The Andean Exception: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Absence of Large-Scale Indigenous Social Mobilization in Peru

THESIS

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Abstract

The study of “new” social movements in Latin America has inspired the work of many scholars from numerous disciplines over the past two decades. In particular, Peru is known among scholars of Latin American indigenous peoples as an exception in the Andes, due to the country’s historical lack of large-scale indigenous movements. It is strange that Peru, the heart of the Inca Empire and a country with similar demographics and ethnic composition as Bolivia and Ecuador, does not exhibit any examples of national-scale indigenous social mobilization. Scholars put forth three frequent arguments to explain this absence: 1) Peruvian ethnic fluidity and fragmentation, 2) historical consequences of the violence associated with Sendero Luminoso, and 3) internal and external organizational dynamics of social movements in Peru. I argue that inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. The ascendance of participation from the local to regional levels of government is more difficult in Peru due to the peculiar ways in which governmental consolidation was implemented historically. This thesis makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on indigenous social mobilization in the Andes by looking specifically at the links between local and regional levels of political institutions, and the way these processes inhibit movements from ascending
from the local level to higher level participatory spaces. Academic literature is most valuable when it can be interpreted by scholars and practitioners alike.
Llaqtakunaq atipayninwan, teqrimuyuta kuyuchisunchis.

When the villages work together, we will turn this world around.

Quechua proverb
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Introduction

The study of “new” social movements in Latin America has inspired the work of many scholars from numerous disciplines over the past two decades. These “new” movements in the region differ from traditional social movements that had previously centered on class and economic issues by shifting their focus to concerns about the environment, human rights, ethnicity, and a number of other social issues demanding attention (Pichardo: 1997, Stahler-Sholk, Kuecker, & Vanden: 2008). Indigenous movements are one of the most notable “new” social movements, occurring in varying intensity from Mexico throughout the Southern Cone. How these indigenous movements affect participatory governance, nation-building, and socioeconomic development is central to why many scholars dedicate so much time and resources to these particular problems.

Trends in the literature of indigenous social movements have irrevocably changed the way we understand indigenous populations and their role in Latin American societies. In reality, many terms such as “social movement” and “indigenous movement” are messily defined and used in a variety of ways by scholars and practitioners alike. For the purposes of this thesis, the term “social movement” will be used according to the definition put forward by Sidney Tarrow, which defines a social movement as "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with
elites, opponents and authorities” (1994, p. 3). Thus, the term “indigenous social movement” will be defined as a social movement that is organized and mobilized around the basis of indigenous identification. For the purposes of this paper, the terms ‘social movement’, ‘mobilization’, and ‘collective action’ will be used synonymously.

The Andean region is notably one of the most popular regions of study in regard to indigenous issues. Specifically, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru have large indigenous populations which comprise 25%, 62%, and 45% of the total population, respectively (CIA: 2009). Statistics of this nature are often skewed or misrepresented due to issues with the census acquisition and shifts in self-identification, but recent studies and census data estimate that there are over 34 million indigenous people in Latin America as a whole, with 3.9 million in Bolivia alone (over 62% of the population). According to Peru’s Population and Indigenous Communities Census conducted in 2007, there are over 1,786 indigenous communities in the country, making it the most heterogeneous country in the Americas (Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática: 2007). The rise of the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia and La Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas del Ecuador (CONAIE) are examples of how indigenous social movements ascend from local to national-level movements and permeate the country’s political realm.

However, when the focus shifts to Peru, these examples begin to wane in power and size. In fact, Peru is known among many scholars of Latin American indigenous peoples as an exception in the Andes, due to the country’s historical lack of large-scale indigenous movements. It is perplexing that Peru, the heart of the Inca Empire and a
country with similar demographics and ethnic composition as Bolivia and Ecuador, does not exhibit any examples of national-scale indigenous social mobilization. Of course, the incredible geographic spatiality of the country does not bode well for cross-regional or national-scale mobilizations. The sheer size of the Andes Mountains, the magnitude of the Amazon, and the distance between indigenous populations and the central government located in Lima hinder indigenous populations’ ability to mobilize. Yet, geographic spatiality alone does not explain this absence (a number of countries have overcome harsh geographic terrain and have experienced large-scale mobilizations). My work will examine the complex reasons why indigenous social movements in Peru developed historically and differently from their counterparts in other Andean countries. This work helps to explain why the study of movement nonexistence matters as well.

The rise of social movements has much to do with imagining citizenship, forging new relations of power, and constructing identities that are integral to the dynamics of society. As such, the non-presence of indigenous social movements also is affected by these characteristics. Many theories exist across a variety of academic disciplines to explain the absence of indigenous social movements in Peru. Scholars have dedicated much time pursuing this absence in order to better understand the role of indigenous populations in Latin America societies, the effect indigenous social movements have on democratization and politics in general, as well as what indigenous mobilizations tell us about the legacies of discrimination affecting parts of the citizenry and their most

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1 To be clear, it is recognized that there are distinctions between these countries that make perfect comparisons impossible, yet comparing social movement activity of indigenous populations among these three countries is still valuable.
pressing social and economic problems. Yet, inconsistencies, contradictions, and incomplete explanations still exist in the literature related to the absence of indigenous social movements in Peru.

This thesis does not attempt to disprove any existing theories; instead, it attempts to synthesize existing explanations through a critical review of the literature in order to suggest an underlying relationship that allows us to better understand the connection between existing theories. In this thesis, I argue that a difference in inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. The ascendance of participation from the local to regional level of government is more difficult in Peru due to the specific ways in which governmental consolidation was implemented historically. I argue that these reasons bring together the frequently used theories proposed by scholars to answer the question of Peru’s exceptionalism. Examining how and why government was consolidated and separated, as well as centralized and decentralized, allows us gain insight into how these relationships have influenced the propensity for large-scale indigenous movements.

Scholars put forth three frequent arguments to explain this absence: 1) Peruvian ethnic fluidity and fragmentation, 2) historical consequences of the violence associated with Sendero Luminoso, and 3) internal and external organizational dynamics of social movements in Peru. The first set of theories argues that the absence of indigenous movements is due to historical legacies of colonialism: social exploitation, racial discrimination, and ethnic fragmentation (Cánepa: 2008, Cadena: 1998, 2001; García:
The second set of theories notes the legacy of Sendero Luminoso and civil war in Peru as a contributing factor for the absence of large-scale indigenous movements in the country (McClintock: 2001, Ron: 2001, Starn: 1995, Yashar: 1998, 2005). Still other theories point toward the internal dynamics of indigenous social movements as a potential causal factor (Alvarez et al: 1998, Hellman: 1995, Hipsher: 1998, Martí: 2010). Do these conceptions accurately reflect our best understandings of these accounts? How do these theories relate to one another and how do they differ? What is the most cited explanation or theory? While some of the primary scholars contributing to this topic are listed above, this thesis will go into more detail to answer some of these questions and expand upon existing literature.

From the literature, it is clear that multiple perspectives are taken into account related to this subject, yet gaps in the literature still exist. It is difficult to narrow down what factors have actually contributed to the absence of indigenous social movements, due to the multi-temporal heterogeneity of the indigenous question in Peru as well as the divergent explanations abounding in these texts. Looking at ethnic fragmentation, the historical violence of Sendero Luminoso, or internal social movement dynamics alone does not offer a holistic understanding of Peruvian exceptionalism. These hypotheses are not sufficient to explain why there is not a higher level of protest or activism among indigenous populations in Peru and there still seems to be missing pieces to the puzzle that are not yet accounted for. In other words, there is a systemic and historical discrepancy between the social, economic, political and cultural standing of indigenous
Peruvians in Peruvian society, and the level of their social organization and political demands.

The problem is, if we leave the analysis where it is – that there are a number of different and competing theories to explain this absence – there is no real way to advance these theories into solutions, suggestions, or effective change. Discourse around topics of this nature becomes obsolete as additional theories and explanations saturate the literature. Understanding the historical lack of large-scale indigenous movements in Peru is urgent in order to determine why these movements have not emerged in a manner similar to other Andean countries. Addressing these issues will help us to understand the relationships between indigenous existence, social mobilization, and policy development.

When we think about indigenous social movements in Peru, we must consider the role that local governance structures and local-level participatory schemes play in its absence, allowing us to address the question and theories from a localized perspective. I argue that the space between local and regional level governance provides a quite weak participatory structure that contributes to and is partially explained by the three main theories proposed by scholars and briefly outlined above. If indigenous citizens cannot participate in local level politics and if their participation cannot transcend to higher levels of governmental organization, their propensity for large-scale social mobilization becomes incredibly difficult. We can look at the question of the absence of indigenous social mobilization as well as scholars’ interpretations about why does it happen, and we can argue that it is possibly a combination of these theories. What this thesis does is uncover underlying relationships – local governance structure and local-level
participatory opportunities – that can be translated into policy recommendations, suggestions, and topics for future research. This thesis will contribute policy recommendations at various state levels, drawing from a number of theoretical arguments offered by various disciplines in the literature.

A comparative analysis is inevitably included in the question at hand, yet a purely comparative perspective exceeds the scope of this paper. Each case is highly contextualized, therefore this thesis will prioritize characteristics specifically related to Peru. I adopt a qualitative, exploratory approach in this thesis and do not intend to identify a specific causal analysis related to the absence of indigenous social movements; the goal of this paper is to uncover an underlying relationship that links existing theories related to this absence for a more nuanced understanding. The following paragraphs briefly summarize the organization of chapters.

The first chapter will outline the historical consequences of colonialism and internal colonialism and their impact on indigenous social mobilization in Peru. These historical circumstances specifically will include the legacy of different forms of coloniality and the impact of Sendero Luminoso. While many historical specificities influence the propensity for indigenous collective action (including the consequences of structural adjustment programs and agrarian reform), Peru’s experiences with the legacy of colonial domination and Sendero Luminoso’s millenarianism are unique in the sense that these examples have created a unique trajectory for the country, distinguishing it from other countries in the region with similar backgrounds (i.e. Bolivia and Ecuador). Chapter one will discuss the interpretations of scholars who look at these historical
circumstances to determine why there is an absence of indigenous social movements in Peru, focusing on literature related to the colonial legacy, ethnic identity formulation and fragmentation, and political history. Texts under investigation in this chapter will include literature from sociological, anthropological, political science, and historical disciplines.

Chapter two illustrates how social movement dynamics – both historical and modern – affect the emergence and/or success of indigenous social movements in the country, utilizing theoretical foundations in sociological literature. Much work has been done on examining small-scale and factionalized indigenous mobilizations in Peru, notably those occurring in the Amazon due to land rights as well as parts of the highlands due to water rights. This chapter will outline ways in which social movement dynamics in Peru contribute to the absence of large-scale indigenous movements.

The third chapter introduces the concept of local level governance to the topic as a whole, explaining why it – as a factor related to mobilization – must also be considered when theorizing why there is not a large-scale indigenous movement organization in existence in Peru. Peru’s governmental structure and organization will also be elaborated upon to contextualize the role of local politics and how citizen participation at this level may or may not transcend to higher levels of government. This chapter will look at texts from political science and public administration to better conceptualize the role of local governance and associational life on indigenous communities. It will provide basic theoretical models that link local level governance to larger ideas, such as participatory governance and the role of public administration in developing countries. Finally, this chapter will contribute to related existing literature by setting the focal point on the local
level of governance, whereas much of the current literature to date has focused primarily on national level governance.

Chapter four explains the central hypothesis of the thesis by explaining how the local governance variable is the missing piece of the puzzle, in a sense. This chapter makes the case for how and why the relationship between indigenous populations and local governance is the common denominator of all the existing theories associated with the absence of indigenous mobilization in Peru. I will justify my argument by examining the relationship between local level governance and the three other explanations for the absence of indigenous mobilization: ethnicity, legacy of Sendero Luminoso, and social movement dynamics.

The conclusion will illustrate how this thesis contributes to the existing literature and provides avenues for future research. Issues beyond the scope of this study will also be documented. Finally, the conclusion will offer policy recommendations based on the findings of this thesis, which is a feature not generally included in academic theses. This thesis makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on indigenous social mobilization in the Andes by looking specifically at the links between local and regional levels of political institutions, and the way these processes inhibit movements from ascending from the local level to higher level participatory spaces. Academic literature is most valuable when it can be interpreted by scholars and practitioners alike.
Chapter 1: ¿Kunanri pitaq noqa kaniri?\(^2\): Relationships between Historical Transformations of the Indigenous “Other”, Legacies of Violence, and the Propensity for Collective Action in Peru

One cannot explain the present without looking at the past, and in order to understand contemporary indigenous social mobilization in Peru, history is tremendously important. The social and cultural condition of indigenous populations today is a direct result of historical events spanning hundreds of years. The greatness of the Inca Empire, its destruction due to Spanish colonization, the legacies of colonial brutality and the subsequent nation-building processes after independence have shaped indigenous populations in Peru, just as these populations have also shaped Peru’s trajectory as a nation-state. These processes have established a living legacy of colonialism in society, where a rearticulation of colonial power has been integrated into modern institutions, in what Quijano calls the ‘coloniality of power’ (2000). As a general framework, these ideas will be elaborated upon later in the chapter. This chapter outlines two key dominant theories that impact indigenous mobilization in Peru, according to existing literature.

Two of the dominant theories that look toward Peru’s historical specificities to explain the ‘absence’ of large-scale indigenous social mobilization are: 1) the exploration

\(^{2}\) Quechua phrase, “who am I today?”.
of how indigenous “ethnicity” has been shaped and reshaped throughout colonialism and modern Peru’s history, and 2) the socioeconomic reforms and counter-reforms that gave rise to Sendero Luminoso and its ensuing consequences. As such, these variables will serve as section headings for this chapter. These two variables have been chosen due to their contribution to an explanation of the absence of large-scale indigenous movements and frequent citation among literature related to this concept.

The first section of this chapter offers a brief summary of these epochs in order to contextualize some of the prevailing theories that attempt to explain the largely absent large-scale indigenous social movement in Peru. The second section will expand on the variables listed above accordingly, reviewing the existing literature related to historical consequences on the propensity for indigenous collective action.

**Historical Background for Contextual Purposes**

An understanding of Peru’s history is crucial to conceptualize the position of indigenous Peruvians today. This section will provide a brief historical background to contextualize the following review and analysis of the literature.

Peru’s territory was home to the largest civilization in Pre-Columbian America, the Inca Empire. In 1532, Francisco Pizarro led a group of conquistadores to the region, capturing the Inca and establishing the bases for the Viceroyalty of Peru by the middle of the 16th century. The two hundred eighty-nine years between Pizarro’s conquest and Peru’s independence not only devastated the indigenous populations, but also irrevocably

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3 For a more detailed explanation of Peruvian history and culture, see *The Peru Reader*, by Starn, Degregori, and Kirk. 1995.
transformed the Peruvian economy and its social fabric. Colonialism stressed the stratification of society and emphasized cultural differentiation to maintain control over native populations. Peru achieved independence in 1821, along with other South American nations during this time. Colonial measures of difference were carried over into the formulation of the modern nation-state as Peru faced the prospects of establishing a national identity. During the 19th and most of the 20th century, indigenous populations were maintained as second-class citizens, therefore, national independence did not signify emancipation or integration into the modern nation-state. Legacies of colonialism were simply maintained under new names and forms of governance.

Like many other Latin American countries, Peru has experienced periods of political and economic unrest as well as stability and in many cases, has seen history repeat itself. During the 1960s, General Juan Velasco Alvarado’s regime, established through a coup d’état, began a series of nationalist policies that increased governmental control over the economy and nationalized several industries in an attempt to alleviate poverty and stabilize the economy through import substitution industrialization. One of the most extensive agrarian policy changes in Latin America occurred during his regime. Land reforms such as these were typically imposed in Latin America to construct a loyal nationalist peasantry, linking peasants to corporatist parties.

However, General Velasco’s Agrarian Reform Law initiated sweeping changes in a way that dissatisfied rural peasants and landowners alike. In addition to the statist character of the legislation that was opposed by landowners, many peasants were simply excluded from the reforms as a whole. According to Seligmann (1995), these reforms did
not take into consideration varied relationships among peasants and did not properly inform rural populations of such changes, resulting in the undermining of the reform success due to a top-down, paternalistic implementation. It was clear that Velasco’s radical agrarian policies were more about state control, and less about the promotion of healthy social change for the rural poor.

Frustration in the countryside grew with poorly-implemented agrarian reforms and economic conditions in general. Destroying feudalist relations (gamonalismo) through the Agrarian Reform law created in Peru a power vacuum in which the neither state nor peasants could fill with leadership roles (Kay: 2001). The reforms ignored internal peasant enterprises, failed to stabilize corporatist relations, and led to disillusionment with Velasco’s “revolution from above” as it is commonly called. The power vacuum and disillusionment with the state sowed the seeds for the rise of Sendero Luminoso (SL), as one of the most historically extreme guerilla movements in Latin America. During the early 1980s, Sendero Luminoso rebelled against what they considered an illegitimate government rule in Peru which was responsible for plummeting living conditions and agrarian policies that threatened subsistence for campesinos. As the military responded with additional violence to suppress Sendero Luminoso, over 200,000 people were displaced. In the end, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that nearly 70,000 people had been killed or disappeared during the political violence (Chauvin: 2003). The Velasco regime and Sendero Luminoso serve as example of enlightened mestizos who attempted to use status and intellectual groupings to forge a hegemonic block and create revolutionary change in the country. However,
indigenous populations were not included nor seen as political agents in either case, but social objects.

