Perpetuated Hostility in World Politics

-Great Powers, Veto Players, and Maintenance of International Rivalries-

PHD DISSERTATION
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ABSTRACT

My dissertation begins with a simple question “Why international rivalries persist over time?” To explain the causes, I develop “a modified two-level game approach” to rivalry maintenance and test the hypotheses drawn from the explanation for the populations of international rivalries, 1819-2001. The approach postulates that the rivalry maintenance is the result of combination of structural constraints-e.g., security linkage between rivalries and great powers, and the constraint from domestic veto players-plus leaders’ optimization behavior subject to the constraints. At the international level, the approach suggests that the security tie between rivalries and great powers creates a broad external constraint under which the leaders in rivalries cannot resolve their contentious relations on the battlefields. At the domestic level, the heightened partisan infighting between competing veto players creates an internal constraint under which the leaders might be prevented from resolving the rivalries at negotiation tables. These two-level constraints dramatically increase the leaders’ costs of ending rivalries and encourage them to maintain rivalries. My empirical analysis provides considerable support for the argument. The finding offers contribution to the enhanced understanding of the maintenance process in international rivalries.
I lovingly dedicate this dissertation to my father and mother, who supported me each step of the way.
Acknowledgements

My dissertation would not have been possible without the guidance and support of many professors and friends. Special thanks go to Randall Schweller, who has been there every step of the way. Professor Schweller always pushed me to think critically and creatively. His suggestion for improving the key argument was a primary driver of my dissertation. I am fortunate to have him as an advisor. Bear Braumoeller provided excellent advice for improving the entire chapter of statistical analysis. His detailed comment and feedback on statistical approach to the maintenance process of international rivalries helped me both to develop and to test a coherent model of the rivalry maintenance. Daniel Verdier offered helpful suggestions on various aspects of two-level game. I also benefited from lively discussions on the dissertation with many fellow students in the Department of Political Science at the Ohio State University. I would like to thank all of them.
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Chapter 1 Introduction

1. Puzzle

Why do international rivalries persist over a broad period of time? Despite significant changes both in external and internal conditions, an overwhelming majority of rivalries has persisted and there is no hint of the improved relationships of those rivalries. Israel and many Arab states, for example, have been maintaining tight rivalry relationships for almost a half-century (Shlaim 2000). The hostility between South- and North Korea has never faded away although three decades have passed since the end of the Cold War (Cha and Kang 2003). India and Pakistan also has been sustaining one of the most contentious relationships in modern history (Paul 2006). Most recently, Cambodia and Thailand, which have been caught in five decades of hostility, clashed once again over the Preah Vihear temple in 2008. Rivalries thus have still pervaded the world politics.

Maintaining rivalry relationships incurs significant costs to their participants. Countries in rivalries must direct substantial resources, which can be used for other needs, toward dealing with foreign enemies (Goertz, Jones, and Diehl 2005). The vast majority of people in the rivalries also live under constant threat from a foreign enemy (Williams and McGinnis 2001; Mor 1997). Despite such external and internal costs, much enmity in the rivalries continues to exist. What explains this durability of inter-state hostility? What makes these rivalries linger for many decades?
To answer this empirical puzzle, I develop a “modified two-level game approach” to rivalry maintenance. My explanation centers on a simple theoretical intuition that foreign policy elites forge and maintain a specific foreign policy toward foreign enemies within a broader context of international and domestic political constraints. At the international level, my approach posits, the security ties to great powers create an external constraint under which rival states might maintain contentious relations across time by preventing battlefield solutions. At the domestic level, the model suggests, the heightened partisan infighting between hard-line and soft-line veto players create an internal constraint—i.e., a policy gridlock—under which rivals might maintain their conflictual relations across time by preventing negotiation solutions. Given such strong structural constraints at work, the approach claims, the leaders in international rivalries, who seek to strike a balance between nation’s security interest and their personal political interest, opt for rivalry maintenance because it helps to maximize the interests subject to the constraints.

Understanding such entrenched hostility in international relations is important from both a theoretical perspective and a practical one. Theoretically, studying “why” and “how” rivalries persist reveals the causes of deep stability in inter-state hostility. Once established, inter-state hostility is difficult to change because it tends to be conservative and to find ways of defending existing patterns of interactions (McGinnis and Williams 1989, 2001; Leng 2001; Vasquez 2005). But the existing accounts of
international rivalries provides relatively little guidance for understanding such enduring hostility because it focuses on the immediate causes and conditions that affect the likelihood of disputes and war (Diehl and Goertz 2000).

Practically speaking, studying the causes of rivalry maintenance offers valuable insights to the understanding of the ways of ending costly inter-state hostility. My dataset on international rivalries reveals that, despite such deep stability, some rivalries had lasted shorter while others lasted longer. For example, Uganda-Sudan rivalry had lasted only for 7 years while Franco-German rivalry had lasted for 111 years. By exploring under what circumstances rivals either persist or end, my explanation can highlight a condition under which foreign policy makers in rivalries can both design and implement successful termination policies.

I proceed as follow. In the first section, I critically review the literature on the international rivalries with a focus on the strengths and weaknesses of the assumptions that the literature develops. In the second section, I develop a theoretical approach to the maintenance process in international rivalries and generate key hypotheses drawn from the approach. In the third section, I conduct an empirical analysis and present the results of the analysis with substantive interpretation. In the fourth, fifth, and sixth sections, I conduct the case studies of rivalry maintenance and termination by focusing on Greco-Turkish rivalry (1958-2001), Indo-Pakistan rivalry (1947-2001) and Argentine-Chilean
rivalry (1952-1984). In the conclusion, I summarize key findings and discuss the implications of my study for future rivalry research.

2. The Literature on International Rivalry

Scholars of international rivalry devote attention to the relationship between structural shocks and rivalry duration. By borrowing the concept of “punctuated equilibrium” from paleobiology, for instance, Diehl and Goertz assert that states in rivalries rapidly lock into enduring rivalries after massive structural shocks, such as world wars, radical shifts in the balance of power, territorial changes, and domestic political turmoil, and then persist until the rivalries’ rapid demise (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2001). During the lock-in period, they argue that rivalries persist through the failures of military strategies. If two contending rivals fail to settle the dispute militarily, rivalries persist because the issues in dispute are left unresolved and the hard-liners on both sides adopt more coercive strategies (Goertz, Jones, and Diehl 2005). This approach, however, doesn’t explain why rivals frequently fail to resolve the dispute through the use of military forces. It also doesn’t examine how the failure of negotiation or conflict management leads to rivalry persistence.

Some studies present evolutionary models of enduring rivalry dynamics. Hensel (1998, 1999), for example, focuses on the impact of rivals’ past behavior, arguing that the use of military tools rather than diplomatic means to settle previous disputes
creates an atmosphere of distrust and hostility that can culminate in an extended rivalry. Maoz and Mor (1998) synthesize both a strategic-choice approach and an evolutionary model into a “super-game” framework. By focusing attention on a “learning mechanism” operating in rivalries, they argue that “in the absence of exogenous changes, a rivalry stabilizes when both states’ perceptions of the opponent’s preferences are confirmed by the opponents’ behavior and there is no readjustment in the actors’ preferences.” But this approach still treats a rival state as “unitary actor” and does not examine how rivals’ preferences are confirmed and re-adjusted by political bargaining among competing domestic political actors.

Thompson (1998; 2001) calls an attention to socio-psychological aspects of international rivalry dynamics. By criticizing prior studies’ exclusive focus on militarization phase of rivalries, he proposes the concept of “strategic rivalries” by which rivalries are defined a pair of states with roughly equal capabilities which expect hostile behavior from each other. Built upon the concept, Thompson explains the expectations of future threat, equal capabilities, cognitive rigidities, and domestic political process all make rivalries persist over time. But Thompson’s study assumes that international rivalry is inherently a competition over relative power position between the states with equal capabilities, thereby ignoring the fact that rivalries can take place and persist due to the conflict over than relative power position and that they persist over time despite a marked asymmetry in military capabilities.
Colaresi (2005) develops “two-level-pressure” theory in which low expected future costs of rivalry and rivalry outbidding are presented as major causes of rivalry maintenance. The theory predicts that if the leaders’ perceived future costs of rivalry are relatively low and if there is rivalry outbidding process within rival societies in which the public becomes distasteful of a foreign rival due to political elites’ propaganda to justify though foreign policy, rivalry is more likely to persist. While the theory is helpful, it is not without shortcomings. First, the theory little says about why many rivals attempt to terminate their contentious relationships by negotiations even though the expected future cost of rivalry is quite low. Second, Colaresi’s argument of outbidding dismisses the possibility that dovish and hawkish elites will attempt to fight their way rather than to outbid each other and that the infighting between the elites may leads to rivalry maintenance by creating a gridlock at home.

From a rational-choice perspective, Bennett (1997; 1998) integrates both structural and agentic factors in a single model of bargaining over rivalry termination between two states. He argues that if the costs to a state of continuing a rivalry surpass the benefits, the leaders in a rivalry are more likely to make a more favorable settlement each other and, as a result, the rivalry ends by bargaining. If the benefits to a state of continuing a rivalry surpass the costs, in contrast, the leaders are less likely to make a favorable offer and bargaining will collapse, leading to the persistence of a rivalry. Bennett finds that low issue salience, the higher level of democracy and structural shocks
all increase the potential benefits of rivalry termination, thereby increasing the chances of rivalry termination. Bennett’s study, however, exclusively focuses on the causes of rivalry termination and doesn’t explain what kinds of factors increase the potential benefits of continuing a rivalry. The study also doesn’t provide a coherent causal mechanism through which both structural and agentic variables interact with one another to lead to rivalry termination.

In sum, prior studies provide a number of fruitful insights concerning the dynamics of international rivalries. Despite such insights, however, the studies pay disproportionate attention to the causes of rivalry termination, thereby leaving the causes of rivalry maintenance unexplained. Although some study examines the maintenance process of international rivalries, it treats rivalry maintenance only as a result of the failure of military strategies. The impact of the failure of negotiated solution on rivalry maintenance thus receives little attention in the study. With these weaknesses in mind, I develop a comprehensive approach to rivalry maintenance in the next section where both structural and agentic factors are carefully interwoven to explain the process by which rivalries persist through the failure of both military and negotiated solutions.
Chapter 2 Theoretical Framework

1. Modified Two-Level Game Approach to Rivalry Maintenance

In this section, I develop a theoretical argument of rivalry maintenance, which might be called a “modified two-level game approach.” The approach recognizes that prior studies of international rivalries pay little attention to the maintenance process of international rivalries and that even existing study does not explain how the rivalries persist through the failure of both “battlefield” and “negotiated” solutions. As a result, a more nuanced approach needs to be developed for the complete understanding of the process of rivalry maintenance. For this purpose, I interweave existing two-level game approach, neoclassical realism, and theory of veto player into a modified two-level game framework.

Allegedly, the existing two-level game approach examines primarily the issue of whether policy outcomes—e.g., agreements—were possible or impossible in light of domestic constraint (Braumoeller 2006). Borrowing insights from the literature both on neoclassical realism and on veto player theory, however, I modify the approach such that broader “external” and “internal” conditions create two-level constraints under which the leaders in international rivalries must maintain their contentious relationships across time.

At the international level, my approach postulates, the security tie to great powers contributes to rivalry maintenance partly by restoring rough military balance
between rivals and partly by facilitating the great powers’ intervention in the disputes that the rivals produce. At the domestic level, the approach suggests, the head-to-head partisan struggle between competing veto players, which the negotiations for rivalry termination may provoke, leads to a gridlock which prevent rival leaders’ further diplomatic effort to resolve the issues in dispute at negotiation tables. These structural constraints dramatically increase rival leaders’ costs of ending rivalries and encourage them to stay in rivalries. In what follows, I explain the details of my argument and generate the key hypotheses to test the argument.

2. International Political Conditions for Rivalry Maintenance

2-1. Balance of Power and Security Ties in Rivalries

The rich literature of realism suggests that relative power distribution shapes a broad contours and general direction of foreign policy of states. The literature claims that the power distribution sets the parameter how states define their interests and pursue particular ends (Schweller 2009; Lobell et al., 2009; Rose 1997).

Applied to international rivalries, balance of power between rivals plays a key role in the maintenance of rivalries by affecting rival leaders’ ability and willingness to continue contentious relations each other. When the rivals are roughly equal in power and neither is about to weaken, the leaders in the rivalries are more likely to define their interests in a zero-sum term and less likely to give up their effort to pursue the interests
through the use of coercive strategy. As a result, the contentious relationships between equal rivals become the most intractable ones (Paul 2006; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Geller 1993). If the power differential between rivals is exceptionally high, in contrast, rivalries are more likely to end. Expecting the cost of continuing military competition against the stronger side to be extremely high, the leaders in the weaker side will give up the competition and compromise the issues under contention through negotiations.

But it should be noted that a rivalry can persist despite marked power imbalance (Diehl and Goertz 2001; Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2006, Paul 2006). India-Pakistan rivalry, for example, has survived almost half century despite their marked power asymmetry (Paul 2006). North Korea also had maintained highly contentious relationship with much stronger South Korea although almost 20 years have passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Cha and Kang 2003). Table 1 summarizes how prevalent unequal rivalries are in world politics.
Table 1. Balance of Power in Rivalry Dyads, 1891-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th># of Dyadic Years</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unequal Dyads</td>
<td>5101</td>
<td>85.1 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equal Dyads</td>
<td>897</td>
<td>14.9 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5998</td>
<td>100 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data derives from the Correlates of War Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (v4.0).

As Table 1 briefly shows, unequal rivalries pervade in world politics. Almost 85 percent out of total rivalry dyads being studied are “unequal” while only 15 percent of the dyads are “equal.” It might be argued that the rivals with asymmetrical capabilities are more likely to die out before their hostility becomes entrenched. Nevertheless, Table 1 strongly suggests that unequal rivalries are possible.

The major reason that unequal rivalries persist across time is because the weaker side in a rivalry is able to militarily compete with the stronger side through the security ties to great powers (Kapur 2005; Vasquez 2005). Alliance and informal alignment to the great power patrons not only allow the weaker side to build their

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1 Based on much prior work on balance of power (Moul 2003; Geller 1993; Hegre 2008; Reed, Clark, Nordstrom and Hwang 2008), I code rivalry dyad “equal” if the ratio of power capabilities held by the stronger side versus the weaker side is less or equal to 1.5 “equal” and “unequal” otherwise. Data on national capability derives from the Correlates of War’s Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC).
military capabilities through the arms transfer and military aid from the patrons, but also help it to counter the military threats from the stronger side. Such security tie in turn leads to counter-alliance between the stronger side and other great powers, which lead to a substantial hardening of their rivalry relationships (Vasquez 2005).

At their zenith of hostility, therefore, an overwhelming majority of rivals have developed complicated security ties to great powers. In the early 20th century, for example, Austria-Hungary formed the Triple alliance with Germany and Italy to balance France while France formed the Triple entente with Great Britain and Russia to counter the alliance (Schroeder 1989). During the Cold War, Israel made a comprehensive informal security ties with the U.S., which resulted in Egypt’s decision to make a formal defense pact with the Soviet Union. Such trend has not changed much since the end of the Cold War. South Korea and Taiwan have consistently maintained the security ties to the United States to counter the threats from North Korea and China while North Korea-China ally has remained strong. Table 2 presents a summary of the security ties between great powers and rivalries in different time periods.
Table 2. Security Ties between Rivalries and Great Powers, Various Periods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All Rivalry Dyads</th>
<th>Before Cold War</th>
<th>During Cold War</th>
<th>After Cold War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One Tie</td>
<td>950 (15.8 %)</td>
<td>176 (8.4 %)</td>
<td>653 (22.7 %)</td>
<td>121 (11.4 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two Ties</td>
<td>1164 (19.3 %)</td>
<td>213 (10.2 %)</td>
<td>682 (23.7 %)</td>
<td>269 (25.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over Two Ties</td>
<td>1631 (27.1 %)</td>
<td>798 (38.2 %)</td>
<td>573 (19.9 %)</td>
<td>260 (24.6 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Any Ties</td>
<td><strong>3745 (62.2 %)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1187 (56.8 %)</strong></td>
<td><strong>1908 (66.4 %)</strong></td>
<td><strong>650 (61.5 %)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Tie</td>
<td>2277 (37.8 %)</td>
<td>902 (43.2 %)</td>
<td>968 (33.6 %)</td>
<td>407 (38.5 %)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>6022 (100 %)</td>
<td>2089 (100 %)</td>
<td>2876 (100 %)</td>
<td>1057 (100 %)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The data derives the Correlates of War Formal Alliance dataset (v3.03). The number of great power ties is calculated at dyadic level.

Table 2 shows that almost 62% of rivalry dyads in 1819-2001 represent the security tie to at least one of great powers. During the Cold War, roughly 66% of rivalry dyads represent the security tie to at least one of great powers. Even after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, 62% of rivalry dyads represent the security tie to at least one of great powers. Hence, the security ties to the great powers have pervaded international rivalries.

The security tie to great powers and corresponding rough military balance between rivals structure the external condition such that the leaders in rivalries might
have a constant incentive to militarize the issues in dispute. Given the constant supplies of weapons and military aid, the leaders in rivalries would have an inflated hope that they could achieve a decisive military victory on the battlefields and monopolize control of the issues in dispute. Thus, military dispute in the rivalries tend to continue until one or both sides gain satisfaction through the use of military force, leading to the persistence of the rivalries. Vasquez (2005), in his analysis of the durability of Indo-Pakistan rivalry, wrote as follows:

“The repeated crises and the interaction of alliances and military buildups play a crucial role in orienting both sides toward emphasizing real-politk thinking and possible windows of opportunity and vulnerability.”... “Every one of the three wars after the First Kashmir War can be seen as being initiated when one side thinks it has an edge that it did not have before.”

In brief, the security tie to great powers and corresponding rough military balance between rivals structure the external condition such that the leaders in rivalries might have a constant incentive to militarize the issues in dispute. Given the constant supplies of weapons and military aid, the leaders in rivalries would have an inflated hope that they could achieve a decisive military victory on the battlefields and monopolize control of the issues in dispute. Thus, military dispute in the rivalries tend to continue until one or both sides gain satisfaction through the use of military force, leading to the persistence of the rivalries.

2-2. Security Ties and the Failures of Battlefield Solutions
Another reason that the security ties to great powers lead to rivalry maintenance is that the great powers often prevent rivals from resolving the issues in dispute on the battlefields. The military dispute in rivalries always entails a risk that it could escalate to all-out war, and the great power patrons, which are clearly aware of the risk, have a strong incentive to prevent the dispute from getting out of control. If the dispute escalates to a full-scale war, they have to come to aid for their clients and major war between the great powers is inevitable. Knowing such risk, therefore, the great powers intervene in the rivals’ military conflict with an intense diplomatic campaign. Such intervention, however, makes it extremely difficult for the rivals to resolve their contentious issues on the battlefields.

The example concerning the failure of battlefield solutions in rivalries due to the intervention by great power patrons abounds. UK, for instance, had actively engaged in the military disputes between France and Germany in the 19th century, fearing that the major war between the two historical rivals would lead both to a collapse of balance of power and to consequential total war in Europe (Schroeder 1985). As a result, the two rivals were not able to terminate their contentious relationship on the battlefields. During the 1974 Cyprus War, the United States placed strong diplomatic pressure on the leaders in the two NATO allies-i.e., Greece and Turkey, not to escalate the war. The intervention deterred the two rivals’ further military efforts and, as a result, the Cyprus dispute was left unresolved despite the war (Bahcheli 1990).
If rivals link their security fate to two nuclear superpowers—i.e., the United States and the Soviet Union, their contentious relationships are the most likely to persist over time. Deeply concerned about the risk that the dispute between the rivals might lead to nuclear calamity in which they would be involved, the nuclear powers would push harder the rivals to stop fighting and to return to the status quo ante. As a result, it will be much harder for the rivals having the security ties with the nuclear superpowers to end their hostility on the battlefields. Gaddis wrote about a stabilizing effect of the nuclear power intervention as follows:

There were no simple mechanisms to put a lid on escalation: to force each nation to balance the short-term temptation to exploit opportunities against the long-term danger that things might get out of hand. The nuclear deterrent provides that mechanism today, and as a result the United States and the Soviet Union have successfully managed a whole series of crises that grew out of the actions of neither but that could have involved them” (Gaddis 1986, p. 122).

Indo-Pakistan disputes vividly show how the security ties to nuclear great powers make a rivalry persist over time. Concerned about the danger of a total war in which they would have been involved, the United States and the Soviet Union have intervened in nearly every dispute between the two rivals from the second Kashmir War and the most recent Kargil War. The two nuclear powers consistently forced the two warring parties to resist widening the conflict and to reach a ceasefire agreement (Ganguly 2001). These interventions made it prohibitively expensive for the leaders on
both side to continue military operations and, as a result, the two rivals had to return to the status quo ante.

To summarize, the security tie between rivals and great powers is a major external cause of rivalry maintenance. The tie makes rivalries persist over time through two mechanisms. First, the arms transfer and military assistance from great power patrons allow rivals to restore rough military balance and to renew military conflict over time by creating inflated hope of military success. Second, the security ties to great powers make rivalries persist by preventing the rivals from resolving the issues in dispute on the battlefields. Fearing that any military dispute between the heavily armed rivals would escalate to a full-scale war, the great powers often intervene in the dispute and force mediation. If nuclear great powers act as the security patrons for the rivals, they will press the rivals “harder” to avoid nuclear calamity. The interventions dramatically increase the rivals’ costs to continue the military dispute and encourage them to return to the status quo ante. The contentious relations between the rivals thus persist through the failure of battlefield solutions. The argument leads to the following hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1

Power imbalance between two rival states increases the probability of rivalry termination.

Hypothesis 2-1

The security tie between rivals and great powers decreases the probability of rivalry termination, leading to longer rivalries
Hypothesis 2-2

The security tie between rivals and “nuclear” great powers decreases the probability of rivalry termination, leading to longer rivalries.

Hypothesis 3

Nuclear power tie is more likely to decrease the probability of rivalry termination than great power tie.

3. Domestic Political Condition for Rivalry Maintenance

3-1. Foreign Policy Leadership and Veto Players in Rivalries

Rivals often try their luck at negotiated solutions. The mounting costs and sobering effect from military confrontation in particular encourage foreign policy leadership in rivalries to play a diplomatic card for ending hostility (Morey 2011). But the probability that two rivals end their contentious relationship by negotiations depends primarily on how domestic political power is shared by competing political groups. How the power is shared affects whose preferences are most likely to dominate policy making (Milner 1997).

Of crucial importance in this regard are the numbers and preference differences between domestic veto players. Veto players are partisan actors whose agreement is needed to alter existing policies. It follows that a change in the status quo of a policy requires a unanimous decision of all veto players. Tsebelis (2002), in his pioneering work,
demonstrates that the probability of making policy change decreases as the number of veto players increases, and as their preference diverges. Policy adherence to the status quo thus becomes more likely as the number of veto players increases and their preferences diverges. Following this logic, I make an argument that the probability of making foreign policy change in rivalries decreases as the number of veto players increases, and as their policy preference diverges.

Major veto players across international rivalries are foreign policy leadership—(i.e., the president and prime minister), ruling and opposition parties in the lower and upper houses in legislative body. These veto players develop and consolidate their policy preference toward a foreign rival relying on the predisposition that they develop and consolidate over the course of a rivalry. Domestic groups possessing a predisposition to be adamant in not compromising with a rival are “hard-line” veto players while the groups having a predisposition to pursue compromise with the rival are “soft-line” veto players” (Vasquez 1993). Hard-line groups tend to emphasize the coercive aspect of power politics and downplay the utility of diplomatic settlement. Soft-line groups, in contrast, are major critics of hard-liners and advocate a foreign policy through compromise.

