was not forced to submit fully to the “new method” of evangelization as in some parts of Mexico, viceregal officials demanded more and more control over the daily operation of the missions. In addition, they increasingly had to demonstrate the commercial and strategic potential of their missions. In the end viceregal officials were able to gain this previously unprecedented control, not through any royal decree, but because new more regalist missionaries began to populate the College, lead by Francisco Álvarez de Villanueva and the Aragonese faction. The presence of such seemingly reform-minded missionaries in the College caused deep disturbances within the community. These eventually boiled over in the guardian election of 1787 when viceregal officials ousted Ocopa’s old establishment by force of arms in favor of the Aragonese faction.

The 1787 election seemingly ushered in a period great success for the missionaries, but in reality sowed the seeds of their downfall. While some members of Ocopa’s old guard attempted to contest the results of the 1787 election, the Aragonese faction’s new, closer relationship with the viceroy allowed it to receive more benefits
from the Crown. To justify the increased Crown patronage the new leaders emphasized the importance of their missions’ commercial and scientific benefit to the empire in public forums such as the *Mercurio Peruano*. The resulting notoriety in turn led to even more favors from the State. These concessions culminated in granting Ocopa almost exclusive pastoral jurisdiction over the parishes and missions of the newly-created diocese of Maynas, which covered most the Spanish Amazon. The Crown’s concession of Maynas to Ocopa, however, proved to be a serious burden. Ocopa lacked both the resources and manpower to minister to the territory. In addition, the Crown’s ignorance of conditions on the ground in Maynas led to the selection of a non-Ocopa friar as bishop, putting into question exactly who had pastoral control over almost all of Ocopa’s entire missionary enterprise in Peru. In the end, however, it was Ocopa’s close identification with the Crown that doomed them. The missionaries were not only peninsular Spaniards by birth, but over the last few decades the College had allowed itself to be coopted to the point where it was considered an appendage of the Spanish State. The missionaries had been converted from a semi-autonomous political, economic, and cultural entity to a group dependent on the Crown not just for funds but increasingly leadership.

The history of the College of Ocopa underlines the importance of multiple groups and individuals at all levels of society in shaping the larger philosophical, political, and economic changes surging through the Atlantic World during eighteenth and early nineteenth century. While the missionaries had attempted to maintain the traditional partnership with the State that such religious institutions had previously enjoyed, with more or less delineated boundaries of political, economic, and cultural influences, the
proliferation of regalist ideas into the Spanish bureaucracy made this increasingly difficult. The impositions that regalist ministers placed on Ocopa over this period were not part of a "smooth, coherent masterly program of imperial change and revival" formulated by some vaunted quorum of "imperial policymakers." They were dependent on individual interpretations of the enlightenment and regalism in reaction to conditions on the ground in the Americas by groups within the Crown bureaucracy, the Church, and even indigenous and African communities all vying for political and cultural dominance. Though all too often the military and political might of State institutions seemingly won out, as the case of Ocopa well demonstrates, in significant ways these processes were shaped by these interested parties engaged in multiple, reconstituting encounters in Spanish America, and throughout the Atlantic World. What happened in the Atlantic World, therefore, was not driven from the top-down or the bottom up, but by groups at all levels of society, as each sought ways to flourish. For Ocopa the choices they made in face of this milieu of conflict and change, however, ultimately proved disastrous. As the crisis of 1808 caused Spain’s military dominance in America to wane, other groups, namely the Creole elites, reconstituted themselves to fill the void. This left the Ocopa missionaries, quite literally, huddled in a no-man’s-land outside the Real Felipe Fortress with bullets whizzing past their heads, caught between a new nation that did not want them and a kingdom that could no longer protect them.

Bibliography

Manuscripts

Archivo Arzobispal de Lima (Peru) (abbreviated AAL): Sección San Francisco VIII-XIII.

