The Pragmatic Alternation Between Two Negative Imperatives in Argentinian Spanish

DISSERTATION

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University

By

Mary Cathleen Johnson

Graduate Program in Spanish and Portuguese

The Ohio State University

2013

Dissertation Committee:

Professor Scott Schwenter, Advisor

Professor John Grinstead

Professor Terrell Morgan
Abstract

Throughout the Spanish-speaking world, we find competition between the use of the 2nd person singular pronouns tíu and vos and their corresponding verb forms. In Argentinian Spanish (AS), speakers alternate between the tuteo negative imperative (TNI) and the voseo negative imperative (VNI), as shown in examples (1) and (2):

(1) ¡No cantes! 'Don't sing!' (TNI)

(2) ¡No cantés! 'Don't sing' (VNI)

Previous research has shown that the VNI and the TNI in AS differ in meaning. Fontanella de Weinberg (1979) notes that the VNI is more forceful, while the TNI is more polite. Johnson & Grinstead (2010) found the VNI to be more pragmatically restricted than the TNI, and propose that the VNI expresses urgency. The current study consists of an analysis of two online surveys of native speakers of AS in order to form a more accurate description of the meaning difference distinguishing these negative imperatives. This dissertation explores how this meaning difference comes about both pragmatically and socially.

Survey 1 explores the effect of immediacy on the choice of imperative used. A context is immediate if the interlocutor is already performing the action that the speaker is requesting they not do. A context is neutral if the action is not yet in progress. Respondents were provided with contexts eliciting a negative imperative response, and were asked to choose which response they would choose in each context. Results indicate
that immediacy, as well as anger condition the use of the VNI, while neutral contexts disfavor it. Dialectal and social differences emerge, such that inside Buenos Aires, males use the VNI more than females in all contexts but angry ones. Outside of Buenos Aires, the only contexts in which the VNI is significantly more likely to be used are the angry ones, and there is no effect of gender. These results point to a pragmatic difference in licensing across dialects of AS.

In Survey 2 participants were given 7 brief contexts, each one followed 4 different utterance types that they needed to evaluate: one VNI, one TNI, one question, and one declarative. The participants were asked to rate how certain the speaker was that the addressee would have performed the action addressed in the utterance on the scale from 1 to 5. Results indicate that the VNI is rated as significantly more certain than the TNI (p<.001). A dialectal difference also emerges, which parallels that found in Survey 1. The VNI is rated as significantly more certain outside Buenos Aires than it is inside Buenos Aires (p<.001).

My data indicate that the VNI conveys information about what the speaker believes to be true of the addressee's intentions. This information is conveyed via Conventional Implicature. Further related meaning, such as anger, among other meaning, is conveyed via Conversational Implicature. The social manifestations of this meaning difference are also explored.

While commands are generally believed to be addressee-oriented, my data provide evidence that information about the speaker, namely their beliefs about the addressee’s intentions, may also be encoded in the command. My results also point towards a dialectal difference of pragmatic restrictions on the VNI.
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my family.
Acknowledgments

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all those who made my graduate studies and the writing of this dissertation possible.

First and foremost, I would like to thank my advisor, Dr. Scott Schwenter, for his guidance and support throughout the dissertation writing process. His research expectations went from scaring me in the beginning of my graduate studies, to encouraging and pushing me in the end, and I owe much of my productivity to him. He has prepared me as a researcher and has been my mentor in both pragmatics and sociolinguistics. I am grateful for his knowledge, expertise, and encouragement, without which I would have never begun working on pragmatics. His insight over caribou coffee with Sonia Barnes, where I write these acknowledgements, led to the progression and eventual completion of this dissertation. For this I am appreciative.

I would also like to express my appreciation for Dr. John Grinstead, who helped me develop my initial hypotheses and exploratory research on my dissertation topic. Furthermore, I thank him for the opportunity to get involved in fieldwork on child language acquisition in Ohio, from which I learned a lot, as well as his collaboration on initial voseo research in Nicaragua and Argentina. John’s support and guidance has been essential to my success as a graduate student.
I am also grateful to Dr. Terrell Morgan, for his help with summer research and IRB approval, as well as for his enthusiasm for Dialectology, and for the voseo, which fed my interest. His sincere interest in my research ideas throughout my graduate studies, from Columbus to Nicaragua, inspired me to continue with my graduate program and investigations. Terrell’s support and guidance throughout my graduate career have been significant to me, and I am grateful.

Next, I would like to thank the friends and colleagues that have accompanied me and helped me throughout this journey. First, I would like to thank Sonia Barnes, who sparked my interest in statistics, taught me much of what I know, and gave me the tools to learn more. I would also like to thank Sarah Sinnott, for discussions regarding the combination of pragmatic and indexical meaning. Her work and insight have been essential to this dissertation and to the future directions I will take it. I also thank Meghan Armstrong for her encouragement, and both academic and personal support throughout the dissertation writing process, without which I may not have made it out alive. I would like to thank Carter Taylor, whose support and friendship have meant very much to me and have helped me make it through my MA program. I also thank Jenny Barajas for her support and friendship throughout my graduate career.

The data for this dissertation was collected with much help from Christy García, who I thank for her help in distributing my online surveys to friends and contacts in Argentina, as well as for sharing her connections to help me get started with my interviews and the matching task in Buenos Aires. I am also thankful to the professors at the Universidad de Buenos Aires and the Universidad Nacional de General Sarmiento, for their help in recruiting participants, especially to Dr. Laura Ferrari. I also thank my
friend Nikki Katz for her help in distributing my surveys and connecting me with native speakers in Buenos Aires, as well as for her friendship and support over the years.

I am also appreciative of the native speakers of Argentinian Spanish, whose intuitions helped guide and advance much of my research, especially to my husband Ricardo Kelly, who could stand to be co-author on this dissertation for all of his work and patience, as well as Fran Reinoso, Fabian Salcedo, Ángelo Chialva, and Jorge Guzmán.

I thank my family for their never-ending support throughout this process. I especially want to thank my mom and dad, Cathy and Larry Johnson, for cheering me on in everything I do, and for their support in this endeavor. Their encouragement and support have gotten me where I am in my life today. I also thank all my sisters, Marissa, Amy, Bonnie and Megan, for their endless support and understanding throughout my graduate education and life. I especially thank my sister Megan, for sharing with me a love of language and linguistics, and for understanding what my dissertation is about, and why it is not written in Spanish!

Lastly, and most importantly, I would like to thank my husband, Ricardo. His obligatory participation as language consultant in all of my research has been invaluable to my entire graduate career. What is more, he has offered his support and encouragement at every moment throughout this journey, and has made countless sacrifices in order to support me and my dreams, including moving across the world. I love you and I thank you, Guaifo.
Vita

2007.................................................B.A. Spanish and Italian, The University of Wisconsin-Madison

2009.........................................................M.A. Hispanic Linguistics, The Ohio State University

Publications


Fields of Study

Major Field: Spanish and Portuguese
Table of Contents

ABSTRACT II

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................ V

VITA......................................................................................................................................... VIII

PUBLICATIONS.......................................................................................................................... VIII

FIELDS OF STUDY.................................................................................................................. VIII

TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................. IX

LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... XIII

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................. XIV

CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION................................................................................................. 1

1.1 THE VOSEO ~ TUTEO ALTERNATION IN SPANISH ....................................................... 1

1.1.1 Formation of the voseo ............................................................................................... 3

1.1.2 Voseo ~ Voseo in Argentina ......................................................................................... 5

1.2 NEGATIVE IMPERATIVES IN ARGENTINIAN SPANISH ............................................... 6

1.3 PREVIOUS WORK ............................................................................................................. 8

1.4 MY PREVIOUS WORK ...................................................................................................... 12

1.5 THE CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS DISSERTATION ..................... 15

CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS ..................................................................... 17

ix
2.1 IMPERATIVES AND COMMANDS

2.1.1 To-Do Lists

2.1.2 Imperatives in speech act theory

2.1.3 Negative Imperatives

2.1.3.1 Cessatives vs. Preventives

2.1.3.2 Epistemicity and Evidentiality in commands

2.1.4 Politeness in commands

2.2 IMPLICATED MEANING

2.2.1 Conversational Implicatures

2.2.1.1 Particularized Conversational Implicatures

2.2.1.2 Generalized Conversational Implicatures

2.2.2 Neo-Gricean Conversational Implicatures

2.2.2.1 Horn’s approach

2.2.2.2 Levinson’s approach

2.2.3 Conventional Implicatures

2.2.4 Conclusions

2.3 SOCIAL MEANING

2.3.1 Indexical meaning

2.3.2 Conclusions

CHAPTER 3 VNI VS. TNI: SPEAKER ORIENTED MEANING

3.1 CONVENTIONALLY IMPLICATED MEANING

3.1.1 Conventionally Implicated meaning and the VNI

3.2 THE VOSEO FORM IN SUBORDINATE CLAUSES

3.3 SURVEY 1

3.3.1 A re-analysis of Survey 1

3.3.1.1 Statistical Methods
CHAPTER 4 PRAGMATICALLY INFORMED SOCIAL MEANING .......... 118

4.1 CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE .................................................. 118

   4.1.1 GCI vs. PCI .............................................................................. 120

   4.1.2 Politeness as conversationally implicated meaning in English .......... 121

4.2 CONVERSATIONALLY IMPLICATED MEANING EXPRESSED BY THE VNI ........ 123

   4.2.1 The contextual occurrence of the VNI ........................................... 123

   4.2.2 Native speaker impressions from interviews .................................... 129

      4.2.2.1 Matching task ....................................................................... 133

4.3 INDEXICAL FIELDS .......................................................................... 136

   4.3.1 Another look at Indexical Fields ....................................................... 143

4.4 CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................. 148

CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSIONS ...................................................................... 150

5.1 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .................................................................... 150

5.2 IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................... 155

   5.2.1 Epistemic meaning and imperatives ................................................ 155

   5.2.2 Pragmatics and Sociolinguistics ....................................................... 157

5.3 FUTURE RESEARCH .......................................................................... 158

   5.3.1 Epistemic meaning ........................................................................ 159

   5.3.2 Social meaning and dialectal variation ......................................... 160
REFERENCES ......................................................................................................................... 162
APPENDIX A: SURVEY 1 QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 168
APPENDIX B: SURVEY 2 QUESTIONS ..................................................................................... 173
APPENDIX C: UTTERANCES HEARD IN MATCHING TASK .............................................. 179
APPENDIX D: IN_EFFECTENCE TREE FOR ALL UTTERANCE TYPES ............................... 181
APPENDIX E: FORMS OF VERBAL VOSEO BY COUNTRY (DICCIONARIO PANHISPÁNICO DE DUDAS, 2005) ......................................................................................................................... 183
List of Tables

Table 1: Variation in the present indicative/present subjunctive voseo paradigms. .......... 4

Table 2: Affirmative imperative voseo forms................................................................. 5

Table 3: Individual responses for Fontanella de Weinberg's study (1979)..................... 11

Table 4: Distribution of TNI, VNI and Either responses by Urgency ......................... 85

Table 5: Distribution of TNI and VNI responses by immediacy .................................. 93

Table 6: Results from logistic mixed-effects model on the whole data set. ................. 95

Table 7: The average ratings of each utterance type in Survey 2 ................................ 107

Table 8: Results of the logistic mixed-effects model on the data from the ratings of the two negative commands in Survey 2 ........................................................................... 108

Table 9: Terms used to describe the VNI ................................................................. 130

Table 10: Results from Matching Task......................................................................... 135
### List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Indexical field of /t/ release from Eckert (2008)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Sinnott’s (forthcoming) Hierarchical Indexical Field of Address Forms</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Distribution of the responses from Survey 1 by urgency</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Distribution of TNI and VNI responses by <em>immediacy</em></td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Random Forest depicting relative importance of each factor in predicting the outcome of the VNI–TNI alternation.</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Conditional Inference Tree of factors influencing the choice of VNI–TNI inside Buenos Aires</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Conditional Inference Tree of factors influencing the choice of VNI–TNI outside Buenos Aires</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Barplot showing the average perceived certainty ratings of each utterance type in Survey 2 (1 = not at all certain, 5 = very certain)</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Random Forest depicting relative importance of each factor in predicting the certainty ratings of the VNI and TNI. Everything to the right of the dotted red line is significant.</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Faces from the Matching Task</td>
<td>134</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Indexical Field of /t/ release from Eckert (2008)</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Indexical Field of associations for the VNI</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure 15: Indexical Field for address forms in Peninsular Spanish, from Sinnott (forthcoming) .......................................................................................................................... 144

Figure 16: Layered Indexical Field for the VNI ................................................................................. 146
Chapter 1  Introduction

1.1 The VOSEO ~ TUTEO alternation in Spanish

Throughout the Spanish Speaking world, there is much variation in the use of the second person singular pronoun and corresponding verb forms (Fontanella de Weinberg 1995-1996, 1977, Benavides 2003, Lipski 1994, Kapovic 2007, Carricaburo 1997). The use of the pronoun tú and its corresponding verb forms (the TUTEO) is found most extensively in most or all of Spain, Mexico, Panama, Colombia, Peru, Cuba, Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic. The use of the pronoun vos and its corresponding verb forms (the VOSEO) is found more extensively in the rest of Central America, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador. Examples of present indicative voseo and voseo can be seen in (1) and (2), respectively.

1. Vos querés cenar conmigo?
2. Tú quieres cenar conmigo?

There are historical reasons that explain why the voseo survived in some Latin American regions and not in others. Those places that maintained more contact with Spain during the 16th century, ie: Mexico, Peru and the Antilles, were more exposed and thus affected by the linguistic changes that were occurring there, including the expansion of the voseo. In the rest of the Latin American countries the use of voseo survived (Benavides 2003).
The Viceroyalty of New Spain was the first viceroyalty, established in 1535, and it included Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, The Dominican Republic, and Central America, along with Florida, New Mexico, Texas and southern Arizona (Benavides 2003). This region, then, has the longest history of exposure to linguistic changes occurring in Spain at the time. Most of it, with the exception of Central America, today is tuteante. The situation in Central America can be explained by their ruling by Captaincy General of Guatemala, discussed below. The second Viceroyalty, established in 1544, was the Viceroyalty of Peru, which included Lima, Bogotá, Quito, Panama, Buenos Aires and Chile (under the Captaincy General of Chile). The Viceroyalty of New Granada, which controlled most of the regions that are now Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela, was established late, in 1717. Before then, it was controlled by the voseante soldiers that arrived almost 200 years prior. This explains the survival of the voseo in those regions, since it had time to establish roots. Nevertheless, as we will see below, the voseo is much less prevalent there than in the Río de la Plata region. This is explained by the importance of Cartagena in this region, a city that, at the time of colonization, maintained significant contact with the already-established and tuteante Caribbean and also with Spain. For this reason, the coastal areas of the countries that made up the Viceroyalty of New Granada are where the most voseo is found, and more voseo is found in the interior of these countries.

The Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata was also established late in the 18th century, in 1776. At the time of its formation, the use of voseo did increase in the region. However, the voseo had already developed more than two centuries worth of roots there, thanks to the conquering soldiers, so the voseo never reached dominance.
While the rest of Central America was part of the Viceroyalty of New Spain, it was under the jurisdiction of the Captaincy General of Guatemala. For this reason, Central America was more isolated than other parts of the viceroyalty, and therefore the *voseo* was able to develop roots early on (Zamora Vicente 1970). This is why the *voseo* still prevails in this region but not in other nearby regions such as most of Mexico and the Caribbean countries.

Benavides (2003) points out that when the Spaniards arrived in the Americas in the 16th century, the *voseo* was alternating with the *voseo*, and often marked a social distinction. This social distinction was not always the same, however. There is evidence that the *voseo* was the most familiar form, used by superiors addressing their inferiors, or between lower class people of equal rank. However, there is also evidence that the *voseo* was the form used by inferiors to address their superiors, or between upper class people of equal rank (Keniston 1937). This inconsistency is what, according to some scholars, led to the instability and eventual demise of the *voseo* in Spain (Kany 1969).

1.1.1 Formation of the *voseo*

Along the lines of instability, among the many *voseante* countries in the Spanish Speaking world, there is some variation in the verb forms affected. Some inflections may remain in the *tú* form, while others take the *vos* form (Fontanella de Weinberg, 1995-1996). Furthermore, there are some dialects where the pronoun *vos* is used in combination with *voseo* verb forms (pronominal *voseo*), or vice versa (verbal *voseo*).

3. Vos tienes la culpa. ‘You are at fault.’

4. Tú hablás. ‘You speak.’
The *voseo*, then, is characterized by the use of the 2nd person singular pronoun *vos* and/or its corresponding verbal morphology. Particular *voseo* morphology is most typically found in the present indicative, the imperative, and the present subjunctive (including the negative imperative). The Real Academia Española characterizes the *voseo* as being formed from the second person plural verb forms in Spanish, but used to address a singular interlocutor. They also state that the *voseo* “implies closeness and familiarity” (Diccionario Panhispánico de Dudas, 2005, translation mine).

The morphology that occurs in the present indicative and the present subjunctive varies throughout the *voseante* world. In an attempt to use the *voseo* as a means to differentiate Spanish dialects, many scholars have studied the *voseo* forms found across different dialects (Lipski 1994, Rona 1964, Kapovic 2007, Carricaburo 1997, Fontanella de Weinberg 1977, Paez Urdaneta 1981). The Real Academia Española created the table in Appendix E\(^1\), which serves to catalog the *voseo* verb forms used in several Latin American countries. Table 1 and Table 2, below, serve as a simplification, depicting the *voseo* present indicative and present subjunctive verb endings, as well as the imperative forms, used in different dialects of Spanish spoken throughout Latin America. These are the conjugations most commonly affected.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Type (1)</th>
<th>Type (2)</th>
<th>Type (3)</th>
<th>Type (4)</th>
<th>Type (5)</th>
<th>Type (6)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-AR</td>
<td>-áis/éis</td>
<td>-ás/és</td>
<td>-ís/ás</td>
<td>-ás/is</td>
<td>-as/es</td>
<td>-áis/is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-ER</td>
<td>-éis/áis</td>
<td>-és/ás</td>
<td>-ís/ás</td>
<td>-is/ás</td>
<td>-es/as</td>
<td>-ís/áis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-IR</td>
<td>-ís/áis</td>
<td>-is/ás</td>
<td>-is/ás</td>
<td>-is/ás</td>
<td>-es/as</td>
<td>-ís/áis</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Variation in the present indicative/present subjunctive *voseo* paradigms.

\(^1\) Re-formatted by me to better fit the pages
Table 2: Affirmative imperative voseo forms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>-AR (hablar)</th>
<th>-ER (comer)</th>
<th>-IR (dormir)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>hablá</td>
<td>comé</td>
<td>dormí</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Type (1) derives directly from the second person plural vosotros form in Peninsular Spanish. Types (2) and (3) most likely were formed from a contraction of the diphthong in Type (1) (although Rona 1964 claims Type (3), is not possible). In Type (2), the stressed vowel remains, while in Type (3) the semivowel is left. Type (4) is similar to Type (2) except that -ER verbs take the same forms as -IR verbs. The morphology in Type (5) corresponds with that of the voseo, but these forms would classify as voseo if combined with the pronoun vos. Type (6) is similar to Type (1) except that -ER verbs take the -IR forms.

1.1.2 Voseo ~ Voseo in Argentina

In Argentina, speakers of all social classes use the pronoun vos instead of tú. The corresponding verb forms occur almost uniformly with voseo morphology in the present indicative and subjunctive, and the imperative (Kapovic 2007), with the exception of certain regions in the north, including Santiago del Estero and Tucumán. The morphology associated with the voseo in Argentina almost always belongs to Type (2), save for some northern parts in contact with Quechua, where the present indicative morphology for -ER verbs is sometimes -ís. There are also areas, namely in and around Santiago del Estero, where Type (5) voseo can be found (Lipski 1994, Donni de Mirande 2000). In voseante areas, the conjugations that are affected include present indicative and subjunctive, and the imperative (Kapovic 2007). In Argentinian Spanish, an alternation exists between the voseo morphology and the voseo morphology for present subjunctive and negative
commands. While the Real Academia Española acknowledges the acceptance of the "voseo" in all social classes (and in oral and written registers), they also note that the present subjunctive "voseo" forms are not accepted as part of the educated norm. While present subjunctive "voseo" forms are included in their table (found in Appendix E), they are not included among the conjugations offered in any verbs in their online dictionary. Nevertheless, this alternation has been identified, and has been said to correspond with a pragmatic meaning difference (Johnson & Grinstead 2010, Fontanella de Weinberg 1979). It is precisely this variation in the use of the negative imperative (and present subjunctive) form, and the meaning associated with it, that is to be explored in this dissertation.

1.2 Negative Imperatives in Argentinian Spanish

The main goal of this dissertation is to understand the alternation between the "voseo" negative command (VNI) and the "voseo" negative command (TNI) in Argentinian Spanish (AS). AS is a dialect area that is known for being "voseante," but maintains an alternation with the "voseo" form in negative commands (and, as will be discussed below, the present subjunctive):

5. No me hablés más!

   *Don’t talk (VNI) to me anymore.*

6. No hables más con las empleadas, porque estamos tarde.

   *Don’t talk (TNI) with the help anymore, because we’re late.*

   *Sos mi vida (González, 2006)*

---

2 "Voseo" present indicative and affirmative command forms are included.
3 The distinction is represented orthographically with an accent mark on the last syllable of the "voseo" forms.
Previous work has suggested that these alternating imperatives are accompanied by a difference in meaning (Fontanella de Weinberg 1979, Johnson & Grinstead 2010). An argument for why this meaning is pragmatic will be discussed in Chapter 3, where I examine the way in which this particular meaning difference is expressed. Still, with the exception of my own work in Johnson & Grinstead (2010), very little empirical evidence has been given to support this. Furthermore, previous work has recognized the alternation only in the negative command, and has denied its presence in present subjunctive forms (Fontanella de Weinberg & Lavandera, 1975, Fontanella de Weinberg, 1979, Moyna 2008). There is evidence, however, that the alternation is in fact present in the subjunctive forms, as can be seen in (7):

7. “La esposa de tu papá no quiere que vayás más a la casa de ellos. No quiere que te juntés con Javier, yo no sé qué habrás hecho pero ella al menos tiene la suerte de poder pedirlo.”

*Your father’s wife doesn’t want you to go to their house anymore. She doesn’t want you to get together with Javier, I don’t know what you have done but at least she is lucky enough to be able to make that request.*

(Bazán, 2011)

The example in (7) demonstrates that the *voseo* form does exist in the present subjunctive, counter to what Fontanella de Weinberg & Lavandera (1975) report. The example in (8) shows that it also exists in affirmative subordinate clauses.

8. Quiero que vengás, necesito que vengás.

*I want you to come, I need you to come.*

The presence of the voseo forms in the present subjunctive is important to this dissertation, because I will turn to the use of the present subjunctive in indirect quotations for clues as to how the meaning difference between the VNI and the TNI is expressed. The way in which the voseo subjunctive forms can help us to interpret negative commands in AS will be explained in Chapter 3.

The ultimate goal of this dissertation is to determine what kind of meaning is conveyed by the VNI, as compared to the TNI, and how this meaning is conveyed. In order to come to this understanding, I use a variety of methodologies of studying the use and distribution of these forms by native speakers of AS. These methodologies include an analysis of the Argentinian soap opera Sos Mi Vida (González, 2006), two online surveys, a matching task, internet searches, and interviews with native speakers.

1.3 Previous work

Moyna (2009) examines the history of the use of the voseo and the voseo in AS generally, not exclusively in the imperative form. She states that presently, the VNI (e.g.: no cantés) is an “imperious” command, conveying anger or impatience. Moyna looks at the history of the voseo in Argentina before 1880. She finds that when Spanish came to America, the voseo and voseo were “pragmatically ambiguous,” since both could be used for equals, but the voseo was also sometimes used for superiors. Because the voseo overlapped with the voseo, there was an alternation between the two pronouns within the same discourse, and also mismatches between pronouns and accompanying verb forms. Both forms co-existed for some time. By looking at data from plays from 1880 to 1911, Moyna notes a rapid increase in voseo use in the affirmative imperative, followed by the present indicative. The present subjunctive, however, demonstrates different behavior.
For those born before 1850, *voseo* and *voseo* forms are both used almost equally. For the younger generations, much less *voseo* is found (under 20%). Moyna questions why the *voseo* did not dominate the present subjunctive, as it did the other paradigms in AS. Because the order in which children acquire verb forms parallels the order in which the *voseo* began to win out over the *voseo* in its development in AS, namely beginning with the affirmative imperative, followed by the present indicative, followed by the present subjunctive, Moyna turns to acquisition data to answer her question. She notes that while children were acquiring the language, they had a doublet in their input for second person. Moyna cites Kroch (1994) in saying that when languages have a doublet, one of two things can happen: one form will be lost, leaving only the other option, or the forms will be assigned different functions or meanings. In the affirmative imperative, a reduction of allomorphs occurred, with the *voseo* winning out, likely due to its regularity, since children have a tendency to overregularize. Then, the next generation of children were presented with relatively stable *voseo* use in the imperative, which they extended to the doublet that still existed in their present indicative forms (the verb forms acquired next). Then, their children received a relatively stable input of *voseo* forms for affirmative imperatives and present indicatives, while still receiving the alternation in the present subjunctive. Moyna hypothesizes that because the present subjunctive is used in two distinct ways—for irrealis and as a negative imperative—they were able to assign a “semantic specialization” to distinguish the two, with the *voseo* used as a deontic marker, for the negative imperative, and the *voseo* used as an irrealis marker. Subjunctive morphology is acquired first in negative imperatives and later in embedded clauses. The spread of *voseo* into the negative imperatives, then, coincides with the order of
acquisition. Moyna notes that only voseo forms are possible in embedded clauses, which are acquired later. She claims that since the voseo and voseo had different meanings, the generalization of voseo into subordinate clauses did not occur. Moyna does not explain why it is that the voseo did not become categorical in the deontic uses of subjunctive, as it did in the affirmative imperative and present indicative. She notes that “there is still no satisfactory explanation for the fact that voseo subjunctive (cantes) is unmarked and can be used with no restrictions, whereas voseo subjunctive (cantés) is exclusively used in the most pragmatically marked contexts of imperious command” (p. 138). Therefore, she does acknowledge a meaning difference between the two alternating imperative forms. Moyna also calls for new data collection and analysis to address why this alternation exists in the negative imperative.

Fontanella de Weinberg (1979) has been one of the only linguists to examine the meaning difference between the two forms, noting that the VNIs are used for peremptory orders, whereas the TNIs are used for more courteous commands. To test this meaning difference, Fontanella de Weinberg tested 12 informants. They were given a group of sentences with directives in various forms, found in (5):

9. a. Cerrá la ventana
   “Close the door”
   b. ¿Podés cerrar la ventana?
   “Could you close the door?”
   c. ¿Me permitirías el teléfono?
   “Would you allow me [to use] your phone?”

Recall that this dissertation is going to show evidence to the contrary. I will, however, offer an explanation for why they appear less in subordinate clauses.
d. No mirés para allá

“Don’t look there” (VNI)

e. No mires para allá

“Don’t look there” (TNI)

The informants ranked each sentence according to the following 5 point scale: 1) polite request (pedido amable), 2) courteous order (orden cortés), 3) neutral order (orden neutra), 4) strict order (orden terminante), and 5) forceful order (orden violenta). She found that the TNI had an average ranking of 2.3, and the VNI had an average ranking of 3.7, and the individual results were reported in the format found in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 pedido amable</th>
<th>2 orden cortés</th>
<th>3 orden neutra</th>
<th>4 orden terminante</th>
<th>5 orden violenta</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>cantés (TNI)</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXXX</td>
<td>XXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cantés (VNI)</td>
<td>X</td>
<td>XX</td>
<td>XXXXXXXX</td>
<td>X</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Individual responses for Fontanella de Weinberg's study (1979)

Fontanella de Weinberg’s results do show a clear difference in meaning between the two forms. Nevertheless, 12 informants and one token each of the two NIs do not provide strong results. While her table does not allow us to see relative rankings of the forms for each participant, she reports that 10 out of the 12 participants ranked cantés higher than cantes, and the remaining 2 participants ranked them the same. In other words, the TNI was never ranked higher than the VNI. Fontanella de Weinberg thus concludes that TNIs are more “polite” (cortés), while the VNIs are more “sharp” (tajante). She also notes that “the existence of a semantic contrast between two forms that are phonologically different leaves no doubt that from a grammatical point of view they make up two different verb forms, and are not mere variants of the same grammatical
construction” (p. 79). This is not surprising, since the history of the forms shows them deriving from different forms (voseo vs. voseo). Thus opposite the single affirmative voseo imperative in AS, cantá, there are two negative imperative forms, cantes and cantés.  