Economically, Peru underwent a series of neoliberal reforms in the late 1980s to establish fiscal and social discipline in the wake of recent economic crises, similar to Bolivia and Ecuador. The demand for constant expansion in the quest for new markets and resources under neoliberalism caused industries of scale to shift in the global economy, often leading to uneven and unequal development. Economic globalization is often perceived as diametrically opposed to the survival and maintenance of indigenous heritage and tradition (Tauli-Corpuz and Mander: 2006). Neoliberal globalization, as it is more often called, imposes a single, market-driven mode of production that creates a hegemonic economic environment unsuitable for indigenous economy. The export-oriented growth associated with neoliberalism favored large-scale industries over smaller industries, thus replacing the local economies of indigenous populations. It is in this sector that we do see indigenous populations mobilizing in reaction to harmful neoliberal policies, such as mining. These movements, however, are not considered under the banner of “indigenous movements”, as they do not emerge based on ethnicity or identity, but economic situations. It is precisely in response to globalization that local, national, and transnational indigenous movements begin to appear. As their traditional ways of life, tenure of land, and economic opportunities are threatened, social movements where indigenous populations are the agents have appeared all over Latin America, from Mexico’s Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional, to Brazil’s Movimento Sem Terra (MST) to Bolivia’s Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).
From Colonialism to the Modern Nation-State: Formulations of Ethnic Identity, the Other, and what this means for Indigenous Social Movements

Perhaps the most cited theory to explain the Peruvian exception regarding indigenous social movements is the idea of ethnic identity formation and fragmentation as it has occurred from colonialism to present day. Culture and ethnicity has been racialized to mark differences (Cadena: 2001), which raises the following questions: how does the ethnicity and race of indigenous populations affect the construction of their identity and Otherness? What is the place of indígenas, positioned as the Other, in Peruvian society, and how does Otherness affect indigenous populations’ propensity for collective action? As indigenous movements continue to arise in Latin America, these topics are critical in understanding indigenous identity, the formulation of the Other, and how this affects collective action proclivities. In order to understand the position of this theory in greater detail, a brief review of the literature is included below.

This section seeks to uncover existing theories and propositions in relation to the questions above by investigating how indigenous identity in Peru has been constructed, shaped, and re-shaped throughout four distinct periods: colonialism, indianismo, 20th century indigenismo, and postcolonial critique. These phases provide a foundation for a more cohesive understanding and cultural analysis of racial and ethnic discourses in Peru, offering applicability to current collective action initiatives of indigenous populations. The transformations of epistemologies during these periods take into consideration multiple positionalities that elucidate underlying conceptualizations existent in racial and ethnic thought in Peru, rather than a singular Euro-centric perspective.
Inevitably, the review of the literature must begin with colonialism, which has - without a doubt - fundamentally structured the concepts of Otherness, race, and ethnicity. Contemporary perceptions of these categories are indubitably founded on the discourses of colonialism and the conditions in which indigenous populations found themselves in colonial contexts. It was during this period that the “Other” was first shaped. Although there is an abundance of colonial readings (Fernandez et al.: 1959, Todorov: 1984), this section will only briefly outline the work of Bartolomé de las Casas and Guamán Poma, as they provide a nuanced perspective of the indigenous positionality during colonialism.

In his famous work, Brevisima Relación De La Destrucción De Las Indias (1542), Bartolomé de las Casas – known as the ‘Protector of the Indians’ - chronicled the process of colonization, paying particular attention to the injustices committed by the colonizers upon the indigenous peoples. He frequently advocated for indigenous populations during this time, actively opposing their forceful subjugation by the Spaniards and their inhumane colonial policies. His writings are the first accounts of the recognition of indigenous human rights. He went on to argue against Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda in the Valladolid debates, where las Casas defended the status of indígenas as humans who suffered greatly at the hands of the Spanish. While las Casas never argued for indigenous self-determination, he did propose that the only way to Christianize native populations was through a peaceful mission, a proposal unprecedented for its time.

Another advocate of indigenous rights was Guamán Poma de Ayala. In his work, Nueva Crónica y Buen Gobierno (1615), Guamán Poma advances the arguments of
Bartolomé de las Casas by providing a collection of Andean histories, Catholic discourses, and political critiques/recommendations during the early colonial period in Peru which illustrated the differences between the Spanish and those they colonized. His purpose for writing the book was to explain the colonial situation to the King of Spain in hopes of restoring some power to the indigenous nobility who held legitimate authority and to whom he belonged. However, Guamán Poma’s positionality calls into question some of his writing. As an Andean noble, he did not necessarily want to represent the indígenas, only to protect them. Yet, he is the first author to explicitly attempt to legitimize historical indigenous rule over Peru, emphasizing their uninterrupted line legitimate heirs and their continual worship of God through Christianity prior to the arrival of the Spanish.

In terms of Othering and the process of differentiating indígenas during this time, Guamán Poma exhibits a negative opinion of racial mixing, condemns mestizaje in many parts of his text, and supports racial segregation in order to maintain a stable society. Consequently, he proposes the establishment of an apartheid system configured by an autonomous República de Indios alongside a República de Españoles. In this sense, he is engaging in a sort of “counter-otherness”. Whereas previous scholars conceptualized “sameness/difference” and “colonizer/colonized”, Guamán Poma extends this conceptualization to categorize races between indígena, Spanish, criollo, mestizo, and so on. In this case, the process of “othering” is not necessarily a single binary of the author. While these two examples of colonial literature do not represent the entirety of racial thought and Otherness during the colonial period, it does provide a basis on which to
build future conceptualizations of these ideas. These works illustrate a greater complexity in the understanding of how the “Other” has affected and shaped indigenous identity. The European discovery of the Americas was the beginning of the “othered” indigenous identity, when respective differences between groups of indigenous populations in the Americas were homogenized into a single, monolithic identity in contrast to the European. From this point, indigenous identity has continued to be shaped and re-shaped.

*Indianismo*

In the nineteenth century, literary and cultural indianismo emerged among artists and writers who empathized with the indigenous peoples, mythologized their past, and romanticized their cultures. For some scholars, indianismo represented an anti-colonial ideology that opposed mestizo or state-led policies and literatures, which emerged from the indigenous cultures itself (Lucero: 2008, Pacheco: 1992). Indianismo, according to Lucero, was meant to challenge Eurocentric ideologies of mestizaje and overturn internal colonial processes in Latin America. For other scholars, indianismo was simply a romantic cultural and artistic expression that appropriated an exoticized indigenous past in a single-minded fashion (Calla: 1993).

This mentality is still partially expressed today through the use of the phrase, “Incas sí, Indios no” (Méndez: 1996), where *indígenas* in Peru identify as “Inca” but not as “indio”. They mythified their indigenous past while subordinating the concept of *indígena* in the present. Fabian (2002) refers to this as the “denial of coevalness”, defined as “a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropology in a Time other than the present of the produce of anthropological discourse” (31). In the
timeless, empty time-space of the nation-state, the voice of the Other is silenced by denying them an understanding of the past, ignoring their positionality in the present, and ignoring their possibilities in the future.

Nevertheless, indianismo remains a relevant, historical period in which the process of Othering the indigenous identity continued to be reformulated and reshaped. Examples of indianismo literature include Clorinda Matto de Turner’s *Aves sin Nido*, which illustrated the social exclusion of indigenous communities and proposed the integration and assimilation of indigenous populations into mainstream society through educational means, as well as Gonzalez Prada’s “Nuestros Indios”. In this text, Prada (1904) offers a sociological critique of the suppression of the “Other” in Peru, namely the *indígenas*, the internal “Other”. Like Mariátegui, he argues that the problem is not pedagogical, but socio-economic. According to González Prada, there is no option for indigenous populations to proactively empower themselves through a peaceful resolution. They are instead limited to a) waiting for their oppressors to have a change of heart, or b) fight their subjugation with violence. González Prada engages in a process of othering indigenous identity by assuming that the *indígenas* were a homogeneous monolith, not taking into consideration the plethora of identities maintained *within* “the indigenous identity” in Peru. This is another reproduction of the Spanish perspective toward native Peruvians. Furthermore, only when *indígenas* are educated through contact with ‘civilized’ individuals, can they become the moral equivalent to dominant society. Prejudice, therefore, is based on cultural difference.
As such, indianismo can be interpreted to be a mestizo-led literary and cultural movement meant to venerate *indígenas*, or an expression of indigenous objectification and mythification. Regardless, the role of indigenous populations in mainstream society was beginning to attract more scholars, authors, and policymakers in Peru who began to question during this time how to resolve the “Indian Problem”, a term that José Carlos Mariátegui will further elaborate some decades later (1971). How the country would continue to build itself and its culture was paramount to intellectuals of this time, but as can be seen in the literature, a process of objectification of the “other” continued. The language of incorporation, assimilation, and integration proves meaningful when discussing the place of *indígenas* in society. Rather than multifaceted, living entities, indigenous populations were still viewed as the outside “other”, an external object that needed to be modernized *into* the dominant society.

20th Century Indigenismo

The 20th century ushered in *indigenismo*, one of the first serious attempts to recognize indigenous populations as a social group horizontal to other social groups in Peru, not vertically beneath, or inferior to them. It was during this period that the “Other” was first attempted to be dissembled as a production of imposed Western epistemology. Jose Mariátegui and his Marxist interpretations are perhaps the most famous example of 20th century indigenismo.

Mariátegui, a Peruvian political philosopher and one of the most influential socialists in Latin American history, often advocated for indigenous rights and self-determination in Peru. In his book, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (1971),
he explained how indígenas occupied an essential place within the organic Peruvian revolution that he sought to achieve through the incorporation of local customs and practice into government, rather than a European model. Mariátegui based many of his claims on multi-temporalities, expressing how colonial problems were ongoing in postcolonial times. For example, the problem of the Indian was not necessarily an ethnic one, but a strategy for Western expansion established during the colonial period. He argued, “The concept of inferior races was useful to the white man’s West for purposes of expansion and conquest. To expect that the Indian will be emancipated through a steady crossing of the aboriginal race with white immigrants is an anti-sociological naiveté that could only occur to the primitive mentality of an importer of merino sheep” (25). The problem of the Indian, according to Mariátegui, was a social, cultural and economic one, where land tenure is the key.

On one hand, he noted the importance of education in regard to socioeconomic factors, but illustrated how the administrations were incapable and unwilling to provide a suitable level of education to these populations, noting how indigenous boarding schools were insufficient across the countryside. On another hand, he argued that the best solution to the Indian problem lay within land tenure and advocates for indígenas asserting their right to land which they had been excluded from historically. Mariátegui argued that the agrarian problem was a consequence of the feudalism that had continued in Peru albeit disguised as a republic, and that the survival of the Indian community (the ayllu) depended on the land:
The subordination of the Indian problem to the problem of land is even more absolute, for special reasons. The indigenous race is a race of farmers. The Inca people were peasants, normally engaged in agriculture and shepherding. Their industries and arts were typically domestic and rural. The principle that life springs from the soil was truer in Peru of the Incas than in any other country…Its civilization was agrarian in all its important aspects” (34-35).

In other words, the Indian problem was a problem of resources and a different way of life based upon another epistemology which sustains a mythical relation of the Indian to the land, not just economically but culturally as well (as the aylлу is the foundation of indigenous society). Mariátegui characterized indígenas as agrarian communists, due to their collective ownership of the land, which is what the agrarian economy should return to. His argument is largely an economic one, explaining how the indigenous agrarian system of the past had higher yields of crops and was efficiently ruled, whereas colonization destroyed this system and replaced it with an inferior substitute. To a large extent, this thought grew out of the Marxist theory that he so famously adopted. Indigenous populations are internally excluded from capitalist notions, because although their labor and land were central to the process of modernization (Coronil: 2000, Quijano: 2000, Walsh: 2012), they themselves were perceived to lack modernity.

Throughout his writings, Mariátegui referred to indigenous populations in Peru only as “the Indian”, yet another method of “othering”. Although his intention was to restore rights and recognition to these groups of people, he essentialized these diverse
communities, ignoring the heterogeneity of those who are externally identified
generically as “Indian”. He spoke of the Indian as being a homogenous entity, which
ignored the crucial differences between those who live in the highlands and those in the
Amazon, for instance. (In contrast, this distinction is made in modern academic literature,
often a possible explanation for why there is little propensity for indigenous collective
action in Peru on a national level).

The practice of speaking for indígenas – even within indigenismo – is a cyclical
theme that maintained the subjugation of these populations through preconceived
definitions of ethnicity and culture. As argued by Marisol de la Cadena (1998),
“notwithstanding the academic and political silence into which race receded since the late
1930s, hierarchical, and exclusionary racial feelings permeated social relationships and
regulated interactions even among intellectuals” (144). This is evident in Mariátegui’s
argument that indígenas were a race of farmers. Their “otherness” was rooted in the
placement of indígenas in rural, agricultural areas of the country.

Toward to the end of the 20th century, other literature emerged that continued the
discourse of the indigenous “other”. The canonical works of important neo-indigenísta
scholars (Cornejo-Polar: 1994, Quijano: 2000) stress the importance of heterogeneity,
border thinking, and the coloniality of power in regard to the “othering” identity process.
We can use the literary critique of Cornejo-Polar to assume that heterogeneity – the
constant interaction of differences in culture that is not synthesized over time – deeply
impacts contemporary Latin American culture, and in that sense, national identity. He
refers to mestizaje as one of the most powerful conceptual resources in Latin America,
used as an interpretive tool to auto-identify much of its population prevailing as a synthesis of many identities in the socio-culture of the region. Cornejo-Polar (1994) argues that heterogeneous texts in the New World implicitly (and explicitly at times) produce a communicative chronicle that emphasizes the spaces that separate and fragment the forces they mobilize. The heterogeneous nature of identity emphasizes the multiplicity and contradictions associated with it.

Speaking on indigenismo, Cornejo-Polar (1994) states heterogeneity is a priori to indigenismo. It is a duality seen in Peru by the distance between the sierra (which is structured rurally, marked by the remnants of feudalism and responding to an underdeveloped capitalist structure) and the more modern and capitalist coast. Indigenismo, then, is more than a representation of its referent, but also a conflictive plurality that is committed to the historic course of nations.

The postcolonial period was certainly full of conflictive plurality, as intellectuals began the process of “imagining their nation”, to borrow a term from Benedict Anderson (1991). Nation-building and the process of development required the Indian Problem to be addressed in order to successfully engage in the state-building process. It was during this time that miscegenation projects began to unify Peruvian culture as one (exemplified in the writings of González Prada: 1904, Mariátegui: 1971). Aníbal Quijano (2000) speaks of the problems associated with such goals.

Postcolonial Critique of the “Other”

In his article, “Colonialidad del Poder, Eurocentrismo y América Latina”, Quijano (2000) critiques the process of homogenizing heterogeneous identities during the post-
colonial period, explaining how heterogeneous histories and identities (such as that of *indígenas* in Peru) were united under only one racial category. He explains, “El cambio histórico no puede ser unilineal, unidireccional, secuencial o total. El sistema, o el específico patrón de articulación estructural, podría ser desmantelado. Pero aun así cada uno o algunos de sus elementos puede y habrá de rearticularse en algún otro patrón estructural, como ocurrió, obviamente, con los componentes del patrón de poder pre-colonial en, digamos, el Tawantinsuyu” (315).

The coloniality of power – the colonial element of power in the globally hegemonic system – has implications on present-day Latin America as well as throughout its history. Quijano (2000) begins by postulating that race is a mental category of modernity; it did not exist prior to the American colonization. As a result, new social identities were formulated around relations of domination and subordination as a way of granting legitimacy to the conquest’s imposed rule. He argues that this has become one of the most effective instruments of social domination, using phenotypic traits to legitimize domination. One of the reasons that race has been such a long-lasting instrument is due to its perverse articulation to economic modes of production, an example being how the blacks were the most important subordinated and exploited group because they played a principal, labor role in the plantation economy. This led to the new global model of labor control (Quijano: 2000). The distribution of racialized social structures combined with the distribution of colonial capitalism worldwide created a coloniality of power within a global capitalistic system. With Europe at its center, an intellectual inter-subjective
configuration was established (world capitalism), where all heterogeneous cultural histories and resources were placed under a single, global order.

Quijano (2000) also traces the implications of colonial power on native populations, citing two key decisive implications: 1) dispossession of historical identities, and 2) a plundering of their place in the cultural production of humanity. Native populations were denied participation in sociopolitical conversations ran by the elite white minority during the state-building process after colonialism. Because of this disenfranchisement, he argues that these societies could not be considered representative ‘nations’, but “estados independientes y sociedades coloniales” (331). Therefore, the indigenous majority shared no common interests with the white minority who maintained Eurocentric ways of thinking, and thus no national commonality could be formed to create the ‘nation-state’. In this way, the coloniality of power was rearticulated. The newly independent states did not decolonize their society after colonialism or during the process of state-building, which is why there is no fully nationalized society in Latin America today, according to Quijano. Consequently, the coloniality of power has made it incredibly difficult for democracy and national identity to flourish.

Looking at the Peruvian case, the plundering of the Inca Empire’s history of cultural production is quite obvious; however, the dispossession of historical identity as “Inca” seems more difficult to detect because there is a notability in the Inca heritage (if in nothing else but political rhetoric and a thriving tourist industry). The dispossession of identity lies within those who are the descendants of the Inca. As mentioned earlier, this has resulted in an “Incas sí, indios no” mentality. Class-based, national policies in Peru
during the 20\textsuperscript{th} century encouraged indigenous populations to identify as campesinos rather than \textit{indígenas}, associating these communities with a glamorized indigenous past, but marginalizing them in the present (Jackson & Warren: 2005, Hale: 2004). This attempted cultural homogenization has been conducted through a cultural genocide of the Indian, which is one of the four historical trajectories stated by Quijano.