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2 Veto players exist in all types of regimes. Even in non-democratic systems of government, politics is rarely a pure hierarchy with a unitary decision maker. Only in highly autocratic setting, government degenerates into a unit veto system where strongmen monopolize decision making. For the details on the relationship between veto players and regime type, see Edward Mansfield, Helen Milner and Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy, Veto Players ad the Dept of Regional Integration,” World Economy Vol. 31, Issue 1 (2008), pp. 71-73.
Foreign policy leadership’s capability to initiate, negotiate, and implement any policy toward foreign rival depends primarily on the number and preferences of these veto players. If governments are composed of multiple veto players or blocs that share control over foreign policy and if their policy preferences diverge, the leadership will likely have great difficulty with forming an agreement for policy toward foreign rival. Built upon the diverging preferences, the competing veto players will fight one another to push the foreign policy leadership to pursue the policy that they prefer. If governments are composed of small number of veto players or blocs and the policy preferences between the veto players are relatively homogeneous, however, the leadership will more likely come to agreement for the policy. Under this circumstance, the policy is more likely to change from the status quo.

3-2. Veto Players, Policy Gridlock and the Failure of Negotiated Solutions

The negotiations for ending a rivalry between two contending states often provoke severe political struggle between competing veto players at home. If governments consist of multiple veto players whose policy preferences are diverged along the line of “continued confrontation” and “compromise through negotiation,” inter-group competition over rivalry termination is inevitable. The soft-line groups, which prefer negotiated solution, would join the leadership and push forward the compromise. The hard-line veto players, in contrast, will depict the leadership’s effort as “premature”
and “treacherous” and attempt to block the negotiation for the compromise (Colaresi 2004, 2005; Hensel 1998, 1999; Vasquez 1993). As a result, domestic politics within rival societies degenerates into a head-to-head partisan struggle between the competing veto groups.

The heightened partisan struggle over the issues of rivalry termination through negotiations creates a syndrome of ill effect within governments-i.e. a gridlock. The veto groups with the hard-line preferences over the termination would try to circumvent the powers of the soft-line groups, vice versa. Such struggle creates a gridlock in which no group can pursue its preferred policy unilaterally and an agreement for rivalry termination is hard to reach. Under this circumstance, the leadership would believe that any further diplomatic action is more costly than inaction. As a result, the leadership decides to return to the status quo, leading to rivalry maintenance.

The example that leaders in rivals failed to terminate their contentious relationships through negotiations due to domestic veto constraint abounds. The 1977 diplomatic effort to settle all agreements through negotiation between Egypt and Israel failed largely because of the policy deadlock that the leaders on both sides faced. The issue of compromise between the two rivals generated a heated partisan infighting between the pragmatists and hard-line groups and a corresponding policy deadlock on both sides. Under this circumstance, the two rival leaders had to abandon their efforts to build peace by negotiation (Shlaim 2000). During the Tashkent peace process, Indian and
Pakistani leaders also had to abandon their effort to settle the Kashmir dispute at negotiation tables because the zero-sum struggle between the hard-line and soft-line groups created a severe policy deadlock on both sides (Edwardes 1966).

Given the different level of veto constraint between two rivals, however, it can be argued that rivalry persistence can result from the actions of a single state that is more constrained by domestic veto players. The leadership in the rival with the higher veto constraint will be less capable of initiating, bargaining, and carrying out the policy of compromise than the leadership with the lower veto constraint. Under this circumstance, the more constrained rival drives rivalry maintenance.3 One recent example is the failure of diplomatic compromise between Greece and Turkey in 1997. Alarmed by the danger of a full-scale war during the Imia-Kardak crisis, the leaders on both sides decided to settle all contested issues through negotiations. Such diplomatic effort, however, achieved little largely because of Turkey’s passivity. During the negotiations, the Motherland Party (ANAP)-led coalition was completely divided between the ANAP’s soft-liners and Democratic Left Party (DSP)’s hard-liners and any agreement on the compromise was impossible (Athanassopoulou 1997). The zero-sum partisan infighting

3 This is a variant of the weak-link principle which has widely been accepted in the literature of democratic peace. The key point in the weak link hypothesis is that the likelihood of conflict depends primarily on how strong the constraints are on the less constrained state in each pair. Modifying and applying this logic to rivalry maintenance, I make an argument that the probability of rivalry termination depends on how strong the constraints from veto players are on the more constrained state in each rivalry pair. For the details on this hypothesis, see Bruce Russett and Johan Oneal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001), p. 99.
between these opposite blocs thus created a severe deadlock in the Turkish national assembly, and as a result Turkish Prime Minister Yılmaz decided to abandon his effort to craft a comprehensive compromise agreement with Greece (Athanassopoulou 1997).

In sum, domestic veto constraint makes rivalries last longer through the failure of negotiated solutions. The negotiations for rivalry termination often creates head-to-head partisan infighting between competing veto players, notably between hard-line and soft-line groups within rivals’ societies and the infighting creates a severe policy gridlock in governments. Under this circumstance, the leadership in the rivalry would believe that any further diplomatic action is more costly than inaction. If the infighting occurs on both sides, the leaders’ cost for ending rivalry through the negotiations increases simultaneously and the rivalry persist by their joint action. If the two rivals have the different level of veto constraint, the leaders with the higher veto constraint have greater cost for ending the rivalry by the negotiations and will likely drive the maintenance of the rivalry. The argument leads to a set of hypotheses as follows.

Hypothesis 4
The greater level of veto constraint in rivalry dyads decreases the probability of rivalry termination, leading to longer rivalries.

Hypothesis 5
The rival with the higher veto constraint decreases the probability of rivalry termination, leading to longer rivalries.
3-3. Shocks, Veto Players and the Failure in Negotiated Solutions

The leaders in rivalries may face a more favorable condition for compromise through negotiations if structural shocks destabilize entrenched hostility. The shocks may open up new opportunities for the compromise by changing the environment such that one side in a rivalry cannot compete with the other side. Scholars of international rivalries have argued that systemic wars, territorial change, power distribution shock, and a series of state shocks such as democratization, regime change, and civil war contribute to rivalry termination over a long period (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Bennett 1997, 1998; Rasler 2004; Thompson 2004).4

Both World War I and II, for example, drastically changed security environment in Western Europe so that many rivalries ended by facilitating the collapse of many antagonistic regimes (Vasquez 1993). The disintegration of the Soviet Union also pushed many communist regimes to compromise with their long-standing rivals by weakening the regimes’ military standing (Thompson 2004; McGinnis and Williams 1991). The democratization in Argentina encouraged Chilean leaders and their Argentine counterparts to terminate their decades-long hostility (Pariah Jr. 2004) while bloody civil

4 Scholars, however, diverge on the length of time period that the shocks may have effects on rivalry termination. For example, Diehl and Goertz (2000) claim that rivalries have their last dispute and end their contentious relationships in the 10-year period after a political shock. Bennett (1998), in contrast, argues that the effect of the shocks may diffuse over a longer period and that rivalries are more likely to terminate with the 20 years of the shocks. In order to assess the substantive effect of the shocks on rivalry termination, my analysis includes the shock variable with the time lag from “1” to “20” years and estimate the effect of the shocks with a set of explanatory variable.
war in Somalia contributed to sharp decline of rivalry hostility with Ethiopia (Colaresi 2005).

Yet, it should be noted that structural shocks rarely force the leaders in rivalries into the adoption of the compromise over continued hostility due to the domestic political hurdles that the shocks create. If the leaders seeking the compromise at the negotiation table against the backdrop of the shocks, hard-line veto players will depict the leaders as “traitor” or “appeaser” and will attempt to derail their peace initiative (Colaresi 2004, 2005; Hensel 1998, 1999; Thompson 2004). Yet the soft-line groups, which increase their influence against the shocks, will try to circumvent the hard-line voice and to push the leadership for moving forward with the compromise. The inter-group competition under the shocks thus degenerates into an “institutional warfare” in which an agreement on the compromise between the veto groups is severely blocked. When the leaders on both rivals experience such warfare at home, therefore, the chance of rivalry compromise by negotiations will sharply decline in spite of the shocks.

One example is the collapse of the agreement of economic and political integration between Argentina and Chile in the late 1960s. Against the backdrop of the democratization underway since the mid 1950s, Argentina’s President Frondizi and his Chilean counterpart Alessandri initiated a joint peace process to resolve the disagreements between the two rivals. In 1959 Frondizi visited Santiago, and the two leaders agreed to economic and political integration and arbitration to resolve border
problems, followed by a declaration agreeing to British arbitration on the Beagle Channel. But the peace process accomplished little because of the formidable political hurdles that the two leaders faced at home. Embraced territorial nationalism and chauvinism based on the idea of “stolen patrimony,” nationalist politicians and military on both sides coalesced into hard-line blocs and waged partisan warfare against the accommodationists, leading to a severe policy deadlock within governments. As a result, the two leaders were prevented from implementing the agreements (Pariah Jr 2004).

As discussed in the previous section, it also can be argued that given the different level of veto constraint between two rivals, the rival with the higher veto constraint will likely drive rivalry maintenance although the shocks create some opportunities for the negotiated termination of rivalry. The leadership with the higher veto constraint will be less capable of initiating, bargaining, and carrying out the policy of compromise even though the shocks destabilize entrenched rivalry hostility. One recent example is South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung’s failure to compromise with North Korea. His “Sunshine Policy,” which emerged against the backdrop of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, failed primarily due to South Korea’s inability to carry out the 2000 South-North Joint Declaration. The declaration provoked an institutional warfare between the dovish ruling party and an opposition coalition of two conservative parties in South’s national assembly and, as a result, the policies aimed at implementing the declaration were completely deadlocked (Thompson 2004).
In brief, the structural shocks, which might destabilize entrenched hostility between rivals, do not automatically lead to rivalry termination if domestic condition within the rival states is not ripe for it. The institutional warfare, which the partisan struggle between the competing veto players with the divergent preference over the compromise generates against the backdrop of the shocks, often creates a severe deadlock, thereby dramatically increasing leaders’ bargaining costs. As a result, the leaders will be prevented from taking further diplomatic action and rivalry will persists despite the structural shocks. The arguments lead to following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 6

Structural shocks increase the probability of rivalry termination over a long period.

Hypothesis 7

The greater level of veto constraint in rivalry dyads decreases the probability of rivalry termination, controlling for structural shocks.

Hypothesis 8

The rival with the higher veto constraint decreases the probability of rivalry termination, controlling for structural shocks.
Chapter 3 Statistical Analysis

1. Population and Dependent Variable

I analyze a population of all international rivalries from 1819-2001 using Klein, Goertz, and Diehl’s (2006) new rivalry dataset. The updated dataset treats a rivalry as a particular dyad in which three or more militarized disputes occurs between the same two states. The new dataset takes a more qualitative approach by identifying rivalries primarily based on the interrelation of issues across repeated conflict. Several MIDs between two states only signals the existence of a rivalry when there are common issues at stake that link each instance of conflict together. Using Klein, Goertz and Diehl’s dataset, I generate 290 international rivalries between 1819 and 2001. I assume that the end of the last MID is the last behavioral manifestation of rivalry, and consider the rivalry to have ended in the 10 years after this time and still survive otherwise (Klein, Goertz and Diehl, 2006). The dependent variable is a count of years until a rivalry ends.

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5 Determining exact dates of termination is a difficult task. Given the absence of objective criteria by which the dates for rivalry termination can be identified, the scholars of international rivalries diverge on the ways to determine when a rivalry is terminated. While Diehl and Goertz (2000) and Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) treat the absence of a militarized dispute at least for 10 years since the last militarized dispute “behavior manifestation” of the resolution of rivalry hostility, Thompson argues that rivalries ceases to exist only when political elites between rivals do not perceive with each other enemy any longer. Since rivalry is by nature a militarized competition between two contending states, I use KGD’s definition of rivalry termination.
2. Explanatory Variables

2-1. Levels of Veto Constraint

For the measurement of the levels of veto constraint, I utilize Henisz’s POLCON V dataset (Henisz 2002). Built upon a simple spatial bargaining model in which both the executive and the legislature bargains over an issue, Henisz calculates the levels of constraints when other political actors are neither completely aligned with nor completely independent from the executive. If the same party controls the executive and the legislative chamber and if the probability of two random draws from the legislature belonging to different parties is quite low, the level of veto constraint declines. If the executive relies on a heavily fractionalized coalition in which the probability that any two random draws were from different parties is high, the level of veto constraint increases. In the case where the opposition controls the legislature the values would be reversed (Henisz 2002).

The resulting measure of veto constraint is a continuous variable ranging from 0 to 1. When veto \( i \) and veto \( j \) equals 0, there is no veto constraint in rival \( i \) or \( j \) and the executive becomes a “unit” veto player. Higher values indicate the presence of effective veto players of government to balance the chief executive. Henisz’s measure is well suited to testing my hypotheses because it is theoretically derived from a single-dimensional, spatial model of policy choice that allows the status quo and the preferences
of veto players to vary across the entire space (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2008).

I develop and include two measures of veto constraint. First, the product of veto constraint in rival $i$ and rival $j$, which is denoted veto$_i \times$ veto$_j$, is included to test the effect of veto constraint at the dyadic level on the hazards of rivalry termination. By modifying the logic of the “weak-link” principle, I also include the higher value of the two monadic values of veto constraint in rival $i$ and $j$, which is denoted veto$_{H}$, to test a hypothesis that the rival state with the higher veto constraint makes rivalries last longer. I expect a positive coefficient on these two variables.

2-2. Power Ratio

Following the logic of the balance of power, I test a hypothesis that dyadic military balance between two rival states makes rivalries last longer while imbalance make them last shorter. For the measurement of the military balance in the rivalries, I use the COW composite capabilities index. It is composed, in equal weights, of a country’s share of the international system’s total population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel production, military manpower, and military expenditures. The variable power ratio is the logarithm of the ratio of the stronger state’s capability index to that of the weaker state. I use the logarithm of the power ratio because having more and more power brings only declining marginal gains (Russett and Oneal 2001).
2-3. Great Power Tie

The variable “great power tie” is created to test a hypothesis that security ties to great powers make rivalries last longer. The definition of great powers derives from the Correlates of War’s concept of major powers. Eight great powers, e.g., United Kingdom (1816-2001), France (1816-1940/1945-2001), Austria-Hungary (1816-1943), Prussia/Germany (1816-1918/1925-1945/1991-2001), Italy (1860-1943), Russia/Soviet Union (1816-1917/1922-2001), Japan (1895-1945 / 1991-2001), the United States (1898-2001), and China (1950-2001), are included as “great powers” in 1816-2001. The security ties data derives from the Correlates of War alliance dataset (version 3.03). The COW alliance dataset provides all formal interstate alliance, such as “defense pact,” “non-aggression pact,” and “entente,” from 1816 to 2001. A rivalry dyad is coded “0” if neither rival \( i \) nor \( j \) in a given dyad is tied to any of the great powers. The dyad is coded “1” if either of rival \( i \) and \( j \) is tied to one of the great powers” and coded “2” if both rival \( i \) and \( j \) are tied to at least one great power, respectively.\(^6\) I expect a positive coefficient on this variable.

I also create the variable security tie to “nuclear great power” to test a hypothesis that security ties to nuclear great powers make rivalries last longer. The nuclear great powers derive from the COW concept of major powers. I consider these

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\(^6\) As an alternative measure of the level of security tie, I sum up the number of all great powers having security tie to rivalries. I take the logged values of this indicator to minimize the impact of extreme values and to reflect the expectation that the marginal effects of great power ties decline as its number increases.
major powers as nuclear great powers when they conducted the 1\textsuperscript{st} nuclear weapon test; the United States (1945); the Soviet Union (1949); UK (1952); France (1960); China (1964). A rivalry dyad is coded “0” if neither rival \(i\) nor \(j\) in a given dyad is tied to any of nuclear great powers. The dyad is coded “1” if either of rival \(i\) and \(j\) is tied to one of nuclear great powers” and coded “2” if both rival \(i\) and \(j\) are tied to at least one nuclear great power, respectively. I expect a positive coefficient on this variable.

2-4. Structural Shocks

To measure impact of various kinds of structural shock on the hazards of rivalry termination, I create a set of dummy variables marking whether that type of occurred in given rivalry dyad. With regards to external structural shocks, the dichotomous variables of “world wars,” “territorial shock,” and “power distribution shock” are created. World war years are 1914-1918 and 1935-1945. Territorial shocks occur during the periods 1845-1849, 1884-1894, 1898-1903, and 1952-1962. Power distribution shocks occurred during 1859-1877 and 1989-2001(Bennett 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000).

Domestic political shocks are measured by dummy variables marking whether democratization, adverse regime change, and civil war occur in a given rivalry dyad. Democratization is measured by a dummy variable marking whether a “six point or greater” increase in Polity VI score occurs in a given year while regime change is measured by a dummy variable marking whether a “six-point or greater” decrease in the
Polity IV score occurs in a given dyadic year, lagged by 1 year (Marshall and Jagger 2004). All data comes from Polity IV data set. Civil war is measured by using the Correlates of War intra-state wars data set (version 4.0). I take only the civil wars that have generated at least “1,000” battle-related fatalities during the periods of civil violence into consideration (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Bennett 1998).

To estimate the combined effect of these structural shocks, I also create the “all shocks” variable. The variable is the sum of the values of each structural shock. Reflecting Diehl and Goertz (1995; 2000)’s argument that shocks’ effect is diffuse and operate over a long period, I include the all shocks variable with a 10-year lag.

3. Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for all of the variables are presented in Table 3. The sample is comprised of all rivalry dyads during the period from 1819-2001. As noted previously, the definition of rivalries and the dates for both beginning and termination of the rivalries derive from Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006)’s updated list of international rivalries.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics on Key Variables in International Rivalries, 1819-2001

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Obs</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. Dev.</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>34.654</td>
<td>22.015</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Censor</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>0.618</td>
<td>0.486</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Tie</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>0.810</td>
<td>0.729</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power (sum)</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>1.834</td>
<td>2.276</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power (logged sum)</td>
<td>3745</td>
<td>0.853</td>
<td>0.657</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Power Tie</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>0.538</td>
<td>0.700</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_i$</td>
<td>5583</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.300</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_j$</td>
<td>5581</td>
<td>0.157</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_i$ + Veto$_j$</td>
<td>5291</td>
<td>0.412</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_i$ × Veto$_j$</td>
<td>5291</td>
<td>0.039</td>
<td>0.122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.731</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_H$</td>
<td>5289</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Wars</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.220</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terri Shock</td>
<td>6022</td>
<td>0.147</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Shock</td>
<td>6017</td>
<td>0.215</td>
<td>0.411</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Change</td>
<td>5681</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.148</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratization</td>
<td>5681</td>
<td>0.023</td>
<td>0.150</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>5992</td>
<td>0.191</td>
<td>0.437</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks</td>
<td>5646</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t, t}$</td>
<td>5645</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t, 5}$</td>
<td>5641</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t, 10}$</td>
<td>5636</td>
<td>0.650</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t, 15}$</td>
<td>5631</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t, 20}$</td>
<td>5626</td>
<td>0.649</td>
<td>0.691</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 3 briefly summarizes, there has been a total of “290” international rivalries between 1819 and 2001. A total of dyadic years of international rivalries is “6022.”
Duration time is measured for each rivalry either until the rivalry ends or until 2001 is reached. If 2001 is reached before a rivalry ends, then the end of the rivalry is unobserved and censoring occurs. In my data set, almost 60 percent of cases (“3721” out of 6022) experience censoring. Event history analysis specified below treats these censored cases as having duration at least as long as the observed time. The mean duration of the rivalries is approximately “35” years. The longest rivalry duration is “111” years while the shortest one is “1” year.

4. Model Specification

4-1. Event History Analysis

I use event history analysis or survival analysis to test the hypotheses that my theoretical arguments generate. The premise of event history analysis is to model both the duration of time spent in the initial state and the transition to a subsequent state, that is, event (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004). In the context of international rivalries, therefore, the event history analysis models both the duration time of rivalries and the transition to another state—i.e., rivalry termination.

In my analysis, it is assumed that rivalries have an observable length or duration from onset until they terminate or the collection of data end. The “time of rivalry onset” provides a natural baseline and the “length of time,” that passes between the time

7 2001 is the year of last observation.
of rivalry onset and the time of rivalry termination, is the “survival time” or the “duration
time.” The rivalries, which not experience a termination by the last observation period are
known as “right censored” observations. The event history analysis treats the
observations that are right censored as having duration at least as long as the observed
time.

The event history analysis focuses on modeling the “hazard rate” which refers
to the “instantaneous probability” that an event will occur after duration $t$, given they
have survived until $t$ (Bennett 1998). In the context of international rivalries, therefore,
the analysis gives the instantaneous probability that a rivalry termination will occur after
duration $t$, given they have survived until $t$.

When it comes to explanatory variables, the event history analysis treats the
variables as “having values that change over time” or “time on the hazard rates.” These
variables are called “Time-Varying Covariates” (TVCs). The traditional OLS model
implicitly assumes that all covariates are time-invariant. By allowing the covariates to
change with time, however, the event history analysis provides information about how
the risk of an event occurrence changes in relations to change in the value of the time-
varying covariates (Box-Steffensmeier & Jones, 2004).

4-2. Specification of Functional Form
Scholars of event history analysis differ in the strengths and weaknesses of various kinds of hazard models. Some research suggests that a Weibull specification is better at modeling rivalry process because it takes account into duration dependence which is suspected to exist in the process of international rivalries (Bennett 1998). Some research, in contrast, argues that a particular probability distribution for the duration in international rivalries is unknown and the Cox model is better suited for modeling the process of rivalry duration (Prins and Daxecker 2007). I utilize a Weibull model because there is substantial evidence that the hazard rate in international rivalries is increasing monotonically with respect to time (Bennett 1997, 1998; Cioffi-Revilla 1998). If such evidence exists, a Weibull model is appropriate because it parameterizes the baseline hazard as “monotonically increasing” with the respect to time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Without any covariates, the form of the hazard function using a Weibull distribution is:

\[ h(t) = \lambda t^{p-1} \quad t > 0, \lambda > 0, p > 0 \]

The parameter \( \lambda \) on the right hand side of the model is a positive scale parameter and \( p \) is a shape parameter, which accounts for duration dependence. When \( p=1 \), the hazard rate is not time dependent, and the process had no duration dependence, and the hazard rate \( \lambda (t) \) equals the constant rate \( \lambda \). In this case, the Weibull specification reduces to the exponential. When \( p > 1 \), however, the distribution of hazard rates shows positive
duration dependence, meaning that a hazard rate increases monotonically over time. In such a case, termination accelerates over time, and an event is more likely to end in each subsequent time interval. When \( 0 > p > 1 \), the distribution of a hazard rate shows that there is a negative duration dependence, which means that a hazard rate decreases over time. In this case, an event becomes institutionalized over time and less likely to end in each subsequent time interval.

The hazard rate for the Weibull distribution with a set of explanatory variables or covariates can be specified as follows:

\[
h(t \mid x(t^-)) = e^{\beta' x(t^-)} p(e^{-\beta' x(t^-)} t)^{p-1}
\]

where the notation \( x(t^-) \) denotes that the change in the covariate is observed prior to time \( t \). The values of the parameters \( \beta \), which computes the influence of the covariate on the hazard rate, are estimated by maximum-likelihood estimation and can be assessed for statistical significance using standard errors and asymptotic \( t \)-ratios. Positive coefficients in \( \beta \) predict longer duration of rivalry, and negative coefficients in \( \beta \) predict shorter duration of rivalry.\(^8\) For the duration dependence parameter \( p \), the correct significance

\(^8\) A common way to parameterize the Weibull model in terms of covariates is by constructing a linear model for \( \log(T) \). This involves the specification of a log-linear model and treating the log of the survival times as the response variable. The Weibull expressed as a log-linear model has the following form:

\[
\log(T) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_{i1} + \beta_2 x_{i2} + \ldots + \beta_j x_{ij} + \sigma e
\]

In this formula, the negatively signed coefficient estimate in the Weibull model implies that the log survival time—a linear mode for \( \log(T) \)—is decreasing as the effect of the variable being studied increases, indicating that the variable leads to an event (or rivalry termination) of shorter duration. The positively signed coefficient in the Weibull model, in contrast,
test involves assessing the probability that $p$ is different from 1 rather than that $p$ is different from 0 since $p=1$ is the parameter value when there is no duration dependence (Bennett 1998).