1.4 My previous work

I have since done some work towards a better definition of the meaning difference between the TNI and the VNI in AS. While Fontanella de Weinberg’s work paved the way for research on these constructions, her scale seems to include different dimensions, in that it ranges from polite to forceful, instead of polite to impolite. I was interested in finding a unifying dimension for the meaning difference, as well as identifying any contextually determined dimensions of meaning, in order to more accurately be able to describe how the meaning is expressed. In Chapter 3, I will present the results of an experiment where the VNI and TNI are ranked on a more appropriate scale.

In a preliminary study I surveyed the language use in the popular Argentinian telenovela Sos Mi Vida (González 2006). In approximately 19.5 hours of programming I extracted 254 negative imperatives, of which 175 (70%) were TNIs and 74 (30%) were VNIs. Five were unclassifiable, because they are the same form in the VNI and the TNI (i.e. no des ‘don’t give’ and no estés ‘don’t be’). There were 84 different verbs total used in negative commands. Of these, 17 appeared in both the TNI and VNI. Examples of imperative forms and their contexts extracted from Sos Mi Vida can be seen in (10).

Note that both negative imperative forms are interpreted as voseo forms for AS speakers. Throughout Argentina, the pronoun tú is rarely used. If a speaker were to include a pronoun with the command (something that is not common, and will be briefly discussed below), it would, in fact, be the vos form.
10. Quique: ¡No vas a abandonar el boxeo!

‘You are not going to quit boxing!’

Monita: ¡A mí no me grites, eh!

‘Don’t yell at me!’ (TNI)

11. Quique: ¿Qué hacés vos?

‘What are you doing?’

Monita: ¡Estoy yendo al gimnasio!

‘I’m going to the gym!’

Quique: ¡Hace media hora que tendrías que haber estado ahí! ¡Don César te va a matar!

‘You were supposed to be there a half hour ago! Don César is going to kill you!’

Monita: ¡Pará, loco! ¡No me gritoneés! ¿qué te pasa?

‘Stop it, crazy! Don’t yell at me! (VNI) What is wrong with you?’

With the examples in (10) and (11) we see two different NI forms in similar verbs that entail the same meaning. Both contexts include the same interlocutors, and both depict situations in which the speaker is angry with her addressee, however in (10) the speaker uses a TNI, and in (11) a VNI is used by the same speaker. This demonstrates speaker variation. While Fontanella’s de Weinberg’s description of the VNI as “sharp” seems to fit the use in (11), her description of the TNI as “polite” does not seem to apply to the use in (10), especially because the speaker is quite angry with her addressee (this is obvious because she screams the utterance in (10) at him).

A look at other contexts yields even more interesting uses of NIs.
12. [Context: Quique’s mother is being held hostage]

Quique: Mamá, no te preocupés, no te va a pasar nada.

‘Mom, don’t worry, nothing is going to happen to you.’ (VNI)

13. [Context: La Turca’s boyfriend is offended that she wouldn’t let him help her study her acting lines.]

La Turca: No te pongás mal, vos, vení.

‘Don’t be sad, come on.’ (VNI)

In (12) and (13), we see the use of a VNI in contexts where the speakers are consoling their addressees. Fontanella de Weinberg’s description of the VNI as a “sharp” order does not seem to be appropriate for this use of the VNI.

In light of the above contexts, it seems that Fontanella de Weinberg’s classification of the TNI as polite, and the VNI as sharp does not accurately account for all of their uses. It may be that the scale she used failed to account for the appropriate meaning difference, and displayed related but uncategorical meanings associated with the two forms. My data shows the VNI used in a wide variety of contexts, ranging from anger to consolation. Still, the TNI was used much more often than the VNI. In light of this evidence, I hypothesized that, in concordance with what Moyna has said, the TNI could be used felicitously in all contexts, whereas the VNI seemed to be restricted. A closer look at the contexts where the VNI was found suggested that the unifying factor in its use was urgency. It seemed that the VNI was being used when the speaker wanted to immediately change a situation. This description seems to be compatible with consolation, where the speaker wants the addressee to feel better right away, and anger,
where the speaker would like whatever is making him or her angry to end immediately. This distinction is explored and developed in Chapter 3.

1.5 The contribution and organization of this dissertation

The purpose of the present dissertation is to explore the difference between the VNI and the TNI in AS. More specifically, I seek to answer the question What leads speakers to choose one form over the other? Is it a difference in pragmatic meaning? A difference in social usage? Ultimately, I will show that it is a difference in pragmatic meaning that also has social manifestations.

In Chapter 2, I will examine the theoretical frameworks that will help explain the variation found in these negative imperatives. Specifically, I will explore the work on imperatives and negative imperatives, from a theoretical perspective, including the theory of speech acts. I will also examine the role of politeness in commands. How different kinds of meaning are expressed is also central to this dissertation, as I will explore how the meaning differences between the two negative imperatives come about. Furthermore, I will explore the social manifestation of this alternation, and how the meaning distinction is represented from a sociolinguistic perspective. Following Sinnott (2010, forthcoming), I will relate the two fields of pragmatics and sociolinguistics in order to demonstrate how they work together in explaining what this meaning difference looks like, and how it comes about.

In order to demonstrate how the meaning arises, I use a variety of methodologies, including two online surveys. The first mimics production, in a forced-choice task, while the second is centered on the perception of the negative commands on a scale of certainty. I also use created examples, and examples found on the web. The results of
these methodologies are presented and discussed in Chapter 3. In order to demonstrate the social and contextual uses of the VNI, I use interviews with native speakers of AS, where they were asked to explain the use of different negative imperatives in different contexts. I also use a matching task where participants needed to match negative imperatives to a neutral face or an angry face, according to who they think said a given imperative. The results from these methodologies are presented and discussed in Chapter 4.

In the final chapter, I will discuss the conclusions that can be drawn from this investigation regarding the variation in negative imperatives in AS, as well as the implications that this has for the study of imperatives in general. I will also discuss how the study of this alternation expands the study of social meaning in combination with pragmatic meaning, and how these fields of linguistic study are related and should be considered together. Lastly, I will introduce further research for which this dissertation paves the way.
Chapter 2  Theoretical Frameworks

2.1  Imperatives and commands

Imperatives and commands have been the object of much research for quite some time (see Aikhenvald, 2010; Kaufmann, 2011; Márquez Reiter, 2000; Haverkate, 1979; Portner, 2005, 2007, among many others). The reason for this abundance of research could be due to the fact that imperatives (and negative imperatives) take on many different forms cross-linguistically, yet every language has a way to get an addressee to act, or a way to try to make someone not do something (Aikhenvald, 2010). In this sense, the function of imperatives and negative imperatives (commanding) is a universal concept. But imperatives, while often times simple in form, can be very complex to study. In terms of meaning, for example, traditional truth-value tests will not work.

Imperatives differ from statements and questions in that they appear to lack distinctions of tense, aspect and modality. Still, in some languages, imperatives do include other distinctions, such as distance in space (do here, or do there) or distance in time (do now, or do later) (Aikhenvald, 2010). Furthermore, the use of an overt subject with a canonical imperative seems to work differently than with questions and statements. In English, for example, including an overt subject can give an ‘impatient, irritated, aggressive, or hectoring effect,’ as in (14), or the effect could be the opposite, of “soothing reassurance, encouragement, support’ (Huddleston, 2002, p. 926), as in (15).

14. You do your homework!
15. *You take a nap now.*

In either case, the use of the overt pronoun signals that the speaker has authority (Aikhenvald, 2010; Portner 2007)—either as someone who can tell the addressee what to do, or as someone who can offer advice, or ‘the one who knows best’ (Aikhenvald, 2010: 7). These are just some of the ways in which imperatives are different from the even-more-studied declaratives and interrogatives.

From a pragmatic perspective, declaratives and interrogatives are concerned with the way the world is, whereas imperatives are concerned with how the world should be (Kaufmann 2011). It is for this reason that traditional truth-conditional semantics does not apply as easily as many would like, as we can see in (16). The truth values of an imperative are not as easily accessible as they are for declaratives.

16. A: *Go to school!*  
   B: #That’s not true.

Some scholars, then, conclude that imperatives do not have truth values. Portner (2004, 2007) discusses the relationship of imperatives to modals. He states that one key difference is that modals have truth conditions, whereas imperatives “intuitively” do not. His explanation for this is that modals add to the common ground, whereas imperatives add to To-Do Lists, or a list of properties for the addressee to carry out in the future. Portner recognizes that modals may also have contributions to the To-Do List of the addressee, but they have the added truth values as well, whereas “an imperative’s only role is to add to the To-Do List” (Portner 2007:366). A detailed exploration of Portner’s To-Do Lists can be found in 2.1.1.
Despite the intuitions of many scholars, many others have found reason to believe that imperatives do in fact have truth values (Aikhenvald, 2010; Kaufmann, 2011; Haverkate, 1979, among others). Some of this research will be discussed in the following subsections.

2.1.1 To-Do Lists

For Portner (2004, 2007) the To-Do List is to imperatives as the common ground is to declaratives. The Common Ground consists of all that is mutually assumed between the participants in a conversation. Declaratives add propositions to the common ground. According to Portner, in a similar way, imperatives add properties to the addressee’s To-Do List. A person’s To-Do List contains the actions that he or she has committed to carrying out (in order to be rational). Take the utterance in (17) (from Portner 2004), for example.

17. Leave!

(17) denotes the property of leaving. Upon uttering it, the speaker adds this property to the addressee’s To-Do List. It serves to make it true of the addressee that he or she leaves.

Portner believes that imperatives are related to deontic modals, such that the uttering of (18a) would lead to the truth of (18b) (assuming Noah is the addressee). This example is taken from Portner (2007).

18. a. Sit down right now! (order)

b. Noah should sit down right now, given that he’s been ordered to do so.

Portner argues that while (18a) and (18b) are not exactly the same, they are related in that (18a) makes sitting down a rule, and (18b) states that sitting down follows
from the rules. This is why the truth of (18b) relies on (18a). One major reason why Portner does not say that modals and imperatives are the same (or that imperatives contain covert modals), as has been proposed by Schwager (2005, 2007), for example, is because modals have truth values, while imperatives do not. This is because modals add propositions to the common ground, while imperatives add properties to To-Do Lists. As a result, (18b) can be judged false if the rules do not include sitting down. Then, sitting down is not something that Noah “should” do. In section 2.1.2, we will see that Kaufmann (2011) evaluates the modal that corresponds with an imperative not as assertive, but rather performative. Portner also recognizes this interpretation, and this is why he believes that the traditional truth conditional analysis of modals will not further the understanding of imperatives—the truth conditions that modals carry are not for their performative use, but rather for their assertive use. On the contrary, he says, the understanding of imperatives may shed light on these performative modals. Portner intends for his To-Do List to help us understand both of these clause types (imperatives and modals). By stating that an imperative’s only role is to update a To-Do List, Portner differentiates imperatives from modals, which can, in their assertive use, have truth conditional meaning, as well. Therefore, Portner relies on imperatives’ lack of truth conditional meaning to make this distinction. In the following section (2.1.2), we will see that this view is not uncontroversial.

2.1.2 Imperatives in speech act theory

Haverkate (1979) discusses a variety of impositive sentences (e.g.: requesting, ordering, etc.) in Spanish. While his analysis is not solely about imperatives, but rather takes into account other directives, imperatives are given some attention. Unlike Portner,
Haverkate believes that imperatives can have truth values. His analysis relies on a distinction between cessative negative imperatives and preventive negative imperatives. Cessatives are meant to change the current state of affairs, while preventives are meant to prevent a possible future state of affairs from coming about. Because cessatives refer to the actual state of affairs, they are subject to truth tests. The truth tests that work on imperatives, however, are not the typical “That’s not true” type tests. In the interaction in (19) we can see how this plays out.

19. A: ¡Callate! ‘Be quiet’
B: ¡Si no estoy hablando! ‘St I’m not talking!’

Speaker B’s response in (19) demonstrates a denial to some proposition included in Speaker A’s utterance. That proposition is precisely a description of what speaker A believes to be the state of affairs. Speaker B, then, responds in order to refute his vocal status in the current state of affairs, namely, that, contrary to speaker A’s beliefs, he is not speaking. Haverkate does not address the use of the discourse marker SI in the above example, however its inclusion is telling. Schwenter (1998, 2002) shows that SI is used dialogically to refute the relevance of the prior assertion. In his example copied in (20), below, we can see that B’s response is meant to refute the fact that Juan’s intelligence is the relevant factor to consider.

20. [Context: A is trying to convince B to hire Juan for a linguistics position.]
A: Juan es inteligente.

Juan is smart.
B: Si no sabe nada de lingüística.
Si he doesn’t know anything about linguistics.

(Schwenter 2002:50)

B believes that Juan’s knowledge about linguistics is the appropriate factor to consider in hiring him, not his overall intelligence. By uttering (20B), the speaker expresses that Juan’s intelligence is irrelevant to the matter at hand. Therefore, \( S_1 \) refutes some part of the information conveyed by the interlocutor. This information, as we can see above, does not have to be part of the propositional content. In (20), speaker B is not denying Juan’s intelligence. He is refuting the relevance of that proposition. Section (2.2) will discuss how this meaning comes about.

We can draw a connection to the use of \( S_1 \) in (19). Speaker B in (19) is using this discourse marker in order to refute the implication that Speaker A made, namely that Speaker B was speaking. He is refuting A’s interpretation of the state of affairs. More about the relevance of discourse marker \( S_1 \) to interpreting the meaning conveyed by commands will be discussed in Chapter 3. For now, we will continue to discuss Haverkate’s analysis of commands.

Haverkate proposes a pair of rules aimed at describing the licensing of uttering a command. The first, the *obviousness rule*, described in (21), is a rule that defines the necessary state of affairs at the time of a command.

21. The *obviousness rule*:

“[a] speaker cannot issue an order to make a request with the intention that the hearer bring about a state of affairs that already exists.” (143).
The *obviousness rule* informs us that commands serve to change the state of affairs, and the speaker, therefore, cannot utter a command that serves to bring about what is already the current state of affairs. The purpose of the command would be void. Therefore, if the speaker knew that the interlocutor was not speaking, the utterance in (19A) would be infelicitous.

There is also a *non-obviousness rule*, described in (22), below.

22. The *non-obviousness rule*:

“It is a necessary condition for the impositive speech act to be performed sincerely that the speaker presumes that the hearer will not carry out the action of his own accord, i.e., without the speaker performing the impositive speech act.” (147)

The *non-obviousness rule* states that the speaker, upon uttering a command, presupposes that the addressee would not otherwise carry out the action if not told to do so. A speaker would not utter a command in order to make the addressee perform an action that the addressee was going to do in any event. In (19A), the speaker must have started from a presupposition that the addressee would not have quieted down had he not uttered the command in (19A). It is, then, these assumptions about the state of affairs that bring about the truth values of imperatives. This is the reason why the exchange in (19) is felicitous— the command in (19A) is in reference to a state of affairs, namely that the addressee is speaking, and the response in (19B) responds to the truth values of a proposition corresponding with this state of affairs.

23. A: Limpiá tu habitación!

*‘Clean your room!’*
B: Si ya estaba por hacerlo!

‘si I was already about to do it!’

The exchange in (23) demonstrates that the presupposition that stems from the non-obviousness rule, namely that B would not have cleaned his room if A had not uttered the command in (23A), can be refuted with sí, as well. Therefore, B is stating that A did not have to utter the command, since his intentions were already to clean his room. Here we see that both pieces of information that come about via Haerktate’s two rules can be addressed in the discourse. Both make some comment about the speaker’s beliefs regarding the state of affairs, and the addressee is able to deny, or contest this state of affairs.

Kaufmann (2011) agrees that imperatives have truth values. She claims that the problem lies in their accessibility. In other words, it is difficult to refute or deny them. Kaufmann argues that any utterance that serves the purpose of commanding, even declarative utterances would not have accessible truth values. She offers the following example (Kaufmann’s (78)).

24. A: I want you to close the door now. (COMMAND)

B: #That’s not true. You are lying.

In (24), we see that when the declarative in (24A) is used as a COMMAND (and not as an ASSERTION, the response in (24B) is awkward. As an ASSERTION, (24A) would be expressing the proposition that the speaker wants the door to be closed—i.e. the speaker’s desire would be at-issue. Then, the response in (24B) would be more felicitous. But as a COMMAND this is not the case. Therefore, Kaufmann argues that imperatives cannot pass the standard truth tests because their truth values are not as accessible as
those for other clause types, but not because they do not have truth values. Other tests for truth values can demonstrate their presence in commands. Therefore, we can turn to Haverkate’s rules in (21) and (22) to find and test for the truth values. It seems that a test with *si* in Spanish (to be discussed further in Chapter 3) may be a step in the right direction.

2.1.3  Negative Imperatives

What is greatly lacking in the abundance of cross-linguistic research on imperatives is an in-depth discussion of negative imperatives. Aikhenvald notes that, in some languages, negating an imperative can be done the same way as negating a declarative. An example of one such language is English, where the negative particle *not* is added to the obligatory *do* support in both declaratives and imperatives, as in (25) and (26), respectively.

25. a. I watch TV (affirmative declarative)
   b. I don’t watch TV. (negative declarative)

26. a. Watch TV! (affirmative imperative)
   b. Don’t watch TV! (negative imperative)

Many languages use the same negative particle for imperatives as they do for declaratives (e.g. English *not*, Spanish *no*, Italian *non*, German *nicht*) while other languages require a special negative particle for negative imperative forms (e.g. Hungarian *ne* and Maybrat *fe* in negative commands contrasts with *nem* and *mai* respectively in statements and questions). Furthermore, many languages use forms other than the true imperative forms for negative imperatives, as can be seen for Spanish and Italian in (27) and (28) respectively.
In the Spanish example, we see that there is a special imperative form for the affirmative imperative, but the negative imperative requires the negator no, plus the irrealis form of the verb, deriving from the present subjunctive. In Italian, again, the affirmative imperative has its own form, while the infinitive of the verb is used for the negative imperative. But apart from these explanations of the formation of the negative imperative, little has been said about what negative imperatives do.

Lacking in Portner’s work on imperatives is an in-depth explanation of negative imperatives. Portner (2010) briefly mentions the role of negative imperatives with respect to possible worlds. According to Portner, negative commands are involved in the ranking of worlds, such that the worlds in which the property denoted in the negative command does not occur are ranked higher than worlds in which it does occur. But it appears there are different forms of negative imperatives (as Haverkate distinguishes with his analysis of cessatives vs. preventives, to be discussed further in this section). If an affirmative imperative adds a property to the To-Do List, then a negative imperative would add the negated property to the list. For example, upon uttering, “Don’t go to the store,” a speaker adds the property “not going to the store” to the addressee’s To-Do-List. Another possibility is that it removes a property from the To-Do List. “Don’t go to the store”
would, then, remove “going to the store” from the addressee’s To-Do List. Alternatively, it could simply keep a property from being added to the list. Which of these functions negative imperatives perform is unclear in the literature. While affirmative imperatives add propositions to the list, there seem to be more possibilities for negative imperatives.

Another area of study that is prevalent in the literature on imperatives is the theory of speech acts—the idea that when a person speaks, he or she is carrying out an action via speech (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969). The speech act associated with imperatives is directing. When a speaker utters a command, the intent is to make the addressee act. But does a negative command, then, keep the addressee from acting? Stop the addressee from acting?

A discussion of negative imperatives is often left out of the abundant discussions of affirmative imperatives and speech acts. However, when the literature does focus on negative imperatives they are often taken in comparison to affirmative imperatives. Haverkate (1979) states that while affirmative commands and negative commands take different forms in Spanish (the former being the imperative form and the latter being the subjunctive form), they do not represent distinct speech acts. Thus, we can turn to the literature on speech acts in imperatives in general in order to understand negative imperatives.

Márquez Reiter (2000) states that directives direct the addressee to perform or not to perform an act. She mentions, however, that not all imperative forms are used in this way. Some imperative forms can be used to express hopes, wishes and desires, as can be seen in (29).
29. ¡Mejorate pronto!  ‘Get well soon!’

Therefore, the imperative form can be associated with an array of speech acts. Among these are requesting, commanding, inviting, and consoling, as exemplified in (30).

30. a. Please turn down the TV.
    b. Do your homework!
    c. Come on in!
    d. Cheer up!

Haverkate’s (1979) cessative and preventive prohibitions also denote two different speech acts—changing the current state of affairs, vs. keeping a state of affairs from coming about. This is a distinction that is crucial to the studies presented in this dissertation, and thus will be discussed in more detail in section 2.1.3.1.

2.1.3.1 Cessatives vs. Preventives

As previously stated, cessative prohibitions serve to alter the current state of affairs (i.e. get the addressee to stop doing something they are currently doing), while preventive prohibitions serve to keep a state of affairs from coming about (i.e. prevent the addressee from carrying out an action they are not currently in the process of carrying out). Cessatives are considered transformative, in that they are an attempt by the speaker to transform a world in which the state of affairs holds into a world in which it does not. In this way, they are parallel to affirmative imperatives, which do the same.

31. No te burles de mí.

    ‘Don’t make fun of me’
In (31), as a cessative, the speaker is attempting to change the state of affairs from being one in which the addressee is making fun of him, to one in which the addressee is doing no such thing. On the contrary, if (31) were uttered as a preventive, one might think that it would be prefacing a story that is to come (e.g. “don’t make fun of me, but, here is what happened…”). In this case, it is preemptive. Its purpose is to get the addressee to refrain from transforming the world into one in which the referenced state of affairs holds.

It is because cessative prohibitions refer to actual states of affairs that they are subject to truth value tests (although not the traditional ones, as we saw above). In an interaction, a hearer does not have to accept the cessative prohibition if he believes that the speaker’s description of his behavior (part of the state of affairs) is accurate. It is in these instances that we can get responses such as (19B), above (as an example with an affirmative command) or (32) below (as an example with a negative).

32. A: No hables. ‘Don’t talk.’
B: Si no estoy hablando! ‘I’m not talking!’

In (32), as a cessative, Speaker A is conveying that his beliefs regarding the addressee’s current behavior is that the addressee is speaking. The addressee can deny this, by uttering the response in (32B). In other words, speaker B would be letting speaker A know that they are trying to transform the current world into one where the current state of affairs holds. This would not, in fact, be a transformation (and violates the obviousness rule).

Haverkate offers further evidence for a distinction between cessatives and preventives by discussing their possible paraphrases. Preventives can be paraphrased by
using words like *evitar* ‘to avoid’, or even *advertir* ‘to warn.’ Such an example can be seen in (33).

33. Evita burlarte de mí cuando te cuente lo que me acaba de pasar.

*Avoid making fun of me when I tell you what just happened to me.*

In (33), the speaker tells the addressee to avoid bringing about a certain state of affairs that does not currently exist. This is in line with preventive commands.

In contrast, cessative commands can be paraphrased with other words, that preventives cannot. These include things like *dejar de* ‘to stop (doing something)’, *no seguir* ‘to not continue,’ etc. This is exemplified in (34).

34. Deja de hablar.      *‘Stop talking.’*

In (34) the speaker tells the addressee to transform the current world form one in which she is speaking to one in which she is not. This would not be a faithful paraphrase of a preventive command, but it certainly is for a cessative. This is, however, possibly because (34) is an imperative (and a paraphrase with *no seguir* would be one as well). Affirmative imperatives are transformative—they change the world from one in which the action is not happening to one in which it is. In this sense, cessatives parallel affirmative imperatives—both are transformative. Preventives, however, are not, since they simply prevent a state of affairs from coming about. Therefore, it may simply be the nature of the paraphrase that Haverkate uses that demonstrates its paraphrasability.

Haverkate states that the paraphrase would be the marked form, while the imperative would be unmarked. His evidence for this is based on the sequence of uttering a negative command with a paraphrased version. This is exemplified in (35) and (36) (copied from Haverkate (1979), p. 41).
According to Haverkate, (35) can be seen as “an acceptable sequence of two cessative prohibitions,” where the allocutionary force is increased in the second part of the utterance. The sequence in (36), on the other hand, would be awkward, since it would not increase the allocutionary force. Haverkate further states that negative imperatives do not include explicit reference to the time of the utterance (or the time at which the hearer should start complying), while the paraphrase does. This could explain the reinforced interpretation in the paraphrased cessative.

There are also several terms that can co-occur with cessatives that do not co-occur with preventives, since their use presupposes that the action is already being performed. These adverbs are más ‘anymore’ and tanto ‘so much.’

(Haverkate 1979:42)

In (37) and (38), it is presupposed that the addressee is yelling at the time of the utterance. 6

Haverkate explores the possibility that preventive and cessative prohibitions may correlate with a specific kinds of verbs, namely what he calls perfective verbs or

---

6Though it seems clear that (38) could be a warning, or a preventive, if the addressee yells often, and the speaker wants to preemptively let them know not to. This will be accounted for in the study presented in this dissertation.
imperfective verbs. This distinction is centered on lexical aspect, and Haverkate’s classification of perfective vs. imperfective verbs corresponds with what are typically known as telic or atelic verbs, respectively. Telic verbs are those that present actions that inherently have a terminal point (such as make a chair), while atelic verbs present actions that do not (such as sing) (Comrie, 1976). Specifically, Haverkate states that cessative prohibitions, since they attempt to change the current (ongoing) state of affairs, would appear only with imperfective (or atelic) verbs. He recognizes, however, that it does not play out this way. Perfective (or telic) verbs can and do occur in cessative prohibitions. This is likely because a cessative can be used to “interrupt the preparatory action or actions of the hearer.” Haverkate’s example is copied in (39), below.

39. ¡No entre en esa habitación!

‘Don’t enter that room!’

The verb entrar ‘to enter’ used in (39) is telic, since it describes an action that takes place during a period of definite length, and is momentary (i.e. you enter, and then you are inside. Entering itself is not an ongoing process). But by uttering (39), the speaker is attempting to keep the addressee from carrying out that action, based on the addressee’s actions at that time. The addressee may have been walking toward the door, and the speaker utters (39) because she had reason to believe the addressee was going to enter. Therefore, it is considered cessative.

There is a further class of prohibitions, namely reproaches, that Haverkate groups with preventives. Reproaches are prohibitions that serve as a reaction to an undesirable action that the addressee has just carried out. An example can be seen in (40), from Haverkate.

39.
40. ¡No me des con la puerta en las narices!

‘Don’t shut the door in my face!’

In (40), the speaker is reacting to the addressee’s actions, expressing that the action was undesirable (a reproach), and is also attempting to make it the case that the addressee does not carry out this action again. The speaker is, then, trying to prevent a state of affairs from repeating itself. Therefore, Haverkate classifies these as preventives.\(^7\)

There is also a relationship between reproaches and cessatives, however, since a speaker can address a current state of affairs with a reproach. An example of such a situation can be seen in (41).

41. ¡No mastiques con la boca abierta!

‘Don’t chew with your mouth open!’

The utterance in (41) would be a reproach, since it is expressing dislike for a behavior that the hearer is carrying out. It is also a cessative, since the addressee, presumably, at that time, is chewing with his mouth open. Therefore, Haverkate sees a connection to both preventives and cessatives. I will further discuss my thoughts on this categorization when discussing choices I made in classifying contexts for my study, in Chapter 3.

2.1.3.2  Epistemicity and Evidentiality in commands

Aikhenvald (2010) states that commands offer fewer choices for expressing evidentiality, due to their nature. Evidentiality refers to the evidence that a speaker as for their claims. It would be strange to respond to a command by saying, “how do you

\(^7\) For the study presented in this dissertation, situations of reproach will be classified along the lines of cessatives, and not preventives, due to their relationship with the current state of affairs. This will be explained further in Chapter 3.
know?” or “what evidence do you have for that?” for example. But, if a negative command is meant to change the state of affairs, and the speaker has some previous idea about what the state of affairs is, then perhaps this is an expression of evidentiality. And in fact, Aikhenvald notes that in Nivkh, an endangered language of Siberia, “preventives” (or prohibitions, really) encode evidentiality in that if a speaker has directly observed the action, they use one suffix, and if it is a warning simply based on prior negative experience, they would use another. This distinction straightforwardly overlaps with the distinction between preventives and cessatives. If the speaker is observing the action, then it is evident, and it would also be a cessative. If the speaker is not observing it at that moment, then it would be more of a warning, or preventive. In this sense, then, it may be best to consider evidentiality in classifying the two types of negative commands.