\textit{Analysis of Formulations of Ethnic Identity, the Other, and what this means for Indigenous Social Movements}

The four phases above provide a foundation for a more cohesive understanding of the indigenous “Other” by tracing the transformations of ethnic discourses in Peru. The “Other” has been shaped and re-shaped throughout history, both by those who oppose indigenousness and those who advocate for it. The beginning of colonization was the nascent period in which we first see a process of ‘othering’ native populations. Throughout the 19\textsuperscript{th} and 20\textsuperscript{th} century, this process has been extended even by \textit{indígenas}’ advocates, who place indigenous identity into distinct geopolitical and cultural categories. However, the utilization of overly simple binaries such as “indigenous/nonindigenous” and “same/other” continues to be re-signified in present-day. Thus, one must enter into ethnic and racial literatures of indigenousness with an understanding of its nuanced and dynamic characteristics.

Jackson and Warren (2005) posit that the “Other” is used by authorities who essentialize indigenous populations in their own interest. Authorities reify an identity to obscure historical processes and politics involved in order to perpetuate hierarchical values placed on ethnicity and race, leaving some groups as “less than human” (559).
Hale (2004) adds to this by explaining how multicultural politics utilize discourses of cultural rights to “divide and domesticate” indigenous movements (17). In the case of Peru, cultural definitions of ethnicity allowed people to overcome their ‘race’ through education, which became anchored in the Peruvian nationalist doctrine and legislation. As race and culture was conflated into one entity, their identity became bound to their place in society.

So, what is indigenous “identity”? In reality, such an identity is never or has ever been uniform or consistent. It is a fluid, flexible notion that may change drastically over a short period of time and is influenced by a number of internal and external factors. According to Jackson and Warren (2005), “what indigenous identity means, for both scholar and pueblo, can become quite unstable when all actors are repeatedly modifying their discourses in response to the ever-shifting terms of engagement” (560). When conceptualizing identity in terms of indigenous groups, it is crucial that this fluid and modifiable structure be taken into account. Jackson and Warren also speak of the importance of directional significations: “The signifiers are not always accepted by their intended signifieds – the actual populations may have other classificatory agenda. It is very clear that knowing who is doing the pointing is crucial” (562). The ways in which indigenous communities, the state authorities, and even scholars utilize ethnic labels is often politicized and are ideologically aligned in a way that advances someone’s interests.

From the review of the literature, it is clear that identity and the indigenous “other” are neither natural nor merely invented and imposed. Rather, it is a positionality
that draws upon historical processes, repertoires of communication, and fluid, dynamic practice within the indigenous existence. The process of “othering” identities has the capability to unify, fragment, and irrevocably change the cultural environment for different social groups. To clarify, the historical processes of the indigenous “other” have affected the propensity for collective action among indígenas in Peru.

In terms of collective action, Cadena (2001) argues that placing indígenas in the bounds of an ethnic group limits a host of other social relations that are also influential, such as race, gender, class, geography, etc. Peru’s absence of indigenous social movements is analyzed by many scholars to reflect assimilation and cultural loss. However, de la Cadena posits that “indigenous culture exceeds the scope of Indianness”. Other characteristics are at play that affects indigenousness, which are disregarded in the bound of “ethnic groups”. According to her postulations, the absence of overt indigenous social movements may have been due to a need to distance the movement from state-sponsored indigenismo.

Other scholars (Greene: 2006, Hale: 2004) point toward a de-Indianization that has occurred in Peru, positing that indigenous populations have left behind their ethnicity – whether intentional or unintentional – to assimilate into the majority. Cadena, however, says this of de-Indianization, “not being Indian did not mean shedding indigenous culture. Rather, de-Indianization implied shedding a social condition entailing absolute denial of civil rights…De-Indianization meant becoming literate, being able to live beyond the hacienda territory, in general obtaining civil rights. And none of this meant shedding indigenous culture. On the contrary, it meant empowering it, and thus pushing it
beyond the scope of disenfranchised Indianness” (21). Cadena points out that indigenous culture and Indian are not equivalent because the latter is a social stigma from the colonial period indicating inferiority. Thus, Indianness is a social condition, not an ethnicity.

Similarly, García (2005) argues that ethnic identity in Peru has a much more dynamic and plural nature than is credited to these populations. In her research on the indigenous identity in the Peruvian highlands, she analyzed the construction of indigenous identity in the highlands and explained that identity has been redefined rather than rejected by native communities. Through an analysis of bilingual education programs imposed by the state and foreign non-governmental organizations, she claims that indigenous populations are renegotiating identity politics by creating a new indigenous space that allow them resist and create change at local levels, not national levels.

From the literature, we can trace these transformations throughout the three distinct periods of colonialism, indianismo, and 20th century indigenismo. Throughout these periods, the indigenous “Other” has gone through historical transformations of differentiation, mythification, and recognition. This is especially relevant in present-day, where the process of “othering” affects and influences indigenous populations’ propensity for collective action. The principles of Otherness can enable greater understandings of the differing propensities for indigenous collective action, manifested through the discourses and practices of “othering” ethnicities. It is impossible for this
paper to address all aspects of these themes, but it does allow us to consider important insights into the manifestation of the indigenous “Other” in Peru.

In conclusion, the notion of “indigenous identity” does not take into account the multiplicity of identities and disallows for any ideas of the fluid, dynamic identification process. Studying “Otherness” encompasses not only how external forces “other” indigenous populations, but how they react to this differentiation and set their own identities in contrast to this otherness. It is necessary for us to challenge the boundaries of what we know as “indigenous identity”, and reject the production of knowledge that defines it so narrowly by engaging in polyvocal discourses that are inclusive of the voices of subaltern actors.

Reforms, Counter-reforms, and the Legacy of Sendero Luminoso: Critical Factors Influencing the Propensity for Indigenous Collection Action

Just as ethnic identity formulation and fragmentation is offered as a theory to explain the absence of large-scale indigenous social movements in Peru, so too is the notion of historical violence. Sendero Luminoso and its legacy unraveled Peru’s social fabric in a way not shared by other countries of comparison. In 1980, Sendero Luminoso traded its nonviolent, leftist activism in favor of a campaign of armed struggle against the State, driven by Maoist ideology. The military responded with a more brutal campaign of destruction, and Sendero’s eventual defeat was due to the State’s ruthlessness in its response, utilizing anti-democratic actions. During the 14-year conflict, over 70,000 deaths and hundreds of thousands of displacements occurred. After 17,000 testimonies,
14,000 pages, and nearly two years of compiling information, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission found that Sendero Luminoso were responsible for 54 percent of the deaths, and the armed forces were responsible for 28 percent of the deaths (Chauvin: 2003). According to Ron (2001), although democratization typically decreases violence, Peru’s experience with the rise of Sendero Luminoso in the 1980s proves otherwise. He posits that Sendero Luminoso escalated violence due to its fear of being marginalized in electoral politics, coupled with inter-ideological competitive fighting.

McClintock (2001) claims that Sendero Luminoso was “savage, sectarian, and fanatical, it is compared to Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge rather than to the Sandinistas or the FMLN Movement in El Salvador” (61). While not all scholars agree with such a strong statement, it cannot be denied that Sendero Luminoso wreaked havoc on the Peruvian countryside.

It is important to note that scholars hesitate to classify Sendero Luminoso as an indigenous social movement for many reasons. First, the conflict between Sendero Luminoso and the government is considered to many Peruvians to be a civil war, not a conflict with a social movement. Second, Peru’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission affirmed that 70 percent of victims from the “ethnic guerillas” were indigenous. Thus, many scholars (Yashar: 1998, 2005, Brysk: 2000, Martí: 2010) do not classify Sendero Luminoso as an ethnic social movement because indigenous populations themselves were frequently targeted. Furthermore, although Sendero Luminoso organized indigenous peasants, they did not organize around the basis of indigenousness, thus excluding them from an indigenous social movement status.
The conflict between the State and Sendero Luminoso was fought in rural areas, in areas with a large presence of indigenous populations, and the aftermath of this conflict can still be witnessed today. Scholars argue that this violent struggle has left a legacy of fear in the countryside, where peasants – indigenous populations included – hesitate to mobilize peacefully for fear of escalation to violence.

Yashar posits that Peru’s lack of indigenous movements is due to the overshadowing of ethnic cleavages by class-based ones, arguing “Organizing occurs within indigenous communities but it is local in scope, weak in outreach, and marginalized from political debates” (1998: 27). She demonstrates how the conflict hampered the political associational space and impeded the emergence of transnational networks for indigenous populations. In comparison with Bolivia and Ecuador, who had sustained trans-community networks which engendered cross-community organizing and led to the emergence of large-scale indigenous movements, the Peruvian state has suppressed rural organizing efforts since the rise of Sendero Luminoso.

Ron (2001) advances this argument by explaining how the conflict with Sendero Luminoso gave Peruvian leaders an alibi and a sense of impunity (588) based on which the Fujimori regime allowed political violence and human rights abuses to continue in an effort to resist Sendero Luminoso. This sense of impunity further decreased the political opportunities for indigenous populations to represent their interests. Looking at the whole picture, it is no surprise that the violence associated with Sendero Luminoso reduced indigenous populations’ propensities for collective action. As such, movements

4 For more information on political opportunity theories in the context of social movements, see chapter 2.
from below consistently fail to translate into large-scale movements that impact national politics (Starn: 1995, 563). The assumption that future social movements have been dissuaded from mobilizing because of the limited gains of social movements during the 1980s due to political violence is sound. Autonomous mobilization was crippled once again by the catch-22 situation that trapped indigenous populations between the millenarian paternalism of Sendero Luminoso and the racist neoliberalism of the government.

Analysis

In conclusion, it can be assumed that Peru’s unique historical trajectory has affected its ability to engage in indigenous collective action, specifically in regard to Peru’s experience with Sendero Luminoso, a key distinction in relation to other Andean countries. After the rise and fall of Sendero Luminoso, citizens – especially those living in the highlands where the violence was most severe – see mobilization as a threat to the country’s law and order. Their experience with violent mobilization left the highlands paralyzed politically and socially, and many citizens fear that mobilization will once again become out of control. If we consider that nearly 70% of the victims of the conflict were indigenous, it is no surprise that these populations may fear the concept of mobilization on any terms, peaceful or violent. Furthermore, Peru’s historical trajectory has led to an internal factionalism between indigenous populations, due to diverse geography separating the Amazon lowlands with the Andean highlands, as well as socio-economic changes. This ethnic fragmentation has led to an inability to unify under an indigenous banner and engage in any mobilizing behavior.
This is an exemplary case of historical trauma, the emotional and psychological wounding of indigenous populations due to intergenerational cycles of violence (Brave Heart et al. 2011). Understanding the historical trauma response among indigenous populations is largely understudied, but research indicates that the response of historical trauma varies from an individual to collective level. One study by Tremblay et al. (2009) indicates a distinct pattern among highland Quechua speakers in the aftermath of the violence, demonstrating a weakening of social cohesion and social support networks, as well as symptoms of anxiety and depression.

According to Drož (2010), Quechua Indians had their own mechanisms for overcoming historical trauma, including reconciliation (living with painful memories but without hatred) that was necessary to overcome the loss of confidence in society during the post-war period. Yet, Tremblay et al. (2009) suggest that civil reconstruction efforts to reduce historical trauma may be increasingly difficult to implement, due to the loss of social and cultural assets, as well as social networks. In fact, many see the idea of ‘truth commissions’ as a neoliberal tool by emphasizing reconciliation between perpetrators and victims as individual citizens, rather than focusing on the damage imposed on the collective. “In this, they place an in-principle limit on the extent to which the ideal of integration with national institutions may itself be implicated in violence and injustice, and, consequently, they place an in-principle limit on the potential for decolonization of relations with indigenous peoples”, argues Corntassel and Holder (2008, 479). In a way, the state-centric approach emphasized an apology to individual citizens, but de-
emphasized the extent to which the victims of violence were largely an ethnic group. Once again, indigenous identity was depoliticized and devalued.

In sum, the state-oriented mechanism to reduce historical trauma through apology or reconciliation has failed to address the collective victimization of indigenous populations, and focused on an individualized process. The loss of social cohesion among indigenous populations during the period of violence was only exacerbated by a truth and reconciliation program that failed to address these losses. Obscuring the indigenous nature of the victims depoliticizes indigenous identity and devalues indigenous social cohesion. “National healing” then, puts into question the legitimacy of any form of future indigenous social mobilization.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the effects on the propensity for indigenous collective action in Peru due to historical transformations of the indigenous “Other” and legacies of violence associated with Sendero Luminoso cannot be dismissed. The traumas of the past have a way of manifesting themselves in the present, and this chapter has attempted to map out some of these processes in the case of indigenous social movements in Peru. The country’s experiences with the legacy of colonialism and Sendero Luminoso are unique in the sense that these examples have created a unique trajectory for the country, distinguishing it from other countries with similar backgrounds (i.e. Bolivia and Ecuador). The question of why there is an absence of large-scale indigenous social movements in the country has largely been answered through an analysis of these historical transformations in the literature thus far.

Introduction

In an interview with a man in Cusco, he explained that Peru is so ethnically, geographically and economically diverse, that indigenous populations do not mobilize precisely because their fragmented identities makes them incapable of unifying under a common cause or banner. It is undeniable that Peru has widely diverse ethnic identities and many scholars note the fluidity of ethnic identity, as described in detail in the previous chapter. However, the fluidity of Peruvian ethnicities alone cannot be the determining factor for the absence of social mobilization. Other countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador, have similar demographic diversity and ethnic divisions among indigenous populations and still have realized large-scale indigenous social movements. What other factors should come into consideration? The emergence of social movements and their role in participatory development has been widely noted among scholars (Bebbington et al.: 2006, Stahler-Sholk et al.: 2008, Tarrow: 1998).

This chapter will examine Peruvian power structures, the existence of marginal players in the periphery, and the emergence of social movements to better understand how these social dynamics influence the organizational infrastructure, movement actors, and strategies used within indigenous social movements in Peru. While it is not intended
to provide an entirely causal explanation, this chapter will explain why organizational
dynamics are crucial to understand when analyzing indigenous social movements in Peru.
How do organizational dynamics in indigenous social movements affect movement
emergence and outcomes in Peru? Who are the movement actors that participate in
mobilizing efforts? What strategies do existing movements utilize, and what are the
outcomes? Do these dynamics help to explain why Peru has not witnessed a large-scale
indigenous movement? This chapter will utilize foundational literature in the study of
social movements to analyze Peruvian power structures, the existence of marginal players
in the periphery, and the emergence of social movements that relate to and affect the
social movement dynamics of 1) organizational infrastructure, 2) movement actors, and
3) strategies used.

Fundamental Theoretical Concepts

Traditional Theoretical Models

How do social movements emerge? What explains the lack of social movement
emergence in Peru? While these questions are incredibly complex, the body of social
movement literature has been historically established in two rational choice models,
resource mobilization and political opportunity theory. Resource mobilization theory
(McCarthy & Zald: 1977, Tilly: 1978) stresses the importance of actors attempting to
attain resources required for social movement emergence and success while mobilizing
members to achieve movement goals. Based on this paradigm, social movements are seen
as rational social institutions, which mobilize groups of people and organizations (the
resources) to pursue collective goals.
On the other hand, political opportunity theory focuses on the idea that existing political systems which are vulnerable to change are seen as opportunities for social movement actors to issue a challenge and push through a social change (Meyer: 2004, Tarrow: 1998). As such, the political opportunity theory emphasizes that social movement actors are dependent upon the existence of a political opportunity being available. For example, Almeida (2008) uses El Salvador as a case study to understand how political opportunities, such as regime liberalization, protest campaigns, and competitive elections, organize civil society around social movement activism.

Tarrow provides a succinct summary of the theoretical emergence of the social movement, stating that, “Contentious politics are triggered when changing political opportunities and constraints create incentives for social actors who lack resources of their own. They contend through known repertoires of contention and expand them by creating innovations at their margins. When backed by dense social networks and galvanized by culturally resonant, action-oriented symbol, contentious politics leads to sustained interaction with opponents. The result is a social movement” (1998, p. 2). As such, contentious collective actions are the basis of all social movements. In terms of the Peruvian context, Tarrow argues that peasants are most likely to rebel against authorities when windows of opportunity appear in the walls of their subordination, as is what occurred during Peru’s history of land occupation. (1998, p. 78). However, in the present context, indigenous Peruvians typically do not have windows of opportunity in their subordination. The lack of a strong governance structure at the local level prevents these
windows of opportunity from appearing in favor the subordinated. This will be analyzed in greater detail in chapter four.

Hipsher (1998) also utilizes a political process approach to analyze protest movements in Latin America that emerged during periods of democratization. Her article focuses on two distinct social movement processes: the development of cycles of protest and the institutionalization of dissent. She argues that cycles of democratization engender cycles of protest that advance the democratizing process quickly, but tend to decline and become institutionalized once democratic implementation is completed. Like Hipsher, other scholars concur with these claims (Madrid: 2005, Van Cott: 2008). The political process model used in this article is based on the premise that the development of social movements is dependent on political institutions and power configurations in the state (Hipsher: 1998, Kitschelt: 1986, McAdam: 1983, Tilly: 1978). From the political opportunity structure, it can be easily noted that Peru’s notorious lack of institutional stability and strength in democratic processes can make mobilization difficult, although it is certainly not alone in this regard. She concludes by stating that Latin American social movements have not continued to grow in strength after the implementation of democracy; rather, they have institutionalized forms of collective action into the state. Yet, indigenous populations have been historically excluded from discourses about democratization and state-building in Peru, leaving them disenfranchised and incapable of accessing such political opportunities.