5. Empirical Results

5-1. Survival Probability in International Rivalries

First, I present a Kaplan-Meier survival curve, which computes the probability that a rivalry will survive at least as long as some time $t$, without controlling for any covariates. The formula for the Kaplan-Meier estimate is $S(t) = \prod_{j < t} \left( \frac{n_j - d_j}{n_j} \right)$, where $S(t)$ is the survival probability at time $t$, $n_j$ is the number of observations at risk at time $j$, and $d_j$ is the number of observations that “die” or “terminate” at time $j$. Time $t$ is calculated from the time at which the rivalry becomes at risk of termination, namely the start year of a rivalry (Bennett 1998).

implies that the log survival time is increasing as the effect of the variable being studied increases, indicating that the variable leads to an event (or rivalry termination) of longer duration.
As Figure 1 displays, initial probability of survival for rivalries being studied is near 100 percent. When the rivalries reach the 40th at-risk year, however, the probability of survival for the rivalries decreases by about 50 percent. The probability of survival reaches its lowest level shortly after 110 years have passed. Since Kaplan-Meier survival curve is based purely on termination times without accounting for why terminations occur, it only presents a first cut at understanding rivalry termination. But the curve strongly indicates that rivalry is highly duration-dependent phenomenon and that the risk of rivalry termination is “increasing” across time.
5-2. Baseline Models

I estimate four main models of the maintenance of international rivalries, 1819-2001. The models presented here include all international and domestic political variables that the previous chapters address and estimate the effects of the variables on the hazards of rivalry termination. The results for the models and model-related statistics are reported in Table 4.

Before turning to the results of each model, it should be noted that \( p \), which is the duration dependence parameter, is estimated between 1.484 and 1.54 across models. This value of \( p \), which is significantly greater than 1, strongly suggests that the hazard rate in international rivalries monotonically increases over time and that there is positive duration dependence. Substantively, the presence of positive duration dependence indicates that the longer the rivalries last, the more likely they become to end in the future. The result is consistent with previous research (Bennett 1998; Cioffi-Revilla 1998).

Turning to the variables included to test key hypotheses, the first column of Table 4 (Model 1) presents a baseline model, which estimates the effect of both external and internal political variables on the hazards of rivalry termination. As hypothesized, the power ratio variable has a statistically significant and strong negative effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. The negative coefficient on this variable suggests that
Table 4 Weibull Results for Baseline Models of Rivalry Maintenance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.109***</td>
<td>-0.116***</td>
<td>-0.111***</td>
<td>-0.119***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Tie</td>
<td>0.136***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.149***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.017)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Power Tie</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.251***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.265***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto _i</td>
<td>0.446***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.394***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.051)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto _j</td>
<td>0.420***</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.290***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.065)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.068)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto _i × Veto _j</td>
<td>0.437**</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.562**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.222)</td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.235)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto _H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.525***</td>
<td>0.440***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.044)</td>
<td>(0.047)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.910***</td>
<td>3.961***</td>
<td>3.898***</td>
<td>3.957***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.025)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>_p</td>
<td>1.537</td>
<td>1.487</td>
<td>1.540</td>
<td>1.484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of obs</td>
<td>5270</td>
<td>5270</td>
<td>5268</td>
<td>5268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of failures</td>
<td>3006</td>
<td>3006</td>
<td>3005</td>
<td>3005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time at risk</td>
<td>179485</td>
<td>179485</td>
<td>179330</td>
<td>179330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-5121.76</td>
<td>-5083.10</td>
<td>-5136.49</td>
<td>-5096.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note:* Cell entries are coefficient estimates and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed significance levels of 0.10 or less are reported (**p < 0.01, *p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).
power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. The result is consistent with previous research (Diehl and Goertz 2000).

The variable “great power tie,” in contrast, has a statistically significant and strong positive effect, indicating that the security tie between rivals and great powers makes rivalries last longer. The major domestic political variable veto \(i \times \text{veto}_j\), which is a measure of veto constraint at the dyadic level—also is statistically significant and positive. The result suggests that rivalries last longer when they have a higher level of veto constraint.

The second column of Table 4 (Model 2) replaces the variable “great power tie” with “nuclear power tie” and estimates the effect of the key variables on the hazards of rivalry termination, controlling for the power ratio variable. The power ratio variable has a statistically significant and strong negative effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. The result suggests that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. The nuclear great power variable appears to have a statistically significant and positive effect. The positive coefficient on the variable indicates that the security tie between rivals and nuclear great powers makes rivalries last longer. The veto \(i \times \text{veto}_j\) variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect on the hazards of rivalry termination.

---

9 The result of alternative indicator of the level of security tie between rivalries and great powers—i.e., the logged value of the sum of all great power ties—also remains statistically significant and positive, indicating that the ties make rivalries last longer. The result is not reported in Table 1.
indicating that the greater level of veto constraint in rivalry dyads leads to longer rivalries.

The third column of Table 4 (Model 3) estimates the effect of the “great power tie” and “veto H,” which is the higher score of veto constraint in each rivalry dyad (a variant of the weak-link principle), controlling for the power ratio variable. The power ratio variable has a statistically significant and strong negative effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. As discussed in the previous models, the result indicates that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. The great power tie variable still has a statistically significant and positive effect. The positive coefficient on the variable indicates that the security tie between rivals and great powers makes rivalries last longer. The veto H variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect on the hazards of rivalry termination, suggesting that the state with the higher veto constraint in each rivalry dyads makes rivalries last longer.

The last column of Table 4 (Model 4) estimates the effect of the “nuclear power tie” and “veto H” variables on the hazards of rivalry termination, controlling for the power ratio variable. The power ratio variable has a statistically significant and strong negative effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. The result suggests that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. The coefficient estimate on the nuclear power tie variable is statistically significant and positive. The result indicates that the security tie between rivals and nuclear great powers makes rivalries last longer. The veto H variable also has a
statistically significant and positive effect on the hazards of rivalry termination, indicating that the rival with the higher veto constraint makes rivalries last longer.

Statistical significance does not mean substantive significance. To gauge the substantive effect of the key explanatory variables—i.e., great power tie, nuclear power tie, veto $i \times$ veto $j$ and veto $i_1$—on the risk of rivalry termination, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for the various values of the variables.$^{10}$ Hazard ratios in the event history analysis calculate the ratio of the hazard rates corresponding to the conditions described by two levels of an explanatory variable.$^{11}$ By examining a change of the ratios for the values of the explanatory variable being concerned, therefore, we can assess how the shift from one distinct value of an explanatory variable to another affects the risk of rivalry termination. First, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for the various values of the “great power tie” and “nuclear power tie” variables in Figure 2-1 and 2-2 respectively.

---

$^{10}$ The formula for the hazard ratio is $\frac{h_i(t)}{h_0(t)} = \exp(\beta'(x_i - x_j))$, where $h_0(t)$ is the baseline hazard function and $\beta'$ and $x$ are the covariates and regression parameters.

$^{11}$ In the event history analysis, the marginal effect approach can be an unduly abstract means of measuring substantive effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable if the variable is an ordinal or nominal. My analysis thus adopts an approach of a change in hazard ratio (or the first difference approach), which calculates the change in the dependent variable as the independent variable move from one discrete value (the minimum) to another (the mean or the maximum). For detailed arguments on the utility of a first difference approach, see Amada A. Licht, 2011, 229-230.
The scatter plots in Figure 2-1 display how the hazard ratios of rivalry termination change depending on the various values of the great power tie variable. If the value in the great power tie variable shifts from 0 (minimum) to 1, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 19 percent. If the value of the great power tie variable shifts from 1 to 2 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination also decreases by about 19 percent. If the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 2 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 34 percent. So the results provide a strong support of my
argument that great power tie decreases the risk of rivalry termination, leading to longer rivalries.

The scatter plots in Figure 2-2 display how the hazard ratios of rivalry termination change depending on the various values of the nuclear power tie variable. If the value of the nuclear power tie variable shifts from 0 (minimum) to 1, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 31 percent. If the value shifts from 1 to 2 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination also decreases by about 31 percent.\(^{12}\) If the value of the nuclear power tie variable shifts from 0 (minimum) to 2 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 53 percent. So the results strongly substantiate my argument that nuclear power tie makes rivalries last longer.

It is also interesting to notice that compared to great power tie, the impact of nuclear power tie on the risk of rivalry termination is bigger. Shifting the value of the nuclear power tie variable from 0 (minimum) to 2 (the maximum) makes rivalry termination 53 percent less likely. But the same amount of the shift of the value of the great power tie variable makes rivalry termination 34 percent less likely. The result provides a strong support for my argument that the rivalries having the security ties with “nuclear” great powers are more likely to persist than the rivalries having the security ties with non-nuclear great powers.

\(^{12}\) Since the Weibull model holds the proportional hazards property, the ratio of the ratios for each “adjacent” values of the variable being concerned is proportional.
To gauge the substantive effect of the key domestic political variables—i.e., veto \(j \times \text{veto } j\) and veto \(H\), I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for the various values of these variables. The results are reported in Figure 3-1 and Figure 3-2 respectively.

The scatter plots in Figure 3-1 compute the hazard ratios for various values of the veto \(j \times \text{veto } j\) variable. The plots show that there is a strong negative relationship between the level of veto constraint and the risk of rivalry termination. If the value of
veto \( i \times \) veto \( j \) shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.039 (mean), for example, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 2.6 percent. If the value shifts from 0.039 (mean) to 0.731 (maximum), the risk of a rivalry terminating decreases by about 37 percent. Finally, if the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.731 (maximum), the risk of a rivalry terminating decreases by about 39 percent. The results strongly substantiate my argument that a higher level of veto constraint in rivalry dyads leads to longer rivalries.

The scatter plots in Figure 3-2 compute the hazard ratios for each value of veto \( H \) (a variant of the weak-link principle). The plots show that there is a negative relationship between the higher score of veto constraint and the risk of rivalry termination. If the value of veto \( H \) shifts from 0” (minimum) to 0.357 (mean), for example, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 25 percent. Yet if the value shifts from 0.357 (mean) to 0.89 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 35 percent. If the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.89 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 51 percent. The results provide a strong support of my argument that the higher score of veto constraint in each rivalry

5-3. Baseline Models with Shock Variables

Next, I test the baseline models, controlling for various kinds of structural shocks. Much prior work in international rivalries claims that structural shocks make rivalries last shorter (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Bennett 1997, 1998). Thus, the
models presented here estimate the effect of the key explanatory variables—great power tie and veto constraint—on the hazards of rivalry termination, controlling for the shocks. Following the logic of Diehl and Goertz (2000), the shock variables are lagged 10 years. The key findings and model-related statistics are reported in Table 5.

Table 5. Weibull Results for Baseline Models with Shock Variables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 5</th>
<th>Model 6</th>
<th>Model 7</th>
<th>Model 8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.100***</td>
<td>-0.103***</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.107***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Tie</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td>0.162***</td>
<td>0.137***</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto i</td>
<td>0.379***</td>
<td>0.388***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto j</td>
<td>0.361***</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto i × Veto j</td>
<td>0.800***</td>
<td>0.771***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.249)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto H</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.473***</td>
<td>0.481***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Continued

---

13 Following Diehl and Goertz (2000)'s argument, I include separate shocks with a 10-year time lag. They argue that “an overwhelming majority of international rivalries had their last dispute in the 10-year period of a structural shock.” Since there is no theoretical guidance of appropriate time lag, however, I test the effect of the shocks with various values of time lag in the models I test in Table 7.
Table 5 Continued

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>t-10</th>
<th>t-10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World Wars</td>
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<td>-0.468***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
<td>(0.053)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terri Shock</td>
<td>-0.106***</td>
<td>-0.125***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
<td>(0.034)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Power Shocks</td>
<td>-0.094***</td>
<td>-0.087***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
<td>(0.033)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regime Chg</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.079</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
<td>(0.079)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Democraz</td>
<td>0.123</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.093)</td>
<td>(0.092)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil War</td>
<td>0.009</td>
<td>0.006</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Shocks</td>
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<td>0.063***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>(0.018)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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<td>3.952***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>1.533</td>
<td>1.534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of subjects</td>
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<td>4966</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of failures</td>
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<td>2830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time at risk</td>
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<td>169786</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-4811.94</td>
<td>-4832.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>-4845.158</td>
<td>-4864.96</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed significance levels of 0.10 or less are reported (**p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).
First, it is of note that the value of \( p \), which is the duration dependence parameter, is estimated between 1.526 and 1.533 across models. This result strongly suggests that the hazard rate monotonically increases over time and that there is strong positive duration dependence in international rivalries. The result is consistent with what I found in the previous models.

The first column of Table 5 (Model 5) estimates the effect of key explanatory variables—“great power tie” and “veto \( i \times \) veto \( j \),” controlling for both power ratio and separate shocks with a 10-year lag. Several points are immediately apparent. The coefficient estimate on the power ratio variable is significant and negative, indicating that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. The great power tie variable has a statistically significant and positive effect. The result suggests that the security tie between rivals and great powers leads to longer rivalries, controlling for the effect of separate shocks. The veto \( i \times \) veto \( j \) variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect, indicating that controlling for the separate shocks, the greater veto constraint at the dyadic level makes rivalries last longer. Turning attention to structural shocks, the “world wars,” “territorial shock,” and “power distribution shock” variables with a 10-year lag appear to have a statistically significant and negative effect. The results indicate that these shocks make rivalries last shorter. The results are quite consistent with the previous research which reports that system-level shocks drive rivalry termination (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Bennett 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000). Yet no state shock—i.e., regime change,
democratization, and civil war, has effect on rivalry termination. This is a somewhat different result than that found in Goertz and Diehl (1995) and Bennett (1998), where democratization and civil wars appear to make rivalries last shorter.

The second column of Table 5 (Model 6) estimates the effects of “great power tie” and “veto $i$” variables, controlling for power ratio and separate shocks with a 10-year lag. The power ratio variable still has statistically significant and negative effect. The result suggests that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. As in the model 5, the great power tie variable has a statistically significant and positive effect, suggesting that it leads to longer rivalries, controlling for separate shocks. The veto $i$ variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect. The result indicates that controlling for separate shocks, the state with the higher veto constraint makes rivalries last longer. The “world wars,” “territorial shock” and “power distribution shock” variables with a 10-year lag appear to have a statistically significant and negative effect, suggesting that these shocks make rivalries last shorter. But state shocks such as regime change, democratization, and civil war have little effect on rivalry termination. As discussed in model 5, therefore, only external structural shocks with a 10-year lag appear to make rivalries last shorter.

The third column of Table 5 (Model 7) estimates the effects of “great power tie” and veto $i \times$ veto $j$, controlling for power ratio and the combined effect of all structural shocks with a 10-year lag. To estimate the model, I create “all shocks” variable
in which the value of each structural shock is summed up, and include it with a 10-year time lag. The coefficient estimate on the power ratio variable remains significant and negative, indicating that power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries. As in the previous models, the great power tie variable has a statistically significant and positive effect, indicating that the security tie with great powers makes rivalries last longer, controlling for the combined effect of all shocks. The veto$_i \times$ veto$_j$ variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect. The result suggests that controlling for the combined effect of all shocks, the greater veto constraint at the dyadic level makes rivalries last longer. The all shocks variable with a 10-year lag has a statistically significant and negative effect. The result suggests that the shocks jointly lead to shorter rivalries within 10 years.

The last column of Table 5 (Model 8) estimates the effects of the great power tie and veto$_H$ variables, controlling for the combined effect of all structural shocks with a 10-year lag. The coefficient estimate on the power ratio variable is negative as well as significant, indicating that the variable leads to shorter rivalries. The great power tie variable has a statistically significant and positive effect. The result suggests that controlling for the combined effect of all shocks, the security tie with great powers makes rivalries last longer. The veto$_H$ variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect. The result suggests that the rival with the higher veto constraint, controlling for the combined effect of all shocks, makes rivalries last longer. The all shocks variable with a
10-year lag has a statistically significant and negative effect. The result suggests that the shocks with a 10-year time lag jointly lead to shorter rivalries.

To gauge the substantive effect of the great power tie variable after controlling for the all shock variable with a 10-year lag, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for various values of the variable. The result is presented in Figure 4.

![Figure 6. Hazard Ratios for Various Values of the “Great Power Tie” Variable, Controlling for All Shocks with a 10-Year Lag](image)

The scatter plots in Figure 4 display the effect of each value of great power tie variable on the risk of rivalry termination, controlling for the all structural shock with a
10-year lag. It seems quite clear that the effect of the great power variable on the risk of rivalry termination is negative as well as significant. If the value of the great power tie shifts from 0 (minimum) to 1, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 19 percent. Shifting the value of the great power tie from 1 to 2 (maximum) also decreases the risk of rivalry termination by about 19 percent. If the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 2 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 34 percent. So the results strongly substantiate my expectation that great power tie makes rivalries last longer, controlling for all structural shocks.

Next, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for various values of two domestic political variables-i.e., $veto_i \times veto_j$, and $veto_H$, controlling for all structural shocks with a 10-year lag. The results are presented in Figure 5-1 and 5-2.
The scatter plots in Figure 5-1 compute the hazard ratios for each value of \( \text{veto}_i \times \text{veto}_j \), controlling for all structural shocks with a 10-year lag. The plots display that the effect of veto constraint at the dyadic level on the risk of rivalry termination is substantive as well as negative. If the value of \( \text{veto}_i \times \text{veto}_j \) shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.039 (mean), the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 4.5 percent. If the value shifts from 0.039 (mean) to 0.739 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination decreases
by about 56 percent. Finally, if the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.731 (maximum),
the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 58 percent. Hence, the results provide a
strong support of my argument that the greater veto constraint at the dyadic level makes
rivalries last longer, controlling for all structural shocks.

The scatter plots in Figure 5-2 compute the hazard ratios for each value of veto
\( H \), controlling the all shocks variable with a 10-year lag. The plots show that the rival in
the weak-link in rivalry dyads-i.e., the rival with higher score of veto constraint-reduces
the risk of rivalry termination. If the value of veto \( H \) shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.357
(mean), for example, the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 23 percent. If the
value shifts from 0.357 (mean) to 0.89 (maximum), the risk of a rivalry terminating
decreases by about 32 percent. If the value shifts from 0 (minimum) to 0.89 (maximum),
the risk of rivalry termination decreases by about 48 percent. The results strongly support
my argument that the rival with the higher score of veto constraint in each rivalry dyad
makes rivalries last longer, controlling for all structural shocks with a 10-year lag.

Finally, I estimate the substantive effect of the all shocks variable with a 10-
year lag on the risk of rivalry termination. For this purpose, I calculate and graph the
hazard ratios for various values of the variable with a 10-year lag. The result is presented
in Figure 6.
Figure 9. Hazard Ratios for Various Values of All Shocks with a 10-Year Lag

The scatter plots in Figure 6 display the hazard ratios of various values of the “all shocks” variable with a 10-year lag. The plots indicate that the all shocks variable has both positive and substantive effect on the risk of rivalry termination. If the value of the all shocks variable with a 10-year lag shifts from 0 (minimum) to 1, for example, the risk of rivalry termination increases by about 9.7 percent. If the value shifts from 1 to 2, the risk of rivalry termination also increases by about 9.7 percent. If the level shifts from 0 (minimum) to 4 (maximum), the risk of rivalry termination increases by about 45
percent. The results thus strongly substantiate my argument that structural shocks make rivalries last shorter.

5-4. Baseline Models with the Shocks of Various Time Lags

In what follows, I estimate the effect of the key explanatory variables—“great power tie” and “veto_i × veto_j,” controlling for all structural shocks with various values of time lag. Prior research suggests that structural shock variable is quite sensitive to specification in terms of the time lags included (Bennett 1998). If the effect of shock varies with the time lag included, therefore, the effect of other explanatory variables may change. Thus, I include the “all shocks” variable with a 5-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year lag respectively and then re-estimate the effect of the explanatory variables on the hazards of rivalry termination.\textsuperscript{14} The results and model-related statistics are reported in Table 6.

\textsuperscript{14} Given the absence of a theoretical guidance on appropriate level of time lag, I include the all shocks variable with various values of time lags from 5 years to 20 years.
Table 6. Weibull Results for Baseline Models (including Veto$_i \times$ Veto$_j$) with All Shocks Variable of Various Time Lags

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 9</th>
<th>Model 10</th>
<th>Model 11</th>
<th>Model 12</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.102***</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.109***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Tie</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.137***</td>
<td>0.133***</td>
<td>0.128***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_i$</td>
<td>0.381***</td>
<td>0.388***</td>
<td>0.398***</td>
<td>0.417***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
<td>(0.052)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_j$</td>
<td>0.346***</td>
<td>0.368***</td>
<td>0.377***</td>
<td>0.398***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.066)</td>
<td>(0.067)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto$_i \times$ Veto$_j$</td>
<td>0.981***</td>
<td>0.771***</td>
<td>0.514**</td>
<td>0.337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.257)</td>
<td>(0.247)</td>
<td>(0.236)</td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
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<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t-5}$</td>
<td>0.022</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.019)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t-10}$</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.061***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t-15}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.094***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks$_{t-20}$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.052***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.902***</td>
<td>3.960***</td>
<td>3.984***</td>
<td>3.964***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>1.528</td>
<td>1.526</td>
<td>1.538</td>
<td>1.536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.022)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
<td>(0.023)</td>
</tr>
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<td>No. of obs</td>
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<td>No. of failures</td>
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<td>2831</td>
<td>2824</td>
<td>2818</td>
</tr>
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<td>Time at risk</td>
<td>170862</td>
<td>169941</td>
<td>169169</td>
<td>169074</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-4847.347</td>
<td>-4845.158</td>
<td>-4794.459</td>
<td>-4804.032</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed significance levels of 0.10 or less are reported (***$p < 0.01$, **$p < 0.05$, *$p < 0.1$).
As in the previous models, the value of $p$, which is the duration dependence parameter, is estimated between 1.526 and 1.538 across models. This result strongly suggests that the hazard rate monotonically increases over time and that there is strong positive duration dependence in international rivalries.

Turning to the key explanatory variables, several points need to be noted. First, the effect of the all structural shocks variable is very sensitive to the specification on time lags included in the models presented here. The coefficient estimate on the all shocks variable with a 5-year lag, for example, is not statistically significant and even “positive.” Within five years of the shocks, therefore, rivalries last longer. When the all shocks variable with a 10-year lag is included, however, it appears that rivalries last shorter. The coefficient estimate on the variable is both significant and “negative.” The all shocks variable with a 15-year lag also has a statistically significant and negative effect, suggesting that rivalries last shorter within 15 years of the shocks. The 20-year all shocks variable also remains statistically significant and negative effect but the coefficient estimate on the variable decreases about 45 percent in magnitude, compared to that of the shocks with a 15 year lag. The results strongly suggest the effect of structural shocks is very sensitive to the specification on time lags and is diffuse over a long period (Bennett 1998; Diehl and Goertz 2000).
Given the sensitivity of the findings on the all shocks variables in terms of the time lags included, I assess how the substantive effect of the all shocks variable varies with various values of time lag. For this purpose, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for the two extreme values of the all shock variables with the time lag from “1” to “20.” The results are presented in Figure 7.

