Policing Womanhood: The International Olympic Committee, Sex Testing and the Maintenance of Hetero-Femininity in Sport

DISSERTATION

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Abstract

This project assesses the significance of Olympic sex testing/gender verification. From 1968 to 1998, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) required sex/gender checks on all female participants, consequently defining and controlling womanhood. In the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, the IOC Medical Commission instituted the first compulsory test of the modern Olympic Movement. The procedure intended to guarantee the authenticity of Olympic competitors and unmask male masqueraders, as well as to scientifically confirm the separation of men and women in sport. Over the next three decades, the IOC authorized a policy of sex/gender conformity, which consequently outlined a specific category of woman for sport. Thus Olympic womanhood—dependent on a belief in natural, dichotomous sex/gender difference—required female athletes to conform to conventional notions of white hetero-femininity. Through these regulations, the IOC, a powerful and influential authority, has continuously reaffirmed a binary notion of sex, privileged white gender norms, re-inscribed a dichotomous paradigm of sexuality and hampered female athleticism. Although protests from the medical community and the Athletes Commission eventually coerced the IOC to abandon compulsory verification in 1999, officials failed to relinquish complete control of Olympic womanhood. The IOC maintained its authority of sex/gender through anti-doping techniques, suspicion-based testing and transgender regulations.
Dedicated to Lucy and George
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Introduction

In the 1960 Summer Olympics, track and field athletes Irina and Tamara Press gained international notoriety. Each sister won a gold medal in the Rome Games, Irina in the 80-meter hurdles and Tamara in the shot-put. Notably, the Ukrainian-born duo dominated women’s track and field, collectively acquiring a total of five Olympic medals and establishing twenty-six world records, all under the Soviet flag.1 While the Soviet Union applauded the Press sisters’ astounding achievements, many in the Cold War West cruelly degraded the Olympians, citing their strength and stature as suspiciously abnormal. The reports disparaged the “Russian muscle molls” for being too big, too “burly” and “heftier” than their Western counterparts.2 For example, New York Times reporter Arthur Daley commented that Tamara was “big enough to play tackle for the Chicago Bears,” while Irina was “about the size of a running guard.”3 In a parallel fashion, journalist Sid Ziff mocked that when contrasted against the stature of Rocky Marciano, the former World Heavyweight Boxing Champion, Tamara made him “look like a midget.”4 These repeated comparisons to male athletes were not accidental. Such accounts not only belittled women’s success in the Olympics, but also constructed

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athleticism as the antithesis to femininity. Accordingly, because Irina and Tamara dismissed Cold War Western notions of hetero-femininity to excel in sport, the two sisters could not be real women.

Based on the assumption that athletic prowess contradicted womanhood, in 1966 international track and field authorities mandated an anatomical investigation for all female participants prior to competition. Editor of Track & Field News Dick Bank explained that this examination intended “to drive out types who really had no business in women’s track.” In other words, the sex test sought to preclude women, like the Press sisters, who “had more male characteristics than female.”

The rumors surrounding Irina and Tamara heightened when the two abruptly dropped out of the 1966 European Athletics Championships, the first international contest to require inspections of all participants. Although they cited their mother’s illness as the reason, many in the Cold War West insinuated that the physical exam was the actual deterrent. Negative speculations increased further when other top female athletes avoided the competition; notably U.S.S.R. broad jumper Tatyana Schelkanova claimed a leg injury and Romanian high jumper Iolanda Balas simply did not show up for the meet. Finally, after a year of abstaining from athletics, Tamara announced her retirement. “I have devoted more than 10 years of my life to sports,” she explained, “and I would like (to cede) my place. . . to young sportswomen. . . to help my

successors.”9 Her sister did not publicly comment on retirement; however, Irina similarly never participated in an event that mandated a sex check.

Deeming the introduction of sex testing in track and field a success, the newly conceived International Olympic Committee (IOC) Medical Commission stipulated in 1968 that all female athletes were required to undergo a chromosomal exam prior to competition. With the check, the IOC consequently controlled womanhood for over three decades.

To assess the long-lasting significance of Olympic sex testing/gender verification, this project explores its history, from 1968 to 2000.10 During this time period, the IOC mandated compulsory sex/gender checks on all female competitors, thereby defining and controlling womanhood. In the 1968 Mexico City Games, the IOC Medical Commission implemented the first sex/gender test of the modern Olympic Movement. The procedure intended to guarantee the authenticity of Olympic competitors and identify male masqueraders, as well as to scientifically confirm the separation of men and women in athletic competition. Over the next three decades, the IOC authorized a policy of sex/gender conformity, which consequently outlined a specific category of woman for sport. Thus Olympic womanhood—dependent on a belief in natural, dichotomous sex/gender difference—required female athletes to conform to conventional notions of white hetero-femininity. Through these regulations, the IOC, a powerful and influential

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10 The IOC required sex testing/gender verification from 1968 to 1998. From the 2000 Sydney Olympics to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, female athletes competed without a gender verification test; however, the Stockholm Consensus, suspicion-based testing and anti-doping controls served the same purpose. In 2012, the IOC re-introduced sex/gender control.
authority, has continuously reaffirmed a binary notion of sex, privileged white gender norms, re-inscribed a dichotomous paradigm of sexuality and hampered female athleticism.

**Theoretical Frameworks**

The IOC is a powerful structure that has historically constrained women and curtailed female athleticism. In the words of sport sociologists Susan Birrell and Nancy Theberge, women’s involvement with sport is “marked by the struggle for control of both the institutions that regulate women’s sporting participation and the meanings of our sport experiences.”¹¹ One might also add that women fight to regain control of their bodies. In order to fully analyze the history and influence of Olympic sex testing, this project examines the IOC’s linguistic choices, incorporates a racial analysis of the policies, and utilizes both “compulsory heterosexuality” and the “fair play” discourse as ideological frameworks.

**Language**

Scholars have increasingly recognized the significance of language in the construction of the social world.¹² Following a generally accepted—yet not unproblematic—feminist paradigm, this project uses the term “sex” to denote biological

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and anatomical distinction, and “gender” to reflect constructed differences, roles and attributes deemed socially appropriate for the sexes. Furthermore, the IOC, in its long history of policing women’s bodies, regularly conflated sex and gender; therefore, “sex/gender” is incorporated to acknowledge the oftentimes inseparable nature of the two ideologies. Some have also criticized the existing sex testing/gender verification literature for using the labels interchangeably. To avoid confusion and best illustrate the mindsets of the sport authorities responsible for the scrutiny, this paper employs the various terms used by the IOC Medical Commission at different moments, as demarcated in the Official Olympic Reports. Accordingly, the IOC referred to the required examination as follows:

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Host City</th>
<th>Term(s)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Grenoble</td>
<td><em>Sex Verification</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>Mexico City</td>
<td><em>Women’s Medical Examination</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Sapporo</td>
<td><em>Sex Check</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Munich</td>
<td><em>Sex Control</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Innsbruck</td>
<td><em>Sex Check</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>Montreal</td>
<td><em>Sex Control</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Lake Placid</td>
<td><em>Femininity Test</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td><em>Femininity Test</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Sarajevo</td>
<td><em>Femininity Test</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Los Angeles</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Calgary</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Seoul</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Albertville</td>
<td><em>Gender Control</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>Barcelona</td>
<td><em>Gender Test</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Lillehammer</td>
<td><em>Gender Testing</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Atlanta</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>Nagano</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>Sydney</td>
<td><em>Gender Verification</em></td>
</tr>
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Table 1. Sex/Gender Control Labels, 1968-1998

The discursive shift from sex test to gender verification is striking. Although always deeply concerned with muscular female Olympians, the IOC Medical Commission initially expressed fears of male masqueraders in women’s competitions. Hence, the test’s original purpose was to detect sex imposters. Yet, with both the impossibility of discovering a clear sex divide and the increased presence of female dopers, the IOC adjusted its semantic framework to encapsulate gender normativity. Women who failed to subscribe to conventional notions of Cold War Western femininity became suspect. Despite these linguistic variations, the IOC Medical Commission continuously blurred sex and gender in its efforts to construct Olympic womanhood.
**Racialized Bodies**

While women in general have historically experienced ridicule for involvement in sport, black bodies in particular have faced hostile contempt for deviating from white femininity. Moreover, as a site of inspection, the black body was deemed primitive, unclean and aberrant by white voyeuristic eyes. Perhaps as the most illustrative example, in 1810, French imperialists placed South African Saartjie Baartman’s body on display in Paris and London exhibits. Known as the “Hottentot Venus,” Baartman’s breasts, genitals and buttocks served as a visual anomaly against which white, Western European onlookers could contrast. Additionally, black women’s sexuality—as emphasized in the focus on specific aspects of Baartman’s body—has been constructed in a binary opposition to that of white women’s in two fashions; black sexuality has been rendered simultaneously invisible and hyper-visible.\(^{15}\) Regarding the latter category, Marilyn Yarbrough and Crystal Bennett noted that the stereotype of the Jezebel exists in the white imagination as the alluring seductress with an insatiable sexual appetite.\(^{16}\)

More contemporary examples of white surveillance of the black body exist within the realm of sport. As Susan K. Cahn explained, in 2007 Don Imus called the Rutgers women’s basketball team, a group comprised predominately of black players, “nappy headed ho’s.” In doing so, he sexualized and degraded the women as “whores” who sold sex to men. According to Cahn, what Imus intended was the opposite, “that the players


were masculine, unsuitable sex objects worthy of contempt.”17 In other words, the Rutgers women did not display white hetero-femininity. More recently, the international scrutiny placed on South African runner Caster Semeyna has caused many to liken the ridicule to that experienced by Baartman. As scholar Carina Ray posited, “fast forward nearly two hundred years and the genitals of another young South African woman, runner Caster Semenya, have once again become the target of western scientists’ prodding and poking.”18 Although two centuries apart, the treatment of Baartman and Semenya illustrate the white fascination with and disregard for black bodies.

In the Cold War, however, the Eastern Bloc female body became the site of hostile interrogation. Although considered white, the women from the Cold War East did not resemble white hetero-femininity as prescribed by the West. Therefore, the Eastern European bodies became the location of imperialism as they were held up as objects worthy of ridicule and contempt. As Cahn argued in a different work, “descriptions of ‘ponderous, peasant-type Russian athletes’ and ‘Amazons from the Russian steppes’ created a contrasting ‘other’ whose very presence lent some legitimacy to the less talented U.S. team.”19 The Eastern European women were thus constructed as racially different. Furthermore, within the Cold War West, white women and women of color were treated contrastingly. Perhaps most notably, within the United States white women

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were held up as icons of appropriate hetero-femininity and contrasted against both black Americans and Eastern Europeans.

*Compulsory Heterosexuality*

The concurrent introduction of anti-doping controls and sex tests in the 1968 Summer Olympics suggests that the IOC viewed heterosexuality as normal and correct. Feminist poet Adrienne Rich labeled such a conviction as “compulsory heterosexuality”—the societal and scholarly view of heterosexuality as natural, acceptable and innate.\(^\text{20}\) Concerned with the overarching tendency of feminist scholarship to treat lesbians and lesbianism as either deviant or invisible, Rich called for scholars to interrogate heterosexuality as a powerful patriarchal institution. To bolster her position, she critiqued four contemporary feminist works, all renowned for their condemnation of an unequal gender-order, and illustrated the ways in which each piece detrimentally presumes the heterosexuality of its female actors.\(^\text{21}\) According to Rich, such scholarly and societal normalization of heterosexuality serves as the most significant force in the subordination of women.

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\(^{21}\) Ibid. Rich critiques Barbara Ehrenreich and Deirdre English’s *For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts’ Advice to Women*, which argues that the advice given to women by male medical authorities mirrored the dictates of the economic marketplace, as failing to interpret the male prescription against lesbianism. Similarly, she posits that the psychoanalytical work *Toward a New Psychology of Women* by Jean Baker Miller discounts lesbian existence completely. According to Rich, Dorothy Dinnerstein’s *The Mermaid the Minotaur: Sexual Arrangements and the Human Malaise* fails to incorporate female agency that countered the collaboration with men. Finally, she claims that Nancy Chodorow’s *The Reproduction of Mothering* ignores the socially imposed restrictions on same-sex relationships and attempts to normalize heterosexuality. The work fails to consider the covert social forces that channel women into marriage and heterosexual romance.
Two decades later, sport sociologist Rebecca Ann Lock incorporated compulsory heterosexuality in her assessment of contemporary doping accounts.\footnote{Rebecca Ann Lock, “The Doping Ban: Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbophobia,” \textit{International Review for the Sociology of Sport} 38, no. 4 (2003): 397-411.} Parallel to Rich’s denigration of the feminist scholarship in the 1980s, Lock critiqued the doping scholarship of the 1990s for similarly assuming innate heterosexuality. While some doping-critics denounced steroid-regulations as a means to maintain conventional gender norms, Lock claimed that few of the adversaries considered the interconnected nature of gender and sexuality in doping stipulations. Most problematically, she explained, scholars failed to consider the heterosexual rhetoric that underpins the discourse of anti-doping campaigns. For example, anxiety over size proved commonplace in such conversations. As conventional hetero-femininity demands petite, non-muscular women, labeling a woman large or masculine is considered demeaning.\footnote{Ibid., 405.}

According to Lock, breaches of heterosexuality and femininity, such as female muscularity and female doping, challenge the hegemonic gender organization and results in societal unease and discomfort. “Doping poses a threat to the heterosexual matrix,” she argued. “The dislike of doping is constituted by a dislike of what it produces—the non-heterosexually feminine woman.”\footnote{Ibid., 409.} Although Lock persuasively illustrated the reification of compulsory heterosexuality in doping bans, she acknowledged her lack of racial analysis. In a footnote, she explained that, while not all of the dopers referenced were Caucasian, her piece did not fully explore the compounded nature of race, gender,
sexuality and doping. The addition of race, and the consideration that Eastern European women were “othered,” enhances the reading of sex/gender controls in the Cold War. Because, from a Cold War Western perspective, the Soviet Union not only emerged as a powerful menace, but also as a threat to the nations’ notions of white hetero-femininity.

*The Fair Play Discourse*

To rationalize sex testing/gender verification, the IOC repeatedly espoused rhetoric that cited equality and fair play. For example, according to Eduardo Hay, the Mexico gynecologist responsible for overseeing the sex control in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, in cases of anatomical difference, “the athlete in question must be withdrawn, in order to allow the others to compete on ‘equal terms’ [emphasis added].” He further reinstated this position, noting that “the sole purpose of the Medical Commission in this investigation of femininity, is to ensure that the physical equality of the women athletes competing against each other.” This sentiment underlined the IOC’s mission for the duration of the sex/gender control. Two decades later, in the 1988 Seoul official report, the organizers similarly noted that “female competitors participating in events for women only were required to undergo gender verification in order to ensure *fair competition* [emphasis added].”

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25 Ibid., 410.
This discourse is problematic for two reasons. First, as sport philosophers and scientists alike recognize, genetic and physiological equality does not exist in sport. Certain “abnormalities”, such as cardiovascular ability, height and lung capacity, foster athletic excellence. For example, U.S. swimmer Michael Phelps, who earned a record-number eight medals in the 2012 London Olympics, was “built to swim.” His longer-than-average arm-span, elongated torso, short legs, size-fourteen-feet and double-jointed ankles, which allowed Phelps to bend fifteen-degrees farther at the ankle than most swimmers, provided him with certain physiological advantages. Similarly, athletes with Marfan Syndrome, a genetic disorder that produces tallness, long limbs and slender fingers, could be perceived as a positive predisposition for sporting success, when diagnosed and treated. Despite the awareness and acceptance of such naturally-produced “abnormalities”, only sex/gender differences appear to produce anxiety and induce disqualification. As sport scholar Jaime Shultz questioned,
Why are genetic variations that affect autosomal chromosomes an advantageous endowment while those that affect sex chromosomes amount to a curse that can effectively drum one out of competitive sport? One can assume that the patriarchal fear of powerful, non-feminine female athletes sparked such a position. Accordingly, only stronger-than-average women aggrieved the IOC.

Second, the presumed need to protect women athletes degraded female athleticism and reaffirmed a belief in male physical superiority. Jacques Thiebault, the French doctor responsible for sex testing in the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics, explained that a control was necessary for “it is inevitable that sooner or later, the representatives of the weaker sex should feel persecuted and ask that the feminine records be awarded to them.” Such rhetoric established athleticism and femininity as oxymoronic and also criminalized powerful female Olympians. Accordingly, Olympic authorities found it inconceivable that strong, muscular women could be authentic or natural. With this line of reasoning, “real” women were those who preserved Cold War Western notions of femininity. Furthermore, the fear of male imposters bolstered the conviction in masculine advantage. The belief that any man could don a wig or a skirt and defeat all women in athletic competition both promoted sport as a male domain and degraded women’s skills and talents.

The IOC thus deployed the rhetoric of “equality” and “fair play” to preserve its vision of appropriate female athleticism. In 1964, sport philosopher Eleanor Metheny identified the necessary qualifications for women’s sport participation to be viewed as

socially acceptable. She outlined the activities deemed “wholly appropriate,” “may be appropriate” and “not appropriate” for women. According to Metheny, appropriate female sport was “aesthetically pleasing” or utilized manufactured devices and light objects, while inappropriate female sport involved resistance of an opponent or use of a heavy object.\(^{36}\) Scholars John W. Loy, Fiona McLachlan and Douglas Booth extrapolated Metheny’s insights to the Olympic Games and asserted that, following these guidelines, women unsurprisingly first competed in golf, tennis and yachting—the wholly appropriate feminine activities.\(^{37}\) Cold War Western sport officials applauded women’s efforts in these suitable events and mandated sex/gender testing when female Olympians excelled in those considered not appropriate.

**Literature Review**

While only one book-length project explores sex testing in the Olympic Movement, several articles discuss its implementation.\(^{38}\) Of the existing scholarship, the majority focuses on the Cold War context of the tests’ first iteration, while others provide either a feminist interpretation of sex/gender classification or incorporate a medical lens to highlight the anomalies uncovered through the examinations. This project incorporates

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all three approaches to broaden the theoretical focus, and also extends the conversation chronologically.

The scholarship within the first category tends to utilize an “East vs. West” paradigm. These publications cite Cold War Western fears of powerful Eastern European women as the primary reason behind the introduction of the sex/gender checks. For example, Ian Ritchie focused on the implementation of sex testing in his piece “Sex Tested, Gender Verified.” He argued that muscular female athletes encouraged the IOC to incorporate measures that reinforced conventional norms of femininity and heterosexuality.\(^{39}\) Similarly, in “Gender Verification and Gender Policies in Elite Sport,” Claire Sullivan illustrated the Cold War roots of the IOC’s policies and highlighted the underlying nationalism and anticommunist-sentiment of the requirement. Significantly, she also noted that the IOC’s fair play discourse reinforced assumptions of male physical advantage.\(^{40}\) To more fully ascertain the sex/gender viewpoints of the Olympic leadership, Alison Wrynn argued in “The Human Factor” that the IOC Medical Commission, swayed by international tensions, formulated crucial decisions pertaining to the science and composition of Olympians. In particular, she discussed the stipulations cast on altitude physiology, drug testing and gender verification.\(^{41}\)

Scholars also examined the attitudes of various publics during the Cold War. Focused specifically on the U.S. rhetoric, Rob Beamish and Ritchie explained in \textit{Fastest},


Highest, Strongest that when the Soviet Union returned to the Olympics in 1951 after a lengthy hiatus, three central concerns emerged within the United States: the public accused the communist government of injecting Soviet women with hormones, charged the U.S.S.R. with sending male masqueraders to defeat “true” women and, lastly, feared that such dramatic female physical achievement insinuated increased gender equality—not just in sport but in society as a whole. In a parallel fashion, Stefan Wiederkehr also illuminated the motivations of those who supported sex testing in “‘We Shall Never know the Exact Number of Men who Have Competed in Olympic Posing as Women.’” Through an analysis of Western-based newspapers, he detailed the anxieties sparked by strong, muscular female Olympians in the Cold War West that catalyzed gender verification.

Clearly, such accounts centralize the Cold War context and emphasize the Western fears of sex/gender and sexuality transgressions. As a result, these works tend to depict the IOC as monolithic, Western-controlled and male-dominated institution. Moreover, the conversation is limited to a specific timeframe. Finally, while this scholarship importantly notes the significance of gender and sexuality in sport, the interrelated construction of race is silenced.

The second category of scholarly works deploys feminist paradigms to challenge the dichotomization of the body and unsettle a binary notion of sexuality. Notably, in “From Women’s Exclusion to Gender Institution,” Sylvain Ferez detailed international

43 Stefan Wiederkehr, “‘We Shall Never Know the Exact Number of Men who Have Competed in the Olympics Posing as Women’: Sport, Gender Verification and the Cold War,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 23, no. 7 (2006): 1152-1172.
Sports’ role in upholding sex/gender difference. More specifically, she illustrated the ways in which the Olympics preserved a bi-categorical institution of sex/gender. Correspondingly, Laura Wackwitz interrogated the enforcement of this dualism in sport. In “Verifying the Myth,” she argued that while verification measures attempted to delineate two categories for competition, the requisite tests actually demonstrated the socially constructed nature of the sex/gender divide. Furthermore, Amanda Nicole Schweinbenz and Alexandria Cronk depicted the ways in which the Olympics serve as an influential forum that reinforces the notion of physical difference between men and women in “Femininity Control at the Olympic Games.” Finally, several scholars utilized the plight of South African runner Caster Semenya—who was internationally scrutinized after triumphing in the 2009 World Championships—as a case study to revisit society’s dependency on a binary system of sex/gender. As an example, in “Girl, Interrupted,” April Vannini and Barbara Fornssler found that the discourse used to describe Semenya discussed her body as a threat to the traditional social and sporting order, and one that was in need of repair. Collectively, such accounts successfully

challenge contemporary thinking of sex/gender construction; however, oftentimes ignore contextual issues.

The medical histories of sex testing, on the other hand, detail the various detection measures utilized in sex testing/gender verification, from the primitive “nude parades” to the more sophisticated polymerase chain reaction test. For example, in “From Genitals to Genes,” James L. Rupert examined the history of sex testing in Olympic competition and explained how the classification of female athletes evolved from genitalia-identification, to chromosomal-detection to DNA-categorization. He focused on the scientific theories that bolstered the varying tests and also the continued incorrectness in results.49 Likewise, Claudia Wiesemann detailed the “abnormalities” identified by sex tests and the implications of such discoveries. In “Is There a Right to Know One’s Sex?,” she posited that the harms of gender verification on athletes—which included unjustified disqualification, social isolation and the possibility of suicide—should outweigh the concerns of possible advantage.50 Finally, medical authorities K.N. Ballantyne, M. Kayser and J.A. Grootegoed utilized a historical case to illustrate the consequence when a female athlete “failed” due to a biological abnormality. The piece, “Sex and Gender Issues in Competitive Sports,” showcases the inability of chromosomal counts to verify sex-segregation in sport and suggests alternative measures that could be embraced to

50 Claudia Wiesemann, “Is There a Right Not to Know One’s Sex? The Ethics of ‘Gender Verification’ in Women’s Sports Competition,” *Journal of Medical Ethics* 37, no. 4 (2011): 216-220.
prevent both unfair advantage and disqualification.\textsuperscript{51} Such reports document the inability of medical technologies to clearly and accurately differentiate sex; however, these accounts fail to draw connection to the historical context. While the Cold War undoubtedly played a large role in both the institution of sex testing and the dichotomization of the body, and the medical practices employed have enhanced the understanding of human biology, other factors existed that bolstered the desire to bar certain female athletes from international events.

\textit{Sources}

In 1996, historian Linda Boorish described the Olympics as a cultural force that reflected and created gender ideologies, and further argued that women’s inclusion and exclusion related to larger social and structural expectations. To fully integrate women into Olympic history, she therefore called for scholars to reconsider the magnitude of the Games and analyze a variety of literary and nonliterary sources. Without such consideration, Boorish posited, “the history and sociocultural meaning of women at the Olympics has yet to be adequately explored.”\textsuperscript{52}

As with all historical works, sources dictate the nature of the story told. To illustrate the authority of the IOC in the regulation of gender and the maintenance of Olympic womanhood, this project embraces a structural approach. By utilizing sources from the IOC and the leading scientific practitioners, this dissertation illustrates the ways


in which gender norms were both entrenched and disseminated in/through the Olympic Movement. In particular, the Avery Brundage Papers, Daniel F. Hanley Papers, Official Olympic Reports and excerpts from Olympic Review provide the various perspectives of the IOC Executive Board and the IOC Medical Commission. Although comprised of individuals, the IOC as an institution determined and dictated acceptable femininity. The Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith Papers and medical journals, on the other hand, detail the various viewpoints of the scientific/medical community. Combined, this top-down framework seeks to assess the IOC as a significant structure, one which generated and perpetuated Cold War Western gender norms through sex testing/gender verification.

Chapter Outline

While some scholars have analyzed sex testing as a unique creation of the Cold War, a complete historical evaluation of the policy remains unwritten. This project intends to more fully interrogate Olympic surveillance and extend the conversation both chronologically and topically.

Foremost, this dissertation will move the discussion beyond the 1960s. Chapter one, “‘Because They Have Muscles, Big Ones’: The Cold War and the Creation of the IOC Medical Commission,” illustrates the sex-segregated framework of sport and the historical challenges to the sex/gender status quo. The section also illustrates the ways in which Cold War tensions not only promoted athletics as a worthy international endeavor but also heightened concerns of fraudulent female competitors. Chapter two, “Is the Athlete ‘Right’ or ‘Wrong’?: The IOC’s Chromosomal Construction of Womanhood,
“1968-1972,” describes how the international tensions that surfaced during the Cold War played a large role in the initial institution of sex testing in the 1968 Grenoble Olympics. The IOC created the Medical Commission to both deter athletes from consuming performance enhancing substances and to bar gender transgressive women from competition. Consequently, the purpose of doping controls and sex tests became conflated in the 1970s, as outlined in chapter three, “‘East Germany’s Mighty Sports Machine’: Steroids, Nationalism and Femininity Testing, 1976-1980.” This section utilizes the victories of the German Democratic Republic in the 1976 and 1980 Olympics to interrogate the IOC’s equation of muscular women and substance-enhanced athletes as unethical cheaters. Furthermore, the IOC’s belief in categorical divisions reverberated throughout the United States. While never mentioned explicitly, white Western women served as the foils to the supposed transgressors of femininity, reinscribing certain stereotypes about women of color.

Although the IOC sought to scientifically differentiate women from men through sex testing, the methods employed repeatedly illustrated the difficulty in determining the exact composition of womanhood. Chapter four, “‘Not Only Inaccurate but also Discriminatory’: The Beginning of a Protest, 1984-1992,” argues that rather than a neat and clear-cut biological divide, sex testing/gender verification demonstrated a range of chromosomal varieties and DNA differences. Disregarding these well-documented problems, the IOC required the test for three decades. No man posing as a woman was ever discovered; however, several female athletes with biological “abnormalities” were unfairly barred. Eventually, protests in the 1980s—coupled with increased concerns
regarding the human rights of athletes—encouraged the IOC to discontinue the practice. It appeared that the governors of the Olympic Movement privileged individual privacy and dignity over worries of competitive fairness.

Yet, as chapter five, “‘Gender Testing Per Se is No Longer Necessary’: Olympic Gender Verification Testing, 1985 to 2000,” demonstrates, alternative Olympic requirements merely rendered sex testing moot. The spandex preferred by competitors, for example, decreased the possibility for anatomical male masqueraders and doping controls required visual examinations during urination. Furthermore, the Stockholm Consensus, penned for the 2004 Athens Olympics, dictated specific norms for transsexual athletes. Olympic leaders thereby maintained their authority over the definition of appropriate womanhood without the aid of scientific verification.

This dissertation explores the full history of sex testing/gender verification to demonstrate the deeply rooted sex/gender concerns Olympic authorities maintained regarding female Olympians. As a powerful institution, the IOC’s sex/gender policies extended far beyond the fields, courts and stadiums. Sex testing/gender verification therefore shaped the larger cultural perception of womanhood. With gender verification reintroduced in 2012—and the justifications voiced for its incorporation disconcertingly similar to those articulated in the 1960s—the importance of understanding the complete social history of sex testing is imperative.
Chapter 1: “Because They Have Muscles, Big Ones”: The Cold War and the Creation of the IOC Medical Commission

Three days after the opening ceremonies of the 1960 Rome Olympics, *New York Times* reporter William Barry Furlong bemoaned the tendency for female Olympians to destroy “The Image.” According to the author, “The Image” referred to the innate beauty possessed by petite, aesthetically-pleasing, non-muscular women. In a three-page diatribe entitled “Venus Wasn’t a Shot-Putter,” Furlong complained that certain sports destroyed this natural feminine appeal, specifically admonishing field hockey, shot-putting, the discus and snooker pool, for, in these activities, the athletes’ “force of intellect—if any—was subordinated to harsher disciplines.” At the same time, however, he posited that a “girl” athlete could maintain “The Image,” if she selected a socially sanctified pastime. “Those that frolic athletically in swim suits or brief tennis skirts find it easy to preserve, not to say enhance, that Image,” Furlong explained. His disdain for women’s sports that required strength and power, such as shot-putting, and appreciation for those that mandated grace and short-skirts, such as tennis, resembled the gender ideologies of the Cold War West.

In the wake of World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as ideologically polarized superpowers. Viewing the Olympics as an influential

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54 Ibid.
international forum, each nation sought to utilize the Games as a signifier of prowess. Unlike the United States, however, the Soviet Union encouraged its female athletes to excel in a variety of sports, including those that necessitated and enhanced muscular physiques. Soviet women earned both medals in the Olympics and condemnation from abroad. As Washington Post sports columnist Shirley Povich noted prior to the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, “the Russian women indeed are favored again over the American women, mostly because they have muscles, big ones, in the places United States gals don’t want ‘em.” Many agreed with Povich and feared that these U.S.S.R. champions were either unnaturally inauthentic, men posing as women or female dopers.

The emergence of gender transgressive female Olympians in the Cold War challenged the deeply-rooted Olympic sex/gender divide. This chapter traces the sex-segregated framework of the Olympic Games and illustrates the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) historical attempts to uphold a dichotomous division. Commenced in ancient Greece, men and women competed separately, a practice predicated upon patriarchal notions of difference. When French aristocrat Pierre de Coubertin founded the modern Olympics in 1896, he not only maintained the sex/gender classification system but also entrenched debasing gender beliefs in the Olympic movement that persisted for decades. When the Soviet Union returned with its powerful female victors in 1952, the IOC sought to strengthen the sex-segregated framework of the Olympic Games and establish a test to determine true womanhood.

55 Shirley Povich, “This Morning,” Washington Post, April 5, 1956, 53.
Sex-Segregation and Olympic Gender Ideals

Although the IOC eventually introduced scientifically verified classifications in 1968, sex-segregation in sport has much deeper historical roots. Perhaps most iconically, contests in ancient Greece excluded women. Significantly—to celebrate the masculine body and pay tribute to the gods—male athletes competed naked, a practice which helped deter female infiltration.56 This requisite of nudity thus served as the first method to ensure sex-separation in sport; paradoxically, this type of test would later be required of female participants to bar men from women’s competitions. In addition, not only did the ancient games forbid female involvement, but women were also disallowed from spectating. According to historian John Mourantidis, the penalty for female intrusion was death by being thrown from the top of mountain Typaion, a peak near Olympia.57 With such severe punishments, only one such incident is known to have occurred. Greek traveler Pausanias testified that the widow Kallipaterira, or Pherenike, from the famed athletic family of Diagoras of Rhodes, disguised herself as a male trainer to bring her son, Peisirodos, to compete. Unable to contain her excitement when he triumphed, Kallipaterira exposed herself. Pausanias relayed that she was released unpunished out of respect for her family.58

Although Kallipaterira’s artifice provided a singular (recorded) example of female agency in the ancient Olympic Games, some scholars speculate that women, specifically

58 Ibid., 51; Scanlon, Eros & Greek Athletics, 219.
unmarried virgins, participated in a separate forum.\textsuperscript{59} Prior to the start of the male festival, women held female-only competitions to honor the Greek Goddess Hera.\textsuperscript{60} Known as the Heraean Games, the contests occurred in Olympia’s stadium and consisted of “stade” races, footraces 5/6 of the male length.\textsuperscript{61} The shorter distance, coupled with the privileging of men’s achievements and the prioritization of the male festival, indicates a societal belief in women’s lesser status, an attitude later embraced and continued by French baron Pierre de Coubertin, the “father” of the modern Olympic Movement.

Centuries after the end of the Greek festivals, Coubertin reformulated the ancient competitions and birthed the modern games in 1896. Born into an aristocratic French family and a child during the Franco-Prussian War, he wanted to avenge the humiliating military defeat that included France’s loss of the Alsace and Lorraine provinces. As a nationalist, the baron initially considered a military career but instead followed an educational tract that gradually prompted his enamor of sports.\textsuperscript{62} According to Professor John Hoberman, the baron’s intentions for Olympic revival aimed primarily at revitalizing French masculinity; however, he also desired European camaraderie to eliminate the possibility of further warfare (and French defeat).\textsuperscript{63} With these nationalistic aims in mind, Coubertin conceived the modern games. He thus revived the Olympic

\textsuperscript{59} Scanlon, \textit{Eros & Greek Athletics}.
\textsuperscript{60} Kyle, \textit{Sport and Spectacle}. Not all scholars agree that the Heraia Games existed in this form. Kyle suggested that some scholars exaggerate the role of women in ancient athletics in an attempt to locate positive female examples.
\textsuperscript{61} Mouratidis, “Heracles at Olympia,” 53.
Games to promote athletic reform and encourage international goodwill. Yet, Coubertin also adamantly opposed female participation.

The French baron’s sex/gender beliefs both paralleled contemporary society and dominated the Olympic policies throughout his tenure. Shaped by nineteenth century’s societal acceptance of “separate spheres,” which encouraged strength, physicality and sociability for men, and mandated passivity, fragility and domesticity for women, he repeatedly espoused such gendered ideals in his formulation of the Olympic movement.64 Coubertin suggested that “the Olympic Games must be reserved for men” and justified this assertion by infamously declaring that female competition “is impractical, uninteresting, ungainly, and . . . improper.”65 Although he succeeded in barring women from participating in the first modern Olympics, his sexist-fueled prohibitions eventually dwindled and females competed from the 1900 Paris Games onward, albeit in separate, and oftentimes modified, competitions.66

Although unable to permanently exclude female competition, Coubertin succeeded in establishing the consummate Olympic authority as a male domain. His classed and gendered convictions led to the naming of fifteen affluent men in the creation of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1894.67 Because Coubertin desired an independent, non-political organization, he selected individuals who could both afford the

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66 The inclusion of women in the Paris Games occurred against the behest of Coubertin and the young, chauvinistic IOC. With the success of the 1896 Games, the IOC had to delegate organizational responsibilities to various committees; under these more localized authorities, women first entered Olympic competition.
67 The International Olympic Committee was created in 1894. Fifteen members were originally selected, with Dr. Wilibald Gebhardt of Germany added in 1895.
necessary travel and contribute to the burgeoning IOC. In the words of historian Allen Guttmann, “the members, who were much more likely to be enthusiasts for turf than track, were selected for their wealth and for their social status.” Moreover, the French aristocrat only elected men. Of the original members, officer Viktor Balck (Sweden), IOC president Demetrios Vikelas (Greece), Coubertin, Alexei General de Boutowsky (Russia), Jiří Guth-Jarkovský (Bohemia), Ferenc Kemény (Hungary) and classics professor William Milligan Sloane (United States) were most active. Other members included Lord Ampthill (Britain), Count Maxime de Bousies (Belgium), Ernest F. Callot (France), Duke of Andria Carafa (Italy), Leonard A. Cuff (New Zealand), Charles Herbert (Britain), Count Mario Lucchesi Palli (Italy) and Dr. José Benjamín Zubiaur (Argentina). Coubertin assumed the presidency in 1896 and held office for almost three decades. Despite his retirement in 1925, Coubertin’s gender beliefs remained entrenched in the IOC. As historians Kay Schiller and Christopher Young explained, throughout the twentieth century, the IOC “behaved on occasion with the random unaccountability of a self-electing gentleman’s club.” In regards to gender, perhaps the most negative consequence of this “gentlemen’s club’s” mercurialness was its embrace of Cold War fears that led to the implementation of sex testing.

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69 Ibid.
The Cold War and International Relations

The all-male IOC grew increasingly concerned about gender transgressions and doping violations as Cold War tensions developed internationally. As previously noted, at the close of World War II the United States and the Soviet Union emerged as uneasy allies. Under the leadership of President Harry Truman, U.S. policymakers sought to maintain the country’s position as a “preponderant of power” by rebuilding the world system to align with the democratic and capitalistic ambitions of the United States. Concurrently, headed by Josef Stalin, Soviet authorities underscored the virtues of communism and demanded territorial extension into Eastern Europe. Relations between the two superpowers thus declined precipitously and divided the world ideologically into “East” versus “West.” As Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis explained, World War II was “won by a coalition whose principle members were already at war—ideologically and geopolitically if not militarily—with one another.” Although direct military conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union never materialized, the two nations did clash on several cultural fronts, including gender ideals and international sport.

Less than one year after the end of World War II, Stalin orated a 1946 election speech (in a one-candidate election) at Moscow’s Bolshoi Theater in which he proposed a solution for any future international turmoil. In his view, monopoly capitalism fostered uneven economic development and was the culprit of the recent multi-country conflict.