A key to understanding social movement theory rests with the notion of hegemony, as reviewed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2001), who define it as a
power relationship where underrepresented social groups (subordinate society) engage in social tasks that benefit the superior power (the hegemon) exclusively. Social movements allow these subordinate social groups to galvanize a counter-hegemonic block under a loose system of hegemony and challenge the system through political discourse. These challenges are known as antagonisms, and can range from economic to social struggles within society. As Laclau mentions, “popular identities were never conceived as being organized around a class core, but on the contrary, were widely open. They could move in different ideological directions, and they could give a place to movements whose ideological characteristics were not determined from the beginning” (1998, interview).

Thus, fragmented social identities are constructed on the basis of complex political discourses and have the fluidity to change these identities and discourses over time.

“New” Social Movements

While traditional social movement theories are indubitably helpful, they are also quite functionalist. This shortcoming therefore requires us to also consider new, emerging theories that offer an alternative perspective to social movement organization. Over the past decade, the nature of social movements has begun to change. More sources of power, movement actors, and strategies have begun to emerge, and with this, new theories as well. Armstrong and Bernstein’s (2008) multi-institutional approach, for example, is differentiated from traditional theories because it takes into consideration multiple sources of power and the diversity of contemporary change efforts by providing an integrative framework that analyzes new social movements. For these reasons, this chapter will loosely follow this model to analyze social movement characteristics in Peru.
Armstrong & Bernstein (2008) put forth a compelling framework in an attempt to explain how “new” social movements require traditional theories to coalesce into one that takes into account multiple sources of power and the diversity of new social movement organizations. Their analysis is particularly helpful in the way that they define and describe the models of society and power, social movement actors, and strategies used. Models of society and power are defined by how domination is organized around not only the state, but other institutions as well. They view culture as constitutive, rather than secondary, which is an important consideration in regard to indigenous populations in the Andes. Secondly, they consider movement actors to be those excluded from the polity, as well as those disadvantaged by rules.

These groups are left in the margins of a loose, inefficient hegemonic state apparatus. This allows for scholars to include marginal players into the analysis of social movements and propensity for social movements, which will be discussed later in the paper. It also allows for the analysis of how movement actors not disenfranchised have become involved in social movements although it does not directly affect them. How these coalitions are formed between those who are disenfranchised and those who aren’t is particularly helpful in the context of social movements in the global south, where transnational organizations and other institutions become influential in the outcome of movements.

Finally, their framework allows for more flexibility when studying movement strategies. Whereas traditional methods look at strategies outside of conventional channels seeking to change policy, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) explain how “new”
social movement strategies depend on the logic of institutions; we must acknowledge that targets matter. As stated by the authors, “once one observes that movements do not all operate within a single polity, target one state, or seek policy change, questions about why actors make the decisions they do about targets, goals, and strategies become more interesting.” (p. 80). Scholars must evolve their theories and conceptions of social movements as the sociopolitical environment of movements and the institutions they challenge change. (A similar theory is proposed in Walker, McCarthy, and Martin’s article, explaining how repertoires are contingent upon the institutional target that a movement selects).\(^5\)

In the case of Peru, the marginalization of indigenous populations is a consequence of a number of power structures, both political and economic, thus their movement strategies will need to be targeted toward both state and non-state institutions. As mentioned in the Walker, Martin, and McCarthy piece (2008), analyzing non-state targets is becoming increasingly important, based on the significance that these targets are more likely during periods when the state is less sympathetic to movement claims. Current social movements in Peru, though not large in scale or organized around ethnicity, generally focus on non-state, corporate targets by protesting the intrusion of extractive industries that have proved harmful to the environment.

Making the state itself a direct target is unlikely, because the State has signaled its apathy toward indigenous claims in the past. As such, “new” social movement theories allow scholars to examine indigenous social movements through a broadened theoretical

scope. Not only do social movements choose to influence the state, but they have begun to mobilize directly against corporations as well. This shift in the identification of an opponent involves the type of representations in the hegemonic system. Not only is hegemony represented by the state, but it is also represented by some corporations, a process generated by neoliberal economic models.

*Social Movement Theories in the Latin American Context*

Hellman (1995) also studies how “new” social movements compare and contrast with traditional, class-based movements as a response to both old and new forms of subordination in Latin America specifically. According to the author, Latin America’s social movements “almost defy categorization” (1995, p. 9) due to the diversity of issue-specific movements and argues that new social movements in the region are more fluid than other theories presumed. Particularly, Hellman questions how scholars label movements as “new” when they strive to construct new identities that are based on the past, namely indigenous populations. Not only it is important to understand how new social movement actors are recruited, but what they do must also be considered. Hellman offers three purposes for new social movement emergence: 1) transformation of the consciousness of participants, 2) provision of concrete concessions for activists, and 3) assistance in the democratization process (1995, p. 174). Of more interest is Hellman’s assertion that social movements are simply the products of the political environment in which they grow. She also stresses the role of alliance-building and how these networks facilitate joining forces around common goals and gaining movement strength. In other
words, there is a constitution of an anti-hegemonic block through the construction of hegemonic articulations (Laclau and Mouffe: 2001).

So, under what conditions does the Peru case conform to Hellman’s theoretical model? It has been argued that Peru’s indigenous populations do mobilize in order to achieve concrete concessions for activists, as Hellman stated. They do this through protesting and mobilizing against corporations that threaten the environment and subsistence base for these populations. However, three issues must be considered when analyzing movements such as these. First, they emerge only when there is a perceived threat, usually to the environment and/or traditional economic practices. Second, these movements are often short-lived and demobilized after the corporation relents or negotiations are made. Third, the movements do not emerge under the banner of “indigenous” identification; rather, they are environmental or economic protests. Although they are mostly compromised of indigenous persons, they do not use this commonality as a method of mobilizing, which begs the question; can these movements even be considered “indigenous”?

Alvarez et al (1998), like Hellman, focus on the democratization factor that underlies social movements in Latin America. They claim that the rise of social movements in Latin America is a critical component in the struggle for democratization, as civil society is charged with social responsibilities and democratic citizenship. According to the authors, “Social movements not only have sometimes succeeded in translating their agendas into public policies and in expanding the boundaries of institutional politics but also, significantly, have struggled to re-signify the very meanings
of received notions of citizenship, political representation, and participation” (p. 2). They seek to answer how cultural politics can shed light on Latin American social movements and the process of democratization as a whole by investigating the relationship between culture and politics. Whereas previous social movement theories focused primarily on the state/polity relations, these authors include culture – a process of producing meanings that shape the social experience – in the analysis of social movements. Thus, culture is inherently enmeshed into collective identities, organizational infrastructures, and strategies employed by social movements. They argue that cultural politics within social movements attempt to challenge dominant political and social cultures, seeking to reconfigure the dominant culture, which moves the analysis beyond static understandings of social movements proposed by reductionist conceptions that prevail in some versions of resources mobilization and political process model approaches.

However, they note that there is an immense distance between civil and political society. Those groups who are excluded from the dominant politics and culture – namely, subalterns – see politics as being an “elite” business in which they have no place (Carvalho: 1991). This is indisputably true in Peru, where many indigenous populations choose to practice an “everyday resistance” (García & Lucero: 2006) to the dominant politics and cultures, rather than engage in large-scale social movements.

Interconnectivities of Power Structures, Marginal Players, and Social Movements in Peru

In recent organizational literature, emphasis has been placed on the ways in which organizations and individuals deployed innovation to act strategically and contribute to
in institutional change (Scott: 2008, Oliver: 1991). These processes of innovative strategies and tactics can be used to enhance the success of social movement groups and actors who use them (Morris: 1981, McAdam: 1983), which may be an important factor in determining Peru’s exceptionalism from an organizational dynamic standpoint. Scott (2008) also refers to the importance of agency – referring to an actor’s ability to effect change upon the social world – when considering the role of power in institutional processes. When crafting an analytic framework of organizational dynamics, agency is crucial. This raises the question, who are the actors? Institutional agents can include the State, professionals, associations, the elites, marginal players, social movements, and rank-and-file participants among others (Scott: 2008).

The Marginal Players: Who are the actors?

Scott (2008) points out the role of marginal players: those who occupy the periphery and have the potential to transform their marginality into innovative processes. Because these subaltern groups do not have power in the existing hegemonic system, they attempt to create a new kind of mobilization that challenges this hegemony from the margins. The indigenous populations of Peru are without a doubt the marginal players of this triangular relationship. Who are the actors that surround existing indigenous movements in Peru? Who are disadvantaged by the rules and existing power structure? What does the interaction between challengers and target tell us about the nature of domination in society? Why do they participate?

To answer some of these questions, Martí (2010) hypothesizes that the emergence of movement actors based on ethnicity is due to the rise in political opportunities, which
allows alliances to form, giving more ability to pressure the opponent through these relationships. He argues, “These alliances with actors who do not generally belong to the indigenous communities themselves have provided the material, symbolic, and institutional resources that form the basis of the movements that we know today” (p. 77, emphasis added). This type of social capital allows for the mobilizing capacity of indigenous movements to be heightened, when non-indigenous actors ally with indigenous actors to advance movement goals.

*Power Structures and Models of Society: What are the dominant power structures challenged in Peru?*

In terms of institutional power structure, modern States possess a wide array of power that define the nature, capacity, and characteristics of the structure it employs, as well as the rights provided to political and economic actors (Scott: 2008). In Peru’s case, the State itself maintains the majority of power within the country. However, Alvarez et al. (1998) advise that “we must view politics as more than just a set of specific activities (voting, campaigning, lobbying)” that occur in clearly delimited institutional spaces such as parliaments and parties; it must also be seen to encompass power struggles enacted in a wide range of spaces culturally” (p. 11). What are the cultural spaces in which power struggles emerge?

Latin American politics are more than institutionalized mechanisms for imposing order; they are also diffused in social relations and private spaces as well. Peruvian power structures will obviously include the state itself as an elite-managed, unitary state and representative democracy, but also includes societal elites and how they maintain
political cultures that exclude other groups from society. For example, the policies put forth by the Velasco regime intended to “uplift” indigenous groups (through agrarian reforms, etc.), but were manipulated by sub-national governments and social elites to maintain exclusionary practices that negatively affected indigenous groups economically and socially. It is important to consider how domination and power are organized around the state, other institutions, and culture in Peru. In particular, the structure of local governance and its relationship to the state as a whole becomes more important as the literature continues to mention the role of institutions.

*The Social Movements: How are institutional infrastructures and strategies utilized?*

Finally, Scott (2008) refers to social movements themselves as an institutional agent, which gives rise to new kinds of institutional forms. According to Scott, “such groups lack the resources available to established powers and must use their energies to challenge and disrupt existing routines in order to attract attention” (2008, p. 103). Similarly, the construction of institutions must be taken into account. How did they emerge and under what circumstances? Scott maintains that the characteristics of an organization is in large part due to its historical foundations: “Because new organizations must rely on existing ideas, technologies, and social routines, organizations take on similar characters – are imprinted by their institutional environment – so as to reflect the historical conditions of their origin” (2008, p. 109).

Alvarez et al. (1998) argue that the analysis of relationships between social movements in Latin American and the power structures (the state, political parties, elitist

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6 These concepts are elaborated upon in chapter 3.
and fragmented institutions) fail to highlight the role of nongovernmental and extra-institutional public arenas, which can be key to consolidated meaningful, democratic practices. In other words, these “extra-institutional” organizations must also be considered when studying social movements in Latin America, as they are a key player in democratic consolidation and social responsibility. Alvarez et al. (1998) adds to this notion of institutional infrastructure by stressing the role of social movement networks, explaining how the analysis of these networks helps to uncover how social movements extend beyond political society and into social relations in general.

The multiplicity of inter-organizational ties is an understudied area of social movements in Latin America, although these relations directly relate to the propensity for social movement organization. These networks extend deep into the social fabric of society, through institutions such as the Church, labor unions, and academia as well as non-institutional organizations such as communal networks (i.e. indigenous ayllus). Social network “webs” are used to metaphorically describe the intricacy of social ties among organizations, actors, and the state/society, allowing us to vividly imagine the multilayers of inter-organizational ties (Alvarez et al.: 1998). What does Peru’s organizational “web” look like? How close are the links between these actors?

Like other scholars (Martí: 2010, Rubert de Ventós: 1987, Mainwaring: 1986, Oxhorn: 1991), Hipsher explains how the presence of allies and support groups have encouraged movement development in the region, citing important examples such as the Catholic Church, which went from being one of the biggest enemies of indigenous populations to one of their biggest defenders. Since the Second Vatican Council in 1962,
the Church has been revaluing indigenous culture and place in society, a theological discourse developed through liberation theology. In consequence, a key difference between Peru and other Andean countries in regard to social movement emergence and organizational infrastructure is the role of the Catholic Church, particularly through the action of comunidades eclesiales de base (religious base communities), also known as base communities, which challenge norms of power and empower poor populations. In Bolivia and Ecuador, the Church was extremely influential in the process of extending political and social benefits to marginalized populations, particularly indigenous peoples.

However, the role of the Catholic Church in Peru has not historically followed this path. Hipsher explains how the lack of will of some religious organizations to advocate for indigenous social movements has left them with little outside support (citing the Chilean case), explaining that as long as some forms of democracy subordinates popular participation in order to maintain stability, such institutionalization will leave movements marginalized. After independence from Spain, the Catholic Church in Peru became much less involved. With an increasing population of already-Christianized mestizos, the Catholic Church began to be replaced by other churches, making their role as an intermediary between the State and indigenous populations less crucial.

Other organizations central to indigenous activism in the Andes are transnational and nonprofit organizations. Brysk (2000) notes that transnational networks provide indigenous populations with five “C’s”, including cash, courage, contacts, consciousness, and campaigns. While Peruvian indigenous social movements have not traditionally utilized these avenues of activism, other countries in the Andes have done so
successfully. One key player is the International Labor Organization, which passed the Indigenous and Tribal People’s Convention 169 in 1989. This is a legally-binding international instrument that seeks indigenous populations to protest from discrimination and abusive labor practices while assisting States with protection measures. Because Peru (and other Andean countries) has ratified this document, it serves as a strategic device for indigenous communities to legally challenge the State, with global support (Warren & Jackson: 2002).

Similarly, the United Nations established the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2008 to recognize these populations worldwide. These international landscapes of indigenous rights are used by many indigenous organizations as a strategy of legitimization while challenging the often coercive nature of the State. In many cases, local indigenous movements in Latin America expanded onto the international level before the national level. Martí gives two reasons for this: 1) the difficulty in gaining access to the national arena and 2) a lack of ‘national’ identity among indigenous populations (2010). These two reasons allowed for complicity between the indigenous groups and outside, non-indigenous transnational organizations. In that case, it is possible that indigenous Peruvians may transnationalize before they nationalize their movement structure. The former (poor access to the national arena) may make the latter (lack of national identity) more difficult.

Just as institutional and inter-organizational processes are key factors in the propensity for collective action, so are strategic responses for social movements. The type of strategies utilized to achieve organizational goals will inevitably influence movement
outcomes. Oliver (1991) outlines five general strategies used by organizations to confront and challenge external pressure: 1) acquiescence – conforming to the perceived demand of dominant authorities, 2) compromise – balancing and negotiating demands, 3) avoidance – concealing efforts and buffering the organization from the need to conform, 4) defiance – resist external pressures to conform, often highly public, and 5) manipulation – attempting to co-opt, influence, or control the environment (Scott: 2008).

What strategies are used by current social movement organizations in Peru? Do they occur inside or outside of conventional political channels? What are the outcomes of utilizing these strategies?

Therefore, indigenous social movements serve as a break in hegemony in their respective countries of origins (and beyond). Throughout Latin America, indigenous social movements have begun to challenge the hegemonic system by engaging in political discourse that gives voice to subordinated groups in society. It is important to mention, however, that the salient aspect of social movements creating a break in hegemony is the idea that subordinate groups tend to articulate their most immediate interests (Hunt: 1990, 312). It would seem, then, that Peru’s absence of large-scale indigenous social mobilization may be due to the inability for indigenous organizations to formulate a clear agenda based on their immediate interests.

Conclusion

It has been made clear throughout this chapter that the organizational dynamics of indigenous social movements is key to understanding Peruvian exceptionalism. These relationships help to explain the conditions in which indigenous movements originate,
survive, and succeed or fail. By examining power structures, the positionality of marginal players, and methods of social movement emergence in Peru, conclusions can be determined about how these characteristics influence and are influenced by organizational infrastructure, movement actors, and strategies utilized in these movements. For these reasons, many scholars claim that Peru’s exceptionalism is due to the unique characteristics of organizational dynamics in the country.

It is evident that the organizational ties and networks within Peru are not closely linked. Yashar (2005) explains that preexisting networks are crucial in creating organizational capacity and transforming identity. Without these preexisting networks, efforts at organizing based on ethnicity are overshadowed by class-based organizing. Polletta and Jasper (2001) also cite the importance of organizational ties within social movements, arguing that preexisting solidarities and prior ties build a stronger collective identity, and thus, a stronger movement itself. Thus, an absence of historical political and religious networking has left Peru without the social networks to mobilize under the indigenous banner.

It is also clear that Peru’s social movements have a problem of scope, where those marginal players who are participating in social movements are doing so through resource wars, rather than ethnic ones. According to Taylor (2011), resource wars are defined as “peasant smallholders concerned to defend livelihood and environment [who] have pitted themselves in seemingly hopeless David and Goliath style contests against powerful multinational corporations and central governments of both the left and right” (p.420). In Peru, a large number of these peasant smallholders are indigenous, but do not
mobilize based on their indigenousness. Rather, they mobilize based on their economic positionality, which is threatened by extractive industries. While indigenous populations in Peru do have a propensity for collective action, which is noted in the ongoing resource wars, the scope of this propensity is economic, not ethnic.