Figure 10. Effect of All Shocks Variable with Various Values of Time Lag on the Risk of Rivalry Termination
Figure 7 presents the effect of the all shocks variable with various time lags on the risk of rivalry termination. First, it seems immediately apparent that the effect of the shocks on rivalry termination is quite sensitive to the specification on time lags. Within the 5-year time period that each data point covers, for example, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from “0” (minimum) to “4” (maximum)” decreases the risk of rivalry termination by about 13 percent. Only when a 6-year lag is included, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from the minimum to the maximum increases the risk of rivalry termination by about 1 percent. The negative effect of the all shock variable increases until a 13-year lag is included. The shift of the value of the all shocks variable with a 13-year lag from “0” to “4,” for example, increases the risk of rivalry termination by about 82 percent. But the effect of the all shocks variable on the risk of rivalry termination begins to decrease since a 14-year time lag is included although it still has negative effect. When the all shocks variable with a 20-year lag is include, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from the minimum to the maximum decreases the risk of rivalry termination by about 38 percent. Overall, the analysis of the hazard ratios of the all shocks variable provides a strong support for my argument that the effect of the shocks is diffuse over time. The result also accords with previous research that structural shocks operate over a long period (Goertz and Diehl 1995; Diehl and Goertz 2000; Bennett 1998).
Other explanatory variables in the models still remain statistically significant and have the expected sign of coefficient estimate. For example, the power ratio variable has a statistically significant and negative effect across the models, suggesting that the power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries, regardless of the time lags on the all shocks variable. The coefficient estimate on the great power tie variable also is positive as well as significant across the models. The result indicates that the security tie with great powers makes rivalries last longer, regardless of the time lags on the all shocks variable. The veto\(_i \times\) veto\(_j\) variable has a statistically significant and positive effect when the all shock variable with a 5-year, 10-year, and 15-year lag is controlled for. But the coefficient estimate on the variable doesn’t reach conventional significance level (\(p < 0.10\)) when the all shock variable with a 20-year lag is included (model 12). The magnitude of the coefficient on veto\(_i \times\) veto\(_j\) variable also gradually decreases as the value of time lag on the all shocks variable increases. This result suggests that the effect of the veto constraint decreases as the effect of the structural shocks is diffuse over a long period of time.

Finally, I estimate the effect of the key explanatory variables-“great power tie” and “veto\(_H\)” (a variant of the weak-link principle), controlling for the all structural shocks variable with a 5-year, 10-year, 15-year, and 20-year lag respectively. The results and model-related statistics are reported in Table 7.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 13</th>
<th>Model 14</th>
<th>Model 15</th>
<th>Model 16</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.107***</td>
<td>-0.106***</td>
<td>-0.110***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
<td>(0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Ties</td>
<td>0.159***</td>
<td>0.151***</td>
<td>0.146***</td>
<td>0.140***</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto_H</td>
<td>0.479***</td>
<td>0.481***</td>
<td>0.474***</td>
<td>0.488***</td>
</tr>
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<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
<td>(0.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks_t-5</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks_t-10</td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.063***</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks_t-15</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.100***</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks_t-20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>-0.056***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.884***</td>
<td>3.949***</td>
<td>3.976***</td>
<td>3.956***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.029)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
<td>(0.028)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>p</td>
<td>1.530</td>
<td>1.529</td>
<td>1.541</td>
<td>1.538</td>
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<td>(0.022)</td>
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<td>No. of subjects</td>
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<tr>
<td>No. of failures</td>
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<td>2830</td>
<td>2823</td>
<td>2817</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time at risk</td>
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<td>169786</td>
<td>169014</td>
<td>168919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR chi2(4)</td>
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<td>413.23</td>
<td>433.47</td>
<td>408.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log likelihood</td>
<td>-4872.09</td>
<td>-4864.96</td>
<td>-4807.34</td>
<td>-4813.59</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Note:** Cell entries are coefficient estimates and robust standard errors are in parentheses. Two-tailed significance levels of 0.10 or less are reported (***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1).
Several points need to be noted. First, the value of $p$ is estimated between 1.529 and 1.541 across models. This result strongly suggests that the hazard rate monotonically increases over time and that strong positive duration dependence exists in the models presented here.

Turning to the all shocks variable, it appears that the effect of the shocks variable is still quite sensitive to the specification on time lags. The coefficient estimate on the all shocks variable with a 5-year lag, for example, is not statistically significant and “positive.” Within five years, therefore, the all shocks variable make rivalries last longer. When a 5-year lag is replaced by the 10-year lag on the all shocks variable, however, rivalries appear to last shorter. The coefficient estimate on the variable is both significant and negative. The all shocks variable with a 15-year lag also has a statistically significant and negative effect, suggesting that rivalries last shorter within 15 years of the shocks. The 20-year all shocks variable also remains statistically significant and negative effect but the coefficient estimate on the variable decreases about 50 percent in magnitude, compared to that of the variable in model 15. The results strongly suggest the effect of structural shocks is very sensitive to the specification on time lags.

In order to assess how the substantive effect of the all shocks variable changes with various values of time lag, I calculate and graph the hazard ratios for the two extreme values of the all shock variables with the time lag from “1” to “20” years. The results are presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8 presents the effect of the all shocks variable with various time lags on the risk of rivalry termination. First, it seems apparent that the effect of the shocks on rivalry termination is quite sensitive to the specification on time lags. Within 6-year time period, for example, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from 0 (minimum) to 4 (maximum) decreases the risk of rivalry termination by about 3.5 percent. Only when a 7-year lag is included, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from the minimum to the maximum increases the risk of rivalry termination by about 11 percent. The
negative effect of the all shock variable increases until a 15-year lag is included. The shift of the value of the all shocks variable with a 15-year lag from 0 (minimum) to 4 (maximum), for example, increases the risk of rivalry termination by about 86 percent. But the effect of the all shocks variable on the risk of rivalry termination begins to decrease since a 16-year time lag is included although it still has negative effect. Within 20 years, for example, the shift of the value of the all shocks variable from 0 (minimum) to 4 (maximum) increases the risk of rivalry termination by only 40 percent. As in the analysis in Figure 7, therefore, the results strongly support my argument that the effect of the shocks is diffuse over time.

Many explanatory variables in the models remain statistically significant and have the expected sign of coefficient estimate. For example, the power ratio variable has a statistically significant and negative effect across the models, suggesting that the power imbalance leads to shorter rivalries, regardless of the time lags on the all shocks variable. The coefficient estimate on the great power tie variable also remains statistically significant and positive across the models. The result indicates that the security tie with great powers makes rivalries last longer although the effect of all shocks with various time lags is controlled for. The veto \( H \) variable also has a statistically significant and positive effect. Compared to the veto \( i \times \text{veto } j \), the veto \( H \) variable has a consistently significant and positive effect, suggesting that the higher score of the veto \( H \) makes rivalries last longer, regardless of the time lags of the shocks.
Overall, the results presented here provide considerable support of my theoretical arguments. Table 8 presents a brief summary of whether my empirical findings are fully commensurate with the hypotheses developed in the previous sections.

Table 8. A Summary of Empirical Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Expectation</th>
<th>Finding</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Ratio</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Negative</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Power Tie</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nuclear Power Tie</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto_i × Veto_j</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto H</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Shocks with a 10-20 Year Lag</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Negative</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto_i × Veto_j (Controlling for a 10-Yr Shocks)</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Veto_H (Controlling for a 10-Yr Shocks)</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
<td>Significant &amp; Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As Table 8 illustrates, my empirical finding is fully commensurate with the expectation that I generate in the previous sections. The power ratio variable, for example, has a statistically significant and negative effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. This result confirms my expectation that growing power imbalance leads to shorter
rivalries. I also find that both the great power tie and nuclear great power tie make rivalries last longer. Across the models, these variables have a statistically significant and positive effect, suggesting that the security ties between great or nuclear great powers and rivals lead to longer rivalries. The results are fully consistent with my expectation. Another key explanatory variable—i.e., veto constraint, which is measured partly by the $veto_i \times veto_j$ variable and partly by the $veto_H$ variable, appears to have a statistically significant and positive effect on the hazards of rivalry termination across the models. The result strongly substantiates my expectation that domestic veto constraint drives rivalry maintenance.

The finding on structural shock variables also is consistent with my expectation. When all shocks variable with a 10-20 year lag is considered, my analysis shows that the variable has a statistically significant and negative effect. The result confirms my expectation that structural shocks make rivalry last shorter and that the effect of the shocks is diffuse over time.

Finally, I find that veto constraint still has a statistically significant and positive effect on rivalry termination although the effect of all structural shocks is controlled for. Both $veto_i \times veto_j$ and $veto_H$ variables appear to make rivalries last longer when the all shocks variable with a 10-year lag is included. The result is fully commensurate with my expectation that given the destabilizing effect of structural shocks,
both the greater veto constraint in rivalry dyads and the higher score of veto constraint (a variant of the weak-link principle) make rivalries last longer.
Case Studies

In this chapter, I conduct case study to probe the explanatory power of my modified two-level game approach to rivalry maintenance. The statistical findings presented in the previous chapter provide a strong support for my argument that both security tie to great power and veto constraint make rivalries last longer. Against the backdrop of these findings, I selected three cases, i.e., the 2nd Greco-Turkish, Indo-Pakistan, and Chilean-Argentine rivalries to conduct the most similar case study.

In the most similar case design, researcher attempt to select cases that are similar in all of their independent variables except for one and differ in their dependent variable (George and Bennett 2004). Following this logic, I chose these three rivalries, which are very similar in their independent variables except the levels of domestic veto constraint, and differ in their dependent variable, i.e., rivalry maintenance and its termination.

Specifically, all these three rivalries took place as a result of territorial controversies and have persisted over time through the security ties to great power. The structural shocks, which might have destabilized their entrenched hostility, were rarely conducive to the termination of the rivalries. Despite such similarities, however, the rivalries displayed a huge variation in the levels of veto constraint that foreign policy leadership has faced at home. Greek-Turkish and Indo-Pakistan rivalries, for example,
have long suffered from fierce partisan struggle between hard-line and soft-line veto players. The infighting often generated a policy deadlock within governments, which prevented their leaders from resolving the issues in disputes at negotiation tables despite structural shocks. The leaders both in Argentina and Chile, in contrast, had been relatively isolated from the partisan infighting between the competing veto players. In 1978-1984, in particular, the leaders in the rivalry enjoyed substantial executive powers due to the significant weakening of the veto powers. When the democratic transition in Argentina opened a window of opportunity for improving mutual relationship, therefore, the leaders in both countries were more capable of constructing an inter-group agreement on rivalry termination and of carrying out the termination.

Taken together, my case studies find that when the foreign policy leaders in the rivalries face the low level of veto constraint at home, they are more capable of terminating the rivalries at negotiation table. Alternatively, when the leaders in the rivalries face high level of veto constraint at home, they are less capable of terminating the rivalries at negotiation table and, as a result, more likely to maintain the rivalries across time.
Chapter 4 Case Study of Greek-Turkish Rivalry

1. A Brief History of the 2nd Greek-Turkish Rivalry

The modern hostility between Greece and Turkey is rooted in the Greek struggle for independence from the Ottoman Empire. The fact that both Turkey and Greece consolidated their national identities by fighting against, and interacting with, each other are at the heart of the hostility between the two states (Krebs 1999). From the Greek perspective, the birth of modern Greece was a result of persistent struggles to end about four hundred years of Turkish rule (or the Ottoman rule). The popular Turkish image of Greek’s independence is that of rebellion. Thus, the troubled history not only spawned deeply ingrained resentments, but also created enemy images on both sides.

The historically based antagonism rapidly turned into rivalry hostility when the two adversaries began to confront each other in Cyprus. The origin of Cyprus dispute traces back to the first quarter of the 19th century when Britain took control of the island from the Ottoman Empire. Under British control, the “enosis” movement, which advocated union to Greece, met with popular support both in Cyprus and on the Greek mainland. The movement reached its climax with the 1950 plebiscite in which the Greek community in Cyprus decided to unite with Greece. However, Turkey claimed that Cyprus ought to revert to Turkey because of the possession of islands by predecessor - i.e., the Ottoman Empire, geographic contiguity, and the presence of an 18 percent
Turkish Cypriot minority. Since then, the two rivals have become embroiled into a full-fledged rivalry relationship.

From the early 1960s on, Greece and Turkey plunged into a series of military disputes. Late in 1963, Greek Cypriots launched a deadly attack on Turkish areas in Cyprus, leading to the intervention of both Athens and Ankara. The hostility caused by the 1963 conflict led to the outbreak of the second military dispute in Cyprus in 1967. With the consent of the military regime, the Greek nationalists launched an attack on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, resulting in the direct military confrontation between Greece and Turkey. These two initial disputes finally materialized into a full-scale war between the two rivals in 1974. The Greek junta leader Ioannidis initiated the coup against Makarios, a Greek Cypriot leader, and threatened the security of Turkish-Cypriots in Cyprus, which resulted in Turkey’s invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

A series of military disputes over the Cyprus issue created external and internal structural conditions under which Greece and Turkey would maintain highly contentious relationships over time. At the international level, the contentious rivalry relations facilitated the security ties between the two adversaries and other great powers, most notably the United States/NATO. With the help of the U.S., the two rivals engaged in an intense arms buildup by which they would sustain an evenhanded military competition over time. The arms transfer and military aid from the U.S. also allowed the two rivals to have a strong incentive to monopolize control of Cyprus and the Aegean with military
forces. Given rough military parity and frequent diplomatic interventions of the U.S., however, the two rivals consistently fail to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes on the battlefields. At the domestic level, the rivalry structured political conditions under which multiple political groups with different threat perceptions and policy preferences engaged in the zero-sum struggle for their preferred policies. However, the struggle often led to a policy gridlock, which made it difficult for the leaders on both sides to resolve both the Cyprus and Aegean issues at negotiation tables.

2. International Political Conditions for Greek-Turkish Rivalry Maintenance

The contentious relationship between Greece and Turkey began to significantly consolidate when the two rivals were officially tied to a common security patron - i.e., the United States. The admission to NATO not only allowed the two adversaries to build their military through the arms transfer and military aid from the U.S., but also encouraged them to shift the focus of foreign policy from the Soviet threat to parochial interests, such as Cyprus and the Aegean. Riding free on the U.S. military assistance, the two rivals rapidly militarized the disputes in Cyprus and in the Aegean. However, the security ties made it extremely difficult for either of the two rivals to achieve a decisive military victory on the battlefield. The United States intervened in almost every military dispute between the two rivals under the banner of “coalition unity” and pushed them to stop fighting. The intervention dramatically pushed up the two rival leaders’ cost of
resolving both the Cyprus and the Aegean dispute with military force and forced them to return to the status quo ante. Thus, the security tie with the United States was a major external cause of the persistence of the Greco-Turkish rivalry.

2-1. Military Buildups through Security Ties to Great Powers

After World War II, both Greece and Turkey faced a common security threat from the communist bloc. Turkey had to confront directly the threat from the Soviet Union while Greece faced growing communist threats from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and its internal communist guerrillas. The convergence of the security concerns prompted the two countries to establish a close security tie with the West, especially with the United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Because of the admission to NATO in 1952 and 1959, respectively, the two rivals became major beneficiaries of the military aid from the United States. Since then, Greek and Turkish political and military collaboration has become routine and institutionalized.

The United States, which became a major security patron for both Greece and Turkey, offered them massive military and economic aid. Responding to Truman’s request, for example, the U.S. Congress granted $400 million for military and economic aid to both countries. With the proclamation of the Marshall Fund in June 1947, the aid markedly increased, amounting to well over $6 billion by the end of the 1960, of which Greece had received $1.7 billion in economic aid and $1.3 billion in military aid; Turkey
received $1.1 billion in economic aid and $1.9 billion in military aid (Krebs 1999). The American military presence in Greece and Turkey became formalized with bilateral base agreements signed in February 1953 and June 1954, respectively. These agreements provided for America’s right to establish bases, to man, equip, and re-supply these bases, and to over-fly Greek and Turkish territories (Couloumbis 1983).

The military assistance continued throughout 1960s and 1970s. Except for the periods when the U.S. imposed an embargo toward Greece (1964-1974) and Turkey (1977-1979), the United States kept its commitment to fortify the military positions of the two rivals against the Soviets. In this period, the United States had maintained roughly the 7:10 ratio to ensure a balance of military strength between the two allies. By the end of the 1970s, therefore, Turkey received a total of $2.5 billion dollars in economic and military assistance, while Greece received more than $11.1 billion (Stearns 1992).

The U.S. role as a security patron continued in the 1980s. A new U.S.-Turkish base agreement was formed in 1980, in which the U.S. military assistance to Turkey increased $200 million in 1979 to nearly $900 million by 1985. The agreement included co-production programs including the F-16 fighter, the M-48A5 tank, frigate construction, the UH-1H helicopter, short-range air defense gun production and the building of a tank

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15 The United States imposed an arms embargo toward Greece in 1964-1974 as a sanction on Greek military regime. It also imposed the embargo on Turkey in 1977-79 in order to push Ankara to stop military operations in Cyprus.
ammunition facility (Haass 2008). The United States and Greece also signed the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA) in 1983, which allowed the latter to purchase U.S. weapons, notably F-16 fighters. By 1985, the U.S. provided $500 million in sales to Greece. The U.S. also committed itself to the modernization of Greek forces (McDonald 2008).

The security ties with the United States have contributed significantly to the persistence of the contentious relationship between Greece and Turkey in two ways. First, the ties helped the two rivals to restore a rough military balance against each other. Over the course of more than 40 years, the United States has applied the 7:10 ratio to ensure the balance of power between the two rivals. Roughly equal flows of arms and military aid from the U.S. led to a highly evenhanded military competition between the two rivals over time.

The security ties between the two rivals and the U.S. also contributed to the persistence of Greco-Turkish rivalry by creating an inflated hope of monopolizing control of contested issues such as Cyprus and the Aegean. Built upon the U.S.’s military assistance, the two adversaries shifted the focus of their foreign policy from the Soviet threat to their more parochial interests in Cyprus and in the Aegean (Krebs 1999). From the 1960s to 1970s, for example, Greek leadership constantly evoked an inflated hope for enosis and supported the Greek Cypriots’ effort to unite with the Greek mainland. In response, Turkey began to renew its territorial claim on Cyprus and issued multiple
threats of military intervention to check the Greek-Cypriot nationalism (Bahcheli 1990). Such hawkish stances on both sides resulted in three major military confrontations in 1964, 1967, and 1974. The two rivals did not hesitate to use U.S.-supplied weapons in the confrontations (McDonald 2008).

Encouraged by the U.S.-determined effort to support militarily, the two rivals also rapidly militarized the disputes in the Aegean in the 1970s and 1980s. Faced off over the delineation of sovereign rights, Greece and Turkey conducted research and explorations in the Aegean beyond their territorial waters (Bahcheli 1990). They also militarized some small islands in the Aegean Sea, which they perceived as the strategic choke point. The tension in the Aegean Sea finally brought the two rivals to the brink of war twice in 1976 and in 1987. Krebs sharply pointed out the impact of the U.S. military assistance to the deterioration of the two rivals’ relationship as follows:

“Their accession to NATO led Greece and Turkey to redefine their interests in ways that strain the alliance commitment, bringing them into tension with each other.”….“Not only did the United States and NATO help revive the dormant Greco-Turkish feud at the height of the Cold War, but also its vaunted mechanisms of reconciliation have served to intensify the disputes between the two states” (Krebs 1999, p. 365).

Taken together, the arms transfer and military aid from the United States and corresponding balance of military balances, allowed the two rivals to redefine their national interests consistent with their needs and to revive historically based hostility. The voice of diplomatic rapprochement and cooperation has been systematically replaced
by the support for coercive real-politic strategy over the issues of Cyprus and the Aegean. Riding free on the U.S.’s assistance, the two rivals relentlessly militarized the disputes in Cyprus and in the Aegean, which significantly contributed to the consolidation of rivalry hostility.

2-2. Great Power Ties and the Failures of Battlefield Solutions

The arms transfer and military aid from the United States helped Greece and Turkey to restore a rough military balance and to redefine their interests in ways that brought them into collision with each other. Heavily armed with the U.S.-supplied weapons, the two rivals rapidly militarized both the Cyprus and the Aegean issues and attempted to resolve them on the battlefields. The security ties between the two rivals and the United States, however, provoked U.S. fear of the breakup of coalition unity in NATO’s southern flank, leading its active diplomatic engagement in the disputes, which rapidly increased the two rivals’ cost of resolving the Cyprus and Aegean issues with military force. Knowing that further military effort would induce the US diplomatic and military retaliation, therefore, the two rivals discarded their military options and, as a result, Greco-Turkish rivalry has persisted despite the disputes.

The first military confrontation between Greece and Turkey occurred in 1963 against the backdrop of an inter-communal violence in Cyprus. Greek-Cypriot police and irregulars launched a deadly attack on the Turkish area of Nicosia. Turkey reacted to the
attack by sending fighter jets over Nicosia as a warning to Greek-Cypriot leaders in December 1963. The Turkish army also was ordered to prepare for a military operation in Cyprus. Greece responded to Turkey’s threat by warning that it would follow suit if Turkish troops intervened. The tension escalated and a full-scale war between the two rivals became a real danger. Faced with the crisis, the United States stepped in. President Lyndon Johnson (LBJ) placed a strong pressure on Turkish leadership not to intervene in Cyprus. In a sternly worded letter to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü, LBJ stated that “I must tell you in all candor that the United States cannot agree to the use of any United States-supplied military equipment for a Turkish intervention in Cyprus under present circumstances” (Bahcheli 1990, p. 63). Fearing the U.S.’s withdrawal of its military assistance, therefore, Turkish leadership cancelled its intervention in Cyprus.

The second military crisis between the two rivals broke out in November 1967. With the consent of the military regime in Athens, Greek Cypriots launched a surprise attack on two Turkish-Cypriot villages, killing twenty-eight Turkish Cypriots. Turkey immediately sent its jets on warning flights over Cyprus with the threat to large-scale military retaliation. Turkey’s threat to take military action, however, led the U.S. to intense diplomatic activities. The United States Presidential envoy, Cyrus Vance, approached all parties and forced them both to defuse the crisis and to construct a cease-fire agreement, which was largely a matter of Greek compliance to Ankara’s demand (Kalaitzaki 2005). The pressure from the United States markedly increased the two rival
leaders’ political and diplomatic cost of continuing military operation over Cyprus. Thus, the Greek government withdrew the nearly 12,000 clandestine troops from Cyprus and Turkey also disbanded its forces in southern Turkey that had been readied to land in Cyprus.

The most dangerous moment between Greece and Turkey came in January 1974. Greek junta leader Ioannidis organized a Greek-supported military coup in Cyprus to remove Makarios, a vocal challenger to Athens’ military regime. By overthrowing Makarios’ government, Ioannidis hoped not only to remove a troublesome leader, but also to consolidate a Greek position in Cyprus (Stearns 1992). Faced with the coup, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit, who was under severe pressure from hawkish opposition parties, ordered Turkish troops to land on Cyprus in July 1974. Ioannidis responded to Turkey’s landing by ordering the Greek forces to wage war against Turkey.

Surprised by the danger of an all-out war between the two NATO allies, the United States began to conduct an intense diplomatic campaign and strongly encouraged both sides to hold peace talks at Geneva. Yet, the talks failed to mediate the two rivals’ disagreements and Turkey launched the second military operation in Cyprus. The U.S. responded to Turkey’s operation by imposing an arms embargo in February 1975. Since most of Turkey’s military equipment had been procured from the United States, Turkish leaders had to stop the operation and, as a result, its third attempt to resolve the Cyprus dispute on the battlefield failed (Bahcheli 1990).
Since the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey arrived at the brink of war twice. Those two crises were all about the status of the Aegean islands. The first Aegean crisis occurred in 1976 over the issue of oil exploration in international waters near the Greek islands of Samothrace, Mytilence, and Chios. Pressed by hawkish opposition leader Ecevit, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel announced in 1976 that a Turkish research ship, the Hora, later renamed Sizmik I, would conduct seismic research in disputed waters (Bahcheli 1990). The mission was escorted by a Turkish warship. Responding to the Turkish mission, Greece announced that a Greek vessel, the Nautilus, was conducting research similar to that of Sizmik I, leading to a Turkish charge that Greece was militarizing the eastern Aegean islands. The mediation of the U.N. Security Council and the World Court defused the crisis (Kalaitzaki 2005).