“The capitalist world is split into two hostile camps,” Stalin declared, “and war breaks out between them.” Furthermore, he posited that the results of World War II demonstrated the success of the Soviet social system and its stability as a viable form of government. Most alarmingly, from the U.S. perspective, Stalin explained that “as regards long-term plans, our Party intends to organize another powerful upswing of our national economy.” Stalin’s Bolshoi Theater speech detailed the U.S.S.R.’s expansionist intentions and illustrated the new postwar entanglements. The division of Europe into spheres of influence—which moved the Soviet Union’s borders several hundred miles into the west and permitted the implementation of subservient Eastern bloc regimes—the joint occupation of Germany and the development of the atomic bomb collectively fostered novel international anxieties.

In response to Stalin’s election oration, U.S. diplomat George F. Kennan assessed the dictator’s intent and proposed a proactive foreign policy in a hastily drafted, eight thousand-word telegram to Secretary of State James Byrnes. Kennan, who at the time worked in the American Embassy in Moscow, identified three main issues in his cable, which was later dubbed the “Long Telegram.” First, he argued that U.S.S.R. leaders viewed the world as divided into a capitalist and socialist binary, in which the Soviet Union felt circumscribed by antagonistic capitalist regimes. Such a conviction appeared

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76 Mawdsley, The Stalin Years, 15.
77 Romagnolo, “Speech Delivered by J.V. Stalin.”
rooted more in popular lore than reality, yet it nevertheless nurtured insecurity and generated neurotic foreign policies.\(^{80}\) As a second point, the U.S. diplomat noted that not all U.S.S.R. citizens agreed with the Soviet authorities on the necessity of destruction; many posited that peaceful coexistence was possible. Finally, Kennan foreshadowed an image of the Soviet Union as a devastating force and suggested that the United States should confront the country directly, for attempts at cooperation would be futile.\(^{81}\) In his view, the Soviet Union was a political entity “committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*” (peaceful agreement).\(^{82}\) Although Kennan concluded that the United States should avoid acting with hysteria, his later public supposition that “vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies” was necessary cemented the United States’ foreign policy.\(^{83}\)

Cold War apprehensions were further aggravated three years later when U.S. informants discovered Soviet atomic weaponry.\(^{84}\) With the grave confirmation of the U.S.S.R.’s nuclear capabilities, the United States responded by accelerating its own production of atomic bombs. Both countries consequently engaged in a nuclear arms race; each was convinced that the only way to deter its perceived enemy from deploying


\(^{81}\) Jeffrey Montez de Oca, “The ‘Muscle Gap’: Physical Education and U.S. Fears of a Depleted Masculinity, 1954-1963,” in *East Plays West: Sport and the Cold War*, eds. Stephen Wagg and David L. Andrews, (New York: Routledge, 2007), 137. In the “Long Telegram,” Kennan mentioned the word “penetration” five times. According to sociologist de Oca, such Cold War discourse constructed the Soviet Union as overly masculine and the United States as weak and vulnerable. Utilizing homophobic dialogue, Cold War language was “simultaneously homoerotic in its desire to penetrate the other and homophobic in its desire to protect and enclose the space of the self” (137).

\(^{82}\) Kennan, “The Long Telegram.”


catastrophic technology was to possess more of such armaments. As Gaddis explained, “the problem now was not so much how to defeat an adversary as how to convince him not to go to war in the first place.”\textsuperscript{85} Thus, taking the reins from Truman in 1953, successor Dwight D. Eisenhower rejected limited notions of war and instead prepared the country for total nuclear engagement. U.S.S.R. leader Nikita Khrushchev, who presided after Stalin’s death in 1953, similarly attempted to conceal vulnerability through atomic buildup.\textsuperscript{86} Unlike Eisenhower, however, Khrushchev initially voiced overt threats toward the Cold War West, sporadically delineating specific targets.\textsuperscript{87} For example, he foreshadowed that any missile confrontations would be “fought on the American continent.”\textsuperscript{88} This arms-race-mentality dominated foreign policy throughout the Cold War. When President John F. Kennedy entered office in 1961, he was “shocked to discover that the only war plan Eisenhower had left behind would have required the simultaneous use of well over 3,000 nuclear weapons against all communist countries.”\textsuperscript{89}

\textit{Cold War Gender Norms and International Sport}

Although the possibility of mutual catastrophic destruction through oppositional atomic bombs actually limited warfare, the conflict between the United States and the

\textsuperscript{85} Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War: A New History}, 62.
\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 69-70.
\textsuperscript{89} Gaddis, \textit{The Cold War: A New History}, 59-79. Direct altercation proved avoidable; however, the two countries clashed in decolonizing countries, notably engaging in conflicts in Korea and Vietnam. Gaddis argued that the United States and the Soviet Union engaged in warfare in Korea; yet, the two superpowers tacitly agreed to cover up the fighting.
Soviet Union increased the depth and distribution of propaganda, thereby fostering a variety of cultural confrontations. Significantly, in the United States, citizens increasingly turned to marriage and parenthood with “enthusiasm and commitment.” As historian Elaine Tyler May argued, “domestic containment,” the idea that the dangerous social forces of the atomic age could be combated within the home, served to privilege heterosexuality and prioritize conventional gender roles. Furthermore, a public belief in “reproductive morality” insinuated that prospective parents should consider their offspring’s impact on the strength and “progress” of the United States before conception. In other words, parents must consider a future child’s race, class, gender and sexuality before reproducing. Tellingly, marital literature and medicinal theories posited that children born into “stable” families (another code-word to encourage parents to abide by societal norms) possessed more fruitful childhood and adolescent experiences. Historian Carolyn Herbst Lewis similarly noted that Cold War physicians—the self-elected guardians of sexual well-being concerned with dysfunction, infertility, premarital sex and divorce rates—shaped heterosexuality as the embodiment of U.S. sexual citizenship. As such, when contrasted against the Soviet Union’s perverse familial framework, the nuclear family in the United States evolved into an icon of stability thought necessary to survive the Cold War.

91 Ibid., 13-14.
Also connected to this familial endorsement, sexuality norms in the post-war era hinged upon heterosexual interaction that denounced all other forms of relationships. Because the Cold War context mandated social control, which included the management of sexuality, U.S. authorities constructed deviance of heterosexuality as treasonous. In particular, lesbianism came under increased scrutiny and was deemed “a social problem.” Resultantly, as demonstrated by historian George Chauncey, gays and lesbians experienced a reduction of rights during the Cold War, due to the hardening of the sexual binary and the criminalization of all examples of non-heterosexuality.

Within this context of compulsory heterosexuality, international sporting victories gained significant cultural capital.

Sport emerged as a contested arena, one in which the two superpowers not only sought to demonstrate nationalistic superiority but also faced each other directly. As the Cold War intensified, the Olympics evolved into a significant measure of national vitality and prowess. Thus, when negatively contrasted against the athleticism of the Soviet Union, perceived diminishes in U.S. physical vigor encouraged Eisenhower to create the

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96 Barbara J. Keys, *Globalizing Sport: National Rivalry and International Community in the 1930s* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). The utilization of sport as a measure of national prowess was not a novel Cold War concept. Keys demonstrated that in the 1930s, the U.S. framed international participation in sport as a moral crusade to spread American values of fair play and democratic involvement abroad. In addition, U.S. involvement—notable in the 1932 Olympics—tied mass culture, commodification and entertainment to sport. Moreover, Germany also viewed sport as an important measure of national power in the 1930s. Under Nazi control, the country perceived athletics as a valuable instrument of foreign policy. Hitler attempted to use the 1936 Olympics to promote the country, build national strength and gain international legitimacy. Finally, Stalin showed little interest in modern sport at first and instead advocated a more “proletarian” brand of sport, which disdained individualism. Yet as tensions between community and competition sharpened, sport in the Soviet Union increasingly resembled modern, capitalistic sport.
President’s Council on Youth Fitness (PCYF) in 1956. Abhorred by the results of the Kraus-Weber Minimal Fitness Test—which found that 57.9 percent of U.S. schoolchildren failed to meet minimum fitness standards compared to only 8.7 percent of European children—the president conceived the cabinet-level Council through an Executive Order.97 As a central coordinating body, the PCYF intended to serve as a “catalytic agent” that focused primarily on public awareness.98 Under Eisenhower, the organization prescribed broad-based fitness programs that maintained a play-like orientation.99 Despite the PCYF’s ambivalent results,100 the President’s actions nevertheless likened the United States’ supposed “muscle gap” to the “missile gap,” consequently molding sport into a critical component of foreign relations. Akin to the contemporaneous arms race, Eisenhower instigated a Cold War “body race.”101

Continuing Eisenhower’s fitness crusade, Kennedy extended the PCYF and deployed systematized sport as one solution to the perceived communist threat. Even prior to his official assumption of office, he embraced the necessity of physical activity and publicly lauded the importance of national vitality in international affairs. For example, in a 1960 *Sports Illustrated* article entitled “The Soft American,” the president-

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98 The President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, “About the Council.”


elect articulated the development of sound bodies as a specifically Cold War Western endeavor. According to Kennedy, “the knowledge that the physical well-being of the citizen is an important foundation for the vigor and vitality of all activities of the nation, is as old was Western civilization itself.”102 In this view, then, the Soviet Union existed outside the celebratory tradition of the geographic West and thus as a serious threat to the American way of life. As such, he declared that, “in a very real and immediate sense, our growing softness, our increasing lack of physical fitness, is a menace to our security.”103 Responding to his dire prophesies, when only a month into his term, Kennedy extended the power of the PCYF and changed the organization’s name to the President’s Council on Physical Fitness (PCPF), ensuring the incorporation of all age groups.104 Furthermore, in line with transitions in the field of physical education—which embraced utilitarian activities with measurable standards—Kennedy supported systematized exercise routines with quantifiable outcomes.105 To preempt any accusations of softness, an incrimination that plagued his administration in regards to its foreign policy, Kennedy hired famed University of Oklahoma football coach Charles “Bud” Wilkinson to head the PCPF and

103 Kennedy, “The Soft American.” To simultaneously combat the Soviet Union’s strength and the United State’s softness, Kennedy proposed four solutions. First, he posited that the president should establish a White House Committee on Health and Fitness that embraced the fitness of the entire nation. Second, the physicality of the youth should be the responsibility of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Third, the governor of each state should gather annually for a National Youth Fitness Congress to discuss the status of physical fitness. Finally, the president and all related departments “must make it clearly understood that the promotion of sports participation and physical fitness is a basic and continuing policy of the United States.”
104 The President’s Council on Physical Fitness and Sports, “About the Council.”
launched a public service advertising campaign to inform citizens of the importance of national vigor.\textsuperscript{106}

According to sociologist Jeffrey Montez de Oca, the national fear of a muscle gap projected Cold War anxieties onto the bodies of young, white males. Such convictions allowed U.S. authorities to strategically utilize physical education during the 1950s and 1960s to cement the social order as white, heterosexual and masculine.\textsuperscript{107} As such, the Soviet Union was described as a racial “other” and an aggressive communist force that threatened to penetrate the soft and vulnerable United States. According to de Oca, “the ‘muscle gap’ discourse and the cultural policy that flowed from it was simultaneously a racial and gender project working to rearticulate the United States’ racial-gender order.”\textsuperscript{108} To combat the perceived vulnerability, yet remain oppositional to the state-sponsored regimes of the Soviet Union, the United States favored non-governmental organizations, such as the USOC, the Amateur Athletic Association (AAU) and the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA), and imagined collegiate programs as the primary training grounds for potential world-renowned sportsmen. Regarding female competitors, U.S. sport authorities remained detached and uninterested—a practice paralleling the wider society’s view of female sport as secondary and inferior—leaving supervision in the hands of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletic for Women (AIAW). Significantly, in contrast to the NCAA’s “competitive model” of sport, which promoted elitism and a win-at-all-costs mentality, the AIAW preferred the “cooperative

\textsuperscript{108} Ibid., 140.
model,” a democratic vision of recreation that valued participation for all, yet arguably limited female athleticism.\textsuperscript{109} The AAU and NCAA sought control only when the U.S.S.R. started to utilize its women for Olympic dominance.\textsuperscript{110}

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union also viewed sport as a tool to demonstrate governmental excellence, largely through state-sponsored programs. Yet, prior to World War II, the country had essentially sidelined sport, viewing athletics as a pastime of the elite. While individuals did engage in worker-sports associations and tsarist Russia participated in the 1912 Stockholm Olympics, no Soviet team competed in the interwar period due to the reluctance of the government to support international contests against bourgeois teams.\textsuperscript{111} Furthermore, to combat the capitalistic IOC, in 1921 the Soviet Union sponsored a rival forum, the Red Sport International. Despite its popularity domestically, the Red Sport International failed to contend with the Olympics as a premiere international event.\textsuperscript{112}

In the wake of WWII, however, the Soviet Union realized the potential of sport to further its foreign policy objectives. The government thereby terminated its practice of athletic isolation and dramatically expanded sporting opportunities. For example, while in 1946 the Soviet Union participated in only two international athletic events, between 1946 and 1955, the country competed in an additional twenty-five, including in the


Olympics. Perhaps more importantly, the Soviet Union fostered a nationalistic drive for victory, offering its athletes financial compensation for world records and Olympic medals.

According to professor of Russian studies Jim Riordan, the Soviet Union envisioned sport as fulfilling five broad objectives. First, victorious participation in international competition helped nurture relationships with pro-Soviet nations abroad. In the same vein, the Soviet Union also sought to promote friendly relations with its border-states, deploying sport as an influential diplomatic and nationalistic medium. Third, the country hoped to garner support for its policies, particularly from the developing nations in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Fourth, sport was viewed as a tool to reinforce the global socialist community. Finally, underscoring the first four aims, the Soviet Union desired victories, particularly at the Olympics, to demonstrate its national power.

Because the United States and the Soviet Union each heralded sport as a universal standard of achievement, the two nations increasingly saw the Olympics as an important measure of international authority. The superpowers not only viewed the Games as a forum to showcase superiority worldwide, but also as a tool to instill a sense of belonging internally and promote attachment to an abstract, national community. As sport historians David L. Andrews and Stephen Wagg explained, “international sporting competition provided a hitherto unprecedented—and, arguably, cathartic—vehicle for the

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114 Riordan, “The Role of Sport,” 587. In 1947, the USSR issued a resolution in which it declared that individuals who broke world records or earned Olympic medals would be financially compensated.
115 Ibid., 569-595.
116 Keys, *Globalizing Sport*. Keys incorporated Benedict Anderson’s notion of “imagined community” to illustrate how the consolidation of international sport in the 1930s generated both national attachment and an imagined global community.
expression of the new order of nation-based antagonisms within the post-war world.”\textsuperscript{117} Yet the IOC, founded upon geographic Western ideals and led by individuals from the Cold War West, remained rooted in anti-socialist beliefs and resistant to Eastern European prowess.\textsuperscript{118} As Guttmann explained, the IOC allowed Eastern European nations to compete in the Olympics; however, it refused to elect Communist representatives into the organizational body. Yet, when the IOC finally recognized the U.S.S.R. NOC in 1951, divisions commenced and the differences between oppositional ideologies caused recurrent friction. Despite efforts to promote the Olympics as apolitical, the Cold War politicized the IOC.\textsuperscript{119}

Additionally, the Cold War Western gender norms that generated graceful and petite female athletes were challenged by the successful Olympic performances of muscular Eastern European women. This threat was most worrying from the U.S. standpoint. Female athleticism in the United States remained bounded by ideals of submissiveness and appeal, consequently pushing women’s sport into a secondary position of inconsequence, which greatly diminished the possibility for Olympic success. As a result, in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics, the Soviet Union earned eleven of the possible twenty-one medals in women’s gymnastics and eleven of the possible twenty-seven events in women’s athletics. The United States earned zero and one, respectively. Furthermore, of its seventy-one medals accumulated in 1952, U.S.S.R. women earned

\textsuperscript{118} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{119} Guttmann, \textit{The Olympics: A History}, 86-90.
twenty-two; of the United State’s seventy-six medals, eight were earned by women, seven in swimming and diving.\textsuperscript{120} This trend continued for decades:

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Olympics & Men & Women & Total \\
\hline
1948 & 72 & 12 & 84 \\
1952 & 68 & 8 & 76 \\
1956 & 60 & 14 & 74 \\
1960 & 59 & 12 & 71 \\
1964 & 66 & 24 & 90 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
Olympics & Men & Women & Total \\
\hline
1948 & Did not compete \\
1952 & 48 & 23 & 71 \\
1956 & 79 & 19 & 98 \\
1960 & 75 & 28 & 103 \\
1964 & 71 & 25 & 96 \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Table 2. Summer Olympics Medal Breakdown by Sex/Gender, 1948-1968\textsuperscript{121}

The difference did not go unnoticed in the United States. As Povich reflected in the \textit{Washington Post},

These 1952 Games wouldn’t even have been close between Russia and the United States save for the almost complete dominance of the Russian women in the heftier field events and the gymnastics . . . . In the non-bicep division, though, in the more graceful swimming and diving events where feminine form counts more than feminine muscle, the American girls were all-conquering. Each to her liking, perhaps.\textsuperscript{122}

\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{120} The U.S. women’s 4x100 relay team, comprised of Mae Faggs, Catherine Hardy, Barbara Jones and Janet Moreau earned gold, the lone medal awarded to the U.S. in a women’s event, outside of swimming and diving.


While this passage highlights significant Cold War gender themes, Povich’s comment also proves telling in terms of race. Significantly, he failed to consider the efforts, successes and composition of the U.S. track and field team.

Due to the historical prohibitions of middle-class feminine norms in U.S. sport, few white women opted to compete in track and field in the first half of the twentieth century. In the wake of World War II, conventional gender norms further helped society imagine the sport as a masculine pastime. Therefore, any woman who opted to participate in track and field frequently faced stigmatization as an “amazon” or a muscle moll. Due to this racial and classed castigation, black women excelled in athletics. As historian Susan K. Cahn explained, “black women stepped into an arena largely abandoned by middle-class white women . . . and began to blaze a remarkable trail of national and international excellence.”

For example, in the 1956 Melbourne Olympics, the United States earned three medals in track and field (the Soviet Union earned eight). Millie McDaniel finished first in the high jump, Willye White placed second in the long jump, and Isabelle Daniels, Wilma Rudolph, Mae Faggs Starr and Margaret Matthews Wilburn earned bronze in the 4x100m relay.

While these athletes helped dismantle certain racial prejudices, their triumphs in track and field simultaneously reinforced stereotypes of black women as less feminine than white women. The victorious figure of the black female runner consequently fused together gender and racial stereotypes. In the same vein, the successes of the Soviet

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women in track and field allowed the Cold War West to construct Eastern Bloc female Olympians as racialized “others.” Although white, Eastern European women were viewed as non-whites, due to their overt disregard for white, Western norms of femininity.

When the U.S.S.R. rejoined the Olympic movement in 1952 and a medal-counting contest commenced between the United States and the Soviet Union, U.S. officials and members of the anticommunist-IOC feared that individuals and nations would breach the limits of human performance—via the ingestion of chemical substances and the transgression of gender norms—for the sake of Olympic grandeur.

*The IOC’s Sex/Gender Anxieties*

As Cold War fears aggrandized the significance of sport and nationalistic ideals underlined the Olympics, the IOC grew increasingly concerned with the potential for inauthentic human enhancement. Olympic authorities worried simultaneously about the deployment of fraudulent women and the utilization of illegal substances for gold-medal victories. To absolve these anxieties, the IOC created the Medical Commission in 1962. In order to limit participation to appropriate women and natural participants, the committee implemented both sex and doping controls.

Due to the deeply-rooted historical association of sport and masculinity, whispers of ambiguously-sexed female athletes and men posing as women for athletic achievement

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125 “Doping,” *Olympic Review* 84 (November 1963): 60. In a 1963 bulletin, the IOC asked national federations to “disregard questions of national prestige” when discussing human enhancement with athletes.
predated the Cold War. The 1936 Berlin Olympics proved notably rife with such accusations. Several Olympic historians have detailed the increased drive for grandeur instigated by Nazi Germany. Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party not only demanded victories, but also sought to create a memorable, international festival to showcase both the authority of the new government system and the superiority of the Aryan race to the world.

Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the 1936 Games sparked nascent concerns of nations using sex/gender transgressive competitors for medals. In Berlin, U.S. runner Helen Stephens finished first in the 100-meter-race and set a world record that stood for over nineteen years. Because few believed a woman could run at such a fast pace, many questioned Stephens’ biology and she was forced to undergo a sex test, which she passed. Yet, the second-place-finisher, Stella Walsh, a Polish-born athlete with U.S. citizenship—who joined the combative chorus in accusing Stephens of being a man—was later discovered to possess both male and female chromosomes. After Walsh was killed by a stray bullet in 1980, the medical autopsy revealed she was intersexed.

Furthermore, the only reported instance of a man posing as a woman in Olympic competition occurred in the 1936 Games. German high jumper “Dora” Ratjen, who finished fourth in the women’s event, admitted two decades later to his male identity and

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126 Cahn, Coming on Strong.
128 Mandell, The Nazi Olympics.
name, Hermann Ratjen. Some speculated that the Nazi party forced this *faux* participation due to its anti-Semitic desire to replace Gretel Bergmann, a world-class Jewish high jumper, with Ratjen. ¹³¹ Others critiqued this account and argued that Ratjen was born with ambiguous genitalia. According to historian Vanessa Heggie, “rather than being a conspiracy, his place on the 1936 German women’s high-jumping team is explained more by a mundane and human case of gender uncertainty, medical error, fear and embarrassment.” ¹³²

The 1936 Berlin Olympics thereby cemented concerns regarding sex/gender deviancy in international competition. Importantly, future IOC President Avery Brundage served as the chaperone of the U.S. athletes in Berlin; while in Germany, he grew anxious about the participation of ambiguously-sexed women. In particular, Brundage disdained the fact that two former female champions, who had participated successfully in other European track events, underwent sex-reassignment surgery after competition.¹³³ Transgender individuals spark anxieties by blurring boundaries and demonstrating the fluidity of gender, clear challenges to the sex-segregated nature of sport.¹³⁴ As a result, he wrote a letter to IOC President Count Henri Baillet-Latour describing women with “apparent characteristics of the opposite sex” and asked if a sex

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¹³³ “Change of Sex,” *Time*, August 24, 1936, 39–40. Brundage discovered the plights of female-to-male transsexuals Zdenek Koubeck and Mark Weston. Prior to sex-reassignment surgery, Koubeck set the Czechoslovakian women’s records in the broad jump, high jump and several short and mid-distance races, as well as held the women’s world record in the 800-meter run in 1934; Weston was a women’s world-class shot putter and javelin thrower.
check policy had been enacted. “If not,” Brundage reasoned, “it might be well to insist on a medical examination before participation in the Olympic Games.” Additionally, in his first meeting as an IOC member, he advocated for increased visual scrutiny of women, “to make sure they were really 100% female.” Such a requirement would later be enforced during his presidency.

Despite a lack of confirmed male masqueraders in Olympic history and the false condemnation of Ratjen, rumors were nevertheless heightened during the Cold War. With the increased international authority granted to the Olympics, the Soviet Union’s return in 1952 and the country’s immediate medal successes sparked alarm. As aforementioned, the most distressing fact from the U.S. perspective was its Cold War counterpart’s reliance on women for first-place finishes. When images of unapologetically powerful and victorious U.S.S.R. women flooded the United States, many decried the loss of femininity, invasion of men in women’s competition and end of fairness in sport. As sport scholar Stefan Wiederkehr explained, “Western media displayed a clear tendency to juxtapose attractive females from the West with ugly and virilized sportswomen from the Soviet bloc.” Cold War Western norms of femininity

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138 Stefan Wiederkehr, “… If Jarmila Kratochvilova is the Future of Women’s Sports, I’m Not Sure I’m Ready for It.’ Media, Gender and the Cold War,” in Euphoria and Exhaustion: Modern Sport in Soviet Culture and Society, eds. Nikolaus Katzer, Sandra Budy, Alexandra Köhring and Manfred Zeller (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010), 320. Along with illustrating this tendency of the Western media, Wiederkehr demonstrated a similar bias in communist presses. According to the author, both capitalist and communist journalists highlighted their country’s conventionally feminine women; however, Eastern bloc accounts ignored all “ugly” sportswomen whereas Western reports emphasized opposing nation’s non-feminine athletes.
mandated slender-stature, passivity and grace; muscular-builds, aggression and power, on the other hand, raised concerns and threatened Western male dominance in sport.

Consequently, hostile speculations and suspicions further abounded. In non-Olympic competition, for example, French runners Lea Caurla and Claire Bressolles underwent sex-reassignment surgery after winning medals in the 1946 European Championships.139 Four years later, Dutch track athlete Foekje Dillema defeated national rival Fanny Blankers-Koen—who had previously won four gold medals in the 1948 London Summer Olympics—and concurrently established a new Dutch record in the 200 meter race. Dillema was then expelled from competition for life by the Royal Dutch Athletics Federation for refusing to undergo a sex test at the European Championships. Scientists posthumously discovered that Dillema was a 46,XX/46,XY chromosomal mosaic.140 As another example, after North Korean Sin Kim Dan broke the women’s 400- and 800-meter races in 1960-1961, other female track athletes refused to run against her, claiming she appeared too masculine. A North Korean man later claimed Dan was his son he had lost in war.141 Also in track and field, Tamara and Irina Press won five gold medals for the Soviet Union in the 1960 Rome Olympics and then faced hostile criticism for their apparent disregard of Cold War Western femininity.142 Antagonistic allegations increased when the two retired shortly after the IOC instituted mandatory sex

Such accusations peaked in the Cold War and encouraged sport authorities to push for increased sex/gender control.

Armed with such speculations, in 1948 the British Women’s Amateur Athletic Association (BWAAA) incorporated one of the first compulsory sex/gender regulations in international competition. To participate in women’s events, female competitors had to obtain a physicians’ letter verifying the appropriate sex. In a parallel fashion, the IOC requested female Olympians submit an affidavit, signed by a doctor, certifying that they were women for the 1952 Helsinki Games. Yet, the concern that some unscrupulous individuals might utilize fraudulent documents led to the implementation of a visual examination, a requirement that eventually emerged as the standard. Resultantly, in the 1966 European Athletics Championships in Budapest, three female doctors inspected the 243 women participants. According to Arne Ljungvist, “sport had no other means of asserting the gender of participants other than having them parade naked in front of a panel of doctors. After this ‘examination’, the panel decided whether the case presented to them was a woman or a man.” As evidenced by the stipulations of the BWAAA and the treatment of the Press sisters, track and field emerged as the most...

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144 Heggie, “Testing Sex and Gender in Sports,” 157-163. Heggie argued that concerns with ambiguously sexed athletes commenced in the 1930s and not the 1960s, as most histories suggest. As such, in the 1930s scientific attempts to verify sex segregation in sport originated.
146 United Press International, “Sex Tests no Turnoff Now,” Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1976, C4. In the article, Janice Lee Romary, member of the U.S. Olympic teams from 1948 to 1968, detailed the IOC’s request. According to the piece, athletes could have any doctor sign the form, opening the possibility for bribery. Romary explained that she carried the “oft-folded and yellowed piece of paper for use as a good cocktail party gag.”
147 Ferguson-Smith and Ferris, “Gender Verification in Sport,” 17.
scrutinized arena. According to sport scholar Ian Ritchie, ‘it was in track and field in particular that female Soviet athletes had been most successful, most visible, and most derided.”

Therefore, in the 1966 British Empire and Commonwealth Games in Kingston, Jamaica, female athletes underwent a manual examination. Pentathlon gold medalist Mary Peters recalled that the check was “the most crude and degrading experience I have ever known in my life.” U.S. shot-putter Maren Silder, who was sixteen-years-old at the time of the exam, remembered that “they lined us up outside a room where there were three doctors sitting in a row behind desks. You had to go in and pull up your shirt and push down your pants.”

The crude physical inspections continued in the 1966 Asian Games. Notably, Philippine star sprinter Mona Sulaiman—who had, in record-setting-times, won the 100-meter and 200-meter races in the previous Asian Games—refused to undergo the examination. She later explained that a severe case of the flu had persuaded her to forego the procedure. Unfortunately officials and the public alike dismissed her illness as a façade and maliciously expressed doubt. When solicited for a comment regarding Sulaiman’s refusal, the Philippine team physician Antonio Vergara responded that “of course, I have my doubts,” inferring that athletic successes stemmed solely from non-

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151 Quoted in Heggie, “Testing Sex and Gender in Sports,” 159.
feminine characteristics. A teammate similarly voiced skepticism, noting that “she acts like a girl, but she talks like a man.” More overtly hostile, *Sports Illustrated* writer Marvin Zim chided that “still left unanswered is the question of whether Mona is a Filipino or Filipina.” Along with a disregard for human dignity, this comment also demonstrates the racial undertones of sex/gender testing. Sulaiman returned home under a cloud of suspicion, her athletic career desecrated. Interestingly, she fended off the resultant local incertitude by boldly daring those who challenged her identity to allow their husbands to join her for an overnight visit. This line of reasoning insinuated that femininity could be verified through a demonstration of heterosexuality.

Public condemnations of sex test failures continued the following year, as did novel attempts to scientifically pinpoint biological difference. The IAAF instituted a chromatin test for the 1967 European Cup Track and Field Event in Kiev, Soviet Union, thereby replacing physical inspections. Chromatin tests, also labeled the Barr body test or the buccal smear test, analyze chromosomal cells to determine the presence of a stain (the Barr body) and thus of a woman. Although believed to surpass “naked parades” and “manual examinations” in efficiency and accuracy, problems quickly surfaced.

Notably, Polish sprinter Ewa Klobukowska—who had passed the visual examination in the 1966 European Championships—was discovered to have a “mosaic”

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155 Ibid.
156 Enzo, “Mona Sulaiman.”
of chromosomes.\textsuperscript{158} She was stripped of her medals, barred from competition and publicly ridiculed. Despite their later renunciations of these reactions, the international governing bodies of sport viewed Klobukowska’s condition as justification for increased policing.\textsuperscript{159} Brundage, who had assumed the IOC presidency in 1952, was quick to agree. In the wake of the IAAF’s initial implementation of examinations, he appealed to Porritt to prepare sex testing suggestions for the upcoming IOC Session in Tehran. Brundage reasoned, “In view of the sex developments at the recent European Championships in Budapest and the action of the I.A.A.F., should we not have something in our rules on this subject.”\textsuperscript{160} French doctor Jacques Thiebault, who would oversee the chromosomal check in Grenoble, agreed. Regarding the rumors about the “so-called females who are as strong as oxen,” he speculated that it “is inevitable that sooner or later the real representatives of the weaker sex will feel persecuted and will demand their feminine records be attributed to them.”\textsuperscript{161} To ensure that the “real representatives” of womanhood participated, the IOC Medical Commission approved the introduction of sex testing in Olympic competition.

\textit{The IOC’s Anti-Doping Controls}

As Cold War concerns seeped into sex/gender verification discussions, the IOC concurrently debated anti-doping controls. IOC President Brundage publically

\textsuperscript{160} November 1, 1966, Letter from Brundage to Porritt, Box 104, IOC Commissions and Committees—Medical Commission, Part III, 1966-1969 Folder, Avery Brundage Paper Collection, University of Illinois Archives.
\textsuperscript{161} July 14-17, 1968, Minutes of the Meeting of the Medical Commission, Box 89, IOC Meetings, 1968, IOC Meetings—67th Session Folder, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archives.
recognized doping as an Olympic issue in 1960. Concerned with the possible widespread use of amphetamine sulfate, “pep pills,” by Olympians, he appointed a four-person committee comprised of Porritt, Ryotaro Azuma of Japan, Josef Gruss of Czechoslovakia and Agustin Sosa of Panama to research the prevalence of performance enhancing substances in Olympic competition. This newfangled anxiety stemmed largely from the death of Danish cyclist Knud Enemark Jensen in the 1960 Rome Games. After competing in a cycling race, which reportedly occurred in 104-degree-weather, Jensen and two of his Danish teammates were hospitalized for heat exhaustion. Jensen’s questionable death in the hospital sparked an investigation, after which the Danish team doctor eventually admitted that he distributed Ronical, a vasodilator, to his riders. Although Jensen’s autopsy also revealed traces of amphetamines, the Italian authorities failed to publish the medical results and punishments were not allocated.

The IOC received further motivation to assess the implications of drug use in 1967. In the Mont Ventoux stage of the Tour de France, English cyclist Tommy Simpson swayed, staggered and eventually collapsed on the side of the road. He died in route to the hospital due to a combination of amphetamines and brandy. Despite the lack of

166 “Waging War against Dope,” Olympic Review 77 (February 1962): 46. The IOC defended its inaction by blaming the medical and legal authorities who failed to release the autopsy and cause of death. The report explained that “it is not the responsible directive bodies of sports who are intervening to put down this danger, but the police. Yes . . . the police!”
immediate sanctions in the wake of these two fatalities, the cyclists’ posthumous legacies serve as the incidences that prompted the IOC to assume an anti-doping stance.

According to legal scholar Thomas M. Hunt, the IOC faced four interrelated problems in its early quest to abate doping in Olympic competition. Foremost, some Olympic officials remained indifferent to the subject and consequently prioritized alternative issues. The complexities of amateurism, for example, notably consumed Brundage. Second, scientific difficulties in detection of prohibited substances, coupled with the costs of such controls, worried the International Federations. As a third deterrent, ethical and medicinal ambiguities regarding the definition of doping hindered implementation of anti-doping measures at early Olympic contests. Finally, Cold War politics and the fragmented nature of the international sport system—notably the IOC, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) instituted their own rules, regulations and punishments—served as dual obstacles.  

To absolve the issue of Olympic doping, the IOC established the Medical Commission with Porritt, then-president of the Royal College of Surgeons of England, as the head of the committee. Porritt’s relative indifference toward the issue, as well as his belief that doping should remain under the surveillance of the International Federations and not the IOC, however, led to little-action from the Medical Commission while under his tenure. As an example of his unconcern, at the 1964 Tokyo meeting...
Porritt recommended that the IOC take three minimal steps to diminish doping in the Olympics: issue a formal declaration condemning the use of drugs, implement sanctions against individuals who promote drugs in sport and request national Olympic committees require its athletes undergo examinations.\(^{170}\) While recognizing doping as a dilemma, Porritt opted to avoid outlining direct policies. Yet when Prince Alexandre de Mérode of Belgium assumed the reins, the IOC Medical Commission not only garnered control of doping tests, but also assumed responsibility for the maintenance of sex/gender and sexuality norms.

In the 1967 IOC general session in Tehran, Iran, it was decided that de Mérode would take over as chair of the Medical Commission.\(^{171}\) Porritt’s final remarks as head of the Medical Commission not only addressed concerns regarding “doping, sex tests and anabolic steroids” but encouraged the committee to ensure that future Olympic Games would possess “the medical machinery to cope with these problems.”\(^{172}\) With the addition of the Belgian royal, the committee was comprised of Professor Arnold Beckett of Great Britain, Professor Giuseppe La Cava of Italy, Vice-President Arpad Csanadi of Hungary, Doctor Pieter Van Dijk of Holland, Doctor Albert Dirix of Belgium, Doctor Eduardo Hay of Mexico, Professor Ludwig Prokop of Austria and Doctor Jacques Thiebault of France.\(^{173}\) In the words of Hunt, “as a Belgian aristocrat, de Mérode embodied the notion that the Olympic leadership should remain the preserve of the well-


\(^{172}\) Ibid.


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bred and financially secure social elite.” He also continued the legacy of IOC leadership as solely a masculine endeavor, as well as a predominately European one. More importantly, de Mérode heeded Porritt’s advice and the IOC Medical Commission concurrently mandated sex tests for female Olympians and generated a list of prohibited substances for the 1968 Grenoble Winter Olympics.

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174 Hunt, Drug Games, 29.
Chapter 2: Is the Athlete “Right” or “Wrong”? The IOC’s Chromosomal Construction of Womanhood, 1968-1972

In the 1968 Mexico City Summer Olympics, the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) Medical Commission simultaneously implemented the first mandatory sex tests and doping controls of the modern Olympic movement. These procedures intended to scientifically confirm the separation of men and women in athletic competition, as well as guarantee the “authenticity” of Olympic participants. Fearful of masculinized women and the hazards of drugs—both exacerbated by Cold War tensions—the IOC Medical Commission tested 803 female athletes’ chromosomal patterns and analyzed 670 urine samples for traces of prohibited substances in Mexico City. According to Sir Arthur Porritt, former chairman of the IOC Medical Commission, such procedures were deemed necessary in order to deter female competitors, particularly those from the Eastern Bloc, from consuming male hormones.

175 “Medical Commission,” Olympic Review 5 (February 1968): 71-73. The IOC Medical Commission implemented doping measures and sex tests in the 1968 Grenoble Winter Games. While the Medical Commission had hoped to check all women, the technological strain of implementing the control for the first time resulted in the use of a lottery system in which only one-out-of-every-five female athletes underwent an examination. For the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, the IOC Medical Commission required the check for all women.

176 Neil Amdur, “The Drug Game Threatens International Amateur Sport,” New York Times, Nov. 4, 1979, S1. In this piece Monique Belioux, the general secretary of the IOC, explained that one of the biggest challenges the IOC faced was the “manipulation of athletes with drugs and the fabrication of an artificial human being.”

“There is a very simple test to determine if the athlete is right or wrong,” he explained.178 His conflation of the purposes of doping controls and sex tests demonstrates the significance of sex/gender and sexuality in the IOC Medical Commission’s regulatory policies. Chromosomal and doping stipulations attempted to distinguish between the “right” athletes, women deemed appropriately feminine and therefore natural, from the “wrong” athletes, those deemed inappropriately masculine and therefore inauthentic. To regulate hetero-femininity in sport, the IOC Medical Commission’s chromosomal checks and anti-doping policies promoted a polarized view of sex classification, reaffirmed white femininity as normative and maintained a binary vision of sexuality.