While many scholars attempt to establish theoretical explanations for a lack of large-scale indigenous social movements in Peru, it is clear from the previous review of the literature that such movements in the Andes are rarely similar and homogenous in nature. As stated by Warren and Jackson (2002), “rarely are indigenous movements as standardized in vision or coherent in organization as their supporters suggest. Their heterogeneity may be an asset in some situations and a liability in others.” As such, many indigenous movements defy scholars’ attempts to categorize and define movement outcomes in clear categories. This chapter has provided insight on how organizational dynamics affect these propensities of large scale, indigenous mobilization in Peru.

Based on the literature, it appears that there is propensity for a large-scale indigenous social movement in Peru, but current organizational dynamics prevent this from materializing at present. In other words, a key factor of Peru’s exceptionalism lies within the characteristics of organizational dynamics within social movements. Examining the relationships between power structures, the existence of marginal players, and the methods of social movement emergence helps us to better understand how these characteristics influence organizational infrastructure, movement actors, and other organizational dynamics in the Peruvian case. With these insights, we can begin to
explain why Peru is considered to be the “Andean Exception” of indigenous social movement emergence.
Chapter 3: “Lejano y Ajeno”: The State, Governance Structures, and Indigenous Populations in Peru

No one knows who will live in this cage in the future, or whether at the end of this tremendous development entirely new prophets will arise, or there will be a great rebirth of old ideas and ideals or, if neither, mechanized petrification embellished with a sort of convulsive self-importance (Weber: 1904, 182)

Introduction

The advent of government and ideas related to ‘governing’ bodies is a topic that has been widely studied throughout centuries, across disciplines, and around the globe. Looking at the way government as an entity has been identified, defined, and established helps us to understand contemporary civil society, particularly in regard to the relationship between government and the governed. These relationships become increasingly complex when the needs of the people become more diverse and as governments begin decentralizing into sub-level governance structures. While decentralization processes can be traced back to the Roman Empire, it is more pertinent to refer to the governmental organization of Tahuantinsuyu, the Inca Empire. As a federalist system, the Empire was composed of a central government, and its four regions, or suyus: Chinchay Suyu, Anti Suyu, Kunti Suyu, and Qulla Suyu. The peoples conquered and incorporated into the larger Tahuantinsuyu had to submit to the rule of the Inca, pay their taxes in labor and goods, and adopt the legal-moral code that ruled social relations. At the same time, they were allowed to maintain their own local customs, local
deities and authorities. Conceptualizing the tensions between these traditional, federalist forms of government and the complex layering of authorities left by the colonial administrations of the Viceroyalty helps us to situate the Peruvian experience.

This chapter will elaborate on these tensions in more detail, introducing the concept of governance structures in Peru by explaining why it, as a factor related to mobilization, must also be considered when theorizing why there is not a large-scale indigenous movement organization in the country. Furthermore, this chapter also relates governance structures to the larger question of indigenous social movements in Peru, explaining how the role of subnational politics and citizen participation may or may not ascend to higher levels of government. I argue that the differences in inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. In other words, the ascendance of participation from the local to regional level of government is more difficult in Peru due to the methods in which governmental consolidation was implemented historically. By examining how and why government was consolidated and separated, as well as centralized and decentralized, allows us to gain insight into how these mechanisms have influenced the propensity for large-scale indigenous movements. In short, Peru’s lack of participatory governing structures prevents the ability for indigenous mobilizations to emerge nationally.

This argument is centered on the idea that a stronger connection between local level and regional level governance would serve as a vehicle for consolidating local indigenous organizations into larger organizations able to negotiate indigenous demands
with regional and national governments and enter into political alliances on a wider scale. It is imperative to note that the concepts of decentralization, subnational governing structures, and participation do not infer a western-style, liberal democratic structure. Rather, it emphasizes a notion of participatory governance that can emerge in a variety of political structures. Thus far, scholars have primarily focused on national or local level political institutions, exclusive of one another, to explain the absence or emergence of indigenous social movement. Yashar (2005) analyzes the relationships between political institutions and indigenous movements on a meso-level, looking at state formation, trans-community networks, and other possible factors from a top-down perspective.

On the other hand, the essays in *Natives Making Nation: Gender, Indigeneity, and the State in the Andes* (Canessa: 2005) take on a different perspective by looking at local-level experiences of indigenous populations without linking these experiences to regional and/or national processes. This thesis makes an important contribution to the burgeoning literature on indigenous social mobilization in the Andes by looking specifically at the links between political institutions at the local and regional levels. My research analyzes the way these processes inhibit indigenous movements from ascending from the local level to the national scene, without discounting the validity of existing theories that explain the absence of indigenous social movements in Peru in differing ways.

I contend that Peru’s lack of large-scale indigenous social movement organizations is due to a weak relationship between local and regional governance structures in the state. Texts from political science and public administration will be reviewed to better conceptualize the role of local governance and associational life on
indigenous communities and will provide basic theoretical models that link local level
governance to larger ideas, such as participatory governance and the role of public
administration in developing countries. More importantly, this section will seek to link
these ideas to the larger notion of participatory governance. The following chapter will
synthesize this argument with the three arguments posited by other scholars and
mentioned in previous chapters regarding the absence of large-scale indigenous social
movement in Peru. Finally, this research will contribute to related existing literature by
setting the focal point on the relationship between local and regional levels of
governance, whereas much of the current literature to date has focused primarily on
national level governance.

This chapter will be organized as follows. The first section will briefly define key
terms that will be used in the argument to clarify any complicated or differing definitions.
Then, I will argue the relevance of governance structures, engaging key theoretical
framework, while the third section offers a review of the literature regarding the structure
of governance in Peru. The fourth and final sections will offer secondary data and
descriptive statistics in order to support the arguments of the thesis in the final chapter.

Definition of Key Terms

Before delving into the core of the argument, a brief definition of key terms is
necessary in order to reduce the potential for misinterpretations. In reality, defining terms
is a difficult task because these terms are usually used widely throughout scholarly
research and in many different ways. Therefore, this section will define terms according
to how they specifically relate to the topic at hand, borrowing definitions from other works.

The term “governance” has been used widely since its inception in the 1980s and is commonly used as a synonym for “government”. However, this is not accurate. “Governance” is quite different from “government” in terms of the organizations, individuals, and roles represented by these terms. Stoker (1998) argues that, “Governance is ultimately concerned with creating the conditions for ordered rule and collective action. The outputs of governance are not therefore different from those of government. It is rather a matter of a difference in processes” (17). He outlines five propositions for the definition of governance, which emphasizes that governance encompasses the work of government and of other actors involved governmental institutions and responsibilities. These propositions are that governance 1) refers to a set of institutions and actors beyond government, 2) identifies the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities for tackling socioeconomic issues, 3) identifies power dependence involved in these relationships, 4) refers to autonomous network of actors, and 5) recognizes the capacity to get things done. It is this type of governance that is the focus in this chapter.

On the other hand, “government” is a much older term, and represents the formal system mentioned in quote above. Scholars have put forth a variety of definitions of government, from Max Weber to Foucault, and these definitions are widely used in many different ways throughout scholarly research. Foucault focuses on “governmentality”, which is a designation for how the conduct of individuals or states might be directed (Hunt & Wickham: 1994). As Foucault argues, “the State is no more than a composite
reality and a mythical abstraction whose importance is a lot more limited than many of us think. May what is really important for our modern times... is not so much the State-domination of society, but the ‘governmentalisation’ of the State” (Foucault: 1979, 20). While Foucault emphasizes the notion of “governmentality”, Weber (1904) emphasizes “government” as a concept. For simplicity’s sake, ”government” will be used only to define the administrative entities that organize and govern the state and citizens. As mentioned by David Easton, government is the only entity that can authoritatively allocate values and make decisions on behalf of all people (cited in Raadschelders: 2003, 53).

Finally, participatory mechanisms and decentralization processes do not assume a liberal democratic structure as is often utilized as an ‘ideal type’ of government in Western literature. Rather, these concepts assume a governmental structure that emphasizes and supports participatory governance; individual or collective, ‘democratic’ or otherwise noted.

Relevance

The relevance of these topics lies within the need for a more nuanced understanding of the way in which subaltern citizens (namely, indígenas) relate to and with their governance structures and institutions at a local and regional level. It is clear that local level governance can encourage citizen participation, which then encourages participation in other areas of civil society. Without local level participatory possibilities, the capacity for social movements to mobilize is quite low (Abramovay: 2007, Lindert & Verkoren: 2010, Lucero: 2007). In addition, a healthy and participatory civil society is a
key characteristic of participatory governance, as civil society is seen as a cornerstone of these systems.

As noted by a recent study by the Latin American Public Opinion Project, only 18.5 percent of Peruvians believe they have a stable democracy, and consequently only 60.1 percent of Peruvians support democracy (that is, liberal democracy) as a system of governance, making Peru rank last on this scale out of the 26 countries included in the study. For Bolivia, only 22.8% of its citizens believe their democracy is stable, while 70.3% support democracy as a system of governance (Latinobarómetro: 2011). It must be noted that there is an intrinsic link between neoliberalism and democratic governance in Latin America, and much of the opposition to “democracy” goes hand in hand with the opposition to neoliberal policies, because they imply and support each other. Civil society, in fact, is a misnomer for the space where the market constitutes citizens that self-discipline and where governmentality is effectively realized. These statistics indicate disenchantment with democracy in Peru and beseech us to uncover reasons for why democracy is struggling in Peru. Coupled with our understanding of the place of indigenous populations in Peruvian political society, it is easy to see why a deeper investigation of indigenous participation in civil society is necessary and relevant.

Also, it is important to understand how inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local regional participatory schemes are affected by and affect decentralization. Processes of decentralization can have a positive impact on public policy initiatives and democratic consolidation, as mentioned by Nijenhuis (2010), because it allows local governance structures to be more responsive to local needs.
However, Nijenhuis (2010) also notes that such a positive impact is only achieved when governance structures are able to formulate strategies in public-private partnerships and create basic conditions necessary to implement policy. Decentralization will serve as a key component to this chapter because it is the vehicle through which local and regional governance is effectively realized.

Therefore, if inter-organizational governance structures are solidly developed at the local level, it can be reasonably assumed that indigenous social movements will more likely take advantage of the political opportunities provided. Albó (2002) offers evidence of this by illustrating the process of transforming indigenous leaders of social movements into councilors and parliamentary deputies in Bolivia. Thus, if we understand how decentralization and governance structures at the local and regional levels are established and engage indigenous populations, we can better conceptualize how to further empower these marginalized groups and establish a stronger civil society as a whole.

**Review of the Literature**

Literature related to governance structures, decentralization, and public participation at the local level is abundant. This section will briefly review the literature, offering ways in which these theoretical foundations can be applied not only to the local level, but to the regional level as well. One of the primary ways in which the literature is engaged is through “ideal types”, an intersubjective element of social theory originally posited by Max Weber. Ideal types are a useful tool in building a theoretical framework
around ideas of governance, and two ideal type models will be used for this purpose in this section.

The first ideal type model related to governance addresses local government in Latin America by looking at basic features of local government systems and categorizing them around Nickson’s ‘managerial’ and ‘governmental’ ideal types (2011). The managerial ideal type is characterized by a local government that primarily delivers goods and services, which is locally administered and political subordinate to the central government. According to Nickson, this ideal type is one where “the central government imposes the territorial reorganization of local government in order to achieve economies of scale through the amalgamation of municipalities into larger administrative units” (2011, 2).

The governmental ideal type is characterized by a local government that engages in shared community interests by making policy choices, and works in collaboration with the central government. Nickson (2011) describes this ideal type as having a shared responsibility with the central government, a higher degree of political autonomy, and a strategic role in governance. He concludes that the managerial ideal type is gaining strength in Latin America. This ideal type model provides a way in which to look at the role of governance structures in Latin America and analyze how these ideal types are situated within the parameters of civil society. Looking at historical trends and local government development in Peru, it is clear that the country more closely identifies with the managerial ideal type due to the limited autonomy of municipalities and the prioritization of basic service and good delivery to citizens.
The second model as proposed by Geddes (2010) centralizes around local governance as well. The first ideal type is neoliberal local governance and is characterized by a top down institutional approach dominated by market principles, and a focus on economic competitiveness. The second ideal type in this model is local governance that contests neoliberalism, characterized by a bottom up institutional approach, collectivist principles, and a focus on social redistribution (Geddes: 2010, 164). While Bolivia provides a good example of the transition from a neoliberal local governance ideal type to an ideal type that contests neoliberalism, Peru has not witnessed such a shift to a governance model that contests neoliberalism at this time.

Using ideal type models to construct a theoretical foundation for understanding governance allows us to make easier cross-country and cross-level comparisons. While ideal type models intend to emphasize elements common in most cases of the subjects being analyzed, it may be conceptually easier to understand and more beneficial to consider these phenomena along a continuum, rather than based on dual “ideal types”. In reality, some local development processes and governance structures accentuate existing divisions in society (Lindert & Verkoren: 2010), making the study of these mechanisms more complex than what they may seem.

Latin America as a region has gone through a process of reinvention through the consolidation of democracies by administrative decentralization. Decentralization processes have created a patchwork of region and sub-regions according to economic potential. The urban/rural divide must also be considered during these processes. Lindert and Verkoren (2010) note that the implementation of organic laws (creating new
institutional regimes), particularly in Bolivia, directly incorporated formerly excluded rural populations in the municipal political structures (6), which opened up spaces for social participation and multi-sector partnerships. It is in this environment that social movements are more readily able to thrive.

In addition, the health of municipalities varies dramatically based on the rural/urban environment. Many municipal authorities lack the ability to raise revenue on their own, making them dependent on the central government for fiscal resources (Lindert & Verkoren: 2010, 8). Among the many constraints on rural municipalities include lack of qualified staff and poor debt financing potential). Bolivia has sought to remedy rural/urban divides through municipios productivos and mancomunidades, which emphasize poverty reduction by focusing development planning on rural areas and engaging in inter-municipal development cooperation.

Andersson et al. (2009) found that the Amazonian territory in Peru has witnessed a more promising institutional arrangement for decentralization. This differentiation between the Amazon and Highlands is evident in the mapping of indigenous social movements in the country. The authors argue that this differentiation is due to the role of collective action at the district level, playing the political brokerage role between the central government agencies and the municipality. They note that the “jurisdictional scope between the provincial and district level has not been clearly divided” – the district level was not given the necessary tools to fulfill their duties as prescribed in the Constitution. In practice, elections provided more authority to the mayor particularly, and problems with the ‘majority rule’ aggregation mechanism used in voting allowed
elections results to, at times, contradict the will of the constituency. This creates a dependency of the minority party on the will of the mayor within local politics. The ambiguity of the law and the lack of resources to promote transparency and accountability on the local level reduce potential for participation.

In the context of Peru, examples of rural development initiatives within decentralization mechanisms are few. While the urgency of local discourse is becoming clearer in Peru, much of the literature focuses primarily on urbanized spaces. For example, Hordijk (2005) illustrates the success of participatory budgeting in urban spaces of Peru, while Schönwälder (2002) similarly shows how urban popular movements can become key actors of social change by making democratic practices at the local level more meaningful, and thus, strengthening democracy from the bottom up. However, both of these case studies were located in highly urbanized areas, and generalizing these successes for the country in its entirety is problematic due to its heterogeneous nature ethnically, politically, and geographically. Furthermore, case studies specific to urban spaces fail to mention the deep-rooted, weak municipal structures that lack institutional capacity for citizens to participate in rural areas. While Schönwälder begins to bridge the gap between institutional structures and social movements, his work remains urban-centric and does not extend outside of urban space. The challenge then, is how to utilize these studies and theoretical framework in a way that sheds light on governance and growth at the local level in rural spaces.

Muñoz et al. (2007) partially accomplishes this challenge by clarifying the relationship between institutional structures and social movements. Their findings
indicate that the poor find collective action to be more difficult in fragile institutional systems, due to the inability to move to the next stage of organizing. They argue, “Community level action needs to interact with an intermediate level to achieve change successfully. If the intermediate level is controlled by political parties that are fragmented, corrupt, and prone to personalism and favoritism, then the connections go sour and trans-communal structures are difficult to build” (Muñoz et al.: 2007, 1940). As such, it is clear that Peru’s notoriety with weak political parties and regional level governance impedes organizations’ ability to engage in collective action outside of the local level. In addition, weak decentralization has done little historically to create spaces of participation outside of this level. Interestingly, this is one of the few studies that relate local governance to what is happening at a regional level. It is this transitory space between the local and regional levels the focal point of this thesis.

In addition to the inability for local level mobilization to successfully interact with the intermediate level, there is also a problem of communication and information transfers. As explained by Reyes-García et al. (2010), there are structural limitations to the dissemination of political knowledge across poorer rural areas. In essence, they posit that difficulty accessing information makes awareness of decentralization efforts incredibly difficult. Thus, the development mechanisms included in decentralization legislation may not positively impact some rural segments of society simply due to lack of information about these processes. The rural/urban divide coupled with a limited dissemination of information explains then, why many Peruvians see the state itself as

**Peru in Context: Data & Descriptive Statistics**

This section will provide an overview of governance structures in Peru, including legislative mechanisms and descriptive statistics, to connect the previous theoretical foundations in a Peruvian context. As mentioned earlier, the Inca Empire was governed under a federalist system, divided into four *suyus*, or regions. At the center of the *suyus* sat Cusco, akin to a modern federal district, and center for politics and religion. These regions were divided into upper and lower divisions, *hanan* and *hurin*, making it easier for tax collection throughout the Empire (Cieza de León: 1995).