Evidentiality is related to epistemicity, which refers to the speaker’s commitment to the veracity of their proposition. Unlike evidentiality, it does not deal with the basis for the claims, but one can see how more evidence for one’s claims would indicate greater epistemic commitment. Aikhenvald notes that while declarative utterances often have markings of epistemicity (conveying certainty, uncertainty, doubt or disbelief) these markings are absent in commands. However, considering that we have discussed the presence of truth conditions in commands, perhaps this should be reconsidered. If at least cessative negative commands have truth conditions, as Haverkate believes, and these truth conditions have to do with a speaker’s comment about the current state of affairs, then would this not be due to the speaker’s expression of epistemic commitment regarding this state of affairs?
Epistemicity is often studied in combination with modals. In example (42a-b), we see that the degree of certainty that the speaker has over the proposition that Jennifer is sick changes, depending on the modal used (such that “must” expresses more certainty than “may”).

42. a. Jennifer must be sick.
    b. Jennifer may be sick.
    c. Jennifer is sick

Interestingly, as we saw has been argued for imperatives, it has been argued that epistemic meanings do not contribute to the truth conditions of an utterance. Papafragou (2006), among others, however, argue that they in fact do. She argues that, “epistemic backgrounds are not always understood ‘objectively’ in terms of ‘what is known’ in the community but are often restricted to the speaker’s current knowledge state” (p, 1690). She argues that in an example such as (42), only in the case of (42c) would the speaker be considered to have said something false if it turned out to be the case that Jennifer is not sick. In (42a-b), the speaker is not held accountable in the same way. This must be because his proposition included his lack of certainty. Papafragou, then, argues that the problem is that typical tests for truth conditionality do not work for epistemic modals, not that epistemic modals do not, in fact, contribute to truth conditions.

I will show that the speakers “current knowledge state” can in fact be marked on negative commands in AS. In particular, I will show that one piece of information conveyed by the VNI is a comment regarding the speaker’s belief about the addressee’s intentions. In Chapter 3 I will show that it has truth conditional, epistemic meaning.
2.1.4 Politeness in commands

Just as not all imperatives perform a speech act of commanding (as we saw in (30), not all directives are expressed as imperatives. The difference between direct and indirect speech acts comes into play here. Direct speech acts are said to be those in which there is a direct match between clause type and illocutionary force. An indirect speech act is one where no such direct relationship exists (Huang, 2007). Imperatives are the most direct way of requesting action from an addressee. However, there are many ways to indirectly carry out the same requests, a few examples of which can be seen in (43).

43.  a. ¡Cierra la ventana!  ‘Close the window.’
    b. ¿Podrías cerrar la ventana?  ‘Could you close the window.’
    c. ¿Está cerrada la ventana?  ‘Is the window closed?’
    d. Hace frío.  ‘It is cold.’

In (43), a-d are in order from most to least direct. We can see that the utterances in (43c) and (43d) generate via Conversational Implicature a request to close the window. Contextually, of course, it could mean the opposite. If it were hot out, then both of those could be requests to open the window.

Levinson (1983) points out that most speech acts are indirect, at least in English, as can be seen in (44b-h) (adapted from Levinson 1983: 264-5; see also Huang 2007).

44.  a. Close the door!
    b. Can you close the door?
    c. Are you able by any chance to close the door?
    d. Would you close the door?
    e. Would you mind closing the door?
f. May I ask you to close the door?

g. Would you mind awfully if I was to ask you to close the door?

h. How about a bit less breeze?

Why might it be that people use so many indirect speech acts? Probably because indirect speech acts are generally associated with politeness (Brown & Levinson, 1987; Márquez Reiter, 2000; Márquez Reiter & Placencia, 2005; Aikhenvald, 2010; Huang, 2007). Theories of politeness based on Brown & Levinson (1987) make up a large proportion of the research done on imperatives. This theory takes as central Goffman’s (1967) notion of ‘face.’ As defined by Brown & Levinson (1987), ‘face’ is “the public self-image that every member wants to claim for himself” (p. 61). Within the idea of ‘face’ we find ‘negative face’ and ‘positive face.’ Negative face refers to individual freedom of action and freedom from imposition. Positive face refers to an individual’s desire for approval. Politeness strategies are used in attempts by the speaker to not threaten the addressee’s face. Among the intrinsically face-threatening acts (FTAs) are commands (Brown & Levinson, 1987). Commands inherently intrude on their addressee’s freedom from imposition, thus threatening their negative face. The degree to which the strength of an FTA can be measured depends on the social distance between the speaker and the hearer, the relative power of the speaker over the hearer, and the absolute ranking of the imposition in a culture. FTAs need to be taken into consideration for both the speaker and the hearer. The speaker, upon uttering an apology, for example, is threatening his or her own face. Upon uttering an order, the speaker threatens the hearer’s face. Speakers employ politeness strategies to mitigate the effects of the FTAs.
that they perform. One such politeness strategy is indirectness. This can be seen in example (44), where (a) is invariably seen as less polite than (b-h).

Given the FTA nature of imperatives, according to Aikhenvald (2010), in many languages the use of imperatives tends to be limited to situations of obvious authority. Aikhenvald surveys the literature on a large variety of languages to discover the different kind of imperatives found and the meaning encoded in them. Many languages, such as Korean, have special polite forms. Others may have special ‘familiar’ or less polite forms. According to Aikhenvald (2010: 217) “Indo-Pakistani Sign Language has a special form for a ‘rude’ command implying immediate action; this type of command is usually directed at children or servants—that is, addressees with a lower status than oneself.” It seems to be the case that in languages where an alternation based on politeness exists between several commands, the less polite commands are used for addressees who are younger or lower in status than the speaker. Aikhenvald (2010: 221) says, “The strength of a command and politeness are typical imperative-specific extensions of tense.” This is because some languages (Evenki, Punjabi, among others) distinguish immediate and delayed commands. The immediate commands denote more forceful orders, while delayed commands convey a more polite tone. This is not surprising, since an immediate order would be more restrictive than a delayed order, in that it interrupts the addressee’s current state, without warning. In some languages aspect markers may influence the politeness of a command as well. There is a tendency for imperfectives to be taken as more polite than perfectives. In Pendau using the continuative aspectual enclitic suggests that the task is not urgent, thereby enhancing politeness, whereas the completive marker adds urgency, and is taken as less polite.
Aikhenvald notes that in Lavukaleve, there is a punctual and a durative marker for imperatives (and interestingly, it is only for imperatives). The punctual marker is used when “instantaneous completion is commanded” (p. 126). The durative marker denotes a command that can be completed over time. The Algonquin language, Fox, also has a way to express a command to be carried out in the immediate future vs. a command to be carried out in the remote future. Nambiquara also has an immediate imperative and a delayed imperative. “The immediate imperative implies an urgent command... while the delayed imperative has no overtones of urgency” (p. 130). Therefore, it appears that marking time frames for commanded actions is not uncommon cross-linguistically. With respect to face, we can deduce that urgency in a command is more threatening to the hearer’s negative face, since a timeframe in which the imposition is to be carried out is specified. In other words, the command is more restricting upon the addressee. In contrast, the delayed commands may allow for a degree of flexibility in the timeframe, thereby minimizing their imposition.

Not enough has been said in the literature about negative commands with respect to politeness. Aikhenvald (2011) notes that negative imperatives tend to express fewer meanings than their affirmative counterparts, but does not delve into their face-threatening abilities. Likewise, Márquez Reiter (2000) addresses the role of politeness in imperatives in Uruguayan Spanish as compared to British English, but does not address negative imperatives. Fontanella de Weinberg (1979), as discussed in Chapter 1, does discuss the alternation between the VNI and the TNI in Argentinian Spanish, and says that the VNI is less polite than the TNI, but she does not analyze these in terms of Brown & Levinson’s politeness theory. Fontanella de Weinberg (1979, and with Lavandera,
40

1975) concludes that VNIs are used for imperious or *peremptory* orders, while TNIs are used for more courteous commands. In other words, she finds the VNI to be more imposing than the TNI. Fontanella de Weinberg & Lavandera (1975) also determined that the *voseo* form does not appear in the present subjunctive, but rather is reserved exclusively for the negative imperative. In Chapter 3, I will argue that this distinction is due not to a grammatical specialization of forms, but rather is conditioned by the meaning encoded in the VNI form. I will also demonstrate that, while certainly less frequent, the *voseo* form is in fact found in present subjunctive uses.

Given that the speech acts that negative imperatives perform are similar to those of affirmative imperatives, perhaps we can assume that they pose the same threat with regards to face. It certainly seems to be true that negative imperatives impose on their addressee’s freedom from imposition to an equal degree as affirmative imperatives. Combining Portner’s To-Do List theory with that of politeness theory, we can deduce that according to politeness theory, people wish to have control over their To-Do-Lists (which negative face seems to indicate). If this is the case, then both affirmative and negative commands would be face threatening, since both are an attempt by the speaker to alter the addressee’s To-Do-List. They also give the addressee less freedom over the possible future state of affairs, and give the speaker more control in this regard.

2.2 Implicated meaning

In the study of meaning, there is a tendency to distinguish between literal meaning and non-literal meaning. The literal meaning boils down to “what is said” (in Grice’s 1975 terms), or at-issue entailments (as Potts, 2003, 2005, 2007, calls them). This meaning is truth-conditional, and is typically a part of semantics. The non-literal meaning
goes beyond this to include meaning that is implicated, or the meaning that the speaker intends by what they say. This meaning may be dependent upon either the linguistic form or the context, and may take into account the relationship between the speaker and the interlocutor, among other things. Within implicated meaning, there are further divisions, which are to be discussed below, along with a discussion their contextual dependency.

2.2.1 Conversational Implicatures

One goal of this dissertation is to determine the ways by which the relevant meaning difference between the TNI and the VNI in AS comes about. In order to do that, I turn to explore the different ways that meaning is typically conveyed.

Conversational Implicatures (Grice, 1989) are a type of non-truth-valued meaning that is expressed in conjunction with context. The existence of Conversational Implicatures relies on the assumption that speakers are cooperative in communication. Specifically, they follow the Cooperative Principal, described in (45):

45. The Cooperative Principle

*Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged* (Grice, 1989).

The Cooperative Principle consists of four maxims, which serve to describe specifically what “rules” cooperative speakers follow. These maxims are summarized in (46):

46. I. Quantity

a. Make your contribution as informative as required (for the purpose of the exchange).
b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

II. Quality

a. Do not say what you believe to be false.

b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

III. Relation

a. Be relevant.

IV. Manner

a. Avoid obscurity of expression.

b. Avoid ambiguity.

c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

d. Be orderly.

When speakers speak, their interlocutors can assume that they are being cooperative, and can infer information accordingly. Usually, Conversational Implicatures come about by a speaker either observing or flouting one of Grice’s maxims. A speaker can also violate the maxims, as in the case of a blatant lie, or they can opt out of them, which is the case of a well-known study of Malagasy (Keenan, 1976). In Malagasy, speakers are reluctant to be informative, because having information gives the speaker prestige. When a speaker chooses to flout a maxim, they violate it knowing that their interlocutor will recognize the violation, and will be able to make the appropriate inferences in order to interpret the speaker’s message. Take, for example, the exchange in (47).

47. A: I can’t stand Mark!

    B: What nice weather we have today!
Speaker B’s response in (47) violates the maxim of relation, since the weather is irrelevant to A’s remark about Mark. Speaker B knows that his response is irrelevant, and expects speaker A to know this as well. Speaker B likely wishes to implicate that he does not wish to comment on Mark, for whatever reason. Speaker A, assuming Speaker B is cooperative, would reason that Speaker B said something irrelevant, and that there must be a reason for it. He will thus consider the possible reasons why Speaker B may have done so, and will infer perhaps that Mark is approaching or is within earshot, and Speaker B therefore does not wish to comment on him. In this way, Speaker B’s flouting of the maxim generates an implicature, which allows Speaker A to infer the relevant information. Implicatures that arise via a speaker’s behavior with respect to the maxims of the cooperative principle are Conversational Implicatures.

Let us look at a few examples that demonstrate Conversational Implicatures derived from other maxims. In the following exchange, we can see an implicature based on the Maxim of Quantity.

48. A: How many children do you have?

B: 3

a. \(+\rightarrow\) B does not have more than 3 children

In the above exchange in (48), Speaker B implicates that he has 3 children, and not more. This is an example of a scalar implicature. Based on the maxim of Quantity, we can assume that Speaker B is giving all of the required information to answer Speaker A’s question. Therefore, the hearer can infer that Speaker B does not have any more than 3 children. With scalar implicatures, the uttering of a weaker value (in this case, 3 children) implicates that the stronger value (in this case 4 or more children) is not the
case. This is also a Horn scale (Horn, 1972), since the stronger value would entail the weaker value. Namely, having 4 children entails having 3 children, and having 2 children, and having 1 child.

The Maxim of Quantity can generate implicatures that are not scalar, as well. An example can be found in the following exchange in (49).

49. A: What time did you get home last night?
   B: At 12:37 and 29 seconds.

In (49), Speaker B is being overly informative with his response. He is giving too much information. Speaker A likely would have been satisfied with a response like “around 12:30,” but Speaker B chooses to include more information in order to convey further information. This information could be that B is annoyed by A’s inquisition.

Implicatures based on the Maxim of Quality are centered on the speaker’s beliefs regarding the truth of their utterance.

50. A: We need someone to make the cake for the party.
   B: I can do it!

In (50), B’s response that they can make the cake implicates that they believe they will be able to do so. Speaker A can infer that perhaps B has made a cake before (and therefore has evidence that he will be able to do so again) or that they have some other sort of evidence of their ability to do so. If Speaker B fails to make the cake successfully, Speaker A would have a right to be disappointed.

In (51) we can see how the Maxim of Manner can give way to particularized interpretations, as well.
51. John’s mother and her husband are coming over for dinner.

   a. ➔ John’s mother’s husband is not John’s father.

   Given the way in which the speaker chose to express the utterance in (51) one can infer that John’s mother’s husband is not John’s father. If he were, the speaker would have violated the submaxim “Be brief.” It would have been more brief to say that John’s parents were coming over, or even his mother and father, if that had been the case.

   It is important to note that the context contributes to the generation of Conversational Implicatures, not the particular linguistic forms themselves. In other words, there is no particular word or form used by Speaker B in (47) that generates the implicature that Mark is within earshot. It is his entire utterance taken in context that licenses this inference. If B’s utterance about the weather in (47) were put into a different context, perhaps one where the interlocutors were in fact talking about the weather, or they just stepped outside and the utterance were relevant to the context, then no such implicature would have been generated. Likewise, in an example (52), from Sinnott (2010), the context will influence the inference taken by the utterance.

52. My dog is inside.

   i. ➔ Get my dog out of the house

   If (52) were uttered in a context where a house is on fire, and firefighters arrive at the scene, it would most likely be taken as a request to get the dog out of the house. While the speaker did not literally tell the firefighter to get the dog out of the house, the firefighter can easily infer such an interpretation, given the maxim of relevance. The speaker also avoids being overly informative by taking for granted the fact that the house
is on fire and that her dog is important to her and is in danger, and she would like for him not to be harmed by the fire.

In an exchange such as the following, the sentence “My dog is inside” will be interpreted in a very different way.

53. A: Oh no! I didn’t know it was raining! My dog is out getting soaked!

B: My dog is inside.

In this context, Speaker B’s utterance would certainly not be interpreted as a request to get the dog out of the house. On the contrary, inside the house is the perfect place for the dog to be. Speaker B, instead, is providing relevant, and truthful information in response to Speaker A’s information regarding her own dog.

These examples demonstrate the contextual dependency of Conversational Implicatures. The meaning of a sentence will vary depending on the context in which it occurs, and the interlocutors’ knowledge of the Cooperative Principle. The implicature is not generated due to the particular linguistic form, but rather the context in which it arises. For this reason, synonyms in the same context should generate the same Conversational Implicatures. This is an example of Conversational Implicatures are nondetachable—they arise contextually, so conveying the same proposition within the same context will generate the same implicature. For example, in (54), any of the italicized words would generate the implicature that Joe does not always run outside.

54. Joe often/usually/frequently runs outside in the winter.

i. ➞ Joe does not always run outside in the winter.

Given the Maxim of Quantity, we can infer that Joe does not always run outside, but rather may sometimes run indoors. It may appear at first glance that the implicature
generated in (i), that Joe does not always run outside, is associated with the particular lexical items in italics. Nevertheless, this is not the case, as can be seen in (55) below.

55. Joe often, in fact always, runs outside in the winter.

In (55), the implicature that was generated in (54) is cancelled by the linguistic context. The speaker cancels the implicature by adding the phrase “in fact always,” and the truth-value of the utterance is not affected. This is another property of Conversational Implicatures—they are cancellable, since they are not inherent to the linguistic form, but rather rely on the context. Similarly, non-linguistic context can cancel Conversational Implicatures.

The degree to which an implicature is attached to the form or to the context varies, however. For this reason, Conversational Implicatures are divided into two types: Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs) and Generalized Conversational Implicatures (GCI). Both GCIs and PCIs can be cancelled or blocked, which shows that none of these meanings are inherent to the linguistic forms used themselves, but rather arise contextually.

2.2.1.1 Particularized Conversational Implicatures

While both PCIs and GCIs do depend on context for their generation, PCIs are more context-dependent than GCIs are. PCIs require more calculation than GCIs, and they arise only when certain contextual conditions are met. The inference in (52i), for example, is a PCI, since other utterances of the same sentence would not yield the same interpretation (as is demonstrated by the exchange in (53). Therefore, it is the context that contributes to the generation of (52i). A further example to demonstrate the high contextual dependency of a PCI can be seen in (56).
56. Mother: Why are you awake?

Child: I can’t fall asleep. I saw a monster in my closet!

Mother: Monsters are not real.

i. \( \Rightarrow \) You did not see a monster in your closet.

The mother’s reply in (56) implicates that there is not a monster in her child’s room. However, uttered in a completely different context, the sentence *Monsters do not exist* may generate no such implicature. In other words, there is no inherent class of cases where utterances of the type “X is not Y” that yields “You did not see an X.” Therefore, in a context where, perhaps, a monster-loving child requests a monster for his birthday, the mother could utter the same sentence, and she would not be conveying that the child did not see a monster in his closet, but rather, more likely, that she is unable to give the child a real monster for his birthday. This is because PCIs, such as that in (56i) rely heavily on the context in which they are uttered.

PCIs, then, rely on specific contexts to come about. In the absence of these contexts, the PCI will necessarily be absent. In this way, they contrast with GCIs, which are discussed below.

2.2.1.2 Generalized Conversational Implicatures

GCIs, while still contextual, are the preferred, or default interpretation of an utterance. The theory of GCIs is thoroughly developed in Levinson (2000). While PCIs are calculated when specific (or “particular”) contexts yield them, GCIs require less calculation, and they will arise by default, provided that specific contexts do not block them.
A GCI, then, would arise in any context where the linguistic form is used, except in those contexts in which it is specifically cancelled. An example of a GCI, then, can be seen in (54), where the use of *often, usually* or *frequently* would typically generate the implicature *not always*. However, we can see in the utterance in (55) that this implicature can in fact be cancelled, and not apply to specific contexts. Therefore, we would say that the default interpretation would be *not always*, but that this implicature may not arise in specific contexts. A further example of a default implicature can be seen in

57. I have $15.

i. $>$ I have only $15 (not $16, or $17, etc....)

Typically, when a person utters something as in (57), it is generally understood that they do not have more than the amount stated. This implicature would be generated by the Maxim of Quantity. Nevertheless, we could think of a specific context in which this inference can be cancelled. Such would be the case in (58), below.

58. A: Tickets cost $15 but I forgot my wallet!

B: I have $15.

i. $\neq$ I have only $15.

In (58), it is not expected that Speaker B disclose all of the money that he has, since the only relevant amount is the $15 that Speaker A lacks. Therefore, the GCI generated in (57) is cancelled by the specific context for (58). More detail about GCIs can be seen in section 2.2.2.2, below.

2.2.2 Neo-Gricean Conversational Implicatures

Many scholars have found Grice’s Cooperative Principle and Maxims to be a good start to describing communication, however they find the maxims to be superfluous,
and overlapping. The Maxim of Quantity, for example, often yields the same results as the Maxim of Relation, since saying more than is necessary can go hand in hand with saying something irrelevant. Similarly, the second submaxim of the Maxim of Quantity (do not make your contribution more informative than is required) is quite similar to the third submaxim of the Maxim of Manner (Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity)). Therefore, several scholars, particularly Horn (1984) and Levinson (2000), have attempted to condense the maxims into simplified principles.

2.2.2.1 Horn’s approach

Horn (1984) retains the Maxim of Quality, but otherwise divides the system into two principles—the Q-Principle and the R-Principle. These principles help reduce Grice’s Maxims in order to more simply account for communication.

59. The Q-Principle (Hearer-based)

a. Make your contribution sufficient (Quantity)

b. Say as much as you can (given R)

(lower-bounding principle, inducing upper-bounding implicata)

60. The R-Principle (Speaker-based)

c. Make your contribution necessary (relation, quantity 2, manner)

d. Say no more than you must (given Q)

(upper-bounding principle, inducing lower-bounding implicata)

The Q-Principle, in (59), is akin to Grice’s first submaxim in the Maxim of Quantity. Horn notes that this principle asserts a lower bound, but can give rise to upper-bounding implicatures. An example is as follows:
61. Q-based scalar implicatures

a. Jorge ate some of his food.
   i. \( \rightarrow \) Jorge did not eat all of his food.

b. John has 3 dollars.
   i. \( \rightarrow \) John does not have more than 3 dollars

The assertion in (a) is that Jorge ate ‘some if not all’ of his food; however, the implicature is that he ate ‘some but not all’ of his food. Likewise, the assertion in (b) is that John has at least 3 sisters, but the implicature is that he does not have more than 3. These implicatures come about based on the Q-Principle, since if the speaker were being sufficiently informative, they would have to use the stronger predication. These implicatures are GCIs, though, since they come about as a default, however they can be cancelled by specific contexts. If the context for (b), for example, were that it costs $3 to enter a bar, then the implicature in (b) would not hold. This is because the speaker may have uttered (b) as evidence that John can enter the bar. Any person with at least $3 could enter, but having more than that amount would not be relevant, and therefore would not need to be expressed, as per the R-Principle.

The R-Principle, in (60), combines Grice’s second submaxim of Quantity, as well as the Relation and Manner Maxims. This principle is upper-bounding, and generates lower bounding implicatures. In Horn’s words:

“A speaker who says ‘...p...’ may license the R-inference that he meant ‘...more than p...’.” (p. 14).

An example of this would be in the case of an indirect speech act. If somebody utters (62), for example, in a context where the addressee’s ability to do so was not in
question, then the hearer could infer that the speaker is doing more than asking about the addressee’s abilities, namely, making a request.

62. Can you pass the salt?
   i.  \(\rightarrow\) I am requesting that you pass me the salt.

Another R-based implicatures can be seen in (63), taken from Horn (1984). By saying that he broke a finger, the speaker implicates that it was his own.

63. I broke a finger yesterday.
   i.  \(\rightarrow\) The finger I broke was my own.

It is also the R-Principle that allows for the implicature in (i), above, where the speaker is requesting that her dog be saved from the burning house.

Interestingly, Q-based implicatures can be cancelled by negation, whereas R-based implicatures cannot. The Q-based implicature in (a), then, does not hold if the utterance in (a) is negated, as demonstrated in (64).

64. Jorge didn’t eat some of his food; he ate all of it.
   i.  \(\neq\) Jorge didn’t eat all of his food.

The R-based implicature in (62), on the other hand, cannot be cancelled by negation. For example, the implicature generated in (i) is not what is being negated in the following example.

65. I didn’t break a finger yesterday.
   i.  \(\neq\) I broke a finger, but it wasn’t one of mine.

When the speaker negates the proposition in (63), he is not negating the implicature as well. Therefore, under Horn’s theory, just as in Grice’s theory, Conversational Implicatures are cancelable.
2.2.2.2 Levinson’s approach

Levinson (2000) also attempted to reduce Grice’s Maxims into a simplified theory of communication. He proposes three heuristics, based on Grice’s Maxims, which interact in order to allow for successful communication. These heuristics are described in (66), below.

66. Levinson’s Heuristics

a. The Q-Heuristic

What isn’t said, isn’t

b. The I-Heuristic

What is simply described is stereotypically exemplified

c. The M-Heuristic

What’s said in an abnormal way isn’t normal

The Q-Heuristic is related to Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity, and is responsible for scalar implicatures. Therefore, in an utterance such as that in (67), it is assumed, based on the Q-Heuristic, that the speaker said all they were in the position to say.

67. Nine people came to the party.

   i. +> More than 9 people did not come to the party.

Based on the utterance in (67), the hearer could infer (i), that no more than 9 people went to the party.

The I-Heuristic is related to Grice’s second Maxim of Quantity. It is based on informativeness, and is centered on the idea that what can be taken for granted does not need to be said. Levinson describes this heuristic by saying:
“Brief and simple expressions thus encourage, by this heuristic, a tendency to select the best interpretation to the most stereotypical, most explanatory exemplification.” (p. 37)

Given this heuristic, the utterance in (68) generates the implicature in (i).

68. David arrived and the party started.

i. ➔ David arrived and then the party started.

While the utterance in (68) only entails that both events (David arriving and the party starting) happened, the implicature is that the order in which the events were uttered is the order in which they happened.

The M-Heuristic is related to Grice’s Maxim of Manner. It directly contrasts with the I-Heuristic. In the I-Heuristic, interlocutors assume that what is said in a simple way must be stereotypical. The M-Heuristic, then, states that what is said in a marked way must be non-stereotypical.

69. Doug’s mother’s husband is coming with her to dinner tonight.

i. ➔ Doug mother’s husband is not Doug’s father.

The example in (69), if Doug’s mother were married to Doug’s father, the simpler way to express this would be to state that Doug’s father was coming to dinner. However, since a more complicated utterance was used, the hearer can assume that there is something non-stereotypical about the relationship, and thus arrive at the inference in (i).

Levinson’s reliance on stereotypes as a basis for his Heuristics demonstrates his belief in a default interpretation, particularly that which arises via GCI. In fact, his theory is set in a discussion of GCI. For Levinson, communication is divided into three layers. The first two layers come from the standard ideas of communication. Layer one is
sentence-meaning, layer two is speaker-meaning, and his layer three is utterance-type-meaning. The first level corresponds with the study of grammar as a whole. The second level, which Levinson also calls utterance-token meaning, accounts for PCIs. According to Levinson, the third layer is “a level of systematic pragmatic inference based not on direct computations about speaker-intentions but rather on general expectations about how language is normally used” (p. 22). This layer of meaning, then, allows us to talk about things like speech acts, presuppositions, Conventional Implicatures, felicity conditions, and GCIs. GCI’s, then, according to Levinson, are the Conversational Implicatures that arise that are less contextually dependent; however, as above examples have shown, the context certainly can block the generation of a GCI. Therefore, while they are indeed reliant on context, they are the implicatures that arise with particular linguistic forms, in almost any context, provided the implicature is not specifically blocked. In this third level of meaning inferences that come about based on linguistic form and meaning can be explored. In the next section (2.2.3), I will discuss another type of implicated meaning that is more form-dependent: Conventional Implicatures.

2.2.3 Conventional Implicatures

Conventional Implicatures, unlike Conversational Implicatures, are meaning that is found in the linguistic form itself, not contextually based. Conventional Implicatures do not need to be calculated from what we know about cooperative speakers (i.e.: from Grice’s Maxims, Horn’s Principles, or Levinson’s Heuristics, etc.), like Conversational Implicatures do. While they are not context-dependent, and they are attached to the linguistic form itself, they do not contribute to the truth values of the utterance, which makes them separate from “what is said.” Conventional Implicatures were briefly
discussed by Grice (1989), but only in an attempt to set them apart from the true topic at hand, which was Conversational Implicatures. Conventional Implicatures, for Grice, do commit the speaker to their meaning “by virtue of the meaning of [the speaker’s] words,” however they are not a part of “What is said”, as they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. In Grice’s example, given in (70), the speaker conveys a causal relationship between being an Englishman and being brave.