The dispute in the Aegean between Greece and Turkey escalated into a status of near-war again in March 1987. Following the decision of Greece’s Northern Aegean Petroleum Company to drill for oil ten miles east of the island of Thasos, Turkey dispatched the research vessel Sizmik I to carry out seismic research on the continental shelf claimed by Greece. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou declared that all necessary measures were to be taken to safeguard Greece’s sovereign rights and placed the Greek armed forces in a total state of readiness (Clogg 1991). The two rivals were at the brink of outright war for the first time since 1976. NATO, however, immediately intervened and forced the two rivals to hold peace talks (Kalaitzaki 2005). Hard pressed by the
NATO, Turkish President Ozal declared that the Sismik I would operate only in Turkish territorial seas, while Greece likewise declared that no drilling would take place in disputed waters.

In January 1996, the two rivals confronted once again over the ownership of two small, uninhabited islands in the Aegean, which Turkey called “Kardak” in Turkish and “Imia” in Greek. The crisis originated from the Greek parliament’s ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, which gave Greece the right to expand its territorial waters from six to twelve miles. Turkey, which was not a signatory to the Convention, declared that it considered any expansion of Greek territorial waters as *cause belli*. During the crisis, Greek nationalists used a grazing ground for goals to raise a Greek flag while Turkish journalists followed to replace it with a Turkish one. The special forces of the two rivals finally landed secretly on both the west and east islands, respectively, and war became a real possibility (Clogg 1992). War was averted during the final hours of the crisis by U.S. intervention. The Clinton administration pressed both sides to stop escalating the crisis by hinting of an arms embargo. Fully aware of the cost of the embargo, both sides finally agreed to return to the status quo ante and issued a non-aggression declaration in Madrid in July 1997 (Athanassopoulou 1997).

In sum, no militarized dispute between the two rivals since 1963 has contributed to the resolution of the Greco-Turkish rivalry relationship on the battlefields. Although Turkey prevailed in the 1974 Cyprus dispute, it had to be satisfied with the
control of about forty percent of Northern Cyprus. The primary reason why the two rivals constantly fail to resolve the dispute in Cyprus and in the Aegean with military force is that the rivals’ further military actions were blocked by a common security patron - i.e., the U.S./NATO. Fearing that a full-scale war between the two allies would lead to a breakup of coalition unity in NATO’s southern flank, the United States and NATO have conducted an intense diplomatic campaign in nearly every military dispute between the two rivals. The harsh response from these patrons with the frequent threat to cut off military and economic aid made it prohibitively expensive the leaders on both sides to continue military efforts on the battlefields. In this way, the security ties with the U.S./NATO have made the Greco-Turkish rivalry persist through the failure of the battlefield solutions.

3. Domestic Political Conditions of Greek-Turkish Rivalry Maintenance

A series of military confrontations between Greece and Turkey, including the 1974 War, created a domestic political condition in which competing political forces have emerged and competed with one another over foreign policy. Based on different threat perceptions and policy preferences, these groups have engaged in a zero-sum political struggle to press their leaders to adopt the policy that they prefer. When the two rival leaders attempt diplomatic settlements of rivalry relationships, therefore, a fierce partisan struggle between the groups was inevitable and a severe policy deadlock occurred. The deadlock
made it extremely costly for the leaders on both sides to move forward with the settlement. Expecting that further diplomatic effort would increase their bargaining costs at home, therefore, the two rivals’ leaders returned to the status quo. The heightened partisan infighting between the veto players and corresponding policy deadlock, thus, were central to the failure of the negotiated termination of Greco-Turkish rivalry.

3-1. The Number and Preference of Greek Veto Players

Greece has a parliamentary system with a unicameral legislature, the Vouli, in which two dominant political forces - conservative and socialist - have fiercely competed with each other. In the 1950s and 1960s, the National Radical Union (NRU), the ruling conservative party, and the Center Union (CU), the leftist opposition party, were two major veto players in Greek government. Keenly aware of the growing power imbalance slanted in favor of Turkey, the NRU consistently represented soft-line voice in the Vouli. Prime Minister Karamanli, the leader of the NRU, and his party echelons justified their soft-line stance by claiming that, “the only way the Greek community would become full masters in Cyprus is the increasing dominance of the economically advanced Greek majority on the islands” (Bahcheli 1990 p. 51).

The Centre Union, which was a major legislative opposition during this time, in contrast, was a staunch advocate of “enosis” and constantly pushed the NRU leadership to accelerate military preparedness on future Turkish attacks on Cyprus. Building on the
widespread anti-Turkish sentiment, held by the majority of the Greek public since the 1955 riots in Turkey, the CU mobilized the public behind its nationalistic cause. Georgios Papandreou, the leader of the Center Union, for instance, frequently harnessed the support of the public by emphasizing the imperative of enosis. However, the NRU’s majority position in the Vouli allowed Karamanli’s soft-liners both to override the powers of the CU and to stabilize the relationship with Turkey (Coufoudakis 1985).

The post-war conservative supremacy, however, came to a halt with the victory of the CU in the elections of 1963. After taking office in 1963, the Papandreou-led government catered to Greek nationalism over the Cyprus issue and constantly renewed the quest for enosis. The seven-year military dictatorship, which led to the collapse of the CU government, further exacerbated Greek relations with Turkey. Greek military leader Ioannidis, who was the most hard line of the hardliners in the military, not only backed for the Greek Cypriot insurgency for union with Greece, but also organized the 1974 coup in Cyprus, which overthrew the government of Archbishop Makarios III. The coup, however, provoked the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, which brought Greece and Turkey to war (Clogg 1992).

After the collapse of the military dictatorship in 1974, Greece returned to a parliamentary democracy with two dominant parties. Karamanlis formed the New Democracy (ND) and won the elections in 1974 and 1977. Nationalist groups led by Andreas Papandreou formed the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and became
a major opposition group, carrying veto power in the Vouli. During this time the ND and PASOK displayed a significant ideological difference over the issue of the Greek-Turkish relationship. Against the backdrop of a humiliating defeat in the 1974 war, the ruling ND sought to find a way out of the Greek-Turkish impasse by negotiations while the hard-line PASOK was opposed to any negotiations with Turkey (Clogg 1992). Supported by a majority in the Vouli, however, the ND was able to continue its accommodative stance toward Turkey by the late 1970s.

The 1980s witnessed the rise of partisan infighting between the PASOK and the ND. The PASOK won two legislative elections and formed the governments in 1981 and 1985, respectively. After coming to power, the PASOK socialists consistently took hard-line stances toward Turkey. Andreas Papandreou, the leader of the PASOK, who had long been a fierce critic of his right-wing predecessors, made it clear that negotiations with Turkey, basically, were pointless because there was nothing to negotiate (Clogg 1991). The ND, now a major opposition in the Vouli, in contrast, defended the policy of compromise that their predecessors advocated. Since 1987, however, a drastic change in the parties’ preference had occurred. Surprised by the 1987 Aegean Crisis which brought the two rivals to the brink of total war, the PASOK tempered its hard-line ideology and began to seek diplomatic solutions. The Mitsotakis-led New Democracy (ND), however, became increasingly hard-line and used its ever-growing hawkish stance for undermining
the PASOK’s legitimacy (Coufoudakis 1991). During this time, therefore, the zero-sum partisan struggle between the two veto groups became routine. The balance-of-power between the two competing veto groups further tightened in the 1990s. After achieving the near-margin victory in the 1996 election, the ruling PASOK coalition continued to pursue an accommodative policy toward Turkey. Nevertheless, the New Democracy, which significantly increased its share of the vote in the election, placed considerable pressure on the PASOK not to go too far in the direction of compromising Greece’s national interest with Turkey. The tug-of-war between the two competing veto groups became routine and an inter-group agreement for a major policy change was impossible.

3-2. The Number and Preference of Turkish Veto Players

Like Greece, Turkey has a unicameral parliamentary democracy in which major veto powers resided in the single house called “Meclis” until 1960. With the 1960 military coup staged by a group of army officers, however, Turkey degenerated into a unit veto system. The military rule ended in October 1961 and Turkey returned to a parliamentary democracy with two major parties - i.e., the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Justice Party (AP). The CHP was a hawkish force and consistently took an antagonistic stance toward Greece since its formation. During the 1963 ethnic clash in Cyprus, for example, Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü and his CHP echelons used the clash as a
means to create both anti-Greek sentiment and a sense of Turkish unity (Adamson 2001). Süleyman Demirel-led the Justice Party (AP), which came to power in 1965, however, was a moderate force and pursued the policy of normalizing the relationship with Greece. By stressing Turkey’s commitment to NATO (Ahmed 1977), the AP attempted to unnecessary military conflict with Greece. During this time, therefore, Turkey’s Greek policy was the result of political bargaining between the two competing veto players.

Turkey experienced another military coup in 1971. Faced with mounting civil uprising and political chaos engendered by ideological strife between the rightist groups and Marxist revolutionaries, the Chief of the General Staff, Memduh Tağmaç, handed the prime minister a memorandum, amounting to an ultimatum which demanded the formation of a strong and credible government, which could put an end to political and social unrest. Claiming that the ultimatum was rejected by the government, the Tağmaç-led military took power and amended the constitution to strengthen the state against civil society. The military ruthlessly purged radical elements in Turkish society and returned the power to the civilian politicians through the 1973 parliamentary election (Ahmed 1977).

The October 1973 parliamentary election marked a turning point in Turkish politics. For the first time since 1950, the CHP failed to maintain its hold on power and had to form a coalition government. Minor parties such as the Nationalist Salvation Party (MSP), the Democratic Party (DP), and National Action Party (MHP) made inroads into
the traditional strongholds of the two major parties (Syari 1977). The CHP formed a coalition government with the hawkish MSP. While in office, therefore, Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit was hard pressed by his hard-line coalition partner to take a more hawkish stance toward Greece, which resulted in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (Adamson 2001).

The military once again stepped into Turkish politics in 1980. Immediately after the coup, all Turkish parties were banned and closed. In 1983, however, the junta allowed the formation of new political parties with some restrictions. Against the backdrop of the new political milieu, Özal’s Motherland Party (ANAP) emerged a dominant party in the 1983 election. Yet, the ANAP’s dominant position gave way to a multiparty competition immediately after the 1987 election. With the substantial decline of its vote share, Özal’s liberal ANAP had to compete with new conservative parties such as the Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP), the True Path Party (DYP) and the Democratic Left Party (DSP). While Özal’s ANAP pursued the policy of extending an olive branch to Greece, these conservative opponents sought to sustain antagonistic relationships with Greece (Kramer 1991). Under this circumstance, the ANAP leadership and the opposition parties were not able to forge an agreement for Turkey’s Policy toward Greece.

From 1989 through the 1990s, the dominant position of the ANAP further weakened and the traditional conservative parties reinforced their veto powers. Bülent
Ecevit’s Democratic Left Party (DSP), Süleuman Demirel’s the Truth Party (DYP), and Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP) in particular, increased their vote shares in the national elections (Aras and Bacik, 2000). Since no party delivered a legislative majority in 1995 election, the ANAP and DYP formed a minority coalition in March 1996. However, the ANAP-DYP coalition was toppled due to the RP’s censure motion, forcing the DYP leader Demirel to form a government with the RP led by Necmettin Erbakan. Soon after coming to power, the Erbakan-led coalition government enraged the military by promoting the agenda of Islamization of Turkey. As a result, Erbakan was forced to resign and the ANAP, DYP and DSP formed the second coalition government (Athanassopoulou 1997). During this time, therefore, Turkey suffered from the chronic frailty of multi-party coalition and any policy change based on inter-party agreement was impossible.

3-3. Veto Players, Partisan Infighting, and the Failure of Negotiated Solutions

The constant failure of military solutions to resolve the key issues in dispute prompted Greece’s and Turkey’s diplomatic efforts to end decades-long hostility through negotiations. A series of military conflicts and corresponding collapse of the military regimes, followed by the return of democracy, provided an opportunity for the two rivals to improve contentious relationships at negotiation tables. Yet, such negotiations had little effect on the termination of Greco-Turkish rivalry. The zero-sum political struggle
between hard-line and soft-line veto groups, which the negotiations provoked on both sides, led to a severe policy deadlock within the rivals’ government, thereby dramatically increasing leaders’ cost of building an inter-group agreement on the negotiations. As a result, the two rival leaders could not move with the negotiations and the contentious relations between the two rivals have persisted over time.

The first comprehensive effort to end the enmity between two rivals through negotiations occurred immediately after the 1974 Cyprus War. During the war, Turkey occupied nearly thirty percent of northern Cyprus and accelerated its effort to control the island. As the crisis escalated, however, an intense diplomatic campaign by the United States and Britain led to the Geneva Conference; the two rivals issued a declaration which called for: 1) a cease-fire; 2) the evacuation of the Turkish enclaves occupied by Greek and Greek-Cypriot forces; 3) the exchange of military and civilian personnel; and 4) the re-establishment of a constitutional government in Cyprus. However, the Geneva Conference achieved little, due to Turkey’s second military operation on the island. Hard pressed by the hawkish opposition who wanted to further exploit the opportunity that the 1974 war created, Turkey continued its military operation, which culminated in the collapse of the Geneva Conference (Bahcheli 1990).

The second diplomatic effort to normalize Greek-Turkish relationships occurred during a military crisis in the Aegean in 1974. In June 1974, Turkey sent an oceanographic vessel accompanied by several warships, to explore parts of the Aegean
where Greek and Turkish claims to the continental shelf overlapped. Athens’s reaction was low-key, chiefly a diplomatic note and the deployment of a small naval force. When the crisis flared up, Turkish Prime Minister Demirel and Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis issued a joint communiqué in May 1975, agreeing to bring the continental shelf issue to the ICJ and solve other problems through negotiations (Bahcheli 1990). In August 1976, however, Turkey sent the Sismik I again to collect seismic data west of Greece’s Lesbos island. This time, Greek armed forces went on full alert, backed by domestic political uproar and a barrage of angry media comments (Clogg 1992).

The diplomatic campaign conducted by the UK and UN, however, forced the two rivals to sign the “Berne Protocol” in November 1976, in which they promised to negotiate on the continental shelf issue and meanwhile to refrain from any drilling. The Protocol, however, failed to settle the dispute in the Aegean. The primary reason that the Protocol accomplished little was that Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis’s diplomatic initiative was significantly constrained by the PASOK nationalists’ political challenge. In the 1977 election, the vote share of the PASOK doubled and Greek politics rapidly disintegrated into the head-to-head confrontation between the two competing veto players, the ND and PSOK. Supportive of both nationalism and the enosis movement, the PASOK strongly opposed any negotiations on the Aegean issue while the ND pushed for the diplomatic settlement of the issue based on the Berne spirit. The zero-sum struggle between these two veto groups led to a severe deadlock and Karamanlis had to delay
further negotiations (Clogg 1992). The Berne Protocol was finally cancelled when the PASOK took power in 1981.

The most critical moment for Greco-Turkish rapprochement came in 1986 when Turkish Prime Minister Özal launched the policy of “extending an olive branch” to Greece. Against the backdrop of democratization that had begun in 1981, Özal wanted to end the decades-long military competition with Greece and to direct the resources for reviving Turkey’s stagnant economy. Özal also believed that the improved relationships with Greece were essential to Turkey’s EC membership and its transformation into the leading economic force in the eastern Mediterranean (Kramer 1991). Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and his PASOK officials, in the first instance, did not take Özal’s peace initiative seriously because they believed that the Motherland party and its leader Özal was still under orders from the military junta.

Yet, the 1986 dispute in the Aegean continental shelf impelled the Greek leaders to attempt a major policy change. In March 1986, Greece’s government decided to drill in the contested Aegean areas. Turkey dispatched a warship to block Greece’s drilling effort, which in turn led to Greece’s deployment of a warship in the area. The possibility of a full-scale war between the two heavy-armed rivals became real for the first time since 1974. Turkish Prime Minister Özal, however, took a soft-line stance by stating that “if they don’t touch our ship, we don’t touch their ship” (Birand 1991, p. 32). This statement gave Papandreou and Greece a strong impression that he would be a man
of peace who did not want war. Since the crisis defused, therefore, both sides began to take confidence-building measures, which led to the Davos meeting in 1988.

The Davos meeting was the first diplomatic initiative that both sides would terminate decades-long hostility at “all fronts.” The meeting brought a hope to both Athens and Ankara that long-standing hostility would end by negotiations at the highest levels. Turkish Prime Minister Özal claimed that now was the time both to break up the long-standing feud and to reap the gains from economic cooperation. Greek Prime Minister Papandreou also felt the need to avoid future crises that would bring the two countries to the brink of all-out war. The common interests in the prevention of outright war and in economic cooperation thus led to a “no-war agreement” at Davos. According to the agreement, the two committees were created to resolve mutual problems. The Economic Committee would look toward mutual benefits from economic cooperation, whereas the Political Committee would draw up a list of problems and measure steps to take toward a basic solution (Birand 1991). Both committees met twice, once in Greece and once in Turkey, during May and September 1988. The two rivals also agreed that the Cyprus problem would temporarily be set aside in the meetings.

As the Davos process continued, however, both Papandreou and Özal realized that they faced formidable political hurdles at home. In Greece, an institutional warfare between Papandreou’s officials and conservative ministers and between the ruling PASOK and the opposition ND erupted. When Papandreou completed a series of initial
talks, and planned to visit Turkey to return Özal’s visit to Athens, the hard-line veto players in the parliament accused Papandreou of abandoning enosis by leaving Cyprus out of the talks. In the parliamentary debate that followed the Davos meeting, Mitsotakis, the leader of the ND, for example, accused Papandreou of “abandoning the cause of Cyprus and of having embarked in negotiations without making substantive talks contingent upon a Turkish troop withdrawal from Cyprus” (Coufoudakis 1991 p. 52). Despite such criticism, however, Papandreou’s officials continued to push for the Davos process by emphasizing the imperative of peace. Consequently, the zero-sum struggle between the two polarized blocs erupted in the Vouli and the policy of the rapprochment with Turkey was completely deadlocked. Expecting the domestic political cost of building an agreement on the rapprochement to be too high, therefore, Papandreou had shied away from carrying out the Davos agreements (Pridham 1991).

On the Turkish side, Prime Minister Özal and his soft-line officials also had to meet political challenges from hard-line elements in government. The Kemalist opposition parties such as SHP and DYP, which had a strong belief that anything other than an “iron fist policy” can hint of Turkey’s weakness, accused Özal’s policy of being “premature.” The opposition to Özal’s Davos initiative also came from within the cabinet. The ANAP leader, Mesut Yılmaz, and the ministries of defense and foreign affairs, which were under the influence of Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, strongly opposed the Davos process by claiming that Özal was making too many concessions without rewards.
The political challenge from these hard-line elements made it prohibitively expensive for Özal to move forward with the initiative, leading to a significant delay in the implementation of the Davos agreements. Akiman, who witnessed the Davos process as Turkey’s ambassador to Greece, summarized the causes of the collapse of the process as follows:

“The hard-liners in the Greek cabinet were unhappy with the Davos process. Their pressure on Papandreou eventually made the latter quietly shy away from this affair. In Turkey, too, Özal’s opponents used this Greek reluctance as an opportunity for them to criticize his government, themselves. As a result, the committee meetings slowly ground to a halt, and a great opportunity for both sides was lost” (Akiman 2002, p. 29).

The two rivals’ most recent effort to end the hostility by negotiations occurred against the backdrop of the 1996 Imia-Kardak crisis. The crisis originated from the Greek Parliament’s ratification of the Law of the Sea Convention, which gave Greece the right to expand its territorial waters from six to twelve miles. In response, Turkey, which was not a signatory to the Convention, declared that it considered any expansion of Greek territorial waters as cause belli. During the crisis, Greek nationalists used a grazing ground for goals to raise a Greek flag while Turkish journalists followed to replace it with a Turkish one. The special forces of the two rivals finally landed secretly on both the west and east islands respectively and the war became a real possibility (Clogg 1992).

The crisis, however, created a strong impetus for the two adversaries to begin the peace process again. On 23 March 1996, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Mesut Yilmaz announced that he wanted to see a “Peace Process” launched to resolve the tensions
between Greece and Turkey. But the proposal was immediately rejected by Greece. The nationalist feeling, which mobilized during the Imia/Kardak crisis, constrained Greek leaders to reciprocate the peace initiative. In 1996, Erbakan, the leader of Turkish Islamist Welfare Party (RP), was elected as a new prime minister in the coalition with Çiller’s True Path Party (DYP). The Islamist prime minister made it clear that his government would be a compromise government. The newly elected Greek Prime Minister Simitis also agreed to pursue a compromise over the Aegean dispute. The two rivals’ movements in the direction of compromise entered a new phase in April 1997 when they accepted a proposal of the Dutch presidency of the EU to establish a committee of wise men to study pending bilateral problems.

Soon after, however, the leaders on both sides had to meet strong domestic political challenge. Prime Minister Simitis faced the mounting criticism inside the Greek government. The ND conservatives began to accuse the government of going too far in the direction of compromising Greece’s national interests. The minister of defense and foreign affairs in the PASOK government also resisted Simitis’ diplomatic approach. Political backlash also occurred in Turkey. The new minority coalition government, which consisted of the DYP and RP, was unable to fulfill its commitment to the compromise because Prime Minister Erbakan was forced to resign by the military. The ANAP leader Yılmaz, who formed a new coalition government with the DSP and DTP, also was prevented from pushing the compromise forward. The new coalition was
completely divided between the ANAP’s soft-liners and DSP’s hard-liners and any agreement on the compromise was impossible (Athanassopoulou 1997). The mounting cost of constructing an inter-group agreement on the compromise at home thus encouraged the two rival leaders to seize a middle ground - i.e., the “Madrid Declaration” in which Greece implicitly accepted the freezing of its right to expand its territorial waters and Turkey expressed a willingness to withdraw its threat of war. The declaration, however, was at best a non-binding and anti-war agreement, which had no effect on the resolutions of the key disputes in the Aegean.

Taken together, the leaders in the two Aegean rivals have constantly failed to settle their contested issues at the negotiation tables due to the domestic political hurdles that the fierce partisan struggle between competing veto players presented. The diplomatic effort from the 1974 Geneva conference to the most recent Madrid Declaration produced heated partisan in-fighting between soft-line and hard-line groups, and the in-fighting often pushed up the leaders’ cost of constructing an inter-group agreement on the negotiated settlement by creating severe policy deadlocks. The Davos peace process, which was the most comprehensive diplomatic initiative to end the rivalry at all fronts, also achieved little because of political challenges that leaders faced at home. The internal politics of the two rivals during the process was completely divided between soft-line and hard-line groups and neither side acquiesced in the policy of the other, leading to a deadlock. Under this circumstance, the leaders’ bargaining cost skyrocketed
and further diplomatic effort was discarded. In this way, the domestic veto constraint has made Greco-Turkish rivalry persist over time through the failure of the negotiated solutions.
Chapter 5 Indo-Pakistan Rivalry Case Study

1. A Brief History of Indo-Pakistan Rivalry

The origin of India-Pakistan rivalry dates back to the period of the two states’ joint independence from the British India Empire. The states of British India, which had been ruled directly from Britain, were scheduled to be divided based on demographics: Muslim states and areas would go to Pakistan and Hindu counterparts would go to India. The state of Jammu and Kashmir, which was nominally independent but recognized as the princely state of the British Crown, however, complicated the process of division. The state had a Hindu monarch, Maharaja Hari Singh, and a Muslim-majority population. Most Muslim religious leaders favored Kashmir’s accession to Pakistan, while the vast majority of poor Muslim peasants supported Kashmir’s accession to India, which expected to provide more economic opportunity (Ganguly 2001).