While discussing the possibility of ascertaining sex for competition, the IOC ignored the medical community’s concerns regarding the sole utilization of chromosomes and required a chromosomal test for all female athletes in the Mexico City Olympics, rationalizing its policy on the supposed need to prevent male masqueraders from participating in women’s events. Although several leading biologists, endocrinologists and geneticists opposed only using chromosomes to indicate sex, the medical community as a whole largely supported the quest to find some measure to justify sex-segregated sport. The assumption of female athletic inferiority, intertwined with a belief in fairness, underlined such resolve.

This chapter argues that the Olympic sex test and doping controls bolstered a false system of sex-demarcation, promoted a gendered hierarchy in sport, supported

compulsory heterosexuality and reified white privilege. While Olympic authorities viewed those who failed the sex tests as unintentional victims of inconsistent biology, the IOC Medical Commission attacked those who breached anti-doping controls as purposeful cheaters. Yet, any woman discovered to have transgressed either boundary was viewed as abnormal and resultantly barred from competition. Through scientific regulations, the IOC Medical Commission constructed Olympic womanhood along Cold War Western lines of gender and sexuality, which helped to limit female athleticism. As United States Olympic Committee head physician Daniel F. Hanley aptly foreshadowed in 1967, with the introduction of the sex test “we will establish a new definition of femaleness.”

_Historical Conceptions of Sex-Distinction_

Labeling someone a man or a woman is a social decision. We may use scientific knowledge to help us make the decision, but only our beliefs about gender—not science—can define our sex. Feminist Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling

Cold War anxieties may have forced international attention onto sex/gender-difference, however, the desire to pinpoint the location of divergence between man and woman—as well as the desire to correct any incongruence—was not a novel aspiration of the IOC. As sport scholar Kevin B. Wamsley explained, “western social, political, religious, and economic institutions were built on the fundamental notion that men and

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women were clearly discernable [sic] entities,” as was sport. \textsuperscript{182} Attempts to identify the reason, purpose and moment of disparity between the sexes/genders therefore predated Cold War politics. \textsuperscript{183} In the United States, scientists shifted from a concentration on anatomical entities to a focus on chemical agency as the primary measure of distinction. Medical practitioners, also invested in a dual-body system, eventually interpreted scientific evidence to “cure” individuals who did not fit within the man/woman categorization pattern. Although concentrations, theories and solutions changed throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, scientific and medicinal allegiance to a binary system of sex remained unalteringly intact.

By the nineteenth century, over five hundred theories claimed to comprehend human sex differentiation. \textsuperscript{184} Of the numerous postulations, a great diversity of explanations existed, ranging from ancestral inheritance to environmental factors. For example, some claimed that the position in the womb determined a baby’s sex, while others argued that diet held sway—a pregnant woman’s poor nutritional habits


\textsuperscript{183} Jill A. Fisher, \textit{Gender and the Science of Difference: Cultural Politics of Contemporary Science and Medicine} (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011). Historically, several cultures have embraced hermaphrodites and intersexes, indicating the existence of societal organizations based on continua. In the premodern era, for example, Aristotle categorized hermaphrodites as a type of twin. Physicians in the Middle Ages similarly posited that differentiation was based on heat: the heat on the right side of the uterus produced males, the coolness on the left created females and fetuses in the middle became manly women or womanly men. Yet, during the Renaissance, various religious institutions intervened in the controlling of hermaphrodites and intersexes. Sharon E. Preves, “Sexing the Intersexed: An Analysis of Sociocultural Reponses to Intersexuality,” \textit{Signs: Journal of Women in Culture & Society}, 27 no. 2 (Winter, 2002), 537.

In the nineteenth century, legal institutions increasingly demanded sexual clarity as the institution of marriage gained authority and required sexual segregation.

guaranteed the birth of a boy.\textsuperscript{185} While diverse hypotheses initially proliferated, attention to anatomical features eventually gained prominence. Influenced by a conviction in “separate spheres,” anatomical studies reinforced the social duality through measurements of pelvis sizes, skull shapes, brain formations and reproductive organs. As Allen Petersen discovered in a historical analysis of Gray’s \textit{Anatomy}, anatomical studies cemented the longevity of a two-sexed model and also reaffirmed the superiority of the male body.\textsuperscript{186} Disseminated as a canonical work of knowledge—from the mid-nineteenth century to the present—Gray’s \textit{Anatomy} positioned male anatomy as the standard and reaffirmed females’ social role as dedicated to reproduction.\textsuperscript{187}

With this attention on physical features, the gonads emerged in the literature as the preeminent factor of differentiation. Therefore, as historian Alice Dreger dubbed it, the late nineteenth century was the “Age of the Gonads.”\textsuperscript{188} In her words, during this time sex was “marked by one trait and one trait only, the anatomical nature of a person’s gonads.”\textsuperscript{189} Dreger reasoned that the Victorian belief that the fundamental societal difference between men and women stemmed from reproduction likely fostered the emphasis on this body part, despite an individual’s actual or lack of reproductive capabilities.\textsuperscript{190} For example, one could appear feminine internally and externally, yet be

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{185}Mittwoch, “Erroneous Theories,” 167.
\textsuperscript{187}Ibid., 3. According to Petersen, the nineteenth century postulations guaranteed the longevity of the two-sexed model.
\textsuperscript{188}Alice Domurat Dreger, \textit{Hermaphrodites and the Medical Invention of Sex} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 11.
\textsuperscript{189}Ibid.
\textsuperscript{190}Ibid., 151.
\end{footnotesize}
labeled a male due to the possession of testicles.\footnote{Ibid., 145.} Despite this transition of measurement from general anatomy to the more-specifically-defined gonads, scientific interpretation remained embedded in societal values. Thus, corresponding to popular norms, Victorian era scientists claimed that the testicles served as the seat of masculinity and fostered bravery, vigor and longevity. The uterus initially signified femininity; however, the discovery of the ovaries allowed medical authorities to shift the location of docility and subservience there.\footnote{Petersen, “Sexing the Body,” 8. Peterson noted that the ovaries were described extensively in Gray’s Anatomy and suggested that this reflected the nineteenth century view that the ovaries were believed to be the “essence of femininity.”} In addition, sexual difference became more linguistically defined. According to medical historian Thomas Laqueur, as the new terminology—the ovaries and the testicles—circumscribed different functions, structures that had previously been believed to be common to all, such as the skeletal and nervous systems, were also distinguished along gender lines in the medical discourse.\footnote{Thomas Laqueur, \textit{Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud} (Harvard University Press, 1990), 149-150.}

Concurrently, biologists in the mid-nineteenth century asserted increased authority over the body and sought to differentiate abnormalities from normal. For example, French biologist Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire notably extended teratology from the study of birth defects to the classification of anatomical anomalies. Saint-Hilaire and like-minded scientists consequently pathologized ambiguous bodies and cemented a belief in the ability to “correct” mistakes, again bolstering a dual-body paradigm.\footnote{Fausto-Sterling, \textit{Sexing the Body}, 36-37.} Unable to see molecular components, authorities in the nineteenth century remained tied to what appeared before the naked eye. With the invention of the

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 145.}
microscope, however, cellular and chemical components gained importance; yet, faith in the divisions of male/female and normal/abnormal remained.

Equipped with the microscope, the study of sex differentiation morphed into the examination of sex hormones at the turn of the century. As progressive reformers challenged the social system, endocrinology emerged as a tool to help maintain the status quo. According to Fausto-Sterling, in an era that argued for equality and individual liberties, “scientists defined some bodies as better and more deserving of rights than others.” While the study of sex hormones developed into a significant field of novel research, endocrinology remained rooted in the preexisting beliefs of dualistic differentiation. Disregarding the full-body utilities of hormones, endocrinologists delineated the chemicals as specifically sexual in nature, consequently rendering all their other functions invisible. As health technology professor Nelly Oudshoorn explained, these authorities not only defined “sex” hormones as binary but also specific in origin and function. Resultantly, the notion of “male” hormones and “female” hormones emerged, a development that would prove significant in the social construction of female dopers.

By the middle of the twentieth century, geneticists also posited that sex was irrevocably cemented at conception by nuclear elements. Whereas endocrinologists claimed that hormones constructed sex, geneticists argued that chromosomes determined development. Despite the momentary impasse, the two camps eventually agreed that

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195 Ibid, 39.
196 Nelly Oudshoorn, Beyond the Natural Body: An Archeology of Sex Hormones (New York: Routledge, 1994).
197 Ibid., 21.
both genes and hormones worked in concert to define the man or woman. If genetic variables commenced the process, hormones completed the course.\(^{198}\)

While this fleeting scientific gridlock proved permeable, the discovery of female sex hormones in men raised doubts over the specificity of endocrine function. This shocking innovation also cultivated concerns regarding the utilization of gender pronouns for human hormones. For accuracy, some replaced the accepted classification system with variances—for example, by using “ambosexual” hormone or the “so-called” female sex hormone in substitution—while others demanded a complete overthrow of the contemporary categorizations.\(^{199}\) As a result, “estrin,” “estrogen,” “androsterone” and “testosterone” were introduced. Despite this new categorization, each name nevertheless remained attached to certain bodies, another important development in the later societal perception of female dopers. As Oudshoorn explained, “although scientists abandoned the concept of sexual specificity, the terminology was not adjusted to this change in conceptualization.”\(^{200}\) In addition, for the sake of monetary gain, pharmaceutical companies demanded specialization in the 1940s and pushed the classification further along a dichotomous trajectory. Although scientists viewed all organisms as a chemical combination of male and female, they bolstered the interpretation of the human body as binary.

Moreover, twentieth century medical practitioners also maintained a dual sex-paradigm by studying mixed-sexed and transgender individuals and forcing their

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\(^{198}\) Fausto-Sterling, *Sexing the Body*, 163.

\(^{199}\) Ibid., 188.

\(^{200}\) Oudshoorn, *Beyond the Natural Body*, 36.
adaptation. Perhaps most notably, sexologist John Money sought to treat intersexed individuals by incorporating environmental factors with biological status.\textsuperscript{201} While progressive in his field and equipped with innovative notions of social gender, Money’s treatments never embraced difference; rather, he recommended prenatal solutions, surgical alterations, and psychological adjustments. As radical feminist Janice Raymond wrote, “under the guise of science, he makes normative and prescriptive statements about who women and men are and who they ought to be.”\textsuperscript{202} Moreover, while male-to-female transsexual Christine Jorgensen captured attention in the wake of World War II, her public transition provoked anxieties regarding the collapse of society’s sex/gender categorization.\textsuperscript{203} According to historian Joanne Meyerowitz, despite the possibilities opened by transsexuals for sex and gender blurring, Jorgenson’s more immediate impact “was to reinforce traditional norms of gender.”\textsuperscript{204} Twentieth century attempts to “fix” intersexed and transgender individuals thus further privileged certain types of bodies and undermined the possibility for a sex-spectrum.\textsuperscript{205}

\textsuperscript{201} Joanne Meyerowitz, \textit{How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). John Money, one of the founders of the John Hopkins Gender Identity Clinic that performed sex-reassignments surgeries in the United States, notably dismissed psychoanalytical and biological models of gender. Instead, he argued that social learning shaped gender roles. Money also believed that infants remained gender-free and therefore could be assigned a sex without psychological damage. While this helped eradicate a wholesale belief in a genetic binary, it also led to his problematic recommendation for David Reimer’s reassignment surgery. Money suggested Reimer, a toddler who experienced a botched circumcision, live life as female. Reimer committed suicide in 2004. For information on Reimer, see John Colapinto, \textit{As Nature Made Him: The Boy who was Raised a Girl} (New York: Harvard University Press, 2001).

\textsuperscript{202} Janice Raymond, \textit{The Transsexual Empire: The Making of a She-Male} (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 44.

\textsuperscript{203} Meyerowitz, \textit{How Sex Changed}, 68.

\textsuperscript{204} Ibid., 125.

\textsuperscript{205} Preves, “Sexing the Intersexed,” 525.
Concerned with the inadequacies of sex-based hormonal differences, scientists continued to search for concrete measures to identify differentiation. In 1948, University of Western Ontario micro-anatomist Murray Barr discovered a mark on the nucleus of the sex chromosomes while analyzing the nervous system of cats. With assistance from his graduate student Ewart Bertram, he recognized that the stains were readily observable on some cells and not apparent on others. Upon further investigation, the two scholars noticed that the appearance of the marks seemed to be related to the sex of the animal. While the cells of the female felines exhibited the stain, the cells of the male did not.

Barr and Bertram’s corresponding report in *Nature* explained that:

> The morphological distinction, therefore, between the neurones of the mature male and female cat is so clear that sections from the brain, spinal cord or sympathetic ganglia of animals of both sexes may be readily sorted into two groups without prior knowledge of the sex.

The two scientists also posited that similar marks existed in human cells.

> With this study, chromosomes became the main signifier of sex. The resultant check, labeled the Barr body test or the buccal smear test, analyzed cells to determine the

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207 Chromosomes exist in the nucleus of human cells and are comprised of DNA tightly coiled around proteins. Humans usually have forty-six chromosomes, arranged in twenty-three pairs. Of these forty-six, two are labeled sex chromosomes, which control the development of sex characteristics. Women are typically believed to possess forty-six somatic chromosomes and two XX sex chromosomes (46,XX); men are typically believed to possess forty-six somatic chromosomes and one X and one Y sex chromosome (46,XY). Widespread cases of chromosomal “abnormalities”, however, problematize a clear delineation of sex. Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome (AIS) exists when a person, who is chromosomally a man (46,XY), is resistant to male hormones and therefore demonstrates the physical characteristics of a female. Klinefelter Syndrome occurs when men inherit extra X chromosomes (46,XXY or 46, XXXY) and, as a result, produce less than average testosterone. Turner Syndrome is present when women inherit only one X chromosome (46,X0) and consequently do not develop ovaries. The Centre for Genetics Education, “Genes and Chromosomes: The Genome,” Genetics.edu, http://www.genetics.edu.au.
presence of the stain (the Barr body) and thus of a woman. “What makes this story especially interesting,” noted health policy professor Fiona Alice Miller, “is that the interpretation of the Barr body as a marker of the female sex chromosome constitution was erroneous.”208 While Barr and Bertram initially believed that the dark spot identified two chromosomes—XX—scientists Susumu Ohno and T.S. Hauschka verified in 1959 that the Barr body actually verified only one X chromosome.209 This finding dramatically altered previous perceptions of sex determination. For example, prior to 1959, an individual with XXY was read as a woman; following the breakthrough, the same person was identified as a man. Or, an XO person previously determined to be a man was recorded as a woman after Ohno and Hauschka’s discovery.210 In addition, rather than attributed to sex reversal, Klinefelter’s Syndrome was revealed to be caused by an extra X chromosome and Turner Syndrome by an absence of the X chromosome.211 Nonetheless, in spite of Barr’s errors—and his explicit warning that the measure not be used in sport—his method of verification was accepted as doctrine by the governing bodies of sport, including the IOC, for it supported a sexual dichotomy.212 The Barr body test therefore remained essential in the process of separating men and women, specifically in Olympic competition.

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210 Miller, “‘Your True and Proper Gender’,” 462.
211 Ibid., 466.
The Chromosomal Control of the Female Body

As Ohno and Haushcka revealed their interpretation of the Barr body test, medical practitioners assessed the major occurrences of the 1960 Rome Olympics. Accounts in leading journals, notably *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Society* and the *British Journal of Sports Medicine*, expressed concern regarding the treatment of athletes. From the U.S. perspective, the major problems in Rome were dysentery and overeating.\(^{213}\) According to the British, however, doping served as the largest obstacle in need of solution.\(^{214}\) Yet, when the international press honed in on the question of unfeminine athletes and detailed the incorporation of a sex test at the 1966 European Track and Field Championships, questions of sex-determination infiltrated the medical discourse. In particular, the failure of Polish athlete Ewa Klobukowska sparked tremendous debate. Although authorities responded with an assortment of opinions and recommendations—and questioned the sole employment of the Barr body test in the detection of women—most concurred with the IOC regarding the necessity of some type of verification system to uphold fair play.

When the reports that first highlighted the muscular appearances of Eastern European athletes reverberated through the popular media, details also seeped into the medical dialogue. The first article to appear in *JAMA* regarding Eastern European


athletes, titled “Introducing the, Uh, Ladies,” noted the difficulty of separating men from women, particularly when adolescent males adorned female clothing. More problematically, according to the journal, “certain ‘lady’ contestants in track and field have, over the years, turned out to be men.”

While the U.S. editors agreed with the necessity of a sex check to identify the real ladies—those not designated by quotation marks—they suggested that the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) replace its visual/physical examinations with a buccal smear—a direct contrast to the publication’s earlier postulation regarding the inadequacy of chromatin verification.

Accordingly, implementing the Barr body test would assure “both dignity and integrity” for competitors.

In the same vein, Dr. Raymond G. Bunge, professor of urology at the University of Iowa and regular contributor to JAMA, jokingly suggested that the IOC alter event titles to conform with sex chromosomal determination. For example, he advised that the men’s and women’s events be altered to “the XXY or the XXXY or the XXXXXXY 100-meter dash, the pole vault, the mile run, etc.” From his point of jest, Bunge did outline a more serious consideration. “Out of this bewildering dilemma I offer the Olympic Committee a suggestion,” he wrote. “Eliminate from competition all those who have a contradiction in the morphological criteria . . . . Allow competition only among those athletes who have no contradiction.” While admittedly harsh, he did also recommend


216 “Nuclear Sex,” JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association 179, no. 6 (June 6, 1959): 679. According to the seven members of the JAMA editorial board, the possible existence of genetic or biological variety “serves to stress the fact that the ultimate determination of sex should not be based on chromatin patterns alone but on a consideration of the total psycho-physical personality.”

217 “Introducing the, Uh, Ladies,” 1118.
that the IOC establish two Games: “one for the ‘normal’ men and women and another for the contradictive group.”218 According to Bunge, the structure of “normal” sport needed a clear division of sex.

Others more explicitly disagreed with the singular use of the Barr body test to delineate classification. University of Glasgow pathology professor Bernard Lennox noted that the Olympic decision to segregate based upon chromosomal counts stemmed from a problematic Western emphasis on sexual difference. He explained that while the division of sexes served to prevent self-fertilization, “we are conditioned to exaggerate it, and we emphasize it by external additions of clothing, behavior and the like.” Lennox further reasoned that because approximately five percent of the population was born intersexed, utilization of chromosomal counts proved misleading.219 Writing in the same year, anatomy expert, and one of Barr’s postgraduate students, Keith L. Moore argued that because scientific innovations illustrated that no single criterion clearly distinguished man from woman, chromosomal analyses did not identify one’s “true sex.” Hence, he posited that women with chromatin-negative nuclei and “abnormal” chromosome complexes should not be prohibited. Furthermore, Moore noted the futility of the test for “medically, there is no doubt about their femininity.” Although he may have employed femininity as a synonym for sex, his word choice is nonetheless significant; Moore also

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argued that ineligibility would only be valid when a Y chromosome and male-like characteristics appeared in women.  

Also concerned with female masculinization, Hanley, the leading medical authority of the USOC, disputed Bunge’s assertions of prohibition. In his view, women with sex-linked chromosomal variances should be permitted in Olympic competition. “If you are throwing out everybody with any chromosomal abnormality at all,” Hanley reasoned, “then you are wrong.” Interestingly, he postulated that a visual examination would provide more accurate results than the Barr body test. In his view, the current microscopic control would provide the “same conclusion that any near-sighted college boy can come to from a block away.” Such accounts focused on the outward appearance of the athletes, inferring that female masculinization was the issue, not chromosomal “abnormalities”.

The medical community may have disagreed with the IOC regarding the significance of chromosomes, yet both structures embraced scientific studies and controlled the perception of women’s bodies. Collectively, the IOC Medical Commission and the leading medical authorities espoused paralleling discourses that shaped the societal interpretation of what constituted the normal female body. In the 1968 Grenoble Winter Games, then, the IOC experimented with requiring its vision of womanhood.

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221 Hanley, “Medical News,” 55.
“Research into Femininity”: Sex Testing in the Grenoble Winter Olympics

After the conclusion of World War II, French communist and capitalist systems experienced an intense struggle for power and prestige. Consequently, sport also evolved into a divisive arena. While some supported Olympic and IAAF organizations, others esteemed the Communist Federation Sportive et Gymnique des Travailleurs (FSGT).222 Yet, when Charles de Gaulle spearheaded the new Fifth Republic in 1959, he assumed control of sport in his quest to fashion France into a significant world power. Notably, sport in the educational system was reconfigured to serve as the primary foundation for future leaders and world-class athletes. de Gaulle also created the Municipal Offices of Sport to act as the umbrella organization for school sport, Sport for All and elite sport. Therefore, to further enhance both France’s governmental and athletic reputation, as well as to gain economic, political and symbolic profit, the country bid for the 1968 Winter Games.223 Unbeknownst to the French at the time, by hosting the Grenoble Olympics, their country would also be forced to showcase its new, postwar gender norms.

Following the war, the French embodied a new way of living. According to historian Kristin Ross, the country transformed “from a rural, empire-oriented, Catholic country into a fully industrialized, decolonized, and urban one.”224 A quick, almost haphazard campaign of modernization sparked dramatic changes in individuals’ private and public interactions. Importantly, a postwar governmental obsession with cleanliness

and purity led to the controlling of domesticity. The idea that “an efficient, well-run harmonious home is a national asset” seeped into the culture, which helped normalize Cold War Western gender norms.\(^\text{225}\) A novel housewife ideal promoted gender conformity, exacerbated in the Grenoble Winter Olympics.

In the wake of the May 1967 IOC General Session in Tehran, Alexandre de Mérode and the members of the Medical Commission discussed the possibility of requiring sex and doping checks for all Olympic participants. As one of its first orders of business, the committee issued a press release that emphasized the likelihood of establishing medical controls in upcoming Olympic contests to members of the IOC Executive Board, International Federations and National Olympic Committees. While rather unclear in terms of what methods would be used in the future, the press release explained that the Medical Commission intended to institute a variety of tests. First, the organization planned to change the entry form so that all athletes who signed agreed to submit to any examination “thought necessary in the interests of both his health and future.”\(^\text{226}\) Although women had participated in the Olympics since the 1900 Paris Games, the IOC still clearly centralized the position of its male competitors. Furthermore, the Medical Commission noted it would provide a list of drugs soon and establish a procedure to test athletes in time for the Mexico City Summer Olympics. Finally, the press release explained that anti-doping tests would be carried out on a

\(^{225}\) Ibid., 77-78.
random basis while the sex test would be completed on the three winning female competitors of some events, to be determined at a later date.\(^{227}\)

To assess any methods of control previously utilized by other sporting bodies, the Medical Commission also sent a survey to the International Federations. The circular letter requested information regarding any rules or measures previously deployed to combat the “very controversial problems” of sex determination and doping.\(^{228}\) While conflated under the control of one authority, sex testing and anti-doping served specific means. The IOC interpreted sex test failures as unfortunate victims of nature and doping violators as unscrupulous cheaters. Women who breached both categories, however, would be viewed even more disdainfully.

With the results collected, and after several months of long-distance conversation, the Medical Commission concluded that dual measures to curtail sex/gender fraud and the use of performance enhancing chemicals must be implemented for the Grenoble Winter Games, prior to its previously planned start for the Mexico City Summer Games.\(^{229}\) In January of 1968, mere days before the opening ceremonies scheduled for February 6, the Belgian prince reported the Medical Commission’s conclusions to the IOC Executive Board. Specifically, de Mérode outlined the methods for the tests and explained that, in light of the expenses involved, only fifty out of the two-hundred-and-

\(^{227}\) Ibid.


\(^{229}\) January 26-27, 1968, Meeting of the IOC Executive Board at Mon Repos Lausanne, Box 86, IOC Meetings—Executive Board, Lausanne, January 26-27, 1968, Folder, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archive.
fifty female athletes would be tested, by a lottery system, in Grenoble.\textsuperscript{230} Yet, he also made it clear that the IOC Medical Commission intended to check all women’s sex/gender in the future. With approval from the IOC Executive Board, on January 28, 1968, the Medical Commission ordered sex testing for roughly twenty percent of Grenoble’s female Olympians.\textsuperscript{231}

In conjunction with its decision to require “medical proof” of sex, the Medical Commission also generated a list of prohibited substances.\textsuperscript{232} The committee banned the ingestion of alcohol, amphetamines, cannabis, cocaine, ephedrine, opiates and vasodilators.\textsuperscript{233} Although anabolic steroids were of concern in the initial conversations, the Medical Commission lacked the knowledge and ability for accurate testing, thereby deterring it from appearing on the original prohibited substance list.\textsuperscript{234} Nevertheless, fears of female steroid-users tellingly proliferated.

For example, writing an editorial in the same year that the prohibited substance list appeared, Monique Berlioux, director of the IOC, confirmed the necessity of sex tests for the Olympics and disparaged the use of steroids by women. Berlioux had assumed the leadership position when former director, Otto Mayer, proved too impetuous and obstinate for IOC President Avery Brundage. According to Berlioux, “they tried to find a

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\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.
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man, of course, but they could not find the right person.”\textsuperscript{235} Referencing the recent implementation of the medical controls at the 1966 European Championships, she noted that individuals who consider,

That a sports field is not a place for a woman, are probably smiling sarcastically after having heard that some of the greatest woman champions do perhaps not belong to the ‘weaker’ sex after all.\textsuperscript{236}

Presumably alluding to the sudden retirement of the previously mentioned Press sisters, her editorial bolstered Cold War Western notions of femininity through a trite condemnation of powerful female Olympians. Furthermore, by defending the sex control as a tool to ensure fairness in competition, Berlioux reaffirmed a binary notion of sex/gender. Accordingly, because “hermaphroditism does not exist” and “one is born a man or a woman,” maintaining sex-segregation through the tests was an imperative of the Olympic movement. While essential, she did concede that “nature can play some funny tricks,” acknowledging the possible existence of a biological spectrum. For that reason, speaking on behalf of the IOC, Berlioux explained that “we are grateful for this initiative which will make it possible to put an end to the cheating, which takes place, whether intentionally or not.”\textsuperscript{237}

In this view, then, biological variation created fraudulent women. While she perceived potential sex test failures as “unfortunate girls,” Berlioux interpreted female dopers as unscrupulous athletes who purposefully altered their biology for gold-medal victories. Attempting to win by the means of a drug “is worse than an act of dishonesty,

\textsuperscript{237} Ibid., 1-2.
it is an outright injustice,” she argued. Correspondingly, French Medical Commission member and head of the Grenoble medical controls Jacques Thiebault envisioned anti-doping checks as a means to curtail an “evident attempt of fraud” whereas the role of sex testing was to “confirm a default in nature.” As illustrated through such claims, the IOC and its Medical Commission viewed gender transgression and drug use—specifically the ingestion of steroids—as dual and overlapping threats to its sex/gender-segregated categorical divide. Through the sex tests and doping controls, many hoped that only a specific type of woman could enter the Olympics.

To fulfill these aspirations, the IOC Medical Commission instituted such checks in the 1968 Grenoble Winter Games. To curb drug use in the Olympics, the Medical Commission oversaw the analysis—the International Federations actually conducted the tests—through gas chromatography and infrared spectrophotometry, for a total of eighty-six checks. In the eighty-six specimens, no doping substances were found.

While the anti-doping measures proved relatively unproblematic to implement, the incorporation of sex tests raised several issues. According to Thiebault, the very
name “sex control” sparked confusion for it only applied to female participants. Therefore, he tellingly suggested “research into femininity” be utilized instead. In his view, femininity entailed “a group of characteristics peculiar to women.” Although the French doctor failed to elucidate his reason for the name alteration, his choice seemingly represents the IOC’s underlying concern with outward expressions of gender performance.243

In addition to the misleading label, the sex tests faced several logistical problems. While the IOC Medical Commission had wished for the examinations to be completed prior to competition, not all female athletes arrived in France with enough time for this to occur. Furthermore, as planned, only one out-of-every five female participants underwent chromosomal verification.244 For the small percent of women tested, the Medical Commission attempted to perform the tests “with the greatest respect for human rights and with absolute secrecy.”245 A different report noted that the controls occurred in such a secretive manner in order “to avoid all embarrassment.”246 Though the IOC sought to preserve the dignity of anyone who should fail its parameters, the possible disqualification of a woman with different chromosomal makeup from the Olympics reinforced a belief in difference and fostered the notion of an ideal female Olympian.

243 July 14-17, 1968, Report on the Medical Organization at the Grenoble Games, Box 89, IOC Meetings, 1968, IOC Meetings—67th Session, Mexico City, Reports by Commissions, Part II, Folder, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archive.
244 “de la Chapelle, “The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin Screening for ‘Gender Identification’ of Female Athletes,” The Journal of the American Medical Association 256, no. 14 (1986): 1920-1923; “Extracts from the Report of Doctor Thiebault,” 269-273. According to Thiebault, “many of them arrived at the examination in a tense state but as soon as they understood the method used they relaxed, obviously relieved that they did not have to undergo an anatomical examination.”
Yet perhaps more problematically, the sex tests also reified white norms of femininity. Many in the U.S. interpreted the new requirement as an unnecessary annoyance, specifically referencing white, Cold War Western athletes who subscribed to conventional feminine ideals. For example, Shirley Povich of the *Washington Post* posited that in mandating the exam for eighteen-year-old American skier Karen Budge, “the IOC will be a whopping loser.” According to Povich, although “the muscular Russian and Polish babes were not quite as feminine as they declared in the Olympic registry,” Budge was a “peachcake” and had “blue orbs that would melt an entire ski slope.” Moreover, Budge had the capability to “set off a whole cantata of wolf whistles.”Such accounts favorably interpreted outward displays of white heterofemininity, appearances deemed attractive by male voyeurs. According to sociologist Sylvain Ferez, sport is a normative structure that helps define beauty and ugliness. As such, “it produces aesthetic and legal judgments aimed at establishing the institution of gender as something ‘natural’ and as a universal category.” The highlighting of sexual appeal thus compromised athleticism and helped reaffirm sport as a masculine enterprise. Furthermore, although never mentioned explicitly, only white athletes were held up as representative of the ideal Olympic competitor.

Finally, some involved found the selection process too arbitrary. For example, U.S. ski team coach Bob Beattie noted that “the whole business of this testing is mad . . .

They’re picking girls at random. Likewise, in the words of one anonymous Olympic official, the arbitrary selection “did nothing to solve the problem since it still left too many of the girls unchecked.” Accordingly, this “problem” would best be solved if they tested “the most obvious” of the athletes. Clearly “the most obvious” implied those women who did not subscribe to Cold War Western femininity—most likely a reference to the muscular, powerful Olympians from Eastern European countries.

Despite the aforementioned concerns, no female athlete failed the sex test in Grenoble. As Thiebault recounted, “happily for us there has been no doubtful case because I still wonder how we would have acted if a young woman (with a fairly famous name) had become a problem.” Yet, Austrian Olympian Erika Schinegger, world champion skier and national hero, had opted to withdraw from the Grenoble Olympics rather than publicly undergo the sex test. Weeks prior to the 1968 Winter Games, the Austrian team had visited the University Hospital in Innsbruck for a routine check. “I was told my tests had not proved satisfactory, that I could no longer compete as Erika,” Schinegger recalled. “I was asked to sign a declaration that I was withdrawing from the sport for personal reasons.” The doctors informed her that she possessed internal male sex organs. After transformative surgery, in 1968 Schinegger returned to the men’s

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249 Povich, “This Morning,” D1.
251 Ibid., D1. The following competitors, considered retrospectively questionable, did not compete: Soviet Claudia Bayarskikh, Austrian Erika Schinegger and Austrian Krastana Stoesa.
252 July 14-17, 1968, Report on the Medical Organization at the Grenoble Games, Box 89, IOC Meetings, 1968, IOC Meetings—67th Session, Mexico City, Reports by Commissions, Part II, Folder, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archive.
Europa Cup tour as Erik.²⁵⁵ Perhaps because the failure occurred outside the Olympics, and Schinegger’s transition reified binary sex, Thiebault was able to dismiss the adversaries of sex testing and suggested that the IOC continue the practice in the Mexico City Summer Games.

_Sex Testing in the Mexico City Summer Olympics_

As Cold War Western gender norms shaped Olympic protocol, the polarized ideological struggles between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. continued to influence nations located at the periphery. According to historian Julia Sloan, Mexico and other similarly positioned “Third World nations” were unable to escape the enveloping weight of the volatile disagreement, in terms of international relations and domestic affairs. In presenting a more nuanced view of the traditional Cold War narrative, she argued that Mexico interpreted the global conflict as an example of aggression orchestrated by imperialist states to dominate less developed countries. In other words, Sloan posited that Mexico envisioned the turmoil “not as a contest between communism and capitalism, but as a contest between the nations that were internationally dominant and those that were dominated.”²⁵⁶ This sentiment molded Mexico City’s bid, as well as the country’s marketing of the 1968 Summer Olympics.

In the 1960s, Mexico struggled in both domestic affairs and international perceptions. Despite two decades of substantial economic growth, dubbed the “Mexican miracle,” political fractures plagued the country. A tacit understanding between the U.S. and Mexico had allowed Mexican authorities a degree of autonomy in exchange for guaranteed internal stability. Thus the ambiguous nature of the Mexican Federal Penal Code allowed the ruling party, the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), to pass the “Law of Social Dissolution” and punish acts of disorder, subversion and treason.\textsuperscript{257} With all opposition essentially silenced, the PRI maintained only a pretense of democratic leadership, creating a volatile situation that would come to a violent head mere days before the Olympic opening ceremonies.\textsuperscript{258}

Concurrently, international opinions marginalized Mexico as a “developing” nation. To combat this image, Mexican authorities looked to the prestige and power afforded by sport.\textsuperscript{259} In the 47\textsuperscript{th} Session of the IOC in Helsinki, Finland, representatives of Mexico City placed a bid for the 1960 Games, hoping to bring the Olympics to Central America for the first time.\textsuperscript{260} Although Rome, Italy, eventually earned the honors, Mexico City garnered esteem through its organization of the 1955 Pan American Games.\textsuperscript{261} The focus on sport continued unabated as the government poured resources into new facilities. For example, according to Mexican Olympic Committee president Marte R. Gomez, by 1960 the country had invested one hundred million pesos in its state-

\textsuperscript{257} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{260} “Extract of the Minutes of the 47\textsuperscript{th} Session,” \textit{Olympic Review} 34-35 (September 1952): 20-29.
of-the-art “City of Sport.” Although Mexico’s governmental spending would later be questioned in a student-led protest, the IOC recognized the commitment to sport and awarded Mexico City the 1968 Summer Olympics.

When Mexico City defeated Buenos Aires, Argentina; Detroit, United States; and Lyon, France; as host city, members of the IOC reacted with mixed support. According to historian Eric Zolov, an implicit ethnocentrism underlined the hesitancy of some to wholeheartedly embrace the city, while many Mexican citizens responded with celebratory unease; both wondered if it was viable for a financially unstable country to stage the Olympics. The combination of ethnocentrism from abroad and skepticism from within encouraged the leaders of Mexico City to control all images surrounding the event. Zolov argued that the Cultural Olympiad, a year-long scheduling of cultural events, enhanced this aim through the conveyance of five specific themes for foreign consumption. First, the official logo of the 1968 Summer Games depicted Mexico City as a thriving, cosmopolitan destination. To curb the image of Mexico as a “developing” nation, such demonstrations of modernity proved abundant. Almost in contrast, a second aim was to illustrate Mexico’s authenticity through a range of folkloric exhibitions. Third, promoters deployed bright colors to portray the country as both festive and exotic.

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262 Marte R. Gomez, “Mexico’s New City of Sport,” *Olympic Review* 71 (1960): 30-31. Located to the east of Mexico City, the City of Sport maintained an 8,200-seat stadium, thirty-six football grounds, twenty-six basketball courts, twenty-five baseball grounds, nineteen volleyball nets, two Olympic pools, one diving pool and one hockey ground.

263 Allen Guttmann, *The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992), 129-130. As Guttmann noted, with the 1964 Games in Asia for the first time, movement into South America was a logical step for the IOC as a way to continue universalizing the Games.

264 Zolov, “‘Showcasing the Land of Tomorrow’,” 165.
As a fourth ideal, organizers deployed iconic images of doves to represent Mexico’s role as peacemaker in a time of international turmoil. In retrospect, this attempt seems hypocritical in light of the Tlatelolco Massacre that occurred prior to the opening ceremonies. Concerned with governmental oppression, irresponsibility and spending—epitomized by the enormous Olympic budget—students gathered in the Plaza de las Tres Culturas in protest on October 2. This peaceful gathering erupted in deathly violence. Never one to admit the intimate relationship between the Olympics and politics, Brundage responded the following day that the Games must continue.

Finally, according to Zolov, “liberated women” were strategically utilized to enhance the country’s representation as modern. Because many considered Mexico a machista society, one in which women were denied mobility and rights, the organizers used the Olympics as a forum to highlight a new, modern woman. Officials recruited and showcased middle-class, lighter-skinned female volunteers to present a particular image. The most notable example stemmed from the torch lighting ceremony, where Norma Enriqueta Basilio served as the first woman to ever light the Olympic Cauldron. This creation and conveyance of a modern woman mirrored the IOC’s beliefs about appropriate female Olympians, those who subscribed to white, middle-class notions of femininity and who also possessed the correct chromosomes.