70. He is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave.

According to Grice, this causal relationship is conveyed via Conventional Implicature in that it arises via the nature of the words selected. It, however, does not contribute to “What is said”, in the sense that if it were to not the case that being brave was caused by being an Englishman, the utterance would not be strictly false. This is the extent to which Grice discusses Conventional Implicature.

Now, the most influential contributor to research on Conventional Implicatures has been Chris Potts (2003, 2005, 2007). According to Potts, Conventional Implicatures are “speaker-oriented entailments,” and they are “independent of the at-issue entailments” (Potts’ at-issue entailments are akin to Grice’s “what is said”). A typical example of Conventional Implicature arises in appositives, as can be seen in (71).

71. Carol, Peter’s sister, is coming in from Chicago.

A speaker would not choose to convey the most essential information as a parenthetical. The at-issue content from (71) is that Carol is coming in from Chicago. This information contributes to the truth of the utterance, and is the main purpose of the utterance. The information that Carol is Peter’s sister is expressed via Conventional
Implicature. This is further evidenced by appositives in indirect quotations, as can be seen in (72)

72. Anna: Carol is coming in from Chicago.
   Bonnie: Anna said that Carol, Peter’s sister, is coming in from Chicago.

In (72), Anna’s utterance is simply that Carol is coming in to town. Bonnie’s report of Anna’s utterance, however, conveys extra information—namely that Carol is Peter’s sister. Although Anna did not state that Carol is Peter’s sister, Bonnie’s indirect quote is faithful to Anna’s utterance. The appositive is attributed to Bonnie.

Similarly, in (73), the adverb *surprisingly* is also not part of the at-issue entailment, but rather is conveyed via Conventional Implicature. It is also speaker-oriented, as it expresses Bonnie’s surprise at the fact that Timothy did not go to the party. The feeling of surprise is not attributed to Anna.

73. Anna: Timothy did not go to the party!
   Bonnie: Anna said that Timothy, surprisingly, did not go to the party!

Another typical example of a Conventional Implicature is that which comes about from the word *but*, in English. As can be seen in (74), *but* carries an implicature that there is a contrast between the two sentences it connects.

74. Lucy is a big dog, but she is nice.
   a. That's not true. Lucy is a medium-sized dog.
   b. That’s not true. Lucy eats people for breakfast!
   c. #That’s not true. Big dogs are almost always nice!

The truth values of the utterance in (74) are concerning the truth of each of the sentences connected by *but*, particularly *Lucy is a big dog* and *She is nice*. The utterance
in (74) is true provided that Lucy is in fact a big dog, and that she is nice. If it were the case that large dogs were almost always nice, this would be a strange thing to say, however. This is because the utterance in (74) implicates that there is some contrast between being a big dog, and being harmless. If this contrast were false, however, the truth of (74) would still hold. This is because the implicature of contrast does not contribute to the truth values of the utterance. The responses in (a) and (b) are both felicitous, since they address the truth of “What is said.” The response in (c) is infelicitous, since it addresses the truth of the contrast between being a big dog and being nice.

These examples show that the word but in English conventionally implicates a contrast, but this contrast does not contribute to the truth values of the utterance. This is true of all conventionally implicated meaning.

According to Potts (2005), Conventional Implicatures are entailments, as they are part of the linguistic form, but are separate from at-issue-entailments. Their most important attributes are that they carry speaker-oriented meaning, and they are not cancellable. Potts defines Conventional Implicatures with the following characteristics (where CIs for him are our Conventional Implicatures).

75. Potts (2005) characteristics of Conventional Implicatures

i. CIs are part of the conventional (lexical) meaning of words.

ii. CIs are commitments, and thus give rise to entailments.

iii. These commitments are made by the speaker of the utterance “by virtue of the meaning of” the words he chooses.

---

8 The second part of (c) is acceptable. It is the “That’s not true” that is infelicitous.
iv. CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is 
“said (in the favored sense)”, i.e., independent of the at-issue
entailments.

Each section of this definition helps distinguish Conventional Implicatures from
other kinds of meaning. Characteristic (i) means that “[Conventional Implicatures] cannot
be teased apart from the lexical items that produce them” (Potts, 2005, p. 28). In other
words, they cannot be cancelled, the way Conversational Implicatures can. This is
because, instead of being context dependent, they are inherent to the meaning of the
lexical item. Thus, in an example such as (70), above, the use of the word therefore
inherently indicates a causal relationship. If the speaker did not want to express one, they
would have to use another lexical item.

Characteristic (ii) means that Conventional Implicatures commit the speaker to
their proposition. In other words, they are undeniable. This, in combination with the prior
characteristic, help classify Conventional Implicatures as entailments (although not at-
issue entailments).

To exemplify, if Sarah utters (76), her only proposition is that Ricardo lost his
job. If Sarah utters (77), she expresses both that Ricardo lost his job, and that she believes
him to be a loser.

76. Ricardo lost his job.

77. That loser Ricardo lost his job.

In (77), then, the at-issue entitlement is that Ricardo lost his job, but the
conventionally implicated meaning is that he is a loser. This meaning is attributed to the
speaker—i.e. it is the speaker’s opinion of Ricardo. Therefore, if somebody were to
indirectly quote Sarah, they would be more likely to use the utterance in (78), since the utterance in (79) would inaccurately attribute the idea that Ricardo is a loser to the speaker, not to Sarah, and it is, in fact, Sarah’s view.

78. Sarah said that Ricardo lost his job.

79. #Sarah said that that loser Ricardo lost his job.

Furthermore, if somebody heard Sarah utter (77), they would be licensed to say that Sarah called Ricardo a loser. This is because it is in fact part of what Sarah said, and is undeniable. It is not, however, the purpose for Sarah’s utterance. Sarah’s main contribution in (77) is that Ricardo lost his job. Bach (1999) challenges the notion of Conventional Implicature, and in doing so, proposes the Indirect Quotation test in order to test for “what is said.” According to the IQ Test, information is part of “what is said” if it can appear in an indirect quote of the utterance, as part of what is being quoted. Since in (79), Ricardo being a loser is attributed to the speaker, not to Sarah, it is not taken as part of “what is said.” The only part of Sarah’s utterance that contributes to “what is said,” therefore, is the fact that Ricardo lost his job.

Since Conventional Implicatures are “part of the conventional meaning of words,” they should not be cancellable. This is true, as we can see by the infelicity of the utterances in (80).

80. a. #That loser Ricardo, who is very successful, lost his job.

b. #That loser Ricardo, who is not a loser, lost his job.

Characteristic (iii) means that Conventional Implicatures are speaker-oriented. They express the beliefs of the speaker alone. This is demonstrated by (79). The speaker could not utter (79) in an attempt to attribute Ricardo being a loser to Sarah, because the
expressive is necessarily attributed to the speaker. Uttering (79) would incorrectly implicate that the speaker believes Ricardo to be a loser, when in fact, the speaker intends to attribute this belief to Sarah.

Characteristic (iv) means that Conventional Implicatures are not the same as at-issue entailments. At-issue entailments contribute to the truth of an utterance, and they can express the beliefs of other people. In (81), this difference is apparent.

81. Sue believes that that jerk Conner got promoted.

The fact that Conner got promoted expresses Sue’s belief, not the speaker’s. This is the at-issue entailment of (81). However, the fact that Conner is a jerk is the speaker’s view, not Sue’s, and this is expressed by Conventional Implicature.

Characteristic (iv) also distinguishes Conventional Implicatures from presuppositions. Presuppositions are propositions that must be true in order for an utterance to be understood. For example, in the following utterance in (82), it is presupposed that I have a cat. If I did not have a cat, the utterance would make no sense.

82. I have to pick my dumb cat up from the vet.

Nevertheless, (82) also contains conventionally implicated meaning, namely that I think my cat is dumb. If my interlocutor knew that I did not in fact think my cat was dumb, they would still be able to make sense of this utterance. Perhaps they would interpret that I was bothered by the inconvenience of having to go to the vet, and was taking this out on my cat. In contrast, if my interlocutor knew that I did not have a cat, then they would not be able to make sense of (82), since it would be based on a false presupposition.
Another type of expressive that Potts (2005) mentions is that which comes about via address forms or honorifics. Sinnott (2010) uses Potts’ theory to analyze address forms in Peninsular Spanish. Honorifics are used to speak politely to the addressee, or to express a relationship between the speaker and the verb’s argument (often times the addressee, but it can be a third party). The politeness that comes about is expressed via Conventional Implicature. The Japanese example in (83) (from Potts 2005) demonstrates this.

83. Yamada sensei-ga o-warai-ni nat-ta.

Yamada teacher-NOM HON-laugh-DAT be

‘Professor Yamada laughed.’

The honorific in the example above indicates that the speaker considers Yamada a superior. This superiority is expressed via Conventional Implicature. Sinnott (2010) examines address forms in Peninsular Spanish, and she proposes that the use of the V form (the formal form of address) conveys social distance, via Conventional Implicature. She further discusses social meaning that is conveyed via the use of different address forms in Peninsular Spanish, and her work will be discussed in more detail to follow, since it formed the basis for much of the work in this dissertation. In Chapter 4, I will show that the distinction between the TNI and VNI is one that also relies on confianza, or the lack of social distance. In this sense, it is related to the formal and informal distinction in Peninsular Spanish, and to honorifics.9

Potts also cites the German subjunctive mood, which is used to indicate that “the speaker wishes to distance himself from the propositional content expressed” (p. 186).

9 Although it should be noted that AS also has a formal usted form, which is an option for negative commands as well. The VNI and TNI are both familiar forms.
Potts argues that this lack of commitment to the proposition is expressed via Conventional Implicature, and offers the following examples.

84. Fritz glaubt, dass Maria krank sei

\[ Fritz \textit{ believes that } Maria \textit{ sick is. KONJ } \]

‘Fritz believes that Maria is sick.’

85. Fritz ärgerte sich darüber, dass Maria krank sei.

\[ Fritz \textit{ annoyed self there-over that } Maria \textit{ sick be. KONJ } \]

‘Fritz was annoyed about the fact that Maria was sick.’

In (84), the subjunctive is used because the speaker is not the one who believes that Maria is sick—it is Fritz who believes this. Therefore, the speaker is able to distance himself from the proposition. If the subject were first person instead of Fritz, then the subjunctive would not be felicitous in that example, since it would be explicitly stating that Maria being sick is the speaker’s belief—something they cannot distance themselves from. In (85), we see that the subjunctive is infelicitous because the use of the factive asserts that Maria is in fact sick. In this example, the at-issue entailment is that Fritz is annoyed. By using the subjunctive to convey that Maria is sick, the speaker is not committing himself to the proposition that Maria is sick. This is problematic, since it contradicts the presupposition that she is (expressed by the factive).

2.2.4 Conclusions

Potts’ model of Conventional Implicature will be a useful tool in describing the extra meaning that is conveyed via the VNI in Argentinian Spanish (as compared with the TNI). Part of the meaning conveyed by the VNI seems to be encoded in the linguistic form itself. I will show that the VNI conveys speaker-oriented meaning that is expressed
in a similar way to expressives. This extra meaning conveys the speaker’s beliefs about
the state of affairs, specifically that the speaker believes that the addressee had the
proposition that they wish to be carried out on his or her To-Do List. Evidence for the
speaker-orientation of this meaning will be given based on its use in indirect quotations.

I also intend to show that various social meanings are associated with the VNI,
particularly anger or impoliteness, and that these meanings are conversationally
implicated. To do so, I will show that these meanings can be cancelled in certain
contexts. Brown & Levinson (1987) address situations in which expected polite forms are
not used. “Non-occurrence of expected [polite] forms... can be made sense of by
analysing the rational sources for those occurrences in an otherwise homogeneous style
with other rational sources. For instance, a sudden warning ‘Come here’, interposed in a
formerly polite conversation, is not read as rude despite the overt imperative, if the need
for efficient or urgent communication takes precedence over face redress” (Brown &
Levinson, 1987: 282). In such a context, the “formerly polite conversation” blocks the
generation of the impolite implicature that would be associated with using an overt
imperative in English. Likewise, the VNI conveys impoliteness when the context doesn’t
block it. In contexts where impoliteness might be expected, like when the speaker is
bothered or angry, the impoliteness implicature survives. Brown & Levinson also say that
urgency is one reason why people ignore politeness strategies—using these strategies
would decrease the communicated urgency. This explains the appearance of the VNI in
situations like asking for forgiveness or consoling, which would not license impoliteness,
but the urgency of the situation remains. In the case of consolation, for example, we will

64
see that the context blocks the default *angry* interpretation, which does not match, contextually.

2.3 Social Meaning

The types of meaning discussed above, particularly PCIs and GCIs, have implications for the expression of social meaning. In the analysis of a morphological (or lexical) alternation, taking into account pragmatic or semantic meaning differences before addressing social meaning is essential. In this dissertation, I will show how the pragmatic meaning conveyed by the VNI informs the social meaning associated with it. The social analysis will concentrate on the notion of the Indexical Field (Eckert, 2008), which I discuss in the following section.

2.3.1 Indexical meaning

A look at recent work in sociolinguistics can also help us to describe what is happening with the two alternating negative commands in Argentinian Spanish. The idea of the indexical field (Eckert, 2008) may be useful in explaining the array of possible meanings associated with the VNI. According to Eckert, an indexical field is a “constellation of ideologically related meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable” (p. 454). Eckert calls for attention to social meaning in the study of variation. She argues that variation makes up an indexical system that provides information about the people who use the variables. Thus, the point of departure of variationist studies should be the meanings of the variables. Meanings get associated with different social categories, and social variables. The different linguistic variables that a speaker uses, can tell you something about what that speaker is like, the qualities they
have, or that person’s style. For Eckert, the final goal of her analysis is to find the way in which variation informs style. How do the meanings of variables form the meanings of styles? Presumably, in order to describe a person’s overall style, their use of a variety of variables must be considered. But the study of one variable at a time, and the meanings associated with it, can lead to understanding the styles of those who use it.

Eckert found that the quality of the vowels used by adolescents outside Detroit distinguished their styles, such that girls used more of the older Northern Cities Shift features, and burnouts used more of the urban innovations (backing). Yet she argues that the users of these variables are not making direct claims regarding their gender, or “burnout” status. She also surveyed a study of Beijing Mandarin (Zhang, 2005), where she examined the differences between the speech of state-employed workers and yuppie workers (who worked for global companies). It was found that the variable [i] had a “oily” quality, and that those who used it were seen as smooth, or streetwise. The state employed workers used this variable much more. Furthermore, Zhang found that the state workers were more likely to produce an interdental fricative for an alveolar one (e.g.: [ta paitsʰai] as pronounced as [ta paitθʰai]). Another variable that distinguishes these groups is the use of a full tone on unstressed syllables. Yuppie speakers tend to use the full tone, and they are seen as being a Hong Kong-Taiwan wannabe, because these are features more likely to be found in the more global, capitalist markets outside of Mainland China.

The message we can take from these studies that Eckert reports on is that “variables that historically come to distinguish geographic dialects can take on interactional meanings based in local ideology” (p. 462). This meaning stems from ideologies about what it means to be from those places, and what kinds of people live
there, etc. People can then choose linguistic features to represent their identity. In Labov’s famous study of Martha’s Vineyard fisherman, where he found that fisherman were using a centralized variant of /ay/, these people were not claiming identity as Vineyarders, but were identifying with what it meant to be a Vineyarder. Therefore, when speakers use different variables, they not only are making claims about their own identities, but they are picking and choosing particular characteristics of a certain group that they identify with.

In order to explain variability in the social meanings associated with a single variable, Eckert proposes the indexical field. This idea is based on Silverstein’s (2003) idea of indexical order, whereby he makes a distinction between first-order indices, second-order indices, etc. In this model, a first order index indexes membership in a group, while a second order index indexes specific elements that characterize the speaker based on that group association (this distinction corresponds with Labov’s (1971) indicator vs. marker distinction). Since variables and forms are constantly being evaluated and their interpretations are subject to change, the indexical value of the variable is also subject to change. That is how the indexical field comes about. The indexical field contains all of the ideological meanings that can be associated with a particular variable. Which of the possible meanings comes about in a given situation is dependent upon various factors, including the context.

Campbell-Kibler (2007) studied the perception of –ing vs. -in in English, and found that use of –in can be associated with many things, including casualness, youth, informality, intimacy, and speakers who are carefree, or country. The velar variant, on the other hand, was associated with education, articulateness, credibility, older speakers,
as well as prissy, city or confident speakers. Knowledge about the speaker or the speech context can influence which meaning comes about.

The variables studied in the realm of indexical fields have been mostly phonetic. Another example from Eckert (2008) is that of /t/ release in northern California. The original study was from Bucholtz (2001), but the indexical field analysis is Eckert’s. She distinguishes between permanent qualities that are associated with /t/ release, and “momentary and situated stances.” The indexical field Eckert created can be seen below in Figure 4. The qualities in boxes are social types, the qualities in black are permanent qualities, and the qualities in gray are stances.

![Indexical field of /t/ release from Eckert (2008)](image)

Figure 1: Indexical field of /t/ release from Eckert (2008)

The indexical field in Figure 1 shows us the various meanings that can be associated with /t/ release. It is important to note that these qualities may be associated with /t/ release, but also with any other number of variables the speaker could be using. Therefore, in order to convey “Articulate,” and not “Angry,” for example, a speaker would presumably use /t/ release in combination with other variables that may index
“Articulate.” Eckert also notes that her separation between grey and black is meant to be fluid, whereby what can start out as a stance can become a quality. For example, anger may be a situated stance, but if a person is habitually angry, they may become seen as an angry person, and angry becomes a quality of theirs.

Eckert states that the meanings the hearer is to associate with a given occurrence of a variant depend on his or her perspective, as well as the “style in which it is embedded—which includes not only the rest of the linguistic form of the utterance but the content of the utterance as well” (p. 469). Sinnott (forthcoming) argues that the context works with the utterance to produce the indexical meaning. It is interesting that some of the same meanings found in Eckert’s indexical field for /t/ release are valid also for what I will present for VNIs, particularly anger, but also interesting is that the opposite meanings of polite and formal are found. Still, this shows that these types of meaning are the types found in indexical fields, even when the indexical field is for a variable that is quite different from mine.

While so far most of the work done on indexical fields has examined phonetic variables, there are a few recent studies exploring variation at the morphological and lexical level (Sinnott, 2010, forthcoming on Address Forms in Peninsular Spanish; Beaton & Washington, 2012, on the Brazilian Portuguese term favelado). Sinnott (2010, 2013) proposes a unification of indexical fields and Conversational Implicatures. Her work on address forms in Peninsular Spanish has begun to develop a unified framework including the study of pragmatics (implicatures) and sociolinguistics (indexical fields). She found that the use of the address form usted indexed formality, old age, and unfamiliarity. Sinnott (2010) argues that the GCIs (or default interpretations) are what
make up the indexical field, while any other meaning implicated by PCIs is more contextually dependent, and are not part of the indexical field. In her 2013 paper, she retracts this stance and proposes a layered indexical field that can account for more salient meanings as well as more contextually dependent meanings. The layers represent a hierarchical order that resembles to Silverstein’s indexical orders. The innermost layer corresponds to the first order index. These are the most “basic” indices that represent the contextual information that the speakers rely on in order to decide which address form to use on that occasion. They rely on the speaker’s membership in a population. The second layer corresponds to the second-order index. These meanings are the most salient meanings that arise based on the use of one address form over the other. While all of the meanings are context dependent, these are less context dependent than the meanings that are found in the third layer. The third layer contains the most contextually dependent associations. The speaker begins in the first layer, and determines which address form to use based on their membership in a group. For address forms, this typically has to do with whether or not the speaker must convey distance or not. Then, further indices can come about, which can help the hearer decide why the speaker may be expressing (or not) distance. These are from the second and third layers. If a speaker wants to convey distance, because she has confianza with her interlocutor, that is found in the second layer. But speakers can convey distance for more highly specific contexts, for example if they are angry. These more specific contextual interpretations are what are found in the third layer. Sinnott’s layered Indexical Field can be seen in Figure 2, below.
Figure 2: Sinnott’s (forthcoming) Hierarchical Indexical Field of Address Forms

Importantly, Sinnott refers to all of these meanings as implicated meanings. She ties the Indexical Field with Conversational Implicature. In this analysis, then, the most contextually dependent meanings (those in the third layer) are conveyed via Particularized Conversational Implicatures. The less contextually dependent meanings, or the default meanings (those in the second layer) are conveyed via Generalized Conversational Implicature. This model helps us understand not only what meanings are associated with different forms, but also how these meanings come about.

Beaton & Washington (2012) examine the lexical item *favelado* in Brazilian Portuguese. They claim that use of this term most commonly indexes negative meanings such as *poor, drug-dealer* or *slut*. But they also claim that some of the meanings associated may be positive, such as *badass* or *streetsmart*. While the negative meanings are more frequent, the positive meanings require highly specific contexts to come about,
and are due to a reappropriation of the meaning. This wide variation in possible meanings associated with *favelado* could be accounted for by Sinnott’s model.

### 2.3.2 Conclusions

It has been argued (Lavandera, 1978; Romaine, 1984; Eckert, 2008) that in the study of variation, it is necessary to take into account not only variation in form but variation in content. Pragmatic meaning will be essential to the study of variation, especially at the morphological, or lexical and syntactic levels, but also at the phonological level (Eckert, 2008). The different pragmatic meanings of the variables may be a cause for different social distributions. Therefore, the study of meaning is necessary for the study of variation. In order to explain the social meaning that each variable can signal, it is important to address the pragmatic meaning. This dissertation does just that. I explore the pragmatic meaning that separates the VNI from the TNI in Argentinian Spanish, and I later explore how these forms are distributed socially. I use the pragmatic meaning in order to explain this social distribution, and I follow Sinnott’s (2010, forthcoming) idea of the layered Indexical Field. The pragmatic meaning associated with the VNI can help us understand some quality about the speaker who uses the VNI, or their stance. This is discussed further in Chapter 4.
Chapter 3  

VNI vs. TNI: Speaker Oriented Meaning

3.1 Conventionally implicated meaning

Recall that Conventional Implicatures convey meaning that is not contextually dependent, but found in the linguistic form itself. According to Grice (1975), Conventional Implicatures are not exactly part of “what is said,” as they do not contribute to the truth conditions of the utterance. For Potts (2005), Conventional Implicatures are entailments, as they are part of the linguistic form, but are separate from at-issue entailments. Potts characterization of Conventional Implicatures is repeated here in (86) (where “CIs” is his abbreviation for “Conventional Implicatures”).

86. a. CIs are part of the conventional (lexical) meaning of words.

   b. CIs are commitments, and thus give rise to entailments.

   c. These commitments are made by the speaker of the utterance “by virtue of the meaning of” the words he chooses.

   d. CIs are logically and compositionally independent of what is “said (in the favored sense)”, i.e., the at-issue entailments.

Each part of the above definition helps distinguish Conventional Implicatures from other kinds of meaning. (86a) means that “[Conventional Implicatures] cannot be teased apart from the lexical items that produce them” (Potts 2004, p. 28). In other words, unlike with the case of Conversational Implicature, synonyms in the same context would
not generate the same Conventional Implicature, since the conventionally implicated meaning is tied to the linguistic form itself. This is also a reason why they cannot be cancelled, the way Conversational Implicatures can, since, instead of being context dependent, they are inherent to the meaning of the lexical item. That brings us to (86b) and (86c), which serve to distinguish Conventional Implicatures from Conversational Implicatures. Because Conversational Implicatures are context dependent, and therefore absent in certain contexts, they are not inherent to the linguistic form themselves, and thus do not give rise to entailments. Conventional Implicatures, on the other hand, are dependent on the linguistic form alone, and therefore, arise by the nature of the words chosen. For this reason, they are undeniable. (86c) also says that that Conventional Implicatures are speaker-oriented. They express the beliefs of the speaker alone. It is in this sense that Conventional Implicatures are distinct from at-issue entailments, which brings us to (86d). (86d) means that Conventional Implicatures are not the same as at-issue entailments. At-issue entailments can express the beliefs of other people. In (81), repeated here as (87), this difference is apparent.

87. Sue believes that that jerk Conner got promoted.

The proposition that Conner got promoted is the at-issue content. This proposition holds true only in Sue’s beliefs, but not necessarily the speaker’s. Therefore, that proposition is not speaker-oriented, but expresses the beliefs of somebody else. However, the fact that Conner is a jerk is the speaker’s view, not Sue’s, and this is expressed by Conventional Implicature.

I will demonstrate that the additional meaning provided by the VNI is expressed via Conventional Implicature. Because of the nature of imperatives, typical tests for
conventional implicature, particularly testing for its independence of the at-issue entailments, are not easily applied. Tests for non-truth conditional meaning, such as the “that’s not true” test, are typically used to differentiate the meaning expressed by a Conventional Implicature from the at-issue entailment. An example of this test was demonstrated in (74). In (74c), we saw that the contrast conventionally implicated by *but* was non truth-conditional, and that the utterance in (74) would be taken as true even if it were the case that big dogs are always nice. Imperatives are difficult to test in this way. For this reason, I use a variety of methodologies in order to demonstrate that the meaning associated with the VNI is speaker oriented, and that it is separate from the main function of the imperative, which is to add a property to the addressee’s To-Do List.

I propose that *immediacy* is the unifying dimension that applies to all contexts in which the VNI occurs, and that *immediacy* is expressed via Conventional Implicature. In order to explore whether *immediacy* is conventionally implicated, we turn to Potts (2007). Potts (2007) notes that Conventional Implicatures are mechanisms that permit speakers to “comment upon their assertions, to editorialize in the midst of asking questions and imposing demands” (p. 2). This is seen in appositives, for example, such as (71)-(73), above. As a further example, take (88).

88. Sarah Palin said that Bill Clinton, a conservative politician, left early.

The speaker is using the appositive construction’s Conventional Implicature to state the position that Clinton is conservative. Since we know that Palin is a conservative politician (more so than Bill Clinton), we know that this would not be Palin’s position, but rather that of the speaker. Yet it is still a faithful indirect quotation of what Palin said, if she had uttered, “Bill Clinton left early.”
3.1.1 Conventionally Implicated meaning and the VNI

The nature of imperatives makes them difficult to analyze in this way, since they always state the speaker’s desires. Nevertheless, since negative imperatives in Spanish are expressed by the present subjunctive forms, which can be used in indirect quotations of commands, we can consider indirect quotes in our consideration. As the exchange in (89) shows, it is felicitous for a speaker to use the VNI form when echoing what another speaker had previously said using a TNI.

89. [Context: Mother yelling to her son from another room]

Mother: ¡No comas la torta! Es para después.

*Don’t eat (TNI) the cake! It is for later.*

Son: [to his father, who is with him in the kitchen]

¿Qué dice mamá?

*What is mom saying?*

Father: [responding to his son]

a. Dice que no comás la torta.

*She says for you to not eat (VNI) the cake.*

The above exchange would be felicitous in a context where the boy is reaching for the cake. The mother, being in another room, may not be aware of the immediacy of the situation, but the father, witnessing the boy reaching for it, may address this immediacy in his indirect quote. Both possible responses by the father would convey the same “what is said” (or Potts’ “at-issue entailments). Thus, the mother’s utterance is faithfully conveyed, but only the VNI would convey the father’s own *immediate* commentary.
Likewise, it would be possible for the reverse situation to occur, whereby the mother utters a VNI, and the father echoes it as a TNI. A plausible context would be one in which the boy is far from the cake, and not paying any attention to it. The mother, being in another room, may assume that the boy wants to eat some, and utter a VNI, however, the father, noticing that the boy had no apparent intention to eat the cake, may remove the *immediacy* from the utterance in his indirect quotation, while still being faithful to the mother’s utterance. Examples like these are crucial to showing that the “extra” information encoded in the VNI is speaker-oriented, and conveys the speaker’s commentary.

The example in (89), then, demonstrates that the *immediacy* encoded in the VNI is speaker-oriented, and is separate from the at-issue entailment. It is also the case that this meaning is undeniable (or not cancellable)—a defining characteristic of Conventional Implicature. Example (80) demonstrated that conventionally implicated meaning, expressed in this case by the epithet, is uncancellable. Likewise, the information expressed by the VNI is as well.

90. ¡No comás la torta!... #tampoco pensé que lo ibas a comer.

“Don’t eat (VNI) the cake!... not that I thought you were going to eat it.”

91. A1: ¡No te burlés de mí!

    *Don’t make fun of me!*

    B: Si no me burlo nunca de vos!