In contrast, modern-day Peru is officially considered a Presidential Representative Democratic Republic and remains a highly centralized unitary state with weak regional governments and a checkered democratization history. The administrative divisions of Peru have changed from time to time, particularly during the Fujimori regime (1990-2000). Older territorial subdivisions at the regional and local level have merged and split throughout history, primarily due to the need for decentralization structures and urban migration.

I begin this overview of Peru’s governance structures in 1980, because this was the year of Peru’s first “true” democratic election, with the appointment of Fernando Belaúnde as president. Of course, this can be debated according to varying degrees of what democracy and “free and fair” means; however, for the purpose of this paper, the
general consensus on the emergence of the “third wave of democracy” in the region is that it occurred in the 1980s (Nickson: 2011, O’Neill: 2005, Willis, Garman, & Haggard: 1999). Thus, engaging the discourse of democratic governance structures becomes irrelevant prior to the 1980s.

Formally, Peru decentralized in 1978, with the election of the Constituent Assembly dominated at the time by the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) party. With the election of Belaúnde (who was a member of the Popular Action party), decentralization provisions and reforms were included in the Constitution (O’Neill: 2005, 190). Furthermore, 1980 was the first year that all Peruvians were allowed to vote. However, in the early 1980s, the rise of Sendero Luminoso began a violent campaign against the Peruvian state, devastating the economy, shaking the political scene, and terrorizing the population at large.

Alan García, president from 1985 to 1990, initiated the implementation of the decentralization process put on paper two years earlier. This process included making regions elected bodies for the first time. Dickovick (2007) argues that the decision to decentralize and build up the regional level of politics in Peru at this time was a response from party members (García’s APRA) who were losing electoral power nationally; they were electorally more successful at the regional level. Thus, the decision to decentralize was a response by APRA to outweigh the success of their opponents at the national level by building up their electoral base regionally. During this time, nearly 60 percent of the country’s fiscal resources were legislated to be distributed at the regional level.

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7 For more information about the legacy of Sendero Luminoso, see chapter 1.
By 1989, 12 autonomous regions were established, making regional decentralization a success through a top-down approach.

However, regional strength did not last. With the election of Alberto Fujimori in 1990, regions were disbanded under the autogolpe of 1992, in an attempt to weaken APRA’s regional electoral base. Under Fujimori, regions were replaced with Consejos Transitorios de Administración Regional, which were government-designated ‘regional’ authorities. This decision was based on his party’s failure to win a large portion of the 1993 municipal elections (O’Neill: 2005, 190). As a result, he shifted power away from regions and back to the central government, in what Crabtree calls a “chimera of consolidation” (2010, 367). This reversed what progress had been made in the 1980s to decentralize. According to O’Neill, “Fujimori eroded the ability of opposition parties – already weakened by the end of the 1980s– to organize strong candidacies in municipal elections” (2005, 201). Under threats of human rights violations, Fujimori resigned in 2000 and fled the country.

Alejandro Toledo won the presidency in 2000, and recommitted the country to democracy. In 2002, Toledo signed the Ley de Bases de la Decentralización (Decentralization Framework Law), which legislated a restoration of regions and resource transfers to municipalities. In the beginning, Toledo reversed Fujimori’s anti-regionalismo and established 25 new regions to replace the 12 regions disbanded by Fujimori. However, after Toledo’s Perú Posible party witnessed electoral failure at the regional level in 2002, Toledo began to backpedal on his promises of regionalization and diverted funds from the region to the local level (Dickovick: 2007). For the rest of his
term, Toledo did not attempt to champion the strengthening of regional governments. In fact, he used the Consejo Nacional de la Decentralización (National Decentralization Commission) to fight devolution to the regions, while strengthening local level municipalities with fiscal transfers. This commission created a structure that was highly unfavorable for regional governments (Dickovick: 2007, 11). In other words, Toledo ignored the needs of regional government due to a lack of electoral strength at that level, and redirected funding to local governments, where his party was more successful. This supports O’Neill’s hypothesis that decentralization is more likely when a party’s national electoral power is weak and their subnational bases (whether regional or local) is relatively higher (2005).

Where does that leave Peru today? Crabtree posits that, “Peru remains a country where the ‘democratic deficit’ is marked and most political parties are little more than personalist groupings with scant institutional life except at times of elections” (2010, 359). With electoral support as the primary reason for decentralization from the top-down, it is no surprise that ethnic inclusion is not prioritized in decentralization processes as it is in other Andean countries. In short, institutional development from the bottom-up is not sufficient. In fact, Peru ranked lowest on the league table of institutionalization (Mainwaring & Scully: 1995, 17). Without institutions, indigenous populations are incapacitated at every level of government, making civic participation of any kind – whether through voting, electoral representation, or social mobilization – impossible. According to a UNDP survey in 2004, Peru is a country where “poverty is widespread, inequalities deep and entrenched, corruption abundant, justice inaccessible to most
people, the ability to defend rights lacking, and the institutional mechanisms through which to express ‘voice’, largely absent” (UNDP: 2006).

In present-day, Peru is divided into 25 regions, 195 provincial municipalities, and finally, 1,838 district municipalities. For an example of this breakdown, see Appendix 1 for a regional map and Appendix 2 for a breakdown of the Cusco region. Peru is the only country in Latin America that has a two-tier municipal organization. In regard to socio economic development, Peru has a poverty rate of 27.8 percent, with a GDP of $176.9 billion, and a Gini coefficient of 58.2 (World Bank: 2013).

Analysis: Peru, Governance, and Indigeneity

Governments are the only entity that can authoritatively allocate values and make decisions on behalf of all people. For this reason, understanding governance structures is incredibly important for understanding the needs of the people, particularly those suffering from centuries of marginalization. Governance and participation in Latin America are generally characterized by high levels of inequality, low levels of inclusiveness, and a tradition of centralization and authoritarian rule, which have been strongly conditioned by historical factors. In addition, the review of the literature has demonstrated three key characteristics about Peru’s governance structures and the relationship between local and regional participatory schemes.

First, Peru’s governance structures are characterized by a top-down approach. As a highly centralized country, it is no surprise that the national government has strongly
directed how decentralization is legislated and implemented. As such, decentralization has been pursued as a means of electoral power, rather than as a means of true participation at the local, regional, and national levels. Andersson et al. (2009) focus on the ways in which top-down decentralization affects governance arrangements for rural development at the local level by analyzing different national policy contexts. They add to literature regarding the interaction of governing and influencing actors by stating that the ultimate interaction outcome is based on “the preferences and role of other policy actors as determined by specific socioeconomic context, and the dynamics of the existing local institutional arrangements” (4). In municipalities with more inclusive, participatory processes for decision making, more effective services and goods are delivered. Not only must we take into account the institutional spaces, but also contexts unique to each space as well as the historical and cultural dynamics interacting within this space. The institutional, top-down approach also has prevented the proper redistribution of fiscal resources from the national to subnational levels. Alongside this, governance structures at the local and regional level are not capable of collecting revenues autonomously.

Second, participatory schemes and governance are more successful in highly urbanized areas. I do not intend to discredit Peruvian governance structures as a whole, as there has been success at the municipal level in urban regions. However, the problem remains that this success is not transferred to the rural regions of the country, which is also where the majority of indigenous populations reside (World Bank: 2005) (see table 1). Thus, rural municipalities lack financial and human resources to effectively operate a comprehensive range of services.
Third, there is a severe disconnect between the local and regional governance structures, especially in rural areas. A lack of interaction between the local and regional levels will undoubtedly affect the propensity for indigenous social movements as a national scale. Conversely, if there is a strong governance structure where interaction is encouraged at each level (from the local to regional to national), civil society and social mobilization will be able to more easily access political and social opportunities, theoretically strengthening movement success. In other words, indigenous social movements would have the institutional capabilities to carry their message and implement change by following this structure. Crabtree (2010) supports this assumption, explaining that institutional access would allow these organizations to have a national impact, rather than acting in isolation. He notes that existing social movements lacked the sort of institutional access to the state that parties could provide, but don’t (2010, 376). Peru’s experience has failed to bind together individual communities of interest around a wider campaign for indigenous rights.

It can be argued that these three characteristics contribute to a weaker propensity for indigenous collective action on a large-scale and a weaker civil society in general. Even the Peruvian government has commented that present legislation has been inadequate for promoting a higher level of citizen participation (United Nations: 2005, 8). This supports the argument that differences in inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scene.

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8 This theory will be argued in more detail in the following chapter.
Conclusion

Much of what scholars know about governance structures today is based on a nuanced understanding of the impact of historical specificities on contemporary governance structures in this region. The public sector of Peru, which includes inter-organizational governance structures, is a consequence of not only colonial legacies, but periods of authoritarianism, a reversal of democratic consolidation, and the impact of early foreign assistance programs. As such, Peru’s governance structure is characterized by a top-down, centralized approach, an urban/rural divide, and a disconnect between the local and regional levels. This chapter has proposed the argument that Peru’s lack of large-scale indigenous social movement organizations is due to a weak relationship between local and regional level governance structures in the state.

Reviewing the existing literature from an interdisciplinary perspective has contextualized the role of governance and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes. Crabtree strongly states, “Peru remains hobbled in its institutional development by a colonial heritage of profound inequalities broken neither during the Independence period nor since” (2010, 361). Although this statement may seem negative at first, it indicates the importance of institutional development in the Peruvian context. While it is still too early to tell whether decentralization has truly solidified democratic consolidation, it proposes the question of how these governance processes – especially at the transitional space between the local and regional level – affect collective action propensities for indigenous populations. The following chapter
will go into further detail about the relationship between inter-organizational governance structures and indigenous social movements in Peru, situating this relationship within existing theoretical framework elucidated upon earlier in the thesis. In conclusion, there is no single path or pattern of power relations that explains governance regimes in Peru. With a better understanding of the cyclical nature of the relationship between governance and indigenous populations, we can begin to develop a more holistic understanding of how these processes affect the propensity of indigenous social mobilization in Peru.
Chapter 4: From Ayllus to Authoritarianism and Beyond: Analyzing Governance Structures to Bridge the Gap between Theoretical Junctures

Introduction

This thesis has ushered us through the many different - and sometimes divergent – theoretical discourses that attempt to explain the absence of a large-scale indigenous social movement in Peru, in contrast to its Andean counterparts. The previous chapter illustrated the concept of governance structures and Peru’s unique historical trajectory in relation to the role of local level politics and how citizen participation at this level may or may not ascend to higher levels of government. How then, do governance structures and participatory schemes relate to the previous theories explicated earlier in the thesis?

This chapter elaborates on the central hypothesis of the thesis by explaining how governance structures and participatory schemes serve as the missing piece of the puzzle in explaining Peru’s indigenous exceptionalism. This chapter makes the case for how and why the relationship between indigenous populations and governance is the common denominator of the existing theories associated with the absence of indigenous mobilization in Peru. I will situate my argument within existing theories related to colonial legacies and the indigenous “Other”, historical violence associated with Sendero Luminoso, and social movement dynamics to explain Peru’s lack of large-scale indigenous social movements.
This chapter attempts to synthesize existing explanations through a critical review of the literature in order to suggest an underlying relationship that allows us to better understand the connection between existing theories. I argue that a difference in inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. The ascendance of participation from the local to regional level of government is more difficult in Peru due to the methods in which governmental consolidation was implemented historically. I argue that these reasons bring together the frequently used theories proposed by scholars to answer the question of Peru’s exceptionalism.

As visualized by in Appendix 1, subnational governance structures are the underlying variable that synthesizes other explanations for Peru's exceptionalism. Addressing the problem through a lens of subnational governance allows us to holistically analyze and understand the complexity of questioning the absence of a large-scale indigenous social movement in the country. Following the illustrations of the graph, this chapter will be divided into three sections that will elucidate my propositions and arguments for the relationship between governance and each of the three variables associated with it. The first section will explain how colonial legacies and the action of "othering" indigenous identities shaped the way subnational governance was implemented, and likewise, how these subnational governance structures reinforced colonial legacies and othering far after colonialism ended. The second section will explain the intricate relationship and timing of the rise of Sendero Luminoso and
processes of political decentralization, and how these processes affected the stability of subnational governance before and after the violence had ended. Finally, the third section will explain how social movement dynamics have affected and been affected by governance in Peru. The key notion to consider in this chapter is the mutually reinforcing and symbiotic nature of these relationships.

Governance, Legacies of Colonialism, and "Othering" identities

The past has a way of manifesting itself in the present, and chapter one described these processes in the case of indigenous social movements in Peru, elucidating the connections between legacies of colonialism, the “othering” of indigenous peoples, and the propensity for large-scale indigenous collective action. Literature analyzing ethnic identity and legacies of colonialism as a causal factor to explain Peru’s exceptionalism tends to ignore how these variables are manifested in the present-day. Dietz (1992) argues that Peru is one of the most heterogeneous countries in the region, which is the basis of its profound ethnic and cultural cleavages throughout its history. Of course the process of shaping and reshaping indigenous “identities” during colonialism and modern Peru’s history is relevant, but it is important to recognize that these variables are not only conceptual and intangible in nature; they are also apparent in tangible, real-world functions. Legacies of colonialism and indigenous “othering” processes are noticeable in nearly every realm of society in everyday life.. These variables have infiltrated into daily courses of action, whether it be political legislation, development projects, or just basic interactions in a public space. This section will demonstrate how the conceptual ideas
based on “othering” identities and legacies of colonialism are very realistically incorporated into and characteristic of governance structures, which in turn affects participatory possibilities. Legacies of colonialism irrevocably changed the way in which Peruvian governance structures first emerged, how they relate to citizens today, and how these structures reinforce processes of “othering” both implicitly and explicitly.

To begin untangling these relationships, we must go back to 1542, with the establishment of the Spanish Viceroyalty in Lima. As a colonial administrative district, the Viceroyalty was responsible for conducting Spanish colonization and administration, and was one of only two Viceroyalties in South America at the time. Highly centralized, the Viceroyalty was divided into audiencias, which were further divided into gobernaciones, and finally districts that allowed it to use the layering of local governments to strengthen its central power. The vertical political organization of the Viceroyalty is a pattern that persists in Peru today, mirroring the modern organization of regions, provinces, and districts (Mabry: 2002). Lima still exists as the epicenter of Peruvian national politics, and likewise, mirrors the centralized governing structure of the Viceroyalty. Similar to the parallels of governance between the colonial and modern period, marginalization and ethnic cleavages of today resemble those of the past.

Even after independence, indigenous populations were denied participation in the nation-building process. As mentioned in other chapters, newly independent Peru maintained the exclusionary nature of colonial politics that has steered the process of governing the country since. These processes have established a living legacy of colonialism in society, where a rearticulation of colonial power has been integrated into
modern institutions, in what Quijano calls the ‘coloniality of power’ (2000). From the
onset, governing was not seen as a participatory process, but one of exclusion. Unlike
Bolivia in 1952, Peru did not engage in a revolution that challenged such historical
trajectories. Quijano advances the argument by stating, "En este sentido, el proceso de
independencia de los Estados en América Latina sin la descolonización de la sociedad no
pudo ser, no fue, un proceso hacia el desarrollo de los Estados-nación modernos, sino una
rearticulación de la colonialidad del poder sobre nuevas bases institucionales." (2000:
236). Historically marginalized populations in colonial society are the same marginalized
populations in Peru still today due to the continually manifested nature of neocolonial
tendencies. These tendencies not only reveal themselves in society, but in modern
governance as well.

Identity politics in governance as a whole is very multifaceted in Latin America,
and while this thesis addresses the question of indigenous social mobilization at the
national level, it is the local level that must be emphasized. While it is no surprise that
indigenous populations are still on the periphery regarding national politics, it is what is
occurring at the local level that is of interest. The basic premise of this thesis is that local
level indigenous participation cannot ascend to higher levels of participation, whether at
the regional or national level. The interstice of governance and participation between the
local and regional levels has not been conducive to indigenous participation. The
argument of this section, then, is that the processes of decentralization and governance
have been implemented in a way that contributes to the exclusion of certain groups of
society, namely, indigenous populations.
Cameron (2010) analyzes the relationship between indigenous groups and democratization in rural municipal governments in the Andes, and notes “the rural Andes are the site of both some of the most interesting experiments in municipal democracy and also some of the most exclusionary, elite dominated systems of local government in Latin America” (2). Therefore, there is no generalizable way to categorize or characterize local government as it includes or excludes indigenous populations. In a recent survey analyzing the salience of ethnic identity collected throughout Peru, indigenous populations responded with general feelings of seeing themselves as powerless, with the exception of local government (Paredes: 2007). It is easier for ethnic minorities to access participatory schemes at the local level, rather than other levels of government. Hale (1997) argues that the role of decentralization and multifaceted political activity (governance) is the strongest argument for the potential of identity politics in the region. He posits that historically marginalized groups in society can become resources in a “third space” of political activity, moving beyond the traditional subjugator/subjugated relationship (581). However, the capability of the groups to take advantage of political opportunities that emerge is contestable.

While local level governance structures can be an impetus for indigenous social mobilization, it can also hinder these actions if the development of local government reinforces colonial legacies and concepts that “other” minorities. Cameron (2010) argues that local spaces are key nodes within broader social movements in the Andes, providing these populations with movement support, opportunities to develop administrative experience, and avenues for experimenting with alternative political systems. However,
he also notes that there is no generalizable path or pattern of power relations regarding municipalization in the Andes as it is highly dependent on contextual factors of geography, socioeconomic characteristics, and politics. For example, some municipalities use regulations to justify undemocratic policies or ignore regulations altogether, while others deepen democracy by incorporating civil society involvement without formal regulation mandating it.