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266 Estimations on the number of deaths range and remain unclear. Official reports first declared four deaths, followed by the hospitals citing twenty-six. Some more current approximations suggest the death toll is closer to two hundred.
268 Zolov, “‘Showcasing the Land of Tomorrow’,” 167-178.
Although Thiebault, the French sex control authority, unwaveringly granted approval to the Olympic sex test procedure, Brundage attempted to delegate authority to the International Federations prior to the Mexico City Games. He was concerned about the legality of the IOC mandating sex and doping controls. de Mérode, on the other hand, wanted complete control. As a result, in the months leading up to the Summer Olympics, the two clashed in a series of circular letters. On August 26, 1968, Brundage informed the International Federations and the National Olympic Committees that it was not the intention of the IOC to carry out the tests. Yet, he explained, all Olympians must comply with the regulations. In his view, the International Federations would enforce sex testing policies and anti-doping procedures. Immediately, de Mérode responded that the “absolute confusion” caused by Brundage’s misinformation “is a serious blow to the work we [the Medical Commission] are trying to achieve.” He further reasoned that “this change of opinion brings us back to the question of how much we can depend on the decisions of the IOC.” Worried about belittling the efforts of the Medical Commission, Brundage later agreed that all testing in Mexico City would be done under the supervision of the committee and according to its regulations.

Therefore, for the Mexico City Olympics, the IOC required that “all women athletes participating in the Games will be controlled” by the Medical Commission. Led by Eduardo Hay, a professor of gynecology and obstetrics, 803 female Olympians

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underwent a sex check. According to Chicago Tribune reporter Marion Lay, the reactions of the tested individuals ranged from carefree nonchalance to severe stress. Moreover, in response to the long wait outside the polyclinic, “some athletes suggested that if doctors were good-looking enough, one might skip the test and prove her femininity by seducing him.”274 Such sentiments demonstrate the connection between femininity and heterosexuality.

Again, no abnormalities were officially reported. Although all female Olympians passed the sex measures in 1968 and received “femininity certificates,” documentation that verified Olympic womanhood, Berlioux remained suspicious. “We should remember that the controls did not in fact lead to any disqualifications,” she noted. “On the contrary, certain ‘female’ competitors disappeared from the scene.”275 While the Games remained free from “inauthentic” women, the IOC disqualified two athletes and one team for doping violations. Swedish modern pentathlon Hans-Gunnar Liljenwall had absorbed too much alcohol, resulting in the disqualification of the entire team, and a wrestler had inhaled a cotton-wool swab soaked in ammonia.276

Despite the barring of only two athletes by the IOC, later popular reports of the 1968 Mexico City Games described the rampant use of performance enhancing substances.277 On the forefront, an investigative piece in Sports Illustrated highlighted the universal trend of drug-use in elite competition. Penned by Bil Gilbert, the report chronicled the extensive athletic dependency on special pills, formulas and shots for

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276 Ibid., 561-564.

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enhanced performances. Furthermore, he argued that if not banned, drug usage would only grow exponentially.\textsuperscript{278} Similarly, according to writer Jack Scott, drugs and sport “is becoming as common among athletes as the wearing of socks.”\textsuperscript{279} In this \textit{Chicago Tribune} article, Bill Toomey, the 1968 gold medalist in the decathlon and the winner of the AAU’s Sullivan Award, admitted that he utilized drugs to assist his Olympic performance. Decathlon teammate Tom Waddell verified Toomey’s account and further claimed that more than a third of the U.S. track and field team ingested steroids prior to competition.\textsuperscript{280} In response to the \textit{Chicago Tribune} article, Sam Goldberg, a U.S. decathlon hopeful, affirmed the commonly-held notion that “no decathlete could win an Olympic medical without the aid of steroids and/or amphetamines.” He also explained that “the same idea exists, but to a slightly lesser degree, as far as securing a berth on our American Olympic team.”\textsuperscript{281} The athletes who stepped forward all articulated nationalism as the bolstering factor in the decision to dope. As weightlifter Ken Patera noted, “when I hit Munich next year, I’ll weigh in at about 340, maybe 350. Then we’ll see which are better—his (Soviet champion Vasily Alexeyev’s) steroids or mine.”\textsuperscript{282}

Regarding female Olympians, anxiety over steroid use also proliferated. For example, after receiving a medal in the 1968 Olympics, Olga Connolly—the Czechoslovakian discus thrower renowned for both her Olympic gold medal-effort in the 1956 Melbourne Games and public love affair with U.S. discus thrower Harold

\textsuperscript{278} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{280} Ibid.
Connolly—told Charles Maher of the *Los Angeles Times* that she refused to return to the 1972 Munich Games. According to the story, when Connolly discovered that ninety percent of European female finalists in the Mexico City Games ingested steroids, she opted to terminate her throwing career rather than compete. “I don’t like track any more . . . Because of the drug business,” she explained. Tellingly, Connolly’s decision to end her Olympic vocation did not stem from medicinal concerns but from fears of masculinization. “Steroids make them [female competitors] more muscular, far more so than women used to be,” she explained. In conjunction with her public, heterosexual love affair, Connolly’s embodiment of heteronormativity clearly entailed an embrace of gender norms. With an abundance of such reports, and the paralleling gender anxieties, the IOC Medical Commission opted to increase its vigilance for the 1972 Winter and Summer Olympics.

*The Sex Check in the 1972 Sapporo Winter Olympics*

In the late 1930s, Japan was poised to serve as the first Asian country to host the modern Olympics. Prior to Sapporo’s and Tokyo’s effective bids for the 1940 Winter and Summer Games, respectively, the Olympic movement had remained rooted in Europe and the United States. Although the 1937 Japanese invasion of China revoked the bid and the outbreak of World War II eventually canceled the 1940 Games, Japan’s

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284 Since the reestablishment of the modern Olympic movement in 1896, the cities to host the Games were Amsterdam, Netherlands; Athens, Greece; Berlin, Germany; Chamonix, France; Lake Placid, United States; Los Angeles, United States; Paris, France (twice); St. Louis, United States; St. Moritz, Switzerland; and Stockholm, Sweden.
successful campaign relied upon an important discursive paradigm that held long-lasting implications for the Olympic Movement. Significantly, the successful campaign presented Japan as the embodiment of oppositional tensions, which included being geographically Eastern and Western, old and new, and modern and traditional. In the interwar years, this strategy of blended conventions resonated with the IOC; however, it also allowed the predominantly European Olympic authorities to mark Japan as different. Furthermore, as anthropologist William W. Kelly illustrated, all later Olympic Games hosted by Asian cities were similarly constructed as dissimilar from the European events, both culturally and politically. Therefore, when the Summer Olympics reached Japan in 1964 and the Winter Olympics in 1972, the Japanese organizing committees sought to use the forum as signifiers of the country’s rebirth and selective modernization.

After experiencing the devastation of World War II, Japan hoped to alter its image from a tarnished, defeated country to that of a nation replete with economic prosperity and confidence. Banned from the 1948 Olympics for fighting with the conquered Axis Powers, Japan returned in the 1952 Helsinki Games and started to utilize international events to help construct a new image. As historian Sandra Wilson explained, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, along with the 1970 World Exposition in Osaka, showcased

287 John Horne, “Understanding Sport and Body Culture in Japan,” Body & Society 6, no. 2 (2000): 73-74. As Horne explained, Japanese “modernization” was selective in its incorporation of ideals and conventions from elsewhere, which enabled the country to develop as an Asian “Other” (from the Western vantage), and simultaneously as superior to its nearby Asian neighbors. Accordingly, Japan existed as both “ultra-Oriental” and “trans-Oriental.”
“deliberately-crafted versions of Japan’s past, present and future,” designed to persuade both domestic and international audiences of the country’s flourishing position.\textsuperscript{289} Innovative satellite technology used in the 1964 Games, which permitted live global broadcasts for the first time in Olympic history, bolstered these dual aims. For example, the marathon race was run throughout Tokyo, on a course strategically devised to visually highlight the city’s urban change.\textsuperscript{290}

While science, technology and urban renewal proved to be the emphasized trifecta of modernity in the wake of World War II, Japanese sport also experienced subtle changes in the postwar period. Comparable to overarching social ideologies, sport in Japan both mirrored and resisted conventions from the geographic-West. As sport scholar John Horne noted, Japan concurrently appropriated European pastimes, such as baseball and football, and also maintained sporting hegemony over its Pacific neighbors.\textsuperscript{291} Japanese women, therefore, saw increased opportunities for participation, including at the Olympic level. Female competitors excelled in the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, however, representations of women’s achievements remained rooted in patriarchal gender norms. As Japanese scholar Rio Otomo argued, sporting narratives shaped gold medal achievements as “self-sacrificial deeds for the nation,” and, moreover, the athletes were presented as dutiful daughters of fatherly coaches, rather than as individual sporting victors.\textsuperscript{292} Although Japanese sporting gender norms appeared to

\textsuperscript{290} Tagsold, “Modernity, Space and National Representation,” 196.
\textsuperscript{291} Horne, “Understanding Sport and Body Culture,” 81-82.
\textsuperscript{292} Rio Otomo, “Narratives, the Body and the 1964 Tokyo Olympics” \textit{Asian Studies Review} 31, (June 2007): 121.
complement those of Cold War Western countries, concerns regarding masculinized female athletes continued to proliferate in the 1972 Sapporo Winter Games.293

In the 64th Session of the IOC, merely two years after the conclusion of the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the Executive Board approved Sapporo as the host city for the 1972 Winter Games.294 After the perceived successes of the dual medical checks in Mexico City, the IOC also maintained the necessity of sex tests and doping controls, and continued to debate the question of oversight. In particular, Brundage, still wary of the legality and expenses involved, remained convinced that the IOC should delegate responsibility and require the International Federations to exam all competitors. Consequently, in the 68th Session of the IOC, held in Warsaw in 1969, de Mérode reiterated that each International Federation was required to carry out its own alcohol, dope and sex tests, with the assistance of the IOC Medical Commission.295 Because confusions failed to dissipate, the Medical Commission drafted two official pamphlets—one on anti-doping measures and one labeled “Sex Control”—to provide additional guidance for the Sapporo and Munich Games. The pamphlets were made available during the 72nd Session of the IOC, mere days before the opening ceremonies of the Winter Games were scheduled to commence.296


294 “Minutes of the 64th Session of the IOC,” *Olympic Review* 95 (August 1966): 79-93. In this session, Sapporo beat competing host cities Banff, Alberta; Lahti, Finland; and Salt Lake City, United States. Sapporo earned thirty-two of the sixty-one votes.


296 “Summary of the 72nd Session of the International Olympic Committee,” *Olympic Review* 53-54 (February-March 1972): 71-75. Sex tests and doping controls were combined under “medical costs.”
The IOC Medical Commission’s 1972 “Sex Control” pamphlet provided draconian stipulations for all female Olympians. First, any competitor registered as “being female” was required to take a sex control examination prior to participation.\textsuperscript{297} The pamphlet dictated that all tests must occur in the presence of at least one member of the Medical Commission, which at the time was comprised of eight men and one woman.\textsuperscript{298} Second, any athlete who had previously undergone a check and possessed a “sex control certificate,” granted by either the IOC Medical Commission or an IF during world or continental championships, were exempted. Third, the samples, derived from either the buccal mucous membrane or hair roots, were screened for X-chromosomes and Y-chromosomes. Finally, should a sample prove irregular, the IOC Medical Commission mandated a silent disqualification. The pamphlet explained that “neither the fact of this examination nor its results will be made public out of deference to the human rights of the individual.”\textsuperscript{299} As any alternative chromosomal combination besides XX resulted in immediate ineligibility, the IOC Medical Committee unfairly barred competitors and chromosomally circumscribed sex division.

Veiled in paternalistic conventions of fair play, the guidelines constructed Olympic womanhood along binary notions of Cold War Western gender ideals.

According to the \textit{Sapporo 1972 Olympic Winter Games Official Report}, the purpose of

the control measure in Japan was to deter muscular competitors from entering women’s competitions. The report explained that:

Women athletes are commonly required to undergo an examination to confirm their sexual identity because of the large number of individuals, who, although appearing to be female, have the physical characteristics of males.\footnote{Organizing Committee for the Sapporo Winter Games, \textit{Sapporo 1972 Olympic Winter Games Official Report Part II} (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1972), 386}

Notably, this statement does not relay fears of chromosomal “abnormalities” but instead focuses on the speculation of masculine traits in women Olympians. Such an overt postulation begs the question, what exactly are “male” and “female” characteristics? According to historian Susan K. Cahn, female athleticism threatens a hierarchical status quo that depends upon a belief in natural and irrevocable gender difference. In the Cold War West, “not only have men dominated the playing fields, but athletic qualities such as aggression, competitiveness, strength, speed, power, and teamwork have been associated with masculinity.”\footnote{Susan K. Cahn, \textit{Coming on Strong: Gender and Sexuality in Twentieth-Century Women’s Sport} (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 3} Thus, to preserve athleticism as a male characteristic, sport authorities sought compensation through sex control measures.

Presumably, then, the Sapporo organizers wanted to eliminate any woman who transgressed gender boundaries, which consequently denied female athleticism. Equipped with the decrees of the Medical Commission pamphlet, the Sapporo Olympic medical authorities administered checks on the 217 female participants registered in the
three permissible sports: luge, skating and skiing. Although no “abnormalities” were reported, the sex control measures did not escape criticism.

The Danish Protest

In the midst of the Sapporo Olympics, Brundage received an alarming report regarding the IOC’s use of chromosomal verification. Penned by five Danish medical doctors, “A Memorandum on the Use of Sex Chromatin Investigation of Competitions in Women’s Division of the Olympic Games” critiqued sex control and called for the IOC to abolish the practice. The authors—two psychiatrists, two geneticists and one gynecologist—lamented the policy and provided scientific and ethical justifications for its termination.

Foremost, the authors noted that while no medical or legal delineation of sex existed, “the international olympic committee [sic] has made its own definition.” The five Danish authorities did acknowledge that three types of sex could be outlined, chromosomal sex, somatic sex and psychosocial sex; however, none provided an unambiguous classification system. Accordingly, chromosomal sex, the preferred measurement of the IOC, utilized the sex chromosomes, while somatic sex incorporated both gonadal anatomy and secondary sex characteristics. Psychosocial sex related to the self-identification of the individual. Significantly, the authors argued that relying solely

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303 Organizing Committee for the Sapporo Winter Games, Sapporo 1972 Olympic Winter Games, 386.

upon chromosomal sex unfairly barred women with a variety of naturally occurring “abnormalities”, including ovarian dysgenesis, pure gonadal dysgenesis and testicular feminization, more commonly known as Morris’ syndrome. The medical doctors explained that “the test discriminates . . . in a way that may lead to serious psychological disturbances in the individuals discriminated against.” More directly, they concluded that the IOC’s sex control was “irresponsible from medical point of view, and unethical.”

After reviewing the report, from which the president of the Danish National Organizing Committee quickly distanced himself, Brundage advised de Mérode that the Medical Commission should consider the “disquieting” information. In a circular letter, the IOC president suggested to the chairman that as the technical test proved unreliable, “maybe the eye of a 25 year old would be better.”

Brundage’s mocking proposition implies that the underlying purpose of sex control was to deny access to any unattractive female competitors. In other words, the IOC’s main intent was to prohibit women who did not abide by the heterofeminine ideals of the Cold War West.

Upon learning of the Danish protest, the International Federations requested that de Mérode meet with the authors of the troubling report. The president of the Medical Commission listened to the concerns of the medical professionals and yielded that “it was practically impossible, scientifically, to define the sex of an athlete.” Nevertheless, he

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305 Ibid.
306 February 18, 1972, Letter from Danish NOC President to IOC, Box 105, Commissions, IOC Commissions and Committees—Medical Commission, 1970-1973 Folder, Avery Brundage Collection, University of Illinois Archive. Two weeks after the Danish medical doctors sent the report, the Danish NOC president clarified in a letter to Brundage that he had no part in the study.
remained steadfast in his belief that sex testing was a necessity. According to de Mérode, the aim of the control was not to decree the sex of the examined, but to ensure that no woman possessed a physiological advantage. He also reasoned that “practical” issues raised by the IOC outweighed the professors’ “scientific side.” Brundage agreed.

Hay, a member of the IOC Medical Commission and the overseer of the exam in 1968, similarly defended the objective of the sex test in 1972. In his view, the IOC could not accommodate individuals with different chromosomal types due to the need for fair play. He thus vocalized the necessity of gender conformity for entrance into women’s Olympic events, a belief he upheld for years. As Finnish geneticist Albert de la Chapelle later reflected about Hay, “he is a charming person, but he still does not quite know what the whole thing is about.” Hay’s ignorance and repeated emphasis on femininity is telling; according to such assertions, strong female athletes must be controlled. As he illustrated, the IOC appeared apprehensive about powerful Olympians who did not abide by contemporary mores. Changes, therefore, would not be forthcoming in Munich.

Sex Control in the 1972 Munich Summer Olympics

The division of Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), supported by Great Britain, France and the United States, and the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), supported by the Soviet Union, created considerable

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309 Quoted in Hunt, *Drug Games*, 23.
311 February 22, 1981, Letter to Elizabeth Ferris from Eduardo Hay, Correspondence Between Ferguson-Smith and Dr. Elizabeth A. Ferris on Proposed Joint Article on Chromosomal Abnormalities and Sex Test of Femininity, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
animosity. Disturbed by the division, and still Cold War Western in orientation, the IOC recognized the National Olympic Committee of the Federal Republic in 1951 and denied the GDR application, consequently limiting participation in Helsinki to the West Germans. After a brief period of dual recognition and joint-team efforts, the IOC relented and granted the GDR the right to enter a separate team in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics.\textsuperscript{312} From that point forward, the two nations competed under separate flags and sought to demonstrate its ascendancy through athletic capital.

Therefore, the masterminds of the Munich bid, West German Olympic Committee president Willi Daume and influential politician Hans-Jochen Vogel, sought the lauded host-city-position as a way to resituate West Germany at the forefront of international affairs. Prior to the Munich Games, the country’s global ventures remained primarily limited to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, European pursuits and sporadic exchanges in cultural diplomacy.\textsuperscript{313} Daume and Vogel posited that the return of the Olympics to Germany would encourage urban regeneration, generate civic conciliation, increase tourism and “overlay residual images of the recent past with new narratives about the country’s political, economic, social and cultural acumen.”\textsuperscript{314}

Yet, similar to the larger German population’s burden of its Nazi past, the Munich Olympics Organizing Committee’s (MOOC) recognized the 1972 Olympics’ encumbering position. Promoters sought to both remember and dissociate from the tragedies of Nazi Germany. The eleven-year-span from 1958 to 1969 served as the acme

\textsuperscript{312} Guttmann, \textit{The Olympics}, 95-99.
\textsuperscript{313} Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, \textit{The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany} (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010), 2.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., 4.
of public demand for somber reflection and exacting retribution; however, according to scholars Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, “by 1965, the year in which the Munich Olympic bid was conceived, a paradoxical mix of heightened sensitivity and moral ambiguity toward the past had clearly been established.”\textsuperscript{315} Hence, the 1972 Munich Games embraced an apocryphal vision of the country’s heritage and presented a purposeful narrative about a newly modern, albeit divided, Germany.

Despite the MOOC’s greatest efforts to convey a positive image of a new West Germany, the 1972 Munich Olympics “were to be remembered for one of the world’s most horrifying acts of political terror.”\textsuperscript{316} In the midst of the Games, the Palestinian terrorist organization Black September took eleven Israeli athletes hostage. After a foiled rescue attempt, all eleven were killed.\textsuperscript{317}

On September 6, the day after the “Munich Massacre” occurred, Brundage announced that “The games must go on” in a speech that many criticized as insensitive.\textsuperscript{318} Although a controversial and seemingly callous decision, the Olympic Games followed the predilection of its president and commenced after a memorial and moment of silence. Along with the scheduled competitions, sex control continued undeterred.

With the 1972 “Sex Control” pamphlet’s stipulations previously implemented in Sapporo, the required chromosomal checks ran relatively smoothly in Munich. Unlike past sample-collection procedures, the MOOC suggested that International Federations

\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{316} Guttmann, \textit{The Olympics}, 138.
use hair-roots for examination. Rather than through a cheek-swab, physicians located chromosomes on hair follicles. According to the *Official Report of the Munich Olympics*, “the sex of a person can be diagnosed without difficulty from the hair root just as certainly as by the usual methods.”

While perhaps scientifically innovative, the purpose of the hair root inspection appears to contradict de Mérode’s previous assessment that sex control measures seek to prevent unfair advantage, not denote sex classifications. This inconsistency suggests that the IOC Medical Commission, and consequently the International Federations and Organizing Committees, did not recognize or agree upon the fundamental reasoning for sex testing. Nevertheless, equipped with a self-assurance provided by novel technology, and under the watchful eye of the Medical Commission, the International Federations conducted 960 sex tests and validated the authenticity of 114 “sex control certificates.”

Yet, despite the ease in implementing the process, the Medical Commission quickly faced a worrisome situation. For the first time since sex testing was commenced, whispers of failures surfaced.

Because the IOC proved stringent in its non-disclosure policy, the actual number of women who failed the sex test remains unknown. Rumors, however, inundated most Olympics. In 1993, an Olympic official offhandedly remarked that there had been at least one-to-two disqualifications at every Olympic Games except one, from 1968 to 1988.

Scholars have therefore attempted to estimate the total number, basing their

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320 Ibid.
321 February 22, 1981, Letter to Elizabeth Ferris from Eduardo Hay, Correspondence Between Ferguson-Smith and Dr. Elizabeth A. Ferris on Proposed Joint Article on Chromosomal Abnormalities and Sex Test of Femininity, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
approximations on the ratio of chromosomal “abnormalities” within the larger population. For example, gynecologist John S. Fox suggested that as many as one in every four hundred competitors were wrongly excluded.\(^{322}\) The total tally, however, remains unclear. Some further speculate that when faced with an unexpected test result, questioned athletes may have preferred to withdraw rather than submit to clinical examinations that would permit eligibility.\(^{323}\) According to Hay, this happened approximately a dozen times from 1968 to 1980.\(^{324}\)

Unfortunately, the IOC Medical Commission fretted little over the number of women unfairly barred. More disconcertingly, from the perspective of Olympic officials, was the rumor that a male masquerader successfully evaded detection in the Munich Games. According to various insinuations, the Korean women’s volleyball team included a male player to help the team earn the bronze medal. To avoid exposure, the squad devised a complex scheme where the person who underwent the sex test was a woman carrying the passport that belonged to the man who participated in the Games.\(^{325}\)

Regardless of the accuracy or exaggeration of this tale, after the closing ceremonies of the Munich Games, rumors that three women failed the chromosome check


\(^{324}\) February 22, 1981, Letter to Elizabeth Ferris from Eduardo Hay, Correspondence Between Ferguson-Smith and Dr. Elizabeth A. Ferris on Proposed Joint Article on Chromosomal Abnormalities and Sex Test of Femininity, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\(^{325}\) Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, “The Sex Test in International Sport,” The Sex Test in International Sport, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
proliferated. In response to these suspicions and resultant protests, de Mérode proclaimed in a press release that “scientifically the examinations are irreproachable” and that, “from an administrative point of view everything is perfectly in order.”

Although most names still remain clandestine, the IOC’s handling of failures is significant. Whereas official policy publicized all doping violations, the Medical Commission refused to release the names of any woman deemed irregular. According to Medical Commission member Hay, the IOC published and circulated doping breaches as a tool to deter others from following suit. In cases of sex control abnormalities, however, “care must be taken for the result to be kept secret,” he explained. Furthermore, “her malformation should not be publicised since she is not at fault.” With this arrangement, the IOC shaped male Olympians who doped as competitive cheaters and female Olympians who did not pass the sex test as irregular monstrosities. Yet, fears of female dopers and the anxieties fostered by sex control failures further conflated and seized public attention as the GDR gained international sporting prestige.

In the 1961 edition of *Olympic Review*, Marie-Therese Eyquem, the General Superintendent of Women’s Sports in France, penned an article dedicated to the status of female participation in international contests. Renowned for her militant feminism and socialist leanings, she condemned the sexualization of the female athlete in the piece, yet

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demanded that women try to maintain their elegance and beauty when competing.\textsuperscript{329} Paradoxically, Eyquem lambasted the “inaeshtetical aspect of a graceless woman.”\textsuperscript{330} Concerned with the doping scandals, and clearly influenced by Cold War Western dictates of gender and sexuality, the French pioneer of women’s sport denounced “a particularly revolting form of doping that of women athletes who take male hormones.”\textsuperscript{331} Eyquem’s lament against female dopers mirrored the beliefs of the IOC Medical Commission.

With a deeply-rooted conviction in appropriate gender norms—and a belief that gender and sexuality could be read on the body—the IOC Medical Commission depicted both female drug users and sex test failures as inauthentic, unnatural women. Despite the concerns voiced by the medical community, the IOC Medical Commission therefore carried out chromosomal tests for over two decades. Although the Medical Commission defined dopers as cheaters and ambiguously-sexed athletes as victims of a cruel biology, the IOC nevertheless conflated the two as detractors of true Olympic womanhood. This practice was heightened in the 1976 Montreal Games.

\textsuperscript{329} Thierry Terret, “From Alice Milliat to Marie-Therese Eyquem; Revisiting Women’s Sport in Franc,” \textit{The International Journal of the History of Sport} 27, no. 7 (2010): 1154-1172.
\textsuperscript{330} Marie-Therese Eyquem, “Women Sports and the Olympic Games,” \textit{Olympic Review} 73 (February, 1961): 49. She also questioned a “man who has too much grace.”
\textsuperscript{331} Ibid., 50.

In the 1976 4-x-100 meter medley relay finals, seventeen-year-old East German swimmer Kornelia Ender touched the wall 6.6 seconds ahead of U.S. swimming star Shirley Babashoff. With this slight difference, Ender and the German Democratic Republic (GDR) relay team handed the U.S. its only non-gold-medal finish since the event was first introduced in the 1960 Rome Olympics. The 6.6 second difference not only surprised the U.S. squad, but also ensured Ender of her fifth medal of the Montreal Games, secured her position as the first female swimmer to win four gold medals in a single Olympics and guaranteed that Babashoff walked away with only one gold medal, four silvers and bitter suspicion.

Consumed by Cold War fears and expecting a better performance from its team, the U.S. press immediately conflated sex/gender, sexuality and doping, lambasting the East Germans as masculinized, non-heterosexual cheaters. For example, Bill Shirley of the Los Angeles Times denoted the East Germans as “the world’s first bionic swim team,” while additional reports referred to the 5-foot-9, 163-pound Ender as the “king-sized

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Frank Litsky, “Gold Rush Anticipated by Strong U.S. Swim Team,” New York Times, July 18, 1976, 133. From the introduction of swimming in 1896 to the 1972 Munich Games, the U.S. men had won sixty-three of the 124 gold medals. Similarly, since the inclusion of women’s swimming in the 1912 Stockholm Games, and allowance of American female swimmers in the 1920 Antwerp Games, the U.S. women had won forty-seven of the eighty-four gold medals.
Kornelia.” It should be noted that Babashoff, a U.S. swimming favorite and leader of the onslaught against the East Germans, measured in at 5-foot-10 and 160 pounds.334

The U.S. competitors also provided snide remarks. Wendy Bogioli, who placed third in the 100-meter butterfly, commented that “Kornelia is phenomenal, but personally I wouldn’t want to look like most of the East German swimmers. Sports shouldn’t come to having a woman looking like a man.” Male swimmer John Naber agreed, noting that “our American girls don’t want to make the sacrifice to lift weights . . . . They wanted to go on dates instead, and I can’t blame them.” Accordingly, by training, the East German swimmers had breached the bounds of womanhood.

Yet, the East German swimmers passed all sex testing and anti-doping measures, including the new steroid check. Importantly, the two controls served distinct purposes; however—when discussing female Olympians—medical authorities, athletes and reporters alike viewed the sex and anti-doping controls as a single tool to prohibit socially inappropriate women from competition. This chapter outlines the ambiguity of anti-doping and sex tests in the 1976 and 1980 Olympics, and argues that the confusion consequently conflated muscular women and substance-enhanced athletes as unethical cheaters.

Furthermore, media accounts demonstrated the continued inability of Olympic authorities to pinpoint the exact composition of women. Most tellingly, Olympic medical authorities were regularly featured as incorrectly outlining chromosomal verification as a

measure to “catch” those who had ingested steroids. Such accusations helped deny strength and power as acceptable characteristics of womanhood for Olympians. Similarly, reporters repeatedly described the Eastern European competitors with disgust and framed Cold War Western women as both appropriately feminine and heterosexual. In such accounts, only white women garnered attention as the embodiment of normal, reinscribing certain gender stereotypes for women of color.

Finally, the Cold War West insistently called for increased policing, veiling its rampant nationalism under the guise of fair play. While the head of the East German sport federation, Manfred Ewald, mandated systematic doping, the USOC purposefully ignored similar habits within the United States. Ewald’s requirements were a clear and tragic violation of human rights, however, both arrangements breached the Olympic charter. Nevertheless, the coverage of Olympic controls helped reaffirm conventional femininity as the preferred incarnation of gender, and heterosexuality as the expected embodiment of sexuality.

IOC President Lord Killanin and the Rise of Steroids

After serving the International Olympic Committee (IOC) for two decades, Avery Brundage ended his tumultuous career as IOC president. His successor, Lord Killanin, the head of the Olympic Council of Ireland, assumed the position following the 1972 Munich Olympics. During his reign, volatile political dissention worsened and, as a result, Killanin’s term was marred by nationalistic embroilment, protests and boycotts. Although overseeing a difficult and short presidential term, he did impact the Olympic
movement in two significant ways. First, he eased Brundage’s severe interpretation of amateurism with a more moderate view, recognizing the need for some Olympians to utilize athletically-generated finances.\(^{336}\) Second, Killanin increased the medical surveillance of competitors. In a 1978 speech at the University of Sussex, he articulated his belief that the tendency for nations to utilize fraudulent competitors—“abnormal” women and dopers—“is the most serious affecting international sports and the athlete today.”\(^ {337}\) Consequently, during Killanin’s reign, the IOC focused on medical control, specifically heightening sex/gender checks and anti-doping measures, which included the new steroid test.\(^ {338}\) The use of anabolic steroids, a synthetic form of testosterone, was not new in the 1970s; throughout history, various forms of artificial testosterone were believed to not only strengthen one’s capacity for work but to also enhance sexual experiences—helping foster a cultural lore around the substance.\(^ {339}\) According to Professor John M. Hoberman, “testosterone became a charismatic drug because it promised sexual stimulation and renewed energy for individuals and greater productivity for modern society.”\(^ {340}\) Synthetic forms of testosterone have elicited promises of hormonal rejuvenation, illusions of sexual excitement and, perhaps most importantly to Killanin, fears of superhuman athletes.

Anecdotally, a farmer in the Neolithic Era first recognized the importance of testes—later identified as the production site of testosterone—when he castrated a sheep and noticed improvements in the domestication of the animal. The first deliberate testicular experiment, however, did not occur until the eighteenth century. Rooted in the scientific tradition where gonads determined sex, in 1787 Scottish surgeon John Hunter removed a testicle from a rooster and implanted it in a hen. Although the appendage adhered, Hunter did not perceive any changes in the recipient; therefore, he opted not to publish his findings and only discussed the results in lectures.\footnote{Erica Freeman, David A. Bloom and Edward J. McGuire, “A Brief History of Testosterone,” \textit{The Journal of Urology} 165, no. 2 (February 2001): 371.} Almost a century later, Arnold Adolph Berthold noted that a “bloodstream substance” in roosters affected the species’ appearance and behavior. Unfortunately for the German physiologist and zoologist, his theory was not widely accepted by his contemporaries.\footnote{Ibid.}

Perhaps the most bizarre case in the history of testicular-research occurred at the end of the eighteenth century. In 1889, French physiologist Charles Edouard Brown-Sequard published the results of an auto-experiment, in which he injected testicular extracts from guinea pigs and dogs into himself. As a result of the injections, he reported amplified strength, greater mental capacity and a larger appetite, as well as relief from constipation. Brown-Sequard also noted an increase in the arc of his urine stream.\footnote{Dotson and Brown, “The History of the Development of Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids,” 762.} Importantly, as Hoberman and Charles E. Yesalis explained, the seventy-two-year-old Harvard professor publicly declared “that he had drastically reversed his own decline by
injecting himself with a liquid extract.” Brown-Sequard also provided samples of the liquid, free of charge, to any physician willing to test the substance, thereby sparking a wave of international experiments aimed at curbing a variety of disorders, from cancer to hysteria. Thus, by the end of the century, more than twelve thousand physicians administered such fluids to patients, and, the predecessors to modern pharmaceutical companies sold it as the “Elixir of Life.”

As knowledge of the supposed capabilities of testicular extracts proliferated, medical authorities grew increasingly interested in the strengthening potential of the liquid. In an 1896 paper, Austrian physicians Oskar Zoth and Fritz Pregl proposed injecting athletes with testicular-derived substances in order to enhance their performance. The two had self-injected themselves with extracts and measured increased strength in their middle fingers. Similarly, by the early 1900s, Viennese physiologist Eugen Steinach had developed the “Steinach operation,” a partial vasectomy that claimed to increase hormonal production for the “middle-aged” and “listless.” According to doctors J.L. Dotson and R.T. Brown, “it was apparent to researchers that some substances circulating in the blood was responsible for their findings.” Yet, it was not until 1929 that a more specific paradigm was established, which paved the way for the synthesis of testosterone.

345 Ibid.
346 Ibid.
348 Hoberman and Yesalis, “The History of Synthetic Testosterone,” 77.
349 Ibid., 764.
In 1929, German biochemist Adolf Butenandt isolated the first sex hormone, producing oestrone in crystalline form. With the discovery, experimentation on human subjects excelled. Notably three research teams, each subsidized by competing pharmaceutical companies, raced to isolate and manufacture the driving force behind testicular secretions.\textsuperscript{350} The foundation for modern androgen therapy was thus laid by several scientists. In 1931, Butenandt separated steroidal androgens from urine.\textsuperscript{351} Four years later, Karoly Gyula, David, E. Dingemanse, J. Freud and Ernst Laqueur isolated what they eventually named “testosterone” in crystalline form from the testicles of bulls. The four scientists coined the term testosterone from a combination of “testicle,” “sterol” and “one,” the suffix of ketone. Finally, also transpiring in 1935, Butenandt and Hanisch, as well as L. Ruzicka and A. Wettstein, chemically synthesized testosterone.\textsuperscript{352}

With testosterone isolated and synthesized, research on its potential flourished in the 1940s. Importantly, in 1945, U.S. microbiologist Paul de Kruif published \textit{The Male Hormone}. In this breakthrough monograph, de Kruif endorsed testosterone, claiming it helped increase libido and boosted athletic performance. Although poised at mid-century to be the preeminent therapy for rejuvenation and stimulation, as well as an aid for athletic enhancement, testosterone failed to hold sway in the public consciousness due to the ignorance and biases of physicians regarding sexuality, and also because of the

\textsuperscript{350} Hoberman and Yesalis, “The History of Synthetic Testosterone,” 78.
\textsuperscript{351} As a result of his work on sex hormones, Butenandt was jointly awarded the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1939 with Leopold Ruzicka; however, due to Nazi governmental policies he rejected the award. Butenandt eventually accepted in 1949, after World War II.
general prudery of the U.S. population.\textsuperscript{353} For example, a review of \textit{The Male Hormone} in the \textit{Quarterly Review of Biology} noted the work’s “lusty and ribald flavor,” and reported that it maintained a “tone of vulgarity that vitiates de Kruij’s purpose of presenting the case for testosterone.”\textsuperscript{354} Despite the overarching resistance to testosterone therapy in the United States, body builders on the West Coast notably embraced steroids as a tool to increase muscle mass.\textsuperscript{355} With the dissemination of anecdotes extolling increases in strength and power, athletes increasingly dabbled with synthetic variants of testosterone to improve individual performance. As a result, steroids and sport became intimately linked.

Although the IOC recognized the problem with this connection, amphetamine controls proved a greater concern of the Medical Commission in the early 1960s. Furthermore, the lack of an effective steroid-test deterred its implementation.\textsuperscript{356} For example, the 1972 \textit{Doping} brochure, published by the IOC Medical Commission and distributed to all International Federations and National Olympic Committees to follow for the Munich Olympics, explained that steroids “cannot be detected with certainty” and

\begin{itemize}
\item[353] Hoberman, \textit{Testosterone Dreams}, 55-57.
\item[356] “Minutes of the 65\textsuperscript{th} Session of the IOC,” \textit{Olympic Review} 98-99 (May-August, 1967): 89-95. In the meeting minutes of the 65\textsuperscript{th} Session of the IOC, Porritt addressed the members on the problems of “doping, sex tests and anabolic steroids.” He noted that use of steroids to enhance performance had been on the incline since 1963, and, that “the advantages that such changes can have to sporting activities requiring power are obvious” (95).
\end{itemize}
therefore remained off the list of prohibited substances. As legal scholar Thomas Hunt noted, Porritt and his successor, Prince Alexandre de Mérode, feared that the “inclusion of a pharmacological agent that could not be detected might undermine the legitimacy of the emerging anti-doping framework.” Thus, when Professor Raymond Brooks discovered a successful method for detecting inauthentic testosterone, the Medical Commission quickly incorporated steroids as a prohibited substance.

In the early 1970s, Brooks, a professor at St. Thomas’s Hospital in London, worked on applying radioimmunoassay—a technique that measures antigens, such as hormone levels, by using antibodies—to steroids. He effectively created a test in 1974 that identified orally ingested steroids; unfortunately, the method required two-to-three days for complete analysis. Despite the time-gap required for the molecular examination, the first trial with a steroid check occurred at the Commonwealth Games in Christchurch, New Zealand, in February 1974. Nine athletes tested positive, yet no names were released nor punishments dispensed.