After the Kashmir leader Hari Singh decided to remain independent, both Indian and Pakistan governments pressed him to join either of the two states. When a tribal rebellion broke out in the southwest area of Kashmir in 1947, therefore, Pakistan, which sought a unified country built around Muslim identity, quickly moved to aid the rebel groups. Faced with Pakistan’s intervention, the Hindu monarch Hari Singh asked for India’s military assistance. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who wished to incorporate Kashmir into secular India, ordered the Indian Army to fight an intense battle
against the Pakistan Army. As the battle continued, however, the leaders on both sides realized that the war would drag on indefinitely, and decided to bring the dispute to the UN Security Council in January 1948. However, the Security Council failed to ameliorate the two rivals’ disagreement about Kashmir.

The so-called first Kashmir War of 1947 created structural conditions under which the two rivals became locked into a vicious cycle of conflict and cease-fire negotiations. Since the end of the first Kashmir War, the two rivals began to believe that it is a moral imperative to include Kashmir into their territories. Given the diametrically opposite national and religious identity, integrating Kashmir into their homeland became a life’s necessity on both sides. From Pakistan’s standpoint, for instance, the homeland of the Muslims of South Asia would be incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir. India also remained equally determined to hold on to Kashmir to demonstrate its strong commitment to secularism and liberal democracy (Nawaz 2008).

Since the first Kashmir war, India and Pakistan fought two major wars and numerous military disputes over a variety of issues in dispute, including the Jammu and Kashmir dispute. These military confrontations created both external and internal structural conditions under which the two rivals would maintain highly contentious relationships across time. At the international level, the confrontations facilitated the formation of strong security ties between the two rivals and other great powers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, China and UK. As a result, the two rivals were able
to restore a rough military balance in the Kashmir theatre and to renew military disputes
over time. Given the restored military parity and frequent intervention of great power
patrons, however, the two rivals have consistently failed to resolve the contested issues
on the battlefields. At the domestic level, the rivalry structured political conditions under
which multiple political groups with different preferences fiercely competed with one
another for their preferred policies. The zero-sum political competition between the
groups, however, led to a gridlock, which prevented the leaders on both sides from
resolving the issues under contention at negotiation tables. The failure of both battlefield-
and negotiated-solutions, thus, was central to the persistence of Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

2. International Political Conditions for Indo-Pakistan Rivalry Maintenance

The hostility between India and Pakistan, which primarily originated from the Kashmir
dispute and consequential wars, created a peculiar external condition under which the two
rivals could maintain contentious relationship for decades. Fully aware of the need for
military preparedness in future conflicts, the two rivals each formed military alliances
with other great powers, notably the United States, Soviet Union and China. The military
or security ties to the great powers not only allowed the two rivals to build their military,
but also induced them to continue military confrontation across time as well. Ironically,
however, the ties made it extremely costly for the two rivals to resolve the Kashmir
problem on the battlefields by inviting the great powers’ intervention and forced them to
return to the status quo ante. Thus, the failure of battlefield solutions induced by the great powers’ interventions was a major external cause of the persistence of Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

2-1. Military Buildups through Security Ties to Great Powers

The hostility between India and Pakistan considerably stiffened when the two rivals began to engage in competitive arms races through the arms transfer and military aid from security patrons such as the United States, Soviet Union and China. The arms supply from the patrons not only made the military competition between the two rivals evenhanded and sustainable over time, but also reinforced existing hostility by creating the two rivals’ false optimism about military victory on the battlefield.

Immediately after the 1947 war, Pakistan, clearly aware of the growing military imbalance against India, was very active in pursuing diplomatic and military ties with external powers. The U.S. incentive to increase its influence in South Asia matched Pakistan’s need to balance against India. On April 2, 1954, therefore, Pakistan and the United States signed a military pact. Under the terms of this agreement, the United States promised to provide Pakistan with substantial military equipment as well as training for the Pakistan armed forces. From the mid-1950s to 1960, Pakistan thus received $447.4 million in military assistance and purchased $427.4 million of military materials from the United States. Hundreds of Pakistani military officers were trained by the United
States (Afroz 2007). Throughout the 1970s, China also played a crucial role in Pakistan’s military buildup. Alarmed by the Sino-India war of 1962, China began to dramatically increase its military aid to Pakistan. Between 1970 and 1980, it provided some 500 tanks, 25 naval vessels, 300 combat aircraft, and much other equipment. By 1980, Chinese military aid had reached a total of $600 million (Wirsing 1985).

The United States’ pro-Pakistani stance pushed India to look for a security patron. Provoked by the U.S. tilt toward Pakistan, the post-Nehruvian politicians concluded that India must develop military strengths as well as diplomatic power by aligning with a great power - e.g., the Soviet Union. From the mid 1950s, therefore, India has constantly requested Soviet conventional arms. The Soviet Union, which had been contending for influence in South Asia with the United States, reacted positively. From the early 1960s onward, therefore, India had received more Soviet assistance than China had. In 1964, for example, the Soviet Union gave India military credits for 44 MiG-21s, 20 helicopters, and 70 PT-76 tanks. The Soviets also had shown considerable restraint in the 1974 test of India’s nuclear device. Between 1976 and 1980, the Soviet Union supplied 82% of India arms imports ($2.3 of $2.8 billion), giving India the fourth largest share (after Libya, Syria, and Iraq) of total Soviet arms exports to non-communist countries (Wirsing 1985).

Washington D.C.’s declining interest in South Asia led to a significant restriction of its military support to Pakistan in the late 1970s. Yet, the Soviet move
toward Afghanistan and the fall of the Shah of Iran dramatically altered the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan, which suddenly became the most important country in the region for the containment of the Soviet Union (Paul 1992). President Carter, responding to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, offered Pakistan a $400 million assistance package in February 1980. The Reagan administration further increased the U.S. arms and economic aid to Pakistan. By 1985, Pakistan became the fourth largest recipient of U.S. bilateral military assistance, behind Israel, Egypt, and Turkey. Responding to the U.S.’ growing military commitment to Pakistan since the Afghan crisis, the Soviets offered additional MiG-31s and licensed the Indian production of MiG-27 ground attack fighters. It also collaborated in India’s plans for indigenization of arms production. Thus, Wirsing expressed his concern about the role of great power patrons in the arms buildup between India and Pakistan as follows:

“Virtually since independence, all branches of the armed forces of India and Pakistan have been heavily dependent on great powers. Directly or indirectly, the supplier states have exercised profound influence on the military balance in South Asia by controlling: the type, quantity, and quality of weapons offered; the timing and rate of arms deliveries; the establishment of pricing, credit, and repayment terms; the provision of infrastructure, spare parts, maintenance, and training; and, not least, the licensing of technology transfer, co-production, and re-export” (Wirsing 1985, p. 273).

The security ties between the two rivals and great powers have contributed significantly to the persistence of contentious rivalry relationships between India and Pakistan. Above all, the ties led to the restoration of rough military balance between the
two adversaries, especially in the Kashmir theatre. The arms supplies from the U.S. and China, for instance, allowed Pakistan to offset its quantitative inferiority with qualitative superiority. Thanks to the qualitative superiority, Pakistan was able to concentrate heavy military force in the Kashmir theatre. Similarly, Soviet arms supplies helped India both to maintain an edge in quantitative capabilities and also to fortify its military capabilities in Kashmir. As a result, the military capabilities, which have been deployed against each other in the Kashmir theatre, have been on an almost equal footing for over four decades (Paul 2006).

The great power ties also made the Indo-Pakistan rivalry persist over time by creating the false optimism of incorporating Kashmir into their territories by using military force. Encouraged by constant supplies of weapons and diplomatic support from the great power patrons, the two adversaries have intensified their efforts to monopolize control of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan leadership, for instance, not only waged a number of bloody military disputes, but also constantly supported pro-Pakistan insurgents as well (Ganguly 2001). India also has never abandoned its effort to integrate Kashmir into its territory, although its stance was largely defensive and reactive. The arms supplies from the Soviets, in particular, muted India’s incentive to settle the Kashmir issue through negotiations and prompted it to stand firm in the Kashmir issue with the frequent threat to escalate the Kashmir dispute into all-out war (Wirsing 1985).
Taken together, the arms transfer and military aid from great power patrons and corresponding balance of military capabilities in the theatre of contest deprived the two adversaries’ incentives to resolve the dispute via non-military tools. Built upon the unremitting military and diplomatic support from the patrons, the two rivals have relentlessly militarized the Jammu and Kashmir problem. It was not the two rivals’ destiny to compete militarily with each other for so many years without the military support of their security patrons.

2-2. Great Power Ties and Failure of Battlefield Solutions

The restoration of rough military balance in Kashmir and consequential optimism of military victory have led to a number of military confrontations between India and Pakistan. Ironically, however, the security ties between the two rivals and great powers made it extremely difficult for either of the two states to resolve the Kashmir problem on the battlefields. Fully aware that any military dispute between the two heavily-armed rivals would escalate to a full-scale war, the great powers made systematic efforts to prevent military crises from spiraling out of control. The threat to cut off military aid, the deployment of warships around disputed area, and growing diplomatic pressure by the great power patrons all pushed up the two rivals’ expected costs of military solutions and compelled them to return to the status quo ante in Kashmir.
The first massive military confrontation between India and Pakistan occurred in the summer of 1947. The communal rioting in Poonch accompanying the independence and partitioning of India and Pakistan began to spread from Punjab into Jammu and Kashmir. The Pakistan government provided logistic support to the Poonch rebels and their Pathan allies. With his domain on the verge of collapse, however, Hari Singh signed Kashmir’s accession to India on October 26, 1947. Consequently, the India government began airlifting troops and supplies to the capital of Kashmir, which resulted in pitched battles between the two rivals. As battles continued, however, Britain stepped in to stop the fighting. Still under the influence of British Crown, Pakistani military leader Kahn and Prime Minister Nehru found that referring the Kashmir dispute to the UN security Council would not only avoid London’s further pressure, but also contribute to the resolution of the dispute through negotiations (Potter 1998). In the Security Council proceedings, however, the U.S. and UK adopted a decidedly pro-Pakistani stance, while the Soviet Union endorsed India’s position. The politicization of the Kashmir problem by the two opposing blocs led to a failure of the UN effort to demilitarize Kashmir (Ganguly 2001).

The second Kashmir War broke out when Pakistani leader Ayub Khan approved the infiltration operation in Jammu and Kashmir in 1965 to precipitate an insurgency against the rule by India. Pakistan military intelligence units created the false impression in governmental circles that powerful Kashmiri resistance forces would rise up to join an
insurgency (Ganguly 2001). When the Pakistan army crossed the ceasefire line in southern Kashmir, however, India retaliated with a dramatic offensive across the Indo-Pakistan border. As the fighting intensified, the great powers intervened to prevent the conflict from spiraling out of control. Immediately after India’s retaliation, for example, the Johnson administration pressed both sides to stop the fighting by imposing an arms embargo (Hagerty 2003). The Soviet Union also stepped in and urged both sides to initiate a cease-fire talk. Increasingly dependent on the military assistance from the two superpowers, Indian prime minister Shastri and Pakistani president Kahn realized that further military action would complicate the security cooperation with the two superpowers. The two rivals finally agreed to the Tashkent Agreement in which the two warring parties agreed to return to the status quo ante. Despite the bloody fighting in the war, therefore, the two rivals were not able to resolve the Kashmir problem on the battlefield.

India and Pakistan fought another bloody war over the issue of East Pakistan in 1971. A long-standing demand for regional autonomy in East Pakistan led to the Pakistani military regime’s brutal crackdown on the East Pakistani population, which resulted in the flight of some ten million refugees into India. India responded with helping both to liberate East Pakistan and to create the new state of Bangladesh. Pakistan responded with a pre-emptive air strike on India’s northern air base in 1971, leading to the India Air Force (IDF)’s massive retaliation on a West Pakistani air base. In the midst
of the war, however, the Nixon administration, which was receiving strong diplomatic
support from Pakistan to improve its relations with China, sent a naval task force, not
only to demonstrate its support for Pakistan, but also to prevent India from dismembering
West Pakistan (Van Hollen 1980). The dispatch of the American fleet in the Bay of
Bengal prompted the Soviet Union’s intervention. Fearing that the further escalation of
the war would lead to a crisis in which the two superpowers must confront each other in
South Asia, Moscow also placed considerable pressure on Indian leadership to withdraw
its troops from West Pakistan. Knowing that continuing military operation would further
enrage Moscow, Indian leadership finally relinquished its ambition for crippling
Pakistani military and returned to a cease-fire agreement.

India and Pakistan were embroiled in a violent and deadly conflict again in the
late 80s. Provoked by the widespread corruption in the 1987 local elections, which
allowed the India-backed coalition to come to power, the tide of violence and unrest
swept throughout the Kashmir Valley, and a full-blown secessionist insurrection raged
against India (Ganguly 2001). Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto decided to aid the
insurgency in Kashmir while India increased its troop strength to quell the insurgents.
The military clashes in the Valley continued through much of 1990, raising Washington
D.C.’s concern about the dangers of nuclear war in South Asia. In middle of May,
therefore, the United States intervened to stop the fighting. Robert Gates, the U.S. deputy
national security advisor, accompanied by Richard Haass, a member of the National
Security Council, visited New Delhi and Islamabad, calling for restraint from both sides (Hegarty 2003). U.S. President, George H.W. Bush and President Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union also issued a joint statement urging both sides’ restraint over Kashmir (Ganguly 2007). These diplomatic efforts dramatically increased the two rivals’ political costs of continuing the fighting and pushed them to restore the status quo in Kashmir.

In 1999, India and Pakistan plunged into another full-scale war along the Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. The *cause belli* was the Pakistani attempt to infiltrate regular troops and Kashmir insurgents on the Indian side of the LoC. The combination of Pakistanis’ false optimism and Indian complacency contributed to the outbreak of the Kargil War of 1999 (Ganguly 2001). With the help of the Indian Air Force (IAF)’s air strikes, India recaptured twenty-one positions that the Pakistani insurgents had secretly captured. Despite the surge of human and material costs on the battlefields, however, Pakistani leaders refused to stop fighting, leading to intervention by the United States. Worried that the war between the two nuclear rivals would engulf the entire region in nuclear catastrophe, the Clinton administration strongly urged both sides to resist escalating the conflict. Clinton also dispatched the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. Anthony Zinni, to prevail upon Pakistan leaders to call an end to the Kargil operations (Hagerty 2003). In the immediate aftermath of Zinni’s visit, Gordon Lanpher, a U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state for South Asia, visited New Delhi to counsel restraint by the Indian leaders (Riedel 2002). In the mist of the U.S. ongoing
pressure, Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif came to the conclusion that withdrawing the army and insurgents from the battlefields would be less costly than continuing the fighting. Once again, Pakistan’s effort to resolve the Kashmir problem on the battlefield failed due to the intervention by the United State.

Taken together, no militarized dispute between India and Pakistan since their independence from Great Britain has contributed to the ultimate resolution of contested issues - most notably the Kashmir dispute. Over the past five decades, the two rivals plunged into three major wars and numerous small-scale skirmishes but none of these helped to end the costly rivalry relationships on the battlefields. The primary reason that the two rivals constantly fail to resolve their contested issues by military means is that the great powers, such as the United States, Soviet Union, and UK, intervene in most conflicts and prevent one side from prevailing on the battlefields. Fully aware of the potential dangers of a full-scale war between the two heavily armed rivals, the powers have constantly pressed the two rivals to discard their military effort using a variety of tools, such as diplomatic pressure, the deployment of warships and the threat to cut off military aid. These preventive efforts dramatically increased the two rivals’ cost of continuing military operations, leading to the battlefield stalemate. As a result, the Kashmir problem was left unresolved and Indo-Pakistan rivalry has persisted over time.

3. Domestic Political Conditions for Indo-Pakistan Rivalry Maintenance
A series of wars and recurring military skirmishes between India and Pakistan created a domestic political condition in which competing political forces have emerged and competed with one another over foreign policy. Equipped with different threat perception and policy preferences, these groups have engaged in fierce political struggles to impel their leaders to adopt the policy that they prefer. When the two rival leaders attempt negotiations, therefore, head-to-head partisan infighting between the groups was inevitable and a severe policy gridlock occurred. The gridlock pushed up the leaders’ costs of constructing an inter-group agreement on the negotiations and forced them to return to the status quo—i.e., the maintenance of the rivalry. The heightened partisan infighting between the competing veto players and corresponding policy gridlock, thus, was an internal cause of the persistence of Indo-Pakistan rivalry.

3-1. The Number and Preference of Indian Veto Players

For most of the years since independence, India’s politics has been a parliamentary democracy. Although there were two houses of parliament, e.g., the Council of States (the upper house) and Lok Sabha (the lower house), the former carries only the powers of recommendations to the bill that the latter introduces. Thus, the political competition over foreign policy has primarily occurred in the Lok Sabha. Since its independence from the British Crown, ten to twelve minor parties have been represented in the Lok Sabha
but the Indian National Congress (INC) has been the single largest post-independence political party until 1979. Coalition government was rare and the INC played a key role in shaping New Delhi’s policy toward Pakistan from the 1950s to early 1960s. During this time, the INC behaved like a “unit veto” player and frequently overrode the veto powers of nationalist opposition parties like the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS) and Swatantra Party (SP). If the INC leadership favored a policy change, it would have easily obtained cabinet approval. At the early stage of India-Pakistan rivalry, therefore, two dominant leaders in the INC, e.g., Prime Minster Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi, had enormous influence in the formulation and implementation of India’s foreign policy toward Pakistan (Chaulia 2002).

Since the mid 1960s, however, the non-Congress parties began consolidating their veto power. Among others was the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which was the political arm of Jana Sangha (or RSS) that vehemently resisted the dictatorial and dynastic rule of the INC. The hard-line BJS in particular firmly pressed Indira Gandhi’s government to commit itself to India’s territorial integrity and not to ease the hard-line stance toward Pakistan. This resulted in the enactment of various central laws and constitutional provisions that allowed the government to delay procedural democracy in Kashmir (Saideman 2005). The pressure from the BJS thus was a major cause of the INC’s hawkish turn toward Pakistan throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
From 1977 on, India experienced the surge of partisan struggles between soft-line INC and hard-line veto players. Ms. Gandhi’s rule by Emergency Law precipitated the formation of the Janata Party (JP), the anti-Congress bloc, and brought it to power in 1977. Since then, numerous anti-IN C parties emerged and fought against the INC to increase their representation in the Lok Sahba. After the JP failed to sustain a parliamentary majority, fear of the INC’s repressive control of the government led to the formation of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which became a credible “nationalist” alternative to the INC throughout the 1980s. Seizing the popular delusion derived from the INC’s number of corruption scandals and an opportunity to reshape national politics and state ideology, the BJP incorporated a call for “value-based politics” into India’s party system and established itself, in contrast to the INC (Seshia 1998). From 1977 to 1989, therefore, India’s Pakistan policy was the result of political struggles between the INC and BJP.

From 1989 onward, India experienced a radical party realignment in which the political base of INC was further eroded by the BJP and other powerful third parties. During this time, no government was able to form a one-party government. The INC fell from its position from overwhelming dominance at the national level, concomitant with the steady ascendance of the BJP and the proliferation of numerous regional parties. The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist party, in contrast, gained substantial strength as the major opposition to the INC at the national level. Based on cultural
nationalism, which emphasizes India’s superior ancient Hindu glory, it has attempted to replace the softness of Nehruvian and Gandhian foreign policy with Hindu masculinity (Chaulia 2002).

The years 1996–2000 were a period of turmoil with several short-lived coalitional governments holding sway. The BJP formed a government briefly in 1996, followed by the “United Front Coalition” that excluded both the BJP and the INC. In 1998, however, the BJP returned to power by forming the center-right coalition, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with thirteen minor parties and became the “first non-Congress government.” In this period, therefore, there were at least fourteen veto players with different policy preferences in the BJP-led ruling coalition. The power struggles between the BJP and its coalition partners became routine and the BJP suffered from a chronic instability of the coalition. The BJP leaders thus frequently had to compromise Pakistan policy with the coalition partners and major policy change was impossible because the partners’ veto power was widely dispersed.

3-2. The Number and Preference of Pakistani Veto Players

veto system in which Khan and his civilian officials acted as a collective veto player and took a tight control of foreign policy. During this period, the military and nationalist politicians—notably Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto—fed off each other to create a national consensus that India is a major security threat to Pakistan (Tremblay and Schofield 2005). They also disseminated an idea that a strong army equates to a strong state. The propagation of anti-Indian sentiment by Pakistan’s military regimes had served the purpose of unifying the larger population with regard to foreign policy goals.

In the 1970 parliamentary election, the Peoples Party (PPP) contested with full force, defeating both the far-right wings and center-right forces in West Pakistan, although it faced a definite defeat in East Pakistan where communist forces were very active. After the independence of East Pakistan, however, Bhutto and his PPP became a dominant party in the National Assembly of Pakistan. For the first time in the history of the country, the democratic socialists came to power. Bhutto and his civilian government promulgated the 1973 constitution and put the country on the road to parliamentary democracy. Built upon a legislative majority in the assembly, Bhutto also took a highly accommodative stance toward India. However, his policy of accommodation often mobilized political opposition from Islamist veto players, such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam, and Markazi Jamiat-Ulema-Pakistan (Ali 1972).

The political turmoil after the 1977 general election, however, invited the Pakistan military intervention in politics, which resulted in the installment of a military
dictatorship. General Zia ul-Huq, who became a unit veto player through the 1977 coup, embraced the Islamist vision of state and used it for shoring up his political legitimacy (Nasr 2005). Consequently, Islamist organizations such as the Jam‘at and Jamiat-I Ulama Islam, aligned with Zia and exercised strong influence on Pakistan’s India policy. Clearly defining Pakistan’s identity as an Islamic one, the military-Islamist alliance justified their rule by the imperatives of defending Pakistan from the unrelenting threats from India. This antagonistic stance continued until Zia died in a plane crash in 1988.

Democracy returned in 1988 after the general election, which was held after the death of General Zia. The election saw the victory and return of the Peoples Party (PPP) back into Pakistan politics. This period, lasting until 1997, introduced the parliamentary democracy with two dominant parties: the PPP, center-left socialist, and the Islami Jumhoori Ittihad’ (Islamic Democratic Alliance, IJT), the center-right conservatives. Over this period, the two opposite blocs had engaged in a zero-sum struggle for increasing their influence over foreign policy. Bhutto and her ruling PPP took a highly accommodative stance toward India while the PML-led IJT pushed for the policy of continued confrontation. After returning to power in 1990, however, the center-right conservatives also became engulfed in a power struggle between right-of-center civilian politicians and military officials aligned with Islamists, which ultimately led to the breakup of the alliance.
In the midst of the power struggle, the PLM’s leader, Nawaz Sharif, created a strong political base in the 1993 election. The result of the election suggested the emergence of a strong right-of-center party whose political base was based neither on Islamist parties nor on the military. Capitalizing on the parliamentary majority, Sharif concentrated the executive power in his hand and finally imposed a “state of emergency,” by which he obtained enough power to rule by ordinances. From 1997 to 2002, therefore, political competition in Pakistan primarily occurred between the competing factions within the PLM - e.g., Sarif’s cronies and hard-line military officials (Rizvi 1998). These two competing factions plunged into a head-to-head infighting over the policy toward India (Jones 2002).