Looking at legislative framework that creates new institutions for citizen participation, it is easy to see how the indigenous “other” can be excluded. More specifically, while legislative framework does address the rights of indigenous populations in Peru, the implementation and regulation of these frameworks is not followed through accordingly. Salgado (2006) points out three different territorial spaces for participation and consensus-building between local and regional spaces in Peru, illustrating their challenges. These frameworks were included in Peru’s 2002 Framework Decentralization Law and Organic Law of Regional Governments, though not elaborated upon specifically. First, Mesas de Concertación de la Lucha Contra la Pobreza (MCLPs) seek to reach consensus solutions between the state and civil society regarding anti-poverty strategies. Consejos de Coordinación Regionales y Locales (CCRLs) serve as a tool for regional governments to reach agreements on regional and local development plans and financial processes. Finally, the 2003 Framework Law for Participatory Budgeting sought to implement participatory budgeting in municipalities to strengthen fiscal resources (Salgado: 2006, 55).
However, Salgado explains the many problems associated with these participatory projects. For example, MCLPs have mixed results in many regions of Peru due to lack of consensus-building outcomes, while CCRLs only meet twice a year and agreements are not binding. Finally, there is a lack of linkage between district, province, and regions, preventing plans from being brought together on multi-levels of government (Salgado: 2006, 58). Most importantly, many of these projects are built in a way that excludes indigenous participation. These workings, alongside other aspects of decentralization, raise deeper issues about relations between representative and participative democracy and between politics and society.

In sum, the relationship between colonial legacies, the indigenous “Other”, and governance structures must be examined in greater detail to understand why there is an absence of national-scale indigenous social movements in the country. Of course, legacies of colonialism and the ethnic fluidity and fragmentation due to centuries of ‘othering’ processes contribute to this absence on a conceptual level. But these factors also contribute to the absence of large-scale indigenous mobilization in Peru on a very real-life level as well, through governance structures that tend to reinforce the notion of the indigenous as an “other” not quite “us”.

The before and after: Governance and Sendero Luminoso
Like legacies of colonialism, governance structures in the present are also intricately related to the rise of Sendero Luminoso. The timing of Sendero Luminoso during the 1980s and 1990s coincide with a change in decentralization processes, affecting the stability of subnational governance before and after the violence had ended. Looking at the historical timing of unrest, violence, and attempted decentralization indicates that weak institutions led to the rise of Sendero Luminoso, which subsequently broke down previous attempts at decentralization and ushered in a period of centralized, authoritarian government under Fujimori. The aftermath is one where Peru’s government could not begin to re-democratize and decentralize until 2000. This is unique compared to the experiences in Bolivia, which had democratized and decentralized decades before Peru. In fact, Peru was the first country to transition to democracy from authoritarian rule in Latin America, as well as the first to abandon the transition to democracy during the 1990s (Cameron: 1994, 3).

Between 1969 and the mid-1970s, General Juan Velasco Alvarado initiated sweeping agrarian reforms that were opposed by rural peasants who were excluded from land redistribution\(^9\). It was this dissatisfaction among peasants that was so ruthlessly exploited by Sendero Luminoso. As Kay (2001) argues, “Peru is a tragic illustration of an agrarian reform policy which, while solving some problems, also opened the way for new grievances and conflicts in the countryside, thereby leading to the emergence of the Sendero Luminoso guerilla movement” (749). As mentioned in greater detail in chapter three, Peru began the process of democratization and decentralization (which go hand in

\(^9\) For more information on Velasco and agrarian reforms, see chapter 2.
hand) in 1980, when regions were first established. By 1984, a new municipal code was promulgated, and President Alan García initiated decentralization as a way to build up subnational power. He established twelve regions in Peru to create alternative electoral power that he was rapidly losing at the national level. Unfortunately, these regions were hastily created, not provided resources to become stable subnational governance structures, and were heavily dependent on the central government. When the Peruvian state violently responded to Sendero Luminoso’s guerrilla warfare, the democratization and decentralization process virtually stopped. Kay (2001) points toward the weakness of institutions to explain why Sendero Luminoso was initially so successful in their campaign.

Sendero’s eventual defeat was also due to the State’s ruthlessness to dispel Sendero Luminoso through anti-democratic actions. Fujimori’s 1990 election brought an open breach of the constitution, restrictions on rule of law, and authoritarian-like power focused around the central government. In addition, Fujimori disbanded the regions established by García in 1992 to weaken his opponents’ electoral base and replaced them with government-designated appointees. Instead, he attempted to promote municipalization at the local level to increase state presence in rural areas as a tactic to fight against Sendero Luminoso. Again, this decentralization process never actually was implemented on the ground. Thus, the 1990s was characterized by weak institutions at subnational levels of governance, little capacity in local government, lack of trust by the people, and fear of any mobilizing organization. Thorp et al. (2006) explain Peru’s environment as one of critical tension at this time: “enough organization to resist the
mobilization, but not enough to manage effective change to right injustice, given the incoherence of local and national institutional structures” (471).

It is at the intersection between the guerilla warfare of Sendero Luminoso and Peru’s attempt to decentralize that we see how the propensity for indigenous collective action at the national level can hindered in two ways. First, the institutionalization of governance structures in Peru is still quite limited due to its recent implementation. What progress was made in the 1980s to democratize and decentralize was subsequently subdued by the violence carried out against indigenous populations by both the Peruvian military and Sendero Luminoso. The democratic consolidation process in Peru at this time can be looked at as nothing but “rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic” (Dietz: 1992: 255). The timing of these events makes Peru unique in the Andes, because true democratization and decentralization was not attempted until much later in Peru. Slater (1998) troubles the idea of whether a social movement is a break from or a continuation of the political, whether it is a reflection of civil society or abandonment of the state. He argues that democratization and decentralization help to create new associations that struggle against centralism and create new forms of spatial subjectivity and identity (1998).

It is this spatiality that I am arguing is crucial to understand in order to reconcile Peru’s exceptionalism in the context of indigenous social movement absence. For example, indigenous challenges to the centralized nature of the state in Bolivia generated a legislative response in the form of the Law on Popular Participation. But in Peru, mobilization sought to establish regional levels of territorial power, which was
implemented but ultimately undermined by the violence triggered with the rise of Sendero Luminoso. Slater explains it well by saying that “the framing of time, and the ordering of space, followed an externally imposed logic, the effects of which still resonate in the postcolonial period. The struggles to recover an autochthonous narrative of time and an indigenous ensemble of meanings for the territory of the nation have formed an essential part of post-independence politics” (1998: 391). In Peru, the timing of decentralization and democratization attempts (through the creation of regional levels of governance) was undermined by the simultaneous rise of Sendero Luminoso. In this sense, the institutional order of the state was shifted in a way that made the indigenous struggle to gain power in the space between the local and regional level quite difficult. Thus, new forms of spatial subjectivity emerged between the local and regional levels that resisted indigenous attempts to challenge the territoriality of the State.

Secondly, the manipulation of “ethnicity” during the violence of the 1980s has negatively affected the propensity of large-scale indigenous social mobilization in Peru. Although ethnicity was not instrumentalized as a central process of this violence, it was nevertheless a prominent feature. Not only were rural populations – consisting mostly of indigenous ethnicities – enlisted in the violence, but ethnicity in itself was sufficient grounds for suspicion by the State. Indigenous populations were more likely to be considered collectively as a potential subversive or threat during the conflict (Thorp et al: 2006). The notion of ethnicity being used by both the State and Sendero Luminoso is also supported by Cadena (1998), who argues that Diaz Martínez, one of founding leaders of
Sendero Luminoso, used geographically determined culture and differences in the ethnicities of urban and rural divides to spur the inception of Sendero Luminoso violence.

Furthermore, Theidon (2003) illustrates how the aftermath of war serves as a motivator for the reflection of history and social memory. The aftermath of violence in Peru caused many victims (of whom the majority were indigenous) to ‘re-create’ themselves using the intersubjectivity of memory. As she explains, “forgetting can consist of remembering something else – of replacing a history of humiliating and racist treatment at the hands of the hacendados with another history that erases this ethnic stigma” (2006: 79). Therefore, not only did the violence between the Peruvian state and Sendero Luminoso break down democratic processes such as decentralization, it also positioned ethnicity in a way that caused indigenous populations to be a target in society. A partial response to this targeting is one that sheds ethnic identity and adopts a new one. Ethnicity is no longer salient. This is not meant to imply a de-ethnicization or de-indianization, necessarily. Rather, class-based issues have become prioritized over ethnic-based issues in Peru. Whereas other Andean countries have witnessed the opposite (Kauffman: 2008, Roitman: 2009), Peru’s indigenous populations continue to see class as more salient than ethnicity.

In sum, no other country in Latin America has experienced the level of economic decline, political violence, or growth of the informal sector as Peru witnessed in the 1980s. If we are to believe that decentralization has the potential to offer indigenous

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10 Between 1980 and 2000, political violence caused over 69,000 deaths; 75% of these were indigenous peoples (Corntassel and Holder: 2008).
groups more participation and opportunities for mobilization (Fox & Aranda: 1998, Postero & Zamosc: 2006), then it is the very absence of decentralization in Peru’s modern history due to Sendero Luminoso’s uprising and subsequent State’s repression that has limited the propensity for indigenous mobilization for so long. Coupled with a reduction in ethnic salience, the relationship between governance structures and historical violence contributes to Peru’s indigenous exceptionalism.

Organizational Dynamics and Governance

Understanding the mutually reinforcing nature of the relationship between organizational dynamics and governances provides the final piece of the puzzle explaining Peru’s mobilizing exceptionalism. This section will explain how social movement dynamics in themselves have affected and has been affected by governance in Peru, following the model put forth by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008). Explaining the relationship between social movement emergence and continuity as related to local level governance helps us to explain the inner workings of the movements themselves and the extent to which movements affect and are affected by governance structures.

In an effort to advance the traditional political opportunities model that is saturated in social movement theories, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008) provide an alternative approach that addresses multi-institutional politics and multiple sources of power. Whereas the political process perspective sees power centered on the state and organized around the formal political arena, the multi-institutional politics approach sees power centered on the state, as well as other institutions and culture. In addition, this
approach is organized around the formal political arena as well as how power is manifested in other institutions. The multi-institutional politics approach allows us to better understand the interaction between movement actors and the dominant culture, state, and institutions that maintain power in a culturally cognizant context. Most importantly, this approach helps to make sense of ‘internal contradictions within movements’, as noted by Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 86), where oppression may be distributed through multiple institutions, making the identification of which battles to fight difficult for movement actors because they are challenged by a number of institutions simultaneously.

In terms of governance structures (and the institutions that these structures are comprised of), Muñoz et al. (2007) find collective action more difficult in fragile institutional systems. Organization and cooperation on the community level as well as the ability to move to the next stage are key issues impeding collective action. A complex political climate and unstable institutional context makes it difficult for social movements to emerge and grow. Muñoz et al. (2007) argue, “Community level action needs to interact with an intermediate level to achieve change successfully. If the intermediate level is controlled by political parties that are fragmented, corrupt, and prone to personalism and favoritism, then the connections go sour and transcommunal structures are difficult to build” (2007, 1940). As such, it is clear that Peru’s notoriety with weak political parties and regional level governance impedes organizations’ ability to engage in collective action outside of the local level. In addition, weak decentralization has done little historically to create spaces of participation outside of this level.
Although much of the literature on indigenous social movements focus on the lack of rural development as a reason for why these movements emerge, little focus has been paid to the reverse; or how local development can cause – or fail to cause movements to emerge and grow. Bebbington et al. (2006) explain how processes of decentralization have encouraged a range of rural social programs that offer levels of formal participation and which has given local organizations an increased role in rural development. Importantly, they hypothesize that “relative openness of the ties cultivated by movements and reflected in their governance structures is also critical in determining outcomes and can serve as a counterweight to the strength of elites” (2006, p. 25). In Peru’s context, weak local governance structures do not provide the support necessary for local movements to a) counterweight the strength of elites, or b) transcend beyond the local level. Thus, governance structures contribute to why large-scale movements do not emerge in Peru.

Taylor (2011) uses a case study in San Marcos, Peru which analyzed the internal organizational dynamics of a social movement protesting mining in the area. He found that, while decentralization processes aimed to bring the government closer to the people of Peru, the formation of regional governments since 2002 has fragmented decision-making processes. Secondly, the state is no longer considered as monolithic and daunting as it did in the previous decade. According to Taylor, this creates “an opportunity for social movements to take advantage of contradictions and navigate between different layers and institutions inside the state apparatus” (2011: 438). His statement is interesting because it takes the disjointed nature of Peruvian subnational politics and makes it
positive for social movement emergence and success. However, he does posit that these opportunities to maneuver between jurisdictions are only possible for those individuals who can have access and take advantage of these opportunities.

Similarly, Chartock (2011) argues that indigenous social movements in Peru are so weak due to the ambiguity in the law, specifically in regard to how indigenous participation should be incorporated into the implementation process. Secondly, Peru’s movements have difficulty “filtering up through the organizational infrastructure” (318) due to a lack of presence at the national level. In essence, existing movements are not provided the access or opportunities to reach the national level due to weak state capacity. Peru’s weak state capacity is partially due to the breakdown of democratization and decentralization during the violence between the State and Sendero Luminoso in the 1980s and early 1990s.

However, it is important to note that the absence of national indigenous social movements in Peru does not mean that indigenous populations do not mobilize at all. In fact, there are many examples of localized, small-scale organizing, particularly in the Amazon. The following subsection will briefly examine recent organizational attempts.

Recent Organizational Attempts in Peru

With the election of Alejandro Toledo in 2001 came a number of newly-founded indigenous organizations, led by political officials of the State. Toledo’s wife, Elaine Karp, created the National Commission on Andean, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (CONAPA) in 2001, which was intended to signify the potential for indigenous advancement on a state level. However, many Indians began to detract from these
organizational efforts, claiming the organization did not serve who it intended to serve (Greene: 2005). Public scandals and bureaucratic inefficiency began to delegitimize the authority of the organization, such as Karp’s decision to accept privately-funded research projects that made indigenous members of CONAPA question its motives. In the end, local and regional level indigenous organizations publicly declared their refusal to participate in a national indigenous organization led by cronies of the dominant elite.

More historically-grounded institutions, such as the Permanent Conference on Peru’s Indigenous Peoples (COPPIP), established in 1997, and the Interethnic Development Association of the Peruvian Rainforest (AIDESEP), established in 1980, continued to support the push for a large-scale indigenous organization that would continue to demand constitutional reform. As Greene mentions in his article in what he calls a "clear concessionary gesture" (2005, 35), Toledo attempted to improve his approval ratings among indigenous populations (which were in the single digits) by creating the Development Institute for Andean, Indigenous, Amazonian, and Afro-Peruvian Peoples (INDEPA) in 2004, which ended up being fraught with problems of its own. Since then, INDEPA has been incorporated into the Ministry of Culture, which calls to question whether the organization still maintains a true indigenous interest.

This highlights the unique positionality of organizational dynamics in relation to governance. As mentioned in chapter 3, much of Peru’s experience with decentralization and giving more power and autonomy to subnational governments has been to increase electoral power in these spaces. Toledo's attempt to increase his electoral approval rating with indigenous populations by creating an "indigenous" organization not only shows the
relationship between governance and organizational dynamics, but also helps to explain why indigenous populations may lack faith in institutions that "promote indigenous causes". In essence, Toledo's infiltration into indigenous organizational dynamics weakened the capacity of indigenous populations to establish stable or viable organizations.

There are a number of regional organizations that have sought to unify indigenous populations in Peru in the past, but none have yet gained enough ground to be recognized on a national – or international – scale. While AIDESEP claims status as a “national” organization, their national representativeness is questionable. Deborah Poole (2010) argues that the 1997 creation of the National Confederation of Communities Affected by Mining (CONACAMI) has played an important role in revitalizing indigenous resistance in the Andean regions by incorporating the defense of indigenous rights and political participation into their organizational objectives. CONACAMI’s structure is supra-communal, representing 16 of the 24 departments in Peru, as well as the 3,000 individual communities that experience the negative effects of the neoliberal development of extractive industries. In a sense, CONACAMI does seem to operate as a unified, national-level organization because it extends into over 66% of Peru’s departments and collaborates with regional organizations. However, CONACAMI organizes under the basis of environmental protection, not ethnic identity. As stated on their website, they seek to create economic, social, and environmental justice as pueblos with collective rights confront the abuses of transnational companies, extractive economic activities, and national and global politics (CONACAMI: 2011).
The Peruvian Amazon has seen considerably more action involved with indigenous resistance in contrast to the Peruvian highlands. In 2008 and 2009, indigenous populations in the Peruvian Amazon organized to oppose President García’s decrees that opened up the region to private investment. For example, Decree LD No. 1090 alone would have re-designated 45 million hectares of protected forestry for agricultural use (Hughes: 2010). AIDESEP – representing over 350,000 indigenous Amazonians in Peru – spearheaded the opposition to the government’s latest attempt to restructure indigenous resource rights, in what became an intensely violent conflict. Although estimates vary, approximately 50 people died from what is now known as the Devil’s Curve and Bagua massacres (Rénique: 2009). While insurgency in the Amazon is long-standing, Rénique notes that the scope of this conflict was unprecedented, as was the response by the García government.

Negotiations between the government and AIDESEP followed, but were quickly halted when INDEPA was invited to the talks. AIDESEP claimed that the invitation to INDEPA was nothing but a “smokescreen”, although they continued negotiations with Congress which eventually led to the termination of two of the presidential decrees, including LD No. 1090 (Rénique: 2009).