With this breakthrough, the IOC Medical Commission added anabolic steroids to the prohibited substance list in April, 1975, and commenced its detection in the 1976

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361 Ibid., 291.
Montreal Games. Although available, the IOC did not introduce the new technology in the Innsbruck Winter Olympics as the Medical Commission felt that summer athletes were more likely to use anabolic steroids than their cold-weather counterparts. The Olympic authorities may have cast its winter athletes as less inclined to chemically enhance performance; however, anxieties regarding the sex/gender of Eastern Bloc female skiers and skaters still abounded.

Checking Sex in the 1976 Innsbruck Winter Olympics

In 1970, the IOC selected Denver, United States, as the host city for the 1976 Winter Olympics. With the decision, the Colorado capital edged out Sion, Switzerland; Tampere, Finland; and Vancouver, Canada. Preparations commenced immediately; however, two years after accepting the bid, the Denver populous grew disenchanted with the prospect of hosting the Games. In particular, concerns stemmed from the expansion of expenditures asked of the city and the state, as well as the projected environmental impact. Led by local politician and later governor Robert “Dick” Lamm, Denver citizens succeeded in securing a referendum regarding the ability of the State and city to provide the necessary finances to the Denver Olympics Organizing Committee (DOOC). On November 9, 1972, voters resoundingly approved

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an amendment to the Colorado constitution prohibiting the use of further state funds, which forced the DOOC to withdraw its acceptance.\textsuperscript{368}

Upon learning of the Colorado referendum, the IOC scrambled to secure a replacement host city. The Executive Board quickly sent a circular letter and questionnaire to all National Olympic Committees to determine the possibilities for candidatures.\textsuperscript{369} In an effort to keep the Olympics in the United States, the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) offered Salt Lake City as an alternative. Yet, similar to the financial anxieties voiced by Coloradans, the “Mormon Mecca in the foothills of the Rockies” proved unable to guarantee the required funds.\textsuperscript{370} In what proved to be an additional desperate attempt, the USOC next suggested Lake Placid as a potential site.\textsuperscript{371}

Perhaps annoyed with Denver’s abrupt rejection and the apparent ineptness of the USOC, the IOC offered the Games Innsbruck, Austria, a small Austrian city that had previously hosted the Winter Olympics in 1964.\textsuperscript{372}

Due to the smaller window of time allocated for planning, as well as the IOC’s underlying fear that the Winter Olympics were marred by gigantism, professionalism and commercialism, the Innsbruck Olympic Organizing Committee (IOOC) deemed the upcoming 1976 Winter Olympics the “Unpretentious Games.”\textsuperscript{373} Headed by Karl Heinz Klee, the IOOC was determined to limit its budget to the equivalent of forty million

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[]\textsuperscript{369} “Denver,” \textit{Olympic Review}, 524.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
dollars, approximately one-eighth of the projected budget for the upcoming Montreal Summer Olympics.\textsuperscript{374} Although financial austerity was a necessity, medical control—sex testing and anti-doping checks—was a priority.\textsuperscript{375} 

The 1976 Innsbruck Olympics occurred against a backdrop of increased sporting opportunities for Austrian women. According to sport scholar Matthias Marschik, activism in the 1960s sparked a new paradigm of female sporting participation. No longer completely sidelined, women gained opportunities to compete in “traditional men’s sports,” those that required physicality and contact. Despite this glimmer of progressivism, however, Marschik explained that “women’s activities were minimised and ‘ghettoised’ through a system of male control.”\textsuperscript{376} Similar frameworks continued to plague various Cold War Western sporting entities. For example, twenty-eight men and only one woman, Dr. Tenley Albright, served as officers of the USOC at the time, not an uncommon ratio. Moreover, as \textit{Washington Post} journalist Leonard Shapiro explained, “Americans are not the only male chauvinists in the world.”\textsuperscript{377} In 1976, no woman had ever served as an IOC member and would not for another five years.\textsuperscript{378} With such male-centric organization, the IOC Medical Commission continued to mandate sex testing, a policy underlined by nationalistic notions of hetero-femininity.

\textsuperscript{376} Matthias Marschik, “Offside: The Development of Women’s Football in Austria,” \textit{Football Studies} 1, no. 2 (August 1998): 73.  
Nationalism was rampant in the 1976 Winter Olympics. While it touched nearly every aspect of sport, Cold War biases proved overt in the figure skating events. According to the Associated Press, the “ugly business of political dealing and bloc voting is still alive and festering.” As a result, U.S. and U.S.S.R. skaters alike cried partiality, claiming that they did not get “a fair shake” from the Communist-bloc and Capitalist-bloc judges, respectively. From the political standoff, U.S. skater Dorothy Hamill emerged as “a fantasy of grace” to win the women’s gold, earning unanimous first-place votes from the nine judges. Importantly, the nineteen-year-old Chicago native embodied the Cold War Western ideal of hetero-femininity: white, conventionally feminine and romantically (publicly) involved with Dean Martin Jr. As such, she was idolized as a Cold War Western icon of beauty, grace and appropriate athleticism. For example, prior to her free program performance, a member of the audience held up a sign that read “Which of the West? Dorothy!” Referencing Cold War politics and playing upon The Wizard of Oz, the sign-maker asked which Western athlete would defeat East Germany’s Christina Errath for the gold—Hamill. Such positioning of Eastern and Western female athletes as foils not only occurred on ice, but also surfaced in the discourse surrounding sex and doping controls.

Although sex testing and anti-doping checks fell under the authority of the IOC Medical Commission, each maintained a different purpose. According to the Innsbruck

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Olympic Winter Games Official Report, the medical department was divided into three sections: medical care, doping checks and sex checks, “the functions, localities and staff of which were severely separated.”

Not everyone recognized the divergent aims, however, and instead focused on the singular effort to police femininity. This would become increasingly apparent when the East German women captured international attention in the 1976 Summer Olympics.

The Success of the GDR Sport System

At the close of World War II, the Soviet Union established the GDR as a socialist state within the eastern zone of occupied Germany. Although the U.S.S.R. relinquished control in 1949 to the Socialist Unity Party, headed by Wilhelm Pieck, the GDR remained a satellite territory to the Soviets. As German scholars Werner W. Franke and Brigitte Berendonk explained, “in the 1960s, the GDR was a relatively obscure country with a Cold War image and dominated by the ‘Iron Curtain’ surrounding it.”

To absolve this representation, the GDR attempted to utilize sport, specifically the Olympics, as a tool to gain international prestige.

In 1968, for the first time, the GDR competed as its own nation. Prior competitions required the Eastern and Western divisions of Germany to participate as a single entity. Therefore, upon the GDR’s introduction in Mexico City, the small nation of seventeen million people immediately gained international recognition for earning

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twenty-five medals. This trend continued. As Bill Shirley reported in the Los Angeles Times,

By 1972 at Munich, the East Germans even had the Soviet Union and the United States looking nervously over their shoulders as they demonstrated the marvels of socialism by sweeping 66 medals, only 30 less than the superpowers.386

When contrasted with population, the GDR’s success was astonishing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>German Democratic Republic</th>
<th>Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic</th>
<th>United States of America</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>25 17,084,000</td>
<td>91 128,000,000</td>
<td>107 200,706,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>66 17,043,000</td>
<td>99 131,437,000</td>
<td>94 209,896,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>90 16,786,000</td>
<td>125 134,690,000</td>
<td>94 218,035,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>126 16,737,000</td>
<td>195 1368,291,000</td>
<td>174 Did not compete</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>Did not compete</td>
<td>Did not compete</td>
<td>235,825,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>102 16,666,000</td>
<td>132 146,343,000</td>
<td>94 244,499,000</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 2. Medals Earned in Summer Olympics and National Populations, 1968-1988387

To combat questions of illegal enhancements, the GDR invited U.S. journalists and athletes to examine its sport system prior to the Montreal Games. The visit left many in awe. For example, Shirley gapped that the organization, “aided by equal parts of politics and dedication,” provided the equivalency of one hundred million dollars a year


Similarly, in an article entitled “East Germany’s Mighty Sports Machine,” Michael Getler described youth sports and commented that the country’s resultant success “amounts to an extraordinary phenomenon that extends well beyond the world of sports into the realm of international politics, mass psychology and sociology.” Gold medalist Donna de Varona also noted the country’s “excellent organization.”

Importantly, not only was she amazed by the national dedication to exercise, but also that “women are equal.” Unlike in Cold War Western countries, the GDR demanded its female athletes undergo training equivalent to the males. Equality also occurred in medicinal treatments.

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, researchers recovered a variety of documents that detailed the dosages of steroids administered to hundreds of East German Olympic athletes for almost two decades. In 1966, physicians started to administer Oral-Turinabol, an androgenic-anabolic steroid, to male Olympic-potentials. As Franke and Berendonk explained, this was not an atypical practice; steroid use was widespread among athletes in strength-dependent events, including those from the United States.

In the 1976 U.S. Olympic trials, for example, twenty-three athletes failed the drug controls in track and field events in Eugene, Oregon. None were punished. Rather, USOC medical director Daniel Hanley strove to comprehend new testing measures in

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order to assist the U.S. Olympians in avoiding future detection. With the noticeable improvement in its athletes, however, the GDR commenced a state-sponsored program of steroid administration, which incorporated women Olympians in 1968. By 1974, steroid consumption for athletes was a requirement, not a choice. Many female Olympians later reported being forced to ingest “blue pills,” with devastating consequences.394

The rumors regarding the East German athletes abounded. Some speculated that the GDR setup a tent on the outskirts of the Olympic Village to assist its athletes in clearing doping controls.395 Others claimed that the Soviet Union rented a yacht to serve as a floating laboratory. Athletes supposedly boarded the boat the day before competition for testing, to ensure a successful check.396 Yet, the most hostile criticisms were saved for the East German women’s swim team. Perhaps this negative reception stemmed from the GDR’s direct confrontation to the sex/gender paradigm of the Cold War West.

Sex Control in the 1976 Montreal Olympics

Cold War disputes also extended into the host city-selection process. For the 1976 Summer Games, Los Angeles, United States; Montreal, Canada; and Moscow, Soviet Union; emerged as the top three candidates to secure the bid.397 Moscow ended the first round of voting ahead of the other cities; however, the lack of a majority required casting a second series. Therefore, upon the removal of Los Angeles as an option,

Montreal acquired seventeen additional votes—the number previously cast for the U.S. city—to defeat the Soviet Union. Not incorrectly, the Soviets unhappily interpreted the turn-of-events as an example of capitalist countries working in tangent to defeat communist nations. According to Tass, the official news agency of the Soviet Union, IOC members failed to expand the Olympic Movement and instead voted “from their personal political likes and dislikes.” Others similarly suspected that the IOC shied away from having to select one superpower over the other. “They didn’t want to get involved in a power struggle between the two blocs,” reasoned Los Angeles committee member Warren Dorn. Montreal thus earned the right or, as some would later venture, the burden, of hosting the 1976 Summer Olympics.

In his speech before the IOC Executive Board, Montreal Mayor Jean Drapeau promised austerity and frugality for the XXI Olympiad, estimating that the costs would peak at 1.25 million Canadian dollars. Unfortunately, divisive nationalism and ambitious aspirations marred the planning and preparations, pushing the price-tag closer to two billion. The city was consequently left with tremendous debt. As historian and former Olympian Bruce Kidd explained, the bitter clashes between French-speaking Quebeckers and Canadian liberals polarized the country and delayed the necessary organization. Importantly, the provincial government only (reluctantly) guaranteed financial help in

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1973, which granted only three years for facility construction.\footnote{401} In addition, Drapeau rescinded his commitment to austerity and instead proceeded grandiosely. According to historian Allen Guttmann, “he planned for the Olympic Games as if her were a Roman emperor rather than an elected official.”\footnote{402} These compounded issues ensured that the legacy of the Montreal Olympics would be to serve as a warning of mismanagement.

When compared to the governmental difficulties, the Montreal medical services team organized with ease. Directed by Carroll A. Laurin, orthopedic surgeon and professor at McGill Medical School, the Montreal Medical Planning committee met five years prior to the Games to commence its organization.\footnote{403} In the midst of planning, however, the group was forced to adjust to changes made in the Olympic Charter. In 1975, the IOC combined part of Rule 26, the “Eligibility Code,” and Rule 29, the “Participation of Women.” Previously, Rule 26 outlined several requirements for eligibility, including the bounds of amateur status and an anti-doping clause. According to the guideline, all athletes were required to undergo a doping test and anyone found guilty would be disqualified.\footnote{404} Rule 29 listed the sports permissible for women and

\footnotetext[401]{Bruce Kidd, “The Cultural Wars of the Montreal Olympics,” \textit{International Review for the Sociology of Sport} 27, no. 2 (1992): 151-164. Kidd claimed that the difficulties in organization must be understood within the context of nationalism. During the 1970s, the collective identify of Quebeckers opposed the pan-Canadian identity of the federal government. Furthermore, Montreal served as a volatile microcosm of the conflicts, as it was dominated by a small Anglophone elite and home to a large population of French-speakers.}

\footnotetext[402]{Guttmann, \textit{The Olympics}, 143.}


noted that “female athletes may be subjected to medical proof.” Under the new Rule 27 of the 1975 Olympic Charter, the “Medical Code,” the IOC outlined four regulations:

A. Doping is forbidden. The IOC will prepare a list of prohibited drugs.
B. All Olympic competitors are liable to medical control and examination, in conformity of the rules of the Medical Commission.
C. Any Olympic competitor refusing to take a doping test or who is found guilty of doping shall be eliminated.
D. Competitors in sports restricted to women must comply with the prescribed tests for femininity.

This overt combination of sex and doping controls further conflated the purpose of the two policies in the minds of Olympic officials and Olympic audiences.

With the simultaneous introduction of doping controls and sex testing in 1968, the U.S. media had already interpreted the Medical Commission’s implementation of these dual scientific measures as a means to bridle threats to Cold War Western hetero-femininity. The combination of Rule 26 and Rule 29 merely exacerbated the conflation. These accounts constructed non-conventionally feminine women as both unnatural frauds and masculinized cheaters. Such declarations depicted chemical performance enhancement and sex/gender transgression as parallel forms of deviancy, and also again demonstrated the inability of the IOC Medical Commission to locate the exact composition of women.

The underlying concern most regularly repeated in the Cold War Western discourse was the fear of female masculinization as a signifier of non-heterosexuality.

With contemptuous disgust, the U.S. reports regularly pointed out the masculinizing

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405 Ibid., 17
effects female athletes supposedly experienced through the ingestion of steroids.

Increased bulk, the development of facial hair and the deepening of the voice were the most highlighted implications. As sociologist Rebecca Ann Lock noted, being accused of looking like a man is a grave insult in the United States. She argued that “what these kinds of insults reveal is that femininity is aligned with heterosexual attractiveness and one is read as ugly when one’s muscularity is close to that of a man’s.” Furthermore, the assumption suggests that sexuality can be read on the body.

To combat the perceived transgressions of female dopers, the U.S. media described the Eastern European athletes with repulsion and highlighted the heterosexuality of the Americans. As aforementioned, in 1976, led by the successful Ender, the East German women’s swim team received the most antagonistic speculations. For example, Rod Strachan, described by the Chicago Tribune as “a handsome University of Southern California swimmer,” commented that the East German swimmers failed to appear appropriately feminine. He noted that “they’re quite a bit bigger than most of the men on the American team. They could go out for football at USC. They’ve got some big guys there.” The U.S. public also read the squad’s unparalleled and seemingly instantaneous successes with great doubt. Shirley reported that “the explosive power of the teenagers, as well as their uncommonly rapidly improvement, has made some people suspicious.” Not surprisingly, the competitors’ appearance was the central cause of concern. “The girls’ size—reportedly they average

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two inches taller than their opponents—also has caused talk and at least one official complaint,” said Shirley.\textsuperscript{410} This reference to the Olympians’ sizes parallels Lock’s interpretation of compulsory heterosexuality. She argued that popular media always interpret size in terms of muscles. “In these instances,” Lock explained, “the accused or tested dopers are insulted because of their muscularity.”\textsuperscript{411} Importantly, rapid growth appeared to be an issue solely for the female competitors from East Germany. When Australian swim star Shane Gould grew five inches in a short period of time, she experienced no parallel condemnation.\textsuperscript{412} The U.S. doping discourse during the Cold War aligned femininity with heterosexual attractiveness.

Furthermore, some reports noted that such masculinization hindered heterosexual social relationships. Neil Amdur of the \textit{Chicago Tribune} noted that many American women refused to adopt serious weight-training methods, “that the effects of seeing themselves with broader shoulders would create further complications in a social life already inhibited by rigid practice schedules.”\textsuperscript{413} Such accounts envisioned heterosexuality as a tool against masculinization. These assertions not only privileged Cold War Western sex/gender norms but further reasserted sexuality as binary and heterosexuality as correct.

As anxiety over natural sex and doping consumed the public imagination, many sought guidance from the IOC Medical Commission. For example, in a \textit{Chicago Tribune} article, “Drugs in Sport,” Jack Scott depicted doping as a widespread occurrence. While

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{410} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{411} Lock, “The Doping Ban: Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbophobia,” 404.
\item \textsuperscript{412} Shirley, “World’s First Bionic Swim Team,” D1.
\item \textsuperscript{413} Amdur, “Femininity of Prowess,” E2.
\end{itemize}
he described the use of doping in weight lifting and throwing, Scott did so without
judgment and did not criticize male dopers. Of the female competitors, however, he
reported that “the most serious and dangerous use of drugs by females is the taking of
male hormones.” Fortunately, though, according to the reporter, the “new infamous sex
test” was designed to detect the practice.” He clearly conflated the purposes of the
dual measures and interpreted sex testing and doping controls as a single method to detect
and deter unnatural female Olympians. In the same vein, journalist Kathleen Burns
explained that “at the Olympics, women are required to take the sex test to see if male
hormones are present in their systems.”

Perhaps more concerning, however, was the misunderstanding that stemmed from
Olympic sources. As recorded in the New York Times, for example, Olympic reports
suggested that the sex test worked to deter female athletes from ingesting steroids.
Accordingly, the reason the former Olympians from the Soviet Union and Romania
retired unannounced was out of fear that they “would not have passed because they had
been taking male hormones.”

Finally, sportswriters, concerned with the medal count and troubled by muscular
women, masked their nationalism through calls for fair play. Accounts therefore
condemned both the science of and the powerful female Olympians from the Eastern
Bloc. The U.S. Olympic team, accustomed to securing a majority of Olympic medals
with minimal contestation, was shocked when countries from Eastern Europe challenged

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the historical American gold-medal stranglehold. For example, when the Soviet Union
sprinter Valeriy Borzov earned the title, “the world’s fastest human,” the U.S. press was
abhorred. In response to the accomplishment, Los Angeles Times Jim Murray
bewilderedly asked, “I mean, can you believe Volga Boatman winning a sprint?” He
further noted that “Russians are supposed to win things where you grunt a lot, or get a
hernia. Or where you time them with a sun dial.” His more overt nationalism surfaced
when he posited that “they gave Borzov the standard doping test but that ain’t about to
satisfy me. I want to check him for wires and valves and reset buttons . . . . They’re not
kidding me. This guy wasn’t born, he was programmed.” This sentiment illustrates
the nexus of nationalism and doping in Olympic history. To combat the U.S.S.R.
challenges, American athletes condemned the Eastern Europeans as analytical, machine-
like and stoic. Yet sports reporters and U.S. citizens awarded the most hostile criticism to
the Eastern European women.

Under the guise of fair play, the Cold War West condemned the Eastern bloc
countries for utilizing illegal substances. Without self-inspection, the reports critiqued
the eastern Europeans for pushing the limits of human performance and risking the
athletes’ health for the sake of gold medals. In this line of thought, the Eastern European
countries were guilty, not the United States, and therefore, increased policing was
necessary. While nationalism underlined almost the entirety of the U.S. discourse, two
pieces from Los Angeles Times columnist Jim Murray provides the most striking

417 Pat Putnam, “It May be Short but it isn’t Sweet,” Sports Illustrated, March 6, 1972,
418 Volga Boatman was a derogatory nickname created in the west regarding Soviet citizens.
examples. Veiled in humor, yet seeped in nationalism, he degraded the Eastern European countries and painted its women as masculinized cheaters.

The first piece describes the contents of a hypothetical time capsule from the next century. Entitled “100 Years from Now,” the article predicts the status of the sporting world in the year 2076. After Murray posited that in the 2076 Olympic Games the planet Krypton angrily boycotts the 46th Olympiad because the planet Telegony was permitted to enter under the name of Greater Uranus—clearly a satire of the political boycotts that marred the Olympics during the Cold War—he speculated about the continued importance of the sex tests and anti-doping controls in the Games. He wrote that the East German housewife, “Lotta Bulk,” would win the unisex shot-put with a throw of 287 feet. Murray explained that “the 900 pound East German is the first to throw the 16-pound shot overhand.” While couched in humor, Murray’s column nevertheless illustrates the nationalistic interpretation of the Eastern European women, and the intersections of nationalism, gender and sexuality. He ended the piece by suggesting his hyperboles were actually rooted in truth. Murray explained that “if any of all of these things are true, nothing has changed.”

The second piece similarly deploys nationalistic satire to debase the femininity/sexuality of the Eastern European women. Entitled “The New Order comes to the World of Sports,” the article describes a hypothetical interview with the fictitious head of the German sports medicine ministry. Speaking in broken English, the doctor

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421 Ibid.
describes his chemical experiments. The article plays upon the robotic stereotype of the Eastern European competitors and points to the inauthenticity of their bodies and performances. In regard to female competitors, the Dr. explained that he could successfully enlist King Kong in the women’s division. He explained “My poy, ve could get King Kong certified for de girls’ figure skating or der female half of der gold dances! Nothing is impossible for German engineering! All ve need is a few parts from Krupp und a Punsen purner!” ⁴²³ These two articles represent the sentiment that reverberated within the United States. Nationalistic undertones degraded the Eastern European women’s hetero-femininity, and called for increased controls under the guise of fair play.

Yet, degrading the Eastern European women was not solely a U.S. venture. Similar accounts reverberated throughout the Cold War West. For example, writing from Fiesole-Firenze, Italy, Leo Campagnano asked,

As far as women athletes a question is in order. Are they really women these Russian and East German athletes who have no esthetical marks of women, who walk like men, and have a decided masculine face? Is it true they are wonderful performers, but are they women? Or are they a third sex?⁴²⁴

The Cold War Western discourse echoed the IOC’s fair play rhetoric and served to villainize Eastern European women who did not abide by conventional notions of femininity.

Although the two superpowers may have disagreed on appropriate womanhood, through the 1970s the Soviet Union and the United States curbed hostilities in détente, greatly reducing ideological and propagandist conflicts. After this brief glimmer of

⁴²³ Ibid.
relative mollification, however, the 1980s saw a dramatic resurgence in international
dissention. Notably, in 1979, a group of Iranian students overran the U.S. embassy in
Tehran and held fifty-two Americans hostage for 444 days. Additionally, the Soviet
Union invaded Afghanistan one month later to bolster the Afghani’s unstable communist
government. Unable to counter these volatile situations, the United States experienced a
loss of confidence, which was further compounded by domestic stagflation and fuel
shortages. Thus, against a backdrop of heightened nationalistic embroilments, the 1980
and 1984 Olympic Games emerged as even more significant political forums.

_Femininity Control in the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics_

Much to the annoyance of the IOC, only the United States put forward a bid for
the 1980 Winter Olympics. Although the cities of Vancouver and Garibaldi, Canada,
originally demonstrated interest in jointly hosting the Games, the financial concerns
highlighted by the 1976 Summer Olympics convinced the two to abandon the effort. In
the wake of the Montreal Games—which cost an unprecedented amount, nearly
bankrupted the city and took thirty years to pay off—few governments proved interested
in acquiring the debt seemingly required to serve as an Olympic host. On October 4,
1974, the Vancouver-Garibaldi committee officially withdrew its bid, leaving Lake
Placid, New York, as the only candidate. As a result, in an anti-climatic announcement at

425 David Patrick Houghton, _US Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis_ (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
589.
the 75th Session of the IOC, the IOC selected the U.S. city as the location of the 1980 Winter Games. 427

With a population of 2,700 year-round residents, one hundred less than in 1932, Lake Placid became the smallest city to ever host the Winter Olympics. 428 As organizer J.B. Fell noted, the greatest challenge for the city was to prove the “Lake Placid claim . . . that small dedicated communities with appropriate winter sites can still play host to the world’s athletes.” 429 Unfortunately, without the assurance of local, state or federal governmental funding, the Lake Placid Olympics Organizing Committee (LPOOC) faced substantial financial difficulties. Although it had hosted the 1932 Winter Olympics, the city’s standing infrastructures required several improvements, as well as the addition of new facilities, a large concern for a small community. In particular, the LPOOC required renovations for the Olympic Arena, the ski jump and the ski lodge, along with refrigerator enhancements on the bobsled run and speed skating oval. Furthermore, construction of a sport complex—complete with two modern ice skating rinks, eight thousand seats and locker rooms to accommodate up to ten teams at once—was required, in addition to a new outdoor speed skating track, a press center and the Olympic Village. 430 Worrisomely, by 1979 the price tag for the 1980 Olympics had exceeded two hundred million dollars, six times the original estimate. 431

427 Ibid.
430 Ibid., 84-86.
Influenced by the debt incurred by Montreal, the U.S. government initially refused financial assistance, thereby casting doubt on the capabilities of the LPOOC.\textsuperscript{432} Fearful of another last minute withdrawal from a U.S. host city, Olympic officials asked Innsbruck to serve as a substitute should the LPOOC falter.\textsuperscript{433} The U.S. Congress eventually voted to provide support when the LPOOC threatened to terminate its bid. To ensure the LPOOC’s success, the government reluctantly agreed to supply forty-seven million dollars for sport facilities, twenty-two million dollars for athletes’ housing, which was later converted into a federal detention center after the Games, and twelve million dollars for security. Even with this aid, the LPOOC amassed almost six million dollars in debt.\textsuperscript{434} The medical controls required by the IOC undoubtedly increased this encumbrance. President Killianin recognized that “there was no doubt that the programme was expensive;” however, he continued to emphasize its necessity.\textsuperscript{435}

Consequently, during the Lake Placid Olympics the LPOOC and IOC Medical Commission placed a premium on doping and sex/gender controls. Following the guidelines outlined in the Olympic Charter Rule 27, the IOC prohibited five categories of drugs—anabolic steroids, central nervous system stimulators, pain-killing narcotics, psychomotor stimulants and sympathomimetic amines—and required sex/gender testing. Headed by local Lake Placid family practitioner George G. Hart, the LPOOC Medical Services oversaw both the anti-doping controls and the femininity tests. With a budget of

over one million dollars, the group spent $975,000 to curb drug use and $9,250 to detect any sex/gender abnormalities. Yet, according to Medical Commission member Daniel Hanley, the U.S. representative of the IOC Medical Commission, sex-testing procedures and doping checks were complicated, expensive and unnecessary. For, when completed, the results “are the same as what any nearsighted college boy could have told you with a glance across the street.”

Apparently outward subscription to hetero-femininity ensured appropriate womanhood, rendering both controls moot.

Not everyone agreed. With the name changed from “sex control” to “femininity control,” the IOC Medical Commission again demonstrated its concern with muscular women. As Washington Post reporter Ken Denliner explained, the medical tests at the Lake Placid Games served to ensure appropriate feminine participation. First, he noted, women passed through “Femininity Control,” where female competitors presented a certificate. According to Denliner, this document simply stated: “I am woman.” If such affirmation had not been granted, the athlete proceeded to undergo “an uncomplicated sex test.” Deliner explained that certification is necessary for what “one assumed was obvious,” as assumption that again stemmed from outward, hetero-feminine appearance. He further verified his claim through Dan Perl, director of the cytogenetics lab and associate professor of pathology at the University of Vermont. According to Perl, despite any suspicions that may be drawn due to muscular stature, “they really are women.” Perl conflated doping and sex/gender controls, noting that “it gets back to the whole question

of anabolic steroids. Which means it’s more a doping problem. Furthermore, in a different report, he noted that although some women found the measure offensive, “it’s for their own protection,” a reaffirmation of the fair play rhetoric. Clearly many read the IOC’s regulations as a necessary test to control femininity and ensure a level playing field. As professor Michael Bertrand, a scientist from the Institute of Nationale de la Recherache Scientifique on site for the IOC Medical Commission, noted “we’re like policeman. . . . We prevent accidents from happening.” Clearly, the experts from the Cold War West interpreted masculinized females as “accidents.”

**Political Entanglements in the 1980 Lake Placid Winter Olympics**

Not only did Cold War mandates of femininity mar the Lake Placid Olympics, but the 1980 Winter Games also occurred against a backdrop of increasingly volatile international relations. Most significantly, the 1979 U.S.S.R. invasion of Afghanistan and the Soviet’s overt refusal to its remove troops greatly distressed the United States. From the U.S. vantage, the incursion served as a violent resurgence of Communist intent. The Soviet Union, however, viewed its actions as those of a stronger country assisting a faltering neighbor under its sphere of influence. Despite the differing perceptions, both countries utilized the Olympics as a tool to acquire foreign support and invalidate the oppositional nation.

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In the wake of the 1979 Afghanistan controversy, U.S. President Jimmy Carter sought to improve his public persona. Facing reelection, he feared that the country’s confidence in his leadership was diminished due to the enduring Iranian hostage crisis, the Soviet’s demonstration of military hostility and domestic stagflation. Therefore, on January 20, 1980, mere weeks before the scheduled commencement of the Lake Placid Games, during a *Meet the Press* interview Carter articulated an ultimatum for the Soviet Union: remove troops from Afghanistan within one month or the United States would lead a boycott of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics. The U.S. president reasoned that, Aggression destroys the international amity and goodwill that the Olympic movement attempts to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined.\(^{441}\)

Carter later reflected that “I did not want to damage the Olympic movement, but at the same time it seemed unconscionable to be guests of the Soviets while they were involved in a bloody suppression of the people of Afghanistan.”\(^{442}\) Upon reviewing the president’s declaration, the House of Representatives endorsed the boycott the following day, 386-12, and, one week later, the Senate provided the necessary approval, 88-4.\(^{443}\) Carter’s congressionally-supported ultimatum—which was not championed by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC), at least initially—ensured the heightening of international tensions during the Lake Placid festivities.

To garner support for the United States, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance orated a speech during the 82\(^{nd}\) Session of the IOC in Lake Placid, two days before the Opening


Ceremonies of the Winter Games. He described the underlying purpose of the Olympic Movement, pointing out that the IOC strove to foster international peace and accord through sport. According to Vance, then, the question before the Olympic officials was “whether the Games should be held in a country which is itself committing a serious breach of international peace.” The U.S. Secretary of State posited that to do so would be “wholly inconsistent with the meaning of the Olympics.” Therefore, Vance suggested that the IOC transfer the Summer Games to a different location or postpone the event. If those options proved impossible, he noted that the IOC had cancelled Olympics in the past. “By upholding the principles of the Olympics when they are under challenge,” Vance reasoned, “we will preserve the meaning of the Olympics for years to come.”

His patriotic rhetoric was met with irritated silence. IOC President Killanin later recalled “I had the feeling as these words came down from the rostrum that there were a lot of white knuckles gripping the arms of chairs to conceal anger.” All seventy-three members of the IOC voted to reject Vance’s demands.

Animosity between the Soviet Union and the United States thus increased during the 1980 Winter Olympics. As political science scholar Donald E. Abelson argued, in the Cold War, “any major event that involved a matchup between the Soviets and Americans . . . was bound to be viewed as not only a confrontation between the world’s two superpowers, but as competition between two very political systems and sets of

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445 Ibid., 110.
From the U.S. perspective, none more so than the hockey semi-final match.

On February 22, the U.S. men’s hockey team, comprised of young, collegiate amateurs, defeated the highly-ranked Soviets, 4-3. Prior to the competition, the Soviet Union had defeated a National Hockey League all-star team, 6-0, and the U.S. Olympic team, 10-3, in exhibition matches, and outscored opponents 51-11 in Olympic competition. Dubbed the “Miracle on Ice,”—a reference to commentator Al Michael’s famed question, “do you believe in miracles?”—the surprising victory revitalized the United States and provided the populous with a brief moment for nationalistic pride. In addition, according to historian Nicholas Evan Sarantakes, the match changed the minds of many in the United States regarding Carter’s position on not attending the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The underdog victory greatly diminished domestic support for the boycott. As Carter recalled, “I was hoping this victory and the gold medal were an omen of better days ahead. But that was not to be.”

Despite his hope for a political-free Olympic forum, the U.S. president maintained a stringent ultimatum. Resultantly, when the Soviet Union failed to remove its troops by the end of February, Carter reiterated his plan to boycott the Moscow Games.

Technically, however, the White House nor the U.S. Congress held direct power over the

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451 Carter, Keeping Faith, 489.
USOC. A privately-funded organization, the USOC maintained the right to send its athletes abroad for participation in Olympic events, without governmental approval. Therefore, as historian Guttmann explained, “since he had no legal right to command the USOC to comply with his wishes, the president resorted to threats and intimidation” [emphasis in original].\(^{452}\) For example, Carter foreshadowed an end to all financial support and a possible increase of taxes should the officials opt to supply U.S. representation to Moscow. With such admonishments, on April 12, 1980, the USOC voted to boycott the Summer Olympics, by a margin of two-to-one.

After receiving the (reluctant) approval of the USOC, Carter quickly sought to expand the boycott. Although the British Parliament and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher agreed to reject Moscow’s invitation, the British Olympic Committee defied its government and voted to send athletes to the Summer Games. By the Opening Ceremonies, eighty other nations opted to compete while sixty-two boycotted. Among those that refused participation was Cold War Western allies Canada, Israeli and West Germany.\(^{453}\) Although only 5,929 athletes participated, fewer than in the previous three Games, the U.S.-led boycott was largely deemed a devastating, political failure.\(^{454}\)

_Femininity Testing in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics_

The possibility of a communist city holding the Olympics was raised a decade before Carter announced his intent to lead a boycott of the Moscow Games. In 1970, the Soviet Union put forward a bid to serve as host of the 1976 Summer Olympics. The IOC

\(^{452}\) Guttmann, _The Olympics_, 151.
\(^{453}\) Ibid., 150-154.
\(^{454}\) Saranatakes, _Dropping the Torch_.

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sidestepped an overt Cold War entanglement, however, by eventually selecting Montreal, Canada, over superpower cities Los Angeles, United States, and Moscow, Soviet Union. Disappointed but not undeterred, both the Moscow and Los Angeles committees reintroduced bids for the 1980 Summer Olympics. The two cities served as the only candidates, seemingly forcing the IOC into a Cold War conundrum. Yet, the lateness of the Los Angeles bid, which surfaced only in response to Moscow’s initial position as the lone candidate and therefore required an extended deadline, along with the IOC’s desire to appear apolitical, essentially ensured an easy Soviet victory. In the 75th Session of the IOC, the Soviet Capital edged out the U.S. city, 39-20. With the nineteen-vote advantage, the Games moved behind the Iron Curtain.

From the perspective of the Cold War West, sport in Eastern Europe encouraged inappropriate notions of gender equality. In particular, many feared that Soviet women too willingly embraced masculine characteristics, either through intense physical training or the consumption of anabolic steroids. Although the U.S.S.R. sport structure commenced under oppositional circumstances than those in the Cold War West, the Eastern and Western systems mirrored each other more than they differed by the height of the international conflict. Nevertheless, the longevity of gender conformity in Soviet sports encouraged Cold War Western journalists to continue drawing distinctions between Eastern and Western female athletes, which in turn prompted the IOC to perpetuate its parameters on Olympic womanhood through femininity testing.

Prior to World War II, the Soviet Union promoted gender equality as a significant component of its communist regime. The state-controlled utilitarian system therefore advocated sport participation for all citizens—men and women alike—as a tool to improve both individual health and collective military force. According to scholar Alison Rowley, the Soviet Union specifically encouraged women’s participation in sport to foster greater worker productivity, ensure military preparedness and nurture new, “ideologically correct” forms of physical activity.\textsuperscript{458} Therefore, when contrasted against the West, Soviet women in the 1920s and 1930s experienced much greater support for full athletic participation. As historian Kateryna Kobchenko explained “the concept of sports specifically for women was almost redundant because almost all sports, except for boxing and wrestling, were considered to be suitable for women.”\textsuperscript{459} U.S.S.R. female athletes, then, not only demonstrated substantial physical prowess but also muscular physiques. Purposefully established as dissimilar from the “bourgeois ladies” of the West, Soviet norms of femininity celebrated “masculine” traits in women.\textsuperscript{460}

In the postwar era, however, ambivalence seeped into the communist-controlled nation and Soviet gender affinities aligned more closely with those of the West. When Leonid Brezhnev assumed power as General Secretary in 1964 he initiated several reforms, one of which provided substantial financial support to athletic organizations and


\textsuperscript{460} Ibid., 265. Kobchenko noted that ideology occasionally proved different from reality. Although the communist regime espoused notions of gender equality, women nevertheless faced opposition from patriarchal organizations that maintained traditional attitudes.
fostered the Soviet Union’s dominance in the Olympics. Yet, women’s sport faced contradictory ideologies as the General Secretary simultaneously promoted and discouraged female participation.\textsuperscript{461} For example, Brezhnev highlighted certain sporting achievements, specifically those earned in gymnastics, while concurrently banning other physical activities. Most notably, in 1973 the Sports Committee outlined a resolution that impeded women from competing in events that enticed male voyeurs or harmed female reproductive organs.\textsuperscript{462} As a result, notions of femininity altered. During the Brezhnev era, \textit{zhenstvennost} signified a supposed athletic inner beauty possessed by female athletes, comprised of compassion, grace and motherhood.\textsuperscript{463}

Although the U.S.S.R. press showcased \textit{zhenstvennost} as the preferred form of womanhood in the Soviet Union, this celebration of femininity did not mirror that of the Cold War West. In an assessment of Cold War media accounts, scholar Stefan Wiederkehr found substantial similarities between the East and West; however, he also noted one significant difference. All outlets proved guilty of underreporting women’s sporting experiences, as well as culpable of implementing linguistic devices to degrade female achievements.\textsuperscript{464} The major distinction, then, stemmed from the treatment of

\textsuperscript{462} Jim Riordan, “Revolt Against the Fitness Fraud: Sport in the Soviet Union,” \textit{Times}, April 5, 1989, 63360.
\textsuperscript{464} Stefan Wiederkehr, “‘… If Jarmila Kratochvilova is the Future of Women’s Sports, I’m not sure I’m ready for it.’ Media, Gender and the Cold War,” in \textit{Euphoria and Exhaustion: Modern Sport in Soviet Culture and Society}, eds. Nikolaus Katzer, Sandra Budy, Alexandra Köhring and Manfred Zeller (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2010): 315-335. He found that both trivialized sportswomen, presented female athletes in conventional gender roles, highlighted supposed psychological issues and sexualized the

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“non-feminine” women. In the Cold War West press, reporters contrasted “ugly” women of the Eastern Bloc against the conventionally feminine, “pretty” women of the West. Journalists from the Cold War East ignored all incidences of non-traditionally feminine women.\textsuperscript{465} The continued reporting of “ugly” women in the Cold War West encouraged the IOC to bolster its femininity testing and doping controls in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics.