3-3. Veto Players, Partisan Infighting, and the Failures of Negotiated Solutions

Given the decreasing utility of major war as a solution to decades-long hostility in Indo-Pakistan rivalry, the only viable solution is to compromise by negotiations. As compared to other rivalries, however, both India’s and Pakistan’s diplomatic efforts to compromise with each other have been relatively rare and intermittent. Major structural shocks such as democratization in Pakistan, the end of the Cold War, and bloody wars opened a window of opportunity to the rivals’ improved relationship but rarely led to the end of the rivalry hostility. At the heart of the failure of the negotiated solutions is the domestic political obstacle that foreign policy leaders on both sides faced. In particular, the zero-sum
political struggle between competing veto groups and consequential policy gridlock dramatically increased the leaders’ bargaining costs and prevented them from terminating the hostility at negotiation tables.

The first effort to normalize relations between India and Pakistan through negotiation occurred immediately after the end of the Second Kashmir War. Soviet premier Alexei Kosygin, in an attempt to expand Soviet influence in South Asia and limit Chinese influence in Pakistan, invited Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan to the Soviet Central Asian city of Tashkent to mediate a post-war settlement. Under the auspice of Kosygin not only did the two sides agree to a ceasefire and return to the status quo ante, but they also agreed to abjure from the use of force to settle outstanding territorial disputes. The conference was viewed as a great success and the declaration that was released was hoped to be a framework for lasting peace (Ganguly 2001).

However, the Kashmir dispute was left unresolved in the agreement. Despite the overriding need to resolve the dispute, the leaders on both sides had shied away from mentioning the problem during the negotiations largely because of the domestic political challenge. Indian Prime Minister Shastri and the ruling INC, who pushed for the resolution of the Kashmir problem from the beginning of the negotiations, faced strong pressure by the extreme Hindu opposition not to barter away India’s core interest for the sake of peace (Edwardes 1966). The struggle between the INC and the oppositions led to
a stalemate so that Shastri could not move forward with the issue of the settlement of the problem. Pakistan’s domestic political situation was similar to that of India. Pakistani leader Kahn made a massive effort to settle the Kashmir issue because he believed that it was the ostensible cause of the war. Yet, substantial pressure to resist the settlement came not only from the opposition parties but also from those in power, most notably Bhutto, the minister for external affairs. Expecting the cost of building an inter-group agreement on the Kashmir issue to be high, Khan finally decided to negotiate only the withdrawal of troops in the cease-fire agreement.

Domestic political obstacles presented by internal political struggles between competing veto blocs, thus, resulted in the Tashkent Agreement, whose effect was highly limited on the improvement of contentious relationships between the two rivals. The major benefit that India and Pakistan obtained in the agreement was the withdrawal of armed personnel from territories occupied or otherwise penetrated during the war. Nevertheless, the fundamental cause of the rivalry - the Kashmir problem - was totally set aside during the negotiations due to the gridlock that internal political struggles generated on both sides. Thus, the agreement held no near prospect of ultimate termination of Indo-Pakistan hostility. One outside observer, who witnessed the whole peace process in Tashkent, wrote that, “India and Pakistan settled for vagueness on every issue except the disengagement of troops (Edwardes 1966, p. 382).”
Another peace agreement between India and Pakistan emerged against the backdrop of Pakistan’s humiliating defeat in the Bangladesh War of 1971. Pakistan, which suffered a huge military defeat in the war, need to negotiate with India, which now wanted to exploit the after-war situation for enhancing its strategic interests. The summit between the two rivals was the first India-Pakistan dialogue at the highest level since the Tashkent meeting. Yet, Indian Prime Minster Mrs. Gandhi and Pakistani President Bhutto, met with diametrically opposed views. Backed by the decisive victory in the war, Mrs. Gandhi used the issue of Prisoners of Wars (POWs) as a lever to settle all disputes on their own terms while Bhutto made it clear that he would take a step-by-step approach (Burke1973).

As the negotiations moved forward, domestic political pressure escalated on both sides. On the Indian side, the Jana Sangh Party, the major nationalist opposition, requested that the cease-fire agreement include a permanent resolution of the Kashmir problem. Yet Mrs. Gandhi, who was skeptical about the resolution of the Kashmir dispute in a kind of cease-fire agreement, hesitated to bring the dispute to the negotiation table. The two veto groups thus were unable to agree on the terms and conditions that India had to push for in the negotiations. Pakistani Prime Minister Bhutto also encountered the similar problem. Keenly aware of Pakistan’s weakened bargaining position, Bhutto took a step-by-step approach to settle the Kashmir problem. But Pakistani veto groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Pakistan Democratic Party were opposed to any
compromise on Kashmir during the negotiations. The internal political struggles on both sides thus led to a deadlock over the Kashmir problem at the negotiation table (Ali 1972).

The deadlock, however, was settled, primarily because of India’s concession. Knowing that the Kashmir dispute would complicate the peace process, Mrs. Gandhi decided to leave the settlement of the dispute to future negotiations. The INC’s landslide victory in the 1971 election in particular helped Mrs. Gandhi to override the resistance from the JSP and other minor nationalist parties. After much argument by both sides and exchange of drafts, the two leaders finally formed the Simla agreement on 2 July 1972. The agreement not only provided a mechanism to facilitate the withdrawal of forces to the Indian-Pakistan border, but also contributed to the improvement of bilateral relations between the two rivals by declaring the two rivals’ intent to put an end to the conflict and confrontation and to live in peaceful coexistence (Tahir-Kheli 1973). Yet the most intractable issue, Kashmir, remained unsettled and both parties agreed to meet again for the discussion of the issue at a mutually convenient time in the future. The period of détente, followed by the agreement, lasted until the early 1980s.

The most comprehensive diplomatic effort for ending contentious relations at all fronts was triggered by the simultaneous nuclear tests of India and Pakistan during May 1998. New Delhi’s nuclear tests of May 11th and 13th generated anxiety and resentment in Islamabad and intensified its fear that India might use its enhanced nuclear capabilities to coerce Pakistan to make concessions over Kashmir. Not surprisingly, Pakistan responded
to India’s nuclear provocation by testing its own nuclear device. The 1998 Nuclear Test Crisis, however, generated grave concern for nuclear war between the political elites on both sides.

The first sign of the talks to reduce tension came from New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister, Vajpayee, wrote a letter to its Pakistani counterpart, Sharif, on June 14th, in which he reiterated India’s strong commitment to peaceful relations and the development of what he called a stable structure of cooperation. Sharif accepted Vajpayee’s initiative and the two leaders met to discuss the worsened situation at the 10th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). The ensuing meetings, including the summit, however, failed to produce a breakthrough in the two parties’ stalemate in the Kashmir issue. Another hope for peace came from Pakistani prime minister, Sharif’s acceptance of an Indian journalist’s suggestion to welcome his prime minister’s traveling on the inaugural bus journey to Lahore. In the immediate aftermath of the acceptance, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee accepted Sharif’s invitation to ride on the bus to Lahore, one of Pakistan’s most historical and symbolic cities (Wheeler 2010).

At Lahore, the two prime ministers reached agreement on two documents. The first document was the “Lahore Declaration,” which delineated the general principles to regulate India-Pakistan relations in the new nuclear security environment of South Asia. The second one was a “Memorandum of Understanding,” signed by the Indian and Pakistani Foreign Secretaries, in which both sides pledged to inform each other of any
ballistic missile tests, to continue their moratorium on nuclear testing and to work toward an upgrading of communication links, as well as to take other measures that would reduce the risks of an accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons (Mahmood 1999, 34). Both sides also committed themselves to setting up working groups to investigate and resolve the details with a view to reaching a formal treaty by the middle of 1999. However, the Declaration acknowledged the dispute over Jammu and Kashmir only with the general commitment that both sides would intensify their efforts to resolve the problem.

The hope and expectation that the Lahore peace process would materialize into a durable peace, however, evaporated shortly after the Lahore summit, primarily because of domestic political obstacles that the leaders of the two rivals faced at home. On India’s side, the Vajpayee’s government had to face severe political challenges from hard-line forces in the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which consisted of thirteen political parties. The Shiv Sena, the most nationalist coalition partner, accused the Prime Minister of attempting to establish an “elusive peace” without the settlement of Kashmir. The hard-liners in the BJP also denounced the prime minister’s policy. Indian Home Minister Lal Krishan Advani, for instance, made a statement in Lok Sabha that “Kashmir is an integral part of India and there can be no compromise on it at any point of time” (Mahmood 1999 p.35). He even called for Akhand Bharat, which is an irredentist movement to include Pakistan and Bangladesh into India to form a Hindu confederation.
Encountering such criticisms, Prime Minister Vajpayee fought his way on grounds that the process helped to overcome the fear and suspicion that poisoned relations between the two rivals (Wheeler 2010). The zero-sum partisan struggle between the hard-line factions and Vajpayee’s soft-line officials created a severe deadlock in the Lok Sabha, which made it extremely costly for Prime Minister Vaipayee to establish working groups with Pakistan.

The frailty of the BJP-led coalition government also prevented the Vajpayee government from pushing for the Lahore peace process. In April, 1999 Ms. Jayalalitha, who was the leader of a minor coalition partner - the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK) - made two demands for continued support: the reinstatement of Navy chief Vishnu Bhagwat; and transfer of Defense minister George Fernandes, to a less sensitive ministry. When the demands were rejected by the Prime Minister, Jayalalitha announced that she was removing her eighteen members from the NDA. Consequently, a confidence vote in Parliament was taken and the government lost by one vote in the 545-member Lok Sabha, leading to the collapse of the BJP-led coalition on April 17.

The verbal provocation from India’s hard-line leaders, the deadlock over the Kashmir issue within the BJP government, and the collapse of the BJP-led coalition all contributed to the intensification of political struggle between the hard-line and soft-line factions in the PML-led Pakistani government. The Pakistani Foreign Ministry and
military, which rallied around General Musharraf, began pressing Sharif not to yield on the Kashmir issue (Wheeler, 2010). The Islamist party Jamaat-I-Islam also strongly opposed any sort of compromise with India by mobilizing nationalist groups across the nation. These groups accused Sharif of downplaying the importance of the Kashmir issue (Mahmood 1999). The collapse of the BJP-led coalition in India also provided a strong rationale for Pakistan hard-liners to intensify their efforts to derail the peace process. Citing that Vajpayee’s caretaker government had neither the willingness nor the ability to carry out the declaration, they forced Sharif to return to a previous antagonistic posture.

Despite such opposition, Sharif and his soft-line officials did not give up the attempt to compromise on Kashmir and to transform the Lahore declaration into a formal peace treaty. Several rounds of secret discussions about Kashmir occurred between officially designated representatives of the Indian and Pakistani governments between 3 March and 27 June 1999 (Jones 2002). The Lahore peace process, however, was utterly shattered by the Kargil War. The cause of the Kargil War is still unclear, but it is widely believed that the hawkish element in the Pakistani government, notably the military, which was quite critical of Sharif’s policy of the compromise with India, launched secret military operations to derail the Lahore peace process (Ganguly 2001; Jones 2002; Wirsing 2003). Faced the war, Sharif was not able to move forward with the negotiations on Kashmir with India.
To summarize, India and Pakistan have constantly failed to settle their contentious rivalry relationship through negotiations due in large part to the domestic political obstacles that the zero-sum partisan struggle between competing veto players presented to the leaders seeking the settlement. Both the Tashkent and Simla agreements contributed to the amelioration of the hostility that the 1st and 2nd Kashmir Wars engendered, but were nothing more than cease-fire agreements, which rarely contributed to the resolution of the Kashmir dispute. The policy deadlock, which head-to-head partisan struggles created between soft-line and hard-line groups on both sides, dramatically increased the leaders’ costs of constructing an inter-group consensus on the Kashmir issue and, as a result, the leaders were prevented from discussing the issue at the negotiation table. The Lahore peace process, which came closest to the termination of rivalry relationships by negotiation, also achieved little because of the political hurdles that leaders faced at home. The internal politics of the two rivals during the Lahore summits were completely divided along the lines of “continued confrontation” and “compromise.” Under this circumstance, neither of the soft-line and hard-line groups pursued its preferred policy unilaterally, leading to a severe policy deadlock. The deadlock not only obstructed the creation of working groups, but also caused a severe political backfire - i.e., the Kargil offensive in Pakistan, which resulted in the official death of the Lahore peace process.
Chapter 6 Argentine-Chilean Rivalry Case Study

1. Brief History of Argentine-Chilean Rivalry

The modern hostility between Argentina and Chile is rooted in competing ownership claims on the area surrounding the Beagle Channel, located at the southern tip of South America. During their formative years of state-building, the two rivals started to reinforce their sovereignty claims over the area. The competing territorial claims came to be fused with competing national identities which had emerged against the backdrop of the wars of independence against the Spanish Crown (Garrett 1985). This postcolonial condition set the stage for developing rivalry between Argentina and Chile.

The Beagle Channel had been at the heart of the disputes. The use of the Beagle Channel as a divisor began with the Treaty of Limits of 1881. In this treaty, Chile and Argentina agreed that the Isla de los Estados and all other islands east of Tierra del Fuego would belong to Argentina, and that Chile would possess all islands south of the Beagle Channel and north of Cape Horn, and all islands west of Tierra del Fuego (Lindsey 1987). However, developments in navigational technologies, changes in maritime jurisdiction, and increase of regional trade all made the agreements of the 1881 treaty obsolete and the two rivals began to change the status quo in the Channel in their favor.

The territorial controversies worsened through the early 20th century by the shared misperception that each of two sides suffered substantial territorial losses due to
the military incursion of the other side during the nineteenth century. On Argentine side, it had been widely believed that Argentina’s territorial loss in the Andes and Pantagonia was the result of Chile’s illegal occupation of the territories. A parallel perception also had existed in Chile (Child 1985; Thies 2001). The misperception led the two rivals both to develop and to consolidate the hostility against each other. During WWI and WWII, however, the territorial dispute was dropped as important event because economic adjustment and political instability were paramount concerns in both countries (Talbott 1974). It was only after the end of WWII that the two rivals renewed activity in the Beagle Channel area, followed by a series of militarized disputes (Garrett 1985).

The territorial disputes and consequential hostility, that the disputes had generated, structured both external and internal condition such that the two adversaries could maintain extremely contentious relationships across time. At the international level, the hostility prompted the two rivals to rapidly build their military with the help of external powers. The United States in particular played a key role in the military buildups of the two rivals. Having been preoccupied with the imperative of containing communist forces in Latin America, it signed “Rio Treaty” with both Argentina and Chile and provided massive military aid. The arms transfer and military assistance from the U.S. not only allowed the two rivals to sustain an evenhanded military competition for decades, but also prompted them to militarize the dispute in the Beagle Channel. The rough military balance, that the U.S. military assistance facilitated, and the diplomatic
intervention from the U.S., however, made it difficult for the two rivals to resolve their territorial controversies on the battlefields. At the domestic level, the rivalry created a political condition in which the competing veto players with different policy preferences emerged and engaged in a zero-sum partisan struggle over foreign policy. The struggle often led to a deadlock, which prevented the leaders on both sides from resolving the disputes at negotiations table. If was only after the leaders on both sides broke the deadlock by nullifying the hard-line veto players’ opposition that Argentina and Chile resolved the Beagle Channel dispute and terminated their decades-long rivalry relationship at negotiation tables.

2. International Political Conditions for Argentine-Chilean Rivalry Maintenance

The contentious relationship between Chile and Argentina began to significantly consolidate when the two rivals were militarily tied to a common security patron—e.g., the United States. The ties with the U.S. not only allowed the two rivals to build their military through the arms transfer, military aid and training from the U.S., but also pushed them to militarize the disputes in the Beagle Channel. With the help of the U.S. military aid and training, the two rivals produced numerous boundary disputes and were brought to the brink of all-out war in 1978. Faced with the crisis, however, the United States stepped in to force the two rivals to avert war. It also pushed the Vatican to mediate the dispute. Such diplomatic efforts dramatically increased the two rival leaders’
cost of resolving the Beagle Channel dispute on the battlefields and encourage them to return to the status quo ante. Thus, Argentine-Chilean rivalry persisted through the failure of the battlefield solution of 1978.

2-1. Military Buildups through Security Tie to Great Power

The disputes on borders and the Beagle Channel had a huge effect on the consolidation of rivalry relationships between Argentina and Chile. For the continuation of effective military confrontation, the two adversaries rapidly fortified their military along the borders from 1950 onwards. The military buildups on both sides were largely indebted to the military assistance from the United States. Built upon the Military Assistance Program (MAP), the U.S. government helped both Argentina and Chile to equip their forces with the U.S.-provided armaments. In 1946-1969, for example, the US provided roughly 129.1 million in military aid to Argentina and 143.2 million to Chile (Baines 1972). The U.S. also played a key role in training military officials in the two rivals. By sending military advisory groups, it helped the two rivals both to improve the quality of military education and to modernize the organization of the forces (Fitch 1979).

In addition to the military support at the bilateral level, the U.S. incorporated Chile and Argentina in an overarching collective defense system-i.e., the Organization of American States (OAS). Since WWII, the U.S. and Latin-American countries realized that unilateral action could not ensure the territorial integrity of the American nations in
the event of extra-continental aggression. To contain conflicts within the hemisphere, therefore, the U.S. created a system of collective security, i.e., the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (or Rio Treaty), in 1947. The Treaty was transformed into the OAS in 1948—when the U.S. Secretary of State George Marshall persuaded Latin-American countries to transform the Treaty into an overarching regional organization. The OAS allowed the U.S. to be the near-monopoly supplier of military hardware to the two rivals and to use its hegemonic position to prevent one of them from gaining the military superiority (Ebel et al., 1991).

The security ties with the United States have contributed to the hardening of hostility between Argentina and Chile in two ways. First, the military buildups, which the U.S. military assistance facilitated, helped the two rivals to reach rough military parity and to maintain it over time. Subjecting to the imperative of containing Cuba communism into the hemisphere, the U.S. provided almost equal amounts of military aid, including direct arms transfer, and military training throughout the 1960s. Both Argentina and Chile used the aid to strengthen military position against each other. As a result, the military competition between the two rivals became quite evenhanded over an extended period of time (Ebel et al., 1991).

The U.S. military assistance and consequential military balance also contributed to the persistence of Argentine-Chilean rivalry by creating inflated hope of military success on both sides. Encouraged by the U.S. military aid, the leaders on both
sides, particularly the military regimes, had systematically developed the myth of “stolen patrimony” and used it for creating optimism that they could monopolize control of the territories in dispute (Child 1985). From the early 1960s on, for example, Chilean leaders began to increase military presence in the Beagle Channel in an attempt to use the tightened control of the Channel for consolidating their domestic political standing. The military leaders in Argentina, who were aware that their continued legitimacy was dependent upon their commitment to the homeland, also had became reliant more on military tools in securing its control on the Beagle Channel. Consequently, the military dispute in the Channel became regular occurrences in the 1960s and 1970s (Thies 2001). The continued military conflict, that the inflated hope of military success had prompted, in turn consolidated the mistrust and antipathy on both sides, leading to the persistence of Argentine-Chilean rivalry.

In sum, the security ties between the two rivals and great powers-notably the United States-had significantly contributed to the persistence of contentious rivalry relationships between Chile and Argentina. The military assistance from the U.S. not only allowed the two adversaries to restore rough military parity, but also prompted them to define territorial interest in a zero-sum term. Built upon enhanced military standing, the two rivals also rapidly militarized the Beagle Channel dispute. The inflated hope that the Channel could be controlled by military means, coupled with territorial nationalism,
constantly pushed the two rivals to produce recurrent militarized dispute, which led to a significant hardening of rivalry hostility.

2-2. Security Ties and the Failures of Battlefield Solutions

The restoration of rough military balance and consequential optimism of military success have led to a number of military disputes between Argentina and Chile. Equipped with the US-provided arms, the two rivals made systemic efforts to monopolize control of the borders and the Beagle Channel in disputes. Paradoxically, however, the security ties to the U.S. made it extremely difficult for the leaders on both sides to achieve the goal. Knowing that the military conflict between the two heavily-armed rivals would lead to a major war in Southern Cone, the U.S. and its key ally UK deeply intervened in the military crises between the two rivals, notably in the 1978 crisis. Such interventions dramatically increased the leaders’ costs of resolving the territorial controversies on the battlefields, leading Argentine-Chilean rivalry to persist across time.

From the early 1950s on, Argentina and Chile experienced a series of militarized disputes over the issue of the ownership of the Beagle Channel. In 1954 Chile established a naval station on Navarino Island to serve as a command post for disputes in the area. Argentina responded to Chile’s installation of the station by destroying an automatic beacon on Snipe Island in 1958, followed by the landing of 80 sailors to seize the island (Thies 2001). This incident had a rippling effect across the previously settled
borders such as Palena Valley and the Puna de Atacama. Since these island incidents, the border conflict between the two rivals became routine.

The recurring military tension and the hostility that the incidents prompted on both sides materialized into a major military crisis in 1964. The rumor that Argentine-backed coup would be launched against Chile to topple Allende’s socialist government had surfaced and a Chilean border guard was killed and three other Chilean soldiers were taken prisoner by Argentine force (Thies 2001). Massive anti-Argentine protest occurred in Santiago and the Chilean congress went into emergency session. Hard pressed by nationalist groups within the Congress, Allende sent heavily armed police to the area (Talbott 1974). Fearing that further confrontation might lead to a full-scale war, however, both sides de-escalated the crisis and submitted the controversy to the International Court of Justice at the Hague.

In May of 1968, the two rivals were brought again into a real possibility of full-scale war in the Beagle Channel. Citing the insecurity of their naval base at Ushusia, Argentina began the operation of the air forces and navies and Chile responded with the same kind of operation. Faced with simmering risk of war, however, cooler heads prevailed, and in 1971 President Allende of Chile and President Lanusse of Argentina asked Queen Elizabeth II to arbitrate the boundary in the Beagle Channel (Thies 2001). The Agreement for Arbitration, which was signed in London on 22 July 1971, designated
an Arbitral Court and stipulated that the decision from the Court would be transmitted to
the British crown, which could accept or reject the decision.

The Arbitral Court reached its conclusion in February 1977. Queen Elizabeth
adopted the decision and delivered it to Argentina and Chile. The arbitration, however,
largely favored Chile, rejected the Argentine biocenanic principle, recognized Chilean
sovereignty of the three islands, and divided the channel to give each country navigable
waters (Lindsley 1987). Not surprisingly, Argentina refused to accept the ruling and
requested bilateral negotiations with Chile by declaring the award “fundamentally null”
(Garrett 1985). Dissatisfied with the decision from the Court, Argentine began to send
planes and ships violating Chilean air and maritime space. On December 9 1978,
Argentina finally called upon its armed forces reserves and sent a naval squadron into the
Beagle Channel region. In response, Chile also dispatched vessels to the area and
instructed its navy to defend its territory (Garrett1985). Argentina sealed its borders with
Chile and expelled over 3,000 Chileans from the country (Thies 2001).Both sides
expected that war was imminent

When the crisis escalated into a near status of all-out war, however, the United
States intervened for preventing the war between its two hemishpere allies. The
American embassies in Santiago and Buenos Aires informed both sides that war was not
an acceptable alternative in the eyes of the Carter administration (Garrett 1985). United
States Ambassador Raul Castro also arrived in Buenos Aires just hours before the
military operation. He lobbied a military commander, and then traveled to Cordoba in an attempt to forestall military action. The Carter administration also pushed the Vatican to accelerate its diplomatic effort to mediate the dispute (Lindsley 1987). In addition to the direct diplomatic pressure, the U.S. pushed the two rivals to hold bilateral talks in the OAS. These diplomatic efforts finally led to the rival leaders’ acceptance of Pope John Paul II’s mediating role in the dispute.