    *I never make fun of you!*

    A2: #No pensé que ibas a burlarte. Solo quería avisarte.
#I didn’t think you were going to make fun. I just wanted to let you know.

(90) and Speaker A’s second utterance in (91) are awkward, since they deny the speaker’s sense of immediacy, or the fact that the speaker believed the addressee was otherwise going to carry out the action. Since the VNI expresses this speaker belief, later denying it yields an infelicitous utterance.

The above examples demonstrate that the “extra” information encoded in the VNI (separate from the speaker’s addition to the addressee’s To-Do List) arises via Conventional Implicature. This meaning meets the defining characteristics of Conventional Implicature, specifically that it is speaker-oriented, and it is separate from the at-issue entailment. In 3.3 and 3.4, this idea will be further substantiated with empirical evidence.

3.2 The *voseo* form in subordinate clauses

Since we have now seen examples of the *voseo* form being used in the subjunctive of a subordinate clauses, as in (89), we can begin to address why this might be the case, despite previous reports that indicated that this form was reserved for imperatives only (Fontanella de Weinberg, 1979). Imperative forms are generally taken to be more direct than suggestions in subordinate clauses (Blum-Kula, 1987, 1989 shows this for English & Hebrew; Neumann 1997 for German). Given this, we would expect the *voseo* form to appear more often in negative commands and less often in subordinate clauses, which would be less compatible with the *immediacy* expressed by the *voseo* form. Use of a more indirect form could contradict the *urgency* of the situation (Brown and Levinson, 1987). This is reflected by findings from Fontanella de Weinberg & Lavandera (1975), who state
that almost no voseo forms are found in subjunctives in subordinate clauses. The authors note that the voseo form seems to be reserved for negative imperatives, and is almost never found in subordinate clauses, concluding that it is a form that specifically has imperative meaning. Impressionistically, the authors are correct about the voseo form being more frequent in negative imperatives than in subordinate clauses. Nevertheless, the degree to which they claim it is not used in subordinate clauses may be exaggerated, at least today (more than 30 years later). Internet searches do yield quite a few results for voseo subjunctives in subordinate clauses, in pages from Argentina, as can be seen in (92-94), below.

92. [Mother to her child:] “La esposa de tu papá no quiere que vayás más a la casa de ellos. No quiere que te juntés con Javier, yo no sé qué habrás hecho pero ella al menos tiene la suerte de poder pedirlo.” (Bazán, 2011)

“You father’s wife doesn’t want you to go (voseo form) to their house anymore. She doesn’t want you to get together (voseo form) with Javier, I don’t know what you have done but at least she is lucky enough to be able to make that request.

93. Quiero que vengás, necesito que vengás.

I want you to come, I need you to come (voseo forms)

(http://bodegadelsitio.blogspot.com/2011/08/sopa-de-mariscos.html)
94. A: Si no metes goles, no ganas partidos.¹⁰

B: nadie dice que no metás goles, pero primero lo primero: hay que ser sólidos atrás y a partir de ahí terminar de edificar al equipo...

* A: *If you don’t make goals, you don’t win games.*

* B: *Nobody is saying not to make goals* (voseo form), *but first things first: you have to be solid in the back and from there finish building the team…*

( http://www.turiver.com/foros/campo-de-juego/60888-no-existe-mejor-defensa-que-un-buen-ataque/2.html )

Still, it is clear from what has been posited in prior research (i.e. Fontanella de Weinberg, 1979), and from the results of Internet searches, that the form is more common in the negative imperative form, and speakers seem to be aware of this, as the comment in (95) from a YouTube video dedicated to explaining the voseo in Argentina shows.

95. El voseo en subjuntivo en el contexto de expresar "imperativo negado"

(no me digás) goza de buena salud en Argentina y convive con las formas de 'tú' en el mismo contexto (no me digas)... El voseo en subjuntivo en otros contextos (digás lo que digás) también convive con la forma de 'tú' pero es menos común.

* The voseo in the subjunctive in the context of expressing a “negative imperative” (no me digás) enjoys good health in Argentina and coexists

¹⁰ It is assumed that these verbs would be voseo verb forms, metés and ganás, given that the speaker (writer) is Argentinian, and present indicative verb forms are exclusively voseo. The lack of orthographic accent, I presume, is due to a tendency to not write them in informal settings. Since this is from an internet forum, their absence is not surprising. Throughout the research for this paper, the presence of an orthographic accent mark was taken to indicate stress, while the absence of one was not taken to necessarily indicate anything. Therefore, a VNI was only identified as a VNI (and not a TNI) if the orthographic accent mark was present, or if the verb form otherwise allowed for identification, such as in the case of those that have stem-changes in the tú form but not the vos form (pienses vs. pensé, respectively).
with the forms from tú in the same context (no me digas) ... the voseo in the subjunctive in other contexts (digás lo que digás) also coexists with the form from tú but it is less common.

(http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E0XVtiD8eRY&feature=related)

It makes sense that the form would be less common in subordinate clauses, given the reasons stated above regarding directness. Therefore, Fontanella de Weinberg and Moyna’s claims that a semantic specification took place separating the two forms are likely not the case. On the contrary, the voseo subjunctive form conventionally implicates *immediacy* in both the negative imperative and the embedded clause. This implicature itself is precisely the reason it is less commonly found in embedded clauses—they are less direct than negative imperatives, and, therefore, also less immediate.

3.3 Survey 1

The results from the analysis of *Sos Mi Vida* (González, 2006), indicated that the TNI seemed to be unrestricted, while the VNI occurred in more urgent contexts, where the speaker wanted to stop the addressee from carrying out an action that was present in the current state of affairs. Angry contexts fit this description, for example, since the speaker would presumably want whatever is making him angry to end immediately. In Johnson & Grinstead (2010), an online survey was administered to 151 native speakers of AS in order to test the hypothesis that *urgency* distinguishes the VNI from the TNI. All participants were self-identified native speakers of AS. Out of the 151 participants, 42 were males and 109 were females. The survey was distributed in two different orders so as to counterbalance the order in which each participant received each context. All participants had to acknowledge using both the TNI and the VNI forms in their speech in
order to take the survey. Participants included speakers from the provinces of Buenos Aires, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Mendoza, Neuquén, Río Negro, Salta, San Juan, and Santa Fé. They were also asked to provide the city they were from, their level of education (elementary, secondary, university or postgraduate), their sex, and their age group (18–25, 26–35, 36–45, 46–55, 55+). Age was later divided into three general groups: young, middle and old, where young was 18-35, middle was 36-45, and old was 46+.

There are two conditions by which a context was deemed urgent. A context was considered urgent if the speaker had specified their desires, yet the addressee is still in the process of carrying out the action that the speaker does not want them to do. Alternatively, a context was also considered urgent if it was made explicit that the speaker was angry or upset about the addressee’s actions (even if the speaker had not previously expressed his/her desires).

In this online survey, participants were provided with 10 urgent contexts and 10 non-urgent contexts. They were asked to choose from 3 possible answers whether they would use as a response a VNI, a TNI, or if either form would be acceptable. Examples of an urgent context and a non-urgent context can be seen in (96) and (97), below.

96. Non-urgent Context

A: Estás en un video club y el chico que atiende te trae películas de acción. Vos tenés ganas de ver una de amor. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?

You are in a video store and the boy behind the counter is bringing you action movies. You feel like watching a romantic movie. Which of the following options would you say to him?
o No me traigás películas de acción.

Don’t bring (VNI) me action movies.

o No me traigas películas de acción.

Don’t bring (TNI) me action movies.

o Cualquiera de las dos.

Either of the two.

B: Estás en un restaurán con tus amigos. El mozo te pregunta qué querés. Vos pedís un sandwich pero no querés que tenga queso. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?

You are in a restaurant with your friends. The waiter asks you what you want. You order a sandwich but you don’t want it to have cheese. Which of the following options would you say to him?

o No le pongás queso.

Don’t put (VNI) cheese on it.

o No le pongas queso.

Don’t put (TNI) cheese on it.

o Cualquiera de las dos.

Either of the two.

97. Urgent Context

A: Estás en un videoclub y el chico que atiende te trae películas de acción. Vos tenés ganas de ver una de amor, y se lo decís. El chico te dice que igual te
quiere mostrar su película favorita, que se llama "Lucha a la muerte"—es de acción. No te interesa y estás apurado. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?

You are in a video store and the boy behind the counter is bringing you action movies. You feel like watching a romantic movie, and you tell him so. The boy says he wants to show you his favorite movie anyway, which is called “Struggle to the Death!”—It's an action movie. You are not interested and you are in a hurry. Which of the following options would you say to him?

- No me traigás películas de acción.
  
  Don’t bring (VNI) me action movies.

- No me traigas películas de acción.
  
  Don’t bring (TNI) me action movies.

- Cualquiera de las dos.
  
  Either of the two.

B: Estás en un avión, esperando a que despegue. Es la primera vez que volás y tenés un poco de miedo. Escuchás a una azafata decirle a otra que le preste un poco de maquillaje. Las mirás y la azafata te dice, "así, si se cae el avión, me muero linda" y te guíña un ojo. A vos no te parece graciosa una broma así y te hace enojar. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?

You are on a plane, waiting for it to take off. It is your first time flying and you are a little scared. You hear a flight attendant tell another to lend her a bit if makeup. You look at her and the flight attendant says to you, “this way, if the
plane goes down, I’ll die pretty” and she winks at you. You don’t think a joke like that is funny, and it upsets you. Which of the following options would you say to her?

- No digás eso.
  
  *Don’t say (VNI) that.*

- No digas eso.
  
  *Don’t say (TNI) that.*

- Cualquiera de las dos.
  
  *Either of the two.*

The investigators did find a significant effect of *urgency* on the selection of negative imperative response, such that the VNI was significantly more likely to appear in urgent contexts than in non-urgent contexts (p<.01). This distribution can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 3, below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urgent</th>
<th>Non-urgent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>802 (53%)</td>
<td>1118 (74%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNI</td>
<td>440 (29%)</td>
<td>173 (11%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Either</td>
<td>268 (18%)</td>
<td>219 (15%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI &amp; VNI</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 167$, df = 1, p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI &amp; Either</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 27.7$, df = 1, p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNI &amp; Either</td>
<td>$\chi^2 = 33.2$, df = 1, p &lt; .001</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Distribution of TNI, VNI and Either responses by *Urgency*
These results led the investigators to conclude that the TNI has a relatively broad distribution across contexts, and is thus unrestricted, while the VNI is significantly more restricted to urgent contexts.

3.3.1 A re-analysis of Survey 1

The results from this survey provided a good start to an analysis of the VNI~TNI alternation. It seems to be the case, however, that urgency, while on the right track, was not quite a unified dimension, as it considered both what the speaker had previously stated as her desires, as well as the speaker’s emotions. Could urgency be redefined in a way that could provide us better insight as to what is conditioning this variation? The criteria used for urgency differ slightly from my current definition of immediacy, which I
hypothesize is a more accurate dimension to distinguish the VNI from the TNI. Recall that *urgency* was defined by a context in which the speaker expressed his/her desires, and the addressee carried out a contrary action, or by a context in which the speaker was upset about the addressee’s actions. *Immediacy* has a more finite definition, which is more reliant on the distinction between cessatives and preventives. Recall that Haverkate (1979) separates negative commands into these two categories. Take (98) for example.

98. ¡No te rías! ‘Don’t laugh’

A cessative command attempts to transform the world from one in which a certain state of affairs holds into one in which it does not hold. Therefore, if (98) were cessative it would be the case that at the time of its utterance the addressee was laughing. Upon uttering (98), the speaker attempts to change this fact, and bring about a world in which it is no longer the case. In contrast with cessatives, preventives are an attempt to get the addressee to refrain from bringing about a state of affairs that is not yet in existence. Thus, (98) could be uttered in a context where the speaker is going to relate a story and does not want the addressee to laugh at it.

Haverkate’s analysis uses truth values to justify the separation of these prohibitives. He states that since cessatives refer to a real state of affairs, they have truth values. Therefore, the response in (99) could be an appropriate response to (98), if (98) were uttered as a cessative.

99. Si no me río en absoluto. ‘Si I’m not laughing.’

By uttering (99), the hearer would be stating that he or she does not accept the speaker’s description of his or her behavior, and can therefore not carry out a cessation. What this means, then, is that (98) includes a proposition about the current state of
affairs. Haverkate, in his proposal, does not see truth values as applicable to preventives, however, since a response like (99) would be odd if (98) were uttered as a preventive. Further evidence for a distinction between cessatives and preventives is that cessatives may co-occur with certain adverbs that do not appear with preventives, for example más and tanto, as we saw in (37) and (38). The co-occurrence of these terms with cessative commands is due to the fact that they presuppose that the addressee was already performing the action that is being commanded against. Therefore, they could be grouped with cessatives, which also indicate that the speaker would like the addressee to stop their current actions.

Another type of cessative mentioned by Haverkate is one where the speaker attempts to “interrupt the preparatory action or actions of the hearer so that he/she does not make true the propositional content of the sentence” (p. 42). In these cases, the state of affairs does not yet include the proposition that the speaker would like to remove from the world, but the speaker has reason to believe that the hearer intends to make true the propositional content. An example can be seen in (100), uttered in a context where the speaker sees the hearer approaching the door to the room, and believes that the hearer intends to enter.

100. ¡No entre en esa habitación! ‘Don’t go into that room.’

In this context, the hearer was not already entering the room, but the speaker believed that he or she intended to enter and thus the utterance in (100) serves as a cessative to block the speaker from bringing about the state of affairs in which he or she enters the room.
Haverkate speaks of a third use of negative commands. This use is for reproach, as can be seen in (40), repeated here as (101).

101. ¡No me des con la puerta en las narices!

‘Don’t shut the door in my face!’

Taking (101) as an example, we can see that reproaches are associated with cessatives, in that in a context where (101) is uttered, we can assume that the speaker is responding to the fact that the hearer has just performed the act described in (0). In other words, the proposition referred to in (101) is already part of the state of affairs. However, since the act is completed, a true cessation is not possible, thus the separation between a cessative and a reproach. Reproaches are also related to preventives, because we can assume that the speaker, upon uttering the reproach in (101), also intends to make clear that he or she does not want the addressee to repeat that behavior again. By nature, cessative prohibitions try to get the addressee to stop carrying out an action that he or she is already doing. Therefore, they require immediate action. Preventive prohibitions say nothing about what the addressee is currently doing, but serve to get the addressee not to carry out an action in the future. Preventives, then, seem to have a larger window of time in which their commanded action could be carried out.

Returning to the survey, contexts were then recoded to create a better distinction between the two contexts. The distinction is centered on the speaker’s perception of the immediacy of the context. A context is immediate if the speaker believes the timeframe in which it needs to be carried out is smaller. In practice, then, if an action is already part of the state of affairs, then removing it would be more immediate than if an action were not already part of the state of affairs and the command served only to keep it from
eventually coming about. I group reproaches with cessatives, and classify them both as immediate, since they give the speaker reason to believe that the addressee will carry out the action again (since they have done so before), and the action is already a part of the state of affairs. Therefore, reproaches require more immediate action than a typical preventive. Immediate contexts require the addressee to change the current state of affairs, whereas neutral contexts serve to prevent the addressee from carrying out an action that is not yet in the state of affairs. The distinction, then is centered on the addressee’s actions alone, without regard to whether or not the speaker has expressed his/her desires (a criterion previously used to define urgency). The contexts from this online survey were reanalyzed in order to code them for the new definition of immediacy. Contexts were coded as immediate (addressee is already performing or has already performed the action the speaker is requesting they not do) or neutral (the action is not yet in progress). As such, contexts like the non-urgent context in (96A) were recoded as immediate, whereas (96B) was neutral. Both urgent contexts in (97) were coded as immediate, since in (97A) the guy behind the counter is in the process of bringing you action movies. In (97B) the flight attendant has already said what you don’t want her to say, and thus, her action was already part of the state of affairs. This context falls into the category of reproach, coded as immediate. The data were re-analyzed, taking this new factor into consideration. I also grouped “either” responses in with VNI responses. The reasoning behind this was that the previous analysis did indicate that the VNI was restricted, while the TNI was not. Therefore, by responding “either”, a participant was essentially stating that the VNI would be possible. This is a special case since the TNI, on the other hand, seems to be the unrestricted one (given the observations from Sos Mi
Vida). Therefore, the question I now turn to answer is *which contexts license the VNI?*, and “either” responses indicate that the VNI is licensed.

3.3.1.1 Statistical Methods

In recent years, the choice of statistical analysis in linguistic research has been varied. Researchers have used generalized linear models, using variable rule programs, such as *Goldvarb X* (Sankoff et al, 2005) or mixed effects models, using programs like *Rbrul* (Johnson, 2009) or *R* (R Development Core Team, 2011), and, more recently, Random Forests and Conditional Inference Trees, using *R*. Tagliamonte & Baayen (2012) explore the different statistical tools in order to gauge their utility for the study of language variation.

The generalized linear model, using only fixed effects, can be problematic for most types of sociolinguistic studies, since typically more than one observation (or token) is attributable to each speaker, or participant. A fixed effects model relies on the exhaustion of all possible members of a group, and its analysis is applicable only to those sampled. Since researchers typically want to be able to make generalizations from their subset of participants to the general population, a mixed effects model is more appropriate. A mixed-effects generalized linear model allows the researcher to include fixed factors, where all possible levels are represented (ie: sex: male vs. female), as well as random-effects, where the factor is considered as a predictor in the model. The best example of a random-effect for linguistic research is the speaker, or the participant, since each one presumably contributes multiple observations to the data. In a model where the speaker is taken as a random-effect, the model considers the speaker as a possible predictor for conditioning the variation. The advantage to this is that it considers the
effects of individual speakers on the variation. In the data analyzed here, for example, including participant as a random effect will allow us to account for individual speaker preference for one negative imperative or the other, independent of the other factors. Tagliamonte and Baayen (2012) find that the mixed-effects model taking speaker as a random effect was better representative of *was–were* variation than the fixed-effects model (as demonstrated by an ANOVA).

Random Forests (Strobl et al, 2008), like logistic models, seek to determine which factors best explain variation in a data set. They go about it in a different way, however. Random Forests establish by trial and error whether a variable is a useful predictor of the variant in question. In order to do this, they use Conditional Inference Trees (Hothorn et al, 2006), which determine whether splitting the factor groups by level corresponds with a split in use between the variants under study. It works through all of the factors and recursively splits each subset until no further splitting is justified (as determined by significance testing, with a default of $p=.05$). Random forests produce numerous conditional inference trees for various subsets of data by random sampling. It evaluates the usefulness of each predictor for explaining the variation. While the random forest, considering a multitude of conditional inference trees over random points in the data set, is superior in explaining the importance of each factor in explaining the variation, the conditional inference tree is able to consider complex interactions between factors.

Tagliamonte and Baayen (2012) conclude that “the random forest and conditional inference tree offer an ideal tool to be used in tandem with the mixed-effects logistic model to come to a full understanding of the quantitative structure of a data set and as a result an optimal interpretation of the variation” (p. 164). I will present results from all of
these methods in order to best describe the factors accountable for the VNI–TNI alternation in AS.

3.3.1.2 Results

The raw distribution of the choice of negative commands from the re-analysis of Survey 1 can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 4. We can see that the VNI, while still the least frequent choice, was used significantly more in immediate contexts than in neutral contexts.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Immediate</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>VNI</td>
<td>771 (43%)</td>
<td>329 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNI</td>
<td>1041 (57%)</td>
<td>879 (73%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-squared = 72.75, def=1, $p < .001$

Table 5: Distribution of TNI and VNI responses by immediacy

The results from Table 5 can be further visualized in Figure 4, below.

![Distribution of responses by immediacy in Survey 1](image)

Figure 4: Distribution of TNI and VNI responses by immediacy
These results indicate that the VNI was chosen significantly more in immediate contexts than in neutral ones (p<.001), thus indicating that immediacy distinguishes the VNI from the TNI. What these data tell us is that the VNI is used to convey information regarding the state of affairs. Its use in immediate contexts tells us that it is used to stop the addressee from performing an action that is already being carried out. In other words, it is meant to change the current state of affairs. Recall Portner’s (2004, 2007) notion of imperatives adding propositions to the addressee’s To-Do List. For Portner, the To-Do List is parallel to the common ground. Both discursive participants have access to this To-Do List. In other words, the speaker may have knowledge about what the addressee is to do, or what the addressee has on his or her To-Do List. My view with respect to the state of affairs, then, is that it includes information about what the speaker believes to be true about the world, including what they believe to be on the addressee’s To-Do List, or their intentions. So while the VNI seems to be relating information about the speaker’s beliefs regarding the state of affairs, it appears that the TNI can be used in any context, because it says nothing about the speaker’s beliefs regarding the current state of affairs (beyond what is naturally conveyed by the use of a command—see Haverkate’s rules in (21) and (22)).

Based on comments made by native speakers regarding the VNI (discussed in Chapter 4), I divided immediate contexts into angry vs. non-angry, in order to determine whether this dimension possibly contributed to the choice between negative imperatives, or if it was any immediate context at all that licensed the VNI. The data was first analyzed in a factor analysis using a mixed effects logistic model. A dialectal difference emerged. Table 6 shows us the results of the best-fitted mixed-effects linear regression
model, as determined by an ANOVA comparing different models. The models were generated using the lmer function in R (Bates et al, 2011). It indicates that immediacy and location are the best predictors in order to describe the variation found in the use of the VNI and TNI in the survey, such that neutral contexts yielded the VNI significantly less often than immediate (non-angry) contexts (p<.01). This is seen by the negative Estimate number in the table. We can also see that angry contexts yielded the VNI significantly more often than non-angry immediate contexts (p<.01). This is demonstrated by the positive number in the Estimate. Furthermore, a dialectal difference can be seen such that Inside Buenos Aires Province (BA Province and Capital) the VNI is used significantly less than outside Buenos Aires Province.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>z value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept (includes non-angry, immediate contexts, and Outside Buenos Aires province location)</td>
<td>-0.7548</td>
<td>0.1488</td>
<td>-5.071</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immediacy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>0.5999</td>
<td>0.1108</td>
<td>5.415</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>-0.6278</td>
<td>0.1084</td>
<td>-5.792</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA Province</td>
<td>-0.9801</td>
<td>0.4238</td>
<td>-2.313</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>-0.8993</td>
<td>0.3524</td>
<td>-2.552</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Results from logistic mixed-effects model on the whole data set.

I then generated a Random Forest in order to understand better the order of importance of each relevant factor. The results of this analysis can be seen in Figure 5. The Random Forest calculates the relative importance of each factor, and it also calculates the significance of the factors. What it does not show is the specific effect of the levels within the factors, or the relationship between them. That will be shown in the Conditional Inference Tree to follow. The Random Forest demonstrates that Participant
as a random effect is the most important, indicating that there is a high amount of cross-participant variation. Some participants had a tendency to choose the VNI or the TNI more overall than others. The next most important factor is Immediacy, as expected based on the results of the logistic model. Next, Sex was an important factor, followed by Age and then Location.

Figure 5: Random Forest depicting relative importance of each factor in predicting the outcome of the VNI~TNI alternation.

The details of the effects of each of these factors can be seen in the Conditional Inference Tree in Figure 6. In this figure we can also see some things that the above models do not show, such as the fact that angry and immediate contexts together, as one group, are also significantly different from neutral contexts.
Figure 6: Conditional Inference Tree of factors influencing the choice of the VNI~TNI on the whole data set.
Using the Conditional Inference Tree, we see important interactions in the data that a logistic model doesn't show. If left up to the logistic model only, it would appear that Immediacy and Location were the sole predicting factors. The conditional inference tree shows much more. In Figure 6, we can see that the first split made by the inference tree is by Immediacy. As expected, the results indicate that Angry and Immediate contexts correspond with significantly higher selection rates of the VNI than Neutral contexts (p<.001). What we can also see, which corresponds to the results from the logistic regression, is that within Angry and Immediate contexts, there is a further split, such that the VNI was significantly more likely in the Angry contexts than in the Immediate ones (p<.001). In non-angry Immediate contexts, Sex is also a significant predictor of negative imperative choice, such that males were significantly more likely to choose the VNI in immediate (non angry) contexts than females (p=.003). Within Angry immediate contexts, Location was a significant predictor, such that participants from Outside Buenos Aires province were more likely to choose the VNI than those from within Buenos Aires province (including capital) (p=.012). In Neutral contexts, the same effect of Location is found. Outside Buenos Aires the VNI was chosen more than Inside Buenos Aires (p<.001). There is a further significant factor of Sex within Buenos Aires province. Just as was the case in non-angry Immediate contexts, males were significantly more likely to choose the VNI than females in Neutral contexts, within Buenos Aires (p=.017).

These results, in combination with the results of the linear regression, point towards a clear dialectal difference with respect to the effect of Immediacy. In order to
visualize this difference better, the data were analyzed separately by dialect. The resulting Conditional Inference Trees can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Figure 7: Conditional Inference Tree of factors influencing the choice of VNI~TNI inside Buenos Aires
In Figure 7, we can see that within Buenos Aires, the results look like what we saw for the whole data set—significantly more VNI in all Immediate contexts than in Neutral contexts ($p<.001$) and also significantly more in Angry immediate contexts than in non-angry Immediate ones ($p<.001$). We also see the same effect of Sex that we saw in the whole data set, such that in Neutral contexts and Immediate contexts, males are significantly more likely to use the VNI than females ($p=.022$ and $p=.006$, respectively). In Angry contexts, no effect of Sex is found. In other words, participants of both sexes were equally likely to use the VNI in angry contexts.

In Figure 8, we see that when we consider only the data from outside of Buenos Aires province, there is a different patterning. The only significant predictor is immediacy (no effect of sex found in this data). Interestingly, the only immediate
contexts where the VNI is significantly more likely are the angry ones (p=.019). Unlike what we have seen up until now, in this subgroup, immediate contexts and neutral contexts group together, and are not significantly different from each other. These differences point toward a pragmatic licensing difference across dialects of Argentinian Spanish. Inside Buenos Aires, immediacy in general, including angry contexts, licenses the VNI. Outside of Buenos Aires, anger alone is the determining factor. It is important to recall that the angry contexts were also immediate. The participants from outside Buenos Aires, then, rely on the additional angry meaning in their evaluation of which negative imperative form to use. The participants from inside Buenos Aires relied more specifically on immediacy, but anger enhanced the outcome of the VNI.

While it is clear that the VNI is much more common in immediate contexts than neutral ones, it is still the case that we find overlap between the VNI and the TNI in many of the contexts. Since the VNI is evidently the restricted form, and the TNI appears to be more unrestricted, we must consider why we have the VNI occurring in some neutral contexts. Could it have to do with the contexts not accurately describing what the speaker interprets to be the state of affairs? Perhaps the description provided in the context did not give a thorough enough description of the state of affairs. The state of affairs was limited, then, to what was explicitly evident given the context. Then, in (96B), for example, the evident state of affairs includes only that you order a sandwich and do not want it to have cheese. It does not state anything about whether or not you are accustomed to having your order fulfilled exactly as placed, or if perhaps this restaurant is known for getting it wrong. If participants have preconceptions like this, with extra information, they may be inclined to construe contexts that could be more immediate—
Perhaps contexts of reproach, or anger. If participants did have other interpretations or preconceptions about the state of affairs, this could have influenced their responses, as well. This shortcoming is explored in a second online survey.

3.4 Survey 2

In order to explore the influence of the speaker’s beliefs about the state of affairs on the choice between the VNI and the TNI, an additional online survey was carried out—this time a perceptual one. I wanted to explore the possible epistemic meaning associated with the VNI. In particular, I wanted to know if the alternation might have to do with what the speaker believes the state of affairs to be, as opposed to simply the evident state of affairs. More specifically, if a speaker believed the addressee intended to carry out an action, this should be considered more immediate than, say, a general warning not to do something.

3.4.1 Methods

In Survey 2, 119 participants were given 7 different brief contexts, each followed by an utterance that they were asked to evaluate. Participants included 87 females, and 32 males. Participants provided their age, their education level (secondary, tertiary, graduate), and the province in which they were born. All of that information provided the social variables that were considered for this analysis. Participants included speakers from Uruguay, as well as the Argentinian provinces of Buenos Aires, Chubut, Córdoba, Entre Ríos, Jujuy, Mendoza, Neuquén, Río Negro, Salta, San Juan, San Luis, Santa Fé and Tierra del Fuego. The province in which the participant was born was later coded as Uruguay, Buenos Aires Capital, Buenos Aires province (but not capital), and Outside
Buenos Aires. All but one Uruguayan participant was from Montevideo. The one that was not was from Minas. Because survey 1 yielded dialectal differences between the Spanish spoken in Buenos Aires (province), and that spoken outside of Buenos Aires, I was also interested to see whether the ratings of the commands were different across these dialects. In a second coding, Uruguayan Spanish was included together with Buenos Aires Capital and province, to create a general “Río de la Plata” (RP) category, which contrasted with “other”, which included the other participants. The results from survey 2 were analyzed considering the location where the participant was born (in the Río de la Plata region or outside of it), and the rating given to each command type.