To comply with the sex/gender mandates of the IOC, the Moscow Olympics Organizing Committee (MOOC) established the Medical Services team. Comprised of eighteen doctors and sport specialists, the group was placed in charge of both femininity testing and doping checks.\textsuperscript{466} Notably, the laboratory for femininity tests was housed in the doping control center, which helped further conflate the purpose of the different exams.\textsuperscript{467} With the assistance of the U.S.S.R.’s Institute of Medical Genetics, an institutional affiliate of the Academy of Sciences, the MOOC Medical Services examined 995 competitors and recognized two hundred femininity certificates.\textsuperscript{468} Although the IOC Medical Commission did not publicize the number of failures, rumors of seven disqualifications surfaced. According to de Mérode, “the story is crazy and completely untrue.”\textsuperscript{469} In a later account, Hay admitted that the MOOC Medical Services team

\textsuperscript{465} Ibid., 330.
\textsuperscript{468} Ibid.
uncovered three suspicious cases in Moscow. Of the three, two athletes did not pass further examination.\textsuperscript{470}

Although the U.S. public condemned the GDR, the demands for Olympic victories remained prevalent. Shortly after the Montreal Games, the USOC approved the formation of a medical panel, headed by Dr. Irving Dardik, to study the application of scientific and medical advances to athletics. Specifically, the committee was to look into areas considered “taboo.” As Hunt explained, while the U.S. never adopted a program to the same degree, the doping-regiment implemented by the GDR “was the sort of attitude that characterized the connections within the Olympic movement between nationalist forces and the increasing popularity of performance-enhancing drugs.”\textsuperscript{471} The main concern, then, stemmed from the GDR’s requirement of female doping. Thus, as East Germany secured more and more medals, the conflation of sex testing and doping increased. Confusion over the distinction between the dual controls continued; however, concern over the legitimacy of chromosomal verification also expanded. Eventually, the inability of chromosomal verification to validate Olympic womanhood encouraged the IOC Medical Commission to seek new alternatives.

\textsuperscript{470} January 27, 1987, “IOC Medical Commission Working Group on Gender Verification,” Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow, Archives.  
\textsuperscript{471} Hunt, \textit{Drug Games}, 31-32.
Chapter 4: “Not Only Inaccurate but also Discriminatory”: The Beginning of a Protest, 1984-1992

In 1985, twenty-one-year-old U.S. swimmer Kirsten Wengler traveled to the World University Games in Kobe, Japan. Prior to competition, she underwent the prerequisite sex test. Yet, when Wengler lined up with her teammates to receive a “fem card,” she was told to return to the laboratory for further examination. The retest confirmed the presence of a Y chromosome. “I was crying and really freaked out,” Wengler recalled. “I thought I would never be able to have children and that something was wrong with me.” After much debate, she was allowed to compete in the University Games because the medical organizers were not prepared to conduct a gynecological inspection.

When Wengler returned to the United States, her parents, both employed in medical professions, arranged for her to undergo a more sophisticated sex/gender test. This assessment found that she was the victim of a false positive. The abnormality supposedly uncovered in Japan was actually a protein that resembled a Y chromosome. While the young swimmer was obviously relieved, Wengler worried about the potential for others to experience similar errors. In particular, she feared for those who, in a

comparable situation, would not have the personal connections or affluence to coordinate a different examination. “She would probably go home, never find out about the mistake, and feel inadequate for the rest of her life,” Wengler feared. Unfortunately, it is likely that many did experience such a fate.

Also in the 1985 World University Games, Spanish hurdler María José Martínez Patiño also experienced difficulty with the sex check. Because she had forgotten her femininity certificate—previously granted to her in 1983 at the World Track and Field Championships in Helsinki, Finland—she had to repeat the chromosomal checkup. This time, however, she failed. With the negative results, and at the request of her team doctor, Patiño claimed injury and remained on the sidelines. She was devastated. “I spent the rest of that week in my room, feeling a sadness I could not share,” Patiño recalled. “Growing up, neither my family nor I had any idea that I was anything other than normal.” The following year, prior to the Spanish National Games, the team physician again ordered her to excuse herself from competition. “I was told to feign an injury and to withdraw from racing quietly, graciously, and permanently,” she said. “I refused.”

Her resultant success in the 60-meter hurdles sparked an avalanche of international criticism. “I was expelled from our athletes’ residence, my sports scholarship was revoked, and my running times were erased from my country’s athletic

474 Ibid.
records,” Patiño explained. “I lost my friends, my fiancé, my hope, and energy.”

Yet, in the midst of the international ostracizing, Patiño did receive support. Notably, Finnish professor of clinical genetics Albert de la Chapelle reached out to the Spanish hurdler. The two forced the issue to the forefront of both the medical dialogue and the public conscious. With Wengler’s and Patiño’s publicity, authorities and individuals alike began to more openly question the necessity and acceptability of the Olympic sex tests. While the International Athletic Association (IAAF) abolished the test accordingly, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) remained steadfast in its policy of biological separation. Yet, each entity nonetheless supported the philosophy that only certain types of women—those who exhibited conventional norms of Western femininity—should be allowed to compete.

**IOC President Juan Samaranch, Women’s Advancement and the Caracas Scandal**

Before the commencement of the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, Lord Killanin concluded his time as IOC President. In 1976, after enduring occupational strains for four years—exacerbated by Cold War hostilities—and consequently suffering a heart attack, which he blamed specifically on the stresses caused by various Olympic crises, the Irish nobleman declared his desire to only serve as a one-term president.

“There’s a lot of pressure on me to run again,” Killanin explained in 1977, “but my ulcer

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477 Ibid.

says ‘No, eight years is enough.’ He remained steadfast in this decision and, after a tumultuous reign, abdicated the position. Prior to the election of his successor, Killanin warned that any person who fulfilled the presidency should possess the ability to withstand criticism, for “there is one thing of which I can assure you—you will find it very lonely at times.” Spanish diplomat Juan Antonio Samaranch assumed power and, as forewarned by Killanin, faced severe disparagement for his handling of gender verification and doping allegations.

Although mottled by several international scandals, Samaranch’s presidency did oversee the first inclusion of women into the IOC. As his successor Jacques Rogge reflected in 2010, “people tend to forget that in 1980, when Samaranch was elected, that the IOC was a very conservative, men-only club.” Moreover, when he assumed the reigns from Killanin, not only had the IOC never recognized a single female member, but only eighteen percent of Olympians were women. Samaranch therefore pushed for advancement by admitting several women into the administration, expanding the number of women’s sports in the Olympics and increasing the percentage of female

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480 Lord Killanin, My Olympic Years (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc. 1983), 220
Olympians. Notably, in 1981 Samaranch approved the election of two women, Flor Isava-Fonseca of Venezuela and Pirjo Haggman of Finland, and three more within the next five years, Mary Alison Glen-Haig of Great Britain, Princess Nora of Liechtenstein and Anita DeFrantz of the United States. He also oversaw the addition of seventeen Olympic sports.

Yet, his progressiveness did not extend to all aspects of female participation. Samaranch permitted femininity testing/gender verification to continue for almost two decades, despite increasingly visible international protests. As aforementioned, the IOC’s singular use of chromosomes to determine womanhood sparked concern almost immediately upon its introduction in the 1968 Mexico City Olympics. For example, the organizers of the 1970 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games sought to comply with the orders of the IOC Medical Commission and requested the expertise of University of Glasgow professor Malcolm Ferguson-Smith. The internationally acclaimed geneticist denied assistance as he found the test inappropriate and discriminatory. “My reason is that a buccal smear test taken in isolation says nothing about the sex of the individual,” he explained to the Commonwealth officials in 1969. Ferguson-Smith further argued that the test was incorrect for three reasons: chromosomes did not always mesh with

485 Ibid., 185-186.
487 November 6, 1969, Letter to James R. Owen from Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Correspondence Regarding the Buccal Smear Examination at the 1970 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
social and legal sex, seven in one thousand of the population possessed “abnormal” sex chromatin and physical inspections would prove more appropriate in the uncovering of male masqueraders. He suggested that members of the IOC Medical Commission “have been wrongly advised and that it is not in the best interests of the individual competitors to have this test.”

Concurrently, the European Society of Human Genetics gathered in 1970 to discuss the “Determination and Differentiation of Sex” in Ghent, Belgium. At the meeting, several renowned geneticists and endocrinologists concluded that the Olympic chromatin was severely flawed. According to de la Chapelle, the group agreed that the procedure was “one of the most horrid misuses of a scientific method.” Although these individual instances did little to alter the mindsets of IOC members, when de la Chapelle and Ferguson-Smith joined together in opposition, the two eventually forced change under Samaranch’s reign.

Samaranch thus faced sex/gender anxieties and doping concerns simultaneously. Notably, one year before the 1984 Olympics, Caracas, Venezuela, hosted the ninth Pan American Games. Commenced in 1951, this international event gathers all North and South American countries, with a recognized National Olympic Committee, every four years to compete in Olympic events and other sports popular throughout the two continents. Importantly, as the largest multi-sport event in 1983, the Caracas Pan

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488 November 21, 1969, Letter to Col. John Fraser from Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Correspondence Regarding the Buccal Smear Examination at the 1970 Edinburgh Commonwealth Games, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
American Games served as the first international forum that implemented relatively accurate testing for anabolic steroids and testosterone. Of the 3,426 athletes who attended from thirty-six countries, fifteen male athletes failed: eleven weightlifters, one cyclist, one fencer, one sprinter and one shot-putter. Perhaps more notably, upon learning of the disqualifications, twelve U.S. track and field athletes abruptly flew home out of fear of being caught. A surprising number of last-minute drop-outs and injuries also occurred. As Craig Neff reported in *Sports Illustrated*, the Caracas scandal was the “broadest, most heavily publicized drug scandal ever to hit amateur sports.”

With the sudden exodus of the U.S. athletes and the disqualification of Jeff Michels, a top U.S. weightlifter, many questioned the extent of the doping quandary. According to historian Terry Todd, as journalists investigated, reports discovered that the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) “was not the only group of sports administrators who had chosen the ‘see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ approach to the problem.” The National Collegiate Athletic Association, National Basketball Association, National Football League and other professional sport industries had also regularly turned a blind eye to drug use. As a result, USOC head F. Don Miller announced that there would be testing at all upcoming U.S. Olympic trials. Interestingly, to save face for the impending Los Angeles Olympics, Miller did not publicly announce the discovery of eighty-six positive tests until after the 1984 Games. Sanctions were also not imposed.

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494 Ibid., 101.
showcase the IOC’s newest testing techniques and also the organization’s seriousness regarding anti-doping aspirations. Yet, to avoid legal issues, the IOC Medical Commission weakened the doping controls in Sarajevo as it simultaneously strengthened the gender verification measures.

_Femininity Testing in the 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympics_

In 1984, against a backdrop of doping scandals and political protests, the Winter Olympics proceeded to Yugoslavia. The Sarajevo Games marked the second Olympics held in a Communist-controlled state, as well as the second under Samaranch. In a surprise decision during the 80th Session of the IOC in Athens, the Yugoslavian bid defeated Gothenburg, Sweden—considered by many to be the lead candidate—and Sapporo, Japan. Not only was Sarajevo’s victory unexpected, but the timing proved significant; seventy years earlier, the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo had triggered World War One. The irony was particularly poignant as the Yugoslavian organizers promoted the city as an “intersection” between different worlds. In particular, those responsible for the candidacy noted that “Sarajevo closely knits the East and West.” With hostilities between the two superpowers increasing, an agreeable location was clearly necessary. Moreover, when the United States announced its boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, and the Soviet Union mirrored the declaration by refusing to send its athletes to Los Angeles four years later, the 1984 Winter Games stood as the singular Olympic opportunity for a competitive encounter between the two countries.

Recognizing this volatile relationship and the international clout granted to sport, the IOC Medical Commission continued to control all competitors. Yet, as de Mérode weakened the requirements for the testosterone test, he strengthened the checks on women, despite publicly recognizing the inconsistencies and complexities of the compulsory test.\(^\text{497}\)

For both the 1984 Winter and Summer Olympics, the IOC utilized the steroid test developed by West German biochemist and Medical Commission member Manfred Donike. As a former cyclist who had competed twice in the Tour de France, Donike was concerned that athletes might employ synthetic forms of testosterone to gain an advantage. He therefore developed a method to accurately determine whether a competitor had used “exogenous” (unnatural or synthetic) testosterone. Concerned with the legality of the novel test, however, the IOC altered Donike’s measurements and checked for a ratio above six-to-one. In other words, an athlete had to possess six times more testosterone than was considered normal to be detected. Some feared that this would do little to curtail the ingestion of synthetic substances.\(^\text{498}\)

Related to this concern of testosterone enhancement, the IOC Medical Commission pondered incorporating stricter checks for female Olympians. Most notably, de Mérode worried that allowing the International Federations to grant femininity certificates opened the door for cheating. To limit the possibility of sex/gender fraudulence, he suggested that the Olympic Medical Commission be the sole organization permitted to exam and approve of women athletes.\(^\text{499}\) Samaranch agreed and in 1982

\(^{499}\) Almond, Cart and Harvey, “IOC Might Order New Sex Check,” E1.
declared that only the documentation provided by appropriate Olympic authorities would be accepted in Sarajevo.\(^{500}\) Annoyed with the IOC’s skepticism, the IAAF venomously protested the change in protocol; however, de Mérode proved unwavering in his decision.\(^{501}\)

Furthermore, although the justifications for sex/femininity testing had varied throughout the previous two decades—altering from the need to unmask male masqueraders to the need to identify biological “abnormalities”—the underlying purpose remained unchanged. The IOC Medical Commission was steadfast in its quest to bar any woman who did not adhere to conventional norms of Cold War Western femininity.

“The sex tests are obligatory under Olympics rules,” de Mérode postulated. “They are conducted on women only and are intended to prevent athletes who are biologically male from competing in women’s events.”\(^{502}\) In the same vein, USOC medical director Anthony Daly explained that the regulations intended to “protect Olympic female athletes against unfair competition.”\(^{503}\) This paternalistic framework was enacted in both Sarajevo and Los Angeles.\(^{504}\)

The IOC Medical Commission thus continued to proclaim the necessity of femininity testing, despite the rising costs caused by the dismissal of the International


\(^{502}\) “IOC Says Sex Tests will be Kept Strictly Secret,” *Los Angeles Times*, July 29, 1984, H43.


Federations’ assistance in verification. In the Sarajevo Winter Olympics, the organizing committee therefore pooled the resources of the Sarajevo University Medical Centre, the medical institutions of the Yugoslav National Army, the Sarajevo first-aid services, the Health Centres at Hadzici and Pale, the Institute for Sports Medicine and the Red Cross. Furthermore, the IOC awarded the Sarajevo medical committee “considerable financial investments” to ensure adequate testing for both doping and gender. Despite the anxieties raised in the wake of the Caracas scandal, only one positive doping test was uncovered. Of the 262 women examined, no mention was made of any failures; however, that does not mean that no abnormalities were discovered. As de Mérode reasoned, anyone who did not pass the femininity measures would “quietly disappear . . . without publicity.” While he avoided opposition in Sarajevo, de Mérode faced criticism in Los Angeles regarding the purpose and imperfection of chromosomal analysis.

**Gender Verification in the 1984 Los Angeles Summer Olympics**

On January 20, 1981, former Californian governor Ronald Reagan gained control of the White House. He defeated the incumbent Carter and assumed the presidency in a time of national uncertainty and discontent. The prolonged war in Vietnam, sustained Soviet presence in Afghanistan and continued hostage crisis in Iran, combined with the upheaval sparked by social movements and unrest fostered by identity politics, beget a

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507 Ibid., 148.
508 “IOC Says Sex Tests will be Kept Strictly Secret,” H43.
“confidence gap” in the United States.\(^{509}\) As historian Robert M. Collins explained, the coalescence of these anxieties caused “a palpable loss of confidence, a disturbing sense that the nation’s drift might easily turn into permanent decline.”\(^{510}\) Reagan was thus determined not to mirror his predecessor’s passivity.

He therefore introduced a more aggressive approach to end the Cold War. Many of Reagan’s foreign policies involved directly confronting the Soviet Union and maintained the long-term goal of defeating communism entirely.\(^{511}\) For example, the administration orchestrated the Reagan Doctrine, a stance that suggested the United States actively aid groups that lived under communist regimes and attempted to help eradicate the government. In his 1985 State of the Union Address, the re-elected president declared that “support for freedom fighters is self-defense” and noted that he wanted to “support the democratic forces whose struggle is tied to our own security.”\(^{512}\)

While previous presidential doctrines embraced a defensive position, such as the Truman Doctrine and the Nixon Doctrine, the Reagan Doctrine embodied a preemptive orientation.\(^{513}\) Resultantly, under the Reagan Doctrine, the United States provided assistance to anticommmunist movements in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Grenada and


\(^{511}\) Ibid., 196.


\(^{513}\) Robert H. Johnson, “Misguided Morality: Ethics and the Reagan Doctrine,” \textit{Political Science Quarterly} 103, no. 3 (1988): 509-529. Johnson argued that the Reagan Doctrine illustrated both continuity and change in regard to presidential doctrines. While the ideology behind the Reagan Doctrine hinged upon notions of American exceptionalism and unilateralism, the policy also moved the country from a defensive orientation to a more preemptive stance.
Nicaragua. The policy also prompted a significant shift in United States’ stance on communism, from an ideology of “containment” to that of “rollback.” Perhaps not surprisingly, then, Reagan’s efforts to defeat the Soviet Union greatly increased Cold War hostilities.514

With animosities between the two superpowers heightened, the Olympic Movement again served as a forum for non-military confrontation. When the IOC requested potential candidatures for the 1984 Summer Olympics, only Los Angeles, United States, submitted a bid. Other interested cities, such as Brussels, Belgium, opted to withhold their offers, recognizing that with the 1980 Summer Games awarded to Moscow, “Los Angeles had every chance of being chosen.”515 Not only did the Cold War thereby impact the bidding process, but international tensions also extended into the 1984 Olympics.

Most significantly, the decision to hold the Summer Games in the United States allowed the Soviet Union to reciprocate the U.S.’s boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. On May 8, 1984, the U.S.S.R. National Olympic Committee announced its decision to withdraw from the Los Angeles Games, citing concerns of security as the primary factor. According to Tass, the official press of the Soviet Union, the Reagan administration encouraged an “anti-Soviet hysteria,” which would create “unbearable conditions” for Soviet athletes and officials in the United States. “In these conditions, Tass reported, “the national Olympic Committee of the U.S.S.R. is compelled to declare

the participation of Soviet sportsmen in the Games impossible.”

Reagan—who initially supported Carter’s boycott but later altered his position for political reasons—responded by calling the Soviet’s position an unjustified and “blatant political act.”

Ignoring the hypocrisy of this assessment, the U.S. President continued to try to persuade the Soviets to attend. Despite these efforts and those of IOC President Samaranch, the Soviet Union remained unwavering and opted to forgo the Los Angeles Olympics. As a result, fourteen Eastern Bloc countries did not compete in the 1984 Summer Games; without contestation from East Germany or the Soviet Union, the United States dominated almost all events. Although women from the Eastern Bloc did not participate, the IOC Medical Commission maintained its command on appropriate womanhood.

Prior to the commencement of the Los Angeles Summer Games, the U.S. press highlighted certain female athletes, those who adhered to white, middle-class notions of femininity, to serve as foils to the Eastern European women who remained at home. For example, despite a career riddled early with injuries, Mary Decker was esteemed as America’s beloved pig-tailed prodigy, who both embraced and espoused the virtues of nationalistic femininity. To several U.S. journalists, Decker repeatedly called her Soviet rival Tatyana Kazankina “Ted,” for what she explained were “obvious reasons.”

517 Regarding the change in position, see Kenneth Reich and Douglas Shuit, “Reagan Cools on Olympic Boycott,” Los Angeles Times, March 28, 1980, A12. Reagan reportedly altered his opinion when he realized that other countries refused to join the United States in the boycott. The timing just happened to coincide with his campaign. For information on Reagan’s response to the Soviet’s announcement, see Raymond Coffey, “U.S. Charges Foul play: Soviet Olympic Pullout ‘Political’ Olympics,” Chicago Tribune, May 9, 1984, 1.
518 Iran and Libya also did not attend, however, not due to Cold War allegiances.
Decker claimed that “when I first ran against her as a young girl in Moscow years ago, I used to beat her in the 800. The girl I ran against now looks like her brother.” Of the East Germans, she scoffed that “all I know is they have hair growing in places where normal women don’t. And the runners I’ve seen look different than I do.” Her utilization of “normal” is significant, as Decker was constructed in the U.S. as the icon of white femininity.

As an additional example regarding Decker, columnist Jim Murray described an incident that supposedly occurred at a track meet in Hungary. Accordingly, when Decker went into a locker room, she immediately rushed right out blushing. “I thought I told you I wanted a women’s dressing room!” she had wailed to officials.” When told that it was a women’s locker room, Mary was “flabbergasted. She had thought she wandered into a touring troupe of the Green Bay Packer’s by mistake.” For over a decade, Decker existed in the minds of many Americans as the perfect image of female athleticism. As Rick Reilly confessed in 1984, “we are fools for Mary Theresa Decker. Hopelessly smitten. She is what we like. She wins. She smiles. She is the girl we carry in our wallet.”

Unfortunately for Decker, a collision with South African native and British Olympic contender Zola Budd in the 3,000 meter finals eliminated any opportunity for a gold medal.

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522 Murray, “You’d Never Think She is One of Them,” D1.
Yet even Decker, the U.S. “sweetheart” was required to verify her sex/gender in the 1984 Summer Olympics, regardless of physical appearance or national renown.\textsuperscript{524} For the Los Angeles Games, the IOC Medical Commission relinquished some control and permitted IAAF-granted femininity certificates. The track and field authorities convinced the IOC to recognize its “femininity programme” by noting the large number of Olympians in need of control, as well as by guaranteeing that only IAAF Medical Delegates would issue certificates.\textsuperscript{525} For those without proper documentation, the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) medical services team conducted examinations at polyclinics at the University of California Los Angeles (UCLA), the University of California Santa Barbra (UCSB) and the University of Southern California (USC).\textsuperscript{526} With an IOC Medical Commission member always present, the buccal smear samples were collected by graduate nursing students of the schools. Seemingly confusing both the procedure and the purpose of the control, one nurse noted that “we have a waiting list of men who want to take our positions.”\textsuperscript{527} For the actual chromatin analysis, the LAOOC contracted with the Nichols Institute, a for-profit organization that specialized in diagnostics.\textsuperscript{528} The Nichols Instituted conducted a total of 1,610 tests, of which less than one percent needed repeat collection due to poor technique. Maintaining the secrecy, the LAOOC did not publicly report how many women failed; however,

\textsuperscript{524} Decker qualified for the 1996 Atlanta Olympics at the age of 37. During the required doping tests, her urine sample showed an illegal testosterone level. The IAAF consequently banned Decker from competition in 1997. For more information, see Tim Layden, “Paralysis by Urinalysis,” \textit{Sports Illustrated} 86, no. 21 (May 1997), 108.

\textsuperscript{525} “Within the International Federations,” \textit{Olympic Review} 188 (June 1983): 408.


\textsuperscript{527} Kay, “Olympic Women Seek ‘XX’ Rating,” C1.

approximately eight competitors demonstrated abnormal results. According to IOC Medical Commission member Eduardo Hay, five of these Olympians underwent an additional clinical evaluation and were allowed to participate. Yet the other three, when informed of the distressing news, refused to return for further examination.529

With the possibility of unfair disqualifications in the 1984 Los Angeles Games, controversy surrounding gender verification heightened. The IOC Medical Commission simultaneously—and seemingly contradictorily—declared the need for gender verification and noted the imperfection of the current control techniques in delineating a divide. For example, de Mérode acquiesced that “it is not rare for women to have both sets of sex-linked chromosomes.”530 Rather than admit defeat, however, the Belgian prince and the Olympic medical authorities implemented slight alterations in the procedure. “The IOC has determined that the ratio should not exceed 30% male-to-female,” he explained.531 Repeatedly under de Mérode, the Medical Commission demanded that an arbitrary line be drawn to uphold sex-segregation in the Olympics. Because no biological division existed, the IOC created its own. Upset with the continued iterations of femininity control, protestors turned attention to the 1988 Calgary Winter Olympics.

*Gender Verification in the 1988 Winter and Summer Olympics*

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529 July 2, 1988, “IOC Medical Commission Working Group on Gender Verification,” Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
530 Almond, Cart and Harvey, “IOC Might Order New Sex Check,” E1.
531 Ibid.
After putting forward two unsuccessful bids in 1964 and 1968, Calgary, Canada, won the right to host the 1988 Winter Games. As the Calgary Olympic Development Association (CODA) commenced its planning for the festival, debates regarding the validity of gender verification testing continued. In particular, those opposed to the requirement called for medical geneticist Brian Lowry and physics professor E.B. Challis to refuse assistance in the examination process. In 1986, Lowry had published a piece with colleague David I. Hoar in the *Bulletin of the Hereditary Diseases Program of Alberta*, in which the two authors detailed the inadequacies of the chromatin control and suggested physical inspections as a replacement. According to the report, “the chromosomal sex is not the final answer to an individual’s gender.” With this public condemnation of the Olympic policy, many were surprised when Lowry accepted the Medical Commission’s request to oversee the control in Calgary. Although both Lowry and Challis recognized the inherent flaws in chromosomal verification, they remained committed to the IOC. In a 1987 response letter to de la Chapelle, Challis noted that while “there is reason for concern. . . . [w]e do not see how a blank refusal to carry out the sex testing program in Calgary would obtain the ends that you desire.” Despite voicing initial resistance, Lowry did withdraw his support at the last minute, concerned

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533 March 18, 1987, Letter to Albert de la Chapelle from E.B. Challis, Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
that the local organization insisted upon using volunteers instead of trained professionals for the preparation of the buccal smear slides.\textsuperscript{534}

To further combat the IOC’s mandate, geneticists Joe J. Hoo and de la Chapelle articulated further suggestions. According to Hoo, a “total offensive” move was necessary to curtail femininity testing at the Calgary Games. In his view, those opposed to the practice should generate a written statement accessible to a lay audience, obtain signatures from medical authorities and distribute the documents to the press.\textsuperscript{535} Chapelle, on the other hand, opted to directly approach IOC officials. He wrote de Mérode and asked the chairman of the Medical Commission to explicitly identify the purpose of the policy; troublingly, this question still remained unanswered. Moreover, according to de la Chapelle, suspicions rooted in social anxieties did not suffice as rationale for the procedure. “Concern about incessant allegations in the Olympic Village and persistent rumors do not themselves form a basis of such decisions,” he explained. In addition, de la Chapelle demanded the test be stopped immediately, for “the present practice is inefficient, injust [sic], harmful and immoral.”\textsuperscript{536} Despite such vocal opposition from a variety of medical authorities, the IOC opted to maintain femininity

\textsuperscript{534} August 8, 1988, Letter to Martin Bobrow from Joe J. Hoo, Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{535} January 6, 1987, Letter to Albert de la Chapelle from Joe J. Hoo, Correspondence Concerning the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{536} July 31, 1987, Letter to Alexandre de Mérode from Albert de la Chapelle, Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
testing for the 1988 Winter Olympics. In the Calgary Games, the Medical Commission tested 296 female athletes with no published positive results.\footnote{Calgary Olympic Organizing Committee, \textit{XV Olympic Winter Games Official Report}, volume 1, part II (Lausanne: International Olympic Committee, 1988).}

Following the Winter Olympics, the IOC finally agreed to consider the concerns voiced by de la Chapelle and other leading medical authorities. In July 1988, one month before the commencement of the Summer Games, the Medical Commission formed the “Working Group on Gender Verification” to discuss matters related to the controversial testing and generate a report for the Executive Board in Seoul. Unfortunately, little was accomplished and the group dissipated under the impression that de Mérode would reconvene the workshop the following year. He did not. As de la Chapelle succinctly and angrily explained in a letter to Ferguson-Smith,

> In other words, the whole thing is to be forgotten. Parenthetically, let me insert a word of admiration for the Prince de Mérode: this is exactly how one should handle an unpleasant affair. Just appoint a committee, convene it once, and let it die.\footnote{November 16, 1989, Letter to Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith from Albert de la Chapelle, Correspondence Concerning the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.}

The IOC Medical Commission thus continued undeterred in the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea.

South Korean President Park Chung Hee was the first to envision his country as the host of the Olympic Games. After Park was assassinated in 1979, his successor, Chun Doo Hwan, articulated similar ambitions, albeit for different purposes. Following Park’s death, South Korea faced great instability; after years of experiencing a military
dictatorship, many citizens hoped for a return to civilian governance. Worried about the potential international repercussions should South Korea succumb to political turmoil, in 1980 the United States dispatched forces to establish a de facto government, headed by Chun Doo Hwan. Under President Chun, the South Korean economy expanded, which sparked labor shifts and social dislocation. This resultant rise in economic prosperity also increased political expectations, thereby fostering criticism of Chun’s military system. Finally, the administration faced an ascendency of hostilities from North Korea. According to political science professor Jarol B. Manheim, these three factors prompted Chun to outline a bid for the 1988 Summer Olympics. The South Korean president believed that hosting the Games would legitimize his rule by drawing world attention to the government, showcasing the recent economic prosperity and casting a negative light on the North Korean threat. As Manheim explained, “the visibility afforded by a successful Olympic enterprise would proclaim to the world South Korea’s new status as an industrializing country while providing a vehicle for credit-claiming at home.”

President Chun’s desires materialized in the 84th Session of the IOC, when Seoul, South Korea, defeated Nagoya, Japan. With the winning bid, the Games moved to Asia for the second time. The Seoul Olympics Organizing Committee (SLOOC) hoped to utilize this connection and mirror the successes of the first Asian Olympics, held in

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542 Ibid., 282.
1964 in Tokyo. Specifically, SLOOC president Roh Tae Woo and President Chun interpreted the Tokyo Summer Olympics as a triumphant introduction of the newly-modern Japan to the world. Although South Koreans maintained an embittered relationship with the Japanese, due to Japan’s previous occupation of South Korea, Woo and Chun recognized and aspired to Japan’s position in the global economy. Yet, despite this eagerness to repeat the successes of the 1964 Games, the Seoul Games actually emulated the 1968 Mexico City Olympics, marred by political unrest, student protest and the international questioning of the organizational capabilities of South Korea. Tensions raised by the organizers of the Olympics actually provided the impetus for direct elections in 1987, which led to the ousting of President Chun. SLOOC president Woo assumed power, ensuring the Olympics occurred in South Korea.

Coupled with these domestic complications, the IOC also feared a second Soviet boycott in two Olympiads. After the creation of two Korean nations in 1953, the Soviet Union recognized the Democratic People’s Republic, North Korea, as the only legitimate representation of Korea. The United States maintained a similar relationship with South Korea. Due to Cold War constraints, the Soviet Union initially wavered upon the possibility of its participation in Seoul. According to the head of the Soviet Olympic Committee, Marat Gramov, the IOC’s selection of South Korea was “not an appropriate place,” for the country possessed few diplomatic relations. “Frankly speaking,” he

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commented, “we don’t understand why the Olympic Games should be held in Seoul.”  

A combination of President Chun’s conciliatory gestures towards Moscow and newly empowered Soviet General Secretary of the Communist Party Mikhail Gorbachev’s lessening of hostilities towards the Cold War West, however, encouraged Soviet participation. On January 11, 1988, the Soviet Union agreed to attend the Seoul Olympics.

Along with concerns regarding the Soviet Union’s attendance, the IOC also worried about the potential for a North Korean boycott. To absolve political differences, IOC President Samaranch suggested that five Olympic events—archery, cycling, table tennis, women’s volleyball and the first-round of football—be held in Pyongyang. The SLOOC adamantly opposed the proposal, pointing out that such a maneuver breached the Olympic Charter. North Korea also proved adverse to the suggestion as it demanded to instead be named an official co-host of the Games. Unable to compromise, North Korea boycotted. The Seoul Games therefore continued the pattern of boycotts, ongoing since 1972, and also marked the final showdown between U.S. and U.S.S.R. athletes as the Soviet Union would cease to exist before the 1992 Barcelona Games.

As previously noted, despite the growing opposition from the medical community, the IOC maintained compulsory gender verification for all women in the

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549 Associated Press, “Seoul Makes a Play for Soviet Bloc,” Chicago Tribune, Oct. 5, 1984, 5. Chun cut political ties with the Soviet Union in 1983 after a Korean Air Lines jetliner strayed into Soviet territory and was shot down. All 269 passengers on board were killed.
Seoul Olympics. Under the watchful eye of the IOC Medical Commission, the SLOOC therefore conducted chromosomal analysis on 2,050 female athletes and exempted 255 participants who possessed an IAAF or IOC femininity certificate. Yet, Patiño’s plight did vex some individuals on the Medical Commission. According to member Arne Ljungqvist, after the Spanish hurdler made international headlines, he “wanted to persuade the IAAF and the IOC to stop this idiocy.” Unfortunately, it would take over a decade of protest for the IOC to acquiesce its sex/gender position.

Patiño, de La Chapelle and Protest

Unlike others who failed the chromosomal test, Patiño refused to feign injury and quietly disappear. Resultantly, after almost two decades of unmediated sex testing, the medical community as a whole started to more vocally question the legitimacy of the procedure. As de la Chapelle had despairingly commented, “I am now quite pessimistic about achieving anything without a public scandal.” Patiño provided this necessary impetus.

The international scrutiny forced upon Patiño sparked a variety of responses from medical authorities. After contacting the Spanish hurdler, de la Chapelle wrote to fifteen

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556 April 14, 1987, Letter to Martin Borbrow from Albert de la Chapelle, *Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.*
internationally renowned geneticists and asked for their opinion on the Olympic sex/gender policy. All but three responded, and the twelve concurred that the test was scientifically unsound and ethically incorrect.\footnote{January 27, 1987, Letter to Geneticists from Albert de la Chapelle, Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives. de la Chapelle contacted Christos Bartsocas (Athens, Greece), Kare Berg (Oslo, Norway), Herman van den Berghe (Leuven, Belgium), Kirk Bootsma (Rotterdam, Netherlands), Marco Fraccaro (Pavia, Italy), Jean Frezal (Paris, France), Nemat Hashem (Cairo, Egypt), Janusz Limon (Gdansk, Poland), Jan Lindsten (Stockholm, Sweden), John Philip (Copenhagen, Denmark), Elizabeth Robson (London, England), Carlos San Roman (Madrid, Spain), Ivan Subrt (Prague, Czechoslovakia), Ulrich Wolf (Freiburg, Germany) and Liljana Zergollern (Zagreb, Croatia).} He also published a study that found gender verification “not only inaccurate but also discriminatory.”\footnote{Albert de la Chapelle, ‘The Use and Misuse of Sex Chromatin Screening for ‘Gender Identification’ of Female Athletes,” \textit{JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association} 256, no. 14 (October 1986), 1920.} According to de la Chapelle, the methods practiced by both the IOC and IAAF failed in two significant ways. Foremost, it barred women with chromosomal “abnormalities” unfairly, for these athletes did not possess advantage over other competitors. Secondly, the scientific technologies employed left the majority of individuals who should be excluded unnamed. In his view, this included three types of participants: men, women who consumed hormones and women with natural conditions that increased strength and size.\footnote{Ibid., 1920-1921.} Thus, while he influentially criticized the IOC and IAAF for their dependency on chromosomal verification, de la Chapelle also suggested that sport authorities return to visual inspections to exclude “abnormal” females—those with larger-than-average muscularity—resultantly reifying normative notions of both biology and femininity.