Together, Chile and Argentina had failed to resolve their territorial dispute, notably the Beagle Channel dispute, on the battlefields. The fear that military dispute between the two heavily-armed rivals might lead to major war prevented the leaders on both sides from escalating the dispute to severer one. The diplomatic intervention from the great powers such as Great Britain and the U.S. also made it difficult for the two rivals to resolve their territorial controversies through the use of military force. The British government made a constant effort to arbitrate the Beagle Channel dispute. The U.S. also conducted intensive diplomatic campaign at both bilateral and multilateral level to prevent the direct military clash between the two rivals during the 1978 crisis. These interventions increased the two rival leaders’ costs of resolving their territorial disagreements on the battlefields and encouraged them to search for diplomatic settlement.
3. Domestic Political Condition of Argentine-Chilean Rivalry Maintenance

A series of military disputes between Argentina and Chile over the issue of the Patagonia and Beagle Channel structured a domestic political condition in which competing political groups with different policy preferences could compete fiercely with one another over foreign policy. When the two rival leaders tried their luck at the compromise of rivalry through negotiations, the groups engaged in a head-to-head partisan struggle, leading to a severe policy deadlock within governments. The deadlock, the struggle induced, made it prohibitively expensive for the leaders on both sides to construct an inter-group consensus for the compromise and encouraged them to return to the status quo ante-i.e., rivalry.

3-1. The Number and Preference of Chilean Veto Players

Chile has a presidential system in which president and multiple parties in Congress shares veto powers. Before the 1973 coup led by Augusto Pinochet, it enjoyed the oldest, most vibrant democracy in Latin America. In the Lower House elections of 1950 and 1953, the Traditional Conservative Party (PCT), which had represented conservative and a nationalist segment of population, obtained a larger share of the vote and became a ruling party under radical president Gabriel Videla (1946-1952). The Social Christian Conservative Party (PCSC), which represented more liberal ideology, in contrast, became a major opposition veto player. In December 1953, the Traditionalist Conservative Party
joined with part of the Social Christian Conservative Party and formed the United Conservative Party (PCU). The other half of the Social Christian Conservatives joined with the Falange Nacional in 1957 and formed the Christian Democrat Party (PDC). Since then, the right-wing PCU and leftist PDC maintained a tight partisan balance in Chielan politics. When it comes to the policy toward Argentina, the PCU advocated hardline stance while the PDC was opposed to it (Parish, Jr. 2006).

In the 1970s, Chile experienced a great transformation in its party system. Salvador Allende, a socialist politician, was elected as Chilean president (1970-73). Responding to the ascendancy of the socialist candidate, conservative Chilean parties, including the PCU, formed the National Party (PN), a coalition of the right-wing parties of the Chilean political spectrum. The leftist parties, in contrast, coalesced into People’s Unity (UP), which became a staunch advocate of Allende’s socialist government. Between 1970 and 1973, therefore, Chilean party system was totally divided between socialist and conservative blocs (Valenzuela and Scully 1997). As a result, Allende had great difficulty introducing a major change in the policies that he pursued.

In 1973, Chile degenerated into a unit veto system when General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende’s socialist government and became the president of the Government junta of Chile. Pinochet installed a systematically repressive 17-year military government. While in office, he disbanded the Congress and made the military junta serve as the government’s legislative body. As a result, Pinochet was able to
dominate Chilean policy making, including foreign policy, by drafting or introducing legislation. In dealing with Argentina, however, Pinochet was a geopolitical realist rather than mindless hard-liner. Keenly aware of the potential benefits of economic cooperation with Argentina, he became more willing to respond to the peace overtures from Argentine counterparts through the 1970s.

3-2. The Number and Preference of Argentine Veto Players

Like Chile, Argentina has a presidential system but the adoption of proportional electoral system allowed a number of minor parties to be represented in Congress. From the mid 1940s on, however, Juan Perón was three times elected President of Argentina, and his ruling Peronist Judicial Party (PJ), obtained most seats and became a dominant party. There was only one opposing party of importance—the Radical Civic Union (UCR)—but its legislative power was significantly weakened because of Peron’s charismatic leadership (McGuire 1997). Until a military took over the government 1966, Argentina thus had the presidentialism with a dominant party. Under this circumstance, President Peron and his PJ took a tight control of foreign affairs and exercised considerable influence on the policy toward Chile. Keenly aware of potential benefits of the cooperation with Chile, Peron and the PJ took a consistently soft-line stance, which materialized into the Treaty of Economic Union in 1953 (McGuire 1997).
In 1955, Argentina experienced a military coup, and Eduardo Lonardi, a Catholic nationalist, assumed leadership of the revolutionary junta that overthrew Juan Perón on September 16, 1955. After experiencing three-year rule by interim government by the military, Argentina returned to democracy by electing Artuno Frondizi as new president in 1958. Under Frondizi presidency, Argentina was dominated by the Intransient Radical Civic Union (UCRI). Since the Lonardi-led military junta already banned Peronist parties in 1955, the UCRI achieved a landslide victory in 1958 election and became a unit veto player. President Frondizi, who was backed by the UCRI, continued Peron’s policy of compromise and agreed with Argentina to create the Latin America Integration Association (LAIA). But the economic and social stresses led to Frondizi’s 1962 overthrow (Parish, Jr. 2006).

Argentina under President Arturo Illia’s presidency (1963-1966) moved into multiparty system. People’s UCR (UCRP) and the center-left UCRI obtained most votes in the election but minor parties such as Union of the Argentine People (UDELPA) and Democratic Progressive Party (PDP) also obtained some setas in Congress. In this period, hard-line president Illia and other liberal opposition parties had engaged in a heated partisan infighting over the issue of the Beagal Channel dispute. Yet the infighting didn’t last too long due to the military coup in 1966. After toppling the civilian president Illia, the hard-line military dictators, such as Juan Carlos Onganía, Roberto Levingston, and
Alejandro A. Lanusse completely dominated foreign policy making and led a highly antagonistic policy toward Chile (Thies 2001).

After the retreat of the military junta in 1973, the presidential system with two dominant parties was reinstalled in Argentina. The Justicialist Liberation Front (PJ), which was a loose coalition between the former Peronists and conservatives, and the UCR obtained most of votes, and became two major parties in Congress. The returned former president Perón and his third wife Maria Martinez assumed office and wielded a substantial influence on Argentine foreign policy. The political and social turmoil during Peron’s third term, however, gave Argentine military a rationale to step into politics, which resulted in the installment of general Videla’s military regime (1976-1981). During Videla’s regime, Argentina degenerated again into a unit veto system, in which de facto President Videla served as a single veto player. Equipped with chauvinistic ideology and strong anipathy toward Chile, Videla rapidly antagonized Argentina’ realtionship with Chile, which culminated in “1978 Operation Soberanía” in the Beagle Channel area.

After Videla’s regime collapsed due to the Malvina/Falkland fiasco, Argentina was brought into a road to democracy. In the 1983 election, reformist President Alfonsín and the Radical Civic Union (UCR) were given a majority in the Lower House and became a ruling party. During this period, president Alfonsín, who was a staunch advocate of peace and cooperation, wielded exceptionally strong presidential power. Backed by the majority position in Congress, he pursued the policy of compromise with
Chile through negotiations by utilizing decrees of urgent necessity, which were not constitutional provisions (Parish, Jr. 2006).

3-3. Veto Players, Partisan Infighting, and Failures of Negotiated Solutions

Over the course of rivalry, both Argentine and Chilean government had made numerous efforts to improve their bilateral relationship at negotiation tables. Most of the efforts, however, had not materialized into a comprehensive rapprochement until 1984. The government’s policy of diplomatic settlement provoked head-to-head partisan infighting between the accommodationists and nationalistic groups, which often resulted in a severe policy deadlock within the government. The deadlock pushed up the leaders’ cost of constructing an inter-group agreement on the settlement, leading them to return to the status quo ante.

The first diplomatic effort for terminating Argentine-Chilean rivalry since WWII was made in the early 1950 by Argentine President Juan Perón. Motivated by his ambition to form a South American alliance, Perón offered Chilean President Gabriel Videla negotiations for a “Treaty of Economic Cooperation” (Thies 2001). Videla responded positively because the postwar collapse in copper prices had devastated Chile’s economy, and he needed the new markets and investment. But negotiations hadn’t materialized into any formal treaty of economic cooperation because the Chilean conservative party, the PCT, strongly resisted the president’s policy of cooperating with
Argentina. Videla and the ruling the Social Christian Party had fought their way against the PCT, but failed to obtain the PCTs’ approval in the ratification of the treaty (Parish, Jr. 2006).

Argentine President Frondizi initiated the next cycle of cooperation with his Chilean counterpart Alessandri, after a series of border incidents, including military actions in the Beagle Channel. In 1959 Frondizi visited Santiago and the two leaders agreed to the arbitration to resolve border problems, followed by economic and political integration. The agreement, however, unraveled soon partly because of the collapse of Frondizi’s government and partly because of the policy deadlock in the next civilian government. Right after coming to office, President Arturo Illia and his officials came under the pressure from the hawkish military, the UCRI, and nationalist press. Illia’s soft-line officials and these hard-line veto players were deadlocked over the issue of political and economic integration with Chile. Expecting the cost of breaking the deadlock to be high, Illia reverted to hard-line nationalism (Thies 2001).

The Argentine military regime led by Alejandro Lanusse and a Chilean socialist President Salvador Allende restarted the next round of compromising effort. Facing economic and political crises at home, both leaders sought to end costly rivalry relationship by resolving the disputes in the Beagle Channel. In 1971 the two parties signed an agreement submitting the Beagle issue to arbitration panel organized by Queen Elizabeth in 1971 under provisions of the old 1902 treaty (Garrett 1985). Argentine
military generals, who had strong hostility toward Great Britain due to the dispute over the Malvinas/Falkland Islands, however, pushed their leader not to accept the British arbitration. Faced with the challenge from the inner-circle of the military junta, Lanusse became less willing to resolve the dispute through the British arbitration (Thies 2001). Chilean President Allende’s effort to resolve the dispute by the panel’s arbitration also completely unraveled as a result Pinochet-led military coup in 1973.

Since the 1973, the relationship between Chile and Argentina became rapidly exacerbated. When the arbitration award came out from the International Court of Justice which three small islands in the Beagle Channel handed down to Chile in 1978, the hard-line military officials in Argentina began to press de facto President Videla not to compromise on the Channel with Chile, claiming that the court’s decision not only threaten national honor, but also forces Argentina to cede an area of potential economic and strategic value (Thies 2001). The opposition of the hard-liners made it extremely difficult for Videla to accept the award. Videla finally declared the award fundamentally null and returned to previous antagonistic posture. Despite the 6-year diplomatic efforts that Great Britian and the ICJ had made, therefore, Argentina and Chile failed again to resolve the Beagle Channel dispute through the arbitration.

4. The Termination of Argentine-Chilean Rivalry
Since the collapse of the 1978 negotiations, the two rivals were brought to the risk of an all-out war over the issues of the Beagle Channel. But the U.S. massive diplomatic campaign and Vatican’s mediating effort defused the crisis. Since the end of the crisis, the two rivals faced the most favorable condition for the compromise on all disagreements, including the Beagle Channel dispute, through negotiations. A series of structural change, such as the Falkland War, the collapse of the military junta and corresponding democratization in Argentina, gave new impetus for the leaders on both sides to resolve the dispute at negotiation table. Against the backdrop of such structural changes, Argentine President Alfonsín and Chilean dictator Pinochet overrode domestic hard-line veto groups and agreed to the “Treaty of Peace and Friendship” in 1984.

4-1. Structural Shock as a Trigger of Termination of Argentine-Chilean Rivalry

The Argentina’s defeat in the 1983 Falkland War and consequential collapse of Videla’s military regime changed both external and internal condition in Argentine-Chilean rivalry such that the leaders on both side might introduce a major foreign policy change. The disastrous years of military government capped by the Malvinas fiasco left officer corps divided and demoralized and allowed reformist government to take office in a stronger position relative to the military (Thies 2001). The newly-elected reformist President Raúl Alfonsín introduced an idea that the longstanding dispute with Chile had presented an obstacle to Latin American solidarity, as well as a continuing source of military influence.
in Argentina. Such new idea pushed Alfonsín’s to increase his effort for regional cooperation and integration.

On Chilean side, the retreat of the military junta in Argentina, which had taken consistently antagonistic stance toward Chile, encouraged Pinochet and the military officials to revise decades-long hostile approach to Argentina. Expecting that the new leadership in Argentina would produce a breakthrough in foreign policy, Pinochet and his cronies began to think of the potential benefits of cooperating with Argentina. The danger of a full-scale war that Chile faced during the 1978 crisis, coupled with economic downturn, also led Chilean leadership to revise its long-standing antagonistic approach to the Beagle Channel dispute.

But it should be noted that such changes in structural conditions did not directly lead to the resolution of the Beagle Channel dispute and corresponding peace treaty between Argentina and Chile. To produce a breakthrough in their rivalry, the top leaders on both sides had to overcome a domestic political hurdle that the decades-long hostility has created at home. Among others was the heightened partisan struggle between the nationalist groups and accommodationists. As the leaders on both sides hinted of compromising on contested issues through negotiations, these competing veto groups began to hard press their leaders to adopt the policy that they advocate. The hawkish nationalists attempted to block the leaders’ peace efforts while the accommodationists began to buttress the leaders’ policy of compromise. The zero-sum struggle between the
two opposite blocs thus created a severe policy deadlock within the governments of the two rivals.

4-2. Weak Veto Players, Coalition of Peace and Rivalry Termination in 1984

The newly elected Argentine President Alfonsín had a strong commitment to creating solidarity between Latin American countries. He believed that the major obstacle to Latin American solidarity stems from the long-standing disputes in the Beagle Channel and consequential enduring hostility between Argentina and Chile. Alfonsín thus put high priority on the resolution the Beagle Channel dispute by negotiations. Alfonsín’s accommodative stance sent a strong signal to Chilean dictator Pinochet that Argentine leadership is ready to introduce a major foreign policy change, especially over the issue of the Beagle Channel.

Committed to building stable peace in Latin America, Alfonsín initiated the decisive stage of negotiations with a proposal to reopen talks on the basis of a 1980 papal proposal. He proposed first to resolve the Beagle Channel question and then to raise the level of economic and political cooperation between the two countries. Pinochet responded to the proposal positively.

As the negotiations continued, however, a formidable domestic political obstacle crystallized on both sides. In Argentina, a number of lobbying groups equipped with nationalistic causes formed under the names like the “Argentine Sovereignty
“The Beagle and South Atlantic Movement,” and the “Movement for Sovereignty Affirmation” (Parish, Jr. 2006). The Judicialists Party (PJ), a major legislative opposition aligned with the movements to derail Alfonsín’s peace initiative. Parallel organizations also formed in Chile, such as the “Committee for Defense of Chilean Sovereignty.” Retired army officers and politicians from Pantagonian districts led the movement. A Chilean diplomat issued extremely provocative press release accusing Pinochet’s policy of compromise (Parish, Jr. 2006). Faced with the mounting challenge from these nationalist groups, the accommodationists fought their way by emphasizing the long-term benefits of compromising the rivalry. The partisan struggle between the opposite blocs finally degenerated to an institutional warfare within the governments of the two rivals.

However, the concentration of executive power on top leadership, coupled with the significant weakening of the powers of the nationalist veto groups, allowed Alfonsín and Pinochet to break the deadlock that the warfare generated. On Argentine side, President Alfonsín had achieved a landslide victory in the 1983 election and his URI became a majority party in the Lower House. The democratic transition, that got its own start, also enabled Alfonsín to use substantial informal power-i.e., presidential decree— which was not constitutionally authorized. Using the decree, Alfonsín ordered a non-binding plebiscite, which resulted in an overwhelming victory in which more than 80 percent favored the peace treaty with Chile (Parish, Jr 2006). The plebiscite helped the
UCR-dominated Lower House to approve the treaty of peace and friendship. To finalize the ratification of the treaty, however, Alfonsín had to obtain the approval of the Senate in which both the UCR and PJ, a major opposition, maintained a close partisan balance. By stressing the potential benefits of the peace treaty, however, Alfonsín skillfully co-opted small moderate parties so as to vote for the treaty. The Argentine Senate finally ratified the treaty in March 1985.

On Chilean side, the military junta was still a unit veto player and acted as the government’s legislative branch which held the authority to ratify treaties with foreign countries. Given Pinochet’s tight control of the junta, however, a major foreign policy change depended primarily on Pinochet’s willingness and capability. Although many nationalist groups opposed the treaty, especially in the south where presumed Argentine threat was closet, they had little effect on the ratification process in the face of Pinochet’s firm support (Parish, Jr. 2006). After Argentina ratified the treaty, therefore, Pinochet-led Chilean junta completed its ratification.

The 1984 rapprochement between Argentina and Chile vividly shows how structural shocks are inextricably intertwined with domestic politics to generate the termination of long-lived rivalry. The Argentina’s military defeat in the Malvinas/Falkland War and subsequent the collapse of the military junta provided a window of opportunity through which the leaders on both sides could revamp the costly contentious relationship. The retreat of the military junta in Argentina allowed reformist
President Alfonsín come to office with a proposal to reopen talks with Chilean leader. The proposal by the democratically elected leader prompted Pinochet’s positive response. However, negotiating peace between the two rivals generated a zero-sum political struggle between the nationalists and accommodationists. Alfonsín and Pinochet, who enjoyed substantial executive powers, however, overrode the nationalist veto players’ opposition. The major veto players on both sides,-i.e., the PJ in Argentina and the nationalist groups in Chile-were politically too weak to challenge the strong authority that Alfonsín and Pinochet enjoyed during the negotiations. A unique institutional configuration, i.e., the combination of low veto constraint and strong executive power-thus was central to the termination of Argentine-Chilean rivalry.
Chapter 7 Conclusion

My research began with a simple question “Why international rivalries persist over an extended period of time?” To answer the question, I develop “a modified two-level game approach” to rivalry maintenance and test the hypotheses drawn from the approach for the population of international rivalries, 1819-2001. My central claim is that rivalry maintenance is the result of leaders’ optimal behavior to both international and domestic political constraints. At the international level, my approach postulates, the security tie to great powers contributes to rivalry maintenance partly by restoring military balance between two rivals and partly by facilitating the powers’ intervention in the military conflict that the rivals produces. The restored balance of power and the intervention dramatically increases the rival leaders’ cost of ending rivalries with military force, leading to the persistence of the rivalries. At the domestic level, the approach suggests, the policy gridlock, which the head-to-head partisan struggle between competing veto players generates against the backdrop of a compromise, pushes up the leaders’ cost of ending the rivalries at negotiation tables, leading to the persistence of the rivalries.

The statistical analysis presented above provides considerable support for my argument. First, the analysis shows that the great power tie at the international level and the veto constraint at the domestic level are central to the persistence of international rivalries. The indicators of the two explanatory variables, such as great power tie, nuclear
great power tie, veto constraint at the dyadic level, the higher score of veto constraint, the veto constraint at the dyadic level after controlling for structural shocks, and the higher score of veto constraint after controlling for structural shocks, all have statistically significant and positive effect on the hazards of rivalry termination. The results suggest that these variables make rivalries last longer. The analysis of the hazard ratios of the variables also shows that the effect of the variables is substantive as well as significant.

The historical examination of the cases of both rivalry maintenance and termination also shows that the causal mechanisms that the modified two-level game approach postulates are very clearly manifested in the cases. The security ties between Greek-Turkish rivalry and the U.S./NATO, and between Indo-Pakistan rivalry and the U.S./the Soviet Union not only made the military competition between the rivals evenhanded, but also prompted them to renew constantly the military disputes in the issues in dispute, notably Cyprus/the Aegean and Kashmir. Faced with the disputes, however, the great power patrons deeply intervened to stop things from getting out of control. Expecting the further military effort to be extremely costly due to the great powers’ intervention, the leaders in the rivalries stopped fighting and returned to status quo ante, leading the rivalries to persist. At the domestic level, the partisan infighting between opposite veto players and resulting policy gridlock made it extremely difficult for the leaders in the rivalries to resolve the Cyprus/Aegean and the Kashmir dispute at negotiation tables. The gridlock dramatically increased the leaders’ costs of constructing
an inter-group consensus on the diplomatic settlement of the disputes and forced them to preserve the status quo ante.

A significant variation on the key explanatory variable, i.e., the level of veto constraint, however, leads to completely different outcome—i.e., rivalry termination. Argentine-Chilean rivalry, like Greek-Turkish and Indo-Pakistan rivalries, had long maintained a close security tie to the U.S. and, as a result, the two adversaries constantly failed to resolve their territorial disagreements on the battlefields. The Argentina’s military defeat in the Malvinas/Falkland War and subsequent the collapse of the military junta, however, opened a window of opportunity through which the leaders on both sides could revamp the costly rivalry. Committed to restoring peace in Latin America, reformist Argentine leader Alfonsin first proposed to hold the talks for the treaty of peace and friendship to Chile. Expecting the benefits of the cooperation with democratizing Argentina to be reasonably high, Chilean leader Pinochet reciprocated the proposal. As the two sides were nearing the treaty, however, the nationalistic opposition in both countries became increasingly vocal. Yet, a unique institutional configuration, i.e., the significant weakening of the powers of hard-line veto players in legislative body, allowed the leaders on both sides to bypass the opposition and to complete the ratification of the treaty. The low level of veto constraint thus was central to the negotiated termination of Argentine-Chilean rivalry.
The major contribution of this research to extant rivalry scholarship is two-fold. First, I develop a comprehensive approach in which structural and agentic factors are carefully interwoven to explain the process by which rivalries persist through the failure of both battlefield and negotiated solutions. Allegedly, prior study of international rivalries takes an overly structural approach and pays disproportionate attention to the causes of the beginning and termination of international rivalries. So, the causes of the rivalry maintenance are relatively ignored by the study. Even the study whose focus is on the maintenance process of the rivalries overemphasizes the impact of the failure of battlefield solution on rivalry maintenance, thereby dismissing the possibility that the rivalries can persist through the failure of negotiated solutions. By focusing on the interplay between structural constraint and rival leaders’ choice, however, my approach illustrates that the rivalry maintenance is the result of rival leaders’ optimal behavior subject to both international constraint-i.e., the security ties to great powers-and domestic constraint-i.e., partisan infighting between competing veto players and resulting policy deadlock. I believe that this approach offers a better understanding of the rivalry maintenance because it carefully interweaves the variables, which the prior studies ignore or treat separately, into a comprehensive framework.

Second, my research provides a strong empirical support for the argument that great power ties and partisan conflict between competing veto players are central to the persistence of rivalries. By employing a dataset that offers intensive information about
international and domestic political situation of international rivalries, my statistical analysis substantiates the expectations that the modified two-level approach generates. The statistical evidence also is confirmed by the process-tracing case studies of Greco-Turkish, Indo-Pakistan and Argentine-Chilean rivalries. The studies illustrate that the full range of causal mechanisms that the approach predicts is clearly manifest in these rivalries.

Despite such interesting findings, however, this research is the initial step for complete understanding of the dynamics of rivalry maintenance. Since my research primarily focuses on political elites operating within both international and domestic constraints, it rarely examines the impact of media and patriotic public on rivalry maintenance. Several studies have already noticed that the pressure from nationalist media supported by patriotic public is another possible reason why rivalries persist for a long period of time (Mor 1997; Huth 1996; Thies 2001). The future research must devote more attention to the combined effect of political elites, nationalist media and patriotic public on rivalry maintenance.

While such work remains to be done, there are clear lessons to be drawn from this research. Rivalry maintenance is the result of the interplays between structural and agentic factors. Such structural constraints as the security tie to great powers and the pressure from domestic veto players are inextricably intertwined with leaders’ concerns for national and domestic political interest to make rivalries last longer. Hence, any
foreign policy leaders, who seek to terminate long-lived rivalry relationship, must design and implement termination policies that can overcome such two-level constraints simultaneously. Given the disutility of major war, the only viable option for rivalry termination is the compromise through negotiations. My analysis illustrates that rivalries are more likely compromise with one another if their leaders construct and maintain a stable ruling coalition through which they push both great power allies and domestic veto players to stand behind the policy of compromise.


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