Archivo de Limites, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Lima, Peru (abbreviated AL-MRREE): LEB-3-6, 3-13, 3-25, 3-26, 3-29, 3-30, 11-39, 12-2, 12-4, 12-5, 12-6, 12-8, 12-11, 12-12, 12-14, 12-15, 12-16, 12-17, 12-18, 12-23, 12-24, 12-25, 12-26, 12-28.

Archivo del Convento de Santa Rosa de Ocopa (Santa Rosa, Peru) (abbreviated AO): N. 60, 62, 64, 68

Archivo General de Indias (Seville, Spain) (abbreviated AGI): Arribadas de Cádiz 241, 242, 538, 591; Audiencia de Lima 415, 417, 419, 536-539, 541, 542, 643, 677, 685-687, 703, 763, 764, 808, 834, 881, 882, 982, 983, 988, 994, 1580, 1596, 1606-1612; Contaduría 1770, 1771, 1772, 1870, 1873; Escribanía 527; Indiferente General 962, 1525, 2979A, 2980, 2981; Mapas y Planos, Peru-Chile 32, 33.


Archivo Histórico Nacional (Madrid, Spain) (abbreviated AHN): Codices 41B, 243B.

Archivo Regional de Junín (Huancayo, Peru) (abbreviated ARJ): Protocolos Notariales, Tomos 16-27.

Archivo San Francisco de Lima (Peru) (abbreviated ASFL): Registros 2, 6, 41,42.

Biblioteca de la Real Academia de Historia (Madrid, Spain) (abbreviated RAH): Colección Mata Linares 9-9-3 1680, 1699, 1703-1707, 1731.
Biblioteca Nación de España (Madrid, Spain) (abbreviated BNE): Manuscritos 3107, 3108, 3109, 3112.


Biblioteca Real del Palacio Real (Madrid, Spain) (abbreviated BRPR): II2761, II2875, II3327.

Colección Rubén Vargas Ugarte (Lima, Peru) (abbreviated CVU): Papeles Varios Manuscritos Tomo 11 No.20, Tomo 14 No. 71, Tomo 18 No. 25, Tomo 24 No. 19, Tomo 20 no. 49, Tomo 24 No. 20, Tomo 24 No. 32.

Published Primary Sources


González de Agüeros, Pedro. Clamores Apostólicos dirigidos a todos los religiosos del órden de nuestro padre San Francisco, en estas provincias de España, Solicitando Operarios Evangélicos, zeloso del bien de la almas, se alienen fervorosos á pasar á las Misiones de Indias, para emplearse en la conversión de la Gentiles que habitan en aquellos montes: con advertencias prácticas para los que quieran dedicarse á este Apostólico Ministerio: Y un Estado de la Religion Seráfica en las dos Américas é Islas Filipinas para mejor conocimiento de aquellas partes. Madrid: Oficina de Don Benito Cano, 1791.


**Secondary Literature**


Glave, Luis Miguel. “El Apu Ynga camina de nuevo: Juan Santos Atahualpa y el asalto de Andamarca en 1752.” *Perspectivas Latinoamericanas*, no. 6 (2009), 28-68.


Izaguirre, Bernardino. *Historia de las misiones franciscanas y narración de los progresos de la geografía en el oriente del Perú; relatos originales y producciones en lenguas indígenas de varios misioneros... 1619-1921*. Lima: Talleres tipográficos de la Penitenciaria, 1922-29.


Pallarés, Fernando, Vicente Calvo, and José Amich. Noticias históricas de las misiones de fieles e infieles del colegio de propaganda fide de Santa Rosa de Ocopa. Barcelona: Impr. de Magriña y Subirana, 1870.


286


Riva Agüero, José de la. Los franciscanos en el Perú y las misiones de Ocopa. Barcelona: Tipografía católica Casals, 1930.

Rodríguez Tena, Fernando. Crónica de las misiones franciscanas del Perú, siglos XVII y XVIII. Iquitos, Peru: CETA, 2005.


287
Tibesar, Antonine. “San Antonio de Eneno: a Mission in the Peruvian Montaña,”
*Primitive Man* 25, No. 1/2, 24.