Writing in the same year, U.S. medical geneticist Joe Leigh Simpson agreed that the singular use of chromosomal tests was inadequate and unfair. He also recognized the
complexity of the subject, and, unlike de la Chapelle, posited that all verification measures would prove inadequate in fulfilling their goal of sex determination. In his view, “eliminating screening would probably have little or no practical effect, and it might restore a few personal dignities.” 560 He later acquiesced that a visual examination would be the “lesser evil.” 561 Similarly, professor of pathology M.A. Ferguson-Smith and British Medical Officer for the Modern Pentathlon Association Elizabeth A. Ferris argued that the Barr body test incorrectly banned individuals, including those with androgen insensitivity syndrome, gonadal dysgeneses, Klinefelter’s Syndrome and mosaicism. 562 Although the two authors articulated the inherent flaws of chromosomal testing, Ferguson-Smith and Ferris suggested increased vigilance in laboratories rather than the abolishment of the examination. 563

Famed sexologist John Money also criticized the IOC’s dependency on chromosomal difference. Writing to Genel in 1987, he argued that the Olympic position was an immoral “policing policy.” In Money’s view, requiring all competitors to showcase identical chromosomal counts was as impractical and idiotic as demanding that all athletes possess equal height, weight, intelligence, hormone levels and lung capacity. Half-jokingly, he suggested that sports:

Copy the policy of wrestling and boxing: divide people into competitive championship classes, and run the Olympics like the Westminster Dog Show. There could be special classes for the adrenogential syndrome; for the androgen-insensitivity syndrome; for the supernumerary Y syndrome;

563 Ibid., 20.
for Klinefelter’s or Tuner’s syndrome; for Marfain’s syndrome [sic]; for eunuchs; for testosterone replacement syndrome; and yes, even for those who risk impaired health or a shortened life span by dosing themselves up with anabolic steroids.\textsuperscript{564}

While Money clearly chided the IOC, he did articulate a more serious point. He concluded that gender verification was both “arbitrary and totalitarian.”\textsuperscript{565}

While many medical experts found de la Chapelle’s results and postulations compelling, others remained unconvinced.\textsuperscript{566} Notably, Medical Commission member Eduardo Hay was unmoved. After several direct conversations with this “chief guru of the sex chromatin business,” de la Chapelle realized Hay was “an extremely nice old gynecologist, but knows little about endocrinology and almost nothing about genetics.”\textsuperscript{567}

Therefore, the IOC Medical Commission was able to conduct sex/gender control for the 1988 Seoul Olympics with minimal dispute.\textsuperscript{568} Perhaps even more importantly, Prince Alexandre de Mérode—the chairman of the Medical Commission since 1967—remained at the helm of the organization and repeatedly extolled the necessity of the policy.

According to Ljungqvist, while some from within the IOC started to question gender verification, “we didn’t stand a chance of changing things while de Mérode remained in

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\textsuperscript{564} September 29, 1987, Letter to Myron Genel from John Money, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, March-April 1994, Papers of Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{565} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{567} February 25, 1987, Letter to Martin Bobrow from Albert de la Chapelle, Copies of Correspondence between Professor Albert de la Chapelle and Dr. Martin Bobrow Regarding Challenges to the Buccal Smear Test, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{568} Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee, \textit{Official Report}, 182. The IOC Medical Commission tested 2,305 women prior to competition.
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office.” Consequently, it was the IAAF that led the way in ending the practice; however, it would prove to be a change in name only.

Monaco

Concerned with the IOC’s unabashed commitment to gender verification, and de Mérode’s refusal to schedule a second meeting with the concerned geneticists, Ljungqvist organized an IAAF “Workshop on Femininity” in Monte Carlo, Monaco. For two days in November 1990, experts from Belgium, British Columbia, Bulgaria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Mexico, the Republic of Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States—which included the reluctant chairman of the IOC Medical Commission—listened to a variety of presentations that discussed the benefits and problems of the current sex/gender policies in sport. On behalf of the IOC, Hay reiterated the Medical Commission’s staunch opinion that the “control of femininity is necessary and well done,” while Dr. Peter Jenoure, senior physician of the Swiss Ski Federation, described the International Skiing Federation’s (ISF) comparable view that sex/gender testing remained essential for competition. According to Jenoure, the medical commission of the ISF was considering the implementation of a multi-faceted control, one which required a chromosomal check, gynecological exam and blood testing. Similarly, French medical doctor Bernard Dingeon depicted a new method for gender verification, one which the IOC would

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569 Ljungqvist, Doping’s Nemesis, 186.
eventually adopt in 1992, despite the protests of the IAAF and other medical authorities.\textsuperscript{571}

In contrast, U.S. professor of medical psychology Anke Erhardt articulated the psychological aspects of the procedure and the “unintended discrimination” caused by current gender verification procedures. Also from the United States, athlete Alison Carlson conveyed the lack of consensus among female Olympians regarding the policy and admitted that, without education, most “aren’t impelled to give it much thought.” She did note, however, that while most agreed with the underlying intent of testing, a revision of the current system “is sorely needed.” Finally, de la Chapelle, Ferguson-Smith and Ferris all argued for an end to the current practices.\textsuperscript{572}

At the workshop’s conclusion, the group outlined several proposals and recommendations for sex/gender control in future competitions. First, they noted that there was a lack of documented material regarding past procedures, and therefore suggested more information be made publicly available. In particular, the attendees requested reports on the number of women who had not passed previous tests, reasons cited for their failure, diagnoses and final decisions enacted. Second, the working group attempted to answer the always-nebulous question, why mandate sex/gender testing? Accordingly, the purpose solely remained to prevent male masqueraders. As such, they argued, gender verification should never preclude those born with chromosomal defects who are raised female. In the same vein, the IAAF participants recognized that several athletes had been unfairly barred in past competition. Furthermore, to eliminate linguistic
inconsistencies, they proposed that the title of any assessment be changed to “Eligibility Test for Women’s Competition.”

Perhaps most importantly, as a fifth point, the IAAF workshop called for sport authorities to abandon chromosomal testing. In their view, “the present sex chromatin test is inappropriate and scientifically unsound.” Instead, they suggested sport officials adopt a physical checkup to ensure the health of all athletes, including men. The participants reasoned that such an examination would serve to determine if an athlete, male or female, suffered from a condition that would cause injury.\footnote{Ibid.}

The IAAF heeded the advice two years later and terminated compulsory gender verification for all international track and field events.\footnote{January 24, 1991, Letter to All Participants of Gender Verification Workshop in Monte Carlo from Arne Ljungqvist, Papers Relating to the International Athletic Foundation Workshop on Approved Methods of Femininity Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.} Recognizing the inherent flaws of chromatin analysis and the likelihood that “there will never be a laboratory test that will adequately assess the sex of all individuals,” the governing body provided two guidelines for future participation.\footnote{Arne Ljungqvist and Joe Leigh Simpson, “Medical Examination for Health of All Athletes Replacing the Need for Gender Verification in International Sports: The International Amateur Athletic Federation Plan,” \textit{JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association} 267, no. 6 (February 1992): 851.} First, because the fundamental purpose of the procedure stemmed from the desire to prohibit male masqueraders, the IAAF reasoned that gender verification was moot with new anti-doping requirements. In particular, the visual inspection of competitors during urination-collection eliminated the possibility for fraudulent sex. Yet, the stipulation did not terminate sex-control but instead returned
attention to supposed anatomical differences. As sport scholar C.L. Cole argued, the IAAF “used the conditions created through drug testing to visually inspect genitals.”

Second, to ensure the “health” of competitors, the IAAF implemented a “simple physical inspection” for all female athletes. Similar to the visual scrutiny necessary for anti-doping tests, the physical examination further reinforced the societal belief in polarized, bodily difference. Moreover, although the IAAF trumpeted its pioneering decision to eliminate the test, it nevertheless maintained the right to check any “questionable” competitors on a case-by-case basis. In other words, an examination could be required based upon an athlete’s external (non-conventionally feminine) appearance or from a detection of “abnormal” genitalia. Thus, the IAAF’s “abolishment” of gender verification merely repositioned the scrutiny of sex/gender within anti-doping controls, physical inspections and suspicion-based checks.

Before the IAAF announced its new policy, the IOC Medical Commission discussed the possibility of relinquishing control of sex/gender during a 1991 meeting in Albertville, France. After Ljungqvist detailed the proposals created by the IAAF Workshop on Femininity, the IOC Medical Commission voted to accept only one point, the prerequisite that athletes undergo a “health check” in their countries of origin. “The IOC Medical Commission was far more difficult to convince then the IAAF Council,” Ljungqvist recalled. “It became clear to me . . . that it would be impossible to obtain a

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577 Ljungqvist and Simpson, “Medical Examination for Health of All,” 851.
‘full victory’ and that a step in the right direction was the maximum I could expect.”\textsuperscript{579}

Unfortunately, the Medical Commission moved to an opposite conclusion. While the group did recommend to the IOC Executive Board that all female Olympians should possess a “health and gender” certificate, the Medical Commission also lobbied for the introduction of its own novel form of gender verification: polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing. Unlike the previously-utilized Barr body test, PCR assessed genetic material to determine sex/gender. Upon receiving the suggestion, the IOC adopted PCR for the 1992 Albertville Winter Olympics.\textsuperscript{580}

Although the Olympic authorities attempted to combat potential opposition with an innovative method, medical experts, national governments and athletes alike questioned the legitimacy, legality and ethics of the procedure. For example, Simpson noted that possession of abnormal DNA did not determine one’s sex/gender. Moreover, he found the sensitivity of the process disturbing. Simpson reasoned,

> With sex chromatin testing I was at least assured that in expert hands the test could do that for which it was designed—distinguishing XX from XY individuals. However, contamination is such a problem in the sensitive “PCR test” that even in the best of hands some normal females will be “typed” as males.”\textsuperscript{581}

Parallel concerns inundated the 1992 Winter Games. Accordingly, debate between the IAAF and IOC regarding appropriate verification technologies heightened during the 1990s. Although the two organizations disagreed on methods—pitting PCR against physical examinations—both organizations conceded that requiring a system of control

\textsuperscript{579} March 4, 1991, Letter to All Members of the Gender Verification Workshop from Arne Ljungqvist, Papers Relating to the International Athletic Foundation Workshop on Approved Methods of Femininity Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{580} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{581} Ibid.
remained imperative; this suggests a continued belief in polarized difference and also marks femininity as an innate, natural status for women. Thus, when the IOC did finally discontinue the procedure in 1999, it nonetheless maintained control over women and perpetuated normative sex/gender.

Protest over PCR: Opposition in the 1992 Albertville Winter and Barcelona Summer Olympics

The medical community largely opposed the decision to employ PCR testing in Olympic competition. For example, gynecologist John S. Fox lamented the IOC’s discriminatory gender stance and also reproached Olympic authorities for refusing to heed the advice of medical/scientific experts. “Despite the considerable amount of genetic, gynecological and psychological evidence that can be mustered in opposition to the process of gender verification,” he argued, “the dinosaurs of the International Olympic Committee and its Medical Commission seem determined to pursue their current policy.”582 Italian pediatricians, Perez Marco Vignetti, Adriana Rizzuti, Lida Bruni, Maria Cristina Tozzi, P. Marcozzi, and Luigi Tarani—all employed by the University of Rome and involved in granting “sex passports” for over twenty years—also publicly denounced the novel measurement. These officials depicted the new method as a form of physical abuse and urged “that this unpleasant and counterproductive practice be abolished” immediately.583 The combination of inappropriate genetic techniques,

prejudice of the IOC’s “female only” test, failure to consider naturally-produced biological “abnormalities” and the resultant stigmatization caused by a positive test result fostered significant opposition from a variety of medical officials.\textsuperscript{584} These challenges, however, did little to deter the IOC in Albertville or Barcelona.

To host the 1992 Winter Olympics, a record-setting seven locales outlined bids, a sharp contrast to the 1980 Winter Games for which only Lake Placid, United States, demonstrated interest.\textsuperscript{585} The realization that holding the Olympics could amass a tremendous profit—as first achieved in the 1984 Los Angeles Games through private sponsorships and lucrative television contracts—encouraged several cities to place bids. The organizing committee of Albertville, France, therefore highlighted the area’s accommodations, climate, economic stability and telecommunications in an effort to impress the IOC’s delegates.\textsuperscript{586} To further entice support, former Olympic skier Jean-Claude Killy spoke on behalf of the city; Killy earned three gold medals in the 1968 Grenoble Winter Games, the last held in France.\textsuperscript{587} While the Grenoble triple gold-medalist impressed some, the Parisian loss for the 1992 Summer Olympics likely bolstered the Albertville victory.\textsuperscript{588} Hence, after five days of frenzied lobbying and six rounds of voting, Albertville emerged as the winner.\textsuperscript{589}

\textsuperscript{585} Committees from Albertville, France; Sofia, Bulgaria; Falun, Sweden; Lillehamme, Norway; Cortina d’Ampezzo, Italy; Anchorage, United States; and Berchtesgaden, West Germany; all outlined bids.
As French citizens celebrated the triumph, an array of French authorities debated the appropriateness of permitting PCR testing to occur in France. Prior to the Games, twenty-two French scientists, two of whom held Nobel Prizes, signed a petition denouncing its use on both medical and ethical grounds. Furthermore, French ministers wrote to IOC President Samaranch and called for him to terminate the control. Perhaps most coercively, the French Medical Association’s ethics commission, the Conseil de l’Ordre des Médecins, threatened disciplinary action for any French doctor who participated in PCR verification during the Albertville Olympics. According to Association President Louis Rene, the method was not only inaccurate but also a violation of privacy. Many believed that these overlapping threats would undermine the IOC and force the Medical Commission to abandon the test.

Despite the challenges, however, the IOC implemented compulsory PCR testing in the 1992 Albertville Games. Dingeon, the French medical doctor largely responsible for the novel verification method, publicly dismissed the protests and called those behind it “spoilsports.” He also claimed that the intervention of the French scientists was “more polemical than scientific” and argued that they did not possess “real knowledge” of the sporting world. Accordingly, only Dingeon and the IOC Medical Commission comprehended the gendered realities of Olympic competition. Yet, somewhat

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590 Stuart Wavell and Andrew Alderson, “Row Looms over Olympic Sex Test,” The Sunday Times, Jan. 26, 1992, ST.
592 Ibid.
593 Ibid.
594 March 11, 1993, Letter to Elizabeth Ferris from Bernard Dingeon, Ferguson-Smith’s Correspondence Regarding Test Results from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.
inconceivably then, the fundamental purpose of gender verification still remained unclear. For example, Dingeon reasoned that the new procedure differed from the chromosomal analysis in that “the old test sought to establish that a woman was female. We set out to prove she is not a man.” At the same time, IOC spokesperson Michele Verdier noted that “it is not for the IOC to decide who is a man and who is a woman. We just want to make sure that athletes compete under fair conditions.” The pioneer of the PCR test and the IOC seemed to maintain dissimilar ideologies regarding the goal of gender verification; nevertheless, both espoused rhetoric that embraced the discourses of fair play and protection. Dingeon later explained that “only athletes competing in women’s events are screened for fraud, as a woman winning in a male event is unheard of.” Such comments further reinforced the notion of female athletic inferiority and degraded women’s sporting achievements.

While Dingeon discounted the claims of his peers, he found a proponent of PCR testing in IOC Medical Commission member Patrick Schamasch. Schamasch, a French orthopedic surgeon, served as the chief medical officer of the Albertville Olympics Organizing Committee (COJO). In this position, he oversaw four types of services: health examinations, anti-doping checks, water quality tests and gender verification. To ensure appropriate sex/gender control, his medical team collected DNA samples in the Olympic Village and then sent them to Dingeon’s hospital, the Hospitalier de Chambéry.

595 “Olympic Chiefs Brush Off Sex Test Storm,” Reuters.
for analysis. After screening 557 Olympians, Dingeon and Schamasch concluded that PCR verification was successful and cited four specific justifications for its continuation in Olympic competition. First, the doctors echoed the IOC’s insistence regarding the necessity of gender control and argued that PCR testing “excludes athletes who do not satisfy the requisite criteria to compete in a women’s event.” The two did not offer suggestions as to what comprised the “requisite criteria.” Second, Dingeon and Schamasch announced the reliability of the method, claiming to have achieved over a ninety-nine percent success rate in Albertville. As a third point, they found the test necessary for the identification and removal of transsexuals, a growing concern among the governing bodies of sport. Finally, the doctors pointed out that female athletes disliked undergoing gynecological examinations to prove their womanhood. For demonstrating such prowess in Albertville, Schamasch was named the IOC Medical and Scientific Director a year later, and would play a significant role in the creation of an Olympic transgender policy in 2003. Collectively, he and Dingeon ensured only women with the “requisite criteria” competed in the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics.

Paralleling the large number of bids outlined to host the 1992 Winter Games, six cities expressed interest in fulfilling the position for the 1992 Summer Games. Enticed by the possibility for both economic and symbolic profit, the organizing committees

601 James C. Puffer, “Gender Verification: A Concept Whose Time has Come and Passed?,” British Journal of Sports Medicine 30, no. 4 (December 1996): 278. Concerned gynecologist James C. Puffer noted that, even with ninety-nine percent accuracy, the possibility remained that seven of the approximately seven hundred women in the Winter Olympics, and twenty of the approximately two thousand women in the Summer Olympics, could be falsely deemed positive.
603 Barcelona, Spain; Paris, France; Brisbane, Australia; Belgrade, Yugoslavia; Birmingham, Great Britain; and Amsterdam, Netherlands, served as the six candidate cities.
responsible for the candidatures devoted millions of dollars to campaigns and also bartered with other locations for votes. Notably, Barcelona—Spain’s second-most-populated city—outspent its competitors with the equivalent of a ten million dollar investment in promotions. The Spanish coordinators also allegedly received assistance from Horst Dassler, German president of Adidas and creator of International Sport and Leisure, a marketing firm that maintained a lucrative contract with the IOC.

Reportedly, Dassler successfully acquired the necessary votes for Barcelona, while Samaranch’s position within the IOC further encouraged a victory for his hometown. While the Barcelona native claimed he remained uninvolved during the voting process, Samaranch’s authority clearly wielded results. On October 17, 1986, he officially declared his city the winning candidature.

Under Samaranch, the Barcelona Olympics embodied new international and economic philosophies. Coined the “New World Olympics,” “Neo Olympics” and the “New-Order Olympics” by the New York Times, the 1992 Games marked the rise of

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605 Vyv Simson and Andrew Jennings, The Lord of the Rings: Power, Money and Drugs in the Modern Olympics, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991). According to the authors, “The Club,” one of the most secretive and influential societies in the world, controlled the 1992 bidding process. This unofficial group was comprised of “self-promoting ‘Presidents’”—including Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) President and IOC delegate Dr. Joao Havelângæ, Adidas president and creator of International Sport and Leisure Horst Dassler, and IOC President Samaranch—who “between them . . . run world sport” (4). Samaranch sued the two journalists for criminal libel, citing inaccuracies regarding his role in the Spanish Civil War. Simson and Jennings failed to attend the trial and were found guilty in absentia. If the two appeared in Lausanne, Switzerland, they would have to serve five days in jail. Alex Duff, “Juan Antonia Samaranch, Olympics Head for 21 Years, Dies at 89 in Spain,” Bloomberg.com, April 21, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-04-21/juan-antonio-samaranch-olympics-head-for-21-years-dies-at-89-in-spain.html.
newfangled global relations, as well as the termination of the amateurism ideal.\textsuperscript{608} With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Iron Curtain, an unprecedented 175 countries competed in Barcelona. The dissolution of the Soviet Union allowed for the independent participation of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania and, for the first time since 1960, South Africa was allowed to attend. Moreover, athletes from East and West Germany competed under a single German flag. Finally, the 1992 Summer Games was the first not tarnished by a boycott since 1972.\textsuperscript{609}

In addition to showcasing this new world order, the Barcelona Games also included full-fledged professional athletes for the first time in Olympic history.\textsuperscript{610} The Samaranch-headed IOC abandoned Pierre de Coubertin’s idealistic conviction in amateurism and continued to commercialize the Olympic Movement.\textsuperscript{611} As journalist Michael Janofsky noted, “sport has become engulfed in an unabashed chase of dollars, pounds, lira, francs, marks and yen.” He further pointed out that in this money-driven era, “the quaint philosophies that once defined the Games” no longer held importance.\textsuperscript{612} The IOC may have softened Coubertin’s stance on amateurism, however, it maintained

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{609} Janofsky, “New-Order Olympics Began,” 234.
  \item \textsuperscript{610} This claim is somewhat disputable. Tennis and track and field athletes oftentimes earned payment for victories; however, they still maintained amateur status. Some might also suggest that the financial support state-sponsored athletes received in various communist countries rendered them more professional than amateur. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the Barcelona Olympics, the IOC completely abandoned Pierre de Coubertin’s amateur ideal in 1992.
  \item \textsuperscript{612} Janofsky, “Rare Air and New Rules for Olympics,” SO1
\end{itemize}
the founder’s view on appropriate womanhood. Olympic authorities therefore continued gender verification in Barcelona.

Similar to the twenty-two French scientists who denounced PCR testing, Spanish medical authorities also disdained the practice. Tellingly, renowned Barcelonian geneticist Xavier Estivill refused to provide assistance when asked by the Barcelona Olympics Organizing Committee (COOB’92). He rejected the COOB’92’s offer because he feared that the relative ease with which PCR could be conducted would allow for the procedure to become commonplace, despite the expanding debate regarding the constitution of sex/gender. Furthermore, Estivill questioned the IOC Medical Commission’s expertise in explaining to an athlete what it means to produce a positive sample.⁶¹³ Without his assistance, the COOB’92 employed molecular science professor Angels Serrat and biochemistry professor Antonio García de Herreros to organize the sex/gender control. According to Serrat and de Herreros, female nurses successfully screened 2,406 Olympians.⁶¹⁴

Of the 2,406 Olympians verified, twelve produced irregular results. Upon further testing, one sample proved to be a false-positive—which further alarmed those who opposed the PCR method—while five were deemed positive due to genetic “abnormalities”.⁶¹⁵ The IOC Medical Commission requested that the five athletes who

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⁶¹⁵ Ibid. Of the twelve irregular results, one was a false-positive and eleven demonstrated “abnormal” genetic material. After testing the eleven for SRY, a specific gene located on the Y chromosome, its
showcased the deviations undergo a gynecological inspection for admittance, after which four were permitted as XY chromosomal females. Bolivian athlete Sandra Cortez, however, opted to forgo competition rather than proceed with further examination.\textsuperscript{616} With her withdrawal, the IOC immediately assumed Cortez was guilty of gender deceit. According to Medical Commission member Eduardo Hay, the Bolivian track and field athlete was “a genuine case of a normal male masquerading as a female.”\textsuperscript{617} The IOC further applauded the PCR test for accurately detecting and deterring an “anatomical male.”\textsuperscript{618} Yet, many disregarded Hay’s suspicions and discounted the IOC’s self-praise due to the rumors that suggested Cortez was a biological mother of three children.\textsuperscript{619} Many medical professionals feared that, rather than an instance of gender fraudulence, Cortez’s removal resulted from media harassment.\textsuperscript{620}

Therefore, in the wake of the 1992 Albertville and Barcelona Games, those opposed to the use of laboratory testing continued to fight for the IOC to terminate the practice. As the Olympic genetic verification method increasingly demonstrated naturally-produced varieties, however, the medical community suggested a return to visual inspections. Accordingly, if the purpose of the sex test was to prohibit men from presence was shown on five samples and thereby spurred the IOC’s decision to mandate physical examinations for the five athletes.

\textsuperscript{616} June 14, 1993, “Insert C,” Correspondence, Chiefly Regarding the Adoption of Gender Verification at World University Games, February-March, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{617} February 17, 1993; Letter to Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith from Myron Genel, Ferguson-Smith’s Correspondence Regarding Test Results from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, October 1992-1993, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\textsuperscript{618} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{619} June 14, 1993, “Insert C,” Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith.

\textsuperscript{620} Elsas, Hayes, and Muralidharan, “Gender Verification at the Centennial Olympic Games,” 50.
participation, a simple visual check would suffice. These proposals not only reaffirmed a
dichotomy but also blurred biological and societal interpretations of sex and gender. By
recommending visual examinations, the medical community attempted to link sex to
appearance. Thus concerned with outward subscriptions to femininity, medicinal
authorities eventually deemed the sex test redundant as the doping check unearthed
“abnormalities” through its requirement of visual inspection of urination. While de
Mérode, Hay and other Olympic officials may have ignored the concerns voiced in
France and Spain, consequently criminalizing sex/gender-transgressive Olympians, the
progressive outlook of the Norwegian government forced the IOC to reconsider its
stipulations.
Chapter 5: “Gender Testing Per Se is No Longer Necessary”: The IAAF and The IOC, 1994-2000

As protest over gender verification increased in the wake of the 1992 Winter Olympics, Bernard Dingeon, the French doctor responsible for overseeing the tests in Albertville, publicly supported the International Olympic Committee’s (IOC) campaign to scientifically verify womanhood. Writing in *JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association*, Dingeon acknowledged the inadequacies of the formerly-used chromosomal check; however, he remained “convinced of its essential soundness,” referring to the necessity of a control mechanism to ensure equality and fair play in women’s competition. Moreover, he bemoaned the meddlesome concerns raised by the medical authorities of the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF). In his view, the successful introduction of the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test in Albertville would quiet the opposition for “PCR is perfectly suited to, and economically compatible with, the constraints of the Olympic Games.”

Others disagreed. In response, Albert de la Chapelle, Alison Carlson, Anke Ehrhardt, Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Elizabeth Ferris, Myron Genel, Arne Ljungqvist and Joe Leigh Simpson refuted Dingeon’s beliefs and again called for an abolishment of the IOC’s practice. Importantly, the protestors questioned the fundamental purpose of sex

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testing/gender verification, a nebulous subject since the introduction of the policy. At different points throughout its history, the procedure was rationalized as a defense against male masqueraders, as a deterrent for female doping and as a system to curb biological advantage. Disconcertingly—after almost three decades of mandating compulsory sex testing—the IOC’s main intent still remained unclear. Therefore, de la Chapelle, Carlson, Ehrhardt, Ferguson-Smith, Ferris, Genel, Ljungqvist and Simpson begged for the IOC and Dingeon to “realize the inadvertent damage done by laboratory-based testing” and to adopt the physical examination recently embraced by the IAAF. “[G]ender testing per se is no longer necessary,” they reasoned [emphasis by authors]. Although the leading protestors disagreed with the method, they did not refute the fundamental belief that “real” women athletes needed protection. Accordingly, control of female Olympians was imperative, an ideology that remained intact even after the abolishment of Olympic gender verification.

This chapter outlines the debate surrounding gender verification from the seemingly oppositional perspectives of the IOC and the IAAF. Although the two organizations disagreed on the method of verification—pitting PCR against physical examinations—both organizations conceded that requiring a system of control remained imperative. This concurrence demonstrates the continued belief in biological, polarized difference, one which suggests femininity is an innate, natural status for women.

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Furthermore, despite the protests regarding the singular use of the PCR test to ascertain sex/gender, the IOC Medical Commission remained staunch in its position and continued compulsory gender verification for women in the 1994 Lillehammer, 1996 Atlanta and 1998 Nagano Games. Finally, a combination of medical protest, state involvement and athlete condemnation forced the IOC to alter its position in 1999. The IOC Medical Commission voted to terminate gender verification after the 1998 Olympics, however, the IOC refused to relinquish complete control of the female body. Through suspicion-based checks, anti-doping techniques and the newly-implemented Stockholm Consensus, Olympic authorities continued to promote a binary notion of sex/gender, discredit female athletes as inferior and promote Western hetero-femininity.

Confusion and Alarm in International Sport
Following the 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympics, international sport federations were left perplexed regarding the methods to be used for—and the legality of—gender verification. With the IAAF’s recent abandonment of chromosomal and genetic checks, and the IOC’s reactive reiteration of testing, organizations charged with running multi-sport events were unsure of the correct sex/gender protocol. Confusion further abounded as the debate intensified. In the two years prior to the 1994 Lillehammer Olympics, different athletic forums implemented a range of control measures, which further highlighted the tenuous nature of sex testing/gender verification in sport.

In 1993, Buffalo, United States, hosted the World University Games, an international, multi-sport event organized specifically for the participation of university
athletes. Although previous games had mandated sex/gender checks, the Buffalo coordinators questioned the appropriate methods to enact. Medical Services director Virginia Scahill initially, and somewhat combatively, supported the IOC’s efforts to scientifically uphold sex-based classifications in women’s competitions. de la Chapelle pleaded for her to follow the example set by the IAAF and abandon gender verification; however, Scahill disbelieved his claim that the International Federation had eliminated the policy. After receiving several imploring contacts from de la Chapelle, she simply refused to answer his calls. As he sourly explained to the members of the IAAF Workshop on Femininity,

At this stage, all I can say is that history seems to be repeating itself with stunning precision: we fail again. The only new thing this time is that I have been dealing with a female organizer rather than a male one.  

Yet, after Ljungqvist contacted Scahill and detailed the IAAF’s position, she not only agreed to halt chromosomal checks in Buffalo, but also declared her advocacy for the complete termination of gender verification in sport.

Hence, under the advisement of de la Chapelle and Ljungqvist, organizers suspended blanket screening in the Buffalo World University Games. This abrupt change in policy appears to have raised little concern; perhaps because, at the time, of the thirty-four International Federations with sports on the Olympic program only five

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623 March 23, 1993, Letter to Alison Carlson, Myron Genel, Joe Leigh Simpson, Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Anke Ehrhardt, Elizabeth Ferris and Arne Ljungqvist, Ferguson-Smith’s Correspondence Regarding Test Results from the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

624 Erik Brady, “University Games Drop Gender Test,” USA Today, July 15, 1992, Factiva. In this article, Scahill appeared to alter her position radically. She told Brady that “we are just flat-out not doing the test . . . It’s been done for 25 years now, and it’s unfair and unnecessary.”

conducted on-site screens: basketball, skiing, shooting, volleyball and weightlifting. Similarly, in the following year, the Vancouver promoters of the 1994 Commonwealth Games also decided to temporarily discontinue the practice.626

Along with the growing organizational confusion regarding the logistics of sex/gender testing, groups focused on women’s rights in sport became more vocal in their objections. Notably, in 1994, the British Sports Council organized the first World Conference on Women and Sport in Brighton, England. The 280 delegates from eighty-two countries congregated to formulate a plan to foster an environment that would encourage the full involvement of women in all aspects of sport. Two years later, recognizing the importance of diverse opinions and the need for gender equality in sport, the IOC followed suit and organized its own forum. In 1996, over 220 delegates from ninety-six countries attended the IOC World Conference on Women and Sport, held at the Olympic Museum in Lausanne, Switzerland.627 Importantly, the participants generated seventeen resolutions, one of which requested that the IOC “discontinue the current process of gender verification.”628 This initiative was supported by a range of internationally significant women, including former Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto, Former Prime Minister of Norway Gro Harlem Brundtland, Hillary Rodham

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628 Ibid., 24.
Clinton, first lady of the United States, Queen Noor of Jordan and Mary Robinson, President of the Republic of Ireland.\textsuperscript{629}

Unfortunately, the IOC remained undeterred. Prior to the Lillehammer Olympics, the IOC Medical Commission combated the protests of the IAAF with its own scientific authorities and experts. Although the dispute sparked both confusion and conferences that called for change, opposition remained relatively limited to medical practitioners and women’s groups. The progressive nature of the Norwegian government, however, ensured its involvement in the debate.

\textit{Gender Testing in the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympics}

Prior to the 1994 Winter Olympics, Lillehammer citizens joked that the city’s most esteemed accomplishment was serving as the birthplace of Thor Bjøerkland, the man who invented the cheese slicer. Perhaps disenchanted with the area’s dairy-related fame, in 1981 a handful of “dreamy locals” conspired to swing the international spotlight to the small Norwegian city.\textsuperscript{630} Although the IOC initially considered Lillehammer for the 1992 Winter Games, the Executive Board eventually voted for Albertville, France. Determined to return the Olympics to Norway, the local hopefuls re-introduced the bid two years later. In the 94\textsuperscript{th} Session of the IOC in Seoul, Lillehammer earned the right to host the 1994 Winter Games, the first Olympics held outside of the traditional four-year cycle.\textsuperscript{631}

\textsuperscript{629} Ibid., 23.
\textsuperscript{631} The IOC voted to alter the format of the Olympics to space the organizational time required between the Games. Furthermore, the IOC receives greater income during the years in which the Olympics are held.
The IOC selected Lillehammer for the city’s conception of holding “compact games.” Concerned with the ever-growing “gigantism” of the Olympics, the IOC welcomed the Lillehammer Olympics Organizing Committee’s (LOOC) intent to keep all events close to the city. Although Lillehammer won the bid on the basis of this objective, the reality of hosting the Winter Olympics forced the LOOC to move certain events to distant locations. Notably, Alpine skiing occurred in Øyer and Ringebu, ice hockey in Gjøvik and skating in Hamar, distances of approximately twelve, thirty and forty miles from Lillehammer, respectively.632 Furthermore, many credit the Lillehammer Olympics as serving as the foundation for future “green games.” This aspiration did not appear in the original bid; however, from the onset, the LOOC sought to curb pollution and encourage environmental sustainability. The IOC appropriated the idea for later events.633 While Olympic authorities extolled the LOOC’s progressivism in regards to the location and environment, the Medical Commission would come to disparage the country’s foresight in regards to sex/gender.

Perhaps more than any other nation in the Cold War West, Norway has historically been lauded as a pioneer of gender equality. Starting in the nineteenth century, the country granted women unprecedented rights, far ahead of its European counterparts. For example, in the mid-1800s, Norwegian women gained access to craft and commerce and earned both property rights and the equal right of inheritance.634

Similarly, the government granted female suffrage in 1913, thereby acting as the first sovereign state in Europe to extend political citizenship to women. Although feminist thought wavered throughout the early part of the twentieth century—epitomized by the mid-century Labour Party’s conservative stance toward women—the 1960s marked a significant turning-point as a new generation of women embraced critical stands toward gender politics. Individuals involved in the “second wave” of feminism fought to alter the fundamental nature of the state and concurrently demanded the same rights as men. The 1970s, then, was a moment of a strong and visible women’s movement. With forceful encouragement from Norwegian feminists, the government accepted responsibility for requiring gender equality and passed the Equal Status Act of 1978, which prohibited all discrimination on the basis of gender. According to historian Gro Hagemann, this piece of legislation “has been the key pillar of Norwegian equal status policy in the last decades of the twentieth century.”

Moreover, Norway ratified all United Nation (UN) agreements on human rights, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The Universal Declaration of Human Rights—adopted by the UN Generally Assembly in 1948 and signed by Norway in the same year—served as the first international expression of the rights to which all humanity is entitled. Some who questioned the IOC Medical Commission’s gender policies hinted that sex testing breached this doctrine. Notably,

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Access to craft and commerce occurred in 1839-1865, equal right of inheritance in 1842 and property rights in 1865.  
635 Ibid., 427.  
636 Ibid., 421
Article 2 prohibits discrimination on the basis of “race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status,” while Article 3 guarantees “life, liberty and security of person.”\footnote{The United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” \textit{UN.org}, http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml.} Taken in conjunction with Article 12, which states that “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy . . . nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation,” Olympic sex testing could be viewed as both a discriminatory violation and as a harmful invasion of an individual’s privacy.\footnote{The United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” For more analysis on Human Rights and Sex Testing, see Stacy Larson, “Intersexuality and Gender Verification Tests: The Need to Assure Human Rights and Privacy,” \textit{Pace International Law Review} 23, no. 1 (Winter 2011): 240-241. Yet, Larson also noted that Article 29 provided leeway to national legislation, which could maintain that an individuals’ rights are outweighed by the necessity of fair play in sport.}

The CEDAW further bolstered gender equality worldwide. Colloquially described as the “international bill of rights for women,” the document originated out of a 1979 UN General Assembly convention. The Convention defines what constitutes discrimination against women and outlines an agenda to terminate such practices. Importantly, countries that accepted the CEDAW were required to “ensure the elimination of all acts of discrimination against women by persons, organizations or enterprises.”\footnote{The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, “Text of the Convention,” \textit{Un.org}, http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm.} Norway ratified the document on May 21, 1981.\footnote{Although Norway provided a signature on July 17, 1980, the country did not ratify the CEDAW until May 21, 1981. Upon ratification, Norway became the fifteenth country to successfully embrace the convention, joining Barbados, Belarus, Cape Verde, China, Cuba, Dominica, Guyana, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Sweden and Ukraine. As of 2012, the United States has not ratified the CEDAW and is the only “developed” country not to do so. United Nations Treaty Collection, “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,” \textit{Un.org}, http://www.treaties.un.org.}
Hence, since the 1980s, Norway touted gender equality and placed women in substantial leading roles. As one emblematic example, in 1985 Prime Minister Brundtland appointed forty-four percent of women among her ministries. Not surprisingly, the substantial changes in political and economic gender relations paved the way for significant alterations in women’s sport.