Each context was given 4 separate times, with 4 different utterance types each time: one VNI, one TNI, one question and one declarative. The interrogative utterance and the declarative utterance served as fillers. Importantly, they also provided a means to situate the VNI and TNI ratings with relationship to other utterance types that we had prior knowledge about with regards to the certainty scale. By nature, an interrogative is information seeking, and therefore the speaker uttering an interrogative would be less certain about the response. Therefore, I expected the interrogatives to be the least certain (with the ratings closest to 1). Since declarative utterances can become questions with just a change in intonation (ie: *vas a pedir el pollo* vs. *vas a pedir el pollo?*) the declaratives in this experiment all began with *ya sé que* ‘I already know that.’ This way, the participants could not interpret them with intonation that would have caused the declarative to be understood as an interrogative, or a command. It was therefore hypothesized that the declaratives would yield the most certain ratings, closest to 5.
All utterances and contexts were presented in written form. In order to ensure that participants paid adequate attention to punctuation (since the difference between the VNI and the TNI is represented only with an orthographic accent mark), training was done in the beginning of the survey. In the training, participants had to accept that they identified and understood the difference between the two utterances given in (102) and the two in (103).

102. A: No vengás todavía. “Don’t come (VNI) yet.”
    B: No vengas todavía. “Don’t come (TNI) yet.”

103. A: Vas a comer. “You are going to eat.”
    B: ¿Vas a comer? “Are you going to eat?”

In order to determine if epistemic meaning was in fact present, the participants were asked to rate how certain the speaker was that the addressee would have performed the action addressed in the utterance on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 was not at all certain, and 5 was very certain. Examples of each type of context are provided in (104-107).

104. With VNI utterance

Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:

"No pidás el pollo."

¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

*Julio and his friend are in a restaurant. Julio says to his friend:*

“How sure was Julio that his friend was going to order the chicken?*

- 1 nada seguro ‘not at all sure’
- 2
- 3
105. With TNI utterance

Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:

"No pidas el pollo."

¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

Julio and his friend are in a restaurant. Julio says to his friend:

“Don’t order the chicken.” (TNI)

How sure was Julio that his friend was going to order the chicken?

- 1 nada seguro ‘not at all sure’
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 muy seguro ‘very sure’

106. With interrogative utterance

Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:

"¿Vas a pedir el pollo?"

¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

Julio and his friend are in a restaurant. Julio says to his friend:

“Are you going to order the chicken?”

How sure was Julio that his friend was going to order the chicken?

- 1 nada seguro ‘not at all sure’
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 muy seguro ‘very sure’
107. With declarative utterance

Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:

"Ya sé que vas a pedir el pollo."

¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

Julio and his friend are in a restaurant. Julio says to his friend:

“I already know you are going to order the chicken.”

How sure was Julio that his friend was going to order the chicken?

- 1 nada seguro ‘not at all sure’
- 2
- 3
- 4
- 5 muy seguro ‘very sure’

My expectations were that the declarative and the interrogative would fall at the high and low ends of the scale (respectively), and that the TNI and the VNI would fall in the middle of these other utterance types, with the VNI rating higher and the TNI rating lower. Nuyts (2000) supports this hypothesis.

Information questions are generated by gaps or unclarities in conceptual knowledge, i.e. essentially by epistemic uncertainty, and the intention to fill or resolve them. And orders or requests for action, or promises, are probably generated by a combined epistemic assessment of the (non)existence and a deontic assessment of the (un)desirability and/or (in)necessity of a state of affairs, and the intention to do something about this (351).

Therefore, questions are expected to be associated with uncertainty. The two imperative forms (the TNI and the VNI) should include some sort of epistemic
assessment of the existence of a certain state of affairs. Therefore, I hypothesized that the TNI and VNI should be rated somewhere between the question and the declarative on a scale rating degree of certainty. Since we are discussing two imperatives, the relative rating between those two forms is most important. The results can be seen in the following section.

3.4.2 Results

The average ratings of each utterance type can be seen in Table 7 and Figure 9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average Rating</th>
<th>Declarative</th>
<th>VNI</th>
<th>TNI</th>
<th>Interrogative</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>T-Test for VNI~TNI means</td>
<td>4.68</td>
<td>3.81</td>
<td>3.10</td>
<td>2.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>t = -12.03, df = 1634, p&lt;.01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: The average ratings of each utterance type in Survey 2

Figure 9: Barplot showing the average perceived certainty ratings of each utterance type in Survey 2 (1 = not at all certain, 5 = very certain)
As expected, the declarative received the highest average rating of certainty, at 4.68, and the interrogative received the lowest rating, at 2.30. The VNI and TNI fell expectedly in the middle, the VNI rating significantly higher than the TNI, with ratings of 3.81 and 2.30, respectively (p<.01).

A generalized mixed-effects logistic regression was run on this data, using the lmer function in R, in order to determine the relevant factors in predicting the rating of the two commands. This included all possible factors: Participant as a random effect, and Utterance Type, the Province where the participant was born, and the Age, Sex and Education level of the participant as fixed effects. Results from this analysis can be seen in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intercept (TNI)</th>
<th>Estimate</th>
<th>SE</th>
<th>t value</th>
<th>p-value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.1001</td>
<td>0.0670</td>
<td>46.27</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utterance.Type</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNI</td>
<td>0.7131</td>
<td>0.0511</td>
<td>13.95</td>
<td>&lt;0.01</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Results of the logistic mixed-effects model on the data from the ratings of the two negative commands in Survey 2

The above results indicate that the sole factor in predicting the perceived certainty ratings of the VNI and the TNI is the utterance type, such that the VNI was rated significantly higher than the TNI (p<.01). In other words, none of the other social factors were significant in determining how a participant would rate the negative imperatives.

I also generated a Random Forest (Strobl et al, 2008) in order to have another idea about the order of importance of each relevant factor. The results of this analysis can be seen in Figure 10. We can see that Participant as a random effect is the most important, indicating that there is a high amount of cross-participant variation. The next most important factor is Utterance Type, as expected based on the results of the logistic model.
Next, Age was an important factor, followed by Location. Sex and Education seem to have minimal effects on the perceived certainty of the utterances evaluated.

![Random Forest depicting relative importance of each factor in predicting the certainty ratings of the VNI and TNI.](image)

Figure 10: Random Forest depicting relative importance of each factor in predicting the certainty ratings of the VNI and TNI. Everything to the right of the dotted red line is significant.

The details of the effects of each of these factors can be seen in the Conditional Inference Tree (Strobl et al, 2008) in Table 8. This was run including the data from the declaratives and the interrogatives as well, in order to see whether the splitting of the data would render information about what conditions the certainty ratings of the TNI and VNI. Some social factors were found conditioning the ratings of the declarative and interrogative utterances, but since those are not crucial to the present study, I have cut the
inference tree to zoom in on the relevant part. The entire inference tree can be found in Appendix D.
Figure 11: Conditional Inference Tree of factors that contribute to the rating of the VNI and the TNI in Survey 2 (cut from inference tree from entire data set.)
In this figure we can also see some things that the models above do not show. Recall that conditional inference trees evaluate whether an independent variable is a useful predictor of the responses of the dependent variable and splits each of the predictors into subsets that are further evaluated, considering the effect of subsequent factors. In Figure 11, it shows an interesting division of utterance types. The declarative and the VNI, together, are rated significantly higher than the interrogative and the TNI, together (p < .001). Within these categories, each utterance type is also significantly different from each other. But the division of utterance types where the VNI is grouped with the declarative, and the TNI with the interrogative, provides further insight into the evaluation of certainty for each of the command types. Participants associate the VNI with the speaker being more certain about what the addressee intends to do. The TNI is associated with less certainty in this respect.

In Figure 11, the inference tree also considers whether splitting the data by location corresponds to different ratings of the TNI and the VNI. The results indicate that the location where the participants were born does not influence their rating of the TNI. However, an effect of location is found on the rating of the VNI, such that it is rated significantly higher (as more certain) outside the Rio de la Plata region than inside this region (p=.002). This division by dialect corresponds to the dialectal division found in Survey 1, where outside Buenos Aires province the VNI was used more with angry contexts than just immediate or neutral ones, while within Buenos Aires province any immediate context (including the angry ones) yielded more VNI than neutral contexts. Given this distinction, the rating difference in survey 2 is not surprising. If the VNI is more associated with anger outside of Buenos Aires, we might expect those participants
to find this form to be more certain—in a sense, more accusatory. In order to induce this *angry* interpretation, we would expect that the speaker would be certain about the proposition that is being negated. If the speaker were not very certain about the addressee performing the action, and the command were just uttered as a prevention or general warning, they likely would not be angry about it.

3.5 The VNI co-occurring with discourse marker *si*

In 2.1.2, I introduced the use of the discourse marker *si*, used dialogically to refute the relevance of the prior assertion (Schwenter, 1998, 2002). The example in (20), copied here as (108), below, we can see that B’s response is meant to refute the fact that Juan’s intelligence is the relevant factor to consider.

108. [Context: A is trying to convince B to hire Juan for a linguistics position.]

A: Juan es inteligente.

*Juan is smart.*

B: *si* no sabe nada de lingüística.

*Si he doesn’t know anything about linguistics.*

(Schwenter, 2002, p. 50)

B believes that Juan’s knowledge about linguistics is the appropriate factor to consider in hiring him, not his overall intelligence. By uttering (108B), the speaker expresses that Juan’s intelligence is irrelevant to the matter at hand. Therefore, *si* refutes some part of the information conveyed by the interlocutor. This information does not have to be part of the propositional content. In (108), speaker B is not refuting Juan’s intelligence. He is refuting the relevance of Juan’s overall intelligence to his suitability for the position.
In (19), Speaker B also uses this discourse marker to refute A’s implication that Speaker B was speaking. He is refuting A’s interpretation of the state of affairs.

It is because cessative prohibitions refer to actual states of affairs that they are subject to truth-value tests (although not the traditional ones, as we saw above). In an interaction, a hearer does not have to accept the cessative prohibition if he believes that the speaker’s description of his behavior (part of the state of affairs) is accurate. It is in these instances that responses such as (19B) are found (as an example with an affirmative command) or (32), repeated as (109) (an example with a negative).

109. A: No hables. ‘Don’t talk.’

B: sí no estoy hablando! ‘sí I’m not talking!’

In (109), as a cessative, Speaker A is conveying that his beliefs regarding the addressee’s current behavior is that the addressee is speaking. The addressee can deny this, by uttering the response in (109B). In other words, speaker B would be letting speaker A know that they are trying to transform the current world into one where the current state of affairs holds, which is not possible.

Discussions with four native speakers of AS indicate that they agree that the exchange in (109), while acceptable, would be better if (109A) were a VNI instead of a TNI (although Haverkate’s example was not meant to be a representation of AS, and he does not address the TNI~VNI alternation at all11). In explanation, they tend to say that the TNI is more of a suggestion, and the response in (109B) is defensive. That is why it would correspond better to the VNI, which has more accusatory overtones. This accusatory interpretation indicates that the speaker believes the addressee is carrying out

11 In other Spanish varieties that lack this alternation, it would not be possible to evaluate which negative imperative form would be “better” with the discourse marker. Haverakte analyzes only the TNI.
the action that the speaker does not want the addressee to be carrying out. The response with *si*, then, is intended to counter this belief, or this description of the state of affairs, which includes the addressee’s To-Do List. Further exploration of this correspondence, specifically by experimental testing, would be helpful in providing further evidence for this association.

3.6 Discussion

The purpose of the surveys was to identify the nature of the meaning expressed by the VNI. The first survey suggested that *immediacy* conditions the distribution of the VNI and the TNI in AS. *Immediate* contexts were defined by those in which the undesirable proposition (the one being commanded against) is already a part of the state of affairs, as an action already carried out or in progress. The overwhelmingly significant difference in the distribution of the two negative commands across immediate and neutral contexts does point toward a distinction based on *immediacy*. The second survey was done in order to solidify these results, as well as to test the epistemic meaning associated with the VNI, under the hypothesis that when the VNI was used, the interpretation would be that the speaker was more certain that the addressee was going to carry out the action (that the action was or would be part of the state of affairs). This perception data shows that native speakers identify the VNI as conveying significantly more certainty than the TNI. Based upon the results of the two online surveys, I conclude that the VNI conveys information regarding the speaker’s beliefs about the addressee’s intentions: the speaker chooses the VNI to keep the addressee from performing an action that the speaker believes is already in the addressee’s set of intentions (or To-Do List, following Portner, 2004, 2007, 2010). The TNI does not convey the speaker’s beliefs regarding the addressee’s intentions. This
licensing analysis thus unifies VNI contexts. While commands are generally believed to be addressee-oriented, they may also encode epistemic information about the speaker’s beliefs about the addressee’s intentions, in this case morphologically.

This epistemic meaning, I conclude, is conveyed via Conventional Implicature. The meaning expressed fits Potts’ definition of Conventional Implicature, in (75) and (86). While the regular tests for Conventional Implicature are not as easy to employ in the study of these forms, given the nature of imperatives, we can see that this meaning is in fact conveyed via the lexical item itself, and not simply contextually. Survey 2 contained very little context. The only information given was in order to create a plausible context for an utterance in general. No information regarding the speaker’s beliefs, or the addressee’s intentions (or habits) was provided. Still, participants were able to identify the certainty conveyed by the VNI, and the TNI did not get the same rating. The contextual appropriateness of the VNI in combination with the discourse marker si also indicates a defensive response to a more accusatory utterance. This indicates that while the certainty is not part of “what is said”, it is in some way part of the propositional content, since it can be denied in the addressee’s response.

The indirect quotation in (89) also demonstrates that the VNI expresses the speaker’s beliefs, and not anybody else’s. The possibility of its use in indirect quotations, where the original quotation was a TNI, demonstrates that it expresses only the speaker’s beliefs. This would still be a faithful reproduction of the original speaker’s utterance, but it includes the commentary of the new speaker, as well. The possibility of uttering a TNI as an indirect quotation where a VNI was originally used is just as telling. The speaker of the indirect quotation would not want to commit himself to the belief that the addressee
was going to carry out the action if they knew otherwise. The speaker can, therefore, remove that implication by using another form. The propositional content of the utterance would be faithful to what the original speaker said. This also demonstrates that the speaker’s beliefs are independent of “what is said” (or Potts’ at-issue entailments). “What is said” is the same for the TNI and the VNI. What is implicated is different.
Chapter 4    Pragmatically Informed Social Meaning

Because one goal of this dissertation is to determine the ways in which the relevant meaning difference between the TNI and the VNI in AS comes about, the previous chapter discussed the conventional meaning difference associated with the VNI-TNI distinction. This chapter explores other meanings that the VNI may convey, including the anger meaning discussed in the previous chapter, and how these meanings come about.

4.1    Conversational Implicature

Conversational Implicatures (Grice 1975) are a type of meaning that is expressed in conjunction with context. Unlike Conventional Implicature and entailments, Conversational Implicature is highly context dependent, and is not dependent on the linguistic form itself. A Conversational Implicature comes about by a speaker either observing or flouting one of Grice’s maxims or the Cooperative principle. The Cooperative Principle is repeated in (110) below.

110. The Cooperative Principle

Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.

Grice breaks the Cooperative Principle down into four maxims, the observance of which would yield results that comply with the Cooperative Principle. These maxims are
repeated in (111) below:

111. I. **Quantity**:
   a. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange).
   b. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required

II. **Quality**:
   a. Do not say what you believe to be false.
   b. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

III. **Relation**:
   a. Be relevant.

IV. **Manner**:
   a. Avoid obscurity of expression.
   b. Avoid ambiguity
   c. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
   d. Be orderly

Usually, Conversational Implicatures can be generated by a speaker either honoring or flouting these maxims. But, unlike Conventional Implicatures, it is the context that generates Conversational Implicatures, not solely the particular linguistic forms. For this reason, synonyms in the same context should generate the same Conversational Implicatures. For example, in (112), any of the italicized words would generate the implicature that Joe does not always run outside.
112. Joe *often/usually/frequently* runs outside.

i.  

It may appear at first glance that the implicature generated in (112) is associated with the particular lexical items in italics. Indeed, all of those lexical items express similar propositional content. Nevertheless, it is not the lexical item that generates the Conversational Implicature, as is demonstrated in (113) below.

113. Joe often, in fact always, runs outside.

In (113), the implicature that was generated in (112) is cancelled by the linguistic context. If the meaning were attached to the linguistic form, the context would not be able to remove that meaning. The defeasibility of Conversational Implicatures is essential to their separation from other types of meaning, such as entailments and Conventional Implicatures. Similarly, non-linguistic context can cancel Conversational Implicatures. In 4.2, I will show that native speakers may infer various interpretations from in the VNI, namely politeness, aggression, or impatience. I will argue that these meanings are contextually dependent, and thus conversationally implicated.

4.1.1 GCI vs. PCI

Grice (1975) and later Levinson (2000) both distinguish between two types of Conversational Implicatures, based on their contextual dependency. A Generalized Conversational Implicature (GCI) is the default interpretation of a form. These interpretations are contextually dependent, in that they emerge if the context does not prevent them from doing so. In this way, they are separate from Conventional Implicatures and entailments. However, they are less contextually dependent than
Particularized Conversational Implicatures (PCIs), which arise only if specific contextual conditions are met. Levinson’s definition of the two is as follows:

114. **PCI**: an implicature i from utterance U is *particularized* iff U implicates i only by virtue of specific contextual assumptions that would not invariably or even normally obtain.

**GCI**: an implicature i is *generalized* iff U implicates i *unless* there are unusual specific contextual assumptions that defeat it.

So we can understand GCIs as the default interpretation of a linguistic form, which emerges in the event that no special contextual conditions block its emergence. In this way, it is partly dependent on the linguistic form, but is also dependent on the context. A PCI, on the other hand, is an unusual interpretation that emerges only in the event that specific contextual conditions are met. It is not reliant at all on the linguistic form, but rather is exclusively dependent on a particular context.

4.1.2 Politeness as conversationally implicated meaning in English

A look at politeness in commands in English (and in general) can help us prepare to discuss the politeness distinction found in the VNI~TNI alternation, as first mentioned by Fontanella de Winberg (1979). Brown & Levinson (1987) address situations in which expected polite forms are not used. “Non-occurrence of expected [polite] forms... can be made sense of by analysing the rational sources for those occurrences in an otherwise homogeneous style with other rational sources. For instance, a sudden warning ‘Come here’, interposed in a formerly polite conversation, is not read as rude despite the overt imperative, if the need for efficient or urgent communication takes precedence over face redress.” (Brown & Levinson 1987: 282). In such a context, the “formerly polite
conversation” blocks the generation of the impolite implicature that would be associated with using an overt imperative in English. Therefore, in a context where, perhaps, two adults are having friendly conversation and a car is headed in the direction of one of them, the other may utter “come here” in order to avert the danger that could otherwise be caused to the addressee. By doing so, the speaker does not implicate any impoliteness, and the addressee would not infer any. The context of the imperative, being encompassed in otherwise polite conversation, as well as its purpose to avert danger for the addressee, cannot be understood as impolite. In other words, the context cancels what would have otherwise been conversationally implicated impoliteness. Brown & Levinson also say that urgency is one reason why people ignore politeness strategies—using these strategies would decrease the communicated urgency. This is also true of “metaphorical urgency,” where a speaker “speaks as if maximum efficiency were very important” (p. 96). This is the case for English, where indirect speech acts are usually preferred over imperatives, yet imperatives are found in expressions like “Forgive me” or “Excuse me.” These are inherently polite expressions, yet they are urgent, thus allowing the imperative form. In effect, one could argue that they are conventionally less direct, despite their form, since in use they are less “commanding.” This is because the contexts in which they typically occur block the impoliteness that would otherwise be associated with uttering an imperative, and thus the hearer can rely on conventionality to interpret them as less imposing or less coercive, despite their more direct form (for a discussion of conventional indirectness, see Morgan, 1978; Blum-Kula 1987, 1989; Félix-Brasdefer, 2005). Actions such as asking for forgiveness, or consoling (which we saw examples of in Chapter 1, and will see to follow), do not yield impolite interpretations, but the urgency of the
situations remains, in the sense that they are transformative, and respond to the current state of affairs (e.g. one in which the addressee is upset with the speaker, or one in which they are sad and need to be consoled).

Looking at the contexts where negative imperatives occur in AS and the judgments of their occurrence by native AS speakers can help us pick apart the different dimensions of their meaning, and how these are conveyed. The next section discusses a study of various interpretations that native speakers associate with the VNI.

4.2 Conversationally implicated meaning expressed by the VNI

An examination of the use of the VNI, as well as native speaker judgments regarding the meaning that they convey, point to many different impressions of the meaning they express. Examples for this section come from the Argentinian soap opera Sos Mi Vida (González, 2006). The data for this section come from judgments expressed as comments via the survey data from Johnson & Grinstead (2010) and from recordings I obtained by interviewing native speakers in Argentina about why one negative imperative is used over another in video clips from Sos Mi Vida. The survey comments and examples from Sos Mi Vida are found in section 4.2.1. The responses from native-speakers in the interviews are presented and discussed in section 4.2.2. All participants were self-identified, adult native speakers of Argentinian Spanish.

4.2.1 The contextual occurrence of the VNI

In the online survey from Johnson & Grinstead (2010), participants were allowed to leave comments on each question. Comments were not taken as a response, but were optional inclusions, in addition to the participant’s required response. Many of these
comments served to explain the participants’ choice of command form, or to explain how their choice might have been different, depending on the context. For this reason, many of these comments can help us identify the various meanings and interpretations native speakers have of the VNI and TNI, and the alternation in general. Some comments from the survey can be seen in (115) and (116).

115. “Si es jóven la primera, si es grande la segunda”

“If they are young the first, if they are old the second.”

116. “Me parece que la primera denota mayor familiaridad con el otro”

“It seems to me that the first denotes more familiarity with the other person.”

In (115) we see that the participant would not want to use the VNI with older addressees. This is presumably because of the familiarity associated with the form, as noted by another participant in (116). Age differences correspond to social distance, and the use of a familiar form in a social interaction between two socially “distant” people would be inappropriate. This is in line with what Sinnott (2010) and others have found in studying address forms in Peninsular Spanish, which are also conditioned by social distance.

(117) and (118) were also left as comments describing the participants’ choice of VNI or TNI in the survey data. These comments refer to the VNI as being more impatient.

117. “Estoy apurada = impaciente.” (participant chose VNI)

‘I’m in a hurry = impatient’

---

12 In all of these comments, “la primera” refers to the VNI, and “la segunda” refers to the TNI, as per the order in which the commands were given as options in the survey.
118. “No estoy molesta.” (participant chose TNI)

‘I’m not bothered’

In (117) the participant indicates that her choice of the VNI would convey her impatience. In (118) the participant indicates that her choice of TNI was due to the fact that she was not bothered. In other words, the use of the VNI would have expressed this bothered feeling.

Still, in (119) we can see that the participant recognizes that the VNI could be used along with a “kind tone.” This is a response to a survey context where the participant wants a kilo of cheese, and needs to tell the server that she wants it unsliced.

119. “Preferentemente usaría ‘cortés’, aunque podría usar el otro, pero el tono sería de amabilidad en ambos casos. La elección del término ‘cortés’, a mi entender, se debería a un apuro por evitar que lo cortase antes de que pudiera decírselo. O para darle a entender claramente que lo quiero sin cortar.”

‘Preferably I would use ‘cortés’ [VNI], although I could use the other, but the tone would be kind in both cases. The choice of the term ‘cortés’ [VNI], by my understanding, is due to a hurry to avoid [the butcher] cutting it before I could tell him [not to]. Or to make him understand clearly that I want it uncut.’

This “kind tone” expressed in (119) presumably would serve the purpose of making it clear that the speaker did not mean to be impolite or impatient. In other words, the “kind tone” would cancel this possible interpretation of the VNI. Recall that cancelability is a key characteristic of Conversational Implicatures. Yet the use of the
VNI is still possible, as the participant expresses. For this reason, it is analogous to Brown & Levinson’s example of imperatives being used in English to convey urgency that would otherwise be left unexpressed by a more indirect expression. In other words, the urgency (or immediacy) of the situation, specifically that the speaker wants to avoid the worker slicing the cheese “in a hurry.” This participant’s use of the term apuro ‘hurry’ to explain the use of the VNI indicates that the interpretation would be one of immediacy. It would serve to interrupt the preparatory actions of the addressee, as, recall, Haverkate (1979) includes as a type of cessative. This explains why the more direct, less polite form can be used while still maintaining kindness in tone. No impoliteness is conveyed. The speaker simply conveys the immediacy of the situation.

Thus, despite the fact that the VNI is often deemed less polite, or impatient, we can certainly find it used in contexts where the speaker does not want to convey these feelings. Refer to (120) and (121), from Sos Mi Vida.

120. [Context: Quique’s mother is being held hostage.]

Quique: Mamá, no te preocupés, no te va a pasar nada.

‘Mom, don’t worry, nothing is going to happen to you.’ (VNI)

121. [Context: La Turca’s boyfriend is offended that she wouldn’t let him help her study her acting lines.]

La Turca: No te pongás mal, vos, vení.

‘Don’t be sad, come on.’ (VNI)

In (120) and (121), we see the use of a VNI in contexts where the speakers are consoling their addressees. These contexts are, by nature, not impolite, and the interpretation of the VNI does not change them into impolite contexts. Thus, in these
instances, the VNI is not understood as implicating impoliteness. The impoliteness that can be associated with such a form is cancelled by the context of consolation, which does not license the impolite interpretation. Another example of a VNI used in consolation (with lots of context) can be seen in (122).

122. Me senté en la sala de espera, pero de verdad estaba impaciente.

-Liam - escuché al lado mio, miré y estaba Louis – Hannah me aviso¿Brittany está bien?-me preguntó asustado.

-No sé - dije entre lágrimas - Me muero si le pasa algo - me miró sin entender – digo - me corregí - pobre chica, no puede pasarle algo.

-Si en eso tenés razón, no te preocupés va a estar todo bien, tengo que avisarle a sus papás - se paró.

-Anda tranquilo -l o miré irse mientras marcaba los números. De repente veo que sale una enfermera, la misma que nos recibió y me acerqué.

-¿Está bien Brittany? - pregunté secándome las lágrimas.

-Si, sólo fue un desmayo¿Vos sos el novio? - me calmó y me preguntó

-Si - le respondí sin pensararlo - Pero¿Segura esta bien? - volví a preguntar.

-Si, no te preocupés, ahora solamente está dormida – suspiré aliviado - enseguida vuelvo con más información- al oír esas palabras me volví el alma al cuerpo, me senté nuevamente y vi que mi primo se acercaba.

‘I sat in the waiting room, but honestly I was impatient.

-Liam – I heard at my side, I looked and Luis was there- Hannah told me.

Is Brittany ok?- he asked scared.
-I don’t know- I said among tears- I’ll die if anything happens to her- he looked at me without understanding- I mean – I corrected myself- poor girl, nothing can happen to her.

-Yes you are right about that, don’t worry everything is going to be ok, I have to let her parents know- he got up.

-Go ahead- I watched him leave as he dialed the numbers. Suddenly I see the nurse come out, the same one that received us and I went up to her.

-Is Brittany ok? - I asked, drying my tears.

-Yes, it was only a faint. Are you the boyfriend? – she calmed me and asked me.

-Yes- I responded without thinking- But are you sure she is ok? – I asked again.

-Yes, don’t worry, now she is just sleeping- I sighed, relieved- I’ll be right back with more information- upon hearing these words my soul returned to my body, I sat down again and I saw that my cousin was approaching.’

(http://twitpic.com/7eipna)

We can see by the abundant context in (122) that in both instances the speakers use the VNI to console the addressee, who is worried about his girlfriend’s health, since she is in the hospital. Neither context is aggressive, impatient or impolite. We do see a possible situation of priming, however, since the VNI occurred, and then another VNI occurred. The possible effect of priming is an interesting one. Does a prior occurrence of one negative imperative form or the other influence the next occurrence? Given the
infrequency of negative imperatives in discourse in general, this would be difficult to measure, and as of yet remains unanswered.