This conflict was considered to be a huge success for indigenous populations in the Amazon for three key reasons. First, AIDESEP gained widespread support from non-indigenous Peruvians as well as international stakeholders, increasing public awareness about the dangers of neoliberal economic policies. Second, it proved that the defense of natural resources was a national issue for all Peruvians, rather than just an indigenous
problem. Finally, it generated a political shift among key governmental officials. Both the Prime Minister and the Minister for Women’s Affairs and Social Development resigned shortly after the crisis, citing their failure to handle the situation peacefully (Hughes: 2010). The AIDESEP organization utilizes rich repertoires of action, including demonstrations, strikes, violent occupations, blockades, as well as legal challenges with the government. Why these repertoires are not diffused to other parts of the country is an important key research question that must be considered. It is also important to keep in mind that this mobilization was historically unprecedented, as was the government’s reaction.

Why do Peru’s indigenous populations in the Amazon seem to have more propensity for collective action than those in the highlands? Martí (2010) claims that it is due to the ability for Amazonian tribes to gain more media attention, attracting transnational organizations which, in turn, create networks and opportunities for resources. Indigenous populations in the highlands have difficulty materializing their demands in the political arena. As stated by Martí, “the difficulty that they have had in creating a space for representation in their countries reveals a lack of responsiveness on the part of national authorities with regard to the issue of indigenous rights” (2010: 86)

In essence, many of these organizations follow the top-down rhetoric of Peru's political culture, eliminating and in the very least, discouraging, local, grassroots-level initiatives. Interestingly, Greene (2005) argues that Toledo's actions hint at the potential of increasing unification, and says, "Where exactly the steady globalization of Peru's indigenous movement will lead is to be determined as much by the force of global
indigenismo as by Peru's internal region-to-region and president-to-president dynamics" (39). With 8 years to reflect on Greene's predictions, we can say that the potential of increasing unification has not come to pass, and the dynamics of which he spoke are still contentiously limiting the propensity for national-level indigenous social mobilization.

In conclusion, this chapter has made the case for how and why the relationship between indigenous populations and governance is the common denominator of the existing theories associated with the absence of indigenous mobilization in Peru. By synthesizing existing theoretical explanations through the lens of governance structures and participation, we can better understand the intricate connection between seemingly different theories. Differences in inter-organizational governance structures and the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. As such, the relationship between governance structures and legacies of colonialism, violence during the conflict with Sendero Luminoso, and social movement dynamics mutually reinforce an environment that prevents the mass mobilization of indigenous populations at a national scale, making them the exception in the Andes. Addressing issues of colonial legacies of “othering” identities, historical violence, or social movement dynamics alone will not change Peru’s exceptionalism in this regard. What is needed is a holistic approach to address the deficits in their governance structures both politically and socially. As stated by Mario Palacios, president of CONACAMI (2008-2010):

We are effectively excluded from social, political, and economic participation because the state is dominated by criollos who are, in fact, a
minority in the country. So the indigenísta movement has put forward the needs to reinvent another form of the state and a new model of democracy – a democracy that is no longer just representative…So we need a different democracy, and the form of democracy that we propose from within the indigenous movements is communitarian; it is a participatory democracy of *manda obedeciendo*\(^{11}\) (Poole, 2010: 32).

**Conclusion**

It is often argued that Peru’s indigenous movement shouldn’t be seen as a failure, because the frameworks used by scholars do not accurately describe the complexity of indigenous politics (García and Lucero: 2006). Yet, simply saying that scholarly discourse and inaccurate theoretical arguments fail to properly address this complexity doesn’t actually advance our understanding of a very real issue. Looking at the absence of large-scale indigenous social movements in the perspective of governance structures allow us to gain an understanding of what this issue looks like *on the ground*, so to speak, so that solutions and future research can be identified that will benefit the lives of indigenous populations in Peru and ensure that they have access to participate in the structures that govern them. The link between social mobilization and successful participatory governance cannot be denied.

\(^{11}\) Zapatista phrase signifying “lead by obeying” (Tacho: 2007).
Conclusions: Where We Go From Here

As mentioned in the introduction of the thesis, the rise of social movements has much to do with imagining citizenship, forging new relations of power, and constructing identities that are integral to the dynamics of society. This thesis has attempted to examine the complex reasons why indigenous social movements in Peru show a different historical trajectory than that of its counterparts in other Andean countries. More specifically, it has set out to synthesize existing theories that address why Peru’s indigenous social movements have not witnessed a large-scale, national social movement. In this conclusion, I will briefly summarize the thesis, explain its relevance to the topic at hand, and provide direction for future research and public policy recommendations.

Brief Summary

Many theories exist across a variety of academic disciplines to explain the absence of indigenous social movements in Peru and scholars have dedicated much time pursuing this absence in order to better understand the role of indigenous populations in Latin America societies. Scholars put forth three frequent arguments to explain this absence: 1) Peruvian ethnic fluidity and fragmentation, 2) historical consequences of the violence associated with Sendero Luminoso, and 3) internal and external organizational dynamics of social movements in Peru.
The first chapter outlined the historical consequences of colonialism and internal colonialism and their impact on indigenous social mobilization in Peru. In order to understand the current positionality of modern indigenous populations, we must conceptualize the legacy of different forms of coloniality and the impact of the social-political violence associated with Sendero Luminoso. As shown in the analysis of theories associated with these variables, historical specificities do influence the propensity for indigenous collective action. Peru’s experiences with the legacy of colonial domination and Sendero Luminoso’s authoritarian millenarianism are unique in the sense that they created a unique trajectory for the country, distinguishing it from other countries in the region with similar backgrounds (i.e. Bolivia and Ecuador). Through the interpretations of scholars who look at these historical circumstances in determining why there is an absence of indigenous social movements in Peru, we find that gaps still exist in the literature that do not fully explain the absence of large-scale indigenous social mobilization.

The second chapter illustrated how social movement dynamics –both historical and modern – affect the emergence and/or success of indigenous social movements in the country. Much work has been done on examining small-scale and factionalized indigenous mobilizations in Peru, notably those occurring in the Amazon due to land rights as well as in parts of the highlands due to water rights. Once again, while theoretical arguments related to social movement dynamics do contribute to understanding Peru’s exceptionalism in regard to indigenous social mobilization,
analyzing the issue from this theoretical perspective alone does not provide a full
depiction of the realities of the situation.

In order to begin to bridge the gaps in existing literature, chapter three introduced
the concept of governance to the topic, explaining why it – as a factor related to
mobilization – must also be considered when theorizing why there is not a large-scale
indigenous movement organization in existence in Peru. This chapter contextualized
Peru’s governance structures, the role of subnational politics, and citizen participation to
better discern how movements may or may not ascend to higher levels of government. By
setting the focal point of the argument on subnational governance structures, we can link
the success of indigenous social movements to the historical formation of governance in
Peru.

Chapter four explained and elaborated upon the central hypothesis of the thesis by
explaining how the local governance variable is the missing piece of the puzzle, in a
sense. I have argued that a difference in inter-organizational governance structures and
the relationship between local and regional level participatory schemes account for why
Peru’s indigenous movements have not ascended to the national scale. The ascendance of
participation from the local to regional level of government is more difficult in Peru due
to the specific ways in which governmental consolidation was implemented historically. I
argue that these reasons bring together the frequently used theories proposed by scholars
to answer the question of Peru’s exceptionalism. Examining how and why government
was consolidated and separated, as well as centralized and decentralized, allows us gain
insight into how these relationships have influenced the propensity for large-scale indigenous movements.

This thesis makes the case for how the relationship between indigenous populations and local governance is the common denominator of all the existing theories associated with the absence of indigenous mobilization in Peru. My argument was substantiated by examining the relationship between local level governance and the three other explanations for the absence of indigenous mobilization: ethnicity, legacy of Sendero Luminoso, and social movement dynamics. Through a critical review of the literature, we have uncovered an underlying relationship that allows us to better understand the connection between existing theories.

Relevance: Why does it Matter?

From the literature, it is clear that multiple perspectives are taken into account related to Peru’s indigenous social movements, yet gaps in the literature still exist. It is difficult to narrow down what factors have actually contributed to the absence of indigenous social movements in the country, due to the divergent explanations abounding in these texts. Looking at ethnic fragmentation, the historical violence of Sendero Luminoso, or internal social movement dynamics alone does not offer a holistic understanding of Peruvian exceptionalism. Furthermore, rarely do existing pieces of literature address competing theories or attempt to synthesize related arguments. What scholars and practitioners alike are left with is a muddled and inconsistent blend of hypotheses, variables, and arguments that very rarely align with one another. Moreover,
existing literature rarely succinctly provides an accurate or accessible notion of why Peru’s indigenous social movements fail to mobilize on a national scale. If we leave the analysis where it is – that there are a number of different and competing theories to explain the absence of large-scale indigenous social movements in Peru– there is no real way to advance these theories into solutions, suggestions, or effective change.

Understanding the historical lack of large-scale indigenous movements in Peru is urgent in order to determine why these movements have not emerged in a manner similar to other Andean countries. Addressing these issues will help us to understand the relationships between indigenous existence, social mobilization, and policy development. I believe that there is a systematic and historical discrepancy between the social, economic, political, and cultural standing of indigenous Peruvians in Peruvian society. Furthermore, I believe that analyzing subnational governance structures and the way these organizations interact with one another historically sheds lights on these discrepancies. It is my hope that this thesis is able to amalgamate some of these seemingly contradictory theoretical arguments and more pithily explain the unique circumstances that make of Peru an exception in the Andes in regard to its indigenous social movements.

This thesis is also relevant because it helps us to look at Peru’s past in order to better understand its present. The unique way in which the country democratized, decentralized, and established a space at the subnational level for citizens to participate is key to understanding why some groups of citizens have developed civic participation differently. In other words, indigenous populations’ propensity to mobilize at a national
level is more difficult in Peru due to its institutional past. Attempts to democratize, decentralize, and expand power at a subnational level that has empowered indigenous populations in other countries has been mitigated in Peru due to the timing of radical reforms, historical violence, and polarizing political decisions. When we think about indigenous social movements in Peru, we must consider the role that subnational governance structures and participatory schemes play in its absence. We must also bear in mind that the discrepancy between a simple statement of “democratic structures” and true, participatory governance.

I argue that the space between local and regional level governance provides a quite weak participatory structure that contributes to the absence of large-scale indigenous social mobilization. If indigenous citizens cannot participate in local level politics and if their participation cannot transcend to higher levels of governmental organization, their propensity for large-scale social mobilization becomes incredibly difficult. Simply said, a lack of participatory governance structures make it impossible for indigenous populations to mobilize. What this thesis does is uncover underlying relationships that can be translated into policy recommendations, suggestions, and topics for future research.

Public Policy Recommendations

As a western scholar of indigenous studies in a non-western context, I am aware of my positionality and do not intend to provide policy recommendations blindly or in a
patronizing way. I realize that my insight into these topics is partially limited due to my own positionality; I want to emphasize my awareness of these circumstances.

Rather than provide an exhaustive list of recommendations, here are the three most pressing recommendations derived from the critical review of the literature:

- **Establish more inclusive institutional spaces at the local level.** Research shows that more inclusive participatory processes allow for a more effective provision of services and goods (Andersson et al. 2009, Fox & Aranda: 1998, Salgado: 2006). The development of robust institutions that manage cooperation and coordination at a local level encourages stakeholders with different interests to have a stake in the sustainability of local governance practices. Cameron (2010) argues that local spaces are key nodes within broader social movements in the Andes, providing indigenous populations with movement support, opportunities to develop administrative experience, and avenues for experimenting with alternative political systems.

Bolivia’s “Plan de Todos” campaign in 1993 outlined specific participatory initiatives to engage local populations and now serves as a best-practice method for decentralization in other countries. These initiatives include *organizaciones territoriales de base* (OTBs) and *municipios productivos* (Lindert & Verkoren: 2010); it is recommended that local institutions in Peru borrow these strategies that include a better distribution and administration of public funds, a restructuring of municipalities according to traditional ways of governing, and encouragement of popular participation. For example, OTBs stimulate
participation in local government by utilizing already existing neighborhood communities (Nijenhuis: 2010, 78). By going through the OTB registration process, these communities and organizations could obtain legal status and present demands to municipal council through participatory, bottom-up planning. When local citizens have political authority to organize and participate in their own govern structures, they are more likely to engage in democratic practices.

- *Strengthen regional spaces for participation, governance, and communication.*

The space between local and national level governance is rarely studied, researched, or mentioned in the literature. Yet, this is a critical space for indigenous social mobilization. Without the institutional mechanisms in place at this level, social movements, civic participation, and public policies cannot effectively ascend from the local level. The contribution of social movements to Latin American democracy can be found in the proliferation of the public sphere. Thus, extending the public sphere is crucial for the stability of democracy and inclusion of all segments of civil society. In Bolivia, indigenous challenges to the centralized nature of the state generated a legislative response in the form of the Law on Popular Participation. Peru should encourage investment capabilities at the regional level that target rural communities, prioritize education and invest in health initiatives. Furthermore, scholars should begin to focus on theoretical approaches that incorporate case studies on the regional-level to expand our understanding of complex socioeconomic, cultural, and political circumstances.
• Implement legislation that is specific, direct, and evaluative. Andersson et al. (2009) specifically state, “jurisdictional scope between the provincial and district level has not been clearly divided”. The district level has never been given the necessary tools to fulfill their duties as prescribed in the Constitution. While the Organic Law of 2002 provided – or listed, rather – participatory mechanisms, actual participation in rural areas is scarce. The ambiguity of the law and the lack of resources to promote transparency and accountability on the local level reduce potential for participation. In Peru, mobilization sought to establish regional levels of territorial power, which was implemented but ultimately undermined by the violence triggered with the rise of Sendero Luminoso (Slater: 1998). The differences in geopolitics as expressed in the institutional order of each state are clear. Forms of ownership, then, differ along these parameters. Legislation must be created that identifies specific needs of the people, specifically states the law, and evaluates the impact of the law once it is implemented. This includes enforcing existing legislation that is rarely enforced currently. Explicit mandates must be created that outline the provision of resources and technical assistance to and from municipalities and provinces in order to reduce the possibility of abuse of power at the local level.

The question remains as to why the Peruvian central government (or subnational governments) would be interested in pursuing the aforementioned policy recommendations. Many argue that strong, central governments do not freely give away power. However, there are two key reasons as to why we may expect central
governments to do so. First, a decentralization of power can be helpful electorally. As noted earlier in this thesis, the practice of decentralization was utilized by former presidents García, Fujimori, and Toledo to improve electoral support at subnational levels. Decentralizing power, which simultaneously has the capacity to improve access to public services, will create a subnational power base necessary for political parties at the national level.

Secondly, the implementation of the above recommendations benefits the development of the Peruvian state as a whole. The inclusion of marginalized populations supports the development of the populous, which in turn establishes a more stable civil society and nation.

**Considerations**

After the research was conducted and analyzed, it is clear now that the hypothesis of this thesis can work two different ways. First, the failure of Peruvian indigenous social movements at the national level can be due to the inadequate establishment of subnational governance structures (which would have otherwise empowered local, indigenous communities). This was the hypothesis of the paper. Or, we could argue that the inadequate establishment of subnational governance structures by central governments is due to the lack of national level indigenous mobilization in Peru. However, the evidence provided in this thesis suggests that the hypothesis may be more likely for one reason: historical junctures and timing of decentralization efforts. As mentioned in chapter four, the historical timing of Peru’s decentralization efforts and the
rise of indigenous movements in Latin America is significant. Bolivia began its decentralization efforts nearly 30 years *prior* to the rise of its national indigenous social movements in the first part of the decade. On the other hand, Peru’s attempts to decentralize (in the 1980s and again in the 1990s) were mitigated by external factors such as Sendero Luminoso and the Fujimori regime.

It is impossible to say that the lack of subnational governance structures is the causal mechanism that explains the absence of national-scale indigenous social movements in Peru. Too much emphasis on democratic institutions and not enough emphasis on social mobilization characteristics will be read as paternalistic and neo-colonial. This is not the intent of this thesis. Rather, it is important to recognize and better understand the inherent *correlation* between the rise of social movements and the implementation of subnational governance structures, particularly for marginalized populations. This relationship has much to do with assuaging social discontent and modifying social relations over the long-term.

Nevertheless, it is important to mention the caveat of Peru’s unique historical timing. Because decentralization occurred so late, it could now be the case that the lack of national level indigenous mobilization in Peru has failed to pressure the central government to prioritize decentralization efforts at the local level. Additional time and research is needed to better understand the historical timing of these variables.
Future Research

As noticeable throughout the thesis, much of the evidence that substantiates my hypothesis is based on secondary data. Future research necessarily includes acquiring primary data on governance structures, practices and expectations in rural areas. While much of the literature emphasizes urban areas, or the national-level, more work must be done on the regional level, particularly in rural spaces.

More specifically, more research should be done on the concept of the indigenous “ayllu”, or community in Quechua. These community organizations were a prime example of localized social mobilization and were used to organize indigenous populations for centuries. In Bolivia, the Law of Popular Participation recognizes these ayllus and has attempted to preserve these structures at the local level and incorporate them into the municipal organization of the state. More research should be conducted to determine how at what level indigenous ayllus are persevered in Peru. Similarly, the practice of “minga” or “ayni” – reciprocal community help and collective work – merits additional research. How these indigenous, communal practices have been preserved and incorporated into modern governance structures will help us draw better conclusions about the propensity for indigenous collective action in Peru.
Figure 1: Regional Map of Peru

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística e Informática
Figure 2: Example of Peruvian decentralization from regional to municipal level, Cusco

Source: Author
Figure 3: Merging Theoretical Paradigms

Source: Author
Table 1: Population of Peru, by ethnicity and domicile, 1972-2000 (percent)

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