Prior to the opening of women’s athletic opportunities in Norway, Norwegian sport resembled the sporting norms of its neighboring country, England. Comparable to the command English medical officials held in the United Kingdom, Norwegian male doctors similarly legitimized women’s strength and stature as inferior to men’s. These authorities posited that strenuous exercise and exertion fostered female demise and ruin, thereby cementing sport as male endeavor. Although this conception remained deeply rooted in Norwegian sport, alternative ideologies occasionally permeated the hegemonic ideal. Most significantly, prior to World War I, the Workers Sports Confederation (AIF), one of the two large sport federations in Norway, articulated a political goal of promoting equality between men and women. Additionally, in the interwar period, the AIF notably appointed a women’s committee and outlined the first sport-specific policy for women. In 1946, when the AIF merged with the Norwegian Confederation of Sport (NCS), the women’s group continued; however, in 1953, the committee was abolished. Although

641 Hagemann, *Citizenship and Social Order*.
the NCS Committee for Instruction and Information was expected to incorporate policies specifically for female athletes, few were passed.\textsuperscript{644}

Faced with limited sporting prospects and entrenched discrimination, Norwegian women mobilized in the 1980s. On the coattails of the larger women’s movement, female athletes demanded increased access to sport. The Norwegian Equal Status Council therefore arranged a hearing to assess women’s participation in physical activities in 1984, which led to the reinstatement of a women’s committee within the NCS. This newly formulated women’s organization sought to appraise the current situation and draft solutions to boost female involvement. Within the same year, the NCS further adopted a specific plan of action and outlined three main goals: to legalize working with women’s rights in the organization, to establish a formal network for women and to plan and to coordinate activities for females.\textsuperscript{645} Additionally, the NCS passed the first gender quota for sport organizations in 1987.\textsuperscript{646} The legally-delegated quota system required that each gender be represented on elected board and committees. Although the quota-system was sharpened in 1990 and applauded for elevating female representation in various federations, the more powerful positions—those located at the acme of the sporting hierarchies—remained firmly rooted in masculine tradition.\textsuperscript{647} Nevertheless, the country’s unique combination of embracing human rights, encouraging female


\textsuperscript{645} Ibid.


\textsuperscript{647} Ibid., 41-53.
athleticism and requiring legal equality coalesced, allowing Norway to serve as the first country to directly challenge Olympic gender verification practices.

The Lillehammer Olympics, therefore, was a turning point in the history of Olympic sex testing. In 1994, the Norwegian government declared gender verification “illegal and unethical” and Norwegian scientists denied the IOC assistance.648 Without the support of the government and the expertise of the country’s medical authorities, the IOC Medical Commission scrambled to find replacements to conduct the examinations scheduled for February.649 Due to the growing concern regarding the ethics and legality of PCR testing, the Medical Commission experienced substantial difficulty locating willing European specialists. Finally, Dingeon, the aforementioned individual responsible for gender verification in Albertville, agreed to assume control.650

Although the IOC Medical Commission eventually found alternate geneticists to complete the examinations, the Norwegian government’s overt refusal to support gender verification—which followed closely on the heels of the protests in Barcelona and Albertville—clearly irked some Olympic officials. To assuage these concerns, the IOC employed the Norwegian Sports University to ascertain the sentiments of female Olympians in Lillehammer. Headed by professor Berit Skirstad, the research posed eleven questions regarding personal perception of gender verification to 115 athletes. Skirstad found that the less information about the procedure the athlete possessed, the

more supportive she was about its necessity. “The athletes in general have not known enough about the complications attached to the test to question them,” she concluded. “They tend to think that the test protects against male intruders in female competitions.” Tellingly, after completing the research, Skirstad joined those against gender verification and voiced protest.

The embracement of gender verification by female Olympians is disappointing, yet not surprising. Since the initial implementation of mandatory control measures, women have largely supported sex testing/gender verification for a variety of reasons, all primarily rooted in cultural norms and social anxieties. Foremost, many competitors accepted the IOC’s postulation that female athletes needed protection from the gender transgressive individuals deemed too muscular and too powerful for competition, which suggests that (Cold War Western) athletes placed limitations on their own strength and capabilities. Moreover, social biases dictated that strong women breached compulsory heterosexuality. Therefore, as historian Cecile Hourly explained, “passing the sex test proved to the world that their abilities and gender were legitimate.” Finally, most Olympians failed to recognize the flawed nature of the control methods. According to gynecologist John S. Fox, “most female athletes are ignorant of the limitations of the test . . . and of the disastrous emotional and social consequences for the individual who has

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the misfortune to fail.” 655 The acceptance demonstrated by a majority of female Olympians is one reason why the IOC was permitted to continue the test for over three decades.

Perhaps out of chagrin that the IOC conducted gender control in 1994 despite the country’s refusal to cooperate, the Norwegian government passed several laws to clearly and unequivocally prohibit sex testing in the future. Foremost, six months after the close of the Lillehammer Olympics, the parliament passed the Biology ACT no. 56 of August 5, 1994. 656 This piece of legislation required informed consent on any medical use of biotechnology. 657 Moreover, when the 1995 Junior World Championships in alpine skiing occurred in Voss, Norway, the organizers successfully argued that gender verification practices violated Norwegian law, derailing any efforts to implement the exam. 658 To further bolster the national position, the Norwegian Biotechnology Advisory Board, an independent body appointed by the government, evaluated the test in 1996 and also deemed it illegal. The Board passed its findings onto the NCS and sex testing was prohibited in the 1997 Nordic Skiing Championships in Trondheim, Norway. 659 Finally, in January 1997, an Amendment was proposed to parliament to further clarify that gender verification was illegal in Norway. 660 The Amendment passed in April 1997, officially

656 Skirstad, “Gender Verification in Competitive Sport,” 121.
outlawing sex tests conducted for non-medical reasons. Although Norway joined with the IAAF in the refusal to support sex testing, some still believed in the necessity of the practice.

_The New Racial “Other” in Olympic Competition_

In the midst of the IOC and IAAF’s battle over gender verification, Chinese athletes began to flourish in international sport. Similar to the Soviet Union’s rejoinder in 1952, the People’s Republic of China returned to the Olympics after a twenty-four-year boycott in 1984 and immediately showcased tremendous athletic capabilities. For example, after earning twenty-eight medals in the 1988 Seoul Olympics (compared to the U.S.S.R.’s 132 and U.S.’s 102), Chinese athletes secured fifty in the 1996 Atlanta Games, finishing fourth in the medal count. Table 4 illustrates the continuation of this trend.

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Even more noticeably, women from the People’s Republic of China dominated international track and field. For example, in the 1993 World Championships, Chinese competitors earned six of the possible nine medals in the women’s long-distance races. The previously undecorated athletes also set several world records a few months later, in the 1,500-meters, 3,000-meters and 10,000-meters races, during the Chinese National Games. Yet, rather than celebrate these impressive triumphs in women’s sports, many in the Cold War West doubted the authenticity of the achievements. “I would love to jump up and down and say ‘Fabulous!’” explained U.S. athlete PattiSue Plumer, “but to smash those records by that much, it needs investigation.” Similarly, U.S. teammate Mary

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Decker Slaney, never one to avoid spreading harmful suspicions about successful opponents, argued that “if they ratify these records, it will set women’s middle distance and distance running back 25 years . . . . It will ruin the sport.664

Such sentiments percolated in the Cold War West, consequently degrading female athleticism and simultaneously “othering” the Chinese women. According to sport sociologist Darcy C. Plymire, as assessment of the Western coverage in 1993 demonstrates its tendency to construct the victorious Chinese athletes as fraudulent and unnatural.665 As illustrated in the reports, female success was cause for suspicion, not celebration. Moreover, although no Chinese women failed the compulsory drug test, journalists voiced suspicions of steroid abuse as a tactic to protect the rightful claimants to athletic victories—white, hetero-feminine, Western women. Finally, the doping accusations allowed many to liken the Chinese athletes to those of the Eastern Bloc who had raised gender anxieties in the early stages of the Cold War. As Plymire noted, “in the eyes of some, the Chinese are the inevitable heirs to the legacy of the ‘Big Red Machine’ simply because they are a communist nation.”666 The Chinese athletes were depicted as guilty due to their governmental correlation to the Soviet Union.

Thus, with the animosities between the two superpowers largely dissolved, Cold War Western anxieties were transferred to the geographic East, specifically onto China—the newest threat in the global establishment. Paralleling the hostile criticisms voiced

666 Ibid., 160
against Eastern Bloc women in the height of the Cold War, Chinese women were increasingly established as the racial and gendered “other” in the realm of sport. The concerns sparked by the Chinese runners’ rapid ascendency were further exacerbated in the 1993 East Asia Games when four women failed the gender verification check. Kong Chuan, head of the Games medical committee, reported that the discoveries occurred prior to competition and resulted in the immediate removal of the athletes. Although Chuan refused to identify the athletes or name the nationalities of the disqualified, the media highlighted the possibility of fraudulence.667

Prompted by these speculations of ambiguously sexed/gendered Chinese female athletes, several Cold War Western running authorities publicly lamented the IAAF’s decision to abolish gender verification. The U.S. editor of Keeping Track: International Track & Field Newsletter, Janet Heinonen, led the charge. She argued in 1994 that “although some experts believe that sex testing in athletic competitions should be abolished, women on the playing field deserve the right to compete against athletes of their own sex.”668 While Heinonen clearly reinforced the notion that female athletes were in need of protection, she also perpetuated a belief in polarized sex/gender.669 She repeatedly declared that no biological overlap existed between men and women, a

667 Sport Around the World, “Women Stopped in their Tracks by Tests,” July 24, 1993, Gender Verification Correspondence, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.


conviction derived from conversations with steroid-expert Don Catlin. Catlin, founder of the UCLA Olympic Analytical Lab, prioritized testosterone levels in the determination of gender. Therefore, with this information gleaned from Catlin, Heinonen suggested the IAAF return to a gynecological exam for all women competitors, supplemented with blood testing in cases of questionable results.

On February 24, 1994, sixteen female runners followed Heinonen’s lead and formally petitioned the IAAF to reinstitute gender verification for all “high stakes” women’s events. Dubbed the “Heinonen Sixteen,” the group consisted of several famous world-class athletes, most of whom competed for the United States. South African Colleen de Reuck’s was the only non-U.S. runner to sign the appeal; she gained U.S. citizenship six years later. Galvanized by the fears of female dopers, gender fraudulences and racialized bodies, the Heinonen Sixteen articulated five major demands to the IAAF. Most significantly, the athletes requested the return of gender verification in any event that awarded medals or prize money. Second, the group asked that all women who desired to participate in such competitions be forced to agree to sex/gender control if victorious. Third, the Heinonen Sixteen suggested that the check—a chromosomal analysis as well as a pelvic examination—be completed within forty-eight hours of the race and occur in a clinical setting, under the supervision of the IAAF. If

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670 April 19, 1994, Letter to Arne Ljungqvist, Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Liz Ferris and Myron Genel from Alison Carlson, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

671 February 24, 1994, Letter to Arne Ljungqvist from Olympic and International World Class Athletes, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson Smith, University of Glasgow Archives. The sixteen athletes who signed the petition all maintained U.S. citizenship: Darcy Arreola, Cathie Twomey Bellamy, Kelly Blair, Melody Fairchild, Eryn Forbes, Kathy Hayes Herrmann, Lynn Jennings, Kristy Johnston, Anne Marie Letko, Lisa Ondicki, Annette Peters, PattiSue Plumer, Colleen de Reuck, Mary Slaney, Shelly Steele and Elizabeth Wilson.
any question surfaced, the runners desired that both blood and hormonal testing occur. Along with gender verification, the group requested a continuation of the femininity certification process. Finally, the Heinonen Sixteen demanded gender verification commence immediately. “We are willing to undergo testing,” they declared, “to ensure that women are competing for women’s awards.” Clearly, the sixteen world-class not only internalized the notion of female inferiority but also failed to comprehend the reality of biological difference.

The Heinonen Sixteen’s demands quickly gained credence. For example, in October, a conference was held alongside the 1994 Asian Games in Hiroshima, Japan, to answer questions regarding gender verification. According to reporter Phyllis Fang, the impetus for this symposium stemmed from newfangled global anxieties. “The conference was held against a background of accusations by some western coaches that there was something suspicious about the sudden emergence of China’s recent women world record swimmers and middle-distance runners,” she explained. Such speculations bolstered the IOC’s decision to maintain gender verification.

The opposition voiced by the Heinonen Sixteen and other track and field competitors did not surprise the original members of the IAAF Workshop on Femininity. According to Ferguson-Smith, the general lack of insight into human biology by the general population, combined with the IOC’s steadfast reliance on scientific technologies that promoted sex/gender difference, ensured widespread confusion. He therefore

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672 February 24, 1994, Letter to Arne Ljungqvist from Olympic and International World Class Athletes, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

suggested that the protests be utilized as an opportunity to both re-emphasize the underlying discrimination of the IOC’s policy and provide sweeping education for athletes.\(^{674}\) Carlson agreed. In her view, the Heinonen Sixteen “need to know that they are asking doctors to play god and make subjective assessments of advantage and womanhood.”\(^{675}\) Ferguson-Smith’s and Carlson’s advisement of education would prove significant for the eventual termination of the IOC’s gender verification requirement; however, until Olympians expressed aversion to the procedure, the IOC continued to control womanhood.

The 1996 Olympic bid went to Atlanta, United States. Although the country did not have federal requirements prohibiting gender verification, many hoped that the recurrent criticisms and increased opposition would force the IOC to end PCR verification. “We don’t know what will happen in Atlanta in 1996,” said an optimistic Ljungqvist. “It could be a turning point, if they don’t allow this sort of testing to occur.”\(^{676}\) His hopefulness would prove to be misplaced.

**Gender Verification in the 1996 Atlanta Summer Olympics**

To gain international attention and foster a reputation as a center of racial justice and economic prosperity, Atlanta vied for the 1996 Summer Olympic bid.\(^{677}\) Led by

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\(^{674}\) March 16, 1994, Letter to Arne Ljungqvist from Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\(^{675}\) April 19, 1994, “Letter to Arne Ljungqvist, Malcolm Ferguson-Smith, Liz Ferris and Myron Genel from Alison Carlson, Correspondence Regarding the Petition by the “Heinonen Sixteen” on Gender Verification, Papers of Malcolm Andrew Ferguson-Smith, University of Glasgow Archives.

\(^{676}\) Fang, “Games—Sport Will Perplexed by Man-Woman Question,” LBA.

William “Billy” Porter Payne, and with the support of Mayor Andrew Young, Atlanta put forward a bid to the IOC. Although U.S. President George Bush also endorsed the ambition, the Atlanta proposition was considered largely implausible as the United States had hosted the Olympics twelve years earlier in Los Angeles. Moreover, with centennial honors, many assumed Athens was the obvious choice. Yet, after IOC delegates examined the candidature’s hotel accommodations and flight connections, as well as their proposed conditions for athletes, economic stability, facilities, police presence and security measures, Atlanta edged out Athens, 51-35. As a result, in the 96th Session of the IOC, Samaranch announced the city as responsible for hosting the Centennial Games.

With the victory, the U.S. city hoped to highlight certain achievements to a global audience. In particular, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympics Games (ACOG) recognized the unprecedented increase in sporting opportunities for women in the United States and sought to promote this phenomenon. Significantly, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC), the U.S. commercial network entrusted with televising the 1996 Olympics, promoted the Atlanta Games as the “Olympics of the Woman.” In NBC’s line of reasoning, the Centennial Olympics served as the culmination of feminism and Title IX, a significant piece of legislation in the United States that demanded gender equitability in federally-funded sport. While the U.S. media thereby proclaimed the Atlanta Games as the coming of the female athlete, the validity of the assertion was

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679 Other candidature cities included: Belgrade, Serbia; Manchester, England; Melbourne, Australia; and Toronto, Canada.
questionable as gender biases existed from the onset. For example, despite the networks’ sanctioning of increased female exposure as a universal goal, the coverage nonetheless continued to favor male athletes, in both amount and description. \footnote{Susan Tyler Eastman and Andrew C. Billings, “Gender Parity in the Olympics: Hyping Women Athletes, Favoring Men Athletes,” \textit{Journal of Sport and Social Issues} 23, no. 2 (May 1999), 140-170.} Furthermore, although U.S. women accounted for a greater proportional share of medals than the U.S. men in 1996, NBC dedicated more airtime to male figures, including athletes, coaches, fans and commentators. Finally, to reinforce femininity in women’s sport, NBC awarded twice as much time to females in individual events as compared to females in team sports. \footnote{Ibid. Of the women’s airtime, sixty-one percent showed swimming, diving and gymnastics while power sports, such as discus and shot put, received hardly any mention.} Thus, while NBC claimed to shine a new light on women Olympians, coverage demonstrated the ubiquitous nature of the deeply-rooted Western concerns with feminine demonstrations. \footnote{C.A. Tuggle and Ann Owen, “A Descriptive Analysis of NBC’s Coverage of the Centennial Olympics,” \textit{Journal of Sport and Social Issues} 23, no. 2 (Mary 1999), 171-182} Comparable to this coverage, the IOC also enforced femininity.

By 1996, virtually all medical societies had called for the IOC to terminate its gender verification tests. Within the United States, the American Academy of Pediatrics, American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, American College of Physicians, American Medical Association, American Society of Human Genetics and the Endocrine Society publically opposed the practice. \footnote{Joan Stephenson, “Female Olympians’ Sex Tests Outmoded,” \textit{JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association} 276, no. 3 (July 17, 1996), 177.} The most oft-cited reasons stemmed from the inherent flaw in seeking biological sex-distinction and the reliance on error-prone test methods. As Emory University geneticists Louis J. Elsas, Risa P. Hayes and Kasinathan Muralidharan explained in the \textit{Journal of the Medical Association of Georgia},
The combination of non-valid screening tests, discriminatory aspects of ‘female only’ gender verification, failure to take into account problems of intersex and consequent stigmatization of positive screenes [sic] all created a backlash of resentment among medical professionals towards gender verification in sports.685

Yet, still staunch in the opinion that the control should continue, the IOC Medical Commission maintained the requirement that all female athletes undergo a check prior to competition. Learning from its past mistake—permitting Norway to challenge the IOC and refuse assistance in Lillehammer—the Medical Commission forced the ACOG to sign a contract, which required an on-site screening location and bound the city to the procedure.686

As a result, the ACOG Medical Commission assumed responsibility. After a meeting in 1995 on how best to proceed, the group established two main priorities regarding gender verification, to “prevent masquerading males from competing and do no harm to females with anticipated problems of intersex.”687 The Atlanta-based Medical Commission therefore enlisted the Genetics Department at the Emory University School of Medicine to analyze samples.688 For the actual DNA collection, only female technicians worked with the athletes, due to the sensitivity of the PCR test.689 Tellingly, the ACOG also had gynecologists, psychiatrists, urologists and endocrinologists on standby, insinuating that the IOC Medical Commission still struggled to determine

686 Ibid., 249-254
687 Ibid., 51.
689 Elsas, Hayes and Muralidharran, “Gender Verification at the Centennial Olympic Games,” 50.
exactly how to identify sex. Nevertheless, the Emory University geneticists processed samples from 3,387 female Olympians.

Of the 3,387 participants checked, eight demonstrated ambiguous results. According to the Emory University geneticists, seven of the eight exhibited Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome. Had the previous measures been in place, the eight would have likely been quietly disqualified. With the consultation of a plethora of medical experts, however, the ACOG determined that “no men masquerading as women were encountered, and all participants were cleared for competition.”

Similar to the research conducted in Lillehammer, the Genetics Department at the Emory University School of Medicine interviewed female participants to determine their perspective on sex control. Through exit interviews, ninety-four percent of the respondents noted that they did not feel “anxious” regarding the screening, while eighty-two percent believed that the test should continue to be required for future competitions. Furthermore, seventy-nine women opted to write comments, from which a handful of recurrent themes surfaced. First, some women supported the myth of male biological superiority and bought into the scare of male masqueraders. One simply commented that “I do not want to race men.” In the same vein, several women raised the notion of fairness. One commentator suggested that the IOC “should test all athletes who win,” and another more succinctly explained that gender verification is “necessary for fairness.”

691 Of the female participants, 379 women did not need verification because they competed in open events and, in addition, 296 had previously been granted a certificate. Elsas, Hayes and Muralidharran, “Gender Verification at the Centennial Olympic Games,” 50-51.
Finally, some recognized the obtrusiveness of the process. One posited that “I don’t think we should take the test more than once” and another that it was an “expensive and labor intensive procedure.” Comparable to the results unearthed in Lillehammer, gender anxiety and concerns of fairness led most female Olympians to embrace gender verification as a necessity. Although the women athletes supported verification, the outcry from the medical community expanded and eventually forced the IOC to alter its policy.

Gender Verification in the 1998 Nagano Olympics and the Election of the Athletes Commission

In 1991, the IOC selected Nagano, Japan, as the second Asian city to host the Winter Olympics. During the 97th Session of the IOC, the Japanese mountain metropolis and Salt Lake City, United States, emerged as the top two contenders. The other three candidatures, Aosta, Italy; Jaca, Spain; and Östersund, Sweden; were considered too “small fry” to host the Winter Games. Initially, the IOC favored the U.S. applicant, due to the geographic location of Salt Lake City, as well as the area’s airport, athletic facilities, housing and transportation; however, Atlanta’s successful bid for the 1996 Centennial Games bolstered Nagano’s position. The IOC was reluctant to

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693 Elsas, Hayes and Muralidharran, “Gender Verification at the Centennial Olympic Games,” 53.
award the Olympics to the same country consecutively.\textsuperscript{696} Therefore, in the fifth round of voting, Nagano, the “Roof of Japan,” trumped Salt Lake City by a mere four votes.\textsuperscript{697}

Despite the incongruities reported in Atlanta, and the continued criticism of the Medical Commissions’ obstinacy, the IOC upheld gender verification in the Nagano Winter Games. To fulfill the Medical Commission’s regulations, the Organizing Committee for the XVIII Olympic Winter Games (NAOC) created its own Medical Services Commission, comprised of nineteen experts from various medical and governmental organizations. Headed by Professor Yoshio Kuroda, the NAOC’s Medical Services Commission provided general health-related care, oversaw sanitation, supervised anti-doping checks and conducted PCR testing.\textsuperscript{698} For the sex/gender control, 679 of the 815 winter Olympians did not possess valid femininity certificates issued by the IOC. As a result, the Medical Services Commission collected both chromosomal and DNA samples from the participants, and sent the screens to the Nagano Municipal Hospital for analysis.\textsuperscript{699} Director Kuroda did not publicly report any failures. While the PCR testing in Nagano may have proceeded more smoothly than in Lillehammer and Atlanta, Olympians increasingly voiced resentment of the process. Thus, when direct elections occurred for the Athletes Commission, competitors themselves altered the course of gender verification.

During the 1996 Atlanta and 1998 Nagano Games, Olympians voted for fellow competitors to serve as representatives on the Athletes Commission for the first time in

\textsuperscript{696} Ibid., 6-10.
\textsuperscript{699} Ibid., 295.
Olympic history. The IOC founded the Athletes Commission in 1981 to act as the liaison between the participants and the governing body, and had previously determined membership for over a decade.\(^{700}\) In Atlanta, fifty-four percent of Olympians cast votes and elected rower Roland Baar (Germany), track and field athlete Hassiba Boulmerka (Algeria), track and field athlete Sergey Bubka (Ukraine), volleyball player Charmaine Crooks (Canada), swimmer Alexander Popov (Russia) and track and field athlete Jan Železný (Czech Republic).\(^{701}\) Following comparable elections in Nagano, in which fifty-eight percent of participants voted, cross country skier Manuela di Centa (Italy), speed skater Johann Olav Koss (Norway) and cross country skier Vladimir Smirnov (Kazakhstan) joined the seven summer members.\(^{702}\) The IOC also included nine additional individuals to ensure gender, geographic and sport balance.\(^{703}\)

Three years after the initial vote was conducted in Atlanta, the nineteen members of the Athletes Commission became embroiled in the protest against Olympic gender verification. Notably, Norwegian speed skater Koss, who earned three gold medals in the 1994 Lillehammer Games and had also trained as a physician, studied the sex/gender controls on behalf of the Athletes Commission. After listening to his assessment, the group recommended that the IOC discontinue gender verification immediately. While commendable in its efforts to force Olympic officials to relinquish control of women, the Athletes Commission outlined a proposal that permitted suspicion-based checks. This clause allowed for the “intervention and evaluation of individual athletes . . . if there is

\(^{703}\) “Athletes Elect Athletes,” 19-20.
any question regarding gender identity.” Anxieties regarding hetero-femininity clearly remained intact.

*The Termination of Olympic Gender Verification?*
With the Athletes Commission’s recommendation, in the 1999 IOC Session in Seoul, Samaranch announced the termination of compulsory gender verification in Olympic competition. According to the meeting minutes, the Executive Board voted to strengthen anti-doping checks and terminate sex/gender testing, “on an experimental basis,” for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics. At first glance, this decision seemed to indicate the IOC’s relinquishment of sex/gender control. Many welcomed the change and applauded the Olympic authorities’ surrender. Upon further examination, however, it became clear that the IOC Medical Commission maintained jurisdiction in the determination of appropriate womanhood and merely fulfilled its intentions elsewhere.

As Genel and Ljungqvist argued, Samaranch’s announcement was largely misinterpreted. The two warned that “gender verification has not, as some believe, been completely abandoned.” Through the increased weight granted to anti-doping exams, inclusion of a “suspicion-based” clause and articulation of the Stockholm Consensus, the IOC continued to control women’s bodies, again casting doubt on athletes who did not demonstrate normative femininity or genitalia.

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Throughout its history, the IOC Medical Commission clearly conflated the purposes of its anti-doping checks and sex test/gender verification measures. While this association waxed and waned for three decades, the two were conjoined again in 1999 when the IOC terminated chromosomal and DNA sex/gender assessments. Rather than completely abandon control, the IOC Medical Commission simply couched gender verification in anti-doping methods. Most notably, the urination component of the doping test required visual inspection by an Olympic official, which permitted authorities to scrutinize an athlete’s genitalia. As sport physician James C. Puffer explained, the possibility for the inclusion of a male masquerader was “laughable” due to the “direct observation of athletes providing urine specimens from their urethras.” Barry Dickinson, Genel, Carolyn B. Robinowitz, Patricia L. Turner and Gary L. Woods similarly posited that the urination examination “would seem to obviate the possibility of male imposters successfully competing.”

Still clearly concerned with fraudulent competitors, the IOC’s hidden agenda was problematic for two reasons. First, cloaking the control in anti-doping techniques again tied a woman’s sex/gender to her reproductive organs. In doing so, the IOC replicated the “naked parades” implemented during the early stages of the Cold War. Second, the inclusion of gender determination in anti-doping measurements permitted the IOC to further naturalize the body. In particular, the subtle focus on hormone-levels created an arbitrary division between “normal” and “masculine” women. This subjective

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708 Puffer, “Gender Verification: A Concept Whose Time has Come and Passed?,” 278.
demarcation helped exclude athletes whose bodies fell outside conventional sex/gender norms.  

Furthermore, for the 2000 Sydney Summer Olympics, the IOC Medical Commission embraced suspicion-based checks. Mirroring the IAAF’s gender stipulations, the IOC upheld its right to verify any woman participant, should a challenge arise. In other words, Olympic authorities could require a female athlete who appeared too “suspicous” (non-feminine) to undergo the PCR test.  

With this denotation, the IOC again suggested that overt performances of hetero-femininity guaranteed womanhood. Moreover, suspicion-based testing overtly criminalized strong women and established athleticism and femininity as polar characteristics.

Finally, in 2003, the IOC cemented the sex/gender dichotomy in Olympic competition through its guidelines for transsexual athletic inclusion. The resultant policy, “The Stockholm Consensus,” penned by the IOC Medical Commission, outlined very specific rules to stipulate transgender performances in the Olympics. First, the guidelines stated that a transgender individual must undergo sex-reassignment surgery and alter external genitalia. The second requirement varied upon country of residence; however, the rules explained that all competitors were required to receive legal recognition by “appropriate official authorities.” Thirdly, the IOC mandated transsexual

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712 The Stockholm Consensus divided transsexual athletes into two groups. One set of stipulations referred to individuals who had undergone sex-reassignment surgery pre-puberty; for these individuals, the Stockholm Consensus allowed them to compete in the resultant gender division without restriction. For the other group, the IOC established the narrow set of regulations.
athletes administer hormone therapy “appropriate for the assigned sex” to minimize “gender-related advantages.”\textsuperscript{713}

Although the Olympic Games strive for international unity, the Stockholm Consensus demonstrated a geographic Western, elite bias. While the policy notably discriminated against individuals from less-industrialized nations, it also allowed the IOC to maintain its stranglehold on Olympic Womanhood.\textsuperscript{714} For example, hormone levels “appropriate for the assigned sex” remains disputable as no one standard exists. The use of conservative medical criteria therefore not only diminished accessibility for many transsexual athletes, but also suggested that hormone-levels exist in humans in a binary rather than in a spectrum. Furthermore, by deploying discourses of fairness, the IOC reified patriarchal assumptions of male biological superiority. The claim that the Stockholm Consensus guaranteed a level playing field stemmed from fears of male-to-female transsexual inclusion, comparable to the anxieties sparked by muscular women.

After thirty years of protest, the IOC eventually agreed to abandon compulsory gender verification in 1999, at least in name. “It took a long battle to put an end to gender testing,” recalled Ljungqvist. “This was a decades-long example of sexual


\textsuperscript{714} For several transgender athletes who so desire, surgery remains an impossibility. Sex-reassignment is expensive, thereby only making it affordable for wealthy athletes. In addition, several countries do not have the necessary medical background or scientific technology to perform the operations and sex-reassignment for female-to-male transsexuals has yet to be perfected. Legal recognition by “appropriate official authorities” is also problematic. Transsexuals outside of North America and Europe have difficulty changing legal status. Even in the United States, recognition varies state-by-state.
harassment within sport. Gender testing was a flagrant abuse, nothing else.”

Despite his optimistic reflection, femininity policing remained intact. Doping controls required visual scrutiny, which allowed for an assessment of genitalia. In addition, the IOC authorized suspicion-based testing and, according to this stipulation, any competitor who did not subscribe to conventional femininity could be required to undergo an examination. The confusion regarding sex/gender persisted, as did the anxiety over non-conforming, non-feminine women. Finally, the IOC Medical Commission’s rules for transgender athletes further reified a sex/gender-segregated binary. Sadly, “flagrant abuse” of the IOC did not end.

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Conclusion

In the 800-meter final of the 2006 Asian Games, twenty-five-year-old Indian middle-distance runner Santhi Soundarajan placed second. After the closely contested race, the Tamil Nadu native stood victoriously on the podium and happily showcased her medal.\(^{716}\) Her triumph, however, was short-lived. The day after she earned silver, Soundarajan, a world-class athlete who had previously garnered several first- and second-place finishes in international events, was asked to submit to a gender verification test.\(^{717}\)

Although the International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) and comparable governing bodies, including the International Olympic Committee (IOC), had abolished sex testing in the 1990s, sport authorities still maintained the right to require its competitors to undergo an exam at any time.\(^{718}\) Therefore, four IAAF doctors, none of whom spoke Tamil, the native language of Tamil Nadu, extracted blood and scrutinized Soundarajan’s naked body. The silver medalist was not told the purpose nor the outcome of the thirty-minute examination. It was days later, when back in Tamil Nadu, that Soundarajan learned from the evening news that she had failed the test. “That was the


\(^{717}\) Ibid.

\(^{718}\) The IAAF eliminated sex testing in 1992 and the IOC followed suit and dropped the exam after the 1998 Nagano Olympics. Yet, each organization maintained the right to test any “questionable” female athletes on a case-by-case basis. Chromosomal or genetic verification could be required based upon an athlete’s external appearance or from a detection of “abnormal” genitalia as noticed during the visual requirement of doping tests.
end of my sports life,” she recalled. The IAAF immediately stripped Soundarajan of her medal and barred her from future competitions.

Three years later, eighteen-year-old South African runner Caster Semenya similarly burst into the public consciousness. The previously unknown middle-distance athlete gained notoriety at the 2009 World Track and Field Championships for defeating her competitors by a margin of more than two seconds, considered a tremendous gap in the 800-meter race. Yet, Semenya’s impressive victory was quickly overshadowed by the vicious criticisms voiced by those she defeated. “Just look at her,” said Mariya Savinova of Russia, presumably referring to Semenya’s muscular stature. In the same vein, Italian middle-distance runner Elisa Cusma scoffed that “these kinds of people should not run with us. For me, she’s not a woman. She’s a man.” Such hostile suspicions stemmed from Semenya’s notable improvement, powerful build and deep voice. Thus, equally skeptical, the IAAF required that her sex/gender be scientifically verified.

Influenced by both Soundarjan’s and Semenya’s physical appearances and international plights, as well as by the specter of unfair advantage in women’s competition, the IOC reintroduced gender verification in the 2012 London Olympics.

Outlined and published by the IOC Medical and Scientific Department on June 22,
2012—mere weeks before the Opening Ceremonies of the Summer Games—the novel stipulations targeted “deviant” female athletes. As outlined in the “IOC Regulations on Female Hyperandrogenism,” to ensure equitability, women with higher-than-average levels of androgens were deemed ineligible to compete. Androgenic hormones control muscular development and women with hyperandrogenism typically produce an excess of (naturally-produced) testosterone. Concerned with “strength, power and speed, which may provide a competitive advantage in sport,” the IOC required all National Olympic Committees (NOC) to “actively investigate any perceived deviations in sex characteristics.”\(^\text{723}\) According to Dr. Stephane Bermon, a coordinator of the working group on Hyperandrogenism and Sex Reassignment in Female Athletics, women with the ailment have an “unfair advantage,” for it produces “more muscle mass, easier recovery and a higher level of blood cells.”\(^\text{724}\) Yet, tellingly, the stipulations isolated women and did not reciprocally bar male Olympians with abnormal levels of androgens, either higher or lower.

Protests quickly likened the new control to the Olympic sex/gender check unveiled in 1968. In the 1968 Mexico City Summer Games, the IOC implemented compulsory sex testing for female athletes, a policy that dictated appropriate Olympic womanhood until 1999. For over three decades, sport officials policed sex/gender through an assortment of methods, which included physical inspections, chromosomal

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analysis and DNA assessments. Despite the IOC Medical Commission’s innovativeness in techniques, the group failed to locate a clear division between men and women. Nevertheless, the male-dominated, Cold War West-controlled organization repeatedly upheld the necessity of the exam as a tool to both promote fair competition and deter male masqueraders.

The IOC’s insistence illustrates the anxieties sparked by muscular women. Concerned with blatant displays of non-normative femininity, Olympic officials vilified successful female athletes through public contestations of their sex/gender. Moreover, the use of sex testing/gender verification controls not only criminalized Olympians, but also established female athleticism as the antithesis of power, speed and strength. Cloaked under the façade of fair play, the IOC’ policies thus belittled female Olympians and reified the assumption of male physical superiority.

Although protests from the medical community and the Athletes Commission eventually coerced the IOC to abandon compulsory verification, authorities failed to relinquish complete control of Olympic womanhood. On the one hand, the proposals articulated and embraced by the IAAF re-focused attention on athletes’ anatomy. By suggesting Olympians undergo “health checks” prior to competition insinuated that sex/gender was located on the body. On the other, the IOC continued to determine womanhood through its anti-doping methods, suspicion-based testing and the Stockholm Consensus. The IOC Medical Commission couched gender verification in doping tests. By mandating a visual examination during the collection of a urine sample, officials instituted visual checks. Furthermore, the IOC permitted challenges based on women’s
appearances. As such, any female deemed unfeminine could be required to report for
further examination prior to participation. Finally, the Stockholm Consensus detailed
very strict guidelines for transsexual athletic inclusion, thereby further reinforcing the
idea of difference. Thus, with the new verification measures outlined for the 2012
London Games, the IOC merely strengthened its control.

Rather than re-introduce problematic testing to reassert a polarized sex/gender
binary, the IOC must surrender control and permit a more flexible sporting system. If
entirely abandoning sex/gender-segregation seems too far-reaching, the Medical
Commission could at least relinquish its spurious authority and allow athletes’ physicians
to determine “correct” classification. In this framework, men and women experience
parallel treatment and powerful female athletes are not singled-out and hostilely vilified.
Moreover, medical experts could incorporate a range of identifiers, including anatomic,
chromosomal, genetic, hormonal, legal and social determinants. Importantly, self-
identification must be included in the designation.

To radically alter the nature of sport and disrupt society’s dependence on a false
sex/gender dichotomy, however, the IOC should alter its athletic priorities and refigure its
divisional paradigm. Foremost, to account for a range of genetic predispositions—not
merely those typically associated with masculinity and femininity—Olympic authorities
might consider de-emphasizing activities that highlight brute strength, such as power
lifting, and add events that showcase endurance, such as distance swimming and ultra-
marathons. Even more influentially, the IOC could abandon sex/gender cataloguing and
mandate integration. If some type of demarcation proved necessary (initially), height or
weight classes could be incorporated, as utilized in wrestling and boxing. If the IOC abandoned sex/gender classifications, society as a whole would likely embrace a sex/gender spectrum.

Nevertheless, the IOC has opted to instead continue its strict sex/gender surveillance. The motivations of the 2012 control, although outlined four decades later, clearly echoed those articulated for the antecedent exam of the 1960s. Critics dubbed the contemporary check “femininity policing” and argued that the male-centric IOC again sought to control women’s bodies and bar certain types of female athletes from the Olympic Movement. As former Olympian and current Olympic scholar Bruce Kidd explained, “It’s still the old patriarchal fear, or doubt, that women can do outstanding athletic performances. If they do, they can’t be real women. It’s that clear, it’s that prejudicial.”

In the same vein, Olympic scholar Kevin B. Wamsley argued that “no matter what they call it, it’s still a sex test and that’s all about judgments and so much more about social values than science.” As Kidd and Wamsley both noted, the more recent rendition of Olympic sex/gender control measures stemmed from deeply-rooted social ideologies about women’s role in sport. Despite the volatile outcry, the IOC carried out the verification test for the 2012 London Olympics. Presumably the exam will remain in place for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and beyond.

The justifications articulated in 2012 thus mirror those postulated in the 1960s. Sex testing/gender verification, whether based on anatomy, chromosomes or testosterone,

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725 Ibid.
726 Macur, “Sex-Verification Policy is Criticized as a Failure.”
fosters a belief in biological essentialism and criminalizes women who do not subscribe to conventional hetero-femininity.
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**Archives**

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Daniel F. Hanley Papers

University of Cornell Archives  
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Avery Brundage Collection