With many of the consolation contexts containing the verb *preocupar* in the VNI form, one might wonder if perhaps this verb does not occur in the TNI (and that it would then, be a verb effect, and not necessarily contextual). This, however, is not the case, as can be seen by the use of the TNI with the same verb in the following context, also of consolation.

123. [Context: La Monita is getting arrested and is being denied a phone call. Martín stops it and says she has a right to one. Then he utters this:]

Martín: No te preocupes, Monita. Estoy acá.

*‘Don’t worry (TNI), Monita. I’m here.*

What (123) shows us, in combination with (120)-(122), is that the context is of consolation, not the verb form itself. The meaning, then, is not related to the particular form, but rather is contextually dependent. This is precisely the nature of Conversational Implicatures, specifically particularized Conversational Implicatures. The idea that consolation, impoliteness and impatience, among others, is expressed via PCI is supported by the fact that the interpretation of these feelings relies on the presence of specific context. These interpretations are easily cancelled by linguistic and non-linguistic context, simply because the lack of a specific context to generate them would result in the absence of their interpretation.

4.2.2 Native speaker impressions from interviews

After compiling some clips from *Sos Mi Vida* in which at least one negative imperative was used, I interviewed 10 native speakers of AS about their use. Each
participant watched 2 or 3 clips from the soap opera, in which at least one negative imperative was used. All participants were native speakers of AS, over the age of 18. 9 were females, and 1 was male. For each use of an imperative, they were asked to discuss why that imperative was used over the alternate option. These discussions may have led to a broader discussion about language use, or about uses in general of VNI vs. TNI. The conversations were recorded and analyzed in order to determine which words the participants used to describe the VNI, and which to describe the TNI. The terms used most often to describe the VNI were grouped by sentiment and can be seen in Table 9 below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Términos usados</th>
<th>Terms used</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enojado/agresivo/ofensivo</td>
<td>Angry/aggressive/offensive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Imperativo/directo/orden/fuerte</td>
<td>Imperative/direct/order/forceful</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular/tanguero/bruto/de barrio</td>
<td>Colloquial/slangy/brute/low-class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De confianza</td>
<td>Familiarity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autoridad/superioridad</td>
<td>Authority/superiority</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9: Terms used to describe the VNI

The terms used to describe the VNI all express sentiments about the speaker’s attitude or social standing. In other words, the VNI is providing social (indexical) information about the speaker that the hearer can use to characterize them. Some terms did seem to come to mind quicker and more often than others. The descriptions at the top of the table were used most often. Examples of descriptions given by the native speakers interviewed can be seen in (124)-(126).
124. STE-1:

“No te hagas es más indirecto. No es tan fuerte, además. Cuando vos decís no te hagás la gila es como más fuerte, más enojado. Lleva más potencia.”

‘No te hagas (TNI) is more indirect. It isn’t as strong, either. When you say no te hagás (VNI) la gila it is stronger, more angry. It is more powerful.’

125. STE-3b:

“Si es mucha pelea, o hay más autoridad en una parte y por ahí tiende a llevar en la última sílaba el acento”

‘If there is a fight, or there is more authority in some part then maybe the stress would tend to fall on the last syllable.’

B: “Llevar el acento al final es para alguien que tenés confianza, seguro, y que te podés enojar”

A: “la confianza de poder enojarte.”

B: ‘Putting the stress at the end is for somebody you are familiar with, and who you can get angry with.

A: ‘the familiarity to be able to get angry.’

126. STE-5:

“Supongamos que yo te diga “a mí no me grités” y no quiero generar una ofensa… y no pue… como te vuelvo a decir, es neutro, como digamos… si el contexto no es de ofensa y vos usás uno de estos que se esperaría en un contexto de ofensa, pero el contexto hace a la normalidad de la charla, no pasaría nada…”

131
‘Suppose I tell you “don’t yell at me (VNI)” and I don’t want to be offensive... well... as I say again, its neutral, I mean... if the context is not offensive and you use one of these forms that you would expect in an offensive context, but the context makes the situation normal, then nothing happens...”

As these participants point out, the ‘anger’ interpretation of the VNI is quite salient. Nevertheless, as participant STE-5 describes in (126), the context plays an important role. This participant’s description is key for discovering how this angry interpretation comes about. The VNI may be understood as angry if the context permits it, but if the context is not one of anger, then anger is not implicated or understood. Therefore, the meaning is in fact contextually dependent. If the context is not permissive to anger, then anger is not going to be interpreted. However, we do see that anger is a salient interpretation. Therefore, it seems to be the case that only in highly specific contexts would this interpretation not arise. Another example of a context in which a VNI is used, but anger is not intended, is as follows, in (127).

127. STE-6-3a:

A: El que yo uso es “no te vayás”… “dale, no te vayás.”

B: Es un poco el imperativo pero con tono de mimosa.

A: What I use is “don’t go” (VNI)... “come on, don’t go (VNI).”

B: It is a little bit imperative but with an affectionate tone.

(127) shows again that while the VNI is more “imperative” it can be used in conjunction with an affectionate tone. In other words, context (in this case, linguistic) can
cancel this more imperative meaning. Furthermore, in this context, anger is not interpreted. Instead, it is more of a begging situation. Based on these perceptions of the contextual use of the VNI, I argue that anger is contextually dependent meaning, expressed by Conversational Implicature. But it does not seem to be as contextually dependent as the meanings discussed in the prior section. It appears that the meanings of consolation, or impatience, etc arise in very specific contexts, and are thus expressed via PCI. On the contrary, it seems the meaning of anger is a default of sorts, and it arises provided that there is not a very particular context blocking it. It seems to be, therefore, generated via GCI. In section 4.2.2.1 I will provide experimental evidence to support that the anger associated with the VNI is conveyed via GCI.

4.2.2.1 Matching task

Given that speakers interviewed about the VNI and TNI distinction typically stuck to ideologically related terms to describe the VNI, as indicated by the top of Table 9, it does seem that the default interpretation of the VNI is related to anger or aggression. I therefore hypothesized that these meanings are expressed via GCI. Specific contexts can cancel them, but it seems that in the majority of the situations, anger is interpreted. In order to test the hypothesis that these are expressed via GCI, I carried out an experiment in Buenos Aires. This experiment was a matching task, with 63 adult native speakers of Argentinian Spanish, in Buenos Aires. These participants were recruited via university professor acquaintances, and were all university students. The participants heard 10 VNIs and 10 TNIs (and 20 fillers), and they needed to match each utterance with which of the faces in they think said it. The fillers included declaratives, affirmative imperatives, and questions. All utterances that the participants heard can be found in Appendix C. Face A
was intended to be an angry one, whereas Face B was intended to be neutral. Both faces were identical in every way except for the shape and quantity of their eyebrows. Face A had bushier eyebrows angled inward, with a slight wrinkle between them. Face B had thinner, straighter eyebrows with no wrinkles on his forehead or between the eyebrows. A survey of 15 colleagues supported my intuition that Face A was seen as angry, while Face B was seen as neutral. The faces can be seen in Figure 12. Importantly, no context was given for the utterances, as each utterance was independent of the previous utterances.

![Figure 12: Faces from the Matching Task](image)

The results can be seen in Table 10. Participants identified the VNI as being said by the angry face significantly more than they identified it as being said by the neutral face. The key to this experiment is that there was no context. It was important to determine if the angry interpretation was coming about even under these circumstances. The findings indicate that it in fact was. Therefore, even without any context to contribute
to the angry interpretation, participants believed that the VNIs were more likely to have been said by the “angry” face than the TNIs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>TNI</th>
<th>VNI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angry</td>
<td>44% (n=280)</td>
<td>60% (n=375)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neutral</td>
<td>56% (n=350)</td>
<td>40% (n=255)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chi-squared = 28.7, df = 1, p < .001

Table 10: Results from Matching Task

These results tell us that without any particular context to block the angry interpretation, this interpretation prevails. Recall the comment from participant STE-5 in (126). This comment supports the argument that the “offensive” meaning associated with the VNI may be cancelled if the context is one that specifically does not allow for such an interpretation. This supports the fact that the interpretation is in fact context dependent, and is not inherent to the form itself. Nevertheless these experimental results demonstrate that, barring a particular context to cancel it, the angry interpretation is inferred. In light of this evidence, I claim that the angry interpretation of the VNI is expressed via GCI. This meaning will come about unless a particular context (linguistic or otherwise) cancels it.

Therefore, I have thus far identified three different types of meaning associated with the VNI, specifically. The Conventionally Implicated meaning, discussed in Chapter 3, expressed the speaker’s beliefs regarding the addressee’s To-Do List. This chapter demonstrates the presence of Particularized Conversational Implicatures that can arise with the VNI, in certain contexts. There is also a Generalized Conversational Implicature, namely anger, which arises in the event that a context does not cancel it. In the following
section, I will explore how these meanings are manifested socially. In other words, the meaning difference found in the VNI and the TNI has social implications. Taking into account the pragmatic meaning difference, who uses the VNI? The model I follow is based on Eckert’s (2008) idea of an Indexical Field, as well as Sinnott’s (forthcoming) expansion of this concept and connection of it with pragmatic meaning.

4.3 Indexical Fields

As explored in the previous section, anger is associated by default with the VNI. It is important to note that this “meaning” points towards the speaker. It is the speaker’s attitude, or the speaker’s state that is characterized. This speaker-oriented meaning provides social information that can be used to characterize the speaker of an utterance. Therefore, it is only right that a sociolinguistic theory account for it. The different linguistic variables that a speaker uses, can tell you something about what that speaker is like, or that person’s style (Eckert, 2003). By style, I understand how the speaker portrays himself. Eckert (2003) states:

“The selection of variables for making stylistic moves is based, then, in the speaker’s interpretation of the meaning potential of the available resources” (p. 43).

In this way, speakers choose their variables to reflect a certain style, and then these variables come to be associated with certain traits. Eckert (2008) states that social meaning should be considered first and foremost in any study of variation. I extend this idea to include pragmatic meaning as well. I turn to the Indexical Field (Eckert 2008) in order to describe the meanings that are associated with the VNI-TNI distinction. The Indexical Field (IF), according to Eckert, is a “constellation of ideologically related
meanings, any one of which can be activated in the situated use of the variable” (p. 454). In other words, it is the collection of information that hearers can extract about a speaker from a speaker’s utterance. Eckert’s work on style and on the indexical field is centered on the conviction that “different ways of saying things are intended to signal different ways of being” (p. 456).

The variables Eckert (2008) considers in her analysis are mostly phonetic. Ultimately, it appears that speakers use different variables in order to identify with different social groups, or to express different stances. Eckert examines various studies, including Campbell-Kibler’s (2007) study on the affix –ING in English. Campbell-Kibler found that while the velar pronunciation was associated with education, intelligence and articulateness, the alveolar pronunciation was associated with lazy, uneducated and easygoing people. The context determined which of these indices the hearer associates with an occurrence.

Eckert also looks at Bucholtz’s (2001) study on /t/ release in American English in order to discusses the notion of indexical fields. Released /t/ can be associated with nerds or teachers. It is associated with educated, or elegant speech, but can also be associated with somebody who is annoyed, angry, polite or formal. There are quite a variety of interpretations associated with this variant, and some are contradictory. The indexical field Eckert created is given in Figure 1, and is repeated here in Figure 13. The qualities in boxes are social types, the qualities in black are permanent qualities, and the qualities in gray are stances. Eckert divides the categories this way only to show how fluid the relationship between them is. She points out that “while anger or cynicism may be
momentary and situated stances, people who are viewed as habitually taking such stances may become ‘angry’ or ‘cynical’ people through stance accretion.”

Eckert states that the meanings the hearer is to associate with a given occurrence of a variant depend on his or her perspective, as well as the “style in which it is embedded.” It is interesting that some of the same meanings found in this indexical field are valid also for what I have found for VNIs, namely anger and annoyance, but also interesting is that the opposite meanings of polite and formal are found. This shows that these types of meaning are the types found in indexical fields, even when the indexical field is for a variable that is quite different from mine (a phonological variable). In the case of a variable larger than a phonological one, particularly one that has propositional meaning, the variables in question would be those that share propositional meaning—synonyms, in a sense. But the “extra” pragmatic meanings associated with them may have social manifestations that can also contribute to a speaker’s self-portrayal.

Figure 13: Indexical Field of /t/ release from Eckert (2008)
In the case of the VNI-TNI alternation, a speaker may use the VNI to convey a colloquial, or informal style. This meaning may come about based on the pragmatic associations with the form used. If a VNI conveys the speaker’s beliefs regarding the addressee’s intentions, then it, in effect, is more accusatory than the TNI. Therefore, it is straightforward why this form may not be used in formal situations. This could make it more accessible for a speaker who wants to portray informality. Then this form itself would begin to be associated with informality, and its social meaning, in effect, derives from its pragmatic meaning.

Looking more specifically at the associations hearers make of the VNI, we can translate the terms from Table 9 into an indexical field (IF) for this distinction. The resulting IF is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPERATIVO</th>
<th>POPULAR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ENOJADO</td>
<td>AUTORIDAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIRECTO</td>
<td>BRUTO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRESIVO</td>
<td>SUPERIORIDAD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORDEN</td>
<td>DE CONFIANZA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OFENSIVO</td>
<td>TANGUERO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE BARRIO</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 14: Indexical Field of associations for the VNI

The terms in the above IF are those that are commonly associated with the VNI. In making up the IF for the VNI, these terms are those that point toward some characteristic of the speaker who uses the VNI. When a speaker uses the VNI, they share information about their stance. The speaker may be expressing superiority, or may be being aggressive, or may be being informal. I did not make the distinction between
stances vs. permanent qualities, particularly because it seems that with relation to the VNI, all indexed meaning points towards a stance. In other words, no one person has occasion to use the VNI all of the time, given any permanent qualities of theirs. Even a person who is *de barrio* or *bruto*, like Quique from *Sos Mi Vida* (González, 2006), does not exclusively use the VNI. On the contrary, the speaker’s reactions to certain situations or their actual stance at the time of the utterance is what seems to license the VNI. What this IF brings to my analysis is an interpretation of the meaning associated with the speaker, in social terms. When a hearer hears a speaker use a VNI, they are able to infer information about that speaker, namely their emotion at the time of the utterance (i.e.: they are angry), or, if the context indicates it, that there is a need for directness or authority. Such would be the case, as described in section 4.1.2, if a speaker needed to communicate a warning. Other social information that could be inferred from the use of the VNI centers around the speaker’s social class (i.e.: *popular, bruto, de barrio*). I must first be clear that I am not suggesting social class is acting independently of the previously identified meaning difference identified between the VNI and TNI. Instead, it is this meaning difference that drives the social difference. Lavandera (1978) argued, and Eckert (2008) agrees, that while the analysis of phonological variation is less reliant on theories of meaning, given that sounds do not carry meaning on their own, that is simply not the case for morphological, syntactic and lexical variation. Therefore, considering differences in content is necessary before considering social differentiations of forms. The reason is that it may in fact be the content, or the meaning, that is driving the social distinction. This is, in fact, the case with the VNI–TNI alternation. They are synonyms in that they share the same propositional content, but as Chapter 3 demonstrated, they do
have different pragmatic meanings, and the relationship of these meanings with the social meanings that come about should be considered. To show this, let us turn to further comments from the interviewed speakers regarding the use of the VNI.

128. STE-1

“Depende de la edad… los jóvenes no son de respetar tanto”

‘It depends on the age... young people are not very respectful’

129. STE-2

“se asocia generalmente en que las clases más bajas son como… las más altas son como más contenidas- lo socialmente correcto es no desbordarse en ninguna situación”

‘the lower clases are like… the higher ones are more contained the socially correct thing is to not “overflow” (over-express emotion) in any situation.’

130. STE-3

“Él es más bruto, más de conventillo… Ella como que se está en ese momento relacionando con gente más high. Entonces es como que está tratando de hablar mejor.” (describiendo por qué Quique usa VNI en un video y la Monita usa TNI).

‘He is more brute, more from the slums... She is at that time hanging around with “higher” people, So it is like she is trying to speak better.’ (describing why Quique uses the VNI in one video and la Monita uses the TNI).
In (128)-(130) we can see that the use of the VNI can point to different social information regarding the speaker's social standing. It is this social standing with relation to the content of the VNI that is important. In (128) participant STE-1 states that young people would use more VNI because they are less respectful, and the VNI expresses less respect. Therefore, it is not important to note simply that young people use the VNI more, but rather why this would be the case. According to participant STE-1, they use it because of this perceived social tendency they have to be more disrespectful. Similarly, in (129) participant in STE-2 states that people of higher social classes are less likely to be overly expressive, and show emotion. This participant is describing why Constanza, a character of high social class, uses the TNI over the VNI in a context in which she is angry. The participant believes it would be less characteristic of Constanza’s social class to express her anger. Therefore, it is the case not only that higher social classes may refrain from VNI use more than lower social classes, but the reason this is so has to do with social norms and values. In the same vein, in (130) participant STE-3 states that Quique used the VNI, because he is of low social class. La Monita used the TNI, because she is associating with people of higher social class, and wants to speak more “correctly.” So, it is because the VNI indexes “bruteness” and “slums”, or lower social class characteristics, that the hearer is able to draw these connections between how Quique is as a person, and his language use, as well as La Monita avoiding associations with these characteristics by using the alternative form.

Some participants also mentioned that they would not use the VNI with certain people who are socially higher than them in some way, specifically with their boss. In other Spanish-speaking countries, a boss-worker relationship may warrant the use of
usted; however, in Argentina, usted is used much less, and speakers use the voseo even in relationship of social distance. Still, speakers recognize that they would not use a negative command in the form of the voseo, given that they have the alternative option of a TNI that is deemed less direct and more polite.\(^\text{13}\)

4.3.1 Another look at Indexical Fields

It may be helpful to consider recent work by Sinnott (forthcoming), who worked on IFs for address forms in Peninsular Spanish (tú vs. usted). Sinnott expands on the prior structure of the IF by separating it into layers. The value of this is centered on Silversein’s (2003) idea that new indices can form based on existing indices (nth order and then \(n + 1\)^{st} order). The value to this addition is that it allows for a description of meanings that stem from other meanings, in the fluid sense that Eckert also addresses. Sinnott represents this fluidity by using layers in her IF. This allows for a hierarchical order to account for the meanings that are more “readily understood” than others. In Sinnott’s examined case of address forms, all layers of her IF are “bound together by the existence of the Conventional Implicature of distance” (p. 8). More specifically, the usted form conventionally implicates more distance, while the tú form implicates less (Sinnott, 2010). In her IF, the innermost layer consists of the most basic indices that speakers use to determine which address form is appropriate. It includes characteristics of the addressee, including age, sex and location (among others). Layer 2 includes more contextually dependent information, such as formality, respect and confianza. Layer 3

\(^{13}\) It is important to note that Argentinians do not have a sense of one of these forms being voseo and one being tuteo. Both are familiar forms, and if a pronoun were to be used with them (which itself is not common with commands), it would be vos.
includes the most contextually dependent information, such as anger, disrespect or a change in relationship distance. Sinnott’s IF can be seen in Figure 15.

![Image of Indexical Field for address forms in Peninsular Spanish, from Sinnott (forthcoming)](image)

Figure 15: Indexical Field for address forms in Peninsular Spanish, from Sinnott (forthcoming)

To give an example of how the layers in the IF interact with one another, let us assume the speaker chooses an usted form. After stopping at layer 1 and deciding to express distance based on age, for example, further indices may come about, leading the speaker to layer 2. The speaker’s use of the usted form based on age in layer 1 could index respect in layer 2. If this speaker later switches to use a tú form with the same interlocutor, thus indicating that a change in their relative distance has occurred, this is layer 3 taking effect. Layer 3 is the most context dependent layer, and a change in relative distance is highly particularized. In this case, the more recent use of tú not only
implicates that their relationship is now of confianza (via layer 2), but also that a change occurred (layer 3).

It is important to note that not all layers of the IF must be reached. Sinnott states that a young speaker who wishes to disrespect an elder can jump to layer 3 and use a tú form for disrespect. Since the addressee would presumably know that the speaker notes their age difference and is choosing to ignore it, then she can infer that the speaker did so intentionally in order to express disrespect. The prior layers would have led the speaker to choose an usted form, yet the specific context of wanting to disrespect the elder allowed him to ignore those layers.

Sinnott’s layered IF could apply to the VNI-TNI distinction in AS. It requires a classification of the terms from Figure 14 into their respective layers. Since layer 1 is the information that is presupposed (Silverstein 2003) upon the use of a VNI, I believe the only term (at least thus far discussed) that fits in this layer is de confianza. This is because it has been established that the VNI is more direct, and it is not a term one would use with a social superior (eg: a boss). It seems that the social requirement for its use has to do with the relationship between the interlocutors being one that allows for the directness of the VNI. One group of participants told me that they would not use the VNI with me, and we were of similar age and the same gender. This is because we were, in effect, strangers (and I was also an outsider, not being from Argentina) and therefore did not have the required confianza. Layer 2 consists of the least contextually dependent information. This information, while still being contextually dependent, is less so than layer 3. In this layer, I put the terms anger, aggression and offensive. These are the terms that were used the most often to describe the VNI, and they are ideologically related. In
the prior section, we saw that *anger* is at least one default interpretation of the VNI, meaning that it is calculated provided that the context does not cancel it. Layer 3 contains other terms that were mentioned, including *bruto, de barrio, tanguero,* and new ones that I added based off of speaker interviews and corpora, *begging* and *consolation.* Begging refers to situations like that in (127), given by a group of participants in the interviews. The group agreed that if somebody were with them and were about to leave, and they did not want them to go, they would use the VNI ‘*no te vayás.*’ This was not out of anger or offense, but rather, a begging tone, serving to try to influence the addressee to stay. Consolation was added given contexts like those seen in (12) and (13), where no anger can be interpreted, but the speakers are trying to console their addressees using a VNI. This is licensed by the *confianza* between the addressees, and also by the fact that the addressee is currently worried—this is the current state of affairs—so the context would be one of *immediacy.*

![Figure 16: Layered Indexical Field for the VNI](image)

146
The layered IF for the VNI, in Figure 16, then, shows how the meanings associated with the VNI are related. A speaker who is licensed to use the VNI given its pragmatic meaning, and the confianza between the interlocutors, is sharing further information about himself. If a speaker uses the VNI and expresses confianza (layer 1), then the hearer may determine that this confianza licenses the speaker to express his anger, or to be offensive (layer 2). If none of the layer 2 meanings seem to match the context, the hearer can think further and turn to layer 3, and could determine that the speaker is simply being more brute, or slangy. All of these meanings relate to the pragmatic associations of the VNI, specifically that it expresses that the speaker believes the addressee intended to perform the action that is being negated. The freedom to express this belief has to do with the characteristics found in the IF. Recall the comment in (125), where the participant indicated that the need to “be able” to get mad with the interlocutor. These refer to social norms. Therefore, the use of the VNI first indexes confianza—the necessary characteristic in order to be able to express the other characteristics. Then, the hearer can turn to other layers of the IF in order do determine what exactly the confianza is for. All of the characteristics in the IF are face-threatening in some way, which is why the confianza is necessary. By expressing consolation, for example, the speaker threatens the addressee’s negative face, by putting herself in the position to console, as someone with some type of authority, or “the one who knows best” (Aikhenvald, 2010, p. 7). By expressing anger, the same threat is made. This is why, presumably, confianza is first necessary for use of the VNI.
4.4 Conclusions

Just as all of Sinnott’s layers in her IF are bound by the Conventional Implicature of distance, all layers of the above IF are bound by a Conventional Implicature of prior belief about the addressee’s To-Do List. This is the overarching content of the VNI, and it licenses all uses of this form. The contextual meanings that come about interact with the social characteristics of the speakers that use the forms, in order to provide a characterization of what kind of person uses certain forms. The VNI includes information about the speaker’s emotional state, as well as the relative social statuses of the interlocutors, and the context.

In this model, I have shown how the meaning associated with the VNI is expressed via Conversational Implicature. Specifically, anger/aggression is expressed via GCI, and other, more contextually dependent meanings are expressed via PCI. It is not a coincidence that these correspond with different layers of the Indexical Field. The second layer consists of contextual information that is less contextually dependent than the 3rd layer, but is not presupposed, as in the first layer. This corresponds nicely with GCIs, which are the default interpretation of a form that emerges in any situation in which a discourse context does not block it. The third layer consists of the meaning that emerges in specific contexts. This layer corresponds to PCIs.

Any model intent on explaining social variation of morphological variation needs to account for the meaning differences associated with each morpheme. This model does so by demonstrating how the meaning difference interacts with the social characteristics of the speakers that use each form. It is not enough to explain who uses a form the most without addressing what about this form and what about this person (or this group of
people) allows for this to be the case. Upper class people may refrain from VNI use because of the social restriction on overly expressing emotion. Lower class people may use more VNI because of a tendency to be less emotionally contained. Likewise, younger people may be less respectful, and thus more direct. Characteristics of the speakers can inform us about why one group may be more likely to use one form over another, given the content the form expresses. In this way, pragmatics informs sociolinguistics, so that the social meaning can be understood as a whole, and not from a pure variationist perspective.
Chapter 5 Conclusions

5.1 Summary of findings

With this research, my aim was to provide an analysis of the alternation between the VNI and TNI, a case of variation previously identified by several scholars, but only briefly explored in the prior literature by Fontanella de Weinberg (1979). My analysis incorporates methods and analytical techniques from the areas of pragmatics and sociolinguistics in order to account for when a speaker chooses to use one negative imperative form over the other. I was interested in identifying what meanings were associated with the VNI specifically, and how these meanings arise pragmatically, as well as how they are manifested socially. The information encoded in the VNI goes above and beyond what is typically encoded in imperatives. In addition to the propositional content of the imperative, which it shares with the TNI, the VNI conveys “extra” meaning. I have identified this meaning as conveying the speaker’s epistemic commitment regarding the state of the addressee’s To-Do List, and have demonstrated that it comes about via Conventional Implicature.

In Chapter 2 I discuss the relevant frameworks that come into play in my analysis. These include the study of commands and imperatives in general, and what they are known to convey. I include what has been said of commands in speech act theory and politeness theory, as well as the expression of epistemicity in commands. I then talk about the expression of meaning in general, for the purpose of later (in Chapters 3 and 4)
applying this to the meaning difference found in the VNI~TNI alternation. I discuss conversationally implicated meaning (generalized and particularized) and conventionally implicated meaning. I also discuss the expression of social meaning, and the indexical field, to be implemented in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to the pragmatic distinction between the two negative imperative forms in AS. Examples from indirect quotations demonstrate that the information encoded by the VNI is speaker-oriented. It conveys the speaker’s own commentary regarding their beliefs about the addressee’s intentions. If the speaker believes the addressee intends to carry out the action that is being commanded against, the VNI is how he can convey this information. In the case of an indirect quote, this information does not convey what the original speaker expressed, but rather, the quoter’s own editorializations. In the case of the VNI, example (89) demonstrates that the father can convey immediacy by using a VNI, and still faithfully quote the mother, who used a TNI. This demonstrates that the VNI and the TNI share the same at-issue entailments (“what is said”), but it is the “extra” meaning that is different. It is the existence of the two different negative imperative forms that allows us to identify and classify this “extra” meaning. I then present further evidence that this “extra” meaning is Conventionally Implicated. Survey 1 served to test the hypothesis that this meaning was centered on the immediacy of the context. Immediacy was defined as any context in which the speaker has reason to believe that the addressee will carry out (or has already carried out) the action being negated. In other words, they require the speaker to transform the current state of affairs. In contrast, neutral contexts serve to prevent the addressee from carrying out an action that is not yet present in the state of affairs. The survey results indicate that
the VNI was used significantly more in *immediate* contexts than in *neutral* ones. They also indicate that *immediate* contexts that were also *angry* yielded more use of VNI than those that were *immediate* but not *angry*. This, along with native speaker commentary that indicated that the VNI sounded *angrier*, led to the matching task experiment in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 also includes the analysis of a further online survey, which explored participants’ perceptions of the speaker’s beliefs regarding the addressee’s intentions, with relationship to the two commands. This was meant to test the hypothesis that the VNI was used when the speaker believed the addressee had the action being negated on his or her To-Do List. Results demonstrate that in rating how certain the speaker of an utterance was that the addressee was going to perform the action addressed in the utterance, participants rated the VNI as significantly more “certain” than the TNI. The further grouping of the VNI with the declarative utterance, and the TNI with the interrogative utterance provide additional support for the certainty distinction. These results combined help to define the true distinguishing factor between the TNI and the VNI. I conclude that the VNI conveys epistemic information regarding the speaker’s beliefs. While not unheard of, it is not typical of commands in general to convey information about the speaker’s epistemic commitment. More specifically, the VNI conveys the speaker’s commitment to the truth of the fact that the addressee was otherwise going to carry out the action that the speaker wishes to keep out of the state of affairs. In this sense, the VNI conveys not only “don’t do that,” but also “I believe you were going to do that.” The TNI is more neutral with regards to the speaker’s beliefs regarding the addressee’s intentions.
Apart from these meaning differences, social and dialectal differences were also found in the licensing of the VNI vs. the TNI. Survey 1 indicated that men were significantly more likely to use the VNI than the TNI in all contexts except angry ones, where gender of the participant did not make a significant difference. This difference in use is supported by the associations that some AS speakers mentioned in commentary regarding the survey. One participant who responded with more VNIs, for example, wrote as a comment, “soy algo masculina al hablar” (I’m a bit masculine in my speech), pointing towards an association of the VNI with masculinity. This association also corresponds to the common interpretation of the VNI as more aggressive, or more angry sounding, since these characteristics are generally taken to be more masculine.

As for dialectal differences, Survey 1 indicated that outside the province of Buenos Aires, the VNI was chosen significantly more than inside the province of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, outside Buenos Aires, the association with angry contexts is stronger, such that the only immediate contexts that yield significantly more VNI than TNI are those that are angry. This corresponds with the dialectal difference found in Survey 2. In Survey 2, participants from outside the Río de la Plata region rated the VNI as significantly more certain than those who lived within the Río de la Plata region. These results support each other, in that if a VNI is interpreted as more certain, it could incite more anger (since it would sound more accusatory). Likewise, if speakers were associating the VNI with anger, they would be inclined to interpret it as more certain, for the same reasons.

In addition to the conventionally implicated meaning that the VNI conveys, further contextually dependent pragmatic meaning also arises with its use. This meaning
was explored in Chapter 4, where I determined that the salient association of the VNI with *anger* was due to its status as a GCI. GCIs convey the default interpretation of a form (Levinson, 2000), which arises in the event that a specific discourse context does not block it. In order to test the contextual dependency of the VNI, a matching task was carried out in which speakers were provided no context for the utterances they heard, but were asked to match them to the faces shown in Figure 12. The results indicated that in the absence of a context, participants were still associating the VNI significantly more with the angry face than with the neutral face. This indicates that the anger interpretation arises independently of context. Other meanings associated with the VNI seem to be more contextually dependent, in that they occur only if specific contexts license them. These meanings are expressed via PCI, and they include begging and consolation.

Following Sinnott’s (forthcoming) model of a layered indexical field, I compiled a model of the characteristics associated with the VNI, where the least contextually dependent ones are found towards the middle, and the more contextually dependent meanings are found in the outer layer. In this analysis I use the pragmatic meaning conveyed by the VNI in order to understand the social meanings that come about. In the case of morphological variation, it is especially necessary to consider the content of the variants. Understanding the meaning expressed by a variant can help interpret why that variant has different socially-salient associations. It may explain who uses the variant, and in what contexts. In this case, it is important to consider the meaning conveyed by the VNI in order to understand why the VNI would point toward an angry interpretation, and also why its use is higher in male speakers than in female speakers. In this way, pragmatic meaning helps inform social meaning. I conclude that the meaning conventionally
implicated by the VNI, regarding the speakers’ beliefs, points to an angry interpretation, which, in turn, has social manifestations, including being used more often by male speakers, or sounding more brute.

5.2 Implications

5.2.1 Epistemic meaning and imperatives

Besides providing a better understanding of the TNI~VNI alternation, and the specific meaning encoded in the VNI, the results of this dissertation have implications for the study of imperatives in general. Imperatives are typically addressee-oriented, in that they denote properties that should be true of the addressee. They add properties to the addressee’s To-Do List, or, in the case of negative imperatives, remove these properties, or prevent their addition. The propositional content of an imperative (used as a directive) includes the “command” alone. They are also speaker-oriented, in that they denote properties that the speaker wishes to be true of the addressee. Some languages do have commands that encode a reported evidential (ie: “do this, on somebody else’s order”) (Aikhenvald 2010). This reported evidential, when used with a declarative, often conveys a lack of epistemic commitment on the part of the speaker (ie: “He is said to be a doctor” may convey that the speaker does not necessarily believe this). Aikhenvald reports that “none of these epistemic overtones are ever found in imperatives” (139). Still, she reports on prior work on commands that has shown that, in some languages, “extra” information can be encoded in the command. Examples include aspectual information, or distance in space or time. According to Aikhenvald, commands do not typically convey epistemicity, however, she is referring to the type of overtones expressed in declaratives (ie: those
conveyed by reported evidentials, which indicate disbelief on the part of the speaker, who is conveying somebody else’s belief). The lack of expression of evidentiality, she says, is due to the nature of imperatives themselves. Declaratives have a more easily-accessible information source, as demonstrated by the follow-up question “How do you know?”, which can felicitously follow declaratives. Indeed, it would be strange to follow up a command with such a question. Aikhenvald says this is because commands are not linked to an information source. She does, however, cite one language, Nivkh, which does encode evidentiality in its negative command. Essentially, it uses one suffix for cessatives, and one for preventives. If the speaker witnesses an action and wishes to stop it, he uses one suffix. If the command serves to simply prevent an action from coming about, he uses another.

On a similar note, I have shown that the VNI speaker-oriented information conveyed by the VNI is epistemic in nature. When a negative command is uttered, it serves to stop or prevent the addressee from carrying out an action. A speaker may be attempting to stop the action, or could simply be preventing the action. The epistemic commitment conveyed, then, is regarding whether or not the speaker believes this action needs to be stopped or simply prevented. With regards to Portner’s (2004, 2007) To-Do List analysis of imperatives, I conclude that the VNI includes information about what the speaker believes to be true about the addressee’s To-Do List. The speaker may believe this due to evidence in the discourse context, but this meaning itself is not contextually reliant, and direct evidence is not necessary.

This epistemic meaning contributes to the truth conditions of the imperative. While it has been argued that imperatives do not have truth values (Portner, 2004, 2007),
it has also been argued that they do (Haverkate, 1979; Kaufmann, 2011). The speaker, by uttering a VNI, is making a claim about what they believe to be true about the current state of affairs. Addressees are permitted to deny this claim, as Haverkate demonstrates in (19) for affirmative imperatives. The use of discourse marker *si*, which serves to refute the relevance of a prior assertion (Schwenter, 2002), helps demonstrate what the truth values of the negative imperative are. In this case, it is the speaker’s belief regarding the state of affairs. I suggest that the discourse marker *si*, then, will be favored after a VNI over a TNI.

The analysis of this epistemic meaning as truth conditional, but also as conveyed via conventional implicature is important for theoretical purposes, because conventionally implicated meaning is typically considered to be non-truth conditional. I have shown, however, that regular tests for truth conditionality (e.g. the “that’s not true” test) do not work for imperatives. The study of conventionally implicated meaning is centered on declaratives, and has not been considered in relation to imperatives. Therefore, it has been shown that the conventional tests for truth conditionality do not work for conventionally implicated meaning in declaratives. Nevertheless, the data presented here demonstrate that the epistemic information conveyed by the VNI is conventionally implicated— it meets all other requirements for conventionally implicated meaning, namely that it is speaker-oriented and not at-issue. Yet it would seem that it is also truth-conditional.

5.2.2 Pragmatics and Sociolinguistics

Another contribution of this dissertation has been the use of pragmatic meaning to inform the study of variation and sociolinguistics. Following Sinnott (2013), I turn to the
meaning encoded by the variants in order to better understand the social distribution of these variants. The VNI, conveying the speaker’s beliefs about the addressee’s intentions, may sound more accusatory. This may explain why it is associated, socially, with anger as well as directness. Social class associations can also be explained by the meaning differences, since speakers noted that those of upper classes are less likely to express their emotions.

The combination of these linguistic areas of study is essential to the study of morphological (and lexical) variation. I also incorporated different levels of pragmatic meaning with different levels of social meaning, following Sinnott’s (2013) layered indexical field. This model allows for the distinguishing of more easily calculated meanings vs. those that are more context specific, or nuanced. This is in line with Eckert’s (2008) analysis of variants, including /t/ release, as discussed above. Specifically, her “stances” (represented in grey in her indexical field, given in Figure 1, and Figure 13) include a variety of different, contextually dependent social meanings.

The layered Indexical Field, then, includes a distinction between the more contextually dependent meaning and the more easily calculable, “default” meanings associated with the variants. This idea is still new and further research and data from morphological and lexical variation will help refine the notion of a pragmatically-informed social model.

5.3 Future research

This research has contributed to the understanding we have about what meaning is conveyed by commands, and how this meaning is conveyed. There is still much to be done in the area of negative imperatives in general, and more specifically on the VNI~TNI alternation. I will present here some ideas for future research on these issues.
5.3.1 Epistemic meaning

Future research that will help advance current knowledge about the VNI~TNI alternation, and, more broadly, the information conveyed by imperatives, includes further study of sř in combination with the two command forms. I intend to collect empirical evidence to demonstrate the preference of sř in response to a VNI as opposed to a TNI. This will further the evidence already provided to support the epistemic meaning associated with the VNI. It will also provide additional evidence that epistemic meaning can in fact be encoded in imperatives.

The epistemic meaning associated with the VNI~TNI alternation can also be studied in the realm of child language acquisition. Recent studies on children’s acquisition of epistemic information (Armstrong 2011, Papafragou 1998, among others) indicate that it is acquired around age 4 or 5. Armstrong (2011) explores children’s knowledge of belief state information encoded in prosody and Papafragou (1998) looked at modal verbs. A study of children’s perception of the VNI~TNI contrast can help advance this knowledge, and further what is known about the acquisition of Theory of Mind (Wellman 1990). The Theory of Mind refers to a person’s ability to reflect on his or her own mental state (or that of others). It is centered on the ability to separate the mind from reality. Papafragou (1998) explores epistemic modals in conjunction with theory of mind. Armstrong (2011) looked at the acquisition of prosody in Puerto Rican children. One of the prosodic contours she explored conveyed disbelief on the part of the speaker. Because epistemic information has been shown to be acquired around the age of 4-5, I would expect children this age to also be beginning to acquire the pragmatic distinction between the VNI and the TNI, since this distinction is also one that marks the epistemic
commitment of the speaker. I plan to develop an experiment in order to determine whether children’s acquisition of the VNI~TNI alternation corresponds in age with their acquisition of other epistemic information. This study will further support the notion that the “extra” information encoded in the VNI is in fact epistemic in nature.

5.3.2 Social meaning and dialectal variation

This dissertation was a start to understanding the social manifestations of VNI~TNI variation. I am interested in further exploring the social distinctions made between these forms. With more data from large quantities of native speakers of AS that include a larger number of those from different socio-economic backgrounds and education levels, the social effects of this variation may be better understood. The methodologies used (namely the online surveys) were geared at obtaining a large number of participants in a short amount of time. However, they are not without problems, since they likely reached fewer participants from lower socio-economic backgrounds. This, in turn, may have affected the representation of different dialects, as well. In-person research done in a variety of cities in different regions of Argentina may yield even more interesting dialectal and social differences.

While the samples used for the studies in this dissertation were not small, considering all of the variables taken into account (education level, gender, age, location) some factor groups did not have enough members to be able to truly make any strong claims about them. To give one example, there were very few participants in Survey 1 who were from outside Buenos Aires and had a graduate education. Therefore, I was unable to examine to the fullest the relationship between education level and location.
I am also interested in further exploring the regional variation found in the use of these variants. Collecting more data from outside Buenos Aires will be key. This way, instead of one broad “outside BA” group, I can consider separate regions from Argentina (and also Uruguay) in order to see if there are further differences in use of the two negative imperatives across more regions. More specifically, I am interested to see whether geographical distance from Buenos Aires plays a role in the interpretation of the VNI~TNI alternation. The ability to determine this will depend on the ability to collect large amounts of data from each region of Argentina. Ideally, each region represented would include both male and female participants of a variety of ages and education levels/social classes. The timeframe required of such a project would make it almost unattainable, but it could be simplified by concentrating on major cities throughout different regions.
References


BATES, DOUGLAS, MAECHLER, MARTIN and BOLKER, BEN. 2011. lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using s4 classes (R package version 0.999375-39).


CAMPBELL-KIBLER, KATHRYN. 2007. Accent, (ING) and the social logic of listener perceptions. American Speech 82, 32–64.


PORTNER, PAUL. 2010. “Imperatives and the Analysis of Permission and Choice,” Talk at The Ohio State University Colloquium. 5 February 2010. Columbus, OH.


APPENDIX A: SURVEY 1 QUESTIONS

CONTEXT 1
Non-urgent
Estás en el supermercado comprando un kilo de queso. Lo querés entero, no cortado, y se lo tenés que decir al chico que trabaja ahí. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No lo cortés
No lo cortes
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en la carnicería y le pedís al carnicero un kilo de vacío para un asado. Entonces el carnicero empieza a cortarte milanesas. Vos sólo le pediste vacío. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me cortés milanesas
No me cortes milanesas
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 2
Non-urgent
Estás en una zapatería y la chica que trabaja ahí te muestra un par de zapatos de vestir. Vos necesitás zapatillas deportivas. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me mostrés zapatos de vestir
No me muestres zapatos de vestir
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en una zapatería y necesitás zapatillas deportivas. Aunque se lo hayas dicho a la chica que atiende que sólo necesitás zapatillas deportivas, ella insiste y te trata de convencer de que compres zapatos de vestir, porque están en oferta. No te interesa y estás medio molesto. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No tratés de venderme zapatos de vestir
No trates de venderme zapatos de vestir
Cualquiera de las dos
CONTEXT 3
Non-urgent
Estás en una librería y querés hacer fotocopias de unos folletos. Las querés en blanco y negro, no en color, y se lo tenés que decir al chico que trabaja ahí. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me las hagás en color, las quiero en blanco y negro
No me las hagas en color, las quiero en blanco y negro
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en una librería para hacer fotocopias de unos folletos. El chico que trabaja ahí tiene las manos llenos de tinta. Agarra papel para poner en la fotocopiadora y lo mancha todo. Está por fotocopiar tus folletos en papel manchado. Te enojás, porque son folletos importantes. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me los hagás con manchas
No me los hagas con manchas
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 4
Non-urgent
Estás en un videoclub y el chico que atiende te trae películas de acción. Vos tenés ganas de ver una de amor. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me traigás películas de acción
No me traigas películas de acción
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en un videoclub y el chico que atiende te trae películas de acción. Vos tenés ganas de ver una de amor, y se lo decís. El chico te dice que igual te quiere mostrar su película favorita, que se llama "Lucha a la muerte"- es de acción. No te interesa y estás apurado. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me traigás películas de acción
No me traigas películas de acción
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 5
Non-urgent
Estás en el avión con un amigo y él se fue al baño. La azafata está ofreciendo bebidas. Te pregunta si deja algo para tu amigo. No es necesario porque sabés que tu amigo recién tomó agua. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No, no le dejés nada
No, no le dejes nada
Cualquiera de las dos
Urgent
Estás en un avión, esperando a que despegue. Es la primera vez que volás y tenés un poco de miedo. Escuchás a una azafata decirle a otra que le preste un poco de maquillaje. Las mirás y la azafata te dice, "así, si se cae el avión, me muero linda" y te guiña un ojo. A vos no te parece graciosa una broma así y te hace enojar. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No digás eso
No digas eso
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 6
Non-urgent
Estás en una librería porque querés comprar un libro para las vacaciones. El vendedor te está ayudando a elegir uno, y quiere saber qué tipo de libros te gustan. Te gusta de todo excepto de terror. Decidís dejarlo elegir al vendedor. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
Eligí vos, pero no elijás uno de terror
Eligi vos, pero no elijas uno de terror
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en una librería porque querés comprar un libro para las vacaciones. El vendedor te está ayudando a elegir uno, pero parece que a él le gustan mucho los libros de ciencia ficción, mientras que a vos no te gustan. Le decís que no querés uno de ciencia ficción, pero él sigue mostrándote varios libros de ese género. Después de un rato, estás un poco molesto. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me recomendés libros de ciencia ficción
No me recomiendes libros de ciencia ficción
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 7
Non-urgent
Estás en un restaurán con tus amigos. El mozo te pregunta qué querés. Vos pedís un sándwich pero no querés que tenga queso. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No le pongás queso
No le pongas queso
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Una amiga te lleva a un restaurán para comer con unos amigos. Hay vino y tu amiga está tomando demasiado. Agarra la botella para servirse más vino. Te enojás porque después te tiene que llevar a tu casa en auto. Querés decirle que no lo haga. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No tomes más vino, tenés que manejar
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 8
Non-urgent
Estás en el aeropuerto y te ofrecen 800 pesos si aceptás un cambio a otro vuelo a tu destino. Vos aceptás, con tal de que salga hoy. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
Está bien, pero no me metás en un vuelo que salga mañana
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás viajando por trabajo y tenés una reunión importante por la mañana. Tu vuelo ha sido cancelado por problemas de la aerolínea. Le decís al representante de la aerolínea que tenés que salir hoy pero te dice que te va a meter en el primer vuelo que sale mañana. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me metás en un vuelo que salga mañana, tiene que ser hoy
Cualquiera de las dos

CONTEXT 9
Non-urgent
Estás en una heladería y no te decidís por el sabor de helado que querés, pero no querés chocolate. La chica te pregunta qué sabor querés. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
Cualquiera, pero no me sirvás chocolate
Cualquiera de las dos

Urgent
Estás en una heladería y pedís helado de vainilla. La chica de la heladería te dice que está bien pero después ves que te sirve helado de chocolate. No querés chocolate. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones le dirías?
No me sirvás chocolate
Cualquiera de las dos
CONTEXT 10

Non-urgent
Llamás por teléfono a una casa de comida para pedir una docena de empanadas para que las entreguen en tu trabajo. No las querés hasta las 5:00. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones dirías?
No me las llevés hasta las 5:00
No me las lleves hasta las 5:00
Las dos estarían bien.

Urgent
Llamás por teléfono a una casa de comida para pedir una docena de empanadas para que las entreguen en tu trabajo a la 1:00. A pesar de que les hayas dicho que las querés para la 1:00, te dicen que para las 11:00 las entregan. ¿Cuál de las siguientes opciones dirías?
No, no me las llevés a las 11:00, las quiero a la 1:00
No, no me las lleves a las 11:00, las quiero a la 1:00
Cualquiera de las dos
APPENDIX B: SURVEY 2 QUESTIONS

CONTEXT 1
1. VNI
Juan y su Hermana están hablando de diferentes destinos para las vacaciones. Juan le dice a su Hermana:
“No vayás a Chile.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Juan que su Hermana iba a ir a Chile?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nada seguro</td>
<td>muy seguro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. TNI
Juan y su Hermana están hablando de diferentes destinos para las vacaciones. Juan le dice a su Hermana:
“No vayas a Chile.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Juan que su Hermana iba a ir a Chile?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nada seguro</td>
<td>muy seguro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Interrogative
Juan y su Hermana están hablando de diferentes destinos para las vacaciones. Juan le dice a su Hermana:
“¿Vas a ir a Chile?”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Juan que su Hermana iba a ir a Chile?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nada seguro</td>
<td>muy seguro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Declarative
Juan y su Hermana están hablando de diferentes destinos para las vacaciones. Juan le dice a su Hermana:
“Ya sé que vas a ir a Chile.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Juan que su Hermana iba a ir a Chile?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>nada seguro</td>
<td>muy seguro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CONTEXT 2
1. VNI
Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:
“No pidás el pollo.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

2. TNI
Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:
“No pidas el pollo.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

3. Interrogative
Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:
“¿Vas a pedir el pollo?”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

4. Declarative
Julio y su amigo están en un restaurán. Julio le dice a su amigo:
“Ya sé que vas a pedir el pollo.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Julio que su amigo iba a pedir el pollo?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

CONTEXT 3
1. VNI
Mario y Lucas están hablando sobre política Mario le dice a Lucas:
“No votés a Rosana.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Mario que Lucas pensabe votar a Rosana?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

2. TNI
Mario y Lucas están hablando sobre política Mario le dice a Lucas:
“No votes a Rosana.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Mario que Lucas pensaba votar a Rosana?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

3. Interrogative
Mario y Lucas están hablando sobre política Mario le dice a Lucas:
“¿Vas a votar a Rosana?”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Mario que Lucas pensaba votar a Rosana?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

4. Declarative
Mario y Lucas están hablando sobre política Mario le dice a Lucas:
“Ya sé que vas a votar a Rosana.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Mario que Lucas pensaba votar a Rosana?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

CONTEXT 4

1. VNI
Irene acaba de hacer una torta. Le dice a su hijo:
“No comás la torta.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Irene que su hijo iba a comer la torta?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

2. TNI
Irene acaba de hacer una torta. Le dice a su hijo:
“No comas la torta.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Irene que su hijo iba a comer la torta?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

3. Interrogative
Irene acaba de hacer una torta. Le dice a su hijo:
“¿Vas a comer la torta?”
¿Cuán segura estaba Irene que su hijo iba a comer la torta?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro
4. Declarative
Irene acaba de hacer una torta. Le dice a su hijo:
“Ya sé que vas a comer la torta.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Irene que su hijo iba a comer la torta?

1 2 3 4 5
nada seguro muy seguro

CONTEXT 5
1. VNI
Lucía le dice a su esposo que su hija tiene un acto esta noche. Después le dice:
“No te olvidés.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Lucía que su esposo se iba a olvidar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

2. TNI
Lucía le dice a su esposo que su hija tiene un acto esta noche. Después le dice:
“No te olvides.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Lucía que su esposo se iba a olvidar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

3. Interrogative
Lucía le dice a su esposo que su hija tiene un acto esta noche. Después le dice:
“¿Te vas a olvidar?”
¿Cuán segura estaba Lucía que su esposo se iba a olvidar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

4. Declarative
Lucía le dice a su esposo que su hija tiene un acto esta noche. Después le dice:
“Ya sé que te vas a olvidar.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Lucía que su esposo se iba a olvidar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

CONTEXT 6
1. VNI
La hija de Ana va salir a jugar antes de ir a cenar. Ana le dice:
“No te ensuciés.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Ana que su hija se iba a ensuciar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

2. TNI
La hija de Ana va salir a jugar antes de ir a cenar. Ana le dice:
“No te ensucies.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Ana que su hija se iba a ensuciar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

3. Interrogative
La hija de Ana va salir a jugar antes de ir a cenar. Ana le dice:
“¿Te vas a ensuciar?”
¿Cuán segura estaba Ana que su hija se iba a ensuciar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

4. Declarative
La hija de Ana va salir a jugar antes de ir a cenar. Ana le dice:
“Ya sé que te vas a ensuciar.”
¿Cuán segura estaba Ana que su hija se iba a ensuciar?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura

CONTEXT 7
1. VNI
Jorge acaba de leer un libro que no le gustó. Le comenta a su amigo:
“No leás ese libro.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Jorge que su amigo iba a leer ese libro?

1 2 3 4 5
nada segura muy segura
2. TNI
Jorge acaba de leer un libro que no le gustó. Le comenta a su amigo:
“No leas ese libro.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Jorge que su amigo iba a leer ese libro?

1  2  3  4  5
nada segura  muy segura

3. Interrogative
Jorge acaba de leer un libro que no le gustó. Le comenta a su amigo:
“Vas a leer ese libro?”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Jorge que su amigo iba a leer ese libro?

1  2  3  4  5
nada segura  muy segura

4. Declarative
Jorge acaba de leer un libro que no le gustó. Le comenta a su amigo:
“Ya sé que vas a leer ese libro.”
¿Cuán seguro estaba Jorge que su amigo iba a leer ese libro?

1  2  3  4  5
nada segura  muy segura
APPENDIX C: UTTERANCES HEARD IN MATCHING TASK

1) Llevame a la playa.
2) No me mires.
3) No pongás eso ahí.
4) María recién salió a trotar.
5) No te vayas todavía.
6) No tires ese papel.
7) No me grites.
8) Llamarlo mañana.
9) No pensés en eso.
10) Llamar al doctor.
11) Vení a mi casa a comer.
12) No me mires.
13) Vamos a cenar juntos.
14) No le digás lo que te dije.
15) ¿Te gusta la comida?
16) No llorés.
17) No me grités.
18) No corras en la calle.
19) Tomate el colectivo.
20) Me gustaría ir pero no puedo.
21) Decíme la verdad.
22) No te vayás todavía.
23) No te levantes.
24) ¿Me das una servilleta?
25) No pienses en eso.
26) ¿Cómo estás?
27) Me gustaría al cine.
28) Ayer me llamó Antonio.
29) Ya me lo dijiste.
30) No llores.
31) No corráis en la calle.
32) No me gusto la película.
33) No le digas lo que te dije.
34) No vas a ir a la fiesta.
35) Se me olvidó.
36) Tenés que ir a estudiar.
37) Tenés que dormer más.
38) No pongas eso ahí.
39) No tires ese papel.
40) No te levantés.
Figure 17: Conditional Inference Tree depicting factors that contribute to the rating of the VNI and TNi in Survey 2
APPENDIX E: FORMS OF VERBAL VOSEO BY COUNTRY (DICCIONARIO PANHISPÁNICO DE DUDAS, 2005)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PAÍS / TIEMPO VERBAL</th>
<th>Argentina</th>
<th>Paraguay</th>
<th>Uruguay</th>
<th>Chile</th>
<th>Perú (Arequipa)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRESENTE DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantás comés vivís</td>
<td>cantás comés vivís</td>
<td>cantás comés vivís</td>
<td>cantáis(s) comi(s) vivís(s)</td>
<td>cantás comís vivís</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO PERFECTO SIMPLE O PRETÉRITO DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantirí(s) comerí(s) vivirí(s)</td>
<td>cantirí(s) comerí(s) vivirí(s)</td>
<td>cantirí(s) comerí(s) vivirí(s)</td>
<td>cantirí(s) comerí(s) vivirí(s)</td>
<td>cantarás comerís vivirís</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENTE DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td>cantaría(s) comiera(s) viviera(s)</td>
<td>cantaría(s) comiera(s) viviera(s)</td>
<td>cantaría(s) comiera(s) viviera(s)</td>
<td>cantaría(s) comiera(s) viviera(s)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO O PRETÉRITO DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td>cantabilidad comíabilidad vivibilidad</td>
<td>cantabilidad comíabilidad vivibilidad</td>
<td>cantabilidad comíabilidad vivibilidad</td>
<td>cantabilidad comíabilidad vivibilidad</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDICIONAL O POSPRETÉRITO</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERATIVO</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAÍS / TIEMPO VERBAL</td>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Venezuela</td>
<td>Guatemala</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>---------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO O PRETÉRITO DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDICIONAL O POSPRETÉRITO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAÍS / TIEMPO VERBAL</td>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>Honduras</td>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Panamá</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENTE DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantás comés viví</td>
<td>cantás comés viví</td>
<td>cantás comés viví</td>
<td>cantás comés viví</td>
<td>cantá(s) coméi(s) viví</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO DE INDICATIVO O COPRETÉRITO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURO DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantarés comerés vivírés</td>
<td>cantarés comerés vivírés [8]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO O PRETÉRITO DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDICIONAL O POSPRETÉRITO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERATIVO</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví</td>
<td>cantá comé viví[12]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAÍS / TIEMPO VERBAL</td>
<td>México (Chiapas y Tabasco)</td>
<td>Cuba (Oriente)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENTE DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantás, comés, vivís</td>
<td>cantái(s), coméi(s), vivís</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO DE INDICATIVO O COPRETÉRITO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO PERFECTO SIMPLE O PRETÉRITO DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantastes, comistes, vivistes</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUTURO DE INDICATIVO</td>
<td>cantarés, comerés, vivirés</td>
<td>cantaréi(s), comeréi(s), viviréi(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENTE DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRETÉRITO IMPERFECTO O PRETÉRITO DE SUBJUNTIVO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONDICIONAL O POSRETÉRITO</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMPERATIVO</td>
<td>cantá, comé, viví</td>
<td>cantá, comé, viví</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>